1. Introduction

According to Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, “The fundamental question of Sung Neo-Confucians was an ethical one: how to get a moral individual! This quest led them into metaphysical speculation about the substance of the Tao and the cosmic ground for the inner nature of the individual.” Having the same problematik as the Song China Neo-Confucians, the Chosŏn Korea Neo-Confucians, however, in particular delved into human feelings (情) and tried to justify the origin of good feelings (善) within li-qi binary theory (理氣論, principle and material force). This was the beginning of the Four Seven Debate (四端七情論, sadan ch‘ijŏngnon). It also can be said to be the distinctively Korean development of Neo-Confucian li-qi theory.

Since Takahashi Tôru (1878–1967), in his 1929 article “The Development of the Li-principle Faction and the Qi-principle Faction in Chosŏn Confucian History,” regarded the Four Seven Debate as the hard core of Chosŏn Confucianism and classified Chosŏn Neo-Confucianism into three factions, that is, li-principle (主理), qi-principle (主氣), and compromise (折衷), nearly all scholars of Korean Confucian philosophy agree that Korean Confucian philosophy began with the Four Seven Debate. For example, Yi Sang-ʻun wrote, “In the development of Korean Confucian theory, the problem of the Four Beginnings which was aroused in the li-qi theory between Tʻoegeye 退溪 (Yi Hwang, 1501–1570) and Kobong 高峰 (Ki Taesŭng, 1527–1572) could be a watershed. This is the Four Seven Debate…… Since this debate affects the foundation of Korean philosophy, it is a problem for all the Korean philosophers that they should find some connections with the thought of modern philosophy.” Pae Chong-ho writes, “Generally speaking, the essence of Korean Neo-Confucianism is characterized as having two tendencies, li principle and qi principle … which were caused by the Four Seven Debate.” Park Chong-hong also states, “Korean Neo-Confucianism can be characterized by the Four Seven Debate and insŏng mulsŏngnon (人性物性論, a debate of the sameness or difference about the nature of man and animal).” It may be said therefore that the Four Seven Debate is an indispensable field of study as regards the development of Neo-Confucianism in Chosŏn Korea.

The Four Seven Debate began between Tʻoegeye and Kobong in 1559, and has come to be regarded as the most important philosophical debate in Chosŏn intellectual history. This debate is widely recognized as a profound theoretical debate on li-qi theory. The topic of the Four Seven Debate centers around questions regarding the nature of the human mind (心, sim) and how to justify moral nature (性). This is evi-
dent when one examines the meaning of Four Beginnings (四端) and Seven Feelings (七情). In short, the Four Seven Debate concerns how to explain the human mind by means of *li*-qi binary theory.14) According to Michael C. Kalton, “It discloses potentials and tensions in the Neo-Confucian vision as elaborated by Zhu Xi.” 15)

The Four Seven Debate was foreshadowed in Zhu Xi’s *li*-qi theory. 16) Even though Zhu Xi’s theory was further elaborated by Choson Neo-Confucian scholars who participated in the debate, the issue was not clearly solved because their philosophical language was limited to Zhu Xi’s system. T’oegye’s theory is a dualism of *li* and *qi*. He posited *li* as an independent dynamic entity in order to defend innate human morality while exploiting Zhu Xi’s words. According to Youn Sa-soon (Yun Sa-sun), “T’oegye, in the Four Seven Debate, emphasized the issuance of principle: that is, he wanted to convince people of the propriety and spontaneity of one’s original nature which enable one to overcome the possible hindrance of material nature.”17) For this reason T’oegye’s theory led to a strong dualism. Kobong in turn criticized T’oegye’s *li*-qi dualism based on Zhu Xi’s “no dichotomy” (不可分開) between *li* and *qi*.

Yulgok (Yi I, 1536–1584) was in the same line with Kobong. He criticized T’oegye’s *li*-issuance theory, asserting that “*li* is non-active, and *qi* issues, and *li* mounts it” (氣發理乘). In terms of the relations between *tosim* (道心, Tao mind) and *insim* (人心, human mind), he claimed that *tosim* can change into *insim*, or *insim* can change into *tosim*, which might open another chapter in Choson intellectual history. According to him, human morality does not depend on either nature or feelings, but instead is up to the will (意). As a result, human feelings, which T’oegye once despised, appear as a driving force thanks to the will.

2. The Problems of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings

The Four Beginnings were introduced by Mencius18) in order to support the argument that human nature is good. If we examine the whole passage in *Mencius* where the Four Beginnings appears, the passage is divided into three parts as follows:

Mencius said, ‘All people have a mind/heart which cannot bear [to see the suffering] others. The ancient kings had this mind/heart which could not stand to see the suffering of others, and, with this, operated a government which could not stand to see the suffering of the people. If, in this state of mind, you ran a government which could not endure people’s suffering, you could govern the realm as if you were turning it in the palm of your hand. Why do I say all human beings have a mind/heart which cannot stand to see the suffering of others? Even nowadays, if an infant were about to fall into a well, anyone would be upset and concerned. This concern would not be due to the fact that the person wanted to get in good with the baby’s parents, or because he wanted to improve his reputation among the community or among his/her circle of friends. Nor would it be because he was afraid of the criticism that might result from a show of non-concern.

‘From such a case, we see that a man without the feeling (mind, 心) of commiseration (憐愍) is not a man; a man without the feeling of shame and dislike (羞惡) is not a man; a man without the feeling of deference and compliance (謙順).
is not a man; and a man without the feeling of right and wrong (是非) is not a man. The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of humanity (仁之端); the feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness (義之端); the feeling of deference and compliance is the beginning of propriety (禮之端); the feeling of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom (智之端).

‘People have these Four Beginnings just as they have their four limbs. Having these Four Beginnings, but saying that you cannot act on them is to cheat yourself. To say that the ruler doesn’t have them is to cheat the ruler. Since all people have these Four Beginnings within themselves, they should all understand how to enhance and develop them. It is like when a fire just starts, or a spring first bubbles out of the ground. When you are able to fully develop [these Four Beginnings], you will be able to take care of all people within the four seas (the world). If you don’t develop [them], you will not even be able to take care of your parents.’

First, we have to be aware that the subject of the entire argument is the human mind. Second, the logical pattern proceeds to deduce the Four Beginnings after generalizing the example of “a child falling into a well.” The argument then induces the Four Virtues from the Four Beginnings. Third, even though the quotation is divided into three parts, most scholars have quoted exclusively the second part, which has caused them to ignore the logic of the passage. Now we need to analyze the three parts of the quote to elucidate the argument of the Four Beginnings.

The first part of the quotation includes the parable that has become very famous as representing the core of Confucianism. The main idea of the parable can be seen in the first proposition of the quotation: all people have a mind which cannot bear to see the suffering others. This is a major premise of Confucianism, which results in the proposition that a human being has an innate goodness. Mencius thus provides the parable in order to deduce the Four Minds (四心). As a result, the second part begins with a detailed description of the Four Minds: the mind (or feeling) of commiseration (憫隱之心), the mind (or feeling) of shame and dislike (羞惡之心), the mind (or feeling) of deference and compliance (辭讓之心), and the mind (or feeling) of right and wrong (是非之心). Mencius, providing the example, intended to clarify the fact that these Four Minds play a role as the essential conditions for a human being to become a human being. However, the problem lies in the next logical step.

According to Mencius, the Four Minds are the beginnings of humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom (仁義禮智). That is to say, the predicates of the Four Minds are the beginnings, not the Four Virtues—humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. The Four Virtues are new concepts in this argument. The beginning is the translation of tan (端, in Chinese, duan), which literally means the beginning/end of a piece of thread. The Four Minds are the beginnings/ends of the Four Virtues. The Four Minds are attributes of the Four Virtues, which indicates the important point that the Four Virtues can only be inferred from the Four Minds. Therefore, the Four Beginnings determine the Four Virtues; we can simply assume the Four Virtues by the Beginnings. Nevertheless, Mencius juxtaposes the Four Beginnings with the Four Virtues through the Beginnings until the end of the argument because Men-
Mencius wanted to clarify the proposition that human nature is good by presenting the Four Virtues. In the end though, Mencius is not talking about these Four Virtues, but only about the Four Beginnings. The Four Virtues are the concepts induced from the Four Minds. This conclusion eventually led to the philosophical debates found in Chosón intellectual history.

The third part of the quotation includes another important point in understanding the relationship between the mind and the Four Beginnings. First, a human being has the Four Beginnings, just as he has four limbs. Second, a human being should develop the Four Beginnings to their fullest extension. In terms of the first proposition, though, Mencius should have said, “Human beings have these Four Minds just as they have their four limbs.” But he said, “Human beings have the Four Beginnings,” instead of the Four Minds. This is because Mencius intended to emphasize the Four Virtues and not the Four Beginnings. However, it might be awkward if he were to state “the Four Minds are the Four Virtues” mainly because the latter is induced from the former. For this reason he required a connecting device between these two factors, which was the Beginnings.

Mencius wanted to show concrete moral values whereby human beings can behave like human beings. What Mencius intended to say to the people of his time was that human beings should develop the Four Beginnings to their fullest extension: the Four Virtues. In other words, human beings should develop the Four Beginnings with their own will because they are human beings. Here, if we follow the logical pattern and restore the connecting devices to their original meaning, the proposition entails, “Human beings should develop the Four Minds to the fullest extension of the Four Minds.” This cannot show concrete pictures of that to which human beings should aspire. Thus Mencius presents the Four Virtues as concrete moral values. With these virtues in mind people can find the goal that they can reach with their own will. However, this is not sufficient as there is no account of “how to achieve this goal.”

In conclusion, the Four Beginnings in *Mencius* is an argument about human mind. Human beings have the Four Minds (feelings, 心) which are basic conditions to becoming a human being. And since the Four Minds are the beginnings of the Four Virtues, human beings should develop them to the fullest extension of the Four Virtues with their own will.

Now, let us turn to the Seven Feelings. In *Book of Rites* we find:

What are human feelings? They are joy (喜), anger (怒), sorrow (哀), fear (懼), love (愛), hate (恨), and desire (欲), which human beings can feel without learning. … Therefore the sage controls the seven feelings and opens the ten righteousnesses. 22)

Among these feelings, I doubt whether desire can be described as one of the human feelings. In addition, three of the feelings, fear, love, and hate, do not seem to be clearly separate from the preceding three feelings. More importantly, it is doubtful whether we can describe the complexity of human feelings with these seven feelings alone. However, since Chosön intellectuals regarded these seven feelings as human feelings in general, they used another description about human feelings in the Four
Seven debate. These are seen in *Doctrine of the Mean* as follows:

Before the feelings of joy (喜), anger (怒), sorrow (哀), and pleasure (樂) are aroused it is called equilibrium (centrality, mean; in Chinese, *zhong*). When these feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called harmony. Equilibrium is the great foundation of the world, and harmony its universal path. When equilibrium and harmony are realized to the highest degree, Heaven and Earth will attain their proper order and all things will flourish.\(^{23}\)

Although we cannot confirm that the Four Feelings include the Seven Feelings found in *Book of Rites*, we do not have to differentiate between them if we try to talk about human feelings in general. The intellectuals in Chosŏn Korea used the four feelings of *Doctrine of the Mean*, instead of those found in *Book of Rites*. According to Kim Ki-hyon, the Four Seven Debate was caused by identifying the Seven Feelings with the Four Feelings. He continued, while the Seven Feelings in *Book of Rites* are illustrated as dangerous and should be controlled by moral virtues, the Four Feelings are described as objective and comprehensive. Even though according to him the feelings described in the two books are different, Chosŏn intellectuals identified them, which directly caused the Four Seven Debate. For example, T'oegye came close to the Seven Feelings of *Book of Rites*, whereas Kobong approaches the Four Feelings of *Doctrine of the Mean*.\(^{24}\) Even though Kim tried to interpret the Four Seven Debate based on the fact that the connotations of the two feelings are mixed, it is difficult to accept as it were because the Four Seven Debate concerns human feelings in general and their relations to nature (性). Nevertheless, his interpretation provides a suitable point to understand the Four Seven Debate in terms of differentiating the feelings. In line with this, Tu Wei-Ming differentiated the feelings from emotions. He states, “A feeling person is sensitive and intuitive, an emotional person often yields to uncontrollable passions. Feeling can be a constant state, emotion is often short-lived. In sum, we can feel (or sense) what is within us without expressing it but our emotions cannot but show upon our countenances.”\(^{25}\) He concluded that the Four Beginnings are feelings, and the Seven Feelings are emotions, noting that the Chinese character *qing* (情) can be rendered as feeling and emotion.\(^{26}\) However, the Four Seven Debate can be said to concern mainly emotions if we follow Tu Wei-ming’s definition. It concerns how to prescribe human emotions with the *li*-*qi* binary system, or how to prescribe human morality. The debate seems moot.

3. **The Four Seven Debate: T'oegye**

The Four Seven Debate was foreshadowed in 1553 when T'oegye advised Ch'uman Chŏng Chi-un (秋澗 鄭之雲, 1509–1561) to amend his “Diagram of the Heavenly Mandate” (天命圖, *Ch'ŏnmyŏngdo*). Writing in detail, Chŏng stated in “Diagram,” “The Four Beginnings issue from *li*; the Seven Feelings issue from *qi*” (四端發於理七情發於氣).\(^{27}\) He asked T'oegye whether this was correct, and in reply, T'oegye, quoting the passage from Zhu Xi, advised him to amend the passage as, “The Four Beginnings are the issuance of *li*; the Seven Feelings are the issuance of *qi*” (四端理之發七情氣之發).\(^{28}\) T'oegye’s amendment resulted in the dynamism of *li* based on the bifurcation
of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings. Furthermore, it came to more clearly divide \( li \) and \( qi \). Kobong’s basic attitude toward T’oegye is based on this strong dualism. According to Zhu Xi, \( li \) and \( qi \) cannot be separate.

After Kobong’s criticism, T’oegye, in 1559, sent him a letter in which he amended his previous thought as follows:

The issuance of the Four Beginnings is purely a matter of principle (理) and therefore involves nothing but good; the issuance of the Seven Feelings includes material force (氣) and therefore involves both good and evil.\(^{20}\)

T’oegye could not give up the idea that \( li \) is pure and the origin of all human morality. Fundamentally this position was caused by the major premise of Sung Neo-Confucianism: \( sōng \) (性, nature) is the same as \( li \). Even though the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings issue from the human mind, T’oegye had to protect the sanctity of the Four Beginnings because they all originate from \( li \). More specifically, T’oegye thought that the original nature (本然之性) can and does ultimately overcome the obstacles caused by the emotional (or instinctive) needs of psychophysical nature (氣質之性).\(^{30}\)

However, Kobong did not cease attacking T’oegye’s idea. T’oegye again amended his idea as follows:

The Four Beginnings are all good. Therefore it is said, ‘Without these four dispositions, one is no longer human.’ And it is also said, ‘As for the feelings, it is possible for them to be good.’\(^{31}\) In the case of the Seven Feelings, then, good and evil are not yet fixed.\(^{32}\)

And he amended it yet again:

The Four Beginnings are all good. Therefore, it is said, ‘Without these four dispositions, one is no longer human.’ And it is also said, ‘As for the feelings, it is possible for them to be good.’ In the case of the Seven Feelings, then, they are originally good but easily devolved into evil. Therefore, when they issue with proper measure, they are called harmonious. As soon as we have them but are not able to exercise discernment, then the mind-and-heart is already in the condition of missing its proper condition.\(^{34}\)

T’oegye changed his conception of the Seven Feelings to be “good and evil are not yet fixed” and “originally good but easily devolved into evil.” T’oegye could not avoid this change in position because the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings are a problem of the mind (心). That is to say, T’oegye must have recognized that the Four Seven Debate is a debate within the same realm of \( qi \), namely, the mind, and he tried to protect the concept of \( li \) or \( sōng \) in the mind. Therefore, Kobong’s argument, which is that the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings cannot be separated, is logically superior to that of T’oegye. Nevertheless, T’oegye could not relinquish his idea. His final conclusion is as follows:
In the world, there is no qi without li; no li without qi. As for the Four Beginnings, li issues and qi follows (理發氣隨); as for the Seven Feelings, qi issues and li mounts it (氣發理乘). If qi does not follow li, li cannot issue; if li does not mount qi, [a human being] falls into [seeking] self-interest and selfish desire to become a brute.35

T’oegye’s basic standpoint does not change. Li and qi altogether issue respectively (理氣互發). More specifically, li is covered by qi like the yolk of an egg. Accordingly, when li issues forth, it manifests through qi, which T’oegye describes as “qi’s following.” On the other hand, when qi issues, it stimulates the inner li, which he describes as “li’s mounting.” The Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings all indicate the feelings of the human being, which are composed of the combination of li and qi. Although the Four Beginnings are only good, they issue through qi. Because the Seven Feelings contain not only evil but also good li can be said to involve itself in their issuance of them. As a result, T’oegye seemingly achieved his goal without contradicting that li and qi are different but not separate.36

Youn Sa-soon argued that on a cosmological level T’oegye’s theory maintains the identification of “what is so” (所以然) and “what should be so” (所當然). According to him, “The law of ‘what is so’ is applicable when a thing can be formed necessarily (or naturally), while that of ‘what should be so’ is applicable when a thing is formed intentionally. So, a thing must be formed necessarily (naturally) and intentionally in order to satisfy the conditions of both these laws. This is the condition under which the identification of ‘what is so’ and ‘what should be so’ can actually be maintained. Therefore, in order to apply T’oegye’s theory to the whole universe, we should demonstrate that the universe is formed in the same way an individual is formed.”37 Youn continues to argue that this is only possible because T’oegye’s theory basically follows qi theory,38 writing, “Like Ch’eng-Chu, T’oegye thought that one of the characteristics of ki is its capacity for generation and destruction, and that the universe, as the aggregation of ki, is a living entity, or a kind of ‘organism.’”39 He points out the weak point of T’oegye’s theory in the following manner:

In the first place, if the organic view of the universe is really founded on the basis of ki’s being subject to generation and destruction, there should be a fundamental explanation of this characteristic in ki. In this respect, though it may seem far-fetched, there should also be presented some theory of life itself.40

The explanation of this characteristic of qi was the question of T’oegye’s theory that qi principle scholars such as Hyegang (惠巖, 1803–1877) ultimately attempted to address. The Four Seven Debate is mainly an argument about whether the human mind is good or evil. T’oegye’s problematik lies in from where the feelings originate. T’oegye’s final conclusion yields five important points. First, T’oegye tried to protect the potential for morality as already suggested in Mencius. If li, as Zhu Xi wrote,41 does not have a creative power, li itself cannot project anything to human behaviors. T’oegye could not allow this definition even though he was one of the followers of Zhu Xi. After his struggles in supporting his own idea, T’oegye finally found the appropriate sup-
porting passage in *Zhu Zi yulei* (朱子語類, Classified Conversation of Zhu Zi), which states, “The Four Beginnings are the issuance (發) of *li*; the Seven Feelings are the issuance (發) of *qi*.” In employing this passage, he achieved two goals. He found the basis for asserting that *li* has a creative power as the origin of morality, and at the same time, he could escape from betraying Zhu Xi’s doctrine as he used Zhu Xi’s own basis for asserting that

Second, T’oegye showed an inclination towards regarding *li* as good, but *qi* as evil. As discussed above, in terms of feelings, T’oegye seems to follow the connotation of the Seven Feelings in Book of Rites. Even though he changed his position as a result of Kobong’s attacks, his basic attitude remained unchanged. This can be interpreted as T’oegye trying to grant a potential morality to human beings, in other words. Despite his intention to establish morality, his scope became much wider because he asserted the superiority of *li* over *qi*. It is quite difficult to interpret human feelings with *li* and *qi* as seen in Zhu Xi’s own writings. Conclusively, as T’oegye maintained that *qi* is evil, the physical world also became evil. This is vastly different from Yulgok’s view. According to Ro Young-chan, “For Yulgok, neither principle nor material force has any intrinsic moral implication; rather, they are cosmological concepts that gain moral significance when applied to human beings, since human beings are not free of a moral dimension.”

Third, T’oegye’s theory of the mind does not clarify much in regards to the mind’s internal structure and function. His account of the mind provides no description or explanation for other spiritual/mental abilities and processes, such as will or reason. Instead we find such things in the writings of Hyegang.

Fourth, *li* in T’oegye’s theory becomes an independent dynamic entity and his *li*-*qi* theory has a strong tendency towards an obvious dualism. T’oegye’s theory can be said to be based on the major Neo-Confucian premise: *sŏng* is the same as *li*. If we replace *li* in T’oegye’s remarks with *sŏng*, or human nature, the argument might become very simple. However, from a cosmological point of view, the *li* issuance (理發) of T’oegye can be interpreted as “the issuance of an existential pattern or physical law (in Hyegang’s case),” which is an awkward way of describing the universe. This position was criticized by Yulgok.

Lastly, T’oegye’s theory should solve the problem of the characteristics of *ki* in order to complete his organic view of the universe because the identification of “what is so” and “what should be so” is based on an organic *ki* theory. We can find this answer in Hyegang’s *qi* theory.

4. The Four Seven Debate: Yulgok

The second round of the Four Seven Debate began between Yulgok and Ugye Sŏng Hon (牛溪 成渓, 1535–1598; Ugye is his pen name) who, in 1572, wrote a letter to Yulgok asserting that Zhu Xi’s differentiation between *tosim* and *insim* corresponds to T’oegye’s alternating issuance of *li* and *qi*. In his preface to *Doctrine of the Mean*, Zhu Xi wrote, “The one (*insim*) arises from the selfishness of the physical constitution (形氣), while the other (*tosim*) arises from the correctness of the conferred nature (性命).” T’oegye also wrote, “*Insim* indicates the Seven Feelings; *tosim* indicates the Four Beginnings.”
Yulgok clarified his position in his first letter to Ugye as follows:

The mind is single; using [diverse] terms for it such as ‘tosim’ and ‘insim’ is a result of the distinction between our conferred nature (性命) and our physical constitution (形氣). The feelings are single; speaking of them in some cases as ‘the Four [Beginnings]’ and in others as ‘the Seven Feelings’ is due to the difference between speaking with exclusive reference to principle and speaking of it as combined with material force. Thus insim and the tosim cannot be combined, but rather are related in the same fashion as end and beginning. The Four Beginnings are not able to include the Seven Feelings, but the Seven Feelings include the Four Beginnings.45)

According to Yulgok, the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings are one because they are all human feelings; however, the Seven Feelings include the Four Beginnings because, while the Four Beginnings indicate good human feelings, the Seven Feelings are the comprehensive feelings of human beings. Yulgok’s interpretation of the Four Seven Debate is basically identical with Kobong’s. In terms of insim and tosim, they arise from our two different natures, however, the origin of both is the single mind. Depending on from where they issue, they have two different names, and, as a result, they cannot be combined.

Thus what is the relation between insim and tosim? T’oegye early on divided and allotted them into the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings. However, Yulgok could not follow T’oegye’s interpretation since the two minds are related in the same fashion as either beginning or ending.46) He states:

Now, [the disposition of] man’s mind-and-heart (心) emerge directly from the correctness of the normative nature (性), but sometimes they are not able to conform to it and follow it out, but rather become interfused with selfish intentions. When this happens, it is a case of beginning with the tosim and ending with insim. Or sometimes they emerge from the psychophysical constitution but do not diverge from correct principle; in this case, there is certainly no departure from the tosim. Or sometimes they diverge from correct principle but recognize the mistake and become ordered and subdued and do not follow the selfish desires. When this happens, it is a case of beginning with insim and ending with the tosim.47)

Here, Yulgok provides a groundbreaking interpretation of the two minds. That is to say, tosim can change into insim, or insim can change into tosim. This opens another chapter in Chosŏn intellectual history. T’oegye maintained a dualistic standpoint regarding the mind of human beings, accepting that its components such as virtue and desire, good and evil, or moral reason (the Four Beginnings, tosim) and feelings (the Seven Feelings, insim) exist independently in the mind. According to T’oegye’s logic, in order to protect the morality of human beings, this reasoning is extended to the cosmological view and resulted in his theory of the alternating issuance of li and qi. However, when Yulgok essentially broke down the barrier between the two minds, sud-
denly the morality of human beings, as asserted by T’oegye, became vulnerable, if not questionable.

However, according to Yulgok’s theory was it still possible to protect the morality of human beings? He wrote, “Insim and tosim refer inclusively to both the feelings and will; they do not refer only to the feelings.”48) Yulgok emphasized another mental ability of human beings and thereby settled the problem. He wrote:

In general, the condition before [the mind-and-heart] is aroused is the nature; after it is aroused, it is feelings. When it is aroused and engages in consideration and calculation, it is will. The mind-and-heart is the master of the nature, feelings (情), and will. Therefore the conditions of being not yet aroused, already aroused, and exercising calculation can all be referred to as the mind-and-heart.49)

Here we find a particular definition of the mind of human beings. The mind has three conditions: nature, feelings, and will. According to Yulgok, the will is based on logical judgment or logical reason. Human morality does not depend on either nature or feelings, but instead is up to the will. Feelings cannot be said to have a partial value whether good or evil, but they possess both good and evil. It is the will that controls the feelings. Therefore insim, by way of the will, can change into tosim. As he emphasizes the importance of the will, the status of the mind of human beings becomes wider in its scope. Now human feelings, which T’oegye once despised, appear as a driving force thanks to the will.

However, Yulgok’s insim-tosim theory has a tendency towards subjectivism. Han Hyŏng-jo, in “Yulgok’s Plan of Self-Cultivation,” points out,

The center of this moral cultivation is the mind-and-heart. It controls the process of human response from potential energy to actual issuance, to check the deviance and modify it properly. In the course of Yulgok’s argument, he never investigates the possibility of falling into an uncertain result. After all, if the criteria can be left to individual awareness, though metaphysically its objectivity is ensured by Heaven, in a concrete situation it will easily be contaminated by the arbitrariness of a subject.50)

That is to say, Yulgok’s theory possibly lacks objectivity while T’oegye persisted in the dualistic standpoint which regardless would be able to secure objectivity.51) This problem can be partly solved by Tasan Chŏng Yag-yong’s (茶山 丁若鏞, 1762–1836; Tasan is his pen name) kwŏnhyŏng (權衡, to weigh and compare) theory, but Hyegang’s ch’uch’uk (to investigate and infer) theory can provide a direct answer to this problem because ch’uch’uk theory naturally encompasses the verification (驗) process.

Yulgok’s view on the Four Seven Debate and insim-tosim is based on his li-qi theory. Yulgok asserts that li is universal and qi is particular (理通氣局), and particularly emphasizes that original qi (本然之氣) is one and clear and pure. He wrote:

[Li] relies upon the process flux (流行) of qi, uneven as this may be. Its original
excellence is everywhere, unlimited by the partiality of qi. And yet, it also takes the lead of qi as a particularizing [principle]. What is particular is due to qi, not li. When qi is complete, so, too, is li. What is complete is qi, not li. Li is everywhere present, even in dregs, ashes, excrement, and dirt. It is the reason for each having its own nature. Yet li suffers no injury in its original excellence. This is what is meant by li being universal (理通). But what is the meaning of qi being particular (氣局)? Qi is the visible and has its beginning and end, with something prior to it, and something posterior. Qi is originally one and clear and pure. How can we speak [in this first instance] of the qi of … dregs and excrement and dirt? But since it moves without cease, ascending and descending, it becomes uneven and produces myriad changes. [And such things come about] … as clear qi, which is different from turbid qi, and even the qi of … dregs and excrement and dirt.52)

Even though Yulgok accepts that li is universal, but he emphasizes that qi is originally pure and clear. After qi issues and produces myriad things, it becomes turbid. This view explains why Yulgok rejects T‘oegeye’s li issuance and his partial judgment on insim. The good feelings and bad feelings are issued by the original qi, and insim and tosim are also issued by the original qi. Whether its issuance accords to li determines either insim or tosim.53)

However, Yulgok does not contradict Zhu Xi. Rather he seems to be a loyal follower of Zhu Xi. In terms of li and qi, he wrote:

Generally speaking, that which gives issuance (發之者) is material force; that whereby there is issuance (所以發者) is principle. Without material force, there would not be the power of issuing; without principle, there would not be that whereby it issues. (Even though a sage should be born again, the words from ‘that which gives issuance’ (發之) could not be changed.)54)

Qi plays an active role and li assures the basis from which qi issues forth. This seems to follow Zhu Xi’s li-qi binary theory, but the connotation is quite different. Song Neo-Confucians (particularly the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi) tried to introduce li into the Chinese intellectual discourse and for this reason Zhu Xi also needed to emphasize li rather than qi.55) However, Yulgok intended to control the overpowering li. T‘oegeye took the li part from Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory and emphasized it to its extreme. As a result, li itself came to acquire a creative power, which Yulgok could not accept. Yulgok could only accept qi issuance in reality. He said:

T‘oegeye based himself on these [words of Zhu Xi] and established a theory that said: ‘In the case of the Four Beginnings, principle gives issue and material force follows it; in the case of the Seven Feelings, material force gives issue and principle mounts it.’ What he says about material force giving issue and principle mounting it is permissible. But this is not the case only with the Seven Feelings; the Four Beginnings are likewise a case of material force giving issue and principle mounting it. What do I mean? Only after seeing the child about to fall into
the well is there the issuance of feelings of commiseration. Seeing it and feeling commiseration has to do with material force; this is what is described as material force giving issue. The root of commiseration is humanity; this is what is described as principle mounting it.56

Yulgok’s intention becomes quite clear. He attacked T’oegye’s theory of the alternating issuance of 俸, and accepted only the issuance of 颺. The Seven Feelings and the Four Beginnings are all human feelings. The Four Beginnings mean that 颭 is issued from the basis of 俸. 俸, according to Yulgok, is the root of good feelings. He claims that “俸 is non-active, and 颭 is active; 颭 issues, and 俸 mounts it” (氣發理乘).57 According to Julia Ching, “Yulgok has made a real contribution to Neo-Confucianism philosophy, on an issue that Chinese thinkers have not settled clearly. He has removed certain ambiguities present in Zhu Xi’s statements, especially regarding 頔 and 頑 and 頔 ch’i (氣, in Korean, 킥): that these are ‘two things,’ and yet must remain inseparable. … He has done so by emphasizing the role of ch’i.”58 It is true that Zhu Xi’s 頔-qi theory is ambiguous, but Yulgok clarified and resolved this issue. In this case, Yulgok can be said to depart from Zhu Xi’s influence because the initial ambiguity is a characteristic of Zhu Xi’s system, not Yulgok’s. Thus it can be said that Yulgok’s 頔-qi theory was also destined to destabilize Zhu Xi’s system. Yulgok does not end his argument here. Instead, he continues his attack on T’oegye by separating the Four Seven Debate from the cosmological argument. He wrote:

In Heaven and Earth, is there no mind for understanding (知覺)? After a human body with vital energies (血氣) comes to exist, the mind for understanding comes to arise. Because Heaven and Earth is a certain big vessel, it can enfold the myriad of things. Since it has no vital energies and no [potential] for understanding, it is impartial in its covering and supporting [the world].59

The universe, Heaven and Earth, is different from a human being in that it has no mind. The mind is a special attribute of human beings. Those who have a physical body and vital energies can bear their own species; that is to say, they can only bear one of their own kind. For example, a human being can only bear a human being, not a horse or a tiger. This is possible only because they have a physical body. Also, the mind comes to arise after they form the physical body. Thus, if we say that Heaven and Earth have a mind, Heaven and Earth must have a physical body. If Heaven and Earth have physical form, it cannot encompass the myriad of things. Therefore Heaven and Earth cannot have a mind. Since Heaven and Earth do not have a mind, which is the agent for knowing or mental processes, it is different from human beings. Here, Yulgok separates the argument about human beings from the cosmological view.

4. Conclusion and Questions

Pae Chong-ho concluded regarding the Four Seven Debate as follows:
They (Choson Neo-Confucian scholars) tried to inquire into the existence of human beings that characterizes the Four Beginnings—the Seven Feelings and insim-tosim, which is a unique feature of Choson Neo-Confucianism. They tried to penetrate Heaven and human beings. Therefore, understanding the human psycho-mental function as the Four Beginnings—the Seven Feelings and insim-tosim, they tried to solve the metaphysical problems concerning its origin. Accordingly, it was not a matter of analyzing the psycho-mental constitution or its process, but of explaining its origin, which, to (Choson) Neo-Confucianism, concluded the argument of li and qi in the end. Consequently, (Choson) Neo-Confucianism, with li-qí doctrine, aimed to penetrate Heaven and human beings, which also becomes a final goal. This means to connect ‘being’ (sein) of the nature with ‘what it should be’ (sollen) of human beings. Here (Choson) Neo-Confucianism, appearing as both moral philosophy and natural philosophy, became concentrated on two questions, what it should be and what it is. Later, scholars separated into the factions of qi principle (主氣), li principle (主理), and compromise (折衷) continued to argue.61

The Four Seven Debate began under the majorNeo-Confucian premise of “sŏng is the same as li.” They tried to solve the metaphysical problems about human psycho-mental function by means of li-qí binary theory. However, the debate had inherent problems in that it mixed the human realm with the cosmological realm. T’oegeye tried to provide a general basis for human morality using li and qi. As a result, he conceptualized li as having an active and creative power. Precisely this point caused the Four Seven Debate in Choson intellectual history. However, Yulgok separated ethics from cosmology, and in doing so he denied li’s activeness. The universe is different from human beings mainly because it does not have a mind, which is the subject of human mental ability. This intellectual development provided an important clue to the next unfolding of Neo-Confucianism in the Choson period.62

Since the mind of human beings is separated from Heaven and Earth, the next question lies in how a human being understands the universe. Human beings should understand the universe with their own mental ability. And, more importantly, the inclination of affirming the positive character of qi eventually led to a reappraisal of Zhu Xi’s li-qí system. In line with this, Hyegang might be positioned as the last scholar of this trend in Choson intellectual history.

Notes
1) Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch’eng Liang’s Challenge to Zhu Xi, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 41.
2) This is the first article written about Choson Korea Confucianism in the modern thesis-writing style. This had a strong influence on Korean scholars in both a negative and positive sense. The framework of interpreting Choson Confucianism as the Four Seven Debate and li-principle and qi-principle began with this article. On the other hand, this article stresses that there is no special characteristic to Choson Confucianism, which stimulated Korean scholars to study Choson Confucianism in order to find their identity.
4) Yun Sa-sun, in tong’yang sasang kwa Han’guk sasang, identifies six characteristics in Korean Neo-Confu-
cianism: give primacy to the Cheng-Zhu school; have a tendency towards intellectualism; show special respect for Confucian ritual put particular stress upon moral obligations; have a tendency toward intellectual conservatism; and show a special inclination to humanism (Yun Sa-sun, *Tong'yang sasang kw'a Han'guk sasang*). See Hwang Joon-yon, “Confucianism in Korea: A Brief Introduction,” in *Reader in Korean Religion*, ed. Kim Chong-suh, (Sŏngnam, Republic of Korea: The Academy of Korean Studies, 1993), 76–78.

Keum Jang-tae states, “First, it offers moral standards that uphold the moral character of the individual, promote moral order in society, and regulate moral relations between nations. Second, it emphasizes education. Third, Confucian rituals of ancestor worship became an integral part of Korean life. Fourth, Koreans’ philosophical perception of man and the world is heavily influenced by a Confucian understanding” (Keum Jang-tae, *Confucianism and Korean Thoughts*, (Seoul: Jimoondang, 2000), 33–34).

From a philosophical point of view, Choung Haechang (Chŏng Hae-ch'ang) states, “Another important characteristic of Chosŏn Neo-Confucianism arises from the fact that it developed quite independently and differently from China and Japan. Neo-Confucians of Chosŏn were very interested in theories of principle (li/li) and material force/energy (ch'i/ki), which concerned the most metaphysical part of Neo-Confucian philosophy, and the theories of propriety (li/ye), which concerned the most practical part of Neo-Confucianism. One of the most prolonged controversies, one which has lasted since the sixteenth century, revolves around the debate over whether genuine human emotion and thought stem from li or ch'i” (Choung Haechang, “Overview,” in *Confucian Philosophy in Korea*, eds. Choung Haechang and Han Hyong-jo, (Sŏngnam, Republic of Korea: The Academy of Korean Studies, 1996), 4).


6) According to Mencius, “The feeling (mind, 心) of commiseration is the beginning of humanity (仁之端); the feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness (義之端); the feeling of deference and compliance is the beginning of propriety (禮之端); the feeling of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom (智之端)” (*Mencius*, 2A.6).


8) Pae Chong-ho, *Han'guk yuhaksa*, 70.

9) Another hot issue in Korean Neo-Confucianism in Chosŏn Korea in the seventeenth century was the horak nonbyo or insŏng musŏn. Yi Kan (李柬, 1677–1722) took an affirmative position in accepting the view of the sameness of nature emphasizing the annotation of *Doctrine of the Mean*. Han Wŏn-jin (韓元震, 1682–1751) took a negative position in the view of the difference of nature accepting the annotation of *Mencius*. The Debate was triggered by Zhu Xi’s ambigous commentary upon the nature of a human being and animal: “The nature is what the man is given from Heaven’s li, while the life is what the man is given from Heaven’s qi. The former is metaphysical, the latter is physical. ... Speaking in terms of qi, sensation and physical exercise are common both in man and animal. But speaking in terms of li, benevolence and righteousness are different in man and animals.” For details, see Hwang Joon-yon, “Confucianism in Korea: A Brief Introduction,” 74–76.

Since the debate is based on li-qi theory and the premise “nature is the same as li,” it can be understood within the same paradigm of the Four Seven Debate.


11) I only discuss the Four Seven Debate of Yi Hwang and Yi I because the development of the debate can be understood within these two scholars’ discourse. This is not that I despise the later development of Chosŏn Confucianism but that I only show the nature of Chosŏn Confucianism so as to understand the general picture of the Chosŏn Confucian history.

12) The debate concluded in 1566.

13) For the sake of consistency, I have translated sim 心 as “the mind,” but it should be understood as the mind/heart, which contains intellectual and emotional faces at the same time.
T'oegye was strongly influenced by Xinjing (心經, in Korean, Simgyo ˘ng). Michael Kalton wrote, “T'oegye did grow up with access to broad collections of Neo-Confucian works, but a few that he did manage to obtain left a deep impression on him. Undoubtedly the most important of these was Simgyo ˘ng, or Classic of the Mind-Heart, by Chen Te-hsiu (1178–1235), a leading scholar of the late Sung period. This work, a collection of passages dealing with self-cultivation compiled from classical and Sung Neo-Confucian sources, was circulated in Korea in a greatly expanded version, Simgyo ˘ng puju (Classic of the Mind-Heart Supplemented and Annotated), by the Ming scholar, Ch'eng Min-cheng (1445–1499). T'oegye obtained a copy sometime in his early twenties, and it became his constant and daily reading matter to the end of his life. Although it was later lost in China, T'oegye’s love for this work helped it attain a permanent and important place in the Korean Neo-Confucian world, where it went through some twenty-five printings from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. Classic of the Mind-Heart is a crystallization of Ch'eng-Chu thought dealing with personal self-cultivation, an aspect often called simhak (心學, in Chinese, hsin-hsüeh), ‘the learning of the mind-and-heat,’ or simbi ˘p (心法, in Chinese, hsin-fa), “the system of the mind-and-heart.” It deals almost exclusively with the inward cultivation of the spiritual life, and emphasizes above all kyong (敬, in Chinese, ching), ‘mindfulness, as the central practice of all self-cultivation” (Michael C. Kalton, To Become a Sage: The Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning by Yi T'oegye, [New York: Columbia University Press, 1988], 19–20).


There may have been a number of authors of Mencius. For the sake of simplicity, I regard the historical Mencius as the author of Mencius.


The human mind is not the counter-concept of tosim (道心) in this context. “Mind” is a translation of sim (心), which also includes meanings such as “heart” and “feelings.”

Including belief (信), these virtues are called the Confucian Five Virtues.

Book of Rites, ch. 22; see Shisanjing zhushu, [Shanghai: Guji Chubanshe, 1997], 1422.

Zhong Yong, ch. 1; Chan, op. cit., 98.


Ibid., 275.

Pae Chong-ho, Han’guk yuhaksa, 72.

Zhu Zi yulei, 53:20a.

Sach’il i-ki wangbokso ˘:A:1a; Kalton, The Four Seven Debate, 1.

Youn Sa-soon, op. cit., 229. Maintaining the spiritual characteristic of qi, I translate kijiljiso ˘ng (氣質之性) as “psychophysical nature.” Michael C. Kalton, in The Four Seven Debate, translated kijiljiso ˘ng into “psychophysical nature” because he seems to emphasize a spiritual component along with the material characteristic of the general translation of “physical nature” in the context of the Four Seven Debate. See Kalton, The Four Seven Debate.


Sach’il i-ki wangbokso ˘:A:4b; Kalton, op. cit., 11.

Sach’il i-ki wangbokso ˘:A:31a; Kalton, op. cit., 53.
There are two different interpretations regarding how T’oegye assimilated Chinese Neo-Confucianism. First, T’oegye clarified Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory. According to Choung Haechang, “T’oegye is the first thinker of Chosón who established a profound philosophical system of his own and yet remain closely within the philosophical structures laid out by Zhu Xi. … He laid down the theoretical foundation of li-ism for following generations by clarifying some ambiguities concerning the relationship between li and qi that were left not clearly and fully explained by Zhu Xi himself” (Choung Haechang, “Overview,” 12). According to Tomoeda Ryūtarō, “For him, the relation between principle and material force is dialectical from beginning to end. He asserts that principle is the leader and material force the follower. He states more clearly than Zhu Xi that principle has priority over material force with respect to value. Thus Zhu Xi’s dialectical and structural theory of existence was clarified by T’oegye” (Tomoeda Ryūtarō, “Yi T’oegye and Zhu Xi: Differences in Their Theories of Principle and Material Force,” in The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea, eds. Wm. Theodore de Bary and JaHyun Kim Haboush, [New York: Columbia University Press, 1985], 257). In line with this, Tu Wei-ming concludes, “T’oegye was not only a faithful transmitter but also a creative interpreter” (Tu Wei-ming, “T’oegye’s Creative Interpretation of Zhu Xi’s Philosophy of Principle,” in Korean Philosophy: Its Tradition and Modern Transformation, ed. Korean National Commission for UNESCO, [Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym, 2004], 90).

Second, T’oegye deviated from Zhu Xi’s position and came closer to Wang Yang-ming’s position. According to Lee Seung-Hwan, “T’oegye’s position on the other hand, tends to deviate from Zhu Xi’s position and leans halfway toward Wang Yang-ming’s philosophy of mind (心學), when he attempts to show the predominance of li over ch’i in the case of Four Beginnings” (Lee Seung-hwan, “T’oegye’s Moral Metaphysics and Moral Psychology,” in Confucian Philosophy in Korea, eds. Choung Haechang and Han Hyong-jo, [Sŏngnam, Republic of Korea: The Academy of Korean Studies, 1996], 70).

Charles Wei-hsün Fu wrote, “T’oegye’s use of the word ‘li’s predominance’ and ‘li’s manifestation’ tends to Wang Yang-ming’s position insofar as his interpretation of Mencius’ idea of Four Beginnings is concerned” (Charles Wei-hsün Fu, “T’oegye’s Thesis on the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings: A Philosophical Examination,” Korea Journal vol. 25 no. 7 [July 1985], 22).

According to Youn, “It appears at first sight to be something resulting from necessity or with no purpose. But it can also be spoken of as changing according to some purpose. For instance, we can say that a flower blooms naturally and purposelessly while at the same time it blooms for the purpose of fruition. Each leaf grows by itself but its growth is connected with the growth of the whole tree. In this way the change of each part of an organism proceeds inevitably (or naturally), while at the same time it does so purposefully because it is associated with the change of the whole. Thus no change in an organism can be explicable only in terms of ‘what is so (of itself).’ In other words, it can be said that there is no phenomenon of circumstantial force such as distorted principle (p’ien-li) in the change of an organism. After all, the view of the universe as an organism may prove T’oegye’s true theoretical basis on which the identification of ‘what is so’ and ‘what should be so’ is seen as rational. In other words, his view of the universe as such, together with his view of human nature, can be said to support his assertions of moral behavior conforming to nature, or ethical behavior conforming to original nature when ‘what is so’ and ‘what should be so’ are identified” (Youn, op. cit., 237).

According to Tu Wei-Ming, the problem of whether or not principle moves is highly controversial. Zhu Xi himself does not seem to be clear about this problem. See Tu, “Yi T’oegye’s Perception of Human Nature: A preliminary Inquiry into the Four-Seven Debate in Korean Neo-Confucianism,” 278.


T’oegye sinsaeng munjip, 36:2a.

Han Hyŏng-jo, “Yulgok’s Plan of Self-Cultivation,” 117.

In line with this, Hyegang provides how humans can accord to *li*. In other words, he offers the method to recognize *li* and how to practice it in everyday life.

“Agent” means a cause of subjective action. “Subject” requires a counterpart, “object,” but “agent” does not necessarily require “object.”

Pae Chong-ho, Han'guk yuhaksa, 204.