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*Funding Social Change Since 1967*

# RESIST

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*A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority*

September, 1994

## Elections in Brazil

### A Real Choice at Last?

HELOISA SOUZA

October 3, 1994 may mark the election of the first leftist president in Brazil, South America's biggest nation. As time goes by, it seems more likely that Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, whom everyone refers to as Lula, of the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Worker's Party) and his main opponent, former Minister of the Economy Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the Brazilian Social Democratic Party, will face each other again in November for a run-off. Brazilian election law provides for a second round if no candidate gets a majority on the first ballot.

This will be Brazil's second free and popular election after almost 30 years of dictatorship. On March 31, 1964 the military overthrew democratic president João Goulart and initiated the period that would make history as Brazil's darkest years. Torture, imprisonment, disappearances, repression, and censorship became commonplace. Students, political activists, artists, writers, and workers went into hiding or fled the country; many of those who did not were found killed or mutilated.



Lula, center with beard, being greeted by supporters at Harvard University last May. Photo: Flávia Smith.

If any good has come out of those 29 harsh years it is the fact that the country has grown ripe for its first leftist president. Traditionally in Brazil, the military has taken over whenever it decreed that Brazilians needed to be saved from the red peril. But in 1994, to hunt Communists is out of favor, and the possibility exists for a candidate from the left to succeed.

Founded 14 years ago in the midst of the Brazilian *redemocratização*, Lula's

*Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT) grew from a gathering of intellectuals and union people who used to meet at a restaurant in São Bernardo do Campo, São Paulo's industrial area, to become the country's most popular party. The PT and Lula remained tiny until after president Fernando Collor, who defeated Lula in the 1989 presidential election, was impeached for corruption in December of 1992.

*continued on page three*

## Readers Write...

to Vladimir Mayakovsky\* (1893 - 1930)  
—Judy Clark

*Judy Clark has been a member of the Writer's Workshop at the women's prison in Bedford Hills, New York, for many years. She writes: "I turned to writing at a very low point in my life inside, and it [the workshop] helped me save my life. The Writer's Workshop ... helped me, and many others to develop our craft, to find the courage to draw on our lives and to write in our own unique voices, and to take ourselves seriously as writers. "to Vladimir Mayakovsky" won second place in the 1993 PEN prison writing contest. We're pleased to re-print it here.*

History  
has been unkind to you  
                    Mayakovsky  
making fools  
                    or lunatics of  
us  
                    who chase the rainbow  
                    blinded by its shimmering radiance  
                    fading  
                    like dreams  
                    disappearing  
                    into morning

Your life a warning:  
poets who would be prophets  
may lose their lyrics  
                    their lives

History's stern judgments:  
he sold his soul to dictators  
                    his craft to technocrats  
he loved too much he loved too little  
he gave in  
                    he gave up

Today  
the New World you championed  
                    the dreams I fought for  
are consigned to history books  
                    written  
                    in black and white  
                    bereft of poems

A middle school teacher  
in America  
wraps it up neatly, to his pupils  
in one simple sentence:  
                    Communism was bad  
                    from start to finish  
                    bad and it lost!

A child  
stands  
hands on hips  
chin out in challenge:  
                    "That's your opinion  
                    and too simple  
                    My grandparents were Communists  
                    It was an idea a dream  
                    People tried  
                    but they made mistakes  
                    It's not so simple as good and bad."

In the prison visiting room  
the child looks her mother  
in the eye. She says  
                    "Your intentions were good,  
                    but you went about them  
                    wrongly."

And I  
                    her mother  
                    who grew up  
dancing  
                    to your rhythms and rhymes  
                    Mayakovsky  
then plunged  
                    from poetry  
                    to war  
find my way back  
                    to you

Reading your rebellious lyrics  
I contemplate your end  
                    Mayakovsky  
                    caught  
in the iron jaws of history  
                    and your own intimate demons

This I know:  
Despite my failures and defeats  
my sorry solitude  
the burden of guilt  
and the death of dreams  
despite the cold of a winter morning  
waking to cinderblock walls and  
rows of barbed wire  
robbed  
                    of every warm blanket  
                    of illusion

Still  
I crave life  
                    Mayakovsky  
child  
poems  
                    dreams.

*Bedford Hills Prison, May Day 1993.*

*\*Mayakovsky was known as 'the poet of the bolshevik Revolution', though his art and his relationship to the Soviet government grew more contentious over the years. He shot himself, playing Russian Roulette, at the age of 37.*

*continued from page one*

Since the last elections, the party has doubled its federal representation and now numbers 700,000 members, with 120,000 party activists. The PT controls more than 2,000 city branches, and 1,400 city councils. Relatively speaking, this is still not high, but it is a significant increase since 1989. The party also holds more than 50 city and town halls, four of them state capitals (Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Goiânia and Rio Branco), and has 77 state representatives, one senator, and 36 congressmen. Estimates are that the PT may double its federal representation in the October elections.

According to the Brazilian weekly news magazine *Veja*, the days of the penniless 1989 campaign are long gone. For the 1994 campaign, the party budget was \$30 million. "Entrepreneurs that in 1970 called up police to beat up strikers and in 1989 gave money to Collor, have come to the conclusion that it is more prudent to become friendly with Lula than risk to be unpleasant to a likely president," *Veja* reported.

**A President of Their Own**

If the PT wins and Lula becomes president, Brazil will be led by someone who is much like the majority of its population. Despite their great social differences, (in 1989 the top 10% of the population reportedly had 51.35% of the income and the bottom 50% had 10.8% of the income) Brazilians tend to nurture leaders and idols who represent the minority of Brazil's population. (For example, Collor, and blonde blue-eyed children's television star Xuxa.) Lula himself does not hide his humble roots, mirroring those of many Brazilians. Born to a poor family in northeastern Pernambuco, he had little and intermittent schooling. At 15 he started out as a metal worker and in 1975, at 30, was elected president of his union, one of the most powerful in Brazil. In 1979, 17,000 metal workers held the first major strike against the military regime. Lula was arrested but released after a mass demonstration.

Lula entered politics in 1980 and

lost the 1982 São Paulo gubernatorial race. Four years later he was elected to Congress and in 1989, despite leading in the presidential campaign, he lost to Collor in the second round. Never one to give up, he formed a parallel government against Collor and benefited politically when Collor was impeached.

Charismatic, Lula can speak the language of common people as well as that of intellectuals. When he was in Boston in May delivering a speech at Harvard University, Lula was enthusiastically greeted by a crowd of undergraduate and graduate students. "Lula presidente!" and "Já ganhou!" ("Lula president!" and "already won!") the crowd shouted and clapped. Through the years he has polished his speech but he has not smoothed his sharp tongue. Many people want to see him in office because they feel he is one of them. And in response to critics who complain that, besides many other things, Lula does not speak "good" Portuguese, they shrug their shoulders: "So does 80% of the Brazilian population."

**Campaign Trials and Tribulations**

Four years ago, when Lula appeared likely to become president, many people wondered if the military would accept a leftist, poorly educated union worker as their commander-in-chief. This time, no one inside or outside Brazil doubts that Lula will take office if he wins. The question posed now is whether the candidate Lula will be able to overcome his party's problems and overturn the erosion of his campaign.

As this issue went to press, polls showed 46 year-old Lula, once the front-runner, slipping fast to 63 year-old Cardoso, who, as Minister of the Economy was the architect of the *Plano Real*, a government strategy to curb a 50 percent monthly inflation rate. This reflects the way in which Brazil's new economic plan and the Bisol affair (José Paulo Bisol, Lula's vice-president who was accused of nepotism and financial irregularities) hurt Lula's campaign. Bisol has now been replaced by Aloizio Mercadante, a professor of economics and Lula's closest economic strategist.

At first, however, the PT and Lula were reluctant to make the change because it could signal that the accusations against Bisol were true.

Shortly after the PT decision to switch Lula's running mate, candidate Fernando Henrique Cardoso also discharged his vice-presidential candidate, Guilherme Palmeira, who was accused of corruption, replacing him with senator Marco Maciel of the Liberal Front Party.

The vice-presidential issue is a crucial one in Brazil because in the last seven years Brazilians have twice seen a vice-president governing in place of the elected president. In 1984, Vice-president José Sarney became president when President Tancredo Neves died before assuming office. The current president, Itamar Franco, assumed office after Fernando Collor's impeachment.

Maciel's nomination as Cardoso's running mate has stirred bitter comment from the opposition parties because of his political past. Maciel

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**ILLEGITIMATE AUTHORITY**

*Funding social change since 1967*

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occupied several senior positions during the dictatorship and reportedly helped to write the amendment that allowed the military to close down Brazil's National Congress in 1969.

At the time, Cardoso had been persecuted by the military rulers, and was forced out of São Paulo University in 1969. He later achieved an illustrious international academic career. A specialist on the economics of development and the author of several books and essays on economics, he began his political career in 1978 when he was elected to the senate for the opposition party. Cardoso has been a senator ever since and in 1982 helped to found what became Brazil's largest opposition party, the Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). Six years later Cardoso left with a faction of the PMDB and formed the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB). Ironically in the early 1990s, PSDB's left wing and PT moderates were urging a political alliance which could have turned Cardoso into Lula's running mate rather than his main rival. Instead, Cardoso and his party supported the Collor administration.

The Real Plan, launched July 1, helped to revitalize Cardoso's presidential campaign which had been lagging more than 30 points behind Lula's. Before the Real Plan and the Bisol affair, it had appeared that Lula would win on the first ballot. The decision by Lula and the PT to keep Bisol as a running mate and not to support the economic measures proved to be serious mistakes. The *Central Única dos Trabalhadores* (CUT), Brazil's biggest union, which supports Lula, put out a slogan: "It [the Real Plan] feels like a nightmare but it's real." Lula said, "Workers will wake up just as poor the next day as when they went to bed the day before." He has charged that the timing of the plan was designed for maximum impact on the elections. The PT warned the electorate to be cautious of the stabilization plan's short term benefits during the campaign period.

The population thought otherwise.

Tired of inflation, frozen salaries, and overnight economic measures,

Brazilians, who in the last nine years had to deal with five different currencies, at first were skeptical but soon became convinced that the Real Plan would work, lured by the promise (and encouraged by pervasive messages in the media) that their money would increase in value. As the new currency, set initially at a one-to-one parity with the US dollar and backed by Brazil's foreign reserves, put buying power back into Brazilian pockets, Cardoso's standing in the opinion polls rose.

This situation is likely to change however. According to respected Brazilian economist Maria da Conceição Tavares the dollar-real parity is illusive because it was arbitrarily fixed by a government decree. She said there is no such thing as a strong currency in Brazil today, and the improved buying power is temporary.

At PT headquarters, however, there is little doubt that changes must be made in order to regain terrain and win back the people's confidence. Indeed, Lula was put under tremendous pressure from *Frente Brasil Popular*, the coalition of seven parties that support him, to declare his acceptance of the Real Plan and to replace his vice-president. He has done the latter, and recent reports indicate that he is changing his position on the former.

### Outcome Unpredictable

At the moment, the election outcome is uncertain. "Right now it's extremely unpredictable," says Brown University's Thomas Skidmore, a historian of Brazilian affairs. "It's clear that Cardoso is benefiting from the Real [Plan]." On the other hand, according to Skidmore, Lula "has to move away from radical positions. I believe he has been bothered by past promises and positions he wished to change." In other words, Lula has been trapped between his own readiness to move more to the center and the left wing of his party which requires him to stick with radical political positions, particularly on economic issues.

Reportedly both Lula and Cardoso support abortion rights. In Brazil, a country that holds the world's largest

Catholic population, the Catholic Church has a significant impact on social policy. Progressive church sectors are backing Lula, but conservative Catholic sectors and many Protestant churches are backing Cardoso, who describes himself as an atheist, because they support his economic policies. Skidmore points out that today's situation differs from 1990, when Lula was almost elected. "Brazil is no longer in the aftermath of the revolution [referring to the 1964 military coup d'état] and we do not know how strong the CEBs (Comunidades de Educação de Base) and the progressive church are." The CEBs strongly supported Lula four years ago "but my feeling is that they've weakened. I'm not saying they won't help, I'm saying it is a question mark."

Lula and Cardoso's campaign positions are similar in other areas as well. Both candidates focus on social issues, promising to keep inflation down while raising the standard of living. Lula and the PT defend strong investment in job development and improving working conditions in rural and suburban areas to avoid migration to the big cities. Cardoso intends to invest in the professional development of doctors and nurses to improve health conditions in Brazil. Lula wants to launch a four year emergency sanitation plan and a plan to educate people about health issues. Cardoso wants to implement a new administrative order which prioritizes health and disease prevention. Both Lula and Cardoso intend to promote small towns, giving them money to finance their own emergency health care. Both candidates oppose public money going into private health plans. Lula goes further and says health plans should cover everyone regardless of his/her financial or health condition.

The major differences between the two are their positions on land reform and the foreign debt. Lula has a program of land redistribution he says he intends to implement right away if elected. Land reform is a controversial topic for most politicians in Brazil and neither Cardoso nor the rest of the presidential field are talking about it at all.

On economic issues, Mexican

# The Korean War Threat and the Arms Budget

DANIEL B. SCHIRMER

In the late winter and early spring of this year the Pentagon began a significant military build-up in South Korea that carries with it the threat of war. In support, Pentagon allies in politics and the media have promoted an atmosphere of war crisis centered around North Korea. The Pentagon claims that this military build-up is necessary to prevent North Korea from

## Brazil

economist Jorge Castañeda says Lula needs to gain the support of the Brazilian middle class. "Lula has come a long way. He learned how to position himself in the Brazilian society. With him, PT can become a big social-democratic party. He needs to make alliance with the middle class and neutralize his enemies—the US and the financial community—by giving them guarantees for his program."

Brazilian journalist Paulo Henrique Amorim says the "banking committee is reasonably concerned" by Lula's statement in New York last May that he wants to renegotiate Brazil's foreign debt. "I don't think it would be wise to reopen an agreement" [just signed by Cardoso several months ago prior to his stepping down as Minister of the Economy to run for president] and warns that the PT and Lula "don't know what to do with inflation. They have a program to win elections not to run the country."

## The People versus the Media

Amorim, the Globe television network's USA bureau chief, and Skidmore arrive at similar conclusions when analyzing Lula and Cardoso's performance. "He [Cardoso] is not popular, he has no charisma. Cardoso speaks our language [that of the media and the economists]. He does well on TV but... he does not

acquiring nuclear weapons. There is, however, a more compelling reason for the "crisis": the Pentagon's need to secure its own survival as a dominant force in society, now that the sense of military urgency occasioned by the "evil empire" has disappeared. A U.S. army colonel stationed in South Korea suggested that the South Korean military build-up might serve such a purpose when he told David Hacksworth of *Newsweek*, "South Korea is a jobs program for the military and the last hope of the arms dealers."

talk to the old lady of Botucatu [meaning he does not talk the people's language] as we say at *O Globo*," says Amorim.

Skidmore: "Cardoso is the darling of the media. They love him. Unfortunately the electoral votes are much more than the elite. Cardoso is extremely skilled in negotiating...this is very important...he had a very good team in the Fazenda [the Ministry of Economy] but he allied himself with the most reactionary groups in Brazil." And adds: "We don't know what semiliterate people will do. Collor received many of those votes," but it's unclear who will get them in the coming election.

Brown University's Skidmore also raises the question of which candidate will benefit from voting fragmentation. For instance, at this moment, polls tend to show that Cardoso is profiting from the failing campaign of candidate Oreste Quércia of the now centrist PMDB in São Paulo.

Besides the two front runners, seven other candidates are running for president, among them Senator Espiridião Amim of the rightist Progressive Reform Party (PPR), with three percent of the votes, and former Rio de Janeiro governor Leonel Brizola of the leftist Democratic Workers Party (PDT), with seven percent. Election

## Intensive Weapons Build-up

Last March the U.S. army sent new Apache helicopters to replace old models in South Korea. In April, the Pentagon dispatched a battery of Patriot missiles to South Korea, and in June David Sanger wrote in the *New York Times* from Seoul: "The American military has brought in a tremendous amount of hardware — laser-guided bombs, intelligence air-craft, radar to pinpoint the North's artillery..."

Alongside these military prepara-

*continued on next page*

authorities say approximately 100 million Brazilians are of voting age—voting is compulsory in Brazil—including 40,000 living abroad.

As the electoral process unfolds it is impossible to predict the results. Since Collor's impeachment the political consciousness of Brazil's population has changed dramatically. There is great distrust of politicians in general, but this may not translate into a victory for Lula. The majority of the population is poor and hungry, and may vote for Cardoso because they want to believe his economic strategy will provide some relief. On the other hand, it is unclear how many people are actually aware of Cardoso's policies. Lula still has much more name recognition than Cardoso, especially among the poor and less educated.

Whoever wins will have to govern through a coalition and through compromise. Regardless of the outcome, however, for Brazilians it is gratifying to know that for the first time since the end of the military years the presidential campaign is actually about social and economic issues rather than about who is and who is not a Communist. ◇

*Heloisa Souza is the co-editor of The Brazilian Monthly and a freelance reporter in the Boston area.*

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tions, war talk flourished. The Senate called for the re-introduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, and in June it urged Clinton to send more troops to South Korea. In the same month, Brent Scowcroft, Bush's top security advisor, proposed a preemptive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities. On June 20 the cover of *U.S. News and World Report* carried a photograph of a grim-faced North Korean soldier with the question, "The next war...could it go nuclear?" A month later, after Kim Il Sung's death, *Newsweek's* front cover bore the headline, "Korea after Kim, the headless beast," dehumanizing North Koreans in a blatant example of war propaganda.

The Pentagon plays on memories of North Korea's Cold War invasion of South Korea to validate the current build-up as necessary to protect the South from another invasion. But in February, 1994, U.S. military observers at the DMZ reported that the North was not beefing up its military in preparation for war, and no such evidence has been forthcoming since.

In the early stages of this heightened tension, the North Korean military did some sabre-rattling, one general threatening to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire." In April, however, in a statement that received little attention from the U.S. press, Kim Il Sung disassociated himself from the "sea of fire" threat and rebuked the general responsible for it.

Conditions that were conducive to North Korea's Cold War invasion do not exist today. In the '50s North Korea had two powerful allies that supported its invasion of the South — the Soviet Union and China. Today the Soviet Union is no more and Beijing does not want a war on the Korean peninsula for fear it would disrupt foreign trade and investment, China's current preoccupations.

In the '50s the North Korean economy was strong, that of the South, weak; now the situation is reversed. Today North Korea is a small, isolated, and impoverished country with an annual defense budget of \$2 billion, compared to that of the South at \$12

billion (not to mention the \$250 billion budget of the U.S. military, the South's chief ally). No wonder the Center for Defense Information, led by retired officials of the U.S. Armed Forces, states flatly that South Korea can very well take care of its own defense. Yet Lieut. Gen. James Clapper, head of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, maintains that "North Korea will be the critical, major military threat for the next few years." (Evidently the General is looking forward to South Korea's "jobs program" lasting some time.)

To support its Korean war scare, the Pentagon also relies on the once-dominant official ideology of the Cold War, with its hostility to a repressive one-party Communist state. Yet the position is wildly inconsistent. China is such a state, in possession of the atom bomb, but it is not threatened by Patriot missiles and war talk; instead Washington tends to overlook the Chinese government's repressive policies because China is such an important trading partner.

There are those who argue that trade with Asia requires a continued military presence in the region. The U.S. currently has a huge military establishment in Asia known as the Pacific Command. This force includes 300,000 service men and women; half the warships of the U.S. Navy; two-thirds of the Marine Corps; two army divisions, and several tactical fighter wings of the U.S. air force. The 37,000 troops in South Korea, and the military build-up there, comprise the spearhead of the Command, all directed against North Korea and costing the U.S. taxpayer a pretty penny.

Last fall Admiral Charles Larson, head of the Command, claimed that maintenance of this huge military machine was needed to provide "support" for U.S. business as it took advantage of flourishing Asian markets. But in 1993, Spain, without a notable military presence in Asia, increased its exports to China nearly 200%, and other industrial powers have had similar success, also without heavy military support.

The U.S. taxpayer may become

aware of these facts. Accordingly, the threat of nuclear proliferation and war presents a more cogent argument for U.S. arms expenditures in Asia. Richard Haass, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, warns, however, that a war on the Korean peninsula would actually disrupt trade and investment in Asia. So, when the Pentagon risks a war with North Korea it seems to be more concerned with its own political survival than with that of U.S./Asian trade.

### The Sanctions Scare

In March, 1993, the U.S. and South Korea practiced war games directed against North Korea, which included simulated exercises with nuclear weapons. As a result of these games, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the current tension began. A year later, in March, 1994, the U.S. began its military build-up, and then brought the threat of war into view on two occasions in April and June. The issue precipitating this sharpening of the tension in each case has been the claim of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the watchdog of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that North Korea was obstructing the inspection of its nuclear facilities, making it impossible to determine whether or not Pyongyang was actually engaged in the production of nuclear weapons.

On both occasions President Clinton proposed economic sanctions against the North under U.N. auspices. North Korea has said it would regard sanctions as an act of war. The first of these crises was defused by China which proposed, instead of sanctions, a U.N. letter urging North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA. Clinton agreed to do this and the U.N. carried it out. The second such incident was laid to rest by the June meeting between ex-President Carter and Kim Il Sung, who agreed to freeze all nuclear activities that might relate to bomb production if and when top level negotiations were conducted with the U.S.

Prior to Carter's visit, North Korean officials had stated more than once

that full inspections would be allowed if the U.S. would agree to top level negotiations leading to diplomatic recognition. Moreover, this position was well known. The prominent South Korean political figure Kim Dae Jung, for example, referred to the possibility of such a package deal when he addressed an international peace conference in Manila in April. It would seem, then, that if the U.S. government had undertaken serious negotiations with North Korea earlier, the military build-up and the threat of war could have been avoided.

Mark Melcher, a research director for the New York investment house Prudential Securities, Inc., may have indicated why the route of war-scare and military build-up took precedence over that of negotiation when he told the *Christian Science Monitor* on June 20 that "the threat of conflict with North Korea has been exaggerated — perhaps by the Pentagon — as a way of offsetting defense cuts by Congress."


As the June crisis developed the Clinton administration began an attempt to set up an international coalition to back the economic sanctions proposed against North Korea. In its June 13 issue *Time* magazine wrote: "In an era when coalition building is deemed a necessary requisite to military action, sanctions are an important step up the ladder to war."

Indeed, Secretary of Defense Perry has said that upholding nuclear non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula was worth the risk of war.

### Nuclear Non-Proliferation is a Myth

Is the defense of the principle of nuclear non-proliferation worth the risk of war on the Korean peninsula? While no one in their right mind wants to see the spread of nuclear weapons, the nuclear non-proliferation policy, as presently practiced by the principle nuclear powers, particularly the U.S., is not worth the risk of war. It does not have a moral leg to stand on, and is completely impractical as well.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into being in 1968, pushed forward by the U.S., but soon adhered



to by the Soviet Union. It was used as an instrument of the Cold War since each superpower wanted to preserve as near a nuclear monopoly as possible and did not want their rival's client states to gain the bomb. The Cold War purpose of nonproliferation was demonstrated by the exceptions the U.S. made to it: Israel was allowed to get the bomb as a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the Mideast, as was Pakistan, when it opposed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

The late Peter Clausen, an expert on U.S. non-proliferation policy, laid down the U.S. post-Cold War paradigm in his book, *Nuclear Nonproliferation and the National Interest*. Calling upon the United States "to establish a strong priority for nonproliferation in planning the post-Cold War order," Clausen directed the thrust of this policy against the "Third World" (the phrase commonly used to refer to the countries of the South, to developing countries, and to former colonial countries), writing: "Although proliferation no longer threatens to catalyze a U.S. - Soviet nuclear conflict, the Third World threat is not self-contained. It is linked by strategic, economic, and geographic factors to Western interests, and thus poses risks from which the U.S. cannot realistically hope to insulate itself."

In other words, nuclear weapons in the wrong hands could threaten U.S. and "Western" interests in the Third World: military vantage points, cheap labor, raw materials, and opportunities for trade and investment. Evidently

there are those in the Third World who see the question just as clearly as did Peter Clausen, but from the opposite point of view. The editor of *Malaya*, a daily paper in Manila known for its opposition to the Marcos dictatorship, wrote on June 6, 1994:

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the biggest fraud and swindle ever inflicted by the nuclear powers on the rest of the world. Its objective is not to prevent war and keep the peace but to enable them to preserve their monopoly and thus their military superiority. They can bully peoples and countries they don't like at will.

But the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is only one side of the U.S. nuclear policy toward the Third World. The other side is to develop nuclear weapons the Pentagon can use against countries of the Third World, preferably countries without nuclear capability. In September, 1992, William Arkin, a nuclear weapons expert now connected with Greenpeace, wrote in *The New York Times* that scientists at the Los Alamos Laboratory, with the tacit approval of the Bush administration, were working on a new generation of very small nuclear weapons for use in the Third World. In February, 1993, the *Times* carried a story that General Lee Butler and his assistants at the U.S. Strategic Command were working on computer models that would enable

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President Clinton to "aim nuclear weapons at Third World nations that threaten the interests of the U.S. and its allies."

While the U.S. presumes to admonish and threaten North Korea for its perceived interest in developing nuclear weapons, this country itself possesses 17,000 nuclear warheads, has threatened North Korea with nuclear weapons on South Korean soil for nearly 40 years, and presently targets North Korea with the hydrogen bomb. In the face of such a consistent and formidable nuclear threat it would not be surprising if North Korea became interested in having a nuclear weapon as a matter of self-defense.

Moreover, while the U.S. threatens North Korea with war over what may be preparations for the development of a nuclear bomb, it turns a blind eye to similar preparations in South Korea and Japan, North Korea's neighbors, as recently reported by Eric Nadler in *The Nation*. Clearly that's because both of these close allies of the Pentagon support U.S. hegemony in Asia. The arrogance and hypocrisy of U.S. non-proliferation policy as applied to North Korea is obvious.

In addition to its moral bankruptcy, the policy is impractical. Referring to Brent Scowcroft's proposal to bomb North Korea's nuclear facilities, Peter Grier, Washington correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*, wrote on June 20, "Some ... analysts say such forcible non-proliferation may not be worth the risk, considering that with atomic bomb technology now over 50 years old proliferation is inevitable."

Given that the know-how of making atomic bombs is probably so accessible that their spread is inevitable, and given that the atomic weapon is an unmitigated evil whomever possesses it, the only just, rational, and effective policy is universally to abolish and outlaw this hideous and inhuman armament. This policy must be adopted in the first place by those who possess the greatest stockpiles of nuclear weapons, particularly the U.S.

This is the urgent call of one of the

U.S. military's most senior officers, Gen. Charles Horner, head of the U.S. Space Command. He told a meeting of reporters in Washington in July that nuclear weapons were "obsolete" and he wanted to "get rid of them all." Horner harkened back to a vision endorsed by Reagan and Gorbachev — that of the U.S. and the Soviet Union — the two main nuclear powers, both moving toward total nuclear disarmament. "Think of the high moral ground we secure by having none," said Horner. "It's kind of hard for us to say to North Korea, 'You are terrible people, you're developing a nuclear weapon,'" when the U.S. has thousands of them.

Nuclear non-proliferation as now practiced by the U.S. has not stopped nuclear proliferation, but instead bolsters the monopoly of the current nuclear powers who can direct their weaponry against the Third World. It serves only to sidetrack and obscure the only solution to the problem of nuclear weapons — their total abolition.

#### Negotiation Possible with Pressure

What is the outlook for Korea? Will the process of negotiation that the U.S. and North Korea have entered into lead to a peaceful and nuclear-free Korean peninsula? That depends on several open questions.

First, there is the policy of North Korea after the death of Kim Il Sung. It now looks as though Kim Il Sung's son, Kim Jong Il, intends to carry on the policies laid down by his father in his conference with Carter. Kim Jong Il's government is now engaged in top-level negotiations with the U.S., and the meeting with South Korean leadership, agreed to by Kim Il Sung, has been postponed but not cancelled. The new regime so far gives the appearance of stability.

Second, there are the pressures exerted by hawks in the U.S. It is certain that those who have an interest in maintaining tension on the Korean peninsula will do what they can to disrupt the process of negotiation now taking place; to put pressure on Clinton to disengage from the negotiating process and return to the policy of con-

frontation. Some Seoul analysts, for example, regard as highly questionable the testimony of a North Korean defector, Kang Myong Do, who claims North Korea possesses five nuclear bombs. That testimony places him in the same camp as the CIA, which has maintained all along that North Korea has one or two such bombs. The timing of Kang Myong Do's testimony also seemed odd; this defector came forward less than 10 days before North Korea and the U.S. were to resume high level talks in Geneva.

The role of President Clinton has been ambiguous to say the least. He agreed to Carter's visit to Kim Il Sung, whereas Bush had refused a previous request by Carter for permission for such a visit. On the other hand, he was busy planning economic sanctions against North Korea, and troop reinforcement to South Korea, just before Carter reported on the success of his meeting. Clinton seems, above all, to be responsive to pressure. So, if war is to be averted in Korea, its opponents must counter pressure from the Pentagon lobby; they must write, wire, and phone President Clinton, urging him to continue to negotiate a peaceful solution to the nuclear question in Korea. ◇

*Daniel Schirmer is the author of Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War, and, with Steven R. Shalom, The Philippines Reader: A Documentary History. He is a member of the Friends of the Filipino People and Mobilization for Survival.*

**Are you torn between going to school and your conviction against killing in war?**

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**FEAT**

1601 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 750,  
Washington, DC 20009, Tel: 202-483-4559

# GRANTS

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women's resource center serving refugee and displaced women in Zagreb. NONA (which means "grandmother" in a Croatian dialect) opened in December, 1993, offering Croatia's first women-centered library.

BWEP is now working to ensure the survival of NONA and to build lasting working relationships with other women in the Balkans through cultural exchange, networking, fundraising, and responding directly to the expressed needs of Balkan women. This summer, BWEP planned visits to NONA and to Sarajevo to begin planning for a women's center there. One member of BWEP collected and personally carried into Tuzla \$2500 in vitamins and 300 pounds of humanitarian aid. The group has organized speaking engagements in the Chicago area and elsewhere to support crosscultural understanding between Balkan and U.S. women. BWEP also sponsored a 4-day speaking tour by Katarina Vidovic, a feminist activist from Croatia.

BWEP's primary means of communication are phone, fax, and modem rather than through a traditional newsletter. Through these means the group has been able to obtain magazine subscriptions for NONA; make contact with students who conducted a \$5,000 fundraising drive for NONA; mobilize for demonstrations on behalf of women war survivors; keep the academic community informed about the women's archive and library in the Balkans which is housed in NONA; and organize an internship for a U.S. student who spent 8 weeks of work and study at NONA. BWEP has found that the Internet allows the group to quickly transmit information directly from women at NONA about their programs and the actions of other women's groups in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. RESIST's recent grant was used to support BWEP's phone, fax, and Internet expenses for six months.

## Colorado Coalition Against Apartheid

(renamed Colorado Coalition for a New South Africa)  
1535 High Street, 3rd Floor  
Denver, CO 80218

The Colorado Coalition Against Apartheid was formed in 1984 in response to a speaking tour by members of the African National Congress in Colorado. The group worked to educate the public

about the repressive nature of apartheid in South Africa, and played a key role in opposing and ultimately blocking the establishment of an honorary consulate in Denver. The group supported the ANC's boycott of Coke-a-Cola, and launched a successful five-year campaign to force the city of Denver to divest its holdings in South Africa.

The goals of the group (renamed Colorado Coalition for a New South Africa - CCNSA) are to assist in the struggle for freedom, peace, human rights and political and economic equity in South Africa. The work involves public speaking, educational and cultural events, and material and technical support. Group members believe that the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment of a multi-racial and multi-party government will not immediately translate into an egalitarian society, and that decades of racial segregation and hatred will require decades of racial acceptance and reconciliation. However, as a step towards equity, the group works to promote fair distribution of educational and economic resources as well as land, housing, and food.

Projects CCNSA is currently involved with include an African film festival depicting varied aspects of contemporary life in South Africa. The group publishes a quarterly newsletter providing its 1800 readers with substantive information on the current social and political climate in South Africa. A major undertaking for this year is a Sister Community Project with Duncan Village in South Africa. Duncan Village is a Black township that is part of East London. CCNSA currently has two members in South Africa working to make this project successful.

The first residents settled Duncan Village in 1871. Since that time there have been numerous efforts to relocate its residents. Duncan Village Local was formed in 1985 as part of the South African National Civics Organization to oppose the imposition of repression by the white regime and "puppet" Black government officials. CCNSA is working with the Duncan Village Local to help them equip and staff an office in the community. The Local plans to initiate a brick-making project leading to the development of a housing cooperative.

RESIST's grant of last December was used to support the group's newsletter, the spring festival, and educational work focused on the Sister Community Project.

## Grants to groups doing South Africa support work since 1985

*In the last nine years RESIST provided nearly \$9,000 in 24 grants (including 6 emergency grants) to anti-apartheid activism, and other work in solidarity with the people of South Africa as they worked to overthrow the apartheid system. Our focus has been to fund those groups whose work falls outside the guidelines of liberal or mainstream foundations.*

- 1985— Coalition for Illinois Divestment (Chicago, IL)  
Columbia University Free South Africa Movement (NY, NY)  
Michigan Coalition for Human Rights (Detroit, MI)  
Bishop Tutu Refugee Fund (Hartford, CT)
- 1987— Bishop Tutu Refugee Fund (Hartford, CT)
- 1988— Afrika Baraza (Roxbury, MA)  
Iowa Citizen Action Network (Des Moines, IA)  
Synapses, Inc. (Chicago, IL)
- 1989— Africa Resource Center (Oakland, CA)  
Chicago Committee in Solidarity with Southern Africa (Chicago, IL)  
Clergy & Laity Concerned (Eugene, OR)  
Free My People/Youth Leadership Movement (Roxbury, MA)  
Simon Nkoli Coordinating Committee (Cambridge, MA)
- 1990— Committee Against Racism & Apartheid (Washington, DC)  
Nelson Mandela National Reception Committee/USA (Wash. DC)  
South Africa Working Group/AFSC Western MA (Northampton, MA)
- 1991— Chicago Alexandra Sister Community Project (Chicago, IL)  
Chicago Mozambique Support Network (Chicago, IL)  
Global Exchange (San Francisco, CA)  
Michigan Coalition for Human Rights (Detroit, MI)  
Mobilization for Survival (Cambridge, MA)  
Southern California Ecumenical Task Force on South Africa (Los Angeles, CA)
- 1993— Colorado Coalition Against Apartheid (Denver, CO)  
Michigan Coalition for Human Rights (Detroit, MI)

# GRANTS

In each issue of the newsletter we highlight a few recent grants made to groups around the country. In this issue we feature grants to groups doing international solidarity work. In recognition of the recent all race elections in South Africa, we also include a listing of grants made over the past nine years for South Africa support work. The information in these brief reports is provided to us by the groups themselves. For more details, please write to them at the addresses included here.

## Peace Brigades International/USA, 2642 College Avenue Berkeley, CA 94794

Peace Brigades International (PBI) began its work in 1983 in Guatemala. Volunteers accompanied threatened members of the Mutual Support Group of Relatives of the Disappeared. In 1987, PBI was invited to set up a similar project in El Salvador, and remained there until 1992 following the peace accords. In both countries, PBI has given protective accompaniment to dozens of trade union members, university students, women's groups, peasant communities and refugee groups. In Guatemala, prior to PBI's work in 1983, no human rights organization could openly exist.

In 1989, PBI initiated an escort service for human rights workers in Sri Lanka, and in 1991 began a project in native communities in North America and has engaged in accompaniment and peace education workshops with Mohawk, Iroquois, Inuit, and Innu communities in New York and Que-

bec. In December of 1992, PBI participated in a coalition effort in Haiti entitled Cry for Justice. This year, PBI is working in Colombia and in North America, accompanying protest demonstrations against the construction of a dam which will flood thousands of acres of ancestral Innu land.

PBI's purpose is to challenge the myth that violent institutions and warfare must dominate human affairs. By pursuing international strategies for peacemaking, PBI volunteers demonstrate that individuals working together can act boldly as peace-makers even when governments cannot or will not. PBI provides accompaniment for those whose lives are threatened; fosters reconciliation and peace dialogue among conflicting parties; and conducts education and training for peace and human rights activists.

PBI/USA has an Emergency Response Network of 1800 individuals and organizations who send telexes and faxes to local authorities in response to attacks or illegal detention of those whom PBI accompanies. The group also prints and distributes materials including the *Project Bulletin* and the *PBI/USA Report* which contains accounts of PBI teams' work and photographs and is distributed to a mailing list of 5700 in the U.S. The U.S. office of PBI also coordinates speaking tours and training events. Two week-long nonviolence training intensives are held each year. PBI has received requests for accompaniment from groups in Fiji, Iraq, Azerbaijan, the Philippines, Burma, Panama, Honduras, Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, Chad, and Croatia. The ability to respond depends on human and financial resources.

PBI volunteers are armed only with cameras. When violence occurs, volunteers photograph the situation; the photographic evidence and witness of international volunteers have proved to be powerful tools for social justice. Visual images as carried in PBI's educational materials are essential to its ability to mobilize the peace and human rights community in this country. RESIST's recent grant to PBI will help cover the costs of film for teams in Guatemala, Sri Lanka, and North America.

## Balkan Women's Empowerment Project, P.O. Box 409281 Chicago, IL 60640

The Balkan Women's Empowerment Project (BWEP) was formed in April, 1993, by two Chicago activists who had been involved with the Bosnia Committee of the Chicago chapter of the Women's Action Coalition (WAC). While organizing street demonstrations and letter campaigns on behalf of Balkan women, BWEP initiated conversation with Balkan women to find out what they needed from women in the U.S. Repeatedly, women requested books and information on rape, recovery, women's health, and general feminist titles. In response, BWEP organized 16 women's bookstores and organizations in the U.S. to participate in a book drive in the summer of 1993, which resulted in a collection of over 1,200 books. BWEP worked with Natasa Jovicic and author Durda Miklauzic of Zagreb, Croatia leading to plans for the NONA Multimedijski Zenski Centar, a

*continued on page nine*

### Join the Resist Pledge Program

We'd like you to consider becoming a Resist Pledge. Pledges account for over 25% of our income. By becoming a pledge, you help guarantee Resist a fixed and dependable source of income on which we can build our grant making program. In return, we will send you a monthly pledge letter and reminder, along with your newsletter. We will keep you up-to-date on the groups we have funded, and the other work being done at Resist. So take the plunge and become a Resist Pledge! We count on you, and the groups we fund count on us.

- Yes! I would like to become a Resist Pledge. I'd like to pledge \$\_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_\_ (monthly, bi-monthly, quarterly, 2x a year, yearly).**
- Enclosed is my pledge contribution of \$\_\_\_\_\_.**
- I can't join the pledge program just now, but here's a contribution to support your work. \$\_\_\_\_\_**

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### Housing Available

If you are moving to Boston, or know someone who is, and need temporary housing, we may have just the place! Tatiana Schreiber, the RESIST newsletter editor, needs a responsible person or couple to rent her 4 1/2 room furnished apartment from November through April (dates somewhat flexible) in a great location in the Jamaica Plain section of the city. The apartment is in a six-family building with good neighbors, near public transportation and parks. Rent will be approximately \$650 + utilities and is somewhat negotiable. Pets are possible too. Call (617) 522-7720.