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## Adverse selection and moral hazard in group-based lending

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*Document Version*

Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

*Publication date:*

2005

[Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database](#)

*Citation for published version (APA):*

Mehrteab, H. T. (2005). Adverse selection and moral hazard in group-based lending: evidence from Eritrea. s.n.

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**Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in  
Group-Based Lending:  
Evidence from Eritrea**

**Habteab Tekie Mehrteab  
University of Groningen**

RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN

ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD IN GROUP-BASED  
LENDING: EVIDENCE FROM ERITREA

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van het doctoraat in de  
Economische Wetenschappen  
aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen  
op gezag van de  
Rector Magnificus, dr. F. Zwarts,  
in het openbaar te verdedigen op  
donderdag 10 februari 2005  
om 16.15 uur

door

Habteab Tekie Mehrteab  
geboren op 5 juni 1959  
te Asmara  
Eritrea

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## **Acknowledgements**

This thesis has been completed with the help and cooperation of many institutions and individuals that have played a vital role in providing intellectual, material and moral support.

I would like to thank NUFFIC for its financial support and the Faculty of Economics of the University of Groningen for extending its resources and creating a stimulating learning environment during my stay in Groningen.

On the intellectual side I wish to express my gratitude and thanks to my promoter Prof. Robert Lensink and my co-promoter Dr. Niels Hermes for their hearty support, encouragement and intellectual guidance and advice. Without their professional guidance this work could not have the quality it has now. Moreover, I would like to extend my gratitude for their congenial hospitality. I would also like to thank the committee members of this thesis, Prof. Andy Mullineux, Prof. Jan-Willem Gunning and Prof. Bart van Ark, for reading my manuscript and for their valuable comments.

The office for International Relations and Centre of Development Studies of the University of Groningen were providing me with necessary facilities and support during my entire study period. My special thanks go to Drs. Madeleine Gradeur, Mr. Eric Haarbrink, Ms. Marieke Farachi and Drs. Regine Van Groningen from the international relations office and to Mr. Arthur de Boer and Dr. Pieter Boele van Hensbroek from the Centre for Development Studies. I also wish to express my thanks to Dr. Clemens Lutz from the faculty Business and Management of the University of Groningen for his constant support and encouragement during my study period.

As my study was based on primary data collected from different parts of Eritrea, I received logistical, material and moral support from a number of institutions and individuals in my home country. I want to acknowledge with appreciation the assistance I got from the employees of the Saving and Microcredit Program (SMCP) and the Southern Zone Savings and Credit Scheme (SZSCS). My special thanks go to Mr. Mengisteab

Afeworki and Mr. Brhane Beyene from SMCP and to Mr. Hasebenebi Kaffel and Mr. Issaias Abraham from ACORD-Eritrea.

I am also grateful to all my friends and colleagues for their intellectual and moral support. In particular, I want to thank my friends Biniam Araia, Fikadu Mesfun, Fitsum Ghebreghiorgis and Yosief Abraha for their encouragement and support during my study period.

Last but not least I would like to extend my gratitude and thanks to my family for their material and moral support. A special gratitude goes to my father and sisters (Tekie, Lemlem, Netzanet, Shiwa, Mitzlal and Zufan). However, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my late mother Himan Mereed. Although she did not get formal education herself, she sacrificed a lot and gave all her support to see me pursue me education.

Habteab Tekie Mehrteab

Asmara, December 6, 2004

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