



# Preferential Voting Systems

Influence on Intra-Party Competition  
and Voting Behaviour

Gianluca Passarelli

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*After all, I am still writing (kind of) books only for the pleasure of dedicating them to you: Cesira, Mario, and the “newly elected” who is expected in our family: Gabriele. They were truly selected via a “preference vote”*

## PREFACE

Being born in Italy (being Italian is different, and I never completely understood what it really means) has had some influence, albeit involuntarily, on my political and cultural education. When I was very young, I witnessed “preferential voting” in action. Since then, I have cultivated a passion for the study and analysis of electoral systems. Through a child’s eyes, I watched the unfair and undemocratic so-called “*scheda segnata*”, in which, until 1991, a maximum of four votes was possible and parties gave their affiliates a number series, such as 1, 2, 3, 4, indicating the precise candidates whom they were to support. The control in the precinct was the confirmation that the voter was loyal. This system was primarily (but not exclusively) used by the Christian Democrats to control voters’ behaviour. Similarly, the Communists, who claimed to fight for voters’ freedom, in fact controlled their behaviour by simply supporting the official party rankings and harshly limiting any internal competition and voters’ individual choice.

Many years later, I had the chance to restart my study of this topic at the Istituto Carlo Cattaneo in Bologna, Italy. Since then, I have continued to follow this research path, largely inspired by the works of Matthew Shugart, and have had the opportunity to strengthen my knowledge at the Department of Political Sciences, Sapienza University, Rome.

The main questions that have held my mind are the following. Does preferential voting really confer more power on voters? In such a context, do voters really determine the election of a candidate or, as the

empirical evidence seems to suggest, is the case just the opposite? Is preferential voting a system that severely limits voters' options? Based on my personal experience, I always doubted that preferential voting genuinely conferred any decisive power on voters, at least in Italy. Nevertheless, I needed more sophisticated information than my intuition to answer this question, and I needed to compare more than one case to have a larger picture of the variant ways in which preferential voting can manifest itself. The evidence gathered here confirms my intuition, as well as the importance of investigating how voters' freedom and power to affect electoral outcomes and parliamentary turnover can vary widely across preferential voting systems' provisions.

Rome, Italy

Gianluca Passarelli

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Scandinavian countries should adopt as a model. Seriously. Giovanni Bachelet involuntarily furnished the exergue for this book. Michelangelo Gentilini and Federica Delogu skilfully managed the data set for a few countries. The staff of the library of the Department of Political Sciences, Sapienza, provided constant and kind support. I would also like to thank all the participants at the conference on “Preference Voting” hosted at Sapienza University in 2014. I am also grateful for the helpful environment of the Department of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, which gave me the final push to take the last step of this project. Thank you to Scott Morgenstern, Barry Ames, and Jae-Jae Spoon and to Maxfield Peterson for his valuable work in correcting the text. I am grateful to the publisher and to Ambra Finotello and Anne-Katrin Birchley-Brun for their trust and support.

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Bologna, Pittsburgh, and Rome  
May 2019

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## Preferential Voting: Theoretical Approach and Empirical Consequences

Elections are crucial in politics. In his novel Ignazio Silone reported a lovely story in which an unknown candidate was elected despite the official party supporting another challenger.

*“Two days later, a curious old little man arrived in the square from Rome. [...] No one knew him; his name was Scellingo. He said he was an oculist and that he was running on the People’s Party ticket against the Prince. A curious crowd surrounded him, most of them children and women, who could not vote”. [...] “Tell your fathers that the vote is secret. Nothing more”. Then he added: “I’m poor, I make my living as a doctor, but if any one of you had something wrong with his eyes, I’ll cure him for nothing”. [...] “Remind your fathers that the vote is secret”. Then he left. But the election of the Prince was so certain, [...] that the authorities and the Prince’s agents announced in advance a celebration of the inevitable victory. [...] Great was the astonishment of all when it was announced that in the privacy of the ballot box an overwhelming majority of the voters had chosen the unknown oculist. (Silone 1968: 54–55)*

The above quote from Ignazio Silone tells us that voters have the power to decide and that their vote matters. However, the extent to which the latter is true depends greatly on the electoral system in question. Electoral systems matter and, as such, are well debated and analysed in the literature. In the last three to four decades, there have been many improvements to these analyses in both theoretical and empirical terms. However, although the comparative research on

electoral systems represents a well-established and mature field, there are still “new challenges ahead” (Shugart 2005: 25). A general definition considers electoral systems as “a set of laws and party rules that regulate electoral competition between and *within* parties” (italics my own) (Cox 1997: 38). In particular, the “*within*-parties” dimension is still relatively undeveloped. Although some research and case study contributions have emerged, “the relative absence of basic comparative data on the intraparty dimension hinders our development and testing of theory” (Shugart 2005: 25).<sup>1</sup> This book represents an attempt to shed some light on this topic by exploring the effects of “preferential voting systems”, in particular PLPR systems, and the intraparty dimension and to frame the electoral rules at the base of each system.

Considering voters’ behaviour and influence on electoral outcomes, it is possible to conceive of two main categories of preferential voting systems: when voters vote directly for the list and when they do not. The process of allocating seats to candidates may be “direct” or “mediated” by a second step. In proportional representation systems, in one case, parties establish the order of candidates on the list and each seat won by the party is successively assigned to each candidate following the list order. Closed-system proportional representation (CLPR), as the system just presented can be defined, is not the only system, however. There are also systems that allow voters to cast a vote for their preferred candidate either from a single party list of their choice or from multiple lists. The crucial point is that voters decide (totally or partially, according to some requirements that I shall detail) who is elected to the party list. To accomplish this, there are both *open-list* and *flexible* systems. However, as indicated earlier, “preferential voting” is an aspect of electoral systems that is frequently mentioned in the literature, but special studies on the topic are lacking. Although there has recently been an

<sup>1</sup>Thus, if it is true, as Katz and Bardi state, that “preferential voting has received less attention from scholars, less than it deserves” (1979: 94) and that, until now, only a few scholars have devoted meticulous empirical research to the topic, this book ambitiously attempts to fill that gap. Of course, in the twenty years since Katz and Bardi’s analysis, research has been conducted on preferential voting in different countries and by various scholars (Marsh 1985; Katz 1986; Karvonen 2004, 2011; Ortega 2004; Shugart 2005; Shugart et al. 2005; Bergman et al. 2013; Wauters et al. 2018). Nevertheless, even though well-conducted analyses and in-depth case studies exist, a general research project that compares countries that adopt preferential list proportional representation (PLPR) is still lacking, at least to my knowledge.

increase in the number of journal articles dealing with “preferences”, this is certainly not the case for systematic and comparative analyses of preferential voting systems. Research including all cases (or at least a significant amount of them), is still lacking, at least beyond mere descriptions of electoral systems’ technicalities, and researchers have yet to place a deeper focus on the effects of preferential voting. In particular, more attention should be paid to the consequences of preferential voting for party organization and internal electoral competition. Therefore, this analysis is primarily concerned with the impact of preferential voting on the intraparty dimension, an area that is still lacking in data. Rather than standing in the crowded field of comparing electoral systems and their consequences for a particular political system characteristic, such as Effective number of parties (ENP), socio-economic variables, government and parliament structures, and so on, I focus on the ways in which preferential voting systems affect intraparty dynamics. Indeed, this agenda recognizes Shugart’s claim that “redressing the relative absence of systematic intraparty data for those electoral systems that entail intraparty competition should be high on the agenda in coming years” (Shugart 2005: 50). This investigation emerges from a situation in which, for “most questions concerning preference voting, research is just beginning” (Katz 1986: 102). However, although the situation of preferential voting studies is not as terrible as Richard Katz aptly describes in a study published more than 30 years ago, a lack of information, data, and analysis remains, as I shall describe.

If we only consider the voters’ options, then the preferential voting system can be considered as a system in which the voters are not only offered “a choice between parties, [but] they can simultaneously make a choice between individual candidates that represent the party of their choice” (Karvonen 2004: 203). However, the voters’ choice is only one part of the analysis, and open-list proportional representation (OLPR), to which the latter definition refers, is “nothing” more than one category of proportional representation preferences list (PRPL) regimes, albeit barely the most common and diffuse and probably the best known.

The effects of electoral systems on party systems are a topic of significant study. Electoral systems’ impacts on ENP, the level of disproportionality, and the ballot structure are noted as being “particularly important in the case of list systems” (Farrell 2001: 82). Nevertheless, a conceptual clarification process is needed before beginning an analysis of “preferential voting systems”, in particular, a shared definition

must be identified. There are important differences between scholars on this issue, primarily because there is no systematic comparative analysis of cases within a single category. For example, David Farrell indicates that “most of the list systems operate a more flexible, or ‘open’ ballot structure, and are, to varying degrees, preferential systems” (Farrell 2001: 82), and then he lists those that are least open. Moreover, the author adds that an intermediate category of openness is presented by cases like Finland or Italy “[...] where personal votes have a real influence on candidate rank order” (Farrell 2001: 87). In the same light, Lijphart includes Single transferable vote (STV)/Ireland together with other preferential voting systems (2005: ix). I think that the lack of comparative analysis of “preferential list proportional representation” (PLPR) cases has created a need for a common theoretical framework, especially with regard to the effects of electoral systems on both the intraparty dynamics of parliamentary turnover and the internal competition.

The behavioural influence of electoral systems can be separated into three categories of affected actors: parties, candidates, and voters. “A system may require the elector to vote solely for a party list, the particular candidates elected being determined by their order on the list, or offer degrees of choice of candidate within party list, or even across party lists” (Bogdanor 1983: 2). It has been stated clearly that additional elements, such as district magnitude, also in PLRP, can affect voters’ behaviour. Similarly, parties’ internal organization can play a relevant role in shaping candidates’ behaviour before and after the elections. Therefore, the measurement of variations between and within electoral systems is an important source of knowledge in the field of electoral systems. Regarding electoral systems’ features, Blais (1988) indicates three main domains: (1) the rules (the structure of the vote; the object of voting; and the mechanism—the number of votes and the kind of votes); (2) the district (the kind of district and the magnitude); and (3) the formula (majority, plurality, proportional, and mixed). In terms of results, the level of proportionality is then taken into account. In particular, looking at preferential voting systems, the variables to be considered include the district magnitude, the number of votes cast, the ballot structure, the choice of candidate within parties, whether voting is compulsory, the possibility of voting for both the list and the candidate, and the percentage of votes needed to change the party’s list order (in the latter case only for flexible-list systems).

Therefore, one<sup>2</sup> of the most interesting areas to investigate in the field of preferential voting systems is, as stated earlier, their impact on intra-party competition. Moreover, albeit not analysed in this book, do parties take into account voters' expectations when choosing candidates on the list? We do not yet know exactly, although some data are being explored (André et al. 2017). In what way might preferential voting affect political parties? In particular, do preferences matter in terms of party personnel and differences in party strategies in a preferential voting environment? In this vein, as Carey and Shugart argue in their well-known article, "it is widely acknowledged that electoral rules shape the extent to which individual politicians can benefit electorally by developing personal reputations distinct from those of their party" (1995: 418) (see also Fenno 1978; Uslander 1985; Jacobson 1990; Mainwaring 1991; Geddes and Ribeiro Neto 1992; Shugart and Nielson 1993).

However, here I am interested in the effects of preferential voting on voters' choice and candidate endorsement and turnover. In fact, focusing on preferential voting represents "a closer look at an aspect of intraparty competition" (Wildgen 1985: 947), also considered to be an element of electoral stability and parties' internal balance of power. As Shugart clearly states, "the study of the intraparty dimension has been hampered by a sometimes nebulous characterization of the dependent variables, a lack of data, and even worse, a lack of clear understanding of what the rules being investigated across countries are" (2005: 36).

According to Carey and Shugart (1995), whose analysis focuses on candidates' personal reputation, there are four different cases or subtypes of PLPR systems:

1. **Open-list formula with multiple votes.** In this subtype, "lists are still composed by party leaders, but voters may express preferences for some candidates over others [...]. The fact that voters are allowed multiple votes [...] means that candidates of a given party can run as a bloc" (1995: 426) (an example of this can be found in Italy prior to the reforms of 1993) (Passarelli 2017, 2018).
2. **Open-list formula with a single vote.** In these systems, "voters cast a single vote below the party level, either for an individual candidate or a factional list. [...] candidates can no longer run as

<sup>2</sup>As described in Chapter 2, I also include other variables—such as the party systems—for the effects of preferential voting.

teams, seeking to share the votes of particular voters. Each candidate or list stands alone in the quest for each voter's single vote" (1995: 427) (examples are Brazil, Chile, and Poland).

3. **Open-list formula with open endorsement and multiple votes.** Here, "party leaders do not have the ability to select candidates" (1995: 427). There are no empirical examples of such a system.
4. **Open-list formula with open endorsement and a single vote.** "Open list system in which party leaders do not control endorsements, and in which voters cast a single vote below the party level" (Carey and Shugart 1995: 428) (examples include Finland and Brazil<sup>3</sup>).

The term "preference" is an object of debate, and considerable misunderstanding, conceptual stretching, and disputes on a shared definition persist. There is often an overlap between terms, and one word is frequently used to refer to different systems. Broadly speaking, there is more than one system, in both majority and proportional contexts, that allows voters to cast a "preference vote", that is, a vote for their favourite candidate(s). However, only a few systems make voters' decision truly influential. Further conceptual and theoretical clarity is needed to make a comparison possible and valuable. Just as an example, the single non-transferable vote, single transferable vote, and PLPR list systems all allow voters to cast preference votes. However, they do so through distinct mechanisms, with differing consequences for voters' power and intraparty dynamics. In particular, in PLPR systems, candidates' votes are pooled by party, while, in the other two systems, they are not.<sup>4</sup>

As a general assumption, it is reasonable to state that proportional representation with preferential voting—PLPR—grants voters the opportunity to choose both their party and their parliamentary<sup>5</sup> representative. However, merely having an opportunity to indicate their preferences does not mean that they will actually matter in determining the electoral outcomes. This is important, first, because—as I shall detail—there are

<sup>3</sup>The Brazilian system closely approximates this configuration, in which, once a politician is elected under a party label, he or she cannot be denied access to the party list in subsequent elections (Mainwaring 1991). The law was the n. 9.504 of 30 September 1997. The Tribunal Special Electoral has dropped its efficacy on April 24 2002.

<sup>4</sup>When pooled votes count for the party too, they affect the distribution of seats among both parties and candidates.

<sup>5</sup>Presidential cases are reported in Chapter 3.

flexible-list systems in which voters can only truly realize this opportunity if a few conditions are satisfied; second, because, even in “truly” open-list systems, in which the voters’ behaviour directly decides who will be elected, the party elite’s choice in the available slate of candidates (more popular, etc.) can affect the realistic chances of other challengers, carrying a downstream effect that limits voters’ options before they even reach the polls. Moreover, as I shall describe in greater detail later, the level of voter power in PLPR systems varies considerably between different cases and systems depending on the number of votes that may be cast, the presence of thresholds, the ballot, and the compulsoriness.

The main characteristic of preferential voting systems is their capacity—unlike the situation in other electoral systems—to increase voters’ power to affect the choice of representatives. Further, according to a strain of the literature, authors and politicians alike claim that preferential voting should increase MPs’ accountability. However, this normative assumption has yet to be tested, at least to my knowledge; in any case, it has not been tested in a comparative way. It seems that, in this sense, preferential voting is understood as a system in which voters choose MPs directly. This does not imply, however, that voters determine who is elected. On this line of thinking, it is useful to note Pedersen’s (1966) distinction between preferential voting used effectively and preferential voting not used effectively as a way of testing the accountability assumption. Again, the true element of voters’ ability to affect MPs’ election and, perhaps, their accountability involves measuring the power of voters over candidates through indicating their choice. I engage with these measures empirically in Chapters 5 and 6 of this book.

## 1.1 RESEARCH OBJECT, AIM OF THE BOOK, AND THEORETICAL APPROACH

In his valuable essay on the state of research on electoral systems, featured in Gallagher and Mitchell’s edited book, Matthew Shugart clearly states that, “[p]erhaps it could serve to spur the development of research into the large category of preferential-list PR (PLPR) systems if we orient them clearly with respect to other systems that can be termed ‘preferential’” (2005: 40). Embracing such a distinguished suggestion, this volume offers an analysis and data on preferential voting (PV) from a comparative perspective. It includes about 20 countries from all over the world. Preferential voting is a particular type of voting offered to voters in PR

systems (*see the discussion in Sect. 1.5 for other cases*). This research focuses on open-list and flexible systems, those in which voters can (or in some cases must) cast one (or in some cases more than one) vote for an available candidate on the party's list. Thus, the book addresses the effects of electoral systems, in particular the systems that have adopted a preferential voting model. The research object is of particular relevance to comparative politics, not only for those studying electoral systems but also for those interested in the consequences related to PV's features as well as its effects on parties, voters, and candidates. This represents an innovative and ground-breaking research approach to the study of preferential voting. In fact, with some notable relatively recent exceptions (Katz 1980, 1994; Marsh 1985), preferential voting is neglected in comparative studies of electoral systems, especially in terms of data analysis. Although a considerable body of literature on electoral systems exists, preferential voting is typically included as part of a general analysis of different electoral systems by country (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005; Colomer 2011). Additionally, preferential voting systems are poorly described and not analysed in a systematic, comparative way. On a more positive note, over the past ten years, a growing group of scholars has conducted studies on preferential voting (Shugart 2005; Karvonen 2010, 2011; Farrell 2011). Moreover, there are some new studies focusing on certain aspects (gender, personal votes, candidates' personal characteristics, etc.) related to preferential voting (Marsh 1985; Katz 1986; Karvonen 2004, 2011; Ortega 2004; Shugart 2005; Shugart et al. 2005; Valdini 2006; McElroy and Marsh 2010; Bergman et al. 2013; Spierings and Jacobs 2014; Wauters et al. 2018; Passarelli 2017). Nevertheless, even though valuable analyses and in-depth case studies exist, general research comparing countries that have adopted either "open-list proportional representation" (OLPR) or more flexible systems is still in demand. If it is true, as Katz and Bardi maintain—echoed by Shugart's recent quote (2005)—that "preference voting has received less attention from scholars than it deserves" (1979: 94), this book modestly attempts to fill some of that gap by comparing a wide selection of relevant cases. There is a clear lacuna that spans at least three main spheres of research. The quantitative gap is represented by the lack of a complete database on preferential voting that covers a large time span and that delves beneath national-level data. The qualitative gap is represented by a dearth of data on individual parties and political personnel. Finally, there is an analytical gap requiring in-depth research that examines the consequences of the use of preferential voting.



Moreover, many research questions have arisen about the “goodness” of preferential voting as well as its effect on party personnel’s “qualities”, party organization, the power of voters, candidates, and MP selection. Following a description of the different types of electoral systems (national and European) that permit voters to vote preferentially, I will test the hypotheses that preferential voting affects intraparty dynamics and the “political and party system”. In particular, to measure the consequences of preferential voting, different variables will be presented, such as those related to the intraparty competition and the structure of the political/party system. Through this expansive cross-national data set, this book aims to fill the aforementioned gaps in quantitative, qualitative, and analytical progress. It should be noted that, due to data-gathering constraints, the extent to which these gaps are filled varies by country. The research presented here broadens our understanding of preferential voting in two important ways: (1) it provides a systematic data set on preferential voting; and (2) it conducts a test of important hypotheses concerning the effects of preferential voting.

In the literature, electoral systems that allow voters to express their preference are defined in several different ways. Different definitions focus on different aspects of preferential voting. Some pay attention to the power conferred on the voters, namely how many preference votes they can cast; it is important that such definitions take into consideration whether voters may change the party’s list order or cast a vote for a candidate of another party. Again, the central question remains: are election outcomes decided by party preferences or voters (or both)? Finally, is preferential voting mandatory or merely an option? Is there any requirement, such as gender-based voting, in the case of two or more preferences being allowed? These aspects are presented in the following chapters.

Table 1.1 reports all the cases included in this research. As I shall describe in the next chapters, the availability of data for the listed variables differs slightly between the cases. As the table demonstrates, this analysis focuses on a significant sample consisting of 19 PLPR cases.

In Table 1.1, together with the list of PLPR cases included in the research, next to the country name, I indicate the initial year of the analysis, which often overlaps with the date of PLPR’s introduction in the country. Moreover, Table 1.1.A indicates to which sub-type belongs each PLPR case. As previously stated, data are not always available for all countries and for all years in an identical, standardized way, either

**Table 1.1** Cases included in research (PLPR electoral systems)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Start year</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Start year</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Start year</i>
Austria	1979	Czech Republic	1996	Netherlands	1946
Belgium	1919	Denmark	1971	Peru	1995
Brazil	1998	Estonia	1992	Poland	1991
Bulgaria	2014	Finland	1970	Slovakia	1994
Chile	1989	Greece	1996	Sweden	1998
Croatia	2015	Kosovo	2012		
Cyprus	1981	Italy	1948		

*Source* Author's own elaboration

**Table 1.1.A** Preferential voting electoral systems: cases and sub-types

<i>Open list</i>	<i>Flexible</i>
Brazil	Austria
Dominican Republic	Belgium
El Salvador	Bulgaria
Italy (1948–1993)	Croatia
Latvia	Czech Republic
Peru	Denmark
	Lithuania
	Slovakia
	Sweden
<i>Quasi list</i>	<i>Latent list</i>
Chile	Estonia
Finland	Netherlands
Poland	
<i>Protected open list</i>	
Cyprus	
Greece	
Italy 2015	

because the group of countries included in the sample varies greatly in terms of electoral thresholds, the number of preferences, the district magnitude, and so on or because some data are simply not available to scholars. Table 1.1 clearly indicates that the study includes a significant number of cases and thus their comparison should deliver promising

results. These countries all belong to the PLPR category but vary in different elements in relation not only to the electoral system in and of itself (in particular, the sample features four PLPR subtypes) but also to the form of the government, the timing of democratization, the size, the population, and the geographical area. They vary in terms of PLPR systems' features, such as the reasons for the representatives' selection and the context.

Table 1.2 presents a list of all the countries that have adopted a PLPR electoral system, as observed in 2017.<sup>6</sup> The list reports 29 observations from countries that feature PLPR systems in their national assembly, the lower house. The cases analysed are exclusively from lower houses, and there are only two upper-house examples of PLPR to my knowledge. The second-largest sample consists of the countries that use PLPR to elect representatives to supranational assemblies. In particular, Table 1.2 provides a list of European countries that elect MPs to the European Parliament. Among the 28 EU countries, more than half of them (17) use PLPR, while only 1 case uses a preferential voting system to select the members of its upper house (Belgium). In particular, preferential voting is used for supranational elections in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and Sweden. For general elections, it is used in, among others, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, and Greece. At the subnational level, preferential voting is used Italy and Norway (Table 1.2). The list of countries that I select to represent the world's sample of PLPR systems for lower houses shows that: (1) 13 cases use this electoral system for both national and supranational houses; (2) 3 have the same system in 3 arenas (national, supranational, and regional); (3) 8 of them utilize PLPR for the national assembly only; (4) 1 (Norway) employs PLPR in the regional context alone; and (5) only 1 country uses PLPR for all 4 assemblies considered (Belgium).

<sup>6</sup>Countries like Italy, even though they no longer utilize a preferential voting system, are included in the research due to their relevant theoretical and empirical influence on the category. Incidentally, Italy, as reported in the paragraph on the case, has approved a new electoral law that reinstates preferential voting (Passarelli 2018).

**Table 1.2** Countries with a preferential voting system by assembly

<i>Country</i>	<i>National assembly (lower house)</i>	<i>Subnational assembly (regional)</i>	<i>Supranational assembly (European Parliament)</i>	<i>Upper house</i>
Austria	1		1	
Belgium	1	1	1	1
Brazil	1			
Bulgaria	1		1	
Chile	1			
Colombia	1	1		1
Croatia	1		1	
Cyprus	1		1	
Czech Republic	1		1	
Denmark	1		1	
Dominican Republic	1			
Estonia	1		1	
Finland	1		1	
Greece	1			
Iceland	1			
Indonesia	1			
Italy <sup>1</sup>	1	1	1	
Japan <sup>2</sup>		1		
Kosovo	1			
Latvia	1		1	
Lebanon	1			
Lithuania <sup>3</sup>	1		1	
Malta			1	
Netherlands	1		1	
Norway		1		
Panama	1			
Peru	1			
Poland	1		1	
Slovakia	1		1	
Sri Lanka	1			
Suriname	1			
Sweden	1	1	1	
Total ( <i>N</i> )	29	4	18	2

*Source* Author's primary research

*Note* Slovenia is a controversial case especially about Slovenia is the "sub-districts". It is my understanding that in that each sub-district has a party listing only one candidate. If that is the case, I would not call it preferential-list PR

<sup>1</sup>1946–1991

<sup>2</sup>National tier

<sup>3</sup>Data on preferences not available. Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Luxembourg, and Switzerland adopt a free-list (panachage) electoral system

As previously stated, the goal of this book is to offer a rich analysis of preferential voting systems across about 20 countries. The main purpose of this endeavour is to produce a reliable source of information for the scholarly field of electoral systems and in particular for preferential voting. The book aims to direct renewed focus towards original electoral data, provide information on the countries with (or that have recently adopted) a preferential voting system, and conduct a detailed and purposeful literature review on the topic. To move beyond mere descriptive analyses, which represent an important first step and deserve adequate attention, I will also offer detailed data analysis. The most important goal of the book is to illustrate the main effect related to preferential voting through rigorous cross-national analysis. In particular, I will concentrate on the consequences of PV, especially with regard to candidates and voters.<sup>7</sup> Providing an explanation for the effects and causes behind preferential voting is an important goal, one that implies many theoretical consequences for the field of electoral systems and their selection by sovereign governments/parliaments (Renwick and Pilet 2016).

Many research questions have arisen about the “inherent good” of preferential voting as well as its effects on party personnel’s “qualities”, party organization, the power of voters, and so on. Although I focus only on certain dependent variables, the data for this project are available for further analysis and will be useful to those interested in a comparative perspective on electoral systems. I offer a general conclusion based on the results of the research. If it is the case that “cross-national analyses using entire countries as aggregate have definite limits when it comes to detecting strategic effects that may be due to varying degrees of preferential voting” (Karvonen 2011: 134), my research attempts to overcome such limitations. This goal is pursued by producing a comparison between a high number of cases and, where possible, standardizing the variables to strengthen the validity of the inferences. Of course, the internal variance of preferential voting systems disallows a complete cross-national comparison of all the relevant variables. Nonetheless, this project represents a thorough evaluation of all reasonably obtainable evidence and takes special care to avoid conceptual stretching and other errors produced by forced comparison.

<sup>7</sup>The small number of cases suggested dropping the analysis of political parties. The latter study can be conducted at the national level.

“Do voters decide?” This was the non-rhetorical question that Michael Marsh (1985) asked about 30 years ago when presenting “the first comparative work to note systematically the range of variation within list PR systems” (Shugart 2005: 40). This book advances the field of electoral studies, particularly with regard to understanding the effects of electoral systems on different political actors. The study of electoral systems has attained many important goals, especially in terms of cross-system comparison (Shugart 2005). However, there is still a lack of comprehension and explication of the effects of electoral systems on intraparty competition. Further, there is a lack of comparative study of similar causal patterns influencing the electoral behaviour identified within “single” electoral systems. This book’s perspective is theoretically located within the neo-institutionalist tradition, which emphasizes the importance of electoral systems as causal variables. However, it is also rooted in the analysis of the socio-political variables that exert distinctive influences on voters and parties within variant institutional contexts. The literature on electoral systems and voting mainly focuses on the relationship between parties, voters, and candidates. In the case of preferential voting, this link is particularly important due to the potential that voters have to influence the election of a representative directly (which varies across systems, as we shall see), in some cases to the chagrin of party elites.

This research project follows a two-pronged strategy: a diachronic comparison and a synchronic one. The first compares elections held at different times ( $t^1$ ;  $t^2$ ;  $t^3$ , etc.) for each case study *within* the same kind of election (e.g. national, regional, and supranational). Somewhat inversely, the second axis of the research compares the effects of preferential voting in different countries, where/when possible, and includes a few political parties. Through this method, I can compare the effects of PV both between countries/cases and within each country. The data allow for diachronic and synchronic analyses of all the cases, thus enriching the internal validity and the explanatory leverage of the empirical analyses. The comparison with other non-national elections is only performed at the descriptive level, that is, the share of preference votes. In fact, my main focus in terms of “dependent/independent” analysis is on the effects of the preferential voting systems in national elections.

I test hypotheses related to the effects of preferential voting electoral systems on the “political system” as a whole, in particular on the intraparty dimension. Specifically, to measure the consequences of the presence/absence of preferential voting, a number of variables are

considered. From a theoretical point of view, each point/variable that I consider refers to a specific hypothesis and a particular research question.

Different concepts, definitions, and variables are matched. To avoid conceptual confusion and overlap between different meanings, straightforward theoretical clarification is needed. Therefore, I offer a critical review of the various concepts related to the term “preferential” as applied to voting behaviour. Similarly, I propose a critical list of the various definitions of “preferential voting”. Finally, both dependent and independent variables are presented as useful tools for analysing the voting behaviour in countries adopting preferential voting systems.

The book focuses on preferential voting and on the systems that enable such voting. Therefore, “in the large category of preferential-list PR (PLPR)” (Shugart 2005: 40), I analyse a sample of countries that have adopted OLPR and flexible systems as well as their subtypes (see Chapter 5).

## 1.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTENT

Having illustrated the general aim of the book and introduced its main topic, the following introductory sections outline the basic structure of its chapters and the arguments to be made. Six substantive chapters follow. These are preceded by an overview of preferential voting in each country as well as the findings concerning its consequences.

The book begins with an overview of the concept of preferential voting and establishes the current terms of the debate about the characteristics of such an electoral system. Moreover, the potential kinds of relationships between preferential voting and other variables are presented in a preliminary description (the effect on parties’ features, the balance of power between a party’s faces, leadership, the party system, voters, and electoral geography). Chapter 1 presents the main arguments related to the effects of the electoral system on the political actors. In particular, it introduces and discusses the most important features of the main electoral systems and their potential political and electoral consequences.

Moreover, the chapter furnishes a definition of preferential voting, and a discussion of the concept as well as the main contributions is provided by focusing on the work of scholars, such as (in alphabetical order) Ames, Bardi, Blais, Colomer, Farrell, Karvonen, Katz, Marsh, Norris, Samuels, Shugart, Taagepera, and those who have followed them. The final sections focus on the consequences of preferential voting

systems. In particular, the text analyses the electoral and partisan dynamics related to the intraparty competition. What are the expected results in terms of parliamentary turnover and the PLPR variables that can affect this process and other electoral outcomes, such as the ENP, the volatility, and the turnover? On this line, the chapter also provides an index of preferential voting measuring voters' power. Moreover, the hypotheses, data, and methodology are described in Chapter 2 together with the case studies and the research project as a whole. The case studies are presented in depth in Chapter 3, in which the electoral systems' features are highlighted considering both the context of Europe, where the main preferential voting group of countries is located, and that of the rest of the world. Chapter 4 underlines the main trends in the number of preferences cast and the intraparty dynamics. In Chapters 5 and 6, I present the main findings both for the individual cases and from a comparative perspective. After a deep analysis of the main results country by country, grouped by the main preferential voting subtypes, I illustrate the comparative statistical analysis including all the cases in the research. Finally, I summarize the book's main results, the theoretical consequences, and the possible further steps.

Since the book aims to shed more light on the ways in which preferential voting, as a relatively understudied type of electoral system, operates, I would also like to emphasize that the book and the research presented here might be of interest to a broader set of readers by explaining that those who are interested in the working of liberal democracy would also find the book useful even if they are not especially interested in electoral systems per se. In fact, the electoral system, in particular PLPR, indicates that the real balance of power between the voters and the parties affects the general outcomes of parliamentary representation. Therefore, knowing such a worldwide diffused electoral system better may help scholars, students, opinion leaders, and stakeholders to plan their decision making and programmes better.

### 1.3 STATE OF THE ART: MAJORITARIAN, PROPORTIONAL, AND MIXED MEMBER

Although the literature on electoral systems is now well consolidated, it is important to recall the main contributions, the state of the art, as well as the most controversial theoretical debates and their consequences for



the modern study of the topic. With regard to the analysis of preferential voting systems, such a review is of particular importance.

Is there a “perfect”<sup>8</sup> “set of rules [to] structure how votes are cast at elections for a representative assembly and how these votes are then converted into seats in that assembly”? (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005: 3). If such a system does exist, would it be desirable to have? The latter question is, of course, rhetorical but nonetheless important. Many political scientists try to identify the “best” electoral system. Has the great divide between majoritarian and proportional systems in some way been bridged to create the “best of the both worlds”, as an important book asked rhetorically regarding mixed electoral systems (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001)? The effectiveness and “quality” of an electoral system are largely determined by the feeling that political actors have towards it and the extent to which it fits with their own goals and expectations. Therefore, generally speaking, the selection and evaluation of a system’s “perfectness” will broadly depend on the purposes for which it has been adopted or for which it has been proposed for future use. A citizen of an ancient Grecian city-state (*poleis*) would probably desire a proportional representation system that would include all citizens. Vice versa, the governing elite of that polity would be likely to prefer a lot system that minimizes the influence of competing political powers (Manin 1996). PR electoral systems are generally favoured by small parties and minorities (language, ethnicity, religion, territory, etc.). Minorities may accept a majoritarian (single-seat district [SSD]) electoral system when they can reasonably expect to elect a few candidates due to the geographic concentration of their votes in a defined area (Sartori 1976; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Conversely, medium-sized and big parties, often geographically diffuse in their national bases, are able to maximize their electoral performance in both PR systems and “majoritarian” systems, such as the SSD and double-ballot systems. Therefore, evaluating an electoral system’s “perfection” is no easy task and almost by necessity involves a certain level of subjective judgement. For a given electoral system, the analysis and evaluation of its characteristics and functioning should consider the effects on different arenas and different political and social

<sup>8</sup>For whom and for what? The variables to consider are several and sometimes they differ in outcomes and are not truly comparable. Parties, voters, candidates, accountability, turnover, and turnout are only a few aspects of electoral systems.

actors. Therefore, any conclusion on the effectiveness of an electoral system will always be biased by the parameters adopted by its evaluator.

First, it is necessary to describe briefly the main characteristics of each commonly adopted electoral system. Generally speaking, electoral systems are primarily distinguished into majoritarian and proportional ones. Most analyses and debates centre on the characteristics and effects of plurality systems vs. proportional ones. This distinction follows a geographical cleavage whereby the nations of Western Europe have traditionally adopted PR systems while the Anglo-American countries have been associated with majoritarian, “first-past-the-post”, or better SSD, systems. Within the broader categories synthesized by Michael Gallagher, we can identify finer-grained types of electoral systems, such as: (1) single-member plurality (SMP), alternative vote (AV), and the two-round system (2RS) for the category of single-member constituency; (2) mixed compensatory and mixed parallel for the mixed systems; (3) closed-list systems; and (4) open-list and flexible-list systems in the category of preferential-list systems (to which we should add two other subtypes, at least, as we shall see), the proportional single transferable vote, and the SNTV (as adopted in Japan) (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005: 5; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001: 11).

The consolidated literature on electoral systems agrees that several primary factors must be considered in any comparative analysis thereof. From a theoretical point of view, the main factors to consider in electoral systems are the type of vote (mandatory or not), the structure of the ballot, the number of votes allowed, the possibility to split votes, the voters’ influence on the choice of elected candidates, the district magnitude, the number of circumscriptions, the presence of legal thresholds, preferential voting, the provision of compensatory seats, and the number of tiers. According to Rae (1967), among the most relevant characteristics of an electoral system are its *formula* as well as the presence of legal thresholds and the nature of the choice that the voters are called to express (party/list, candidate, or both). We know that electoral systems can affect voters, candidates, parties, policies, and the party system as a whole. Moreover, some electoral systems allow voters to cast more than one vote. This can be achieved by allowing voters to select both a candidate and a list (the German case, for example) or to cast votes for more than one preference (for example Italy pre-1991, a case that, by the way, is not mentioned by Gallagher and Mitchell, because they probably consider the use of more than one preference vote as one vote/one case

per se) (2005: 7). On this line of thinking, it is also useful to mention the ballot structure as a crucial element of electoral systems. Essentially, we may distinguish between systems that only allow voters to vote for a party and systems in which voters may rank parties and/or candidates.

As stated previously, there are fields in which the literature is well consolidated, namely with regard to the effects of electoral systems on the number of parties or the level of disproportionality (Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 18). Nonetheless, there are other significant aspects of the electoral systems literature that remain fragmented and/or under-analysed, such as electoral systems' impact on parties' internal composition. In this book, I consider the effect that a particular electoral system has on political parties and representation as well as the variables that affect voters' behaviour positively in casting a given preference. In majoritarian systems, both plurality and majority, voters' choice can be truly "decisive", given the opportunity to choose among the candidates in the district "directly". Hence, the voters might affect the final result, not being limited to a party list. The magnitude of this influence can vary depending on the "openness" of the second ballot in majority systems (2RS), but it is generally important. In proportional systems, voters vote for a party and then the allocation of seats among the candidates is decided following the rank order of the party list. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to refer to 'proportional representation' as if it denotes a single type of electoral system. "Proportional representation is in fact a generic term denoting a number of different systems sharing only the common aim of proportionality between seats and votes" (Bogdanor 1983: 2). There are also PR systems with "open lists": those in which voters can indicate a preference for a candidate (Marsh 1985; Katz 1986). Mixed-member electoral systems combine aspects of PR and plurality systems. This combination is achieved by introducing mixed parallel or mixed compensatory (additional seats) elements into the procedures dictating the allocation of seats. Recently, such "mixed" systems have undergone worldwide diffusion, and the number of countries that have adopted one of them has swiftly increased to a dozen cases, although the diffusion wave of the 1990s soon fizzled out (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001; Massicotte 2011).

The literature on electoral systems is now well consolidated, having established two distinct research goals pertaining to separate aspects of study. In particular, we can broadly distinguish between two approaches, the first one focusing on the classification of electoral systems and the

second one—building on the first—focusing on identifying the impacts of these variant systems. Attention to the classification project is particularly important here due to preferential voting’s need to be categorized singularly. It is crucial to determine how preferential voting is understood, where it is located in the classification of electoral systems, what its main characteristics are, and what problems hinder its study. The analysis of electoral system classifications is therefore important to clarify and explain preferential voting’s effects. After all, if we consider that elections are basically represented by their electoral formula, that is, the rule determining how votes are translated into seats, it is clearly important to focus on PV to furnish more data and interpretations.

However, the literature adopts different approaches and tools in the classification of electoral systems. Each approach has its own indicators and variables as well as analytical criteria and emerges from diverse theoretical frameworks that ultimately generate many more classifications, groups, and analytical consequences.

Broadly speaking, electoral system classifications follow the basal criterion distinguishing between plurality, majority systems, and proportional representation, to which the mixed category must now be added (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). In these categories, we find some electoral systems that generally follow the same rationale and hardly vary. One can identify two main approaches in the literature. The first refers to the electoral formula and follows the seminal study of Arend Lijphart (1994). This approach provides a detailed list of different systems and their distinct functionalities. The second general approach considers elements other than the electoral formula as being of primary importance in classifying electoral systems. Different authors emphasize many factors as being relevant in a proper classification of electoral systems. Douglas Rae stresses the difference between two types of ballots (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005: 7): categorical ballots, which “compel the voter to choose one candidate or party”; and ordinal ballots, which “allow the voter to express a more complex, equivocal preference by rank-ordering the parties” or candidates (1967: 17–19, 1971). Further, Rae introduces the concept of electoral systems as candidate-centred or party-centred (Shugart 2001), while Taagepera and Shugart stress the “decisive role” of the district magnitude in affecting proportionality (1989: 112). André Blais tries to move beyond the plurality/majority/PR distinction by distinguishing between three dimensions of electoral systems—the ballot, the structure, and the formula (1988: 106)—dividing them into six

categories: “(1) The nature of the constituency (whole constituency/districts); (2) constituency magnitude; (3) the object of the vote (lists/individuals); (4) the number of votes allowed; (5) the type of vote (nominal/ordinal/numerical); and (6) the formula (majority/plurality/proportionality)” (ibidem). Finally, David Farrell classifies electoral systems according to the electoral formula and system output and offers a typology based on the ballot structure (candidate-based/party-based choice) and the extent of the voters’ choice (categorical/ordinal). Gallagher and Mitchell (2005: 5–9) report a detailed list of the main dimensions of electoral systems, especially the district magnitude, ballot structure, and number of votes cast, as well as case studies, examples, and types.

Introducing those elements found to be useful in classifying electoral systems is important in the study of preferential voting, as it will allow me to determine how PV fits into this conceptual schema and what its peculiar characteristics are. Following this line of thinking, I now discuss the effects that electoral systems have on the political system as a whole *vis à vis* three main political actors: political parties, voters, and candidates. A similar approach to identifying the impact of electoral systems is then tested on the case of preferential voting and the impact on intra-party dynamics.

#### 1.4 EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: VOTERS, CANDIDATES, AND PARTIES

The choice of an electoral system matters in many respects. It can affect the political system, the party system, the nature of government, the cohesion of parties, the voters’ influence on the candidate choice, the level of accountability, and so on. Electoral systems influence the actions of political actors. Several elements of electoral systems may affect political parties in their magnitude, organization, and campaign activities as well as the opportunities for independent candidates in a political system. Fundamentally, political parties’ behaviour represents their response to the possibilities and constraints of a given system. Electoral systems have mechanical and psychological effects (Duverger 1951). Mechanically, their consequences are observable in the transformation of votes into seats. Psychologically, they affect both voters and parties in different ways. Prior to the vote, voters decide strategically which party or candidate to support. This choice is, in part, based on a consideration of

their perceptions of the chance that their vote will count (Cox 1997). However, such strategic considerations operate differently across electoral systems. Voters respond to the system's opportunities and constraints, meaning that the choices they make in a plurality system are different from those they make in an OLPR system. Similarly, political parties are affected by electoral systems and react accordingly. The party leadership decides, for example, to nominate a politician (or not) in a given district, to make alliances with other parties, or to run alone. If we consider the two main categories of electoral systems (plurality vs. proportional), plus the mixed ones, we can observe different effects depending on a given electoral system's characteristics. These elements determine different outcomes in the fields of parties/candidates and voters.

In the case of district magnitude, a large categorical distinction quickly arises. Under a plurality/majority system (First-past the post "FPTP", Single seat district "SSD", Alternative vote "AV," or the two-round system), voters elect a single representative. By contrast, all PR systems<sup>9</sup> require electoral districts that elect more than one member, otherwise their logic will mimic that of the SSD (Herron et al. 2018). Under any proportional system, the number of members to be selected in each district determines, to a significant extent, how proportional the election results will be. Moreover, there is generally a strong positive correlation between the average district magnitude and the average party magnitude. Consequently, the party magnitude is a crucial factor in determining who will be nominated for candidacy and eventually elected. Each electoral system is likely to encourage different kinds of party organization. For example, centralized political systems with closed-list PR are likely to favour strong party organization. Conversely, decentralized, district-based systems, like FPTP, may have the opposite effect. Similarly,

<sup>9</sup>In addition, this is the case for some plurality/majority systems, such as block vote and PBV, and some other systems, such as limited vote and SNTV. Among the historical cases, I would also mention the Italian Senate (1948–1993), which had a dual formula. It functioned as an SSD system whenever a candidate obtained 65 per cent of the votes; seats not filled in the SSD were instead allocated at the regional level via the D'Hondt method (Passarelli 2018: 867) or the system used since the 2012 elections in Romania in which only those candidates who win over 50 per cent of the votes in single-member constituencies are automatically elected. The remaining seats are distributed among the political parties first at the county level (using the Hare quota) and then at the national level (according to the D'Hondt method), provided that they pass the 5 per cent threshold.

PLPR may favour, or at least not disincentivize, intraparty competition and conflict or divisions.

The type of electoral system may also influence the type of party system that evolves. Maurice Duverger (1951) expresses the influence of the electoral system on the party system by presenting the well-known and debated so-called three sociological laws: (1) a majority vote on one ballot is conducive to a two-party system; (2) proportional representation is conducive to a multiparty system; and (3) a majority vote on two ballots is conducive to a multiparty system, inclined towards forming coalitions. Although there is no universal consensus on such “laws” (Shugart 2005: 30), Duverger’s dictum has generated a widespread debate. In particular, the effect of “majoritarian” systems on the reduction of both the number of parties and the number of “real” candidates has been “tested” in different forms (Grofman and Lijphart 1986; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994; Cox 1997; Benoit 2002).<sup>10</sup> Similarly, another aspect that, according to Shugart, deserves more attention is the role of two-tier systems in the allocation of seats (Shugart 2005).

Further, electoral systems affect the kind of relationships that form between individual candidates and their supporters. Systems that make use of single-member electoral districts may encourage individual candidates to see themselves as the delegates of particular geographical areas and as beholden to the interests of their local electorate. By contrast, systems that use large multi-member districts, such as most PR systems, are more likely to deliver representatives whose primary loyalty lies with their party on national issues. If we accept that electoral systems influence the behaviour of parties, voters, and candidates, we must then consider the main dimensions and issues of an electoral system and how those unique elements may result in specific patterns of behaviour. Among those elements, the most relevant are the district magnitude ( $M$ ), the level of legal thresholds, the assembly’s size, the level of electoral dispersion over the national territory, bonus seats, the double ballot, the electoral formula, the ballot paper, and the formula (Rae 1967; Sartori 1976; Grofman and Lijphart 1986; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Cox 1997; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005; Farrell 2011).

<sup>10</sup>In a recent work, Shugart and Taagepera (2017) introduce innovative theoretical and empirical tools to deduce the number of parties when just knowing the number of seats in a representative assembly and the magnitude. Taagepera (2007) focuses on the revisions to introduce into the electoral systems to obtain the desired change in the average number of parties and cabinet duration.

As I transition to an analysis of preferential voting cases in particular, it must be emphasized that open lists, preferential ballots, personalized proportional representation, and voting for “lemmas” (brands) and “sublemmas” allow voters to select a party candidate and one or more individual candidates. Variations include compulsory or optional preferences, the latter of which permit voters to cast votes for individual candidates or the party list as given (unless, obviously, s/he abstains; null or blank). The basic procedure requires all preference votes for either individual candidates or party lists to be counted as votes for the corresponding party; after each party has been allocated a number of seats related to those votes, they are partially filled with the individual candidates featured on the lists. Of course, the higher the number of individual preferences that each voter is able to express in the ballot, the more intense the individual candidates’ competition to fill the corresponding seats is expected to be. Open-list systems that permit voters to select a few candidates, usually from one to three, have been used in most countries of Western Europe<sup>11</sup> (Colomer 2004: 51–52) (*details of countries are provided in Chapter 3*).<sup>12</sup>

The use of PLPR is often accompanied by a debate about the supposed advantages and disadvantages that it brings for both voters and parties. Even though the analysis of pros and cons is deeply related to the particular political culture of each nation, the parties’ will, and the political actors’ goals, it is possible to construct a framework of theoretical advantages and disadvantages that are generally associated with PLPR in most contexts. Many scholars blame PLPR for weakening parties and for particularistic or corrupt electoral behaviour (Mainwaring 1991; Ames 1995; Chang and Golden 2007), whereas others argue that the hidden exchange behind PLPR can be “positive” (Piattoni 2012). In particular, there may be positive relationships between some socio-political variables and the use of preferential voting. According to PLPR advocates, the introduction of preferential voting systems generally offers several

<sup>11</sup>In Italy from 1946–1948 to 1993. Up to four preferences until 1991 (Passarelli 2017, 2018).

<sup>12</sup>From this perspective, the single transferable ballot, as well as the open ballot or “panachage” used in Switzerland, can be considered extreme cases, beyond the opportunities supplied by open lists or double voting, since they permit candidates to be selected from different parties and thus promote very high (intraparty) individual competition (Colomer 2004: 52).



advantages. It enables citizens to choose between different candidates on lists, and it increases the legitimacy and responsibility of the elected officials. Preferential voting therefore generates a process of accountability, as it increases the level of intraparty democracy, leading to a greater influence from local party branches on the party's central office. It raises the quality of the proposed candidates and, accordingly, their campaigns. It introduces a merit system for creating candidate lists and decreases the likelihood of weak candidates and obedient party members being proposed. However, disadvantages can arise when we examine voter satisfaction (Farrell and McAllister 2006). In particular, some argue that PLPR leads to corruption and intraparty electoral competition, which can cause fragmentation and disunity within party organizations. These authors find that “preferential voting [as defined above, not exclusively in PLPR systems—author’s note] can make a difference in levels of voter satisfaction with democracy” (ibidem: 743). Party disunity is, in fact, one of the main problems attributed to the PLPR effects. The proliferation of factions and political stalemates are among the consequences of the sort of intraparty competition caused, or at least not impeded by, PLPR systems. The party unity is undermined by the harsh struggle between candidates of the same party. The associated rise in electoral campaign costs is seen as one of the negative effects of PLPR, especially due to its positive relationship with corruption phenomena in exchange votes and negative patronage linkages between candidates and voters (Ames 1995). Internal competition is one of the most prominent characteristics of PLPR. Its heightened focus on personal votes can elevate parochially minded candidates over those with more programmatic national interests (Carey and Shugart 1995; Bergman et al. 2013). This can be considered an advantage, in terms of the close relationship fostered between candidates and voters and the defence of local interests, or a disadvantage, given the associated rise in lobbying for limited interests and the well-known risks of patronage and corruption.

While the analysis of pros and cons is highly determined by the national political culture, the parties’ strategy, and the political actors’ goals, it is nonetheless possible to construct a general framework of theoretical advantages and disadvantages that PLPR may carry across cases. These unique benefits and drawbacks primarily concern voters’ power and satisfaction, the party decision-making process, the accountability of elected officials, the level of representation of women, young people, and minorities, the electoral campaign costs, and an increase in patronistic, parochial, or even corrupt behaviour.

## 1.5 PERSONAL VOTING AND PERSON VOTING: LOOKING FOR A DEFINITION

If it can be said that PR systems feature greater variation than their single-seat district counterpart, it is also evident, as noted by Eckstein, that “it is the easiest thing in the world to get inextricably tangled among the complexities of electoral systems” (1963: 249). Indeed, such a statement can reasonably be applied to the “world” of preferential voting systems alone. In this chapter, I clarify the use of lemmas as well as the subtypes of this system while introducing a discussion on their effects on candidates, voters, and parties. First, a primary distinction should be made in the PR family among list systems. As I describe in this chapter, we can have list systems in which voters cannot express a preference for a candidate on the list (closed list) and list systems in which voters are allowed to cast a preference that affects the list (preferential list). To classify electoral systems better, scholars indicate a variety of important distinguishing factors, such as the types of ballots (Rae 1967), the number of votes allowed, the district magnitude, the presence of legal thresholds, a second round, and so on (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005: 7).

Before examining the details and providing a definition of the “preferential” voting system, I lay out the different electoral paths of each preferential voting electoral system as well as the diverse trajectories that a “preference” vote may take.

### *1.5.1 Preferential Voting: Different Patterns and as Many Outcomes*

The process of voting is not as uniform as one might imagine. It is subject to different behavioural constraints and demands on voter knowledge, which generate very different outcomes. Such conditions may vary between two or more consecutive elections but may also differ when comparing different “ways” of voting or methods of casting a ballot under different rules. The diverse array of electoral systems may direct voters’ choices in many different directions.

Let us think about the path of a “preference vote” and how many different directions it can follow. To describe the relationship between the preferential voting systems and the possible outcomes, as well as sketching a few examples, I imagine the “preference vote’s” trip towards the voter’s favoured candidate.

*Step 1:* At the very beginning of the electoral path, citizens who are entitled to vote have basically two options<sup>13</sup>: to go to the polls or to abstain. Once they have decided to participate in the election, they face different electoral systems (I am not interested here in their choice, as voters could for example enter a blank or null vote instead of supporting a party and/or a candidate). The first crucial step for the preference vote depends on the kind of electoral system adopted in the country in which it is cast. *Step 2:* As I am dealing exclusively with PR preferential voting systems, the trip towards the different outcomes of a preference vote begins with the PR list system. All other electoral systems, such as majority and mixed, are not considered. *Step 3:* Analogously, the trip of our “preference vote” cannot enter the “closed-lists” box, because, by definition, those systems do not allow preferences. The vote that voter “A” casts then enters the ballot of one of several PLPR systems, in which, using a metaphor, the preferences are “full citizens”. *Step 4:* However, even though preferences are allowed, this does not automatically imply that they will be used. In fact, there are cases in which casting a preference is mandatory and others in which it is optional. *Step 5:* Both mandatory and optional preferential voting systems may or may not have electoral thresholds. The presence of thresholds and their amplitude will affect the level of openness/closedness of the system in terms of voters’ influence. *Step 6:* Taking the previous steps into consideration, there are now four possible outcomes, represented by four PLPR subtypes: (a) open-list proportional representation; (b) flexible-list systems; (c) quasi-list systems; and (d) latent-list systems. *Step 7:* Within some PLPR systems, preference votes are the exclusive determinant of seat allocation, while, in other systems, the official party rank matters too. *Step 8:* In each of the PLPR systems mentioned above, it is possible that voters are allowed/asked to cast one or more preference votes (as repeatedly indicated, in PLPR, personal votes are pooled together with list votes). Potentially, voters could decide to indicate their party preference and one preferred candidate from another list; where possible, this option will automatically bring the electoral system into the *panachage* category, which is not analysed in this book. Finally, Fig. 1.2 presents a few examples of each type, although two categories are empty, namely the quasi-list and the latent-list systems, for which, to my knowledge, there are

<sup>13</sup>Except in cases in which voting is mandatory, although voters always have the practical ability to abstain regardless of the implied legal consequences.

no cases in which voters are obligated to cast more than one preference. *Addendum*: It must be noted that the compulsoriness of preferential voting can be divided into different theoretical categories, albeit not always with corresponding empirical examples: (1) casting a preference for a candidate is compulsory, and at the same time voters have the option to cast a list vote; (2) casting a preference vote for a candidate as well as for the list is compulsory; and (3) casting a preference vote for a candidate is compulsory, and it is the only vote possible (as in Chile, Finland, or Poland) (Fig. 1.1).

Preferential voting systems allow voters to choose not just among partisan options but between individual candidates within a given party or faction, thus “indicating a preference for one or more candidates within one list” (Shugart 2005: 40). Given its felicitous combination of voting for individuals and proportional representation, preferential voting is used in several countries. In parliamentary elections<sup>14</sup> with preferential voting, the competition primarily takes place among political parties, while voters also have the option to assign preference votes to individual candidates. At the “second level”, there is a parallel competition among individual candidates. Preferential voting is an element that combines support for individual candidates with support for a party. Preferential voting itself is (or should be, *see the different cases in* Chapter 3) influenced far more by the personalities of the candidates than by any “ideological affinity” with a political party. Therefore, preference votes can be seen as votes for individual candidates, including a limited ballot in majority systems and double voting and open lists in proportional representation (Colomer 2004: 50). In general, open lists and preference ballots, as well as personalized proportional representation and voting for “lemmas” (brands) and “sublemmas”, allow voters to select a party candidacy and one or more individual candidates. Variants include compulsory or optional preferences, the latter permitting a vote for a party list as given. Colomer considers variations based on different ballot forms. He distinguishes between “closed, semi-open, and open” (2011: 8). Although this classification concerns an electoral system’s ability to produce different degrees of party representation and

<sup>14</sup>In Sri Lanka, the president is elected with an instant-runoff system. Similarly, Uruguay “was the one national level example of the use of a PL system in a single-seat district. Presidential elections were conducted by competing party slates, which usually contained more than one candidate. Voters voted for a candidate, but the winner was defined as the candidate with the most votes within the party with the most votes” (Shugart 2005: 39–40).





Fig. 1.1 The theoretical paths of a preference vote and its outcomes (*Source* Author's primary elaboration)



**Fig. 1.2** Compulsoriness and pooling voting in PLPR systems (possible outcomes)

personal representation, it seems non-exhaustive when compared with the full scope of systemic differences that may affect the form of “preferential voting”. Colomer includes both Finland and Belgium, which differ significantly in terms of preferential voting, intraparty competition, and electoral outcomes, in the same category. Additionally, the “open” category is a little misleading, as it includes both Australia (OLPR) and Luxembourg (*panachage*). According to Colomer, “Preferential list systems enable voters to choose a party and one or more candidates from the party” (2011: 9). Nevertheless, analysing the ballot forms and their openness, Colomer distinguishes between systems in which “voting for some individual candidate is compulsory (as in Finland) or optional (as in Belgium)”. He then that “the two variants give the voter two choices, even if with the second variant a voter, whose preference order for individual candidates, may coincide with the order in which they are presented by the party, exerts only one choice” (ibidem: 9). I think Colomer’s above assumption on preferential voting ballots is misleading, and, without any specification, it may generate a conceptual overlap between ballot forms and (PLPR) electoral systems. In fact, the discriminatory variable is not the optionality of casting the preference vote but whether voters’ behaviour decides partially or totally who

is elected to the seats allocated to the party. There are PLPR systems in which preferential voting is mandatory and voters' choices determine who is elected (as in Chile) and ones in which preferential voting is mandatory but voters' behaviour is *not* the only variable accounting for the selection of the candidates (as in the Netherlands). There are also PLPR systems with optional preference votes (as in Italy pre-1993), in which the preference votes cast are the sole determinant of the list of candidates elected. Thus, it is best to consider PLPR as an umbrella term that is comprised of a family of subtypes (Shugart 2005: 40ff.). Considering the centrality of candidates in electoral systems, Mitchell groups together "genuinely preferential (open) list and single transferable vote (STV) systems" (2000: 342). He then distinguishes between "formally preferential list systems in which the choice of candidate is generally ineffective" (ibidem: 341). As his example of the Norwegian system demonstrates, that is indeed true. However, I still believe that the most important distinction lies between cases belonging to the same subtypes of PLPR, after full consideration of their "real" functionality. There are "genuinely" open-list systems that do not appear to produce higher levels of turnover or voter choice than their closed-system counterparts. The same can be said for formally "open-list" systems as well. This suggests that a distinction *within* PLPR subtypes is needed.

Furthermore, there are many salient differences between so-called "preferential" voting systems, which often share little beyond the ability of voters to indicate a "preference".<sup>15</sup> In all three systems, SNTV, STV, and PLPR, candidates compete against challengers in other parties as well as their co-partisans. While, in STV systems, voters' preferences are ordered, in PLPR and SNTV votes are given to one (or more) candidates chosen by voters' preferences. In addition, in PLPR systems, the number of seats won by a party depends only on the lists' electoral performance and not (also) on the distribution of votes across its candidates. Instead, the votes for parties and candidates are pooled. Conversely, in SNTV and STV systems, candidates compete against their co-partisans and candidates of other parties, and the number of seats won by each party is entirely dependent on candidates' individual performance. These systems carry risks of so-called allocation errors and over-nomination. Parties have to worry about the possibility that votes will become overly concentrated on one or two candidates, diminishing the enthusiasm for other candidates further down the list and hurting the party's seat allocation.

<sup>15</sup> Panachage is not included (see Sect. 1.6).

In sum, the “preferential voting” system category brings together countries that have very different characteristics and generate just as many different outcomes, suggesting that a common conception of preferential voting is still lacking. Norris notes that in “open-list multimember districts electors cast a ballot for a party, but they can express their preference for a candidate or candidates within a party list” (2004: 213). This clarification is important, albeit partially nullified when the author considers “27 PR electoral systems worldwide [...] as well as in STV elections in Ireland” (2004: 213). The problem with preferential voting is thus both theoretical and empirical. A standard definition is needed as well as a categorical portfolio of definitive empirical cases. There is, as I shall outline, a conceptual overlap and stretching between preferential voting systems and the precise definition of a “preference vote”. In this vein, Cox’s analytical distinction is very valuable. Cox focuses on seat allocation processes, a critical distinguishing aspect between PR systems: “when intermediate seat allocations are made to lists, then the question arises as how the list’s seats are allocated among the candidates on the list” (1997: 60). In particular, he differentiates between closed-list systems, in which “the party establish[es] an order of candidates on the list, with the first candidate on the list getting the first seat to which the party is entitled [...], and so on”, and open-list systems, in which a “party’s voters decide which of its candidates will win the seats allocated to the party’s list” (ibidem: 60–61). Cox also refers to *flexible* systems in which voters “have the ability to vote for individual candidates (possibly in addition to the ability to vote for lists)” (ibidem: 61). However, this is a little misleading, as it is possible to have PLPR, or even OLPR, systems in which the voters only casts a vote for the candidate whom they prefer (e.g. Finland and Chile, as I shall detail in Chapter 5) and *flexible systems* in which the preference votes are automatically pooled and calculated alongside the list votes (e.g. the Netherlands). Finally, Lakeman and Lambert simply state that “most countries using list systems of proportional representation have modified them so as to give the voters a choice between candidates in a more or less effective form” (1946: 92), although they consider SNTV, STV, and OLPR as categorically distinct from one another, because they are based on different formulas.

As we can see, the literature on preferential voting presents no shared, standard definition of the term itself. The state of the art indicates that there is a need for clarification, “as even today systems are often misclassified” (Shugart 2005: 40). There are many different definitions, which refer



to as many different concepts; moreover, various terms are often used synonymously with overlapping meanings and implied characteristics. This situation emerges primarily from the fact that, in some cases, a single term is adopted to denote different electoral systems. This is the case, for example, for open-list proportional representation, the alternative vote, the ranked vote, and the single-transferable vote. This confusion often arises because of geographically based biases in the areas in which the term “preference” is used and culturally consolidated praxis (calling “preference” something different from its meaning in other contexts). However, the problem is not (only) having different wordings but the danger of using terms that refer to diverse (and sometimes opposite and contradictory) concepts. In academia, different definitions cannot coexist when referring to the same research object or concept. There are various terms to describe as many different understandings of preferential voting. As reported in various works, there are “personal voting”, “person voting” (Sartori 1994: 15), “intraparty choice”, “intraparty preference voting” (Katz 1980: 240), and “preference vote”. Norris adopts “preference vote”, “non-blocked vote”, and “open vote” as synonyms for preferential voting (2004: 2). Farrell and Scully propose that one considers “personal vote” and “preferential voting” as interchangeable terms that indicate votes for individual candidate preferences in list PR systems (2002). Each of these proposals is lacking in parsimony. In particular, both “personal voting” and “person voting” appear to be too vast in meaning and therefore can result in overlapping with “personal vote”. In this sense, a clear and crucial distinction must be made between “nominal vote” and “personal vote”: “the presence of nominal voting [in which voters cast their votes for candidates by names and seats are allocated to individual candidates on the basis of the votes they receive] allows casting a personal vote,”<sup>16</sup> which is “based on the candidate’s record, character or other attributes specific to the candidate” (Samuels 1997; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001: 10, fn 2; Carey and Shugart 2005). With regard to “intraparty choice,” referring to it as a synonym for preferential voting may be misleading due to its potential connection to the process of candidate selection rather than the electoral process.

One of the causes of misunderstanding and confusion is, I think, the fact that, more than different “definitions” or wordings, scholars

<sup>16</sup>A “personal vote” refers to “that portion of a candidate’s electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record” (Cain et al. 1987: 9).

sometimes refer to different research objects using the same words. Therefore, it is crucial first to define the borders of a topic to avoid conceptual trespassing and stretching. Accordingly, I believe that it is important to focus on a few main elements that I consider to be relevant in any preferential voting system: whether preferential voting is mandatory; that preferences alone determine who is elected; that votes are pooled at the party level; that the possibility to cast one or more preference votes exists; and the type of ballot, that is to say, the possibility to indicate a preference by writing the candidate's name or a number or using two ballots. We need parsimonious definitions and categories to organize these characteristics into identifiable, standardized subtypes. A broad, general definition of preferential voting will of course include these subtypes, but we cannot have different definitions beneath this referring to various concepts at different times.

Various scholars have proposed definitions of preferential voting. Among them, starting from the highest scale of generality, I relay the most convincing definitions. According to Giovanni Sartori, “[p]referential or preference voting allows voters to indicate on their ballots one of more preferred (selected) candidates, either by writing in or ticking off their names. Generally, preference voting applies to PR list systems. When applied to the alternative vote it also entails a rank-ordering of the preferred candidates that is not contemplated, by contrast, by the PR list systems” (1994: 12). The problem with Sartori’s classification is that it lumps together PR and majority systems and therefore seems to be a broader, general category of voting rather than a particular system. In this sense, it mainly refers to cases that share the possibility of voters “choosing” a candidate. However, this possibility exists in very different systems, for example the Latvian (voters can upgrade or downgrade a candidate), *panachage*, and OLPR systems. Following this line of thinking, Renwick and Pilet, in their very interesting and rich book, couple together true *panachage* cases—Switzerland and Luxembourg—with OLPR systems, such as Italy before 1993, Finland, and Poland (2016: 179). Similarly, according to Bram and Fishburn (1983), preferential voting systems “are systems that allow voters to rank from best to worst”. These kinds of interpretations risk confusing the ordinal ballots of STV or the alternative vote with preferential-list systems. In the same vein, Coakley and Fraenkel (2017) overlap, under the same umbrella of “preferential systems” that they analyse, STV cases (Northern Ireland) and AV cases (Fiji and Papua New Guinea); they also refer to Malta and

Australia as “preferential” systems (2017: 672).<sup>17</sup> Here, vice versa, preferential voting systems are considered to be those based on lists and a vote for both party and/or candidate(s). Cox (1997) and Shugart (2005) are very clear about that distinction, especially with regard to the polling procedure. Under STV, the voter decides on a rank ordering of candidates, which does not follow party lines, while “under a pooling vote, the set of candidates over which a vote may be used is determined by those actors who prepare and submit lists. Thus, *a preference vote within a list is always a pooling vote*” (Shugart 2005: 41). Therefore, an analysis of preferential voting lies at the nexus of proportional representation systems.

There is a need for a unique and parsimonious categorization of preference votes. Lauri Karvonen bases his classification of electoral systems with preferential voting on two questions/dimensions: (1) can the voters choose between several candidates nominated by the same party and (2) does a vote given to a candidate benefit the candidate exclusively or can it be transferred to benefit the party or the list (*pooling vote*) (2004: 206)? Karvonen proposes a scale of systems that allow voters to cast a preference by distinguishing between those that require voters to mark the order of their preferences for all the candidates and those that only allow voters to indicate a preference between several candidates of the same party. According to Karvonen, it is possible to have: (1) “strong” preferential voting in list systems, in which preference votes are the sole basis on which individual legislators are chosen; (2) “weak” preferential voting in list systems, in which the list order or a similar consideration plays a parallel role to preferential voting and clearly limit its effects; (3) “closed party lists”, in which the choice of individual legislators is based solely on a list order predetermined by the party; and (4) candidate votes that do not pool at the level of parties. Single transferable vote and single non-transferable vote systems are the chief examples of this kind of “independent” preferential voting (Karvonen 2004: 207). The final classification is especially useful in classifying electoral systems; however, its link with PV as a whole is a little unclear. The six categories indicated in fact contain considerable within-category variance and refer to a broad scale of electoral systems.

<sup>17</sup>We need a standard definition. The fact that voters choose, and thereby indicate “a preference”, does not imply that all systems can be labelled as “preferential voting systems”. PLPR, STV, and AV follow different logics for seat allocation.

Therefore, in this study, the categories of interest are the first two, namely “strong” and “weak” systems, in which Karvonen distinguishes between the levels of incidence of preferential voting in the choice of individual legislators. We can add the category of “candidate vote” systems, although those are not list systems. Finally, the adjectives “strong” and “weak” are somewhat misleading, as we can have “formally” weak systems wherein the influence of voters in selecting MPs is comparatively high and, on the other hand, “strong” systems in which preference votes do not shape the party’s candidate selection in any way, and thus voters’ opportunities to influence the candidate selection are, on the whole, quite limited. For example, Karvonen includes Sweden among the “weak” preferential voting countries. However, it would be much more theoretically and empirically grounded to use the term “flexible system” for those cases that allow candidates to overcome the party list order and eventually to consider cases as “weak” or “strong” based on the performance across well-defined measurements. Further, such assessments should be based on reliable data and indicators, which measure, for example, the effectiveness of preference votes in the selection of the MPs. Karvonen excludes flexible-list cases from his analysis and, as a result, fails to capture the effects associated with the considerable variation within PRPL subtypes. Therefore, I think it is better to refer to “weakness” in terms of results and to use “flexible” as a different category from OLPR. This is the classification that I adopt in Chapters 5 and 6 by analysing the data case by case and comparing them. We can measure the impact of voters’ behaviour (preference votes, as stated) in different contexts (turnover, candidates’ defeats) by using comparable empirical evidence, enabling us to deem one PV system “stronger” than another by virtue of the effectiveness of its preference votes.

In his consideration of the ballot itself, Rae (1971: 17–18) makes an important distinction between “categorical” and “nominal” cases. “Categorical systems channel each parcel of electoral strength into the grasp of a single party, while ordinal balloting may disperse each parcel of electoral strength among a number of competing parties”. However, Rae does not clarify sufficiently how to distinguish and define PLPR systems, which seem to be included in the same categorical systems in some cases (Finland, Italy pre-1993, or the Netherlands, which vary greatly) and in the ordinal ones in others (e.g. Luxembourg).

A general typology of preferential voting, which includes fixed, flexible, open, and free lists, is offered by Bogdanor (1983: 14). However,

Bogdanor includes in the “preferential voting” category all systems “of voting in which the elector express(es) a rank order of preference between candidates. The alternative and the single transferable vote are systems of preferential voting” (1983: 9). This definition is far too general and cannot be accepted. Its borders are too weak, as, from a theoretical point of view, *all* electoral systems allow voters to indicate a “preference”! Therefore, excluding closed-list systems from this context, I consider preferential systems to be those that permit voters to choose to support a party list or a candidate from the party list order (flexible) and cases in which voters are allowed to select their preference from an unstructured list (Pedersen 1966; Marsh 1985: 366).

Farrell and McAllister consider preferential voting systems in a range varying from more preferential to less preferential systems: “There is a range of preferential systems, which vary in terms of degree of choice given to the voters. These systems share in common the characteristic that voters are given much greater freedom in completing the ballot paper, either in terms of making multiple marks against several candidates, or in some cases being able to rank-order the candidates” (2006: 3). The idea of the continuum is interesting, especially if it focuses on *one* dimension of *one* system, but it should be specified further. We could also consider measures of freedom, evaluating the consequences of such a characteristic (see Sect. 2.3 *on the preferential voting index*).

All the above-mentioned definitions are useful, and they stress one or more aspects of what we can generally refer to as preferential voting. However, each of them is lacking in terms of parsimony and/or clarity. They are too general, each capturing cases and systems with a great range of crucial internal differences. Some are PR systems, some are not (AV), some use mandatory preference votes, and others use them only as an option. Preference and preferential are used synonymously in the description of too many cases. Each voter is showing his/her political, electoral, and even personal “preference” when choosing a party or a candidate in a given electoral race. Nevertheless, each “political preference” *is not a vote of preference* per se. In fact, it is crucial to distinguish among electoral systems in which voters are actually entitled to express a preference between candidates of one or two lists. Other non-PR list systems involve other systems than “preferential voting”. However, considering OLPR as a synonym for PV in general may be misleading and generate overlapping between electoral systems that are in fact very different. Therefore, we should include that open-list proportional form

of list PR in which voters can express a preference both for a party or grouping and for one, or sometimes more, candidates within that party or grouping. As I describe in Sect. 1.8, not all political and electoral “preferences” can be considered per se as being related to the preferential voting system, and analogously not all “personal votes” are preference votes. Vice versa, all *preference votes are personal votes too*.

Following this line of thinking, Shugart opts not to use the term “open list” as all-encompassing but rather proposes the definition “preferential-list PR” (PLPR). In Shugart’s view, PLPR should denote systems “in which intraparty allocation takes place across party lists, but voters are permitted (or sometimes required [...]) to indicate a preference for one or more candidates within one list, or, rarely, across more than one list”<sup>18</sup> (2005: 40). Consequently, Shugart indicates a typology of preferential-list PR allocation methods and distinguishes the following. (1) *Open-list systems* are those systems in which the ballots provided by parties are unranked and the preference votes alone determine the order of election from a party’s list.<sup>19</sup> (2) *Flexible-list* systems are those in which preference votes are not the sole criterion for determining candidates’ ranks. (3) A *quasi-list system* is a subtype of open-list systems in which the voters cannot cast a vote for the list, and at the same time, must express a preference for one of the candidates. Therefore, preference votes exclusively determine the ranking of the party candidates. (4) *Latent lists* are a subtype of *flexible lists* (Marsh 1985), in which the voter has to express a preference and the list is likely to determine the order of election for most candidates (Shugart 2005: 42–43). Thus, a preferential-list system should not be confused with the ordinal ballots of STV, the block vote, or the alternative vote, which are also sometimes termed “preferential” but are not list systems. Basically, we deal with Shugart’s distinction between systems in which a voter, by not giving a preference vote, leaves the decision to other voters (open list)

<sup>18</sup>In this passage, it seems as if Shugart includes panachage among the preferential voting systems; however, he then clearly distinguishes between PLPR and panachage.

<sup>19</sup>As Cox reports, “in some systems, voters are allowed to alter the order of names on the ballot; I include this possibility under the general rubric of ‘preference votes’” (1997: 61, fn 17). However, I would argue that it is better to refer explicitly to a particular case or electoral system. Therefore, I consider all the system’s characteristics to avoid misunderstanding. Again, if the system allows this change in the same party’s list in a PR system (otherwise it is a case of panachage), then I include this case among PLPR without a doubt. The crucial distinction is between *open* and *flexible* systems to avoid the “general rubric” of preference votes.

and systems in which this action leaves the decision to the party organization (flexible list).

As seen, there are PLPR subtypes, such as quasi-list systems in the case of OLPR and latent-list systems in the case of flexible-list systems. Those categories, as is well argued (Shugart 2005), cover almost all the potential cases. However, in my critical review of the countries adopting a PLPR electoral system, I am faced with a theoretical challenge posed by a number of cases that clearly do not fit into any of the four above-mentioned subtypes. Therefore, I propose to introduce an additional subtype that will offer a recovery to such electoral systems in which there is an overlapping of different rationales. I call this category “protected open list”, and it is a subtype of OLPR.<sup>20</sup> The cases with this label present peculiar characteristics, such as the selection of candidates through preferences, as in OLPR, together with provisions that exempt one or more candidates from being submitted to the competition for preference votes. Moreover, the electoral system does not state any legal threshold or quota for candidates willing to be elected. In my review, I find at least three cases operating under such provisions. The cases falling into this category are in fact not completely OLPR, as the head of the list has a special status that exempts a candidate from the intraparty competition. At the same time, the system is not CLPR either, as the remaining candidates must compete to gain the qualification, and finally the system is not formally flexible, as no clause requires candidates to obtain a certain number of votes. Therefore, again, we are not dealing with OLPR, in which what matters is solely the voters’ choice; nevertheless, we are not describing a flexible-list case, because there is no provision obliging candidates to reach a given threshold. Moreover, this system cannot be defined as a mix of OLPR and flexible but rather as a mix of OLPR and CLPR. For these reasons, I argue that it would be correct to define it as “personalized OLPR”, in which the personalized provision is given by the special status accorded to the head of the list or the equivalent, while the rest of the system works as “pure” OLPR. This is the key difference from any possible “mixed OLPR+flexible system”: “personalized OLPR” works as open list, except for usually one candidate (almost always the head of the list). The latter does not compete for the preferences in a different or mitigated way despite co-partisans, but he or she

<sup>20</sup>I owe this definition to Matthew Shugart with which I have discussed an early classification of this sub-type.

is simply elected if the party wins at least one seat. In particular, it is the case of the Cypriot electoral system, in which the first candidate on the list (party leader or not) is not required to receive preference votes to be elected. Furthermore, in the Greek context, while all other candidates compete for preference votes, party leaders and former prime ministers are protected, being automatically awarded as many preference votes as their party receives votes in their district. Moreover, 12 “state deputies” out of 300 have been elected via the closed-list system (according to the largest-average method). Finally, in the Italian electoral system approved in 2015 (and then reformed in 2017 and therefore never used), in each district, the party’s lists included a head of the list, whose name is printed beside the symbol of his or her party, and the other party candidates, whose number ranges from half to “magnitude” (M) for each district. In the case that a party wins only one seat in the district, it will be allocated to the head of the list, while, from the second seat onwards, they will be allocated to the candidates obtaining the most preference votes (Passarelli 2018).

From this discussion, it should be evident that the term “preferential” needs to be clarified and delimited well in its borders. If at one point it seemed as if we could refer to “preferential voting” as any system in which voters express their political “preference”, it should now be clear that preferential voting is only possible when voters can indicate a preference for a candidate on the party list. If we consider the *preference vote* as any situation in which “candidates’ votes ... influence seat allocations among the members of a given list”, as Cox (1997: 61) does in noting Marsh (1985) and Katz (1986), then a crucial difference arises. As I have argued, we cannot consider “preference” to be the voters’ behaviour in any electoral system. At least, if we do, we must be aware that we are just referring to the voters’ electoral will and choice and not to a particular element of a PR electoral system. That is exactly what Cox refers to: the possibility to alter, modify, and, in the end, determine which candidates will obtain the seats to which the party is entitled. Having clarified that, it should be emphasized that there are then differences in terms of the compulsoriness of such votes, their influence in determining the ranking of candidates, the possibility to cast more than one vote, and so on. If it may “spur the development of research into the large category of preferential-list PR (PLPR) systems if we orient them clearly with respect to other systems that can be termed ‘preferential’ (Shugart 2005: 40), and it is important not to confuse preferential-list systems with other



systems, we must then use the term exclusively in reference to systems that provide voters with an intraparty choice among multiple candidates. An additional difference between PLPR systems and other “preference” voting systems—such as STV—is that the former do *not* allow voters to rank their candidates but allow them “only” to indicate their preferred candidate(s). I focus on countries that allow voters to do so by choosing a candidate. Therefore, here I adopt Shugart’s typology and definition to analyse the countries included in the sample. It should be clear that OLPR only represents a case of PLPR systems. Here I share Shugart’s idea that “it is misleading to refer to all systems in which voters may give preference votes as ‘open lists’, because the list is not very open in practice if voters may indicate a choice of candidate, but such choices seldom have any impact on which candidates are elected” (Shugart 2005: 42). To give the reader an idea of the differences among these systems, I briefly provide some information related to OLPR and flexible systems and to systems that can be considered or have been labelled as “preferential”, although they are not all included in my analyses<sup>21</sup> to avoid conceptual stretching. In theoretical terms, and for purposes of conceptual clarity, I must emphasize that a crucial difference exists between the concepts of *closed*- and *open*-list systems. In the current terminology in the literature, “closed” refers to the absence of preference votes, while “open” includes that option. However, the Spanish-language sources use a more detailed terminology that, while lacking in parsimony, provides the necessary clarity. As Carey and Shugart state, “the term generally used is *listas cerradas y bloqueadas*, meaning closed and blocked lists” (1995: 435). Some sources use the term “fixed lists” (Bogdanor 1983). What the English-language literature generally calls open lists are called, in Spanish, *listas cerradas y no bloqueadas*, where “‘closed’ refers to the absence of cross-party preference voting (*panachage*), rather than the absence of any preference voting” (Carey and Shugart 1995: 435). Therefore, in open-list systems, voters can indicate a preference (*lista no bloqueada*), but they cannot modify the list (add/subtract names, etc.) (*lista cerradas*).

After presenting the characteristics of each electoral system, I will test the effects of different electoral PLPR frameworks primarily on the intraparty electoral competition, turnover, level of renewal of candidacy, and voters’ behaviour.

<sup>21</sup>In this sense, I deal only with cases fitting Karvonen’s categories 1 and 2 (Karvonen 2004) and Shugart’s typology in particular (2005: 40).

## 1.6 OPEN-LIST AND FLEXIBLE-LIST SYSTEMS, SNTV, STV, AV, AND *PANACHAGE*

Before deciding on a definition of the preferential voting system, it is crucial to review the extant literature on the topic as well as on the different definitions that have been proposed over time.<sup>22</sup> As we have seen, there are several definitions of an electoral system that allows voters to express a preference. Generally speaking, the main aspects that characterize an electoral system with preferential voting and differentiate it from other systems are as follows. The first is the power conferred on the voters and the number of preferences that they can indicate. The second is the ability of voters to change the party's list order as well as to vote for a candidate of another party (however, this case falls into the *panachage* category). Again, is it the party's vote share that decides who is elected or the votes for the candidates (or both)? The final aspect is whether preferential voting is mandatory or optional. Is there any requirement, such as a gender quota, in the case that two or more preferences are allowed? Those elements are crucial to demonstrate how preferential voting systems vary and to understand the various consequences for parties and candidates that different PV systems may create. The cacophony of definitions of preferential voting described in the literature review demonstrates the necessity of developing one shared and parsimonious definition of PLPR. If we assume, as reported, that PLPR should denote electoral systems "in which intraparty allocation takes place across party lists, but voters are permitted (or sometimes required [...]) to indicate a preference for one or more candidates within one list [...]" (Shugart 2005: 40), then we have a clearly defined category. We can now begin to discuss and differentiate among the types that fit this definition and vary in the different critical elements discussed. First, OLPR should be considered to refer to those electoral systems (proportional-list ones) in which preference votes are the sole "criterion in determining the rank of candidates on the party list" (Shugart 2005: 42). It is relevant to differentiate, as has been done, between OLPR and flexible systems. It is

<sup>22</sup>As reported in Chapter 2, authors adopt different approaches to classifying the "preferential" vote systems: ordinal vs. cardinal; open vs. closed; the importance and the structure of the ballot; the determinants or the consequences; and grouping together majoritarian and proportional systems alike, just to mention a few (Rae 1967; Katz 1980, 1986; Marsh 1985; Karvonen 2004; Shugart 2005).

useful to consider that Katz, in his seminal volume, conceives of preferential systems in PR as one category, as he states that “in other systems [than PR], however, the particular candidates awarded their party’s share of the parliamentary seats may be selected totally or partially by the voters themselves” (1980: 31). Although we cannot, of course, have cases in which the rank order of candidates is solely indicated by the party (as such cases fall into the CLPR category), it is possible for parties within PLPR systems to have some level of control over this process (Carey and Shugart 1995). There are different variables to be considered beyond the extent to which votes alone determine the order of election: how many preferences the voters can indicate, the presence of thresholds to be overcome to allow the preferences to count, how ballots are ranked (by the voters and/or by the party), whether a gender representation quota is required (compulsory vote for male/female candidates, whether indicating a preference is mandatory or not, etc.) (Fig. 1.2).

Preferential voting combines support for individual candidates with support for the party and is arguably based more on the influence of the personality of the candidate than on the influence that can be expected from the support arising from “ideological affinity” with a political party.<sup>23</sup> Thanks to a felicitous combination of voting for individuals and proportional representation, preferential voting is used by more and more countries (see Chapter 3). In parliamentary elections with preferential voting, the competition takes place primarily among political parties, yet voters also have the option to assign preference votes to individual candidates. Thus, at the “second level”, there is a parallel competition among individual candidates. However, preferences in PLPR are pooled, meaning that any vote for a candidate on the party list will increase the party’s electoral performance.

Moreover, in the vast family of PLPR, we find the second-biggest category, that of flexible-list systems. With the flexible-list lemma, as seen in Shugart’s typology described in the previous section, are defined those electoral systems in which preference votes are not the sole criterion for determining candidates’ ranks. The allocation of seats to candidates

<sup>23</sup>Voters may very well use a criterion other than a candidate’s personality when deciding how to cast a preference vote: other criteria could include the candidate’s allegiance to a faction or ideological grouping within the party, the candidate’s interest group affiliations, the candidate’s views on a particular issue that cuts across party lines, and the candidate’s socio-demographic characteristics. It remains that PLPR systems are candidate-centred electoral systems in which the personality of the candidate matters.

takes into account both the party-provided rank order and the preference votes. Typically, a quota of votes is required to guarantee a candidate a seat among those allocated to his/her party. Flexible-list systems vary widely with regard to this quota and thus in the potential that voters have to modify the party's list ranking. In this sense, the flexible-list system represents a compromise, a hybrid, because both party ranking and preferences decide the order of election from the list. Therefore, flexible lists "offer voters the choice of supporting the list or indicating a single preferred candidate from the party structured list" (Marsh 1985: 366). Accordingly, it makes sense to distinguish between OLPR and other variously labelled list PR cases (semi-open, semi-closed, flexible, ordered, and weakly structured) (Bogdanor 1983; Farrell and Scully 2002), in which the list order has an important role in allocating seats among candidates of the same party. To sum up, we can refer to countries that adopt flexible-list systems as those that "give both party leaders and voters some say in the allocation of a list's seats among its candidates" (Cox 1997: 61). However, as we shall see, although the mechanics of flexible-list systems vary widely, in most cases, the list order is the predominant factor for determining which candidates are elected. Hence, in a sense, flexible-list systems represent a compromise between OLPR and CLPR systems, in which both voters and parties play a role. However, the main criticism of flexible-list systems is that they only formally offer more power to the voters, while in reality they are nothing more than a facsimile of CLPR. This criticism is true to varying degrees in different countries, as I discuss in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. As seen, preferential voting has sometimes generated confusion and overlapping between different concepts. Having a political preference and, therefore, casting an electoral choice on the bases of those shortcuts cannot be considered as a preference vote per se. If not all the voters' decisions can be grouped as "preferences", then a clear distinction is required, underlining the differences between the personal vote (as in the majoritarian system: AV, plurality, or better SSD) and the preference per se in proportional contexts, in which the voters cannot rank the candidates; they cannot pick a name from other lists (*panachage*); voters' choice affects (at different levels) the candidates elected; there is one round/count; and there is no transferable vote.

Here I briefly discuss SNTV, STV, and AV electoral systems, which are sometimes labelled as "preferential" ones but are not considered so for this analysis. I consider only those three systems as the only similar

ones to PLPR, plus *panachage*. However, while some are comparable to the OLPR and flexible-list systems in the meaning of “preference” (the voter chooses a candidate) and in its consequences, others are not. The term *panachage* (also known as *free list*) is used in francophone countries to denote the version of list PR in which voters may vote for a party or grouping *and* for one or more candidates, whether or not those candidates are nominated by that party or grouping. The capacity to vote for more than one candidate across different party lists provides the voters with an additional measure of control and is thus categorized here as a free-list system. As Shugart notes, “in most PLPR systems, the voter’s opportunity for giving preference is confined to a single list. However, PLPR also admits the possibility of *panachage*, as in the open-list systems of Luxembourg and Switzerland, whereby the list imposes no boundary on the candidates to who a voter may choose to give preference votes” (Shugart 2005: 42, fn 17). Basically, in the *panachage* system, there is the same logic as OLPR but it is adopted with no political and electoral (list) boundaries. In those two countries, electors have as many votes as there are seats to be filled and can distribute them to candidates either within a single party list or across several party lists as they see fit. Therefore, *panachage* is the only system out of SNTV, STV, and AV that is included in PLPR, although I do not deal with it in the book for both theoretical (I focus only on OLPR and flexible systems) and empirical reasons (the lack of data and difficulties of comparison). Other systems present a kind of preference expressed by the voters, but this can be understood as merely an aspect of the “personal vote” rather than an effectual action of the voters in candidate selection. In PLPR, the preference vote is crucial (with some degree of differentiation) in determining who is elected, while the personal vote is merely a factor in individual voters’ candidate selection. In the *single non-transferable vote* (SNTV) system, voters cast one vote for a single candidate in multi-member districts. The winners are therefore the top M vote champions. The *single transferable vote* (STV) system is a “sophisticated” (Jesse 2000) preferential candidate-centred proportional representation system used in multi-member districts. Candidates who obtain a specified quota of first-preference votes are immediately elected. In successive counts, votes are redistributed from the least successful candidates, who are eliminated, and votes in excess of the quota are redistributed from successful candidates until sufficient candidates are elected. STV—the most well-known case of which is found in Ireland (Sinnot 2004)—and OLPR share the

fact that voters cast a vote for individual candidates, although in the first case voters may rank (all) the candidates, that is, they may choose among the candidates nominated by the party (Bergman et al. 2013). In this sense, this differentiation between systems in which the voters can and cannot order their preferences partially echoes the differences between closed and not-blocked lists that I presented in Sect. 1.5.

Elections under the alternative vote system are usually held in single-member districts, like FPTP/SSD electoral systems. However, AV gives voters considerably more options than FPTP/SSD when marking their ballot paper. Rather than simply indicating their favoured candidate, under AV, electors rank candidates in the order of their choice by marking a “1” for their favourite, “2” for their second choice, “3” for their third choice, and so on. The system thus enables voters to express their preferences between multiple candidates rather than simply their first choice. For this reason, it is often known as “preferential voting” in the countries that use it. AV also differs from FPTP/SSD in the way in which votes are counted. Like FPTP/SSD or TRS, a candidate who has won an absolute majority of the votes (50 per cent plus 1) is immediately elected. However, if no candidate has an absolute majority, under AV, the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is “eliminated” from the count, and his or her ballots are examined for their second preferences. Each ballot is then transferred to whichever remaining candidate has the highest number of preferences in the order marked on the ballot paper. This process is repeated until one candidate has an absolute majority and is declared duly elected. AV is thus a majoritarian system. If it is true that the electoral systems influence the behaviour of parties, candidates, and voters, then it is crucial to analyse the voters casting such a vote and the parties and candidates alike (Karvonen 2004: 209).

Therefore, although in those electoral systems the voters can or must indicate a “preference”, I will not be dealing with them. The reason for not including the AV and the STV in this analysis lies in the fact that, while the previous electoral systems not only allow a preference vote among candidates, they also allow or require ordering of the preferences that implies ordering of candidates and parties alike. Vice versa, the PLPR electoral systems represent voters’ choice between candidates of the same party, without splitting their vote or transferring it, with the selection of the elected in the first tier. Thus, I can test the hypotheses related to the party’s internal turnover, the voters’ choice, and the number of preference votes cast.

## 1.7 CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENTIAL VOTING

The literature on the effects of electoral systems is well consolidated (Shugart 2005). Nevertheless, studies focus more on the differences between “big” families, such as PR, majority, plurality, and mixed systems, than on “different” systems within the same broader category. A number of important advances have recently been made, especially in the area of the effects of electoral systems on some issues. In general terms, electoral systems’ effects are measured with regard to their consequences for parties and party systems, votes, and thus the political system as a whole. For parties, the system’s impacts on candidate recruitment are investigated, as well as the impacts on political personnel, the presence of factions (unified or not), the role of the leadership, the change in the electoral offer, and so on.

The choice, use, and reform (Renwick 2010; Bowler and Donovan 2013) of a given electoral system imply certain consequences for voters and parties. In majoritarian systems—both plurality and majority—voters indicate their preferences for a candidate who is running for the only seat allocated in the district. The party intervenes by contributing to the choice of candidate as well as by conveying partisan preferences to voters; nevertheless, the main role in political campaigns is played by the candidates themselves, even though differences arise between countries. In proportional systems, voters vote for a party, and the allocation of seats among candidates is decided in accordance with the rank order of the list. However, there are also PR systems with open lists, in which voters can indicate a preference for a candidate (Marsh 1985; Katz 1986). Indeed, the choice and use of PLPR electoral systems have been made and justified in many cases with reference to voters’ power. As Farrell puts it in his analysis of closed PR systems, “individual voters have absolutely no say over who represents them” (2001: 83). In these cases, the list of candidates is drawn up by the party leadership, and voters can only select one list, that of their “preferred” party.<sup>24</sup> Consequently, the voters have no say in the rank order decided by the party organization and leadership. The only possible action for voters, therefore, is to try to affect the list rank (before the elections) to influence the process of candidate selection (Hazan and Rahat 2010). Electoral systems also have effects on

<sup>24</sup>Of course, there are different contexts, but the point to retain here is that PLPR systems are systems in which the role of candidates is generally more important. In fact, in different countries and political parties, the party leadership may not necessarily select candidates in closed-list systems.

parties: they “can be chosen not only for the inter-party allocations of seats which are the result but also for their consequences on intra-party competition between individual candidates” (Colomer 2004: 49–50). Roughly speaking, as Colomer has underlined, while strongly independent individual candidates should be expected to prefer systems offering voters the opportunity to choose among individuals, compact, disciplined parties will prefer to establish nomination systems of candidates by which the choice of voters will be determined by party labels rather than by the individual characters.

It is possible to identify the main theoretical “consequences” of preferential voting for parties, voters, and candidates. From a sociological point of view, the presence of PLPR can influence the representation of some specific social groups (ethically, linguistically, geographically, economically, etc.). As it has been noted, women represent a crucial test case in such a context (Shugart 2005: 41ff.). Further, the electoral system can, of course, affect political parties and their dynamics of internal competition, as I shall present in Chapters 5 and 6. Similarly, voters’ choices can be influenced by the level of emphasis on candidates’ characteristics. Voters will seek closer relationships with candidates and MPs who try to appeal primarily in terms of personal or local benefits. In addition, PLPR can generate, or at least not impede the growth of, factionalism, given its exacerbation of intraparty competition. Loyalty to a party can be weakened in favour of candidates and their personal networking efforts. The use of *the personal vote* (Cain et al. 1987) is thus another element related to the presence of a PLPR electoral system, given that it stresses candidate features more than party appeal, in particular by promoting intraparty competition. If, among PLPR systems, “the primary dimension of variation is whether preference votes alone determine the order of election” (Shugart 2005: 43), they can also vary in terms of consequences for the legislator’s side. This can be measured, for example, by examining legislative behaviour and committee assignments.

Moreover, as I shall describe (Chapters 5 and 6), we can distinguish between “real” cases of preferential voting and those that can be defined as “fake” or “illusory” ones. In the first group, “the influence of preference votes is evident/relevant”, while, in the second category, that impact is less important (Karvonen 2004: 207–208).<sup>25</sup> To some extent,

<sup>25</sup>Although he does not measure the impact of the preferences on this perspective.



there is no difference from CLPR, which is obviously without preference votes. Therefore, to show the differences between cases in terms of consequences and impacts, I measure a few indicators related to preferential voting behaviour in both OLPR and flexible systems<sup>26</sup> and the intraparty competition, which is the topic of the next section and the core of my analysis.

## 1.8 “MY KINGDOM FOR A ... SEAT!” INTRAPARTY DYNAMICS AND COMPETITION

I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for today, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use; rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. (Macchiavelli, *The Prince*, ch. XX)

The main influence that preference votes can exert is on the actual selection of candidates to be elected. Recalling the very important article by Michael Marsh (1985), the question is to understand whether “voters decide”, in which form, and to what extent eventually. As I have detailed in the introduction to this book and in the methodology section (Chapter 2), one of the most stimulating theoretical questions concerns the weight of the personal vote in determining intraparty competition dynamics. Since preferential voting allows voters to select both the list that they prefer and the candidates whom they want to promote (it does not matter in this context whether that happens through a unique vote or two separate ones), it makes sense to say that such electoral systems “are really double elections” (Wildgen 1985: 949). From a theoretical point of view, then, preferential voting systems—PLPR—offer voters the possibility of affecting the choice of their parliamentarians. Therefore, the main research question can be summarized as: “how much do preferences weigh compared with other variables, such as the party’s leadership choice in ranking

<sup>26</sup>Moreover, as stated, the adoption of PLPR, and in particular of OLPR, has regularly been coupled with a political and academic discussion of its pros and the cons. In particular, the focus has been on voters’ power and satisfaction, the parties’ decision making, the electoral accountability, the representation of specific socio-demographic groups, the voter-candidate bargaining, and the personal vote.

the candidates and/or allowing them to run again in the electoral race?” Moreover, it is intriguing from a theoretical point of view to consider the dynamics connected to intraparty competition. In particular, it has to be noted whether there are relevant over-time trends, differences between parties as well as countries, and finally between and within PLPR subtypes. Essentially, an analysis must consider “the inter-party dimension, which relates to the distribution of seats across parties, and the intra-party dimension, concerning distribution of seats among candidates within parties” (Shugart 2001: 25). After all, an electoral system is “a set of laws and party rules that regulate electoral competition between and *within* parties” (my italics) (Cox 1997: 38). Consequently, there is not only an interparty contest “(which almost monopolizes scholarly attention) but a set of simultaneously held intraparty contests which may not have received all the attention they deserve” (Wildgen 1985: 949). Moreover, if we consider that “politicians are motivated by the desire to seek re-election” (Carey and Shugart 1995: 418), then it is evident that intraparty competition, especially in PLPR contests, has an important role requiring in-depth analysis. Intraparty competition in preferential voting systems is very different from that in other electoral systems, and, even in PLPR subtypes, it is plausible to hypothesize different patterns resulting from the electoral law/system’s rules. In most other proportional systems, voters can alter the order of candidates, although the official party rank remains important, either formally or politically. As we have seen, the level of PLPR can vary broadly depending on the level of openness of the system, that is, the voters’ power in determining the allocation of seats to candidates. The level of openness of a PLPR system can incentivize candidates to cultivate a personal vote.

However, in the literature, as partly anticipated in the introduction, intraparty competition and dynamics are topics of considerable interest, albeit the subjects of only a few comparative research endeavours. Although the competition between parties is well studied, the gap concerning the intraparty struggle is still vast.

Marsh (1985: 366) maintains that, “with the notable exception of Katz’s study (1979), intraparty choice has been neglected as a topic of systematic, comparative theoretical and empirical study”. Shugart emphasizes the same issue, claiming that there is a lack of (reliable) data and comparative analysis on preferential voting in list systems (2005: 50). In PLPR systems—as well as in SNTV but with a different rationale—intraparty competition concerns different levels of party and candidate relationships. Nevertheless, as Shugart clearly states, “If the study

of the effects of SNTV is well developed, we know a good deal less about the workings of PLPR, and how it relates to SNTV as a member of a family of systems that entail intraparty competition” (2005: 48). As is clearly indicated by Richard Katz: “because the candidate does not owe his election only to his party, he has less reason to be loyal to it once elected” [similarly,] “an independent campaign organization gives a politician wherewithal credibly to buck party discipline”. “[Moreover], in building an independent campaign base, a candidate will incur debts, make compromises, and develop loyalties different from those of other candidates of the same party” (1986: 101). In this sense, Karvonen (2004: 218) tries to measure—albeit for three countries only, one of which uses PLPR—party discipline using roll-call votes, despite their well-known flaws and the presence of the tool of the frequency of recorded votes in parliament, as proposed by Saalfeld (1995). As has been highlighted, electoral systems present opportunities and constraints to voters and parties alike. In particular, electoral systems that emphasize intraparty competition between individual candidates are preferred by strong independent candidates in spite of disciplined parties that stress the party label to pull voters’ support (Colomer 2004: 50).

Nevertheless, thirty years after Katz’s statement, it is still evident that “on the intraparty dimension we are still largely lacking data” [...] (and that) “the field would benefit from an increased availability of raw data such as candidate shares of preference votes for preferential-list PR systems” (Shugart 2005: 50–51). Therefore, although the distribution of votes across parties and the interparty competition are analysed in detail, “a deeper understanding of vote distributions across candidates would advance research on the intraparty dimension” (Bergman et al. 2013: 321). On a similar note, Lijphart stresses that “there are also still significant gaps and underdeveloped themes, like the internal organization of parties and the relationships of parties and candidates to their constituents” (2005: vii). This book offers the most data possible on different countries and parties with regard to the consequences for the intraparty dimension in terms of competition.

Following this line of thinking, and considering the variation in PV’s features that is the independent variable, it is also crucial to consider the district magnitude as a variable affecting the intraparty competition. If we assume that the district magnitude (Taagepeera and Shugart 1989; Carey and Shugart 1995; Shugart 2005) is the number of seats per constituency, then it is evident that, in single-seat district majority systems,

there is generally little intraparty competition, as the parties present each field one candidate per district.<sup>27</sup> Analogously, in terms of absent intraparty competition, the role of *M* is not influential in CLPR systems. Vice versa, in PLPR systems, the district magnitude is clearly a variable related to the competition for preference votes, and it has consequences for the intraparty dynamics.

As we shall see, the district magnitude varies across countries; thus, it is reasonable to expect different outcomes in terms of intraparty competition and the level of preferential voting (see Sect. 4.4). Depending on *M*, the parties behave differently. The party leadership's electoral strategy and candidate allocation decisions can be influenced by *M* as well (which candidates are to be presented in which district, in which list position, etc.). Further, the party organization can be put under stress (the presence of factions can then be magnified or weakened depending on the number of available seats in a district and those potentially allocated to the party according to its force) (Zariski 1962; Katz 1986; Karvonen 2004).

Candidates will also behave differently on the basis of *M*, which is likely to influence the overall structure of their electoral campaign and, more specifically, their efforts to contact voters (Carey and Shugart 1995). Depending on the district magnitude, electoral campaigns may focus on personal characteristics rather than the party ideology or devote efforts to obtaining a favourable position on the party list, especially in flexible systems. In closed-list systems, legislators must appease party leaders rather than voters to influence their position on the party list. Vice versa, in open-list PR systems, votes are pooled across candidates so that a vote for an individual candidate is also a vote for the party; thus, candidates' incentives to cultivate a personal vote are quite high in PLPR, in which the preference votes are the sole determinant of candidates' rank on the list.

Party loyalty can be influenced broadly by these dynamics as well. Depending on *M*, a candidate has more or less incentive to promote "personal" campaign appeals rather than party-centred ones. The costs of the campaign are likely to increase with the need for personal "canvassing", and therefore each candidate's chances will be affected by his or her availability to finance high levels of personal outreach. Thus, it is

<sup>27</sup>For a few exceptions, see Shugart (2005: 38, fn 11).

evident that the type of representation linkage can be influenced heavily by the electoral system through *M*. Finally, voters' electoral behaviour will be influenced by *M* on the basis of the above-mentioned intraparty competition characteristics. The bigger the *M* (in PLPR), the greater the odds of being contacted personally by a candidate as well as the greater the likelihood of "local" issues being heavily featured in campaigns and the risk of pork barrel campaign appeals or even corruption phenomena and so on.

In addition, as theorized (and analysed in this book (see Chapter 5), the probability of receiving preference votes increases with *M* (Carey and Shugart 1995; Shugart 2005). The district magnitude also plays a key role in determining whether candidates emphasize personal or party votes. As the district magnitude increases, the odds that an individual legislator will emphasize personal characteristics to attract more votes increases in preferential-list systems. Greater district magnitudes increase the number of co-partisans whom candidates are forced to compete with, which elevates the need for candidates to differentiate themselves from co-partisans. As such, seeking personal votes is the best way to defeat co-partisan challengers.

Therefore, as Carey and Shugart clearly put it, "rather than decreasing, the importance of personal reputation actually increases with magnitude in those systems in which copartisans compete with each other for votes and seats. The logic is that, as the number of other copartisans from which a given candidate must distinguish herself grows, the importance of establishing a unique personal reputation, distinct from that of the party, also grows" (1995: 430). This is obviously the case in PLPR systems, with some variation across flexible- and open-list systems. Continuing this line of thought, it is worth mentioning that Norris argues the opposite of Carey and Shugart's principle and hypothesis, although without any empirical evidence to support her claims. As she states, "extremely large multimember districts are likely to weaken the incentive to cultivate a personal vote in preference-ballot elections, as it will be difficult for any individual candidate to stand out from the throng" (2004: 232). If, on one side, it is true that "preference-ballot elections" include both PLPR and STV systems, Norris's assumption that a large *M* decreases the incentive to cultivate a personal vote remains largely untested. Finally, Lakeman and Lambert argue, albeit implicitly referring to the weight of *M* in terms of candidates' personal mobilization, that the difficulty of covering a large PR constituency is outweighed

by “voters’ power of choice between persons” (1955: 16 and 133).<sup>28</sup> Further, as Mainwaring indicates (1990), the specific characteristics of the nations in which PLPR systems operate, together with the timing of preferential system introduction, can result in different levels of internal party cohesiveness. Therefore, as I shall describe in the next section, my main dependent variables of interest are the preference vote share of parties in different cases and over time as well as the result of the interelection turnover/competition.

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<sup>28</sup>The authors distinguish between the LR and the D’Hondt formula, as they affect the intraparty allocation of seats (ibidem: 15).

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## Hypotheses, Data, and Methodology

The main goal of this study, the results of which I report in this book, is to investigate the effects of preferential voting on voters, parties, and candidates. In this chapter, I frame the research method, the hypotheses, and the data used. As voters can or must cast at least one preference vote, PLPR should affect party lists with different levels of intensity. In particular, the electoral system's features in the cases examined help us to detect different outcomes: I focus on the share of preference votes cast (voters' side) and the effects on MPs (turnover), on the party system (ENP and volatility), and on political parties (factions and turnover). In particular, with regard to the case selection, I include an important level of variation and differentiation between countries. Further, I overcome the main concern expressed by Karvonen, who claims that, to measure the "possible effects of preferential voting, sample size, unfortunately, must vary from hypothesis to hypothesis" (2004: 206). In fact, I have a bigger sample as well as a more coherent set of variables for almost all the cases included in the research. Indeed, the sample size of my research allows me to face better one of the methodological problems that Karvonen underlines when he states that, "[g]iven the limited number of existing preferential systems and the uneven regional distribution of these cases, the problems become even more acute. Still, it seems natural to start an investigation at the comparative cross-national level to detect any differences that might manifest themselves" (2004: 209). However, my investigation only partially follows Karvonen's path, as I try to delve further both in theoretical and in empirical terms. In fact, I analyse a

larger number of cases, enabling a more extensive and empirically rigorous comparison. To this end, I adopt a fixed set of variables for several countries and identify differences and similarities between countries as generated by the preferential voting system.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the growing availability of empirical data, albeit not always the same for all countries, allows me to reach more detailed conclusions than are reported thus far in the extant literature. Even controlling for simple bivariate relationships represents a step forward in the analysis of the effects of preferential voting systems.

The analysis of data on preferential voting follows a two-step path. After a theoretical introduction, there are two empirical sections. The first includes a descriptive presentation of data, while the second includes a focus on individual countries<sup>2</sup> and a comparative perspective.

The case selection is as accurate as possible. The group of countries included in the research—as presented in Chapter 1—is wide and covers almost all the countries adopting a PLPR system. From a methodological point of view, the cases included offer a good level of variation in terms of the characteristic of the electoral systems, although always under the common label of PLPR systems. Different variables are considered to compare the different systems and their influence on the electoral outcomes. The cases analysed vary in terms of the number of preferences allowed, their compulsoriness, and the presence of thresholds to modify the party list order.

## 2.1 HYPOTHESES

The goal of the book is to offer an analysis of preferential voting from a comparative perspective. First, I provide a deep description of the different kinds of electoral systems that permit voters to express preferences in the ballot. In some systems (mostly proportional ones), the electoral law permits voters to indicate only one “preference” for a candidate on a party list (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland). In a much more limited set of cases (Italy before 1991 and

<sup>1</sup>Ortega Villodres (2004) claims to compare 16 “preferential” systems. However, the book includes SNTV, STV, AV, PLPR, and *panachage*; thus, the analysis focuses on lower chambers and upper houses alike. Moreover, the author covers a short time span of about ten years per country on average.

<sup>2</sup>Except when data at the precinct level are available or for in-depth case studies.

Belgium, for example), the electoral law permits voters to indicate preferences for up to four candidates even in plurinominal districts (Norris 2004: 231). Second, I present data on preference votes and their consequences in countries that have adopted or still use an electoral system that allows voters to indicate one or more preferences for candidates on a single party list (Shugart 2005: 40). Finally, I test the hypotheses related to the effects of preferential voting electoral systems on the entirety of the “political system” as well as the individual political parties.

I present a data analysis on the use of preferential voting for all the countries included in the sample. In particular, in comparing the cases, I present data on the share of preference votes at the national level, the differences in the use of preference votes between electoral levels (if any), the variation in the share of voters’ preference votes between political parties according to the political party family (extreme right, centre, left, and extreme left), and the concentration of personal votes for different candidates (those who collect more preferences, the distance between the first and the last, etc.) for each case, comparing these results between different countries. The comparison follows a geographical approach, meaning that the listed electoral data are analysed by grouping the countries into two areas (Europe and the rest of the world). Moreover, to provide a consistent and detailed analysis of the data, and to illustrate the variation in the amount and use of preferential voting, a diachronic perspective is adopted. Such an approach affords a description of changes over a temporal period of the last twenty years, depending on the case. Finally, together with a general comparison, I focus on specific aspects of certain countries. This deep analysis of particular cases represents tests of the general research and in particular attempts to offer richer information on “particular” countries that have adopted preferential voting for many years and that, for different reasons, can be considered as “models”.

Preferential voting can influence the behaviour of different actors as well as the political and electoral outcomes. To capture these effects, I test some of the variables suggested by Karvonen (2004), as well as adding some new ones. To measure the consequences of the presence/absence of preferential voting, I now present the operationalization of the variables implied by the research questions:

*H1: Intraparty competition and parliamentary turnover.*

One, probably the most important, political implication of preferential voting is that, under such systems, candidates of the same party must

compete with each other for election. The degree of intraparty competition may then vary accordingly. As the second political consequence, the intraparty choice of candidates is likely to favour the personalization of politics. In this sense, preferential voting and the ensuing intraparty competition are likely to increase both the visibility of candidates and the importance of voters' evaluations of their qualifications in casting a vote.<sup>3</sup> Essentially, where voters have more power (depending, as seen, on PLPR's provisions—*see the index in Chapter 3*), they have a greater impact on the selection of candidates. Therefore, I consider the effect of preferential voting on the “index” of the political élite's renewal (incumbent MPs' turnover). In particular, to convey the level of party personnel turnover, I consider the rate of incumbent MPs re-elected relative to the total number elected (Katz and Bardi 1979: 82–83; Katz 1986).

Thus, I hypothesize that we should expect a higher rate of MPs' turnover in systems with preferential voting than in non-preferential systems, especially PR systems with closed lists. In preferential systems, “a candidate can [...] fail in its re-election not only for losses of party but also because he/she can be defeated by other candidates with more preferences [...]” (Katz and Bardi 1979: 82).<sup>4</sup>

*The higher the level of PLPR openness, the greater the number of outgoing MPs replaced by preference votes. Therefore, in OLPR and quasi-list systems, I expect more MP defeats due to preference votes than in both flexible-list and latent-list cases.*

*H1A: Preferential voting entails high legislative turnover.*

The possibility of rewarding and punishing individual legislators leads to more legislators being voted out and newcomers being voted in than in systems without preferential voting (Katz 1980: 34).

*H2: Voters' power and the use of preferences.*

Preferential voting confers on voters the power to decide the choice of MPs. The range of the decision effects vary according to a few variables. To measure the real power of voters' behaviour, I create a “preferential voting” index (Sect. 2.3). The index includes different variables, such as the number of votes allowed, the presence of thresholds, the

<sup>3</sup>It should also lessen the partisanship in such systems (Renwick and Pilet 2016).

<sup>4</sup>Of course, this last situation can also indirectly affect the balance of power within the party.

mandatoriness of the preference, and the political party's primacy in deciding a few elected candidates, as the provision for PLPR's features. The hypothesis is that the voters' power to affect the deputies' election will be related to the probability of casting a preference vote. Therefore, *the higher the score on the index of voters' power, the greater the share of preferences indicated.*<sup>5</sup>

*H3: Effective preferential voting has negative effects on political stability.*

If preference votes tend to emphasize the personal characteristic of candidates rather than party loyalties, then party discipline should be affected negatively by a lack of obedient legislative and partisan behaviour. MPs' risks of defeat in voting behaviour in the parliament ought to increase, as they base most of their electoral success on their own personal capital rather than the party's. The party's organization should, in turn, be less able to control candidates and elected legislators alike, resulting in less cohesive parties during the legislative process. Hence, MPs will be more likely to behave independently and to affect the stability of the parliamentary majority. *Therefore, the level of cabinet instability should increase in PLPR systems* (with differences also among PLPR subtypes) (Petersson et al. 1999: 129–131; Karvonen 2004).

*H4: Preferential voting reduces the fragmentation of the party system.*

This hypothesis is related to the previous one. In PLPR systems, both the candidates and those elected are theoretically more independent from the party's organizational hierarchy, and thus attitudes toward party switching or splitting should become more favourable (or at least ambivalent). Consequently, in preferential voting systems, politicians have less motivation to leave their parties, as, once they have secured their nomination, they can negotiate their position in the official party rank, stressing the personal electoral capital represented by their preference votes.

<sup>5</sup>The district magnitude and the preference votes. Although it is an independent variable that is different from the electoral system's features, it is important, as it can affect the share of preference votes cast (Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Carey and Shugart 1995; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005; Farrell 2011). The new focus on M is put forth by Carey and Shugart, whose study emphasizes M's role in influencing voting behaviour as well as candidates' approaches to elections. In particular, Carey and Shugart clearly state that "M has the unusual [...] property that it affects the value of personal reputation in opposite manners, depending on the value of ballot. In all systems where there is intraparty competition, as M grows, so does the value of personal reputation" (Carey and Shugart 1995: 418).

*Therefore, I expect there to be less party system fragmentation in preferential voting systems than in single-member district or closed-list systems. I use the effective number of parties (seats) as an indicator of the level of party system fragmentation, enabling cross-national comparison.*

*H5: Preference votes and electoral volatility.*

In preferential voting cases, voters' loyalty to parties should gradually decline, as they increasingly consider candidates' characteristics in their decision regarding who to support. Therefore, an increasing proportion of voters may decide to change their electoral behaviour on the basis of candidates' political appeal. Hence, in PLPR systems, *I expect to find higher levels of electoral volatility* (Marsh 1985: 376).

*H6: Preference votes and electoral turnout.*

The ability to cast a preference vote for a candidate within a list can be considered as a chance to increase the contact and informational exchange between candidates and voters. As such, voters in preferential systems are more motivated to vote (Verba et al. 1978) than voters in systems without this ability. Therefore, we should expect a difference in terms of turnout between preferential and non-preferential systems. Such an increased turnout can be considered as an expression of the greater freedom conferred on voters in preferential systems. This expansion of voter power can, in some cases, be argued to disarticulate the party's ruling class in favour of a more grassroots candidate selection process. The vote for an individual and the possibility, albeit theoretical, of affecting the selection of those elected should function as a stimulus for more intense electoral participation.

*To establish whether a relationship exists between preferential voting and electoral participation, I consider variations in turnout between elections with preferential voting and elections without it. If this is hypothesis confirmed, the turnout in elections with preferential voting<sup>6</sup> should be systematically higher than that in elections without it.<sup>7</sup>*

<sup>6</sup>Karvonen (2004) tries to measure this relationship by also considering the district magnitude. However, here I only deal with the national results.

<sup>7</sup>There some other variables that could be included in the research. However, as the relationship is not always clear, they could be considered as control variables or be subject to an in-depth case study. The extent to which voters engage in preferential voting should inform us whether the party is unified or stratified into factions that compete for



## 2.2 CASES, METHODOLOGY, AND DATA

I focus my analysis on cases that belong to the PLPR category. In preferential systems, as seen, the basic procedure requires all preference votes for either individual candidates and/or party lists to be counted as votes for the corresponding party. After each party has been allocated the number of seats corresponding to those votes, the seats are filled with the individual candidates provided on the list. Of course, the higher the number of individual preferences that each voter can express, the greater the individual candidates' competition to fill the corresponding seats is expected to be. This procedure does not apply to flexible systems in which additional requirements must be overcome to be elected. Preferential voting systems permitting the voter to select a few

preference votes. Additionally, examining the rate of expressed votes of preference should help to detect differences between parties from different ideological families. Voters' behaviour and characteristics may vary depending on the party that they prefer and support (i.e. left-wing voters may engage in higher/lower levels of preferential voting than right-wing voters). Moreover, preferential voting is often debated regarding its potential consequences for spending, electoral campaign costs, and financial control. Preferential voting leads to individual campaigning and, consequently, personal campaign finance. This makes it more difficult for parties' central leadership and the government to control and regulate party finance (Katz 1980: 90–91; Petersson et al. 1999: 140–142). Moreover, on the party side, it is argued that preferential voting leads to less party cohesion. Individual legislators will feel pressured to demonstrate their independence on questions of great importance to their voters, as their political future lies primarily in the hands of the voters in their constituencies (Katz 1980: 34; Blais 1991: 250; cf. Sánchez de Dios 1999: 159).

Another hypothesis is related to the socio-economic conditions of a given context. In a few countries, the use of preferential voting is viewed as an expression of the "traditional" political culture, while, in other cases, it is considered as a cause of corruption. There are many contrasting views on the types of linkages that preferential voting creates between voters and candidates. Those who allege that preferential voting is correlated with corruption argue that it disposes voters to cast their votes for *a specific* person in exchange for particularized benefits rather than political, ideological, or public interests. The Italian general elections represent a strong example of this view, and abundant data cement such interpretations. In particular, Parisi and Pasquino (1977) refer to the concept of "votes of exchange" to indicate a particular agreement between a candidate and (some of) his or her voters. Generally speaking, there is some empirical evidence of a correlation between increased electoral campaign costs and preferential voting in Italy as well as of a disincentive to go to the polls when the "exchange" is not clear (a referendum, etc.). However, it is still unclear whether such a relationship between casting a preference vote and a *kind* of elector exists (Cartocci 1985; Pasquino 1993; Piattoni 2007).

candidates, usually from one to three, have been used in many European countries (presently including, among others, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, and Sweden), as well as in Latin American countries (like Brazil, Chile, and Peru). In some countries and/or on some territorial levels, it is possible to indicate (more than) one preference. The use of preferential voting (PLPR: OLPR+FLPR) is permitted for national general elections, for “second-order” elections (such as those for the European Parliament), and in the selection of candidates for sub-national assemblies (regions, states, municipalities, etc.). In particular, preferential voting is adopted for supranational elections (European) in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and Sweden (among others). For general elections, I identify preferential voting systems in countries such as the following (see Table 2.1): Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Chile, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Poland, and Sweden (among others).<sup>8</sup> I identify preferential voting systems at the subnational

<sup>8</sup>Liechtenstein is a constitutional monarchy. After the Second World War, the majority system was replaced with a proportional one. Together with Luxembourg and Switzerland, it is one of the countries where a free-list system is used; that is, the voters can vote for candidates from different candidate lists. The grand duchy—the constitutional monarchy—of Luxembourg represents one of the most “open” PR systems with preferential voting. The power and the opportunities for voters are, in fact, quite relevant both in terms of electoral choice and the ability to affect the lists of candidates elected and in terms of modifying the party leadership decision on the rank order. Luxembourg is one of the countries where a free-list system is used. The system was introduced in 1919. Voters have as many preferential votes as there are candidates to be elected in a given electoral district and are free to distribute their votes as they wish; they can cast all of their votes for one candidate or distribute them to different candidates, even those from different lists. In fact, in Luxembourg, voters have many opportunities and alternatives in the electoral process that merit consideration—together with the Swiss case (*see infra*)—as one of the most flexible PR “open” ballots (Farrell 2001: 87; Shugart 2005; Lutz 2010). In particular, voters can cast as many votes as the number of seats in a given district. Further, they can choose among three options: (1) cast a vote for a party, a vote for the list that automatically implies giving a vote to each candidate of the chosen party; (2) give two personal votes to one candidate (“cumulation”); or (3) use the *panachage*, that is, cast a vote for candidates from more than one party list (Marsh 1985: 369). Luxembourg elects six members to the European Parliament. The electoral system is based on proportional representation. Luxembourg comprises one national electoral district for these elections. The Droop/D’Hondt electoral formula is utilized, and there is no legal threshold for candidacy. Luxembourg is the only EU member country where the lists are open and voters can choose among all the candidates from different party lists and cast as many votes as there are seats to be distributed.

level in Belgium, Italy, Sweden, and Norway. The sample in the research includes 19 cases, although on some occasions the analysis is focused on a smaller selection than 19 due to the unavailability/unreliability of the data, both for comparisons and/or for the case study (see Chapter 1).

In sum, I have a considerable sample size that features countries that have adopted preferential voting for both national-level and second-order elections. This sample builds on a topic that is, so far, studied primarily at the case-study level and thus constitutes a significant step forward for the comparative analysis of preferential voting systems.

### 2.2.1 *Methodology*

First, I approach the analysis from a broadly comparative perspective (all cases and over time), searching for differences between European countries and non-European ones. Comparative analysis holds a central place in social science research: according to Almond and Powell (1966), political science is necessarily comparative.

In comparative political research, we can distinguish between the “most similar systems design” and the “most different systems design” (Przeworski and Teune 1970). In the present work, I follow the first path, looking for differences between similar cases. The data analysis covers all the national elections held in the countries considered; where possible, I take into account European supranational elections (1979–2014).

Many research questions have arisen about the “inherent good” of preferential voting and its effects on party personnel’s “qualities”, party organization, the power of voters, and so on. These findings clarify the value of focusing on preferential voting as a factor in the electoral system choice. I present a general conclusion based on the results of the research. If “cross-national analyses using entire countries as aggregate have definite limits when it comes to detecting strategic effects that may be due to varying degrees of preferential voting” (Karvonen 2011: 134), my research offers an attempt to overcome such limits. This goal is pursued by producing a comparison between a large sample of cases, maintaining standardized cross-national variables where possible. Of course, the internal variance of preferential voting systems does not allow for a complete comparison of all variables across all cases. Nonetheless, this attempt at compiling and comparing the available data across the largest sample size possible represents a formidable response to the challenges of the comparative analysis of preferential voting systems and

promises a level of analytical rigour that is, thus far, unparalleled in this particular field of study.

Working with relatively few cases and, instead, a greater number of variables can lead to some methodological problems, including the difficulty of applying statistical association tests, which, notoriously, require an adequate number of cases for the estimates to be reliable. Therefore, having a robust sample of about 200 cases (election/country equal to 184) allows me to face this potential problem with reliable statistical tools. The strategy of comparing similar cases, highlighting the differences, also responds to this need, as it allows me to perform “controlled comparisons” (Eggan 1966).

Another element to take into account is time. Comparing cases over time also implies that one has to consider the theme of periodization. The latter element entails the need to assess whether the variables have changed over time. Nevertheless, in this research, the “key” variables, both dependent and explanatory ones, present variation that is not dependent on time and on periodization (for example, the electoral systems change their internal features with a low frequency and for small adjustments that do not affect the general framework). In sum, time is not a key element in this research design, so the statistical technique employed to explain the phenomenon and to assess its consequences can overcome this potential problem.

To explain the consequences of preferential voting, the statistical analysis employed in the volume includes some advanced techniques, such as multivariate regression. The latter is the best technique to adopt, as it is useful in estimating a single regression model with more than one predictor variable. I focus on elections as the basic unit of analysis, so each regression model tries to explain how the PLPR electoral systems in national elections affect the electoral outcomes as well as the parliamentary turnover. Accordingly, I deal with a set of identical independent variables related to the electoral system’s characteristics, such as the presence of thresholds, the number of preferences, voting compulsoriness, open-list systems, and flexible systems.<sup>9</sup> The variables are operationalized as follows.

<sup>9</sup>In each model, the time is assumed to be invariant, so this is a pooled regression model. I prefer to use this kind of model instead of a time series analysis regression because the time is not a strategic element, although, in a few cases only, the electoral system’s features have been modified slightly.

*Type of electoral system.* The source from which I classify the electoral systems is the official documents provided by the ministry of the interior of each country. Combining the different electoral systems' features, I classify each case according to the most relevant literature in the field (Shugart 2005). Therefore, I deal with two main families of electoral systems and as many subtypes, a classification that allows me to observe the predicted variation in the electoral outcomes of "preferential voting".

The electoral systems' features may affect many aspects of the electoral behaviour and parties' behaviour in different ways too. Part of the literature focuses on the link between voters and parties that would be emphasized by some electoral systems rather than others, which would instead favour a less close relationship. Analogously, some electoral systems incentivize the representative-voter relationship, while others are less keen to do so. Therefore, considering the share of voters who declare themselves to feel close to a party and/or MP enables me to detect variation in the effects of electoral systems' features.

Moreover, as the literature on the electoral systems' effects is well consolidated, I expect to observe variation in the main dependent variable, that is, the level of interelection MP turnover. The latter is in fact one of the main topics still to be analysed in PLPR electoral systems, especially from a comparative perspective. Following this line of thinking, I include a few dependent variables, such as the number of outgoing MPs who are not re-elected for different reasons, mostly related to the electoral system's characteristics. The share of preference votes that the candidate receives, the position in the party's list, and the party's electoral performance are the main sources of interelection parliamentary turnover. Moreover, in terms of electoral systems' effects, I consider the impact on the representation side (the effective number of parties and seats) and the level of electoral volatility, as two indicators of voters' behaviour effects as determined by the electoral systems' features. In particular, the synthesis of the independent variables related to the electoral systems' features come from an index of "openness", merging the level of the party's power with that of voters' power. As explained above, in the data set, there are also the two pillars of my final index, party and voter (Table 2.1).

**Table 2.1** Theory, concept, variables included in the research

<i>Theory</i>	<i>Concepts</i>	<i>Variables</i>
Electoral systems	Voters' power	Number of preferences allowed Presence of thresholds Voting compulsoriness Quota reserved for head of the list
Electoral systems' effects	Party closeness	Rate of respondents remembering the name of the candidate who ran/stood in the district
Electoral systems' effects	MP–voter contact	Contact with an MP over the last year
Electoral systems' effects	Whether a member of the assembly is re-elected	Outgoing MP defeated because of the party's negative performance
Electoral systems' effects	Whether a member of the assembly is re-elected	Outgoing MP defeated because of the place in the list order (only for flexible systems)
Electoral systems' effects	Whether a member of the assembly is re-elected	Outgoing MP defeated because of his or her negative performance in terms of collected preferences despite co-partisans
Electoral systems' effects	Whether a member of the assembly is re-elected	Outgoing MP defeated because the party did not renew his/her candidature
Electoral systems' features	Importance of magnitude	Number of MPs per district (average)
Electoral systems' effects	Representation	Effective number of parties (seats)
Electoral systems' effects	Voters' electoral behaviour	Volatility

*Source* Author's own elaboration

### 2.2.2 *Data*

The data collected cover all the national elections held in 19 countries (the time span varies depending in the country analysed but broadly extends from 1945 to 2016). I have about 200 cases (election/year). Moreover, I take into account the European elections (1979–2014) for a selected sample of cases and subnational elections, such as regional ones, for countries including Italy, Belgium, Sweden, and Norway (the time span depends on the country), and preferential voting (official electoral results of each country).

The data come from various sources. In particular, the main data set comes from my personal collection within the context of wider research that I have conducted on “party preferences”. Other reliable sources are data available on the ministry of the interior’s website of different countries. All that information has been collected over a ten-year period and systematized in Gianluca Passarelli’s archive on preferential voting. Although the data set has a consistent pattern, the information for the different variables comes from many sources. The source from which I classify the electoral systems is the official documents provided by the ministry of the interior of each country, and then I include them in a typology according to the literature in the field. The data set stores, for each country, information on the aforementioned elections, and the data regarding the party closeness, voters’ contact with MPs, and their knowledge of the member of parliament all come from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems database. Moreover, in terms of interelection parliamentary turnover, I have collected data on the causes of outgoing deputies’ (lower houses) defeats. The information on the share of defeats due to partisan defeats, the list order position, the number of preferences collected, and the non-renewal of candidature all comes from the national ministry of the interior as well as from the country’s expert archives. The data on the effective number of parties are based on Gallagher’s archive as well as on Casal-Bertoa’s archive. The data on electoral volatility and its internal components in parliamentary elections (lower house) come from the Vincenzo Emanuele data set (2015; Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2015). Finally, the share of preference votes cast in each election have been calculated by the author based on the national official electoral results as provided by the ministry of the interior of each country.

### 2.3 VOTERS’ POWER AND THE PREFERENTIAL VOTING INDEX

As we have seen, in the literature, there are a few different definitions of electoral systems that allow preferential voting. Several definitions focus on the main aspects of a preferential voting system and what differentiates it from others. Some focus on the level of power conferred on the voters, which can be measured in a variety of ways, such as the number of preferences that they can indicate; whether voters may modify the party’s list order; or whether they can cast votes for candidates from multiple parties. Again, is it the party’s vote that decides who is elected

or rather the votes for candidates (or a combination thereof)? Finally, is preferential voting mandatory or merely an option? Is there any requirement such as gender quotas in cases in which two or more preferences are allowed? Having defined those aspects, it is relevant to turn to an analysis of the consequences of preferential voting.

As we have seen in detail (Sect. 1.8), the adoption of PLPR may significantly empower the voters in their decision making, even in CLPR systems, which typically place tremendous power in the hands of the party leadership. Voters' influence on electoral "outcomes" in *lato sensu* varies broadly depending on the electoral system. The opportunities that voters have to influence election outcomes may span from the moment immediately before entering the polls to events following the election. For example, in plurality systems, voters may have the opportunity to participate in party candidate selection (so-called primaries) (Hazan and Rahat 2010). Once the candidate has been selected (either via primary election or directly by the party organization), the voters can obviously exert an impact on the public selection of MPs in the general election. However, the level of influence that voters have in the general election depends on the degree of "freedom" that the electoral system confers on them. The discriminant role is the emphasis on the personal vote. Some systems emphasize candidates' "personal" characteristics rather than party programmes (candidate v. party-centred electoral systems) (Carey and Shugart 1995). Within these different contexts, one can measure the influence of voter behaviour at both district and national levels. Voters' power in choosing among single candidates is greatest in SSD/2RS systems, weaker in PLPR systems, and weakest in CLPR systems. This ideal continuum has levels of variation depending on the competitiveness of the district, the role of parties, candidates' characteristics, and so on. Voters can influence the electoral outcome "nationally" by choosing the head of the government, for example in presidential and semi-presidential regimes or to some extent in parliamentary systems with "majoritarian" effects (the United Kingdom or the case of majority assuring systems). After the election, the voters' "power" varies by electoral systems as well. The process of accountability will be more pronounced at the district level and will vary depending again on candidate v. party-centred electoral systems. Finally, we should also consider whether voters are offered the chance to cast more than one vote, to split their ticket, or to vote for both a party and a candidate. Similarly, additional provisions, such as recalling procedures, may increase voters' power. In this



work, I focus on the levels of voter power permitted by PLPR systems. In Chapter 3, I show how such opportunities for voter influence differ across national electoral systems and their specific provisions. The independent variable here is the electoral system and its features as grouped in the index. The dependent variable is the voters' power and behaviour.

I propose an index to measure the "strength" of preferential voting across countries. With this tool, it is possible to predict, to some extent, the influence that voters have on electoral outcomes within a given context (Chapters 5–6). I consider the different elements that characterize PLPR systems and compare the levels of voter influence across these systems.

### 2.3.1 *An Index of Preferential Voting System Influence*

It is possible to synthesize the behavioural influence of electoral systems into three categories of affected actors: "A system may require the elector to vote solely for a party list, the particular candidates elected being determined by their order on the list, or offer degrees of choice of candidate within the party list, or even across party lists" (Bogdanor 1983: 2). Because the effects of preferential voting systems on political parties, voters, and intraparty competition may vary greatly among different cases, it is useful to try to identify the primary factor responsible for such variation. As I describe, there are cases in which the influence of preferential voting on the electoral system matters more in terms of interelection parliamentary turnover, voters' behaviour, and concentration of personal votes. Variations in party characteristics, voter orientation, social conditions, and so on may intervene by amplifying or reducing those influences. However, having a general theoretical framework that identifies the aspects of preferential voting systems that are most responsible for influencing the relevance of preference votes should be useful in analysing the case studies. Pursuant to this goal, I create an *index of preferential voting relevance* (PVR), which takes into account the role of the party and the voter as indicated in a PLPR electoral system. The first dimension—the *X*-axis—refers to the party, while the second dimension—the *Y*-axis—focuses on the voter. The hypothesis is the following: the greater the voters' power, the lesser the party's influence. Thus, I expect a one-point increase in voters' power for each one-point decrease in parties' influence. The fundamental theory is that the more a PLPR system confers power on voters, the more influential voter preferences

will be on the political and electoral outcomes, such as the intraparty competition and turnover. To construct the index, I select different constituent variables for both indicators, the voters' power and the parties' power. For the VOTERS, I include the following:

### 1. Voting compulsoriness

where "yes" = 1; "yes, but not enforced" = 0.5; "no" = 0

*Voting compulsoriness*: In some countries, the electoral law states that voters must go to the polls, while, in others, turnout is entirely the voters' prerogative. However, in some cases, the level of compulsoriness is so low as to be essentially symbolic, and the law clearly states that it will not be enforced. Voters' freedom increases as their legal obligation to go to the polls decreases (no matter how real the enforcement is). Therefore, I clearly classify all countries in the sample according to their electoral rules and locate them within one of the three aforementioned categories.

### 2. Preference vote compulsoriness:

where "yes" = 1; "no" = 0

*Compulsory preference*: In PLPR systems, voters can cast a preference vote for the candidate whom they want to support. In some contexts, this is a mere option, while, in other cases, the expression of ranked preferences is mandatory. Accounting for this possibility represents a measure of the voters' freedom. Thus, I categorize this element as a dichotomous variable, where the value "1" indicates the presence of a mandatory preference vote and "0" indicates the absence of such a mandate. Here the compulsoriness is considered as conferring more power on voters in their chances to affect the intraparty dynamics and competition.

### 3. Preference vote quota:

where  $> 5\% = 0$ ;  $\leq 5\% = 0.5$ ; none = 1

*Preference vote quota*: In some PLPR systems, namely the *flexible-list* and *latent-list* cases, candidates are required to reach a certain number of votes to change the official rank order established by the party. When this quota is not reached, the electoral system continues to utilize the established list order as the sole method of allocating seats to candidates. If candidates are unable to fulfil this quota, the list system is essentially

closed, and the influence of the voters is nil. It is thus evident that the higher the electoral quota, the lower the potential for voter preferences to affect the selection of those elected. As different countries have different thresholds, I indicate three categories that broadly correspond to the level of voters' freedom and opportunities to modify the list order: >5 per cent; ≤5 per cent; any threshold.

#### 4. Number of preference votes allowed:

where 1 = 0.5; 2 = 0.75; > 2 = 1

*Number of preference votes allowed:* As not all PLPR electoral systems confer the same amount of preference votes on voters, it is important to consider the implications of such variations. The theoretical starting point is that, all other things being equal, the greater the number of preferences, the wider the voters' choice in affecting the election of their preferred candidates. Therefore, I indicate three main categories based on the number of preference votes available to voters and classify countries accordingly: one preference, two preferences, or more than two preferences. The categories are defined as such on the theoretical basis that the difference between one and two votes yields a substantial difference in voter opportunities, while greater than two represents a separate category (it must be noticed that, to my knowledge, only a very small handful of countries allow this option).

In the case of PARTIES, the variables that I select are the following:

#### 1. Election is completely determined by the voters' choice:

where "yes" = 0; "no" = 1

*Election is completely determined by the voters' choice:* This variable refers to the level of "openness" of the electoral system, in other words, how many deputies are elected via preference votes only and/or as a result of the official party rank. The categorical distinction is between open-list and flexible-list systems. It should be noted that flexible-list systems contain some within-category variation in terms of the impact of voter choice; however, the fact that the party maintains some influence over candidate selection unambiguously distinguishes such systems as being separate from voter-dominated, open-list processes. However, as I show in Chapter 3, dedicated to the national cases, there is a theoretical possibility of having cases in which the electoral system works in a "mixed"

way: the overwhelming majority of candidates are elected via preferences, and, although there is no legal threshold as in the flexible-list system, there are provisions that make the system work as CLPR (usually for the head of the list only).

## 2. Head of the list's guarantee:

where “yes” = 1; “partial (quota)” = 0.5; “no” = 0

*Head of the list's guarantee:* Although, in PLPR systems, voters can cast one (or more) preference vote(s), the allocation of seats to candidates may depend both on voters' choices and on the party's decision to draft the list order. Moreover, the electoral law can state that a special status is conferred on the head of the list, which represents, in some sense, a guarantee of inclusion in the election for the specified candidate. The top-of-the-list candidate is often exempted from collecting preference votes or, in some cases, will receive as many votes as those attributed to the party in the list portion of the ballot. In both circumstances, the head of the list has the guarantee of a seat so long as his/her party obtains at least one. Such a provision directly affects the voters' power to influence the election of candidates via their preferences by restricting their ability to remove a particular candidate through preference votes. I create three categories, dividing cases in which such a possibility exists from those in which it does not, and finally include a “mixed” category wherein the “guarantee” is conferred on the head of the list but with some conditions (e.g. if the candidates placed at the bottom of the list obtain a certain number of votes, they can modify the head-of-the-list provision).

## 3. Candidate/elected quota reserved for parties:

where “yes” = 1; “no” = 0

*Elected quota reserved for parties:* Do the parties have a reserved slate of candidates to be elected regardless of how many seats the party wins (and regardless of their status, e.g. head of the list)? Such a rule affects voters' choice, as voters are rendered unable to influence the candidate selection without securing a certain number of seats for a given party. To capture this variation, I adopt a dichotomous variable—yes/no—according to the presence (1) or absence (0) of a quota of “seats” attributed to the parties beyond the final order of candidates based on their personal votes.

#### 4. Parties' votes quota:

where  $> 5\% = 1$ ;  $\leq 5\% = 0.5$ ; none = 0

*Party votes quota:* This variable considers whether there is a quota of party votes that the candidates have to satisfy to modify the official party list order. The presence of this kind of provision intervenes in the level of the preferential voting openness. I classify cases using three categories based on the size of the quota: greater than 5 per cent, equal to or less than 5 per cent, or lacking any quota at all. Those categories are not arbitrary but refer to a reasonable number of votes that a candidate should be able to collect and that would negatively affect the voters' freedom and the chance of affecting the candidates' election.

Therefore, the score for both indexes ranges between zero and four, where zero means no voter and/or party influence on the preferential voting dynamics and four represents the highest level of influence for both of them.

The variables are combined into indices for both dimensions, making it possible to measure the balance of voters' power on the "party" side and on the "electoral law" side in the PLPR systems included in the sample. As I measure different variables with different scales, I recode each variable to provide a standardized score for both parties and voters. The minimum value is subtracted from each case's score, and the results are divided by the difference between the maximum and the minimum value and then multiplied by 4 to obtain the 0–4 range. The formula is:  $4 * ((\text{VAR} - \text{MIN}) / (\text{MAX} - \text{MIN}))$ . The final index, both for "parties" (labelled as index ONE) and for "voters" (labelled as index TWO), ranges between 0 and 1. Therefore, it is possible to represent each case analysed following the Cartesian coordinate system.

To build the index of preferential voting, I select different variables. They are related to the level of both voters' and parties' freedom, depending on the PLPR system's provisions. The more the party can intervene in the electoral process, the less freedom the voters have to express their preferences. The combination of the two dimensions into a single typology makes it possible to compare different levels of preferential voting openness between countries. For this purpose, I generate two new variables, "voter\_st" and "party\_st", as standardized scores (Z-scores) of "index\_voter" and "index\_party". These new variables have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The range of values for

voter\_st varies from a minimum of  $-1.94$  to a maximum of  $1.74$ , while that for party\_st ranges from  $-1.98$  to  $2.32$ .

Therefore, as I describe in detail with data in the results chapter, the typology has the four following types: (1) the more positive the *index\_voter* is, the greater the voters' freedom in casting a vote and the more power they have potentially to affect the MP selection; (2) the more negative the *index\_voter* is, the less freedom the voters have in casting a vote and the less power they have potentially to affect the MP selection; (3) the more positive the *index\_party* is, the greater the party's ability to affect the choice of MPs and consequently the weaker the voters' power potentially to affect the MP selection; and (4) the more negative the *index\_partyvoter* is, the greater the voters' chances of influencing the MP selection. In the final chapter, when analysing the data and comparing cases, it is useful to observe where each case is located considering the outcomes of the empirical analysis.

Moreover, the use of a typology combining the two dimensions (voter and party) allows a better study of the different types apparent in each case (electoral system/country). Therefore, recurring to a qualitative variable, in operationalization terms, permits better classification and a better comparative approach. In this context, I classify different electoral systems according to both the voters' and the parties' features. The final result is a scatter plot that depicts the distribution of cases in a bidimensional space defined by the voters' power and the parties' organizational characteristics in terms of candidate selection for elections.

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## Preferential Voting Across the World

This chapter concerns countries that have adopted a PLPR system as of 2017. In the following pages, I explain the national electoral systems by grouping them by region (European vs. non-European, north vs. south, east vs. west). The first, the European area, contains the most numerous cases, while other continents clearly show fewer cases, albeit significant ones. Together with a deep description of the electoral framework of each country, I consider institutional variables, such as the form of government, as well as the period of democratization, considering the different “waves” in which each country adopted a democratic regime and when it adopted PLPR, thus grouping “new” and “old” cases.

As stated in the introduction to this book and in the methodological section, this investigation is motivated by a series of theoretical and empirical inquiries. Why do preference votes matter? Do electoral outcomes depend on the electoral formula, the district magnitude, the presence of thresholds, or the political culture and regional aspects? I determine when preferential voting has an influence on political and electoral outcomes. Is there a constant and regular pattern or do variations occur over time? Again, is it important to consider where preferential voting has a greater effect, not just in terms of countries but also in terms of electoral levels (national, regional, etc.)? If preferential voting can be found to affect political outcomes, it is of paramount importance to understand how this happens. Do parties play a relevant role or are voters able to unhinge the parties’ electoral strategies, such as the definition of the list rank order? Considering those variables, and the

differences between cases that would probably arise, thus implies taking a fresh look at the intraparty consequences of preferential voting among PLPR cases. In the next section, I begin with a general overview of PLPR countries and then turn to specific analyses by region.

### 3.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW

Of the almost sixty democratic countries, as grouped by Lawrence LeDuc et al. (1996) and by Lijphart (1999), in 1999, almost half had proportional representation systems (Farrell 2001: 8–9). Among those countries (and adding some others that are not included in those initial lists), the total number of proportional representation (PR) cases adopting a preferential voting (PV) system was 22 in 2017. It can thus be said that about one-quarter of the world’s democratic countries have adopted preference electoral systems at the time of writing, albeit with considerable variation between them, such as the extent of voters’ powers, the degree of “openness”, the role of parties, and so on (*see infra*). Focusing on PLPR, I have a substantial sample of countries, with considerable variation in terms of institutional design, electoral law, country size, and so on. A first glance at the geographical distribution clearly shows that most of the 22 PR countries that have (or had, as in the Italian case) a preferential voting system are located in Europe, with only a few in Latin America, and the other continents are represented only ephemerally. This confirms Marsh’s observation from over 30 years ago that, in most Western European democracies (*see the next section*), voters were/are permitted to choose among a party’s candidates at the level of parliamentary elections (Marsh 1985). Preferential voting is also used in the parliamentary elections of several post-communist countries that have adopted PLPR for their democratic regimes, while Latin American and Asian democracies are barely represented in the group. In 14 of the 32 countries included in the CSES national election study data set, voters are allowed to cast preference votes for particular candidates within a single party group. Intraparty preference choice is provided in legislative elections to the lower house in Belgium, Chile and Czech Republic, and the Unicameral Parliament in Denmark, Iceland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Slovenia, and Sweden. There are, however, major variations in the method of intraparty choice across these countries. In some contexts, voters can cast a preference vote; in others, they must vote for one candidate within a party list. By contrast,

in Switzerland<sup>1</sup> and Luxembourg, voters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled in the constituency. Variations are also reflected in the different impacts of the party ordering of candidates on the outcome. In Chile, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland, and, in most instances, Denmark, the election order within a party group is determined entirely by the number of nominative votes that candidates receive. In Belgium, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway,<sup>2</sup> and Sweden, a combination of party ordering and nominative votes determines which candidates will be elected.<sup>3</sup>

Considering the different analytical dimensions that distinguish electoral systems, it is useful to classify the cases of our sample accordingly (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005: 8–9). In terms of district magnitude, we have sufficient variation within the sample. There is significant variation between countries,  $M$ . There are cases in which only one constituency covers the entire country, so  $M$  is equal to the number of MPs to be elected in parliament. The Netherlands represents such a case ( $M = 150$ ).

It is important to consider how many levels of seat allocation an electoral system has. This information allows us to determine whether this is an important aspect in terms of the preferential voting outcome (Denmark, Austria, and Estonia).

The cases reported above indicate that there is vast range of thresholds in flexible-list systems, thus theoretically affecting the electoral outcomes in each country in different ways.

In a few cases within the sample, voters are allowed to cast more than one vote. Therefore, the voters' possibility in terms of preference votes to be cast ranges from one to more than one, as we shall see in the forthcoming country-level analysis. A few cases are worth mentioning here.

<sup>1</sup>From this perspective, the single-transferable ballot, as well as the open ballot or *panachage* used in Switzerland, could be considered extreme cases, beyond the opportunities supplied by open lists or a double vote, since they permit candidates to be selected from different parties and thus promote very high intraparty individual competition (Colomer 2004: 52).

<sup>2</sup>As I present in the paragraph on the country, the Norwegian system practically works as a closed system, although theoretically voters have the option of striking names from a list.

<sup>3</sup>Finally, in other countries, such as Japan (until 1994) and Taiwan, members of parliament are elected directly by voters. In these systems, votes are only given to candidates. In *plurality* and majority systems—such as SNTV—there has also been preferential voting (South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan); for the “transferable vote”, preferential voting has been in place in Ireland since 1922 (Norris 2004: 231).

It is, for example, interesting to refer to Belgium (since 1995) and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where voters can support a number of candidates equal to the district magnitude. Moreover, there are a number of cases in which it is possible to cast up to five personal votes, such as Cyprus and Kosovo (ten in the past); then there are systems that allow for up to four preferences, such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Greece, Italy (from 1946 to 1991), Peru and Sri Lanka. Finally, all the other cases' electoral law states that voters can cast one preference vote only.

If, in theory, voters in all PRPL systems are allowed to choose their own candidate, or at least indicate their preferred one, it must be stressed that the actual influence of such an indication varies importantly. As I describe in Chapter 6 in a comparative way, including results, consequences, and voters' power, some countries require the vote share thresholds to be overcome for voters to change the party list, others do not, others do it partially, and so on.

### 3.2 EUROPE: THE CORE OF PLPR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Europe is the continent on which the most countries use, or have used, a PLPR system enabling voters to indicate a preference for one (or more) individual candidate(s). Many electoral systems in Europe use PLPR, in which voters can indicate not just their favoured party but their favoured candidate within that party. In 2017, 18 countries in Europe had a preferential voting system, to which we should add the Italian case, which reformed its electoral law in the early 1990s and again in 2015, reintroducing preferential voting (see Sect. 6.1). This is not surprising when we consider that most PR electoral systems are located in Europe, most of which were established when universal suffrage spread across the continent. From a geographical point of view, it is also clear that most PLPR systems are found in Western European countries, whereas few Central and Eastern European countries have adopted such a peculiar electoral system. Six of them are new democracies that were previously part of communist regimes, while Greece is the only "third-wave" democracy included in the PV group. The Nordic countries constitute the region with the most PLPR systems, with four countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden) featuring PV. In ten out of the fourteen European Union countries with PV, preferential voting is used for both national- and supranational-level elections. In total, from a regime type perspective, among those countries with an "open" PV system, six elect their

**Table 3.1** The PLPR flexible-list cases and the threshold level for candidates

<i>Country (Lower house)</i>	<i>Threshold</i>
Austria	16.67
Belgium	quota
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3
Bulgaria	7
Croatia	10
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	quota
Estonia	5
Netherlands	0.67
Slovakia	3
Sweden	4
<i>Average</i>	6

*Source* Author's own elaboration

president via popular election (Bulgaria, Finland, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Cyprus: the latter are the only presidential regimes in a group of semi-presidential ones), and there are many parliamentary constitutional monarchies, while the president is elected by the parliament in only three countries, and lastly there is the small and peculiar Republic of San Marino.

Table 3.1 indicates the European countries that currently use (or having used in the past) a PLPR electoral system and that are included in the sample. At first glance, one may observe that the European cases represent the vast majority of the sample of PLPR systems, as I detail in this chapter. In chronological terms (the year when countries adopted PLPR), the range extends from 1919 for Belgium to 2014 and 2015 for Bulgaria and Croatia, respectively. Moreover, the variation does not follow a geographical pattern, with northern (Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Estonia) and southern cases (Italy, Cyprus, and Greece) and Central Europe (Austria, Czech, and Slovakia). The period of democratic transition matters too, as there are countries with a more consolidated democratic regime (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Italy) together with newcomers, especially post-communist regimes (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, and Poland). In terms of the electoral systems' features, most of the European cases, although similar by nature of belonging to the PLPR family, are "flexible-list" systems, with the exceptions of Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Finland, and Poland, which are "open-list" cases. We can further distinguish between countries belonging to the four PLPR

subtypes rather than only the broader categories of “open” and “flexible” ones: (1) *quasi-list*: Finland and Poland; (2) *OLPR*: Italy (pre-1993 and post-2015), Greece, and Cyprus; (3) *flexible list*: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Slovakia, and Sweden; and (4) *latent list*: Estonia and the Netherlands.

### 3.3 HOW THE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS WORK

The electoral system features of countries that have preferential voting are reported in detail. In particular, I focus on the main characteristics related to the opportunities and constraints that the electoral law offers to political parties, candidates, and voters. To detect any association between form of government and preferential voting, the main characteristics of the institutional system are briefly indicated. The ballot structure and electoral provisions for the voters are detailed, as they are crucial to understanding the potential consequences and effects of preferential voting. Following a general presentation of all the cases, I group them according to their main similarities related to their preferential voting systems to analyse them and observe the variation in outcomes. In particular, I devote attention to whether preferential voting is mandatory, the number of possible preference votes available to the voters (one or more), the effects of preferential voting on the allocation of seats among parties' elected candidates, and so on. Finally, the presentation of the electoral systems' features also considers whether voters are able to cast preference votes in elections other than national lower-chamber elections, in particular whether voters may cast preference votes in supranational elections (the European Parliament) and subnational elections (regional, mayors, etc.) and whether preferential voting is allowed for upper-house elections. The same variables are considered for all the countries in the sample, and the data are analysed when comparable (either diachronically or synchronically). Specifically, I examine the nature of the PLPR system (flexible or open), whether PV is mandatory, the presence of gender quotas, the number of preferences allowed, the presence of a threshold, and so on.

#### 3.3.1 *Austria*

The Austrian electoral system is a proportional one and, together with the Dutch and the Israeli cases, represents near full proportionality.

From the institutional point of view, Austria has a semi-presidential system, although in practice it has always functioned as a parliamentary regime, with the prime minister generally carrying far more influence than the president (Müller 1999). It should be noticed that Austria, a semi-presidential regime since 1929 (Müller 1999), has a bicameral system (the *Bundesrat*, the upper chamber, and the *Nationalrat*, the lower chamber), consistent with its federal constitution. Although there has always been a PR system, some reforms have taken place, the last of which occurred in 1992 (the point at which our analysis of this system begins). Parliamentary elections are held every 4 years to fill 183 available seats. Parties must either secure at least 4 per cent of the valid votes cast at the national level to participate in the distribution of seats or obtain 1 seat at the regional level. In Austria, seats are assigned through a 3-tier system: Länder, regional, and national.

From a historical perspective, preferential voting was introduced in 1949, at which point voters were allowed to alter the order of the candidate list or even eliminate candidates. In 1973, the system of preferential voting was changed, reducing the number of preference votes to one (Renwick and Pilet 2016: 36). In 1992, the most recent change to the system was made, enabling voters to cast one preference vote for each type of candidate list (regional and Länder). This system first became operational in the 1994 election.

Voters can cast one vote by indicating either their preferred party or their preferred candidate (by writing the candidate's name) at both the regional and the Land level (at the national level, party lists are fixed and voters cannot change them). Preference votes for candidates are "not accompanied by indicating a party preference count as party votes" (Müller 1999: 402).<sup>4</sup> To win a seat based on received preferences, if the party obtains at least one seat, regional-level candidates must obtain either a number of preference votes equal to a sixth of the party vote in that district or half as many preference votes as the Hare quota (total votes/total seats in that district). At the Land level, candidates must collect as many preference votes as votes required to win a seat. These relatively high thresholds make it difficult for candidates to overcome the party list rank order; thus, the party leadership's choice almost always strongly prevails.

<sup>4</sup>This is a crucial difference from other OLPR cases, such as Italy (1946–1993), where the vote for the candidate only was also attributed to the list to which s/he belonged.

Since 1996, Austria has also used preferential voting in its selection of MPs for the European Parliament. Similar to the legislative elections, the seats (18) are allocated on the basis of the percentage of votes obtained by each party list. However, whereas the national context is multi-district, Austria's European elections feature a single nationwide electoral district with the same 4 per cent vote share threshold required to access the distribution of seats. On the preferential voting side, it should be noted that candidates who win 7 per cent of the total preference votes obtained by their party automatically win one of the seats afforded to the party, irrespective of their position on the list.

### 3.3.2 *Belgium*

The Belgian preferential voting system was introduced in 1899, at which time voters had one preference vote. In Belgium, voters have (for both the House and the Senate) the ability to cast a vote for a party or indicate a preference for an individual candidate. In 1995, an important electoral reform extended the number of personal votes to be cast: voters can support a number of candidates from one to a maximum equal to the district magnitude (ESCE; Renwick and Pilet 2016). Nevertheless, the voters' power to affect the final rank order and thus the candidate is limited. In fact, the system attributes the party votes to the candidates placed high on the party list, making it quite difficult for "weaker" candidates to "leapfrog" into a winning position from lower on the list. Consequently, only a *very* small percentage of seats conferred on parties are allocated on the basis of unusually large numbers of personal votes for individual candidates (De Winter 1988). In this sense, the Belgian preferential voting system can be considered one of the most closed among those PR systems with "open" ballots. That is to say, the voters' chances of affecting or modifying the rank order as defined by the party leadership are quite scarce.

The threshold is fairly high when we consider that, to be elected at the "first" ballot count, each candidate must meet the eligibility figure (calculated by dividing the party's total constituency votes by the number of seats that it has won plus one). As I show in Chapters 5–6, it is quite difficult for other candidates beneath the head of the list to reach that figure. If that does not happen, list votes are added to the head of the list's preference votes until the quota is reached. This procedure is then repeated until all of the party's seats have been allocated.



“However, if the list votes are depleted before all the seats have been assigned, then the remaining seats are given to those remaining candidates who have the largest number of preference votes” (De Winter 2005: 422).

This limitation to preferential voting’s effectiveness is fortified by the fact that party votes are used to top up the personal votes of the head of the list, thus tipping the system’s balance heavily in favour of the party’s list order. In 2000, a new reform formally attempted to reduce the party’s influence on the selection of the candidate in favour of the voters’ power. In fact, in 2000, the weight of list votes was reduced: “whereas previously all list votes were assigned to candidates, now only half of them are assigned, following the order of the list” (Renwick and Pilet 2016: 139).

As we can see, and I describe in Chapters 5–6, there is a considerable disconnection between the powers ostensibly conferred on the voters and their actual impact on the candidate selection. While voters “may either cast a vote for one party (by ticking the relevant box under the party name) or a vote for one candidate (by ticking the relevant box next to the candidate)” (Farrell 2001: 83), their ability to influence the candidate selection rarely matters, as candidates “placed low in the rank order require... a very large personal vote in order to ‘leap-frog’ into a winning position” (*ibidem*).

Although the PR system was first introduced in 1899, the actual system adopted in 2003 still conforms to its original D’Hondt formula when allocating seats among parties (to access to seats’ distribution, political parties have to obtain at least 5 per cent at the constituency level). Institutionally speaking, Belgium is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system composed of two chambers: the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives. The form of government is federal. Both the electoral system and the form of government have been strongly influenced by the presence of deep cleavages, in particular the saliency of linguistic and regional divisions and differences. Within this socio-institutional context, the presence of a PR system helps to contain potential internal conflicts as well as giving all “minorities” the opportunity to be represented in the Parliament.

Despite these intentions, the PR system has frozen the high partisan and electoral fragmentation, which is propagated by the resulting absence of national parties and the emergence of parties that solely contest elections in either Francophone or Flemish constituencies.

Moreover, the decision to adopt a preferential voting system, together with a PR formula, has not weakened the party leadership but rather instilled in the parties' central offices a strong level of control over seat allocation and candidate selection. Consequently, only a paltry few MPs are chosen "directly" by voters' preferences in spite of their low list rank.

Preferential voting is also used to select Belgium's representatives in the European Parliament, of which there are 24. The D'Hondt formula is used, and there is no legal threshold for representation. The country is divided into 4 constituencies (Flemish, Walloon, Brussels-Hal-Vilvoorde, and German-speaking<sup>5</sup>), which reflect the regional and linguistic divisions mentioned earlier. Hence, voters are provided with the opportunity to influence the party ranking of candidates (but face the same aforementioned barriers as in the national parliamentary context). Finally, the PLPR system has also been adopted to select the members of the regional councils (André et al. 2012; Wauters et al. 2012).

### 3.3.3 *Bosnia and Herzegovina*

The parliamentary form of government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is associated with a proportional electoral system that was introduced in the first elections following the war in 1996, while preferential voting was adopted in 2000. The electoral system is flexible, meaning that it can function as either a closed- or an open-list system depending on whether a candidate list obtains more (open-list system) or less (closed-list system) than 3 per cent of the votes cast in a given election. If a party or a coalition does not have enough eligible candidates on the list to fill the seats allocated to it, the mandate is transferred to the party or coalition list in another constituency. In detail, the electoral law states that the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH shall consist of 42 members, 28 of whom shall be directly elected by voters registered to vote for the territory of the Federation of BiH and 14 of whom shall be directly elected by voters registered to vote for the territory of the Republika Srpska. The mandate of members of the House is equal to four years. Voters can vote for as many candidates on the candidate list of a political party. Mandates are allocated to each constituency adopting the pure Sainte-Laguë highest-average method.

<sup>5</sup>In 1994, Belgium introduced a guaranteed seat for the German minority.

Political parties, coalitions, lists of independent candidates, and independent candidates cannot participate in the allocation of mandates if they do not win more than 3 per cent of the total number of valid ballots in a constituency.

### 3.3.4 *Bulgaria*

Bulgaria, which has a semi-presidential form of government and a unicameral (*Narodno Sabranie*) parliamentary system (240 members), first adopted the preferential voting system for national elections in 2014.<sup>6</sup> The law approved in 2011 modified the then-CLPR electoral system with a 4 per cent national threshold (Hare–Niemeyer method). In the first election under the PV system, 35.2 per cent of voters cast a preference vote (Bulgarian Electoral Commission; Renwick and Pilet 2016: 226). To modify the party’s list order of candidates, a candidate must obtain at least 9 per cent of the valid votes to modify his/her rank.<sup>7</sup> The presence of such a threshold makes the Bulgarian system a flexible-list system in the family of PLPR for national elections. Voters can cast up to one vote of preference.

Since 2007, Bulgaria has allowed preferential voting in European elections. Voters can indicate one candidate preference, and, if a candidate obtains 15 per cent of the valid votes cast for the respective candidate list, he or she is moved up the list to replace the candidate sitting in the last elected position in the original list order. Therefore, this case can be included in the flexible-list category. The threshold has been reformed on two occasions since 2007: in 2007 and 2009, the threshold was 15 per cent, but, since 2014, it has been reduced to 5 per cent (Hare–Niemeyer method).

<sup>6</sup>In 1990, there was a mixed-member system, as 200 seats were elected through a double-ballot system in single-member districts and 200 by PR (D’Hondt) in 28 districts. There was only 1 national tier for the PR seats with a 4 per cent threshold at the district level. From 1991 to 2014, only 31 members were elected using the SMD system, while 209 members were elected under the CLPR system.

<sup>7</sup>All candidates receiving at least 9 per cent of all votes received are placed on a list, list “A”, in the order of the number of preference votes received, and all others are placed on list “B”, in the order in which they originally appeared on the list.

### 3.3.5 *Croatia*

Croatia is a newcomer to PLPR. Until 2015, the country had a closed-list system. Only in February of the same year was preferential voting introduced. The new electoral law represents a flexible-list system, as it states that candidates move to the top of the list only if they receive at least 10 per cent of their party's votes. Voters have the chance to cast one preference vote for the candidates of their preferred party list or they may select one party without casting any personal votes for individual candidates. In 2015 and 2016, elections were held in 10 electoral districts ( $M = 14$ ).<sup>8</sup> Parties or coalitions had to pass a 5 per cent threshold at the district level to be allowed into the seat (151) distribution, which followed the D'Hondt method.

It is important to note that Croatia adopted a PLPR flexible-list system (D'Hondt) for European elections well before doing so for national elections. In 2010, the Parliament adopted a law that states that only candidates who receive support from at least 10 per cent of their party's voters can move to the top of the list. Only those party lists that have obtained more than 5 per cent of the total amount of valid votes will take part in the allocation of mandates.

### 3.3.6 *Cyprus*

The 80 seats in Cyprus's House of Representatives are elected from 6 multi-member constituencies, with the number of seats allocated according to the population of each area.<sup>9</sup> The proportional preferential voting system was introduced in 1979, and the number of preference votes ranges from one to five, depending on the number of mandates in the electoral district. In fact, voters—who are legally obligated to vote—select the party list and then, within the list, are able to mark

<sup>8</sup>Plus one electoral district for Croatian citizens living abroad (three seats) and one electoral district for national minorities (eight seats): three for Serbs; one for Czechs and Slovaks; one for Italians; one for Hungarians; one for Albanians, Bosniaks, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Slovenes; and one for Austrians, Bulgarians, Germans, Jews, Poles, Roma, Romanians, Rusyns, Russians, Turks, Ukrainians, and Vlachs.

<sup>9</sup>Of the 80 seats, 56 are elected by Greek Cypriots and 24 by Turkish Cypriots. However, due to the partition of the island in 1974, the 24 Turkish Cypriot seats are unfilled, and the House of Representatives has de facto had 56 seats since its enlargement in the 1980s.

one preference for every four seats to be filled in their constituency. In the case of constituencies with fewer than three seats, only one preference can be marked. Seats are distributed among lists within each constituency by dividing the total number of votes cast for each list by the electoral quota (the largest-remainder method using the Hare quota). The remaining seats are then distributed among the parties or coalitions of parties that won at least one seat in any constituency pursuant to the first distribution or, for single parties, at least 1.8 per cent of all the valid votes cast throughout the island (for coalitions of two or more parties, the applicable figures are 10 and 20 per cent, respectively). Notwithstanding the above, 3.6 per cent of the total number of votes cast are required for lists of single parties participating in the second distribution to be entitled to a second seat.

As in other PLPR systems, voters first select the list that they wish to vote for and then may support a number of candidates equal to a quarter of *M*. However, the Cypriot PLPR system is a peculiar one,<sup>10</sup> as the first candidate on the list (party leader or not) is not required to receive preference votes to be elected. Therefore, as both the preference votes and the list order determine the seat allocation among parties' candidates, albeit in very uneven proportions, such as 99 per cent vs. 1 candidate, the Cypriot system should be included in the flexible-list category. However, given that almost all candidates' positions on the party list are subject to modification via preference votes, it seems fair to consider the Cypriot system as OLPR.

Moreover, Cyprus, which has a presidential form of government (an anomaly in the European panorama), elects six members to the European Parliament. The electoral system is based on proportional representation in a single, national electoral district for European elections. The Hare electoral formula is utilized, and the legal threshold is set to 1.8 per cent. Party lists enable voters to express preferences among the candidates belonging to the party list of their choice.

<sup>10</sup>A similar system, in which the head of the list competes according to a "closed-list" logic, was approved in Italy in 2015, although it has not yet been used for general elections.

### 3.3.7 *Czech Republic*

The elections to the Chamber of Deputies in the Czech Parliamentary Republic (the President is elected by the Parliament) are held according to the principle of proportional representation as defined in the nation's Constitution. The national territory is divided into 14 electoral districts, which correspond to the regions. The allocation of seats uses the D'Hondt formula and is calculated only for those political parties or groupings that meet the 5 per cent national vote share threshold.

Preferential voting in the Czech Republic was introduced in 1990 in what was then Czechoslovakia. In 2002 and 2006, the number of preference votes was reduced to two, but, in 2010, it was raised to four. Voters can therefore cast more than one (four)<sup>11</sup> preference votes for individual candidates, who are ranked according to the determination of their parties.<sup>12</sup> The voters' power to affect and determine a candidate's ranking is limited by the requirement that—as in the Austrian case—the votes of preference that he/she receives in the district represent more than 5 per cent<sup>13</sup> of all the votes received by the given party. Therefore, the probability of gaining the necessary number of preference votes is far greater in small regions than in large ones (Voda and Pin 2010).

The Czech Republic elects 22 members to the European Parliament through a proportional representation system. The Czech Republic comprises 1 national electoral district for these elections. The D'Hondt electoral formula is utilized, and the legal threshold for seat allocation is 5 per cent nationwide. Thus, voters are able to express their preference for a certain candidate on their favoured party list. Each voter has up to 2 preference votes, and, as for the national case, to shift his/her position on the list, a candidate has to obtain at least 5 per cent of the votes delivered to his/her political party.

<sup>11</sup>In 2006 (Law No. 480/2006 Coll.), the number of possible votes of preference to cast was raised to four.

<sup>12</sup>On the ballot appear the candidates' name, age, profession, residence, and party affiliation.

<sup>13</sup>Up to 2006 (Law No. 480/2006 Coll.), the threshold was equal to 7 per cent.

### 3.3.8 *Denmark*

Denmark—a constitutional parliamentary monarchy—has a PR system with preferential voting and a unicameral legislature (*Folketing*). Preferential voting was introduced in 1920, and voters may cast one preference vote (Elklit 2002). Each elector votes for one of the party lists but may also cast a “personal vote” for one of the candidates. Uniquely, the Danish national electoral system is built around its list organization and presentation. Roughly speaking, there are “standing districts”, in which the parties’ nominated candidates are printed first on the party’s ballot paper and the other candidates follow in alphabetical order, while the “standing in parallel” form allows parties to present lists of candidates who are competing simultaneously in the district (all the names are printed in bold) (Pedersen 1966; Elklit 2011). Simply put, the Danish system exhibits a “list PR, an average district magnitude of about eight seats, national compensatory seats with a low 2 per cent threshold, and highly proportional allocation formulas”, as it represents Lijphart’s ideal electoral system (Lijphart 2005: ix).

Although voters can cast their vote for either their preferred party or an individual candidate in both forms, there are crucial differences between them. The dissimilarities concern both the method of counting preference votes and, consequently, the allocation of seats among the candidates of a given party. In the first case—“standing districts”—it is irrelevant whether the candidate who stands in the nomination district receives votes through “personal votes” or “party votes”: in both situations, the “nominee” will receive all ballots as such. This form implies a much higher barrier to voters’ ability to change the rank order decided by the party, since “weaker” candidates need a higher number of preference votes to be elected. One might argue that the first form of list organization and presentation functions as a flexible-list case. In the second case—“standing in parallel”—the party’s votes are allocated among *all* the candidates in the district in a proportional manner following the number of preference votes that each of them receives. Thus, one might argue that this second format functions as an open-list system, as voters can determine which candidates are elected through their preferences without the intervention of the party rank order. It is noteworthy that, until the 1960s, a third formula of party list and presentation was used, especially by the parties of the left (communists and social democrats). A party presented the candidate list in its own preferred order, and,

although voters could vote for the party, the nomination district's candidate, or one of the other candidates in the constituency, the selection of a party's elected candidates varied widely vis à vis the previous two forms. In fact, mainly the challenger candidates should gather at least a number of votes equal to the number of the party's votes divided by the seats (plus one) allotted to the given party in the district. Therefore, this was a way to keep "safe" seats for party leaders, for example, and in general to allow much more effective party control over the elected candidates.

A proportional preferential electoral system is also used for European Parliament elections. Denmark<sup>14</sup> elects 13 representatives to the European Parliament for a unitary national electoral district. The D'Hondt formula is used, and there is no legal threshold for representation. Hence, voters are provided with the opportunity to overrule the party ranking of candidates by using one preference vote. As the PLPR is open list, the candidates with the most votes on the individual lists are elected.

### 3.3.9 *Estonia*

In 1992, Estonia changed its electoral system from single transferable vote (STV) to an OLPR system in which voters have one preference vote. The current Estonian electoral system can be included in the "flexible-list" group, and, as we shall see later, the flexibility is greater in practice than in other countries that have adopted similar systems.<sup>15</sup> Voting is mandatory, and voters must cast a preference vote for one candidate on a party list. To access the seat distribution, parties must exceed an official threshold of 5 per cent of the national vote. In terms of the intraparty allocation of seats, the process consists of two steps: first, candidates may obtain their seats on the basis of their own preference votes; then, candidates are ordered following the number of their personal votes. However, seats in the various multi-seat districts that are not filled by one of the two stages in which preference votes are taken into account are filled instead by a third step at the national level. In this step,

<sup>14</sup>Greenland and the Faroe Islands are not part of the EU and therefore do not participate in EP elections.

<sup>15</sup>As noted by Shugart in his "Fruits and Votes" blog, Estonia was, for one election, one of the few countries (the only one?) outside the UK and its former colonies to have used STV.



the allocation of the remaining seats follows the candidates' order on the party's *closed* national list. The reforms in 1992 established that only candidates who had won votes equal to at least 10 per cent of the district Hare quota could receive district seats. Another important reform was approved in 2002, which stated that: (1) parties would win district seats not just for each Hare quota that they reached but also for any remainder of 75 per cent of a Hare quota (including a total party vote of at least 75 per cent of a Hare quota)<sup>16</sup>; (2) for the national tier, a flexible-list mechanism would be adopted. The seats are allocated in the candidates' order on the party list but only among those candidates who have received at least 5 per cent of the Hare quota in their district; if too few candidates meet this threshold, the remaining seats are allocated in the order of votes received (Mikkil and Pettai 2004; Pettai 2004).

Moreover, at the European level, the Estonian system states that voters are allowed to indicate a preference for a candidate of the party that they support. There is no threshold, as the system is open list, and there is no legal threshold to access the seat allocation process.

### 3.3.10 *Finland*

The Finnish PR open-list electoral system is an old one. It was originally introduced for the first democratic elections in 1907, when the country was still under Russian rule.<sup>17</sup> In 1919, the electoral system was reformed to give voters three preference votes and the ability to reorganize party candidate lists. In 1933, the number of preference votes was reduced to two, and voters lost the right to order candidate lists, a right that “had never had any practical significance” (Törnudd 1968: 57).

<sup>16</sup>This element has resulted in the extension of the number of seats allocated in the districts using open lists. In fact, as Shugart argues, it is possible that the number “of seats filled at the national rather than district level (and therefore by party rank rather than by preference votes) has grown over time, in part because parties are free to nominate many more candidates than there are seats in a district, and the more that parties do so—and nominate candidates with a personal following—the lower the number of candidates that will tend to have enough votes to be elected based on their preference votes at the district level” (Fruits and Votes: [fruitsandvotes.wordpress.com](http://fruitsandvotes.wordpress.com)).

<sup>17</sup>At the time, a list could contain no more than three names, but multiple lists could combine to form an “electoral alliance”. Voters were able to support a list without alteration, change the order of names on a list, or submit their own list (Törnudd 1968: 35).

In 1953, the number of preference votes was further reduced to one (Sundberg 2002; Raunio 2005). Finally, through reforms introduced in 1954, lists became entirely “open”. Preferential voting is mandatory, opening the debate on voter satisfaction (Bengtsson and Wass 2010). Voters must cast their ballot for a candidate by writing that candidate’s number on the ballot paper; there is no opportunity for a list vote, with most parties choosing to list their candidates in alphabetical order (Raunio 2005: 478). Therefore, preference votes entirely determine the order in which candidates are elected (Von Schultz 2018).

Finland, which has a semi-presidential form of government (Elgie 1999), elects 13 members to the European Parliament. The electoral system is based on proportional representation. The whole country forms a single constituency, in which voters choose between individual candidates from non-ordered party lists and there is no legal threshold for candidacy. The seat allocation to parties is based on the D’Hondt method. Indeed, as in Eduskunta elections, the intraparty allocation of seats follows the logic of OLPR, meaning that candidates on lists are ranked according to the number of preference votes that they have received. Seats are distributed to candidates entirely on this basis.

Finland, for the European elections, uses a list-based system with preference votes and proportional allocation of seats following the D’Hondt system. Candidates on the lists are ranked according to the number of votes that they receive. The whole country forms one single constituency. Voters choose between individual candidates from non-ordered party lists. After each party, electoral alliance, and joint list has been allocated the number of seats to which it is entitled, the candidates on the lists are ranked according to the number of their preference votes. This means that, within electoral alliances, the distribution of seats is determined by the plurality principle, regardless of the total number of votes won by the respective parties forming the alliance (Raunio 2005).

### 3.3.11 *Greece*

In Greece—a parliamentary unicameral republic—preferential voting was introduced in 1926, with a maximum of 2 preference votes, depending on the magnitude of the electoral district. In 1974, OLPR characteristics were introduced, yet the system exhibited many of the properties of a “flexible system”. While all other candidates competed for preference votes, party leaders and former prime ministers were protected from this

competition by automatically being awarded as many preference votes as votes received by their party in their district.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, 12 “state deputies” out of 300 were elected via the closed-list system (according to the “largest-average” PR formula). Overall, the electoral system has been modified several times since the initial democratic transition process. For a short period, preferential voting was dismissed. In 1985, a reform eliminated preferential voting, replacing the flexible system with a completely closed-list one. Just 4 years later, in 1989, a new reform reintroduced preferential voting, basically restoring the system that had existed before 1985. Between 1993 and 2004, multi-member constituency seats were allocated in each district by the Hagenbach-Bischoff method (56 constituencies for 288 seats: 48 multi-member constituencies and 8 single-member constituencies—under a plurality system—and the above-mentioned multi-member nationwide constituency for 12 seats). To participate in the distribution of seats, a list had to obtain at least 3 per cent of the vote at the national level. The 2007 and 2009 elections were held under a new electoral law introduced in 2004, which automatically grants the winning party (the party obtaining the highest number of valid votes) a majority premium of 40 seats, while the remaining 260 seats are distributed through proportional representation. However, under the terms of a 2008 amendment to the electoral law, the majority premium increased to 50 seats in 2012. Currently voters have a maximum of 5 preference votes, depending on the district “magnitude”. Moreover, it must be specified that when a second election is called shortly after a previous one (as in 2012), the second one uses a closed-list system. Parties almost always just ranked the candidates in the same order as their preference votes in the earlier election.<sup>19</sup>

### 3.3.12 *Iceland*

The *Althing*, the Icelandic Parliament, elects its 63 members through a 2-tier proportional representation system. Of those seats, 54 are filled in 6 multi-member constituencies through the D’Hondt method. Voters cast a ballot for a constituency party list and may change the ranking

<sup>18</sup>As we have seen, this provision has also been adopted in the Cypriot and Italian cases (as of 2015).

<sup>19</sup>List of the districts by magnitude.

of candidates or reject candidates on a list by crossing their names out. Only parties who obtain at least 5 per cent of the valid votes nationally can participate in the seat allocation (Hardarson 2002). The main electoral reform was adopted in 1959, and it conferred on voters “considerable freedom to express their preferences among candidates but effectively no influence over which candidates would actually be elected” (Renwick and Pilet 2016: 147). In fact, the preference votes were used to calculate only one-third of the points allocated to each candidate, and the remaining two-thirds were determined by the parties’ ballots.

In 2000, the electoral system was reformed again: the method of Borda counting within lists was recalled after it was used before 1959. However, a limitation was introduced, as “only candidates in the top part of their party’s list—consisting of twice the number of candidates as the number of seats that the party had won in the district—[were] considered” (Renwick and Pilet 2016: 147). Consequently, the system became potentially more flexible as, unlike in the past, when half a party’s voters had to place a candidate first to change the party’s official rank, after the reform, about 10 per cent of voters can potentially modify it.

### 3.3.13 *Italy*

The Italian case, along with the Belgian, Chilean, and Finnish ones, is quite old, having adopted the PR open-list system a long time ago. Since the first democratic national elections after the Second World War, held in 1948, the Italian Chamber of Deputies has been selected through preferential voting using the Imperiali formula. Italian voters were allowed (depending on the district size, which ranges from four to more than fifty candidates) to modify lists by casting three or four preference votes (Wildgen 1985: 949). After a quota of seats was allocated to a party based on its proportion of list (party) votes, candidates were assigned seats based on the number of preference votes received by party supporters (Passarelli 2017, 2018).

Even though the national parliament is no longer (since 1993) elected through a PR open-list system, in Italy voters can still use preferential voting in three kinds of elections. In city council, regional assembly, and European Parliament elections, voters can cast preference votes. Italy elects its 72 members to the European Parliament in 5 multi-regional electoral districts, and voters are allowed to cast up to 3 votes in some

regions but only a single vote in others.<sup>20</sup> In 2009, the Parliament introduced a 4 per cent national threshold that must be met to be allocated any seats as well as a change according to which the maximum number of preference votes allowed was homogenized for all districts (up to 3). From 1979 to 2004, the electoral formula utilized was the Hare formula, and there was no legal threshold. The law enabled voters to express preferences only among the candidates belonging to the party list of their choice. Moreover, according to the amendment introduced in April 2014, voters have to choose either one man and two women or two men and one woman. If there is no gender diversity in a voter's preferences, the second and third preferences will be deemed null and void. The seats are distributed according to the Hare–Niemeyer system. Votes are counted and seats allocated at the national level. A quotient is established determining how many votes are required to win a seat. If, in a constituency, a list has obtained an insufficient number of votes to win a seat, these votes are transferred to the constituency in which the list of the party in question has obtained a relative majority of the votes. In this way, all the parties benefit from the redistribution of votes at the national level.

### 3.3.14 *Kosovo*

Kosovo's PR system was introduced for the first elections following the war in 2001. Preferential voting was introduced in 2007, with 10 preference votes allowed; that number was reduced to 5 in 2010. Kosovo represents an *at-large* multi-member constituency ( $M = 120$ ). In the 2001 and 2004 elections, a closed-list system was adopted, while, in 2007, open lists were introduced. Voters were allowed to vote for up to 10 candidates within the same party list. Following the declaration of independence, the Kosovo Assembly adopted the election law for the first time.<sup>21</sup> However, the law adopted in 2008 enabled voters to cast only a single preference vote, whereas voters had previously been entitled to 10.

<sup>20</sup>North–West (Valle d'Aosta, Piedmont, Liguria, and Lombardy) (up to three preferences); North–East (Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and Emilia-Romagna) (up to two preferences); Centre (Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, and Lazio) (up to two preferences); South (Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, and Calabria) (up to two preferences); and Islands (Sicily and Sardinia) (up to one preference).

<sup>21</sup>The electoral rules were previously determined by the UN administration representatives.

The same law introduced a provision making a vote for the party list an automatic vote for the top-of-the-list candidate. This guaranteed that the first candidate on the list would become an MP if the party won at least 1 seat.<sup>22</sup> However, in 2010, before the parliamentary elections, amendments were adopted that brought back preferential voting (i.e. open lists), but this time the number of preference votes was reduced from 10 to 5.<sup>23</sup> In addition, the rule giving party votes to the top-of-the-list candidate, which had been used by legislators to strengthen the positions of their party leaders, was abolished. The Law on Local Elections contains such a decision, stating that voters have only 1 preference vote at their disposal within the candidate list. The legal threshold is 5 per cent.

In 2007, for the first time, voters were allowed to cast 10 preference votes within a single party (candidate) list. This caused enormous technical problems for election administrators, and the number was subsequently decreased to 5 for the parliamentary elections in 2010. Voters are obliged to cast some preference votes for the ballot to be considered valid but need not use all 5 preference votes.

### 3.3.15 *Latvia*

The history of the renewed Republic of Latvia began in 1991, when Latvia declared independence. Since then, Latvia has held seven parliamentary elections to elect members of the unicameral *Saeima*. Parliamentary elections were held in 1993, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2011 (early elections). In the national parliamentary elections, Latvia is divided into five constituencies, which consist of cities and municipalities.<sup>24</sup> In the Latvian case, the data allow us to see: (1) a candidate's number in the result of voters' preferences (*N.p.k.*),

<sup>22</sup>“The seats allocated to a Political Entity in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be distributed to the candidates on the Political Entity's candidate list as reordered in paragraph 4 of this Article, starting from the first candidate on the list in descending order, until the number of seats allocated to the Political Entity is exhausted” (Article 111, paragraph 5 Law No. 03/L-073 on General Elections in the Republic of Kosovo adopted in October 2008).

<sup>23</sup>“A voter shall be issued with a single ballot for the election and (a) shall mark it with a vote for one (1) political entity, and (b) may also mark it with votes for up to five (5) candidates from the list for the political entity for whom the voter has voted” (Article 110, paragraph 4 Law No. 03/L-256 on Amendments to the Law No. 03/L-073 on General Elections in the Republic of Kosovo adopted in October 2010).

<sup>24</sup>There are 9 cities and 110 municipalities in Latvia (Saeima Election Law, Article 7).

(2) a candidate's number on the party's list (*Numurs saraksta*), and (3) a candidate's received points (*Punkti*), which are calculated in the following way: the number of votes for party "x" plus voters' pluses for this candidate and voters' minus crossings out of this candidate.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, in Latvia, it is possible to calculate not only the preference share expressed both in total and for each party or electoral district but also the extent of the voters' influence on the candidate selection. In fact, it is possible to identify, specifically, how the party list order was modified in particular elections (*see infra*).

In Latvia's parliamentary elections, voters may cast one preference vote and can mark either their favourite candidate or the one whom they do not want to be elected. The fact that candidates can run in multiple districts was seen as enlarging the perception of political distance between candidates and voters. As a consequence, in some cases, the victorious candidates in a given district were not always those whom voters had actually preferred; for this reason, this procedure was abolished in 2009 (Millard 2011).

Latvia elects eight members to the European Parliament. The electoral system is based on proportional representation. Latvia comprises one national electoral district for these elections. The unmodified Sainte-Laguë electoral formula is utilized, and there is no legal threshold. Voters are entitled to vote for (+) or reject (−) each candidate on the list.

### 3.3.16 *Lithuania*

Since 1996, the Lithuanian *Seimas* has been elected through a mixed electoral system in which voters can indicate up to five preferences by marking the candidates' electoral number in the ballot. However, the impact of the preferences is reduced by the simultaneous possibility of being elected of candidates running in single-member districts (Massicotte 2011: 103).

The impact of the preference votes on the candidates elected has grown over time. As reported by Massicotte (2011: 107), the number of MPs elected thanks to preferences increased to 24 (out of 70) in 2008 (14 and 15 in 1996 and in 2000 and 2004, respectively).

<sup>25</sup>The Saeima Election Law, Article 39.

### 3.3.17 *The Netherlands*

The PR system with one preference vote was introduced in 1917 (Andeweg 2005), and elections since 1918 have been carried out by proportional representation. The House of Representatives is composed of 150 members elected for a 4-year term of office, introduced in 1917. Parties submit lists of candidates in 19 electoral districts.<sup>26</sup> As previously stated, voters indicate a preference for 1 candidate on 1 party list, and the preference vote is mandatory. House of Representatives seats are distributed on a nationwide basis among party lists that obtain a national electoral quota, which is calculated by dividing the total number of valid votes by 150 (the number of House seats, which was 100 until 1956). The implicit threshold is equivalent to approximately 0.67 per cent (there is no specified numeric legal threshold). The number of votes won by each qualifying list or combination of lists is then divided by the electoral quota (Hare method), and the result of this division, disregarding fractions, is the initial number of seats obtained by each list or combination of lists. Any seats that remain unallocated after the application of the electoral quota are distributed according to the D'Hondt highest-average method (introduced in 1933 and effective as of 1937), while seats won by combinations of lists (allowed since 1973) are distributed among constituent parties through the largest-remainder method (Jacobs 2018). If a party that has submitted different lists in different electoral districts wins seats in the House of Representatives, these are apportioned among its district lists using the largest-remainder method as well. In terms of intraparty dynamics, it should be noted that list seats are allocated first to candidates whose preference votes exceed one-quarter of the electoral quota up to the total number of seats won by the list. In 1997, the preference threshold was lowered from 50 to 25 per cent of the electoral quota. However, if unfilled list seats remain, these are allocated to candidates in the order in which they appear on the list. As such, voters are provided with the opportunity to change the party ranking of candidates. Therefore, it is possible to consider the Netherlands as using a flexible-list system. The Netherlands—a constitutional monarchy—elects 25

<sup>26</sup>Newly formed parties, or existing parties that failed to obtain at least one House seat in the preceding general election, are required to submit a deposit, which is forfeited in the event that the party fails to poll at least half of 1 per cent (0.5 per cent) of all the valid votes.



representatives to the European Parliament through an open-list system, and each voter has 1 vote, which he/she can give either to a list or to a candidate, so the order of names on the list can be changed.

### 3.3.18 *Norway: An Assumed OLPR That Never Was*

The Norwegian case represents a sort of “assumed OLPR” that never was. Here, I present the characteristics of the electoral system to justify why the case is not included in the sample. The PR system was introduced in 1920. Voters can alter the order of the candidates’ list or mark the candidate whom they do not want to be elected (Aardal 2002). National (parliamentary) elections: under the electoral system (which has been used since proportional representation was introduced in 1920), a voter can both cross out candidates from the lists and change the ranking (for example, move candidate number 5 down to number 10 on the list or move him/her up to number 1, etc.). However, if this is to have any effect, more than 50 per cent of those who vote for a list (a constituency party) must make the same change. In other words, if candidate number 2 is to be elected instead of candidate number 1, half the voters (plus one) must place number 2 before number 1 by crossing out number 1 or moving number 2 up to the first place on the list. To my knowledge, this has never happened (Shugart 2005; Valdini 2013). Because preferences carry no consequences for the distribution of seats, statistics for preference votes at national elections have never been published officially, at least to my knowledge. However, I had the opportunity to collect data on the 2013 results directly from the Ministry of the Interior. Despite the potentiality that only a low percentage of voters cast preference votes, as they do not affect the outcome, the data show that almost 12 per cent (11.9 per cent) of voters cast a preference vote. In distinguishing between subtypes of PLPR systems, Shugart clearly indicates that it is an important operation to avoid mistakes and the inclusion of cases that do not fit the category. In particular, he refers to Colomer (2004), who “does not differentiate these types of PLPR, referring to flexible lists—and even some that are almost closed as ‘open lists’” (Shugart 2005: 43). Shugart clearly indicates Norway, “where voters have the option of striking names from a list, few do so; moreover, only a very substantial percentage of voters acting in concert could actually bring about a change in the list order (which apparently has never happened)” (ibidem). In sum, the Norwegian case is an example of an (almost) closed-list system, in

which the theoretical potential to modify the party order list has not been fulfilled. This is the case because it was never “adopted”, especially in terms of intraparty consequences and parties’/voters’ power.

Preferential voting has also been adopted in subnational contexts. First, it is necessary to distinguish between regional and municipal elections, as there are differences in the way in which preferential voting is used in these two types of elections. Preferential voting was not effective in regional elections before 2003 (previously, the same system as in national elections was used). Regarding regional elections, data on the use of preference votes are not published by any official statistical offices. However, secondary data report information for the 2003 and 2007 elections. As detailed in Chapter 4, fewer than one-quarter of voters, respectively, cast a preference vote. For municipal elections, the use of preference votes increased from 26.4 per cent in 1979 to 40.0 per cent in 2007 and to 42.0 per cent in 2011.

### 3.3.19 *Poland*

The Polish electoral system, which features one preference vote, was introduced in 1991, just after democratization. A 5 per cent threshold was established before the 1993 election. The system featured a 2-tier process, the first completely “open” and the second based on closed lists. Voters<sup>27</sup> cast their ballot for 1 candidate on 1 list in one of the 37 districts. Therefore, 291 seats (out of 460) were allocated entirely on the basis of the preference votes obtained by the candidates. In the second tier, the remaining 69 seats were allocated based on a closed-list system. This system was modified in 2001, when Poland—a semi-presidential regime (Elgie 1999)—abolished the national, closed-list component of the election as well as the national tier and its 7 per cent threshold. Since this reform, a full open-list system has been in operation (Birch et al. 2002; Millard 2009). As such, Poland belongs to the PLPR family. For a few years, the system functioned as a hybrid, part OLPR and CLPR, but was never, as has been claimed, “a flexible-list system” (Renwick and Pilet 2016: 160). The Polish electoral system does not

<sup>27</sup>The Constitution states that: “The election shall be universal, equal, direct and proportional and shall be performed by secret ballot” (Article 130) and that “460 deputies shall be elected to the Sejm in multi-member electoral constituencies from constituency lists of candidates” (Article 132).

offer voters the chance to cast a list vote, only the ability to vote for a candidate. The sums of personal votes determine the number of seats to be allocated to parties as well as the intraparty distribution of seats. It is quite evident that the electoral system of Poland fits squarely into the box of quasi-list PLPR systems. All seat allocations are made solely on the basis of preference votes, without any provisions requiring thresholds or quotas to be met for candidates to modify the party's list order.

Sejm seats are distributed in each constituency among qualifying lists by the largest-average method of proportional representation (D'Hondt), among party lists that obtain at least 5 per cent of all the valid votes cast at the national level, while coalition lists are required to obtain at least 8 per cent of the valid national vote. However, lists representing national minorities are exempt from the electoral threshold requirements. In the Sejm, 460 members are elected through an OLPR system to serve 4-year terms. There are 41 multi-member constituencies consisting of between 7 and 20 seats. Electors are *required* to cast a preference vote for the candidate of their choice. All preference votes are tabulated as votes for the candidate's party. Together with the 5 per cent threshold for parties, there is an 8 per cent threshold for coalitions at the national level.<sup>28</sup>

### 3.3.20 *Slovakia*

In Slovakia, each voter may, in addition to choosing a party, select one to four candidates from the ordered party list. Candidates who are selected by more than 3 per cent of all-party voters are elected first (in order of the total number of votes), and only then is the party ordering used. As in the Czech Republic, preferential voting was introduced in 1990 in Slovakia, in the then common country of Czechoslovakia. Voters have the ability to cast as many as four preference votes (Beblavy and Veselkova 2014).

For European elections, voters select two candidates. Eligible candidates must have more than 10 per cent of the total votes to override the party list. In the European election of 2009 (the most recent election run under this system), three of Slovakia's thirteen MEPs were elected solely by virtue of the preference votes received (having positions that

<sup>28</sup>Candidates who belong to ethnic minorities are exempt from the threshold requirements.

were too low to win otherwise), and only one (Katarína Neveďalová of SMER) was elected solely by virtue of her position on the party list (having fewer preference votes than a number of other candidates who themselves had preference votes from less than 10 per cent of their party's voters).

Slovakia elects thirteen members to the European Parliament. The electoral system is based on proportional representation. Slovakia comprises one national electoral district for these elections. The Droop (largest-remainder) electoral formula is utilized, and the legal threshold currently sits at 5 per cent nationwide. The system is a flexible-list system, as candidates who win 10 per cent of the preference votes out of all of those obtained by their party obtain the seat as the first candidates of these political parties (irrespective of their position on the list).

### 3.3.21 *Slovenia*

In 1990, the provisions for electing the Socio-Political Chamber (one of the chambers in the old, socialist institutional setting) were quite permissive in that the electorate was given the option of both preferential (up to as many deputies allocated in the district) and cross-party voting, and the threshold for parties to receive mandates in the second tier of the election was relatively low (2.5 per cent). Mandates were allocated using the Hare method in the first tier and the D'Hondt method in the second (Gaber 1992). The Law on the Elections to the National Assembly was passed in 1992 and it was changed in 1995, 2000, 2006 and 2017. Slovenia has PR system with 8 constituencies (*volilna enota*) and each is further divided into 11 sub-constituencies (*volilni okraj*). In the period 1992–2000 Hare and D'Hondt formulas were used for distribution of seats. In terms of the preferential voting provisions, in 1992, the reform indicated that voters could only vote for one candidate from the list of their choice. "While mandates allocated at the first tier of the election were to be awarded in accordance with the electorate's preferences, the new law provided parties at the second tier of the election with the option of allocating up to fifty per cent of all mandates awarded in total according to the party's ranking of candidates as submitted in their original list" (Fink-Hafner 2008; ESCE data set). In 1996 three referendums on three different electoral systems were held (PR, two-round system and mixed system). In 2000 the Constitution was changed and PR system was constitutionally defined as well as 4% threshold, and Droop and

D'Hondt formulas are used. Already in 1997, the law reforming the electoral system stipulated that parties' right to allocate up to 50 per cent of mandates according to their own ranking was to be revoked (Toplak 2006; Fink-Hafner 2008). Indeed, voters in the sub-constituency can now only choose one candidate among candidates from different lists in one sub-constituency where each individual party can only propose one candidate.

In Slovenia, a PV system is used to elect municipal council members and members of the European Parliament but the preference vote is not absolute, but comes into effect after certain threshold is reached. Ballot papers contain the numbers and names of candidate lists in the order decided by the party, and each list includes the numbers and full names of the candidates. Voters vote by encircling the number of the candidate list that they are supporting. If they wish to give a preference vote to a certain candidate on the list, they can encircle the number next to the name of the candidate for whom the preference vote is cast.

Slovenia elects eight members to the European Parliament. The electoral system is based on proportional representation with PV where again the PV is not absolute but comes into effect after certain threshold is reached. Slovenia comprises one national electoral district for these elections. The D'Hondt electoral formula is utilized, and there is no legal threshold.

### 3.3.22 *Sweden*

The members of the Swedish Riksdag, a unicameral parliament, are elected by means of free, secret, and direct elections. Voting in such elections is by party, with an option for voters to express a preference for a particular candidate on a party list. The fixed constituency seats in each constituency are distributed proportionately among the parties on the basis of the election results in that constituency. In Sweden—a constitutional monarchy—the proportional representation system was introduced in 1911, with preferential voting featuring one preference vote being introduced in 1997. Therefore, preferential voting in Sweden is a relatively “recent” phenomenon. Before its first adoption in 1998, a closed-list PR system was in force, implying both electoral and political supremacy for parties over candidates. Voters were significantly less or even totally unable to affect the party's choice in rank order and MP selection. The electoral reforms of 1997 introduced the *option* of voting

for an individual candidate, and thus it became possible for candidates and voters to modify the party's choice in ranking candidates, assuming that the favoured candidate received enough personal votes (Särilvik 2002). Sweden represents an example of a flexible-list system, as changing the party list order requires a candidate to obtain at least 8 per cent of the party's valid votes. This threshold came into effect in 1998 and lasted until 2014, when it was reduced to 5 per cent.

As the Swedish party system was stable in the period spanning the 1994 and 2006 elections, this change in the electoral law allows us to measure the effects of PV on both intra- and interparty relationships in a controlled setting. Using a newly collected data set of roll call votes in the Swedish Riksdag and surveys of Swedish MPs from the 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 parliaments, this paper analyses the effects of the electoral reforms on a number of parliamentary issues. First, it investigates the effects that electoral reform had on the parliamentary voting behaviour of MPs in the Riksdag, measuring the extent to which MPs alter their behaviour in response to increased electoral incentives to cultivate a personal vote, as posited by Carey and Shugart (1995).

Sweden elects 18 members to the European Parliament. The electoral system is based on proportional representation. Sweden comprises one national electoral district for these elections. Similar to the national parliamentary elections, the modified Sainte-Laguë formula is utilized and the legal threshold is set at 4 per cent. Voters may express a preference for a certain candidate on their favoured party list. The required threshold for election on the basis of preference votes in EP elections is 5 per cent. The candidate receiving the highest number of votes will then be placed first on the list.

### 3.4 THE REST OF THE WORLD: A FEW "EXCEPTIONAL" CASES

The sample of non-European countries that have adopted PLPR electoral systems is not big,<sup>29</sup> containing fewer than ten cases, and is far smaller than the European sample. Brazil is the oldest case among those with PLPR and is the oldest case of OLPR in the world, predating Chile and aged European cases such as Italy, Belgium, or Finland. Beyond Europe, which can be considered the continent of PLPR systems, there are four

<sup>29</sup>Brazil, Chile, Peru (included in the research), Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Suriname, Sri Lanka.

cases of PLPR from South America, two from Central America (Panama and the Dominican Republic),<sup>30</sup> and only one from Asia (Sri Lanka).<sup>31</sup> Therefore, it is worthwhile noting that even an experienced scholar such as Lauri Karvonen, in his interesting review and analysis of preferential voting, does not mention either Brazil or Peru—to say nothing of Panama and Sri Lanka—as countries with PLPR, and in fact he states that “the only exception [to a European, considered as ‘standard’ for the preferential voting phenomenon, *author’s note*] is Chile” (2004: 208). Although the extra-European cases are not as numerous as their European counterparts, they in fact represent an important sample.

### 3.4.1 *How the Electoral Systems Work*

Although the remaining PLPR cases outside the European context are not as numerous, they are worth analysing. Among this collection of electoral systems, there are in fact relevant countries. One of the most important is Brazil, which has a long tradition of preferential voting. Moreover, Latin America is well represented, as we also find Chile and Peru, both adopting an OLPR system, like Brazil. Moreover, there are other smaller countries, still in the context of South America, that have adopted or recently used a PLPR system, such as the Dominican Republic, and Suriname. Even though, for the latter, the electoral data are not available or reliable for the entire period, it is important to mention them for analytical purposes, at least in terms of the electoral system diffusion. Finally, there are cases on other continents, such as Sri Lanka and Australia (upper house), and a few “controversial cases”, such as Iraq, Indonesia, and Fiji. Therefore, the sample represents a group of cases with internal variation in terms of the electoral systems’ features as well as in comparison with the European context. For those reasons, in this section, I present the way in which the electoral system works in each of those countries.

<sup>30</sup>In El Salvador there was one election (2012) that was OLPR, but since then voters have been able to cast preferences across party lines.

<sup>31</sup>As repeatedly noted, in this book, I only deal with lower houses. Otherwise, I would also have included the Belgian senate, for example.

### 3.4.2 *Brazil*

It is worth noting that Brazil adopted an open-list system before most other countries—Italy (1946), Finland (1955), and Chile (1958)—that would come to be known for utilizing that system of proportional representation (Raunio 2005; Siavelis 2005). The PR system featuring one preference vote was introduced in 1945 (Mainwaring 1990). Brazil's system, in effect, offers voters two options: to vote for either a name or a party list. The seats won by parties (or interparty coalitions) are occupied by the candidates who have obtained the most votes from each list. It is important to emphasize that interparty coalitions function as a single list; that is, the most-voted-for candidates from within the coalition, regardless of their own party, are elected. Unlike other countries (Chile, Finland, and Poland), where voters must choose a name from the list for their vote for the party to count, in Brazil, voters have the option of voting either for a party or for a name (*legenda*). The vote for a party is considered only in the distribution of seats among the parties and has no effect on the distribution of seats among candidates. The national legislature is bicameral. The Senate is composed of three senators per state. The less populous states are greatly overrepresented in the Chamber. There is a minimum of 8 deputies per state and a maximum of 60, so supposedly proportional elections are marked by gross disproportionalities. The number of voters per deputy in the state of São Paulo is over 10 times greater than that in the least populated state (Acre), giving Brazil one of the world's most evident case of malapportionment. The Brazilian OLPR system offers citizens exceptional comparative weight in intraparty selection at election time. A citizen casts a vote for one deputy only, and this vote cannot be transferred to other individuals. Seats are first distributed to parties according to the total number of votes that their candidates receive and then within parties according to the number of individual votes. Preference votes are the only factor considered in the allocation of seats to candidates once the total amount of seats has been assigned to a single party. However, this is not the only provision that confers on politicians an important degree of autonomy from their parties. In particular, it is worth mentioning the *candidato nato* (literally, birth-right candidate). This rule states that federal and state deputies automatically have the right to be on the ballot for their current position



in the next election.<sup>32</sup> This provision is very important in understanding the party candidate–voter relationship and has many consequences for the interelection turnover, as I show in Chapter 6. MPs have great political freedom, as they can violate all of the party’s programmatic concerns, consistently vote against the leadership, and still be guaranteed a place in the ballot. Moreover, an incumbent “can even switch parties despite the opposition of the party leadership and still be guaranteed the right to run for office on that party’s list” (Mainwaring 1990).<sup>33</sup>

The 513 members of the House of the Deputies are elected in 27 districts for a 4-year term (D’Hondt formula). The district magnitude ranges between 8 and 70 deputies. This malapportionment especially affects the state of Sao Paulo,<sup>34</sup> for which the size of the constituency would otherwise have reduced its dominant role in politics. The electoral law states that parties must receive at least 3 per cent of the total national vote for the Chamber of Deputies, with at least 2 per cent in 5 states, or they will be part of the seat distribution. In terms of preference votes, it is important to remember that parties can present 1.5 times the number of seats to be filled.<sup>35</sup> This provision has important consequences for intraparty competition, the relationship between candidates and party leadership, and the organizational hierarchy. The possibility of running a number of candidates larger than that suggested by M presents an incentive for parties to stack lists with many candidates, as they stand to benefit from the personal votes accrued by candidates (votes are pooled to

<sup>32</sup>This rule applies to town council representatives too and, until 1986, to senators.

<sup>33</sup>As reported by Scott Mainwaring, “such a case occurred in the PMDB in the state of Paraná in 1986. Renato Johnsson, a federal deputy of the PDS, the party created by the military government, applied for membership in the PMDB of Curitiba, the capital of the state. The PMDB Directorate of Curitiba turned him down, but Johnson then convinced a Directorate in the interior of the state to accept his membership in the PMDB. Having done this, Johnsson was assured of a place on the PMDB ballot by the institution of the *candidato nato*” (1990). The military government (1964–1985) approved a law according to which MPs changing parties would lose their seat, unless it were to form a new party, which was allowed once in every four-year period. However, the democratic parliament revoked this provision (Constitutional Amendment n. 25 of May 1985) and consequently allowed candidates to change parties at will.

<sup>34</sup>The number of votes to elect a deputy in the state of Sao Paulo, which has more than 25 million voters and 70 MPs, is 10 times bigger than that in the state of Amapá, where 290,000 voters elect 8 seats.

<sup>35</sup>The number increases to double or three times the numbers of seats if a party makes an alliance with one or two parties, respectively.

determine how many seats the party will obtain). This fosters fierce intra-party competition among the many candidates aiming to obtain a seat. This provision also has an important and potentially negative impact on parties' organization. In fact, the large number of candidates negatively affects parties' ability to control who is elected. As a result, the role of individual candidates in determining their fate increases dramatically in the campaign period. The relatively low threshold paired with the high (on average) district magnitude makes it comparatively easy for parties to secure representation in the chamber. Even small parties have a reasonable opportunity to secure at least one seat in congress. Moreover, and this is a crucial point in terms of the OLPR system, these elements represent an incentive for candidates to change parties, as the risks of defeat typically associated with a lack of party support are comparatively minor.

### 3.4.3 *Chile*

Chile has a presidential regime in which the president is elected through a two-ballot system. The legislative branch is bicameral, and the Chamber of Deputies<sup>36</sup> (lower house) is composed of one hundred and twenty members elected in sixty districts with magnitudes of two. The parties or coalition electoral lists may include up to two candidates, and voters can indicate a favoured candidate on the list of their choosing. Until 2015,<sup>37</sup> the electoral system coupled a PR electoral system with a magnitude of two, which was unique in the international panorama. In fact, the so-called "binominal formula" states that parties can offer up to two candidates in districts, while voters can cast one preference vote. Voters are obliged to cast preference votes, as party list votes do not exist. All votes for candidates of a given party are pooled and considered as the total amount of valid votes for the party for which they are running. The binominal system has two main effects on interparty

<sup>36</sup>The Chilean Parliament is bicameral, and it includes a Senate composed of 60 senators.

<sup>37</sup>The law reforming the electoral system was published in May 2015. It decreased the number of electoral districts to 28 (formed by merging previous districts) as well as the number of senatorial constituencies to 15 (1 for each region). Each electoral district elects between 3 and 8 deputies, while each region elects between 2 and 5 senators. The D'Hondt method will continue to be used to determine the winners. The number of lawmakers has increased in each chamber, to 155 in the lower chamber and to 50 in the Senate. The new system will debut in the 2017 general elections. Representatives elected under this new system will take their seats in March 2018.

competition and intraparty dynamics, respectively. The use of D'Hondt in two-member districts implies that the strongest party in the district must double the vote total of the second-place list to win both seats. Consequently, the most common result is that “each of the two top polling lists wins one seat” (Siavelis 2005: 438). With regard to the system’s effect on intraparty competition—as we shall see in Chapter 6—it is strongly influenced by those electoral dynamics. The main competition is between the two party’s candidates, and, as the more likely result is to have only one elected deputy, the seat will usually be allocated to the most well-known candidate. Thus, “the system [...] establishes very high thresholds for representation within each district” (Siavelis 2005: 438).<sup>38</sup> In addition, as we shall see later, the parties prefer to determine their candidate *before* the general elections. Therefore, they nominate one strong and one weak candidate, rendering the intraparty competition for preference votes unimportant. Generally speaking, the seats are allocated first to parties and then to individual candidates. Therefore, as seats are allocated to candidates *only* on the basis of their preference votes, we can include the Chilean electoral system in the open-list category and more specifically in its quasi-list subtype (Shugart 2005: 42).

### 3.4.4 Colombia

The country has a presidential system (Moreno 2011). For the parliamentary elections, in the lower house, there is the possibility of the PLPR electoral system. The PR system, which features one preference vote, was introduced in 2003 (Taylor and Shugart 2018). The electoral system of Colombia is unique in that the parties can opt for either open or closed candidate lists, with most of the parties choosing open lists. Therefore, voters who choose a party running an open list may indicate their candidate of preference among the names displayed on the ballot paper; if the voter does not indicate a preference and only votes for the party, the vote is valid for the purposes of the threshold but not for reordering the list based on preference votes. Both assemblies adopt the same electoral rules, as well as the departmental assemblies.

Colombia is, together with Kosovo, perhaps the only country to use the OLPR system in a single nationwide district. It is used in this manner

<sup>38</sup> $M = 2$  (for a detailed compendium, see Appendix C of Gallagher and Mitchell (2005)).

exclusively for the senate ( $M = 100$ ); the House of Representatives has an open-list but districted system. In Colombia, parties may present either closed or open lists. Most opt for open lists (Pachon and Shugart 2010).

### 3.4.5 *Dominican Republic*

The proportional representation (PR) system was introduced in 1978, and preferential voting featuring one preference vote was introduced in 2002. However, in 2010, the Junta Central Electoral eliminated the preference vote.<sup>39</sup> To my knowledge, so far, there have been three elections under the OLPR electoral system, in 2002, 2006, and 2010, as the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2014 have not been held due to the very infrequent prolongation of the term until 2016 to synchronize it with the presidential one.

### 3.4.6 *Ecuador*

The Ecuadorian free-list PR system was introduced in 1998. Voters are entitled to cast as many preference votes as there are candidates to be elected in a given electoral district and may distribute them among candidates from different candidates' lists. In a single national district, 15 members are elected through open-list proportional representation and 103 members are elected from provincial lists via open-list proportional representation.<sup>40</sup> Voters have the right to cast as many votes as there are seats to be filled in each district (the size of the district magnitude) and may give those votes to candidates all of the same party vote or freely for candidates across parties.

### 3.4.7 *Fiji*

In 2013, Fiji adopted a new electoral system along with a new constitution. Art. 53.1 of the constitution states that "The election of members

<sup>39</sup>The resolution states that the electoral law does not specify the "modality of voting" and that the adoption of OLPR for the 2002 election was a prior resolution of the JCE. The motivations rely on the fact that the preferences would have been "traumatic" for the party system. In 2013, the congress passed a law re-establishing OLPR.

<sup>40</sup>Six members are elected through plurality by voters living abroad in three districts. Moreover, the law requires alternating gender of candidates on candidate lists.

of Parliament is by a multi-member open list system of proportional representation, under which each voter has one vote [...]”. Actually, the multi-member district is a single nationwide one ( $M = 50$ ). To access the process of seat allocation, parties/lists must pass the 5 per cent national vote share threshold. This provision thus pushes Fiji into the OLPR category. In this case, as Shugart observes in his “Fruits and Votes” blog, “Fiji will join Colombia as perhaps the only country to use such a system in a single nationwide district”. However, the lack of specifications and detailed information<sup>41</sup> leaves open the possibility of considering Fiji’s system as a flexible-list system, in particular a “latent” one (Shugart 2005), along with Estonia and the Netherlands, although no provision or quota to be overcome is furnished, or as a “quasi-list” system (as Chile, Finland, or Poland).

### 3.4.8 *Indonesia*

The Indonesian PR system, which allows one preference vote, was introduced for the first Indonesian elections in 1955. Voters could cast one preference vote, and those candidates who reached quota were allocated seats. Thus, the system was flexible. In 1959, following a regime change, a closed-list system was introduced. In 1999 a team of experts appointed by the government approved a proposal a new flexible system in which candidates achieving a Hare quota within the district would get a seat. However, as the relatively modest districts size, only 2 of the 550 MPs reached that threshold, so leaving the system working as a closed-list one. In 2008 the threshold was lowered to 30 per cent of the quota, so making easier to candidates to compete on the basis of their personal electoral capital than the parties’ rank. Finally, in 2014 the Constitutional Court ruled that all seats were to be allocated based on the candidates’ personal votes, so making the Indonesian system an OLPR (Allen 2018: 929–930).

### 3.4.9 *Iraq*

The Iraqi closed-list PR system was introduced in 2005, two years after the 2003 deposition of the Hussein regime. Preferential voting with one preference vote was introduced in 2010.

<sup>41</sup>Art. 53.2/A states that “the total number of votes cast for each political party contesting the election, which shall be determined by totaling the number of votes cast for each candidate of that political party”.

### 3.4.10 *Lebanon*

Lebanon, a parliamentary republic, is a newcomer to the world of the PLPR systems. In June 2017, the Parliament (unicameral) approved a new electoral law that abolished the block vote system (MNTV), used since 1958 for legislative elections, and introduced an OLPR system. The 128 deputies are elected in 15 major electoral districts, of which 13 are comprised of minor constituencies (so-called *qada*). Voters may cast a preference vote (art. 98/1) for their preferred candidate, although they cannot indicate a name from a party list different from the one that they have chosen. Moreover, voters in major electoral districts including more than one minor constituency may cast their preference vote only for candidates within their minor constituency. The technicalities of the new electoral law state that the formula adopted to allocate the seats is the Hare formula, and only lists that obtain one full quota are allowed to participate in the seat distribution. As  $M$  ranges from 5 to 13 (average 8.5), the effective threshold varies across districts from 7.7 to 20 per cent.

### 3.4.11 *Peru*

Preferential voting with a maximum of two preference votes was introduced in Peru in 1985 (Schmidt 2003). Until the 2000 election, Peru's unicameral congress had only one national district. Since the reforms in 2001, Peru has had 26 electoral districts, with most magnitudes in the 2–9 range, with the exception of Lima ( $M = 35$ ).<sup>42</sup> In Peru, casting a preference vote is voluntary; therefore, some voters may cast two, one, or no preference votes and just cast a vote for a party.<sup>43</sup> The national elections of 1992 were not regular congressional elections: in this year, Peru elected a new constituent congress to elaborate a new constitution. In any case, I include this election, since preferential voting was used.

<sup>42</sup>There were 25 districts between 2001 and 2006. The district “Lima provincias” was created for the 2011 elections, and since then the district “Lima” has been divided into “Lima provincias” and “Lima + residentes en el extranjero” (citizens living abroad).

<sup>43</sup>OLPR with a single preferential vote had been used in the 1978 Constitutional Assembly election, which had been conducted in a single national district.

### 3.4.12 *Suriname*

The Surinam PR system features 1 preference vote and was introduced in 1987. Members are elected to 10 multi-member constituencies, ranging from 2 to 17 members, with an average district magnitude of 5.1. In the National Assembly, 51 members are elected through an open-list proportional representation system to serve 5-year terms.

### 3.4.13 *Sri Lanka*

In Sri Lanka, the PLPR system was introduced in 1978 and offers voters the opportunity to cast up to 3 preference votes. The 225 Members of Parliament are elected through open-list proportional representation in multi-member constituencies to serve 6-year terms. To be allowed into the distribution of seats, parties must clear a threshold of one-eighth of the votes in their respective constituencies. There are 22 multi-member constituencies containing 196 seats and 1 nationwide constituency with 29 seats. A recognized political party that polls less than 5 per cent of the total votes within a district is disqualified, and the balance of valid votes is repurposed for the allocation of seats on the basis of proportional computation. In each district, the political party or independent group securing the highest number of votes is entitled to declare 1 member elected (the bonus seat). The remaining members are elected on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by the political party or independent group. The 1978 Constitution introduced a radical rupture from the previous electoral system, which was based on the first-past-the-post (FPP) system. In terms of the allocation of members from each political party (or independent group), the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, which introduced a preferential system, states that voters are entitled to indicate their preferences within the party or group list of their choosing. Three such preferences can be indicated by selecting the numbers assigned to particular candidates. The counting of preference votes takes place at the second stage, following the counting of party votes, and determines which candidates occupy the seats allocated to a given party.

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## Consequences of Preferential Voting

The first stage is to calculate the level of the preference vote share, as well as its concentration among candidates. The share of preference votes can be determined as the ratio between the total number of preferences expressed and the total number of preferences possible. Of course, this value can be calculated for the party and the constituency alike (Wertman 1977; Katz and Bardi 1980; Marsh 1985; Katz 1986; Karvonen 2004; Shugart 2005). There is also agreement among scholars that it is possible to find variation in terms of preference votes' ratio due to the political party size and organization or the electoral geography (Fig. 4.1).

In countries that allow voters to cast more than one preference vote, such as Belgium, Italy, Peru (except in in the  $M = 1$  district), and Kosovo, it is not possible to know exactly how many voters cast one, two, or three personal votes.<sup>1</sup> The only available data refer to: (1) the MAX, as the hypothesis is that all preferences correspond to as many voters who indicate one preference only; and (2) the MIN, as we argue that the number of preferences indicated is given by the number of voters who all used the maximum number of personal votes allowed by the law.

There are two different and even opposite hypotheses and interpretations of preferential voting usage. The first considers the possibility

<sup>1</sup>In countries where it is not possible to cast other than a personal vote that is pooled to the party too, following other examples, I calculate the share of preferences indicated by counting all those given to other candidates than the head of the list.

Preferential voting ratio:	$\frac{\textit{preference votes expressed}}{(\textit{valid votes}) * (\# \textit{ preference votes allowed})} \times 100$
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**Fig. 4.1** Preferential voting share (*Source* Author's elaboration)

that preference votes will increase the interparty competition and, therefore, as a party's fortune improves, there will be less preferential voting. Schepis (1963), for example, finds such a relationship in the case of the Italian Socialist party. Vice versa, Katz and Bardi argue that "[...] when a party is dominant in an area [...] interest and turnout in its primary increase [...]. As a result, the balance of power within the [dominant party] is more important than balance of the power within any other parties, and this should lead to greater voter interest and participation in the intraparty preference poll" (1980: 102). The problem is that neither hypothesis has been tested (both Schapis and Katz and Bardi only measure these data for one national case). In this book, I test the hypothesis of a relationship between the preferential voting ratio and the party electoral strength for several parties and elections.<sup>2</sup> The second important question related to preferential voting systems is related to their effect on the internal party electoral competition and how to measure it. I propose to consider several different indicators for this purpose (see Chapter 2).

In addition, we can measure two dimensions of competition: the influence and the weight of the head of the list or the most-voted-for candidate (as it is not possible to detect who was the head-of-the list in all cases and in different countries this figure simply does not exist, as I indicate in Chapter 3) and the preferences' distribution across candidates.

#### 4.1 PREFERENCE VOTES CAST AND INTRAPARTY DYNAMICS

Table 4.1 reports the data on preference votes in 16 countries for the European elections since 1979, the first year of the popular direct election of European MPs. This list represents a sub-sample of the cases

<sup>2</sup>This test is particularly interesting given newly available data that make possible an analysis that also considers the district magnitude (as an intervening variable) (Carey and Shugart 1995), as I present in Chapters 5 and 6.

**Table 4.1** The preferential votes at the European elections (1979–2014) (%)

<i>Country/year</i>	1979	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014	<i>Mean</i>
Austria				13.4	7.8	10.3	15.2	16	12.6
Belgium	58.5	n.a.	n.a.	55.2	59.8	65	61.7	52.3	58.8
Bulgaria						15.9	16.1	42.6	24.9
Croatia							69.1	78.5	73.8
Denmark				78.1	76.6	82.4	76.9	75.4	77.9
Finland				100	100	100	100	100	100
Italy	34.8	27.3	32.4	25.5	25.3	23.1	18.4	15.5	25.3
Latvia						83.3			83.3
Netherlands	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	39.8	39.8
Slovakia							82.3	83.3	82.8
Slovenia							77.6	77.3	77.5
Sweden				45.5	66.2	59	59.2	50	56

*Source* Author's elaboration on countries' minister of interior and/or national electoral committees


included in the research not only because it is limited to European elections but also because some of the European countries included in the broader sample do not use PLPR electoral systems in their European-level elections. Moreover, the comparison over time can only be analysed on a case-by-case basis, as the countries included in the sample joined the European Union at different points in time. Therefore, the most appropriate comparison is conducted by taking the countries' mean for each period in which they are included. Excluding the Finnish case, due to the fact that Finns must indicate a preference (therefore, the total is always equal to 100 per cent, as in the national case), countries can be sorted into three groups based on the share of preferences indicated on average. The first includes cases in which the percentage of voters casting a preference vote is, on average, greater than 70 per cent; respectively, those are Latvia (83 per cent), Slovenia (77 per cent), and Croatia (74 per cent). All are post-Communist cases and new democracies and represent the top three cases in the general rank. The second group includes countries that range between 50 per cent and 70 per cent: Belgium (59 per cent) and Sweden (56 per cent). Finally, the third sample group's cases registered a percentage below 50 per cent: the Netherlands (39 per cent), Italy and Bulgaria (25 per cent), and Austria (13 per cent).

#### 4.1.1 *Austria: A Few Preferences for a Group of Candidates*

The Austrian electoral system belongs to the PLPR family and in particular shows a flexible-list format. Although the system has had a PR structure for a long time, the effective introduction of the preference vote option was only introduced in 1992. If we consider the national trend in the number of voters casting a personal vote, then it is evident that there has been a slow but clear increase over time. The quota of Austrian voters who cast a preference vote (it is possible to cast only one preference vote) between 1994 and 2013 was equal to less than a quarter of the total on average (23.2 per cent). The trend has been almost regular, albeit with two cases in which the percentage of preference votes cast fell well below both the average and the symbolic level of 20 per cent, respectively in 1995 and in 1999. This constantly growing trend can be associated with and explained by the increasing intraparty competition as well as the greater presence of important candidates, such as popular and famous people able to collect a considerable share of the personal consensus, especially in the case of the two biggest parties (Müller 1999). These data appear to be coherent with the assumption that “personal reputations can be valuable in electoral systems with large (even nationwide) districts as well, when candidates are elected from personal votes rather than from party lists” (Carey and Shugart 1995: 419).

Moreover, taking into account the peculiarities of the Austrian preferential voting systems allows me to analyse the number of preference votes cast at the Land level. The process of allocating seats and voting in fact contains a two-tier base. The fragmented line in Fig. 4.2 shows that preferential voting has been adopted far less in Land districts than at the regional level. The average between 1994 and 2013 was equal to 3.7 per cent, with a regular trend except for the first election included in the research, 1994 (7.9 per cent). Finally, the data referring to the nationwide districts are available only for the latest election included in the time span of the analysis: about 6% of voters indicated a preference in such a context. Voters can cast two preference votes: one for the regional level and the other for the national level (Ortega 2004: 166).

Moreover, considering the single elements of preferential voting behaviour, Table 4.2 clearly indicates the country’s electoral system dynamics. However, due to the lack of data, it is not possible to observe the flexible list’s specific effects on Austrian voters’ behaviour. Only a few pieces of punctual information are available. In particular, I was able to



**Fig. 4.2** The trend of preference votes in Austria: 1994–2013 (general elections) (*Source* Author's own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Austria [[https://www.bmi.gv.at/412\\_english/](https://www.bmi.gv.at/412_english/)])

collect the score for the Gini index for the 2013 elections only. However, the coefficients are interesting, as they referred to all three territorial levels. The regional one indicates the lowest score for the Gini coefficient, 0.70, then 0.80 for the land level and finally 0.93 for the nationwide district. Those data imply that the intraparty competition was stronger at the subnational level, where possibly several candidates could compete for preference votes. Vice versa, at the national district level, the challenge was in a sense limited to the very few top party candidates, supported by the party organization itself and in any case often very popular and famous, thus making it almost impossible for any other co-partisan to challenge them. Table 4.2 shows in addition the Gini coefficients by political parties. The data indicate a similar national pattern in terms of centralization and concentration of preferences votes among a few top leader party candidates for almost all the main Austrian political forces, also situated around 0.9. The only exceptions to this trend are the two minor parties, the Christliche Partei Österreichs (CPÖ) and the Pirat, with coefficients of 0.67 and 0.57, respectively. Analogous trends are detectable at the regional and land levels, at which political parties do



**Table 4.2** The Gini coefficients for territorial level and political parties in Austria (2013)

	<i>Regional district</i>	<i>Land districts</i>	<i>National district</i>
All candidates	0.7	0.809	0.934
<i>Parties</i>			
BZÖ	0.635	0.787	0.934
CPÖ	0.455	0.588	0.675
EUAUS	0.134	0.298	–
FPÖ	0.633	0.726	0.93
FRANK	0.49	0.611	0.782
GRÜNE	0.589	0.756	0.944
KPÖ	0.557	0.649	0.818
M	0.382	0.577	0.604
NEOS	0.514	0.639	0.782
PIRAT	0.398	0.445	0.562
SLP	0.401	0.628	–
SPÖ	0.652	0.765	0.902
WANDL	0.116	0.21	0.391
ÖVP	0.714	0.783	0.941

*Source* Author's adaptation on Minister of Interior of Austria. <https://www.federal-chancellery.gv.at/>; Marcelo Jenny's calculations

not show on average Gini coefficients that are different from those registered at the aggregate level for all parties. Moreover, in subnational districts, no relevant party has a significantly different score from others, meaning that the most important variable in terms of preferential voting concentration in Austria is not (only) the party per se but rather the level of voting.

As it was impossible to collect data on the concentration of preferential voting in Austria between 1994 and 2013, I cannot present any information on the voters' behaviour. In particular, this condition does not allow me to articulate the candidates' qualities in terms of gathering more votes than their challengers and whether voters split their votes instead of focusing only on a selection of them. Moreover, the Austrian case is different from others for example concerning the information on the highest/lowest scores obtained by a candidate in collecting preferences or the percentage of preferences collected by the heads of the list.

However, on the basis of the data presented above, it is still possible to argue about the preferential voting dynamics in Austria. Together with a relatively low level of preference votes cast, albeit with territorial

**Table 4.3** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Austria (1994–2013)

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>List order (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total</i>
1994	183	55.7	3.3	14.8	0	26.2	100
1995	183	84.7	2.2	4.9	0	8.2	100
1999	183	56.3	8.2	6.6	0.5	28.4	100
2002	183	54.1	8.7	8.2	0.5	28.4	100
2006	183	67.2	4.9	8.2	0	19.7	100
2008	183	63.9	8.2	9.3	0	18.6	100
2013	183	51.9	12.0	9.8	0.5	25.7	100
Mean	183	62.0	6.8	8.8	0.2	22.2	100

*Source* Author's adaptation on Minister of Interior of Austria. <https://www.federal-chancellery.gv.at/>; Marcelo Jenny's calculations

differences and decreasing associated percentages from the regional districts to the national level, there is a clear uneven distribution of votes among candidates, while almost all the relevant parties show similar trends in terms of the Gini coefficients.


On the other side, when we consider the effect of preferential voting on the intraparty competition, the Austrian case offers very interesting data. Table 4.3 provides the possibility to detect the main trends in the interelection parliamentary turnover between 1994 and 2014.

Let us consider the influence of each factor taken into consideration in this analysis of the effects of preferential voting on the interelection parliamentary turnover. The average turnover of MPs indicates that about two-thirds of them (62 per cent) have regularly been re-elected in each election.

The second-biggest factor influencing the parliamentary interelection turnover in Austria has been “non-renewed candidature”. In fact, between 1994 and 2013, about one-quarter (22 per cent) of the incumbents did not have their candidature renewed in the following election. Then, considering the reasons for the MPs' defeat, it is possible to observe that the number of partisan reverses and that of replacements due to the list order are almost equal. In particular, the latter accounts for about 9 per cent of the incumbents' fate, while partisan defeats represent less than 7 per cent. Finally, the preference votes appear not to have been significant at all, as very few incumbents' defeats were due to the

intraparty competition (0.2 per cent). Now, if we consider those variables over time, it emerges that the number of MPs re-elected has not changed significantly, except for 1995, when the peak of 85 per cent of incumbents confirmed in their seat was registered. Analogously, or, better, as a consequence, the lowest number of incumbents with non-renewed candidature was registered in the same year (8 per cent). Vice versa, the trends of the partisan and list order defeats have changed significantly over time. However, the first increased regularly from 1994 to 2013 (from 3 per cent to 12 per cent), while the second diminished by about 5 percentage points (15 per cent in 1994 to 9 per cent in 2013).


Considering the data presented above, it emerges clearly that PLPR has had a very low influence on the interelection turnover. Better, the number of incumbents being replaced due to preference votes has been almost nil. This result confirms that, when the electoral system has electoral thresholds to make the system truly work as OLPR instead of CLPR, the voters' influence is not strong. In fact, preference votes only decided a very small number of incumbents' replacements in about 20 years (the only exceptions were the 1999, 2002, and 2013 elections with 1 case each). Therefore, considering the electoral system's features, the quota represents a true obstacle to candidates' ambitions to be elected out of the list order. Moreover, the preference votes in Austrian parties are normally concentrated on the top-of-the-list candidates, so it is very difficult to collect "a sixth of the party vote in the district or to win half as many as preference votes as the Hare quota" (total votes/total seats in that district). In Austria, the electoral system's features together with the voters' behaviour and the party's attitude towards supporting the top-of-the-list candidates have marginalized the effect of preference votes on incumbents' replacement and intraparty competition. As a result, the main dynamics of interelection turnover runs between the number of MPs being re-elected and the group of people without candidature, which together account for more than 80 per cent on average. Parties' control over candidature, candidature renewal, and the position in the party' list order make the difference in terms of re-election. Therefore, voters' power in affecting candidates' election is weak. The number of deputies elected out of the list order between 1999 and 2013 was equal to 3, so a very limited number of candidates were able to overcome the threshold and be elected thank to their personal votes. Thus, the variable has had no significant influence in Austria. Finally the Fig. 4.3 reports the trend on preferential voting at the European elections.



**Fig. 4.3** Trends of preference votes in Austria (1994–2014): European elections (Source Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Austria [[https://www.bmi.gv.at/412\\_english/](https://www.bmi.gv.at/412_english/)])

#### 4.1.2 *Belgium: Nominally a Preferential List System, Practically a (Semi-) Closed One*


Belgium is among the earliest cases, not only in Europe, to have adopted an open-list system. Actually, as seen in the section on electoral systems’ characteristics, the Belgian case fits perfectly with the PLPR subtype of flexible-list systems. As reported in Fig. 4.4, the proportion of voters who cast a preference vote alone or together with the list vote (as seen, in Belgium, voters can indicate one preference for one candidate of their preferred party) increased from just over 15 per cent in 1919 to about 60 per cent in the most recent elections of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Although the data cover a very broad time span, it is possible to differentiate between two phases. In fact, if the whole period shows an average of 40 per cent in terms of preference votes cast from 1919 to 2014, then an important distinction arises. The latter represents a divide in chronological, political, and electoral terms. The trend in fact shows a clear pattern that separates the pre- and the post-Second World War elections. In the first case, between 1919 and 1939, the mean was equal to



**Fig. 4.4** The trend of preference votes in Belgium: 1919–2014 (House, general elections) (*Source* Author's elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Italy)

20 per cent, while, in the second part of the period covered, the average was more than double that of the first phase (45 per cent between 1946 and 2014). Thus, there has been clear, constant, and relevant growth of the share of voters casting a preference vote over the last century. The peak was reached in 2003 (66 per cent), while, since 1974, the percentages have only occasionally, and barely, fallen below 50 per cent. The latter stable increasing trend can also be explained partially by the fact that the intraparty competition could have risen due to the weakening of voters' party loyalties. That is, they vote more and more to support a particular candidate instead of only casting a list vote and, therefore, implicitly accepting the list order as a whole as decided by the party elite.

Moreover, it should be noticed that the preferential voting system in Belgium has also been adopted for the election of the upper house. The results for the Belgian Senate follow the same growing trend that I have depicted in the case of the lower house, the only relevant difference being the score of the means of the different phases. In general, the proportion of voters who cast a preference vote for the election of the Senate has been smaller than that of the House, 32 per cent for the entire period (vs. 39 per cent), while, in the pre-Second World War phase, the Senate registered about 8 points fewer than the House



**Fig. 4.5** The trend of preference votes in Belgium: 1995–2014 (regional elections) (*Source* Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Italy)

(20 per cent vs. 12 per cent); finally, in the post-Second World War period, the number of preference votes cast was on average 7 points lower in the upper house (38 per cent vs. 45 per cent).

Further important data on Belgium’s elections come from the regional level, that is, to select the regional councils. Figure 4.5 reports the share of preference votes covering the 1995–2014 period. In this time span, about 60 per cent of voters on average indicated a preference for a particular candidate, although a clear decreasing trend is detectable, especially from 2004 until the latest election, when the proportion of preference votes fell below the threshold of 60 per cent for the first time.

However, due to a lack of available data, it is not possible to analyse the individual factors related to the preferential voting behaviour and in particular to the concentration of votes among candidates.

Nevertheless, the data gathered on the interelection parliamentary turnover between 1977 and 2014 (Table 4.4) indicate interesting trends and dynamics. In Belgium, the effects of preferential voting on the intra-party competition has not been particularly relevant. Let us then consider the main electoral dynamics of the parliamentary turnover and its causes. Of 100 outgoing MPs, on average more than 60 have regularly been re-elected between 2 consecutive elections. Moreover, the number of incumbents who have not been re-elected due to their candidature not

**Table 4.4** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Belgium (1977–2014)

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>List order (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>
1977	212	79.9	5.6	2.8	0	11.7
1978	212	82.1	5.5	2.7	0	9.7
1981	212	68.4	6.5	3.3	0.9	20.8
1985	212	66.0	6.8	3.4	0.5	23.3
1987	212	74.5	6.0	3.0	0.5	16.0
1991	212	59.0	7.6	3.8	0.9	28.7
1995	150	40.0	11.2	5.6	0.9	42.3
1999	150	59.3	7.5	3.8	4.0	25.4
2003	150	47.3	9.5	4.7	12.0	26.5
2007	150	48.0	9.3	4.7	11.3	26.7
2010	150	56.0	8.0	4.0	8.0	24.0
2014	150	48.0	9.3	4.7	4.0	34.0
Average	181	60.7	7.7	3.9	3.6	24.1

*Source* Author's own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Belgium. <https://www.federal-government.be/en>

being renewed account for about one-quarter of the total (24 per cent). Therefore, on average, barely 85 per cent of all the MPs in election number 1 were re-elected or not confirmed because of the impossibility of running for their seat again. In addition, the candidates' defeats produced by a negative partisan electoral performance were equal to about 8 per cent on average between 1977 and 2014. Considering the variables strictly related to the intraparty competition, it emerges that the number of defeats generated by the party's list order accounts for less than 4 per cent. In the same respect, preference votes registered on average a small influence on the incumbents' fate, as only 3.6 per cent of MPs were replaced thanks to the personal votes conferred by voters. From a diachronic perspective, it is possible to observe that, for all the variables, the trend has been positive in the sense that the percentage registered increased over time. In detail, the partisan defeats passed from less than 6 per cent to more than 9 per cent, while the defeats due to the list order rose from less than 3 per cent to about 5 per cent. Analogously, the share of MPs whose candidature was renewed grew from about 12 per cent to more than one-third of the total (34 per cent). Finally, the percentages connected to the variable

“preference votes” followed a positive trend from less than 1 per cent to about 4 times that proportion. However, the factor “re-elected” witnessed a negative trend, being the only variable to behave as such. The negative trend registered scores from about 80 per cent at the beginning of the period examined to less than half of the sample (48 per cent). Moreover, in detail, if we consider the fate of the second half of this sample of “not-re-elected” incumbents, then interesting information comes to our attention. Looking at the total of the incumbent MPs’ defeats in Belgium between 1977 and 2014, the main variable accounting for candidates’ defeats was the fact that the candidature of about two-thirds of them was not renewed (62 per cent). Second, the deputies’ fate was decided by their own party’s electoral performance; that is, the fact that the party for which they ran obtained fewer seats than in the previous election, hence making it impossible for them to be confirmed. Then, finally, both the list order variable and the preference votes account for about 9 per cent of all the incumbents’ defeats, with 9.7 per cent for the former and 8.7 per cent for the latter.

The data presented above confirm the relevance of the threshold that flexible-list systems adopt to make the procedure of seat allocation completely open. In Belgium, whatever their rank list position, only those candidates whose number of preference votes reaches the eligibility figure (calculated by dividing the party’s total constituency vote by the number of seats that it won plus one) can be elected. That provision is confirmed as being crucial in impeding candidates placed low on the party’s list from modifying the order of seat allocation among the candidates of each party. In fact, a very low number of deputies have been elected out of the list order. Only 83 have been able to pass the threshold and be elected thanks to their personal votes in spite of their position on the party’s list. These data represent on average fewer than 3 deputies per election between 1919 and 2014, equal to less than 2 per cent of all the deputies elected in the period. Despite shortening the time span to the post-Second World War elections only, the results do not change significantly, as the average changes to just over 2 per cent. The latter data also confirm that the electoral system changes adopted in 2000, which reduced to only 50 per cent the number of list votes cast for a party in a given constituency available to upgrade the preference votes of those high on that party list (Table 4.5).

To sum up, the data strongly support the hypothesis that, in a flexible-list system, the influence of preference votes is very weak. Belgium,



**Table 4.5** Deputies elected out of the list order in Belgium (1919–2014): general elections

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs (#)</i>	<i>Out (n.)</i>	<i>Out (%)</i>
1919	186	1	0.5
1921	186	1	0.5
1925	187	2	1.1
1929	187	0	0
1932	187	1	0.5
1936	202	2	1
1939	202	0	0
1946	202	0	0
1949	212	1	0.5
1950	212	0	0
1954	212	1	0.5
1958	212	0	0
1961	212	4	1.9
1965	212	2	0.9
1968	212	4	1.9
1971	212	2	0.9
1974	212	3	1.4
1977	212	0	0
1978	212	0	0
1981	212	2	0.9
1985	212	1	0.5
1987	212	1	0.5
1991	212	2	0.9
1995	150	0	0
1999	150	0	0
2003	150	18	12.0
2007	150	17	11.3
2010	150	12	8.0
2014	150	6	4.0

*Source* Author's own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Belgium.  
<https://www.federal-government.be/en>


between 1919 and 2014, represents a strong example of this type. Almost two-thirds of MPs were re-elected, while those who did not win a seat were excluded basically because of their party's decision. In fact, focusing only on the variables that are directly connected to the partisan control, it appears that the fate of about 30 per cent of the MPs' depended on the choice not to let them run again under the party's label or because they gained a lower position on the party's list order than in the past. In Belgium, political parties' elite decisions, and the electoral

threshold that the flexible-list system has established, determine the MPs' chance of being confirmed in their role in the following election more than any other variable. Therefore, the data empirically confirm the not influential role of preferences in two concurrent factors: (1) first, the list votes for candidates are unfairly distributed in favour of the top-of-the-list candidates, so the "[a]vailable party votes are generally exhausted before they can be of any use to candidates closer to the bottom of the party list" (Farrell 2001: 87), and (2) thus "only a very small bunch of seats are affected by an unusually large personal vote for individual candidates" (De Winter 1988). In synthesis, although the Belgian electoral system is claimed to be one of the oldest PLPR systems formally giving power to voters, the bitter conclusion is that, "in practice, voters only really decide the number of seats a party won, not who fills the seats" (De Winter 2005: 422).

Therefore, it seems that parties' organization rigidly controls candidature, candidature renewal, the position in the list order, and the selection of MPs in safe seats. As a consequence, the role of voters is rarely influential in the process of interelection turnover even via preference votes. In this context, the role of the thresholds, as a flexible system, must be taken into account as an explanatory variable affecting both the voters' and the preference votes' influence on the turnover. In any case, albeit increasing slightly in the last decade since 2003, the influence of preferential voting as a variable explaining an important share of interelection turnover appears not to be very important in Belgium. Finally, Fig. 4.6 reports data on the preferential voting share at the European elections.

#### 4.1.3 *Brazil: The Oldest OLPR Case with a Relatively Small New Trend in Preferences*

Brazil was among the first countries (Belgium also was an early comer) to adopt an OLPR system and certainly the first in the case of presidential regimes. Table 4.6 reports the trend in the number of voters casting a personal vote. Since 1998, the share of preference votes cast has increased by about 10 percentage points, reaching 78 per cent in 2014. On average, about 8 out of 10 Brazilian voters indicated a preference (it is possible to indicate only one preference) between 1998 and 2014 (78.5 per cent) (Fig. 4.7). However, although the comparison over time during the period considered signals clear growth in the use of preference votes, it is noticeable that, after the big increase between the two




**Fig. 4.6** Trends of preference votes in Belgium (1979–2014): European elections (*Source* Author's elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Italy)

**Table 4.6** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Brazil (1998–2014) (House of Deputies)

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
1998	513	56.1	0.0*	0	13.6	
2002	513	52.3	17.3	3.5	26.9	100
2006	513	50.1	17.3	9.2	23.4	100
2010	513	55.0	9.7	9.2	26.1	100
2014	513	51.5	10.9	6.6	31.0	100
Average 1998–2014		53.0	11.1	5.7	24.2	
Average 2002–2014		52.3	13.8	7.1	26.8	

*Source* Author's own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Brazil. <http://www.brazil.gov.br/>

\*data not available



**Fig. 4.7** The trend of preferential votes in Brazil: 1998–2014 (general elections) (House of Deputies) (*Source* Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Brazil)

first elections (68 per cent in 1998 and 83 per cent in 2002), the number of voters deciding to choose a candidate together with their preferred party has slowly but constantly decreased. In fact, from the peak of 2002 (83 per cent), the rate of preference votes cast reached a level below 80 per cent (78 per cent), after always being above that threshold in the period considered. In any case, the Brazilian case shows a very high score in terms of preference votes per election, and only further observation can confirm whether the decrease of 5 percentage points registered between 2002 and 2014 really represents a U-turn despite the peak in the scores above 80 per cent or rather a partial and ephemeral adjustment.<sup>3</sup>

Beyond the small decrease in preferential voting use, the high Brazilian score clearly indicates the crucial role that candidates play in

<sup>3</sup>Electronic voting machines were introduced in Brazilian federal elections in 2002. This has somehow affected the trend changes in preference voting as suggested by Hidalgo (2012). That is, invalid voting rates went down when the voting moved from paper to machine, and less knowledgeable voters, who were likelier to give only a party vote, were less likely to spoil their ballots on the machine.

elections and vis-à-vis their parties. Moreover, as seen in Sect. 3.4.2 on the Brazilian electoral system, the role of candidates is also particularly emphasized in relation to the parties' scant organizational strength as well as their relatively low hierarchical structure (Nunes 2015). The candidates are very important as political actors linking parties and voters, who cannot really lean on nationally diffused organizational branches. Therefore, the influence of local bosses is considerable in terms of collecting votes during the general elections (House of Deputies). They try to build their personal network by using pork tools and to emphasize their personal characteristics to earn more votes (Carey and Shugart 1995), also considering the fact that voting is mandatory and often voters look for an opinion maker and/or the possibility of patronage. As a consequence, the intraparty competition has an important role and the fight to gather more votes is especially tough. Finally, but no less importantly, the above-mentioned electoral dynamics is emphasized by the presence of a relatively average district magnitude, which, as indicated, has an important correlation with the preferential voting increase rates.

Considering the great influence of preference votes in Brazilian general elections, it is important to test whether their substantial use has an effective influence on the intraparty competition too. The data presented in Table 4.6 are interesting. Table 4.6 offers the possibility to detect the main trends in the interelection parliamentary turnover between 1994 and 2014. In particular, if we consider that the open list was introduced in Brazil to prevent strong party control from developing in the first place (Mainwaring 1999), then it appears crucial to determine how important the role of candidates is in the intraparty electoral competition and in particular in the interelection turnover vis-à-vis the influence of the parties.

Table 4.6 shows the individual contribution to the parliamentary interelection turnover of the different variables included in the research. The first element that has important relevance is the share of incumbents being re-elected. In Brazil, between 1998 and 2014, more than half of the MPs (House of Deputies) (53 per cent) were regularly re-elected in the following election. Of those MPs who were not re-elected, the most important portion consists of those whose candidature was not renewed: the latter variable accounts for approximately one-quarter of the total incumbents (24 per cent). However, in the Brazilian case, this factor should be analysed in consideration of not only the parties' influence but also that of the candidates themselves. In fact, one of the peculiarities of the electoral system is the fact that the incumbent had (until 2002) the right to candidature renewal. This was the so-called *candidato nato* figure. Therefore, in

the logic of the interelection turnover, this implies that, in a sense, the role and the influence of the candidates are crucial too. Although the share of incumbents whose candidature was not renewed can reasonably be considered as being mainly the consequence of the party's leadership decision in defining candidatures in other countries, the logic is the opposite in Brazil. The candidates who do not run in the following election, despite being incumbents, are those who, in almost all cases, have decided not to run again. Furthermore, this element has important theoretical implications not only for the Brazilian case but also from a comparative perspective when analysing the intraparty competition dynamics. Following this line of thinking, it is worth noting that those incumbents who are defeated because they "decided" not to run in the following election should not be considered as "not candidates" at all. In fact, as explained in the section on the Brazilian electoral system, *candidato nato* could switch their party. Thus, it is quite likely that a significant number of those "without re-candidature" "simply" decided to run for another party. Actually, most deputies who do not run again choose instead to take a different office (such as mayor) as reported by David Samuels (2003), where Congress is a stepping stone to a more powerful and lucrative career in municipal politics for a large share of deputies. Moreover, considering the remaining motivations for not being re-elected, in Brazil, the influence of partisan defeat and the preferential voting competition, the third possible one—the order list—does not apply to OLPR systems. The first, the party defeat, accounts on average for about one-tenth (11 per cent), whilst the second variable—preference votes—has on average determined 6 per cent of the incumbent MPs' fate.

Generally, there has not been any particular trend over time for the variables considered, especially for the number of MPs re-elected and those whose candidature was not renewed. The only partial exception to this was the partisan defeat factor, albeit in a minor form, from the preferences. In fact, it is possible to detect a constant decrease in the weight of this variable explaining the interelection turnover, which fell from about 17 per cent to one-tenth since 2002. Vice versa, the influence of preference votes on determining the defeat of incumbents increased, passing from 3 per cent to more than double, having twice reached a peak near 10 per cent in 2006 and 2010.

Following the data analysis, it is then reasonable to signal that the importance of preference votes in the Brazilian case has twofold relevance. Voters significantly use the option to choose a candidate among those presented by their preferred parties. About three-quarters of them indicate a preference for a person together with their partisan choice.

Moreover, in terms of preference votes' concentration, the data tell us that Brazilian parties are fragmented. The role of factions in collecting personal votes is important, and that confirms the intraparty competition of the Brazilian parties and their non-hierarchical structure, although this trend is mitigated by the role of the top candidates (Ames 1995; Nunes 2015).

The electoral system has had an impact on the intraparty competition, though, as well as on the parties' strength. In fact, "the open list antedates by a decade the emergence of the first mass party in Brazilian history. Thus, an electoral system that encourages individualism has functioned since before the first days of modern political parties" (Mainwaring 1990). Almost half of MPs are re-elected, while those who do not win a seat are excluded basically because "their party" or, better, the MPs themselves decide not to run again in the following elections. Therefore, the data confirm that parties' organization is not able to control candidature, candidature renewal (in a sense they cannot), and the selection of MPs in safe districts. The incumbents' electoral strength makes it very tough for challengers to defeat them via preference votes, so the intraparty competition is cruel but cannot intervene in the inter-election turnover more than only very marginally.

#### *4.1.4 Bulgaria: A Newcomer to the Flexible-List System with Interesting Dynamics*

Bulgaria has only recently adopted a PLPR electoral system. The first election to be held with this system was in 2014, and the latest was in 2017, and the country provides a clear example of a flexible-list system (Shugart 2005). Data reports the share of preference votes cast in the latest two consecutive elections held in Bulgaria with the "preferential system". Between 2014 and 2017, there was no relevant change, with the percentage of personal votes for candidates being equal to about one-third of the total possible (35 per cent vs. 33 per cent, respectively).

Table 4.7 clearly indicates the country's electoral system peculiarities. In terms of intraparty competition, an interesting fact is that preferential voting led to the so-called "15/15" phenomenon. In the 2014 European vote, the then party leader of the Bulgarian socialist party, Sergei Stanishev, was shoved down the list to be replaced by the candidate who was fifteenth on the list. Momchil Nekov, a hitherto obscure 27 year old, became the toast of those amused by the Bulgarian socialist party's misfortunes. Because the BSP's ballot number in the European elections was 15, the party at the time sought to ascribe the

**Table 4.7** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Bulgaria (2014–2017)

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>List order (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total</i>
2014	240	32.9	33.7	8.9	15.4	9.1	100
2017	240	49.5	8.9	4.6	17.1	19.9	100
Mean		41.2	21.3	6.8	16.3	14.5	

*Source* Author's own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Bulgaria. <https://www.mvr.bg/en/>

phenomenon to voters' confusion about how to use the system, implying that people had made a mistake marking "15" twice only because they wanted to make it clear that they were voting for the BSP. This led it to be known as the "15/15 phenomenon".

The analysis of MPs' turnover and its causes as a consequence of preferential voting applies to Bulgaria due to the fact that, so far, two national elections have been held with preferential voting. However, it is possible to focus on the difference in shares in MPs' turnover, comparing the short period of time in which PLPR has been in use. Although it is not "statistically" relevant, at least in terms of trends, given the fact that we only have two cases, the comparison gives us an idea of the possible impact that the preferential voting system will have in the future vis à vis the previous system.

Most outgoing MPs have regularly been re-elected, as more than 40 per cent have been confirmed in their position (41.2 per cent), with a big increase in the second election held with the PLPR electoral system. If confirmed in future elections, these latter data would indicate an important trend, especially considering the political parties' strength. The latter data should in fact be coupled with the number of those whose candidature was not renewed because of a likely decision of their own party not to allow them to run again for the seat (or of candidates deciding not to run again): 14 per cent of the outgoing MPs were in such a position on average, with a big increase between 2014 and 2017. Moreover, in terms of deputies' defeats, it is worth mentioning the fact that, in Bulgaria, about one-fifth of those attempting to be re-elected have been defeated because of a negative party performance (21 per cent). Moreover, looking at the weight of the preference votes in determining the outgoing MPs' fate, we can observe that, on average in Bulgaria, they accounted



for a relevant 16 per cent, with no differences between the two races. It is a very important number, even from a comparative perspective, as I show in the final chapter in this book. Finally, 7 per cent of deputies' electoral defeats that are ascribable to the list order represent the confirmation of the electoral system's importance in affecting the intraparty dynamics and competition. On this line of thinking, considering only the MPs' defeats generated by the electoral systems' features, it is impressive to notice that preference votes account for about 41 per cent, almost as many as partisan defeats (43 per cent) and far more than the list order (15 per cent).

Moreover, as Bulgaria has adopted a PLPR electoral system for the European elections, it is worth mentioning the trend in terms of preference votes cast in each election. Although, on average, the percentage of preference votes cast is about one-quarter of the total potentially possible (24.9 per cent), there is an interesting change in the trend over time. A big increase was registered in the latest electoral race in 2014, in which the number of preference votes cast was equal to more than 40 per cent (42.6 per cent), which represented a jump of 26 percentage points. At first glance, it thus seems that Bulgarian voters cast significantly more preference votes in the European elections than in the national ones, probably due to the differences in terms of what is at stake (second vs. primary elections) and the related role that parties play.

In conclusion, it is possible to argue that, in Bulgaria, although few elections have been contested with the PLPR system, the preferences matter. They seem to have been important in the interelection parliamentary turnover as well as in the intraparty dynamics and competition. Although the number of outgoing deputies summed with the group of incumbents whose candidature was not renewed accounts for the large majority of case (55 per cent), the influence of personal votes is quite relevant, with more than one-sixth of them directly influencing their electoral success (or rather defeat). Thus, it seems that PLPR conferred on Bulgarian voters the possibility to intervene in MPs' selection and deselection process.

#### *4.1.5 Chile: The Party's Primaries to Overcome Preference Votes*

Chile represents a case of a PLPR system, specifically, as seen, a quasi-list subtype (Shugart 2005). Table 4.8 clearly indicates the peculiarities of the country's electoral system. In fact, the Chilean OLPR (quasi-list) has particular effects on the voters' behaviour. The data included for the variables in Table 4.8 tell us a few important things. First, in terms of the total share of preference votes cast, in Chile, all voters (100 per cent) cast

**Table 4.8** Trends in preferential voting in Chile (1989–2013)

<i>Voters which expressed a preference (min %)</i>	<i>Average of voter's expressed preferences</i>	<i>N. of candidates up to 75% of preferences by party</i>	<i>% of candidates up to 25% of preferences by party</i>	<i>Lowest (%)</i>	<i>Highest (%)</i>	<i>Average % pref. won by 1st placed candidates</i>	<i>Gini's index on preferences by candidates (on all candidates by party)</i>	<i>Women (%) preferences</i>
1989	100	3	98.8	0.01	100	34.7	0.5203	8.3
1993	100	3	98.18	0.11	100	36.2	0.5251	9.7
1997	100	1	99.55	0.06	100	36.4	0.552	15.2
2001	100	0	99.48	0.07	30.19	37.3	0.5224	15.2
2005	100	1	99.22	0.08	91.21	36.6	0.4989	17.7
2009	100	1	98.83	0.05	78.03	34.2	0.5271	16.8
2013	100	2	99.15	0.08	100	36.3	0.541	20.3
Mean	100	1.6	99.0	0.1	85.6	36.0	0.53	14.7

*Source* Author's elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Chile. <https://www.gob.cl/en/>

a preference vote, being the consequence of the fact that there is no provision for a list vote; therefore, the system actually works as a mandatory preference one. Moreover, to observe the variation in electoral behaviour better, I consider the share of votes won by the candidate who received more votes. However, I cannot focus on candidates other than the head of the list, as the district magnitude is equal to two. Therefore, the most reliable information comes from the two variables at the end of the table. In particular, the average of the preference votes obtained by the candidates is classified first in terms of personal votes as well as according to the Gini index. The former tells us that, on average, among all the candidates, the winner has collected about one-third of the preference votes (36 per cent). Vice versa, the level of concentration of votes on candidates states clearly that, on average, there has been a rather unequal distribution of preferences, 50 per cent of the votes being in the hands of one candidate. However, due to the peculiarity of the Chilean system, it is necessary to turn our attention to the differences among parties. In fact, a maximum of two candidates being allowed per party in each district, the “average” should always be considered as being divided into two (higher/lower than 50 per cent), as well as the Gini index.

Another peculiarity of the Chilean electoral system or, better, of its electoral law is the fact that two separate ballots exist for male and female voters. Therefore, it is possible to calculate exactly the variation in voters’ behaviour due to the gender effect, as the last column of Table 4.9 shows, in Chile.

Female candidates have obtained on average about one-sixth of the preference votes (14.7 per cent). In terms of scores, very few candidates have obtained a percentage of preferences greater than 75 per cent of the total conferred on their party. In fact, since 1989, only eleven of them have been able to overcome this symbolic threshold of 75 per cent of the votes collected. On the other side, practically all the candidates have obtained a percentage of preferences up to one-quarter of the total. Coherently with the latter data, Table 4.8 indicates clearly that there are often candidates who collect very few votes (about 0 per cent), as the lowest score registered, while, conversely, there candidates who are able to collect more than three-quarter of them and in some cases even the total (100 per cent). The latter case is clearly due to the fact that some parties only present one candidate in the district (Karvonen 2004: 205).

**Table 4.9** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Chile (1993–2013)

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total</i>
1993	120	72	60.0	15.8	0	24.2	100
1997	120	74	61.7	12.5	0	25.8	100
2001	120	77	64.2	16.7	0	19.2	100
2005	120	77	64.2	15.0	0	20.8	100
2009	120	76	63.3	15.8	0	20.8	100
2013	120	78	65.0	13.3	0	21.7	100
Average	120	75.7	63.1	14.9	0	22.1	100

*Source* Author's elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Chile. <https://www.gob.cl/en/>

In synthesis, the data on preferential voting in Chile tell us that there is still an uneven distribution of votes between male candidates and female candidates and that the concentration of preferences among candidates is quite high or equally distributed (about 0.50 according to the Gini index), also due to the presence of quite a low M for PR systems (max. 2 candidates per party). Thus, together with the data on the share of votes won by the first candidates (about 40 per cent), it is possible to argue that voters and candidates have less to say in preferential voting than parties due to their influence on the selection of candidates and potential MPs as well as on renewing the candidature for incumbents (as we shall see later). Those data in fact contrast the idea of voters of selecting among many options. The concentration of votes can of course be considered as a free choice, but we know that the parties' power in selecting the candidates and their list order can affect the final result.

The second part of the statistical analysis of the Chilean system focuses on the intraparty dimension of the competition. Table 4.9 reports the weight of each factor on the interelection parliamentary turnover between 1989 and 2013, that is, the period of the democratic elections. The first point to stress is that, in each election, about two-thirds of outgoing MPs are re-elected (63 per cent on average). Moreover, in terms of the importance of preference votes to the interelection turnover, it is important to consider other variables. As the Chilean electoral system is exclusively based on preference votes in terms of the allocation of seats, we do not have to consider the variable “intraparty defeat due to

list order”, unlike flexible systems. Similarly, the “preferential voting” variable per se does not appear as an explanatory factor in the parliamentary turnover. In fact, even though the intraparty competition is one of the theoretical possibilities to determine who is (re)elected or not, no such case has happened in reality in Chile. Due to the peculiar dimension of  $M$  (equal to 2), the political parties prefer by far to preselect the candidate whom they will endorse electorally and who therefore will have a greater probability of being elected if the party wins a seat, which is the most likely scenario even for the biggest parties. Therefore, the relevant factors in explaining the intraparty competition and the parliamentary turnover in Chile are the two remaining variables included in the research. Table 4.9 shows that the most important factor affecting MPs’ turnover is the fact that a significant number of the incumbents do not have their candidature renewed in the following elections. This variable represents more than one-fifth of the destiny of the outgoing MPs, with a share of 22 per cent on average, although this has decreased slightly since 1997. Finally, the second variable influencing the level of turnover is partisan defeat, which is parties’ electoral performance. Generally speaking, it is possible to argue that, in Chile, the direct influence of the preferential voting system is less important than the pre-electoral intra-party candidate selection dynamics. Most MPs are re-elected, while those who are not do not win the seat basically because their party does not allow them to run again in the following elections or because of a party’s negative electoral performance, which means that it gains fewer seats than in the past. Partisan organizations control candidature and the selection of MPs in safe seats, and they often resolve the competition between challengers in advance. Some parties hold a kind of primaries rather than simply deciding in the central office who is a candidate and who is not. If a coalition’s two-candidate list consists of one incumbent and one new candidate, it is perfectly possible for the new candidate to receive more votes than the incumbent and hence oust the incumbent. However, the data show that no replacement has happened. Therefore, the real voters’ power in affecting the MPs’ selection through preference votes is essentially null.

#### 4.1.6 *Croatia: Few Elections Yet, But Preferences Appear to Be Influential*

Although Croatia has only recently adopted a PLPR electoral system, it is worth mentioning its result in terms of preference votes. The time

span covered is a very short one, although there is the possibility to compare two cases each for both the European and the national elections. Although there is no possibility to detect any trend, having only a two-year time span as well as two cases, it is important to mention that about two-thirds of Croatian voters decided to support a candidate together with the party list for which they voted. There was in fact no change between 2015 and 2016, as the share of preference votes in both cases was equal to 66 per cent. In more detail, it is interesting to consider the level of preference votes' concentration among the different candidates. Table 4.10 tells us that only a small number of candidates have been able to win more than 75 per cent of the total preference votes cast for their respective party. Vice versa, it is possible to see that almost all candidates have received a maximum of one-quarter of all the personal votes collected by the candidates of the same party. Moreover, the share of preference votes collected by the candidate who was placed first in terms of personal votes gathered is equal to 25 per cent on average. A slight decrease or change was registered between 2015 and 2016, when this figure reached 23 per cent from over 26 per cent. Similarly, it is very interesting that the peak in terms of preferences has been equal on average to 78 per cent.

Moreover, focusing on the effects of preferential voting, it is possible to detect the main causes of interelection turnover. In Croatia, between 2015 and 2016, the main contribution to the level of parliamentary turnover came from the MPs being re-elected (Table 4.10). The latter variable accounts for more than two-thirds of the total (67 per cent). Although only a series of data covering two elections in a row can be included, it is interesting to detect that the number of the re-elected incumbents summed with those outgoing MPs whose candidature was not renewed represents more than 80 per cent of the total interelection turnover or, better, deputies' fate. Therefore, if the "candidature not renewed" variable represents about 13 per cent, the "partisan defeats" account for less than 7 per cent. Moreover, the influence of the party leadership choice on candidates' list order is not an influential variable in terms of MPs' defeat (less than 1 per cent). Vice versa, it is worth mentioning that the preferential voting variable accounts for about 12 per cent of the incumbents' fate. In addition, if we only focus on the weight of the preference votes in the total outgoing MPs' defeats, it emerges that, in Croatia, albeit for one election only, that factor affected the interelection path for about 37 per cent of MPs. It represents the second-biggest score in terms of incumbents' defeats, only a few percentage

**Table 4.10** Concentration of votes in preferential voting in Croatia (2015–2016): general elections

<i>Election</i>	<i>Valid votes cast</i>	<i>Preferences expressed</i>	<i>N. of candidates with over 75% of preferences by party</i>	<i>% of candidates with up to 25% of preferences by party</i>	<i>Lowest (%)</i>	<i>Highest (%)</i>	<i>Average % pref. won by 1st placed candidates</i>	<i>Gini</i>
2015	2,225,923	1,481,070	0	97.2	0	73.5	26.3	0.58
2016	1,903,230	1,257,464	1	97.9	0	82.2	22.9	0.59
Mean	2,064,577	1,369,267	0.5	97.6	0	77.9	24.6	0.585

*Source* Author elaboration on Croatian Minister of Interior. <https://Mlada.gov.hr/>, with the cooperation of Dario Nilic Cakar

points after the MPs who did not have their candidature renewed (41 per cent) but almost double the number of “partisan defeats” (20 per cent) and far higher than the importance of the “list order” (only 2 per cent). Finally, the Gini index tells us that, in Croatia, during the two general elections held with PLPR so far, there has been a quite high concentration of personal votes. In both cases, the score is equal to about 0.60, which clearly indicates that the top candidates have been able to collect a significant part of the preference votes. These results, coupled with the “flexible” nature of the electoral system, have had a strong impact on the parliamentary turnover.

Moving to the European level, I have analysed data on the 2013 and 2014 elections to select the Croatian deputies for the European Parliament. The electoral system for the European elections in Croatia works in the same way as that for the national elections. As seen, there is a flexible-list system, in which only candidates winning support from at least 10 per cent of their party’s voters can move to the top of the list. In the first European elections (in 2013), about 70 per cent of voters cast a candidate preference vote, while this share increased to 78 per cent. The trends in the concentration of preference votes in the European elections broadly follow the same path and proportion as those registered at the national level. In fact, on average, candidates who received more personal preference votes collected on average one-quarter of their party’s total preferences (24.8 per cent), and none of them reached the three-quarters thresholds, whilst almost all of them collected up to 24 per cent. Analogously, the highest score of a candidate obtaining many preference votes was equal to 53 per cent in 2013 and 60 per cent in 2014. Moreover, if we consider the main important characteristic of flexible-list systems, namely the threshold that a candidate has to pass to modify the party list order, it appears that, in 2013, almost half of the twelve MPs who were elected were able to exceed that 10 per cent threshold. However, none of them can be considered as being elected “out of the list order”, as they all already occupied electable positions on their party lists.

To sum up, in Croatia, the direct influence of the preferential voting system seems to be important enough. Although most of the outgoing MPs are re-elected, the influence of the preference votes is relevant in affecting the incumbents’ defeats. The personal votes for candidates matter in fact for about 12 per cent in terms of the incumbents’ general fate, while, if we only consider the causes of defeats, this percentage



rises to almost 40 per cent. Therefore, together with the party decision not to let MPs be candidates in the following election, the preferences represent the second-biggest factor determining deputies' defeat. Even though it is not possible to speak properly of a trend, as the Croatian case includes only two elections so far, it is quite impressive to consider the proportion of each variable's relevance in terms of interelection parliamentary turnover. Therefore, it is quite arguable that, in Croatia, the parties' organization is very influential in controlling the outgoing candidatures. At the same time, the voters' behaviour matters too, as a relevant amount of the incumbents' defeats derive from the preference votes' distribution among candidates. Moreover, these data are quite impressive if one considers that Croatia has adopted a flexible-list system, in which generally the electoral dynamics are less likely to affect the final list order and the candidate election due to the presence of the above-mentioned thresholds.


#### *4.1.7 Cyprus: Head of the List and a High Concentration of Preferences for Top Candidates*

Cyprus can be included in the category of open-list proportional representation systems. However, as seen, the peculiarity of the system is that the head of the list does not need to compete for personal votes, as the first seat that a party wins is automatically allocated to him/her. Therefore, as there are no thresholds as in flexible-list systems, Cyprus's system can be classified as OLPR, as all other party candidates only compete on the basis of their personal votes and not the official party's rank.

Figure 4.8 clearly indicates that the share of preference votes cast has not followed a linear pattern but, on the contrary, has had continuous ups and downs. Between 1981 and 2011, on average, the percentage of Cypriot voters casting a preference was equal to about 60 per cent,<sup>4</sup> with two peaks in 1991 and 2001, when the percentage rose to about two-thirds, and the lowest score in 1981, with only half the preference votes cast.

Focusing on the level of concentration of preference votes among different candidates, it is possible to provide evidence that, on average, almost no candidate was able to collect more than 75 per cent of all the

<sup>4</sup>It must be noticed—as indicated in the methodological part of the book—that the share of preferences is calculated as the ratio between the total preferences over the total votes and the maximum preferences allowed.



**Fig. 4.8** Trends in preferential voting in Cyprus (1981–2011) (*Source* Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Cyprus)

preference votes cast, whilst, on the contrary, more than three-quarters of the candidates were capable of gathering up to 25 per cent of the personal votes cast.

However, these data have a double meaning that also depends on the characteristics of the electoral system per se. As seen, in Cyprus, voters can cast up to five preference votes, albeit depending on the district magnitude. Now, as the share of preferences is based on the total potential preference votes being cast (valid votes \* the maximum of preferences allowed, weighted to take into account the differences between districts), it is arguable that obtaining over 75 per cent of all preference votes could be very tough for any candidate. That would imply having a real champion of the preferences. The other side of the coin brings another possible interpretation, though. Considering the fact that the head of the list is safe by definition and does not have to compete with co-partisan challengers, it could be argued that the rivalry between the remaining candidates is more “open” and “tough” at the same time, as the hierarchy is less pervasive. Therefore, it would help to explain why so few

**Table 4.11** The concentration of the preference votes in Cyprus (1981–2011)

<i>Election</i>	<i>% of candidates with over 75% of preferences by party</i>	<i>% of candidates with up to 25% of preferences by party</i>	<i>Lowest (%)</i>	<i>Highest (%)</i>	<i>Average % pref. won by 1st placed candidates</i>	<i>Gini's index on preferences by candidates (on all candidates by party)</i>
1981	0.8	77.8	0.5	88.7	41.7	0.747
1985	0	76.4	0.5	68.5	42.4	0.58
1991	0	75.7	2.8	65.6	39.6	0.598
1996	0	77.2	1.4	68.2	44.1	0.701
2001	0.6	79	0	89.5	40.4	0.717
2006	0	80.4	1.3	67.2	39.3	0.705
2011	0.3	73.6	1.1	80.1	41.4	0.705
Mean	0.2	77.2	1.1	75.4	41.3	0.679

*Source* Author's elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Cyprus. [http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/moi.nsf/index\\_en/index\\_en?OpenDocument](http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/moi.nsf/index_en/index_en?OpenDocument); with the cooperation of Christophorus

candidates in Cyprus are able to collect more than 75 per cent of the votes. In a sense, the expectation would be to have a fairly equal distribution of personal votes among candidates. Of course, this interpretation can only be measured by analysing the “quality” of candidates with a case study. However, some indirect data tell us that this interpretation is not completely compatible with the data of the Cypriot case. The Gini index is in fact on average equal to 0.68 for the period covered in the analysis. Therefore, the concentration of votes is in favour of the top candidate, who is able to collect more preference votes. Such a high score tells us that, together with the head of the list, who is not involved in the competition for preferences, there are usually a couple of candidates who account for most of the votes. Moreover, the second interpretation is supported by the average of the preferences won by the candidate who received more personal votes: the latter value scores 41 per cent. In addition, on the same line of thinking, it is interesting to note that Table 4.11 indicates that, on average, the highest absolute score is 75 per cent. Finally, it should be underlined that the relatively high score for the concentration of preference votes—as indicated by the Gini index

**Table 4.12** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Cyprus (1981–2011)

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total</i>
1985	59	51.3	0	2.6	46.2	100
1991	59	33.9	3.6	14.3	48.2	100
1996	59	41.1	3.6	14.3	41.1	100
2001	59	42.9	3.6	3.6	50.0	100
2006	59	44.6	3.6	8.9	42.9	100
2011	59	44.6	1.8	5.4	48.2	100
Mean	59	43.1	2.7	8.2	46.1	

*Source* Author's elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Cyprus. [http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/moi.nsf/index\\_en/index\\_en?OpenDocument](http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/moi.nsf/index_en/index_en?OpenDocument); with the cooperation of Christophorous

score—must be read together with the fact that the head of the list does not collect preference votes. Therefore, these data somehow indirectly indicate that the competition among candidates is only partially open, as there is one top candidate supported by both the party and many voters.


Finally, in terms of the importance of preference votes for the interelection turnover, Table 4.12 presents a very interesting result. As the electoral system in Cyprus is exclusively based on the preference votes in terms of the allocation of seats (except for the repeatedly reported case of the top candidate), I do not deal with the “list order” variable like the same OLPR cases. The first information capturing the researcher’s attention is the average amount of outgoing MPs whose candidature was not renewed. Cyprus is in fact the only country among those included in the research in which the biggest group is represented by those who were defeated because the party (more likely than their own decision) decided not to allow them to contest a new electoral race (46 per cent). The second variable affecting the Cypriot parliamentary turnover is the number of those who were re-elected, on average 43 per cent. Therefore, those two groups account for about 90 per cent of all the incumbents, as the rest of the factors only represent a small minority. Nevertheless, although the share of those defeated because of a partisan negative performance constitutes less than 3 per cent, the number of defeats that can be ascribed to the preference votes is quite important, at least from a comparative perspective. In fact, 8 per cent of outgoing MPs were defeated

due to the preferences themselves. From a diachronic perspective, no particular trend arises, despite a few peaks existing for each category, namely 14.3 per cent of preference defeats in 1991 and 1996 (the number of defeats due to the preferences is about equal to three-quarters of the total defeats, that is, excluding those who were re-elected and those whose candidature was not renewed). In conclusion, the case of Cyprus highlights well the relevance of the electoral system's features and in particular the role of preferences. It is clear from the data that the political parties are very important in strongly affecting the MPs' electoral fate; the role of the preferences is not completely absent, even though it is quite marginal.

#### *4.1.8 Czech Republic: A Few Preferences That Do Not Matter*

As presented in Chapter 3, the Czech Republic's system is a clear example of a flexible-list system (Shugart 2005). The use that voters have made of their preference votes has been quite modest, for example compared with the similar Slovakian case (see the relevant section in this chapter). Between 1996 and 2013, on average, barely one-sixth of all the potential preference votes were cast (15.4 per cent) (Fig. 4.9). Over time, although there have not been any substantial ups and downs, it is possible to observe that, after the 2002 peak, which also represents the biggest score ever reached in the Czech Republic (20 per cent), there was a slow but clear declining trend until the latest election, in which the score was equal to the mean of the entire period.

The second axis of analysis of the Czech Republic reports, as for other countries in this book, the results on the intraparty dimension of the competition. Table 4.17 illustrates the influence of each factor on the interelection parliamentary turnover between 1996 and 2013. The average MP turnover indicates that about half of them (46 per cent) have regularly been re-elected in each election. Although there has been no particular trend, it is possible to observe that the lowest level of MPs' re-election was registered in 1996 (36 per cent), while the peak of confirmations of outgoing deputies occurred in 2002 (58 per cent). Moreover, considering the factors that could affect the causes of MPs' defeat, it is possible to observe that the "list order" accounts for more than one-sixth of the cases (16 per cent on average between 1996 and 2013). The trend has in fact been constant throughout the period considered in the analysis. Remaining in the field of the partisan factors



**Fig. 4.9** Trends in preferential voting in the Czech Republic (1996–2013) (Source Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Czech Republic)

affecting the share of the interelection turnover, it is possible to indicate that “partisan defeat” has had a weak influence in the Czech case. In fact, in the last thirty years, the parties’ performance has not influenced the destiny of outgoing candidates so much, as, on average, barely more than 5 per cent of them have undergone an electoral defeat because of their own party. The trend declined strongly between 1996, when almost one-fifth of incumbents were defeated because of the party’s performance, and 2013, when only 1 per cent experienced a defeat for that reason.

Finally, in terms of the importance of preference votes for the interelection turnover, Table 4.13 presents a very interesting result. As the Czech electoral system is not exclusively based on preference votes in terms of the allocation of seats, due to the presence of electoral thresholds to be overcome to avoid the “closed-list” mechanism, the analysis of data is crucial and revealing. Table 4.17 reports that other new candidate challengers replaced only 3 per cent of the outgoing deputies because of preference votes. Moreover, from a diachronic perspective, it is possible to see that, in the two first elections considered here (1996 and 1998),

**Table 4.13** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Czech Republic (1996–2013)

<i>Election</i>	<i># of MPs</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>List order (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total</i>
1996	200	72	36.0	18.0	17.5	0	28.5	100
1998	200	108	54.0	8.5	12.0	0	25.5	100
2002	200	117	58.5	0	19.5	3	19.0	100
2006	200	96	48.0	1.0	17.0	2.5	31.5	100
2010	200	83	41.5	4.0	12.5	9.5	32.5	100
2013	200	79	39.5	1.0	17.5	3.5	38.5	100
Average		92.5	46.3	5.4	16.0	3.1	29.3	

*Source* Author's elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Czech republic. <https://www.mvcr.cz/mvcren/>

no new candidates were elected thanks to the preferences per se. On average, in the time span of the research, a small minority of non-incumbents were able to gain access to the Parliament by defeating an outgoing MP via personal preference votes. Following this line of thinking, it must also be considered that, as seen in detail in the description of the electoral system features, the quota of preference votes to be obtained to overcome the closed-list mechanism of seat allocation has decreased over time (from 10 to 5 per cent). Therefore, it is likely that this “institutional” change positively affected the voters’ power by expanding the possibilities to influence the chances of selecting a “new” MP via preferential voting, thus overcoming the threshold. Hence, the relevant factors in explaining the intraparty competition and the parliamentary turnover in the Czech Republic between 1996 and 2013 are the two variables of re-elected candidates and those whose candidature was not renewed, which together account for more than three-quarters of the total. Generally speaking, it is possible to argue that, in the Czech Republic, the direct influence of the preferential voting system is not very relevant. Almost half of MPs are re-elected, while those who do not win a seat are excluded basically because their party does not allow them to run again in the following elections or because they obtain a bad position in the party’s list order despite occupying a better position in the past election. Therefore, it seems that parties’ organization rigidly controls candidature, candidature renewal, the position in the party’s list order, and the

selection of MPs in safe seats. Moreover, the information collected on the number of MPs elected “out of the list” order is consistent with the trends registered in the interelection parliamentary turnover. In fact, as shown in Table 4.18, only a small group of deputies (16, which means 8 per cent on average of all the incumbent MPs) was elected out of the list order between 1996 and 2013. However, the partial increase registered after the late 1990s is also probably related to the changes in the electoral system thresholds that I have reported above and that formally reduced the influence of the level of “flexibility” of the system, making it more “open”, at least on paper.

The latter data are confirmed and strengthened by the results that only consider the outgoing MPs and their defeats. The variable that generated more electoral defeats was the decision not to make the incumbent a candidate, which accounts for more than half of all the defeats (54 per cent). Secondly, the official party rank significantly affected the outgoing MPs’ chances of being confirmed in their role, as about 30 per cent of defeats came from the “list order”. In addition, partisan defeats produced barely one-tenth of all the MPs’ turnover in the Czech Republic between 1996 and 2012. Finally, the preference votes were responsible for just a few MPs replacements, less than 6 per cent of all the turnover.

Consequently, the role of voters is rarely influential in the process of interelection turnover, even via preference votes. In this context, the role of thresholds, as a flexible system, must be taken into account as an explanatory variable affecting both the voters’ and the preference votes’ influence on the turnover. In any case, albeit increasing slightly in the last decade, the influence of preferential voting as a variable explaining an important share of interelection turnover appears not to be very important in the Czech Republic. In fact, on one side, in 2010 and 2013, the rate of deputies elected out of the list order also increased despite their past position due to the fact that the percentage of preferences to be obtained to overcome the list order decreased (Table 4.14). On the other side, the number of MPs being replaced because of the preferences is still not important.

#### *4.1.9 Denmark: Where Casting a Preference Vote Has No Ambition*

Denmark, as seen, like almost all other Scandinavian countries, has adopted a PLPR electoral system. The peculiarity of the Danish electoral



**Table 4.14** Deputies elected out of the list order in Czech (1996–2013): general elections


<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs</i>	<i>Out (n.)</i>	<i>Out (%)</i>
1996	200	0	0
1998	200	2	1.0
2002	200	12	6.0
2006	200	6	3.0
2010	200	47	23.5
2013	200	29	14.5
Average	200	16.0	8.0

*Source* Author's elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Czech republic. <https://www.mvcr.cz/mvcren/>

system makes it one of the most “complicated” (Elklit 2005) among those belonging to the family of flexible-list cases, though. Although the country has used the PLPR system for many decades, I have been able to collect data on the preference votes share only since 1990. Figure 4.10 reports the data on the share of preference votes cast over time per election (I remind readers that each Danish voter may use a personal vote to support his/her preferred candidate).

The trend over time has been quite stable, with an average of about 50 per cent of voters casting a preference vote. Since 1990, in only two cases were the registered percentages below half of the preferences potentially being cast, in 1998 and in 2001 with 48 and 46 per cent, respectively. Even though data on the internal concentration of votes among candidates are not available, I was able to gather information on the main sources of interelection parliamentary turnover between 1979 and 2015.

The proportion of incumbents being re-elected between two consecutive elections has increased over time (46 per cent in 1979 to 65 per cent in 2015), with constant growth. The highest peak was registered in 1988 (83 per cent), while the lowest number of MPs confirmed in their seats occurred in 1979, at least for the period covered in the analysis. Moreover, the number of deputies who were not re-elected due to not having their candidature renewed accounted for about one-eighth of the total (13 per cent). Therefore, if we only consider the share of those who were re-elected plus the share of those who were not confirmed “just” because they did not run again, those two variables cover more than 80 per cent of all the outgoing deputies. Moreover, considering the other factors of MPs' turnover, the data indicate that the weight of the partisan



**Fig. 4.10** Trends in preferential voting in Denmark (1990–2015) (*Source* Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Denmark)

defeats was important, influencing about one-sixth of them (15 per cent) and being significantly bigger than the two remaining variables, namely the party list order and the preference votes. In the first case, the effects generated about 1.6 per cent of defeats on average, while, in the second group, the variable produced just over 2 per cent of the deputies’ turnover. In addition, from a diachronic perspective, while the partisan defeats increased over time from 12 to 20 per cent, the number of MPs not having their candidature renewed fell from 37 per cent to about one-tenth of the sample. Vice versa, the cases of both the list order defeats and the preference votes do not show any particular tendency from a temporal perspective (Table 4.15).

Focusing on the outgoing MPs’ defeats only, that is, measuring the effects of each factor on the intraparty competition and the party’s decision, gives us the weight of the different variables on the interelection parliamentary turnover. The biggest factor in determining an incumbent’s electoral defeat was his or her party’s negative performance, which

**Table 4.15** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Denmark (1979–2015)

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>List order (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total</i>
1979	175	<b>46.5</b>	11.7	2.3	2.3	<b>37.2</b>	100
1981	175	73.6	15.6	0.8	0.9	<b>9.1</b>	100
1984	175	67.3	16.5	2.3	1.8	<b>12.1</b>	100
1987	175	75.0	15.0	1.7	1.3	<b>7.0</b>	100
1988	175	82.9	10.4	1.6	1.7	<b>3.4</b>	100
1990	175	73.1	18.3	1.0	1.9	<b>5.7</b>	100
1994	175	68.6	6.3	2.1	7.6	15.4	100
1998	175	71.0	18.4	1.2	1.8	<b>7.6</b>	100
2001	175	62.8	17.3	1.5	1.7	<b>16.7</b>	100
2005	175	65.0	16.7	1.9	1.4	<b>15.0</b>	100
2007	175	70.4	10.4	1.8	2.5	<b>14.9</b>	100
2011	175	61.3	20.7	1.6	2.1	<b>14.3</b>	100
2015	175	65.4	20.7	1.3	2.3	<b>10.3</b>	100
Average		67.9	15.2	1.6	2.3	13.0	

Source Author's elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Denmark. <https://english.oim.dk/>

did not allow him/her to be confirmed as a representative in the lower house. This variable generated about half of all the defeats (47 per cent). Moreover, the influence of the party's decision not to confirm some of the outgoing MPs' candidature for the following elections caused 40 per cent of the total interelection parliamentary turnover. Therefore, almost 90 per cent of the total defeats came from two variables only, that are not factors determining an electoral MPs' defeat.


The power of parties' organization to affect MPs' fate is quite relevant, as it accounts for about half of the total defeats (40 per cent come from the non-renewal of candidature and more than 5 per cent from the list order ranking). Both of the latter are in fact determined by the partisan choice, that is, allowing an MP to be confirmed as a candidate or not and/or conferring on him/her a good position on the party's list for the ballot or not. That implies that parties' electoral strategy in selecting the candidates, directly or not, affects deputies' chance of being re-elected. Moreover, when adding the party's electoral performance, as seen, it emerges that almost 100 per cent of the outgoing MPs are decided by the partisan activity. In fact, the role of voters

seems to be relative in its influence, as only 7 per cent of the incumbents' defeats are directly affected by the preference votes.

In synthesis, the Danish case shows interesting dynamics both in terms of the preference vote share and in terms of the intraparty competition and interelection turnover. The parties' organization matters as well in their choice of who is confirmed as a candidate and in which position the outgoing MPs are placed in the party's list order. Similarly, the parties' choice to run with an open list rather than a closed one is important due to its effects on the intraparty turnover and on voters' power over candidates and the selection elected. However, among those parties (the large majority of them, more than 75 per cent on average) that decided to adopt the open-list option, the influence of preferential voting in determining a shift in the outgoing MPs' renewal is quite low, although voters continue to cast their unique preference votes massively (50 per cent on average since 1990).

#### 4.1.10 *Estonia: Flexible System with "Open List" Effects in MPs Election*

Estonia has a PLPR electoral system. In particular, it can be associated with the flexible family and its latent subtype (Shugart 2005: 42), as I have detailed in Chapter 3. As voting is mandatory, and voters must cast a preference vote for one candidate on a party list, it is evident that the number of preferences cannot be smaller than 100 per cent. Therefore, as for other cases, namely Poland and the Netherlands, and to some extent Finland (Karvonen 2010), to gain an idea of the share of preferences among candidates, it is thus possible to focus on candidates other than the "head of the list". The trend in preferential voting in Estonia (1995–2015)—as defined above—has been constantly increasing, rising from about 40 per cent to about 55 per cent, although a diachronic difference emerges, with a big increase in the 1990s and a stable trend afterwards (Renwick and Pilet 2016: 227). Figure 4.11 reports data referring to the preference votes cast in favour of all the candidates other than the "head of the list". However, it must be specified that we are dealing with a head of the list in strictu sensu, at least more than in the Finnish case (*see infra*), as the order of candidates on the list is specified by the political party. Therefore, the data on all the other candidates are meaningful and useful for our goal of detecting how many voters have chosen a "preference". Between 1995 and 2007, on average, more than



**Fig. 4.11** Trends of preference votes in Estonia (1995–2007): European elections (*Source* Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Estonia)

40 per cent of voters cast a personal vote in favour of candidates other than the one indicated by the party as the “leader” of the list. Although there have been no particular trends over time, a noticeable peak was registered in 1999, when the share of votes for different candidates from the heads of the lists surpassed 50 per cent.

Table 4.16 refers to the sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Estonia. The data are meaningful and offer many points of analysis. Between 1995 and 2015, the main electoral fate of MPs was the constant re-election of more than half of them. On average, 55 per cent were in fact confirmed in their parliamentary role, while less than 17 per cent were not elected due to a lack of their party’s support. A similar amount of defeats came from the electoral defeat par excellence, as investigated in this book, which is the influence of the preferences over the parliamentary turnover. In Estonia, the personal votes seem to matter, as 16 per cent of the outgoing deputies have regularly been defeated by virtue of the preferences themselves.

**Table 4.16** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Estonia (1995–2015)

<i>Election</i>	<i>Mps (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>List order (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total</i>
1995	101	43.5	18.8	–	3.0	34.7	100
1999	101	44.5	16.8	–	5.0	33.7	100
2003	101	33.6	24.8	–	17.8	23.8	100
2007	101	73.3	6.9	–	19.8	0	100
2011	101	70.3	1.0	–	20.8	7.9	100
2015	101	68.3	1.0	–	29.7	1.0	100
Mean	101	55.6	11.6	–	16.0	16.8	

*Source* Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Estonia. <https://www.siseministerium.ee/en>

Finally, the partisan defeats have represented on average about one-eighth (11.6 per cent) of the parliamentary turnover.<sup>5</sup>

Finally, it is worth mentioning that, in Estonia, although it has a flexible electoral system—as noted above—the impact of the list order is nil. One of the most likely reasons for such an outcome is the peculiarities of the Estonian electoral system. As suggested by a country expert, Vello Pettai, Estonia does not have a list-based voting system, in which voters first choose a party list and then mark preferences within that list. Rather, Estonians vote for a single candidate in their multi-member district, and that person might gain the seat in the district if they have received enough votes. If they do not, they might still win a (so-called *compensation*) seat, when any remaining (unaccorded) seats are then distributed based on the national vote totals for each party and if the candidate is ranked high enough in a predetermined party ranking of its candidates.

<sup>5</sup>Regarding incumbents, it must be clarified that the turnover is important even soon after the elections. Therefore, as for other countries and to ensure methodological consistency, I calculate the data after the results have been made official. For example, during the 2003–2007 parliamentary term, there were several dozen MPs who either left office or were ministers, and so on. That means that just as many “alternatives” were appointed from the parties’ original candidate lists, and many of them also ran for “re-election” in 2007. Therefore, if one looks simply at who was listed as an MP in the 2007 election lists, the total number of “incumbents” (thanks to these alternatives) was 118, thereby surpassing even the number of MPs in the Parliament itself (which is 101).

Therefore, the influence of the list order does not affect the candidates' fate in the country.

Therefore, in Estonia, the weight of the preferences in terms of their ability to affect the interelection turnover has increased quickly over time. Although the rate of MPs being re-elected is quite important, as well as the influence of political parties in deciding who cannot run again, the importance of the preferences appears to be very high. Therefore, the Estonian case gives us the chance to question the influence of the electoral system's features in relation to the turnover and in particular to make a comparison with other PLPR systems, as one goal of this book. In particular, it raises a question about the influence of a mandatory system in which the voter cannot decide not to vote and must cast a preference vote too.

#### *4.1.11 Finland: Compulsory Preferences and Significant Effects on MPs' Turnover*

The Finnish case is very interesting due to its electoral system's peculiarities and the results that arise from the study of preference votes. As seen, Finland has a quasi-list system (Raunio 2005; Shugart 2005: 42). Table 4.17 presents data on the electoral trends in terms of preferential voting. The information covers the 1970–2015 period. It is possible to observe a few relevant electoral aspects. Considering that casting a preference vote is de facto mandatory in Finland, then the percentage of voters who express such a vote will automatically be equal to the total, 100 per cent. Given the difficulties, both theoretical and empirical, in calculating the share of voters who indicate a preference for candidates other than the head of the list (Karvonen 2004; Shugart 2005; Renwick and Pilet 2016), it is useful to focus on the distribution of seats among all the candidates. As for other countries, I report (Table 4.17) the share of candidates who obtained more than 75 per cent of all the preferences of their party. In Finland, this never happened in the period examined. Conversely, more than nine candidates out of ten collected “only” up to 25 per cent of the personal votes for their party. Following this line of thinking, I turn now to the average of the preference votes cast for the candidates classified as first in their district. As Table 4.17 shows, this value in Finland has on average been equal to almost one-quarter of the total preferences (24 per cent). The trend has been regular, with no peaks in the entire period included. The fact that Finnish candidates do not receive a large percentage of votes is confirmed by the two

Table 4.17 Trends in preferential voting in Finland (1970–2015)

<i>Election</i>	<i>Average of voter's expressed preferences</i>	<i>% of candidates with over 75% of preferences by party</i>	<i>% of candidates with up to 25% of preferences by party</i>	<i>Lowest (%)</i>	<i>Highest (%)</i>	<i>Average % pref. won by 1st placed candidates</i>	<i>Gini's index on preferences by candidates (on all candidates by party)</i>
1970	100	0	95.7	n.a.	n.a.	22.8	0.41
1972	100	0	94.2	n.a.	n.a.	26.2	0.48
1975	100	0	95.6	n.a.	n.a.	25.2	0.45
1979	100	0	96.5	n.a.	n.a.	23.8	0.47
1983	100	0	97.0	n.a.	n.a.	21.0	0.46
1987	100	0	96.3	n.a.	n.a.	24.0	0.46
1991	100	0	98.2	n.a.	n.a.	22.2	0.45
1995	100	0	97.8	n.a.	n.a.	23.6	0.46
1999	100	0	96.9	n.a.	n.a.	24.2	0.47
2003	100	0	96.8	0.28	5.3	25.1	0.46
2007	100	0	97.3	0.25	5.5	24.9	0.47
2011	100	0	96.7	0.2	4.5	25.9	0.49
2015	100	0	97.2	0.16	4.2	23.5	0.48
Average	100	0	96.6	0.2	4.9	24	0.46

Source: Author's own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Finland. <https://intermin.fi/en/frontpage>



variables that report the highest and the lowest percentage reached in absolute terms. In the latter case, the candidates with the lowest level of preference votes received only 0.2 per cent on average in the 2003–2015 period (previous information on that variable is not available). In the former case, the average was about 5 per cent, still for the 2003–2015 period. Finally, the level of concentration of votes on candidates states clearly that, on average, there has been quite an unequal distribution of preferences, the value of the Gini index being 0.46, meaning that almost half of the votes were collected by the top candidates, all parties considered together.

Unlike the situation in Estonia, for example, in Finland, the candidates are not listed in the ballot according to the parties' decision. Therefore, as they are not ordered based on any political or organizational order, it is not possible or, better, not reliable to refer to personal votes of preference for all candidates other than the head of the list. In fact, the list order is defined in alphabetical or random order, so any interpretation of the distribution of preferences as a form of deliberate choice for using the “preferential voting system” would be a misinterpretation (Karvonen 2010).

To sum up, in Finland, between 1970 and 2015, voters indicate their preference by conferring the most votes on the top party candidates, as shown by the Gini values. There is a concentration of votes among them, and therefore the competition is in a sense limited due to the fact that the candidates are not ordered and voters choose on different bases from a hierarchical rank order. Moreover, the regular trend of the electoral strength of the candidates placed first in terms of votes obtained confirms that they are able to obtain a relevant share of the partisan consensus. Therefore, it seems that Finnish voters choose their “preferred” candidate without following any rank list order or any partisan suggestion. Rather, there is confirmation that they tend to provide support for a small group of them on which they confer the largest part of the votes, thus generally leaving the consensus for others low. The share of votes for candidates is not very important in terms of the absolute amount, as none of them collected more than 10 per cent. I turn now to the factors explaining the influence of preferential voting on the selection of candidates and potential MPs as well as on the renewal of the candidature for incumbents.

Table 4.18 reports the descriptive statistical analysis of the intraparty dimension of the competition in the Finnish case. The data indicate that,

**Table 4.18** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Finland (1970–2015): general elections

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs (#)</i>	<i>Mps re-elected (n.)</i>	<i>Mps re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total %</i>
1970	200	107	53.5	5.5	13.0	28.0	100
1972	200	152	76.0	4.0	12.5	7.5	100
1975	200	120	60.0	5.0	18.0	17.0	100
1979	200	123	61.5	4.5	18.0	16.0	100
1983	200	113	56.5	1.5	24.0	18.0	100
1987	200	114	57.0	2.0	15.0	26.0	100
1991	200	122	61.0	3.5	19.5	16.0	100
1995	200	113	56.5	2.5	20.0	21.0	100
1999	200	124	62.0	1.5	16.0	20.5	100
2003	200	133	66.5	1.0	15.5	17.0	100
2007	200	119	59.5	2.0	16.0	22.5	100
2011	200	109	54.5	2.0	17.0	26.5	100
2015	200	122	61.0	2.5	17.0	19.5	100
Average		120.8	60.4	2.9	17.0	19.7	

Source Author's own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Finland. <https://intermin.fi/en/frontpage>

on average, 60 per cent of outgoing MPs are re-elected in the following election, with the maximum reached between 1970 and 1972 (76 per cent) and the lowest score registered in 1970 (53 per cent). Moreover, looking at the factors that affect the interelection turnover, it is possible to observe that the most important is the non-renewal of candidature. On average, about 20 per cent of incumbents did not have their candidature renewed in the following election, with generally a stable trend except for the elections of 1972 (7.5 per cent) and 1970 (28 per cent). Vice versa, considering the incumbents' defeats due to electoral dynamics, I point out first that, unlike my approach to flexible systems, I do not include the variable "intraparty defeat due to list order", as the Finnish electoral system is exclusively based on preference votes in terms of the allocation of seats. Thus, it is possible to consider that the most important factor explaining MPs' defeats is the "preferential voting" variable per se. This means that the intraparty competition is one of the most relevant possibilities to determine who is (re-)elected or not. The preference variable accounts for about one-sixth (17 per cent) on average of the destiny of all the incumbents between two consecutive

elections. The highest level of intraparty competition was registered in 1983, when about one-quarter (24 per cent) of the outgoing deputies in the past elections were defeated on the basis of the preference votes that they collected, despite the amount won by new (or more) non-incumbent challengers. Finally, Table 4.22 shows that partisan defeat is the second variable influencing the level of turnover among those who included a level of intraparty electoral competition. The parties' electoral performances affected the MPs' turnover slightly. In fact, less than 3 per cent of all the outgoing MPs were defeated because of a negative performance of the party to which they belonged. In two cases (1983 and 1987), "partisan defeats" counted for less than 2 per cent of the outgoing MPs' outcome, and this figure was just 1 per cent in 2003. In a few cases only, the percentage of this kind of defeat reached scores of about 5 per cent, meaning that this variable is not a significant one affecting incumbents' turnover in Finland. This variable represents more than one-fifth of the destinies of the outgoing MPs, with a share of 22 per cent on average, although it has decreased slightly since 1997.

Generally speaking, it is possible to argue that, in Finland, the influence of the preferential voting system is relevant enough. Although most MPs are re-elected, and 20 per cent of them are not re-elected because their candidature is not renewed, still an important share (about 17 per cent) of them lose their seats on the basis of preference votes. Therefore, the combined effect of both the decision of the parties regarding the renewal of incumbent MPs' candidature and the voters' influence on intraparty competition accounts for about half of the effects on the inter-election parliamentary turnover. Vice versa, partisan defeat in itself does not count much in deciding MPs' fate.

Finally, as Finland has also opted for OLPR for the European elections, I report data on the parliamentary turnover between 1996 and 2014. Table 4.23 clearly indicates the most relevant factors in explaining incumbents' turnover since the first European election in Finland. As the number of European deputies is relatively small (about 15 on average in the period considered), I present data on absolute numbers. The relevant issue here is in fact to consider which factors affect the parliamentary turnover more and whether there are relevant differences from the national elections. As Table 4.19 reports, about half of MP incumbents are not re-elected in the following election because they do not have their candidature renewed, with the partial exception of 1999, when the number was not so important. This was probably due to the fact that the

**Table 4.19** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Finland (1996–2014): European elections


<i>Election</i>	<i>MEPs (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (n.)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total %</i>
1996	16		0	0	0	0	0
1999	16	8	50.0	6.3	12.5	31.2	100.0
2004	14	6	42.9	0	0	57.1	100.0
2009	13	5	38.5	7.7	0	53.8	100.0
2014	13	4	30.8	0	15.4	53.8	100.0
Average	14.4	5.8	40.5	3.5	7.0	49.0	

*Source* Author's own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Finland. <https://intermin.fi/en/frontpage>

parties consider it “normal” to give MPs the chance to run for a second consecutive term regardless of the outcome. Moreover, about four out of ten outgoing European deputies were re-elected, although there has been a slight decline in the trend. What is really interesting in terms of the relevance of the electoral system and thus of preferential voting is the fact that only in two elections was the intraparty competition crucial: in 1999, two incumbents were defeated by the preference votes collected by another challenger, as many as in 2014, although the total number of MPs attributed to Finland diminished to thirteen. Finally, the partisan defeats have a very weak influence on determining the parliamentary turnover. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that, in the Finnish case, the electoral dynamics in terms of the influence of preferential voting on explaining the parliamentary turnover barely follows the same trends. Apart from re-elected incumbents, and those who were not re-elected because of non-renewed candidature, what really matters are the preference votes cast and the partisan performance as the last explanatory factor.

#### *4.1.12 Greece: Declining Use of the Preference, and Increasing Effects on MPs Turnover*

Greece is the second-biggest Mediterranean and European country to adopt PLPR following Italy, although, as seen, Croatia and Kosovo have also recently joined the club. The data reported here extend from 2004 to 2012 for national elections only, as the law states that an OLPR



**Fig. 4.12** Trends in preferential voting in Greece (2004–2012) (*Source* Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Greece)

system is used for the European level. Dealing with the Greek case is important, as the electoral system has changed several times over the last two decades (Renwick and Pilet 2016), as seen in Chapter 3. The number of preferences allowed has changed over time, as well as the presence of thresholds, typical of the flexible electoral system, and even the formula adopted.

This section deals with the main trends as well as the consequences of the use of preferential voting in Greece (2004–May 2012<sup>6</sup>) to allow a comparison with other countries that have adopted PLPR electoral systems (Fig. 4.12).

Greece certainly represents a case of a PLPR system, although the subtype to which it belongs is not immediately clear. As indicated in Chapter 3, the Hellenic electoral system is neither a complete case of OLPR nor a flexible-system case (Shugart 2005). As seen, it shows elements typical of both the open-list systems and the flexible-list systems. Therefore, due to the special status conferred on the head of the list, I have created a new PLPR subtype—*personalized OLPR*—which includes Greece and Cyprus.

<sup>6</sup>In 2012, Greece held two early elections in a row, the first in May and the second in June. However, for the latter case, data are not available.

**Table 4.20** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Greece (2004–2012)

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
2004	284					
2007	269	39.8	8.8	13.0	38.4	100
2009	284	54.6	5.6	21.6	18.2	100
2012	232	34.9	11.6	24.6	28.9	100
Mean	267	43.1	8.7	19.7	28.5	

*Source* Author's elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Greece. <https://www.ypes.gr/en/Ministry/>

Table 4.20 clearly indicates the effects of the country's electoral system on voters' behaviour. The total share of preference votes cast indicates that, in Greece, there has been a clear large decrease in the total amount of personal votes. In fact, between 2004 and 2012, the percentage of preferences fell from 82 per cent (the peak) to more than 64 per cent, which is a drop of about 18 percentage points.

Moreover, to observe the variation in electoral behaviour better, I can consider the share of votes won by the candidate who received more votes. On average, the percentage of preference votes won by the first-placed candidates was equal to about one-third of the total (33.8 per cent), without any relevant changes in the trends over time.


Considering the concentration of preference votes among candidates, it emerges that the average for the Gini index was equal to 0.78 over the period considered. That clearly means that there has been a rather unequal distribution of preferences, about three-quarters of "personal" votes being in the hands of one candidate. Consistent with those data, it appears that almost 75 per cent of candidates were able to obtain up to 25 per cent of the preference votes, confirming the centralization of personal votes around one or a few candidates. The data on the preference votes' concentration are more interesting if related to the electoral system's features, which confer a special status on the head of the list. Party leaders and former prime ministers are protected from the competition for personal votes, being automatically awarded as many preference votes as votes received by their party in their district. All this said, the

Gini index values assume a deeper meaning, emphasizing the concentration on the top candidates of the majority of preference votes.

In synthesis, the data on preferential voting in Greece tell us that the concentration of preference votes among candidates is quite high. Therefore, considering the data on the share of votes won by the first-placed candidates, the number of preference votes cast, it seems as if preferential voting allows voters a say in the candidates' selection as well as the renewal of the mandate for incumbents.

The results concerning the intraparty competition in Greece are quite interesting, also bearing in mind the electoral system's features reported above. Table 4.20 presents the influence of the electoral system on the interelection parliamentary turnover between 2004 and 2012. The average of MPs' turnover indicates that more than 4 out of 10 incumbents (43 per cent) have regularly been re-elected in each election. In the period covered by the analysis, there was not a coherent trend but rather a few ups and downs: the lowest level of MPs' re-election was registered in 2007 (39.7 per cent), while the peak occurred in 2009 (55 per cent). Among the main factors influencing MPs' defeat, it emerges that those who did not have their candidature renewed account for about 30 per cent (28.5 per cent). Therefore, despite the party's "decision" influencing about three-quarters of the outgoing MPs' destiny, one must consider that the influence of the preference votes on the MPs' turnover accounts for a considerable number: about one-fifth (19.7 per cent). Finally, the partisan defeats represent less than 9 per cent (8.7 per cent) (the list order variable does not apply to Greece). Over time, it is possible to observe that, for both the partisan and the preference vote defeats, there has been an increase, while the percentage of MPs not having their candidate renewed has decreased significantly. Vice versa, if we only consider the "electoral" defeats, that is, excluding the number of MPs who were re-elected, then the role of preference votes accounts for more than one-third (35.7 per cent) of all the outgoing MPs' setbacks.

Generally speaking, it is possible to argue that, in Greece, the direct influence of the preferential voting system is comparatively relevant. Although one-quarter of the MPs are regularly re-elected and one-third of them are not included because their party does not allow them to run again in the following elections, the turnover due to voters' choice is quite important. That confirms the influence of the electoral system despite the power exercised by parties' organization in controlling candidature, candidature renewal, and the selection of MPs in safe seats.



**Fig. 4.13** Trends in preferential voting in Italy (1948–1992): general elections (*Source* Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Italy)

#### 4.1.13 *Italy: The Myth of Preferences That In Fact Are in the Hands of the Parties’ Boss*

The data collection covers all the national elections held in Italy (1948–1992) (Fig. 4.13). Moreover, I take into account the European elections (1979–2014) and the subnational elections, such as regional contests (1970–2015). This section deals with Italy, which can be considered one of the most seminal cases of political systems in which the preference vote system has been adopted. Between 1948 and 1992, in the general elections in Italy, it was possible to cast up to four preference votes (only one in 1992),<sup>7</sup> and preferential voting is still allowed for regional (1970–2015) and European elections (1979–2014) alike. The objective of this section is to report the main trends as well as the consequences of

<sup>7</sup>In districts with a magnitude up to 15, 3 preferences can be indicated, and 4 preferences when 16 or more deputies are selected in the district.



**Table 4.21** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Italy (1948–1992)

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Party's performance (%)</i>	<i>Preference votes (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
1948	551	–	–	–	–	
1953	550	45.7	28.3	16.9	9.1	100
1958	595	48.2	37.8	7.1	6.9	100
1963	629	53.4	33.6	6.3	6.7	100
1968	623	51.0	37.0	6.4	5.6	100
1972	628	53.8	34.3	4.8	7.1	100
1976	628	46.0	40.8	5.6	7.6	100
1979	629	54.5	34.4	7.0	4.1	100
1983	629	46.0	42.8	2.9	8.3	100
1987	629	44.7	43.6	4.9	6.8	100
1992	631	41.3	45.2	6.6	6.9	100
Mean	611.1	48.5	37.8	6.8	6.9	

Source Author's elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Italy. <http://www.interno.gov.it/en>

the use of preferential voting in Italy (1948–2015) and to consider Italy in the general context of other countries adopting the same kind of electoral system (Passarelli 2017, 2018).

As reported by Table 4.25, between the period 1948/1987 and the 1992 elections, there was a strong decrease in terms of percentage points of those electors who expressed a “personal” vote. Moreover, if we focus on the 1992 elections (when only one preference vote was possible), we can observe the lowest scores of all the eleven elections analysed. This can be interpreted both as a diminishing appeal of preference votes and as the possibility to measure the “real” impact of those voters.

Table 4.21 clearly indicates a few trends in the Italian context. In particular, it is possible to highlight a number of points. First, about half (48.5 per cent) of the MPs were re-elected between 1948 and 1992 in Italy. There are two outliers, the highest percentage occurring in 1972 (54 per cent) and the lowest in 1992 (“only” 41 per cent). Moreover, considering the reasons related to failed re-election, it appears that 38 per cent of the incumbents did not have their candidature renewed, with the smallest share reached in 1953 (28 per cent) and the biggest in 1992 (45 per cent).


The first two categories broadly account for almost all the cases (86 per cent). Therefore, considering those who have not been re-elected and those who have not been re-elected due to “extra” electoral reasons (non-renewal of candidature), in Italy, it is possible to cover almost all the cases. In addition, as I describe, there are important empirical and theoretical consequences even from a comparative perspective.

As a consequence, less than 14 per cent of the outgoing MPs were not re-elected due to electoral factors, such as the preferential voting competition per se or the party’s electoral performance. The party’s performance and the preference votes each account for about 6 per cent, with an oscillating trend in the first case and quite a stable tendency in the case of preference votes.

The first general comment that can be made is the following. Italy, as one of the preferential voting countries par excellence, where voters’ power in selecting MPs is assumed to be great, has shown a comparatively (as detailed below) “very” low percentage of parliamentary personnel renewal attributable to preferences per se. Therefore, Italian voters have had relatively weak power to choose (although they were able to confirm many of them) or better to force out unwanted outgoing MPs; however, some influence remained. Thus, the sweeping generalization of Sartori (1997: 17–18), based on the Italian experience, according to whom party “machine bosses” can manipulate preferential voting to ensure that they and their favoured candidates are elected no matter how apparently “open” the lists are, does not completely stand up to empirical scrutiny as a broad proposition, although it certainly it grasps the sense of the question.

Moreover, as anticipated in the chapter on electoral systems’ features, in Italy, the PLPR electoral system has also been adopted for the two most important “second-order elections”, the European and the regional ones.<sup>8</sup> In the first case, European elections have been held in Italy since 1979 (Fig. 4.14). Generally speaking, there has been a strong and constant decrease in terms of preference votes cast (of the total available) out of the total number of valid votes for the parties. In fact, the share of preference votes at the national level has markedly reduced from about 35 per cent in 1979 to just over 15 per cent in 2014. The national values

<sup>8</sup>For local elections, voters can also cast a preference vote. In 2012, the male/female vote of preference alternation was also introduced in cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants.




**Fig. 4.14** Trends of preferential voting in Italy (1979–2014): European elections (*Source* Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Italy)

tell us that a clear decreasing trend in the use of preferential voting has been underway since 1979.

The regional election data analysis reports that no cases of the areas in northern Italy showed scores above the national mean. As for the European and the national elections, a clear territorial cleavage arises in the regional case. This trend is confirmed in all the elections from 1970 to 2014, with only a few exceptions. On the southern side, we see scores higher than the national mean, whereas, conversely, we find that all the northern regions (with the reported few exceptions) show scores lower than the national mean. The average for the entire period was a little less than one-third, being equal to 32 per cent of the share of preference votes cast in each election in the period between 1970 and 2014. However, due to changes that affected both the electoral and the party systems in the 1990s, it is relevant to consider the differences between two crucial periods for the Italian politics. Between 1970 and 1980, the share of preference votes cast in the regional elections was equal to 26 per cent, while, between 1995 and 2014, that percentage rose to a little less than 40 per cent (38.4 per cent) (Fig. 4.15).

Moreover, since preferential voting has been adopted in at least three cases in Italy, as I have reported, then a synoptic figure could help in detecting trends better. Figures 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 show the



**Fig. 4.15** Trends in preferential voting in Italy (1970–2014): regional elections (Source Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Italy)

percentage of preference votes cast for all the regional, national, and European elections held in Italy between 1948 and 2015. In the first European elections of 1979, more than one-third of the preferences that could be cast were effectively expressed (34.8 per cent), whereas, from then onwards, the average constantly decreased over time. Vice versa, the regional elections produced the highest percentage of preference votes cast: 41.3 per cent in 2005. Finally, the national elections have registered an average of about 30 per cent of preference votes cast of the total possible votes available to candidates, except for the “peak” reached in 1948 (32.5 per cent).

#### *4.1.14 Kosovo: Using Many Preference Votes Has Important Effects*

The Balkan country is a latecomer to the family of PLPR electoral systems. As seen in detail, Kosovo only adopted a preferential voting system in the first decade of the twenty-first century. However, the OLPR system’s structure has already been changed, especially in terms of the

number of preference votes allowed. That element significantly affects both the characteristics of the electoral system itself and the consequences that it can generate. Moreover, the law has intervened in the level of openness of the electoral system, as, for one election, only the head of the list was relieved of collecting preference votes, as all party votes were considered to be cast in his or her favour. Between 2010 and 2014, the share of preferences expressed remained largely unchanged, moving from 84 per cent to 82 per cent. Now, given the fact that voters in Kosovo can cast up to five votes, it is interesting to consider the total amount of preference votes to determine whether there has been a change in terms of absolute numbers both for valid votes and for preferences expressed. Table 4.26 tells us that, in 2010 and in 2014, the number of preference votes remained practically the same (77,000 more in 2014), with an average of about 3 million. Analogously, the total number of valid votes remained stable over time, around 700,000 on average, with a small increase in 2014 (+30,000). Therefore, the stable trend matches any real increase in terms of preference votes effectively cast. However, I cannot say whether this stable trend hides different trends in terms of the number of preference votes cast per voter. As for other countries where more than one preference is allowed, there are three theoretical possibilities. (1) Valid votes > preferences: it is possible to calculate the number of voters who cast at least one preference vote. Therefore, assuming that all voters expressed one vote, we can infer the number of voters who cast a personal vote. That is the maximum theoretically possible number of voters who exercised the right to express a preference. (2) Valid votes < preferences: this means that some voters cast more than one preference vote. However, without detailed data on the ballots, it is impossible to know how many did so. Following the inverse reasoning of the previous hypothesis, it is conceivable that all voters cast the maximum number of preference votes allowed. Nevertheless, in the Kosovar case, as more than 80 per cent of preference votes were expressed, it is likely that the average number of preference votes per voter is quite accurate and plausible. Now, the data tell us that, in Kosovo, this score is 4.2 on average. The latter data indicate that the voters were keen to use their right to support as many candidates as possible among the candidates of their preferred party.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup>Although data from the 2007 elections are not available, it would have been interesting to see any difference in the share of preference votes cast. In fact, any significant variation

**Table 4.22** The concentration of the preference votes in Kosovo: 2007–2014 (general elections)

<i>Election</i>	<i>N. of candidates with over 75% of preferences by party</i>	<i>% of candidates with up to 25% of preferences by party</i>	<i>Lowest (%)</i>	<i>Highest (%)</i>	<i>Average % pref. won by 1st placed candidates</i>
2010	0	92	0	45	23.0
2014	0	91	0	71	32.0
Mean	0	91.5	0	58	27.5

*Source* Author's own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Kosovo. <https://mpb.rks.gov.net/>

Turning the analysis to the level of concentration of preference votes among the candidates, Table 4.22 clearly indicates a few relevant points in the Kosovar elections. No candidate has been able to collect more than three-quarters of all the preferences expressed, while it is possible to find almost all the candidates in the range from 0 to 25 per cent. Moreover, the candidates who were able to gather the highest number of personal votes gained on average about 60 per cent of the preference votes, although on average the votes in favour of the candidate placed first (in terms of preferences obtained) was equal to one-quarter of the total.

could have been related to changes in the electoral law rather than in voters' behaviour per se. In fact, these data could have been misleading. As the proportion of preference votes cast is calculated as the ratio between the preferences expressed and the valid votes multiplied by the number of preference votes allowed, then it is crucial to refer to the change in the latter. As seen, in 2017, 10 preference votes were allowed, while, in 2010 and 2014, this number decreased to exactly half. Therefore, although the values are perfectly comparable and meaningful, it is important to determine whether there have been important changes over time in terms of the total amount of preferences expressed. These data would in fact tell us more about the effective and real weights of the personal votes over time. The raw number of preferences expressed could help us in detecting whether their electoral influence and importance have grown between two elections or, vice versa, whether the percentage increase is only due to the change in the number of votes allowed. In the first case, Kosovo would have been facing an electoral event with potential relevant political consequences (no relevant change in valid vote terms and a big increase in terms of preferences), while, in the second, the importance of preferences would be only marginal (no changes in both variables).

From the theoretical point of view, those data are particularly interesting, because they clearly indicate that the number of preference votes allowed by the law matters in different respects. First, it affects the share of preference votes cast, as the variation in percentage points does not really represent an increase; second, the presence of an important number of preferences has mitigated the process of concentration of votes in favour of one or a few top candidates or better their ability to collect high percentages of personal votes. The latter element is in fact confirmed by the scores for the number of candidates with over 75 per cent of preferences as well as by the average number of preference votes won by the candidates who arrived first on their list.

In terms of MPs' turnover over time as an effect of the different electoral system factors, it is possible to see that, in Kosovo, the main variable accounting for the change is the number of those being re-elected (38 per cent on average). Moreover, the second-biggest non-electoral factor affecting the outgoing deputies' fate is the share of those whose candidature was not renewed between two consecutive elections (20 per cent). Surprisingly, the preference votes represent the strongest electoral factor in deciding the interparliamentary turnover in Kosovo, as more than one-third of MPs' destiny was decided by personal votes (35 per cent). Vice versa, not having the "list order" case, as the Kosovar electoral system is an OLPR system, the number of partisan defeats accounts for less than one-tenth (8.3 per cent). As data are available for two elections only, it is not possible to make a reliable comparison over time, although the number of re-elected MPs has increased significantly and the number whose candidature was not renewed has decreased accordingly. Moreover, if we consider those numbers without including the defeats due to extra-electoral factors, then the importance of preference votes increases remarkably (80 per cent vs. 20 per cent of the partisan defeats). Therefore, the Kosovar case tells us that preference votes matter, probably also due to the possibility for voters to cast a relevant number of personal votes, as they represent one of the biggest factors in the comparative perspective. Political parties have a big say, as they decide the MPs' fate directly (19.6 per cent of MPs' non-renewed candidature) or not (37 per cent of re-elected candidates); however, besides the political actors, voters can intervene effectively by shaping the destiny of many candidates for the Parliament, as the preferences decide about one-third of them (Table 4.23).

**Table 4.23** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Kosovo (2007–2014)


<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
2007	120					
2010	120	28.4	10.8	37.5	23.3	100
2014	120	46.7	5.8	31.7	15.8	100
Average		37.5	8.3	34.6	19.6	

*Source* Author's own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Kosovo. <https://mpb.rks-gov.net/>

#### 4.1.15 *Netherlands: The Increasing Share of Preferences Does Not Affect Candidates' Fate*

The Dutch electoral system fits into the flexible-list category, and in particular it is an example of a *latent-list* structure. The Netherlands couples a very high proportional electoral system ( $M=150$ ) with party system fragmentation and not very strong parties (Lijphart 1999). All those elements work under the rules of PLPR that oblige voters to cast a preference vote. The national trend in the number of voters casting a personal vote is a useful starting point to analyse voters' behaviour. A methodological clarification should be underlined, though. As voters cannot select a party list but can, or rather must, only cast a personal vote, the share of voters who “decided” to cast a preference vote is therefore not available as a way of measuring preferential voting. The mandatory element of PLPR makes this an impossible option, as in other cases, namely Chile, Estonia, and Finland, albeit with some differences. Political parties are free to determine the candidates' order in the ballot, and, as a consequence, voting for the head of the list would imply supporting the party's decision on the list order. Although, from a theoretical point of view, voters who have decided that they like the candidate placed at the top of the list best should be considered to have used their preference vote, it is not possible to detect them through quantitative analysis. Moreover, even if the party's candidate selectors might well have deliberately placed a very popular candidate at the head of the list, we assume that, given the context of such electoral systems, voters casting a vote for the head of the list are confirming the party's choice. Therefore, the best way to have comparable data to measure the “use” of preferential voting





**Fig. 4.16** The trend of preferential voting in the Netherlands: 1946–2012 (general elections) (*Source* Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Netherlands)

is to calculate the proportion of voters casting their ballot for a candidate other than the top candidate on each list (Karvonen 2004, 2010; Andeweg and van Holsteyn 2011; Renwick and Pilet 2016: 226).

Since 1946, there has clearly been an increase in the number of voters casting a preference vote for candidates other than the head of the list. The share of voters casting a personal vote for candidates other than the one placed first by the party rose from 3 per cent in the first election after the Second World War to 19 per cent in the latest election for which data were collected, in 2012 (Fig. 4.16). The trend indicates constant growth, with a significant increase starting at the beginning of the 1980s and three peaks over 20 per cent (in 1998, 2002, and 2006). The average for the period considered was equal to about 12 per cent, and, in fact, in almost all the elections held after 1982, that score was exceeded.

The quota of Dutch voters who cast a preference vote (voters have to indicate only one preference), calculated as the proportion of choices that were different from the party’s list order rank, is useful but of course can assume different meanings. The growing trend has to be considered as an increasing attitude of voters towards “casting” a preference vote,

as we assume that this information is useful and the standard practice. In fact, the expanding number of “preference votes” could also indicate that the voters’ loyalty towards their parties is declining and that the intraparty competition is therefore growing. However, not having the possibility to measure exactly how many voters decide voluntarily to cast a preference vote in addition to the party vote, the data that we have to deal with remain those mentioned above, which are important and tell us some information at least. Therefore, differently from the Austrian case, in the Netherlands, it is only indirectly possible to confirm Carey and Shugart’s assumption, according to which the candidates’ personal characteristics matter, especially in electoral systems with large (even nation-wide) districts.

Moreover, considering the single elements of preferential voting behaviour is not possible for the Netherlands. As data are not available on the concentration of preferential voting for the period considered, I cannot present any information on the voters’ behaviour. Therefore, it is not possible to discuss the intraparty competition (the Gini index) or the smallest and largest proportions of preference votes collected by one candidate on average. However, albeit in an indirect way, it is possible to determine how many personal votes were received by the first-placed candidate, which here assumes the double meaning of being the head of the list and the candidate who obtained the most votes. As I calculate the proportion of voters casting a preference vote as the total number of preference votes cast in favour of all other candidates than those first placed in the ballot, then I may assume that the remaining personal votes are those gathered by the head of the list. Therefore, subtracting the percentage of the share of preferences per year from the total (100 per cent) will give us the number of votes conferred on the first-placed candidate. It is intuitive to observe that the proportion has decreased over time, following the opposite trend from that described in Fig. 4.20 (share of preferences cast). It seems then that the role of both the party’s list order and the influence of the head of the list is decreasing. The lack of available data does not allow the calculation of the Gini index value, which would have given us a measure of that possible trend, which is the concentration of personal votes in the hands of a few candidates or even one. Nevertheless, as in the previous case, it is possible to use the data on preference votes cast in favour of the head of the list as an “index of concentration”—a kind of dirty Gini score—although we do not know how unevenly the remaining votes are distributed. Therefore, although

**Table 4.24** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Netherlands (1977–2012)

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>List order (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
1977	<b>150</b>	<b>53.3</b>	15.2	5.2	<b>0</b>	<b>26.3</b>	100
1981	150	<b>58.6</b>	13.9	4.7	0	<b>22.8</b>	100
1982	150	<b>80.5</b>	10.1	3.4	0	6.0	100
1986	150	<b>66.7</b>	12.2	4.1	0.7	<b>16.3</b>	100
1989	150	<b>70.6</b>	11.5	3.9	0	<b>14.0</b>	100
1994	150	<b>50.7</b>	16.0	5.4	0	<b>27.9</b>	100
1998	150	<b>50.7</b>	16.0	5.4	1.3	<b>26.6</b>	100
2002	150	<b>52.7</b>	15.4	5.2	0.7	<b>26.0</b>	100
2003	150	<b>70.0</b>	11.6	3.9	1.4	<b>13.1</b>	100
2006	150	<b>52.0</b>	15.6	5.3	0.7	<b>26.4</b>	100
2010	150	<b>52.7</b>	15.4	5.2	1.3	<b>25.4</b>	100
2012	150	61.2	13.3	4.5	0.7	<b>20.3</b>	100
Mean	150	59.9	13.9	4.7	0.6	20.9	

*Source* Author's own elaboration on Minister of Interior of the Netherlands. <https://www.dcnanature.org/dutch-ministry-of-internal-affairs/>

I cannot refer to that information as the Gini value, it still gives us an idea of how the level of the votes in the hands of the top candidate who was supported by the party has changed over time.

Moreover, as the country consists of only one district, it is impossible to measure the correlation between the share of preferences and the district magnitude. Vice versa, despite the relative lack of detailed information on the concentration of preference votes, considering the data on the influence of preferential voting on the intraparty competition, the Dutch case shows a great deal of data and dynamics. Regarding the different sources of interelection parliamentary turnover, it is possible to observe that, in the Netherlands, between 1977 and 2012, the main group of incumbents was regularly re-elected in the following election (Table 4.24). In fact, 60 per cent of MPs were confirmed between two consecutive elections. The second-biggest variable is the group of those outgoing deputies whose candidature was not renewed in the following election, representing more than one-fifth of all the incumbents (21 per cent). Moreover, the partisan defeats in the Dutch elections accounted for about 14 per cent of the total interelection turnover rate. Far from this proportion,

there is then the “list order” variable, which accounts for about 5 per cent of MPs’ electoral path between two elections. Finally, the least important factor affecting the parliamentary turnover is represented by preference votes. In the Netherlands, between 1977 and 2012, less than 1 per cent of the outgoing MPs were replaced through preference votes.

Over time, the number of re-elected MPs has increased from about half of MPs to more than 60 per cent, with peaks of more than 70 per cent in 1989 and 2003 and even more than 80 per cent in 1982. The latter highest score was probably influenced by the fact that early elections were called in that year, so parties are usually better equipped to face competitive challenges to their decision on ranking candidates. Vice versa, the number of both the partisan defeats and the defeats generated by the list order did not register any particular change over the period considered, remaining quite stable around their respective means. Finally, if the preference votes have no trend, as they were not influential at all, the share of outgoing deputies who were not confirmed as candidates in the following election was quite irregular, with several ups and downs, although in the long term there was a slow increase, especially after the 1980s.

Considering the electoral defeats only, it is possible to observe that the main factor affecting the interelection turnover was the fact that more than half of the incumbents were not confirmed as candidates (52 per cent). Moreover, MPs’ defeat due to a negative party electoral performance was equal to more than one-third of all the defeats (35 per cent). Thus, the list order caused more than one-tenth of all the incumbents’ defeats in the Netherlands between 1977 and 2012. Finally, preference votes do not even represent 2 per cent of all the candidates’ defeats in all the elections considered over more than 35 years.

The above-mentioned electoral dynamics of intraparty competition are also confirmed by considering the total amount of deputies elected “out of the list order”, that is, by changing the party’s list ranking, referring to candidates whose preference votes exceed one-quarter of the electoral quota. Fewer than one candidate on average has been elected by modifying the list order, representing even fewer in percentage terms (0.5 per cent). In addition, it should be noticed that this value could have been even less significant if I had covered the entire period. Only in 1959 a deputy was elected out of the list order. The latter choice implies that the average covering the entire time span would have been even smaller. The only partial exceptions to this trend (two MPs elected out of the list order) are represented by two elections, those in 2003 and 2010.

In synthesis, it is possible to observe that the fact the Netherlands has adopted a flexible-list system affects the intraparty dynamics and outcomes. The voters' influence on modifying the parties' decision regarding candidature and those elected is almost null, whilst the role of the parties' organizational strength seems to be confirmed. This is due to a couple of concurrent variables. The data on the causes of MPs' defeat show very well that the influence of both the concentration of votes around the candidate placed first and the high threshold to change the list order have generated a quasi-zero effect in terms of voters' ability to change the candidate selection. The consequence is a very low number of MPs being able to be elected out of the list order. Finally, the fact that political parties matter is confirmed by the fact that the two main factors for incumbents' defeat in the Netherlands between 1977 and 2012 were the non-renewal of candidature and the list order, the influence of which accounted for about 64 per cent. Those are two variables that are basically related to the parties' leadership decision making regarding the list of candidates. In conclusion, it is possible to argue that political parties in the Netherlands matter in terms of interelection parliamentary turnover. In fact, they are able to affect deputies' fate by deciding whether to allow them to run again in the following elections and/or whether to confer on them a good position in the list order. Moreover, following the goal of answering this book's research question, it clearly emerges that the electoral system's features matter as well, as very few candidates were able to pass the threshold and make the system work as an open-list one in about 40 years. Therefore, the electoral rules nullify the voters' preference vote and their intent to affect the deputies' election and turnover.

In general, it is possible to argue that, in the Netherlands, although the electoral system confers a little power on the voters in terms of their influence on the MPs' selection, political parties' role and influence matter.

#### *4.1.16 Norway: A Supposed OLPR That Never Was*

As reported in the chapter on electoral systems, Norway has not (yet) adopted a PLPR electoral system. Although, theoretically, voters could choose, the limits are so high that the thresholds are impossible to pass. No candidate has been elected until now due to the "choice" of the electors made through preference votes. At the moment at which

I write these lines, an electoral reform is supposed to be discussing the goal of introducing a PLPR electoral system. After all, in Norway, preferences have already been adopted to select the elected candidates for the regional elections. Unfortunately, the only data available are those of two consecutive elections, 2003 and 2007. On average, about one-quarter of potential personal votes have been cast on average, with practically no differences between the two races.

#### 4.1.17 *Peru: The More Voters Express Preference Votes, the Less They Influence MPs' Turnover*

Peru is the third-most-important country among the South American ones analysed in this book. However, its electoral system is much more similar to the Brazilian one than to the Chilean one. Peru has in fact adopted OLPR and not a quasi-list subtype (Shugart 2005: 42). Figure 4.17 presents data on preferential voting behaviour from 1995 to 2011. The first result to observe is the percentage of voters who expressed a preference vote. On average, that share is equal to




Fig. 4.17 Trends in preferential voting in Peru (1995–2011) (Source Author's elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Peru)

47 per cent on the basis of all the preference votes potentially cast, calculated as the ratio of the preferences expressed to the total possible votes, as defined in Chapter 4. Peruvian voters may cast up to two preference votes for as many candidates, so this percentage is very important. It means that almost one voter out of two was keen to cast a personal vote for one of the candidates of the party that s/he decided to support. However, since the second election, there has been a slow, albeit clear, decreasing trend in the share of preference votes cast.

Turning to the analysis of the distribution of those preferences, it appears that none of the candidates for all the elections included in the sample ever collected more than 75 per cent of the votes. Conversely, almost 100 per cent of them obtained percentages of preference votes equal to or less than 25 per cent. As detailed later, this information offers us many elements to think about political parties, voters' behaviour, and intraparty competition between candidates. Moreover, to observe the variation in electoral behaviour better, I consider the share of votes won by the candidate who received the most votes. In Peru, the candidates who came first in their districts obtained on average 8 per cent of the votes.

In terms of candidates' electoral performances, Table 4.25 indicates that, although the lowest score reached is zero, there are candidates who on average reached a peak of almost 20 per cent of the total preferences. The historical trend has not been linear, though. The percentages have fluctuated widely, with the highest peak in 2001 (36 per cent) and the lowest score in 2000 (8 per cent). Finally, the results of the Gini index, showing the level of concentration of votes on candidates, on average indicate clearly that there has been an important level of preference distribution in favour of a few people. On average, 65 per cent of votes between 1992 and 2016 in Peru were collected by a small group of candidates, with the highest level reached in 1992 (73 per cent) and the lowest in 2011 (61 per cent).

What we learn from the data on the Peruvian use of preferential voting is the following. First, there is a concentration of preferences that is clearly unequal, with the top candidates able to gather more than two-thirds of their party's preference votes. Moreover, the scores achieved by the party's first-placed candidates suggest that political parties' leadership is important in generating a large amount of support from voters and hence in affecting the parliamentary turnover.

**Table 4.25** The concentration of the preference votes in Peru: 1992–2016 (general elections)

<i>Election</i>	<i>% of candidates with over 75% of preferences by party</i>	<i>% of candidates with up to 25% of preferences by party</i>	<i>Lowest (%)</i>	<i>Highest (%)</i>	<i>Average % pref. won by 1st placed candidates</i>	<i>Gini's index on preferences by candidates (on all candidates by party)</i>
1992	0	99.9	0	26.2	4.7	0.735
1995	0	100	0	11.2	1.9	0.75
2000	0	100	0	8.5	1.9	0.629
2001	0	99.9	0	36.1	15.0	0.636
2006	0	100	0	22.5	12.2	0.651
2011	0	100	0	18.2	14.8	0.61
Mean	0	99.98	0	19.3	8.4	0.655

Source Author's own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Peru. <https://www.gob.pe/mininter>

Thus, what clearly emerges is the role of important candidates/leaders in political parties, their organizational pattern—at least the electoral one—being mostly focused on the pre-eminent candidate. Moreover, the intraparty competition would be strongly mitigated by the latter element; thus, the strength of candidates collecting many votes will be a party's organizational outcome. That means that candidates with many preferences could play a relevant role in the organization and in the party's decisions, for example that of whether to renew an incumbent's candidature. This is the subject that I address now. It seems that voters' behaviour could be important, although probably limited, in deciding who is elected and who is not, given the high number of votes conferred on one or a few of them. That point leads to the question of “which” candidate voters support, making a crucial distinction between incumbents and new challengers.

The second part of the statistical analysis on the Peruvian system focuses on the intraparty dimension of the competition. Table 4.26 reports the weight of each factor on the interelection parliamentary turnover between 1995 and 2016, that is, the period of the democratic elections after the elections for the democratic constituent congress. On average, in each election, 26 per cent of outgoing MPs were re-elected.



**Table 4.26** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Peru (1995–2016)

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
1995	120	43.7	8.8	13.8	33.7	100
2000	120	24.2	10.0	29.2	36.6	100
2001	120	30.0	21.7	10.0	38.3	100
2006	120	13.3	15.8	13.4	57.5	100
2011	130	20.8	12.5	18.4	48.3	100
2016	130	23.1	11.5	4.6	60.8	100
Mean	123.3	25.9	13.4	14.9	45.8	


*Source* Author's own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Peru. <https://www.gob.pe/mininter>

Moreover, in terms of the importance of the preference vote to the interelection turnover, as the Peruvian electoral system is based exclusively on the preference votes in terms of the allocation of seats, I do not consider the variable “intraparty defeat due to list order”.

The “preferential voting” variable represents one-sixth of the parliamentary turnover. An analogous percentage is represented by the outgoing MPs who were not re-elected due to a partisan defeat. However, the most relevant factor in explaining the Peruvian intraparty competition and the parliamentary turnover is the share of incumbents whose candidature was not renewed. The latter factor represents 46 per cent of all the cases, following an increasing trend over time. In Peru, a decreasing number of MPs are being re-elected, while most of them do not run in the following electoral race, suggesting the important role of party organizations in candidature. Finally, while the share of partisan defeats remained stable over time, the rate of MPs being replaced due to preference votes dropped dramatically in the latest elections considered here (4.6 per cent in 2016), thus needing to be confirmed in the future. However, the general role of personal votes seems not to be entirely relevant in Peru.

#### 4.1.18 *Poland: A High Number of Preferences That Influence MPs' Turnover*

Poland fits well with the *quasi-list* subtype of PLPR systems (Shugart 2005: 42–43). In fact, voters can neither vote for a party list nor rank candidates among those indicated in the party list. All votes are pooled



**Fig. 4.18** Trends in preferential voting in Poland (1991–2015) (percentages refer to votes other than those for the head of the list) (*Source* Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Poland)

at the party level to allocate seats to each party. Voters’ only way to express their vote is to cast a preference vote, the sum of which for each individual candidate solely determines who is elected and who is not. For those reasons, it is not possible to measure the share of preferential voting, as it will be equal to 100 per cent. The only way to measure it is to consider the percentage of voters who indicate a preference for candidates other than the head of the list, assuming that those who voted for them were in a sense accepting the list order and not expressing any change. The proportion of voters who choose to cast a preference vote is therefore not available as a way to measure preferential voting. Figure 4.18 reports the share of preference votes for all candidates except the first in the ballot. It is possible to observe that, between 1991 and 2015, there was no clear trend, but the scores were quite stable at around 65 per cent of the total preference votes cast. In the period considered, the increase was of about 5 percentage points, with a peak of 68 per cent in 1997.

Turning to data related to the preference votes' distribution, it is possible to add some value to the previous figure. The first evidence obtained is the fact that no candidate obtained more than 75 per cent of the preference votes among all those attributed to his/her party's companions. Vice versa, candidates basically received much fewer preference votes, as shown by the variable that indicates the number of candidates who received up to 25 per cent of preferences (97 per cent on average between 1991 and 2015). In terms of intraparty competition, it is thus possible to see that, on average, the highest score attained by a candidate is about 35 per cent, with a growing trend, increasing from 20 per cent to 35 per cent (the lowest received zero votes, meaning that there are a number of "fake" candidates, who represent no more than names to fill up the party's lists). The candidates placed first (in term of preferences gathered) obtained on average 35 per cent of the total personal votes for their party's list. Given that, as mentioned, the total share of preference votes cast in Poland is by definition equal to 100 per cent, it is important to consider the concentration of votes and their distribution among candidates. Moreover, as I calculate the share of preference votes cast in favour of all other candidates than the head of the list, I am also able to report the percentage of personal preference votes collected by the candidate placed first on the list (in terms of ballot ranking): the two scores match. On average, in Poland, between 1991 and 2015, this score was equal to 35 per cent, as above, meaning that the head of the list is not challenged by his/her co-candidates. As there is no provision for a list vote in the Polish electoral system, the system actually works as a mandatory preference one. The most important variable in this sense is the Gini index, having seen the average number of preference votes obtained by the candidates classified first. Table 4.27 tells us that the level of concentration of votes on candidates was rather high, as the value of Gini is about 0.70 on average for the considered period, with a rather stable trend over time. Therefore, the preferential voting in Poland shows quite an unequal distribution of personal votes, being concentrated mostly in the hands of one candidate. This figure shows a small negative trend since 1991, when it was about 41 per cent. In addition, continuing to analyse the concentration of votes, it is noticeable that no candidate could collect more than the head of the list or those who collected more preference votes. Most of the candidates in fact obtained on average fewer than one-quarter of the votes, while the

**Table 4.27** Concentration of preferential voting in Poland (1991–2015)

<i>Election</i>	<i>Average of voter's expressed preferences for candidate other than head list</i>	<i>% of candidates with over 75% of preferences by party</i>	<i>% of candidates with up to 25% of preferences by party</i>	<i>Lowest (%)</i>	<i>Highest (%)</i>	<i>Average % pref. won by 1st placed candidates</i>	<i>Gini's index on preferences by candidates (on all candidates by party)</i>
1991	59.4	0	100	0	19.7	40.6	0.67
1993	61.4	0	99.7	0	40.6	38.5	0.63
1997	67.6	0	91.7	0	34	32.4	0.59
2001	67.6	0.11	96.3	0	43.5	32.4	0.66
2005	66.7	0.08	96.4	0	28.6	33.3	0.67
2007	61.4	0.08	96.5	0	46.6	38.6	0.71
2011	66.9	0.04	96.4	0	36.8	33.1	0.71
2015	66.5	0.07	95.9	0	35.4	33.5	0.73
Mean	64.7	0.05	96.6	0	35.7	35.3	0.67

*Source* Author's elaboration Minister of the Interior of Poland; with the cooperation of Maria Winclawska. <https://www.premier.gov.pl/>

**Table 4.28** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Poland (1991–2015)

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs (#)</i>	<i># of MPs re-elected</i>	<i>% of MPs re-elected</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total</i>
1991	460	119	25.9	8.9	13.3	51.9	100
1993	460	139	30.2	33.3	12.2	24.3	100
1997	460	179	38.9	29.8	11.3	20.0	100
2001	460	176	38.3	30.4	7.0	24.3	100
2005	460	162	35.2	13.7	7.2	43.9	100
2007	460	277	60.2	15.0	9.1	15.7	100
2011	460	286	62.2	4.3	11.3	22.2	100
2015	460	221	48.0	12.8	10.7	28.5	100
Average	460	194.9	42.4	18.5	10.2	28.9	

*Source* Author's elaboration Minister of the Interior of Poland; with the cooperation of Maria Winlawska. <https://www.premier.gov.pl/>

candidates who garnered more personal support were able to reach about 36 per cent of the consensus, with an occasional peak over 40 per cent (in 1993 and in 2007).


In sum, the data on preferential voting in Poland show an uneven distribution of votes among candidates, as confirmed by the concentration of preferences among candidates, which is quite unequally distributed (0.67 in the Gini index).

Thus, together with the data on the share of votes won by the first candidates (about 40 per cent), it is possible to argue that voters divided their choice among different candidates, although the head of the list still had quite considerable power in collecting many preference votes. It is now time to focus on the effects of preferential voting on renewing or rejecting the incumbents.

The second part of the data analysis on preferential voting's consequences in Poland refers to the results regarding the intraparty dimension of the competition. Table 4.28 shows very interesting data about the weight of each variable on the interelection parliamentary turnover between 1991 and 2015. The average MP turnover indicates that barely 40 per cent of incumbents were regularly re-elected in the following election. Thus, the first important piece of information indicates that, in Poland, the number of MPs being re-elected is far below 50 per cent. Moreover, if we consider the second-biggest factor affecting

the intraparty competition, it appears that the candidature of about 30 per cent of the incumbents was not renewed. Thus, the two variables together account for more than 70 per cent of the sample variation in MPs' interelection turnover. Consequently, it is worthy of observation that partisan defeats explain about 20 per cent of the MPs' turnover in Poland. More interestingly, the preference votes per se represent more than 10 per cent of the incumbents' fate in Poland. This result is in line with the Gini index score, which clearly indicates an important level of intraparty competition, as the concentration of votes on the top candidates was not especially important unless we consider the head of the list, whose scores (on average about 35 per cent) can partially be explained by the fact that a large amount of voters tend to "support" or "accept" the party list choice. Over time, a few important trends emerged. The preference votes remained quite stable except for the 2001–2007 period, when, for three elections in a row, the percentages fell below 10 per cent. Vice versa, the partisan defeats fluctuated: a clear increase occurred in the first part of the period, immediately followed by a constant decrease to about 13 per cent. Conversely, the number of MPs being re-elected was quite stable over time except for the latest three elections, in which the percentages reached more than 60 per cent in two cases and then fell below 50 per cent (48 per cent).

The data presented clearly indicate that Poland is a very interesting case in terms of the effects of preferential voting. As shown in Table 4.28, the direct influence of preferences is quite important, as about one-tenth of all the MPs' defeats between 1991 and 2015 came from intraparty dynamics. The role of parties is not insignificant, representing approximately 30 per cent of all the cases, if we consider MPs whose candidature was not renewed as a consequence of parties' decision. Then it seems that partisan defeat matters too, as it accounts for one-fifth of all the cases on average. Therefore, it appears to be a differentiated path from the Polish interelection turnover paths. The parties' organization does not rigidly control candidature, candidature renewal, and the selection of MPs in safe seats, if it is true that barely 40 per cent of them on average are regularly re-elected. The role of voters is clearly influential in the process of interelection turnover via preference votes. These data also tell us that the party/voter relationship is not as close and strong, and voters do not particularly follow a party's discipline, so quite an important share of MPs' turnover can be determined by preference votes.



**Fig. 4.19** Trends in preferential voting in Slovakia (1994–2016) (House) (Source Author's elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Slovakia)

#### 4.1.19 *Slovakia: Where the Hidden Flexible-List System Is Almost a Closed-List System*

The other ex-Czechoslovakian country, Slovakia, along with the Czech Republic, has adopted a PLPR electoral system to select MPs for the national parliament. Analogously to the situation of its Czech sister, Slovakia fits into the flexible-list category (Shugart 2005). Figure 4.19 clearly indicates that the share of preference votes cast has increased strongly over time. In fact, the proportion of preference votes has grown by about 30 percentage points, with scores rising from more than 50 per cent in 1996 to almost 81 per cent in 2013. The average is quite high, as it accounts for over two-thirds of the personal votes potentially being expressed, and the increase has been particularly significant since 1998, with the two elections held in the 1990s being the only cases with a score below 60 per cent.

Table 4.29 reports data on the trends of different variables related to MPs' turnover. It is possible to observe that there is a fair amount of variation in terms of different sources of interelection parliamentary

**Table 4.29** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Slovakia (1994–2016)

<i>Election</i>	<i># of MPs</i>	<i># re-elected</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>List order (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total</i>
1994	<b>150</b>	57	38.0	0.0	32.0	0.7	29.3	100
1998	<b>150</b>	74	49.3	6.0	18.7	0.0	26.0	100
2002	<b>150</b>	43	28.7	26.0	4.7	0.0	40.6	100
2006	<b>150</b>	66	44.0	18.0	7.3	1.4	29.3	100
2010	<b>150</b>	77	51.3	18.0	10.0	0.7	20.0	100
2012	<b>150</b>	106	70.7	4.7	13.3	4.0	7.3	100
2016	<b>150</b>	69	46.0	11.3	23.3	0.7	18.7	100
Average		70.3	46.9	12.0	15.6	1.0	24.5	

*Source* Author's elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Slovakia. <https://www.minv.sk/?ministry-of-interior>

turnover. As it is clear from the data, between 1994 and 2016, the share of turnover in Slovakia was not very high. In fact, the average MPs' turnover indicates that about half of them (47 per cent) were re-elected in each election. The trend has been quite unambiguous, with constant growth, despite the lowest level of MPs' re-election in 2002 (29 per cent) and the peak of re-election of outgoing deputies in 2012 (71 per cent). Vice versa, among the causes that could have affected MPs' defeat, it emerges that candidature not being renewed represents about one-quarter of the incumbents, with a decreasing trend since 2000, when the percentage reached the highest score in the period covered by the analysis (41 per cent). Then, looking at the variables related to the intraparty dimensions, Table 4.29 highlights the fact that the "list order" represents more than 15 per cent of the cases, with a decreasing trend until 2002 and new growth since 2006. That clearly means that, also in Slovakia, the decision of the party's organization to place one candidate in a good or bad list order position could effectively affect his/her chance of being re-elected. Moreover, among the factors explaining the interelection turnover in Slovakia, it is important to mention "partisan defeat". The latter variable had a relevant influence on the incumbents' defeats, as, in the last thirty years, the party's performance has represented on average about one-eighth of all the outgoing candidates. In fact, albeit with a decreasing trend since 2002 (26 per cent, which is the



peak of the entire period), 12 per cent of all cases fall into the category of those who experienced an electoral defeat because of their own party's electoral performance. Preferential voting represents the last variable among those included in the analysis but also the least important one. In fact, the level of influence of preference votes in determining the level of parliamentary turnover is quite low in Slovakia. Between 1994 and 2016, a rather insignificant percentage of incumbents was defeated on the basis of the number of votes collected. On average, only 1 per cent of all the outgoing candidates was replaced by a non-incumbent, who was able to collect more preference votes. Table 4.29 reports scores with a clear homogeneous trend—around 1 per cent—except for the 2012 elections, in which the share of those defeated thank to the preferences rose to 4 per cent. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the relevance of preference votes to the intraparty competition and turnover is not crucial in the Slovakian context. In the latter case, the electoral system is a flexible one, meaning that the preference votes are not the only criterion at the base of seat allocation, as there are electoral quota that candidates have to obtain as a minimum share to modify the party list order. Now, as Table 4.29 reports, the latter option only modifies the number of incumbents being re-elected in a very few cases. This implies that the parties' behaviour in making their list rank and the thresholds to modify the closed-list mechanism of seat allocation make it very difficult for preferences to matter. Although, as seen, a relevant share of voters cast preference votes, their influence on the interelection parliamentary turnover was very limited. In particular, in detail, it is possible to see that, in two elections, the percentages of challengers replacing incumbents due to preference votes was even equal to zero. As for the Czech case, the quota of preference votes to be obtained to overcome the closed-list mechanism of seat allocation has been modified. In 2006, the threshold was lowered from 10 to 3 per cent of the party's votes. Therefore, the framework according to which candidates who cross the threshold are placed in the front positions of the list has been modified. Nevertheless, the data collected for elections after this electoral change are not linear in their trend, as is not possible to establish whether voters benefited from the lowering of the threshold.

To sum up, it is possible to argue that, between 1994 and 2016, the most important variables explaining the intraparty competition and the parliamentary turnover in Slovakia were the fact that many outgoing candidates did not have their candidate status renewed and that about half

of them were simply re-elected. The analysis of data focused on defeats only, that is, excluding the MPs' who were re-elected, to emphasize or, better, to measure the weight of each variable connected to the intra-party dynamics, tell us that the preference votes only mattered in 2 per cent of all the incumbents' fate. The preferences were not relevant to the turnover, the party's choice not to allow MPs to run again for their seats (or their own decision) represented 46 per cent of the total defeats. Moreover, and related to the latter variable, the list order, as decided by the party's organization, generated about 30 per cent of the electoral defeats. Finally, just over one-fifth of all the interelection parliamentary turnover came from the negative performance of the party to which the candidate belonged. As indicated above, these data confirm the parties' strength in determining the MPs' destiny and the parliamentary turnover much more than the voters. In particular, the Slovakian case is interesting because the parties' electoral strategies and decision affected a crucial proportion of MPs' defeats, about three-quarters. In the same light, using the latter data, Table 4.30 reports the number of the deputies elected "out of the list order", who clearly represent a small minority. Between 1994 and 2016, on average, less than 10 per cent of all the incumbents were selected differently from the official party rank, representing 5 per cent of the total.

In terms of the theoretical implications of the data presented above, it is possible to argue that voters' influence is not very significant, as shown by the low rate of challengers replacing incumbents thanks to preference votes, while the role of parties seems to be more important. In fact, as underlined by André et al. (2017: 597), in Slovakia, as in the two other

**Table 4.30** Deputies elected out of the list order in Slovakia (1994–2016): general elections

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs</i>	<i>Out (n.)</i>	<i>Out (%)</i>
1994	150	10	6.7
1998	150	0	0
2002	150	1	0.7
2006	150	7	4.7
2010	150	11	7.3
2012	150	15	10.0
2016	150	13	8.7
Average		8.1	5.4

*Source* Author's elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Slovakia.  
<https://www.minv.sk/?ministry-of-interior>


countries (Belgium and Czech Republic) that they examine, “preference votes have an important indirect effect on a candidate’s prospects for a career in politics, capable of incentivizing them to spend considerable time and effort chasing preference votes”. This result is not in contrast with the data here, as the former refers to the candidacy and not the share of re-elections, in which those candidates who were elected and replaced via the preferences are very few and the list order matters (Spáč 2016).

The decision to confirm or change the party list ranking is crucial for incumbents, who lost their seat in almost one-fifth of cases because of this variable. Similarly, the partisan defeats represent an important issue for incumbents, who were often defeated because of their party’s negative performance. Parties’ organization matters more than voters in determining interelection parliamentary turnover in Slovakia, although, in a few ephemeral cases, voters can intervene by changing the list order and contributing to replacing an incumbent with a new challenger. This is an important point to be analysed from a comparative perspective, both with other flexible systems and with all the PLPR cases.

#### *4.1.20 Sweden: Few Preferences for Even Fewer Deputies Elected Thanks to Personal Votes*

Sweden is one of the latecomers to the big family of PLPR systems. As seen, since 1998, Sweden has used a flexible-list system, in which voters can cast both a list vote and a personal vote. Between 1998 and 2014, on average, over 25 per cent of voters regularly chose a candidate as well as a party, while a slow, albeit regular, decreasing trend is detectable. In fact, the proportion of preference votes cast fell by more than 5 percentage points (from 29.9 per cent in 1998 to 24.6 per cent in 2014) (Fig. 4.20).

The different reasons related to the parliamentary turnover between two consecutive elections in Sweden have had many levels of influence since 1998 (Table 4.31). The percentage of outgoing MPs being re-elected in the following election (also thanks to voters who confirmed their choice) was equal to 60 per cent on average, without any particular trend over time (the peak being in 2010 with 62 per cent). The second-biggest factor affecting the incumbents’ fate was the fact that, on average, 27 per cent of them were not allowed to run in the following election to try to confirm their seat (or decided not to run



**Fig. 4.20** Trends in preferential voting in Sweden (1998–2014) (Source Author's elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Sweden)

**Table 4.31** Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Sweden (1998–2014)

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs (#)</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>List order (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>Candidature not renewed (%)</i>	<i>Total</i>
1998	349						
2002	349	59.8	4.6	5.2	2.9	27.5	100
2006	349	56.8	8.0	1.7	2.6	30.9	100
2010	349	61.5	6.9	3.2	2.3	26.1	100
2014	349	60.7	2.6	4.9	4.6	27.2	100
Mean		59.7	5.5	3.8	3.1	27.9	

Source Author's elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Sweden. <https://www.government.se/government-of-sweden/>

again). This percentage was stable over time, with the only increase occurring in 2006 (30 per cent). Therefore, the number of those being re-elected plus that of those whose candidature was not renewed is equal to about 90 per cent of all the MPs' paths between the two elections.

Consequently, the third variable, which affects the parliamentary turnover in Sweden more, did not pass 6 per cent on average. However, the number of deputies' defeats due to the partisan negative performance decreased over time, falling from 5 per cent to less than 3 per cent. The official party rank and the preferences votes do not represent more than between 3 and 4 per cent for all the incumbents, in particular 3.8 per cent for the "list order" and 3.1 per cent for personal votes. However, although they represent barely the same proportion of MPs' turnover, the partisan defeats and the preferences show inverse paths when considered over time. In the former case, the trend was almost stable, except for the lowest score in 2006 (1.7 per cent), while, in the latter, the percentage grew from 2.9 per cent to 4.6 per cent, in particular in 2014. The former data can be explained on the basis of the changes that affected the electoral system. In fact, as seen in Chapter 3, between 1998 and 2014, the seats were allocated in the candidates' order on the party list, except when a candidate obtained 8 per cent of the party vote, while, in 2014, the threshold was lowered to 5 per cent. In those cases, as stated, the candidate at the bottom of the list can move upwards and participate in the seat allocation based on the number of personal votes of each candidate. Moreover, turning the focus to the reasons for electoral defeats in the interelection parliamentary turnover trend, the Swedish case clearly indicates its own characteristics. Almost half of the incumbents' defeats came from the fact that 70 per cent of outgoing MPs who were defeated did not have their candidature renewed. Furthermore, about 14 per cent of the defeats were generated by the negative electoral performances in which the beaten candidates were running for renewal. In terms of intra-party competition in a strict sense, it emerges that the party's list order represents about 10 per cent of all the defeats, while the preferences themselves did not reach 8 per cent of all the incumbents' replacements between 1998 and 2014.

In the light of the data presented above, the thresholds in the Swedish flexible-list electoral system seems to be important in terms of their influence on the interelection parliamentary turnover, albeit not as significantly as in other similar cases (as I detail in Chapters 5–6). Additional data come from the number of MPs elected out of the list order. Between 1998 and 2014, on average, about 77 deputies per year/election were selected outside the official party list order. The latter data

**Table 4.32** Deputies elected out of the list order in Sweden (1998–2014): general elections

<i>Election</i>	<i>MPs</i>	<i>Out (n.)</i>	<i>Out (%)</i>
1998	349	87	24.9
2002	349	86	24.6
2006	349	57	16.3
2010	349	59	16.9
2014	349	98	28.1
Average		77	22.2

*Source* Author's elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Sweden. <https://www.government.se/government-of-sweden/>

mean that about 22 per cent of all the outgoing MPs were replaced or re-elected according to personal preferences and, therefore, passed the legal threshold stating that candidates must obtain at least a certain number of preference votes to modify the party's list order (Table 4.32). Thus, these data of course include a number of incumbent MPs, but they tell us that the impact of preference votes, albeit not crucial, is increasing.

The proportion of preferences expressed at the European elections, as Sweden has also adopted PLPR for supranational elections. On average, more than half of the preferences potentially being expressed have been cast (56 per cent), with a peak in 1999 (more than two-thirds), while the lowest level was reached in the first European elections, in 1994 (45 per cent). From a diachronic perspective, it is possible to observe that preference votes have experienced a significant decline, especially after 1999 and three times in a row.

Finally, as preferential voting has also been adopted in Sweden to select the councillors of the subnational assembly, it is worth mentioning the data on regional elections. Between 1998 and 2014, Swedish voters cast on average about one-quarter of all the potential preference votes. Moreover, a decreasing trend can be detected, as a 6-percentage point decline was registered between the first and the latest regional elections that followed the preferential voting list system (from 29 per cent to less than 23 per cent, respectively, in 1998 and 2014).

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## Who Receives More Preference Votes and Who Is Elected?

### 5.1 CONCENTRATION OF PREFERENCE VOTES

To investigate the concentration of preference votes, I use the GINI index. “The Gini index seems the most defensible for three reasons: it has some intuitive appeal as a measure of dispersion, is approximately normally distributed across the database, and has a normed metric going from zero (complete equality of vote distribution) to unity (complete head-of-list dominance)”<sup>1</sup> (Wildgen 1985: 953). I calculate any given candidate’s share of preference votes. The Gini index is thus calculated on the basis of the preference votes cast for candidates. The Gini coefficient, as a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent inequality, is in this case a useful instrument to indicate the level of disproportion of votes among candidates of the same party. Thus, when the coefficient is zero, it expresses perfect equality, signifying that every candidate has the same number of preference votes. Vice versa, a Gini coefficient of one expresses maximal inequality among values: one single candidate has all the votes. This information is particularly important in comparing the effects of PLPR on voting behaviour and accordingly on internal party competition. Here, the Gini value is adopted to *determine which parties have a stronger “leader” and which parties show a higher degree of internal competition.*

<sup>1</sup>It is referred to here as the concentration of votes on a single candidate.

The values are obtained for general election years as well as for political parties (when data are available and reliable). This index (Gini) is based on the level of concentration of votes among candidates and tells us crucial information on parties, voters, and candidates. The greater the concentration of preference votes on one candidate, the lower the level of intraparty (open) competition, indicating a party organization centred on strong leadership. Voters are likely to perceive and support this status by awarding the top candidates their votes. They may also support the top candidates due to a lack of awareness of any other relevant candidates, a symptom of the party leadership's choice to elevate a single candidate to the virtual exclusion of all others. On the other side of the continuum of preference vote distribution, we may find a low Gini index value, meaning that the distribution of preference votes among the available candidates is quite homogeneous. This information is very important, because it signals the possibility that the given party fielded candidates with no relevant differences between them in terms of electoral or political strength. As a result, they each collect the same number of preference votes. The Gini index also tells us that the organizational structure of such a party is probably composed of different factions in horizontal competition, relegating the importance of any vertical hierarchical order. Additionally, in such a context, candidates are faced with intense open competition.<sup>2</sup>

Therefore, together with the Gini coefficient, I include a measure of preference vote shares of the first winner, which is important, because some parties have only one winner. In the case of PLPR, even if a party has several winners, it may have one "list-puller" who dominates the intraparty competition while others win seats only due to the pooling of the list-puller's votes (Bergman et al. 2013).<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup>The choice to adopt the Gini index as a measure of personal vote concentration is supported by a commonly held attitude in the literature (Karvonen 2004; Ortega 2004; Bergman et al. 2013). Other possible solutions, such as standard deviation, were considered but not adopted. SD quantifies the amount of variation of a set of data values, where a low standard deviation indicates that the data points tend to be close to the mean, while a high standard deviation indicates that the data points are spread out over a wider range of values. This is, however, important information in our case, as the most relevant information comes from knowledge about the concentration of consensus around the top candidates rather than the dispersion itself.

<sup>3</sup>They analyse *non-transferable* vote systems, such as OLPR and SNTV.

## 5.2 INTRAPARTY ELECTORAL COMPETITION

The second group of variables that I consider refers to intraparty competition. These variables are designed to capture variation in the effects of PLPR on party personnel selection. Incidentally, we know that candidate selectors do indeed take candidates' popularity into account when drawing up party lists (André et al. 2017). In fact, as personal votes are pooled, the party can benefit from that transfer.

By considering different variables, it is possible to evaluate which factor(s) explain more changes in parliamentary turnover and intraparty competition. In detail, I consider:

1. The number of outgoing MPs being re-elected;
2. The number of incumbents not being re-elected because their candidature was not renewed;
3. The number of incumbents defeated due to their party's negative electoral performance;
4. The number of candidates' defeats generated by their poor position on the party's list vis à vis the previous election;
5. The number of outgoing deputies defeated as a consequence of purely intraparty competition, that is, having received a smaller number of preference votes despite a challenger not being an MP in the previous legislature.

Following a general comparison of all the PLPR cases included in the research, I then focus on differentiation among OLPR and flexible countries.

Let us envision, in detail, the possible scenarios and consequences for parties for each variable included. Imagine that, in a given country, we have a parliament (lower chamber) composed of 100 outgoing MPs. In the following election, there are different possibilities in terms of intraparty electoral competition and turnover. The first step is to consider how many of those incumbents were re-elected. In the literature, two main crucial comparative studies on turnover use the measure that aims to consider the proportion of outgoing deputies who, having been

elected in one election, were elected in the next election (Katz 1986: 97). I follow this approach.<sup>4</sup>

In our example, there are 40, meaning that 40% of outgoing deputies were confirmed in the next general election. Of course, we should consider, together with other variables, such as the rank list, the impact of the preference votes given to them and thus the voters' choice and influence, albeit with differences of relevance varying across the four PLRP subtypes. Here, I am basically dealing with the reasons for MPs' turnover as something that is measurable with quantitative analysis. The second step is to consider how many of the outgoing MPs were not re-elected. Having calculated the share of re-elected MPs, this is quite an easy and intuitive task. It does not add any supplementary information to our knowledge about the intraparty competition and dynamics. In fact, knowing that 60 (or 60% in our example) outgoing deputies were not re-elected "just" tells us, albeit in a different way, something that we have already calculated, that is, the level of intra-election MP turnover. Of course, this information covers many aspects of party behaviour as well as electoral and party system effects. However, I would take a step further in analysing electoral systems' effects on parties' internal life, in particular their level of turnover, as originating from the intraparty competition. The most interesting information, both theoretically and empirically, comes from the variables that explain why MPs were *not* re-elected. After step two, different possibilities arise, with a large number of factors affecting the probability of being confirmed as an MP. The first explanatory variable concerns political parties' electoral performance. To calculate how many outgoing MPs were not re-elected due to partisan reasons (not strictly intraparty competition), I consider the following: "if no nonincumbent on a party's list was elected in a given constituency, then all defeats of incumbents on the list were regarded as 'partisans defeats'" (Katz 1986: 98). This variable basically considers the defeats as a result of the performance of the party and not that of the outgoing MPs. As the example below shows, five MPs from the

<sup>4</sup>The other three possible counts are the following: (1) the proportion of outgoing deputies who, having been incumbents at the end of the lifetime of a parliament and having contested the ensuing election, are elected; (2) the proportion of outgoing deputies who, having been incumbents at the end of the lifetime of a parliament, are elected in the ensuing election; and (3) unity minus the proportion of deputies who are first-term members (Bowler and Grofman 2000: 83).

**Box 5.1** Example of “partisan defeat” in PLPR systems

<i>Election time 1</i> (five MPs from party “X”)	<i>Election time 2</i> (four MPs from party “X”)
<i>Outgoing MPs:</i>	<i>Renewed candidature:</i>
Red	Red
Blue	Blue
Yellow	Yellow
Brown	Brown
Orange	<i>Orange (not re-elected)</i>

*Source* Author’s own elaboration

party “Red” were elected in constituency X in an election held at time 1 (Box 5.1). In the following election (time 2), the same party won four seats only in constituency X. Consequently, the party lost one MP between the two elections. In this case, there was *not* a non-incumbent replacing him/her via intraparty competition, that is, via preference votes. This implies that the defeat was due only to the party’s performance. In fact, the party “Red” only won four seats instead of five in the past election. This also implies that the candidate “Orange” lost the seat *only* because he/she was the lowest in the party’ list order in terms of preference votes received. Therefore, as a result of the party winning one seat fewer than in the past, he/she was not confirmed as an MP.<sup>5</sup>

Continuing the exploration of the possible factors affecting the chances of an MP being re-elected, I now turn to the “intraparty” dimension. Here, I consider the possibility that outgoing MPs not being re-elected is an effect of intraparty competition: “if at least one nonincumbent was elected in a constituency, then all defeats of incumbents of the same party were regarded as ‘intrapartisan defeat’” (Katz 1986: 98). Unlike point two (partisan defeat), here I assume that at least one non-incumbent MP was elected in the following election. This means that the “new” MP replaced one of the outgoing MPs. However, considering that a “new” candidate has replaced an incumbent one tells us partial information only. In fact, the question of the exact cause of this defeat remains unanswered: is it a

<sup>5</sup>Theoretically, it could also be the case that candidate X was not re-elected due to both his/her party’s failure and his/her own lack of ability to obtain a similar personal vote as in the previous election. Unfortunately, assessing this empirically is problematic, because data of this nature are simply not available on a large scale (only a case study of some districts could be conducted in the future).

**Box 5.2** Example of “intraparty defeat due to the list order” in PLPR systems

<i>Election time 1</i> (five MPs from party “X”)	<i>Election time 2</i> (five MPs from party “X”)
<i>Outgoing MPs:</i>	<i>Renewed candidature:</i>
Red	Red
Blue	Blue
Yellow	Yellow
Brown	Brown
Orange	<i>Black (elected): s/he was NOT an incumbent</i>
	<i>Orange (not re-elected)</i>

*Source* Author’s own elaboration

combination of intraparty competition and the party list order? Thus, I present two possible scenarios:

1. In the first scenario, an incumbent is defeated by a “new candidate”. Here, the electoral result can be seen as a consequence “of list order if the new candidates were given a more favorable list position than the incumbents who were defeated” (Katz 1986: 98). In this case, a candidate standing for re-election at time 2 is replaced by a new candidate who was a non-incumbent at time 1. Although the party has won the same number of seats, the incumbent is not confirmed, because the party’s list order placed him/her in a less favourable position than in the past. In my example (see Box 5.2), candidate “Orange” lost his/her seat due to the superior position of candidate “Black” on the party’s list. This scenario is obviously only possible in flexible-list systems in which the party’s list order matters. If the thresholds to overcome the party list order are not reached, then the system does not function as an OLPR system but rather as a CLPR one. Therefore, the relevance of the candidates’ position on their party’s list becomes crucial in determining who is elected. As stated, this variable is considered only in countries that feature a flexible-list system.
2. A second possible scenario is a situation of typical internal competition: a defeat due to intraparty preference votes per se. In this case, the candidate “Orange” lost the seat because s/he obtained fewer preference votes than a newly elected non-incumbent MP (Box 5.3). Of course, this scenario only applies to OLPR and

**Box 5.3** Example of “intraparty defeat due to preference votes” in PLPR systems

<i>Election time 1</i> (five MPs from party “X”)	<i>Election time 2</i> (five MPs from party “X”)
<i>Outgoing MPs:</i>	<i>Renewed candidature:</i>
Red	Red
Blue	Blue
Yellow	Yellow
Brown	Brown
Orange	<i>Orange (not re-elected)</i>
	<i>Black (elected): s/he was NOT an incumbent</i>

Source Author’s own elaboration

flexible-list systems in which candidates overcome fixed thresholds to compete on the basis of preference votes. A critical conceptual distinction must be made between OLPR systems and flexible-list systems. In the former, all “non-incumbent” elected MPs can be considered as “newly” elected by definition. The crucial point is that they can be so *only* through preference vote competition. Therefore, it can be said that, in OLPR, *all* new MPs are such thanks to the preference votes that they have been able to gather. In flexible-list cases, this cannot be taken for granted. If a non-incumbent is elected in a given election, this is not necessarily due to the preference vote competition. In fact, s/he could have obtained the seat simply because s/he was placed in a strong position on the party’s rank list.<sup>6</sup>

The final cause of MP turnover comes from outgoing candidates who did not stand for re-election. This variable concerns intraparty dynamics and indicates that political parties decided, prior to the elections, not to confirm a given politician’s candidacy, thus automatically rendering his/her re-election impossible. Moreover, it is also likely that some of these MPs retired voluntarily (due to age, negative expectations that they would not secure enough preference votes to be re-elected, etc.) (Matland and Studlar 2004). Therefore, the data allow a comparison of the impact of different PLPR systems on the intraparty dynamics and

<sup>6</sup>I consider this difference when calculating the data.

outcomes. When data for these variables are available and reliable at the party level, they enable interparty comparisons.

As stated, each variable<sup>7</sup> responds to a theoretical research question. Between two consecutive elections, the turnover can basically be seen as the amount of outgoing MPs who are re-elected. However, some scholars also consider the number of candidates who have been elected at any point in the past. In this work, I consider only those candidates who were elected in the most recent election. In any case, MPs' fate can be considered a dichotomy between being re-elected and not being re-elected. However, this important information does not supply all the necessary details on the MPs' destiny. In fact, there can be different causes related to their "defeat" or, better, non re-election. Among those who did not obtain a seat, it is possible to distinguish between those who were "simply" not renominated and those who were defeated in the election. The problem is that, more often than not, the latter category remains a sort of "catch-all" folder that includes all defeats. We know very well that this is not the case. Although the difficulties in collecting data represent the main reason for a dearth of investigations into the real and variant reasons for such defeats, our conclusions cannot simply coexist with this lack of information and knowledge. In PLPR electoral systems, the variety of potential factors behind an MP's electoral defeat are even more diverse than under other systems. As I have detailed, the defeat of an incumbent in a PLPR system can be attributed to (1) "partisan defeats", when no non-incumbent on a party's list was elected in a given district, which implies that all defeats of incumbents on the list were due to negative party performance; (2) "intrapartisan defeat": (a) if at least one non-incumbent was elected in a constituency, then the defeats must be due to the intraparty preference vote competition; (b) the defeat may also be due to the list order, that is, to the new candidate being given a more favourable list position than the defeated incumbent.

<sup>7</sup>(1) Percentage of outgoing MPs re-elected in the following election. (2) If no non-incumbent on a party's list was elected in a given district, then all defeats of incumbents on the list are regarded as "partisan defeats" or, better, interparty defeats. (3–4) If at least one non-incumbent was elected in a district, then all defeats of incumbents of the same party are regarded as "intrapartisan defeats": (3) the result of the list order if the new candidates were given a more favourable list position than the incumbents who were defeated; (4) or the intraparty preference vote. (5) Number of outgoing MPs not re-nominated in the following election.



The data analysis is thus related to the research question concerning the extent of the preference votes' effect on the parliamentary turnover/intraparty dynamics.

### 5.3 LEVELS OF INTRAPARTY DYNAMICS

In terms of theoretically possible outcomes, we can imagine a continuum of intraparty electoral competition. On one side of the spectrum, we find that preference votes matter. This implies that the competition among candidates within a party is real, effective, and based on personal electoral capital more than partisan dynamics, albeit not exclusively based on personal votes. In such cases, however, the political parties still play a role (for example in deciding whether to allow or disallow a nomination). At the other end of the spectrum, we may find that political parties are the main, almost exclusive, actors in determining MPs' electoral fate between two consecutive elections. In this situation, the role and influence of voters' preferences is quite limited or even null, meaning that PLPR's features do not matter.

To measure the level of intraparty electoral competition, it is prudent to conceive of two alternate paths. On the first path (STRICT), I refer to the two situations in which PLPR's system features affect the intraparty competition *directly* and, therefore, measure the personal votes of each challenger. Moreover, considering the PLPR subtypes and the variables included to measure the level of intraparty competition, it is possible to have two scenarios: (1) preferences votes+list order, as in the *flexible-list* cases; (2) preference votes, for the open-list systems. Vice versa, in the second case (AT LARGE), I also include in the group of variables affecting the intraparty competition the party organization's choice *before* the election itself, which is the compiling of the party official list. In a sense, I consider part of the intraparty competition to happen in the party organization, in which the fight is related to the decision on being allowed to run again or being dismissed. Therefore, as above, it is possible to have two scenarios, depending on the PLPR characteristics: preferences votes+list order+non-renewed candidature, in *flexible-list systems*, and preferences votes+non-renewed candidature, for the *open-list* cases. Consequently, calculating the data on one of the two approaches implies giving more or less weight to the preferences themselves (how much the preferences count in the total of the interelection turnover) or, better,

to focus on the influence of the personal votes on the total number of MPs' defeats. Therefore, it is possible to observe the variation in intra-party dynamics as explained by the different PLPR systems' features.

## 5.4 PLPR AND ITS SUBTYPES: A COMPARISON

### 5.4.1 *National Elections*

The core of intraparty competition is well represented by the following Tables 5.1 and 5.2. They respectively indicate the weight of different variables on the interelection turnover in national elections for both PLPR subtypes, namely the flexible-list and latent-list systems, and quasi-list systems. First, I focus on each factor through a comparison between the countries of both groups as well as a general comparison of all the cases included in the research. In Chapter 6, I present a comparison of all the PLPR subtypes cases. Therefore, the general comparison is followed first by an analysis of each PLPR subtype, then the geographical pattern, and finally the main consequences of preferential voting to offer a generalization.

**Table 5.1** The impact of different variables on the parliamentary turnover in flexible-list systems and latent-list systems (average) (%)

<i>Country</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>List order defeats (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>MPs not re-candidate (%)</i>	<i>Total %</i>
Austria	62.0	6.8	8.8	0.2	22.2	100
Belgium	60.7	7.7	3.9	3.6	24.1	100
Bulgaria	41.2	21.3	6.8	16.3	14.4	100
Croatia	67.6	6.6	0.7	11.9	13.2	100
Czech Republic	46.2	5.4	16	3.1	29.3	100
Denmark	69.3	14.2	2.5	2.7	11.3	100
Estonia	55.6	11.6		16	16.8	100
Netherlands	59.9	13.9	4.7	0.6	20.9	100
Slovakia	46.9	12	15.6	1.00	24.5	100
Sweden	59.7	5.6	3.7	3.1	27.9	100
Average	56.9	10.5	7	5.9	20.5	
St. dv.	9.36	5.08	5.53	6.34	6.25	

*Source* Author's elaboration on countries' ministers of interior and/or national electoral committees

**Table 5.2** The impact of different variables on the parliamentary turnover in open-list systems and quasi-list systems (average) (%)

<i>Country</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>List order defeats (%)</i>	<i>PV (%)</i>	<i>MPs not re-candidate (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Brazil	52.2	13.8	<i>not apply</i>	7.1	26.9	100
Chile	63.0	14.9	<i>not apply</i>	0	22.1	100
Cyprus	43.0	2.7	<i>not apply</i>	8.2	46.1	100
Finland	60.4	2.9	<i>not apply</i>	17.0	19.7	100
Greece	43.1	8.7	<i>not apply</i>	19.7	28.5	100
Kosovo	37.5	8.3	<i>not apply</i>	34.6	19.6	100
Italy	48.5	7.5	<i>not apply</i>	6.2	37.8	100
Peru	25.7	13.8	<i>not apply</i>	14.8	45.7	100
Poland	42.4	18.5	<i>not apply</i>	10.2	28.9	100
Average	46.2	10.1		13.1	30.6	
St. dv.	11.49	5.48		10.07	10.33	

*Source* Author's elaboration on countries' ministers of interior and/or national electoral committees

As described in the previous chapters, I collect data on five variables that each carry potential effects on MP turnover. To recall briefly the rationale behind the variables' selection, the research question motivating this analysis concerns the measurement of the influence of preferential voting on intraparty competition to determine whether preferences really matter in selecting deputies or whether other variables are more relevant.

## 5.5 FLEXIBLE-LIST AND LATENT-LIST SYSTEMS

Starting from the variable of interelection turnover, on average, 57 per cent of incumbents in flexible-list systems and latent-list systems are regularly re-elected. The data (Table 5.1) clearly indicate a divide between countries above the mean (Denmark, Croatia, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands, all above 60 per cent; Sweden, 59.7 per cent) and those below the limit of 50 per cent (Estonia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria, which has the smallest rate of returning incumbents with about 40 per cent).

Moreover, turning to the main reasons for MPs' defeat or failure to secure re-election, data indicates that slightly more than one-fifth (20.2 per cent) of them were not confirmed in their position because

of non-renewed candidature. In terms of countries' differences, more than half of them are located above the mean (to be precise, the Czech Republic, with the highest score, Sweden, Slovakia, and Belgium, as well as the Netherlands and Austria, which are just a few decimals above: 20.5 and 20.4 per cent, respectively), namely, in decreasing order, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Slovakia, Belgium, and the Netherlands. At the bottom of the table, we find Estonia, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Denmark, with significantly lower scores.

Having considered the two main variables that affect interelection turnover, namely being re-elected and non-renewed candidature, I now shift the focus to the main causes of MPs' defeat. As previously indicated, there are three main causes of incumbents' defeat when running for re-election under a PLPR system. In the case of both flexible-list and latent-list systems, "partisan defeat" was responsible for about one-tenth of MPs' fates (10.5 per cent).

Five cases are above 10 per cent and the general average: Bulgaria, Denmark, Netherlands, Slovakia, and Estonia. All the other countries fall below that threshold, as Belgium, Austria, Croatia, Sweden, and the Czech Republic register scores between 8 and 5 per cent.

The fourth variable in terms of the relative weight of influence on interelection turnover is the "list order". This final factor accounts for about 6 per cent of the variation in turnover. There are significant differences between four cases, which show percentages above the mean, specifically Austria (9 per cent), Bulgaria (6.8 per cent), and in particular the Czech Republic and Slovakia, with values around 16 per cent each. Further below that benchmark are all the other cases, ranging from the 5 per cent of the Netherlands to the unimportant 0.7 per cent of Croatia, while between them we find Belgium (3.9 per cent), and Denmark (2.5 per cent), as well as Estonia, with an astonishing case of 0, which, as stated in the paragraph on the Baltic country, can be explained by the electoral system's peculiarities.

Finally, the preferential voting variable must be analysed as well. It is important to identify the magnitude of preference votes' influence on the interelection turnover in both flexible-list and latent-list electoral systems. On average, for the ten cases included in the research, I find that preference votes matter for barely 6 per cent (6.1), a small average score that nonetheless represents a large variation among the countries studied. Excluding the Bulgarian, Estonian, and Croatian cases, which represent outliers with their percentages of about 12 per cent, findings

indicate that all the other cases are located around the mean, with low percentages (Belgium: 3.6 per cent, Denmark and the Czech Republic: 3.1 per cent, and Austria: 2 per cent). Finally, there are two cases for which the influence of preference votes on the interelection turnover is even smaller and almost statistically insignificant: Slovakia (1 per cent) and the Netherlands (0.6 per cent).

Considering data, beyond the differences between countries, it is possible to see that, at the aggregate level, the most important variable in flexible-list and latent-list electoral systems that affects the intraparty dynamics is the number of incumbents being re-elected. If, in the latter case, this is true for far more than half of the sample, preference votes account for just 6 per cent. Therefore, more than 75 per cent of incumbent MPs' fate depends on whether their candidature is renewed, the likelihood of it not being renewed being 22 per cent. In addition, incumbent MPs depend on preference votes to be re-elected, like all candidates, but the data indicate that the preferences and intraparty competition are not very influential. The true intraparty competition variables only account for the remaining 25 per cent. However, among those variables, the most influential is partisan defeat (10 per cent), which exerts a far greater impact than both the preference votes and the list order. It is thus evident that, in these two PLPR subtypes, preferences do not affect the interelection turnover or have, at best, a minor influence.

## 5.6 OLPR AND QUASI-LIST SYSTEMS

I turn now to an analysis of the second part of the PLPR electoral system group. As for the case of flexible-list and latent-list systems, I now compare each variable by country in the groups of OLPR and quasi-list systems. The number of incumbents re-elected, which in general represents about half of the cases, shows an important difference between the top-listed countries and those that are below the mean (Table 5.2). Chile has the highest rate of incumbency re-election (63 per cent), followed by Finland (60 per cent) and Brazil (52 per cent). Further from the top is Italy, which lies around the mean (48 per cent). We then find Greece and Cyprus together, with 43 per cent, and Poland slightly below (42 per cent). Finally, we have Kosovo, with a significant 37 per cent, and then the Peruvian case, with a considerably lower score (26 per cent).

Considering the possible reasons for MPs' defeat, not have their candidature renewed in the following election seems to be a very important factor. In fact, the latter accounts, on average, for about 30 per cent of incumbents' electoral outcomes between two elections in the countries included in the research. Moreover, among the OLPR and quasi-list systems, there are variations in terms of the share of MPs not having their candidature renewed. The highest scores are found in Cyprus (46 per cent) and Peru (43 per cent), followed by Italy (38 per cent) and Poland, barely in line with the average of the entire sample (29 per cent). Then there are countries with lower scores, such as Brazil, although it is not that far from the mean (27 per cent), whilst, in Chile, Finland (22 and 20 per cent, respectively), and Kosovo (19.6 per cent), the impact of candidature non-renewal is closer to one-fifth.

In terms of intraparty competition defeats, Table 5.2 indicates the share of "partisan defeats", which account for about 10 per cent of the turnover. Internal variation between countries is also important in this case. Two cases, Finland and Cyprus, are outliers registering the lowest levels (about 3 per cent). The top cases are grouped well above the mean: Poland and Peru (18 per cent), closely followed by Chile and Brazil (14.9 and 13.8 per cent, respectively). Therefore, this bipolar distribution is accompanied by the remaining cases, which account for about 8 per cent (Greece, Kosovo, and Italy).

Focusing on preferences, it becomes clear that this variable had an impact of about 13 per cent on average on MPs' turnover between two consecutive elections. Besides the top case, represented by two countries—Greece (19.7 per cent) and Finland (17 per cent)—there is Kosovo, which represents the peak with its highest score (34.6 per cent). Behind this outlier, there are two countries located around the mean (Peru: 13 per cent; Poland: 10 per cent), whilst the remaining countries fall far below 10 per cent, with Cyprus (8 per cent), Brazil (7 per cent), Italy (6 per cent), and Chile (0 per cent). The latter case is due to its electoral system's peculiarities, as illustrated in the ad hoc paragraph and as presented as a consequence of a pre-electoral selection of candidates to be substituted.

In sum, one can argue that, in OLPR and latent-list electoral systems, the weight of preference votes is not completely uninfluential, as it accounts for about 13 per cent of the turnover, but it is significantly less important than other variables, such as partisan defeats and non-renewal of candidature.

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## When Preferences Matter More

### 6.1 OPEN LIST V. FLEXIBLE LIST: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

At this point, having reported the data on each variable and on each country belonging to both of the two groups of PLPR electoral systems in detail, it is interesting to compare the two groups in general terms. Although there are different variables and as many approaches to be taken into account when studying the political turnover, here—as repeated—I am dealing with the impact of the electoral system, namely PLPR. For example, as discussed by Matland and Studlar (2004), it is important to consider the level of electoral volatility, the time between elections, and the age of the democracy. Here, I make a comparison following a multivariate approach, also controlling for same variables that they include as well as a few others.

Table 6.1 presents very interesting results. Of the five variables considered as possible outcomes in the incumbents' political and electoral paths, it is possible to compare only four of them. In fact, as reported, the “list order” does not apply to the OLPR systems and the quasi-list system. Therefore, the comparison indicates that, in three out of four cases, the couple of OLPR + quasi-list shows larger than average percentages for countries in the flexible-list and latent-list groups. In fact, in the OLPR and quasi-list systems, the partisan defeats, the possibility of not having candidature renewed, and preference votes account for more, on average, in terms of interelection turnover. Vice versa, the only factor that matters more in flexible + latent list systems is re-election, that is, the



**Table 6.1** The impact of different variables on the parliamentary turnover in PLPR systems (average per sub-types) (%)

Flexible lists + latent list	57.0	10.5	6.3	6.1	20.2
OLPR + quasi lists	46.2	10.6	not apply	12.9	30.3
<i>DIFF. (p.p.)</i>	10.8	-0.1	n.a	-6.8	-10.1

*Source* Author's elaboration on countries' minister of interior and/or national electoral committee

share of MPs confirmed in the following election. This is very important, innovative, and not only carries empirical relevance but also confirms a crucial theoretical consequence. First, it can be said that preferential voting matters more in OLPR, as we would expect theoretically, as voters' behaviour is much more likely to influence the election of a particular candidate. Vice versa, the distinctly smaller impact of preference votes in flexible-list systems (more than 50 per cent smaller in percentage points than in OLPR systems: 6.1 per cent vs. 12.9 per cent) confirms the importance of the presence of thresholds, which, when unmet, cause the electoral system to function as CLPR. The other data emphasize the fact that, in flexible-list cases, the influence and power of political parties in determining or at least having a greater say in MPs' turnover is more pervasive than in OLPR systems. This consideration is confirmed by the fact that the share of incumbents' re-election in flexible-list countries is larger than that in OLPR systems (57 per cent to 46.2 per cent). The empirical evidence suggests that political parties can manage a considerable number of re-election outcomes prior to the election through its control over the party's list rank order. This strategy is further supported by the presence of generally high or efficient thresholds (in terms of personal votes to be obtained) that make it difficult for candidates placed low on the list to shape the party's list order and replace their top-of-the-list comrades.

To complete the analysis, and to derive the main differences among countries belonging to different PLPR subtypes, I turn now to a comparison of all the cases included in the research. I focus on each variable to observe the variation between cases (Table 6.2).

I start with the number of re-elections. Seven of the top ten scores registered for incumbents' re-election come from the flexible-list group. These countries (Denmark, Croatia, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Estonia) are squarely at the top with results greater than the mean and above 60 per cent, whilst, among the OLPR cases, only Chile, where the

**Table 6.2** The impact of different variables on the parliamentary turnover in PLPR systems (average per country) (%)

<i>Country</i>	<i>MPs re-elected (%)</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Partisan defeat (%)</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>MPs not re-candidate (%)</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Preference votes defeats (%)</i>
Denmark	69.3	Bulgaria	21.3	Cyprus	46.1	Kosovo	34.6
Croatia	67.6	Poland	18.5	Peru	43.5	Greece	19.7
Chile	63.0	Peru	17.7	Italy	37.8	Finland	17.0
Austria	62.0	Chile	14.9	Czech Republic	29.3	Bulgaria	16.3
Belgium	60.7	Denmark	14.2	Poland	28.9	Estonia	16.0
Netherlands	60.5	Netherlands	13.8	Greece	28.5	Peru	12.7
Finland	60.4	Brazil	13.8	Sweden	27.9	Croatia	11.9
Sweden	59.7	Slovakia	12.0	Brazil	26.9	Poland	10.2
Estonia	55.6	Estonia	11.6	Slovakia	24.5	Cyprus	8.2
Brazil	52.2	Greece	8.7	Belgium	24.1	Brazil	7.1
Italy	48.5	Kosovo	8.3	Chile	22.1	Italy	6.2
Slovakia	46.9	Belgium	7.7	Netherlands	20.5	Belgium	3.6
Czech Republic	46.3	Italy	7.5	Austria	20.4	Denmark	3.1
Greece	43.1	Austria	6.8	Finland	19.7	Sweden	3.1
Cyprus	43.0	Croatia	6.6	Kosovo	19.6	Czech Republic	3.1
Poland	42.4	Sweden	5.6	Estonia	16.8	Austria	2.0
Bulgaria	41.2	Czech Republic	5.4	Bulgaria	14.4	Slovakia	1.0
Kosovo	37.5	Finland	2.9	Croatia	13.2	Netherlands	0.6
Peru	26.1	Cyprus	2.7	Denmark	10.9	Chile	0
Mean	51.9	Mean	10.5	Mean	25.0	Mean	9.3

*Source* Author's elaboration on countries' minister of interior and/or national electoral committee  
*Note* In bold the flexible-list systems

party organization matters as well as the importance of *M* (equal to 2), Finland (60 per cent), Brazil (52 per cent), and partially Italy (48 per cent) register comparable scores. All the other cases are far from the mean, and the large majority have an OLPR system, except for Bulgaria.

The partisan defeat variable does not show any particular or clear pattern in the difference between flexible-list cases and OLPR cases (Table 6.2). Rather, there is a group of countries at the top (Poland, Peru, Chile, the Netherlands, and Denmark: between 18 and 14 per cent) and Bulgaria, which represents the peak with 21 per cent. The latter cases stand significantly above the score registered for other countries, such as Belgium, Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, and Finland. After all, as stated, from a theoretical point of view, the rate of partisan defeats truly depends not only on the electoral system per se but also on the parties' performance. Vice versa, as just seen, parties can face the electoral challenge by "saving" a number of people acting on the list order, and this is much more feasible in flexible-list contexts, as the data have aptly confirmed.

Considering data featuring the rank of countries with the highest scores for the number of incumbents not having their candidature renewed, does not show any particular connection between flexible-list and OLPR systems either. In fact, it is possible that, among the cases above the mean, there are as many OLPR systems as flexible-list ones, although Cyprus, Peru, and Italy appear far above the others, with 46 per cent, 43 per cent, and 38 per cent, respectively. At the bottom, we find Finland, Croatia, and Denmark. Vice versa, most of the countries with a score below the mean are flexible-list systems, with Estonia, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Denmark falling well below 20 per cent and the Danish case scoring only 10 per cent.

Finally, but certainly not the least-important variable, I focus on the impact of preference votes by country. Data tells us that significant differences arise between OLPR and flexible-list cases. As expected, with the exceptions of Bulgaria and Estonia (16 per cent), and to some extent Croatia (12 per cent), all the cases located above the mean belong to the OLPR subtype of the PLPR family. In particular, it is the case of Kosovo that stands as an outlier, with 34 per cent, followed by Greece with about 20 per cent and then Finland with half the Kosovar score (17 per cent). Significantly, all those cases are well below the mean of all the sample (9.3 per cent), signalling a clear divide between the flexible systems and the open-list ones.

Conversely, all the countries at the bottom of the rank are cases adopting a flexible-list electoral system (with the peculiar exception of Chile). In the middle, we have cases such as Peru (12 per cent), Poland (10 per cent), Brazil (7 per cent), and Italy (6 per cent), which registered far higher scores than the highest-scoring flexible-list systems (3 per cent). These data confirm—again with the exception of Chile, where the intraparty competition is decided before the election via the party’s primaries or the central office’s decision—that the level of “preferential voting” system openness depends on voters’ power to influence the selection of candidates for election and that the presence of thresholds makes a crucial difference in turning flexible-list systems into functionally CLPR systems.

In terms of intraparty competition and interelection turnover, it is also possible and appropriate to conduct an analysis that focuses on electoral/intraparty defeats only. One can, in fact, make a comparison by taking into account the different reasons that have generated an MP’s defeat. In this way, one can measure the influence and the weight of each factor connected to the intraparty competition. In particular, this comparison allows us to consider the impact of preference votes as a single variable related to the total amount of interelection turnover. Therefore, Table 6.3 reports the incidence of each of the different variables generating a defeat as a percentage of the total of MPs overthrown. In particular, Tables 6.3 and 6.4 focus on the comparison of the partisan, list order, and preference vote defeats only. All the latter are in fact the sole factor related to the electoral patterns and so to the voters’ choice, whilst candidature renewal is a sort of pre-electoral decision that parties or sometimes also outgoing candidates will make. In particular, focusing on these variables allows us to identify the different patterns related to the impact of the preference votes in different countries and PLPR subtypes alike.

Table 6.3 allows for a cross-country comparison, which has never been performed in the past. The most important impact of preference votes is in Croatia, followed by Estonia and Bulgaria, with scores well above 40 per cent. Then we have two countries for which the scores are around the mean (24 per cent), Sweden (25 per cent) and Belgium (19.1 per cent). Finally, the remaining sample consists of the Czech Republic and Estonia with 12 per cent and the others with a marginal score of 3 per cent.

**Table 6.3** The rate of intraparty electoral defeats in flexible-list systems (average) (%)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>List order defeats (%)</i>	<i>Preference votes defeats (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Austria	42.0	54.6	3.4	100
Belgium	52.3	28.6	19.1	100
Bulgaria	43.5	15.1	41.4	100
Croatia	34.5	3.4	62.1	100
Czech Republic	22.1	65.3	12.6	100
Denmark	79.6	8.4	12.0	100
Estonia	42.6	0	57.4	100
Netherlands	72.5	24.4	3.1	100
Slovakia	41.9	54.4	3.7	100
Sweden	44.8	30.2	25.0	100
Average	47.6	28.5	24.0	100

*Source* Author's elaboration on countries' minister of interior and/or national electoral committee

**Table 6.4** The rate of intraparty electoral defeats in OLPR systems (average) (%)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Partisan defeats (%)</i>	<i>Preference votes defeats (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Brazil	64.6	35.4	100
Chile	100	0	100
Cyprus	23.9	76.1	100
Finland	11.2	88.8	100
Greece	31.0	69.0	100
Italy	53.7	46.3	100
Kosovo	19.4	80.6	100
Peru	49.5	50.5	100
Poland	73.8	26.2	100
Average	47.5	52.5	100

*Source* Author's elaboration on countries' minister of interior and/or national electoral committee

A similar analysis can be conducted with the OLPR systems. Table 6.4 reports the percentages for the preference votes and the partisan defeats, as, in open-list systems, there is no list order variable by definition. It is worth mentioning that, among the outgoing MPs' defeats, the influence of the preference votes is remarkable in Finland, Kosovo, and Cyprus, all well above 75 per cent, and Greece, which can be associated with

this group too, with 69 per cent. Then we have Peru, Brazil, and finally Poland, where the preference votes affect only 25 per cent of all the electoral defeats, despite a mean of 52 per cent. The latter data are particularly relevant if compared with the numbers of the flexible-list systems, in which, as seen, the impact of the preference votes on the total electoral defeats is 24 per cent, which is less than half and a difference of 28 percentage points. Therefore, these data also confirm the different outcomes that OLPR and flexible-list systems generate for intraparty dynamics and parliamentary turnover. The latter result is particularly evident in the case of preference votes. In fact, even though that could have appeared unsurprising to some, the impact of PLPR systems on the intraparty electoral competition has never been tested comparatively and extensively before.

Finally, I focus on the weight and impact of the thresholds on the parliamentary turnover as well. Table 6.5 presents the list of countries with flexible-list systems. In those cases, it is possible for candidates to be elected out of the list order if they satisfy the quota established, making the system function as an open-list system. The number of candidates who are then elected via this option constitutes an important indicator of the openness of the system and the real impact of preferential voting. Therefore, calculating these data is extremely important both theoretically and empirically. However, if one considers only the raw number of MPs elected out of the list order, then the comparison with other countries would lack reliability or utility. In this case, the “only” feasible approach is to conduct a diachronic comparison country by country. Vice versa, taking into account the percentage of MPs selected via preference votes, those who have dismantled the list order constraints, allows researchers to compare the different weights that preference votes carry across many flexible systems. The data reported in Table 6.5 clearly stress that there is a great level of variation among the ten countries analysed. If we consider the average of MPs elected out of the list order per period in each country, it becomes clear that, in Sweden, it has been less difficult to elect candidates by reaching the established quota. In fact, more than one-fifth of all Swedish MPs considered were selected as if the electoral system worked as an OLPR system. The two countries of the former Czechoslovakia follow in this rank. The Czech Republic shows a significant 8 per cent of deputies, while in Slovakia this variable accounts for about 5 per cent of MPs.

**Table 6.5** The influence of thresholds in 10 flexible-list systems

<i>Period</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>MPs elected out of the list order (%) (mean of the period)</i>	<i>MPs elected out of the list order (n.) (mean of the period)</i>	<i>Quota</i>
1999–2013	Austria	0.6	3	50% of the electoral quota at the regional level; one-sixth of the party's votes at the regional level
1919–2014	Belgium	1.7	2.9	party votes in district/party seats in district + 1
1945–2014	Belgium	2.1	3.5	party votes in district/party seats in district + 1
2014–	Bulgaria	n.a.	n.a.	7 per cent of the party's votes nationwide
2015–	Croatia	n.a.	n.a.	10 per cent of the party's votes nationwide
1996–2013	Czech Republic	8	16	5 per cent (at the district level)
1971	Denmark	n.a.	n.a.	party votes in district/party seats in district + 1
1992–2015	Estonia	4.1	9.7	1 quota (valid votes/M)
1998–2012	Netherlands	0.9	1.3	25% of the electoral quota
	Norway <sup>a</sup>	0	0	
1994–2016	Slovakia	5.4	8.1	3 per cent (at the district level)
1998–2014	Sweden	22.2	77.4	4 per cent (at the district level) 8 per cent between 1998 and 2014

*Source* Author's elaboration on countries' minister of interior and/or national electoral committee

<sup>a</sup>Although it is theoretically possible to change the party list order, it must be specified that the Norwegian electoral system functions as a closed list system; see Shugart (2005)

## 6.2 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS. OLD, NEW, AND COLD CASES. ELECTED, RE-ELECTED, AND REJECTED: THE PLPR EFFECTS ON THE INTRAPARTY DYNAMICS

The preferential voting system represents a big family, as we have seen throughout the book. PLPR in particular is not homogeneous, and, as I have indicated in Chapter 1, referring to “preference” does not make much sense without important specification. Analogously, we have seen that even the “open-list” category cannot be considered as exhaustive. Therefore, I have presented and analysed the four subtypes of PLPR (Shugart 2005). This operation allows me to detect more nuances in the effect of each electoral system on the dependent variables. However, the statistic is not automatic; it needs some preliminary specifications.

In fact, as I have an dependent variable that is continuous, independent, and categorical, the most appropriate statistical analysis is to proceed by using dummy variables. I have four categories (subtypes) of the independent variable. As a reminder of PLPR’s categories, I can here report what I have extensively described in Chapters 3 and 5. They refer to the PLPR electoral system’s subtypes: (1) *open list*; (2) *quasi-list*; (3) *flexible list*; and (4) *latent list*, the provisions of which in synthesis vary according to the level of power that they confer on voters in their ability and freedom to select their candidate.

Table 6.6 presents linear regression models of the MPs who were re-elected between two consecutive general elections in 20 PLPR electoral systems. The models presented have six independent variables. The regression includes the electoral system (PLPR), which consists of four subtypes (open list, quasi-list, flexible list, and latent list, as specified in Chapters 2 and 3), the voter index, and the party index (see Sect. 2.3).

Model 1 is significant, and it measures the impact of the PLPR electoral system itself on the probability of outgoing candidates being re-elected. The model explains a good proportion of the variance, as the  $R^2$  value reveals. Considering each PLPR subtype, it is possible to observe the following data. Having the *open-list* system as the baseline Model 1 indicates that all the variables are significant, although the *quasi-list* and the *flexible-list* systems have greater beta coefficients (.682 and .641) than OLPR, almost twice the effect on re-election, as well as the case of the latent-list system, which contributes to explaining a moderate likelihood of re-election (.488). In all the cases, the relation is positive and strong.



**Table 6.6** Probability of being re-elected in PLPR electoral systems—OLS regression

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	
	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>
Open-list ( <i>baseline</i> )	27.971 (10.901)	.388*			7542 -10,833	.105
Quasi-list	53,671 -11,125	.682***			26,799 -12,112	.340*
Flexible-list	35,847 -10,323	.641**			21,283 -10,336	.380*
Latent-list	39,030 -11,167	.488**			25,754 -10,648	.322*
Party index			15,515 -7140	.144*	12,651 -10,216	.117
Voter index			41,199 -6769	.403***	38,949 -9894	.381***
(Constant)			10,818 (4.368)*		-6468 -9325	
$R^2$		.137	.193			.263
Observations		189	189			189

*Source* Author's elaboration on the "Preferential Votes" database (Passarelli 2018)

*Note* Dependent variable = MPs re-elected

*B*: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation Error in parentheses

*B Std*: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance

*F*-test. Sig.: Model 1 (\*\*\*); Model 2 (\*\*\*); Model 3 (\*\*\*)

\*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$

Moreover, when proceeding by adding two other independent variables, namely the party index and the voter index, the models explain much more of the variance. In particular, the  $R^2$  is .193 in the case of Model 2 and .263 for Model 3, which includes all the independent variables. The beta values indicate that the electoral system types matter in explaining the variation of the level of MPs being re-elected in PLPR systems. It is worth mentioning that the relation is quite strong (and statistically significant) both in the case of the voter index, which explains much more variation, and in the case of the party index, although the latter explanatory factor loses its significance when adding all the variables to the final model, while the voter index keeps its explanatory power.

The three models clearly indicate that the electoral system matters in explaining the variation in the level of outgoing MPs being re-elected. This pattern is confirmed in all three cases, that is, considering the party index and the voter index alone or together with the PLPR subtypes. As I discuss in the conclusion, those data have an important theoretical impact on the effects of electoral systems, as they tell us that, in the presence of a PLPR electoral system, the chance of being elected increases when the voter power goes up. In fact, this association is particularly true in the case of the voter index.

When analysing the first of the dependent variables that are directly related to the intraparty and interparty electoral competition, it is interesting to observe the effects of the PLPR electoral systems on the number of incumbents being defeated because of a party's negative performance. Table 6.7 reports the linear regression considering the political parties' electoral performance as affected by the electoral system's features. Model 1 is significant, and the  $R^2$  is .079. The beta standardized values tell us that all the PLPR electoral systems have a positive and strong relation with the dependent variable. Compared with the baseline, the quasi-list system produces the greatest incident of defeat in comparison with the other subtypes (standardized beta of .464). The probability of being defeated because of the party's negative electoral performance is also tested in Model 2. In fact, when adding the two variables related to the party's and the voter's power in terms of preferential voting provisions, it emerges that Model 2 is significant, as the  $R^2$  value indicates (0.266). In particular, the beta clearly shows that the voter index varies with the dependent variable. The relation is strong and positive, and a one standard deviation increase in the voter index results in a quarter standard deviation change (.247) in the likelihood of being defeated because of the party's electoral result. The regression F-tests are positive and significant in both Model 2 and Model 3. In the last case, the  $R^2$  is .117 and all the independent variables (except OLPR) contribute to explaining part of the variation in the chance of being defeated "thanks" to the own party performance. It is worth mentioning that the quasi-list factor has the strongest effect on the dependent variable, as in Model 1, while the voter index does not show a significant value. For the explanatory factors that present significant values, the beta tells us that the relation is positive and strong. In general, Model 2 has a higher  $R^2$  (.266) and the voter index is demonstrably an important covariate (.247).

**Table 6.7** Probability of being defeated via partisan performance in PLPR electoral systems—OLS regression

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	
	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>
Open-list ( <i>baseline</i> )	6366 −3039	.329*			3824 −3187	0.198
Quasi-list	9814 −3102	.464**			7468 −3563	.353*
Flexible-list	5893 −2878	.392*			2669 −3041	0.178
Latent-list	8722 −3114	.406**			6730 −3133	.313*
Party index			2296 −2059	.079	5715 −3005	.197*
Voter index			6780 −1952	.247**	2970 −2911	0.108
(Constant)			2671 (1.260)*		−.832 −2743	
$R^2$		.071	.266			.117
Observations		189	189			189

*Source* Author’s elaboration on the “Preferential Votes” database (Passarelli 2018)

*Note* Dependent variable = Partisan Defeats

*B*: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation Error in parentheses

*B Std*: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance

*F*-test. Sig.: Model 1 (\*\*); Model 2 (\*\*); Model 3 (\*\*)

\*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$

The electoral system “works” very well in explaining the variations in the likelihood of being defeated in PLPR electoral systems because of the “list order”. It is clear from Table 6.8 that Model 1 is a good predictor of the change in the status of the dependent variable ( $R^2 = .149$ ). However, it must be underlined that—as indicated in the chapter on the electoral systems’ characteristics—the list order variable only refers to the *flexible-list* and *latent-list* systems. It is the case in particular of the *flexible-list* electoral systems that are shown to be able to explain quite a high likelihood of list order/re-election (.420), whilst, in the case of the *latent-list* system, this likelihood is almost three times smaller (.155). Nevertheless, the ability of the PLPR electoral system in explaining the parliamentary turnover due to the list order retains its validity once new variables are

**Table 6.8** Probability of being defeated via the list order in PLPR electoral systems—OLS regression

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	
	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>
Open-list ( <i>baseline</i> )						
Quasi-list						
Flexible-list	3955 (0.694)	.420***			5.257 -1032	.559***
Latent-list	2078 (0.991)	.155*			3.071 -1047	.229**
Party index			5135 -1282	.283***	-0.497 -1652	-0.027
Voter index			-.172 -1216	-.010	4.287 -1439	.249**
(Constant)			.430 (.784)		-2641 (.969)*	
$R^2$		.149	.080			.194
Observations		189	189			189

*Source* Author's elaboration on the "Preferential Votes" database (Passarelli 2018)

*Note* Dependent variable = List Order Defeats

*B*: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation Error in parentheses

*B Std*: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance

*F*-test. Sig.: Model 1 (\*\*\*); Model 2 (\*\*\*); Model 3 (\*\*\*)

\*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$

introduced into the model. This is the case for both Model 2 ( $R^2 = .080$ ) and Model 3 ( $R^2 = .194$ ). Model 2 indicates that the party index has a greater beta coefficient (.283) while the voter index is not significant (and negative). Finally, when putting together all the explanatory variables, it emerges that they are significant and strongly related to the dependent variable, except in the case of the party index. In detail, the *flexible-list* system explains the largest part of the likelihood of list order defeats (.559), which is almost double that in the other two significant cases, *latent list* being equal to .229 and *latent list* with a beta std being equal to .249.

These data are particularly relevant from a theoretical point of view, as they underline the importance of the electoral system's rules in conferring more power on parties than on voters, as frequently happens in

flexible-list systems. To some, those “interesting” findings can seem like a statement of the obvious that more MPs will be defeated due to preference votes under open-list systems, in which voters’ preferences are all-important than under flexible-list systems, in which it is more difficult for the voters to exert any impact through the use of preference votes. However, it must be kept in mind that voters decide, and their choice can ultimately be affected by many factors, in particular the electoral system, as I have tested and shown in this book.

The probability of being defeated because of the preferential voting per se is strongly and positively related to the voters’ power, resulting from the electoral system’s provisions (Table 6.9). However, the PLPR electoral system is not determinant as a whole, although the electoral system’s features are indeed. Model 1 indicates ( $R^2 = .214$ ) that open-list (.403) and quasi-list (.543) systems contribute to explaining a good level of variation, while flexible systems are not significant. The relation for both the “open”-list system and its subtype is strong and positive. Moreover, Model 2 indicates a very interesting point, that is, the difference between the party and the voter index. Although both variables are significant and show strong relations, the first is negatively associated with the dependent variable ( $-.298$ ) while the second has a positive sign (.496). They account for an important share in explaining the variation in the effects of the electoral systems’ features on the voters’ behaviour and intraparty dynamics, namely MPs’ defeats due to preference votes.

This trend, as well as the differences between the two latter explanatory variables considered, is also evident from Model 3. In fact, even adding all the variables to the final model, voters’ power explains more than parties’ power (one and a half times more), although, as seen, they move in opposite directions in terms of their sign (the first is negative and the second is positive).

Therefore, it worth mentioning that the voters’ power is positively correlated with the likelihood of being replaced by another candidate via the preference votes. Vice versa, the parties’ power is a factor that is correlated negatively with the probability of experiencing an electoral defeat because of the personal votes. The PLPR electoral systems’ subtypes lose their significant value when included in the final model, thus emphasizing the more important weight of the electoral system’s features than the category itself. The most relevant point is that the voters’ power variable keeps its strength and sign in both models, confirming the importance of the power conferred on the voters by the electoral system. Moreover, it

**Table 6.9** Probability of being defeated via preference votes in PLPR electoral systems—OLS regression

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	
	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>
Open-list	7360	.403**			3549	.194
( <i>baseline</i> )	−2638				−2645	
Quasi-list	10,843	.543***			3102	.155
	−2693				−2957	
Flexible-list	2234	.157			3377	.238
	−2498				−2524	
Latent-list	3807	.188			2263	.112
	−2703				−2600	
Party index			−8158	−.298***	−8964	−.327***
			−1677		−2494	
Voter index			12,885	.496***	12,396	.478***
			−1590		−2146	
(Constant)			1426		−1131	
			−1026		−2277	
$R^2$		.214	.308			.317
Observations		189	189			189

*Source* Author's elaboration on the "Preferential Votes" database (Passarelli 2018)

*Note* Dependent variable = Preference votes Defeats

B: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation Error in parentheses

B Std: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance

F-test. Sig.: Model 1 (\*\*\*); Model 2 (\*\*\*); Model 3 (\*\*\*)

\*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$

is quite impressive and significant to consider that the voter factor maintains its strength in both models. These data support and confirm the book's research question and hypotheses as relating the electoral systems' features to the effects on the intraparty competition.

The impact of the PLPR electoral system seems to be very important in affecting the probability of an outgoing MP having his/her candidature renewed in the following elections (Table 6.10). The electoral system is positively correlated with the likelihood of candidature being renewed, and Model (1) explains a good part of the variation ( $R^2$  equal to .108). Besides the OLPR, which represents the baseline (.586), the other variables present positive and strong relations as well, although they contribute to explaining the variation to a lesser extent. In particular, the two "flexible" subtypes (.492 and .298, respectively)

**Table 6.10** Probability of candidature being renewed in PLPR electoral systems—OLS regression

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	
	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>
Open-list ( <i>baseline</i> )	23,149 -6077	.586***			10,598 -5956	.268
Quasi-list	22,104 -6202	.512***			4853 -6659	.112
Flexible-list	15,112 -5755	.492**			7214 -5683	.235
Latent-list	13,044 -6225	.298*			5142 -5855	.117
Party index			6574 -3807	.111*	4695 -5617	.079
Voter index			26,056 -3609	.464***	25,323 -5440	.451***
(Constant)			1938 -2339		-3953 -5127	
$R^2$		.108	.237			.259
Observations		189	189			189

*Source* Author's elaboration on the "Preferential Votes" database (Passarelli 2018)

*Note* Dependent variable = No Re-Candidate

*B*: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation Error in parentheses

*B Std*: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance

*F*-test. Sig.: Model 1 (\*\*\*); Model 2 (\*\*\*); Model 3 (\*\*\*)

\*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$

predict much less than the quasi-list (.512) and the baseline. Model 2 ( $R^2$  equal to .237), which is significant, clearly indicates that the voter index explains a very important part of the likelihood of candidature being renewed (beta std equal to .464), especially considering that the party index is able to explain only about one-tenth, although both factors show positive relations.

When adding new variables, namely the voter index and the party index, the electoral system subtypes become not significant, whilst one of the two other factors shows a big impact. The voter index is positively correlated with the variation in the level of MPs' candidature renewal. Table 6.10, reporting the impact of PLPR and its features on the probability of candidature renewal, clearly signals that the PLPR electoral

**Table 6.11** Probability of variation in the effective number of parties in PLPR electoral systems—OLS regression

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	
	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>
Open-list ( <i>baseline</i> )	2601 (0.729)	.558***			2576 (.784)	.552**
Quasi-list	1809 (0.744)	.355*			1,766 (.876)	.346*
Flexible-list	2258 (0.690)	.623**			2254 (.748)	.622**
Latent-list	2669 (0.747)	.516***			2656 (.770)	.513**
Party index			.431 (.514)	.062	-.026 (.739)	-.004
Voter index			.127 (.487)	.019	.067 (.716)	.010
(Constant)			4388 (.314)***		2368 (.675)**	
$R^2$		.080	.004			.080
Observations		189	189			189

*Source* Author's elaboration on the "Preferential Votes" database (Passarelli 2018)

*Note* Dependent variable = Effective Number of Parties

*B*: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation Error in parentheses

*B Std*: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance

*F*-test. Sig.: Model 1 (\*\*); Model 2 (ns); Model 3 (\*)

\*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$

systems are important but the voters' power has much greater explanatory strength. The theoretical explanation for this lies in the impact that each political party organization has on its own candidates' selection process, on the party power, as well as on the opportunities conferred on the voters by the electoral system, which can also vary in terms of promoting more candidate- or party-centred assets (Carey and Shugart 1995).

Two of the models that estimate the effects of the PLPR electoral system on the probability of variation in the effective number of parties (ENP) are significant, whilst Model 2 is not significant (Table 6.11). As indicated in presenting the hypotheses, here it should be made clear that the dependent variable is the ENP (electoral ones). The electoral systems might in fact affect the voters' choice: in the case of the PLPR electoral



systems, as both the candidates and those elected are theoretically more independent from the party's organizational hierarchy, politicians have less motivation to leave their party. Therefore, I expect there to be less party system fragmentation in more candidate-centred systems. Model 1 ( $R^2$  equal to 0.080) shows positive relations between the four explanatory variables. When compared with the OLPR baseline, Model 1 indicates that the flexible list explains a greater amount of variation (.623), while the quasi-list explains about half of its value (.355). Furthermore, when adding the two other factors, the voter index and the party index, the explained variance does not improve. The PLPR subtypes maintain their significance and their explanatory power, having substantially the same sign and strength of the relations. At the same time, Model 3 does not change the value of the voter and party indices, which remain not significant. Therefore, the null impact of both the voter index and the party index could somehow be forecast due to the intrinsic influence of those variables on the intraparty dimension rather than the political and the party system alike. Moreover, that the PLPR system per se is significant represents important new knowledge. The latter means that electoral systems, namely preferential voting ones, can have a relevant impact on the structure of the party system and the representation. It is probably a small addition to the knowledge of the relationship between electoral systems' features and party systems, but it is important empirical evidence.

In PLPR electoral systems, in which voters have important power when selecting their candidate, the impact on the electoral volatility is quite high. Here, as reported when illustrating the hypothesis, I measure the impact of the weight of different PLPR electoral systems on the level of volatility (Table 6.12). Although the latter can be affected by drivers such as the government's performance, here I focus on the electoral system. In both Model 2 and Model 3, in fact, the relationship between the voter index and the probability of a variation in the electoral volatility is positive and strong, with no relevant changes in their predictive power, as the beta std indicates (.283 and .398, respectively). The fact that the party index is not relevant can be ascribed to the more relevant influence that parties have on the interparty competition, despite voters' behaviour being able to affect the level of electoral volatility directly.

Vice versa, the PLPR electoral systems do not represent a good predictor of electoral volatility variation per se. Looking at the different "dummies", it appears that only OLPR has a significant value that

**Table 6.12** Probability of an increase in the electoral volatility in PLPR electoral systems—OLS regression

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	
	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>
Open-list ( <i>baseline</i> )	8916 −4490	.314*			2063 −4743	.073
Quasi-list	8622 −4,588	.278			−1958 −5327	−.063
Flexible-list	5987 −4210	.278			4352 −4418	.202
Latent-list	8801 −4,568	.288			5210 −4568	.171
Party index			.099 −3004	.002	−4607 −4467	−.111
Voter index			11,291 −2885	.283***	15,839 −4466	.398**
(Constant)			8760 (1.899)***		5286 −3964	
$R^2$		.034	.080			.104
Observations		179	179			179

*Source* Author’s elaboration on the “Preferential Votes” database (Passarelli 2018)

*Note* Dependent variable = Electoral Volatility

*B*: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation Error in parentheses

*B Std*: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance

*F*-test. Sig.: Model 1 (ns); Model 2 (\*\*); Model 3 (\*\*)

\*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$

explains a moderate likelihood of volatility (.314). Therefore, the data seem to suggest that, when voters have more power in choosing their candidates, this ability reverberates on the general level of electoral volatility. This is important empirical evidence, which confirms the literature sustaining that voters are more likely to follow candidates than parties in electoral systems in which they can choose the “horse” in the race directly.

One of the most intriguing research questions in the literature on electoral systems concerns, as seen in Chapter 1, the impact of electoral systems’ features on voting behaviour. In the case of preferential voting systems, the idea is that voters would be keener to support a specific candidate, thus in a sense by-passing the party. As Table 6.13 suggests, more “power” conferred on voters would significantly increase the probability

**Table 6.13** Probability of casting a preference vote in PLPR electoral systems—OLS regression

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	
	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>
Open-list	42,043	.529***			38,506	.484***
( <i>baseline</i> )	-9853				-10,533	
Quasi-list	89,914	1.035***			81,895	.942***
					-11,776	
Flexible-list	42,326	.685***			44,570	.722***
					-10,049	
Latent-list	31,881	.361**			30,733	.348**
					-10,353	
Party index			-22,807	-.191**	-11,786	-.099
			-7908		-9933	
Voter index			46,014	.407***	13,076	.116
			-7497		-9620	
(Constant)			32,617		-1026	
			(4.837)***		-9066	
$R^2$	.422		.188		.428	
Observations	189		189		189	

*Source* Author's elaboration on the "Preferential Votes" database (Passarelli 2018)

*Note* Dependent variable = Preference votes share

*B*: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation Error in parentheses

*B Std*: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance

*F*-test. Sig.: Model 1 (\*\*\*); Model 2 (\*\*\*); Model 3 (\*\*\*)

\*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$

that they will cast one (or more) preference vote(s). Model 2 indicates that the "voter" factor represents a good predictor of more preference votes being cast, as the relationship is positive and strong and explains a large share of the variation ( $R^2$  equal to .188). Moreover, the impact of the voters' power is more important in Model 2 than in Model 3 (beta std equal to .407 vs. .116 and not significant), that is, when including all six variables together. Conversely, the party's index is negatively correlated with the likelihood of casting a preference vote in PLPR electoral systems. This is a very significant empirical result, and it is in line with the literature; it also supports the theoretical framework of this book and its research question and hypotheses alike. The increase in the party power index implies a decline in the probability of having more

preferences, as the beta clearly indicates in Model 2 ( $-.191$ ). Last, but not least, when considering PLPR systems per se (Model 1), it emerges that the probability of casting a preference vote is positive in all four cases ( $R^2 = .422$ ), and the relationship is strong. Considering the details of the subtypes, we can observe that, besides the baseline (OLPR), the flexible-list and quasi-list systems explain more variation than the latent list system. Those proportions are confirmed in Model 3 when including all the variables, stressing the influence of the electoral system on the likelihood of casting a preference vote in the ballot. In synthesis, the latter result is very important, as it provides empirical evidence that, in preferential voting systems, the probability of casting a preference vote mostly depends on the PLPR electoral system's features, as defined in Chapter 1.

Table 6.14 (Model 2) indicates that the greater the voters' power, the lower the Gini index of personal votes, that is, a less concentrated share of preference votes around one or a few candidates (.470).<sup>1</sup> Vice versa, the greater the parties' power, the higher the Gini index values, that is, a more concentrated share of personal votes around one or a few candidates ( $-.139$ ). The impact of the variables is quite high, as indicated by the  $R^2$  (.237) and by the strength of the relation, although the party index loses its significance in Model 3 and the voter index explains about half of the analogous cases in Model 3 (beta equal to .470 vs. .412). Model 1 ( $R^2 = .373$ ) clearly indicates that the open-list (.520) and quasi-list (.305) systems are positively related to the Gini index while the flexible-list system is inversely linked ( $-.155$ ). This finding could be interpreted as the influence of electoral systems' features per se on the distribution of votes among candidates. It is more relevant that any particular provision is attributed to voters and/or to parties. In sum, PLPR electoral systems matter by contributing to equalizing—other things being equal—the votes among the list candidates, and this trend is strengthened when adding the voters' provisions. In fact, in line with the book's hypothesis, the voter power keeps its explanatory power when moving from a simple model (# 2) to the model (# 3) in which all variables are considered.

Therefore, Table 6.14 shows that PLPR electoral systems are strongly related to the variation in terms of personal votes' concentration (Gini

<sup>1</sup>The number of cases is slightly lower than for all the other variables. This is due to the fact that, for a few countries, data on this variable are not available.

**Table 6.14** Probability of variations in the Gini index in PLPR electoral systems—OLS regression

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	
	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta std</i>
Open-list ( <i>baseline</i> )	.443	.520***			.284 (0.071)	.333***
Quasi-list	.268	.305***			-.035 (0.102)	-.040
Flexible-list						
Latent-list	-.138	-.155*			-.219 (0.064)	-.247**
Party index			-.172 (0.085)	-.139*	-.173 (0.109)	-.140
Voter index			.569 (0.083)	.470***	.498 (0.114)	.412***
(Constant)			.036 (.055)		.060 (.054)	
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>		.373		.237		.443
Observations		165		165		165

*Source* Author's elaboration on the "Preferential Votes" database (Passarelli 2018)

*Note* Dependent variable = Gini index (based on the preferences cast)

*B*: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation Error in parentheses

*B Std*: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance

*F*-test. Sig.: Model 1 (\*\*\*); Model 2 (\*\*\*); Model 3 (\*\*\*)

\*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$


index), although the sign of the relation changes depending on the electoral systems' features. Vice versa, the voter index variable is able to explain a large share of the variation.

This shows that, when voters' preferences count for more, preference votes are spread more evenly among a party's candidates. As far as I know, this is an original finding. Its significance is related to the fact that voters' freedom in casting their preference votes expands their choice not only beyond the influence and impact of the party's indication (head of the list and/or rank order) but also in terms of candidates' internal electoral competition. These findings tell us something new about voting behaviour, namely that the greater the parties' power, the lesser the voters' freedom. Therefore, from a theoretical point of view, these data feed

the scholarly debate not only on the effects of the electoral systems but also in terms of the intraparty electoral competition: an important piece of information for the literature on the topic and the law-making process alike. Finally, I have elaborated a typology based on the index of preferential voting (PVI). As seen in Chapter 2, I have selected different variables, which are related to the level of both voters' and parties' freedom, depending on the PLPR system's provisions. The more a party can intervene in the electoral process, the less the voters' freedom to express their preferences. The combination of the two dimensions into a single typology makes it possible to compare different levels of preferential voting openness between countries. For this purpose, I have generated two new variables, "voter\_st" and "party\_st", as standardized scores (Z-scores) of "index\_voter" and "index\_party". These new variables have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The range of values for voter\_st is from a minimum of  $-1.94$  to a maximum of  $1.74$ , while party\_st varies from  $-1.98$  to  $2.32$ .

Therefore, as I describe in detail, using data from the chapter on results, the typology has the four following types: (1) the more positive the index\_voter is, the greater the voters' freedom in casting a vote and the more power they have potentially to affect the MP selection; (2) the more negative the index\_voter is, the less freedom the voters have in casting a vote and the less power they have potentially to affect the MP selection; (3) the more positive the index\_party is, the greater the party's ability to affect the MP choice and consequently the lesser the voters' power potentially to affect the MP selection; and (4) the more negative the voter\_index is, the greater the voters' chances of influencing the MP selection. In the final chapter, when analysing data and comparing cases, it will be useful to observe where each case is located, taking into consideration the outcomes of the empirical analysis.

Moreover, the use of a typology combining the two dimensions (voter and party) allows a better study of the different categories in which each case (electoral system/country) are located. Therefore, recurring to a qualitative variable, in operationalization terms, permits a better classification and comparative approach. In this context, I classify different electoral systems according to both voters' and parties' features. The final outcome is a scatter plot that depicts the distribution of cases in a bidimensional space defined by the voters' power and the parties' organizational characteristics in terms of candidates' selection for elections.



**Fig. 6.1** The party index vs. voter index typology for PLPR electoral systems (Source Author's elaboration on the Preferential Votes database [Passarelli 2018])

Figure 6.1 presents very interesting data, which confirm the empirical evidence from the statistical analysis.

In *Quadrant 1*, we find Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy (pre-1992), Kosovo, and the Czech Republic (all of which are also above the intercept), as well as Sweden, Peru, Cyprus, and Belgium. The two latter countries show the highest standardized value in the party index and a relatively low score in the voter index. Quadrant 1 can be defined as that of the equilibrium between the two indexes, with no certain electoral patterns in terms of candidate selection. In those countries, as is also evident from the data analysis, the parties' organization is strong and more able to affect MPs' re-election despite voters' attempt to intervene in the process. This trend is particularly true in the *flexible-list systems*, which tend to emphasize the provisions for parties' power over voters' power. As we have seen, in fact, it is likely to involve a balance of power

that is more in favour of parties' organization, so its influence tends to block the voters' choice.

Located in *Quadrant 2* are countries in which the electoral system confers considerable power on voters rather than political parties in the process of selecting candidates through preferences. Finland appears above all the other cases, showing the highest standardized value for voters' power and the lowest on the X-axis that measures the parties' strength. Then we see the couple of Slovakia and Estonia with similar scores on the voters' scale but with higher values than for Finland for the parties' power index. The remaining places in the quadrant are occupied by Italy (pre-1991), Chile, Poland, and Sri Lanka. In this sense, it is worth mentioning that all the cases in Quadrant 2, except Slovenia (*flexible*) and Estonia (*latent list*), are *open-list* electoral systems. In fact, the data have shown that *open-list* systems on average favour parliamentary turnover via preference votes more than *flexible* ones.

In *Quadrant 3*, in which we find electoral systems conferring at the same time low power on both political parties and voters, there are only four cases: Brazil, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, and the Dominican Republic. The latter, which has not been analysed in terms of intraparty competition patterns, shows the lowest score for the voter index coupled with a relatively high party index. Therefore, we could expect, in further analysis, to detect a low impact of voters' choice. Vice versa, we have two *flexible-list* systems that confirm that voters usually have comparatively weak power, and Brazil, which has an OLPR electoral system. The Brazilian case is peculiar due to the mix of the parties' organizational weakness and some provisions that guarantee the outgoing MPs, thus depressing the potential impact that voters can exert on the selection of candidates.

In *Quadrant 4*, there are two countries, or better two cases, one of which is no longer in operation, that is, Belgium before the electoral reform of 1995. The second case is Denmark, one of the oldest PR electoral systems, which has adopted the *flexible-list* subtype of PLPR. This quadrant is particularly interesting, as it shows the cases in which the electoral systems do not provide high levels of power to voters but offer high provisions to the political parties in terms of controlling or at least affecting preference votes.

Finally, as discussed in Sect. 1.5, I have introduced an additional PLPR subtype to the existing four as a few cases clearly do not fit into any of the four above-mentioned subtypes. This category, "protected



open list”, present peculiar characteristics, such as the selection of candidates through preferences, as in OLPR, together with provisions that exempt one or more candidates from being submitted to the competition for preference votes. Two of the three cases falling into this category (the Italian electoral system approved in 2015 was never used), Greece and Cyprus fall both in *Quadrant 1*. In this case, as we have seen, there is a sort of equilibrium between the two indexes, with no certain electoral patterns in terms of MPs selection. The fact that both cases show similar trends offer a preliminary support to the theoretical relevance of the PLPR “protected open list” subtypes, although future empirical comparison including more cases should be done.

Synthetizing, it is possible to indicate a few general points on what has been learned. First, PLPR matters in the interelection parliamentary turnover. However, an investigation at the PLPR subtype level was necessary, as the differences between electoral systems in terms of provisions for voters’ power and parties’ power affect the final electoral outcomes. The analysis of the typology, which has been developed based on the standardized voters’ and political parties’ indexes, has clearly indicated a few patterns. Moreover, the statistical analysis has clearly shown that the electoral systems’ provisions matter. In particular, as the linear regression has underlined, the voter index factor is almost always (except in one case) statistically significant or highly significant.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, I have calculated the correlation between one crucial electoral system feature, that of voters’ power, and two variables that are essential to a better understanding of the effects of preferential voting and to testing their effects in depth. Although, as it has been shown, the impact of electoral systems can be due to a number of relevant factors (the most obvious of which is whether voting is compulsory<sup>3</sup>) (Blais and Carty 1990), here I deal only incidentally with the turnout itself, as the focus is on the intraparty electoral competitions and MPs’ turnover.

Table 6.15 tells us that the relation between voters’ power and abstention is quite strong, statistically significant, and negative. Thus, the

<sup>2</sup>I have done a simulation of all the possible outcome, and I have estimated the correlation in 500 sample. According the results, the index is not significative correlated ( $p$ -value < 0.001).

<sup>3</sup>In my sample, only Belgium, Brazil, and Peru have a compulsory electoral system, albeit with different levels of implementation and penalties for those not attending the polls. I have included this variable in my analysis.

**Table 6.15** Correlation between voters' power and abstention

<i>Pearson</i>	-.436**
Sig. (2-tales)	0
<i>N</i>	168

*Source* Author's elaboration on the Preferential Votes database (Passarelli 2018)

\*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$

**Table 6.16** Correlation between voters' power and share of preferences

<i>Pearson</i>	.390**
Sig. (2-tales)	0
<i>N</i>	189

*Source* Author's elaboration on the Preferential Votes database (Passarelli 2018)

\*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$

greater the voters' power, the lower the level of abstention. That is a very important empirical and comparative result that sheds light on the PLPR families, although more analysis can be conducted at the case study level or, as stated, also considering the turnout as depending on other factors or even PV as the dependent variable.

In the other case, Table 6.16 clearly indicates that the voters' power and the share of preference votes cast is strong, significant, and positive. That is, the number of preference votes is positively correlated with voters' possibility to express their electoral choice and the affect the final outcomes. Therefore, as in the case of the turnout, these data improve our knowledge of the effects of electoral systems—namely preferential voting—on voter behaviour.

### 6.2.1 *Data and Hypotheses*

The goal of the book was to offer an analysis of preferential voting from a comparative perspective. Having presented the data analysis, it is possible to refer to the hypotheses that I formulated. Preferential voting can influence the behaviour of different actors as well as political and electoral outcomes. To capture these effects, I test some of the variables related to the parties' internal competitive dynamics and the voters' behaviour.

*H1: Intraparty competition and parliamentary turnover*

As seen, under preferential voting systems, candidates of the same party must compete with each other for election. The degree of intraparty competition may then vary accordingly. Essentially, where voters have more power (depending, as seen, on PLPR's provisions—see the index in Sect. 2.3), they should have a greater impact on the selection of candidates. Therefore, I have considered the effect of preferential voting on the share of the political élite's renewal (incumbent MP turnover). The data confirm that the higher the level of PLPR openness, the greater the number of outgoing MPs replaced by preference votes. Therefore, in OLPR and quasi-list systems, I expected more MP defeats due to preference votes than in both flexible-list and latent-list cases. The data signal that it is not the PLPR per se that produces variation in the degree of intraparty competitiveness; rather, its four subtypes contribute to explaining the greater likelihood of being defeated via preference votes. In fact, the level of incumbents' defeats increases from the less "open" PLPR system towards the more "open" one, namely OLPR.

*H2: Voters' power and the use of preferences*

It is widely assumed that preferential voting confers on voters the power to contribute to the choice of MPs. The hypothesis was that the greater the voters' power (e.g. the higher the score for the index of voters' power), the larger the share of preference votes cast. The data substantially confirm my hypothesis, with a strong and positive relation. The results are consistent both in the OLS regression and for the correlation. That means that voters tend to use their power when entitled to express their will in electoral terms.

*H3: Preferential voting reduces the fragmentation of the party system*

In PLPR systems, both the candidates and those elected are theoretically more independent from the parties' organizational hierarchy, and thus attitudes towards party switching or splitting should be more favourable (or at least ambivalent). Therefore, I expected there to be less party system fragmentation in preferential voting systems. Conversely, the data analysis indicates that the effective number of parties increases as a function of the voters' powers and the PLPR electoral system's level of openness. This confirms that voters tend to follow candidates' political and electoral fate rather than their party affiliation. This finding is very important in terms of the theory on party/voter loyalty as well as for electoral engineering when looking for tools to strengthen parties' organization.

*H4: Preference votes and electoral volatility*

In preferential voting cases, if voters' loyalty to parties gradually declines (as indicated above), then they should increasingly consider candidates' characteristics when deciding who to support. The data analysis confirms that an increasing proportion of voters tend to decide who to cast a preference vote for based on candidates' political appeal. In fact, PLPR systems, to different degrees on the basis of the subtypes' openness, show high levels of electoral volatility.

*H5: Preference votes and electoral turnout*

I am aware, as extensively reported in Chapter 4, that the relation between preferential voting and turnout is complex and not linear. From a theoretical point of view, it can be conceived as having a collinearity effect. However, as the book has considered the effects of preferences, here I have tested the hypothesis that abstention in elections with preferential voting should systematically decrease as a function of the electoral system's features, which are the voters' power and the PLPR subtype's level of openness. Data from both the regression and the correlation tell us that the greater the voters' power in casting a preference, the lower the level of abstention.

### 6.3 THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCES

“[S/]he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party” (Schattschneider 1942). This well-known, albeit probably not well empirically tested, statement by Schattschneider is confirmed by the results of the research reported in this book. Although the focus here was on the electoral systems and not on the party nominations, the results stress that the impact of preference votes is strongly reduced by the pre-electoral candidate selection. The candidature of about one-quarter of outgoing MPs is in fact not renewed.

“[R]edressing the relative absence of systematic intraparty data for those electoral systems that entail intraparty competition should be high on the agenda in coming years” (Shugart 2005: 50). In this book, I have focused on the ways in which preferential voting systems influence intraparty dynamics. I started the analysis with the following questions in mind: Does preferential voting really confer more power on voters? Do voters really determine the election of a candidate? Is preferential voting a system that severely limits voters' options? Considering that electoral systems may be considered as “a set of laws and party rules that regulate

electoral competition between and *within* parties” (italics my own) (Cox 1997: 38), it is evident that the “within-parties” dimension is relatively undeveloped. That consideration is true; in fact, Shugart claims that “the study of the intraparty dimension has been hampered by a sometimes nebulous characterization of the dependent variables, a lack of data, and even worse, a lack of clear understanding of what the rules being investigated across countries are” (2005: 36).

As extensively reported, I have focused on the PLPR electoral systems, specifically four sub-categories: the open-list, flexible-list, latent-list, and quasi-list systems. Making such a choice allowed me to investigate better the differences and similarities within the family of preferential voting systems. The latter are not “equal”, and they differ both in characteristics and in the consequences that they produce for parties and electoral outcomes. Moreover, as Pedersen (1966) states in his article, it is possible to make a distinction between preferential voting used effectively and preferential voting not used effectively.

The comparative approach of this book has partially filled the gap that existed in the field by offering not only a data set but also a crucial analysis testing different hypotheses. The results are important and promising, and they offer many points of study in both theoretical and empirical terms. I had the chance to test the overall hypothesis related to the question of whether “really voters decide” (March 1985).

The main results come from the data on five variables that potentially have effects on the MP turnover. Accordingly, I had the possibility to weight the impact of preference votes and in general the preferential voting system’s features on the candidates, that is, the intraparty dynamics. The main goal was to determine whether preferences really matter in selecting deputies or whether other variables are more relevant.

The first main finding is that differentiated trends are apparent between the two main groups of PLPR electoral systems, that is, between flexible-list systems and latent-list systems on one side and open-list systems and quasi-list systems on the other. At first glance (see the details in this chapter), the data indicate that the most important variable in flexible-list and latent-list electoral systems affecting the intraparty dynamics is the number of incumbents being re-elected, while the preference votes account for just 6 per cent. Thus, the data suggest that, in these two PLPR subtypes, preferences do not affect the interelection turnover or their influence is, at best, minor. Vice versa, in OLPR and latent-list electoral systems, the weight of preference votes is

not completely uninfluential, as it accounts for about 13 per cent of the turnover, although it is significantly less important than other variables. Therefore, it is clear that effects still occur between parties and within parties' organization as long they decide candidatures, which affect MPs' fate more than preference votes and much more than voters' power.

However, the two groups show relevant differences in terms of the impact on the intraparty dynamics. The comparison indicates that, in three out of four cases, the couple OLPR+quasi-list systems performs better for countries in the flexible-list and latent-list groups. The only factor that matters more in flexible+latent list systems is re-election, that is, the share of MPs confirmed in the following election. This information is very important and innovative and not only carries empirical relevance but also confirms a crucial theoretical consequence. It supports the idea that preferential voting matters more in OLPR, as we would theoretically expect, as voters' behaviour is much more likely to influence the election of a given candidate. On the other side, the reduced impact of preference votes in flexible-list systems underlines the relevance of thresholds, which make the electoral system function almost as a closed-list system.

Moreover, on the political parties' side, the data emphasize that, in flexible-list cases, the influence and power of party organizations matter more to MPs' career and re-election than in OLPR systems. The empirical evidence suggests that political parties can manage a considerable number of re-election outcomes prior to the election through their control over their party list rank order. Moreover, in flexible-list systems, efficient thresholds (in terms of personal votes to be obtained) make it difficult for candidates placed low on the list to shape the party's list order and replace their top-of-the-list comrades.

Moreover, differences arise considering the results by country. The data emphasize, once again, the role of the electoral system, as the cases line up following the borders of PLPR subtypes rather than other factors related to countries' features. Therefore, it is possible to summarize all the cases located above the mean as belonging to the OLPR subtype. Significantly, all the other countries are located below the mean, highlighting a clear divide between the flexible-list system and the open-list one. Again, from the empirical point of view, the data signal that the level of "preferential voting" system openness depends on voters' power to influence the selection of candidates for election and that the presence of thresholds makes a crucial difference in turning flexible-list systems into functionally CLPR systems.

Moreover, when taking into account only the defeats, thus excluding the MPs who have been re-elected, the data once show again a differentiated pattern between open-list and flexible-list systems. In the first case, the preferences matter for about one-quarter of all the outgoing defeats, while, in the case of “open” electoral systems, they reach about 55 per cent. In flexible-list systems, the preferences’ impact is smaller, as stated, not only because of the presence of thresholds but also probably because of their magnitude as well as parties’ decision regarding candidature and voters’ behaviour. The preferential voting system represents a big family, as we have seen throughout the book. Therefore, I have presented and analysed the four subtypes of PLPR.

The OLS regression clearly indicates that the electoral system matters in explaining the variation in the level of outgoing MPs being re-elected. Those data have an important theoretical impact on the effects of electoral systems, as they tell us that, in the presence of a PLPR electoral system, the chance of being re-elected increases, that is, moving from the less “open” PLPR system towards the more “open” one, namely OLPR.

It is interesting to observe the effects of PLPR electoral systems on the number of incumbents being defeated because of a party’s negative performance. The beta standardized values indicate that all the PLPR electoral systems have a positive and strong relation with the dependent variable. Moreover, the electoral system “works” very well in explaining variations in the likelihood of being defeated in PLPR electoral systems because of the “list order” (the variable only refers to flexible-list and latent-list systems). Those data are particularly relevant from a theoretical point of view, as they underline the importance of the electoral system’s rules in conferring more power on parties, rather than voters, as frequently happens in flexible-list systems.

The probability of being defeated because of the preferential voting *per se* is strongly and positively related to the voters’ power, which results from the electoral system’s provisions. The relation for both the “open”-list system and its subtypes is strong and positive. It is important in explaining the variation in the effects of the electoral systems’ features on the voters’ behaviour and intraparty dynamics, namely MPs’ defeats due to preference votes. Therefore, it is worth mentioning that the voters’ power is positively correlated with the likelihood of being replaced by another candidate via preference votes. Vice versa, the parties’ power is a factor that is correlated negatively with the probability of experiencing an electoral defeat because of personal votes. The most relevant point

is that the voters' power variable keeps its strength and sign in both models, confirming the importance of the power conferred on the voters by the electoral system. This information supports and confirms the book's research question and hypotheses relating the electoral systems' features to the effects on the intraparty competition.

On the same line, the impact of the PLPR electoral system seems to be very important in affecting the probability of an outgoing MP having his/her candidature renewed in the following elections. Vice versa, when considering the effect of PLPR on the "political system", it is worth mentioning that the probabilities of variation in the effective number of parties (ENP) are significant. Moreover, the fact that the PLPR system per se is significant represents important new knowledge. It means that electoral systems, namely preferential voting ones, can have a relevant impact on the structure of the party system and the representation. Concerning the electoral volatility, it seems that PLPR electoral systems have a strong impact. However, looking at the different "dummies", it emerges that only OLPR has a significant value that explains the moderate likelihood of volatility. Therefore, the data seem to suggest that, when voters have more power in choosing their candidates, this ability reverberates at the general level of electoral volatility. This is important empirical evidence, which confirms the literature sustaining that voters are more likely to follow candidates than parties in electoral systems in which they can choose the "horse" in the race directly.

On the voters' side, as seen from the literature, it is argued that PLPR electoral systems may induce citizens to vote more and to indicate a preference as their power increases. The data indicate in fact that more "power" conferred on voters significantly increases the probability that they will cast one (or more) preference vote(s). Vice versa, the party index is negatively correlated with the likelihood of casting a preference vote in PLPR electoral systems. This is a very significant empirical result and is in line with the literature; it also supports the theoretical framework of this book and its research question and hypotheses alike. In synthesis, the latter result is very important, as it provides empirical evidence that, in preferential voting systems, the probability of casting a preference vote mostly depends on the PLPR electoral system's features. The level of power conferred on voters seems to influence the voters' behaviour as well in terms of the choice of the candidate that they support. This shows, I think, that, when voters' preferences count for more, preference votes are spread more evenly among a party's candidates.



As far as I know, this is an original finding, the theoretical significance of which can be established by referring to the voting behaviour branch. The data show that, when voters are more empowered and not constrained to indicate a conditioned choice, their preference is spread among different candidates and not only those indicated by the party. However, as seen, this condition is not enough per se to generate greater turnover in following parliamentary elections in PLRP electoral systems.

This knowledge is not just a statement of the obvious—"voters are more likely to cast a preference vote when preference votes have a good chance of affecting the outcome than when preference votes have little or no chance of affecting the outcome". However, this assumption has never been tested empirically from a comparative perspective, so it shows that it is not indifferent between having one PLPR electoral system and having another. There is in fact internal variation among PLPR electoral systems that generate different outcomes in terms of intraparty electoral competition, which have been measured in this book.

The data suggest that the greater the voters' power, the lower the Gini index of personal votes, that is, a less concentrated share of preference votes for one or a few candidates. Vice versa, the greater the parties' power, the higher the Gini index values, that is, a more concentrated share of personal votes for one or a few candidates. This finding could be interpreted as the influence of the electoral system's features per se on the distribution of votes among candidates. That is more relevant than any provision attributed to voters and/or to parties. In sum, PLPR electoral systems matter in that they contribute to equalizing—other things being equal—the votes among the list candidates, and this trend is strengthened when adding the voters' provisions. In fact, in line with the book's hypothesis, the voter power keeps its explanatory power when progressing from a simple model to the model in which all the variables are considered. Moreover, concerning the cases included in the research, the typology based on the index of preferential voting (PVI) provides very interesting data, which confirm the empirical evidence from the statistical analysis. Countries' locations based on the parties' and voters' power and the statistical analysis seem to support the spatial distribution. We have learned that PLPR matters to the inter-election parliamentary turnover. The analysis of the typology, which has been developed based on the standardized voters' and political parties' indexes, clearly indicates a few patterns. Moreover, the statistical analysis clearly shows that the electoral system's provisions matter.

As the linear regression underlines, the voter index factor is almost always statistically significant. Finally, I calculated the correlation between one crucial electoral system feature, voters' power, and two variables that are crucial for a better understanding of the effects of preferential voting and tested their effects in depth. The relation between voters' powers and abstention is quite strong, statistically significant, and negative. That is a very important empirical and comparative result that sheds light on the PLPR families, although more analysis can be performed at the case study level or, as stated, also considering the turnout as depending on other factors or even PV as the dependent variable. Analogously, the data indicate that the voters' power and the share of preference votes cast are strong, significant, and positive. Therefore, as in the case of the turnout, those data improve our knowledge of preferential electoral systems' effects on voter behaviour. Electoral systems matter. Not only do PV systems shape the intraparty dynamics and outcomes, but relevant differences arise when considering the different PLPR subtypes and their characteristics. The main hypotheses in this book have been confirmed (e.g. the level of incumbents' defeats increases from the less "open" PLPR system towards the more "open" one, namely OLPR; voters tend to use their power when entitled to express their will in electoral terms; the effective number of parties increases as a function of the voters' power and the electoral system's level of openness; PLPR systems, to different degrees on the basis of the subtypes' openness, show high levels of electoral volatility; and data from both the regression and the correlation tell us that the greater the voters' power in indicating a preference, the lower the level of abstention).

The results not only shed light on the empirical side of the electoral field but also underline the theoretical consequences of adopting a particular electoral system, namely a preferential one. The consequences are critical not only for academics but also for politicians, political parties, and voters. The statistical analysis tested important hypotheses related to the impact of electoral systems (PLPR) on intraparty dynamics, which have been investigated relatively little so far. The data reported represent an important step forwards in terms of both the theory on the impact of electoral systems and the measurement of such a relationship between electoral systems (PLPR) and intraparty dynamics. Therefore, with humility, this book represents an important addition to the field of electoral systems and their consequences for voters and parties.

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## APPENDIX: BALLOT PAPER SPECIMENS

# JUSTIÇA ELEITORAL

2ª DOBRA

PARA DEPUTADO FEDERAL

NOME OU N.º DO CANDIDATO OU SIGLA OU N.º DO PARTIDO

1ª DOBRA

PARA DEPUTADO ESTADUAL

NOME OU N.º DO CANDIDATO OU SIGLA OU N.º DO PARTIDO



Fig. A.1 Ballot paper in Brazil

**CONSEJEROS REGIONALES 2017**  
 CIRCUNSCRIPCIÓN PROVINCIAL LIQUIPE

TIRADA EN  
**N°0000000**

<p><b>A. CHILE AMER. OP. INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>SUBPACTO OP. INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>UNO CIRCUNSCRIPCIÓN INDEPENDIENTE</b></p> <p>— 110 JAVIER HERRERA BERNAL</p> <p>— 111 WILSON TORREALBA DELGADO</p> <p>— 112 MARCELO FREITE RIVERO</p> <p>— 113 JAVIER RAMÍREZ CORTÉS ESPINOSA</p> <p>— 114 PAUL FORTUNA SOTO</p> <p><b>SUBPACTO INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>PARTIDO REGIONALISTA INDEPENDIENTE</b></p> <p>— 115 RENZO VANDER PÉREZ GODOY</p> <p>— 116 ANDRÉS BARRAL FLORES</p> <p>— 117 FRANCISCA PATRICKA ALBERTO PARRA</p> <p>— 118 PAULA DE LA FUENTE MARTÍN</p> <p>— 119 FRANCISCO SALDARRIENA RAMÍREZ DE LLANO</p>	<p><b>B. POR TODO CHILE</b></p> <p><b>SUBPACTO OP. INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p>— 120 ANSELMO PARRONARDETES SUAREZ</p> <p>— 121 WILSON FRANCISCO HERNÁNDEZ LULLO</p> <p>— 122 MARCELO JAVIER DE LA FUENTE</p> <p>— 123 MARCELO AARÉL ATERCIERA PROKOT</p> <p>— 124 YERONIMO CORRAL JIMENA</p> <p><b>SUBPACTO INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p>— 125 FRANCISCA VILLALBA VARGAS</p> <p>— 126 LUIS MARCELO CARRERA GALLEGOS CORDOVA</p> <p>— 127 ALBERTO SANCHEZ VILLALBA GONZALEZ</p> <p>— 128 EMILIA JOHANNETTE VARGAS MARCELIA</p> <p>— 129 JUAN CARLOS DE LA FUENTE CORTES</p> <p>— 130 JAVIER MARCELO RODRIGUEZ FLORIAN</p>	<p><b>C. INTEGRACION PARA EL DESARROLLO</b></p> <p><b>POPULACION REGIONAL</b></p> <p>— 131 JUAN CARLOS LÓPEZ JARA</p> <p>— 132 ANDRÉS CORTÉS GONZÁLEZ</p> <p>— 133 JAVIER RUBÉN ANDRÉS CARRERA JARA</p> <p>— 134 JAVIER CARRERA CARRERA</p> <p><b>INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p>— 135 JUAN CARLOS VILLALBA CARRERA</p> <p>— 136 ANDRÉS CORTÉS GONZÁLEZ</p> <p>— 137 ANDRÉS LÓPEZ VILLALBA</p> <p>— 138 ANDRÉS ANTONIO CALZADINI GODOY</p> <p>— 139 NICOLÁS DELGADO BARREDA JARA</p> <p>— 140 ANDRÉS VICTOR GARRIDO CARRERA</p> <p>— 141 ANDRÉS GONZÁLEZ PARRERA GARCÍA</p>	<p><b>D. CHILE AMER. OP. INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>SUBPACTO OP. INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>EL SUJECIO POLICIAL</b></p> <p>— 142 FELIPE ROSAS RODRÍGUEZ</p> <p>— 143 JAVIER RAMÍREZ JARA</p> <p>— 144 MARCELO JAVIER GARCÉS</p> <p>— 145 JAVIER RIVERA CARRERA</p> <p><b>SUBPACTO INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p>— 146 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 147 ANDRÉS LÓPEZ GODOY</p> <p>— 148 JAVIER RAMÍREZ GODOY</p> <p>— 149 ANDRÉS RAMÍREZ GODOY</p> <p>— 150 CHRISTIAN TAYLOR FERRAZ</p> <p>— 151 CHRISTIAN VILLALBA</p>
<p><b>F. POR UN CHILE JUSTO Y PROGRESIVO AJO</b></p> <p><b>SUBPACTO OP. INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>PARTIDO CONSTITUCIONAL DE CHILE</b></p> <p>— 152 FRANCISCO BARRAL GODOY</p> <p>— 153 FRANCISCO BARRAL GODOY</p> <p>— 154 FRANCISCO BARRAL GODOY</p> <p>— 155 FRANCISCO BARRAL GODOY</p> <p><b>SUBPACTO INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>PARTIDO POR LA DEMOCRACIA</b></p> <p>— 156 FRANCISCO BARRAL GODOY</p> <p>— 157 FRANCISCO BARRAL GODOY</p> <p>— 158 FRANCISCO BARRAL GODOY</p> <p><b>SUBPACTO INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>PARTIDO SOCIAL DEMOCRÁTICO</b></p> <p>— 160 FRANCISCO BARRAL GODOY</p> <p>— 161 FRANCISCO BARRAL GODOY</p> <p>— 162 FRANCISCO BARRAL GODOY</p>	<p><b>G. SURVIVIR</b></p> <p><b>SUBPACTO AMPLIO INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>AMPLIO</b></p> <p>— 163 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 164 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 165 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 166 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 167 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 168 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 169 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 170 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p>	<p><b>I. FRENTE AMPLIO</b></p> <p><b>SUBPACTO AMPLIO INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>PARTIDO LIBERAL DE CHILE</b></p> <p>— 171 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 172 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p><b>SUBPACTO AMPLIO INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>PARTIDO DEMOCRÁTICO</b></p> <p>— 173 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 174 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 175 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 176 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p><b>SUBPACTO AMPLIO INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p>— 177 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 178 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 179 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 180 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p>	<p><b>COALICIÓN REGIONALISTA - EDE</b></p> <p><b>SUBPACTO DEMOCRACIA REGIONAL E INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>DEMOCRACIA REGIONAL INDEPENDIENTE</b></p> <p>— 181 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 182 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 183 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p>
<p><b>L. UNIDOS POR LA DECENTRALIZACIÓN</b></p> <p><b>SUBPACTO INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>PARTIDO SOCIALISTA DE CHILE</b></p> <p>— 194 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 195 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 196 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 197 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 198 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 199 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 200 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p><b>SUBPACTO INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p><b>PARTIDO SOCIALISTA DE CHILE</b></p> <p>— 201 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 202 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 203 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 204 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 205 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p>	<p><b>M. FRENTE ECOLOGISTA Y CIUDADANO</b></p> <p><b>ECOLOGISTA</b></p> <p>— 195 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 196 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 197 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 198 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 199 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 200 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 201 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p><b>PARTIDO ECOLOGISTA - EDE</b></p> <p><b>INDEPENDIENTES</b></p> <p>— 202 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 203 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 204 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p> <p>— 205 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p>	<p><b>N. CIRCUNSCRIPCIÓN INDEPENDIENTE</b></p> <p>— 206 ANDRÉS VILLALBA</p>	<p><b>97</b></p> <p>Postulantes a consejeros regionales hay en la Circunscripción Provincial de Liquipe</p>

Fig. A.2 Ballot paper in Chile



ΔΕΓΜΑ  
 ΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΙΚΕΣ ΕΚΛΟΓΕΣ  
 22 ΜΑΪΟΥ 2016  
 ΨΗΦΟΔΕΛΤΙΟ  
 ΕΚΛΟΓΙΚΗ ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑ  
 ΑΜΜΟΧΩΣΤΟΥ  
 ΔΕΓΜΑ

Fig. A.3 Ballot paper in Cyprus

Sønderjyllands Amts  
3. opstillingskreds

## Folketingsvalget 2001

Sæt × til højre for en listebetegnelse (et partinavn)  
eller et kandidatnavn.  
Sæt kun ét kryds på stemmesedlen.

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**A. Socialdemokratiet**

Frode Sørensen \_\_\_\_\_  
Inger Bierbaum \_\_\_\_\_  
Dorte Dinesen \_\_\_\_\_  
P. Qvist Jørgensen \_\_\_\_\_  
Eva Roth \_\_\_\_\_  
Lise von Seelen \_\_\_\_\_  
Søren Ebbesen Skov \_\_\_\_\_

---

**B. Det Radikale Venstre**

Nicolas Lund-Larsen \_\_\_\_\_  
Per Kleis Bonnelycke \_\_\_\_\_  
Bente Dahl \_\_\_\_\_  
Inger Harms \_\_\_\_\_  
Bjarke Larsen \_\_\_\_\_  
Henrik Larsen \_\_\_\_\_

---

**C. Det Konservative Folkeparti**

Kaj Ikast \_\_\_\_\_  
Martin Andresen \_\_\_\_\_  
Bent P. Have \_\_\_\_\_  
Jens M. Henriksen \_\_\_\_\_  
Bente Lassen \_\_\_\_\_  
Lars Munk \_\_\_\_\_  
Klaus Rehkopff \_\_\_\_\_

---

**D. Centrum-Demokraterne**

Henning Nielsen \_\_\_\_\_  
Henning Borchert-Jørgensen \_\_\_\_\_  
Helmuth Carstens \_\_\_\_\_  
Flemming Hübschmann \_\_\_\_\_  
Holger Madsen \_\_\_\_\_  
Peter Berthel Nissen \_\_\_\_\_  
Kai Paulsen \_\_\_\_\_

---

**F. Socialistisk Folkeparti**

Bjarne Eliasen \_\_\_\_\_  
Bent Iversen \_\_\_\_\_  
Jesper Petersen \_\_\_\_\_  
Kirstine Rask Lauridsen \_\_\_\_\_  
Jørn Ulrik Larsen \_\_\_\_\_  
Jørgen Jørgensen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mathias Gotthardsen \_\_\_\_\_

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**O. Dansk Folkeparti**

Søren Krarup \_\_\_\_\_  
Kell Kristiansen \_\_\_\_\_





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**O. Dansk Folkeparti**

Søren Krarup \_\_\_\_\_  
Kell Kristiansen \_\_\_\_\_  
Jørn Larsen \_\_\_\_\_  
Jytte Lauridsen \_\_\_\_\_  
Theis Mathiasen \_\_\_\_\_  
Niels Oluf Michaelsen Petersen \_\_\_\_\_  
Lars Rydhard \_\_\_\_\_

---

**Q. Kristeligt Folkeparti**

Michael Lund Markussen \_\_\_\_\_  
Vibeke Christensen \_\_\_\_\_  
Bjarke Friis \_\_\_\_\_  
Knud Erik Hansen \_\_\_\_\_  
Henning Holm \_\_\_\_\_

---

**V. Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti**

Bjørn Scherbarth \_\_\_\_\_  
Sven Buhrkall \_\_\_\_\_  
Peter Christensen \_\_\_\_\_  
Allan Emiliussen \_\_\_\_\_  
Gunnar Hattesen \_\_\_\_\_  
Helga Moos \_\_\_\_\_  
Hans Chr. Schmidt \_\_\_\_\_

---

**Z. Fremskridtspartiet**

Ole Jensen \_\_\_\_\_  
Heine Andresen \_\_\_\_\_  
Henning Brandt \_\_\_\_\_  
Cari Hahn \_\_\_\_\_  
Margit Petersen \_\_\_\_\_  
Preben Ravn \_\_\_\_\_  
Jens Willatzen \_\_\_\_\_

---

**Ø. Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne**

Baltser Andersen \_\_\_\_\_  
Svend Brandt \_\_\_\_\_  
Signe Færch \_\_\_\_\_  
Jette Hedegaard \_\_\_\_\_  
Egon Laugesen \_\_\_\_\_  
Niels-Erik Aaes \_\_\_\_\_

Fig. A.4 Ballot paper in Denmark



















Fig. A.5 Ballot paper in Italy (Camera dei deputati, 1963)

## Stembiljet

voor de verkiezing van de leden van de  
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal  
op woensdag 15 maart 2017

**Stap 1** Kleur bij stap 1 de witte stip bij de lijst van uw keuze rood, zwart, blauw of groen.

1. VVD 	2. Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)  <b>PARTIJ VAN DE ARBEID</b> <small>gecombineerd met lijst 8</small>	3. PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid)	4. SP (Socialistische Partij) 
5. CDA	6. Democraten 66 (D66)	7. ChristenUnie 	8. GROENLINKS 
9. Staatskundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP) 	10. Partij voor de Dieren 	11. SOPLUS 	12. OndernemersPartij
13. VNL (VoorNederland) 	14. DENK	15. NIEUWE WEGEN	16. Forum voor Democratie 
17. De Burger Beweging	18. WijZinnige Partij 	19. GeenPeil 	20. Piratenpartij
21. Artikel 1	22. Niet Stemmers	23. Liberarische Partij (LP)	24. Lokaal in de Kamer
28. Vrije Democratische Partij (VDP) 			

Namen van de kandidaten staan in het kandidatenoverzicht. Let op! Kies bij stap 1 eerst een lijst, anders is uw stem ongeldig.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60
61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

Fig. A.6 Ballot paper in the Netherlands

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