

MAXIM HEDGES IN LITERARY TEXTS: A TRANSLATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

The article presents conversational and translational analyses of maxim hedges. The purpose of conversational analysis is to recognize conversational strategies employed by the participants in communication, focusing on specific usages of hedging expressions and intensifiers. A meta-linguistic function of hedges is central to my considerations; hedges are viewed as indicators and cues helping to infer the likeliest meaning in the given context of conversation.

A translational perspective of the article is achieved by analysing specific usages of maxim hedges in two parallel texts, the source text in English (ST) and its Slovak translation, i.e. the target text (TT). Distinctive functions of hedges in the ST and TT are identified; the hedges which seem to cause problems in translation are discussed. Using the method of conversational analysis, types of hedges are classified, stating their functions and relatedness to particular conversational maxims. A translational perspective is added by means of a translation analysis, including comparative and contrastive aspects of study. In conclusion, translation strategies have been formulated.

1 Introduction

In the following monologue the speaker summarises past experiences in his life and considers perspectives for the future. There is a conventional part of the utterance meaning which can be marked as ‘an expression of the speaker’s disillusionment’. However, the complex meaning of this utterance involves inferring also conversational parts of the utterance meaning. By saying “*I don’t mean that in a cynical way*” the speaker advises us how to understand his words properly; this statement fulfils pragmatic functions and can be classified as a hedge:

I don’t believe in anything any more. I don’t believe in me, I don’t believe in my friends, I don’t believe in Gemma. But *I don’t mean that in a cynical way*.

The utterance expresses the speaker’s personal feelings, his ‘world view’; in terms of semantics, it entails disappointment and disillusion. In terms of pragmatics, it implies that what is said may be just a temporary opinion, not a real complaint or an act of blaming. The hedged statement enables us to infer that what is said is to be taken as an unemotional and realistic description of the situation.

Generally speaking, hedges are expressions with metalingual function. They gloss on the extent to which the speaker is abiding by the respective conversational maxim. In the above example, the hedging expression serves to clarify the ‘manner’ of talk; it reflects the speaker’s wish to make the utterance perspicuous by advising the reader how to perceive the message. Thus it can be classified as the hedge related to the maxim of manner. In this paper, I discuss all major types of hedges as related to the classical Gricean conversational maxims.

In linguistic research, hedges have been studied and analysed both from a semantic and a pragmatic perspective. In semantics, hedges are modifiers in a narrower sense. Lakoff (1973) defines hedges as “words whose meaning implicitly involves fuzziness”, as “words whose job it is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy” (ibid.: 471). In pragmatics, hedges and intensifiers on Gricean (conversational) maxims are expressions of propositional attitude (Grundy 1999).

In this paper, I study the use of hedges and observe what happens to them in the process of translation, using the language pair English and Slovak. For the empirical research, I have chosen a literary text, the novel *Junk* by Melvin Burgess. Its original and translated versions provided me with parallel English/Slovak text samples of satisfactory length (almost 300 pages each). I chose this novel also because I assume that hedges are frequent in challenging and emphatic utterances, in spontaneous reactions and in expressions of the subjective point of view of a character. The novel is written as a series of personalised narratives; there are 32 chapters and each of them is narrated by one of the characters providing a personal summary of the situations and events. There are some parts of the text which might be challenging for the reader who has to be sensitive to the cues and indications encoded in the text. Some of these passages seem to have caused problems in the Slovak translation. Both for the reader’s and the translator’s better orientation in the discourse of the novel, hedges are useful. They show speaker viewpoint and advise the reader/translator how to take what is in focus. In this paper, I classify the main types of the hedges used in my corpus and explore the ways these hedges are translated into Slovak. More specifically, I want to find out what kinds of hedges might cause problems in translation and why. Where appropriate, reflections on the problems of applying Gricean pragmatics (i.e. Grice’s theory of meaning and cooperation) to literary texts and their translation are included in my commentary.

2 Grice's theory of conversational implicature

Since this study is founded on Gricean pragmatics, namely the theory of conversational implicature and the co-operative principle, a few essential concepts of this theoretical framework are briefly introduced here.

2.1 Implicature and entailment

Implicatures are defined by Grundy (2000) as that kind of meaning which “arises as a result of interactants’ mutual knowledge of the conversational maxims” (ibid.: 80). This is a non-conventional, context-dependent meaning; utterances can create different implicatures in different contexts of use. Implicature arises as a direct consequence of interactants accepting co-operative strategies (Povolná: 2006), which are described by Grice (1975) as “agreed guidelines” for talk. Grice has also pointed out that speakers and listeners seem to share “a sense of cooperation” which means that they are responsible for implications they make. In other words, entering a conversation, we do not normally expect to be tricked, mislead or confused by other participants of communication. However, as Wilson and Sperber (1995) put it, utterances contain “information about the representations to be manipulated and information about how to manipulate them” (based on their distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning) (ibid.: 2).

Entailments are “conventional or semantic meanings which cannot by definition be cancelled without creating a contradiction” (Grundy 2000: 81). The message conveyed in an utterance is usually based not only on what is said but also on what is (conversationally) implicated.

Among implicatures, a subclass related to general discourse features can be recognised. These are known as conversational implicatures, defined by Cruse (2000) as “propositions or assumptions not encoded in what is actually said” (ibid.: 349). The speaker conveys the proposition or assumption which has to be worked out, partially or completely, by the hearer. The hearer assumes that the speaker wants to communicate something which is not expressed by the actual words. In this way “something more is being communicated than is said” – an additional conveyed meaning called an implicature (Yule 1996: 36).

In the next utterance, by performing an indirect speech act, the speaker politely refuses an invitation. The entailment is [he has a place of his own]. Based on the context and situation of this conversation, conversational implicatures, such as [he does not want to get involved with squatters and drug addicts] can be inferred.

- (1) 'Aren't you going to join us, Skolly?'
'I've got a home of my own, thanks.'

There are no hedges used in example (1); however, other devices are used to fulfil pragmatic functions. We perceive the relationship between the speakers as friendly; the negative question and a direct (first name) address indicate familiarity. In terms of pragmatics, the sentence is an indirect speech act of invitation which, in the given context of utterance, implies hesitation [if he comes, would he like what he sees?] and uncertainty [would other people agree with inviting a stranger?]. Similarly, the response of the second participant implies an understanding attitude mainly by its indirectness.

In the next example, we recognise entailments [she did not leave him; he is David's father] and implicatures [there are problems in this family; it is unlikely she would leave him; family ties are still important for her]:

- (2) 'You haven't left him, then?'
'He's your father, David.'

Among implicatures, a subclass of conversational implicatures has been recognised. Cruse (2000: 350) has suggested several distinctive criteria for conversational implicatures; the major ones are quoted below (ibid: 350-351):

1. Context dependence – 'an expression with a single meaning can give rise to different conversational implicatures in different contexts'. For example, the statement '*He's your father, David.*' in (2), can give rise to different implicatures if given as a response to a question like "*Who is this man?*"
2. Defeasibility/cancellability – 'conversational implicatures can be cancelled by additional material without contradiction or anomaly'.
3. Non-detachability – 'the same propositional content in the same context will always give rise to the same conversational implicature'.
4. Calculability – 'a conversational implicature must be calculable, using statable general principles' (e.g. example (3) below).

These criteria involve assumptions of the speaker's responsibility for the content of implicatures and explicatures, and thus, telling a lie, and conveying a misleading implicature (for example, when providing incomplete information) are considered as two distinct conversational strategies (Dontcheva-Navratilova 2007: 130). In the next example, the speaker provides incomplete information implying that Lily is a personality difficult to describe:

- (3) ‘How do you describe Lily?’
 ‘Yeah, *no one’s found the right word for Lils yet,*’ I said.

By performing an indirect speech act the speaker implicitly indicates that Lily is a woman of many faces, a woman of many qualities. A broader situation of the utterance is necessary for inferring the correct meaning:

‘He started talking about Lily. He said, ‘She’s ...’ and then he ground to halt, which was perfectly reasonable. How do you describe Lily?’
 ‘Yeah, no one’s found the right word for Lils yet,’ I said. He smiled and nodded.
 ‘But what about Gems?’ I said.

The utterance is the speaker’s (Rob’s) recollection of a conversation he had with a young man, Tar, when they first met. Tar was trying to be friendly and wanted to say something nice about Lily, Rob’s girlfriend, but he could not. Rob shows understanding and changes the topic. He asks about Gemma, Tar’s girlfriend. In this respect, the additional material confirms the implicatures formulated above.

3 Grice’s conversational maxims

3.1 The cooperative principle

Creating a rational talk exchange requires utterances which are in some way connected to each other and to the main topic of the conversation. The cooperative principle, introduced by Grice (1975), is to guarantee this connection: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (ibid.: 45).

The speakers agree to cooperate in conversation by means of abiding by the conversational maxims. The four classical Gricean conversational maxims are maxims of quality, quantity, relation/relevance and manner (e.g. Grice 1975: 45-46; Cruse 2000: 355-361; Yule 1996: 36-37). The speaker indicates that he/she is abiding by the respective conversational maxim by means of hedges and intensifiers. These are the expressions of propositional attitude which “advise the hearer of the extent to which the speaker is committed to the well-foundedness, informativeness, relevance and perspicuity, respectively, of the propositions to which they are attached” (Grundy & Jiang 1998). They show speaker viewpoint and advise the hearer/reader how to take what is in focus. The utterance in

example (4) entails that the speaker has been going through a difficult period in his life living by himself in a new place. The utterance gives rise to several conversational implicatures, for instance, that [family relations were problematic] and [he left home]. The expression *pretty* can be considered as a hedge. It creates certain fuzziness and uncertainty which imply that [it is hard to admit that it was wrong to leave home]. The function of *pretty* is a pragmatic one; it can be considered as a pragmatic hedge:

- (4) 'I'd been feeling *pretty* down – being away from home, being on my own.'

4 Maxim hedges: A translational perspective

The next four sections are devoted to the analysis of the role of hedges in drawing inferences as to the likeliest meaning in the given context. I work with parallel pairs of examples taken from the original English text (ST) and its Slovak translation (TT). My aim is to classify the types and functions of hedges. More specifically, I want to explore the translational strategies used in the Slovak translation, stating what types of hedges may cause problems for a translator.

4.1 The maxim of quality

The most common type of hedges in my corpus relates to the speaker's desire to express his/her ideas as accurately as possible; he/she tries to describe the events according to his/her best knowledge. Expressions like *actually, I know, I think, I'm fairly sure, she gave that impression, etc.*, notify the reader into what extent the speaker guarantees the truth of his words. Here, the function of maxim hedges is metalinguistic, it is talk about talk; hedges refer to the 'quality' of the language used by the speaker and thus are concerned with 'telling the truth'.

The importance of the quality maxim for cooperative interaction is demonstrated by the large number of expressions the interactants use to indicate that what they say may be not totally accurate. These are usually adverbs such as '*actually, much*' in (5a.), embedded expressions and clauses as '*I dunno/neviem*' in (6a.-b.). A combination of a hedged particle and a metalinguistic comment occurs in (7a.-b.): '*At least, she gave that impression/Aspoň som mal taký dojem.*' Verbs with a modal meaning (e.g. *think, suggest*) can also function as hedging devices; for instance a metalinguistic/pragmatic function of '*I think*' in (5a.) is reflected in the TT where a prepositional phrase with a hedging function is used: '*podľa mňa*' (5b.):

- (5a.) ‘*Actually* she doesn’t *much* remind me of Mum but it makes me feel good because *I think* it helps her.’
- (5b.) ‘*Pravdu povediac*, matku mi príliš nepripomína, ale cítim sa s ňou dobre, pretože jej to *podľa mňa* pomáha.’
- (6a.) ‘Well. It went on till, *I dunno*, ten o’clock? Gemma was getting *really* agitated because Tar wasn’t back.’
- (6b.) ‘Trvalo to dlho, *neviem*, *možno aj* desať hodín. Gemma bola Ø nervózna, pretože Šluk sa stále nevracal.’
- (7a.) ‘Most of the girls don’t like talking customers but this one liked me. *At least*, she gave that *impression*.’
- (7b.) ‘Väčšina dievčat sa nechce púšťať so zákazníkom do reči, ale tejto som sa pozdával. *Aspoň som mal taký dojem*.’

In the TT the quality maxim hedges are mostly expressed by the parallel Slovak expressions, as in (6a.-b.): *I dunno/neviem*; and (7a.-b.): *At least, she gave that impression/Aspoň som mal taký dojem*. Additional (explanatory or hedge-like) expressions and intensifiers are also used, as illustrated by the next example:

- (8a.) ‘He’d been out on the beer *by the look* of him, lurching down the path with his hands in his pockets.’
- (8b.) ‘Boli *pravdepodobne* na pive, to som usúdil podľa ich výzoru, vliekli sa po chodníku s rukami vo vreckách.’

The explicitness of the TT, illustrated in (8a.-b.), is a typical feature of my language material. The semantic message of (8a.) is expressed in the TT by three components: an adverb which functions as a hedge (*pravdepodobne*), the verb which adds semantic specification, i.e. expresses guessing and uncertainty (*som usúdil*) and a hedged prepositional phrase (*podľa ich výzoru*). The ST prepositional phrase (*by the look*) refers to a degree of “reliability” and “truth” of the utterance; it indicates that the speaker abides by the maxim of quality. It is the translator’s choice to further qualify the pragmatic function of a hedged expression (i.e. *by the look*) by an additional adverb not present in the ST (i.e. *pravdepodobne*).

4.2 The maxim of quantity

The speaker's attempt to provide information which is adequate and necessary is commonly indicated by certain cautious notes. These notes can be formally structured as unfinished sentences, clauses or independent statements. In the following examples, hedging phrases and statements indicate the speaker's awareness of her/his being repetitive and excessive in speech; they refer to the quantity maxim:

- (10a.) 'Me and Sals just laughed. It was funny – what did she expect? None of them was expecting it. Me, *like I say*, I'd taken precautions.'
- (10b.) 'Rozosmial som sa spolu so Sal. Bolo to smiešne – a čo čakala? Nikto z nich to nečakal. Ja, *ako som už povedal*, som sa radšej poistil.'
- (11a.) '*I won't bore you with details.*'
- (11b.) '*Nechcem vás nudiť detailami.*'
- (12a.) '*Like I say ... they were all very nice.*'
- (12b.) '*Ako som povedala... všetci boli veľmi fajn.*'

The hedges referring to the quantity maxim do not cause problems in translation. When having a form of a sentence they are either translated literally, as in (11b.), or by a slightly (grammatically) modified phrase, which is more common in the given context, as in (10b.) and (12b.).

4.3 The maxim of relation/relevance

There are several expressions in my corpus which refer to the relevance maxim. These are usually found in the middle of an utterance, such as '*No, but I know*' in (13a.-b.) discussed in more detail in Section 4.5. It shows the speaker's awareness of a certain need to provide relevant information in his talk. By means of this kind of hedge speakers signal or admit that they may have drifted away from the topic. Similarly, the initial phrase '*I mean*' identifies more specifically the problem the speaker wants to talk about.

- (13a.) '*I mean*, poor old Gemma was falling to pieces, Sal was making a fuss to keep her company, but in fact she was just like me and Lils, and all it took was a little dab I had in my pocket and Gems'd be as right as rain ... *No, but I know* it wasn't funny, it feels awful. But, you know...?'
- (13b.) '*Myslel som si*, chudera Gemma, rozpadáva sa na kúsky, a Sally jej kontruje, ale v skutočnosti je na tom tak ako ja s Lil. Stačila by štipka toho, čo som mal vo vrecku, a Gem by sa usmievala ako slniečko... *Nie, vedel som*, že to nie je na smiech, že je to hrozné.'

The hedging statement ‘*I’m going off the point*’ in (14a.) suggests discussing some non-relevant material:

- (14a.) ‘*I’m going off the point*. I was very upset about my shop.’
 (14b.) ‘*Ale k veci*. Ked’ som uvidel svoj rozmlátený stánok, veľmi som sa rozčúľil.’

In the TT the indirect speech act performed by the speaker in the ST is substituted by an explicit wish to return to the topic. Both the ST and TT hedging phrases can be seen as equivalent when considered in isolation. However, the co-text and a broader conversational context indicate that conversational implicatures aroused in the ST have been manipulated in the TT. The hedging statement in the ST (*I’m going off the point*) indicates that the previous talk was a digression and was related to the particular time when his shop got smashed. The main topic of his talk (police and ambulance coming to a house nearby) was just to come. The TT hedge (*Ale k veci*) explicitly invites us to discuss the story it introduces, that is the shop burglary, which is not the speaker’s intention here. Furthermore, in comparison to the ST, the TT adds “more of a story”, which is not expressed in the ST (i.e. *ked’ som uvidel svoj rozmlátený stánok/when I saw my shop smashed*). The sentence (*Anyway, seediness*), which definitely closes the topic of a shop burglary, is omitted in the TT. As a result of this, the successive paragraph is not linked properly; cohesion and coherence are disrupted in the TT. In terms of pragmatics, the recipient infers different implicatures.

4.4 The maxim of manner

The smallest portion of maxim hedges in my corpus is the group of expressions related to the maxim of manner. They show the speaker’s awareness of the manner he/she formulates the message and reflect her/his wish to make the utterance perspicuous. The following are typical examples of hedges of manner: *Let’s be honest, I don’t mean that in a cynical way, don’t get it wrong*. (cf. (1) above).

- (15a.) ‘But when Lils looked at me I stopped laughing because, shit, she really did look awful. Clammy. She’s been doing a lot lately. Well, *let’s be honest*, we all have.’
 (15b.) ‘Ale ked’ sa na mňa Lily pozrela, razom som sa prestal smiať, pretože vyzerala Ø hrozne. Posledné dni toho brala veľa. Ø *Pravdu povediac*, všetci sme brali priveľa.’
 (16a.) ‘*Don’t get it wrong*. We weren’t getting back on it but ... going away and just expecting to drop it was a bit unrealistic.’
 (16b.) ‘*Nechápte to zle*. Nechceli sme sa k drogám vrátiť, ale ... odísť niekam ďaleko, aby sme tam s tým prestali, bolo trochu nereálne.’

- (17a.) *'I know it sounds stupid, but it was like, the flowers had come out for Gemma.'*
 (17b.) *'Viem, znie to hlúpo, ale bolo to tak, tie kvety tu rozkvetli pre Gemmu.'*

This kind of hedges does not cause problems in translation. In the TT the same hedging statements are used.

4.5 Combining pragmatic functions of diverse maxim hedges

In example (15a.-b.) discussed above, various kinds of hedges can be pointed out. Those hedging devices that refer to the manner maxim have semantic functions; they express a wish/request "to be honest". Similarly, the semantic function of intensifiers (i.e. *shit, clammy*) is important; their expressiveness indicates that the situation is serious. In combination with hedges referring to the manner maxim a hedge referring to the quality maxim (i.e. *really*) is used. It functions as a modifying hedge (i.e. it shows the degree of determinateness) and can be characterized as semantic in that it modifies the meaning of "look awful". However, these hedges and intensifiers implicitly suggest considering the problem of drugs in its complexity. In this sense, they function pragmatically.

A variety of maxim hedges has been highlighted in (13a.-b.). Written in italics, the hedges are marked as referring to the maxims of quality (Q) and quantity (Qt). More hedge-like words and phrases are indicated by italics without specifications.

- (13a.) *'I mean (Q), poor old Gemma was falling to pieces, Sal was making a fuss to keep her company, but in fact (Q) she was just (Q) like me and Lils, and all it took was a little dab I had in my pocket and Gems'd be as right as rain ... No, but I know it wasn't funny, it feels awful. But, you know...? (Qt)'*
 (13b.) *'Myslel som si (Q), chudera Gemma, rozpadáva sa na kúsky, a Sally jej kontruje, ale v skutočnosti (Q) je na tom tak ako ja s Lil. Stačila by štipka toho, čo som mal vo vrecku, a Gem by sa usmievala ako slniečko ... Nie, vedel som, že to nie je na smiech, že je to hrozné. Ø (Qt)'*

The English text is full of hedging devices, such as maxim hedges (*I mean, in fact, just, you know*) and intensifiers at the level of syntax (e.g. expressive sentence patterns, such as negative constructions/litotes: *it wasn't funny*, unfinished sentences: *Gems'd be as right as rain...*, and syntactic deviations: *No, but..., But, you know...*). In terms of semantics, expressive lexis arouses several entailments (e.g. colloquial and figurative lexis: *falling to pieces, making a fuss*, a simile: *as right as rain*), etc. In the ST the expression *I mean* functions as a hedge referring to the quality maxim, i.e. as indicating "a way of declining

responsibility for the truth value of the proposition embedded” (Watts 2003: 159). In the TT the past tense and a reflexive form are used what results in perceiving the phrase *Myslel som si* as referential “indicating that the embedded clause is indeed what the speaker believes”. The next example illustrates that the hedging function of the expression *I mean* can be substituted by other hedging (or hedge-like) devices and the hedge itself is deleted in the TT. However, the translation strategy used in (18b.) is disputable.

- (18a.) ‘She was dancing, *I mean*, she was doing things and dancing at the same time.’
 (18b.) ‘Tancovala Ø. Tancovala a obsluhovala aparatúru.’

Similarly, the phrases *I think*, *I believe*, etc. can be used either in hedging or referential functions. Examples (19a.) and (20a.) illustrate the referential use of *I think*; the speakers express their beliefs and confidence in what they say. In the TT changes occur to enhance the referential function.

- (19a.) ‘Well, I like to have a good time but *I just think* there’s more to life than that.’
 (19b.) ‘Áno, aj ja sa rada zabavím, ale *myslím*, že život je o niečom inom.’

- (20a.) ‘*I think* I’m going to get through it. I’m steady.’
 (20b.) ‘*Myslím* však, že to prežijem. Som tvrdý ako kameň.’

In the next examples, *I think* functions as a hedge; it expresses uncertainty and thus indicates that what the speaker says might not be completely true (i.e. it refers to the quality maxim). In the TT the hedging function is preserved; however, the level of uncertainty is expressed by different means. For example, in (21b.) the phrase *I think* is completely omitted and uncertainty is expressed by a hedged phrase *V skutočnosti (in reality)* and a hedged particle *asi (perhaps)*. In (22b.) a different verb is used; the verb phrase *I think* is substituted by *it seemed to me*.

- (21a.) ‘*I think* he was shy or something.’
 (21b.) ‘V skutočnosti bol asi nesmelý alebo niečo také.’

- (22a.) ‘*I think* they hated me for it, bringing their home into disrepute or something.’
 (22b.) ‘*Zdalo sa mi*, že ma preto nenávidia, že kvôli mne strácajú dobrú povest’ alebo niečo také.’

In my material, hedging devices can often be considered as resulting from the spokenness and figurativeness of the speaker’s utterance. These types of hedging devices are most interesting, and most challenging, from a translational

perspective. In the next example, the hedging devices express uncertainty and contribute to the fuzziness of the utterance (e.g. *I dunno, I mean, or something, or whatever*). For a translator, the characteristics of the colloquial speech (talking nonsense, giving incomplete information, etc.), including culture-specific phenomena (i.e. *Little Sammy, Big Sammy*), can present a challenge. In (23b.) the Slovak translation loses some of the ST figurativeness. However, it preserves hedging devices and characteristics of the spoken colloquial speech as classified in Slovak.

- (23a.) ‘They were all standing round in groups, talking about, *I dunno*, how to run your car on rice salad *or something, I mean*, you spend all those years being Little Sammy *or whatever*, you leave school, get out on your own and what do you do? You turn into Big Sammy...’
- (23b.) ‘Všetci postávali v skupinkách, rozprávali sa, *asi o tom*, ako sa čo najrýchlejšie dostať k ryžovému šalátu. *Chcem tým povedať*, že celé detstvo strávite ako taká malá nula *alebo niečo podobné*, potom skončíte školu, postavíte sa na vlastné nohy a čo sa stane? Stane sa z vás veľká nula...’

5 Conclusion

In the majority of the examples here, the hedges in the ST were rendered by hedges in the TT. The translation strategies fall into three groups: in the first group the hedges were deleted in the TT; in the second group, hedges were added in the TT (Sections 4.1-4.4). From a translational perspective, the third group (Section 4.5), where combinations of distinctive maxim hedges occur, is the most frequent and most interesting. Here, the examples of various (morpho-syntactic and/or lexical) changes occur in the TT. In the majority of examples, the hedges and hedging devices are preserved in the TT; their pragmatic function is not always correctly inferred. In the TT equivalent language means are used to express these functions, in some cases, a certain manipulation of conversational implicatures occurs.

The most characteristic qualities of the TT are its explicitness/directness and descriptiveness. These have substituted for the ST implicitness and indirectness in the whole TT. As a result, the TT loses the dynamism of the ST. Despite the fact that this kind of comments came only as a by-product of my observations of conversational situations, they may become a relevant part of an elaborated approach to the evaluation of the translation quality. However, this was not the focus of my study.

As observed in my analysis, in their respective context of a literary work, all hedges call for a pragmatic explanation. In the majority of cases, the hedges did

not cause major difficulties for translation. This statement, however, cannot be generalised because it is based only on preliminary research. A detailed study of the hedging configurations requires looking at their properties in the context of their own functional system, considering specific types of discourse (i.e. hedges in business negotiations, diplomacy, political speeches, advertising, literary texts, etc.). Such a detailed analysis would allow us to gain more insights into the complexities of hedges in translation strategies.

Appendix: Analysed texts

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