




## Jurnal Pertahanan

Media Informasi tentang Kajian dan Strategi Pertahanan  
yang Mengedepankan Identity, Nationalism & Integrity  
e-ISSN: 2549-9459

Journal Homepage : <http://jurnal.idu.ac.id/index.php/DefenseJournal>



# ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE IN 2007–2017 THROUGH DEFENSE DIPLOMACY GOAL VARIABLE

Jana Milia<sup>1</sup>, Bayview Technologies, Inc., [jana.milia@idu.ac.id](mailto:jana.milia@idu.ac.id)

Yandry Kurniawan<sup>2</sup>, Indonesia Defense University, [ykurniawank@gmail.com](mailto:ykurniawank@gmail.com)

Wibisono Poespithadi<sup>3</sup>, Indonesia Defense University, [wibisonolp2m@gmail.com](mailto:wibisonolp2m@gmail.com)

### Article Info

#### Article history:

Received 5 July 2018

Revised 29 August 2018

Accepted 30 August 2018

#### Keywords:

Defense,  
Diplomacy,  
Defense diplomacy,  
Defense cooperation  
agreement,  
National interest,  
Liberalism

### Abstract

Defense cooperation agreement between Indonesia and Singapore has been signed on April 27th 2007 in Tampak Siring, Bali by both country's defense Minister, signifying a further comprehensive agreement based on the content of the DCA (Defense Cooperation Agreement). This defense agreement, in addition of being a continuation of other previous defense cooperation such as Military Training Area in 1995 until 2003, is also a further initiative of Singapore in order to build a mutually beneficial cooperation. In fact, this agreement has also been packaged with extradition agreement which was the initiative of Indonesia. Although the agreement has been signed and agreed by both countries, this agreement was not ratified by Indonesian House of Representatives. Thus, this research will explain about factors or variables that causes the failure of Singapore defense diplomacy. This research uses liberalism perspective, defense diplomacy and bilateral diplomacy concept. The employed research method is analytical descriptive method. Data is collected through interview with 7 informants including academicians, practioners, and other related expert. The data is also obtained from various literatures. Based on 4 defense diplomacy goals variables such as Diplomacy, National Interest, Defense Instrument Usage, Peacetime and Potential Enemy, this research finds that Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2007-2017 has not been succesful yet because there was a difference between Indonesia's and Singapore's national interest. The difference came from the division in Indonesia between its government and parliament where the Government prioritized beneficial cooperation while the Parliament prioritized sovereignty principle.

© 2018 Published By Indonesia Defense University

<sup>1</sup> Corresponding Author. Jana Milia, M.Si(Han) is an alumni of Defense Diplomacy Studies, Indonesia Defense University (IDU). She currently works at Bayview Technologies, Inc., Makati City, Philippines.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. phil. Yandry Kurniawan is a lecturer of Defense Diplomacy Studies at IDU.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. (Cand) Wibisono Poespithadi, M.Sc., M.Si(Han) is a Brigadier General (Army) of TNI, currently serves as secretary of Directorate of Research & Community Services (LPPM), IDU and a doctoral candidate of public policy from Universitas Brawijaya.

## INTRODUCTION

In the context of traditional studies, defense is often interpreted as protecting the state from external physical threat (military). However, the current global development has also placed importance on non-military or non-traditional threat against the state (Kementerian Pertahanan, 2015). As part of the effort to defend against that threat, states will usually increase their military power and capabilities in order to strengthen their defense. One of the efforts is by involving other states. In this case, cooperative security can be an example of inter-linkage between one state and others in defense security framework.

One of the instruments to achieve state defense goal is through defense diplomacy. Defense cooperation and defense diplomacy is one of Singapore's foreign policy agendas (Mindef Singapore, 2018). Singapore wove many defense cooperation with countries they consider to be potential such as the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) States, United States, China, India, Taiwan, and other countries including their neighbor: Indonesia. Indonesia's relations with Singapore has been woven for long and officially started in September 1967 (Kementerian Sekretariat Negara RI, n.d.). From the opening of diplomatic relations, to bilateral cooperation that alludes to various fields of social, political, cultural, tourism, education, and security, Singapore considers Indonesia as a strategic partner especially due to the interdependence between both countries' economy.

Singapore is a small country with an area of 712.4 km<sup>2</sup> or only 1% of Indonesia's 1,904,564 km<sup>2</sup> territory (Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, n.d.). Therefore, Singapore became a state that realizes the importance of strengthening its defense. As such, it can be inferred that Singapore is a country that strives to build its defense sector. This is evidenced from Singapore's defense budget that consistently spends 3% of its GDP compared to Indonesia that only spends less than 1% for its defense budget. Even in

Southeast Asia, Singapore is the strongest state in terms of military capabilities based on its Defense Range and Military Expenditure (Darwanto, 2015). Hence, in order to strengthen its defense capabilities, Singapore must cooperate with other countries. Despite being the smallest country in Southeast Asia, Singapore managed to become the strongest country in Southeast Asia in terms of defense and military. In line with this idea, Singapore cooperates with powerful countries that they consider to be potential partner in defense sector.

As an effort to overcome its deficiencies, Singapore also utilized its neighboring countries that have good relationship with it such as Indonesia to be incorporated in defense cooperation. Defense cooperation between Singapore and Indonesia has been woven for long. It was started in 1974 and continued to this day. Some example includes Latma Indopura in the form of Safkar-Indopura for Army, Elang-Indopura for Air Force and Eagle-Indopura for marine. This cooperation was ended in 1980 and new cooperation was created in 1989 (Ibrahim, 2015). This Military Training Area was unilaterally suspended by Indonesia in 2003 due to various violations conducted by Singapore in Indonesia's territory and because Singapore always involve third party, such as United States and Australia, in every joint military exercise. Singapore then proposed newer and more complex defense cooperation but with the same substance.

Defense Cooperation Agreement or DCA is a defense and security cooperation agreement implemented in the form of joint military exercise between the two countries. On 27 April 2007 in Bali, Indonesia and Singapore agreed to an agreement which was signed by Ministry of Defense Juwono Sudarsono and Singaporean Minister of Defense Theo Chee Hean. This DCA is basically a joint military exercise agenda scheduled for the next 25 years between the two countries and can be implemented after it has been ratified by both countries (Jha,

n.d.). Although it has been signed by both countries, DCA is required to be ratified by the parliaments before it can be implemented. When the DCA was brought before the parliament, majority member was against the agreement. 10 Years past its signatory, this agreement still cannot be realized.

In light of that problem, there is a need to further study about the defense cooperation between both countries especially the defense cooperation that involves Indonesia so there can be a lesson learned from the failure of DCA with Singapore for the future defense cooperation with other countries. Therefore, this research will highlight the reason behind the failure of DCA with Singapore, taking into account that DCA is not the only cooperation that involves Indonesia. What makes DCA between Indonesia and Singapore unique is the fact that there is no significant implementation even 10 years past its signatory. The authors employ variables that became the factor of successful defense diplomacy as the tool of analysis in this research.

## RESEARCH METHODS

Research on Singapore's defense diplomacy toward Indonesia to agree on DCA is conducted by employing qualitative research method through phenomenology approach. This approach attempts to understand the meaning of certain phenomenon and its significance to certain parties in certain situation (Wahyuni, 2012).

The main function of qualitative method is to analyze qualitative or unquantifiable data. The ontology of qualitative method is interpretive perspective, i.e. assuming that a symptom is essentially holistic. Therefore, there is a possibility that the symptom cannot be measured and even observed. In addition, the relationship of symptoms is reciprocal or the data is not static and bound by certain value (Patilima, 2013).

Qualitative method through phenomenology approach is a more relevant approach compared to other

approaches in explaining the international relations phenomenon between Singapore and Indonesia.

The data utilized in this research are primary data source obtained through interview and secondary data source obtained through document and literature review.

Data analysis is conducted by employing analytical coding technique from Creswell with steps as illustrated in the picture below (Creswell, 2016):

- (1) processing and preparing data for analysis;
- (2) reading the overall data;
- (3) codifying or classifying data;
- (4) applying coding process to describe setting, participant, category and theme to be analyzed;
- (5) interpreting data.

## FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

This research is focusing on analysis of the failure of DCA between Indonesia and Singapore. In order to understand the reason behind that failure, the authors employ variables and values contained in that defense diplomacy meaning (Cotter & Forster, 2013) that the variables and values can be considered as the factor that caused the failure of defense diplomacy. The factors itself consist of Diplomacy, National Interest, Defense Instrument, Peacetime and Potential Enemy (Cotter & Forster, 2013).

The first step is determining the problematic phenomenon and it has been done in the introduction section. The second step is explaining the complexity of the situation by first analyzing variables contained in various research questions to various related institutions such as Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, academicians, practitioners, and Indonesian House of Representatives.

### Comparison of Defense Power

Indonesia's national defense is arranged in a total defense system in order to achieve

national goals. At the very least, the national goal will always go hand in hand with national interest which, according to Defense White Paper, is maintaining the integrity of The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) in accordance with Pancasila and 1945 Constitution and ensuring the implementation of national development towards the realization of national goals (Kementerian Pertahanan, 2015).

Furthermore, the Defense White Paper also explains about defense posture which is directly related to defense power and capabilities. Defense posture is directed in accordance with the military and non-military defense capabilities. This research will discuss about the military defense capabilities which is built on an ongoing basis and adjusted and directed to answer various possibilities of challenge, actual problem, and long-term strategic defense capacity building (Kementerian Pertahanan, 2015).

Measuring defense power can be done by looking at the material resources of defense capabilities manifested in military power. However, according to Jasjit Singh, there are 3 things that can be a tool to analyze defense capabilities of a country, namely Manpower, Machine and Money (Singh, 2009). Hence, the defense power and capabilities of a country can be measured from their human resources, machineries (meaning technology and weaponries), and the budget spent by that country.

Analysis of active military manpower (Global Fire Power TM, n.d.-b) shows that Indonesian manpower, based on available population, is less than 130 million with 0.4% of total population or 435 thousand serves as armed forces. As such, despite being the 4<sup>th</sup> most populous country in the world, Indonesia is still incapable to utilize its human resources to strengthen its capabilities.

Singapore has less manpower than Indonesia. Based on the total population, it

has 1.2 million available manpower or 121<sup>st</sup> in the world. As for their armed forces, Singapore has 72,000 troops (Global Fire Power TM, n.d.-b). Hence in terms of manpower and armed forces number, Singapore is far below Indonesia.

The next is machine, which is the main element to measure defense capabilities by looking at military equipment or weaponries. Based on the global rank, Indonesia is 26<sup>th</sup> for army weaponries, 28<sup>th</sup> for ship ownership, and 34<sup>th</sup> for aircraft ownership (Global Fire Power TM, n.d.-b). Looking at Indonesia's land, sea and air capabilities, it can be inferred that Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI)'s power is weak and ineffective. Furthermore, TNI's weaponries are below Minimum Essential Forces standard.

Based on the number of aircraft, Indonesia has 441 while Singapore has 226. As for the number of tank, Indonesia has 418 while Singapore has 196. Then, in terms of naval assets, Indonesia has 221 while Singapore has 40. There seems to be a huge gap between the number of asset and weaponries owned by Indonesia and Singapore.

The last factor is money, otherwise known as defense budget spent by a country. As has known, Indonesia's defense budget is always fluctuating and it influences the fulfillment of defense posture. Meanwhile, Singapore's defense budget is above Indonesia in terms of rank, with Singapore being 23<sup>rd</sup> while Indonesia is 30<sup>th</sup> (Global Fire Power TM, n.d.-b). The comparison between two countries' defense capabilities is summarized in Table 1.

### **Bilateral Relationship between Indonesia and Singapore**

It is a known fact that Indonesia-Singapore relations is strong and intimate, not to mention the two countries are neighboring each other and has interdependence based on each country's interests. Head of Bilateral I Subdivision for Southeast Asia

**Table 1.** Defense Power Comparison

Subject	Indonesia	Singapore
GFP Rank	14 (of 133)	65 (of 133)
Total Population	258,316,051	5,781,728
Manpower Available	1,300,000	1,260,000
Active Personnel	435,750	72,000
Total Military Personnel	975,750	504,500
Defense Budget	\$6,900,000,000	\$9,700,000,000
Total Aircraft	441	226
Tank Strength	418	196
Total Naval Assets	221	40
Labor Force Strength	123,700,000	3,661,000
Oil Production	789,800	500
Oil Consumption	1,660,000	1,300,000
Square Land Area	1,904,569	697

Source: (Global Fire Power TM, n.d.-a)

**Figure 1.** Singapore's Investment to Indonesia

Source: (Pol/Ant/X-3, 2017)

Cooperation of Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the strong bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Singapore can be seen from the intensity of meeting and visitation of both countries. In addition, the two countries have bi-annual summit meeting known as *leader retreat*.

To be clearer, the two countries will not be able to have such routine meeting without good cooperation. This is obviously in line with the mutually beneficial cooperation between Indonesia and

Singapore in terms of economy and investment. This can be seen from the Figure 1.

The above figure illustrates the significant development of economic value between Indonesia and Singapore. Singapore is also the second biggest foreign investor in Indonesia. In 2014 for instance, Singapore's investment realization reached 3.4 billion or approximately 24% of total FDI to Indonesia (Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, 2014).

Five major investment of Singapore in Indonesia is transportation, warehouse and telecommunication, agriculture and plantation, food industry, mining and non-steel industry. In addition to being one of the biggest investors in Indonesia, Singapore is also the source of tourist to Indonesia. The number of tourist from Singapore to Indonesia is about 3 million persons (Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, 2014). Therefore, it can be inferred that relations between Indonesia and Singapore has been woven well and both countries are interdependent to each other based on both countries' balance sheet of economic developments that are interdependent to each other.

### **Defense Cooperation**

#### *Joint Exercise Elang Indopura 1/80 TNI-SAF*

Indonesia and Singapore has a long history of defense cooperation through joint exercise between TNI and SAF (Singapore Air Force). Their cooperation was named Latma Elang Indopura 1/80 (joint exercise between Indonesia and Singapore) which was conducted in Iswahyudi Air Force Base of Madiun. This exercise was consisted of combat training between TNI and SAF by using the F-86 Sabre from TNI-AU (Indonesian Air Force) and the Hawke Hunter from RSAF and conducted in 1980 (Ibrahim, 2015).

In the following years, the relationship between TNI and SAF continued to develop and culminated in 1989 with the construction of training facilities such as Air Weapon Range (AWR). In addition, they also built Air Combat Maneuvering Range (ACWR) for Air Force and Overland Flying Training Area. Those facilities were constructed in Indonesia's territory, specifically in Pekanbaru, Riau, centered in Air Force Base as Detachment Squadron office and Joint Shelter (Ibrahim, 2015).

#### *Military Training Area*

The joint military exercise between TNI and SAF ultimately led to an agreement to create cooperation in a more complex military exercise. This includes Military Training Area (MTA) for Singapore and joint project to build some number of military exercise facilities which was funded by Singapore in three regions, i.e. Riau, Riau Islands and Baturaja in South Sumatera (Dewabrata, 2007).

On 21 September 1995, Military Training Area agreement was adopted where MTA 1 is located in Tanjung Pinang and MTA 2 is located in South China Sea. This agreement was suspended by Indonesia in 2003 because Singapore violated the MTA agreement by involving third party such as United States and Australia to conduct joint exercise in Indonesia's territory (Dewabrata, 2007).

#### *Defense Cooperation Agreement*

Defense cooperation in the form of Defense Cooperation Agreement or DCA between Indonesia and Singapore has been discussed since 2005 (Purwanto, 2006). The agreement between both countries was proposed due to the interest of both nations in maintaining defense partnership, especially Singapore which needs military exercise facilities.

The DCA which was produced and signed in 2007 can be considered as an indirect barter of interest between both countries. In addition to strengthening defense cooperation between both countries, Singapore will provide advanced equipment while Indonesia will provide a space to simulate Singapore's weaponries.

The vastness of Indonesia in addition to close proximity of Singapore and Indonesia will be mutually beneficial, especially the DCA stated that Singapore will contribute to the funding of that cooperation.

Essentially, DCA will be an opportunity and joint exercise facilities between Singaporean troops which will also strengthen Indonesia's defense capabilities.

**Table 2.** Defense Cooperation Agreement

<b>Contents of DCA</b>	<b>Details</b>
Scope of Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regular bilateral consultations and dialogue</li> <li>• Intelligence exchange, including counterterrorism</li> <li>• Scientific cooperation in the field of technology</li> <li>• Promote human resource development</li> <li>• Student exchange of military personnel</li> <li>• Shared or separate exercises (operations and logistics) including mutual access to training areas and facilities</li> <li>• SAR cooperation, disaster management, and humanitarian assistance</li> </ul>
Exercise Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of training areas and facilities in Indonesia for joint TNI and Singapore Armed Force (SAF) exercise and provision of training assistance for the TNI</li> <li>• Provision of access to Indonesian air and sea territories for SAF exercise</li> <li>• Implementation of detailed exercise as stipulated in the Implementing Arrangement (IA)</li> <li>• SAF can exercise with third countries in Alfa 2 and Bravo areas with Indonesian permission</li> <li>• Indonesia reserves the right to supervise the exercises by sending observer and is entitled to participate in the exercise after technical consultation with the exercise participants</li> <li>• Third party personnel and equipment will be treated equally with Singapore's armed naval personnel</li> </ul>
Duration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Apply for 25 years</li> <li>• The parties may review the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and Implementing Arrangement (IA) once every 6 years after the initial 13-year term</li> <li>• DCA and IA are renewed for 6 years after each review except by mutual agreement</li> </ul>

*Source:* Processed by the Authors, 2018

The DCA also stated joint military exercise between the two countries, meaning that this joint exercise will alleviate the limited defense budget of Indonesia. In order to ascertain the content of the DCA, the authors will map the content of DCA in the Table 2.

The DCA is consisted of scope of cooperation, exercise cooperation and duration of the agreement. The scope of cooperation is consisted of forms of cooperation that will be developed between both countries such as exchange of military personnel, joint exercise and cooperation in disaster management.

Exercise cooperation section is a specific section that discusses about the main cooperation agenda. Based on the explanation in this section, it can be inferred

that the exercise area will use Indonesia's territory in Alfa 1, Alfa 2, and Bravo.

The main agenda of this joint exercise is the development of exercise area and facility in Indonesia for joint exercise between TNI and Singapore Armed Force (SAF). Singapore will commit to 90% of the development cost for preparing exercise area. The benefit for Indonesia is that the military base camp will belong to Indonesia after 25 years.

Furthermore, it is also stated in that joint exercise that Singapore can invite third party country to be their partner in their exercise. However, this will require Indonesia's permission as the owner of that area. Then, if the joint exercise will involve other countries, Indonesia will reserve the right to send an observer. At the same time, Indonesia must remain professional toward

**Table 3.** Process for Developing DCA

<b>Year</b>	<b>Information</b>	<b>Timeline</b>
2005	Official Bilateral Meeting, Singapore proposed DCA. 3 Cooperation agreements were agreed (defense, extradition and counter-terrorism)	Pre-Agreement
2006	Informal meeting between Singapore and Indonesia. A team from Indonesia and Singapore met for 4 times to produce DCA	
2007	Agreement was signed by both countries. (9-10 April) Meeting between Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister to discuss DCA. (July) Meeting between Indonesian Minister of Defense and Singaporean Armed Forces Commander-General	Agreement
2008	Bilateral meeting between Minister George Yeo and Hassan Wirajuda to discuss DCA.	
2009	Singaporean Prime Minister affirmed Indonesia's loss by not ratifying DCA due to extradition interest.	Post-Agreement
2010	The creation of leader retreat	
2011	Meeting between Minister of Defenses, Discussion between Singaporean Prime Minister and Indonesian President, gift of fighter aircraft, and establishment of fighter aircraft instructor in Indonesia	
2012	Official summit meeting to discuss outstanding issue	
2013-2017	Annual Meeting/Leader Retreat	

*Source:* Processed by the Authors, 2018

the third party involved by Singapore in joint exercise.

The above explanation shows that there is a mutual beneficial for Indonesia and Singapore through this DCA. The mutually beneficial agreement is obviously based on liberalism principle that prioritizes cooperation for keeping peace (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013). The liberal principle and character in DCA is quite strong evidenced by the fact that two countries or more will build a mutually beneficial cooperation.

In the case of the DCA, the content of that agreement is imbued strongly with liberalism principle. This can be seen from the mutually beneficial cooperation stated in Indonesia such as Indonesia providing area, and Singapore providing advanced facility and technology, as well as technical and academic assistance for TNI.

### **Process for Developing DCA**

In order to agree on DCA, Singapore as the initiator conducted various activities to realize DCA. In addition to continuous diplomacy, Singapore also created framework for meeting between leaders of Indonesia and Singapore to discuss

outstanding issue, including the delay to DCA. This meeting is also known as Leader Retreat. The authors explain the process for developing DCA up to the time when DCA was rejected by Indonesian House of Representatives in the Table 3.

### **Problems Surrounding DCA**

According to Yudi Swastanto as Director General for Defense Strategy of Ministry of Defense, DCA is the umbrella for various agreements. But regardless of that, every defense cooperation have actually been conducted but without legal justification. DCA is that legal justification.

The similar sentiment is also expressed by staff of Legal and International Agreement Division of Ministry of Foreign Affairs who stated that DCA is more expansive and comprehensive than MTA which only discuss about joint exercise, area and smaller territory, and it is also only for military interest. Therefore, DCA exists as an umbrella of other defense cooperation because it involves other defense cooperation such as exchange of information, capacity building, etc.



Based on several explanations above, it can be inferred that DCA is a cooperation truly needed by both countries to develop their defense. DCA is the legal umbrella for every defense cooperation between both countries and is obviously different with MTA.

DCA became a problem when House of Representatives or parliament decided to not ratify the agreement.

Yoedhi also stated that the parliament's policy to not ratifying the defense cooperation was a political decision on the basis of higher interest namely extradition even though the extradition agreement itself is not under Ministry of Defense. As such, the Ministry of Defense as leading sector in this agreement was unable to do anything. In actuality, DCA itself has no problem. MTA is the problematic one. MTA was one of the agenda and content of the DCA.

According to Law No. 24 of 2000 concerning International Agreement, the article 10 on ratification of international agreement stated that an international agreement will be ratified if it is related to politics, peace, defense and state security, territorial change, stipulation of territorial demarcation, sovereignty, human rights, creation of new legal principles, and foreign aid and grant.

The parliamentary decision to not ratify was caused by the following factors:

1. Difference of opinion between stakeholders. The Government of Indonesia was on the benefit of cooperation argument while the parliament was on the sovereignty of territory argument.
2. Adverse Clauses such as Article 6 on Implementing Arrangement where Singapore has the right to conduct joint exercise in Indonesian territory of Alpha 1, Alpha 2, and Bravo area; Singapore has the right to involve third parties in conducting joint military exercise in Indonesia; Singapore Naval Ship is allowed to conduct sea maneuver and exercise including live-fire exercise.
3. Martial Law.

4. Military Training Area.

5. History of the relationship between the two countries.

#### **Four Variables of Successful Defense Diplomacy**

In this study, the authors employ liberalism perspective as rationale behind the analysis. According to Jackson & Sorensen, Liberalism was created on the basis of positive view on human nature which led to the assumption that international relations can be more cooperative instead of conflicting (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013). Therefore, Liberalism assumes state cooperation on the basis of that principle which includes peacekeeping, cooperation etc.

Liberalism will lead to integration and cooperation. According to the liberalists, cooperation under anarchy and regional integration can prevent international war. This is possible because when a nation integrates and cooperates with other nation, they will know about each other's characteristic and war will not occur between them. Therefore, derivative of this perspective to further the analysis is defense diplomacy concept. IN this case, the authors employ Cottey and Foster's definition which stated that defense diplomacy is a tool to realize political goals through military instrument and infrastructure (Cottey & Forster, 2004).

The basic question is, how can we infer whether a defense diplomacy is successful or not or variables that make such defense diplomacy successful. Based on Cottey & Foster's defense diplomacy concept, we can establish variables that constitute defense diplomacy concept, i.e. (1) diplomacy, (2) national interest, (3) military instrument usage, (4) peacetime and former or potential enemy (Cottey & Forster, 2004).

The four variables are the constitution of defense diplomacy. Therefore defense diplomacy activities can be analyzed based on these constitutional variables. In addition, these variables will lead to the

conclusion of whether defense diplomacy can be considered successful or otherwise.

As such, the case of DCA which is a defense diplomacy between Singapore and Indonesia can be considered as a failure due to cannot be implemented 10 years past the signatory date. The following is analysis of that case based on the constitutional variables of defense diplomacy:

### *Diplomacy*

Diplomacy is the most important element of foreign policy and diplomacy can also be considered as a tool for a state to achieve its national interest (Roy, 1991). Diplomacy is related to interstate relationship through negotiation and peaceful means, if possible, in making relationship with other countries. If peaceful means fail to achieve the desire goals, diplomacy allows the use of threat or real power as a mean to achieve those goals (Roy, 1991).

The diplomacy aspect in this case is Singapore's attempt to realize DCA with Indonesia which began in 2007 when Indonesia did not ratify this agreement even in the following years. The diplomacy aspect in this case is important because it is related to the national interest that will be achieved by each cooperating state. The diplomacy that is discussed in this research is defense diplomacy, namely diplomacy within diplomacy or, in other words, diplomacy conducted by both countries in realizing defense cooperation agreement. In this research, diplomacy is considered as a tool and instrument of a state. Singapore that has interest in DCA has conducted diplomacy to agree on DCA which was delayed due to Indonesia's ratification process. This research finds that Singapore has exercised various diplomacies to realize DCA.

*Foreign Policy*, DCA is one of Singapore's foreign policies to weave good defense cooperation with Indonesia. This can be seen from Singapore's statement that explained DCA as a mutually beneficial cooperation that will strengthen Indonesia-Singapore ties (Mindef Singapore, 2007).

Singaporean Ministry of Defense also stated that DCA will be the framework of every defense cooperation which means that DCA is Singapore's interest in exercising its foreign policy. Hence, every policy related to DCA will obviously lead to the realization of Singapore's foreign policy.

*Negotiation*, is the form of diplomacy exercised by Singapore or, in other words, the mean employed in the diplomacy itself. In this regard, Singapore has conducted negotiations to agree on DCA even after the DCA was not ratified. This includes the creation of Leader Retreat as a way for Singapore to regain Indonesia's attention after the agreement was not ratified by the parliament.

*Form of overseas service*. Singapore continues to conduct overseas meeting with Indonesia, both in formal and informal manner. The meeting to discuss DCA itself can be done impromptu in between international conference or meeting by head of state or head of government.

*An abstract judgment*. This can also mean expertise and shrewdness in negotiating. Expertise and shrewdness are two different things but will achieve similar goal. In this regard, Singapore utilized its bigger economic and investment power compared to Indonesia in order to strengthen its diplomacy and negotiation to realize DCA.

Based on several variables above, it can be said that Singapore has exercised strong diplomacy with Indonesia, both through negotiations and meetings with Indonesia, both by head of state and head of government, all of which is ultimately employed to realize DCA.

### *National Interest*

National interest is the main goal in creating cooperation especially in the case of DCA. There are two countries involved in DCA: Indonesia and Singapore. The two countries obviously want to realize their own national political interest through DCA. However, when the agreement has been signed and

agreed by both countries, the parliament of one of the countries did not ratify it, which means there is a different opinion in interpreting the national interest to be achieved through this agreement. Singapore based their rationale on benefit principle while Indonesia on state sovereignty.

The different opinion on national interest ultimately became the key factor in the success of interstate relationship which, in this case, is the success of defense cooperation. This research finds that the difference of opinion between Indonesia and Singapore is caused by the difference of opinion between Government of Indonesia and Indonesian House of Representatives which causes the failure of this agreement.

This was inferred from the internal meeting between the parliament and ministries to discuss DCA. It was then decided on 14 June 2007 that majority member of House of Representatives 1<sup>st</sup> Commission for defense affairs refuse to ratify DCA. For example, Mahfudz Siddiq as one of the members of House of Representatives who, on 4 July 2007 in Jakarta, stated that the government needs to reconsider DCA especially in regard to articles that has been proven disadvantageous for national interest (Kompas, 2007).

Next in 25 June 2007, during a meeting between Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense, House of Representatives 1<sup>st</sup> Commission agreed to reject defense cooperation agreement with Singapore. This rejection was made on the basis that Indonesia as the provider of exercise ground has less benefit than Singapore (Kompas, 2007).

Indonesia's national interest is obviously based on Pancasila and Preambles of 1945 Constitution. However, there is a difference in the interpretation in this case. In order to explain the meaning of national interest in this case, the authors will relate it to classical liberalism theory which was created on the basis of positive view on human nature which led to the assumption that international relations can be more

cooperative instead of conflicting. Therefore, Liberalism assumes state cooperation on the basis of that principle which includes peacekeeping, cooperation etc.

Liberalism will lead to integration and cooperation. According to the liberalists, cooperation under anarchy and regional integration can prevent international war. This is possible because when a nation integrates and cooperate with other nation, they will know about each other's characteristic and war will not occur between them. The same is also true in this case. Singapore and Indonesia have a long history of cooperation even from the early days of Singapore's independence and has conducted various cooperation up to today.

The authors employ liberalism's assumption that legitimizes cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit. The same is also true with Indonesia which, from the beginning of DCA development, has employed mutual interest and positive view consideration to cooperate with each other.

However, the internal discussion in Indonesian House of Representatives apparently resulted in differing opinion which reflects realist point of view. This has made agreement and cooperation with other countries impossible, especially because the internal of a country has contradicting view on certain thing.

The same is also true in the case of Singapore's desire to weave cooperation by using Indonesia's territory, while Indonesia did not want such thing. The parliament believed that DCA is a defense treaty, while in reality DCA is a legal umbrella for any defense cooperation. As such, this difference of opinion has caused the failure of ratifying international agreement.

#### *Usage of Defense Instrument*

The main focus of this agreement is joint exercise, where it is one of the activities and goals of defense diplomacy itself. The use of defense instrument itself is part of defense diplomacy. However, the authors will explain that the use of defense

instrument by both countries is to agree on DCA. This was conducted by Singaporean Minister of Defense and Singaporean Commander-General of Armed Forces who attempted to talk with Indonesian Minister of Defense after the rejection to DCA ratification. This is Singapore's attempt to open up new cooperation in defense industry and other forms of assistance to Indonesia. This is shown as a serious attempt by Singapore to realize DCA.

### *Peacetime and Potential Enemy*

DCA was not created in the context of conflict between Indonesia and Singapore. The two countries have woven good relationship since Singapore's independence in the 1970s which means that this comprehensive defense cooperation known as DCA was created on the basis of mutual trust.

Indonesia and Singapore has never truly been in conflict or huge war. After all, Singapore's defense capabilities are no match to Indonesia's. However, in terms of peacetime between Indonesia and Singapore, it is difficult to consider the relationship between two countries as truly peaceful. Singapore does have conflict with Indonesia from time to time and the fluctuation in Indonesia-Singapore relations can be seen from the various unresolved cases between them. For example, the case of land reclamation conducted by Singapore to expand its territory. Indonesia was worried that Singapore's reclamation will disrupt Indonesia's territorial sovereignty. Singapore's reclamation has significantly shifted the coastline of Singapore to the south or toward the territory of Indonesia (Juniman, 2016). In addition, the contemporary challenge of Indonesia is the control over Flight Information Region or FIR in Natuna region of Indonesia which is controlled by Singapore. Indonesia has been attempting to fight over the ownership of air space in Natuna (Kusumadewi & Utama, 2015).

Defense diplomacy is not only addressed to friendly countries, but also countries that

used to be former enemy and has potential to be future enemy. In this case, Indonesia and Singapore cannot be considered as an enemy to each other because the two countries have never been in an open and direct conflict. Assumption of potential enemy, both from Singapore and Indonesia, might be the factor behind the failure of DCA.

Andi Widjayanto (from interview with the Authors) argued that pattern of friendship and hostility which can be traced from a country's history is influential to that country's foreign policy. Andi stated that state friendship and hostility can be traced from the history. It appears that Indonesia and Singapore has a history of hostility. The pattern of hostility with Singapore led to an argument that providing territory to enemy state for their military exercise will be illogical. This argument assumes that Indonesia should not provide exercise ground for a country that one day will attack Indonesia. Therefore, based on the unresolved conflict and problems between Indonesia and Singapore, it can be inferred that there is a consideration that Singapore will one day become an enemy to Indonesia. This makes it difficult for high politics cooperation such as the defense cooperation proposed by Singapore to Indonesia.

### **CONCLUSION**

Defense diplomacy is a form of diplomacy that aims to achieve national interest by utilizing national defense instrument in peacetime with former and potential enemy. As such, the success of defense diplomacy can be seen from the constituting variables and elements of defense diplomacy itself.

Based on defense diplomacy variable, the failure of DCA between Indonesia and Singapore is caused by the difference of national interest between Singapore and Indonesia.

This research finds that the difference is caused by differing opinion between Government of Indonesia, particularly Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Indonesian House of

Representatives. In fact, the DCA that has been going on for more than 10 years did not yield any result due to failure of ratification. In addition, the extradition agreement in DCA is also delayed because there was no consensus.

Singapore has exercised strong diplomacy with Indonesia, both through negotiations and meetings with Indonesia, both by head of state and head of government, all of which is ultimately employed to realize DCA.

Furthermore, the use of both countries' defense instrument to agree on DCA is evidenced by Singaporean Minister of Defense and Singaporean Commander-General of Armed Forces attempt to talk with Indonesian Minister of Defense after the rejection to DCA ratification.

In addition, DCA was not created in the context of conflict between Indonesia and Singapore. The two countries have woven good relationship since Singapore's independence in the 1970s which means that this comprehensive defense cooperation known as DCA was created on the basis of mutual trust.

Next, defense diplomacy is not only created between friendly countries, but also between countries that used to be or could potentially be enemy. Based on the unresolved conflict and problems between Indonesia and Singapore, it can be inferred that there is a consideration that Singapore will one day become an enemy to Indonesia. This makes it difficult for high politics cooperation such as the defense cooperation proposed by Singapore to Indonesia.

Then there is the national interest aspect which apparently became an important factor in the success of defense cooperation in this case. Defense diplomacy can be considered truly successful if it can cover all of the aforementioned variables. The authors employ liberalism's assumption that legitimizes cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit. The same is also true with Indonesia which, from the beginning of DCA development, has employed mutual

interest and positive view consideration to cooperate with each other.

However, the internal discussion in Indonesian House of Representatives apparently resulted in differing opinion which reflects realist point of view. This has made agreement and cooperation with other countries impossible, especially because the internal of a country has contradicting view on certain thing. The same is also true in the case of Singapore's desire to weave cooperation by using Indonesia's territory, while Indonesia did not want such thing.

The parliament believed that DCA is a defense treaty, while in reality DCA is a legal umbrella for any defense cooperation. As such, this difference of opinion has caused the failure of ratifying international agreement.

Ultimately, DCA is an important lesson for Indonesia to create inter-institutional synergy in order to create an integrated opinion between institutions and agencies. The most important thing is ensuring that an agreement that has been created and agreed on can be easily understood by the House of Representatives to prevent misunderstanding in the agreement's substance and view.

The detailed content of DCA was the source of doubt for the House of Representatives because this agreement involves territorial affairs. Although MTA did include territorial affairs, DCA was the one to be problematized. It appears that the real problem is MTA, not DCA. After all, DCA is actually important as the legal umbrella of defense cooperation.

Viewed from the side of international law, an agreement (especially defense cooperation) is important to be made because agreement will obviously contain rights and duties of each party and can prevent the risk of violation. Both Indonesia and Singapore requires DCA to accommodate their cooperation especially because DCA is the next level cooperation or high political cooperation between the two countries.

The authors argue that, in addition to strategic factor, there is also a material factor that causes Indonesia to agree on DCA, namely the lack of national defense budget in 2007. At that time, Indonesia's cooperation will strengthen TNI's capabilities and capacities, while Indonesia did not have to pay for the cost of their training and preparation.

Therefore, the authors believe that the lack of attempt from Indonesia to resolve and realize this agreement can be explained. After all, Indonesia does not really need Singapore as defense partner, especially because Indonesia has increased its state budget in 2017, which is ten times bigger compared to 2007.

Hence, the difference which is resulted from Indonesia's internal conflict should be a lesson learned for Indonesia in the importance of finding common ground in national interest and what to be prioritized between material gain and territorial affair. This is also a challenge for the Government of Indonesia to convince the parliament in this case.

## ACADEMIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Defense diplomacy as science is very lacking in Indonesia. The concept of defense diplomacy itself is mostly developed by defense studies scholars. Based on an interview with Andi Widjayanto as defense expert and scholar, it was found that defense diplomacy is only discussed by civilian scholars in Indonesia after 1999-2000s due to the need for military reform.

Andi argued that military analysis in Indonesia can be divided into several generations. Early generation consists of military-scholar such as Nasution. Second generation is Salim Said's generation where political scholars were the one who studied military, causing their research to be more about military-politics. The third generation is Juwono Sudarsono's generation, who studied International Relations, security, and Indonesian military. The fourth generation is Andi Widjayanto's generation

who studied security studies and military defense, whose return to Indonesia made him realize that Indonesia is in the need of military reform. The fifth generation is Yandry Kurniawan and Gigin CSIS' generation that continued the military reform idea and mostly focused on its operationalization.

Therefore, defense diplomacy appeared during the fourth generation to respond to Indonesia's need of defense modernization. Then, there was a need to create more stable regional environment, followed by issues surrounding ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Community etc. Furthermore, there was a need to transmit security sector to other ASEAN countries, such as Myanmar, which led to the creation of global network forum. There was also a need to discuss about contemporary issues and studies concerning hostility between Indonesia and Australia, Indonesia and Malaysia, Indonesia and China, and Indonesia and Singapore. Defense diplomacy began to become an object of study, but currently there are no universities that specifically discuss Defense Diplomacy outside of Indonesia Defense University.

Defense diplomacy is only a concept, there is no theory that specifically discuss about whether defense diplomacy is successful or significant or not at all. Therefore, the authors recommend that defense diplomacy studies need to be further developed.

## PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Practical recommendation is recommended for relevant parties in Indonesia's defense diplomacy:

1. Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs which were directly involved in the making of DCA should be able to win diplomacy and fight for Indonesia's national interest. That way, Indonesia will gain a 60:40 advantage from this agreement. Diplomatic loss in fighting for national interest became the lesson learned for Indonesia, especially

Ministry of Defense, to recruit people who have adequate capabilities in diplomacy and making sure whether an agreement can be ratified internally or not.

2. Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be able to clearly convince and explain Indonesia's national interest to the parliament that has the privilege to ratify international agreements. In the future, the case of signed international agreement being rejected by the parliament should be minimized.
3. Although normally international agreement does not involve parliament in its production, the authors recommend a new framework for high politics agreement where the parliament can be involved or at least notified. This should be considered because high politics cooperation is a crucial cooperation for a country because it is related to sovereignty.
4. Ministry of Defense as the leading sector in interstate defense cooperation should be wise in selecting which countries that can be a partner or friend in defense cooperation. After all, defense cooperation in the form of DCA is the next level cooperation between states, meaning Indonesia must look back at the history to ascertain whether a country could potentially be an enemy or otherwise. High politics cooperation should not only be viewed from liberalism perspective.

## REFERENCES

- Cottey, A., & Forster, A. (2004). *Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance*. London: Routledge.  
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315000817>
- Cottey, A., & Forster, A. (2013). *Reshaping defence diplomacy: New roles for military cooperation and assistance*. *Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance*.
- Creswell, J. W. (2016). *Pendekatan Metode Kualitatif, Kuantitatif, dan Campuran (Edisi ke-4)* (4rd ed.). Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.
- Darwanto, H. (2015). *Membangun Industri Pertahanan [Building Defense Industry]*. Jakarta: Kementerian Pertahanan RI. Retrieved from <https://www.kemhan.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/e29fe1f3aba4d1407a84de35b03e344.pdf>
- Dewabrata, W. (2007). Kerjasama Pertahanan Repotnya Menukar Uang Untuk Ruang. *Kompas*.
- Global Fire Power TM. (n.d.-a). Comparison Results of World Military Strengths. Retrieved December 27, 2017, from <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.asp?form=form&country1=indonesia&country2=singapore&Submit=COMPARE>
- Global Fire Power TM. (n.d.-b). Total Available Active Military Manpower by Country. Retrieved December 27, 2017, from <https://www.globalfirepower.com/active-military-manpower.asp>
- Ibrahim, M. (2015). *Tinjauan Hukum Internasional tentang Sewa-Menyewa Pulau Yang Dijadikan Wilayah Pertahanan (Studi kasus Defense Cooperation Indonesia- Singapura)*. Universitas Hasanuddin. Retrieved from <http://repository.unhas.ac.id/bitstream/handle/123456789/18144/SKRIPSI LENGKAP-HI-MULTAZAM IBRAHIM.pdf;sequence=1>
- Jackson, R., & Sorensen, G. (2013). *Pengantar Studi Hubungan Internasional, Teori dan Pendekatan*

- (*Edisi Kelima*) (5th ed.). Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.
- Jha, P. K. (n.d.). Singapore- Indonesia Extradition Treaty ad Defense Cooperation. Retrieved August 21, 2017, from <http://ipsc.org/article/southeast-asia/singapore-indonesia-extradition-treaty-an>
- Juniman, P. T. (2016, April 15). Berkaca dari Reklamasi Singapura. *CNN Indonesia*. Retrieved from <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160415172432-20-124254/berkaca-dari-reklamasi-di-singapura>
- Kementerian Luar Negeri RI. (n.d.). Profil Singapura. Retrieved August 23, 2017, from <http://www.kemlu.go.id/singapore/id/Pages/Singapura.aspx>
- Kementerian Luar Negeri RI. (2014). *Buku Diplomasia Indonesia [Diplomacy Book of Indonesia]*. Jakarta: Kementerian Luar Negeri RI.
- Kementerian Pertahanan. (2015). *Buku Putih Pertahanan [White Book of Defense]*. Jakarta: Kementerian Pertahanan RI. Retrieved from <https://www.kemhan.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/BPPI-INDO-2015.pdf>
- Kementerian Sekretariat Negara RI. (n.d.). Mencermati Peluang Hubungan Kerjasama Bilateral Indonesia-Singapura. Retrieved August 20, 2017, from [http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=4159](http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4159)
- Kompas. (2007). DPR Minta Diminta Tunggu Penyerahan Dokumen Penolakan Perjanjian Kerjasama RI-Singapura Terburu-buru. *Kompas*.
- Kusumadewi, A., & Utama, A. (2015, October 5). "Perang" Udara Indonesia-Singapura. *CNN Indonesia*. Retrieved from <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20151004164716-20-82695/perang-udara-indonesia-singapura>
- Mindef Singapore. (2007). Defence Cooperation Agreement. Retrieved January 22, 2018, from [https://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press\\_room/official\\_releases/nr/2007/apr/27apr07\\_nr.html](https://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2007/apr/27apr07_nr.html)
- Mindef Singapore. (2018). *Mindef Singapore*. Retrieved from [https://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press\\_room/official\\_releases/nr/2007/apr/27apr07\\_nr.html](https://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2007/apr/27apr07_nr.html)
- Patilima, H. (2013). *Metode Penelitian Kualitatif*. Bandung: Alfabeta.
- Pol/Ant/X-3. (2017). RI Usulkan Batam Jadi Pusat Ekonomi Digital [RI Proposing Batam to be Digital Economic Center]. Retrieved December 28, 2017, from <http://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/121404-ri-usulkan-batam-jadi-pusat-ekonomi-digital>
- Purwanto, H. (2006). DPR Minta Perjanjian Ekstradisi RI-Singapura Tidak Dikaitkan DCA. Retrieved January 17, 2018, from <https://www.antaraneews.com/berita/30265/dpr-minta-perjanjian-ekstradisi-ri-singapura-tidak-dikaitkan-dca>
- Roy, S. L. (1991). *Diplomasi* (1st ed.). Jakarta: Rajawali Pers.
- Singh, J. (2009). *Military Leadership for Tomorrow*. (J. Singh, Ed.). New Delhi: K W Publishers Pvt Ltd.
- Wahyuni, S. (2012). *Qualitative Research Method: Theory and Practice*. Jakarta: Salemba Empat.