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Form and substance in the study of international relations

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FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN THE STUDY
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by
Graham Peter Murray

A Thesis

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of Lehigh University
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August 4, 1967
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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

The general approach of this thesis is on two, distinct levels treating the subject International Relations, so to speak, both internally and externally. The external form of the study is assessed first - the scope, character, and status of it as an academic pursuit. It is concluded that in form the subject is now fairly well-defined and strongly, though not universally, entrenched; the analysis is couched in general, comparative terms, the experience of other disciplines being adduced to show that the autonomous position of International Relations is justified and that the process of its establishment is typical. The singular nature of the subject is stressed - its considerable dependence upon other disciplines as to techniques and procedures, coupled with its great independence as subject-matter.

Having delineated the outlines of the discipline, attention is directed inwards, to the substance of the subject. The present disputation between a 'scientific' and a 'classical' approach is assessed, care being taken to set this particular issue within the general nature of epistemological analysis. This exercise is partly developed with the aid of analogies, one of which - drawn from Economics - provides a useful perspective upon the substantive nature of the International Relations theorizing, about which the 'classicists' and 'scientists' are arguing at a more procedural

level. The bifurcation of economic theory into micro- and macro- fields has its parallel in International Relations in the development of the most advanced scientific-theoretical analysis along two roads: that of decision-making analysis applied to foreign policy at the state level; and that of systems analysis comprehending the general interaction of all state units. In the framework of this dichotomy of levels of theoretical analysis the most significant contributions to the substantive theory of the subject are set out and assessed, the 'state of the discipline' in these areas being judged to have advanced greatly but still to be subject to important limitations, in both explanatory and organizing theory and in empirical data.

Chapter 1: Introduction

It is often remarked of persons engaged in the study of international relations that they are inordinately preoccupied with the difficulties of articulating and resolving the questions that relate to the nature and essence of their subject. The concentration upon such questions as 'what is International Relations¹ as a subject of study?' is something which persons working within the field, as well as outside observers, often find exasperating. The great investment of scholarly time and energy in 'thinking about thinking about international relations' strikes many observers as conducive of an undue disregard of the important substantive issues with which the field is replete, and is often cited as evidence of the immaturity of the subject - or at least of many of its practitioners.

Yet although attention to the form, as opposed to the substance, of the subject is in many respects superficial it is difficult to conceive of any discipline making solid progress without some clarification of primary issues. Among the most important of such matters must rank the question of whether the study in hand may legitimately be treated as a distinct discipline or whether available intellectual resources would be better applied to its particular subject-matter within some other discipline. As a field of study international relations is by no means alone in presenting these first order problems; longer established fields such as history have accumulated substantial bodies of thought on their nature and essence as scholarly pursuits - and in the case of history, the substantial sub-field known as 'the philosophy of history' constitutes an acknowledged specialisation. The student of history

¹To avoid confusion, or at least to minimise it, the usage 'International Relations' will stand for the discipline or subject and the usage 'international relations' for the subject-matter thereof.

is fortunate in that his title to academic and administrative independence is seldom contested, and hence his first order questions may be more fruitfully directed to establishing the 'nature' of history, the relative value of various historiographic methods, the uses of history, and so forth. We do not expect that such enquiries will yield final and enduring answers; rather, they are understood as constituting an on-going dialogue, a proper and worthwhile universe of discourse, likely to illumine and shape our study of 'what really happened'. It is nowhere seriously contended that the historian should eschew such methodological and philosophical debate in order to devote himself completely to the substance of history.

It is plain, then, that international relations is by no means unique as a subject-matter in throwing up problems of form and attempting to resolve them for working purposes. But the study is, perhaps, exceptional in its degree of concern - to an extent that might seriously be called neurotic - with the initial, administrative and unproductive, issue of form: is the subject-matter properly and efficiently to be subsumed under the head of a separate subject? Each scholar labouring in the vineyard of world affairs confronts the task of hoeing this troublesome initial row. The arguments pro and con the disciplinary autonomy of the field have been widely stated.² Those hostile to International Relations see in the excessive concern with the issue of autonomy something of a degrading fixation upon the navel of the subject. The disposition to ask 'Is International Relations a discipline?' prompts Morton Kaplan to assert that it "is indicative of a state of unease in the profession"; he goes on:

One would find it difficult to imagine similar questions being asked of economics, sociology, or even political science in general. The practitioners in

² See the UNESCO report prepared by C.A.W. Manning, The University Teaching of the Social Sciences: International Relations (Paris, 1954), esp. Ch.V. For an opposed view see the report in the same series, by W.A. Robson, The University Teaching of the Social Sciences: Political Science, Ch.V.

these fields assume that they practice a discipline and turn their attention immediately to the important substantive and methodological questions raised by their subject matter. They may be concerned with the proper methods of conducting research but not with their title to conduct research.³

It may not be fanciful, therefore, to characterise International Relations as a discipline (if such it be) with an inferiority complex. The inchoate 'philosophy of international relations' is made up of a number of unresolved first order problems, among which absence of an accepted, orthodox field definition is the most serious. Fruitful substantive research and progress seems unlikely of attainment, and will at very least be greatly impeded, while students use a variety of analytical foci and research matrices, since comparability of results will be unobtainable.

The distinction, which is fundamental to this thesis, between the disciplinary form and the theoretical-empirical substance of a subject of study would appear to have special relevance to International Relations at this time. The mass of approaches to the subject-matter which has been thrown up by the recent application of 'behavioural' or 'scientific' to the social sciences has made more urgent the endowing of the field with some operating framework which can structure and order the disparate tools and perspectives which are at present competitive and largely incompatible. Before an adequate theoretical skeleton can be incorporated into the body of the subject a self-evidently essential task is the delineation of that body. The first part of what follows

³ Morton Kaplan, "Is International Relations a Discipline?", Journal of Politics, XXIII,3 (August, 1961), 462.

will thus consist of an attempt to establish the disciplinary status of International Relations as a subject of study. This task having been completed, the thesis will attempt an overview of the substance of international relations the subject-matter in order to achieve an answer, if only provisional, to the most important issue related to the substance of the subject: the nature, scope and value of its theoretical content. The procedure to be followed is governed by the belief that only within the context of form may the substance of a study be properly understood.

Chapter 2: Issues of Form: the Subject of International Relations

The present ambiguously independent status of International Relations reflects, in large measure, the particular circumstances of the subject's growth as a focus of academic concern over the past five decades. The history of the development of international studies in Britain and America, in whose academic cultures they have become most strongly rooted, will thus require to be traced. This process of disciplinary emergence also has general features and it will be necessary to set the growth of an academic specialism of international affairs against salient features of this process. It will then be necessary to consider whether the actual status of International Relations is or is not in conformity with its ideal status, having reference to competing academic-organisational formulations. This enquiry ought ultimately to be productive of a conception of the form of the subject armed with which we may embark upon the determination of questions of theoretical substance.

THE EMERGENCE OF FIELDS OF STUDY

As an explicit academic focus the study of matters international dates largely from the close of the First World War and is in human terms little more than a generation old. The subject-matter of the study has, of course, been much longer within the purview of scholars, most notably of diplomatic historians and international lawyers, though only very slightly does the emphasis and the approach of this earlier work commend it the student of International Relations of the present day. This relative youth of International Relations, even among the social sciences, is

accentuated by the concentration of the bulk of its empirical and theoretical innovation into the years since the Second World War. It is in the past two decades, indeed, that the study of international affairs has achieved its most significant expansion in academic facilities generally, as a result, especially in the United States, of the intellectual and academic hospitality to the subject that has been engendered by the acute international crisis. Although the recent expansion of teaching and research in International Relations has been very considerable, and certainly commensurate with the 'information explosion' in other social science fields, it must be emphasised that by comparison with such subjects as Economics, Sociology and Anthropology our study is marked by a very great lack of valuable empirical research and by a crippling shortage of theoretical constructs with which to generate, organise and add to such little data as is available.

Since International Relations is of such recent origin it is pertinent here to give some consideration to the general process whereby the academic order is re-made to provide subjects for newly perceived subject-matters. An emergent subject can be expected, as does International Relations, to lack empirical and theoretical depth and to be immature for these reasons. A nascent subject will achieve a degree of maturity when it comes to attain depth in these two respects, providing its students with both usable materials and suitable tools with which to work them. Such a distinction between immature and mature subjects is admittedly an arbitrarily dichotomic one and would not lend itself to the

precise determination of fine shades of difference. But we do, in very broad terms, engage in the activity of ranking disciplines on something like the spectrum of maturity-immaturity stated above. There would be fairly wide agreement that, say, Economics is a mature discipline as compared to which International Relations is immature. A long-established study such as Physics or History would likely be admitted as mature whereas a subject recently established to comprehend some subject-matter which has been thrown up by the fusing of two or more fields or by the sub-division of an established one may not be admitted to be entitled to separate treatment. International Relations has emerged from an inter-disciplinary aggregation, itself the product of the hiving off from several subjects of their international aspects, and this pedigree cannot be expected to confer upon the resulting discipline either title or coherence at the outset.

To apply the term maturity to the development of a discipline implies an organic concept of the development of knowledge. This may mislead in that a field of study will not necessarily undergo a cycle of growth and decay analagous to that of a living organism. Certain subjects, for instance History, have retained for centuries a high degree of academic vitality. But from other fields we can draw numerous examples of development in substantial accord with the organic model, growing and diminishing in academic stature in response to social as well as intellectual changes. The decline of Theology from its paramount place in the Medieval academies, as well as the decline of Classics, testifies to the impact of society

upon its educational priorities. This linkage between the overall social milieu and the progress and vitality of branches of learning is also clear from the modern experience of the studies which we describe collectively as the social sciences. Man's grasping for greater mastery over his social environment has led him to systematic academic enquiry into its various discernible sectors. Since it falls within the general field of the social sciences, International Relations can usefully be considered in terms of the general trends in the emergence of disciplines within that field.

Serious attention has been directed to the yawning conceptual and linguistic divergence between the natural and physical sciences, on the one hand, and the humanities, on the other, in recent years. The tension between these 'two cultures' has characterised most of the social sciences during their phases of significant advance in recent decades. The schools of thought traditionally dominant in many of them have been informed in the main by an outlook derived from the humanities rather than from the pure and applied sciences, whereas the methodological and philosophical predispositions of the majority of present day social scientists are shaped and inspired by the model of the sciences, making them intolerant of previous orientations in Political Science, Economics, and other fields. The brashness of the apostles of scientific method in the social sciences has had its counterpart in the derisive contempt of the traditional scholar for those who have not 'steeped themselves' in the minutiae of the appropriate subject-matter and have thus not acquired the 'feel' for it that is the pre-requisite of true knowledge and understanding. The vested interests of the

protagonists in such clashes are, of course, partial determinants of the ferocity of the arguments and, moreover, of the fact that such disputes emerge at all. Scientific and humanistic perspectives are not readily made compatible and opposed points of view will be strongly and sincerely held in accordance with the intellectual dispositions of different men. Hence, the training and intellectual orientation of a particular social scientist will lead him to adopt, say, a predominantly traditional, humanistic approach to the study of his subject-matter; his vested interest in the prevalent hierarchy of subjects will not spring from any superficial calculation of monetary advantage and career advancement, though these may have a place, but from prior choices and habits that are completely integral to his academic personality. In his terms the behavioural students of Political Science may appear to be charlatans and fools, and at best sadly prodigal in their use of scarce academic resources, as compared to the scholars who, like himself, elect to approach Political Theory or Government along well-trodden paths. Since this reaction to intellectual innovation has been quite common in International Relations it may be worth considering it more closely.

A new field suffers particularly from the sceptical hostility of scholarly critics, for it lacks the cloak of legitimacy for the perhaps untried intellectual techniques which it adopts. A study which emerges from aggregation or sub-division of existing studies is likely to possess some theoretical principles, analytical tools, and bodies of data suitable to the new focus of attention, but the

lacunae can be expected to loom more prominently than the extant fragments in the sum total of knowledge. It will thus be relatively easy for critics to indict the pioneers of our new study for striking out along an uncharted route while very ill-prepared. The manifest inadequacy of the new subject on the brink of its emergence cannot easily be denied by even the most zealous of its advocates. But such criticism of their enterprise is likely to be rebutted as irrelevant, although true. For the pioneers will claim to have been attracted to the subject whose claims they advocate by the conviction that it holds out the possibility, not now but in the future, of giving adequate treatment to a subject-matter hitherto neglected. Hence the emergence of positive Economics from the wider study of positive and normative Political Economy. With the passage of time and the modifications which it brings in our understanding of reality we come to question and advocate changes in the faculty structures of our universities, which themselves reflect the conventional divisions of intellectual activity prevalent at some past time. These administrative rubrics will naturally tend to ossify and will require periodic re-assessment and alteration in order that they may accommodate newly-discerned aspects of physical and social reality. Naturally, the insights promised by such reconsideration of the categories of knowledge will stimulate and excite the proponents of disciplinary reorganisation, and their advocacy of new subjects of study may be further coloured by an exaggerated idea of its significance for mankind generally. Extravagant claims in behalf of the new subject may have some value in achieving general assent for its emergence; they may, equally, outrage the academic sensibili-

ties of those who are satisfied with the existing disciplinary order and be counter-productive. What to an innovator may appear as fearless enlargement of the frontiers of knowledge may by the traditionalist be characterised as unnecessary disturbance of the academic landscape.

In the case of International Relations, its establishment as an autonomous study has provoked hostile criticism from scholars among whose fields those aspects of international relations hitherto taught have traditionally been divided. The consternation of historians, economists, lawyers and others at the claim of International Relations to take over segments of their disciplines owes something, doubtless, to intellectual inertia and proprietary interests; but it would seem to be the case that the principal determinant of hostile reactions to International Relations is the conviction of those accustomed to dealing with parts of its subject-matter under traditional rubrics that their subjects offer the most appropriate and efficient intellectual vehicles for the various elements of international reality. As has been observed above, the encrustation of received doctrine concerning academic organisation must be expected to condition reactions to suggested change.

The burden of critical response often rests upon the contention that a particular nascent subject is not a mature discipline. This, as we have noted, is almost always true, usually obvious and, for the purpose of determining the worth of a new approach

rather than that of scoring points against it, quite irrelevant. It might as well be argued by reference to the physical and mental capacities of boys that they will not become men because they are not men now. It must not be asserted, to carry this analogy further, that all boys will become men; for our experience shows that not all will grow to attain the full manly norm of physical stature and intellectual capacity. Environmental factors, apart from hereditary ones, may afflict growing organisms with numerous and crippling burdens that may distort, retard and even completely terminate growth. Likewise, circumstances as well as their intellectual heritages may not conduce to the significant development of academic disciplines. We do not expect all studies, or all men, to grow to maturity. We are perhaps entitled to expect that most will do so. We are emphatically not entitled to infer from the initial puniness of most men and subjects of study that they should be denied the right to life on the grounds that they are not at once mature.

This simple point bears some emphasis: for it is not infrequently in essentially similar logical terms that new subjects are held to be wanting and condemned. An economist has written of the hostile reception within his discipline to the sub-field of Econometrics in similar terms:

A curious feature of the hostility which the more conservative economists display towards mathematical and quantitative thinking is that their criticisms of it often amount to a plea for more complicated and sophisticated models....Most of the criticism concerns factors which...operate in the real world but not in the models. The logic of this seems to be to extend the models to accommodate them.¹

¹J.R. Sargent, "Economics: the Would-be, May-be Science" in J.H. Plumb (ed.), The Crisis in the Humanities (Harmondsworth, 1964), 147.

It is perhaps the proof of the influence of the model of the sciences proper that debates of this sort within the social sciences tend to be couched on both sides in terms of the extent of disciplinary conformity to that model. For even the obscurantist humanities scholars working in social science fields are not shy of condemning the enthusiasts of scientific study for being unscientific. Contemporary culture, particularly the sub-culture of the social sciences, tends to make us feel guilty at our inability to pronounce the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Though the arts subjects may react to the scientific and technological emphasis of the age by retreating into obscurantism, the social sciences are caught, in D.G. MacRae's phrase, "between science and art".² They must thus attempt to make a working synthesis out of both strands and thus relate the philosophical outlook of the humanities to the methodological emphasis of the sciences. Auguste Comte gave to his new subject of Sociology the alternative name Social Physics, but the typical social science is at once art and science. Particular disciplines may not achieve a consistent, integrated resolution of the tension between the two aspects of knowledge in practice. The relationship between art and science may be confined within a subject to the presence within departments teaching it of scholars of both persuasions: a mixture of oil and water rather than a true blend or synthesis.

² In his "The Crisis of Sociology" in Plumb, op. cit., 129.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

The great expansion of international studies during this century has been very much the product of concern about the era of international crisis which opened with Sarajevo. The dominant strand in this response into the 1930's was the reforming, progressive western impulse. This was born in the revulsion at the senseless carnage of the First World War and given considerable impetus by the expectation that the peace settlement would be the occasion for the re-making of the international order. Radical and democratic groups saw the necessity of securing social justice within the state by establishing a just and peaceful order beyond its frontiers. The breakdown of the world order into war in 1914 discredited internationally the ambience of laissez-faire which had been under attack in its domestic manifestations. At the immediate end of the war hopes for a new international order, buttressing and complementing domestic progress, were focussed upon President Wilson's programme for replacing the balance of power with a 'community of power'.

Notwithstanding that the Wilsonian ideals were somewhat sullied by compromise with the unreformed Europeans and that the League itself was rejected by Wilson's own country, progressive groups and individuals played an active role in the universities and in society at large as advocates of international reform. The cataclysm of the war, which for the United States had also been the first significant experience of involvement in the centre of international relations, gave to the many academic courses (and

eventually departments) dealing with international affairs that had been established as a result of the First World War a preponderantly normative, missionary complexion. The early study of international relations was as much, if not more, a matter of social engineering than of a simple quest for understanding. The League of Nations tended to be approached as though it were synonymous with international relations at large, and its treatment was adulatory rather than analytic or critical.

International reformism was less prominent in a further significant dimension of the growing concern with foreign developments: the foundation of establishmentarian and elite bodies for the study of international affairs. The First World War and its aftermath had stimulated the democratisation of foreign policy-making in most countries, and elites were perhaps anxious, like Robert Lowe at an earlier juncture in the expansion of democracy, to 'educate their masters'. The first such body to foster the enlightened handling of matters international was set up by Lord Davies, Lionel Curtis and other figures, academic and public, in 1920, later becoming the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Of similar origin, composition and ethos was the Council on Foreign Relations, set up in New York in 1922. The largely patrician memberships of these two bodies was not seeking direct access to and influence over the mass of the electorates; they were primarily concerned to operate behind the scenes to foster among the governing elites greater knowledge and interest in issues of foreign policy and world politics.

The masses were not left entirely without guidance. The wide diffusion of international questions was catered for by mass bodies such as the separate national League of Nations Unions, established by reformists to foster support for and understanding of the goals of the world organisation. In the United States similar work was done by the Foreign Policy Association, founded in 1918 to erode isolationist sentiment in American public life. These mass organisations were strongly committed to a social engineering approach to world problems; public understanding was to be fostered in order that the masses might endorse valued goals such as collective security and disarmament and be persuaded to shoulder the national burdens which their attainment would require. The rationalistic faith of these bodies in the attainment of enlightenment through education survived, though not undimmed, the Congressional rejection of Wilson's League in 1920. Since the League was still in existence it remained a focus for the educational efforts of such movements, as also for the work of older-established institutions, such as the World Peace Foundation, set up in Boston in 1910, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, founded by the steel millionaire in the following year.

The prime concern of this study is not with wider public attitudes to international problems, but they are indirectly relevant in that they affect the academic provision for international relations. It is pertinent to note, therefore, that inasmuch as internationalist reformism dominated in the study during the 1919-1939 period, that public and governmental sympathy ebbed after Versailles and that in the closing inter-war years there was a

resurgence of realpolitik thinking. Experience showed that collective security, though powerfully conjured with at times in domestic politics, was discounted whenever its place in foreign policy became specific and immediately urgent instead of anonymously general and distant. Of the behaviour of governments in this respect Arnold Toynbee was led to conclude that collective security had not been tried and found wanting, but like Christianity had not been tried at all. Nor were governments solely to blame for the frustration of internationalist hopes: the reformist lobbies themselves did not stand unequivocally behind the policies they advocated. The celebrated 'Peace Ballot' was symptomatic of this ambiguity, piling up impressive majorities for collective action under the League as well as for Britain herself doing very little to achieve it.

These developments in public attitudes were quite quickly reflected in the predominant cast of international studies. The euphoric early years of the League period were marked by a marked bias towards the reformist 'line'. The workings of the League in practice, and the management of collective security in principle, were largely co-extensive with international studies as then taught. Teachers were mostly hospitable to the body of tenets and assumptions that we have since come to call the 'idealist' conception of international relations. The is of the social milieu under consideration was widely subordinated in teaching and research to the ought of the world order the idealists wished to see inaugurated. (The most purblind of the idealists cannot be

indicted for doing this since they were prone to confuse the various existing features of the desired world order with that order which really existed; in their conceptions of international reality the ought hid the is.)

The rapid expansion of the study of international affairs shows that there was a substantial felt need, an 'effective demand' in the economist's language, for it. The study, under a variety of rubrics though not differing enormously in its focus from institution to institution, rapidly achieved endorsement - first as an optional, supernumerary field, and later as a fit study for an undergraduate 'major' and even for postgraduate study and research. Its emergence as a discipline was academically ritualised with the setting up of departments to teach it, though in many places the study has not to this day been separated in this way from the nominal or actual control of a related subject. By no means all universities and colleges were hospitable to the study but its establishment as a specialisation was sufficiently widespread to make it worth the production of texts and other basic literature, a rough but quite sensitive index of the emergence of a discipline. The body of research and writing subsumable under the head of International Relations grew substantially - aided by the subject's proximity to a large, interested lay public - in the inter-war years. Although much of the literature was polemical and tendentious the early academic works in the field were beginning to produce a corpus of narrative and analytic work cast in International Relations terms. There was considerable scope for the combining of man's experience of international affairs in their

many aspects, historical, legal, military, etc., in order to assemble conveniently the bodies of information, doctrines, and theories which were suitable elements of the subject-matter of the new subject.

The gathering together of the academic fragments usable in the study of international relations in the twentieth century may have imparted something of historical perspective to the subject. This perhaps contributed to the decline of idealistic, optimistic formulations and doctrines in the subject. It is more likely, however, that this change in the ethos of International Relations was a reflection of outside events and attitudes. The disintegration of the European settlement, the economic depression, the inglorious experience of the League, and the eventual mounting of international tension at the onset of the Second World War, were factors which made for an international climate unamenable to treatment in idealist terms. The worsening situation seemed decidedly more comprehensible in terms of 'realist' prescriptions and principles, and appeared to bear out the contention of the realist that events and man's nature would pour scorn upon the naive hope of improving international relations. The substitution of realist for idealist conceptions (though this was by no means total) certainly marked a development of the recently established study but it would not be correct to understand this development as a movement in the direction of greater intellectual maturity. For the eclipse of idealist by realist conceptions meant that the misconceptions about international reality which had emerged from one, optimistic situation and outlook were being replaced by a

different set of misconceptions that were the product of another, later and more unfavourable situation. What the subject had still to achieve was balance, that is the ability to accommodate conceptions as diverse as those of the idealist and realist theories. This was not to be achieved until the normative, prescriptive element of the subject was reduced and such theories began to be looked upon in relative rather than in absolute terms. But it was something of an advance to look upon the subject from two rather than from simply one standpoint, however dogmatic. This stage can be marked by the appearance of E.H. Carr's 1939 book, The Twenty Years' Crisis³, a lucid and forceful statement of the realist outlook that proceeds by way of a historical and analytical exposure of the hypocrisy and stupidity of the inter-war cloaking of national interest in internationalist garb. The teachings of Carr and other realists appeared to be confirmed by the outbreak of the Second World War and the final collapse of the hopes that had emerged from the First.

The Second World War was to repeat the experience of the First in two respects relevant to this analysis: firstly, the conflict renewed the general public and academic concern with international affairs; secondly, the war-weariness and insecurity of peoples and governments threw up another organisational monument to the concern of men with the fate of their world order. Idealism was not so pronounced or unanimously affirmed as in the closing stages of the First World War, and its hold upon the attention of statesmen was not total. Much more of a balanced picture of the actual is and the possible ought of the world order is embodied in the

³(London, 1939)

Charter of the United Nations Organisation than was the case with the Fourteen Points or the Covenant of the League. Nevertheless, the establishment of a new international security organisation, as an integral, unquestioned part of the peacetime order, was an authoritative re-affirmation of basic idealist optimism about the feasibility of rescuing man from himself, albeit within a more realistically restricted compass than that of the Wilsonian attempt. A new, diilted and tempered, idealism did not come to be established as the post-war ethos of the subject because international developments were to vitiate the hope that 1945 would profit from the experience of 1919. The unresolved issues between the Soviet Union and the western democracies constituted a significant pall over internationalist hopes even before the events and experiences of 1947-49 which moulded their relationship into what we know call the 'cold war'. The dashing of United Nations hopes and the rapid 'conflict spiral' of the European confrontation, reverberating throughout the world, led to the rapid resuscitation of realpolitik thinking and cast International Relations into an increasingly military-strategic mould.

The international situation of cold war was swiftly to transmute the framework of teaching and research. War and ideological hostility were the dominant substantive international experiences to the analysis of which the subject turned. Especially in the United States, whose second major international involvement had become an insecure and critically dangerous one, the realist interpretation of international relations was taken up as an orthodoxy, imparting doctrinal endorsement to defensive interna-

tional militancy. The realist formulations of the post-war era received forceful expression in the writings of Hans J. Morgenthau, notably his Politics Among Nations⁴. The realpolitik creed had, and indeed retains to this day for some thinkers, considerable appeal, with its emphasis upon the need for the state to ensure its own national security by way of military and diplomatic preparedness, and its assertion of the 'moral dignity of the national interest'. Only in the late 1950's did International Relations begin to be emancipated from predominantly realist interpretation, especially in basic texts, and to shed the narrow focus, both positive and prescriptive, on the national state in favour of a wider outlook. The softening of cold war positions with the emergence of an at least partial detente in the central strategic confrontation has isolated (in the academies though perhaps not so definitely in government) those who cling to 'protracted conflict' interpretations and hew to we-they distinctions. Corresponding to the development of a generally less harsh and strident impression of the real has been a less naive notion of the ideal; students of international organisation in the past two decades have come to achieve a subtle understanding of what may be achieved to better the international society by working in the interstices of the power blocs.

The comparative 'idealism of realism' and 'realism of idealism' constitutes some kind of a progression to a more mature, balanced and detached understanding of international reality. Much of the present work in International Relations has effected a rough synthesis of both theoretical predispositions. There is,

⁴(New York, 1949)

certainly, a remaining pole of both realist and idealist fatuity, but it is mostly to be found outside the discipline as such: the John Birch Society and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament are not properly part of the International Relations constituency - though for some purposes their actions and attitudes are part of its subject-matter. There is, in short, a greater degree of consensus about basic assumptions (though not about methodology or research priorities) in the discipline than at most previous times. This has in part been the result of the departure from the field of the social engineers. But among the students of the subject generally normative motivations have been eclipsed by positive ones. In particular, there has been some lessening of ethnocentrism, which has often resulted from texts and courses focusing upon foreign policy rather than upon international relations. As J. David Singer has pointed out, study at the national state level of analysis is more prone than study at the international system level of analysis to the blight that he calls "Ptolemaic parochialism"⁵. During an eventful and brief five decades International Relations has developed through a number of phases, unevenly and untidily; we must next attempt to determine where the subject now stands as an autonomous discipline and it may be relevant to think of its content as partly, but not yet completely, emancipated from the equivalent of a Ptolemaic stage:

THE DISCIPLINARY STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

One element in the achievement of a working consensus among the various ideological persuasions within the study has perhaps

⁵"The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations", in K. Knorr and S. Verba, (eds.) The International System: Theoretical Essays (Princeton, 1961), 83.

been the common need to defend their specialism from external critics. Allegations that international relations does not constitute a distinct field of study and, hence, does not deserve to enjoy academic autonomy were bound to cause its students to erect a defence, clarifying the nature and scope of their study in order to demonstrate its independent character. These assertions of academic autonomy, and an analysis of them, will allow this section to shed some light upon questions of form in the subject.

Some initial distinctions are called for. We must, firstly, be aware of the difference between the fact that international relations do exist and the contention that, therefore, a subject of study called International Relations ought to exist. A point that is related, but not identical, concerns the need for us to distinguish between the normative issue of what academic standing the subject ought to enjoy and the positive issue of what degree of autonomy it is in practice deemed worthy of possessing. This leads us to dismiss an overly positive judgement of International Relations according to which it might be inferred from the limited provision actually made for the subject as compared to other studies that its subject matter is less significant than that of, say, Economics. Indeed, in the nuclear era a strong case can be made for the proposition that international relations are pre-eminently the 'proper study' for mankind.⁶ Mathisen has noted in this connection that:

The importance accorded to a set of social phenomena may not necessarily be equal to its actual impor-

⁶The phrase is C.A.W. Manning's and reflects his crusading zeal in behalf of the subject; see also T. Mathisen, Methodology in the Study of International Relations (Oslo, 1959), 8.

tance, and it is the former which is most likely to determine the energy devoted to its scientific investigation.⁷

The greater concern of western and world society since 1919, and especially since 1945, with international affairs has been reflected in the emergence of the subject International Relations in the universities. But the subject has not experienced an academic reception proportional to the generally increased readiness to think in international relations terms. Many universities make no provision for the subject and in many more the subject-matter is subsumed under various different heads.

Mention of the varying provision for the study calls for reference to the often illogical and anomalous structure of the disciplinary subdivisions. It is necessary to bear in mind that while we scrutinise the claims of emerging disciplines against the existing range of purportedly distinct studies there is some scope for the application of a double standard. This is the result of our expecting a newly-proposed aggregation or sub-division of studies to conform to disciplinary criteria of logical coherence and academic distinctiveness which may no longer be met (and may perhaps never have been met) by established subjects. Quincy Wright, in his monumental study of International Relations as a discipline, makes succinctly this point that being administratively deemed a discipline in the past will serve, to some degree and if only by default, to confer academic legitimacy upon a field of study:

Once textbooks have appeared and academic chairs have been established under a given name; once

⁷ Mathisen, op. cit., 4.

curricula have been offered, degrees given, and learned journals initiated in a given field; once libraries have been organised according to a given scheme, a discipline has achieved a solidity and position which it is difficult to change however illogical and inconvenient that particular subdivision may in time prove to be.⁸

Wright's listing of some of the factors whose presence gives to a study the focus of distinctiveness suggested by the term discipline provides us with some helpful categories in terms of which to analyse the present standing of International Relations. The subject is not, in fact, established at all major universities even in Britain and the United States, in which countries it has taken root more widely than in other parts of the western world. Research and teaching is often focussed upon international relations within departments whose rubric is Political Science - as at Princeton and Harvard - or as an area of interdisciplinary study - as at Chicago and California. A substantial proportion of those working largely within the subject-matter of international relations do so as political scientists, lawyers, historians or students of less closely related subjects. Diplomatic or contemporary History, Comparative Government, International Economics, and International Law, are all subjects that focus upon part of the international relations milieu. The fragmentation of that milieu as a whole which results from treating its economic, legal and other aspects separately constitutes a denial of its holistic importance. Where International Relations has no place in the administrative hierarchy of the university the subject-matter is usually treated not so much as subordinate but as non-existent as a whole. Other subjects which, in some establishments, do claim the subordination of international studies in toto do potentially

⁸ Q. Wright, The Study of International Relations (New York, 1955), 25; see also C.D. Fuller, The Training of Specialists in International Relations (New York, 1957), 22-3, and G. Goodwin (ed.), The University Teaching of International Relations (Oxford, 1951), 58-9.

make adequate provision for them but in practice seldom do so for all aspects of international reality. The principal focus of the Political Scientist or Historian tends to be such that the distinct nature of international relations is not sufficiently recognized. The case for disciplinary recognition for International Relations, as for all subjects, rests ultimately upon the claim that only its academic focus makes effective provision for the relevant subject-matter. The relative value of International Relations, in terms of this utilitarian principle of effective provision for subject-matter, can best be assessed by considering the merits in this respect of the principal rival disciplines.

Political Science and International Relations

The subject Political Science, or Government or Politics, has itself not been long entrenched in the universities, the first chairs being set up in such fields in the late nineteenth century. The subject-matter has, of course, a venerable history but its treatment as an organised, distinct subject has pre-dated that of International Relations by only a few decades. In the past three-quarters of a century Political Science has become very widely entrenched in western universities. Despite the recent expansion in departmental treatment of international relations - as, for instance, at the new British universities of Sussex, Lancaster, and Surrey - it is unlikely that International Relations will have become anything like so firmly and widely established by the time it was reached an equivalent age.

From the earliest speculation about political affairs, the student of politics has approached behaviour and institutions in

the context of the sovereign community. This context has changed - originally the polis, later the empire, dynastic monarchy, and today the national state - but the traditional focus of the political analyst has continued to be on the prevalent typical sovereign unit. Plato's considerations on the nature of political life attempted to explore the philosophical implications of man's encounter with his fellows by way of examining the types of social and governmental organisation they set up. Aristotle, though also concerned with philosophical issues, was a pioneer of scientific enquiry and went further than Plato in the classification of the institutional forms of government. The philosophical and ethical dimensions of political analysis tended to predominate in the study throughout classical and medieval antiquity, and it was not until the modern age that the positivistic study of governmental forms and political patterns began to emerge as significant. The earlier political philosophers were not greatly concerned with political life beyond the sovereign community, and Machiavelli stands alone as having significant observations to make on the relations between such communities. Even in the modern age of Political Science the study is shaped, in its terminology, techniques, and above all assumptions, by the nature of what (by comparison with international politics) we may call domestic politics. The considerable body of writings that makes up the subject-matter of courses in political thought or theory thus includes very little that either deals specifically with international relations or is even relevant to the international political field.⁹ Despite the growing impact of the international

⁹Cf. M. Wight, "Why is there no International Theory", International Relations, II, 1 (April, 1960).

arena upon the traditional core of the study of politics, man and his relationship to the state, that sector of political reality which is found beyond the boundaries of the sovereign community has been gravely neglected. Since international studies are quite widely felt to fall within the competence of the political scientist it is unfortunate that they are unexploited. The teaching arrangements in a large number of departments make no or only minimal provision for international politics, and where this does appear as a sub-field it is often treated as a special case deviating from 'politics proper' of the domestic variety. The actual experience of the subordination of international relations to the overall political field seems to suggest that Political Science does not make effective provision for studying the political aspects of the international milieu. There are, certainly, possible advantages to be derived from the opportunity offered by studying politics affairs as a whole to gain perspective upon the enduring features of the political process within all milieus. The prospects of such treatment might appear to have improved with the development of behavioural emphasis and the decline of the formerly predominant institutional and legal approaches, but little fruit has yet been borne for the student of International Relations by this development.

So far, this discussion of Political Science and its claim to have subsumed under it the field of international relations has assumed the latter to be a properly political study and has stressed only that international relations operate within a milieu quite distinct from that of politics within the state.

But although we often fail to differentiate between the terms 'international politics' or 'world politics' and the terms 'international relations' or 'international affairs' (this expression tending to have a less academic meaning), the latter terms strictly understood encompass what is denoted by the former and much else besides. Manning's description 'social cosmology' serves, though almost whimsically sweeping, to remind us that international relations are the interactions of the component units of a global society that operates at the economic, psychological, philosophical, legal, and sociological levels and not merely, and perhaps not even always most importantly, at the political one. The balanced and rounded perspectives requisite to the understanding of this global cosmos are not to be gained by restricting our treatment of it to the field of politics alone. It is in this many-faceted nature of international reality that we may find considerable justification for inter-disciplinary cooperation, of which more below, and the principal objections to confining our international perspective to that of any one subject.

In short, therefore, it may be doubted whether a predominantly political study can adequately treat the overall milieu of international relations. Moreover, even within the element of that milieu which is properly susceptible to political analysis, the approach which is commonly adopted in departments of Political Science or Government is not the most suitable for that milieu. This is perhaps the most telling of the two objections to putting

international relations into the field of politics generally. It has particular force in the case of departments and scholars whose focus is upon government as distinct from politics. For if one's specialisation is in the field of public law or administration it will require a very considerable imaginative effort to liberate one's mind from an institutional and procedural cast which is alien to the play of politics internationally. The common ground between the political realms is liable to be greater where the scholar's specialisation is something like the interplay of interest groups or political stability and revolution, though such relatively greater affinity in material does not obviate the need for one's mind to be re-oriented towards the international environment. In this connection it is striking that a lucid and distinguished political scientist, Harold Laski, has demonstrated in his introductory work that the academic grasp of intranational politics is liable to be accompanied by a very tenuous and unsatisfactory comprehension of international politics.¹⁰ Such unsophistication makes it at least arguable that Stanley Hoffmann is correct that greater benefits would flow from subsuming domestic politics under international relations and thus reversing the common hierarchy, and that thereby "...we might produce a Copernican revolution even bigger than the change that transformed economics when macroanalysis replaced micranalysis".¹¹

¹⁰ Compare chapters 1-3 with chapter 4 in his Introduction to Politics (London, 1961).

¹¹ S.H. Hoffmann (ed.), Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, 1960), 1.

There is little prospect that Hoffmann's suggested inversion of the usual order will be followed (though occasionally it occurs that provision is made for the study of international before domestic politics, as the Aberystwyth, whose study of International Politics predates by almost fifty years the recently established subject of Government), and international relations is quite widely regarded as a sub-field of Political Science or Government. This often remains the case, though within departments principally concerned with domestic politics there often develop virtually autonomous studies of international relations, with courses, teachers and researchers independently concerned with that sector of political activity. From the point of view of making effective provision for intergovernmental relations such de facto autonomy is to be applauded, though it is relevant to note that such a degree of independence concedes very much of the case of those who press for the de jure recognition of International Relations. But relative autonomy is itself to be cherished, on the basis that half a loaf is better than no bread at all, and, moreover, it may lead ultimately to full disciplinary provision for the subject. The degree of autonomy varies significantly: at Princeton it is possible to read for a graduate degree in international relations almost exclusively, and in other places the provision made is merely nominal. Data is difficult to obtain on this question, for curricula and other information given in university catalogues often bears slight resemblance to what actually occurs.¹²

¹² Cf. Fuller, op. cit., xi.

Before going further with the analysis of the state of International Relations, reference to other related subjects is called for along the same lines as the preceding discussion of Political Science.

History and International Relations

History ranks close to Political Science as a subject which lays strong claim to handle international relations. The identity of subject-matter is considerable as between International Relations and History and this factor, as with Political Science, has caused the older-established study to assert a claim to control the more recently established. Moreover, International Relations shares with History more than the subject-matter of diplomatic history: there is also considerable affinity with respect to analytical and descriptive technique. There are, however, significant areas of incompatibility between the two studies. The first of these is that the historical approach to international relations has tended, like that of the political scientist, to involve a narrowing of the focus of the observer to the political aspect of state relations. The diplomatic historian is perhaps even more prone than the political scientist to ignore the many facets of international life that seem to clutter and obscure analysis of the significant part - 'what really happened'. The second area of incompatibility is obvious and complete and impossible to overcome: the historicity of History disqualifies the bulk of international relations, the present and future, from its purview. Historians normally obey self-denying ordinances against trespassing in the realm of the

recent past, even, because the paucity of documentary and other primary source material renders the search for definitive understanding difficult if not impossible. Though the pressure to extend the historical realm closer to the present appears to have increased in recent decades the historian of integrity will eschew those periods in whose explanation he can be no more than speculative (though such as A.J.P. Taylor display a great readiness to write as publicists and shed the bounds of time). By contrast, the student of international relations is used to working in the van, so to speak, of historical studies, and impetuously applies the tools of the diplomatic historian's trade to international problems of the immediate past and of the present day; nor does he hesitate to extrapolate into the future and to seek after predictive success. In these respects the subject is disgracefully presumptuous from the historian's standpoint.

International Relations may not properly be subsumed under History but it does have a substantial dependence upon that subject. Historiography provides an important body of raw material for the study of international relations in previous eras; an extensive history background is a valuable preparation for the study of world politics. The study of History is, like that of Politics, a root of the study of International Relations. But it does not follow from this debt that the latter should be subordinated to either of the former, any more than it is the case that the manifest impossibility of studying physics without the use of mathematics ipso facto demotes the physicist to a position

below the salt in relation to the mathematician. The proper relationship between History and International Relations is exemplified by two works by E.H. Carr, the eminent British historian who once worked at the Foreign Office on the practical problems of international relations. He has contributed to the study of inter-war Europe books that focus, respectively, upon the international history and the international relations of that time and place. His International Relations between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939¹³ is an admirably concise diplomatic history of the contemporary, provisional sort, and succinctly covers the inter-war patterns of the most significant national developments and international relationships. By contrast, his forceful book The Twenty Years' Crisis¹⁴ covers this ground from the standpoint of international relations, eschewing (even in the broad detail which is all that Carr can encompass in his brief history of the period) even an outline of what actually happened; instead Carr here attempts to focus upon the fundamental issues underlying the minutiae of international intercourse: the differing assumptions about world society, the place in it of power and justice, and the nature and flexibility of the legal-judicial structure which it has. The distinction between International Relations and the history of international relationships is cogently made by the distinction between Carr's outline history and his introduction to "the science of international relations".¹⁵

¹³ (London, 1947; rev. ed. of his 1937 International Relations since the Peace Treaties)

¹⁴ Op. cit.

¹⁵ Ibid., Part One.

Having attempted to set out the merits of treating international relations in distinct, independent form instead of subordinating it to its principal root disciplines, History and Political Science, it remains to give some consideration to certain other subjects which bear upon its study.

The Contribution of Other Social Sciences

International Law has been the most important of these other fields as an influence over the development of International Relations. Jurists have yielded a greater and more valuable body of thought about the nature of international society than have historians and political analysts together; Grotius stands out as the principal contributor but Vattel, Suarez and a large group of other jurists have had significant contributions to make. As a sub-field of jurisprudence the study of international law had severe restrictions in its perspective upon the relations of states, but the international lawyers - finding the international milieu left to them by default of the early historians and political thinkers - accumulated a rich body of analysis for the subsequent students of international relations per se by going beyond purely legal analysis into examination of the social context of the law of nations. We are familiar today with the sociological emphasis of legal studies in jurisprudence generally but the law of nations has been long treated in terms of the society of nations. Modern students of the law of nations have continued this tradition of outlining the nature of international society, recognising that law is an institution derived from and

reflecting the structure and processes of the community in and by which it has been promulgated. The legal perspective is thus most illuminating for the student of international relations, and the best international legal writing is essential reading.¹⁶ The 'sociology of international law' towards which the legal analyses of Lasswell, McDougal et al. (in their series of works on various aspects of international systems of 'public order') and of W.G. Friedmann¹⁷ are directed are very much distinct from the dry studies of the legal principles and rules as set out in the typical texts and case books. With the increasing importance of international institutions the sociological-legal perspective is becoming increasingly valuable. The emphasis is less upon international law as a useful 'minor' field of a course in international relations, and more upon its study as an integral part of the central study. Developing elements of community in the international society make it likely that legal norms will grow in complexity and importance. It is necessary, therefore, for the subject International Relations to lean heavily upon this disciplinary crutch; this dependence does not, of course, imply the suitability or possibility of International Law itself retaining the virtual monopoly of international studies which it once enjoyed, and which it justified to a greater extent than did History of Political Science under comparable circumstances.

¹⁶ See especially J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (Oxford, 1955 - 5th ed.), chapters I-III; also, W. Schiffer, The Legal Community of Mankind (New York, 1954).

¹⁷ The Changing Structure of International Law (New York, 1964).

Two disciplines which are indispensable to an understanding of the international milieu are Economics and Geography. For the international environment is obviously not to be properly understood within consideration of the physical environment and man's adjustment to it, while the economic factors of the interplay between men's communities may be very significant elements in the overall relationships of states. As specialisms within these disciplines themselves, their international relations aspects have some degree of autonomy. International Economics and Political Geography go beyond those parts of Economics and Geography which are relevant to International Relations, and hence cannot be completely subordinated to it, but some knowledge of them is essentially ancillary to the study of international society. Such tributary studies may also provide valuable theoretical insights, as Geography has done with large-scale geo-political explanations, of varying determinacy, of the ebb and flow of the main currents of international politics¹⁸ - and as Economics has recently done on a smaller conceptual scale.¹⁹

Some discussion of the relationship of Sociology to the field of international relations is called for, not because any sociologists are active in asserting proprietorial rights over this field but because Sociology is potentially the discipline whose claim to overall treatment of the 'social cosmos' is greatest. The potential rather than actual importance of this

¹⁸ Cf. H. and M. Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs, with Special Reference to International Politics (Princeton, 1965).

¹⁹ For instance, the application of bargaining ideas to strategy.

subject must be stressed, for like Political Science it has not in practice expanded its focus to the reasonable limit of the subject-matter. Indeed, the parallel is quite close with Political Science; for, just as Manning characterises that subject as starting from the content of the state and not adequately considering its context, Sociology though concerned with the study of society in all its forms and at all its levels has in fact tended to focus upon the various sub-systems of domestic national society and to ignore other significant types of society like international society. Sociology concentrates principally upon the relationships of individuals and groups within overarching sovereign communities.²⁰ Although in the variety, explanatory range, and scope of its theoretical structure Sociology might be felt the senior social science it has not yet justified its possible title to study international society. The efforts of Parsons, Shils and others to elaborate a 'general theory of action' have not yet led to any significant scope for application to international relations. Even though the intellectual value of such a general theory of social interaction be granted it is unlikely to emerge swiftly: the recorded progress of scientific theory is characterised by extensive refinement and revision as hypotheses fail to achieve explanatory success and are discarded in favour of others. This process is bound to take place where concepts and hypotheses developed to comprehend a society of a

²⁰ This view is not widely stated; see, however, J.N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", 62-3n, in R.B. Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, 1966).

certain cohesiveness are restated for application to a social order of a different level of cohesiveness. In terminological and conceptual respects, Sociology is a discipline distinct from other social sciences to a degree which is likely to make the wider application of its putative general theory extremely difficult.

Having completed this examination of the principal subjects which bear upon the field and study of international relations, and having contended with respect to them all that they do not - both in theory and practice - make adequate provision for the international relations milieu, it remains to examine the formulae under which the study of international relations is related to the organisational and intellectual balances struck in the universities. That is to say, having considered the ought of the autonomy of international relations as a field of study it is necessary to assess the is of academic provision to see how far the ideal position has been achieved.

THE ACADEMIC SYNTHESIS: DEPENDENCE AND INDEPENDENCE

The section above should have made quite evident the essential dependence of the student of international relations upon the subject-matters, and to an extent upon the subjects themselves, of History, Political Science, Law, Economics and so forth. For though it has been here asserted that the studies cannot adequately contain international relations, that field cannot prosper autonomously without leaning heavily upon neighbouring subjects.

This dependence is recognised fully by those, for instance Prof. Manning, who press most strongly for the independent treatment of the international relations subject-matter.

Interdisciplinary Coordination

Such acknowledgement of the essentially eclectic nature of the study has been taken in some quarters to mean that its academic organisation should emphasise the dependence on other disciplines rather than the distinct perspective which it imparts to that which it borrows. This view often finds expression in proposals that the handling of international relations be conducted on an interdisciplinary, or multidisciplinary basis, so as to coordinate the relevant parts of those subjects which contribute something to the field. This type of approach is favoured especially by those who are hospitable to instituting some provision for the study of international relations but who fear the deleterious consequences of fragmenting knowledge and understanding which may flow from allowed the proliferation of disciplines to proceed unchecked. The study of international relations would seem to offer considerable scope for experimentation in such disciplinary coordination, because of its extremely eclectic make-up and its widespread lack of disciplinary legitimacy. Some would see interdisciplinary arrangements as the best means of providing for the filling of a serious academic void while accommodating the disparate contributory fields. Whether or not these arrangements provide the best academic vessel for the study, they are bound to enjoy favour in many quarters because they involve less concession to the demand for disciplinary autonomy than would the establishment

of a separate department with the attendant disruption and opposition liable to be aroused by such a change. The advocate of full disciplinary status for international relations may be satisfied pro tem with what he regards as but a stage half-way to his eventual objective while the academic fraternity as a whole does not have to extend full organisational and academic title to the field.

Some evaluation of interdisciplinary arrangements is called for. The danger of disciplinary proliferation leading to the fragmentation of knowledge is very real but is a general objection which should not, of itself, be felt a sufficient disqualification of the claims of a heretofore ignored study which may appear worthy of academic elevation. Interdisciplinary cooperation may, however, be more worthily used where a field of study can usefully be distinguished but cannot readily be extracted from the subject-matters of a number of fields. Examples that spring to mind include the study of conflict and its resolution, and the study of organizations. With respect to our field, to the extent that interdisciplinary arrangements constitute a reaction to, and progression beyond, the subordination of international studies to some one field, they are a welcome advance. Such cooperation may provide a very useful opportunity for students of the field to demonstrate the value of their perspective applied to "an academic bundle (made up of) history, law, economics, political science, geography and sundry other subjects".²¹ The expertise of various

²¹ Mathisen, op. cit., 20.

disciplines can be tapped by gathering together a panel of economists, political scientists, etc., but the best interest of the subject or field of study upon which these people are severally focusing will not be served unless the arrangement makes some provision for the coordination of their activities. Especially from a teaching point of view, the flexibility of course offerings in American universities is such that the effort of establishing an interdisciplinary programme cannot be justified if it is to present merely the sum of its parts. The additional element which must be provided by an interdisciplinary scheme is precisely that factor which tends to be missing from a degree course concocted by the so-called 'cafeteria' system: a clear focus upon the totality of international relations, as distinct from six or ten different, and probably in part conflicting, ways of regarding them. The need is for interdisciplinary treatment to have sufficient coordination to impart, in Mathisen's phrase, "a common angle"²² to the overall perspective upon the subject-matter - to make the arrangement more than the sum of its parts. The attainment of such a perspective demands rigorous selectivity so that a coherent, manageably homogeneous outlook may be developed. To shift one's perspective properly demands an almost complete reorientation of assumptions, terminology and techniques as between most studies; moreover, all of the participant specialists must be ready to make efforts to achieve generalist skills, a movement which is against the dominant trend of preaching increasingly to the converted alone. Nor must we pass over

²² Ibid., 21

the dangers that such residual disciplinary predispositions will lead some to carry into the interdisciplinary committee or board a substantial degree of academic ethnocentrism - which Mathisen calls more plainly "professional chauvinism"²³: the illusion that one's own particular study is the supreme road to the achievement of enlightenment and the conviction that alternative roads are false and their advocates benighted fools.

Coordinated programmes of the type discussed above in general terms have been established at a number of institutions whose treatment of international relations is distinguished - for examples, California, Yale, Pennsylvania and Chicago. The common practice is for an interdisciplinary committee to oversee the teaching and research arrangements for a degree or degrees (especially at the post-graduate level) in International Relations. Princeton, in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, has gone further by infusing actual courses with interdisciplinary perspectives by entrusting them to the joint supervision of academics of varying persuasions. Yet, even where it is working at its theoretical best, such coordination among disciplines has a serious drawback: the inherent fragmentation and opposition of subjects which results from drawing them together short of disciplinary integration. In practice, of course, the best fruits of coordination are unlikely always to be forthcoming. It may not be at all fanciful to compare the western alarm at the prospect of

²³ Ibid., 26

the United Nations Secretariat becoming subject to the control of a 'troika' system of divided authority with the concern felt by a student of international relations at his field being disrupted by an unruly team, of more than three horses. For it is the case that "every discipline tends to develop its own way of looking at things"²⁴ and the particular training of a student will hamper both his ability and his readiness to achieve a generalist command of the various aspects of a subject-matter such as international relations. The most diligent efforts may result only in mastery of the several aspects - economic, legal, etc. - of that subject-matter instead of in grasp of it as a whole. What the interdisciplinary approach cannot impart, in other words, is the perspective and skill of the specialist in international relations, though at its best it may provide the opportunity to become acquainted with many of its aspects as a generalist. The inherent limitations of this approach are not eradicated until coordination is carried over into the provision of a core of courses specifically designed to tie together the various threads or aspects of the field. And when this is done, an interdisciplinary scheme has been for all intents and purposes transmuted into an integrated disciplinary treatment of international relations - whether or not it is explicitly acknowledged to be such. For according to our previously wrought criterion of 'effective provision', a study which brings to the study of international society a focus upon its distinct nature is effectively the proper study - International Relations.

²⁴ Ibid., 25.

While recognising the value of interdisciplinary coordination as making some provision for the study of a much neglected field, it would seem reasonable, therefore, to assert that the disadvantages of such highlighting of the many aspects of international reality include the major one that the central essence of the subject-matter may be eclipsed and ignored. This disadvantage can only be reduced to a significant extent by taking up instead the integrated perspective of the "unitary approach"²⁵.

Disciplinary Autonomy

Apart from the alternatives of making no provision at all and of making ersatz provision by the expedient of giving some one subject an international 'slant', the development of an independent subject is the other major device for accommodating the study of international society. Whether taking the form of a distinct, nominally independent department or not, the study can be regarded as having effective autonomy so long as it does in fact focus upon international relations and engage in an eclectic search after a synthesis of their various aspects. But the maintenance of such a focus, governed by the requirements of the international subject-matter and not of some other subject-matter, is best secured by the endowment of separate disciplinary/departmental facilities.

The case for such treatment has been urged most consistently and strongly over the past several decades by Professor C.A.W. Manning, occupant for more than thirty years of the Montague

²⁵ Ibid., 28.

Burton (originally Cassell) Chair of International Relations at the University of London (tenable at the London School of Economics and Political Science). Manning, until recently the holder of one of the merely four chairs in the subject at British universities,²⁶ devoted much of his intellectual force and energy to the advocacy of expanded attention to the study of international society and especially to its treatment on a unitary basis. His views are prototypical of the school which seeks to have international relations subsumed only under International Relations, and they are worth close attention. Before enquiring into Manning's position it is necessary to acknowledge that not all the students of international relations of eminence share his insistence upon a unitary, independent provision for that study. Distinguished scholars at Harvard, Princeton and elsewhere in institutions which make no such separate provision for the study thus endorse, at least implicitly or nominally, the subordination of the field of international relations to some other subject or range of subjects. Some students go so far as to explicitly reject the position urged by Manning - as does, for instance, J.W. Burton, who avers that: "International affairs is not a discipline. As a term it describes an extensive field of enquiry...."²⁷

²⁶ Aberystwyth (the first, 1919); L.S.E.; Oxford; Edinburgh. The latter two are not departmental chairs, and Edinburgh's is not full-time. Though the subject is longer established at Aberystwyth, only at L.S.E. could a first degree be taken solely in International Relations (and at University College, London, which still lacks its own chair in the subject). Recently chairs have been established at Lancaster, Sussex, Southampton, etc.

²⁷ Peace Theory: Preconditions of Disarmament (New York, 1962), v.

Professor Manning's eminence in the study, especially in the British academic orbit, has resulted in his being charged with rapporteurial duties at a number of conferences and meetings which have addressed themselves to the ongoing debate about the status and autonomy of the study. He prepared the report that issued from the 1950-52 Unesco enquiry into the university teaching of the subject²⁸, and he was the major contributor to the parallel assessment made under the auspices of the International Studies Conference²⁹ - in whose proceedings Manning has been influential as participant and as spokesman for the conference in its dealings with its sponsoring body, Unesco, and with rivals for its function, such as the International Political Science Association.³⁰

Manning sees international relations as a field of study whose status in the universities (and in intellectual thought generally) is analogous to that of economics a generation ago,³¹ before it became established as a distinct, major discipline. He is inclined to see in academic organisation a structure which changes frequently in response to a process whereby fields of study are defined, they produce disciplinary embryo, and are eventually accorded status as legitimate disciplines. A more appropriate analogy might be the study of political science, itself a major obstacle to the disciplinary acceptance of International Relations. This continuous

²⁸ Manning, op. cit. ²⁹ G.L. Goodwin (ed.), The University Teaching of International Relations (Oxford, 1951).

³⁰ The International Studies Conference, established under League aegis, passed under Unesco but survived until only 1952, when the sponsoring organisation deemed its work to be duplicating that of the I.P.S.A., which claimed International Relations as one of its four major concerns, and hence withdrew finance. See C.A.W. Manning, "Out to Grass - and a Lingering Look Behind", International Relations, II, 6 (October, 1962), 355, 366 et seq.

³¹ Goodwin, op. cit., 12.

but by no means automatic remaking of the disciplinary mappa mundi has resulted in the emergence of international relations as a subject-matter distinct enough for it to deserve disciplinary treatment. It is, at least, an emerging discipline, a subject-in-the-making, even where it may still be nominally within the bounds of some other study.³² This process of emergence generally provokes opposition on the part of those subjects being asked to lose a field of competence which they have traditionally enjoyed. As we have pointed out above, it is hardly a compelling response from the subject which is being divested of part of its subject-matter to assert that arrangements have been very satisfactory in the past. For the advocate of the new subject will be schismatic precisely because he believes past provision for the subject-matter in which he is particularly interested to have been quite unsatisfactory. Manning has made this point in his characteristic oblique and yet pungent prose:

Granted that international relations had indeed been taught in departments of political science. Equally, literature had been sold in drug stores. Maybe there were potent reasons for classing some sorts of literature as a drug: but their availability in drug stores was not itself conclusive on the point.³³

The intellectual merits of such cases are often, sadly, not very evidently considered and the provision which it is decided should be made for a particular subject reflects the balance of power in university committees.³⁴ It is a fact of academic life, that

³² Cf. Mathisen, op. cit., 31. ³³ "Out to Grass", op. cit., 365.

³⁴ Ibid., 365 et seq.; University Teaching of International Relations (Manning), 26.

"the question of what, in academic arrangements, should form part of what, is not in general purely a question of logic but largely one of local tradition and convenience".³⁵

Political Science makes much, as we have noted above,³⁶ of the argument that the subject-matter and techniques of it and of International Relations are so similar as to demand common treatment. The deleterious effects upon Political Science of hiving off international relations are pointed to;³⁷ it is asserted that "the distinction between international relations and the rest of political science is purely one of emphasis and specialisation".³⁸ The affinities between the fields cannot be denied, though ipso facto an affinity cannot be held to demand the subordination of one to another, though it obviously calls for close mutual interest. The reductio ad absurdum of the 'affinity' argument as presented by Robson and others is apparent if we consider the study of sociology: "In a word, has any of sociology's neighbours a theoretically unimpeachable title to exist at all?"³⁹ Affinities must be expected, for what they are worth, to abound on the acade-

³⁵ Ibid., 47.

³⁶ Supra, 29-35.

³⁷ W.A. Robson, op. cit., 63-4, 66. ³⁸ Ibid., 64.

³⁹ C.A.W. Manning, University Teaching of the Social Sciences: International Relations, op. cit., 47.

mic landscape. Hence, it should be understood that they reflect the inevitable ambivalencies and uncertainties that arise when new disciplines emerge from a field dominated by old ones; they should not be regarded as justifying the renewed imposition of outmoded hierarchical relationships. It is necessary to recognise, as Professor Robson himself observes, that "...university organisation is not fixed immutably like the laws of the Medes and Persians but ... like other human arrangements ... can be altered to meet contemporary needs".⁴⁰ With Political Science, as with certain other disciplines, International Relations shares many affinities but its claim to separate treatment is one which has resulted from weighing such ties against what appear more important disciplines, and hence presenting a claim for autonomous treatment to the court of academic public opinion.

Though the assertion of this distinctiveness has been made above in relation to the other disciplines from which International Relations has sprung, it is worth emphasising the nature of the distinctiveness here in this discussion. The basis of the distinction is essentially one of focus, though the focus is upon a subject-matter which is importantly different (in practice more than in theory) from those of related fields, and though that subject-matter may call for somewhat distinct methodological devices and conceptual schemes. The specific perspective of International Relations is one far wider than that which characterises Political Science and a number of other fields of study. In the

⁴⁰ Op. cit., 67.

formulation chosen by Manning:

For international relations, as for ecology, initial interest is in the environment, and the interrelatedness of everything within. In political science, as in psychology, the initial interest is in the individual organism, and its relationship with everything without.⁴¹

It is because of this distinct focus that those who are convinced of the value of using it assert that "work in international relations ... should be administered by a separate international relations department".⁴² It is certainly true that "...there is no method peculiar to the autonomous branch of knowledge of which (international) relationships would constitute the subject matter",⁴³ but the distinctiveness of this study does not rest upon its possession of an exclusive armoury of analytical tools, explanatory concepts, and so on. In this and other important respects International Relations is an independent discipline that is perhaps almost uniquely dependent upon other disciplines. It is not necessary for a subject to have methodological compactness and uniqueness; nor is it necessary in order for a study to be distinct and autonomous that it be distinct in a 'functional' sense, directing itself to a unique subject matter. But it is necessary for a distinct discipline or field of study to be characterised by a substantial element of either one or the other kind of uniqueness, either methodological or functional.⁴⁴

⁴¹ University Teaching of the Social Sciences, op. cit., 74.

⁴² Grayson Kirk, The Study of International Relations in American Colleges and Universities (New York, 1947), 85.

⁴³ J. Vernant in Goodwin (ed.), op. cit., 44.

⁴⁴ Cf. Manning in ibid., 38.

In conclusion, the most appropriate form for the study of international relations would seem to be that of the unitary approach. Though this may effectively be provided within some department other than a department of international relations as such - as is the case, largely, in the treatment of the study under the aegis of the department of political science at Princeton - it is best secured by conceding to the study its autonomous disciplinary status. This will secure that the various elements that go to make up the methodology and perspective of the subject will be more than synthesised; they will be fused into a coherent, integrated unitary understanding. It is appropriate that Professor Manning's words finally describe the rationale and the potential of this perspective:

...an understanding of life is a unitary achievement; and not just a concurrent understanding of so many unconnected themes, economic life, religious, political, social life, and possibly more. A purported understanding which conceived all these facets of existence as presented in dissociation from one another would scarcely be an understanding at all. Essential, surely, to any genuine insight is the principle of wholeness, of integrality, answering to the irreducible altogetherness of the many aspects of existence in the universe as they are.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Manning, ibid., 16.

Chapter 3: Issues of Substance: Theoretical Content and Status

To shift attention from form to substance is to move, as Michael Banks points out, from a controversy now largely stilled to one of growing significance.¹ With International Relations now quite widely established as a nominally or actually independent discipline the legitimacy or otherwise of its status is an issue not often taken up. But within this roughly agreed disciplinary framework, and resulting from the entrenchment and expansion of the subject in the post-war period, there has emerged a more fundamental debate on the scientific-theoretical character of International Relations as a field of study.

The term 'debate' would appear to be appropriate in this connection for in this period, and particularly over the past decade, the accumulation of research and publication - mainly American - of a scientific persuasion has clarified attitudes and led to the emergence of distinct, opposed views on the methodological priorities for the subject. Speculation on the theoretical nature of the subject, which has become a common feature of the professional journals and of gatherings of academics, has increasingly been characterised by the polarisation of views. The recent appearance in the respected journal World Politics of two articles² addressing themselves to the question of the theoretical

¹ "Two Meanings of Theory in the Study of International Relations", Yearbook of World Affairs, vol. 20 (London, 1966), 220-40.

² Hedley Bull, "International Theory: the Case for a Classical Approach", XVIII, 3 (April, 1966), 361-77; and Morton Kaplan, "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations", XIX, 1 (October, 1966), 1-20.

status of International Relations has focused attention upon the positions of the 'classical' or 'traditional' approach on the one hand and the 'scientific' school' on the other. A consideration of Hedley Bull's advocacy of the former methodological persuasion and Morton Kaplan's response in the terms of the latter viewpoint crystallises the issues valuably for our purposes.

CLASSICAL AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES

Bull's article was originally presented, in January, 1966, to the tenth Bailey Conference on the teaching of International Relations in British universities. The author, then Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics and now Professor at the Australian National University, purported to be making a case for the classical approach to the subject; but he sought to do so negatively, by way of a critique of the aspirations and procedures of the opposed, scientific school - and especially of one of its most prominent adherents, Morton Kaplan, whose System and Process in International Politics³ can be said to have marked the emergence of that school.

Bull defines as classical:

...the approach to theorising that derives from philosophy, history, and law...characterised above all by explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgement and by the assumptions that if we confine ourselves to strict standards of verification and proof there is very little of significance that can be said about international relations, that general propositions... must therefore derive from a scientifically imperfect process of perception and intuition, and that these general propositions cannot be accorded anything more than a tentative and inconclusive status appropriate to their doubtful origins.⁴

³(New York, 1957) ⁴Bull, op.cit., 361.

A method of enquiry governed by these assumptions has traditionally predominated in the study of world affairs but has recently been criticised and discarded by those aiming, ultimately, at the scientific goal of "...a theory of international relations whose propositions are based upon either logical or mathematical proof, or upon strict empirical verification".⁵ The adherents of this school conceive of themselves as riding the wave of the future and expect confidently to displace the classical approach as the orthodoxy of the subject and replace it with the scientific. This goal has probably been attained in the United States, though in the British academic community the scientific approach is not yet predominant, though the tide does appear to be running in its favour (as reports of the reception of Bull's paper at the Bailey Conference would suggest).

The senior occupants of British academic International Relations citadels are, however, largely hostile to the newer methodology, and Bull acknowledges frankly that this response springs

much less from any reasoned critique than it does from feelings of aesthetic revulsion against its language and methods, irritation at its sometimes arrogant and preposterous claims, frustration at (an) inability to grasp its meaning and employ its tools, a priori confidence that as an intellectual enterprise it is bound to fail, and professional insecurity induced by the awful gnawing thought that it might perhaps succeed.⁶

Nevertheless, Bull does not believe the classical repudiation of the scientific approach flows entirely from considerations of such dubiety. For he goes on to assert that, in fact:

⁵Ibid., 362.

⁶Ibid., 363-4.

the scientific approach has contributed and is likely to contribute very little to the theory of international relations, and in so far as it is intended to encroach upon and ultimately displace the classical approach, it is positively harmful.⁷

This conviction Bull proceeds to justify by an enumeration of the shortcomings of the scientific theorists as students of international relations.

Firstly, he asserts that the subject-matter is not amenable to a strictly scientific treatment in that "the capacity for judgement" requisite to the management of an enormously complex field redolent with moral problems must be foresworn if one is to follow the "course of intellectual puritanism" which is characteristic of scientific enquiry.⁸ Not only the framing but also the testing of hypotheses demands the exercise of intuition and calls for "a rough and ready observation"⁹ which the scientifically pure must eschew. Within the terms of the scientific code - drawn from the image of 'hard' science which this school of theorists seeks to emulate - Bull hence asserts that fruitful treatment of the most fundamental issues in international relations cannot take place. As a consequence, members of this school tend in fact to "...devote themselves to peripheral subjects - methodologies for dealing with the subject, logical extrapolations of conceptual frameworks for thinking about it, marginalia of the subject that are susceptible of measurement or direct observation".¹⁰ Alternatively, they adopt the classical approach - unacknowledged - in their work. This constitutes Bull's second proposition: that the only illuminating contributions from the scientific school -

⁷Ibid., 366.

⁸Ibid., 366.

⁹Ibid., 367.

¹⁰Ibid., 367.

such as the insights in the writings of T.C. Schelling - have been derived by the relaxation of strict scientific standards and the admittance of the exercise of judgement in the classical mode.

Bull doubts the possibility of developing a cumulative, integrated theory on the subject and sees little prospect of moulding the disparate theoretical languages and conceptual frameworks into a durable, homogenous basis for significant progress towards the theoretical content of the natural sciences. For, given the notoriously intractable subject-matter - a vast number and range of relevant variables, resistant to controlled experiment (leaving aside the question of human involvement and subjectivity) because permanently in flux and containing a substantial element of the contingent - Bull expects that the theory of the subject "will remain indefinitely in the philosophical stage of constant debate about fundamentals" and, hence, that the most enduring and useful of scientific theories will provide but "partial and uncertain guides" and will enjoy a status comparable in this respect to that of classical theories.¹¹

Within the, to Bull, limited scope for scientific theorising that the subject-matter permits he discerns a number of methodological failings which further compound the overall inapplicability of scientific enquiry. The first and most serious methodological distortion which Bull criticises is the readiness "of many of these writers to cast their theories in the form of a deliberately simplified abstraction from reality".¹² The building of theories

¹¹Ibid., 370.

¹²Ibid., 370.

has been too much equated, in Bull's view, with "the construction and manipulation of so-called 'models'",¹³ the term being fashionably and indiscriminately applied even to mere analogies and to elaborate metaphors. Use of models, in the strict sense of the term, is favoured by the scientific school because they abstract from reality sufficiently to allow the exercise of rigorously deductive reasoning - logical or even mathematical - to which the richness and complexity of the subject-matter is not otherwise conducive. Bull maintains that inductively derived empirical generalisation is a methodological process quite capable of producing such insights as have so far emerged from deductive systems of axioms and theorems (i.e. from models, in the formal sense). Moreover, it is his view that the model-builder's propensity to abstract from reality may allow him to fall victim to a serious lapse from proper scientific method, namely:

...a dogmatism that empirical generalisation does not allow, attributing to the model a connection with reality it does not have, and as often as not distorting the model itself by importing additional assumptions about the world in the guise of logical axioms.¹⁴

He goes on:

The very intellectual completeness and logical tidiness of the model-building operation lends it an air of authority which is often quite misleading as to its standing as a statement about the real world.¹⁵

Kaplan's System and Process epitomises for Bull both the ambition and the failure to achieve it of the abstract model-builders. Of Kaplan's application of systems theory to a range of real and hypothetical international systems, variously structured and differently functioning, Bull declares it to consist of "an intel-

¹³ Ibid., 370.

¹⁴ Ibid., 370.

¹⁵ Ibid., 370-71.

lectual exercise and no more".¹⁶ He indicts Kaplan for abstracting from reality to such an extent as to lead to arbitrariness in the selection and depiction of the six systems discussed and for failure adequately to make reference back (in the case of historical or existing systems) to empirical data.

The second major objection Bull makes to the use - or rather misuse, in his terms - of scientific method by the scientists of international relations is to their over-fondness for quantification. This, the "supreme ideal" of scientific precision has by some of the scientific theorists been distorted into "a fetish for measurement"¹⁷ without sufficient regard for the qualitative differences between variables, and even within categories of similar variables. The attempts by Karl Deutsch and his collaborators and pupils, notably Bruce Russett, to measure the social phenomenon of community feeling in the many expressions which it has in international relations are particularly criticised for this fault. Their analyses allegedly fail to discriminate qualitatively among the components of inter-state 'responsiveness' - such as trade flows and diplomatic transactions - which they treat quantitatively. Bull concedes suggestive value to such work but doubts that the scientific quantifiers have added to our knowledge of the subject, except "where they confirm some intuitive impression we already have".¹⁸

Bull certainly acknowledges that "there is a need for rigour and precision in the theory of international politics", but he maintains (in the first of his propositions positively making the

¹⁶ Ibid., 372.

¹⁷ Ibid., 372.

¹⁸ Ibid., 374.

case for classical methodology) that "the sort of rigour and precision of which the subject admits can be accommodated readily enough within the classical approach".¹⁹ This is not to say, however, that all scholars of the classical persuasion have always attempted, let alone succeeded, "to define terms, to observe logical canons of procedure or to make assumptions explicit".²⁰ Although Bull can cite Aron, Waltz and Hoffmann as exemplars of the classical method, scientific at once "in the sense of being a coherent, precise and orderly body of knowledge, and in the sense of being consistent with the philosophical foundations of modern science",²¹ such standards are more often honoured in the breach than in the observance by those who would regard themselves as of the classical persuasion. As Bull himself recognises, the failings of classical practice - as distinct from classical method in theory - have done much to foster within the field a climate favourable to the scientific school as, at least, "a protest against slipshod thinking and dogmatism".²²

He concludes his article with a return to the attack upon the scientific approach, lamenting that its practitioners "by cutting themselves off from history and philosophy, have deprived themselves of the means of self-criticism, and in consequence have a view of their subject and its possibilities that is callow and brash".²³ He recapitulates the index of errors he has promulgated in the foregoing, and abjures us from taking the "false path" blazed by the scientific theorists; we are bidden to recognise that in the appropriate "hierarchy of academic priori-

¹⁹⁻²³ Ibid., 375.

ties"²⁴ for International Relations the classical approach, at its rigorous and consistent best, must be predominant.

That the editors of World Politics should have chosen Morton Kaplan (one of their own number) to contribute an article in reply to Bull's piece is appropriate not only because System and Process was the main target for Bull's strictures, but also because in that work and subsequent writing Kaplan has revealed himself to be one of the most committed of those who advocate scientific treatment of international politics. In tone rather less polemical than Bull's article - and as a reply to what went before, somewhat circuitous and even irrelevant at times - Kaplan's "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations" is an uncompromising, even rigid, statement of the scientific faith. His rebuttal of Bull's 'classical' case, which he prefers to call 'traditional' and is epitomised in his view by E.H. Carr's critique of scientific theory as much as by Bull's, is couched largely in terms of the philosophy of science. In this respect, the controversy is not joined on grounds that make the opposed formulations readily comparable.

Kaplan deals at the outset with what is perhaps the sore of the traditionalist case: the contention that political affairs, involving human purposes and values, constitute systems of action which fall very substantially within the realm of the contingent and are, therefore, not amenable to the scientifically detached and objective treatment of subject-matter which characterises

²⁴Ibid., 377.

the physical sciences. Rejecting the formulation of this case that is presented by E.H. Carr,²⁵ Kaplan cites a number of systems of behaviour all of which "can be investigated by scientific methods" though not necessarily "by the procedures of physics".²⁶ Although "specific explanatory systems must be developed for particular systems" and "the theories, explanations and tools used may differ from those of the physicist, they are part of the general arsenal of science".²⁷

The observations of Bull upon scientific theorising begin to be more directly met by Kaplan's examination of the role of intuition in the generation of scientific hypotheses. He stresses the dependence of all scientific innovation upon the intellectual procedure of intuition, encompassing inspired or educated guesses, and notes its responsibility for many major discoveries.²⁸ For scientific advance in this way to utilise the uniquely complex and sophisticated computer that is the human brain it is necessary, as Kaplan points out, for such intuitions as emerge to be articulated scientifically, precisely, to allow of their verification or falsification - without which science cannot advance. "Even intuition requires the techniques of science to prepare the base on which new intuitions develop", Kaplan observes. The point may be put more succinctly: "Newton could not have had Einstein's intuitions".²⁹ The importance of intuiting in the framing of hypotheses is not, however, at issue in Bull's article. He acknowledges dependence upon intuition in this function to be common to both hard science and social science,³⁰ and he could be

²⁵The Twenty Years' Crisis, op. cit., 3-4. ^{26,27} Kaplan, op. cit., 3

²⁸ Ibid., 3. This point is put more trenchantly in the paper by C.B. Joynt, "International Theory: the Case Revisited", 3.

²⁹ Kaplan, op. cit., 5. ³⁰ Bull, op. cit., 367.

expected to agree with the emphatic statement of Einstein himself that: "The really valuable factor (in scientific investigation) is intuition".³¹ What is really in contention is Bull's view that we are "utterly dependent" upon intuition or 'judgement' in the testing of hypotheses, as well as in their formulation.³²

A related issue is that of the kind of judgement that Bull feels to be necessary for treating the moral questions with which the subject-matter is replete, questions "which cannot by their very nature be given any sort of objective answer, and which can only be probed, clarified, reformulated, and tentatively answered from some arbitrary standpoint, according to the method of philosophy".³³ The human observer impinges upon his subject-matter irretrievably, according to Bull, so that

the theories we produce and the affairs that are theorised about are related not only as subject and object but also as cause and effect, thus ensuring that even our most innocent ideas contribute to their own verification or falsification.³⁴

This view has been pungently stated by E.H. Carr: "Every political judgement helps to modify the facts on which it is passed. Political thought is itself a form of political action".³⁵

Kaplan answers such contentions by asserting that the biases and motivations and sympathies of scientific observers can be compensated for scientifically, to allow comparably accurate study of systems of behaviour that are not susceptible to "the deterministic models of physics"³⁶ as well as those that are.

³¹Q. in Joynt, op. cit., 3. ³²Bull, op. cit., 367. ³³Ibid., 365.

³⁴Ibid., 369. ³⁵Carr, op. cit., 5. ³⁶Kaplan, op. cit., 7.

He recognises that it may be difficult to comprehend scientifically a given environment or system of behaviour for a number of reasons; the intractability of human affairs in the face of the scientific approach may result, he points out, from a complexity - a great multiplicity of variables - which now defeats, and may always defeat, such explanatory theories as man disposes, rather than from the specific complicating factor of purpose. Nevertheless, it is Kaplan's belief that "Many of the major problems of macroscopic international relations...do appear to be manageable" in terms of the scientific approach.³⁷ It is the ability to demonstrate the validity of such expectations in practice - and not philosophical-methodological dispute - as the crucial test of the aspirations of the scientific school.

Kaplan declines to meet in general terms the traditionalist objections presented by Bull to the enterprise of erecting a science of the subject characterised by "precision, rigour, quantification, and general theory".³⁸ He prefers to examine Bull's criticisms in relation to particular contributions of the scientific type. He begins with his own major work, System and Process, putting forward as an initial defence the contention that its strictly deductive, scientific-theoretical character has been exaggerated by Bull, and by other critics including Hoffmann,³⁹ prior to criticising it for shortcomings as a deductive analysis.

The connection between the structure of international systems and the behaviour of their units which is postulated as the basic

³⁷ Ibid., 7.

³⁸ Ibid., 7.

³⁹ Ibid., 7-8n.

hypothesis of his book is justified by Kaplan on the ground that it is a reasonable initial premise upon which a theoretical structure may be established and subsequently examined empirically. No such thorough historical appraisal of his application to international relations of systems theory has been carried out as yet, Kaplan states. He concedes that were such examination undertaken certain modifications - for instance, the elaboration of additional types of system - might suggest themselves, but these would be more readily assimilable within the comparative systems approach than within traditionalist analytical frameworks. His systems theory is thus given the status of a conceptual framework having heuristic value, rather than that of a watertight general theory of international politics. The need which his theories therefore present for empirical analysis itself justifies his use of models for their presentation, he suggests. For the formulation of theories as models makes explicit theoretical assumptions and the extent of their validity, since they allow of verification or falsification. Kaplan readily admits that:

The degree of confidence we place in our studies will never approach that which the physicist has in the study of mechanics (although other areas of physics may present problems as bad as those of politics)...

but he contends that:

...without theoretical models we are unable even to make the discriminations open to us and to explore these questions to the same degree of depth.⁴⁰

Moving from his own work to that of other scientific theorists, Kaplan stresses the significant differences among those

⁴⁰Ibid., 11.

figures whom Bull chose to criticise in common (despite his paying lip-service to the fact of the differences of approach and emphasis between those he singled out for particular attention in his general indictment of the scientific school⁴¹). Kaplan himself declares a number of reservations with respect to a number of procedures utilised by the scientific theorists, principally upon the ground of their appearing inapplicable to the subject-matter. He feels it a fair question, for instance, "whether small group simulations reveal more about small groups simulating international relations than about the complex pattern of international politics"⁴². While simulation is avowedly useful for generating hypotheses, Kaplan doubts its value as a procedure for their confirmation. Bull's assertion that the valuable insights of Schelling's work derive from traditional rather than scientific enquiry is partially conceded; but Kaplan presses Bull upon an admitted weakness in his case for classical theory - the fact that precise and rigorous theorising is very much the exception within his school - in pointing out that insights of the kind Schelling has produced

did not seriously enter the literature until the questions posed by game-theoretic analysis directed attention to them....

He goes on in this vein:

Game theory has only limited applicability to most problems of international politics, but we are hardly likely to learn from the traditionalists what these limits are and why they exist.⁴³

In Bull's criticism of the scientific approach, Kaplan claims to discern a case of ensnarement in the "trap of traditionalism"⁴⁴: indulgence in both over-particularization and unrelated generali-

⁴¹Bull, op. cit., 376.

⁴²Kaplan, op. cit., 13

⁴³Ibid., 14.

⁴⁴Ibid., 15.

zation. Certainly, Kaplan admits, the complexity of the subject-matter constitutes a limitation upon the applicability of theoretical formulae. But it is not enough for the traditionalist like Bull simply to state the existence of this obstacle. Since it is the case that "different subject-matters and different degrees of complexity require different tools of analysis and different procedures"⁴⁵ anyone interesting himself in the task of theorising must attempt to discern to what extent a particular theoretical contribution is impeded by the complexity of the relevant particular aspect or portion of the subject-matter. Instead of in this manner determining the limitations upon particular generalisations of the subject's complexity the practitioners of the classical approach, contends Kaplan, have produced "a great mass of detail to which absurdly broad and often unfalsifiable generalisations are applied".⁴⁶ Such vague and arbitrary traditionalist theories as those of the 'balance of power' enjoy currency notwithstanding "the vaunted sensitivity to history" claimed by Bull, and this is precisely because of "the lack of articulated theoretical structure in the traditionalist approach".⁴⁷ Their hypotheses being testable empirically it is those of the scientific persuasion who are really "using history as a laboratory for their researches".⁴⁸

Another argument against the scientific treatment of social and political affairs that is often asserted by traditionalists as associated with the problem of complexity, but as having distinct and considerable importance of itself, is the problem of the contingent element in human affairs. Kaplan considers this very briefly, adducing one example from physical science - the

⁴⁵⁻⁴⁸ Ibid., 15.

phenomenon of superconductivity - to show that scientific theories can be developed to comprehend the occurrence of surprises within their subject-matters. He admits that this is not to say that physical science can accommodate theoretically all "novel phenomena", and that the prospects for a general theory of international relations performing a comparable function are far less good. Using his own previous formulation, the objections of Bull and other traditionalists to a scientific explanation of a subject-matter incorporating so large an element of the contingent or accidental cannot be so readily dismissed; for they are asserting that the specific application of certain specific scientific methods to the specific field of international relations is liable to be vitiated by the scale of contingent occurrences. Kaplan himself may only assert in response that the refinement of scientific theories will allow the contingent factor to become manageable. Both contentions enjoy at this stage the status merely of expressions of faith - though the onus of proof for the more ambitious formulation inevitably falls upon its advocates.

A more satisfactory response is given to Bull's charge that scientific theorists mistake for concrete reality the models they have deduced abstractly from it. The model is admittedly open to such misuse but the empirical generalisations with which the traditionalists prefer to state the interconnections of variables are not commonly made explicit - and hence falsifiable - as are the contentions incorporated in abstract models. Hence,

it is rather the traditionalist, whose assumptions

are implicit rather than explicit and whose statements are made usually without reference to context, who is more likely to mistake his model for reality.⁴⁹

He goes on, referring specifically to English political science:

The traditional techniques with their inarticulated suppositions, their lack of specification of boundaries, and their almost necessary shifting of premises create a much greater danger that their implicit assumptions will automatically be applied to reality and a much greater sense of complecency than do scientific methods.⁵⁰

Moreover, the traditional theorists are not saved from such error by the discipline and support of philosophy, whose perspectives Bull claimed as the exclusive attribute of the classical school. Kaplan doubts that the practice of this school can justify the monopoly of philosophic insight which Bull claims for its methodology. The traditionalists, viewing philosophy as "elegant but undisciplined speculation - speculation devoid of serious substantive or methodological concerns"⁵¹ have in Kaplan's opinion totally misconstrued the nature of the subject and the applicability to it of scientific theorising.

These two articles have been examined in detail not solely for the illumination which they throw upon the theoretical substance of the subject, but also because the conception of both writers that there is a basic dichotomy between the classical and the scientific approaches - one of the few matters upon which both are in agreement - is a very commonly entertained view. This stress upon a 'great divide' within the subject is, however, dangerous and may be misleading. Apart, of course, from the practical disadvantages of disunity in the field of study it is possible that a polemical debate couched in terms of the Bull-Kaplan ex-

⁴⁹Ibid., 17. ⁵⁰Ibid., 18. ⁵¹Ibid., 20.

change would totally obscure the real scientific-theoretical nature of International Relations and have an extremely deleterious effect on the subject's progress. The polemical objectives of both writers in the World Politics articles have resulted in a strengthening of the already quite widespread impression that the discipline houses two warring factions, following intellectually incompatible methodological paths. It may be, however, that the real as distinct from the apparent significant lines of difference within the field cut across the classical/scientific division. Within both the (predominantly inductive) classical school and the (predominantly deductive) scientific school of the Bull-Kaplan dispute there are analytical theorists whose standards of logical coherence, precision, and rigour give them more in common with kindred spirits nominally within another school than with those of their own who eschew theorising altogether or whose theoretical work is not informed by sufficiently high standards. The possibility that such common ground - perhaps substantial - may exist between the best theorising of both wings of the study is an important consideration to which it will be necessary to return below. Before doing so, it will be helpful to attempt a more dispassionate analysis of the theoretical substance of International Relations, and at the minimum to settle upon the meanings of the terms in which to treat the issues. This task is the more necessary since Bull and Kaplan are themselves 'ideal-types' of ideological hostility on this question, and neither would be wholeheartedly supported in his judgements by all of the allegedly coherent schools which they seek to line up behind their respective standards. We must be careful to avoid polarising the discipline

into reactionary obscurantists shielding themselves and their indolence behind an ostensibly classical methodology of the conventional wisdom,⁵² and presumptuous advocates of a new wave whose brashness and naivety takes the form of the delusion of 'scientism'. The necessity of keeping such images in check demands from us an effort to understand what we are talking about, to rescue from the murky, polemical limbo in which they are falling the notions of science and theory.

THEORY AND SCIENCE

'Theory' is an expression widely and loosely understood to denote the realm of ideas as distinct from that of their application. Any form of activity - diplomacy, for instance - is commonly conceived of as carried on according to the different frames of reference of 'theory' and 'practice'. For certain types of activity, under some circumstances, there may be felt to exist something of an antagonism between these two perspectives. Many aspects of life furnish us with such experience of the conflict between theoreticians and practical men, and the notion of a dichotomy between theoretical and practical aspects of reality is part of the common stock of human thought.

Academic enquiry and instruction are pursuits which are widely characterised as overly, even exclusively, theoretical. It is much lamented in Britain at the present time that the universities are, allegedly, 'ivory towers' of detached, scholarly contemplation. It is complained that the research priorities adopted bear no relation to the productive needs of the community at large;

⁵²It is arguable now that the conventional wisdom has taken the form of the scientific approach already in the United States and that the process has gone a long way in Britain, too.

even those disciplines, such as engineering, whose relevance to practical concerns is considerable are held to have been unduly interested in research projects whose applications may be obscure and unimportant. That we should use the term 'academic' to connote disregard for practical reality is indicative of a general belief that intellectual theorising is an activity irrelevant to the everyday round of production, distribution, and exchange. Compare, for instance, the old saw, 'those who can, do; those who can't, teach'. The prevalence of this tendency to regard the academic as a parasite whose worth to society should be demonstrated in terms of 'productive output' valued beyond his cloistered existence is such as to alarm some, like Michael Oakeshott,⁵³ whose attachment to the pure conception of the classical academic tradition is unrelenting.

The gross generality of this notion that there is a dichotomy between theory and practice is obvious, and the academic community would not accept it as correct. Nor, were the question more carefully considered, would people generally hold that it is reasonable rigidly to compartmentalise the theoretical and the practical modes of experience. In fact, the two are inextricably interwoven in any balanced corpus of knowledge in whatever field of endeavour. The interdependence of theory and practice extends to quite simple tasks - the making of a table, or even the felling of a tree to provide the materials to that end - although the considerable manageability of activities in this category may conduce to their appearing to be entirely within the realm of the practical and owing nothing to a theoretical element. It is because

⁵³ See "The Study of 'Politics' in a University", 301-33 in his Rationalism in Politics and other essays (London, 1962).

of such confusion that theory is still widely, albeit often unconsciously, equated with sterile intellectualism. This is not the appropriate place for further examination of the complex and deeply entrenched false identity, but it remains here to suggest that the confusion may have some relevance to our purpose in that it perhaps rests on a mistaken equation of theory with purely abstract reasoning. Although these are widely and loosely used interchangeably, their equation is misleading. This will be made clear if we attempt to understand more clearly what is meant by theory in an academic context.

Within the academic community theory is understood to have a precise and explicit meaning which it lacks in the world as a whole. In the layman's terms, the whole of an intellectual discipline is theoretical in the sense that it is concerned directly with the world of ideas and only indirectly with the world of things, but only a restricted area of the academic's field of study is in his terms properly theory. Any field or subject-matter which is subjected to academic treatment tends to produce a body of knowledge. It is principally to that body of knowledge, cumulatively developed, that we refer when we talk about Economics or Social Psychology as subjects or disciplines. The accumulated knowledge is of various types, as is evident from an examination of the literature extant in any subject. The largest category, except in the case of disciplines in the earliest stages of development, will be that of information - more technically data - concerning the subject-matter. Within most fields there will be an enormous variety of such data; to take the example of History,

documentary records of Cabinet meetings, memoirs of participants in such meetings, and the analyses by historians of such meetings, all constitute different types of historical information about what in fact happened, of differing philosophical status but in sum all statements that are relevant data for the historian. The diversity of such empirical data is very much greater between various, even kindred, subjects than within individual ones. The results of experiments to find what colour litmus paper turns when dipped in chemical solutions of differing compositions, as well as records of the diplomatic intercourse characteristic of international crises in the nuclear age, are portions of the enormously variegated knowledge that we have gathered of the real world in its many aspects by the processes of empirical enquiry - i.e. by the various forms of observation and experiment.

Empirical data, though the largest, is not the only category of knowledge and it cannot of itself impart understanding - as distinct from knowing. This limitation of empirical data impells the development of a, generally smaller but more important, further category of knowledge: that of explanatory ideas. These ideas discharge the essential role of organising what we know in order that we may understand what we know. Only on the basis of such ideas can we explain observed facts about the properties, behaviour, or relationships of things. To comprehend the 'why' of the different colours assumed by litmus paper requires an idea or ideas that seem plausibly to account for the 'what' data obtained from dipping it into various solutions. Without such ideas, to which we commonly give the names 'theory' or 'concept', we are unable to

organise or explain the information at our disposal, which thus lacks meaning or significant value - it remains a jumble of disparate, unmanageable, inconceivably variegated and inconsistent information. Without theory, to adapt a notion from cybernetics and communications science, our network of knowledge would be totally characterised by 'noise'.

The crucial importance of explanatory ideas or theories is perhaps properly considered as having two facets: organisation of knowledge, and explanation of what we know. A field of study which cannot undertake very ambitiously to explain why - and International Relations, by comparison with the most developed fields of study falls into this category - can at least devote some effort to organising its information so that it knows what it does know in the empirical sense. Only by such processes as the categorisation of data can a body of information be ordered so that its true significance is apparent. The coherence of a body of knowledge is likely to reflect the success of its students in developing a set of valid organising principles; this level of theorising is quite widely described as the activity of elaborating 'conceptual frameworks', or to use James Rosenau's recently suggested term, the activity of developing 'pre-theories'.⁵⁴ Of course, the distinction between this process of working out what it is we know and the other kind of theorising, attempting to establish answers to the why questions that arise out of that what, is not always clear and explicit, indeed, it is not always properly appreciated by those who are engaged in the general activity of theorising. It is worth, therefore, examining the relationship

⁵⁴ See his "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in R.B. Farrell, (ed.) op.cit., 27-92.

which ought properly to obtain between the two kinds of theory, organisational and explanatory.

So far in this discussion, the fairly clear distinction between organisational and explanatory theorising has been apt to give the impression that they constitute stages of theoretical analysis, the former being a necessary though not always sufficient precursor of the latter. In practice, this order of reasoning, though it may seem most logical and natural, is not always followed. The development of disciplines that have come to rank as highly theoretically structured does not bear out any such tidy conception of the process of theory-building. Explanatory theories - it will be understood that theory is in this connection not assumed to have connotations of correctness or otherwise, but only to denote what seems in a particular time and place to explain adequately the relevant observed facts, as did Ptolemy's view of the universe for a considerable length of history - of some generality can quite often be found to exist in fields which have a quite inadequate body of pre-theory. International Relations still has a considerable body of such explanatory ideas in the form of descriptions and analyses of 'power politics' drawing their inspiration from philosophical-psychological conceptions of 'human nature' which do not seem to meet the demands of the information at our disposal, such as it is, concerning both man's nature and the behaviour of his communities in their relations one with another. The important point to note concerning such theories, is not their inadequacy or falsity, which has been forcefully demonstrated,⁵⁵ but their elaboration without very careful atten-

⁵⁵On the 'animus dominandi' school of Morgenthau and other 'power politics' theorists, see C.B. Joynt and S.S. Hayden, "Morals and Politics: the Current Debate", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXI, 3. (August, 1955), 354-362.

tion to the facts as known. This is not to say, of course, that theorising can take place at the explanatory level without any reference to data. The two poles of logical reasoning - deduction and induction - are at one in their dependence upon a modicum of data as a condition of theory-building. Though deductive reasoning certainly appears to differ from reasoning of the inductive variety to a considerable degree in respect of its dependence on the accumulation of information, it would be an absurdity to regard a priori reasoning as possible without a factual framework. Equally, the inductive method of reasoning a posteriori does not completely eschew theorising until the process of data-collection and -organising is completed. In practice, pure induction is rarely to be found and thinking that proceeds from the particular to the general, as with that which proceeds to the general from the particular, is an ideal type or pole of reasoning and does not take into account the blurring in practice of general causation and explanation, on the one hand, and particular cases and empirically established fact, on the other. It is within the mind of the theorist that the activities or processes of explanation and information-management are inextricably interwoven - or one might say, muddled. The preconceived impressions generated by the initial, minimal data gathering exercise without which theorising cannot, as we have said, take place will have a substantial influence upon the explanatory hypotheses which form when the data is analysed. Likewise, in a deductive rather than inductive exercise of reasoning, the influence of theory upon the selection and treatment of data will be considerable.

The analysis so far has established the meaning of theory, and before moving on to a discussion of the connected notion of science it will be useful to define briefly what we are to understand by theory: a principle or body of principles suggested to organise and explain observed facts or phenomena, varying in form and in status from simple concepts of highly specific application to elaborate doctrines or systems of ideas purporting to impart insight of considerable generality. The individual hypothesis, which is the technical term applied to a formulation asserting a particular theoretical explanation, may in ultimate terms be either true or false; its degree of validity as an explanation of observed phenomena at a given time may or may not be amenable to investigation upon the basis of which we can rest confident judgement. Halley's Comet may not, for instance, be expected to appear in our lifetime according to certain hypotheses concerning its passage through the heavens, and this will severely limit our ability to test the validity of these hypotheses; historical enquiry provides a retrospective laboratory, but one of very questionable accuracy whose records may be felt inadmissible as the basis for purportedly scientific extrapolation and utilisation. The furore provoked by the publication of Immanuel Velikovsky's Worlds in Collision⁵⁶ is instructive concerning this particular realm of enquiry, and has some general implications for the activity of theory-building.

The question of theory-falsification and -verification leads us naturally into a discussion of what is meant by science, it being a scientific process that is implied in elaborating and in

⁵⁶(London, 1950)

testing theoretical propositions couched in 'if-then' form. The operational meaning of science and scientific must be established, but it is necessary to note also the common or lay interpretations of the terms. In English it is common usage to restrict the term science as descriptive of the study of physical and natural phenomena exclusively. This identification seems to have arisen because Physics, Chemistry and the other studies concerned with portions of the natural and physical universe were the first disciplines to engage in systematic formulation of testable propositions and, hence, to accumulate significant bodies of confirmed, explanatory theory. The subjects that are referred to as 'the sciences' in lay usage, are thus the most developed and advanced bodies of knowledge from a theoretical point of view. For our purposes it will be helpful to give these sciences adjectival qualification and call them the 'exact' sciences, or loosely the 'hard' sciences. This usage is necessary since the term science is not properly restricted to the most advanced studies but can be more widely taken to encompass all studies which deal systematically with their subject-matters. The nomenclature of many fields reflects a movement away from enquiry informed by the assumptions and methods of 'the humanities' towards more scientific procedure. International Relations is generally deemed to be one of the so-called 'social sciences', though it is not thereby asserted that its theoretical-scientific content and procedure is even as science-like as its sister social sciences which have become known as the 'behavioural sciences': Psychology, Sociology, and Anthropology. Other than these three studies, the social sciences in general might be appropriately described as the 'inexact' sci-

ences. This point will be expanded upon below, but it is necessary first to establish the general nature of scientific procedure, whence it will become clear how scientific are these inexact sciences.

We may start from the acknowledged fact that the exact sciences are the most scientific of all studies. The strict definition of science and scientific procedure does not, however, differ other than in degree from the definitions thereof which would be applicable to other disciplines broadly regarded as scientific. There is, that is to say, one set of scientific criteria, though it is to be expected that the canons of scientific method will be variously applied in different fields. What characterises a scientific study is broad conformity to scientific procedure and a commitment to move progressively in the direction of enlarging the scope and intensifying the application of the suitable scientific techniques. In more concrete terms, to be scientific is to engage in the elaboration and improvement of theory. But it should not be felt that there is any equation in the meanings of science and theory, though the terms are alike in describing the general area of thought that might be called 'organised explanatory ideas'. The principal criteria to which an exact science conforms (and thus the paradigm of science in general) include systematic, rigorous analysis; the formulation of hypotheses in terms which allow of confirmation, whether by deduction from self-evident axioms or by empirical enquiry, through observation or experimentation. To these ends, as a particularly important instance of the general requirement of explicit, consistent procedure, stress is normally laid upon a

high degree of quantifiability of the data concerned. The degree to which this requirement is met obviously conditions the extent of experimental replicability and of deductive calculation and quantification is thus a general rule of thumb guide to whether or not the subject concerned is an exact science. The bundle of scientific criteria suggested here is properly understood as characterising the pure or ideal-type science. In practice, some studies which are widely accepted as among the exact sciences may completely lack one of these prime scientific attributes. For example, Astronomy is a branch of science in which experimentation of any sort, let alone under controlled, laboratory conditions, is impossible of attainment. Again, the subject-matter of the various biological sciences is not readily amenable to quantification. Bearing in mind these limiting conditions, we may attempt a definition couched in relative rather than absolute terms: science is the name we give to a field of study whose knowledge is systematically organised and formulated upon precise and explicit lines, and whose procedure is governed by rigorous application of logical reasoning leaning as far as the subject-matter will allow upon quantitative, experimental and deductive methods. The superior type of science - that which conforms to a fairly high degree to this model of scientific method - is not closed off by any absolute barrier from studies which aspire to follow the path blazed by the exact sciences and which employ techniques of logical reasoning, make proper use of the rules of evidence, etc. The test-tube and the controlled experiment are particular tools of the scientists' trade but they are not universally applicable to those fields of endeavour which are felt to belong among the sciences.

Having proposed operative definitions for both theory and science it is appropriate to relate them. Science properly understood encompasses theory, in that the organising and explanatory principles of knowledge which we understand as theory are an important component of scientific reasoning and knowledge. Briefly, a science must be theoretical, but theory does not have to be scientific. Theory organises and explains but it does not have to do so scientifically - though there is probably wide agreement that it would be a good thing were all theory to be, in a relative sense, scientific theory. The distinction between these two types of knowledge and understanding, science and theory, is not idly made; it has considerable relevance to the social sciences generally and to International Relations in particular. For the burning issue of substance which the subject faces is: how far is, and ought to be, its subject-matter amenable to scientific-theoretical rather than simply theoretical treatment?

THEORY AND SCIENCE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

It has been noted above that the cluster of studies that concentrate upon aspects of the social world are now commonly known as sciences, social sciences. However, we must approach this usage with care. Just as the nomenclature itself gives no conclusive reason for confining the term science to the exact sciences, the readiness of economists, sociologists, political scientists, and even historians, to style themselves social scientists is not alone sufficient proof for the contention that is thereby implied: that Economics, Sociology, etc., are scientific to a more than nominal degree. In the social studies field the term science is

currently sanctioned by fashion: the paradigm of disciplinary development and theoretical progress is the model provided by the exact sciences. These inexact sciences of the social world have become increasingly concerned to rectify their scientific shortcomings, in order to proceed to a status higher than their present one of apprentice theoretical sciences. A methodological ferment has marked this orientation, and much theory - organisational, and explanatory to the extent the latter had been developed - has been subjected to scientific analysis. The respectable goal has become the scientific hope of erecting general explanatory theory and to this end considerable effort has been devoted to refining existing theory and constructing new. - In this connection it is appropriate to consider how far the subject-matter of these social studies is accessible to scientific procedure and treatment.

The most obvious shortcoming of the social sciences in terms of our definition of the ideal-type science is the virtually complete impossibility of conducting experimentation, controlled or otherwise. The practical and political obstacles to such manipulation by men of the social framework in which their fellow men live are massive and forbidding, perhaps most completely in International Relations. There is, too, the problem of the human observer as both subject and object in any such exercise, with the possibility of distortion of events. This point, upon which Bull, Carr and others lay such stress, is of much significance, though in some social milieus it is conceivable that the social scientist could insulate himself to a very high degree from the

subject-matter upon which he is attempting to work. The generally low degree of malleability of much social science material remains, however, in some fields more than in others, of course. A further limiting factor is the restricted possibility of quantifying data. Certain fields have achieved considerable success in this direction, but in the study of the relationships among humans and human groups most of the significant kinds of intercourse are transactions difficult to measure in the way that flows of the commodity money provide the economist with the possibility of quantifying and measuring. Nevertheless, in many areas the prospects of rendering social data into quantifiably workable terms has greatly improved and this obstacle is likely to diminish somewhat in the future. Partly as a result of the two foregoing difficulties, there is a very restricted scope in the social sciences for purely deductive reasoning. The enormous complexity and multiplicity of the relevant variables is daunting in this regard. Such abstract, deductive analyses as have been attempted in the most forbidding fields have tended not to be isomorphic to reality for this reason. A final attribute of scientific analysis may be mentioned: the objective of achieving prediction. The large element of the contingent, accidental, and irrational in human affairs has tended to vitiate hopes of attaining extensive or detailed predictive success. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that complete predictive capacity is not possessed by all exact sciences. Prediction is not, perhaps to be demanded from the social sciences because at their apprentice stage they do not enjoy very much the advantages of quantification, experimentatation, and deduction of which prediction is a product, a culmination.

Plainly the social sciences, in so far as it is reasonable to treat them as a whole, do not very substantially conform to the principal criteria of science. But this observation on a matter of fact should be coupled with the recognition that there is a very marked aspiration in the field generally to approach more nearly to the scientific ideal. This is manifest in the procedure and stated intentions of many theorists in International Relations. The scientific-theoretical aspirations of these students are symbolised by their adoption of the term 'behaviouralism' or 'behavioural science' to describe their techniques and to differentiate them from even the general movement in the field towards making theorising more precise and explicit. The adoption of such terminology reflects the great dependence of scientific theorising in the subject upon those social sciences whose nature is more explicitly scientific. We have returned, then, to that difference within the field which the Bull and Kaplan articles exemplify. It is not possible to move significantly further to resolve the question of how real this dispute is until some areas of the subject are examined in detail to establish concretely their proper scientific-theoretic status. Before returning to the subject of International Relations, however, it may prove instructive to enquire into the status in this respect of the social science which is, according to many observers, most advanced as a scientific-theoretical enterprise: Economics. The status to which this subject has attained, and the procedure and experience by which it did so, are alike inspirational for other social scientists.

THE THEORETICAL STATUS OF ECONOMICS: AN ANALOGY

Reasoning by analogy is a technique strongly entrenched in human thought. Our proneness to draw analogies has developed because of the useful and suggestive insights which they impart, and which we would be unlikely to gain were we rigidly to compartmentalise our study of different fields and eschew the seeking of 'comparative illumination'. Our attachment to this practice is, however, widely condemned as it is held to be dangerously misleading. Inferences drawn from one field and applied to another certainly appear illuminating but logicians warn that by no means the most significant - and perhaps totally insignificant - features of one field of study will be highlighted by an analysis informed by the nature of another field. Resort to analogizing implicitly asserts the parallel, comparable nature of fields between which examples and insights are being transferred, but it is inevitable that to some degree this comparability will be imperfect. Hence, observations which are grounded upon implicitly assumed parallels between different sectors of knowledge and activity will tend to distort our understanding. The extent of this distortion may, of course, be insignificant but its presence is a disadvantage to be borne prominently in mind in any exercise, such as that which follows, whose rationale is the supposed illumination attainable by drawing analogies. The true scope of comparability is difficult to determine precisely. In this case it is not asserted that any very great degree of comparability exists between Economics and International Relations. Nevertheless, the analogy developed below constitutes a tool which, it is hoped, will give some useful perspective in the assessment of International Relations theory.

Inasmuch as Economics and International Relations are both social sciences some simple parallels can readily be drawn. The recent methodological self-consciousness of International Relations has made its students increasingly receptive to treatment of their theoretical problems in terms of perspectives drawn from related studies. Economics, given its reputation as a theoretically advanced study, has been particularly influential upon students in our more primitive field. The development of Economics over the past century, and especially since 1890, has forged a pattern for the advance of the social sciences in respect of both disciplinary distinctiveness and theoretical development. The scope and precocity of the theoretical advance of Economics has established it as the senior branch of the social sciences. Since the course and character of that development has had significant influence on the progress of other fields, it is relevant here to study the theoretical structure of Economics; it is worthwhile to enquire into Economics as the theoretical model for International Relations, that role often being widely imputed to it.

The articulation of explicit theoretical principles is what marks the establishment of a field of knowledge - which may have been long known in large measure by practical men, in the sense that, as Letwin says, builders have always known and applied the basic principles of physics¹ - as a distinct subject of study or intellectual discipline. This process of disciplinary emergence tends to be accompanied in a particular field of knowledge by a divergence of its applications as a 'practical art' from its

⁵⁷W. Letwin, The Origins of Scientific Economics: English Economic Thought, 1660-1776 (London, 1963), vii-viii.

scientific analysis in 'pure' terms. The subject of study Economics is now almost completely divorced from the practical callings of financier and businessman, and even to a considerable extent from the study of such callings. Few men can now operate successfully within both the academic and the practical sides of economics; those who can thereby prove themselves, like Keynes, the masters of two milieus, of two roles, so distinct as to be incompatible for normal mortals. This dichotomy did not characterise the economic world of Ricardo and Adam Smith, in whose work we trace the beginnings of the pure science of economics, as opposed to the genre which has come down to us in the shape of works such as 'How to make a million dollars on the Stock Market'.

When the centenary of The Wealth of Nations fell in 1876 the gathering of academic economists and men of affairs held to celebrate the event was not significantly divided on the basis of 'pure' and 'applied' concerns with economics, all present being fluent in the one language of 'political economy'.⁵⁸ Although Letwin regards Economics as having emerged as a pure science, though a primitive one, over the century before the publication of Smith's major work,⁵⁹ it does not seem that economic theory was not significantly autonomous even a century after 1776. The study of Political Economy did have a place in the universities, but not only was its nascent economic-theoretical element entrammelled with the study of practical commerce: its political-ethical admixture reinforced the overwhelmingly normative character of

⁵⁸ T.W. Hutchison, A Review of Economic Doctrines, 1870-1929 (Oxford, 1953), 2.

⁵⁹ Letwin, op. cit., ix.

the study and limited such scope as did exist for positive analysis. This situation was not greatly altered until the close of the century brought an "immense development of the subject as an academic specialism".⁶⁰ This was marked by the founding of the London School of Economics in 1895, the establishment of the Royal Economic Society and the publication of its journal (1890-91), and the introduction of the Cambridge Economics Tripos in 1903. That the theoretical content of Economics had not greatly expanded in the late nineteenth century is perhaps attested to by the continued favour of academics for the comprehensive treatise as their main intellectual vehicle.⁶¹ Not until shortly before the First World War did the subject begin "to break up and undergo its development in specialised branches"⁶² and hence to outgrow the average academic's capacity for synthesis.

A major comprehensive treatise which stands as a landmark of synthesis for the economic theory of its time is Alfred Marshall's Principles of Economics, which first appeared in 1890. The significance of that work, upon which Marshall's stature rests, is considerable both for its synthesis of existing theory and for its own theoretical innovation, and it may be taken as a useful benchmark in our analysis of the development of pure economics. In that work Marshall presents a substantially complete statement of economics as a study whose focus upon theory was upon those areas of knowledge so restricted as to justify the description micro-theory,

⁶⁰Hutchison, op. cit., 31. ⁶¹Ibid., v. ⁶²Loc. cit.

and whose principles were principally confined to the explanation of static models. The character of his scheme of analysis largely reflected the stage which the theory of the subject had then reached. Utilising the techniques both of economic history and of economic analysis, the latter including both literary and mathematical approaches, Marshall substantially completed the development of the theory of the firm, with which economic theory in its most advanced respects was then roughly coextensive. His analytical focus was principally upon "the stationary state"⁶³ of such micro-economic models, significant variables being held constant over considerable periods of time. In his treatment of the time factor and the valuable, though not particularly new, distinction between the short- and long-term, Marshall was laying the groundwork for later developments in dynamic models of analysis. But despite a certain amount of elementary general, dynamic analysis and the inclusion, in Book V, of "many particular pieces of dynamic analysis"⁶⁴ the theoretical contribution of Marshall's Principles was predominantly of a micro-economic, static character. His codification and development of the notion of equilibrium as an analytical tool, from which much of his reputation as a theorist derives, did not go so far as its utilisation in general dynamic analysis. For its time, however, the Principles constituted an important advance, and the book remained the leading text into the 1920's. Marshall himself was unsure of the validity of his pure theoretical analysis and inclined to be modest about his contribution to Economics; in one paper he went so far as to state that "the nineteenth century has in great measure achieved qualitative analysis in economics....The achievement of quantitative

⁶³Ibid., 79.

⁶⁴Ibid., 80.

analysis stands over for the twentieth century".⁶⁵ He had, in fact, gone beyond merely qualitative, literary analysis but the scope and applicability of his quantitative, mathematical work in theory did not extend to dynamic, macro-economic analysis.

During the considerable growth of Economics as a positive study as the twentieth century proceeded its subject-matter was increasingly subjected to theoretical analysis of greater sophistication. The focus of analysis shifted to the economic system as a whole, reflecting the overall movement in the locus of economic decision-making towards the community at large and away from the firm, its typical sub-system. This broader perspective upon economic life conduced to the growth of "aggregative thinking"⁶⁶: consideration of the overall economy as an equilibrating system rather than of closed, isolated units thereof. Theoretical models of the interaction of such micro-units in larger macro-systems demanded handling of equilibrium in far more dynamic terms to comprehend the fluctuations in key variables such as income, employment, interest and so forth. Treatment of just these factors was central to the model of the elements of a dynamic, macro-economic presented by J.M. Keynes in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, published in 1936. We are accustomed, with respect to public policy, to speak of the subsequent 'Keynesian revolution' in the handling of economic systems, and especially in the technique of maintaining a high level of use of productive resources by the operation of fiscal and monetary policy. In terms of economic theory Keynes has been equally influential, and the study of the economy since the General Theory has hinged upon the macro- rather

⁶⁵Quoted, ibid., 73.

⁶⁶K.K. Kurihara, Introduction to Keynesian Dynamics (New York, 1956), 13.

than micro-economic level of analysis. As the supreme innovator of macro-economics Keynes has been highly influential but his substitution of dynamic analysis for the statics which held sway before has been less complete. His "theory of shifting equilibrium"⁶⁷ does not, in the view of his interpreter Kurihara, adequately "show the process of transitions from one position of equilibrium to another" and may thus be appropriately described as "comparative statics" rather than as true dynamic analysis.⁶⁸ It has been left to later economists to articulate Keynes's general macro-economic model with a dynamic theory, but the macro-economics which has consequently resulted owes very much to the General Theory's inspiration. The subject of Economics has thus come, through the work of many analysts but especially that of Marshall and Keynes, to possess a theoretical structure substantially isomorphic - in the generality of its scope as well as in its capacity to comprehend general and particular dynamic features - to real economic life.

Economics should not be understood to have inherited a complete, totally explanatory theory - for it is incapable, for instance, of a significantly reliable level of predictive accuracy, and as the subject as a practical art demonstrates economic man tends, like the generals, to be able to understand and solve major economic problems only when they have ceased to plague him and others, for which he is quite unprepared and totally unequipped to handle, have come to replace them. But Economics has undoubtedly approached nearer than have other social sciences to the scientific-theoretical stature enjoyed by the exact sciences. The term stature is used advisedly, for the less developed social sciences are

⁶⁷ Keynes, General Theory (London, 1936), 293. ⁶⁸ Kurihara, op.cit., 21.

perhaps inclined to exaggerate their relative primitiveness by overestimating the completeness and extensiveness of the 'general' theory at the disposal of even, say, Physics. There is perhaps some justification, though it is difficult to be sure, in the acid claim of one economist (in a paper presented to theorists of international relations in his capacity as "official analogizer from a sister science") that the status of general theorists "is accorded to them less because their work is complete, or potentially useful, than because, in the sociology of knowledge, abstraction ranks ahead of concreteness".⁶⁹ In any case it is a fact that social scientists have increasingly tended to look upon theorising as a valuable thing, to see its objective as the construction of theories of ultimately general validity, and to look upon Economics as an inspiration in these respects.

It should be borne in mind, however, that economists are not all - especially in Britain - hospitable to scientific-theoretical treatment of their subject-matter. The division between the mathematical economists and econometricians, on the one hand, and the traditional proponents of economic analysis in a 'literary' mould, on the other, is a polarisation which revolves around the question of whether or not the subject is susceptible to scientific handling.⁷⁰ Hence, while it may be valuable to draw from the developing structure of economic theory a path of expansion and progress which may be considered influential and important because of the respect given by other social scientists to the economist-as-theoretician, it is equally pertinent to note that within Economics

⁶⁹C.P. Kindleberger, "International Political Theory from outside", in W.T.R. Fox (ed.), Theoretical Aspects of International Relations (Notre Dame, 1959), 71, 70.

⁷⁰J.R. Sargent, in Plumb (ed.), op. cit.

itself there is a debate analogous to that within International Relations between the traditionalists and the scientists.

In one respect, Economics may provide a useful concrete indication of the way in which we may proceed: the rough but nonetheless significant distinction between the micro- and macro-theoretical levels. This would seem to be applicable, in a rough but useful way, to theoretical analysis in International Relations. For the firm of Economics, International Relations is a field having an analogical unit, the state; likewise, for the general theory of macro-economics, there is an International Relations equivalent in the full-scale interaction theories such as those leaning upon systems analysis. Since both foreign policy analysis and the general analysis of international systems are among the areas of theory most developed, and most advanced in respect of scientific treatment, they provide appropriate foci for closer attention to the substance of theory, particularly scientific theory, in International Relations. The ensuing analysis will accordingly deal respectively with micro- and macro-theoretic levels.

Chapter 4: Micro-Theory: Foreign Policy Decision-Making

INTRODUCTION

One of the most striking features of theoretical contributions to International Relations is their great variety. Systems analysis, game theory, and foreign policy decision-making analysis may be severally comprehensible but they are difficult to integrate into a coherent theoretical perspective upon the subject-matter. International theory is, in fact, a thing of theories, variously purporting to be broad general, or narrow particular, explanatory schemes, useful frames of reference, analytical tools or, at least, perspectives imparting heuristic insight. This disarray may have been worsened by the insistence of some theoretical innovators on the paramountcy of 'advanced theory', and upon establishing a priority in the allocation of research resources of work at the frontiers of scientific-theoretical knowledge over the less dramatic work of refining and applying empirically theory which has been longer in the subject's stock of knowledge.¹ Though this priority has not always been widely and explicitly asserted, International Relations certainly has suffered from a want of applying this, that, or the other analytical scheme to the foreign policy of Ruritania and of many other states. Such unexciting work does not promise accretions to knowledge - indeed, the reverse, since such refinement and empirical application may be expected, in classical theory-confirmation terms, to result in the abandonment of certain theories. But such work would impart a securer foundation to existing theory; we would know more surely what we know.

¹This priority has been advocated in a seminar discussion with the author by George Modelski, London School of Economics, 11.1.67.

In view of the classical-scientific dispute it is particularly important that the scientific-theoretical theories are not left as discrete, mutually unintelligible islands. It may not be far-fetched in the connection of this dispute to adopt two military maxims: if scientific-theory is scattered in penny packets the obscurantist attacks may succeed in picking off dangerously exposed salients; the scientific theorists would perhaps do well, too, to bear in mind the values of defence - or attack - in depth. This initial reference to the discrete nature of theorising in the subject has, it is asserted, some obvious implications for the activity of theorising along any particular lines.

It should be emphasised at the outset that this analysis of decision-making theory relates only to its specific applications in International Relations, although perhaps the greatest progress in this kind of analysis has been made in Economics, Social Psychology, and such interdisciplinary fields as that of organisation theory. The International Relations applications have tended to be based upon the transfer of concepts and techniques from other fields, and this is a path whose validity will be conditioned by the real comparability of subject-matters. For this reason, not even all of the work in decision-making which has been applied to the field of politics in general may have value for students of the external behaviour of states. For, as we have noted above, a theory which may explain aspects of political activity carried on within a self-contained polity may not adequately explain activity which characterises the milieu made up of relations between such units.

Decision-making analysis has been confined in its applications to international relations to treatment of the 'foreign policy process', a fairly distinct sub-field of the overall study. It is not anticipating the conclusions that may properly be drawn at the close of an enquiry such as this to enter the view that it is dubious whether theories of this type may eventually extend beyond the decisional process within more or less formal, organisational units to encompass the complex processes of interaction between such organisations. It is possible to see in decision-making theory a first-order treatment of the 'how' of policy and a necessary underpinning of second-order theory of the 'why' of interaction.² This must be arguable, for in the light of existing literature of decision-making there appears a very great decline in specificity and clarity when the scope of the theory is broadened to achieve greater comprehensiveness. However this may be, it must be made clear that decision-making theory is now an approach to foreign policy analysis and it is not - though it may eventually become - a general theory of international relations. This simple point bears emphasis for, though decision-making theorists often seem to claim for their work present properties which are really future aspirations, we must avoid Hoffmann's mistake of indicting them for failing to explain international relations as a whole,³ and we must assess the value of decision-making analysis in its proper context of foreign policy.

To confine the scope of such theory in this way should not

²C. McClelland, Theory and the International System (New York, 1966), 109.

³S. H. Hoffmann (ed.), Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, 1960), 52-3.

be taken as a denial of its value. We are not entitled to expect full-fledged general theories to spring forth at once; more modest constructs are likely to precede the attainment of this ultimate goal of theorising. Theory-building, not unnaturally, is often discussed in terms of metaphors of building and architecture, and this serves to remind us that theories, like houses and bridges, are not thrown up in a matter of moments. Moreover, the approach to building may vary widely: in Japan the traditional mode of house construction is to raise the roof before erecting the walls. Theorists and commentators talk hopefully of 'islands' of theory emerging only later to be drawn together into a coherent whole.⁴ It is worth bearing in mind, also, that even erroneous or inadequate theory may have value - of a heuristic sort. For example, the analysis of Kaplan's System and Process (if we may leave aside the question of its theoretical value and accept, for argument's sake, the contentions of its classical critics) is couched in terminology that is austere and tortuous; this fault is, however, more than redeemed by his precise encapsulation of the distinction between domestic and international politics in his contrast of system dominant and sub-system dominant political systems.⁵ Such perspective and insight may be salvageable from the least useful theoretical construction. We must bear in mind that theory-building has traditionally been a process of erecting and subsequently modifying or even demolishing an edifice of ideas. The erection of structures to replace those which have been dispensed with draws both experience and materials from the rubble. No-one would pre-

⁴I. Claude, "The Place of Theory in the Conduct and Study of International Relations", Journal of Conflict Resolution, IV, 3 (1960); also H. McCloskey, "Concerning Strategies for a Science of International Politics", World Politics, XIII, 2 (Jan. 1956), 204-5.

⁵Op. cit., 16.

sent this as the most economical method of building theory but it is not entirely wasteful.

THE SNYDER MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING

The outstanding elaboration of decision-making theory in international relations terms - at once most celebrated and most meticulous - is that of Richard Snyder and his associates, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, which first appeared in 1954 as Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics and which appears to have been coming out under various guises ever since, most recently in 1962.⁶ The analytical focus of this collaboration is restricted to what the authors regard as the narrower of "only two ways of scientifically studying international politics", i.e. foreign policy analysis; the work is explicitly not intended to provide any overall "description and measurement of interaction" of international relations as a whole.⁷ Even within this restricted scope the authors are submitting but "a tentative formulation of an analytical scheme" and hoping that it may provide "the core of a frame of reference for the study of international politics"⁸ - one is almost tripped up by such qualifications.

There is initial consideration of the epistemology of International Relations to 'place' their approach against the overall range of contemporary theory. The nature of theorising in the pre-scientific phase of the subject is defined and categorised and the

⁶R.C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and B. Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York, 1962). All quotations are from this work.

⁷Ibid., 73.

⁸Ibid., 17.

assumptions underlying that activity are made explicit. The rigour of this lengthy preliminary section⁹ is maintained in the main body of the work, a meticulous, analytically self-conscious statement of the decision-making approach. To minimise the risk of distortion in the exposition of this closely argued work, which proceeds laboriously step by step, there follows below a fairly full precis.

International Relations is conceived of by Snyder and his associates as a process consisting most importantly of the actions, reactions, and interactions of nation-states. The adoption of the decision-making approach to cut into this process at the state level is predicated upon the conviction that international action is 'planful' and not merely random. An analytical focus upon decision is possible, and fruitful they assert, in that the international milieu is characterised by discernible patterns of interaction having recognisable repetitions, by enduring aims, by kinds of actions which become typical, and by a tendency for relationships to be regularised.¹⁰

The prime focus is upon governments as decision-making entities, formulating and executing foreign policy in the context of their internal and external environments, i.e., upon "the state as actor in a situation".¹¹ The sovereign state is expected to retain its position as "the significant unit of political action";¹² international organisations like the United Nations are not themselves actors but "a special mode of interaction in which the iden-

⁹Ibid., 18-55. ¹⁰Ibid., 62. ¹¹Ibid., 62. ¹²Ibid., 63.

tity and policy-making capacity of individual national states are preserved but subject to different conditioning factors".¹³ The state-as-actor is viewed as operating within a (sociologically derived) 'system of action', comprising actor, goals, means, and situation. For operational purposes state-as-actor is reified in the persons of those who act in its name and are, formally, its decision-makers. (This usage has now become common throughout all wings of the subject.) These decision-makers possess in relation to their actions a certain 'definition of the situation' and decisional analysis must comprehend the components of this: the way in which decision-makers perceive and relate to objects, conditions and other actors within the "relational context"; the existence, establishment or definition of goals; the assigning of significance to various courses of action, "according to some criteria of estimation"; and the application of "standards of acceptability" tending to narrow the ranges of 1. perceptions, 2. goals, and 3. alternatives.¹⁴ These perceptions, choices and expectations which constitute the definition of the situation are conditioned by a variety of factors - such as the demands of the decision-makers' domestic constituency, the weight of the geographical and other elements of the non-human environment - which go to make up what the authors call the "setting": the complex of factors which impinge upon the decision-makers from outside themselves and their immediate organisational milieu.¹⁵ Under 'setting' are subsumed all "potentially relevant factors and conditions which may affect the action of any state";¹⁶ this category hence includes both an external setting, being the physical and social worlds beyond the borders of

¹³Ibid., 64.

¹⁴Ibid., 66.

¹⁵Ibid., 66.

¹⁶Ibid., 67.

the decision-makers' home state, and an internal setting, being those worlds within its boundaries. It is important to note that, in decisional analysis, these two settings are not coextensive with the internal and external environments but consist only of those elements thereof which have operational significance ascribed to them by the decision-makers. It is useful to observe here that others insist on the relevance of the total 'objective' rather than the partial 'subjective' environments of decision. The Sprouts, and following them Frankel, usefully distinguish between the 'psychological' and 'operational' environments (both internal and external).¹⁷

The basic factors involved in the 'decisional situation' having been outlined, the authors introduce concepts aimed to give dynamic properties to their static model. Firstly, the concept of the "path of action" is presented to illuminate the process of the flow of decision, and to accommodate likely modification over time of the original "action hypothesis" which "expresses the particular combination of ends and means involved in a particular action and the expectations embodied in the action".¹⁸ The passage of time may alter all or any of the objective, the strategy, and the time perspective of action, and this concept purports to accommodate such change. Secondly, the passage of time demands a conceptualization of the string of "successive, overlapping definitions of the situation",¹⁹ the decision-maker's outlook being reoriented so as to adjust to the demands of each modification in the 'action hypothesis'.

¹⁷ J. Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy (London, 1963), 4-5; idem, "Towards a Decision-Making Model in Foreign Policy", Political Studies, VII, 1 (February 1959), 3.

¹⁸ Snyder, op. cit., 75-6.

¹⁹ Ibid., 77.

A tentative discussion of types of decisions and their characteristics is appended to the above statement of the basic actor-situation framework.²⁰ There is some further refinement of terms: objectives are defined as "an 'image' of a future 'state of affairs' " to attain which state behaviour is 'directionally' determined and modified.²¹ (Such a 'state of affairs' envisaged in a particular 'action-hypothesis' may, of course, be vague in the extreme and be difficult to operationalize: national security, for example, is one of the objectives of most states but is an objective under which are subsumed many conflicting and incompatible policies.) Policy is defined in two senses, being on the one hand synonymous with action in concrete instances and on the other hand denoting a set of rules or guides in whose terms we select and interpret actions and reactions. To 'have' a policy means both these things.

Within the overall framework we have considered so far, the authors next elaborate the decision-making mechanism itself. Since foreign policy decision-making has been defined as taking place in an organisational context, that context is set out in detail.²² For decision-making does not take place in a vacuum, and the explanatory value of, for instance, personality theory, will be slight unless it is applied in the awareness of organisational constraints upon individual freedom of action. The process of decision within foreign policy organisations is defined as intended to produce "the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects of one project intended to

²⁰Ibid., 81.

²¹Ibid., 82.

²²Ibid., 87ff.

bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-makers".²³ The locus of decision is "the decisional unit"²⁴ which may or may not coincide with a distinct unit of the formal organisational structure, but which is in fact likely to cut across the institutional pattern of government since membership in the decisional unit is defined by reference to the criterion of significant participation in decision with respect to a particular objectives. Filing-clerks and other minor Foreign Office functionaries are not considered to be meaningfully involved in the decisional process, whereas the senior officials of a number of other departments are likely to be intimately involved in view of the myriad domestic implications of modern external policy decisions. It is of course a commonplace of policy analysis that informal decisional units often constitute the 'real' locus of decision - for example, President Kennedy's Cuban missile crisis 'Excom'. A major feature of mid-twentieth century Political Science has been a movement away from formal, institutional analysis - of the legal hierarchies, etc. - towards more flexible, informal analysis - dealing with the 'behavioural' aspects of politics: interest groups, individual attitudes, and so forth. We are now fully accustomed to look beyond the ministerial, departmental facade of government in order to discover where decisions are 'really' taken. The concept of the decisional unit sharpens our perception of this question of the locus of authority, but it is worth acknowledging that we are perhaps too zealous today at searching around and among, and not sufficiently within, the organizational edifice of government. Students of international relations are perhaps occupationally prone to overstress such informal

²³ Ibid., 90.

²⁴ Ibid., 92.

processes.

However, the authors have in mind when referring to the decisional unit a specifically organizational grouping having "formal rules governing the allocation of power and responsibility",²⁵ characterized by specialization of function, hierarchy of authority, etc., and they do not mean the most ad hoc, fluid webs of informal influence. This would at first sight seem to blur the just-made distinction between decisional and institutional units and to deprive the analysis of the freedom from formal structural patterns granted by that distinction, but it may be that most actual decisions of any consequence cannot be handled other than in an organizational framework. Snyder and his associates concede that the institutional setting of government has a great impact upon the decisional units, but only, they aver outright, in so far as the "directives, rules, precedents and ideologies" of decision-makers - i.e., their 'primary institutional affiliation' - mould their activities within the decisional unit. Hence if a particular problem or policy falls within the sphere of competence of a decisional which is made up of officials drawn in the ratio of 3:2:1 from the Ministries of Defence, Commonwealth Relations, and the Treasury, one would expect Ministry of Defence conceptions to be dominant in that decisional unit. The question of the composition of a decisional unit may thus be crucial: while certain matters fall clearly and obviously within the organizational competences of certain officials and are thus automatically assigned to those officials, other issues will fall into a limbo of decisional compe-

²⁵Ibid., 95.

tence requiring that the membership of the unit be settled by a process of negotiation or outright struggle on an inter- or even intra-departmental basis. Foreign Ministers often have occasion to deal with Cabinet colleagues who harbour ambitions to run their own departmental foreign policies.

It is relevant here to note that the analytical scheme is held by its authors to accommodate as decision-makers only officials and statemen involved in the process of government on an official and formal basis. Private citizens are completely excluded; the representatives of significant interest groups or even powerful individuals are acknowledged to wield considerable influence over decisions, but this is defined as indirect influence resulting from their enjoyment of 'access' to decision-makers proper. The eminence grise, press baron and public affairs pundit are alike in performing roles which make them part of the internal setting of the decision-makers and inputs of the decisional process (albeit of importance) rather than participants in that process. Certainly, even if we may discern as the loci of 'real' decision-making the smoke-filled rooms and their equivalents, it is only in the seats of official authority that such choices and compromises are endorsed as political-governmental decisions. The analytical difficulties of integrating 'informal' influence into the decision-making framework are thus most satisfactorily solved by categorizing such influence as 'setting', since it is not "methodologically feasible or advantageous to put non-governmental personnel in the same action system" with governmental personnel.²⁶

²⁶ Ibid., 99.

This may well accommodate the great majority of circumstances but exceptions do exist: can we readily comprehend Lord Harlech's suggestion of the important moving quarantine idea in the Cuban missile crisis on any basis other than that of direct participation?

The 'who' of decision-making having been established, the authors next turn to the 'how' of the decisional process, the course adopted being an assessment of the 'limitations' to which decision-makers are subject. These limits fall into the two categories of external and internal, the former consisting of the relevant 'objective' factors perceived by the decision-maker as those to which his policy must adjust, the latter of those factors internal to the decisional process. These organizational and bureaucratic limitations include such things as the following: availability of information; quality of the communications net; the narrowing of discrimination inherent in the precedent of the organization and the quality of perception of its members; and various concrete limits - the supply of scarce resources such as time, skill, and money. From these external and internal limits the authors select three "major determinants of action"²⁷: these are spheres of competence; communications and information; and motivation, and they are isolated because of their considerable significance in the taking of decisions.

The first of these 'major determinants', spheres of competence, is intended to represent the loosely defined factor of

²⁷ Ibid., 105ff.

'role', and the more concrete one of the 'official' - a decisional unit being understood as "a set of competences and relationships among competences".²⁸ Within this 'set' the sphere of competence of a decision-maker is delineated by both 'explicit' and 'conventional' rules, drawn respectively from the formal job specification and the informally developed expectations about how it is to be discharged. Rules outline questions such as the working relationship of one member to another, the hierarchy of authority, and the appropriate specialization of function, within the decisional unit. Within the unit, a high degree of a member's expectations about his own and others' positions is assumed to be derived from the rules. In their discussion of spheres of competence, the authors are presenting an embryonic theory of bureaucratization (of, i.e., the process whereby organizational "rules, precedents and methods of operation" become "oriented traditionally" and are hence "no longer easily subject to challenge, questioning, or amendment"²⁹). Systems of action are susceptible to this ossification only in so far, they maintain, as their organizational structures amplify the psychological propensities of individuals to bureaucratize their conduct. We know little of how individuals restrict the range of their alternatives, regarding some (in the, to my mind, misleading terminology the authors borrow from Schuetz³⁰) as 'open' (i.e., not seriously considered, whether assumed without doubt or entirely excluded in the same way) and others as 'problematic' (i.e., given serious consideration). Though we do not have great insight into the psychological propensities of individuals in this regard it is plain that decision-makers vary in their interpreta-

²⁸ Ibid., 106.

²⁹ Ibid., 110-11.

³⁰ Quoted, ibid., 111.

tions of their competences - for instance, the strongly entrenched (and to some degree, naively heroic) conception of United States Presidents as falling into the categories either of active, 'strong' interpretation and use of the powers of the executive branch or of passive, 'stewardship' interpretation of what may and should be done. It is, however, very difficult to 'place' a decision-maker along the spectrum from strict, minimal to broad, maximal interpretation of sphere of competence. As it stands, the Snyder, Bruck and Sapin scheme gives no key to the correlation of an individual's experience and values with his decisional unit behaviour. The authors do suggest, however, a number of classificatory criteria according to which the competences of members of a decisional unit will be differentiated, among which are the hierarchies of authority, degrees of specialization and generalization in job specifications, and the degree of participation in the central decisional process (advisory, participatory, etc.), of the decisional unit.

The second major determinant of action, communication and information, is a looser aggregation of elements affecting the behaviour of individuals and organizations. Obviously, a high degree of facility in communication - linguistic, symbolic, etc. - is a prerequisite of real organization, let alone successful organization. The authors draw upon the work of Deutsch and others in viewing decisional systems of action as communications 'nets', and in stressing the need for adequate 'mapping' of the flows of information along both actual and prescribed channels of communica-

tion which, of course, are not necessarily coterminous. Reference is made to the varieties of instruments and procedures of communication and to the rules governing their use. The loss of informational clarity through the distortion that is called, in cybernetics terms, noise is suggested as a (rough) indication of the adaptability of the system to its circumstances. The efficient adjustment of the system depends upon the efficiency of its information 'feedback', or "messages about the actions or state of the system which are returned to the system".³¹ Organizational responsiveness to such feedback is obviously crucial to organizational integrity and success. In practice, this responsiveness will not be complete, and though formal models of decision-making often postulate very full rationality, based on very full information, the validity of such models (apart from their heuristic value) is limited because actual foreign policy decision-making takes place in a milieu characterized by "risk, uncertainty and incomplete information".³² Much social-psychological analysis of decision-making focusses attention upon rationality. The organization is regarded as the repository of rationality, being defined by the authors as "rationalization and formalization of behaviour through the instrumentality of explicit rules" and, hence, as "itself an effort to reduce uncertainty",³³ thereby maximizing scope for rational choice. It is the quality of an organization's communications and information which govern its 'life' in important respects - constituting its memory, inculcating its learned patterns, etc.

As the third major determinant the authors choose motivation

³¹ Ibid., 132.

³² Ibid., 132.

³³ Ibid., 133.

since "Behavior is...understood by motives attributed on the basis of inferences drawn from observed sequences of conduct".³⁴ In seeking thus to make motivation explicit Snyder, Bruck and Sapin are hoping to explain not only individual behaviour but thereby to gain insight into the behaviour of organizational actors - i.e. of collectivities of human beings. Within an organizational context a multiplicity of conflicting motivations are assumed to exist. A general motivational analysis sets out the major properties of motives among which are the following: motives are held to be learned as distinct from biologically inherent in human beings; and the process of 'learning' motives is an element of both general cultural and particular institutional milieus and experiences of the decision-maker. Because of this acquisition process motives tend to persist, social mechanisms reinforcing learned motive patterns, making the decision-maker essentially, "a group actor".³⁵ Motives tend also to be functionally autonomous and capable of generating in turn further motives divorced from the stimulus which gave rise to the original set of motives, as for instance when certain means to a particular end develop into a source of satisfaction in themselves. Motives tend, further, to differ in strength and they commonly conflict with other motives. Such conflict is characteristic of the 'bundle of ends' which make up the national interest that it is the job of foreign policy to secure and advance. The variety of opposed policy instigations thrown up by the decision-maker's domestic setting constitute in technical terms "competitive demands for energy focus and alternative directions of action".³⁶ (This is not untypically over-elaborate

³⁴ Ibid., 141.

³⁵ Ibid., 142.

³⁶ Ibid., 143.

Snyder, Bruck and Sapin language.) An analytical distinction is postulated between 'in order to' motives (directed to the attainment of future objectives) and 'because of' ones (invoking past experience).³⁷ This distinction is useful in terms of the political avowal of motives (rationalization), to which they next turn. It is observed that verbal, declaratory explanation of policy constitutes a policy act, and that 'declaratory' formulations will have impact upon 'action' policy. Motives are thus defined as "acceptable justifications for present, past, and future programmes of action".³⁸ The importance of rationalization is considerable in moulding a range of feasible alternative policies, and especially in modifying chosen courses of action - for it is by no means easy to say one thing and to do quite another while preserving both levels of policy formulation from the mutual interaction which normally takes place. Extending the focus of this section, the authors consider attitudes, defined as "the readiness of individual decision-makers to be motivated" - or, alternatively, "a generalized potential of responses which are 'triggered' by some stimuli".³⁹ The attitudes of individual and collectivity alike can be redefined so as to be more operationally useful by treating them as the basis of the decision-maker's 'frame of reference' - in terms of which a situation is perceived, the relevant values brought into play, and the appropriate evaluation emerges.⁴⁰ The authors aver that the process in practice lacks precision and tidiness but they believe that only by the application of such motivational analysis as is contained in their scheme can we comprehend decision-making behaviour. To this end there is need of categorization of

³⁷Ibid., 144. ³⁸Ibid., 146. ³⁹Ibid., 149. ⁴⁰Ibid., 150-52.

relevant 'motivational data' without which even such little theory as is now available is useless.⁴¹ They suggest a number of classifications including: the functions and objectives of total foreign policy organization and parts thereof (strategies and projects); socially defined norms and values internal to particular decisional units; those norms external to the total decision-making structure and internalized in decision-making (i.e., individual values); material needs, values of society not internalized in the decision-makers; and finally the category of personality, which is given fuller consideration below.

Individual men are significant in the decisional process as 'social beings' whose 'personalities' are shaped by interactions with other men and with the overall system. In the study of personality attention is initially directed to intellectual skills and their application. The specific intellectual tasks discharged in the "deliberation, choice, and problem-solving"⁴² that is decision-making are collectively known as "policy analysis" involving, concretely, a number of activities: the decision-maker will "analyze situations, estimate needs, define problems, establish ranges of alternatives, assign relevancies and significance to events and conditions, and interpret information".⁴³ In seeking to interpret the capacity of the decision-maker to discharge these intellectual operations it is useful to know something of: a) his training and professional-technical experience within and without the decisional unit (e.g., sub-system values, the methodologies of the lawyers and the economists); b) his continued professional affiliations;

⁴¹ Ibid., 153ff.

⁴² Ibid., 161.

⁴³ Ibid., 162.

his working theories of knowledge - concepts of human nature, of social organization and behaviour, e.g., national stereotypes. There are obvious complications arising from the reciprocal interaction of expertise and intellectual outlook - involved in, for instance, the preparation of a departmental minute which is liable, in some measure, to reflect the views of the individual official responsible for its drafting. A second head for the consideration of personality factors is that of the interpretation of competences, or the interaction of the individual actor's personality with his outlined sphere of competence. We have referred above to this question of variations in "role interpretation"⁴⁴ brought to posts by decision-makers of different temperaments. According to the Snyder, Bruck and Sapin scheme, the particular role interpretation adopted will depend upon the respective strengths of, and the kind of interaction between, the "requirements of the group situation" and the "ego-oriented needs and tensions" of individual decision-makers. The former component may be stated with some precision but the latter is obviously difficult to specify and until we have adequate personality theory it will not be possible properly to handle the idiosyncratic element in human behaviour. The third and final category in personality analysis is devoted to handling this relationship between personality types and decision-making, and the authors present a crude typology of personalities from this point of view. Their suggested ideal types, at which one may cavil, include the 'communicator', 'innovator', 'traditionalist', 'literalist', 'power-seeker', and 'career-servant'.⁴⁵ This final contribution to "the groundwork" of motivational analysis concludes the substance of the Snyder, Bruck and Sapin elaboration of the

⁴⁴Ibid., 168.

⁴⁵Ibid., 169-70.

theoretical frame of reference of decision-making analysis.

A recapitulatory section includes a reminder that the central focus of the study has been decision-making and that choice is "what precisely it is that the decision-maker does when he decides".⁴⁶ The authors mention various models of the theory of choice as agreeing on the point that the activity of choosing encompasses two significant elements: an ordering of the chooser's values as a 'scale of preferences', and the governing of those preferences in actual choice by the application of a 'set of rules'.⁴⁷ (These two elements of choice could perhaps alternatively be represented as substantive and procedural choice.) In discussing how far actual decision-making conforms to this logical or mathematical type of model, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin acknowledge the likelihood of considerable empirical divergence, yet they feel such models as their own to be basically realistic: "Decision-makers have preferences; they value one alternative more highly than another. Though the scales of preference may not be as highly ordered as the logical ones referred to above, the decision-makers may be assumed to act in terms of clear cut preferences".⁴⁸ The preferences concerned are not purely individual: as we have noted, these will be mediated through organizational and decisional units. This central question of decisional choice is rather brief, and concludes with a tentative presentation of other factors suggested as relevant, including shared organizational experiences, the 'biographies' of the decision-makers, and the available information - "assessed selectively in terms of the decision-maker's frame of reference".⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Ibid., 175.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 175.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 176.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 176.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE SNYDER MODEL

The obvious initial observation is that the analytical scheme presented by Snyder and his associates has heuristic value, in the terms of our previous definition - i.e., regardless of its ultimate theoretical validity. For the meticulous elaboration of concepts, categories, and relationships is bound to be rich in suggestive insights, bringing to mind hypotheses about the nature of important variables and their interactions. This advantage of clarifying and suggesting ideas is, in fact, an almost ineluctable product of a second major characteristic of the work: its enormous analytical richness and complexity. But we do not build wondrous, Emmett-like edifices of theory merely to produce insights generated by contemplation of the model. Analytical richness, in this and any other explanatory device, has the disadvantage - a fundamental one - of limiting its intelligibility, and hence its theoretical value. In particular, the complexity of the scheme greatly confines the explanatory value of the work as theory, though its theoretical worth in the lower level respect of organizing knowledge may thereby be enhanced. If a tool is difficult to grasp, it is obviously of slight value in performing the task for which it is designed; in this explanatory sense, if a theory confuses and obscures, it must be judged a bad theory. Hence, the work has generated criticisms such as the following, from Stanley Hoffmann: "The box built by Mr. Snyder is so filled with smaller boxes within boxes that before it can be used, much has to be thrown out".⁵⁰ The luxuriant multiplicity of variables which Hoffmann criticizes - and which should have been apparent in the precis above - is a serious fault in the

⁵⁰ Contemporary Theory, op. cit., 52.

authors' own terms. For they set out to produce an analytical scheme whose definitions and distinctions could be operationalized, and it is this ground upon which much of their criticism of traditional theorizing is based. The unweildy, complicated scheme which the authors commend to our use is, in fact, very difficult to use, as is perhaps indicated by the paucity of subsequent work of an empirical nature cast in its mould. The authors are obviously sensitive to such objections; Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, in their report on one of the few published empirical applications of the scheme⁵¹ aver that: "If one must err it ought initially to be on the side of over-elaboration of categories which can be eliminated after empirical investigation demonstrates the need to do so".⁵² Granted that empirical applications provide the ultimate function of 'pruning' theory, there is still a major need for discrimination in the selection of variables and their interrelationships for incorporation in an analytical scheme or theory, and economy of method and clarity and spareness ought perhaps to be the initial guiding rules rather than the ultimate empirical test of efficiency and validity - especially since an overly corpulent theoretical scheme may from the outset be too flabby for any worthwhile empirical testing to take place. There is clearly some danger in theory-building that the analytical model will become the object in itself, and that the activity of theorizing will become more procedural and arid and less substantive and useful. The complexity of the Snyder scheme, it should be pointed out, has been criticized by other

⁵¹"The U.S. Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: the application of an analytical scheme", Administrative Science Quarterly, III, 3 (December, 1958), 341-78 (and in Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, op. cit., 206-249).

⁵²Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, op. cit., 227.

than hostile observers - for instance, Herbert McCloskey, whose sympathetic review of the 1954 publication in World Politics⁵³ is included in the 1962 re-issue. Though enthusiastic in hailing the Snyder, Bruck and Sapin enterprise as a landmark in the scientific study of international relations, the review condemns its major shortcoming of "inordinate complexity"⁵⁴ of analytical layout.

A third point follows on from the question of complexity and is closely related to it: the theoretical status and quality of the work. It is naturally imposing a taxing burden on an explanatory scheme to expect it to explain the relationships among a large number of variables. In this respect, as suggested in the previous paragraph, the very ambitiousness of the scheme detracts from its explanatory effectiveness. The 'frame of reference' presented by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin specifies a wide range of factors which enter into decision-making but their interrelationships are barely touched upon. We are presented with a carefully compiled listing and categorization of elements that affect and determine the taking of decisions, but not much more. The authors introduce their work as an attempt to explain the working of intranational decision - though not of international decision. What they have in fact done is set out a statement of those factors which must be considered relevant for such explanatory work; they have dug the foundations, to revert to our architectural-constructional metaphor, but they have not built the house. Epistemologically their work is a classificatory scheme rather than an explanatory model, an organi-

⁵³VIII,2 (January, 1956), 281-95. ⁵⁴Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, op. cit., 207.

zing theory of 'how' rather than an explanatory theory of 'why'. McClelland's term for it is "an accounting system"⁵⁵ with which we may tabulate amounts in decisional transactions. The analysis has the low-level theoretical status of a taxonomy.⁵⁶ But even this is not to be despised in the current state of International Relations. A mere typology does constitute "a step closer to theory"⁵⁷ and has great value in guiding research - though the dividends in this respect will only be great if the typology or classification is widely used and economies of scale are achieved. It is unfortunate therefore that we lack a considerable body of comparable research cast in Snyder, Bruck and Sapin's terms: though dissertations in that mould are doubtless stacked up in the Northwestern University Library they have not achieved wide currency. Use is really the acid test of theory, and the too great complexity of this scheme has obviously militated against its use extensively, even at its organizing-theory level.

A final point, which may be briefly made but which is of very great significance, relates to the basic focus of the study: decisions, and whether concentration upon them is adequate to impart understanding of even intranational behaviour and outlook.⁵⁸ This point will have to be assessed but it may usefully be treated in terms of decisional analysis of various other thinkers rather than of Snyder and his associates alone. In the section following the work of a number of other analysts will be considered.

⁵⁵ McClelland, op. cit., 108. ⁵⁶ McCloskey, in Snyder et al., op. cit., 195.

⁵⁷ Snyder and J. Robinson, "Decision-Making in International Politics", in H. Kelman (ed.), International Behavior (New York, 1965), 439.

⁵⁸ Hoffmann, op. cit., 52.

OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS TO DECISIONAL ANALYSIS

We may lack a body of empirical writing cast in the particular terms of the Snyder, Bruck and Sapin analysis, but their work has had its influence on the general analysis of foreign policy, which though a fairly new development as a sub-field of International Relations is now almost universally presented in explicit - albeit perhaps nominal - decision-making terminology. In this respect, at least, Snyder and his associates have advanced methodological awareness in the field - and this is always an objective of the scientific theorists. There are now a number of general schemes of foreign policy analysis focusing upon the decisional process, as well as various particular pieces of work giving valuable partial perspectives on decision-making.

Among the general theories is one, that of George Modelski, contemporaneous with the work of Snyder et al. His Theory of Foreign Policy⁵⁹ leans heavily upon macro-economic models of income/production flows. Briefly, the decision-maker occupies a pivotal role mediating between flows of input (of national resources) and output (being the exhaustion of those resources) of policy. Modelski's focus upon the decisional process is distinguished from that of the Snyder scheme by having a wider scope; rather than the single unit 'decision' he is seeking to handle the general, continuous linkage of such units - i.e., 'policy'. With reference to our final point of criticism of Snyder and his associates above, it is interesting to note Modelski's reasons for eschewing the

⁵⁹(London, 1962) First presented as a London University Ph.D. thesis in 1954.

micro-unit decision.⁶⁰ He holds that the decisional focus imputes too precise and definite an image to the policy process. Analysis of those parts of the process which are discernible as decisions cannot shed adequate light upon "the continuous stream of activities within which decisions are embedded, and pays little heed, in theory at least, to the actions that link one decision to another".⁶¹ In any case, Modelski asserts, foreign policy is not basically an activity which is predominantly characterized by problem-solving. He is concerned that decisional analysis may foster the 'genetic fallacy' of imputing to all behavioural phenomena an explanation couched in decisional terms.⁶² Modelski acknowledges the value of decisional analysis for major, discernible events in policy-making but for minor events involving choice, and for much other policy activity not involving choice - for instance, negotiation - in a decisional sense, he is doubtful that decisional explanation and classification is suitable. It is widely stated that decisions are at - or themselves are - 'the core' of politics⁶³ but we should beware of having this notion smuggled without scrutiny into the conventional wisdom of political studies.

A more recent general model of policy analysis, that of Joseph Frankel, conceives of decisions in a similarly broad context to that adopted by Modelski. Although Frankel, unlike Modelski, is content to present his focus as nominally upon decision-making his theoretical model, when fully clothed in the empirical data with which his book The Making of Foreign Policy⁶⁴ is replete,

⁶⁰ Ibid., 12ff.

⁶¹ Ibid., 13.

⁶² Ibid., 13-14.

⁶³ See, e.g., H. Simon, "Political Research: the decision-making framework", 15, in D. Easton (ed.), Varieties of Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, 1965).

⁶⁴ Op. cit.

actually deals with the overall policy process. Frankel's scheme has something of the richness of the Snyder analysis - though of the empirical rather than the theoretical type: whereas it is difficult to use the Snyder model because its theoretical complexity defeats our ability to mobilise empirical data, Frankel's empirical clothing or flesh on the skeleton of his theory is such that we cannot easily discern, let alone use, his theory. Frankel's work is a compendious aggregation of factors relevant to policy-making within the domestic and international environments of the decision-makers. I do not want to suggest that the Frankel scheme is unmanageable in quite the degree to which the Snyder one escapes our grasp. He has in fact set out the theoretical orientation of his analysis in an article published some time before the publication of his book, "Towards a Decision-Making Model in Foreign Policy".⁶⁵ Also, in his book there is an initial attempt to make the theoretical conception fairly explicit.⁶⁶ The model presented by Frankel is perhaps more down to earth and concretely useful than Snyder's because of an important difference of emphasis: the scope of the relevant milieu of policy/decision-making is differently determined. The emphatically behavioural emphasis of Snyder et al. results in concentration upon what the decision-maker thinks is relevant whereas Frankel feels it is necessary to treat the decisional process in terms of the objective environment of the decision-maker as well as in terms of his subjective interpretation thereof.⁶⁷ In this respect, as in that of its empirical 'flesh', the Frankel model is very much more broad but for that very reason

⁶⁵Op. cit.

⁶⁶Op. cit., preface and ch.1 esp.

⁶⁷Vide supra, 105.

not very much easier to operationalize than that of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin.

The general theorists/general conceptual framework builders considered so far are consumers rather than producers of theory. Much of the theoretical analysis applied to foreign policy analysis is drawn directly from work done in other fields - Economics, Social Psychology, etc. - on the decisional process, much of which has considerable general validity extending to the process within our milieu. The major area of useful theoretical discussion is that of the various contributions on the subject of rationality in decisional choice. Most of this work takes as its starting point an image - akin to that which is implicit in much traditional writing on international relations - of a rational 'decisional man', first cousin to 'economic man' who has long served as an ideal type and referent in the best established policy science, and a distant descendant of the rational man who was once felt to people the political landscape. According to this ideal type model the decision-making process is characterized, in the words of its most perspicacious critic, Professor Simon, as "the selection of an optimal course of action from among a set of specified alternative courses of action, on the basis of a criterion of preference".⁶⁸ A high degree of rationality is assumed in the handling of the various components of decisional calculation, about which in turn, indeed as a prerequisite, a condition of rationality, a high degree of knowledge is assumed. In its most formal terms

⁶⁸Simon, op. cit., 18.

(with the potential of pure mathematical treatment⁶⁹) the image of rational man depicts him responding to decisional problems by resort to a whole set of given alternatives, each of which is seen as having certain outcomes (varying in the degree of knowledge and certainty). The selection from this range of an appropriate alternative is done by reference to an articulated, explicit 'utility-function' or 'preference-ordering' in terms of which that outcome is chosen which is 'valuationally' most desirable.⁷⁰ This model of decisional choice is variously held to achieve a 'maximization' of goals or an 'optimization' of choice. Because it is characterized by rationality to such an extent this process is often described as 'means-ends analysis'; the rational man is pictured as "cool and clearheaded" in calculating the best means to attain his known end.⁷¹ Rational man is, then, a tidy, analytically satisfying paragon of decision-making.

There is however the great disadvantage to 'rational man' that he does not exist. From our intuitive knowledge and from what empirical work that is available it is clear that decisional choice is just not rational to the extent depicted in the classical model of pure rationality. (It should be noted that relatively few analysts have actually been guilty of asserting that rational man is completely isomorphic to reality, but as a critical technique it has been useful for Simon, Verba and other observers to set up a classical straw man in order to enlighten in the process of knocking him down.) Having set out criticisms of this conception

⁶⁹ See, e.g., I.D.J. Bross, Design for Decision (New York, 1953), on "statistical decision-making".

⁷⁰ See J. March and H. Simon, "The Concept of Rationality", in J.D. Singer (ed.), Human Behavior and International Politics (Chicago, 1965), 340.

⁷¹ S. Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System", in S. Verba and K. Knorr (eds.), The International System, op. cit., 95.

and its shortcomings as a description of what really happens, Simon, Lindblom, Verba and others attempt themselves to depict the decisional process as it is in the untidy and unsatisfactory 'réal' world, seeking in Lindblom's expression to build a "less heroic model of policy-making".⁷² This can best be done by way of destruction of the unreal and abstract assumptions of the model of pure rational choice. March and Simon are typical in taking exception to three basic assumptions of the model, namely: the assumption as known givens of the range of alternative courses open to the decision-makers; the assumption that the consequences or outcomes of these will be known to a fairly complete degree; and the belief that the decision-makers interpret and choose decisions in terms of an articulated framework of values.⁷³ Simon has elsewhere made a general statement of some force criticizing these assumptions:

Our world is a world of limited, serial information processors dealing with complexity that, for all practical purposes, is infinite in comparison with their information-gathering and -computing powers. It is a world peopled by creatures of bounded rationality. Because we cannot simultaneously attend to everything that is potentially relevant, we must have processes that determine the focus of attention. If alternatives are not given but must be discovered, then there must be processes for seeking them out. The actual choice among alternatives may well turn out to be relatively inconsequential in comparison with the processes that determine what alternatives are available for choice.⁷⁴

The relevant information is not, of course, 'given' from the viewpoint of the decision-maker; there is, therefore, a need for him

⁷²C.E.Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'", Public Administration Review, XIX,2 (Spring, 1959), 80n.

⁷³March and Simon, op. cit., 341; see also Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York, 1957 - 2nd. ed.), 80ff.

⁷⁴Simon, in Easton, op. cit., 19.

to work out alternatives, outcomes, and even values. The most crucial element of perfect rational knowledge - predictive knowledge of outcomes - is certainly not available. Hence, decision-makers can be only 'intendedly' and 'limitedly' rational.⁷⁵ Even in hindsight the objective reality of which courses were open to a decision-maker in a particular circumstance is not likely to be perfectly known.⁷⁶ The rationality which is attainable is relative and subjective - in that it can at best be rational in terms of the particular frame of reference or world-picture which is the real world in the view of the decision-maker. We choose always with respect to "a limited, approximate, simplified 'model' of the real situation".⁷⁷ Our conceptions of the world are necessarily imperfect because the biological capacities of human beings, and the social capacities of the organizations they establish, are not finite while the informational and computational demands of complex decision-making are virtually infinite. Even quite simple problems tax our minds and cannot be handled in pure rational terms because we cannot handle the multitude of relevant alternatives, we cannot assign to them meaningful outcomes, our value-structures are inchoate, and our abilities to calculate optimum policies in terms of those values are of a low level of sophistication. In order for the decisional process to be manageable, decision-makers "must restrict their attention to relatively few values and relatively few alternative policies among the countless alternatives that might be imagined".⁷⁸ Similarly, Bertrand de Jouvenel refers to

⁷⁵Simon, Administrative Behavior, op. cit., xxiv.

⁷⁶March and Simon, op. cit., 342 ⁷⁷Ibid., 342.

⁷⁸Lindblom, op. cit., 80.

a polity having to apply what he calls the 'law of conservative exclusion' according to which certain kinds of instigations cannot be allowed into free competition in the political market place because they are incompatible with the rules of the game.⁷⁹ On the individual level, but more crudely, the decision-maker must conservatively exclude many considerations if his decisional role is to be manageable. As de Jouvenel notes, our conscious and unconscious minds perform this role, analogous to that of a secretary securing a businessman from minor and irrelevant distractions in order to conserve his capacity to handle major questions. At the conscious level man's decisional capacities are protected by his prejudices, that is to say, by "built in principles by virtue of which some cases need not be brought up before our court of justice".⁸⁰ On a less philosophical plane, this screening process of discrimination among factors which may appear relevant in the decisional process does have some rational character; it is not simply random or arbitrary. Though allowance must be made for capricious, careless decision-making, it seems intuitively reasonable to accept Simon's concept of decision-making as involving, in each case, considerable elementary 'substantive planning', the deciding involving an elaboration of basic values and of objectives as much as of courses of action. Only by such prior rational discrimination can the decision-maker's "frame of attention"⁸¹ be sufficiently narrowed to avoid swamping his intellectual capacity. Thereby each decisional choice can be "guided directly or indirectly by much broader considerations of rationality than would be possible if it had to be

⁷⁹B. de Jouvenel, The Pure Theory of Politics (London, 1963), 112; see generally, Part IV, Ch. 2.

⁸⁰Ibid., 95; see also 172. ⁸¹Simon, Admin. Behav., op. cit., 98.

made 'on the spot' without benefit of previous consideration".⁸²
The decision-maker is, then, "selecting general criteria of choice and (then) particularizing them by application to specific situations".⁸³ The term used by another writer, Sir Geoffrey Vickers, as equivalent to 'frame of attention' is 'appreciation' (of both value- and reality-judgements in composition) is useful because its everyday usage focuses our analysis upon the crucial factor of the human capacity to, as we say, 'take in' and absorb the impact of events and the range of variables in decision-making.⁸⁴

Simon is, then, presenting a model of decisional choice in which the scope for rational 'problem-solving' decision is greatly narrowed, and yet the facility of decision-making is increased within that scope by the establishment of a category of 'routinized' responses to decisional difficulties, simplifying and indeed enabling the solution of problems. In terms of stimulus-response, this means that:

When a stimulus is utterly novel, it will invoke problem-solving activity aimed initially at constructing a definition of the situation and then at developing one or more appropriate performance programs.⁸⁵

This modified model of decisional choice is a rational model, only differing in degree, though considerably, from the pure model. In terms of this conception of decisional behaviour the information at the disposal of the decision-maker is infinitely less extensive and reliable. A very great deal of decisional attention is devoted to the question - ignored in the pure model - of deciding what to

⁸² Ibid., 98-99.

⁸³ Ibid., 99; see also Sir Geoffrey Vickers, The Art of Judgement (London, 1965), 68.

⁸⁴ Vickers, ibid., 39.

⁸⁵ March and Simon, op. cit., 343.

decide.⁸⁶ The specification of alternatives, this model asserts, is a difficult, partly rational, process of 'searching'.⁸⁷ Hence only a part of the overall decisional process consists of the activity of deciding as it is presented in pure rational terms. The model of Simon and his school is one which directs attention to "the whole spectrum of decision-making activity - attention directing, design, and choice".⁸⁸ It thus differs in respect of focus as well in respect of the rationality held to characterize the process of deciding from the formal, pure model of rational decision-making.

A major difference between the models is in the autonomy imputed to means and ends respectively. Whereas the pure rational 'means-ends' analysis rests upon the interaction of means and ends as clear, distinct major variables of choice, in the adapted model this categorization is blurred. Since it holds that a pre-selected structure of values is not available to guide the decision-maker's choice of means, it is obvious that the adapted model cannot be centred upon a conception of choice of means in the light of known ends. The distinction from the pure model is made most clear in the work of Lindblom, whose model of decisional choice is intended to cover a process of "successive limited comparisons" in policy selection, and which eschews the "rational-comprehensive" image of the process.⁸⁹ Lindblom holds that in policy-making the evaluation of governing principles and the selection of appropriate courses of action are not sequential steps in

⁸⁶ Simon, in Easton (ed.), op. cit., 19.

⁸⁸ Simon, in Easton (ed.), op. cit., 19.

⁸⁷ March and Simon, op. cit., 343.

⁸⁹ Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'", op. cit., 81; see also, idem, "Policy Analysis", American Economic Review, XLVIII (June, 1958), 298-313.

a process but are inextricably intertwined as one stage of overall problem-solving. This view would seem to be intuitively correct: individuals' value structures tend to be inarticulated to some, and not infrequently to a very great, extent and hence do not often constitute an operationally useful ranking of goals. The problem of values in politics has always presented major obstacles to theorizing; in this connection, the difficulties of measuring the intensity with which a given value is held, and consequently the enormous problems involved in assessing the comparative attachment of an individual to a number, even two, of distinct values, greatly complicate policy analysis and vitiate fully rational procedure for the well-equipped outside observer, let alone for the participant in decisional choosing. Lindblom feels that the policy analyst is thus forced to concentrate upon value choices which are marginal. "The value problem is...always a problem of adjustments at the margin".⁹⁰ What Lindblom is asserting here is that the decision-maker in practice grasps the problems of value involved in decisional choice by comparing differences between the existing policy course and an (or a few) alternative modification which is in question for that policy course 'at the margin' of the policy where it enters the continuum of time and space and circumstances. Moreover, even these 'incremental' changes in values are themselves most attainable if mediated through a choice of policy means. For it is the case, in Lindblom's view, that it is only through 'successive limited comparisons' of concrete, specified policies that decision-makers really come to know what their relative values are. The process of decisional choice tends therefore to involve simultaneously the specification of means and ends, and

⁹⁰Lindblom, "Science", op. cit., 82.

the rationality of choice within that process is confined to the bounds of Lindblom's marginal, incremental, successive limited comparisons of policy alternatives. There is an ongoing process whereby policy is successively approximated to some desired objectives which themselves may substantially change. This is admittedly an imperfect and untidy model but it would appear that it is, by that very fact, isomorphic to reality to a far greater extent than is the pure rational choice model. In particular the adapted model would seem more appropriate to accommodate the bulk of policy decisions - which are unlike the major 'revolutions' in policy in that they do not involve clear-cut issues upon which much attention is focused. (This recalls Modelski's reservations concerning the applicability of the concept decision.) In short, decision-making is a process of 'muddling through' though in its limited way, Lindblom maintains, a scientific process.

The general distinction between pure and modified decisional choice models is perhaps most explicit in their understandings of the rules governing actual decision. Whereas we have seen that the pure model assumes the objective of optimizing or maximising the choice of policy alternatives, the adapted model is less ambitious and its decision-maker seeks instead (in the term coined by Simon) to 'satisfice' - more intelligibly, to achieve merely a satisfactory solution - and does not (because he can not) quest after the one, optimal course or choice. For given that the information at the disposal of the decision-maker - about the range of possible alternatives, the outcomes thereof, the relevant values and their hierarchy, and the relationship of values to alternatives courses

of action - is severely limited, it is simply not possible for us to discern the best solution. This would only be possible, according to March and Simon, if there existed a set of criteria according to which all alternatives could be compared and, further, if the alternative thereby preferred would be preferable in terms of the relevant criteria to all the other alternatives.⁹¹ Since values are normally numerous and conflicting, within the individual mind and far more so within foreign policy organizations, it is most unlikely that such a hierarchy of values could be arrived at. There is obviously a problem of opportunity cost, in terms of value X say, of selecting policy A to achieve objective B which embodies value Y. There is the additional complication that means are not valuationally neutral. It is thus one thing to conceive, in game-theoretic terms, of a minimax of values and quite another thing, which is largely beyond us, to calculate what it will be in practice. Hence we normally confine our decisional efforts to satisficing rather than to maximizing or optimizing. The distinction is made succinctly by March and Simon when they say that satisficing is like searching a haystack for a needle sharp enough to sew with, while optimizing demands that the haystack be combed to provide us with the sharpest needle.⁹² Sir Geoffrey Vickers provides a further, perhaps more helpful, illustration of the nature of satisficing when he defines it (though, confusingly, he uses the term optimizing to mean what the usage of decisional analysis calls satisficing) as "the progressive elimination of alternatives which are judged 'not good enough', until one 'good enough' is found". He gives the example of a high-jump contest in which "the bar is pro-

⁹¹ March and Simon, op. cit., 343.

⁹² Loc. cit.

gressively raised until all competitors but one are proved 'not good enough'; and the survivor, being 'good enough', is consequently 'best'.⁹³ Charles Lindblom is in broad agreement with this conception but he goes beyond it to the extent of asserting that in even the limitedly rational choice of satisfactory policy the operational significance of value preferences may be almost nil. This is not to say that policy choice is entirely random or capricious. Since in his view policy is chosen more on the basis of specifying policies which are better than others on incremental value grounds than upon the basis of ends-means mediation, a 'good' policy may be selected by way of "agreement on policy itself, which remains possible even when agreement on values is not".⁹⁴ Within an organizational decisional unit it seems empirically correct that the only practicable test of 'good' policy is agreement upon its goodness (for whatever reasons) as Lindblom maintains; ends are often left unresolved, conflicting and unsettled in the practice of such units. This image is supported by the experiences of the impact of 'unattached' (i.e., advisory or expert) academics and intellectuals upon the workings of policy machinery; their rational approach tends to engender conflict because it impells them to make explicit their assumptions and values, and such procedure is inclined to impede the achievement of policy consensus by way of satisficing. We must recognize, then, that satisfactory policy may result from quite unsatisfactory reasoning processes. This is, certainly, a most subjective procedure but it should be remembered that not even the pure rational choice model can properly be founded upon objective, absolute givens; for it is the case

⁹³Vickers, op. cit., 42-3n. ⁹⁴Lindblom, "Science", op. cit., 83.

that "objectives themselves have no ultimate validity other than (that) they are agreed on".⁹⁵

CONCLUSION

It is now necessary to attempt a summing up of the theory purporting to explain foreign policy decision-making. Initially it may be helpful to note that even did we have at our disposal a fairly complete organizational and explanatory theory of decision-making in the foreign policy process - and we manifestly do not have such a body of theory - we would not ipso facto have a complete theoretical accommodation of the actions of individual states as policy-making and -executing entities. As has been noted above⁹⁶ objections can be made to conceptions of policy which hinge solely upon the decisional perspective, and so the scope of foreign policy theory is being arbitrarily - though not necessarily unjustifiably: research may not yet be fruitful at the more diffuse policy level - confined to what may be discerned and grasped as decision. The self-evidently central, pivotal nature of decisions in political activity is, in fact, open to serious question. Decisional analysis of the kind developed by Lindblom, which is distinguished by its closeness to empirical reality from much other theoretical writing, comes near to seeing the rational, really decisional element in policy-formulation in its true perspective; but even his work would appear to overstate the coherence of the process: 'muddling through' is in practice more of an art than a science - and it is often not even that and is simply muddle.

⁹⁵Ibid., 84.

⁹⁶Vide supra, 124-5.

Having mentioned an important present limitation upon this particular theoretical perspective upon policy analysis - one whose existence inclines much policy analysis in writing and teaching to remain in a 'literary' theoretical mould - it is meet to set out what are the requirements of a theory of foreign policy analysis, in order to make clear the overall contributions discussed above.

There are obviously a number of key clusters of variables, treated in most of the schemes so far mentioned but upon the place of which in overall policy analysis little consensus would appear to exist. One obvious category is that concerned with the individual men who occupy policy roles and take - in so far as they are discernible - decisions. It is a commonplace of traditional analysis that the personal predispositions of this foreign minister and that president are of importance, and there would not be dissent from the proposition that we must therefore study men. The question upon which dispute will inevitable centre is: to what degree are men important and how can this degree be determined? Obviously, it is interesting to have some insight into the personality traits of men in office, and the highly developed socio-psychological sciences have generated a substantial body of theoretical work - classificatory and also explanatory - on these traits. In their raw form such theories have dubious applicability to international relations analysis - as witness the general reception given to the Bullitt-Freud study of Woodrow Wilson.⁹⁷ Less extravagant and more careful interdisciplinary

⁹⁷Thomas Woodrow Wilson: a Psychological Study (London, 1967).

borrowing has produced very useful work, enlarging the horizons of the international relations milieu - to take one area as illustrative, consider the many valuable articles in the Journal of Conflict Resolution on the subject of national images, their formation, modification, and affects. Psycho-social perspectives give many fruitful applications to the study of individual values, backgrounds, and behavioural characteristics. Such analysis yields much of obvious value to our study of men in foreign policy situations. But these insights and theories, though increasingly used in International Relations, are not of sufficient value to explain policy. For the personal variable must be related to others, one of which is the context or milieu of policy. There is some variation in the perspective which is adopted here. Some studies concentrate upon the organizational structure of the policy machinery itself, while others see that as of importance only in its role as a sub-system of the sovereign community as a whole. The nature of organizational structure, the hierarchies within the society, and similar factors must be organized to acquire a sufficient theoretical framework into which the personality variables can be integrated. Within a general framework accommodating personal and organizational (restricted or extensive) factors it will be necessary to pay particular attention to the way in which they interact, for it is such interaction which will itself constitute national policy-making. Upon the existence of at least these three clusters of variables, or factors, most observers would be prepared to agree, but in theoretical treatment of them their relative importance differs considerably.

Of all existing classificatory-explanatory theories in the foreign policy analysis field, one of the most interesting is that of James Rosenau, recently published.⁹⁸ Though this purports only to be a 'pre-theory' - i.e. aimed at "the preliminary processing of foreign policy materials"⁹⁹ - it is in character more developed and more useful than many putative 'general theories', especially in its classificatory aspects (though these are developed to the point at which they have considerable explanatory value) - see, for instance, Rosenau's diagrammatic ranking of relevant factors in the classification of foreign policy.¹⁰⁰

But even this work does not properly constitute analysis of general theoretical type - as Rosenau is modest enough to admit in his usage 'pre-theory'. The fact is that foreign policy analysis, and even the more restricted decisional analysis, has not advanced beyond the stage of organizational theory. As Rosenau states, "the dynamics of the processes which culminate in the external behaviour of societies remain obscure. To identify factors is not to trace their influence."¹⁰¹ Moreover, even at this level of classificatory theory progress has been by no means impressive. The schema developed by Rosenau is breaking new ground which should by now have been long tilled. Nevertheless, advances are being made. Though International Relations cannot be said yet to enjoy at the micro-unit level a body of analysis comparable in scope and quality to the pre-Keynesian theory of the firm, there is much effort going into the very necessary, pre-theoretical step of "inventorying the determinants of external

⁹⁸ Op. cit. ⁹⁹ Ibid., 41. ¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 90-91. ¹⁰¹ Ibid., 31.

behavior".¹⁰² Without adequate preparation at this level it is perhaps directly harmful to the enterprise of building scientific theory to engage in formulating 'if-then' hypotheses. We first have to know the 'what', before we can - or should - seek to be certain about the 'why' of foreign policy. Ideas about the why will naturally shape our understanding of what it is that we should be finding out at the what level; but conclusive as distinct from tentative explanatory hypotheses must wait upon the development of adequate organizational-classificatory theory. In the sub-field of foreign policy analysis the study International Relations is perhaps now in sight of the 'take-off into self-sustaining growth' of explanatory theory; it has not happened yet because we have not yet finished building the air-strip.

¹⁰²Ibid., 32.

Chapter 5: Macro-Theory: Systems Analysis in International Relations

INTRODUCTION

Just as the terminology, if not very much of the substantive theory, of decision-making analysis has become assimilated to the conventional wisdom of the subject, the language of systems analysis is beginning to have influence in International Relations. Students and teachers and researchers are increasingly able and ready to 'think system'. At the purely terminological level, 'systems analysis' is something of a fashionable usage - a fetish expression. But the approach is gaining ground at other and more significant levels in the subject; books are beginning to appear in the text category which focus explicitly and meaningfully upon international relations in a systems theory perspective, one of the most notable examples being Herbert J. Spiro's World Politics: the Global System.¹

It would be misleading, however, to give the impression that analysis in system terms - nominal and conceptual - has been entirely a product of the scientific-theoretical school of 'behavioural' enquiry. For although it is these advocates of and borrowers from the growing corpus of 'general systems theory' who have taken systems analysis furthest, in a less scientific (but nonetheless influential) sense the study of international relations has long revolved around the idea of system. Semantically, the milieu which we study is a system, in that it is a complex whole made up of a set of interconnected parts; whether or not explicitly articulated as a system

¹Homewood, Ill., 1966.

the 'complexe relationnel international' (to use Prof. Chevalier's expression²) comprehends such a whole encompassing certain parts. Throughout political thought men have drawn inspiration from the consideration of various systems, biological, mechanical, and what might be called social - like Mandeville's Fable of the Bees. In advance of interdisciplinary attention being paid to developing a theory to make such eclecticism respectable (and, admittedly, more fruitful), students of the social sciences were inclined to consider the polity, economy, and society as usefully approached as systems. For International Relations, especially, the sovereign states constitute a number of discernible parts of the international societal whole; the centrality to the subject of the interrelationship of the two perspectives makes International Relations par excellence amenable to systems thinking. For all that the subject has traditionally been studied in implicit systems terms, the overwhelming influence making for the current systems awareness has been the readiness of scientific theorists to establish systems thought explicitly. The inchoate and fragmentary nature of international relations systems theory prior to the scientific theorizing of recent decades compels us to concentrate our attention in this analysis upon the latter, though we may note in passing that the significance of systems ideas in the international outlook of both practical men and academics would provide a fascinating treatise in the history and philosophy of ideas.

As distinct from the micro-theoretical focus of decision-making analysis, recent excursions into systems theory have been

²Quoted in Manning, University Teaching, op. cit., 10.

applied to international politics at the macro-theoretical level. This ambitiously broad scope need not necessarily have been outlined: in pure terms, systems theory is applicable to any unit or aggregation thereof and, indeed, given the formidable problems of complexity and multiplicity existing at the international level, a focus upon the national sub-systems of the overall 'international system' might have been more appropriate because more fruitful. However, with the discovery of the system tool in conceptualizing it came to be applied principally at the macro-level and it is with this emphasis of the literature which exists that it is necessary here to deal. In attempting to do so, some more operative understanding of 'system' and 'systems analysis' must be sought, and this will concern us next. (The issue of the scope and nature of systems theory in International Relations will have to be returned to below.)

THE IDEA OF SYSTEM

Any exercise in theorizing ought to be 'systematic', it is universally held (though in certain respects, for instance in the generation of hypotheses from flashes of intuitive insight, the systematic utilization of mental resources may be at one remove: in preparing the mind to produce the sought-after inspiration). By this is meant that we should be consistent and organized, and generally follow the scientific method, in our thinking; concretely, a systematic approach to data is one which subjects relevant observed phenomena to the scrutiny of the whole range of available relevant hypotheses. In this sense every theorist has - or should

have - a system in the sense of means of procedure. Yet theorizing need not involve a substantive conception of system in its comprehension of a particular subject-matter. Philosophers of History, for example, may or may not discern and point to a system of universal human history though we would expect them to be systematic in sifting the evidence of civilizations from whose experiences they infer lines or cycles of progress or regress; and for this reason Toynbee's A Study of History is of enormous value as a compendium of the history of men's societies, regardless of the validity of the compiler's system of history.

To be more precise about the substantive nature of systems analysis, it involves a particular conception of the character of the milieu to be studied - whereas focus upon the process of decision-making is based upon what might be called a more neutral conception of the milieu (albeit that decisional analysis may in practice have tended to colour its practitioners' understanding of the political process, perhaps considerably). Treatment of international relations as constituting an 'international system' has in fact tended to rest upon an at least implicit stressing of the global whole over the various discrete 'sub-systems'. This is a point which must be considered in detail, in the context of examination of the work of various systems theorists; before doing so, it is necessary to be clear about terms.

At one level of understanding, everything and anything can be subjected to a systems analysis perspective: Kaplan is entirely in

accordance with the technical, though broad, definition of 'systems of action' - as being constituted by any specified set of variables - in stating that: "Napoleon, the Columbia River, and a dinosaur may be considered a system".³ It is a reflection of the genesis of the systems perspective that we regard it as appropriate to conceive of biological organisms, mechanical constructs, and various types of polity as systems. In practice, however, the emphasis in the definition of systems of action is upon sets of variables which are related significantly together - as are the components of a radio set, the organs and matter of a human body, the cells of a living plant, respectively - and thus constitute a recognizable, meaningful whole; kippers and custard do not. Put in characteristically austere language, Kaplan thus defines a system of action operably as:

...a set of variables so related, in contradistinction to its environment, that describable behavioral regularities characterize the internal relationships of the variables to each other and the external relationships of the set of individual variables to combinations of external variables.⁴

Another analyst, Nettl, stresses the importance of approaching the concept system from the perspective of the whole and not simply from that of its component parts - i.e. the individual variables.⁵ But it is necessary in seeking a suitable definition to make reference to the work of David Easton, of the University of Chicago, whose reputation is greatest among all those approaching political analysis in systems terms. Easton has published three significant

³Kaplan, op. cit., 4.

⁴Loc. cit.

⁵P. Nettl, "The Concept of System in Political Science", Political Studies, XIV, 3 (October, 1966), 305.

books embodying and advancing the systems perspective.⁶ In one of these, A Framework for Political Analysis, there is a section (chapter two: Political Life as a System of Behavior) outlining his basic conceptions in this regard. His analysis tends to be highly rigorous, and couched in precisely turned language. Political life is a system in Easton's terms in the sense that it is:

a boundary-maintaining set of interactions imbedded in and surrounded by other social systems to the influence of which it is constantly exposed.⁷

In more traditional analysis, this is to say that political activity is one facet of human life for which other aspects constitute an environment. Within the specifically political system are a number of processes among a number of important variables which Easton regards as characterizing - as defining - political life, wherever it may be found. Since he has gone further than most political scientists in the application to his subject-matter of the abstract models and concepts of 'general systems theory'⁸ it may be fruitful to begin the analysis of the substantive literature with Easton's work; just as in the consideration of decision-making analysis it proved convenient to begin with the Snyder model, because of its comprehensiveness, it may also be most advantageous to approach systems analysis through the work of its most elaborately methodological proponent in political science.

SYSTEMS GENERAL AND INTERNATIONAL

It is not intended here to make anything like so extensive an

⁶The Political System (New York, 1953); A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, 1965); A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York, 1965).

⁷Framework, op. cit., 25. ⁸On which see: L. von Bertalanffy, "General Systems", in Singer (ed.), Human Behavior and International Politics

exposition of Easton's ideas as was attempted in the case of Snyder. This is not meant to indicate a relative valuation of the two theorists -- on the contrary; but it is a reflection of the relevance of each theoretical contribution to the study of international relations. In the case of Easton the reasons for this judgement will not be argued at this point, for they should become plain from a brief exposition of his analytical scheme.

Easton's objective, to which he has drawn nearest in A Systems Analysis of Political Life, has been to develop a general conceptual framework, empirically valid, for the accommodation of political interaction in all milieus. To this end he has elaborated his own set of categories of significant variables - those factors which in his view must inhere in all political life. His concern is with the generality of politics, to the extent that Easton's concern with empirical relevance is put at some hazard. Nonetheless, the scope and richness of his scheme is very considerable - far in advance, for example, of the framework put forward by Almond and Coleman in their The Politics of the Developing Areas⁹ - and it is certainly productive of heuristic insight, at least. Before coming to grips with Easton's categories, this point is worth emphasizing for it bears upon the derivation from general systems theory (itself derived in turn from a motley body of biological, mechanical and social models, as we have already noted) of models or conceptual schemes purporting to possess relevance for particular milieus of other sorts. The degree of relevance will vary, and it will always be arguable, but our ex-

⁹(Princeton, 1960)

perience provides justification for the confident assertion that there is some scope for what has been termed "illumination through retranslation"¹⁰. The transference of a statement or proposition from one medium to another - for instance from verbal to mathematical representation - may yield new insights. This has clearly been a characteristic of game and bargaining theory, and the work of Karl Deutsch in general, and his Nerves of Government in particular,¹¹ has demonstrated the great potential to be gained through restatement of propositions in different 'languages'. The borrowing of general systems theory and its application to such a field as international relations is thus bound to have some worth.

The extent of that worth depends upon how accurately the theoretical models and concepts borrowed yield an appropriate, representative model of the segment of reality in question. For political life in general Easton presents a systemic model of flows, both inputs and outputs - the former being demands and support, and the latter being the responses to inputs mediated through a regulator, whose function is defined as "the authoritative allocation of resources".¹² This function, indeed, is felt to be the central, defining, feature of a political system: allocating resources authoritatively is what political systems do, and by what they are known.¹³ The effectiveness of this regulative function must be adequate to relieve the stress which besets the system, by adopting suitable modifications of behaviour or even of structure, to the extent, perhaps, of systemic transformation, in order that the (or a) system may endure. What governs the effectiveness of such adaptive response by the system is the quality of its feedback -

¹⁰ M. Nicholson and P. Reynolds, "General Systems, the International System, and the Eastonian Analysis", Political Studies, XV, 1 (Feb. 1967), 13. ¹¹ (New York, 1963)

¹² Systems Analysis of Political Life, 22-3.

¹³ Ibid., 21.

its capacity to modify future performance in the light of past reactions - a concept upon which Easton leans heavily, likening its importance in the present age to Darwin's evolution theory in an earlier.¹⁴ This, in large outline, is the constellation of components of Easton's system model of politics; to determine its empirical validity for our purposes - as students of international relations - it is necessary to look at Easton's more specific treatment of the 'international system'.

A first, and by no means trivial, observation about his attention to the international system is that it is grossly inadequate with respect to the length of the work: a mere handful of pages in a book containing 500. It is true that everything that Easton has written in his major book purports to deal with the general nature of political systems, including international ones. But since the comparability of national and international systems is generally felt to require demonstration by those who assert it (see for instance C.F. Alger's article, "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics"¹⁵), and since the identity is widely rejected by students of politics (under one rubric or another), Easton might reasonably have been expected to be at special pains to forestall criticism along the lines of an attack upon the unwarranted subsuming of the international system under a category of system which cannot properly accommodate it. He has not, in fact, devoted sufficient attention to pleading the applicability of

¹⁴Ibid., 367. ¹⁵American Political Science Review, LVII (June, 1963), 406-19.

his abstract general scheme to this concrete particular system.

Easton merely asserts that:

Not only is there an international political system, but it may in fact be usefully interpreted as just another type of system, to be analyzed, described, and compared with all other systems. It is not any more atypical or unique than other classifications...¹⁶

And further:

The international system is comparable in all respects to any other kind of system, at the theoretical level, although the values for the relevant variables will clearly be different. That is to say, we can identify in the international system all of the basic variables... (of) political systems in general.¹⁷

This terminology is a little obscure. If the international system(s) are to be regarded as 'another type' of system(s) there would seem, in logic, to be grounds for expecting its characteristic features to be different, perhaps significantly, from the 'type' of system operating at the national state level. Differences of degree, if not of kind, would be widely supposed to exist as between the main elements of a cohesive national system and a fragmentary global one, even if it is to be granted Easton that it is possible to 'identify in the international system all of the basic variables'. In fact, however, few observers would grant this point to Easton. Whereas in his terms the mediatory, allocative function that is central to political systems is performed internationally by "the great powers and, more recently, various kinds of international organizations, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations"¹⁸, most students of international society would not be inclined to regard

¹⁶Easton, op. cit., 485. ¹⁷Ibid., 487. ¹⁸Ibid., 487.

the great powers or global inter-state bodies as very significantly characterized by 'authority' in the sense that it would be understood domestically. Elsewhere in the book Easton does, it is true, qualify his notion of authority and legitimacy with respect to international society, acknowledging their very limited scope therein.¹⁹ What it is necessary for us to decide, if only provisionally, is how much, to what extent, this central element of Eastonian systems nature is present in international society. It is unfortunate that Easton makes no serious attempt to come to grips with this, the central question from the International Relations standpoint - and this neglect is not allied to a respect for what may be achieved in that subject by independent effort.²⁰ There is much need for students of international society to clarify the nature and extent of the societal authorities characteristic of their milieu, and Easton's concepts may prove valuable as points of reference (and probably for much else besides) even though he himself appears content simply to impose his analytical scheme upon an international reality enormously recalcitrant to its shape. The nature of 'authority' in an anarchy having some quasi-governmental institutions is an area of enquiry to which more may be encouraged to turn by Easton's manifest failure to accommodate - and perhaps to comprehend - it. The field stands in need of clarification on such matters as, for instance, the effect of General Assembly resolutions within the international system.²¹

¹⁹Ibid., 284-5.

²⁰Ibid., 484-5.

²¹Gabriella Rosner Lande, "The Effect of the Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly", World Politics, XIX, 1 (Oct. 1966), 83-105.

In conclusion, we may readily admit of the application of systems terminology and conceptualization in respect of international society - acknowledging the generality of the systems perspective - but this is not per se to endorse each and every formulation of system as applicable to the specific, concrete international field. The Easton scheme has value only of a negative sort, it would appear: it may be used as a stone upon which to hone a more suitable blade, as an Aunt Sally, but it does not constitute even an adequate introduction to viewing system internationally.

Of more positive value are certain other works, applying the systems analysis perspective more narrowly, focusing upon the international system (or systems) and thereby avoiding the distortion which might be called 'domesticism'. Chief among these works is Morton Kaplan's System and Process in International Politics,²² the pioneering work in this, as in many other fields of scientific theory in its international relations applications. In System and Process Kaplan is writing abstractly, though his conclusions and procedures are expected and hoped to have considerable relevance to empirical reality. The work has several dimensions, being directed towards the employment of (then-new) scientific perspectives in a number of ways. Kaplan approaches separately four important aspects of the subject and treats them theoretically, namely: the overall system; the processes of interaction of units within it; values; and strategy. Each of these aspects is allotted a part of the work and the resultant discrete nature of the volume makes for difficulty in

²²Op. cit.

assembling a detailed exposition of a cohesive, integrated type. Though there is a (very brief) chapter (the twelfth) presenting a "unified theory", it is a fault of the book that the theoretical richness of its several parts is not matched by the impact of a coherent whole. This is only to be regretted, though it is not perhaps reasonable to expect everything from a work which encapsulates such important innovations and refinements as does System and Process; it means, however, that the expository effort devoted to other works is less readily applicable and fruitful for this - it is important that the scale of treatment here is not taken as indicative of the view of this writer of the relative worth of, say, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, on the one hand, and Kaplan, on the other.

The most important - and most widely remarked - element of the analysis revolves about Kaplan's elaboration of the structure of (various types of) international systems, which in his view determines the process - the working - of those systems. The study of the subject has long recognized intuitively, and empirically in so far as research has taken place, that there will be differences in the international relations of worlds differently constituted - that, for instance, the world of 1924 differed from that of 1914, and both from that ^{of} 1715 as of 2000 B.C. Kaplan attempts to make our understanding of the nature of, and reasons for, such differences more firmly based by specifying the most significant variables - such as the presence or otherwise of an international organization, and its character; the number, and relative weight, of the sovereign

units comprising the international society; the extent of hostilities and alliances among states; the ethos of the system - for example the perceptions entertained of international roles enjoined by some such doctrine as that of the 'balance of power'. Ultimately, Kaplan is hopeful that it will be possible to attain some degree of predictive skill in assessing the nature of a particular international systemic reality and therefrom inferring the ways in which it will operate or develop.²³ To this end he seeks to determine the distinct past, and likely possible future, ideal-type international systems; it is in the context of the models adduced that the author develops his hypotheses concerning the inter-relationships of structure and process in international systems. Of these, Kaplan specifies six, respectively named, the 'balance of power' system; the loose bipolar system; the tight bipolar system; the universal system; the hierarchical system (encompassing directive and non-directive varieties); and the unit veto system.²⁴ (These are for the most part what their labels suggest; the 'unit veto' system is of a singular kind - though one conceivable, indeed conceived by Kahn - in which each member is capable of destroying any other but is not capable of preventing its own destruction simultaneously.) Kaplan also explores the mechanism of transformation of systems one to another.

It is of interest to look a little more closely at one of Kaplan's systems - the 'balance of power' system, one of the two outlined which has existed historically. This system lacks an over-

²³Chapter 3, "The International Actors".

²⁴Ibid., 21ff.

arching - or rather interconnecting - organizational dimension, but a degree of centrality and cohesive, purposive behaviour is lent to the system by a number of "essential rules" respected by component states as the precepts enjoined and endorsed by the doctrinal valuation placed upon balance and equilibrium. These rules specify in some detail the behaviour characteristic of this type of system: 1. act to increase capabilities but negotiate rather than fight; 2. fight rather than pass up an opportunity to increase capabilities; 3. stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national actor; 4. act to oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to assume a position of predominance; 5. act to constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizing principles; 6. permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to re-enter the system as acceptable role partners or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification. Treat all essential actors as acceptable role partners. In somewhat more rigorous language, these rules specify the characteristics of diplomatic and political motivation and moderation which we regard as typical of the 17th and 18th centuries of European history - the golden era of the 'balance of power'. Objections may be made, however. The first rule applies to all international relations; the second is stated in a way which seems to exclude the diplomatic adjustment, by negotiation, which was a very significant feature of balance systems; moreover, it is dubious whether states did or would now be ready to restrain themselves before point at which the "elimination" of a state as an-"essential actor" would ensue -

for the maintenance of the balance system cannot truly be said to have been the constant, overriding objective of all the states within it: Britain, widely supposed to have been manipulating the 19th century international system to maintain an equilibrium, can equally be seen as operating a hegemonial sway - in limited but significant areas - over the system. On the point of elimination, to return to that, it was not the case that the submergence of essential national actors was technologically or administratively feasible in the (supposedly) golden era of the balance of power - Poland was not an essential actor by any criteria. On balance, therefore, Kaplan's rules cannot be accepted as wholly satisfactory, because they are not adequately isomorphic with reality.

While Kaplan's general thesis of the determinacy of system structure in shaping system process has great attractiveness, the particular nature of his abstract assertions concerning the relationship in various systems is open to question. This is in part the result of his having elaborated four of his six systems by a completely hypothetical and speculative process of reasoning; nor does the confident use of scientific terminology and his penchant for enunciating dogmatically what ought only to be asserted tentatively lessen the analytical dangers to which his work is subject. For all this, the work is of seminal importance - not only in the scientific-theoretical school but, for its truly enormous heuristic value, in less rigorous quarters. Even without the fallacy of 'domesticism' to which we referred above the systems theorist can

be liable to error - particularly if his analysis is pitched at a level of abstraction which allows the lines of general systems theory to overwhelm the substantive nature of the particular reality to which it is applied.

One adherent of the systems approach who attempts to avoid the dangers inherent in this over-abstraction is Richard N. Rosecrance, whose Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective²⁵ intendedly eschews both the 'general explanatory concepts' pitfall of abstraction and the 'detailed empirical analysis' pitfall of over-particularization (of which schools typical examples are, respectively, Kaplan and Snyder). Rosecrance is seeking a via media allowing the blending of systematic and empirical concepts and techniques - attempting to get the best of both worlds but ready to acknowledge the drawbacks of such a compromise: "...the approach of systematic empirical analysis would pay attention to the largest trees, but not to all trees; it would look at the forest, but probably fail to see all of it."²⁶ His intention is to ground his analysis in diplomatic historical data in order to give flesh to the skeleton of systems theory, and this exercise takes up the bulk of the volume. The identification and listing of international systems is an operation open to objection, and the classification adopted by Rosecrance has been criticised on the ground that his specification of systems - all of which he draws from actual historical experience - is too rigorous and prone to subdivision, in accordance with "traditional divisions of historical

²⁵(Boston, 1963)

²⁶Ibid., 5.

scholarship"²⁷ which have not been framed in terms of, and allegedly do not reflect, significant changes in "the mode of conducting international relations".²⁸ Within the time-scale covered by the Kaplan 'balance of power' system model - say, from the mid-18th century until the penultimate decade of the 19th century - Rosecrance discerns as many as six systems, marked off one from another by "bench marks" of importance in the character of international intercourse. Whether the most valuable system specification is - or is nearer to - that of Kaplan or that of Rosecrance is unclear, though it would seem evident that formulations of wider or narrower gauge systems perspectives would be very much less isomorphic with reality as so far experienced. Having worked through his depiction of, altogether, nine separate international systems Rosecrance concludes with a theoretical section in which a major objective is to accommodate the problem of systemic change which, he fairly observes, is not at all well treated in Kaplan and other writings. In a sense Rosecrance goes further than Kaplan in abstracting, for he constructs a mathematical formulation of the variables of greatest significance in in international systems.²⁹ Here he is resorting to formal systems theory and analogizing and it cannot be said that his scientific-theoretical formulae can be readily converted into quantifiably valuable hypotheses in terms of his previous, in many ways most helpful (though arguably prone to distort accepted historiography) empirical representations of past systems (or anyway 'states' of the ongoing system). Rosecrance has not - at least yet - developed the true golden mean of abstract and concrete, theoretical and

²⁷Ibid., 7.

²⁸Loc. cit.

²⁹Ibid., 224ff.

empirical, which he sought.

Systems analysis - understood catholically as encompassing, as borrowing from, a variety of scientific-theoretical concepts and techniques, including inter alia cybernetics and communications theory, and (several varieties of) equilibrium analysis - has constituted the most challenging area in the contemporary explosion of theorizing within the field. That is not to say that it has been outstandingly productive - of operational hypotheses, useful empirical work, and so forth; but it has promised much, and hence canalized much energy into, more careful theorizing. The system concept, though essentially simple, and heuristically beneficial even at low levels of the subject, has in a sense become the dominant substantive idea of International Relations. Though there are those who warn of the dangers inherent in teaching as well as researching in the light of the systems perspective alone, it is probable that the general progress of the subject will be largely carried out in terms of, and owe a very great intellectual debt to, these early proponents of 'thinking system'.

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Curriculum Vitae

Born in London, England, July 1943.

Secondary School Education in Enfield, Middlesex, 1954-59; and in Edmonton, London, 1959-61.

University Education:

London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1961-64, graduating with B.Sc. (Econ.) with honours (Upper Second Class Division) in International Relations.

Lehigh University, 1964-66, reading for M.A. in International Relations.

London School of Economics, 1966-, engaging in research for Ph.D. in International Relations.

Teaching Experience:

Graduate Teaching Assistantship in International Relations at Lehigh University, 1964-66.

Tutorship in International Relations at London School of Economics, 1966-67.

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