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# Indian policy and the new york fur trade, 1674-1765

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INDIAN POLICY AND THE NEW YORK FUR TRADE,

1674-1765

By

Stephen H. Cutcliffe

A THESIS

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in Candidacy for the Degree of

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of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

April 19, 1973  
(date)

Lawrence A. Ceder  
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## Abstract

Fur of all varieties, but especially beaver, had long been an important concern of English economic interests, primarily for the production of clothing, especially hats. England discovered in New York a ready source of beaver pelts; France, from its Canadian base, also sought to monopolize the fur trade. In a see-saw struggle for control of the trade and North America, New York became the fulcrum. The geographic location of the Iroquois Confederation of Indians in western New York gave them a position as the balance of power between the French and English colonies in North America.

England and New York continued a policy of preserving Indian good will throughout the late seventeenth-and eighteenth centuries. However, the reasons behind this Indian policy changed with the passage of time. Because of their location, the Iroquois came to play an increasingly important role as a buffer between Canada and the English colonies, especially after 1750. The Iroquois nations recognized their position and tried to utilize it to their advantage after 1701 by maintaining their neutrality. Declining strength and numbers inclined the Six Nations increasingly to favor the British as the eighteenth century progressed and as it became obvious England would ultimately triumph over France.

New York's Indian policy was often hesitant and contradictory

until mid-century, when imperial policy became fairly consistent. English awareness of market potentials in the colonies forced it to consolidate control of Indian affairs to protect those markets. After the coming of peace in 1763, the fur trade shifted to Canada, ironically leaving New York without profit from the trade which its Indian policy was originally designed to protect. Export figures for New York outlined the importance of beaver and other furs to the colony's economy. These figures also demonstrated that fur was not a reason for changes in Indian policy, but rather that the fur trade fluctuated with periods of war and peace.

## INTRODUCTION

Fur trade and Indian policies presented more than frontier problems for French and English North American colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Fur, especially beaver, had great importance for the politics and economics of many nations and often helped bring on wars. New York, an important outpost of the British Empire between 1664 and 1775, became a focal point in the Anglo-French struggle for control of the fur trade and North America, especially during the years 1674-1765. Geographic advantages favored the English in New York. The Hudson-Mohawk transportation route, which controlled the flow of trade goods to the North and West, aroused the jealousy of France.<sup>1</sup>

The British generally evaluated their colonies in terms of their commercial importance. They sought complementary interaction of mother country and colony, with economic self-sufficiency for the empire as the ultimate goal. Colonies in the early years were expected to provide a supply of raw goods not otherwise available at home. England did not totally fail to

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1. Paul C. Philips, The Fur Trade (Norman, Okla., 1961), I, xx, 249, 392; David M. Ellis, A Short History of New York State (Ithaca, 1957), 50, 52. A map of New York and the surrounding area is included in the Appendix.



notice its colonies' market possibilities, but not until the 1740s did they become significant as markets for manufactured goods. New York commerce during the colonial period consisted largely of the exchange of raw materials, mostly foodstuffs, for manufactures and semi-tropical products.<sup>2</sup> Its merchants often turned to the West Indies for markets, for Great Britain itself did not take much of New York's produce beyond fur, flaxseed, potash, and some iron. While fur maintained its importance as an export throughout the period, wheat soon surpassed it in total value.<sup>3</sup>

England, dependent on northern Europe for its fur supply until the seventeenth century, entered the "modern age" of the fur trade with the discovery of America. Initially, New England was the center of this trade, but by the mid-seventeenth century, the fur trade shifted to the middle colonies. The Iroquois Indians, located on the major trade routes to the Ohio-Mississippi valleys, held the key to this prime fur country, and both the French and English had to deal with this confederation of tribes

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2. George L. Beer, British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765 (New York, 1922), 134-138; Ellis, Short History of New York, 81. Michael Kammen's Empire and Interest (Philadelphia, 1970) contains a good discussion of mercantile theory.

3. Ellis, Short History of New York, 81-82. The Import and Export Ledgers of the Customs Office in the British Public Record Office give a good overall view of the products exported from New York to London and their value. Hereafter they will be referred to as Customs 3.

and its allies.<sup>4</sup>

France and England viewed each other as natural enemies and each sought to protect itself and its colonies as they expanded their frontiers toward one another. Seizure of territory and trade routes was their primary goal, requiring both France and England to extend their influence over trade and to ally with the Indians. Each nation's policy called for its rival's expulsion from the Indian country in order to monopolize as large a proportion of the fur trade as possible.<sup>5</sup>

Charles McIlwain, in his introduction to Peter Wraxall's Abridgment of the New York Indian Records, 1678-1751, stated that trade totally dominated eighteenth-century New York Indian affairs. "Trade and [Indian] policy were inseperable, but trade was the ultimate end of all policy; it was also practically the sole means

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4. Murray G. Lawson, Fur, A Study in English Mercantilism, 1700-1775 (Toronto, 1943), 32; Philips, The Fur Trade, 248-249; Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1924), IV, 283, 294. For a good study on seventeenth century New York Indian affairs see Allen W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century (Ithaca, 1960). The Iroquois, also known as the Six Nations, consisted of six tribes: the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Seneca, Cayuga, and after 1712 the Tuscarora.

5. Osgood, American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, 284-285, 300-301; Col. Johnson to Gov. Clinton, Sept. 25, 1750 and Marquis de la Jonquiere to Gov. Clinton, Aug. 10, 1751, Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York (11 vols., Albany, 1853-1867), VI, 599-600, 731-734 (hereafter cited as O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs.).

in all Indian relations". British and colonial New Yorkers alike sought Indian friendship primarily to control the fur trade, especially during the latter part of the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth centuries.<sup>6</sup>

However, a subtle change in Indian policy developed as the eighteenth century progressed. McIlwain noted that a representative of the Six Nations told the New York Governor in 1735 that "Trade and Peace we take to be one thing." Although his assertion supported McIlwain's contention, it also gave rise to questions concerning the effects of war upon trade, especially as the English came to recognize that the Indians' military importance overshadowed their trade role.

This changed English outlook was fairly well-defined in its Indian policy by 1750. England had recognized that the major value of the Iroquois no longer lay in their function as fur gatherers, but rather in their role as a military ally, or at the very least as a neutral deterrent, against the French in Canada. Archibald Kennedy, New York customs collector, perhaps expressed this most

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6. Peter Wraxall, An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs... Transacted in the Colony of New York, from the year 1678 to the year 1751, ed., Charles H. McIlwain (Cambridge, Mass., 1915), xl; Wilbur R. Jacobs, Diplomacy and Indian Gifts: Anglo-French Rivalry Along the Ohio and Northwest Frontiers, 1748-1763 (Stanford, 1950), 42-43; Stanley C. Smoyer, "Indians as Allies in the Inter-colonial Wars," Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association, XXXIV (1936), 411-422.

cogently in a 1751 pamphlet concerning the importance of the Indians to the British. He noted the continued value of the fur trade, but stressed that "whatever Pretences may be made, it is absolutely true, that the Preservation of the whole Continent, depends upon a proper Regulation of the Six Nations."<sup>7</sup>

Kennedy made several suggestions for regulating the Iroquois and the fur trade, many of which the British later adapted for their Indian policy. He believed that settlers from Holland, Ireland, and Scotland, if encouraged by free land, would help preserve frontier tranquility. New York and the other colonies should jointly construct forts and blockades along the frontier for protection, and a series of smoke signals and gunshots would then warn of French and Indian raids.

Protection of Indian allies, prevention of abuses against the natives, and fair trade regulations became the means of maintaining Iroquois friendship. Since friendly Indians hesitated to go on expeditions for the British for fear of losing their castles while absent, Kennedy recommended erection of forts in each of the Six Nations to protect their land, women, and children and,

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7. McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, xl, 195; Archibald Kennedy, The Importance of Gaining and Preserving the Friendship of the Indians to the British Interest Considered (New York, 1851), 7. Milton M. Klein's "Archibald Kennedy; Imperial Pamphleteer" in Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The Colonial Legacy (4 vols., New York, 1971-73), II, 75-105, provides an excellent summary of Kennedy's political career and his special concern with Indian affairs.

therefore, to quiet those fears. Kennedy also noted that Albany fur traders continually abused the Indians. He suggested the appointment of a single Indian commissioner of high integrity to regulate the trade. Several interpreters and gunsmiths would help the commissioner in his reports and inspections, and all such public servants would refrain from trade with the Indians. Finally Kennedy stated that prices of both trade goods and furs must remain fixed and that trade should be free and open for everyone, "as all Monopolies are the Bane of Trade." Only by such means could the English undersell the French and control the whole Indian trade.<sup>8</sup>

The evolution of such an Indian policy can also be seen in the fluctuating statistics of the fur trade: specifically in the amounts of fur and beaver exported; and in fur as a percentage of all exports from New York to Great Britain. An analysis of import and export statistics helps clarify what happened in the New York fur trade, and when and how this trade affected Indian policy (see the Appendix). If the fur trade had importance for New York, Indian policy offers an understanding of its evolution. The interplay of two aspects, Indian policy and the fur trade, provides the theme of this study.

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8. Kennedy, Importance of Gaining and Preserving, 7-15.

By contrast, most historians' treatments of fur trade and British Indian policy ignore how interactions between the two help to explain the development of both. Historians have produced a varied body of work on North American Indians, but most of the literature in the field takes an ethnological point of view.<sup>9</sup> Frederick W. Hodge's edited Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico and George S. Snyderman's Behind the Tree of Peace provide a good ethnological background for the study of Indians in the United States and Canada and of the Iroquois Confederation in particular. Of the material that does deal with the above two aspects only a portion is directly concerned with New York.

Two unpublished dissertations reflect developments in the fur trade in the colonies surrounding New York. William I. Roberts', The Fur Trade of New England in the Seventeenth Century, described the importance of the early fur trade during the first century of British settlement and prior to the trade's shift to the middle colonies. More valuable to the scope of this study is the dissertation of Francis P. Jennings, Miquon's Passing, Indian-European Relations in Colonial Pennsylvania, 1674-1755. In

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9. Two bibliographical compilations extremely helpful to the study of American Indians are Frederick J. Dockstader, Graduate Studies on the American Indian: A Bibliography of Theses and Dissertations (New York, 1957) and William N. Fenton, American Indian and White Relations to 1830: Needs and Opportunities for Study (Chapel Hill, 1957). Full citations to the works which follow can be found in the bibliography contained at the end of this paper.

conjunction with several recent articles appearing in the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Jennings discussed Indian relations with the Europeans and the gradual deterioration of peace in Pennsylvania between whites and natives during the eighteenth century. The following study should help fill the existing gap between studies of New England and of Pennsylvania.

Recent historians of colonial New York have not totally neglected the importance of the fur trade to that colony, but have instead struggled first to sort out the confusion in the colony's politically factional and therefore confusing history. Lawrence H. Leder's Robert Livingston, 1654-1728, and the Politics of Colonial New York and Stanley N. Katz's Newcastle's New York, Anglo-American Politics, 1732-1753 provide an excellent political framework from which to delve further into British Indian policy. Both authors noted the important role Indians played in New York's economy and also as a military buffer against the French. To fully understand the interaction of the fur trade and New York's Indian policy, one further step is necessary: An analysis of import and export statistics, which was beyond the scope and intention of Leder and Katz, provides a clarification of the traditional documentary evidence.

Of those studies which do deal with the fur trade in general, only Murray G. Lawson's Fur: A Study in English Mercantilism makes use of the statistical material available in the British

customs records. Lawson dealt primarily with the British hat industry, which was the principle user of beaver pelts, rather than in terms of a developing Indian policy. Furthermore, his statistics for New York vary widely from those determined by this investigation. Lawson's use of five and ten year time periods concealed marked variations in the fur trade, which reflected important developments in both the trade and in Indian policy. His general conclusion that fur played an insignificant role in the total colonial economy does not hold for New York alone, as the subsequent data clearly shows. For New York at least there exists a need to clarify this misconception.

Although little secondary literature pertaining to New York Indian policy in the eighteenth century exists, historians have produced a somewhat larger body of material on the seventeenth century. Allen W. Trelease's Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century must stand as the definitive work on this aspect of New York's history. His analysis of earlier misconceptions concerning the development of the Iroquois Confederation and their supposed savage nature provides the basis for further study in the eighteenth century. Trelease's utilization of sources and his organizational framework were an important guide for the approach taken in this study, particularly in the first chapter dealing with the late seventeenth century.



The significant lack of secondary literature on New York's Indian policy determined the scope of this study and necessitated the extensive reliance upon primary materials. In general, eighteenth century New York has only recently merited the attention it deserves, and many aspects of the colony's development remain untouched. In short, because of New York's economic and political importance, its fur trade and the Indian policy, which accompanied the former's evolution, merit closer study than they have hitherto received. Hopefully this study will fulfill that need.

CHAPTER I  
EVOLUTION OF THE COVENANT CHAIN AND ANGLO-IROQUOIS RELATIONS,  
1674-1701

Two themes are basic to an understanding of the fur trade and Indian policy as they developed in New York during the last quarter of the seventeenth century. These themes also provide the basis for the evolution of trade and policy in the following century. First, a general outline of the nature of the fur trade in its geographical, economic, and social aspects is necessary for an understanding of how and why New York's Indian policy developed as it did. Second, an explanation of the Covenant Chain is vital for a comprehension of the relationships between the English and the Indians, and among the latter themselves.

The Covenant Chain metaphorically represented the friendship and varied degrees of affinity between the several parties, both English and native, involved with the fur trade and other areas of intercourse. In conjunction with the evolution of the Covenant Chain, and most important in this time period, was the Indians' development of a policy of neutrality during the last quarter of the seventeenth century. The Indians, especially the Iroquois, feared elimination if either the French or the English

monopolized the fur trade. The Indians recognized that their geographic location and economic role as fur-gatherers placed them in a position of strength if they could become the balance of power between the two European nations. Consequently, they adopted a policy of neutrality to maintain their identity and economic viability. This desire for neutrality, which evolved during a series of wars, emphasized the importance of fur, not only in an economic sense for both New York and the Indians, but also in terms of the resultant English policy toward the Indians.

By 1701 this series of events readied New Yorkers for a growing awareness of the Indians' value as a military ally and buffer against the French. While this policy would not achieve a unified imperial formulation until the 1750s, the format in which it would occur had unfolded by the turn of the century.

European expansion and its accompanying trade goods originally attracted the Indians rather than repelled them. The attractiveness of trade goods traveled by word of mouth and example faster and further inland than the rate of European settlement. A desire for previously unobtainable items such as firearms and ammunition, manufactured textiles, and metal goods often existed well before any actual face-to-face contact between the two civilizations. Friendly Indians provided the white man with already cleared farm land, trade routes into the interior, and

furs (especially beaver) in return for goods which were at first luxury items but quickly became necessities for the natives.

England initially obtained its furs from the New England colonies. However, when England conquered Dutch New Netherland in the second half of the seventeenth century, the trade shifted to New York. New Netherland had existed primarily for the Indian trade, and the advent of English control in 1674 did little to change the nature of Albany's Indian trade.<sup>1</sup> The town's geographic location made it the logical choice from which to control the colony's fur trade. The Mohawk River reached west and brought furs from as far away as the Ohio-Mississippi valleys. In turn, the Hudson River flowing southward from Albany provided an outlet to English markets.

Expanding competition for a limited fur supply brought on large-scale inter-tribal warfare, which continued until the turn of the century. Despite this warfare, the English formed an alliance with the Iroquois nations lying to the west of Albany. During the century of English control, the Five Nations acted both as procurers of the desired fur and as a military buffer against the

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1. Philips, The Fur Trade, 15, 246; Lawson, Fur, 33; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 215; Francis Jennings, "Glory, Death, and Transfiguration: The Susquehannock Indians in the Seventeenth Century," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, CXII (1968), 23.

French in Canada.<sup>2</sup>

In the struggle which evolved for control of the Iroquois, the French suffered a serious economic disadvantage. English woolen textiles, known as duffels and strouds, were more desirable and useful than French luxury cloths. While the French traded with brandy, the Albany handlaers (traders) provided the Indians with much larger quantities of rum for the same amount of fur. Added to this, the French incurred much higher shipping costs, which correspondingly increased their trading prices, giving the English a two-fold advantage.<sup>3</sup>

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2. Lawrence H. Leder, Robert Livingston, 1654-1728, and the Politics of Colonial New York (Chapel Hill, 1961), 12; McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, xxxv-xxxviii; Francis Jennings, "The Indian Trade of the Susquehanna Valley," Proceedings of the American Philological Society, CX (1966), 407. Arthur Buffington described Albany's dominance in the following manner: "governors came and went, reflecting temporarily the policy or lack of policy of the British government, or developing one of their own; but the one constant factor in British Indian policy was the policy of Albany." Arthur A. Buffington, "The Policy of Albany and English Westward Expansion," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, VIII (1922), 335.

3. Leder, Robert Livingston, 47. The following is a comparative price list from 1689 of commodities for which the Indian traded at both Montreal and Albany.

	<u>Albany</u>	<u>Montreal</u>
8 pounds of powder	1 beaver	4 beaver
A gun	2	5
40 pounds of lead	1	3
A blanket of red cloth	1	2
A white blanket	1	2
4 shirts	1	2
6 pairs of stockings	1	2

See O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IX, 408-409.

Transactions of Indian affairs usually occurred in Albany, although more and more envoys ventured into Indian country as the years passed. Indian conferences took place in the fort until the 1760s, after which they were conducted in the court house. Early contacts consisted largely of meetings with single Indians or small groups at odd times during the year. Large full-dress councils did not occur much until after 1664, but by 1690 they had become annual affairs. An exchange of presents was very important as an indication of sincerity, although in the beginning the gifts themselves often were not large. Consisting primarily of strouds, rum, powder, lead, and some guns, these presents at first totaled only about £ 150 a year but by the end of the century had reached more than £ 500.<sup>4</sup>

As Indian affairs became increasingly important, so did the individuals who served as envoys and interpreters. Gerrit Luycasse was the first real envoy, spending the fall of 1690 at Onondaga. He was quickly followed by Arnout Cornelisse Viele, also an interpreter, who spent the following winter among the Indians. These interpreters served not only at conferences, but also as messengers and diplomatic agents to the Iroquois. One of the

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4. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 210-213; Information of the Reverend Mr. Miller respecting New York, Sept. 4, 1696, Proceedings of the Board of Trade, Sept. 12, 1696, Robert Livingston to Lords of Trade, May 13, 1701, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 183, 186, 876.

earliest of these was Akus Cornelis during the 1680s.<sup>5</sup> Agents and envoys served under the orders of the Indian Commissioners and the governors who, in large part, determined the direction of Indian policy.

The fur trade played a vital role in New York's economy in the seventeenth century. Much of the colony's Indian policy developed according to the exigencies of that trade, and an explication of its importance will help explain the vacillating positions of the major participants within the context of the Covenant Chain. Several events during this period brought into focus the significance of fur for the colony.

Colonel Thomas Dongan became New York's governor in 1683, and under his guidance Indian policy assumed a more aggressive tone than before. Dongan's involvement in the controversy over the Susquehanna Indian lands emphasized the continued importance of the fur trade to New York, despite its increasing rivalry with the French. The new colony of Pennsylvania, under the leadership of William Penn, hoped to buy a large tract of Indian land along the Susquehanna River and to establish a fur trade which would threaten Albany's dominance of the western trade. Several investigating Albany court magistrates reported to Dongan their views of the consequences of such a move:

It will tend to ye utter Ruine off ye Bev[e]r Trade....  
Wee Presume that there hath not anything ever been moved

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5. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 210-211.

or agitated from ye first settling of these Parts, more Prejudiciall to his Royall highnesse Interest, and ye Inhabitants of this his governm[en]t, then this business of ye Susquehenne River. The French its true have Endeavoured to take away our trade, be Peace meals but this will cutt it off att once.

To exclude Penn from this area, Dongan accepted the cession of the entire Susquehanna valley by the Iroquois. Such a grant required proof of ownership, which the Iroquois could claim only by right of conquest. A fiction concerning an Iroquois conquest of the Susquehannocks, who occupied the area, emerged at this time to provide a foundation for this transaction. Dongan shortly thereafter persuaded the Iroquois to renew their grant, since he had received instructions from the Duke of York "to preserve the Indian Trade as entire as I can for the Benefitt of the Inhabitants and traders of New York preferably to all others." Governor Dongan, although not the first to realize the value of the West for the fur trade, was the first to try to gain control of it for England. He intended to replace Canada's influence over the western tribes with that of New York, and to achieve that goal he willingly made use of the Albany fur trade and the Iroquois confederacy.<sup>6</sup>

A series of raids and intermittant warfare conducted by the Iroquois against the French and their Indians continued until

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6. Ibid., 254-256, 260; Jennings, "Glory, Death, and Transfiguration," 44; Jennings, "Indian Trade of the Susquehanna Valley," 408; Duke of York to Gov. Dongan, Aug. 26, 1684, O'Callahan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 349.



1684, when both sides, weary of war, agreed to a cessation. The end of Iroquois raids against the western tribes increased the fur trade at Albany in 1685 because both natives and traders alike could freely gather furs. Subsequently, one of Dongan's plans involved sending fur traders directly to the Ottawa, which contradicted his past policy of centralizing trade in Albany. By the fall of 1684 Dongan had begun to issue passes for traders to go into the far reaches of the province. A 1685 trading party led by Johannes Roseboom of Albany was the most important of these. Reaching the Ottawa country, they found themselves received with great enthusiasm because of the low English prices, and the Indians invited them to return every year. In 1686 Dongan organized a much larger expedition consisting of two separate parties. He hoped to establish a trade, to send Iroquois envoys with the mission to arrange a prisoner exchange, and to set up a peace conference with the Ottawa. The first group, under the command of Roseboom, was to leave Albany in September, winter in the Seneca country, and go to Michilimackinac in the spring. Early the following spring a second group led by Major Patrick Magregory would leave Albany, overtake the Roseboom party, and accompany it to the Ottawa country. Iroquois refusal to negotiate ruined the peace mission, while a lost message insured failure of the trade aspect.

Dongan, after learning of a new French garrison at Detroit, ordered Roseboom to remain in his winter quarters until Magregory joined him. Never having received the message, however, Roseboom's small group set out, and a much larger force of French and Indians apprehended them on Lake Huron. Shortly thereafter Magregory's party succumbed to a similar fate. The French returned to Niagara and sent their prisoners on to Quebec; the prisoners obtained their release several months later. Dongan's attempt to gain control of the western fur trade failed because he overestimated English power in the region. The French had too much at stake to allow the English to continue such experiments as Roseboom's, and the English could not commit a large enough force to overcome French hostility.

Dongan's purposes in furthering the fur trade had been both economic and political, for he desired not only to increase the province's wealth, but to strengthen New York by enlarging the volume of the Albany fur trade. England's natural advantages over the French might have increased New York's trade without political involvement, but the fur trade depended upon the Indians, a factor beyond the colony's control. This led to Dongan's political approach, which brought about warfare between New York and France. However, England refused to pay the cost, leaving the expense largely to the colony. Dongan's efforts were too

ambitious for most of his successors to continue, but a claim of sovereignty over the Iroquois and the attempt to use them against the French would eventually become the basis of New York's Indian<sup>8</sup> policy.

Fur played a vital role throughout the seventeenth century in determining the direction and scope of New York's Indian policy. However, the exact size of New York's fur trade cannot be calculated during this period. In 1656 and 1657 Albany traders shipped approximately 46,000 skins down river. Warfare, which started with Iroquois raids against the western tribes in the 1680s and persisted until the 1701 neutrality settlement, and which was fostered by the desire of both the French and the English to control the beaver lands and the Indians, ironically limited the flow of skins. Only 5,000 to 15,000 of them reached New York for export during the last two decades of the century. When the Indians returned to harvesting peltry after 1700, they discovered that the demand for beaver had dropped drastically. Hoping to restore the beaver hat to stylistic favor again, the Iroquois gave Lieutenant-Governor John Nanfan "ten Beavers to send to the King praying his Majesty to make a Beaver hat of them and then wee hope all his good subjects will follow his example and were [sic] Beaver hatts again as the fashion was formerly." Many complained

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8. Ibid., 291-294.

of the poor state of the trade, and it subsequently never rose to its former heights. Nevertheless, fur continued to constitute a large percentage of New York's exports and to shape further the evolution of the colony's Indian policy.<sup>9</sup>

The Covenant Chain defined relationships between the English and the Indians. Although the Covenant Chain remained fairly stable as an institution, the members' conceptions of their roles within the institution changed considerably during the late seventeenth century. A policy of Indian neutrality developed in reaction to attempts by both England and France to monopolize the Indians and the fur trade. However, to explain that neutrality it is necessary first to understand the institutionalized aspects of the Covenant Chain.

Sir Edmund Andros arrived in New York in October 1674 as the new English governor. Within a year he had established a board of Indian commissioners and selected Robert Livingston, an Albany merchant, as Secretary for Indian Affairs. Under Livingston's watchful eye, the Albany Indian records were much better kept than previously had been the case. The board's purpose was to invoke some order into the conduct of Indian

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9. Ibid., 216-217, 323-324; Conference of Lt.-Gov. Nanfan with the Indians, July 1701, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 905.

negotiations, and to give the governor a greater voice in them.

During this period, Andros really formulated the concept of the

10  
Covenant Chain.

The earliest antecedents of the Covenant Chain can be traced to alliances between the Indians and the Dutch of New Netherland. Evidence suggests the Covenant Chain was a metaphor for a series of independent alliances made at various times by both the Dutch and the English. River Indians first noted the chain in 1618, although the Mohawks claimed the first alliance occurred in 1643 with the Dutch. A 1703 speech by the Schaahkooks Indians sheds some interesting but inconclusive light on the situation.

Father

It is now Eighty five years since the first Christian came here in this Countrey then wee tyed them with a Roap but now they are fastened with an Iron Chain to the tree of welfair so that wee hither have stood firm to the Covenant Chain with our father.

Despite conflicting evidence, the first real reference to the

Covenant Chain occurred in 1677 after two treaties with the

11  
Iroquois, negotiated by Andros at Albany.

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10. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 207; Leder, Robert Livingston, 15; Jennings, "Glory, Death and Transfiguration," 35; Francis Jennings, "The Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, CXV (1971), 89.

11. Jennings, "Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain," 89-90; Speech of the Schaahkooks Indians, Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The Livingston Indian Records, 1666-1723, Pennsylvania History, XXIII (1956), 191.

Less than a year after Andros took office, King Philip's War erupted in New England. The governor feared a widespread uprising of all Indians against the English. He was especially watchful lest the Mohawks join King Philip, who was wintering near Albany, as many of the Mahicans had already done. Also potentially very dangerous to the New York fur trade would be any alliance between the Pennsylvania Indians, the Lenape and Susquehannock, against Maryland. Governor Andros convinced the Mohawks to push King Philip out of the Hudson area to within reach of the New England militia. Through the 1677 treaties Andros effected a peace between Maryland and the Iroquois and brought the Susquehannock under nominal control of the Iroquois. An address made by several Mohawk sachems to Henry Coursey, Maryland's representative to the conference, showed the first real establishment of the Covenant Chain.

Wee are glad that ...the Governor General hath bein pleased to destinate and appoynt this place [Albany] to Speake with all Nations in peace....Especially that his honor hath bein pleased to Grant you the Priviledge for to Speake with us heir... for the Covenant that is betwixt the Governor Generall and us is Inviolable yea so strong that if the very Thunder should breake upon the Covenant Chayn, it wold not break it in Sunder. 12

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12. Jennings, "Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain," 89-90; Jennings, "Glory, Death, and Transfiguration," 36, 39-40, 43-44; Address of the Mohawks to Henry Coursey, Aug. 6, 1677, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 45-46.

The Covenant Chain differed from both the nuclear League and the extended tributary system of the Iroquois; it combined both Indian and European politics.

The Iroquois constantly pressured their tributaries to furnish warriors for their battles, but the tributaries discriminated in their degree of response. Thus, the Iroquois clearly did not have total mastery of their tributaries. Although the Susquehannocks lost their identity and became one with the Iroquois, it occurred only with their consent. Their addition to the League increased its fighting strength.

The Five Nations benefited from the Covenant, since it included the Lenape and Mahican Indians as buffers. England viewed the Covenant Chain Indians as legally subject to English sovereignty, while the Indians saw the Chain as a group of unequal peers, each with a power and status and the right to govern itself. To the Indians, the British colonies were only a part of the overall Covenant. Flexibility in practical affairs was the Covenant Chain's greatest merit; it also provided stability for Indian relations and a means for England to penetrate areas claimed by France. Nevertheless, the power of the Covenant Chain had its limits, for the Iroquois recognized the impossibility of diverting the desires of the Albany merchants and the governor. Albany was firmly committed to the prosperity of the Indian trade,

which an enlarged covenant helped to increase.<sup>13</sup>

Although the basic outlines of the Covenant Chain were well established by the late 1670s, it remained for the Iroquois to define their specific role within the Chain, *vis-a-vis* the French and the English. French activities, aimed at monopolizing the fur trade and control over the Indians, forced the Five Nations to move cautiously into the British camp. Furthermore, the need to obtain furs to exchange for trade goods, brought the Iroquois into conflict with the western tribes, who had easier access to the richest beaver lands and who were largely under French influence. French depredations in areas which the Iroquois considered to be of primary concern to them during the two decades prior to the Glorious Revolution convinced the Indians that they needed a policy of neutrality, slightly pro-British in nature, for survival. Despite all this, however, the Iroquois never totally submitted to the English, recognizing that almost as great a danger as that of France lurked behind their friendship, which originated out of a similar desire for fur.

During the period 1670-1701 French policy emphasized prevention of an Iroquois-Huron-Ottawa alliance which, if achieved, would send most of the fur south to Albany. *Sieur de*

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13. Jennings, "Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain," 88-96; Jennings, "Glory, Death, and Transfiguration," 44.



Courcelle arrived in Canada in June 1665 to assume the governorship. To overawe the Iroquois with French power, he planned the construction of a fort at the juncture of Lake Ontario and the Saint Lawrence River. It had a three-fold purpose: to keep a military force within reach of the Iroquois, to provide a trading place for both the Ottawa and the Iroquois, and to hinder commerce between these tribes on the lake.

The Comte de Frontenac succeeded Courcelle in 1672. Convinced of the necessity for such a fort, Frontenac finished the work in the summer of 1672. Frontenac, a farsighted governor, had as his ultimate goal French domination of the North American interior. He supervised the construction of another fort at Niagara in 1679. French activity in the West increasingly aroused Iroquois discontent and probably brought on their invasions of the Illinois country after 1677. It certainly contributed to French-Iroquois discord in 1682 and did little to endear the French to Iroquois hearts.<sup>14</sup>

Continued attacks by the Seneca and Cayuga in 1684 against the western Indians failed to differentiate them from the French and caused Lefebvre de la Barre, Frontenac's successor, to plan

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14. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 247-248; Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Origins of Iroquois Neutrality: The Grand Settlement of 1701," Pennsylvania History, XXIV (1957), 225.

his own retaliatory raid. Fearful of the possible consequences, the Iroquois expressed great friendship for the English in return for a promise of military support. Onondaga and Cayuga sachems went so far as to place themselves under English sovereignty. "Wee have putt our selves under the great Sachim Charles that lives over the great lake, and we do give you Two White Drest Dear Skins to be sent to the great Sachim Charles that he may write upon them, and putt a great Redd seale to them."<sup>15</sup>

On the surface it appeared that the Indians had placed themselves in a subsidiary position to the English within the context of the Covenant Chain. In reality, only two tribes had subscribed to this position, and their very real fear of English aims induced them to treat with the French as well. La Barre agreed to meet with the Iroquois upon learning of their desire for peace. A conference opened at La Famine in the Oswego country with representatives of the Oneida, Cayuga, and Onondaga tribes. Knowing that sickness and a paucity of supplies weakened any military threat that La Barre could make, the Iroquois

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15. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 260-264; Proposition of the Onondaga and Cayuga Indians, Aug. 2, 1684, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 417-418.

quickly gained the diplomatic upper hand. In return for a promise to cease hostilities against all except the Illinois, the Iroquois forced La Barre to make immediate peace with them and to withdraw his forces. Because of this diplomatic loss of face, the French king soon replaced La Barre as governor of  
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Canada.

Dongan exaggerated the friendship of the Iroquois at this time, claiming their submission to England gave substance to its claim of sovereignty over the Five Nations. In reality, the Iroquois continued to take an independent stand, giving up the smallest part of their autonomy only when absolutely necessary. They affirmed this to La Barre at La Famine. "We are born free, We neither depend on Yonnondio nor Corlaer. We may go where we please, and carry with us whom we please, and  
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buy and sell what we please." Although hopeful of maintaining this semi-neutral position, the Iroquois soon returned to the English fold. Events in Canada clearly indicated that the French

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16. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 265-267; Papers relating to La Famine Conference, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IX, 236-248, 269.

17. Cadwallader Colden, The History of the Five Nations Depending on the Province of New-York in America (Ithaca, 1969), 55. Yonnondio or Onontio were names given to the Canadian governor similar to that of New York's governor, Corlaer.

were not yet ready to allow the Iroquois to occupy peacefully a neutral role between themselves and the English.

In August 1685 the Marquis de Denonville replaced La Barre as governor in Canada. He soon concluded that a war against at least the Seneca was necessary to insure the safety of his colony and the maintenance of its fur trade. In the meantime, while strengthening his defensive position, Denonville attempted to quiet Iroquois fears with peace talks. Dongan, fearful of French intrigues, especially the building of a fort at Niagara, called the Iroquois together in May 1686. Niagara controlled the fur trade, and both the English and the French desired it. Dongan warned the Indians of the dangers of French forts in their country and charged them "neither to make warr nor Peace with any Christians without my approbacon; and that you will Suffer no frenchmen nor other Christians to live or Build fort or house at onayaggere [Niagara] or any other Place that might hinder the Brethrens Progress in the Bever hunting." The Five Nations recognized the menace of the French as more immediate than that of the English and agreed to prevent the former's construction of forts and to refrain from trading with them. 18

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18. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 271-274; Proposition of Gov. Dongan to Five Nations, May 29, 1686, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 99-102.

Dongan continued to try to thwart French advances, while furthering those of the English. He attempted to get the Iroquois to interfere with all traders not specifically licensed from Albany. When Denonville invited the Iroquois to a conference set for the spring of 1687, Dongan again reminded them of their promises not to treat with the French. Denonville's true plans emerged when the French captured several Iroquois and sent them to France as slaves. England and France signed a treaty of neutrality in late 1686, and official news of it reached New York and Canada in June 1687; however, it left the question of Indian jurisdiction for a later date. Although Dongan fully intended to respect the treaty's intention, Denonville continued to carry out his plan for an attack on the Seneca.<sup>19</sup>

Denonville descended upon the Seneca country in late June 1687 with a force of 3,000 men. Shortly thereafter, 450 Seneca warriors ambushed the advance guard of the French. Under pressure from the main body of Denonville's force, the Seneca finally retreated, and the French could make no further contact with them.

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19. Gov. Dongan to Monsieur de Denonville, Dec. 1, 1686, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 463; Proposals of Mohawks to Albany Magistrates, Feb. 18, 1687, Proposals of Gov. Dongan to Five Nations, Apr. 25, 1687, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 109-113; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 277-278; Jennings, "Indian Trade of the Susquehanna Valley," 408.

They burned the empty Seneca villages and then, exhausted and sick, withdrew to Niagara. Denonville built a fort there and by early August had returned to Montreal, leaving behind a garrison of 100 men.

The French campaign did little save to reestablish the fort at Niagara, for they could not defeat the Seneca. Dongan received full support from the British government after news of the French attack reached England. However, New York's real problem was now financial, as disruption of the fur trade had seriously reduced the colony's revenue. One of the chronic failures of imperial policy was England's unwillingness to support expenditures for frontier defense. Instead, the burden rested on the colonies themselves. France would have been hard pressed to maintain its position if faced with a united effort by England and its colonies.<sup>20</sup>

Renewed peace agreements in Europe forced Dongan to recall the Iroquois from their raids on Canada. Desirous of peace and recognizing that they bargained from a position of strength, the Five Nations again asserted their independence and neutrality. The Iroquois rejected English claims of sovereignty and any inferior

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20. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 279-280, 286-289; Warrant authorizing Gov. Dongan to protect the Five Nations, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 504.

status in relation to the Covenant Chain. Although the Indians had more reason to dislike the French, they desired to remain aloof from too close a connection with either European nation, unless it benefited them to do so in a specific instance. While the value of neutrality had become clear to the Iroquois, they found it difficult to maintain such a position.<sup>21</sup>

Sir Edmund Andros returned to the colony in August 1688 as governor of the new Dominion of New England, which now included New York. King James approved of Dongan's Indian policy and made no attempt to change it. Rather, the king viewed the Dominion as an attempt to confront Canada from a stronger and more united position.<sup>22</sup>

Peace lasted only until 1689 when the Iroquois became involved in a larger war between France and England resulting from the English Glorious Revolution. The Iroquois found themselves once again the pawns of stronger European powers. Until they could enforce their position as both a sovereign and neutral entity, the Five Nations remained in a state of flux.

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21. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 289-290; Declaration of Neutrality by three Iroquois Nations, June 15, 1688, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IX, 384-386.

22. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 290-291; Instructions for Sir Edmund Andros, Apr. 16, 1688, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 548-549.

Although the Indians tended to side with the English, in their eyes it was as an ally of equal status, rather than as a subordinate to Britain. As the war dragged on the Iroquois increasingly desired peace and neutrality, which they viewed as necessary to their very existence.

William of Orange assumed the English throne in February 1689, and England soon joined in the war against France which was already raging on the Continent. In the American phase of the Glorious Revolution, Bostonians overthrew Governor Andros in April, and Jacob Leisler assumed control in New York after Lieutenant-Governor Francis Nicholson fled the colony in June. The War of the League of Augsburg, known in the colonies as King William's War, lasted until the Peace of Ryswick, in 1697. However, the Iroquois did not consider it over until they signed<sup>23</sup> their own separate peace treaties four years later in 1701.

Distinctly American peculiarities marked this conflict. In New York it was largely a continuation of previous discord between the French, English, and Iroquois. The Iroquois feared a combined plot of both France and England to eliminate them.

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23. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 295-296; Leder, Robert Livingston, 61; also see Lawrence H. Leder, "The Glorious Revolution and the Pattern of Imperial Relationships," New York History XLVI (1965), 203-211.



Shortly after receiving reassurance that this was a false rumor, the Indians resumed hostilities against the French for previously unappeased grievances. Nicholson did not object to this, although he refused members of the 1687 Roseboom-Magregory expedition permission to raid Canada in revenge for their previous losses, largely because he had not yet received definite word concerning the commencement of war. While Nicholson was too reserved for the Albanians, Leisler was too great a firebrand for them. Fearing any upset of their friendly relations with the Iroquois and a possible loss of their fur monopoly, Albany's leaders determined to maintain control of the city until new orders arrived from William and Mary.<sup>24</sup>

On July 26, 1689, 1500 Iroquois warriors attacked and massacred the village of Lachine located about six miles from Montreal. Such attacks by the Five Nations forced Frontenac, who had since returned to Canada, to restrict hostilities to border raids against New England and New York. In retaliation

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24. Leder, Robert Livingston, 61; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 296-297; Stephen Van Cortlandt to Gov. Andros, July 9, 1689, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 592-593; N.Y. Council to Albany Magistrates, May 12, 24, 1689, N.-Y. Hist. Soc., Collections, I (1868), 256-258, 266-267, 285-286.

for the Lachine massacre, Frontenac launched a three-pronged expedition. Two groups attacked Salmon Falls, New Hampshire, and Casco Bay, Maine, while a third descended upon Schenectady on February 9, 1690. Frontenac's forces effectively destroyed Schenectady but also brought a certain unity to the English colonies. Albany, fearful of further French attacks, finally submitted to Leisler in return for continued control of local affairs. They also desired to promote an attack on Canada to insure the elimination of future threats. The New England colonies and Maryland agreed to join New York in raising an expedition of 855 men for the reduction of Canada. Delighted at such prospects, the Iroquois agreed to assist in the joint effort. The expedition failed due to inadequate troops and supplies and to a smallpox epidemic which affected both the Indians and the English.<sup>25</sup>

However, the setback did not immediately weaken the Anglo-Iroquois alliance. Governor Henry Sloughter arrived in New York in March 1691 and, after settling certain governmental affairs, he travelled to Albany to meet with the Iroquois and dispense gifts among the tribes. The Crown's instructions to

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25. Leder, Robert Livingston, 64-67; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 297-304; Proposals of the Commissioners at Albany to the Indians, May 3, 1690, Lt. -Gov. Leisler to Earl of Shrewsbury, June 23, 1690, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 712-714, 731-733.

Sloughter revealed the English conception of relative positions within the Covenant Chain.

You are to encourage the Indians upon all occasions, so as that they may apply themselves to the English Trade and Nation rather than to any others of Europe, ... and upon their renewing their submission to our Government, you are to give them our Royall Presents which we have caused to be provided for them, assuring them in our name that we will protect them as our subjects against the French king and his subjects.

Outwardly professing their allegiance to the British Crown, the Iroquois renewed the Covenant Chain and agreed to join a forthcoming raiding party. The raid had negligible results, and both the English and the Iroquois became increasingly frustrated at the course of the war. New York's problems were again largely financial due to the decline of the fur trade during the war. The colony could not provide for an offensive capability and relied instead on Albany's defenses and whatever support the Iroquois would lend the cause.<sup>26</sup>

Supplies such as guns and ammunition became scarce and more expensive as the war dragged on, increasing the Five Nation's desire for peace. In August 1692 Benjamin Fletcher replaced the

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26. Minutes of the Lords of Trade concerning New York, Aug. 31, 1689, Instructions for Gov. Henry Sloughter, Jan. 31, 1690, Minutes of Indian conference held at Albany, May 26-June 4, 1691, Robert Livingston to Gov. Sloughter, July 2, 1691, Propositions of the Senecas and Mohawks at Albany and the Answer thereunto, Sept. 4, 1691, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 618, 690, 773-780, 783, 806-808.

recently deceased Sloughter. Fletcher's orders to deal with the Iroquois were similar to those of his predecessor. Despite his gifts to the Indians, and despite a request from Queen Mary to the other colonial governors to assist New York in its struggle, little effort was made to prosecute the war vigorously.<sup>27</sup> Fletcher barely averted a crisis with the Indians when Richard Ingoldsby, the commander at Albany, refused to attack the French after they had raided several Mohawk villages. By calling out the militia and by the help of a retaliatory raid led by Peter Schuyler, Fletcher quieted the anger of the Iroquois. Nevertheless, many of the Indians continued to desire peace. Fletcher arranged a large conference with the Five Nations in June 1693 in an attempt to change their minds. Although happy to receive gifts and renew the Covenant Chain, the Indians' fundamental position remained the same.<sup>28</sup>

Aquadacando, an Onondaga sachem, encapsulated well the

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27. N.Y. Council to Mr. Blathwayt, May 30, 1692, Five Nations to Richard Ingoldsby, June 6, 1692, Instructions to Gov. Fletcher, Mar. 7, 1692, Queen to Sir William Phipps (Circular), Oct. 11, 1692, Ibid., III, 837, 842-844, 823, 855-856.

28. Major Ingoldsby to Gov. Fletcher, Feb. 11, 1693, Peter Schuyler's Report to Gov. Fletcher, Journal of Gov. Fletcher's Expedition, Mar. 7, 1693, Gov. Fletcher's Speech to the Indian Sachems and Answer, Feb. 25, 1693, Minutes of Conference with the Five Nations at Albany, June-July, 1693, Ibid., IV, 6-7, 14-24, 38-47.

Iroquois dilemma which would plague them for the rest of the century:

The Mohaques are as if conquered, the Oneijes wavering, the Senekes have great force but [are] more inclined to bever hunting than warr so that the Onondages ly in the greatest danger. You hear in your ears the cry of the women and children for the losse of their husbands and relations, great promises were made now neer five years agoe that Quebeque should be taken by Sea but I dont hear that it is done. I speak not in reference to Our Brother Caijenquiragoe [Fletcher]; he behaves himselfe like a soldier and hath not been long here. New England, Virginia and Maryland hath renewed the Covenant for them but that doth not knock the enemy in the head, so my senses are as drunk not knowing what to doe. 29

Iroquois policy wavered for several years between a desire for peace and neutrality and a willingness by warlike elements of the tribes to continue battle. The Five Nations repeatedly asked for English support for a large-scale attack on Canada and for help when raided by French war parties. However, a continued lack of substantial British aid convinced the Iroquois of the necessity for permanent neutrality and complete balance between England and France. They feared their own annihilation if either nation emerged as the total victor. News of the Peace of Ryswick, signed in October, reached the colonies late in 1697. Eight years of war had done little to solve the basic problems confronting England and France, and the stalemate persisted.

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29. Journal of Major Dirck Wessel's Embassy to Onondaga, Aug., 1693, Ibid., IV, 62.

Curiously enough, the Iroquois found it very difficult to arrive at a viable peace agreement with both the French and the English for another four years.

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Richard Coote, Earl of Bellomont, arrived in New York in April 1698 to take up the governorship of New York, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. The Crown hoped thereby to organize and unite the colonies more effectively against Canada. Shortly thereafter, at Bellomont's orders, Peter Schuyler and Domine Godfrey Dellius travelled to Canada with news of the treaty and instructions to arrange for a prisoner exchange. Frontenac agreeably released his English prisoners, but not his Iroquois ones. He insisted that the Five Nations must conclude a separate treaty with the French, thus challenging English jurisdiction over the tribes. Bellomont met with the Iroquois at Albany in July in order "to continue them faithful and prevent their being debauched by the French kindness or menaces." He returned from the conference convinced that he had regained the friendship of the Five Nations. However, although the Indians agreed to refrain from dealing with the French, they neglected to inform the new governor of negotiations already underway

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30. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 314-323; Leder, Robert Livingston, 134-135.

with Canada for a separate peace.<sup>31</sup>

A variety of abuses against the Iroquois further persuaded them of the need for an independent position within the context of the Covenant Chain. Governor Bellomont quickly became convinced that the Indian commissioners at Albany were misusing their position. Most serious of the complaints came from the Mohawks, who claimed that the commissioners under Fletcher had defrauded them of a part of their lands. This threatened the fur trade and security of the colony, since it weakened Anglo-Iroquois relations. Bellomont removed Fletcher's Indian commissioners and returned their duties to the Albany magistrates. Both the Council and Assembly after some debate agreed to a bill vacating the land grants. Although the law met with mixed reaction, the Crown ultimately upheld its constitutionality.

However, continued abuses kept the Five Nations in a constant state of confusion as to how to balance French and English power. A fear of offending the New York government restrained the Indians in many of their dealings with the French. In reality

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31. Bellomont's Instructions to Schuyler and Delliuss, Apr. 22, 1698, Frontenac to Bellomont, June 8, 1698, Report of Schuyler's and Delliuss' Negotiations in Canada, July 2, 1698, Gov. Bellomont to Lords of Trade, July 1, Sept. 14, 1698, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 341-344, 347-351, 334, 362-364.

a separate peace with Canada, although undesirable from the English point of view, would not have brought down England's wrath upon the Iroquois, since the English feared alienating the Indians.<sup>32</sup>

Immediate need for negotiation evaporated when Chevalier de Callières, Frontenac's successor, released all the French-held Iroquois captives by June 1699. The Five Nations found that peace did not automatically follow the prisoner release, for the western tribes continued their raids into Iroquois country. Commissions appointed under the Treaty of Ryswick continued to discuss the political status of the Indian, but until they reached a specific resolution as to their status, the English could do little to support their allies in this matter. While in Boston in early 1700, Bellomont received word of a conspiracy which he feared involved the Iroquois. He noted in a letter to the Board of Trade: "If a speedy and effectual course be not taken, we shall lose the five nations irrevocably, I foresee it plainly; the French never applied themselves so industriously, as they do now, to debauch them from us; and we on our parts have nothing, nor do nothing to keep 'em in good humor and steady

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<sup>32</sup>, Trelease, Indian Affairs, 337-341; Leder, Robert Livingston, 134.



to us."<sup>33</sup>

Bellomont quickly sent Robert Livingston, Peter Schuyler, and Hendrick Hansen of Albany to travel to Onondaga to talk with the Indians and to arrange a conference for the following August. They found no evidence of a plot against the English, but reported that the Iroquois were demoralized and wavered between the French and the English. Livingston declared

that two things are the principle cause of our Indians desertion.

- 1.) Fear; Seeing the French so formidable as to destroy their cattle and we not able to protect them.
- 2.) Our neglect of sending ministers among them to instruct them in the Christian faith.

I do humbly offer that it is morally impossible to secure the 5 nations to the English interest any longer, without building Forts and securing the passes that lead to their Castles.

Bellomont forwarded Livingston's report to England and eventually incorporated many of its suggestions into his own policy. Since Dongan, no one had had as good a grasp of the frontier situation and its realities as Bellomont.<sup>34</sup>

English and French alike during the summer of 1700 held conferences with the Five Nations in order to win Iroquois

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33. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 342-344; Gov. Bellomont to Lords of Trade, Feb. 28, 1700, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 606-610 .

34. Livingston's Report of his Journey to Onondaga, April, 1700, Gov. Bellomont to Lords of Trade, May 25, 1700, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 648-652, 644-646; Leder, Robert Livingston, 151-153.

allegiance or at least neutrality. Callières and the Iroquois exchanged peace pledges in Montreal. After agreeing upon the restoration of Indian prisoners, Callières declared a truce and arranged for a great conference during August of the following year. Bellomont similarly held a meeting with the Five Nations in August. Continued warfare hindered any successful prospects for the fur trade, and Bellomont urged the Indians to strive for peace with the western tribes to prevent the trade's further decline and any dissolution of the confederacy itself. Solemnly accepting the gifts and renewing the Covenant Chain, the Iroquois agreed to make peace but again neglected to tell the English of their French negotiations.<sup>35</sup>

A similar pattern of events emerged the following summer. In July 1701 a meeting between the Iroquois and western tribes got underway. After much wrangling over the exchange of prisoners, they concluded a peace on August fourth. Three days later the French concluded their agreement with the Iroquois. In exchange for trading rights and recognition of their traditional claims east of Detroit, the Five Nations agreed to remain neutral in any future wars between France and England. While they solidified

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35. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 347; Conference of Governor Bellomont with the Indians, Aug., 1700, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 727-746.

arrangements in Canada, the Iroquois also met with Lieutenant-Governor John Nanfan at Albany. Showing primary allegiance to the English, the Indians deeded their western beaver lands to the King in exchange for his protection in their use of them. The Iroquois had established their neutrality and independence as best as they could, while still satisfying both the French and the English.<sup>36</sup>

Although the Covenant Chain remained stable as an institution during the latter part of the seventeenth century, the position of the Iroquois vis-a-vis the English had obviously changed. They recognized that the British would not commit themselves to the full extent necessary to eliminate the French. When combined with English abuses and attempts at domination, the Iroquois feared for their very existence. Thus, their early position of a semi-subordinate, pro-British ally changed. Recognizing the fruitlessness of the beaver wars and fearing further involvement between France and England, the Iroquois ultimately determined upon neutrality as best suited to their needs. After a half-century of fighting they had forced the European powers to recognize their territorial claims and in turn relinquished

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36. Conference of Lt. -Gov. Nanfan with the Indians, July, 1701, Deed from the Five Nations to the King of the Beaver Hunting Ground, July 19, 1701, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 896-910; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 362-363; Wallace, "Origins of Iroquois Neutrality," 229-233.

rights only to lands west of Detroit, lands which they could not hold anyhow and which had been at the root of most Indian wars since the 1650s. Strict neutrality placed the Iroquois in position as the balance of power between the French and the English colonies. Those two nations embarked upon a policy during the next century which sought to maintain this neutrality, for each continually feared the consequences of a potential alliance of the Iroquois with the other side.

## CHAPTER II

### NEUTRALITY AND THE PRIMACY OF FUR, 1701-1720

Maintaining Iroquois neutrality remained the basic aim of both France and New York during the first two decades of the eighteenth century. Their desire to avoid actual fighting and, more important, to protect the fur trade which had languished for many years, lay behind the preservation of the Indians' neutrality. During Queen Anne's War, France refrained from all attacks on New York largely because Montreal traders, as well as those of Albany, hoped to keep open the fur and Canada trades. Furthermore, the treaties of 1701 provided for Iroquois neutrality, and neither European nation desired to upset the Indian role as a balance between them. New York agreed to expeditions against Canada in 1709 and 1711 only under pressure from England and with the mother country's direct assistance. The Five Nations continued to balance one European nation off against the other by upholding a neutral position, thereby hoping to maintain their very existence. When the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 brought an end to major hostilities between the French and English, fur again preoccupied the New Yorkers. French and Indian conflict on the Carolina frontier threatened the easy pursuit of the fur trade, and New York responded by sending Iroquois war parties to fight

the French inspired natives. Economics, therefore, continued to dominate New York's Indian policy.

Statistics for the quantity and value of fur exported by New York from 1701-1720 help explain New York's evolving Indian policy.<sup>1</sup> Only during two expeditions to reduce Canada did the colony diverge from its major intentions of preserving the fur trade. The Indians provided a buffer against the French during the twenty year period, and fulfilled a largely defensive function for the English. During the two decades New York had to provide larger gifts and more extensive services to maintain Iroquois friendship. This elaborated the original Covenant Chain relationship, since New York, both for reasons of trade and defense, could ill afford to alienate the Iroquois by ignoring their desires.

England declared war upon France in May 1702, and the conflict soon spread to the colonies, where it was known as Queen Anne's War. Tensions, which had built up in America, burst forth in a series of raids on the New England frontiers. New

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1. A short description of the British Customs Records and the information derived from them pertaining to this paper is contained in the Appendix. Customs officials compiled their ledgers beginning in 1607, but the first complete record available for New York started in 1699. The tables at the end of this chapter include the years 1699-1719, and references to any figures derive directly from the information contained therein.

York's border initially remained free of any conflict, largely because of the participants' desire to maintain neutrality there for the protection of the fur trade.<sup>2</sup> Fur had regained its accustomed position of economic importance, and neither New York nor Canada wanted to lose the trade again to the ravages of war. The extremely high figure of 22,536 beaver skins exported in 1699 most likely reflected the end of King William's War and a short return to peace. The following year saw a more representative export of 16,363 beaver pelts, which dropped drastically, however, to 2,629 by the first year of the war. The value of both beaver and all furs remained at a low level after 1702. Although the quantity and value of furs exported from New York, fluctuated during the war, the figures did not return to their earlier levels until the cessation of hostilities.<sup>3</sup>

Iroquois neutrality played an important role in keeping New York's frontier quiet. Learning their lesson well from the first inter-colonial war, the Five Nations determined to balance

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2. Ellis, Short History of New York, 53; William Smith, The History of the Late Province of New York, from its Discovery to the Appointment of Governor Colden in 1762, N. -Y. Hist. Soc., Collections, I (2 vols., 1829-1830), I, 153-154.

3. Table II-3 contains figures computed on the basis of the current value [see Appendix] of the exports from New York to London. The values of beaver and total furs lend further support to these conclusions and those that follow. Percentage columns in the current value series remain the same as in the constant value series, because the Commodity Price Index figure used for each year is constant for all categories.

one European nation off against the other. Lord Cornbury, New York's governor, met with the Indians at Albany during July and August 1702, at which time the Indians informed him of their intent to maintain the peace. They also reiterated their request that Robert Livingston should carry to England the deed to the beaver lands. "Wee pray that Mr. Livingston Secretary for our affairs may be sent to acquaint the Great Queen of England with the state and condition of us and our Country and that ship with good Sayles may be provided for him accordingly." New Yorkers made little effort to prosecute the war during the next several years because of their fur interests. The colony's quest for neutrality did not meet with immediate success in maintaining the level of fur export, as indicated by the low figures for 1702-1707. Nevertheless, a policy of neutrality was welcome to all, except New England, which consequently received the brunt of French attacks.<sup>4</sup>

Despite its policy of neutrality and its desire to pursue the fur trade, New York did not totally neglect its defenses. Lord Cornbury, in his 1702 address to the Assembly,

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4. Alexander C. Flick, ed., History of the State of New York (10 vols., New York, 1933-1937), II, 216-217; Conference of Lord Cornbury with the Indians, July-August, 1702, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 978-999.



noted the need for fortifying the port of New York and providing for frontier defense. In November the House accordingly passed a law to raise £ 1800 for the maintenance of 150 "fusileers" on the frontier plus thirty "outscouts." During this same session, it also passed a bill for the "better settling of the militia" to make it more useful for the defense of the colony. The legislature approved a similar law the following year, raising £ 1300 for the protection of the frontiers. All remained calm during the winter of 1703-1704, but in April 1704 Cornbury again asked the Assembly to provide and provision 150 men for the frontier, some of whom would protect outlying farms to prevent their abandonment. Fearing that Cornbury had misused previous funds, the House refused to allocate new money pending an investigation. Discovery of a balance of £ 1,000 in the governor's coffers, and the Council's repeated attempts to amend money bills encouraged the House in its refusal to approve any funds for defense of the frontier.<sup>5</sup>

On June 14, 1705, Cornbury again stressed the need for

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5. Smith, History of New York, I, 151-154; Journal of the Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Colony of New York (2 vols., New York, 1764-1766), I, 149-150, 153, 158, 174-175, 182, 187, 189, 192-194 (microfilm copy, hereafter cited as Assembly Journals); The Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the Revolution (5 vols., Albany, 1894), I, 493-494, 500-507, 562 (hereafter cited as Colonial Laws of New York); Flick, History of New York, II, 164.

raising money for the colony's defense. He noted French and Indian designs to attack the Five Nations

who if they see we are not willing, or not able to support and defend them, against their Enemies, will the more easily be persuaded to go over to the French, the ill Consequences wherof are so well known, that I need not mention them to you.

The Assembly recognized the need for defense and agreed to provide the necessary money, with the stipulation that it be paid out by "their treasurer." A joint conference held in October could not resolve the differences between Council and Assembly. Although the frontiers were open to attack, the House provided no money until 1706, when the Queen approved the establishment of an Assembly Treasurer. At that time, the legislature again provided for the militia for a one year period.<sup>6</sup>

Indian affairs continued at a somewhat uneventful pace until 1708, when the next session of the Assembly convened. Cornbury addressed the House concerning "the propriety of making presents to the Indians," to which the legislature readily agreed. They hoped to maintain the Iroquois in their neutral position, both for reasons of trade and defense. In September the legislators passed a law providing £ 450 for Indian gifts "to Encourage them to continue their Obedience and Loyalty to Her Majesty." Cornbury

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6. Assembly Journals, I, 196-207, 214, 216-217, 212; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 598, 591; Flick, History of New York, II, 164, Smith, History of New York, I, 158-160.

and the Council also approved bills for the defense of the colony and the continued organization of the militia. Concern for the colony's safety did not preclude a preoccupation with the fur trade. On October 28 the Assembly received a message from the Council informing them of a bill just passed by the upper house that prevented all trade and commerce with the French at Canada and that regulated the Indian trade at Albany. The House refused to concur in that bill or in a second which regulated the transportation of furs, peltry, and other skins. Fur still remained dominant in Indian affairs in New York.<sup>7</sup>

Governor Cornbury had succeeded by 1708 in mismanaging the affairs of government in most all areas of concern. One contemporary wrote, "we never had a governor so universally detested, nor any who so richly deserved the public abhorance. In spite of his noble descent, his behaviour was trifling, mean, and extravagant." His deportment alienated most of the colony, but in the end he served one good purpose: he paved the way for a reconciliation of the factions which had begun in the Leislerian upheaval. Thus, when news of Governor John Lovelace's imminent arrival reached New York, the populace awaited him with open

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7. Assembly Journals, I, 220-221, 225-226, 237-238; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 607-608, 611; Smith, History of New York, I, 164-165.

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arms.

Lovelace arrived in the colony in December 1708 with a two-fold purpose. The Crown proposed settlement under his direction of several thousand Palatines on New York's frontier. England hoped that the settlers would supply Britain with naval stores, thereby reducing its dependence on the Baltic, provide a substantial revenue for the colony, and act as a security buffer against the French. More closely linked to the problem of Indian affairs, however, was an expedition for the reduction of Canada. England, after several victories over France in the European theater, turned its attention to the colonies. Plans for the expedition called for a land assault against Montreal with troops from New York, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania, and a sea attack on Quebec by British forces in conjunction with those of New England. Lovelace convened a new Assembly on April 5, and he informed the members "that he had brought with him large supplies of soldiers and stores of war, as well as presents for the Indians." However, Lovelace died shortly thereafter, and command of the project devolved upon Colonel Francis Nicholson, who had earlier been Lieutenant Governor. On May 17, 1709, the House received news of the proposed expedition and resolved to do

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8. Smith, History of New York, I, 167.

all it could to support the Queen's instructions.<sup>9</sup>

New York had previously been unwilling to take an offensive role in the war for fear of upsetting the fur trade and instigating French attacks. Only under pressure from England and with the increased hope of a smashing victory over Canada were New Yorkers willing to sacrifice the benefits of neutrality. Even so, a group of Albany traders doubted the wisdom of this new policy. By 1708 both the quantity and value of fur had registered a distinct increase over the early war years. This marked growth explained in large part the traders' opposition to the Canadian expedition which might reduce that trade. One especially disgruntled citizen noted, "Interest that governs all the world, Tyrannizes at New York. At Albany where they Trade with the French at Canada, the Handlers,... are against it."<sup>10</sup>

Despite these hesitations, the war fever caught on, and preparations proceeded at a hectic rate throughout the summer. Everyone expected the defeat of Canada before the season ended, "an event which would put a period to all the ravages of an

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9. Queen to Lord Lovelace, Mar. 1, 1709, Board of Trade to Lovelace, Mar. 28, 1709, Lord Sunderland to Lovelace, Apr. 28, 1709, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 70-74; Smith, History of New York, I, 168; Assembly Journals, I, 247; Leder, Robert Livingston, 204-205.

10. Thomas Cockerill to Popple, July 2, 1709, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 80-81; Flick, History of New York, II, 220.

encroaching, merciless enemy, extend the British empire, and augment trade." On May 23 the governor and Council agreed to a bill raising £ 6,000 for the expedition. The following month the Assembly voted to detach 487 men for the expedition and to raise an additional £ 4,000 for their support. Finally, during September the legislature passed a law for the better settling of the militia. Lieutenant Governor Ingoldsby held a conference with four of the Five Nations at Albany in July. Although the Seneca refused to participate, Ingoldsby gained the support of the other nations for the expedition. Credit for raising 600 Iroquois warriors was largely due to Colonel Schuyler, a perennial favorite among the Indians. Despite their great show of interest in the project, however, the Iroquois hesitated to abandon their neutrality and its advantages by too extended an effort.<sup>11</sup>

In spite of the elaborate preparations for the expedition, it failed, causing great consternation among the people. Military reverses in Portugal had forced England to divert to the European theater the naval forces intended for the Quebec assault. Without British support, the whole affair quickly deteriorated and became

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11. Smith, History of New York, I, 170-173; Assembly Journals, I, 249, 252, 254, 258; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 659, 675; Propositions of Lt. -Gov. Ingoldsby to Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, and Cayugas at Albany, July 14, 1709, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 206-210; Flick, History of New York, II, 220.

a fiasco. Leaders of the expedition met with the Indian commissioners and Albany's magistrates on August 12 to prepare an account of the colony's present condition. They noted the "Deplorable and dangerous Condition these frontiers will be in this winter if Canada should not now be Reduced" and suggested several alternatives to protect the colony. The Assembly followed soon thereafter with a memorial to the Queen. "We conceive it our indispensable duty to lay at royal foot how dangerous the French are seated at Canada, and the maxims they follow for making themselves formidable there." Ingoldsby requested the Assembly to provide a fund for strengthening the forts. The House, emphasizing the great cost of the abortive expedition, refused and instead asked the Lieutenant Governor to put the Crown's regular troops on duty to protect the frontier.<sup>12</sup>

Governor Robert Hunter arrived in New York on June 14, 1710, with 2,000 Palatine refugees. Mohawk sachems, upon whose land the Palatines were to have settled, reacted vigorously against the plan. They finally agreed "that her majesty shall have the Land at Skohere for poor people, and not one foot more, provided it be duly purchased." However, Hunter finally settled the Palatines

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12. Smith, History of New York, I, 172-175, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 213-214; Assembly Journals, I, 260-270.

on Robert Livingston's manor rather than Schoharie.

Although New York had escaped French ravages in the past because of Iroquois neutrality and protection, many feared that recent participation in the Canada expedition would bring on direct conflict with the enemy. Failure to settle the Palatines on the frontier potentially exposed the colony to French attack, unless the Iroquois continued in their neutrality. To this end, Governor Hunter traveled to Albany in August 1710 to meet the Five Nations and renew the Covenant Chain. As a result of this conference, Hunter insured the continued friendship of the Iroquois. New England requested Iroquois aid against French Indians who had raided those colonies, but New York refused to use its influence with the Five Nations for fear of upsetting this delicate balance of power and exposing its own frontiers to attack. All remained quiet in the colony until the following summer, when news

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arrived of a second expedition against Canada.

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13. Mohawk Sachems to Indian Commissioners, July 3, 1710, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 215-216. For a more complete study of the Palatine experiment see Leder, Robert Livingston, 211-226 and Walter A. Knittle, The Early Eighteenth Century Palatine Emigration: A British Government Redemptioner Project to Manufacture Naval Stores (Philadelphia, 1936).

14. Conference of Gov. Hunter with the Indians, Aug., 1710, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 217-229; Smith, History of New York, I, 178-179.



Governor Hunter began preparing for the impending invasion upon receiving his instructions on June 14, 1711. He sent Colonel Schuyler to the Iroquois to convince them to join the campaign and then traveled to Connecticut to arrange details with the other governors. The Assembly convened on July 2 and heard the news of the attack on Canada. By the end of the month New York had passed laws raising 600 men and £ 10,000 for the expedition. The colony again took part in the expedition only at England's instigation. Early in August Hunter went to Albany with General Nicholson, and the Iroquois arrived on the twenty-fourth with 700 warriors. After conferring with the Indians, the united forces proceeded to Lake Champlain, only to learn that fog and strong gales had engulfed the fleet and destroyed a large part of the troop transport. The few remaining ships salvaged what they could and sailed back down the Saint Lawrence, effectively ending another  
15  
Canada expedition.

On October 2, 1711, Governor Hunter informed the Assembly of the Canada expedition's miscarriage and of the poor condition of frontier defenses. Consequently the House resolved that Hunter

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15. Gov. Hunter to Sec. St. John, Sept. 12, 1711, Proceedings of New London Congress, June 21, 1711, Conference between Gov. Hunter and the Indians, Aug., 1711, Gen. Hill to Gov. Hunter, Aug., 25, 1711, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 252-261, 265, 278; Assembly Journals, I, 289-296; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 723, 727.

should discharge the forces upon his arrival at Albany except for 150 men to protect the borders during the winter. On November 7 the legislature passed a law to raise 2855 ounces of plate for improvement of the fortifications and for the colony's defense. Shortly after the disbanding of Nicholson's forces, a small Indian raid struck fear into the hearts of New Yorkers. However, it proved to be the only attack against the colony during the war. A desire for neutrality by both New York and the Iroquois had again won out after the failure of the expedition. Only a nominal force to guard the approaches to Albany remained, and no one suggested any further offensive move.

Events during 1712 followed much the same pattern as they had earlier when there were no expeditions against Canada. Preservation of Iroquois neutrality and the fur trade remained central to New York's policy. Addressing the Assembly in early May, Governor Hunter gave the usual warning of frontier dangers, emphasizing the need to provide for defense. During this session the legislature passed several money bills for support of frontier fortifications and garrisons. By December Hunter had assented

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16. Assembly Journals, I, 299-300, 302-304, 309; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 745, 750; Indian Commissioners to Gov. Hunter, Oct. 20, 1711, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 281-282.

to these laws and to two others for repairing the colony's fortifications and organizing its militia. Several letters from the Indian commissioners forewarned the government that the Iroquois, at French instigation, planned to join the Tuscarora Indians in a raid on North Carolina. Several messengers took gifts to the Indians at the order of the Governor and Assembly, with the express purpose of dissuading them from their design and maintaining their neutrality. New York did not wish to see the balance upset. Hunter informed the Board of Trade in December that "the Indians are at home and quiet, having returned from their Expedition without effecting anything, being divided among themselves."<sup>17</sup>

Peace was obviously near at hand in 1713, and all looked forward with great hope to a period of tranquility. Despite warnings concerning the colony's defenseless situation, the Assembly refused to do more than provide for the continued organization of the militia. In June the Council informed the House that the Five Nations were again considering joining the Tuscarora and going to war against the Flathead Indians. Governor

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17. Assembly Journals, I, 310, 315, 320, 331, 316-317, 319; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 757, 773, 778-779; Gov. Hunter to Lords of Trade, June 23, Dec. 16, 1712, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 343, 351.

Hunter sent Hendrick Hansen and several others to Onondaga in September to confer with the Iroquois, hoping to deter them from their intentions. Hansen took with him news of the Treaty of Utrecht which had since arrived in the colony and gifts to renew the Covenant Chain. He succeeded in dissuading the Iroquois from their plans for war, but they nevertheless refused to completely abandon the Tuscarora. After encouraging the Indians in their hunting and trade, Hansen promised them a conference with Governor Hunter in the near future "to take the hatchet out of [their] hands."<sup>18</sup>

The Treaty of Utrecht brought the cessation of hostilities and an increased concern for the fur trade, which had languished for many years. Article 15 of the treaty pertained specifically to the Indian situation.

The Subjects of France inhabiting Canada, and others, shall hereafter give no Hindrance or Molestation to the five Nations or Cantons of Indians subject to the Dominion of Great Britain, nor to the other Natives of America, who are Friends to the same. In like manner, the Subjects of Great Britain shall behave themselves peaceably towards the Americans, who are Subjects or Friends to France; and on both sides they shall enjoy full Liberty of going and coming on account of Trade. Also the Natives of those Countrys shall, with the same Liberty, resort, as they please, to the British and French

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18. Assembly Journals, I, 337-338, 341; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 781; Gov. Hunter to Sec. Popple, Sept. 10, 1713, Conference with the Five Nations at Onondaga, Sept., 1713, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 371-376.

Colonys, for promoting Trade on one side and the other, without any Molestation or Hindrance, either on the part of the British subjects, or of the French.

What had been the de facto situation was now de jure, and herein lay the treaty's value. It justified many earlier actions by the English. Indians and white men could now freely ply their trade. This would remain the situation during the ensuing thirty  
19  
years of peace.

Queen Anne's War had directly affected New York's fur trade and Indian policy. By 1706 the annual value of exported beaver had declined to less than £ 38. Furthermore, the value of beaver and all furs as percentages of New York's exports declined during the war. Although within two years the value of exports of both beaver and all furs increased, it did not return to previous levels until 1714. Exceptionally high figures for that year resulted from the end of the war and the exportation of stockpiled furs. New York's aim throughout the war was to prevent French attacks on the colony and to protect the fur trade as completely as possible. Iroquois neutrality was essential to both ends, for it provided New York with a defensive buffer against the French and allowed the Indians to gather the fur necessary to the colony's trade. The

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19. Fred L. Israel, Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1648-1967 (4 vols., New York, 1967), I, 210.

Five Nations as well as the French concurred in the desire for neutrality. The French hoped to corner the fur trade, as did New York, and Iroquois neutrality was necessary to this. In turn the Five Nations hoped to maintain an independent position, subservient to neither European nation. Only under the direct pressure of England did New York abandon its policy. Despite the two Canadian expeditions, the desire for neutrality had remained strong enough on all sides, so that the delicate balance remained intact.

Indian affairs still occupied much of New York's attention, even after the signing of the Utrecht treaty. Concern centered around the maintenance of Iroquois neutrality, but now on the basis of trade rather than the Indians' defensive military role, which had ended with the return to peace. Evidence of this subtle change lay in the increased value of beaver exports. Beaver alone made up twenty to thirty percent of New York's total exports to London, reflecting the importance of the fur trade to the colony's economy and hence to its Indian policy. Indeed, the value of all furs often constituted over forty percent of New York's trade to London.

Several trends became increasingly evident within the fur trade during the years 1713-1720. New York found itself forced to provide the Iroquois with ever larger gifts at yearly conferences to insure their friendship. The Indians more often demanded the services of smiths to repair their guns and metal goods, to which

New York readily acceded. Smiths and interpreters helped maintain an influence with the Indians and surveyed French movements. French intrigues and rumors of English plots against the Iroquois required New York's constant attention if it was to retain its influence in the fur trade. Market fluctuations and changing tastes affected the demand for fur, most often decreasing its value. Indians found the corresponding increase of prices for trade goods extremely difficult to understand, which necessitated constant reassurance by the English.

Evidence of the colony's concern with the Iroquois was clear when Governor Hunter informed the Assembly on July 7, 1714, that the Iroquois believed themselves neglected and that they grew uneasy. The Five Nations had received news of an English plan to eliminate them, and this made them wary. Reports of "a general Meeting at Onondaga of the 5 Nations and all the Indians... designed to be so Secret that if any Person divulged it they were to suffer Death," reached New York. Fearing the consequences of such a meeting, the Assembly voted £ 400 for gifts and the governor's expenses for a trip to Albany to confer with the Iroquois. Hunter met with the Five Nations in September and reassured them that rumors of an English plot were "altogether groundless and not to be credited, neither can you beleive [sic] it except you should think me so foolish as to cut off my right hand with my left since

we are one flesh and blood." He also encouraged the Indians in the fur trade, especially in opening it up to the Far Nations. The Iroquois sachems thanked Corlaer for his assurances and gifts, and they in turn renewed their part of the Covenant Chain. At this same conference Hunter learned that the Iroquois had taken in the Tuscarora Indians and given them shelter as new members of the Covenant. Iroquois neutrality was necessary for the expansion of the fur trade, and it increasingly depended upon larger gifts and guarantees of support from the English.<sup>20</sup>

Friction along the frontier between the French and the Colonies did not abate, and the Iroquois continually demanded attention to insure their allegiance, or at least their neutrality. French intrigues reportedly lay at the base of a war between the Flathead Indians and Carolina in 1715. Many, such as Charles Lodwick, feared the possible expansion of such a war and its consequences to the colony's trade. He informed the Board of Trade of the general complaint of "a great decay in... trade with the Indians" due to French plotting, which would, "if not prevented,

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20. Assembly Journals, I, 361, 363-365; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 814; McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 96-97; Indian Commissioners to Gov. Hunter, May 13, 1714, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 221-222; Conference between Gov. Hunter and the Indians, Sept., 1714, O'Callaghan ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 382-389.



in a little time seduce all our Indians wholly to themselves, but also be a means to engage them to become our enemies." Governor Hunter journeyed to Albany in August to persuade the Iroquois to intervene in the Carolina war, which would hopefully bring the conflict to a quick end, therefore protecting the fur trade.<sup>21</sup>

Sachems of the Five Nations met with Hunter on August 27 and renewed the Covenant Chain. At that time they also returned the war hatchet from the last French war, and the governor thanked them for their role in it. He went on to note "another hatchet which you mention and I repeat with great joy, that is the hatchet of mutual defence and security, that, as it is bright, I hope and pray it may be lasting as the sun."

Despite their complaints about the price of trade goods, Hunter persuaded the Iroquois by promising them enough guns and ammunition for the expedition to join in an attempt to defeat the Flatheads. Hunter promised to fulfill requests for smiths and a trading house at Albany for the Indians, and the conference

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21. McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 102-105; Gov. Hunter to Sec. Popple, July 2, 1715, Gov. Hunter to Lords of Trade, July 25, Aug. 13, 1715, Lodwick to Lords of Trade, Aug. 23, 1715, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 415, 417-418, 420, 422. Although much of Lodwick's memorial to the Board of Trade later proved to be false and malicious, the above can be taken as typical of the general concern for the state of Indian relations and the fur trade.

broke up amicably shortly thereafter.

During the following year, Iroquois parties set out against the Flatheads as agreed upon, and New York in turn fulfilled its promises to the Indians. Governor Hunter wrote to the Board of Trade in April 1716 that the Carolina war was drawing to a close according to the latest reports. In June the Assembly provided for the construction of two wooden houses for the accommodation of the Indians at Albany, because their trade was "of great advantage to the Country." By December several smiths and other persons had departed from Albany to reside among the Iroquois in answer to their needs and "to keep them firm in their Allegiance<sup>23</sup> and to watch the Motions and defeat the Intrigues of the French."

Continued rumors of English conspiracies to wipe out the Five Nations and repeated complaints about the price of trade goods brought the Iroquois and Governor Hunter together at Albany in June 1717. Hunter indicated great concern with the Albany-Montreal exchange, "that pernicious trade which I am sure is hurtfull to both of us, and only serves to put money in the pockets of a few traders." The sachems frankly admitted,

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22. Conference of Gov. Hunter with the Indians, Aug., 1715, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 437-447.

23. Five Nations to the Indian Commissioners, Oct. 3, 1715, Gov. Hunter to Lords of Trade, Apr. 30, 1716, Ibid., V, 463-464, 475-476; Assembly Journals, I, 383-386; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 890-891; McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 117.

our people are furnished with other goods also at the said French trading house as clothing and other necessaries, which stops a great deal of peltry coming hither; but the French are supply'd with all those goods from the people here at Albany....If you will stop that trade of goods being carried from hence to Canada the other trade will fall of course.

The Albany-Montreal trade would continue as a thorn in the side of all concerned, for it admitted of no easy solution.

The perennial complaint by the Indians about the price of trade goods was based upon their inability to comprehend the fluctuations of a world market. Hunter countered their grumblings with a brief explanation. "The price of goods does not depend on any persons will, the market must govern that which is sometimes higher sometimes lower, but the best way that you can take to get full value for the skins is... to sell them by retail, and then you will have the full value for the skins." Never completely grasping this concept, possibly intentionally, the Indians accepted it temporarily until they next felt the pressure of high prices for trade goods and again reiterated their grievance.

When the Assembly reconvened in September, Hunter addressed them about a memorial written by ex-representative Samuel Mulford, who had attacked each governor in the past and now took on Hunter. Mulford opposed all measures for securing the fidelity of the Five

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24. Conference between Gov. Hunter and the Indians, June, 1717, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 484-493.

Nations and even proposed a scheme to cut them off. Abhorred by such a proposal and its possible consequences for the fur trade and the colony's defense should another war break out, the House lent Hunter its full support and suggested he convince the Indians that the English held no such ill intentions. Iroquois friendship was extremely important to the legislature, because it believed that, "for the Steadiness of those Indians, to the interest of Great Britain, all the last War with France, it is that we owe in a great measure, our presnt Security." Furthermore, the Indians remained central to the pursuit of the fur trade. Governor Hunter agreed to the Assembly's suggestion that he do all he could to reassure the Five Nations and convince them of the falsity of Mulford's memorial. Hunter presented a letter from the Indian Commissioners and noted the complaints of the Iroquois pertaining to the high cost of goods, especially those transported from Albany to Canada. The House resolved to consent to any law which would remedy such abuses. However, any coordinated effort to end this trade would have to wait until William Burnet's term of office.

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Governor Hunter had grown weary of office in the New World. Undoubtedly the death of his wife and a desire to settle his personal

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25. Assembly Journals, I, 400-401, 403, 409; Smith, History of New York, I, 199; Leder, Robert Livingston, 244.

affairs confirmed his intention to return to England. On June 25, 1719, he informed the Assembly of his decision. A memorial which the Assembly presented to Hunter upon learning of his departure testified to his adroitness as governor. When Robert Hunter took leave of New York in the fall of 1719, he left a united colony, rather than the factious and divided one he had found nine  
26  
years before.

Peter Schuyler as Council president managed the affairs of government in the interim between Hunter's departure and Burnet's arrival. Earlier in 1718 Schuyler had informed Hunter that "the Commissioners of Indian Affairs have exactly complied with your last order" for sending smiths "to the Indians who are very quiett and well satisfied as far as we yet hear but deep snow hinders our Intellegence." Events soon proved that all was not quiet with the Iroquois, for Hunter had to travel to Albany to reprimand them for further attacks on the southern Indians and  
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to reassure them of English friendship. In July 1719 Schuyler

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26. McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 116; Leder, Robert Livingston, 248-249; Smith, History of New York, I, 200-202; Assembly Journals, I, 437-439.

27. McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 122; Col. Schuyler to Gov. Hunter, Feb. 5, 1718, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 506, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 226-228.

received news that the French were building a fort a Niagara, and hindering the Indians trading with the English. The Indian Commissioners met with the Iroquois in November to renew the Covenant Chain. They asked the Five Nations to prevent the erection of a French fort at Niagara, to which the Indians replied, "they cannot do it for if they do the French will treat them as Enemies." When the Commissioners further suggested that Jean Coeur, the French interpreter, not be allowed to reside with the Seneca the following winter, the Iroquois answered very plainly and independently:

You say Jean Coeur is to stay among us this Winter and that hele make it his Interest to hinder the far Indians from coming to Trade here, You can better prevent his hindering those Indians from coming to Trade here than we, for if you do not supply the French with Goods from hence they cant furnish the Far Indians with what they want.

The Indians refused to threaten their own position of neutrality and safety by too overt an action against either European nation. 28

Persuasion by the Commissioners had little effect, and by April 1720 Schuyler ordered Robert Livingston, Jr., and Myndert Schuyler to travel to the Seneca country to remind the sachems of their allegiance to the British Crown. Having convinced the Indians of the danger of the French presence for their hunting and trade, Lawrence Clawsen, an Interpreter, set out for Niagara with several

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28. Intelligence of a French Fort at Niagara, July 6, 1719, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 528-529; McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 124-127.

sachems. Upon arriving they ordered the Frenchman there to demolish the trading house, but he refused pending orders from Canada. Clawsen returned to the Senecas and related the situation. The Indians replied in the presence of Jean Coeur that the French had built at Niagara without their permission, and they requested that the governor do his utmost to effect the demolition of the trading house. Schuyler ordered an Indian conference in August to insure the continued allegiance of the Iroquois and to counter-act the French influence.

Late in August the conference got underway with representatives of all the nations except the Seneca, who feared that the English planned to destroy them. Understanding full well the danger of too great a French influence, the sachems agreed to accompany any forces New York might send to destroy the fort at Niagara. However, they recognized that more basic to the problem was the Albany-Montreal trade. "The selling of Indian goods to the French and their Indians of Canada is Great Inducement for the french to make that Settlement and therefore we Desire you to stop that trade." The Indians showed a clear understanding of the French ability to

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29. Col. Schuyler to Lords of Trade, Apr. 27, June 9, 1720, Journal of Schuyler's and Livingston's Visit to the Senecas, May, 1720, Journal of Lawrence Clawsen's Visit to Niagara, May, 1720, Col. Schuyler to Lords of Trade, Aug. 11, 1720, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 538, 542-545, 550-551, 558.

corner the fur trade if individual Albany traders sacrificed the colony's good to their own private interests. However, Schuyler made no effort to solve this problem; rather, he left it for consideration by the incoming governor. After brightening the Covenant Chain he returned to New York City to await the arrival of Governor Burnet.<sup>30</sup>

During the first two decades of the eighteenth century, Albany and the fur trade remained vitally important to New York's economy. The figures included in the following tables reflect that importance and indicate the reasons why New York's Indian policy largely revolved around the question of fur and especially beaver. Even in the course of Queen Anne's War, the colony maintained a position of neutrality, excepting the two abortive expeditions against Canada. Behind this lay New York's desire to further the flow of fur to Albany, for which Iroquois neutrality was essential. An added benefit to neutrality of course was the resultant absence of French border raids. After 1713 Anglo-French rivalry continued to revolve around considerations of trade. Iroquois friendship and neutrality were basic to both the French and English desires to corner the fur trade. Thus, while Indian policy recognized the defensive military value of the Five Nations in time

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30. Conference between Col. Schuyler and the Indians, Aug.-Sept., 1720, Ibid., V, 562-569 .



of war, the constant which continued throughout the period was the economic importance of fur. To preserve the necessary Iroquois friendship, New York provided increasingly extensive gifts and services for the Indians. New York's policy in many ways had been extremely inconsistent, except for the profit motive of certain individuals. William Burnet, Governor Hunter's successor in office, hoped to remedy that situation, but instead found himself faced with insurmountable obstacles.

TABLE II-1

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Year	Total N.Y. exports to Outports in £	N.Y. exports to London and Outports in £	N.Y. exports to Outports as a % of total exports from N.Y. to England
1699	3065. 8. 8	16,818.18.11	18
1700	2036.14. 1	17,567.10. 1	12
1701	4962. 6. 7	18,547. 3. 6	27
1702	3266.18. 6	7,965. 5. 5	41
1703	1408.--. 8	7,471. 8. 8	19
1704	200. 8.10	10,540.17.--	2
1705	missing		
1706	161. 2.11	2,849.17. 7	6
1707	9726.10. 7	14,283. 7. 3	68
1708	3921.--. 5	10,847. 7. 2	36
1709	3104. 9. 7	12,259. 8. 5	25
1710	323.11.--	8,203.18. 3	4
1711	4622. 7. 1	12,193.14.10	38
1712	missing		
1713	4827. 9. 4	14,428.14. 3	33
1714	9732.12.10	29,810.17. 4	33
1715	11,247. 1. 2	21,316.19.10	53
1716	7902.11. 3	21,971.14.10	44
1717	6888.19. 5	24,534.14. 4	28
1718	3539.10. 7	27,331.19. 1	13
1719	4020. 7. 5	19,596. 6. 5	21

TABLE II-2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Year	Beaver (# of Skins)	Value of Beaver in £	Total value of all furs and skins exported from N.Y. to London in £	Total value of all exports from N.Y. to London in £
1699	22,536	5070.12.--	7490.19. 9	13,753.10. 3
1700	16,363	2863.10. 6	4186.16. 7	15,530.16.--
1701	11,330	1982.15.--	3032.10. 4	13,584.16.11
1702	2,629	460. 1. 6	1166. 7. 9	4,698. 6.11
1703	2,474	432.19.--	870. 9.--	6,063. 8.--
1704	3,568	624. 8.--	946.13. 9	10,340. 8. 2
1705	missing			
1706	214	37. 9.--	477.12. 5	2,688.14. 8
1707	2,945	515. 7. 6	1170. 4.10	4,556.16. 8
1708	9,715	1700. 2. 6	2586.10. 8	6,926. 6. 9
1709	16,278	2848.13.--	4129.11. 3	9,154.18.10
1710	5,437	951. 9. 6	2191. 1. 4	7,880. 7. 3
1711	6,942	1214.17.--	2151. 9. 3	7,571. 7. 9
1712	missing			
1713	16,714	2924.19.--	4099. 6. 4	9,601. 4.11
1714	32,291	5650.18.6	6532.15.10	20,078. 4. 6
1715	11,211	1961.18. 6	2688. 8. 1	10,069.18. 8
1716	18,418	3223. 3.--	4780. 2.10	14,069. 3. 7
1717	20,051	3508.18. 6	5851. 6. 4	17,645.14.11
1718	30,209	5286.11. 6	10,208.16. 3	23,792. 8. 6
1719	18,267	3196.14. 6	6682.12. 9	15,575.19.--

TABLE II-2 (cont.)

Year	(5) Value of beaver as a % of all fur and skins exported from N.Y. to London	(6) Value of beaver as a % of total exports from N.Y. to London	(7) Value of total fur and skins as a % of total exports from N.Y. to London
1699	68	37	54
1700	68	18	27
1701	65	15	22
1702	39	10	25
1703	50	7	14
1704	66	6	9
1705	missing		
1706	8	1	18
1707	46	11	26
1708	66	25	37
1709	69	32	45
1710	43	12	28
1711	56	16	28
1712	missing		
1713	71	30	43
1714	86	28	33
1715	73	19	27
1716	67	23	34
1717	60	20	33
1718	52	22	43
1719	48	21	42

TABLE II-3

Year	(1) Current value of beaver in £	(2) Current value of total fur and skins exported from N.Y. to London in £	(3) Total current value of all exports from N.Y. to London in £
1699	5771	8525	15,652
1700	2979	4354	16,152
1701	1927	2948	13,205
1702	454	1151	4,638
1703	417	838	5,839
1704	607	919	10,050
1705	missing		
1706	36	463	2,643
1707	458	1041	4,056
1708	1562	2377	6,365
1709	2866	4154	9,210
1710	1055	2430	8,739
1711	1441	2551	8,979
1712	missing		
1713	2772	3886	9,102
1714	5329	6161	18,934
1715	1813	2884	9,305
1716	2946	4369	12,859
1717	3158	5266	15,881
1718	4732	9137	21,294
1719	2938	6142	14,314

### CHAPTER III

#### FORMULATION AND FAILURE OF A UNIFORM INDIAN POLICY, 1720-1744

During the two and a half decades following Governor Burnet's arrival in September of 1720, two distinct phases developed in New York's Indian policy. A diversity of approaches and concepts had characterized Anglo-Indian relations prior to Burnet's coming, and his governorship marked the beginning of an attempt to organize Indian policy on a permanent basis. He hoped to implement a policy based on the Indians' importance to the colony's defenses, but fierce opposition from the fur trading interest finally defeated his efforts by 1730. However, as King George's War approached, the economic-based policy changed to reflect increasing concern for the Indians' value as an ally and a buffer against the French. The advent of hostilities brought New York's policy full circle.

Burnet's fur policy had a two-fold approach. The governor hoped to end the Albany-Montreal trade which diverted furs to Canada and strengthened the French. Behind this goal lay an understanding of the Indians' military value to the English. In order to satisfy trading interests, however, Burnet had to substitute something for the lost Montreal trade, and he hoped to draw enough fur from the western Indians to counterbalance the lost trade. Fort Oswego, completed in 1727, provided New York with an important

western trading center. However, despite its success, it never attracted enough fur to dissuade the Albany traders from the easy profits of the Canada trade. Only the fear and almost certain knowledge of a third inter-colonial war in the early 1740s brought New York back to a recognition of the value of the Iroquois to the colony's security.

William Burnet was a close friend of Governor Hunter and planned to continue most of his predecessor's policies. In such matters he relied heavily on the advice of Robert Livingston and Lewis Morris. Opposed to Livingston's view concerning the danger of the Albany-Montreal trade were Stephen DeLancey, Adolph Philipse, and Peter Schuyler. These three, deeply involved with commerce in furs, provided continual opposition to all plans for ending the Canada trade and became the center of new factional disputes in the colony.<sup>1</sup>

Even before Burnet's arrival, plans were afoot for a new trade policy. Livingston, then Speaker of the Assembly, prepared a memorial concerning Indian affairs, which he delivered to President Schuyler on August 23, 1720. Deploring present conditions, Livingston believed that,

our danger at present consists chiefly in three things--  
1st The five nations infesting our neighbors the  
King's subjects to the Southward which I perceive (by

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1. McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, lxx-lxvi; Leder, Robert Livingston, 251.

their letters now exhibited) will nor can not longer be endured.

2nd The French settling Onjagaro [Niagara]

3rd The furnishing the French and their Indians of Canada with goods from hence whereby they not only supply the farr Indians and Engroce that trade to themselves, who otherwise must come here to buy them, and by that means secure them to their interest to assist them upon occasion and engage them to be our Enemies--

In order to combat these ills, the elder statesman set forth several proposals. He hoped Schuyler would use his influence to end the Iroquois depradations against Virginia and the Carolinas. Second, Livingston desired "that a private conference be held with a Sachim of each nation to engage a party of their people to go to Onjagore and demolish the French settlement." This, he believed, would end the diversion of western furs from Niagara to Canada, and direct them instead to Albany. Livingston feared most the Albany-Montreal trade, because it brought the western fur trade to Canada and increased French influence with the far nations. Thus, he proposed cutting off the Montreal trade and suggested giving "encouragement... to those that will go to the Sinnekas Country and Onyagoro to sell what Indian goods they please to the Five Nations, of the farr Indians." Hopefully, such action would "keep the Indians steady to the British interest, and defeat the subtle artifices of the French."

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2. Robert Livingston to Col. Schuyler, Aug. 23, 1720, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 559-561.



Governor Burnet quickly saw the value and wisdom of Livingston's thought, and he gave the Speaker's ideas his full support. By mid-October he had replaced several of the old Indian commissioners who "had misrepresented the true Cause of the French success with the Indians... so as to Shelter the Profit some of them had... from their Pernicious Trade with the French." At the same time he dispatched a smith and several others to reside with the Seneca for purposes of observing French movements and maintaining Iroquois friendship.<sup>3</sup>

Burnet first addressed the Assembly on October 13, stressing self-preservation against the French, who infringed upon the fur trade and spread "false and scandalous Reports among the five Nations in order to draw them off from their Allegiance, to the Crown of Great-Britain." By the following month Burnet had clearly formulated his plans. Colonel Lewis Morris presented a bill on November 3 "for the encouragement of the Indian Trade," which the Assembly, Council, and Governor enacted into law on the nineteenth of the same month. It prohibited trade in Indian goods with the French in Canada and imposed a fine of £ 100 and the confiscation of all goods for any violation. In 1720 New York exported over twenty-six thousand beaver skins to London, and

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3. Leder, Robert Livingston, 252-254; McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 132.

Burnet hoped to increase or at least maintain a similar level of  
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trade. He predicted to the Board of Trade on November 26, 1720,  
that "Montreal will sink to nothing which now flourishes by its  
Trade with Albany.... I expect no less than restoring our influence  
over the Five Nations and drawing new Nations of Indians through  
their means to trade with and depend on us." The governor further  
intended to travel to Albany at the first opportunity to confer  
with the Indians, where he hoped to get permission to build forts  
5  
at Niagara and Onondaga.

Governor Burnet reached Albany in September 1721 for his  
first conference with the Five Nations. After renewing the  
Covenant Chain, he warned the Indians of French intrigues and  
requested them "to hinder all these evill practices and designs  
of the French for the time to come without using and violence."  
Burnet then further emphasized the importance of trade. "I do  
not doubt but you will Sweep the Path clean for our people to come  
among you and for the farr Indians to come through your country to

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4. See Table II-2. All further figures pertaining to fur  
exports for the years 1721-1744 derive from the tables at the  
conclusion of this chapter.

5. Assembly Journals, I, 439, 446-448; Colonial Laws of New  
York, II, 8; Gov. Burnet to the Lords of Trade, Nov. 26, 1720,  
O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 576-580.

trade with us." The new governor somewhat naively expected immediate results from this meeting, and shortly thereafter he sent a party led by Peter Schuyler, Jr., to the Seneca country to conduct a trading mission and to establish a settlement. Burnet hoped this would attract the far nations to the English and further hinder the Canada trade. In all this Burnet desired to further imperial ends without hurting trade profits. Those individual traders who suffered could hopefully recoup their losses through an increased western trade.<sup>6</sup>

However, the ineffectiveness of Burnet's fur policy had become obvious by 1722. Even the continued expansion of beaver exports could not hide certain problems. The commissioners for Indian affairs informed him that certain persons in Albany, facilitated by his liberal issuance of passes for travel to Canada, violated the 1720 act. Many traders also sent their goods first to the Mohawks and then on to Canada, whereby they avoided detection. Thus, in July New York passed a second, more stringent act, extending the first and providing for an incriminating oath to be given to anyone suspected of dealing in Indian goods with the French. Several people were empowered to give the oath,

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6. Conference between Gov. Burnet and the Indians, Sept., 1721, Gov. Burnet to Lords of Trade, Oct. 16, 1721, Gov. Burnet's Instructions to Peter Schuyler, Jr., Sept. 11, 1721; O'Callaghan, N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 630-642.

including the mayor and aldermen of Albany and the commanders of the several surrounding garrisons. The 1720 law had placed the full burden of enforcement on the Albany sheriff alone, making it easy to avoid compliance.<sup>7</sup>

Governor Burnet's concern included frontier defense as well as trade, as he indicated in a message to the Assembly on July 3, 1722:

The Security of this frontier depends in a great Measure, on the Fidelity of the Five Nations to this Government.... The most frugal and effectual Method, to keep them in their Allegiance, as well as to preserve and increase our Trade with the far Indians, is to have a fixed Trading House, established among... Seneka's.

Further recognition of the widespread significance of the Iroquois was expressed during a large Indian conference at Albany in August and September. Governors William Keith of Pennsylvania and Alexander Spotswood of Virginia attended, as well as Burnet. All three governors renewed the Covenant Chain for the united British colonies and succeeded in settling many past differences.<sup>8</sup>

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7. McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 139-140; Letter of Henry Holland, June 16, 1721, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 229; Assembly Journals, I, 475, 481-482; Colonial Laws of New York, II, 98-101.

8. Assembly Journals, I, 479; Conference between Gov's. Burnet, Spotswood, and Keith and the Indians, August-Sept., 1722, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 657-681.

Governor Burnet made continuing efforts throughout his administration to further trade and Indian alliances. He next conferred with the Indians in September 1724. During the previous year the Iroquois had officially accepted the Tuscarora as a sixth nation, and henceforth referred to themselves as the Six Nations. At this conference Burnet attempted to get permission to build a fort at Oswego. When the Iroquois suggested Lake Oneida as the site, he replied, "I always like to hear your answers that come from yourselves but I do not like the answer which the Handlers here put into your mouths for they neither love you nor me but mind only their own Profit.... As to the Blockhouse it must be at the Onondages Mouth and not at the Oneides Lake." Increases in beaver exports in 1725 and 1726 tentatively indicated that the several prohibitory trade laws had increased New York's trade with the Western Indians, now ostensibly compelled to turn to the English rather than the French for their necessities. Nevertheless, opposition to the trade laws remained very evident, and by 1726 Burnet himself recognized the impossibility of totally ending the Canada trade. Continued avoidance of the legal prohibition by Albany traders made it necessary for the colony to shift its approach by imposing a discriminatory tax on Indian goods going to Canada, while

taxing "that which goes to the West [only] half as much." Considering the many evasions of the early acts, and considering that the French controlled most of the fur, the increase before 1726 probably resulted from furs brought illegally from Montreal to Albany and then exported, as well as furs gathered by the early traders at Oswego (300 by 1726). After 1726, the imposition of the discriminatory tax on goods going to Canada apparently sharply restricted the Montreal trade, although the western trade did not take up as much of the slack as Burnet had hoped.

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Of all Burnet's efforts, the building of Fort Oswego would be most successful. By 1725 the Indian commissioners believed that "if no Settlement be made among the 5 Nations we will in process of time loose most of our best and trusty Indians and then in Course all the Trade." New York also feared the French fort at Niagara would defeat any plans for capturing the western trade. In the middle of this struggle lay the Iroquois, who continued to strive for a balance between the French and the English. In September 1726 Burnet met

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9. McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 144, 153, lxxv-lxxvi; Conference between Gov. Burnet and the Indians, Sept. 19, 1724, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 718-719; Assembly Journals, I, 538-539; Colonial Laws of New York, II, 281-282, 350-351, 366-367, 370-371.

10. Colonial Laws of New York, II, 281-282; McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, lxxv-lxxvii; Jean Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade Out of New France, 1730-1760," Canadian Hist. Assoc. Report, 1939 (Toronto, 1939), 66, 70; Frederick W. Barnes, "The Fur Traders of Early Oswego," Proceedings of the New York State Hist. Assoc. XIII (1914), 130; Frederick K. Zercher, "The Port of Oswego," Ibid, XXXIII (1935), 309; Philips, The Fur Trade, 380; Lawson, Fur, 34, 39. The enumeration of fur in 1722 also added to the increase of fur prior to 1726.

the Indians at Albany, where they complained bitterly about the French in an oft-quoted speech.

we speak now in the name of all the Six Nations and come to you howling: This is the reason for what we howl, that the Governor of Canada incroaches on our land and builds thereon, therefore do we come to your Excellency our Brother Corlaer, and desire you will be pleased to write to the great king Your Master and if Our King will then be pleased to write to the King of France, that the Six Nations desire that the Fort at Niagara may be demolished.

Returning from Albany, the Governor informed the Assembly of the French danger and proposed to build a fort at Oswego with £ 300  
11  
designated for that purpose.

Work on the fort at Oswego commenced in the spring of 1727 and progressed rapidly. Burnet wrote the Board of Trade in June that he "depende[ed] upon its being of the best use of anything that has ever been undertaken on that side either to preserve our own Indians in our Interest, or to promote and fix a constant Trade with the remote Indians." French alarm and protest increased with the completion of the fort in August, but New York remained firm in its commitment to support the project. Although the cost exceeded the projected sum of £ 300, the Assembly voted to pay for the complete outlay. "All reasonable Charge thereof ought to be

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11. McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 157; Conference between Gov. Burnet and the Indians, Sept., 1726, Gov. Burnet to Lords of Trade, Dec. 4, 1726, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 795-785.

paid and provided for, because the said Building is esteemed formidable and defencible, and to tend very much to secure the Six Nations in the British Interest and to promote the Trade with the more remote Indians." Oswego now became a mainstay for New York's  
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Indian policy.

Burnet's departure from New York in 1728 and the subsequent disallowance in the following year by the Crown of all acts dealing with the Indian trade raised questions concerning the legislation's effectiveness. Throughout the decade debate continued over the efficacy of Burnet's Indian policy. A 1724 petition by several London merchants trading to New York claimed the 1720 trade act "in its Effects... has proved very Pernicious to the British Trade in general, and to the Interest of New York in particular." The New York Council rejected the claim "that there had not been, by far, so great a Quantity of Beaver and other Furs imported into Great Britain since the passing the said Act," along with allegations about the geographical locations of the Indians. Governor Burnet expressed little fear over the French getting trade goods from

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12. Gov. Burnet to the Lords of Trade, May 9, June 29, 1727, Gov. Burnet to the Duke of Newcastle, May 10, Aug. 24, 1727, Marquis de Beauharnois to Gov. Burnet, July 20, 1727, Gov. Burnet to Marquis de Beauharnois, Aug. 8, 1727, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 818-822, 824, 827-832; Assembly Journals, I, 558, 567, 571; Colonial Laws of New York, II, 372-373.



elsewhere, for only Great Britain and its colonies produced most of the items -- guns, rum, strouds, and other woolen goods. Despite conflicting claims and evidence for both sides concerning the Canada trade, no one questioned the importance of the fort and trading house at Oswego. The Assembly maintained its support of the outpost, while the French continued to fear its role in extending British influence.

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Export figures for 1730-1731 further signified the effectiveness of the double-duty tax and the pressure it applied to private trading interests. A better than three-fold increase of beaver exports in 1731 over the previous year signalled the repeal of the fur acts of 1720-1729 prohibiting or taxing the Canada trade. Although the last law was disallowed in December of 1729, that word did not reach the colony until well after the summer trading season had begun in 1730. Thus, the increase which would naturally follow the relaxation of such regulations came in 1731, and fur which had presumably accumulated for a period of years

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13. Petition of London Merchants to King, Cadwallader Colden, Papers Relating to An Act of the Assembly of the Province of New York, for Encouragement of the Indian Trade (New York, 1724), 2, 10-13; McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, lxxxi.

14. McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, lxxx; Gov. Montgomery to the Lords of Trade, Dec. 21, 1730, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 906; Assembly Journals, I, 606.

flooded onto the market. Current values for both beaver and all furs also reflected these same trends during the period that the fur interests again freely plyed their trade.

New York's exports to London during the 1720s were dominated by fur and especially beaver. Beaver alone made up twenty to thirty percent of the value of all New York's exports, while the total value of all furs was often as high as or higher than forty percent. A fluctuation occurred in the total value of all furs as a percentage of New York's exports to London in this period, while the quantity of beaver dropped during the decade and particularly after the double duty tax. Both the total value of beaver and of all furs as percentages also increased in 1730 and 1731. New York's fur policy affected beaver most markedly, for its percentage of the total value of all furs and skins decreased over the period, especially after 1726, only to increase again with the disallowance of the acts.

The evident importance of beaver and fur to New York's trade with London, the major market for peltry, indicated a major difficulty with Burnet's Indian policy. He formulated his theory largely on the importance of the Indian for New York's security against the French, expecting to maintain the level of trade through increased amounts of fur from the West. Burnet's approach was too advanced for the period, however, and New Yorkers continued to

emphasize a trade-based policy during the next decade and a half. Nevertheless, subtle changes would set in with respect to the basis for dealings with the Indians.

Despite Burnet's aggressive Indian policy, subsequent administrations did little to further the program, with the exception of continuing support for Oswego. Factional disputes were common at the time, and any Indian trade regulations met with stern opposition. Wraxall noted in November 1730 that Governor Montgomery, who had succeeded Burnet, had not met with the Indians in two years, which Wraxall considered too long an absence. He attributed this to factionalism, for "Governor Montgomerie was a Wise Man and an honest Governor. I suppose he was distressed by those Factions which have always blasted the Welfare of this province." Fur interests remained central to New York's Indian policy during most of the 1730s, as reflected in the export statistics and in an increased concern for Oswego.<sup>15</sup>

Figures for the quantity of beaver exported from New York after 1731 revealed several interesting trends. After the banner year of 1731, the quantity of beaver dropped off again for four years. No outstanding reason within the fur trade seemed to explain this; it appeared to be part of an overall trend, since all exports

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15. McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, lxxxi, 182; Osgood, American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, III, 376; Cosby to Lords of Trade, June 19, 1734, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 7.

from New York underwent a general contraction. Beaver and total fur as percentages of New York's total value of exports also confirmed this, for they remained constant or even increased over the pre-1731 level. At the end of the fourth decade a great increase occurred in the volume of furs exported, made up largely by an increase in beaver. Decreases occurred in 1740-1741, but the total volume remained higher than in the first half of the 1730s. Cadwallader Colden in 1740 attributed these increases to the policy of strengthening Oswego.<sup>16</sup>

Whether Colden's observation explained in full the increase in furs was not clear. Nevertheless, Oswego's trading house and fort did become the center of most Indian affairs during the 1730s and early 1740s. Contemporary comments and provisions for support testified to Oswego's continued importance. Montgomery first met with the Six Nations in September 1728. At that time he renewed the Covenant Chain and expressed to them the purpose of Oswego: "I now expect you are now Convinced that the Garrison and House erected at Oswego is not only for the Conveniency of the far Indians to carry in their Trade with the Inhabitants of this province but also for your Security and Conveniency to Trade there." On August 26, 1730, Montgomery informed the Assembly of the repeal

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16. McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, lxxxii.

of the fur trade acts and also noted the continued importance of Oswego. "Every man who knows the Interest and Circumstance of this Province, must be very sensible of the Importance of that Place, on which chiefly depends the Prosperity and Success of your Indian Trade; the Fidelity and Obedience of the Six Nations to the Crown of Great Britain; and the Protection and Defence of your frontier Settlements." Both the Council and Assembly subsequently petitioned the Board of Trade for permission to lay a small duty on the Indian trade, which would pay for the support of the fort. They emphasized that the alliance of the Six Nations, "firm and steadfast Friends to the British Interest," depended upon the support of Oswego. Despite fears to the contrary, the Assembly passed an act to support the troops at Oswego and to regulate the trade there in September 1731 and renewed it again the following year. <sup>17</sup>

Late in 1730 Governor Montgomery received news that the French planned to erect a fort at Crown Point on Lake Champlain. He met the Six Nations in May 1731, at which time he renewed the Covenant Chain in the usual manner and warned them against allowing the French to build at Crown Point. Death prevented Montgomery

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17. Conference between Gov. Montgomery and the Indians, Sept. 1728, Gov. Montgomery to Sec. Popple, Dec. 21, 1730, Gov. Montgomery to Duke of Newcastle, Dec. 21, 1730, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 861, 913-914; Assembly Journals, I, 606-607, 610, 620-622, Colonial Laws of New York, II, 705-707, 788.

from reporting fully on this affair, and control of the government devolved upon Council President Rip van Dam. French occupation of Crown Point in 1733 had met with little resistance, and that but verbal, although the French obviously had reasons other than trade in mind. Governor William Cosby met the Six Nations at Albany in September of 1733, where he addressed them concerning the French fort. "I do in particular manner require you in my Masters name, that you will not suffer the French to build any Forts or trading houses on the side of the Lake or any other part of your Lands." More important, his address dealt largely with trade and particularly with Oswego. Taking his cue from Montgomery's address three years earlier, Cosby stressed the value of Oswego for both trade and security. Trade and defense slowly became intertwined as the basis for Indian policy.<sup>18</sup>

Indian policy began a hesitant return to the emphasis on defense prematurely expressed by Burnet. In October of 1733 the Assembly, in response to a petition of a large group of Oswego fur traders, suggested sending a competent person such as David Schuyler to regulate the abuses complained of by the traders. They felt it would increase trade and "tend to the Benefit of his

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18. McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 182-188; Conference between Gov. Cosby and the Indians, Sept., 1733, Gov. Cosby to Duke of Newcastle, Dec. 15, 1733, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 964-967, 972; Smith, History of New York, I, 247; Osgood, American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, III, 375-376.

Majesty's Subjects of the Colony, and enable them to vend much larger Quantities of the British Woollen Manufactures, in Return for the Beaver Furs, and other Skins, they have the Prospect to procure by that Trade." The Albany commissioners wrote to Governor Cosby the following spring, referring to the dangers for both trade and for peace on the frontier of allowing the Seneca to fall under French influence. Cosby addressed the Assembly on April 25, suggesting it send gunsmiths to reside among the Iroquois, for "it is to our Interest to defeat Attempts of the French by the like Acts, and to preserve the Friendship of the six Nations though at greater Expense." Frontier security and trade together determined Indian policy as the decade advanced.<sup>19</sup>

Representatives of the Six Nations at an Albany conference in September 1735 addressed Governor Cosby: "Trade and Peace we take to be one thing," recognizing that each depended on the other. New Yorkers, however, increasingly valued the Iroquois as buffers between themselves and the French. Several Albany inhabitants noted that year that "the five Nations of Indians are [the] Chief Security against the French and their Indians, in time of War." Fear of a dreaded third inter-colonial war grew larger with each succeeding year.<sup>20</sup>

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19. Assembly Journals, I, 651-652, 654; Commissioners to Gov. Cosby, Mar. 4, 1734, McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 189-190.

20. McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 195; Assembly Journals, I, 683.

George Clarke, who, as Council President, took over the governorship and subsequently received appointment as Lieutenant Governor, summoned a large Indian conference in June 1737. He hoped thereby to prevent the French from building a trading post at Irondequat, which would "enable them to intercept all the Western Fur Trade in its way to Oswego." <sup>21</sup> Clarke severely reprimanded the Iroquois for giving permission to Jean Coeur, the French interpreter, to settle at Irondequat. The Six Nations agreed to retract that permission but caustically concluded: "How Comes it that the French have settled so near in the neighborhood even at the Crown Point have they Wone it by the sword We think it is our land." Clarke himself desired permission from the Seneca to build at Irondequat, but he could not persuade them. He settled instead for the usual method of sending an interpreter, smith, and several other people into Indian country to watch over French activities and maintain the British interest. <sup>22</sup>

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21. President Clarke to Lords of Trade, Mar. 16, 1736, Pres. Clarke to Mr. Van Dam, Mar. 11, 1736, Commission of George Clarke, Esq., as Lieutenant Governor of New York, July 13, 1736, Lt. -Gov. Clarke to Lords of Trade, May 9, 1737, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 42-43, 45, 71, 95; Assembly Journals, I, 702-703. Irondequat was located forty miles west of Oswego on the south side of Lake Ontario.

22. Conference between Lt. -Gov. Clarke and the Indians, June-July, 1737, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 98-109; Assembly Journals, I, 705.



Support for the Oswego garrison and prevention of further French forts occupied a large part of New York's Indian policy. In 1737 the Assembly capitalized on Clarke's fear of a defenseless frontier. It forced him to accept a one year revenue act for his support by threatening not to provide for the colony's defenses. Nevertheless, they voted to support the Oswego garrison and continued to do so, recognizing its defensive value to the colony. New Yorkers made continued efforts to keep the French from their proposed building, and the Assembly rewarded the Seneca in 1739 by sending them £ 100 for their important role in preventing further French construction in their area of control. Clarke conferred with the Six Nations in August 1740, at which time they admitted all "the Indians to the Southward and Westward as far as Mississippi" into the extended Covenant Chain. The Board of Trade expressed hope that this action would establish a lasting peace among the Indians. Clarke again requested permission to settle at Irondequat, but the Iroquois desired to maintain their neutrality in the affair. "We perceive that both you and the french intend to settle that place, but we are fully resolved that neither you nor they shall settle there [. T]here is a jealousy between you and the Governor of Canada about that place, if either the one or the other should settle there we think it would breed mischief." However, he did obtain a deed to the Irondequat area the following winter, largely because the decreasing strength

of the Iroquois forced them to lean more to the British cause  
23  
than that of the French.

Although New York's Indian policy increasingly reflected the importance of defensive interests, fur did not lose all its importance until just prior to King George's War. Peltry as a percentage of New York's exports increased, reaching seventy-one percent in 1736, then slowly decreased until 1744. The increased total figures for 1736-1738 indicated the reason for this percentage rise. From 1739-1741 the small overall decreases in volume only marked a return to a more normal level of trade. The years immediately preceding King George's War showed a further decrease in the value of both beaver and total fur, but this proceeded naturally from the tensions along the frontier. Since the value of total exports from New York remained basically constant from the early 1730s through 1745, fur declined in the later years as a percentage of the total exports. Current values again exhibited the major

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23. Assembly Journals, I, 740, 742, 756, 761, 766, 768, 771-772, 775-776; Colonial Laws of New York, II, 974, 1013, III, 104-105, 241; Stanley N. Katz, Newcastle's New York, Anglo-American Politics, 1732-1753 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 152-153, 156-157; Conference between Lt. -Gov. Clarke and the Six Nations, August, 1740, Lords of Trade to Lt. -Gov. Clarke, Aug. 20, 1741, Deed to His Majesty of the Land around Irondequat, Jan. 10, 1741, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 172-179, 199, 204.

changes discussed above, but they further indicated a general  
24  
price decline for fur.

The point at which defensive concerns overshadowed trade advantages remains uncertain. However, as the war years approached, New York placed greater emphasis on Oswego and the fidelity of the Iroquois as security against the French. Clarke's April 15, 1741, address to the Assembly referred to Oswego as "of the highest importance to the Fur Trade," and went on to say, "if you suffer Oswego to fall into the Hands of the French I much fear you will lose the six Nations, an Event which will expose the whole Country to the mercilous Spoil and barbarous cruelty of a Savage Enemy." On April twenty-seventh Clarke told the House that the friendship of the Six Nations was more important than anything else, and "if we lose them, no Part of the Country will be safe." By the following year he made no mention of fur at all in his address to the Assembly. During Clarke's final conference with the Indians in the summer of 1742, he stressed the importance of Oswego and the alliance of the Covenant Chain but made little mention of trade. A great unrest and a fear of a French war lay heavily on

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24. Samuel Storke, a London merchant, complained that by the late 1730s his fur trade had fallen off. As an individual Storke's trade may have declined, but overall figures did not support his complaint. William I. Roberts, III, "Samuel Storke: An Eighteenth-Century London Merchant Trading to the American Colonies," The Business History Review, XXXIX (1965), 164, 167.

the minds of New Yorkers. Even such a stalwart as Philip Livingston wrote to his son expressing his darkest thoughts: "I do very much dread a French war in this Country [. T]here is no manner of notice taken of our frontiers." New Yorkers recognized the importance of Oswego and of Iroquois friendship to the colony's defense with the coming of King George's War.<sup>25</sup>

During the almost quarter century from Governor Burnet's arrival in 1720 to the start of King George's War, New York had experienced two complete turnabouts in Indian policy. Burnet immediately recognized the value of the Iroquois for both New York's security against the French and for the fur trade. He tried to bring the Indians into closer alliance with the English by cutting off the Albany-Montreal trade, but he failed to replace the Canada trade with that of the western tribes. Hence Albany traders opposed Burnet's plan and ultimately brought about its rejection. Albany existed solely for the profits of the fur trade and refused to sacrifice its immediate gains for long-range imperial goals. Defeat of half of Burnet's program in

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25. Assembly Journals, I, 793, 799-800, 827, 831; Conference between Lt. -Gov. Clarke and the Six Nations, June 15-16, 1742, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 216-218; Philip Livingston to Robert Livingston, Oct. 19, 1742, Livingston-Redmond Mss., Franklin D. Roosevelt Lib., Hyde Park, N.Y. (microfilm copy, hereafter cited as Livingston-Redmond Papers); Barnes, "Fur Traders of Oswego," 132.

1729 did nothing to detract from the success of the other half. The fortified trading house at Oswego increased New York's fur trade and furthered the colony's influence with the Six Nations. Succeeding governors met with factional opposition at the slightest hint of an aggressive Indian policy, but no one doubted the value of Oswego. New York continued to provide support for the post throughout the period. Concern for the Indians during the decade of the 1730s centered around what they could provide in the way of trade profits. However, by the early 1740s policy had subtly changed. Impending war with France brought New York back to a recognition of the value of the Iroquois for the colony's security. In their haste to protect themselves, New Yorkers neglected the fur trade almost completely. Indeed, policy had come full circle, but William Burnet did not taste its fruits.

TABLE III-1

Year	(1) Total N.Y. exports to Outports in £	(2) N.Y. Exports to London and Outports in £	(3) N.Y. exports to Outports as a % of total exports from N.Y. to England
1720	1657.11. 1	16,836.12. 7	10
1721	4525. 8. 6	15,681. 3.11	29
1722	3640.17. 7	20,118.13. 5	18
1723	8335.14.10	27,992. 5. 6	30
1724	3998.17. 2	21,191. 2. 3	19
1725	4875. 6. 2	24,976. 5. 3	20
1726	3798. 3. 6	38, 307.17.10	10
1727	2662. 1. 9	28,955. 6.44	9
1728	5676.17. 5	21,141.18. 6	27
1729	4380.11. 1	15,833.18. 9	28
1730	2305.18. 2	8,740.11. 3	26
1731	1552. 1.11	20,756. 1.11	7
1732	1891. 9. 1	9,411. 6. 9	20
1733	2604. 8. 8	11,626.17. 4	22
1734	2900.14.--	15,307.12.--	19
1735	2707.10. 9	14,154. 8. 2	19
1736	2860.13. 4	17,944.19. 1	16
1737	1136. 9. 7	16,833.15.10	7
1738	2681.13. 9	16,228. 3. 7	17
1739	2034.17.10	18,459. 5.10	11
1740	4457.15.11	21,498.--. 5	21
1741	4819.18. 8	21,142. 7. 9	23
1742	1584. 1. 7	13,536.17.10	12
1743	824.10. 2	15,067. 6.11	5
1744	130.--.--	14,527.18. 5	1

TABLE III-2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Year	Beaver (# of skins)	Value of Beaver in £	Total value of all furs and skins exported from N.Y. to London in £	Total value of all exports from N.Y. to London in £
1720	26,579	4651. 6. 6	7281. 8. 6	15,179. 1. 6
1721	23,677	4,141.14. 6	5,320.16. 9	11,155. 1. 6
1722	25,763	4,508.10. 6	6,467.16. 3	16,477.15. 5
1723	22,710	3,974. 5.--	6,222. 8. 6	19,656.10. 8
1724	23,251	4,068.18. 6	7,111.12. 3	17,192. 5. 1
1725	31,619	5,585.16. 6	9,188. 5. 7	20,100.19. 1
1726	35,619	6,233.13. 6	11,925.14. 9	34,509.14. 4
1727	12,573	2,200. 5. 6	5,974.10.--	28,955. 6. 4
1728	13,521	2,366. 3. 6	6,826.17. 2	15,465. 1. 1
1729	10,721	1,876. 3. 6	4,553.66. 2	11,453. 7. 8
1720	7,597	1,329. 9. 6	3,105.10. 2	66,434.13. 1
1731	25,614	4,482. 9.--	8,375. 4. 5	19,204.--.--
1732	6,187	1,082.14. 6	3,851.12. 5	7,519.17. 8
1733	9,883	1,729.10. 6	4,933.16.11	9,022. 8. 8
1734	11,436	2,001. 6.--	4,490. 8. 8	12,406.18.--
1735	8,230	1,440. 5.--	3,813. 2. 2	11,447.17. 5
1736	37,487	6,560. 4. 6	10,713. 4. 3	15,084. 5. 9
1737	36,466	6,381.11.--	9,220. 8. 4	15,697. 6. 3
1738	29,408	5,146. 8.--	6,727. 4. 9	13,546. 9.10
1739	22,148	3,875.18.--	6,149.14.11	16,424. 8.--
1740	16,118	2,820.13.--	5,931.19.11	17,040. 5. 4
1741	23,575	4,125.12. 6	8,187. 7. 2	16,322. 9. 1
1742	8,777	1,535.19. 6	4,049.13. 9	11,952.16. 3
1743	13,413	2,347. 5. 6	5,047.19.11	14,242.16. 9
1744	12,133	2,123. 5. 6	4,843. 7.11	14,397.18. 5

TABLE III-2 Continued

	(5)	(6)	(7)
Year	Value of beaver as a % of all fur and skins exported from N.Y. to London	Value of beaver as a % of total exports from N.Y. to London	Value of total fur and skins as a % of total exports from N.Y. to London
1720	64	31	48
1721	78	37	48
1722	70	27	39
1723	64	20	32
1724	57	23	41
1725	61	28	46
1726	52	18	35
1727	37	8	21
1728	36	15	44
1729	41	16	40
1730	43	21	48
1731	54	23	44
1732	28	14	51
1733	35	19	55
1734	45	16	36
1735	38	13	33
1736	61	43	71
1737	69	41	59
1738	76	38	50
1739	63	24	38
1740	48	17	35
1741	50	25	50
1742	38	13	34
1743	46	16	35
1744	44	15	34



TABLE III-3

Year	(1) Current value of beaver in £	(2) Current value of total fur and skins exported from N.Y. to London in £	(3) Total current value of all exports from N.Y. to London in £
1720	4363	6830	14,238
1721	3806	4890	10,252
1722	4013	5757	14,665
1723	3382	3382	16,727
1724	3581	6279	15,129
1725	4999	8223	17,990
1726	5870	11,246	32,543
1727	2064	5605	27,160
1728	2231	6438	14,583
1729	1816	4407	11,087
1730	1247	2913	6,036
1731	3989	7454	17,091
1732	942	3351	6,542
1733	1438	4100	7,497
1734	1693	3799	10,396
1735	1204	3187	9,571
1736	5392	8806	12,399
1737	5399	7800	13,280
1738	4312	5624	11,324
1739	3147	4994	13,336
1740	2592	5452	15,660
1741	4114	8162	16,273
1742	1464	3860	11,391
1743	2112	4543	12,819
1744	1879	4286	12,742

## CHAPTER IV

### THE CULMINATION OF IMPERIAL POLICY

Indian Policy, as King George's War approached, had reflected the growing recognition of the Iroquois' military value. The years 1744-1763 finalized such an approach. Military immediacies waned with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, and peace brought with it time for reflection in New York. The importance of Indian allies, and the impact of Britain's shift from mercantilism to imperialism continued to dominate Indian policy. Writers on both sides of the Atlantic, such as Archibald Kennedy and Malachy Postlethwayt, emphasized the Indians' value to the colonial defenses, and imperial authorities accepted this continued concern with the Indians' military importance.

Britain during the 1750s and early 1760s increasingly moved toward a unified imperial policy. The government called for an inter-colonial conference on Indian affairs in 1754 and created an Indian superintendency in 1755 to further unify policy. Settlement of the Great War for Empire further reflected England's new imperial concerns. England sacrificed the French sugar islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique to retain Canada, which supplied the majority of furs, but, more important, provided a potential market for Britain's manufactured goods. After the conquest of Canada, the

fur trade shifted north, and both the Iroquois and New York lost their central roles.

King George's War, 1744-1748, occasioned a revival of Burnet's earlier approach to Indian policy. Governor George Clinton favored a vigorous policy toward the French, but many New Yorkers wanted to avoid open conflict. Albany traders continued their desire to maintain as large a fur trade as possible. As would be expected, the value of all furs exported to London, having leveled off during the early 1740s, took a sharp plunge in 1745, after the war had begun.<sup>1</sup> By 1748 New York exported less than £ 1,000 worth of fur and no beaver at all. Fur as a percentage of New York's exports also dropped, but it contributed at least a fifth of the total value, except for 1748, due to a contraction of all exports. Clinton at several points during the war accused fur traders and the Albany Indian commissioners of not supporting a Canada expedition because they feared a loss of their profits from a Montreal trade.<sup>2</sup> To complicate matters further, the Iroquois made a pointed effort to remain neutral in this "white man's" war. Jean Coeur, the French trader, noted their "secret understanding" toward this end; so, too, did Lieutenant Governor Clarke, who

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1. Tables containing all statistical information are located at the end of the chapter.

2. Ellis, Short History, 54; Osgood, American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, IV, 175, 183.

"found them rather inclinable not to intermeddle with the War."  
Despite such hesitant attitudes by the Indians, Clinton pursued a  
policy of keeping the Six Nations favorable to the British interest.<sup>3</sup>

Clinton based his policy on Oswego and its relationship to  
the Iroquois. He and Clarke, in several addresses to the Assembly,  
noted Oswego's importance and the value of keeping the Six Nations  
in the British camp. Warning of a possible loss of the native  
alliance, Clarke told the House in 1744, "we may easily foresee how  
fatal and Destructive such an event would prove."<sup>4</sup>

Albany in June of 1744 was the scene of Governor Clinton's  
first conference with the Six Nations. Stressing the need "to renew,  
strengthen and brighten the Covenant Chain," Clinton proclaimed  
British friendship for the Iroquois, warned of French treachery,  
and urged the Indians to keep careful guard now that the French had  
declared war on the English King. Clinton went on to promise  
British protection and asked the Indians for their assistance "in  
the vigorous prosecution of this just war against the French King,"  
and especially in the protection of Oswego. Upon his return to New  
York, Clarke addressed the Assembly concerning the recent Albany  
conference and stressed the great importance of preserving Oswego,

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3. Conference between Gov. Clinton and the Indians, June, 1744,  
Journal of Occurances in Canada 1746, 1747, O'Callaghan, ed.,  
N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 265, X, 94; Assembly Journals, II, 24.

4. Assembly Journals, II, 15, 24.

upon which "the Fidelity of the Six Nations to the British interest,  
5  
does in a great Measure depend."

Upon receiving news of the outbreak of war, many fur traders retreated from Oswego. Clinton believed this weakened Iroquois confidence in the British. By September 1744 the Assembly passed another act to support the garrison and trading house at Oswego. With a militia reinforcement to double the garrison of royal troops, Clinton confidently wrote to the Duke of Newcastle  
6  
of the fresh spirit instilled among the Indians.

Events in 1745 followed much the same pattern as they had the previous year. Clinton's addresses to the Assembly centered on the importance of giving presents to maintain the Indian alliance. The culmination of the year's effort was the Albany conference held in October, planned in order to allay Iroquois fears of the French and to deny English plans to eliminate the Indians. Ironically, the previous year's conference apparently had done little to quell this disquietude, for Philip Livingston wrote to his son Robert on January thirteenth, "I received Surprising News. That the Mohawk

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5. Conference between Gov. Clinton and the Indians, June 18, 1744, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 262-264; Assembly Journals, II, 24.

6. Colonial Laws of New York, III, 352-353; Clinton to Newcastle, Dec. 13, 1744, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 268; Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of the State of New York (4 vols., Albany, 1850), I, 304 (hereafter cited as O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History).

Indians give out that the White people will massacre them." The October 1745 conference dissipated the Indians' fears of massacre, but Clinton could extract from them only a tenuous promise of aid, even if the French continued their attacks. Upon returning from Albany, Clinton warned the Assembly that, though he hoped for a strict neutrality on the part of the Indians, the legislators could not afford to remain idle, and he asked them for aid toward assisting his majesty's service.<sup>7</sup>

William Johnson had by 1746 usurped the influence of the Albany commissioners in all dealings with the Indians, and Clinton relied heavily on his advice. Johnson received a colonel's commission from the governor of his past services and for his ability to recruit Iroquois aid.<sup>8</sup> A meeting with the Indians in late summer sought their help in a projected expedition against Canada. Only Johnson could influence the Indians to join in this attempt. Factionalism and the desire for neutrality returned to hinder Clinton though. In 1747 he reprimanded Albany for the "shameful Neutrality, which it is generally believed, some in this

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7. Assembly Journals, II, 61, 72, 74, 79; Philip Livingston to Robert Livingston, Jan. 30, 1745, Livingston-Redmond Papers; Paul A.W. Wallace, Conrad Weiser, 1696-1760; Friend of Colonist and Mohawk (Philadelphia, 1945), 229; Conference between Commissioners of the Colonies and the Indians, Oct., 1745, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 289-305.

8. Clinton to Newcastle, Dec. 9, 1746, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 313-314.

Province, have endeavoured to establish between this Province and Canada, at this Time, such as was established in the War in Queen Anne's Reign, by which the French in Canada, gained great Advantages over the neighbouring Colonies, to the Prejudice of the common Interest of the Nation." Despite the factionalism which seemed to dominate the war years, Clinton and Johnson provided for the proper defenses of the colony, although they might have wished for a more aggressive policy. When the Crown set aside the Canadian expedition, it especially disappointed Clinton who believed that only aggressive action by the English would secure the favor of the Indians. Realization of the closeness of peace, however, eased tensions within the colony by late 1748. Governor Clinton warned against a premature relaxation of security, and the House continued the usual support of Oswego. However, it denied financing for the forces on the northern frontier after November first in anticipation of peace.<sup>9</sup>

Peace itself brought with it time for reflection upon Indian affairs and the expected dangers from the French. Policy during the war concerned itself almost wholly with the Indians' military role. This approach would continue through the 1750s, both

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9. Ibid., VI, 310-312, 317-326, 379, 396, 419, 432; Colonial Laws of New York, III, 605-606, 729-730, 736-737; Assembly Journals, II, 115, 124-125, 142, 145-156, 169-170, 172, 186, 223, 235, 239-243, 245, 249; Smith, History of New York, II, 119.

in time of peace and war. Conrad Weiser, Pennsylvania's chief Indian agent, recognized the latent danger of the situation in a 1748 message to the deputies of several Indian nations.

The French King's People have been almost starved in Old France for want of Provision, which made them wish and seek for Peace; but our wise People are of the opinion that after their Bellies are full they will Quarrel again and raise War. All nations in Europe know that their Friendship is mixed with Poison, and many that trusted too much on their Friendship have been ruined. 10

Peace brought with it a rejuvenation of trade from 1749-1754, although 1750 proved an exception, since the larger 1749 total resulted basically from stockpiled fur. It also occasioned a more sophisticated concept of the necessary relationship between the British and the Indians in order to restrain the French from controlling both fur supplies and territory. As soon after the war as 1749, William Johnson reported French attempts to draw the Iroquois away from the British. Fearing their "Scheme which is to build trading Houses and garrisons at all Passes between said [Ohio] River and Oswego," he stressed the need for checking the French advances. New York's Council assured him that the Iroquois would receive ammunition and supplies if they sided with the English against the French. Governor and Assembly alike during the inter-war years, realized the importance of the Indian to the

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10. Journal of Conrad Weiser, 1748, Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Early Western Travels, 1748-1846 (Cleveland, 1904), I, 40.



British cause. The Assembly minutes reaffirmed that "The preserving of the Indians, is undoubtedly of Great Consequence to the Security and Prosperity of this Colony."

Colonial and British thought increasingly recognized the need for unified imperial policy in Indian affairs. Archibald Kennedy expressed well the thinking of the period in a series of pamphlets in the early 1750s. He asked rhetorically if it was not time to secure the frontiers while the peace lasted, "which from all Appearances cannot be very long." "What ever Pretences may be made, it is absolutely true, that the Preservation of the whole Continent, depends upon a proper Regulation of the Six Nations." Cadwallader Colden, inspired by Kennedy's proposals, drew up a memorial on the state of Indian affairs, which eventually went to the Board of Trade in August 1751. It described the Iroquois' importance and the desirability of a single superintendent to supervise them. Increasing information of a similar nature over the next two years, culminating with the news of Mohawk complaints about land frauds and other abuses, forced the Board of Trade and the Crown

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11. James Sullivan, ed., The Papers of Sir William Johnson (14 vols., Albany, 1921-1965), II, 276-279, 281, 301, 314 (hereafter cited as Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers); O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 589-593; Assembly Journals, II, 263, 270, 276, 291, 297, 308, 311, 326, 330, 336-337; Colonial Laws of New York, III, 781-784, 885-886.

12. Assembly Journals, II, 312.

to take positive action.

British concern for a uniform policy grew out of a larger movement toward imperialism that would eventually engulf all the colonies. The Board of Trade in 1753 desired the governor, Sir Danvers Osborne, to recommend laws to the Assembly for repairing and erecting fortifications for the security of the colony and for subsidizing annual presents to the Indians. Concern about the serious nature of Indian affairs induced the Board of Trade to write again on September eighteenth: "Friendship and Alliance is only to be gained and preserved by making Presents to them at proper Times, and upon proper occasions." Indian policy changed radically as the Board, having ordered a conference of all concerned colonies, advised Osborne to "take Care, that all the Provinces, be (if practicable) comprised in one General Treaty, to be made in His Majesty's Name, it appearing to us, that the Practice of each Province making separate Treaty for itself, in its own Name is very improper, and may be attended with great In-  
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conveniency to His Majesty's Subjects." Shortly after arriving in

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13. Archibald Kennedy, Observations on the Importance of the Northern Colonies Under Proper Regulations (New York, 1750), 6; Kennedy, Importance of Gaining and Preserving, 7; Colden to Gov. Clinton, Aug. 8, 1751, Conference between Gov. Clinton and the Indians, June, 1753, O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History, VI, 738-747, 781-788.

14. Assembly Journals, II, 353; Lords of Trade to Osborne, Sept. 18, 1753, Lords of Trade to the Governors in America, Sept. 18, 1753, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 800-802; O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History, II, 317-321.

New York, Osborne committed suicide and Lieutenant Governor DeLancey requested the Assembly to provide for the conference desired by the Board of Trade; the House readily complied.<sup>15</sup> The Albany Congress of 1754 and the subsequent appointment of William Johnson as Indian Superintendent for the Northern Colonies signified the change in Indian policy. Imperial control of Indian affairs would not only prevent abuses in the fur trade, but it would also maintain those alliances which would prevent French encroachment. Recognition of such a vital concept had evolved slowly, but it would prove its worth during the Great War for Empire, the last of the intercolonial wars.

Newspapers in 1754 expressed concern over the French danger and the importance of united action in such matters, and recognition of the seriousness of the crisis brought many prominent colonists together at Albany in June and July. Archibald Kennedy in his writing pleaded with the Albany Congress not to break up for reasons of petty jealousy, believing that only unified action would defeat France, Britain's "implacable and most inveterate  
<sup>16</sup>  
Enemy."

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15. Assembly Journals, II, 367-368; Lt. -Gov. DeLancey to Lords of Trade, Oct. 15, 1753, Lords of Trade to Lt. -Gov. DeLancey, Feb. 26, 1754, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 803-804, 829.

16. The New-York Mercury, May 6, 1754; Archibald Kennedy, Serious Considerations on the Present State of the Affairs of the Northern Colonies (New York, 1754), 3, 14-15.

The importance of frontier issues, as expressed in the Congress's final representation and Plan, indicated the chief concerns of the commissioners. They pleaded for appointment of a single Indian superintendent, and most specifically Colonel Johnson. Brother Abraham, a Mohawk sachem, expressed the need most succinctly: "if he fails us, we die." Conflicting interpretations exist as to the exact reason for and the power behind Johnson's appointment, but the Crown created and filled the office in 1755. Secretary Pownall wrote to Johnson in 1756 concerning the office's importance and its "great end... of fixing them [the Indians] steadily in our interest and engaging them in the service" against the French. Johnson directed Indian policy toward maintaining the friendship of the Indians for strategic ends during the war  
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years.

The renewed struggle for empire brought a fifty percent decrease in all furs exported from New York in 1754 and 1755 and a corresponding decline in beaver. Total exports of all commodities from the colony also declined, so that fur as a per-

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17. Proceedings of the Colonial Congress held at Albany, Representation to the King on the Proceedings of the Congress at Albany, Oct. 29, 1754, Johnson to Gov. Shirley, Jan. 3, 1756, Gov. Shirley to Johnson, Jan. 4, 1756, Sec. Pownall to Johnson, Mar. 5, 1756, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 853-892, 896-897, 916-920, VII, 11-13, 41; Commission from Edward Braddock, Apr. 15, 1755, Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers, I, 465-466. For an interesting discussion concerning the basis for Johnson's appointment see John R. Alden, "The Albany Congress and the Creation of the Indian Superintendencies," Miss. Val. Hist. Rev. XXVII (1940), 193-210; cf. McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, xcvi-scvi; also see Lawrence H. Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution (15 vols., New York, 1936-1971), VI, 137-139, 186-190.

centage did not decrease until 1756 when the second major drop took place. The percentage increase for fur exports in 1758 resulted largely from a further drop in the colony's total exports, rather than a change in the fur situation. Beaver and total fur exports did not rise again until the war began to wind down in America in 1761. As in King George's War, concern centered on the military value of the Indians, rather than on their economic potential. Thus, powerful writers and administrators on both sides of the Atlantic influenced and directed Indian policy on a martial basis.

Malachy Postlethwayt, a British economic writer, published a series of dissertations in 1757 concerning England's commercial interests, in several of which he made extended comments about Indian policy in the American colonies. Postlethwayt's comments were strikingly similar to those of Archibald Kennedy, and he may indeed have borrowed some of the latter's ideas. Nevertheless, his exposition shows the widening concern for a unified Indian policy both in England and in America.

Postlethwayt recognized the increased importance of the Indians as a barrier against the French and believed that Parliament, rather than the individual colonies, must manage such affairs. He believed that "if we do not attach the Indian states to our alliance and friendship upon ties far more interesting, engaging, and obligatory than those that arise from mean temporary presents:...

our settlements in this part of America will not be tenable." To prevent the colonies from falling to the French he suggested that "the chief principles to be laid down in the management of our Indian affairs are, first, by all means to endeavor to undersell the French; and the next is, to do justice to the Indians in all our trafficable concerns with them." Finally, because all the colonies depended upon the security of New York's frontier, Postlethwayt indicated that each should bear a portion of the necessary cost in maintaining the security. This united action would also bolster the British image in the eyes of the Iroquois. Postlethwayt recognized the need for a unified imperial policy<sup>18</sup> and ostensibly influenced others in similar fashion.

Neither New York's laws nor its legislative discussions during the French and Indian War made much mention of trade alone. To minimize abuses of the Indians, the government legislated against selling them liquor and buying or trading their arms, gunpowder, and clothing given in return for their friendship and alliance. New Yorkers recognized the importance of preventing land fraud and usurpations as a means of keeping the Iroquois within the British interest. French settlement at Niagara in 1719 had initially caused the Six Nations to deed their land to the British

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18. Malachy Postlethwayt, Britain's Commercial Interest Explained and Improved (2 vols., London, 1757), I, 421-460, 479, 513-517, found in Reprints of Economic Classics (New York, 1968).

in 1726, eliciting a Board of Trade comment in 1756 that it "clearly mark[s] out what should be the Conduct and Politicks of the English with regard to them viz. to leave them in Possession of their Country, ... and to undertake the Guarantee of it to them, protecting them and their Hunting Lands."<sup>19</sup>

After the 1754 Albany agreement with the Indians, DeLancey expected aid from the Iroquois, but, as he noted, the colony must first put itself "in a proper Posture of Defence." The Assembly continued to support the building and provisioning of forts and garrisons.<sup>20</sup> Most important, the colony needed a show of military strength to keep the Indian favorable to the British. Early defeats near Ft. Duquesne and at Oswego confirmed this need, as pointed out by governors Hardy and DeLancey and by Colonel Johnson. "The Six Nations will never be thoroughly fixed to the British interest and arms until we strike some grand stroke, and thereby convince them that we have ability to protect them and humble the French." Johnson enlisted a minimum number of Indian allies on most occasions, but success brought them to the British

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19. Colonial Laws of New York, III, 1009-1010, 1096, IV, 93, 349-350; Report of the Board of Trade to King, Dec. 11, 1755, O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History, II, 411-412.

20. Assembly Journals, II, 376-377, 380, 388-389, 435-438, 582.

side in larger numbers. The following newspaper account, written after the Crown Point and Ticonderoga battles of 1759, demonstrated the need for a bold offensive capability:

It is said all the Indians but the brave Mohawks stood neuter the first onset the enemy made, to see, it is thought, which way the scale would turn; for I believe it was imprinted in their mind the French were invincible. As soon as they found the contrary, and that the French gave way, it is said but a yard of ground, they fell on them like so many butchers.

As the tide of victory in America began to shift to the British, the colonists emphasized trade as a means of maintaining Indian friendship. Johnson writing to the Board of Trade remarked upon this. "An Equitable and Open and a well regulated Trade with the Indians, is and ever will be, the most natural and the most efficacious means to improve and extend his Majesty's Indian Interest."<sup>22</sup>

Amherst's victories marked the end of French rule in Canada, and Johnson wrote to Secretary Pitt congratulating him on the reduction of Canada. "Thus sir, we became Masters of the last place in the Enemys possession in these parts and made those

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21. Ibid., II, 453, 500; O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History, II, 426-429; Johnson to Lords of Trade, May 28, 1756, Sept. 28, 1757, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 90, 276; Jacobs, Diplomacy, 158-159, 178-180; July 23, 30, Aug. 6, 20, 1759, The New-York Gazette.

22. Aug. 20, 1759, The New-York Gazette; Johnson to Jeffery Amherst, Apr. 21, 1759, Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers, III, 29; Johnson to Lords of Trade, May 17, 1759, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 376-377.



Indians our friends by a peace, who might otherwise have given us much trouble." Pitt's peace negotiations in 1761 revealed differences of opinion as to the value of certain captured French territories. Sugar interests were divided. Importers wanted the French sugar islands so as to gain a monopoly in the world's sugar trade, while many of the producers feared competition by the addition of Guadeloupe and Martinique. The Hudson's Bay Company and the British industrial community desired that England keep Canada for its fur supply and as a potential market for manufactured goods. England desired an early peace, and to that end realized it could not keep both Canada and the sugar islands, for France refused to surrender both its fur and sugar trades. Strong sugar interests and a changing commercial policy, which emphasized the increased importance of markets for manufactures, dictated that England keep Canada, while surrendering Guadeloupe and Martinique. British imperial interests had finally come to the forefront in determining the war's settlement. The Treaty of Paris in 1763 put almost all of North America's fur country in British possession, even though fur itself played a role of little importance in the peace settlement.<sup>23</sup>

The Treaty of Paris had profound effects on New York's fur trade. As the war drew to a close in America, beaver and total fur exports again rose, reaching a plateau from 1762-1764. The slow

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23. Johnson to Pitt, Oct. 24, 1760, Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers, III, 269-275; Edwin E. Rich, Montreal and the Fur Trade (Montreal, 1966), 37-42; Philips, The Fur Trade, 542-543; Beer, British Colonial Policy, 133-155.

decrease for the years 1765-1766 reflected the shift of the fur trade to Canada. Compared with the figures of earlier years, when fur exports were at their height, the downward trend in fur exports was reasonably conclusive. Perhaps most striking was the rise in total exports from New York, especially after the British gained effective control over North America. If combined with the overall decreases in total furs exported, this increase in total exports clearly defined the shrinking role of the fur trade for New York's economy. Control of Indian policy had come under unified imperial jurisdiction, and this destroyed New York's preeminence in the fur trade.

A relaxed Indian policy followed on the heels of victory. Assembly records for the years immediately following the French expulsion revealed little concern for Indian relations, now that they no longer served a purpose as a buffer against encroachments from the North. A decrease in gifts and presents, for which Amherst was largely responsible, and the Indians' fear of British occupation of their lands initiated Pontiac's Rebellion (1763-1764). New York's Assembly grudgingly voted to raise 800 men "to suppress this dangerous Defection, pregnant with the most fatal evils." Despite their early victories, the Indians could not coordinate a united effort, and by September of 1764 Lieutenant Governor Colden informed the Assembly of the peace concluded with

the Indians at Niagara, essentially ending the rebellion.

As the period drew to a close, new comprehensive plans of an imperial nature were drawn for the control of Indian affairs. Even during Pontiac's Rebellion, the British government issued the Proclamation of 1763 in October. It prohibited settlement west of the heads of rivers flowing into the Atlantic, provided for resolution of civil disputes concerning the Indians by the courts of the nearest colony, and required the licensing of fur traders. Designed as a provisional program by Lord Egremont, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, it anticipated a more complete plan. Previous to the issuance of the Proclamation, the Lords of Trade wrote to Johnson and the southern agent on August 5, 1763, asking for suggestions for a comprehensive Indian policy. Combining Johnson's reply and a memorandum from his assistant, George Croghan, the Board of Trade finalized a plan which it forwarded to the Indian agents and governors for their comment in July 1764. The plan provided for many of

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24. Johnson to Amhurst, May 19, 1762, Johnson to Colden, Dec. 24, 1763, Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers, III, 743, IV, 273-277; Jacobs, Diplomacy, 5, 58, 66-67, 161, 183; Assembly Journals, II, 720, 725, 736, 739, 746; O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 586-587, 621-623, 650-653.

25. Vernar W. Crane, ed., "Hints Relative to the Division and Government of the Conquered and Newly Acquired Countries in America," Miss. Val. Hist. Rev. VIII (1922), 367-373; Jack M. Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775 (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1961), 53-57, 63-64; Lords of Trade to Johnson, Aug. 5, 1763, Johnson to Lords of Trade, Nov. 18, 1763, Croghan to Lords of Trade, undated, Lords of Trade to Johnson, July 10, 1764, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 535-536, 572-584, 602-607, 634-641; Croghan to Johnson, July 12, 1764, Sullivan ed., Johnson Papers, IV, 462-463.

of Johnson's proposals, such as conducting Indian trade at specific locations, licenses for traders, and repeal of individual colonial laws regulating trade. In the words of the plan's designers, it had

for its object the regulation of Indian affairs both commercial and political throughout all North America, upon one general system, under the direction of Officers appointed by the Crown, so as to sett aside all local interfering of particular Provinces, which has been one great cause of the distracted state of Indian affairs in general.

Although the plan met with general approval, financial difficulties hampered its implementation, and Johnson continued his own program as it had evolved during the war years. Indian affairs matured, and the British recognized the need for unified control. When left in the hands of the British government, however, this imperial control would eventually bring violent responses from all colonies.

New York's Indian policy and that of the Crown had been based upon the need for Indian allies in the Great War for Empire. Peace in 1763 brought a return to an earlier concern for trade as the foundation of Indian relations. Ironically, when the French retreated from North America, thereby eliminating the need for wartime alliances, the fur center shifted to Canada, and New York found itself without a major interest in this once vital trade.

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26. Lords of Trade to Johnson, July 10, 1764, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 623-624; Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 76-78.

TABLE IV-1

Year	(1) Total N.Y. exports to Outports in £	(2) N.Y. exports to London and Outports in £	(3) N.Y. exports to Outports as a % of total exports from N.Y. to England
1745	854.11.--	14,083. 3. 9	6
1746	630.11. 8	8,841. 3. 2	7
1747	1,345. 1. 8	14,992.--. 6	9
1748	4,060.16.10	12,358. 3. 1	33
1749	3,027. 3. 4	23,413. 9.--	13
1750	2,397.19. 8	33,060. 2. 5	7
1751	5,366.10. 3	42,363.15.11	13
1752	2,164. 1.11	40,648.16.--	5
1753	4,687. 4. 8	50,533. 2. 4	9
1754	5,374. 1.11	26,663.10. 8	20
1755	10,067. 6. 4	28,054.12. 3	36
1756	10,936.12.10	24,073. 1. 4	45
1757	9,340.--. 6	19,168. 4. 5	49
1758	10,818.15. 3	14,260.15. 7	76
1759	11,672.12. 6	23,684.10. 3	49
1760	14,796.11. 2	21,125.--.--	70
1761	31,926.19. 7	48,648.--. 2	66
1762	41,152. 6.10	58,882. 6. 5	70
1763	24,010.14. 7	53,988.14. 4	44
1764	24,775.12.--	53,696.10. 4	46
1765	16,727. 7. 8	54,959.18. 2	30
1766	21,337.18. 6	67,020.11. 8	32

TABLE IV-2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Year	Beaver (# of skins)	Value of Beaver in £	Total Value of all fur and skins exported from N.Y. to London in £	Total value of all exports from N.Y. to London in £
1745	5,586	997.11.--	3,854.19. 2	13,228.12. 9
1746	1,643	287.10. 6	1,827.14.11	8,210.11. 6
1747	3,868	676.18.--	2,587.--. 4	13,646.18.10
1748	none		926.11. 1	8,297. 6. 3
1749	11,462	2,005.17.--	4,690. 2. 6	20,386. 5. 8
1750	10	1.15.--	1,195.13. 7	30,662. 2. 9
1751	12,396	2,169. 6.--	5,209. 1. 1	36,997. 5. 8
1752	27,451	4,803.18. 6	7,084.17. 5	38,484.14. 1
1753	32,215	5,637.12. 6	8,651.--. 5	45,865.17. 8
1754	11,719	2,050.16. 6	4,352. 6.11	21,289. 8. 9
1755	9,803	1,715.10. 6	4,243. 6. 6	17,987. 5.11
1756	2,184	382. 4.--	1,418.11. 1	13,136. 8. 6
1757	none		364.15. 9	9,828. 3.11
1758	none		507.12. 6	3,442.--. 4
1759	none		166.16.11	10,011.17. 9
1760	898	157. 3.--	1,456. 8. 8	6,328. 8.10
1761	11,059	1,935. 6. 6	4,621. 6. 5	16,721.--. 7
1762	13,276	2,323. 6.--	6,417.19. 8	17,729.19. 7
1763	13,497	2,361.19. 6	5,538.15. 7	29,977.19. 7
1764	18,937	3,313.19. 6	6,264. 4. 8	28,921.18. 4
1765	8,704	1,523. 4.--	5,585.16. 4	38,232.10. 6
1766	5,475	958. 2. 6	3,756. 6. 9	45,682.13. 2

TABLE IV-2 continued

Year	(5) Value of beaver as a % of all fur and skins exported from N.Y. to London	(6) Value of beaver as a % of total exports from N.Y. to London	(7) Value of total fur and skins as a % of total exports from N.Y. to London
1745	26	8	29
1746	16	4	22
1747	26	5	19
1748		no beaver	11
1749	43	10	23
1750	.2	.4	4
1751	42	6	14
1752	68	12	18
1753	65	12	19
1754	47	10	20
1755	40	10	24
1756	27	2	11
1757		no beaver	4
1758		no beaver	15
1759		no beaver	2
1760	11	2	23
1761	42	12	28
1762	36	13	36
1763	43	8	18
1764	53	11	22
1765	27	4	15
1766	26	2	8

TABLE IV-3

Year	(1) Current value of beaver in £	(2) Current value of total fur and skins exported from N.Y. to London in £	(3) Total current value of all exports from N.Y. to London in £
1745	805	3111	10,676
1746	258	1636	7,349
1747	580	2214	11,682
1748	none	825	7,384
1749	1823	4263	18,531
1750	2	1064	27,289
1751	1846	4433	31,484
1752	4464	5994	32,558
1753	4742	7277	38,573
1754	1784	3786	18,521
1755	1527	3776	16,008
1756	344	1277	11,822
1757	none	360	9,700
1758	none	511	3,462
1759	none	163	9,782
1760	153	1415	6,151
1761	1835	4381	15,852
1762	2214	6116	16,897
1763	2319	5439	29,438
1764	3271	6183	28,536
1765	1518	5569	38,118
1766	960	3762	46,231



## CONCLUSION

Maintenance of Indian good will through gifts of wampum and trade goods was the avowed aim of all colonies bordering on the frontier and of the British imperial government during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although New York followed that policy during the years 1674-1765, the concepts and bases of its policy changed as the century progressed.

During the last quarter of the seventeenth century, France and England struggled for control of the fur trade. Caught in the middle of these two European nations were the Iroquois. They ultimately decided upon a policy of neutrality, a balance which both the French and the English sought to maintain during the eighteenth century. Governors Andros and Dongan played an important role in the evolution of New York's Indian policy during the late seventeenth century. They had stressed the economic importance of the fur trade, but by the time of the neutrality treaties of 1701, the earlier extravagant numbers of beaver skins had declined. Beaver continued to occupy an important position in New York's economy during the eighteenth century, but not to the extent it had earlier.

Other early governors, such as Lord Bellomont at the turn of the century, recognized the two-fold value of the Iroquois

Confederation, both for the fur trade and for protection against French incursions upon English territory. Not until the arrival of Governor Burnet in 1720, however, did the colony formalize its regulation of Indian affairs. A diversity of approaches and concepts had marked Indian-English relations prior to Burnet's arrival. He attempted to control the fur trade in New York alone, on the importance of Indian alliances for New York's security, although he recognized the value of fur itself. His policy, too advanced for its time, held sway until its revocation in 1729.

Until the middle of the eighteenth century the British had no consistent Indian policy, since each colony controlled its own affairs. Nevertheless, a general policy, although divided in approach, did gradually evolve during the 1730s and 1740s. It increasingly emphasized the need for Indian allies in the expected confrontation with the French in Canada. With increased English recognition of the colonies as valuable markets for manufactured goods, Britain consolidated control of Indian affairs as a means of protecting that market rather than monopolizing fur sources. The Albany Congress and the appointment of Sir William Johnson as Indian Superintendent marked this change. The British looked upon the Indian as an ally and a buffer against the French. Elimination of the French in 1763 enabled Britain to revert to the original approach to the Indian. Fur trade and the prevention of conflict

between white and Indians west of the Appalachians provided the rationale for the Proclamation of 1763 and the ill-fated Plan of 1764 for Indian affairs.

The Iroquois sought a solution to the problem of their position between Canada and the English colonies. They continually feared their elimination by one European power or the other. In actuality the Iroquois played too valuable a role in the fur trade to warrant their fear; however, they failed to recognize this fact. Ultimately, the Indians formed themselves into a united league for purposes of strength, both against Europeans and against other tribes. Combining this with an attitude of neutrality after 1701, they occupied a buffer position, whereby they held the balance of power between France and England in North America. Continued French threats and encroachments forced the Iroquois ever closer to the British camp. At the same time the Indians increasingly grew weaker because of war, disease, and the disintegration of their native culture. During the French and Indian War the Iroquois finally expressed their primary allegiance to the British after the winning side became clearer. Relegated after 1763 to a position of secondary importance, the Iroquois continued to decline in strength and influence.

The statistics for amounts of fur exported from New York in each of the post-war eras showed that overall fur production was not a reason for policy changes; rather fur output fluctuated with

periods of war and peace. At the same time these figures demonstrated the importance of fur to New York's economy, particularly in the early years of the period. A general overall decline in fur as a percentage of total exports to London pointed out the diminishing role of fur, especially after 1763, even though total value of fur did not greatly decrease until this latter date. Thus, a policy which originated to facilitate the fur trade developed into one whereby the Indian became an ally for the preservation of British colonies and their markets against the French. Finally, with the War's conclusion, New York lost the fur trade which the policy was initially designed to develop and safeguard.

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## APPENDIX<sup>1</sup>

Figures and values included in the tables of this paper are compiled from the Import and Export Ledgers in the Public Record Office in London. These ledgers, known as Customs 3/1-80, are on microfilm. The years 1697-1766 are contained in Customs 3/1-3/66, from which only figures for the years 1705, 1712, and 1727 are missing. A duplicate of the 1727 ledgers is contained in the Departmental Archives of H.M. Customs, however.

William Culliford first held the office of inspector general of imports and exports, established in 1696. He and his successors compiled the series of eighty-three folio ledgers which contained the values for imports, re-exports, and exports for both London and the Outports (ports other than London itself in England and Wales). Customs 3 contains the figures pertaining to each foreign country and colony trading with England and included all items exchanged during each year.

Compilers of the data for Customs 3 based their figures on fixed official values at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Consequently, they erected a constant value series as opposed to a current value series, which would have shown the fluctuating

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
1. A more detailed examination than that which follows and a conversion table for data included in the Customs 3 records is contained in an article by John J. McCusker entitled "The Current Value of English Exports, 1697 to 1800," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd, Ser., XXVIII (1971), 607-628.

values of each individual year. A current value series reflects the variations due to price changes. For purposes of this study, a constant value series allows easier measurement of the changing volume of trade. However, John McCusker recently erected a commodity price index (C.P.I.) for the years 1697-1800, which allows the conversion of the constant value series to a current value series. The CPI prepared by E.B. Schumpeter and E.W. Gilboy in the 1930's, provided the basis for McCusker's index. They based the original index largely on products internal to England rather than imported items. As a result, McCusker's index most accurately reflects exports from England rather than imports. Nevertheless, included in the text is a table for each period which reflects the current value of the fur exported from New York to England. Hopefully this may shed some further light on the topic, despite inherent inaccuracies.

Table I in each chapter contains the values of goods exported to the outports in pounds sterling and percentages. The fluctuations in percentage values contained in Table I, column 3 add only a further variable to the London figures. London received most of the furs shipped from New York; the outports, foreign countries, and other colonies received only a small fraction of New York's furs. Figures for London alone therefore provide an accurate picture of the New York fur trade, and all references to imports and exports in the text refer only to those from New York

to London. However, throughout this study it is important to remember that fur and total goods sent to London represented only a portion of the colony's total trade.

Statistics from an early period, such as those contained in the tables and in the Customs 3 records, must be interpreted with extreme care. They can only be used to supplement other materials, for such things as smuggling, errors in original compilation, and changing values of the goods included were not always taken into consideration.



This map was obtained from the original as contained in James Sullivan, ed., The Papers of Sir William Johnson (14 vols. Albany, 1921-1965), III, 32.



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