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The incorporation of Jamaica into the western design

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**THE INCORPORATION OF JAMAICA
INTO THE WESTERN DESIGN**

by
Steven C. Seyer

A THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Faculty

of Lehigh University

in Candidacy for the Degree of

Master of Arts

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May 2, 1961
(Date)

George Kyte
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PREFACE

The Incorporation of Jamaica into the Western Design attempts to illustrate the contributions made by the seizure of Jamaica to the development of the British Empire. Primary emphasis is placed upon the significance of Jamaica in the commercial and naval aspects of that imperial growth. In the process of narration a proper perspective is attained by studying Jamaica's discovery, exploitation by the Spanish, and involvement in the Spanish scheme of empire. Furthermore, to adequately study the English capture of Jamaica, an analysis of the Western Design in all its forms from Elizabeth to Cromwell must be made; then the tale of the English capture of Jamaica can be efficiently understood. Finally, to properly appreciate the significance of the Jamaica seizure, a short study of the beginnings of the crown colony must be included. Thus, The Incorporation of Jamaica into the Western Design is essentially an analysis of the Western Design as manifested by English interests in Jamaica.

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Steven C. Seyer

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A GEOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION

With an area of 4,411 square miles Jamaica is the third largest of the West Indian islands. It is located in the Caribbean Sea just south of Cuba and west of Hispaniola, a position that made it the rendezvous of ocean highways and the commanding point of all ship routes when in colonial days the Caribbean was the belly of commerce. Jamaica is very mountainous, rising in the north into hills of gentle ascent while in the south it presents abrupt precipices and cliffs. Columbus vividly described Jamaica when Queen Isabella requested an account of his voyage. He simply crumbled a piece of paper and presented it to her as a picture of Jamaica. The royal historian elaborated further on Jamaica.

. . . is the fairest island that eyes have beheld;
mountainous and the land seems to touch the sky;
. . . and all full of valleys and fields and plains.¹

Of the 4,411 square miles one half is over 1,000 feet above sea level with much of that in the 2,000-3,000 feet range of the Blue Mountain chain. Oddly, despite all this mountainous area, few mineral deposits of worth are found on the island except for some widely scattered deposits of copper and bauxite. Thus, the Spanish, the first white occupants of the island, neglected Jamaica because they found very little gold or silver there. The mountains do yield another treasure which was

¹W. Robert Moore, "Jamaica, Hub of the Caribbean," The National Geographic Magazine, CV (March, 1954), 333.

overlooked by the Spaniards--the vast forests of valuable woods such as logwood, rosewood, lignum vitae, mahogany, cedar, and bamboo.

In the mountains and valleys are found numerous springs, pools, streams, and rivers. Thus, unlike the other West Indian possessions of the English held prior to 1655, Jamaica was well watered.² The springs are of the mineral variety (sulphuric with a high proportion of hydro-sulphate of lime). During the years of Spanish control and colonial British rule the mineral springs were famous for their curative powers; they were said to have particular effect on gout and rheumatism.³ The rivers and streams are of quick agitation, preventing damps and mists although some do create swamps and quicksand patches in the low coastal areas. These aquatic features of Jamaica are well supplied by an annual rainfall that ranges from 30 to 100 inches. Thus Jamaica could provide the number one ingredient--an ample water supply--for sugar, the crop that would make it the most treasured island of the British Empire.

Although much of the island is mountainous and difficult to cultivate, the soil of the alluvial plains is of the greatest fertility.⁴ The soil is of rich brown loam and brick mould composed of very fine particles of clay, sand, and black mould. Next to the ash mould of St.

²Jamaica's water, however, was noted to be unwholesome and unsavory unless boiled during the early Spanish and English occupation of the island. "A Brief and Perfect Journal of the Late Proceedings and Success of the English Army in the West Indies Continued Until June 24, 1655 (An Eyewitness Account)," The Harleian Miscellany, VI (1810), 389.

³Robert T. Hill, Cuba and Porto Rico with the Other Islands of the West Indies (New York: The Century Co., 1899), p. 195.

⁴Only two-fifths of it could be cultivated during the peak of colonial prosperity due to the extensive mountains. Charles H. Eden, The West Indies (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1880), p. 53.

Kitts and Barbados it is the finest for sugar. In some respects it even surpasses that of St. Kitts and Barbados for it retains its moisture for the dry season and in very wet periods it allows the excess water to sink to subterranean pools, thereby preventing a rotting of the sugar plant's roots. When the English first started planting, the soil was of amazing depth, easily labored, and needed no manure. Thus the island was a veritable paradise for agriculture since it could grow virtually all European and tropical vegetables. Unfortunately the English planted only sugar, the money crop of the age; hence, it was man that limited Jamaica to one item, for nature had given it variety.

Jamaica's weather complemented the excellence of her soil and water ingredients for sugar. The island is screened from the tempestuous winds of the Atlantic by Cuba and Hispaniola, but does suffer from periodic hurricanes born in the Caribbean. These hurricanes, whose season ranges from July to October, are of terrific force that tear the sugar plants out by the roots. The only other scourges of the island are the earthquakes, which are infrequent but have violent tremors such as that which destroyed Port Royal in 1692. Otherwise the climate of Jamaica is excellent. The tropical climate is hot but tempered by the sea breezes, light and enlivening. It is sunny, equable, and ideal varying with the altitude as the low coastal areas are torrid and the mountains quite cool. Eighteenth-century appraisals of the island state that if they live temperately, any Negro or European could live a long life there.⁵

⁵R. Montgomery Martin, History of the British Colonies, Vol. II: Possessions in the West Indies (London: Cochrane and M'Crone, 1834), p. 179.

Jamaica's soil, water, and climate made her an economic gem for the British crown. To these, her harbors added many military and commercial jewels for that diadem. Unlike the other British West Indian possessions, Jamaica is not surrounded by dangerous coral reefs. Numerous creeks and inlets, 30 harbors, and 60 bays all affording havens for vessels appear on all sides of Jamaica. Thus, one can note the strategic, military, and commercial value of Jamaica in the very center of the belly of commerce, America's Mediterranean, the Caribbean Sea.

I. ARAWAK XAYMACA TO SPANISH JAMAICA

Xaymaca, Isle of Springs as Jamaica was known to the Indians, was inhabited by a strain of the Arawak tribes who occupied most of the Greater Antilles. The Jamaican Arawaks, known as Tainos, were not as mild and peaceable as their neighboring cousins were known to be. They were in a hunter-fisher type of culture although they practiced a little agriculture. The Tainos did improve on some of the features of the Arawak culture, such as the elaborate and more seaworthy version of the dugout canoe. Columbus noted seeing a Taino canoe at Jamaica 96 feet long and 8 feet wide.¹ This is all that is known of the original inhabitants of Jamaica, the natives who succumbed to European slavery. Thus, today no "native Jamaican" can be found; not even the language of the Tainos remains. The only remnants of the Tainos-Arawak culture are found in museums where basketry, axeheads, and canoes remain.

Columbus discovered Jamaica on May 5, 1494, during his second voyage to the New World. He was well pleased with the island as he noted its size and fairness. In his later "crumpled paper" account to Isabella, he remarked about its abundance of valleys, fields, and plains and about the great population of Arawaks who were more warlike than any he had ever seen. Columbus' appearance at St. Ann's Bay (he called it Santa Gloria) brought out a fleet of 70 Arawak canoes filled with

¹Alan Burns, History of the British West Indies (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1954), p. 39.

warriors armed with darts. A blank salvo and the appeasement efforts of Diego Colon quieted the disturbed natives who subsequently traded with the Spanish, clothes for cassava and fruit. The next day Columbus moved on to Puerto Bueno where another group of Arawaks, clad only in the various colors of their war paint, attacked him. Columbus then decided it was time to demonstrate the arms of Castile; thereupon he turned his crossbowmen on the natives. The frightened Arawaks retreated, deciding to allow Columbus to repair and caulk his ships, but the Castilian bowmen pressed on to convince the natives of Spanish power. Finally, to appease "the white gods of the great canoes," six Arawak caciques (chieftains) came to see the admiral with offerings of fish and fruit. Columbus was still somewhat disappointed, for the Indian representatives wore no gold ornaments. True, the island might be a paradise comparable to the gardens of Valencia, but of what worth was the paradise if it had no gold or silver for the coffers of Spain? The disgruntled Columbus made several other stops on Jamaica's coast, visited Cuba, and returned to Jamaica's Montego Bay (El Golfo de Bien Tiempo) before completing his second voyage to the New World.

Columbus had another encounter with Jamaica on his fourth voyage to the New World. While on his way to Porto Bello, Hispaniola, a violent storm ravaged his ships. The badly leaking "Capitana" and "Santiago" just made Puerto Bueno (Dry Harbor) with water approaching deck level. This un auspicious landing of June 25, 1503, marked what might be called the first European settlement of Jamaica; for a year would pass before Columbus and his men were able to leave the island. The Spaniards immediately built thatch-roofed houses on the worm-eaten

decks and made fortresses out of the hulks of the two ships. Thus, stranded on the island because the ships could not be repaired since the carpenters, caulkers, and their tools had been lost at sea, Columbus made the most of the situation. He issued strict orders to stay on board and avoid trouble with the Indians. Fortunately, two nearby streams provided an adequate water supply while the surrounding land afforded them foodstuffs. Soon, however, they were able to obtain cassava, chicha, and cornbread from the Indians in exchange for glass beads and bells. It was Diego Mendez who began the trade relations with the Arawaks after the last rations of biscuit and wine had been issued. At an Indian village in the interior, Aquacadiba, Mendez met a friendly cacique who agreed to have his people make cassava bread, hunt, and fish for Columbus' men in exchange for blue beads, combs, knives, hawk-bells, and fish hooks. After making similar arrangements with other caciques, including one named Ameyro who gave him a canoe for a brass helmet, Mendez returned to the Spanish camp.

With the ships permanently disabled, Columbus decided to send for help to the nearest Spanish authority, Nicholas de Ovando, governor of Hispaniola. The man selected to attempt the dangerous journey was again Columbus' most trusted confidant, Diego Mendez, who stated his willingness to make the attempt.

My lord I have but one life, and I am willing to hazard it in the service of your lordship, and for the welfare of all those who are here with us, for I trust in God, that in consideration of the motive which actuates me, he will give me deliverance, as he has already done on many occasions.²

²R. H. Major (trans. and ed.), Select Letters Christopher Columbus, Other Original Documents Relating to His Four Voyages to the New World ("Hakluyt Society Publications," Series 1, Vol. II; London: Bedford Press, 1847), pp. 220-21.

Columbus, embracing him and kissing him on the cheek, wished him well.

Well did I know that there was no one here but yourself, who would dare to undertake this enterprise: I trust in God, our Lord, that you will come out of it victoriously, as you have done in the others which you have undertaken.³

Mendez's first attempt to travel to the southwest coast of Jamaica and then to go by canoe to Hispaniola failed when he was repulsed in the Jamaican interior by hostile Indians. Fortunately, he made his way back to the makeshift camp and there requested more men to accompany him on the expedition. A new group of six Castilians and ten Indians led by Mendez and Bartolomeo "Flisco" Fieschi soon left.⁴

While Mendez and his cohorts were struggling to reach Ovando at Hispaniola, Columbus was having troubles of his own at the Jamaica refuge. A revolt against his authority broke out on January 2, 1504. The 48 rebels were led by Francisco Porras, commander of the "Santiago"; his brother, the military treasurer; Juan Sanchez, a ship pilot; and Barbo, the gunner. Columbus, suffering from the gout, tried to calm them while listening to their pleas.

It appears to us Sir, that your Lordship does not wish to go to Castile, and that you intend to keep us here to perish.⁵

Finally the rebels fled with ten canoes, after which they attacked and robbed the Indians along the coast, but they were soon obliged to return to the camp when Columbus' loyalists led by his brother Bartholomew defeated them. For all their troubles the Porras brothers received only a

³ Ibid., p. 221.

⁴ Bartolomeo Fieschi was of an old Genoese family that had befriended Columbus. Samuel E. Morison, Admiral of the Ocean Sea: A Life of Christopher Columbus (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1942), II, 394.

⁵ Thomas Southey, Chronological History of the West Indies (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1827), III, 93.

short term in chains. The beleaguered Columbus, however, was to suffer another revolt against his rule and an Indian attack before Mendez's aid came. The Indian menace was squelched when Columbus performed his "eclipse trick" on February 29, 1504.⁶ He showed his power to blot out the moon to frighten the Indians when he knew of a forthcoming eclipse of the moon. The repulse of the second revolt involved a bit of luck for it might have blossomed into great proportions had not a ship come from Ovando. This revolt was led by Bernal, an apothecary, and his two friends, Zamora and Villatoro.

Mendez's pleas to Ovando were in vain, for the greedy governor was still a bitter enemy of the admiral. Mendez was imprisoned while one of Ovando's galleons sailed to Jamaica to offer Columbus and his men their condolences and regrets. To display their generosity, Ovando's men left the admiral a barrel of wine and some bacon. Fortunately, Mendez was soon released and was able to get word to the authorities in Spain to have relief ships sent. On June 28, 1504, two ships arrived, one from Spain and one from the reprimanded Ovando, to take Columbus and his men off the island.

The Spanish were slow in following up Columbus' explorations of Jamaica. Settlement was consequently slow since little gold and silver were found there. When they did come to Jamaica, it was nothing substantial, only enough to keep others away. Upon Columbus' death his son Diego pressed the family claims in the West Indies. His one-tenth of the revenue of the Indies was confirmed as well as a variety of titles such as Viceroy of the Caribbean, Admiral of the Indies. The rush to

⁶Major, op. cit., p. 226.

explore and claim land in the Indies brought much confusion and overlapping with a resultant diminishing of the young admiral's power and authority. The cautious Diego soon strengthened his claims by gaining the favor of the Grand Council of the Indies and by marrying the niece of the influential Duke of Alva. It is only Diego's claim that concerns us here, however, and that was in jeopardy when he arrived in Hispaniola as its governor in 1508. The overgenerous Spanish king had given Jamaica to Alfonso d'Ojeda and Diego Nicuesa in addition to settlement rights on the Main. The rival claims were at least of benefit to the settlement of Jamaica; for Diego now rushed to establish a colony there to counteract any claims of the Ojeda-Nicuesa faction. While Ojeda and Nicuesa had their own squabble, Diego sent an expedition of 70 men led by Juan d'Esquivel to Jamaica to press his claims there and to keep others out. Esquivel's expedition was successful as a colony was established and the permanent settlement of Jamaica begun. Had it not been for the rival claims and the subsequent rush to establish them, the settlement of Jamaica might have been put off for many more years for it had "nothing to offer the gold-seekers."

Esquivel and his lieutenant, Panfilo de Narvaez, met little Indian resistance on Jamaica; consequently they lost only four men. He saw that little gold was available, but he did recognize the possibilities for cattle raising. Thus, the Spanish began their settlement on the north coast at Sevilla d'Oro (later Sevilla Nueva and today Old Harbor) where they built forts and houses of brick and mortar with Indian labor. Meanwhile, Ojeda was in a rage as he threatened to cut off Esquivel's head if he found him on Jamaica, for robbing him of his

claim. The Spanish were at first friendly to the Indians, but the greed for gold soon brought cruelty and death to the unfortunate Arawaks. When the impossible-to-pay tributes were not paid, the Arawak Tainos were forced to work the mines of Jamaica and the other Spanish-held lands. In a generation, excessive work, cruelty, and outright murders had wiped out the entire Indian population. Bishop Bartholomew de Las Casas, Protector of the Indians, spoke of Jamaica and the devastation of the Indian population.

In 1509 the Spaniards passed over to the islands of San Juan and Jamaica, which were so many gardens and hives of bees, with the same object and design they had accomplished in Hispaniola, where they committed the great outrages and iniquities narrated above. They even added to them more notorious ones, and the greatest cruelty; slaying, burning, roasting, and throwing the Indians to fierce dogs. They oppressed, tormented, and afflicted all those unhappy innocents in the mines, and with other labours, until they are consumed and destroyed, because there were in the said isles more than a million souls, and today there are not over two hundred in each. All have perished without faith and without sacraments.⁷

Thus, with their Indian labor supply diminished, the Spanish had to turn to Africa to acquire slaves.

Esquivel's mild and humane governorship was a successful one. The two towns of Sevilla and Mellia flourished. The Indians were turned to agriculture to grow yams, sugar cane, cocoa, and other foodstuffs in Jamaica's virgin soil. Furthermore, cattle grew fat on the grassy slopes of the hills and cotton of excellent quality was grown, with which the Indians wove a beautiful fabric. Thus, Jamaica soon became the granary for the expeditions of the conquistadores on the mainland. Unfortunately the benevolent Esquivel soon died and was replaced in 1515

⁷Francis A. MacNutt, Bartholomew de Las Casas: His Life, Apostolate, and Writings (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1909), p. 328.

by the cruel and avaricious Francisco de Garay, who has the distinction of being the richest governor in the 160-year history of Spanish Jamaica. Garay, a partner in the famed mine of St. Christopher's on Hispaniola, did bring further prosperity to Jamaica as the exports of foodstuffs and hammocks rose, but his prosperity was purchased at a terrible price, the extermination of the Arawaks in the mines and fields.⁸ So horrid was the Spanish subjugation of the natives that many of the Arawaks committed suicide by drinking unprocessed cassava juice, a deadly poison, or by jumping off the cliffs.

Garay's path to the Jamaica governorship had been cleared by Pedro de Macuelo, the royal treasurer on the island. Thus, with Macuelo's aid and the king's favor, Garay was able to oust the acting governor there. The Garay-king partnership was designed to bring gold and profits to Garay and to make Jamaica a fortress and arsenal for all the king's conquistadores and a granary for the continent. The ambitious Macuelo soon began a struggle of his own with Garay for the governorship. He finally succeeded in 1522 when Garay left to seek greater fortunes with the Cortez expedition into Mexico. After ousting Garay's son, Antonio, Macuelo held sole authority in Jamaica.

The Garay-Macuelo governorships backed by the Spanish crown did make Jamaica the supply base for the conquistadores, the Main inhabitants, and the treasure fleets. Cattle, hogs, horses, cocoa, lumber, ginger, sugar, pimento, and tobacco of Jamaica provisioned many of the

⁸The Indians were usually divided into repartimientos, lots of 150, 200, or sometimes more; then they were assigned to estates of the various Spanish noblemen. Irene A. Wright, "The Early History of Jamaica (1511-1536)," The English Historical Review, XXXVI (January, 1921), 72.

Spaniards in the West Indies. It was the ambitious Garay who first introduced sugar to Jamaica, since he was not one to pass up an opportunity for profits. He built and operated a sugar plantation to take advantage of the crown's permit allowing the importation of the sugar processing machinery duty free.

Garay's political aspirations while he was governor (1515-1522) brought Jamaica into closer contact with the rest of the Indies. Jealous of the successes of the governor of Cuba, Velasquez, he sent out many expeditions from Jamaica to conquer other lands in the New World. The real importance of these expeditions here is that their size and relative success point out the economic and political strength of Jamaica in the early sixteenth century. Thus, attracted by the fabled riches of Yucatan and other areas of the continent, Garay and Macuelo sent, in 1518, Diego de Camargo with two vessels to Yucatan; in 1519, Alonzo de Pineda in search of a strait or gulf to the Pacific to the Floridas; in 1520, Camargo, his favorite, to plant a colony at Panuco on the Main with three ships, 150 men, and seven horses; and in 1523, another grand expedition of 850 men and 144 horses to Panuco. To finance, supply, and man such expeditions meant that Jamaica must have been prosperous and populous at the time, although part of the expeditions were financed by Garay's personal fortune and manned by newcomers from Spain.

Religious matters also illustrate the early growth of Jamaica. The church immediately began to take care of its growing Jamaican flock by soon building churches, monasteries, and nunneries all over the island with funds from its own treasuries, the crown, and other appropriations. For example, Garay and Macuelo received considerable amounts

of royal funds for the building of hospitals, but when they learned there were no patients for them, they used the funds to build more churches. Thus it seems certain that Jamaica's churches were never overcrowded. With a substantial number of churches and faithful to attend them by 1522, Jamaica rated a "name bishop." Thus, on March 11, 1522, the apostolic prothonotary Andres Lopez de Frias was appointed abbot of Jamaica. His successor was the Jeronimite friar Luis de Figueron, Bishop of La Concepcion on Hispaniola and president of the royal audiencia of Santo Domingo. Men of such fortune and prestige were usually "absentee abbots," but their interest in Jamaica does indicate a bit of the island's growing importance.

Religious and political interest in Jamaica declined after 1530 as the Spanish found new and richer lands on the Main. For the fortune and power seekers, Jamaica became only a stepping stone to greater glories elsewhere. Perhaps it was the lowliest stepping stone; for soon few wanted to go there despite any title that might be granted them--marquis, governor, or abbot. Consequently, the ensuing religious and political history of Jamaica reveals governors and abbots of little enthusiasm or talent who accomplished very little. Title to Jamaica, however, did remain with the Columbus heirs. In 1536 Charles V formally ceded its jurisdiction with the titles Duke of Veragua and Marquis de la Vega to Don Luis Colon, grandson of Columbus. Title and civil and criminal jurisdiction remained in the Colon family until 1653, although it did pass to the female line. Thus the Portuguese Braganza family obtained Jamaica's title through the marriage of a Braganza to Don Luis' sister after Luis, the last male heir, died in 1578. When the Portuguese

revolted from Spain in the mid-seventeenth century, the title reverted back to the Spanish crown.

The political and religious decline also brought economic decadence. There had been quite a bit of expansion when the original settlement at Sevilla sent colonists to the southern sector of the island, but an ant invasion of Sevilla in 1519 and the frequent pirate raids on the exposed north coast drove the Spanish to the south coast of the island where they established the towns of Oristan, Puerta de Esquivella, and Caguaya (Port Royal). Of these three, Caguaya became the most prosperous as a vigorous shipbuilding center and as stopping place for the galleons on their way from the Main to Spain. Near Caguaya the town of Villa de la Vega (sometimes called Santiago de la Vega, today it is Spanish Town), which became the most populous, was begun. In 1534 it became the capital of Jamaica. These towns all flourished and prospered during the "golden age" of Spanish Jamaica, 1505-1530, but they too fell into decadence as Jamaica's importance in the Spanish scheme of empire declined after 1530.

The chief economic problem of Jamaica had always been obtaining people of one sort or another. During the era of prosperity the major difficulty was obtaining laborers; there were plenty of Spanish colonists for administrative, military, or religious duties, but who would work the fields and mines? This problem was solved by the usual means of the day, slave labor, which at first constituted the Indian population. The economic exploitation, however, soon wiped out the Arawaks; thus the Spanish had to seek another source of slave labor. Prior to 1517 few Negroes had been brought into Jamaica. The first were the

three Christian Negroes d'Esquivel brought in 1513. After the devastation of the Arawak population by such cruel governors as Garay, Macuelo, Pedro Cano, and Don Pedro d'Esquimel, suggestions were made to use Negroes in the mines and fields rather than the Indians. The major backers of these suggestions that would solve the labor problem and save the Indians from extinction were Las Casas and Adrian, Cardinal of Toledo, who stated that 4,000 Negro slaves would be needed to supply Hispaniola, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Jamaica.⁹ Las Casas' pleas and those of the Spanish merchants and planters for laborers were answered early by the crown when it gave licenses to a Fleming and two Genoese favorites to supply all the Spanish Indies with Negro slaves. Also, to further promote the welfare of the Indians, a general order was issued in 1531 forbidding the use of Indians as slaves anywhere in the Indies under the pain of heavy monetary penalties.¹⁰ Thus Jamaica began its long history as a slave colony, although during the rule of the Spaniards it never had enough slaves for its own use since the island was used primarily as a "nursery" for the Negroes before they were shipped elsewhere.

There was also always a shortage of whites on the island after 1530. Special offers had to be made to have people emigrate to and stay at Jamaica in order to provide the island with its necessary complement of planters, administrators, soldiers, and skilled workers. Macuelo was the first governor to direct his efforts to bring more whites to the island when he obtained royal permission to bring thirty Portuguese

⁹Southey, op. cit., p. 132.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 168.

families who would receive free passage and duty-free goods to Jamaica.¹¹ Later the crown acceded to prospective colonists requests to have the Jamaican lands sold on credit and directed the island's proprietors to sell land on credit at public auctions. Unfortunately, preference and fraud gave most of the land to planters already on Jamaica instead of to the prospective colonists. Thus, the new land policy served only to enlarge the old plantations instead of attracting more people to Jamaica. As a result, the population of Europeans on the island was never substantial, although the misinformed English of the mid-sixteenth century thought it was well inhabited.¹²

Never again would Spanish Jamaica enjoy the prosperity of its first years, 1509-1534. Stagnation and decadence prevailed throughout the next 120 years of its history with the only interruption a short burst of vigor caused by the emigration of some Portuguese to the island when the House of Braganza obtained title to Jamaica through marriage to the sister of Luis Colon. In the 1580's the Portuguese emigrants brought a resumption of the sugar industry, renewal of the ginger and tobacco planting, and importation of additional cattle, swine, and horses from Hispaniola. Their enthusiasm, however, was not enough to offset the liabilities of a lack of laborers and the attraction of most people to other parts of the Indies where gold and silver could be

¹¹Wright, The Early History. . . , p. 77.

¹²Sebastian Munster in 1553 stated that Jamaica was very well inhabited. Edward Arber (ed.), The First Three English Books on America: 1511-1555, Translations and Compilations of Richard Eden from the writings, maps, etcetera of Peter Martyr, Sebastian Munster, Sebastian Cabot, and extracts from other Spanish, German, and Italian writers of the time (Birmingham: Turnbull and Spears, 1885), p. 31.

found. Thus, the decline continued with the low point in population reached about 1596 when only 120 Spanish were on the island.¹³ Consequently the organization and management of the plantations were neglected; horses, cattle, and swine ran wild; the economy collapsed; and the defenses were ignored. Another result of the lack of white immigration to Jamaica was a substantial amount of racial mixing, some of which produced the Maroons of the interior. The Maroons were primarily a mixture of Negroes and Indians, but some Spanish, Portuguese, and English blood ran in their veins too. They lived in the interior where they recognized no law or authority but their own. Thus, throughout the next three centuries they caused the Spanish and English masters of the island quite a bit of consternation by their frequent raids on the plantations and towns.¹⁴

Although Spanish Jamaica's economy never recovered, the population did rise slightly due to births and some immigration. The new immigrants constituted Portuguese Jews and Spaniards of Jewish and Arab extraction who were then barred from Spain and all the Indies except Jamaica. Evidently the crown thought it was solving two problems in this manner--ridding itself of the "undesirables" and populating Jamaica to prevent its seizure by other powers. Thus, Jamaica's population did rise somewhat until 1655 at the eve of the English conquest of the

¹³Burns, op. cit., p. 114.

¹⁴For an excellent history of the Maroons, see R. C. Dallas, The History of the Maroons From Their Origin to the Establishment of Their Chief Tribe at Sierra Leone Including the Expedition to Cuba for the Purpose of Procuring Spanish Chassuers and the State of the Island of Jamaica for the Last Ten Years (London: T. N. Longman and O. Rees, 1803), 2 vols.



island when there were probably about 1,500 Spanish and Portuguese and 1,500 mulatto and Negro slaves on the island. Of these inhabitants, eight families headed by hidalgos (gentlemen, the patriarch of each family) controlled all the land, which they divided into eight districts or hatos while they lived in slothful luxury. The only town of consequence was Villa de la Vega (Santiago de la Vega), composed of some 2,000 houses and a few churches and monasteries. Of the scatteringly built houses, the better ones were constructed of brick and timber with tile roofs and the poorer of clay and bamboo. In relation to the remainder of the Spanish Empire, Jamaica and its major city, the capital, Villa de la Vega, probably meant very little since Benzoni in his History of the New World scarcely mentioned Jamaica and mentioned no Jamaican town in his list of major cities in the Spanish Indies.¹⁵

Thus, the results of the Spanish conquest and occupation of Jamaica were somewhat detrimental to the island. Actually, a decrease in the population had resulted due to the extermination of the Arawak population. Furthermore, the once Indian paradise of Xaymaca in 1655 was neglected, poorly defended, and occupied by a laboring population imbued with tropical indolence and by Spanish administrators who were simply there to keep foreigners away. Its only claim to fame was as an agricultural center. The island produced cattle, sugar, ginger, and cochineal for trade, much of which was with the Dutch.¹⁶ Also, it still

¹⁵ Girolamo Benzoni, History of the New World, trans. and ed. W. H. Smyth from the Venice, 1572, edition of Peter and Francis Tini ("Hakluyt Society Publications," Series 1, Vol. XXI; London: Bedford Press, 1857), pp. 265-70.

¹⁶ Arthur P. Newton, The European Nations in the West Indies, 1493-1688 (London: A. & C. Black, Ltd., 1933), p. 129.

supplied the mainland expeditions with some horses, cassava, Indian corn, pork, bacon, and beef. Of these, its greatest contributions were its fine horses which were shipped to the continent where they developed new horse ranches of renown.¹⁷ Nevertheless, Jamaica of the mid-seventeenth century was an island of tremendous waste. Most of the cattle, swine, and other animals ran wild although estimates state that 80,000 hogs a year were slaughtered, but these were butchered for the grease they provided; the remainder of the carcass was usually left to rot. Even the natural products of the island were left wasted. The excellent woods of the island's vast forests--the cedar, lignum vitae, mahogany, red ebony, dyewoods (braziletto and fustic)--were used only occasionally for buildings and fences. Such were the results of the lure of gold that drew the Spanish away from Jamaica to other more lucrative (in terms of gold and silver) areas of their huge empire.

To the English of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Jamaica was only some little-known distant isle, barren, rocky, heavily wooded, unplantable, wild, difficult to penetrate due to tortuous trails, and easily defended by resorting to ambushes. The only value they attached to it was their belief that it produced the best hogs in the Indies.¹⁸ Thus Jamaica, deep in lethargy, was the last place expansionist Englishmen would consider as lucrative for conquest. Such was the

¹⁷For an informative account of Jamaica's role in introducing the horse to the New World, see Johnson's article. John J. Johnson, "The Introduction of the Horse into the Western Hemisphere," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XXIII (November, 1943), 587-610.

¹⁸M. Oppenheim (ed.), The Naval Tracts of Sir William Monson ("Navy Records Society Publications," Vol. XLV; London: Spottiswoode & Co., Ltd., 1913), IV, 325.

impression Spain had given the rest of the world of her island paradise in the Caribbean.

Early Jamaica, undermanned and exposed to attack, was frequently raided by the buccaneers. Their objectives were primarily the securing of provisions and the obtaining of refuge from Spanish warships that might be pursuing them since Jamaica offered them little gold or silver. The first of these raiders were the French privateers who ravaged the settlements of the north coast, thereby forcing the Spanish to move to the south coast which was more easily protected. The small-scale "world wars" between Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor and King of Spain, and the French kings brought further raids and destruction, including the devastation of Sevilla d'Oro to Jamaica. By the end of the sixteenth century the English too began stopping at Jamaica. Thus in 1592 William King, with the "Solomon" of 200 tons and 100 men and the "Jane Bonaventure" of 40 tons and 26 men, visited the south side of the island where they filled their water casks and caught 60 turtles. In 1595 Amyas Preston and George Somers stopped there to obtain some cattle for their food stocks. These two visits were typical of early English contacts with Jamaica. They were usually aimed at obtaining provisions; not booty, which they thought Jamaica had little to offer for their efforts. Thus, the more famous seadogs spared Jamaica of their ravages in favor of the treasure cities of the Main. Perhaps they believed the remarks of John Hawkins who, after visiting Jamaica on his second voyage to the Indies, 1564-1565, remarked that the island had no adequate port (none that the Spanish had developed) and that it was sparsely inhabited and therefore offered little booty or plunder.

The beginning of the seventeenth century, however, marked the beginning of Jamaica as a fertile field for the buccaneers since the waters surrounding Jamaica became the favorite point of organization for the Spanish treasure fleets before they made their long journey home to Spain. Jamaica consequently was included in the plans to provide protection for the treasure flotas which were now increasingly subjected to pirate attacks. As early as 1575 suggestions had been made to make Jamaica the headquarters for all the galleon fleets, but that honor was to remain with the more prosperous Cartagena. Again in 1613-1614 suggestions were made to have Jamaica house the "guardacosta," a fleet of warships that would protect the convoys and treasure cities from any attacks. This fine plan might have saved many of the treasure cities of the Main and Greater Antilles from the frequent sackings by the seadogs, but unfortunately most of the ships provided for it were soon absorbed as reinforcements for the plate fleet to carry still more treasure home and by the royal navy to fight in the European wars. The ultimate result was the exposure of Jamaica to still more attacks of greater magnitude.

The first of the major attacks on Jamaica by Englishmen was the raid of Captain James Langton who also attacked Margarita and Hispaniola. In 1593 Langton with the "Anthonie" of 120 tons and his friend, Antonio Martino, with the "Pilgrim" of 100 tons struck Jamaica where they burnt and ransomed several plantations and captured two barks of hides. This raid was followed by the expedition of Sir Anthony Shirley, who had the backing of Queen Elizabeth. In 1597 Shirley was heading for Guiana when a violent storm drove him completely off course. Taking

advantage of the situation he decided to attack Jamaica; thus, on January 29, 1597, he landed near Port Royal and moved six miles inland with little opposition.¹⁹ After a month of burning and looting he left Jamaica on March 6 for Honduras for more raids with Captain William Parker, who had joined him at Jamaica in mid-February. Despite all these contacts with Jamaica, the English still had little interest in acquiring the island. In 1623, however, the first definite suggestion to seize and colonize Jamaica was made by George, Duke of Buckingham. His primary objective was the seizure of the gold and silver of the plate fleet by establishing an English naval base at Jamaica, but he also mentioned that it had excellent soil and air and would easily hold a million inhabitants. Furthermore, he said that it could easily be taken by four men-of-war and 800 troops since the slaves and Portuguese on the island would gladly desert the Spaniards, but he qualified this by stating that Hispaniola must be taken first because of its fertility.

The last major English attack on Jamaica before the final seizure of the island in 1655 occurred in 1642. The year before in their concerted effort to drive all foreigners out of the Caribbean the Spanish had attacked and wiped out the Puritan Providence Company's settlements on Henrietta, Providence, and Tortuga (Isle of the Association) islands. In reprisal the Providence Company, headed by the Earl of Warwick, granted a letter of marque to Captain William Jackson. The

¹⁹For an excellent account of Spanish resistance to the Shirley attack, see Wright's article. Irene A. Wright, "The Spanish Version of Sir Anthony Shirley's Raid of Jamaica, 1597, Including Extracts From Heretofore Unpublished Documents Existing in the Archivo General de Indies, Seville, Spain," The Hispanic American Historical Review, V (May, 1922), 227-48.

emulator of Drake, Jackson sailed to Barbados with his three ships to pick up recruits for his expedition of vengeance on the Spanish. There he obtained 650 men from Barbados and 250 from St. Kitts, all of whom were quite willing to leave the economic and political troubles of the Caribbee Islands which were just then passing through the early stages of the sugar revolution. These pseudo-seadogs first sailed to Margarita to seize the pearl fisheries there, but they were repulsed by the Spanish garrison. Next they attacked Puerto Cabello and Maracaibo, but again they obtained little plunder or revenge since the forewarned Spanish had fled to the easily defended interior with all their valuables. Somewhat discouraged, the armada of revenge now composed of seven ships and 1,100 men sailed to a hidden cove at Hispaniola where they could refit the ships and decide what the next objective would be. Their decision was to attack the less fortified Jamaica. There a small group of the men seized the capital with almost no opposition. Eventually they did destroy the capital, but first they obtained a ransom for it of 200 beeves, 10,000 pounds of cassava bread, and 7,000 Spanish dollars in addition to the plunder they obtained from the remainder of the island.²⁰ Unfortunately for Jackson's finances, he was shipwrecked and lost all the treasure on his return trip to England.

The important contribution of Jackson's victory at Jamaica was not the revenge gained or the booty obtained, but the morale boost it gave to English expansionists. The ease with which Jackson's band took Santiago de la Vega stirred the English to thoughts of further conquest

²⁰For the Jackson campaigns, see Vincent T. Harlow (ed.), The Voyages of Captain William Jackson, 1642-1645 ("Camden Miscellany Publications," Series 3, Vol. XXXIV; London: Butler and Tanner, Ltd., 1923).

since they attached Jamaica's weakness to all the Spanish Indies. Furthermore, their belief in the barrenness of Jamaica was somewhat dispelled by news that twenty of Jackson's men had deserted him to settle on the island whose climate and soil they thought was excellent. Thus, the Jackson victory helped revive the traditional Elizabethan policy of aggressive action against the Spanish monopoly in the West Indies, a policy that had been dormant for the past fifty years. Consequently, some Englishmen with foresight again saw that the ousting of the Spanish from the West Indies and planting of English colonies there was imperative if England was to become a maritime and colonial power. The London merchants, backers of the Jackson expedition, however, wanted nothing to do with the risky and often unprofitable business of colonizing. They desired revenge for their losses at Providence, Henrietta, and Tortuga and quick profits. Thus they demanded Jackson return immediately with all his booty. Others respected the Spanish protests of the Jamaica attack and demands to halt all privateering. Jackson's words did not fall on all deaf ears, however, for among the alert was the ambitious Oliver Cromwell who would one day end the Spanish chapter of Jamaica's history when he glibly accepted the captain's estimate of Spanish strength in the Indies.

Ye strenght of ye Spaniards, in the Occidental Regions, is far inferior to what they themselves so much boasted of, and have still studied to possesse all other Nations with a firm opinion of the same. . . . The Vaile is now drawne aside, and their weakness detected by a handful of men, furnished and sett out, upon ye expense of one private man, who hath darred them at their own doores, and hath beat them out of many strongholds, almost with terror of his name, and ye flying report of his Victory obtained with so much facility.²¹

²¹Burns, op. cit., p. 228.

II. CROMWELL'S WESTERN DESIGN

The Western Design was nothing new or unique to Cromwellian England. It was simply the steady elaboration of the old Elizabethan policy of raiding the Spanish treasure cities, of the early seventeenth-century colonization policy, and of the Puritan policy of ousting the Spanish from the Indies. Several basic tenets had been developed since the seadogs ravaged the Main, most important of which were the English principles that there was no title to land unless it was effectively held and that there was no peace in the Caribbean. These two principles formed the core of the new Western Design, for they offered it quite substantial sanctions. Thus the Western Design was no original product of the ingenious mind of Oliver Cromwell. It was part of the English character burned into it by the traditional Spanish rivalry. In its eventual maturity and development by Cromwell, it included all reasons for conquest and colonization and all excuses and sanctions for the seizure of foreign lands. Included were the seizing of gold, silver, and other treasure; acquiring of strategic areas; hurting the Spaniards in their "Achilles' heel," the West Indies; finding a passage to the Pacific; spreading the gospel; procuring of fisheries; having an outlet for the nation's surplus population which might include criminals and other undesirables; acquiring of new markets; obtaining new raw material sources; and augmenting governmental revenues. Thus, the Western Design constituted one grand remedial scheme, a panacea for all of England's

social, economic, and political ills. From this grand design was born the imperialism and mercantilism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Cromwell thus had an adequate array of reasons and sanctions to allow him to implement his own version of the Western Design. He, of course, had some further embellishments to add to the scheme. One of his primary objectives was the acquisition of new revenues, for he as Lord Protector wished to be financially independent of Parliament just as the previous kings of England had desired. In this endeavor there was a bit of urgency involved because Cromwell wished to have his new government firmly established before it was necessary to consult Parliament on monetary matters and suffer the consequential concessions and reservations it usually extracted from the executives when it made financial grants. Tied inextricably to this motive was his desire to keep the navy busy. The restless seamen, ardent for conquest and plunder, did not admire Cromwell as the army did, for they had no share in his victories or rewards.¹ Thus, Cromwell expected the navy, which he suspected was overwhelmingly of royalist sympathies, to obtain some rich prizes for his coffers while keeping itself occupied and away from the exiled Charles II. Not only would the naval royalists be calmed by a military endeavor, but also the rank and file throughout England and her colonies. To please them and keep them content under the rigors of the Commonwealth government, Cromwell had to wage a lucrative and successful war. A war against the Papist Spaniards would meet these qualifications;

¹M. Guizot, History of Oliver Cromwell and the English Commonwealth From the Execution of Charles the First to the Death of Cromwell, trans. A. R. Scoble (London: Richard Bentley, n.d.), II, 184.

for it would please the militant Puritans by hurting the Papists and would add revenues to the government treasury, thereby relieving some of the taxation on Englishmen. Furthermore, it would appease not only the English in England but also those in the British West Indies, who had just come under effective Parliamentary control in 1652 through General Ayscue's fleet's subjugation of the royalists there.

Financial difficulties were an important but not the singular factor in determining the foreign and commercial policies of Cromwell which in toto equaled the Western Design. The Protector was not only a covetous ruler but also an ardent Puritan, staunch mercantilist, and a fervent nationalist. Cromwell consequently, through trying to fulfill these desires, implementing his Western Design, and eventually taking Jamaica, became the first English ruler to systematically employ the powers of government to extend the nation's colonial possessions.² With simple definite principles which he persistently pursued, he set out to use the fleets to make England the greatest power in the world. In the process his colonial theories were not a subordinate part of his foreign policy, but an independent part of it. The foreign policy was then guided by the principle that England was not simply a European power but a world-wide empire, that the stationary state was doomed to weakness. Again these concepts point out the revival of Elizabethan thoughts that were modified by Cromwell through his own experience with colonies.

Cromwell had always been interested in colonies, for he had been appointed to the commission on the plantations of the West Indies and

²Charles H. Firth, Oliver Cromwell and the Rule of the Puritans in England (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 383.

America (appointed 1643, reappointed 1646) where he was both impressed and disturbed by how little was being done to control the colonies. He also had a very special interest in the colonization efforts of the Puritan Providence Company. At one time he even contemplated emigrating to their settlement on Providence Island off the coast of Nicaragua. From these experiences one can see how Cromwell's Western Design was affected by those of the past, particularly that design of the Earl of Warwick and his Puritan friends of the Providence Company. This Puritan company wished to plant and establish colonies on Providence, Henrietta, and Tortuga islands which they expected to use as bases to eventually oust the Spanish from all the Indies. Their efforts, however, were all in vain for in 1640 a Spanish fleet led by Don Francisco de Pimienta destroyed all their island settlements. Thus ended the Western Design of the Earl of Warwick and the Puritans, the forerunner of Cromwell's Western Design. The Puritans' reprisal expedition of Captain Jackson in 1642 (previously described) then stirred Cromwell's imagination.

Past accounts of successful attacks on the Spanish Indies by such men as Hakluyt, Hawkins, and Jackson convinced Cromwell of the vulnerability of the Indies. The feasibility of the Western Design was given further credit in his mind by the impassioned speeches of expansionists such as Sir William Castell who in 1644, as literary spokesman of the London merchants that wished to see English enterprise well rooted in the Caribbean, mentioned that it would be a simple matter to oust the Spanish from their lands and ports on Cuba and Puerto Rico.³

³Fulmer Mood, The English Geographers and the Anglo-American Frontier in the Seventeenth Century ("University of California Publications: Geography," Vol. VI, No. 9; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1944), p. 370.

The final impetus that brought about the decision to attack the Spanish Indies was provided by Thomas Gage.⁴ Gage, a renegade Dominican priest of English origin, while still a clergyman in Rome had been ordered by his superiors to go to the Philippines as a missionary. While in Mexico City in 1625, on his way to the Philippines, he learned of the hardships that the Pacific islands had to offer. Consequently, he and two other priests with similar orders deserted their superior and wandered about Spanish America. While traveling there he was amazed at the waste, corruption, and defenselessness of all the Spanish Indies. He said the Indies offered "open doors to let in any nations that would take the pains to surround the world to get a treasure."⁵ Gage's account of Spanish weakness was an overestimate, however, for when he was in the Indies they were torn apart by a viceroyalty disagreement, but by the time Cromwell had launched his expedition this was settled and much of the Spanish Indies reformed.

Gage, however, returned to Spain and eventually reached England where he gave up his Catholicism entirely and became a staunch and militant Puritan. His renouncement of Catholicism was said to have been caused by the shaking of his belief in transubstantiation, a tenet of Catholic doctrine, when a mouse ran away with a host he had just consecrated and was left unmolested. Gage was soon overcome with an absolute hatred for anything reminiscent of Popery. In England he fought

⁴The Thompson edition of Gage's travels is excellent. He includes a short biography of Gage. J. Eric S. Thompson (ed.), Thomas Gage's Travels in the New World (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958).

⁵Anne M. Peck, The Pageant of Middle American History (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947), p. 189.

Catholicism in any manner he could--of which one was his book, a travelogue on his adventures in Spanish America and a diatribe against Catholicism that told of the corruption and defenselessness of the Spanish Indies and of the ease with which they could be taken. Cromwell read and believed Gage's book and consulted the wayward priest about the possibility of an expedition against the Spanish Indies.⁶ Thus Gage's word was accepted over the sound advice of English naval and colonial authorities who knew the true status of the Spanish in the Indies. So influential was Gage that, when the expedition was eventually carried out, Cromwell suggested a mode of attack that Gage had developed to the commanders of the expedition. Thus, the commanders found themselves bound by these faulty tactics, for Cromwell's suggestions might easily be interpreted as orders. The influential Gage even had a special ship sent to bring him to Portsmouth, the departure point for the fleet, when the expedition was ready to leave. Eventually he died at Jamaica, the only result of his fanatical bid to break the power of Rome and Spain. His wife did receive a small pension from the grateful English government.

Religious differences had always been a prime factor in the English attacks on Papist Spain, bulwark of Catholicism, but Gage gave them new flavor as he stirred the zealous Protestant hearts of Cromwell and the English people. The Western Design now took on the flavor of a grand crusade to destroy Catholicism and protect Puritanism. To Cromwell this was the critical period for Puritanism, in which it would

⁶For Gage's report to Cromwell, see the Thurloe papers. Thomas Birch (ed.), A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Esquire (London: Gyles, Woodward, Davis, n.d.), III, 59-63.

either attain great heights of success or die out completely. Thus, Oliver Cromwell, a member of the turbulent antipopish school of the coast of Devon, needed no more encouragement to carry out his aggression against Catholic Spain.⁷

The Western Design also played a vital part in the European policies of Cromwell. His plans for the Design had all of Europe in turmoil, for all continental officials knew the Protector needed a financially successful war to keep his subjects appeased and to prevent the return of the Stuarts. Consequently, every nation made bids for his friendship against an enemy of theirs. The Dutch, a merchant-class oligarchy and sympathetic to Puritanism, suggested a joint Anglo-Dutch attack on all Spanish lands. Cromwell liked this Dutch proposal that would then result in an Anglo-Dutch division of the world--the Dutch taking Brazil and Asia and the English taking the Americas and Indies--and a perpetual offensive-defensive alliance between the two. He was particularly pleased with the thought of the English taking the Indies, which he considered the center of world power; but when Gage and other enthusiastic expansionists convinced him of the abject weakness of the Spanish, he decided to attempt the attack alone and reap all the profits.

The French were wary about allowing the English to attack the Indies, since they feared for their own possessions there, which Cromwell did have his eyes on but disregarded because of the added risks involved in a war against both Spain and France. Mazarin, the French

⁷ Germain Arciniegas, Caribbean Sea of the New World, trans. H. de Onis (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 211.

minister, did bait Cromwell with the West Indies while offering him the security of captured Dunkirk if the Lord Protector would see fit to send some English troops and supplies to the continent to help France against Spain.⁸ Mazarin even went so far as to provide Cromwell with valuable information on the movements of the Spanish galleons, but all these French offers were certainly only promises they never meant to keep. The clever Cromwell outmaneuvered all; he accepted no allies, shared no booty, and allowed France and Spain to fight on the continent while he took advantage of the situation with his private war in the Caribbean.

Meanwhile, the object of all the designs, Spain, was quite confident that no harm would come to her at the hands of Cromwell since she had been the first to formally recognize the Commonwealth government and her diplomatic relations with the Puritans had since been quite cordial. What the Spanish did not consider were the latent hatred for Romanism, the rekindling of the old naval-commercial rivalry, and the fear of the Spanish royalty consorting with the disposed Stuart monarch for a restoration of English monarchy, that were still in the minds of the English Puritans and had just been aroused by the ravings and rantings of Thomas Gage. Thus, the Spanish, almost completely unaware of English animosity and giving no pretext for an attack, were dastardly assaulted in their

⁸Accounts such as the Warwick memoirs that stated that Cromwell was urged to attack the Indies by the French and his own covetousness seem doubtful. Certainly, the French would not have encouraged an attack on the Indies that might endanger their possessions there. When they heard of the Penn-Venables expedition to the Caribbean, they were extremely worried and subsequently fortified Guadaloupe. Philip Warwick, Memoires of the Reigne of King Charles I with a Continuation to the Happy Restauration of King Charles II (London: R. Chiswell, 1701), p. 376, and Nellis M. Crouse, French Pioneers in the West Indies, 1624-1664 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), p. 222.

Indies by the aggressive Cromwell.

With the Gage-prompted decision to attack the Spanish Indies finally made, although few other than Cromwell and his immediate associates knew it, Cromwell then began to establish an elaborate system of justifications for his actions, none of which can excuse his outright aggression against a nation that was at peace with him by treaty and practice. His first vindicating move was to make impossible demands on the Spanish king--freedom of trade for English ships in the West Indies and liberty of conscience for English merchants in Spanish cities. The outraged Spanish ambassador, Cardenas, quite justifiably refused, stating that the Spanish king had but two eyes and Cromwell asked for both of them, the Indies and the Inquisition. At the Spanish refusal, Cromwell uttered forth numerous invectives and threats. He said that the death of Charles I ended all Anglo-Spanish treaties; therefore the Spanish government must make new arrangements with England if it expected good relations to continue. Furthermore, he demanded compensation for alleged destruction of English ships and enslavement of English sailors by the Spaniards. To sanction the seizure of any land, he stated that the Spanish held much land with few people on it while the English were overcrowded on their tiny islands. In his commission to Admiral Penn as the naval commander, Cromwell further vindicated the seizure of Spanish lands when he stated that the Spanish held the Indies "contrary to common right and law of nations" and only by "color of the Pope's Donation."⁹ To further admonish the Spanish and to spur his

⁹William C. Abbott (ed.), The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, Vol. III: The Protectorate, 1653-1655 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), p. 528.

people, the Lord Protector accused the Spanish of creating animosity in the Indies by stating that Spain "intends the ruin and destruction of all English plantations, people, and interests in those parts."¹⁰

Another Cromwell excuse for his aggression appeared in his limiting the area of the war to the Caribbean. He specified that the Caribbean area was included in no peace treaties, that no articles of peace existed for the area, and that Spanish conduct in the West Indies meant a declaration of eternal war in that area. Quite naively, Cromwell expected to wage war with Spain in the Indies while maintaining peace with her in Europe. He was even perfectly willing to negotiate a treaty with Spain on the continent while preparing the fleet that would attack the Spanish Indies. The crowning feature of Cromwell's emotional justification of his aggression was then an appeal to God, a religious sanction for English Puritan action. He said that the Indies attack was for the greater glory of God and the establishment of the true gospel; therefore it was lawful by God and nations. Furthermore, he believed that the Spanish idolaters, heretics, and members of the false church must be destroyed; consequently, conquest was free to all people because only God set its bounds and limits.¹¹

With his objectives and sanctions determined, Cromwell kept the destination of his fleets a strict secret. He deliberately allowed many rumors to circulate, which he hinted might be true, to further confuse the rest of Europe. Thus, none of Europe's diplomats knew who he was

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹"A Brief and Perfect Journal of the Late Proceedings and Success of the English Army in the West Indies Continued Until June 24, 1655, by an Eyewitness," The Harleian Miscellany, VI (1810), 373.

going to attack and once they did find out that it was Spain they were not certain just where he would attack them. The Spanish probably knew the least about the matter since their espionage agents could not determine the destination of Cromwell's fleet or convince the Spanish ambassador of the Lord Protector's treachery. A Spanish agent did discover a little about the expedition through an investigation of Cromwell's purchase of Caribbean maps from London chart masters. He told the Spanish ambassador, Cardenas, about his findings, but the overcautious ambassador disregarded the evidence that he considered circumstantial. Cardenas did offer a 10,000 reward for definite evidence, but he soon forgot about the matter and sent no word of it to Madrid. The Spanish agent, rebuffed by Cardenas but still certain of his findings, then sought the aid of the Spanish minister at Brussels, Don John. He also refused to believe the agent's accusations--on the grounds that if Cardenas knew nothing of it, then the plot was nonexistent. Venetian diplomatic communications revealed the extent to which these and other Spanish officials were duped.

At the very moment when the English fleet was weighing for the Indies he (Cardenas) was assured that it would not go to do any harm to the dominions of the Catholics, and at the same time Blake was receiving supplies and entertainment at Naples and in Sicily, Pen was sailing to attack the islands subject to his majesty.¹²

After the departure of the fleet Cardenas finally suspected that something was amiss, whereupon he sent dispatches to his king in Madrid stating his belief that Admiral Penn was headed for Spanish America,

¹²Great Britain, Public Records Office, Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to Indian Affairs, Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in Other Libraries of Northern Italy, 1655-56 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930), p. 129.

probably to attack Hispaniola first. Nevertheless, there was still widespread doubt among Spanish authorities about an English attack in the Indies; thus, little was done to protect Spanish possessions there. Three powerful galleons with 200 men were sent to the garrison at Santo Domingo and all Indies governors were ordered to take the necessary precautions with their cities and the plate fleets, but little was done to effect these precautions. In these warnings the royal officials listed Cuba as the most likely objective for any attack. Thus the Spanish knew very little of the movements of the English fleet that was to implement the Western Design. They did not learn of the attacks on Hispaniola and Jamaica until they were informed by the French. Other European diplomats had at least considered the possibility of Cromwell attacking the West Indies.

. . . not certain about destination of Pen fleet, most think is going to Barbary coast to reinforce Admiral Blake, others to Cape of Good Hope to secure base for ships to the East Indies, . . . some say to take some large island in the West Indies.¹³

In European diplomatic circles the best "educated guesses" were that the Spanish West Indies would be the victim of any Cromwellian aggression.

If continental Europeans knew little of Cromwell's plans, Englishmen knew still less. Even Parliament was befuddled by the Protector's strict secrecy about his expedition. In acts of faith and confidence toward him, the usually cautious Parliament placed the fleets at his disposal without inquiring what he intended to do with them. The Lord Protector's only expressed reasons for the use of the fleets in his remarks to Parliament were that he wished to establish the maritime

¹³Ibid., p. 12.

predominance of England on all seas and that he desired the fleets to guard the seas and to restore England to its dominions on that element.¹⁴ The common Puritans, drunk with the crusading spirit, were certain he was going to attack the Spanish either at Rome or Cadiz. Thus Cromwell's secret was well kept, but such secrecy had a disastrous effect on the morale of the expedition's men who thought the dangers of ocean transport were risky enough without knowing where one was going. Many other protests about the secrecy of the expedition's destination were made, such as those of the sailors' and soldiers' wives who demanded that Cromwell tell them where he was sending their husbands. His reply to all was simple and evading.

The ambassadors of France and Spain would each of them willingly give me a million to know that.¹⁵

By June, 1654, Cromwell and his Council of State had decided to attack the Spanish Empire in the West Indies, although this had already been in the Lord Protector's thinking for quite some time. Among the first advisors for the expedition were Thomas Gage, Thomas Modyford (Modiford), and Lord Willoughby, all of whom continued to convince Cromwell of the ease with which he could take all the Spanish Indies. Modyford and Willoughby should have known better, however, since they had lived in the West Indies and knew the conditions there, but greed for wealth and power had clouded their better judgment also. In the preliminary plans for the expedition, two different strategical maneuvers were

¹⁴Guizot, op. cit., p. 184, and Bishop Gilbert Burnet, Bishop Burnet's History of his own Times: From the Restoration of King Charles the Second to the Treaty of Peace at Utrecht in the Reign of Queen Anne (London: William S. Orr and Co., 1850), I, 49.

¹⁵Guizot, op. cit., p. 184.

proposed by these advisors. Gage recommended that the expedition first take Hispaniola or Cuba, then seize Central America and the plate fleets. Modyford thought the more feasible strategy was to attack Trinidad and the mouth of the Orinoco to acquire a base for an attack on Cartagena, then seize the remainder of Spanish America. To achieve these fabulous aims the advisors thought would take two years, by which time the Spanish would be ousted from all of the New World.

III. THE PENN-VENABLES EXPEDITION

Cromwell, to handle the affairs of the expedition and to direct the lands it would take, appointed a commission whose membership varied much throughout the remaining five years of the Commonwealth era. Among the more distinguished committeemen were Daniel Searle, governor of Barbados; Clement Everard, governor of St. Kitts; Roger Osbourne, governor of Montserrat; Luke Stokes, governor of Nevis; Christopher Keynell, governor of Antigua; Robert Venables, general of the army of the expedition; and Admiral William Penn, naval commander of the expedition. The immediate affairs of the expedition were handled by Daniel Searle, Captain Gregory Butler, and Edward Winslow, erstwhile governor of the Plymouth Colony who was said to have an extensive knowledge of colonial affairs. Theoretically, the committee on the Western Design proceedings was to have full authority over the management of the expedition, but Cromwell guided by Gage's recommendations always held a tight rein over the committee's actions. Thus, in his directives to the committee he always stressed the importance of consulting him on actions and of keeping maximum secrecy about their proceedings.

You shall generally consider of the best and most probable meanes for the carrying on and ymprovement of this undertaking. In case it shall please God to give us success in the present expedition. . .

You shall from time to time certifie to us your opinions and advice concerning these perticulars, and shall not communicate your advices or Counselles but by direction from us.¹

¹Abbott, op. cit., III, 414.

The ultimate decision and actions always rested with the Lord Protector; consequently, the responsibility for the success or failure of this expedition, his pet project, must also rest with him.

The choice of Admiral Sir William Penn as naval commander of the expedition was an excellent one, for Penn in his day was second only to Admiral Blake among the naval leaders and in British naval history he ranks not far behind the invincible Nelson. Penn had some attachment to Cromwell, for in the Protector's service he had risen from common sailor to admiral, but still he had the traditional admiration for kingship and monarchy. Consequently, he has been accused of consorting with the king to desert with the entire fleet to join the monarchial cause. Penn, however, was more than a royalist; he was an Englishman, dedicated to English naval service, patriotic to the core, and a true counterpart of Drake and Raleigh. Thus, it seems doubtful that he really offered his services to the exiled Charles II. No evidence survives to prove he did. This is, of course, not a denial of correspondence between Penn and Charles. They probably believed that Penn's desertion with the fleet from the expedition would not be to the best interests of England. By carrying out the aims of the Western Design through this expedition, Penn would be able to fulfill a twofold purpose--win power and prestige for England and keep Cromwell occupied elsewhere while Charles and his Spanish allies undermined the Protector's position in England and Europe.

Charles as well as Cromwell was capable and quite willing to doublecross the Spanish. The exiled king thought that if Cromwell's Western Design failed, it would pave the way for a quicker royal restoration. If it succeeded to any extent, he thought it would still mean

more power and prestige for England once the Commonwealth ended, as he certainly thought it would once Cromwell died. He also thought the expedition would force Spain to try to oust Cromwell. Thus, regardless of the outcome of the Design's expedition, the exiled king stood to benefit by it. Consequently, the expedition must go on; for even if Penn had made his offer, Charles could not have accepted it for he had no port to receive the fleet in. Consequently, Penn's conscience was soothed. What he did, he did for England; not for Cromwell, nor for Charles, although his royalist-tainted crews may have wished he would have joined Charles.

Word must be mentioned here of Charles' knowledge of the Western Design's expedition. Although there is doubt that offers were made to Penn to desert the Design, overtures by the king's agents were made to the disaffected members of the crews.² Thus, the king knew something of the expedition. Throughout 1654 and much of 1655 Charles knew of the expedition, but was not certain of the destination or the victim. However, working on the assumption that the Spanish were the most likely to be attacked, he made the considerations just previously described. By July, 1655, however, he was advised by a royalist lord that the expedition was headed for either the Americas or Madagascar since the victualing indicated it was destined for some hot and remote area.³ Not until

²David Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy in England ("Yale Historical Publications," Studies 19; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), p. 125.

³Lord Jermyn wrote to the king on January 15, 1655, about the expedition. W. Dunn MacRay (ed.), Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers Preserved in the Bodleian Library, Vol. III: 1655-1657 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1876), p. 7.

informed by Father Peter Talbot on August 4, 1655, did he learn of the English attack on Santo Domingo. Thereafter he was constantly kept informed on the West Indian situation through correspondence with royalist exiles at Barbados.⁴ So strong was royalist sentiment in Barbados and the fleet that, after Jamaica was captured, these royalists offered their support to the king's restoration efforts.⁵ Thus, unknowingly, the Lord Protector had sown some of the seeds of doom for the Commonwealth.

For the present, Cromwell had at least secured a capable admiral for his expedition and had prospects of keeping his royalist opposition content and busily out of trouble. Contrary to Samuel Pepys' belief in statements that Cromwell did not offer the expedition's admiralship to Penn, but that Penn requested the command, the brave, experienced, punctilious admiral was eagerly sought after by the Lord Protector.⁶ Because of the aggressive nature of the expedition, Penn may not have liked the idea of expedition at all; but once Cromwell showed such an interest in him, he made the most of the opportunity to have some past grievances against his family redressed. Thus, in response to Penn's pleas for compensation for family lands lost by confiscation during the Puritan Revolution, Cromwell ordered the Lord Deputy and Council of Ireland to

⁴Granville Peñ; Memorials of the Professional Life and Times of Sir William Penn, Knight (London: James Duncan, 1833), II, 16.

⁵MacRay, op. cit., III, 90.

⁶Pepys said he was told and believed that Cromwell did not ask Penn to go with the expedition, for the Protector could have had any general he pleased. Furthermore, he stated that it was Penn's pride that ruined the expedition. Henry B. Wheatley (ed.), The Diary of Samuel Pepys (London: George Bell and Sons, 1893), III, 317.

make an extensive land grant to Penn.⁷ Here again, the clever Protector fulfilled two objectives; he secured a capable admiral for his expedition and obtained settlers for Ireland which he wished to subjugate through English colonization.

Penn's only function in the expedition was to carry supplies and transport the army which was under the command of Robert Venables.⁸ Thus, all men of the expedition were under Penn's authority while on board the ships, a condition which must be considered later when there was dissension in the expedition's high command over destination and where to land. The preparatory duties of Penn were to supervise the outfitting of the ships and the preventing of sickness aboard the vessels. These instructions were clear enough, but often Cromwell, sending orders through his Secretary of State, John Thurloe, contradicted and overlapped Penn's orders with those of Venables and General Desborough who handled most of the expedition's problems of logistics.⁹ Consequently, Cromwell through his ill-defined orders created dissension among the leaders of his expedition, particularly between the two military leaders, Penn and Venables, whose relationships with each other were already severely strained. Individually both were very capable men; but together their personalities clashed, thereby hampering any joint endeavor that depended on absolute cooperation as this expedition

⁷Abbott, op. cit., III, 528.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Thus, Penn was ordered to transport Venables and his men, take care of the preparations, and prevent sickness, but was directed to accept Venables' advice on the hauling of the troops. Penn, op. cit., II, 23.

did.

The easily offended Penn was often angered by the usually innocent remarks of Venables while the army general, with a bit of egotism in his character, resented Penn's "lording it" over the entire expedition. Cromwell, who knew of these differences, not only ignored them but also furthered the rivalry between the two military leaders by not specifying assignments in his orders. Certainly a man with such military knowledge and experience as Cromwell should have known such action would not motivate the leaders, but would rather detract from the effectiveness of the expedition. Still, he continued the blunders that created a demoralizing dissension in the high command of the expedition. At times he would send directives to Penn through Venables (and vice versa) which Venables might regard as unimportant or would disregard in favor of his own ideas (again vice versa). Seldom did orders come directly from the proper authorities or from Cromwell. There was usually the inexplicable, senseless, indirect communication of orders such as "Penn, you inform Venables," or vice versa. What better method was there to worsen a natural rivalry?

The objectives of the expedition were another source of dissension. Cromwell's orders on this subject were simply to attack anything in the West Indies that belonged to the Spanish. His orders to Venables were typical.

The designe in general is to gain an interest in that part of the West Indies in the possession of the Spaniard. . . .¹⁰

¹⁰ Charles H. Firth (ed.), The Narrative of General Venables With an Appendix of Papers Relating to the Expedition to the West Indies and the Conquest of Jamaica, 1654-1655 ("Royal Historical Society Publications," Series 2, Vol. LX; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1900), p. 112.

Never did the Lord Protector state just what he wanted attacked although he often reiterated his wish that they seize some treasure.

Be master of the Spaniards treasure which comes from Peru by the way of Panama in the South Sea to Porto Bello or Nombre de Dios in the North Sea.¹¹

Cromwell, however, would often reverse this pattern of indecision when he informed the expedition's leaders of the means of attacking specific objectives. Thus he suggested that Venables and Penn use the same means of attack as Captain Jackson had when he attacked Jamaica in 1642. Consequently, the military leaders of the expedition were bound by a specific brand of tactics since Cromwell's suggestions were practically equal to or construed as orders. Thus, Penn and Venables became the chief strategists of Cromwell's Western Design while Cromwell remained the primary tactician, when just the opposite should have occurred to guarantee the expedition any measure of success. The Lord Protector did, however, suggest three alternatives concerning the grand strategy of the Design, but none of these could possibly be construed as orders for he stated no preference but simply mentioned them. The alternatives were to either attack Santo Domingo on Hispaniola and St. John's (Puerto Rico) first, then seize the rest of the Indies; or first attack the Main between the Oronoco River and Porto Bello, then the islands; or attack Santo Domingo, then the Main, then the other islands.¹² The only item that could be construed as a preference in his statements on these various plans would be his stressing of the weakness of Santo Domingo which may have influenced the expedition's leaders to eventually attack

¹¹Ibid., p. 113.

¹²Penn, op. cit., II, 28.

that city.

Cromwell's orders to Venables concerning his duties and the objectives of the expedition were never specific either, but this may have been deliberate action by the Protector to overcome Venables' scruples about attacking the Spanish without a general war when the two nations were at peace by treaty. Robert Venables had thirteen years' service in the army including his recent command in Ulster. Thus, with his never having a major command, lack of faith in the expedition, and little affection for Cromwell, it seems odd that the Protector chose him to lead the army of the expedition. Cromwell may have suspected Venables of being a royalist sympathizer; if so, he could keep him out of touch with the exiled king by sending him away. The possibility that Venables wrote to Charles offering his services in the restoration cause is more remote than that of Penn's. Only Clarendon's later prejudiced account gave consideration to Venables as an active royalist.

Both the superior officers were well affected to the king's service. They did by, several ways, without any communication with each other, send to the king, that if he were ready with any force from abroad, or secure of possessing any port within, they would, engage, with the power that was under their charge, to declare for his majesty. But neither of them daring to trust the other, the king could not presume upon any port; so he wished them to reserve their affections to his majesty till a more proper season to discover them, and to prosecute the voyage to which they were designed, from which he was not without hope of some benefit to himself; for it was evident Cromwell meant to make some enemy, which probably might give his majesty some friend.¹³

On the other hand, since Cromwell expected the Western Design expedition to be such a huge success, he may have feared sending a more prominent commander there in the belief that he would return with such fame and

¹³Ibid., pp. 14-15.

prestige as to be in a position to challenge Cromwell for the Lord Protectorship.

Thus, Cromwell sent the unknown, but capable Venables on the Design's expedition as chief of all forces of the expedition in England and America with full power to obtain and deploy men and supplies in England and then in Barbados and the Caribbee islands.¹⁴ These orders to Venables, however, overlapped those given to other leaders of the expedition. Consequently, more dissension was created among the Design's high command. For example, at times Cromwell designated Penn as solely responsible for transportation and preparation; yet Desborough and Venables often received orders concerning these functions without any specification of who was the ultimate authority. Perhaps Cromwell was confused, for at one time he issued orders that all decisions on destination, operations, planting, and treaty making be made by all the commissioners assigned to the expedition. On other occasions these decisions were relegated to a single commissioner or to a group of two or three. Why all the confusion in the issuing of orders? Studies of Cromwell's character and entire plan of the Western Design found one fault for the blundering that caused the Western Design's expedition to fall short of its grand objectives. That fault was the overwhelming egotism and pompousness of Cromwell. The expedition was his "pet project." Thus no one must have full responsibility for it; no one but he must receive crowds' ovations as conqueror of the Spanish Indies. Certainly, if there had been stability in England to permit him to leave, there would have been no Penn-Venables expedition but a Cromwell expedition.

¹⁴Abbott, op. cit., III, 533.

Thus the veteran soldier, Robert Venables, received full command of the army of the expedition. He was certainly a brave and hard-working officer, but he had not the motivation or imagination that made great generals.¹⁵ His rather deficient strength of character and overconfidence in his own judgment brought him the dislike of the other high-ranking officers, particularly Admiral Penn. He was, however, if not a great soldier, a good one; but he was certainly not meant to lead an expedition of the magnitude needed to implement Cromwell's Western Design. Perhaps he knew he was incapable of leading such a huge expedition, for he did try to refuse Cromwell's offer, but no one could repeatedly refuse the Lord Protector's wishes without suffering some evil consequence. Thus, Venables led the expedition and made mistakes doing so. These were tactical and strategical errors caused by his inexperience and his following of Cromwell's "suggestions." The mistakes were shared by Penn and the other officers of high rank; that is, all but one of the errors, for Venables made his own stupendous blunder when he took his wife along on the expedition. Consequently, he was accused of petticoat rule (Mrs. Venables was not one to hold back advice of any nature) and of self-gratification denied to the rest of the forces. Mrs. Venables, a lady of quite mature charms, was also a great distraction during the journey to the West Indies.

Although Penn and Venables were at times given orders to handle some of the logistics of the expedition, very little of that function was accomplished by them. Most of the supply handling and procurement

¹⁵He was certainly not the weak, irresolute, avaricious, little-loved general Guizot calls him. Guizot, op. cit., II, 199 and 226.

was left to General Desborough (Desbrowe), a relative of Cromwell. Desborough was but one of Cromwell's relatives who took part in the Penn-Venables expedition. The Lord Protector certainly overlooked none of his family as nepotism ran rampant in the Commonwealth. Penn especially was troubled by Cromwell's family employment tactics as the following excerpts indicate.

I do hereby commend to you my kinsman, Mr. George Smythsby, desiring that he may be assured that he shall have some place that shall fall within the fleet under your command. . . .¹⁶

On another occasion, January 15, 1655, Cromwell asked the harassed Penn to give his nephew a position in the fleet's command. ~~To~~ do so, he suggested that the admiral remove one of his relatives from a command to make room for the Cromwellian relative.¹⁷

Unlike some of the other Cromwell relatives in the expedition, Desborough was at least a capable military man with some military skill, although he lacked the organizational and administrative abilities needed for the job he was assigned. Thus, with his inexperience in logistics, his lack of logistic ability, and his corrupt practices (he made a fortune supplying the Penn-Venables expedition), Desborough greatly handicapped the expedition. He and his underlings either provided inferior supplies, not enough supplies, or they shipped them too late to serve the expedition. Consequently General Venables found himself with a poorly supplied and victualled army. For example, when he reached Hispaniola, he discovered that most of the mortar pieces, granado-shells, scaling ladders, horses, and furniture for the horsemen

¹⁶Abbott, op. cit., III, 516.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 575.

had been left behind at Portsmouth. Furthermore, what arms he did have were totally inadequate; the ammunition would not fire, the pikes were too short, and there were no water bottles. These were but a few of the supply inadequacies. Responsibility for these supplies that were not only inferior but usually of the worse sort must rest with Desborough and his underlings. It was his specified duty to see that the expedition was handled and supplied efficiently and adequately. His only excuse might have been Cromwell's insisting that the expedition be rushed in order to cut down expenses. This coupled with his inexperience in logistics might explain some of the mistakes, but undoubtedly the greater part of the explanation for the inferiority and lack of supplies would be found in the bulging money purse of General Desborough. Cromwell, though he rushed the supplying of the fleet somewhat, at least gave detailed suggestions and orders as to what the fleet should have as the following typical account indicates.

Whereas the Victualls under mentioned, viz.

Bisket for eight Moneths.

Beere three moneths; and in lieu of five moneths beere more put on board, Rack or Brandie for Six weeks and Beveridge Wine, Vinegre, and Cider for fourteen weeks.

Beefe fower Moneths of the old store, and two Moneths to be new provided.

Porke Six moneths of what is already made.

Pease for Eight moneths.

Fish six weeks Haberdine, Tenn Weeks Stock fish, and in lieu of sixteene weeks Fish more the vallue thereof to be put on board in Oatmeale Rice, and Pease, Butter three moneths in kind, and five moneths Oyle in lieu of butter.

Cheese three moneths of Suffolke and three moneths Chesire the other two moneths to be supplied in Oyle.

And one hundred Tonnes of bay Salt.

are therefore to be provided for the supply of the Fleet commanded by General Penn: These are therefore to will and require you forthwith to take Care That the Victualls aforesaid be provided, and disposed of for the use aforesaid and that you give

directions to the Victualler accordingly. And for soe doing this shalbe your Warrant. Given at Whitehall the 30th day of August 1654.¹⁸

Perhaps if all supply orders had been issued like this, carried out, and not rushed, the expedition might have been more of a success.

Venables was not only provided with few and inferior supplies, but he was further handicapped by the rabble army put at his disposal. He had suggested the use of the Irish Army (a corps of English veterans of the wars in Ireland) of battle-hardened, seasoned men but had been politely refused, probably for political reasons again. Thus, he received an army great in quantity but poor in quality, since Desborough who was handling the recruiting tried to fulfill one of the objectives of the Design--ridding the English nation of its undesirables. Consequently, Desborough formed an army out of the elite of the slums, escapees from Tyburn and Newgate, knights of the blade, common cheats, thieves, catpurses, and other lewd persons, to present to the general of the expedition. To give this band of iniquity a little military flavor, a few army regulars were ordered to accompany them on the expedition. Still, Venables had a large army of poorly armed, half-drilled, poorly disciplined men who were little known by their officers. For the benefit of the later history of Jamaica it may serve to take note here that among the army regulars was the rugged, tough Colonel Morgan who was accompanied by his ne'er-do-well nephew, Henry, a common soldier who was destined to become Jamaica's greatest pirate and governor.¹⁹

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 424-25.

¹⁹Robert Carse, The Age of Piracy (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1957), p. 146.

Admiral Penn had the same difficulties as General Venables.

Most officers of Penn's fleet were worthless men as were the officers in Venables' army since few men of superior qualities wished to go on an expedition whose destination and enemy were not specified. Furthermore, few officers of quality knew of the expedition, due to Cromwell's strict secrecy concerning it; thus, few had an opportunity to volunteer their services. Penn was further handicapped by his late appointment to the full command of the fleet. His official commission as commander of the fleet was not made until October 9, 1654, when Cromwell was already demanding that the expedition embark because of the great expense of keeping it in the Portsmouth harbor. The two commanders then requested more time for preparations. Penn desired more and better ships, victuals, and equipment. Venables wanted better armaments for one-half of what he had were defective, more veteran soldiers, and a general muster of men and officers before departure.²⁰

Penn struggled desperately (as did Venables with his duties) to obtain more good ships and victuals and equipment, and to fill his complement of sailors. Cromwell, however, wishing the expensive fleet to depart and obtain some results, ordered the commanders to leave as soon as possible. Again on December 20, 1654, the Protector wrote the commanders requesting that they hasten preparing the rest of the fleet, that he understood the care and industry they were taking, that he hoped the dissatisfactions were gone, and that they should not hinder the expedition with their personal differences and troubles.²¹ Finally, over

²⁰Firth, The Narrative . . . , p. 6.

²¹Abbott, op. cit., III, 551.

the protests of Penn and Venables, Cromwell ordered the fleet to depart without fulfilling his promise of more provisions. Thus, the fleet left England with most of the men and supplies not assembled on board the vessels. At least one-half the supply ships were left behind for some unknown reason.

On December 25, 1654, the great fleet of the Western Design left Portsmouth harbor much to the consternation of many war-fearful Englishmen. Most prominent among this group were many influential Puritans who protested the expedition as unchristian aggression.²² The staunch Puritan, John Lambert, was especially against it and forecasted the eventual outcome (respecting the disaster at Hispaniola). He felt religion had no place in war, for he wanted Catholic Spain, England's largest trade customer, as an ally against Catholic France. Ironically, had Cromwell considered such an alliance as Lambert proposed, Spain would probably have done anything for England's aid against France. Nevertheless, the fleet sailed toward the West Indies to attack the Spanish there as a mission of hate and vengeance from Oliver Cromwell.

Meanwhile, another fleet under the command of Admiral Blake sailed toward the Mediterranean Sea to destroy French privateers, Dutch men-at-war, and Barbary pirates at the request of the Levant and other English trade companies who had suffered heavy losses to these buccaneers.²³ Later, Admiral Blake was given additional orders to aid the

²² Julian de Castilla, The English Conquest of Jamaica: An Account of What Happened in the Island of Jamaica From May 20 of the Year 1655, When the English Laid Siege to it, up to July 3 of the Year 1656, ed. and trans. I. A. Wright ("Camden Miscellany Publications," Series 3, Vol. XXXIV; London: Butler & Tanner, Ltd., 1923), p. xxiv.

²³ C. E. Lucas Phillips, Cromwell's Captains (London: William Heineman, Ltd., 1938), p. 235.

activities of Penn and Venables in the West Indies. He had orders to attack Spanish vessels as part of the objectives of the Western Design, but now he was given specific orders to be certain that no Spanish aid from the homeland was sent to the Indies. He was ordered to attack.

. . . as also any other of his ships which you shall understand to be bound for the West Indies with the provisions of war, for the aid and assistance of his subjects there; carrying yourself towards other of his ships and people as you are directed by your general instructions.²⁴

Thus, the grand scope of the Western Design was revealed. It was no part of the Cromwellian foreign policy; it was that policy.

The fleet that left Portsmouth on Christmas Day of 1654 must have been quite an impressive sight. Certainly, it was one of the largest English armadas to ever set sail. The following ships were included in Penn's fleet.²⁵

SHIP	SEAMEN	SOLDIERS	GUNS	CAPTAIN
Swiftsure	350	30	60	Jonas Poole
Paragon	300	30	54	William Goodson
Torrington	280	30	54	George Dakins
Marsten Moor	280	30	54	Edward Blagg
Gloicester	280	30	54	Benjamin Blake
Lion	230	30	44	John Lambert
Mathias	200	30	44	John White
Indian	220	30	44	Terry
Bear	150	30	36	Francis Kirby
Laurel	160	30	40	William Crispin
Portland	160	30	40	Richard Newbury
Dover	160	30	40	Robert Sanders
Great Charity	150	--	36	Leonard Harris
Heartease	70	160	30	Thomas Wright
Discovery	70	160	30	Thomas Willis
Convertine	75	200	30	John Hayward
Katharine	70	200	30	Willoughby Hannam
Martin, a galley	60	--	12	William Vesey

²⁴Abbott, op. cit., III, 746.

²⁵William L. Clowes and Associates, The Royal Navy: A History From the Earliest Times to the Present (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1897), I, 205.

There were also twenty other ships of substantial size that were used as transports. These carried a combined total of 1,145 seamen, 1,830 soldiers, 38 horses, and 352 guns (ship cannon).²⁶ In addition, four very small craft were also taken along. The commander of the entire fleet, Admiral William Penn, was aboard the "Swiftsure." His immediate lieutenants were Vice-Admiral William Goodson aboard the "Paragon" and Rear Admiral George Dakins aboard the "Torrington."

After a pleasant four-week voyage the fleet arrived at Barbados on January 29, 1655. There Penn fulfilled his added instructions of December 14, 1654, which were also issued to some of the other commissioners (Edward Winslow, Robert Venables, Daniel Searle, and Gregory Butler) when he seized three Dutch merchant ships that were trading with the Barbadians in violation of the Commonwealth's navigation acts. The seizure of these Dutch ships led to further distress between Penn and Venables because the admiral placed his nephew, Mr. Pool, in charge of the invoices and accounts concerning the disposal of the vessels. Certainly, this was correct in regard to naval regulations since Penn was in full command of the fleet; therefore he had the authority over disposition of any booty taken by the fleet. Furthermore, Penn strictly followed Cromwell's instructions that all booty taken on land or sea be used for carrying on the expedition, although he did realize the demoralizing effect such a practice would have on the men since this was contrary to English tradition. Usually the men and officers divided all the spoils by predetermined proportions with the state receiving its share also.

²⁶Ibid.

Nevertheless, the punctilious Penn followed his superior's orders rigidly. Venables, however, less concerned with details but more concerned with the outcome of the campaign, demanded that the soldiers be allowed some of the booty throughout the expedition. Thus further bitterness was created between the Design's two generals, but Penn still had his way with the disposition of the plunder. Later Venables accused Penn of refusing to allow him or Winslow to take part in the disposition or to even see the invoices. The Design's army commander further stated that he was certain of falsehoods in the accounts. Certainly there was some embezzlement by Mr. Pool and others for this was an era of corruption in naval affairs as well as in all other fields of endeavor. In his later naval career it was Admiral Penn who purged much of the graft and corruption from the admiralty.

Thus, in an atmosphere of distress and dissension, the military leaders of the expedition--Generals Penn and Venables, Colonels Fortecsue, Buller, Morris, Carter, Doyley, and Major General Hines--and the other commissioners met at Bridgetown, Barbados, to discuss their needs and a plan of attack. Cromwell, in his careless haste and unwillingness to give one man too much power, had commissioned all the expedition's leaders to decide what they needed after the original supplies were sent and to decide a general plan of attack. Consequently, there was more discord among the expedition leaders at Barbados as the food problem had already become acute. Victuals, brandy, and wine were on short supply; the bread was rotten. Furthermore, few foodstuffs could be bought and that which was available was outrageously priced, for Barbados was then a full-fledged sugar colony devoting almost all its

land to "the cane" while it imported practically all of its foodstuffs.

Venables, perturbed by the failure of Cromwell and the Council of State to provide the ten months' provisions for 10,000 men as they had promised, then came into further conflict with his co-commander. The army commander complained that the sailors were receiving full food allowances while his soldiers were receiving only half-allowances, that the fleet refused to give his hungry men any bread at all, and that the soldiers had to buy food or else starve.²⁷ Although Venables' claims may be exaggerated, there was a critical shortage of food among the forces of the expedition. As a result, the fleet had to detach some of the complement of boys in order to save provisions for the fighting men. Thus, these boys were left stranded on Barbados, probably becoming servants or slaves on the sugar plantations. In the economizing mind of England's Lord Protector there was no reason for a food shortage on the expedition. He had expected that they would have enough foodstuffs to take them to the West Indies; thereafter they were to live off the land as much as possible so that the expedition might produce more profit.²⁸

The army never received even its full quota of provisions for the voyage to the West Indies because the anxious Cromwell had ordered the fleet to depart before all the supply ships were ready. Later the Protector did send some ships with provisions to the Indies with orders to try to find the fleet. Typical of these orders were those given to Captain Thomas Bennet of the "Morning Star" and her two sister ships.

²⁷Firth, The Narrative . . . , p. 13.

²⁸Abbott, op. cit., III, 536.

Bennet was directed to Barbados where he was to join the expedition if he found it; otherwise he was to follow the instructions of the Barbados governor, Daniel Searle. Needless to say, few of the provisions, that were inadequate to start with, which were sent from England ever reached the expedition. Consequently, the only hope of obtaining provisions that was left to Penn and Venables was the prerogative of generals-at-sea to order or to take provisions they needed from the merchants for adequate compensation.²⁹ The practice, however, was frowned upon by the public, and the Barbadian planters and merchants then refused to sell their goods except at their inflated prices. Thus, the law of supply and demand proved a further detriment to the fortunes of the Western Design.

Cromwell, proving himself a poor provider for his pet, the Western Design expedition, had given the fleet and the army few weapons. Consequently, most of the weapons and ammunition for the expedition had to be purchased at Barbados. These were totally inadequate. The pikes were but one example of the extreme inferiority of the weapons; thus, the English pikemen had to face the Spanish with pikes at least one foot shorter than those of the enemy.³⁰ Here again Penn and Venables clashed as the army general accused Penn of refusing to release the fleet's pikes and lances which the soldiers needed desperately. Penn, however, was not about to release arms that would endanger the safety of the

²⁹J. R. Tanner (ed.), Two Discourses of the Navy, 1638 and 1659: Also a Discourse of the Navy, 1660, by Sir Robert Slyngesbie ("Navy Records Society Publications," Vol. VII; London: Spottiswoode & Co., 1896), p. 169.

³⁰Firth, The Narrative . . . , p. 14.

ships; for if they were lost, none of the expedition would return. Certainly the admiral had few weapons to spare anyway. Furthermore, Venables said the admiral would not release the gunsmiths or the ammunition to the army. Ammunition was another problem for the beleaguered Venables, for with a complete lack of foresight Cromwell and his logistics guide, General Desborough, had given the army only a little of the English powder that kept only nine months (some was already ruined by the ocean voyage) while refusing Venables' request for the uncompounded powder which was easier to preserve. Thus the expedition was ill equipped in every manner. Venables, who had to fight to win the objectives of the Design, consequently complained of the lack and inferiority of the weapons. Penn, on the other hand, concerned with the operation of the fleet and the eventual establishment on captured lands, felt that they had arms enough but no tools.³¹ Later, when the Protector reprimanded them for the failure of the expedition, the two generals in their defense contradicted and accused each other on these points.

The only bright feature of the provisioning was the complement of horses provided to the expedition by the Barbadians. Most of Barbados' excellent horses were given to the army despite the need for them in the sugar mills of the island. Consequently the island was left with very few, but eventually in 1656 Cromwell ordered Irish horses sent there to replenish the island's supply.³² Unfortunately, most of the horses given to the army were lost at Hispaniola where they were either

³¹Penn, op. cit., II, 81.

³²William C. Abbott (ed.), The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, Vol. IV: The Protectorate, 1655-1658 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), p. 128.

eaten by the starved troops or left behind in the panic and retreat.

Still another incident occurred at Barbados to completely ruin the morale of the army for its forthcoming trials. The sailors, disgusted with the lack of provisions, filled with doubt, fear, and confusion concerning the expedition, and angered because their pay was far in arrears, talked of going home. The soldiers, fearful of being stranded in the Caribbees, then panicked. Fortunately, Venables was able to stem the tide of panic by extracting a promise from Penn. that the fleet would not leave the army and that if any misfortune occurred, the fleet would wait to transport the soldiers back to England. The fear of being deserted by their only means of escape still haunted the rabble army, however. They always had one eye on the enemy and one on the ships.

After giving the men leave in order to save provisions by having them live on a diet the land afforded, and having the coopers build and fill new water casks, the fleet left Barbados on March 31, 1655. At St. Christopher's (St. Kitts) the fleet picked up recruits gathered from St. Christopher's, Antigua, Montserrat, and Nevis to add to the original army from England and the Barbadian volunteers. Thus, the grand army of the Western Design--composed of the rabble of England and an undisciplined mob of West Indian castoffs, bankrupt colonists, broken cavaliers, foreign adventurers, and men deprived of land in the sugar revolution--sailed for its dismal fate at Santo Domingo, Hispaniola.

IV. THE PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE DESIGN

The commanders decided, while traveling through the Caribbees, to attack Hispaniola. They had opened the orders from Cromwell at the specified time and place and found no particular objective listed, but a general outline that left objectives to their discretion. Other accounts of the Penn-Venables expedition have stated that the orders were very specific, particular, and positive and that they should land at such a place which was plainly enough described to them.¹ There was, however, no evidence of specific orders given to Penn or Venables in any of Cromwell's letters, speeches, or memoirs or in any of the other contemporary accounts. They merely indicated that the Protector gave detailed suggestions concerning the manner of attack. Why the commanders decided to attack Santo Domingo, Hispaniola, is uncertain since that city was no longer a treasure city but an intellectual center, but the decision may have been influenced by Thomas Gage's faulty information and advice. The decision did, however, fill the 7,500 to 10,000 men with confidence and presumption to offset their loss in morale due to the lack of provisions and arms. To the rank and file of the expedition, the taking of Santo Domingo was a problem of inhabiting, not conquering. To the officers it was simply a necessary burden to be disposed of shortly while they waited for more granado-shells and mortar pieces to

¹Edward, Earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England to Which is Added a Historical View of the Affairs of Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1827), VI, 2815.

come so that they could attack the wealthier, more fortified cities.²

After reaching Hispaniola on April 13, 1655, the army disembarked ten leagues west of Santo Domingo on the next day, much to the distress of General Venables who wished to land as close as possible to the city. Why they landed so far from the fortress is uncertain, but the fleet's refusal to enter the Santo Domingo harbor was probably due to Penn's fear of the bad navigation there (the Spanish had sunk two ships at the entrance and Penn was convinced a chain was extended across the remainder of that entrance) and the range of the heavy Spanish cannon. On the other hand, Cromwell may have given "specific suggestions" to land away from the city and its fortress, but nevertheless Venables received all the blame for the distant landing when later critics said that if he had landed at Santo Domingo, the inhabitants would have fled to the woods.³

The army supplied with three days' provisions began the forty-mile march to Santo Domingo with high excitement and expectation of obtaining gold, pieces-of-eight, silver, and all the other riches of plunder because they had landed unopposed. One wonders who they expected to find on an undefended coast forty miles from a mighty fortress whose walls offered the finest protection. Their enthusiasm soon disappeared, however, when orders were issued "that when they should enter into the town ~~they should not plunder any money, plate, or jewels, neither kill~~

²"A Brief and Perfect Journal of the Late Proceedings and Success of the English Army in the West Indies Continued Until June 24, 1655, by an Eyewitness," The Harleian Miscellany, VI (1810), 379.

³Bulstrode Whitelocke, Memorials of the English Affairs From the Beginning of the Reign of Charles the First to the Happy Restoration of King Charles the Second (Oxford: University Press, 1853), IV, 207.

any tame cattle upon pain of death."⁴ Instructions were issued that they were to enter the town (Gage said there would be no opposition), occupy it, and wait for the Lord Protector's ships to come to pick up the booty. Thereupon the outraged soldiers refused to fight if they received no loot, but fortunately the clever Venables was able to convince them of their duty as soldiers by stating that he was certain the Protector would give them some added compensation for all their trials.

Added to the disillusionment of the ruined dreams of quick wealth were the rigors of the march through the torridly hot and heavily wooded area. The three days' provisions soon ran out for it had taken over a full day to just get off the ships. Without adequate food the men fell sick from lack of nourishment and the terrible climate of hot days and cool damp nights. Faced with starvation, bands of soldiers wandered off into the thick woods of the interior to obtain some of the wild cattle that roamed there. In those forests many of the unfortunate Englishmen were killed by machete-wielding wild Negroes, or unwarily ran off cliffs or into bogs, or simply died of fright in their fear of the unknown. Added to the lack of food was the critical water shortage, for the men had not brought their water bottles and the forewarned Spanish had stopped up all the wells in the area. The water situation became so bad that some of the men even attempted drinking their urine.

Another blunder by Thomas Gage added to the army's hunger and thirst to bring on the impending disaster. The Indian and Negro guides who, Gage said, hated the Spanish and would gladly help their English

⁴"A Brief and Perfect Journal of the Late Proceedings and Success of the English Army in the West Indies Continued Until June 24, 1655, by an Eyewitness," The Harleian Miscellany, VI (1810), 379.

saviors instead led them into several ambushes. Then, with the men unnerved by these ambushes, the guides led the English army directly into the fire of the Santo Domingo fortress. There the army found itself without the implements (ladders, battering rams, and other implements used to scale or destroy walls) to attack the walls or forts or the entrenching tools (shovels, picks, axes, and knives) to stage a pitched battle. Everything had been forgotten in England.

The army was further hindered in its attack on Santo Domingo by its lack of knowledge concerning the city's fortifications because the only man who knew the fortress, a man named Cox of St. Kitts who had once been a gunner at the Castle of Santo Domingo, had been killed during the march. Also, the Englishmen refused to handle the only mortar the army had. Thus the assaults on the fortress failed as the Spanish cannon cut the English ranks to pieces. Then the hungry, thirsty, and very frightened army panicked. In the complete rout that ensued, one hero appeared, a Major General Haines (Heane, Hane, or Hanes), who was killed trying to stop his regiment from deserting. This was no orderly retreat but a rout of the worst proportions since about only fifty Spanish lancers and pikemen led by the Count of Penalva pursued the huge English army. Certainly, if the Spanish count would have had more men, the Western Design expedition might have ended on the barren coast of Hispaniola west of Santo Domingo.⁵ At least 2,000 of the English soldiers were lost--either killed by the Spanish; massacred by the wild Negroes, Indians, and mulattoes; or succumbed to disease or lack of food and water.

⁵Arciniegas, op. cit., p. 212.

Meanwhile the fleet had plied along the coast to Santo Domingo. There, except for one small squadron, they were unable to enter the harbor because the Spanish had blocked the entrance. They did notice troops near the fort, so they sent supplies there, but to their dismay they discovered the troops were Spanish. While there they did notice that it would have been an excellent place to land the entire English army. The fleet then returned to the original point of disembarkation where the soldiers were again boarded on the ships on April 27. While resting off the Hispaniola coast, the officers decided against another assault on Santo Domingo. Admiral Penn stated his wish to reattack the city while admonishing Venables for his defeats. Winslow too asked for a third attempt on the fortress, but the army officers and Venables refused on the grounds that the "men would not go; they were so cowardly and could not be trusted or confided in except if raised in their spirits by some smaller success."⁶ Some officers even stated that if they had to attack the fortress again, they would rather do it alone than with the rabble troops. The military junta finally decided that the "smaller success" might be attained at Jamaica. Furthermore, they felt that its capture would soften Cromwell's resentment and indignation at the Hispaniola disaster. During these debates the tension between Penn and Venables was heightened by the army commander's demands that the admiral release the ships' provisions. Venables was then angered when Penn refused, probably because he had little or no supplies to give. Thus, the expedition on May 3, 1655, departed from Hispaniola with heads bowed in humiliation and shame.

⁶Firth, The Narrative . . . , p. 34.

During the voyage to Jamaica, Penn was very pessimistic for he feared another defeat at the hands of the underestimated Spanish.⁷ He stated clearly that he would not trust the army with another attack on any island if he could come near enough with his ships.⁸ Venables, however, grew more confident as the fleet approached Jamaica. He was thankful that "God did not give us Hispaniola," for Jamaica was more salubrious and pleasant and would furnish more provisions and livestock.⁹ Furthermore, he felt the island was weakly defended, yet in the heart of Spanish lands; thus, its capture would gall the Spanish. In the midst of this contrasting optimism and pessimism, and dissension, there occurred another misfortune. Before the expedition reached Jamaica, the capable, courageous Major Winslow, his heart weakened by the strain of defeat and rout, died.

On May 9, 1655, the fleet reached the coastline of its next objective where it was sighted by two fishermen who were turtling off Morant Point. Thus, the alarm was sounded for the inhabitants to flee with their valuables to Oristan, which was six miles from where the fleet was headed, Villa de la Vega. A spirited resistance was senseless for the island was occupied by only 1,500 Spanish and 1,500 subjugated Negroes and Indians.¹⁰ Villa de la Vega, the city in the path of the invading army, had only 200 armed men, no regular soldiers, three small

⁷Penn, op. cit., II, 94.

⁸Ibid., p. 31.

⁹Charles M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), III, 17.

¹⁰For an excellent account of the conditions on Jamaica in 1655 and the subsequent Spanish resistance to the English invasion, see the work by Julian de Castilla previously cited.

breastworks, three mounted guns, and a gravely ill governor, Don Juan Ramirez de Orellana. Meanwhile, the 56 vessels of the English fleet sailed into the excellent deep-water harbor of Caguaya (Kingston Harbor) after failing to approach the nearby coast because of the numerous sand bars. Before disembarking, the troops were told that the officers had strict orders to kill anyone who turned back from the battle. They were told that, if they did not wish to fight, they could stay aboard (and suffer the consequences if the attack was successful); many did.

The landing was accomplished with ease and no casualties. After following the path used by Captain Jackson in 1642 to reach the city, the English took the fortress with no opposition when probably only a handful of well-armed Spanish troopers could have stopped the disheartened English army.¹¹ The Spanish, however, were frightened by the great number of English ships and men; thus, they soon sued for peace. Antonio de Salinas, a resident of Villa de la Vega, went to Governor Orellana to request him to send an emissary to the English to inquire what they wanted. Venables told the governor's emissary, Francisco de Carvajal, that the English had come to plant, not pillage. Furthermore, the English commander requested immediate provisions for his starving soldiers; this the placating Spanish soon accomplished. After these preliminary parleys, further talks were held between Orellana's intermediary and the English commanders. In these talks the Spanish claimed the island by the concession and authority of the Holy Apostolic See while the English replied that the Spanish had conquered it; now the English had conquered it. Thus, it was English by right of conquest;

¹¹Castilla, op. cit., p. 3.

the Pope had nothing to do with it.¹²

After Carvajal delivered the English ultimatum of surrender to Governor Orellana, he was ordered to return to the English camp with two other aides of the governor, Don Francisco de Proenza and Duarte de Aevita, to attempt further negotiations with the invaders. There Carvajal was held as hostage, never again to return to the Spanish. He was denounced as a traitor by the Spanish, for his capitulation or defection had a disastrous effect on the islanders' morale. In the terms Carvajal effected with the English, the invaders demanded that the Spanish bring all of their money, gold, silver, jewels, copper, silverware, slaves, household effects, furniture of the ranches, farms, and mills, arms, munitions, and other merchandise to them. They were allowed to keep only wearing apparel, books, writings, and provisions for the voyage to Cuba if they decided to leave the island. The provisions and clothing were limited to a month's victuals, two shirts, one suit of clothes, and the military officers' uniforms. Furthermore, no priests were allowed to remain on the island.¹³

Finally, on May 17, 1655, Governor Orellana accepted the terms of surrender. He died on September 29 while going to England. A few of Orellana's subjects in the Villa de la Vega area also accepted the surrender terms, but most of the Spanish on Jamaica fled to the interior with all the valuables they could carry. Some of the Spanish who had surrendered later gave accounts that the English sold them to Barbados and St. Kitts planters as slaves for merchandise or silver (100 pesos

¹²Ibid., p. 6.

¹³Ibid., p. 12.

per man) instead of abiding by the treaty terms to allow them to live on Jamaica under English rule or to take them to other islands of the Spanish Indies.¹⁴ Many of the Spaniards who fled to the island's interior remained there as guerrilla soldiers, fighting to cover for those escaping to Cuba and Hispaniola and to drive the English out.

Many of the wealthier Spanish attempted a daring escape to Cuba and Hispaniola in the summer of 1655. To stop the fleeing Spanish, the English high command sent Captain Bullard and a small squadron of vessels to intercept them at a departure point 17 leagues from Villa de la Vega. Another group of English was sent by foot to the north coast to prevent an escape there. Both of the intercepting parties fared badly, however, because of a lack of food and drink. Finally, Bullard, his men starving and unable to find the Spanish, had to return to the main English camp with nothing to show for his venture but a few thin cattle and a "Spanish lady who exceeded any three ladies in England in worth, weight and beauty."¹⁵ Bullard did, however, give a glowing account of the island's fertility and wealth, an account that cheered the desperate English.

Those of the Spanish that did try to escape had a difficult time of it. Many died along the bad roads of disease, hunger, or thirst. Wherever they went they spread the "plague" which they blamed the English for bringing to the Indies.

It was noticeable that from the time the enemy (the English)

¹⁴Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁵"A Brief and Perfect Journal of the Late Proceedings and Success of the English Army in the West Indies Continued Until June 24, 1655, by an Eyewitness," The Harleian Miscellany, VI (1810), 388.

came down upon Caobana ranch, the plague began to afflict him and the people of the island, in the bush, with the contagion of fevers, cold pains and fevers, phrensies and madness, carbuncles, swellings, and almost none escaped dysentery.¹⁶

The escaping Spaniards took the disease elsewhere, as an account of a Cuban outbreak of disease indicates. In Cuba 1,500 of the escaping Jamaicans and the resident Cubans died of the plague and pests.¹⁷

Nevertheless, many Spanish did escape to other islands of the Spanish Indies and there began their lives over again. The English certainly knew of the escapees through their constant patrolling of the coast in the late summer of 1655. In their anxiety to have all the Spanish leave the island, however, they permitted the Spanish to escape, even encouraged them, but none were allowed to escape with goods of any value.

Many of the residents of Oristan and Villa de la Vega had been away at their cattle ranches, sugar plantations, and cacao groves when the English had attacked. Many of these, with a few escapees from the two southern towns and other Spanish from the nearby islands, formed the core of a guerrilla army. First they tried to aid the escape of the Spanish women and children with all transportable goods; then they fought to oust the aggressors. The first plea for outside aid for the guerrilla army had been made by the old governor, Orellana, before he had conceded to the English. He had sent the ensign Don Carlos de Louaiana to Governor Don Pedro de Bayona de Villanueva at Santiago de Cuba and to Count de Montalvo, president of the audiencia at Santo Domingo, to inform them of the English attack and to request help. While the ensign's mission for aid was slowed by the complacent Spanish

¹⁶Castilla, op. cit., p. 19.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 20.

governors, the Spanish at Jamaica fought desperately to halt the invaders. At the Caobana River (it is not certain which river this is today) their stiff resistance held off an English force of 1,600 men. An incident there of the bravery of a slave presented an early lesson in the foolishness of racial and social prejudices and demonstrated the Spanish attitude toward racial and social relations.

This slave, a creole named Diego Pimienta, in these combats showed how greatly does virtue adorn the individual and how diversity of color is no obstacle to nobility of blood and worth.¹⁸

The beleaguered Spaniards, now under the command of Don Cristobal Ysassi Arnaldo after Orellana surrendered to the English and his successor Don Francisco de Proenza became too infirm to discharge his duties, finally received some aid from outside Spanish sources.¹⁹ A tobacco ship of Juan de la Pena enroute from Trinidad to Cartagena learned of the plight of the Spanish Jamaicans and subsequently told the governor and captain-general of Cartagena, Don Pedro Zapata, of the situation. Zapata, one of the more enlightened Spanish governors, quickly ordered the ship of Captain Don Nicolas de Quirona to proceed to Jamaica with supplies in the form of maize, cazabe (probably cassava bread), wine, vinegar, salt, powder, bullets and match, lances, shovels, and machetes.²⁰

Ysassi, during the remainder of 1655, concerned himself with a

¹⁸Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁹Don Cristobal Ysassi's appointment as governor stirred some jealousy and resentment among the Spanish because he was related to the former governor and because his new assistant, Don Cristobal de Leiva Ysassi, was also a relative. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

²⁰Ibid., p. 21.

policy of containment, holding the lands of the interior which the English had not conquered, and with the killing of English stragglers. Once he was given full command of all military operations on Jamaica in January, 1656, by Spanish royal authorities, he began small offensives against the invaders as far as his supplies would allow him. Thus, he fulfilled his orders as best he could; he was directed to hold out on Jamaica as long as possible until the empire could send aid. Subsequently, the over-all planning and supplying of Ysassi's operations were assigned to the Duke of Albuquerque, viceroy of Mexico, a capable and conscientious official who really tried to help Ysassi, but who considered the pirate menace more dangerous than the English on Jamaica. Thus, it seems strange that not even the wisest or most foresighted of the Spanish West Indian officials could see the connection between the pirates and an English Jamaica, the eventual development of a pirate base at strategic Port Royal. Albuquerque's actions were so much more confusing since he did recognize Jamaica's strategic position and growing English strength there. Apparently, he as well as the other responsible royal authorities considered the immediate danger to the huge plate fleet greater than the long-range effects of the loss of Jamaica. A mistake in judgment that helped build the English colonial empire and destroy the Spanish empire.

The viceroy of Mexico did send supplies and men on numerous occasions, but in each instance most of the men and supplies were eventually used for other purposes. The chief instigator of these diversions was the governor of the Santiago de Cuba district of Cuba, Don Pedro de Bayona de Villanueva, who was said to have waged more war on

the Spanish Jamaicans than on the English.²¹ Since Santiago de Cuba was frequently used as an assembly point for troops and supplies before sending them to Jamaica, Villanueva often appropriated them for his own garrisons. Further discontent and rivalry was created between Villanueva and Ysassi which greatly hampered Spanish efforts to retake the island. For example, Ysassi wanted the reinforcements landed on the southern coast of Jamaica where he was carrying on his major military operations, but Villanueva wanted to land them on the north shore which was closer to Cuba, thereby saving some transportation expenses. Furthermore, Ysassi was handicapped by the military officials appointed by the crown and Villanueva. They were usually men he considered not experienced in the type of warfare that was demanded in the island operations against the English.²²

Thus, dissension in the high command, the inferiority and lack of supplies, and periodic mutinies of the rank and file soldiers ruined the only major offensive (1657-1658) the Spanish could muster against the English. Thereafter until 1660, Ysassi continued a minor resistance with about 200 men, but the crown and Spanish authorities in the Indies had practically forgotten about him and his island. The expense and effort to try to regain an island whose immediate material loss was hardly

²¹Ibid.

²²For example, Villanueva appointed the egotistical captain, Juan de los Reyes, sargento mayor, but Ysassi had appointed his nephew to the post. Villanueva, however, demanded that Ysassi stop his nepotism and accept Reyes who was inexperienced in guerrilla warfare. Irene A. Wright, The Spanish Resistance to the English Occupation of Jamaica, 1655-1660, A Report read to the Royal Historical Society on May 8, 1930 ("Transactions of the Royal Historical Society," Series 4, Vol. XIII; London: Butler & Tanner, Ltd., 1930), p. 127.

felt was too much to bear, so thought the Spanish officials. By 1660 Ysassi himself felt the situation was hopeless; he was desperately ill, the Negro auxiliaries were deserting, his own men clamored to flee to Cuba, aid from other Spanish islands had ceased, and rival captains had begun to question his authority. Consequently, at the council of Charreras (Chorreras) on February 22, 1660, the remaining Spanish on Jamaica decided to leave the island. At Cuba the governor, Don Pedro de Morales (Havana district), refused to give Ysassi any more men or supplies and forbade him to return to Jamaica. Eventually, the saddened, frustrated Ysassi traveled to Spain where he became a priest and lived to a very old age.

Henceforth, only a few very small, futile attempts were made to retake Jamaica from the English. The crux of the problem was the disconcern of the Spanish who held authority and responsibility, the crown and the governors in the Indies. From the very first news of the English attack on Jamaica the Spanish displayed an almost absolute lack of concern about the fate of the island. Their only reaction seemed to be one of "thank God that it was not one of the other islands." Even considering that the Spanish had other problems to contend with throughout their empire, all evidence indicates they could have afforded some force to drive the English from Jamaica in the years immediately after 1655, had they so desired. Nevertheless, they chose to disregard the island while giving added protection to the plate fleet; thus they suffered the first of a series of losses among their colonial possessions. Consequently action was taken against the English not because of the Jamaica attack, but because of the attacks on the plate fleets and the treasure

cities of the Main. Orders were issued to seize all goods, ships, and other properties belonging to English subjects. Eventually, open war was declared upon England in all parts of the globe (note the rejection of Cromwell's limited war in the Caribbean). The only mention of Jamaica in the war messages of the crown, however, was that the old governor Orellana had had no authority to surrender the island. To regain the island they did little but appoint the Duke of Alburquerque to supervise the retaking. What was needed was a major offensive backed by the royal armada, a measure that would certainly have been successful then; for the English had had no real strength on the island until about 1660.

Thus the royal armada was needed to oust the English, but the king and his immediate councillors refused to allow the armada under the command of the Marquis de Villa Rubia to attack Jamaica. The crown wanted the armada to continue to guard the plate fleet that was carrying three years' accumulation of gold and silver from the Indies to Spain. Furthermore, there was to be no delaying the fleet; thus, it could not even stop to give the Spanish on Jamaica some aid. Some of the Spanish military officials did try to convince the crown of the growing strength of the English on the island and of their plans to use it as a base from which to attack all the treasure cities of Spanish America. They again insisted that no power in the Indies could oust the English, that only the fleet could accomplish it. In this stand they were backed by the Council of the Indies in Spain.

The Council of the Indies was not reconciled to his majesty's decision not to hamper the armada with "any sort of an engagement with respect to Jamaica."

The Council can not refrain from calling your majesty's royal consideration to the great importance of the island of Jamaica and to the imperative necessity of recovering it, no matter what the effort entailed; for if the English hold Jamaica, in addition to the risk and prime danger which menaces religion, all the neighboring islands are wholly exposed and endangered, as are also the coastal provinces of Tierra Firme and Mexico, matters which must be regarded not as remote future contingencies which will probably never present themselves, but as immediate menaces, from which prudence must anticipate immediate losses and menaces which augment every day that the enemy forces strike deeper root in that island while we leisurely let time pass without applying any remedy. This remedy, through God's mercy, is to be the strength of the armada, and therefore the council with the greatest reverence and efficacy possible, entreats your majesty effectively to order that strength exerted between the ending of this year and the beginning of 1659.²³

All efforts to obtain the use of the armada were in vain, however, for the crown seemed quite willing to give up the island it had held only to prevent others from claiming it. The immediate material loss was small; for Jamaica had lost its position as the granary and ranch of the Indies a hundred years before to the mainland colonies, but the principles lost were vital to Spain's future. Now she had to recognize the existence of other powers in the Indies and that she was on the decline powerwise. Furthermore, no longer could she trade or operate in the Caribbean without huge, heavily armed fleets.

Meanwhile, the English were struggling to hold their positions on Jamaica. The Spanish guerrillas in the interior expected to starve the invaders off the island, a policy that came very close to succeeding. When the English army had disembarked on May 10, 1655, to attack Villa de la Vega, it had taken along two to three days' food allowance. On May 12 Penn sent the soldiers new provisions, but warned them to ration all food because the expedition's supplies were almost exhausted.

²³Ibid., pp. 139-40.

Shortly thereafter the food situation became desperate. Then in violation of their orders, although none were punished for it, many of the officers and common soldiers roamed into the woods to kill for food any cattle, horses, donkeys, cats, dogs, or any other animal they could find. Many sickened and died from spoiled meat and unripe fruits and vegetables. Faced by mutiny of the half-starved soldiers, Venables wrote to Cromwell:

Our wants are great; our difficulties are many; unruly raw soldiers, the major part ignorant; lazy dull officers that have a large portion of pride, but not of wit, valor, or activity; but this must not be made public, though I desire my lord may know it, but no more. . . .²⁴

This attempt by Venables to absolve himself of all the guilt for the comparative failure of the expedition pointed out the poor condition and desperate needs of the expedition's forces. Fortunately, the English were able to sustain themselves until September, 1655, when Cromwell and Parliament established special committees for the handling of Jamaican affairs. Then supplies finally began to come to the English on Jamaica; they came in small amounts, but were at least enough to keep them going. Thus, on September 19, 1655, two ships with orders to speed delivery were dispatched to Jamaica with a cargo of shovels, spades, axes, hoes, other tools, clothing, medicaments, victuals, and ship equipment of masts, rigging, and spars.²⁵ The Lord Protector, moreover, did not forget the religious purposes of the Design, for he also sent a shipment of 2,000 bibles, an inedible supply the starving soldiers did not appreciate. Victuals still remained a much wanted commodity on the island,

²⁴Firth, The Narrative . . . , p. 50.

²⁵Penn, op. cit., II, 583-84.

however; for Cromwell rigorously followed his policy of forcing the expedition's forces to live off the land to cut down expenses and to increase profits. Furthermore, the Protector was strongly influenced by mercantilist policies. Thus, in one of the more ridiculous processes of mercantilist procedure, many goods from New England had to first go to England and then be reshipped to Jamaica while soldiers there were in desperate need of them. Fortunately this handicap to intercolonial trade was soon removed.

While the English soldiers were struggling to hold Jamaica, the principals involved in the Western Design--Cromwell, Penn, and Venables--were arguing over the outcome of the expedition. Admiral Penn, assigning his command of the fleet to Vice-Admiral Goodson, left Jamaica on May 27, 1655, to return to England in order to present "his account" of the expedition to Cromwell. He had ignored Venables' pleas to remain until another fleet came with supplies. Consequently, soon thereafter Venables, too, left Jamaica; for he feared Penn would place all the blame on him for the Hispaniola disaster. The army commander, unlike Penn, had at least a legitimate reason for leaving the island, for the council of war at Jamaica had granted him permission to leave because of his health. The mortification and dejection of failure and the sickness and fatigue contracted from the Hispaniola and Jamaica climate had so weakened him that his doctors felt that he would certainly die if he remained in the tropics. This, coupled with his fear of injury to his wife, persuaded him to leave, which he did after assigning his command to General Fortescue.

Penn's arrival with a fleet of 16 ships on August 31, 1655,

astonished the English government and people, for most of them were still experiencing delusions of grandeur of him loading Spanish gold and silver on his vessels. No less surprised were they by the arrival of General Venables nine days later. Penn, however, went immediately to the Protector to present his long and elaborate apologies, but then he was arrested for returning without orders.²⁶ The warrant for his apprehension and committal was issued for having "returned from there contrary to his trust."²⁷ Venables soon met the same fate as Penn. The same charges were made and the same punishment prescribed, but the sickly general was permitted to serve most of his internment in his closely guarded private quarters to preserve his delicate health. During their short imprisonment the two commanders were called upon several times to present their case before Cromwell and the Council of State. In each instance their statements accusing each other held more weight than their respective defenses.²⁸ This was also true of their later writings concerning the expedition. Apparently their better judgment had been clouded by the bitter animosity created between. Thus, they sought only to reprove each other rather than to consider those who were really at fault such as Cromwell and Desborough. Furthermore, they knew they had made mistakes but that much of the responsibility lay with Cromwell, but then who were they to criticize the Lord Protector of

²⁶Birch, op. cit., IV, 28-30.

²⁷Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1574-1660 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1860), p. 429.

²⁸Edmund Ludlow, Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow With a Collection of Original Papers, And the Case of King Charles the First (London: T. Becket, P. A. De Hondt, T. Cadell, and T. Evans, 1771), p. 210.

England.

The censure and imprisonment of the two commanders was not entirely due to any animosity of Cromwell toward them; for it was also an appeasement measure designed to calm the people who were disturbed by the absolute failure of the Western Design's grandiose schemes. Thus, the Protector had to place the criticism and blame on someone's shoulders other than his own. Consequently the two commanders were punished, but not too severely, which would certainly have caused repercussions in the army and navy. The imprisonment of each, however, was very short. On October 25 Penn was released from the tower "in consideration of his acknowledgment of his fault and of his submission."²⁹ When Venables was released on October 30, a statement was issued that indicated that it was the commanders' imprudence, not ill intent, that had caused the expedition's failure.³⁰ Later, public statements were issued that more closely approached the real reasons for the failure; they attributed it to the decision to attempt the Design at such a great distance rather than to irregularities in carrying it out. Not until much later did the defenders of the two commanders convince the public that the generals had done as well as they could with what was provided them. Then the doubtful public accepted the following defense of Venables that could also be applied in Penn's behalf.

~~He did in my judgment carry himself like a godly, valiant, discreet general, exposing himself to the greatest danger, and sharing with us in our wants, and one that did in his place endeavor the suppressing of sin and the promotion of godliness~~

²⁹Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar . . . Colonial . . . 1574-1660 . . ., p. 429.

³⁰Whitelocke, op. cit., IV, 212.

and one that I conceive would have done it more had he fit instruments for his help in that kind which I conceive was much wanting.³¹

Thus, Penn and Venables were attached with the stigma of defeat; never again were they employed by Cromwell.

The Protector had been harsh to the two commanders also because of his great disappointment in the expedition. News of the expedition's progress had reached England slowly. The first unconfirmed reports demonstrated the overconfidence of all concerned with the Design. They thought that the absence of opposition at the Hispaniola landing point meant that the Spaniards had fled from "English might." Thus Cromwell received false accounts stating that on May 4 the expedition had landed 10,000 men unopposed on Hispaniola and had captured Santo Domingo.³² When the true accounts came, he was both shocked and gravely disappointed.³³ For awhile he brooded alone in his room, bitter over the defeat whose ultimate responsibility lay with him. Then anger overtook him; he was determined to punish the leaders who by their ill behavior and lack of courage had turned his pet project into disaster. This he had to do to save face. Fortunately, new reports confirmed the success at Jamaica, an incident seemingly small in relation to the high aims of the original Western Design but enough of a success to please the English populace. Then Cromwell, who must be regarded as one of the great

³¹Firth, The Narrative . . . , p. 46.

³²Abbott, op. cit., III, 755.

³³Foreign emissaries, however, were pleased. "It is to be hoped that this will check the vast and audacious designs of this state." Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar . . . Venetian . . . 1655-6 . . . , p. 94.

propagandists if only for his explaining of the Hispaniola disaster and exploiting of the Jamaica success, was quick to take the escape offered him. The Hispaniola defeat, he explained, was a punishment by God for their vanity and presumption. Furthermore, he told the people that Jamaica was potentially more valuable than any of the other Spanish islands. Thus, the Protector escaped the stigma of the vanquished.

Through the advice of Thomas Modyford and other West Indian merchants, Cromwell learned of the intrinsic value of Jamaica.³⁴ Consequently he took immediate effective measures to secure the English position there. He ordered Admiral Blake to harass any Spanish vessels in the Mediterranean or eastern Atlantic that might be sent to aid the Spanish in the Indies. The very capable admiral fulfilled his assignment well, thereby giving the English time to establish their position on Jamaica. The Protector also sent Major Sedgwick and Colonel Humphries with a fleet of twelve ships laden with supplies to the new English possession. Thus, he destroyed the international belief that he could be easily driven off the island or that his ardor for conquest had been cooled. The encouraging reports of enormous provisions, the fertility of the soil, the vast quantities of fruit, horses, and oxen, and traces of gold and silver on the island sustained the thrifty Cromwell through the first few years of the Jamaica occupation which consumed much of the naval and financial means at his disposal. Furthermore, these indications of the potential wealth of the island persuaded the ambitious Protector to prosecute the original plans of the Western Design with more

³⁴Modyford sent an account of the Jamaica campaign and an estimate of its worth to Thurloe. Birch, op. cit., III, 565.

vigor than ever. He knew that he had to bear expenses and defer profits for awhile, for to lose Jamaica then would prove a disastrous blow to the international prestige of England. Such a loss, he knew, would destroy the Commonwealth and return the Stuarts to power.

V. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ENGLISH JAMAICA

The initial occupation of Jamaica marked the beginning of a five-year period of military rule for the island. This was a transition period during which an attempt was made to make settlers out of the rabble soldiers. The endeavor failed miserably, however, for the English had enough to do contending with the stubborn Spanish guerrillas. Furthermore, they were hampered by their officers' wish to leave, by disease that ran rampant when the inexperienced "soldier planters" settled on unhealthy tracts, and by the prevalence of hunger after the undisciplined troops had wasted the government stores and slaughtered most of the wild cattle.

Thus, the summer of 1655 was one of extreme trial for the soldiers. The departure of part of the fleet with Penn, deaths from hunger, disease, and the losses in the Maroon and Spanish attacks on unwary English camps had reduced their ranks to about 3,000 men. A few of these were army regulars who attempted their planting assignments, but most were the rabble recruits who did nothing but plunder. Their wanton destruction, uprooting crops and slaughtering cattle, soon created a serious food problem, for the English either could not or would not grow food for themselves nor could they go into the interior in search of food because of Spanish ambushes.¹ Thus, the English starved until the supply ships finally came from England. By the time the ships came they

¹Burns, op. cit., p. 254.

were on rations of three biscuits per man per day.

To the starving men Cromwell sent orders much more quickly than supplies. Major General Richard Fortescue, commander of the forces on the island, received orders to build forts at the strategic harbor at Villa de la Vega (Kingston Harbor), to explore, and to make further conquests on the island with his men and those of Major Robert Sedgwick who were forthcoming. The Protector also gave the army officers more of his instructive suggestions. To counteract a possible Spanish attack, he suggested that they fortify the east coast of the island that was nearest to Cuba because that was where they would most likely attack because of the rich copper mine there.²

Meanwhile, the fleet was faring much better than the army, for it could forage about easier. Its first assignment had been to patrol the Jamaican coast to prevent the escape of the Spanish with their valuables and to cut the communication between Spanish guerrillas on the island and Spanish forces at Cuba and Hispaniola. Credit must be given to Goodson and his men for their effective accomplishment of this assignment. Spanish governors in the Indies admitted to their crown that they could not retake Jamaica unless they received the aid of the royal armada to counteract Goodson's vessels. Unfortunately, the lack of supplies prevented the enthusiastic Goodson from carrying out the expansion aims of the Design. As with the army, Cromwell again issued countless orders to the navy instead of sending the spars, sailcloth, rigging, provisions, and additional sailors it needed. However, the Protector's treasury was already depleted. Consequently the inadequately supplied

²Abbott, op. cit., III, 858.

vice-admiral was ordered to seize all Spanish vessels, supply the army at Jamaica, and aid Fortescue in any undertaking he attempts.

The numerous promises and orders of Cromwell finally assumed some substance after he promised Goodson that Jamaican waters would house at least twenty English ships. He ordered seven warships there immediately and directed the West Indian merchants to ship supplies to the island. Goodson, however, was impatient; he set out to obtain the much needed supplies, to fulfill Cromwell's expansion dreams, and to obtain plunder to replenish the English treasury. From July to December, 1655, he patrolled the coast of the Spanish Main between Cartagena and Porto Bello waiting for the appearance of the plate fleet. In October he sacked Santa Marta, but the booty obtained hardly paid for the powder and shot expended. Then, to Goodson's dismay, the great plate fleet escaped him. In the subsequent years the undaunted Goodson and hundreds of daring ship captains like him continued to raid the Main. Of these later attacks by the royal navy out of its Jamaica base, the most rewarding were those on Rio de la Hacha in 1656 and on Tolu in 1658.³

Probably the most important of these in terms of long-range effects were those by the English royal navy in conjunction with the Caribbean pirates on the Mosquito coast of Central America (the coasts of Honduras and Nicaragua). There the invaders became the allies of the Zambos (a cross of Negro males and Indian girls), a strong, active, lawless people who hated the Spanish. Together the allies ravaged the cacao plantations of Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In addition

³For accounts of the Goodson raids, see the Thurloe papers. Birch, op. cit., IV, 159-60, and V, 96.

to the plunder they obtained, they also cut and exported dyewoods and mahogany. To Spanish protests concerning these acts of aggression, the English authorities did nothing but reply that they were due to ambiguous orders.

One of Goodson's busiest captains was Christopher Myngs (Minns) who had served with renown in the vice-admiral's raid on Rio de la Hacha.⁴ Constantly thereafter he attacked Dutch and Spanish ships and raided Spanish cities. In 1659 he staged one of his more illustrious campaigns, the sacking of Campeche, Coro, Cumana, and Puerto Cabello on the Main with a force of four ships and 300 men. His capture and plunder of Santiago de Cuba in 1662, however, was his greatest endeavor. He had been sent by Lord Windsor, then governor of Jamaica, to punish the Spanish for their refusal to trade with the English and for their aid to the guerrillas on Jamaica. Myngs' expedition of eleven ships (mostly privateers from Port Royal) and 13,000 men demolished the Santiago de Cuba fortress and looted the city of all its wealth.⁵ After this success Myngs, no less a pirate than Henry Morgan but having governmental sanction, was rewarded with a seat on Jamaica's council.

All of these expeditions, in a sense piratical themselves, gave sanction and encouragement to the rise of Jamaica as a pirate base. The military governor, Edward Doyley, was probably the first to suggest the island as a haven for the pirates. He invited them to Jamaica to help him hunt down Negroes and Spanish in the interior, to calm his soldiers

⁴For an account of Myngs' daring capture of Santiago, see Firth's article. Charles H. Firth, "The Capture of Santiago by Captain Myngs, 1662," The English Historical Review, XIV (July, 1899), 536-40.

⁵Ibid., pp. 538-40.

and the civilians, and to stop any revolts against his rule. These buccaneer volunteers were rewarded in cash and in letters of marque, but soon Doyley and other English officials became concerned with the intensity of pirate activities on the island. Thus, they then opposed the frequent raids as weakening the struggling colony by their detracting influence on agriculture and commerce that would make the island a permanent settlement. Nevertheless, piracy continued and soon became a highly reputable and profitable profession; for it contributed much to the growth of Jamaica. Consequently, Jamaican officials followed the Cromwellian policy of granting any favor, immunity, or protection to promote the welfare of the island.⁶ Thus, no hindrance was placed on any ship, sailor, or adventurer that sought refuge there.

Meanwhile, the English on Jamaica received their first substantial aid with the arrival of Major General Robert Sedgwick in the autumn of 1655. There the new general found Fortescue (the military leader since Venables had left) dying, the troops undisciplined and starving, and the commissioners gone. To establish some order in this utter chaos, he appointed a military council to elect a governor, or president, to aid him in ruling the island. The council selected the sickly Fortescue, but he soon died and was replaced by Sedgwick. He ruled the island until his death in May, 1656, whereupon Colonel William Brayne succeeded him. Sedgwick while in command had vigorously opposed the piratical raids on the Main. He considered them unprofitable and harmful since they made the English appear bloody and cruel to the Indians and Negroes and hindered the island's development by detracting from the planting and

⁶Abbott, op. cit., III, 816.

settling of the island. During his short term of office he also did much to achieve Cromwell's aims for the island. He fortified and settled the St. Jago area and helped establish it as a base for the fleet, thereby making Jamaica secure from attack. In response to the Protector's requests he also provisioned the fleet.

. . . and you shall use your endeavors from time to time to provide the fleet with flesh and other necessaries as may be had from the island of Jamaica.⁷

Sedgwick's successor, Brayne, had little time to rule either, for the veteran of General Monck's campaigns in Scotland also fell victim to disease in September, 1656. The next in line was Colonel Edward Doyley, a soldier of experience and resolution who was well liked by his men and seemed immune to disease, characteristics he well needed to rule the chaotic, disease-ridden island.⁸ Doyley, after having the council elect him governor and requesting Cromwell's confirmation of the election because no officer of rank survived, began his stern rule of the island.⁹ His years of governing were quite productive and it is to his credit that Jamaica survived as an English colony in those early trying years.

Doyley's most difficult problems were those of obtaining supplies, maintaining the English position there, beginning the plantations,

⁷ Ibid.; pp. 55-57.

⁸ Doyley did fall sick once, however, according to a letter of Robert Sedgwick to Cromwell. Birch, op. cit., IV, 153.

⁹ Doyley's actions are confusing. First he wanted the command; then he recommended someone else. Cromwell also suspected him of being a royalist. Abbott, op. cit., IV, 623, and Birch, op. cit., V, 138.

and building forts and houses.¹⁰ The clever governor practically forced Cromwell and Parliament to send him the aid he so desperately needed by continually sending them reports of impending Spanish invasions of the island; for he knew they meant to keep the island and would do anything to prevent its recapture by the Spanish. Nevertheless, the years 1656-1657 were difficult ones for the English Jamaicans. When he did receive supplies after warning of Spanish attacks and stating the prevalence of sickness and death and the colonists' threats to leave the island because the mother country had deserted them, Doyley again had to complain to Cromwell. He told the Protector that shoes and pay for the soldiers might help the island's progress more than the bibles and liquor that were sent. By the end of 1657, however, supplies were beginning to come with some regularity, but they were to remain a problem until Jamaica's economy was firmly established in the next decade. Reasons for the slowness and deficiency in provisioning were aptly described in an early statement by Cromwell: "I realize many provisions lost because not stored in right places, embezzled or squandered through negligence."¹¹ Thus, corruption among supply officers, unfit transport ships, and lack of knowledge about proper storing caused the loss of many supplies. In addition, Cromwell still wished to have the men live off the land so that he had to send less supplies and thereby have a greater profit from the island.

Another of Doyley's major problems was the frequent raids by

¹⁰The English on Jamaica at first had difficulty building houses and forts because all the masons and carpenters brought from England and Barbados had died. Abbott, op. cit., IV, 311.

¹¹Ibid., p. 193.

Maroons and Spanish on the English towns, plantations, and foraging parties. These raids were part of the Spanish resistance movement to drive the English out, which has been previously discussed. The failure of these attempts to oust the English from the island is largely due to Doyley's military ability. His effective intelligence system warned him of impending Spanish landings on the north coast before they had time to join the guerrillas and attack the English. Probably his greatest victory was that at Charreras in 1657. After learning of the landing of Spanish reinforcements on the north coast, he sent Major Stevens with a regiment of troops to St. Anne where the English captured the stored arms and ammunition of the Spanish. Meanwhile he had sent another group of a few hundred men on a small man-of-war to the north coast where they attacked Charreras, which the Spanish had made their magazine and headquarters. The campaign was thus a great victory for the English, for they had killed many Spanish and had captured all their arms and ammunition. Furthermore, it had smashed the last great Spanish offensive to retake the island and had given English morale a substantial boost. Consequently, Doyley was able to more effectively discipline and organize his troops and the civilians on Jamaica. In addition, he had removed the major aid on Jamaica available to the Spanish, the Maroons, by persuading them to desert the "hopeless" Spanish cause, although in later years the Maroons on their own would continue to plague the English. Finally, to prove his victory, Doyley sent Colonel Barry with some Spanish captives and the King of Spain's standard to Cromwell, but by the time Barry reached London the Protector was dead. Thus, the Western Design's greatest advocate had never heard any good news of Jamaica, the

Design's single accomplishment, nor had he heard of the victory that had removed the stain of defeat from English forces in the West Indies.

Hardships, diseases, lack of supplies, and the dangers of Maroon and Spanish raids made the populating of Jamaica a difficult problem for Cromwell and his commissioners for the island. They had thought the populating would be easy; thus, before the expedition had begun in 1654, Cromwell contacted the New England governors about sending people to Caribbean lands which the English intended to seize.

. . . he might possibly remove them to a place where they should have towns, habitations, lands, staple commodities, etcetera. It is conceived of Hyspaniola or Mexico. A great fleet is being sent thitherward and its thought that it was to drive out the Spaniard, which if it be effected there may be room enough for all New England people and many more.¹²

Thus, two of the manyfold purposes of Cromwell's Western Design were revealed. He wanted to populate his newly conquered colonies while easing the economic distress of his older colonies. The misinformed Protector, believing New England was barren, unhealthy, and unproductive, thought that New Englanders would rush to colonize his new Caribbean possessions. To fill the void their emigration would create, he expected to send Irish Tories and other English malignants. The depression in New England, however, began to fade before Cromwell's agents could convince the people to go to Jamaica. Furthermore, the wary New Englanders, particularly those of the New Haven colony, sent agents to investigate the situation on Jamaica.¹³ After hearing the gloomy reports of the agents,

¹²Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society ("Connecticut Historical Society Publications," Vol. III; Hartford: Case, Brainard, and Lockwood Co., 1895), pp. 318-19.

¹³Birch, op. cit., V, 6-7, and VI, 362.

they refused to go the Caribbean regardless of the concessions Cromwell offered them.¹⁴

Cromwell, still optimistic that Puritans throughout the empire would swarm to Jamaica, promised the governors on the island thousands of settlers. His agent for recruiting settlers from New England, Daniel Gookin, knew otherwise, however. Gookin had very little success as he was continually confronted by the weak excuses of those who dreaded going to the island. The usual words were that "God was not calling them."¹⁵ After securing only 400 persons from the four colonies, he was finally recalled to England in July, 1656.

While attempting to persuade the New Englanders to emigrate to Jamaica, Cromwell was also trying to have the troublesome Scots go there. Some soldiers did agree to go, but they were a bad lot; for most of them became casualties before leaving for Jamaica when they rioted at the port. Forty were killed and eighty injured there. Henceforth, the Council of Scotland tried in vain to fulfill the Protector's orders to secure emigrants for the new English possession. Finally in desperation to populate Jamaica, Cromwell issued orders to the sheriffs to gather all masterless vagabonds, robbers, poor, and orphans and to turn them

¹⁴The concessions were quite liberal, but granted to Protestants only. At various times the government offered: 20 acres of land to every male above 12 years of age; 10 acres for every male or female added to the male; 7 years' liberty to hunt horses and cattle; no rent for 7 years, then a penny per acre; free exploitation of the mines (except gold and silver) except one-fifth of pearls and precious stones and one-tenth of metals to be set aside for the crown; English citizenship; and customs free for 3 years. Abbott, *op. cit.*, III, 853.

¹⁵Charles J. Hoadley (ed.), Records of the Colony or Jurisdiction of New Haven, From May, 1653, to the Union, Together with the New Haven Code of 1656 (Hartford: Case, Lockwood & Co., 1858), p. 180.

over to the army for shipment to Jamaica. As early as 1654 he had had Parliament draft a bill to transport vagrants to the colonies; now he had it in law and used it extensively to populate Jamaica. In subsequent years circular letters were sent to majors, generals, and commissioners of the counties with orders to apprehend lewd and dangerous persons, rogues, vagrants, and those who had no way of livelihood and to transport them to the plantations. Furthermore, justices of the peace were to tell the Privy Council the names of rogues, vagabonds, idle and disorderly persons, and beggars who they thought fit for transportation to the plantations as indentured servants.¹⁶ Thus, no common Englishman was legally safe from being "shanghaied."

Thus again one of the objectives of the Western Design was fulfilled. England was cleared of this "pollution," the rabble, to make room for the "good people" to live.¹⁷ Consequently, religious dissenters were also included in Cromwell's concept of rabble; hence he ordered vagabonds and light women, which included (by his principles) Catholic priests and Catholic boys and girls, to be sent to Jamaica.¹⁸ From this method of populating Jamaica stemmed one of the most horrid of emigration schemes. Soldiers were ordered to gather 1,000 Irish boys and girls, seize them from their parents, and ship them to Jamaica as slaves. Fortunately, the project collapsed and only a few of the youngsters were sent, but those met the terrible fate of the "Black

¹⁶Leo F. Stock (ed.), Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North America, Vol. I: 1542-1668 (Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1924), p. 293.

¹⁷Arciniegas, op. cit., p. 214.

¹⁸Ibid.

Irish."¹⁹

Convicts and those judged incorrigible were also included among those rabble to be exiled to Jamaica. Convicts, however, were not shipped in great numbers until after the Restoration, when merchant favorites of the king petitioned for a grant allowing them to take sentenced criminals to Jamaica as indentured servants. Thus, in 1661, a company of London merchants headed by Jeremy Borne1 asked the crown if it could have some criminals for laborers on their Jamaica plantations. After some delay, permission was granted to take 73 from Newgate for a servitude of ten years (later fixed at seven years).

. . . Proviso tamen ac est mens et intentio harum nostrarum patentium Pardonacionis quod ipsi praedicti Edwardus Beckford . . . ac eorum quilibet et earum quelibet per Thomas Middleton Alexm Howe Jeremia Bonell et Edwardum Barnard de London mercatores et alios de societate sua indilate transportentur extra hoc Regnum Anglie trans mare ad insulam nostram de Jamaica.²⁰

The practice of transporting criminals to Jamaica soon faded, however, when by the late seventeenth century the planters and merchants of the island began to turn down the convicts in favor of honest, hard-working people.

Among the incorrigibles sent to Jamaica were many women since no self-respecting Puritan lady would go to the island that housed so many.

¹⁹The importation of thousands of Negro slaves brought about the Negroization of many of the indentured servants. Among these were the white Irish who were sent there. They retained their customs, but became the "Black Irish." A. Grenfell Price, White Settlers in the Tropics ("American Geographical Society Publications: Special Publications," No. 23; New York: Lord Baltimore Press, 1939), p. 27.

²⁰Abbot E. Smith, "The Transportation of Convicts to the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century," American Historical Review, XXXIX (January, 1934), 239.

dens of iniquity. Consequently, Cromwell and subsequent commissioners handling the affairs of Jamaica had to obtain women of weak virtue to go there to help establish the colony. Soldiers were ordered to search the London streets for loose women and to visit the brothels and other places of entertainment to seize the women and force them aboard ships destined for Jamaica. One observer remarked, "Heard they took up many loose wenches at London to send over to Jamaica."²¹ Governmental excuses for these kidnappings were that the women were needed to nurse the sick. Probably these were the only methods of securing any females for the island since none of England's finer bred ladies would go there after hearing of the plight of the widows of soldiers there. With conditions so deplorable on the island many of them sold themselves into temporary servitude on other islands or on the continent rather than remain on Jamaica.

Many of these lesser Englishmen thought their fates would be bettered on the island, but those who came during the first ten years, 1655-1665, had their hopes dashed.

The eleven ships lately arrived to this place with 800 men I pittie them at the heart, all their imaginary mountaines of gold are turned into dross, and their reason and affection are ready to bid them saile home again already.

Never did my eyes see such a sickly time, nor soe many funerals, and graves all the towne over that it is a very Golgotha.²²

The prevalence of dysentery and fevers and the complete lack of sanitary precautions gave Jamaica a reputation for unhealthiness,

²¹E. Hockliffe (ed.), The Diary of the Reverend Ralph Josselin, 1616-1683 ("Camden Society Publications," Series 3, Vol. XV; London: Royal Historical Society, 1908), p. 114.

²²Firth, The Narrative . . . , pp. 141-42.

sickness, and death. Consequently, people of good quality would not voluntarily emigrate there. Thus, emigrants of any worth were usually religious or political refugees--Cavaliers, Roundheads, Irish Catholics, Quakers, and other dissenters. Many Jews were also sent to the new English possession where they never were really accepted by the populace there either. Restrictions upon their lives were rigid and numerous, among which were their restriction from employment in public offices, limitation of voting franchise, and special taxes.²³ Also persecuted on Jamaica were the Quaker exiles whose first appearance on the island in 1657 worried Governor Doyley, who feared that disturbances would be created by the circulation of Quaker propaganda literature.

The only groups to come to Jamaica in substantial numbers and with some degree of willingness were those from the other British West Indies where the sugar revolution had deprived them of their lands. The introduction of the sugar industry necessitated vast plantations and tremendous capital; consequently, the small landowner had to give way to the large-scale operators (comparable to the latifundiae of ancient Rome). Then the dispossessed, small landowners wandered about the Caribbees, joined the pirates, emigrated to the American continent, and after 1655 went to Jamaica. For example, in January, 1656, Governor Stokes wrote Cromwell that 1,600 poor of Nevis had gone to Jamaica.²⁴

These and other West Indian emigrants to Jamaica like them were

²³Fernando Henriques, Jamaica, Land of Wood and Water (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1957), p. 24.

²⁴Of the 1,600 colonists from Nevis, two-thirds of them died of disease at Jamaica. Among the casualties were Governor Stokes and his wife. Birch, op. cit., VI, 110.

experienced planters, acclimated to tropic weather, hardened to resist diseases; thus, they formed the foundation of the new colony. Their making a home of Jamaica gave the island colony permanency, something piracy had not offered. They came to the island usually of their own accord, determined to forge a new life for themselves, but they were exactly what the struggling colony needed. Ironically, these West Indian emigrants to Jamaica--the panacea for all the island's ills--were not at first accepted there, for to the Protector they were worse than the rabble he was sending.

While the Protector and then the king were trying to populate Jamaica, pirate activities were gaining full impetus about the island. Attempts to curb the pirates were again begun after the Restoration when Charles II began his appeasement policy toward Spain. He and his first governors of Jamaica, Lord Windsor and Thomas Modyford, endeavored to establish a legal Spanish trade to make the island an emporium of trade, warehouse of goods, and training ground for slaves destined for the Main. Their means of achieving these aims were to offer Spain peace in return for free trade with the Spanish colonies. Thus, a temporary ban was placed on privateering activities. The Port Royal buccaneers, however, simply operated out of their old haunts at Tortuga while continuing the raids upon the Spanish, et al. Consequently, the English were unable to convince the Spanish of their friendliness or of their ability to control the privateers. As a result, free trade was not granted and the privateering began again at full scale at Port Royal. Henceforth, Jamaica carried on its own private war with the Spanish (and with the Dutch who tried to compete for the Caribbean trade), with the buccaneers

as its striking force and the militia as its land defense. For the English on Jamaica this policy provided a cheap defense and an enormous profit.

The pirates who moved to Jamaica after its conquest by Penn and Venables in 1655 were mostly refugees from the pirate isle of Tortuga. That tiny island's pirates from all nations had been the scourge of the Spanish, particularly during the French buccaneer Le Vasseur's rule of the island. After his death by assassination in 1653, the island's defenses weakened under the rule of the French-appointed leader Chevalier de Fontenay. Consequently, in 1654 the Spanish were able to drive the pirates off Tortuga, but then they had to leave the island to go to the aid of their beleaguered comrades on Jamaica during the Penn-Venables attack of 1655. After their capture of Jamaica, the English took possession of the unoccupied Tortuga and named Elias Watts, a pirate, governor. Thus, the English and French pirates, plus those of other nationalities, returned to their old sanctuary. Distress soon rose again, however, when the French sent Jeremie Deschamps Sieur de Moussac et du Rausset, a pirate of renown, to Tortuga as its governor. He had, in addition to the French commission, another from the Commonwealth government of England in another of the inexplicable actions of the Lord Protector and his council. Certainly, this allowing the French to control an island they, the English, had seized was contrary to all principles of the Western Design. Nevertheless, Watts, the Jamaica-appointed governor of Tortuga, was forced off the island by Deschamps. He and his cohorts then decided to seek refuge at Port Royal now that the English had secured Jamaica permanently from the Spanish. However,

they remained in close contact with their counterparts on Tortuga through the Caribbean regional pirate organization and government known as the Brethren of the Coast.

If ever a city was deigned to be a pirate base it was Port Royal. From its fabulous deep-water harbor at easily defended Jamaica, the buccaneers had easy access to the Yucatan Channel, that narrow passage through which all Spanish treasure-laden galleons passed. Furthermore, it was within striking distance of the treasure cities of the Spanish Main. Once within the harbor of Port Royal a ship and its crew were safe, for no one would dare disturb its evil security, not even the pirates themselves; for Port Royal was known as the sanctuary of every outlawed man, woman, and ship of the world. Thus, this pirate Babylon became the wickedest and richest city of its day. Simultaneously it had grandeur and sordidness as fabulous treasures were brought to its cathedrals, stores, homes, and offices by hands stained with the blood of innocent merchants. Gold was cheap, but not nearly as cheap as life in the city where death lurked in every corner fulfilling the pirate ode: a short life, but a merry one.

All kinds of people came to Port Royal, the City of Gold. Most common were the bearded seamen, bronzed and weather-stained, and decked with priceless jewelry and the finest silks of the Orient. Even the lowliest cabin boy wore earrings of gold and precious gems. To entertain these pleasure-seeking men and to take some of their wealth came a wide variety of the world's rabble, for Port Royal was reputed to provide any pleasure, any vice.

It affords or can afford whatsoever or most things affected by

man either for pleasure or profit.²⁵

Tavern-keepers were numerous and wealthy, for the city was noted for having a tavern for every two men. There the buccaneers would drink, swear, brawl, and indulge in other unmentionable pleasures while gambling with heavy gold coins of all sizes, shapes, and nations (usually Spanish pieces-of-eight) and with the gems of cathedrals. They were known to spend 2,000-3,000 pieces-of-eight a night. Thus the pirates who came to Port Royal burdened with wealth lost it quickly to dice, rum, and the doxies of the port. The prostitutes, who came from all corners of the earth to entertain the pirates, were the elite of their profession. They could return home wealthy if they were durable enough to accept the love-making of the buccaneers. Needless to say, with all the loose living in Port Royal, venereal diseases ran rampant there and took a heavy toll of lives. This then was seventeenth-century Port Royal, Jamaica's pirate sanctuary. Before the century ended, much of it was destroyed by fire and earthquake.²⁶

English civilians on Jamaica, meanwhile, complained of the pirates. They stated that the freebooters ruined trade, held back the progress of the island, frightened good people away, and generally contributed to the detriment of the island. What they did not consider, however, was that the buccaneers had built and defended Jamaica when Cromwell and the English kings were either unable or unwilling to

²⁵W. Robert Moore, "Jamaica, Hub of the Caribbean," The National Geographic Magazine, CV (March, 1954), 334.

²⁶For an excellent illustrated account of seventeenth-century Port Royal, see Marion C. Link, "Exploring the Drowned City of Port Royal," The National Geographic Magazine, CXVII (February, 1960), 151-83.

contribute very much to the welfare of the island. Their argument for free trade with the Spanish was ridiculous at the time, for the Spanish king was not about to grant trading rights in his Caribbean realm to anyone. The buccaneers, operating under the Elizabethan-Cromwell policy of privateering, although morally wrong, did bring wealth and prosperity to Jamaica. They did so first by bringing their booty and plunder to the island; then by smuggling goods and slaves to and from the Spanish Main. Eventually the Spanish were forced to concede trade rights to the English. The pirates who had helped bring about that concession certainly did not immediately end their raids. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, piracy began to fade as legitimate free trade with the Spanish increased and became more lucrative.

Thus, the buccaneers had contributed tremendously to the commercial and industrial growth of Jamaica. Shipbuilding and ship repair yards appeared all over the island's coastline. Victualling and supplying their ships necessitated hundreds of shops and warehouses. Then the wealth the pirates brought to the island and spent there stimulated trade and agriculture, thereby preparing the way for Jamaica's development as an emporium of trade within the British Empire.

The rich planters found the pirates to their advantage in supplying them with slave labor. Some of the more ruthless freebooters brought living booty to Jamaica in the form of Spaniards, English, Orientals, Negroes, and others they could capture. The unfortunate captives were then sold to the sugar plantation owners as indentured servants or as slaves. On the other hand, the Jamaica planters and merchants were sometimes displeased by the more humanitarian buccaneers who

would seize an English ship, free the indentured servants aboard, and leave them at Montego Bay, Jamaica, where they would be safe. Nevertheless, the planters were never satisfied. They finally began to complain that the pirates were driving away the good white population and keeping others from emigrating to the island. They said the island would soon become a "black island," but, of course, they did not consider that they were the chief cause of the Negroization of Jamaica through their constant importation of thousands of Negro slaves for their sugar, cacao, and ginger plantations.

In the final analysis, the credit for defending Jamaica against the Spanish and for establishing the island's initial prosperity must be given to the privateering forces. Cromwell's, and later the crown's, inability or unwillingness to provide adequate protection to the island during the first years of the English occupation could have led to its recapture by the Spanish. The English on Jamaica, however, saw the value of the pirates and were willing to allow the privateering until a sound colony and a stable economy were evolved. Meanwhile they would enjoy the inexpensive defense and prosperity the buccaneers afforded the island. The decline in morals they felt they could bear as long as profits continued to rise. Thus the 2,000 pirates and 14-15 heavily armed privateer vessels that operated out of Port-Royal contributed much to Jamaica. They even contributed to the development of colonial governmental machinery. Consequently the admiralty court came to full life as an administrative unit when naval officials had to handle the booty that was brought to Jamaica by the buccaneers who were listed as privateers. Thus, by 1664, the admiralty court system was firmly

established.²⁷

²⁷Helen Crump presents an informative account of the development of the admiralty system and of Jamaica's contribution to it. Helen J. Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction in the Seventeenth Century (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1931).

VI. THE BEGINNING OF THE CROWN COLONY

Cromwell had almost immediately after the conquest of Jamaica turned the management of its affairs over to a commission of select government officials and London merchants. Among these men who were to handle not only the affairs of Jamaica but of all the West Indies were Thomas Povey, Tobias Bridges, Stephen Winthrop, Richard Sydenham, and Martin Noells.¹ With these men began the tightening of England's hold on her colonies. Through their efforts Jamaica was saved for England, thereby making the island the first colony founded and established by governmental means. Their chief problem, however, had been to convince Charles II to keep the island his adversary, Cromwell, had stolen from his Spanish friends.

The Spanish expected Jamaica to be returned to them after the Restoration since it had been stolen from them by rebels who fought against the English royal government, which the Spanish king had formally befriended. Charles may even have promised the return of the island when he bargained for Spanish aid during his exile. Thus, for the first few years after the Restoration, the status of Jamaica was in question. There was still an Anglo-Spanish war being waged although no military or naval operations were taking place because of the lack of

¹Martin Noells replaced R. Bowes who was originally appointed to the committee. Noells, a wealthy merchant, made a fortune supplying the new colony. For his efforts the government gave him a grant of 20,000 acres of land on Jamaica. Andrews, op. cit., III, 38.

funds on both sides. Finally, with the shortage of funds and the friendliness between the two monarchs, peace was restored in May, 1660, but the Spanish and English in the West Indies did not recognize the peace treaty. Consequently fighting continued in the Caribbean. Charles, frankly, did not know what to do with Jamaica then. Indications are that his Privy Council never considered giving it up, but he apparently tired of the issue eventually and considered returning it to the Spaniards.² Foreign officials felt the English king was pressuring Parliament to cede Jamaica to Spain because it was acquired by usurpation and an act of tyranny. They were convinced of his good intentions toward the Spanish crown because they believed the maintenance of Jamaica was too costly and of no advantage to the English. Charles, however, never had much of an opportunity to press for the island's return; for the planters and merchants, covetous of the treasures they knew Jamaica could afford, would not let him give it up.

The closest Spain may have come to regaining her lost Caribbean island was probably during the negotiations for the proposed marriage between Charles II and the Spanish Infanta. The arrangements had Charles marrying the Infanta with her dowry of 500,000 crowns in return for which Charles would cede Jamaica to the Spanish.³ The negotiations were in vain, however, for Charles accepted a more lucrative marriage offer from Portugal. The Portuguese, seeking an ally against Spain,

²Edward R. Turner, The Cabinet Council of England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Vol. I: 1622-1784 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930), p. 64.

³Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice and in Other Libraries of Northern Italy, XXXII (1659-1661), 281.

gave him Catharine of Braganza, 800,000, the Bombay trading center, and the Tangiers naval station. Thus, Jamaica remained occupied by the English but was still not legally recognized as a possession of the English crown.

Charles, not wishing to offend anyone, continued to vacillate in his Jamaica policy. Consequently, Parliament took it upon itself to act on the disputed island. Here again, however, foreign observers felt that Parliament would take no action on Jamaica in order not to "tie the king's hands on the issue."⁴ Foreign opinion still held that maintaining the island would be useless and too expensive for the English. Furthermore, the European diplomats considered the Jamaican situation and climate totally unsuitable to Englishmen. Finally they added that Parliament would not keep the island because it would serve as a pretext for future wars since it was not a conquest but a usurpation of Cromwell.⁵ However, contrary to all reports, there were a substantial number of English planters and merchants who intended to keep Jamaica at any cost.⁶ Proof of their intent could be seen in the vast amounts of troops, settlers, food, and supplies they sent to Jamaica while negotiations with the Spanish were continued.

As early as December 7, 1660, a bill was introduced to Parliament for the annexation of Jamaica to the English crown. The House of

⁴Ibid., p. 200.

⁵Ibid., p. 212.

⁶Samuel Pepys was one of the few who disagreed with this. He felt the merchants feared another Spanish war if the island was retained. Thus, he thought most wanted to return the island. Henry B. Wheatley (ed.), The Diary of Samuel Pepys (New York: George Bell and Sons, 1893), II, 246.

Commons, dominated by mercantile interests, quickly passed the bill, but it was held up in the House of Lords because of the machinations of the Spanish ambassador and because of Charles' fear of a renewal of the Spanish war. By December 21, 1661, however, the bill passed through both houses of Parliament. Upon the passage of the bill, Speaker of the House of Lords Sir Edward Turner commented on the annexation of Jamaica:

The honorable accessions of Dunkirk, Tangiers, and Jamaica do at present require a great supply; but, we have reason to believe, in time to come, will repay this nation their principal with good interest.⁷

Charles, however, continued his passive attitude toward the actions on Jamaica. His noninterference with Parliament's annexation bill was largely due to the efforts of Richard Povey, the merchant friend of Martin Noells (Noel), who convinced the king of the potentialities of the island. The Spanish, however, did not recognize English sovereignty over Jamaica until the Treaty of Madrid in 1670. Nevertheless, they still held the Caribbean as "mare clausum," not free to foreign trade except with express Spanish approval. Furthermore, in the treaty they reiterated their claims to all lands in the Indies on the basis of first discovery and rejected the English theory of effective occupation as a basis for validity in land titles. The loss of Jamaica, however, had changed all colonial theories. Now, might made right.

Meanwhile, on Jamaica the Restoration had brought many political changes. Edward Doyley was retained as governor (commissioned February 13, 1661), but was ordered to erect courts of justice, control the army, and to create and take the advice of a council of twelve elected

⁷Stock, op. cit., I, 293.

from the inhabitants of the island. The governor and council were then to handle all the social, economic, and political affairs of the island, end the martial law, fortify the island, and set aside land for the royal demesne. The governor then had full powers to do anything for the colony's security as long as his actions were not repugnant to the laws of England. Henceforth, through his tenure as governor Doyley fulfilled these obligations with his usual determination and efficiency. Most important of his actions was certainly the creation of the council of twelve although it did become more of an appointive body than an elective one, but it was a step toward allowing the colonies some self-government.

After a seven-year stay on Jamaica, Doyley, however, was tired and longed for return to his homeland. As a result, he resigned the governorship in 1662 and was replaced by the pleasure- and comfort-loving Lord Windsor. Certainly Jamaica, which needed a hard-working, determined administrator, was no place for the foppish English nobleman. During Windsor's short administration some accomplishments were made, largely through the efforts of the council which grew in power through the governor's complacent attitude. His major achievements were the permanent ending of martial law, the extension of English control over the nearby islands such as the Cayman Islands and Goat Island and Pidgeon Island, the formation of municipal governments, the appointments of sheriffs and justices, division of the island into seven administrative parishes, and the establishment of a Court of Admiralty. Furthermore, the Windsor administration continued the liberal land policy although few Englishmen of moderate means could afford the trip to Jamaica

to take advantage of it. Consequently, most people who went to the island went as indentured servants. Thus the rich planters and merchants bought up the lands, formed plantations, and operated them with indentured and slave labor.

The responsibilities and hard work demanded by the Jamaica governorship convinced the fun-loving Lord Windsor that he should return to the comforts of London. Pepys commented upon Windsor's return to England:

He told the Duke (of York) of their taking the fort of St. Jago upon Cuba by his men; but upon the whole, I believe that he did matters like a young lord and was weary of being put upon service out of his country, where he might have pleasure.⁸

Windsor's duties were then assumed by the chancellor of Jamaica, Sir Charles Lyttleton, until the council and its president, Colonel Thomas Lynch, appointed Lynch acting governor. Then the crown, with its usual inaction and complacency on colonial matters, left the governorship vacant until 1664 when the king commissioned Thomas Modyford, the former governor of Barbados, as governor of Jamaica. Modyford's commission was largely due to his cousin's, the Duke of Albemarle, influence with Charles II, but nevertheless Modyford's appointment became the best thing England had done for Jamaica since conquering it.

No man was more capable or better suited for the Jamaican governorship than Thomas Modyford. The efficient, capable, and experienced administrator knew the West Indies, its people, soil, and climate. He brought the Barbadian sugar planting and manufacturing secrets to

⁸Richard Lord Braybrooke (ed.), Diary and Correspondence of Samuel Pepys, Vol. VII: February 1, 1667 - September 30, 1667. Deciphered with additional notes by Mynors Bright (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1884), p. 31.

Jamaica to bring the island further fame and prosperity. Under his guiding hand Jamaica began its long history as the commercial and naval power in the British Empire. The governor, a very successful planter and merchant himself, persuaded others to come to the island and develop it. Furthermore, he established a strong civil government on the island. In 1664 the first elected assembly (previously the governor's council had acted both as council and assembly) was convened by Lieutenant Governor Sir Charles Lyttleton and elected as its first speaker Robert Freeman. Here, however, ends the narrative of the incorporation of Jamaica into the Western Design. Modyford's administration marked the end of the struggle to hold the island and establish a colony there.

The English government's recognition of Jamaica was now affirmed since it had given the island a government, treasury, and budget. Furthermore, the English exchequer had a definite stake in the island's future, for thousands of pounds of sterling had been appropriated to further the new colony's economy. Now, the crown had also given the colony an enterprising governor. Thus, Jamaica became the pet colony of the Restoration. This was primarily so because it conformed most closely to the seventeenth-century concept of an ideal plantation. Its climate favored the production of subtropical goods such as sugar, coffee, ginger, pepper, cinchona bark, and cattle and horses, all goods England needed and desired.⁹ Its moderate size favored commercial development and effective control. Furthermore, it provided a great market for English manufactured goods and could absorb the thousands of

⁹David Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II (2d ed. rev.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), II, 665.

Negro slaves the Royal African Company would ship there for a fabulous profit. Thus Jamaica fitted perfectly into the new brand of English mercantilism. The island's plantations could produce and export those commodities in demand for English home consumption and for re-export to the European continent.

It was the capable Modyford that molded Jamaica to the mercantile plan the English merchants and planters desired. At first unable to obtain trade rights from the Spanish, Modyford and subsequent governors of Jamaica permitted the pirate actions to continue until the Spanish were forced to depend on the English for goods. Meanwhile Jamaica reaped fabulous profits as the buccaneers stimulated commerce and agriculture on the island. With privateering and commerce previously discussed, however, agriculture remains to be analyzed here. Prior to Modyford's administration little planting of consequence was done on the island. What was accomplished was the beginning of a few cacao and tobacco plantations. The chief problem had been the lack of men of good quality, small farmers who would begin the cultivation of Jamaica's rich soil. Through Modyford's efforts, however, many solid small planters went to Jamaica to stimulate the island's agricultural growth.¹⁰ Thus, through their example many more worthwhile people came to the island, thereby building it into the richest commercial and agricultural colony of the British Empire in the eighteenth century.

¹⁰The former governor of Barbados persuaded many Barbadians to join him in emigrating to Jamaica. Thus, a good example was set for other people of quality to go to the island. Also, agents scoured all Europe to obtain settlers for the new possession. A. P. Thornton, West-India Policy Under the Restoration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), pp. 62-63.

Modyford also met much opposition in his attempts to develop Jamaica. Lord Willoughby, governor of the Caribbee islands, and other West Indian planters and merchants did not want Jamaica to prosper and thereby offer them competition in the tropical goods market. Consequently, in their greedy efforts to keep the demand high and supply low (to control prices), the West Indian profiteers fought Modyford and the Jamaican interests on all fronts. They lobbied the crown, Parliament, the Privy Council, and all the committees on colonies; but, fortunately, all their efforts were in vain. The English and continental colonial markets, starved for goods Jamaica could produce, disregarded the West Indian lobbies and demanded that the government further encourage the commercial and agricultural development of the island.

Jamaica's first agricultural pursuits were designed to produce goods which the early colonists thought there was a great demand for and which they could grow. Thus the early colonists of the island--soldiers turned planters--began small cacao and tobacco plantations, raised horses, mules, and cattle, and cut the logwood of the forests. It was cacao, however, that was the chief commodity produced until the old cacao trees died and the new imported ones did not thrive. Then the sugar industry was revived by Modyford who knew all the Caribbee secrets of sugar production. Thus, starting with the three old sugar plantations the Spanish had operated, Modyford and his colonists made sugar "king" on Jamaica.

Generally speaking, Jamaica's soil was inferior to that of Barbados and St. Kitts, but the abundance of it compensated for the inferiority (Jamaica's soil was good for sugar but produced less per acre).

The English sugar planters needed room for expansion because by the mid-seventeenth century the Caribbee islands were terribly overcrowded. Every available inch of the islands had been used for sugar planting. In addition, the Caribbee planters were further handicapped by the insufficient amounts of water available on the islands. Furthermore, the years of continuous tobacco planting, then sugar planting, had begun to deplete the soil on the tiny islands. Consequently the planters looked upon Jamaica as a paradise of 4,411 square miles with one-fourth of that level enough for cultivation and ripe for exploitation. Thus, in search of new lands and in answer to Modyford's pleas for more interested settlers, the planters swarmed to the new English possession. By 1670 there were 15,000 people on Jamaica with 209,000 acres planted. There were 57 sugar refineries and 49 indigo works.¹¹ Thus, for all who came to Jamaica there were tremendous profits. Even the government prospered for the duty on wine alone paid all the government's expenses.

Jamaica's physical attributes, ideal for sugar, brought about this prosperity.¹² The distribution of the wealth resultant from the

¹¹Ogg, op. cit., II, 666.

¹²There was an abundance of water and good soil. The soil which was ideal for sugar, a mixture of clay and sand that holds moisture, was found in scattered sectors of the island. Jamaica's soil further contained limestone and flint on a substratum of soapy marle. Thus, it was very tenacious and retentive of water, difficult to plough and trench, but was extremely productive for sugar. George Porter, The Nature of the Sugar Cane; With Practical Directions for the Improvement of its Culture and the Manufacture of its Products (Philadelphia: Carry and Lea, 1831), p. 43. Also, in addition to Porter, consult the following for accounts of colonial West Indian sugar production: Richard Pares, A West-India Fortune (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1950), and "An Historical Account of the Rise and Growth of the West-India Colonies and the Great Advantage They Are to England in Respect to Trade," The Harleian Miscellany, IX (1810), 403-45.

prosperity changed soon, however. The capital needed to begin a sugar plantation, the risks involved, and the expense of planting, processing, and shipping made the sugar industry a large-scale operation. Thus, on Jamaica, as had happened on all the Caribbee islands, the many small plantations were consolidated into large ones. With the consolidation came the overseers and the Negro slaves.

Few Negro slaves were brought into the island until the sugar plantations began on a large scale about 1664. Then the unfortunates were brought in droves from Africa by the Royal African Company (in 1672 the company obtained a monopoly of the slave trade). The company obtained its royal charter in 1663 and began its century-long practice of sending annually at least forty ships laden with Negro unfortunates from Africa to Jamaica. Consequently, in a few years after Modyford's revival of the Jamaican sugar industry the island had become the greatest market for Negro slaves. It may have been the biggest market for slaves, but it did not always obtain the choicest or physically superior ones because the English, even in prosperous times, usually asked for long credits rather than paying cash for their slaves. The ruthless slave traders, however, wanted hard cash in their risky business. Consequently Jamaica received the slaves of lesser value. The slaves themselves, however, dreaded being sent to Jamaica; for the island was noted for its savage and cruel treatment of slaves. In subsequent years the worst fate of a malefactor Negro in another colony became the sentence of shipment to Jamaica.¹³

¹³Herbert I. Priestley, The Coming of the White Man, Vol. I of A History of American Life, ed. A. M. Schlesinger and D. R. Fox (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 324.

As happened on the other islands when the sugar revolution hit, the importation of Negro slaves soon far outstripped the white population. Sample population figures pointed this out.¹⁴

DATE	WHITE POPULATION	NEGRO POPULATION
1658	4,500	1,400
1664	6,000	9,504

This trend continued until Jamaica was practically a black island. Thus, today's population ratio favors the Negro 60-1 over the white. The effects of the sugar revolution and influx of Negro slaves on Jamaica differ somewhat from those on the Caribbees. On the Caribbee islands all the land was absorbed by the great sugar planters. Consequently the dispossessed small landowners and planters had no place to go. They either had to leave the island or work for the large-scale planters. On Jamaica, however, the situation was different, for the island was also a commercial center. There dispossessed landowners had other opportunities than emigration or serfdom. There they could man the pirate vessels, join the merchant ship crews, become a shipwright or a tavern-keeper, or operate or work in any of the shops of the bustling towns of Jamaica.

The influx of Negro slaves to Jamaica created a serious problem that the other British West Indies did not experience. The island's vast, rugged interior provided a refuge for slaves who could escape from the plantations. There they joined the roving bands of Maroons, the Indian-Negro-Spanish-English breed who held the interior as their own domain. Occurring on the average of every three years for the next

¹⁴George W. Roberts, The Population of Jamaica (Cambridge: University Press, 1957), p. 33.

century, the Maroon raids in conjunction with slave uprisings ravaged Jamaica. Meanwhile, the English government expended 240,000 and thousands of men to quell the disturbances. Otherwise, the introduction of sugar had similar effects on Jamaica as it had on the Caribbees. Thus, with most of the land devoted to sugar production or to other crops destined for export, Jamaica depended on outside sources, particularly the North American colonies, for its food supply. Consequently, a trade of tremendous volume developed between the continental colonies and Jamaica. Generally speaking, rum, molasses, and sugar went to New England in return for foodstuffs and manufactured goods.¹⁵ Thus, Jamaica's prosperity extended throughout the empire, as the island in the sun became the key to the success of the empire. She justly deserved the title Admiral Rodney bestowed upon her, "the brightest jewel in the British diadem."¹⁶

¹⁵For the best account of Jamaica's importance to the eighteenth-century British Empire and of its trade with England and the other colonies, see Lawrence H. Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, Vol. II: The British Isles and the American Colonies: The Southern Plantations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960).

¹⁶Eric Williams, "The Golden Age of the Slave System in Britain," Journal of Negro History, XXV (January, 1940), 83.

A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONCLUSION

The entire process of the incorporation of Jamaica into the Western Design marked the final change in the concept of colonies. Heretofore, colonies in the English mind meant a band of persons of common nationality who left their country and settled down in a new territory where they constituted themselves a distinct political community. Now, the colony was conceived in a new form as a national asset designed to yield as much profit to the mother country as possible. The seizure of Jamaica, the only fruit of Cromwell's pattern of aggression, also marked a turned point in British history. Henceforth, England built her empire upon the tenets of obtaining overseas possessions and maintaining mastery of the seas. Consequently, Jamaica's capture and the establishment of an English colony there began a new breed of Englishmen who were filled with new ideas of further expansion, of new staple products, and of building and sailing new ships. Here appeared the harbinger of eighteenth-century expansion as England began its rise as a commercial and colonial power. No longer were Englishmen motivated by a desire to extend Protestantism, but by the desire for material gains.

Jamaica was the only result of Cromwell's aggressive foreign policy. Dunkirk might be considered another acquisition, but it was sold by Charles II to France for 400,000. The reasons for the failure of the Design's expedition to achieve its grand aims may be summed up by listing: Thomas Gage's faulty information, corruption in the admiralty

and various committees, dissension among the commanders, Cromwell's meddling, insufficient and inferior supplies, the rabble army, and English inexperience in the Indies. The reasons for the expedition could be narrowed down to two factors, power and prestige. Cromwell wanted great military successes to consolidate his position in Europe and at home in England. Thus, the assertions that he implemented the Western Design only for the greater glory of England are faulty, for its success meant so much for his fate.¹ He did, however, make the rest of Europe recognize the growing power of England.

Though his government did a tyrant's resemble,²
He made England great and her enemies tremble.

Thus, in the final analysis, he became the first real English expansionist; perhaps, the first imperialist.

The acquisition of Jamaica was considered a small gain by most people of the mid-seventeenth century. Consequently Cromwell's version of the Western Design was deemed a failure by his contemporaries. However, foreign emissaries thought and hoped that it was enough to satisfy the Protector's appetite for expansion.

It is hoped that this will check the vast and audacious designs of this state.³

Cromwell, however, soon realized the commercial and strategic importance of the island. He saw that to hold it, it must have an adequate population and proper colonization. These measures he quickly tried to

¹David Hannay, A Short History of the Royal Navy, 1217-1815, Vol. I: 1217-1688 (London: Methuen & Co., 1898), p. 277.

²Ibid.

³Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar . . . Venetian . . . 1655-6 . . ., p. 94.

provide; consequently, Jamaica became a state enterprise. The island was then the first colony founded by the state.

Since Jamaica was the state's initial effort at colonization, inexperience caused many mistakes in the operation and control of the colony. Thus, the government had to rely on a trial and error method. Consequently the capture and colonization of Jamaica brought the regulation and control of colonies to the forefront of English politics. In summation, the Jamaica acquisition began the government's concern in all phases of colonialism--acquisition, control, regulation, and exploitation.

Jamaica has meant many things to England. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was in a very strategic position (it still is, but its relative importance is smaller); for it was situated well for the conquest and trade of the Main since it lay in the belly of all commerce in the New World. Consequently, it quickened English commerce and freed England from economic dependence on other nations who might become her political rivals or economic competitors. Militarily, it gave England a rallying point in the New World while England gave it security. Meanwhile, its loss meant the beginning of the end for the Spanish, the disintegration of the Spanish American Empire and the complete loss of her mastery of the seas. Henceforth, no Spanish plate fleet would dare sail the Caribbean or the Atlantic without a heavily armed escort.⁴

The island was a godsend for English merchants and planters who

⁴The Spanish were so worried about the new danger to their plate fleets that they considered reshipping the plate from Buenos Aires across the southern Atlantic to Spain. Birch, op. cit., VI, 846.

desired to expand or begin new operations. Previously England had held only five tiny Caribbee islands that devoted themselves to sugar.

COLONY	DATE OF ACQUISITION	AREA IN SQUARE MILES
Barbados	1624-5	166
Antigua	1632	108
St. Kitts	1623	65.5
Nevis	1628	50
Montserrat	1632	32

Thus, the sugar planters had 421.5 square miles of land to work with. Of that total every bit of available, cultivable land was devoted to sugar. Consequently the Caribbees were very overcrowded crop-wise and population-wise. Furthermore, the land was becoming exhausted because of the constant planting (as soon as one crop was harvested, another was planted in its place). With Jamaica's acquisition they had 4,411 square miles of new land (at least one-fourth cultivable) which they soon exploited in response to Thomas Modyford's colonization efforts.

The new acquisition was also a benefit to other sectors of the growing British Empire. The trade impetus provided by the Cromwellian government (Jamaica was made duty-free for seven years and exempt from taxes on her production for ten years) spurred a tremendous intercolonial trade of which Jamaica was a keystone. The new island colony exported currency, sugar, molasses, rum, cotton, ginger, cocoa, coffee, pimento, spices, fustic, ebony, lignum vitae, and mahogany.⁵ In return, Jamaica imported foodstuffs, flour, bread, cod and other fish, Indian corn, rice, horses and other livestock, and wood products (barrels, house construction) from North America; barreled pork and beef, firkins of butter, and herring from Ireland; and a countless variety of

⁵Gipson, op. cit., II, 184.

manufactured goods from England.⁶ On this tremendous volume of trade, England received very substantial revenues for the government. The most significant feature of all this trade was its unbalance, which was created by French West Indian competitors. Since the eighteenth-century French sugar islands of the West Indies could sell their sugar, rum, and molasses for less than that of the British West Indies because of the more efficient French banking and shipping, the English sugar planters had to give gold and currency to the North American colonies to balance the trade and compete with the French whose goods were smuggled into the continental colonies. Consequently, the currency that found its way to the North American colonies was vital to their economy since they were so hard pressed for hard money.⁷

Thus, the narrative of early Jamaican history is completed. In the eighteenth century the island became Britain's most prized possession. Thus, the English were justified in stating that "God hath blessed our design. . . ."⁸

⁶Ibid., pp. 184-85. The reader may also consult H. C. Bell, "West Indian Trade Before the American Revolution," American Historical Review, XXII (January, 1917), 272-87.

⁷Curtis Nettels, "England and the Spanish American Trade, 1680-1715," The Journal of Modern History, III (March, 1931), 1.

⁸Wright, The Spanish Resistance . . . , p. 140.

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VITA

Steven Carl Seyer was born to Henrietta Ruth Gehringer Seyer and Stephen John Seyer in Allentown, Pennsylvania, on January 1, 1938. After the fanfare resultant from Steven's being Allentown's first child of 1938, the family settled in Allentown. The war, however, took Stephen to Camden, New Jersey, to work in the New York Shipbuilding Corporation's plant there. Consequently, young Steven began his schooling in the public schools of Mount Ephraim and Collingswood, New Jersey. Then the war's end and the death of the paternal grandfather persuaded the Seyer family to return to Pennsylvania. After establishing residence in Northampton, Pennsylvania, the Seyers sent Steven to Our Lady of Hungary Parochial School where he completed his elementary education in June, 1950.

Steven's secondary education was obtained at the Northampton Junior-Senior High School. After participating in various sports, clubs, and other activities and attaining numerous scholastic awards and elective offices, he graduated from Northampton in June, 1956. His collegiate career was begun at Villanova University as a pre-law, history major. However, there the uncertainty about his future career was cleared. Consequently, in February, 1957, he transferred to Muhlenberg College as a history major preparing for a career in teaching. There he participated in various activities, including Phi Alpha Theta Honorary History Fraternity. Spring, 1960, brought a University Scholarship

Award from Lehigh University for graduate work in history and a Bachelor of Arts (history major) degree from Muhlenberg College. Thus, in September, 1960, Steven began his studies for his master's degree in history at Lehigh University. This he hoped would prepare him for a more effective and rewarding career in teaching.