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# Toward a theory of communal conflict: the case of cyprus

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ABSTRACT

As a first step towards the construction of a theory (or set of theories) relating to communal conflict, the present work focuses upon a study of the evolution of relationships between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots in Cyprus, from 1571 to the present. Cyprus, representing a middle-range case in a typology of apparent communal conflict, is a prime example of the way an initial situation of "difference" (in an ethnic, cultural sense) accelerates to become successively, geographical separation, political separation, and finally, absolute separation through mutual violence. Through a fairly detailed, chronological account these changes are plotted. The case is complicated somewhat by the involvement of outside parties in the primary dispute. The implications of this involvement are tentatively explored. Reference is made to the several mediation efforts aimed at reaching "a solution" and the stated conclusion is that these efforts have failed due to an inability (or unwillingness) on the part of participants to separate the primary dispute from secondary and tertiary disputes concerned with the status of Cyprus.

The concept of a violence threshold is put forward as a critical point in need of further analysis, together with reformulations of concepts relating to frustration, defensive

group mechanisms and group structures during conflicts.

Finally, a definition of "communal conflict" is given, that is substantially different from a definition of "civil war" by virtue of the absence of a degree of civitas or community.

TOWARD A THEORY OF COMMUNAL CONFLICT:  
The Case of Cyprus

by

David J. Dunn

A Thesis

Presented to the Graduate Committee

of Lehigh University

in Candidacy for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in

International Relations

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This thesis is accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

May 12, 1971

(date)

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ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION


The decade of the nineteen sixties saw the appearance, in quite overt fashion, of an apparently new class of conflicts; the Nigeria-Biafra conflict, civil disorder in Ulster, communal strife in Malaysia, language conflict in Belgium, separatist movements among the French population of Canada, conflict between Tamil and Sinhalese in Ceylon, conflict in the Horn of Africa, racial conflict in Kenya and finally, but certainly no less important, inter-communal strife in Cyprus, were the component parts of the class. The theme behind these conflicts, the factor which apparently unites them in the same generic class, is that of "difference" - the separation of one group from another either physically, psychologically, or both. In all these cases the parties are separated by factors of race, language, colour or religion. Generally, these factors may be subsumed under the heading "ethnic" - a generic term used to designate groups characterised by distinctive origin. In a broader sense, the term may be applied to the minority groups of society; they are separated by factors most easily (and significantly) labelled ethnic. All the cases listed are characterised by societal cleavages along ethnic lines. The pervasive feature of the cases is one of difference in a fundamental, visible, lasting and socially rein-

forced manner.

However, ethnic difference is not necessarily a cause of conflict. When issues of ethnic difference transcend the level of mere differentiation of one group from another and difference becomes a significant factor in the distribution of wealth, social position and political roles, then ethnic difference becomes a key variable. The point to be made is that difference is significant when it determines action. Here the issue of prejudice is significant. Prejudice is essentially an aspect of attitude; discrimination is the disadvantageous treatment of one group by another. In the group of cases listed, one group in each conflict claims to be the object of discrimination.

To be sure, these conflicts did not originate in the sixties, but they erupted into outbreaks of violence, in varying degrees. Indeed, it may be possible to locate these conflicts on a scale of "communal conflict intensity"; constructed on the basis of deaths and/or damage.<sup>1</sup> A tentative outline of such a scale might resemble the following:

FIGURE I: Tentative Classification of Selected Conflicts



Three sub-classes may be constructed, according to this simple scale. Low-level conflicts are bounded by a violence threshold; as yet these conflicts have not become overly violent, despite periodic outbreaks. The middle-range group have crossed this violence threshold, such that violence becomes a part of day to day life (if not persistently and overtly, then intermittently, with repressed hostility below the surface), yet the conflict is restrained in some way. In the higher class, conflict becomes more intense, more organised and more bloody. The prime example of the higher class, that of Biafra-Nigeria, was such that the conflict ended when one group coerced the other into compliance with its demands. The lower level conflicts are such that violence is not yet institutionalised and, therefore, accomodation is often possible in favourable conditions. The major characteristic of the middle range group is persistence; the conflicts have become persistent features of life, violence is used in large part and accomodation is frequently difficult if not impossible; the prime examples are Ulster and Cyprus.

The subject of the present thesis is a study of the conflict between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots in Cyprus, a conflict which has several factors to commend it as a subject of study. First, the conflict is rooted in history and the growth of value systems to the extent that "tradition

custom, ancient ambitions and resentments, and assumed analogies from the past, the history of centuries or even milleniums is part of the living present."<sup>2</sup> Political leaders have appealed to old values to muster support, to the extent that "Greekness" itself is a key factor in need of explanation. Second, the conflict has passed a violence threshold so that violence becomes a standard tool of political action. An understanding of how this happens is important. Third, the conflict is persistent, despite the presence of a United Nations force, several attempts at mediation and periodic face to face negotiations between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. Moreover, the United Nations presence is such that it is necessary to evaluate rival perceptions of the conflicting parties, to establish what the function of a peacekeeping force is or ought to be. Finally, the conflict is in the middle range and, as such, it may yield insights into the nature of ethnic conflict in general and highlight the features that distinguish one conflict, or sub-class, from another. Yet the Cyprus conflict does not exist in a purely ethnic form; it is the thesis to be argued here that Cyprus is the subject of at least two conflicts; at the primary level is the dispute in Cyprus, involving issues of participation, legitimacy and difference between Greek and Turk; at the secondary level is the conflict over Cyprus,



involving the governments of Greece, Turkey and Great Britain.

The aim of the study. The aim of the present work is not to answer a long list of difficult questions concerning disputes in and over Cyprus; for one thing, the lack of available data is such that it precludes a set of definitive answers. The aims are more modest; to identify trends and patterns (such as they may be) and to give an indication of the points which, with further study, could yield fruitful results. The present work is centred on identification of a preliminary nature.

On another, methodological, level the case study establishes the limits of empirical possibility and provides a meeting point for historical, political and methodological approaches. If a theory of ethnic conflict be possible, then salient features from one case need to be identified. Subsequently, these features need to be applied to other cases within a presumed class, to establish whether the factor of inclusiveness is superficial or significant.

CHAPTER 2The Factor of Ethnicity

In view of the centrality of the concept of ethnicity, it is necessary to elaborate on this concept and emphasise the operational components of a definition. According to Naroll<sup>1</sup>; and as generally understood in anthropological literature, the culture-bearing unit (called by Naroll the "cultunit") which, for present purposes may be made synonymous with the ethnic group, has four component features; first, it is biologically self-perpetuating; second, it is characterised by shared cultural values, realised in the overt unity of cultural forms; third, it makes up a field of communication and interaction; fourth, it has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order. Despite its coherence and brevity, this definition is unsuitable. As the Norwegian anthropologist Barth has put it, "it begs all the critical questions; while purporting to give an ideal type model of a recurring empirical form, it implies a preconceived view of what are significant factors in the genesis, structure and function of such groups."<sup>2</sup> Moreover, such a definition

does not necessarily explain the causal link between two of the component parts of the definition; the acquisition of values and the problem of boundary maintenance.

Fundamental cultural values are transmitted from one generation to the next through the day-to-day process of socialisation; the family, the church, the school and the group all exert pressure to accept common values.

What the ideal-type definition takes for granted is the maintenance of a group boundary. In fact the boundary of any system is a crucial factor in system maintenance, hence the recent attention paid to the concept by anthropologists, political scientists and others. Certain transactions are proscribed, others are held to be legitimate - the crucial questions are; which transactions, when and in what circumstances. The logical dilemma in the ideal-type definition that is unresolved is this; is the cultural-bearing unit's distinctiveness a cause or effect of semi-permeable boundaries? (Applied to the Cyprus case, does the desire of Greek-Cypriots to be Greek first and then Cypriot preclude certain types of intercourse with Turkish-Cypriots? It is hoped that what follows may cast some light on this aspect of intergroup relations.) The social psychologist Muzafer Sherif had identified the nature of the problem for he argues (with emphasis) that "Though not independent of the relationship within the groups in



question, the characteristics of functional relations between groups cannot be deduced or extrapolated solely from the properties of relations that prevail among members within the group itself."<sup>3</sup> Although not explicitly stated, Sherif's concern is with the boundary problem; it is in some way a part of, yet separate from, the groups which comprise a system of interaction. Emphasis on this boundary problem may yield insights into the nature of in-group socialisation and the generation of attitudes.

CHAPTER 3Cyprus Before 1878

The island of Cyprus has never been a part of the Greek nation-state, yet the influence of Greek history is sufficient to stir in Greek-Cypriots a feeling of patriotic fervour whilst in Turkish-Cypriots it is sufficient to make them want to feel and act in a characteristically non-Greek fashion. To understand these reactions it is necessary to survey the history of Cyprus and map the influences which have moulded modern Cyprus.

It is generally accepted that Greek influence in Cyprus dates from the arrival of Mycenaean traders in the fourteenth century B.C.. (The discovery of Mycenaean graves in Cyprus would seem to support this view.<sup>1</sup>) Subsequently, Cyprus became an important trading centre in the Mediterranean area, with the result that Mycenaean and, later, Achean settlers moved to Cyprus. Furthermore, it is believed that the disruption caused by the Trojan Wars (1000 B.C.) led more Greeks to settle Cyprus.

By the fourth century B.C. Hellenic influences were even more strongly felt in Cyprus when the Cypriot King Evagoras undertook a systematic campaign to Hellenise Cyprus. This movement culminated in the growth of a Greek

literary tradition, based in Cyprus, that eventually led to the foundation of the Stoic school of philosophy in Athens, by the Cypriot, Zeno of Kition, in the third century B.C.. A more significant event was the advent of Christianity to Cyprus, brought by the apostles Paul and Barrabas in the year 45 A.D.. The transformation was such that by the fourth century the majority of Cypriots were Christian and the Emperor Constantine had recognised Christianity. The significance of the Christian church, and the uniting both of it and Hellenism mark the growth of the church in Cyprus as both a religious and secular institution; it is by reference to the growth of Christian orthodoxy in Cyprus that one can understand the role of Makarios III as both President and Prelate. The institutionalisation of the church was further strengthened in the year 488 A.D. when Emperor Zeno of Byzantium declared the Cypriot Church autocephalous (i.e., independent.) By the sixth century, "the old order had gone" to the extent that, according to Alastos;

Life began to flow in well defined grooves. The Church was supreme and untroubled by internal divisions . . . . Social life was regulated. All-embracing laws and edicts governed every phase of life. The peasants were riveted to the soil.<sup>2</sup>

In 1191 the role of the church was circumscribed when the island fell to Richard Couer de Lion, who reportedly landed in Cyprus by accident. Within several months, however,

the Frankish Lusignan dynasty assumed sovereignty, under circumstances which are not entirely clear. With the end of the Byzantine period the Church role diminished to the extent that the unprecedented oppression of the Lusignan period almost completely eliminated the Church of Cyprus. Yet during the Lusignan period, which lasted until 1489, Cyprus assumed a role that it has not yet fully discarded; it became a key factor in a western European movement to prevent foreign intervention in the (Middle) East. "It was a forward base which kept the western enterprises of the crusades going, despite its ruinous contradictions, for years it remained an outpost of western commerce and Roman Catholicism in the Levant."<sup>3</sup> The decline of the Cypriot Church was due to its incorporation into the Church of Rome, which forbade the election of an Orthodox archbishop, authority being vested in a Latin Archiepiscopal See.

The transference of control of Cyprus from the Lusignans to the Venetians in 1489, was apparently of little consequence for the Cypriots since "the change . . . . made little difference. The majority of people were serfs to the nobles and devoid of any rights whatsoever."<sup>4</sup> Towards the end of the Venetian period there appeared signs of a popular revolt against the absolutist government (1562) but its discovery by the Venetians led to a period

of even more strictly repressive policies.

The Ottoman Empire took over Cyprus in 1571; that it did not do so before this time, despite a threatening posture is a tribute to the force of Venetian arms, the success of Venetian diplomacy, or a combination of both. Under the Ottoman rule, one of the most significant developments in Cyprus was the elevation of the Church of Cyprus; the old system of rigid ecclesiastical control of secular activities was reintroduced as an administrative move. The Archbishops of Cyprus were employed as the instruments of social control in newly acquired territory. Such a development strengthened the role of the Church since the spiritual authorities were permitted to control education in Cyprus; by so doing it continued the inculcation of Hellenic and Orthodox values to the Greeks, the predominant section of the population. By 1660 the Archbishop and Bishops of Cyprus were recognised by the Porte (the Government of the Ottoman Empire) as representatives of the Christians in Cyprus, a move which "represented the first step toward recognition of the Cypriot ecclesiastical hierarchy, and particularly the Archbishop, as the official guardian and representative of the Greek Cypriots, which was finally to become part of Turkish policy."<sup>5</sup>

In 1754 the Bishops of Cyprus were appointed to a new, higher, status giving them direct access to the Porte, whilst

at the same time the Archbishop was recognised as Ethnarch, or politico-religious leader of the Greek community in Cyprus - a position presently occupied by Makarios III. Despite the progressive moves at the administrative level, social and economic conditions under the Ottomans was far from satisfactory; famine, plague, economic depredation, were characteristics of the early years of Turkish rule. By 1821 the position of the Church was severely controlled, a major result of the Greek war of independence. According to Hill,<sup>6</sup> the Turkish discovery of the enrollment of Cypriot priests in a Greek nationalist movement, in 1819, led to swift and sharp reprisals; Turkish troops were sent to Cyprus (from Syria), the population was disarmed and, on the orders of the Turkish governor, sympathisers with the Greek cause were executed. By June of 1821 the French Consul in Cyprus wrote that "not a day passes without people being hanged, strangled or butchered in the capital."<sup>7</sup> The impact of the Greek war of independence on Cyprus was twofold. In the short run it undermined the authority of the Church, the organisation most identified with the Greek cause, whilst, in the longer run, it seemed to have contributed to the "Greekness" of Greek-Cypriots, for whom the Greek struggle for freedom was the classic symbol of liberation.

Several subsequent revolts were quelled by the Turks



and the situation was relatively quiescent, at least until the Crimean War, when Greeks in Cyprus, half expecting a Russian victory over the Turks, began an anti-Turkish campaign, especially after the defeat of the Turkish fleet at the battle of Sinope in 1853. The intervention of France and Britain on the side of Turkey seems to have strictly limited the range of expedients to which Turkey could resort to silence dissent. Moreover, the Archbishop and Governor of Cyprus called upon the dissenting population to exercise restraint, the former going so far as to threaten excommunication for dissenters, a move deemed necessary in face of the apparent growth of an articulate class of merchants, teachers and educated younger groups thought to present a challenge to ecclesiastical rule.

A most significant development in the later years of the Ottoman period was the granting, to Greeks, of the right to open Greek schools, which was the foundation of the Greek Cypriot educational system. According to Alastos "this achievement was more remarkable inasmuch as it was due entirely to the Church or private initiative in the face of governmental indifference and occasional hostility. It was confined solely to Greek Cypriots . . . Turks were generally quite uneducated."<sup>8</sup>

By the time Turkish rule ended in 1878 the Turkish

population, Moslem in religion, comprised approximately one quarter of the total population of Cyprus. (According to the census of 1881, Turks comprised 24.9% of a total population of 186,000.) Thus, since the establishment of a garison of 16,000 in 1571, many of whom stayed in the island as colonists, the Turkish community had transformed itself into a significantly large group in the total population. The immediate effect of the end of Turkish sovereignty was felt in the distribution of population. The now indigenous Turks, who had inherited lands formerly the property of the Turkish ruling class became owner-farmers; the serious population decline in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made it difficult to find tenants for farms. However, since the Turks could retain only a portion of the old Turkish feudal land system, Turkish settlements became widely dispersed and separated from Greek settlements. In the major towns it was a characteristic that Turks were housed in "quarters" in predominantly Greek population centres.

Thus, by the time the British arrived in Cyprus Cypriot society, if society there was, was characterised by a factor of difference. The indigenous population was culturally heterogenous, separated by religion and custom and frequently geographically separate. As an indication of the degree of difference, by the early years of the



British administration, Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities were differentiated at the institutional level on purely ethnic lines.

CHAPTER 4Cyprus Under the British: 1878-1954

The Crusades saw Cyprus assume a critical role in Mediterranean and Middle Eastern politics' by the middle of the nineteenth century the potential strategic role of Cyprus became the focus of British foreign policy. As early as 1818 a British army officer in India had commented that "The possession of Cyprus would give England a preponderating influence in the Mediterranean and place at her disposal the future destinies of the Levant."<sup>2</sup> In 1866 a Foreign Office memorandum, concerned with the status of Crete, stated that:

It [Crete] may be considered as one of the chain of sentries which, in connection with Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus serve in friendly hands to keep open this important connection with our Eastern Empire. Candia (Crete) and Cyprus have more than once been described as the keys to Egypt and there is no doubt that in the possession of a naval power hostile to England, they might be a great menace for our route across the isthmus.<sup>1</sup>

Undoubtedly, the major British interest in acquiring Cyprus is explicable in terms of defense of the Empire. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and, before it, concern for access by Britain through the Euphrates valley to India were important considerations that influenced British policy. Russian interest in the Balkans, following the sign-

ing of the Treaty of San Stefano on March 5, 1878, the establishment of the independent state of Bulgaria and the growth of Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania, aroused the British government. Later in March reservists were activated in response to this perceived Russian threat to Persia and Afghanistan and, thereafter, India. One of the major planks in the construction of British policy concerned with the Eastern Question was the acquisition of a naval base in the eastern Mediterranean. As possible sites Lemnos, Gallipoli, Crete, Rhodes, Lesbos, Haifa and Cyprus were suggested. The choice of Cyprus was made in April or May of 1878,<sup>3</sup> since it had the required characteristics of location, size, population, defensibility and commercial prospects. Furthermore, the position seemed to be that, in view of the factor of location, "whoever holds Cyprus holds Scanderoon [Iskendrum] . . . . in short, holding Cyprus gives Scanderoon."<sup>4</sup>

Lord Salisbury cabled the British Ambassador in Constantinople regarding the overtures to be made to the Sultan with the argument that it would be impossible for England to exercise the necessary vigilance over Syria and Asia Minor, and to accumulate the materials of war, "unless she possesses a stronghold near the coast. Presence of English in Cyprus will enable them to strengthen the Sultan's authority in Syria and Mesopotamia, . . .

where it will probably be much shaken."<sup>5</sup> A second cable was more frank and amounted to an ultimatum: "Nothing has saved the Sultan . . . except the friendship of England . . . but England will desist from all further efforts unless the Sultan agrees to allow her to protect his Asiatic Empire on these terms."<sup>6</sup> On June 4, 1878 a "Convention of Defensive Alliance" was signed between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire; for promises by Britain to join with the Empire if Russia should encroach upon parts of the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan agreed to protect the rights of Christians within the Empire "and in order to enable Britain to make necessary provision for executing her engagement, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England."<sup>7</sup>

The Congress of Berlin convened in June of 1878, under the chairmanship of Bismarck, to revise the San Stefano agreement and achieve, through a policy of balance, some stability in the Balkan area. Several of the new states found their independence ostensibly reinforced, but the major aspect of the Congress for Britain, was the legitimisation, by the Great Powers, of British control in Cyprus. In Britain, Gladstone, while admitting that the Berlin agreement was not without some merit in view of its humanitarian clauses regarding Christians, dismissed the British acquisition of Cyprus, which he called "an act

of duplicity not surpassed, and rarely equalled, in the history of nations."<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, when the Liberals returned to power, two years later, they did little to abrogate the most onerous aspects of the Convention.

Thus, British interest in Cyprus was primarily strategic; it remains so in the 1970's and is epitomised in the survival, in an independent republic, of two 'sovereign base areas', the function of which is to enable Britain to counter any Soviet penetration of the Middle East.

(The survival of this article of faith of British policy is documented below.)

British control of Cyprus was greeted with varying degrees of enthusiasm by the Cypriot population, Turks included. Britain was democratic (unlike the Ottoman Empire, thus giving Turks some hope of progress), Christian, thus appealing to the Greeks, and had displayed admirable Philhellenic motives, both before and after 1821; Britain, after all, was the home of Byron.

The British flag was raised in Nicosia on July 12, 1878 and within ten days Sir Garnett Wolsey, the first British High Commissioner, arrived in Cyprus. Archbishop Sophronios, welcoming Wolsey, waxed lyrical on the virtues of a British presence, speaking of "a new life . . . for the people of Cyprus . . . with equal rights for all" and equal responsibility.<sup>9</sup> It is almost axiomatic, among Greeks

at least, that Sophronios also said "We accept the change of government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected."<sup>10</sup> The exact form of the speech, and exactly who said it, is a matter for some argument, but the point to be made is that a statement along these lines had strong appeal to the Greek population, especially in light of Greek policy in the mid-nineteenth century and the expansion of the boundaries of the Greek state.

It is, therefore, opportune to discuss at this point the central features of the Greek ideas of "Mother Greece" and the unity of Greece, a belief that has its origins in the "Megali Idea" (the "Great Idea"). The Megali Idea was succinctly defined, circa 1878, by the first United States Minister to Greece, C.K. Tuckerman, who wrote:

The Great Idea means that the Greek mind is to regenerate the East - that is, it is the destiny of Hellenism to Hellenise that vast stretch of territory which, by natural law, the Greeks believe to be theirs, and which is chiefly inhabited by people claiming to be descended from Hellenic stock, professing the Orthodox or Greek faith, or speaking the Greek language.<sup>11</sup>

Furthermore, these people:

in the aggregate, vastly outnumber the people of Greece proper, and are regarded by the "Free Greece" as brethren held in servitude by an alien and detested power. There are in European Turkey . . . not far from fifteen millions of people, of which number less than four millions



are Ottomans. The rest . . . profess the Greek religion or speak the Greek dialect.<sup>12</sup>

Of the integral role the Megali Idea assumed in the life of Greece, Tuckerman wrote:

However divided public opinion in Greece may be as to the proper time and method for attempting the realisation of the Hellenic Idea, the idea itself never leaves the teeming brain of the Greek . . . at heart he still cherishes it . . . as a tenet of his political and religious faith.<sup>13</sup>

This aspect of irredentist nationalism, the stress on the Hellenic unity of the eastern Mediterranean and the classical virtue of ancient Greece, presaged the Greek war of independence. Before 1821 the term genos was used to mean nation; according to the old Greek usage the word means 'kin' or 'stock'. By the early nineteenth century, when Greece became independent, the term was changed to ethnos and applied to the Greek nation par excellence. Whatever the reason for the change, the initial instrumental use of the term genos, an old Greek form, was symptomatic of the revival in things Greek. Another indicator was the changing of names; common names like John, Peter or Constantine were changed in favour of Aristides, Themistocles and the like. The point of all this was to appeal to symbolic and historical values in aid of the independence cause. By 1844, with the Greek state established, the Megali Idea appeared as a concrete policy; in a speech before the Greek parliament Ionnes Kolettes argued that

"the soldiers of the revolution are not only those who rebelled in 1821 but all those who fought for liberty since the fall of Constantinople."<sup>14</sup> Analogous to the contemporary American idea of "Manifest Destiny", the Megali Idea was popularised in the historical writings of Constantinos Paparrighopoulos (1815-1891) whose most popular work, a five volume history of Greece, revived usage of the term ethnos. Of Paparrighopoulos it has been said that he "brought life to the Greek past and inspired faith in the fortunes of the future . . . his main line was that of the nation's unity through time."<sup>15</sup> The philologist Georgis Hadjidakis (1848-1941) similarly popularised the unity of Greek language since Homer, thus making possible the popularisation of Greek unity through time. The idea of a greater, more extensive Greece was not merely an historical myth; for nineteenth century Greeks it was contemporary history. "Enosis" (the union with Greece) of the Ionian Islands, made possible through cession by Britain, in 1864 and the addition of Thessaly in 1881 were concrete examples of the possibilities of a Greater Greece and it is not surprising that Cypriots made frequent reference to the Ionian Islands 'enosis'!

Cypriot claims for union with Greece were persistent and popular. A memorandum to the British government in



1881 stated:

The Cypriots, mindful of their history, have never forgotten their Hellenic origin. Relying on the magnanimity of the British people, they hope that in due time favourable consideration will be given to their aspirations. Their only aspiration is the Union with their Mother Country, Greece, in accordance with the precedent of the Ionian Islands.<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, the link with Greece at this time was more than spiritual. With Greek mobilisation, in preparation for war with Turkey, in 1880, supplies (mules, to be precise) and 150 volunteers were sent to Greece by Greek-Cypriots, together with a letter to King George, an expression of Cypriot solidarity with Mother Greece.

Such enthusiasm, however, was curtailed by an Order in Council of May, 1881 which declared the neutrality of Cyprus and, among other things, curtailed the recruiting of soldiers in the service of any other state, in Cyprus. In Britain, Gladstone, on receipt of several requests for the cession of Cyprus to Greece, replied, via the High Commissioner, that "the inhabitants must remember that the island is occupied by England as part of the Turkish Empire by virtue of a Convention with the Porte. Similar proposals contravening that Convention cannot be discussed."<sup>17</sup>

By an Order in Council of September, 1878, the British government established a Legislative Council in Cyprus. The Council consisted of the High Commissioner and between

four and eight other members, "half being official, the other unofficial!" To advise the High Commissioner the Order also established an Executive Council, although he was in no way bound to take its advice. "This Constitution was generally similar to those granted to Crown Colonies, in which the Crown has entire control of legislation, laws being made by the Governor with the concurrence of a Council nominated by the Crown."<sup>18</sup> In 1880 administration of Cyprus was deemed the function of the Colonial Office, to which the Foreign Office transferred the matter. In 1881 the Secretary of State for the Colonies ordered a report on conditions in Cyprus and, following submission of the report (in 1882) certain reforms were initiated in the system of Cypriot governance and were transmitted to the High Commissioner, from the Colonial Office, in March, 1882.<sup>19</sup> The new Legislative Council was to consist of twelve Elected and six Official Members, to be presided over by the High Commissioner, who was to have a casting vote. Significantly, the twelve elected members were to be divided in proportion to the distribution of population between Christian (Greek) and Moslem (Turk) as shown in the 1881 census of population (see Table II). Thus, there were to be nine Greeks and three Turks. Apart from such matters as the salaries of the High Commissioner, judges and official members, as well as the Tribute

(a controversial tax issue and part of the 1878 Convention, under which the British were obliged to pay Turkey; the sum was raised through taxation of the population), the Council was free to discuss any matter. However, owing to the as yet unresolved status of the island (i.e., it was held to be not 'legally' British), ultimate power to legislate through Orders in Council was left to the Crown. Suffrage was to be confined to male taxpayers over the age of twenty-one.

The reaction to the new constitution was mixed. Among Greek-Cypriots the reaction was extremely favourable; Archbishop Sophronios, in a cable to England, thanked the Queen for the reforms on behalf of all Greek-Cypriots. Among the Turkish population the reaction was quite different; a petition was sent to the Colonial Office, stating:

The Legislative Council which is hereafter the basis of the Administration will ultimately become a prelude to the independence which is the motto constantly repeated by our Christian compatriots and on which their designs and acts are concentrated . . . We know perfectly well that Her Majesty's Government makes laws according to the capacity and requirements of every place, and we desire to repeat that the project of proportional representation in the Legislative Council is in every respect detrimental to our own rights and destructive to the safety we now enjoy. We consequently take the liberty to solicit your Lordship to be pleased to amend according to the principle respected ab antique the franchise in question which (in its proposed form) is incompatible with local requirements and which, if enforced, will absolutely compel us to leave the island for some other place.<sup>20</sup>

In addition, the Turks cabled the government in Constant-

inople and received an assurance from Turkey that their minority rights would be protected.

As it turned out, the fears of the Turks proved to be groundless, since the functioning Council was characterised by an alignment of British and Turkish groups against the Greeks; the six Official members, aligned with the three Turkish Elected Officials could always equal the nine Greek votes and since the presiding High Commissioner was endowed with a casting vote, policy was often made against the will of the Greek majority. The Turkish-British 'alliance' was based on three factors; as former rulers the Turks felt affinity with the British; the Greeks, propogating 'enosis', were perceived as disloyal partners; and, third, the alliance helped allay the fears, made public earlier, of Turkish subjugation.

The significance of all this is that ethnic difference was the foundation of political cleavage at the level of the Legislative Council. The Turkish population identified itself, and was seen to be so identified with the British administration as plainly anti-'enosis' and therefore, anti-Greek, at least in Greek eyes. As for the Greeks, constituting almost three-quarters of the population, they were a political minority in almost all cases and, therefore, 'subjugated' - at least in terms of the Megali Idea.

Needless to say the 'enosis' campaign continued un-

abated. The celebration of Queen Victoria's jubilee, in 1887, was boycotted by the Greeks, who countered it with meetings, led by the Orthodox Church, in support of 'enosis'.<sup>21</sup> In 1889 Sophronios led a delegation to London to present a list of grievances to the British government and to reiterate their enosis demands. A protest meeting in Limassol in 1895 passed a resolution, typical of the protest mood in the Greek-Cypriot community as a whole, asserting that:

The Hellenic people of the district of Limassol, in concord with the rest of the Hellenic people of the island, who form the great majority of the whole population, has always desired, desires and will desire one, and only one solution and to-day solemnly demands the union with Hellas to which it belongs by race and blood be effected with the least possible delay.<sup>22</sup>

Two years later, when Greece declared war on Ottoman Turkey, thousands of Greeks left Cyprus to join the Greek armed forces; by one estimate, more than 6300 Greek-Cypriots left the island for this purpose.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, it has been asserted that "with the Cypriot volunteers in the war, Cyprus was a proud participant in the national cause."<sup>25</sup> By 1899 the idea of a "Greater Greece" received a fillip when Crete was placed under a Greek High Commissioner. In Cyprus this move stimulated widespread pro-enosis demonstrations. Of the demonstration in Limassol in May, 1899, the local police report described a scene



of stirring emotion with Greek flags, the playing of the Greek national anthem and "cheers for the King of Greece - but no cheers were there for the Queen."<sup>26</sup>

Throughout all of this the Turkish element of the population was formulating its own, separate, demands. In November, 1895, the British Ambassador in Constantinople, in reference to the enosis movement in Cyprus, stated, in a letter to London, that enosis "would be violently opposed by the Ottoman portion of the population."<sup>27</sup> Moreover, earlier in the same year, the Turkish community in Cyprus, led by the Mufti (or religious leader), petitioned the Chief Secretary and the Colonial Secretary several times, and the Turkish position, as embodied in these statements, is worth quoting at length, for it is fair evidence that, by this time, the two groups in Cyprus had become polarised around the enosis issue. The Turks stated that "we pray in the name of all of the Moslem inhabitants that the Government may take such measures as to prevent the occurrence of things causing the excitement of the Moslems."<sup>28</sup> A second petition specifically stated the Turkish position:

The feeling that the Mohammedans will not agree to the Administration of Cyprus leaving the people to Greece is unanimous. If our island be united with an unjust Administration that is not yet civilised, this Administration will increase the oppressive conduct and manners of our Greek fellow countrymen.

If it be absolutely necessary . . . that the is-

land be given up . . . , in order to preserve our lives, property and honour, the favour is humbly asked that it may be restored to the Ottoman government.<sup>29</sup>

It is fairly clear that what had initially been a factor of difference - that is, the difference between Greek and Turk per se - had by now been transformed into a political cleavage along ethnic lines. Indeed the positions were so polarised as to be predictable; at the level of the Legislative Council the cleavage was institutionalised whilst, at the local level, popular support for the respective positions was solid and widespread. It is significant that, at this stage, there was little, if any, conflict of a violent nature, a factor which might be explained in terms of the functional value of institutionalised vocal conflict in organised councils.<sup>30</sup> Whilst both sides were vociferous in the presentation of their demands, it could be argued that the institutionalisation of these demands negated the need for violence as a means of articulating demands; such an explanation seems to be within the bounds of plausibility.

Despite the several pronouncements regarding the legitimacy of the enosis demands (most notable of which is that by Winston Churchill who, as Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, visited the island in 1907), and opposition to them, the next significant period in Cyprus history con-

cerns the First World War. With the outbreak of war in November, 1914, Britain, now a belligerent vis a viz Turkey, annexed Cyprus, following abrogation of the 1878 Convention. By October 1915, following the Bulgarian declaration of war on Serbia, the allied force in Salonika was hard-pressed and Britain, France and Russia tried to enlist Greek aid. Greece was, however, strictly neutral, adhering to the neutrality policy of King Constantine. Acting alone, the British government offered Cyprus to Greece in exchange for a Greek declaration of war against the Central Powers. The offer was refused, and never officially repeated, on the grounds of Greece's rigid neutrality. 'The Times', subsequently, described the offer as being "lighthearted", (see footnote 45, below). According to Alastos,<sup>31</sup> however, Britain had previously offered Cyprus to Greece in 1913 in return for the right of access, for British warships, to Argostoli (in Greece) in case of war, though nothing ever came of it.

Following the war, Lloyd George, in a memorandum to the Cypriot Mission in London, saying that he was well aware of the wishes of the Cypriot people, pointed out that Cyprus would be considered. Hill states that Venizelos extracted from Lloyd George a promise to cede Cyprus to Greece when Italy similarly gave up Rhodes.<sup>32</sup> Much encouraged, Greek-Cypriots formed deputations and issued pamphlets in support of the enosis cause. The Turkish population,



however, was similarly vociferous in voicing their own demands, sending to London a petition "from the representatives of the 60,000 Moslems of Cyprus"<sup>33</sup> praying that they should remain under British control. At this time, however (and despite Lloyd George's apparent commitments), British policy was undergoing significant change. In 1919 the War Office General Staff was, in internal memoranda, referring to the strategic considerations regarding Cyprus; in view of the ideal nature of Cyprus for aerodromes and a flying-boat base, there were strong "strategic considerations for not parting with it."<sup>34</sup> By July of 1919 the commitment to hold on to Cyprus was official government policy; as 'The Times' reported, the decision, in face of Greek demands for enosis, was that "Cyprus shall remain under the British flag."<sup>35</sup> Evidence of apparent indecision on the part of the British stimulated the Greek enosis demands and in 1920 the Greek members of the Legislative Assembly resigned. The Government, meanwhile had enforced martial law and proscribed propagandist activity, under threat of deportation. Subsequently, following the exile of two leading Greek propagandists, new Greek organisations designed to give weight to the "national cause" were formed, under the direction of the Ethnarch. The campaign for enosis was severely dented by the Greek defeats in Asia Minor in 1922 (e.g., the debacle at Smyrna) and the Cypriot Greek Politi-

cal organisation began to decline. A further blow was the legitimising influence of the legal transfer of Cyprus from Turkey to Britain embodied in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, thus ending any speculation that the British period in Cyprus was temporary. By 1925 Greek resistance had sufficiently subsided and the Greek members returned to the Legislative Council. Cyprus became a Crown Colony in 1925, the High Commissioner being replaced by the position of Governor.

The Greek frustrations in the Legislative Council and in the immediate struggle for enosis led to a re-organisation of Greek social and political organisations, a move designed to consolidate and further articulate Greek demands. In December 1921, the National Assembly, an avowedly political organisation, was formed among Greeks; the executive arm of the organisation was the National Council. Consisting of forty-six members, the Council had, as members ex officio the Archbishop of Cyprus, three bishops and the Abbot of Kykko, the remaining seats being filled through elections in the Greek community. A major plank in the organisation's philosophy was systematic non-cooperation with the British administration, a prime example being the boycott of the Legislative Council (see above). More important in the longer run was the establishment of a

dual education system in Cyprus; the cleavage was along purely ethnic lines, since schools were established for the Greek and Turkish sections of the population. At the heads of the dualist system were the respective leaders of the two groups, the Ethnarch and the Mufti. In the Greek school system great emphasis was placed on classical aspects of Greek culture and language, whilst in the Turkish schools religion was emphasised, before 1922, and following the Kemalist revolution, greater stress was placed on the prime features of the new Turkish nationalism.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, the two education systems had complete control over the setting of curricula, selection of books and hiring of teachers. In these terms, socialisation took place on distinct communal grounds; education, if anything, stressed cultural, religious and social difference at the expense of community-building and in support of sectional beliefs. "The process of acquiring categories for self and other people," writes Sherif, "begins with the persons and locations immediately perceivable in the child's surroundings, proceeding outward from his centre to conceptions of groupings more remote and more abstract, such as from . . . family to ethnic grouping."<sup>37</sup> This is surely not insignificant; the children of the twenties were the parents of the nineteen-fifties. In response

to the passing of the 1923 Education Law, aimed at giving the government a say in education through the control of teacher appointments, the Greek community denounced the move as a step towards the de-Hellenisation of the Greeks since, said the Greek Board of Education "this law is opposed to the real and expressed will of the Church of Cyprus and the Greek-Cypriots."<sup>38</sup> A further attempt to control education, in 1929, brought forth a similar Greek reaction. The same year the Greeks were sufficiently motivated (and/or frustrated) to present a list of demands to the government in London, asking for a greater devolution of legislative authority, with the British representation in the executive branch curtailed, this despite (or because of?) an enlargement of the Legislative Council, in 1925, to twenty-four members. The 1925 reform was such that the Anglo-Turkish alliance could still pass legislation in face of Greek opposition. In rejecting the 1929 list of demands for constitutional change, Passfield (the Colonial Secretary) severely reprimanded the Greek Cypriots, rejected the demands for enosis and went so far as to state that "there is much to be said for the view that what Cyprus needs at present are fewer occasions for political discussion and more occasions for constructive work."<sup>39</sup> Moreover,

Passfield countered the Greek move by presenting a list of material improvements in the island during the period of British rule; roads, a railway, postal services, afforestation and mineral resource development had all improved, or been newly constructed, under the British. "In this place it is necessary only to point out that," according to Toynbee, "the progress in Cyprus, though manifestly creditable in itself, was nothing exceptional or extraordinary."<sup>40</sup> Yet, as Hill has pointed out,<sup>41</sup> "[the Greek-Cypriots] would prefer to be ruled by Greece rather than prosper under a foreign Power," so that Passfield's statement fell on partially deaf ears.

Following this rebuff, the Greek reaction was to further streamline their political organisations; the old organisational structure was revamped and demands made more often and more loudly. At the same time the Cypriot economy, the major exports of which were minerals, was feeling the harsh wind of economic depression as raw material prices fell. In response to falling world demand, thousands of workers were dismissed from the island's copper and asbestos mines, agricultural wages and prices fell and the burden of debt increased. As if to compound the feeling of deprivation, in April 1931, a Turkish member of the Legislative Council, apparently



against the wishes of his colleagues, voted with the Greek bloc to defeat a proposed tax measure. In response, the measure was passed through an Order in Council, ordering taxation increased by £20,000. As subsequent events illustrated, the passage of the bill was extremely provocative, resulting in the appearance of violence in an organised, systematic form on the part of the Greeks. That 1931 was a turning point is acknowledged by Toynbee,<sup>42</sup> who argues that 1931 constituted a violence threshold since,

During the thirteen years following the Armistice between Turkey and the Allied Powers . . . in 1918, the Cypriot Greek nationalists employed the pacific and constitutional methods of protest and petition. In October 1931 they, or their followers, resorted to violence.<sup>43</sup>

It appears that violence was a result of an accumulation of frustrations; the new status of Crown Colony in 1925, the rejection of the constitutional demands in 1929, economic and social upheaval in 1930 and, finally, in 1931, the by-passing of the administrative machinery to pass an unpopular tax bill were all major milestones in the process.

The September Order in Council moved the Greek National Movement to stir popular opinion towards boycotts of British goods and refusals to pay taxes. Meetings in early October, to discuss a Greek manifesto regarding action, culminated in the resignation of one of the Greek members of the Legislative Council. In a letter of resignation, Nikhodhimos

Mylonas proclaimed the union of Cyprus with Greece and declared "we shall do all that is humanly possible to give effect to this decision as speedily as possible."<sup>44</sup> Whilst this decision did receive some criticism it was instrumental in arousing public sentiment. In Limassol, on October 20, Mylonas made an inflammatory speech and, by the next day, the remaining Greek members of the Legislative Council decided to resign, their decision being announced at a public meeting in Nicosia. Following the meeting the former members of the Council, and the prominent Nicosia church leaders, led a demonstration to Government House to hand in their resignations. When the crowd of "5000, singing the Greek national anthem and shouting for enosis"<sup>45</sup> arrived, Government House was set afire and gutted. The police opened fire on the crowd, wounding several of them.

The affects of the Nicosia demonstration were felt all over Cyprus; tension was described as "high" in Limassol, Paphos and Kyrenia and on October 23, there was a riot in Limassol, where the District Commissioner's house was burned.<sup>46</sup> On the village level, Greek flags were hoisted and local Greek Committees formed. The reaction of the British government was to send more troops to Cyprus, from Egypt, to restore order. Within ten days the 'revolution', as proclaimed by the leaders of the Nicosia dem-



onstration, was suppressed. By the early days of November, two thousand persons had been arrested, others confined to specific locations and the ten leaders of the Greek movement (including the Bishops of Kitium and Kyrenia) deported. By Letters Patent of November 12, 1931 the Governor was given all power to legislate, the Legislative Council having been disbanded, political parties were declared illegal and the press strictly censored. Furthermore, the display of national symbols, other than the British, was proscribed and the teaching of Greek and Turkish history restricted. (Though the Turks did not actively participate in the disturbances, they were equally hard hit by the subsequent governmental decrees.)

Throughout the whole disturbances, the Greek government in Athens was quite passive. Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, had declared that the issue of union was not political, being a British domestic issue, and thus precluded any official Greek support. Moreover, Venizelos' comment was tantamount to nothing less than an official apology to Britain for the activities of an unsupported minority. The 'unofficial' Greek reaction was quite different. A manifesto, sympathetic to the Greek-Cypriot cause, signed by a group of leading Greeks (including a former President) was published by the Athens press, the

Orthodox Church issued pronouncements to the same effect and there were appeals to the British Church to intervene in the dispute. Indeed, the Greek government was hard put to contain the popular reaction; Venizelos went so far as to ban open-air demonstrations favourable to the Cypriot cause. Gradually the campaign subsided, yet the idea of enosis was not without widespread support.<sup>47</sup>

The "Society of Friends of Cyprus" and the "Students Association for Cyprus" were typical of the organisations that appeared in Greece following the 1931 riots.

Meanwhile, in Cyprus, political activity was channelled in new directions within the new government laws. The trade union movement, for example, which in 1931 comprised only eighty-four persons, had by 1940 expanded to encompass sixty-two unions and almost 3500 members.<sup>48</sup> By 1944 almost eleven thousand persons were in trade unions. According to a 1953 report, almost seventeen thousand Greeks were members of trade unions; by comparison, only 512 Turks were thus enrolled.<sup>49</sup> Among the agricultural population, cooperatives were formed and by 1940 over 100,000 people were members, compared to only a few hundred in 1932. The Cypriot daily press, nonexistent before 1932, made its appearance the year after the enosis riots and by the early 'fifties comprised six Greek, three Turkish and one English newspapers.

In 1936 the "Society for Cypriot Studies" was founded by the leading intellectuals in the island, having as its goals the preservation and publication of historical material, the popularisation of aspects of Cypriot philology and the foundation of a museum of Cypriot art. That this "revolution" in the organisation of the Cypriot population followed an extremely damaging blow to the enosis cause, tells us something of the nature of the articulation of group goals in a systematic, concrete form at critical stages of a conflict.

The 1937 Education laws were designed to dent the power of the newly organised Greeks, giving to the government the power to investigate the affairs and accounts of the Church, provided the government with the power to disqualify for Church office anyone deported or convicted of sedition and, finally, permitted the Governor to veto any election to the Orthodox See. Thus, it appears that these government acts were designed to further circumscribe the role of the church in the nascent Greek movement and limit the sub-surface development of Greek institutions.

In the Second World War, Cypriot support for the **Allies** was accompanied by a belief that, with the cessation of hostilities, union with Greece would follow almost automatically. Indeed, Churchill's message to the Greek Prime Minister Tsouderos, in October 1941, (commemorating the anni-

versary of Italy's attack on Greece) was interpreted in Cyprus as a clear statement of British aims since Churchill had declared that "the unity of all her (Greece's) sons and daughters behind their King and government in the cause of their fatherland will bring its sure reward."<sup>50</sup> Further evidence of apparent change in the British position came in 1943 when, for the first time since 1931, municipal elections were allowed. Following its election, the new council in Limassol passed a resolution asserting that, after the war (which it supported) the aim for all Greeks in Cyprus should be for the realisation of their national wishes and that "Greeks should be officially called Greeks and not merely Christian Orthodox and the Turks Turks and not Moslems."<sup>51</sup>

The British position regarding Cyprus in general, and the Cypriot Church in particular, underwent significant change in October 1946 when, in a written reply to a Commons question, the new Colonial Secretary in the post-war Labour government, Mr. Creech-Jones, announced that official policy was under review.<sup>52</sup> The stated aim was to evaluate the existing situation with a view to instituting changes designed to permit "a more liberal and progressive regime in the internal affairs of the island." Moreover, with this objective in mind, the Government, in an attempt to utilise the role of the Church in a constructive fashion, announced

the lifting of the 1931 deportation order, thus permitting the return of the leading figures of the 1931 campaign, and the right of Cypriots to fill the vacant position of Ethnarch.

Among those who did return to Cyprus was Makarios, Bishop of Kyrenia, who, on his repatriation, addressed a gathering of Greeks and exhorted, amidst a sea of Greek flags, "Enosis and only enosis!"<sup>53</sup> In June 1947, an election was held to elect an Archbishop, in accordance with British wishes. However, the successful candidate, Leontios, died within a month of his election and was succeeded by the Bishop of Kyrenia, who became Makarios II. By so electing Makarios, the Church declared itself again the leader of the enosis campaign, strongly influencing, through its attitudes and policies, the political attitudes of Greek-Cypriots in general. Indeed, the Church was instrumental in defeating the 1946 proposals. The Church role became diametrically opposed to that hoped for by the British.

Under the 1946 proposals, the Governor was to convene a meeting of a Consultative Assembly, representing the various Cypriot groups, with a view to creating a representative council responsible for internal affairs. In March of 1947 a new governor, Lord Winster, arrived in Cyprus. (It is worthwhile noting that his arrival provoked opposition from Greeks and large demonstrations,



in support of his appointment, on the part of the Turks),<sup>54</sup> and announced that, in accordance with official policy enunciated by the Colonial Secretary,<sup>55</sup> there was to be no change in the status of the island; continued British possession was to go "hand in hand with the programme of development and the intention of establishing a liberal and progressive regime in internal affairs."<sup>56</sup> By July of 1947 invitations were sent to representatives of Cypriot groups asking that they participate in the consultative assembly with a view to drafting a constitution for Cyprus. Under the leadership of Makarios II, however, the sole aim of the Greek population was enosis. Thus, the Church boycotted the meetings of the assembly from the outset. Of the forty people invited, only eighteen attended the Assembly's first meeting in November 1947. Of these, seven were Turkish-Cypriots, eight were left-wing Greek-Cypriots, one was a Maronite and two were Greeks without party affiliation. "As soon as the members put forward their proposals, they found that the terms of reference were very strict indeed. The chairman . . . ruled out of order any reference to self-government; or any reference designed to give elected representatives real executive authority."<sup>57</sup> Under these conditions, the discussions entered a period of limbo and were formally adjourned.

An attempt to relieve the impasse was made in May 1948 when proposals were put forward for a "new constitution" for Cyprus. There were, however, to be certain limits since the Government argued that they would be "unable to give their approval to a constitution which fundamentally exceeded proposals in the direction of self government,"<sup>58</sup> i.e., enosis could not be considered. Central to the new constitution was the idea of a Legislative Council composed of twenty-two members; eighteen were to be Greek, four were to be Turkish, each group being elected by the separate communities. It was thought that "in view of the substantial Turkish minority . . . the Turkish community should elect their own representatives."<sup>59</sup> Moreover, there were to be four Official members on the Council, but the presiding officer would not have a casting vote. An Executive Council, comprising three Greeks and one Turk, would be established to advise the Governor, who was to have, in the last resort, the "usual reserve legislative power."

These proposals were presented to the Assembly in May, where they were rejected by eleven votes to seven; the seven opposition votes were those of the Greek-Cypriots who had, when the plan was first announced, rejected it on the grounds that enosis had not been mentioned. In August 1948 the Consultative Assembly was dissolved by



the Governor, although the May proposals were not withdrawn. (Of the breakdown of the proposals, Lord Winster later observed that the major cause was "political cowardice . . . an unwillingness to take responsibility, [which] is the curse of Cypriot policies."<sup>60</sup>

At the same time as these indications of change appeared at the administrative level, changes were taking place on the local level and within the Church. Shortly after his election to the position of Bishop of Kitium, Makarios (not to be confused with the Ethnarch, Makarios II) organised a reform of the Ethnarchy Council. By the end of 1948 Makarios was Director of the Council, strongly pressing the enosis issue and publishing a magazine, "Greek Cyprus" promoting it. In 1949 the British Government refused to give its consent to the holding of a plebiscite to ascertain the state of local opinion regarding the future form of Cyprus government. The official answer was that, first, the government was not aware of any general demand for a plebiscite and, second, it would not serve any useful purpose.<sup>61</sup> Yet in face of official disapproval the Church, under the apparent direction of the younger Makarios, organised its own "unofficial" plebiscite. The voting, in January 1950, revealed an overwhelming support for enosis; of the Greek-Cypriots entitled to vote, 95.7% (i.e., 215,108) voted for union with Greece.<sup>62</sup>

The response from the Turkish-Cypriots was immediate. The head of the Turkish National Party described the plebiscite as "an unwarranted political manoeuvre." Turks were, he went on, opposed to even a genuine plebiscite because "they believed that for economic, military, geographical and political reasons the island should remain in British hands. If Britain ever left Cyprus, then the island should go to its previous owner, Turkey. Enosis would bring misery."<sup>63</sup>

In Greece, Church and press reaction to the plebiscite was loudly in favour of enosis, whilst the reaction of the government was one of deliberate silence.

The plebiscite, and its aftermath, mark a turning point in the Cyprus conflict. First, it revealed the extent of Makarios' influence upon popular Greek opinion. Upon the death of the elder Makarios, in 1950, Makarios Mouskos, a Cypriot by birth, committed to the idea of a Greater Greece, was elected to the position of Ethnarch, from which he led the anti-British campaign. Secondly, the plebiscite brought forth from the Turkish community another clear statement of policy, avowedly anti-Greek and pro-British. The two Cypriot groups were openly committed to incompatible goals. The plebiscite was clearly catalytic; as a result of its being held, firm political goals were enunciated by both groups and the factor of difference, which had escalated to disagreement,

was now a state of mutual exclusivity of goals: if one was to be 'successful' it would be at the expense of the other.

As Ethnarch, Makarios pressed the enosis campaign with unmitigated zeal. On the diplomatic level, visits to Greece, France, the United States and Britain (all within a five month period) helped bring attention to the Greek-Cypriot cause. On another level, Makarios, in conjunction with another Cypriot, Grivas, began organising a political campaign, the aim of which was to pressure Britain into leaving Cyprus, by raising the costs of staying, i.e., systematic violence.

The organisation of what later came to be called E.O.K.A. (National Organisation of Cyprus Fighters) dates from July 1952, when a meeting was held in Athens under Makarios' chairmanship, to discuss the liberation of Cyprus from British rule. The prime mover in organising the meeting was George Grivas. In the middle of 1951 Grivas had undertaken a study of the problems involved in waging a guerrilla campaign in Cyprus. The formal meeting gave recognition to the Grivas plan and two committees were established - military and political - to help implement it. In November 1952, Grivas went to Cyprus, for four months, to survey the mountain regions and the coastal sites where landing of arms might

be possible. When the period of planning ended, Grivas returned to Athens to assemble arms, many of them remnants of the Greek Civil War, and begin a period of more systematic planning. The attempt to organise a guerrilla campaign was not without opposition; Grivas himself recounts the "blunt refusal" of some groups to participate.<sup>64</sup> More important, an overture to the Greek government received a firm rebuff from the Prime Minister, Marshal Papagos.<sup>65</sup> Nevertheless, the campaign to organise the movement proceeded apace<sup>66</sup> and in late 1954 Grivas left Greece for Cyprus to begin a campaign which altered the nature of the Cyprus conflict.

In the period 1878 to 1954 the conflict in Cyprus had been "colonial," the majority of the population wanted a change in the island's sovereignty whilst the colonial power, and with it a minority of the population, wanted the status quo to prevail. After 1954, the British, the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus, and the governments of Greece and Turkey, became committed to separate and conflicting policies over the status of Cyprus and, at the same time, the dispute over Cyprus functioned as a catalyst in the further worsening of relations between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots within the island itself.

CHAPTER 5Cyprus Under the British: 1954-1960

The factor of Greek involvement is crucial for it is the active involvement of the government in Athens that separates the post-1954 enosis effort from that of 1931. Not only did Greece supply Grivas with arms and aid, it put the Cyprus issue before the United Nations in five consecutive sessions. Moreover, the Greek government, by taking up the Cyprus issue, jeopardised its successes in other areas of foreign policy - not least its new-found friendship with Turkey.

Following its success in the election of November 1952, the Right-wing, conservative Greek government of Marshal Papagos was committed to a five-point foreign policy: perpetuation of peace through United Nations diplomacy; friendship and cooperation with Turkey; better relations with Yugoslavia; cooperation with Britain, France and the United States on aspects of western defence; and a realistic treatment of the Cyprus issue.<sup>1</sup> Shortly after the new government assumed power, Papagos approached the British Ambassador in Athens with a plan for a liberal constitution and a plebiscite within two years.<sup>2</sup> In September of 1953 the Cyprus issue was

raised in the General Assembly debate, with a hint that the Greek government desired bipartite negotiations with Britain.<sup>3</sup> Later the same month Papagos met Eden, British Foreign Secretary, in Athens and was told that Cyprus was not an issue, nor could it be one. The British position was further reiterated by Eden in December in a meeting with the Greek Ambassador in London.

Thus, by the beginning of 1954, with popular opinion in Greece (urged on by the Athens press) in favour of enosis and the British government inflexible in its refusal even to discuss Cyprus as an issue, the Greek government was seriously weighing the costs and benefits of going before the United Nations to call for negotiations with Britain. Public statements from Stephanopoulos, Foreign Minister, and Kyrou, Ambassador to the U.N., were evidence of firm intent by the Greek government. On March 15, however, Eden again reiterated the British position when, in the Commons, he stated that, despite informal approaches from the Greek government, "Her Majesty's Government cannot agree to discuss the status of Cyprus."<sup>4</sup> The decision to go before the United Nations was made on April 15, 1954.<sup>5</sup> By placing the issue before the U.N. the Greek government hoped to pressure Great Britain into negotiation, but Papagos was anxious not to let the gulf between Greece and Britain grow too



large. (Following a demonstration in Rhodes, in favour of enosis, Papagos had stated "We intend to prevent any action which may damage Anglo-Greek friendship"<sup>6</sup>). In regard to the Turkish position, the Greeks were optimistic, mistakenly so in view of the Turkish commitment to the status quo;<sup>7</sup> a belief that any negotiations over Cyprus should be tripartite and a Turkish statement to the effect that a U.N. debate would damage Greek-Turkish relations, were the major planks in the Turkish argument.

In view of the growth of cooperative ventures between Greece and Turkey in the early 'fifties, Greece could little afford a costly rupture, yet the Cyprus issue eventually nullified these early gains. As partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation after 1952, and under Anglo-American pressure to cooperate in the field of Balkan security, Greece and Turkey grew closer in view of a community of security interest. In February 1953, representatives of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia met to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Soon ratified, the agreement was the foundation of the Bled agreement of August 1954, linking the three states through a Treaty of Political Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. This new-found community was, however, short lived.

British intransigence and a refusal to discuss the



status of Cyprus was linked to the progress of the negotiation with Egypt regarding the Canal Zone Base Agreement. On July 27, 1954, Britain and Egypt secured the "Heads of Agreement" regarding the Suez base, thus paving the way for the final agreement (October 19, 1954) under which Britain was to evacuate her base within twenty months. The new headquarters for Middle Eastern Command was to be Cyprus. Thus, on July 28, 1954, Mr. Hopkinson, Secretary of State for the Colonies, told the Commons that "there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent . . . I have said that the question of the abrogation of British sovereignty cannot arise . . . that British sovereignty will remain."<sup>8</sup> This was, Mr. Hopkinson had said, a "vital strategic area."

At the same time, the 1948 Constitutional offer was withdrawn since "it had not been taken up by responsible and representative political leaders."<sup>9</sup> Thus, the government planned to introduce a new constitution, having provision for a legislature containing both Official and Nominated Members - together forming a majority - and Elected Members, together with the appointment of Elected Members to an Executive Council "to take charge of departments." This was, however, to be only a step in the dir-

ection of "constitutional advancement."<sup>10</sup> To forestall any Cypriot reaction the government invoked the existing anti-sedition laws (under Cypriot law, sedition was defined as any attempt to bring about a change in sovereignty), with a statement to the effect that a hard line would be followed,<sup>11</sup> and giving notice that any publications or persons advocating union with Greece would be severely punished. In response, the Cypriot press suspended publication for a week.

By the middle of August, the Greek campaign for enosis was underway. Students at Athens University, urged by their rector to hate Britain, demonstrated in favour of union and nationwide demonstrations were sponsored by the Pan-Hellenic Committee for the Struggle of Cyprus.<sup>12</sup> By the end of August, the British consulate in Crete had been bombed, Makarios had led an anti-British demonstration and more than sixty Greek students were injured in demonstrations in Athens. More significant, perhaps, were the positions of the three governments involved. Papagos, in a letter to U.N. Secretary General Hammarskjold, asked that a plebiscite be held, under U.N. auspices, to decide the will of the Cypriot people.<sup>13</sup> The British response was to argue that the Cyprus issue was purely an internal matter and, with the government of Turkey, agreed to oppose the Greek

move at the U.N. on these grounds.

The Greek diplomatic campaign was not without some success. On September 24, the General Assembly decided to include the Greek item (calling for the "Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the island of Cyprus,"<sup>14</sup>) on its agenda, although the British delegate, Selwyn Lloyd, argued that it had no right to do so. When the issue came before the Assembly for debate and voting, in December 1954, it was approved by fifty votes to none, with eight abstentions. The British government claimed that the passage of the resolution relegated the issue to a relatively minor status, since "no further action"<sup>15</sup> was to be taken although the issue would remain before the U.N.. Thus, the Turkish Government also considered the issue closed and Prime Minister Menderes expressly stated this view in a call for better relations with Greece.<sup>16</sup>

In Cyprus itself the U.N. decision precipitated a series of protest strikes and demonstrations. In one such incident, in Limassol, a dozen persons were injured when British troops fired at rioters. Shortly thereafter, rumours began to circulate that Britain was to make a new offer regarding self-government and the Governor, Sir

Robert Armitage, urged Cypriots to adopt a conciliatory attitude.<sup>17</sup> In face of persistent violations of the anti-sedition laws, however, the British army arrested fifty demonstrators and, in London, the Colonial Secretary, Lennox-Boyd, quashed rumours of an impending constitutional offer.

The failure of the Greek resolution to gain little more than passive acceptance at the U.N. prompted a change in Greek policy, for in January 1955, Papagos, who had previously rebuffed any offer of aid to Grivas, came out in support of the violence campaign.<sup>18</sup> At the same time, "the organisation" was given a name - E.O.K.A. - and a list of its aims drawn up. Indeed, the prime aim of the organisation was such that it could be construed as being complementary to the official government policy in Athens. As Grivas published it, the aim of the organisation was:

to arouse international public opinion, especially among the allies of Greece, by deeds of heroism and sacrifice which will focus attention on Cyprus until our aims are achieved. The British must be continually harried until they are obliged by international diplomacy exercised through the United Nations to examine the Cyprus problem and settle it in accordance with the desires of the Cypriot people and the whole Greek nation.<sup>19</sup>

The E.O.K.A. campaign began on April 1, 1955, when, in the early hours of the morning, bomb explosions destroyed property in Nicosia, Lamaca and Limassol; a radio station

near Nicosia was also damaged. In Athens, the press blamed the outbreak of violence on British rigidity, (as did Makarios) whilst a semi-official newspaper argued that, whilst violence should be disapproved, all "national revolutions" were legitimate.<sup>20</sup> The leader of the Turkish-Cypriots, Mr. Faiz Kaymak, denounced the British for not dealing with the campaign quickly, whilst Makarios, for the Greek-Cypriots, announced that he would not meet with the Governor until self-determination became a subject of discussion. Among Greek-Cypriots, the bombings stimulated interest in the E.O.K.A. campaign and voluntary recruiting to the organisation followed. Significantly, the Cyprus police appealed for men "of all communities" to join a special police force with the intention of putting down the "mounting anti-British demonstrations"<sup>21</sup>. (By February of 1957, the Auxiliary police force was 97% Turkish-Cypriot.<sup>22</sup>) Moreover, the first death of the E.O.K.A. campaign occurred on June 19 when, in a series of bombings throughout Cyprus, a Turkish constable was killed in Nicosia.

The effect of the violence was sufficient to provoke a response from the British government. On June 30, 1955, after persistently arguing that Cyprus was a purely domestic issue, Eden, in a Commons address, invited representatives of Greece and Turkey to a conference, in London, to



discuss "problems of security in the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus."<sup>23</sup>

Agreement from the Greek and Turkish governments was almost immediate, despite the worsening of relations between Britain and the former as a result of a series of radio broadcasts, from Radio Athens, which Britain claimed incited the Cypriot population. In Cyprus, Makarios, who was not invited to attend the conference, quickly denounced the inclusion of Turkey on an equal footing with Greece and predicted the failure of the tripartite talks. In spite of an announcement that talks would be held, they did not commence until August 29, 1955. The rationale of the British government, in convening the conference, seems to have two major aspects: first, by introducing a diplomatic 'barrier', before a "last resort" to the U.N., the British hoped to deflate the Greek effort. In this respect it was partially successful since the Greek government, in submitting a second request to the U.N., asking the General Assembly to call for Cypriot self determination, made recourse to the U.N. contingent upon the success of the London conference.<sup>24</sup> Second, and perhaps more important, Britain formally invited Turkey to become a party to the dispute over Cyprus, in support of the British status quo position. More than this, however, the British overture to Turkey is linked,

in a fundamental way, to long-term British policy in the Middle East. At the time of the signing of the Balkan Pact in August 1954, 'The Times' gave weight to the Turkish position:

By virtue of her geographical position and the numbers and quality of her armed forces, Turkey is called upon to play an important part in the defence system of both the Balkans and the Middle East . . . .

Turkey possesses an army and a long tradition of bravery and endurance, supplemented with a familiarity with the kind of warfare that would be waged in a mountain region. . . .

The importance of the Middle East lies in the fact that it contains 54.7% of world oil resources.<sup>25</sup>

By courting Turkish favours, Britain could be assured of a loyal ally in the Middle East and in the Cyprus issue. Yet Turkey was not without her own rationale. By firmly opposing enosis, Turkey could rule out the not-so-remote possibility that Cyprus might at some future date become an island base of a Communist-controlled Greece, with all the attendant strategic risks. Indeed, the 1958 election success of the Leftists in Greece, gaining 25% of the popular vote, did much to reinforce this Turkish viewpoint. Moreover, Mendenes publicly called for the status quo to prevail several times in the interim period before the conference convened.

In Cyprus, the violence campaign was well underway and general strikes, riots and police involvement became



almost normal occurrences. Grivas' campaign had crossed a second barrier when support from the student population was enlisted to demonstrate and distribute leaflets. The success of E.O.K.A. was such that Makarios sent a message to Grivas saying, "I congratulate you. E.O.K.A. has contributed more to the Cyprus struggle than seventy-five years of paper war."<sup>26</sup> Meanwhile Greek-Cypriots were resigning from the police force en masse, to be replaced by Turks and British officers hurriedly flown from other colonies.

The London conference convened on August 29, in the wake of a series of demonstrations and killings in Cyprus. Under the chairmanship of the British Foreign Secretary, MacMillan, the first days of the conference consisted of presentations of initial positions. For Greece, Stephanopoulos argued that the value of Cyprus as a base depended upon the goodwill of the people of Cyprus and that Cyprus was now more than a domestic issue. MacMillan stressed Britain's commitment to hold the island, together with a commitment to keep order, whilst Zorlu, for Turkey, stated in no uncertain terms, that if Britain left Cyprus, Turkey would take control of it. With pessimism descending, the prospects for success were further exacerbated when rioting broke out at Izmir and Istanbul. Turks, apparently in retaliation for bombings of Turkish buildings

in Salonika, rampaged through the streets burning and looting Greek stores and firing Greek churches.

(Following the coup d'etat of 1960, evidence came to light in Turkey that the Izmir riot had been planned by Mendenes, as well as the Salonika bombings, to act as a show of Turkish interest in Cyprus, but later got out of hand; indeed, there were suspicions that this was the case as early as mid-September.<sup>27</sup>)

In these circumstances, MacMillan put forward a plan offering to Cyprus a "substantial measure of self government," without implying that self determination would follow;<sup>28</sup> an assembly with an elected majority, appointed minority and proportional representation for Turks was to be linked to a Council of Ministers, autonomous in all affairs except foreign affairs, defence and public security. To give effect to the plan a tripartite commission would be established in London. Not unexpectedly, the plan was not well received and the conference ended within ten days of its first session. The "Manchester Guardian", recording the end of the conference, reported "The discussions on Cyprus have come . . . to an inconclusive end. Indeed it is worse than inconclusive. The effort has been seriously to worsen relations between Greece and Turkey while Britain's own position in Cyprus has not been in the least improved."<sup>29</sup>

Indeed, the situation was such that Greece severed sea and air links with Turkey and refused to join N.A.T.O. exercises and meetings of the Balkan pact in face of Turkish hostility. The British response, following the London conference, was to send more troops to Cyprus. On September 16 the E.O.K.A. movement was declared illegal and, following a series of attacks on police stations and thefts of arms, the "security forces" began systematic searches for arms caches. A second Greek-Cypriot organisation (M.O.K.A. - Mystery Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) formally announced its foundation and its allegiance to E.O.K.A. in mid-September and the frequency of violent outbreaks increased.

The Greek diplomatic campaign received two major setbacks in the month of September. First, the American Secretary of State, Foster Dulles, sent almost identical letters to the governments of Greece and Turkey, telling them to "mend their fences" in the interests of the solidarity of the alliance.<sup>30</sup> For the Greeks this was an unfortunate reprimand since they deemed the Turks to be at fault, whilst Dulles' letter seemed to cast equal blame. The feeling was further compounded when, within two days, the U.N. steering committee voted against the inclusion of the Cyprus issue for the tenth session. Of the seven votes against the Greek position, five were from N.A.T.O.

allies - among them the United States, Britain and France.<sup>31</sup> In Athens, the conservative, pro-western newspaper "Kathimerini" spoke of the betrayal of Hellenism.<sup>32</sup> On October 5, Papagos died and Constantine Karamanlis was appointed to the position of caretaker prime minister, pending the holding of a general election.

Further evidence of a British commitment to "order in Cyprus" came on September 25, when Field Marshal Sir John Harding, former Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was named Governor of Cyprus and commander-in-chief of the security forces. Explaining the replacement of a civilian, Armitage, by a soldier, the Colonial Office cited the need to maintain the security of the base in Cyprus. In response, Stephanopoulos announced that the appointment of Harding was tantamount to a British declaration of war upon Cypriots,<sup>33</sup> whilst Makarios announced the formation of a passive resistance movement. The situation in Cyprus itself was, however, far from passive, with strikes and clashes with troops taking place on a greater scale with greater frequency. More troops were flown to Cyprus from the Sudan and, in response, E.O.K.A. increased the frequency of its attacks.

Towards the end of October the Governor banned the Greek celebration of Greece's rejection of Italy's ulti-

matum in 1940. The effect of the ban was to precipitate riots, against the ban, in the major towns on the island in which many were hurt in clashes with troops sent to control them. Moreover, the sentencing to death of a Greek-Cypriot for killing a policeman, caused further violent outbreaks, both in Nicosia and in Athens.<sup>34</sup>

The policy initiated upon the arrival of Harding was two-pronged; in addition to trying to eradicate E.O.K.A. through a systematic campaign of law and order, there were also intermittent negotiations with Makarios on ways to end the violence and endow Cypriots with political responsibility. Harding had stated his objective as being "to establish and maintain law and order . . . and to be prepared at any time to discuss constitutional developments towards self government on the basis of the proposals put forward at the London conference."<sup>35</sup>

Early on in their discussions there were reports of a narrowing of differences on the issue of self determination, with Britain willing to discuss self-government if the violence ended. In return, Makarios reportedly dropped the issue of enosis in favour of self determination.<sup>36</sup> The British strategy seems to have been that if E.O.K.A. could be curtailed, then the power of Makarios to bargain would be severely eroded and a settlement reached. Yet, according to Charles Foley "the bargaining



advantage lay with whoever was more successful outside the conference room."<sup>37</sup>

By November of 1955 the Greek-Cypriots clearly had the upper hand. The campaign to save Karaolis from a sentence of death for murder, encompassed most Greeks on the island. Students demonstrated, bombs were thrown at British buildings and installations, British soldiers were killed and, in response, schools were closed, the police campaign stepped up and more stringent measures invoked. Following the killing of a British soldier, in retaliation for the death of a Cypriot, a state of emergency was declared and, with it, emergency regulations were introduced. Thus, the carrying of arms was punishable by death, public meetings were prosecuted and strikes made illegal.

Meanwhile there was much discussion on the subject of repairing the Greco-Turkish rift that followed the London conference and the Izmir riots. The government in Athens held that no conciliatory action was possible until it had been indemnified for the damage to Greek property and, in anger at the Turkish position, threatened to leave the Balkan alliance. Responding to this impasse, the government of Yugoslavia attempted to intervene as mediator in the dispute.<sup>38</sup> The Greek response to the now deadlocked Harding-Makarinos negotiations was to



send a representative to confer with both. As a result the Greek government was "hopeful" that some success would be forthcoming. According to Xydis, the Greek representative, Mr. Liatis, was sent to inform Makarios of the extent of Greek support "and to suggest to him that he should resume his talks with the Governor" on the basis of a revised British proposal for some degree of self government.<sup>39</sup> The talks resumed on January 9, 1956, and there were press reports of British concessions in the offing.<sup>40</sup> The magnitude of the gains in the talks was such that agreement was reported close by both sides; Makarios was asked to accept a compromise proposal of self rule followed by self determination later, "when strategic considerations permit."<sup>41</sup> For the Greek-Cypriots, Makarios was to try to end the violence. The positions were thought to be close enough to make a settlement possible and Dulles, for one, was pressing the British to keep the negotiations going.<sup>42</sup> Harding was called to London for talks and returned to continue the negotiations with Makarios. At the same time, Greece was reported to be satisfied with a Turkish indemnity offer, related to the Izmir riots, and agreed to attend a meeting of the Balkan pact.

One of the major obstacles at this point of the negotiations was the control of the police force during any

intermediate period of government. Grivas informed Makarios that the control of internal security must not be left in the hands of the British.<sup>43</sup> In turn, Makarios amended this condition, to agree to British control of the police, if the auxiliary force (which was by now largely Turkish-Cypriot) were abolished. As if to reinforce the Greek-Cypriot opposition to the auxiliary force, Themistocles Dervis, the Mayor of Nicosia, called the conduct of the police in quelling a student demonstration "barbaric."<sup>44</sup>

The impending Greek election caused a slow-down in the negotiations with Britain waiting to see the evolving Greek policy. The election success of Karanlis and the National Radical Union on February 19 ensured the continuity of Greek policy - despite criticism from opposition parties.

The day to day events in Cyprus were such that violence was by now becoming an endemic feature. Assassinations and demonstrations were widespread and reprisal killings frequent. Indeed, the violence was a key to the success of the negotiations, since the British demanded its end before agreeing to a settlement. Thus, on February 16, Grivas ordered a suspension of all attacks in order to promote a settlement. With an agreement apparently close at hand, Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, perhaps fearing any compromise might be a prelude to enosis,

spoke for the Turkish-Cypriots when he announced that they would fight enosis.<sup>45</sup>

Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, flew to Cyprus to confer with Harding; the United States Consul General told Makarios that the United States thought the terms of a British settlement "fair" and a settlement seemed nearer yet. As mediator in the Harding-Makarios talks, Francis Noel-Baker, a Labour Member of Parliament, guided the parties. Fluent in Greek, Noel-Baker was employed to journey between Government House and the residence of Makarios, with details of the few difficulties outstanding; the role of the police, composition of a Cyprus parliament and an amnesty for E.O.K.A. members.

That the negotiations subsequently broke down, with agreement apparently so near, may be explicable in terms of factors extraneous to the Cyprus disputes per se. On March 1, 1956, General John Glubb was dismissed as head of the Jordanian Arab Legion and summarily ordered to leave the country. Due solely to a personal disagreement with King Hussein, the dismissal of Glubb was perceived in Britain, and especially by Eden, as a portent of instability in the Middle East. The net effect in London of the Jordanian disturbances was to convince the British decision makers (primarily in the Cabinet) that

Britain must adhere to a rigid policy of strength in the Middle East - including Cyprus.

The same day, with negotiations again at an impasse, Lennox-Boyd returned to London and terrorist activity erupted again. Makarios blamed the British for the failure of the negotiations: specifically, British unwillingness to concede on three issues; on a guarantee that the projected Legislative Assembly would have a Greek-Cypriot majority; on a time limit for the retention of police powers by Britain; and on a proposal for an amnesty for all political prisoners.<sup>46</sup> The changed principle of British policy, with negotiation being replaced by coercion, manifested itself shortly thereafter when Britain suspended the negotiations and gave priority to ending the terrorist campaign. Lennox-Boyd, announcing the decision, stated that Britain had the resolution and force to restore order and blamed Makarios for not condemning the violence on the part of the Greek-Cypriots. Harding immediately echoed this by refusing to accede to Makarios' demand for an amnesty for those held on charges of carrying weapons and rebuked Makarios for not calling for an end to violence.<sup>47</sup> As for the Athens government, the British "jammed" Radio Athens, long a sore point between the two, thus cutting off its link with Cyprus. Reciprocating, the Greek radio ceased broadcast of all

B.B.C. programmes.

On March 9, Makarios, Bishop Kyprianou of Kyrenia and two others were deported from Cyprus and flown to the Seychelles. Explaining the decision, Lennox-Boyd told the Commons that there was evidence of their "connection with violence" and, in light of it, "their influence must be removed."<sup>48</sup> Two days later, on March 14, Eden addressed the Commons to explain the recent government policy on Cyprus and concluded by outlining the philosophy of the government:

Her Majesty's Government must be concerned . . . to protect the vital interests of its own citizens. The welfare and indeed the lives of our people depend upon Cyprus as a protective guard and staging post to take care of those interests, above all oil. This is not imperialism. It should be the plain duty of any Government and we intend to do it.<sup>49</sup>

The effects of the decision were widespread. Greece was the scene of fierce anti-British demonstrations, the Greek government protested to the U.N. and withdrew its ambassador from London. The United States, surprised at the deportation, voiced its "sympathetic concern" to Greece and called for a resumption of talks. In Cyprus itself, after an hiatus, the violence began again, preceded by a general strike during which only Turkish stores were open. Needless to say, the Turkish-Cypriots, by their acquiescence, gave tacit approval to the British decision.

With a rapid increase in the campaign of violence,



Harding announced that Britain might need six months to end the terrorist campaign and, until it was ended, no talks on self-government would be held.<sup>50</sup>

Towards the end of March, relations between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot took a sharp turn for the worse. The facts of the matter are imprecise, but by one report a group of Greek-Cypriots, apparently drunk, entered the village of Vasilia and began attacking the Turks in the Turkish quarter, injuring many.<sup>51</sup> In retaliation, Turks in Nicosia stoned Greek buses and damaged Greek-owned property in Hermes Street, the border between the two quarters of the town. The effect of these incidents was to reveal the nature of "normal" day to day relations between the two Cypriot communities; superficially, relations were good, yet single provocative incident immediately polarised the communities, with violent incidents following. Indeed, the Vasilia incident turned out to be only the start of violence between the communal groups. The general situation worsened when, in April, a British civilian was shot dead by E.O.K.A., the first British civilian to be killed, and a force of British police volunteers were flown to Cyprus to aid in the general law enforcement and security duties, the first such unit ever deployed outside Britain.<sup>52</sup>

By this time, with violence firmly entrenched, the positions of the parties were clear. On three separate occasions, British representatives (Eden, Harding and the



United Kingdom delegate to the Council of Europe) reiterated that order must precede talks.<sup>53</sup> The E.O.K.A. position was also hardening, with suspected Greek-Cypriots now being killed. The Ethnarchy Council, at its first meeting since Makarios' deportation, ruled out further negotiation until the return of the Ethnarch. Thus, within two months the positions were almost completely altered; conciliatory attitudes gave way on all sides to hard line, intractable bargaining positions. The last vestiges of moderation disappeared with the execution of two convicted Greek-Cypriots, Karaolis and Demetriou, and the reciprocal execution, by E.O.K.A., of two British soldiers.

The violence between the Cypriot communities increased sharply. Following the killing of a Turkish policeman, with E.O.K.A. claiming responsibility, Turkish-Cypriots rioted throughout the island. In Nicosia, Greek shops were burned and stoned and British troops were called in to separate the Greek and Turkish quarters.<sup>54</sup> Shops were damaged in Lamaca and Limassol, whilst further armed clashes were reported elsewhere.

In Paphos, another Turkish policeman was killed and in Nicosia, British troops were again called in to separate groups of fighting Greeks and Turks.

With the situation becoming worse by the day, Harding

was called to London amid reports of an imminent British change in policy, despite a speech by Eden to the effect that Cyprus must be held to safeguard British oil.<sup>55</sup>

Shortly thereafter, the British Cabinet was thought to be ready to offer to Cyprus a draft constitution with fairly liberal provisions, and a date for self-determination. But to be accepted the plan had to receive Turkish support, and this proved to be the stumbling block.

The Turkish government argued that the offer of self-government to Makarios in March had gone too far and that it opposed any change in the present status of the island.<sup>56</sup>

Moreover, Menderes argued that any move towards the granting of self-determination would be in violation of the Lausanne Treaty, and that Turkey would never change its policy.<sup>57</sup> In Cyprus, the Turkish-Cypriot leader Kuchuk warned that if Cyprus were granted a liberal constitution, then Turkey would leave the Baghdad Pact and sever ties with Britain, in spite of assurances that a constitution would preserve Turkish rights.

Nevertheless, in July, signs appeared that the British position, in face of almost unrestrained violence and the exacerbation of relations between the communities in Cyprus, was changing. Harding, following the London meeting, went back to Cyprus stating that, if Makarios denounced the use of violence, then "a new situation

would be created." More important, Eden announced that Lord Radcliffe would be sent to Cyprus to gauge the state of local conditions, but that a constitution would not be offered until the terrorism ended.<sup>58</sup> Whilst Dervis called the proposed visit a waste of time, Kuchuk came out in favour of it, but insisted on equal Turkish representation. Despite the initial Greek protests, Radcliffe was able to meet with both Cypriot groups before returning to London.

In August the Governor announced an extension of the scope of the emergency powers in an attempt to curb the mounting violence. (During the month of July, seventeen deaths were reported.) By the middle of the month, however, the violence was interrupted by an eleven day truce. In an interview with the "Cyprus Times" Harding put the onus for any initiative on E.O.K.A. by saying "Let the murderers make the first move if there is to be a stopping of the violence and its consequences."<sup>59</sup> E.O.K.A. quickly took up the offer and called for negotiations along the lines suggested by Makarios in March. After eleven days, however, the truce collapsed over the issue of E.O.K.A. surrender and the violence resumed with increasing frequency: in the following month, seventeen deaths were reported.

In the meantime, the Greek government had decided to take the matter of Cyprus before the United Nations

yet again, on the grounds that Britain had failed to take the necessary steps to solve the Cyprus problem, the truce offer notwithstanding. At the same time, Britain referred the Cyprus issue to the United Nations in view of the suspected involvement of Greece on behalf of the Greek-Cypriots, not least in the matter of arms shipments. (Both claims were included in the Assembly agenda for the eleventh session.) A second dispute between Greece and Britain arose over the role of Makarios. Britain claimed that Makarios was not indispensable to any negotiations, whilst (in a speech to the Greek Chamber of Deputies) Averoff-Tossizza, the Greek Foreign Minister, hinted that Makarios would soon be released. Greece was, moreover, ready to discuss any suitable offer from Britain.<sup>60</sup>

In the wake of an unprecedented wave of violence - during the month of November, thirty-four deaths were recorded - and in face of the Greek willingness to negotiate, Harding flew to London for talks with the Cabinet. Several days later, after talks with Harding, Lennox-Boyd flew to Greece for consultation with Karamanlis. On December 19 a White Paper, embodying Radcliffe's proposals, was made public and presented to the Commons by the Colonial-Secretary. The major provisions of the proposals included the establishment of a legislative

assembly with twenty-four Greek members, six Turkish members (elected by the Turkish community) and six official members appointed by the Governor. The assembly was empowered to exercise full control in all areas except foreign affairs, defence and internal security. In fact, British control of the police was the major reason for the Greek rejection of the offer; it was upon this matter that the Makarios talks with Harding had floundered.

Yet a more significant development at this stage was not the rejection of the Radcliffe proposals but the introduction of the possible option of partitioning the island. Lennox-Boyd, winding up presentation of the Radcliffe proposals, had maintained that: "Her Majesty's Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options."<sup>61</sup> The possibility of partition, a concrete Turkish presence, officially recognised, was quickly picked up by Menderes and "taxim" (partition) remained the Turkish, and Turkish-Cypriot slogan until 1958. Indeed, such was the Turkish enthusiasm for the partition proposal, that a concrete plan was presented in January of 1957.<sup>62</sup>

The by-now systematic E.O.K.A. campaign of assassinating Turkish policemen precipitated a further crisis early



in 1957. In response to such a killing, Turkish youths set fire to Greek buildings in Nicosia and, in defiance of a curfew order, demonstrated en masse at the ensuing funeral. More such clashes followed and relations worsened further. Indeed, the Greek parliament called for a United Nations force to be sent to the island.<sup>63</sup> Rather than give sustenance to the Greek cause, the United Nations did much to defeat it. When the joint Greek/British items were considered by the General Assembly they were resoundingly defeated when the Assembly voted, by 55 votes to none, with two abstentions, a resolution calling for "an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression" to achieve a solution.<sup>63a</sup> The Greek reaction was to ask Grivas to effect a cease-fire in order to stimulate negotiations.<sup>64</sup> With the leading E.O.K.A. personnel either detained or killed, there was little Grivas could do but comply and, on March 14, E.O.K.A. offered to suspend operations if Makarios were released.

Harding was immediately called to London and, after Cabinet discussions, the British response was announced; Makarios would be released if he denounced the use of violence. This he duly did and was released from the Seychelles on April 7. Grivas was given an offer of safe conduct out of the island. The effects of the release of Makarios were widespread. In Greece, the reaction was



extremely favourable and Ambassador Mostras returned to London. The Greek-Cypriots responded by demonstrating in favour of enosis and were dispersed by troops. The Turkish government, however, viewed these developments with considerable alarm; coupled with the debacle of Suez, the release of Makarios seemed to be a clear sign of British weakness. Indeed, the popular press reflected this attitude and later began an attack on the Orthodox Church in Cyprus. Among Turkish-Cypriots, the slogan was still partition.

Thus, events seemed to taking a turn for the better, especially with the entry of British troops into the Greek quarter of Nicosia, the first such venture in fourteen months,<sup>65</sup> There were, however, significant developments regarding relations between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. Whilst Makarios was calling for the exclusion of Turkish-Cypriots from any negotiations he gave guarantees that their rights would be upheld.<sup>66</sup> In return, Kuchuk refused to attend any meeting attended by Makarios.<sup>67</sup> By May the Turkish-Cypriots were solidly in favour of partition and Kuchuk was in Ankara conveying the message to the Menderes government. The size of the rift between the two primary parties was made clear when, on June 3, eighteen Turkish-Cypriot members of the local town councils resigned en masse, charging that their Greek counter-

parts were seeking to use their majority status in support of solely Greek aims.<sup>68</sup> The truce, however, proved to be durable and Harding, after another visit to London, lifted 33 of the 76 emergency regulations on August 9, more than four months after the start of the truce. By early September the new bargaining positions were clear; Karamanlis stipulated that self-determination for Cyprus was the pre-condition for Greek participation in any talks; Makarios had agreed to join talks with Turkey present, and Turkey (and with it the Turkish-Cypriots) were rigidly adhering to the partition plan. As Foley puts it, "Speeches were filled with Taxim and Taxim came booming over the radio from Ankara."<sup>69</sup>

On October 11 the truce ended. By Grivas' own account, the violence began again in reprisal for a British raid on a Troodos hideout of E.O.K.A.. On October 19, Harding was replaced as Governor by Sir Hugh Foot, previously Governor of Jamaica, and popularly regarded as "liberal". With the news of a new Governor came an increase in the violence, but it was not solely confined to Greek-British clashes. Volkan, a Turkish underground organization, warned that "for every dead Turk there would be five dead Greeks," in response to the killing of yet another Turkish policeman.

With the defeat, in the United Nations General As-

sembly, of a fourth Greek resolution, riots erupted in the island, with several killed. Yet the defeat at the United Nations again stimulated diplomatic efforts to achieve a settlement. In Paris, Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary General of NATO, initiated negotiations during a NATO meeting. Involved were the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and Great Britain. In the same place, President Eisenhower conferred with Karamanlis.<sup>70</sup> After a month in Cyprus, Foot flew to London, whilst Makarios went to Athens, amid speculation that an initiative was near. Foot, however, warned observers not to expect "miracles."<sup>71</sup> Yet the signs persisted that something was in the offing as, first, Lennox-Boyd met the Turkish Ambassador and, second, Foot flew to Ankara, with Lloyd, for talks with the Turkish government.

Yet while Foot was in London and Ankara, the inter-communal conflict reached new dimensions as British troops clashed with Turkish-Cypriots in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. Furthermore, the previously united Greek-Cypriots were beginning to fight amongst themselves; leftist and rightist factions openly fought each other after two Greeks of leftist leanings were killed. An anti-E.O.K.A. demonstration, 3000 strong, again preoccupied the British force in Nicosia and Kuchuk was sufficiently alarmed to call attention to the situation. The worst of

it was, however, yet to come, for within two days Turkish-Cypriots rioted in Nicosia in favour of partition, with the mob stoning police and causing widespread damage. In more clashes with police, four Turkish-Cypriots were killed. The government countered by placing the Turkish quarters of Nicosia and Famagusta under curfew whilst local leaders in the areas hurriedly appealed for order.<sup>72</sup>

With the talks continuing in Ankara, a statement was issued by Menderes, to the effect that Turkish-Cypriot interests would be guaranteed in any settlement. The press, however, assailed the British handling of the riots in Cyprus, the first open criticism of the British position. After leaving Ankara, Lloyd flew to Athens for talks with government officials, accompanied by reports that tripartite talks might soon result. They did not, but the general opinion prevailing in Athens was that the negotiations had entered a "new phase."<sup>73</sup> Indeed they had, since Athens was the scene of a meeting between Foot and Makarios.

Despite the rising dissatisfaction among the Turks (a rally in Nicosia, on February 11, saw the appearance of the slogan "Partition or death!") the Government was sufficiently confident that it permitted tourists to

enter the island for the first time in two years. The decision proved to be a little premature for bombings increased in frequency throughout March and, on April 4, two Greek-Cypriots were assassinated. The assassination of two British soldiers (May 4) led to the reimposition of the death penalty for terrorist offences and the arrest of 500 Greek-Cypriots for questioning.

Meanwhile, the Turkish-Cypriots had formally declared themselves independent of the Greek-Cypriots. At a meeting held on April 24, 5000 Turks had voted to form separate municipalities in the main towns of the island and to pay no more taxes to the Greek Councils.<sup>74</sup> Amidst further rumours that a new British plan was to be offered for discussion, the Turkish-Cypriots threatened a renewal of violence if partition were not included. On June 3, in a pro-partition demonstration, three Turks were killed and more than twenty injured. (In addition, the Ankara government was persistent in its partition demands and, as if to epitomise the popular feeling of Turks, Makarios was burned in effigy in Ankara.<sup>75</sup>) Things became worse when reports circulated throughout the island about the "Guenyeli massacre." A party of Greek-Cypriots had been arrested by British troops and driven to a nearby Turkish village and told to walk home. When the British left, a group of Turks attacked the Greeks,



killing several. Of the impact of the incident, Foley has written, "After Guenyeli any semblance of a civilised society vanished."<sup>76</sup> Indeed, the situation seemingly worsened on all fronts. Two battalions of troops were dispatched to Cyprus by Britain, whilst Greece, in face of ever more persistent Turkish protestations over partition, withdrew all its personnel from NATO headquarters in Izmir and severed all military ties with Turkey. There were, however, reports of an impending British initiative, which seemed to be supported when the Greek-Cypriot mayors of Cyprus met Foot before going to meet Makarios in Athens.

The initiative came when MacMillan announced a new plan before the Commons - "A new adventure in partnership" between the communities in the island and also the governments of Britain, Greece and Turkey.<sup>77</sup> With the initial assumption that the status of the island would not change for seven years, the major elements were outlined. There was to be a separate House of Representatives for each community, each having final legislative authority in communal affairs; the authority for internal administration, other than communal affairs and internal security, was to be undertaken by a Council presided over by the Governor and including representatives



of the Greek and Turkish governments, together with six elected members drawn from the Houses of Representatives, four Greek and two Turkish; the Governor, acting in conjunction with the Greek and Turkish governments, would have "reserve powers" to ensure the preservation of communal interests as well as control over defence, internal security and external affairs; and, finally, representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments would have the right to require any legislation, defined by them as discriminatory, to be reserved for investigation by an impartial tribunal. Further, MacMillan went on, "we trust that this imaginative plan will be welcomed by all concerned in the spirit which it was put forward."<sup>78</sup>

In essence, the plan was a basis for discussion. It contained some element of partition by giving both communities separate legislative assemblies and it offered some degree of encouragement to the proponents of enosis by institutionalising a link with Greece. Predictably, Kuchuk and Menderes rejected the plan, almost in unison, since it gave no mention of partition, as defined by the Turks. Makarios' position did show some sign of change, however, for whilst he did reject it, he did admit that self-government was some way along the road to self-determination. Averoff-Tossizza, in a speech before

the Greek parliament, told deputies that Greece would postpone its demand for self-determination if self-government was offered.<sup>79</sup>

The diplomatic activity was accompanied by a period of relative quiescence in Cyprus, but this was brought to a halt when a Greek-Cypriot was shot dead in the Turkish quarter of Limassol. The killing of seven Turkish-Cypriots (July 12), which brought the total of dead, in little over a month, to forty-two, precipitated strikes by Turks in Famagusta. In an attempt to calm the situation, Foot, Dervis, and Denktash, leader of the Turkish community in Kuchuk's absence, issued an appeal for calm and an appeal for an end to the violence.<sup>80</sup> By early August, Menderes, in a significant gesture of conciliation, asked the Turkish-Cypriots to curb the prevalent violence.

Indeed, conciliation seemed to be the prevailing mood at the diplomatic level. MacMillan asked Menderes and Karamanlis to join him in a joint appeal for an end to the violence and E.O.K.A. announced a truce. At the invitation of the Greek government, MacMillan flew to Athens and, later, to Ankara for talks with Menderes. Significantly, Menderes accepted the British partnership plan, calling it "compatible with the ultimate Turkish demand for partition."

These discussions led to a modification of the partnership plan, details of which were announced on August 15. The June 19 plan was modified at four major points; first, there was a suggestion of an island-wide legislature, superior to the two communal chambers; second, there were to be invitations to the Greek and Turkish governments to appoint liason representatives to the Governor, instead of having members in the Governor's Executive Council; third, provision was to be made for separate Greek and Turkish municipal councils in suitable localities, which would add separate communal executive functions to those already outlined; and, fourth, the proposal that Cypriots have dual nationality (both British and Greek or Turkish) was deferred.<sup>81</sup>

At this stage, with Makarios and Karamanlis rejecting the proposals, it appeared that NATO might become instrumental in bringing about a settlement. Since Turkey accepted the British plan, Spaak went to Greece to try to persuade the Greek government to do likewise and asked Britain not to implement its new plan until all involved agreed to it. However, the Greek government refused to consider the NATO initiative since it believed that the British plan was prejudicial to the long term future of the island. In the meantime, Makarios had put forward his own plan, which ruled out any union with

Greece and assured the Turkish-Cypriots that their rights would be safeguarded.<sup>82</sup>

With the limbo in negotiations the violence in the island erupted yet again; with British civilians the main target. In face of the new campaign, Foot offered arms to British civilians wishing to arm themselves<sup>83</sup> and troops combed the island in a new wave of anti-E.O.K.A. activities. On November 22, E.O.K.A. declared a truce, just at the time the thirteenth United Nations Assembly was considering a draft Greek resolution calling for Cyprus independence after a trial period of self-government. After much debate, the Assembly finally passed a Mexican-sponsored compromise resolution calling upon all the nations concerned to strive for a "peaceful, democratic and just solution."<sup>84</sup> With the Greek initiative at the United Nations again defeated, MacMillan urged Greece and Turkey to confer with Britain, pledging to accept any agreed amendments to the British plan. The offer was taken up and, amid signs of Greco-Turkish rapprochement, events took a turn for the better. Talks in Paris between the Greek Ambassador and the Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu were followed by visits to the same place by Averoff-Tossizza and a statement from Foot that, if the present truce were made permanent, then Makarios would be allowed to return to Cyprus. The comings and goings of January culminated

in an announcement that Karamanlis, Averoff-Tossizza, Menderes and Zorlu had agreed to meet in Zurich on February 5. Thus, after persistently refusing to enter into talks with Turkey and after five attempts to bring the United Nations into the dispute on its side, the Greek government had been forced to accept the position it had for so long tried to avoid.

From the six-day conference came the skeletal features of the Cyprus constitution of 1960. Agreement was reached on the issues of president and vice-president; the former was to be a Greek-Cypriot whilst the latter would be a Turkish-Cypriot and have veto powers over policies affecting Turkish security and the Turkish-Cypriot community, including foreign affairs and the appointments military and police chiefs. There was to be a joint legislative chamber, with two-thirds of the seats allotted to the Greek-Cypriots. The independence of the island was to be safeguarded by a tripartite agreement between Britain, Greece and Turkey, whilst a joint Greek-Turkish garrison would be stationed in the island. Great Britain was to retain its military bases on the island.<sup>85</sup>

This done, the proceedings moved to London. Greece invited Makarios to attend and Turkey made a similar gesture to Kuchuk. Makarios took issue with several aspects of the Zurich agreement, not least those of the



vice-presidential veto and the 30% Turkish representation. But since Greece was already in agreement, Makarios was given a clear alternative - either to agree or to disagree. The former was chosen and the London agreement signed on February 19.

In Cyprus, the Governor released the prisoners held in detention camps on February 22, declared an amnesty for E.O.K.A. members on February 27 (including safe passage to Greece for Grivas) and revoked the order exiling Makarios on March 1. On March 9 Grivas gave his full support to the new arrangements and returned to Greece, to be met with a hero's welcome, and seemed set to retire from public life, only to return by July. Later in the year the cleavages in the island grew wider. Greek-Cypriots became more disorganised and split into factions (with Grivas openly critical of Makarios by early August<sup>86</sup>). By October the constitutional negotiations were suspended following reports of arms smuggling to Turkish-Cypriots. Indeed, the mood was tense enough to provoke the Governor into increasing British army patrols to keep order. In Turkey, denials that Turkey was implicated in any arms smuggling were profuse, whilst the Greek government was cautious. Makarios, however, trying to keep the Greek-Cypriots united, urged moderation and a return to nego-



tiations, which duly reconvened in early November.

Constitutional development continued throughout the year. A Joint Constitutional Commission was established at Zurich and empowered to draft a constitution. A second committee was established to plan and supervise the orderly transfer of power at independence, and both proceeded with their work in orderly fashion. On October 27 the draft of a defensive agreement was initialled by Greece, Turkey and Britain, and on November 10 Makarios and Kuchuk agreed on the respective powers of the offices of president and vice-president, but not without several deadlocked sessions.

By early December, however, the rift in the Greek ranks manifested itself when Makarios found himself opposed in an election held to fill the Presidency. After a somewhat acrimonious campaign Makarios was elected, defeating John Clerides, the second Greek candidate who had opposed the pre-independence agreements. Kuchuk was elected to the Vice-Presidency unopposed.

It had been announced in 1959 that Cyprus would become independent in February 1960. As event turned out, negotiations over the size of the British base areas preoccupied British and Cyprus representatives for much of January; by Cypriot request, independence was postponed. Outstanding points of difference were settled by July 1 and August 16 was set as the formal day for independence.

CHAPTER 6Cyprus and Constitutional Conflict: 1960-1963

On August 16 "a sovereign and independent republic" of Cyprus came into being. In theory and in law, Cyprus was sovereign and fully independent; in fact it was not. The powers of the Cyprus government were circumscribed severely. True, the Constitution assured the legal independence of the republic, but two other important documents accompanied the Constitution - the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee. Under the terms of the Treaty of Alliance, effected August 16 1960, Greece and Turkey were empowered to participate in the common defense of Cyprus, and , to this end, establish a tripartite military headquarters in the island. For this purpose, 950 Greek and 650 Turkish officers and men were stationed in the island, the command of the headquarters rotating between Greek, Turkish and Cypriot every year.<sup>1</sup>

The Treaty of Guarantee recognised the "independence, territorial integrity and security" of Cyprus, yet contained the following provision:

Article IV: In the event of a breach of the present treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. Insofar as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the

three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present treaty.<sup>2</sup> (Emphasis added.)

The treaty was inherently contradictory since, whilst firmly recognising the independence of the republic, it gave to each of the guarantor states the right of unilateral intervention. But the treaties were what they were - fragile documents which reflected minimal common interests by all those concerned in its planning and construction. Surely, any document born of five years of animosity could be little else?

As if these were not enough, the provisions of the Sovereign Base Agreements further articulated the powers of the Cypriot administration. Under the provisions of the "Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus," the republic was to comprise the island, and offshore islands, with the exception of two areas - the Sovereign Bases of Akrotiri and Dhekilia. Moreover, under Annex B, section 3,

The United Kingdom shall have the right to use the airfield at Nicosia together with any facilities on or connected with the airfield to whatever extent is considered necessary from time to time by the United Kingdom authorities for the operation of United Kingdom military aircraft in peace and in war, including the exercise of any operational control of air traffic.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, Britain maintained the right to use Cyprus as an air base, in pursuit of its Middle Eastern defense policy.

Indeed, it may be argued that, of all those involved in the Cyprus issue, Britain got "the best of the deal," for Cyprus was still a base, just as Britain had wanted, whilst Britain was rid of a thorny and, no less important, costly colonial problem.

Within these strictly defined limits, the Cyprus constitution was supposed to function. However, the new constitution was the embodiment of the ethnic difference in Cyprus! The major provisions of the constitution are illustrated in the diagram below. Article Two of the Cyprus Constitution recognises the existence of two ethnic groups:


- (1) The Greek Community shall comprise all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural tradition or who are members of the Greek Orthodox Church.
- (2) The Turkish Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems.<sup>4</sup>

In addition, both languages are regarded as "official" and receive equal recognition. Also recognised is the right of both groups to celebrate Greek and Turkish national holidays and to fly the Greek or Turkish flag. Thus, the 1960 Constitution was built around a bicomunal structure and the factor of "difference" institutionalised at all levels.

The Constitution expressly states that the President

FIGURE II

Constitutional Structure: 1960



must be Greek and the Vice-President Turkish, each being elected by their respective communities. Yet this presidential system is further moulded to fit a bi-communal system since, if the President should be unable to perform his function through incapacity, the Vice-President would not assume the presidential role. This would be done by the President of the House of Representatives - a Greek, by law. Under Articles 48 and 49 of the Constitution, the President and Vice-President have the right of final veto over decisions of the Council of Ministers concerning foreign affairs, defense and security.

The Council of Ministers emphasises the bi-communal split at a lower but more widespread level. By Article 46 of the Constitution, the ten-man Council must comprise seven Greeks and three Turks, with one of three major ministries being under the charge of a Turk - Foreign Affairs, Defense or Finance. (In fact, a Turk held the position of Defense Minister.) Decision making in the Council is by an absolute majority, with the presidential veto in certain prescribed areas of competence.

In legislative matters, the House of Representatives was to reflect a similar 70:30 ratio between Greek and Turk. Moreover, each group of representatives was to be elected by the communities separately. In its delegation



of legislation to committees, the House was empowered to assure the representation of both communal groups in accordance with specified formulae.<sup>5</sup> The presiding officers must, by law, be representatives of both groups, each having the right to take over the presidential or vice-presidential roles, as noted above.

Beneath the House of Representatives in the administrative hierarchy are the Communal Chambers and these, perhaps more than any other, epitomise the separation of, and institutionalise the difference between the ethnic groups, since

The Greek and Turkish Communities respectively shall elect from amongst their own members a Communal Chamber which shall have the competence reserved for it under the provisions of the Constitution.<sup>6</sup>

Article 87 enumerates the reservations, which include all religions, educational, cultural and teaching matters, issues of personal status, the composition of courts set up to deal with civil disputes dealing with status and the imposition of taxes and fees on Community members in order to provide for their respective needs and institutions.

(This last emphasises the aspect of group need and its relation to "the state"; it is, in fact, a recognition that an institution something less than the state, the ethnic community, is the only institution capable of fulfilling certain needs. See Burton on this point.) These

provisions ensure that socialisation will take place at the ethnic-group level, rather than at the level of a higher community. Moreover, under Article 108,

- (1) the Greek and Turkish Communities shall have the right to receive subsidies from the Greek or Turkish government respectively for institutions of education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to the Greek or Turkish Community respectively.
- (2) Also where either the Greek or Turkish Community considers that it has not the necessary number of schoolmasters, professors or clergymen for the functioning of its institutions, such Community shall have the right to obtain and employ such personnel to the extent strictly necessary to meet its needs as the Greek or Turkish government respectively may provide.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, if the communities themselves are not able to provide the instruments of socialisation, they may ask for aid from their "mother country," when they themselves deem it necessary, in order to ensure the preservation of the group.

In the public service, there was to be a quantitative distribution in all grades of the hierarchy on a 70:30 basis, the Greek having a majority. The Public Service Commission was similarly split.<sup>9</sup> The armed forces of the republic were set at two thousand men, split 60:40 between Greek and Turk, whilst the security forces (police and gendarmerie) were to be comprised of 70% Greek and 30% Turk, except in the transition period, during which (by virtue of their predominant role during

the emergency period) Turks could be employed to a maximum of forty per cent.

Yet the constitutional separation of the two ethnic groups in Cyprus is only one aspect of the separation issue. For one thing, the Greeks and Turks were geographically separated, and for another they were psychologically separate. According to data made public in 1964, of the 634 towns and villages in Cyprus in 1960, only 114 were classified as "mixed" i.e., having both Greek and Turkish population; 62.4% of all the settlements were wholly Greek, 19.1% wholly Turkish, and the remainder mixed. (Fuller information is contained in Table III, below.) Yet even in mixed villages and towns Greek and Turk were separated into quarters and intercourse between the two groups reduced almost to a minimal level. Foley, for example, in a description of Famagusta noted that "it was really two very different towns" with the Turks in the Gothic area and the Greeks in the newer part of the town.<sup>10</sup> Given that this was a description of the 'fifties, it is hard to believe that the cessation of hostilities did much to change it for the better. By 1960 economic separation had become a major problem. Indeed, by 1960 Cyprus had a form of dual economy, although interdependence between the two groups fluctuated with political events. Nevertheless, Meyer was moved to comment

(in 1962),

Despite the logical arguments against economic separatism, and the drop in its intensity after independence, it still remains a central problem . . . It has no economic justification of any kind. Contemplation of the costs, administrative difficulties and utter futility of separate facilities and economies for the island's Greek and Turkish Communities is a melancholy task indeed.11

Nevertheless, perhaps the most important cleavage at independence was psychological - indeed, constitutional, geographical and economic separation are merely surface indicators of an incompatibility of group values. If, in the preceding account, a great deal has been made of the ideas of goals, goal articulation, demands and counterdemands, it is because these are the central features of the primary dispute in Cyprus. During the 'fifties the factor of difference was manifested in the extent to which both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots articulated separate demands - by means both pacific and, later, violent. Indeed, by the day of independence the separate positions were almost irreconcilable; the constitution reflects this state of affairs. The constitutional base upon which an "independent" republic of Cyprus was founded was flimsy and fragile at the points where cooperation was expected. That it worked at all is surprising; that it failed after a short time fairly predictable.

Yet even when the constitutional system did work it worked badly, to the extent that deadlock over interpret-

ations of what the constitution actually meant (as opposed to what it said) precipitated crisis after crisis and, subsequently, a resumption of violent conflict. The major tension areas were four; the implementation of the 70:30 ratio in the civil service, the implementation of the 60:40 provision in the army, income tax legislation, and the municipalities law. These four 'areas' merely reflect the concrete expressions of the Greek and Turkish communities; the Greeks subscribed to the view that the constitution was to be implemented for the good of all Cypriots (most of whom were Greek) whilst the Turks sought to preserve Turkish rights through a minimalist interpretation of the constitution.

In the civil service issue, the Turks argued that the Greeks had been privileged far too long and that Turks should be given administrative positions, whilst the Greeks countered that the Turkish position put ethnicity before ability.<sup>12</sup> In an attempt to circumvent the problem the President and Vice-President set up a joint committee to study the problem. A report ensued and precipitated another conflict over interpretation. One of the major comments made by the committee was that "The Commission had to draw from a population forming the 18% of the population which was poorly educated in order to fill 30% of the Civil Service [and] made it difficult to find qualified Turks for many posts."<sup>13</sup> In turn, the Turks criti-



cised the Public Service Commission. To find a solution, the issue was submitted to the Supreme Constitutional Court which adjudicated in only five of almost thirty cases submitted to it on the question of the 70:30 ratio. With the resignation of the President of the Court (in May 1963<sup>14</sup>) the issue became deadlocked and has never been solved.

Similarly with the army ratio. The question arose as to whether the contingents of each group should be mixed; the Council of Ministers argued that they should, the Vice-President that they should remain separate. (Osman Orek, the Turkish-Cypriot Minister of Defense, argued that the army should be comprised of five battalions, each with three companies. The Turks believed that battalions could be mixed, but that, because of religious, cultural and disciplinary problems, companies could not.) The Vice-Presidential veto returned the matter to the Council of Ministers for reconsideration and the latter duly reiterated its earlier position. The deadlock was never resolved.

Article 78(2) of the Constitution stated that "the adoption of any law . . . imposing . . . taxes shall require a separate simple majority of the Representatives elected by the Greek and Turkish Communities respectively taking part in the vote."<sup>15</sup> The Greeks viewed this pro-



vision as obstructive, clearly giving the Turkish-Cypriots a more than proportional say in common affairs, whilst the Turks argued that they had simply been accorded equal rights. With no agreement on a tax structure at independence, the colonial system was extended temporarily (as provided in Article 188 of the Constitution) whilst new laws were made. On the matter of a second extension, the Greeks favoured three months whilst the Turks argued that two would be sufficient time to resolve the issue. Moreover, a Turkish Representative argued, in the House, that "if a two month period is not accepted, our group (or a majority of it) will vote against [any extension] . . . and the Greeks will bear the responsibility."<sup>16</sup> When the matter came to a vote, on March 31, 1961, eleven Turkish-Cypriot votes were cast against the Greek proposal and the measure failed. With a further resort to the House blocked in December 1961, the matter reverted to the Communal Chambers and, on December 20 1961, the Greek-Cypriot Communal Chamber passed a law relating to "Personal Contributions" (based on the defeated House bill) and abolished the communal tax implemented in 1960. The Turkish Chamber similarly passed a law legalising taxation at the communal level, both laws being upheld by the Supreme Constitutional Court when it was called upon to adjudicate on the matter.

By far the most important issue concerned with the separation of the communities and the devolution of authority was that of separate municipalities.

According to Article 173;

- (1) Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of the Republic . . . Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Lamaca and Paphos by the Turkish inhabitants thereof . . . .
- (2) The council of the Greek municipality shall be elected by the Greek electors . . . , the council of the Turkish municipality by the Turkish electors.<sup>17</sup>

Until 1958, these towns had unified municipalities but in April 1958 the Turkish-Cypriots set up their own municipal system. (See footnote 74, Chapter 5.) By 1959 the Turkish municipality was recognised as being legal. With no agreement on a unitary system at independence, Article 188 was again invoked, giving time for a compromise to be worked out. The "temporary" system of municipal separation was extended eight times, until 1962. By March of 1962, however, Makarios issued a statement to the effect that any partition would not be countenanced.<sup>18</sup> In reply, Kuchuk argued that partition was possible. A compromise position was presented to the House of Representatives on December 22 1962, by Glaflos Clerides President of the House. Instead of the existing separate municipal councils, a Joint Committee was proposed for each town, its membership reflecting the proportional representation of the population in each town.<sup>19</sup> Kuchuk replied

that any constitutional change would be premature and irreversible and argued that the existing system should continue.<sup>20</sup>

With the positions becoming ever clearer, Makarios issued a clear statement to the effect that there was no hope for a solution, but, more important, "Neither at present nor in the future will we ever accept geographical partition."<sup>21</sup> The Turkish response was to pass their own law, "The Turkish Municipal Chamber's Municipal Corporation Law" on December 31 1962. Greek action was taken in the Council of Ministers, where a decision was made to the effect that all municipal territories would come under the "Administration and Improvement Law," a restatement of a colonial law which established the mixed councils in 1950.

Both Greek and Turkish actions were submitted to the Supreme Constitutional Court, where they were declared ultra vires. Significantly, the decisions of the Court reflected a split within the organ itself since the decisions were by majority, with the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot judges voting separately on each issue.

By the middle of the year, with the constitutional system deadlocked, reports appeared that Makarios was to bring the United Nations into the conflict by going before the organisation to denounce the Constitution as unwork-

able and to unilaterally abrogate the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee.<sup>22</sup> In an interview with the "Contemporary Review", Makarios, asked whether he was "seriously contemplating this course"<sup>23</sup> answered:

My view is that the Treaty of Guarantee should cease to exist . . . [it] comes into direct conflict with the very sense of independence, and is, in my view, contrary also to the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We do not recognise the Guaranteeing Powers to have any rights of interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus, and we shall reject and oppose any attempt by any one of them to interfere in any way.

The revision . . . of certain constitutional provisions has become beyond doubt necessary, in the interests of the smooth running of the state. . . . Our intention is not to disregard the interests of the Turkish community. . . . The procedure that would be followed for revision of the Constitution has not yet been decided.<sup>24</sup>

More specifically, Makarios argued that "the rights granted to the Turks" by the Constitution" were out of all proportion."<sup>25</sup> Makarios' comments reflected the general mood of the Greek-Cypriots in face of Turkish intransigence. "Throughout the last months of 1963 the new line was publicised in speeches, broadcasts and newspapers."<sup>26</sup>

A critical point was reached when, on November 31, 1963, Makarios submitted a list of thirteen proposed amendments to the Constitution, designed to rectify the faults in the existing structure. The thirteen points

were:

1. The right of veto of the President and Vice-President of the Republic to be abandoned.
2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for the President in case of his temporary absence.
3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present, the President by the Greek members and the Vice-President by the Turkish members.
4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for the President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity.
5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.
6. Unified Municipalities to be established.
7. The administration of justice to be unified.
8. The division of the security forces into police and gendarmerie should be abolished.
9. The numerical strength of the Security forces to be determined by law.
10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish-Cypriots in the composition of the public service and the forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of the Greek and Turkish-



Cypriots.

11. The number of members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to five.

12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.

13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.<sup>27</sup>

Whilst several of these changes would have given the Turks more representation (e.g., Vice-President temporarily filling the position of President), six may be considered attempts to curtail Turkish authority; the vice-presidential veto would be abolished; simple, unified majorities would circumvent Turkish separation; unified municipalities and judicial systems would curtail Turkish influence as well as the attempts to unify the armed forces and civil service. As Makarios must surely have expected, the proposals were rejected by Kuchuk and, in a directive from Ankara, by the Turkish government.<sup>28</sup> What, then, were the Archbishop's motives? It seems evident that there were several. By producing proof of intransigence and deadlock on the part of the Turks, Makarios could go before the United Nations and ask it to produce a solution. By so doing, several courses of action could be ruled out; a Turkish invasion, partition, a regional peacekeeping force and an agreement on the lines of the London or Zurich agreements. Apparently, Makarios wanted the United Nations to legitimise any Greek



Cypriot action in Cyprus. Makarios, present at the Banding conference in 1955, and clearly aware of the composition of the United Nations in December 1963, could go before the General Assembly with a clear case for United Nations intervention as an alternative to unilateral intervention by other states.<sup>29</sup>

By the middle of December the parties in Cyprus were far apart on almost all issues. It appears, also, that preparations were underway, and had been for some considerable time, for armed conflict. Wrote Foley,

Since the failure to agree on the municipalities issue, the Turks had been getting ready; in January, by tapping their frequent telephone calls to Ankara, the Greeks discovered that their opponents could already call upon a force of 2500, partially armed and trained.<sup>30</sup>

Moreover, following the May rejection of the municipalities case by the Supreme Constitutional Court, the Greeks had begun a military training programme. "By December (1963) the Greek-Cypriots had 5000 fully trained men, with another 5000 in various stages of readiness."<sup>31</sup>

Under these circumstances it was, perhaps, to be expected that a relatively minor incident could touch off large-scale violence.

CHAPTER 7Separation: 1963 to the Present

On December 21 1963 the action which further separated the Cypriot communities occurred. On a street bordering the Greek and Turkish sectors of Nicosia, a Greek-Cypriot police patrol stopped a group of Turks and asked for means of identification. The Turks refused, a scuffle followed and two Turks were killed; nine other people were injured.<sup>1</sup> The following day a funeral was held for the dead Turks, attended by several thousand people. Following the funeral large-scale street fighting and shooting began in Nicosia. The United States Ambassador and the Acting British High Commissioner called on Makarios to appeal for calm and the Greek government sent a statement of concern. In Turkey, however, the reaction was more vociferous. Deputy Prime-Minister Feyzioglu, called for the punishment of those guilty of perpetrating the crimes against Turkish-Cypriots, and there were widespread anti-Greek demonstrations in Turkey.<sup>2</sup> With the fighting continuing, the British government called on Greece and Turkey to formally join in a conciliatory approach to Makarios, whilst the Greek deputy Prime Minister Venizelos, called for a conference between the factions involved in the fighting.<sup>3</sup> (Indeed, it was far

from clear what units were involved in the fighting. As later evidence revealed, the Turkish policemen left the police force to fight with the main Turkish groups, whilst Greek-Cypriots formed themselves into special units and began policing the Nicosia area. The Greek and Turkish army contingents in the island formed the nuclei of the irregular forces of both groups.)

Makarios and Kuchuk, in somewhat uncharacteristic fashion, acted jointly for a cease-fire and one was effected on December 25. By the next day fighting had resumed, however, and Turkey charged that Greeks were undertaking a genocide campaign against Turkish-Cypriots.<sup>4</sup>

In the meantime, the Turkish government action was more than vocal. On December 25, Turkish aircraft swept low over Nicosia and a fleet of surface ships left Turkey for Cyprus. In a speech before the Turkish parliament, Prime Minister Inonu made public these moves and was loudly applauded.<sup>5</sup> In face of the Turkish action, British representatives asked Makarios to agree to the stationing of a tripartite force in the island to forestall any further deterioration in the situation. Makarios agreed, as did Kuchuk.

As the tripartite force, mainly British in view of the existing reservoir of men available in the base area, undertook its prophylactic function the tension abated. The

local fighting ebbed, Erkin, the Turkish Foreign Minister, ordered the surface fleet not to land in Cyprus, and Inönü issued a statement to the effect that the situation had improved. Despite the British presence, shooting incidents were not totally eliminated; witness the large scale incident in Paphos on December 28. In order to further prevent further fighting, Sandys, the British Commonwealth Secretary, proposed the establishment of a neutral zone in the middle of Nicosia, separating the Greek and Turkish quarters. (This neutral zone later became known as the "Green Line.") At this stage, the estimated number of fatalities was put at between one- and two-hundred.<sup>6</sup>

The Turkish position, meanwhile, had led to the involvement of the United Nations in this phase of the conflict for, as a result of the Turkish overflight of Nicosia, the Cypriot delegation asked for a meeting of the Security Council to consider a complaint against Turkey. Whilst a meeting was held, its effects were inconclusive since it adjourned without taking any action.<sup>7</sup> However, the Cypriot representative, Zenon Rossides, argued that the protest from Kuchuk, against the United Nations meeting, had "brought into sharp focus the need of United Nations action to restore the situation in Cyprus and the safeguarding of the independence of a member state,"<sup>8</sup> a demand not inconsistent with Makarios' thirteen points proposal.

Significant developments occurred on December 31 when Kuchuk proposed that, since the two Cypriot communities could no longer live together, the "constitution no longer exists."<sup>9</sup> For the Greek-Cypriots, Makarios stated his intention to scrap the Treaty of Guarantee.<sup>10</sup>

During the fighting of late December the Greek irregular units had undertaken a campaign to encircle the northern suburb of Nicosia, an area almost exclusively Turkish-Cypriot. In the course of this operation, several hundred hostages were taken. With the release of these hostages, and a reciprocal move by the Turks, events took a turn for the better and, despite Greek and Turkish threats of unilateral intervention, the outlook was further brightened when Makarios and Greek and Turkish representatives agreed to attend a conference in London at the suggestion of Sandys.<sup>11</sup>

In the meantime, with the British force under pressure to keep an uneasy peace, Britain requested (to U Thant) that the United Nations send an observer to supervise the existing, but precarious, cease-fire. Indeed, with British troops in control only in Nicosia, the general situation was quite unstable. By January 5, however, British troops advanced to Trakhonas and Omorphita, north of Nicosia, villages that had been heavily damaged in the fighting.



As the London conference approached, position statements appeared periodically and in confusing fashion. Thus, for example, on January 6 Rauf Dewktash argued that the Turks "may not seek partition, but a major shift of populations" at the London conference.<sup>12</sup> Kuchuk, three days later, argued that the Turks would demand partition of Cyprus along the 35th parallel.<sup>13</sup> The position of Turkey was made crystal clear by Erkin who stated that "Turkey's main concern in any consideration of the future of Cyprus is to strengthen the guarantees of the Turkish community in the island."<sup>14</sup> Effectively, the Turkish adherence to the status quo precluded any change in the status of Cyprus, the prime aim of Turkey. Greek reaction was to place the matter before the NATO Council with the objective of forestalling Turkish intervention; when the Council met, on January 2, it heard "three conflicting reports"<sup>15</sup> on the situation in the island. The British position was to effect, as quickly as possible, a conference in an attempt to forestall United Nations action; the "New York Times" correspondent reported that "The view here [in London] is that there is no need for any action by the U.N."<sup>16</sup> clearly reflecting a British desire to retain some degree of control over the situation.

By this time, however, the British peacekeeping



force was coming under heavy criticism from Kuchuk who argued that, since the British had handed back to its rightful owners (Greek) property in the Turkish quarters of Nicosia, the British were extending Greek positions whilst a cease-fire was in effect.<sup>17</sup>

The London Conference opened on January 15, accompanied by loud pro-enosis demonstrations in Athens and Salonika. More important, there were accompanying signs of progress in Cyprus with the dismantling of several roadblocks by both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, the display of "enormous goodwill" between the two communities during the cease-fire, and the resumption of some commercial activities.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, it must be stated that, for the most part, the Turkish community was concentrated in several enclaves; in the northern part of Nicosia, in a narrow area astride the Kyrenia road (north of Nicosia) in the Town of Louroujina, in an area near Lefka and at two beachheads at Kokkina and Limnitis the Turks were in heavily defended enclaves.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, the location of these areas illuminates, to some degree, the relationship between Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots: if supplies were to be landed, then the north coast was the most convenient area and if the supplies were to be moved to Nicosia, they would have to move along the Kyrenia road.

At the London conference Erkin plainly stated the Turkish position; "Cyprus is too important strategically for Turkey to feel secure unless she has an army contingent permanently in Cyprus."<sup>20</sup> In addition, Denktash argued that only by living separately could the Turkish-Cypriots feel secure. For the Greek-Cypriots, Glafkos Clerides argued that the constitution should be replaced by "a unifying document." (It is perhaps indicative of the mood that, despite their adjacent table positions, the Cypriot delegations made no contact, "not even glances."<sup>21</sup>) The talks soon entered a deadlocked stage, exemplified by the dispute over the status of Spyros and Kyprianou. Sent by the Council of Ministers, Kyprianou claimed to represent the Cypriot government, but Denktash argued that, since no Turkish minister had been present, Kyprianou was not representative. On January 19 a delay in the proceedings was announced whilst Sandys, the Chairman, conferred with Cypriot representatives, and Palamas, the Greek foreign minister, returned to Athens. A more significant development in Athens was the invitation sent by Grivas to Greek-Cypriots to travel to Athens for talks with him; one hundred and thirty attended.<sup>22</sup> The inference to be drawn from this, in view of Makarios' quick rebuke to Grivas warning him not to interfere,<sup>23</sup> is that Grivas was sounding opinion regarding a potential new role for himself

in Cyprus. (See below).

With the talks at an impasse, Britain took the initiative by proposing the formation of a NATO peacekeeping force, with the aid of the United States. The Washington reaction was quite cool, but the British argued that, above all, Cyprus was "a problem for the Alliance."<sup>24</sup> However, the British plan neglected three major factors; the Turks, the Greek-Cypriots, and the Turkish-Cypriots, all of whom were opposed to the NATO plan. Yet with tentative commitment of units from several European states, the plan proceeded. Military discussions were initiated in Washington, yet the United States government was anxious not to offend Turkey, where the United States had bases. On January 29, Turkey left the dormant London conference although Erkin agreed to stay in London. At the same time, fourteen ships left Iskendrum on what was described as "an official air-sea exercise", whilst the Greek government announced navy landing exercises in Crete.<sup>25</sup>

With the situation in Cyprus quiescent, the next few days saw a search for a NATO force. Following visits to Athens and Ankara by Lyman Lemnitzer, the NATO Supreme Commander, Erkin termed the prospective United States involvement "a good development."<sup>26</sup> Yet the establishment of the force was conditional; the United States argued that if the

NATO force were to become operative, two conditions must be fulfilled - approval from the Cyprus government (which had not yet come) and a suspension of the Treaty of Guarantee for three months (to which Turkey was opposed). Indeed, whilst the British and American government were debating how to launch the force, Makarios was stating that he would oppose any NATO force; Makarios repeatedly argued that any peacekeeping force should have the authorisation of the United Nations and that its task should be to prevent any unilateral intervention. Makarios was not without support; since the start of the December fighting, the Soviet government had persistently warned against NATO and Turkish intervention. On January 30 the Soviet Union sent a note to U Thant, United Nations Secretary General, informing him that the Security Council was responsible for keeping the peace in Cyprus.<sup>27</sup>

Despite this opposition, concrete proposals were announced the following day. An international force, consisting of at least 10,000 men would be deployed in Cyprus, the United States contributing 1200 combat troops and "as many support troops as necessary."<sup>28</sup> Whilst Turkey and Greece now accepted the plan, the Cypriot foreign minister, Kyprianou, rejected it on the grounds that, if the British forces were inadequate (as Sandys had argued they were) then the United Nations should take the responsibility for a peace-

keeping force.<sup>29</sup>

At this stage, reports appeared regarding a build-up of anti-American feeling in Cyprus, together with strong pressure among the Greek-Cypriots to reject the plan. On February 1, Makarios rejected the idea of a NATO force "definitely". With the rejection of the NATO plan violence erupted sporadically in Cyprus and bombs damaged property at the United States Embassy and the British High Commission. The British government, despite Makarios' rejection, tried to muster forces for a reformed peacekeeping force, yet received a blow to their hopes when U Thant stated that the Security Council should handle the matter.<sup>30</sup>

On February 11 new violence erupted in Cyprus, with Limassol the centre of fierce fighting. The fighting had been sparked by an incident south east of Nicosia where eleven were killed and fifty injured. Within three days, more than fifty dead were reported in the Limassol fighting, with more than a hundred injured. With the British force unable to control the situation, Britain finally asked for a meeting of the Security Council, to "consider the urgent problems raised by the deterioration of security in Cyprus."

At this stage it is perhaps opportune to discuss British and American motives before the Council debate. Anthony Verrier has written;



It is essential to correct a general impression that the British forces are in Cyprus solely to keep the peace. They are not. They are there first and foremost to preserve Britain's strategic interests in the island, which, through bases and installations, provide in theory the facilities for operations in the Middle and Far East. Since these interests cannot be preserved while the island is in ferment, the garrison, reinforced from the United Kingdom, has perforce switched to internal security duties.<sup>31</sup>

This adequately reflects British motives; to retain control over the situation to preserve intact the functioning of the base areas. Of the United States, it may be said that its prime motive was to preserve stability in the NATO alliance; indeed, in view of the aid going to both Greece and Turkey one suspects that the United States was instrumental in reconciling Greek and Turkish attitudes regarding the NATO force.<sup>32</sup>

Despite the presence, since January 17, of a United Nations observer (General Gyani) and the British force, the situation in Cyprus continued to deteriorate as the British troops were hard put to control fighting in Polis and Tylleria. Furthermore, reports circulated that illegal arms shipments into Cyprus were increasingly frequent, despite denials.<sup>33</sup>

The first meeting of the Security Council (February 17) was brief, postponing debate one day until U Thant had further talks with participating delegations. This is not the place for a detailed analysis of Security Council politicking,



but it should be obvious that a great deal of intensive activity was necessary to launch the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Whilst the first debate opened on February 18, the resolution authorising the establishment of the force was not passed until March 4 1964, during which time the Security Council met on no less than eight separate occasions. The Security Council debates considered, in essence, two major perceptions of what a force should do. On the one hand, Britain (supported by, among others, the United States, China and Norway) argued that the first priority was to restore peace in the island. The United Kingdom representative stated that "since the beginning [our efforts] have been directed to one end only . . . namely, to calming the situation and restoring peace . . . The right course was to address ourselves to the problem of restoring peace and thereafter to move on. . . to solving the political problems."<sup>34</sup> On the other hand, Cyprus presented a different view, supported by Greece, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Kyprianou argued that the Council "should, primarily, and without waiting for any other action, take the necessary measures for the protection of the territorial integrity and the independence of Cyprus."<sup>35</sup> Whilst it was admitted that, in the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee, there was a right of intervention, this was not, argued Kyprianou, a right of mili-

tary intervention. But, more important, the Treaty was illegal. Under Article 103 of the Charter, obligations under the Charter prevail over other agreements and, since military intervention was proscribed by Article 2(4) of the Charter, then the Treaty of Guarantee was an invalid document. Such was the Cypriot rationale.

In essence, the conflict was over what a force could do. Whilst the British argued for a prophylactic role (i.e., peacekeeping) the Cypriots argued in favour of a more positive, political role (i.e., peacemaking). The final resolution may be considered a mixture of the two and, in view of its importance, it is given in full.

#### The Security Council

Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution,

Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the treaties signed at Nicosia on August 16 1960,

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads:

"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,"

1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sover-

eign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace;

2. Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;

3. Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint;

4. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the Force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Commander of the Force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the Force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation;

5. Recommends that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions;

6. Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose;

7. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, a mediator, who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people

of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff.<sup>36</sup>

This resolution, jointly sponsored by Bolivia, Brazil, Ivory Coast, Norway and Morocco, was adopted unanimously.

The resolution authorising UNFICYP is in many ways a radical departure from the resolutions that established previous United Nations forces. First, it called for voluntary contributions to meet expenses, clearly reflecting a desire not to compound the disastrous debacle over financing that preoccupied the nineteenth session of the General Assembly. Second, it ventured into the realm of peacemaking by appointing a mediator and asking the force to promote "a return to normal conditions." Third, clearly mindful of the Congo operation, the resolution set a (renewable) time limit upon the duration of the force. Fourth the resolution tried to specify as precisely as possible the mandate of the force; indeed it was fairly successful. The area of dispute surrounded the interpretation of "normal conditions." (As a goal, U Thant interpreted this to mean the removal of barriers to free movement of population and daily commercial intercourse.)

Despite unanimous approval of UNFICYP, it was not de-

clared operational until March 27, during which time there were ominous developments. (Not least of these was another statement from Grivas, denying that he was about to resume underground activities.<sup>37</sup>) The voluntary financing clause caused some states to think twice before committing troops to the force, whilst several of those states to whom approaches were made (Canada, Sweden, Ireland, Finland and Austria) asked for clarification of the size, composition and function of the force - as well as finance.<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, the first United Nations troops (Canadian) arrived in Cyprus on March 15, following commitments from Finland, Ireland, and Sweden, and financial commitments from Britain and the United States. Yet another "first" for the United Nations force was its inclusion of troops from a permanent member of the Security Council, Great Britain. This was a somewhat realistic assessment of the situation since the British forces were equipped, quartered and stored in the island itself; on the debit side, however, it must be remembered that Britain, as the former colonial power, was the object of a great deal of hostility, not least from the Greek-Cypriots.

Despite this progress, the situation remained extremely tense. Turkey continued to mobilise its forces, the Turkish Communal Chamber voted to "give" power to Inonu to intervene and, when incidents did occur, Turkey threatened reprisals



for the damage incurred by the Turkish-Cypriots.

On March 25 the appointment of Sakari Tuomioja as mediator was announced, following prior discussions between the Greek, Turkish and Cypriot groups. Within a day of the appointment being announced, the United Nations force was called upon to halt fighting in Nicosia and in a skirmish between rival factions, the force was fired upon. On the ninth anniversary of the commencement of EOKA activities, Grivas announced in Athens, that he would be prepared to fight again to liberate Cyprus.<sup>39</sup>

By early April, with UNFICYP assuming peacekeeping duties on a large scale, Makarios announced that Cyprus was, unilaterally, terminating the Treaty of Alliance. In return, Turkey rejected Makarios' action.<sup>40</sup> This done, the Greek government, with Makarios, argued that self-determination was "the only permanent and just basis for a solution to the Cyprus issue."<sup>41</sup> Whilst all this manoeuvring was going on, in preparation for Tuomioja's mediation effort, the conditions in Cyprus were far from satisfactory. Grivas was by this time moving, in periodic statements, towards intervention in the Cyprus dispute in an active capacity,<sup>42</sup> and UNFICYP clashes with Greek units became more frequent. By the end of April, the Turkish-Cypriots had rejected a conciliatory move by Makarios to issue a general amnesty for all Turkish-Cypriots and were



engaged in heavy fighting in Kyrenia and Ayios-Theodoros. The Orthodox festival of Easter led to a lull, during which U Thant put forward a peace initiative; at a level subservient to that of mediator, it was proposed that a political officer should be appointed to settle day-to-day conflict, in accordance with the terms of the United Nations resolution, to effect a return to normal life. On May 11 Galo Plaza, a former President of Ecuador, was appointed to the post of special representative, with the assigned task of undertaking direct negotiations with the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots "on immediate and pressing problems" which included "measures to end hostilities and prevent their recurrence and to generally bring about a return to normal living conditions."<sup>43</sup> With the United States now actively involved in a search for a settlement (President Johnson had appointed Senator William Fulbright a special envoy to Athens and Ankara and had later warned the two governments not to act militarily,<sup>44</sup>) the diplomatic activity was seemingly advancing on a broad front.

By June, however, the (by-now solely Greek) Cypriot House of Representatives passed a bill authorising conscription, an increase in the size of Greek-Cypriot forces, and the purchase of arms from overseas. Kuchuk responded by vetoing the bill and, in turn, Makarios argued that Kuchuk had no powers whatsoever, giving them up in December 1963

when he led the Turkish "insurrection." To forestall any rash Turkish action, Johnson (through Lemnitzer) issued a stern warning to Turkey saying the United States would not permit any conflict between Greece and Turkey.

Against this background of initiative, counterinitiative and contradiction, U Thant presented his first report to the Security Council on June 16 1964. The report was far from encouraging, the relative quiescence was attributed to the harvest period, during which the communities got on with "normal" activities as far as possible, under the watchful eye of UNFICYP troops.<sup>45</sup> (There were in fact, reports of cooperation between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, although it is not clear to what extent.)<sup>46</sup> Indeed, the UNFICYP forces carried out extensive activities accompanying Turkish-Cypriot groups, ensuring the flow of foodstuffs to the Turkish enclaves, and locating missing persons. However, U Thant stated that, despite the United Nations presence, the military positions of both groups had improved relative to each other.<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, the arms supply problem was critical and, in face of a clear lack of encouragement, Tuomioja's task was increasingly difficult. In spite of, or perhaps because of, U Thant's report, the mandate of the force was extended a further three months by a unanimous

vote of the Security Council.<sup>48</sup> In its renewing resolution, the Council included a paragraph calling on "all State members of the United Nations to comply with" the enabling Resolution 186 and Resolution 187 of March 13 1964 (designed to deter further Turkish action) and refrain from any action likely to exacerbate the situation, clearly a second reprimand to Turkey.<sup>49</sup> At the same time Gyani was replaced as force commander by General Thimmaya of Finland.

Towards the end of June, reports appeared to the effect that Grivas had returned to Cyprus and was conferring with Greek-Cypriot leaders. In spite of official denials of Grivas' presence, a broadcast over Nicosia radio, by Grivas, confirmed his presence. On June 29 Grivas issued a call for a "free Greek Cyprus."

With the renewal of the UNFICYP mandate, the diplomatic initiative was taken up in Washington, reflecting a United States desire to preserve alliance solidarity and pull back Turkey from the brink of invading Cyprus. In a Washington conference with Johnson (June 22) Inonu argued that the Turks could not stand by and see the Turkish-Cypriots massacred. At the close of the talks, two days later, a joint communique reaffirmed the validity of the 1960 Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee, a clear rebuff to Makarios' denunciation of them. With the Greek

government unwilling to participate in joint discussions, Johnson assumed the role of intermediary, meeting Papandreu on June 25. In a news conference, Papandreu declared the 1959 treaties invalid and opposed direct talks preferring to leave mediation to Tuomioja.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, in a meeting with U Thant, Papandreu argued that a meeting with Turkey would only compound the mutual differences; as for a solution to the Cyprus conflict, only a plebiscite would suffice.<sup>51</sup>

Again the scene shifted to the United Nations and Tuomioja arranged mediation talks in Geneva, asking Greece and Turkey to send representatives. This they duly did.

When the Geneva meeting opened on July 5, the United States was represented by Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, sent by President Johnson as an official representative. Meanwhile, Grivas, in Cyprus, was urging enosis, calling on Greek-Cypriots to "march hand in hand toward victory or glorious death" in the cause of a "free Cyprus."<sup>52</sup> At the same time, it was announced by Galo Plaza that a neutral zone had been established along the Nicosia truce line, within which the United Nations would have the exclusive right to patrol, search, disarm and arrest.<sup>53</sup> A further development on the local level came on July 9 when the House of Representatives announced a modification of the Cypriot judicial system, abolishing the separated lower courts (where

a Turk was tried by Turks) and reforming the Supreme Court. However, the situation in the field was deteriorating rapidly as both sides were reportedly receiving illicit supplies of arms. The Greek-Cypriots urged Greek businessmen to halt the sale of "strategic items" to Turkish citizens. (By 1967, the selective Greek-Cypriot embargo limited Turkish fuel consumption to two gallons per vehicle per week, and prohibited the trading of electric plugs and fittings, among other items.) The aim of the Greeks at this stage was twofold; to prevent a tactical build-up of materials and to discourage Turkish settlement in the enclaves. In fact, the situation was somewhat anomalous; whilst most of the Turkish population prepared to live in enclaves, many did not and engaged in "normal" commercial transactions with Greek shopowners and merchants. But, as U Thant repeated frequently, even in the periods of greatest calm, freedom of movement was far from complete.<sup>54</sup>

The major outcome of the Geneva meetings came to be known as the "Acheson Plan", which reflected the American desire to achieve a settlement and some degree of stability in the Mediterranean. The plan called for "the union of most of Cyprus with Greece," "adequate provision for the well-being of the Turkish-Cypriots" and a "sequestered base for ground, air and sea forces" of Turkey.<sup>55</sup> Whilst Turkey accepted the plan as a basis for discussion it was firmly



turned down by Makarios and the Greek government as "absolutely unacceptable",<sup>56</sup> on the grounds that it was recognition of the Turkish claim for partition.

With a settlement far off, fighting broke out on a large scale in the Kokkina region, with other clashes reported in Kyrenia and Nicosia. According to contemporary reports, more than twenty deaths were reported, with two hundred injured. Turkey, by this time ready to intervene as a matter of course, sent aircraft over the island, bombing Greek emplacements near Kokkina. Yet another critical point had been reached. In response to the Turkish bombing, a meeting of the Security Council was held, but adjourned without taking substantive action. The Turkish government justified the action as "police action", whilst the Greek government condemned it as a "massacre".<sup>57</sup> The Soviet Union and the United States, both anxious to stabilise the situation, expressed concern. Makarios, however, called upon the Greek-Cypriots "to fight to the death". Moreover, Turkey threatened to attack Greek-Cypriot positions again unless the pressure on the Turkish-Cypriots was relieved. The warning went unheeded and the Turkish bombings renewed, as fighting around Kokkina continued.

In this almost anarchic situation, with the UNFICYP troops unable to affect the course of events and previous United Nation resolutions being constantly violated, the



Security Council met in emergency session and unanimously passed a joint Anglo-American resolution (193[1964]) calling for an immediate ceasefire by all concerned and asking Turkey to "cease instantly the bombardment of and use of military force of any kind against Cyprus."<sup>58</sup> After initial noncommittal statements, Cyprus and Turkey accepted the terms of the ceasefire on August 10, although Turkey argued that it would continue "warning flights" until the positions prevailing before August 5 (i.e., before the Greek advance to Kokkina) were restored.

The events of early August 1964 reveal a degree of confusion. With Turkey actively involved, Greece relatively silent, the Cypriot communities in constant conflict, the United Nations trying to mediate, and the United States trying to influence events, the situation was clearly transitional. After the initial fighting and diplomacy, which proved "unsuccessful," the parties involved seemed to be trying, in face of military stalemate, to consolidate positions before bargaining.

Thus, by the middle of August, conciliatory overtures appeared. In a note to Papandreou, Inonu called for a quick settlement stating that "maintenance of friendly relations between our two countries is a requirement of our national interest and ideals."<sup>59</sup> The same day, the Greek government castigated Makarios (or Grivas?) for acting militarily without prior notification. On August 13 Papandreou

rejected bipartite negotiations with Turkey but argued that a peaceful settlement was desired, a clear reference to the mediation effort of Tuomioja, Further evidence of a Greco-Turkish detent appeared on August 19, when the two governments agreed to return their forces to NATO, from whence they had been drawn earlier.

At this time however, the United Nations mediation effort was held up when Tuomioja, after a stroke, died on August 16. Not until September 16 was a successor appointed, Galo Plaza. During this month-long hiatus in the mediation effort, the Cyprus situation was further worsened when, in retaliation for the Turkish bombings, the Cyprus government refused to permit the normal rotation of the Turkish army force in Cyprus. The Turkish government said that it would rotate its garrison by force, if necessary, but, after consultation with U Thant, agreed to postpone any action "for a certain time". But as this problem was shelved, another one worsened. On September 10, the Turkish government submitted a memorandum to U Thant, protesting the Cyprus government's "inhuman blockade [economic] against the Turks of Cyprus", especially those in the Kokkina area who were "in danger of starving to death."<sup>60</sup> In response, Makarios invited General Thimayya and representatives of the International Red Cross to visit Kokkina. After doing so (on September 12) a report was issued in which conditions in Kokkina were described as "subhuman". On receipt of the report, Makarios agreed to

permit food to be taken into Kokkina, at the expense of the Cyprus government, and allowed Turkey to land food if the United Nations were allowed to take it into Kokkina. On September 15 Makarios put forward a peace plan, under which the Government would remove economic restrictions on the Turks, order the removal of armed posts if the Turks would reciprocate, give financial assistance if the Turks wished to return to their homes, grant a general amnesty and accept practical suggestions aimed at pacifying the island.<sup>61</sup>

With the three month extension of the UNFICYP mandate drawing to a close, U Thant reported to the Security Council on September 10 regarding the activities of the force. Despite the efforts of the force, Thant argued, "it had not been able to prevent a recurrence of fighting", although it had prevented incidents from escalating.<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, U Thant put the United Nations force into military perspective; whilst UNFICYP numbered little more than 6000, the Cyprus Government National Guard (led by Grivas, who was appointed to the position of head on August 13) had grown from 15000 to 24000, whilst the Turkish-Cypriot "army" numbered 10000, excluding 1700 police and elements of the Turkish army. Despite this military situation (and the financial problems besetting the force), U Thant went on "to withdraw the Force at this time could lead to utter disaster in the island."<sup>63</sup>

However, the present mandate of the force was such that, if it were to discharge its duties effectively, certain changes would have to be effected, most notably giving the force greater freedom of movement, the right of self-defense and the right to dismantle fortifications and establish buffer zones. (In the period the force has been in Cyprus, this was the only occasion when clarification of its mandate was requested.) Following debates the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution (194[1964]) renewing the mandate of the force. At the same time, U Thant informed the Council that the Cyprus government had agreed not to interfere with the Turkish troops rotation and that the Turkish government had agreed to place its troop contingent under UNFICYP command.

With the renewal and clarification of the UNFICYP mandate the disputes entered a period of general stability, during which sporadic outbreaks of shooting were reported, characterised by general signs pointing to an improvement in the situation. For example, on October 26 1964, the Kyrenia road was opened to civilian traffic (under United Nations escort) for the first time since December 1963. In general (but with reservations detailed below) the situation that prevailed in 1964 is that which presently prevails; the two communities are far apart, both physically and politically. Whilst the UNFICYP troops have the task of quickly calming down any sporadic outbreaks, the administrative arm

of the force (UNCIVPOL) is performing a valuable function in terms of returning conditions to "normal". This said, however, it must also be repeated that the stable situation depends upon the attitude of the Turkish government. Witness, for example, the crisis of November 1967.

The crisis was centred round the desire of the Cyprus government to resume its own police patrols with Cypriot National Guard escorts in Ayio-Theodoros. Although the local UNFICYP commander had agreed to this procedure, the Turkish-Cypriots had not. Patrols resumed, despite Turkish opposition. Two patrols on November 14 and 15 encountered no resistance. Later in the afternoon of November 15, however, a second patrol accompanied by the National Guard was fired on by Turkish-Cypriots. By early evening the National Guard (equipped with armoured cars) had overrun the village, leaving almost thirty Turkish-Cypriots dead.<sup>64</sup> In a report to the Security Council the following day, U Thant stated; "The magnitude of the Ayios-Theodoros operation and the speed with which it was carried out clearly indicate that the National Guard had planned in advance to carry out this operation in the event of any show of opposition by the Turkish-Cypriots."<sup>65</sup> Despite efforts by UNFICYP to interpose its forces between the Cypriot groups, they were unable to do so, being overrun and



disarmed by the Greek-Cypriot force.

Turkey, which had long warned that if shooting occurred then it would intervene, acted rapidly. A note was sent to Athens, blaming Greece for the action and demanding the recall of General Grivas, the man held responsible by the Ankara government.<sup>66</sup> (The Greek government recalled Grivas to Athens on November 19, ostensibly for military consultations.) With sporadic firing in Nicosia, Turkey issued a statement to the effect that, if the United Nations could not control the situation, then Turkey would be forced to act. Turkish overflights of the island were reported the next day and mobilisation orders were issued to Turkish forces. Foreign Minister Caglayangil issued a statement to the effect that the Turkish-Cypriots would be protected. With the worsening situation in the island (Greek and Turkish units had overrun several United Nations posts<sup>67</sup>) and large-scale demonstrations in Turkey pressing for an invasion of the island, the United States intervened to avert any further moves likely to worsen the already precarious situation. President Johnson appointed Cyrus R. Vance as special envoy to go to Athens, Ankara and Cyprus to work with the special United Nations representative (Rolz-Bennett) to achieve a solution to avert any Turkish intervention - not to solve the whole Cyprus issue.<sup>68</sup> At the same time, a third mediation effort was launched by



NATO when Greece and Turkey accepted an offer from Manlio Brosio, NATO Secretary-General, to try to arrange a settlement.

All this intense diplomatic activity produced results when, on November 31, Greece and Turkey reached an accord, calling for; the disbandment of the Cyprus National Guard, leaving only a reorganised police force; the immediate evacuation from Cyprus of all Greek and Turkish troops in excess of those allowed by the London and Zurich agreements; the immediate demobilisation of the armed forces held in readiness in Turkey; and an expanded security role for the United Nations force.<sup>69</sup> According to a "New York Times" report, Vance had planned to fly to New York from Athens, but was forced to fly to Cyprus to obtain the consent of Makarios, in view of the latter's concern for adequate guarantees against outside intervention in Cyprus.<sup>70</sup>

On December 22 1967 the Security Council extended the UNFICYP mandate by unanimous vote (resolution 244[1967]), but not without some discussion as to the future role U Thant should play in determining the exact role of UNFICYP. Furthermore, the resolution called upon the parties concerned to "undertake a determined new effort" to keep the peace and achieve a permanent settlement to the Cyprus dispute.

By the end of December a more significant, in terms of a long-term resolution of the conflict within the island, came when the Turkish-Cypriot leaders announced the formation

of a "Transitional Administration" to administer the affairs of the Turkish-Cypriot community "until such time as the provisions of the 1960 constitution have been fully implemented."<sup>71</sup> A system of administrative procedures was effected and Kuchuk was appointed President of the Transitional Administration, with Denktash (who had been living in Turkey since 1964) appointed Vice-President.

Responding to the new Turkish-Cypriot move, the (Greek) Cyprus Foreign Ministry warned all members of the diplomatic corps not to have any contact with the new Turkish administration and declared a Turkish diplomat, who had attended the meeting that approved the new system, persona non grata.

On December 31, Denktash was arrested after landing in Cyprus and deported to Turkey without charges being preferred.

The early months of 1968 again saw a reexamination of U Thant's role as coordinator of UNFICYP activities, whilst Greece and Cyprus argued that he should try to achieve a permanent settlement, Turkey considered that his powers should be limited to, and defined in terms of, the context of the immediate crisis.<sup>72</sup> Indeed, the question of perspective critically affected the implementation of the December 3 agreement. With Greece and Turkey complying with the provisions relating to troop reductions, Makarios replied to a Turkish note regarding the disbandment of the National Guard by arguing that this would only be possible within the terms

of a general settlement of the whole Cyprus issue.<sup>73</sup> Furthermore, Makarios called for a presidential election to "receive a new mandate" following the crisis of 1967. Despite opposition from a pro-enosis candidate Doctor Evdokas, Makarios received 95 per cent of the votes cast in the election held on February 25.<sup>74</sup>

Following the election success, Makarios initiated new peace moves; by the end of March the ban on any diplomatic contact with the Turkish administration was lifted and on April 13 Denktash was allowed to return to Cyprus from Turkey, the step generally being interpreted as a reflection of the new initiative to obtain local-level agreement. On June 24, Denktash and Glafcos Clerides conferred for the first time in an attempt to find a settlement. That these talks continue to the present time (May 1971) is perhaps a reflection that little substantive progress has been made. However, it does also reflect a desire, by both parties to keep open channels of communication - in itself not a negative development.

The appearance of this new plateau of negotiation, however, moved extremists within the Greek-Cypriot ranks to form a right-wing, pro-enosis political group, the National Front, in March 1969. (It has been suggested that "the possibility that the Front has link with dissident Greek army officers serving with the Cypriot National Guard cannot be

entirely discounted.<sup>75</sup>) The National Front has undertaken a systematic campaign of violence and assassination which began in March 1969 with the attempted assassination of the Chief of Police. In subsequent months, further attacks were made on prominent public figures and the organisation was proscribed in August 1969. In January 1970 the Government passed a law giving to the police powers of arrest and detention of suspects for a period of a maximum of three months.

On March 8 1970, an attempt was made on the life of Makarios when a helicopter carrying him was fired upon in Nicosia. (The National Front, disclaiming any responsibility, was later freed from blame by Makarios.) One week later, Polycarpos Georghiadis, former Minister of Interior, was found shot dead by a roadside near Kythrea. The circumstances of Georghiadis' death are far from clear, but in view of his opposition to the policy of Makarios after 1969, a serious challenge to Makarios' leadership, (indeed, Foley argued as long ago as 1964 that Georghiadis' role was important<sup>76</sup>), rumours circulated that Greek army officers were somehow implicated.<sup>77</sup>

The present situation is, therefore, stable but in a decidedly negative sense. U Thant's most recent report (S/10005) yet again deplores the lack of any progress to-

wards a settlement, nor even towards normalisation. The Turkish enclaves still exist, supplied with necessary materials and aid from Turkey. According to a recent report,<sup>78</sup> the completion of an airstrip in the major Turkish enclave is indicative of the present state of affairs. Yet another recent report describes the Denktash-Clerides talks as "worse than deadlocked."<sup>79</sup> One wonders, in fact, if any progress has been made at all. Whilst Makarios argues that "Cyprus is a Greek island. We shall maintain it as a unified island until we have handed it back to Greece"<sup>80</sup> [sic], Clerides argues that enosis talk is "a bit overdone", whilst the Turks see their worst fears confirmed. The present situation is perhaps epitomised by a recent press comment, to the effect that "One madman on either side could blow the place up at any minute."<sup>81</sup> To safeguard the situation, however, the UNFICYP troops still patrol in Cyprus, with the sole purpose of preventing small scale incidents "blowing the place up."

At this stage, perhaps, it is opportune to put the role of UNFICYP into perspective, since it is the most stable element in an unstable situation. From the beginning, U Thant interpreted the mandate contained in the initial enabling resolution of March 4 1964 as a threefold task; to prevent a recurrence of fighting by interposing the UNFICYP troops



between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots; to define law and order in general terms, not relating to the 1960 Constitution but to a sense of stability, and third, "a return to normal conditions" was interpreted as a return to "normal" in social terms, i.e., the reopening of shops, factories and farms. The Secretary-General's logical premise was that the force could try to create "an atmosphere more favourable to the efforts to achieve a long term settlement."<sup>82</sup> Achieving a long term settlement, however, was not the task of the force. Whilst the administrative arm of the United Nations force (UNCIVPOL) could perform a centripetal function in the short term and in relation to immediate issues, the long term settlement was a matter for the United Nations mediator and the parties involved.

It is sufficient to comment that since the report of the United Nations mediator, Galo Plaza, was published in March of 1965<sup>83</sup> the situation has changed little. In essence, the Plaza report is a significant yet neglected document. Perhaps for the first time, the mediator's report gave primary emphasis to the local level. "In my view the procedure most likely to produce fruitful results would be for a meeting or series of meetings to take place in the first instance between representatives of the two principal parties who belong to Cyprus; the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-



Cypriot communities."<sup>84</sup> The reasoning is quite clear:  
"It is between those communities that peace, agreement  
and understanding must be formed before there is any  
solution to the Cyprus problem; it is, at base, they who  
bear arms against each other; and it is they who must  
live under the terms of any settlement."<sup>85</sup>

CHAPTER 8The Elements of a Model

At this stage it is necessary to elaborate on those issues to which allusions were made in the preceding text, but which were neither explicitly mentioned or defined. This section is, in a sense, a gathering together of loose ends which have been present in the preceding account and which, if they are to be of more than passing value, need to be expanded and elaborated. Whilst no claim is made in favour of "a model of communal conflict" based on the Cyprus case, it is to be hoped that a classification of major points may be of some heuristic value.

1. The levels of conflict; parties and issues. It is fairly evident that there are at least two disputes relating to Cyprus: at the primary level, there is the conflict in Cyprus concerning the issues of day-to-day participation and coexistence between two separate groups - the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. At the secondary level is the dispute concerning the eventual status of Cyprus, the parties to this dispute being Great Britain, Greece and Turkey. It is, of course, not easy to separate the two in a clear cut fashion, but an examination of two attempts to solve "the Cyprus

issue" illustrate the confusion that results from interlocking one conflict level with another. In 1959, for example, it was assumed that the Greek and Turkish governments were clearly cogniscent of the demands of the two Cypriot communities; an identity of goals was assumed.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution of March 1964 regarded Greece, Turkey, Great Britain, the Turkish-Cypriots and the Greek-Cypriots as parties to a dispute. But this is plainly misleading; the parties are not all equally involved, nor are they concerned with the same issues, and it is unlikely that "a solution" could be found to satisfy all those concerned. The three governments of Greece, Turkey and Great Britain are in conflict over the strategic role of Cyprus; Britain seeks to maintain a strategic base in a stable environment whilst Turkey desires a Cyprus in the hands of a neutral or friendly government. Thus, Lewis has written:

Turkey's attitude has been widely interpreted as a concern for the Turkish minority in Cyprus. Though real, it was not paramount. Her chief anxiety was for her own security. . . . To let Greece complete her encirclement by annexing Cyprus would be to prejudice the security of the entire population of Turkey for the sake of the Greek "pocket majority" in the island.<sup>1</sup>

The position of the Greek government is more problematical. However, in view of the traditional tenets of the "Megali Idea" and the major aspects of Greek policy in the 1950's,

Cyprus may be seen as part of a larger Greek diplomatic strategy aimed at bolstering Greek prestige.

As Burton has put it, the Greek and Turkish governments "might have been purporting to be acting on behalf of and in defense of the communities; but their own negotiations and activities indicated that their interests were not firstly those of the local communities."<sup>2</sup> (Indeed, it may be possible to identify a tertiary level, comprising the United States and the Soviet Union, with Cyprus assuming a major role in terms of alliance stability.) The explicit reference to the local-level dispute as a key to the resolution of conflict at all levels was made in the United Nations Mediator's report of 1965, in an implicit fashion. Yet the distinction remains both implicit and conceptual and there has been little indication of any progress in terms of practically differentiating one dispute from another.

2. Linkage Theory; the interaction between and within systems.

Having explained the existence of two systems of behaviour in terms of two disputes, it becomes necessary to explain the influence of one upon the other. Rosenau has termed this area of study "linkage theory"<sup>3</sup> - the search for meaningful links between national and international systems.

Rosenau has cast the problem in terms of boundaries and bridges, yet it is presumed here that this starting point

is erroneous. A study of the costs and benefits accruing to a state if it enters a national dispute is not a cost-benefit analysis of getting over a bridge or getting through boundaries. Such a perspective presumes, in a way, the existence of billiard-ball type states with relatively impermeable and concrete boundaries. The cost-benefit analysis is related to redefining a situation to the extent that a new system of behaviour, not bound by state boundaries, is created. Thus, when the Greek government took up the Cyprus issue in 1954 it did not "link" one system with another - it recast the Greek-Greek-Cypriot relationship in new behavioural terms. There was a system organised round a prime goal - to change the status of Cyprus.

What the changed status of Cyprus was to be was not a point of complete identity between the two Greek groups, but the community of goals was sufficient to realign them in a new system. Further evidence to support this concept is the flow of Greek arms to Greek-Cypriots (and Turkish arms to Turkish-Cypriots); the boundary of Cyprus was significant only in the sense that it was a nuisance, since British (and later U.N.) patrols tried to halt the flow of arms.

Thus, critical decisions do not merely link systems, they redefined a situation according to new criteria (e.g., perceived community of, and complementarity of, interests, the stakes and risks of redefinition) and create new relat-

ionships. The national-international dichotomy is in a way superficial since it presumes the existence of gaps that have to be bridged. System theory may help to get around this problem by focusing on new systems, in terms of which a link is less meaningful.

Having provisionally classified the disputes and explored the relationships between the two, certain observations are presented that relate primarily to the communal conflict in Cyprus.

3. From difference to separation. A major objective of the preceding account was to plot the evolution of the relationship between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities in Cyprus. The tentative (impressionistic) conclusion is presented in the graph below.


The escalation from a level of mere difference to violent separation may be explained in terms of Gurr's<sup>4</sup> model of "relative deprivation", a derivative of Dollard's "frustration-aggression" hypothesis.<sup>5</sup> The Greek disappointment at the British decision to hold on to Cyprus after 1878, despite expectations by the former that enosis would be forthcoming, acted as a stimulus to Greek demands. Successive efforts to change the status of Cyprus failed and by 1882 the Greek-Cypriots were voicing their demands for separate representation in the Legislative Council. With the further frust-



FIGURE III

The Evolution of Difference

FEATURE *of*  
DIFFERENCE



ration of Greek demands in 1920 a new stage was reached when the Greek members of the Council boycotted its proceedings. The feeling was compounded in 1931. Yet the critical point was reached in the period after World War II, when rumours had circulated that Britain was to leave Cyprus. When these hopes were dashed, a systematic campaign of violence was planned. Clearly, a violence threshold had been reached; at a certain frustration level, violent procedures were invoked. Yet with the use of violence by one group, the second (Turkish) group itself turned to violence. By the late 1950's both Cypriot groups were fighting each other, and by the end of 1963 they were separated and violently opposed to each other.

This evolutionary perspective tells us something about the use of violence. In the first instance, the threshold of violence is fairly high, yet as the conflict persists the nature of violence changes; from an initial symptom of frustration the factor of violence is transformed into an endemic feature. By 1963, both groups had come to expect that any dispute would, of necessity, be violent and prepared themselves accordingly.

The factor of expectations is critical. **Expectations** are judgements about the future behaviour of others and, as such they are subject to distortion, i.e., prejudice may become a basis for action. The idea of a self-fulfilling

prophecy is also important. Thus, if the Turks expect Greek-Cypriots to resort to violence, they too will resort to violence; the appearance of E.O.K.A. stimulated the appearance of a Turkish underground movement.

Siegel<sup>6</sup> has termed this "defensive cultural adaptation", meaning that in response to a perceived change a minority group centralises its goals around central cultural symbols. In essence, the Turkish-Cypriot goals have been simple and appealed to all members of the group; first, adherence to the status quo, then taxim (partition) when it appeared that Britain might leave Cyprus, and then the claim for adequate powers of representation. All three reflect an underlying desire of the group to preserve itself in a separate, identifiable form.

4. Group structures in conflict situations. It is generally argued that conflict with an out-group unifies an in-group. Thus, for example, Coser has restated Simmel's maxim in the following fashion: "Conflict with another group leads to the mobilisation of the energies of group members and hence to increased cohesion of the group."<sup>7</sup> The answer to this is that it depends upon a time factor which is important. Thus, in the period 1950-1957 the Greek-Cypriots (or at least its leadership group) were united against the British and Turkish-Cypriots. As time went on, however, divergences occurred with respect to short term policies and long term strategies.

In 1964 the re-entry into Cyprus of Grivas, who had openly disagreed with Makarios' tactics earlier, was clear evidence of a splitting of ranks. Similarly, the opposition against Makarios in presidential elections are indicators of division. Nor does the Simmel/Coser proposition strictly apply to the Turkish-Cypriots. Whilst Kuchuk has been officially unopposed, the role of Denktash as a leader is far from clear. Thus, it is evident that conflict duration is important and in need of further explanation.

5. Conflict and group boundaries. Since one of the major variables in the preceding account was the concept of group boundary, it may be of interest to review Coser's treatment of this subject. Again reformulating a proposition from Simmel, Coser states; "Conflict serves to establish and maintain the identity and boundary lines of societies and groups."<sup>8</sup> The Cyprus case verifies this proposition. The foundation of E.O.K.A. in 1955 saw Greek-Cypriots leave the police force (where they might have had to take up pro-Turkish positions) and join the Greek community, whilst the (anti-Greek) police force became almost wholly Turkish. Moreover, E.O.K.A.'s systematic execution of Greek's having dealings with Turks is an example, if extreme, of the same phenomenon. More generally, however, it appears from the available evidence that the general belief, held by both groups, was that

contact with the other group was in some way dysfunctional, but for this statement to be concretely upheld there is a need for further, more detailed, analysis.

6. The relevance of the state. From the preceding account it is fairly obvious that Cyprus is neither a sovereign nor an independent republic. It is further argued that Cyprus is not a state nor, with the precarious co-existence of two separate communities bound by different values and symbols, can it hope to be in the present circumstances. There is no Cypriot consciousness; there are two separate group consciousnesses, and they are exemplified by the adjectives used to describe Cypriots as either Greek or Turkish. There is, more pointedly, adherence and loyalty to an organised group below the level of the state itself - the ethnic group. The ethnic group, both in itself and in conjunction with the larger ethnic reservoirs of "Greekness" and "Turkishness", supplies the wants of its members. Internal integration, the maximisation of a favourable input-output ratio for the society and survival and protection against external enemies, all functions of the nation-state according to Katz<sup>9</sup> (and others), are performed by the ethnic group. Such a situation, surely, must lead us to a reexamination of the concept of the state, particularly its relevance to modern conditions where "the State" subsumes a host of

group, cultural and ethnic loyalties, not least in formerly colonial areas. Such an analysis may lead us to believe that, in certain circumstances, "the state" may have only limited usefulness as a conceptual device.

7. A definition of communal conflict. Conflicts within states are normally labelled either revolutions or civil wars. By using the term revolution, one implies that a certain sector of the population actively revolts against a part, a sector, or a group within the system. Such a belief presumes an initial state of value compatibility. The same may be said for civil strife: it presumes a degree of system wholeness (Civitas) and the appearance of a set of centrifugal forces that cause disruption. Communal conflict, i.e., conflict between communities, may be characterised as conflict between disparate, separate and identifiable groups. Now the community may be organised around symbols such as race, language, religion or colour, but there is an implicit idea of the absence of a sense of wholeness, community or society. Thus, communal conflict, it is argued, is wrongly approached from the perspective of the nation state. The apparent utility of system theory may help circumvent the semantic and conceptual difficulties inherent in a state perspective, but even if it is found to be unsuitable, it may have pointed out further areas of analysis.



8. The wider systemic effects of violent conflict. The analysis of a conflict or a set of conflicts has more than mere intellectual value. If it is to be of any value at all it must be relevant and directed toward problem-solving. Recent research has revealed previously ignored effects of conflict, i.e., upon socialisation. Only with the appearance of a bitter conflict on the doorstep of those able to deal with the problem of socialisation (i.e., the Ulster conflict) by virtue of their being able to allocate resources to research, have these wider effects been catalogued. Thus, for example, Fraser<sup>10</sup> has recently studied the traumatic effects of violent conflict upon children in Belfast and found a significant link between the frequency of violence and mental disorder. Yet, compared to Ulster, the conflict in Cyprus is much older. That it is so may tell us something about the wider systemic effects of violence in the Cypriot communities. Having said that, it may stimulate us in the knowledge that an understanding of conflict, of all kinds, may have more than passing value. As a prominent Cypriot has recently stated, "The younger generation is worse - at least we used to talk to one another in the old days. They have grown up apart, behind barricades, and have learned only to fight."<sup>11</sup>

TABLE I

The Population of Cyprus

<u>YEAR</u>		<u>ABSOLUTE</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
1881 <sup>1</sup>	GREEK	136,629	73.4
	TURK	46,389	24.9
	BRITISH	691	0.4
	OTHERS	2,400	1.3
		186,084	100.0
1946 <sup>2</sup>	GREEK		80.2
	TURK		17.9
1960 <sup>3</sup>	GREEK	442,138	77.1
	TURK	104,320	18.2
	MARONITE & ARMENIAN	6,324	1.1
	BRITISH	17,513	3.0
	OTHERS	3,271	0.6
		573,566	100.0
1967 <sup>4</sup>	TOTAL	614,000	

Footnotes

1. Alastos, p.321.
2. *ibid.*
3. Statistical Data by Ethnic Group, 1964, Table I.
4. Estimate, U.S. Dept. of Commerce; Overseas Business Reports, October 1968. Basic data on the economy of Cyprus.

TABLE IIPopulation of Cyprus: Distribution by Village

<u>SETTLEMENTS</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>% AS PROPORTION OF TOTAL POPULATION</u>
<u>GREEK</u>	274,436	395	62.3%
OTHERS	3,342		
<u>TURKISH</u>	36,837	121	19.1%
OTHERS	128		
<u>MIXED</u> (Mainly major towns)	255,277	114	18.0%
GREEK	166,907		
TURK	66,907		
OTHERS	21,463		
<u>OTHERS</u>	2,240	4	0.6%
MARONITE	2,175		
GREEK	--		
TURK	65		
<u>TOTAL</u>	573,556	634	100.0%

Source: Statistical Data by Ethnic Group, Nicosia 1964.  
Abstract of Table V.



To accompany Table II





MAP II: Explanatory note.

The map is a reproduction of that appended to "Statistical Data by Ethnic Group," Nicosia 1964.

LEGEND

1. Colours: Blue = Greek settlement  
 Red = Turkish settlement  
 Green = Maronite settlement  
 Black = others

2. Circle size: (lower right).

The circles in the lower right illustrate village size and represent, from top to bottom;

Settlements over 2000 population		
"	1000-2000	"
"	600-1000	"
"	300- 600	"
"	100- 300	"
"	10-100	"
"	less than 10	"

FOOTNOTESINTRODUCTION

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