

1973

The American military expedition against Quebec, September 19, 1775 to January 1, 1776

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**THE AMERICAN MILITARY EXPEDITION
AGAINST QUEBEC,
SEPTEMBER 19, 1775 TO JANUARY 1, 1776**

**by
Robert F. Reeves**

A Thesis

Presented to the Graduate Committee

of Lehigh University

In Candidacy for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the


Department of History

Lehigh University

1973

This thesis is accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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

Chairman of Department

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Abstract

From September 19, 1775 until December 31, 1775 a motley army of Continental soldiers under Colonel Benedict Arnold engaged in an expedition aimed at capturing the Canadian city of Quebec. This expedition was the first attempt to attack Quebec by an overland route through the Maine wilderness. But due to the lateness of the season and an underestimation of the distance to be covered, the struggle of Arnold's poorly trained and ill-equipped soldiers to survive the march became an epic of human suffering and endurance.

The survivors emerged from the wilderness with Quebec in a highly vulnerable state, only to realize that their march had rendered them incapable of attacking the city. However, had it not been for poor timing and miscalculation, it seems likely that Arnold's men could have taken Quebec despite their lack of military competence.

The assault went into a second phase. The rebel army laid siege to Quebec, hoping to regain their advantage. But since Continental soldiers enlisted for only six months, the expedition's commanders soon faced the dilemma of having to attack the city before their army

returned home. The result was a forced battle which ended in a crushing defeat for the Americans. This defeat ultimately cost the colonies whatever chance they had of gaining Canadian allegiance.

The assault was part of a larger strategy to win Canada. Although the Quebec attack developed as the step-child of General Washington's planning, in the end we find his strategy correct. However, there is a question of whether his priorities were correct in placing the greatest importance on the capture of Montreal.

The expedition also labored under many disadvantages inherent to the early Continental Army. A sense of military discipline was almost totally lacking among the enlisted men. Insipient regionalism also caused numerous command problems. Lack of training in rudimentary survival skills or in martial skills badly handicapped the army. Lastly, the unwillingness of the civilian soldier to commit himself longer than six months broke the expedition's back.

In the end, the example of the Quebec expedition draws clearly into focus the odds against which the American colonies struggled and the miracle of their success.

Introduction

In the first year of the American Revolution, the Second Continental Congress reluctantly admitted to itself that hope for reconciliation with Great Britain was rapidly fading. Part of this admission resulted in the creation of the Continental Army. However, Congress' recognition of coming hostilities lacked the conviction to provide strategic guidelines to the new army's leaders. That responsibility fell on Commander George Washington.

For several months Congress had debated the question of dealing with the British presence in Canada. Several colonial militias had already attacked two British garrisons along the Canadian border, and the problem seemingly had become one of convincing the Canadian population that the rebel colonies were directing their actions solely against the British. British garrisons on the Canadian border generated the fear that Canada would serve as a staging area for military thrusts aimed at dividing the colonies from Canada to Boston or New York. By late July General Washington had taken control of the new army and had begun formulating strategies to deal with Canada as well as the critical situation in Boston.

From this military evaluation by Washington came the Canadian campaign. It first developed as a single

front assault led by General Philip Schuyler of New York on the garrisons at St. John's and Montreal. But when Washington found that he had more men at Cambridge than he could keep busy, he added to Schuyler's drive the frequently suggested but never used plan to attack overland through the Maine wilderness and capture the St. Lawrence gateway city of Quebec.

The main phase of Washington's plan resulted in clear successes, but the expedition to Quebec ended in a frustrating defeat. Shortly after this defeat, St. John's and Montreal both fell into British hands again. The British threat in Canada remained, and instead of becoming a potential fourteenth colony, Canada continued as a British military base. Eventually, in 1777 this threat culminated in General Burgoyne's Hudson Valley Campaign. Until the smoke at Saratoga had settled and a resounding American victory resulted, the defeat of rebel forces at Quebec and its aftermath stood as a significant determinant of the Revolution.

This study deals with the development, execution and failure of the Quebec expedition. It is concerned mostly with how the expedition progressed rather than why it failed. As the reader will see, the reasons for the expedition's failure are fairly obvious, and because of the source materials available on the expedition, how

it occurred is by far the most interesting study.

There are relatively few opportunities to study segments of the American Revolution almost exclusively through eyewitness accounts. We are fortunate that the expedition against Quebec not only offers this opportunity but also provides excellent insight on the military life and character of some of the first Continental soldiers, the strengths and particularly the weaknesses of the infant Continental Army and early colonial military strategy. That the enigmatic and controversial Benedict Arnold commanded the expedition is but an additional attraction to the study of this subject.

At least eighteen members of the expedition kept diaries or later wrote accounts of their participation in the expedition. Furthermore, for the later stages of the expedition we are able to play the American accounts off against those kept by several civilians and soldiers trapped in Quebec. Because of the large number of accounts, there is an almost daily breakdown of events directly up to the defeat. Wherever possible the author attempts, through multiple-source footnotes, to indicate all of the works corroborating or disagreeing with one another.

There are definite problems associated with any attempt to accurately piece together the expedition solely from primary accounts. Many times diarists were

mistaken in their entries, either because they were incorrectly informed or lost. In several cases most of the diarists simply believed things that later proved false.

Although the siege of Quebec continued for four and one half months after the battle, this study ends with the American defeat on December 31, 1775. Beyond that date the outcome was predetermined, and what followed was anticlimactic. Many of the diaries end or offer little more than the routine descriptions of everyday life in prison or waiting for the siege to gasp its last breath.

Chapter I

Invasion Decision and Preparations

As the gulf between Great Britain and the American colonies widened in the 1770's, leaders on both sides showed growing concern over the disposition of Canada. Both recognized the crucial role Canada could play if a major conflict developed. Residents of Northern New York and New England remembered all too well the earlier French and Indian War and their own vulnerability to the devastating invasions loosed on them by French Canadians and Indians. To forestall similar strategy by the British, a rag-tag army of "Green Mountain Boys" and other New Englanders captured the border forts at Crown Point and Ticonderoga on May 9, 1775.¹ Parliament, on the other hand, had already passed the Quebec Act on June 16-17, 1774, to secure Britain's hold on Canada against the revolutionary spirit in America.² To further

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1. Allen French, The First Year of the American Revolution, (Boston, 1934), pp. 143-144, 151; Chapter XI, "Ticonderoga -- Its Capture and Consequences," gives a vivid, well documented account of this action and its results.
 2. The Quebec Act contained six major provisions: (1) The Proclamation of 1763 no longer applied to Canada; (2) Excepting taxation, legislative power rested with the Governor of Quebec and a selected

legitimize rebel fears, General Gage wrote from his tenuous Boston post as early as September 1774 to ask Governor Carleton of Quebec "whether a Body of Canadians and Indians might be collected, and confided in, for the Service in this Country, should Matters come to Extremities." Carleton responded that the Canadians "might be

Council; (3) Roman Catholics were free to practice their religion and religious background was no basis for exclusion; (4) Old Laws concerning civil rights and property were reinstated; (5) English criminal law would apply with modifications such as elimination of Habeas Corpus; (6) The Quebec boundary was expanded westward to lake Erie and from western Pennsylvania to the Mississippi River. Parliamentary History of England, (London, 1813), XVII, 1357-1407; Bernard Donoghue, British Politics and the American Revolution, (New York, 1964), pp. 106-108. American leaders considered the Quebec Act part of the Coercive Acts because it limited westward expansion by the colonies, legalized the despised Catholic Church, and returned Canadian government to French influence. Parliament presumably was willing to weaken Britain's control over Canada to provide a stronger hold on the colonies; see Address to the People of Great Britain, October 2, 1774, Journals of the Continental Congress, (Washington D.C., 1904), I, 81-90. The question of the Act's primary intent still continues; Justin Smith, Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony, (New York, 1907), I, 74-77, groups the Quebec Act with the Coercive Acts. More recently, George M. Wrong, Canada and the American Revolution, (New York, 1935), p. 258, sees the Act as both "a masterpiece of statesmanship that saved Canada" and "a blundering provocation to rebellion." Donoghue, British Politics, p. 126; Jack M. Sosin, Agents and Merchants, (Lincoln, 1965), pp. 182-183; and Mason Wade, The French Canadians, (Toronto, 1968), I, 58-67; contend that the Act's purpose was to stabilize Canada. Conditions in the colonies only hastened the Act's passage, since the problems dealt with in the Act existed prior to the colonial crisis. Colonials misinterpreted the Act's intent.

depended on."³ Richard Henry Lee doubtlessly received some intelligence of this or similar requests by Gage for Canadian assistance, since he passed information on to Samuel Adams in February 1775 warning of a military invasion from Canada.⁴ Thus, unless rebellion in Canada or an invasion by rebels created a diversion for British troops stationed there, the potential threat of an incursion from Canada loomed heavily in the minds of American leaders.

Americans mistakenly hoped that Canada would join the colonies out of mutual dissatisfaction with British rule. But many significant differences existed between the colonies and Canada. Canadians also remembered the past century of war and the colonial hatred for Catholics and the French. For the vast majority of Canadians, their origin, religion, culture and economy differed from that of the American colonies. Following passage of the Quebec Act, unrest over the issues of representation, civil law and religious toleration diminished.⁵ Canadians generally accepted the status quo.

3. General Gage to Governor Carleton, September 4, 1774; Governor Carleton to General Gage, n.d., Public Record Office, Colonial Correspondence, Quebec: 10, pp. 159, 163; quoted in Smith, Fourteenth Colony, I, 78.

4. R.H. Lee to S. Adams, February 4, 1775, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee, ed. James Ballagh, (New York, 1911), I, 127-130.

5. Wade, French Canadians, I, 64.

The initial American attempt to solicit Canadian support brought no response.⁶ This particularly troubled rebel leaders in Massachusetts who had received Lee's letter. To further assess and encourage Canadian sympathies before the Second Continental Congress convened, the Boston Committee of Correspondence appointed their accomplished propagandist, Samuel Adams, to write another letter showing cause for and requesting Canadian support. Adams directed the letter to "some gentlemen of Montreal and Quebec." He selected a young Yale lawyer named John Brown to make delivery.⁷ The letter noted the many common grievances of both populations and then urged a united front against the British:

The Enemies of American Liberty will surely be chagrined when they find, that the people of Quebec have in common with the Americans the true sentiments of Liberty. How confounded must they be, when they see those very Peoples upon whom they depended to aid them in their flagitious Designs, lending their Assistance to oppose them, cheerfully adopting the resolutions of the late Continental Congress & joyning their own Delegates in another, to be held at Philadelphia on the 10th of next May.(8)

John Brown completed his portion of the mission with only

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6. Continental Congress to the Inhabitants of Quebec, October 26, 1774, Journals of Congress, I, 105-113.
 7. Samuel Adams to John Brown, February 21, 1775, The Writings of Samuel Adams, ed. Harry A. Cushing, (New York, 1907), III, 182.
 8. Committee of Correspondence of Boston to Inhabitants of Quebec, February 21, 1775, Ibid., III, 186.

moderate success. He then journeyed to Philadelphia to describe the current Canadian stance to the Continental Congress on May 18, but no Canadian representative accompanied Brown. Apparently Brown informed Congress about more than Canadian attitudes, for the Journal on the 18th noted that "a design is formed by the British Ministry of making a cruel invasion from the province of Quebec."⁹

Yet, alarming as this news seemed, Congress only reacted with a call for the removal of cannon and military stores from Fort Ticonderoga. After an inventory, everything would be held in safe keeping "in order that (it) may be safely returned when the restoration of former harmony between great Britain and these colonies shall render it prudent."¹⁰ Some influential members of Congress still harbored the hope of reconciliation without further violence at this point, and thus generated a more restrained approach from Congress.

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9. Journals of Congress, II, 56; In light of the knowledge that no formal plans for an invasion from Canada developed, it is interesting to contemplate the possibility of conspiracy by those persons involved in presenting this data to Congress, e.g. S. Adams, R.H. Lee and J. Brown. For further consideration of this see Ira D. Gruber, "The American Revolution as a Conspiracy: The British View," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd. ser., XXVI, (July, 1969), 360-372; Herbert J. Henderson Jr., "Political Factions in the Continental Congress," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1962), pp. 24, 35-36, 40, 45, 52.
 10. Journals of Congress, II, 56; French, First Year, p. 377.

While peaceful settlement of their differences with Britain outwardly seemed the cause for Congress's caution, underlying apprehensions also prevailed. Uppermost in its thoughts was the fear that, through some ill-considered act, it might alienate the Canadians, thereby causing them to join Britain. Crown Point and Ticonderoga were both close to the Canadian border. Congress now concluded that their capture had caused alarm in Canada. Consequently, Congress appointed a committee to write another open letter assuring the Canadians that these military actions were

...dictated by the great law of self-preservation. They (the forts) were intended to annoy us, and to cut off that friendly intercourse...which has hitherto subsisted between you and us. We hope it has given you no uneasiness, and you may rely on our assurances, that these colonies will pursue no measure whatever, but such as friendship and a regard for our mutual safety and interest may suggest.⁽¹¹⁾

Congress further supported its letter with a resolution on June 1 forbidding any colony to invade Canada. Since some rumor of an invasion from Ticonderoga had reached Congress, it immediately dispatched notice of the resolution to the Fort's commander.¹²

As Congress expounded on its peaceful intentions and simultaneously wrestled with the problem of defining

11. Ibid., II, 70.

12. Ibid., II, 75.

its own authority, military men from both sides called for direct action involving Canada. On June 9, Governor Guy Carleton declared martial law in Quebec Province in response to Ticonderoga's capture. All currently enlisted militia received an alert to repel any attempted invasion, and a new militia levy was ordered.¹³ Similarly in Boston, General Gage confronted a growing rebel army. On the same day Carleton declared martial law in Quebec, Gage informed Lord Dartmouth that "General Carleton would be justified to raise bodies of Canadians and Indians to attack them (the colonies) in return."¹⁴

Concurrently, the two feuding leaders of the militias which captured Crown Point and Ticonderoga (Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold) sought to continue northward.¹⁵ Both men made strong pleas to lead separate armies into Canada. A weakened force of regulars and militia defended Quebec Province, they maintained. Allen developed his plan

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13. A Proclamation by Governor Carleton, June 9, 1775, Peter Force, ed., American Archives, (Washington D.C. 1839), 4th ser., II, 940.
 14. General Gage to Lord Dartmouth, June 12, 1775, Ibid., 4th ser., II, 968.
 15. Arnold and Allen received commissions independently from two separate committees. Violence threatened to erupt when the two confronted one another over this issue. See Accounts in James Flexner, The Traitor and the Spy, (New York, 1953), pp. 43-48; French, First Year, pp. 149-153; John Pell, Ethan Allen, (Boston, 1929), p. 83; William M. Wallace, Traitorous Hero, (New York, 1954), pp. 39-46; also American Archives, 4th ser., II, 1085-1088.

in rather vague terms: "Two or three thousand men, conducted by intrepid commanders, would make a conquest of the ministerial party in Canada."¹⁶

Arnold made his bold plea directly to the Continental Congress. Not only did he give intelligence on British garrison strength, but he also reaffirmed, based on personal contact, the willingness of the Indians and some Canadians to aid an American invasion force. The letter proposed and gave plans for an attack by 1,700 men under Arnold's command on British strongholds in Canada.¹⁷ Unfortunately, the request reached Congress when it was preoccupied with the creation of the Continental Army and when its mood still dictated caution over matters concerning Canada. No general acceptance yet existed in Congress during mid-June toward large-scale offensive military undertakings out of the colonies. Besides, following the episode with Allen, Arnold's name carried the taint of controversy. His letter met with silence. However, Congress unknowingly improved Arnold's future chances to pursue his plan when it appointed George Washington Commander-in-Chief of the Continental

16. Colonel Allen to Massachusetts Congress, June 9, 1775, American Archives, 4th ser., II, 939; since Allen's letter reached the Massachusetts Congress at a time when all efforts were directed toward Boston, it met with no response.

17. B. Arnold to Continental Congress, June 12, 1775,

Army. Disgusted, frustrated and unaware that Washington agreed in principle with his plan, Arnold resigned his state commission on June 24, and hurried home to New Haven only to find that his wife had died.¹⁹

Records claim that an imminent invasion by General Carleton's little army caused Congress to reverse its decision not to invade Canada. But also plausible was the suggestion that General Washington favored this course of action and controlled this change of policy from his position as Commander. Washington's correspondence of June 25 to newly appointed General Philip Schuyler anticipated Congress's decision by two days. The letter asked Schuyler to "obtain the best Information of the temper and disposition of the Canadians that a proper line may be mark'd out to conciliate their good opinion or facilitate any future operation."²⁰ Whatever the case, on June 27, Congress timidly and uncertainly resolved:

Ibid., 4th ser., II, 976-977; see also Colonel Benedict Arnold to Governor Trumbull, June 13, 1775, Ibid., 4th ser., II, 977-978.

18. Journals of Congress, II, 91.
19. Flexner, Traitor and Spy, pp. 54-55; French, First Year, pp. 149-158.
20. Journals of Congress, II, 109; General Washington to General Schuyler, June 25, 1775, The Writings of George Washington, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, (Washington D. C., 1931), III, 302-304.

That if General Schuyler finds it practicable, and that it will not be disagreeable to the Canadians, he do immediately take possession of St. Johns, Montreal, and any other measures in Canada, which may have a tendency to promote the peace and security of these Colonies. (21)

Plans for an invasion of Canada developed slowly. General Washington remained preoccupied during most of July with the organization of his army. In New York, General Schuyler continued throughout the summer to prepare boats and supplies for his assault. Finally, on August 20, Washington wrote to Schuyler to tell him of a more elaborate Canadian strategy, a plan which the Commander had considered for many days. Noting that he could spare 1,000 to 1,200 men from his army at Cambridge, Washington proposed to send a force into Canada via the Kennebec River in Maine. Quebec City, guardian of the Saint Lawrence, he selected as the second objective. This pincer strategy presumably would create an advantage leading to the capture of all major cities in Southern Quebec. Schuyler would approach from New York northward toward Quebec, while the additional force would march and boat north from Maine, take Quebec and move down the Saint Lawrence to join Schuyler. General Carleton commanded too small a force conceivably

21. Journals of Congress, II, 109-110.

to protect the entire area.

Washington's plan to attack Quebec seemed sound and had some historical precedent. The Kennebec-Chaudiere rivers route periodically attracted attention for many years. Two Frenchmen proposed it as a means of surprise attack on Boston in 1697 and 1702. During planning for the British attack in 1759, they gave this route some consideration, but accepted instead General Wolf's daring approach down the Saint Lawrence. Recognizing the future potential of the river trail, the British Army sent Lieutenant John Montresor to map part of the Kennebec River immediately after the French and Indian War. More recently, Colonel Jonathan Brewer offered the Massachusetts Congress his services to lead a small force up the Kennebec trail in the spring of 1775. But Brewer's petition remained unanswered when Washington wrote to Schuyler about his plan. After over seventy-five years of consideration, the trail remained virtually unexplored except by a small number of Indians.

Washington's selection of Benedict Arnold to lead the Quebec portion of the invasion surprised no one.

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22. General Washington to General Schuyler, August 20, 1775, Writings of Washington, III, 436-439; Carleton had only about 550 active troops under him at this time.
 23. Smith, Fourteenth Colony, I, 496-498; gave copiously documented account of the route's background; Petition of Jonathan Brewer to Congress of Massachusetts, n.d., American Archives, 4th ser., II, 462.

Congress had suggested in late June that Arnold be consulted prior to movement into Canada. As Washington developed his new plan, Arnold visited headquarters. He had just settled an old account from Ticonderoga with the Massachusetts Congress. He and Washington presumably discussed the Quebec invasion, Arnold adding to the plan from his earlier experience. Apparently Washington liked what he had heard about the little Colonel and gave him the command.²⁴

Following Washington's letter to Schuyler by one day, Arnold began making arrangements for his expedition. He had to contend with a critical lack of time. Many arrangements needed completion before the force could depart Cambridge, and the difficult winter came to the upper Chaudiere by mid-October. The expedition required supplies for 1,200 men and boats to carry the supplies. Accomplishing all preparations in the shortest possible time meant the operation could begin no earlier than mid-September. Even at that rate Washington projected an arrival date at Quebec of late October, dangerously close

24. Journals of Congress, II, 109. Arnold had paid himself for many of the provisions at Ticonderoga, but the Massachusetts Congress felt he had overspent their money and called Arnold to Cambridge to give an account. This humiliated and infuriated Arnold. Later the Continental Congress repaid him; Wallace, Traitorous Hero, pp. 56-58; French, First Year, p. 431; Smith, Fourteenth Colony, I, 495-496; no record of the appointment or meeting exists.

to the time troops in numbers encountered difficulty surviving a wilderness march. Washington knew the expedition allowed only a small margin of error, but based on the maps and reports in his possession, the plan seemed likely to succeed.²⁵

Since using the river route supposedly offered the advantage of transporting provisions by water, one of Arnold's first tasks involved building an invasion fleet of small river craft. On August 21, Arnold wrote to Mr. Reuben Colburn of Gardinerstown, Maine, asking how soon two hundred light 'battoes' capable of carrying six or seven men and their baggage could be built. Each boat also required four oars and two setting poles for pushing. Arnold questioned the quantity and price of available fresh beef on the Kennebec. Then too, if Colburn had collected information from anyone recently returned from Quebec, it might help.²⁶

General Washington's involvement with the operation continued concurrent with Arnold's. On September 2, he

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25. General Washington to Governor Trumbull, October 13, 1775, Writings of Washington, III, 29.
 26. Benedict Arnold to R. Colburn, August 21, 1775, Justin Smith, Arnold's March from Cambridge to Quebec, (New York, 1903), pp. 75-76; Smith, Fourteenth Colony, I, 413, Remark XXXIII. Smith was the only author aware of this letter and its source.

wrote to Nathaniel Tracy of Newburyport, Massachusetts, ordering him to secure all vessels necessary to transport 1,100 troops from that port to an unspecified destination.²⁷ The next day Washington gave Reuben Colburn formal orders to begin working on two hundred batteaux at a price of forty shillings apiece.²⁸ In all of these arrangements a most fateful selection occurred when a surveyor named Samuel Goodwin accepted Washington's request to supply Arnold with maps. These covered the coast from Cape Elizabeth to the Penobscot and Kennebec Rivers, and then up the Kennebec, including all portages, to the Ammeguntick Pond (known as Chaudiere or Magnetic Pond) and the Chaudiere River in Canada.²⁹ Lastly, Washington gave Colburn instructions to hire scouts for a reconnaissance of the line of march. Colburn's hiring of two local men named Dennis Getchell and Samuel Berry later caused Arnold's men tremendous hardships. Both of these "scouts" moved up the Kennebec River on

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27. General Washington to Nathaniel Tracy, September 2, 1775, Writings of Washington, III, 470-471.
 28. General Washington to R. Colburn, September 3, 1775 Ibid., III, 471.
 29. Samuel Goodwin to General Washington, October 17, 1775, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 961-962.

September 1.³⁰ Assembling the necessary troops remained the final task.

Throughout late August and early September several thousand men and officers arrived at Washington's Cambridge headquarters to form the Continental Army. Arnold's force, selected from this assemblage, consisted of three rifle companies, ten musket companies, one doctor, one chaplain and at least two or three women.³¹ The later famous Daniel Morgan led his rifle company all the way from Winchester, Virginia, and joined Arnold.³² Pennsylvania supplied the other two rifle companies under Captains William Hendricks and Matthew Smith. Each company averaged slightly over ninety men. The musket

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30. Dennis Getchell and Samuel Berry to R. Colburn September 13, 1775, Ibid., 4th ser., III, 961-962.
31. Estimates of the total number and composition of the expedition's participants varied; Smith, Arnold's March, p. 57, gave 1,050 as the total; Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, (New York, 1952), I, 165, added one more to Smith's total; additional but differing totals existed in French, First Year, 432 f.n.; Diary of Benedict Arnold, March to Quebec, ed. Kenneth Roberts, (New York, 1945), p. 72; Diary of Joseph Henry, Ibid., p. 300; Diary of Abner Stocking, Ibid., p. 546; Harrison Bird, Attack on Quebec, (New York, 1968), pp. 65, 68, 116, listed three women: Mrs. Greer, Mrs. Warner and possibly Mrs. Issac Senter.
32. Don Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan, (Chapel Hill, 1961), p. 24; Morgan brought ninety-six men and Hendricks brought ninety.

companies mostly came from the more immediate area. Each consisted of roughly eighty-four men under one captain.³³ Unlike the sophisticated rifled weapon carried in the rifle companies, these men carried the heavier and less accurate musket. However, the differences between these two types of soldier later manifested themselves in more than their armament.

By September 11, the entire force paraded in preparation for the march to Newburyport and the coastal trip to Kennebecport.³⁴ The three rifle companies departed following review.³⁵ But several delays slowed the musketeers. One or more of these companies supposedly lacked their full complement of eighty-four men and remained to obtain the necessary recruits.³⁶ Then the men from Connecticut under Colonel Roger Enos refused to march

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33. Captains Dearborn, Goodrich, Hanchett, McCobb, Scott, Topham, Ward, Williams and Lt. Colonel Roger Enos.
 34. Diary of Caleb Haskell, March to Quebec, p. 472; Diary of Ephem Squire, Ibid., p. 618.
 35. Diary of George Morison, Ibid., p. 510.
 36. Diary of William Hendricks, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd. ser., XV, 88; Bird, Attack on Quebec, p. 60; Smith, Fourteenth Colony, I, 516, Remark XXXV, 617. Bird and Smith do not fully agree. Bird maintains that at least two men were conscripted on September 8, Private Kimball and a friend. Smith notes that at least one of the companies (McCobb's) lacked several men when it departed.

without first receiving their back pay.³⁷ This incident marked the first of several acts of insubordination by New England soldiers.

Enthusiasm and attitudes toward soldiering, important elements in the campaign, varied greatly among Arnold's men. On learning that only three rifle companies could go with Arnold, the commanders of the ten companies gathered at Cambridge called a council. They agreed to decide who would remain behind by drawing straws. Morgan, Hendricks and Smith won, to the envy of those assembled.³⁸ By contemporary observation, these frontier riflemen seemed to have flair and a keen love for combat--attested to by the large number of skirmishes and brawls in which they participated at Cambridge.³⁹ The Virginia riflemen earned a particularly outstanding reputation for their ability to endure forced marches. Earlier, they had traveled the six hundred miles from Winchester to Cambridge in twenty-one days without losing a man. Their rifled weapons, leather clothing, tomahawks

37. Diary of Squire, March to Quebec, p. 619.

38. Diary of Hendricks, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd. ser., XV, 31.

39. Diary of Henry, March to Quebec, p. 300ff; American Archives, 4th ser., III, 457; Smith, Fourteenth Colony, I, 509-513.

and long knives added to their ability to survive in wilderness or in battle.⁴⁰ Within their own ranks they maintained strict discipline and respected their officers. On these points the musketeers differed markedly.

The majority of men in Arnold's musket companies knew little about the wilderness and were ill equipped to deal with the demands soon to confront them. Most of the New Englanders came from simple farming backgrounds. Several others recently graduated from college and sought adventure. Unlike the rifle companies where the officers recruited the men, musketeers usually elected their officers, who thus tended more toward popularity than soldiering. This 'leveling spirit' continued to hamper Washington's army throughout the Revolution. With the lack of respect which resulted, when it came time to choose between military rule or individual will, individuality won all too frequently.⁴¹

Shortly before the last of Arnold's men solved their problems and marched, General Washington issued the expedition's orders to Arnold. Rather than bind Arnold to

40. Diary of Henry, March to Quebec, p. 301; Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan, pp. 23-26, gave a detailed, well documented account of this march, the equipment and the recruitment of the rifle companies. Smith, Fourteenth Colony, I, 509-513.

41. French, First Year, pp. 433-434.

specific tactics (other than keeping in touch with Schuyler), Washington dealt mostly with the conduct of colonial troops within Canadian territory. The completed orders consisted of fourteen points, beginning with a reminder to Arnold of the gravity of his expedition and enormity of his responsibility. Consider Canada a friendly country, and "check by every Motive of Duty and Fear of Punishment, every attempt to plunder or insult any of the Inhabitants of Canada." Punishment for such deeds included death. All provisions must be paid for in full, and good will generated among the people. Washington pointedly stated that Arnold's Protestant soldiers must refrain from abusing Catholic Canadians. Concerning the mission directly, the General asked that Arnold keep him informed, that he try to stay synchronized with Schuyler, that he return if weather deteriorated, and that he move with all haste due to the approach of bad weather.⁴²

Initial preparations for the expedition ended by mid-September. On the sixteenth the entire force gathered

42. General Washington to Colonel Benedict Arnold, September 14, 1775, Writings of Washington, III, 491, 492-496; Arnold also received a supply of broadsides translated into French and telling the Canadians of his good intentions.

at Newburyport to board the coastal transports.⁴³ That same day Arnold ordered three lookout boats up the coast to scout for British men-of-war.⁴⁴ Following another review and a worship service, all troops boarded the eleven vessels hired by Nat Tracy and prepared to depart with the next favorable wind. But when no wind developed, discipline degenerated. Apparently, many men felt bored and tried to sneak ashore for one last farewell to the Newburyport populace. A guard was finally posted to keep the men on their ships.⁴⁵ Two hot and listless days after embarking, the wind gradually improved, and one of the most difficult expeditions in American history moved northward.

Despite its early stage, the expedition already suffered from serious defects. Lateness of the season,

43. Diary of R. Jonathan Meigs, March to Quebec, p. 173; Diary of Arnold, Ibid., p. 44; Diary of Dr. Issac Senter, Ibid., p. 197; Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 545; Diary of Squire, Ibid., p. 619; Diary of Hendricks, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd. ser., XV, 88; Diary of Joseph Ware, The New England Historical and Genealogical Register, (1852), VI, 129.

44. Diary of Arnold, March to Quebec, p. 44.

45. Diary of William Humphrey, Magazine of History, (1931), XLII, extra no. 166, 88.

combined with a general underestimation of the total distance and conditions of the trail, drastically affected the estimation of Arnold's needed supplies. Most soldiers lacked the necessary training to survive a hostile winter wilderness or to manage the small boats carrying their supplies through raging rapids.⁴⁶ Their initial optimism and confidence created a care-free attitude in the ranks. Consequently, most men were unprepared mentally and physically for the vicissitudes they soon met. Equally harmful, the maps prepared for Arnold's use were inaccurate both on distances and portages.⁴⁷ Compounding this, the two scouts hired by Colburn reported going over most of the trail, when in fact, they only scouted the first eighty miles, by far the easiest portion of the trail.⁴⁸ Those stomach-turning discomforts encountered during the short sea voyage to Kennebecport must have seemed minor when

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46. Smith, Arnold's March, p. 79, conjectures that the flimsy construction of the batteaux (which is discussed in the next chapter) resulted from an underestimation by Colburn of their time in use and the ferocity of the Kennebec.
47. Samuel Goodwin to General Washington, October 17, 1775, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 1084; Diary of Humphrey, Magazine of History, XLII, extra no. 166, 90; Diary of Senter, March to Quebec, p. 216; Smith, Arnold's March, pp. 207, 261-262.
48. Diary of Henry, March to Quebec, pp. 307-308.

compared later to the rigors of upstream travel and the
Maine topography and climate in early winter.

Chapter II

The Kennebec and the Realities of Travel

This next stage of the expedition brings the first movement of men and supplies up the Kennebec-Chaudiere route. Several small settlements exist during the initial fifty miles, and the force maintains some contact with civilization. But the sense of adventure soon loses its glow in the face of freezing, swift-running reality, for the river and the weather made mighty foes. Injury and sickness stalk the soldiers in every rapids, through the forest, and in their camp. As it started, the expedition had the full potential to make General Washington's plan succeed; yet after covering the first two hundred miles, Arnold's men face the threat of destruction by enemies they cannot fight.

The trip from Newburyport to Gardinerstown forewarned of difficult times ahead. No sooner had the eleven "dirty coasters and fish boats" departed Newburyport harbor than one of them ran aground.⁴⁹ Refloating attempts failed, and the companies of Captains Hendricks, Scott and Thayer had to face the jibes of

1. Diary of Arnold, March to Quebec, p. 44a.

their comrades while transferring to other ships.²

The ten remaining ships reached open sea by evening and sailed northward toward the Kennebec's mouth. The sea soon introduced most soldiers to the unpleasantness of seasickness. It grew so bad by midnight that the convoy put into shore for a short recovery period.³ Once the fleet reached open sea again, it was caught by a storm; by morning it had scattered the ships and their regurgitating passengers over a wide area. However, every vessel survived these difficulties. By September 20, several of them reached Gardinerstown and dropped anchor.⁴ In Reuben Colburn's Gardinerstown boatyard lay two hundred new batteaux for Colonel Arnold's inspection.

Arnold reached Gardinerstown on September 22, and immediately set himself and his men to work. Although Colburn had indeed finished the two hundred batteaux in the short time allowed him, Arnold found them smaller than specified, made of green rather than seasoned wood and poorly constructed. Arnold apparently concluded

2. Diary of Fobes, Ibid., p. 581; Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 248.

3. Diary of Eleazer Oswald, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 1059; Diary of Hendricks, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd ser., XV, 33.

4. Diary of Meigs, March to Quebec, p. 174; Diary of Senter, Ibid., p. 198; Diary of Humphrey, Magazine of History, XLII, extra 166, 88.

that correcting these deficiencies would cost too much time, so he ordered twenty additional batteaux built.⁵ As this process took place, he ordered one hundred and ten men and their officers to begin transporting cargo in batteaux to their first base camp at Fort Western, six miles above Gardinerstown.⁶

The new campsite hardly deserved its name. Fort Western had at one time been an impressive fortress, but now its two large and two small blockhouses were crumbling and it had a generally rundown appearance. One of Arnold's troops described it as "a place of no great strength or security."⁷

During this transfer of troops and supplies from Gardinerstown to Fort Western, the recurring problem of discipline and military rule confronted Arnold. On the evening of September 22, a group of soldiers staying in a private home got drunk and rowdy. Captains Thayer and Topham were also staying there and asked the drunken men to calm down. This worked initially, but several minutes later a shot fired into the house critically wounded a man who lay sleeping near the hearth. Soon

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5. Benedict Arnold to General Washington, September 25, 1775, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 960.
 6. Diary of Arnold, March to Quebec, p. 44b; Diary of Humphrey, Magazine of History, XLII, extra 166, 89.
 7. Diary of Humphrey, Magazine of History, XLII, extra 166, 89.

afterwards the wounded man died. James McCormick, described as a normally quiet fellow, was captured the following morning and accused of the murder. A gallows was raised while a makeshift court martial sentenced him to hang. But Colonel Arnold, who reached the scene just before the hanging, did not feel that a strong case had been made against McCormick, and questioned the impact on morale of an execution this early in the campaign. Therefore, Arnold halted the proceedings and granted a reprieve until General Washington could review the case.⁸ Although unpopular with some, Arnold's action unquestionably established him as a commander willing to exercise his authority.

During this same period, several men from New England companies were caught stealing. At least one from Captain Scott's company was drummed out and others received lashes.⁹ Such activities presented Arnold

8. Diary of Arnold, March to Quebec, p. 44^b; also, B. Arnold to General Washington, September 27, 1775, Ibid., p. 67, Arnold said of McCormick: "The criminal appears to be very simple and ignorant; and in the company he belonged to, had the character of being a peaceable fellow....I wish he may be found a proper object of mercy...." See also Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 132; Diary of Senter, Ibid., p. 199; Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 249; Diary of Melvin, Ibid., p. 436; Diary of Humphrey, Magazine of History, XLII, extra 166, 89.

9. Diary of Haskell, March to Quebec, p. 474.

with a severe test of his leadership.

Although the movement of provisions from Gardiners-town to Fort Western remained incomplete, Arnold ordered Lieutenant Steele, guides Gatchell and Berry (who had returned from their first trip) and four other men to scout ahead to Chaudiere Pond and collect information from local Indians. Since a number of portages lay ahead, Arnold sent Lieutenant Church, a Surveyor, a pilot and five others to measure the best portage routes.¹⁰ Both of these details carried significance, because security (from ambush and to protect the element of surprise) and speed held the key to the expedition's chance of success.

On September 25 Arnold prepared to deploy his main force when he confronted a frustrating but common Continental Army chain-of-command problem. To achieve an efficient movement of troops, the Colonel planned to disembark his men in four divisions separated by one-day intervals. This, he hoped, would allow continuous movement by all divisions and prevent massive slowdowns at portages. However, very serious trouble threatened

10. Diary of Oswald, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 1059.

when Arnold appointed Colonel Christopher Greene as commander of the first division composed of the three rifle companies. Upon learning that Greene, an outsider, would be their leader, the rifle companies refused to accept him. Daniel Morgan compounded the problem by maintaining that General Washington had given him sole command of the riflemen. The situation offered no easy solution. If Arnold upheld his original order to Greene, he would likely face mutiny by his three best companies. Yet, if Arnold withdrew the order, he would lose his authority of command. In the end, Arnold skeptically accepted Morgan's claim and put him in command of the first division and gave Greene joint command of the second division with Major Bigelow.¹¹ This action seemed to satisfy everyone concerned, and soon the main body of the expedition began leaving Fort Western.

11. Arnold wrote to General Washington to check Morgan's story. Washington denied having made this arrangement with Morgan and later reprimanded him. Fortunately, Arnold's action worked without setting off a major dispute between the New England and Virginia troops. Benedict Arnold to General Washington, September 25, 1775, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 1059. See also Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, (New York, 1952), Notes, Chapter 13, f.n. 15, p. 449; Ward maintained that Hendricks and Smith were unwilling to take orders from anyone, including Morgan. Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan, pp. 28-29.

Arnold separated each of the four divisions into two groups, a land party and a party to handle the bateaux, thereby providing extra help when necessary and keeping coordination among the units. Morgan and three companies were first to go. With forty-five days' provisions, they served as the advance party and were to move to the Kennebec's headwaters and prepare a portage road across the Great Carrying Place.¹² Greene and Bigelow, with the companies of Captains Hubbard, Topham and Thayer, followed Morgan on September 26. The third division, led by Major Return Meigs, and composed of the companies of Hanchett, Ward, Dearborn and Goodrich, left on September 27.¹³ Since the fourth division presumably had the easiest position, the trails being prepared by earlier divisions, they received the duty of carrying the extra food and supplies. This final group consisted of the companies of Scott, McCobbs and Williams, under the command of Colonel Roger Enos. With his entire force under way, Colonel Arnold followed in a faster canoe,

12. Diary of Oswald, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 1059; Diary of Dearborn, March to Quebec, p. 132; Diary of Senter, Ibid., p. 199; Diary of Hendricks, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd ser., XV, 33.

13. Diary of Oswald, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 1059; Diary of Meigs, March to Quebec, p. 175.

planning to traverse the entire line of troops.¹⁴

The formidability of river travel soon beset the entire force from private to colonel. Approximately eighteen miles above Fort Western, each division passed old Fort Halifax and confronted Ticonic Falls, the first portage. Within this short span of travel, many of the batteaux had undergone such a beating from the rapids and rocks that they would not float. Of course, the infirmities resulting from the batteaux's hasty construction compounded this problem. When Captain Dearborn reached Ticonic Falls, his boat had swamped completely and all of his baggage was wet.¹⁵ Many others had similar experiences, including Colonel Arnold. He fought valiantly to keep his leaky canoe floating long enough to catch up with his troops; but he finally had to give up, ground the canoe, and purchase another. The devastation to batteaux which Arnold found at Ticonic Falls caused him to order the carpenters in Colonel Enos' division to come forward and begin repairs.¹⁶ Meanwhile

14. Diary of Arnold, March to Quebec, p. 45.

15. Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 133.

16. Diary of Oswald, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 1060; Diary of Arnold, March to Quebec, p. 45; Benedict Arnold to Roger Enos, September 29, 1775, Ibid., pp. 68-69.

soldiers had their introduction to carrying supplies and batteaux over this first portage. After a day of struggling to cross the portage, Caleb Haskell wrote in his diary: We "...crossed over the river to Halifax Falls (Ticonic Falls), landed our boats and carried them over the carrying places one hundred and twenty rods a new sort of work for us."¹⁷ Indeed, the work proved grueling, for each batteau weighed at least four hundred pounds and the barrels of beef and salted meat weighed at least two hundred and twenty pounds apiece.¹⁸ Since the portage trails were often steep and complicated with other obstacles, the possibility of injury constantly existed. Fatigue rewarded those agile enough to complete the task.

Beyond Ticonic Falls stretched a long rapids known as "five mile ripples." Most boats in the first division attempted to go through them. But Arnold thoughtfully hired a man named Croseir and his oxen to carry his baggage around this dangerous water. Others were not as lucky as Arnold. Doctor Senter lost the bottom in his leaky batteau, but found another he could purchase. Others experienced Senter's difficulty as each succeeding

17. Diary of Haskell, Ibid., p. 474.

18. Orders to Reuben Colburn, September 3, 1775, Writings of Washington, III, 471.

division moved into the "ripps." The river's increased velocity forced most men to wade, pulling their batteau. Normally, this would have been rigorous exercise, but the water temperature, like that of the air, had dropped considerably. Now the cold water numbed mens' bodies, as they frequently submerged themselves chin-deep.¹⁹ However, the greatest problem developed from the condition of the batteaux. Leaking increased in this rough water, and all too often, the batteaux came apart under the slightest pounding. Men working these craft soon vented their anger on Reuben Colburn's carpenters, as the following entry from Humphrey's diary aptly related:

...Had they built them as they ought to have done, they would have been much better. I hope that those infamous villans, who satisfy their avaricious tempers and fill their own private concerns with the spoils of this country, may suffer like those of their countrymen that are obliged to make use of their boats, an invention of the infernal spirits, made for the destruction of the men that use them; for the boats were so bad that the men must be in the water weather in or out of them....(20)

Approximately twenty-one miles above Fort Halifax, a third falls confronted the army. Unlike the "ripps,"

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19. Diary of Arnold, March to Quebec, p. 46; Diary of Senter, Ibid., p. 201; Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 250; Diary of Ware, New England Register, VI, 129.
20. Quoted, Diary of Humphery, Magazine of History, XLII, ex. 166, 90.

Skowhegan Falls ran shallow and tumultuous.²¹ But signs of even more serious problems manifested themselves during the first week of October. Morgan's lead division began finding discrepancies in their maps. Distances, directions and conditions described by the maps were unreliable. On land, many soldiers showed signs of fatigue and sickness from stumbling through the forest. They lagged behind their divisions, sometimes getting lost. Even in camp at night conditions worsened. Many men had only blankets to cover them, and when it rained, they were miserable. Adding to the discomforts of those forced to sleep in the rain or in clothes wet from wading, nightly temperatures dropped below freezing by September 30. Soldiers awakened to find their clothing frozen on them.²²

Such conditions soon produced casualties. Doctor Senter noted at Fort Halifax that several men had dysentery. By October 3, Captain Dearborn recorded sending two of his men home due to sickness. The threat of

21. Diary of Thayer, March to Quebec, p. 250; see also Smith, Arnold's March, p. 102.

22. Diary of Humphrey, Magazine of History, XLII, ex. 166, 90; Diary of Thayer, March to Quebec, p. 250; Diary of Meigs, Ibid., p. 512.

sickness unquestionably increased at Skowhegan Falls, where the river flowed so swiftly that it sometimes took the wading batteau crews a dozen attempts to breach a single rapid. Many small disasters beset individuals in these rapids, as Major Meigs learned when his boat flipped and cost him a tea kettle and all of his butter and sugar--"a loss not to be replaced."²³

Approximately fifty miles above Fort Western the last vestiges of civilization ended. Here, a severe drop in the river, known as Norridgewock Falls, halted each of the divisions for several days. The falls were impassable, necessitating a major portage. From October 1 to 8 each of Arnold's divisions took its turn struggling to move around the falls.²⁴ The river banks proved too steep to negotiate while carrying loaded batteaux, so Arnold hired oxen, sleds and wagons from the nearby settlers to drag everything over the one and a quarter mile portage. Heavy rain hampered their progress, but each

23. Diary of Senter, March to Quebec, p. 200, 201; Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 133; quoted, Diary of Meigs, Ibid., p. 136.

24. Diary of Oswald, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 1060; Diary of Dearborn, March to Quebec, p. 133; Diary of Haskell, Ibid., p. 475; Diary of Melvin, Ibid., p. 436; Diary of Hendricks, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd ser., XV, 34; Diary of Ware, New England Register, VI, 129.

of the divisions completed the portage and proceeded up river by October 9th.²⁵

During the Norridgewock portage, a damaging discovery occurred. Many of the batteaux carrying barreled provisions (bread, fish, pork and beef) had been partially filled with water during much of the journey. Since the food casks were not water proof, their contents soaked up water. Those with bread in them swelled and often burst, the bread spoiling immediately. Much of the salted food lay in open casks; consequently, washing it with fresh water allowed this food to spoil. By October 5, many companies had been reduced to diets of flour and salvaged salt pork.²⁶ As the last division passed Norridgewock on October 7, their bread supply also became unfit for consumption. Arnold again called on the carpenters, this time to repair both the batteaux and the food casks.²⁷ But little could be done about the lost provisions.

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25. Diary of Humphrey, Magazine of History, XLII, ex. 166, 91; Diary of Thayer, March to Quebec, p. 251; Diary of Oswald, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 1060-1061.
26. Diary of Senter, March to Quebec, p. 203; Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 133; Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 251; Diary of Humphrey, Magazine of History, XLII, ex. 166, 90.
27. Diary of Arnold, March to Quebec, p. 48; Diary of Senter, Ibid., p. 202.

With all of his divisions underway, Arnold again moved through the entire line of march. Captain Thayer's company in the second division had crossed Devil's Falls by October 5th, and on the 6th they could see the snow covered mountain marking the Great Carrying Place. Morgan had already reached this point and had his men working to build a road. By the 9th, Enos' division crossed through Devil's Falls.²⁸ Arnold's army stretched over a trail of more than twelve miles. Despite the hardships and fatigue, the expedition's spirit seemed to rise as it approached the Great Carrying Place which superficially offered vastly improved travel conditions.

The Great Carrying Place occurred at the junction of the Kennebec and Dead Rivers. Because the rivers converged at right angles, the Dead River flowing into the Kennebec from west to east and the Kennebec continuing on its southward course, a delta-shaped land mass developed. Since the Dead River followed the direction of march, several miles of marching were eliminated by leaving the Kennebec and diagonally crossing this delta. The three small lakes which lay in a line across the delta seemed

28. Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 252; Diary of Oswald, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 1061.

to offer an additional advantage to this route. By using the lakes, the boatmen gained several respites during the twelve and a half mile portage.²⁹ The Dead River then flowed from an area known as the Height of Land, where it emerged in a series of extremely rough headwaters.

But the Great Carrying Place did not offer the easy passage anticipated by the army. Work on the portages began immediately following each division's arrival. While some men took the salt pork and other provisions out of barrels and strung them on poles for easier carrying, others helped cut a road to the first lake.³⁰ They repeated this process after each lake. By October 11, the first division had crossed the muddy, root filled road to the first lake.

Problems plagued the portages across the Great Carrying Place. Ever cumbersome boats produced the most obvious difficulty. It usually took four men to hoist the overturned batteau onto their shoulders. They then carried it to the next lake with great difficulty.

29. Diary of Meigs, March to Quebec, p. 177.

30. Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 252; Diary of Humphrey, Magazine of History, XLII, ex. 166, 92.

Downturned edges of the four-hundred-pound craft were sharp and dug into each man's shoulders.³¹ In addition, the freshly cut roads were choked with protruding roots and freezing, swampy slime. As each division passed over the roads, their condition worsened. Consequently, the misstep of one loaded man usually plummeted all four into the icy muck with boat or pork barrel crushing down on them.³²

Such conditions took their toll in both patience and morale. Roads were "half a leg high" in mud. And following the toil and fatigue of the daylight hours came the marshy wet ground for a bed. Hardly anyone remained dry. As a result, most men could not sleep and congregated around campfires trying to warm their dampened bodies. Several fights eventually broke out as patience and tempers shortened.³³

Sickness increased markedly during these portages. According to Doctor Senter, much of this newer sickness

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31. Diary of Stocking, March to Quebec, p. 550; Diary of Fobes, Ibid., p. 582.
 32. Diary of Arnold, Ibid., p. 52; Diary of Senter, Ibid., p. 205; Diary of Melvin, Ibid., p. 437; Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 550; Diary of Hendricks, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd ser., XV, 37.
 33. Diary of Humphrey, Magazine of History, XLII, extra no. 166, 93; Diary of Morison, March to Quebec, p. 514; Diary of Fobes, Ibid., p. 582.

came from bad drinking water in the area. Although the water, Senter noted, looked yellow in color and smelled very bad, the soldiers could not refrain from using it, because "The meat had much salt thus causing them to need water but often no sooner would they eat and drink than they would puke it up." Arnold decided that the growing numbers of sick and injured warranted some action. Thus he ordered a bark hospital erected between the first and second lakes. The worst cases received medical services at the hospital; in some instances, they were then sent home under escort.³⁴

Ironically, the worst blow thus far fell on October 15, close to the day General Washington had predicted the expedition's arrival at Quebec. The food supply had so diminished that division officers instituted half rationing. Each man now received only three quarters of a pound of pork and flour per day. With this event, Colonel Arnold showed the first signs in his diary that overall conditions worried him.³⁵

34. Diary of Senter, March to Quebec, p. 205; Diary of Oswald, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 1062.

35. Diary of Meigs, March to Quebec, p. 178; Diary of Arnold, Ibid., p. 50; Diary of Oswald, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 1062.

Amidst this hardship, Arnold continued to carry out his duties. On October 13 he wrote letters to an informer in Quebec and to General Schuyler. The Quebec-bound letter requested more intelligence regarding the French Canadian disposition, for he had heard nothing since leaving Cambridge. The other letter inquired about the position of the second rebel army invading Canada.³⁶ Despite being far behind schedule, Arnold apparently still hoped to coordinate his attack on Quebec with the attack on Montreal.

The two scouting parties Arnold sent out from Gardinerstown returned to the main force as it crossed the Great Carrying Place. Lieutenant Church and the surveyors returned first. They had not reached their objective, but Church did give Arnold a detailed description of the ground he supposedly covered. One day behind Church, Lieutenant Steele and his men returned. They, too, had failed to reach their destination. However, Steele reported that the eighty miles of the Dead River they had covered were made up of good land and deep swift water. Both leaders reported no sighting of Indians.³⁷

36. Diary of Arnold, March to Quebec, p. 51; B. Arnold to John Manir, October 13, 1775, Ibid., p. 69.

37. Diary of Oswald, American Archives, 4th ser., III 1062.

In retrospect, neither scouting trip provided Arnold with knowledge which could substantially affect events of the next two weeks.

From October 11th to the 17th the expedition moved on to the Dead River, with its steep banks and invisible but swift running current. The land on either side seemed firm.³⁸ As this transition from the Great Carrying Place occurred, the food shortage became acute. Colonel Greene's division ran short of flour. One of the lead companies had only five or six pounds of flour for fifty men. Major Meigs finally ordered the slaughter of the two oxen which had accompanied the army. Five-eighths of the oxen went to the first three divisions, and the remaining three-eighths were sent back to Colonel Enos as reserve supplies. Meanwhile, Arnold ordered an officer, two sergeants and twenty-nine privates from each division to return with Major Bigelow and bring forward some of the extra food carried by Enos' division.³⁹

Suddenly, and without warning, the weather unleashed its full malevolence against the tattered soldiers. On

38. Diary of Arnold, March to Quebec, p. 52; Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 135; Diary of Thayer, Ibid., pp. 253-254.

39. Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 155; Diary of Meigs, Ibid., p. 178; Benedict Arnold to Roger Enos, October 17, 1775, Ibid., p. 74.

October 18, while a large portion of the troops awaited provisions, rain started falling. It continued with hurricane intensity for three full days, stalling most companies. The Dead River rose slowly at first, but on the night of October 21, it caught at least one division off guard with a sudden surge, and washed away two precious barrels of pork and gunpowder. Those men without tents again faced the elements unsheltered. One wrote in his diary on the night of October 19 that such conditions were "hard for poor soldiers that have to work hard in the rains and cold, and to wade a mile and a half knee-deep in water and mud, cold enough, and after night to camp in the rain without any shelter."⁴⁰

Benedict Arnold fared little better than his men. On the 21st, he crossed four small portages and did not make camp until after dark. Although quite fatigued, his clothes were wet and could only be dried by a fire. He finally went to bed at 11 o'clock only to awaken at four o'clock in the morning as the rising water completely inundated his camp. Arnold spent the remainder of the night in "no very agreeable situation."⁴¹

40. Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 254; Diary of Haskell, Ibid., p. 476; Haskell's company supposedly covered twenty-seven miles during this period. Diary of Squire, Ibid., pp. 622-623; see also Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 255.

41. Diary of Arnold, Ibid., p. 54.

Those who had escaped being drenched earlier met an equally damp fate on October 22. The men on foot found the low land along the trail flooded, completely hiding the path. Captain Dearborn's company slogged only four miles in a full day's march; few, if any, exceeded them. One group became completely separated from the main force and eventually sat out the night without food or shelter.⁴²

The sight of his wretched men in freezing rain and his own discomfort obviously concerned Arnold as he wrote in his diary on the 22nd:

The rapidity of the current renders it almost impossible to ascend the river, &c. Add to this our provisions almost exhausted, & the incessant rains for 3 days has prevented our gaining anything considerable, so that we have but a melancholy prospect before us, but in general spirits are high.(43)

Little did Arnold realize how rapidly spirits were declining.

On October 21, Colonel Enos came forward alone as far as Thayer's company looking for Colonel Arnold. Enos could not find the Colonel and gave no particular reason for wanting him. But to Thayer it seemed evident that

42. Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 136; Diary of Meigs, Ibid., p. 179; Diary of Haskell, Ibid., p. 476.

43. Diary of Arnold, Ibid., p. 55.

Enos was quite troubled. Meanwhile, Major Bigelow returned from the rear with only two barrels of flour, claiming that the officers of the fourth division even begrudged him that. Fortunately, the flood waters had receded, allowing the lead divisions to reach the Dead River's headwaters, and no one initially reacted to Bigelow's difficulties. Then, disaster struck. Pushing up against the headwaters, seven batteaux flipped over and all of their cargo washed away. In the remaining batteaux accumulating water had spoiled all but a small portion of the meat.⁴⁴ Now the expedition's situation approached a crisis.

Arnold recognized the great concern of his officers and called a council of war to discuss further plans on October 23. Since Arnold was at this time with the lead divisions, Enos and his officers still had no chance to meet with him.⁴⁵ The council reached two major decisions. A Lieutenant Lyman was selected to leave the main force on the next day and return home with about two dozen sick and injured men. Then Captain Oliver Hanchett and fifty men were to take ten day's supplies and go ahead

44. Diary of Thayer, Ibid., pp. 253-255; Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 551; Diary of Arnold, Ibid., p. 55.

45. Diary of Senter, Ibid., p. 212.

for more provisions, (assuming that the expedition was within nine or ten days of the first Canadian settlements).⁴⁶ To keep Enos posted, Arnold immediately sent him a letter describing the two decisions and noting the desperate shortage of food up front.⁴⁷ Little did Arnold anticipate the outcome produced by his letter and the passing of Lieutenant Lyman's disabled men through the fourth division.

Soldiers, with spirits dampened by endless rain, with half empty stomachs, swollen feet and aching shoulders, whose bodies were stiff from sleeping on wet ground in frozen clothes, probably all secretly wished to quit the expedition and return home. When the rear division confronted the boatloads of sick men returning from ahead, it seemed to them that conditions were worsening. Determined to judge their own fate, several of the rear division officers called an independent council of war at noon on October 25. Their reason: to decide whether to continue or to return. Bigelow, Topham, Thayer, Ward, Greene and Enos voted to continue. One vote threw the

46. Diary of Fobes, Ibid., p. 583; also Diary of Arnold, Ibid., p. 55, states 26 sick returned; Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 136, also claims 26; Diary of Melvin, Ibid., 438, indicates 40 returned; Diary of Haskell, Ibid., p. 477; Diary of Hendricks, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd ser., XV, 37.

47. Colonel Arnold to Colonel Enos, October 24, 1775, March to Quebec, p. 75.

decision in favor of going on. However, McCobb, Scott and Williams refused to accept this outcome; like it or not, they intended to return with their men.⁴⁸

Although diarists' descriptions of what followed were sketchy, the refusal of his three principal officers to advance caused Colonel Enos to change his vote. The fourth division was returning. Thayer wrote of the change: "Colonel Enos Declared to us he was willing to go...and share the same fate with us, But was obliged to tarry thro' means of his Effeminate officers."⁴⁹ By 2 P.M., October 25, the entire fourth division, a total of three hundred men, had deserted the expedition.⁵⁰

Had he wanted to stop Enos, there was little Arnold could do, for the desertion took place after the Colonel moved ahead of the lead division in search of provisions, he was no longer in touch with the expedition.⁵¹

Immediately following the defection of Enos and the advance of Arnold, additional havoc befell the remaining troops. The night of October 25 produced snow and freezing rain. The next day, high winds continually forced

48. Diary of Squire, Ibid., p. 624; Diary of Senter, Ibid., pp. 210-212; Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 256.

49. Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 256.

50. Diary of Squire, Ibid., p. 624.

51. Diary of Morison, Ibid., p. 517.

the batteaux ashore for bailing. Simultaneously, a deep psychological trauma occurred. After believing for weeks that their march would end in early October, the remaining men finally recognized that the distance to Quebec was far greater than anyone imagined. Abner Stocking wrote: "This day our afflictions increased, fear was added to sorrow. We found to our astonishment that our journey was longer than we expected; what was more alarming, our provisions were growing scant."⁵² Adding anger to misery, word of Enos' desertion began filtering forward. Some men became so distraught at this news that they knelt in the snow and prayed that the deserters would meet an ungodly end. Finding most of the gunpowder wet and unfit for use now seemed of minor consequence.⁵³

With no recourse but to continue onward, the three remaining divisions reached the Height of Land on October twenty-seventh. Colonel Arnold had crossed it two days earlier.⁵⁴ The Height of Land extended from the northern Appalachian Mountains and created a geographical phenomena similar to the continental divide. On the other

52. Diary of Arnold, Ibid., p. 56; Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 551.

53. Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 137; Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 551.

54. Diary of Arnold, Ibid., p. 56.

side lay the Chaudiere, flowing with the direction of march, the last leg of the journey.

But members of the expedition at this point could hardly give thought to those last miles or to their objective. Their only concern now was survival. The proud but naive force which had departed Gardinerstown in September was now reduced to a faltering band of starving men. The lot of each soldier reached a new low. His body was bruised and beaten from the ravages of the portages. He was subjected to the lashes of nature, and ever increasing numbers of his companions fell victim to sickness or injury, largely due to the relationship between their salty diet and the contaminated water they had to drink. The loss of food due to incompetent boatmanship, excessively rough water, and faulty batteaux simply increased the potential for failure. At the Great Carrying Place most companies went on half rationing. By October 24, some of the men in Colonel Greene's division were reduced to boiling candles and drinking the juice for dinner and breakfast.⁵⁵ As they descended the Height of Land, the specter of a cruel and lonely death hung over each man.

55. Diary of Senter, Ibid., pp. 209-210.

Chapter III

An Army of "Ourang-Outangs"

Arnold's emaciated little army reached the headwaters of the Dead River by October 26. At this juncture, with its food virtually gone and Arnold advancing on his own, the expedition faced several difficult crossings. A chain of interconnecting ponds lay above the Dead River's headwaters. They offered easy travel. But beyond the ponds was the Height of Land and a series of small uncharted bogs, swamps and streams surrounding Chaudiere Pond and River. The Height of Land presented the simple problem of climbing its crest; the ground was firm and the trail open. Only the army's starving condition made this a serious obstacle. However, on the other side of this elevation the ground became a tangle of swamp grass, brush and twisting streams leading nowhere. Without maps, the army could easily get lost in this area; without maps and food, getting lost meant almost certain death.¹

While his men struggled through the chain of ponds approaching the Height of Land, Arnold raced ahead to catch Lieutenant Hanchett's party and secure the provisions.

1. Smith, Fourteenth Colony, I, 567-586, gives by far the most detailed description of this area. In 1903 Smith traveled through the area taking pictures and making notes.

On October 26 Arnold had passed through the chain of ponds. One day later, he descended the small river leading into Chaudiere Pond (also called Lake Magnetic).² Because this river proved so treacherous and deceptive, with many small branches going off the trail and its principal artery ending in a terrible swamp, Arnold determined that the main force should avoid using it. In a message sent to his men on October 27, Arnold advised them to leave all batteaux behind, divide their remaining provisions equally and march around the east side of the stream and Chaudiere Pond. But due to a delay in sending the letter, several companies had already set off down river when it arrived, and unfortunately, those companies which received Arnold's advice were also destined to suffer.³

Anticipating part of Arnold's orders, the main force had crossed the Height of Land and grouped beside the Arnold River. There they had divided their provisions, each man receiving five to seven pints of flour and four to eight ounces of pork to sustain him until help arrived.

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2. This stream became known as the Arnold River, and for clarification, the author will use this name in the text.
 3. Benedict Arnold to His Officers and Men, October 27, 1775, March to Quebec, p. 79; Smith, Arnold's March, p. 198. Smith calls the events surrounding this letter "a striking nodal point" in the expedition. More specifically, the choice of Hull as messenger and guide had disastrous results.

Then, before Arnold's message could stop them, the companies of Goodrich, Dearborn, Smith and Ward had set off on foot down the Arnold River's banks.⁴

When Arnold's letter arrived, his army had divided into four parts. Arnold and Lieutenant Hanchett's party of sixty men met on October 29 and made up the first part. Daniel Morgan and his three hardy companies advanced separately but also in front of the main body of troops. Morgan's men, instead of abandoning their batteaux, had carried them over the Height of Land and launched them in the Arnold River. They were to follow the same route as their commander. The third and fourth groups were components of the main body; the four companies mentioned earlier also set off down the Arnold, and the remaining five companies were to follow the route recommended in the letter Issac Hull brought from Arnold.⁵

Let us first examine the events surrounding the movement of the four companies marching down the Arnold's banks. According to the diarists in this group, these men advanced without incident until they arrived at the point where the river dispersed into swampy land at the tip of Chaudiere

4. Diary of Ware, New England Register, VI, 130; Diary of Thayer, March to Quebec, p. 259; Diary of Matthias Ogden, New Jersey Historical Society Proceedings, n.s., XIII, (January, 1928), 18.

5. Diary of Arnold, March to Quebec, pp. 58-59; Smith, Arnold's March, p. 203.

Pond. There, Goodrich's company, which appeared to lead, found itself stalled as it tried to skirt the lake. Goodrich and several of his men waded around in the swamp, sometimes in water up to their chests, looking for a way to cross the rivers feeding into the lake. Meanwhile, those men who remained scratched around in the snow and ice for enough wood to build a fire to dry out the searchers. At least one man collapsed during this effort due to lack of nourishment. But by that night Captain Dearborn's company had reached Goodrich's position, and throughout the following day Dearborn used the lone batteau and a canoe he had salvaged to ferry all three companies across the swamp.⁶

The ferrying job proved costly. When Dearborn first arrived, Goodrich had persuaded him to paddle up the lake in pursuit of several batteaux carrying the last provisions. By nightfall they still had not caught the batteaux, but they did spot a faint light on the east shore of the pond. Unfortunately, it only turned out to be a man from Captain Hanchett's company who had been left behind in the bark hut where Colonel Arnold camped on October 27. Realizing the batteaux were out of reach, Dearborn and Goodrich

6. Diary of Ware, New England Register, VI, 131; Diary of Dearborn, March to Quebec, p. 138; Diary of Melvin, Ibid., pp. 438-439; see also Smith Arnold's March, p. 213.

deposited their provisions in the hut and returned to their men on the next morning. Meanwhile, without any bad conscience, Morgan's men passed by the hut a short time later and stole all Dearborn's and Goodrich's remaining provisions.⁷

With the worst part of the swamp behind them, food remained a paramount concern for the four departed companies. Dearborn noted on October 30 that "some companies had but one pint of flour for each man and no meat at all." Captain Goodrich's company, still trying desperately to find their batteaux, marched ten miles on the 30th only to find the batteaux smashed and all provisions lost in the Chaudiere's headwaters. In despair, Goodrich's company decided to breakup, each man for himself, moving at his own speed. Although all four of the companies reached the Chaudiere headwaters by the 30th, many men had become too weak from lack of food and exposure to combat the fatigue of marching and the assaults of the wintry climate.⁸

The five companies remaining behind (those of Hendricks, Hubbard, Thayer, Meigs and Topham) received Arnold's letter and shared a fate even worse than Goodrich and Dear-

7. Diary of Dearborn, March to Quebec, p. 138; Diary of Melvin, Ibid., p. 438.

8. Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 139; Diary of Melvin, Ibid., pp. 439-440; Diary of Ware, New England Register, VI, 131; Many men, including Dearborn and Melvin, became too sick to keep pace with the others.

born. Close to 4 P.M. on October 28, Issac Hull came upon these waiting companies and delivered Arnold's letter. Not only did it state that Hull would guide them around the swamps, but that fresh provisions would be waiting for them just below the Chaudiere's headwaters. This last bit of news set off a reaction among the men which they later regretted. For as Hendricks later noted in his diary, "we ate up our bread more lavishly than we otherwise would have done...for we supposed we were much nearer the inhabitants than we really were."⁹

With renewed spirits all five companies immediately set off behind Hull, moving in a northeasterly direction. By nightfall they set up camp on the high ground southeast of Chaudiere Pond. Everything appeared to go as expected. But on October 29 they received a painful blow. Everyone broke camp early that morning, and with Hull leading the way, they marched directly into

an ocean of swamp...covered with a low shrubbery of cedar and hackmetack, the roots of which were so excessively slippery, that we could hardly keep our feet.... After walking a few hours in the swamp we seemed to have lost all sense of feeling in our feet and ankles.(10)

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9. Diary of Senter, March to Quebec, p. 213; Diary of Morison, Ibid., p. 523; Diary of Ogden, New Jersey Historical Society Proceedings, XIII, 18; Diary of Humphrey, Magazine of History, XLII, ex. 166, 97; Diary of Hendricks, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd ser., XV, 39-40.
 10. Diary of Humphrey, Magazine of History, XLII, ex. 166, 97; Diary of Thayer, March to Quebec, p. 259;

Finally, Issac Hull grimly admitted he knew no more about the route around the swamp than the men he was leading. Thus the five companies spent the night of the 29th sleeping on slushy beds of snow, completely lost.¹¹

The next day brought even further travail. For the entire day the army wandered haphazardly through the swamp. Lack of food and overexposure began to show; men with greater strength moved well ahead of those less resilient. Sometimes the army passed through water the height of an average man's chest, and to do so, they usually had to break a skin of ice covering the frigid water. According to one diarist's calculations the army marched almost twenty miles that day, yet they found themselves only four to five miles from their previous camp. That night Dr. Senter described the past day:

In this state of uncertainty we wandered through hideous swamps and mountainous precipices, with the conjoint addition of cold, wet hunger, not to mention our fatigue--with the terrible apprehension of famishing in this desert.(12)

Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 554.

11. Although Hull apparently told Arnold he knew the area, in fact, he had never covered it. That the men he led did not shoot or starve him was a credit to their patience.
12. Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 259; Diary of Morison, Ibid., p. 524; Diary of Senter, Ibid., p. 217; Smith, Fourteenth Colony, I, 579; Smith visited this location in 1903 and gave this description: "Nothing could have been more doleful or more desperate. Whether to call it land or call it water one could hardly say; and indeed it was neither, but an indescribable expanse of waveless black

Their first bit of good luck befell this wandering band late the next day. After spending the entire day fruitlessly searching for Arnold's trail at the Chaudiere's headwaters, the companies prepared to make camp. In the midst of this activity, several soldiers stumbled upon the marked trail. Although virtually without food, the army at least knew its location. On the following day they reached the headwaters just as the four companies moving up the lake shore arrived. Slightly earlier Daniel Morgan and his men had made a tragic arrival at the same position. As their seven batteaux passed into the headwaters, all were smashed to pieces on the rocks. One man died and most provisions, powder and several rifles were lost.¹³ Still, the army had regrouped and had reached the open trail. The question of survival now hung on their ability to hold on until food arrived.

The ravages of the swamp took a costly toll of Arnold's men. Haskell noted that five men from his company were left

and rusty brown, varied with oozy ground and water-soaked refuse.... Swamp-grass flourished with a luxuriance that hinted of a loathsome fertility. Bubbles of tainted gas exploded in the hectic pools. Scores of dead trees, the debris of the highlands, lay rotting here and there, while over them towered lifeless trunks gradually toppling into the same horrible grave.... It was death in life and life in death; the morgue of the wilderness; the lazaretto of blight and decay."

13. Diary of Morison, March to Quebec, p. 524; Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 139; Diary of Senter, Ibid., p. 218; Diary of Melvin, Ibid., p. 439; Diary of Stocking, Ibid., pp. 554-555.

behind in the swamp.¹⁴ On October 31, Lieutenant McClellan of Hendrick's company remained in the swamp after several officers divided their food with him.¹⁵ Diarist Melvin contracted what he called the "flux" and Captain Dearborn became totally disabled. The exact number of men lost from the expedition in the swamp either by starvation or by getting lost was unknown. Morison estimated a number as high as seventy or eighty. Justin Smith later calculated that perhaps fifty men had perished.¹⁶ Whatever the number, it remained an enormous sacrifice of unfortunate men to errors of judgment.

The collected army's suffering continued for two more days. Everyone tried to advance, but many men fell behind again. Several soldiers were seen to offer others as much as a dollar for a small lump of moldy bread.¹⁷ One member of a small group owned a sliver of chocolate which he shared with the others by boiling it then dividing

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14. Diary of Haskell, Ibid., p. 478.
 15. Diary of Hendricks, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd. ser., XV, 42.
 16. Diary of Melvin, March to Quebec, p. 440; Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 139; Diary of Morison, Ibid., pp. 533-534; Smith, Arnold's March, pp. 232-234.
 17. Diary of Ware, New England Register, VI, 131; Diary of Hendricks, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd ser., XV, 43.

the results.¹⁸ But many men had no food at all and were left to their own devices. Senter listed in his diary such things as shavings soap, pomatum, lip salve, shoe leather and cartridge pouches which eventually served as sustenance. Others even boiled their leather breeches and drank the juice. Still others killed a pet dog belonging to Captain Dearborn and devoured it--entrails, paws and tail.¹⁹

Aside from falling victim to the kettle, clothes and equipment also succumbed to the rigors of travel in large numbers. Shirts and breeches were torn by the brambles and roots. Rifles had rusted and sometimes broken when used as walking supports and for smashing holes in the ice. Many men walked barefoot in the snow, their shoes worn out or eaten. Matthias Ogden resourcefully bundled his tender feet in discarded flour sacks.²⁰

Some soldiers, Melvin for one, were lucky enough to shoot a small wild animal for food.²¹ But most men were

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18. Diary of Ogden, New Jersey Historical Society, n.s., XIII, 21.
 19. Diary of Senter, March to Quebec, p. 219; Diary of Morison, Ibid., pp. 528, 532; Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 139; Diary of Meigs, Ibid., p. 181; Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 260; Diary of Henry, Ibid., p. 341; Diary of Haskell, Ibid., p. 478; Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 555.
 20. Diary of Ogden, New Jersey Historical Society, n.s., XIII, 21; Diary of Dearborn, March to Quebec, p. 140.
 21. Diary of Melvin, March to Quebec, p. 440.

not so fortunate. On November 1, Matthias Ogden stumbled upon a man from Goodrich's company lying in the path, too weak to move. The soldier claimed he had not eaten in two days. Good Samaritan Ogden gave the fellow half of his two ounces of pork and some of Captain Smith's bread. Soon the soldier revived and continued marching.²² But a little further back, a young Dutchman, whose wife had accompanied him, died from hunger and exposure.²³ When they broke camp on November 1, most men were too weak to maintain their balance; they reeled and stumbled like drunks. The smallest obstacle felled them, and walking down hill, they usually completed their descent in a rolling clump.²⁴ Another day without food and the entire army would no doubt have perished.

As his army faced this critical situation, Arnold's dash to find provisions ended in timely success. He had arrived at the Chaudiere's southernmost settlement on October 31, and immediately purchased all available food. A party then returned down the trail with these supplies in search of the army. During the afternoon of November 2,

22. Diary of Ogden, New Jersey Historical Society, n.s., XIII, 20.

23. Diary of Stocking, March to Quebec, p. 556.

24. Diary of Hendrieks, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd ser., XV, 43; Diary of Ware, New England Register, VI, 131.

as the most advanced members of the expedition staggered around a curve in the trail, they saw two French Canadians driving five cows and two horses toward them. According to several diarist, mens' eyes filled with tears at this sight and the forest echoed with shouts of joy. Several men immediately set to work slaughtering and dressing one of the cows. Men once facing death by starvation now found the slightest morsel a tasty banquet. To the great joy of Simon Fobes, he became the beneficiary of a six inch piece of the cow's intestine, which he "ate with a relish."²⁵ Additional provisions such as tobacco and mutton for the sick arrived shortly thereafter, and by nightfall, soldiers who had abandoned hope of survival started regaining their strength.²⁶

With the food crisis lessened, the expedition now moved through a series of friendly but mercenary Canadian settlements along the Chaudiere. Most troops noted with astonishment the great friendliness shown toward them by the first Canadians they met. According to Ogden, Colonel Arnold told him that the people of Sartigan rang the

25. Diary of Senter, March to Quebec, p. 219; Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 261; Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 556; Diary of Fobes, Ibid., p. 585.

26. Diary of Humphrey, Magazine of History, XLII, ex. 166, 98; Diary of Dearborn, March to Quebec, p. 139; Diary of Meigs, Ibid., p. 181; Diary of Melvin, Ibid., p. 440; Diary of Haskell, Ibid., p. 478; Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 556.

parish bell to celebrate his arrival.²⁷ Abner Stocking's diary entry on this occasion perhaps best described the Americans' initial reaction to Canadians:

The kindness and hospitality of the inhabitants was to us very pleasing. After having been lately our enemies...we did not expect to experience...so much friendship. They readily supplied us with whatever they had to spare, and discovered much tenderness toward those who were sick.(28)

Fresh beef, butter, pheasants and other fowls and vegetables were all offered to the soldiers. However, Arnold's men soon learned that the Canadians did not offer their goods merely out of kindheartedness. Although most Canadians remained friendly throughout the campaign, time after time, beside descriptions of Canadian hospitality, American diarist noted the excessive price of their goods. Thayer unhappily recalled purchasing a rather bad gallon of New England rum for two dollars, double the cost at home. Milk prices ran around one shilling per quart, and a loaf of bread stood at one shilling. According to Melvin, some nearby Indians also cashed in by charging him one shilling, four pence for a pint and a half of boiled rice.²⁹

27. Diary of Ogden, New Jersey Historical Society, n.s., XIII, 21.

28. Diary of Stocking, March to Quebec, p. 557.

29. Diary of Meigs, Ibid., p. 181; Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 557; Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 262; Diary of Melvin, Ibid., p. 440; Diary of Humphrey, Magazine of History, XLII, ex. 166, 98; Diary of Hendricks, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd ser., XV, 46; Diary of Ware, New England Register, VI, 131.

On November 3, at St. Francisway, a rather unlikely group of reinforcements joined the expedition--Indians. A number of them had approached Arnold, inquiring about "the Quarrel between the king and his children." After Colonel Arnold supposedly gave them a short speech on this topic, approximately thirty-two of the Indians joined the army. Their pay was eight dollars (two in advance), plus bread.³⁰ Unfortunately we learn virtually nothing more about the role played by these Indians during the remainder of the campaign.

The expedition still had fifty miles to travel before reaching the St. Lawrence, and the roads were in the worst winter condition--"half a leg deep in mud." Dr. Senter, in what must be an exaggerated entry, wrote that the horse he managed to rent struggled through mud up to its belly most of the distance to the river. As for shelter, some men located small huts to sleep in along the way, but most resorted to stables and barns for their lodgings. Many soldiers also continued to show signs of their recent ordeal and fell along the road. The lucky ones had friends who supported them and forced them to walk while rubbing their stiffened bodies with snow to

30. Diary of Ogden, New Jersey Historical Society, n.s., XIII, 22; Diary of Senter, March to Quebec, p. 220; Diary of Melvin, Ibid., p. 441.

restore circulation.³¹ Matthias Ogden noted the extreme vulnerability of the expedition to enemy attack at this point, a worry which must have crossed the minds of others as well:

Our situation seemed somewhat ticklish. As yet we had no certain intelligence of the strength of the enemy at Quebec, nor had we heard a word from General Schuyler or his army; our whole number did not exceed 600 and they not all effective; the most of us naked and bare-foot and very illly provided with ammunition; with winter approaching in hasty strides...we had no quarters...nor any possibility of retreating....(32)

Arnold found numerous duties to perform as his ragged army approached Point Levi on the St. Lawrence. To provide for the army's advance, he continued ahead and ordered beef slaughtered and prepared for them every ten to twelve miles. By November 5 portions of the army had passed St. Mary's, approximately twenty miles below Point Levi. To protect the main body of troops from ambush, Arnold ordered a lieutenant and twenty men to scout the entire area up to Quebec.³³ This squad also received orders to alert the Canadian population to the army's advance; it was presumed this would lessen fears and show the Americans' friendly intentions. Meanwhile, Arnold learned that the Quebec garrison, now aware of his approach, had destroyed all

31. Diary of Morison, March to Quebec, p. 532.

32. Diary of Ogden, New Jersey Historical Society, n.s., XIII, 24.

usable boats on the St. Lawrence, thus hoping to allow Arnold no means of crossing the river. As a counter to this tactic, Arnold ordered Captain Thayer (who had just brought twenty-six invalids up from below St. Mary's) to purchase all available craft along the upper Chaudiere. Thayer found approximately twenty boats, and by November 8 he had pushed off toward Point Levi.³³

During the days from November 7 to November 10 the entire army reached Point Levi. They had completed a march of over three hundred miles under inhuman conditions. That in itself was a victory for each surviving soldier. However, the ravages of victory were still highly visible. The last men arriving at Point Levi recounted the deaths of several more musketeers from starvation, and many others still lay along the roads between Sartigan and Point Levi, too sick or too exhausted to continue.³⁴ The main force was equally worthless as fighting men on this date. A British officer in Quebec later estimated that fifty organized men

33. Diary of Dearborn, March to Quebec, p. 141; Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 262.

34. Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 141; Diary of Melvin, Ibid., p. 441; Diary of Meigs, Ibid., p. 182; Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 558; Diary of Morison, Ibid., p. 531; Diary of Senter, Ibid., p. 222; Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 263; Diary of Hendricks, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd ser., XV, 47-48; Diary of Ogden, New Jersey Historical Society, n.s., XIII, 24; Diary of Ware, New England Register, VI, 132.

could have captured the entire force.³⁵ When Arnold called a general muster of the army, Abner Stocking sadly but humorously described the gathering:

A more pitiful and humorous spectacle was exhibited than I had ever before seen. In our long and tedious march through the wilderness, it was not with us as with the children of Israel, "that our clothes waxed not old," ours were torn in pieces by the bushes, and hung in strings--few of us had any shoes, but moccasins made of raw skins--many of us without hats--and beards long and visages meager. I thought we much resembled the animals which inhabit New-Spain called the Ourang-Outang. (36)

His army assembled, Arnold proceeded to turn full attention to the almost forgotten objective: the walled city of Quebec. All troops remained on the south side of the St. Lawrence until November 13. Several distant sightings of the enemy did occur. Then, on November 9, the Americans captured a young British seaman named McKenzie from a raiding party which strayed too close. Shortly thereafter, a deserter from the Quebec garrison also entered the American camp. Both men told Arnold the discouraging news that Quebec had recently been reinforced by one hundred and fifty men from Sorrell under Colonel McLane. Neither man could offer much information beyond this.³⁷

35. Letter of Henry Caldwell, May 1776, Historical Magazine, 2nd ser., II, (1897), 97.

36. Diary of Stocking, March to Quebec, p. 558.

37. Diary of Melvin, Ibid., p. 441; Diary of Morison, Ibid., p. 532; Diary of Ogden, New Jersey Historical Society, n.s., XIII, 23.

Quebec presented several problems to anyone who sought to capture the city, particularly because of its location on cliffs over the river and the high wall surrounding the main city. Since Arnold's attack would be overland, he recognized the need for scaling apparatus. Thus many enlisted men were employed at Point Levi constructing ladders.³⁸

Because of the original strategy to tie the attack of Montreal with the attack on Quebec, and because of the onset of winter weather, time became one of Arnold's foremost concerns. And although his army was still physically handicapped, the Colonel decided on November 13 that an attempt to take the city had to occur. That night, all of the army able to travel embarked on the river in thirty-five canoes. The operation required extreme caution because two British warships anchored off Quebec had men patrolling both shores in small boats. These patrols had to be evaded in order to maintain an element of surprise. The complete crossing took from 8 P.M. until 2 A.M. on November 14. The army landed at Wolfe's Cove, the same point from which General James Wolfe initiated his successful invasion sixteen years earlier.³⁹ But there all similarity between the two attacks ceased.

38. Diary of Thayer, March to Quebec, p. 264.

39. Diary of Senter, Ibid., pp. 224-225; Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 141; Diary of Meigs, Ibid., p. 182; Diary of Melvin, Ibid., p. 441; Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 559; Diary of Ware, New England Register, VI, 132; Diary of Ogden, New Jersey Historical Society, n.s., XIII, 27.

Waiting on the north shore of the St. Lawrence for others to arrive, the first men across became extremely cold. Snow was falling and a biting wind numbed exposed hands and faces. The waiting soldiers decided to build a fire to alleviate their suffering. A British patrol boat spotted the fire immediately and approached the area, its crew shouting challenges toward the shore. Arnold and several others hid in some brush near the shore, but unfortunately, a soldier hiding elsewhere opened fire on the patrol boat. It retreated into the darkness at once, leaving the invading party to wonder whether the incident had cost them the sorely needed advantage of surprise.⁴⁰

The thought that Quebec would be alert to his attack caused Arnold to pause and reconsider his plan. He called a war council of those officers with him on the north shore to reevaluate the attack. Much against the wishes of some, Daniel Morgan in particular, a majority of the council voted to abort the attack. Powder was low and the scaling ladders had not yet been ferried across the river.⁴¹ By virtue of this decision, all possibility of

40. Diary of Fobes, March to Quebec, p. 587.

41. Diary of Morison, Ibid., pp. 532-533; Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 559.

capturing Quebec without laying siege to the city was lost.

Unquestionably, the decision not to attack Quebec during the early morning darkness of November 14 became the most critical of the campaign. Many questions relative to the decision remained: How well prepared was Quebec on November 14? Was the advantage of surprise immediately lost? Could the Americans have successfully attacked? No doubt each man present at the war council asked himself similar questions. An examination of Quebec's status on November 13 provides at least partial answers.

Actual preparations within the city were relatively light. When the first inkling of an attack reached Quebec in September, town meetings began and met regularly from then on.⁴² Sometime prior to October 1, the citizenry decided to build barrier gates on all roads connecting the Lower unfortified town from the Upper Town which was walled.⁴³ Beginning on September 28, all persons entering and leaving Quebec were subject to search and interrogation. On November 3, the city gates were ordered closed by 6 P.M., to remain closed until sunrise the next day. And according

42. Anonymous Diary from Quebec, Collections of the New York Historical Society, III, (1880), 175.

43. Anonymous Letter from Quebec to London, October 1, 1775, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 925.

to the Quebec Orderly Book, orders for doubling the city guard were to take effect on November 14!⁴⁴

But these were minor precautions; actual protection from a nighttime assault was meager. According to diaries of persons living in Quebec in November, not a single regular British soldier remained in Quebec when Arnold arrived at Point Levi. Shortly thereafter Colonel McLane had arrived with his hundred fifty men, but they were new untried recruits.⁴⁵ Governor Carleton and seven hundred regulars from Quebec had departed earlier to fight the other American army attacking St. Johns.⁴⁶ And although the city owned forty cannon, they were not yet mounted and were useless. This was one of the primary reasons the city militia had not attacked Arnold's forces when they first arrived at Point Levi.⁴⁷ The Quebec garrison supposedly numbered 1,126 on November 14, but that number was misleading. Seven hundred eighty of them were Canadians who had been unwillingly conscripted. The remaining

44. Quebec Orderly Book, Documents of the Quebec Literary and Historical Society, 7th ser., n.v., pp. 163, 174, 178.

45. Anonymous Letter from Quebec, October 25, 1775, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 1185.

46. Anonymous Diary from Quebec, Collections of the New York Historical Society, III, 176.

47. Letter of Henry Caldwell, May 1776, Historical Magazine, 2nd. ser., II, (1897), 98.

three hundred forty-six were an impotent conglomeration of seamen, raw recruits and artificers.⁴⁸ How this motley group would react to a nighttime attack seems highly questionable.

As to the loss of surprise, no Quebec source investigated noted that an American force had reached the north shore on the night of November 13. At least one secondary source contended that several hours passed before the men in the patrol boat were able to return to their ship and relate the incident.⁴⁹ It would seem that Arnold's fear, although believed reasonable at the time by his officers, was premature.

Had the attack occurred, at least a portion of Quebec probably would have fallen. But none of the American officers had any accurate intelligence regarding Quebec's situation on November 14. The final decision rested entirely on previous knowledge of Quebec and on imagination. What apparently stood uppermost in the officers' minds was the exhausted and ragged men who accompanied them. Powder was low; no man could fire more than five rounds.⁵⁰ The soldiers appeared lifeless and ragged. Looking up at Quebec through that night's freezing

49. Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan, p. 38.

50. Diary of Morison, March to Quebec, pp. 532-533; Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 559.

snow and rain, the knowledge that they had barely survived the ordeal of their wilderness march probably weighed heavily on their minds and heightened the risk involved in a potentially rash attack against an unmeasured foe.

Chapter IV

Quebec Attacked and Conclusions

Although fear that they had lost the immediate advantage of surprise precipitated the American war council which called off the November 14 attack, the underlying and most important reasons for the decision resulted from the wilderness march; too few able-bodied men, guns, and provisions, and a drained spirit. Once they made the decision not to attack, the Americans converted the campaign into a siege, and the effects of the wilderness march on the campaign's outcome became more remote. The siege lasted for more than six weeks, and newer difficulties replaced many of those created by the march. In effect, a point of demarcation took place and the campaign shifted to a new phase.

By the morning of November 14, Quebec knew the Americans had crossed the St. Lawrence. Arnold decided to move his entire army to a holding position on the Plains of Abraham, south of Quebec, on the same side of the river. This was the area where Generals Wolfe and Montcalm fought their epic battle sixteen years earlier. Now Arnold and his officers decided that this area was most suitable for launching their next move. There they would establish a temporary camp and prepare a siege of the city if their

overture's for the city's surrender failed.

During the first two days of the American encampment on the Plains of Abraham, Arnold attempted to draw Quebec into a negotiated surrender. To accomplish this he lined up his troops and marched them past the city walls in such a manner that all of them could not be seen at once. Presumably, this created the illusion that the army consisted of a far greater number of soldiers. Immediately after each of these parades, Captain Ogden volunteered to walk toward the city walls carrying a white flag. He also carried a request for Quebec's surrender. If allowed to enter the walls, Ogden was to deliver this to the Governor. But the Quebec guard was not at all fooled by Arnold's deception, and each time Ogden showed himself, they fired on him. After two fruitless attempts, Arnold finally gave up this ploy and resigned himself and his army to besieging the city.¹

Quebec reacted by undertaking preparations for the siege. Fortunately for the city's loyalist population, Governor Carleton had returned on November 19, before Arnold could establish his positions. Carleton had barely escaped capture in the fall of Montreal. Now he immediately set about placing Quebec in a ready state for attack and siege. First, Carleton declared that all persons not

1. Diary of Thayer, March to Quebec, p. 265; Diary of Meigs, Ibid., p. 182; Diary of Ogden, New Jersey Historical Society, n.s., XII, 29.

in sympathy with the British and unwilling to defend Quebec should immediately leave the city or be imprisoned. "Thus," wrote Thomas Ainslie in his journal, "was our militia purged from all those miscreants who had already taken arms with a design no doubt of turning them against us."²

As a second step, Carleton ordered all able-bodied seamen in Quebec harbor ashore to serve in the militia. This move increased garrison strength as of November 30 to 1,800 men, including four hundred seamen, three hundred and thirty marines and two hundred and thirty Royal Emigrants.³

However, very little could be done about the city's food supply, which was drastically low. This shortage soon reduced the Quebec population to a diet of salt beef, salt pork and salt fish.⁴

During late November and early December Colonel Arnold tried to secure his position, closing off the city. But he was forced to relocate the army at Point-aux-Trembles (a few miles up river) when he received intelligence that

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2. Journal of Thomas Ainslie, Documents of the Quebec Literary and Historical Society, 7th ser., (1905), 17; Unfortunately, Ainslie did not record the number of persons who accepted this order and left Quebec.
 3. Diary of Hugh Finley, Ibid., 4th ser., (1875), 4,
 4. Anonymous Letter from Quebec, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd ser., XV, 58.

Quebec had plans to attack his camp.⁵ Outnumbered by three to one, Arnold had no intention of confronting Carleton's army in a pitched daylight battle. At Point-aux-Trembles, Arnold could continue to close off the city, and he could wait for General Montgomery, who had replaced Schuyler, to reinforce him.

This first army sent into Canada had, with great difficulty, succeeded in capturing its objectives. Both Schuyler and Montgomery had advanced from their respective outposts (Ticonderoga and Crown Point) in early September; Schuyler held overall command. The American army was green, unconfident and bumbling. Twice portions of Schuyler's army met and defeated British forces, only to retreat in disorder themselves. His many illnesses sucking away his ability or spirit to lead, Schuyler finally abdicated his command in favor of Montgomery on September 16, and returned to Fort Ticonderoga. Montgomery immediately laid siege to St. John's, bombarding the fort into rubble. But the garrison bravely held out for fifty-five days despite the almost continuous pounding they absorbed from American mortars. During the seige Montgomery confronted innumerable problems in his own ranks. Insubordination

5. Benedict Arnold to General Montgomery, November 26, 1775, March to Quebec, pp. 90-91; Diary of Finley, Documents of Quebec Society, 4th ser., 4.

and supply shortages presented the greatest difficulties. But finally, St. John's surrendered on November 2. Many of Montgomery's men did not want to march on to Montreal, but by bribing them with the promise that they could return home as soon as the city fell, Montgomery managed to take Montreal bloodlessly on November 13. After a short period of reorganizing and reinforcing his army at Montreal, Montgomery took a small force and marched off to rendezvous with Arnold at Quebec.⁶

While Arnold's army waited at Point-aux-Trembles, deteriorating discipline created a threatening situation. Trouble first surfaced on December 3. Arnold had ordered Captain Hanchett to return to the army's original camp and bring up three batteaux of provisions. Hanchett refused the order, stating that such a trip was too dangerous. This refusal so riled Arnold, that for the first time recorded throughout the expedition, he lost his temper and swore to arrest Hanchett. However, Arnold soon real-

6. The ineptitude, insubordination, lack of supplies and coordination described in the St. John's-Montreal campaign parallels closely with events at Quebec. Unfortunately, very few diarists were among Montgomery's men, so that descriptions come mostly from military correspondence. The best collection of primary sources for Montgomery's campaign is American Archives, 4th ser, III. This volume is replete with letters covering the entire period. Justin Smith, Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony, I, Chapters XIII-XVI, gives the most detailed, documented secondary account. But Smith is obviously strongly biased against Schuyler. Allen French, The First Year of the American Revolution, pp. 415-431, offers an articulate account.

ized that if he disciplined Hanchett, he stood to lose Hanchett's entire company. No doubt eaten with frustration at his officer's pernicious actions, Arnold eventually accepted Captain Thayer's offer to make the trip.⁷ Several days later Arnold again tried issuing an order to Hanchett's company and to two others to man the forward guard position. Hanchett refused the order on the grounds that the guard positions were open to cannon fire from the city. Once more, Arnold found himself without recourse, unless he could withstand the loss of three companies.⁸ Both incidents served to undermine discipline and order to a dangerous level. For his part, Hanchett cultivated several other companies, severely weakening morale and the army's effectiveness.

As a timely counter to Hanchett's activities, General Montgomery and a small force arrived on December 1 with supplies for Arnold's men. Among the supplies were much needed clothing and shoes, as well as ammunition. Montgomery established headquarters in a large old house, and on the same day reviewed Arnold's ragged little army.

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7. Diary of Thayer, March to Quebec, pp. 269-271; Thayer's account offered the only details surrounding these incidents.
 8. Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 144; Diary of Haskell, Ibid., pp. 481-482.

Three days after Montgomery's review, Arnold and his officers felt sufficiently secure to move the army back to the Plains of Abraham.⁹

For the next several days the Americans strengthened their siege of Quebec. All roads leading into the city were blockaded. They planted a breastwork for artillery near an old mill, about seven hundred yards from the Quebec wall.¹⁰ Underbrush, snow and freezing water were poured over the breastwork, and soldiers then fortified the icy mound which emerged with cannon. But despite the ingenious method of fortification, the breastwork could not withstand the shot of the heavy cannon now mounted on Quebec's walls.¹¹ In still other areas, the Americans set up mortars and other installations, and on December fourteenth a few rounds were fired into the city.

During this state of activity, Arnold's men were continually haunted by the trials of a wintry campaign. Bitterly cold weather set in by early December; it seemed a matter of course that snow fell daily. On December 6 the first cases of small pox appeared in camp. Some

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9. Diary of Stocking, Ibid., pp. 560-561; Diary of Hendricks, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd ser., XV, 50.
 10. The breastwork came down river on December 4; Diary of Haskell, March to Quebec, p. 482; Anonymous Diary, Documents of Quebec Society, 8th ser., (1906), 58.
 11. Diary of Senter, March to Quebec, p. 230.

soldiers concluded that Nature had sided with the British.¹²

Since Quebec showed no signs of submitting by mid-December, Montgomery determined that an attack on the city must soon occur. Most of Arnold's men had enlisted for only six months, and their time ended on January 1, 1776. On that date they were free to leave. Neither Montgomery nor Arnold believed that many of them would willingly remain. Montgomery spoke individually about his plan to each officer and then addressed the men. To his profound dismay, Montgomery found many soldiers opposed his proposition, "especially those...who belonged to Arnold's corps. (They)...had taken some disgust to (their) general, as he was for maintaining more rigid discipline than (they) were willing to submit to."¹³ But Arnold had shown himself as not only a fair but flexible commander throughout the campaign. It would seem that Hanchett's activities and the shortness of enlistment time caused this displeasure with Arnold.

Nevertheless, if an attack was to occur, it had to come by December 31. Thus the two commanders began making plans to attack the city no later than December 26 or 27.

12. Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 146; Diary of Haskell, Ibid., p. 482; Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 561.

13. Diary of Stocking, Ibid., p. 561.

Montgomery described the plan in a letter to General Washington:

I propose the first strong northeaster to make two attacks by night; one, with about a third of the troops, on the lower town, having first set fire to some houses, which will, in all probability, communicate their flames to the stockade lately erected on the rock near St. Rogue; the other upon Cape Diamond bastion, by escalade.
(14)

With the plans set, another of those bumbling events which had thusfar haunted the campaign occurred. On the night of December 23, one night before Montgomery planned to attack, a British prisoner named Joshua Wolf got his guard drunk and escaped to Quebec. Not only was Wolf a professional soldier, a clerk for Colonel Caldwell, but he had lived in the American camp since his capture in early November, conversing and listening to Arnold's men discuss battle plans. Wolf knew almost as much about Montgomery's plan as his officers. Colonel Caldwell later wrote of Wolf's knowledge: "he brought us the first certain accounts of their intentions to storm the town; of their having ladders prepared; and of the different attacks they were to make, as talked of amongst their troops...."¹⁵ According to other accounts, Wolf also reported on the

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14. General Montgomery to General Wester, December 16, 1775, American Archives, 4th ser., IV, 289.
 15. Diary of Finley, Documents of Quebec Society, 4th ser., 7; Letter of Caldwell, Historical Magazine, 2nd ser., II, 99.

difficulty Montgomery was having persuading his troops that an attack was necessary.¹⁶ In light of this intelligence, the Quebec command immediately acted to prepare for the attack by requesting half the garrison to remain dressed and on alert at all times.¹⁷ Wolf's escape ultimately provided the British with two distinct advantages over the Americans; the knowledge that an attack must occur before January 1, and the realization that fighting no longer appealed to many of the Americans.

Fully aware that his plans might be known, Montgomery changed the attack schedule to December 27. Throughout the appointed day a northeaster gusted coldly upon Quebec. Troops were ordered to prepare for a nighttime assault. But, as nature continued to favor the British, the weather suddenly cleared, a bright moon shone, and the entire plan was scrubbed. Montgomery thanked the troops for turning out, and informed them that an attempt would come again within the next few days.¹⁸

Those days of waiting surely produced mixed emotions. Unquestionably, Arnold and Montgomery, and perhaps others,

16. Diary of Finley, Documents of Quebec Society, 4th ser., 7.

17. Quebec Orderly Book, Ibid., 7th ser., 198.

18. Diary of Dearborn, March to Quebec, p. 148; Diary of Meigs, Ibid., p. 188; Diary of Senter, Ibid., p. 230; Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 273; Diary of Morison, Ibid., p. 535; Diary of Melvin, Ibid., p. 442; Melvin claimed these events fell on December 26.

anxiously hoped for another storm and no further mishaps. To convince their men to re-enlist under present conditions would be impossible. Those men whose enlistments expired on December 31 felt that too much had been exacted from them already. If asked to stay, many would simply walk away from the camp and never return. Some might call this desertion, but in the eyes of most enlisted men, they were free to leave when their contracts ended. As these tensions coursed through the American camp, the moment of attack finally arrived.

The night of December 30 produced a blinding snow storm. By 10 P.M. plans for the attack had been relayed to most officers. Montgomery and Arnold would lead separate attacks, coordinated to cause the greatest strain on British manpower and firepower. Montgomery would strike at a house called the "Potash." Arnold had to sneak under the city's wall and approach the Lower Town opposite Montgomery. Eventually they would meet and go over the wall while a diversionary force held the attention of the garrison.¹⁹ At 2 A.M. the army had taken up its positions at the various leader's headquarters. By 5 A.M. they had begun to approach the half sleeping, half dressed city.

19. Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 275; Diary of Meigs, Ibid., p. 189; these accounts offer the best descriptions of the preparations; see also, Diary of Ware, New England Register, VI, 132-133.

Captain Malcolm Fraser stood guard on the city's walls that morning, the howling storm stinging his face and eyes. Suddenly, he saw a rocket flash skyward from the rebel camp and knew it was the long awaited signal for the attack. He immediately left his post to run through the streets shouting "turn out." He also had the alarm bell rung and drums beat, but the weather was so bad, neither could be heard. However, most stations were manned in time to face the oncoming Americans.²⁰

Montgomery's portion of the attack ran into trouble at the outset. Directing his troops, Montgomery made short work of the several picket lines erected to delay a mass charge. Then, still leading his men, he approached a blockhouse with several cannon. Despite being almost transfixed with fear at the Americans' approach, one man in the blockhouse had the sense to fire a cannon filled with grapeshot. This single shot had a devastating effect on the American column. Montgomery and several men caught the full force of the grapeshot. Falling backward from the concussion of the projectiles, everyone in the line of fire, including General Montgomery, lay faceup in the snow, dead.²¹ The sight of their commander and comrades

20. Diary of Ware, New England Register, VI, 132; Diary of Finley, Documents of the Quebec Society, 4th ser., 8.

21. Diary of Dearborn, March to Quebec, p. 152; Diary of Meigs, Ibid., p. 189; Diary of Senter, Ibid., p. 234; Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 276.

dying in this manner stunned the remaining troops. When Montgomery's second in command, Colonel Donald Campbell, reached the front of the column, he found the men huddled in leaderless groups some distance from the bodies. Instead of rallying the men, Campbell showed he had no stomach for the battle, and with a conservatism bordering on cowardice, he chose to call a retreat (a move for which he was later court-martialed) without firing a shot or retrieving the bodies of his dead commander and soldiers.²²

Arnold's line of march was actually more treacherous than Montgomery's. It went directly below the walls of the Upper Town. There were no roads to follow, and no one really knew the way. Adding to these obstacles, the "way (was) dark and intricate, among stores, houses, boats, and wharves, and (was) harrassed at the same time with constant fire of the enemy from the walls...."²³ To make matters worse, Captain Dearborn's company had not been properly notified about the attack. They arrived an hour behind the main column, and when confronted by the British, their guns were wet from the snow and would

22. Diary of Thayer, Ibid., p. 276; see also Bird, Attack on Quebec, p. 221; Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan, p. 49; Smith, Fourteenth Colony, II, 115-116, gives a singularly one-sided, eloquently damning character sketch of Campbell.

23. Diary of Meigs, March to Quebec, p. 190.

not fire. The British captured them all without firing a shot.²⁴

Arnold's column continued on through a hail of musket fire. When Arnold fell with a shot in his leg, Daniel Morgan led the men onward. The first phase of this assault went very successfully. Morgan moved so swiftly that he and his men scrambled over the entrance to the Lower Town, and with only a few shots, immediately captured fifty guards.²⁵ At this point, Morgan reluctantly held up, waiting to hear from Montgomery; the delay cost him all further chance of success.

Recognizing that the only serious trouble came from Morgan's entry into the Lower Town, Carleton coolly reinforced the men facing Morgan. A small scale but very animated battle ensued. Finally, facing the British alone, Morgan surrendered, but only because he could no longer fire his weapons and no one would venture close enough for him to use his sword.²⁶ The attack had ended.

With Morgan's capture, Quebec once again stood secure. For the Americans the attack had been a disaster. Arnold was carried from the field against his will, now the sole

24. Diary of Dearborn, Ibid., p. 153; Diary of Meigs, Ibid., p. 190.

25. Diary of Porterfield, Magazine of American History, XXI, (1889), 318-319.

26. Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan, pp. 44-49.

commander of the survivors. Of the one thousand or more Americans, Indians and sympathetic Canadians who participated in the assault, at least thirty-five were killed and three hundred seventy-two taken prisoner. British losses were estimated at twenty to fifty men killed and a smaller number wounded.²⁷

Although Carleton and his officers continued to view the remnants of the American army as a threat, they would have been hard pressed to defend themselves against a counterattack from Quebec. But Carleton seemed satisfied to sit in his city throughout the winter, while the pitiful band of rebels attempted to survive the attacks of Mother Nature. Actually, most of those men whose enlistments ended on December 31 returned home. And although Arnold pleaded for reinforcements, they did not arrive until April. Smallpox as well as desertion continually diminished the size of his force. Then, on May 7, 1776, British reinforcements reached Quebec in a fifteen-ship fleet. The rakish General John Burgoyne commanded these new arrivals, seven Irish and one English regiment, and

27. Roberts, March to Quebec, p. 40; Smith, Fourteenth Colony, II, Remark LXIV, 580-581; Few sources agreed on the number of killed and wounded. British estimates ran as high as two hundred forty killed. The actual number, averaged from all accounts, was probably less than fifty.

2,000 Hessians.²⁸

A small skirmish between the Americans and British followed Burgoyne's arrival. But the Americans soon recognized that they had lost any chance of taking Quebec. No further attacks occurred, and the entire American force began its long retreat homeward. The defeat at Quebec also left the areas captured earlier by Montgomery untenable. They, too, were abandoned shortly. Although Canada remained a concern for the Americans, at least until after the Saratoga campaign ended in the fall of 1777, no further expeditions against Canada materialized for the duration of the Revolution.²⁹ The total campaign ended a dismal failure, costing the Americans one of their most promising Generals, the support of the French Canadians, and raising very serious questions about the potential of the Continental Army. The tragic, misguided march up the Kennebec and Chaudiere Rivers stood as an epic of man's ability to endure the consequences of his own inadequacy, but little more than that. Perhaps the most that could be said is, that by virtue of having faced death together, the participants'

28. Ward, The War of the Revolution, I, 197; Francis V. Greene, The Revolutionary War, (New York, 1911), p. 26.

29. This excludes the area promised Canada in the Quebec Act.

regionalis had been diminished. When they again went into battle together, they had become an effective unit.³⁰

30. At least one major example of this new understanding took place at Saratoga. Two repatriated officers captured at Quebec, Daniel Morgan from Virginia and Henry Dearborn from Massachusetts were responsible for rolling up Burgoyne's flank and ensuring his defeat by Benedict Arnold.

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Failure of the Quebec assault ultimately led to a collapse of the entire Canadian campaign. The American goals of making allies of the Canadian population and of denying the use of Canada to the British for military support against the colonies was never achieved. With but one exception the reasons for this failure lay in internal conditions surrounding the Quebec assault and not in basic strategy. Washington's plan to attack Canada on two fronts was sound. Until the final stage at Quebec, it proceeded as planned, St. John's and Montreal falling, Governor Carleton's force being too small to defend both areas simultaneously. Despite the agonies of Arnold's march, and given the military status of Quebec when he arrived, success may have escaped him by a small margin on the morning of November 14.

The one exception or weakness in strategy was the failure to recognize that success at Quebec held the key to long term success in Canada. Even if Montreal had not fallen, it could not have remained in British hands for very long with an American-held Quebec keeping reinforcements from moving up the St. Lawrence. Yet in planning, the Quebec assault was the step-child of the campaign. It developed as an afterthought to Schuyler's approach

from Ticonderoga. This in turn influenced timing, and timing stood as the greatest cause of failure.

Timing was entangled with almost every element detrimental to the Quebec expedition. Timing and under-estimation of the line of march are difficult to separate in their influence on the assault. Congress' hesitance to approve any operations in Canada held up serious planning until late July and early August. An attack on Quebec did not come to light until August 20. In the letter announcing his plan to Schuyler, Washington referred to the distance Arnold and his men must cover as "inconsiderable."³¹ Since the actual time vis-a-vis distance was unknown, there was no sense of urgency. Again, on October 13, while Arnold's men struggled to cross the Great Carrying Place, Washington gave further indication that he did not fully appreciate the dimensions of the expedition. He wrote that he anticipated Arnold's arrival at Quebec by October 20, three full weeks before the army reached Point Levi.³² From his orders to Arnold, which provided for cancellation of the expedition, it seemed unlikely that Washington would

31. Washington to Schuyler, August 20, 1775, Writings Of Washington, IV, 437.

32. Washington to Governor Trumbull, October 13, 1775, Ibid., IV, 29.

have allowed the army to depart as late as September 19 if he had had an accurate conception of the trail's length and condition.

Furthermore, the misconception of distance, spread among the troops by officers using inaccurate maps and scouting reports, produced painfully detrimental results. Even as late as mid-October, Arnold inaccurately anticipated his arrival at Quebec by two weeks.³³ Realization that the distance was much greater came to Arnold's men while they were pitifully entrapped along the Dead River by incessant rain, flooding and facing a desperate shortage of food. Of course, the bogus and incomplete scouting reports turned in by Berry, Getchell and Lieutenant Church only compounded the final recognition. Morale suffered immeasurably. And it seemed likely that the impact of this new reality played a significant role in the decision of Enos' officers to defect.

One cannot separate timing and underestimation from such factors as weather conditions and poorly constructed batteaux. By late September snow was falling and water was almost freezing, yet many men lacked shelter because it did not seem vital during planning. Blame was heaped on Rueben Colburn for the poor job done on the batteaux,

33. Arnold to Washington, October 13, 1775, March to Quebec, p. 72.

but he was hardly to blame. Only fourteen days passed from the time Colburn received approval to build two hundred batteaux and the expedition's arrival in Gardinerstown. The job was larger than anything Colburn ever dreamed of handling in his small boatyard; seasoned wood ran out and there was scarcely enough green lumber to complete the batteaux. Beyond this disadvantage, Justin Smith conjectured that Colburn had no awareness of the stresses these craft would face.³⁴

Thus, like a chain reaction, the foul weather, rough water, poor batteaux and lack of boating skills among Arnold's men coalesced into two additional debilitating problems; loss of food and sickness. Massive quantities of food were either lost in rapids or spoiled by continuous washings in fresh water. This naturally led to rationing, fatigue and the need to drink contaminated water at the Great Carrying Place. If sickness did not result from this combination, it came from over-exposure. And, as the physical demands of the expedition increased, these two factors generated an inverse physical reaction to the demands.

Of course, the troops' lack of training in basic survival and military skills were not factors implicit

34. Diary of Meigs, Ibid., p. 174; Smith, Arnold's March, p. 79.

solely in the Quebec expedition. But they definitely combined with such inherent conditions as bateau construction and the hostile wilderness and its climate.

The most insidious problems generated by Arnold's soldiers came from their approach to the military, their steadfast provincialism and independence, and not from their lack of training. Once again, these characteristics were not peculiar to Arnold's men; they pervaded the Continental Army during most of the Revolution. The incidents over pay, the murder, and Colonel Greene's command of the first division were minor examples of this complication. Hanchett's insubordination and the willingness of so many men to agree with him was a more serious example; the effect of this on the final assault could have been significant.

Continuing with this same problem, the defection of Enos' division had by far the most damaging impact on the expedition up to the first assault attempt. Since Enos carried the largest portion of the provisions, it was quite possible that his division's presence would have meant the difference between victory and incapacitating starvation or death. Also of major significance was the simple fact that while the November 14 war council called off the assault partially because of insufficient

manpower, Enos defected with three hundred reasonably healthy men.

In an endeavour encompassing the number and variety of individuals involved in the Quebec expedition, some instances of human fallibility were bound to occur. But this expedition seemed to have more than its share of serious deceptions and bungles. In the cases of Berry, Getchell and Issac Hull, outright fraud occurred, and each incident severely hurt the expedition. Yet, possibly the most costly errors in terms of the expedition's goals were simple bungles--the unordered shot at the patrol boat on November 13 and prisoner Wolf's escape. Fate coupled with incompetence handicapped both the attempted assault and the assault itself.

During the encampment at Quebec, the six month enlistments common to the men in the Continental Army created a major disadvantage. In substitution for practical military logic, the coming termination of enlistments forced the assault. While Montgomery got the storm he wanted, he may not have wanted to attack so soon after the alert caused by Wolf's escape. Obviously, increasing restlessness manifested itself in the American camp as late December approached. Once more, this condition was not only found within the Quebec encampment. Washington experienced

very grave difficulties over enlistments throughout the Revolution. Losses of men during this same period seriously threatened Washington's ability to isolate Boston.³⁵

Finally, it is commonly accepted that Benedict Arnold was one of Washington's most capable field commanders prior to his defection to the British. In the face of the manifold problems surrounding the march and assault on Quebec, Arnold certainly emerged as a strong and intelligent officer. But his reputation was neither enhanced nor harmed by Quebec. Unless one probed deeply, Arnold's attributes were all but hidden by the immensity of the expedition's problems and failure. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that anyone less than an excellent leader could take such a menagerie of humanity, lead them through three hundred miles of rapids, swamps, cursed weather, gut-breaking work, sickness and starvation, and survive to assault the enemy.

35. See French, The First Year, p. 502, Chapter XXXI, "The Re-enlistment"; this is one of the most complete, documented discussions of a very important but neglected aspect of the Revolution.

ANNOTATED LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED

Primary Sources: American

Arnold, Benedict, "Journal," in March to Quebec, Kenneth Roberts, ed., 5th ed., New York, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1945.
(September 16, 1775 to October 28, 1775; September 16 through September 26 is written by Arnold's aid, Eleazer Oswald, in the first person. Arnold's "Journal" is the most essential of all sources. Although he is unemotional and gives few of his personal views, he provides an exacting record of orders, departures and portages. He tries particularly to give his exact location within the line of march, and also records such things as weather, time and distances. He does not cover such incidents as the murder or the Greene-Morgan command problem in detail. He gives few indications regarding the condition of troops. Unfortunately, the "Journal" ends before Arnold's men emerge from the swamps surrounding Chaudiere Pond.)

_____, Letters, in March to Quebec, Kenneth Roberts, ed., 5th ed., New York, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1945.
(September 27, 1775 to February 27, 1776; Arnold's letters are especially important because they continue beyond the "Journal," shedding light on such incidents as the murder, command problems and provisions. Arnold's letters from Quebec are very helpful in determining his troops' condition prior to the attack.)

Dearborn, Henry, "Journal," in March to Quebec, Kenneth Roberts, ed., 5th ed., New York, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1945.
(September 10, 1775 to July 16, 1776; Dearborn's "Journal" is another essential work. Because he had fewer men to look after, Dearborn gives a much more detailed account of the men's condition and morale. One must take care, however, in using the entries from November 6 to December 9. Although Dearborn follows the army during that period in the "Journal," he was not with it. Dearborn also gives descriptions of the weather, land and portages, and he provides the basis for the discussion of the four companies traveling up the east side of Chaudiere Pond.

Fobes, Simon, "Narrative of Arnold's Expedition to Quebec,"
in March to Quebec, Kenneth Roberts, ed., 5th ed.,
New York, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1945.
(Fobes' "Narrative" was dictated to his son sixty
years after the expedition. Roberts points out that
Fobes claims to have seen a man after the battle
who was actually killed.)

Haskell, Caleb, "Diary," in March to Quebec, Kenneth
Roberts, ed., 5th ed., New York, Doubleday, Doran
and Company, Inc., 1945.
(May 5, 1775 to May 30, 1776: Haskell gives a good
account of the expedition. He was a member of Captain
Ward's company. Although his distances are inaccurate,
he describes the constant problems encountered moving
the heavy batteaux up rapids and over portages. He
offers a useful account of the three-day rain storm
of October 19-23.)

Hendricks, William, "Diary," in Pennsylvania Archives,
2nd ser., XV, (1890).
(August 1775 to December 30, 1775: Hendricks led
one of the three rifle companies. He was at the
head of the marching troops. The "Diary" provides
a good description of the movement up river and
across the Great Carrying Place. Hendricks also
describes the portage of Morgan's batteaux across
the height of land. This "Diary" serves as good
corroborative material, particularly in relation
to the lead troops' condition prior to Enos' deser-
tion. Hendricks gives no value judgments. Unfortun-
ately, he was one of the men killed during the battle.)

Henry, John Joseph, "Campaign Against Quebec," in March to
Quebec, Kenneth Roberts, ed., 5th ed., New York,
Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1945.
(Henry wrote this in 1814, a few months before his
death. It is the account of an old pious man. Recol-
lections are largely copied from other diaries. But
one cannot totally discount Henry's importance, for
he is the only account of a man who traveled with
Steele, and he is the only one who mentions that
Berry and Getchell did not scout the entire distance.)

Heth, William, "Papers," in Winchester, Virginia Historical
Society Papers, I, (1931).
(A very short account of little worth. The introduction
is much better and more comprehensive than the account.
Heth was a member of Morgan's riflemen, and therefore,
was in the lead group.)

Humphrey, William, "Diary," in Magazine of History,
XLIII, extra no. 166, (1931).

(Humphrey's was one of the outstanding accounts not included by Kenneth Roberts in March to Quebec. Humphrey's description is useful throughout. He gives numerous details and tidbits shared by other diarists. His account of the Great Carrying Place is excellent, as are his entries concerning Chaudiere Pond and the siege at Quebec.)

Journals of the Continental Congress, Washington D.C.,
U.S. Government Printing Office, I-III, (1904-7).

Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, Edmund
C. Burnett, ed., Washington D.C., Carnegie Institute
of Washington, I, (1921).

Meigs, Return Jonathan, "Journal of Occurrences," in
March to Quebec, Kenneth Roberts, ed., Doubleday,
Doran and Company, Inc., 1945.
(September 9, 1775 to January 1, 1776: This is a
major source. Meigs was a company leader in the
third division. He describes things without embel-
lishment. The accounts of portages, the Dead River,
the height of land and the swamp are excellent.)

Melvin, James, "Journal," in March to Quebec, Kenneth
Roberts, ed., 5th ed., New York, Doubleday, Doran
and Company, Inc., 1945.
(September 13, 1775 to August 5, 1776: Melvin's
"Journal" is terse, and according to Roberts,
partially copied from a diary by Moses Kimball.
But the Kimball diary is unpublished and unavail-
able. Melvin was a member of Dearborn's company.
It is he who claims that Morgan's men stole food.)

Morison, George, "Journal," in March to Quebec, Kenneth
Roberts, ed., 5th ed., New York, Doubleday, Doran
and Company, Inc., 1945.
(July 26, 1775 to September 1776: The "Journal" is
not very good, and was written sometime after the
expedition. In large part it is a copy of Ware and
Hendricks. Morison is full of double talk, particu-
larly concerning morale. He does admit, in a round
about manner, to stealing a squirrel skin during
the worst period of starvation.)

Ogden, Matthias, "Diary," in New Jersey Historical Society
Proceedings, new series, XIII, (January, 1928).
(November to mid-December 1775: Ogden was one of
six unattached volunteers who went with Arnold.

His short account is quite important because Ogden had a keen sense of observation and a sharp mind. The points he makes are essential to any formulation of the army's condition and morale. Unfortunately, the final portion of Ogden's "Diary" is missing. He was one of those wounded during the battle but not captured.)

Oswald, Eleazer, "Diary," in American Archives, Peter Force, ed., 4th ser., III, (1840).
(September 16 through November 1775: Oswald's "Diary" is a direct parallel to Arnold's. But Oswald does include details not found in Arnold's. Oswald's account extends beyond Arnold's, and gives better views of troop conditions.)

Porterfield, Charles, "Diary," in Magazine of History, XXI, (1889).
(This "Diary" mostly concerns the time following the battle. However, the entry for December 31, 1775 is useful. Porterfield was with Morgan and claims to be the first one over the wall that morning.)

Senter, Issac, "Journal," in March to Quebec, Kenneth Roberts, ed., 5th ed., New York, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1945.
(September 13, 1775 to January 6, 1776; Senter's "Journal" is one of the most important sources. Because he was the only doctor, he continually came in contact with the sick and injured troops. He takes much more time to describe their condition and the reasons for that condition. It was Senter, for instance, who noted the bad water at the Great Carrying Place. Senter was also present at the council called by Enos' officers. He was in the division led by Issac Hull into the swamps. It is Senter who gives the details of the things the troops resorted to for food. His account of the troops preparing for battle is excellent.)

Squire, Ephriam, "Diary," in March to Quebec, Kenneth Roberts, ed., 5th ed., New York, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1945.
(September 7, 1775 to November 25, 1775: This "Diary" is important for one reason; Squire was a member of Captain Scott's company which returned with Enos. Also, his complaints about inadequate shelter are important, for that was a serious plight for those men in the rear.)

Stocking, Abner, "Journal," March to Quebec, Kenneth Roberts, ed., 5th ed., New York, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1945.

(September 14, 1775 to January 1, 1776; conclusion covers up to September 1776; Stocking's "Journal" is essentially a copy of Tolman's and Hendricks' "Diaries." It is inaccurate in dating because the "Diaries" copied were from men in the lead division and Stocking was actually with Burchett's men in the third division. Stocking's real importance lies in the passages describing the insubordination of New England troops.)

Thayer, Simeon, "Journal," in March to Quebec, Kenneth Roberts, ed., 5th ed., New York, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1945.

(September 11, 1775 to August 12, 1776; Captain Thayer's "Journal" is another of the more important sources. Again, it should be noted that Thayer closely parallels Tolman's "Diary." But Tolman and Thayer traveled together, so it is likely that they worked together at times on their accounts. Considering he was lost, Thayer gives one of the best accounts of the episode in the swamps. This is also true of his description of the siege and battle.)

Ware, Joseph, "Diary," in The New England Historical and Genealogical Register, VI, (1852).

Justin Smith emphatically denies that this "Diary" is Joseph Ware's. It is attributed to Joseph Ware of Needham, Massachusetts. But according to Smith, Ware never belonged to Arnold's army. Smith contends that it is the work of Ebenezer Tolman of Ward's company. However, this evidence did not come to light until 1903, and the "Diary" is thus listed as Ware's in all publications prior to 1903. The "Diary's" importance rests on the fact that it was written by a common enlisted man--whoever he may have been.)

Washington, George, Writings of Washington, John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., Washington D.C., United States Government Printing Office, III-IV, 1931.

Primary Sources: British and Canadian

American Archives, Peter Force, ed., 4th ser., II-III, (1849-1850).

(This work is a mass of Revolutionary War materials placed in loose chronological order. Listed under Quebec are several anonymous letters written from that city immediately before and during the siege.)

Ainslie, Thomas, "Journal," in Documents of the Quebec Literary and Historical Society, 7th ser., (1905). (Ainslie was living in Quebec during the siege. He takes account of the movements of Arnold's men, the rumors running through the city of coming attacks and he gives listings of the Quebec garrison and militia strength. The "Journal" provides considerable help in portraying the tensions felt by the British living in Quebec.)

Anonymous, "Diary," in Documents of the Quebec Literary and Historical Society, 8th ser., (1906).

(The "Diary" begins with early preparation of the city for an assault. It gives accounts of town meetings, lists garrison strength and also notes the wild rumors which flooded the city when Arnold and his men arrived.)

Anonymous, Letter from Quebec, in Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd ser., XV, (1890).

(This letter appears immediately after Hendricks' "Diary." It gives information on just how poorly prepared Quebec was for a siege.)

Caldwell, Henry, Letter, in Historical Magazine, 2nd ser., II, (1867).

(This is the most important Quebec source for several reasons. First, the letter covers the entire campaign. Second, Caldwell was a Colonel in the Quebec garrison and a major character in the battle. Third, it was Caldwell's clerk, Joshua Wolf, who escaped from Arnold to give Caldwell news of the planned attack.)

Finley, Hugh, "Diary," in Documents of the Quebec Literary and Historical Society, 4th ser., (1875).

(Finley was a civilian living in Quebec during the siege. He takes particular note of the return of Caldwell's clerk, and indicates the awareness inside Quebec that Arnold was having trouble with his men.)

Orderly Book of the Quebec Garrison, in Documents of the Quebec Literary and Historical Society, 7th ser., (1945).

(The orderly book gives the best account of the disposition of troops throughout the siege and battle. It is best for determining the number of guards on duty and the opening and closing of the city gates.)

Parliamentary History of England, London, T.C. Hansard, XVII-XVIII, (1813).

Secondary Sources: Books

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(A work written for popular consumption. It is not footnoted nor does it have a bibliography.)

Donoghue, Bernard, British Politics and the American Revolution, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1964.

Flexner, James, The Traitor and the Spy, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953.

(One of the few biographies of Benedict Arnold, this work is helpful for background and an understanding of Arnold.)

French, Allen, The First Year of the American Revolution, New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934.

(This is a very thorough study, well documented and highly readable.)

Greene, F.V., The Revolutionary War, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911.

Higginbotham, Don, Daniel Morgan, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1961.

(Higginbotham devotes two full chapters to the Quebec expedition, and provides descriptions of Morgan's character, motivation and abilities.)

Smith, Justin, Arnold's March from Cambridge to Quebec, New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1903.

(The most detailed and extensive study ever done on the Quebec expedition. Smith walked the entire distance of the expedition himself in 1903.)

The work is extensively footnoted and annotated. His account of the descent into the swamps helps to clear up a confusing situation. Unfortunately, this work ends on November 13, 1775.)

_____, Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony, New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1947.
(This is the most complete analysis of the entire Canadian campaign to date. Without it, no study on the subject is complete.)

Sosin, Jack, Agents and Merchants, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1965.

Wade, Mason, The French Canadians, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1968.

Wallace, Willard, Traitorous Hero, New York, Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1954.

Ward, Christopher, The War of the Revolution, New York, The MacMillan Company, I-II, 1952.
(This work helps to place the Canadian campaign within the context of the Revolution.)

Wrong, George, Canada and the American Revolution, New York, The MacMillan Company, 1935.

Vita

Robert Frank Reeves, the son of Robert C. Reeves and Dorothy (Silpath) Reeves was born in Riverside, New Jersey on August 15, 1944. He attended Smithfield Consolidated School and East Stroudsburg High School in Pennsylvania before graduating from Burlington City High School, Burlington, New Jersey in 1962.

His undergraduate training began at Bloomfield College in Bloomfield, New Jersey. He transferred to Drew University after his freshman year and graduated cum laude with a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1966. Lehigh University granted him a teaching assistantship in history, which he held until 1968. Then he became the Assistant Director of Admission at Lehigh. Currently, he is the Assistant Dean of Student Life there.

He is married to the former Linda Tobias of Garden City, New York. They have one son, Stephen Kenneth Reeves. Presently, they live at R.D. 3, Quakertown, Pennsylvania.