Time, intersubjectivity, and musical relationship in Alfred Schutz

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In this work I tackle certain aspects of the relationship between time and intersubjectivity in Alfred Schutz. I present a summary of the methodological architecture of the Austrian sociologist, outlining the specificity of the relationship between time and consciousness. I discuss the treatment of the musical experience as an example of the peculiar declination of a series of temporal dynamics connected to the intersubjective creation of meanings. Finally, I set out some thoughts related to the debate on the relationship between time, intersubjectivity and music in Schutz.

The musical relationship is a context endowed with meaning, not the object of conceptualization, that allows us to identify in a paradigmatic way the relationship between the subjective sense and experience of the other. The theory of appresentation of Schutz is the center of the process of constitution of meaning of the understanding of the other. The emergence of meaning is related to the dynamics of the passive and active poles of the consciousness and the constitution, in the we-relation, of a radically intersubjective dimension that exceeds the Cartesian distinction between inside and outside.

1. Time, consciousness and action

Time is one of the central categories of the noetic analysis of Schutz. It’s well known that one of the criticisms of the Austrian sociologist of the comprehensive sociology of Weber is that of not having given sufficient attention to time in the examination of meaning, subjectively understood. Schutz reworks the theses on time of Bergson and Husserl in a synthesis that helps us to understand a number of processes related to the constitution of subjectivity and the intersubjectivity in the world of everyday life.

According to Schutz, «the problem of meaning is a time problem», it pertains to «internal time consciousness» (Schutz 1967: 12). Time is not a matter of conscience: it is consciousness that constitutes time.

1 I’ll take for granted the theory of finite provinces of meaning, which constitutes the scope from which emerges the problem of time in the eyes of Schutz and the fundamental theme of the typicality of experience, which Natanson explains, is perhaps one of the main terms of the vocabulary of Schutz (Natanson 1973: 111).
The first aspect of the link between temporality and experience implies the distinction between sense of action and sense of the action accomplished. According to Schutz, we must clearly distinguish between the current action (actio) and the act made (actum) (Schutz 1967: 39). The act performed refers to the past, while the action is related to the future, the present course with its pretentions and anticipations. Since the action of the actor is future-oriented this anticipatory nature leads to the engagement of a project that precedes it in the timeline (ibid.: 82-83). The project is the temporal expression of intentionality, it has the form of the future perfect (modo futuri exacti) and has as its object the action accomplished in fantasy. Only the completed actions are accessible to the reflective glance, they are acts conceived in the form of time past (modo praeterito), while in planning future action the subject refers to its hypothetical conclusion.

As in Weber, the sense of action is linked to the motives; between project and motives for action there is a fundamental temporal connection. The author distinguishes between “final” motives (in-order-to) and “causal” motives (because):

From the actor’s point of view, ‘in-order-to motives’ concern the future [...]. In short, the aim motivates the project. “Because motives” instead refer to the past and represent the motivation of the aim itself of the action. [...] The nature of this type of motive is complex: it is rooted in the actor’s personality, in his unconscious. It is sufficient here to recall that Schütz affirms the quasi-causal nature of such motives, given that they operate behind the actor’s back, so to speak. Furthermore, while I am living the course of the action, I am also turned towards the future. I am therefore driven by in-order-to motives. To grasp the “because motives” the actor must turn to his past (Muzzetto 2006b: 15).

According to Schutz, there are two distinct attitudes towards experience: the direct and the reflective attitude. The direct attitude is the direct experience over the course of events of that which is experienced in the “here and now.” In this “to live in their own actions” the actors have a very low level of awareness of the acts they commit. In the reflective attitude, however, the ac-

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2 Moreover, says Schutz, the knowledge now available «at the time of projecting [...] must necessarily be different from that which I shall have when the now merely projected act will have been materialized. Until then I shall have grown older and if nothing else has changed, at least the experiences I shall have had while carrying out my project will have enlarged my knowledge. In other words, projecting like any other anticipation carries along its empty horizons which will be filled in merely by the materialization of the anticipated event. This constitutes the intrinsic uncertainty of all forms of projecting» (Schutz 1962: 69).
tor turns his attention to his own experience by engaging in an act to reverse the flow of consciousness, figuratively “stops to think.” With reflection they delineate clearly those experiences that flow indiscriminately in durée (Schutz 1967: 102). The change of attitude leads to a change of the temporal structure. With reflection you stop to think, time is metaphorically stopped by awareness, even if the reflection does not stop the flow of internal time and the changing of knowledge underlying this change. Thus emerges the problem of the time lag between the flow of experience and the acquisition of knowledge, that according to some is a paradox. The paradox of meaning that would imply the contradiction between lived experience and present experience: if only the first is delineable reflexively, then the second would seem excluded from the attribution of meaning. The solution to this paradox is present in the same theory of action of Schutz, that is the frame in which the study of the structure of consciousness occurs. In the predicative moment of reflection there is also active a set of experienced imagined futures. If in Weber only the action is meaningful, and not the behavior, for Schutz the meaning of the action is in the act. We have seen that the project is taking a position on the future. The meaning is the result of the intentionality of the reflective act. As Muzzetto explains, this

3 Muzzetto notes that the relationship between sense and temporality is further complicated by the character of the intentional units. The structure of these units of meaning emerges in the predicative sphere of transversal intentionality, but has its roots in the pre-predicative sphere of longitudinal intentionality. The latter is connected to a context, which assumes the temporal relationship between current, future and past experiences. The context consists of quanta, by indivisible elements in the flow of internal time that depend on the passive syntheses (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 56). Put another way, the intentional units are relational units that consist of idealizations of the and-so-on (e-cosi-via) and the you-can-always-renew (si-può-sempre-di nuovo) idealizations connected to internal time. «The structure of quanta is consistent with the notion of flux. Thus, the now of the stream of consciousness, the present of human experience, is not an instant experienced as separate from the preceding and the following instants: it is a “vivid present” which, like James’s “specious present”, 17 is tied to the past and to the future» (Muzzetto 2006b: 11).

4 According to Cox, this paradox is the result of a misinterpretation of the theses on inner consciousness of time by Husserl. Schutz would read through the pattern of Bergson and would face an insurmountable predicament. As Muzzetto explains, «Cox fails to discern the originality of Schütz’s position (Although it is certainly true that in his use of Husserl and Bergson, Schütz is not greatly concerned with proving the compatibility of their theoretical approaches, nor with providing an analytical demonstration of his own stance)» (Muzzetto 2006b: 13).

5 Giolo Fele speaks of “Weber’s paradox”: if behavior endowed with meaning is only that which is conscious, that in which one has a «reciprocal intentional orientation [...] in which the meaning is given by sharing a repertoire of meanings, a common set of symbols that draw on» sender and receiver, then most of the daily actions, such as those of routine, are foolish (Fele 2001: 204).
represents the central point of the solution of the problematic node related to
the relationship between time and meaning: the project makes significant both
the act and the action. Only the possibility of imagining an action completed
allows me to design and then to genuinely bring into being the individual phas-
es of the action: these depend on the final outcome to be achieved. The action
can be understood as consisting of partial actions each of which represents
a step towards the final result. The what resolves the problem of the unitary
character of the action and its articulation. The view that the meaning does
not belong to the immediacy of the experience in the stream of consciousness
thus does not mean that the sense operates as a sort of Paretian “derivation”
or in any case a rationalization. The what would be inevitable if it were at-
tributable only to a reflection ex post on the experience. But we can anticipate
our steps reflexively. The possibility of the meaning of the present is thus in
the capacity to anticipate, to think in advance about the results (imagined) of
our steps. Even the action, not only the experience is therefore endowed with
meaning. And so the present also acquires sense from the anticipation of the
future (Muzzetto 2006b: 14).

To argue that the meaning is in the project, doesn’t mean to establish an
exact match of the future results of the action, nor does it mean to put in
place an ontological separation between spheres. The project is not realized,
for example, because the reality is in itself risky or because the actor is un-
able to discover a “right combination” able to put him/her in the condition
to discover a state of future things connected to a presumed actual uniform-
ity. This view leads to naive realism, because it would mean bringing to the
world of science aspects of the world of common sense, in which uncertainty
is suspended “for practical purposes”. The central point is that the future
will always be configured differently from what has been sketched previ-
ously because the knowledge available and the system of relevances of the
subject will necessarily be different. The meaning given to a point in time
“A” will always be different from the meaning given to point in time “B”. In
a certain sense the changing of knowledge is an important imposition. The
relationship between project and reality is a relationship of construction in
which the time elements of the project shape what is called “reality”.

6 Schutz writes: “Until then I shall have grown older and if nothing else has changed, at least
the experiences I shall have had while carrying out my project will have enlarged my knowl-
dge” (Schutz 1962: 69).

7 One must always bear in mind that “reality” in Schutz is a deliberately controversial concept
that expresses a tension between the idea of common sense, of something that exists “out there”,
and the phenomenological conception that what exists “out there” is always something
applies not only for the future but also for the attribution of meaning to past events.  

I think the central aspect of the paradox of time is not its solution, impossible as in all paradoxes, but its neutralization. This recalls the comprehensive methodological system of Schutz, who translates the principle of “return of things to themselves” of Husserl into a radically empirical analysis. With this in mind, the meaning that can be established from the “specious present” of the social relationship is central, a time that cannot be absolutely defined.

It seems that the reason for this is the following: We have no power to define the limits of our specious present, to draw its border lines over against the past or the future. Our stream of consciousness is itself articulated. Impulses and resting places, periods of tension and relaxation alternate. Wave follows wave, each wave having its crest and valley. Each of these impulses is experienced as a unit, a movement in inner time which tends to fulfil its final phase as soon as meaningful that becomes such only after being experienced. The author says: «I am afraid I do not exactly know what reality is, and my only comfort in this unpleasant situation is that I share my ignorance with the greatest philosophers of all time» (Schutz 1964: 88).

8 The vision of Schutz can be considered a special variant of the hermeneutical circle. It has a reciprocal relationship between the constitution of experience, sedimentation in the depths of knowledge available, activation facing a new experience.

9 One of the sources from which Schutz draws is Augustine of Hippo, according to which time is made of more moments that follow one another without ever being present, of past moments that are collected when they no longer exist, of future moments that never exist. According to Augustine, time exists in the consciousness and not outside of this, consciousness is the only way to measure it. Time does not have a factual consistency, that is to say it does not have a measurable extension outside of consciousness. The past is no longer because when it is collected by the consciousness it is no longer present, the present is elusive because we grasp it when it has already passed, the future is never present because it is anticipated by the conscience. Augustine writes: «What then is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I want to explain it to someone who asks, I no longer know. And yet I calmly affirm to know that if nothing passed there would be no past, and if nothing happens, there would be no future, and if nothing existed there would be no present. So in that sense there exists two of these times, the past and the future, if the past is no more and the future is not yet? With regard to the present, if it were always present and were not to lapse into the past, there would not be time, but eternity. So if the present, to be a part of time, exists inasmuch as it elapses into the past, in what sense can we say that it also exists? If indeed its only reason for being is that it will not exist: in reality it’s true, as we say, that time exists only as much as it tends not to be» (Augustine 1989: Book XI, 14:17). The size of conscience recalls the reflexive centrality of the present. Humans measure time through the soul, understood as a reflection on the past, the present and the future. Augustine speaks of “trinity of the present.” The past, present and future, Augustine substitutes, respectively, the present of the past, recalling the memory, the present of the present, linked to perception-attention, the present of the future, related to anticipation (ibid.: Book XI, 20:26).
it starts. If we interrupt this development before the impulse comes to an end, if we make this impulse abortive, we cannot grasp our specious present and the relevant sector of our past adherent to it (Schutz 1996: 274).

2. Time, intersubjectivity and music

2.1 Time and intersubjectivity

The time difference between direct attitude and reflection is essential to understanding the difference between comprehension of experiences, of one’s self, and that of the experiences of others, of the Alter. Schutz says:

We cannot approach the realm of our Self without an act of reflective turning. But what we grasp by the reflective act is never the present of our stream of thought and also not its specious present; it is always its past. Just now the grasped experience pertained to my present, but in grasping it I know it is not present any more. And, even if it continues, I am aware only by an afterthought that my reflective turning towards its starting phases has been simultaneous with its continuation. The whole present, therefore, and also the vivid present of our Self, is inaccessible for the reflective attitude. We can only turn to the stream of our thought as if it had stopped with the last grasped experience. In other words, self-consciousness can only be experienced modo praeterito, in the past tense (Schutz 1962: 172-173).

In this step, Schutz further specifies a crucial moment in time: to live in our acts, the “vivid present”, as opposed to the indirect reflexive grasping of the ego or self, in time past. The vivid present, or “specious present”, is the civic time or common time, is the result of the union between the internal time of the flow of consciousness, quality, and external time, cosmic, quantified. The vivid present is the matrix of all social relations, it is the dimension that regulates the various levels of actors’ lives, making possible the intersubjective coordination among human beings (Schutz, 1962: 222)\(^\text{10}\).

The vivid present is particularly important because it is linked to that idea of “being in the world” as pre-predicative evidence of human experiences.

\(^{10}\) Berger and Luckmann emphasize the “constriction” of the present vividly: “The temporal structure of everyday life confronts me as a facticity with which I must reckon, that is, with which I must try to synchronize my own projects. I encounter time in everyday reality as continuous time and finite. The same temporal structure [...] is coercive. I cannot reverse at will the sequences imposed by it” (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 41).
Schutz takes some concepts present in the thought of Merleau-Ponty to explain how this temporal mode, full of intersubjectivity from the start, is fundamental for the categories of thought:

According to Merleau-Ponty, the thinking of the normal mind does not consist in subsuming experiences under categories. The category imposes upon the terms which it unites a significance which is exterior to them. This synthesis originates in the vivid present, that is, in the pre-predicative evidence of the unique world to which all our experiences refer. This primordial world is structurized by a system of significations, that is, of correspondences, relations, participations, which the concrete subject spreads around himself, living in them and through them and using them not by an explicit conceptual procedure but merely by his being within the world. From there the higher structurizations of our conscious life are built up by reactivating our sedimented experiences and amalgamating them with the actual vivid thought (ibid.: 274).

According to the Austrian sociologist, intersubjectivity is a given in the world of everyday life. The author believes that the vision of Husserl’s transcendental intersubjectivity leads to a series of insurmountable aporia. In the world of everyday life, the other is cultured appresentatively by the size of the we-relation, which is the social relationship in which you live a kind of fusion with the other. In this relationship the other body is the pre-eminent vehicle of understanding the other. This understanding does not imply an act of inference, there is no perception of a body and then the attribution of meaning through a reflexive act. The understanding of the other comes directly. I gather the other in the pre-predicative sphere because the signs of his/her body (facial expressions, proxemics) immediately recall “our” experi-

11 Schutz reworks the theory of appresentation of Husserl adapting it to his analysis on intersubjectivity in the world of everyday life. «It seems to us that Husserl’s theory of appresentation covers all cases of significative and symbolic references dealt with by the various authors discussed before. In all these cases an object, fact, or event is not experienced as a “self,” but as standing for another object which is not given in immediacy to the experiencing subject. The appresenting member “wakens” or “calls forth” or “evokes” the appresented one. [...] These appresentational relations may occur on various levels: appresented an object may in turn appresent another one, there are signs of signs, and symbols of symbols, etc. Moreover, the appresenting immediate experience need by no means consist in the perception of the physical object: it may be a recollection, a fantasm, a dream, etc» (ibid.: 297).

12 In the natural attitude, the body functions as an index of the experience of others, «the mere existence of a frame of reference referring to the Other, of a system of interpretable signs or symbols, for instance, is sufficient for the belief in the existence of other persons» (ibid.: 177).
ence. The size of us is constitutive of social reality; as Natanson explains, it is the systemic root of society\textsuperscript{13}.

The fact that I can grasp the Other’s stream of thought, and this means the subjectivity of the alter ego in its vivid present, whereas I can grasp my own self only by way of reflection on its past, leads us to a definition of the alter ego: the alter ego is that subjective stream of thought which can be experienced in its vivid present. [...] The alter ego, therefore, is that stream of consciousness whose activities I can seize in their present by my own simultaneous activities. This experience of the Other’s stream of consciousness in vivid simultaneity I propose to call the \textit{general thesis of the alter ego’s existence}. It implies that this stream of thought which is not mine shows the same fundamental structure as my own consciousness (Schutz 1962: 173-74).

The union of the streams of experience is the main theme of the reflections of Schutz on intersubjectivity. It is a theme that recalls the size of the preconceptuality of the sense of social relations, the human universe of pure sociability emerging in the temporal sphere of the vivid present.

\textbf{2.2 The musical relationship and its characters}

The analysis of the constitutive dimension of time is configured in a particular way in the analyzes on the musical relationship. Schutz was interested in music as a social phenomenon to be understood as an act of co-construction and conveyance of meanings. The intent of the Austrian sociologist was to provide a rigorous theoretical basis for the “scandalous” problem of intersubjectivity, a theme taken for granted in the social sciences (as was the problem of language). The correctness of following a melody, whether its a piece of music or a symphony, is the nucleus of the analysis on the intersubjective character of music. According to the author,

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music is a meaningful context which is not bound to a conceptual scheme. Yet this meaningful context can be communicated: The process of communication between composer and listener normally requires an intermediary: an individual performer or a group of coperformers. Among all these participants there prevail social relations of a highly complicated structure (Schutz 1964: 159).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{13} Natanson asserts that, with the theory of \textit{we-relation} as «systemic root of a shared world» (Natanson 1977: 110), Schutz passes from an ego-centered approach to one centered on society and intersubjectivity.
When Schutz speaks of a meaningful context he wants to underline that there are social rules followed by the actor to establish the correct meaning: the interpreter’s task is to understand the correct meaning (Schutz 1996: 243). In addition, the standards of correctness are not connected to the conceptual aspect. Schutz contrasted language with music. Language has a function of mainly semantic representation, it is formed by a series of terms (nouns, verbs, adjectives) which refer to a conceptual scheme. This allows interpretation of the world and presents an syntactic apparatus applicable to propositions that can be correct or not on the basis of operational rules. To the contrary, music does not have a representative function, does not follow operational rules (ibid.: 244). Nevertheless, the experience of music has its own syntax, which is connected to the relationship between time and intersubjectivity: it is therefore always possible to determine whether the execution of a piece of music is correct or not.

The musical experience has a meaning that can be grasped only polythetically14, because it is connected to the flow of internal time. The music is an entity made of time that is apperceived “step-after-step” independently of the spatial perception15, it can not be grasped monothetically, which is equivalent to saying that it is experienced without a conceptual scheme connected to objects defined spatially. Schutz writes, when we hear a piece of music we participate in the flow of the music, «the flux of music and the flux of the stream of our consciousness are interrelated, are simultaneous; there is a unity between them; we swim, so to speak, in this stream. And music goes on as a unit which is indivisible» (ibid.: 250).

The focal point of the musical experience, then, is the presence of a nucleus of meanings unable to be conceptualized. The significance of this nucleus is similar to that of the social relationship of us16 because in the here and now of

14 The attribution of meaning can happen in two ways: polythetically or monothetically. Polythetic understanding involves reconstitution of the steps through which the sense of an experience is formed. With a polythetic act those courses of events that have made the experience are retraced by searching for the explanatory connections. The monothetic understanding, however, is the synthetic grasp, in a single act, the polythetic sense of the experiences (Schutz 1970b: 80-81). One essential point must be stressed: the ability to monothetically grasp experience polythetically constituted indicates the presence of connections of meaning between the experiences themselves.

15 «Music does not require any kinaesthesia on the part of the listener» (Schutz 1996: 253), because it is an ideal object independent of the vehicle that transmits it (ibid.: 247). Music is an event of internal time, «the time within which we grow old, the inner time of our stream of consciousness, is entirely free from elements of space» (ibid.: 254).

16 Kersten believes that this is a paradox. Being the ideal-typical sociology of Schutz, it is centered on reflection and presents some methodological tools, such as the postulate of adequacy, which permits work on this theme. Like all paradoxes, however, the non-conceptual aspect of music and social relationship is always the starting point and not the final stage of analysis (Kersten 1976: 64).
the specious present, this nucleus is a kind of Arianne’s thread that allows the orientation towards meaning.

Schutz summarizes some invariant elements of the musical experience. First, the experience of music is «in the flux of inner time, in the stream of consciousness. It does not necessarily refer to objects of the outer world» (Schutz 1996: 260). The external dimension may be required to coordinate the events of internal time with spatial events. Schutz writes of appresentative references, which are vehicles of meaning, that is to say media that «originated in the suggestions of movements and, first of all, in the movements of the human body, which occur simultaneously in both dimensions – the inner durée as well as the spatialized time» (ibid.).

Secondly, the music experience is a temporal synthesis that «takes place in a specious present which, by means of recollection and expectation, includes elements of the past and the future» (ibid.).

Furthermore the music is experienced as a whole, it is a theme that is configured with gestalt. «The basic element of all music is a unique configuration called the theme. It is itself extended in inner time. It is apperceived as a unit (Gestalt), or as a combination of those units» (ibid.). The theme may be used, repeated, replaced and recur again; it can be combined with other issues or with parts or modifications, successive and simultaneous, of the theme itself. Despite these modifications, the theme is always experienced as “the same” theme (ibid.: 261).

Finally, the author addresses the problem of rhythm which, is not part of the musical experience. Rhythm is an ambiguous concept, it refers to physiological events like the heartbeat or breathing, to events in the outside world like marching, walking, dancing and «to specific structurizations of our modern musical ideas (rhythm as a function of harmony)» (ibid.).

Schutz examines a number of basic categories of the musical relationship: continuity and repetition, identity, movement.

The first category is the binomial of continuity and repetition. «By way of retention the intermittent repetitions of the same tone are brought to coincidence and apperceived as a specious continuance, although actually repetition of the same occurs» (ibid.: 263). The apperceptive mode is the intuitive reference to something different with respect to the present experience (Schutz 1962: 296), it is the reference to a meaningful relationship. The virtual unity is then a sort of “coherence” of sense of the continuous elements in the musical flow, which are retentively mediated in the apperceptive process. Schutz speaks of “virtual coherence”. The repetition, however, «is merely a special case of the intermittence of a continuance. It is intermittence of a sameness» (Schutz 1996: 263). He notes that when the continuity and repetition refer to a functional unity, to themes or «to independent parts of the musical forms.
Then they do not originate in pure retention. They are based upon the other forms of memory; the repetition originates in a synthesis of recognition between the reproduced past experience of the theme with its actually experienced recurrence, and the continuance originates in a fulfillment of the previously anticipated development by the actual experience» (Schutz 1996: 263). With this affirmation Schutz means that retention alone is not sufficient for the determination of meaning, reproduction is also necessary through a synthesis of recognition which recalls the category of identity.

The second category addressed by Schutz is identity or uniformity, «the question of ‘sameness’ is one of the most difficult problems of phenomenology» (ibid.). It is necessary to distinguish identity from sameness. It has identity when you are in front of an object that during the moment of attribution of meaning it is changed, because it has been identified as the same object at a different point in time than the first. It has sameness, however, when we are faced with two different objects that can be distinguished because they are not the same object. Schutz gives the example of the repetition of two re notes: they are the same note, but interspersed with a break. The second re is different from the first re because it is a repeated note that begins after the first is finished. First, then, there is a temporal differentiation, «the retention of the actual experience of the first tone in its complete development - initial phase, enduring phases, end-phase – has been retained when the second tone was actually experienced» (ibid.: 264). In the second place, the repetition of the note changes our fund of knowledge, albeit imperceptibly; the second re has a different meaning because it is placed later in time and thus is no longer the re of before because, again imperceptibly, it has also changed the system of relevances of the subject who listens. In this sense, «the entry of the second tone certainly adds something new to our previous experience. But it is not entirely new, there is no contrast between this experience and the previous one, as it was the case when the first» re followed a do (ibid.). The interaction of retentions attributed to a re that follows a re has a different character from that of a re that follows a do. Identity is therefore characterized by a change of the internal time of consciousness. «The same occurrence, if repeated, is not experienced as strictly the same, it is not even experienced as being a like experience. Our mind has changed, infinitesimally, but, nevertheless, changed by already having once pre-experienced» the re note «in the same context» (ibid.).

The third category is that of movement17. Schutz explains that the identification of the experiences of objects of the external world, in the manipulative

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17 Skarda says Schutz is not very clear in defining this category. The analysis of the movement seems a continuation of the analysis of identity. Previously, Schutz had written that the spatial
sphere, can take place by means of kinesthetic acts. For example, it is possible to see and touch an object, stop the perception, return to seeing and touching the object, check and see if it is the same or not. Schutz says he has an intermittence in the understanding of the object, which implies the abandonment and restoration of the field of experience, and the identification of the object as the same object as before. «In the case of visible or tangible objects, the synthesis of identification can be verified by releasing it from my field of experiencing through the performance of an appropriate kinaesthesia and by re-establishing the previous field through the performance of an opposite kinaesthesia which undoes the first one. These kinaesthesias interrupted my experience of the enduring sameness of the object» (Schutz 1996: 265). It is possible to perform the same operation in order to compare the uniformity of two objects. For example, to control the length of two objects I can move them together and compare them in order to see or touch and determine whether they are uniform or not. The same thing does not apply to objects acquired in the purely auditory field, like musical objects. Schutz gives the example of the sound of a waterfall: if you approach it is possible to hear it, if you move away it is no longer possible to hear it. The auditory object, therefore, remains in the stream of consciousness even if it is no longer perceived. Schutz writes that the knowledge of sound «is based on my knowledge that the object, “cascade”, exists and that it has lasted while my experiencing of it was interrupted. It is the knowledge of a lasting quality of an external object which is in question» (ibid.). In the auditory field, the intermittency of a continuity cannot be attributed to a kinesthetic change that «re-establishes or even verifies sameness. Intermittence has not a subjective, but an objective character. The sound, the tone itself, has ceased to exist, and another one has started to appear. This other one may be like the first but it is, strictly speaking, never the same one» (ibid.). In internal time the synthesis of the identification does not presuppose, as in external spatialized time, the possibility of comparing, to superimpose an object and another. If in space the coexistence of two objects as different and separate units is possible, namely sameness is possible, «in the sphere of inner time, in the sphere of purely auditory experiences, there is no coexistence. Likeness or sameness refers to succeeding objects; there is not the possibility of looking from one object to the other in order to perform the synthesis of identification or of recognition. And, nevertheless, we identify the recurrent tone as a tone like the first, or we even say that the same tone has been repeated» (ibid.: 266). The author’s conclusion is that in the flow of internal time category of movement, of kinesthesia, is stranger than internal time, the auditory sphere in which the musical experience has a place (Skarda 1979: 73).
and in the auditory musical sphere, «in the dimension of inner time, or in the purely auditory sphere of music, the form of sameness is not that of a numerical unity but of recurrent likeness; and after this explanation we will use the term, “sameness”, exclusively for conveying recurrent likeness [...]» (ibid.).

2.3 Passive synthesis in the experience of music

The recognition of an object of experience, «the synthesis of recognition or of identification…is a passive synthesis which does not require any activity of our mind» (ibid.), that is to say it does not require a reflective effort. Schutz addresses three aspects of the problem of passive synthesis in musical experience: «a) Sameness and likeness having meanings in the spatial world of visible and touchable objects different from those in the world of pure music which has its existence merely in the dimension of inner time. b) Within the experience of pure music the synthesis of recognition is another one if referred merely to recurrent times or to recurrent thematical units. c) It is quite another kind of synthesis at work if I recognize musical recurrences when listening to a work of music for the first time living within the ongoing flux (or if I re-establish such a situation), or if I recognize a piece of music or its thematical elements, not being immersed in the ongoing flux but reproducing in my mind music with which I am familiar» (ibid.: 268).

The first aspect is related to the irreversibility of internal time, that is the basis for describing the difference in meaning between the objects perceived in the spatial sphere and those perceived in the sphere of internal time. If the objects of the spatial sphere can be caught both monothetically and polythetically, the objects of internal time can be caught only polythetically. Visual and tactile understanding of objects in space can be modified in order to see that previously we have had experience of the same object that now has changed (Schutz 1996: 266, trans. com. 1996: 72). For example, I can turn back when I go the wrong way, I can return to a base point, I can go back to the position of familiarity and security that allows me to understand the mistake and maybe take the right path. Going back where I was before, I have not encountered any spatial obstacle. Consequently, through an monothetic understanding I made a comparison between the memory of what happened and what is now. This example is a case of what Schutz defines as illusion of passive synthesis of overlap. The illusion is in the fact that, from the point of view of the meaning, you can never return to the same point in space time where we were, you cannot ever tap into the same flow. The comparison, therefore, can only take place after the event and what I’m actually doing is a comparison between the memory of the total picture of the experience I had in mind at point in time A and the memory of the overall picture of the experience I had at point in time
B. These two points, from a spatial perspective, are the same; but from the point of view of meaning are the same only after they have been understood, which is to say a monothetic understanding through which, with a single glance, I canceled the infinite number of changes that have occurred in the course of my absence from “home base.” Schutz says: «I grasp the field monothetically by one single ray, and I find that there is a coincidence between the actual monothetic experience and the recollection – and the monothetically recollected, previous one. What gives the illusion of a ‘passive’ synthesis is merely the superfluousness of starting over again the polythetic activities of our mind in which the monothetic experience of the field has been built up» (ibid.: 267). The illusion of passive synthesis disappears when I consider my experience in a polythetic manner. Retracing step-by-step the way that I traveled from A to B, «if any step actually performed corresponds to like steps previously performed and not recollected, and if the actually performed step had a sedimentation like the ones recollected, I say that the field re-perceived, or the objects re-experienced, are the same or the same, although modified» (ibid.). Returning to our example, I can spatially retrace the way I have already come and ascertain if it is the same way or another. In the spatial sphere monothetic recognition is possible because in this sphere one has the freedom to return to the basic position and undo the changes that have inevitably occurred in the meantime. Also in the spatial sphere I can achieve polythetic recognition, which will be apparent if that what is expected as familiar will in fact be different. This double possibility does not apply to objects in the temporal sphere, which can only be grasped polythetically. «Objects existing merely within the dimension of inner time, merely audible objects and, especially, musical objects, can only be recognized polythetically» (ibid.).

The second point involves how you have different identification depending on the reference to the succession of time or on the occurrence of thematic unity. In the first case we are completely immersed in the flow of internal time, we do not have any attitude towards temporal objects. Ours is a polythetic experience in the indistinct flow of inner consciousness of time. In the second case the identification refers to recurring thematic units. These gestalt units are in the basic position that alternates with indistinct flow. Schutz refers to the points of flight and rest of William James to explain the exit and entry from the flow of internal time. The theme is a sort of key to understanding, anchored to the Self, of what is happening. This theme may be taken up «any time if I am listening to this symphony or reproducing it before my inner ear» (ibid: 268).

The last point is closely related to the previous one. There are two types of synthesis, according to which an actor listens to a piece of music for the first time or recognizes it then as familiar. When I listen to a musical piece
that involves me for the first time, I live in the inner flow of time, I surrender to the flow; with the retention and reproduction I can bring out uncontrollably reflexive thoughts and memories. We are in polythetic indistinct step-by-step experience, but we are out of the passive synthesis of identification. The second type of synthesis is exactly that passive identification. We are in the environment of thematic reflection, I can attribute the piece I listen to past experiences of functional thematic aspects of the music that is flowing or not.

3 Significant aspects of the relationship between time, music and intersubjectivity

The investigations of Schutz on musical relationship are of great value to the social sciences. They allow you to identify a number of problems that are related to the intersubjective establishment of meaning. I will isolate a number of points that should be understood in an ideal-typical way: the synchronization of time of the actors, the problem of transition from the polythetic to the monothetic, the link between intersubjectivity and immediacy of experience, music as a finite province of meaning.

3.1 Synchronization of time of the actors

The first point is related to different modes of synchronization between different streams of consciousness of the actors involved in the musical relationship.

The constitution of meaning of the musical experience takes place in the internal time of consciousness, it is mediated by appresentative references that in the world of everyday life take the form of objects made by sounds and perceptions of movements. Schutz identifies three ideal-typical subjects in reciprocal interrelations in musical relationship: the listener, the composer and the performers.18

The listener is one who grabs a piece of music created by another. He is therefore not involved in the construction of the meaning of the same song, but is interested in rebuilding the meaning. Goettlich holds in Fragments of phenomenology of music that Schutz describes the ways in which the listener becomes aware of the “right” meaning of a piece of music (Goettlich 2014: 247).

18 The analysis of Schutz concerns opera, but it can also be extended to other types of musical genres. As Goettlich explained, through three ideal-types, the Austrian sociologist showed the ways in which, in individual experience, a musical meaning is experienced: «(1) as a listener, e.g., sitting in a concert hall or listening to his iPod; (2) as a musician, that is, as member of an ensemble or as a soloist; (3) as a composer» (Goettlich 2014: 246).
Music is an ideal object that exists independently of physical conditions on which it bases its communication, conditions that relate to external time\textsuperscript{19}. The listener or beholder\textsuperscript{20} is linked through the music to a number of meaningful aspects connected to the depth of internal time. These meaningful aspects involve the synchronization of internal times both with performers of the musical text that interpret the text and with the composer and with the other actors who listen to the musical means. The music blends the inner experience of the listener with that of other actors in the here and now of we-relations listen to a piece of music. In this sense, Mori speaks of music as a means of expression of the spontaneity of the human being. Music is a vehicle that allows the reciprocal tuning of the actions of the actors. The meaning of words is secondary to the musical atmosphere created by the apperception of sound and rhythm. The musical atmosphere is «intrinsically related to the inner life of the public» (Mori 2014: 270). The atmosphere is therefore a meaningful intersubjective structure that is conveyed by the music, recalling the primordial world of inner experience of the other. The musical atmosphere allows the sharing of meanings between performer and audience, although in “quasi-simultaneity”\textsuperscript{21}. Fele observes how a musical composition is brought to life, “is embodied” in the relationship between composer and beholder, through the exclusive moment «of the use (of the reading, listening, execution) through concrete reflective practices during the musical flow» (Fele 2001: 209). The temporal process of listening to a piece of music brings out the role of knowledge as intersubjective communicative skill. These reflective skills\textsuperscript{22} and indexicals give effect to the meaning of the song, actualizing in a continuous way and «existing while the sound flow develops» (ibid.: 210). Fele emphasizes that the analysis of “endogenous” time of Schutz recalls the

\textsuperscript{19} Goettlich highlights how Schutz was interested in the social aspects of music, how his scientific aim was to analyze the act of intersubjective understanding mediated by music. For this reason, the work of the Austrian sociologist is an example of fruitful connections between phenomenology and sociology. The author observes that the concept of music as a backdrop given meaning with no conceptual framework is unclear. “Context” is too general a category, the term “sound” seems to be more appropriate: «Music is a sound, or a sequence of sounds, provided with meaning. Since the same can be said of spoken language, one has to further clarify: Music is a meaningful sound, but the meaning is not expressed in words» (ibid.: 244).

\textsuperscript{20} Schutz states that «the term “beholder” will include the executor, the listener, the reader of music» (Schutz 1964: 169, trans. com. 1996: 103).

\textsuperscript{21} The experience of the “quasi simultaneous” stream of consciousness of the mediator and the listener is also present when listening via other media such as CDs and videos.

\textsuperscript{22} It should be noted that the reflexivity mentioned by Fele refers «to the embodied practices through which social members produce prospectively and retrospectively courses of action recognizably ordered, explainable, normal, natural» (ibid.).
“light” moment of ordinary interaction, a moment located inside the context from which emerge the experienced meanings. The internal time connects the composer, who is spatio-temporally in a past epoch, to the audience, who listen to the music in a “here and now” in a “quasi-simultaneous” way. The author observes that the analyses of Schutz are important because they highlight how the interaction between composer and performer is a temporal process in which the notion of meaning emerges as a procedural constitution to investigate step by step. In other words, Schutz demonstrates how meaning is radically contextual, «where the context is not a false attribute that “adds” or that qualifies a meaning predetermined, autonomous in its definition».

It seems that Schutz, in examining how the viewer is bound to the composer through internal time, «wants to recover the historical dimension (in a macro-sociological and structural sense: the size of the tradition, that had been raised by Halbwachs), under the form of a personal interview, continually present in the music, between the living and the dead».

The ideal type of the composer represents the dimension of the tradition, that in Schutz takes the form of a cultural pattern transmitted by the predecessors and acquired by members of a social group. According to Goettlich, the typification of Schutz aims to investigate «the constitution of subjective meaning (Sinn) without the construction of objective meaning (Bedeutung) [...]».

Fele explains how Schutz refutes the idea of a pre-existing meaning to guarantee mutual understanding, and does not agree with the assumption, found in George Herbert Mead, that language is the foundation of social relations. This way of approaching the problem of meaning, according to Fele, is exemplary of Schutz’s refusal to treat the social and musical relationship with a mentalist model; on the contrary, these relationships are non-conceptual forms of interaction. Music is based on a precommunicative relationship in which you can live simultaneously with each other in specific time dimensions. In other words, like other non-conceptual social relations (for example walking together, dancing, making love, playing tennis, etc.), the musical relationship is based on the we-relation. Fele observes how «Schutz [...] is not interested in analyzing music in itself, the musical experience or the structure of sounds, but rather to examine the problems that arise» during the realization of a piece of music.

Fele cites Garfinkel, who says that the mutual orientation of two subjects always involves a “minimum consensus” of normative order to follow in the course of interaction, implies a minimum common denominator. Garfinkel speaks of this moment as a “full-moment” «that is to say an interval to be treated as a point. A succession of such dense moments produces the notion of temporal sequence».

Garfinkel also writes that the analysis of this point in time involves leaving the same time stream, and thus the loss of those time relevancies that define the peculiar sense of inner time, relevancies that are the basis of the definition of action. Consequently, «we must look elsewhere, and not in the analysis of the time, the answer to the question arises: where to look for the factors that determine the conditions of regularity of temporal succession?».

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The meaning of the music refers to previous experiences and reproduction processes, that is to say to a scope of reconstruction of meanings already established. The question that is raised here is whether the way of establishment of meaning of music is the same for both composer and listener. Goettlich says the difference between the mode of use of the meaning experienced of the music of the composer and the listener is bound to a boundary between phenomenology and sociology whose analysis implies an assumption of the practice of a composer who is neither empirical nor psychological. To specify this peculiarity, Goettlich reflects on the modality of understanding of a melody. As we have seen, Schutz says that understanding a melody involves the creation of a thematic unit, a “place of rest” in the sense of William James. This “place of rest” is a reflexive aspect that is alternated with a “place of flight”, which is connected to the indistinct flow of internal time (ibid.: 252). The relationship between composer and listener is characterized by the reflexive production of a theme, that is to say a gestalt configuration by which the music sequence can be apperceived as the “correct” one. It is a process of construction and reconstruction which, to an extent and in accordance with different modes, also affects the ideal-typical figure of the musician. As for the composer, his/her task is not to create a melody out of nothing, because if it were so he/she could proceed arbitrarily and compose musical sequences that would always be correct. On the contrary his/her task is to give life to musical meanings different from those that came before, but linked to the latter on the basis of a relationship that “inexplicably” is already present in the internal flow and must reflexively be brought to light. Goettlich says there are two ways to understand the act of composing a musical sequence: the creation and the discovery:

On the one hand, it is clear that the composer is creating something new: a sequence of tones played in a specific tempo and with specific phrasing; that is, a musical theme which comes into existence in the very moment the composer plays it for the first time; it is not there before. On the other hand, in a certain sense, the meaningful melody is already there before the composer managed to arrange the precise tones in the right sequence. This is suggested by the fact that the composer can easily discriminate between those series of tones which are wrong and the one which is right (ibid.: 250-251).

The music, then, is both creation of something totally new, and an ideal object that already exists. As one can conceive of a musical theme that already exists it’s understood: the composer imagines, in his/her mind, that the theme is something that is already there. The same invariant process is followed by the performer and the listener, which respectively reproduce with action in
the outside world a series of sounds and, in the world of interior meanings, a series of meanings connected to sound. Listener, musician-performer and composer share an intersubjective representational core that remains the same on the basis of the principle of the relative insignificance of the vehicle (Schutz 1962: 302). Goettlich observes how the basis of the significance of a piece of music, defined as “existing” or “already there”, will be the experience of the theme, and not some prior ontological existence (Goettlich 2014: 251).

The ideal type of the musician refers to an individual who plays alone or in a group a score written by himself or by someone else. Goettlich explains that Schutz is talking about an expert musician who performs a piece according to standards of correctness, and not a musician who improvises or a beginner who wants to improve their skills. If you also consider the relationship with the listener, you could speak of a triple correlation, in which the player acts as a mediator between composer and listener. The central aspect of the figure of the musician is to be the central pivot of articulation of the foundational dimension of the *we-relation*. The musician assumes the relationship of mutual harmony, that is, a relationship in which you have the fusion of the flows of the experience of people who “grow up and grow old together in the vivid present”. This applies both to the members of an orchestra, who make music together in the here and now of *we-relation*, and for the relationship between composer and performer, outside the *we-relation*, because they live in different eras. The reason for this view is that the “mutual self harmony in relation” has as a reference the internal time and not the external one. Consequently, even if the relationship between composer and performer derived from the face to face relationship, derived from the “outer” meeting space, it is in any case based on elements of the “internal” experience that can not be separated by the sedimentation of past subjective experiences. The creation of a piece of music and the musician’s interpretation of the composer’s opera comes “step-by-step”, in a polythetic way. The polythetic process of the constitution of meaning makes the sharing by two individuals of the same or different external times irrelevant. The crucial point is that the partners, living through the same process, establish the simultaneity between their streams of consciousness; the sharing of internal time is more important, for Schutz, than the fact that making music together is also an event of external time. Goettlich repeats the central thesis of Schutz's view that «this sharing of the other’s flux of experiences in inner time, this living through a vivid present in common, constitutes what we called [...] the mutual tuning-in relationship, the experience of the “We”, which is at the foundation of all possible communication» (Schutz 1964: 173). Fele focuses his attention on the process of the “step-by-step” setting up that invests time synchronization of experience between the musician and the composer. For the performer of a song the musical score is
not an self-explanatory instruction packet, but a set of meanings necessarily vague and open to different interpretations. As for all instructions from the world of everyday life, the Austrian sociologist believes that an interpretive work of “closure” of the musical text is necessary. This work of closure, continues Fele, was held in accordance with located “social determinants”: «tempo, dynamics, and expression, or directions as to the connection with other sounds (by such devices as ties, slurs, and the like)» (Schutz 1964: 166). In this context, therefore, the closure of musical text takes place in accordance with non-formalized practices of the performer, which emerge as the imposed relevances of the context of interaction. The radical context of meaning, according to Fele, highlights the constructivist matrix, intersubjective and radically contextual of the investigations of Schutz; the musical experience «is not based on the survival of individual interpretations of disembodied documents such as written scores (or even on a set of informal interpretive traditions), but on the continuing review of the experience again, each time, that piece of music in its individuality» (Fele 2001: 209). Furthermore, the central element of the connection between internal and external time of most performers of a piece of music that play together is the externalization of social interaction «in a concrete and visible shared space» (ibid.: 215). Through the procedural explication, step by step, of the spatial sharing of the stream of consciousness of the other, by means of mutual bodily movements, Schutz «overcomes a purely private and interior model of musical use to establish the very conditions of intersubjectivity» (ibid.).

3.2 Transition from polythetic to monothetic

The musical experience has a non-conceptual structure. This aspect raises a number of problems associated to the central assertion of Schutz according to whom the meaning emerges in the predicative sphere, although it has its roots in the prepredicative sphere of consciousness. The polythetic character of musical experience and its connection to monothetic understanding is one aspect of this issue. First of all, the difficulty of rendering logically coher-

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25 Fele emphasizes that the aim of Schutz is to understand «what happens in the effective performance of a musical piece» (Fele 2001: 209). In this sense, the critique of Costolloe of the idea of meaning of the Austrian sociologist as an exclusively private matter (Costolloe 1994) misses the central aspect of his analysis: the social relationship between a listener and a composer, who share a wealth of typical knowledge, radically social, that emerge interactively and simultaneously through the musical experience. The viewer synchronizes the internal time with the composer through a “semiotic-textual” legacy (Fele 2001: 214), that is, by means of a score played by the performer.
ent the translation of meaning from an unreflective field to a reflective field emerges. Furthermore, there is the fundamental problem of awareness and knowledge of the Self. Finally, there is the methodological problem connected to the background of the construction of the idealtype.

Sebald says there are two ways of dealing with the “pseudo paradox” between polythetic and monothetic. The first method is that derived from the elaboration of the theory of William James’ succession of transitive and substantive phases in consciousness. Schutz considers conscious reflection that unifies the object of experience a “resting point”, while the indistinct succession of “points of flight” to be not immediately conscious. The second method, however, recalls the stream of consciousness that seems to be triggered and addressed by external events as in the articulation of musical phrasing (Schutz 1996: 274-275). In other words, the musical experience is an imposed relevance that brings out “step-by-step” cognitive aspects which are contextually relevant.

Goettlich and Mori tend to interpret the relationship between polythetic flow and monothetic experience in the first sense. Sebald, Fele and Stascheit are closer to the second perspective.

According to Goettlich, the reconstruction of the meaning of music needs the understanding of the polythetic flow of the meanings of a piece of music, but implies monothetic reflection on the entire experience. Goettlich observes how the alternation between polythetic and monothetic actually signals that the listener is able to understand the music during his listening only through the use of “themes” or musical units that imply “a sense of virtual purpose”. A sequence of tones is experienced as a melody if it puts the viewer in a state of mind in which one can stop look back at oneself and attribute meaning. This recalls the importance of the alternation of “places of rest and flight” from the theory of William James. Mori retains that the distinction between polythetic and monothetic signals a differentiation between orders of consciousness. The problem faced by Mori is the phenomenological representation of the inner life of consciousness. The author affirms that we can consider music a solitary art through which it is possible to spontaneously express one’s Self. For example, the technological supports are vehicles through which, alone, the actors can listen to their favorite music. In this sense, the use of musical experience as artistic experience is a spontaneous activity in the world of everyday life that enables us to reflect on the relationship between the structure of conscious-

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26 Notably, this paradox is present in the world of science, in the world of constructs of the second degree, not in the constructs of the first degree of everyday life, in which the experience of music and interaction with others are taken for granted, are “data of the natural attitude.”
ness and intersubjectivity. Music is an event of internal time that mediates between the various expressions of the mental life of others (Mori 2014: 271). Mori picks up Schutz’s distinction between internal time and external time, considering the first a spiraling and indistinct time and the second to be linear. The descriptions of Bergson discuss a cone of light, of Husserl who draws a triangle, and of Schutz who elaborates in a more complex way the triangle of Husserl, are metaphors that seek to significantly order polythetic internal experiences that are increasingly difficult to express. The Japanese sociologist places emphasis on how the linearity of the flow of consciousness is a metaphor that aims to monothetically simplify the complex process of sedimentation of knowledge in the memory. The difference between the polythetic and monothetic structure of Schutz can be seen as mirroring the contrast between two temporal orders. Mori writes of polithetically synthesized order and monothetically synthesized order. The polythetic order is the interconnection between exclusively graspable perceptual experiences as a complex. The monothetic order, however, is the linear order. Schutz reworks the idea of polythetic flow and of monothetic understanding as a function of the concepts of simultaneity and quasi-simultaneity between two people (ibid.). Music is a polythetic flow of the internal consciousness of more people that acts as a vehicle of meanings.

The second solution, which seems more innovative, opens up new perspectives on the role of the body as mediator between internal time and external-space time. It should be emphasized that Schutz expressly denies that the spatial experience can be the origin of the musical experience. Even rhythm is an experience that has its origin in internal time. Nevertheless, Sebald argues that Schutz’s theory can be reorganized in a coherent manner as occurrence of internal time confined to bodily movements. The structural opening of the phenomenological machinery of Schutz allows a harmonious integration of the relationship between internal time, consciousness, and external time, understood as corporeal sphere, as the basis for developing a theory of emotions (ibid.: 15). Fele is of the same opinion, who states that the role of public space and external time, understood as a «concrete physical place where music is shared» (Fele 2001: 215) is fundamental because the face-to-face relationship

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27 «A perception, namely a perceptively lived experience, can be positioned as a distinction. Therefore, a perception can entail distinct differences. However, whether these positioned points can be put onto the same straight line or not, is dependent on each viewpoint, from which man pays attention to something intended» (ibid.: 272).

28 Sebald poses a series of problems: the non-conceptual structure of meaning, the problem of passive synthesis, the phenomenological concept of ideal object, the problem of thematic units, the connection of body, mind and space (Sebald 2013: 11).
can emerge, understood as the mutual physical presence of other bodies in the present experience. The bodies of the performers of a musical piece become an additional score from that of the semiotic-textual composer. The interaction of gestures between performers is unthinkingly assumed as a set of commands that guide the mutual behavior. Fele writes: «Schutz in this way is transported into the open, to the surface of social relations, as embodied scenic features, those conditions of possibility of sharing a stream of activities that were previously hidden: they are no longer confined within the consciousness, as events of internal time, but they see the light in the concrete interaction with my direct interlocutors in the flesh in front of me» (ibid.: 215-216). Fele accentuates the importance of the mutual physical presence in communication, reworking the idea of Schutz according to which the knowledgeable communicative intent is not always present. The musical relationship is an example: «The Other’s facial expressions, his gestures in handling his instrument, in short all the activities of performing, gear into the outer world and can be grasped by the partner in immediacy. Even if performed without communicative intent, these activities are interpreted by him as indications of what the Other is going to do and therefore as suggestions or even commands for his own behavior» (Schutz 1964: 176). Fele stresses that Schutz was one of the first sociologists from which Garfinkel was inspired to investigate communication as a procedure located in a “here and now” that is linked to the external time of interaction. Schutz «laid the foundations of a sociology of interaction, in which the body takes on a significant value. No longer are the intentions or the will that determine the communication: the processes of communication no longer take place in the recesses of consciousness, but relate primarily to the presence of at least two persons» (Fele 2001: 217). Fele cites the analysis of Schutz of the steps constituting the process of construction of meanings that are «a little gem of a study of social interaction» (Fele 2001)²⁹. The investiga-

²⁹ Fele’s use of Schutz to explain some aspects of the vision of Garfinkel is a great example of how to confront the theoretical between phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology in a balanced way. Fele is very diplomatic in his elaboration of the themes of the empirically intersubjective experiences of making music together. This in light of a series of unbridgeable distances between instances of postanalytical ethnomethodology and those of comprehensive sociology: one among many is the underestimation of the subject in ethnomethodology and the importance of memory and internal time in comprehensive sociology. The ethnomethodological interpretation made by Fele of Schutz can be understood as a methodologically interesting extension that, nevertheless leaves open many questions. Chief among these issues is the relationship between the internal time of consciousness and spatialized external time. In ethnomethodology there is a substantial elimination of internal time and a reduction of social relations to external time, spatially located contexts (see Rawls 2015). According to Schutz, although the body, with its symptoms of expression, is the element of mediation between internal
tion on the processes of coordination between social actors in “the flesh” and the relationship between the internal and external time of Schutz are an example of ethnomethodological “respecification” of traditional objects of conventional sociology, in order to «penetrate into the practices that constitute a culture, trying to return from inside the same logic that participants adopt to make their conduct, in the same moment in which they are mutually related to each other, coherent and sensible» (ibid.: 218-219). 

According to Michael Stascheit, monothetic reconstruction of meaning refers to a context of objects, not a monothetically synthesized single element. He retains that the interpretation of musical experience as a relationship given meaning that doesn’t have a conceptual framework of reference leads to the core problem of the hermeneutic interpretation (Stascheit 2014: 121). The hermeneutic circle recalls the problem of the prepredicative dimension and extra-linguistic meaning. This theme is a real challenge of Western thought: the author speaks of borderline experience. The experience of the hermeneutic circle is connected to sociability and its many forms. The most radical form of sociability is the experience of the “we-relation”. From the empirical point of view all social relations are experiences of time objects that have a polythetic structure, they flow in the consciousness of internal time. The problem of Stascheit is coherence between the polythetic and monothetic plane of distinct streams of experience. The meaning of the experience of temporal objects is contained mainly in the polythetic structure of the elements present in the consciousness of time (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 53). In order to grasp the time and external time or space, he is also drastic in the assertion that the spatial and rhythmic element is not the origin of the musical experience and is irrelevant (Schutz 1996: 253-254). 

Although many ethnomethodological studies can be considered an empirical application of the theories of Schutz on the musical relationship, «it should be emphasized, however, that ethnomethodology is not interested at all in issues of internal time, but considers social interaction as theatrical devices that are publicly available» (Fele 2001: 219). According to Fele, one of the nuclei of ethnomethodological analysis is in the four-page essay on communicative relations in the outside world that Schutz intended to pick up again and develop. The analysis of the heirs of Garfinkel seems to be of a different opinion however. Anne W. Rawls, Michael Lynch and Wes Sharrock, for example, have repeatedly stressed the dissonances rather than the similarities between the vision of Schutz and Garfinkel. This was well demonstrated by Alex Dennis in a lively debate with Lynch and Sharrock, the latest interpretations of postanalytical ethnomethodology equated Schutz to a kind of scientist that would separate the world of science and the world of common sense. Because of this view, the thought of the Austrian sociologist would be an obstacle to the attempts of Garfinkel to empirically analyze the world of daily life. It should be emphasized that between phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology there are even some stark differences, but it is equally true that the elimination of Schutz by the authors to better understand the ethnomethodological movement is a misinterpretation that produces only a loss to the same ethnomethodology (Dennis 2004).
meaning of the experience of a temporal object the subject must complete in a reflexive way the polythetic constitution of that experience. The problem is that the sharing of monothetic transformation is problematic. The solution of Stascheit is found in the presupposition of a common level of physical attention rooted and expressed in the relative tension of the bodies. The perception of the body is the vehicle of the synchronization of time of the experiences between subjects who are involved in the musical flow. The intensity of the tension between the bodies is the temporal measure that is experienced as a succession of steps of mutual attention. The author speaks of a number of stages of the musical experience. The first level is that of listening to music as it usually is found in the world of everyday life, a mode that we can define as naive. It has a low tension of consciousness, the musical experience is presented in an indistinct way. This naive mode of the undifferentiated flow of music is defined as mode of resonance. The second level is the intentional mode: it has a greater attention which commits the subject to perceive sounds related to a focal moment of the musical experience, a moment connected to the continuous co-presence of the musical flow. Finally, there is the co-performative mode, in which listening is focused on a part of the musical flow and is directed towards the future (Stascheit 2014: 117). The demarcation of these three levels makes it possible to clarify the problem of the “independence of hands”, that is to say the problem of how the junction between body movements and the polythetic musical flow come about. In this case, the medium that allows simultaneous access to the experience of polyphony, coherently maintaining the pace of hand movement, is the piano (ibid.: 115).

31 The analysis of Stascheit is articulated by the theoretical systems of Bergson and Merleau-Ponty, translating the appresentation of Schutz into an intersubjective field theory, of a gestalt matrix, that seems to oversimplify the relationship between experience, intersubjectivity, music and the body. The result is a kind of Okkam’s razor centered on the theme of “incarnation” of meanings. Consequently, Stascheit develops the problem of the hermeneutic circle in a vision that emphasizes the non-conceptual nature of the intersubjective relationship. This is in contradiction with the central aspects of the vision of Schutz, which is divided on the primacy of the selection. For the Austrian sociologist the hermeneutical circle is certainly present in the form of a link between appresentative reference and totality of experience. It is equally correct to say that this recalls some gestalt aspects, integrating them with concepts of pragmatism - as the idea of points of flight and rest in James. Nevertheless, his perspective is linked to that of a reflexively oriented subject (a “weak” subject), even if a non-Cartesian one. In other words, the vision of Schutz is essentially noetic. Schutz has always had strong reservations about the theory of the field of gestalt matrix. For a long time he debated vigorously against the attempts of his friend Aron Gurwitsch to eliminate the idea of the subject (see Schutz, Gurwitsch 1989, Sacchetti 2010). On the contrary, Stascheit seems to help the noematic dimension prevail, emphasizing the holistic aspect of the lack of reflection and of the perception of the body. The danger of this operation is to eliminate key aspects like the theme of meaning understood and
3.3 Intersubjectivity and immediacy of experience

The musical relationship is an empirical example of sharing of prelinguistic meanings within the field of the “we-relation”: it has the union of streams of consciousness and the establishment of a “common We” which is the basis of the “grow together” in the specious present. This idea involves crossing the classic Cartesian distinction between internal and external knowledge and also forms the basis of the conception of the socio-centric meaning of Schutz. The idea that intersubjectivity is a given in the world of natural attitude and its articulation through the theory of signs and symbols has been the object of several criticisms. The latter is of particular importance to Zaner who criticizes the idea of “mutual tuning-in relationship”, the basis of the “we-relation” and constitutive aspect of the musical relationship. In summary, Zaner argues that Schutz articulates intersubjectivity in a Cartesian manner by treating it the same way as a kind of interior that would emerge in relationship with the Other. Because the interior is accessible only to the subject, it would spring from an elusive symbolic interpretation in communication and is therefore meaningless. In addition, the author evaluates the theory of problematic appresentazione because it does not permit understanding of how one can catch the Other. Finally, he sustains that the notion of the Other as a given in the world of everyday life is incomprehensible. The “we-relation” is a enigmatic concept (Zaner 2002).

One of the clearer responses to Zaner’s observations is that of Belvedere, which can be summarized in three points: first, intersubjectivity emerges through mutual reflection in the world of everyday life; second, the appre -sentation of the other implies the empirical perception of a body that is constitutively experienced as a set of meanings; and lastly, the other is a given in the world of daily life because, in this context, he/she is an immediate and indubitable manifestation.

The first point is placed within the now classic critique of psychology that is leveled, by different authors at different times, at phenomenology and specifically at Schutz. The development of the theory of language by Luckmann,

of reflection, the problem of the relationship between individual experience, musical experience and system of relevances.

32 For a detailed analysis of the critiques of the idea of intersubjectivity of Schutz see Muzzetto (Muzzetto 1997).

33 A paradigmatic example is represented by the arguments of Gorman (Gorman 1977). He charges Schutz of moving himself from a psychologist’s perspective, without explaining the meaning of intersubjectivity and, in fact, placing himself within the category of naive realism. Not to be missed, the biting work of Edward G. Armstrong, who believes there is a general trend of “anti-phenomenological” thought – a sort of “phenomenologofobia” – accuses phe-
as articulated by the encounter with the other that is captured as the body conveys appresentativamente meanings, is a fruitful example of radically empirical co-constructive meanings themselves. The appresentative understanding of meaning is “direct” because it takes place in a situation of face to face interaction in which one has the “mirroring” of the Self in another Self and vice versa. With mirroring one has the attribution of subjective meaning to that which has been caught by an interpretative scheme (Luckmann 1983: 83)\(^{34}\). Belvedere shows how the reflection has a perceptive basis given by synchronization between elements of internal time and external events. This perceptive basis is present in every intersubjective relationship and forms the core of the “theory of the existence of the alter ego”.

Secondly, Zaner says that the theory of appresentation of Schutz is obscure. Actually Schutz and Luckmann well explain the analytical steps of the perception of the other starting from the process of passive synthesis. The body of the other, with all its expressive symptoms, immediately recalls the idea of being human that Schutz calls “my fellow”. The other is caught, first, in an immediate way, with an appresentative perceptive synthesis; only in a second moment have you the reflexive categorization\(^{35}\). Schutz’s theory of im-

\(^{34}\) Luckmann summarizes the relationship between theory of appresentation and meaning in the following points. 1) When two details are both present in the unity of perception and are characterized by the transfer of meaning (inference by analogy), then we are faced with associative coupling. In this relationship A, which is present, is associated with B, which is also present. 2) When two details, one present, the other absent, are characterized by analog transfer of meaning, then we are faced with appresentative coupling. In this relationship A, which is present, appresenta B, which is not present. 3) When two details, one present, the other absent, are characterized by the theming of that which is absent through that which is present, then we are facing meaningful coupling (reflexive). In this relationship A, which is present, means B, which is not present. There is a relationship at increasingly complex levels that involves the following elements. 1) The flow of consciousness, 2) the passive synthesizes, 3) the thematisation, 4) the activation of the ego through the attention, 5) experience 6) the reflexive outlet (the return to experience), 7) the significance of the experience, 8) the project, 9) the project directed towards the alter ego, 10) social action (Luckmann 1983: 77-78).

\(^{35}\) Belvedere points out that «one of Schutz’s main contributions on the subject is (regardless of Zaner’s criticisms) to reveal that intersubjectivity relies on my perception of the other’s body mediated by signs and objects of the outer world, ie, that there is no perception of his inner time flow involved in intersubjectivity, even though I can experience the same flux of experience as others, not by grasping it through empathy but reproducing it on my own by a synchronization of our fluxes of experiences mediated by a pre-conceptual kind of ‘communication.’ Put otherwise, I do not
mediate perception of the other (i.e. appresentation in the world of everyday life), according to Belvedere is the foundation of empirical certainty of the existence of the other (certainty, however, that is “always subjected to contrary evidence”)\(^{36}\). This means that the other is grasped within a pre-conceptual level on the basis of body language. This prelinguistic level is the basis of the entire intersubjective relationship and is based on an attitude that has to go beyond the limitations of positivism, whether by vulgar empiricism or sensible intuition. Schutz’s settings offer us a model that allows «a profound and multifaceted description including not only sensorial data but also, and particularly, the types and categories that shape our perception of things» (ibid.: 226).

Finally, Belvedere clarifies the steps of Schutz’s theory of *alter ego* that Zaner found confused. Intersubjectivity theory articulates the idea that «the other is constituted in a passive synthesis of our minds; thus, our knowledge of the other is not the product of our active reflective grasp but it is imposed on our perception in a compelling and indubitable way» (ibid.). The other is a given in the world of life intending it as a body through which, in a pre-reflective way, «I can start a social relationship. Thus, the given of the Other is not the appresentation of his inner stream of consciousness but his bodily signs, perfectly presented to my perception and which work along with mine in a pre-linguistic ‘conversation’» (ibid.).

### 3.4 Music as a finite province of meaning

Music separates the reality of the art world from the world of everyday life (Schutz 1964: 197), the language that accompanies music refers to relevances reproduce other’s experiences: I produce my own, in a similar by way means of communication mediated by signs, living in a We-relationship while growing older together» (Belvedere 2014: 225). Belvedere continues: «Although Schutz does not say so, we could think of this as a non-intentional bond to the Other given that - just as Zaner argues - in Schutz’s position the only intentional relationship is between my noesis and my noema – i.e., there is no intentional relationship between my noesis and the other’s. So one could say that I do not experience the flux of experience of the other but I do experience the same as him, not only in his *duree* but in mine. Consequently, perception is a good enough fundament for stating intersubjectivity in the framework of a phenomenology of the natural attitude, which means that no empathy is needed» (ibid.).

\(^{36}\) According to Belvedere, «for transcendental phenomenology, this kind of attachment to perception would give us no more than a subjective and relative experience and would lead us to reject philosophical certainty and remain in skepticism. On the contrary, for Schutz (and the author), perception is the ultimate fundament of all certainty. Our claim here is not to drop back into relativism and skepticism but setting universalism on different grounds arguing that all certainty comes from the natural attitude, which shall be described not as mere subjective and relative but – in “thick description” – as objective and absolute» (Belvedere 2014: 225-226).
(Schutz, 1996: 245) and to reordered symbolic meanings at almost infinite levels (Schutz 1964: 187). The analysis of alternation between musical melody and rhythm as the basis of the passage between orders of reality is an example of how «music expresses and creates spontaneously ordered lived experiences which are composed of sensory perceptions and bodily movements» (Mori 2014: 273). According to Mori, melody, harmony and rhythm are three musical elements of the constitution of a configuration of meaning articulated in time. In the same mode as intervals of perception of the sounds of one’s body (for example heartbeat, pulse, respiration and step), the musical experience is a lived experience which constitutes a primordial rhythm based on a subjective axis and temporal primary present in the mind of every individual (ibid.). The melody is closely linked to this axis of time, because it is an element of the perception not objectively definable: once created it disappears from the flux of experience. Similar to harmony, when combined in various ordinate shades of the experience, the melody is a set of meanings perceived in a unified way. The rhythm, however, is nothing more than a division of the melody in the field of space and time. Rhythm is caught through a perception experienced in the form of intervals that are followed and distributed back into a melodic flow. The function of mediation between orders of reality of melody and rhythm can be exemplified by the role of language. The sound of the words and the rhythmic accompaniment of body movements are the basis of the transition from a time dimension to a spatial dimension. The sound of language invokes a mutual duality: on the one hand, it has a conceptual meaning inherent in words; on the other, the sound of the speaker’s voice or song is similar to a melody that conveys meanings that transcend the cognitive and conceptual aspect. The voice becomes a vehicle for mediation of emotions that you express through words. Put differently, the cognitive order mediated by the sound of words is always linked to other aspects that recall different symbolic orders. Music has a meta-trascendental specificity «which is a priori creating and coordinating an order of lived experiences, depends very strongly on an experienced duality of rhythm» (ibid.: 275).

Another aspect is the problem of understanding the specific difference between sound and music. The use of the theory of signs and symbols of Schutz can distinguish three possible types of meanings of music: an indicative meaning, an emblematic meaning and a symbolic meaning. The latter meanings are related, respectively, to small, medium and large transcendences. In the first case, music is understood as an indication, overcoming so-called “Small Transcendencies”; in the second case as a sign, overcoming so-called “Medium Transcendencies”; in the third case as a symbol, overcoming so-called “Great Transcendencies”. According to the “Principle of the Relative
Irrelevance of the Vehicle” [...], music may be used as an indication as well as a sign or a symbol” (Goettlich 2014: 245).

Music is a means of overcoming a small transcendence when it is used as an index, for example, like the sound of an alarm clock that reminds you of the time when you have to wake up. Obviously, this is not the meaning of the music Schutz intended, but it is a sort of “indebted appropriation” of the intrinsic end of music. The indicative meaning of music is derived and does not furnish distinctive criteria with respect to sound. The emblematic or symbolic meaning of a musical expression tells me something of my interlocutor, for example, the sound of teeth grinding can suggest to me information about his mental state. As Goettlich explains, the more comprehensive distinction between mere sounds and music is to be found in the third sense, relative to the symbolic meaning.

Music, in opposition to mere sounds, has the capability to overcome a “Great transcendency”. In other words, music is an acoustic phenomenon occurring within the paramount reality and referring – at least potentially – to a transcendent sphere of reality, that is, the world of arts. It is this third potential meaning which distinguishes music from mere sounds” (ibid.).

Conclusions

According to Schutz, the inner consciousness of time is an indispensable universal structural basis of all the processes of the attribution of meaning. I agree with Skarda when he maintains that the Austrian sociologist examines the problem of music with an emphasis on how the acoustic field of the spatial sphere depends on a temporal structure that may remain implied, but that is methodologically essential. This structure recalls the knowledge sedimented in the past37. Among the egological and internal temporal dimensions there is an indissoluble link. To eliminate the internal time dimension means to elimi-

37 Skarda writes: «Emphasis should be placed on the word ‘spatial’ here. Although Schutz does not, in this quotation, specify that he is speaking of the absence of spatial structure, I believe that is what he intended. To be sure, there is structure in the acoustic field, but it is temporal not spatial. For example, if there is depth in acoustic experience then it is the experience of temporal depth, i.e., the past, that is meant» (Skarda 1979: 99). Pedone is of the opposite view, who claims that this thesis is unfounded, «for the lack of an explicit consideration of the symbolic processes that come into play when listening» (Pedone 1996: 20). The observations of Skarda are a stimulus for further reflection on the centrality of the egological dimension, of that symbolic and that of constitution of meanings that can not be developed here.
nate the dimension of subjectivity and the intended meaning. The sociology of Schutz is noetic, it is radically anchored to an entity that continuously reconfigures the meanings as a function of systems of relevance that emerge from time to time in the multiple fields of experience. One can parenthesize the internal temporality, for methodological purposes (for example in dealing with the musical rhythm and the dimension of the body), but always bearing in mind that the reflective dimension, linked to the Self, cannot be eliminated.

The egological dimension recalls the theory of appresentazione, the theme of music as a finite province of meaning and that of the relationship between individual and collective dimensions of meaning. The musical relationship is an example of “we-relation”, in which it has a fusion with the others in a symbolic “We” in which the appresentative is the common situation and the appresented is the participation in a world of ideal categorizations. Music is thus a relationship that expresses in a non-conceptual way symbolic aspects that can form the basis of an infinite chain of appresentative relationships. Among these symbolic aspects those related to intersubjectivity are nodal. The musical relationship therefore constitutes a potential vehicle of union between individual center and social center of the constitution of meaning.

In Schutz the attribution of meaning is always based on emergencies of the “here and now.” These emergencies are a sum of imposed and intrinsic relevances, and are never defined a priori. The voluntarism or passivity, the reflexivity and the irreflexivity are methodological hypotheses not likely to be of clear demarcation. In the world of everyday life, the realization of a project cannot be subjected to a control system that can bring into being clear dividing lines between intrinsic or imposed relevances, between reflective or irreflective aspects. Only if the actor could master all the total connections of their experiences past, present and future, and all possible combinations between these links might one arrive at a precise demarcation. This hypothesis of hyper-rationality, however, would be a metaphysical hypothesis.

Schutz explains how, for example, Kierkegaard uses the work of Mozart as a symbol which is the starting point of a symbolization of different degree. Specifically, Kierkegaard contrasts the immediacy of the music, connected to an aesthetic-erotic plane, the reflection of the language, connected to the ethical plane, Schutz 1964.

According to Schutz, in the works of Mozart the characters are ideal-types that express universal feelings. These feelings are developed intersubjectively through action, highlighting aspects linked to the interior life and to personality. In the works of Mozart, musically, an atmosphere is created that characterizes the social climate; more people express their individuality in a unified manner, making the complexity typical of the experience clear to the public. In other words, the multi-dimensionality typical of social situations is created (Schutz 1964: 199).

Awareness of the impossibility of accurately controlling the context of future predictions is an epistemological hinge of the antipositivist thought of the author. In the essay on Tiresias,
The anthropological model of Schutz shows how internal time is the key and uneliminable element in the process of attribution of meaning and intersubjective constitution of reality. The division between internal and external time of Schutz is not similar to the Cartesian distinction between \textit{res cogitans} and \textit{res extensa}, but it is a heuristic distinction which aims to clarify the phenomenon being studied, which stands out from the idea of intentionality of consciousness. In this view, time and intentionality are analytical elements inevitably subordinate to common inter-subjective time. The problematics of the nonconceptual aspects of the musical experience and of intersubjectivity is a way to conjugate the relationship between the process of polythetic construction and monothetic synthesis. The intersubjective coconstruction of meaning always implies a tension between related areas that entail, for example, subjective and intersubjective experience, language (constructs of first and second degree), finite provinces of meaning (the world of everyday life and symbolic worlds).

Notwithstanding the analysis of Schutz on the musical experience being but an outline, the depth and richness of his reflections are still unsurpassed. The openness with which the sociologist articulates the meaningful themes of the relationship between intersubjective time and musical relationship can be exemplified in two non-mutually exclusive points. The first point is the notion of musical relationship as “step-by-step” co-construction of meanings, that has been the area of origin of a series of empirical studies on the located construction of meaning. As Fele explained, Harold Garfinkel (Garfinkel 1967) took cues from essential surveys of Schutz on the interaction of experiences in musical experience, on the temporal relationship and intersubjectivity. The father of ethnomethodology, with the appropriate differentiation, then empirically developed part of the assumptions of Schutz, attempting to make a connection on the side of taken for granted. Aaron Cicourel (Cicourel 1964; 1973) was another author who, on the one hand, developed in a critical key the problem of \textit{Verstehen} by applying the methodology of empirical research, and on the other, reorganized the study of temporal processes of interaction and procedural practices with which the actors attribute meaning, in an empirical key consistent with the assumptions of Schutz. The second point is that Schutz applies that principle to the relationship between time, forecasting in the world of everyday life and the assumption of risk that that particular prediction will be wrong (cf. Schutz 1964). The view of the Austrian sociologist not dissimilar to the wholism of Pierre Duhem, which, in physics, explained how one «can never submit an isolated hypothesis to experience, but only a whole set of hypotheses. When the experience is in disagreement with his predictions, it [...] teaches that at least one of the assumptions constituting the set is unacceptable and should be modified, but does not [...] indicate which must be changed» (Duhem 1906, trans. en. 1978: 211).
of the link with the social construction of meanings and connections with the social structure. As Mori explained, the scope of music is connected to an intersubjective structure of meanings mediated symbolically, that go beyond the situationality of the context or subjective goals. Through the linguistic experience – for example, the tone, the pauses, the volume of the sound of the words – appresentatively called and created meanings that have a spectrum of almost infinite shades. With this in mind, Luckmann proposes a theory of language that unfolds from the appresentative elements connected to the sound of the voice (Luckmann 1975; 1983). In a manner consistent with the symbolic interactionism of G. H. Mead, he develops themes related to the later attempts of Schutz to address the phenomenological problem of language (cfr. Schutz 1958). Cicourel, however, articulated an ethnography of located contexts centered on the idea of language as a typical vehicle of knowledge and social practices that multidimensionally structure, “from the beginning”, relations between the actors in interaction, allowing the connection between individual and social structure (Cicourel 1973; 1981).41

Finally, I borrow a thought from Schutz to say that I’m not sure if I was able to highlight the relevant aspects of the relationship between time, intersubjectivity and musical experience, and I’m not even sure if my observations are adequate to either the author or to those of whom have studied him. Of one thing, however, I am certain: that the relationship between time, intersubjectivity and musical relationship is a central aspect of the debate in the social sciences that has not yet been overcome.

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41 These two aspects of the Verstehen of Schutz can only be mentioned here and should be the object of deeper study.


Henri Matisse, *La Danse* (1910)