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The Pro- and Anti-Christian Writings of Fukan Fabian (1565-1621)

Introduction

It is the intention of this paper to discuss the Japanese Jesuit and apostate Fukan (or Fukansai) Fabian 不干斉ハビアン (1565-1621) as an unusual example of the critique between religious traditions. Fukan had probably been a Zen-Buddhist monk before he turned to Christianity and received the theological education of a Jesuit. However, he changed his attitude from being a devoted Christian to supporting the government in its suppression of that religion. This change is documented in two contradictory writings, a Christian apologetics, including a critique of Buddhism, Confucianism and Shintō (Myōtei Mondō 妙貞問答, 1605), and a refutation of Christianity after he had turned his back on the Christian church (Ha Daisus 破提宇子, 1620). By taking up these works, I want to turn attention to factors that structure inter-religious critique: the standpoint from which critique emerges and the resulting dynamics of critique and response.

Fukan Fabian is a particularly interesting case with regard to the standpoint and the dynamics of critique. For one thing, he is a Japanese who experienced an intense Christian training and lived with Jesuit missionaries for about 20 years. Consequently, his knowledge and understanding of Christianity was different from that of “popular” Christianity which – as Higashibaba Ikuo (2001) has illustrated in his study on kirishitan – was characterised by attempts to integrate Christian symbols and thinking into the worldview(s) of Japanese religiosity. By contrast, the Jesuit training of native personnel was rather intended to replace Japanese religious worldviews by the missionaries’ version of a Christian view of man and world. Yet, being Japanese and having been a Buddhist monk set Fukan also apart from the missionaries. He was familiar with “popular” Japanese religion, with current Buddhist and Neo-Confucian philosophies, Shintō mythology, and probably with aspects of “popular Christianity” as well. Given this background, the question arises how these various dimensions of Fukan’s religious knowledge are reflected in his standpoint of critique in Myōtei Mondō and Ha Daisus. Does Myōtei Mondō represent a Jesuit standpoint as suggested by the historian Ebisawa Arimichi (1971: 116 f) who emphasises the dependency of Fukan’s writing on the Jesuit Alessandro Valignano’s

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1. For details on the theological education of Japanese Jesuits see Schütte (1939) and Cieslik (1963).

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(1539-1606) *Catechismus Christianae Fidei*? Or does he give credit to aspects of Japanese religions without refuting them? And what characterises his anti-Christian standpoint in *Ha Daiusu*?

On the other hand, Fukan’s anti-Christian treatise *Ha Daiusu* is a rare case of a direct response to Christian critique of Japanese religions. Not only does Fukan refute his own arguments brought up in favour of Christianity and against Japanese religions in *Myōtei Mondō*; he also reacts – though implicitly – to Alessandro Valignano’s critique of Japanese religions as raised in his catechism. Fukan’s writings therefore give us the opportunity to take a look at the discursive processes of critique and anti-critique, i.e. the rhetoric strategies applied to counteract Christian critique and apologetics. Inter-religious critique and disputations were important tools of the Jesuit mission in early modern Japan: From the start, the Jesuits criticised Japanese religions in their writings and preaching, and they eagerly engaged in disputations with Buddhist monks.\(^3\) Since the beginning of the 17\(^{th}\) century their critique was counteracted in anti-Christian writings by Buddhists, former Christians and Confucian scholars. Fukan’s *Ha Daiusu* was the first anti-Christian treatise; due to his inside knowledge of Christian doctrines, praxis and clergy his arguments served as a model for later writings. By comparing Fukan’s pro-Christian and his anti-Christian writings I want to point out some dimensions of his “standpoint of critique,” and illustrate how the shift of standpoint is reflected in his method of argumentation.

### On the biography of Fukan Fabian

Fukan Fabian was probably born in 1565.\(^4\) The sources that inform us about his life are the official registers of the Jesuit ecclesiastical institutions, the letters of the missionaries, popular anti-Christian writings and his own writings. Reliable dates concerning his biography are the year 1586 when he became a Japanese catechist (*dōjuku*), the year of his Christian apologetics *Myōtei Mondō*, which is dated 1605, and the date of his anti-Christian writing *Ha Daiusu* 1620.\(^5\) In 1592

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3. Martin Repp has pointed out the relevance of inter-religious disputations in the Jesuit missionary activities in Japan. In his analysis of disputations among missionaries and Buddhist monks he concludes that both parties displayed an uncompromising attitude of ‘victory or defeat’, which was paired with a “confrontational approach” on the Jesuit side. He also hints at the rather inclusive arguing of the Japanese Buddhists in contrast to the Jesuits’ inclination to emphasise differences between the two religions. See Repp 2006: 50 f (quotation 51), and Repp 2005.

4. According to Anesaki Masaharu (1930: 466) the name Fabian was given to him when he was baptised in 1583.

5. On Fukan’s biography see Humbertclaude 1941; Ebisawa 1971: 113-119; Elison 1973: 142-184; Anesaki 1930.
he was registered in a Jesuit catalogue and in a list of residents of the Jesuit collegio in Amakusa as being 27 years old and a “master of the Japanese language” with a little knowledge of Latin. (Elison 1973: 145) After entering the Society in 1586, Fukan was trained at the Jesuit collegio in Nagasaki as what Higashibaba (2001: 26) called a “scholastic dōjuku,” i.e. a catechist who aspired to become a padre. These lay Christians differed from the “common” dōjuku in that their studies included the Latin language. Dōjuku as well as the other native personnel played a crucial role in the missionary work of the 1580s: due to the poor language skills of the European missionaries, they carried much of the burden of preaching and translating. (Higashibaba 2001: 22) Therefore, the mission consultations of Japan in 1580 and 1581 agreed to admit Japanese as Jesuits, based on a solid theological and philosophical education. As a consequence, one novitiate in Usuki (Kyushu), two seminars in Azuchi and Arima (Kyushu) and a college in Funai were opened in 1580. Another consequence was the compilation of a new catechism by the Visitor Alessandro Valignano, the Catechismus Christianae Fidei (published in 1586), for the training of the Japanese clergy. Most probably Fukan Fabian’s Christian education was based on this catechism. (Ebisawa 1971: 117)

Fukan’s language skills made him a highly valuable member of the mission in Japan. Not only did he serve as interpreter for the Jesuits, in 1592 he wrote a simplified version of the Heike monogatari in Roman letters as a language and history textbook for the missionaries. Besides, he took part in the translation of selections of Aesop’s Fables into Japanese. However, Fukan’s value for the Jesuits cannot be restricted to his linguistic mediation. Due to his educational background, he was to a certain degree familiar with both Western and Eastern systems of thought. According to popular anti-Christian writings he was a Zen-Buddhist monk before he converted to Christianity. Therefore, he was a perfect inter-cultural mediator and propagator of the Christian mission in Japan. In fact, various accounts document that Fukan was engaged in inter-religious debates. His public appearance as a Christian advocate and opponent of Buddhism is reported on three occasions, two disputations and a funeral.

A disputation between Fukan and the Buddhist monk Hakuô is reported in several popular anti-Christian chapbooks, the so-called kirishitan zokusho (キリシタン教の成立史)
According to Fujita Kankai (1953: 32 f), the genre of “concrete and narrative anti-Christian writings” directed at the uneducated audience of peasants and miners emerged after the final prohibition of Christianity in 1614 and the peasant upheaval in Shimabara in 1637/38. The dispute between Fukan and Hakuō is reported in Kirishitan gotaiji monogatari, Kirishitan shisōmon raichō jikki and Nanbanji kōhaiki.

See for example Ebisawa 1971: 54; Fujita 1953: 40. Fujita Kankai (1953: 40) argues that Fabian and Hakuō as the main protagonists of the narrative are both modelled after the historical Fukan: Fabian represents the Christian Fukansai, Hakuō the old Fukan who has become Buddhist again in his later years.

It tells us how Fukan tries to persuade the mother of a high-ranking retainer of Toyotomi Hideyoshi to convert to Christianity. For a while, the lady resists his pledges and emphasises her trust in Amida Buddha. Finally, swayed by the gifts he has sent her, she suggests to stage a dispute between Fukan and Hakuō, a lay Buddhist and former resident of Hiei-zan. Naturally, Hakuō is the winner of this dispute. See Nanbanji kōhaiki 1971: 48-62.

For example the account reports that Fukan tears Buddhist scriptures apart and steps on them. (Nanbanji kōhaiki 1971: 57)

Nanbanji kōhaiki 1971: 60. In a detailed analysis of the contents of the dispute, Fujita Kankai (1953: 38-40) has argued that the arguments brought up by Fabian as well as by Hakuō are based on Fukan’s writings Ha Daiusu and Myōtei Mondō. It is on the basis of this analysis that he claims the identity of Hakuō and Fabian.

Traditions of disputation in Japanese Buddhism have been investigated with regard to their meaning for the Buddhist-Christian encounter in early modern Japan by Martin Repp (2006: 45 ff).
In contrast to the fictive nature of this disputation, another one did actually take place: a debate with the Neo-Confucianist Hayashi Razan 林羅山 (1583-1657), who later became an influential advisor of the Shōgun. According to the account written by Hayashi Dōshun 林道春 (Razan), Fukan met him and his brother Nobuzumi 信澄 in 1606 to dispute the claims of a round earth, as well as the Christian view of god and creation.16

Another event in the same year gained Fukan public attention and raised the anger of Buddhist priests in Kyōto: in a sermon at the funeral of a Christian noblewoman in Kyōto, he fiercely attacked Japanese Buddhism as being unable to provide salvation.17 The annual letters of the Jesuits also mention a disputation with a Buddhist monk of the Nichiren-school in 1606. (Elison 1973: 153 f)

Fukan turned his back on Christianity shortly after these events, according to Humbertclaude (1941: 620f) in 1608 or 1609.18 As motive, Anesaki (1930: 471 f) stresses Fukan’s disappointment with the discriminating behaviour of the Jesuits. Notwithstanding his enormous commitment to the Society, he was never ordained as priest. Concerning his life after that event, we have to rely on the sporadic appearance of his name in Jesuit letters. A letter by the Jesuit Mattheus de Couros dating from March 1621 complains about the dissemination of Fukan’s anti-Christian writing Ha Daiusu. It also mentions Fukan’s temporary companionship with Murayama Tōan, the former Christian magistrate of Nagasaki who was executed with most of his family in 1619. Given these circumstances, Elison (1973: 154-164) assumes that much of Fukan’s motivation for writing Ha Daiusu was self-defence against the threat resulting from the persistence of his image as a Christian. Another letter by the Jesuit Joanbaptista de Baeca tells us that Fukan is “on the verge of death” (Elison 1973: 154), thus marking 1621 as the year of his death.

Fukan’s critique of religions

Myōtei Mondō – A Japanese catechism

In 1605 Fukan completed his Myōtei Mondō (“Dialogue between Myōshū and Yōtei”).19 It consists of three books: A refutation of Buddhism,20 a refutation of

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17. Humbertclaude quotes a summary of the sermon in the letter of the Vice Provincial Francisco Pasio to the General of the Society from October 1606 (1941: 620f). See also Anesaki (1930: 470) and Elison (1973: 143).
18. According to Fukan’s preface in Ha Daiusu (1620) he left the Society of Jesus about 15 years earlier. However, in 1607 he was still listed in the catalogues of the Jesuit residence in Kyōto. (Elison 1973: 154)
20. In 1930 Anesaki Masaharu published a summary of the first book under the title Buppō no shidairyaku nukigaki 仏法之次第略抜書. He had found a refutation of Buddhism among
Confucianism (*jūdō no koto* 儒道之事) and Shintō (*shintō no koto* 神道之事), and an apologetics of Christianity (*kirishitan no osbie no taikō no koto* 貴理志端之教之大綱之事). According to Fukan himself, the writing is intended to provide Christian ladies with detailed knowledge of the doctrines since they have little opportunity to visit churches and ask men about the teachings. (*Myōtei Mondō* 1970: 180) The text is written in dialogue form: Lady Myōshū asks questions or raises doubts concerning Christian teachings, whereas Lady Yūtei answers them from a Christian point of view. However, Fukan’s real audience was not restricted to ladies. In 1607, for example, *Myōtei Mondō* was presented to Honda Kōzuke, a close retainer to the Tokugawa shōguns Ieyasu (1543-1616) and Hidetada (1579-1632). (Cf. Elison 1973: 158)

As a literary genre, *Myōtei Mondō* is generally regarded as a Christian catechism. (Ebisawa 1971: 116; Higashibaba 2001: 55) Thus, it stands in line with previous catechisms of the Jesuits in Japan. These can roughly be divided into those used for proselytising and those for theological education. The first one to be used for the purpose of proselytisation was the catechism by Franz Xavier. In 1546, he edited a catechism that was translated into Japanese in 1548 and again in 1550. As the early preaching of the missionaries consisted mainly in reading Xavier’s catechism out in the streets, it was an important missionary tool. In practice, the readings from the catechism were accompanied by attacks on the Japanese religions. (Higashibaba 2001: 2 f) Xavier’s catechism was replaced in 1555 by the *Nijūgo-kajō* 二十五条 (“25 articles”), a catechism compiled by Padre Balthazar Bago on the basis of Xavier’s work.

Since 1591, the *Dochiriina Kirishitan* どちりいな きりしたん (“The Christian Doctrine”), published “for the purpose of popular edification” (Higashibaba 2001: 53), became the standard Japanese catechism for evangelisation work. It was

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21. A copy of the original manuscript was found 1918 in the library of the Ise Shrine by Sakamoto Kōtarō 坂本広太郎. He introduced it to the public in an article in the journal *Shigaku zasshi* 史学雑誌 2, 1918. See Ebisawa (1971: 113) and Humbertclaude (1938: 515). This version contained only the last two books.

22. Xavier’s catechism was based on the catechism edited by Joao de Barro 1539 in Lisbon. A short summary is given by Elison (1973: 36). It includes the proof of a personal god as creator of the world, an explanation of the eternal soul of man in contrast to the mortal soul of other living beings, the refutation of Buddhist sects, the story of creation, the fall of Lucifer and man, the theological meaning of Jesus Christ and the last judgement, and the Ten Commandments. See Elison (1973: 36) and Higashibaba (2001: 2 f).

printed by the Jesuit printing press and distributed among the missionary personnel all over Japan, which amounted in 1592 to about 600 people. (Higashibaba 2001: 72) In contrast to Xavier’s catechism it did not include the refutation of Japanese religions; rather, it contained modifications and additions to the Portuguese original as a response to problems or questions arising in Japanese encounters with Christian theology. (Higashibaba 2001: 56-64)

One of the main catechisms for theological education is Alessandro Valignano’s Catechismus Christianae Fidei, a Latin catechism printed in Lisbon in 1586 as a teaching compendium for the Japanese students at the Jesuit schools. It consists of two parts: the first book combines a refutation of Japanese religions – mainly the Buddhist sects – with an explanation of the nature and the attributes of the Christian God, arguments to prove God’s existence, his creation of the world and humans, and the nature of the soul. The second book covers various aspects of Christian conduct. Given the fact that the explanation of Christian doctrines is closely tied to the refutation of Buddhist teachings, the work is a good illustration of the apologetic dimension in theological education by the Jesuits.

With a similar intention, Padre Pedro Gomez (1535-1600), Vice-Provincial from 1590 to 1600, compiled three compendia for the training of Japanese Christian students in the early 1590s. They were used from the middle of the 1590s in an introductory course to philosophy and theology in the Japanese collegios. (Schütte 1939: 234 f) The theological compendium also includes topics that were of particular interest for missionary work in Japan: How far should participation in such Japanese rites as ancestor veneration be allowed? Should Christian believers confess to their faith when they have to face death for being Christian? How diligently should those who wish to be baptised be instructed in matters of Christian faith?

format. However, Higashibaba points out that the questions and answers resemble a debate rather than guiding the reader and supporting his memorizing as in the Portuguese ‘original.’ Its contents are the nature of God, Jesus and humans; the meaning of the cross; the main prayers; the credo and articles of faith; Christian ethics; the sacraments and their meaning; and everyday Christian praxis. See Higashibaba 2001: 55, 63-71.

24. See footnote 2.
25. The rigid and uncompromising rejection of Japanese religious believes and practises in Valignano’s catechism stands in contrast to the image of a tolerant and culturally adaptive Valignano as constructed by authors such as Franz Josef Schütte and Pedro Lage Reis Correia, who emphasise his missionary method of accommodation. Correia for example contrasts his alleged pleas for “greater tolerance,” his policy of “integration into the society that was thought to be evangelized” (2001: 98) with the Franciscans’ non-accomodating concept of proselytisation.
26. Schütte 1939: 250-256. In addition to these catechisms, a variety of theological compendia, confessionals, prayer collections and other spiritual and ritual literature was used. The printing press brought to Japan by Valignano in 1590 made the ‘mass-production’ of texts possible and thus enhanced the standardisation of theological instruction significantly. A list of texts printed by the Jesuit printing press between 1590 and 1612 is given by Higashibaba 2001: 52 f.
Fukan’s *Myōtei Mondō* was probably intended to be used in everyday missionary propagation rather than as a catechism for theological education. This can be concluded from Fukan’s remarks about his intended audience. Yet, considering his extensive reference to Buddhist and Confucian concepts, it can be assumed that it was directed at a well-educated audience rather than at commoners with little reading ability. Formally, it resembles the dialogue form in *Dochiriina Kirishitan*. As in *Dochiriina*, the questions posed in *Myōtei Mondō* are critical and challenge the answering person who acquires the status of a master unfolding her arguments. Another similarity with the *Dochiriina* is the metaphorical language applied in both writings. It stands in contrast to the sophisticated scholarly style of Valignano’s catechism, thus indicating the different audience. However, Fukan’s *Myōtei Mondō* shares with Valignano’s catechism the weight he puts on refuting Japanese religions and the intention of proving the superiority of the Christian idea of salvation compared to the assumed lack of it in Japanese religions, particularly in Buddhism.

**Fukan Fabian’s standpoint of critique in Myōtei Mondō**

In *Myōtei Mondō*, Fukan argues from the standpoint of a Jesuit. Like Valignano in his catechism he demands exclusive veneration of the Christian god and neglect of Buddhist or Shintō deities. His standpoint is clearly expressed in Yūtei’s explanation of the first commandment:

> The first commandment says you must revere and cherish the one Deus. That means after you become a Christian, you must not use kami, Buddhas or even inferior ‘things’ any more (神仏已下の事、是を用べからず). You are supposed to revere and worship the one Deus only.  

Fukan’s claim of exclusive worship rests on a logical and a pragmatic reason: logically, he argues that the phenomenal world must have been created intentionally, and there can be only one omnipotent creator-god; pragmatically, everybody should venerate the Christian god because he is the only one who can guarantee a good life in this world and the next world. (*Myōtei Mondō* 1970: 146-152, 170) Consequently, his arguments against Buddhism, Confucianism and Shintō are intended to refute their respective explanations of how the phenomenal world arose, as well as to question their ability to offer salvation.

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27. *Myōtei Mondō* 1970: 170. Similarly, Valignano explains that the first commandment does not allow veneration and worship of anybody else but the Christian God (*In primo nanque mandato praecribitur, ut nullus adoret, & colat, nisi unum tantum Deum [...]*); this includes the prohibition “to venerate icons, kami and botoke, to put our hope and salvation into their hands and expect from them strength and help” (*[..] et ita boc praecepta interdictus est nobis omnis simulacrorum cultus: Prohibemur Camios, & Fotoquios venerari: prohibemur nostram in illis spem, & salutem collocare: ab eis opem, & auxilium petere.*). See *Catechismus Christianae fidei 1586*, *Catechismi Iaponensis libri secundi*, *Prooemium*, A 2, and *Concio Prima in Qua Divinum Legis Praecepta explicantur*, A 3.
This last intention is obvious from his refutation of Buddhism in the first book of *Myōtei Mondō*. To Fukan, Buddhist thought does not offer a reasonable concept of salvation in the afterlife. For one thing he points at the human nature of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas like Shakyamuni or Amida. How can human beings possibly help other humans to salvation in the afterlife? (*Myōtei Mondō* 1970: 105f) For another, he criticises the Mahāyāna Buddhist concept of “emptiness” (*kūmu* 空無) as rendering all ideas of afterlife pointless. Although “provisional teachings” (*gonkyō* 權教) as “skillful means” (*hōben* 方便) misguide common people by claiming that there is an afterlife, the “real teachings” (*jikkyō* 実教) tell us that the afterlife is ultimate emptiness. (*Myōtei Mondō* 1970: 107 f) Even Amida Buddha and the Pure Land exist only within the human mind: “You must understand the Pure Land as being ‘mind only,’ Mida as being your mind, i.e. both point at the human mind only, yet Amida and the Pure Land can be considered the main teachings.” (*Myōtei Mondō* 1970: 110) He exemplifies the distinction between “real teachings” and “provisional teachings” by referring to the Zen Buddhist idea of the ultimate non-duality of all concepts, including that of good and bad, right and wrong.

Saying that the “law is originally no-law” means that the original mind is no-mind and no-conceptualisation. Saying that the “law of no-law is the law” is like seeing the flowers [of a tree], but if you cut the tree and look at it, there is neither green nor red. Yet, when spring has come and the tree has been blessed by rain and dew, flowers that don’t actually exist will provisionally blossom. In analogy, although originally [the mind is] no-mind, as time passes a beautiful or an ugly mind might appear. This is indicated by saying “the law of no-law is the law.” [...] The 28 patriarchs in India, the six patriarchs in China, they all conclude that the Buddhist law is not two. Therefore, it is said that good and bad are not different, right and wrong are one. (*Myōtei Mondō* 1970: 107 f)

Buddhist concepts of afterlife belong to the realm of illusions, he argues, even the ten worlds of existence are not more than “circumstances of the present (*genzai no arisama* 現在ノ有様), they all belong to the world as we see it, and never are they a kind of afterlife.” (*Myōtei Mondō* 1970: 111) Besides, Fukan points at the ethical consequences of this worldview, namely the dissolution of a distinction between good and bad, right and wrong. Without the promise of an afterlife, he fears there is no motivation for proper moral conduct in everyday life: good deeds would not be rewarded and bad actions not be punished. (*Myōtei Mondō* 1970: 108)

Here, Fukan argues on the Christian premise that salvation is to be expected in the afterlife, an idea he sees ultimately denied in Buddhism. In line with this argument, he dedicates his apologetics to the Christian interpretation of salvation. In six chapters, he argues in favour of a god who has created the universe and governs nature as well as human fate; he introduces the concept of *anima rationalis* as the eternal dimension of man, the Christian understanding of paradise and hell, and explains the moral and ritual requirements for acquiring life in paradise.

However, Fukan complements the promise of salvation after death with that of salvation *in this life*. He links the expectation of a good afterlife to that of a good life “here and now” by referring to Japanese religious terminology. For example,
the title of the second chapter in his Christian apologetics is “That there is only one true lord of peace and security in this life and of good rebirth in the afterlife” (genze an’non gosbō zensho no makoto no aruijī, ittai masbimasu koto 現世安穏、後生善所ノ真ノ主一体在マス事). The phrase genze an’non gosbō zensho (“peace in this life, good birth in the afterlife”) appears in the fifth chapter of the Lotus Sutra, where the historical Buddha Gautama Siddharta describes the benefits deriving from his teachings.28 In his refutations, Fukan uses gosbō (literally “afterlife”) mainly with reference to the Pure Land as taught in Amida Buddhism.29 “Peace in this life” (genze an’non), on the other hand, is closely linked to the idea of genze riyaku 現世利益, or go-riyaku 御利益 (“this-worldly benefits”), i.e. benefits experienced in this life as a result of Buddhist religious praxis, such as chanting or copying sutras, invoking Buddha names, etc.30 Fukan re-interprets this phrase by linking it to the Christian god as the lord over the two worlds, i.e. the one who grants benefits in this life and joy in the afterlife. (Myōtei Mondō 1970: 146, 150)

Myōshū: Until now, I have always thought that there is nothing like kinen or kitō31 in Christianity; I didn’t know that I could simply change the place to which I direct my requests, and still pray for a long life and happiness in this world, joy, peace and a good place in the afterlife. [...] It is really reasonable to change the place to which I direct my requests. (Myōtei Mondō 1970: 150)

He points out that although temple parishioners are encouraged to pray for a good afterlife and peace in this life, although goma 護摩, kaji 加持32 and the recitation of the

28. Ian Reader and George Tanabe (1998: 73 f) refer to this expression in order to argue that emphasis on worldly benefits is authorized by Buddhist scriptures rather than being an adaptation to popular religiosity.
29. For example Myōtei Mondō 1970: 109f. The space Fukan dedicates to refuting the actual existence of Amida Buddha and the Pure Land (four of the 12 chapters of the first book) suggests that he regarded this as the prominent Buddhist concept of afterlife.
30. Originally a Buddhist term, genze riyaku designates benefits in “this life” as granted by Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Prayers for such benefits are called genze kitō 現世祈祷. (Nakamura 1991: 338) The term came to comprise all kinds of practical benefits granted by Buddhas, Bodhisattvas or kami, be they individual, local or national. These range from peace and political stability to good harvest and professional success as well as health, wealth, good childbirth, successful studies, or safety at home and on travel, etc. The means to achieve such benefits were ritual worship such as offerings, the chanting of sutras, mantras or invoking Buddha names (nenbutsu), pilgrimage or ascetic practices, supporting the construction of temples or statues, and prayers. (Shioiri 1999: 273) The fundamental meaning of the concept of genze riyaku for contemporary religious life in Japan has been elucidated by Ian Reader and George Tanabe (1998) in their study on ‘practical benefits.’
31. In Fukan’s time, kitō 祈祷 prayers in esoteric Buddhism aimed mainly at individual benefits such as health, safety, prosperity in business or agriculture, or protection from disasters. (Hikita 1985: 251)
32. Goma (skt. boma) is a basic ritual in esoteric Tendai and Shingon Buddhism that is often combined with kaji kitō. In Japanese esoteric Buddhism it is assumed that the
fire as representation of wisdom and compassion burns the human passions that are represented by the wood, oil, salt, incense and vinegar that is thrown into it. The merit gained by this ritual can be transferred in order to provide practical benefits as mentioned above. (Kinouchi 1999: 347) Kaji is the ritual by which the practitioner fuses his mind (by meditation), body (by forming a hand gesture, a mudra) and mouth (by intoning a mantra) with Buddha Dainichi (skt. Mahāvairocana).

Fukan takes up the terminology and praxis of Japanese religions and integrates them into his pro-Christian arguments. He does not criticise the popularity of worldly benefits in favour of the life to come after death; instead, he claims that the Christian god is much more capable to meet these religious needs than Buddhas, Bodhisattvas or kami. In this way he gives consideration to the religious background of his Japanese audience and tries to bridge the gap between their religious customs and Christianity.

The same attitude is reflected in the way he integrates Neo-Confucian morality into Christian thinking. When he explains the anima rationalis as that which endows humans with the faculty of cognition and moral awareness, he describes morality in terms of the five Neo-Confucian virtues: “Another effect of it [the anima rationalis] is that you know the truth about things (mono no kotowari o shiru 物ノ理ヲ知リ), strive to realise the principles of benevolence (nin 仁), righteousness (gi 義), propriety (rei 礼), wisdom (ebi 智) and good faith (shin 信) and consider your fame after death.” (Myōtei Mondō 1970: 161) Similarly, he explains the fourth commandment by referring to the Confucian virtues of filial piety (kōkō 孝行) and loyalty (ebū 忠):

The fourth [commandment] says that filial piety (kōkō) should be practiced toward father and mother. This is understood to comprise all younger brothers following their elder brothers, and vassals putting all their effort into cultivating one-minded loyalty to their lords. (Myōtei Mondō 1970: 170)

Finally he argues on the basis of Buddhist thought, i.e. the differentiation between “true” and “conventional” reality, when stating that “all things have an illusionary and a real side; therefore it is important to understand that also with regard to the lord of the two worlds of this and the next life, we have to differentiate between
illusionary lord and real lord.” (Myôtei Mondô 1970: 146) He continues to expound that Buddhas are illusionary, kami can be reduced to yin and yang, and therefore only the Christian god is the true lord. Interestingly, he reverses the basis of his argument in the same passage when he identifies the kami with the Confucian concepts of yin and yang and claims that these are in fact the materia prima as explained in Christian thought. (Myôtei Mondô 1970: 146) He maintains this perspective in the following chapters where he presumes the truth of the Christian conception of the three types of soul. Thus, he “falsifies” the Buddhist idea of rebirth by assuming that man is endowed with an anima rationalis that provides him with the faculty of moral differentiation and thus distinguishes him from animals. If man could be reborn as an animal, he argues, animals should have the same faculties of cognition and morality, since these are not part of the physical body. (Myôtei Mondô 1970: 163) Clearly, this argument does not rest on Buddhist notions of man that deny a permanent self as the subject of rebirth. Thus, although Fukun’s standpoint is clearly determined by an attitude of Christian exclusivism, his rhetoric affirms aspects of religious praxis in “popular” Japanese religion, fundamental concepts in Buddhist thought and Confucian morality.

What are Fukun’s criteria for evaluating a religion? In Myôtei Mondô, reason (dôri 道理, kotowari 理) is one of the most obvious criteria for his claim of exclusive belief in the Christian god. In his reference to reason, Fukun reflects Valignano’s emphasis on rationality as the premise of truth. According to Valignano, God has endowed man with reason (Lat. ratio), mind (Lat. mens) and intellect (Lat. intelligentia). Due to these faculties man – in contrast to other living beings - can distinguish between right and wrong, good and bad. His mind and intellect enable him to understand the “truth” of things as well as the basic moral distinction between right and bad. Valignano emphasises reason as the basis of human cognition in order to prove the universal validity of his arguments: since they are based on rationality, everyone must realize their truth.

Fukan also gives authority to his arguments by referring to reason. In his outline of Christianity the persuasiveness of arguments is expressed by the terms dôri or kotowari. Fukun applies the term dôri mostly in the sense of “logic,” “reason” or “truth.” Different to Valignano, Fukun does not emphasise the universal character of “truth” and “logic” as accessible by means of reason, mind and intellect; instead he argues for the superiority of reason compared to tradition as the ultimate

33. “[Reliquae animantes] ratione vacant, mente, & intelligentia carent, qua quid in rebus verum sit, quid falsum, & quid prosequendù ut bonestum, & bonum, quid fugiendum ut turpe, & malum, discernere quæant: homo vero præter vitam & sensus, quibus eum Deus suo beneficio donavit, vi quæam, & facultate longë præstantiore constat, quam mentem, & intelligentiam vacant, qua per rationes, & argumenta consecta rerum veritatem inquirit, & quid differat inter bonestum, & turpe, cognoscit.” In: Catechismus Christianae Fidei ..., Prooemium (A 2). Ieiri Toshimitsu in his translation of the Catechismus into modern Japanese uses risei 理性, seisbin 精神 and chisei 知性 to translate ratio, mens and intelligentia. The original version as edited in Ieiri uses kotowari (理) or dôri (道理), chie (智恵) and sei (精). (Nihon no katekizumo 1969: 3, 195)
criterion for truth. In doing so, he constructs a dichotomy between Christian
thinking as based on rationality, and Japanese, i.e. Buddhist and Confucian, thinking
as based on “traditional” authorities.

To think that something has to be believed because a Buddha has taught it, or
that the words of the patriarchs must be true, and therefore not to inquire into the
reasons, this is the foolishness of the people of the old school. For example, if you
walk along a dark path, and rather than walking in the light of your own torch you
drop it somewhere and trot along in the light of a man who walks five or ten cbō in
advance; isn’t then your own torch sadly useless? Claiming that something cannot be
wrong because it has been said by a Buddhist patriarch, or asking for someone else’s
words without using one’s own intellect and the ability to differentiate, that is useless
intelligence (muda na chie). (Myōtei Mondō 1970: 158 f)

Obviously, Fukan does not limit himself to refuting the contents of Buddhist and
Confucian teachings; he also questions the underlying legitimisation of truth.
Probably Fukan’s examples are meant to be a critique of the meaning applied in
East Asian Buddhist schools to the genealogy of doctrinal transmission. This mode
of authorization is contrasted with the two pillars of Christian reasoning: reason
(kotowari, dōri) and the doctrinal tradition of the church (denju 伝授). (Myōtei Mondō
1970: 164)

Fukan’s standpoint in Myōtei Mondō is predominantly that of a Jesuit who
propagates the replacement of Japanese religious beliefs and customs by
Christianity. In his refutation, he argues against doctrinal contents and principles
of their authorization. Interestingly, this exclusivist attitude is complemented by
attempts to bridge the gap to customs and thought of Japanese religiosity. Thus
the writing seems to have had a double function depending on its audience: to
the European Jesuits, it proved Fukan’s loyalty and “orthodoxy”; to his Japanese
audience, it presented ways of viewing Christianity – though only selectively – in
terms of Japanese religious and moral customs.

Fukan Fabian’s standpoint of critique in Ha Daiusu

Fukan explains his motivation to write Ha Daiusu as the desire to make up for
his Christian past by providing Buddhists and Shintō priests with solid knowledge
of Christianity so they can refute it properly. (Ha Daiusu 1970: 424) However,
discussions about his motivation often refer to the last chapter where he blames the
Jesuits for their arrogant behavior towards Japanese, in particular for their refusal to
allow Japanese into the priesthood: “Because they are arrogant people they don’t even
consider Japanese to be human beings. […] Beside, they don’t let Japanese become
padres. You can imagine what feeling it is not being able to realize your heart’s desire.”
(Ha Daiusu 1970: 443 f) In fact between 1601 and 1614 fifteen Japanese were ordained
as priests, and Fukan was not among them. (Cieslik 1965: 76 f)

The treatise consists of two parts: In seven steps Fukan explains and refutes basic
Christian doctrines, comprising the Christian concept of god, the differentiation
between anima rationalis, sensitiva and vegetativa; the fall of man; the role of Jesus as savior of mankind and the Ten Commandments. In the final part, he discusses some questions concerning Christianity, mainly with regard to the conduct of missionaries and Christians.

Fukan’s standpoint in Ha Daiusu is clear right from the start. In the preface he declares himself to be anti-Christian: his intention is to refute Christianity on the basis of his inside knowledge and “to illuminate what is right” instead. (Ha Daiusu 1970: 424) Consequently, many of his arguments are a reversal of his own reasoning in Myōtei Mondō. For example, in the first chapter of his anti-Christian writing he takes up the Christian argument that neither Buddhas nor kami can be thought of as creators of the universe, because they are merely human beings. To him, this statement rests on a wrong understanding of the Mahāyāna Buddhist concept of a Buddha. The historical Buddha Shakyamuni, he argues, is just a human manifestation of the dharma-kāya (Jap. bosshin 法身), i.e. the original body of a Buddha, which is eternal, unchangeable and beyond conceptualization. The kami, on the other hand, are “traces” of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, hence they too cannot be called human. 34 Ebisawa Arimichi has interpreted Fukan’s self-refutation as reflecting his poor theological understanding and the lack of a religious development. (Ebisawa 1971: 276) In evaluating Fukan’s faith, Ebisawa in my view ignores the intention of Fukan’s writings. Since both writings are intended to persuade, they cannot be interpreted as indicators of Fukan’s personal religiosity. Rather, they should be regarded as demonstrations of a particular standpoint, i.e. as a means to define his position in Christian and anti-Christian social settings of his time.

However, Fukan does not simply replace his former Christian belief with Buddhism. Instead, his religious standpoint is characterized by a pluralistic and a particularistic attitude. His affirmation of religious plurality is obvious in the way he contrasts the Christian idea of a creator god with Buddhist, Confucian and Shintō explanations of how the world arose. Fukan quotes the Dao de Jing on the arising of heaven and earth and all phenomena, mentions the Buddhist concept of jōj¨ ek¨ 成住壞空, i.e. the cyclical process of evolving and vanishing world-systems, and the legendary primal deities of Shintō mythology. He concludes by asking, “Why is it that only the Christians again and again talk about this topic as if only they knew about the creation of heaven and earth?” (Ha Daiusu 1970: 426) Thus, Fukan does not claim the superiority of Daoist, Buddhist or Shintō cosmogonies, but attacks the claim of exclusiveness made by the Christians. Throughout the book, Fukan displays this pluralistic standpoint. He contrasts Christian doctrines with respective counter-models taken from Confucian philosophy – especially with regard to the arising of the world out of the dao (道) and through yin and yang (in’yō 阴阳), or

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34. Ha Daiusu 1970: 427 f. Here, Fukan refers to the concept of bonji suijaku 本地垂迹 (“original forms of deities and their local traces”), i.e. of an original (bon) (Buddha or Bodhisattva) and its manifestation in “traces” (shaku) (Shintō deities). The development of that concept has determined the relations between Buddhist and Shintō deities, especially between the 9th and 12th century. See Teeuwen and Rambelli 2003.
Mahāyāna Buddhist thought, such as the idea of the dharmakāya. (Ha Daiusu 1970: 427, 429 f)

In addition, Fukan opposes the universalism of Christian truth claims by advocating a particularistic attitude. He explains the co-existence of Buddhism, Shintō, and Confucianism by the particular situation of Japan as “the land of the gods, and, because of the eastward expansion [of Buddhism], the land of the Buddhas.” (Ha Daiusu 1970: 427) According to Fukan, it is due to the heavenly mandate given by Amaterasu to the first emperor of Japan, and the propagation of Buddhism by Prince Shōtoku, a manifestation of a Buddha who acted in accordance with Amaterasu’s will, that Japan is protected by both, kami and Buddhas. Thus, the peaceful reign of the country depends on the prosperity of Buddhism and Shintō and vice versa. (Ha Daiusu 1970: 441 f) “When Shintō and the Buddhist law exist, the royal law will also flourish, and because there is the royal law, the authority of kami and Buddhas rises [...]” (Ha Daiusu 1970: 441) By emphasizing the mutual dependency of political stability and religious prosperity Fukan makes the welfare of Japan his criterion of evaluating religion.

The combination of concern for the country and dismissal of universal and exclusivist religious claims is most evident in Fukan’s comment on the Ten Commandments. Here, he counteracts Valignano’s statement that the Ten Commandments are profoundly reasonable and just; therefore they can and should be accepted by all countries and people. (Nibon no kateki zumo 1969: 135; Catechismus Christianae Fidei, Libri secundi, A 3 f) Against this assertion Fukan argues that the Ten Commandments cannot be accepted in Japan. Because of Shintō mythology, Japan’s political order rests on the worship of kami and Buddhas, whereas its social order depends on the Confucian virtues of filial piety and loyalty towards the secular lord. To him, the first commandment “You shall revere God above all other things” threatens the balance of political, social and religious order in two ways: It forbids the worship of non-Christian deities, thus preparing the ground for an implementation of foreign customs; and it authorizes resistance against secular lords, if this is in accord with God’s will: “According to the first commandment one must not follow the commands of one’s lord or father, if these are against the will of Deus, nor even value one’s life; it includes the encouragement to conquer the country and destroy the Buddhist and the imperial law.” (Ha Daiusu 1970: 441 f, quotation 441) Again he argues on the premise that religion ought to serve the country, and that Christianity is not compatible with a peaceful political order.

He also questions the exclusivity of the Ten Commandments by stating that they are included in the five precepts for lay Buddhists (not to kill, not to steal, not to commit adultery, not to lie and not to consume intoxicating liquids). Beside, they do not exceed Confucian moral teachings:

There are numerous moralities, but none exceeds the five relationships. Lord and vassal, father and child, husband and wife, older and younger brother, friend and

35. In Ha Daiusu (1970: 441) he states: “The Christians wait until the time has come to turn the whole of Japan Christian, to destroy the Buddhist law and the way of the gods.”
friend, if they fulfill their mutual moral duties, what need could there be for anything else? [...] The duties among lord and vassal are loyalty and benevolence, among father and child filial piety and caring love, among husband and wife their respective obligations, between older and younger brother brotherly love, and faithfulness between friends. (Ha Daisu 1970: 441)

The plurality of religions as advocated above is paralleled here by a plurality of moral teachings.

Although much of Fukun’s arguments against Christianity is based on the idea of national welfare, reason still is the other criterion of evaluation. He does not refer to dōri or kotowari as extensively as in Myōtei Mondō, but he applies logical reasoning when he criticizes inherent contradictions in the idea of an omnipotent, omniscient and merciful God. For example, he comments on the teaching that Jesus was sent by God to atone for the sin of Eve and Adam.

They say that God appeared on earth 5000 years after heaven and earth were opened. Was this atonement so late because the distance between heaven and earth is extremely far and it took him some years to come such a long way? Or did he need so long to prepare for the journey? Since there was no atonement for 5000 years all men all over the world must have fallen into hell, an uncountable number of people. These uncountable people must have dropped into hell like raindrops. Can you really call him, who watched this without mercy for 5000 years, without making up his mind to create a means to save these people, lord of mercy? (Ha Daisu 1970: 438)

In a similar pattern the narrations of the Old Testament are used to question the qualities attributed to God: Why did God create the angels so that some of them would oppose him? (Ha Daisu 1970: 433) Why did he create Adam and Eve so they would sin against him? This god must be either cruel or ignorant, he concludes. (Ha Daisu 1970: 434 f)

Fukan applies the same criteria in Ha Daisu as in Myōtei Mondō, but the relation between them is reversed: here, compatibility with Japanese socio-political conditions gains dominance over reason.

**Conclusion**

Concerning the *dynamics of critique and anti-critique*, Fukun Fabian’s critical writings reflect a shift from an exclusive religious standpoint to that of a religious pluralist who is neither non-religious nor committed to one particular religion. Ha Daisu is not an apologetic work that defends a certain religious tradition. Nevertheless Fukun claims the superiority of specific religions (mainly Buddhism and Confucianism) over others (Christianity), i.e. he does not promote a non-religious position. With this shift of position he changed the premises of his arguments: In Myōtei Mondō he assumes that the function of a religion is to provide individual salvation, whereas in his anti-Christian writing a religion must support the social and political order. In line with these assumptions, he applies different *criteria* of evaluating religions, or rather, he puts different weight on the same criteria. In
**Myōtei Mondō** his main measure for accepting or dismissing a religion is reason, i.e. the rationality of truth claims. In *Ha Daisu* on the other hand, the main measure is appropriateness for Japan, i.e. compatibility with socio-political conditions and religious customs of his time. In his response to his former work Fukan thus sets up a new frame of reference for discussing the value of religions. He substitutes Jesuit discourses of religion (for the individual) by referring to Japanese discourses in which emphasis on socio-political functions of religions and concepts of religious plurality have played a major role.\(^{36}\) Thus, Fukan’s critique of religions is characterised not only by the confrontation of different kinds of religions, but also by the confrontation of different concepts of religion. His critique operates on two levels: In terms of contents, he criticises the truth claims of Christian doctrines; on the meta-level he criticises a concept of religion based on universalism and exclusiveness.

Fukan’s exclusivist standpoint in *Myōtei Mondō* mirrors that of Valignano in his catechism. Both argue on the premise that a religion should lead to individual salvation, and its teachings ought to be in accord with reason. To the Jesuits, *Myōtei Mondō* thus confirmed Fukan’s orthodoxy. Yet, integrating terminology, concepts and praxis of Japanese religions and ethics offered ways of adapting Christianity to the context of Japanese customs and thoughts. His standpoint might thus be described as oscillating between Christian theology and Japanese religious worldviews, with a strong dominance on the theological side. The intention of *Myōtei Mondō* can thus be described as evangelisation among Japanese.

His anti-Christian stance, on the other hand, is strongly influenced by the rhetoric of the expulsion edict of 1614. It states that Japan rests on the unity of the three teachings (Buddhism, Shintō and Confucianism) and blames Christians for attacking the two religions and Confucian morality, for trying to usurp the country and to destroy the imperial law. (Ebisawa 1970: 598) By making use of the same arguments, Fukan demonstrates his awareness of a “cultural” – or national – identity that determines his judgement on religions: because he is Japanese, he propagates the worship of Buddhas and kami and the maintenance of Confucian morality.

I therefore agree with George Elison’s suggestion that Fukan wrote *Ha Daisu* as a means of self-defence in order to prove his loyalty to the anti-Christian politics of the bakufu. (Elison 1973: 155-164) Elison assumes that Fukan might have felt urged to “testify” his anti-Christian attitude because his involvement in a scandal concerning the Christian magistrate of Nagasaki raised doubts about his religious convictions. To me this argument is more convincing than reducing his motive to disappointment (Ebisawa 1971: 276f), or “disgust” with the Jesuits and ideological discrepancies, as Oskar Mayer (1994: 26) claims. Why should Fukan wait more than ten years to express his disappointment?

The case of Fukan illustrates the multiple layers of criticising religions from a “religious standpoint.” Not only are his religious standpoints based on different

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36. This is obvious in the emphasis on the state-protecting function of Buddhism by the emperors of the Nara era (710-794), in the canonisation of Shintō myths legitimating political power in the 8th and 9th century, in Nichiren’s (1222-1282) preoccupation with national welfare, and the developments towards *bonji suijaku*, to name just a few examples.
dimensions of religion, including individual religiosity, social or political functions, popular religion or “state religion.” At the same time, they represent particular notions of religion and reflect the position of a religious insider as well as that of an outsider who argues in favor of specific religions. His writings therefore are a good example of how inter-cultural critique between religions is not only a confrontation of religious convictions, but a confrontation between different discourses of religion.

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