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RE-VISITING ‘SOLIDARNOŚĆ’

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the Polish Solidarity’s propaganda practice. Drawing from a discursive archive comprising cultural artefacts, the movement’s policy statements, and augmented by interviews, this Foucault-inspired study reveals how ‘propaganda of protest’ became a ‘pillar’ of the Solidarity movement’s campaigning. This study analyzes propaganda strategies and tactics for mobilization and political engagement among Poles, and how campaigning aided power shifts between the movement and the authorities. Contextualizing this analysis in the Sovietized settings, this study shows that propaganda was inherent to Solidarity’s transgressive and subversive campaigning in multiple areas of the movement’s agency: mobilization and support building, construction of collective identities, coalition-building, issues management and policy making, and implementation. Finally, I argue, that the qualities of Solidarity’s propaganda were culturally-grounded, based on the self-presentation strategies as well as the zeitgeist belief in engagement of workers’ with trade unionism rather than policies of the state socialist regime.

Key words: social movement, campaigning, propaganda, protest, Foucault
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RE-VISITING ‘SOLIDARNOŚĆ’: PROPAGANDA OF PROTEST AND CAMPAIGNING OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Despite a burgeoning body of research on the Polish Solidarity, Garton-Ash (2006) notes the scope for further analysis of the movement. This is particularly true of Solidarity’s campaigning. The recent scholarship tends to conceptualize social movements’ campaigning within liberal media landscapes. For example, Cammaerts’ (2012) advances the concept of mediated opportunity structure, the focus of which is analysis of movements in environments ultra-saturated by the media. He addresses the logic of protest in democratic, capitalist and techno-savvy settings, but it has limitations once confronted with the task of historicizing civic campaigning within authoritarian regimes such as the state socialism of 1980s Poland. In the Sovietized media landscape “citizens lacked the opportunity to express or to discuss their opinions on political issues, since there was no freedom of speech or independent media channels open to voice such a freedom” (Aleksandrowicz et al., 2010, p. 158).

Despite the above-mentioned constraints, Solidarity’s campaigning aided forms of political engagement (Mason, 1982). Given limited cross-disciplinary debate on communicative practices among social movements’ (Downing, 2008), this article builds on various strands of scholarship and provides insights into the movement’s campaigning during ‘the carnival of Solidarity’ era (August 1980-December 1981). This study focuses on analysis of propaganda and, by problematizing it as a discursive practice¹, it contributes to the body of knowledge on campaigning in the following ways: it positions the organization of propaganda on the map of practices inherent to Solidarity’s campaigning, it historicizes propaganda through the campaigns’ lived experiences, it empirically substantiates the concept of ‘propaganda of protest’, and critically analyzes power relations inherent to Solidarity’s campaigning. Finally, the relevance of the Foucauldian approach undertaken in study for analysis of other social
movements, historical and more contemporary ones, is discussed. The primary contribution of this article is to the field of critical communication studies, whereas its secondary contribution falls into the analysis of social movements and civic cultures in Poland.

CAMPAIGNING: PR-PROPAGANDA OF DISSENT AND PROTEST

A departure point for this analysis is the recognition that Solidarity’s campaign was based on multiple trajectories of actions and, because of its networked organization, can be described as a ‘information and influence campaign’. Manheim (2011, p. 18) defines this term as “a systematic, sequential and multi-faceted effort by one actor to inform or to influence the perceptions, preferences or actions of, some other actors”. L’Etang (2016, p. 32) points out that in terms of basic terminologies, social movements can be understood as “long-term campaigns”, “activism as specific historical events”, and public relations (PR) as “strategic communication”. Simultaneously, she acknowledges that these categories are open to re-interpretation. On the one hand, this approach allows anchor public relations as one of the pillars in the organization of Solidarity’s campaign. On the other hand, it enables historicize this form of persuasive communication as a practice pertaining to the themes of mobilization, political engagement, communicative exchanges, and policy influence.

The central premise of this article is that propaganda and public relations (PR) underpin dissent and protest as political agency and, by virtue of its mobilizing affordances, is one of the early emergent components of Solidarity’s protest. Following Moloney’s (2006, p. 6) argument that public relations is a soft form of propaganda, this article recognizes that imaginaries of this discursive practice are linked to cultural settings for its performance (Corner, 2007). It is within the contemporary scholarship on public relations that useful ways of conceptualizing the pillar of Solidarity’s campaigning, that this article focuses on, are found. To remain faithful to the terminologies in the field, this article follows the writing
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convention - ‘PR-propaganda’ - which both, encapsulates public relations as a soft form of propaganda and broadens the analytical scope, as it requires to interpret this practice through the prism of campaigners’ cultural settings (Moloney, 2006, p. 6).

Coombs and Holladay (2012) note the change of focus in research away from ‘corporate’ and ‘government’ towards the practice of public relations by ‘social movements’. This shift has triggered the need to re-think terminologies in the field. For example, the term ‘political public relations’ is used more broadly than ‘activist public relations’ as a descriptor of the practice (Karlberg, 1996; Dozier & Lauzen, 2000; Taylor et al., 2001). Elsewhere, Holtzhausen (2007) writes about activism as a corporate PR practice, whilst Berger & Reber (2005) demonstrate how activists use digital media in public relations.

While analytically useful, contemporary public relations terminologies are problematic for this study from two reasons. First, during the Cold War, in the Sovietized part of Europe, the term ‘propaganda’ was used as a dominant signifier of persuasive communication, and had no conceptual alternatives. Second, ‘dissent’ and ‘protest’ entail challenging the status quo, therefore analysis of Solidarity’s campaigning requires a framework sensitive to power relations. The term ‘activist public relations’ tends to be used generically, whereas ‘protest’ and ‘dissent’ are particular types of political action. To align them with campaigning, I turn to the ideas of ‘PR-propaganda of dissent’ and ‘PR-propaganda of protest’. The first term refers to “the dissemination of ideas, commentaries, and policies through PR techniques in order to change current, dominant thinking and behaviour in discrete economic, political and cultural areas of public life” whereas the latter “is also persuasive communication, but not principally about ideas, behaviours and policies. Instead, it persuades in order to implement those ideas, behaviours and policies into law, regulation and other forms of executive action” (ANONYMIZED, 2013, pp. 4-5).
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In addition to terminological considerations, this study is positioned against scholarship that draws from social theory to historicize PR-propaganda. This approach has been undertaken by scholars in the field (Holtzhausen, 2011; Demetrious, 2013; Anderson, 2017), the works of which have generated insights into the ways in which this practice evolved over the years. This study, however, can be mapped out more precisely against the recent work produced by L’Etang (2016) as she draws from the analysis of Touraine to explore historicity in public relations by social movements. While Touraine et al.’s (1983) classical volume on Solidarity pays no attention to campaigning practices, elsewhere, Arnason’s (1986, p. 144) reading of his works reveals that Touraine views communication as “conflictual appropriation of historicity by collective actors who struggle for control of it”. For L’Etang (2016) this is an argument for the importance of studying PR-propaganda by social movements as a practice mediating social change. Following these insights, this study is located on the continuum of research on PR-propaganda in campaigning but, unlike in the existing scholarship, it focuses on a social movement, the political action of which unfolded in Poland during Sovietized era.

DISSENT MEDIA VERSUS PROPAGANDAIZED DISSENT

Solidarity has been analyzed within many academic fields. Yet, scholarship tends not to bridge scattered research on the movement, and scholars exploring Solidarity tend to remain in ‘disciplinary silos’. For instance, media studies credit Solidarity for the advancement of the oppositional public sphere, arguing that Solidarity’s ‘dissent media’ circulated the oppositional ideas (Curry, 1990; Pfetsch & Voltmer, 2012). At the turn of 1970s and 1980s public spheres in Poland were highly polarized. Oftentimes, political action in the ‘official’ public sphere mobilized the resistance within ‘oppositional’ and ‘alternative’ public spheres (Jakubowicz, 1990). Dissent media, therefore, was the focus of media studies research.
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Conversely, with a few exceptions (Ławniczak et al., 2003; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006; Fras, 2010), communication studies have paid little attention to Solidarity. Social theorists and political studies (Staniszkis, 1984; Zielonka, 1986) only make references to ‘propaganda wars’ between Solidarity and the authorities. Kubik (1994) analysis is close to the approach undertaken in this study, as it focuses on symbolic and discursive features of the Solidarity’s movement. However, his analysis focuses on the power of cultural meanings, but pays limited attention to the campaigning dynamics using those symbols. All in all, literature review reveals dispersed features of analysis of the Solidarity’s campaigning. Further, it reveals campaigning pillars: reliance on ‘dissent media’ and reliance on ‘PR-propaganda of dissent’ and ‘PR-propaganda of protest’. This study focuses on the latter.

FOUCAULT, CULTURE & PR-PROPAGANDA

To trace the Polish Solidarity movement’s PR-propaganda practices, I turn to the oeuvre of Michele Foucault. Foucault’s (1974) ‘analytical toolbox’ has been applied to analysis of PR-propaganda, and approached as ‘discursive practice’ (Motion & Leith, 2007). In this article, his concepts strengthen analysis by foregrounding cultural features of PR-propaganda, and by revealing how this discursive practice shaped power relations. To compellingly account for cultural sensitivities of the Solidarity’s era, the conceptual framework for this study is made up of Foucault’s take on power, culture and discourse. Following Foucault (1967, p. 582), I argue, that Solidarity created a politically unique ‘cultural conjuncture’. Shaping it and being shaped by it, PR-propaganda was an articulation of a culture of resistance, in which protest and dissent were central to the Solidarity movement’s political action.

This analysis draws from Foucault’s views on power. For Foucault (1978) power lies within systems of control and focuses on disciplining people. Indeed, the initial source of Solidarity’s power lied in resistance to institutional conditioning and in collective political
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action. On the one hand, its campaigning was prompted by the unmatched expectations with public policies: growing inequalities, falsehoods in the state-controlled media about economy, corruption, poor standards of health and safety, and declining standards of living. On the other hand, the August strike was initiated by a network of ‘agitators’ who mobilized this political action (Mason, 1982). In terms of power effect, Solidarity’s PR-propaganda is thought of as “a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression” (Foucault, 1980, p. 119).

Foucault et al. (2000) distinguishes power derived from relationships of exchange from power derived from communicative relationships. This article focuses on the latter, bearing in mind that in unfolding the dynamics of power relations - resistance to power and limits of power - define PR-propaganda. Given that this article pays attention to the dynamics of power relations inherent in the practice of PR-propaganda, in doing so, it extends its analytical capacity by adopting the notion of ‘counter-conduct’ (Foucault, 2007). Using PR-propaganda to voice protest exemplifies ‘counter-conduct’ well. It illustrates how Solidarity became a subversive and transgressive producer of discourses, particularly how PR-propaganda became the act of counter-conduct against Polish government public policies.

METHODOLOGY

This interpretivist study aims to analyse the practice of PR-propaganda. Building on from the conceptual framework, this study is rooted in Foucault’s power network ontology as, particularly in the absence of the organized structures, the participants of this study viewed the emerging Solidarity’s campaign through the prism of networks. For Foucault, as noted by Eriksson (2005, p. 598), “the ontology of power can be approached only through a whole historical network, which implies various forms of knowledge, institutional practices, juridical and economic systems, and cultural relationships. These constitute what Foucault
calls ‘the network of power’”. Because this analysis focuses on campaigning, it subscribes to the worldview, in which the practice of propaganda unfolded within human networks.

To further bridge the gap between the conceptual framework and findings, the epistemic position of this study is embedded in the study of discourse. For Foucault (1972, p. 49) discourses are “practices that systematically form the objects and subjects of which they speak”. As well as thinking about the Solidarity’s campaign as a network, by the virtue of PR-propaganda’s power effects, this study is underpinned by the notion of discursive practice in which ‘to speak is to do something’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 209). This sensibility translates to performative and communicative features of propaganda as traceable “rules which are quite specific to a particular time, space, and cultural setting” (O’Farrerell, 2005, p. 79).

Bearing in mind Foucault’s take on knowledge, this exploratory study was designed to trace the organization of the campaign networks, and strategies and tactics as the manifestations of the propaganda practice itself. Following the review of literature, four research objectives have been developed: 1) to analyse contextual features of Solidarity’s PR-propaganda; 2) to map out key actors driving PR-propaganda; 3) to analyse how communicative strategies and tactics were linked to the movement’s goals; 4) to reveal transformational aspects of Solidarity’s PR-propaganda. A multi-sourced archive, covering campaigning practices was collected at the European Centre of Solidarity in Gdańsk. The archive comprises interviews, media artefacts (e.g. notations, digitalized interviews), policies and outputs of PR-propaganda practice (205 artefacts). The archive was evidenced into non-verbal and oral elements (L’Etang, 2010). To cross-examine the non-verbal artefacts, interviews with Solidarity members were conducted (July, 2012- August, 2013) with a view to unpack localized meanings, intentions and terminologies underpinning practices, for example, the usage of labels such as ‘public relations’ versus ‘propaganda’. Among discursive strands explored in
the interviews were: identities of the movement, the organization of campaigning, PR-
propaganda strategies and tactics as well as links them and the movement’s goals.

The field testing stage, mainly through the informal interviews with the European Solidarity
Centre in Gdańsk, led to the identification of Solidarity’s members engaged in the practice of
PR-propaganda. A snowballing technique was used to recruit participants, all of whom
belonged to Solidarity’s PR-propaganda networks. The fieldwork practicalities dictated the
necessity to divide some interviews: 9 interviews (1.5-hour average length) with 6 participants
(Tab. 1.), all of which were conducted in Polish. Their interpretation remained closer to
English as the targeted language. Given that discursive material was collected, the procedure
of triangulation was extended to non-discursive material as the materialization of PR-
propaganda traces. This was done to cross-examine participants interviews against policy and
media artefacts to generate insights addressing research objectives in more supportive way.
Field notes facilitated making connections between data sets making up the archive.

Subsequently, discourse analysis was applied to the collected archive. The procedure for this
practice-oriented discourse analysis focused on the organization, and strategies and tactics
underpinning propaganda. To address ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of PR-propaganda, in the analysis
process, contextual features of discourse on the practice were considered. First, Hook’s (2005)
take on Foucault’s discourse analysis, this study, apart from praxeology, accounts for: history
in the contextualization of discourse; conditioning the statements emerging and discourse as
material connected to textual elements embedded in the practice. Second, Jäger and Maier’s
(2009) outline of Foucauldian discourse analysis was paid attention to, particularly in relation
to the unpacking of discursive strands; discursive limits and techniques for narrowing themes
down; discursive fragments; discursive entanglements; collective symbols; discursive planes;
discursive events and contexts; discursive position. Third, Parker’s (1994) use of Foucauldian
discourse analysis facilitated the analytic process in the examining of alternatives modes of
expression that are not used, or search for as unspoken features of discourse, in a process of ‘free association’. The reduction of discursive statements and the search for utterances focusing on performative features of the Solidarity campaign enabled me to summarize the propaganda strategies and tactics in the Tab. 2 on pp. 32-33.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Campaign role</th>
<th>Time of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anna</td>
<td>July, 2012</td>
<td>Translator, member</td>
<td>169:11 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zygmunt</td>
<td>July, 2012</td>
<td>Poster Group, member</td>
<td>83:06 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerzy</td>
<td>August, 2012</td>
<td>Artist, member</td>
<td>75: 12 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janusz</td>
<td>May, 2013</td>
<td>Spokesperson, member</td>
<td>58:00 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giedymin</td>
<td>August, 2012</td>
<td>Spokesperson, member</td>
<td>63:07 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joanna</td>
<td>June, 2013</td>
<td>Translator, member</td>
<td>45:12 min.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DISCURSIVE CONTEXTS**

I start off the presentation of findings with an outline of contextual features of Solidarity’s campaigning. On 14 August 1980, a network of dissidents, led by Bodgan Borusewicz, initiated a protest in the Gdańsk Shipyard, an industrial compound employing 17,000 people. Soon after its outbreak, Lech Wałęsa assumed the leadership of the protest. The impetus to the outbreak of the strike had been the government’s announcement of a pricing policy, which became a ‘short-cut’ for inefficiencies of the state socialism, and a tipping point for the escalation of issues underpinning unsatisfactory economic and industrial affairs. The news about the strike circulated the region, mobilizing other state-run enterprises to join in. The
state-run news agency and the media denied the news (MKS, 1980a). On 16 August, the
Inter-factory Strike Committee (the MKS) was formed to coordinate the protest. The
protesters embarked on a campaign to shift the government’s policies orientation. Faced with
the hostile media landscape, however, their campaign took some unexpected turns.

Similarly, as in the work of Kubik (1994), while painting the background for Solidarity’s
campaigning, participants of this study placed the strike on the continuity of dissent
preceding the August protests. Even though the Sovietized regime in Poland was designed to
prevent citizens from autonomous political action, the outbreak of the strike was attributed by
them to ‘lived memories’. These included street protests in Gdańsk (1970), Ursus and Radom
(1976) and their brutal pacifications by the state authorities; the clandestine dissent driven by
‘second circulation’ and samizdat (e.g. ‘Bond’, ‘Voice’, ‘Critique’, ‘Worker’, ‘Puls’)
produced by, among others, the Committee for the Workers’ Defence (the KOR) or human
right groups, e.g. the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civic Rights (the ROBCiO).
Finally, the mobilizing significance of Jan Paul II to the mood setting for the protest was
foregrounded too. The Pope’s 1979 state visit to his homeland, the broadcast of which was
exceptionally permitted by the authorities, became a rare opportunity to disseminate “Let thy
spirit descend and renew the face of the land, this land!” – a spiritual message interpreted as
the statement of support for political dissent in Poland (Anna, interview, 2012).

PROPAGANDA AS ZEITGEIST

In August 1980, leaders of the Shipyard strike chose campaigning strategies, keeping the
previous political action in mind. It was uttered: “Wałęsa was one of the leaders during the
1970 protests and he knew what would have happened if the authorities used force. In the
light of those memories, he tried persuasion, and attempted a dialogue with the authorities”
(Anna, interview, 2012). Of all the themes in the discourse on Solidarity’s campaigning, the
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naming practices was culturally-grounded. Statements and utterances about the use of persuasive communication were re-occurring. The term ‘public relations’, however, was seen as being a dislocated descriptor, as “none of the Solidarity’s spokespeople described their practice as ‘PR’” (Anna, interview, 2012). Yet, the relational logic featured in the discourse: participants discussed dialogue as means to political engagement. Simultaneously, they spoke about ‘visual propaganda’ (Giedynim, interview, 2012) or ‘acts of propaganda’ (Zygmunt, interview, 2012) as pillars of the campaign. The term ‘propaganda’ mirrors the zeitgeist in the approach public engagement, but the practices were unique acts of self-presentation.

There was consent among the participants about polarized (‘us’ versus ‘them’ logic) positioning of Solidarity’s campaign against government’s propaganda. Descriptors such as ‘spokesmenship’ or ‘information campaign’ allowed them to distance their practices from those of their antagonists. Another way to differentiate the movement’s propaganda was through highlighting inclusivity and accuracy as campaigning features: the former was described as “community based” (Anna, interview, 2012) whereas the latter as “well-sourced” (Janusz, interview, 2013). These insights align with the ‘speaking the truth principle’ as the movement felt duty to fact-based campaigning (Smolar, 2013, p. 132). For example, the former Solidarity spokesmen revealed: “I was amazed as I did not feel that I needed to prepare myself to speak to journalists. I simply spoke what I thought was necessary, assuming that I should speak the truth, nothing but the truth, but perhaps not always the entire truth” (Janusz, interview, 2013). Through the commitment to truth-telling, campaigners assumed moral ‘high grounds’. Using the notion of ‘righteousness’ was a deliberate move: it was designed to appeal to largely Catholic citizenry and gave the campaign the initial legitimacy.
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MOBILIZATION OF THE AUGUST 1980 STRIKE

The process of the institutionalization of propaganda on a wider scale began when the Solidarity movement was registered as a trade union (p. 21). Prior to that, the campaign for the formation of a trade union was mobilized by a small network of dissidents. Its early stages were reported by participants as being in the state of flux and communicative roles among the protesters had a propensity to overlap. Also, at that time, the right to public meetings was restricted – strikes as acts of political engagement, had consequences far exceeding the significance of protests in liberal democracies.

On 14 August 1980, industrial workers reacted to the announcement of the governmental policy. The agitative public speeches of a group of dissidents mobilized the occupational strike in the Shipyard. Using leafleting, its protagonists targeted the Shipyard’s workforce and management with the message of the strike outbreak and the need for workers’ rights. The campaign strategy was based on ‘spill-over effects’ and industrial negotiations with the government. In an open letter, protesters called for the authorities to start negotiations. The ad hoc Information Centre was set up in Warsaw where Jacek Kuroń of the KOR handled media relations with foreign correspondents, e.g. ‘Radio Free Europe’. Western diplomats based in Warsaw were targeted too. The news about the strike circulated fast and the Gdańsk protest became an example to follow for enterprises nation-wide (Anna, interview, 2012).

The campaign to win the hearts and minds pressed on. The Shipyard became a confined contestation site, on the walls of which murals and slogans marked discontent. The protest banners occupied public spaces. The Shipyard neighborhoods rapidly turned into ‘community activism sites’, supporting the protesting workers. The response to the denial of the protest by
the state media was a public display of slogans throughout Gdańsk (e.g. ‘Only patience and solidarity can bring us victory!’ or ‘The strike goes on!’) - all calling for the strike action to continue. In the meantime, supporters of the protest decorated the Shipyard gates with images of Jan Paul II, national flags and flowers in colors signifying national identities. The message was simple but powerful: the local strike was being escalated to a national campaign.

Following the formation of the MKS, the ‘21 Demands’ were drafted by Maciej Grzywaczewski and Arkadiusz Rybicki. Displayed on wooden boards, they became the protest manifesto including the following demands: formation of trade union, respect for freedom of speech, right to the strike action without repercussions and releasing of the prisoners of conscience (MKS, 1980b). Once articulated using self-presentation tactics, the protesters continued voicing their demands: leafleting and media statements were put out by the team from ‘The Solidarity: Strike Information Bulletin’ (1980). Anti-Soviet sentiments underpinned campaign tactics. To amplify the ‘21 Demands’, the slogan ‘21x Yes’ that in Polish political culture signifies the rigged 1946 referendum, pathing the way to Soviet regime in Poland, was appropriated.

From the outset, the campaign focused on policy ideas. As previously noted, the campaign goals matched the conceptualization of propaganda practice by social movements’, as it was geared towards policies implementation. The discourse on the propaganda practice revealed that the protesters called for revisiting of industrial relations by giving workers’ concessions for self-governance. The campaigners emphasized that political engagement with policy proposals was pushed, for example, via media relations, by appealing to public good and the ‘dignity in labour’ ideal (Janusz, interview, 2013). These, and other policy ideas, gained a greater tracking when the MKS was formed. One of the press statements chronicles this
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event: ‘As a result of an agreement between striking enterprises across the coast, on 16 August, the MKS was formed in the Gdańsk Shipyard. Its aim is to coordinate demands and strike action’ (MKS, 1980b). From 16 August, 1980 the MKS became a ‘dominant coalition’ and a body driving the implementation of the movement’s emerging ideals.

MEDIA RELATIONS

Despite limited campaigning resources, protesters kept the strike action up. To continue adding pressure on the authorities, the protesters used a mixture of propaganda strategies and tactics. In spite of political news blackouts, the MKS Presidium proactively conducted media relations, primarily targeting Western media, as they were more trustworthy in comparison to state media. An estimated number of 400 local journalists and foreign correspondents reported from the Shipyard. The movement’s media relations strategy was underpinned by uniqueness of the protests, benefitting the campaign in terms of media access as political action on this scale came to many as a surprise. The following statement accounts for the ease in the conduct of media relations: “In 1980-81 we did not have to look for journalists. I can recall when in February 1981 I travelled to France to meet up with trade unionists. To my surprise, I had been asked, ‘What does Solidarity do to attract media attention’? We do not do much, I answered. We have been changing political situation in Poland’” (Janusz, interview, 2013). In addition, the protesters and supporters engaged with the media: vox populi and word-of-mouth aided the conduct of media relations and gaining support for the movement.

In terms of organization, media relations was conducted by a dedicated spokesperson and a team producing ‘The Information Bulletin: Solidarity’. On 21 August, Lech Bądkowski, a publicist and a political writer, presented the protesters with a letter of support from the local
branch of the Polish Writers Association (1980). Given his credibility, derived from artisan affiliation, Bądkowski became a spokesperson for the movement, and played a central role in the conduct of media relations. His seat on the MKS Presidium allowed unlimited access to the strike leaders. Done this way, the practice of propaganda gained a strategic position. Bądkowski died in 1984, but his memoirs reveal the following insight into media relations:

“In my view we had a very good relationship with journalists. Because I did not have time to monitor the media (and trust me, it was difficult to access news media), on occasion, I relied on media clippings and briefs produced by journalists. Both local and foreign journalists were helping us out. Among the foreign correspondents, the most active were those of the Associated Press, Reuters and the BBC. I could rely on their insightful media summaries”.

Because the Solidarity’ campaign was under-resourced, by acting as ‘public journalists’ (Merritt, 1999), reporters supported the Solidarity’s campaign. Among media relations tactics were media statements, multi-lingual press conferences, media briefings and live interviews. The media relations strategy further exemplifies the strategic approach to propaganda practice: the strike leaders commented on the events, for example, Wałęsa gave his first interview to the BBC and to Jarmo Jääskeläinen, a documentary film-maker.

Despite the hostile media landscape, Solidarity’s campaign generated favorable publicity at home. Facilitated by the network of personal influence, news stories about the strike were produced for the local press, e.g. ‘Baltic Daily’ published ‘The Self-governance’ column. Yet, limited ground was gained to access national broadcast media with the movement’s messages (Janusz, 2013). Concerns over the silencing of the protest were addressed by circulating
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foreign media stories about the strike at home: clippings of foreign news media stories about the movement were publicly displayed in the Shipyard. On 23 August, Konrad Bieliński and Krzysztof Wyszkowski produced the first issue of ‘The Strike Information Bulletin’, which carried out reprints of news stories from foreign media, policy statements, appeals, messages of support and commentaries on the strike from across Poland.

MAKING OF THE MOVEMENT’S IDENTITIES

In addition to extensive media relations, Solidarity’s propaganda shaped the movement’s collective identities. The advancement of ‘the self’ (Foucault, 1988) was attributed by participants to the movements’ collective interests and ethos of their political action. Those features were captured in the movement’s visual identity - a symbol expressing the protest as a spectacle of numbers and a celebration of community spirit. The notions of ‘solidarity’, ‘community’ were its main sub-texts. Jerzy Janiszewski, the designer of this visual identity, was looking for an artistic expression to mirror public mood. Drawing inspiration from the strike’s community spirit, he discussed its aesthetics with Krzysztof Kacprzyk and created the famous ‘Solidarity’ visual identity, later appropriated as the name of the labor union. Its attributes were drawn up from national symbols and signified the blood spilled during the 1970s protest (Jerzy, interview, 2012).

Designing of the visual identity required creativity as its makers were limited to the DIY work and resources available in the Shipyard. Following its emergence, the visual identity was used in media relations, featured in foreign media and was adopted by the campaigners and supporters abroad. The Solidarity’s visual identity was aligned with the title of the strike bulletin, but its execution was in Janiszewski’s hands. His design featured on self-made
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posters, t-shirts and it was used by journalists (Jerzy, interview, 2012). This symbol stood for unity and resistance against government policies. In Polish political culture, the so-called, ‘Solidaryca’ lettering became a design icon on its own right.

During the August strike, religious and national identity symbols were used to the propagandistic ends, e.g. posters of Jan Paul II or the ‘Anchor’ (a visual identity of the Polish Home Army). To commemorate the 1970s protests, the protesters erected a cross with an inscription of a powerful message adopted from Lord Byron: “For freedom's battle once begun; Bequeath'd by bleeding sire to son; Though baffled oft is never won”. Those culturally-grounded symbols of spirituality, national identities and freedom were circulated by the campaigners, aiding the reactivation of romanticized myth of Polish struggles for freedom and liberation from foreign, in this case Soviet subordination.

Further, propaganda techniques were used to reinforce the ‘peaceful’ identity of the movement. It was of paramount importance to the strike leaders that the movement was known to public opinion for peaceful political engagement. The following techniques were used to facilitate it: alcohol prohibition instructions and leaflets were circulated, broadcasted mass service and music performances. For example, on 25 August, Chopin and Moniuszko’s repertoire was performed in the Shipyard by the Gdańsk Philharmonic Orchestra (Information Bulletin, 1980). The emotive campaign appeals were articulated by music performances of protest songs, e.g. ‘The hymn of the Bar Confederates’. The appropriation of arts to the campaign foregrounded antagonistic Polish-Russian sensibilities and became an expression of aesthetic ‘otherness’ (Ross, 2002). In the meantime, Wałęsa himself contributed to the making of the movement’s peaceful identity: his charismatic speeches
broadcasted to the protesters aimed at evoking a sense of hope. The sense of peaceful identity was also reinforced by the incoming messages from the supporters (Anna, interview, 2012).

**COLAITION-BUILDING, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS & DOCUMENTARIES**

The protest campaign was successful because of its scope: the outbreak of the strike resulted in a joint strike action among state-managed enterprises. Four days into the strike, the MKS represented 156 enterprises, but towards the end of the strike action it represented approximately 3,500 enterprises. The MKS formed a coalition of support beyond industrial enterprises: it included the Catholic Church, the Young Poland Movement and the KOR, to name but a few. According to Harris and Fleisher (2005), coalition-building is the most powerful tactic in policy driven campaigns. The emerging movement gained support from several directions, including support from the French CFDT Centrales, the American Federation of Labour and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. This coalition aided legitimacy and allowed the MKS leverage in industrial negotiations (Anna, interview, 2012).

The protesters’ bridging strategy aimed at gaining support of influential actors who acted as ‘campaign intermediaries’. For instance, despite hesitation, the Catholic Church backed the protesters. Statements issued by the Church officials and masses celebrated for the workers protesting across Poland are illustrative of its engagement with Solidarity’s campaign, for example: ‘On 17 August, 1980 at 10.30 am, in the Gdynia Shipyard, begun a mass celebrated by the Prelate, Dr H. Jastak. It was a service for intentions of the workers’ who died in 1970 and for those workers striking today. The service was attended by crowds from several cities. It was attended by 12,000 people’ (Information Bulletin, 1980).
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During the August strike, the Solidarity campaign used other types of cultural intermediaries. Despite the denial of the strike action, on 31 August, the authorities gave in to mounting public opinion pressures and agreed to industrial negotiations with the protesters. This stage of the campaign was aided by ‘external advisors’ supporting negotiations with a high-profile committee. Under the leadership of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, advisors advocated the adoption of ‘21 Demands’ as the orientation for public policy. This campaign tactic aimed at broadening the movement’s public appeal among multiple occupations and industries. The negotiations provided another insight into the diversity of campaign practices: in the socialist regime lobbying was not a routinized government relations practice, but these industrial negotiations supported by the advisers, carried out marks of influence on policy makers.

The industrial negotiation expanded the Solidarity’s campaigning to new avenues. A special place in the discourse on the practice of propaganda was attributed to documentaries. Kilborn (2006, p. 203) argues that documentary-film making and campaigning are ‘uneasy bedfellows’. In the case of Solidarity, however, the two practices grew into a ‘symbiotic relationship’. The Association of Polish Film-Makers was given access to chronicle events unfolding in the Shipyard. Andrzej Wajda’s endorsement of this initiative was protected it from being a sting operation. Alongside the regional ‘TVP Gdańsk’ news crew, film-makers had exclusive access to negotiations, and its footage was turned into the documentary, ‘Workers ’80’ (by Andrzej Hodakowski and Andrzej Zajączkowski). Despite censorship, nation-wide screenings of this feature aided raising awareness of the Solidarity’s policy goals (Anna, interview, 2012). The making of this documentary illustrates endorsement by a third-party, which later, became a wide-spread tactic as Solidarity’s campaigning was endorsed by celebrities or public intellectuals (e.g. Daniel Olbrychski, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault and Jack Nicolson).
INSTITUTIONALIZING PROPAGANDA

Solidarity’s campaigning led to unprecedented changes to the state socialism in Poland: on 24 October 1980 the movement was registered as a labor union on the basis of the agreement (‘Gdańsk Accords’) between the campaigning protesters and the authorities. Subsequently, Solidarity’s approach to the practice propaganda altered. Despite initial financial difficulties, the union’s campaigning became institutionalized. From this point onwards, campaigning strategy diversified and predominantly focused on: using the ‘Gdańsk Accords’ agreement to push for more freedom of expression, expansion of campaign networks and opportunities for high profile media features such as Wałęsa’s interviews with Oriana Falacci (e.g. Chicago Tribune, 1981). To implement the ‘Gdańsk Accords’, the union focused on the management of public policy issues. For example, a spokesperson represented Solidarity on the steering committee negotiating access to the broadcast media. In the meantime, Solidarity was making the most out of the policy item allowing the union’s internal publications to be uncensored and, in turn, enabling the existence of ‘dissent media’ (Janusz, interview, 2013).

Solidarity continued expanding its networks: Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the union’s longest-serving spokesperson (1981-9), led media relations; Giedymin Jabłoński set up the Department of Visual Information; Joanna Wojciechowicz established the Department for Information Dissemination made up of the Visual Arts Studio, the Poster and Propaganda Group and the Radio Solidarity Agency (the RAS). The Poster and Propaganda Group, coordinated by Zygmunt Błażek, was a campaigning network that saw itself as following the tradition of the war-time resistance by using publicity stunts, murals, self-made posters and political art – all aimed at engaging with Solidarity’s policies (Zygmunt, interview, 2012).
RE-VISITING ‘SOLIDARNOŚĆ’

April 1981, under the leadership of Arkadiusz Rybicki, the Bureau of Press Information (the BIPS) was formed. It was a hybrid of a ‘press office’ and a ‘news agency’ (Giedymin, interview, 2012).

DISCUSSION

This article demonstrates that in addition to ‘dissent media’, the practice of propaganda was inherent to Solidarity’s campaigning. Unlike professional government or corporate persuasive communication, the Solidarity movement’s propaganda appeared to have been an ‘occupational practice’: it emerged in grass-root civic settings and displayed a unique approach to ‘information and influence campaigns’. Yet, the background to the practice of Solidarity’s propaganda was shaped by the movement’s policies, culture of resistance, resourcefulness of the protesters, and the expansion of networks. Although propaganda was strategic for the movement, the status of this practice was undermined by governmental ‘black propaganda’. Aiding the culturalistic stand of research on Solidarity (Kubik, 1994), this study adds to our understanding of campaigning in socialist Poland, as propaganda was one of the hallmarks of political engagement, responding to the demand for political action.

Solidarity’s decentralized campaign organization included: dissidents and the protest leaders, foreign media correspondents, clandestine organizations such as the KOR, but also the Catholic Church, artists, translators and the labor unions’ abroad. This bottom-up approach to the campaigning led to the emergence of multiple networks, which became power clusters for the campaign expansion. The multi-dimensional organization of propaganda reveals that Solidarity diversified strategies to engage multiple publics. Additionally, the flexible campaign organization worked to the movement’s advantage, as it enabled responding to
RE-VISITING ‘SOLIDARNOŚĆ’

incoming issues. In the Solidarity’s protest campaign, propaganda became a ‘cultural conjuncture’ (Foucault, 1967, p. 582), and those who practiced it, derived its power from multiple communicative and cultural sources. The findings also reveal an evolution in campaigning trajectory - from the protest sites to the institutionalization of propaganda.

Unlike in liberal democracies, where social movements’ campaigns tended to focus on engagement with multiple policy makers, Solidarity challenged the heart of government and its public policies. Its campaign strategies and tactics were inextricably linked with the strike goals. This political action and the struggle for the ‘Gdańsk Accords’ was seen by campaigners as a learning curve in participatory politics in the midst of Cold War. In the light of findings of this study, the argument that campaigns are ‘voices’ heard over the market cacophony (Moloney, 2006) extends from market relations to industrial relations. To reshape them, Solidarity relied on self-presentation strategies to have its voices heard in making an input to public policies and building support for the independent labor union.

Shifting industrial relations, driven by campaigning, demonstrate Solidarity’s propaganda real ‘power effects’ (Foucault, 1980). It mobilized the strike, enhanced political engagement and, in turn, provided input to public policies. Among Solidarity’s propaganda practices were: media relations, celebrity endorsement, demonstrations, branding, publicity stunts and leafleting, to name but a few of its modalities (Tab. 2). But the findings of this study go beyond mapping out propaganda strategies and tactics: it traces the origins of and unfolds its evolution. For participants, the practice of propaganda was a liberating political action as the power effects of Solidarity’s propaganda reached beyond the subversion of the August strike action: whilst the authorities claimed to have been the only legitimate workers’ representation, the rise of Solidarity undermined this monopoly among public opinion.
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The participants’ discourses on Solidarity’s propaganda of protest reported this practice as an illustration a counter-conduct, which became a productive force for far-reaching societal transformations. Given the settings in which Solidarity’s propaganda emerged, the transgressive qualities of this praxis stemmed from its abilities to mobilized political action and, by the virtue of its outcomes, it demonstrates how campaigning redefined communicative imbalances as well as policy issues in Poland (Aleksandrowicz et al., 2010). Finally, the transgressive feature of propaganda impacted the continuity of civic-ness in Polish political culture, even if interpreted from contemporary perspective. In 2010, the Centre for Public Opinion Research (2010: 17) surveyed Poles (n= 1803) and revealed that Solidarity’s propaganda was associated with: strikes (26 %), industrial negotiations (7 %), media coverage (6%), participation in strikes (5%), national symbols, banners, and leaflets (3%), freedom of speech (2%), and critique of Solidarity (2%). The recall of Solidarity’s propaganda marks the continuity of resistance as its cultural legacy.

While the findings of this study cannot be generalized, its approach to the study of propaganda can be fruitful for the analysis of social movements in historical and contemporary contexts. The legacy of the Solidarity movement transcends boundaries of time and space. This argument also applies to campaigning of Solidarity’s contemporaries - ‘Charter’ 77’ in Czechoslovakia and the East German networks of emerging movements such as ‘Initiative for Peace and Human Rights’ and ‘Working Group’ - which gave rise to the ‘New Forum’ in the fall of 1989. Their campaigning can be explored with the use of Foucauldian analysis, as it permits the examination of transformations in practices such as circulation of publicity and collective symbols, and cultural legacies of their campaigns. With changing media landscapes, Foucauldian approach to the study of campaigning can be also
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useful in the contemporary contexts – his views on networks and power embedded within ‘information and influence campaign’ (Manheim, 2011) can be utilized in the settings of multi-modal campaigns in the Middle East (2011). This can also include Solidarity as, in 2011, its former leaders rallied media support for the Arab Spring. These transformations in the ways Solidarity’s propaganda practices continue can be subject to further analysis (Reuters, 2011).

CONCLUSIONS

Foucault’s oeuvre is helpful in revealing the nuances of propaganda as the practice exerting power effects on public policy and industrial relations. In the 1980s, Foucault himself campaigned for Solidarity, whilst today his concepts enable us to revisit the movement’s campaigning through the lens of historically grounded and culturally sensitive interpretations. In doing so, the findings of this study substantiate the concept of ‘propaganda of protest’. By no means, however, this study exhausts analysis of Solidarity’s campaigning. Future studies can be expanded by examination of ‘propaganda of dissent’, leading up to the outbreak of the August strike. Other promising research themes include Solidarity’s campaigning overseas; hybridization of the campaign genres; and campaigners’ career paths post-1989 or the intertwining relationship between campaigning and contemporary political cultures.

Whilst this article primarily contributes to the debate on campaigning by social movements in the former ‘Eastern Bloc’, its conceptual contribution goes beyond the boundaries of the region, as it advances the inquiry on the previously under-explored links between propaganda and protests. The key lesson emerging from Solidarity’s legacies is that campaigning was inextricably linked to political action: without propaganda the August strike and a broader
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Solidarity campaign would not have gained momentum. The movement’s propaganda predominantly relied on self-presentation strategies; it was based on cultural appeal strategies, and it was enacted by networks of occupational campaigners. The most significant outcome of the campaign was the formation of the Solidarity labor union: it became a platform for reshuffling power relations, public policies and for the advancement of participatory political culture in Poland and beyond.
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NOTES

¹ O’Farrell (2005, p. 135) states that “The term refers to a historically and conceptually specific set of rules for organizing and producing different set of knowledge”.

## Table 2. Summary of propaganda strategies and tactics used by the Solidarity movement (1980-1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROTESTS ACTION</th>
<th>CAMPAIGN TECHNIQUE</th>
<th>PROPAGANDA GOALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agitation</td>
<td>public speeches, leafleting, murals, protest slogans,</td>
<td>strike mobilization, following and support building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>letters announcing the outbreak of the strike</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain strike action</td>
<td>propaganda of ‘deed’, self-publication of demands, media statements,</td>
<td>industrial resistance, civic disobedience,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dissemination of instructions about the organization of strikes</td>
<td>behavioral measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-publication of demands</td>
<td>publicly display on boards, banners, news releases</td>
<td>building the campaign momentum, industrial policy draft,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>leafleting, industrial negotiations (proto-lobbying)</td>
<td>developing the protest manifesto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media relations</td>
<td>press conferences, spoksmanship, live interviews,</td>
<td>raising awareness, countering the government PR-propaganda narratives, media commentaries and publicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>media monitoring, media briefings, world-of-mount</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vox populi, photo management and opportunities,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>accreditation policy for journalists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## RE-VISITING ‘SOLIDARNOŚĆ’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-publicity</th>
<th>publishing the strike bulletins</th>
<th>providing commentary, sharing news stories, building sense of participation in policy making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective identities building</td>
<td>visual identity design and management, use of national and religious symbols, sharing messages of support on industrial boards, posters, story telling</td>
<td>shaping the public face and identities of the movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition-building</td>
<td>open letters and public statements, escalation of the strike action by several including many enterprises, experts’ support, public statements by the Church, forming some relationships with Western labour unions</td>
<td>building public support thorough personal and institutional networks, securing resources, including communicative resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community building</td>
<td>fundraising activities, celebrities and intellectual endorsements, word-of-mouth, prohibition instructions, reprinting statements of support, propaganda of ‘deed’ (via personalization of stories, e.g. Anna Walentynowicz)</td>
<td>building sense of participation in policy changes, building a moral high ground, building participatory attitudes and shaping behaviours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art, documentaries and spiritual activities</td>
<td>self-publicized events: concerts and music performances, displays of poetry, public masses, confessions</td>
<td>up-keeping the strike’s momentum, building sense of hope, raising awareness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>