UNIVERSITY OF TARTU

Faculty of Social Sciences

Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies

Ryan Haggard

RUSSIAN AND CHINESE CONCEPTIONS OF DETERRENCE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF REVISIONISM AND THE STATUS-QUO

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Supervisor: Eoin Michael McNamara, MSc

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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I, Ryan Haggard, have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced. The word count is 24158 excluding references, appendices, and required documents.

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Abstract

The study of deterrence provides a unique and insightful alternative for the evaluation of state revisionism and status-quo adherence. This thesis provides an innovate method and proof-of-concept for the categorization of state revisionism, through operationalization of state deterrence strategies, using two of the most topical and relevant rising powers as cases: the Russian Federation and People's Republic of China, during the so-called period of the 'Rise of the Rest' and the 'Return of Geopolitics'. Through the use of data-driven qualitative content analysis, areas of interest are determined; from which key events are identified and evaluated by comparing the empirical results to the theoretical frameworks of deterrence and the long-established definition of revisionism. Through this methodology, this thesis finds that both the Russian Federation and People's Republic of China are revisionist states, with the Russian Federation being significantly more revisionist than China; due to the differing security environments, historical and territorial context, and deterrence conceptions. By using the study of deterrence as an explanatory framework, this thesis provides a proof-of-concept and model for future research, and is the first holistic study on state revisionism in over 15 years, as well as it is the first comparative measurement-based study of its class.

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INTRODUCTION

There has been much concern recently in both academic circles and among world actors about the so-called 'Rise of the Rest' and the 'Return of Geopolitics', such that Western hegemony over wealth, power, and values are being challenged by revisionist powers seeking to undermine and even replace the current international system. The Russian resurgence of assertion: intervention into Ukraine and associated annexation of Crimea, aggressive nuclear rhetoric, energy politics, military modernization, cyber-attacks, and disinformation campaigns, to name a few; has alarmed many in the West on the displacement of the current status-quo. Further to the East, the Chinese assertion over disputed territory in the South China Sea has drawn substantial concern as well, due to the increasing Chinese military presence and activities in a region that represents roughly one-third of global shipping. Moreover, the advent and presence of the Dong Feng 'carrier-killer' intermediate-range ballistic missiles [IRBM] presents a clear challenge to the American power-projection and ally assurance in the area.

While observers seem to agree that Western hegemony is being challenged, they do not agree on the very nature of this challenge, with some expecting and predicting major upheaval [revisionism], some expecting reform or even defining the actions of Russia/China as maintaining the norm [status-quo]. Moreover, there is a clear discrepancy in the literature concerning the degree of attribution to which the labels 'status-quo' and 'revisionist' are applied to both China and Russia; even to the extent of attributing these labels *a priori*, without methodological justification. Russian strategy and actions have been described as revisionist, seeking to challenge the international system; however they also have been described as status-quo: attempting to preserve the buffer zone against NATO by preventing adjacent states from leaving its sphere of influence and/or joining the EU/NATO. China's actions have been described as revisionist, seeking to challenge US hegemony; however it has also been described as status-quo, seeking to assert itself over its interests as a regional power, without aspirations to challenge the international system. Several of these studies go so far as to claim that Russia and China are status-quo powers, and the West precipitated revisionist behaviors that forced Russian and Chinese action to maintain the status-quo. Currently

the corpus of literature concerning the status-quo and/or revisionist nature of the Russian Federation and People's Republic of China primarily frame the debate on revisionism as both dichotomous where Russia/China is a revisionist/status-quo power and the West/ United States is the opposite. There are some studies that attempt to measure whether either Russia or China is a status-quo or revisionist power explicitly, however the holistic studies are fairly outdated (15+ years) and the contemporary studies are primarily concerned with specific actions in specific, singular policy dimensions, rather than overall strategy or posture. Moreover this dichotomous nature of the states involved, are primarily categorized along a binary nature, either being revisionist or status-quo, with no differentiation or delineation along a gradient between the two to measure to what extent each state falls under each categorization.

The classification and understanding of the extent of a state as a status-quo or a revisionist power is of significant consequence, as the substantive difference in threat perceptions and identification, as well as subsequent, associated actions relating to them, across the entire spectrum of political actors; has stark political consequences. Moreover, the extent to which a state is revisionist or status-quo, as well as the primary motivations encouraging a state to adopt such stances, have drastic implications on the structural nature of state relations along several dimensions. Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the classification of the extent to which the Russian Federation and People's Republic of China as status-quo or revisionist is accurately answered.

The objective of this thesis is to address this gap in the existing literature and provide a comprehensive analytical model that compares and contrasts Chinese and Russian native deterrence conceptions and applications of deterrence, during key events in specified areas of interest to determine to what extent they can be categorized as revisionist or status-quo powers. The usage of the analysis of deterrence posture offers an insightful option in determining status-quo and revisionist attributes of a state, as deterrence posture is a multi-sectoral state function that encompasses the overall

strategic viewpoint and self-placement of the state, as it is an all-encompassing endeavor that is directly linked to a state's survival.

This will be done within the framework of a comparative study, as these cases have been ascribed similar characteristics with the same point of departure [Both states being described as either status-quo or revisionist], analyzing the convergence and divergence in the deterrence approaches of each state, to determine the underlying factor(s) that contribute to their similarities and differences. The Russian Federation and People's Republic of China have been chosen as cases for their topicality, distinct international relevance, and particular gap in analysis concerning methodological ascription of status-quo and revisionism. The indicators will be drawn from the supplementary method of Data-Driven Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA), primarily focused on the governmental national defense documents, doctrine, and press releases; or secondary source translation or analysis in the case where primary documents are scarce, that define native deterrence outlooks and areas of interest. This is done for the purpose of applying native conceptions of deterrence, rather than overlaying Western preconceptions and projections, which would run the risk of obfuscating or misinterpreting the native conceptions, reasoning, and application. The timeline will primarily be taken post-2014, after the so-called 'Rise of Geopolitics', an oft-quoted [directly or indirectly] point of departure in the relevant, associated academic literature; where a resurgence of revisionist behavior and ideology is widely acknowledged to make its way back to the world stage. Naturally, the roots of this resurgence predate 2014, which will be acknowledged as supplementary material, however the predominant focus will be on events post-2014.

Four research questions, two primary and two derivative, drive the methodological structure and empirical analysis: firstly, '*What are the differences between the deterrence strategies of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation*?' [1]; and secondly, '*Can China and Russia ultimately be categorized as revisionist powers through their deterrence strategies* [2]?' The derivative questions are respective to their counterparts: firstly, '*Why might there be diverging drivers for deterrence*

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conceptions/outcomes between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China?' [1B]; and secondly, '*If China and Russia can be categorized as revisionist powers, to what extent* [2B]?' Analysis of the deterrence conceptions and applications provides a potential valuable vector to address the afore-mentioned theoretical gap in the background literature concerning the status-quo and revisionist categorization of these two states; by providing a holistic approach, encompassing many policy dimensions along both a geographic and a strategic-level perspective.

From the theoretical framework and background approach, the initial expectation is that China will have a softer-bounded approach, regardless of the degree of status-quo or revisionism expressed, due to their Minimum/Limited Deterrence conception. On the other hand, comparatively, the Russian approach will appear to be more emphatically aggressive as a result due to their Strategic Deterrence conception.

The thesis is structured in four main sections. The first provides an overview of the background literature, theoretical gap, and research solution. The second provides the theoretical framework, specific deterrence formulations, and conceptual relationships that form the ideational foundation the thesis. The methodological breakdown is supplied in the third section, detailing the research design, research methods, case selection justifications, research paradigm delineation, as well as the coding and indicators through which the empirical data is gathered and categorized. In the fourth section, the afore-mentioned empirical findings are correlated, categorized, and analyzed. Lastly, the conclusion encapsulates and contextualizes these findings and their implications in relation to the academic literature and practical environments.

CHAPTER I. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section contains the literature review: a comprehensive analysis on the state of the art concerning the ascription and categorization of the People's Republic of China and Russian Federation as either status-quo or revisionist states. The background literature contains a gap, as much of the categorization of the two states is done *a priori*, without methodological justification. The studies that do contain methodological evaluation, primarily have used single-sectoral/domain analysis to determine status-quo or revisionist attributes of the two states. Single-sector analysis has a limited explanatory ability due to its narrow scope. This paper argues that the study of deterrence, as a multi-sectoral approach, would greatly improve the explanatory ability to determine whether a state is status-quo or revisionist due to its holistic, strategic, and integral nature concerning the state.

1.1 China

The chronological scope of this corpus of academic literature on Chinese revisionism and the status-quo primarily encompasses studies from the mid-2000s to the present [early 2019 at the time of the writing of this thesis]; however there are outliers as old as the 1995 (Johnston, 1995) concerning the Chinese conceptions of Limited Deterrence. That being said, the primary study from which most subsequent studies on the topic of Chinese revisionism exist referential to, is a 2003 study by Johnston. This study establishes the explicit definition of revisionism used by many studies henceforth, even those not concerning China: *"... a revisionist state is one which does not participate actively in major international institutions, which breaks the rules and norms of those international institutions in which it does participate, or which temporarily abides by the rules and norms but when presented with the opportunity tries to alter them in ways inconsistent with the original purposes of the institution and community…"*. Therefore, given the straightforward and easily transferable nature of this definition in terms of application to other states, this is the definition of revisionism that will be used in reference to this study.

Worries about China's rise as an aspiring global power have existed since before the turn of the millennium. Shambaugh (2001) acknowledges this in a study, which pits China against the United States in a binary classification within a binary outcome frame; where only one state may hold either categorization state, whilst the other must exist as the directly opposing categorization state. This study insinuates that, regardless of orientation, one must exist in opposition of the other, as the two cannot coexist as such. This oppositional logic is seen in many of the following studies.

Huiyun (2009) attempted to determine the level of status-quo and revisionist attitudes that Chinese leadership held from the inception of the People's Republic of China. The author uses historical case studies to determine Chinese leaders' beliefs using operational code analysis. The results of the study show that there is a declining trend in revisionism chronologically, to the ultimate end of the author claiming that only Mao Zedong was revisionist due to the historical context.

Walter (2010) attempts to determine Chinese status-quo or revisionist attitudes on the basis of adherence and adoption of global financial regulatory norms. In this study, several problems on the issue of measurement emerge. Attribution of the intent behind government actions to either reject or adopt measures, as well as to the speed in which the norms are adopted may have many influencing factors; bureaucracy, existing norms, pragmatism, etc. Additionally there is a bifurcated and incomplete adoption of these norms and standards by the biggest guarantors of the norms and standards, e.g. the United States; which poses the issue of to what extent can adoption of norms be indicative of status-quo or revisionist attitudes. A study by Combes (2011) ran into similar issues concerning adherence to the international norms of global trade, non-proliferation, and environmental regimes. Combes also ascribed status-quo/revisionist attributes to other international actors a priori, without measurement. Taylor (2007), likewise attempted to analyzed adherence to international norms, organization, and laws to which it is party; and ran into similar issues of methodology and measurement.

Mearsheimer (2006) takes this issue of methodological impreciseness further in his article 'China's Unpeaceful Rise'. He ascribes much onto China from his own opinion without methodological justification or rigorous support to his many arguments. He projects much from Western ideals, trends, and precedent.

Kastner and Saunders (2012) base their argumentation on whether China is a status-quo or revisionist state on the supposition that leadership travels are an indicator of foreign policy priorities. The authors present one of the few discerning studies that attempts to measure status-quo and revisionist attitudes using mutually-exclusive methodological rigor. However, the theoretical goalposts are difficult to pin down as it is unclear at what measurement of frequency of travel, specific capacity, and material outcome constitutes revisionism. While, leadership travel may be an indicator of foreign policy priorities; to make the argument of a state's attributional status, solely on the basis of leadership travel, would be difficult.

1.2. Russia

The chronological scope of the corpus of academic literature concerning the status-quo and revisionist qualities of the Russian Federation primarily consists of studies and journal articles post-2014 and shortly thereafter with an outlier concerning the general trends that would eventually lead to the Russian intervention into Ukraine and this so-called 'return to geopolitics' and 'rise of revisionism' (Larabee, 2010). Explanatory context is needed as to why the academic literature regarding such revisionist tendencies occur so far from the natural hard limit of the fall of the Soviet Union. At the time of the fall of the Soviet Union, it was characterized that Russia ceased to be a threat, and was 'defeated', instead focusing on recovering, reorganizing, and reintegrating into the world economic system and international community. Thusly, more attention was placed onto the United States of America as the sole remaining superpower and de-facto global hegemonic power and the global order that was to follow; specifically, on how the US would preserve paradigm surrounding the unipolar transition and subsequent apotheosis (Mastanduno, 1997). The decade following the fall of the Soviet Union was marked by hope and anticipation of further Russian 'buy-in' to the international system

and liberal democratic norm adoption; up to and including EU membership. However concurrent and subsequent to this period of time, there was a measured anxiety in the West, as those accession and integration talks failed. Russia instead worked on developing its own sphere of influence and alternative regional organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO] and what came to be known as the Eurasian Economic Union [EEU] set up in seeming opposition as a mutually-exclusive option to North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and the European Union [EU] respectively; who were accepting former Soviet states as members (Larrabee, 2010). While the organizations and their non-Soviet, post-fall predecessors were established relatively early, the organizations themselves were not so diametrically opposed to their Western counterparts at that time.

This paradigm of minor concerned escalated into growing anxiety over the 2008 intervention into Georgia, yet the outcome was somewhat tolerated in the West, and was not seen as the paradigm changer as the 2014 Intervention into Ukraine. It was at this latter point that the discourse on Russian revisionism spiked dramatically (Larrabee, 2010).

Mearsheimer (2014a) discounts this "prevailing wisdom", and details a geopolitical status-quo of spheres of influence, and then describes how the West had been slowly expanding and absorbing former USSR satellite states; and the 'illegal coup' in Ukraine was the final straw for Russia. Mearsheimer details the 'warning shot' with the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. He indirectly ascribes status-quo attributes to Russia and revisionist attributes to the West.

In a second piece, an op-ed for the New York Times, Mearsheimer (2014b) elaborates this viewpoint, attributing great power status to the United States and Russia. He claims that the United States is not looking at the Ukrainian situation in geopolitical terms, as Putin is, but in different legal terms that absolve the West as a whole, of all wrongdoing in terms of creating the situation.

McFaul (2014) writes a retort to Mearsheimer (2014a) in Foreign Affairs, indirectly assigning the revisionist attribute to Russia in lieu of Mearsheimer's status-quo attribution. He uses empirical action and reaction paradigms in the 'reset' years between Obama and Putin to illustrate his point. McFaul rests the blame on unrest originating from internal dynamics in regards to another round of enduring electoral fraud coupled with Putin's announcement of returning for a third term; and subsequent Russian deflection upon a convenient and outside source.

Sestanovich, in the same publication (2014), also critiques Mearsheimer's article's internal logic (2014a), citing Ukraine's internal strife, Moscow's interference and influence, the 'Ukraine Question' in NATO policymaking, as well as extensive literary support from Mearsheimer's own previous article on the subject (Mearsheimer, 1993). Sestanovich then blames Putin's public support for aggressive and violent repression of the protesters for the fall of Yanukovych's regime; and attributes the subsequent humiliation causally to the seizure of Crimea and following intervention into Ukraine.

Mearsheimer (2014c) in the same publication, writes his rebuttal to both McFaul and Sestanovich, attacking their credibility and accusing them of misrepresenting his argument. He challenges the assertion that Sestanovich presented in the 'virtual' disappearance of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine disappearing after 2008, stating that "No Western leader publically questioned the alliance's 2008 declaration that Georgia and Ukraine 'will become members of NATO'", adding that the United States was one of said members backing that "pet project". He acknowledges that McFaul and Sestanovich may truly have thought that the NATO extension to Ukraine was off the table, but he asserts that "no prudent Russian leader" would interpret it in that manner. Mearsheimer then characterizes the 2014 coup as illegitimate, due to its violent nature.

Konyshev and Sergunin (2014) focus on the Arctic dimension of Russian foreign policy as a measure of status-quo and revisionism of the Russian state. The Arctic, he argues, is a region where the Russian Federation is not seeking an expansionist, aggressive policy; instead it seeks to preserve the status-quo. His analysis of the Russian militarization concluded that the modernization programs did not add significant offensive capabilities. Instead, Konyshev and Sergunin denote this military modernization as demonstration of Russia's great power status.

Haukkala (2015) studies the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis by analyzing the foreign relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation, during the formation of the new status-quo following the collapse of the USSR. This study raises interesting questions on the aspects of revisionism/status-quo while the status-quo is forming.

1.3. Comparison of Cases

The more recent articles from this corpus of this background literature concerning the status-quo and revisionist aspects of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation primarily has a sectoral focus to either directly or indirectly determine the adherence to status-quo or to determine a revisionist nature. Articles concerning the People's Republic of China vary from what sector is analyzed and expounded upon as indicative of the status-quo or revisionist orientation; whereas articles regarding the Russian Federation almost entirely measure the status-quo and/or revisionist aspects through focus on the military aspects and actions conducted; as the vehicle through which these arguments are made [the exception being the article by Haukkala (2015)]. The vast majority of the Russian analytic substance primarily focuses on the study of military orientation and actions. The framing of the global placement of the People's Republic of China varies, from aspiring regional and global power, to not being mentioned at all. The framing of the global placement of the Russian Federation generally is concerned with the rise, resurgence, and return of the great power politics, whether continuance of the status-quo as an enduring or 'temporarily-embarrassed' great power; or conversely, as a revisionist power, attempting to seize or prove its own

'great powerism' to the world. Within either paradigm, the predominant focus of the vast majority of the articles in the corpus is on the Russian intervention into Ukraine.

It is important to note that when the two states are mentioned together, China and Russia are seen as within the same binary categorization, regardless of if the categorization is revisionist or status-quo, and the United States/European Union/West is paired against them as the opposing binary categorization as the other (Mead, 2014; Zakaria, 2013). In most cases the 'other' is considered to be either the United States explicitly, the nebulous 'West', generally considered to contain the European Union and NATO; or even more nebulous 'international order', which generally encompasses the previous 'others' with the added norms, international organizations, and treatises therein. This also holds true in all articles in this corpus that have a categorization to where the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation are mentioned explicitly to be either status-quo or revisionist; or to have characteristics of either attributional status; the United States of America remains the 'other' in every categorization, even if that same other is status-quo to a more mixed categorization of China; the delineation and 'otherness' of the United States remains intact. In no cases in this corpus, have we seen either the Russian Federation and the United States, or the People's Republic of China and the United States in the same categorization; the only characterization that approaches this categorization is an addendum that states that even though the United States [and West in general] may be considered [a] status-quo power[s], in that particular case, they do not always adhere to the rules and norms they agree to in international organizations (Walter, 2010).

Additionally, the framing of revisionism and status-quo, especially with Russia, is portrayed not in a spectrum, but as a binary categorization within these texts above; which is problematic, as much nuance is lost with that lack of specification. On the other hand, the background literature concerning the argumentation for the attributional status of the People's Republic of China primarily does have characterizations where both status-quo and revisionist qualities are ascribed to the state during analysis; though, regardless of ultimate attribution, there is a marked difficulty in clearly delineating the

nature of the state as status-quo or revisionist (Walter, 2010; Combes, 2011; Taylor 2007). However, these ascriptions have not resulted in the creation of secondary classifications.

The factors and indicators in contemporary studies, if used, are generally limited to specific policy dimensions in specific geographical locations, which is not sufficiently indicative of the overall stance of the state. Furthermore, there is little in the contemporary literature of measuring Chinese military actions; and Russian revisionism/status-quo estimation is generally used as a state-of-being argument, not actually measured explicitly. The little measurement contained and included in these studies are derived from sectoral analysis, which ultimately is limited in its explanatory ability for holistic strategic analysis, with a binary classification matrix (Larrabee, 2010; McFaul, 2014; Mearsheimer, 2014a; Mearsheimer, 2014; Mearsheimer 2014c, Mead, 2014; Sestanovich, 2014; Zakaria, 2013). The closest measurement on the degree of holistic state revisionism has been sector-based or issue-based adherence to international regimes (Johnston, 2003), with the studies own authors denoting their difficulty in ascribing intent as to revisionist or pragmatist behavior, in light of the assertion that many status-quo powers seek to ignore many of the same binding regimes and applied norms as well (Walter, 2010; Combes, 2011; Taylor 2007).

1.4. Research Solution

The analysis of overall deterrence posture and associated military actions offer a hitherto unexplored dimension of determining status-quo adherence and addressing these gaps in the academic literature. Deterrence posture is a multi-sectoral state function that provides insight into the overall strategic viewpoint and self-placement of that state, as it is an all-encompassing endeavor that is directly linked to a state's survival.

While previous studies in this literary corpus have attempted to link a series of military actions in a theatre to a claim of revisionism vs status-quo adherence (Johnston, 2003;

Taylor 2007; Shambaugh, 2003), there has been little contemporary literature examining the holistic nature of state documents concerning deterrence, actions, and events in multiple locales in Chinese and Russian foreign policy. Isolated analyses of regional actions such as the level of Russian militarization of the Arctic (Konyshev & Sergunin), intervention into Ukraine and Georgia (Mearsheimer 2014a; Mead, 2014); as well as the Chinese militarization of disputed regions in the South China Sea (Mead,2014; Huiyun, 2009) certainly provide valuable insight into the doctrine and regional strategic aim of these states; however determining the overall nature of the regimes, as revisionist or status-quo, requires a study with a wider lens. These regional and topical studies, while valuable in their own right, only offer an incomplete picture when it comes to the holistic strategic aim of these states. Focusing the lens onto overall deterrence posture, brings into focus the strategic disposition of these states as seen through their eyes, as it is through native interpretations of deterrence, instead of an overlaid projection from the Western-dominated academic literature that would otherwise distort the interpretation of the findings.

This study focuses on these important gaps in explanation and degree in which adherence to revisionism or the status-quo is expressed, and seeks to offer a better conceptualization and measurement of status-quo/revisionism in international politics. It does so by devising an innovative way to identify and classify the degree to which status-quo/revisionism is expressed by a state by measuring key events in defined areas of interest vis-a-vis the native conceptions of deterrence that define the bounds and objectives under which a state operates.

CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section introduces the theoretical foundation of the thesis. Three schools of deterrence will be explored: Western, Chinese, and Russian. Western Deterrence will be used as a comparative to the native deterrence conceptions. There will be a focus on inter-state deterrence to determine revisionism/status-quo attributions; as a focus on non-state actors in most cases, does not necessarily provide mutually-exclusive delineation on status-quo/revisionist adherence. Reference to stratagems regarding non-state actors would be used as supplementary material if it appears in the analytic corpus. Furthermore, terminology that will be operationalized within the methodological section will be introduced and defined in this section.

This thesis will primarily be constructed via the theoretical perspective of deterrence theory. As established in the previous chapters of this thesis, the selection of overall deterrence posture as the vehicle through which the level of status-quo or revisionist status is evaluated, was conducted on the merit of the holistic and multi-sectoral nature of deterrence posture as the strategic disposition of the state.

2.1. Western Deterrence Theory

For the conceptualization of Western deterrence theory, this paper will primarily use the Psychological Deterrence and Rational Deterrence conceptions, used by Schelling and Huth respectively; along with further references by Jentleson, whose terminology is used in many NATO official security documents on deterrence. These conceptions of Western Deterrence theory are further expanded on practically by Betts, Jervis, Knopf, F. Morgan, P. Morgan, and Whytock. Western deterrence theory is often used as a comparative, especially with Russian deterrence theory; therefore the inclusion of it inside of the theoretical framework for this paper is crucial as a comparative control to provide the 'othered' anchor to which the native deterrence conceptions can be contrasted. This section will not be overly extensive, as it represents the baseline control to which the native deterrence conceptions will be measured. In cases of necessary specificity, the requisite comparatives will be located in the native deterrence conception sections.

The general precepts of Western deterrence theory are Jentleson's conceptions of proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility; which are used extensively in several generations of Western deterrence literature, as well as in the national security strategies of many NATO states (Haggard, 2019). Proportionality refers to the proportional relationship between ends and means (Jentleson & Whytock, 2006). Reciprocity refers to the linkage and trust paradigm between defending incentives and attacking concessions (P.Morgan, 2005). Coercive credibility refers to the reputational believability that a given state will follow-through on its threats (P.Morgan, 2003).

2.1.1. Psychological Deterrence Theory

Psychological Deterrence is the now-classic theory on the expansion of military strategy to include psychological variables in addition to traditional military conceptions. In the Psychological Deterrence model, the interrelationship between the capacity of a state to conduct warfare, levels of threat employed to coerce behavior or to intimidate other states, as well as the subsequent and concurrent posturing of allied, neutral, target, and hostile states create a system of bargaining power as a measure of political capital; variable upon capacity, usage, relative capability, and current social and environmental dynamics (Schelling, 1966). Psychological Deterrence evolved into an inductive model, rather than a deductive model; as it focuses on past behavior in historical cases, rather than an innate assumption of standardized and homogenous rationality; within a political psychology framework rather than from a pure realist frame. The focus from the deterrence model is primarily concerned with how the specific deterrence actions and overall strategy affect the target actor and influences the target's psychological aspect vis-a-vis leadership (Jervis, Lebow & Stein, 1989). Thusly, Psychological Deterrence is a model that prioritizes the collation, categorization, and analysis of the different perceptions that exist in a particular paradigmal ecosystem. Naturally these perceptions may diverge from 'objective' reality, which may be due to circumstance or intentional derived action. Regardless, these information differences ultimately affect decision-making, and the misinformation or disinformation that is acted upon has great ramifications for the objective situation in reality. These misperceptions may be in the vein of credibility of any actor within the ecosystem, value of the object being acted upon, the available alternative options for an adversary, etc. These perceptions may also

lead to self-deterrence, as the British government leading up to World War II; or conversely, overconfidence (Jervis, 1982). Psychological Deterrence frames its model upon assumptions of risk aversion, the prioritization of [state] survival, such that a cost-benefit analogue is taken into consideration with psychological factors (Jervis, 1979); as well as loss-aversion, the innate disinclination and dispreference for 'losing' or having the perception of having lost. Loss-aversion is a psychological aspect that affects both the populace of a state, as well as the political elite and leadership (Jervis, 1992); as the perception of 'losing' affects everything from legitimacy, to approval rating, re-election chances, as well as their personal psyche [in the relevant case of leadership].

2.1.2. Rational Deterrence Theory

Rational Deterrence Theory (Huth, Gelpi & Bennett, 1993) is a conception with a game theory base of rational actors conducting mutual evaluation on such factors as the military-political balance, reputational qualities concerning past behavior (Huth,1997), signaling credibility [costliness], and known interests (Huth, 1999). In this regard, all actors in this paradigm are assumed to be rational, with an offensive equational cost-benefit matrix that denotes potential gains to unacceptable damage, tangent to the credibility of both their own threat, as well as the projected defense and retaliation (P. Morgan 2003). Signaling credibility as a function of costliness describes the notion that all states are incentivized to signal their political and military behavior in such a way that would prioritize survival and the maximize the accomplishment of their goals; knowing this, the state would thusly be required to prove the validity of their signalling action by incurring costs that otherwise would not be acceptable for a lesser action, such as a mobilization or relocation of military personnel or strategic weaponry. The 'known interest' factor is a measure of the level of involvement a state has with a particular region, state, or specific sectoral paradigm; and is collated and correlated against the other factors as a variable on predicted involvement. Rational Deterrence theory presupposes the self-interested pragmatism of the titular rationality for all actors, as well as the homogenous aspect of nations that does not take into account the difference in subjective threat perception assessment (F. Morgan, 2010). It also does not take into account simple diplomatic miscommunication or strategic miscalculation (Betts, 2013);

nor adequately takes into account, the innate predictive uncertainty that exists within the ecosystem of international relations that drastically affects policy-making (Betts, 1985) vis-a-vis incomplete information, misinformation, disinformation, and misinterpretation available to and received by policymakers (Jervis, 1989), resulting in a "probable costs" to "probable benefits" matrix (F. Morgan, 2010), that later studies have addressed. The theory focuses on the preventative aspect of deterring action; whether direct military action, military action onto and into another area [Extended Deterrence], or generally, dissuading a given political action. The litmus test of success for Rational Deterrence theory is fundamentally determined by whether or not the deterrence succeeds or not in deterring the action.

2.1.3. State of the Art: Western Deterrence Conceptions

"Overall, the most important result of the fourth wave has been to reveal the value of moving toward a broader concept of deterrence that incorporates non-nuclear and even non-military sources of leverage". (Knopf, 2010)

The so-called 'fourth wave' of deterrence research was marked by an ideational expansion to accommodate the new challenges presented by the Global War on Terror and the paradigm shift from a bipolar competition between the United States and Soviet Union to a unipolar global order (Knopf, 2010). Previously, the ideational and theoretical gaps that deterrence research was able to address, became wider; and deterrence study was seen as a 'second-best' option for state security needs outside of bespoke or tailored strategies, situations, and interactions (Knopf, 2008a). This paradigm shift was followed by an expansion of the bounds of the conception of deterrence to adequately address the unique challenges presented by non-state actors and asymmetric threats to global security dynamics, insofar much as the differences between deterrable state and non-state actors operating in different capacities and paradigms (P. Morgan, 2010). Over time, this expansion of the deterrence conception in this manner, to address non-state actors, also evolved to encompass state actions that may involve non-state actors, asymmetric or unconventional warfare, and previously non-weaponized state functions. This also was followed by a decrease in the reliance on

traditional deterrence measures, such as nuclear deterrence; as well as a reimagining of the nature of extended deterrence (P. Morgan, 2012). Deterrence as a definition, expanded to involve 'anything that can be used to deter', with non-military means being used as a supplementary aspect for nuclear and conventional military means (Knopf, 2008a). The growing complexity of state usage of non-state functions in support of traditional methods of deterrence, as well as asymmetric functions and non-state actors; led to a further emphasis on 'tailored deterrence', as the uniqueness of a given deterrence dilemma presented challenges that a generalized strategy would fail to address. Naturally, the formative nature of this deterrence conception led to 'growing pains', as heuristics regarding projections onto other state actors led to an unfortunate misdiagnosis and miscommunication as to the ability to actively tailor the deterrence to the target (Knopf, 2008b). This particular aspect has been explored and deemed relevant to the Russian case, as we have seen in the background literature, as this now-expanded conception broadens the scope and dimensions for deterrence among state actors, through the focus on asymmetric threats; of which state actors have the ability to fund, facilitate, and encourage. Compounding the complexities of deterrence regarding the expanded scope and dimensions for deterrence is the issue of attribution; whereas previously attribution was easier to denote, certain aspects of ascribing intentionality and responsibility for state actions have become more difficult (P. Morgan, 2012). The differentiation in the conception and perception between deterrence conceptions of this aspect of state funding and state-management of previously non-weaponized state functions as well as asymmetric operations will likely become a focal point in the analysis.

2.2. Russian Deterrence Theory

For the conceptualization of Russian deterrence theory, this study will primarily use the conception of 'strategic deterrence', and associated subtypes of *sderzhivanie* [restraining], *ustrashenie* [intimidation], *prinuzhdenie* [compellence] from the Russian national security documents (2010 Military Doctrine, 2014 Military Doctrine, 2015 National Security Strategy). These concepts are used and elaborated upon by Ven Bruusgaard, Adamsky, Sinovets, Renz, and Lanoszka.

2.2.1. Russian Strategic Deterrence

Russian Strategic Deterrence [*strategicheskoe sderzhivanie*] is a native Russian deterrence conception that encompasses the cross-domain concept of what is known in the West as the Russian doctrine of 'hybrid warfare' and the Russian concept of 'New Generation Warfare' [NGW]. The conception of Russian Strategic Deterrence as 'hybrid warfare' is a misnomer as well as a primarily Western construct, as the categorization of 'Strategic Deterrence' is not primarily a military conception with aspects of other domains; it is a continuous all-spectrum toolbox [*Kompleksnyi/sistemnyi podhod*] that is to be used both in peacetime, wartime, and anywhere in between to accomplish the strategic objectives of the Russian Federation (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). Ironically, Russian experts view New Generation Warfare as a response to Western 'hybrid campaigns' against Russia; whereas they view their NGW [vis-a-vis Strategic Deterrence] as cross-domain deterrence (Adamsky, 2018). Russian Strategic Deterrence is generally constructed much more broadly than the Western conception of deterrence, containing offensive, defensive, military, non-military, nuclear, and non-nuclear tools; used in both peacetime and wartime (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). Adamsky argues that, while the current conception of deterrence is, innovative; it retains much tradition and historical continuity in respects to Russian strategic culture, especially in regards to its strong linguistic and idiosyncratic imprints. Idiosyncratic imprints such as the terms of 'military cunningness', and other precepts to what is now known as military 'asymmetry' or 'asymmetric' warfare, had been seen in doctrine from the Soviet and even the Tsarist times. The substitution of methods other than force was seen as a way to complement and even a multiplicative quality for a commander. These linguistic imprints extend to the origins for conflictual terms: 'struggle', as well as the linguistic origins for 'deterrence', add to historical context. *Bor'ba*, or 'struggle' is used to describe the terminology used within this deterrence literature, which blurs the line between war and peace as a continuous spectrum of enduring struggle. Information struggle, radio-electronic struggle, economic struggle, armed struggle; are all used in lieu of 'warfare' and is phrased in both passive and active components in terms of competition (Adamsky, 2018). The Russian words for compellence are twofold: *Sderzhivanie* [Restraining], *Ustrashenie* [Intimidation]. *Sderzhivanie*, as 'restraining', 'keeping out', or 'holding back' is a broader term than the Western

deterrence conception, as it encompasses all tools and methods that are used [instead of 'could be used'] to prevent war from breaking out; which includes an overarching view of an ideation similar to the Western conception of 'containment' (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). It also has status-quo connotations, as a reactive measure to deter a change in the current paradigm (Adamsky, 2018). *Ustrashenie*, on the other hand, is generally more specifically linked to the nuclear arsenal. Usually this term is used in reference to the [implicitly illegitimate] deterrent policy of other states and has a few negative connotations, associated with 'nuclear blackmail'. A common reflexive phrase to describe Cold War policies conducted by the United States was, according to Ven Bruusgaard was '*sderzhivanie putem ustrasheniya*', or 'deterrence through intimidation'. When reflexively referring to their own deterrence conceptions, Russia primarily uses *sderzhivanie* (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). A third term: *priuzhdenie*, or 'compellence', primarily refers to a proactive connotative understanding of actions taken to change the status-quo. This term is primarily used to indicate a specific delineation on type of influence or action the state is taking. This term is used rather awkwardly, as there is not an established term for coercion vis-a-vis a combination of deterrence and compellence. Additionally, Adamsky notes that current Russian typology lacks adequate specificity for the differentiation of concepts, where the various terminology of deterrence were used interchangeably, compounding confusion; as well as the double use of 'Strategic Deterrence' as referring specifically to the strategic nuclear arsenal (Adamsky, 2018).

The Russian Federation's usage of Strategic Deterrence is a function of its inability to compete with regional adversaries such as NATO in every domain. Russian Strategic Deterrence attempts to overcome this strategic shortcoming by using this holistic and continuous containment, deterrence, and coercion concept to conduct coordinated, simultaneous activities to actively and passively influence its adversaries in a cross-domain manner to use all available tools to deter and dominate conflict (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). Keeping this in mind, the strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenal is still the cornerstone and guarantor of Russian deterrence (Sinovets & Renz, 2015).

The objective of the Russian deterrence stratagem is the prevention of behavior through management and stabilization within the domains in which it chooses and in which it is obliged to 'struggle'. It aims to deter through and dominate these domains. The primary subjective litmus test through which Russian Strategic Deterrence frames its effectiveness is the imposition of 'unacceptable losses'. This framing exists across the afore-mentioned multiple constitutive domains, as there is an emphasis on the interchangeability of conventional weapons, non-strategic nuclear weapons; and then again separately on the use of non-military domains and conventional military domains (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). The logic here is that a traditional strategic nuclear weapon is aimed at inflicting unacceptable losses, with even a limited nuclear strike also having such destructive consequences that it would deter an aggressor in a large-scale conventional conflict. Modern conventional precision weapons also have the capacity to inflict unacceptable losses in 'demonstration strikes', 'limited strikes', and the targeting of objects of critical importance. Ideally, the ability for conventional weapons, non-strategic nuclear weapons, strategic nuclear weapons, and non-military tools [such as political or economic tools] to deter an opponent would provide a complementary effect with a great amount of added-value in the form of flexibility that a single domain, that is, nuclear capabilities, cannot solely provide on its own. Theoretically, strategic deterrence provides the Russian Federation with a flexible system that can deter and contain conflict in peacetime, wartime, and the times in between; with the possible risks of misallocation of domained tools conflating high and low level risks, being outweighed by the overall flexibility and effectiveness of the system. Explicitly, the Russian Strategic Deterrence concept prescribes the use of wartime tools in times of peace. That being said, Adamsky argues that there is a certain non-coherence on the categorization of what actions require a nuclear response, in terms of severity and impact. He also notes that there is a lack of streamlined integration with the national-level deterrence strategy, which presents concerns on the monumentality of this task, as well as an asymmetric nature of the nuclear domain as a deterrence function, out of sync with the other constitutive domains in the holistic deterrence concept (Adamsky, 2014a).

Moreover, non-military tools used in such a flexible arrangement, provide an increased signaling capability in their ability to provide more policy options to de-escalate conflict. Political, economic, informational, and other forms of pressure may be added in concert to influence a target to modify the situation at an earlier stage than the employment of military tools (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). Adamsky (2014a) notes the emphasis placed on combining tools and domains, nuclear and non-nuclear tools used for signaling, non-military tools to increase pressure, etc; entitling this concept 'crossdomain coercive capability'. In another article, (Adamsky 2014b) Adamsky explains the effect that crossdomain coercive capability has on increasing deterrence credibility by increasing escalation ladder levels as de-escalatory potential, as, put simply; there are more signaling and de-escalatory options before military engagement and nuclear options (Adamsky, 2018).

The newest and least-developed component of Russian Strategic Deterrence is the non-military deterrence domain. The use of non-military domains: 'economic, ideological, scientific, cultural, political, informational' is intended to address the interrelationship between the functioning and actions of states in the international ecosystem. Ven Bruusgaard argues that the Russian theorists understand the nature of the political threats they believe they are facing, however she believes the way in which these measures would deter conflict is mechanically unclear. She notes that there is little detail in the theoretical writings that form her corpus, on how non-military deterrence would function, outside of the statement that the tool usage depends on the status of the target state in the international system. There is little to no categorization or assignment on which actions would cause non-military reaction or retaliation; nor how the non-military tools would actually deter further aggression (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). Adamsky agrees with this point implicitly, as while the Russian holistic conception of deterrence has additional non-military tools that may theoretically allow for the employment of options that would reduce a kinetic outcome; the approach itself is 'saturated with procedural deficits that, unless addressed, may lead to inadvertent escalation' (Adamsky, 2018). Adamsky argues that this deterrence conception is in relation and response to the United States vis-a-vis NATO, and the soft arms race that occurs in posturing, technological innovation, and regional developments; influences

the formation of norms (Adamsky, 2014b). However, at the same time, he notes that this aforementioned dissonance, along with the incongruity of the different domains and their combination is a result of the consequence of the newness of this theory, which is still formulating and evolving itself. Further along this vein, are the second order effects of the chronological articulation of the theory, being a living, nascent theory: the theory itself should be understood within its intellectual history and the understanding of the semi-recent paradigm shift that spawned it (Adamsky, 2018).

Regarding Russian Strategic Deterrence as a whole, there are questions on how effective are the communicative elements of Russian signaling. The usage of 'unacceptable losses' as a predetermined metric of objective and success raises issues of miscommunication and conflict psychology, insofar much as the appearance of nuclear and non-nuclear blackmail and brinkmanship having a deleterious effect on the global perception of the Russian Federation; hypothetically impacting the receptiveness to cede to Russian demands. Furthermore, there is little consideration nor alternatives on the possibility that the tactics used would cause escalation instead of de-escalation, or even retaliation from military or non-military sources (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). Even passive details such as the threat of nuclear first-strike, exacerbate the baseline tension level (Sinovets & Renz, 2015), which several NATO member-states have explicitly referenced in their threat perception (Haggard, 2019). Lastly, as a cumulative point, current Russian typology lacks a methodology for the 'culminating point', the point at which further escalation in counterproductive (Adamsky, 2018); hypothetically locking this paradigm into a brinkmanship set.

2.2.2. Comparison to Western Deterrence Conceptions

The most striking difference between Russian Strategic Deterrence and the previously-mentioned Western deterrence conceptions is the Russian conception's portrayal of war and peace as a spectrum, not as a binary categorization of success. Whereas the West categorizes the action-reaction paradigm as a metric regarding a measure's efficacy, where deterrence has failed if the targeted action is not dissuaded; the Russian conception is objective-oriented and persistent, having additional measures employed as

a result to accomplish the deterrence. Ven Bruusgaard notes that the Russian Strategic Deterrence ideation has three unique features: universality, continuousness, and its combination of deterrent and coercive logic (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). It is important to note that Russian Strategic Deterrence is linked explicitly to the projection and perception of Western deterrence measures and strategic actions. For example: New Generation Warfare, the use of cyber-domain, and information struggle is denoted as 'reflexive control', when used in regards to holistic social consciousness and in reference to specific situations. This reflexive control is seen as the retaliation towards what is classified as 'Information Warfare' from the United States. This 'information deterrence' is still a relatively new concept, being not fully defined or elaborated upon; but it is a mechanism through which information warfare can be used to deter or prevent conflict (Adamsky, 2018).

Russian threat perception focuses on a wide range of holistic actions, including domestic threats as both military danger and what is seen as Western subversion in the information domain targeting the domestic population; undermining 'spiritual and patriotic traditions'(Russian Federation, 2014). Strategic vulnerability is a systemic theme throughout Russian threat perception, with regime change, military mobilization and exercises, as well as NATO military infrastructure moving Eastwards, and the possibility of a 'prompt global strike'; included among the explicit threats to the Russian Federation. Regarding NATO, cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is no longer seen as a vehicle through which collective security can be reinforced, as it was in the 2010 Russian military doctrine; now, it is characterized as an 'equal partner for dialogue'. Conversely, the 2014 Russian military doctrine emphasizes the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO], the Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO] as well as partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]. A vital sphere is interest is also mentioned, yet not entirely defined. Sinovets and Renz attribute this lack of specificity to a desire for strategic ambiguity; however, they also note that the mention of the explicit inclusion of the Arctic for the first time, betwixt this strategic ambiguity, as a significant point of establishment (Sinovets & Renz, 2015).

2.3. Chinese Deterrence Theory

For the conceptualization of Chinese deterrence theory, this paper will primarily use the Minimum/Limited Deterrence theory [*zuidi xiandu weishe/ youxian weishe*] and the Strategic Deterrence theory [*zhanlue weishe*]. These concepts are used and elaborated upon by Chase, Chan, Erickson, Yeaw, Johnston, Ross, Hjortdal, and Fravel. The source material on the Chinese military doctrine itself primarily will consist of primary source documents regarding Chinese military strategy, translated publications by former Chinese military officers, and studies conducting analysis of Chinese military strategy and doctrine. These include studies and analysis conducted by Liang, Xiangsui, Finkelstein, Fravel, Medeiros, Heath, Gunness, Cooper, Bolt, Gray, Chansoria, Rinehart, and Singh.

It is important to note that China lacks a public legal document such as the U.S. National Military Strategy that outlines its national strategic objectives and methodology; however the lack of legal basis does not impede the study of Chinese deterrence, as numerous white papers, speeches by senior officials, and articles published by officers serve a similar purpose, without the burden of legal constraint (Finkelstein, 2007; Fravel, 2008; Fravel & Medeiros, 2010; Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). This lack of legal constraint allows for a certain level of advantageous strategic ambiguity (Rinehart, 2016).

2.3.1. Chinese Strategic Deterrence

Chinese Strategic Deterrence [*zhanlue weishe*] is a broad concept, containing a multidimensional combination of military and nonmilitary domains that constitute a combined 'integrated strategic deterrence' posture taking advantage of all elements of 'comprehensive national power' [*zonghe guojia liliang*]. The objective of this deterrence strategy is 'war containment': 'pre-war crisis control, operational control during war, and stability control after war', using whole-of-government methods to prevent the outbreak of war, and measures to contain its escalation (Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). A credible strategic deterrent, by this standard, includes nuclear,

conventional, space, and cyber capabilities (Chase & Chan, 2016). The important detail in this regard is that Chinese strategists view that the military domain has the most immediate and direct influential capacity to affect a potential adversary's strategic calculus. That being said, Chinese military publications have repeatedly emphasized the use of nonmilitary domains as strategic deterrence domains, both separately and in support of military actions (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999; Chase & Chan, 2016).

The framing of war is primarily conceptualized as war between comprehensive national power: a war between systems. Even if there is victory without war, it does not mean there is not a war at all. In broad strokes, these are economic wars, political war, science and technology wars, and diplomatic wars within the 'war' frame. The four national power sub-systems measured by Chinese analysts are material/hard power [national resources, economics, science/technology, and national defense], spirit/soft power [politics, diplomacy, culture, education], coordinated power [leadership, management, coordination of national development], and environmental power [international, natural, and domestic] (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999; Chansoria, 2009). There are 11 security domains: political, territorial, military, economic, cultural, social, scientific and technological, informational, ecological, financial, and nuclear. These reflect interests that have extended to the open-ocean, outer space, and cyberspace (Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). This comprehensive domain fusion for the purposes of war is characterized as the mobilization of national resources as a 'people's war' and provides a 'solid material and technological foundation' for Chinese exertion of power (Chase & Chan, 2016). Naturally this has had overlap with the military performing non-military activities, and nonmilitary actors performing military/paramilitary activities; such as the formation of the Chinese Coast Guard from several non-paramilitary entities (Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). Cross-domain initiatives are primarily framed in main-element/supporting-element(s) constructions where such things as electronic warfare and trade warfare can support conventional warfare. While primarily the main-element is military in nature, this is a general rule, not a set formula. In the Chinese conception, there is "almost no domain which does not have warfare's offensive pattern". Likewise, supranational and intra-national means are explored as exploitable domains, as their interconnected nature to the state function is emphasized. It is stressed that every

domain can become a battlefield and that military action does not always have to be the primary action. As scholars, businessmen, and generals all can be actors and national tools; all domains can be a battlefield (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999)

Chinese Strategic Deterrence is primarily framed in generalized, pre-established paradigms: regarding peacetime, times of tension, and wartime. The peacetime paradigm is characterized by 'preventative deterrence activities' that correlate to passive, enduring threats to China's national security. The 'peacetime deterrence posture' uses China's 'comprehensive national power' to maintain a 'balanced relationship with the opponent for a relatively long period of time'. This 'static deterrence capability' allows for such actions as displays of strength such as military parades, exercises, official and unofficial media reports, etc. In times of tension, China shifts towards an 'emergency deterrence posture' to place threat upon an opponent, using 'a dynamic deterrence capability', which includes posturing and actions by the military and non-military domains in support. This is designed to signal resolve and willingness to fight, so that the adversary can reverse course at the last second. Notably, the strategic missile units attempt to exert pressure through public opinion in various public media to deter adversaries in peacetime and in times of tension. These 'displays of strength' are an integral part of the Chinese method. As the situational intensity increases, the deterrence actions increase accordingly; to the extent of carrying out cyber-attacks and even limited firepower attacks proximate to the enemy forces. The categorization of said attacks are correlated to how close the situation is to conflict. This would be supplemented with public broadcasts declaring intent to the foreign public and elite audiences, as to create upward psychological pressure onto leadership to capitulate to Chinese demands. This extends to the 'all-out escalation' paradigm, which orders silo-based missiles and other strategic weaponry for preparation; with the same media methodology. Posturing, in this regard, is an integral part of the signaling element for China; which operates under the assumption that it has the necessary time to actuate all steps of its deterrence strategy (Chase & Chan, 2016).

In all stages of a potential conflict paradigm, the advocation for a diplomatic solution, win-win scenarios, and to garner international support and action legitimacy is seen as paramount. This is done to minimize the externalities and consequences of actions taken; as the Chinese have concern for spillover from a crisis situation into other interests; even in victory. Ideally they would form a coalition of countries to deter the enemy, both militarily and in negotiated settlements. The act of 'saving face' is also of great importance throughout the process (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999; Chase & Chan, 2016).

The decision to escalate tensions intentionally is dependent on the potential to achieve political goals. Military and non-military force is used to achieve broader political/strategic objectives, and an emphasis is placed on the controllability of the situation where the military operations must be confined by political objectives at all times, or risk 'domestic, political, economic, and social stability' and may cause regional or global tension. The Chinese view a small controlled conflict as a potential action to prevent a larger conflict; should non-military activities fail; as to not escalate to a large-scale war, should deterrence fail. Ideally, conflict would be averted before it happens, and the root causes identified and resolved through cooperative mechanisms and participation in international security and diplomatic institutions; otherwise the conflict will be enduring and cyclical (Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016).

That being said, the Chinese do also note that 'stability' as a concept is not to be sought at all costs, advocating for the measured exploiting of crises and potentially using military clashes to improve China's position strategically by protecting its interests and potentially finding the bottom line of an opponent. This brinksmanship and lack of context does contain a certain escalatory logic that may overestimate the Chinese confidence in their ability to control a conflict situation (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999; Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016).

Chinese Strategic Deterrence also contains a linguistic component, in that the term for deterrence, '*weishe*' also includes a similar ideation as the Western 'compellence' conception by Schelling (Chase & Chan, 2016).

Active Defense is a keystone guideline in Chinese military doctrine. The principle behind Active Defense is that while China will not 'attack unless attacked', the definition of an attack on the strategic level, does not necessarily have to involve a kinetic attack; however China may respond kinetically on an operational level. Plainly, if China's strategic or core interests are 'attacked' in a non-military fashion, it may attack pre-emptively in a military fashion as a response (Rinehart, 2016). The goal of Chinese deterrence is to affect the adversary psychologically and destroy the will to fight, ideally before fighting occurs; and accordingly, the defense prioritizes attacking the foe far away from the mainland, to minimize damage to China. This has implications for their Nuclear No First Use policy (Chase, Erickson, & Yeaw, 2009).

Nuclear Deterrence forms a rather dualistic cornerstone in Chinese thought (Singh, 2016). It is simultaneously one of the most important types of strategic deterrence, being unmatched in its destructive potential; however, because of its potential for mutually assured destruction against another nuclear power, the nuclear deterrent is limited in its utility. The lasting impact on the user state's political, economic, and diplomatic standing is seen as not desirous (Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). People's Liberation Army [PLA] publications assert that conventional military deterrence, denoted as 'real war capabilities' [*shizhan*] (Ross, 2002) contains a higher degree of utility and flexibility, as they are not subject to the unique constrains and ramifications associated with nuclear weapons (Chase & Chan, 2016; Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016).

The PLA portrays the cyber domain as especially important for strategic deterrence, as it allows China to reduce a high-tech adversary's advantage in a hypothetical conflict. It has varied applications, such as challenging U.S. hegemony through norm competition

on its own, targeting adversarial logistical, communications, commercial, and critical infrastructure, as well as actions taken in support of an initiative in a military or non-military domain; such as within the Active Defense framework (Chase & Chan, 2016). A computer-network attack [CNA] in computer-network operations [CNO] is seen as the 'spearpoint of deterrence', as it can increase the cost of a conflict to an unacceptable level before it has begun; thus deterring the opponent (Hjortdal, 2011). Chinese military doctrine has prioritized information denial (except the information wanted to be given), strategic deception and achievement of psychological surprise for decades (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999; Chansoria, 2009). This, along with controlling the international media narrative, is considered 'information deterrence'. (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999; Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). Chinese scholars argue that the 'information umbrella' [*xinxi san*] is superior to the nuclear umbrella, as it is not similarly constrained; and can be used in peace and in war (Ross, 2002).

It is important to note that many of the capabilities and processes regarding this strategic deterrence concept were mainly aspirational, as China did not have the physical elements to match the conceptual elements across many domains. This gap has lessened over the years, however it is currently unclear to what extent it has narrowed the gap; only that the gap is still significantly affecting the concept as a whole (Chase & Chan, 2016). It is also important to note that the Chinese objective of winning without force, is caveated with limitations: "only when the deterring state has 'extremely limited' political objectives, when there is an 'extreme power imbalance,' and when the target has a 'conciliatory attitude'" (Ross, 2002). Additionally, the native literature contains innate assumptions that the crises situational paradigm will provide enough time to go through all deterrence steps; as there is little writing on the circumstances that lack sufficient time. Regarding psychological pressure, there is also little literature on the topic of miscommunication, psychological backfiring, the implications of potential brinksmanship; as well as the innate assumption that the Chinese are immune to psychological pressure themselves (Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016).

2.3.2. Minimum Deterrence and Limited Deterrence

There is a debate on whether China uses the Minimum Deterrence (*zuidi xiandu weishe*) strategy or the Limited Deterrence strategy (*youxian weishe*). Minimum Deterrence is the ideation that a state should retain the minimum level of nuclear weapons required to ensure its sovereignty and deter war from nuclear and non-nuclear states (*you qima de huanji shouduan*); while simultaneously avoiding arms races. Comparably, Limited Deterrence 'requires a limited war-fighting capability to inflict costly damage on the adversary at every rung of the escalation ladder, thus denying the adversary victory in a nuclear war'. Practically this is a slightly more flexible nuclear strategy with different nuclear tools for its deterrence purposes (Fravel & Medeiros, 2010). Both strategies repudiate the Mutually Assured Destruction conception, as 'unacceptable losses' is defined with a much lower threshold than 'total annihilation' (Chansoria, 2009). Both strategies have the goal of surviving a nuclear first strike (Chase, Erickson, & Yeaw, 2009), with assured retaliation capabilities (Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). The mainstream view regards Minimum Deterrence is the primary approach, yet there is sufficient support to mention Limited Deterrence as an option (Fravel & Medeiros, 2010).

The relatively slow pace of evolution and articulation of nuclear strategy and doctrine can be explained by the imposition of precepts by Chairman Mao, the tumultuous context of the Cultural Revolution and its lasting impact, and the technological limitations of the industrial and educational base during the economic transformation (Chase, Erickson, & Yeaw, 2009). Chairman Mao primarily viewed nuclear weapons as tools to prevent a nuclear attack and prevent nuclear coercion; with the goal of having a second strike capability. This largely limited the development of nuclear strategy and explains much of the relative vulnerability of the nuclear arsenal and lack of survivability for several decades following China's nuclearization. Chinese research regarding nuclear doctrine languished until the mid-1980s (Fravel & Medeiros, 2010).

Practically, however, China has suffered greatly from limited institutional and logistical capacity regarding its nuclear tools, calling into question the survivability of the nuclear

weapons and ability for China to assure the retaliation component of its Minimum/Limited Deterrence strategy (Fravel & Medeiros, 2010). Furthermore there is little research published on how these concepts would work operationally, and it is repeatedly noted that China may lack the operational capacity to effectively conduct either deterrence strategy effectively, though that gap has been closing (Johnston, 1995; Chase, Erickson, & Yeaw, 2009; Fravel & Medeiros, 2010). The Chinese leaders themselves have minimal confidence in their second-strike capability, or even a first strike capability. The preparatory time required for either option take a significant amount of time that greatly risks detection and pre-emptive attack (Ross, 2002). Regardless, for China, nuclear weapons is not only a strategic necessity, but a prerequisite for international stature (Johnston, 1995; Finkelstein, 2000; Singh, 2016).

The logic of Chinese Minimum/Limited Deterrence is as follows: learning from the mistakes of the Soviets attempting to match the U.S. in military spending, the Chinese have opted to pursue an approach that maximizes sufficiency and effectiveness, whilst attempting to minimize the potential for escalation and arms races. Accordingly, China does not have many nuclear weapons. The objective for both strategies is to prevent nuclear conflict and the escalation of such conflict with credible signaling (Chase, Erickson, & Yeaw, 2009), while at the same time, preclude the use of nuclear coercion against China. Chinese policymakers are acting under the assumption that the U.S. is not willing to risk nuclear war 'at the cost of even a few American cities', whereas they have said they are willing to endure more devastation (Bolt & Gray, 2007).

China has a No Nuclear First Use [NFU] policy, however there is several debates from senior military leaders and strategists, on whether certain caveats warrant non-observance (Rinehart, 2016), such as: a response to an attack on strategic nuclear sites, to deter external intervention in a Taiwanese crisis or conflict, catastrophic defeat in Taiwan, in response to breaches of territorial integrity (Chase, Erickson, & Yeaw, 2009). Furthermore, the Active Defense strategy may have the Chinese use nuclear weapons in response to a non-kinetic attack, because the Chinese had been theoretically attacked strategically; thus fulfilling their No First Use phrasing, allowing them to

proceed with their own attack. (Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). Strategists have suggested that the NFU policy is mutable, as that it could be formally changed in response to regional and imminent threats as a tactic (Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). Lastly, the Chinese assert that if nuclear weapons are used against China, they must use nuclear weapons in retaliation (Ross, 2002).

China's NFU policy and advocation for the banning of all nuclear weapons may also be a pragmatic position, rather than a moral one. China does not have the technological supremacy or numerical value to win a meaningful nuclear conflict. Its comparatively weak position permits the Chinese to advocate for reduction, as it will affect the Americans and Russians to a greater degree than themselves (Bolt & Gray, 2007).

2.3.3. Comparison to Western Deterrence

While both Western Deterrence and Chinese Deterrence have the goal of deterring conflict, the difference lies in framing. The West attempts to prevent conflict, the Chinese attempt to win without firing a shot, due to imposition of indecision via psychological pressure. Whereas the West view war as a deterrence failure, the Chinese view war as another step in deterrence that may prevent a larger war from breaking out. Posturing, in this regard, is an integral part of the signaling element for China; which operates under the assumption that it has the necessary time to actuate all steps of its deterrence strategy. It appears to operate on a similar logic to the Psychological Deterrence conception; however, instead of taking psychology into account in the holistic sense, informing decision-makers; the Chinese variant uses military and non-military actions to impose an overwhelmed psychological state. It is centered on China as the operative actor, wherein the object of deterrence is seemingly ascribed an inferior level of actorship, with the Chinese state seemingly impervious, or otherwise not afflicted by said psychological condition.

China's nuclear deterrence strategy is delineated above, where the Chinese prefer to use a minimal and limited countermeasure response to impose unacceptable losses; rather

than attempt to achieve dominance and a mutually-assured destruction threshold. The evolution and articulation of Chinese nuclear deterrence theory has been limited due to historical context and industrial capability.

2.3.4. Comparison to Russian Deterrence

Both Russian Strategic Deterrence and Chinese Strategic Deterrence have similar ideations of a spectrum of conflict; the primary difference being the Russian denotation of 'struggle' and explicit categorizations, whereas the Chinese imply the spectrum, but still use the word 'war'. It does mention a seemingly similar ideation of 'struggle' within a competitive context, however this was an isolated incident. Chinese Limited Deterrence is similar to Russian Strategic Deterrence in conceptual framework, as they are both designed to address asymmetric power relationships in their respective regions; however, Chinese Minimum and Limited Deterrence operate at a much lower threshold of violence, as to impose unacceptable losses from a 'sufficient' level of a particular deterrence tool, rather than truly compete or dominate, as Russian Strategic Deterrence. This ideation extends to every operative deterrence element of Chinese Strategic Deterrence as well as Russian Strategic Deterrence. This difference, coupled with the repeated peaceful and non-directed contextual emphasis in the deterrence documentation, in conjunction with the emphasis on existing ownership of Taiwan, border regions, and Nine-dash line, implies both an independent normative frame, as well as a lack of relative capability independent of the delineation of the aspirational nature of its deterrence strategy in the Theoretical Framework corpus. The Russian Deterrence conception also contains a normative frame, however that frame is directly linked via opposition to NATO actions as illegitimate; while it does contain normative elements concerning multipolarity [as do the Chinese], this ideation is massively overshadowed by the oppositional frame.

The framing of action initiatives of Chinese Strategic Deterrence is that of a main element with supporting elements, each having different utility and effectiveness in different contexts; whereas Russian Strategic Deterrence is conceptualized as an interchangeable spectrum of multi-domain tools for all contexts.

Both Russian and Chinese deterrence conceptions have issues of incompleteness and methodological deficiencies in regards to the actual deterrence mechanics of the strategies. Both states' deterrence conceptions have aspirational qualities that reflect a current lack of integration, capability, and incomplete ideation.

The framing of peace and war paradigms differ, in that the Chinese have set categorized deterrence denotations that they categorize action-reaction paradigms, whereas the Russians operate on a continuous spectrum of war and peace. This reflects the difference between Chinese emphasis on postural efficacy and signaling, whereas the Russian emphasis relies on objective-orientation. That being said, the non-binary objective-oriented litmus test for success for both models remains a commonality.

2.4. Revisionism

The definition chosen for revisionism for this thesis is Johnston's formative conception; the majority of subsequent studies that explore revisionist and status-quo adherence explicitly reference this definition.

> *"... a revisionist state is one which does not participate actively in major international institutions, which breaks the rules and norms of those international institutions in which it does participate, or which temporarily abides by the rules and norms but when presented with the opportunity tries to alter them in ways inconsistent with the original purposes of the institution and community..."*. (Johnston, 2003)

2.5. Status-quo

The definition chosen for 'status-quo' is the logical opposite of Johnston's revisionist definition; to reflect the polar opposite point.

> *"a status-quo state is one that actively participates in major international institutions, which follows the rules and norms of those international institutions in which it does participate; and follows those rules and norms in ways consistent with the original purposes of the institution and community"*.

CHAPTER III. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

This methodological section combines constructivist ideations of discourse framing and normative identification with deterrence theory conceptions of threat perception and subject-object pairing. It does so within a comparative study frame using Data-Driven Qualitative Content Analysis [QCA] as the primary empirical research framework. The following chapter contains the methodological framework, which includes the research design, research questions, corpus of data, research methods, and limitations.

3.1. Research Design

This comparative study uses Data Drive QCA to compare and contrast Chinese and Russian deterrence conceptions and applications of deterrence at key events within defined areas of interest to determine whether they can be categorized as revisionist or status-quo powers. The corpus of data is delineated and justified. Data-Driven QCA will be used to code the primary source deterrence conceptions with supplementary secondary source analysis. Limitations of the methodological framework are also explored.

3.2. Research Questions

The revisionist nature of the Russian Federation and People's Republic of China is taken for granted in contemporary public and academic discourse, without the rigor of testing and evaluating that 'fact' by any meaningful metric. In the last 15+ years, the closest measurement on the degree of revisionism has been sector-based or issue-based adherence to international regimes, with the studies own authors denoting their difficulty in ascribing intent as to revisionist or pragmatist behavior, in light of the assertion that many status-quo powers seek to ignore many of the same binding regimes and applied norms as well (Walter, 2010).

This issue of single-sector/instance focus in the background literature engenders certain issues of scale. While an event or sector may certainly provide some useful information as to the disposition of an actor in a specific instance, more data points are needed along

multiple vectors. This study seeks to test the degree of revisionist and status-quo behavior of these states as a function of the study of deterrence; a multi-dimensional facet of political action, whose holistic nature provides greater insight as to the dispositional attributes of the regimes. The conception and application of deterrence provides subject-object pairings and threat perception, which by definition, enlighten the audience as to the viewpoints of the state authors. This study will determine these threats; normative values, and desired outcomes, as they all provide concrete anchors from which operationalization of that corpus of data will create indicators to which real-world events can be evaluated. To begin this methodological approach, the following research questions are posited.

[1] What are the differences between the deterrence strategies of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation?

'Differences' refer to the substantiative divergence in the deterrence conceptions and outcomes of each state. The litmus test for these differences are delineated and defined by the ability of these differences to have an overall impact on the reference points and doctrinal actions taken by the state actor in question. For example: such differences in subject-object pairing, stated/observed thresholds for response, expressed desired outcomes (short/long term), overall outlook, measurements of success, severity of language and language content (as well as citation of international/regional/historical norms and precedent), valid retaliatory actions of self/other, etc. This question is the launching point for the following questions and sub-questions.

[1B] Why might there be diverging drivers for deterrence conceptions/outcomes between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China?

Naturally, this 'why' sub-question follows the 'what' parent question. As with any study, understanding the drivers on outcomes is of paramount importance in both the academic sphere and the public realm. The impact of specific combinations actors, influences, and actions have in regards to policy and reactions viewed through different theoretical lenses is of utmost relevance here.

[2]Can China and Russia ultimately be categorized as revisionist powers through their deterrence strategies?

'Ultimately', in this case, refers to the both aspect of distinct finality, in terms of this paper, as well as the strategies being rendered down to the most basic level of measurement. 'Strategies' refers to both the conceptualization and application of deterrence by the state involved. This question evaluates the claims from the background literature, through the operationalized data correlations in the analysis.

[2B] If China and Russia can be categorized as revisionist powers, to what extent?

This sub-question is an extension of the previous question, with delineation and specification to follow. The answer to this question is relative, comparative to both the other state in this comparative study, as well as to the aggregate categorization markers in the data classification. This question satisfies and fills the gap in previous studies that sought to just simply denote Russia and/or China as revisionist or status-quo without qualifications, substantiations, or delineations.

3.3. Data Selection

The corpus of data to be collected, used, and analyzed will originate from the actions by the People's Republic of China and Russian Federation during key events in areas of interest, primary source documents concerning those areas of interest within the overall deterrence conception, and secondary sources that provide either analysis or overviews of the events themselves. The 'areas of interest' in this study are designated as the coded variables that demonstrate indicators significant to deterrence, as defined by the data-driven QCA from the national security documents themselves.

The Chinese or Russian governmental real-world interactions within these 'areas of interest' will then be taken as data points, designated 'key events' to be cross-referenced with the deterrence conceptions and political-strategic precepts that were established previously in the study, to determine the adherence, practical application, mitigating factors, and overall result. It is important not to overlay the Western deterrence

conceptions onto these distinctly-original native deterrence conceptions, as it risks data contamination and value projection, and as such, data-driven case selection is the most relevant and appropriate to address this matter.

In order to analyze and categorize the various conceptions of deterrence, I will be using the various 'national security strategies', 'national defense concepts', and their equivalents as primary governmental source documents as my corpus. These documents are the most relevant, reliable, and valid for the purposes of determining the official governmental stances of these states, as they are the official governmental publications on this subject matter. As deterrence requires a communicative element, issues of differing content in the various translations is not an issue; as the level of clarity put forth in the publication is a deterrence action in and of itself. As not every relevant primary governmental source national security document is made public in English, supplementary material will be drawn from academic literature surrounding said documents. While certainly reliance on supplementary material drawn from secondary sources is not ideal, in this case it is a matter of either doing with or doing without.

This corpus of data will be used to compare and contrast Russian and Chinese strategic thought concerning deterrence. While using data-driven methodology to determine deterrence conceptions does much to discourage pre-emptive hypotheses and expectation overlay; such objectives as determining threat perception, direct and indirect objects of deterrence; level of aggression and posturing, as well as the means and methods of deterrence; are universal. The differences lie in application, values, acceptable targets and methods, measures of acceptability and success, etc.

These 'key events within areas of interest' are both informed by and acted upon by the state in question, through the native deterrence conceptualization determining relevance of the indicator, as well as the state itself influencing the event. This is ultimately a measurement of the state's adherence to its own doctrine. Naturally there will inevitably be mitigating factors, influencing this arrangement, as nothing in the regional and global

political ecosystems solely exist in a vacuum. However, deterrence documentation takes this into account as either the ecosystem as visualized by the state or a normative ecosystem desired by the state.

Documentation concerning the official state responses and narratives for the operationalization of key events within areas of interest will predominantly prioritize governmental press releases, responses from senior governmental figures in their official capacity, academic studies that aggregate such data and governmental reactions to key events, reputable press sources that contain primary source references, as well as other items of literature or media that contains direct quotation or analysis of action regarding the primary source.

These prioritizations follow the existing methodology in a preference for primary source material, with supplementary secondary source material if required. It is integral to take note of the governmental responses, as it informs the reliability and adherence to their deterrence doctrine; however the commentary and analysis in both academic sources and informed media sources provide a level of scrutiny and context that, while invariably biased to an extent and even projected; do provide valued interpretations within their argumentation. These will be used sparingly, in a supplementary and complementary context, if needed; as possible causal explanations in the event that there is major dissonance and conflict between the stated doctrine and the actions taken contra to said documentation.

3.4. Timeframe of Case selection

These cases will be primarily taken post-2014, after the so-called 'Return of Geopolitics'; the oft-quoted point of departure in the relevant, associated academic literature. This point represents the key moment in which the issue of revisionism and geopolitics was widely acknowledged to have made its way to the forefront of the world scene (Zakaria, 2013). The roots are deeper, naturally, the most obvious and pressing case being the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. The enduring and contributing

influences to deterrence as well as the ideational forbearers as well as the deterrence conceptions themselves have obviously occur before 2014, however the vast majority of the actions responding to world events that contribute to this idea of contemporary revisionism are brought to the forefront during this specified time. Actions and events taken prior to 2014 will be acknowledged and brought into the corpus, however there will be an emphasis on cases concerning key events will be taken post-2014 as the primary focus to this point of departure.

3.5. Research Methods

The primary research frame used for this thesis will be the comparative study. In the background literature, both the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation have been compared in similar strokes as revisionist powers in several different studies and as status-quo powers in separate strokes in other studies. However, in the vast majority of studies, where they are mentioned together, they are ascribed similar qualities in broad strokes, as rising [or existing] regional powers with nuclear capability.

The research method used in support of the primary research frame, specifically for coding and analyzing the national security documents will be Data-driven Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA). Qualitative Content Analysis is a methodological research technique that systematically describes the meaning of qualitative material by classifying said material as instances, subsequently put into categories of a coding frame. This reductive, systematic, and flexible method allows for vast quantities of data to be condensed into efficient and manageable portions that are then ideally placed for comparison, both from document to document and from case to case. Qualitative Content Analysis is the most suitable method for this study, because the analysis of these state documents on deterrence requires coding with the ability to understand, analyze, and explain the nuances within. Quantitative coding lacks the ability to process this nuance, and it lacks the ability to measure the significance of the coded variables; the numeric value of the instances of a specific keyword has little bearing on the intensity and nuance regarding the attitudinal approaches of the author, particularly in translated material. This QCA will be data-driven, as deterrence is a broad concept that

is applied across a study of different countries with differing historical, military, and cultural backgrounds. Additionally, it is important to develop the coding frame from the data itself, as these native conceptions are significantly different from the Western conceptions of deterrence, and as such; the coding frame needs to be built from the deterrence documentation given by these states, rather than a projection or superimposition of non-native conceptions, expectations, and norms onto the object of research. Moreover, the actual coding will be derived from the conceptualization and categorization specifically or implicitly invoking deterrence within the document, especially if any status-quo and revisionist aspects are mentioned or implied. Implicitly in this case would both include sub-conceptualizations of deterrence within a 'deterrence' section, and references with the exact established deterrence, specific to the definition constructed. The latter being essentially: the deterrence classification establishes the definition, and that potential deterrence reference is compared to the definition; and if it is referential to the established definition, it would be classified as deterrence. The codes themselves will be descriptive, not limited to any specific unit length; as the conceptual basis of brevity and explanation may differ in the English translation of a document originally written in Mandarin or Russian. These codes will be used to develop indicators as the operationalization of the coding frame, to classify and determine to what extent the state follows its deterrence strategies and what form that deterrence strategy takes in practice.

As this study is data-driven and derived from native conceptions of deterrence, it normally would be difficult to create an initial hypothesis, however; based on the background literature and theoretical framework, the initial expectation is that China will have a softer-bounded approach, regardless of the degree of status-quo or revisionism expressed, due to their minimum/limited deterrence conception. On the other hand, comparatively, the Russian approach will appear to be more emphatically aggressive as a result due to their strategic deterrence conception; again regardless of their level of status-quo or revisionism expressed.

3.6. Limitations

The most obvious and present limitation in this study is the relatively short sample size of the timeframe in which the main corpus of evidence resides. Indeed, this does limit the study insofar much as it predominantly relies upon specific native deterrence documentation to categorize and determine empirical results, there is a legitimate criticism in the fact that prior influences, events, and trends are largely relegated to a supplementary frame. That being said, this is the first comparative study of its class concerning the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation in the last 15+ years, there needs to be a starting point to launch subsequent studies, in terms of precedent. An anthropological or anthological study would be appropriate for a study focused on a singular one of these state actors, not a new comparative study. Moreover, a significant section of the results of this study both indirectly and directly, evaluates the validity of the so-called 'Rise of the Rest' concept, necessitating the post-2014 scope.

The selection of the study of deterrence, while excellent as a study of strategic-level coordination of efforts, broadly ignores the interrelationships concerning the effects of positive economic and political relationships; particularly ones that involve states that are among the targeted objects to be deterred. However, the world economic regime, as a whole, being an international system in which the Russian Federation and People's Republic of China are irrevocably embedded, does, by its own nature as an open economic system; serve to both obfuscate and inundate academics and practitioners studying it, with widely varied and conflicting data concerning the level of 'buy-in', that the actors have in such a system that is nigh-mandatory to international wealth and power. It does little to specify and qualify the nature of positive and negative economic relationships as a function of political relations, nor does it, outside of egregious circumstances, properly delineate the practical applications of good and bad faith state economic actions without the superimposition of non-native norms. As such, ascribing positive and/or negative intent or meaning solely through an economic dimension suffers through the need for qualifiers to determine the contextual basis for those actions and the intent behind them. Without a proper official governmental responses, the increase of the price per unit of energy export to a state by another state could be

punitive, profit-driven, or due to budgetary needs. Additionally, at what threshold of percentage increase in price, lead to a determination of state action and intent? Conversely, the ascription of positive political relations due to positive sectoral interaction and import/export are difficult to determine purely economically as many interactions, particularly with specialization or resource export are due to the requirements of circumstance and pragmatism.

The use of a deterrence dimension as a supplementary qualifier can put these actions into perspective, however, the sheer volume of economic interrelationships; would better be suited to have the deterrence dimension as the primary focus of research, with the economic dimension as its supplementary. However, this does lead to a quandary of having to develop a metric to which extent a positive economic interaction bypass a bad interaction, and to what level each influences the other, which again references the afore-mentioned good/bad faith problem. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, these economic interactions must be parsed and filtered solely through the lens of the deterrence dimension to negate this quandary; resulting in only using those economic actions that fit as a deterrence action in this dataset.

Coding is the operative component of QCA. It allows for the reduction of information into its most basic units, providing a concise approximation of the intent of a body of literature. Unfortunately, there is an inherent data cost, as it relies almost entirely on the coder. This subjectivity is unavoidable, as QCA primarily focuses on discerning meaning, which is subjective in and of itself. To mitigate the effects of coder subjectivity, I have focused the coding frame as well as the re-cycling action therein, into subject-object pairings, avoiding the use of charged projective words to describe actions, and prioritized the usage of the documents' own wording. Invariably, attitudinal ascriptions onto other actors and actions are necessary, however the deterrence documents themselves offer much in the way of repeated justification along several vectors approaching the subject-object discourse frame.

CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

The following section contains a two-part comparative analysis on the findings of the study, as well as the testing of the hypotheses.

4.1. Russian Federation: Data

The national security documents used for the analysis are the 2014 Military Doctrine and the 2015 National Security Strategy. These documents are, at the time of the writing of this thesis, the most current and up-to-date primary source material on deterrence from a public Russian governmental source. While there are preceding deterrence documents, the purpose of this analytic component is to develop a current state-of-the-art to be compared to the Chinese model of deterrence, and actions therein; and such inclusion of a chronological survey risks affecting the analytic cohesion, at such a formative juncture; as this is the first study of its kind. The 2014 Military Doctrine, naturally is a boilerplate document, upon which generalized declarations are made as to the import and legal basis for deterrence as well as the official stances of the Russian Federation are made. The 2015 National Security Strategy is a more practical document, defining the different domains of security/deterrence/struggle, threat perception, normative agenda, and worldview.

4.2. Russia: Areas of Interest

The deterrence documents implicitly reference the status-quo of the international system and explicitly invoke several revisionist stances; which is significant in and of itself. It also provided several areas of interest to test the conceptual precepts. Notably, there is no mention of Syria at all in the documents.

4.2.1. The Arctic

The Arctic was deemed important in the both documents. The Russian Military has built 475 military sites in the Arctic in the past six years (TASS, 2019). While there is much concern for Arctic militarization (Ilyushina & Pleitgen, 2019), from NATO member-

states; Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made explicit note at the February 2019 Munich conference that while the Russian Federation is concerned about NATO objectives in the Arctic, they believe that established regional cooperation in the Arctic does not require an additional military component (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). The creation of military bases and other supporting infrastructure in the Arctic is consistent with the 2009 Russian Federation's Policy for the Arctic to 2020. At the same time, the results likely to prove inconclusive, insofar much as their ability to discern whether such Arctic militarization would be seen as revisionist or status-quo, as the construction of said bases and infrastructure are on the Russian Federation's own territory, and border security is the prerogative of any state. Even if the construction of military infrastructure was accelerated due to East-West tension, the fundamental critical structural question remains. A similar issue arises from the enduring semi-regular interception of Russian military aircraft near Canadian and American borders via the Arctic(TASS, 2018b; ABC News, 2018; CBC, 2018), these military patrols' presence within international waters, even close to other states' borders, is not conclusive as to the attributional status of the state as a whole.

4.2.2. Abkhazia and South Ossetia

In both defense documents, the explicit recognition of the statehood of the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia play a key role in Russian foreign policy, especially as it pertains to common defense vis-a-vis the Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO], and separately, with regional integration efforts via the EEU, and the CIS. As of May 2018, 5 states have recognized the two previously-Georgian breakaway regions: Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru; in chronological order. Vanuatu and Tuvalu had previously recognized the independence of these regions, however they withdrew said recognition as they established official diplomatic relations with Georgia in 2011 (TASS, 2018a). Naturally, the Republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia recognize each other; and there are other de-facto and unrecognized states that recognize the two polities as legitimate, however these are not included in the number, even by Russia. Additionally, the context in which the states broke away from Georgia, namely, the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, was generally seen as a Russian move to prevent

Georgia from being eligible to attain NATO membership (Isachenkov, 2018; Atlantic Council 2018); a move that was expressed as desirous by both Georgia and NATO (NATO, 2008). This motion has carried onwards and had been reaffirmed in successive NATO summits (NATO, 2019) The official Russian *casus belli* was the defense of civilians, many of whom had Russian citizenship; an internationally recognized normative action. However, the mass passportization beforehand, in incredible numbers in the preceding months to, and subsequent years from, the invasion in the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, suggests an intentional subversion and exploitation of international norms (Natoli, 2010) to supply a manufactured *casus belli* as *de facto* 'bio-colonization', into an otherwise internal affair (Artman, 2011; Nagashima, 2017). Regardless of arguments of maintaining a status-quo of the current number and positioning of NATO member states in relation to the neighborhood of the Russian Federation; the passportization action directly preceding the conflict, the circumstances of the war itself, and subsequent continuous official recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia despite international non-recognition by 97.4% of UN member states; constitutes revisionist actions.

4.2.3. Ukraine

As per the 2015 National Security Strategy, the blame for the conflict in Ukraine rests on the shoulders of the United States and European Union, for their support for the 'anti-constitutional *coup d'etat*' and resulting second and third order effects. The annexation of Crimea explicitly not mentioned, despite happening the year before the document's release. That being said, it is integral to the Ukrainian situation, and will be included in this section.

The official state rhetoric in this regard is that subsequent to the 'illegal coup' and ousting of Yanukovych, 'volunteers' formed armed militias in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, attempting to defend themselves against the 'far right' and the 'fascists' in Kiev that took over the 'legitimate government'. Subsequently, the Crimean government held a referendum for independence, and following its overwhelming assent; the Crimean government then petitioned the Russian Federation to be absorbed and incorporated

(Myers & Barry, 2014; Vidmar, 2015). The United States (Pifer, 2014b) and European Union contest this narrative (Council of the European Union, 2014; PACE, 2014) heavily, and claim subversion of the Ukrainian state and several violations of international norms and law, as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements concerning the territorial integrity as well as other requisite territorial understandings [See: International Treaties]. The international community predominantly condemns this move, with a substantial neutrality. The UN general assembly passed a non-binding resolution, with 100 votes in favor, 11 against, with 58 abstentions out of 193, declaring the Crimean referendum invalid (Charbonneau & Donath, 2014). Furthermore, the vast majority of the Crimean Tatars native to the Crimean peninsula, which constitutes 12% of the Crimean population, abstained from voting in the resolution, citing the illegality of the motion (Saluschev, 2014; BBC, 2014a).

Considering the rapidity in which the referendum and annexation took place after the deposition of Yanukovych, in reference to the Russian defense documents' precepts; the quick referendum and annexation appears to be quite opportunistic, compared to the alternatives. The repeated and pointed emphasis the Russian Federation put upon the international system and international norms regarding diplomatic resolution in the official security documents implies a disposition desirous to use said international conflict resolution system for addressing grievances and discussing solutions. The classification of the deposition of Yanukovich as a *coup d'etat*, as a challenge to the validity of the governmental change; would qualify that situational paradigm to be eligible for OSCE, UNSC, or many other international vehicles for conflict resolution, mandate-generating, and paradigm-shifting action; to say nothing of bilateral and multilateral attempts at conflict resolution with the relevant parties. While there are arguments that the Western support for the transition would likely make the efforts unsuccessful, the swiftness in which the Russian Federation enacted their military intervention and flash referendum seemed to discount the process entirely, as the 5 days after the 22 February ousting of Yanukovych and the 27-28 February seizure of key Crimean governmental buildings and airports by pro-Russian gunmen, the so-called 'Little Green Men' and 22/24 days after the 16 March referendum for Crimean secession and subsequent absorption on 18 March by the Russian Federation (BBC,

2014c; Al Jazeera, 2014) are too short and the events too rapid for any reasonable international actor to conclude that the Russian Federation is attempting to resolve the situation through any international vehicle or peaceful resolution. Moreso, considering that a week after the 22 February ousting, on 1 March, the Federation Council unanimously approved President Putin's request to use the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine and Crimea; (Lenta, 2014; Reuters, 2014) shows that from the official, formal side, that 7 days were given at a theoretical maximum, for a hypothetical resolution, if it were to be so attempted; ignoring all of the informal, legal-adjacent factors operating at that time.

Conversely, this short timeline implies that the Russian Federation is acting unilaterally to present the world with a *fait accompli*, rather than adhering to the precept of exhausting all non-military measures before applying military force as per the afore-mentioned official documents. Even potential mitigating circumstances, as given in the Russian statement of reason for the annexation (Marxsen, 2014; Vidmar, 2015) for the protection of Russian-speaking peoples and Russian civilians, fall short; as the risk to Russian citizens abroad at that time was fairly minimal, with a lack of present and imminent danger to the public, shortly after the ousting.

The deployment of unmarked military personnel under no flag presents issues of attribution, yet also of responsibility; considering the 2014 Military Doctrine as to the protection of compatriots abroad. This overarching logic extends to Eastern Ukraine, specifically the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where the Russian government has encouraged and supported the separatist movements with both military, legal-adjacent, and political actions and non-actions (Bebler, 2015; Trenin, 2016). The 2014 Military Doctrine explicitly allows for the protection of Russian citizens [along with an ambiguous term: 'compatriots'] abroad, as is consistent with international norms, along an identical vein to which the Russian Federation claimed its involvement (Vidmar, 2015). If Russian troops were deployed openly under explicit invocation of this international norm and legal basis, then there would be an argument to be made in favor of the status-quo; or at least, a factor against revisionism. The lack of identification

implies that there is not an official basis for deployment; or that there is insufficient cause. Moreover, the excuse that the soldiers were volunteers (Oliphant & Sabur, 2015; Engel, 2015) falls short, as the loss of control of personnel and matériel to the extent of invading a neighboring country and establishing separatist movements and regimes would be decried as unacceptable by any reasonable state, especially the state from which they originated. The nonchalance from the Russian government implies responsibility. Furthermore, aside from the identification of equipment specific to Russian Armed forces [highly likely to include the 45th Guards Separate Reconnaissance Regiment of the VDV] (Pulkki, 2014); the incredibly large amount of medals given to ground troops at a time when the Russian Federation was not overtly fighting a war against any other state [The Russian Federation did not begin overtly operations in Syria until September 2015, whilst the periods of time in this study precede this time], implicates Russian military involvement (Gregory, 2016). President Putin even admitted the presence of Russian military intelligence officers, after the capture of two such individuals by Ukraine; as well as the presence of the Russian army in Crimea, supporting the 'local defense forces' at the time of the referendum (Oliphant & Sabur, 2015; Walker, 2015).

The post-factum narrative that Crimea was historically a part of Russia and was given to Ukraine as a mistake during Soviet times (Myers & Barry, 2014; Sasse, 2017; Ragozin, 2019), also does not carry much weight; as Putin had roughly 14~ years to make overtures and significant actions before the annexation, yet did more in one month than in those 14 years; implying opportunism over the political circumstances in Ukraine, rather than the continuation of efforts to return Crimea to Russia through internationally normative channels.

The deployment of unmarked, non-attributed troops by the Russian Federation into Ukraine and Crimea, flash referendum and annexation into the Russian state, incitement and support for separatist activities; all within a brief period of time impossible for the international conflict resolution system explicitly and repeatedly mentioned in official Russian state documents to adequately address, with no reasonable, mitigating

circumstances; continued denial, and post-factum arguments for normalization; all while denying involvement, constitutes highly revisionist actions.

4.2.4. The Maritime Environment

Special import has been given to the maritime regions as 'transportation arteries' as a potential strategic zone of interest in the 2015 National Security Strategy. However, upon further investigation, the preponderance of material concerning the maritime environment, regarding Russia are generalized economic vectors with potential non-deterrence political ramifications (Economist, 2019; Bechev, 2019), aforementioned concerns about Arctic militarization (Gramer, 2017), general issues regarding such non-interstate deterrence state functions as addressing the actions of non-state actors, state functions regarding immigration, and combatting terrorism (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2009). Outside of this majority, the most relevant incident regarding revisionism and the status-quo is the incident and circumstances surrounding the ramming of a Ukrainian vessel, subsequent boarding, and capture of its crew, by the Russian FSB Coast Guard (Pifer, 2018; Troulliard, 2019). The initial incident took place within overlapping Crimean and Russian territorial waters within the Sea of Azov as per the maximum distance allotted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, whereas the final boarding and capture of Ukrainian sailors took place in international waters (Cruickshank, 2018). The Russian Federation and Ukraine had signed a 2003 treaty concerning the Strait of Kerch and Sea of Azov, granting free passage to Ukrainian and Russian vessels; whilst recognizing the areas as both Russian and Ukrainian territorial waters (BBC, 2018; Cruickshank, 2018). Considering the fact that the ultimate seizure of Ukrainian sailors and their vessel in international waters, 2003 treaty that grants passage to the Strait of Kerch and Sea of Azov regardless, and the circumstances surrounding the Russian annexation of Crimea and intervention into Ukraine; the actions surrounding the 2018 incident concerning the capture of Ukrainian sailors by the Russian Coast Guard are deemed to be revisionist.

4.2.5. Special Services

The 2015 Russian National Security Strategy mentions that "increasingly active use is being made of special services" potential. This section will evaluate the use of special services as an area of interest. While it is difficult to properly address the scope of actions by intelligence services, given the nature of intelligence work, this study will primarily focus on the specific circumstances and actions that have the potential to violate international treaties and contradict the other specific markers that the Russian government placed in its national defense documents concerning its normative ideals. The potential lack of complete data in this regard is not an insurmountable issue, as the existence of violations ascribes revisionist qualities.

Simultaneously, the actions that do not constitute violations or are not provable violations, do not confer the status-quo attribution in this particular case; as any particular frequency ratio of violations to non-violations are overshadowed by the import of the egregiousness of said violations.

The poisoning of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military intelligence officer and double agent, and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury, England is one such action. On March 4, 2018, the Skripals were found unconscious on a public bench, and upon admission to the hospital and analysis, it was determined that they were exposed to Novichok, a Soviet-developed nerve agent (Schwirtz, 2019). The British authorities determined that the poisoning was a premeditated action by 2 GRU agents on behalf of the Russian Federation through CCTV footage (Pérez-Peña & Barry, 2018). The United Kingdom declared that the use of Novichuk on British soil constituted a breach of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction; otherwise known as the 'Chemical Weapons Convention' [CWC]. As a result, the British government, along with 28 other governments, expelled a total of 153 diplomats; an otherwise unprecedented number (Chugtai & Petkova, 2018). The British government further included the incident as relevant to their threat perception paradigm in their 2018 National Security Strategy (HM Government, 2018).

The Russian government denied these allegations, and repeatedly asserted that the two men were tourists. They attempted to reverse the dialogue, claiming that the British government is violating international law by refusing to provide access to the Skripals to Russian consular officials. The British government refused, citing that Yulia Skripal did not wish to see the consular officials; and that the location of the two will remain secret, referencing the attempted murder. The Russian government refutes those claims, and asserts that the British government had not provided the necessary level of evidence to prove their claim (Schwirtz, 2019).

The CCTV footage of the two individuals, subsequent identification, chemical analysis of the nerve agent, and record expulsion of Russian diplomats; coupled with the lackluster Russian response in the face of said evidence and flimsy alibi, indicates a serious revisionist action as the violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (art 1. sec. 1b) for an assassination on foreign soil is an egregious break of international norms and concord.

The apprehension of four GRU officers by Dutch authorities on April 13, 2018 for attempting to conduct a cyber-attack on the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW] headquarters building (Viswantha, Colchester, & Volz, 2018) also constitutes another such action. The Dutch authorities found specialist hacking equipment, a mobile phone activated nearby GRU headquarters in Moscow, as well as a taxi receipt from thereabouts as well, in the vehicle in which the officers were apprehended. Further investigation revealed that the men were traveling on diplomatic passports and were met at the airport by a Russian embassy official (Henley, 2018). This constitutes a revisionist action, especially in the context of the poisoning of the Skripals earlier in the year, as the OPCW building is where an investigation of said poisoning was occurring at that time.

The requisite Russian actions in Ukraine and Crimea are covered under the support in the 'Ukraine' section.

The Russian government was also accused of conducting a worldwide cyber campaign, which included misinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, and document releases. The governments of New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom accused the Russian military for conducting 'reckless' cyber-attacks, including the 2017 Bad Rabbit ransomware attack, the 2016 Democratic National Convention [DNC] hack, and the World Anti-Doping Agency [WADA] cyber-attack. The governments included GRU-linked aliases associated with the cyber-attacks. (Berlinger & Dos Santos, 2018). The hack of the DNC was further confirmed by the Mueller investigation, which noted that tens of thousands of stolen documents were released under Russian-controlled aliases (Hendry, 2018).

Special Council for the United States Department of Justice Robert Mueller criminally charged 13 Russians and 3 Russian entities including the 'troll farm' known as the Internet Research Agency. The Mueller investigation accused them of several crimes, including identity theft to purchase advertising (Swaine, 2018), creating and disseminating memetic images for political use, and staging dozens of rallies for and against particular issues with contact with hundreds of unwitting American proxies (Lee, 2018); as well as deliberately spreading misinformation to exacerbate existing cleavages in American society (Birnbaum, 2019). The 'troll farm' at the center of these allegations is the 'Internet Research Agency', a state-run organization (Myers & Evstatieva, 2018). The organization was taken seriously to extent that U.S. Cyber Command hacked the Internet Research Agency during the day of the 2018 Midterm Elections and the days shortly thereafter so that it would not interfere with said election (Barnes, 2019). The interference in foreign elections; the hacking, theft, and dissemination of confidential files; as well as the continued spread of misinformation and attempted fomenting of dissent in the form of setting up political rallies across both sides of a myriad swath of issues constitutes revisionist actions.

The illegal and legal-adjacent actions conducted by Russian intelligence, including the poisoning of the Skripals, which constitutes a violation of the CWC, attempted hacking of the OPCW headquarters building, Russian intelligence supporting the separatist movements in Ukraine, and sustained global hacking campaign; including interference the U.S. Election, deliberate spread of misinformation in foreign elections constitutes severe revisionist actions. While the misinformation component may be a function of the 'informational struggle' component of Russian Strategic Deterrence; the contradictions between Russian governmental actions and the expressed Russian desire for non-interference in their own affairs concerning actions "destabilizing the domestic political and social situation" insinuate further revisionist behavior, as the discrepancy between Russian stated action and their emphasis on the "preservation of the stability of the system of international law and the prevention of its fragmentation, attenuation, and selective application" (Russian National Security Strategy, 2015).

4.2.6. International Treaties

The Russian defense documents repeatedly invoke the supremacy of international law, with specific importance given to the security-related treaties to which the Russian Federation is party, with a special concern regarding with arms control. This analysis section is concerned with determining the validity of accusations of non-adherence to the treaties that qualify as relevant under the afore-mentioned Russian defense documents; post-2014.

The Russian Federation has been accused of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty [INF Treaty] (Pifer, 2014a), by the United States, in 2008, 2014, and 2017 (Congressional Research Service, 2019). The INF Treaty prohibits 'intermediate-ranged and shorter-ranged ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles'. Intermediate-ranged is defined as missiles that have a range between 500-5,500 kilometers. Additionally, the INF Treaty classifies every associated variant of a missile capable of intermediate range, as well as its launchers; with the intermediate-ranged classification, even if they are altered for other purposes, or are otherwise not capable of performing that mission. Furthermore, if a single ballistic/cruise missile had

been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery; all missiles of that type will henceforth be classified as weapon-delivery vehicles (Schneider, 2014; Congressional Research Service, 2019). The reported accusation violations are as follows: In 2008, the R-500 missile [part of the Iskander-M]; in 2014, the Obama Administration claimed violations of the treaty, but did not specify a weapon system; and the Trump Administration recorded violations in 2017, however, they also did not specify the specific missile at issue [the RS-26 was not determined to be the missile in question in the 2017/2018 Compliance Reports] (Congressional Research Service, 2019). The missiles that are alleged to be in violation of the INF Treaty are the 3M14, 9M729, 'Bastion', and the R-500. Normally, it is rather difficult to confirm the technical qualities and capabilities needed to prove violation of such an arms treaty via journalistic sources and even statements from foreign governments. However, in November 2017, the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, revealed that the Russian Federation had "set up full-scale units of vehicles capable of delivering precision-guided missiles to targets located up to 4,000 kilometers away." Additionally, in the same month, 'Russia Beyond the Headlines', owned by *Rossiya Segodnya*, a state-run news organization; confirmed reports that the range of several missiles using the Iskander-M missile system are in the prohibited range of the INF Treaty stipulations: "Each [of the] various missile[s] can be charged with a warhead packed with up to 500 kilo[s] of high explosive, which can destroy enemy military bases and ground forces up to 600 km away". However, due to technical details of the definition of the range component for ballistic missiles, it is unclear if this is a violation or circumvention (Schneider, 2017). Regardless, the testimony of the Russian Chief of General Staff, as well as a confirmation of missile ranges via a state-run media organ; constitutes admission of either circumvention or violation. The enduring monetary cost for research and development, length development cycles, expertise, deployment, training, and testing of the missiles and missile systems; exhibits a high level of intentionality to this state action. While it is difficult to discern if the actions taken by the Russian Federation are circumventions or violations of the INF treaty, either option is considered revisionist for the purposes of this thesis.

The Charter of the United Nations is a formative document in international law and normative values; one that is referenced explicitly and repeatedly in the Russian national security documents. The UN Charter is also a document that is referenced frequently concerning Russian violations of international law with respect to Ukraine (Marxsen 2014; Bebler, 2015; Vidmar, 2015; Yost, 2015). The article in question of violation is Article 2, Section 4: "*All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations*" (U.N. Charter art. 1, sec. 4). As established above, the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine had been violated by the Russian Federation under the aforementioned circumstances. Given the repeated emphasis on the formative and boilerplate nature of the Charter in the Russian national security documents; this fact lends itself more emphatically to the continued revisionist ascription to the Russian Federation's 'International Treaties' section.

In regards to the 2003 Treaty Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Cooperation in the Use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait, the actions of the Russian FSB Coast Guard concerning the 2018 Kerch Strait incident were deemed to be revisionist [See: The Maritime Environment]. Additionally, the Russian government was deemed to be in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention for the 2018 poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal. Accordingly, the action is deemed to be a serious revisionist action due to the deployment of a nerve agent on foreign soil for the purposes of assassination [See: Special Services].

Regarding the Russian Federation's specific commitments to respect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, the two predominant agreements in question are the multilateral 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and the bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership of 1997.

The 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances is a multilateral agreement between the Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States, and Ukraine concerning security guarantees against the violation of territorial integrity, threat, or use of force against the operative state [Ukraine], in accordance with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]. Ukraine inherited the third-largest nuclear stockpile in the world, after the fall of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian government expressed a desire to denuclearize with a simultaneous concern about the potential for a Russian nuclear monopoly in the post-Soviet space. The United States, United Kingdom, and Russian Federation therefore extended security guarantees to Ukraine for the denuclearization of the state and return of the Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia (Budjeryn, 2014). The operative clauses of this memorandum concern the respect of the independence and sovereignty of the existing borders of Ukraine, as well as a prohibition on the threat and use of force against the territorial integrity and/or political independence of Ukraine, and proscription on the use of economic pressure for political effect. Potential mitigating circumstances in this regard are matters of self-defense, and matters in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Marxsen, 2014; Yost, 2015).

As mentioned in the 'Ukraine' section, the Russian military intervention qualifies as a use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine. It has also used economic pressure both in the past, both with energy resources and limited sanctions as a consequence of the intervention in Ukraine. The sovereignty of Ukraine was further violated with the annexation of Crimea and support for separatists both in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine. As mentioned before, there are no mitigating circumstances; including self-defense, nor a relevant clause in the UN charter. Additionally, the final clause concerning consultation concerning the afore-mentioned clauses; was violated, as Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister boycotted the consultation called by Ukraine in early 2014.

In regards to the Russian response, Mr. Lavrov gave a press conference on 26 January, 2016; where he stated that the Budapest Memorandum only contained one obligation:

not to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Furthermore, he claimed that the Russian Federation had not signed the Budapest Memorandum with the current government of Ukraine; and was not bound by it, as a result. This interpretation of the memorandum contradicts with the text of the document itself. The assertion that the governmental change disqualifies it from all existing treaties with the Russian Federation goes counter to international norms concerning the treaty obligation of states. Furthermore, this would require the Russian Federation to renegotiate and re-sign every agreement it has with other states at the change of government of every state; (Pifer, 2016). These actions appear to intentionally attempt to subvert and alter the original purpose of the treaty, consistent with the definition of revisionism used in this thesis.

The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership of 1997 is a bilateral treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine that unconditionally guarantees the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of each state. It further codifies the assurance of non-use of force, threat of force, including economic means of pressure (Stewart, 1997; Nation, 2000; Marxsen, 2014).

As with the Budapest Memorandum of Security Assurances, the Russian Federation has violated the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership with its military intervention, economic pressure, annexation of Crimean, and support for separatist movements in the Ukrainian state; without mitigating circumstances permissible under the treaty.

Thusly, given the stakes of the Ukrainian situation and the flagrant violations of international norms, as well as the repeated violations of the Intermediate-Ranged Missile Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, Charter of the UN, an allegedly formative and core document to the Russian Federation's National Security documents; violation of bilateral agreements concerning territorial integrity and political independence, as well as shared use of maritime regions; violation and attempted circumvention of the Budapest memorandum; the overall classification of the Russian Federation's actions in the 'International Treaties' section is 'Highly Revisionist'.

4.3. China: Data

The national security document chosen for the analysis is the 2015 white paper: China's Military Strategy, released by the PRC State Council Information Office. This document was chosen as the most current and relevant primary source material, owing to the particular strategic document paradigm detailed in the theoretical framework. The document contains normative elements, strategic disposition, and core deterrence interests; largely regarding maritime and regional interests.

4.4. China: Areas of Interest

The deterrence document implicitly references a passively changing status-quo, and the dedication of China to adhere to international norms/obligations and to preserve peace and stability. It simultaneously denounces hegemonic actions and power politics, framing it as a threat to world peace and stability. This implies a perception of a different status-quo, as a multi-polar order, rather than a unipolar order. It also has a bifurcated level of clarity, with normative values being vague and ambiguous, while core strategic interests being abundantly clear.

4.4.1. Border Disputes

China has had a vast history of border disputes, owing to both historical context, as well as its sheer number of neighboring countries. It has since resolved most of these conflicts officially (Tweed, 2018), with the majority of the remaining conflicts being related to demarcation of Exclusive Economic Zones and territorial waters claims. The sea-borders will be covered in the 'Maritime Rights and Interests' section.

The remaining existing active border disputes are largely Sino-Indian, owing to 1890 convention, which was based on a faulty cartographic survey (Joshi, 2017). After the 1962 Sino-Indian War, there have been numerous clashes, standoffs, and regular incursions by both sides; continuing to present day. Chinese and Indian actions have largely been reciprocal in this regard, with incursions and minor violations being the norm (BBC, 2014b; Miglani & Bukhari, 2014; Joshi, 2017; The Economic Times,

2018). However, in 2017, the Chinese army attempted to build a 'motorable road' in disputed Doklam/Dokalam; violating a 1998 agreement not to 'disturb the status-quo of 1959' (Jennings, 2017; Joshi, 2017). This incident is clearly in violation of said agreement, though due to its isolated nature, and the long-standing reciprocal paradigm with assertions over the disputed regions; this section is categorized as 'slightly revisionist'.

4.4.2. National Unification

The Chinese insistence on national reunification with Taiwan is a key point made in the document. This paradigm is rather unique given its nature and the history of state recognition regarding the Republic of China [ROC/ Taiwan] and the People's Republic of China. It is one paradigm for a separatist movement to carve out a territory, as the document implies; it is quite another for a state to lose recognition, as Taiwan has. ROC was globally recognized as 'China' for decades, before the PRC established diplomatic relationships with other states, conditional upon the acceptance of its 'One China Policy'. Now, only 17 states recognize Taiwan. Even the United States, the security guarantor of Taiwan, does not recognize the state officially (Australian Government, 2019). Chinese actions in this regard are largely limited to military exercises within its own borders/international waters, economic/political influence, and the exceedingly rare airspace encroachment (Zhang, 2019; Rodrigo, 2019). It is exceedingly difficult to ascribe attributes to state interactions with internationally-insinuated de-facto non-states with such unique history, given the lack of precedent. Therefore, there is insufficient data for a meaningful analysis.

4.4.3. Developmental and Overseas Interests

China explicitly and repeatedly references its developmental and overseas interests in a broad, vague sense as a core interest requiring its defense umbrella. These interests are primarily economic, supporting the larger Chinese economic growth model: trade, investment, energy, the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the safety of the 120 million Chinese tourists and 40 million ethnic Chinese living abroad (Yung, Rustici, Devary, &

Lin, 2014; Heath, 2018). Chinese actions in this regard, are the establishment of several military bases abroad in support of economic, protective, and anti-piracy operations. The Chinese prioritize safety and stability in regards to their overseas/developmental interests, with a marked disinterest of interfering in local affairs (Yung, Rustici, Devary, & Lin, 2014; Heath, 2018). It is important to note that the establishment of bases overseas and PLA expeditionary capability is still in a nascent stage. Even so, the establishment of foreign bases via agreements with the host-nation is entirely normal. As such, the categorization given to the section is 'Status-quo'.

4.4.4. Maritime Rights and Interests

China repeatedly and explicitly emphasize their maritime rights and interests throughout the 2015 Military Strategy as a key strategic interest; attempting to delegitimize foreign claims on disputed maritime regions in the South and East China Seas. The disputed sea regions include the Spratly Island, Senkoku islands, Scarborough Shoal, Paracel islands; as well as other myriad groupings of island masses. There are a host of claims from several states in the region, all claiming historical precedent, whether on a legal basis or from historical territory holdings (Jennings, 2017; Tweed, 2018; Romaniuk & Burgers, 2019). The relevant Chinese actions identified here are the building of artificial islands to take advantage of the international norm concerning territorial waters, the occupation and building of military and civilian infrastructure on the disputed and artificial islands, and paramilitary patrols over the disputed and artificial islands.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] arbitration tribunal ruled against Chinese claims, including the so-called '9-dash line' in *Philippines vs. China*, in 2016. The tribunal did not determine ownership of the islands or create boundaries; the outcomes were predominantly focused on classification and validation of claims. China declared it would not take part of the arbitration and has since categorically rejected the ruling; despite being a party to UNCLOS (Phillips, Holmes & Bowcott, 2016).

China has been building artificial islands and reefs in the South China Sea for the better part of a decade, with subsequent occupation and militarization of both disputed and artificial landmasses; necessitating military and paramilitary maritime patrols for the securing of said landmasses (Romaniuk & Burgers, 2019). Legally, via UNCLOS; artificial islands are not considered as 'rocks' for the delineation of territorial waters and the legalities of sovereignty and passage concerning said categorization. However, China has been enforcing the UNCLOS norms concerning territorial waters and its 12 nautical miles enforcement paradigm on both areas classified as 'rocks' as well as the artificial islands that do not have the classification; contravening the norm (Tiezzi, 2015).

The non-participation in the UNCLOS arbitration process and rejection of the result is considered a revisionist action due to China being a party to UNCLOS. Furthermore, China implicitly recognizes the legitimacy of the UNCLOS arbitration panel, as it has been providing its judges to said panel for decades (Odom, 2017). The building of artificial islands and reefs, and subsequent enforcement of the territorial waters paradigm where the paradigm is not legally justified; where the legal document explicitly states it is not legally justified (Part 2, Sec. 2, Art 11.), is considered a highly revisionist action. The occupation and militarization of disputed islands is considered a highly revisionist action as it attempts to force a *fait accompli*, in a region that represents a third of global shipping (China Power Team, 2017), instead of going through the established arbitration process to which China is party. These actions, being directly analogous to clauses of the revisionist definition used "*which breaks the rules and norms of those international institutions in which it does participate, or which temporarily abides by the rules and norms but when presented with the opportunity tries to alter them in ways inconsistent with the original purposes of the institution and community*", result in the 'Maritime Rights and Interests' section to be categorized as Highly Revisionist.

4.4.5. Korean Peninsula

China frames its interest in the Korean Peninsula as concern over instability and uncertainty; though it limits its concerns to 'terrorism, separatism, and extremism'; explicitly ignoring the North-South paradigm and U.S. involvement, outside of a generalized reference to the U.S. 'rebalancing strategy'.

China has historically aligned with North Korea, the so-called 'Blood Alliance', after their respective communist revolutions; aiding them in the Korean War, and acting as their security guarantor, continuing to present day (Wibawa, 2019). The reasons are threefold: Opposition to U.S. influence, maintaining regional stability, and the development of China's own influence (Chenjun & McGregor, 2019). China is opposed to the continued U.S. influence in its regional backyard, and seeks to prevent Korean re-unification, as it would likely be on the South's terms; thereby removing the buffer-state between China and South Korea/United States. China heavily prioritizes stability in the Korean peninsula, and economically sustains the North Korean regime; as the collapse of said regime would cause a colossal refugee and humanitarian crisis, the brunt of which would be borne by China. Even a North Korean economic collapse, such as in the 1990s, would be devastating to the Chinese economy; not to mention the potential fallout from the consequences of war or even nuclear exchange (Nanto & Manyin, 2010; Chenjun & McGregor, 2019). Lastly, the economic leverage that China has over North Korea, though nebulous in its efficacy in comparison to North Korean brinksmanship; supports the Chinese precept in the deterrence document, about opposing arms races of any type, especially nuclear races. The presence of external security guarantors: China and the U.S. and their influence on both sides, theoretically and empirically discourages the neighboring states from seeking internal security guarantees; such as nuclear weapons.

While attempting to maintain regional stability and pragmatically advancing your own regional influence over rivals is not revisionist; contravening a dozen UN and UNSC resolutions regarding sanctions regimes against North Korea, concerning forbidden imports, exports, and financial/economic restrictions (Schoff, 2019); is considered

revisionist. There are legitimate arguments to be made for mitigating circumstances, in the pragmatism expressed and personal stake involved with China economically propping up the North Korean regime, in the significant negative economic and humanitarian costs at the potential collapse of the regime, and international obligations to prevent humanitarian crises. Therefore, the categorization given to this section is 'Moderately Revisionist'.

4.4.6. Outer Space

The defense document repeatedly references outer space as an area of interest, however the paradigm is mostly posturing and aspirational; reflecting the aspirational nature of the doctrine discussed in the theoretical section. Regarding capabilities, China has a modest space program, no militarized aspects in space, and has invested into ground-based anti-satellite weaponry (Hussain & Ahmed, 2018); which is legal under current international law (Chatterjee, 2014), and even is a necessity to safely dismantle any aging satellites (Hussain & Ahmed, 2018). China has also signed all-bar-one UN treaties and conventions on space, and is a member of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The treaty in question, 1979 Moon Treaty only has 11 signatories (Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 2014). Thusly, the classification of China's actions in this 'Outer Space' section is 'Highly Status-Quo'.

4.4.7. Cyberspace

China has consistently and emphatically reiterated the importance of cyberspace and the actions taken for security therein, in the deterrence document. Their characterization is predominantly defensive in nature, and notes the importance of international cooperation.

Chinese actions in this regard are the hackings of private and public institutions globally with said cyber-attacks including, but not limited to: compromising integral systems for the functioning of foreign governments, IP theft, mass-identity compromise, theft of diplomatic and state communications. The integral systems include the attributed

compromise of U.S. critical infrastructure systems (Finkle & Bing, 2018; Sabur, 2019). The IP theft includes public, private, and military sources in North America, Europe, and Asia (Finkle, 2015; CSIS, 2019; Jinhua, 2019) with condemnation from the U.S., U.K., New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the EU, and Japan (CSIS, 2019). Cyberattacks resulting in mass identity compromise has generally been limited to U.S. companies and governmental agencies (Finkle, 2015; Sabur, 2019). The theft of diplomatic cables and other state communications includes the Russia-U.S. summit, EU diplomatic cables, and multiple elections in Southeast Asia (CSIS, 2019).

While mass identity compromise and the theft of diplomatic and state communications are indirectly addressed as non-desirous against China in the 2015 China's Military Strategy document, the actions themselves do not technically fit the definition of revisionism used in this thesis. The theft and inappropriate access to information, while publicly decried by most states; is not necessarily fit the norm paradigm in regards to international organizations; as there has been no evidence of attempts at electoral manipulation, only theft of information. However, on the other hand, compromising integral systems for the functioning of foreign governments, does violate the ability for the state to maintain sovereignty, as critical infrastructure is integral to the actual functioning of the state logistically. As the cyber-intrusions were limited to prepositioning efforts to lay the groundwork for future attacks, and not to attack the critical infrastructure itself; the outcome was limited. However the targeting of critical infrastructure in the first place is revisionist, as it denotes a potential use of force or threat to affect the sovereignty of a state; contravening the UN Charter (U.N. Charter art. 1, sec. 4). In regards to the continual IP theft and economic espionage, regarding the US in particular; China has violated a bilateral 2015 US-China Cyber-agreement (Jinhua, 2019), specifically concerning the precept of '*refrain from conducting or knowingly supporting cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property*' (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2015). This constitutes a violation of the bilateral agreement, and thusly is a revisionist action. As a result, the categorization for the 'Cyberspace section' is revisionist.

4.4.8. International Obligations

China puts an emphasis on fulfilling its international obligations with a focus on cooperation in the national security document. This characterization is simultaneously concrete and broad in its delineation: with specifics such as 'strictly observe the mandates of the UN Security Council as well as the particulars of humanitarian aid, and regional organizations it prioritizes; on the other hand, 'Faithfully fulfilling China's international obligations', 'do their utmost to shoulder more international responsibilities and obligations', and 'contribute more to world peace'; is ill-defined. For the purposes of this study, the explicitly-defined evaluable data of the UNSC mandate adherence, as well as the implicitly-defined evaluable data of the adherence to UN, regional, bilateral/multilateral, and other binding agreements to which it is party; will be used to determine the categorization. This section is partially derivative of the other sections, reflecting the interconnected nature of Chinese conceptualization in the deterrence document.

China has been a comparatively passive actor in the UNSC, using its veto a total of 12 times, with 8 of those vetoes pre-2014 (Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 2019). This has been attributed by authors to a cautiousness on the over-exercise of such power (Holland, 2012). 2 out of 3 solo vetoes, all of which took place before 2014 (Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 2019), were conducted purely in opposition to states that supported Taiwan. China instead generally uses the abstention to show its disapproval (Holland, 2012). China has predominantly adhered to the UNSC mandates, with the notable enduring exception of North Korea, as noted in the 'Korean Peninsula' section. Taking into account the general passive approach and preponderance of adherence to UNSC mandates with one notable, continuous exception with mitigating circumstances as mentioned in the 'Korean Peninsula' section; the categorization of China's UNSC adherence is one step down from the related section: 'Slightly Revisionist'.

China's interaction within the formation of various resolutions and declarations of the UN, are predominantly value-driven (Deng, 2015); with the requisite deterrence-related sectors generally relegated to the UNSC. The exception to this rule, are the UNCLOS

South China Sea paradigm, evaluated 'Highly Revisionist', covered in the 'Maritime Rights and Interests' section, and the treaties concerning the use of Outer Space, evaluated 'Highly Status-quo' covered in the 'Outer Space' section.

Likewise, the bilateral treaties concerning the Sino-Indian border dispute was covered under the 'Border Dispute' section, resulting in the 'Slightly Revisionist' categorization. The bilateral US-China cyber agreement violation is revisionist, under the 'Cyberspace' section.

China identifies 6 regional organizations/associations in the deterrence document as important to its international obligations: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO], ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus [ADMM+], ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF], Shangri-La Dialogue [SLD], Jakarta International Defence Dialogue [JIDD], and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium [WPNS]. Of these organizations, only the SCO qualifies for evaluation due to the non-binding and platform nature of the rest of the organizations/associations: they are merely meeting platforms for dialogue for the formation of bilateral and multilateral discourse (ASEAN, 2007; International Peace Institute, 2013; Odom, 2017); and as such do not meet the standards for the evaluation of revisionist/status-quo norm and rules adherence. The SCO predominantly addresses non-state issues, such as anti-terrorism and anti-separatism; state aspects generally refer to solidarity in regards to protecting the sovereignty of member-states and opposing intervention in member-state affairs on the basis of human rights violations or 'humanitarianism' (Gill, 2001; Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2001). While China has adhered to this precept in its UNSC voting pattern (United Nations Security Council, 2019), the invalidation of almost all organizations/associations and minor relevance of the SCO to deterrence; renders an 'Inconclusive' result.

Taking into account the disparate results of the sections and sub-sections that constitute this section, the result for the 'International Obligations' categorization is 'Mixed'.

4.4.9. Regional Stability

The deterrence document repeatedly emphasizes regional stability in various characterization: through a function of Chinese non-instigation and defensive nature, that would produce regional stability and peace. However, the operationalization of this section, due to the interrelated nature of the afore-mentioned sections results in a gestalt of the 'Maritime Interests', 'National Unification', 'Border Disputes', 'Korean Peninsula', 'International obligations' via regional organizations/associations, and 'Cyberspace' via affected regional actors, sections. The interplay between China's *fait accompli* tactic with the artificial and disputed islands, treatment of maritime norms, border disputes, cyber-attacks and electoral/diplomatic monitoring, actions in the Taiwan paradigm all render results similar to the mutually exclusive categorizations above, as mitigating effects of the context of the Korean paradigm and participation in regional security organizations serve to act as a summative result rather than an independent section. As such, the result is a 'Mixed' categorization.

4.5. Results

RU Area of Interest	Result	CN Area of Interest	Result
Arctic	**Inconclusive**	**Border Disputes**	**Slightly Revisionist**
Abkhazia/South Ossetia	**Revisionist**	**National Unification**	**Inconclusive**
Ukraine	**Highly Revisionist**	**Developmental/Overseas Interests**	**Status-quo**
Maritime Environment	**Revisionist**	**Maritime Rights/Interests**	**Highly Revisionist**
Special Services	**Highly Revisionist**	**Korean Peninsula**	**Moderately Revisionist**
International Treaties	**Highly Revisionist**	**Outer Space**	**Highly Status-quo**
		Cyberspace	**Revisionist**
		International Obligation	**Mixed**
		Regional Stability	**Mixed**

Fig.1 Results of Findings

4.6. Research Questions Answered

This section will answer the research questions posited above in light of the findings of the study.

[1] What are the differences between the deterrence strategies of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation?

The conceptual differences from the 'Theoretical Framework' section have led to different empirical outcomes. The outcome variance predominantly encompasses the overall levels of revisionism, of international norm/law adherence within areas of interest, of obfuscatory elements, and of kinetic outcome. Russia has an overall higher level of revisionism than China, consistently acting in a revisionist manner across almost all areas of interest as a modus operandi; whereas China appears to act in a revisionist manner in reference to gaining advantage in core strategic interests. This is

also reflected ideationally, with significantly more emphasis place in predictability and the maintenance of peace and stability in Chinese theoretical documentation, compared to Russian theoretical documentation. Russia attempts to obfuscate and deny its revisionist actions through denial and misdirection; while China remains relatively open about its actions, even in cases where it acts in a revisionist manner [aside from Cyber, which is an intelligence dimension, and generally is not admitted regardless]. Lastly, there is a marked difference in the level of kinetic action between the two states: Russia supporting separatist elements in Ukraine military, conducting assassinations, and interfering with foreign governments; compared to China's occupation-based *fait accompli* in the South China Sea and information-theft via cyber.

[1B] Why might there be diverging drivers for deterrence conceptions/outcomes between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China?

Both China and Russia have enduring territorial and historical legacies that drive their deterrence policies as well as deep asymmetries between themselves and their competitors. China is operating in a paradigm against several passive, separate regional actors with disparate territorial claims, and one global actor with no territorial claims; creating a comparatively-low pressure environment. Russia is operating in a paradigm where its former satellite states are attempting to leave its sphere of influence into a rival security/economic organization, changing the geopolitical balance.

This paradigm difference allows for China to pursue a more controlled and measured approach, in Active Defense; as explained by the innate assumptions in the deterrence literature on the comparatively-slow pace of posturing and escalation, the implication being that the deterrence will likely be done on its terms, or controlled to a favorable outcome. Its Minimum/Limited Deterrence theory is a reflection of ideology delaying further research to a point where the outcome of the Soviet case could be taken into account. This measured approach is evidenced by the slow, decade-long assertion and occupation of disputed and artificial islands in the South China Sea, the enduring border disputes, lack of reunification, cyber/information operations, and continued support for North Korea. These actions are methodical and represents a lower-pressure paradigm.

Russia inherited its nuclear arsenal, which made the nuclear deliberation unnecessary. In response to a more unified adversarial front, Russia attempts to act as a first mover (McLellan, 2017), to impose the afore-mentioned unacceptable costs onto its opponents through Strategic Deterrence to overcome this asymmetry. Russian actions demonstrate unpredictability, as a unitary actor against coalition actors that desire predictability [demonstrated in the responses to Russian deterrence actions]. Russian risk/pain thresholds are much higher than its opponents as demonstrated by the repeated violation of international norms with little effective response [effective defined as deterring Russian revisionist actions], allowing it to continue its deterrence logic. This first mover logic drives many of the deterrence actions surrounding Ukraine, Crimea, as well as influencing elections and performing intelligence operations. By acting unpredictably and forcing a *fait accompli*, while maintaining deniability and using non-military actions such that other nations would have a higher political cost threshold to respond; Russia is able to address this deep asymmetry.

[2]Can China and Russia ultimately be categorized as revisionist powers through their deterrence strategies?

Yes, both states can be categorized as revisionist. Through identification and measurement of the key events informed by areas of interest as indicators of status-quo/revisionist categorization; both China and Russia qualify as revisionist states. Russia received categorical 'revisionist' and 'highly revisionist' results in all-but-one area of interest, with the non-revisionist result lacking sufficient data to make a meaningful evaluation. China received mixed results that skewed revisionist in aggregate, however, when taking into account the scope and weight of each area-of-interest, the extensive impact and enduring aspect of such dimensions as cyberspace, the occupation and enforcement of illegal territorial waters paradigms of disputed and artificial islands in the South China Sea, and the support of North Korea vastly outweighs China's limited space program and the nascent development of overseas bases and overseas operations. Both states, despite the emphasis on supremacy of

international law and adherence to international norms; have repeatedly and egregiously violated said norms in multiple dimensions.

[2B] If China and Russia can be categorized as revisionist powers, to what extent?

Russia has consistently acted in a highly revisionist manner across all of the determinable indicators drawn from its deterrence documentation. The flagrant, continuous, and deliberate nature of the strategic actions taken across many regions and in many cases of varying intensity; denotes a disregard for international rules and norms, regardless of whether Russia is party to the norms or not. The blatant disregard for the bilateral and multilateral agreements to which Russia is party, the repeated infringement on the sovereignty of other states both digitally and violently, and the use a chemical weapon for an attempted murder on foreign soil; all contribute to the 'highly revisionist' state categorization for Russia. The only higher possible designation would be a circumstance where a state would reject participation in international organizations and associated norms as a whole.

At first glance, from the results, it would appear that China leans revisionist. However, as explained in research answer [2], the differences in weighting and scope shows that China's actions in references to core interests predominantly are varying levels of revisionist. This reflects a pragmatic adherence to international norms and standards when it is not disadvantageous to the state, however; when potential lasting advantages or core interests are concerned; China does not hesitate to act in a revisionist manner. Thusly, the overall categorization for China is 'revisionist', markedly less than Russia's 'highly revisionist' label; as the egregiousness of the Russian incidents vastly outnumber and outweigh the Chinese incidents.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This thesis sought to determine the level of status-quo or revisionist attributes that the Russian Federation and People's Republic of China exhibited through the use of deterrence study as an explanatory lens. Through a research process that involved Data-driven Qualitative Content Analysis to determine Areas of Interest that in turn, revealed key events that were then analyzed; this thesis was able to determine that both Russia and China are revisionist states, with Russia being significantly more revisionist. This is due to the differing nature of its security environment and enduring historical and military legacy; prompting Russia to attempt to act as a 'first-mover', to gain the initiative and impose 'unacceptable losses' as well as obfuscation, to deter counteraction, in the face of a coalition-based adversary, that consists of many former satellite states in its historical sphere of influence, and to overcome the innate situational asymmetry between itself and NATO/EU. China, on the other hand, due to its security environment containing relatively weaker, individual regional actors and a global actor in the US; and a comparative lack of nuclear and military ability to enforce its claims, attempts a more slow and measured approach; largely declaratory and with assertions of legitimacy. This paradigm has developed a postural paradigm, where Chinese documentation takes for granted the slow pace of its environment and has developed its conceptual strategy and conducted its empirical actions accordingly.

In addition to determining the revisionist nature of Russia and China, this thesis demonstrates the potential for use of deterrence study as a viable vehicle to determine the status-quo and revisionist nature of a state, and contributes to the literature on revisionist studies as a whole by opening up an entirely new sector of study for analysis. This thesis is a valuable proof-of-concept for future research, concerning studies on revisionism that operationalize and measure the differences between strategic conceptions and guidelines to the empirical result. Additionally, this is the first holistic [not focused solely on a single aspect] study on revisionism in over 15 years, and the first comparative study that attempts to measure the specific levels of revisionism of its cases. Measurement-based revisionism studies provide leaders and scholars a scientific and useful tool for decision-making and transferable quantifications to future studies,

both chronological and lateral. This thesis provides a model for such studies, and forms the foundation for such research.

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APPENDIX I. CODING FRAME

Doc.	Meaningful Unit	Condensed MU	Codes	Use	Category
2014R	3. The legal basis of the Military Doctrine consists of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, generally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation in the field of defense, arms control and disarmament, federal constitutional laws, federal laws, as well as statutory legal acts of the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation.	Legal basis for document includes invocation of international laws, norms and treaty.	International Norms. International Treaties. International Law. Legal Basis.	Y	Precept
2014R	5. The Military Doctrine reflects the commitment of the Russian Federation to taking military measures for the protection of its national interests and the interests of its allies only after political, diplomatic, legal, economic, informational and other non-violent instruments have been exhausted	The military is a last resort for protecting interests after all other non-military instruments have been used.	Military Last Resort	Y	Precept
2014R	9. World development at the present stage is characterized by the strengthening of global competition, tensions in various areas of inter-state and interregional interaction,	The current geopolitical paradigm is chaotic and filled with competing interests and instability due	Chaotic Ecosystem Multipolar World Interstate Tension	Y	Viewpoint

	rivalry of proclaimed values and models of development, instability of the processes of economic and political development at the global and regional levels against a background of general complication of international relations. There is a stage-by-stage redistribution of influence in favour of new centres of economic growth and political attraction	to a wide variety of inequality and socioeconomic factors.			
2014R	11. ...The existing international security architecture (system) does not ensure equal security for all states.	Russia has a dissatisfaction with the current system.	Dissatisfaction: Status-Quo	Y	Viewpoint
2014R	12a. ...build-up of the power potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and vesting NATO with global functions carried out in violation of the rules of international law, bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries near the borders of the Russian Federation, including by further expansion of the alliance	Russia views NATO as violating international law via expansion.	Threat Perception International Law	Y	Viewpoint
2014R	12d. ...establishment and deployment of strategic missile defense systems undermining global stability and violating the established balance of forces related to nuclear missiles, implementation of the	Russia defines the status-quo and says that NATO violated it by several methods.	Definition: Status-quo Balance of Power Threat Perception	Y	Viewpoint

	global strike concept, intention to place weapons in outer space, as well as deployment of strategic non-nuclear systems of high-precision weapons				
2014R	12l.use of information and communication technologies for the military-political purposes to take actions which run counter to international law, being aimed against sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity of states and posing threat to the international peace, security, global and regional stability	Cyber-enabled assets can be used to undermine the integrity of state sovereignty.	Cyber: Sovereignty violations [Negative Connotation]	Y	Precept
2014R	22. The Russian Federation has the legitimate right to employ the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies to repel aggression against itself and/or its allies, to maintain (restore) peace as decided by the UN Security Council or another collective security body, as well as to protect its citizens abroad in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation.	Russia has the right to protect its citizens abroad, and enact security measures in line with international norms, law, UNSC mandate.	Protect Citizens Abroad International Norms International Law UNSC	Y	Precept
2014R	31. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation may be employed outside the country to protect the interests of the Russian Federation and its	Russia may protect its citizens abroad and protect interests, in accordance with	Protect Citizens Abroad Protect Interests	Y	Precept

	citizens and to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the generally recognized principles and norms of international law, international treaties of the Russian Federation and the federal legislation.	international norms, laws, and treaties.	International Norms International Treaties International Law		
2014R	32s. to protect national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region.	Russia prioritizes the Arctic.	Arctic	Y	AoI: Arctic
2014R	55b.with the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia – ensuring common defense and security	Russia has Abkhazia and South Ossetia under its extended deterrence umbrella.	Abkhazia South Ossetia Common Defense	Y	AoI: Abkhazia & South Ossetia
2014R	55a) to strengthen international security and strategic stability at global and regional levels on the basis of the rule of international law, and first of all the UN Charter provisions;	Russia follows a rules-based order under international law and the UN charter.	International Law UN	Y	Precept AoI: International Treaties
2014R	55b) to establish and develop allied relations with the member states of the CSTO and the member states of the CIS, with the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia, as well as relations of friendship and partnership with other states;	Russia desires to ally with the CSTO, CIS, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and other states.	Abkhazia South Ossetia Allies	Y	AoI: Abkhazia & South Ossetia
2014R	55d) to develop relations with international organizations for the prevention of conflict situations and maintenance and	Russia desires to work with international	Conflict Resolution	Y	Precept

	strengthening of peace in various regions, including with the participation of Russian military contingents in peacekeeping operations	organizations for conflict resolution.	International Organization		
2014R	55e) to maintain equitable relations with interested states and international organizations to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;	Russia desires to cooperate internationally for weapons control.	Weapons proliferation

Missiles | N | |
| 2014R | 55g) to fulfill international obligations of the Russian Federation. | Russia has a duty to fulfill international obligations. | International Norms

International Treaties | Y | Precept |
| 2014R | 56a) with the Republic of Belarus:

-coordinating the activities in the sphere of development of the national Armed Forces and the use of the military infrastructure;

-elaborating and harmonizing measures to maintain the defense capability of the Union State [of Russia and Belarus] in accordance with the Military Doctrine of the Union State; | Russia desires for better coordination and interoperability with Belarus. | Belarus

Coordination

Elaboration | N | N/A |
| 2014R | 56b) with the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia – ensuring common defense and security; | Russia has Abkhazia and South Ossetia under its extended deterrence | Abkhazia

South Ossetia

Common Defense | Y | AoI: Abkhazia & South Ossetia |

2014R	56c) with the CSTO member states – consolidating efforts to improve the capabilities of the CSTO collective security system for ensuring collective security and common defense;	Russia works with CSTO with upgrading defense.	CSTO Consolidation Capabilities	N	N/A
2014R	56d) with the CIS member states – ensuring regional and international security and carrying out peacekeeping operations;	Russia uses peacekeeping operations with CIS members.	CIS Security Peacekeeping	N	N/A
2014R	56e) with the SCO states – coordinating efforts to confront new military risks and military threats within common space, as well as establishing a necessary legal and regulatory framework;	Russia coordinates military legal efforts with SCO.	SCO Coordination	N	N/A
2014R	56f) with the United Nations and other international, including regional, organizations – involving representatives of the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies in the management of peacekeeping operations and in the process of planning and carrying out preparatory activities for operations aimed at maintaining (restoring) peace, as well as in participating in the elaboration, coordination, and implementation of international agreements on arms control	Russia works with the UN/International organizations with international treaties, arms control, and peacekeeping.	UN International Organization International Treaties Arms Control	Y	Precept AoI: International Treaties

	and strengthening international security and increasing the participation of units and servicemen of the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies in operations aimed at maintaining (restoring) peace.				
2015R	7. State policy in the sphere of the safeguarding of national security and the socioeconomic development of the Russian Federation contributes to the implementation of the strategic national priorities and the effective protection of national interests. A solid basis has been created at this time for further increasing the Russian Federation's economic, political, military, and spiritual potentials and for enhancing its role in shaping a polycentric world	Russia views itself in a polycentric paradigm and is working towards improving its actorship.	Polycentric World Actorship	Y	Precept
2015R	8. Russia has demonstrated the ability to safeguard sovereignty, independence, and state and territorial integrity and to protect the rights of compatriots abroad. There has been an increase in the Russian Federation's role in resolving the most important international problems, settling military conflicts, and ensuring strategic stability and the supremacy of international law in interstate relations.	Russia protects compatriots abroad and desires the supremacy of international law.	Compatriots abroad Supremacy of International Law	Y	Precept

2015R	12. The strengthening of Russia is taking place against a backdrop of new threats to national security that are of a multifarious and interconnected nature. The Russian Federation's implementation of an independent foreign and domestic policy is giving rise to opposition from the United States and its allies, who are seeking to retain their dominance in world affairs. The policy of containing Russia that they are implementing envisions the exertion of political, economic, military, and informational pressure on it.	There are multiple threats to Russia, including opposition from the US and its allies, who dominate the current world and are trying to contain Russia.	Threat Perception Revisionism Containment: Russia Threat Perception	Y	Viewpoint
2015R	13. The process of shaping a new polycentric model of the world order is being accompanied by an increase in global and regional instability. We are seeing an exacerbation of contradictions linked to the unevenness of world development, the deepening of the gap between countries' levels of prosperity, the struggle for resources, access to markets, and control over transportation arteries. The competition between states is increasingly encompassing social development values and models and human, scientific,	Russia is shaping a new polycentric world order, which causes global/regional instability. There are widening gaps of inequality and competition. Waterways are an important dimension. The special services are increasingly important as a tool for deterrence.	Revisionism Threat Perception Competition Arctic Special Services Sea Spectrum: struggles	Y	Viewpoint Precepts AoI: Arctic AoI: Special Services AoI: Sea

	and technological potentials. Leadership in exploiting the resources of the world's oceans and the Arctic is acquiring particular significance in this process. An entire spectrum of political, financial-economic, and informational instruments have been set in motion in the struggle for influence in the international arena. Increasingly active use is being made of special services' potential.				
2015R	15. The buildup of the military potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the endowment of it with global functions pursued in violation of the norms of international law, the galvanization of the bloc countries' military activity, the further expansion of the alliance, and the location of its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders are creating a threat to national security. The opportunities for maintaining global and regional stability are shrinking significantly with the siting in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and the Near East of components of the US missile defense system in the conditions of the practical implementation of the "global strike" concept and the	NATO is violating international law with its actions and capability developments, which threatens Russia.	Threat Perception International Law	Y	Viewpoint

	deployment of strategic nonnuclear precision weapon systems and also in the event that weapons are deployed in space.				
2015R	16. The persisting bloc approach to solving international problems is not helping to counter the entire range of present-day challenges and threats. The increase in migration flows from African and Near Eastern countries to Europe has demonstrated the non-viability of the regional security system in the Euro-Atlantic Region based on NATO and the European Union.	Bloc approaches in general threaten stability.	Threat Perception	Y	Viewpoint
2015R	17. The West's stance aimed at countering integration processes and creating seats of tension in the Eurasian region is exerting a negative influence on the realization of Russian national interests. The support of the United States and the European Union for the anti-constitutional coup d'etat in Ukraine led to a deep split in Ukrainian society and the emergence of an armed conflict. The strengthening of far right nationalist ideology, the deliberate shaping in the Ukrainian population of an image of Russia as an enemy,	The West is creating tension and countering Russian Interests. The US and EU support an illegal coup in Ukraine, and are responsible for the current situation. They are blaming Russia for the Ukrainian crisis.	Threat Perception Ukraine Conflict Threat Perception Threat Perception Threat Perception	Y	Viewpoint AoI: Ukraine

	the undisguised gamble on the forcible resolution of intrastate contradictions, and the deep socioeconomic crisis are turning Ukraine into a chronic seat of instability in Europe and in the immediate vicinity of Russia's borders.				
2015R	-- consolidating the Russian Federation's status as a leading world power, whose actions are aimed at maintaining strategic stability and mutually beneficial partnerships in a polycentric world.	Russia is consolidating its great power role, in a polycentric world.	Polycentric World Russia great power	Y	Viewpoint
2015R	29. In the sphere of international security Russia remains committed to the utilization of primarily political and legal instruments and diplomatic and peacekeeping mechanisms. The utilization of military force to protect national interests is possible only if all adopted measures of a nonviolent nature have proved ineffective.	The military will be used as a last resort.	Military Last Report Diplomacy	Y	Precept
2015R	36. Interrelated political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures are being developed and implemented in order to ensure strategic deterrence and the prevention of armed conflicts. These measures are intended to prevent the use of	Strategic and Nuclear Deterrence definition.	Strategic Deterrence Nuclear Deterrence	Y	Precept

	armed force against Russia, and to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Strategic deterrence and the prevention of armed conflicts are achieved by maintaining the capacity for nuclear deterrence at a sufficient level, and the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, and military formations and bodies at the requisite level of combat readiness.				
2015R	43. The main threats to state and public security are: -- intelligence and other activity by special services and organizations of foreign states and individuals that causes harm to national interests; -- the activities of terrorist and extremist organizations aimed at changing the constitutional order of the Russian Federation through violence, disrupting the operation of the organs of state power, destroying or disrupting the functioning of military and industrial facilities, critical public infrastructure, and transport infrastructure, and intimidating the population, including by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and radioactive, poisonous, toxic, and chemically and biologically dangerous	Multitude of threat perceptions including special services, foreign operators, non-state actors, and a whole host of WMD attacks, critical infrastructure, etc.	Threat perception Threat Perception Threat Perception Threat Perception Color revolution Threat Perception	Y	Viewpoint

substances, carrying out nuclear terrorist attacks, and attacking and disrupting the continuous operation of the Russian Federation's vital IT infrastructure; -- the activities of radical public associations and groups using nationalist and religious extremist ideology, foreign and international nongovernmental organizations, and financial and economic structures, and also individuals, focused on destroying the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, destabilizing the domestic political and social situation -- including through inciting "color revolutions" -- and destroying traditional Russian religious and moral values; -- the activities of criminal organizations and groups, including transnational ones, connected with the illegal trade in narcotic and psychotropic substances, weapons, ammunition, explosives, and the organization of illegal migration and human trafficking; -- activities connected with the use of information and communication technologies to disseminate and promote the ideology of fascism,				

	extremism, terrorism, and separatism, and to endanger the civil peace and political and social stability in society; -- criminal offenses targeting individuals, property, the state authorities, and public and economic security; -- corruption; -- natural disasters, accidents, and catastrophes, including those connected with global climate change, the deterioration of the physical condition of infrastructure, and outbreaks of fire.				
2015R	76. The strategic aims of ensuring national security in the sphere of culture are: -- the preservation and augmentation of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values as the foundation of Russian society, and the education of children and young people in a civic spirit; -- the preservation and development of the common Russian identity of the Russian Federation's peoples and of the country's unified cultural area; -- the enhancement of Russia's role in the world humanitarian and cultural area.	Russian spiritual, moral and cultural values are the foundation of society.	Spiritual Values Moral Values Culture	N	N/A
2015R	87. The safeguarding of national interests is furthered by an active Russian Federation foreign policy geared to creating a stable and	National interest in making a new international system relying on international law,	International Law Norm creation	Y	Precept

	enduring system of international relations relying on international law and based on the principles of equality, mutual respect, noninterference in states' internal affairs, mutually beneficial cooperation, and a political settlement of global and regional crisis situations.	equality, and noninterference.	System creation		
2015R	89. The development of relations of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Republic of Abkhazia, and the Republic of South Ossetia is for the Russian Federation a key area of foreign policy. Russia is developing the potential of regional and sub regional integration and coordination on the territory of the participants in the Commonwealth of Independent States within the Commonwealth itself and also the Collective Security Treaty Organization , the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Union State exerting a stabilizing influence on the general situation in the regions bordering the participants in the Commonwealth of Independent States, the	The CIS, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia will be regionally integrated, and other regional organizations will have relations developed.	CIS Abkhazia South Ossetia CSTO EEU	N	AoI: Abkhazia & South Ossetia

	Republic of Abkhazia, and the Republic of South Ossetia.				
2015R	98. The Russian Federation is interested in establishing full-fledged partnership with the United States of America on the basis of coincident interests, in the economic sphere included, and with regard to the key influence of Russo-American relations on the state of the international situation as a whole. The improvement of the mechanisms of arms control specified by international treaties, confidence-building measures, the solution of questions involving the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, expanded cooperation in the fight against terrorism, and the settlement of regional conflicts remain most important areas of this partnership.	Russia desires to work with the US on a variety of efforts such as arms control, conflict resolution, and other existing treaty obligations.	International Treaties Arms Control Conflict Resolution	Y	AoI: International Treaties
2015R	104. To preserve strategic stability the Russian Federation: -- contributes to the preservation of the stability of the system of international law and the prevention of its fragmentation, attenuation, and selective application resulting in instability and conflicts; -- honors international treaties and agreements in effect in the	Russia prioritizes international law and treaties, equal application: especially with arms control, nuclear weapons, etc; in accordance with international law and the UN.	International Law Threat Perception International Treaties Arms control UN	Y	Precept AoI: International Treaties

	sphere of arms limitation and reduction and participates in the drafting and conclusion of new accords corresponding to national interests; -- is prepared for further discussion of a reduction of nuclear potentials based on bilateral accords and in multilateral formats and also contributes to the creation of fitting conditions permitting a reduction in nuclear arms without detriment to international security and strategic stability; -- contributes to the strengthening of regional stability through participation in processes of a reduction and limitation of conventional armed forces, and also through the development and application of confidence-building measures in the military sphere; -- considers international peacekeeping an effective instrument for settling armed conflicts, and participates in it and advocates the strengthening of this institution strictly in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter; -- contributes to the formation of a system of international information security; -- participates in activities pursued under the aegis of the United Nations and other		International Law International Organization Conflict Resolution		

	international organizations to deal with natural and manmade disasters and other emergencies, and also in rendering humanitarian aid to countries affected.				
2015R	105. To ensure strategic stability and equal multilateral cooperation in the international arena the Russian Federation makes every necessary effort to maintain at the least costly level deterrence potential in the sphere of strategic offensive arms.	Russia attempts to prevent escalation with the lowest level of deterrence.	Deterrence Reassurance Nuclear Deterrence	Y	Precept
2015R	115. The main indicators necessary for an evaluation of the state of national security are: -- the citizens' degree of satisfaction with the protection of their constitutional rights and freedoms and personal and property interests, including against criminal infringements; -- the proportion of modern models of arms and military and special equipment in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, and military formations and organs; -- life expectancy; -- per capita GDP; -- decile coefficient (ratio of the income of the most prosperous 10 percent of the population and the least prosperous 10 percent of the population); -- inflation; --	Russian indicators for state security are internal measures of welfare.	Indicators National Security Internal	N	Precept

	unemployment; -- proportion of expenditure in the GDP on the development of science, technology, and education; -- proportion of expenditure in the GDP on culture; -- proportion of territory of the Russian Federation not conforming to environmental standards.				
2009R	6b) in the sphere of military security, defense and protection of the state border of the Russian Federation lying in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation - maintenance of a favorable operative regime in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, including maintenance of a necessary fighting potential of groupings of general purpose armies (forces) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other armies, military formations and organs in this region	The Arctic is important for national defense.	Arctic Paradigm setting	Y	Precept
2009R	b) in the sphere of military security, defense and protection of the state border of the Russian Federation lying in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, it is necessary: -to create groupings of armies (forces) of the general purpose of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other armies, military formations and	The Arctic is important to Russia, and requires a new border regime, capable of exerting control over the vast area; and an entirely new system and infrastructure.	Arctic Paradigm setting Threat perception Base building	Y	Precept

organs (first of all, boundary organs) in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, capable to provide military security under various conditions of a military-political situation; -to optimize the system of a complex control over the situation in the Arctic, including the boundary control at the check points across the state border of the Russian Federation, introduction of a border zones regime in the administrative-territorial formations of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and the organization of a device technical control over the strait zones, rivers estuaries, firths on the itinerary of the Northern Sea Route; -to bring the possibilities of the boundary organs into line with the character of threats and challenges of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. -The basic measures on the realization of the state policy in the sphere of military security, defense and protection of the state border of the Russian Federation lying in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, are as follows:		System creation		

	-creation of an actively functioning system of the coast guard of the Federal security service of the Russian Federation in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and increase of efficiency of interaction with boundary departments (coast guards) of the adjacent states concerning combating terrorism on the sea, suppression of illicit activity, illegal migration, protection of water biological resources; -development of a boundary infrastructure of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and technical reequipment of boundary organs; -creation of a system of the complex control over the surface situation, strengthening of the state control over trade activity in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation;				
2015C	-The world today is undergoing unprecedented changes, and China is at a critical stage of reform and development. In their endeavor to realize the Chinese Dream of great national rejuvenation, the Chinese people aspire to join hands with the rest of the world to maintain peace, pursue development and share prosperity.	The world is changing, China desires to peacefully develop and opposes hegemony and power politics.	Paradigm setting Status-quo Peace Stability Opposition: Hegemonism	Y	Viewpoint

	-China's destiny is vitally interrelated with that of the world as a whole. A prosperous and stable world would provide China with opportunities, while China's peaceful development also offers an opportunity for the whole world. China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, oppose hegemonism and power politics in all forms, and will never seek hegemony or expansion. China's armed forces will remain a staunch force in maintaining world peace.		Opposition: Power Politics Peace		
2015C	-In today's world, the global trends toward multi-polarity and economic globalization are intensifying, and an information society is rapidly coming into being. Countries are increasingly bound together in a community of shared destiny. Peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit have become an irresistible tide of the times. -Profound changes are taking place in the international situation, as manifested in the historic changes in the balance of power, global governance	There is a global trend towards multipolarity and interconnection. There are changes happening both locally and abroad, in regards to international competition and towards peace. There are a variety of threats that threaten this development.	Paradigm setting Multipolar world Peace Interconnectedness Changing paradigm Balance of power Peace	Y	Viewpoint

	structure, Asia-Pacific geostrategic landscape, and international competition in the economic, scientific and technological, and military fields. The forces for world peace are on the rise, so are the factors against war. In the foreseeable future, a world war is unlikely, and the international situation is expected to remain generally peaceful. There are, however, new threats from hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism. International competition for the redistribution of power, rights and interests is tending to intensify. Terrorist activities are growing increasingly worrisome. Hotspot issues, such as ethnic, religious, border and territorial disputes, are complex and volatile. Small-scale wars, conflicts and crises are recurrent in some regions. Therefore, the world still faces both immediate and potential threats of local wars.		Threat perception Interventionism		
2015C	-With a generally favorable external environment, China will remain in an important period of strategic opportunities for its development, a period in which much can be achieved. China's comprehensive national	China is growing in international influence and capability and faces threats to its national unification, territorial integrity,	Threat Perception National Unification Territorial Integrity	Y	Viewpoint AoI: National Unification

	strength, core competitiveness and risk-resistance capacity are notably increasing, and China enjoys growing international standing and influence. Domestically, the Chinese people's standard of living has remarkably improved, and Chinese society remains stable. China, as a large developing country, still faces multiple and complex security threats, as well as increasing external impediments and challenges. Subsistence and development security concerns, as well as traditional and non-traditional security threats are interwoven. Therefore, China has an arduous task to safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity and development interests.	and developmental interests.	Development Interests		AoI: Territorial Integrity AoI: Development/ Overseas Interests
2015C	-As the world economic and strategic center of gravity is shifting ever more rapidly to the Asia-Pacific region, the US carries on its "rebalancing" strategy and enhances its military presence and its military alliances in this region. Japan is sparing no effort to dodge the post-war mechanism, overhauling its military and security policies. Such development has caused grave concerns among other countries in the region. On the	Asia is becoming more important, the US is reasserting itself, Japan is remilitarizing. China has important maritime rights and territorial interests which are getting infringed upon. Instability in the Korean peninsula	Paradigm shift Threat perception Territorial sovereignty Maritime rights and interests Island occupation	Y	Viewpoint AoI: Maritime Rights and Interests AoI: Korean Peninsula AoI: National Unification

	issues concerning China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China's reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied. Some external countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China. It is thus a long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests. Certain disputes over land territory are still smoldering. The Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia are shrouded in instability and uncertainty. Regional terrorism, separatism and extremism are rampant. All these have a negative impact on the security and stability along China's periphery.	and separatism are threats.	South China Sea External influence Maritime Rights and Interests Korean Peninsula Instability Separatism		
2015C	-The Taiwan issue bears on China's reunification and long-term development, and reunification is an inevitable trend in the course of national rejuvenation. In recent years, cross-Taiwan Straits relations have sustained a sound momentum of peaceful development, but the root	Taiwan reunification is inevitable. Separatists are threatening peaceful development. There are other internal separatism movements and	Taiwan National Unificaion Inevitable Peaceful	Y	Viewpoint AoI: National Unification

	cause of instability has not yet been removed, and the "Taiwan independence" separatist forces and their activities are still the biggest threat to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. Further, China faces a formidable task to maintain political security and social stability. Separatist forces for "East Turkistan independence" and "Tibet independence" have inflicted serious damage, particularly with escalating violent terrorist activities by "East Turkistan independence" forces. Besides, anti-China forces have never given up their attempt to instigate a "color revolution" in this country. Consequently, China faces more challenges in terms of national security and social stability. With the growth of China's national interests, its national security is more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, serious natural disasters and epidemics, and the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as well as institutions, personnel and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue.	threat of a color revolution.	Instability Separatism Color Revolution Threat perception		

2015C	-To realize China's national strategic goal and implement the holistic view of national security, new requirements have been raised for innovative development of China's military strategy and the accomplishment of military missions and tasks. In response to the new requirement of safeguarding national security and development interests, China's armed forces will work harder to create a favorable strategic posture with more emphasis on the employment of military forces and means, and provide a solid security guarantee for the country's peaceful development. In response to the new requirement arising from the changing security situation, the armed forces will constantly innovate strategic guidance and operational thoughts so as to ensure the capabilities of fighting and winning. In response to the new requirement arising from the worldwide RMA, the armed forces will pay close attention to the challenges in new security domains, and work hard to seize the strategic initiative in military competition. In response to the new requirement coming from	China needs to improve the systems and strategies of its armed forces to accomplish its national security objectives to safeguard its national, developmental, and overseas interests, reunify the state, and provide for regional stability.	Threat Perception Developmental Interests Peace Regional Cooperation International Cooperation Overseas interests National Unification Overseas Interests Strategic Deterrence Nuclear Deterrence International Organizations Peace Regional stability	Y	Viewpoint AoI: Developmental and Overseas Interests AoI: National Unification AoI: Regional Stability

| | the country's growing strategic interests, the armed forces will actively participate in both regional and international security cooperation and effectively secure China's overseas interests. And in response to the new requirement arising from China's all-round and deepening reform, the armed forces will continue to follow the path of civil-military integration (CMI), actively participate in the country's economic and social construction, and firmly maintain social stability, so as to remain a staunch force for upholding the CPC's ruling position and a reliable force for developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.

-China's armed forces mainly shoulder the following strategic tasks:

--- To deal with a wide range of emergencies and military threats, and effectively safeguard the sovereignty and security of China's territorial land, air and sea;

--- To resolutely safeguard the unification of the motherland; | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

	--- To safeguard China's security and interests in new domains; --- To safeguard the security of China's overseas interests; --- To maintain strategic deterrence and carry out nuclear counterattack; --- To participate in regional and international security cooperation and maintain regional and world peace; --- To perform such tasks as emergency rescue and disaster relief, rights and interests protection, guard duties, and support for national economic and social development.				
2015C	-III. Strategic Guideline of Active Defense -The strategic concept of active defense is the essence of the CPC's military strategic thought. From the long-term practice of revolutionary wars, the people's armed forces have developed a complete set of strategic concepts of active defense, which boils down to: adherence to the unity of strategic defense and operational and tactical offense; adherence to the principles of defense, self-defense and post-emptive strike; and adherence to the	Active defense is an important concept and is defined here. If we are attacked we must attack back.	Strategic concepts Active Defense Must attack if attacked	Y	Precepts

	stance that "We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked."				
2015C	-China's socialist nature, fundamental national interests and the objective requirement of taking the path of peaceful development all demand that China unswervingly adhere to and enrich the strategic concept of active defense. Guided by national security and development strategies, and required by the situation and their tasks in the new historical period, China's armed forces will continue to implement the military strategic guideline of active defense and enhance military strategic guidance as the times so require. They will further broaden strategic vision, update strategic thinking and make strategic guidance more forward-looking. A holistic approach will be taken to balance war preparation and war prevention, rights protection and stability maintenance, deterrence and warfighting, and operations in wartime and employment of military forces in peacetime. They will lay stress on farsighted planning and management to create a favorable posture,	China desires peaceful development and uses active defense. It will attempt to continue to develop measures to enhance military readiness and contribute to regional stability.	Peace Active Defense Strategic Deterrence Regional Stability	Y	Precepts AoI: Regional Stability

	comprehensively manage crises, and resolutely deter and win wars.				
2015C	-To implement the military strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation, China's armed forces will optimize the military strategic layout. In view of China's geostrategic environment, the security threats it faces and the strategic tasks they shoulder, the armed forces will make overall planning for strategic deployment and military disposition, in order to clearly divide areas of responsibility for their troops, and enable them to support each other and act as an organic whole. Threats from such new security domains as outer space and cyber space will be dealt with to maintain the common security of the world community. China's armed forces will strengthen international security cooperation in areas crucially related to China's overseas interests, to ensure the security of such interests.	China uses active defense, and prioritizes international cooperation for its overseas interests. It also prioritizes outer space and cyberspace as important security domains.	Active Defense Overseas interests International cooperation Outer Space Cyberspace	Y	Precepts AoI: Developmental and Overseas Interests AoI: Outer Space AoI: Cybersapce
2015C	-To implement the military strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation, China's armed forces will	China's military will follow the guidelines set out in previous legal subordinate	Territorial Sovereignty Maritime Rights and Interests	Y	Precepts

	uphold the following principles: --- To be subordinate to and in the service of the national strategic goal, implement the holistic view of national security, strengthen PMS, prevent crises, deter and win wars; --- To foster a strategic posture favorable to China's peaceful development, adhere to the national defense policy that is defensive in nature, persevere in close coordination of political, military, economic and diplomatic work, and positively cope with comprehensive security threats the country possibly encounters; --- To strike a balance between rights protection and stability maintenance, and make overall planning for both, safeguard national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, and maintain security and stability along China's periphery; --- To endeavor to seize the strategic initiative in military struggle, proactively plan for military struggle in all directions and domains, and grasp the opportunities to	documentation. The military will be defensive and adaptable for the pursuit of regional stability, territorial sovereignty, and maintain border security as well as maritime rights and interests. It will also seek to improve itself competitively and strategically, while attempting to cooperate regionally in security.	Border/ Regional security Peace Defense Stability Struggle Unitary government Regional cooperation Regional security		AoI: Maritime Rights and Interests AoI: Regional Stability AoI: Border Disputes AoI: Maritime Rights and Interests.

	accelerate military building, reform and development; --- To employ strategies and tactics featuring flexibility and mobility, give full play to the overall effectiveness of joint operations, concentrate superior forces, and make integrated use of all operational means and methods; --- To make serious preparations to cope with the most complex and difficult scenarios, uphold bottom-line thinking, and do a solid job in all aspects so as to ensure proper responses to such scenarios with ease at any time and in any circumstances; --- To bring into full play the unique political advantages of the people's armed forces, uphold the CPC's absolute leadership over the military, accentuate the cultivation of fighting spirit, enforce strict discipline, improve the professionalism and strength of the troops, build closer relations between the government and the military as well as between the people and the military, and boost the morale of officers and men; --- To give full play to the overall power of the concept of people's war, persist in				

	employing it as an ace weapon to triumph over the enemy, enrich the contents, ways and means of the concept of people's war, and press forward with the shift of the focus of war mobilization from human resources to science and technology; and --- To actively expand military and security cooperation, deepen military relations with major powers, neighboring countries and other developing countries, and promote the establishment of a regional framework for security and cooperation.				
2015C	-In line with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defense and open seas protection, the PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from "offshore waters defense" to the combination of "offshore waters defense" with "open seas protection," and build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure. The PLAN will enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuvers, joint operations at sea, comprehensive defense and comprehensive support.	China will bolster its navy to defend its maritime and developmental interests, in line with strategic deterrence guidelines.	Maritime interests Strategic deterrence Maritime rights and interests Development interests	Y	AoI: Maritime Rights and Interests AoI: Developmental and Overseas Interests

	-Force Development in Critical Security Domains -The seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace, lasting stability and sustainable development of China. The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. It is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic SLOCs and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power.				
2015C	-Outer space has become a commanding height in international strategic competition. Countries concerned are developing their space forces and instruments, and the first signs of weaponization of outer space have appeared. China has all	Outer space is a new important domain for china, and the weaponization of space presents a threat to China. China attempts to cooperate in	Outer space Weaponization of space Arms race	Y	AoI: Outer Space

		international efforts to keep space peaceful.	International cooperation.		
	along advocated the peaceful use of outer space, opposed the weaponization of and arms race in outer space, and taken an active part in international space cooperation. China will keep abreast of the dynamics of outer space, deal with security threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets to serve its national economic and social development, and maintain outer space security.				
2015C	-Cyberspace has become a new pillar of economic and social development, and a new domain of national security. As international strategic competition in cyberspace has been turning increasingly fiercer, quite a few countries are developing their cyber military forces. Being one of the major victims of hacker attacks, China is confronted with grave security threats to its cyber infrastructure. As cyberspace weighs more in military security, China will expedite the development of a cyber force, and enhance its capabilities of cyberspace situation awareness, cyber defense, support for the country's endeavors in cyberspace and participation in international cyber	Cyberspace is a new important domain for holistic Chinese efforts. It presents a wide variety of threats to critical infrastructure and constituent parts to Chinese governmental security.	Cyberspace Military Cyber		AoI: Cyberspace

	cooperation, so as to stem major cyber crises, ensure national network and information security, and maintain national security and social stability.				
2015C	-Pushing ahead with PMS in all directions and domains. Due to its complex geostrategic environment, China faces various threats and challenges in all its strategic directions and security domains. Therefore, PMS must be carried out in a well-planned, prioritized, comprehensive and coordinated way, so as to maintain the balance and stability of the overall strategic situation. China's armed forces will make overall planning for PMS in both traditional and new security domains, and get ready to safeguard national sovereignty and security, protect the country's maritime rights and interests, and deal with armed conflicts and emergencies. To adapt to the upgrading of weaponry and equipment as well as changes of operational patterns, China's armed forces will further optimize battlefield disposition and strengthen strategic prepositioning.	China has a wide variety of threats across many domains that must be addressed on a theoretical level; including its maritime rights and interests.	Paradigm setting Maritime Rights and Interests	Y	AoI: Maritime Rights and Interests

2015C	-Preparing for military operations other than war (MOOTWs). As a necessary requirement for China's armed forces to fulfill their responsibilities and missions in the new period as well as an important approach to enhancing their operational capabilities, the armed forces will continue to conduct such MOOTWs as emergency rescue and disaster relief, counter-terrorism and stability maintenance, rights and interests protection, guard duty, international peacekeeping, and international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). They will work to incorporate MOOTW capacity building into military modernization and PMS, and pay special attention to establishing emergency command mechanisms, building emergency forces, training professionals, supporting task-specific equipment, and formulating relevant policies and regulations. Military emergency-response command systems will be tuned into state emergency management mechanisms. China's armed forces will persist in unified organization and command,	The military will be used in non-military roles to increase their utility; including stability maintenance and other mechanisms for overseas interests.	Overseas interests	Y	AoI: Developmental and Overseas Interests

	scientific employment of forces, rapid and efficient actions, and strict observation of related policies and regulations.				
2015C	-Pursuing a security concept featuring common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, China's armed forces will continue to develop military-to-military relations that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party. They will strive to establish fair and effective collective security mechanisms and military confidence-building measures (CBMs), expand military and security cooperation, and create a security environment favorable to China's peaceful development.	China desires non-aligned, non-confrontational, relations with other states for a peaceful and stable environment. It believes it can accomplish this through regional military cooperation.	Non-alignment Non-confrontational Regional Cooperation	Y	Precept AoI: Regional Stability
2015C	-Developing all-round military-to-military relations. China's armed forces will further their exchanges and cooperation with the Russian military within the framework of the comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination between China and Russia, and foster a comprehensive, diverse and sustainable framework to promote military relations in	China desires to have bilateral military relations, dialogue, and exchanges with Russia and the US for regional stability. It also prioritizes relations with non-specified European, African, Latin American,	Regional Stability International cooperation Military cooperation Dialogue	Y	AoI: Regional Stability

more fields and at more levels. China's armed forces will continue to foster a new model of military relationship with the US armed forces that conforms to the new model of major-country relations between the two countries, strengthen defense dialogues, exchanges and cooperation, and improve the CBM mechanism for the notification of major military activities as well as the rules of behavior for safety of air and maritime encounters, so as to strengthen mutual trust, prevent risks and manage crises. In the spirit of neighborhood diplomacy of friendship, sincerity, reciprocity and inclusiveness, China's armed forces will further develop relations with their counterparts in neighboring countries. Also, they will work to raise the level of military relations with European counterparts, continue the traditional friendly military ties with their African, Latin American and Southern Pacific counterparts. China's armed forces will work to further defense and security cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and continue to participate in multilateral	and South Pacific counterparts. It singles out the SCO, ASEAN organs, SLD, JIDD, and WPNS to further security cooperation.	Conflict management Regional Organizations		

	dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), Jakarta International Defence Dialogue (JIDD) and Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). The Chinese military will continue to host multilateral events like the Xiangshan Forum, striving to establish a new framework for security and cooperation conducive to peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.				
2015C	-Pushing ahead with pragmatic military cooperation. On the basis of mutual respect, equality, mutual benefit and all-win cooperation, China's armed forces will continue to carry out pragmatic cooperation with their counterparts in various countries of the world. In response to the changing situation, China's armed forces will constantly explore new fields, new contents and new models of cooperation with other militaries, so as to jointly deal with a diverse range of security threats and challenges. Extensive dialogues and exchanges will be conducted	China will continue cooperation with their counterparts for military cooperation and explore other methods of cooperation for regional, overseas, and maritime security.	Military cooperation Regional Stability Maritime security Overseas interests	Y	AoI: Regional Stability AoI: Developmental and Overseas Interests AoI: Maritime Rights and Interests

	with foreign militaries on defense policy, services and arms building, institutional education, logistics and other subjects to promote mutual understanding, mutual trust and mutual learning. The Chinese military will also strengthen cooperation with related countries in personnel training, material assistance, equipment and technology, so as to strengthen mutual support and enhance respective defensive capabilities. Bilateral and multilateral joint exercises and training, involving various services and arms, will be conducted at multiple levels and in various domains to enhance joint operational capabilities. The Chinese military will work to extend the subjects of such training and exercises from non-traditional to traditional security areas. It will actively participate in international maritime security dialogues and cooperation, and jointly deal with traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats.				
2015C	-Fulfilling international responsibilities and obligations. China's armed forces will continue to participate in UN peacekeeping missions, strictly observe the mandates of the	China views that it has international obligations in following the lead of the UN and UNSC, as well as	International Obligations UN	Y	AoI: International Obligations Precepts

	UN Security Council, maintain its commitment to the peaceful settlement of conflicts, promote development and reconstruction, and safeguard regional peace and security. China's armed forces will continue to take an active part in international disaster rescue and humanitarian assistance, dispatch professional rescue teams to disaster-stricken areas for relief and disaster reduction, provide relief materials and medical aid, and strengthen international exchanges in the fields of rescue and disaster reduction. Through the aforementioned operations, the armed forces can also enhance their own capabilities and expertise. Faithfully fulfilling China's international obligations, the country's armed forces will continue to carry out escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and other sea areas as required, enhance exchanges and cooperation with naval task forces of other countries, and jointly secure international SLOCs. China's armed forces will engage in extensive regional and international security affairs, and promote the establishment of the mechanisms of emergency	an obligation for conflict management, especially in regional peace. Humanitarian relief, maritime interests, regional security, among other specific peace-related responsibilities are counted among China's obligations.	UNSC Conflict Resolution International cooperation Peace International obligations Maritime Rights and Interests Regional Security International Obligations		AoI: Regional Stability AoI: Maritime Rights and Interests

	notification, military risk precaution, crisis management and conflict control. With the growth of national strength, China's armed forces will gradually intensify their participation in such operations as international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, and do their utmost to shoulder more international responsibilities and obligations, provide more public security goods, and contribute more to world peace and common development.				

'Doc': Deterrence Document Used.

- 	'2014R': 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation
- 	'2015R': 2015 Russian National Security Strategy
- 	'2009R': 2009 Russian Federation's Policy for the Arctic to 2020
- 	'2015C': 2015 China's Military Strategy

'Meaningful Unit': Full Text as per standard QCA.

'Condensed Meaningful Unit: Summarized texts as per standard QCA.

'Codes': Differentiated coding as per standard QCA.

'Use': 'Usable'. Denotes the conditionality of a meaningful unit to be used as an indicator for deterrence. If the subject-object characterization is descriptive, rather than declaratory and relationship-defining; then it does not qualify to be used. Disqualifying factors are primarily measurement-based. [See: 'Methodological Framework' for extensive explanation]. Binary.

Category: Categorization as per standard QCA.

- 'AoI' : 'Area of Interest'. The operationalized categorization frame for this thesis [See: 'Methodological Framework'.
- 'Precept': Denotes categorization of guiding principle to be compared later in the context of empirical state actions.
- 'Viewpoint': Denotes categorization of framing of a particular paradigm to be compared later to contextualize state actions.

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