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Outsourcing and Offshoring Engineering Projects: Understanding the Value, Sourcing Models, and Coordination Practices

Leslie Willcocks, Ilan Oshri, Julia Kotlarsky, and Joseph Rottman

Abstract—In this paper, we review recent developments in the field of outsourcing and offshoring and the implications for engineering management. We examine three aspects involved in outsourcing and offshoring, namely, sourcing models, coordination, and value extracted from outsourcing projects. We conclude that additional research is needed on recent trends in outsourcing and the impact of such change process on the practice of engineering management.

Index Terms—Engineering management, offshoring, outsourcing, sourcing models, coordination.

I. INTRODUCTION

BY OCTOBER 2010, the size of the worldwide market for information technology outsourcing (ITO) was \$270 billion and the business process outsourcing (BPO) market was \$165 billion. Recent estimates predict that between 2011 and 2014, ITO will grow at 5%–8% per annum and BPO will grow at 8%–12% per annum. It is also expected that the BPO market will overtake the ITO market [1].

Clearly, this ongoing growth in the outsourcing market has implications for engineering management and engineers involved in software development and other forms of product development. In the past, key engineering challenges were around the need to improve quality, enhance product features, integrate service with product offerings and speed up the innovation system. Nowadays, engineers are being asked to reorganize the product development function to accommodate outsourcing activities as part of the innovation process. This requires them to redefine 1) the way innovation is carried out within and outside the firm; 2) the boundaries of the product development function; and 3) the mode of coordination through which work is performed globally. Firms also have to develop new capabilities to support the ever-changing business models in their sourcing engagements. Understanding how and where value is created

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in sourcing engagements comes as an additional challenge as dependence on external partners increases. Executives responsible for innovation and information technology (IT) performance have been revisiting their business models and rethinking the roles of C-level managers, such as Chief Information Officers (CIOs), within the firm. At the same time, vendors of outsourcing services are more aware of growing demands from firms for innovation and transformation through outsourcing engagements, and are refocusing their effort to deliver value to clients by improving performance management systems and extending their offers.

This paper reviews the prominent changes that outsourcing causes within and outside the firms, in the context of engineering management. We take a practice-based approach in an attempt to bring together the vast research on outsourcing from both vendor and client sides, while also trying to provide some guidelines for engineers in the context of changing global business environments and reshaping of the practice of outsourcing within product development.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, we explore sourcing models, project management, coordination practices, and the notion of value in outsourcing in the context of engineering management. We also offer links to the papers published in this special issue.

II. SOURCING MODELS: OUTCOMES FOR PRACTICE

Choosing the appropriate sourcing model is a critical aspect in planning an outsourcing project. The range of sourcing models is diverse and includes single vendor, panel and multisourcing settings. In a recent study, Willcocks and Lacity [2] suggest that the ITO and BPO outsourcing markets will continue to grow through multisourcing. Although ITO and BPO spend has been increasing, in the last few years the average size and duration of individual contracts have been decreasing. How can we reconcile smaller, shorter deals with an overall increase in the ITO/BPO markets? The figures suggest that client organizations are actively pursuing more multisourcing. Multisourcing has always been the dominant practice and overall growth is driven by client organizations signing *more* contracts with *more* suppliers. While multisourcing helps clients access best-of-breed suppliers and mitigates the risks of reliance on a single supplier, it also means increased transaction costs since clients have to manage more suppliers. Multisourcing means also that suppliers incur more transaction costs. Suppliers have to bid more frequently because contracts are shorter, suppliers face more competition

because smaller-sized deals mean that more suppliers are qualified to bid, and suppliers need to attract more customers in order to meet growth targets.

These arguments were used in the early 1990s to try to persuade customers to buy into large-scale long-term single supplier outsourcing arrangements. Critics argued that companies that signed long-term contracts lost control of their IT assets and capabilities (e.g., Strassmann [3]). An interesting fact that was lost in the focus on mega-deals, was that the dominant trend, even in the 1990s was not for long contracts. By 2000, there were only about 140 such deals worldwide. Research shows that in the U.S. and U.K. lead markets, over 75% of organizations consistently outsource 15%–50% of their IT budgets, typically to multiple suppliers [4]. Mega-deals, and especially single suppliers, have always been in the minority. One explanation for this is that most organizations want to reduce the higher risk profile inherent in large-scale outsourcing to third party suppliers [4].

What are these risks in practice? As companies accumulated experience with IT outsourcing through the 1990s, practices that differentiated success from failure emerged. Lacity and Willcocks [5] find that the relative frequency with which selective outsourcing (20%–80% of the IT operating budget goes to external providers) decisions achieved expected cost savings was higher than in the case of total outsourcing (80% plus of the IT operating budget goes to external providers) or total insourcing (more than 80% of the IT operating budget remains within the organization). The rationale is that few vendors or internal IT departments possess the expertise to perform all IT activities in the most efficient way. Selective outsourcing allows organizations to select the most capable and efficient sources, a practice some refer to as “best-of-breed” sourcing. Indeed, the ability to focus in-house resources on higher value work can also be the justification for selective outsourcing. In most cases of total outsourcing, participant firms encounter one or more of the following problems in trying to realize the expected cost savings:

- 1) extra fees for services beyond the contract, or extra fees for services the outsourcer assumed were included in the contract;
- 2) “hidden costs” on both the client side (e.g., IT spend hidden in decentralized budgets) and the supplier’s side (e.g., cost of transferring software licenses);
- 3) inflexible contracts not allowing for changes in technology, market prices, business processes, or business direction.

Between 2000 and 2005, research showed that detailed short-term contracts worked well if participant firms were able to define requirements precisely. This ensured that they paid market prices, encouraged good vendor performance (based perhaps on threats to switch suppliers when the contract expired), allowed client firms to learn gradually how to outsource efficiently and, in some cases, allowed client firms to recover more quickly from any mistakes. More recent research reveals a number of emerging practices, which, in principle, will achieve success by other means. These include flexible pricing, competitive bidding beyond the baseline contract, beginning a long-term relationship

with a short-term contract, and performance-based contracts [6].

The aforementioned findings and recommendations are holding up well in relation to outsourcing experiences and outcomes since 2000. By 2005, “multisourcing,” as it came to be called [7], was being portrayed as the main sourcing model being applied by client firms for ITO and BPO. Unfortunately, many practitioners overlooked the notion of *selective* sourcing of external supply and also internal supply when warranted. Also overlooked was the important question of what number of suppliers was optimal. Clearly, the transaction costs involved in dealing with multiple suppliers could reach formidable levels, and the complexities involved in managing contracts and relationships could be daunting.

In a recent report, Willcocks *et al.* [8] look in detail at the tradeoffs between bundled services and multiple suppliers. By bundled services, they mean

“A mix of business process and/or information technology services purchased separately or at the same time from the same supplier where synergies and efficiencies are sought in end-to-end processing, governance, relationship management, cost, and performance.” (p.?)

Their findings apply equally well to major engineering projects involving choices about sourcing models and numbers of suppliers. They can be summarized as follows.

- 1) Multisourcing may give the client more power and more control over each individual supplier, and involve less dependence on each. However, greater control comes at the price of higher management costs, and more time, effort and measurement. It can be argued also that bundling outsourcing services makes the client larger and more important to the provider, which makes the provider more responsive, and especially in terms of improvements and innovation. In multisupplier environments, the retained management capability needed to manage outsourcing regularly costs between 4% and 10% of the total contract value [4]. As multisourcing governance has moved up the outsourcing agenda since 2007, these costs are rising [6].
- 2) In terms of risk, while dependence on one or two suppliers may be risky (much depends on their capabilities and their financial strength) multisourcing brings new risks, including cracks between service, security issues, hidden costs of continued monitoring and renewal of contracts, and possible replacement of suppliers. It is necessary to evaluate the size of the risks from bundling or not bundling, relative to the risks a business faces in the course of its main operations. Organizations often impose, quite inconsistently, higher levels of risk for back office deals than for strategic business initiatives, for example.

On incremental bundling, Willcocks *et al.* [8] found that many organizations adopted this route over time. They also found that some organizations gained from major one-off bundling deals, although this was rare for complex BPO arrangements. Much depended on the abilities of both client and supplier to manage these arrangements, capabilities that are quite specialized. Other organizations adopted the approach of rationalizing their IT and/or business processes, sometimes through a shared services

195 route, before seeking bundled outsourcing arrangements. This is
 196 a more tactical process and mitigates some of the risks inherent
 197 in outsourcing inefficient IT and processes, although depending
 198 on the savings on time and costs, such risks may be justified.
 199 The cost gains from bundling two or more business functions,
 200 for example, IT and human resources management (HR), or
 201 procurement and HR, rather than outsourcing them separately
 202 to different suppliers, could be of the order of 10%–15% [9]. The
 203 savings may be even higher if the supplier introduced a more
 204 standardized management and measurement process and is able
 205 to implement standardized business processes and IT. A prime
 206 contractor model which is a network of suppliers that is managed
 207 by one of the contractor accountable and liable for the delivery
 208 of the service represents a “half-way house,” but it is unlikely
 209 to achieve significant cost savings, process standardization, or
 210 innovation compared to a bundled outsourcing arrangement.
 211 A prime contractor model presents many risks and experience
 212 shows that they do not necessarily bring benefits.¹

213 So when do bundled outsourcing and fewer suppliers make
 214 operational sense? Willcocks *et al.* [8] find several advantages
 215 from bundling, such as that it:

- 216 1) simplifies and expedites procurement and contracting
 217 (sole-source versus tendering);
- 218 2) simplifies the governance process;
- 219 3) reduces duplication of management layers, processes, and
 220 costs;
- 221 4) reduces operating risks by limiting points of failure;
- 222 5) standardizes and simplifies operations;
- 223 6) achieves operational synergies across business processes
 224 and between a business process and the supporting IT;
- 225 7) mitigates delivery risk through simplified points of
 226 contact;
- 227 8) reduces service provider costs/prices through simplified
 228 management and scale economies;
- 229 9) supports preexisting standardized technology and pro-
 230 cess trajectories, e.g., use of enterprise resource planning
 231 (ERP);
- 232 10) can drive wider holistic back-office changes.

233 However, Willcocks *et al.* [8] conclude that this does not make
 234 bundled outsourcing the best option. These gains are possible,
 235 but much depend on the maturity and capabilities of client and
 236 supplier to deliver on the promises in the particular bundling
 237 deal. Thus, it is not surprising to find a range of client profiles
 238 when investigating outsourcing arrangements.

239 The bundling sourcing model is particularly critical in relation
 240 to innovation and knowledge. Willcocks *et al.* [1] show that
 241 senior executives generally adopt one of four approaches to
 242 innovation, each with distinct knowledge objectives (see Fig. 1).

243 “Do-It-Yourself” scores highly for retaining control and keep-
 244 ing the value of transformation within the company. However,
 245 success requires both funding and appropriate skills. This option
 246 is also most likely to encounter internal resistance if its impor-
 247 tance is not flagged by senior management. The “Management




Fig. 1. Options for back-office innovation [adapted from Willcocks *et al.* [1]].

248 Consultancy” route brings in external energy, is a clear signal
 249 of the commitment to major change, and reduces political resis-
 250 tance. The most significant risks from this approach are cost
 251 escalation, lack of sustainability, and poor knowledge transfer.
 252 “Fee-For-Service Outsourcing”—whether ITO or BPO—can re-
 253 sult in small, usually one-off, innovation in inherited back-office
 254 management practices, business processes, and investment in
 255 new technology. However, the results are usually not long term.
 256 Fee-for-service contracts are structured around cost/service is-
 257 sues and do not incentivize the supplier to innovate. They signal
 258 an over-reliance on the supplier to innovate in business areas
 259 where new ideas should be an in-house problem. The supplier
 260 tends to focus on selling extra services to increase its margins
 261 and may become embroiled in immediate crises and operational
 262 problems. The employer does not develop or employ more inno-
 263 vative staff or make efforts to foster the contractual relationship.

264 Based on the learning from a major engineering project—the
 265 building of Heathrow Terminal 5—Willcocks *et al.* [1] show
 266 that some form of “Collaborative Innovation” is required if sus-
 267 tained, significant IT or back-office, and business innovations
 268 are to be achieved. The greater the motivation, the more likely
 269 that the contract will include some form of risk-reward com-
 270 ponent. Collaborative innovation can take the form of a formal
 271 joint venture as in the case of several BPO deals and cases
 272 of engineering collaborations. The paper, “Global multisourc-
 273 ing strategy: integrating learning from manufacturing into IT
 274 service outsourcing” (by Levina and Ning) in this special is-
 275 sue extends these debates and practice points by integrating the
 276 learning from research in the operations management and IS
 277 fields and by developing a theoretical model of the tradeoffs
 278 associated with the use of multiple vendors for IT services.
 279 The authors produce a conceptual map of four configurations of
 280 what can constitute a multivendor supply base, and extend the
 281 debate even further by applying this map to analyze two global
 282 financial service firms and their global sourcing strategies.

283 We next examine project management practices and their
 284 relevance to managing engineering outsourcing projects.

¹In [2] and [5], the authors point to cases where management costs were not noticeably lower than in other models, and best practice was not shared among the different suppliers.

III. PROJECT MANAGEMENT IN OUTSOURCING

There is a long tradition of project management studies in the engineering and construction sectors, and some of these developments and practices can be applied to outsourcing and offshoring of IT projects. For example, *Accelerating Change* report [10] that describes a U.K. project conducted by the Strategic Forum for Construction, led by Sir John Egan, lists the most important drivers as being client leadership, integrated teams, and relevant employees. Central to the approach outlined are partnering and collaboration. In relation to ERP implementation, the main problems are their large size, long time scale, complex, new or untried technology, and lack of clear detailed project staffing and management structures. Traditional “waterfall” systems development methods are not appropriate for implementing IT-based projects constituting real business innovation.

Many IT outsourcing projects are run according to a “time box” philosophy [11] in which the IT-based business innovation must be delivered within foreseeable period of time and must be aligned with the organization’s overall IT architecture. It is sometimes possible to decompose such projects into smaller phases, each of which will deliver tangible business benefits. For example, in large-scale outsourcing projects, the transition phase, in which client systems are transferred to the vendor, is planned as a series of “waves” each taking from 2 to 3 months. Time discipline reduces the risk of a project failing to meet business requirements, ensures that some big projects are reduced to a series of more manageable units, that business benefits flow regularly, and that the team will remain focused be fully staffed over a limited period. In the outsourcing context, such an approach also makes it easier for client firms to ensure the continuity of the business during transition. For the vendors, on the other hand, a “time-boxing” approach offers a clear association between deliverables and rewards. Within projects further time boxing can occur in relation to different parts of the development to reduce drift from the overall business delivery target.

What is the role of suppliers in projects? Willcocks *et al.* [1] suggest that external perspectives and external knowledge can contribute much to the process of technical and business innovation. Suppliers can also compensate for in-house shortages in routine and specialized skills in order to ensure rapid delivery of the system. The routine, easily codifiable processes can all be outsourced [12]. Our research suggests that IT-based innovation means that suppliers are utilized most effectively if they are directed and controlled by the outsourcer, perhaps within the home company. “Insourcing” external skills, if properly managed, can release valuable transfer-of-learning effects.

The alternative of outsourcing the management of IT-based innovation to a third party, places the external supplier in an invidious position. Technical work requiring the application of expert know-how and techniques can be outsourced to the appropriate specialists. The more complex (i.e., adaptive) the work becomes, the more leadership is required and the greater become the requirements for multiple stakeholders to engage with defining the problem and work together to come up with a solution. Adaptive challenges arise in situations where problems and so-

lutions are unclear, multifunctional teams are needed, learning is vital, innovation is usually necessary, and there is a general business goal rather than precise metrics guiding the project. In such situations, the role of leadership is to maintain direction and shape the context and process that will accomplish this goal. Moreover, the more radical and business focused the innovation goal, the more crucial it is for the client to lead the project. Willcocks and Lacity [2] show that in-house leadership is vital for large-scale IT and back-office innovation and transformation because they generally involve adaptive challenges. Even fee-for-service outsourcing will involve some adaptive challenges, which are often interpreted as technical challenges.

Offshore outsourcing introduces additional dimensions and complexity to project management. Offshore outsourcing can involve time zone and cultural differences [13], impose the need for more control [14], [15], involve problems related to the transfer of knowledge [16], require more precise definition of requirements [17], and introduce difficulties in terms of managing dispersed teams [18]. The transaction costs involved in offshore outsourcing are considerably higher than those related to domestic outsourcing [19]. Researchers have identified practices and capabilities specific to offshore outsourcing [20] including the use of middlemen [21], the design of special client-offshore supplier employee interfaces [16], the use of larger numbers of links [17], and others [22], [23].

Governance models are also an important factor that influences success in outsourcing relationships. In their article in this special issue, “Managing Software Outsourcing Relationships in Emerging Economies: An Empirical Study of the Chinese Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises,” Ren, Ngai, and Cho explore three different governance models and their impact on success of engineering projects in the emerging Chinese outsourcing market. The authors analyzed three different interorganizational models: contractual-based, relational-based, and vendor-specific investment. By analyzing the success of 83 software engineering projects from 77 Chinese small- and medium-sized firms, they found that both contractual and relational governance models were key contributors to successful projects. Combined with vendor-specific investment, the three models accounted for 45% of the variance in outsourcing project success. Their study also showed that Chinese client firms utilize vendor specific investment to protect their financial investment connected to the relationship. The investment was shown to enhance the long-term partnerships client firms have with their suppliers. As emerging economies continue to expand their role in the software engineering landscape, this study also confirms the importance of relational-based governance models and vendor management.

Deeper insights into offshore outsourcing are provided by Gopal *et al.* [24] who examine the effects of capability process maturity (CPM) and communication/coordination practices on ITO project outcomes, in the context of application development projects outsourced to offshore suppliers. The authors find that CPM quality processes *reduce* the level of project reworking, *increase* project efforts, and have *no effect* on project duration. CPM technical processes *reduce* the level of project effort, *increase* project duration, and have *no effect* on the level of rework.

398 Also the greater the number of project status meetings, the more
 399 this increases project effort; and the more incremental releases,
 400 the less project rework but the more project effort.

401 The paper “An empirical investigation of client managers’
 402 responsibilities in managing offshore outsourcing of software
 403 testing projects’ (by Jain, Poston, and Simon) in this special
 404 issue examines client managers’ responsibilities in the man-
 405 agement of offshore outsourcing of software testing projects.
 406 The authors point out that while this practice is increasing, lit-
 407 tle research has been done on the problems encountered by
 408 clients in managing projects with offshore vendors, or on the
 409 changes required to manage offshore outsourcing relationships
 410 effectively. The authors use a case study approach to identify
 411 six project management activities. They discuss the changes
 412 that were required and examine the coping strategies employed
 413 by client managers to deal with these project management ac-
 414 tivities. They describe how the interplay among multiple global
 415 boundary variables affects these activities, and integrate insights
 416 from global distributed teams, organizational communication,
 417 and the offshore outsourcing literature to ground the relation-
 418 ship theoretically, between the boundary variables and coping
 419 strategies.

420 Another paper in this special issue “Information technology
 421 and distance-induced effort to manage offshore activities” (by
 422 Aubert, Rivard, and Templier) examines the role of distance and
 423 IT in the management of offshore activities. The study devel-
 424 ops a model of the effect of distance on the effort required to
 425 manage an offshore activity. This involves developing an under-
 426 standing of which aspects of distance and which features of the
 427 technology influence the effort required to manage an offshore
 428 activity, how this influence is exerted, and how IT and distance
 429 interact. The authors study 12 organizations in Canada, West-
 430 ern Europe, and Eastern Europe. The model they propose posits
 431 that perceived distance is a key antecedent to effort. Their model
 432 suggests that IT facilitates higher level formalization of the in-
 433 formation exchanged and moderates the impact of geographic
 434 distance on the effort required to manage offshore activity.

435 In the next section, we examine coordination and knowledge
 436 management practices in the context of engineering manage-
 437 ment outsourcing projects.

438 IV. COORDINATION AND KNOWLEDGE IN OUTSOURCING AND 439 OFFSHORING ENGINEERING PROJECTS

440 In large-scale engineering projects, coordinating the work is a
 441 primary management task. In the context of software engineer-
 442 ing, the unique properties of software make its development
 443 more difficult than other engineering disciplines. Software sys-
 444 tems are *complex, not visualizable*, and constantly subject to
 445 *change*. Software systems have to *conform* to the continuously
 446 changing environment of their application [25]. These inher-
 447 ent challenges make software engineering a complex discipline
 448 and increase the obstacles to management practice that relies
 449 on “traditional” coordination mechanisms, such as *organization*
 450 *design*, which encompasses formal structures such as hierar-
 451 chies, linking pins, teams, and direct contact; *work-based mech-*
 452 *anisms*, which include plans, specifications, standards, catego-




Fig. 2. Coordination mechanisms for managing knowledge in globally distributed teams (adopted from Kotlarsky *et al.* [15]).

453 rization systems, and representations of work-in-progress such
 454 as prototypes and design documents; *technology-based mech-*
 455 *anisms*, which enable information capture, processing, stor-
 456 age and exchange (e.g., electronic scheduling, groupware, and
 457 shared databases), and replace human input by automating cer-
 458 tain tasks; and *social mechanisms*, which involve communica-
 459 tion activities, working relationships and social cognition [26].

460 A. Adapting Coordination Mechanisms for Outsourcing and 461 Offshoring Project Teams

462 Outsourcing and offshoring arrangements make coordination
 463 more difficult due to the geographic, temporal, cultural, and
 464 often organizational distance (in outsourcing arrangements) be-
 465 tween the individuals involved in remote collaborative engi-
 466 neering efforts [27]. The breakdown of traditional coordina-
 467 tion mechanisms, an incomplete picture of what is happen-
 468 ing in remote locations, the difficulties involved in working
 469 across different time zones and delays in distributed collabora-
 470 tive work processes have been reported in globally distributed
 471 projects [28], [29]. Additional challenges arise when tools, pro-
 472 cesses, and the information and communication technology
 473 (ICT) infrastructures are different across different remote lo-
 474 cations [30], [31].

475 To deal with these challenges, coordination mechanisms for
 476 globally distributed teams have been adapted to allow remote
 477 teams to work across distance time zones. Coordination me-
 478 chanisms have become crucial *knowledge management mechanisms*
 479 ensuring effectiveness and efficiency among globally distributed
 480 teams and improving the utilization of knowledge across dis-
 481 persed sites, in the pursuit of a joint collaborative outsourcing/
 482 offshoring effort (see Fig. 2), as explained later.

483 Coordination mechanisms employed by global teams rely on
 484 *technologies*, which enable rapid access and dissemination of

485 knowledge through intranets, knowledge databases, and repos- 542
 486 itories that in turn rely on sophisticated search and retrieval 543
 487 mechanisms [32], collaborative technologies, and social me- 544
 488 dia [26]. 545

489 *Organization design* mechanisms facilitate knowledge flows 546
 490 by providing a structure that allows dispersed outsourcing 547
 491 project teams whose members typically include representatives 548
 492 of the client, supplier(s), and consultancy firms, to channel and 549
 493 integrate their expertise. Coordination requires the knowledge 550
 494 that resides in different parts of a globally distributed project 551
 495 team to flow and be connected in a structured manner. The de- 552
 496 sign of the organizational structure of an outsourcing project 553
 497 team should make it clear who is supposed to know what, and 554
 498 who is supposed to communicate with whom, which makes 555
 499 knowledge flows more efficient [26], [32]. The organization 556
 500 design mechanisms that have proven successful in outsourc- 557
 501 ing and offshoring projects include implementing mirror orga- 558
 502 nization structures onsite and offshore, setting up miniteams 559
 503 to focus on a specific feature or subject and establishing cen- 560
 504 ters of excellence specializing in specific industry solutions or 561
 505 technologies, promoting direct contact between remote counter- 562
 506 parts, and appointing contact persons to liaise between remote 563
 507 members [26], [32]. *Work-based mechanisms* capture knowl- 564
 508 edge and make it explicit through specifications, blueprints and 565
 509 prototypes, which enable replication and facilitate standardiza- 566
 510 tion across remote sites. This helps to diffuse knowledge and 567
 511 expectations and render it useful to people working in dispersed 568
 512 locations. The division of work driven by the availability of ex- 569
 513 pertise (and not location), standardization and centralization of 570
 514 tools, and made accessible through the Web [29], implementa- 571
 515 tion of knowledge transfer methodology and mechanisms to 572
 516 facilitate knowledge retention [32] are some of the work-based 573
 517 mechanisms that improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 574
 518 coordination of outsourced and offshore projects. 575

519 Finally, *social mechanisms* establish social capital and help 576
 520 individuals to learn who knows and does what. (What people 577
 521 are *supposed* to know and do is part of the organizational de- 578
 522 sign mechanisms discussed earlier.) Communications, tradition- 579
 523 ally recognized as an adaptive coordination mode, are essential 580
 524 in outsourcing and offshoring projects where individuals from 581
 525 client, supplier and other participating organizations may be en- 582
 526 counteracting unfamiliar circumstances and may be working with 583
 527 colleagues that they do not know. Through communications and 584
 528 engagement in joint social practices, they can establish a shared 585
 529 understanding and develop working relationships that enhance 586
 530 the accuracy of their expectations about others' thinking, activi- 587
 531 ties, and expectations. The nature of outsourcing and offshoring 588
 532 projects creates barriers to social practices involving colleagues 589
 533 from different national and organizational cultures, working in 590
 534 geographically dispersed locations and in different time zones. 591
 535 Usually only top and middle management levels meet face-to- 592
 536 face, and while such meetings may be helpful, they are also 593
 537 generally very *formal* and taken up with discussion of project 594
 538 procedures and technical issues. Such face-to-face meeting is 595
 539 usually *short* and *sporadic*, which allows little opportunity for 596
 540 informal communication that might become the basis for in- 597
 541 terpersonal relationships and facilitate closer collaboration and

understanding. Although ICT had advanced, it does not replace 542
 the need for personal contact or facilitate the social capital that 543
 is typically accumulated through face-to-face meetings [33]. 544
 Implementing social coordination mechanisms in globally dis- 545
 tributed teams requires dedicated management and activities that 546
 vary according to the project lifecycle, and provide teams with 547
 the tools and technologies to support remote social practices. 548
 Table I, adapted from Oshri *et al.* [34], presents some activities 549
 and practices for individuals, groups, and organizations in glob- 550
 ally distributed teams. These are designed to build and maintain 551
 social ties among remote counterparts before face-to-face meet- 552
 ings or after they have met. 553

The paper Coordination and performance in global software 554
 service delivery: the vendor's perspective (by Gopal, Espinosa, 555
 Gosain, and Darcy) in this special issue examines coordina- 556
 tion and performance from the vendor's perspective. They look 557
 at coordination between client and vendor teams, and within 558
 vendor teams. Software quality and development speed are the 559
 performance outcomes studied in this paper. The authors show 560
 that both client-vendor coordination and vendor team coordina- 561
 tion positively influence the quality of project output, but not 562
 the speed of development. This paper contributes to our un- 563
 derstanding of coordination within and between vendor teams, 564
 and the impact that coordination has on software development 565
 performance. 566

567 B. Role of Transactive Memory Systems in Coordinating 568 569 Knowledge in Outsourcing and Offshoring Projects 570

Globally distributed teams involved in outsourcing or off- 569
 shoring focus their coordination efforts on managing knowledge 570
 across remote locations using the four types of adapted coordi- 571
 nation mechanisms described earlier. Over time, they become 572
 familiar the responsibilities and knowledge of the members of 573
 their dispersed project team. As their familiarity and knowledge 574
 about their counterparts increase, the global team becomes more 575
 efficient in dealing with cognitive labor. Team members develop 576
 a *Transactive Memory System* (TMS) that is a combination of 577
 individual memory systems and communications (or "transac- 578
 tions") between individuals which enable a shared division of 579
 cognitive labor used to encode, store, and retrieve knowledge 580
 from different, but complementary domains of expertise through 581
 engagement in collective tasks. 582

Processes that enable the creation and renewal of a TMS are 583
 directory updating, information allocation, and retrieval coordi- 584
 nation. *Directory updating* is associated with learning about 585
 the areas of expertise of team members and creating awareness 586
 about who knows what in the team or organization; *informa- 587
 tion allocation* refers to communicating information to the rel- 588
 evant experts for processing and storage; *retrieval coordination* 589
 refers to requests to access unique stored information to enable 590
 task performance [35]. The level of development of the group's 591
 TMS is characterized by its *specialization* which refers to the 592
 degree of differentiation of the knowledge possessed by team 593
 members; *coordination* that implies the team's efficiency at pro- 594
 cessing knowledge while working together; and *credibility* that 595

TABLE I
INDIVIDUAL, TEAM, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING SOCIAL TIES BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER
FACE-TO-FACE MEETINGS (ADAPTED FROM OSHRI *ET AL.* [34])

	Before F2F	During F2F	After F2F
Individual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offer language courses • Increase awareness of communication styles • Offer short visits of individuals to remote locations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create space for one-on-one interactions • Provide sense of importance of each member • Adjust communication styles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offer short visits to remote locations • Offer temporary co-location • Ensure real time communication channels • Ensure mixed audio and visual cues
Team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Introduction of new team members • Increase awareness of team composition • Offer virtual F2F meetings • Increase awareness of communication protocol • Set up mini-teams • Appoint contact person per remote team 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct kick-off meeting • Offer space for multiple interactions between counterparts • Offer team-building exercises • Organise social events • Discuss differences in national cultures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Facilitate reflection sessions • Facilitate around-the-table discussions • Facilitate progress meetings
Organizational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distribute newsletters • Create and offer shared cyberspaces 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discuss organizational structure • Discuss differences in organisational culture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure direct communication channels

596 refers to the team members' beliefs about the reliability of other
597 members' knowledge [36]–[39].

598 The development and activation of core TMS processes (di-
599 rectory updating, information allocation, and retrieval coordi-
600 nation) are supported by knowledge directories that point to
601 where knowledge and expertise reside [40]–[42]. According to
602 Oshri *et al.* [43], these directories can be *codified* (e.g., infor-
603 mation systems and technologies, ICT, and knowledge manage-
604 ment systems) or *personalized* (e.g., one's own and other peo-
605 ple's memories), which is in line with codification-based and
606 personalization-based knowledge approaches in the literature
607 (e.g., [44], [45]). In outsourcing and offshoring contexts, cod-
608 ified IT-based TMS directories available to dispersed workers
609 typically include various corporate-wide and project-specific
610 document- and knowledge-management systems, project port-
611 als, and expertise directories (e.g., “yellow pages”) that can be
612 accessed from remote locations. Personalized directories that
613 are formed through experience of working together and infor-
614 mal social networks, typically, are less developed in globally
615 distributed teams where members have few opportunities to
616 use social coordination mechanisms that facilitate their devel-
617 opment. Therefore, codified directories play a central role in
618 facilitating the use of TMS in global teams.

619 As individuals gain on the job experience, and as team mem-
620 bership changes (which is common in large-scale long-term
621 outsourcing contracts), a TMS develops and is continuously
622 renewed by constant updating of codified and personalized di-
623 rectories [43]. Because these teams rely on codified rather than
624 personalized directories, *technology-based* coordination mech-
625 anisms are critical for supporting the global team's TMS.

626 *Work-based* mechanisms facilitate the codification of knowl-
627 edge, which, if stored in repositories or databases supported by
628 efficient search capabilities, reduce the cognitive load of the
629 group by storing codified knowledge in organizational memory
630 systems, rather than the memories of individual group members.

631 *Organization design* mechanisms that provide a structure for
632 the efficient flow of knowledge within the global team “protect”
633 the TMS of the globally distributed team against deterioration
634 resulting from changes to organizational membership, by cap-
635 turing who is *supposed* to know what. For example, if a team
636 member is replaced, the role to be filled and responsibility it
637 entails (e.g., a specific system, portfolio of applications, or so-
638 lution) is familiar to the rest of the team. The new appointee will
639 be allocated the knowledge related to this area of responsibility.
640 Clearly, interpersonal relations and personalized TMS directo-
641 ries will suffer if individuals leave the team, and it takes time
642 for newcomers to develop relationships and be able to exploit
643 the group's TMS.

644 Overall, coordination mechanisms adapted for globally dis-
645 tributed teams and TMS improve the utilization of dispersed
646 knowledge resources which in turn improve group performance.
647 The coordination challenges that arise in outsourcing and off-
648 shoring software engineering projects can be managed by focus-
649 ing coordination efforts on managing dispersed knowledge [26],
650 while a TMS facilitates the transfer and sharing of knowledge
651 among team members (e.g., [41], [43], [46]).

652 While the focus in TMS research is mostly on couples
653 engaged in close relationships, and small work groups (e.g.,
654 [47], [48]–[50]), some studies investigate how a TMS is devel-
655 oped and activated in contemporary settings, such as globally

distributed and virtual teams (e.g., [43], [46], [51], [52]), or quick-response organizations such as emergency rooms or disaster recovery teams where, to save lives, individuals need to be able to integrate their knowledge and act quickly (e.g., [53], [54]). From an engineering perspective, Oshri *et al.* [43] study the role of a TMS in transferring knowledge between onsite and offshore teams involved in offshore outsourcing software development projects. Their research demonstrates how encoding, storing, and retrieval processes enable knowledge transfer between remote counterparts and proposes specific mechanisms to support the development of codified and personalized directories between members based onsite and offshore.

The paper “Hallowed grounds: The role of cultural values, practices, and institutions in TMS in an offshored complex engineering services” in this special issue (by Jarvenpaa and Keating) examines how cultural differences among engineering team members affect the coordination of dispersed knowledge and the development of TMS, based on a longitudinal case study of a dispersed, cross-cultural team involving U.S. and Romanian engineers. The findings demonstrate that cultural differences in values, practices, and institutions have a major impact on TMS indicators of specialization, coordination, and credibility.

So far the paper has focused on exploring outsourcing practices in the context of engineering management. We now explore the notion of value in outsourcing projects.

V. NOTION OF “VALUE” IN OUTSOURCING PROJECTS

Extracting value from outsourcing engagements is a key objective for client firms and vendors. Existing research (e.g., [6], [55]) focuses mainly on the risks associated with outsourcing. Work that examines the impact of ITO on firm performance (e.g., [56]) provides little explanation of how these firm performance indicators inform the long-term strategies of firms.

More research is needed on whether clients see value from their outsourcing engagements. We refer to the notion of value not primarily as knowing the value of a particular activity in financial terms, but knowing *how* to value it, and *why* [57]. As outsourcing projects become ever more complex, and include multiple business functions and multiple vendors, client firms are finding it harder to realize the value these engagements bring to their organizations. A high degree of dependency between outsourced business functions, especially in the case of a bundled service-sourcing model to try to improve the entire or part of the value chain, may erect even more hurdles to understanding and measuring the value in complex outsourcing projects.

While client firms often see value as a one-off cost savings resulting from the outsourcing projects, the impact of most outsourcing projects, and especially those involving transformation and innovation, is much wider. A recent study by Oshri and Kotlarsky [58] aimed to understand whether client firms realize value from their outsourcing engagements, and the role of the CIO in the conceptualization of value within the client firm, as a first step towards capturing the notion of value in outsourcing. Their research was based on a survey of 263 CIOs and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) from leading European firms

with revenues between \$500 million and \$6 billion (71% over \$1 billion), representing industries that have been outsourcing IT and business processes for some time, including financial services, manufacturing, logistics, retail, utilities, and telecoms. The survey was followed up with interviews with CIOs of several leading European firms including ABN AMRO, Royal Dutch Shell, Maersk, and Philips.

Results of this study highlight the difficulty in evaluating the value in outsourcing engagements that involve multiple suppliers and several business areas. For example, when clients expect vendors to actively help them to achieve competitive advantage, this adds additional difficulties in evaluating return on investment. The survey results support this with only 39% of CIOs and CFOs believing that assessment of the financial contribution of outsourcing activity is feasible. Also, more and more outsourcing contracts are related to high-value activities, which often require intense and ongoing collaboration in the form of joint ventures between client and vendor, further inhibiting the translation of the benefits from outsourcing activities into financial benefit. Only 28% of CIOs and CFOs believed that their organization was able to assess the business value of outsourcing beyond the one-time project cost savings.

Some sophisticated vendors have perfected their performance management systems with the development of metrics that capture and quantify the activities of their staff. Such metrics allow these vendors to secure their margins and avoid the “winner’s curse” syndrome [59]. On the other hand, most client firms tend to rely on service level agreements (SLA) as a means to evaluate their satisfaction from outsourcing arrangements, which shifts the focus to the micromanagement of day-to-day performance with little attention to the long-term value from such partnerships. One CIO described the approach to evaluating satisfaction as the mean to assess the value of their outsourcing arrangements:

“We try to simplify it. It’s too much over the top. We have everything we outsourced on service level agreements and we have a pretty good matching system.”

Quantifying the indications provided by SLA, however, is also not straightforward: 37% of the CIOs and CFOs surveyed never tried to quantify the financial benefits from outsourcing arrangements. Another 20% of CIOs and CFOs had no idea whether this has ever been attempted in their organization. Of those CIOs and CFOs who did try to quantify the financial benefits from outsourcing arrangements, 43% of them were not confident about how returns were measured. One commented that:

“That is the problem. You know what it costs but you don’t really know what the value is.”

When asked: why have you not tried to quantify the financial contribution of your outsourcing arrangements? 51% of CIOs and CFOs said that these benefits were difficult to quantify, and 41% assumed that they were positive.

It is evident that since ITO and BPO are critical for the competitiveness of most firms, the role of the CIO and the *retained client organization* that encompasses in-house capabilities

766 required to manage the outsourcing relationships, develop vi- 821
 767 sion for business and functions, and lead architecture planning 822
 768 and design [4] are becoming important to achieving business 823
 769 objectives. Both parties are expected to act as connecting links 824
 770 between the outsourcer’s business strategy and the market, through 825
 771 a smooth execution of the sourcing strategy. It is imperative that 826
 772 the CIO can make a business case to the board and act as a 827
 773 change agent within the firm to achieve business transformation 828
 774 and innovation via outsourcing partnerships. However, accord- 829
 775 ing to our survey, 64% of the CFOs did not think that CIOs 830
 776 are successful in communicating the potential financial benefits 831
 777 from outsourcing arrangements. This would seem to question 832
 778 the maturity and sophistication of the retained organization. One 833
 779 CIO offered this reflection: 834

780 [. . .] in my network when I discuss with other CIOs and I ask them, 835
 781 “How are you doing on your business case?” they said, “What do 836
 782 you mean ‘business case’?.” I then say: “You need something to 837
 783 describe against a report. If you don’t start with a business case, if 838
 784 you don’t start with clear objectives, how are you going to report?” 839

785 The results of our survey and interviews show that some of 840
 786 the critical strategic benefits from outsourcing, such as business 841
 787 transformation and the ability to achieve a competitive edge are 842
 788 perceived by CFOs to be poorly communicated to the board by 843
 789 CIOs. The fact that many CIOs are not members of the executive 844
 790 board magnifies this problem. Put it simply, often the message 845
 791 that the CIO sends to the board through the CFO is “lost in 846
 792 translation.” 847

793 A. *Dynamic Nature of the Value and the Role of the CIO*

794 The results of the survey and the interviews with CIOs led 848
 795 to our first conclusion: *value should be perceived as a dynamic* 849
 796 *concept*. The desired value from an outsourcing arrangement set 850
 797 jointly by client and vendor at the start of the project is destined 851
 798 to change over time. Few firms are aware of this and even fewer 852
 799 take steps to mitigate this risk. If changes in value over the 853
 800 life of the outsourcing project are not acknowledged, tensions 854
 801 and disagreements will build up between the parties and will 855
 802 erode any benefit from the outsourcing arrangement. However, 856
 803 the dynamic nature of value does not mean that clients have 857
 804 the freedom to redefine their expectations autonomously. This 858
 805 needs to be a joint effort, in which the first step will be to develop 859
 806 mechanisms that will detect changes in value. Sensing mech- 860
 807 anisms should be supported by joint learning between client 861
 808 and vendor. The more opportunities there are for joint learning 862
 809 among client and vendor teams, the more likely that value as 863
 810 a dynamic concept can be monitored. The research found that 864
 811 value is most easily detected if outsourcing arrangements are 865
 812 based on relational value. This means that efforts will be made 866
 813 to develop the supply network relationships by responding to 867
 814 the changing nature of value. 868

815 The second conclusion is that many CIOs still do not “speak” 869
 816 the “business language.” Most of them are not executive board 870
 817 members, and many have emerged from the IT/IS ranks and 871
 818 often had little exposure and involvement in formulating the 872
 819 firm’s business strategy. It has been argued that the role of CIO 873
 820 has become less strategic since IT is no longer a source of com- 874

petitive advantage. However, since the mid-1990s, CIOs have 821
 been asked to lead outsourcing projects and transform the way 822
 that services are designed and delivered. Firm boundaries have 823
 been redefined and sources of innovation reconsidered. Clearly, 824
 nowadays the CIO is, if anything, more strategist than ever and 825
 its role within the firm is destined to grow. However, to cope 826
 with such changes CIOs need to learn. They need to learn the 827
 “business language” spoken at the executive board. They need 828
 to be able to formulate and argue a strong business case for 829
 an outsourcing arrangement, at the strategic, operational, and 830
 financial level. They need to learn to focus on business improve- 831
 ment processes rather than service improvement processes and 832
 on business transformation rather than IT improvements. Their 833
 position within the organization should be more central, with 834
 a direct influence on decisions made at the board level. A CIO 835
 then should become a central figure and a driving force in im- 836
 plementing the firm’s sourcing strategy. 837

The paper, “The sidelining of top IT executives in the gover- 838
 nance of outsourcing: antecedents, power struggles, and conse- 839
 quences” (by Chakarabarty and Whitten), in this special issue 840
 demonstrates the importance of understanding the dynamics 841
 between business executives and IT executives, as described 842
 earlier. The authors focus on the relative power of each execu- 843
 tive group and the implications for firm performance, arguing 844
 that business executives have more power in IT outsourcing 845
 decisions if firm’s financial performance has been poor and when 846
 the firm did not have a sizeable IT workforce. This situation, ac- 847
 cording to the authors, leads to poor firm performance. On the 848
 other hand, when power concerning IT outsourcing decisions 849
 lies with the IT executives, outsourcing performance is at best. 850

851 VI. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

852 Since 1995, there has been an increase in the number of papers 853
 854 published on the topic of outsourcing and offshoring. Clearly, 855
 856 academics and practitioners are taking a greater interest in the 857
 858 phenomenon since its impact across the entire firm value chain 859
 860 has become more obvious. Although several areas related to 861
 862 outsourcing and offshoring have been examined, we believe 863
 864 that there are opportunities to advance our understanding of 865
 866 this practice and its impact on organizations and societies. We 867
 868 suggest three themes that would be particularly fruitful research 869
 870 areas in the near future. 871

872 First, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been linked 873
 874 to outsourcing and offshoring, but it is unclear whether “green- 875
 876 ing” IT and applying CSR to outsourcing and offshoring projects 877
 878 results in competitive advantage for client firms. The evidence 879
 880 suggests that much of the CSR rhetoric and practice is geared to- 881
 882 ward cost reductions. Such observations call for further research 882
 883 to examine the strategic role that CSR plays in outsourcing and 883
 884 how CSR is implemented in IT and BPO projects. 884

885 Second, research should look at the management of and strate- 886
 887 gic approach to offshore captive centers [60]. Very few studies 887
 888 have examined this phenomenon despite its growing importance 888
 889 (e.g., [61]). In particular, the relationships between the parent 889
 890 firm and the captive center are not well understood. 890

Third, research on outsourcing tends to overlook innovation. Although outsourcing initially was focused on the software development and IT management function, there is an increase in the level of outsourcing of more core, high value knowledge-intensive activities that involve high degrees of innovation [62]. How innovation is achieved and by what means are central questions that should be investigated in the context of outsourcing. Understanding the impact of various sourcing models on innovation performance is another fruitful line of research.

As outsourcing evolves, we would anticipate that other issues will become high on the research agenda, including new sourcing models (e.g., Cloud Services), sophisticated engagement modes (e.g., multisourcing, bundled services), and outsourcing performance (a shift from focus on SLAs to measuring the value in its holistic sense). Within these broad themes there will be numerous opportunities to advance understanding and expand the body of literature on outsourcing and offshoring.

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