British identity and the German other

William F. Bertolette

Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, wberto1@tigers.lsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations

Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation


https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/2726

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
BRITISH IDENTITY
AND THE GERMAN OTHER

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of History

by

William F. Bertolette
B.A., California State University at Hayward, 1975
M.A., Louisiana State University, 2004
May 2012
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank the LSU History Department for supporting the completion of this work. I also wish to express my gratitude for the instructive guidance of my thesis committee: Drs. David F. Lindenfeld, Victor L. Stater and Meredith Veldman. Dr. Veldman deserves a special thanks for her editorial insights and recommendations concerning organization of the material.

W. F. B.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................................................................. ii

LIST OF TABLES.......................................................................................................................... v

LIST OF FIGURES.........................................................................................................................vi

ABSTRACT...................................................................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................................1

2 HISTORY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONAL IDENTITY.........................................................35
   National Cultures and Citizenship..........................................................................................39
   Recent Historiography on National Identity........................................................................47
   National Identity and the Brain.............................................................................................58
   The Illusion of National Character.......................................................................................63
   The Psychology of Stereotyping.........................................................................................67

3 BRITISHNESS, ENGLISHNESS AND GERMAN OTHERNESS.............................................. 75
   British and English Identity.................................................................................................76
   British/English Individualism and European Holism...........................................................87
   The Jewish Other in Europe and Britain.............................................................................92
   Temporal and Spatial Difference in British and German Identities.....................................102

4 EMPIRE, RACE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN...............................110
   Victorian Mentalities, National Myth and Empire...............................................................113
   Comparisons with Antiquity...............................................................................................118
   The Racial Argument..........................................................................................................125
   Conscious Stereotyping in the Nineteenth Century..........................................................137

5 STEREOTYPES OF OLD GERMANY.......................................................................................143
   The Moral Barbarian...........................................................................................................143
   The German Boor...............................................................................................................152
   The Pious/Godless German...............................................................................................159
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>NEW GERMANY: STEREOTYPES AND CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF GERMANY DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Unpolitical German</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Early Nationalism, German Students and Dueling</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Old German Passivity and Servility: 1830-1848</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unrevolutionary Germany: 1848</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bismarckian Germany</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Germany and the Old Stereotype</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>IMPERIAL RIVALRY AND DIPLOMATIC ANTAGONISM</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anglo-German Colonial Rivalry</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Rivalry</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Diplomatic Antagonism</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

1. Periodical Sources Used—Great Britain up to 1914.................................................................23

2. German Stereotype Context Categories......................................................................................29

3. Macnamara’s Racial Characteristics of Europeans.................................................................130
# LIST OF FIGURES

1. Periodical Peak Circulations................................................................. 26
2. Percentages of Stereotypes by Context.................................................... 29
3. Stereotypes by Context Over Time.......................................................... 30
4. Contextual Shift in the German Stereotype............................................. 31
5. “John Bull As Others See Him.”............................................................... 138
6. “From the Fatherland.” The German Michael......................................... 182
ABSTRACT

British identity evolved through conscious comparisons with foreigners as well as through the cultivation of indigenous social, economic and political institutions. The German other in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Britain, like the French other in previous centuries, provided a psychological path toward unity against a perceived common enemy. Because German stereotypes brought into sharp focus what the British believed themselves not to be, they provided a framework for defining Britishness beyond Britain’s own internal divisions of race, ethnicity, class, religion, gender and politics. Post-World War II devolution and European integration have since revived British internal national divisions.

The image of innocuous Old Germany as England’s “poor relation,” a backward cluster of feudal states, gave way during the nineteenth century to the stereotype of New Germany, Britain’s archenemy and imperial rival. After unification in 1871, German economic growth and imperial ambitions became hot topics for commentary in British journals. But the stereotypical “German Michael,” or rustic simpleton, and other images of passive Old Germany lingered on as a “straw man” for alarmists to dispel with New German stereotypes of aggressive militarism and Anglophobic nationalism. Some Germanophobes, however, and many Germanophiles, clung to older stereotypes as a form of escapism or wishful thinking, the former believing that national character deficiencies would foil German ambitions, the latter that German idealism and good sense would eventually resolve Anglo-German disputes.
The British entente with France in 1904, and Russia in 1907, ended more than a decade of Anglo-German alliance attempts. These missed opportunities were thwarted by mutual distrust, opposing geopolitical strategies, diplomatic maneuvering and, ultimately, naval rivalry. But national stereotypes in public media also contributed a cultural aspect to Anglo-German diplomatic antagonism. British journalists drew upon a rich heritage of German stereotypes, both for polemical argument and for entertaining a national self-image at the expense of the German other. Stereotypes also gained currency through pseudoscientific racial theories and ethnological hierarchies that constituted the nineteenth-century paradigm of innate national character. Because they encapsulate assumed national difference so effectively, stereotypes in print provide a useful perspective on the interface between national identity, public opinion and policy.
1. INTRODUCTION

The importance of othering in the formation of British identity has long been noted by historians. Linda Colley’s seminal work on the origins of Britishness dealt not only with the shared experiences of Protestantism, prosperity, monarchy and empire, but also emphatically with the construction of British identity in opposition to French culture, French Revolution and Napoleon.¹ Colley argued that Britishness arose not to supplant Welsh, Scottish or Irish identities but to consolidate a militant Protestant unity against Catholic France, from the beginning of the eighteenth century through the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Some historians have extended the trajectory for English cum British identity beyond that explored by Colley. Keith Robbins observed that the trope of the “elect” nation had combined English patriotism with Protestantism in opposition to imperial Catholic Spain during the sixteenth century.² And just as France eclipsed Spain to become the dominant continental power and Britain’s imperial arch rival by the mid-eighteenth century, France’s defeat by Prussia in 1871 made unified imperial Germany the new bogey. By then the ideals of liberty and good government had displaced Protestantism as mainstays of English/British identity, thanks in large part to the


Scientific Revolution and humanistic reinterpretations of scripture.\textsuperscript{3} Aligned with a traditional antipathy to centralized and arbitrary governments, the English/British model of parliamentary government, free trade and common law would inform the othering of all of these rival continental powers, regardless of religious affiliation.\textsuperscript{4} In the case of Germany, economic and military expansion and the perceived threat to British commercial and imperial supremacy overshadowed any supposed Anglo-German cultural, religious, dynastic or racial affinities. From the unification of Germany up to the formation of the European Union, the German other would provide for Britain in decline a contemporized version of the negative cohesiveness that the French other supplied for the forging of British unity at the dawn of the eighteenth century. F. M. L. Thompson illustrated the material dimensions of this continuity when he compared pre-World War I British alarmism with post-World War II “declinism,” both linked to hysteria concerning German economic and industrial advancement.\textsuperscript{5}

Anglo-German diplomatic estrangement during the late nineteenth century would also diminish residual Teutonism and mitigate British ethnic divisions in English eyes, a process already underway with influential cultural critic Matthew Arnold’s incorporation of Celtic and

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., 117. See also Krishnan Kumar, “‘Englishness’ and English National Identity,” in David Morley and Kevin Robins, eds., \textit{British Cultural Studies: Geography, Nationality, and Identity} (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 46-47.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
English literature in 1867 and his turn to Anglo-Saxonism from the Teutonism of his equally influential educator father, Thomas Arnold.⁶ Satirizing the wholesale conversion of English journals from Anglo-German to Anglo-Celtic affinity during World War I, a Scottish writer cited the “Hunnish” ancestry and imperialism of the fickle English whom he expected would eventually realign themselves with Germanism in accordance with the dictates of racial kinship, economic interest and faddish journalism.⁷ Given such explicitly multiethnic and utilitarian aspects of British identity, and with current trends toward devolution in mind, historians have debated the extent to which an outwardly directed Britishness superseded an ethnic and culturally-based Englishness and created an artificial and fragile civic unity. Krishnan Kumar, while defending Colley’s thesis that Britishness inspired loyalty like any national identity, nevertheless descried the late nineteenth-century rise of a separate racial and cultural English national identity.⁸ From the more mainstream point of view of those who argue an enduring fusion of Britishness and Englishness, Robin Cohen wrote that, in lieu of any “essential Britishness,” British/English identity took shape through interactions on six frontiers: with “the United States, Europe, the former white Dominions, the wider Commonwealth, the internal Celtic fringe and the body of ‘aliens’ seeking to acquire British citizenship.”⁹ Cohen’s reflection


on the inseparability of British/English self from peripheral other recalls Bernard Crick’s statement that Englishness must be seen as a relationship, not only in dealings and comparisons with foreigners but also in the self-stereotypes of individualism, gentleness and tolerance invoked in support of British governance despite occasional harsh policies. Crick had outlined a purely civic British identity, which reconciled democratic values and authoritarian colonial policies under the gloss of progress and a civilizing mission. But Crick also remarked the exportability of benign Englishness via the cult of “the gentleman” and the elevation of its corpus of clichés—good manners, openness, fairness, love of leisure, anti-intellectualism and acceptance of eccentricities—to the level of an exemplary social code.

Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Germany would provide a convenient counterfoil for the celebration of English/British social graces as well as self-defined traits such as political acumen. National stereotypes in literature and contemporary media offered reverse self images, anxiety-reducing comparisons that projected certain negative qualities onto the other. The “unpolitical” German stereotype, for example, could both reassure and justify British imperial pride dampened by relative industrial and military decline. Because the Germans had failed to develop successful colonies like the British, so went the logic, they should and would drop their dreams of expanding empire. Charles Sarolea, a Belgian by birth and Prussophobic head of the French Department in the University of Edinburgh, reiterated this familiar argument.


11 Ibid., see also 5, 97, 100, 109.
in his analysis of the “Anglo-German Problem,” written in 1912. German blindness to their own colonial deficiencies, their missed opportunities, their brutality toward native populations, their own “passive obedience” and lack of initiative, he contended, undermined Germany’s grievance that England had thwarted Germany’s “place in the sun.”12 But German othering operated on much more mundane levels as well in periodical literature, and not without paradoxes. Despite the usual stereotype of German political servility and passivity, for example, German servants could be seen as maddeningly obstinate and assertive of their customary rights. One lady writer complained that her decently educated but “hopelessly uncouth,” “incorrigibly dirty” and “loutish” German servants would gather after hours in doorways to flirt and gossip, in utter disregard of the inconvenience and nuisance to master and mistress.13 A constellation of such anti-German stereotypes, with all of their inherent contradictions, provided malleable props to British self-esteem in many different contexts.

The nineteenth-century British image of Germany took shape during an “era of uncertainty” in relation to sweeping political and industrial revolutions, nationalist wars and imperial rivalries.14 The consciousness of living in an age of transition, seen as beginning with


14The phrase was used by Samuel Hynes, The Edwardian Turn of Mind (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), viii. Walter E. Houghton, in his classic work, The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830-1870 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 96-97, also argued that the “secret yearning after certainty” or some dogma to replace, or revive, the ideal of progress emerged as the governing motif in a substantial body of Victorian literary, scientific and religious thought. These concerns followed upon unresolved spiritual crises generated by the scientific assault on religion and spread of agnosticism.
the French Revolution and lasting throughout the nineteenth century, generated a spectrum of emotional opinion ranging from wild optimism to deep, brooding pessimism.15 Even though the nineteenth century brought dramatic British commercial and imperial expansion, and a corresponding gradual improvement in living standards, rapid technological and social change spawned a persistent sense of dread which pervaded much of the commentary and art of the period, as if the pace of progress itself were leading civilization into the abyss.16 In addition to the internal philosophical concerns that troubled mid- and late-Victorian writers who sought to revive the tarnished ideals of reason, progress and morality in reaction to a new culture of materialism, Germany’s transformation under Prussian leadership from a collection of weak, relatively backward, agricultural kingdoms into the dominant military and industrial power on the Continent counted as a crucial factor in this growing angst. Bismarck’s aggressive diplomacy, which led to successive Prussian military victories over Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-1, created a united, autocratically governed German Empire, whose tariff-protected economy and cartel-driven industrial expansion, eventually surpassing Britain in steel production and chemicals, presented a new model of national efficiency that contradicted

15David Newsome, The Victorian World Picture: Perceptions and Introspections in an Age of Change (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 1-3, 88-89, 173, places the high-water mark of Victorian optimism at 1865, after which the thought of steady progress seemed unrealistic. At the other extreme, some individuals suffered an overwhelming pessimism or sense of grief, which could result in a prevalent condition characterized by mental paralysis known as mal du siècle or “neurosthenia.” See also Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 49, who regards the 1851 Crystal Palace Exhibition as the high point of British imperial exuberance.

16Newsome, Victorian World Picture, 37-38, 125, refers to John Martin’s painting, “The Last Judgement” (1853), as typifying the nostalgic or medievalist reaction against industry and change led by such notables as Matthew Arnold, John Ruskin, William Morris and others. Amidst other images of impending doom, the painting depicts a train plunging into an abyss.
the cherished Liberal tenets of representative government and free trade. Moreover, Germany
replaced France as the new “Bonapartist” regime in the center of Europe but lacked the political
affinities felt to exist between the English parliamentary system and the democratic republics of
France and the United States. New Germany increasingly threatened the Victorian anglocentric
world view, a perspective based on the paradigms of providence and the English model which
had been popularized in the historical and fictional works of Thomas Macaulay, Thomas Carlyle,
Charles Kingsley, Charles Dickens, William Makepeace Thackeray and others.

Uncertainties related to technological change and imperial rivalry represented only
surface features of yet another underlying moral and philosophical dilemma facing Victorian
Britons. Along with a fear of war, bloody revolution and recurring economic cycles of boom and

\[\text{Ibid., 166, 169, 172-73. See also Houghton, }\]
\[\text{Victorian Frame of Mind, 39, 44-45, and }\]
\[\text{G. M. Young, }\]
\[\text{Portrait of an Age, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 75.}\]

British approval of American economic strength and imperial dominance in the Western
Hemisphere, which contrasted sharply with the “Teutophobic” reaction to German economic
rivalry and imperial pretensions, was partly justified by the notion of Anglo-Saxon kinship and
political affinity.

Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993), 70-71, 74, treats
cultural imperialism as an integral component of national and social identity especially evident in
nineteenth-century British novels, where the often subtle, but ubiquitous, presence of the empire
incorporated references to the institutions of bourgeois society with a “departmental” view of the
world that placed London and metropolitan culture at the center of a greater, culturally inferior,
Britain. Bernard Porter’s valid critique of cultural imperialism among British working and
middle classes did not rule out a culture of imperialism among civil servants and the politically
influential upper classes. See The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in
 Britain (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). Patrick Brantlinger, Rule of
Darkness: British Literature and Imperialism, 1830-1914 (Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell
University Press, 1988), 11-12, 109, dates the origins of British cultural imperialism back to
Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719), or even William Shakespeare’s Tempest, and the legacy
of pastoral conversion fantasies of settlers civilizing natives. Later, the myth of providential
dark empire energized adventure tales and other literary forms as a vehicle for manly heroism or
missionary fulfillment.
bust, all of which kept a rein on optimism well into the century, the mid-Victorian decades marked a disenchantment with Enlightenment humanist ideals, such as the concepts of universal brotherhood and the perfectibility of man, that brought a hardening of social and racial attitudes.\textsuperscript{19} Several developments at home and abroad have been blamed for this demise of Liberal idealism. Disenchantment on the domestic front stemmed from the perceived failure of the Poor Laws and social unrest associated with Chartist agitation. Overseas, the Crimean War (1853-5) and Indian Mutiny (1857), with their widely publicized horrors and atrocities, shook a public accustomed to thirty-five years of relatively peaceful diplomacy, colonization and commercial expansion. In 1865 Governor Eyre’s brutal suppression of the Jamaican Rebellion won broad support as well as criticism, but by that time the failure of missionary expeditions and the deflation of exaggerated commercial expectations had already dispelled earlier Evangelical and Utilitarian optimism bred on the belief that non-Western cultures would readily adopt European ways, or that free trade would miraculously lead savages to civilization without the need for annexation and forceful repression.\textsuperscript{20} Pessimism regarding the moral foundations and future of the British empire thus grew not only with doubts about Britain’s capacity to sustain its lead in the face of foreign competition, which paradoxically produced a more stridently militant

\textsuperscript{19}Hyam, \textit{Britain’s Imperial Century}, 77-80, 89, 92, cites the Floggings Act (1863), the Prisons Act (1865), The Criminals Act and The Habitual Criminals Act (both 1869) as evidence of a tougher attitude toward social problems that undermined previous assumptions of innate human rationality and spelled the end of sentimentality and idealism based on Rousseau’s \textit{Social Contract}. This change depended in no small part on the polygenism of Christian Literalists and the “inherited prejudice” of ethnologists and anthropologists, many of whom misapplied Darwinian models to human society.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., 69, 73, 77. See also Brantlinger, \textit{Rule of Darkness}, 28, on the support among English intellectuals and clergy for harsh measures in Jamaica, and pp. 30-31, on the Liberal ideal of commerce as a civilizing “miracle.”
imperialism, but also with perceived discrepancies between the public's idealized view and the harsh realities of imperial rule. Imperial angst did not turn to “Little Englandism” in the main, or to any rational argument for the reform of either domestic or colonial economic, social and political inequities. Rather it meant coming to terms with “reality” through the acceptance of both domestic social class inequalities and overseas imperialism, and it strengthened distinctions based on social, racial and national stereotypes at the expense of more universal humanitarian doctrines. British imperialists often justified authoritarian rule abroad, ostensibly for strategic purposes, by resorting to demeaning stereotypes, as in propaganda opposed to Home Rule in 1886 which caricatured the Irish as lazy, childish, dirty, mischievous, ignorant, emotional, unstable, superstitious, lying and vengeful.

The power of stereotypes to shape and influence public opinion also derived from the fact that beneath concerns over moral decline and derailment of the engines of progress—commercial prosperity, social reform, and imperial preeminence—lay an inward obsession with social and national identity. Whether this identity crisis affected individuals on a personal level, as in the pressure to conform to romanticized social and sexual ideals, or disturbed their status-
consciousness as members of a larger group, it also heightened the tendency to draw distinctions based on class, nationality and race. If English intellectual culture from Francis Bacon, John Locke and Jeremy Bentham to John Stuart Mill and Charles Darwin had been defined as empirical, utilitarian, concrete and individualist, in contrast to continental metaphysics, philosophical abstraction and ideological politics, Victorian authoritarian conformism and hierarchical thinking in terms of nationality, morality, class and race could still prevail. Elie Halevy concluded in his classic history that England became a “country of voluntary obedience” to a moral authority established within the confluence of Evangelical and Utilitarian movements, an authority all the more powerful and dogmatic because welded to the causes of individual political freedom and social reform. G. M. Young also described the early Victorian decades as an “age of acquiescence,” of life accompanied by the sense “of being under a Code” and

24Patricia Anderson, *When Passion Reigned: Sex and the Victorians* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 60, 64, 67, 148, outlines the idealized connection between class status and sexuality shaped by romantic fiction, and the contradiction between the Victorian ideal of sexual fulfillment and the reality of unfulfilled lives, whether those of men striving to project the manly image of the Christian Gentleman, or socially and economically disadvantaged governesses, teachers and seamstresses inhibited by social propriety from legitimately expressing their passions. Hyam, *Britain’s Imperial Century*, 135-37, 375, refers to the sexual motivation of avid imperialists, seeking a break from inhibition through either sublimation or the “lure of black flesh,” which, along with proconsular ambition, provided a stimulus to imperial expansion.

25Kumar, “‘Englishness’,” 50. Paternalistic, authoritarian neo-feudalism had not been wholly consigned to the realm of ideology, however. The political tenacity of the landed aristocracy in Britain, their domination of the House of Lords, Foreign Office, diplomatic corps and high bureaucratic state and imperial positions, and their cooption of new wealth through induction into the peerage and assimilation into high society, has been noted by Arno J. Mayer in *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), 88-95.

characterized by a uniformity of artistic taste which itself provoked a movement toward deliberate exoticism.27 Young spoke of a society in which the conflict between professed religious beliefs, practical ideals and intellect bred a self-righteous, sometimes consciously hypocritical, conformism that granted undue authority to public opinion and moralistic doctrine.28

The unique association between Victorian social, political and economic thought and the ideal of “character,” with its evaluative connotations as both cause and desired goal of a model national and imperial system, suggests a moral anxiety about rapid social change as well as one psychological motive behind British assertions of superiority over foreigners.29 The prevailing evangelical frame of reference in pre- and early Victorian England which presumed a connection between morality and socio-economic success, and which survived in Gladstonian tenets linking providential reward and retribution with the necessity for a moral public policy, points to the strong religious component in conceptions of British national character as a pillar of empire.30 Popular imperialism further provided atavistic and socially regressive, authoritarian themes that served as a platform for ordering the world according to an elaborate racial and ethnic hierarchy

27Young, Portrait of an Age, 17, 154, 161-62. This assessment, of course, pertains to the “official” culture and excludes the underground pornographic press. Exoticism, in most cases, could be described as reserved by today’s standards. See also Hynes, Edwardian Turn of Mind, 138-68, on the sought-after liberation from Victorian restraints.

28Young, Portrait of an Age, 16, 167, 253. See also Houghton, Victorian Frame of Mind, 399.


with, of course, British Anglo-Saxons at the top. Imperialism also promoted a sense of national unity among members of a growing and increasingly striated middle class by subsuming class interests and status anxieties—what E. J. Hobsbawm has termed the “uncertainty of the bourgeoisie.” This nineteenth-century quest for social identity ranged in expression from plutocratic conspicuous consumption and aristocratization to petty-bourgeois differentiation from the working class through education, residence, lifestyle and sporting events. The “domestication” of imperialism served both to underscore the interdependency of imperial rule and British character, or selfhood, and to reinforce the idea of a providentially ordained imperial mission to establish and maintain cultural hegemony over the realm.

In an imperial age of conflicting values, cultural pessimism, pseudoscientific racism, moral anxiety and doubt, the Victorian national identity crisis left its imprint in ambiguous

31Brantlinger, Rule of Darkness, 33-35, concurs with Joseph Schumpeter's view of imperialism as cultural regression or social atavism, particularly in regard to revitalization of the fantasy of aristocratic authority as a sub-theme in Victorian adventure fiction. Examples include glorification of the warrior hero in the King Arthur legend and superimposition of the English gentleman on themes of racial and international rather than class conflict.

32The Age of Empire 1875-1914 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 170, 176, 181-84. Hobsbawm labels nationalism a petty-bourgeois movement because it afforded a collective identity, as defenders of the nation, preferable to an inferior class status. Patriotism, specifically reflected in the successful, non-compulsory military recruitment of middle-class youths during the Boer War, apparently compensated for social inferiority (pp. 160, 188-89).

33Said, Culture and Imperialism, 83, cites the connection in Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park between domestic tranquillity and West Indies plantation overlordship. The empire offered redemption for criminals as seen in Southy’s Botany Bay Eclogues (1794) and in Dickens’s Great Expectations (1860), but it also provided for self-justification through the projection of negative racial and ethnic stereotypes as noted in the work of Thackeray and the comic-heroic adventure novels of Captain Marryat. It is interesting to compare here the interconnection between the degeneration of the noble savage stereotype and the fictional hero’s regression from Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe to Kurtz, Joseph Conrad’s backsliding white savage in Heart of Darkness (1899). See Brantlinger, Rule of Darkness, 39, 50, 104-6, 111.
stereotypes of Germany and German culture. Carlyle and the mid-century Germanophiles, for example, looked to “pious” Germany as a beacon of traditional Christian-feudal ideals in contradiction to earlier condemnation of Germany as the source of atheistic biblical criticism and Jacobin sympathies. Later, rapidly developing Germany represented both a model of military, industrial and educational modernization and a menace to British security and imperial pre-eminence. Such contrasting perceptions of the Germans, most blatantly expressed in the divergence between Teutonism and more exclusively Anglo-Saxonist racial theories, also defined two British political schools, which Paul M. Kennedy has labeled Germanophile “idealists” and Germanophobe “realists.” These two opposing camps generally espoused anti-imperialist versus imperialist policies in their approach to international problems: idealists optimistically sought solutions through goodwill, diplomacy and free trade, whereas realists more pessimistically advocated fortification of the state, defense of national interests and protectionism. They also disagreed in their expectations as to whether Germany would evolve toward the English political and economic model or, as a corollary, whether an Anglo-German alliance could be based on cultural and racial “affinities.”

While this division generally mirrored the split between Liberal and Conservative, linking attitudes toward Germany with party affiliation remains problematical. To restate George

34In contrast to the traditional view of Germany as a bastion of conservatism and anti-Jacobin sentiment, the British reaction to German literature at the turn of the century expressed quite the opposite. The discrepancy will be dealt with in a discussion of early British attitudes toward German literature in chapter 5.

Dangerfield’s famous phrase, the “strange death of Liberal England” that came in the form of Liberal imperialism shattered both Little Englander and Germanophilic idealism from the Left.  

Dangerfield specifically referred to the British public’s self-indulgent release of inner tension through melodramatic scenarios of a German invasion:

\[\text{\ldots what could be more exciting than to gather all the political rages, all the class hatrads, all the fevers for spending and excitement and speed, which then seemed to hang like a haunted fog over England—to gather them and condense them into one huge shape and call it Germany?}^{37}\]

Nothing illustrates this internal conflict between imperialism and Liberal Germanophilia better than the political career of Joseph Chamberlain. Chamberlain began as a Radical reformer in the 1870's, split with Gladstone as a Liberal Unionist in 1886 over the issue of Irish Home Rule, and as a champion of imperial-social and tariff reform, became a lay participant in the “squalid argument” that galvanized Liberal and Free Trader opposition in 1903.  

As Colonial Secretary under Salisbury’s third Conservative ministry Chamberlain advocated an alliance with Germany in both 1898 and 1899, only to be rebuffed at home and abroad. In 1901-2 he wound up publicly trading insults with the German Chancellor, Bernard von Bülow, in a bitter exchange concerning British soldierly conduct during the Boer War that reverberated in the patriotic presses of both

\[\text{\ldots} \text{Hobsbawm, } \text{Age of Empire, } 189-90, \text{ argues that the phrase might be extended to include western Europe because imperialism generally undermined bourgeois liberalism.}^{36}\]

\[\text{\ldots } \text{The Strange Death of Liberal England, (New York: Capricorn Books, 1935), 119.}^{37}\]

\[\text{\ldots } \text{The Liberal reaction came in response to Chamberlain’s Glasgow speech of October 6, 1903 which implied that imperial preference would benefit England by keeping colonies at the status of non-industrial, primary producers. Cited in Bernard Šemmel, Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought 1895-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 93, in a discussion of Chamberlain’s transformation from Benthamite social reformer to imperialist tariff reformer.}^{38}\]
nations. The repeated failure of Anglo-German alliance attempts had prompted Chamberlain to favor, along with many Liberal Imperialists, an understanding with France and Russia rather than the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy. The Fabian Socialists, as muted imperialists and anti-Gladstonians, also presented an exception to the internationalist, Germanophile left in that they did not join Liberal attempts, such as the futile Haldane Mission in 1912, to improve Anglo-German relations.

Even taking into account the anomalies of Liberal and Social Imperialism, discrepancies in respect to attitudes toward Germany existed within opposing political parties. Long after 1871 Conservatives, in the Germanophilic tradition of Carlyle and Coleridge, found much to admire in staunch German monarchism, anti-individualism and state corporativism, while Liberal and Conservative imperialists alike espoused German, or Prussian, models of national efficiency, state interventionism and military readiness. Many Liberal Germanophiles, on the other hand, who at first distinguished between a “good,” scholarly, enterprising, moral Germany, and a “bad,” reactionary, Junker-dominated Prussia, became disenchanted with the Prussianization of

---

39 See Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), 239, 248-49. Chamberlain publicly objected to rumors of British atrocities during the South African war with the assertion that British troops acted no less honorably than Prussian soldiers at Sedan in 1870. Bülow compared Chamberlain’s remarks to “biting on granite” in a Reichstag speech calculated to win political support from the patriotic right, but which effectively scuttled further attempts at an Anglo-German understanding. See also G. P. Gooch, *Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft* (London: Longmans, Green, 1942), 64-65.

40 A. M. McBriar, *Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 1884-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 124-25, 135, discusses Fabian imperialism as defined by George Bernard Shaw citing his tract *Fabianism and the Empire* (London: Richards, 1900) and Fabian efforts to distinguish themselves from Jingoists. The pre-ordained failure of War Secretary Lord Haldane’s visit to Berlin has been read as a face-saving way of scuttling further attempts at forging an Anglo-German understanding. See Stephen J. Koss, *Lord Haldane: Scapegoat for Liberalism* (New York; London: Columbia University Press, 1969).
German statecraft and culture under Bismarck. These intra-party disparities tended to undermine the “idealist” position for several reasons: first, calls for emulating Germany, for the sake of competing with her, betrayed an intrinsic Germanophobia; second, old distinctions between the “two Germanies,” between stern, disciplined, autocratic Prussia and cosmopolitan, romantic, philosophical southern Germany, began to wane with the rise of imperialist and nationalist sentiments in Germany; third, colonial rivalry, events such as the kaiser’s inflammatory 1896 Kruger Telegram and increased German armaments all strengthened the Germanophobe argument; and fourth, an increasing perception of the breadth of German Anglophobia at the century’s end weakened Germanophile attempts to differentiate between the German people and the Hohenzollern regime. Kaiser Wilhelm II’s confused love/hate relationship with his English mother’s country and his indiscretions in the press constituted yet another byway complicating this maze of ambiguous opinion regarding Germany. Wilhelm’s volubility, and his unquenchable desire to reconcile his English sympathies with his autocratic Prussian heritage, and with his idea of popular Anglophobia in Germany, produced the infamous Daily Telegraph Affair, in which Wilhelm stated that he belonged to a select minority of

41Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 119.

42Kennedy, “Idealists and Realists,” 144-47. The Kaiser’s congratulatory telegram to South African President Paul Kruger for his defeat of the Jameson Raid perpetrated by English settlers in the Transvaal aroused British public indignation and brought recriminations against devious and meddlesome German tactics. The rebellion grew out of long-standing disputes between English immigrants, or Uitlanders, and the pro-German government in the Transvaal. Later, German pro-Boer sympathies, accelerated German naval construction, the two Moroccan Crises (1905 and 1911), and, in general, the political manipulation of anti-English sentiment in Germany confirmed Germanophobic opinion in Britain.
Anglophiles in an Anglophobic country. The published interview evoked reactions ranging from optimism to scathing ridicule in England, outrage and embarrassment in Germany.\textsuperscript{43}

In his comprehensive work on the subject of Anglo-German relations during the nineteenth century, Kennedy coined the phrase “Anglo-German antagonism” to describe the pervasive cultural and diplomatic antipathies that strained relations between the two countries from the time of Bismarck to the outbreak of World War I. Kennedy concluded that the diplomatic contest and cementing of alliances that preceded the war stemmed essentially from a clash of imperial aims: Britain wishing to preserve the status quo and her own imperial ascendency, Germany wanting to achieve a “place in the sun” at the expense of it. He pointed out, however, that although Bismarckian Germany’s transition from a “cluster of insignificant States under insignificant princelings” to a major power cast her into the role of England’s arch-rival, especially in view of Germany’s geographical proximity and the relative weakening of France and Russia during that period, the description of this developing conflict as an “antagonism” depended as well on cultural and ideological factors.\textsuperscript{44}


\textsuperscript{44}Kennedy, \textit{Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism}, 466, 470. The quote comes from a June 1914 address delivered by Lord Welby to the Royal Statistical Society, cited in Kennedy, 464.
The interface between public sentiment and government policy looms large in Kennedy’s analysis because of the practical impossibility, confronting decision-makers in either country, of separating diplomatic, colonial and military issues from the impact of popular nationalism and nationalist pressure groups in the domestic political arena. German chancellors consistently tapped strident nationalist Anglophobia to gain political advantages: Bismarck, for example, when he launched his program of colonial annexations in 1884, and Bülow when he sought public and Reichstag support for naval increases fifteen years later. British officials, on the other hand, encountered scathing media criticism whenever they attempted to cooperate with Germany. The 1902 Venezuelan blockade, for example, an attempt to exact payment for damages caused during revolution initiated by Britain in concert with Italy and Germany—in league with “the Goth and shameless Hun,” as Rudyard Kipling put it—had to be quickly abandoned due to public outrage and fears of American reprisal. Likewise, in 1903 an organized press campaign thwarted government attempts to arrange financing of the Baghdad Railway project in cooperation with Germany.\footnote{Ibid., 172, 240, 259, 261. The quotation comes from the last line of Kipling’s poem \textit{The Rowers}, published in the \textit{Times} at the height of the protest against the Venezuelan debacle. Chamberlain weighed in against the Baghdad Railway scheme shortly before unveiling his Tariff Reform proposals, which were aimed primarily at Germany.} The elemental contribution to the Anglo-German antagonism of foreign policy decisions that were driven or justified by their nationalist appeal underscores the importance of a news media where forms of expression could present an overgeneralized, distorted picture, lacking subtleties. In the case of the British periodical press, which is the focus of this study, Germanophobic sentiments could appear as blatant scaremongering, but more often found
expression in stereotypes which could subtly convey an anti-German message without disturbing journalistic decorum.\textsuperscript{46}

By the mid-1890s the monthly and weekly journals had evoked a portrait of Germany that was the antithesis of Britain in everything from society and the arts to economic, colonial and diplomatic methods. Beneath the facade of material similarity between two industrialized rival nations, and the superficial affinities of racial kinship, Protestantism, and royal family ties, writers exposed glaring cultural and political incongruities that fed the antagonism and deepened stereotyped divisions. From the British point of view, Germany lacked firmly-held convictions based on constitutionalism, freedom of speech and religion, individualism, toleration of dissenters and minorities, pacifism, a sense of “fair play,” free trade, and policies that can be summarized as “Gladstonism” versus “Bismarckism.” There were no British equivalents of an all-powerful Bismarck or threats of a \textit{coup d’état} in reaction to liberal movements from an unrepresentative autocracy; no anti-socialist laws or \textit{Kulturkampf} (Bismarck’s discriminatory laws against Catholics and expulsion of Jesuits) and nothing resembling the class of East Elbian Junkers or the extreme antisemitism and anticapitalism of the German peasantry and lower middle classes.\textsuperscript{47} Writers exploited these perceived differences in order to discredit German military, governmental or protectionist economic models, but they also perpetuated stereotypes


\textsuperscript{47}Kennedy, \textit{Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism}, 152-53.
that exaggerated facile distinctions configured more according to psychological needs than rational argument.

The division between idealist and realist, although it applies to British attitudes toward Germany from a policy perspective, tends to minimize the darker duality of nostalgic delusion versus national character assassination marking treatments of Germany in the periodical press. For this study, the adjectives “escapist” and “alarmist” more accurately convey the expression of contrasting views of Germany which frequently cut across party lines. Both British Conservatives and Liberals indulged in either “idealistic” wishful thinking or “realistic” scaremongering in their assessments of a yet little known and semi-mythical country. More importantly, stereotypes that accompanied and embodied those opinions reinforced a xenophobia not evident in statements of policy. In addition, the stereotypic maintenance of a psychological dichotomy elevating the “good” self at the expense of the “bad” or “inferior” other ensured that superficially polarized images of Germany did not cancel each other out. Supposed virtues thus

---


49 Sander L. Gilman, Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race and Madness (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 20. Gilman clarifies the common motivational basis behind both “negative” and “positive” stereotypes: “The former is that which we fear to become; the latter, that which we fear we cannot achieve.” The myth of the “dark Continent,” which exemplified a nineteenth-century transition away from an idealized “noble savage” stereotype to the characterization of subject races as merely savage, can be seen as a late phase in the centuries-long formation of a “superior” imperial self-image through the denigration of an “inferior” other. See Said, Culture and Imperialism, 106; Brantlinger, Rule of Darkness, 10-11, 174, 179; and Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, 349.
became implied weaknesses: the “philosophical” and “honest” German would be deemed “impractical” and “politically naive,” “thorough” German scholars decried as “plodding” and laborious, and disciplined German troops reviled as cowardly, lacking “pluck” or initiative. The fact that even sympathetic articles nearly always contained condescending or contemptuous stereotypes of Germans and German ways indicates the presence of a powerful psychological dynamic that shaped attitudes regardless of political position.

The links established by social psychologists between stereotypy, ethnocentrism, nationalism and authoritarianism have vindicated earlier concerns about the vulnerability of minds unversed in the concept of stereotypes.50 Walter Lippmann, who in 1922 first coined the term “stereotype” to refer to a psychological image, condemned the “oceans of loose talk about collective minds, national souls, and race psychology” prior to World War I that fostered, among other things, the pseudo-Darwinian assumption of inevitable war between competing nations.51 Stereotypes enabled such delusions, and most Victorian and Edwardian writers, unaware of or unconcerned about their prejudicial nature, voiced uninhibited opinions without the benefit of contemporary admonitions to the contrary. Stereotypes flourished in nineteenth-century Britain because they presented simple and seemingly concrete “historical” explanations that eliminated uncertainty. They afforded a temporary respite from anxiety through self-justifying national comparisons which often involved escapist allusions to antiquity, racial myth or faith in providence. In the case of Germany, stereotypes also sounded warnings to alarmists who

50 The classic studies establishing these connections can be found in T.W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950). Later studies have refined but not refuted these associations and concerns.

preferred to project their insecurities on an arch rival. Whether alarmist or escapist, the German stereotype became both a target and a touchstone of British self-worth.\textsuperscript{52}

This study explores the textual evidence of stereotypes in an effort to better understand British identity vis a vis the German other before World War I and how the perception of Anglo-German difference affected British foreign policy. It presents a historical survey of the evolution of the German stereotype, paying particular attention to stereotypes employed within the context of Anglo-German comparisons in periodical literature of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, during an era before television or widespread cinema and radio. The monthly and weekly reviews, concerned less with reporting news than with social commentary or digressions on national character, provide the richest source of stereotypes and thus constitute the bulk of primary sources used here (see table 1, pp. 23-25).\textsuperscript{53} Citations of non-fiction books, speeches, cartoons, and newspaper articles, mostly written between 1890 and 1914 appear largely in connection with specific issues or events. Because the reviews catered to readers from fairly exclusive social and educational backgrounds, with well-defined political views, they allow some limited quantification and comparison by political party and social class (see figure 1, p. 26).

This same exclusivity, however, precludes sweeping generalizations due to the fact that wealthy and well-educated readers of reviews and magazines made up only a fraction of the whole

\textsuperscript{52}Charles Copland Perry in “Germany as an Object Lesson,” \textit{Nineteenth Century} 45 (April 1899): 526, stated as much when he called Germany the “touchstone of our conduct.”

\textsuperscript{53}Essays, commentary and the occasional satire find inclusion here, but not an exhaustive look at the depiction of Germans in British fiction. This has been masterfully dealt with in Peter E. Firchow’s book, \textit{The Death of the German Cousin: Variations on a Literary Stereotype, 1890-1920} (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1986; London: Associated University Press, 1986).
TABLE 1

PERIODICAL SOURCES USED—GREAT BRITAIN UP TO 1914

L = Lower  
M = Middle  
U = Upper

A. NEWSPAPERS (London):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>POLITICAL ORIENTATION</th>
<th>PRICE</th>
<th>ANNUAL CIRCULATION (RELEVANT DATES)</th>
<th>READERSHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CLASS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarion</td>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>.5d</td>
<td>600,000 (1896-1907)</td>
<td>L-M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1d</td>
<td>69,000 (1890-1903)</td>
<td>L-UM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily News</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>.5d</td>
<td>140,000 (1904-1907)</td>
<td>L-UM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1d</td>
<td>300,000 (1888)</td>
<td>LM-M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morning Post</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>3d</td>
<td>3,500 (1871)</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pall Mall Gazette</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>2d</td>
<td>8,000 (1880-1890)</td>
<td>M-U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>1d</td>
<td>255,300 (1893)</td>
<td>LM-UM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>3d</td>
<td>40,000 (1890-1907)</td>
<td>M-U</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WEEKLY AND SUNDAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>POLITICAL ORIENTATION</th>
<th>PRICE</th>
<th>ANNUAL CIRCULATION (RELEVANT DATES)</th>
<th>READERSHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chamber's Journal</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5d</td>
<td>80,000 (peak)</td>
<td>LM-M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lloyd's Illustrated Weekly News</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1d</td>
<td>910,000 (1893)</td>
<td>L-LM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>3d</td>
<td>3,000 (1868)</td>
<td>UM-U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reynold's News</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>1d</td>
<td>300,000 (1881)</td>
<td>L-LM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday Review</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td>20,000 (1871)</td>
<td>M-U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spectator</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td>5,000 (1871)</td>
<td>M-UM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Dispatch</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1d</td>
<td>140,000 (1870)</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. POLITICAL MAGAZINES AND REVIEWS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>(DATE OF INCEPTION - CLOSE)</th>
<th>POLITICAL ORIENTATION</th>
<th>PRICE</th>
<th>ANNUAL CIRCULATION (RELEVANT DATES)</th>
<th>READERSHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Blackwood's</td>
<td>(1817)</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>2s6d</td>
<td>7,500 (1868)</td>
<td>UM-U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Contemporary Review</td>
<td>(1866)</td>
<td>Liberal Reformist</td>
<td>2s6d</td>
<td>4,000 (1870)</td>
<td>M-U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Edinburgh Review (Q)</td>
<td>(1802)</td>
<td>Liberal Unionist</td>
<td>6s</td>
<td>7,000 (1870)</td>
<td>UM-U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Woman's Review</td>
<td>(1866)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Fortnightly Review</td>
<td>(1865)</td>
<td>Liberal-Radical</td>
<td>2s6d</td>
<td>2,500 (1872)</td>
<td>M-U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Review</td>
<td>(1893-1898)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*MacMillan’s Monthly Review</td>
<td>(1859)</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1s</td>
<td>7,500 (1868)</td>
<td>M-U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*National Review</td>
<td>(1883)</td>
<td>Conservative Unionist</td>
<td>2s6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Century Review</td>
<td>(1897-1900)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Review</td>
<td>(1889-1897)</td>
<td></td>
<td>6d</td>
<td>39,000 (1889)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Nineteenth Century</td>
<td>(1877)</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>2s6d</td>
<td>10,000 (1880)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Review</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Quarterly Review (Q)</td>
<td>(1809)</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>6s</td>
<td>8,000 (1890)</td>
<td>UM-U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Westminster Review (Q)</td>
<td>(1824)</td>
<td>Liberal-Radical</td>
<td>2s6d</td>
<td>4,000 (1870)</td>
<td>M-U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World's Work (London ed.)</td>
<td>(1900)</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* most influential reviews  
(Q) = Quarterly

(TABLE 1 continued)

C. POPULAR AND GENERAL PERIODICALS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>DATE OF INCEPTION - CLOSE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>PRICE</th>
<th>ANNUAL CIRCULATION (RELEVANT DATES)</th>
<th>READERSHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CLASS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally Sloper's Half-Holiday</td>
<td>(1884)</td>
<td>Humor (ill.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borderland</td>
<td>(1893)</td>
<td>Occult</td>
<td>1s6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassell's Family Magazine</td>
<td>(1874)</td>
<td>Short articles (ill.)</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td>250,000 (1865)</td>
<td>LM-M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornhill</td>
<td>(1860)</td>
<td>Fiction and articles</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td>12,000 (1882)</td>
<td>M-U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Illustrated Magazine</td>
<td>(1883-1913)</td>
<td>Fiction and articles (ill.)</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentleman's Magazine</td>
<td>(1731)</td>
<td>Fiction and articles</td>
<td>1s</td>
<td>10,000 (1870)</td>
<td>M-U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Words</td>
<td>(1860)</td>
<td>Religious magazine (ill.)</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td>80,000 (1870)</td>
<td>LM-UM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmsworth's</td>
<td>(1898)</td>
<td>Articles and stories (ill.)</td>
<td>3.5d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idler (Q)</td>
<td>(1892-1911)</td>
<td>Light literature (ill.)</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladies' Realm</td>
<td>(1896)</td>
<td>Articles and fiction (ill.)</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure Hour</td>
<td>(1852-1905)</td>
<td>Religious magazine (ill.)</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td>80,000 (1870)</td>
<td>L-M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ludgate's</td>
<td>(1891-1901)</td>
<td>Fiction and articles (ill.)</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McClure's</td>
<td>(1893)</td>
<td>Fiction and articles (ill.)</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pall Mall Magazine</td>
<td>(1893)</td>
<td>General articles (ill.)</td>
<td>1s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson's Magazine</td>
<td>(1896)</td>
<td>Fiction and articles (ill.)</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punch</td>
<td>(1841)</td>
<td>Humor (ill.)</td>
<td>3d</td>
<td>40,000 (1870)</td>
<td>M-U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strand</td>
<td>(1891)</td>
<td>Light magazine (ill.)</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td>250,000 (1891)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday at Home</td>
<td>(1854)</td>
<td>Religious magazine (ill.)</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temple Bar</td>
<td>(1860)</td>
<td>Fiction and biography</td>
<td>1s</td>
<td>8,000 (1896)</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windsor Magazine</td>
<td>(1895)</td>
<td>Fiction and articles (ill.)</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman at Home</td>
<td>(1893)</td>
<td>Magazine for women (ill.)</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Woman</td>
<td>(1892)</td>
<td>Christian magazine (ill.)</td>
<td>3d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE 1. These graphs illustrate the circulation figures in table 1 (pp. 23-25). The pie charts indicate percentages of a total peak circulation representing 3,728,000 theoretical readers, according to estimated social class, education and politics.
society, albeit a very influential one. Another methodological problem arises in the question as to whether a majority of readers agreed with, or merely tolerated, a writer’s views.\textsuperscript{54}

The problem of exclusivity can be partially addressed by the correspondence between key themes in the more select journals and those found in mass-circulation newspapers established after 1855. Re-circulation and republication of many of the more expensive “serious” journals also somewhat mitigates this class imbalance in readership.\textsuperscript{55} Unfortunately, neither cheap dailies nor official Labour Party publications can be relied upon for an accurate assessment of working-class attitudes. A case in point, Robert Blatchford’s \textit{Clarion}, the most widely read Socialist journal before the war, exhibited a strong anti-German bias in contrast to the international, anti-Jingoist and generally Germanophilic tone adopted by Labour.\textsuperscript{56} Labour Party leaders themselves apparently suffered a kind of schizophrenia, idealizing the German Social

\textsuperscript{54}The graph on page 26 (Figure 1) shows the sheer proliferation of small-circulation periodicals, geared to middle- and upper-class readers of good education, in which the more extreme negative variations of the stereotype appear. Lord Northcliffe’s \textit{Daily Mail} stands as a notable exception to the usually benign and bland fare served up by the large circulation periodicals.

\textsuperscript{55}Richard D. Altick, \textit{The English Common Reader: A Social History of the Mass Reading Public 1800-1900} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix edition, 1963), 359, mentions as serious (i.e. not entertainment) journals the \textit{Fortnightly Review} (1865-1959), \textit{Contemporary Review} (1866-\textit{\textsuperscript{\textdagger}}, and \textit{Nineteenth Century} (1877-1950). Based on information in the \textit{Wellesley Index} regarding stature and consistency of subject matter, the list should include the following titles (inclusive of name changes): \textit{Blackwood's} (1817-1980), \textit{Edinburgh Review} (1802-1929), \textit{Macmillan's} (1859-1907), \textit{National Review} (1883-1950), \textit{Quarterly Review} (1809-1967), and \textit{Westminster Review} (1824-1914). Many articles from these journals were republished, critiqued or summarized in W. T. Stead's \textit{Review of Reviews} (1890-1936) which claimed a readership of 150,000 in its first year.

Democratic Party as a model of organizational efficiency while condemning, or at least dismissing, Marxist dogmatism and utopian radicalism as a necessary evil under the *Kaiserreich*.\footnote{See Stefan Berger, “Between efficiency and ‘Prussianism’: stereotypes and the perception of the German Social Democrats by the British Labour Party, 1900-1920,” in Rainer Emig, ed., *Stereotypes in Contemporary Anglo-German Relations* (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000), 178, 182, who notes the repercussions of these stereotypes on British Labour Party policy before and during the war.} As to the question of consensus, the sheer frequency and persistence of certain themes and images dispels some uncertainty about what appealed to readers, whether specific stereotypes recurred within a given periodical or obtained broad currency in a variety of magazines. Stereotypes themselves constituted a form of language or code that, regardless of a writer’s position on a particular issue, performed the task of simplifying and conveying information replete with value judgements and prejudices.

The ubiquity of stereotypes that defined all facets of German life and culture, from politics and business to society, religion and the arts, allows for their classification under broad contextual categories derived from the source material in reference to specific issues, rivalries and comparisons that represented the general body of British opinion (see table 2, p. 29, and figures 2-4, pp. 29-31). This arbitrary categorization, however, should not obscure the interconnection between integral components making up the German character as portrayed in British periodicals. A series of stereotypes could serve collectively to reinforce the argument, for example, that a country of unpolitical Bürghers, impractical theorists and small-minded shopkeepers had no capacity for administering a great empire (and, therefore, why should it try?). Similarly, accusations of unscrupulousness or Anglophobic intent crept into various surveys of German commercial, colonial or diplomatic pretensions. Stereotypical traits also overlapped
TABLE 2

GERMAN STEREOTYPE CONTEXT CATEGORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture/Race</th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Empire/Colonies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>German Arms</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Boer War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparisons</td>
<td>Naval Rivalry</td>
<td>Economic Rival</td>
<td>Colonial Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture in General</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Income</td>
<td>Colonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy</td>
<td>Press Wars</td>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>Explorers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity</td>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>Merchandise</td>
<td>German Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Professions</td>
<td>Myths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td></td>
<td>Taxation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trade Policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trade Practices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Character</th>
<th>National Figures</th>
<th>Politics/Government</th>
<th>Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Character</td>
<td>Literary</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Domestic Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Traits</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>German Politics</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philosophical</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Fashion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Gatherings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Royalty</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Habits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Manners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Press</td>
<td>Romance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rural Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sexuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Life</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Percentages of Stereotypes by Context**

FIGURE 2. A chart based on the incidence of stereotypes counted in the periodical sources used (magazines only) and sorted by context.
FIGURE 3. Contextual shift in stereotypes over time based on the periodical sources used (magazines only). This chart should not be taken as an exhaustive survey for the entire time period, although it does accurately reflect the 1890s.
FIGURE 4. These rough tabulations show an increase in political stereotypes after 1848, and an emphasis on national figures with the elevation of Bismarck to the German Chancellorship. Likewise, the subjects of colonial expansion, diplomacy and economy became significant categories for stereotyping after 1871. The charts show the relative incidence of stereotyping within the designated subject categories in the periodical sources used (magazines only).
contextual boundaries in the case of separately targeted groups, such as German professors, peasants, Junkers or clerks, who were represented as possessing undesirable qualities endemic to the entire German “race.” Certain stereotypical images, like the rustic German Michael, the philosophically speculative German or the German bully, also transcended narrow definitions to act as powerful symbols of Anglo-German difference. While contextual emphasis clearly shifted over time in relation to events, stereotypes remained remarkably consistent, only taking on new forms with the emergence of “New Germany.” The strong pull of continuity, however, ensured the inevitable comparison, usually negative, of these newer images with older, time-honored stereotypes of national character.

The printed evidence of stereotypes represents a point at which the investigation of subjective and objective realities come together, a nexus between psychology and history. Although the two disciplines seem to pursue opposite ends—psychology looking for subconscious motives using case histories, history trying to avoid speculation about subconscious motivation by discerning mentalities from historical records—an understanding of the psychology behind stereotypes can clarify their historical significance as more than mere sources of amusement. A further methodological difference between psycho-historical research and histories of sociological phenomena lies in the distinction between individually held and consensual or “cultural” stereotypes. The present study deals with stereotypes in print and visual media and only indirectly with the way individuals adapted them according to their own


personalities. Evaluating the historical significance of the attitudes and values represented by these mental icons, without attempting to fathom the personal motivations of a generation of long-deceased writers, therefore requires some reference to the insights of identity theory. Some discussion of British historical memory, national myth and recurring themes—the canvas upon which late and post-Victorian images of Germany were painted—will also prove useful in understanding how national distinctions tended to cast Germany as Britain’s modern opposite and arch nemesis.

The following chapters move from the general to the specific. Chapter 2 traces the historiography of national identity and citizenship laws as well as psychological theory behind group identification and stereotyping. Chapter 3 deals with the formation of modern British and English identity and cultural factors differentiating Britain from modern Europe, and Germany in particular, on matters involving individualism, the treatment of Jews, historical memory and geopolitical orientation. The chapter closes with a discussion and examples of conscious stereotyping by British writers in the nineteenth century, how a few intuited the cultural and psychological dynamics affecting perception of self and other on a national level but indulged in stereotyping just the same. Chapter 4 delves into prevailing national, imperial and racial myth in Victorian/Edwardian Britain and significant themes that underscored the providential uniqueness of Britons in contrast to Europeans and Germans in particular. Chapter 5 focuses specifically on the origins and persistence of German stereotypes from ancient times into the modern era and how images of Old Germany colored British reactions to German cultural developments. Chapter 6 concerns the staying power of the “unpolitical German” stereotype through Germany’s transition to a politically unified state under Prussian leadership, and how the coexistence of
innocuous Old German stereotypes and those of a menacing New German rival respectively shaped escapist or alarmist perspectives of British commentators. Chapter 7 explores ways in which contrasting Anglo-German identities and imperial rivalries affected Anglo-German relations before and after World War I. The dissertation concludes with some remarks on the significance of German othering in post-imperial, post-World War II Britain and how a century of Anglo-German antagonism continues to resonate in British identity and European politics. Within the evolutionary cycle of British national identity, from the union of Britain in 1707 to present trends toward devolution, the counter identity of the German other represents the latest phase. What develops from here will surely provide a continuing case study for scholars of national identity.
2. HISTORY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Historians have wrestled with the question of national identity for many decades, even though terminology has changed. References to “national character” have fallen out of favor, largely because the phrase conjures up unwonted associations with nineteenth-century stereotypes of innate and unchangeable national difference.¹ “National identity” avoids the suggestion of preordained traits or deterministic classification schemes while still conveying the reflexive sense of individual selfhood as well as group consensus about what constitutes nationhood. And though national identity clearly differs from deliberate nationalism, and implies neither patriotism nor chauvinism, the connection between the two concepts has engendered a chicken-and-egg debate among historians. Did national identity in some form preexist modern nation-states and nationalism, or did it have to be invented after their creation? Notwithstanding this ongoing controversy between so-called perennialists and modernists, the fictive nature of both national identity and nationalism goes virtually unchallenged.² Nor does anyone deny that

¹An example of “character” used as a virtual synonym for identity can be found in Charles Royster’s A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783 (New York: Norton, 1981). The author discusses American providentialism and overconfidence in military potential that worked to the detriment of logistical and monetary considerations during the American Revolution (and arguably still does in America’s wars abroad).

²Perennialism allows for continuity between modern conceptions of nationality and older references to nations as distinct breeds or races of people associated with particular territories, and it stresses the recurring psychological need for group identification in different historical contexts. Perennialism differs from primordialism in its lack of insistence upon an organic
these pervasive constructs have changed the world for both good and ill, because the collective fictions of nationalism and imperialism have indeed wrought, in Tony Judt’s words, “significant material consequences.” Nationality and nationalism can perhaps best be seen as social and political adaptations within the paradigm shift of rising modern nation-states. They served as ideologically neutral conduits of loyalty which could be exploited for the creation of both liberal democratic and authoritarian regimes. The parameters of national identity within particular historical contexts, therefore, should tell us something about attitudes and motivations behind both national movements and international conflicts.

The proverbial optical metaphor, “through a glass darkly,” has characterized pathways and obstacles to viewing past mentalities. Historians have relied on the long view in order to determine the roots of national identity and nationalism, and to compare outcomes in different places and times. In this regard, the two broad schools already mentioned differ more in emphasis than in substance. Modernists, including Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and John Breuilly among others, have postulated the rise of nationalism as a kind of surrogate religion which prompted the need for invented traditions. They have insisted that the shared culture of modern nationhood must be understood as structurally related to the modern industrial state and inseparable from modern institutions and developments such as mass literacy, mass


communications, mass education and mass politics. Yet even those who dispute a strictly modern constructionist view agree with these contextual arguments. One of the strongest critiques of the modernist position, however, centers around the question of “affective continuity”: how did populations so easily transfer loyalties to a new conception of nationality, and why did they so readily accept invented traditions? Anthony D. Smith, a foremost scholar of national identity and self-proclaimed ethnosymbolist, answers this question with the observation that much modern “invented” tradition really should be considered a “reinterpretation of pre-existing cultural motifs” and a “reconstruction of earlier ethnic ties and sentiments.”

In recognition of the “shared myths, memories, symbols, values and traditions” that identify a historic homeland, Smith has emphasized the role of ethnoreligious symbolism and linkages between the formation of national identity and ethnic community that preceded the rise of ideological or political nationalism.

The argument for precursors of modern nationalism has also prompted Tom Garvin to criticize Gellner’s modernist thesis for giving short shrift to older traditions of collective identity “still ‘knocking around’ in our modern cultures.” These “ancestral cultural ghosts,” he admonished, while pointing to the close ties between Islamic tradition and Iranian nationalism,

---

4 Key works include: Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, New Perspectives on the Past (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); E. J. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition, Past and Present Publications (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), in which Hugh Trevor-Roper exposes the literally fabricated tradition of Scottish clan tartans (pp. 23, 30); and John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (New York: St. Martin’s, 1982).


“have a life of their own and can dictate the form of the succeeding nationalist identity.”

Clifford Geertz had similarly drawn attention to the problematic clash between new “civic” nationalisms and “primordial attachments” in African and Asian states, suggesting that leaders seek to domesticate these cultural “givens” rather than belittle or deny them.

These warnings about conflicting elements within national identity echo the classic work of Hans Kohn, who in 1944 contrasted a Western European civic-territorial national identity with a more virulent Eastern European nationalism based on an organic conception of common culture and ethnicity. Civic nationalism, propelled forward by an empowered bourgeoisie in both England and France, Kohn wrote, extolled individual liberty and universal rights through common laws, rational doctrines of citizenship and defined boundaries. Ethnonationalism, orchestrated from above by semi-feudal aristocracies, sought legitimacy in ancient traditions and nebulous conceptions of the soul of the people or a national mission in conscious opposition to western ideals. Kohn cited the examples of German Volksgeist and Russian Messianism.

Kohn also introduced the theme of an ancient “national idea” in the identification by Hebrews and Greeks with a “cultural mission” and with societal frameworks more egalitarian.

---


8Interpretation of Cultures, 259, 277. See also Smith, Cultural Foundations, 9.

and enduring than the Persian, Egyptian or other civilizations of kings and priests. Kohn noted with some irony, bred cosmopolitan and universalist ideas via the Greek Sophists and Stoics and the Judeo-Christian Old and New Testaments. Kohn further distinguished Greek visual/spatial cultural and racial unity from Jewish audio/temporal conceptions of a calling or historical mission. From these two ancient spatial and temporal models, certain elements of modern national identity can be traced: the “us” versus “them” mentality reflecting Greek denigration of barbarians, as well as the citizen’s duty to state or polis, and the Hebrew trope of the “chosen people” with a national history and covenant with God for a providential future. Kohn cited, as an example of the latter, the early modern revolutionary Puritan self-identification with Hebraic ideals, which became a metaphoric expression of English political and religious liberties. Poet and polemicist John Milton considered his “sacred task” the writing of political treatises advocating the liberty of unlicensed printing and the fundamental equality of men, including the right to depose tyrants.

**National Cultures and Citizenship**

In 1882 French philosopher Ernest Renan delivered a famous lecture entitled “What is a Nation?” in which he warned against the dangers of confounding nation and race and the

---


11 Ibid., 47-49, 56, 59. Kohn specifies the books of Isaiah and Matthew.

12 Ibid., 30-37, 50-53.

13 Ibid., 168-170. Kohn refers to Milton’s works respectively entitled *Areopagitica* (1644) and *Defense of the People of England, concerning their right to call to account kings and magistrates and after due conviction to depose and put them to death* (1650).
supposed “right to take back the scattered members of the Germanic family,” a pointed allusion to the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871.\textsuperscript{14} Renan asserted place and history as the main criteria for nationality in opposition to the ethnolinguistic determinism of German writers, notably nationalist historian Heinrich von Treitschke who sought to legitimate German occupation of former French territory on that basis. Treitschke’s argument coopted elements of the organic tradition built upon Johann Gottfried von Herder’s definition of nations as historically continuous and autonomous ethnic, linguistic and cultural communities. But while Herder’s defense of cultural pluralism and relativism did not preclude his own cosmopolitan, humanitarian and pacifist Enlightenment values, later writers adopted a more chauvinistic tone.\textsuperscript{15} In particular, Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s nationalistic and antisemitic \textit{Addresses to the German Nation} (1807-8), written and delivered under the pall of French occupation, denigrated “neo-Latin” European countries that had inherited the dead language and corrupt culture of Rome. Fichte extolled German language and culture for reflecting the “living spirit” of a people and wrote that Germans alone, as the original Teutonic people described by the Roman historian Tacitus in 98 CE, “had retained all the virtues of which their country had formerly been the


\textsuperscript{15}Isaiah Berlin, \textit{Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas} (New York: Viking, 1976), 156-58, refused to label Herder a revolutionary-turned-reactionary patriot/romantic irrationalist according to a commonly perceived German response to the Jacobin Terror and Napoleonic wars. Berlin asked ironically, “Was not this the path pursued by Fichte (above all Fichte), Görres, Novalis and the Schlegels, Schleiermacher and Tieck, Gentz and Schelling, and to some degree even by the great libertarian Schiller?”
home—loyalty, uprightness, honour, and simplicity.” In Fichte’s opinion a true German looked beyond appearances to the essence of being, believed in “the eternal progress of our race” and would fight to the death not for constitution or laws but for love of the fatherland and “the devouring flame of higher patriotism.”

Although Fichte certainly drew from Herder his antipathy for dead and distant cultures, and probably his contempt for Jews as an alien and parasitic race, and though he seconded Herder’s disgust at the imitation of French culture in Germany, Fichte’s nationalism marked a clear departure from Enlightenment political ideals and what Isaiah Berlin called Herder’s own “peculiar brand of universalism.” While Herder criticized the ranking of cultures according to a single universal standard as an abuse linked to political elitism and the suppression of organic cultural development, he never abandoned Enlightenment optimism about progress toward overarching humanitarian values. Fichte, on the other hand, politicized organicism and, in his

---


17 Ibid., 111-12, 125, 141.

18 Vico and Herder, 157, 178, 182. Berlin tended to dismiss Herder’s Eurocentric racism as typical of his age rather than a contradiction to his general humanism, but Herder’s ideal of humanity and progress, as Cedric Dover had earlier argued, tended to disparage non-European beliefs. Herder’s conception of environmental adaptation specifically disadvantaged Africans and Jews with the respective assumptions of a primitive homeland or none at all. See “The Racial Philosophy of Johann Herder,” The British Journal of Sociology 3, no. 2 (June, 1952): 124-133.

rejection of perfectibility and a hypothetical golden age, sought to turn Enlightenment universalism on its head by claiming for Germans alone the true path toward “becoming.”

For Berlin, this shift marked the dramatic contrast between a benign Counter-Enlightenment that envisioned cultural pluralism within the framework of a basic universal morality and a far more subjectivist and relativist Romanticism that postulated self-created moral values and the reforming of nature and society through individual and collective will. Roger Hausheer, referring to Berlin’s work on the roots of Romanticism and the central role of Fichte in this transition, wrote “his [Fichte’s] voluntarist philosophy of the absolute ego that creates literally everything inaugurated an epoch,” and “Fichte’s image of man as a demiurge inspired Carlyle and Nietzsche and had a fateful impact on the ideologies of Fascism and National Socialism.”

Hausheer credited Berlin not only for differentiating Herder’s Counter-Enlightenment from later Romantic reaction but also for recognizing Herder’s prescient conception of the individual’s need for self-identification and expression within a historical community. From this perspective, the Romantic revolt exalted Herder’s emphasis on “belonging” into a politicized conception of

---


22 “Enlightening the Enlightenment,” 45-46. The disruption of community through imperial conquest and rapid technological change has triggered, in Hausheer’s words, “those pathological convulsions of national self-awareness that now scar the entire globe.”
national character in reaction to centuries of French domination culminating in the Napoleonic Wars and invasion of German territory.

The significance of Berlin’s Enlightenment/Counter-Enlightenment dialectic for understanding modern nationalism and national identity arises from efforts to gain perspective on the relative forces of universal reason and cultural tradition. The three major figures in Berlin’s schema—Giambattista Vico, Johann Georg Hamann and Herder—countered (or complemented) Enlightenment monism and what they considered reductionist social theory based on natural law with a more holistic and empirical acknowledgment of cultural pluralism.23 In contrast to a mechanistic view of human reason gradually emerging triumphant through trial and error from the tumult of instinct and passions, labeled “springs of human action” by Scottish philosopher David Hume, Vico contended that mythic traditions and customs of “principled” behavior governed both reason and instinct in ways discernable through a “common mental language” underlying cultural diversity.24 Vico and Herder, pioneers of anthropological historicism, devised methodologies analogous to Newtonian mechanics yet appropriate to their relativist orientation: Vico in his intuitive search for “principles of humanity” and Herder in his evaluation of cultures through their own criteria. Herder’s Counter-Enlightenment critique must be distinguished from anti-Enlightenment concerns as much as from the Romantic movement. His protest against the “tyranny of reason” and the “brutally efficient state” really comprised part of


the Enlightenment itself and cannot be classed with anti-rational polemics for established religion or divine-right monarchy.\textsuperscript{25} Frederick Beiser writes that Herder continually leaned toward an all-embracing humanitarian philosophy in his attempts to reconcile the cross-currents of \textit{Aufklärung} and \textit{Sturm und Drang}, respectively represented by his two mentors, Kant and Hamann.\textsuperscript{26} He adopted Hamann’s thesis on the irreducibility of life as a corrective against excessive generalization or mechanistic abstraction, but essentially accepted Kant’s naturalism and the rational principle in explaining laws governing the universe.\textsuperscript{27}

Herder’s conditional cultural relativism becomes important for nationalism and national identity through the temporal/spatial paradox that arises in his separation of cultural nation from political state. Herder resolved for himself the inherent discrepancy between cultural autonomy and a desired evolution toward humanistic political goals with the idea of relative progress, and his populism and pluralism remained essentially democratic and egalitarian.\textsuperscript{28} But because Herder conceived of nationalism as purely cultural within the framework of Enlightenment

\textsuperscript{25}See Darrin M. McMahon, “The RealCounter-Enlightenment: The Case of France,” in Mali and Wokler, 97-98, 108. Mark Lilla advances the idea that reaction and critique have mingled in an “eternal Counter-Enlightenment” from Socrates to Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant, revolving around the relation of reason to morality, the sacred and political authority. See “What Is Counter-Enlightenment?” Mali and Wokler, 11.

\textsuperscript{26}Beiser, 191-94.

\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., 193, 196. As an empiricist, Herder rejected Kant’s categorization of \textit{a priori} transcendent human faculties (i.g., reason, will, morality) distinct from natural instincts and the struggle for survival. See also Berlin, 164, 174.

\textsuperscript{28}See Beiser, 208-9, on Herder’s attempted resolution of the relativist/humanist paradox. Beiser, 211-15, outlines a strain of anarcho-socialism in Herder’s insistence that a government’s duty to educate should in no way impinge upon unfettered individual self-development within a locality or culture.
humanism, he did not fully consider the potentially radical implications of incommensurable culture and ethical relativism in the case of aggressive political nationalism or in troubled relations between states. Of course, political state and cultural nation have not stayed separate in the real world, at least since the rise of the modern state with nationalism as a surrogate religion. Nevertheless, Herder did vigorously condemn three great myths, later sins, of political nationalism: the notion of cultural superiority or a dominant model; the escapist vogue of historical myth, such as those entertained in the supposed ancient heritage of French classicism or the pedigree of German purity and heroism against Rome; and lastly, any uniformitarian idea of progress.

While the Enlightenment/Counter-Enlightenment dialectic remained unresolved with the onset of nationalism, the civic/organic dichotomy has left its imprint in nationality laws founded respectively on *jus soli* (right of soil), emphasizing place of birth, and *jus sanguinus* (right of blood), based on parental citizenship by descent. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the former became a hallmark of French citizenship, made even more inclusive with the addition of *jus sanguinus*; the latter became the sole determinant of a more exclusionary German citizenship at birth. Rogers Brubaker attributed this divergence to “particular cultural idioms” expressed through state policy within specific historical and institutional contexts. Brubaker argued that existing nationality laws remained unchanged, even amidst what became virtually

29 Berlin, 184-5, 209-11.

30 Ibid., 186-90.

identical patterns of immigration, because they conformed with deeply ingrained traditions of “elite national self-understanding.” Over the long term, discounting the xenophobic phase of the Jacobin revolution, the French adhered to a republican tradition of inclusion in contrast to the German self-representation of cultural homogeneity essentially closed to multicultural citizenship—the distinction between a French Staatsnation and a German Kulturnation observed by German historian Friedrich Meinecke as early as 1908. Subsequent challenges to Brubaker’s thesis derive from the difficulty in differentiating a politics of identity from a politics of interest behind the veil of citizenship laws, yet the historical continuity of French and German naturalization policies does suggest a division between political and cultural perspectives on national identity. The bipolarity between complete assimilation and exclusion might best be seen as a continuum that requires varying degrees of conformity to a political or cultural ideal, a view that makes Hans Kohn’s “two kinds” of national identity a singular sociological phenomenon with organic/voluntarist or ethnic/civic variations. These dualities in fact frame


33See Annemarie Sammartino, “After Brubaker: Citizenship in Modern Germany, 1848 to Today,” German History 27, no. 4 (2009): 583-99, a survey of recent work by Andreas Fahrmeir, Dieter Gosewinkel, Joyce Marie Mushaben, Eli Nathans, Oliver Trevisiol. See esp. 585-89, on the questionable correlation between parental citizenship and ethnic background, the patchwork quality of immigration laws, the primacy of residency in many localities and the fact that either patriarchal privilege in claiming illegitimate children or willingness to serve in the military could trump ethnic affiliation.

34Smith, Nationalism, 40-42, remarks that the situation of Jews within the early French Republic, where individual rights trumped ethno-religious practices, presaged more recent
partisan differences *within* nations which can become transformed into stereotyped differences *between* nations.

**Recent Historiography on National Identity**

Perspectives on national identity have shifted considerably since the 1940s. Raymond Grew, surveying the long historiography of national identity in 1986, specifically praised studies of nationalism by Carlton Hayes, Hans Kohn and their followers as analytical departures from national character questionnaires and the self-mythologizing national histories of preceding generations. He also credited later comparative studies for conceiving the formation of national identity as part of a universal historical process that necessarily depends upon a territorial state, or the longing for one, and that requires an evaluation of national identity in terms of international relations as well as internal politics.\(^{35}\) The comparative approach, in Grew’s view, entailed consideration of both self-consciously propagandistic identity constructions and less conscious, event-driven formulations of national identity. By the mid-1980s historians of the modernist school and their critics had established, according to Grew, the following key points: the dual impetus driving national identity in the merger of individual motivations to reap the political and economic rewards of citizenship with the top-down interests of the state in problems with multiculturalism, such as the ban on Islamic face veils.

cultivating citizens and patriots; the easy association of national identity with political ideologies and motives, authoritarian or libertarian; and the crucial role of media and cultural venues, from academic literature and opera houses to daily newspapers and music halls, in shaping national identity. Grew saw the need for more work on the modern state’s claim to neutrality as an incentive to patriotism and on the interfaces between “official” histories and popular culture, particularly the appeal and utility of national stereotypes in defining and shaping acceptable codes of thought and behavior. Grew suggested a pre-modern source for national stereotypes in the differentiation and characterization of European aristocracies through an early literary genre that provided a template for the categorization of modern nation-states and whole populations.

Grew’s interest in national stereotypes found support in Orest Ranum’s emphasis on the vital importance of counter-identities in shaping early modern national identity, notably in the context of moral, aesthetic and historical comparisons that denied to the other any claim to divine favor, diplomatic trustworthiness, virtuous habits or physical attractiveness. Ranum laid out some pre-Enlightenment commonplaces that, in their accentuation of aesthetic, moral and political difference, closely resemble modern tropes of national identity and foreign otherness. He found a parallel with modern ruralism in much older encomiums on the physical beauty and divine providence bestowed on the patria, and he recognized precursors of modern national

---


stereotypes in sixteenth and seventeenth-century binary images that contrasted, for example, Italian treachery with English openness, or French lasciviousness with English modesty and chastity. Ranum also noted a political motive in the much-discussed poverty of the French peasant in contrast with his well-fed and better-dressed English counterpart, a view that would persist beyond the eighteenth century as an argument for superior British government and property laws in advancing liberty and prosperity. According to Ranum, the polemic utility of this British starving peasant image, the French “beast,” appears in its selective application to France but not Ireland, and the fact that French writers who recognized the same deficiencies in French peasant life blamed seigneurialism, poor management or soil quality rather than monarchical style or government per se.\textsuperscript{38} Ranum warned that general tropes, ranging from English assumptions of French cowardice to German beer-drinking or any sort of blanket scapegoating, offer little explanatory value outside of a particular historical context. He nevertheless faulted earlier studies of nationalism for not taking into account the inseparability of counter-identities from national self-definition, whether in the form of a binary opposition or drawn from pre-existing theories such as those contrasting southern European promiscuity with northern chastity or eastern despotism with western humanism.

More recent studies have further challenged the modernist position by placing the construction of national identities into medieval or ancient times. Benedict Anderson’s dating of imagined national communities from the inception of mass-distribution print media has led some

\textsuperscript{38}By the same token, the seventeenth-century French perception of Greek backwardness and “enslavement” under Ottoman rule did not serve as a counter-identity because of sympathies reflecting belief in an ancient Greek golden age.
to criticize an overemphasis on the homogeneity of medieval culture in Europe.\textsuperscript{39} If the self-differentiation of Frankish crusaders from Muslims and oriental Christians in Holy Land settlements around 1099 does not in itself refute the idea of a monolithic European Christendom, the characterizations of different European populations by traveling writers does indicate at least the encouragement of perceived collective national difference. For example, Eustache Deschamps (1346-1406), an official in the administrations of Charles V and VI of France, commented on the slovenliness of the Germans and the infidelity of the English, whom he continually lambasted in his satirical poems.\textsuperscript{40} Monarchical continuity and genealogy also apparently stood as precursors to national identity for loyal factions and people employed in government service during the middle ages.\textsuperscript{41} Evidence for the differentiation of cultural identities in medieval Britain can be found in Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s treatment of Asser’s \textit{Life of King Alfred} (893) as not only a foundational text for the consolidation of West Saxon hegemony but also, through the Welsh monk’s use of Latin and bilingual references to place names, an entrenchment of cultural diversity within Britain itself.\textsuperscript{42} Geoffrey of Monmouth’s \textit{History of the Kings of Britain} (c. 1138) directly challenged English superiority and the renown of Anglo-Saxon lineage by propagating the Arthurian myth and central image of a magnificent British (i.e.,


\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., 27, 61, 177.

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., 133.

Welsh) imperium, one that quickly became anglicized. Rodney Hilton has also argued that before the spread of print and popular theater English chauvinism and “consciousness of a national identity, in so far as it existed, almost certainly arose from the recognition of a potentially hostile ‘other’” during Anglo-Scottish border wars and aristocratic wars in France during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

Historians have even found ancient precursors of modern national identity in the association of cultural or ethnic identities with political states. Patrick Geary has placed the origins of European ethnonationalist politics in late antiquity, when heterogenous populations coalesced around successful leaders and established territorial kingdoms during the final dissolution of the Roman Empire. Autonomous kingdoms in turn spawned regional identities, but certainly not the homogeneously ethnic national groups claimed by nineteenth-century historians and present day nationalists. Taking a cue from Hans Kohn on the cultural foundations of nationhood, Anthony D. Smith argues that forms of national community preceded modern nations and nationalism by more than a millennium. In Smith’s long view the three forms of national identity—hierarchical, covenantal and republican—have respective ancient

\[43\text{Ibid., 80-81.}\]


\[46\text{The Cultural Foundations of Nations: Hierarchy, Covenant and Republic (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008).}\]
precedents in the Near Eastern empires of Persia and Egypt, in Israel, and in Greece and republican Rome. According to Smith, the crucial break from hierarchical conceptions of “nations” in Europe, meaning territorial kingdoms ruled by aristocratic elites, came during the Reformation with the broadening base of “national” sentiment linked to the idea of a covenantal mission in Protestant countries which, in turn, allowed the introduction of republican ideals. Smith observes these forms persisting and coexisting in differing conceptions of national identity. In France, for example, the radical republican ideal imbibed covenantal elements in oath-taking and a state religion, and accommodated a conservative, monarchical, heroic ideal in the Napoleonic, deGaullist tradition. United States history has also recorded contrasting covenantal and republican founding ideologies—pilgrims versus the “classical” founding fathers—as well as legacy of racial hierarchy from the institution of slavery. Smith’s theory also helps explain the endurance of the British monarchy within a parliamentary democracy, and the influential trope of New Jerusalem in British political history from the Puritan Revolution through the post-World War II welfare state.

Not only has national identity been loosened from its modernist moorings in recent studies, social and psychological aspects of the interface between national identity and both

---

47Ibid., 55, 58, 65.

48Ibid., 104, 117, 133. Smith leaves the titular republic of Venice out of the equation, although by the time the Papal Inquisition had began to challenge Venice’s reputed religious tolerance in the 1540s the ruling Venetian oligarchy had already discarded all but the veil of republicanism and was proceeding to manage and modulate the papal war on heresy. See John Jeffries Martin, Venice’s Hidden Enemies: Italian Heretics in a Renaissance City (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1993).

49Smith, Cultural Foundations, 137, 151, 166-70.
domestic and international politics have been explored. William Bloom referred to Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory—a five-tier pyramid rising from basic physiological needs, to security, love, self-esteem and self-actualization—in order to illustrate the limits of coercion in the reciprocal relationship between leaders and led in constructing national identity. In short, citizen loyalty depends upon the perception of state legitimacy. Bloom postulated a “national identity dynamic” that rallies public opinion in favor of foreign policies that either address perceived threats to, or somehow enhance, national identity. Domestic political competitions and, more explicitly, foreign policy decisions hinge on which candidate or party can tap public concerns about national security and/or national prestige. The “national interest,” from Bloom’s perspective, too easily becomes a rationalization vulnerable to political manipulation and “has no conceptual use as a tool for ranking foreign policy priorities.” Even worse, national identity harbors an atavistic warrior culture mentality of not showing weakness to the enemy and therefore impedes the “‘sacred’ communication and ritual of diplomats” that would otherwise allow for a realignment of positions without loss of prestige. Bloom apparently sees the national identity dynamic as a double-edged sword that can be appropriated for propaganda

50 Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 16, 23, 55-56, 64.

51 Ibid., 79-81.

52 Ibid., 84.

53 Ibid., 154. While Bloom distanced himself from the “ideal” of secret or insular diplomacy, even if it were possible, and rightly observed the dangerous and obstructionist potential of a politicized foreign policy, his contention that “successful” nation-building cultivates an attitude of “my country right or wrong” seems disturbingly Machiavellian (pp. 58, 157).
purposes by governments, in order to deflect internal dissension, but that can also wound the
governing party if policy fails to win public approbation. Although Bloom fails to back up his
highly theoretical arguments with historical examples, he makes the salient point for this study
that diplomatic antagonism and conflict stem not from cultural difference alone—witness the
post-1945 shift in German and Russian alliances vis à vis the western powers—but from images
of the other as either threatening or not self-enhancing through affiliation, except in a negative
sense.54 As Ranum has shown, the starving French peasant stereotype garnered support for an
anti-French policy in eighteenth-century Britain through an assumption of political superiority
that obscured any moral sympathies for a people under despotic rule—and this amidst much
aristocratic admiration for French culture. The French image would not soften in British media
until France’s defeat by Prussia in 1871 and, despite ongoing Anglo-French colonial rivalries and
perceptions of cultural difference, newly united imperial Germany would become the main
continental military threat and binary opposite in British eyes.

Recent works on national identity tend to emphasize either cultural or structural (political,
economic, social) foundations, a division which reflects the underlying debate over pre-modern
or modern origins but which often reinforces the inseparability of the two approaches. Ernest
Gellner, a modernist who sees the national principle arising essentially as the modus operandi of
modern social conditions stemming from industrialization, nevertheless agrees with Anthony D.
Smith on the instrumentality of unified, pre-modern high cultures in the formation of national
identity.55 Like Smith, Gellner looks to the Renaissance and Reformation as a crucial era for the

54Ibid., 152-53.

marriage of state and culture in Western Europe, particularly in the territorially unified dynastic states centered in Lisbon, Madrid, Paris and London. According to Gellner, these politically and culturally unified western states naturally entered the “Age of Nationalism” when it arrived in the early nineteenth century, whereas the “brides” of Italian and German cultural unity had to await their belated political “grooms,” Piedmont and Prussia, for national unification in a later “Age of Irredentism.” Gellner’s schema distinguishes these particular natural and even necessary national developments from abortive and “nasty” expressions of twentieth-century ethnonationalism, among which he includes the failed post-World War I Eastern European states lacking both cultural and political unity, Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism and post-Cold War outbreaks of ethnic cleansing within the former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{56}

But if Gellner and Smith agree that the Protestant Reformation prepared the ground for nationalism through increased literacy and consolidated vernacular high cultures, Gellner argues that the 1815 Vienna Settlement constituted the swan song of hierarchical agrarian loyalties as well as dynastic territorial and institutional controls. For Gellner, post-Enlightenment nationalism and national identity coincided with the rise of differentiated but internally homogenous cultural “parks,” distributed geographically and temporally across Europe in synch with the industrial revolution. Technical innovation necessitated meritocracy which in turn eroded traditional legal and social status differences.\textsuperscript{57} Unlike Smith, Gellner does not trace cultural continuities from pre- and post-Reformation times into the modern era as proof of an

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., 50-58. Gellner hopes that a final “stage” of nationalism, “The Attenuation of National Feeling,” will arrive within an increasingly globalized world and convergent European Union.

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid., 34-35. See also 23, 26-28.
evolutionary cognizance of national identity. In Gellner’s view nations and national identities appeared as the “political shadows” of their respective national cultures during the Romantic period and have since reflected cultural currents, Nietzsche having articulated the Social Darwinist ideology of ruthless national competition. In sum, Gellner agrees with Smith on the cultural foundation of nations, but he discounts proto-national religious identities and deems truly national cultures only those that sprang from structural changes accompanying the development of modern states and economies.

Gellner’s concentration on structural instrumentalities, and not on the psychological dimension of what he considers the important yet wholly fabricated content of nationalist ideology, has prompted some to look closer at social and cultural mentalities in the construction of national identity. Seeing Gellner’s reductionist linkage of nationalism to industrialization as too one-sided, Ross Poole argues the importance of pre-industrial capitalism and commercial markets in opening up a “public sphere” for rational discourse and an expanded idea of citizenship through print media and coffee shops. While not differing too radically from Gellner in his assessment of external factors driving national identity, Poole accepts the possibility of pre-modern national identity by tying it specifically to membership in and allegiance to a political community as well as to exclusion of and reaction to an alien other. Further exploring the

---

58Ibid., 69-70.
59Ibid., 77.
60Gellner credits Elie Kedourie’s *Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960) for revealing to him the artificiality of nationalism, a view which Gellner endorses only insofar as nationalism “sees itself” but not how it “really is.” See Gellner, 7-12.
61*Nation and Identity* (London: Routledge, 1999), 22, 27, 32-34. Poole offers an
inseparability of personal and social identity, Poole looks to Thomas Hobbes and John Locke as early modern pioneers in identity theory, philosophers who considered a secular and monistic personal identity within political and moral contexts. Locke, in particular, and Immanuel Kant a century later, connected personal identity with the self-conscious, rational appropriation of moral and legal responsibility for one’s actions. While both Hobbes and Locke conceived the importance of reason for apprehending natural rights and a social contract, Locke’s call for greater constitutionalism and autonomy based on a rational human capacity for self-improvement controverted Hobbes’s defense of an authoritarian state as necessary for governing instinctually brutal human interactions. Underlying their diametrically opposed political perspectives, the disagreement between Hobbes and Locke over what drives human identity and action frames the modern Nature versus Nurture debate. The Hobbesian mechanistic conception of personal liberty, constrained by natural physical force and moral law, met its counterpart in Lockean egalitarianism and confidence in the rational shaping of the human mind as a tabula rasa or blank slate. 

Besides continuities between these early theories of mind and modern expansive interpretation of Jürgen Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, translated by Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989; German original, 1962).

62 Poole, National Identity, 47, 50-51. See also pp. 12, 66 and 71 on the inseparability of “I” and “We,” and parallels between personal guilt and collective shame, or personal pride and collective identity.

63 These political positions appeared in Hobbes’s Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil (1651) and the second part of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (1689), the main tenets of which Locke had discussed with contemporaries since the 1670s.

investigations into the psychological synthesis of instinct and reason in self-definition, Poole recalls Clifford Geertz’s argument for primordial symbolic adaptation with the observation that language and cultural symbols “provide an inescapable structure of experience.” From this vantage point, cultural and structural arguments for the formation of national identity find common ground in the mother of all structures, the human brain. The very fact that Gellner and Poole agree on the likely future demise of nationalism indicates at least some tacit agreement on the adaptability of human psychology to an increasingly interconnected world.

**National Identity and the Brain**

Recognition of the sociological nature of national identity and nationalism, with its manifold boundaries of language, religion, race and national character, begs the question of psychological motivation. The idea that an instinct for self-preservation might inspire national identity arises quite logically from the fact that war and revolution, as well as struggles for or against empire, have figured prominently in the formation of national consciousness—at least in official memory. In his famous book on the origins of nationalism, Benedict Anderson referred to cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers as ubiquitous and “ghostly” symbols of modern

---


---

65 Poole, 69. Locke’s conception of personhood, the capacity to enter into binding contracts and commitments as a rational and moral agent, remains the standard definition for questions concerning ethics and neuroscience. See Marya Schechtman, “Getting Our Stories Straight: Self-narrative and Personal Identity,” and Carol Rovane, “Personal Identity and Choice,” in Debra J. H. Mathews, Hilary Bok, and Peter V. Rabins, eds. *Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Perspectives from Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 68, 95.
Of course, instinct alone could never explain the incorporation of national traditions, images and symbols into a concept of self, nor could it explain the personal choice to either to abet or resist a totalitarian regime. Self-justification, or preservation of “self” in the abstract, better describes the psychology driving both national identity and nationalism. More relevant to the question of motivation, Anderson outlined an essential human propensity for constructing collective identities beyond the immediate influence of family and locality. This human constant underpinned the shift from identification with pre-modern universal religions, sacred languages and consecrated monarchies toward identification with “territorialized” faiths, vernacular cultures and nationally legitimated governments. Cultural relativism and national identity, according to Anderson’s thesis, merely represented a newer phase of imagined community developed within the modern paradigm of competing nation-states.

The combination of non-rational impulse and rational adaptation that seem to mark collective identification on a panoramic scale corresponds with social categorization on an individual level. Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke have stressed the twofold process of group identification and individual role within a group, and they hypothesize a combination of subconscious self-categorization (what one is) with conscious self-verification (what one does) formulated “in terms of meanings imparted by a structured society.” This same interface between “instinct” and rationality in social identity theory has found confirmation in

---

66 Imagined Communities, 9-12.

67 Ibid., 16-22.

neuropsychological studies that demonstrate a striking correlation between brain structure and personal identity. Recent studies of brain activity using non-invasive functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) show that human perception of social realities involves an integration of separate functions carried out in the right and left hemispheres of the brain. The self-differentiating, protective, emotional reactions associated with right brain activity appear to undergo mediation by the rationalizing, evaluative, socially adaptive and self-justificatory capacities of left brain regions.\textsuperscript{69} The bizarre phenomenon of brain lateralization not only produces clinical abnormalities such as the “Dr. Strangelove” or alien hand syndrome suffered by split-brain patients, it also implies the existence of an internal division, or even conflict, between preconscious impulse and rational judgement which must be reconciled with cultural values in self and group identification.\textsuperscript{70} Other recent studies have confirmed a similar structural correlation involved in cognitive dissonance and attitude change.\textsuperscript{71} Most recently, David

\textsuperscript{69}Marek Cielecki, “A Neurocognitive Model of the Self,” chap. 3 in Tomasz Maruszewski, Małgorzata Fajkowska, and Michael W. Eysenck, \textit{Personality from Biological, Cognitive, and Social Perspectives} (Clinton Corners, NY: Werner, 2010), 57-61. The theory parallels Freudian conceptions of a rational ego reconciling the conflict between unconscious drives and cultural traditions—id versus superego—with the corpus callosum acting as a physical bridge between opposing tendencies.

\textsuperscript{70}Todd E. Feinberg, \textit{From Axons to Identity: Neurological Explorations of the Nature of the Self} (New York: Norton, 2009), 191-196. Dr. Strangelove, the ex-Nazi doctor played by Peter Sellers in Stanley Kubrick’s classic Cold War film of the same name, could not control his Hitler-saluting, self-strangling arm. The comic portrayal essentially mimics the real condition of severe epileptic and stroke patients who have undergone surgery to disconnect right and left hemispheres of the brain, a condition in which the “anarchic” right-brain-controlled left hands of these patients act with a will of their own. Feinberg conceives of the sense of self as largely dependent upon organizational unity within the brain, particularly in nested or recursive neural hierarchies at the most advanced levels of brain structure (pp. 182-185, 189, 198, 209-213).

Eagleman has dubbed the brain a “team of rivals” pitting mainly automatic emotional responses against cognitive reason.\textsuperscript{72} Unconscious “zombie systems” work to keep the team of rivals integrated seeking structure in meaningless patterns and creating narratives to explain social reality. According to this scenario the mind as a blank slate becomes a mere euphemism and free will gets demoted to a dubious veto power at the end of a chain of unconscious reactions.\textsuperscript{73}

Several recent studies in neuropsychology reveal aspects of the bilateral brain highly relevant to group identification and stereotyping. The non-verbal right brain plays a crucial role in self-awareness, particularly in the self-related emotions of pride, guilt and shame, as well as in appreciating humor and inferring the mental states of others. Autism and Arsperger patients lack the right-brain capacity for empathy, deception or deception detection.\textsuperscript{74} The right brain has also been designated a “primitive and egocentric hemisphere,” indispensable for synthesizing a holistic view of social situations, apprehending an internal representation of others and forming a sense of identity in relation to others.\textsuperscript{75} It has been associated with the survival instinct and the capacity to extract connotational and contextual meanings—getting the moral of a story or the


\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 83, 137, 139, 166-67. Eagleman writes, however, that the materialist monist paradigm of modern neuroscience does not negate the idea of mind as a sum of parts, nor can it disprove the brain’s potential function as a sophisticated receiver of a higher absolute reality. Plato and Descartes live on (pp. 217, 222).


punch line of a joke, or even recalling a true memory.\textsuperscript{76} The left brain, governing language, routine cognitive analysis and logical detail, seeks logically coherent, causal explanations regardless of their correctness and even creates information to fill gaps in ways that conform to social or cultural expectations.\textsuperscript{77} These generally recognized bilateral brain functions involved in self and group identification seem eminently suited to stereotype creation and elaboration: the right-brain inference of group identity becomes embellished by left-brain creativity that portrays the other in a self-justifying way according to accepted social norms. A definable “what” delimits the ineffable “who.” The bilateral model also explains the automatic and “systematic information-processing biases” that accompany stereotypic expectations in differentiating self from other, as well as the paradoxical application of rational cognitive means toward non-rational ends in identity construction.\textsuperscript{78} Neuroscience has thus discovered a normative, identity-creating, self-justifying process within the human psyche that should be taken into account when discussing national or any type of group identification.

This brief foray into neuropsychology should not be construed as a biological or reductionist hack at the Gordian Knot of national identity—historians, after all, must examine specific historical circumstances. Yet the assertion of some psychological predisposition toward collective identity does offer a corrective to the often misleading search for what Walker Connor called “tangible” keys to the riddle of nationality, by which he meant markers of national


\textsuperscript{77}Hart, \textit{Brain, Attachment, Personality}, 244.

\textsuperscript{78}C. Neil Macrae, Charles Stangor, and Miles Hewstone, \textit{Stereotypes and Stereotyping} (New York: Guilford, 1996), 231.
difference or affinity such as religion, language or political ideology. Conner decried the semantic confusion of “nation” with territorial “state” because it too often glossed over multi-nationalism and the non-rational, constructed myth of ethnic kinship that he considered central to nationalism. While Connor’s emphasis on kinship myth rings true both for evolving nationhood and for more recent trends toward devolution in the case of Great Britain, a question remains whether constructed ethnicity represents just the most integral “tangible” component of a national identity driven by deeper psychological processes. National identity supports one important, intrinsically political, aspect or layer of group identification that coexists with a kaleidoscopic shifting of regional, local, linguistic, class, gender, occupational, friendship and family identities. Whether increased globalization and the expansion of the European Union diminish European nationality in favor of opportunistic regionalism remains to be seen.

The Illusion of National Character

Even though the use of stereotypes dates from antiquity, nineteenth-century notions of national character, introduced through the romantic era historicism of Herder and later exploited by social Darwinists and racial theorists, invested national stereotypes with a new historical and pseudo-scientific significance. Only since the mid-twentieth century have scholars routinely rejected as invidious reductionism the belief in some inherent racial or ethnic component of personality, yet assumptions about cultural or collective identity have haunted more recent work. French anthropologist Louis Dumont, referring to cultures as “living beings,” argued in


1986 that “national variants” in religion and philosophy, arising from and refining a sense of collective identity, led to Germany’s divergence from Western Enlightenment ideals. While he shunned direct stereotyping, Dumont posed generalizations based on presumed cultural traits, such as the German’s “quasi-proverbial proclivity to obey.” Historians have also proven vulnerable to type-casting and sweeping generalizations based on national character. The statement, for example, concerning World War I that “the very virtue of the German people, as the servants of their rulers’ ambitions, made the danger of permanent slavery for Europe extreme” not only glosses over the complexities of pre-war German internal politics and ignores the Social Democratic Party’s long-standing opposition to militarism, but also shifts the burden of war guilt onto the Germans’ ethnic predispositions, as if they could not help themselves.

---

the irrational concept of national character. He pointed to problems that arise both in overlooking distinctions between social groups and in confusing nationality with psychological or other attributes. Only six years earlier, Otto Klineberg in “A Science of National Character,” *Journal of Social Psychology* 19 (February 1944): 147-62, had stressed the importance of national character in devising propaganda for psychological warfare and conducting military operations, even though he had also looked askance at some of the wartime “psychoanalysis” of Nazi Germany and theories that posited a plausible reality or “kernel of truth” behind every stereotype.

---

81“Are Cultures Living Beings? German Identity in Interaction,” *Man*, n.s., 21 (December 1986): 589-90. Dumont described Germany’s ideological “acculturation to modernity” as the manifestation of a duality between individual and collective identity (individualism versus holism), the former evident in Luther’s teachings, Pietism and the concept of *Bildung*, the latter in pan-Germanism and the idea of universal sovereignty, which underlay both Marxist class and Prussian state ideologies. In regard to German identity he wrote, “Externally the undisturbed permanence of holism (*accompanied by a strong bent to subordination*) and, internally, the formative influence of Luther (strengthening Christian individualism but confining it within the person) are two fundamental features that go far to make understandable the interplay of German culture with its environment and history.” (Italics added.)

Social psychologists since the 1960s have concentrated on the need to discern genuine cultural differences without projecting them onto cultural personae, thus avoiding the “fundamental attribution error” or tendency to attribute individual actions to personality traits regardless of situational factors. This newer perspective finally discarded conventional Aristotelian notions of innate character disposition that had been propagated during Victorian times, particularly in connection with nationality. While socio-psychological studies have since aimed at rational explanations of cultural difference based on sociological or historical data, nearly all nineteenth-century literature on national character either assumed the existence of innate difference or never bothered to distinguish cultural from biological traits. The distinction between cultural identity and ethnicity remained too weak to ward off the irrational appeal of national myths and stereotypes that negated anxiety by bolstering a sense of superiority over outside ethnic groups. Writers generally supported an ethnocentric hierarchical mentality by

---

criticizes Max Weber’s stereotype of the “driven tradesman,” the embodiment of the Protestant ethic, thinking only of business and making money. Firchow, *Death of the German Cousin*, 202, also cites incidence of stereotypy in Salvador de Madriaga’s *Portrait of Europe* and faults Barbara Tuchman in *The Guns of August* (1962) for referring to a combination of arrogance, rigidity and stupidity as a “natural quality in Germans whose expression so often fails to endear them to others.”

---

83Stanley Milgram’s Stanford study of obedience to authority, conducted in 1963, wherein a majority of subjects “shocked” their “students” to death in a sham learning experiment, revealed the fallacy of drawing conclusions about character based on experimental results. The fundamental attribution error seemed to stem partly from a strong Western cultural bias toward individualism and partly from a sense of denial among observers that one could act in a manner similar to test subjects in a given situation. L. Ross and R. Nisbett, *The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 56-58, reexamine the impact of situational factors on Milgram’s results.

84Howard F. Stein, “Culture and Ethnicity or Group Fantasies: A Psychohistoric Paradigm of Group Identity,” in *From Metaphor to Meaning: Papers in Psychoanalytic Anthropology*, Series in Ethnicity, Medicine, and Psychoanalysis, no. 2, ed. Stein and Maurice Apprey
sanctioning national and racial stereotypes, even if they recognized some psychological dynamic underlying nationalistic self-adulation with its reciprocal denigration of other nationalities.

While research since the 1960s has veered away from national toward racial and gender stereotypes, the prevalence and persistence of late nineteenth-century notions of national character has repeatedly surfaced in twentieth-century studies. In 1959 a UNESCO-sponsored examination of French and German stereotypes held by other Europeans and themselves, found that participants characterized Germans as hard-working, practical, disciplined, submissive to authority, and domineering, even brutal, in their relations with other peoples. The French were perceived as friendly, easygoing, generous, light-hearted, artistic and gregarious, lazy, temperamental, impulsive and quarrelsome.85 As a rule, respondents denied negative traits in their own national group and, perhaps more significantly, refused to apply the most popular, and subjective, self-assigned traits to other nationalities. German subjects considered themselves hardworking (80%) and brave (60.2%), while only a few conceded these qualities to the French (3.2% and 9.2% respectively). French subjects touted their generosity compared to the Germans (52.9% versus 1.5%), and considered themselves far less domineering (3.6% versus 59.6%) or cruel (0.6% versus 37.1%).86 Positive assumptions about national identity usually accompanied


the assignment of negative qualities to an outgroup. More recent surveys that concentrate on some subtler nuances of stereotyping have also shown an enduring tendency among respondents to differentiate nationalities on the basis of traditional stereotypes.\textsuperscript{87} And while national stereotypes are unlikely to be found in twenty-first century didactic treatises, they continue to pervade fiction, visual media and comedy.\textsuperscript{88}

**The Psychology of Stereotyping**

Research on stereotypes since the 1920s has followed three basic theoretical approaches: socio-cultural, psychodynamic and cognitive.\textsuperscript{89} The first two defined stereotypy as a phenomenon of cultural conditioning and personality, while the third sought the initial motivation for stereotyping in the perceptual process itself. According to the socio-cultural definition, stereotypy precedes the use of reason and imposes its stamp, replete with traditional cultural values, on the evidence of our senses. Walter Lippmann first stated that culture defines perceptions—“we define first and then see.” He compared the function of the stereotyping mind to “the doorkeeper at a costume ball who judges whether the guest has an appropriate masquerade.”\textsuperscript{90} A Princeton University study done in 1933 by Katz and Braly, which tested

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{88}Satirical exploitation of this mother lode of comedic material can be seen, for example, in adult television cartoons like “The Simpsons” and “South Park.”
\item \textsuperscript{89}For a detailed discussion of these theoretical perspectives on stereotypes see Richard D. Ashmore and Frances K. Del Boca, “Conceptual Approaches to Stereotypes and Stereotyping,” in Hamilton, \textit{Cognitive Processes}, 2-8.
\item \textsuperscript{90}Lippmann, \textit{Public Opinion}, 81, 98. Current research bears out the idea that believing is
\end{itemize}

67
similarities between individual prejudices and stereotypes found in popular magazines, confirmed the idea of a socio-cultural phenomenon.91

The psychodynamic approach came into vogue after 1935 with Gordon Allport’s explanation of the link between stereotypes and prejudice, notably in their rationalizing and justifying functions.92 Researchers subsequently found close associations between stereotypy and the rigid thinking symptomatic of authoritarianism, which added an even more sinister aspect: unquestioning, prejudicial acceptance of stereotypes signified a defective personality, a weak ego, and a mind prone to fascism due to a dependence on external authority rather than internalized values.93 The authoritarian personality revealed itself through close identification with an ingroup, the use of double standards, hierarchical thinking, conformism and moralistic self-justification through the projection of negative qualities, including the responsibility for discrimination itself, onto an outgroup.94 Despite their prejudicial nature, however, stereotypes

91See Ashmore and Del Boca, “Conceptual Approaches to Stereotypes,” 6.


93Adorno et al., Authoritarian Personality, 51, 386, 454, 457, 632, 664-65, 747, 759. Critics were quick to dispute the fallacy of linking authoritarianism solely to the political Right and pointed to the Soviet Union as a prime example of authoritarianism of the Left. See Richard Christie, Studies in the Scope and Method of the Authoritarian Personality (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1954), 27.

94Adorno et. al., Authoritarian Personality, 43-44, 173, 191-94, 204. The term, “anti-intraceptiveness, was coined to describe authoritarian lack of commiseration with others and an
were also found to involve objective cultural factors and seemed at times to operate on a rational or pseudo-rational level. This realization inspired the cognitive approach, spearheaded by Henri Tajfel in 1969, which explained stereotypes as a function of categorization processes linked to perception but not necessarily prejudice. The cognitive school drew inspiration from the “economy of effort” hypothesis in Lippmann’s initial description.

Current identity theory builds on the cognitive definition with studies of group dynamics which focus on levels of consensus and the unconscious transmission and self-reproduction of stereotypes. While cultural norms and the avoidance of cognitive dissonance continue to be regarded as sources of bias, social psychologists have begun to analyze language itself as a “social product.” Researchers attempt to quantify stereotyping in personal narratives or inability to “put oneself in another’s shoes,” combined with resistance to objective self criticism.

95 Ibid., 655, 752, 754. See also H. D. Forbes, Nationalism, Ethnocentrism and Personality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 21, 35, 52, 57-58, 97, 176-77, who contrasts contemporary authoritarianism with Plato’s Timocratic society (i.e., Spartan, warlike, authoritarian, conformist, honor-loving). Forbes also distinguishes between liberationist and authoritarian nationalism, the former being characteristic of democratic revolutions, the latter of imperialistic ventures. In either case propagandistic stereotypes might appear, but their use in the second instance would more likely be pathologically based on irrational fear, or an aggressive desire to dominate, rather than the genuine need for liberation from an oppressor. Ideally, a democratic revolution would seek to broaden, not narrow, the base of the ingroup (i.e., humanity over nationhood).

96 Pettigrew, “Extending the Stereotype Concept,” 313.

97 See, for example, Yoshihisa Kashima, Klaus Fiedler, and Peter Freytag, Stereotype Dynamics: Language-Based Approaches to the Formation, Maintenance, and Transformation of Stereotypes (New York; London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2008).

ingroup/outgroup descriptions by assigning values to words according to their degree of “abstraction.” For example, adjectives and metaphorical nouns, most abstract because detachable from a specific semantic context, get counted four points each; verbs that express a mental state, such as to “hate,” “admire” or “appreciate” rate three points; verbs that convey an emotional reaction or implied value judgement, such as to “amaze,” “anger,” “help” or “tease” rate two points; and simple, “concrete,” action verbs, such as to “run,” “walk” or “hit” rate one point each because evaluative connotations depend entirely upon context. An average of these assigned values determines the “linguistic abstraction bias,” which can purportedly betray, for example, a high degree of shared context and cognitive ease in a piece of writing intended for a select ingroup of readers. Such language-based approaches to stereotyping support the premise that “saying is believing.”

Some definitive conceptions of stereotypes have evolved through decades of research: stereotypes consist of patterns of traits that make up a “Gestalt attribution,” correlated with a social or cultural group; global stereotypes usually encompass specific contradictions; stereotypes tend to be extremely persistent and they contribute to the de-individualization of those targeted. These universal signatures of stereotyping certainly apply to nineteenth-century

---

99 Ibid., 14-15.

100 Kashima, *Stereotype Dynamics*, 66, 190-94, 201, 207, 244, 259, 271.

101 Hamilton, “Illusory Correlation,” 122-26. The matching of traits with particular groups, can become biased through the tendency to associate undesirable behaviors or traits with lesser-known groups.

102 Allport, *Nature of Prejudice*, 195. The self-contradictory nature of stereotypes proved to Allport that attitudes, rather than genuine group traits, served as the basis for justifying prejudice toward a particular group.
British views of Germany. Stereotypes of Germans from all walks of life combined an
to the Chinese people. These stereotypes often have roots in historical events, cultural
assortment of traits to form a convincingly generalized mental image. The diverse sometimes
contradictory images that constituted the “German stereotype” could be tailored to idealized or
demonized descriptions of radically different target groups and yet impose a certain blanket
uniformity, notwithstanding efforts to characterize Germans as lacking a strong national identity
compared with the British or French. Perceptions of historical change also played a role. The
global German stereotype could accommodate temporal inconsistencies, so that a demonized
“New Germany” could be seen as a radical departure from an idealized past. The late nineteenth-
century stigmas of German unscrupulous trade practices, diplomatic blackmail and inept colonial
administration, for example, directly opposed more traditional stereotypes of German honesty,
loyalty and bureaucratic efficiency. The old stereotypes nevertheless persisted as nostalgic
reminders of Germany’s innocuous past, even amid perceptions of a changing Germany. The
emphasis on national stereotypes in nineteenth-century Britain represented a vain attempt to
come to terms with changing political, economic and diplomatic realities that only served to de-
individualize and superficially categorize national outgroups. Popular definitions of national
character supplanted Enlightenment concepts of individualism and free will with more
generalized, prejudicial and immutable group traits.

Past and present theories define stereotypy as a tendency to categorize empirical data in
response to a combination of natural mental limits, prejudice and insecurity. The cultural

103Ibid., 191. Allport wrote, “a stereotype is an exaggerated belief associated with a
category. Its function is to justify (rationalize) our conduct in relation to that category.”
Lippmann, Public Opinion, 89, and Ashmore and Del Boca, “Conceptual Approaches,” 29-30,
take note of the cognitive factors involved in the assimilation of information, either limited in
itself or by the mind’s tendency to simplify complex and detailed masses of data. Adorno et al.,
framework from which these categories derive determines, for example, whether a character trait will be judged healthy or sick, familiar or strange, just or unjust, moral or perverse. Sander L. Gilman has theorized that such cultural reference points or “root-metaphors” fulfill a psychological “need to structure the world in familiar terms.” The differentiation between self and the world during infancy, according to Gilman, parallels a split between “good” and “bad” arising from a feeling of control, or the lack of it, over the environment. The projection of negative aspects of the self onto a “bad” object provides an escape from contradictions present in self-integration. Gilman wrote that the act of projection

... saves the self from any confrontation with the contradictions present in the necessary integration of “bad” and “good” aspects of the self. The deep structure of our own sense of self and the world is built upon the illusionary image of the world divided into two camps, “us” and “them.”

... Stereotypes are a crude set of mental representations of the world. They are palimpsests on which the initial bipolar representations are still vaguely legible. They perpetuate a needed sense of difference between the “self” and the “object,” which becomes the “Other.”

The self/other dichotomy, which remains constant despite the Protean nature of stereotypes, provides a conduit for the projection of self-directed negative feelings onto the other


Authoritarian Personality, 44, tend to see the categorization process as both cause and effect of prejudicially motivated rigid thinking.

Gilman, Difference and Pathology, 22, borrowed the term from Stephen Pepper, to refer to a basic analogy drawn from “some area of commonsense fact” and extrapolated to other areas of experience. A root-metaphor resembles a paradigm, or model, governing the assimilation and explanation of factual data, similar to Lippmann’s cultural “canons.” See Lippman, Public Opinion, 120.

Gilman, Difference and Pathology, 17-18, 22-25, speaks of “illness, sexuality, and race” as three broad categories used to differentiate self from other according to the following polarities: healthy/sick, good/bad, normal/deviant, moral/immoral, superior/inferior. Needless to say, these categories often overlap. Adorno et al., Authoritarian Personality, 46-47, noted the polarizing tendency of stereotypes in images of strength and weakness.
through either deprecatory or idealized images.\textsuperscript{106} Through the mind’s natural tendency to simplify and categorize information, stereotypes provide a psychological defense mechanism against the assimilation of knowledge that would otherwise refine, and possibly soften, the distinction between self and other. Even within the context of an ethnic joke stereotypes displace anxiety by reaffirming the “self” at the expense of the “other” and asserting a sense of control over that which cannot be controlled. An example of this can be seen, according to Christie Davis, in the “stupid” Irish and “stingy” Scottish jokes that gained popularity in England during the rise of industrialism in Britain because they delineated incompetence and self-defeating avarice—the polar extremes of failure in a capitalist society.\textsuperscript{107}

Stereotypy becomes pathological when it involves the denial and projection of one’s own fears and weaknesses onto the other, and when the acceptance of blanket generalizations exposes an inability to perceive significant individual differences among the stereotyped outgroup.\textsuperscript{108} On a deeper psychological level the we/they polarity represents the self’s struggle against annihilation at the expense of the other, an irrational inner conflict that can reinforce a self-defeating neurosis. What superficially appears to be a symbiotic relationship within the ingroup,

\textsuperscript{106}Jungian theory holds that the self-stereotype, being an artificial reflection of cultural ideals, or super ego, represents an attempt to shore up a flagging self-image and thus requires a stereotype of the other on which to project negative qualities or unsublimated id drives. C. G. Jung, \textit{The Undiscovered Self} (New York: New American Library of World Literature, 1964; originally published by Little, Brown, 1959), 12.

\textsuperscript{107}Davis, “Ethnic Jokes, Moral Values and Social Boundaries,” \textit{British Journal of Sociology} 33, no. 3 (September 1982): 387-90, defines ethnic jokes as “a means of providing a structure for an uncertain world,” and an attempt to escape from “ethnic and economic anomie” (p. 393). Ethnic jokes project the fear of failure onto minorities and justify keeping them on the moral and social fringes.

\textsuperscript{108}Adorno et al., \textit{Authoritarian Personality}, p. 806.
such as one’s own culture, race, class, or family, can become a “reciprocal parasitism,” whereby individuality is sacrificed implicitly in order to strengthen collective identity in opposition to a third party or “triangulated enemy.”\textsuperscript{109} In the case of nationalism, stereotypes reinforce a psychologically negative, propagandistic ingroup mentality by creating a superficial unity among diverse social groups, so that nationalism becomes self-exultation, or exoneration, while internationalism implies a loss of national identity and “self.” The inhabitants of two competing nations, lacking shared cultural values or common assumptions, will likely see themselves as irreconcilable rivals on many fronts, locked in a conflict pitting the “good” self against the “evil” other.\textsuperscript{110} This phenomenon especially appears in relation to highly sensitive issues that lead to wholesale condemnation of the outgroup, such as occurred during “Made in Germany” phase of the Anglo-German trade rivalry that made headlines in 1896. Whether or not it actually challenges the ingroup’s way of life, the outgroup is apt to be perceived as malevolent or “wrong-headed,” and the sole obstacle in the way of progress.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{109}Stein, “Culture and Ethnicity,” 148-49.

\textsuperscript{110}Gilman, \textit{Difference and Pathology}, 18.

\textsuperscript{111}Lippman, \textit{Public Opinion}, 127, and Forbes, \textit{Nationalism, Ethnocentrism and Personality}, 136-37. See also Adorno et al., \textit{Authoritarian Personality}, 619, on the “key” idea, held among anti-Semites, that Jews are the source of all problems. Such pseudo-erudite formulae “reduce the complicated to the elementary,” and offer “emotional, narcissistic gratifications which tend to break down the barriers of rational self-criticism.”
3. BRITISHNESS, ENGLISHNESS AND GERMAN OTHERNESS

Most historians have accepted the defining conception of Britain that arose during the eighteenth century as “Protestant, commercial, maritime and free,” to quote David Armitage’s familiar phrase.¹ They have disagreed, however, over whether Britishness constitutes a national identity or a multinational construct prone to disintegration in the absence of external reasons for being. The integrative forces of imperial trade, colonial rule and defense against continental powers have long since diminished to the point where British identity has largely been reduced to political rhetoric directed either at nostalgic unionists or progressive multiculturalists. Prime Minister Tony Blair, a supporter of Scottish and Welsh devolution, sought to shore up New Labour’s unionist credentials at a press conference in April 2000 by reiterating the mid-Victorian British values of tolerance, fair play and decency. And many Britons of Commonwealth immigrant backgrounds utilize hybridized categorizations such as Caribbean British or Asian British as terms of inclusion.² According to the Economic and Social Research Council, a well-budgeted research group founded by royal charter in 1965, the general decline in attachment to Britishness has reflected generational trends and has not triggered any widespread identity crisis


in England as of 2005. Nevertheless, the fact that writers in both popular and academic genres have spilled a lot of ink addressing the issue during the past two decades suggests an ongoing interest, if not an obsession, with national identity. Certainly for historians any change or continuity in attitudes becomes important for a long-term view of national self-imaging. The following sections in this chapter will outline both the popular arguments and historiography concerning British/English identity and delineate some significant cultural differences between Britain and the Continent that affected conceptions of national identity.

**British and English Identity**

The apparent fragility of British identity in the face of political devolution and European integration during the 1990s brought forth a cascade of books on national identity focusing on race, place, class, empire or “all of the above” in their assessments of Britishness or Englishness. Many of the so-called “portrait” books, and even some academic works on British and English identity, have indulged in or bordered on myth-making themselves. Jeremy Paxman, for example, filled the perceived need for a redefinition of Englishness in answer to Scottish and Welsh devolution, and in doing so reaffirmed all of the traditional tropes from insularity to individuality, eccentricity, domesticity, romantic ruralism, self-effacing intellectualism and love of sport. After describing the English as “casual Germans” Paxman proceeded to draw a sharp contrast between English “sensible scepticism” toward the state and the inflated importance of a *Patrie* or *Vaterland*. He credited an evolved English political identity for not having to elevate

---

3 *FINAL REPORT of the Devolution and Constitutional Change Programme* (Economic and Social Research Council, 2005), online at http://www.devolution.ac.uk/final_report.htm.

cultural heroes in the manner of Goethe and Schiller, thus excusing a traditional benign neglect of Shakespeare, and he gloried in English freedom from laws restricting rug beating or car washing to certain days and hours as in Germany.\(^5\) Along with this triumph of individualism over holism, Paxman offered explanations for English self-stereotyping which would certainly fit foreign accusations of cant, or hypocrisy. English ruralism countered the very real grime of coalfields and factories, domesticity refuted the fact of authoritarian imperialism and the image of John Bull presented the diplomatic face of an honest, no-nonsense merchant/trader while public school-bred aristocrats actually ran the empire.\(^6\)

If Paxman presented a light-hearted view of Englishness, consistent with centuries-old British stereotypes, other writers dwelt on a sometimes gloomy English separatism. Simon Heffer felt England had been betrayed by a “political class” in having to passively endure the devolutionary, and economically suicidal, ambitions of Wales and Scotland, and he decried the blind sentimentality of fellow Conservatives who held on to the nostalgic fiction of union.\(^7\) Referring to the English as a Christian and monarchist people, and to nationalism as a “potent, visceral force,” Heffer called for a “conscious atavism” in rebuilding English identity.\(^8\) For Heffer, the European Union “Superstate,” even if socialistic and counter to the English spirit, would actually liberate England economically, culturally and politically through greater

\(^5\)Ibid., 131, 138, 192-93, 260-61.

\(^6\)Ibid., 183.


\(^8\)Ibid., 17, 41, 127.
regionalism in an all-English Parliament. However, as Heffer himself admitted, reactions to multiculturalism and associations with old Victorian jingoism or boorish soccer hooliganism would pose major problems for this fantasy of revived English nationalism.\(^9\) Roger Scruton, more recently, practically yearns for the bad old days of Anglican conformity and class hierarchy. Extolling sexual repression, especially the Platonic love of boys, as a cardinal English virtue along with intellectual self-effacement and duty to empire, Scruton laments the passing of English character in the form of eccentric individualism, fair play, self-mockery, humility and gentleness.\(^10\) But while Scruton praises the empirical nature of English law and the legitimate moral authority of English bobbies as bulwarks of liberty against French or German-style centralization, he also embraces monarchy and hereditary peerage as forces for stability, and he disturbingly links the erosion of traditional civility and loss of a rural agricultural existence to the abolition of class privilege.\(^11\) Andrew Marr entertained wholly different conclusions in his review of conservative reactions to the break-up of Britain predicted in Tom Nairn’s provocative book of the same name. Marr agreed with Nairn about the artificiality and outmoded imperial utility of British institutions, citing the role of Crown, Church and Parliament in quelling national hubris for the sake of accommodating and uniting a multiethnic empire. Marr also welcomed European integration as a cure for nationalist delusions or a resurgence of English Powellism.\(^12\)

\(^{9}\)Ibid., 36, 42, 46-47, 101, 109, 124. One might wonder whether Heffer’s suggestion of splitting up the BBC (p. 130) would satisfy cultural angst and stave off economic disintegration.


\(^{11}\)Ibid., 116-18, 127, 176, 188-90, 244-57.

But rather than dwell like Nairn on the preservation of an archaic state or the English absorption of Scottish intelligentsia and consequent cultural provincialisms of tartanry and Kailyardism, Marr called for a reimagined Britain with four parliaments plus overarching federal body as necessary, not least, for preserving social programs and assisting blighted areas. In contrast to conservative nationalists, Marr mocked obsolescent state sovereignty arguments and looked to a non-national Green England tradition, championed by both localists and cosmopolitans, that would profit by a Europe of semi-autonomous regions and thriving exportable cultures.

Scholars differ over whether Britishness subsumed Englishness or imposed English identity on Britain as a whole, and pronouncements of British identity’s demise have been countered with promises of its revival in new multicultural forms. Richard Weight and Krishnan Kumar have stressed the need for redefining Englishness because in their view Britishness had checked the development of a strong English identity. Countering this, Peter Mandler argues that English identity has been continually scrutinized and refashioned through centuries and that the English model of parliamentary government has kept Enlightenment ideals essentially intact. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberal notions of national character and political leveling fed radical patriotism at home while the idea of progress justified authoritarian colonial rule of


14 Marr, 99, 121, 143, 166-67.

supposed inferior or backward peoples abroad.\textsuperscript{16} England did not need a modern revolution, Mandler adds, because the ruling class’s accommodation of gradual change kept the theory of advancing civilization tenable despite popular racial Anglo-Saxonism and challenges to empire incurred during the 1857 Indian Mutiny and later imperial rivalries.\textsuperscript{17} According to Mandler, the late-Victorian/Edwardian self-image of a “governing and colonizing people” reconciled English national character with British institutions, and similar adjustments came with subsequent changes. Theme-park rusticity arose in reaction to a post-World War I sense of isolation just as Stanley Baldwin’s image of benign common sense, cooperation and good humor smoothed the face of interwar economic turmoil. The image of the Little Man as hero during World War II, followed by the kinder, gentler English idealist through years of social welfare and imperial decline, replaced the Philistine and rugged materialist John Bull icon.\textsuperscript{18} Mandler concludes that such journalistic national character stereotypes and their propagandistic overtones, have not only been ultimately rejected as anti-individualist but have also lost their peculiarly English flavor now that the Whig progress narrative has become global.\textsuperscript{19} Giving a similar upbeat assessment

\textsuperscript{16}The English National Character: The History of an Idea from Edmund Burke to Tony Blair (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2006), 29 and passim. Mandler’s argument here recalls the civic/ethnic, modern/antimodern, progressive/regressive dualities that for Tom Nairn make up the “Janus face” of nationalism. See Nairn, The Break-up of Britain, 348-49.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., 59, 85, 90, 106-8. The chief proponents of Anglo-Saxon freedoms, medievalists William Stubbs and Edward A. Freeman, actually credited early institutions as much as race. The works cited by Mandler include, William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England in Its Origin and Development (1873-1878) and Edward A. Freeman, History of the Norman Conquest (1867-1876).

\textsuperscript{18}Mandler, English National Character, 130, 145-48, 163-67.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., 240-42.
of a more inclusive civic redefinition of Britishness compatible with regional and multicultural identities, Paul Ward associates the Labour Party’s contained devolution policy with long-term Liberal support for Home Rule in the various British subnationalities.\textsuperscript{20} Scottish historians, on the other hand, have brooded about the deleterious effects of an imposed Anglo-British identity, Cairns Craig having seen in the absence of the Scottish realist novel a negation or denial of core culture narrative history with its modernizing elements. The resulting embrace of myth and geological time in Scottish literature, Craig contended, evokes a barbaric past and paints Scottish identity as lawless.\textsuperscript{21}

The more optimistic scholars of a revived Britishness take their cue from earlier studies that center identity in political, commercial and maritime developments; less rosy scenarios arise from notions of a culturally derived identity linked to race, ethnicity, class, gender or religion. One obvious reason for this discrepancy arises from the inherent divisiveness of these latter social and cultural categories, but another derives from the fact that national identity itself depends upon a viable dominant political consensus. Gerald Newman’s study of eighteenth-century Anglo-French cultural relations makes this point in a curiously roundabout way. Newman asserts the cultural origins of English nationalism, labeling it a moral reaction to an alien cultural invasion and a “creation of writers” that provoked the transition from aristocratic

\textsuperscript{20}Britishness since 1870 (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), 97, 110, 168-69.

Francophilia to English artistic chauvinism. But the underlying political and socio-economic nature of this culture war emerges in the targeting of a Frenchified, effeminate and dissipated Whig aristocracy by middle-class merchants and intellectuals who sought a political voice. Newman describes the construction of an English national character featuring sincerity and forthrightness in opposition to French guile, pretense, toadying and artfulness—an identity that chimed with patriotic politics aimed at Sir Robert Walpole and aristocratic privilege. The new patriotism romanticized the idea of a free people under the Norman Yoke of aristocratic corruption and found a hero-leader in William Pitt, who successfully prosecuted the Seven Years War against France. Newman calls British Francophobia a “loose cannon,” exploited alike by conservatives, evangelicals and radicals. In the long run, he argues, it served a secular and rather narrow and backward-looking nationalism that eschewed revolutionary abstract universalism for a national radical tradition that later found expression in Chartism. Newman’s definition of English cultural nationalism thus becomes culturally embellished politics—or really a case of psychological othering, because Newman himself recognizes the paradox of an ongoing parallel intellectual revolt against aristocratic corruption and hypocrisy within France.

Newman anticipated Linda Colley’s work on British identity to some extent by discerning in anti-French stereotypes a binary opposition that galvanized English patriotism in both


\[23\] Ibid., 129, 136, 141, 168-69. Walpole, an influential Whig politician during the early Hanoverian decades, became the first defacto Prime Minister.

\[24\] Ibid., 162, 169, 222.

\[25\] Ibid., 141.
domestic politics and foreign policy. Colley provided a comprehensive analysis of early British unity and identity in addition to her theme of French othering, including the role of the monarchy as a rallying point, a vibrant press, the cults of Parliament and commerce, the providence of military success, social clubbing and the expansion of empire. Her focus on Protestant solidarity against a threatening and denigrated Catholic French other, however, applies more to the transition from earlier centuries of religious wars than to the rise of political patriotism during the later eighteenth century. Besides the growing toleration that preceded the Catholic Relief Act in 1829, Colley herself had exposed the limited utility of Protestantism for French othering in British radical support for the French-assisted American Revolution. P. J. Marshall has further contended that, regardless of divided opinion on American definitions of universal freedom, most Britons had by then identified with imperial and maritime power as a guarantor of British political liberty, with Protestantism and providence providing supplementary moral justification.

The argument for primarily political origins of British national identity has found support in the work of Peter Furtado, who traced political patriotism as grounds for criticizing government to the early Stuart period. Furtado also saw in the symbolic shift from Elizabethan Gloriana to post-union Britannia a secular association with power politics and maritime

26 Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, 36, 44, 50-51, 56-61, 90, 94.


hegemony. Hugh Cunningham likewise placed Greek political thought via Machiavelli and opposition to the aristocratic suppression of Saxon liberties (the Norman Yoke) alongside the Protestant ideal of an elect nation as sources of English radical patriotism. More recently, Louise Marshall has recognized in British theater between 1719 and 1745 an arena for political debate. Patriotic themes became standard fare, often in allegorical form, and attacks on Walpole dealt with favoritism, factionalism, political placement and unsound treaties. The cult of Parliament, the fall of the Machiavellian favorite and allegories idealizing the protection of ancient liberties, Marshall argues, created a “homogenous” version of British identity in a unique space for encoding stereotypes, a function later to be extended in nineteenth-century periodical literature. Peter Mandler has stressed the institutional orientation of British identity following an age of revolutions and Burkean pragmatic conservatism, and how the celebration of Parliament, English law and abstractions like the “spirit of the gentleman” could stand for universal values and progress in spite of class inequities. By the early nineteenth century liberal gradualism would lie at the core of British identity as illustrated by the aristocratic Whigs’ return


30 “The Language of Patriotism,” in Samuel, 1:58-60


32 Ibid., 11, 41, 44-45, 47, 65, 183.

to power during the 1830s under the banner of popular sovereignty in the abstract.\(^{34}\) The affinity between liberal landlords and professional do-gooders, Mandler wrote, made possible a “Victorian revolution in government . . . activist aristocratic politicians working through ambitious civil servants under the general pressure of popular demands.”\(^{35}\)

Krishnan Kumar presents probably the most comprehensive survey of literature on English national identity.\(^{36}\) He reviews work by Hans Kohn, Liah Greenfeld, Gerald Newman and Linda Colley, as well as by medieval scholars, including Patrick Wormald, all of whom find beginnings or significant episodes of British national identity in various time periods ranging from Alfred the Great’s ninth-century West Saxon hegemony and the idea of a *gens Angloricum* to the Tudor monarchy, the English Civil War and eighteenth century Anglo-French wars.\(^{37}\) Kumar dismisses all of these interpretations on the basis that they cannot all be right, although he generally agrees with Colley’s explanation of British Protestant unity. But because Kumar sees English identity as distinct from British, a debatable assumption, he locates English nationalism at the end of the nineteenth century during the heyday of racial Anglo-Saxonism and the rise of imperial Germany.\(^{38}\) Consequently, Kumar’s idea of English nationalism and national identity


\(^{35}\)Ibid., 40.


settles on a consciously constructed response to the racial politics of an imperial age and not one developed unconsciously in the transition to modernity. While Kumar’s exhaustive reevaluation of the origins and phases of English identity offers a very precise definition of the differences between largely civic Britishness and predominantly ethnocultural Englishness, it tends to neglect the important formative impact of eighteenth-century political patriotism on English identity. Kumar does acknowledge the essential civic elements in Englishness that tend to be overlooked in what he sees as a late nineteenth-century Herderian and reactionary cultural construction of English identity, yet his cultural definition too easily dismisses less self-conscious but more historically significant political principles central to both English and British identity.39

Tying English identity to the idea of racial homogeneity might well be considered problematic ever since Daniel Defoe’s scathing satirical poem, *The True-Born Englishman* (1701), about a people descended from many conquerors and immigrants:

> From whose mix’d relics our compounded breed,  
> By spurious generation does succeed;  
> Making a race uncertain and uneven,  
> Derived from all the nations under heaven.40

Kumar placed English “racial” nationalism at a time when the search for British unity in diversity became a common theme in literature focused on national culture and identity. Matthew Arnold, in the late 1860s, had pressed for the assimilation of Celtic writers into the corpus of English

39Ibid., 236.

literature as well as the inclusion of both Saxon and Celt within the English “racial” makeup.\(^\text{41}\)

But even though a broader British and Anglo-Saxon inclusiveness also took hold in the realm of international relations, Kumar, unlike Colley, does not pay much heed to othering in the context of the Anglo-German antagonism. Subsequent chapters will examine how specific images of the German other propped up a superior British/English self-image in both racial and cultural contexts and also shaped perceptions of Anglo-German diplomatic relations. The remainder of this chapter will concentrate on some cultural and historical factors that reinforced English/British exceptionalism as compared with perceived continental and German differences.

**British/English Individualism and European Holism**

The conventional view of the Hobbes/Locke, nature versus nurture antithesis mentioned earlier masks a deeper structural commonality. Because these political opposites both embraced an empirical tradition of *tabula rasa*, inherited from Sir Francis Bacon and others, and because they voiced identical concerns about the role of education and public opinion in forging social consensus, Neal Wood has placed Hobbes and Locke within an “English paradigm” of empiricist and individualist social environmentalism. English intellectuals during the Enlightenment sought moderate reform through education, Wood argues, in contrast to more radical and sweeping European collectivist approaches to restructuring society that followed the approaches of Niccolo Machiavelli, Jean Bodin and Baron de Montesquieu.\(^\text{42}\)

---


Hobbes’s scheme for the “collectivization” of opinion from above as pouring “the new wine of royal absolutism” into the “old Baconian bottle of empiricism,” with its emphasis on education and university reform.\textsuperscript{43} According to Wood, English thinkers’ attraction to \textit{tabula rasa} stemmed from a “pervasive individualism” that promoted atomistic and empirical science as well as social theory. Although Wood neglects to mention demands for the individual freedom to philosophize voiced in the Dutch Republic by Baruch Spinoza and in German lands by Immanuel Kant later, and while his rather weak cultural arguments for English individualism include private profit-seeking, Calvinism and a fashion for empirical enquiry and fact-gathering inspired by the Domesday Book, he does put his finger on a more convincing social cause of difference. A greater degree of marginalization and disenchantment with \textit{L’Ancien Régime} may have prompted continental \textit{philosophes} to advance more radical proposals for change.\textsuperscript{44} Wood’s premise agrees with Alan Macfarlane’s assertion that a unique individualism characterized English society from at least the thirteenth century, a byproduct of social mobility and widespread affluence in an individualistic market society. Macfarlane found English difference in everything from nuclear family life to a fluid labor market, individualized property rights, a “peculiar” legal status for women, an absence of extended kinship ties or typical peasant marriage patterns—even a less sexual, less cannibalistic and more individualistic stereotype of the English witch as poor and demanding rather than gaining supernatural advantage over neighbors.\textsuperscript{45} Macfarlane bolstered

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., 660.

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., 666-67.

his arguments with evidence from studies of the medieval Poll Tax in England, from travel accounts of fifteenth-century aristocratic continentals who regarded the absence of social barriers a species of English arrogance, and from historical assessments by Montesquieu and Alexis de Tocqueville.46

The argument for an early modern ideological division between England and continental Europe has also gained support in Jonathan Israel’s work on the Radical Enlightenment. Israel found in post-Cartesian English empiricism an accommodation of spiritual existence, immortality of the soul and providence which had been abandoned in Spinoza’s monistic pantheism where God equaled the “totality of everything” and the creative power in nature, related to man only as “immanent cause.”47 English empiricism founded a religiously neutral scientific methodology which accommodated English and French High Enlightenment providential deism, Israel argued, whereas the Radical Enlightenment in Europe established the materialist/rationalist basis of the modern scientific paradigm with the triumph of philosophy over theology and reason over faith. Israel further wrote of a “war of philosophies” between moderate English and German Enlightenment “physico-theological” theorists who disputed Spinozian materialistic “fatalism” from different perspectives. Lockean-Newtonianism, dominant only in England and Iberia, postulated a separation of unknowable spirit from sensory matter and construed extrinsic motion and gravity as evidence of the “Finger of God,” directing physical reality and human affairs. Leibnizian-Wolffianism, which gained currency throughout Germany

46Ibid., 167-70. The works referred to include Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws (1748) and de Tocqueville’s L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution (1856).

and the Baltic and checkmated Anglomania in parts of Italy, Switzerland and France, conceived of an intrinsic synchrony of spirit and matter, implemented through points of energy called “monads,” which allowed for the intervention of providence through multiple possible outcomes.\(^{48}\) These distinctive religio-scientific perspectives, if one applies Wood’s thesis, bred contrasting social metaphors: the English atomistic notion of constantly interacting disparate individuals versus continental ideas of historically structured molecular social entities.\(^{49}\)

Israel also pointed out an essential dichotomy between Lockean “negative” libertarian individualism, which allowed an empirical justification of historic institutions and the reasonableness of Christianity itself, and Spinozan “positive,” even utopian, confidence in the rational refashioning of civil society to reflect a more democratic state of nature.\(^{50}\) In Spinoza’s cynicism regarding existing institutions and his proposals for elemental change one might trace the genesis of Enlightenment anti-clericalism, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social contract,

\(^{48}\)Ibid., 457, 473, 512-13, 518-19, 525-27, 549. Israel refers to the philosophical writings of Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716, specifically \textit{Monadologie} (1714)) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754).

\(^{49}\)Another manifestation of the anti-Spinozan moderate Enlightenment concerns varied approaches to biblical exegesis. Jonathan Sheehan describes how the crisis of unbelief took different national paths. In England, scholarly “apologists” worked to validate the King James Bible and preserve the Reformation principle of \textit{sola scriptura} from radical deism. In Germany, the initiative toward biblical scholarship arose from a Pietist desire to supplant Lutheran orthodoxy with a “subjective religion of love and rebirth.” These diametrical motives of preservation versus transformation stemmed from dissimilar confessional environments and partly explain the vitriolic late eighteenth-century English reaction to German Bible criticism. Even Wesley, despite his affiliations with emotive Pietism, excoriated the futility of textual criticism in his quest for “faith and salvation.” See \textit{The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 28-30, 57, 49-95, 244-45.

\(^{50}\)Israel, \textit{Radical Enlightenment}, 253, 259, 272-73. Spinoza’s philosophy became widely known, and banned as atheistic and immoral, after the publication of \textit{Tractatus Theologico-Politicus} in 1670.
Maximillian Robespierre’s radical revolution, Charles Fourier’s utopian socialism and Karl Marx’s historical determinism.\textsuperscript{51} And while radical imagination certainly informed and inspired English republicanism and revolution, as Jonathan Scott has argued, departures from classical individualism in James Harrington’s utopian republic of \textit{Oceana} (1656), in Leveller insistence on a more godly society or even in Hobbes’s monarchical \textit{Leviathan} did not preclude the pragmatic defense of individual liberty, active citizenship and imperial expansion that constituted England’s “Machiavellian moment.”\textsuperscript{52} Israel’s assertion that the split between moderate Enlightenment deism and radical monistic materialism mirrored an ancient Stoic/Epicurian dichotomy over individual and communal expressions of morality offers an intriguing historical perspective for understanding a Lockean/Spinozan difference.\textsuperscript{53} It seems significant that the English deistic tradition, strongly evident in Adam Smith’s philosophy of self-regulation, relied on an internalized, individual, evolutionary, empirical and Stoical conception of necessary virtuous suffering, whereas continental radicalism, evinced in Rousseau’s “general will,” seeks to impose an externalized, communal, revolutionary, rational and virtuous \textit{necessary} solution to suffering. Perhaps a starker contrast can be found in a comparison between Thomas Malthus’s dystopic

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., 265-67. Israel points out Rousseau’s affinity with a Spinozan philosophical, civic religion.

\textsuperscript{52}\textit{England’s Troubles}, 308, 311.

\textsuperscript{53}Israel, \textit{Radical Enlightenment}, 626, cites a classic dispute in England between the third earl of Shaftesbury and Dutch immigrant philosopher Bernard Mandeville: Shaftesbury extolled Stoic virtue, and an innate “moral sense,” over hedonistic, egoistic Epicurianism, to which Mandeville replied that the “superficial veneer” of virtue had simply been applied to a morality governed by social interaction and the force of law.
vision of necessary individual moral restraint and Fourier’s utopian leap to the inevitable, communal realization of God-instilled passions.

**The Jewish Other in Europe and Britain**

The role of the Jewish other stands as a decisive factor in European divisions between civic and ethnic nationalisms. William Brustein, in a recent quantitative study of antisemitism in Europe, compared attitudes in print toward Jews with antisemitic acts, legal and otherwise, recorded from 1899 to 1939 in Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Romania. Besides the salience of economic troubles, increased Jewish immigration and growth of the political Left in fomenting antisemitism, Brustein’s quantitative analysis revealed telling spatial and temporal variations between act and opinion. French antisemitism appears to have been relatively non-activist and not the hotbed of anti-Jewish activity supposed from the Dreyfus Affair or years preceding Vichy government—a diagnosis supportive of Rogers Brubaker’s work on Franco/German citizenship differences. But perhaps more interesting, the greater incidence and violence of antisemitic acts in Germany and Romania did not broadly coincide with unfavorable

---

54 *Roots of Hate: Anti-Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 10, 12, 34. Antisemitic acts numbered as follows: Britain (73), France (49), Germany (709), Romania (431) and Italy (39), 401 of the German antisemitic acts having occurred under the Nazi regime. Brustein used the *American Jewish Year Book* for a primary record of antisemitic acts and a random sampling of two major newspapers in each country for an index of attitudes. He coded as favorable, unfavorable or neutral all reportage on Jews in these ten selected newspapers for the 15th of each month between 1899 and 1939. Temporal variation within the time frame appears in two series of graphs: one for antisemitic acts, both in toto and differentiated by country (pp. 15, 16); the second for attitudes during the periods 1899-1913, 1914-1923, 1924-1932 and 1933-1939 (pp. 26-29).

55 Ibid., 337. Brubaker only lightly touched on the issue of antisemitism in relation to national identity, explicitly to highlight the French adherence to, and German rejection of, *jus soli* during a period of intensified anti-Jewish feeling throughout Europe. See *Citizenship and Nationhood*, 12, 102, 135-36.
attitudes toward Jews in select major newspapers until after 1932.\textsuperscript{56} The later upsurge of anti-Jewish journalism in those countries suggests the impact of coordinated propaganda or pressures put on journalists rather than any spontaneous outpouring of popular antisemitism, and the period from 1933 to 1939 in Brustein’s analysis correlates with significant political developments: the Nazi accession to power in Germany, the rise of antisemitic rhetoric culminating in the Nazi-oriented Goga government in Romania and, in relatively philosemitic Italy, Mussolini’s racial “revolution” and his opportunistic attempts to win Nazi approval.\textsuperscript{57} Brustein’s study casts doubt upon the idea of axiomatic German antisemitism with evidence of its variability and thus disqualifies arguments for an endemic German “eliminationist” ideology or the inevitability of a

\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Roots of Hate}, 25.

\textsuperscript{57}Besides the presence of Jews in the Italian fascist camp itself, many non-Jews, including Mussolini, despised and obstructed Nazi exterminationist policies. See R. J. B. Bosworth, \textit{Mussolini}, (London; New York: Arnold; Oxford University Press, 2002), 282, 334-344. For an interpretation stressing imperial-totalitarian objectives in a futuristic fascist racial policy see, Frank Hugh Adler, “Why Mussolini Turned on the Jews,” \textit{Patterns of Prejudice} 39, no. 3 (2005). On the dominating presence of antisemitism in within the Romanian nationalist movement, and the conversion of many formerly non-xenophobic writers and intellectuals to a “rational” antisemitism motivated by fears of Jewish incursion into spheres of economic and social life, including literature and journalism, see Leon Volovici, \textit{Nationalist Ideology and Antisemitism: The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s}, trans. Charles Kormos (Oxford: Pergamon; published for the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism (SICSA), the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1991), 155-58, 163-67, 177-80, 189. 192-93. Romanian nationalists from both Right and Left had long embraced an antisemitism clothed in Orthodox Christian symbolism and spirituality, but during the 1930s the increased popularity of the fascist Iron Guard hyped by a “new generation” of pro-fascist intellectuals provoked a countervailing barrage of antisemitic propaganda from loyalist clergy. The flare up in Romanian antisemitic journalism may also reflect campaigning leading up to the election of 1937. See Paul A. Shapiro, “Faith, Murder, Resurrection: the Iron Guard and the Romanian Orthodox Church,” in Kevin P. Spicer, ed., \textit{Antisemitism, Christian Ambivalence, and the Holocaust} (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007), 136, 139-50, 152-55.
Holocaust without Hitler.\textsuperscript{58} In place of a vague definition of antisemitic German political culture leading up to the Holocaust, Brustein sees a “manifestation” of antisemitic attitudes and actions being produced, like antisemitism itself, “by antecedent and independent factors.”\textsuperscript{59}

One such antecedent factor can be found in the tradition of collective violence against Jews in Germany since the Middle Ages, a form of political activism intimately connected with exclusionary aspects of modern German identity. A consensus has arisen that modern anti-Jewish violence in Germany represented more than the mere scapegoating of Jews in times of socio-economic distress or the spontaneous expression of German political culture, even though Nazi propagandists later tried to sell that idea to make the pogrom of \textit{Kristallnacht} in 1938 appear a \textit{völkisch} phenomenon.\textsuperscript{60} Exclusionary violence, rather, depended upon a perceived Jewish threat to national identity and well-being, combined with some level of organized antisemitic agitation and an assumption of legitimacy amongst the rioters, whether in complicity


\textsuperscript{59}Brustein, 43, 45-48, 341-44. Increased Jewish immigration and decline in gross domestic product emerge as the most powerful, independent factors associated with antisemitic acts, leftist politics less so, despite the amount of rhetoric targeting it.

\textsuperscript{60}Christhard Hoffmann, Werner Bergmann, and Helmut Walser Smith, eds., \textit{Exclusionary Violence: Antisemitic Riots in Modern Germany} (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002) deals with important continuities between the 1819 so-called Hep Hep riots in Wurzburg and subsequent episodic violence throughout German territories during the years 1830, 1848-9, 1881 and 1900.
with or in opposition to authorities.\textsuperscript{61} And while the “Hep! Hep!” catchword and a medieval Carnivalesque, world-turned-upside-down atmosphere characterized many of these ritualized, communal acts of violence, opposition to Jewish emancipation remained the central issue provoking such actions. Riots directed against liberal initiatives for social and economic modernization advanced by Jews in fact succeeded in postponing Jewish emancipation until 1869-71. Thereafter the “Jewish Question” became a staple of unofficial antisemitism, kept alive in Bismarckian-era party politics and in a media-driven “domesticated” antisemitism lasting through the Wilhelmine era.\textsuperscript{62} During the \textit{Kaiserreich} (1871-1914), Christhard Hoffmann has argued, the success of government and mainstream antisemitic conservatives in disavowing militant demagoguery only served to make antisemitism “respectable,” more appealing to the middle-class and part of a nationalist world view that could easily harbor more radical strains of anti-Jewish activism.\textsuperscript{63} Even taking into account some extremely violent antisemitic rhetoric in nineteenth-century Germany, it nevertheless remains one of the twisted ironies of history that the


\textsuperscript{62}For a discussion of these points and the “self-help” aspects of ritualized violence see the excellent summary by Richard S. Levy, “Continuities and Discontinuities of Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Germany 1819-1938,” in \textit{Exclusionary Violence}, 192-99.

\textsuperscript{63}See “Political Culture and Violence” in \textit{Exclusionary Violence}, 77-79, on Bismarck’s political exploitation of antisemitism, 90-92 on the government’s distancing itself from militant antisemitic demagogues like Hermann Ahlwardt and Ernst Henrici.
land sought as a refuge by Ostjuden refugees fleeing deadly Russian pogroms in 1881 would, under Nazi rule, resurrect a far more lethal modern version of the medieval pogrom.\textsuperscript{64}

Despite the Nazi regime’s decisive break with past official policies, Helmut Walser Smith has found in German antisemitism a “long, if thin line of continuity” linking histories of local violence to the broader conception of a racialized nation.\textsuperscript{65} Smith regards the 1870s as a watershed marking the transition from a bourgeois constitutionalist “official” nationalism to a post-unification radical nationalism that subordinated interests of state to exclusionary religion, social Darwinist racialism and revived Fichtean notions of German originality and destiny—all of which targeted Jews as well as Catholics, Poles and socialists.\textsuperscript{66} Smith seems to be arguing that exclusionary cultural nationalism, specifically related to questions of identity, did warp German politics and enabled the apparent discontinuity of Nazi state-sponsored violence.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{64}On the ritualistic nature of nineteenth-century German exclusionary violence compared with more lethal institutionalized pogroms see Helmut Walser Smith, “Konitz, 1900: Ritual Murder and Antisemitic Violence,” 96, Werner Bergmann, “Exclusionary Riots: Some Theoretical considerations,” 179-80, and the introductory essay by Bergmann, Hoffmann and Smith, 9-11, 14-15, all in Exclusionary Violence.


\textsuperscript{66}Ibid., 221-22.

\textsuperscript{67}This conclusion accords with Gellner’s thesis that both politics and culture became distorted in the vortex of nationalism and national identity. William Sheridan Allen’s The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town 1930-1935 (1965; repr., New York: New Viewpoints, 1973), 209-10, 215, 225-26, also revealed the inadequacy of a simple cultural explanation for antisemitism. Nazi success in Northeim (named Thalburg in the book’s first edition) depended less on residual antisemitism than on political divisiveness, a weak democratic tradition, violent rhetoric, displays of force and the promise of national unity under authoritarian rule. The exclusion of Jews in Northeim, Allen argued, proceeded not by unleashing popular antisemitism but through conformity or acquiescence to a political ideology and strategy of social atomization that brought all formerly independent organizations and groups under Nazi
Nazi takeover represented a perversion of German politics, the popular antisemitic component in national identity certainly supplied an exploitable resource. The exclusionary strain in German national identity grew in reaction to liberal reform movements inspired by Ephraim Lessing’s message of religious tolerance in *Nathan the Wise* (1779) and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s concept of *Bildung*, or individual self-development, in *Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship* (1795-96). Both works, stemming from Enlightenment opposition to retrograde religious tradition and stifling social convention, inspired German Jews to see in the abandonment of anti-modern Judaic customs a path toward full German citizenship. Barbara Fischer writes that the promise of a dialogue between German Jews and Christians, concerning the emancipation and reformation of Jews into German citizens, encountered serious obstacles during the course of the nineteenth century and ultimately faltered on the theological premise that Judaism merely prefigured Christianity and therefore signified nothing for the fulfillment of German identity. Fischer focuses on German nationalist reactions to Lessing’s work and on Jewish idolatry of Goethe that stirred paranoid fears of Jewish “signification” and interpretation of German culture and identity, a racist turn in German national self-identification which led to the ironic exclusion of Jewish German liberal nationalists. George Kohler has also examined the theological basis of the 

---


69 Ibid., 178-182.
debate over Jewish German citizenship and Treitschke’s role in promoting the “deicide myth” that Judaism posed a threat to Christianity and therefore to Germanness. Treitschke’s demand for Jewish conversion, an idea supported even by ostensible philosemites, speaks to the exclusively Christian conception of German Geist and the rejection of Jewishness as non-German and separatist. Frustrated assimilationism, in a sense, bred a rhetoric of exclusion and expulsion.70

No such antisemitic paranoia dominated British identity politics. Deborah Cohen writes that Jewish Britons enjoyed full citizenship after 1866 and freedom from pogroms and mob violence despite a five-fold increase in numbers through increased immigration between 1888 and 1914.71 Admiration of Jews provided a strong counter-argument to typical racist concerns about Jewish conspiracy, racial hybridity or characterizations of ubiquitous, social-climbing “secret” Jews in widely read novels.72 Racial categories based on physical features, such as big noses, actually counteracted fears of the Jewish Chameleon. The acknowledgment of Jewish


72. Ibid., 471, 475, 477-78. Cohen mentions George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda (1876) as the most notorious “Jewish” novel that started a trend.
adaptability, both as a danger and an asset, Cohen argues, speaks to the rapid assimilation of Jews into British society and their eventual acceptance through a prevailing liberal gradualism.\textsuperscript{73} Antisemitic stereotypes certainly peppered the popular press, however, ridiculing the hypocritical pretensions and poor fashion-sense of the “Gentleman Jew,” for example, as demonstrated in Thackeray’s 1846 satire for \textit{Punch} entitled “Snobs of England.” One cartoon depicts a diminutive, gaudily dressed Jewish dandy with huge nose, bulging eyes and swarthy, hairy complexion in the process of ordering up a serving of pork, “crackling, sage and onions and all” from a tall, blond, impeccably dressed and faintly amused servitor.\textsuperscript{74} Multiple hats (“Mosaic ornaments”) and Old Clothes became long-standing symbols of Jewish deceit and huckstering. Carlyle applied the latter trope to Benjamin Disraeli, an Anglican politician of Jewish ancestry who eventually served as British Prime Minister from 1874 to 1880.\textsuperscript{75} Thackeray’s \textit{Codlingsby} (1847), a lampoon of Disraeli’s political/autobiographical novel \textit{Conigsby} (1844), accentuated the stereotyped pretense of the Gentleman Jew by placing most of the action in the ghetto and reversing conventional ideas of beauty and taste. Thackeray’s satire ostensibly relieved anxieties surrounding Jewish emancipation by reasserting British racial preeminence in reaction to Disraeli’s “bold foregrounding of racial issues” in \textit{Conigsby}, where he placed Jews and Arabs on a level with Saxons and Greeks as Caucasions at the top of a four-tier race hierarchy.\textsuperscript{76} But even

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{73}Ibid., 480-81, 483.
\item \textsuperscript{74}Claire Nicolay, “The Anxiety of "Mosaic" Influence: Thackeray, Disraeli, and Anglo-Jewish Assimilation in the 1840s,” \textit{Nineteenth-Century Contexts} 25, no. 2 (2003): 133.
\item \textsuperscript{75}Ibid., 127, 129.
\item \textsuperscript{76}Ibid., 126, 134-35, 142.
\end{itemize}

99
if Disraeli did have to fantasize his youthful acceptance among English school peers in his self-fashioning novel, the fact that he could surmount prejudice and rise to the pinnacle of political and social success testifies to a British national identity secure enough to allow some flaunting of exotic oriental origins on Disraeli’s own part.\textsuperscript{77}

It would be misleading to conclude that Britain historically lacked an inner enemy equivalent to the Jewish threat in the case of German identity. Catholics led a stigmatized and sometimes harrowed existence from Tudor times up to the anti-Catholic Gordon Riots of 1780. Yet by the time Catholic emancipation came in 1829, and with the disappearance of any viable Spanish or French military threat, anti-Catholicism had lost its political underpinnings. Given the fact that Germans had often confounded the threats of British and Jewish capitalism, some small irony might be found in the leveling of British suspicions against German immigrants during the nineteenth century. Germans had been the largest immigrant group in England after 1851 until the influx of Eastern European and Russian Jews between 1888 and 1914, but what began as a concern over the influx of German clerks and waiters working for low wages the German “enemy within” became a paranoid fantasy with the spy mania of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As Panikos Panayi has documented, Britons proved themselves capable of mob violence and exclusionary politics during World War I. This took the form of vandalism against German-owned shops, looting, boycotts, calls for internment of all Germans, draconian acts blocking the trading rights or company registrations of German residents and the

\textsuperscript{77}Richard Aldous makes this point about Disraeli’s projected self-image in pursuit of literary and political success in \textit{The Lion and the Unicorn: Gladstone Vs Disraeli} (London: Hutchinson, 2006). Disraeli became the honored spiritual founder of the Conservative imperialist Primrose League in 1883, two years after his death.
social shunning of German families like that of Edgar Speyer, a prominent businessman and philanthropist who was forced to moved to New York under suspicion of multinational financial connections. Organizations like the British Empire Union, the Anti-German League, the National Party, the Vigilantes and the Alien Internment League called for the extirpation of Germans from British society. Books like Ian D. Colvin’s *Germans in England 1066-1598* (1915), Kirtan Varley’s *The Unseen Hand* (1916) and Arnold White’s *The Hidden Hand* (1917) supported the expulsionist agenda with complex conspiracy theories that rival in absurdity the infamous antisemitic *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (1903 in Russian; 1920s in English). But considering the linkage of this wartime anti-Germanism to an external national threat, and the double irony that the ultra-respectable Primrose League’s ritualized adoration of Disraeli coincided with its interwar ramp up of anti-alien rhetoric, it might be reasonable to conclude that British identity tended to be outwardly rather than inwardly projected.

Until very recently, British citizenship remained inclusive but also hierarchical, with classes ranging from full citizenship to imperial subject. Some British historians have argued

---


79. Ibid., 165, 172, 174, 202. Colvin saw the insidious hand of the German Hamsa (Hanseatic League merchants) behind the launch of the Spanish Armada in 1588.


81. The British Empire and Commonwealth left a legacy of multiple grades of citizenship, from full British nationality to British Overseas Citizen, British Protected Person, British National Overseas and British Dependent Territories Citizen—a smorgasbord of identities depending upon place of birth, some of which can be upgraded to full nationality. The designations of “Subject” and “Citizen of the UK and Colonies” have been dropped since 1949.

Krishnan Kumar and Richard Weight warned that English nationalism risks being hijacked by soccer hooligans waving the red and white flag of St. George or becoming aligned with reactionary racism along the lines of Enoch Powell’s 1960s rhetorical attack on anti-discrimination legislation.\footnote{Kumar, \textit{The Making of English National Identity}, 270.} On the other hand, Weight located in England’s libertarian heritage and parliamentary democracy the proper cure for resuscitating a more radical patriotism. Kumar argued that nostalgic cultural definitions of Englishness, from fox-hunting to exclusive ruralism, racial or linguistic purity or any sense of “owning” past cultural achievements should not be politicized. “A public, institutional definition of Englishness,” he added, would embrace and elucidate English civic principles simply taken for granted in Britishness.\footnote{Kumar, 270.}

\textbf{Temporal and Spatial Difference in British and German Identities}

The importance of official histories and territorial boundaries in defining cultural and political identities dates back to the ancient Hebrews and Greeks, as Hans Kohn argued, and such temporal and spatial conceptions varied considerably in British and German orientations. In

\footnote{\textit{Britishness since 1870} (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), 126.}

and 1983, respectively.
national histories, for example, Kevin Cramer has observed a striking contrast between
nineteenth-century British and German reevaluations of early modern developments. British
historians, he wrote, could mythologize the creation of a legitimate modern, religiously and
politically unified parliamentary state at a critical moment in history—through revisionist
interpretations of Oliver Cromwell, the English Civil War and subsequent Glorious Revolution
of 1688 leading to the Anglo-Scottish union of 1707 and later Acts of Union with Ireland in
1801. German historians, divided in their Protestant and Catholic sympathies and frustrated by
German disunity before Bismarck, differed in their assessments of the role played by ambitious
“warlord” and Catholic commander Albrecht Wallenstein during the Thirty Years War.
According to rumor and Friedrich Schiller’s extremely popular literary portrayal, Wallenstein
attempted to bring about German unity during the Thirty Years War before his assassination by
Habsburg agents. Not only did Germans lack a unifying and triumphal linear narrative like that
cherished by the British, Cramer argued, but the image of an “unrealized nation,” the obsession
with atrocity stories and the necessity for a “bold repudiation of old ways of thinking” also
became embedded in a national myth of redemption through sacrifice that persisted into the Nazi
era. 85

If a historical sense of providential triumphalism became a significant component of
British identity, something of the reverse occurred in Germany through the influence of Friedrich
Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s essay on The Use and Abuse of History (1874) coupled happiness and
freedom of action with the ability to forget or “feel unhistorically,” and his posthumously popular

85 Kevin Cramer, The Thirty Years’ War and German Memory in the Nineteenth Century,
Studies in War, Society, and the Military (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 96-97,
100, 186, 188.
Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None (1883-85) expanded this theme with the anti-historical, non-linear idea of “eternal recurrence.” According to Swiss psychologist Carl Jung, Nietzsche’s concerns over the constraining or distorting effects of history reflected a broader German desire to throw off the weight of the past. And despite Nietzsche’s personal cosmopolitanism and affected Anglophilia, Steven E. Aschheim has concluded that Nietzsche’s “Germanness” emerges in the apt conjunction of his iconoclasm with historical developments in Germany after 1890, from “the critical discontent and prophetic intimations pervading fin-de-siècle Wilhelmine society” to the “need for a negative foil” to post-World War II German identity. As a result of the predominant association of Nietzscheanism with pan-German militarism, however, the experience of World War I sharply divided Nietzsche’s canonization in Germany from his demonization among the western powers.

---

86 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche and Peter Fritzsche, Nietzsche and the Death of God: Selected Writings, Bedford Series in History and Culture (Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin, 2007), 54.

87 C. G. Jung and James L. Jarrett, Jung's Seminar on Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, abridged ed., Bollingen Series (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 373. In Jung’s analysis, Nietzsche had absorbed the materialistic individualism of the 1880s and elevated it into a philosophy justifying “ruthless egoism,” along with the Fichtean delusion that man had invented morality and could therefore will a transvaluation of values (pp. 93-95, 170).


89 Ibid., 85, 123-25, 131-35. Nietzsche became unfairly linked with Anglophobic imperialists, Heinrich von Treitschke and General Friedrich von Bernhardi. Bernhardi plainly touted superior German culture as a justification for continued economic and political expansion, which meant inevitable war with England. See Britain as Germany’s Vassal, trans. J. Ellis Barker (New York: Doran, 1914; original German, 1912), 36, 48-51, 55-57, 162-64. This book was published as a cheaper, popularized version of Germany and the Next War (1911), which went through nine editions before the outbreak of World War I.
Notwithstanding the early appeal of a Nietzschean “transvaluation of values” among English writers and readers seeking an antidote to Victorian sentimentalism and ethical crusading, Nietzsche’s iconoclastic and elitist interpretation of history provoked negative reactions in Britain.\textsuperscript{90} Even before the Nietzsche legend became widely associated with Prussian militarism and warmongering, George Bernard Shaw, who strongly disavowed any ideological connection between his \textit{Man and Superman} and the \textit{Übermensch}, scorned the ineptitude of Nietzsche’s attack on Christianity, modern democracy and socialism. Shaw derided Nietzsche’s obsession with “plots hatched by malignant philosophers to frustrate the evolution of the human race and mass the stupidity and brute force of the many weak against the beneficial tyranny of the few strong.”\textsuperscript{91} Although Nietzsche himself abhorred German nationalism, many of his writings contradicted liberal and democratic ideals central to British identity. Regardless of what Nietzsche’s unconventional and self-liberating message meant to Anglophone readers on a personal level, he came to symbolize German deviance from western models.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{90}Patrick Bridgwater, \textit{Nietzsche in Anglosaxony: A Study of Nietzsche's Impact on English and American Literature} (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1972), 14-15, 18-19. See also Bernd Magnus and Kathleen Marie Higgins, eds. \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche} (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 48 on Nietzsche’s perspectivism in \textit{Beyond Good and Evil} (1886) that reserved the right to philosophize only for those born or cultivated to it.

\textsuperscript{91}Ibid., 62-63. The quotation comes from a review of Nietzsche’s works in translation entitled “Nietzsche in English,” \textit{Saturday Review} 11 (1896). Although he borrowed from Nietzsche a single word for the title, Shaw’s comedic play dealt with women’s instrumentality in determining eugenics through the Life Force. Nietzsche had expounded upon the “slave morality” of Christianity in \textit{On the Genealogy of Morals} (1887).

\textsuperscript{92}Peter Bergmann, in Nietzsche, \textit{“the Last Antipolitical German”} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 82, argued that Nietzsche typified his generation by promoting “an anemic, bloodless vision of war,” and that he cultivated a “benign view of militarism” among the educated German middle classes by giving an “aesthetic meaning” to the expansion of military
Anglo-German territorial orientations constituted another basis for stereotyped difference, particularly in the dichotomy taken for granted between British sea and German land power. Contrary to the alarmism of popular fiction, Britain had no real cause to fear a German invasion by sea even as the Anglo-German naval rivalry picked up steam at the turn of the century. Nor did Britain pose any significant military threat to Germany, despite German concerns about “encirclement.” Culturally and strategically, the idea of a greater Britain, resting on the world-wide diffusion of Anglo-Saxon emigration and culture, quelled British anxieties about racial or imperial slippage. Charles Wentworth Dilke’s survey of British dominions in 1868 predicted a triumph of Saxondom over hostile “cheaper” races and a swelling of the English “race” to 300 million by 1970 that would make European rivals Italy, Spain, France and Russia seem mere “pigmies.” A German equivalent to this geopolitical security blanket existed in the Mitteleuropa idea of military and economic hegemony in Eastern Europe, beyond Germany’s most vulnerable border. Despite these seemingly compatible geopolitical visions, however, diplomatic conflict came in the form of naval rivalry and European alliances. Up until Britain’s entry into the Triple Entente with France and Russia in 1907, the staple of British foreign policy had been maintaining a free hand in the European power balance, but the German naval challenge, German military influence in Turkey and plans for a Berlin to Baghdad railway


changed that. Russia became the check on German designs in the East, with the new alliance system only confirming German fears of encirclement.

Divergent geopolitical visions created quite different paths for British and German identity. Britain could exploit the commercially successful imperial legacy of a Commonwealth of nations through two devastating world wars; Germany’s military occupation of the Eastern Front during World War I only served to warp German Kultur and identity, ultimately spawning unrealizable aspirations for totalitarian control that presaged Hitler’s Drang noch Osten a generation later. But the British overseas empire also left its own disturbing imprints on British colonial and postcolonial identity. Ian Baucom wrote about the incompatibility between tropes of ingroup purity and the realities of outgroup absorption that led to a tropicalization or hybridization of cultures. Baucom specifically referred to Indianized architectural elements of Bombay’s Victoria Terminus and the fictional image of the racially white but “gone native” Kim of Kipling’s classic novel. Even after his complete reeducation, or “sahibization,” Kim becomes more useful to the empire as a hybrid subject, able to obtain knowledge from the natives for the great imperial project of mapping India. For Kipling, Baucom argued, British imperial rule implied a dilution or loss of what it meant to be English.

Similarly, Simon Gikandi has discussed how the inseparability of metropole and periphery affected the formation of English identity: early through a triumphal imperial


Englishness that depended upon the alterity of colonial spaces and cultures and later through a modernist disenchantment with the philosophical inconsistencies and harsh realities of imperial rule. As part of the modernist reaction to imperialism, Joseph Conrad’s novels and stories pessimistically portrayed the delusions of imperial mentality and the malignant effects of untamable Africa on the European psyche and identity. Like Baucom, Gikandi emphasized the inherent contradiction between imperial expansion and racial or cultural exclusivity that has sustained a colonial and postcolonial English identity crisis. Gikandi concluded that cultural representations of the other became integral to the construction of English/British identity, often through themes of spatial or sensorial disorientation.97

An example of spatial othering in an Anglo-German context, when Germany could still be classed as a backward region, can be found in an oddly horrifying little tale entitled “A Night in a German Wood.”98 Warning English pedestrian tourists in 1852 never to embark on “such fascinating excursions” without a guide or a reliable compass, the author loses his way in the heavily-wooded Westphalian countryside one evening and winds up groping amidst a “darkness that might be felt” through field and wood. Unable to understand cryptic directions shouted from a solitary passing cart to “follow the foot of the woods,” he finds himself stumbling in circles and eventually marooned in a gloomy wood where he recalls:

. . . almost every branch I grasped in the dark to help me onward seemed crowded with snails, which smashed slimily under my shuddering hand! Glow worms were sparkling in the underwood in such myriads as I never witnessed before. . . .


98Chambers’s Edinburgh Journal 441 (June 12, 1852): 381-83.
Despite excessive fatigue he resolves to keep moving because:

. . . the dank grass, the trees dropping with dew, the creeping autumnal fog, and increasing cold, made me pause, and feel that to sleep in my light summer dress under such circumstances was, if not to die, at least to contract, during the night, such disease as would render existence not worth the having—racking rheumatism for life, or fever, or inflammation, in some of their many forms, and endless consequences.

He chances upon a village and finally arrives at his lodging in the wee hours, later reflecting on the way the German landscape had deceptively echoed local church bells and the “puzzling manner” in which German woods are parceled out: “shuffled together when the estates of several proprietors run into one another at a given point,” making them “singularly difficult to steer through them even by day, and to the uninitiated, quite impracticable by night.” Such spatial disorientation, with attendant dangers, served as testimony to German otherness.
4. EMPIRE, RACE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN

Theories concerning the connection between national identity and stereotyping largely derive from attempts to explain nineteenth-century popular fascination with national character and cultural myth. National stereotypes became part of the cultural mythology of modern Europe through their supporting role as pillars of an obsession with antiquity or what Mircea Eliade called “historigraphical anamnesis,” the effort to forge a link with primordial time as if through the remembrance of a past life. The drive to establish a national identity often led to abuses of historicism that devolved into fantastic speculations about race and ancient origins, false comparisons with antiquity and suppositious parallels between contemporaneous events and great historical dramas, such as the rise and fall of Rome and the barbarian invasions. But this European-wide phenomenon also stimulated an interest in national folklore. Romantic literature and popular folk tales enabled communion with the remote past for a much wider audience, and probably exercised a subtler and more tenacious influence, than didactic treatises on racial origins or national character.

---

The compression of historical time through national mythmaking in Britain, which complemented the “domestication” of geographical space as one of the constituents of imperialism, succeeded most convincingly through anglicized versions of the King Arthur legend and the socially rehabilitated image of the outlaw hero, Robin Hood. Stephanie L. Barczewski has explained how the resuscitation of these two medieval warrior-heroes furthered cultural nationalism in their appeal to diverse, ideologically opposed groups.\(^2\) The King Arthur legend lent itself to an imperialistic, muscular Christianity and missionary zeal as well as an aristocratic, conservative view of social reform, such as that championed by the Christian Socialists, who from the 1850s stressed community and the neo-feudal idea of mutual obligations and loyalties between classes in opposition to social equality and democratization through parliamentary reform. Arthurian heroes also became models for crusading, “knights-errant” of the realm who set out to right social injustices both at home and abroad. The chivalric metaphor not only invested imperial service with a sense of moral duty, as in the idea of rescuing backward peoples from slavery, superstition and oppression, but the Arthurian motif of Sir Perceval and Sir Galahad in quest of the Holy Grail also reinforced Christian themes and added sexual purity to
the gentlemanly virtues of courage, loyalty and compassion. 3 By contrast, the isolationist legend of Robin Hood emphasized social equality, independence, and justice for the oppressed through the threat of rebellion. Robin Hood became an icon for various working-class groups, including the extremely popular Friendly Societies. After thematic elements of social class conflict had been softened through the invention of aristocratic origins and allegiance to Richard I, Robin Hood became a national symbol of pride in English character and Anglo-Saxon political institutions that accorded with the Whig interpretation of history. 4 Because of the depth of their appeal to socially diverse groups of men, women and children, both the King Arthur and Robin Hood legends inculcated a sense of national and racial unity.

Cultural myths contain root-metaphors worthy of consideration for imagological studies because they reveal stereotypes to be not merely isolated images but part of a world view that includes national self-image. 5 This fact becomes paramount in avoiding the trap of ascribing to stereotypes too localized a significance based on “self-interest,” such as selling newspapers or

---

3Ibid., 62, 64-70, 220-21. Even as late as 1916 Baden Powell envisioned the Boy Scouts as young knights of the realm, saving the empire from the path of alleged Roman decadence. See Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, 133.

4Barczewski, Myth and National Identity, 77-79, 127. The exaggerated conflict between Saxon and Norman in later nineteenth-century treatments of Robin Hood, in comparison with Walter Scott’s Ivanhoe (1820), concurred with racial arguments vaunting the triumph of superior Saxon legal, political and religious institutions over allegedly corrupt, Norman-imposed systems, two examples being the Magna Carta and Henry VIII’s break with Rome. Newsome, Victorian World Picture, 189, cites William Theed’s 1868 statue of Victoria and Albert in Saxon garb as an illustration of how the English folklore revival depended as much on its didactic value as on profit motive and antiquarian interest.

5Firchow, Death of the German Cousin, 181-83, defines imagology as “the study of national/ethnic/racial/cultural images or stereotypes as they appear in literary contexts.” He also sees an inherent political rationale for studies of group images and preconceived ideas that “exercise a determinable influence on group behavior.”
But the obsession with myth also speaks volumes about the anxieties associated with a highly moralistic, hierarchical, authoritarian conformist mentality. The capacity of national myth for allowing a vicarious sense of self-worth, self-glorification or self-justification through mere identification with a larger group explains its success as both a propaganda medium and a means of establishing a moral basis for the perception of an orderly world. Whether by virtue of the struggle against evil or the dispensation of Providence, the entire British or Anglo-Saxon race and its imperial or national aims, or those of a particular subset class, could be exonerated in comparison with rivals. The Arthurian legend, the myth of the gentleman, and references to antiquity and race all supported an internal as well as external hierarchy that represented one of the sinews of empire.

**Victorian Mentalities, National Myth and Empire**

The moralistic component of British nationalism, which found expression in the idea of a providentially ordained mission, served both to justify British commercial and imperial expansion and, at the same time, to vilify the growth of competing empires. The broader implications of the Evangelical creed had established a moral basis for British acquisition of wealth and power, “that sense of being an Elect People which, set to a more blatant tune, became a principal element in Late Victorian Imperialism.”\(^7\) This moralistic self-aggrandizement

---

\(^6\)Gay, *Freud for Historians*, 105-7, argues, in a somewhat different context, that self-interest rarely appears as a purely rational means to a material end, but usually represents a complex blend of materialism, narcissism, and altruism, defined not as a universal motive but by the claims and actions of the individuals or groups in question.

\(^7\)Young, *Portrait of an Age*, 4. See also Houghton, *Victorian Frame of Mind*, 44-45. Mid-Victorian notions of physical and moral superiority, marking the British as an elect or chosen people, usually stood on comparisons with the French.
naturally implied a sense of ethnic superiority that shaped attitudes at the height of British imperialism. Peter Firchow wrote:

The consciousness of their innate moral superiority was the cause in the British public mind of the very natural conviction that any foreigner who opposed himself to the British will was *ipso facto* opposing the virtues of gentleness, chivalry, honor, sportsmanship, democracy and, in a word, civilization.⁸

The commingling of imperial status with positive perceptions of British national character underlay Germanophobic opinion in British reactions to German industrial, trade, colonial and naval rivalries.

Britain’s transition toward a “conscious policy of Imperialism” entailed a shift from expansion through commerce to a policy of annexation during the 1880s.⁹ Germany’s bid for colonial power, which began with the proclamation in 1884 of a protectorate over the region around Angra Pequena in Southwest Africa, and which was followed by inroads in East Africa, the Cameroons and elsewhere, provoked an annexationist response from a British government formerly reluctant to take on unnecessary burdens of empire.¹⁰ Britain, having already annexed

---

⁸Firchow, *Death of the German Cousin*, 177.


¹⁰Britain annexed Bechuanaland in order to provide a huge buffer territory to the east of German Southwest Africa and secured the unclaimed coastal territory between Natal and the
Cape Colony on the east side in order to block German access to the landlocked Transvaal. In 1888 the British East Africa Company was granted a charter in response to German incursions into Sultan of Zanzibar’s dominions. See Goodlad, British Foreign and Imperial Policy, 33-34.

11 William G. Hynes, The Economics of Empire: Britain, Africa and the New Imperialism 1870-95 (London, Longman Group, 1979), 68-69, 73-77, notes the lobbying efforts of the Manchester cotton merchants and other groups seeking guarantees of free trade in response to the encroachment of foreign rivals on colonial markets. Pressure from commercial groups reacting to fears of recession, overproduction and the need for new markets also motivated the British annexation of Upper Burma in 1886, which was justified as a means of protecting India (pp. 54-55). David McLean, in “Finance and ‘Informal Empire’ before the First World War,” Economic History Review, n.s. 29, no. 2 (May 1976): 295-305, argues that British “free trade imperialism” in Turkey, Persia and China adhered to the strategy of achieving political influence, and thwarting German or French influence, through the support of British commercial and financial ventures in an attempt to exercise “control without formal responsibility” (p. 305).

prestige, and “Little Englander” non-interventionists. Radical imperialist leaders Joseph Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilke supported the former position by urging a more “forward” policy against German intrusions in Africa.\textsuperscript{13} The appointment of Joseph Chamberlain as Colonial Secretary in 1895 meant the official endorsement of free trade imperialism and a more straightforward and ambitious policy of developing tropical colonies and dependencies as both a source of raw materials and a market for British industrial goods.\textsuperscript{14}

The new imperialism marked a departure from religious and moral considerations, which had characterized Gladstonian “reluctant” imperialism, toward a preoccupation with imperial and national power.\textsuperscript{15} Social reform in the 1890s acquired an imperialistic motive that superseded the evangelical zeal of 1830s Benthamite reformism, just as imperial defense superseded fear of revolution as an impetus for reform legislation.\textsuperscript{16} This change exacerbated a long-standing moral dilemma due to a perceived break from the idealism that had previously motivated missionary expeditions as well as domestic social policy during the reform era. Britain’s imperial destiny,

\begin{itemize}
\item T. A. Jenkins, \textit{The Liberal Ascendency, 1830-1886} (New York: St. Martin’s, 1994), 169-72.
\item Hynes, \textit{Economics of Empire}, 138-42. Chamberlain’s appointment ironically coincided with a general improvement in the economy, which undercut commercial imperial motives.
\item Jenkins, \textit{The Liberal Ascendency}, 162-64, remarks on the “revivalist” tone of support for Gladstone prior to 1880 and the popularity of his speeches denouncing the jingoistic excesses of “Beaconsfieldism,” or Disraeli’s imperial policy. The theme of atonement can thus be seen as an undercurrent moderating, if not totally opposed to, imperialism.
\end{itemize}
once celebrated and endowed with a sense of mission by Carlyle, Kingsley and others, had become an article of faith to many only despite Liberal pangs of conscience.\textsuperscript{17} The public perception of an innocent empire, a “loose and sometimes accidental association of units,” that characterized the early British Empire had laid the foundation for claims of an empire without design.\textsuperscript{18} With the policy shift toward annexation, the need arose to justify Britain’s “noble” experiment in order to satisfy ethical scruples and to counter German criticisms of British imperialism, such as those leveled by popular historian and lecturer Heinrich von Treitschke.\textsuperscript{19} The traditional idea of “innocent” commercial expansionism, consonant with a divine mission to overcome and displace old, corrupt, decadent and tyrannical empires, was being challenged—an idea that dated back to fifteenth and sixteenth-century anti-Hispanic, anti-Romish propagandistic appeals to providential favor.\textsuperscript{20} The rise to imperial preeminence had put Britain in a less defensible position morally vis-a-vis Germany: was not Germany the new David and England the

\textsuperscript{17}Young, \textit{Portrait of an Age}, 177, speaks of the “religious fervour” or “religious horror” indicative of opposing Victorian attitudes toward imperialism.


\textsuperscript{20}William S. Maltby, \textit{The Black Legend: The Development of Anti-Spanish Sentiment, 1558-1660}, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1971), 131, cites a 1660 London pamphlet entitled \textit{The Character of Spain: Or, an Epitome of Their Virtues and Vices}, published long after the cooling of military hostilities, as one of the early English treatises on national character. Despite a three-century time differential, some intriguing similarities can be found between sixteenth-century anti-Hispanism and nineteenth-century Germanophobia. Maltby mentions the prominent role of printed matter in demonizing the enemy (pp. 126-27), racial and moralistic religious arguments (pp. 104, 135), the portrayal of the English as liberators of native peoples (p. 128), and unfamiliarity with the target country (p. 138).
overgrown, decadent Goliath? This inversion of the imperial paradigm, which had formerly placed England as the heroic underdog, now cast England as the “weary Titan, staggering under the too-vast orb of his fate” or a “huge giant sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretched in every direction, which cannot be approached without eliciting a scream.”

During the long interval before this conceptual “turning of the tables,” however, neo-classicism and romanticism had allowed a reappraisal of antiquity and folklore that smoothed over associations with paganism offensive to Christian sensibilities. Thenceforth, the rich repositories of imagery supplied both by national myth and the classical model of empire would prove serviceable to moralistic perspectives on the realities of nineteenth-century imperialism.

Comparisons with Antiquity

Appreciation of the splendors of ancient Greece and Rome in an age of imperialism often led to identification with those ancient models of empire, a vantage point which placed Germany historically in opposition to “civilization.” In 1854 Kingsley’s Westward Ho! likened the exploits of the sixteenth-century English sea dogs to those of the Greek heroes at Troy, Marathon and Salamis. The tendency to draw comparisons with the classical world led one anonymous

21The statements made respectively by Joseph Chamberlain, while Colonial Secretary, and Thomas Sanderson of the Foreign Office are quoted in Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 229.

22Houghton, Victorian Frame of Mind, 288-91, has documented the infatuation with Hellenic culture, especially an admiration for the Greek ideal of rounded self-development, in writers like Matthew Arnold, J. A. Symonds and Walter Pater. While their ideas opposed John Stuart Mill’s more Romantic conception of individuality, both schools recognized Goethe, ironically, as a modern proponent of self-development. See also Richard Jenkyns, The Victorians and Ancient Greece (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 331-34 on Hellenism and empire.

23Charles Kingsley, Westward Ho!, chap. 1, 2-3, cited in Houghton, Victorian Frame of
writer to reason that hilly, coastal England spawned an active, Athenian-like race of busy traders while flat, dull, inland Germany produced conservative, Spartan agriculturalists. The analogy inferred British cultural superiority and portended inevitable conflict. Although patriotic writers extolled a British affiliation with Greek heroism and commercial acumen, the Roman/British capacity for empire building and administration became a more significant point of resemblance. In some cases neo-Romanism implied a repudiation of the Greek ideal which, in the realm of intellectual cultivation, befit the Germans only too well. Frederic Harrison wrote in 1871:

In their later ages the Greeks, with their matchless mental gifts, were of almost no account as a nation; whilst the Romans, in cultivation far their inferiors, were foremost by the ascendancy of their national genius. The real strength of a nation, especially in these days, consists not in its achievements in science or art, but in the degree to which its national will can command the sympathies and give shape to the wants of the age.

Placed in the midst of an alarmist polemic for an interventionist policy against Germany during the siege of Paris at the close of the Franco-Prussian war, Harrison’s paean to Rome deftly assuaged British imperial pride while paying tribute to the undeniable achievements of German

\[\text{Mind, 324.}\]

\[24\text{See “French, Germans and English,” British Quarterly Review 13 (February 1851): 348.}\]

\[25\text{Even the greatest of Germanophiles, Thomas Carlyle, had called the English a “dumb people” because, “Like the Old Romans, and some few others, their Epic Poem is written on the Earth’s surface.” But he also warned of the “Berserkir-rage” caged up within the breasts of these “silent” descendants of the ancient Teutons. See Carlyle’s Past and Present (London: Chapman & Hall, 1843) chap. 5, “The English,” quoted in English Prose of the Victorian Era, ed. Charles Frederick Harrold and William D. Templeman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), 224, 228.}\]

scholarship. However, statements like “scratch the Junker, and you will find the lanzknecht [sic]” and “the fact that every German is a soldier, is itself a proof of a lower type of civilization” conveyed the gist of Harrison’s message: namely, that England’s “duty” lay with the cause of civilization against purportedly barbaric Germany.\(^{27}\) Identification of Germany with Rome, when it occurred, tended to be negative. At least one writer found “something of the temper of ancient Rome about the German Empire” in its fondness of “massiveness,” dramatic effect and pugnacity—elements which smacked of paganism.\(^{28}\) Most comparisons with antiquity, however, accorded with Harrison’s view and the idea of German reversion to ancestral pagan beliefs.\(^{29}\) This impression cropped up in various contexts, from criticism of Goethe to ridicule of German superstition and comments about “a pagan congregation of devout enthusiasts of the Wagnerian cult,” or “a considerable touch of paganism” in the kaiser’s “ardent ancestor-worship.”\(^{30}\)

\(^{27}\)Harrison, National and Social Problems, 63-69.


\(^{29}\)Hoover, God, Germany & Britain, 40-41, cites Louis Untermeyer, Heinrich Heine: Paradox and Poet (New York, 1937), 1:229, about the famous poet’s often quoted 1834 prophecy that Germans were “reverting to type” and abandoning Christianity, and he remarks on the English clergy’s perception of German neopaganism gained from Queen’s College Professor of Modern History, J. A. Cramb’s Germany and England (London, 1914).

\(^{30}\)Mander, Our German Cousins, 137, refers to Coleridge’s hatred of Goethe’s paganism. Dawson, Germany and the Germans 1:376, reported that Ascension Day, the fortieth day after Easter, used to be sacred to Donar, the pagan German god of thunder, and that superstitious peasants would hide scissors and needles during storms lest harm would befall the crops. The quotes are from Katherine Blyth, “Sketches Made in Germany—No. 1,” Nineteenth Century 40 (September 1896): 386, who hints at German paganism being in competition with Christianity, and Charles Lowe, “The Kaiser and His Family: A Study in Heredity,” Pall Mall Magazine 25 (October 1903): 150.
Imperialist identification with Rome continued throughout the latter nineteenth century from the Don Pacifico affair of 1850, when Palmerston had echoed a popular sentiment by declaring that, just as Rome protected any Roman citizen who could say *civis Romanus sum*, “the watchful eye and the strong arm of England will protect a British subject in whatever land he may be.”

In 1895 Chamberlain exhorted the British people to “build railroads [in Africa] as the Romans built roads,” and voiced the conviction that “the only dominion which can in any way compare with the British dominion is, of course, the old empire of the Romans.”

Lord Rosebery posed the rhetorical question in 1900, “Are we, like the Romans, not merely a brave, but also a persistent, business-like, alert, governing people?”

Even those who debunked British affinities with Rome sought out differences in order to show that Britain would prevail where its ancient counterpart failed. “If Imperial Rome had held at her disposal a small fraction of that mental vigour which is at the disposal of England now,” wrote J. B. Bury in 1896, “her Empire would never have succumbed, as it did, to the Germans.”

____________________

31Don Pacifico was a Moorish Jew and British subject whose claims against the Greek government prompted an anti-Semitic mob to burn his Athens residence. British support eventually led to an embargo and seizure of Greek vessels in the Piraeus followed by Greek capitulation. See *Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), 3rd series, 112 (1850): 443-44, the debate on Don Pacifico and Greece, 25 June 1850, quoted in Kenneth Bourne, *The Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1838-1902* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), “Selected Documents,” 301-2. Two days later Gladstone replied, “What then, Sir, was a Roman citizen? He was the member of a privileged class; he belonged to a conquering race, to a nation that held all others bound down by the strong arm of power.” Gladstone deplored the idea that the British were to be “the universal schoolmasters.” *Hansard’s*, 575-76, quoted in Bourne, 306.

32*Daily Telegraph*, 24 August 1895, 3.


34“The British and Roman Empire,” *Saturday Review*, 81 (June 1896): 645. Some
It would be inaccurate to say that all admirers of Rome despised Germany or that all Germanophiles necessarily detested Rome and its Latin “derivative,” France, but references to Rome versus Germany did attain a new historical significance in the minds of many nineteenth-century British writers and readers, usually to the detriment of Germany after 1871. Germanophobes constantly hammered home the theme of an archetypal conflict between civilization and barbarism. Written at the high point of post Boer War Anglo-German hostility, Kipling’s inflammatory poem, “The Rowers,” with its use of the epithets “Goth” and “Hun” for Italy and Germany, implied Britain’s abrogation of imperial responsibility as the torchbearer of classical civilization:

And ye tell us now of a secret vow
Ye have made with an open foe!

The dead they mocked are scarcely cold,
Our wounded are bleeding yet -
And ye tell us now that our strength is sold
To help them press for a debt!

In sight of peace - from the Narrow Seas
O’er half the world to run -
With a cheated crew, to league anew
With the Goth and the shameless Hun!36

Anglophile German historians of the mid-nineteenth century celebrated the idea of an English “New Rome” in opposition to similar French claims, an argument that enhanced the appeal of Anglo-German racial kinship while negating feelings of cultural inferiority to the French. See McClelland, German Historians in England, 104-5.

35The distinction between Roman and Teuton, or Goth, also applied to literary and religious comparisons of Classicism versus Romanticism and Christianity versus neopaganism, respectively. See Madame de Staël-Holstein, Germany, trans., O. W. Wight, 2 vols. (New York: Derby, 1861), 1:198-201. See also Hoover, God, Germany, and Britain, 40-41.

The classical metaphor provided a venerable framework upon which to hang distinctions and reaffirm traditional racial and national stereotypes, but it also served to admonish as well as bolster imperial pride. Only two months before Rosebery’s empire speech George Bernard Shaw had warned his compatriots against the dangers of following in the footsteps of ill-fated Rome.37 This pessimistic note sounded the ambivalence that darkened late-Victorian attitudes behind a facade of imperial self-assurance. The theme of imperial decline ran counter to early Victorian optimism about success through laissez-faire economics and the mirage of what later came to be called “splendid isolation.”38 The new strain of pessimism developed not only in response to Bismarckian Germany’s successful defiance of English political and economic models, but also in view of increasing imperial rivalry and the need to protect trade and preserve British power through alliances that might threaten the diplomatic free hand and possibly commit Britain to a future European war.39

appeared in the *Times*, 22 December 1902, kindled public outrage at British collaboration with Germany and Italy in blockading the Venezuelan coast amid reports that German warships had bombarded forts and sunk several gunboats. Kipling clearly referred to the bitter feelings aroused by German criticism of British troop conduct during the Boer War and the concurrent hysteria over German Anglophobia. The poem’s title appears to be a play on “The Rovers,” the title of an anti-German satirical drama of a century earlier. See also de Staël-Holstein, *Germany*, 1:400, where she refers to Attila as a German hero.

37 *Fabianism and the Empire* (London: Grant Richards, 1900), 53, cited in Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform*, 130. In this famous manifesto Shaw argues against Free Trade because it would lead to Britain’s dependence on her colonies and to a fate presaged by that of imperial Rome. Both Shaw and Rosebery used the Roman analogy to support an imperialist policy from opposite perspectives.


39 See Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980* (Glasgow: Fontana Paperbacks, 1981), 118-139, on
The rise of both America and Germany complicated the future of British world leadership and infused the issue of social reform with a new sense of urgency. Joseph Chamberlain and the Tariff Reform League emphasized protection of British industry for the maintenance of empire and welfare of the working class, while the Liberal Imperialists and Fabians argued for the improvement of working class conditions in order to breed a healthy, vigorous, imperial race. In either case, imperialists rejected free trade, “scoffed at Cobdenite or socialist proclamations of international friendship” and urged preparation against the “inevitable challenge of German power.”

Fear of Britain’s “inevitable” decline, along the lines of Gibbon’s Rome, became a constant source of anxiety which peaked during the Boer War with its supposed revelations of “racial degeneration” in anaemic combat troops. Moreover, the promise of imperial greatness seemed to depend upon technical education, military efficiency, and solving the inequities facing an expanded industrial working class, problems for which the German model offered a number of possible solutions. For example, the German Realschulen, the General Staff, and Bismarck’s State Socialism (i.e., worker’s old age, sickness and accident insurance) were widely discussed and supported by imperialists in relation to needed reforms. While it provoked interminable sermonizing and opprobrium, the German model left no doubt as to the necessity of action, but the idea of a federated empire resting on state protection of industry and labor represented an imperialist holy grail nestled amidst the horrors of Germanization. Fears of retaliatory “dear”

developments that determined Britain’s pre-World War I alliances with France and Russia rather than with the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy.


bread and low wages galvanized working-class and Liberal opposition to both tariff reform and the ideal of German industrial expansion and its “Germanness.”

The Racial Argument

The twin specters of imperial decline and racial or moral degeneration sustained the romantic myth of Teutonic purity in opposition to classical models in general and decadent Rome in particular. The myth of German racial and moral purity, one of the earliest themes making up the German stereotype, can be traced in modern times to the late-renaissance rediscovery of Tacitus’s Germania. Written in 98 CE, this polemical ancient ethnography idealized German valor, love of freedom, simplicity and marital fidelity in contrast to decadent Rome. The lasting power of the Tacitean stereotype derived from the simplified Roman reference to unconquered regions east of the Rhine and north of the Danube and to its depiction of the myriad tribes subsumed under the name Germani as a unique, indigenous people with essentially homogenous and surprisingly admirable features, character, customs and religious beliefs. Exaggerated by sixteenth-century German humanists and co-opted by Anglo-Saxonists, the idealized portrait of

42Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform, 118. See also Frank McDonough, The Conservative Party and Anglo-German Relations, 1905-1914 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 100.


44Regarding the Germans as aboriginal and unalloyed with other races through immigration, Tacitus wrote: “who would leave Asia, or Africa, or Italy, for Germany with its wild country, its inclement skies, its sullen manners and aspect, unless indeed it were his home?” See Hadas, Tacitus, 709.
Tacitus furnished a legacy of Germanic racial and moral superiority that, once connected with the idea of Anglo-German racial kinship, would prolong the life of Germanophilia in England. 45

Germanicism as a component of Anglo-Saxonism, which had begun to rival the earlier myth of British Trojan origins in the late Elizabethan era, would reach its most exuberant expression during the mid-nineteenth century. Historians and writers including Lord Macaulay, Sharon Turner, Thomas Carlyle, John Kemble, Goldwyn Smith, John R. Green, William Stubbs, James Anthony Froude, Charles Kingsley, Edward Freeman, and Lord Acton waxed eloquent on the greatness of the Anglo-Saxon race and its Germanic racial and political heritage. 46 Kingsley, probably the most exuberant proponent of this school, believed devoutly in the Teutonic origin of English law and constitutionalism and saw in the English working man a descendant of the ancient Germanic tribesman:

The nearest type which we can see now is, I fancy, the English sailor, or the English navvy. A great, simple, honest, baby—full of power and fun, very coarse and plain

45 The earliest historical works championing a Germanic heritage, and adhering closely to Tacitus, were William Camden’s Britannia (1586) and Remaines Concerning Britain (1605), followed by Richard (Rowlands) Verstegen’s Restitution of Decayed Intelligence (1605) which ran to five editions by 1673. Verstegen had dropped his family name and adopted his grandfather’s German name. Anglo-Saxonism also figured prominently in numerous revisions of the Norman Conquest throughout the seventeenth century and in panegyrics to Germanic racial origin such as John Hare’s St. Edward’s Ghost (1647) and Richard Hawkins’s A Discourse of the Nationall Excellencies of England (1658). See Hugh A. MacDougall, Racial Myth in English History: Trojans, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons (Montreal: Harvest House, 1982), 45-49, 59-63, 81-82.

46 The Germanic origins of English political freedom, a notion derived from the description in Tacitus of the Saxon Witan or open council, appeared in the writings of Baron de Montesquieu, David Hume and others during the eighteenth century. See MacDougall, Racial Myth in English History, pp.91-92. Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 114-15, discusses the racially Germanophilic historical school that developed at Oxford under Thomas Arnold, William Stubbs, T. H. Green and others even before the advent of general admiration for German scholarship.
spoken at times: but if treated like a human being, most affectionate, susceptible, even sentimental and superstitious; fond of gambling, brute excitement, childish amusements in the intervals of enormous exertion; quarrelsome among themselves, as boys are, and with a spirit of wild independence which seems to be strength; but which, till it be disciplined into loyal obedience and self-sacrifice, is mere weakness; and beneath all a deep practical shrewdness, an indomitable perseverance, when once roused by need.47

Citing Tacitus, Kingsley deemed stereotypical chaste self-restraint the source of Teutonic virility and moral strength that defeated the supposedly corrupt and degenerate Romans.48 As a warning to his contemporaries he cast England in the role of decadent Rome, quoting an absurdly ethnocentric analogy on the subject of moral decay: “No tongue may tell the orgies enacted, with the aid of French cooks, Italian singers, and foreign artistes of all sorts.”49 That Kingsley really intended a special distinction for Anglo-Saxons becomes clear in his saga of the struggle between the Germanic “Forest Children” and the Roman “Trolls,” where he took pains to separate “false, vain, capricious” Franks (French), “lazy” Goths (Italians), and “cruel” but proud Visigoths (Spanish) from the allegedly cruel but “most pure” Saxons. Imagining a sequel to the Niebelungenlied in the Teutonic quarrel over the spoils of Rome, Kingsley considered the English ancestors fortunate to have left the continent of Europe, and to have preserved “unstained the old Teutonic faith and virtue” by avoiding such a demoralizing conflict.50 Thus, even at its


48Ibid., 50-51.


50Kingsley, The Roman and the Teuton, 8-9, 17. Saxons were cruel only because they were indifferent to passion and sensuality.
height Teutophilia contained the seeds of its own destruction through racial hair-splitting that would acquire even greater political and moral significance to British observers of post-Bismarckian, expansionist Germany.

The racial component of the Tacitean stereotype gained credibility during the nineteenth century through the desire to equate contemporary political or cultural entities, and national character, with preconceived over-simplifications of the distant past. British racialists depended upon Tacitus, for example, when asserting the superiority of “pure” northern Teutonic peoples over “mongrel”, decadent southern Latin races or, conversely, comparing the deficits of German racial homogeneity unfavorably with more heterogenous Anglo-Saxons. Nineteenth-century ethnologists supported the stereotypical polarity between Northern “industrial” and Southern “sensual” Europeans by claiming for Anglo-Saxons and Teutons the successful qualities of the former (i.e., reason, industry, thrift, morality) and disowning traits associated with the imperial and moral decline of the latter (i.e., emotionality, laziness, extravagance, eroticism).51 Such arguments served to prognosticate or rationalize the imperial or economic predominance of Anglo-Saxon and Germanic Europeans according to a deterministic racial hierarchy, often based on pseudo-scientific assumptions about cranial capacity or skull shape.52 The further assertion of

51In an 1898 review of two books on racial/national character, Edmond Demolins’ À quoi tient la superiorité des Anglo-saxons (Paris, 1897) and Di Guglielmo Ferrero’s L’Europa Giovane: Studie Viaggi nel paesi del Nord (Milan, 1897), the traits of chastity (with a reference to Tacitus) and the capacity to endure monotony made the key difference that gave rise to the economic superiority of the Northern over the Southern European races. See Gwynn, “The Success of the Anglo-Saxons,” Edinburgh Review, Reprinted in Living Age 217 (April-June 1898): 353-55, 360. The persistence of the North/South racial dichotomy, which figured prominently in sixteenth-century anti-Hispanism (see Maltby, Black Legend, 104), is also discussed in Firchow, Death of the German Cousin, 25, and Mander, Our German Cousins, 52.

52On craniometry and the selective manipulation of criteria to obtain prejudicial results
British superiority over Germans and Scandinavians was justified by emphasizing the unique heritage of the British racial mixture. The more “plastic” character resulting from a happy confluence of Teutonic (Nordic), Iberian (Mediterranean) and Mongolian (Alpine) qualities, so one argument ran, set Anglo-Saxons apart from their racially “pure” Germanic cousins (see table 3, p. 129). Innate flexibility and adaptability resulting from this racial fusion supposedly enabled the British to avoid religious and socio-political extremism and to “bend to dynastic and political storms in a manner which it is to be feared the pure Teuton may find difficult to achieve under similar circumstances.”

The Tacitean stereotype of racial distinctiveness lost cogency not only because the argument for racial purity cut both ways, but also because the false sense of racial and cultural unity ascribed to the Germans was controverted by observations of German racial and political diversity. The “network of boundaries” and mixture of races that defined the small states of “middle” Germany seemed symptomatic of a national defect supposed to be the outgrowth of political particularism. Even the larger states of Prussia and Bavaria, which embodied the


Nottige Charles Macnamara, *Origin and Character of the British People* (London: Smith, Elder, 1900), 164, 213-14, and especially 222-23, where he considers the unalloyed Teutonic strain to be overly aggressive and self-destructive. The rationalization of national stereotypes through pre-conceived racial categories based on craniometry can also be seen, for example, in the supposed Ibero-Mongoloid mixture that formed the “lazy, rollicking, merry Irishman of the caricaturist” (p. 208).

Ibid., 226. Herbert Spencer and others propounded the idea of racial mixture as the key to adaptability and survival of the fittest during the 1870s and 80s, but benefits did not apply to intermarriage between blacks and whites. See Robert C. Bannister, *Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Thought* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979), 189, 229.

Quoted from William Howitt, *Life in Germany* (London: Routledge, 1849, first edition

129
The Student Life of Germany (London, 1841), 178. See also “Peasant Life in Germany,” Westminster Review 66 (July-October 1856): 57-58, on how German peasants, through allegiance to race and province, lacked “individualization in features and expression.”

stereotypical opposites of North and South Germany, represented a racial and cultural antithesis.

Prussians were considered to be infused with Slavic blood and caricatured as aloof, warlike, orderly and domineering in contrast to gregarious, artistic and effusive Bavarians, who more resembled the French and Italians. Although the critique of pure Teutonism proved more acerbic than the counter-theme of German racial and cultural heterogeneity, the prevalence of both views

allowed condemnation of German national character as either in-bred and obnoxious or polymorphous and lacking distinction.\textsuperscript{56}

As older Germanophilic notions of racial kinship gave way to a clarification of Anglo-German differences, the very proximity of Anglo-Saxons and Teutons in the Anglocentric racial hierarchy, taken together with the old saw about Anglo-German religious and cultural affinities, ironically provoked a kind of national one-upmanship waged through the relentless pursuit of distinctions. British conceptions of racial character during the nineteenth century generally imbibed Anglo-Saxons with all of the Teutonic, or German, virtues and none of the vices. Britons, for example, had supposedly inherited mechanical ability, deliberation, ethics and sexual morality without the plodding stolidity, inflexibility, gloominess and pugnacity of the Germans. Imperial rivalry exacerbated the obsession with Anglo-German racial and cultural distinctions on both sides of the North Sea. Treitschke, for one, played a major part in converting the sentimental myth of Anglo-German affinity to one of perpetual rivalry when he began to formulate a contrast between competing “Anglo-Saxon” and “Teutonic” cultures, a theme that resonated with Pan-Germanists.\textsuperscript{57} On the British side, one author voiced a typical late nineteenth-century attitude: that England, since the time of the Norman Conquest, had become

\textsuperscript{56}When Matthew Arnold criticized Richard Strauss’s \textit{Sinfonia Domestica} as a typically “ugly and ignoble” product of Teutonic \textit{Kultur}, his words found favor with audiences for whom Teutonism had become synonymous with archaism and tactlessness. See Barbara Tuchman, \textit{The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War, 1890-1914} (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 373.

the home of “that heterogenous but most distinctive race, to whom the Germans were and have ever since been foreigners, whatever their share in a common ancestry.”

British assertions of racial superiority produced other absurdities, such as the contention that Frederick the Great owed his greatness to English genes, but they also exposed a firm belief in the inherent moral ascendancy of British racial character which accompanied an equally strong distrust and dislike of Germany on many fronts. Righteous indignation over German trade practices, for example, stemmed from the contention that superior breeding and morals prevented British tradesmen and merchants from producing and selling inferior goods, and thus from competing effectively in foreign markets against cheaper German products. In diplomatic relations, an air of condescension and suspicion towards the German character accompanied the assumption that a non-aggression pact with Germany would simply become a licence for German bullying. The hardening of racial attitudes during the Victorian era became an indispensable


59 W.H. Wilkins, “The First Queen of Prussia,” Nineteenth Century 49 (April 1901): 678. Sophie Charlotte, sister to George I and maternal grandmother of Frederick the Great, married Prussia’s Frederick I, who was described as deformed and “of anything but an amiable reputation.” She, on the other hand, had English blood and possessed, “in no small degree, the beauty, dignity, and personal charm characteristic of the race, which even the infusion of sluggish German blood could not mar” (p. 667).


component of imperialism to which comparative craniologies and evangelical missions lent an air of scientific and moral validity. The “romantic racism” that defined an intra-European hierarchy based on national character merely represented the upper tier of a broader prejudice against “primitive” non-Europeans who lacked any claim to a “civilized” past and thus became the hapless victims of imperial “philanthropy.” Placement of British Anglo-Saxons at the top of this racial hierarchy, whether by virtue of “pure” Aryan lineage or a wholesome European racial synthesis, provided an organic rationale for imperial hegemony to which the United States, not Germany, could logically be seen as Britain’s Anglo-Saxon heir apparent.

While stereotypes served as building blocks for a hierarchical world view, which temporarily reduced anxiety and increased “self-esteem” through the denigration of other nationalities, they also embodied categorical “truths” which ultimately supported a pseudo-biological, “Darwinian” interpretation of world history. Well before the publication of Darwin’s *Origin of Species* in 1859, theories about social evolution, lacking any scientific basis, maintained contemporary conservative racist and sexist ideologies. Blunt statements about the

---


64 Peter Dickens, *Social Darwinism: Linking Evolutionary Thought to Social Theory* (Buckingham, UK; Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000), 7-8, 15, 19, 21, refers mainly to
extermination of weak races and the inevitability of mass suffering, however, not only provided ammunition for virulent racists and militant imperialists, but in the process also stigmatized social Darwinism itself as an anti-Enlightenment, anti-Utopian, and “un-Christian” excuse for social and imperial exploitation. Neo-Darwinist geneticism of the 1890s disturbed the dream of evolutionary progress through environmental means. It also provoked a moralistic reaction from neo-Lamarckian social reformers who targeted the influence of German biologists August Weismann and Ernst Haeckel and the so-called “tough” school of Darwinistic Nietzscheans. The equation of Nietzsche with barbarism, Machtpolitik and Prussian militarism constituted an important facet of the negative Social Darwinian (originally anti-Spencerian) stereotype. Despite the fact that Nietzsche ridiculed Darwin’s theory, and despite the existence of a contrary or “tender” view of Nietzsche, the common attitude prevailed that Nietzsche, as H. L. Mencken

the work of Herbert Spencer, who coined the term “survival of the fittest” ten years before the publication of Darwin’s famous work, but also mentions John Lubbock, who applied Darwin’s idea of natural selection to Eurocentric racial theory.

Bannister, Social Darwinism, 3, 9-11, 53-54, cites quotations from Spencer’s Social Statics, originally published in 1850, and Social Statics, Abridged and Revised (1891) to show that he strongly reaffirmed his original conception of ruthless natural selection despite reform efforts motivated by his theories.

Bannister, Social Darwinism, 132, 138. The new interest in genetics was spurred by Weismann’s theories on heredity (germ plasm) and the rediscovery of Gregor Mendel’s experimental work. Haeckel synthesized folkish and racist romanticism with social Darwinist ideology into a monistic view of man as totally subject to natural forces, a view that spurned the scientific validity of historical and theological values. Although some British and American writers rivaled the extremity of Haeckel’s ideas, the weaker political tradition of liberal individualism in Germany probably allowed for greater propagation of the “collective Darwinism” that was to become the core of Nazi ideology. See George J. Stein, “Biological Science and the Roots of Nazism,” American Scientist, 76 (January-February 1988): 55-56.

Bannister, Social Darwinism, 202, 208-9.
expressed it, was to Darwin, Spencer and Huxley “what Beelzebub is to a trio of bad boys.”

Even if “Darwinism was a convenient brush with which to tar racists, and vice versa,” the moral and scientific controversy surrounding the “survival of the fittest” doctrine involved questions of attitude and policy that rarely challenged the paradigm of a racial hierarchy. Social imperialists and social Darwinist reformers employed the same prejudices as the more extreme polygeneticists and militant imperialists, but toward opposite ends. The fact that both adherents and critics of social Darwinism could find common ground in vilifying the Germans typifies the double-edged nature of late nineteenth-century British Germanophobia and its logical absurdity.

Social Darwinism, eugenics and the fixation on racial distinctiveness reflected concerns over racial degeneration and the belief that evolution somehow entailed a diminution of racial vigor. Paradoxically, these fears and social imperialist angst stimulated calls for emulating the German model, particularly in education. It is nevertheless interesting that War Secretary, Lord Haldane, felt it necessary in 1901 to qualify his pitch for educational reform according to the German example with praise for the allegedly superior courage and doggedness of Anglo-Saxons in order to dispel the idea of a “decaying race.”

Despite reluctant acknowledgment of superior training methods, resistance to the German educational model and a refuge for vanity could be


69Bannister, Social Darwinism, 184-86. Darwin’s Descent of Man reinforced the notion of a hierarchical progression from barbarism to civilization, but carefully avoided a racial interpretation.

70Polygeneticists believed in separate origins rather than phenotype or genetic variations for different races, as if different species of humans existed.

found in ethnocentric arguments and the shadowy realm of national character. Mid-century distinctions between the German methodical “creature of form” and the self-educated, adaptable Englishman resonated fifty years later in charges that German higher education cultivated the head at the expense of character.\textsuperscript{72} The publication of Edwin Earnest William’s \textit{Made in Germany} in 1896, a troubling discourse on Britain’s eroded industrial base, rekindled advocacy for educational reform along German lines, but resistance to the “tyrannical” Prussian model continued to reflect hostility toward the alleged evils of state control, deleterious effects on character, and the basic incompatibility of national temperaments.\textsuperscript{73}

Belief in race as the primary determinant of character implied that reversion to ancestral type was inevitable and that social and national policy should be formulated on a racial basis.\textsuperscript{74} Despite the mirage of diplomatic security based on Anglo-German racial affinity, the biological view of imperial rivalry as a competition between races pitted England against Germany as


\textsuperscript{74} Macnamara, \textit{Origin of the English People}, 212, for example, saw a “reversion to the Iberian type at the expense of the Teutonic element” in the smaller stature and darker complexion of London’s laboring classes. A stint in the British navy was prescribed to reverse this tendency (p. 231). He also predicted a time “not far distant when vast hordes of the Mongolian or the brachycephalic race, will again overwhelm China and ultimately the whole of Asia” (p. 220).
“natural rivals” rather than friendly cousins.\textsuperscript{75} Years before Joseph Chamberlain’s failed efforts to promote an Anglo-Saxon/Teutonic alliance with Germany, the advocacy for imperial federation and preparation for inevitable war with Germany had acquired a racial basis, one derived from the pseudo-Darwinian idea of nations as “species in the making.”\textsuperscript{76} Ford Maddox Ford mockingly described the inevitable outcome of a future determined according to the dictates of national character with a warning about the peril of English slackness:

\begin{quote}
We are the people who will win terrific victories against enormous odds—in the game of tennis, or in the other game of tennis that used to be played with stone balls. But in the end, some Prussian, some Jew, or some Radical politician will sleeplessly get the best of us and take away the prizes of our game.\textsuperscript{77}
\end{quote}

**Conscious Stereotyping in the Nineteenth Century**

The term “stereotype,” once strictly printers’ jargon referring to a metal plate used for imprinting identical images, appeared occasionally in either a literary or national context during the nineteenth century. In 1890 Gladstone referred to Irish “discontent stereotyped in the experience of generations and of centuries” as a warning against the futility of Conservative half-way measures on the issue of Home Rule.\textsuperscript{78} In 1893 the writer of an article on English characters in French fiction mentioned “the Englishman of the French stage who (except he be taken from

\textsuperscript{75}MacDougall, *Racial Myth in British History*, 128-29, writes that the myth of a racial alliance with Germany lingered on in moribund form until the outbreak of World War I.

\textsuperscript{76}[A Biologist], “A Biological View of Our Foreign Policy” *Saturday Review* 81 (February 1896): 118-20.

\textsuperscript{77}Ford Maddox Hueffer [Ford], “High Germany 1: How It Feels to Be Members of Subject Races,” *Saturday Review* 112 (30 September 1911): 422. Ford’s name change represents his growing anti-Germanism and his resignation to peer pressure. See Firchow, *Death of the German Cousin*, 90-99.

\textsuperscript{78}Daily Telegraph, 23 January 1890, 5.
history) is for the most part a commonplace and stereotyped figure.” Some acknowledgment of stereotypical distortions entered the public media when British writers explored the parameters of their own national image through the perceptions of continental observers (figure 5). An article published in 1890, entitled “John Bull Abroad,” applauded a shift in French caricature from the typical English “milord, . . . triste, prudish, and gauche” to a more flattering, cosmopolitan image. But the author himself portrayed the English tourist as a tweed-suited, pipe-smoking, recklessly spending rowdy who patronized “artistic nudities in the Rue de Rivoli” and terrorized waiters, “whom he abuses or knocks down, and, with a lordly air, throws them a napoleon wherewith to buy plaster.” This reflected self-image of a swashbuckling, plucky “‘Arry of world-wide fame,” who “can seldom divest himself of his English spectacles in looking on foreign habits and customs,” and who deserved reproach for letting his patriotism overrun the boundary of prejudice, nevertheless received a favorable comparison with the German:

. . . if his reputation for grand seigneur is on the wane, so also is his reputation for boorishness, insolence and self-sufficiency. This he has handed on to the German, who has inherited the reputation, and its consequent unpopularity, with this difference, that whereas John Bull, if he incurred dislike and ill-feeling, had a golden ointment wherewith to salve the wounds he inflicted, Herr von Donnerblitzen exaggerates the insolence and lacks the salve.80


80. John Bull Abroad,” Temple Bar, reprinted in Living Age 187 (October-December 1890), 224, 227-28. The last quotation typifies the conception of Germany as a backward or
If the general impression existed that the English unfairly saw the French as vain “fribbles and fools,” and that the French likewise viewed the British as “brutes and barbarians” with a “reputation for being disagreeable,” a similar revelation occasionally surfaced that images of Germans might be based more on English expectations and fears than on reality. As early as 1864 one writer for Cornhill Magazine suggested that German professors had been unfairly characterized as “unpractical” when viewed from the vantage point of the “practical” English mind. During the 1890s a few articles even acknowledged a correspondence between changing times and changing impressions of Germany. The stereotypical Old German, a “sluggish, phlegmatic, prosaic sort of person, with few ideas beyond his pipe and his beer” had metamorphosed into a being “excitable, impulsive, and quick-tempered, with an abnormally long tongue,” a “curious mixture of prose and poetry,” of “cynical common sense and visionary sentimentality,” who had “little self-control, no reserve at all.”

Famed journalist, E. J. Dillon, noted a similar change in the German image after the Kruger Telegram episode in 1896. “Honest, modest, Protestant Germany,” he wrote, the “mainstay of peace and order,” had become “the only blustering, scheming, and really dangerous power, on the Continent.” When referring to political freedoms, observed Dillon, “we are wont to sneer at the Germans as slaves.”


82 “German Professors,” Cornhill 10 (July-December 1864): 352.

83 “Cousins German,” Cornhill 17 (September 1891): 295.
Labeling the Germans “earnest monks of science,” he then sought to clear up a misconception:

“In spite of all our withering denunciations of the fair-haired Teuton, in his invidious capacity as underpaid clerk and commercial tactician, he has no serious rival, all the world over, in the earnest pursuit of ideals and the self-denying cultivation of science.”

There existed a sense among some journalists that British ignorance, irrationality and prejudice fed misperceptions of Germany. “What chiefly deters the English mind from following German affairs with any interest,” declared Louis Bamberger in 1892,

    . . . is the state of tutelage in which, according to their impression, Germans are kept by their Government. They look down with contemptuous pity on the child-like attitude of German representative bodies towards their grandmotherly régime, and set little value on their acts.

Bamberger, a German liberal, insisted that this “defective insight” into German political life had led to a “distorted and exaggerated estimate” of falsely juxtaposed news reports, leaving the prevailing impression “that a Socialist insurrection is impending in Germany, and that the Emperor is preparing to overcome it by the introduction of a monarchical dictatorship.” Seven years later, despite a steady increase in coverage of German affairs, Charles Copland Perry, the

---

84 E. J. Dillon, “Germany’s Foreign Policy” Fortnightly Review, reprinted in Living Age, 212 (January-March 1897): 73. A long-time contributor to the Fortnightly, Dillon won recognition for his disclosure of Turkish atrocities in Armenia in 1895. A character sketch entitled “Dr. E. J. Dillon: Our Premier Journalist,” in the Review of Reviews 24 (July 1901): 21-26, revealed this “knight-errant of journalism” to be fluent in German and an admirer of Kaiser Wilhelm II. As a measure of the contemporary emphasis placed on the connection between ethnicity, culture and character, Dillon’s “essentially combative” nature was attributed to his Irish ancestry and “the pessimism which forms the foundation of Dr. Dillon’s character” to his fondness for Schopenhauer.


86 Ibid., 386.
same writer who called Germany the “touchstone of our conduct,” described the attitude of most Englishmen:

Germany is simply a country which, for reasons best known to itself, keeps a very large army, possesses a good many autocratic and boorish officials, which has once or twice, in the person of its Emperor, had the impertinence to interfere with our own affairs and which persists in flooding our labour-markets with cheap clerks.87

Perry held that the British entertained an irrational view regarding the legacy of Bismarckian “unscrupulousness” and “wicked militarism,” and he argued that German diplomacy and military power were based on dire necessity, and that the Franco-Prussian War had been inevitable. But even this apologist for Germany and advocate of German educational and industrial models employed a litany of German stereotypes and managed to convey, in a sardonic reflection on the image shift from German Michael to menace, a vaguely dreadful warning:

A learned German professor with blue spectacles was in our eyes more a subject of derision than of disquietude, nor could we conceive that so unornamental a personage could in any way influence us either for good or evil. It is only recently that the scales have fallen from our eyes. Like the fellow-citizens of the Greek philosopher, we have been much surprised to find that the scientific investigations of which we had made so light could turn out water-wheels. Accustomed as we have been to regard the Germans as a nation of sentimentalists and unpractical theorists, we have now become painfully conscious that there are more things in heaven and earth than were dreamt of in our philosophy.88

Germany’s arrival in the world of commerce and industry indeed exposed the inaccuracy of the “old-fashioned philosophic German” stereotype, a revelation which generated what seemed to some writers an overcompensated image of the German arch rival. The world, wrote James H. Collins in 1911, “insists that he is a bugaboo, that Providence has endowed him with mysterious

87 Perry, “Germany as an Object Lesson,” Nineteenth Century, 526-27.

88 Ibid., 528, 531, 534.
faculties not given to others, that he is irresistible in competition, and that behind his industrial
development he is hiding a tremendous political programme.”

The preceding examples show a vague conception among British journalists of the pitfalls of stereotypy. Some recognized ulterior political motives behind the propagandistic use of the German “bogey,” seeing in the nightmarish invasion fantasies of scaremongers a hidden agenda to garner support for increased armaments. The stereotyping process itself, however, as a psychological mechanism fomenting prejudice, generally remained above suspicion. Awareness of the mere existence of stereotypes did not necessarily shatter a writer’s belief in the rationality of national character, nor did it stifle the proliferation of stereotypes from his own pen. Writers capitalized on the seductive expediency of stereotypical images. And if they occasionally strove to avoid the perils of generalization about Germans, they did so as much through fear of inaccuracy due to German diversity as from any ethical or psychological principle.

Stereotypes in nineteenth-century Britain may have provided a source of amusement or represented a sincere attempt at explanation, but they also encapsulated cultural distinctions in a way that defined British national character in opposition to alien groups, usually by accentuating a positive self-image and deprecating the other.

---


91 William Harbutt Dawson, *Germany and the Germans*, 2 vols. (New York: Appleton, 1894), 1:v-vi, claimed in his introduction to be an unprejudiced observer, clearing up many English misconceptions and studiously avoiding generalizations about German traits and peculiarities. He nevertheless discoursed at length on the German character and employed some familiar stereotyped figures.
5. STEREOTYPES OF OLD GERMANY

The German reputation in Europe, from the time of Julius Caesar up to the twentieth century, rose from barbarian anonymity to the pinnacle of artistic, scholarly and scientific achievement. But at each stage the German stereotype incorporated some remnants of the past. In the case of Germany, the intrinsic negative/positive dualism of stereotypes acquired a sense of historical verity that colored contemporary images in the eyes of foreigners. This may be partly attributable to long-standing uncertainty regarding German political and national identity in comparison with Britain, France or Spain, which had become established nation-states centuries before German unification in 1871. From the perspective of many late nineteenth-century British writers, Germany remained an ambiguous ethnic and diplomatic entity, even though the larger states of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony and Hanover, had been well defined through diplomatic, cultural or dynastic connections. Attempts to delineate German national character consequently relied on a mass of contradictory stereotypes that contained both geographical and temporal discrepancies. Images of North Germany, South Germany, “Old Germany” and “New Germany” each carried their own subset of characteristics and character traits, but some powerful motifs persisted throughout the centuries to instill tradition of conflicting themes.

The Moral Barbarian

Just as the Tacitean stereotype had conferred status on the German image through the ancient imprimatur of racial distinctiveness, and controverted in its own day the implied
inferiority of the generic name, *Germanii*, as well as many negative assumptions about half-animal barbarians hostile to civilization, it would also present early modern Germans a worthy pedigree that offered redemption from hitherto ignominious origins.¹ This presumed identity, resurrected in the fifteenth century, would sustain yearnings for a political and ethnic unity that centuries of political fragmentation and imperial aspirations had failed to provide. It also furnished the historical basis for an evolving cult of Germanicism, paradoxically opposed to and yet entwined with the Roman imperial legacy, that traced a tortuous continuity from the time of the Gothic migrations to the Nazi era.² German humanists cited Tacitus to refute derogatory images of Germans disseminated by foreigners, and the Tacitean stereotype of moral and martial superiority served as a cornerstone of a national mythology founded upon the defeat of invading Roman legions in 9 CE by Germanic warriors under the leadership of Arminius. Ulrich von Hutten’s Latin dialogue, *Arminius* (1528), revived this ancient heroic figure to symbolize Reformation Germany’s defiance of Rome.³ Tacitus thus became the primary source for the

¹Julius Caesar considered the Germans more savage and less amenable to civilization than the defeated Gauls, from whom he learned the name in 53 B.C. See Herwig Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and Its Germanic Peoples*, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 3-7, 12.


earliest outpourings of German “nationalism” as well as subsequent theories of German racial and cultural superiority. The venerable stereotype even found its way into nineteenth-century British affirmations about the Germans’ character and social customs, such as their “unsuspecting openness of heart,” good nature and hospitality, or their “strict and severe” matrimonial bond and “superior sexual morality.”

The ancient idealized portrait of German courage, purity and simplicity contained blemishes, however, which also possessed staying power. Tacitus, after all, did consider the Germans to be barbarians, albeit uniquely moral ones, and he described them as violent, slothful and prone to gambling and drunkenness. Moreover, some “positive” aspects of the stereotype implied certain character deficiencies. “A race without either natural or acquired cunning” seemed both morally innocuous and politically defective. Such contradictions reemerged nearly two millennia later as British writers seemed to borrow from the Tacitean stereotype an attitude of nostalgic idealization mixed with condescension and moral condemnation, an attitude reflecting the inherent good/bad duality of the stereotype itself. Strains of this duality appeared during the nineteenth century with the persistence Romantic images of chivalrous German

---

4Nationalism used here refers more to cultural, racial and linguistic pride than to exaltation of a political state, although an ethnic territoriality, as in the idea of “German lands,” certainly existed. On the incipient nationalism engendered with the publication of the Germania in 1500 see The New Cambridge Modern History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), vol. 1, The Renaissance, edited by G. R. Potter, 67, 118. See also MacDougall, Racial Myth in English History, 42-44.


6Hadas, Tacitus, 720.
nobles, honest craftsmen and naive peasants even amidst accusations of artistic mediocrity and virulent moralistic reactions against German literature and biblical or aesthetic criticism. The ancient stereotype also embodied contradictory traits that later defined the North/South German duality differentiating disciplined, warlike, sober Prussians from lazy, beer-drinking, hospitable Bavarians.

Another Renaissance document, Machiavelli’s *Description of German Affairs*, written in 1512, reinforced the image of German military valor and added the traits of industry and thrift, characterizations that gained prominence much later in connection with the German economic model and Anglo-German trade rivalry of the late nineteenth century. Machiavelli’s remarks on the Spartan simplicity of German domestic life echoed those of Tacitus, and his admiration for German military and social virtues generated an idealized image. Again, however, serious weaknesses flawed this prototype of the German military model. Machiavelli observed that, because political divisions undermined the military strength of the Emperor and princes, Germany could not accomplish great things. He also noted a lack of independence and initiative on the battlefield stating, “They are excellent in a field-fight, but for the storming of a town, they are good for nothing; and but little to defend one: and generally where the men cannot keep their

---


8 J. R. Hale, in *Machiavelli and Renaissance Italy* (London: English Universities Press, 1961), 107, suggests that Machiavelli used “a somewhat idealized Germany as a stalking-horse” to attack his fellow citizens’ dependence on mercenaries, love of display and reluctance to pay taxes.
old orders, and manage themselves with room enough, they are worth but little.”

These perceived flaws anticipated nineteenth-century “unpolitical” and “methodical” German stereotypes that presumed German mediocrity and inflexibility, traits contrasted to the British self-stereotype of innate capacity to govern and “pluck.” In 1893, for example, prognosticators of an imaginary European “Great War” envisioned “Teutonic courage and discipline” in the heat of battle, as well as the precision of movement and perfect “mechanism” of German troops and supply lines, but also the fatal absurdities of German regimentation:

And how bravely those Germans fought! And now, looking back in cold blood, how needlessly were they butchered! Exactly opposite where I stood, their infantry moved forward with even more than the precision of a parade; in little squads, but shoulder to shoulder, with all the rigidity of a birthday review. I could even see the officers halting and actually correcting the alignment. Needless to say, these living targets were riddled through and through in the very moment of their pedantic folly.

Mockery of “pipeclayed” Germans and their military maneuvers—“the run after a running foe is the cream of German tactics”—accompanied a serious hope that German “dependence and docility,” lack of adaptability and staying power would ameliorate the threat of what the world considered a model army. An article in Cornhill Magazine shortly after the outbreak of World War I hypothesized that German soldiers, being accustomed to “thinking in grooves” and

9Machiavelli, “State of Germany,” 267

10The author, supposed to be an American correspondent, exclaimed, “How the veterans of our Civil War would have scoffed at this slave-driver’s discipline!” See Rear Admiral Colomb et al., The Great War of 189_: A Forecast (London: Heinemann, 1893), 274. See also 119, 176, 217.

11[Linesman], “German War,” Blackwood’s 172 (November 1902): 726-27. Pipeclay, used to polish swords and other metal soldierly accouterments, also means routine and implies an excessive fondness for parade-ground drill or attention to correctness in dress. See also ”The Nightmare of Germany,” Spectator, reprinted in Living Age 212 (January-March 1901): 59-60.
incapable of acting as individuals, had grown dependent on closed-order maneuvers. English readers could take comfort in the belief that German mental inflexibility would be no match for British initiative and pluck on the battlefield. The writer further extrapolated from this “unpliability” of the German mind, which “unfits him for dealing with alien or inferior races,” an incapacity for empire that would not (and should not) challenge British imperial ascendency.12

The German military reputation, which had acquired a dark side in association with images of barbarians opposed to Rome, received a fillip with the exploits of German mercenaries or Landesknechten who, along with Spanish troops under Charles V, carried out the brutal Sack of Rome in 1527.13 Even though the most threatening aspects of German militarism did not gain prominence until the expansion of Germany in the nineteenth and the rise of Nazism in the twentieth centuries, the affiliation of the Germanic warrior with Goth, Vandal and Hun remained a persistent theme. As one post-World War II translator remarked, the Germania, “a detailed account of a great people that had already begun to be a European problem in the first century of our era, should still have a message for us in the twentieth.”14

The Tacitean stereotype greatly influenced nineteenth-century British commentary on German character, as did the Roman/barbarian duality and Machiavelli’s images of virtuous, yet


13The Sack of Rome became a symbol of excessive brutality in subsequent literature. The onus of barbarity was shifted onto the German Landesknechten in Gucciardini’s Storia d’Italia, which went through three editions (1579, 1599 and 1618) in the English translation by Geoffrey Fenton entitled, The Historie of Guicciardini, Containing the Warres of Italy. Cited in Maltby, Black Legend, 8.

oddly self-compromised, Germans. These ideas found a reflection in the writings of French authoress Madame de Staël, who implanted, or at least encouraged, in English minds the notion that modern German culture betrayed intrinsic national and racial characteristics peculiar to Germany. German romanticism and philosophical idealism could be seen as a divergence from mainstream European culture, classicism, French realism and British empiricism—a divergence which intimated the transmogrification of ancient inherent differences stemming from Germany’s barbarian, non-Roman past. De Staël also stamped the German predilection for romanticism, mysticism and chivalry as an indigenous quality wholly separate from classical Greek or Roman influence.\(^{15}\) Although de Staël’s popular work, translated and published in 1813 as *Germany*, furnished a much-needed antidote for the triple dose of bad translations, scathing ridicule and venomous criticism that had poisoned early appreciation of German literature in Britain, readers imbibed much more than a mere treatise on literature in her sweeping commentary on German politics, history, geography, religion and social life. De Staël restored and updated the moral barbarian stereotype in many respects, substituting for the demarcation between primitive tribal societies and the superior culture, technical proficiency and civic organization of imperial Rome the contrast between socio-economically backward, politically medieval Germany and post-Enlightenment, culturally sophisticated, post-revolutionary, but also repressive France under

---

\(^{15}\)She based this conclusion partly on the literary device of allusion to providence rather than fate. See de Staël, *Germany* 1:198, 200, 204. Because the manuscript of *De l’Allemagne* had been indicted by Napoleon in 1810 for being too sympathetic to Germany, and thus anti-French, a smuggled copy first saw publication in England in 1813, both in translation and in the original French. On the early condemnation of German literature by English anti-Jacobin critics, to be discussed in more detail below, and de Staël’s reconstructive influence, see B. Q. Morgan and A. R. Hohlfeld, *German Literature in British Magazines 1750-1860* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1949), 52.
Napoleon. Nevertheless, the affinities between her idealized portrait of Germany and the work of her ancient predecessor did not escape the attention of the German poet and wit Heinrich Heine:

\[\ldots\] by her praise of the intellectual life and idealism of Germany she really intends to censure the contemporary realism of the French and the material pomp of the imperial epoch. Her book *De l’Allemagne* resembles in this respect the *Germania* of Tacitus, who perhaps by his apology of the Germans intended to write an indirect satire against his countrymen.\(^{16}\)

De Staël lauded the prevalence of Christian virtues, charity and morality in Germany, calling it a land of “poets and thinkers,” artistically original and intellectually honest, yet politically naive. Just as she echoed Tacitus in her admiration for German simplicity, honesty and marital fidelity, however, she also nurtured the convictions of her predecessors that inherent weaknesses negated any threat that Germany might pose to the security and prestige of other nations. Whereas Tacitus believed that Germans could be easily overcome by indulging their vice for drink, and whereas Machiavelli noted the disunity and political particularism of Germany that persisted in her own time, de Staël’s argument rested largely on a stereotype of German culture and character itself, the ingredients of which comprised a recipe for political mediocrity: Germans indulged without restraint in abstract metaphysics and, in stark contrast to the perspicacious French, tended to “wrap in obscurity what was before clear.”\(^{17}\) German impracticality and clumsiness blended anomalously with a tedious adherence to detail and an overly serious nature, which added a somber note to the theme of self-defeatism. Even the


\(^{17}\)de Staël, *Germany* 1:133. See also 44, 51.
independence of spirit and originality that de Staël so admired in German literature seemed incongruously hemmed in by narrow codes of social conduct and ingrown traditions of chivalry that had spawned excessive and tiresomely pointless displays of elegant manners. She also observed an unbridgeable gulf between idealistic men of letters and Machiavellian German statesmen. Her assessment of Prussia’s Frederick the Great as more French than German simply provided the exception that proved the rule of German political incapacity or lack of integration.  

De Staël’s admiration for Germany found its limits in the heroic efforts of individuals who had achieved an intellectual or artistic ascendancy over the bleak confines of German social life and climate. While she praised the high rate of literacy in Germany, and a certain freedom from French self-adulation and the tyranny of public opinion, she deplored the boredom of existence, the bland conversation and lack of patriotism that she found there. Despite noting superficial geographical differences between a cold, contemplative North and a vegetative, more sociable South, she deemed all of Germany a land of “repose, indolence and reflection” that offered wholesome serenity but little in the way of excitement or stimulation. The positive qualities of sincerity, diligence and the power of reflection which she discerned in the German character should therefore be considered within the context of her initial impression of German life: “Stoves, beer, and the smoke of tobacco surround all the common people of Germany with a thick and hot atmosphere, from which they are never inclined to escape.”

18 Ibid., 41, 67, 69, 80, 87, 100, 105, 123, 319.  
19 Ibid., 38. See also 34, 39, 63, 76, 97.
The German Boor

The revival of Tacitus, which satisfied a longing for historical greatness among sixteenth-century German nobles and scholars, represented in part a reaction against a much less glorious portrait of German life that had emerged since the late middle ages. Historian Hajo Holborn wrote that “gluttony and drunkenness were, according to native and foreign testimony, much worse than elsewhere.” Even though Tacitus had mentioned a German propensity for drunkenness, his revised idealization of an innate moral sense mollified, as it had done in the first century, this image of German unbridled revelry, which Sebastian Brandt aptly satirized and canonized in his widely popular Narrenschiff, or Ship of Fools. Even amidst the implied social criticism in Brandt’s work, however, the ancient characterization of innocent artlessness remained unobscured. British literary scholar Charles H. Herford, writing in 1886, pointed out a telling comparison of


21From the Chronicles of Bavaria, quoted in Reinhardt, Germany: 2000 Years, 184.

sixteenth-century German and English fool literature. In contrast to the deceitful fool of English literature, he wrote,

. . . Brandt has his own country in view, and he gives enormous space to the riotous sensuality for which Germany was then and long afterwards a bye-word, while he has little to say of the subtle duplicities of which, as the patriots of the next generation exultingly boasted, the guileless Teuton had never been accused.23

Herford drew a broader distinction when comparing German and English versions of a derivative genre of fool literature modeled on the exploits of Frederick Dedekind’s Grobianus, the quintessential boor featured in a form of satire described as “an aggressive and militant grossness, trampling on refinement and glorifying in its own excesses.”24 A few lines may illustrate the point:

Both eate and drinke so much, that thou both drunke and filld maist bee,
Till when, nor rest nor quiet must be looked for of thee.
And if of hickets or of sobs thou use to utter store,
They both are signes which future vomites use to goe before.
Let not the newness of the thing seeme beastly in thine eies,
But boldly make all those which hinder thy proceedings rise,
And casting that which thy queasy stomacke not agreeth,
Return unto the table, having slightly washt thy teeth.
And being set, take care again to fill thy belly straite,
And in the rowme of all thats gone, thrust in another baite.25

23Literary Relations of England and Germany, 338-39.

24Ibid., 380-81. Frederick Dedekind’s Grobianus, originally in Latin (Frankfurt: n.p., 1549) first appeared in English translation as The School of Slovenrie, or Cato Turned Wrong Side Outward, trans. R. F. Gent (London: Simmes, 1605), but this must have been a rare edition because Herford cites Grobianus; or, the Compleat Booby, trans. Roger Bull, (London: Cooper, 1739) as the first widely known translation (p. 389).

Despite being the penultimate expression of excessive behavior and bad taste, Grobianism, through its sheer unconventionality, nevertheless stimulated nostalgia for naturalness and lost Arcadian simplicity. From this duality Herford could infer a clear difference between English and German sensibilities. The English version of Grobianus resembled the cynical fop, the eccentric scholar or misanthrope who exposes the insincerity of social conventions, a concept Herford regarded as too subtle for Dedekind’s Germany in which he found “a society too intolerably natural to even affect refinement.”

The stereotypical German boor, initially perpetrated by German social satirists, would adopt various guises throughout the nineteenth century, often in conjunction with figures vastly different from the aggressively overindulgent dandy depicted in Grobianus. The stigma of obtuse unmanners would be applied to German students as well as their favorite target, the bourgeois Philister, to swaggering Prussian officers, to know-it-all professors and to German social customs in general. The effectiveness of these nineteenth-century stereotypes probably owed something to the freshness of Grobianism as a literary image in the late eighteenth century. Herford described this abrupt transition:

Some forty years after the translation of Grobianus, polite England was weeping over the translated Werther. The typical German figure of the later eighteenth century follows hard upon the last traces of the typical figure of the sixteenth; the master of callous brutality and phlegmatic ill-breeding leaves the stage as the classical victim of sentimental passion enters it.

---

26Herford concluded, “the contrast which Dedekind found in the German society of his day between the ‘respectable’ burgher and the wilfully offensive boor, was qualified by the finer contrast of which English society afforded suggestions, between the devotees of social convention and of the ‘simplicity of nature.’” *Literary Relations of England and Germany*, 397.

27Ibid., 398.
The fine line separating appreciation of primitive simplicity from abhorrence of primitive crudity reveals the paradoxical nature of both the moral barbarian and German boor stereotypes, their negative aspects featuring images of uncivilized behavior, backwardness, cruelty and a lack of taste or refinement. Even though de Staël reintroduced into nineteenth-century Britain an image of naive and austere Germans largely devoid of Grobian vulgarity, the stigma of German boorishness continued to figure prominently in later national comparisons, and often implied a laxity of character more fundamental than mere rudeness. A reference to bad manners as “German breeding” prompted one writer in 1840 to ponder the hypothetical case of a fly in a glass of wine: the Italian would call the waiter to take it away, the Frenchman would remove the fly and drink the wine, the German would drink the wine fly and all, and the English John Bull would throw the glass against the wall with an indignant “God-damn.” Some seventy years later Ford Maddox Ford would relate a similar tale of German gross negligence. An “immense drayman,” having drunk “at one draught” a pot of ale into which some malicious pranksters had dropped a dead mouse, wiped his mouth on his sleeve and then remarked, “A hop or a Cork!” to the wonder and admiration of all beholders.

Nineteenth-century British criticism of German slovenliness, gluttony, drunkenness, bad manners, and indifference to the suffering of others seemed to extend the Grobian tradition to society at large. “Villages are said to be always distinguished by an extraordinary degree of dirt and slovenliness,” wrote William Howitt in 1842, during one of his German tours. He described the rural homes as “often pestiferous with unsavory smells, of which the inhabitants appear

---


29. Hueffer [Ford], “How It Feels to Be Members of Subject Races,” 422.
totally unconscious.” The stigma of uncleanliness applied even to Berlin where “along every street, and before every house, even in the finest parts of the city and the neighborhood of the king’s palace, is a stagnant sink, which fills the whole air with its rank odor.” Howitt then related a tale of callous indifference that exposed a sinister core of insensitivity masked by mere surface grossness. A little boy of five or six, having been pushed into one of those fetid sinks, began to “cry most piteously.” Howitt continued,

It was in a crowded part of town but nobody seemed to take much notice; we therefore asked the boy where he lived, and he showed us a little girl near his own age, who was standing by and knitting most composedly. This he said was his sister, and he would get her to go home with him and say how he became so dirtied, or he should be beaten; but she kept knitting on. . . . it was not till one good man seized her sternly by the arm and forced her along, that the little stoic would move a foot, or anything but her knitting needles.

Howitt remarked that this “apathy” seemed perplexing in a people “who in their domestic relations and in their literature exhibited so much feeling.” Similarly, physical manifestations of slovenliness or gluttony to some writers could betray more serious philosophical or ethical deficiencies. German students, or Burschenschaften, for example, were considered “a race to be eschewed by all who had a wholesome reverence for soap and a horror for Kantian philosophy.” An obese, “triple-chinned” German professor, whose “small, pig-eyes peered out from under their pent-house above a mass of pendulous and quivering cheek,” expounded a theory of racial territorialism according to which, strictly speaking, England belonged to Germany.

Howitt, Rural and Domestic Life of Germany, 22, 90.

Ibid., 85.

A more innocuous, if no less deplorable, image of German gluttony, laziness and drunkenness continued to be a favorite topic into the 1890s. One anonymous writer scorned the German *Mittagessen*, or midday meal, saying “no highly-civilized nation dines heavily in the middle of the day,” and opined that “the Germans hold, with certain of the ancient philosophers, that their souls are situated in their stomachs.”

A more detailed treatise on the German penchant for a leisurely existence of eating, drinking and smoking graced the pages of *Gentleman’s Magazine* in 1895. Some excerpts follow:

The German out-of-doors spends most of his time walking from one restaurant to another, and always smokes: a cigar is as invariable a feature on his face as the carefully-cultivated moustache; . . . Even the German workman smokes them during the many moments of leisure which occur in his work, for he does not hurry or overtake himself; . . .

. . . The end and aim of every German expedition is the restaurant; after seeing twenty of these establishments in two hundred yards of street, one realizes how extensively they must be patronized. . . .

. . . The Germans have a habit of taking all their courses on one plate, which is not very inviting, and, like Dr. Johnson, have been known to snort over their food. . . .

. . . Beer is, with the love of music, the great national characteristic, and the methods employed in the beer-clubs, to drink as much as possible, suggest the orgies of some of the Roman emperors. Perhaps it is due to this excessive drinking, and the smoky atmosphere of the restaurants, that so many of the Germans have eyes which look as if they had been boiled, and wear spectacles so much more generally than the English.

The gluttony of German theatre patrons became legendary. A commentator for *Cassell’s Family Magazine* in 1898 described the ritual gorging between acts:

As these worthy citizens with their wives emerge from the theatre, they call loudly for beer and various eatables, and, sitting down, commence to devour their food with astonishing rapidity. The interval lasts but ten minutes, and they intend to make the best use of their time. Presently a bell rings loudly, and back to our seats we all hurry, the supper consumers finishing the last fragments of their meal *en route*. Several, we notice,

---

33Cousins German,” *Cornhill*, 295, 297.

are still furtively munching when actually back in their stalls. After each act—astonishing though it may seem—there is a repetition of the process I have described. Their appetites seem positively to increase rather than diminish after each attack upon the eatables.\(^{35}\)

Another source commented:

A sine quâ non of every German theatre is a large foyer, flanked by cold buffets which are piled with heaps of greasy-looking “doorsteps” of bread and sausage amid innumerable glasses of beer and lemonade. Every German theatrical performance is interrupted for a twenty minutes’ interval in the middle, when the entire audience storms the buffets, satisfies its appetite, and then solemnly defiles in procession round the foyer. It is a truly extraordinary sight to see a smart audience at the Opera gathered about these sandwich counters, wolfing down “Butterbrödchen” as if they had not had a meal for a week.\(^{36}\)

The image of the slovenly boor complimented the concept of backward or agricultural Germany. Berlin, often labeled a dull and uninspiring city, a “sprawling commercial town in the middle of a sandy plain,” and a “provincial town” in comparison to the great capitals of Europe, seemed an appropriate environment for the dull, indolent, self-indulgent Prussian:

Fortunately, the Prussian is an optimist who looks on his immediate surroundings with a superb indifference. He needs little in this life and seems to expect less in the next. So long as he can sit in a tree-shaded garden, smoke tobacco, drink lager-beer, and listen to a band, he is perfectly happy. The stern joy of violent physical exercise he cannot understand, preferring rather to cultivate philosophy and a portly figure. Occasionally he is considerate, frequently he is kind. But now and again the English visitor finds himself recalling with satisfaction the answer of the schoolboy who, when asked to describe the manners and customs of a certain tribe, laconically replied, “These people have no manners, and their customs are beastly.”\(^{37}\)

---


The Pious/Godless German

Superceding the legacies of ancient, mediaeval and renaissance sources, developments in the sixteenth century would add an entirely new dimension to the image of Germany in English minds. Before the Henrician Reformation and Protestant sectarianism established theological boundaries, the Lutheran Reformation exerted a profound, albeit “heretical,” influence in England through doors opened by the Lollards, book merchants, and Cambridge scholars who gathered at the White Horse tavern “Little Germany” to discuss Lutheran doctrines. The image of Lutheran piety and a Protestantism which “sprang from the heart of the German race and from that indestructible love of freedom of mind” would survive as a positive virtue of Old Germany even at the height of the Anglo-German antagonism. But within the span of a single generation following the Anglican split from Rome in 1534, the birthplace of the Protestant Reformation became known more as a land of sorcery and diabolism. This shift in viewpoint depended a great deal on religious fanaticism and superstition in Germany itself, amplified not a little by sectarian rivalry, anti-Catholicism and its reaction, and by Luther’s own writings about portents and the omnipresence of the devil in various guises. The worst abuses of this pathological obsession

---

38 A. G. Dickens, The English Reformation (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), 36-37, 68-69. Theology and financial considerations also dictated policy when in 1535 Henry VIII refused to accept the Confession of Augsburg and Lutheranism as the price of admission to the Schmalkaldic League (p. 175).

39 “England’s Relations With Germany,” Quarterly Review 183 (April 1896): 547. This article presented a sympathetic view of German imperial ambitions, from unification to colonial expansion, even after Kaiser Wilhelm II’s infamous Kruger Telegram of January 1896, although it preceded Germany’s ambitious naval building program launched in March of 1898.
with the occult culminated in the “collective insanity” and debasement of law that extended witchcraft persecutions throughout Germany into parts of Europe and beyond.\textsuperscript{40}

Drawing upon the fame of Paracelsus and the Faustian legend, Germany’s notoriety as a place of witchcraft and demonic possession had received great impetus from the publication by two German Dominicans of the \textit{Malleus Maleficarum} or “Witches’ Hammer,” in 1486.\textsuperscript{41} This inquisitors “bible,” sanctioned by a papal Bull declaring witchcraft heretical, laid the foundation for the classical conception of the stereotypical witch found in the dramatis personae of early English witch stories and plays.\textsuperscript{42} Herford attributed the negative shift in Germany’s reputation partly to a comparative loss of literary and civic prestige as England made advances in commerce, politics and literature, even supplanting Germany as the stronghold of Protestantism. He also blamed English indifference to German political history and preoccupation with a “literature of marvels,” prodigy collections and cheap leaflets advertizing “Wonderful strange

\textsuperscript{40}Rinehardt, \textit{Germany: 2000 Years}, 265-68, cites Luther’s \textit{Explanation of the Monkish Calf of Freiberg in Saxony}, published in 1522, Melanchthon’s \textit{The Popish Ass in Rome}, and the raft of \textit{Teufels-literatur} generated by Lutheran preoccupation with the devil. According to Rinehardt, witch persecution in Germany claimed 100,000 German victims. Norman Davies, \textit{Europe: A History} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 567, mentions the marked susceptibility of Germany and the Alps to this form of collective hysteria and oppression.

\textsuperscript{41}Paracelsus or Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim (1493-1541) earned his reputation for wizardry as a Swiss alchemist and extraordinarily gifted physician. See Davies, \textit{Europe}, 489. Doctor Georg Faust (1480?-1541), arch sorcerer, physician and alchemist, later fictionalized as Johann Faust, claimed through his mastery of black magic to have engineered the conquest of Rome in 1527. See Rinehardt, \textit{Germany: 2000 Years}, 266.

\textsuperscript{42}Herford, \textit{Literary Relations}, 220-23, 232-37, cites three Elizabethan works as examples: Thomas Middleton’s (d. 1627) \textit{The Witch}, Thomas Heywood’s (d. 1641) \textit{The Lancashire Witches}, and Thomas Dekker’s (1570?-1641?) \textit{The Witch of Edmonton}. He also traces its influence, and elements of Teutonic mythology (e.g., “the mystic Norns”), to Shakespeare’s \textit{Macbeth} (p. 236).
Newes from Germany” full of portents, curiosities and bizarre tales of the supernatural.\(^{43}\) The elements of grim reality and fantasy interwoven in tales of German diabolism that drifted into England on a tide of frenzied Protestant piety left their mark in English minds. In the devolution of German witch stories one could see, “a sort of hideous travesty of the Faust motive;—the diabolic intercourse in a more repulsive form, the supernatural powers put to a baser use.”\(^{44}\)

If superstition held less sway three centuries later, the association of horror and the supernatural with Germany survived in the enormously popular neo-Gothic novel, which featured “dungeons of sinister castles hidden in German forests, or convents where nuns found recreation in flogging screaming novices.”\(^{45}\) Gottfried A. Bürger’s romantic poem, Lenore, a widely read and reviewed example of German horror and macabre imagery, went through six translations, one by Walter Scott, and numerous editions between 1796 and 1846.\(^{46}\) The story revolved around a young girl who blames providence for the disappearance of her soldier-lover. The

\(^{43}\) *Literary Relations*, 165-79. Herford’s citations include the following two works: *A Briefe Collection and compendious extract of strange and memorable thinges, gathered out of the Cosmographye of S. Munster* (London: Marshe, 1572, available in German as early as 1537) and Stephen Batman’s *The Doome* (London: Nubery, 1581) which presented a translation and supplementation of Conrad Lycosthenes’s portent collection, *Prodigiorum ac ostentorum chronicon* (Basel: Petri, 1557). He describes the contents of the popular fare as “...massacres, and earthquakes, storms, executions and apparitions, monstrous births and bodies raised from the dead, fasting girls and ‘damnable sorcerers,’ strange signs in the air, prophecies in the mouth of rustics and of sages, visions of angels, mysterious glimpses of the Wandering Jew” (p. 174).

\(^{44}\) *Literary Relations*, 179.

\(^{45}\) Altick, *The English Common Reader*, p.289, notes the popularity of the neo-Gothic novel amongst working-class readers of the 1820s.

lover’s phantom appears at midnight, on horseback, to carry his unsuspecting mistress to the final completion of their union—in the grave. De Staël remarked on the play’s macabre imagery and spoke of German terror as “a relic of the northern mythology—a disposition naturally inspired by the long nights of a northern climate.” She explained the relatively rapid decline of terror in English poetry by comparing English with German character:

Imagination in England is almost always inspired by sensibility; the imaginations of the Germans is sometimes rude and wild: the religion of England is more austere, that of Germany more vague: and the poetry of the two nations must necessarily bear the impression of their religious sentiments.  

Despite its popularity the macabre aspect of German literature also drew protests. An early attack on German drama complained of “the strange and preposterous partiality for the Gothic productions of the German school; the distempered rage for the gloomy, the horrible, the disconnected, the disproportioned, and the improbable.” Nevertheless, critical objections to German horror, mysticism, extravagance, sentimentality and indecency only temporarily quelled the influx of Märchen or tales, translated “from the German,” into England.

By the 1890s images of witch Sabbaths at the “haunted” Brocken served better as inspiration for English literary “tourists” than as fodder for moralistic literary critics. *Good Words* referred to this infamous peak in the Hartz mountain range as:

---

47 *Germany*, 1:152, 233-36.

48 William Preston, *Edinburgh Magazine*, 1802, quoted in Morgan, *German Literature in British Magazines*, 46-47. Preston’s distinction between Gothic and classical literature also weighed heavily against the Germans, “its ponderous masses, its elaborate littleness, and capricious profusion of ornament” standing in abject humility beside “the sublime simplicity, the chaste symmetry, the harmonious integrity of the Greek and Roman models . . . to which the best modern writers have formed themselves.”

German horror, and English appreciation of it, confirmed the sixteenth-century literary tradition of monstrosities, marvels, superstition and witchcraft persecutions associated with Germany, which provided, as in the case of Tacitus’s *Germania*, a ready reference when needed.

Given the so-called Protestant “affinities” between England and the land of Luther, one might search for reasons, besides literary mass appeal, why the diabolical image of Germany persisted along with its obverse, German piety. In 1732 the idea of racial kinship, Protestant gratitude for the German Reformation and the feeling that Germany had surpassed England in the arts and sciences supported the argument that the English could not “depreciate” Germans without “defaming themselves.”

This sanguine view, however, encountered resistance not only because it went against the grain of isolationist British nationalism but also because it overlooked some very real differences involving theological doctrine and the role of religion in the political histories of both nations. The importance of doctrinal distinctions, such as the strength of Erasmian or Calvinist, as opposed to Lutheran, influences in England lie beyond the scope of this paper.

However, England’s evolution from Protestant prince-worship to “civil courage”

---


52 The influence of Erasmus on early English humanism and the split with Luther over the issue of free will has been dealt with in Johan Huizinga’s classic *Erasmus and the Age of Reformation*, trans. F. Hupman (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). Dickens, *English Reformation*, 231, 238-39, speaks of Archbishop Cranmer’s failure to establish a link with Melancthon and the Lutherans, and the consequent predominance of non-Lutheran, even anti-
through martyrdom, exile and Puritan parliamentary opposition indicates a historical basis for British antipathy to German religious institutions.\textsuperscript{53} Even thirty years before Bismarck’s Kulturkampf of 1870, British writers opposed to state interference with religious liberties criticized the Prussian Evangelical Church as a “foul blot upon the mild and paternal character” of the Prussian government.\textsuperscript{54} Apart from such institutional and political criticisms, however, other aspects of German religious thought and practice both fascinated and repelled English minds.

German religious influence in England was plagued by delay, ambivalence and neglect in a way that would later characterize the halting acknowledgment of German literature in England. German hymns, which helped inspire English spiritual poetry, appeared in translation as early as 1539, but restrictions on congregational hymn-singing delayed publication of major collections until the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{55} Anton Wilhelm Boehme, court chaplain of the first two Hanoverian Georges, translated several devotional works that stimulated a brief flurry of interest

\begin{flushleft}
Lutheran, influences in England that prevented “Protestant thought from consolidating in its earlier forms.”
\end{flushleft


\textsuperscript{54}“Germany,” \textit{Blackwood’s}, p.134. See also “The Archbishop of Cologne and the King of Prussia,” \textit{Blackwood’s} 43 (June 1838): 766, and, a later argument against its effectiveness in raising peasant morals in Richard Heath, “The Prussian Rural Labourer and the Evangelical Church,” \textit{Contemporary Review} 75 (May 1899): 735.

\textsuperscript{55}Garold N. Davis, \textit{German Thought and Culture in England 1700-1770} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1969), 15, writes, “hymn singing was frowned upon by many churches until well into the eighteenth century and beyond.” He provides ample evidence of the hymn’s literary influence, however.
between 1706 and 1716, but a more significant religious link between England and Germany took shape in the Wesleyan/Moravian connection. John Wesley and his brother Charles first encountered the German Moravians in 1735 while aboard a ship bound from England to the American colony of Georgia. Wesley admired the Moravians’ “servile” humility, meekness and courage, and he recorded in his journal of 25 October the reactions of his shipmates during a storm at sea:

In the midst of the psalm wherewith their service began, the sea broke over, split the main sail in pieces, covered the ship, and poured in between the decks, as if the great deep had already swallowed us up. A terrible screaming began among the English. The Germans calmly sung on. I asked one of them afterwards, “Were you not afraid?” He answered, “I thank God, No.” I asked, “But were not your women and children afraid?” He replied mildly, “No; our women and children are not afraid to die.” From them I went to their crying trembling neighbours, and pointed out to them the difference, in the hour of trial, between him that feareth God, and him that feareth him not.56

On returning to England Wesley pursued his connections with the Moravians and, with his brother, translated and published several volumes of hymns from the German. Wesley’s spiritual transformation, the driving force behind the “Great Awakening” in England, apparently drew inspiration from the German Pietist doctrine of personal salvation by faith as preached by the German Moravians.57 His infatuation with the Moravians, and the religious emotionalism of both Pietism and Wesleyanism, encouraged the acceptance in England of German literature that possessed a “sentimental, moralizing, didactic tendency” which appealed to the middle-classes of both countries during the eighteenth century.58

56Quoted in Davis, *German Thought and Culture*, 25.

57Ibid., 29-30, 42-43. Davis connects the subjectivity and emotionalism of these hymns to the roots of English romanticism, particularly in the work of Shelley (pp. 37-40).

58John P. Hoskins, “German Influence on Religious Life and Thought in America during
But the Methodist/Moravian connection proved to be a mixed blessing for the image of Germany in England. Widespread opposition to Methodism in England resulted in attacks on the Moravians, and Wesley himself eventually split from the Moravians largely due to personal differences with Count Zinzendorf, the sect’s leader in England.\(^{59}\) In 1740 he wrote, “Is not the Count all in all? Are not the rest mere shadows; calling him Rabbi; almost implicitly both believing and obeying him?”\(^{60}\) Despite Zinzendorf’s popularity among the upper classes in London and Oxford, many objected to Moravian doctrines and practices, such as the reference to Jesus as the “bridegroom of the soul” in the Count’s hymns. In *Hymns extracted from the Brethren’s Book* (1749) Wesley ridiculed repulsive imagery emphasizing the wounds of Christ, the so-called “blood and wounds hymns.”\(^{61}\) His rejection of the grotesque element seems to foreshadow a British repulsion from, and grim fascination with, associations of the macabre with German religion, as with literature, during the nineteenth century.\(^{62}\) William Howitt in 1842

---


\(^{60}\) Wesley’s letter to the Moravian Brethren (1740), quoted in Clifford W. Towleson, *Moravian and Methodist*, (London: n.p., 1957), 203, cited by Davis, *German Thought and Culture*, 60, who also comments on Wesley’s aversion to mysticism (p. 35).

\(^{61}\) Davis, *German Thought and Culture*, 61-62. Zinzendorf dropped the offensive hymns from the “London” song book in 1754 after being warned of *Leichtsinnigkeit*, or carelessness, by another German poet, Gerhardt Tersteegen.

\(^{62}\) Holborn, *The Reformation*, 118, refers to the macabre tradition of the famous German paintings of suffering Christ by Mathias Grunewald (1480-1529), who portrayed “the world in all its gruesome horror.”
described a German graveyard where newly made graves revealed fragments of bone, teeth and even “sculls [sic] nearly whole” on the surface. “We observed at the base of the church,” he continued, “a large hole, descending into a vault, which had a strange appearance.”

Complaining that “the love of the people for bloody imagery is here again peculiarly conspicuous,” he described one of the wayside shrines in Germany:

In a side chapel is a red sepulchre, with all its solemn apparatus and deathly figures. In the chapel hang various paintings, but the people flock with eager zeal to one—that of Christ just taken down from the cross, with copious streams of blood running from hands, feet and side. You see the people touching this blood and then kissing their hand. Not one wound, nor one stream of gore, that they do not greedily rub their fingers on again and again, and as often kiss them, as if they could never be satisfied.

German mysticism and works of biblical criticism, although widely available in translation during the eighteenth century, met with general distrust amongst the English clergy. Many English theologians condemned Earnst Moritz Arndt’s conception of the “kingdom of God [within]” as heretical, and even Wesley found distasteful William Law’s translation and exposition of the works of Jacob Boehme. German biblical criticism, which began filtering into England in the 1820s and 30s, brought an overwhelming negative reaction that dwarfed any interest shown by Broad Church liberals in Strauss’s Leben Jesu and other translations of German theology and rationalism. The publication of Essays and Reviews (1860), a scholarly excursus on literal historical and scientific explanations of the Bible, compiled by a group of English theologians, triggered a firestorm of opposition that resulted in the suspension from


64Ibid., 132.

benefices of two contributing clerics and a declaration of protest signed by 11,000 English clergymen. The work also met with disfavor from some prominent political figures, including abolitionist William Wilberforce, and future Prime Ministers Gladstone and Salisbury. Against the onslaught of liberal theology and “Higher Criticism” from Germany, the Catholic Church offered a refuge to the Tractarians of the Oxford movement led by Cardinal Newman, who decried the dangers of “continental infection” upon hearing that Lutheran bishops from Prussia sought Anglican ordination. The fact that distrust of German influences coincided with a revival of orthodox Christianity made the reaction against German theology all the more powerful and vehement.

Despite a long history of theological divergence, disputation and distrust, the argument for Protestant solidarity reappeared consistently in regard to nineteenth-century Anglo-German relations. Queen Victoria expressed her willingness to declare England sympathetic to Protestant Germany in the event of an unprovoked attack by Catholic France, and many, including a majority of the English press, supported Bismarck’s *Kulturkampf* against the Ultramontanes and the doctrine of papal infallibility, at least in purpose if not in method. British ardor cooled quickly, however, upon consideration of Bismarck’s tyrannical tactics, fears of German aggression against France and Belgium and, not least, pro-Irish and Catholic sentiments in Britain.

---


68 Sizeable minorities in each country, Catholics in Germany and Irish in Britain, worked to counteract already weak Anglo-German Protestant sympathies. See Kennedy, *Rise of the*
The mirage of Anglo-German religious affinity would ultimately shatter in an eruption of religious chauvinism during the decades prior to World War I. The apocalyptic sense of fighting a cosmic war between good and evil became a predominant theme in the writings and sermons of British theologians and would result in a thorough revision of German history built on the worst aspects of the German stereotype. Opinion held that critical rationalism had diverted Germany from true religious faith toward a barbaric reverence for the State and an unholy glorification of Machtpolitik, a supposition which implied a degeneracy or inherent weakness in Germans, a childish, mechanical susceptibility to the teachings of evil philosophers (Nietzsche) and the whims of megalomaniac rulers (Kaiser Wilhelm II).\textsuperscript{69} Positive aspects of the German character, such as chivalry, piety and morality had supposedly been abandoned or corrupted in the reversion to neopaganism.\textsuperscript{70} Such streams of invective only broadened the ideological gulf initially opened with British rejection of German devotional works, biblical criticism and metaphysical speculation on the nature of God.

**British Reactions to German Literature**

Although the scope of this study does not warrant a comprehensive review of British receptivity to German literature, historians of the subject tend to agree that recognition of German literary achievement met with some unusual resistance in England. John Mander wrote: \textquoteleft\textquoteleft The evolution of German intellectual life—Deutscher Geist—was seriously out of phase with English appreciation of it, with the result that the picture remained always a little cloudy, and at

\textit{Anglo-German Antagonism}, 106-8.

\textsuperscript{69}\textit{Hoover, God, Germany, and Britain}, 69, 74.

\textsuperscript{70}\textit{Ibid.}, 23-42.
The reception of German literature in England suffered from times very seriously distorted.”  The reception of German literature in England suffered from what Mander called “a fatal compound of ignorance and ambivalence . . . . German piety might be ridiculed at one moment; German ‘immorality’ the next.” This “embryonic English reaction to things German” revealed itself in the reaction to two popular, but diametrically opposed, genres: works of religious piety or pastoral works, the so-called “sentimental and moral” tale “from the German,” and the violently emotional Sturm und Drang creations of the Romantic writers. Early enthusiasm for both types of literature withered under the satirical blasts and ridicule of British reviewers, and a revival of interest in Germany’s literary renaissance had to wait at least a decade for a reappraisal by Madame de Staël, and longer for the advocacy of Thomas Carlyle.

Timing presented a major obstacle to the appreciation of German literature in Britain because reasonably good translations of Märchen, or German tales, and works by Gessner, Wieland, Lessing, Goethe and Schiller became widely available only after 1790 amidst news of revolution in France. Moreover, a reversal of early sympathies with the revolution, as expressed in the writings of Coleridge, Wordsworth, and political essayist William Godwin, led to a conservative reaction, stoked by invasion fears, which associated German literature with extreme liberalism and the questioning of authority. This incipient trend, marked by virulent attacks on

71 John Mander, Our German Cousins, 20.

72 Ibid., 24, 27-28. The “two kinds” of literature anticipates a dichotomy between good and bad Germans which represents a factor in stereotyping that permits the pretense of rational judgement while pigeonholing the target group according to its perceived positive and negative aspects. This phenomenon is discussed in reference to anti-Semitism in Adorno, Authoritarian Personality, 622.
German works by British critics, contradicted the longer term reality of a Francophobic motive for the appreciation of German literature discussed by Elie Halevy:

The French Revolution placed an abyss between the literature of England and France. Meanwhile German literature was coming to birth, a literature of sentiment, romance and unbridled fancy. To put the imagination to school in Germany and to compose Gothic romances was to collaborate with the anti-Gallican and anti-Jacobin movement.\(^{73}\)

While Francophobia did encourage receptivity to German literature during the Napoleonic Wars, turn-of-the-century literary critics, aligned with the conservative anti-Jacobin movement in Britain, placed the German literati squarely in the camp of the enemy. In 1799 the *Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine* launched a vicious and highly politicized crusade against the initial popularity of German works, deploring:

\[
\ldots \text{a glaring depravity of taste, as displayed in the extreme eagerness for foreign productions, and a systematic design to extend such depravity by a regular importation of exotic poison from the envenomed crucibles of the literary and political alchemists of the new German school.} \ldots \text{Even an act of despotism when exercised for the purpose of rescuing mankind from the worse species of oppression—the subjugation of the mind to the degrading tyranny of Philosophism—would be entitled to applause.} \ldots
\]

\(^{74}\)

Such extreme reactions from ultra-conservative journals wrought a noticeable change even in some mainstream periodicals previously friendly to German literature.\(^{75}\) The tenor of the times proved so unfavorable that one early Germanophile’s literary venture, James Bereford’s *German Museum*, begun in 1800, folded after the third volume amid a barrage of scathing attacks from the *Anti-Jacobin Review*. In the preface to his final volume Beresford discreetly explained that,

\(^{73}\)Halevy, *A History of the English People*, 446.


\(^{75}\)Both the *Monthly Mirror* and the *Critical Review* belong in this latter category. See Morgan, *British Magazines*, 46.
“depending in a material degree on the number of supporters, prudence forbid [sic] us to comply any longer with the wishes of a small, though respectable and chosen, host of friends and compels us to give way to imperious necessity.”76

British receptivity to German literature followed a generally predictable pattern, with the lion’s share of attention and acclaim eventually going to the works of Goethe and Schiller. This broad perspective, however, minimizes some dramatic and curious anomalies that delayed a widespread appreciation of Germany’s late eighteenth-century literary renaissance until Victoria’s reign.77 German traveler, C. A. G. Goede, after debunking the idea that English readers were well-versed in German literature, aptly summarized the situation in England at the beginning of the nineteenth century: “Many English consider German literature immoral and dangerous, but they have formed this hasty opinion on some trifling German novels, which too easily find their way from circulating libraries to the toilet of beauty.”78 The lapse in appreciation depended on more than just scanty knowledge of German and bad translations; it was also a function of popular tastes and sentiments. Hysterical reactions followed translations of Goethe’s novel, The Sorrows of Werther, and Schiller’s play, The Robbers, the chief objections to these works revolving around questions of moral character and fears of their effect on society. Werther drew blame as an apology for suicide, its baleful influence suspected in an often-repeated account

76Morgan, British Magazines, 47-48. The publication’s complete title was The German Museum or Monthly Repository of the Literature of Germany, the North and the Continent in General.

77Morgan, British Magazines, 64.

of the self-inflicted death of a woman under whose pillow a copy of the novel had been found.\textsuperscript{79} Schiller, deemed a revolutionary like Goethe, was denounced for making criminals heroes and advocating overthrow of the social order in a play that to one critic covered “the natural deformity of criminal actions with the veil of high sentiment and virtuous feeling.”\textsuperscript{80} \textit{The Rovers}, an extremely popular parody of Schiller’s \textit{Robbers} and Goethe’s \textit{Stella} published in 1798 by the \textit{Anti-Jacobin Review}, caricatured some of the worst tendencies in German drama and successfully initiated a wave of ridicule that stunted early enthusiasm for German literature.\textsuperscript{81} \textit{The Rovers} dealt as much with the character of Germans and German writers as with any specific literary abuses, and it precipitated a wholesale condemnation of German society, the literati themselves being labeled “men of profligate lives and abandoned characters.”\textsuperscript{82} English writer and moralist, Hannah More, promoting the nineteenth-century stereotype of women as the guardians of public virtue, called “loudly” upon the women of Germany to oppose:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{79}Suicide having been popularly known as the “Englishman’s malady,” one indignant reviewer hoped to “blot out this foul national reproach.” See \textit{European Magazine} 19 (1791): 184, quoted in Stockley, \textit{German Literature}, 24.

\textsuperscript{80}Frank Woodyer Stockoe, \textit{German Influences in the English Romantic Period 1788-1818} (Cambridge: The University Press, 1926), 16, 29, noted the uneven mixture of effusive praise with stern warnings against the social implications of Schiller’s work in Henry Mackenzie’s influential lecture, published in the \textit{Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh} in 1790 and reprinted in the \textit{Edinburgh Magazine} that same year.

\textsuperscript{81}Morgan, \textit{British Magazines}, 45, 84. The complete title of the satire, \textit{The Rovers; or the Double Arrangement}, referred to the original version of Goethe’s \textit{Stella}, published in 1776, which involved a ménage a trois between a man and two women. Goethe revised the work in 1816 to end tragically, but this version never reached the British public.

\end{flushright}
the irruption [sic] of those swarms of publications now daily issuing from the banks of the Danube, which, like their ravaging predecessors of the darker ages, though with far other and more fatal arms, are overrunning civil society. 83

But even attempts to vindicate Germany’s greatest writers by excusing romantic excess as an expression of German character succeeded rather in distorting the image of Germans in general:

What would be with us extravagance is with them but nature. Characters not very dissimilar to those of Moor and Werter [sic] are not unfrequent in Germany. It is from the state of human society in that country that the wild, terrific pathos and sublimity of the German works of genius take their origin. 84

The unfortunate fact that conservative English tastes ran to the sentimental melodramas of August von Kotzebue must be considered yet another consequence and cause of the negative first impression of German literature in England. 85 This intense, but relatively short-lived, obsession with mediocrity not only deflected interest away from more substantial works, but also served to legitimize the wave of anti-German reaction and ridicule that had quelled initial enthusiasm. Germanophile English critic Henry Crabb Robinson scolded the editors of the Monthly Register in a series of letters published in 1802: “You know nothing about German literature. . . . Kotzebue’s and Iffland’s plays and Lafontaine’s novels are not German


84Monthly Magazine 5 (1798), 172 f., quoted in Morgan, British Magazines, 47.

85Morgan, British Magazines, 44, 53-54, 96. The murder of reactionary writer Kotzebue by Jena student Karl Sand, a fanatical member of the Burschenschaft, or revolutionary student corps, suggests an early Anglophobic component of German nationalism, especially given the incongruity between generally enthusiastic British audiences and widespread German objections to Kotzebue’s sentimental excesses and their effect on the portrayal of German national character abroad. While it became generally acknowledged that Sand acted alone, his fellow Burschen worshiped him as a “misguided martyr” after his execution in 1916 by the Prussian government.
Nevertheless, a typical review of German literature at the close of the eighteenth century expressed, at best, a polite condescension:

The German works which have faintly aspired to the name of genius have not yet been tried by the voice of time; and such are the remaining marks of barbarism and prolixity (the latter a most unclassical defect), that it will probably be long before Germany shall produce a classical author, admitted like those of England, France, Spain, and Italy, into universal fame. In short, we admire the Germans merely as disciples, but cannot venerate them as masters; nor can candour abstain from a smile, when a German critic pronounces the dictates of his own imperfect taste upon the works of more enlightened nations.

Such lofty contempt for things German anticipated similar attitudes found in later articles on national character and other subjects far removed from literature.

Because the admirers of German letters seem to have been much less outspoken than the critics, caution must be exercised in judging the reception of German literature solely on the basis of the reviews. If Crabb Robinson seems like a lone voice, however, it may reflect the fact that some of the major writers of his generation influenced by German literature—Coleridge, Wordsworth, Scott, Southey and Lamb—defy definition as a Germanophilic “school.” They may have admired Germany, as did many of their contemporaries, in reaction to France and Jacobinism, but their German influences often proved to be superficial and their Germanophilia only lukewarm. Coleridge’s interest in German philosophy, especially Kantian, led him to live

---

86 From “German Literature. By a gentleman resident in one of the most popular of the German universities,” The Monthly Register and Encyclopedic Magazine 1 (1802): 397, quoted in Morgan, British Magazines, 55. Robinson, lived in Weimar, knew Goethe, Schiller and Wieland, and joined the group of English literary Germanophiles following Coleridge, Wordsworth, Lamb, Liegh Hunt and De Quincey. See Mander, German Cousins, 31-32.

87 From a review of Wilhelm Render’s Tour Through Germany (London: Longman, 1801) in the Critical Review (December 1801), quoted in Stokoe, German Influences, 44.

88 Mander, Our German Cousins, 126. Stokoe, German Influences, 86-87, 114, discusses both the rather specialized interests of Scott and Wordsworth’s, “insularity,” or distance from
and study for several months in Germany during the winter of 1798-9. He nonetheless found Kant’s moral teaching “stoical and loveless” and rejected what he considered Goethe’s “blasphemous” paganism and immorality. While Coleridge’s praises of German literature caught the attention of his contemporaries, his generalizations and comments seem to anticipate much of the criticism of the following century. “There is a nimity, a too-muchness in all Germans,” he wrote in his Table Talk (c. 1835), “it is the national fault.” He imputed to the Germans a moral ambiguity and considered them not poets but “good metaphysicians and critics: they criticized on principles previously laid down.” According to Coleridge, German literary style was “merely a method acquired by them as we have acquired a style.” Such were the faint praises of one of the era’s foremost literary figures.

Madame de Staël’s Germany redeemed to some extent the blackened reputations of Goethe and Schiller and generated much popular interest in German literature. Her explanation of the English prejudice against German literature rested principally on a difference in national character: the Germans “take pleasure in the ideal” while the English love “their laws, their manners, and their forms of worship.” “The Germans,” she wrote, “are to the human mind what pioneers are to an army,” while the English have “a dread of new systems.” De Staël’s work inspired Thomas Carlyle, Britain’s greatest champion of German culture during the nineteenth century, who improved receptivity to German literature through his literary, historical and critical

________________________

German literature. See also Morgan, British Magazines, 51.

89Mander, Our German Cousins, 132, 138, 149.

90Table Talk, 2:54, 344; Allsop Letters, 2:4, quoted in Stokoe, German Influences, 142.

91de Staël, Germany, 1:150-51.
But the attraction exerted by Carlyle over his fellow Victorians partook more of a search for religion, which he found in an eclectic conception of “German Idealism,” rather than in any deep understanding of his mentors: Goethe, Kant, Fichte and Novalis. Carlyle’s hero worship and his glorification of the Christian-feudal past appealed to the Victorian desire for salvation from atheism, loneliness and isolation, the by-products of a modern, democratic-industrial society. The fact that Carlyle had never met Goethe, his “messiah,” and only at the age of sixty visited Germany, where he complained about the beds, noisy hotels and food, reveals Carlyle’s Germany to have been largely a product of his imagination. The decline of his influence, which began long before his death in 1881, indicates not only that a Victorian appetite for eccentric, and often bombastic, soul-searching had abated, but also possibly that the real Germany was not living up to the ideal he had created.

Later nineteenth-century commentary on the German language and literature repeated many of the earlier criticisms, although with less vehemence. Literary reviews and even general articles on Germany harped on the “awful” German language with its “unreadable,” “crabbed letters,” “plumping phrases” and “cyclopean sentences,” or its “clumsy” and “antediluvian” writings.

---


93 Mander, Our German Cousins, 93, 100-101.

94 Houghton, Victorian Frame of Mind, 77, 311.

95 Thomas, “German Literature and Mid-Nineteenth-Century British Novelists,” 38. See also Mander, Our German Cousins, 104-6, on how Carlyle’s Calvinist orientation distorted his interpretation of Goethe, in particular his translation of Entsagen, or moderation, as “renunciation.”
styles. But gradual acceptance of German literature brought more benign appraisals of German literary “nobility,” “purity,” “dignity,” “inward truth,” and “psychological depth,” of “sincere,” “free, lofty and joyful” style and “good, true, beautiful and important” content. Earlier dismissal of Goethe as “absurd, puerile, incongruous, vulgar and affected,” of German authors as “pathetic,” or of German literary taste as the “vulgarity of pacific, comfortable Burghers, occupied with stuffing, cooking, and providing for their coarse personal accommodations,” faded with the advent of more balanced and differentiated criticisms of a wider array of authors. German writers had also gained a reputation for originality and inventiveness, and had benefitted from a popular conception of romanticism, the “romance that lurks in every German heart.” But resistance to crediting Germans with literary ability lingered on into the 1890s with absurd claims such as the insistence on the Semitic origin of all talented German writers, an assessment reminiscent of the allowance made in 1856 for the Gallic wit of half-Jewish Heinrich Heine: “he is as much German as a phesant [sic] is an English bird, or a


99Lee, “German Drama of Today,” *Cornhill*, 166. Positive comments and praise for imaginative, enthusiastic and “ingenious” elements in German literature appear as early as 1825 along with harsh criticisms in “German Genius and Taste,” *Edinburgh Review*, 414-16.
A genuine appreciation of German literature did take root in Britain, but only against a persistent reaction that had less to do with lack of appreciation than with national prejudice. No sooner had Germany “arrived” than the charge was leveled that all her greatness lay in the past, and that an “abundance of mediocrity” in the “land of Goethe” had brought about the “falling off of genuine literary productions.”

If the foregoing synopsis of British reactions to German letters seems overly negative, it nevertheless exposes the critical voice that played continuously in the reviews and magazines. Whether or not a reader of Kant or Goethe, or some popular translation, ever paused to consider the author’s Germanness seems less relevant than the negative summation of German national character that gained momentum in the press. This early negativity underscores the fact that British Germanophobia before World War I did not spring spontaneously from the soil of diplomatic and political antagonism alone. British contempt for things German covered all aspects of German culture from literature, religion and philosophy to social customs, education, business and politics, each of which came under the lens of British scrutiny during the nineteenth century. Germany’s evolution within two decades of Bismarck’s accession to power from England’s “poor relation” into a formidable competitor for world power and market share only increased the intensity and shifted the direction of the antagonism. Writers after 1871 began to

100 “German Wit: Heinrich Heine,” Westminster Review 65 (January 1856): 6-7. Charles Lowe, Berlin correspondent of the Times and biographer of Wilhelm II, expressed the idea that no true Teutonic literature, only Semitic, existed in the German language, and that most of the leading authors and actors in Germany were Jewish. See “The German Newspaper Press,” Nineteenth Century 30 (December 1891): 868, and “The New Emperor and His New Chancellor,” National Review, 18 (September 1891): 29.

examine the meteonic rise of Germany closely and, according to contemporary social theory, to conceive of the British and German Empires locked in a Darwinian struggle for supremacy, a theme kept alive in the public imagination through popular invasion scare literature. A remarkable continuity nevertheless existed in the opinions of writers separated by more than two generations. The same patronizing air of grudging admiration mixed with contempt, ridicule and moral condemnation remained, only with this major difference: the new alarmism shifted its focus away from the deleterious effects of German “speculative” philosophy and “immoral” literature onto the more “concrete” phantoms of military invasion and economic sabotage.

**Backward Germany**

The theme of backwardness permeated nearly all stereotypes of Old Germany—that is, Germany prior to widespread recognition of literary and scholarly achievement, nineteenth-century military victories, political unification and economic expansion. The history of witch persecutions, the devastation and horrors of the Thirty Years War, from 1618 to 1648, as well as the decline of the once prosperous Hanse towns, furnished a dismal picture of petty feudal tyrants lording it over servile burghers and backward, superstitious peasants. Economic relations between England and Germany declined and remained depressed during the seventeenth century. High tariffs on books, the lack of translators and the vogue of French literature, combined with a dearth of literary output in Germany itself, conspired to stifle any great knowledge or appreciation of German literature in England. And this cultural neglect occurred at a time when English writers, from Shakespeare to Joseph Addison, John Milton, Ossian, Thomas Percy, Alexander Pope, Samuel Richardson, the Earl of Shaftesbury, James Thomson, and Edward Young exerted an important literary influence in Germany. The Hanoverian Georges did little to
remedy the situation and “their bad manners and personal insignificance tended to develop in the English aristocracy a certain feeling of superiority and even contempt.”

Longstanding indifference to German political affairs continued until 1755, when the statesmanship and military exploits of Frederick the Great won broad English admiration and sympathy. But British receptivity to a Germany of rising intellectual and political significance confronted some devastating obstacles after a century of relative neglect. B. Q. Morgan observed:

Reliable knowledge of the German people’s language, culture, and ideals came slowly. It is not surprising, therefore, that when sporadic interest in some phase of German culture did develop, it should take the form of extravagant praise or bitter denunciation. There was no broad, comprehensive view of German conditions, no fair standard for a comparison or correlation of values.

On the eve of Germany’s late eighteenth-century literary and cultural renaissance British knowledge of Germany remained paltry and affected by earlier stereotypical themes: the moral, yet unrefined barbarians of Tacitus, German piety versus Faustian diabolism, the simplistic, natural fool versus the slovenly boor, the industrious yet politically inept bürgher. These conflicting images reflected an ambivalence toward the Germans that found expression in British reactions to German culture. As events in Europe during the nineteenth century turned more attention to German politics, the unpolitical German became the dominant theme of another stereotypical duality, especially during the revolutionary period of 1848 when fanatical students, know-it-all professors and reactionary aristocrats posed familiar figures. The Old German image of the politically and socially naive, rustic “German Michael,” the antithesis of political

---


103 Ibid., 39.
fanaticism, would survive even amidst the harsh glare of Bismarckian era nationalism and fears of Germany’s growing economic and military power (figure 6). Declared as late as the 1890s to be “typical of the views still held by the vast majority of Englishmen on the Kaiser’s subjects,” this embodiment of England’s “poor relation” has been described as follows:

He is a shaggy-looking scamp, this fellow, wearing an English railway-porter’s cap, a kind of bunchy Norfolk jacket and trousers stuffed into Russian peasant top-boots; he smokes a long porcelain pipe, and, of course, wears blue glasses.¹⁰⁴

During the nineteenth century the image of “New Germany” emerged with stereotypes of automaton soldiers, cruel officers, meddlesome officials, unscrupulous merchants, plodding clerks, inept colonists, servile workers and peasants, politically retrograde women and degenerate children. These negative images would serve as self-satisfying foils to notions of British superiority and would provide ammunition against proponents of the German model in education, trade practices and military discipline during an era of accelerating economic, colonial and diplomatic rivalry. Additionally, the stigma of diplomatic duplicity and blackmail would arise from the policies of Bismarck and his successors under Wilhelm II. These

¹⁰⁴Wile, Our German Cousins, 9. The persistence of the German Michael stereotype reinforced a general belief in fast-growing Germany’s political and emotional immaturity. See Hoover, God, Germany and Britain, 57.
two national figures personified different aspects of a modern yet strangely feudal New Germany, an image that, in some respects, would be built upon the ruins of the old. By destroying the idealistic Old German image of morality, honesty and heroism, under the pretense of revealing some horrible truth lurking within, Germanophobes could indulge in a kind of reactionary iconoclasm. Indeed, both old and new images tended to be negative because the Old German “virtues” always bore a taint of inferiority, while even the most positive assessments of New Germany carried an implicit warning to either emulate or fall prey to the new menace.

The dualistic nature of stereotypes allowed their connection with either positive or negative imagery. Wishful thinkers entertained the moral stereotype of Tacitus and the themes of racial and Protestant affinities despite charges of German reversion to barbarism. And while some ridiculed German political naivete, many still stuck to a belief in Germany’s eventual evolution toward the English constitutional model. Some ultra-escapists simply denied the capacity of the Germans to become a serious rival and dwelt on images of a quaint, picturesque and backward Germany. Alarmists tended to adopt a more Machiavellian image of Germans as capable and industrious but immoral or amoral. They frequently coupled these stereotypes with the themes of inevitable war and German opposition to civilization and Christianity.
6. NEW GERMANY: STEREOTYPES AND CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF GERMANY DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Despite harsh criticism still being meted out to German writers and philosophers during pre-Victorian decades, interest in the land and people of Goethe and Schiller did survive the earlier onslaught of anti-Jacobin Germanophobia in Britain. In fact, the German stereotype retained many, if not all, of the positive characteristics inherited from Tacitus which became incorporated in the image of Old Germany, a combination of Madame de Staël’s cultivated land of chivalric ideals, honesty and moral uprightness with the conception of Germany as England’s poor relation, striving to be like England herself. *Blackwood’s*, for example, approved of this blend of wholesome mediocrity, portraying Hanoverian soldiers as honest, sober, music-loving, scientifically knowledgeable, and, if “adapted . . . not for great public distinction,” leading well-mannered, pure and simple lives.¹ Such conditional admiration included an admission that Germans displayed the “Protestant” virtues of humility, modesty, thrift and industry, combined with more originality, less status consciousness, and a greater capacity for enjoying life than the English.² By the 1890s, however, even German *Gemüthlichkeit*, a word signifying inward as

---

¹“The King’s German Legion,” *Blackwood’s* 43 (June 1838): 741, 743.

²“Cousins German,” *Cornhill*, 297-98. Self-criticism centering on the English incapacity for enjoying life compared with, for example, French *joie de vivre* did not impinge upon the overriding assumption of British cultural superiority, but represented rather a price to be paid for imperial greatness. See Gwynn, “Success of the Anglo-Saxons,” 354, on English ready acceptance of a monotonous and monogamous existence.
well as outward “cheerfulness” or “comfort,” which described a positive facet of the Old or South German stereotype opposite in nature to English “stiffness and reserve,” appeared to be threatened with extinction under modern Germany’s “consciousness of new-born dignity”. This chapter deals with how this transition came about, and how German political developments gave rise to stereotypes of German political ineptitude as a means of both preserving an air of British superiority and projecting the worst aspects of nationalism and imperialism onto the Germans.

Even before imperial rivalries developed between Britain and Germany during the mid-1880s, a psychological rivalry had been played out on cultural grounds, as seen in negative British reactions to German literature and theology. This game of national one-up-man-ship also extended to political and social commentary as German nationalism, reform and revolutionary movements became items of interest in British periodicals. Defining German national character often served as a vicarious means of predicting future outcomes, particularly during the revolutionary year of 1848 and, later, in coming to terms with Bismarckian Germany’s transition from the innocuous and cultured land once admired by Prince Albert and Queen Victoria toward the Prussian model of militaristic diplomacy and efficient, but reactionary, government.

Throughout the century British writers produced a significant body of literature aimed at exposing the “German Mind” or “German Character,” seen either as an inherent cause or result of socio-economic, political and cultural realities. These excursions into “things German” included general descriptions of Germany as well as more specialized social commentary about various facets of German life. “Touring” articles, written more in the narrative tradition of de Staël than functional guides such as Baedeker’s, continued to highlight the quaint and curious

---

3Evans, “Germany Under the Empire,” 548-49. For an earlier description of Gemütlichkeit see “Germany,” Blackwood’s, 127.
features of pastoral Old Germany, but did not hesitate to register complaints about modern developments or point out lingering areas of German backwardness amidst rapid modernization. More specialized articles that targeted New Germany usually dealt with particular issues, institutions or groups, either for purposes of comparison with English equivalents or to argue a case for or against the German model. Many of the statements about German character, however, exude a timeless quality, as if the Germans would always be of a singular nature, the boundaries of which extended to encompass contradictions born of changed circumstances. Biographical articles also provided a window on German character by endeavoring to discover how famous, or infamous, individuals fit or departed from the stereotypical mold.

A new strain of Germanophobia followed political developments in Germany from the end of the Napoleonic Wars, through German unification and the foundation of Empire in 1871, up to the advent of World War I propaganda. Perception of Old German political incapacity and subservience to authority receded before apprehensions about fanatical nationalism, socialism, Bismarckian *Machtpolitik* and, eventually, imperial ambition. It would be misleading, however, to present this shift from old to new as a linear progression from good to bad, or from innocuous to menacing, concomitant with Germany’s rise to great power status. Many demeaning traits which constituted a mark of inferiority in the Old German stereotype remained in place. While Germany’s expansion in the latter nineteenth century generated new concerns and appraisals, sometimes positive as in the case of the German educational or industrial models, the emergence of new, disturbing stereotypical elements also evoked an idealized portrait of Germany’s past as a hopeful reminder of the Germans’ “true” nature. This persistent belief in the comfortable, innocuous, older stereotype found expression, for example, in images of a pastoral, romantic
South versus an aggrandizing Prussian North, or a liberal Anglophilic versus a conservative
Anglophobic Germany. Such wishful thinking furnished, in a frustratingly vague way, continual
hope for Germany’s transition toward an English-style constitutional monarchy, much as the
notion of racial kinship was touted as the basis for an Anglo-German diplomatic alliance.
However, the idealized image of pacific, pure, wholesome, Anglophile, impractical, unpolitical,
agricultural Old Germany also became the proverbial “straw man” behind which everything
objectionable about New Germany could be revealed and lambasted. The perceived
Prussianization of German politics, German militarism, imperial rivalry and diplomatic
blackmail presented both Liberals and Conservatives multiple rationales for alarmist
Germanophobia, which news of growing German Anglophobia at the century’s end, and the
outrageous statements of Kaiser Wilhelm II, only served to exacerbate. To a great extent,
therefore, the idealized or innocuous aspects of the Old German stereotype represented what
British writers and readers wished to see, and the threatening or deplorable aspects of New
Germany what they feared.

The Unpolitical German

Political affiliation in Britain, while it had virtually no bearing on the use or non-use of
stereotypes, naturally gave rise to a significant disparity of opinion on Germany. British Liberals
generally entertained optimism about gradual German political evolution toward an English-style
parliamentary system, and to this end supported and praised German progressives and socialists.
In contrast, British Conservatives usually remained skeptical of German statesmanship and
political maturity, especially in light of a rising socialist movement, and thus emphasized the
appropriateness and importance of maintaining the authoritarian Prussian monarchical system for
the Germans’ own sake. To backward-looking Conservatives Germany presented a living tableau of a glorified feudal past, whereas most Liberals sympathized with the struggle for freedom of England’s “continental cousin” against formidable obstacles born of unfavorable historical circumstances. British Germanophiles on both sides of the political divide thus nurtured idealized images: the Liberal ideal originating in a vague notion of a historical German, or Saxon, “love of freedom,” the Conservative counterpart exemplified by the Prussian model of enlightened and efficient monarchy. Despite this division, both Liberals and Conservatives could mock German political ineptitude in the struggle against, or acquiescence to, autocratic rule, and both could consider Germany a hopelessly backward conglomeration of largely anachronistic feudal states. It seems nonetheless remarkable that conservative Blackwood’s estimations of German disunity, lack of patriotism, political ineptitude and degradation during the 1830s and 40s would resound in the Liberal-Radical Westminster and Fortnightly reviews during the 1890s and 1900s. British readers learned once again that Germans are “particularists by nature,” that they “are neither by nature or habit a political people,” that they lacked “sound political instinct.”

4

**Early Nationalism, German Students and Dueling**

Notwithstanding late eighteenth-century British anti-Jacobin Germanophobia, which remained circumscribed within the purview of literary criticism, the first cracks in the broader paradigm of Old German passivity and patience appeared with reports of the rise of German nationalism after Napoleon’s defeat. Blackwood’s review of “Hodgskin’s Travels in Germany”

(1820) reported that the “ancient temper of calmness and mildness” of the German people had given way to a “diseased state of the public mind,” indicated by the accolades heaped on political writers whose “wild theories and visionary doctrines,” promulgated “with a rashness and wickedness,” had unexpectedly found favor “among a nation whose habits are in general those of good sense and moderation.” This dangerous “fermentation” of popular discontent had arisen from the effect of “narrow-minded” government policy on a people “degraded to the most perfect indifference” to death and suffering.⁵ While the more Conservative, Germanophilic reviewer generally agreed with Hodgskin as to this state of affairs in Germany, he objected to the writer’s denigration of the tombs of sovereigns, his unflattering opinions of German literature and philosophy, his attack on George IV’s Hanover policy, and what he perceived as an attempt to portray all governments as an “artful contrivance of tyrants” to be swept away and supplanted with “pure reason.” Indicative of the emotional controversy excited by divergent opinions on Germany, which had become a laboratory for political speculation, he also blasted Hodgskin as a “literary esquire . . . radical traveler and Cockney philosopher,” whose limited knowledge did not justify the “extravagant arrogance” of his pronouncements on German life and society.⁶

Liberals and Conservatives could agree, however, in their disapproval of the activities of German student unions, or Burschenschaften, the most literal symbol of “Young” Germany, whose strange blend of quasi-religious, neo-feudal, revolutionary, radical nationalism certainly appeared at odds with the idealized English model of a more secular, utilitarian evolution toward

---

⁵“Hodgskin’s Travels in Germany,” Blackwood’s 6 (February 1820): 541-42.

⁶Ibid., 536-37.
parliamentary government. The nationalist student movement had been suppressed under the 1819 Carlsbad Decrees, which implemented the “Metternich system” of strict censorship, espionage and university supervision after corps member Karl Sand’s assassination of reactionary writer and journalist August von Kotzebue. Whether or not the murder of this once enormously popular writer poisoned English minds against the Burschenschaften, a significant body of opinion likely held that the suppression of the universal Burschenschaft movement allowed German nature to return to its “inherent” morality and propriety. Descriptions of fanaticism and rowdy behavior overwhelmed any admiration for the student corps’ patriotic spirit or defense of academic freedom. In fact, criticism tended to focus on the superficial aspects of the Burschen phenomenon as a departure from more benign circumstances, regardless of philosophical complexities or socio-political realities prompting Burschenschaft ideology. In 1824 the Liberal Edinburgh Review characterized the typical German student as arrogant, holding “ludicrously erroneous ideas of honour,” and defending only the supposed “academic” freedoms to act and dress contrary to custom and to “besot himself with beer and tobacco.” Such “disorderly Teutonic youths” treated outsiders with contempt, lacked humility and discipline in comparison with “sober” British students or their own fellow German citizens, and wasted their academic

7“Young Germany” originally connoted a very positive image of cultured Anglophile German liberals who wanted to see Germany move toward parliamentary reforms. But the designation could also signify the more raucous nationalism of the German student-corps and could be used interchangeably with “New Germany” to stress a rising potential military, economic and imperial menace.

8See Howitt, Life in Germany, 92, 94.

9Such as, for example, student leader Karl Follen’s use of religion as an integrating factor for the movement, or his pessimistic distrust of all government as a means of justifying alienated, dispossessed intellectuals in a corporative system. See Leonard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 268-69.
years indulging in scandalous behavior before graduating to Burghertum and Philistinism. But, more importantly, from a political perspective German student activism stood in stark contrast to the idealized image of a “patient,” “educated” and “enlightened” people deserving, but denied, constitutional concessions from an autocratic government—an image more aptly suited to the intellectual and Anglophile Young Germany movement of the 1830s. True to his Liberal viewpoint, the writer for the Edinburgh scorned any “partiality for Prussian despotism” and denounced arguments that Germans were content to live under arbitrary government or that they would thus be better prepared for a real constitution, seeing in delay, rather, a cause of contention, bitterness and a spur to radical groups.

From the 1820s onward, student exemplars of Gothic barbarism were deemed excitable, crazy, medieval and murderous. Although conceded to be “leaders of the mobs, or the heroes of the barricades” during the revolutionary period of 1848, student radical nationalists were also considered “vapouring,” “hot-headed,” “fancied enthusiasts” and the Burschenschaften regarded as “pretty safety valves enough to let off the exuberance of studentic steam.” This somewhat contradictory image of German students as posturing, yet far from harmless, juveniles survived into the 1890s. Students would be described as a “truly dangerous class” of “superficially book-learned” individuals, who had obtained a “sufficient smattering of letters, philosophy, economics, and science enough to make them the readiest tools of the agitator,” and accounts of student


11Ibid., 91, 93-95.

dueling brought the sham-comical and threatening elements of the stereotype together. From the mid-1820s, when the Edinburgh Review and Blackwood’s reported on the commonplace occurrence of student duels provoked on the slightest pretext, until the outbreak of World War I, a perverse fascination kept alive in the British press what had become a traditional antipathy for this curious and ominous relic of feudal times. Despite an early notion that student societies, with their staunch devotion to patriotism and honor, promoted the Alt Deutsche virtues of sincerity and strict chastity, German dueling, especially student dueling, posed a continuing source of frustration and disappointment for both German liberals and British Germanophiles who sought similarities with England in the emergence of New Germany.

The German student stereotype retained its suggestive power, especially when it resurfaced during the 1890s after the youthful Kaiser Wilhelm II’s accession to power. It offered a convenient symbol of unbridled, irresponsible nationalism mixed with immature politics and

13“Mr. Dawson’s The Germans,” Saturday Review 77 (February 1894): 207. Many British readers no doubt believed, as did the Prussian government, that the Burschen were “secret and really revolutionary associations.” See “Fritz Reuter and the German Students’ Clubs,” Review of Reviews 11 (April 1895): 348.

14Early reports of student dueling can be found in “A Tour in Germany,” Edinburgh Review, 80 and J. G., “Letters From the Continent,” No. I, on German duelling, Blackwood’s 16 (November 1824): 557-59. On how Evangelicals, as part of the reform movement, had helped to discredited dueling among the English aristocracy during the 1820s and 30s see Elie Halevy, Triumph of Reform, 162. Taking the high moral ground on dueling could bolster national self-image as seen in the view that the persistence of the practice in France was due to a greater degree of “animal spirits” among a people with fewer religious scruples. See Edward Lytton Bulwer, England and the English, ed., Standish Meacham, in Classics of British Historical Literature, John Clive, gen. ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), originally published in 2 vols. (London: Bentley, 1833), 60.

15Early apologies for German student dueling can be found in “Letters From the Continent,” No. II, Blackwood’s 17 (March 1825): 330-31, 334, and Howitt, Life in Germany, 46-49.
neo-feudal militarism, all of which seemed to prognosticate Germany’s ominous future direction. In 1893 *Ludgate’s Magazine* published a luridly illustrated narrative entitled “Student Duelling [sic] in Germany” in which the author recounted his firsthand experience witnessing the *Mensur*, or ritualized sword-fight, between students. He wrote from the perspective of an English tourist encountering the strange appearance of the many students whose “square, good-humored faces, . . . were so seamed across and across with sword-cuts that it was hard to tell where the smile ended and the scars began.” On the way to the dueling grounds he recalled a conversation with one of the participants: “‘Lot’s of blood let this morning,’ said a warlike Teuton as he stuffed his mouth full of sausage. I shuddered, and took another sip of cognac.” When he asked this “murderous youth” his reason for fighting and discovered the provocation to be nothing more than the rude stare of a stranger, he remarked to himself, “What a curious thing this sense of honour is!” and vainly tried to “deprecate” the youth’s “politely disguised contempt” at hearing that an Oxford undergraduate in a similar situation “would not thirst for the stranger’s blood.” The comic elements of this grisly travelogue appear in the “sleepy-eyed policeman,” who “knows . . . what is afoot” (“Boys will be boys, and if the Kaiser and Prince Bismarck don’t mind, why should a poor, simple *Schutzmann* trouble his head about the matter?”) and the “inevitable and omnipresent glass of beer,” but the ghastly results of this “‘quiet and gentle passage of arms’” reveal the barbarity of the custom. In one duel the defeated

---

16George W. Smalley, “A Visit to Prince Bismarck,” *Fortnightly Review*, reprinted in *Living Age* 198 (July-September 1893): 654, for example, described Wilhelm II as “boyish, and even schoolboyish.”

17“Student Duelling in Germany,” *Ludgate’s Magazine* 6 (November 1893): 43.

18Ibid., 44.
loses “a piece of the scalp about two inches long and one broad,” in another “his cheek is laid open from the upper lip to the ear, and two teeth are cut clean asunder” before the injured are patched up by the attending doctor (“How like a butcher he looked!”).\(^{19}\)

The reference to the indulgent policeman would have reminded many readers of Wilhelm II’s defense of the Mensuren to a meeting of German students in Bonn, May 1891, when he stated his hope that “the spirit which is fostered in their Corps, and which is steeled by strength and courage, will be preserved, and that you will always take delight in handling the rapier.”\(^{20}\) Referring to this imperial faux päs, Charles Lowe, Wilhelm’s English biographer and frequent apologist, commented euphemistically in the conservative National Review at the time that “the young Emperor is apt to let himself be carried away by the enthusiasm of the moment.”\(^{21}\) But the kaiser’s pronouncements, as well as reports of dueling deaths in Germany, received enough publicity in the British press well into the twentieth century to reinforce the seeming ubiquity of what had long been seen as uncivilized, ungentlemanly behavior.\(^{22}\) In March of 1890, for example, the Pall Mall Gazette reported some details of the kaiser’s dueling edict which made an encounter between officers permissible when personal violence had been offered without apology, or an insult had been proffered to a lady relative or betrothed of the challenging

\(^{19}\)Ibid., 44, 47-48.

\(^{20}\)Quoted in Dawson, Germany and the Germans, 1:247.

\(^{21}\)Lowe, “The New Emperor and His New Chancellor,” 27.

\(^{22}\)An article entitled “Fatal Duel Between German officers,” Morning Post, as late as 12 May 1911, described the rules of combat as pistols at fifteen paces, the exchange of shots to continue until one of the duelists was rendered unable to fight.
officer. In the New Review of June 1896 Karl Blind accused the German government of impeding the reform of this “hideous face-slashing” practice. The Free Review in July of the following year bluntly paraphrased the kaiser’s military code of honor, “that the civilian has no honour to speak of, and that it is the duty of every soldier to kill or maim that contemptible creature who dares to offend him.” And while the Mensur rarely ended in a fatality as compared with duels using sabers or pistols, which was more likely in an encounter between army officers, the fact that authority figures, such as professors and government officials, condoned or encouraged the technically illegal practice as a form of institutionalized violence accentuated a very clear distinction between English and German societies.

Old German Passivity and Servility: 1830-48

Dueling and dueling scars among German students and army officers presented a glaring refutation of modernity, but the apparent toleration of this “warrior code” of conduct posed an even greater obstacle to hopes for Germany’s development toward an acceptable civilian parliamentary government. Fear of the consequences of dueling on German society, both from

---


26. According to Norbert Elias, The Germans (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 63-65, 155-58, the nineteenth-century rise of Prussian Germany to a position of power through a series of military victories over Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1871), and the incorporation of portions of the German middle class into the establishment through student fraternities and dueling societies, led to the adoption of an aristocratic “warrior code” in place of a humanitarian code. The new “aristocracy” of senior civil servants, university professors and students (i.e., anyone who could engage in a duel) traded the freedom of the masses for social prestige and a more circumscribed, symbolic freedom from the state’s “monopoly of violence.”
injustices perpetrated with impunity and from its general acceptance, which implied an inherent civic weakness on the part of the Bürghertum, gave psychological leverage to the stereotype of “inbred” militarism. Despite civilian antipathy to army duels expressed by German liberals in 1848 and during the 1850s, the survival of the practice only confirmed the nearly ubiquitous image of German political backwardness in British periodical literature. The pervasive notion of German submissiveness and servility, the counterpart to bullying by army officers and students, represented one of the most damning consequences of Old German passivity in English evaluations of Germany.

Admissions by reviewers that travel accounts had yielded only a very superficial and limited knowledge of Germany, and that England remained in a state of ignorance regarding her continental cousin, scarcely impeded stereotyping of Germans by British writers. In a comprehensive critique of contemporary travel literature the Westminster Review complained about British ignorance of the “intricacies of German politics, the state of manners, and domestic life” and yet mocked one author in particular as naive and deficient in her portrayal of German national character by writing, “even the serious Germans cracked an occasional joke at Mrs. T’s expense . . . phlegm itself could not resist the temptation.” Blackwood’s blamed the Germans themselves for being overlooked culturally by the “vain” French and “proud” British. “Slavish submission” to the role model of Louis XIV among German aristocrats during the “era of Frenchification” had bred a “self-disowning character” and a lack of self-respect that forced the German intellect to retire “behind huge fortifications of lumbering erudition and thorny


metaphysics.” 29 Both Madame de Staël, who only “blew away the mists”, and Thomas Carlyle, “the great apostle of the Teutonic gospel,” won praise for acquainting the British with the merits of German literature, but runaway enthusiasm for German culture only provoked disparagement:

. . . we will not exchange our classic Edinburgh or our titanic London for any elegant cabinet city of a Carlsruhe, spread out in courtly elegance like a lady’s fan, on the foreground stiffly adorned with long Lombardy poplars, while behind some dark sombre Schartzwald [sic], instinct with robbers and hobgoblins, frowns. The Goethe-maniac and Kantian apostles of Germanism, may phrase as mystically as they will; we will not exchange our British soil, where on we walk erect, for any sublime ballooning, devil knows wither, in the crescent boat of German metaphysics. We will not admit Goethe into partnership with Shakespeare. 30

In Charles Julius Weber, author of a four-volume “self-portrait” of his own native Germany, Blackwood’s had found “a brain well stored with curious scraps of book learning, such as every German must have,” and a “fluent breadth of wit . . . so far as a German can be witty.” Weber described, “methodically, as a German will,” a Germany that opened up a rich panoply of stereotypes. He compared cheerful South Germany with the “dreary,” “phlegmatic” and melancholy North whose inhabitants, like their “stepmother Nature” are “serious, monotonous, unfriendly, unwieldy, colder, more watery, more sandy . . . not cheerful, merry, and communicative, like the sons of the southern hills—without wine, without harp and song.” Weber’s comments on German national character, which the Blackwood’s reviewer found “particularly edifying,” painted the disarming image of a kind-hearted, earnest people who enjoyed an increased longevity due to purer morals (shades of Tacitus) and described the typical German as “earthy” and “not so nimble, merry and witty as the Frenchman . . . not so proud, whimsical and dry as the Briton; not so lazy, bigoted, and miserly as the Italian: but a plain

29 “Germany,” Blackwood’s, 119-20.

30 Ibid., 122-23.
downright honest unpretending specimen of humanity, indefatigable, solid, quiet, sensible and valiant.”

Negative elements of the Old German stereotype in Weber’s work included “morbid sensibility,” superstition, pedantry, rudeness, slowness, “lumbering heaviness,” phlegm (“The North German postilion exemplifies the truly phlegmatic character, . . . nothing discomposes him so long as his pipe only smokes and his schnapps is paid.”) and servility, “pusillanimous humility,” a “dull tame submissiveness, which begot our woeful spirit of imitation, our pompous concern about trifles, and our wonderfully low estimate of our own dignity—a very dog’s humility.” Servility tarnished the stereotype of the rustic simpleton or German Michael, who “allows himself to be kicked in the rear quietly, and then asks Was beliebt? (What’s your will?).” The German use of certain “respectful” phrases in addressing titled personages allegedly signified a “moral debasement,” an observation indicative of the extent to which the stereotype of political subservience had undermined evaluations of German culture and character. Weber attempted to soften these national character defects by appealing to the “historical grandeur” of the Teutonic race, to Germany’s medieval prominence and Christian humility, or to her newer reputation for intellectual superiority, erudition and scientific accuracy. For English writers, and probably readers, however, the negative qualities of German servility, phlegm, artistic mediocrity and political ineptitude were not so easily dismissed, because they characterized an older, more innocuous Germany that entertained no pretense of rivalry with allegedly superior English culture.

---

31Ibid., 124-25, 127.

32Ibid., 128-30.
Within the paradigm of German political backwardness and inertia, German heroic resistance to French domination seemed in retrospect to be an anomaly. Napoleon’s occupation therefore supposedly benefitted Germany, not only by breaking up the Holy Roman Empire and removing an obstacle to national self-determination, but also because loose, dull and heavy Germans needed bracing, sharpening and spurring—they wanted a soul, something the English and French already had. Seven years of Napoleonic tyranny since the Battle of Jena in October 1806 had served to “regenerate national pride in response to French vanity.” By God’s grace the “instinct good in human nature . . . burst the clogs and bandages of hereditary baseness.” “One leap brought the Prussian people from the lowest depth of baseness to the proudest pinnacle of heroism. . . . every vulgar jäger in a green coat was a hero.”

British reactions to German political developments during the first half of the nineteenth century appear to have imbibed the spirit of anti-Jacobin hysteria and ridicule that had initially greeted German literary accomplishment at the close of the eighteenth century. Support for the “mild and paternal character” of the Prussian government accompanied distrust of “subversive” revolutionary ideas and movements simmering in Germany during the 1830s and 40s. This attitude was based on the idea that German particularism and disunity, despite a developed cultural and ethnic sense of nationhood, had bred an indifference to “executive affairs” and political realities. Social quietism, combined with “intellectual restlessness,” a peculiar passion for “metaphysical and fantastic subjects” and a “propensity to theorize, not merely beyond, but in utter neglect and contempt of experience,” had supposedly created a dangerous condition in

33“Reminiscences of the Year 1813 in Germany,” Blackwood’s 48 (December 1840): 746-48.

34“Germany,” Blackwood’s, 130-31, 134.
An infectious enthusiasm for ideas among Germans steeped in “immense erudition” and “pedagogism,” if invested in revolutionary ideologies and put into practice, could potentially upset the “equilibrium of the social and moral order” and disturb the “uniform course of progressive improvement and prosperity.”\textsuperscript{36} The double irony of German political incapacity producing unempirical philosophy or literature tainted at its source, which in turn could propagate political fanaticism, underscores the key importance of the unpolitical German stereotype in establishing a perspective on political developments in Germany. Because of the premium placed on national character, uncertainties and misgivings regarding the Germans seemed to amplify the specter of menacing and portentous political changes in Germany, especially when measured in opposition to an idealized English pragmatism and model of political development.

\textbf{Unrevolutionary Germany: 1848}

The stigma of German political ineptitude, defined so thoroughly by the 1840s with various pronouncements in \textit{Blackwood’s} about German political degradation, disunity, indifference and lack of patriotism, came to full fruition in reports of revolutionary activity and the convocation of the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848. \textit{Blackwood’s} mockingly lamented the lost glories of “old Father Rhine,” who, despite his “conceitedly-vulgar airs” and “overrated allurements,” yet retained a “spurious halo” of kindly reminiscences for the English tourist, but who had lately been despoiled by Young Germany in its “revolutionary frenzy” of the “charm of

\textsuperscript{35}“The Archbishop of Cologne and the King of Prussia,” \textit{Blackwood’s}, 767.

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., 768.
foreign bustle and movement.” The unfortunate fact that Germany had followed France’s lead and caught the “St. Vitus of revolution” created a problem for English tourists:

Since Germany, with its newborn cry for imperial unity, has appeared inclined to turn back again, in new revolutionary spirit, to old feudal times, the Rhenish hotel-keepers seem to think that they ought to appear in the characters of the old robber-knights.³⁷

Besides encountering formerly “active and obsequious” waiters, now growing fat and “pale with ill-humour at their diminished *trinkgelder,*” the English traveler, according to *Blackwood’s,* might well wonder at the “bombastic and unpractical dreams” of German scholars, “children as they may be in political life,” pursuing the “ill-defined idol . . . of German unity,” or at the “general herd of men,” like a “flock of sheep”—or “pack of wolves”—taking up the insane cry of over-enthusiastic students for a united Germany. The “long-pretended spirit of romance” in Germany seemed to be giving way to the pretense of “symbol-loving” Germans, fond of “parading the dress” of revolution and the “ostentatious display of the new-old imperial, so-called national cockade, the red, black, and gold colors of the old German Empire.” The events of 1848 represented, from *Blackwood’s* perspective, an aberration or a “drunken fit” of revolution and a departure from the old Germany of “patriarchal” and “peacefully disposed” cities—more specifically, from the once contented serenity of conservative South Germany. It purportedly followed that, despite the “rude, ready eloquence” of some individual speakers, the Germans, “proverbially vague in their philosophical theories, . . . show themselves still more so in their political views.”³⁸

³⁷“What Would Revolutionizing Germany Be At?” *Blackwood’s,* 373.

³⁸Ibid., 373-75, 378, 382.
Two months later, Blackwood's reconfirmed the observation that quiet Germany had embraced anarchy. Radicalism was in vogue in Frankfurt and in Cologne, “always a nest of rascality and filth,” where the writer found “miscreants in blouses, belching out their unholy hymns of revolution” and the manners of the people, under the influence of irresponsible demagogues, to have become “rude and ruffianly in the extreme.” The article summarized the political situation in Germany: the Rhenish states, swayed by France and revolutionaries with the help of “expatriated journalists and crack-brained political poets,” had granted constitutions by the score, while Prussia, whose policy “has always been of the most tortuous and deceptive kind,” had affected liberalism in order to distinguish herself from Austria. The public address delivered on 18 March 1848 by the Prussian king Frederick Wilhelm IV, who “remained true to his original character of charlatan,” stood as a singular testament to “royal confidence in public sottishness and credulity.” Germany’s leading democrats, “however wild in their principles,” were credited with seeing through this ruse, but they had become distracted from their primary goal of establishing democratic freedoms and fixated instead upon the “dim phantom of German unity.”

The Frankfurt Parliament, described as a “motley assemblage” whose countenances “were generally mean and vulgar, and in some cases absurdly bizarre,” was filled with “incapable” politicians with “wild and crude ideas,” uncomprehending bürghers and merchants “fattened on tobacco and beer,” “crazy students in their medieval garb,” professors and the stereotypical “recluse scholar . . . proverbially a man unfit to manage his own affairs.” Revolutionary excesses, such as the brutal murder of Prince Felix Lichnowsky at the gates of Frankfurt by a “cowardly and rascal rout,” were condemned and likened to another atrocity of


202
that fateful year, namely “the unexampled abomination of Christian men adopting cannibalism, . . . as was the case not a month ago at Messina!” As for the Frankfurt Assembly and German political aspirations: “Heaven help the idiots! [W]hat would they be at? They have got all manner of constitutions, liberty of the press—though there is not a man in Germany who could write a decent leading article—and a great deal more freedom than is good for them already.”

While the “ludicrously tragic” drama of 1848 and its aftermath continued to be attributed to the intransigence of Frederick William IV and a “tyranny of professors” acting as state functionaries, the idea also persisted that the reflective character and passivity of the Germans themselves contributed to their own political deficiencies. Despite earlier charges that German speculative philosophy had bred a contempt for sober inquiry and created an un-Christian, egotistical and godless contempt for authority in a generation of Germans that sought change through violent revolution, the perception endured that incapacity for political revolution itself distinguished Germany from France and England. An 1898 retrospective in the Review of Reviews characterized the events of 1848 in Germany as a revolution that “stood still before thrones” and reiterated the common theme that the German “revolution” bore no resemblance to the great historic revolutions of 1640 and 1688 in England, or those of 1789, 1830 and 1848 in

_________________

40Ibid., 530-33.


42See “Results of German Philosophy,” British Quarterly Review 7 (May 1848): 406, 426-29.
France. The attribution of Germany’s still-born revolution primarily to the German’s unpolitical nature tended to gloss over many real factors, such as political fragmentation, generally favorable economic conditions, enlightened reforms and the intelligentsia’s vested interest in the bureaucracy. German political retardation nonetheless did seem to stem from disunity and a lack of centralization that impeded the adoption of British-style civil liberties, ministerial responsibility and parliamentary government. The weak imperial system that preceded attempts to achieve political liberty had allegedly allowed petty kings and princes, “neither fearing God nor regarding man,” to flourish under an amorphous and chaotic regime headed by an impotent Emperor. These grim realities, plus the depredations of war and foreign invasion, the cowardice and incompetence of their own rulers, were believed to have left the German people “destitute till quite recently of any feeling of nationality.” In 1901 the Spectator blamed the “utter lack of German public spirit” during the previous century on “generations of incoherence” stemming from centuries of existence as a mere “geographical expression” and

---


44T. C. W. Blanning, Reform and Revolution in Mainz, 1743-1803 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), points to these and other factors which include, the conservative solidarity of guilds, disenchantment with French laissez-faire economics, resentment over the real or imagined depredations of French invaders and a philosophical divergence from the French and English enlightenment in the German conceptual association of political liberty with state authority. See also Blanning’s, “German Jacobins and the French Revolution,” Historical Journal 23 (1980): 985-1002.

“shadowy Imperial power” prior to German unification. New Germany dominated by Prussia
and “hypnotized by the generations of Hohenzollern influence,” had still not made significant
strides politically since the events of 1848 and 1870.46

**Bismarckian Germany**

The unpolitical German stereotype persisted through the Bismarckian era despite
acknowledgment of Bismarck’s own canny diplomacy and political savvy. Bismarck himself,
though an archconservative and fierce monarchist, represented a departure from the stiff
reactionism that preceded his appointment as Prussian Minister-President and Foreign Minister
in 1862. The *Fortnightly Review* offered a political assessment of then Count Bismarck at the
time of Prussia’s crushing defeat of Austria at Sadowa in July of 1866. Bismarck appeared a
reckless opportunist and hypocrite, a “true fanatic” for Prussia masquerading as a German
nationalist who had reversed his long-standing opposition to “universal suffrage” only for
reasons of political expediency.47 The author documented Bismarck’s aversion to
constitutionalism, his arrogance toward liberals, his harassment of independent journalists and
his part in the Prussian politics of might over right that had dissolved a recalcitrant parliament
over the contentious issue of the king’s military budget.48 Bismarck’s obstruction of German
liberalization, and his targeting of the French and such “enemies” of the empire as Poles,

---

46. “German Characteristics,” *The Spectator*, reprinted in *Living Age* 228 (January-March
1901): 129-30.

47. Universal suffrage meant the vote for male taxpayers only. Under the Prussian three-
class electoral system, established in 1849 for the Chamber of Deputies or lower house of
parliament, the wealthiest 20-25% controlled two-thirds of the vote.

Catholics and socialists in order to whip up nationalist support, constitute what David Blackbourne has designated “the Bismarck-problem” that limited the political integration and evolution of Germany.\textsuperscript{49} In his opposition to liberal German Anglophilia, Bismarck drew on Anglo-German distinctions based upon his own misapprehensions of the English political model. He admired the English hereditary aristocracy’s retention of power in the House of Lords but despised the weak British monarchy, insisting that the Prussian crown remain the “main pillar” of the state.\textsuperscript{50}

Besides Bismarck’s anti-English sentiments and Machiavellian schemes, the acquiescence of elected German politicians to the government’s top-down approach revealed a disturbing disconnect between popular nationalism and liberalism. In 1867 the \textit{London Review}, remarking on the ease with which Bismarck, as “arch-magician,” had “smoothed down the acerbities of conflicting opinion,” wondered how the government’s constitution for the North German Confederation had passed almost unanimously, even without needed amendments on ministerial responsibility, compensation for elected members and the free reporting of debates.\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Gentlemen’s Magazine} in 1870, while retaining the idea that a freedom-loving German people would continue to oppose Bismarck’s Prussian Junker policies, nevertheless admitted the “fictitious halo of patriotism” that insured his unlimited power and popularity. German unification would thus allow of no immediate prognostication for German democracy, which the


\textsuperscript{50} Schlesinger, “Count Bismarck,” 396-97.

\textsuperscript{51} “The North German Constitution” (29 June 1867): 720.
author believed required a long internecine struggle. Frederic Harrison, a radical progressive and early alarmist, considered Prussia a war state, in which “the very germ of international morality is wanting,” and he declared the trope of the mild, domestic German no longer valid in a militaristic nation where the Lanzknecht “stalks still beneath the Pickel-haube.” Comparing Bismarckism with Napoleanism, Harrison advised the formation of an alliance to stop the “retrograde” consequences of Prussian ambition. After German unification had become a reality in January of 1871, Edwin Goadby responded to Harrison’s critique with the argument that Bismarck’s acts constituted those of a “real patriot,” given his Prussian culture and character. Goadby argued situational factors as explanations for Prussian Chauvinism and Bismarck’s “iron and blood” rhetoric. These he respectively based on Prussia’s strategically precarious position between France and Russia and Bismarck’s daunting political task of reconciling feudalism with republicanism. Goadby nonetheless stereotyped Bismarck as an exemplar of Prussian pugnacity, disputatiousness, impatience and snobbery. In his “defense” of Bismarck Goadby also blamed German “political backwardness and sloth” and the “collections of oddities” that characterized the German people: “scholars, dreamers, poets, metaphysicians—anything but politicians.”

52 “Bismarck's Prussia,” 5 (September 1870): 473, 479, 482.


54 Ibid., 641-43.


56 Ibid., 340-44.
The currency of the unpolitical German stereotype did not destroy hopes for a more democratic Germany and peaceful Europe. Goadby entertained the prospect of a stable, progressive, enlightened and spiritually regenerated Germany within a decade, built upon the “heroic quality” of Germany’s leaders. Six years after the creation of the second German Empire, Herbert Tuttle would voice a similar belief in the “resolutely liberal” character of the German people, but only after denouncing Bismarck’s personal rule as a farce that revealed the German incapacity for peaceful political progress without the din of patriotic war. Tuttle described German conservatives as mostly “dull country squires,” liberals as sycophantic and supporting only union and nationalism, socialists as too violently progressive and progressives as Anglophile but obnoxious to Prussian “Philistines.” Tuttle attributed the impotence of German parliament to the fact that, unlike republican France, the monarchist foundation of the state itself remained questionable.

Opinion on Bismarck’s politics and foreign policy remained divided during the 1870s and 80s. Reporting on Bismarck’s failed efforts to undermine free parliamentary speech in 1879, the Examiner averred that behind the chancellor’s political schemes there existed an equally reactionary plan to return Germany to protectionism and to the police state of post-Napoleonic times. But this negative picture should be weighed against later reassessments of Bismarck’s foreign and social policies. Refuting portrayals of Bismarck as either Machiavellian or Napoleonic, the Fortnightly Review in 1887 praised the “arbiter of Europe” for using his powers

---

57 Ibid., 345-46.


59 “Bismarck’s Third Defeat and German Prospects” (15 March 1879): 328.
with discretion and for his pro-British influence at Constantinople. Bismarck’s “plain and straightforward policy” for the defense of Germany would no doubt continue and, with the pending accession of Crown Prince Frederick to the Prussian throne, formerly turbulent relations between Bismarck and the English-born Crown Princess Victoria would resolve into “complete accord” on the interests of the German Empire.\(^{60}\) Although liberal hopes for a more progressive, Anglophile German government were dashed with the premature death of Kaiser Frederick III in 1888, British reformers, radicals and social imperialists alike could look to Bismarckian state insurance models. Joseph Chamberlain and the Unionists, eventually endorsed tariff reform.\(^{61}\)

Bismarck’s falling out with Kaiser Wilhelm II and his forced resignation in 1890, metaphorically depicted as “Dropping the Pilot” in John Tenniel’s famous *Punch* cartoon, led some to regret the ex-chancellor’s downfall.\(^{62}\) Sensing an atmosphere of worry and anxiety in European chancelleries since Bismarck’s disappearance, an anonymous writer for the *Fortnightly Review* detailed the unraveling of German foreign policy through the kaiser’s vacillations. The author missed Bismarck’s “brilliant unscrupulousness” and lamented the kaiser’s aspiration to be not an “honest broker” but a “sort of War Lord of European Peace.” The impatient kaiser abandoned his *Neue Kurs* of openness and conciliation after the lapse of Bismarck’s secret Reinsurance Treaty with Russia had precipitated the Franco-Russian Dual Entente in 1894, and after the repeal of Bismarck’s anti-Socialist law had failed to quell democratic political

\(^{60}\) The Present Position of European Politics: Part I.—Germany,” 4-7, 12-14.


\(^{62}\) Tenniel’s cartoon appeared in the March 1890 issue.
activism. The kaiser had then adopted an Anglophobic policy in South Africa which culminated in the 1896 Kruger Telegram and consequent alienation of England. The Quarterly Review’s encomium of Bismarck upon his death in 1898 absolved Bismarck of any responsibility for the Franco-Prussian War and painted him as a visionary and “true patriot,” despite counterproductive mistakes made with the Kulturkampf and anti-socialist laws.

Countering these revisionist views of the Bismarck legacy, the Speaker set out to debunk the Bismarck myth with the argument that Bismarck could have achieved nothing without von Moltke’s army and the easily manipulated Kaiser Wilhelm I. Bismarck’s sins, including the trumped up prosecution of his rival Count von Arnim and the “insolence” shown Frederick III’s widow, exposed him as a simple bully. Some writers expected a continuation of Bismarck’s Machiavellian policies, steeped in “unmitigated duplicity,” to be carried on against Britain. So wrote “Ignotus” about the kaiser’s naval buildup, the attempts to undermine British prestige in China, and the German world policy of supplanting British influence wherever possible. The suspicion that Bismarck had nourished a quiescent German Anglophobia also persisted beyond...

---

63 “The German Emperor’s Foreign Politics,” Fortnightly Review 62 (September 1897): 471, 472-73. Bismarck’s Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 guaranteed neutrality in the event Germany or Russia went to war with a third party. A German attack on France or Russian attack on Austria-Hungary would void the neutrality obligation.

64 Ibid., 475-76, 477.


his dismissal. In 1901, Henry W. Wolff complained in the *Monthly Review* that German ill-will had arisen only after Bismarck’s accession to power, and that “official inspiration” had orchestrated the systematic distortion of English history in German eyes. Old German admiration and envy of English foreign policy, self-government and individualism had been recast as scorn for “unfair, self-seeking and scheming” English ways. British complaints of German methods or manners had themselves been chalked up to envy of German military and economic advancement.\^68\(^\text{68}\) “Patriae quis Exul,” writing for the *Contemporary Review* in 1902, likewise condemned Bismarck’s efforts to foster Anglophobia against German liberals and English influences at Court, and he blamed Bismarck for inspiring articles calculated to stir up European pro-Boer sentiments against Britain following the First Anglo-Boer War (1800-1801).\^69\(^\text{69}\)

**New Germany and the Old Stereotype**

The Germany that arose within twenty years after the wars of unification to new heights of military, economic and industrial power caused a realignment of the old stereotype. At mid-century Germans could be pejoratively labeled “conservative agriculturalists” and accused of leading dull, unchanging, inland existences which made them non-commercial and impractical, given to reflection and intellectual endeavor—qualities that, when combined with the constant

---


\^69\(^\text{69}\)“Anglophobia in Germany,” Reprinted in *Living Age* 232 (February 1902): 454-55.
threat of foreign invasion and consequent necessity of a large standing army, were believed to have bred an “unresisting obedience” to authority.\(^{70}\) By the 1890s, however, German industrial advances had largely relegated the “agricultural” label to descriptions of quaint, rural areas, forcing the once broadly applied image of “backwardness” to become more narrowly focused on German politics and social life. In June of 1897 the \textit{Contemporary Review} published an article by a writer under the pseudonym of “Germanicus” that summed up the British Liberal view of German political life during the Wilhelmine Era:

The Germans have not yet had their 1688, nor their 1789; and we cannot believe that they will be spared the experience of England and of France. The literary Golden Age in Germany also arrived a century later than the similar epochs in the two Western European countries. Notwithstanding Sadowa and Sedan, notwithstanding their superior chemical industry and their Röntgen rays, the Germans, as a political body, are a hundred years behind the English or French nation. They boast of a Constitution, a Parliament, and all the other paraphernalia of modern government. But the Emperor nevertheless considers himself the master, just as James II. did.\(^{71}\)

Contrast the above quotation with a more Conservative, apologetic view expressed five years later by Charles Lowe in \textit{Pall Mall Magazine}, in which he attempted to dispel the notion of Germany “Under the Iron Heel” of an autocratic Emperor by distinguishing the kaiser’s more limited powers as “little more than a figure-head” of the German Empire from his political powers as King of Prussia. Lowe explained away apprehensions about the “patriarchal opportunities which present themselves for the assertion of his imperious character,” claiming that the kaiser’s authority was checked by the Prussian constitution which “secures a very large

\(^{70}\)”French, Germans and English,” \textit{British Quarterly Review}, 347-78, 351-53. The author employed the classical metaphor of liberal, Athenian, busy traders versus conservative, Spartan farmer-soldiers in order to distinguish active, energetic and commercial “Anglo-Germans” from their Teutonic continental cousins.

\(^{71}\)”Germans and Their Kaiser,” \textit{Contemporary Review} 71 (June 1897): 805. The same quote reappeared the following month in Von Seckendorff, “William the Cad,” 469.
measure of political power and personal liberty to the people—quite as much as is good for them in the peculiar circumstances of their geographical and military position as a ‘besieged fortress’ in the centre of Europe.”

The conservative, pro-monarchical stance was spelled out by Blackwood’s in 1890 when it called the Prussian crown “one of the best governments and purest administrations in the world,” and praised Frederick Wilhelm IV, despite his “mental state bordering on insanity,” for rejecting the proposals of the 1848 Frankfurt Parliament which would have made the monarch a “slave to triumphant democracy.” The monarchical imposition of a constitution had preserved the German “conservative character” and “profound notions of duty,” which had been imbued from the philosophy of Kant and the poetry of Schiller. These had imparted distinct competitive advantages for a German Empire, “safer in the hands of the powerful and prudent administrators.”

The Quarterly Review in 1891 advanced a similarly...
undemocratic line of political Germanophilia in a eulogy of the Hegelian ideal of state interests superceding individual rights, which in Britain could have been

. . . nearly represented by the English Court . . . before the authority of the Crown had been annihilated, the House of Lords reduced to the shadow of a great name, the House of Commons turned into an auction mart, . . . trading upon passions and prejudice of a populace incapable of understanding even the rudiments of the questions whereof it has been constituted the supreme arbiter.74

Germany, that “noble and puissant nation,” ruled by “true kings of men” who were instilled with an “organic morality,” who commanded a “patriot army” and who presided over political institutions that “offered orderly expression to popular sentiment” and guaranteed “a rational amount of individual freedom,” stood as a “bulwark of law and order” amidst a Europe of peoples given over to “anarchy and self-government by the basest.”75

Conservatives by no means monopolized positive appraisals of the German government. In April 1899 the Liberal-Unionist Nineteenth Century published an article by Charles Copland Perry in which he advised Britons to reassess their antipathy for German political institutions and modify their attitude of “lofty superiority” and “amused contempt” toward Germany. He summarized the typical British attitude as follows:

. . . Germany is simply a country which, for reasons best known to itself, keeps a very large army, possesses a good many autocratic and boorish officials, which has once or twice, in the person of its Emperor, had the impertinence to interfere with our own affairs and which persists in flooding our labour-markets with cheap clerks.76

Perry argued that Anglo-German “differences of conception and character” stemmed from historical causes: insular Britain advanced through prosperity, war-ravaged Germany through

75Ibid., 179.
76Perry, “Germany as an Object Lesson” Nineteenth Century, 527.
adversity. He insisted that the “paternal” government, which “moves our pity and contempt,” originated from a sense of personal responsibility on the part of Germany’s rulers for the purpose of implanting “the conception of obedience, discipline, duty, simplicity of life, and moral responsibility” in German minds. He considered the British system, in comparison, to be plagued by “continually shifting authority that tends to deaden the sense of moral responsibility” in British leaders. Perry held that paternalism offered distinct practical imperial advantages over the “fatalism” of democracy, through which “humanity and reason are so often sacrificed to the fetish of individual liberty, that the vital interests of the many are at the mercy of the few.” But he also regretted the “transparent hypocrisy of regarding the collective ignorance of the many as the omniscient voice of Providence.”

In the *Fortnightly Review* of May 1895, William Harbutt Dawson acknowledged that pre-Bismarckian Prussia, though lacking real civic or political freedoms, was benevolent despotism or “patriarchalism in its best form,” with “tolerable, and even good” laws and an “efficient and honest” bureaucracy. Dawson admitted only the remotest possibility, however, that the antiquated system preserved under Bismarck’s reactionary supervision would ever be overturned by a Liberal majority in the Reichstag or by revolution. Tempered praise for Prussia’s “incorruptible bureaucracy” sometimes rested on the racial argument that German “Caesarism” differed from its endemic Latin counterpart only through being antithetical to Teutonic, or German, character. Racially-based Germanophilia, however, often played into the hands of Germanophobes because assumptions about the “German spirit of

---

77Ibid., 529-31.


thoroughness,” or the “immense vitality of the Teutonic stock,” made the observation that Germany possessed “the most efficient national directory in the world” more a cause for concern than a mark of praise.\textsuperscript{80}

British magazines from the mid-1880s through 1914 tended to reduce Germany’s internal political, economic and social inequities down to a formula coupling overbearing and burdensome government with civic weakness, an interpretation which made the German people appear politically indifferent, apathetic or childish. In 1890 the \textit{Saturday Review} wrote that Germans “know perfectly well that their votes will not, in all probability, be followed by any serious change of government,” and that “the peculiar relations of the German parliament and the German Crown enable Germans . . . to play at opposition and fronde.”\textsuperscript{81} The source of the German political malaise was believed to have sprung from blind veneration of the Hohenzollern dynasty, “an ecstatic and mystic religion” and a “species of fanaticism which is without a parallel in history.”\textsuperscript{82} In 1893 the \textit{Fortnightly Review} echoed these sentiments, stating that parliamentary institutions “are not founded in the hearts of the people” and “the German people play at parliaments,” that Bismarck had established the “kingly principle” in German public life, and that Wilhelm II was attempting to make the government the arbiter of German consciences by making the emperor into a pope.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{80}[Calchas], “Will Germany Fail?” \textit{Fortnightly Review}, 586-87.

\textsuperscript{81}”The German Elections,” \textit{Saturday Review} 69 (March 1890): 252.

\textsuperscript{82}Bamberger, “German Crisis and the German Emperor,” 397.

\textsuperscript{83}Smalley, “A Visit to Prince Bismarck,” 656-57. The comment about the kaiser’s religious pretensions refers to his backing of the failed Zedlitz School Bill of 1892 that would have made religious instruction in primary schools both “denominational and compulsory.” Intended as a sop to the Catholic Center party and a way to counteract Socialism, the bill, which
In contrast to the undisputed, if unscrupulous, political savvy of Bismarck, Wilhelm more easily fit the unpolitical German stereotype with the added imprimatur that his “want of real political capacity is coupled with the most energetic self-confidence known to mankind.”

During the brief honeymoon period after the Bismarck’s removal in 1890, the kaiser’s new government presented a “favourable” prospect and hopes ran high for an end to heavy-handed government and press manipulation. But revelations of Wilhelm’s “extremely autocratic” nature quickly reversed earlier optimism. To many, Bismarck’s dismissal itself and the kaiser’s failure to wean German workers away from socialism through appeals to their patriotism presented ample proof of his political incompetence. Writers more frequently criticized Germany as an “over-administered” nation, staffed with servile officials and dominated through a “Philistine” and “ridiculous” inspired press, whose fulsome praise of the government “reeks of the gutters of ancient Byzantium.” Little hope for change was foreseen by those who considered German national character to be “essentially conservative.” Leisure Hour in 1894 concluded that “in spite of the humane and ideal bias of the German character, there is no country where there is less hope that any reform will be put into action. The Germans are still, as they always were,

---

extended to the clergy of the predominating sect at any given school the authority to advise and even correct teachers, aroused widespread opposition in “cultured and sceptical” Germany, particularly from moderates and the Left, before being dropped. See “The Question of Religious Instruction in Prussian Schools” in Review of Reviews 5 (February 1892): 275.


Despite this apparent contradiction, along with muted admiration for the “peculiarity of local patriotism” and the alacrity with which Germans volunteered for unpaid public office or municipal service, the monolithic stereotype of German political ineptitude and indifference prevailed. 89

The diversity of political parties in Germany did not dissolve the stereotype of political incapacity. No Mr. Gladstone stood as chief of the opposition in a political system that seemed “vague and formless” except for imperial authority. 90 German Progressives, although generally admired, appeared weak and ineffectual against the fanatical obstructionism and tenacity of the


88  "The Peoples of Europe—Germany,” pt. 4, 386. As an example of such diversity the author states, “There is more resemblance between a Hamburger and an Englishman than between a Hamburger and a Prussian” (p. 387).

89  Two notable contemporary studies have examined “local” politics and its relation to German nationalism, countering the idea of Prussian-imposed national allegiance with evidence of local and regional autonomy. Mack Walker’s German Home Towns: Community, State and General Estate, 1648-1871 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971) looks at the roots of political homogeneity and conformism in towns averaging 10,000 inhabitants, which constituted over a quarter of the German population; Abigail Green’s Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) challenges the assumption that particularism opposed nationalism by finding similarities between nineteenth-century German nationalism and earlier state patriotism in Hanover, Saxony and Württemburg.

Conservative agrarians, or Junkers, and the protectionist “tergiversation” of the National Liberals. The German Center Party appeared to consist of backward, bigoted and small-minded “enemies of a really free movement” in a system regarded as a “caricature of genuine Parliamentary government,” and Social Democrats, despite some acknowledgment of pragmatic political opportunism, were criticized as doctrinaire Utopians, chasing the “grandiose dream of a socialistic paradise.” German women were not spared criticism, despite sympathy for their plight in a nation where they allegedly endured a status akin to beasts of burden. Though educated to a “higher standard of mere book-learning,” than English women, German women could boast of no Jane Austen, no George Eliot, no Miss Braddons or class of fashionable women of the world. Neither the image of the domestic hausfrau, for which the German Empress herself posed as the royal model, nor the stereotypical flaxen-haired, blue-eyed, angelic Gretchen approached the Englishwoman’s interest in female suffrage or social work.

Criticism of the German newspaper press usually emphasized either its lack of political content or its pro-government and Anglophobic bias. Although praised as well-written, high-minded and patriotic, German newspapers contained no letters to the editor—no “voices from the


93At least, this was the view of Lowe in “The Women of Germany,” 116-17.

crowd”—and therefore could not be relied upon to arouse Germans from the torpor of political apathy (“a stone which cannot easily be set rolling”). Many newspapers were counted as ready tools of a paternal government. The repressive Lèse-Majesté laws, which allowed prosecution of journalists who criticized the kaiser or his government, redeemed to a great extent the reputations of martyred German journalists in British publications normally accustomed to condemning journalistic toadyism or reacting to German Anglophobia. In 1895 the prosecutions of Social Democrat leader, Wilhelm Liebknecht, and Dr. Hans Delbrück, editor of the Preussische Jahrbücher, were considered “absurd” and “childish,” symptomatic of the “young mad cap on the throne.” In 1898 British magazines also mocked the sentencing of Herr Trojan, editor of the satirical Kladderadatsch, to two months in prison for publication of his “Mailed Fist” cartoon ridiculing the kaiser’s statement that a good Prussian soldier must also be a good Christian. The cartoon represented Alexander the Great, Leonidas, Napoleon I and “that scoffing Voltairean, Frederic the Great, listening with amused contempt to the Kaiser’s dictum.” Despite the fact that the Review of Reviews regularly reproduced cartoons from German satirical magazines, such as Simplicissimus and Kladderadatsch, a general impression of the German press as either politically indifferent or subservient persisted. Nearly a decade later in 1907, in the aftermath of a flurry of journalistic hostility referred to as the Anglo-German paper war, the Contemporary


Review reported on the visit of some English journalists who commented on the state of affairs in Germany. Although united in the hope and belief that Anglophobia had waned and that Germany sought better relations with England, writers differed significantly in their assessments of German politics and potential diplomatic outcomes. The milder appraisal reaffirmed the old stereotype of German blind allegiance to the whims of an earnest and energetic government; the more worrisome appraisal interpreted Germany’s “domineering ambition” and policy of the “mailed-fist” as the will of the people. Anglo-German rivalry and the problem of German Anglophobia had by that time made judgements about German political ability seem like an empty exercise.

7. IMPERIAL RIVALRY AND DIPLOMATIC ANTAGONISM

The various Anglo-German rivalries which developed during the latter nineteenth century significantly affected British conceptions of German character because stereotypes often devolved from, and presented explanations for, Germany’s historical role on the world stage. During the mid-1880s, while Germany acquired territories in West Africa, British writers also began to recognize Germany’s challenge to British industrial and commercial supremacy. Within two decades Germany appeared a formidable competitor, poised on the opposite shore of the North Sea with the world’s largest army and a navy formidable enough to arouse British concerns. No longer the “poor relation,” the old stereotype of Germany as Britain’s inferior racial cousin could only provide weak assurances that the Germans would come to their senses and restore the natural order of things by relinquishing their aspirations to world power. Otherwise, Germany would upset the balance of power and lead a rapidly arming world to the brink of catastrophe. The answer to the question of “Who are the Germans?” was largely a moral one which depended upon the questioner’s point of view. Many writers dealt with the threat of imperial Germany by drawing comparisons between British and German colonial administration, trade practices and diplomacy, then extrapolating perceived differences toward a broader comparison of British versus German national character within the over-arching context of an ethnic/racial hierarchy. Complacency became less tenable as New Germany recast the stereotypical mold and presented Germanophobes with increasing cause for alarm.
Anglo-German Colonial Rivalry

The advent of German colonial rivalry, joining Belgian and French, became a thorn in the flesh for British imperial pretensions, a likelihood foreseen by Bismarck who nevertheless acceded to popular expansionism during the mid-1880s and, by exploiting Anglo-French disputes over control of Egypt, gained territorial concessions in West Africa, the Cameroons and Togoland.¹ These and later German incursions into the hinterlands of East Africa, as well as intrigues involving the Sultan of Zanzibar within Britain’s perceived sphere of influence, brought forth angry reactions in the press against the British government’s apparent complacency in defending its own interests. With the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, Germany gave up claims to Uganda and Witu on the East African coast in exchange for Heligoland, a small island in the North Sea near the mouth of the Elbe and of no strategic importance to Britain. The frontiers of German and British East Africa were also extended west of Lake Victoria to the Congo State. The 1890 Agreement, which actually settled territorial disputes in East Africa to Britain’s advantage, was disparaged as a “policy of surrender” and “a melancholy monument erected over the grave of our lost opportunities.”² Opposition to the Anglo-German Agreement also focused on the moral consequences of handing 2000 Heligolanders “over to the tender mercies of German militarism.”³


²V. Lovett Cameron, “England and Germany in Africa,” pt. 2, *Fortnightly Review* 48 (July 1890): 129. In a postscript to the article, which was written before the agreement was signed, the *Fortnightly’s* editor regretted not having been able to “substitute congratulation for criticism” of Britain’s “humiliating capitulation.” (pp. 163-4). See also “Progress of the World: The Anglo-German Agreement,” *Review of Reviews* 2 (July 1890): 5.

³“Progress of the World: The Anglo-German Agreement,” 8. The Heligolanders were given the option of assuming English nationality.
The perception that Germany worked at cross-purposes to British interests in Africa came to the fore when German protests cancelled a provision of Britain’s Congo Treaty with King Leopold that in 1894 had leased a strip of land adjacent to the German East African frontier to Britain, thereby frustrating the long-cherished imperialist dream of a Cape to Cairo railway. This development signified the Wilhelmine government’s more openly confrontational policy since Bismarck’s dismissal in March of 1890. The most revealing facet of British opposition to German colonial expansion in East Africa appears in its focus on national character. Reviled as an arrogant and acquisitive parvenu, Germany was taken to task for imitating the “methods of the cuckoo” and acting like “a dog who leaves his own plate of dinner before he has begun, to seize the dinner on another dog’s plate.”

The fear that Germany was bent on “the humiliation and the spoliation of England,” compounded by a belief in the German national characteristics of perseverance and patience, actually galvanized British imperial ambitions. Writers condemned German methods and motives and criticized British complacency:

There is a large unoccupied uncoloured space on the map between Angola, the Zambesi, and the Congo Free State which she might explore and settle and paint Prussian blue if she has any stomach for the adventure. But as a rule the work of opening out new country is not to her taste. It is so much more easy and pleasant to leave that to Englishmen, and when they have overcome all the difficulties and dangers that await the first explorers and settlers, to walk in after them and turn them out either by force or by negotiation, the latter method as a rule being preferred, as it is found by experience to be the less troublesome and more efficacious of the two.

In surveying the negotiations between England and Germany as a whole, one is struck by three things: the impudence (it is a strong word, but no milder will serve) of the claims made by Germany, the humbleness, not to say subserviency of England in the face of them.

---


of those claims, and the evidence of a feeling, perhaps quite unconsciously betrayed by Lord Salisbury, that England is unequal to the burden of empire.6

Much of the opposition to German colonial expansion relied on the same moral arguments used to justify Britain’s imperialist ventures: only Britain could be trusted to ensure the abolition of slavery and fulfill “white man’s burden,” the responsibility to civilize native populations. British writers accused Germany of “plunder” and “outrage” in dealing with native populations, and of concluding unscrupulous and “valueless” treaties with native chiefs. “Such are the methods of Dr. Peters for introducing German civilization in British territory,” commented Blackwood’s on the exploits of German colonial propagandist and explorer, Karl Peters.7 The German presence in East Africa and Zanzibar, and the “truculence of German officials and adventurers” described as “masterful, domineering, and using the language of conquest,” drew blame for inciting native uprisings and interfering with British efforts to suppress Arab slave-trading in the region.8 The Pall Mall Gazette reported on the pro-British reaction to the Anglo-German Agreement in Zanzibar:

. . . the foreign residents received the news of the English protectorate with the greatest satisfaction, as they feel sure commerce will increase. The English are popular, whereas the Germans frighten the Africans, displease the Europeans, and terrorize the Arabs. The German residents are greatly disappointed.9

On 15 September 1890, the Daily Telegraph broke the “startling news” that the German administrator in Bagamoyo on the German East African coast had published an official notice

7“German Aims in East Africa,” Blackwood’s 147 (May 1890): 702, 700, 705, 690, 693.
9Pall Mall Gazette, 26 July 1890, 5.
allowing open trading of slaves and the recovery of runaways. The scandal attracted widespread condemnation, particularly in the Liberal press, which prompted an unconvincing denial from the German Foreign Office. German officials sought to palliate the action as merely a sanction of the status quo and as an assertion of Germany’s rights to follow a “cautious approach” toward abolition in lieu of the Sultan of Zanzibar’s emancipation decree, which was issued under the British protectorate. Attempts by the German government to extricate itself from this public relations morass only fed Germanophobic opinion, even though the German suppression of Arab slave-trader insurrections did receive some recognition. Germany stood “disgraced before the civilized world” for abrogating the anti-slavery provisions of the 1884 Berlin Conference and the 1890 Brussels Act, and, worse yet, for allowing the infidel Sultan to voice complaints about European hypocrisy. In 1890, before the full flowering of Anglo-German antagonism, the Daily Telegraph expressed an inscrutable mixture of moral outrage and sympathetic Germanophilia in regard to the slave-trade scandal:

It is deplorable, not only on moral grounds, but because nothing is more eminently calculated to wound the feelings and ruffle the susceptibilities of Englishmen than any

---

10Daily Telegraph, 15 September 1890, 5.

11Compare “Blacks and Blacklegs,” Pall Mall Gazette, 17 September 1890, 1, with the milder coverage in the conservative Standard, 18 September 1890, 5, which basically accepts the German denial and criticizes the “painful impression” made by “recent severe articles in the English press” and the “false news” circulated by enemies of Germany. The German rationale for the proclamation was reported in the Daily Telegraph, 18 September 1890, 5.

12Daily Telegraph, 17 September 1890, 5. From 1888 to 1890 the German explorer and administrator, Captain Hermann von Wissmann, succeeded in quelling the Arab rebellion, at one point even joined by the British in blockading the coast.

13“Blacks and Blacklegs.”
encouragement of such a vile and infamous trade on the part of a nation for which they entertain sincere esteem, regard, and admiration.  

British criticism of German colonial policies persisted and increased in severity during the 1890s. In 1897 the Saturday Review charged that German importation of arms and ammunition had “renewed and re-inspired” the slave trade and imperiled the lives of missionaries and traders. In addition, proneness to tyranny and atrocities such as the flogging of women had allegedly stilted German colonial development. Kenneth Mackenzie has remarked on the chorus of dissent against German colonial methods in the British press and on the consensus that blamed such transgressions on Teutonic cruelty. In 1892 Robert Louis Stevenson published a litany of charges alleging German abuse of Samoan natives and official attempts to suppress the reporting of native grievances. While Stevenson did not completely exonerate England’s record of dealing with native populations, he peppered his criticism of German methods with comments about German “touchiness,” secrecy and other national traits that clearly marked the Germans as intrinsically ill-suited for colonial rule.

A little more than a decade later, native uprisings in Southwest Africa seemed to confirm German colonial ineptitude. Not only did the treatment of native populations become a

14Daily Telegraph, 18 September 1890, 5.

15“German Loyalty and Honesty,” Saturday Review 83 (January 1897): 106.


17A Footnote to History: Eight Years of Trouble in Samoa (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1905, first published in 1892), 34, 38, 119, 239, 246.
humanitarian concern, but the success of European colonialism and imperial enterprise itself appeared to be at stake. Far from leveling charges of genocide in the suppression of the Herero rebellions in 1904, British journalists took Germans to task for not governing in a “spirit of stern humanity” and for relying too much on the inconsistent methods of missionaries and soldiers. 

Appeals to native “vanity” from the former mixed with punishment by lash from the latter, according to one writer, fell far short of the otherwise “laudable” treatment of blacks by white merchants and settlers. Another writer recommended invoking a British “Monroe Doctrine” against further German expansion in Africa, on the grounds that such mismanagement endangered the “peace and safety” of the European colonial enterprise. 

From the very outset the whole concept of German colonialism had roused suspicion and derision, having supposedly grown out of a far-fetched, whimsical Hohenzollern tradition of piracy and land-lubbing failure resurgent in the fantasies of the “young Caesar,” Kaiser Wilhelm II. In a very short time, however, Germany evolved from an upstart colonial rival to an imperial menace. German colonial rivalry, which in 1890 seemed to be motivated by envy and a policy of harassment, soon

---


19Elkind, “German Troubles,” 257-58, considered the black man “as vain as he is lazy” and saw Christian teachings of equality leading to disrespect for whites.

20Eltzacher, “German Danger,” 535.

21Perry, “Traditions of German Colonization,” 113, 115-19, mocked the kaiser’s ambition to succeed where his ancestor, Frederick William, the Great Elector of Brandenburg, had failed. Piratical associations, stemming from the Elector’s dependence on the Dutch buccaneer, Benjanim Raule, and his failure to establish a lasting colony on the Guinea coast, had led the Elector’s successor, Frederick William I, to abandon the colonial cause.
became a sinister attempt to “stab England in the dark,” and a plot to convert South Africa into a German-Dutch colony.²²

**Economic Rivalry**

Anglo-German trade rivalry in the press followed much the same course as colonial rivalry. By the mid-1890s Germany had become England’s “most dangerous rival,” accused of counterfeiting British trade-marks and flooding England with cheap articles “Made in Germany.”²³ The German economic “peril” to England, a largely imaginary fear because of mutual trade benefits, seemed rooted in German capacity for plodding industry and enterprise.²⁴ Every positive model of German economic success, however, came accompanied by criticism of German immoral methods and trading practices which constituted a form of parasitism.²⁵ Germans, labeled “shopkeepers, always; merchants never,” ostensibly produced cheap, inferior wares for sale through enterprises that were “bounty-fed, and existing only by subsidies and the sweat of mankind.”²⁶ Emblematic of a conspiracy theory, the caricature of the German clerk as an invaluable commercial weapon in the Anglo-German trade war carried with it the conviction

---


²⁵Ibid., 107.

that his acceptance of a low salary for an unrewarding job also betokened an oppressive political and economic system.\textsuperscript{27}

The Anglo-German trade rivalry should be viewed not as an isolated competition for markets but as bound up psychologically with the colonial, arms and naval races and with British reactions to German \textit{Weltpolitik}.\textsuperscript{28} Ross J. S. Hoffman has contrasted the relative pacifism of late nineteenth-century trade journals with contemporary alarmism prognosticating an inevitable Anglo-German war for commercial supremacy. Beyond being numbered among the many contenders vying for access to Britain’s global trade networks, Hoffman argued, Germany’s economic advances challenged British pride in commercial acumen and free trade idealism.\textsuperscript{29} Not only had tariff barriers caused a dramatic forty percent decline in the value of British exports to Germany between 1870 and 1889, the flap over trade-mark fraud and resulting Merchandise Marks Act of 1887 increased hysteria by virtue of the number of cheap goods requiring the “Made in Germany” stamp that afterwards poured into England.\textsuperscript{30} Even if the erosion of British overseas markets, assisted by subsidized shipbuilding and the general carving up of China that began with the German seizure of Kiaochow, did not shake British dominance of a vibrant entrepot and re-export trade, Germany’s rapid industrial expansion and export of advanced industrial products like beet sugar, chemicals, machinery, ironware and electrical equipment did

\textsuperscript{27}J. J. Finlay, “The Genesis of the German Clerk,” \textit{Fortnightly Review} 66 (September 1899): 533-34.


\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry 1875-1914} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1933), 277, 279, 303-4.

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., 30-31, 45, 49-50. Some cheap imported German cutlery had been marked “Sheffield,” after the city in South Yorkshire reputed for fine knife manufacture.
ultimately reverse a favorable trade balance and underscore Britain’s relative economic decline.\textsuperscript{31} Economic rivalry nonetheless remained an indirect factor in pre-World War I Anglo-German antagonism, partly because political divisions in Britain worked against a concerted anti-German tariff policy. Although anti-protectionism did not necessarily imply anti-imperialism in Britain, parties left of center pushed for international cooperation.\textsuperscript{32} But anxieties about German economic ambitions, when linked with the unpolitical German stereotype and imperial rivalries, certainly exacerbated pre-war Anglo-German tensions and, Douglas J. Newton has argued, bolstered the post-war Lloyd George coalition favoring harsh peace terms for Germany.\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{The Diplomatic Antagonism}

The Anglo-German antagonism cannot be linked to any direct territorial conflict such as arose between England and France during the colonial and Napoleonic wars, or between England and Russia during the Crimean War. England historically found itself allied, though not always formally, with Austria and Prussia against any expansionism that threatened the European power balance and its own strategic interests. No real cause for Anglo-German diplomatic antagonism existed until Bismarck took up the reins of government in Prussia. British diplomats had long sought a stable, reformed confederation of German states under Prussian leadership and separate from reactionary Austria, but the failure of the Frankfurt Parliament and the absolutist tendencies of Frederick Wilhelm IV and William I proved less than promising. Ironically, Bismarck initially

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., 63-65; Kennedy, \textit{Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism}, 234, 293.


achieved through war the defensive federal union, top-down reforms and conservative constitutional monarchy Britain had hoped could be attained peacefully. But, as Frank Lorenz Müller has written, British observers would be disappointed by the absence of “Whig policies in a country without Whigs” as well as haunted by how “the spectre of German hegemony” might unbalance the European system.\(^\text{34}\)

In February of 1864, the sixteen-year dispute between Denmark and Germany over the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein culminated in the invasion of Jutland by Prussian forces. Even though Britain, since the days of Palmerston, had acted as a technically neutral mediator in this quarrel, the sudden transfer of three hundred thousand Danes to German rule stung British ambassadors with a feeling of diplomatic impotence. Despite Queen Victoria’s pro-German sympathies, the Danish Wars set off a public reaction in Britain that revealed an impulsive, irrational anti-Germanism and brought forth displays of animosity that usually exhibited a complete misunderstanding or ignorance of the complexities of the situation.\(^\text{35}\) Victoria’s influence during the Danish Crisis depended more on the Cabinet’s desire to avoid an Anglo-German War than from any shared pro-German sentiments, but even the queen’s attitude toward Prussia changed dramatically after the extinction of petty states, including Coburg, and the incorporation of larger states, including Hanover, into the North German Confederation under Prussian control.\(^\text{36}\) The Schleswig-Holstein issue remained a bone

\(^{34}\text{Britain and the German Question: Perceptions of Nationalism and Political Reform, 1830-63 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2002), 174, 190-93, 207-8.}\)

\(^{35}\text{See Keith A. P. Sandiford, Great Britain and the Schleswig-Holstein Question 1848-64: a Study in Diplomacy, Politics and Public Opinion (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 81, 116, 145, 150, 155, and chap. 6, “British Reaction to the Dano-German War.”}\)

\(^{36}\text{Ibid., 148.}\)
of contention in the history of Anglo-German diplomatic relations that nationalists on both sides could exploit. At the June 1895 opening of the Kiel Canal, which ran from the North Sea to the Baltic through territory once governed by Danes, one writer remarked, “The Duchies were ripped from Denmark by a process none too scrupulous, and England played a sorry part in a cynical transaction.”

The Danish Question also perpetuated the image of the German, or Prussian, bully which would gain further momentum during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1, especially with the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. Indeed, the war marked a watershed in the shift of British sympathies away from Germany and toward France after the demise of Napoleon III.

Following the declaration of war on 19 July 1870, the Times had branded the French a “vain race,” but by 2 September, the day of the French capitulation at Sedan, the same paper poured out its sympathy for “Unhappy France”:

...we are overborne with sympathy for the unhappy nation. A people of so many virtues, gifted beyond all other races with vivacity, swiftness of intelligence and emotional energy—people which has carried into the lowest ranks of life the education of social civility, threatens to become once more politically bankrupt.

---


38. Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 22-24, argues a gradual abandonment of suspicions against France, accompanied by a growing apprehension of German power after 1871. There was no abrupt break in diplomatic relations.

39. “France and Germany,” Times, 19 July 1870, 5. “Unhappy France,” Times, 2 September 1870, 7. After asking if the French passion for military display had produced the catastrophe that led to their downfall, the writer stated, “we hope that the fearful experience of this war will uproot it forever.”
The military success of Bismarckian Germany did not win unqualified admiration, even in an age fascinated with military accomplishments. As the stereotype of the arrogant Prussian quickly supplanted that of the arrogant Frenchman, and as Bismarck was cast in the role of a new Napoleon, one writer asked, “can any success earn complete absolution for the mixture of craft and force which in seven years has so enlarged the borders of Prussia as to make of a second-rate kingdom the arbiter of Europe, the possessor of a million armed men?”40 Images of German militarism and Machiavellian foreign policy reminiscent of Frederick the Great stayed fresh in the British periodical press through World War I, recasting old notions of German philosophical idealism and political naivete. Talk of the kaiser’s policy of the “mailed fist” (i.e., military and naval strength) and events such as the Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911, and the Zabern Affair in 1913, would further instil the association between German diplomacy and militarism and sustain the image of Germany as an international bully and menace.41

During the 1890s Anglo-German diplomatic relations took a decidedly negative turn. Several factors have contributed to this view, most important being the adoption in both

40C. C. C., “France and Germany,” letter to the editor of the Times, 1 August 1870, 9. See also an article reprinted from the New York Times that appeared in the London Times on 19 September 1870, 10, recounting an anecdote that described the “habitual arrogance” of a Prussian soldier who refused to accept the gentlemanly hospitality of his French captors.

41Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 224. Kaiser Wilhelm II hope to cow Britain into an alliance failed miserably. The arrival of the German gunboat Panther at the port of Agadir during the Second Moroccan Crisis served only to increase Germany’s isolation and further cement the Anglo-French Entente. The Zabern Affair occurred when insulting remarks made by a Prussian lieutenant about the local populace of the Alsation town of Zabern touched off public disorders that were dealt with summarily by the garrison commander, Colonel von Reuter. Reuter escaped reprimand and his actions were sanctioned by the kaiser. The incident demonstrated the predominance of the Prussian military clique in the upper echelons of German government as well as the inefficiveness of the Reichstag and civil law. See Gordon A. Craig, Germany 1866-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 298-99.
countries of policies designed to enhance imperial prestige. After Bismarck’s dismissal in 1890, Kaiser Wilhelm II’s embarkation on a new course of Weltpolitik based on colonial and naval expansion threatened the very foundations of British policy. German foreign policy also became more stridently anti-British under pressure from nationalist groups like the Pan-German and Navy Leagues. In England, the electoral gains of the Unionist coalition in 1895 reflected popular imperialism and increasing concerns over Anglo-German colonial and trade rivalries. The elevation of Joseph Chamberlain to the office of Colonial Secretary indicated the government’s resolve to support a more active and vocal imperial policy. Fears of diplomatic isolation and encirclement, respectively, plagued British and German policy makers. Despite the German refusal to consider naval reductions, which posed a major obstacle to an alliance, these fears stimulated various attempts at an Anglo-German understanding 1887 to 1901.

The question as to why Britain and Germany never entered into any formal agreement regarding the European power balance defies any simple explanation. Economic rivalry and ideological differences certainly contributed to the Anglo-German antagonism, but their

---

42See Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 180, and Craig, Germany, 330-31. See also Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 218, who describes the anti-German trend in Britain in the years 1892-95 as a shift in attitude rather than policy.

43Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 446-47. A key element in the German fear of encirclement, the so-called “Copenhagen complex,” referred to the British attack on the Danish fleet in 1807 as proof of a long-standing, Machiavellian policy of English navalism which implied the possibility of a British pre-emptive strike against the fledgling German fleet. See Charles E. McClelland, The German Historians and England, 211-12.

44See H. W. Koch, “The Anglo-German Alliance Negotiations: Missed Opportunity or Myth?” History 13 (October 1969): 386, and Gooch, Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft, 65. See also Craig, Politics of the Prussian Army, 257-94, on German military interference in foreign policy from the Napoleonic period through World War I, especially the pernicious effect of German naval attachés on diplomatic efforts to ease the Anglo-German naval rivalry.
importance should be weighed carefully in assessing the British position. Germany’s remarkable political and economic metamorphosis into a fledgling world power and formidable competitor would not in itself explain the diplomatic antagonism were it not for Germany’s geographical proximity to England—the economic expansion of the United States was equally dramatic. Nor would the ideological gulf separating “liberal” England from “reactionary” Prussian-dominated Germany have necessarily precluded an entente, like the ones signed with Japan in 1902 or Russia in 1907. The mutual distrust and suspicion in diplomatic and government circles that hampered attempts at constructive negotiation rested on the diametrically opposed global strategies of the two nations: England committed to preserving empire by maintaining the European status quo and Germany bent on expanding empire by changing it. Refusal to compromise by either government fueled the antagonism. The ill-conceived German policy of winning British cooperation through humiliation only played into the hands of Germanophobes in the British press and Foreign Office who advocated a tougher policy toward Germany.

In the search for causes of World War I historians have pointed out the lack of coordination and direction in Wilhelminian Germany’s foreign policy, and its effect at the British Foreign Office, as a destabilizing factor. In addition to German diplomatic risk-taking during the twenty-five years prior to world War I, Britain’s failure to make a clear declaration of support for Belgian inviolability has come under fire. Britain’s unwillingness to abandon the policy of

45Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 464-65.
46Ibid., 470.
47Craig, Germany, 244-45.
a free hand toward Europe and failure to adopt policies that might have averted war, namely the maintenance of Austrian integrity and a power balance in the Balkans, have been also been deemed symptomatic of a universal, imperialistic short-sightedness.\textsuperscript{49} To the latter point, R. J. Crampton has shown that attempts to improve Anglo-German relations through cooperation on the periphery, specifically via efforts to quell nationalist and territorial squabbles in the Balkans, signally failed to address more substantive issues concerning military and diplomatic commitments. The collapse of a short-lived Anglo-German “hollow detente” during the Balkan wars of 1912-13, Crampton concluded, reflected the inability of the great powers to stray from alliances that constituted a larger European crisis.\textsuperscript{50} As to the policy of the free hand, Gordon Martel has concluded that Britain’s default policy of non-alliance actually offered the best strategy for balancing the Central Powers’ Triple Alliance against the Franco-Russian Dual Entente. Lord Rosebery’s invasion and control of Egypt through the Khedive in 1892, besides securing the Suez Canal and a route to India, established a British presence in the Eastern Mediterranean that could check French and Russian imperial ambitions while Britain could enjoy an automatic security in the military standoff between the two European alliances on the Continent. According to Martel, Britain’s built-in relationship with Germany as a tacit member of the Triple Alliance depended upon assurances that Italy and Austria-Hungary could rely on a


\textsuperscript{50}British diplomats found that Germany would neither part with Austria and Italy on the protection of Albania’s coastline from Greek incursions nor jeopardize commercial and military ties with the Ottomans for a coerced compensatory surrender of Turkish-owned Aegean islands to Greece. This impasse left Britain without support on the one issue that mattered: control of the Eastern Mediterranean and a possible launching point for involvement in any European scramble for Asiatic Ottoman territories. \textit{The Hollow Detente: Anglo-German Relations in the Balkans, 1911-1914} (London: Prior; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1979), 123-25, 174-75.
British counter to France and Russia in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{51} Success and diplomatic leverage depended upon Britain’s ability to remain aloof from any formal alliance. Keith M. Wilson has argued that Sir Edward Grey’s abandonment of the free hand by joining the Triple Entente and pursuing naval talks with France and Russia destroyed the balance of forces and merely confirmed German encirclement fears.\textsuperscript{52}

Group psychology also played a part in policymaking through the presence of a conformist mentality shared by many prominent members of the British government, clergy, press and Foreign Office. Paul Kennedy referred to the role of the “Official Mind” and the “permeation of ideas, consultations, influences and shared prejudices across the borderline between it and the ‘outside world.’”\textsuperscript{53} The British Foreign Office prior to World War I, with its cliquish esprit de corps, charged atmosphere, exclusiveness, secrecy and shared stereotypes of the enemy, suggests the Orwellian term “groupthink,” applied by Irving L. Janis to the concurrence-seeking that overrules critical or rational thinking in a cohesive ingroup of that description.\textsuperscript{54} Exaggerated fears of British isolation behind the push for a French alliance and the pursuit of outdated and unrealistic views of Britain’s foreign policy challenges persisted. The expectation that British sea power, for example, combined with a meager expeditionary force could deter or

\textsuperscript{51}\textit{Imperial Diplomacy: Rosebery and the Failure of Foreign Policy} (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1986), 112-17, 258-61.

\textsuperscript{52}\textit{British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: From Crimean War to First World War} (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 177, 180.

\textsuperscript{53}Kennedy, \textit{Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism}, 432.

efficiently prosecute a ground war proved sadly mistaken.\textsuperscript{55} If British policy could be termed realist in reaction to German naval buildup and demonstrations of force in Morocco, its premise rested on a fear shared by both Liberal and Conservative politicians. Although Conservatives went to great length to counter charges of anti-Germanism, and found out the political deficits of touting the German model for tariff reform, Conservative Germanophobia on the eve of war, although far more tempered than the journalistic scaremongering of ultra-Right extremists, nevertheless allowed an easy consensus with the Liberal government for intervention on behalf of France.\textsuperscript{56} Official clannishness and Germanophobia would also breed victims. The case of Eyre Crowe, senior clerk at the Foreign Office, deserves special mention. Born in Leipzig, educated in Germany and France, and having ties to Germany through birth and marriage, he became the leading German expert at the Foreign Office as well as the most virulent critic of any attempt at an Anglo-German understanding. Shortly after his promotion to Senior Clerk he penned the famous Crowe Memorandum of 1907, which expressed his views, and the views of the senior Foreign Office hierarchy, on German diplomatic blackmail and the inevitability of Anglo-German confrontation.\textsuperscript{57} Crowe’s ironic vilification as a German sympathizer in 1915 seems hardly surprising when one considers the maligning of a scapegoat to be a common and politically expedient product of the interplay between hysteria and ideological conformism.


\textsuperscript{56}McDonough, \textit{The Conservative Party and Anglo-German Relations}, 138-39.

\textsuperscript{57}Steiner, \textit{Foreign Office and Foreign Policy}, 110-117. See Kennedy, \textit{Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism}, 266-7, on the division in the Foreign Office between taking a hard line toward Germany and a more general policy of “easing Britain’s global difficulties.”
Historians have not overlooked the power of public opinion and the close relationship that had developed between the press and the British Foreign Office by the 1890s. The makers of British foreign policy, even if they wanted to, could not have insulated themselves from the effects of peer pressure and public hysteria. Public reactions to the Kruger Telegram, Daily Telegraph Affair and other such incidents demonstrated the ease with which intense resentment, aroused by the kaiser’s indiscretions and the perception of diplomatic chicanery on the part of the Germans, could quickly escalate into a storm of outrage. The manifestation of British mass hysteria over everything from German invasion plots to reports of spies and Zeppelin flyovers also raises questions about the historical causes and effects of delusional psychology. Beneath all of the concerns over diplomatic isolation and anxieties over German challenges to British colonial, industrial or mercantile interests one can find stereotypes of the malevolent Anglophobic German. The fear of being humiliated by a stereotyped and demonized rival only confirmed Germanophobic opinion that had existed in Britain long before the days of Bismarck.

---

58For example Oron James Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy: With Special Reference to England and Germany 1890-1914 (New York: Appleton-Century, 1940); Morris, The Scaremongers; and Steiner, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy.


In the ramp up to World War I, such cultural obstacles to an Anglo-German understanding pale as determinants of policy beside diplomatic allegiances and the naval arms race. But inflexible stereotypes of German militarism, Kaiserism and diplomatic blackmail persisted into the interwar period and fomented a policy of harsh “realism” when German fledgling democracy called for idealist appeasement from a position of strength. Douglas Newton has found no little irony in the fact that many “economic warriors” and advocates of the “knock-out blow” during and after the war became idealistic appeasers too late, after the Weimar government had been discredited by a resurgent German Right.\(^6\)

What role, then, do national identity and stereotypes play in international relations? In 1910 Norman Angell, an Anglo-American, published a prescient book entitled *The Great Illusion*, in which he argued the utter futility and absurdity of war in an modern economically interdependent world.\(^7\) He did not advocate disarmament but debunked the notion of any economic advantage to be gained from military power, and he suggested that the victor in a world struggle would at best be forced to perpetuate the existing trade system. World War I had no real winners, and indeed resulted in economic collapse that led to fascism and the rise of totalitarian states. Angell’s controversial thesis really addressed the dangers of national identity in diplomatic relations—not structural or cultural factors that constitute a day-to-day sense of nationality, but all of the emotional and Social Darwinist ideological distortions that have accompanied the worst aspects of nationalism. Angell called for a rationalization of European diplomacy, by which he meant dismissal of the fallacy that nations act or can be perceived as


individuals. That illusion has unfortunately persisted through two world wars, not only in the mirage of national self-determination but also through the perpetuation of national stereotypes within the paradigm of nationhood. Even the supposed “internationalist” communist regimes in the Soviet Union, China, North Korea or Yugoslavia failed to elude association with the nation-state. Historians have accurately assessed rational geopolitical stratagems and military calculations as principle factors leading to global conflict, but they have not yet come to an equivalent understanding of the psychological mechanisms and irrational borders of fear that motivate war in the first place.

Ibid., 193.
8. CONCLUSION

The 2011 European Union debt crisis, and Germany’s imposition of economic austerities on the eurozone for saving the currency, generated taunts of a “Fourth Reich” and references to appeasement by Europhobic populists in France and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{64} That the crisis prompted British Prime Minister David Cameron’s veto of tough fiscal measures under German leadership, and gave rise to German worries about being isolated and saddled with staggering costs reminiscent of war reparations, indicates the persistence of stereotyped views about Germany’s role in Europe and Anglo-German relations. Something similar occurred two decades earlier. The destruction of the Berlin Wall in 1989, symbolizing both an end to Cold War tensions and the impending reunification of divided Germany, brought cheers throughout the free world, but in the wake of initial celebrations dissenting voices could be heard in the press. In his mildly alarmist “Uneasy About the Germans,” playwright Arthur Miller sensed “something factitious about German society in the minds of Germans” and a less “transcendent” feeling among Germans toward the Federal Republic than that shown by French, British or American citizens toward their respective governments. For Miller, West Germany’s tolerant, democratic government lacked “consecration by blood,” and the knowledge that many Germans had sacrificed their lives actually fighting to prevent it, “keeps sucking the life out of German protestations of a democratic faith and casts suspicion on the country’s reassurances that its

economic power is no menace to the world.”¹ Miller’s warning sounds hauntingly reminiscent of
German author Thomas Mann’s post-World War II diatribe on undemocratic, anti-
Enlightenment, demonic Germans, ever willing to strike a Faustian bargain for world power at
the expense of liberty. Unlike Mann, however, Miller recognized the importance of discarding
old stereotypes and suspicions in hopes of accentuating the positive.²

Such timeworn post-Holocaust worries about German anti-western sentiments and
*Machtpolitik* failed to dissuade the appreciable majorities world-wide who favored reunification,
but even optimistic articles noted apprehensions among Germany’s European neighbors, not to
mention Britain, Israel and the superpowers. In *Time* magazine’s March twenty-eighth cover
story, entitled “The Germans: Should the world be worried?” Bruce W. Nelan reported that “fear
of Germany, in abeyance for more than 40 years while the country was divided in a bipolar
world, is on the rise,” backing up this statement with wary and unenthusiastic quotations from
such notables as former French Prime Minister Michael Debré, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze, and Israeli Prime Minister Ytzhak Shamir. More to the point, West German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s “politically motivated equivocation” regarding the status of
Germany’s post-war border with Poland provoked Polish demands, supported by Britain and
France, for a voice in the so-called “two-plus-four” reunification talks taking place between the

---


two Germanies and the four World War II allies: the U.S., Britain, France and Soviet Union.\(^3\)

Even though Kohl, once reelected, smoothed over fears of territorial ambition by calling for a quick settlement of the border question, the immediacy of West Germany’s economic dominance conjured up premonitions of a German commercial hegemony in Europe, particularly Eastern Europe, which would jeopardize the political and economic integration of the European Community.\(^4\)

Similar misgivings resonated in historians’ prognostications of a German turn toward isolationism, a new economic nationalism with ominous political overtones, or the possibility of a Soviet-friendly Ostpolitik abetted by simmering disenchantment with U.S. policies and the apparently popular appeal of neutrality.\(^5\) Additionally, intellectual currents in West Germany

\(^3\)“Anything to Fear?” *Time* (26 March 1990): 32-34. Not surprisingly, Poland was the only country surveyed showing a majority opposed to a single Germany. The fact that the Federal Republic had previously recognized under a 1970 treaty the inviolability of Poland’s borders, specifically the Oder-Neisse line separating East Germany from formerly Prussian Silesia, underscores the seriousness of Kohl’s foreign policy gaffe. On this earlier treaty as a prelude to Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik see Gordon A. Craig, *The Germans* (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1982) 58.

\(^4\)Surprised not to find a “bastion of chauvinism” amid the more than 600,000 Silesian ethnic Germans, Peter Schneider, in “Is Anyone German Here?” *New York Times Magazine* (15 April 1990): 63, attributed the source of nationalist agitation, and Kohl’s electioneering motive, to West Germany’s still influential right-wing hard-liners. Nelan, “Anything to Fear?” 41-42, reported in 1990 that West Germany alone accounted for approximately one-fifth of the EC’s population and gross domestic product and 31% of its exports.

during the 1980s aroused suspicions that Germany’s ties to the West could prove more tenuous than hoped. These “straws in the wind” included an academic reaction against Enlightenment-centered approaches to German history and revival of the nineteenth-century *Mitteleuropa* idea which, even aside from its history of propagandistic exploitation by imperialists and Nazis, hinted at an anti-western protectionist bloc along the lines of a German-dominated Central European customs union or *Zollverein*. *Mitteleuropa* also suggested the potential for an enlarged neutral zone that could upset the paradigm of an East-West strategic balance in post-Cold War Europe. Moreover, the collapse of Soviet power and influence brought back into vogue talk of a German *Sonderweg*, or special path, applied specifically to Germany’s unique geopolitical position and arguments for an increased leadership role in East Europe. But

Germany discussed in Wolfram F. Hanrieder’s *Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). Hanrieder blamed this divergence on the U.S. “double containment” policy of keeping Germany and Europe divided between the superpowers.

Craig, “A New, New Reich?” 33. German economist Friedrich List and others advocated *Mitteleuropa* in the 1830’s as a protectionist scheme to promote national unity and economic expansion. Bismarck adopted the concept during the 1880s because it dove-tailed with German colonial ambitions in its appeal to Pan-German nationalists and helped undermine Anglophilic German liberalism. In concert with Franco-German colonial cooperation, *Mitteleuropa* would provide a foundation for German *Weltpolitik* through both economic and political protectionism, by isolating Britain and containing Russian expansionism. The Nazis perverted *Mitteleuropa* into a German “Monroe Doctrine” justifying territorial annexation and political domination in East Europe. See Bascom Barry Hayes, *Bismarck and Mitteleuropa* (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press; London: Associated University Presses, 1994), 18, 391-93.

Jorg Brechtefeld, in *Mitteleuropa and German Politics: 1848 to the Present* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996), 77, 88-89, 95-97, points out that the 1980s renaissance of *Mitteleuropa* accompanied a shift from prooccupation with detente and defense issues to questions about Germany’s foreign policy role in East Europe. While acknowledging its darker connotations, he uses *Sonderweg* in a positive sense, applauding the notion of Germany as a “bridge” between East and West, although not at the expense of Germany’s western connections and not without a consistent and concise policy.
In a concise overview of the historiography of German conservatism, editors Larry Eugene Jones and James Retallack outline the stages through which the traditional view of “backward” German aristocrats’ failure to accommodate liberalism became a key component in the *Sonderweg* thesis. Building upon earlier evidence that, unlike their western counterparts, German aristocrats successfully adopted “pseudo-democratic” techniques of mass-mobilization and demagoguery in the reaction against loss of privilege, the “new orthodoxy” of the 1970s, following the work of Ralf Dahrendorf and historians from the University of Bielefeld, held that the “temporal disjunction” after 1871 of rapid economic modernization within an essentially feudal system gave undue leverage to conservative agrarian and industrial elites and thus retarded the social and political development of the German bourgeoisie. See “German Conservatism Reconsidered: Old Problems and New Directions,” in *Between Reform, Reaction, and Resistance: Studies in the History of German Conservatism from 1789 to 1945* (Providence, RI; Oxford: Berg, 1993), 3-17.

David Blackbourne and Geoff Eley’s seminal work, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-century Germany*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) stood the *Sonderweg* thesis on its head by arguing instead for Anglo-American exceptionalism. While crediting the revisionists for exposing the fallacy of monolithic German conservatism, Roger Fletcher, in “Social Historians and Wilhelmine Politics,” 86-104, countered that Germany indeed differed from western democracies due to the relative lack or ineffectiveness of forces for political change driven autonomously from below against a “semi-absolutist Prussian military monarchy.” Geoff Eley, in his introduction to *From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 5-12, explained his break from the continuity thesis, supported from political and socio-economic perspectives, respectively, by what he called the Anglo-American liberal school of historians, represented by Hajo Holborn, Karl Dietrich Bracher and Gordon Craig, and the later West German critical school inspired by Fritz Fischer and Hans-Ulrich Wehler. The Blackbourne/Eley thesis has since generated studies that debunk the “unpolitical” German stereotype arising from the more

*Sonderweg*, despite its limited nationalist appeal, also denotes a long-held historical view that modern Germany’s nineteenth-century bourgeois revolution from above constituted an exceptional and “abnormal” departure from western liberal models of democratic pluralism, mainly through the survival of authoritarian, pre-industrial traditions which paved the way for the rise of fascism in the twentieth century. Although historians since the mid-1980s have offered correctives to the concept of German exceptionalism, or “peculiarity,” and have questioned the extent of manipulation by conservative elites and the idea of continuity from Bismarck to Hitler, the negative implications of *Sonderweg* have by no means disappeared.
Amidst these shades of the past and future uncertainties, countervailing arguments played up “forty years of solid achievement” since “Zero Hour” (1945), highlighting the western-oriented vision and firm leadership of Konrad Adenauer, West Germany’s first chancellor, and Germany’s evolution toward tolerance and social conscience, exemplified by special ties with Israel and by the greater political assertiveness of women, labor and especially youth. Indeed, against the backdrop of West Germany’s record of pro-Zionism, active participation in the prosecution of Nazi war criminals, and payment of substantial reparations totaling over 17 billion DM to Israel and families of Jewish victims, the perception of a greater willingness on the part of Germans since the 1970s to discuss the crimes of the Nazi period, and acknowledge some degree of national complicity, probably owes as much to the mere endurance of peaceful democracy as to any other cause.

---


11 John Ardagh, Germany and the Germans: An Anatomy of a Society Today (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 391-400, included the following milestones in this transition to greater openness: Chancellor Willy Brandt’s unabashed homage to Polish Jews killed by Nazis during his 1970 state visit to the Warsaw ghetto memorial; Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker’s 1984 speech, on the fortieth anniversary of the German surrender, commemorating Holocaust victims and urging acceptance of the truth of Nazi horrors; the closer scrutiny of Hitler’s Third Reich in schools and media during the 1970s, including broad exposure to Hollywood’s 1979 Holocaust series; and a greater readiness among youth to speak out and confront lingering denial in older generations.
Despite such assurances, however, reunification and the future of Germany’s western-oriented strategic alliances prompted U.S. President George H. W. Bush, during a Camp David meeting with Chancellor Kohl, to issue warnings about the dangers of “unpredictability” and “instability” facing a Europe without NATO.\textsuperscript{12} Shared worries about NATO’s future and “a new unstable world of shifting alliances and multi-polar uncertainties” resounded across political and international fronts with news of Italian Socialist foreign minister Gianni de Michelis’s pessimistic outlook after Italy’s exclusion from the “two-plus-four talks.”\textsuperscript{13} Perhaps more revealing as to the depth of concern from the British perspective, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher convoked a meeting of eminent historians at Chequers to discuss German character and its ramifications for the future of the European Community. A confidential memorandum of the meeting written by Thatcher’s private secretary, and later leaked to the press, noted that Germans historically demonstrated “insensitivity to the feelings of others . . . their obsession with themselves, a strong inclination to self-pity, and a longing to be liked . . . a capacity for excess, to overdo things, . . . a tendency to overestimate their own strengths and capabilities,” but also stated more optimistically that “there was a strong school of thought among those present that today’s Germans were very different from their predecessors.”\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, references to


\textsuperscript{13}Lally Weymouth, “Being Beastly to Germany,” \textit{National Review} 42 (16 April 1990): 22, wrote that de Michelis, “even more than Margaret Thatcher, . . . has come to symbolize European apprehension about growing German power.” His failed demands for participation in “two-plus-four,” which drew the curt reply from West Germany’s Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher that “You’re not a player in this game,” only amplified de Michelis’s opposition to a rush to reunification that he feared would jeopardize NATO.

\textsuperscript{14}Craig R. Whitney, “Sizing Up the Germans: A Thatcher Symposium,” \textit{New York Times} (16 July 1990): A6. A generally positive consensus that German reunification would enhance both European integration and East European democratization emerged from the meeting, which
German angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, sentimentality, and other negative stereotypes, when exposed, naturally aroused considerable resentment in Germany and unmasked an irrational side to British Conservatives’ opposition to reunification.¹⁵

The sudden reassessment in Anglophone periodicals of West German society as something novel in comparison with immediate post-war years seemed remarkable in its capacity to both reassure and bewilder. Reports of West German affluence and the comforting familiarity of western capitalism, consumerism, fashion and enjoyment of leisure coexisted with outrageous extravagance, the excesses of shock theater, and quirky laws that appear out of synch with memories of the “overgrown work ethic” that created Germany’s economic miracle.¹⁶ Another manifestation of this climate of ambiguity and uncertainty could be seen in the readiness of journalists to exploit outmoded national stereotypes in order to tantalize readers. Semi-jocular reference to the “Latinization of Germany” and “a distinctly non-Teutonic mañana principle,” used to describe the apparent sanctity of Freizeit (leisure time), and a quote from Tacitus, the first-century Roman historian, about furor Teutonicus and “fanatically loyal” Germans, or Friedrich Nietzsche’s infamous statement on the inherited European dread of the “Teutonic blond

included historians Fritz Stern, Hugh Trevor-Roper, Norman Stone and Gordon Craig.


beast” may have made for interesting copy but also betrayed a journalistic tradition of
categorizing groups and individuals, whether through a desire to entertain or simply for the sake
of condensing and simplifying information.17

The perpetuation of national stereotypes through mass media proved to be far from
extinct, even though journalists have generally repudiated a genetic component to national
character and avoid didactic discourses such as those which framed the unabashed speculations
of previous eras.18 But even amidst contemporary awareness of the pitfalls of stereotyping, a
source’s credibility, for example, can enhance the mystique of national character as a force
guiding policy. When German novelist Günter Grass observed that reunification would only
serve to isolate Germany and that “when Germany feels itself isolated, we know the often
panicky reaction that follows,” the weight of his words relied as much on his reputation for
insight into German character as on historical evidence.19 When Arthur Miller referred to a
middle-aged, pro-reunification German journalist’s misgivings that “the problem with the
German, the one great weakness of his character, is his worship of loyalty. Loyalty! Loyalty! It’s
the supreme virtue, the chain around his heart,” he illustrated the subjectively persuasive
potential of national character stereotypes in opinion formation.20 Miller accordingly emphasized

17The quotations can be found respectively in Rademaekers, “The Oh So Good Life,” 82; Nelan, “Anything to Fear?” 32; and Friedrich, “Germany Toward Unity,” 66.

18Nelan, “Anything to Fear?” 34, noted general acknowledgment of the genetic fallacy but
points out the risk of stereotyping cultural traits and historical traditions in attempts to define
national character.


20Miller, “Uneasy About the Germans,” 85.
the need for Germans to quell the prevailing uneasiness about their character by somehow reconciling images of past militarism with the peaceful present.

The fact that questions about German national character would accompany a sense of uncertainty about the future of Europe and the world during a time of transition is, of course, nothing new. Uncertainty has historically colored the Germans’ own struggle for national identity and stability—a situation known as les incertitudes allemandes—and it pervaded the larger “German Question” of national unity and European integration, two goals that until the twenty-first century have remained mutually exclusive. But on a social and psychological level, uncertainty has also characterized the general tenor of Anglo-German relations since the eighteenth century. In 1974 John Mander wrote that an “ambiguous curse of unpredictability” has historically distinguished Germans from other nationalities in British eyes, not that the British have ever been overly fond of foreigners. To show that this “curse” has engendered an almost endemic sense of mistrust that spans generations, Mander cited a British opinion poll in which even the youngest respondents, those who neither imbibed the hun-baiting Vansittartism of the years surrounding World War II, nor remembered what preceded the positive changes under Adenauer and succeeding chancellors, ranked Germans their least favorite among European peoples.21 The irony that the British view of Germans as unpredictable stood

21John Mander, *Our German Cousins: Anglo-German Relations in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (London: Murray, 1974), 3-4. The poll revealed a broad perception of the Germans as violent, intolerant and unfriendly—qualities that certainly contradict the pre-Bismarckian stereotype of the German Michael, or rustic simpleton. Lord Vansittart, author of *The Black Record: Germans Past and Present*, 14th ed., (London: Hamilton, 1941), 14-16, 33, 38-39, laid out the unforgiving premise that Hitler and Nazism were no aberration, but the inevitable outcome of ancient blood-lust, a warped military honor code and the reversion to savagery of a people deeply in need of spiritual regeneration. Mander saw reason for hope in the prescient views of Vansittart’s ideological opposite, John Maynard Keynes, who stressed the key importance of Germany for Europe and civilization, and the need for British participation in a
diametrically opposed to the “loyalty” upon which Germans prided themselves points to a strange logic behind this persistent animosity. According to Mander, the mid-Victorian “loyal German” stereotype underpinned “too saccharine” and sentimental images of German romanticism and liberal Young Germany that dissolved into the bitter realities of German rivalry and Weltpolitik before World War I. From this perspective, the twentieth-century association of German identity with Prussian militarism, ruthless efficiency and Nazi brutality appears to have provided a psychological refuge from uncertainty by obliterating the earlier, more benign, yet just as two-dimensional “straw man” of German character.

Nazi atrocities fit “preconceived patterns of thought and attitudes towards things German,” wrote D. C. Watt in 1965, and post-war mass opinion in Britain, failing to appreciate, or ignorant of, the realities of life and opposition under totalitarian rule, assumed the collective guilt of all Germans. Watt surmised that persistent war-time stereotypes of Germany in Britain, which had impeded Anglo-German reconciliation for twenty years and had galvanized broad opposition to German rearmament, would only gradually be displaced by new stereotypes during a transitional period fraught with a reversion to old, familiar images in times of stress. The reunification of Germany reasserted old questions about German character and exposed

European Free Trade Union, foreshadowing the European Community (Our German Cousins, 12, 260-62).

Mander, Our German Cousins, 4, 10-11.


Ibid., 152-56. Watt referred to the “Bevanbrook axis” of anti-rearmament sentiment voiced by Conservative Lord Beaverbrook from the Right and led by Aneurin Bevan from a divided Left (pp. 123-24).
uncertainties previously quarantined by memories of allied victory and the exigencies of Soviet containment. The tenacity of Nazi and World War II imagery in Britain figured prominently during the farcical Anglo-German “holiday” or mock-territorial “beach towel” wars of the 1990s, which evoked derision of German tourists who rose “barbarically early” to secure pool-side Lebensraum at hotels and resorts in Morocco or Tenerife.25 A controversial commercial for Carling Black Label beer depicted a late-rising young British tourist throwing his towel to skim across a pool, in a manner reminiscent of the world War II bouncing bomb, only to land on a lounger where it unfurls to reveal the Union Jack to a group of befuddled German tourists.26

While such comical insinuations should be taken lightly, the fact that they coincided with serious German-bashing in the nationalist press of Britain suggests their appeal to a more deep-seated and politically motivated animosity. Unjustified accusations of German cowardice and malingering during the 1991 Desert Storm operation in Iraq failed to take account of Germany’s significant logistical and financial support as well as NATO restrictions imposed on Bundeswehr activity. From the same quarter came contradictory warnings about the menacing military potential of an erstwhile “cowardly” reunited Germany. A. J. Nicholls recounted that during the

25Nicholls, *Fifty Years of Anglo-German Relations*, 18. Harald Husemann, “We will fight them on the beaches,” chap. 4 in Rainer Emig, (ed.), *Stereotypes in Contemporary Anglo-German Relations* (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000), 59-60, 69-71, defined the Anglo-German beach towel controversy and concomitant stereotyping as a consequence of culture shock and the tendency to rally around national symbols as a way of promoting group identity in opposition to foreign groups during holidays in unfamiliar territories. Husemann relied on a theory advanced by social-psychologist Herbert Tajfel whereby conformism and the substitution of social in-group identity for personal identity can become a vicarious means of establishing a positive self-image through negation of the other.

1990s Germany “had become a whipping boy for the nationalist British media,” receiving blame for everything from the devaluation of the pound sterling in 1992 to the European ban on British beef amidst the “mad cow” disease scare. He cited a Daily Express cartoon dated 10 May 1996 depicting Helmut Kohl wearing an EU armband in a war room with other helmeted and Pikelhaubed Germans, plotting invasion and the extermination of peacefully grazing British cattle. And despite the landslide victory of the Labour party in the 1997 elections, which ostensibly implied public rejection of a highly Germanophobic and Europhobic Conservative campaign, opinion polls of the 1990s have demonstrated some longer-term adverse effects of anti-German political propaganda. This persistent British Germanophobia, even if in a popularized tongue-in-cheek form, has prompted, for example, a reference to the new German Reichstag as “the hub of a new European superstate-in-waiting,” and a frank admission appearing in the 11 July 1999 edition of the Sunday Times Colour Magazine article entitled “Hunforgiven:” “We all hate the Germans—come on, it’s all right, admit it, we’re all agreed, we hate them.”

While war imagery taken too seriously has backfired in the political arena, it has also fallen flat in the world of sports as shown by the unsuccessful attempts of the Daily Mirror and other tabloids to resuscitate German stereotypes and relate war-time scenarios to Anglo-German rivalry during the Euro 96 soccer championship. Ironically, soccer rivalry has actually improved the image of Germans in British eyes in at least two ways: first, through respect for players, in particular the good-humored and easy-going star player Jürgen Klinsmann, who played out a one-year stint with a British professional team; and second, through British fans’

---

27Nicholls, Fifty Years of Anglo-German Relations, 17-19.

strenuous objections to Germanophobic hype and statements like “We have to teach the Hun a lesson” in the tabloids. 29 The self-conscious and embarrassing absurdity attending the use of such antiquated stereotypes probably offers the most promising hope for their eventual demise, especially in light of European integration. To suggest that British soccer fans’ objections to mixing sports with politics brought a sea-change in attitudes may be stretching a point. Recent journalistic efforts may prove more effective in debunking cultural stereotypes, like the runaway best-seller in Germany entitled My Dear Krauts (2006) by the Times Berlin correspondent Roger Boyes. Commenting about an anticipated British edition, Boyes declared the welcome passing of war-time allusions and “heel-clicking clichés,” and he referred to the popularity of British comedy in Germany shown by “an encyclopaedic knowledge of Benny Hill, Monty Python, Fawlty Towers, Mr. Bean, The Office—slavishly copied—and Borat.” 30 Finding Germans “on the same wavelength” and even somewhat belatedly amused at “jackboot jokes” and Hitler satires, Boyes attributed the “serious German” stereotype not to any character deficit but to a sociological separation of humor from everyday life. If his descriptions of a “banter-less society,” averse to sudden sarcasm or irony and torn between national pride and crippling self-doubt, seem a bit like benign renditions of earlier stereotypes, at least Germans themselves find Boyes thought-provoking and amusing.

This dissertation has argued the endurance of stereotypical thinking and the role of stereotypes in national identity construction. Stereotypes of Germany in nineteenth-century


30 See these comments by Boyes prior to the publication of the British edition in “Sour Krauts?” The Times, December 21, 2006.
Britain defined what it meant to be British through biased comparisons which, taken as a whole, typify the psychological rivalry underlying a sense of self versus other. The Germans functioned, Peter Firchow wrote, as the “defective mirror image” of the English through which national self-image could be differentiated, maintained and reinforced.\textsuperscript{31} From the foundation of the German Empire in 1871 up to World War I and beyond, the bipolar representation of Anglo-German character distinctions through stereotypes provided a convenient means of projecting negative aspects of the British national self-image onto the Germans. Railing against German tacit approval of Turkish Armenian massacres, against German complicity in the East African Arab slave trade or against maltreatment of native populations, to cite a few examples, opened up ample moral high ground upon which to retreat from national self-criticism. If negative British reactions to German culture, society and politics had proven the time-honored notion of Anglo-German racial and cultural affinity to be illusory, the emergence of Germany as a great power and arch rival destroyed it. As growing interest in German affairs brought increased press coverage, the strenuous efforts to dissociate British from German national character in the later decades of the nineteenth century almost warrant a re-coining of the sixteenth-century proverb: “familiarity breeds contempt.”\textsuperscript{32} Originally intended as a warning against loss of respect through unrestrained fraternization with social inferiors, and a reminder of the importance of maintaining official decorum, the adage can be applied to shifting British attitudes toward Germans in two respects. First, it describes the superior attitude of those who ridiculed German cultural pretensions and imperial ambitions. Second, it connotes a delusional familiarity with German

\textsuperscript{31}Firchow, \textit{Death of the German Cousin}, 184.


257
stereotypes which did not involve any real social interaction but instead promoted either
idealized, sentimental and unthreatening images of Anglo-German affinity or a reactionary
iconoclasm that demonized Germany as Britain’s polar opposite and arch nemesis. In a narrower
sense, which nevertheless resonated in the press, the strained relations between King Edward VII
and his nephew Kaiser Wilhelm II, who personified many of the worst aspects of New Germany,
certainly suffered from an excess of forced familiarity on the kaiser’s part.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Books and Pamphlets


The Groans of Germany: or, the Enquiry of a Protestant German into the Original Cause of the Present Distraction of the Empire. Translated from the original lately published at the Hague. 3rd ed. London: J. Huggonson, 1741.


*Newspapers (Daily and Weekly)*

*Clarion*. London.
*Pall Mall Gazette*. London.
Periodicals
(Articles Arranged Chronologically by Title)

“Hodgskin’s Travels in Germany.” 6 (February 1820): 536-42.
“Letters From the Continent.” No. II, on German students. 17 (March 1825): 329-35.
“The King’s German Legion.” 43 (June 1838): 739-56.
“The Archbishop of Cologne and the King of Prussia.” 43 (June 1838): 757-68.
“Reminiscences of the Year 1813 in Germany.” 48 (December 1840): 746-64.
“Traits and Tendencies of German Literature.” 50 (August 1841): 143-60.
“What Would Revolutionizing Germany Be At?” 64 (September 1848): 373-86.
“German Aims in East Africa.” 147 (May 1890): 689-707.
“Anti-English Sentiment in Germany.” 169 (April 1901): 585-94.

Borderland. London.

British Quarterly Review. London.
“Results of German Philosophy.” 7 (May 1848): 404-31.

Cassell’s Family Magazine. London.

Chamber’s Journal. London.
“Gretchen at Home.” 13 (June 1896): 395-96.

Contemporary Review. London.
“The Church and Social Democracy in Germany.” Richard Heath. 74 (October 1898): 547-62.
“Germany and England: The Visit of the English Journalists.” Frederich Dernburg. 91 (June 1907) 761-66.
“Trade Unionism in Germany.” Eduard Bernstein. 92 (November 1907): 679-89.

Cornhill Magazine. London.
“(German) Money and Manners.” 9 (January-June 1864): 566-75.
“German Professors.” 10 (July-December 1864): 342-54.
“Cousins German.” 17 (September 1891): 295-300.
“Commissions in the German Army.” Reprinted in Living Age. 202 (July-September 1894): 171-84.


“Mr. Chamberlain’s Speech.” Reprinted in a *Living Age*. 217 (June 1898): 750-52.


“A Tour in Germany.” 41 October 1824): 78-96.


*English Illustrated Magazine*. London.


“The Enslavement of Married Women in Germany.” Mary Mack Wall. 27 (July 1896): 151.


“A Lesson in German.” [Genose Aegir]. 59 (February 1896): 177-96.
“Queen Victoria and Germany.” Lucien Wolf. 69 (March 1901): 408-19.

Free Review. (University Magazine & Free Review) London.

Gentleman’s Magazine. London.

Good Words. London.

Harmsworth’s Magazine. London.
“In Business as Emperor.” C. F. Dewey. 2 (February 1899): 3-12.

Idler. London.


Ladies’ Realm. London.
Leisure Hour. London.
“The Statesmen of Europe: Germany.” Three parts. Reprinted in Living Age. 195
252-53.

Ludgate’s Magazine. London.

197 (April-June 1893): 676-85.
“Not Made in Germany.” Reprinted in Living Age. 212 (January-March 1897): 557-64.


National Review. London.
“English and German Music.” J. F. Rowbotham. Reprinted in Living Age. 190 (July-September
“Should We Seek an Alliance.” F. Greenwood.27 (March 1896): 21-32.
“The Rapprochement Between France and Germany.” [Ignotus]. Reprinted in Living Age. 222
(July-September 1899): 758-65.
“A Comparison of German and English School Children.” Catharine I. Dodd. Reprinted in
Living Age. 228 (January-March 1901): 288-96.

“As Others See Us.” T. H. S. Escott. 8 (July-December 1900): 98-103.

New Review. London.
“The German Crisis and the German Emperor.” Louis Bamberger. 6 (April 1892): 385-98.

Nineteenth Century (Nineteenth Century and After).
“Compulsory Insurance.” Dr. F. H. Geffcken. 30 (September 1891): 380-86.
“German Versus English Trade in the East.” Clavell Tripp. 43 (February 1898): 192-96.
“Eleanor d’Olbreuse and Queen Victoria.” Adrienne van Amstel. 43 (April 1898): 625-32.
“Germany as an Object Lesson.” Charles Copland Perry. 45 (April 1899): 525-37.

Pall Mall Magazine. London.
“How the Dukes of Coburg Hunted Three Hundred Years Ago.” W. A. Ballie-Grohman. 16 (October 1898): 159-67.


“Why the Russians Hate the Germans.” 4 (November 1891): 611.
“The German Emperor From a French Point of View.” 5 (May 1892): 483.
“The German Tramp.” 8 (September 1893): 413.
“Compulsory State Insurance: Results of the Experiment.” 8 (September 1893): 505.
“Hints From German Municipalities.” Dr. Albert Shaw. 10 (January 1894): 41.
“The Decline and Fall of British Industrial Supremacy.” 14 (July 1896): 74-83.
“Is There a German Menace to England?” 15 (May 1897): 564.
“A Genius Upon a Throne.” 18 (July 1898): 27.
“Recent Caricatures of the Kaiser.” 18 (December 1898): 595-97.

*The Saturday Review.* London.
“German Loyalty and Honesty.” 83 (January 1897): 106.

*The Speaker.* London.

*The Spectator.* London.
“The Increase in German Prosperity.” 80 (August 1898): 269.
“German Idealism.” 81 (December 1898): 903-4.
“Life and Thought in Germany.” 81 (December 1898): 978.

*Strand Magazine.* London.

*Sunday At Home.* London.
Temple Bar. London.
“Eight Weeks Service in the German Army.” 93 (September-December 1889): 331-42.

“Peasant Life in Germany.” 66 (July-October 1856): 51-79.
“Socialism and Militarism.” R. S. Long. 146 (December 1896): 681-84.

Windsor Magazine. London.
“At Sea With the German Emperor.” Flora Klickmann. 2 (November 1895): 499-503.

Woman at Home. London.


Young Woman. London.

Secondary Sources

Books


**Articles**


VITA

Born in Wilmington, Delaware, in 1950, William F. Bertolette enrolled at the University of Delaware in the fall of 1969, where he studied literature, film and music. In the summer of 1972 William transferred to the University of California at Hayward where he expanded his knowledge of music theory, honed his piano playing skills, and furthered his photographic experience. He also began researching topics in European history and studying documentary film making under the guidance of Professor Richard C. Raack. William received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Studies, with English concentration, in August of 1975 and began to pursue a career as a part-time jazz pianist while working as a district manager for the Oakland Tribune.

In 1980, William embarked on a three-month backpacking tour through the diverse landscapes and cultures of Europe, taking photographs and visiting the historical architectural landmarks and museums of London, Paris, Amsterdam, Florence, Rome, Athens, and many other cities. After returning to the United States, William established residence in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, where he worked as a musician and photographer before enrolling in the graduate program in history at Louisiana State University. William served as a graduate assistant during completion of the course work for a Master of Arts degree, and he capitalized on skills as a database programmer, tutor and videographer while writing the thesis. After completing his
master’s thesis William opted to continue studies at Louisiana State University toward a doctoral degree in history and received a graduate assistantship toward that end.

William’s interest in the relationship between psychology and history, specifically in the interface between social psychology, politics and diplomacy in modern Europe, has led him to investigate a comparison with Eastern cultures. He has traveled in India and explored various avenues of Vedic knowledge, Indian music and the practice of meditation and yoga. He is particularly interested in the disparity between perceived cultural difference and some striking similarities in philosophical and religious orientation between East and West. William maintains a vibrant interest in global environmental and political developments.