

SUBSTITUTING THE STATE: THE EFFECTS OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF COLOMBIAN COFFEE-GROWERS ON DEMOCRATIC
BEHAVIORS AND ATTITUDES

By

Brian Matthew Faughnan

Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

Political Science

December, 2013

Nashville, Tennessee

Approved:

Professor Mitchell A. Seligson

Professor Edward F. Fischer

Professor Jonathan T. Hiskey

Professor Zeynep Somer-Topcu

Professor Elizabeth J. Zechmeister

Copyright © 2013 by Brian Matthew Faughnan
All Rights Reserved

To my family, past, present, and future

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In so many ways my time at Vanderbilt has seemed to go on forever. However, as I reflect on the people who have helped me out along the way and to whom I will continue to be indebted, it seems like just yesterday that I arrived to Nashville. I must first thank the political science faculty who, back in 2007, took a risk and admitted me to the graduate program. Since that time, the department has grown to an almost unrecognizable form. Because of this, all who have benefitted from an association with the Department of Political Science in the last 10 years owe a debt of gratitude to the late Neal Tate, and I am no different.

Additionally, the comparative politics faculty, most of who are serving on this dissertation committee, have been steadfast and unwavering in their support of me. Mitch Seligson's work ethic and knowledge of Latin American politics is seconded only by his deep concern for others (especially his graduate students) and overall genuine personality. I thank him for taking an interest in me and my research and encouraging me to think deeper and harder. Jon Hiskey has also been guiding me since I began graduate school and I am better because of it. His harsh yet well-meaning critiques have improved my work immensely yet what I learned most from Hiskey came from over beer on Thursday afternoons. Liz Zechmeister arrived to Vanderbilt during my second year in the program and has made a profound impact on my intellectual development. She has been ever willing to listen patiently as I hash out ideas, many of which were less than promising. I thank Zeynep Somer-Topcu for her willingness to read and listen about Latin American state-society relationships and for pushing me to think how the results

might (or might not) extend beyond the region. Finally, Ted Fischer brought a fresh perspective to the dissertation project and I will be forever grateful for his insightful comments and recommendations. Of course, the imperfections found in this project are not because of the lack of guidance by these five esteemed scholars, but instead because of my own lack of ability to properly incorporate their feedback and advice.

This project has also benefitted from the financial, intellectual and personal support of various institutions and centers at Vanderbilt. First and foremost, I must thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) for its steadfast support over these six years. The experiences and personal relationships I have gained as a result of my involvement with LAPOP will last me my entire career. Furthermore, whether through earning a graduate certificate, receiving funding for fieldwork, or presenting before an interdisciplinary audience, Vanderbilt's Center for Latin American Studies, led by Ted Fischer, has been a constant source of support and encouragement during my graduate training. The Graduate School and the College of Arts and Sciences at Vanderbilt and the Tinker Foundation must also be acknowledged for their willingness to fund my trips to Colombia for work on this dissertation.

In addition to the faculty and institutional support I have received, I would be remiss if I did not thank my fellow graduate students in the Department of Political Science. I must especially acknowledge the LAPOP graduate students and staff who preceded me: María Fernanda Boidi, Dominique Zéphyr, Abby Córdova, Daniel Montalvo, Daniel Moreno, Vivian Schwarz-Bloom, Diana Orcés, Rubí Arana, Miguel Cruz, and Juan Carlos Donoso for being so welcoming to a shy and intimidated (for good reason) *gringo* into the Alumni Hall basement. Furthermore, the students that have come

and gone since I have arrived have all made a profound impact on me, not only in my development as a scholar and researcher, but also on a more personal level: Jason Husser, Alejandro Diaz-Dominguez, Margarita Corral, Mason Moseley, Scott Revey, Patrick Bentley, Jen Selin, Fred Batista, Juan Camilo Plata, Gui Russo, Oscar Castorena, Steve Utych, and Scott Limbocker. All have served to make the department an intellectually rigorous yet inviting place to work, study, and socialize.

I must thank my colleague, John Hudak. Although he has since moved on to greener pastures, John continues to remain a dependable friend and honest critic. This work has benefitted greatly from his careful and astute insight. The conversations we had over both coffee and beer have served to improve this work over what it would have been otherwise; I only regret that I was not better able to incorporate his high-quality and well-reasoned suggestions.

In addition to the debts incurred while at Vanderbilt, I have as many, if not more people to thank for their hospitality and assistance during my time in Colombia. First, I must thank Alejandro Cano Jaramillo who, over dinner and *aguardiente*, introduced me to the fascinating Colombian coffee industry and the FNCC. It is no exaggeration to say that without that conversation, this dissertation would not have been produced. Professor Oscar Arango Gaviria of the *Universidad Tecnológica de Pereira* and *Red Alma Mater* spent hours talking with me and helping me to understand the social context of the *eje cafetero* and Colombia more generally. I also thank eminent coffee scholar Diego Pizano for meeting with me and taking an interest in this project. Professors Miguel García Sanchez, Juan Carlos Rodriguez Raga, Angelika Rettberg of the *Universidad de los Andes* and Professor Rodrigo Losada Lora of the *Universidad Sergio Arboleda* all

assisted with this project by either meeting with me or sharing data. Juan Carlos Muñoz Mora (then of *Universidad EAFIT*, now at the *Universite Libre Bruxelles*) spent much more time than he had to discussing this project. Finally, I must thank Professor Samuel Ospina Marin whose patience and willingness to listen to my ideas and insights was no less than heroic. My only regret is that he did not have an opportunity to read the final version. His impact on this project goes beyond words.

I am also forever grateful to the many people who made my stays in Colombia possible and who opened their doors to me. Particularly Doña Ana Marin who graciously opened her home to me and provided me with many hours of conversation and laughter. Eyder Tabares, Mariela Mendoza, Laura Tabares, Fabián González, Lina Ospina, and Germán Guerrero also graciously allowed me to stay in their homes in both Bogotá and Pereira. Additionally, I must thank Evelio Ospina, Jorge Ospina, Gloria Luz Duque, Valentina Ospina, Oscar Arango, Camila Ospina, Virginia Aristizabal, Ana Victoria Ospina, María Amparo Ospina, Luis Aristizabal, Ana María Aristizabal, Juan David Aristizabal, Melva Cano, Alberto Cano, María Mercedes Uricocha, and Rafael Cano. If it weren't for these individuals, my experiences in Colombia would have been much more stressful and much less productive.

Closer to home there are also many people who have contributed greatly to my intellectual and personal development. First, I thank my in-laws, Efraín Ospina and Gladys Cano. The gratitude and respect I have toward them is endless; not only did they introduce me to the beauty that is Colombia, but they allowed their only daughter to marry an eternal student and have supported us as we try to figure things out.

My own parents, Michael and Susan Faughnan have been steadfast in their support of me and my career decisions. Without the love and support they have given me over the years I would not be where I am today; my thanks is infinite. My brothers Michael and Patrick, and my sister-in-law, Lauren have also supported me as I have traveled the circuitous path en route to the Ph.D. I must apologize to them for the many times I seemed distant and withdrawn and can only say that with this stage of my life complete, I hope to improve.

The life of the spouse of a graduate student is often a thankless one; they suffer the same challenges and setbacks, but don't receive the same rewards. This has most definitely been the experience of my wife, Juliana. She has been both my fiercest critic and my most staunch supporter and for this I must thank her. Not only would this project not have been as good without her, but it would have never happened. During a time when many relationships seem to fall victim to the hardships and stress of graduate school, ours strengthened and became more resolute. It is from her love and support that I was able to overcome the inevitable dark and hopeless days that are part of graduate school and it is because of her love and support that I find myself on the cusp of submitting a doctoral dissertation. I am forever indebted to her and will spend a lifetime trying to repay her for all that she has given to me. From day one, this has truly been a joint endeavor. *Te amo mijita linda, ahora y siempre.*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
LIST OF TABLES	xi
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
The Study of Corporatism into the 21 st Century	5
A Subnational Approach to the Study of Corporatism	10
The Subnational Comparative Approach	11
A Note on the Statistical Approach	13
Outline of Dissertation	15
II. ON THE ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF COLOMBIAN COFFEE-GROWERS	18
The National Federation of Colombian Coffee-Growers, 1927-present	19
The Permanent Establishment of the <i>Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia</i>	21
The Federal Nature of the Coffee Federation	23
Federation Activities in Municipalities	26
Conflicts, Disagreements, and Differences	31
The FNCC through a Corporatist Lens	34
The FNCC as a Highly Regarded Municipal Actor	42
Measuring Context in Colombian Municipalities	42
Measuring State Presence	45
Measuring Federation Presence	50
Controlling for Competing Hypotheses	53
Conclusion	55

TABLE OF CONTENTS *continued*

III.	COFFEE, CORPORATISM, AND CITIZEN TRUST IN AND SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT.....	57
	Decentralization in Latin American and Colombia	58
	Trust in Government in (Latin) America	62
	The FNCC’s Effect on Trust in Subnational Colombian Governments	63
	Empirical Analysis.....	67
	Trust in Municipal Government.....	67
	Trust in Departmental and National Government.....	70
	Satisfaction with Local Services	75
	Individual-Level Covariates.....	77
	Results.....	79
	Trust in Municipal Government.....	81
	Trust in Departmental Government	84
	Trust in National Government	86
	Satisfaction with Local Services	88
	Discussion and Conclusion	90
IV.	THE EFFECTS OF THE FNCC ON CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL BEHAVIORS.....	94
	The Perils of Political Participation in Colombia	96
	The Contextual Connection: Municipal Effects on Political and Civic Behavior	99
	The National Coffee Federation and Political Behavior	103
	How Corporatism Affects Behavior in 21 st Century Latin America ..	106
	Political Behavior in Colombian Municipalities	109
	Measuring and Explaining Conventional Political Behavior.....	110
	Measuring and Explaining Unconventional Political Behavior.....	125
	Discussion and Conclusion	132
V.	Conclusion	137
	Corporatism and Mass Behaviors and Attitudes.....	138
	Explaining High State/High Federation Municipalities.....	142
	Studying the Continued Effects of Institutions of the Past.....	146
	Concluding Remarks.....	147
	APPENDIX.....	150
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	155

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
II.1. Summary of Expectations for Each Municipality Type.....	41
II.2. Description of Contextual Level Variables.....	54
II.2. Correlation Matrix of Contextual Variables.....	55
III.1. Expected Impact of Municipal Context on Citizen Perceptions.....	66
III.2. Results of Fully Unconditional Model for Trust in Municipal Government.....	69
III.3. Results of Fully Unconditional Model for Trust in Departmental and National Government.....	74
III.4. Results of Fully Unconditional Model for Satisfaction with Local Services.....	77
III.5. Results of Hierarchical Linear Models.....	80
IV.1. Results of Hierarchical Non-Linear Model Explaining Conventional Political Behavior.....	117-118
IV.2. Results of Hierarchical Linear and Non-Linear Models Explaining Contentious Political Behavior.....	129
V.1. Summary of Findings for Attitudes and Perceptions.....	141
IV.2. Summary of Findings for Behaviors.....	142

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
II.1. <i>Jefe Seccional</i> and <i>Extensionista</i> Visiting a Local Coffee Farmer at his Finca in Dosquebradas, Risaralda, Colombia	27
II.2. Road Sign in Pereira, Risaralda, Colombia Showing Agencies Contributing to Public Works Projects.....	28
II.3. Real Central Government Transfers to Municipalities, 2008	48
II.4. Central Government Transfers Per Capita to Municipalities, 2008	48
II.5. Real Number of <i>Extensionistas</i> by Municipality, 2008	52
II.6. Per Capita Number of <i>Extensionistas</i> by Municipalities, 2008	52
III.1. Average Levels of Trust in municipal Government by Municipality, 2004-2010	68
III.2. Average Levels of Trust in Departmental Government by Municipality, 2004-2009	72
III.3. Average Levels of Trust in National Government by Municipality, 2004-2010	73
III.4. Average Levels of Satisfaction with Local Services by Municipality, 2004-2010	76
III.5. Estimated Values of Trust in Municipal Government for Each Type of Municipality	83
III.6. Estimated Values of Trust in Departmental Government for Each Type of Municipality	85
III.7. Estimated Values of Trust in National Government for Each Type of Municipality	87
III.8. Estimated Values of Satisfaction with Local Services for Each Type of Municipality	89

LIST OF FIGURES continued

IV.1. Percentage of Respondents Voting in Last Presidential Election by Municipality, 2004-2010.....	112
IV.2. Percentage of Respondents Identifying with a Political Party by Municipality, 2004-2010	112
IV.3. Percentage of Respondents Petitioning the Government by Municipality, 2004-2010	113
IV.4. Percentage of Respondents Attending Municipal Meetings by Municipality, 2005-2010	113
IV.5. Percentage of Respondents who Attempt to Convince Others by Municipality, 2005-2010	114
IV.6. Percentage of Respondents who Worked for a Political Party or Candidate by Municipality, 2004-2010.....	114
IV.7. Predicted Probabilities of Having Worked for a Campaign or Candidate by Municipality, 2004-2010	122
IV.8. Predicted Probabilities of Having Attended a Municipal Meeting in the Past 12 Months by Municipality, 2004-2010	124
IV.9. Percentage of Respondents Having Participated in a Protest or Public Demonstration by Municipality, 2004-2008.....	127
IV.10. Average Levels of Approval of Others to Participate in Legal Protests and Demonstrations by Municipality, 2004-2010	127
IV.11. Predicted Probabilities of Having Taken Part in Protest by Municipality, 2004-2010	131

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

El sector cafetero ha jugado un papel de primer orden en el desarrollo económico, político y social de Colombia en los últimos cien años.

(Junguito and Pizano 1997)¹

In late September of 2010, over 200,000 Colombians headed to the polls to cast votes for their preferred candidates. These candidates, however, were not seeking positions in the national or departmental legislatures, but rather were competing for the opportunity to represent their fellow coffee farmers in the National Federation of Colombian Coffee Growers (FNCC), a government-supported organization designed to serve the interests of those involved in Colombia's main agricultural product. Since its creation in 1927, and especially since the ratification of the first International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in October 1963 (Akiyama and Varangis 1990), the Federation has had a profound impact on Colombian politics, economics, and society, serving in many respects as an 'alternative government' that carries out the responsibilities of the state across many areas of the country.

No shortage of research exists on the influence the Coffee Federation, and more generally, the coffee industry, has had on Colombian politics and society over the last 150 years. Indeed, it is this economic sector that has been credited for helping the Colombian economy rebound after war and depression and it is because of this sector that much of the world knows about this mid-sized Andean country. As will become apparent

¹ "The coffee sector has played a role of the first order in the economic, political and social development of Colombia in the last 100 years." (Translation by author)

in this dissertation, the quote above does not exaggerate— it is impossible to talk about Colombian political, social, or economic development and progress without mentioning the coffee sector or the FNCC (or FEDECAFE as it often referred to). However, although it is widely accepted that both are of utmost importance in understanding Colombia more broadly, once one begins to ask “how” exactly these institutions have had such an effect, the responses become less definitive. This is not to say that no empirical research has been done on the causes and effects of this institution; indeed, much ink has been spilled trying to understand the contemporary FNCC (Junguito and Pizano 1991, 1994, 1997; Ortiz 1999; London 1997, 1999, 2002; UNDP 2003). There remains, however, much more to be done in order to better understand the impact of this powerful, non-governmental political and economic institution on the lives of everyday Colombians.

In this dissertation, I seek to fill one of the knowledge gaps that exist in regards to the FNCC and its effects on the Colombian political process. For decades, the Coffee Federation has had a strong presence throughout many of the country’s coffee growing municipalities. Although its presence and the role of its staff was primarily to assist coffee growers in optimizing their coffee output, the FNCC was also tasked with providing many of the goods and services to a municipality’s residents that are normally thought to be under the purview of the state. Because of the Federation’s dual organizational structure, one part is administrative and not directly accountable to members while the second is comprised of bodies of representative actors selected by the group’s roughly 500,000 members. From this, it becomes quickly apparent to an interested observer that the group should affect the behaviors and attitudes of municipality’s population in some way. The question, however, is *how*?

I argue that the Coffee Federation is a continuation of a peculiar state-society institutional arrangement found throughout Latin America. In the first part of the 20th century, state-society relations in Latin America came to reflect the corporatist model whereby society is organized into clearly delineated professional and vocational associations (or corporations) that serve as citizens' avenues into the political world. Although scholars (Schmitter 1974; Malloy 1974, 1977; O'Donnell 1977) theorized that this peculiar institutional arrangement significantly affected Latin Americans' political lives and relationships with the state, others (Hagopian 1998) noted the incompatibility of corporatism with the ideals of the region's dual transition in the 1980s and 90s. Consequently, corporatist organizations were expected to fade away in time. Despite expectations, corporatism is a resilient and enduring feature of Latin American culture and society and has thrived as an economic and social force into the 21st century. While the institutional characteristics of corporatism have been well studied, little empirical work has sought to examine the impact that such an institution has on mass behaviors and attitudes. At its core, Latin American corporatism was (and perhaps still is) a means by which governments depoliticize and "control" the masses. Although procedural democracy has undoubtedly taken hold in Latin America in the past 30 years, what is less clear is the influence of this durable and lasting institution on contemporary behaviors and attitudes.

I find that instead of fading away into the less than democratic past, corporatism has, like other institutions, successfully adapted to the region's new realities of open-market economic systems and democratic governance. Therefore, in the past, organizations such as the FNCC might have sought to lend legitimacy to the government

while simultaneously depressing mass behaviors. In 21st century Latin America, such organizations, while still seeking to legitimize the State, also promote mass participation in conventional modes of political behavior while seeking to prevent participation in those activities which might be less convenient for governments and political elites. Using contemporary subnational Colombian public opinion data, I find this to be precisely the case. In municipalities where the Federation is, in effect, the ‘alternative government’, levels of legitimacy accorded the state among the residents are on par with those municipalities where the State is very active and robust. In these municipalities, levels of participation in conventional political behaviors are no different, or, at times higher, than in other, similar municipalities; however, nonconventional behaviors, such as protest participation are depressed in these areas.

This study is novel in a number of ways. First, state-society relations, especially corporatism, have typically been studied at the national or cross-national level. By ‘scaling down’ to the subnational level (Snyder 2001a) this dissertation recognizes the uneven effects of such institutional characteristics within countries. Furthermore, we know very little about how corporatism actually affects citizen behaviors and attitudes. This reality is surprising given that for many governments throughout the world, these types of state-society structures were explicitly adopted to control the ways in which the masses interacted with and perceived the state. Finally, this study contributes to a relatively small but growing literature on the effects of institutions of the past and their continuing legacy and impact on modern day political processes and procedures.

In this introductory chapter, I present the key concepts and methods that will be used throughout the remaining pages of this dissertation. First, I review the vast literature

that has emerged on the concept of corporatism throughout the past 40 years within Latin America and throughout the world. Second, I briefly discuss the analytical approaches I will use in my empirical analyses. In this section I will examine the benefits of using a subnational comparative analysis to understand the individual-level effects of corporatism and why this is preferable to more common national or cross-national approaches. Also in this section I will explain the empirical strategy to be used throughout the pages of this dissertation. This chapter concludes by presenting an organizational outline of the dissertation.

The Study of Corporatism into the 21st Century

Corporatism has long been of interest to those who study political institutions, both within Latin America and beyond. Although the contemporary meaning of this concept can be traced back to the papal encyclical *Rerum Novarum* published in 1891 by Pope Leo XIII², it was not until the rise of dictator Benito Mussolini in fascist Italy that corporatism began to have relevance beyond academic and theological spheres. Indeed, in a resolution presented on 14 November 1933 to the Assembly of the National Council of Corporations, Mussolini defined corporations as “the instrument which, under the aegis of the State, carries out the complete organic and unitarian regulation of production with a view to the expansion of wealth, political power, and well-being of the Italian people” (Mussolini 1975, 9). With this, corporatism became a primary institutional

² The *Rerum Novarum* was in response to the intense debates between socialist and capitalist forms of economic organization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Pope Leo XIII put forward a corporatist framework as a possible solution to what was seen by the Church as two economic systems that were incompatible with the Catholic faith and social doctrine. For more information on the Catholic connection to corporatist development, see Morck and Yeung (2010).

arrangement in which citizens were organized within society. Furthermore, to participate politically and economically, the Italian citizenry was divided among relevant syndicates “formed for each category of workers, and [...] called upon to examine all problems of interest to the category, to appoint syndicate leaders and to discuss the requirements of the workers” (ibid, 77). In short, the entire economic, social, and political lives of post-World War I Italians flowed through syndicates or federations that corresponded to their profession, trade, or occupation.

As the second wave of democratization receded and authoritarian governments took hold throughout the world (Huntington 1991), including Latin America, scholars began to note that these regimes were using the corporatist frameworks designed by Mussolini to organize, control, and, if needed, repress citizens. While scholars agreed on the general presence of corporatism in the region, they disagreed on the reasons behind it. One view, articulated by Howard Wiarda (1973) was that corporatism, while of course an institutional characteristic in the Americas was, more importantly, part of the social and cultural fabric of the region. “In comprehending the Iberic-Latin systems,” writes Wiarda, “one must think in terms of a hierarchically and vertically segmented structure of class and caste stratifications, of social rank order, functional corporations, estates, juridical groupings and *interests*— a rigid yet adaptable scheme whose component parts are tied to and derive legitimacy from the authority of the central state or its leader” (210-11; see also Wiarda 1974). This corporatist tradition, notably, extends beyond the shores of Latin America and into Eastern Europe, and Ukraine in particular (Kubicek 2000).

Although the cultural approach to the study of corporatism has proven to be influential and long lasting, it has also been largely criticized. “Adoption of the

corporatist framework as the basic paradigm for the analysis of Latin American politics puts research in the area further outside the mainstream of more general developmental theory. Despite the claims for a unique tradition, political behavior in Latin America has much in common with that in other developing areas” (Hammergren 1977, 458). More recently, while reflecting on his career, Philippe Schmitter commented “I didn’t understand how anybody could possibly study corporatism without recognizing it was a state-imposed arrangement. I also disagreed with the notion of an overarching ‘Iberian’ political culture. I had had enough experience living in Mexico before I went to Brazil that I could immediately recognize that in cultural terms, Brazil was not Mexico” (Munck and Snyder 2007, 320). Schmitter completes this thought by stating unequivocally “It was clear to me that corporatism in Brazil had absolutely nothing to do with Brazilian political culture” (ibid).

Schmitter, for his part, had an equally (if not more) influential role in the study of corporatism, particularly from the institutionalist perspective. Indeed, it is in his 1974 article “Still the Century of Corporatism” where the contemporary meaning of the concept was first developed and defined.³ Furthermore, it was in this article where the distinction was made between state corporatism found in “political systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power” (Schmitter 1974, 105) and the more democratically acceptable form, societal corporatism which is “the concomitant, if not ineluctable, component of the [...] organized democratic welfare

³ Schmitter defines corporatism as “a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports” (1974, 93-4).

state” (ibid)⁴ The former, argues Schmitter, is found most frequently in developing regions such as Latin America, while the latter is found primarily in Western Europe and to a lesser extent, the United States (Brand 1988).

While Schmitter’s definition of corporatism is a valid and, at least in theory, testable one, in practice its 19 separate components quickly pose problems in terms of the operationalization of the concept.⁵ A more manageable definition, however, comes from Collier and Collier (1979; see also 1977) who write “one may define a system of state-group relations as corporative to the degree that there is (1) state *structuring* of groups that produces a system of officially sanctioned, non-competitive, compulsory interest associations; (2) state *subsidy* of these groups; and (3) state imposed *constraints* on demand-making, leadership, and internal governance” (968). In the next chapter I use a modified version of this definition to argue that even though Colombia, as a country, can hardly be described as corporative (see Bailey 1977; Kline 2004), it is an ideal case in which to examine the subnational, individual-level effects of the phenomenon.

It was not uncommon for scholars studying corporatism prior to the 1980s to link it with other prevailing concepts of the time. For example Malloy (1974; see also 1977) went so far as to make the case for the “potential utility of revising and enlarging the concept of corporatism as a specific subtype of development-oriented authoritarianism”

⁴ It is worth noting that Schmitter is not the only scholar to disaggregate corporatism; O’Donnell (1974), in the context of bureaucratic-authoritarianism distinguishes between “statizing” and “privatist” forms of corporatism while Lemburch (1979) defines the meaning of liberal corporatism.

⁵ In the same interview with Gerardo Munck in 2002, while reflecting on professional regrets, Schmitter states “My second regret concerns how I conceptualized corporatism. I included a very large number of variables in my definition. That seems excessive now, and I think it was a mistake. It probably would have been better if I had not been so elaborate, if I had focused instead on a small number of dimensions, say, four or five, rather than the nineteen I have been told are there. This would have been an improvement from an operational standpoint. At the time, I thought I could use my elaborate definition in a narrative, descriptive, ‘ideal-typical’ way and that it would be self-evident whether, say, Austria, Finland, or the Netherlands was corporatist. But, later on, when I started to study corporatism quantitatively, I realized my definition was difficult to operationalize” (Munck and Snyder 2007, 334).

(84). Meanwhile, immediately following the implementation of the dual-transition,⁶ both scholars and journalists⁷ argued that corporatist institutions were not conducive with either democratic systems of governance *or* open-market economic systems and would, therefore, fade away into the region's past:

The potential of nonprogrammatic political parties to compete electorally and mediate interests via the traditional channels of corporatism and clientelism is also diminished by the reduction in the scope of state regulatory and distributive activity. Corporatist institutions that were put in place by state authorities in order to control the incipient mobilization of labor will, by design, be less effective mediations for more mature labor movements in open economies. The deregulation of labor markets and the restructuring of labor benefits, objectives on the agenda of every neoliberal reformer in Latin America, in fact have weakened corporatist unions and union-party alliances. (Hagopian 1998, 108).

In 1989, Schmitter noted corporatism's "dynamic continuity punctuated by periodic demise and subsequent resurrection" (Schmitter 1989, 72) but also expressed his doubts that corporatism would ever again be considered a transformational concept in political science. "Especially when viewed from the macro- or national-level, it looks too small in scale to have much influence over transnational forces and too large in scale to be of much help in the restructuring of sectoral and regional patterns" (ibid). While perhaps not to the hyperbolic levels that it was considered to be almost 30 years ago when it was labeled as one of the great "-isms" of political science (Wiarda 1996), contemporary scholars of comparative politics have recognized the continued institutional presence of corporatism and its effects on modern-day politics and society. At least in the case of Latin America, scholars have recognized not only the continued existence and impact of corporatist institutions in the region, but also its evolving nature

⁶ For an overview of the dual transition in Latin America, see Encarnación (1996).

⁷ In its 15 January 1998 edition, the *Economist* wrote "Yet almost a decade after the collapse of the Soviet empire and the near simultaneous exhaustion of Latin American old corporatism, the once powerful left is still struggling to develop a modern alternative to what it calls the 'neo-liberalism' of the reformers."

in diverse areas throughout region including Venezuela (Corrales and Cisneros 1999), Argentina (Etchemendy and Collier 2007) and even subnational Mexico (Snyder 2001b).

The purpose of this section has not been to offer a complete review of state-society relations or even corporatism, but rather to introduce the concept and place it within the field's current debates. At least in Latin America, a primary motivation for corporatism was to affect, in expected ways, citizen behaviors and attitudes throughout the region. While the authoritarian regimes have since been replaced with electorally accountable, democratic governments, corporatism continues to be a relevant structural characteristic in many countries. Given the original intent of corporatism and the fact that it continues to exist in the 21st century, it is important to ask how it affects citizens' perceptions of and interactions with their current governments and democratic systems.

In the next section, I outline the overarching analytical approach that will be used to examine the effects of 21st century corporatism on modern-day mass behaviors and attitudes. In addition to defending my decision to use a subnational approach to answer the questions posed in this study, I will also comment briefly on the methodological approach and econometric techniques to be used for the empirical analyses.

A Subnational Approach to the Study of Corporatism

Undoubtedly, the vast majority of scholarly work on corporatism has been done from a national, or (to a lesser extent) cross-national approach (Malloy 1977; Collier and Collier 1979; Wiarda 2004). I take a different approach by using subnational comparative analysis in order to understand how corporatist structures affect mass behaviors and

attitudes. While there are most certainly costs associated with such an approach, I argue that the benefits far outweigh any of the disadvantages. Here, I briefly discuss my reasons for using a subnational strategy instead of a cross-national one and introduce the hierarchical modeling technique that I will use in later chapters.

The Subnational Comparative Approach

Since the advent of contemporary social science after World War II, scholars have recognized the theoretical and empirical advantages to using subnational levels of analyses. “[I]nternational differences are not solely troublesome, but can be of great value in comparative sociological research and in the study of social change” (Linz and de Miguel 1966, 268). More contemporary scholarship, however, has expounded on the benefits expressed by Linz and de Miguel almost 50 years ago. Specifically, Snyder (2001a) notes the distinct advantages to using subnational units of analysis. First, a subnational focus can greatly increase the number of units under analysis. Instead of studying just one Colombia, a researcher can instead study 32 Colombian departments or 1,100 Colombian municipalities. By doing this, scholars are able to use more robust, comparative analyses rather than the more limiting methodological options that are available when only examining one case. As will be describe in more detail in Chapter II, this particular study takes full advantage of this attribute; by scaling down to the municipal level with multiple survey years, this analysis quickly goes from an N of one to an N of over 300 distinct municipal years.

A second advantage afforded to those who take advantage of a subnational unit of analysis is that by focusing on such units, we are inherently “holding constant” factors

that naturally vary cross-nationally. “Subnational units within a single country can be more easily matched on cultural, historical, ecological, and socioeconomic dimensions than can national units” (Snyder 2001a, 96). Indeed, this point applies especially well to Colombia where not only am I controlling for “fuzzy” concepts such as culture, but because of its unitary nature and extreme uniformity across subnational units I also hold constant institutional characteristics such as government type or strength of political actors.

Another advantage discussed by Snyder is one that was originally put forward in Linz and de Miguel’s essay – the “inappropriate use of national averages.” Indeed, this too is of great importance for the Colombian case; it is national “averages” that have led scholars such as Bailey (1977), Kline (2004), and others to dismiss almost outright the corporatist realities in the country. Although at the national-level Colombia is clearly not “corporatist” in the same sense as Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico, once one digs down to the departmental, or even more strikingly, the municipal level, it becomes clear that corporatism is not an irrelevant or absent characteristic.

Of course one cannot deny that cross-national research approaches lend themselves more easily to issues of generalizability and external validity than do subnational comparative analyses; the motivation for cross-national research, argues Jackman (1985) is “to develop probabilistic generalizations about the causal relationships (or lack thereof) between variables” (166). Admittedly, by examining a single case subnationally, it is impossible to make concrete generalizations beyond Colombia and its Coffee Federation. However, that does not mean that this study lacks relevance beyond the Colombian case. Subnational comparative methodologies are especially useful in

“help[ing] us build theories that explain dynamic interactions among the levels and regions of a political system” (Snyder 2001a, 100). Indeed, as I will argue in the concluding chapter, this study has theoretical relevance for our understanding not only of how corporatism affects behaviors and attitudes inside and outside of Colombia, but also how institutions of the past continue to hold relevance in contemporary society; how best to go about systematically understanding how such institutions influence citizen behaviors and attitudes; and finally, how municipal contexts in Latin America and beyond shape democratic behaviors, attitudes and perceptions of the citizenry.

A Note on the Statistical Approach

The empirical questions posed in this study are clearly of a hierarchical or multi-level nature. I am interested in explaining the extent to which an ecological condition influences individual-level behaviors and attitudes. For decades, scholars have been interested in answering such questions; “People make political decisions and act politically as individuals who are embedded in political contexts that can affect their choices and behaviors. Thus the nature of democratic elections – even if elections are identical – can be influenced by the institutional context” (Dalton and Anderson 2011, 3). However, including variables at multiple levels of analysis into standard ordinary least squares or logistic regression models is problematic: “this procedure can heavily overstate system-level effects largely because they involve single data points that are then associated with [...] individual cases” (Booth and Seligson 2009, 112). To remedy this problem, scholars, in recent years, have begun using modeling techniques specifically designed for hierarchically structured data such as the type I use in this dissertation.

Designed originally for educational and pedagogical research,⁸ social scientists have begun applying hierarchical linear and non-linear models to some of the most vexing social questions of our day. In terms of understanding individual-level outcomes, this statistical technique explicitly recognizes that a number of different factors at a number of different levels influence how a person acts, feels, or behaves, “The use of hierarchical linear models [...] allows incorporating the effects of national and municipal factors on individual outcomes, which in the absence of multilevel statistical techniques would be difficult to assess” (Montalvo 2011, 28). The idea that “institutions matter” in political decision-making and behavior is most definitely not a new idea; however, with hierarchical modeling, we are able to understand better the extent to *how* they matter.

Another benefit of hierarchical modeling techniques is that they allow researchers to make use of data in ways that would otherwise not be possible. Due to various resource constraints, scholars who have been interested in explaining mass behaviors and attitudes in Latin America most often relied on sampling a small number of cities (typically three) or, more recently, relying on survey representative at the national-level. Because the survey’s representative nature did not extend down to the subnational-level, even if a respondent’s state or municipality of residence was included in the dataset, it was impossible to compare with any degree of confidence individuals in different subnational units. Furthermore, for subnational scholars who were fortunate enough to construct subnational samples and carry out surveys, given scarcity of time, money, and other resources, they were almost always restricted to one, or at most, a few, subnational units, leading to the “too few cases/too many variables” conundrum (Goggin 1986;

⁸ For a more in-depth discussion of both the application of hierarchical models in pedagogy and the technical aspects of method, see Raudenbush and Byrk (2002).

Lijphart 1971) that is omnipresent in social science research. By using hierarchical modeling techniques, scholars can use (properly identified) national-level surveys to estimate subnational contextual effects on individual-level behaviors and attitudes. Additionally, although more observations or cases within a group are optimal, “Even two observations per group is enough to fit a multilevel model” (Gelman and Hill 2007, 276). In essence, by simultaneously estimating the effects both contextual- and individual-level variables on the dependent variable, scholars are able to “hold constant” individual-level factors while estimating the independent effects of the contextual co-variates on an individual-level dependent variable.

By using individual-level survey data on Colombia from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), this study takes advantage of both hierarchical linear and non-linear estimation techniques. In addition to the 49 municipalities included in the LAPOP dataset, I merge seven distinct rounds together for the analyses, increasing the number of level-2 groups to over 300 and largely eliminating any “degrees of freedom problem” that would have existed.

Outline of Dissertation

The remaining pages of this dissertation are divided into four chapters. Chapter II begins with an in-depth look at the creation and consolidation of the Coffee Federation as an irreplaceable institutional actor in Colombian politics, economics, and society. Using the definition provided by Collier and Collier (1979), I examine the extent to which the Federation can be considered corporatist while also considering what previous

scholarship has said on the topic. The second part of Chapter II is devoted to the creation of a theoretically relevant and empirically practical typology to categorize Colombian municipalities regarding institutional presence within their jurisdiction. Following this discussion, I consider and put forth a plan about how best to measure quantitatively municipal context in Colombia.

Using the contextual data explained in Chapter II along with individual-level survey data provided by LAPOP, the third chapter of this dissertation examines how FNCC influence, conditional to that of the state, affects citizens' trust in government and satisfaction with local services. In terms of trust in government, I consider measures for trust in municipal, departmental, and national government and find robust effects of FNCC presence on trust at all levels. Furthermore, citizens living in municipalities with either a strong state presence or a strong FNCC presence are, on average, most satisfied with the provision of local services.

Chapter IV focuses its attention on how citizens' political behaviors are affected by living in a certain municipal context. Before turning to the empirical analyses, I review the precarious nature of political participation and behaviors throughout Colombia's recent history. I also consider the role the Federation may have played during the consociational governance period in Colombia known as the National Front when the government explicitly tried to reduce the levels of partisanship among the populace and as a result, reduced levels of political participation.

Next, I consider how the FNCC in contemporary Colombia might affect how people participate politically, in both conventional and unconventional ways. Among the six modes of conventional political participation, I find that, in general, there is little

difference among the municipalities aside from working for a political campaign. For this, I find that citizens living in a municipality with a high Federation and low state presence are more likely to report having done so than citizens living in other types of municipalities.

In terms of unconventional political behavior, I examine participation in protests and support for the right of citizens to engage in peaceful public demonstrations. For the latter I find no statistically significant difference between the municipalities while for the former, I find that citizen living in municipalities with high FNCC presences are less likely to report having participated in a protest than Colombians living in municipalities with low Federation presences. Taken with the findings from the conventional behavior analyses, I argue that these results provide us with evidence of the continued, yet altered role of corporatism in 21st century Colombia.

In the concluding fifth chapter, after summarizing the findings of the analyses, I consider the implications not only for the Colombia and its National Coffee Federation, but throughout Latin America. In general, I contend that while corporatism might have been developed in a less than democratic era of the region, it is an institution that is here to stay and one whose influence must be recognized as fragile democracies in the region continue to consolidate. Also in this chapter I examine possible avenues for future research by examining ways in which scholars have demonstrated that institutions, especially those of a previous time period, affect how people interact with and perceive of their governments. Finally, I offer concluding thoughts on the future of the FNCC and its role within Colombian society.

CHAPTER II

ON THE ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF COLOMBIAN COFFEE-GROWERS

In many ways, the terms *Colombia* and *coffee* are synonymous. Since the early part of the 20th century, Colombia has been a world leader in the cultivation and exportation of high quality, washed Arabica coffee to robust markets of the more developed countries in North America, Europe and even Asia. The success of Colombian coffee is, of course, no accident. Since the creation of the government-sponsored National Coffee Federation in 1927, the Colombian coffee industry has established one of the world's best known and most respected brands; indeed, along with Ronald McDonald, the Energizer Bunny and the Doublemint Gum twins, the FNCC's Juan Valdez is one of the most recognized corporate logos in the developed world (Reina et al. 2007). However, along with its status on the international stage, the Colombian Coffee Federation plays a less obvious but even more important role throughout hundreds of rural Colombian municipalities. The coffee industry, and especially the Federation, substantially affects the lives of millions of Colombian citizens and their daily routines.

This dissertation analyzes the extent to which the FNCC influences the political behaviors, attitudes and perceptions of those Colombians most affected by its presence—namely those living in what I define as coffee municipalities. However, before an empirical assessment of this issue proceeds, it is crucial to offer an in-depth exploration of the origins and structure of the National Federation of Colombian Coffee-Growers and the trajectory of the coffee industry more broadly. While this chapter will mention briefly

the role of the FNCC in the international economic and diplomatic arenas, the main focus will be on the domestic development and impact of the Federation within the Colombian municipality and its influence on Colombian society. Following this discussion, I will link the general discussion on corporatism presented in Chapter I to the National Coffee Federation in Colombia. Next, I will develop and discuss a typology for which to measure Federation presence in a municipality conditional on state presence. This organizational schema will be used in the following chapters to test hypotheses regarding FNCC effects on behaviors and attitudes. Finally, I will detail my strategy for measuring not only the presence of the FNCC within the Colombian municipality, but also the presence and strength of state institutions.

The National Federation of Colombian Coffee-Growers, 1927-present

Following the introduction of coffee into Colombia in the first half of the 18th century by Jesuit priests,¹ cultivation of the crop grew steadily until it became a significant contributor to the country's productivity in the mid 19th century (Machado 1994; Junguito and Pizano 1991; Pizano 2001). Indeed, in 1880, Colombia exported about 107,000 60-kilo bags of coffee; however, by 1905 that number had skyrocketed to over 500,000 (Beyer 1947, 114-15). Similarly, in terms of total Colombian exports, coffee represented 12% in 1880 and 42% in 1905 (ibid). However, like most facets of Colombian economy and society, the coffee industry was left decimated following the Thousand Days' War, the civil war that ravaged the country between 1899 and 1902.

¹ Although scholars conventionally attribute the arrival of coffee to Colombia to Jesuit clergymen, historians and anthropologists have not concluded definitively that this was indeed the original source of the coffee plant to mainland South America.

Given Colombia's need to reestablish foreign trade and to reignite economic activity it was quickly decided that "coffee should play a role of extreme importance commensurate with its already established position as the leading export" (Beyer 1947, 177). Indeed, in 1910 Colombia accounted for about 3% of worldwide coffee exports but by 1930 that percentage had risen to over 10%; this paled in comparison to the worldwide leader, Brazil, which in 1930 was responsible for just under 70% of global coffee exports (Junguito and Pizano 1991, 25). Finally, as Colombia continued to become a world leader in coffee cultivation and export, it began to attract the attention of American and European importers and roasters who were eventually seen within the country as attempting to gain undue influence within the prospering Colombian coffee industry (Koffman 1969, 78).

It was in this economic and international climate that Colombian elites decided that there should be, in the words of Robert Bates (1997), "a permanent defense of coffee." "The key to unraveling this anomaly lies in recognizing that politicians, not peasants organized the Federación" (Bates 1997, 60). However, the actual establishment of such an organization proved to be much more elusive than many had anticipated. In 1920 the *Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia* (SAC) organized the first ever Coffee Congress in Colombia to respond to the devastating effects of the First World War on global coffee prices. While many attended and a number of measures were agreed upon, the results of this two-week conference were all but forgotten just a couple of years later.

The Permanent Establishment of the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia

In 1927, a group of 29 government representatives, businessmen and industry leaders convened in Medellín, Colombia for the Second Coffee Congress where they formed the *Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia*. Equally important to the eventual success of this new organization was the explicit support that it received from the national government, most notably through the passage of Law 26 of 1927 that permitted “the government of Colombia [to] impose an export tax on coffee, the proceeds of which were granted to the FNC(C)” (Bates 1997, 61). As a result of this corporatist arrangement, in 1928, the national government and the Coffee Federation entered into a binding contract that clarified the roles and responsibilities of both parties:

The Federation was to: 1) Promote an active scientific program in the interest of Colombian coffee to be developed on its own initiative; 2) take the necessary measures for the establishment of the best methods of cultivation; 3) establish storage warehouses in the interest of the coffee industry, the profits were to be used by the FNCC as a supplementary source of income; 4) send missions of experts abroad to conduct studies in the interest of the coffee industry; 5) establish roasting houses for Colombian coffee both abroad and at home; 6) publish a monthly magazine; 7) develop statistical services; 8) direct the flow of coffee toward the markets it conceives most appropriate. (Beyer 1947, 237).

The government, for its part, “maintained the right of financial review of the Federation’s activities and investments, with the sanction of fine or cancellation of the contract for any infraction of the agreement” (ibid, 237-38).

It took relatively little time for the FNCC to make its presence felt within the commercial and research sectors of the coffee industry. Indeed, within just ten years of the Federation’s founding, the organization had established what would become a world-

class research center² as well as the establishment of international missions in cities such as New York and Paris devoted solely to the promotion of Colombian coffee interests on the international stage. Perhaps the most significant achievement of the FNCC in terms of international prestige and influence was the leadership role it took (along with the Brazilian coffee industry) in the organization of various international coffee institutions (Bates 1997; Akiyama and Varangis 1990). Other commercial achievements by the FNCC included its controlling share of the international maritime shipping company *Flota Mercante Grancolombiana* (Martinez Becerra 1988) as well as the establishment of its own commercial bank, *el Banco Cafetero*.³

Although the commercial dealings of the Federation took little time to establish, the grassroots and membership issues proved to be more complicated. Following the Second Coffee Congress, “The most crucial immediate problem (as seen by the national committee) was financial” (Koffman 1969, 81). While most of those who led the FNCC saw as the solution to this particular problem the imposition of dues on its membership, Alfredo Cortázar Toledo, a government representative to the Congress, was not one of them: “This formula was absolutely inoperative: membership dues and private donations were a resource that one could not pose seriously, and the appropriations of Congress, the Assemblies or the Municipal Council were, even if sometimes real, a thing so small and so unstable that no important body, such as was intended, could be created on such a basis” (Cortázar 1968, 49). Cortázar convinced industry leaders and government officials that not only would membership dues be an unreliable source of income, but that it would

² One New York Times reporter labeled Cenicafé, the FNCC’s research center as the “NASA of coffee.” <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/science/earth/10coffee.html?pagewanted=all>

³ Following the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement and the beginning of the Coffee Crisis in 1989, both of these commercial endeavors were abandoned.

have a devastating effect on enrollment and therefore the overall legitimacy of the new organization (Koffman 1969). It was decided instead that an export tax administered by the government and deposited in the Federation controlled *Fondo Nacional de Café* would be a more sustainable and realistic alternative.

The Federal Nature of the Coffee Federation

As its name would suggest, the National Federation of Colombian Coffee Growers is structured in a federated manner. Along with the national organization, the Federation also has 15 departmental committees (departments are the equivalents of states in the U.S.),⁴ which is the core of the subnational structure, and within those departmental units, 364 municipal committees, spread throughout the country (FNCC 2011). Furthermore, members of the Federation elect municipal representatives who in turn elect representatives from among their ranks for seats in the National Coffee Congress. Among their more substantive duties, members of the National Coffee Congress are responsible for approving nominations for the Director-General sent to them by the National Committee and approving the national budget and strategic plan as sent to them by the National Committee (FNCC 2004). Municipal representatives serve mainly to bring forth constituent grievances and concerns before the departmental committees while also advising the Federation's administrative representative within the municipality.⁵

Parallel to the representative structure of FEDECAFE exists the administrative arm of the organization led by the national Director-General based in Bogotá. This

⁴ 32 departments and one federal district (Bogotá) make up Colombia.

⁵ Interview with the *jefe seccional* of the Municipal Committee of Dosquebradas, Risaralda, 23 June 2009.

position has only seen a handful of occupants in its 80-year history and many have argued that the Director-General's power and influence rivals that of the president in the sphere of domestic politics and economics. A similar position exists at the department level, thus in effect there are 15 "governor-like" positions around the country. At the local level, departmental committees assign a *jefe seccional* to oversee administrative functions, staffing and budgetary allocation decisions. Since those positions are not elected, the corporate, top-down structure is obvious.

A final structural aspect worthy of note is membership requirements within the Federation. Although some have stated that membership in FEDECAFE is open to "any person interested in developing the coffee industry" (Kline 2004, 188), the reality is somewhat more complicated.⁶ Referring to the Federation's current statutes, an individual is eligible to associate with the organization if (1) he or she devotes at least 0.5 hectares of land to the production of coffee and (2) has at least 1,500 coffee plants. Although it is only land owners who are eligible to become members of the Coffee Federation, FEDECAFE prides itself on delivering services to entire municipalities, whether the individual is a member of the organization or not.⁷

However, while the Federation emphasizes its inclusiveness in social, educational and health programs, it also has a history of ignoring or impeding the organizational efforts of coffee laborers and day workers, "The FNCC's silence... about work conditions on many farms makes it impossible to determine the organization's role in curtailing actions that could have empowered laborers to bargain more freely for wage

⁶ In the original statutes, eligibility was open to anybody who was simply interested in developing the coffee industry; the statutes, however, underwent major alterations in 1958. For a review of the changes made during this time, see Koffman (1969)

⁷ See Chapter I, Article 4 of the Federation's Statutes (FNCC 2004).

and working conditions” (Ortiz 1999, 52). Today, the FNCC estimates that over 2 million Colombians are either directly or indirectly employed within the coffee sector of the national economy. However, only those who own land and devote sufficient amounts of it to the cultivation of coffee are invited to participate and receive full benefits from the organization. What’s more, evidence suggests that the Federation has either neglected or outright hampered efforts of those who are shut out of the association to successfully and meaningfully organize themselves.

Finally, for a municipality to be designated a ‘coffee municipality’ by FEDECAFE, that municipality must have at least 400 Federation-associated coffee farmers “whose annual production is equal or superior to 60,000 *arrobas*⁸ a year” (FNCC 2004, 46) and must be part of a department with a departmental committee. Of the roughly 1,100 municipalities in Colombia, 364 currently have municipal committees (FNCC 2010).⁹ With one-third of the municipalities within Colombia being designated coffee municipalities I will be able to evaluate systematically the differences between coffee and non-coffee municipalities.

Ortiz argues that “Although farmers regard the high echelons as a distant bureaucracy, they are well aware of their dependence on many of the services the FNCC offers. Its presence in the major producing areas is very real. Municipal committees keep track of all affiliated farmers, the size of their farms, how they use their land, and the coffee groves” (Ortiz 1999, 50). In addition, it is at the municipal level where most of the social, educational and health initiatives are undertaken. Given this reality of the

⁸ One *arropa* of coffee is approximately 25 U.S. pounds.

⁹For an overview of the structural organization of the FNCC, see: “Organos Gremiales de la Federación de Cafeteros,” http://www.federaciondefcafeteros.org/particulares/es/que_hacemos/representacion_gremial/organos_gremiales_de_la_federacion_de_cafeteros/ (accessed 13 February 2013).

Federation's structure, this research will examine the effects of the association on individuals nested within distinct municipal contexts—some characterized by an overwhelming Federation presence and others where the Federation's presence is considerably weaker or nonexistent.

Federation Activities in Municipalities

Since its beginning, the FNCC has had a notable presence within municipalities throughout Colombia's primary coffee growing regions. Indeed, just two years after its founding in 1927, the Federation established an agricultural extension program which employs agronomists and engineers to provide technical assistance to federated coffee-growers (Reina et al. 2007). Through this program, farmers meet at least once a year, and often times more with Federation *extensionistas*.¹⁰ Although farmers and managers (*agregados*) are not required to accept or implement any of the advice or guidance of the *extensionistas*, FNCC personnel are generally well-regarded and perceived to be working in the interest of the coffee grower. Indeed, the Federation attributes its overwhelming success in the modernization of the Colombian coffee crop to the well-organized and well-regarded extension service that is present throughout the Colombian countryside.¹¹

While the Federation's extension service is of vital importance not only to the macro success of the Colombian coffee industry, but also to those *caficultores* who receive the benefit, in terms of municipal impact, this service is relatively insignificant. In

¹⁰ Interview with the *jefe seccional* of the Municipal Committee of Dosquebradas, Risaralda, 23 June 2009.

¹¹ The modernization (*tecnificación*) of coffee farms involves farmers adopting methods and practices that in the long term and aggregate increase crop productivity. The initial cost of modernizing a coffee farm can be substantial; farmers must upgrade their coffee plants. Additionally, in order to remain 'modernized' farmers must engage in a practice known as 'zoca' where coffee plants are cut off at the base of their stem and allowed to regrow. It can take anywhere from 18-24 months for a plant to produce coffee beans after this process. The FNCC recommends that at any given time, 20% of a coffee farm undergo this renovation process. For more information regarding these technical aspects, see Guhl (2004)

order to receive this service, one not only has to produce his or her own coffee crop, but must also formally associate with the Coffee Federation. However, of greater consequence to municipal governance and perception, I argue, are the Federation's activities in social welfare as well as infrastructural projects within the localities where it has an official presence. Although the FNCC always had a strong mandate and indeed was contractually obligated to assist in the social welfare and infrastructure of those municipalities in which it had a presence, these activities did not become a primary focus of Federation operations in municipalities until the mid-1960s. Since assuming these duties, the FNCC has been credited with constructing hundreds of schools, hospitals and clinics, thousands of houses and bringing potable water to hundreds of rural municipalities. Furthermore, the Coffee Federation routinely provides comprehensive health, dental and eye care to residents of coffee municipalities and subsidizes essential items such as fertilizers and de-pulpers to prepare coffee for the market.




Figure II.1. *Jefe Seccional* (left) and *extensionista* (center) visiting a local coffee farmer at his *finca* in Dosquebradas, Risaralda, Colombia (photo credit: author).

The Federation's heavy involvement in social welfare and infrastructural matters has not gone unnoticed by scholars. Since the 1980s studies examining the role of the FNCC have equated it to a government bureaucracy or even an independent governmental structure. Palacios (1980), in his seminal work on the Colombian coffee industry, compares the FNCC to the national agricultural ministry. "As a bureaucracy," he writes, "the FNCC seems to be more efficient than other organizations carrying out parallel functions such as the Ministry of Agriculture" (217). More significantly, perhaps, noted Colombian economist Miguel Urrutia (1983, 117) describes the Coffee Federation as being a "parallel state" and anthropologists Jeffery Bentley and Peter Baker (2000) write "In many ways therefore, the Federation operates as a kind of competent, alternative government in the Colombian Coffee Belt, where little corruption is evident. This is remarkable given that nearly one-third of the Colombian population lives within the Central Coffee Belt" (Bentley and Baker 2000, 6).



Figure II.2. Road sign in Pereira, Risaralda, Colombia showing agencies contributing to public works projects. In addition to local government offices, the FNCC (left) is also represented (photo credit: author).

Although the Federation has largely been praised both at home and abroad for its efficient and effective management of social projects and infrastructural development in rural Colombian municipalities, it has not escaped criticism entirely. A primary reproach against the FNCC is that it is concerned with the social and economic fortune of the country's peasantry inasmuch as it corresponds to the organization's commercial interests. In order to ensure the advancement of such interests, the FNCC, according to sociologist Christopher London (1999), has implemented a two-prong strategy based on productivity and paternalism. Through its research activities, extension service and its highly successful modernization campaign beginning in the 1970s and continuing into present-day, the Federation has achieved increased and reliable productivity of high-quality, exportable Arabica coffee. Regarding the second focus, London writes, "Thanks to the construction of paternalistic relations, FEDECAFE has been able to cultivate the necessary moral authority to ensure that their productivity dictates are obeyed" (London 1999, 108). London goes on to argue that this paternalistic mentality has been developed over the years and is sustained by coffee municipality residents' complete reliance on the FNCC for both technical as well as social assistance. "The family farm is perceived to be unable, either materially or mentally, to survive unassisted in today's economy" (London 1997, 289). This dependence, however, is not felt toward government institutions, as it is perceived in these communities that the government has largely failed in its responsibility to provide for and ensure the well being of the residents.

Indisputably, since the collapse in 1989 of the International Coffee Agreement's export quotas and the initiation of what has essentially become an unregulated world market for coffee, the economic and financial situation of the FNCC and the Colombian

coffee sector more generally has declined dramatically (Rincón García 2005).¹² Since that time, the FNCC has had to implement severe austerity measures that have cut spending not only on marketing and other commercial expenses, but also on the services and assistance provided at the municipal level, leading it to rely on the financial support of the national government. However, even with these drastic cuts, between 2006 and 2010, the Federation reported having constructed or improved almost 2,000 water systems, 2,300 classrooms, 62,000 kilometers of roadway, 300 hospitals and over 30,000 single family homes throughout Colombia's countryside (FNCC 2011). Additionally, the Federation has been credited with supplying over 95% of the population in the rural coffee region with reliable and affordable electricity. Finally, while direct investment into social services by the Federation has, in real terms declined in recent years, the government has increasingly relied on the FNCC and its high levels of legitimacy to administer public funds throughout the country's coffee municipalities (Arango Gaviria 2000).

In short, although the macro influence of the Federation has undoubtedly declined since the first days of the 'coffee crisis', the institutional presence of the FNCC in Colombian municipalities is still very real and its everyday impact on citizens who live in those municipalities should not be underestimated. The challenge in the pages below is construct a measure to assess the influence of the FNCC throughout a wide cross-section of Colombian municipalities and estimate the degree to which this influence affects how citizens perceive, assess and behave within the political and democratic worlds of Colombia.

¹² For a comprehensive review of the international politics of coffee and how it affects (and has been affected by) Colombia, see Bates (1997) and Junguito and Pizano (1993).

Conflicts, Disagreements, and Differences

Undoubtedly, the Coffee Federation and the Colombian national government have a very close and intertwined relationship. After all, government ministers hold a veto proof majority on the organization's governing board and two interior ministry officials are assigned to the FNCC headquarters to protect government interests in the coffee sector. Both of these officials receive salaries equivalent to that of the Federation's Director-General.¹³ The direct involvement of the government within the coffee sector has caused concern within international organizations and among scholars,

It has been noted that the government's role and participation in setting internal prices and coffee tax were occasionally influenced by macroeconomic policy goals and political priorities rather than the direct benefit of coffee growers. Naturally, this raises the question of what is the appropriate level of government intervention. The sector's social, economic, and cultural importance in rural areas argues for the government's close participation. However, when compared to other sectors, the current level of direct influence could be considered excessive. (Giovannucci 2003, 546).

This close relationship has also caused a fair amount of conflict and disagreement between the institutions throughout the years. Indeed, even before the ink had dried on the original agreement between the two parties in the late 1920s, disagreements already existed. Many of these disputes have centered on issues of taxation, foreign exchange rates and the devaluation of the Colombian peso.¹⁴ However, in more recent years, more politically charged and controversial disagreements have emerged. For example, following the resignation in 2009 of Gabriel Silva Luján as Director-General of the FNCC to become Colombia's Minister of Defense, President Álvaro Uribe's

¹³ Oscar Arango Gaviria (Professor of Sociology, *Universidad Tecnológica de Pereira* and Director of Regional Development, *Red Alma Mater*) in discussion with the author, July 2011.

¹⁴ See: Koffman 1969 (ch.6) and Bates 1997.

administration was accused of inappropriately supporting the candidacy of Luis Genaro Muñoz over the industry preferred Juan Camilo Restrepo.^{15, 16} In the end, the government's preference won out and Luis Genaro currently serves as the Federation's Director-General while Juan Camilo served in the administration of Juan Manuel Santos until 2013 and Gabriel Silva is Colombia's ambassador to the United States.

In order to advance its own interests, the FNCC has often found itself at odds with a number of influential groups within Colombian society. Perhaps most expected would be the frustrations expressed by private coffee exporters regarding the fact that the Federation serves as both their largest competitor as well as the state-approved regulator of the product. Given that coffee exported with the '100% Colombian Coffee' logo receives a premium on the world market because of its recognized consistent quality over coffee from other producing countries, private exporters recognize the need for and welcome a competent and efficient regulator.¹⁷ In his essay on policy recommendations for the Colombian coffee industry in the 21st century, Daniele Giovannucci (2003) writes, "The [FNCC's] dual role as regulator and market participant should be carefully considered. Some functions could potentially be transferred to other agents, such as cooperatives, associations, or private firms, wherever appropriate, without sacrificing Colombia's ability to negotiate in an ever-concentrating market" (547).

More surprising, however, are the conflicts with groups and interests with which the FNCC is considered to be allied, even groups within the Federation itself. For example, throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the Coffee Federation has

¹⁵ 20 August 2009. "Juan Camilo Restrepo renunció a terna para Gerente de Federación de Cafeteros." *El Tiempo*. <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-5903233> (accessed 13 February 2013).

¹⁶ Interview with former member of National Committee of Coffee-Growers, 18 June 2011.

¹⁷ Interview with owner of a private coffee exporting company, 25 June 2009.

had to contend with various levels of opposition and discontent from departmental and municipal committees. Since the 1960s, the Departmental Committee of Caldas has been known as being especially opposed to many of the policies coming out of the Federation's headquarters in Bogotá. Under the leadership of Pedro Uribe in the 1960s, the Departmental Committee of Caldas, along with those of Risaralda and Quindío “share[d] a common opposition to the proposal formulated at the national level to diversify agricultural production in their departments and reduce coffee output” (Koffman, 1969, 195). The subnational entities have also been long concerned with what they perceive as unfunded mandates from the central office as well as unfair distribution of resources from the national level to the various committees. In fact, in 1957, the entire Municipal Committee of Pereira “resigned in protest because nine out of ten delegates to the coffee congress came from Manizales and none from Pereira” (El Tiempo, cited in Koffman 1969, 196). A central issue leading to the breakup of the department of Caldas into three separate departments (Caldas, Quindío and Risaralda) was, among other factors, conflict between coffee-growers and the Departmental Committee in Caldas.¹⁸

Although a major source of legitimacy comes from the idea that the FNCC represents the interests of Colombian coffee-growers, it has been argued that the FNCC “may [...] work in a vacuum, claiming to speak for the many small coffee producers without any real knowledge of what they [coffee-growers] really want or think or how they regard the men who claim to represent them” (Koffman 1969, 195). While since the time that Koffman conducted his study, the Federation has, mainly through surveys, come to understand small and medium sized coffee-growers better, there have still been periods of acrimony between the FNCC and those Colombians whom it claims to

¹⁸ See: Arango Gaviria and Rodriguez Rodriguez (1994).

represent. An example of this from contemporary history comes from the mid-1990s when the left-leaning *Unidad Cafetera* organized a number of work stoppages and strikes in the coffee region to protest severe cuts in programs and services to coffee farmers and laborers.

The FNCC Through a Corporatist Lens

Forty years ago, scholars such as Robert Erikson and James Malloy argued persuasively that governments throughout Latin America use corporatism as a buffer between themselves and the masses. In exchange for government subsidies, monopolistic status, and other benefits bestowed upon them by national leaders, corporations were responsible for maintaining order among those they represented and for suppressing and discouraging activities by the masses that were considered to be undesirable for or inconvenient to governments or government actors. Finally, corporations were tasked with providing many of the goods and services to citizens that would normally fall under the purview of local, regional, or national governments. Although corporatist scholars of the 1970s and 80s theorized on the impact of corporatism on mass political behaviors and attitudes they were unable to examine their arguments empirically because of strict limitations placed on social science research by the region's authoritarian governments.

Of course, since these arguments were developed, much has changed in Latin America. Most significantly has been the dual transition that swept through the region in the 1980s and 90s leaving in its wake the foundations for procedural democracy and open-market economic systems. As these profound changes settled throughout the hemisphere, there were those who argued that corporatism was compatible with neither

democracy, nor with the neo-liberal economies that had quickly become standard throughout the developing world. For those who did not necessarily express the demise of corporatist institutions, interest in the subject all but died and scholars who were once prolific in corporatist scholarship now focused their attention on more timely topics such as transitions, democratization, and development.

In the 30 years that have passed since the third wave of democratization crashed upon the shores of Latin America, scholars have noticed that corporatism continues to play an influential role on state-society relations throughout the continent. Less understood, however, is the effect such institutions have on contemporary mass behaviors and attitudes; after all, the extent to which we understand how corporatism affects the masses begins and ends with the hypotheses generated by scholars in the 1970s and 80s. However probable these hypotheses were at their time of creation, it is unreasonable to expect that in an era of ever-deepening procedural democracy and open-market economic systems, that corporatism and corporations continue to affect citizens in an identical fashion as that described by Malloy, Erikson, Schmitter, and others. The question that evolves from this discussion is how (if at all) in 21st century Latin America does corporatism influence how citizens behave within the political system and the attitudes they hold toward their respective governments?

Corporatism has not only evolved to remain relevant in the ever-changing context that is Latin America, but has done so in a way that continues to serve effectively the interests of governments that are now dependent on citizen input and participation. However these same governments still seek to limit such behaviors as necessary while also maximizing legitimacy and trust wherever possible.

Colombia's National Coffee Federation serves as an ideal case to examine the effects of corporatism on contemporary behaviors and attitudes. In addition to the general advantages of subnational analyses articulated by Linz and de Miguel (1968) and Snyder (2001b), the Coffee Federation is organized in a federated manner with the lowest-level being the municipality. Because of this, I am able to obtain a measurement of Federation presence at the municipal-level in addition to a state-presence measure that will, in turn, allow me to calculate the presence of the FNCC relative to that of the state for a given municipality. Rather than analyze the effects of Coffee Federation from the national-level, here I scale down to examine how this institution affects mass behaviors and attitudes at the municipal-level. However, given that the Federation does not operate in a vacuum, but in a dynamic political and social environment which includes the presence of the state, I categorize the municipalities into four groups: High State/Low Federation (HS/LF); Low State/High Federation (LS/HF); High State/High Federation (HS/HF); and Low State/Low Federation (LS/LF).¹⁹ These groups represent the presence of the two institutions in a given municipality. In HS/LF municipalities, the state has a high presence while the Federation has either a non-existent or insignificant presence in the municipality. Alternatively in LS/HF municipalities, the Federation is the strong institutional actor while the state is considered to be weak. In the HS/HF municipalities both actors are considered to have strong presences while in LS/LF municipalities both are considered to be weak or non-existent.

¹⁹ The use of typologies in comparative politics, and political science more generally, has often been criticized as lack theoretical depth and analytic rigor. For a defense of the use of categories, see Collier et al. (2009; 2012).

The primary argument throughout this project is that as the Coffee Federation's influence in a municipality increases relative to state presence, the FNCC will function as an "alternative government" or a "state within a state." Therefore, in municipalities where the FNCC has a high presence and the state a low one, the FNCC will act in a more traditional corporatist role, although one that has evolved to function within the constraints of a 21st century electoral democracy and in spite of open-market economic institutions. More specifically, instead of "funneling" citizens away from political life, the FNCC in Low State/High Federation municipalities will work on behalf of the state, lending it legitimacy in the eyes of residents while also encouraging citizens to participate in conventional political activities that are requisite for any democratic society. However, consistent with corporatist institutions of the past, the FNCC will discourage residents from partaking in unconventional behaviors or activities that may be viewed as a nuisance by government.

If the Coffee Federation is, as I argue above, essentially replacing the state as a competent provider of public goods and services in these municipalities, then we would also expect that when compared to municipalities considered to have a high state presence and a low (or no) Federation presence, the estimated individual-level outcomes would be roughly equal. Similarly, by serving as an alternative government in municipalities with a low state presence, it is logical to expect that attitudes toward the government and participation within it would be higher than in Low State/Low Federation municipalities where neither the Federation nor the state has a significant presence.

The expectations for outcomes in municipalities with low state and high Federation presences and low state and low FNCC presences is of particular importance. The only (observable) difference between these two types of municipalities is the significant presence of the FNCC in one and the insignificant (or non-existent) presence in the other. If the Federation is acting in a manner consistent with 21st century corporatism, there should be clear differences between these two types of municipalities. After all, if the Federation were not present in the Low State/High Federation municipality, then that municipality would naturally revert to being a Low State/Low Federation municipality and would assume the related municipal characteristics. Therefore, if, as is hypothesized, Colombians in Low State/High Federation municipalities hold more “pro-government” views and participate at higher levels in conventional political behaviors than residents in Low State/Low Federation municipalities, these differences can be attributed to the presence of the Federation in the locale. As a result, the government is benefitting from the FNCC’s presence in those municipalities; as the Federation provides competent and quality services the government emerges victorious.

The notion that in a democratic society a corporation would serve to both replace the presence of the state while at the same time lending the state legitimacy is not one that strays too far from conventional corporatist theory. However, what is less clear is how corporations would affect both trust in government and political participation among citizens living in areas where both the corporation and the state have relatively strong presences. In the case of the Colombian municipalities and the FNCC this scenario would occur in municipalities considered to be High State/High Federation.

In this type of municipality, it is presumed that given the high presence of the state, it would be state institutions that would assume primary responsibility for the provision of basic services to the citizenry. Therefore, instead of acting as an 'alternative government' and replacing the state, the Federation behaves as a typical non-governmental or civil society organization focusing primarily on its mission of assisting federated coffee farmers. However, this is not to say that there is no cooperation or interaction between the state and the FNCC in these municipalities; indeed, the two often times work closely together in a complementary relationship. In certain instances it is beneficial for governments to rely on others to carry out public services; in the United State, Young (2000) explains that in some cases non-profit organizations have an information advantage over government actors.

Government may choose to contract out not only because it is cheaper but also because it may be unable to differentiate its services in response to the heterogeneous preferences of its citizens. There would be too much information to gather to do so. However, by contracting with nonprofits that are knowledgeable about the individual communities in which they are based, government can overcome the information problem and, within limits, allow those delivery agents to customize services to local constituents. (Young 2000, 154)

Although the FNCC is not a typical non-profit organization, there is no doubt that the relationship described above would apply to many interactions between governments in Colombia and the Federation. An apt example of the cooperation between governments and the FNCC occurred following the January 1999 earthquake that devastated parts of the country whose primary economic activity is coffee. Although the governments financed much of the reconstruction that took place, it was the FNCC, along with its departmental and municipal committees that were tasked with carrying out the

work of rebuilding. Outside of non-critical times such as disaster relief, the FNCC and state institutions work hand-in-hand in many municipalities through what has become known as *bi-gobernación* where both the government and the FNCC contribute financially to public works project and the FNCC implements the project from start to finish.

In municipalities where the state is a strong and effective actor and the FNCC works to complement state presence in many respects, the effect this relationship has on mass-behaviors and attitudes should be a positive one. In these types of municipalities, citizens are experiencing the best of both worlds, a strong and competent state and a well-organized and active civil society organization. For this reason, I anticipate that citizens in municipalities with high state and high Federation presences will be most satisfied with government services in their municipalities. However, an important distinction between the this type of municipality and municipalities where the FNCC has a strong presence but the state has a weak one, is that here the Federation is not serving in a substituting role and therefore the corporatist component of the FNCC is muted substantially. Since corporations in democratic societies are expected to promote conventional political behaviors among citizens while discouraging unconventional behaviors, in HS/HF municipalities, I expect citizen participation in conventional political activities to be lower than in LS/HF municipalities but participation in unconventional behaviors to be higher.

The central thesis of this project is that while corporatism continues to matter in post-third wave Latin America, its effect is conditional on the strength of the presence of the state. Indeed, in the case of contemporary subnational Colombia, the FNCC's effect

on mass behaviors and attitudes should vary systematically according to the degree to which it has replaced the state in a given municipality. Table II.1 below summarizes the expected outcomes of citizens' political behaviors, attitudes and perceptions based on the conditional relationship between the Federation and the state in a municipality.

Municipality Type	Expectations		
	<i>Trust in Government and Satisfaction with Services</i>	<i>Conventional Political Behaviors</i>	<i>Unconventional Political Behaviors</i>
<i>High State/Low Federation</i>	Comparatively High Levels	Lower Likelihood of Participation than LS/HF, but Higher than LS/LF	Comparatively High Likelihood of Participation
<i>Low State/High Federation</i>	Comparatively High Levels, Significantly Higher than LS/LF Municipalities	Highest Probability of Participation, Significant Higher than LS/LF Municipalities	Lowest Likelihood of Participation, Significantly lower than LS/LF
<i>High State/High Federation</i>	Highest Levels	High Probability of Participation	Low Likelihood of Participation
<i>Low State/Low Federation</i>	Comparative Low Levels, Significantly Lower than LS/HF municipalities	Lowest Levels, Significantly Lower than LS/HF Municipalities	Comparatively High Likelihood of Participation

Table II.1. Summary of Expectations for Each Municipality Type

Of course, in order to understand how context affects mass opinions and behaviors and to evaluate the arguments developed above, we must have well-defined measures of the relevant concepts. The remaining pages of this chapter focus on my strategies for operationalizing not just state presence and Federation presence in a municipality, but also other contextual-level conditions that might play a role in explaining independent-level variation in political behaviors and attitudes.

The FNCC as a Highly Regarded Municipal Actor

Although not uniform across municipalities or across individuals, a primary assumption made throughout this project is that the FNCC is an organization that is, for the most part, perceived by Colombian as being effective and well managed. Although public data do not exist regarding the extent to which citizens trust or respect the Federation, a 2003 UNDP publication reports that among household in the coffee growing region, “the most recognized institutions for programs in the region are hospitals, coffee committee (the FNCC), and municipal governments, in that order” (UNDP 2003, 152). Furthermore, anthropological and sociological studies (see Errazuriz 1986; Ortiz 1999; London 2002) argue that at the municipal-level, the FNCC and its associated municipal coffee committees are well regarded and highly respected actors that are seen as reliable providers of goods and services. Finally, also associated with the FNCC (but separate from municipal committees) is the system of coffee cooperatives and depositories strategically maintained through coffee municipalities. Although affiliated coffee farmers are not mandated to sell their coffee to FNCC cooperative, the price guarantee they are afforded and goodwill toward the Federation motivates many to choose FNCC and *ALMACAFE* cooperative over private operators (Junguito and Pizano 1997).

Measuring Context in Colombian Municipalities

I argue that contextual variation in Colombian municipalities will affect significantly, both statistically and substantively, the perceptions, attitudes and behaviors

of Colombian citizens. This study is clearly not the first to hypothesize or analyze the effects of municipal context on mass attitudes and behaviors. Early research notes that at the community level, the concentration of economic power significantly affects the social and economic well-being of local residents, their propensity to participate in civic affairs, and their “problem solving capacity” (Mills and Ulmer 1970 [1946]; see also Goldschmidt 1947). More recently, political and other social scientists have, for the most part, corroborated and extended the original research results. Huckfeldt (1986) for example, finds that environmental conditions at the neighborhood level in the United States influence both individual political participation and “the relationship between participation and individual social status” (116). Others (Blanchard and Matthews 2006; Lyson, Torres and Welsh 2001; Oliver 1999) argue that varying economic conditions and concentration of economic power within US communities significantly affect levels of civic engagement and participation: “[...] economically concentrated environments alienate community members, resulting in an apathetic, disengaged local population” (Blanchard and Matthews 2006, 2245). Clearly, since at least the end of World War II in the United States, academics and policy makers have been interested in the contextual effects of municipal characteristics on citizens’ attitudes and behaviors.

In more recent years, as procedural and electoral democracy has become the norm in Latin America and it has become possible to conduct survey research in the region, scholars focusing on this area of the world have begun to examine the effects of municipal context on Latin Americans’ behaviors and attitudes.²⁰ For instance, in the run-up to Mexico’s historic elections in 2000, Hiskey and Bowler (2005) find that local

²⁰ For an in-depth discussion on the recent advances in survey research in Latin America, see Zechmeister and Seligson (2011).

context affected citizens' evaluations and perceptions of government. "In the case of Mexico, the direct experience of life under a subnational opposition government during the 1990s served to inculcate among citizens in those areas an acceptance of the fairness of elections and of the Mexican system as democratic, attitudes that in turn increased one's willingness to engage in the formal political system" (Hiskey and Bowler 2005, 67).

Likewise, recent research on the causes and consequences of the lack of interpersonal trust reveals that variation in subnational interpersonal trust in Costa Rica is "in great part explained by economic inequality within municipalities. The wider the gap between haves and have-nots at the local level, the lower the average level of interpersonal trust" (Córdova Guillén 2008, 148). Even in Colombia, political scientists have attempted to explain subnational variation in political behaviors and attitudes using contextual level dependent variables. Miguel García has found that both violent municipal contexts as well as the presence of illicit crops in a municipality affect voting behavior (e.g. turnout), protest participation and confidence in key government institutions (García 2009; 2011). Finally, similar to Córdova Guillén's findings in Costa Rica, Espinosa and Rodríguez (2012) find that in Colombia, municipal level factors help in explaining individual level variation in interpersonal trust.

The accurate conceptualization and operationalization of the contextual level variables for the present study is critical. In this section, I will describe in-depth the contextual-level independent variables to be used in forthcoming empirical analyses. I will first explain how I measure state presence within a municipality and will then turn my attention to the measurement of FNCC presence. Finally, I will devote space to explaining the level-2 control variables that will be included in the analyses.

Measuring State Presence

For years, political scientists, sociologists and economists have been debating the merits of myriad methods of measuring state capacity; to date, there is little consensus on the subject and little evidence to suggest that this debate will end in the near future. As Cárdenas (2010) explains, there are at least four categories of state capacity: (1) military capacity, (2) bureaucratic and administrative capacity, (3) fiscal state capacity, and (4) “the quality and coherence of political institutions, which considers the degree of interference between the democratic and nondemocratic features of the political system” (Cárdenas 2010, 3). More often than not, however, any measure attempting to account for state capacity is constructed at the national level while making no attempts at ‘scaling down’ to the subnational. In studies that have attempted to examine state capacity at the local level (Cleary 2007; Grindle 2007), measures of this concept have most often relied on government performance indicators such as public utility provision and access to healthcare and education services (Kurtz and Schrank 2012; Soifer 2012).

Given that in many Colombian municipalities, the FNCC serves as a *de facto* municipal government and provides or at least contributes to the provision of many public goods and utilities, the use of these measures as proxies for state presence in this project would be inappropriate. Therefore, in order to account for the presence of the state in a given municipality, I rely on the amount of central transfers (in millions of pesos) per capita for 2008. The national government’s *Departamento de Planeación*

(DNP) reports the amount of transfers to each municipality in a given year.²¹ While these transfers are not the only resources directed to the municipalities from the central government, I argue that this measure serves as a reliable proxy for state presence; the more a municipality receives in transfers (per capita), the more likely that municipality is to have a significant state presence within its borders.

Although the Colombian state has carried out significant amounts of decentralization since the early 1990s, the fact remains that it is still a unitary (if decentralized) state (Lijphart 1999) and subnational governments, for the most part, are still very restricted in the revenue they can collect independent of the national government (Dillinger and Webb 1998; Escobar-Lemmon and Ross 2011), "... in most of Colombia's more than 1,100 municipalities, almost all the funds they spend flow from above" (Bird 2011, 21). An exception to this rule, however, is that the largest cities in the country have traditionally had more autonomy from the national government in terms of revenue collection and have been able to manage local fiscal issues with an efficiency not seen in other localities throughout the country. These cities routinely receive less (on a per capita basis) than one would normally expect, and therefore, this indicator does not accurately measure state presence in these areas. For this reason, I drop from my analyses respondents nested in the four largest Colombian cities: Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla. Finally, I omit from this analysis the municipality of Guadalajara de Buga located in the pacific department of Valle de Cauca. In per capita terms, of those municipalities in the dataset, central transfers to municipalities in 2008 ranged from 2,360 pesos to 659,600 pesos; the municipality of Guadalajara de Buga has a per capita value of

²¹ These data can be accessed from the DNP's website at <http://www.dnp.gov.co/Programas/DesarrolloTerritorial/FinanzasP%C3%BAblicasTerritoriales/EjecucionesPresupuestales.aspx> (accessed 13 February 2013).

2.00 million pesos. Given that this municipality is a clear outlier and that it would unjustly skew the results of the analyses, I have removed all respondents from this municipality from the dataset. It should be noted that none of these five municipalities have an official coffee presence.

After removing these observations 7,000 responses from 49 unique municipalities representing all regions of the country remain. In terms of the indicator I will use to measure state presence, there exists large variation in the amount central transfers per capita to the municipalities included in the dataset. For example, the municipality of Montería, the capital city of the department of Córdoba, receives the least amount in per capita transfers at 2,360 pesos per head, while in Chalán in the department of Sucre receives over 650,000 million pesos per resident. Figure II.3 presents 2008 transfer amounts in real terms for each municipality while Figure II.4 presents the amounts per capita.




Figure II.3. Real Central Government Transfers to Municipalities, 2008.




Figure II.4. Central Government Transfers Per Capita to Municipalities, 2008.

As is readily apparent in the figures above, in terms of real pesos transferred to municipalities, the tourist city of Cartagena received the most from the central government. Next is Cucuta and Bucaramanga, the capital cities of the departments of Norte de Santander and Santander. In terms of the least amount of central transfers by municipality in real terms, Sutamarchan, Confines and Abejorral are the three municipalities at the bottom of the list.

The results, however, change significantly once we account for the population of each locale. For example, in per capita terms, Cartagena is now sixth from the top while Confines has the highest value. The municipality of Montería finds itself solidly in the middle of municipalities in real terms; however, once population size is taken into consideration, it falls to the bottom of the list.

Although in this dissertation I use central transfers per capita to measure state presence, I am under no illusion that this is either the only, or even the perfect way to operationalize such a concept. However, given the trade-offs that every research project must make, I am confident in both the reliability and validity of the indicator. Of course, in an ideal world I would use a variety of both qualitative and quantitative methods to develop a more comprehensive measure of state presence; but given the nature of the questions asked in this dissertation, I am constrained to using one indicator to capture this complex concept. This measure serves the best methodological and empirical function, given resource and data constraints.

Measuring Federation Presence

Similar to the operationalization of state presence, the accurate measure of institutional influence is not a clear cut or straightforward endeavor. First, one must be sure to be measuring the concept he intends to analyze. In the case of the National Coffee Federation, it may be tempting to simply equate coffee production with Federation presence. While the two concepts are undoubtedly correlated, numerous studies have found that agricultural presence or other economic activities affect outcomes such as violence (Booth 1974), and political and civic participation (Blanchard and Matthews 2006; Lyson, Torres and Welsh 2001; Oliver 1999). Therefore, for this study, it is important that I measure actual institutional presence or influence of the organization and not the presence of the crop.

Another issue that can impede the accurate measurement of an organization's presence in a locale is the less stringent expectations for transparency. Although the FNCC is regarded by policy makers and other elites as being semi-public, it has not been required to meet the same standards of transparency that a full-fledged government organization would have to meet. Indeed, the FNCC has been criticized by economists and other social scientists for lacking true transparency and has been urged to be more forthcoming with information regarding the coffee sector in Colombia. To this end, however, it is extremely difficult to get specific amounts of social and other types of spending by the FNCC disaggregated to either the municipal or departmental level.

In recent years, scholars seeking to understand the influence of the Federation in municipalities have sought to use more accessible data in their quantitative analyses. One such alternative is using the number of FNCC staff or *extensionistas* in a municipality as

a proxy measure for Federation influence (see Muñoz Mora 2010). As Junguito and Pizano (1991; 1993) explain, the role of the *extensionista* in a coffee municipality is far-reaching and goes well beyond simply supplying advice regarding coffee cultivation. These individuals facilitate how coffee farmers and member of the community interact with the large bureaucracy that is the Coffee Federation. These staffers are responsible for representing the FNCC at the municipal level and who are tasked with distributing the goods and services provided by the FNCC within the municipality. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that an increased size in the FNCC staff in a municipality will also signify an increased influence of the organization within that locale.

As such, for this study, I will use the size of the Federation staff in a municipality to measure the overall presence of the FNCC in that area. In order to measure accurately this concept, instead of using real terms, I adjust for the size of the population by taking the number of *extensionistas* per 1,000 residents in a coffee municipality. Figures II.5 and II.6 below show the number of *extensionistas* in the municipalities included in the dataset in 2008 in both real and per capita terms as reported by the Coffee Federation.




Figure II.5. Real Number of Extensionistas by Municipality, 2008.




Figure II.6. Per Capita Number of Extensionistas by Municipality, 2008.

As can be gleaned from figures above, of the 49 municipalities contained in the dataset, 19 have an official coffee presence. In real terms, the number of *extensionistas* in a municipality ranges from zero in those cities and towns that do not have a coffee presence, to a maximum of 10 in the town of Rosas located in Cauca. Of course, once I adjust for population, the results change somewhat; of those municipalities with a coffee presence, there is a range of 0.0019 to 0.7751 *extensionistas* per 1,000 inhabitants.

Controlling for Competing Hypotheses

In addition to the two primary contextual variables described above, the analyses in this dissertation will also include a host of control variables at both levels. Given that the focus of this study is to understand the independent institutional effect of the Coffee Federation on mass behaviors and attitudes, it is important that I isolate this concept to the extent possible while working within the constraints imposed by the chosen research strategy. The first control variable included in the multivariate analyses is the percentage of a municipality's area devoted to the cultivation of coffee. Collected from Colombia's National Geographic Institute, this measure accounts for findings by sociologists (Lyson et al. 2001; Troy and Matthew 2006) that, at least at the ecological level, a municipality's economic concentration and scale of agricultural production affect civic behavior. Finally, studies have found systematic differences between Colombian municipalities with high concentration of coffee production and those with no coffee activity (Muñoz Mora 2010).

The unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) variable measures the level of macro-poverty in a municipality. In essence, as the value of UBN increases, so too does the level of

poverty found in a municipality, as measured by the percentage of households lacking pre-determined basic needs.²² Finally, violence has been found to have a significant effect at both the ecological and individual-level on political participation throughout Latin America (Batteson 2012). Also, previous research on political behavior in Colombian municipalities has found that the presence of armed groups systematically affects voter turnout and vote choice among citizens as well as trust in political institutions (Garcia 2009; 2011). Table II.2 below presents the descriptive statistics and short description of the contextual control variables to be used in this study.

<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>MIN</u>	<u>MAX</u>	<u>STANDARD DEVIATION</u>	<u>MEASUREMENT UNIT</u>
Coffee	Proportion of land in a municipality devoted to the production of coffee	0	30.6	6.8593	Percentages
UBN	Proportion of household in a given area that is considered to lacking basic needs. ²³	10.03	100	21.0495	0-100 scale
Violence	Homicides per 1,000 residents	3.9634	85.7232	21.6993	Number of homicides per 100,000 residents (continuous)
State Presence	Central transfers to municipalities	0.0236	0.6596	0.1227	Millions of pesos, per capita (continuous)
Federation Presence	Number of FNCC staff in a municipality	0	0.7751	0.1205	Number of staff per 1,000 inhabitants

Table II.2. Description of contextual level variables

²² For a more technical discussion of the unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) index, see Feres and Mancero 2001

²³ For more information on how DANE, the Colombian government's statistics office, calculates unsatisfied basic needs, see: http://www.dane.gov.co/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=231&Itemid=66 (accessed 13 February 2013)

	Coffee	UBN	Violence	State Presence	Federation Presence
Coffee	1.00				
UBN	-0.218 (0.129)	1.00			
Violence	0.157 (0.275)	-0.030 (0.834)	1.00		
State Presence	-0.083 (0.565)	0.170 (0.237)	0.096 (0.507)	1.00	
Federation Presence	0.421 (0.002)	0.161 (0.264)	0.305 (0.031)	-0.125 (0.387)	1.00

Table II.3. Correlation matrix of contextual variables, significance levels in parentheses

The final table in this chapter presents the correlations (and their p-values) for the contextual variables used in the proceeding analyses. In all, there do not appear to be any relationships that would cause concern for multi-collinearity;²⁴ indeed, of the 10 pairs included in the table, only two have relationships that are considered to be statistically significant at the .05 level. The number of *extensionistas* and homicide rates correlate at 0.305 (for why, see Muñoz Mora 2010) and expectedly, the correlation between coffee and *extensionistas* is significant at 0.42.

Conclusion

Political scientists, economists, anthropologists and others have noted the important influences of the National Coffee Federation on Colombian society, politics and economics. In this chapter, I have described in detail the development of the FNCC into the institution it is today since its founding at the second National Coffee Congress

²⁴ A common rule of thumb that is used to detect multi-collinearity between two regressors is a correlation of 0.8 or higher (see: Gujarati 2004, ch. 10).

in Medellín in 1927. In both the international and domestic arenas, the FNCC plays a pivotal role in setting and executing economic and social policies and projects.

The FNCC can most definitely be considered corporatist in nature. Using the criteria put forward by Collier and Collier in 1979, the Coffee Federation meets them all; it is heavily subsidized by the central government, it has what can essentially be considered a compulsory membership base, and the national government plays an active role in both the appointment of key positions as well as the implementation and execution of organization policy.

Given the clear corporatist characteristics as well as the institutional development of the FNCC, I contend that this particular case is an ideal one in which to assess the impact of corporatist organizations and structures in Latin American political behavior and attitudes. To do this, I use a number of indicators to measure state presence, Federation presence and other institutional characteristics in Colombian municipalities. By employing econometric approaches that appropriately account for the hierarchical nature of the research question, this study will be among the first to understand how this peculiar institutional arrangement might affect important aspects of democratic development and consolidation in Latin America.

CHAPTER III

COFFEE, CORPORATISM, AND CITIZEN TRUST IN AND SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT

As democracy and neo-liberal economic policies have both broadened and deepened during the past 30 years in Latin America, subnational governments have been called upon to play more meaningful roles in the lives of those living in the region. Nowhere is this truer than in Colombia. Although the country is still considered unitary (Lijphart 1999), since the 1980s the extent of decentralization that has taken place within its borders would rival that of any other country in the hemisphere. “In view of its long history as a high centralized unitary state, Colombia seemed an unlikely candidate for decentralization. Yet since the first decentralizing reforms were introduced in 1982, it has evolved into one of the more decentralized countries in Latin America” (Willis et al. 2007, 29). Indeed, mayors were not popularly elected until the passage of an amendment to the constitution in 1986 and governors not until the ratification of a new constitution in 1991.¹

As decentralization processes have deepened in Latin America and subnational governments have assumed greater responsibility in the administration of social services, infrastructural development, education and other programs, scholars have recognized the importance of understanding citizens’ perceptions of local governments and their satisfaction with the provision of local services. Given that much of the Federation’s social programs and activities in Colombia are administered at the municipal level, I

¹ The first mayoral elections took place in 1988 while the first gubernatorial elections in Colombia occurred in 1994.

argue in this chapter that to have an accurate understanding of how Colombians view their local governments, it is essential to account for the degree to which those governments have been supplanted by non-governmental actors, in this case, the FNCC.

The primary focus of this chapter is to understand the independent effect of FNCC's influence on citizens' trust in various levels government and their satisfaction with the provision of local services in their communities. To accomplish this, I organize the chapter in the following way: section I briefly explains processes of decentralization that have occurred in Latin America and Colombia more specifically since the 1980s; section II examines the importance of understanding citizen trust in democratic institutions and procedures. Drawing from the previous two chapters of this dissertation, in section III I develop my expectations regarding the effects of the FNCC on citizen trust and satisfaction and put forward a series of testable hypotheses. Section IV discusses the empirical strategy and presents the results of hierarchical linear models while section V offers a discussion of these results and concludes.

Decentralization in Latin America and Colombia

Along with the transition to democracy and the implementation of open-market economic systems, a defining feature of change in the last 30 years in Latin America has been the significant levels of decentralization within the region. Subnational governments are no longer simply extensions of central governments in national capitals but are autonomous (if not sovereign) entities charged with the administration and provision of some of the most important government services available to citizens including healthcare, infrastructure and education. Furthermore, leaders of provincial and local

governments are no longer handpicked at the national level, but are elected by the citizens to whom they have a constitutional obligation.

Of course, this has not always been the case. Historically, Latin American countries tended to consolidate much of the political, fiscal and administrative powers and duties of the state within the central government and although some countries experimented with more federal and/or decentralized systems of government, decentralization did not become a clear policy objective until the commencement of the most recent wave of democratization in the 1970s. In conjunction with efforts to consolidate electoral democracy and implement neo-liberal economic policies in the region, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund along with a number of lender countries focused on putting into place theories of local government in Latin America “which argue that decentralization improves democracy by bringing the government closer to the people” (Falleti 2010, 5). By doing this, citizens would become more motivated to participate within the political system and hold their elected officials accountable in ways that would be difficult or impossible at the national level. Economically speaking, Falleti explains that proponents argue “fiscal decentralization improves resource allocation through better knowledge of local preferences and competition among jurisdictions” (ibid). By incorporating both political and economic theories of decentralization, it was argued that corruption, theft and inefficiency would decrease while democratic attitudes, vertical accountability and political competition would improve.

Pressure to decentralize not only came from outside Latin America, but also from within the countries themselves. A large literature in comparative politics has sought to understand how internal forces in the region have affected the processes and degree of

decentralization in the region. A major factor shown to affect decentralization processes in the region is the institutional makeup of the political system in a given country. Specifically, it is argued that decentralization occurs as part of a negotiated process between elite actors at the national and subnational levels in a country's political system. The results of these negotiations and the levels and degree of decentralization in a given society, according to Willis et al. (1999), "will depend heavily on the lines of accountability within political parties. In systems with centralized political parties, the central government has exercised greater control over resources and uses than in countries with decentralized parties, in which subnational politicians exercise influence over legislators" (7). In the case of Colombia, a decentralization plan that was put in place by a president to confront a growing fiscal crisis was soon usurped by subnational forces because of the strong regional party institutions.

Electoral prospects have also been attributed to decentralization outcomes in Latin America (Escobar-Lemmon 2003; O'Neil 2003; 2005); political parties that foresee greater electoral success at the subnational level will favor decentralization over parties that anticipate greater fortunes at the national level. Indeed, while O'Neill (2003) concurs with Willis et al.'s contention that political parties and the political party system have an explicit role to play in decentralization, she argues that it has more to do with survival than with bargaining positions. "Decentralization," she argues, "occurred in Colombia when the party in a position to reorganize intragovernmental power saw its probability of gaining or retaining the presidency as weak" (O'Neill 2005, 90). Therefore, as parties view defeat at the national level as inevitable and long lasting, they will look to decentralize processes and mechanisms of governance to subnational levels where they are more competitive.

A final subdivision of decentralization looks beyond the initial decision of whether to decentralize or not and instead focuses on how the implementation of decentralization affects its final outcomes. Falleti (2005, 2010), in her sequential theory of decentralization, contends that in order to truly understand the process of decentralization, scholars must first detangle it and recognize its three distinct parts: administrative, fiscal and political. By doing this, Falleti demonstrates that “the sequential order of different types of decentralization explains the resulting change in the intergovernmental balance of power” (2010, 17). Given that the decentralization process in Colombia was largely driven by subnational actors and interests, the process was undertaken in such a way as to maximize the benefits of those who were most in control, “The process of decentralization in Colombia followed a sequence of reforms that conformed to the preferences of subnational actors. Political autonomy was devolved first, followed by resources, and finally by responsibilities” (Falleti 2005, 341). By experiencing decentralization through this particular sequence, the process devolved significant powers and autonomy to the subnational level, particularly municipalities.

As countries throughout Latin America, and especially Colombia, have undergone significant amounts of decentralization in the past 30 years, scholars have recognized the importance of understanding government-citizen relations at the sub-national level. However, these analyses typically do not account for many of the unique institutional characteristics found throughout the region. Specifically, in Colombia, in order to ascertain the extent to which citizens trust their subnational governments and are satisfied with the provision of local services, scholars must account for the continuing corporatist state-society relationships that are found at the municipal level and explicitly recognize

that in many municipalities throughout the country, the role of local governments is undertaken by the semi-private National Federation of Colombian Coffee-Growers.

Trust in Government in (Latin) America

Most frequently defined as “the ratio of people’s evaluation of government performance relative to their normative expectations of how government ought to perform” (Hetherington and Husser 2012, 313), political trust has been a well-studied topic by scholars of American politics. Indeed, since social science’s behavioral revolution in the 1950s, scholars have been examining how behaviors and attitudes affect levels of trust in “the government in Washington.” Scholars such as Citrin and Green (1986) discovered that in the American context, presidential leadership and economic success often times serve as catalyst to increases in mass trust toward the government; these gains, however, are mostly short-lived. More permanent are findings by Easton (1975) and Gamson (1968) of a simultaneous relationship between trust and institutional support; “once lost,” remarks Hetherington in summarizing these works, “institutional support is more difficult to recover” (1998, 791).

In what has become a seminal study on the impact trust in government has on support for democratic institutions in the United States, Hetherington (1998) offers a compelling argument that political trust, rather than simply being “a reflection of dissatisfaction with political leaders,” is a cause of decline in diffuse support for political and democratic institutions as well as for the democratic system of governance in general. Furthermore, in their examination of Bolivia’s experience with decentralization, Hiskey and Seligson (2003) find that while this process can serve to strengthen support for

democracy, “the renewed emphasis on local government can have the... effect of producing *more negative* views of the political system when performance of local institutions falters” (64). Given Latin America’s continuing effort to consolidate its fragile democracies and the role citizens have to play in this process (see Linz and Stepan 1996), it would seem that understanding citizen trust toward government and key democratic institutions would be vital in achieving these goals, however, relatively little attention has been paid to this subject.

One comparative study on trust in government and institutions in Latin America comes from Boidi (2009) whose examination of mass trust in Latin American legislatures is one of the few studies that seeks to extend this research from the American context to the comparative realm. Boidi finds that trust in legislatures is significantly and positively correlated with core democratic concepts such as support for democracy and support for the rule of law. In this chapter, I seek to extend our understanding of trust in government and democratic institutions by examining how parallel organizations affect citizen trust in sub-national governments. Given the relatively recent yet ever increasing shift of responsibilities from the national to the sub-national realm, understanding the extent to which citizens in Latin America trust municipal, provincial, and even national levels of government is of utmost importance. To contribute to this understanding, I examine to what extent the FNCC affect trust in governments throughout Colombia.

The FNCC’s Effect on Trust in Subnational Colombian Governments

In many Colombian municipalities, it is not necessarily the local government or other state institutions that provide citizens with the goods and services they have come

to expect from their local officials. In many municipalities, the semi-public, yet unelected and unaccountable, National Coffee Federation fulfills its corporatist responsibilities by taking an active role in the development and administration of healthcare, education, infrastructure, and other tasks usually reserved for government bureaucracies. Per the contractual agreement the FNCC has with the national government via the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, many of the services provided by the organization are not restricted just to Federation members, but are available (and indeed, intended) for all residents in a given municipality. In this chapter, I argue that the extent to which the FNCC has supplanted the local government and in some cases become an alternative government will affect how citizens perceive of and trust in governmental entities and institutions. Furthermore, I contend that the degree to which the FNCC has supplanted the state in a municipality will also influence citizen satisfaction with the provision of local services in their communities. However, this effect will not be uniform or constant across all municipalities that have an official coffee presence, but will be dependent on the extent to which the FNCC has effectively supplanted local government institutions and become, in the words of eminent Colombian economist Miguel Urrutia, a “state within a state.”

Although the Coffee Federation is contractually obligated to provide a number of services to entire municipalities and communities, it is not required to do so anonymously. In municipalities with a Coffee Federation presence, the most recognizable individuals are oftentimes the employees of the FNCC. Dressed in their trademarked bright yellow shirts, FNCC employees are viewed as being dedicated, loyal and competent public servants. In smaller communities, or in municipalities where the FNCC is the legitimate provider of public goods, the organization’s leader in the area, the *jefe seccional*, is

regarded a though he were a local elected official, or the town mayor. These individuals are responsible for organizing, distributing and implementing all goods and activities provided by the FNCC.

As mentioned above, the effect of the FNCC on citizens' perceptions of their government at various levels as well as their satisfaction with the provision of local services will not vary based solely on the presence (or lack thereof) of the FNCC, but will also depend, in large part, on the extent to which the FNCC has replaced or supplanted government institutions and responsibilities. Consistent with general theory developed in chapter II, I expect that in municipalities where there is one strong institutional actor (either the government *or* the Coffee Federation), residents will be comparatively more satisfied with local services as well more trusting in government than residents in other types of municipalities. In these municipalities, citizens will lack a point of comparison with which to evaluate the performance and competency of their local goods provider. It is also possible that in municipalities where the Coffee Federation is the principal provider of public goods, and the state is relatively inactive residents may not distinguish between the goods and services being provided by the FNCC and those *not* being provided by the government, leading residents to hold general feelings of goodwill and high trust toward the state.

Conversely, in municipalities where neither the state nor the Federation has a strong presence, trust in government as well as satisfaction with local services should be the lowest among the four types of municipalities. This result, taken together with the expectation that LS/HF municipalities will have values similar to HS/LF municipalities, would provide significant evidence of a continued corporatist presence in subnational Colombia. The only difference between the LS/HF municipalities and the LS/LF

municipalities is the presence of the Federation; therefore, if the difference in attitudes and perceptions varies significantly between these types of municipalities, such a difference would be attributable to the presence (or lack thereof) of the FNCC.

Finally, in municipalities where the state and the Federation both have high presences, I expect trust in government and satisfaction with local services to be highest. In HS/HF municipalities residents benefit from a competent and effective state presence while also enjoying an equally competent and equally effective Federation presence. In areas where the state might be lacking in terms of public service provision, the FNCC, in its complementary role, will be there to provide such services, resulting in the most trusting and most satisfied group of citizens. Table III.1 below summarizes the expectations developed above.

	HIGH FEDERATION	LOW FEDERATION
HIGH STATE	Citizens most trusting in government and most satisfied with local services.	Citizen comparatively more trusting in government and more satisfied with local services.
LOW STATE	Citizen comparatively more trusting in government and more satisfied with local services.	Citizens least trusting in government and least satisfied with local services

Table III.1. Expected Impact of Municipal Context on Citizen Perceptions.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Using the empirical strategy described in chapter I, in this section I test the effect of the FNCC on citizen perceptions and attitudes toward their government and satisfaction with the services being provided in the municipality. I will examine the effects of the FNCC on four attitudinal dependent variables: trust in municipal government, trust in departmental government, trust in national government and satisfaction with local services. Below I explain in-depth how these variables are constructed, their justification for being included in the analysis, and the average values for each variable in each municipality between 2004 and 2010. Finally, before I can conduct a hierarchical linear analysis, I must first ensure that there are significant amounts of variation to be explained between groups, in this case, at the municipal level. To do this, I present the results of fully unspecified hierarchical linear models for each of the dependent variables.

Trust in Municipal Government

Since 2004, the Latin America Public Opinion Project's survey in Colombia ascertained citizens' perceptions of local government by asking respondents to state, on a 1-7 scale, "To what point do you trust in your municipal government?"² Below, the mean scores for each municipality between 2004 and 2010 are presented as reconfigured on a 0 to 100 scale.

² The original wording of the question in Spanish is: "¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?"




Figure III.1. Average levels of trust in municipal government by municipality, 2004-2010

As is apparent from the results presented in Figure III.1 above, trust in municipal government varies significantly between the 50 municipalities included in the LAPOP dataset. On the 0-100 scale, eight municipalities have averages that exceed 60 points with the municipality of Abejorral, Antioquia holding the highest average at 69.3. On the other end of the spectrum, seven municipalities hold average scores of less than 45 points on the 0-100 scale. Ibague, the capital of the department of Tolima is the municipality with

the lowest average score for trust in municipal government between 2004 and 2010 with a score of 34.9.

While a glance at Figure III.1 makes it clear that there is sufficient variation between municipalities to warrant hierarchical analyses, it is important to ensure that any variation that exists between the level-2 units is statistically distinguishable from zero and that the variation is not simply explained by individual-level factors such as socio-demographic, attitudinal, or behavioral attributes. To assess the proportion of variation to be explained at each level of analysis it is common to estimate a fully unconditional model. In explaining this technique, Raudenbush and Byrk (2002) comment “The simplest three-level model is fully unconditional; that is, no predictor variables are specified at any level. Such a model represents how variation in an outcome measure is allocated across the three different levels (child, classroom, and school)” (228). Of course, in the present situation, the levels of analysis are individual nested in municipality nested in year. Below, Table III.2 presents the results of the fully unconditional model for trust in municipal government.

	Trust in Municipal Government (b32)
Constant	52.7130*** (1.3171)
Variance Components	
Level 1 (Individual)	862.625
Level 2 (Municipality)	65.0360
Level 3 (Year)	9.8929
N obs individual level (1)	7,145
N obs municipal level (2)	337
N obs year level (3)	7
Log likelihood	-34452..067
Chi(2)	282.32

Table III.2. Results of fully unconditional model for trust in municipal government

To calculate the proportion of variance to be explained across municipalities, one must divide the municipal-level variance by the sum of the variance components at all three levels of analysis. Therefore, the equation for this particular case is the following:

$$\frac{65.0360}{(862.625+65.0360+9.8929)}$$

The result of this equation is 0.0694 meaning that an estimated 7% of the variance of the dependent variable is explained across municipalities as opposed to across individuals or years. Finally, a chi-squared analysis suggests the difference between variance components at the three levels to be statistically significant. Alternatively, about 92% of the variation in the dependent variable can be found at level-1 (the individual-level) while a negligible (~1%) can be attributed to difference between survey years. It should come as no surprise that most of the variation in the individual-level dependent variable can be found at the individual-level; however, this analysis demonstrates that there exists unexplained variation in the dependent variable that can be attributed to differences between municipalities. Explaining this variation is my primary concern in this project. Finally, the negligible amount of variation found between years is a comforting discovery and speaks to the overall validity of the LAPOP surveys conducted in Colombia. This signifies that a statistically significant amount of variation (i.e. non-zero) is found between the level-2 groups and warrants a hierarchical analysis.

Trust in Departmental and National Government

Given the unitary form of the Colombian government as well as evidence from previous research suggesting a strong link between the three levels of government, in this

chapter I also examine the extent to which the presence of the Coffee Federation is related to trust in departmental and national governments. Similar to the trust in municipal government item described above, the question wording for the two current items are “To what point do you trust in the government of your department?” and “To what point do you trust in the national government?”³ The average levels of trust in departmental government and national government, on the recoded 0-100 scale by municipality are presented below in Figures III.2 and III.3, respectively.

³ The original Spanish wording for these questions are: “¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Gobernación de su departamento?” and “¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Nacional?”




Figure III.2. Average levels of trust in departmental government by municipality, 2004-2009

At first glance, it appears that average levels of trust in departmental government are higher than those for municipal government. Indeed, while no municipality had average levels of trust exceeding 70 points in the case of municipal government, for departmental government, three municipalities exceed the 70-point mark—Rosas, Abejorral, and Marinilla. Also, while in the case of municipal governance, seven municipalities had average of less than 45, in the case of trust in departmental government, only one municipality, Santa Marta, the capital of the department of

Magdalena, falls below 45 points with an average of 41.7. Finally, because this particular question was not included on the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, only the years 2004 to 2009 are analyzed.




Figure III.3. Average levels of trust in national government by municipality, 2004-2010

Average levels of trust in national government by municipality between 2004 and 2010 are presented in Figure III.3 above. In the case of trust in national government, nine municipalities have average levels in excess of 70 points with five of those, San Juan Nepomuceno, Mita, Ayapel, Santuario, and Abejorral exceeding 74 points. In contrast,

only one municipality has an average level of trust in the national government that falls below 50 points on the 0-100 scale; Pasto, the capital of the department of Nariño has an average of 49.8.

Table III.3 below presents the fully unconditional hierarchical linear models for trust in departmental and trust in national governments.

	Trust in Departmental Government (b33)	Trust in National Government (b14)
Constant	58.6701*** (1.8023)	62.3694*** (0.7956)
Variance Components		
Level 1 (Individual)	731.1	837.0267
Level 2 (Municipality)	58.1575	61.5056
Level 3 (Year)	11.0071	2.2781
N obs individual level (1)	3,995	7,107
N obs municipal level (2)	193	337
N obs year level (3)	4	7
Log likelihood	-18937.11	-34156.274
Chi(2)	170.00	208.25

Table III.3. Results of fully unconditional model for trust in departmental and national government

For both trust in departmental government and trust in national government, the results of the fully unconditional hierarchical linear model demonstrate significant variation to be explained between the level-2 units. For the former, the estimated proportion of variation at the second level is 0.0727 while in the case of trust in national government the proportion of variation between municipalities is 0.0683. Again, as was the case for trust in municipal government, about 7% of the variation in these dependent variables is found between the level-2 groups.

Satisfaction with Local Services

The final dependent variable to be analyzed in this chapter is satisfaction with local services. More specifically, the LAPOP questionnaire asks respondents, “Would you say that the services that the municipality is providing to the people are very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad?”⁴ Similar to the questions described above, I expect that on average, Colombians living in municipalities with two strong institutional actors will be most satisfied with the provision of local services in the community while citizens living in municipalities where one institution has a high presence will also be relatively satisfied with local services. In municipalities with no significant institutional presence, satisfaction will be comparatively low. As is the case with the previous variables, the current dependent variable has been recoded onto a 0-100 scale; 0 signifying dissatisfaction with the provision of local services and 100 signifying satisfaction. Below, in Figure III.4, the average values for each municipality between 2004 and 2010 in terms of satisfaction with local services are presented.

⁴ The original Spanish wording for this question is: “¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son muy buenos, buenos, ni buenos ni malos, malos, o muy malos?”




Figure III.4. Average levels of satisfaction with local services by municipality, 2004-2010

Between the municipalities included in the dataset, significant variation exists in terms of average levels of satisfaction with local services. Indeed, with a span of about 30 points, it is clear that Colombians hold varying views when it comes to the provision of services in their municipalities. Of the 50 municipalities included, 13 have average levels below the midpoint with Ibague being the only municipality with an average below 40 at 38.1 points. Alternatively, eight municipalities have average levels of satisfaction with local services exceeding 60 points; Manizales, the capital of the department of Caldas in

the *Eje Cafetero* has the highest average at 69.3. Finally, as Table III.4 demonstrates below, about 12.29% of the variation that exists in the dependent variable can be explained between municipalities, as opposed to between years or individuals.

	Satisfaction with Local Services (sg11)
Constant	54.9360*** (0.5171)
Variance Components	
Level 1 (Individual)	377.5945
Level 2 (Municipality)	52.9780
Level 3 (Year)	0.3751
N obs individual level (1)	7,215
N obs municipal level (2)	337
N obs year level (3)	7
Log likelihood	-31873.74
Chi(2)	489.09

Table III.4. Results of fully unconditional model for satisfaction with local services

Individual Level Covariates

The primary advantage to using hierarchical regression techniques is the ability to assess both contextual and individual-level effects simultaneously on the dependent variable. In chapter II I explained in-depth the level-2 variables to be included in the regression analyses throughout the dissertation including measurement decisions regarding the specification of state and FNCC presence. Here I will briefly describe the individual-level covariates to be included in the analyses in chapters III and IV; for more information on these variables, including actual question wording, see appendix I.

Given that the overarching goal of this research project is to understand the effects of a contextual situation at the municipal level on how Colombians perceive of and interact with their government, the primary purpose of the individual-level covariates is to control for competing hypotheses or explanations at that level of analysis. Therefore,

the vast majority of explanatory variables at this level are the standard socio-economic and demographic variables commonly found in analyses seeking to understand mass attitudes and behaviors. In the multivariate models presented in chapters III and IV, individual-level attributes such as a respondent's education level, age, political ideology,⁵ and sex are included. Additionally, the analyses also control for a respondent's evaluation of the current national economy and for her level of political knowledge or sophistication.

Two variables that have been included for their theoretical importance are the dummy variables, 'agricultor' and 'peon'. While many of the activities and services undertaken by the FNCC are available to all residents of a given municipalities, there are services that are exclusive to associated coffee farmers. It is conceivable that the Colombian with a more intimate relationship to the Federation may be affected differently than residents who happen to live in a coffee municipality but whose daily routines do not bring them into regular contact with the FNCC. Unfortunately, the LAPOP survey in Colombia does not ask respondents whether they are members of the FNCC, but it does ask their occupation. In an effort to begin to understand how one's association with the Coffee Federation might affect how they perceive of and act within the political realm, I have separated all those who answered that they were farmers (owned their own land) or that they worked on someone else's farm (peón). By doing this, I will be able to interact these variables with the Federation variable to begin to find

⁵ Political ideology as measured by self-placement on a left-right or liberal-conservative scale has long presented a conundrum for scholars of political behavior. Although this variable is often times theoretically and empirically important to include when specifying multivariate models explaining mass behaviors and attitudes, the significant nonresponse to this question removes in a non-random fashion many observations (see Zechmeister and Corral 2013). In order to include this important individual-level attribute but to avoid unnecessarily removing observations from the analyses, I include the political ideology of the respondent into the models as a series of dummy variables. On the 0 to 10 left-right ideological scales, those who answered 1, 2, 3, or 4 are coded as "Leftist"; 5 and 6 as "Center" and 7, 8, 9, and 10 as "Rightist". These categories are then compared against the reference category, those respondents who did not give a valid response (coded as "0").

evidence of a systematic relationship between those who might be associated with the Coffee Federation in high federation municipalities and those who probably are not.

Results

Table III.5 below presents the results of the hierarchical linear models used to estimate the contextual impact of the FNCC, conditional on state presence, on citizen trust in the various levels of government and their satisfaction with local services at the municipal level. In all four analyses, the Federation variable achieves conventional levels of statistical significance, meaning that in municipalities with a value of zero for state presence, the presence of the Coffee Federation will, on average, increase levels of trust in government and satisfaction with local services.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Trust in Municipal Government (b32)	Trust in Departmental Government (b33)	Trust in National Government (b14)	Satisfaction with Municipal Services (sgl1)
Constant	44.5791** (3.5036)	53.4328** (4.4574)	41.3023** (3.2268)	46.6590** (2.4140)
<i>Contextual Level</i>				
FNCC Presence	157.3541** (47.6057)	143.5701* (57.7385)	144.7544** (44.6476)	102.0322** (36.5105)
State Presence	1.3348* (0.5765)	-0.5665 (0.7187)	0.6499 (0.5386)	1.0442* (0.4380)
FNCC*State	-57.7248** (17.2940)	-45.1287* (2.4773)	-49.8453** (16.1762)	-38.9404* (13.1567)
UBN	-0.0252 (0.0324)	-0.0214 (0.0394)	0.0802** (0.0305)	-0.1119** (0.0246)
Coffee Area	0.1213 (0.1228)	-0.0190 (0.1425)	0.0484 (0.1146)	0.3224** (0.0911)
Homicide Rate	-0.0070 (0.0291)	-0.0080 (0.0347)	-0.0676* (0.0272)	-0.0096 (0.0223)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Education	-1.6356* (0.6815)	-0.2556 (0.9103)	-0.71685 (0.6660)	0.3558 (0.4513)
Age	0.8644** (0.3255)	0.4538 (0.4065)	2.2184** (0.3214)	-0.3251 (0.2138)
Leftist Ideology	-5.0293** (1.5545)	-3.1414 (1.9211)	-8.6341** (1.5371)	-2.1364* (1.0323)
Centrist Ideology	1.3971 (1.3260)	3.3728* (1.6665)	-0.0471 (1.3117)	0.1532 (0.8768)
Rightist Ideology	3.9724** (1.2476)	4.2004** (1.5875)	4.2360** (1.2355)	-0.8471 (0.8239)
Agricultor	-2.5945* (1.3072)	-3.1050^ (1.6090)	0.0837 (1.2871)	-0.0282 (0.8679)
Peon	-1.3634 (1.8911)	-4.3604^ (2.2767)	-2.8565 (1.8730)	0.6847 (1.2622)
Female	2.4704** (0.8756)	0.6972 (1.1028)	0.6510 (0.8628)	2.0322** (0.5769)
Wealth	-0.5568^ (0.3217)	-0.3323 (0.4256)	-0.0321 (0.3166)	0.4638* (0.2160)
Sociotropic Evaluation	0.1791** (0.0206)	0.1441** (0.0260)	0.2410** (0.0203)	0.1490** (0.0136)
Political Knowledge	-0.0387* (0.0164)	-0.0102 (0.0204)	0.0475** (0.0161)	-0.0045 (0.0108)
Variance Components				
Level 1 (Individual)	818.4965	715.7889	798.6726	357.9053
Level 2 (Municipality)	52.0665	37.7869	40.3528	38.4908
Level 3 (Year)	7.3230	10.3490	1.1658	1.1151
N obs individual level (1)	4,934	2,711	4,914	4,976
N obs municipal level (2)	323	185	323	323
N obs year level (3)	7	4	7	7
Log restricted-likelihood	-23656.324	-12810.733	-23481.319	-21839.86

Table III.5. Results of hierarchical linear models. Standard errors in parentheses. ^p>.1 *p>.05 **p>.01

The results presented in Table III.5 suggest that in terms of trust in government and satisfaction with local services, the presence of the Coffee Federation, relative to that of the state has a significant effect. Indeed, across the four analyses displayed above, the interaction variable measuring FNCC presence conditional to state presence is significant and negative. Furthermore, aside from the effect of state presence on trust in departmental government, both constitutive terms are positive, although the effect of state presence on trust in national government fails to reach statistical significance. Taken together, these results signify a negative moderating relationship between the presence of the Federation and the presence of the state in a given municipality on individual-level attitudes toward government and satisfaction with services. Unfortunately because of the complexity of both the data and of the interaction terms themselves, aside from the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients, it is difficult to discern much else from the results presented above. For this reason, and to discuss more in-depth the relationship between the dependent variables and other independent variables, I will evaluate the results of each model in more substantive terms below.

Trust in Municipal Government

The estimated effects of the individual-level independent variables on trust in municipal government in Colombia are hardly surprising. Of the eleven variables included in the model, nine achieve at least marginal levels of significance. As is suggested with the negative coefficient, a negative relationship exists between a citizen's level of education and her level of trust in municipal government; *ceteris paribus*, the more educated a Colombian, the less trust in municipal government she will have.

Alternatively, age is positively correlated with the dependent variable; older citizens general have more trust in municipal government than their younger compatriots.

The ideology variables are measured in comparison to those respondents who did not reply with a valid response (i.e. missing). Therefore, compared to those who do not hold (or do not wish to reveal) an ideological position, leftist citizens' average values are about five points lower, holding constant all other variables. On the other end of the spectrum, however, citizens placing themselves toward the right of the left/right scale hold values that are, on average, four points higher than citizens in the referent category. There is no discernible difference between citizen falling into the ideological center and Colombians who opted not to self-place on the scale. Compared to respondents whose primary occupation is outside of agriculture, landowning farmers hold, on average, levels of trust in local government of about 2.5 points lower on the 0 to 100 scales while non-landowning agricultural workers are not statistically different from the reference group. The final dummy variable included in the analysis suggests that women, in comparison to men, are, on average, more trust in municipal governments.

The relationship between wealth and trust in municipal government is marginally negative; wealthier Colombians, in terms of material goods, tend to be less trusting in their local governments. Citizens who hold more positive evaluations of the national economy also tend to be more trusting in their municipal government. Finally, citizens with higher levels of political knowledge are less trust in local governments.

Focusing our attention on the contextual variables included in the model, we find that ecological variation in terms of macro-poverty, the existence of coffee cultivation in the municipality, and homicide levels are not significantly related with the dependent

variables. In order to better understand how the presence of the Coffee Federation affects citizens' trust toward municipal government in Colombia, Figure III.5 below presents predicted values for different types of municipalities, holding constant all other variables except those of immediate interest: FNCC presence, state presence, and the interaction between the two.




Figure III.5. Predicted Values of Trust in Municipal Government by Type of Municipality. 95% confidence intervals displayed in brackets.

In order to present the results as efficiently as possible, I have created four types of municipalities based on the presence of the Federation and the state. The first bar presents the estimated value of trust in municipal government on the 0 to 100 scale for a municipality classified as High State/Low Federation (HS/LF) with 95% confidence intervals displayed in brackets. The second bar shows the value for Low State/High Federation (LS/HF) municipalities while High State/High Federation (HS/HF) follows.

The final bar in the figure represents those municipalities that can be considered to have low state presence and a low Federation presence (LS/LF).

Although much of the variation that exists at first glance is muted once confidence intervals are taken into account, there are still important findings to be gleaned from this figure. First, the predicted value of the Low State/High Federation municipality is significantly higher than the predicted values of the High State/High Federation municipality, and more importantly, the Low State/Low Federation municipality. Also, while not significant at the .05 level, the difference in values between the HS/LF municipality and the HS/HF municipality is significant at the .10 level.

Trust in Departmental Government

Examining those individual-level factors that help to explain trust in departmental government, it is notable that the results are not as robust as those from the previous model, or indeed, from those that follow. Of the level-1 covariate included here, only sociotropic evaluations and ideology achieve statistical levels of significance in their relation to the dependent variable. In the case of the effect of perceptions of the national economy, Colombians who hold more favorable views tend to be more trusting of their departmental governments. With respect to ideology, citizens who identify as rightist and centrist tend to hold levels of trust about three and four points higher, respectively, compared to those who did not offer a valid response to the question. Finally, if the confidence threshold is relaxed from .05 to 0.10, compared to Colombians who are not employed within the agricultural sector of the economy, both landowning farmers and

farm workers (non-landowning) tend to hold lower levels of trust in departmental governments.

The modest performance of the model extends to the contextual covariates. Aside from the high federation variable (which is a constitutive term to the interaction variable and unable to be interpreted independent of the state presence variable [Brambor et al. 2006]) and the interaction term, no other variables achieve statistical significance.




Figure III.6. Predicted Values of Trust in Departmental Government by Type of Municipality. 95% confidence intervals displayed in brackets.

As would be expected, Figure III.6 mirrors the lackluster results from the analysis discussed above. A difference of just four points separates the predicted values for HS/LF type (52.35 points) and the LS/LF type municipality (56.13) with the predicted value of HS/HF falling between the two at 53.91 points. Furthermore, when the 95% confidence intervals are accounted for, any difference found between the municipality types vanishes. However, if we relax the confidence threshold from 0.5 to 0.10, differences

begin to emerge. In particular, the predicted value of the Low State/High Federation municipality becomes significantly higher than the values estimated from the High State/Low Federation type and the Low State/Low Federation municipality.

Unfortunately, because of the extreme confidence intervals, even at the 0.10 level, it is impossible to make conclusive statements regarding the High State/High Federation municipality type.

Trust in National Government

The final dependent variable measuring trust examines citizens' trust in their national government. As can be deciphered from the results of the third model presented in Table III.5, a number of individual-level independent variables are significantly correlated with trust in national government. Age, for example, is a positive predictor of trust in the central government; the older one is, the higher her level of trust, holding all else constant. Similarly, both sociotropic economic evaluations and political knowledge are positively correlated with the dependent variable meaning the higher a Colombian falls on either scale, the higher their trust in the national government, on average. Finally, as has been the case with the other analyses examined in this section, ideology plays a role in explaining trust in the central government; compared to those not offering a valid ideological position, leftists are less trusting while rightists tend to be more trusting in the national government. This should come as no surprise given that throughout period in which this analysis is based (2004-2010) a conservative president, Álvaro Uribe, led the Colombian government.

A citizen's municipal context also plays a role in explaining his level of trust in the national government. Surprisingly, the level of unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) in a community is positively correlated with the dependent variable; on average, an increase in a municipality's level of UBN would result in higher levels of trust in the Colombian government. More in-line with expectations, however, is the negative relationship between a community's homicide rate and its citizens' level of trust in the national government. To understand how the conditional relationship between state presence and Federation presence affects trust in Bogotá, I present the predicted values for each municipal type in Figure III.7 below.




Figure III.7. Predicted Values of Trust in National Government by Type of Municipality. 95% confidence intervals displayed in brackets.

Consistent with the results presented explaining trust in municipal and departmental governments, the municipality type with the highest estimated level of trust in national government is that with a low state presence and a high Federation presence

(LS/HF) with 78.92 points on the 0 to 100 scale. The next highest type of municipality, High State/Low Federation (HS/LF), with a predicted average of 63.86 is not distinguishable from the LS/HF type at the 0.05 level, but does become statistically different at the 0.10 level. The same is true between the predicted values for the LS/HF municipality and the HG/HF municipality—although not statistically different at the 0.05 level; they are distinguishable at the 0.10 level. Finally, the difference between the average value for the LS/HF municipality type and the Low State/Low Federation municipality type is significant at the 0.05 level.

Satisfaction with Local Services

The final perception or attitude-based dependent variable that I examine here is satisfaction with local services, the results of which are presented in the last column of Table III.5. Similar to the previous results discussed above, a number of individual and contextual-level factors play a role in explaining citizen satisfaction with the provision of local services in Colombia. Beginning with the level-1 covariates, both the female variable and the sociotropic evaluation variable are positively correlated with the dependent variable. More substantively, we can expect women to hold, on average, levels of satisfaction with local services of about two points higher in comparison to men. Also, as a Colombian's evaluation of the national economy improves, so too should her overall level in satisfaction with local services *ceteris paribus*.

At the contextual-level, both the level of unsatisfied basic needs and the area of land devoted to coffee cultivation assist in explaining individual-level variation in satisfaction with local services, albeit from opposite directions. First, a municipality's

level of UBN is negatively associated with the dependent variable signifying that as a community's level of macro-poverty decreases, citizens' satisfaction with local services will tend to increase. Alternatively, the results of this analysis suggest that citizens in municipalities that devote higher proportions of land to the cultivation of coffee are, in general, more satisfied with the provision of local services in their community.




Figure III.8. Predicted Values of Satisfaction with Local Services by Type of Municipality. 95% confidence intervals displayed in brackets.

The predicted values presented in Figure III.8 show the same pattern that has been found throughout this chapter. The Low State/High Federation municipality type leads the predicted averages with about 61 points on the 0 to 100 scale while the High State/Low Federation municipality follows, yet is statistically indistinguishable. The LS/HF municipality type, however, is significantly different from both the High State/High Federation and Low State/Low Federation municipality types. While I cannot be confident in the differences between the HS/LF municipality type and the HS/HF

municipality or the LS/LF municipality at the 0.05 level, we can be confident in such differences once I relax the statistical threshold to 0.10.

Discussion and Conclusion

The results of the analyses presented in this chapter not only paint a consistent picture in terms of the effect of the National Federation of Colombian Coffee-Growers on citizen trust in government and satisfaction with local services, but also on how corporatist institutions in 21st Latin America affect citizen attitudes and perceptions. In every case, those municipalities with the highest average levels of either trust or satisfaction were not those with strong presences of both institutions, but those with one strong institutional actor. Indeed, throughout this chapter, it was the low state, high Federation group of municipalities that consistently had the highest levels of predicted average scores on the 0-100 scale, while contrary to my expectations, the high state/ high Federation municipalities have the lowest predicted averages of trust in government and satisfaction with local services.

Scholars, in American and comparative politics, have convincingly made a causal link between specific and diffuse support for democracy. Hetherington (1998) argues that decreases in citizen trust can have pernicious effects on democratic attitudes and values while Hiskey and Seligson (2003) have demonstrated a link between satisfaction with local government and system support. In consolidated and developed democratic systems such as the United States, these warnings may not be as dire as in democratic societies considered to be fragile or unconsolidated.

If, as Collier and Collier (1979) contend, that governments utilized corporatist organizations to serve as buffers between the masses and the government, the results presented in this chapter support the argument that this form of state-society relationship still exists in 21st century Colombia. Even following the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies, and the deepening of democratic processes and procedures including decentralization, it is clear from the preceding analyses that the Coffee Federation continues to have a great deal of impact on citizens living in those municipalities where the FNCC has a large presence.

It is apparent that in municipalities where there exists a small government presence but a large Federation presence, citizen trust in government and satisfaction with local services rivals that found in high state/low Federation municipalities. It is plausible and suggested by the results presented above that if the Coffee Federation did not maintain the presence that it has in those municipalities considered to be low state/high Federation, trust in government, as well as satisfaction with local services would decrease to levels similar to those municipalities considered to be low state/low Federation. Therefore, it is clear that the government benefits from having the Federation take on a more active role and serve as an “alternative government” in these municipalities. It is also apparent, that in these municipalities, the Coffee Federation continues to act as a typical corporation, supplanting the state where necessary and serving as a buffer between the masses and their elected representatives. If the FNCC, a labor organization administered by unelected and (vertically) unaccountable officials, is serving to inflate citizen trust in and satisfaction with the government, might this affect how citizens act within the political realm of democratic governance? Might these buffers that exist

between citizens and the state affect participation in traditional and nontraditional modes of political behavior? Chapter IV of this dissertation examines these questions.

The second significant finding from this chapter is one that was unexpected. In situations where the state and the FNCC have strong presences I expected citizens to be most trusting in government and satisfied with local services. This was because in these municipalities the state would be the primary provider of public goods with the Federation serving in a complementary role. However, the results presented above suggest that Colombians in HS/HF municipalities are, on average, the least trusting in government and the least satisfied with the provision of local services in their municipalities. Although the wide confidence intervals associated with these results should give caution to any conclusions made, I can at least be somewhat comforted by consistency found throughout the analyses estimated in this chapter; indeed, the estimated values for HS/HF municipalities in all the models presented above are the lowest among the four types of municipalities included in the typology. These results suggest that instead of complementing each other in HS/HF municipalities, the relationship between the state and the FNCC is more complicated with a significant competitive dynamic. This is a topic to which I will return in Chapter V.

The primary purpose of this dissertation is to understand the effects of sub-national state-society relations on citizens' attitudes and behaviors. In this particular chapter, I seek to explain how the municipal presence of Colombia's Coffee Federation systematically affects citizens' trust in government and satisfaction with local services. Consistent with the theoretical discussion, the analyses presented here show that Colombians living in municipalities with one strong institutional actor tend to have the

highest levels of trust in government and satisfaction with the services being provided in their communities. Alternatively, in municipalities with a strong presence of both the state and FNCC, trust and satisfaction rival levels found in municipalities lacking a strong institutional presence.

Even as Colombia has decentralized, implemented neo-liberal economic policies and invested in the deepening of democratic processes and procedures while the FNCC has suffered greatly in terms of financial health in recent year, it is clear from the above analyses that this organization still plays a significant role in shaping citizen attitudes and perceptions across sub-national Colombia. In the following chapter, I will examine to what extent this presence affects actual behaviors by the masses in the political realm.

CHAPTER IV

THE EFFECTS OF THE FNCC ON CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL BEHAVIORS

Since the region's independence from the Spanish crown in the 19th century, and indeed before, political participation throughout Latin America has been a risky and perhaps even deadly decision. The latter half of the 20th century was especially brutal for those who chose to participate politically in countries where the second wave of democratization had receded and dictatorships and military regimes had taken hold. In countries such as Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Peru, those who dared participate or partake in political activities deemed unacceptable by the relevant political elite faced harassment, imprisonment, or death. However, as alternatives to participating directly in the country's political life, many governments throughout the region created or supported the creation of organizations that would serve as buffers between citizens and governments and would allow citizens to "participate politically through state-approved, carefully regulated associations" (Erickson 1977, 2). In many instances, these groups were organized around democratic principles where members would have the opportunity to elect leadership, engage in public debate and compete for organizational leadership positions. Although these corporations or corporatist institutions were seen by many to be incompatible and unsustainable with the stated values and goals of both democratization and free-market economic systems, contemporary scholarship has demonstrated that like many pre-dual transition institutions, corporatism has not only survived, but evolved so as to remain a critical part of state-society relations in the region.

Colombia, of course, does not fit neatly within the experiences of the countries listed above. Aside from a couple brief periods of military rule in the 20th century, the republican-era of the Colombian state has been considered at least nominally democratic with the administration of regular and planned elections. However, Colombia has faced its own unique set of problems that has made many modes of not only political participation, but also political identification, deadly endeavors that the state has sought to deemphasize. As Robert Dix (1980) aptly notes, different from most consociational arrangements, the one found in Colombia was particularly unique:

[I]ts subcultures are not ethnically, religiously or even class based. [...] Colombia's subcultures have maintained the intense and deep-seated loyalties to the two historic parties— so intense and deep-seated, in fact, that they have been called the 'hereditary hatreds' and were substantially responsible for the loss of more than 100,000 lives in a quasi-civil war that raged among Liberal and Conservative partisans in the Colombian countryside for more than a decade beginning in the late 1940s. (Dix 1980, 304).

Given that much of the violence described by Dix occurred in the regions of the country where coffee cultivation is a primary economic activity, and as a result, the Coffee Federation has a high presence, I argue in this chapter that the FNCC, while understated, played an important role in halting the political violence of the 1940s. The effects of these activities are still felt to this day throughout many municipalities with a significant Federation presence.

To demonstrate not only the important role of the FNCC during the years of consociational governance but the continuing legacy of that involvement, I divide this chapter into five sections. The first section briefly chronicles the contemporary history of political violence and political participation in the country and considers the role of the FNCC during the country's most recent violent experiences. Section two considers past

scholarship on municipal effects on political and civic behavior while section three develops a theory of how the FNCC should affect citizens' political behaviors. Section four discusses the empirical strategy and presents the results. Section five offers a discussion and finally concludes.

The Perils of Political Participation in Colombia

Throughout the 20th century and into the 21st in Colombia, violence and politics have become so intertwined that it is nearly impossible to know where one ends and the other begins. Scholars have attributed the intense political conflict to as far back as the selection of the country's first president and vice-president, "The basic tale of party formation in Colombia is that the two traditional parties emerged from the political conflicts of two of the country's early leaders, with the Conservative Party emerging from Simón Bolívar and the Liberal Party from Francisco de Paula Santander" (Taylor 2009, 61). These partisan conflicts persisted and developed throughout the 19th century, culminating to the infamous Thousand Days War beginning in 1899. Although records and historical accounts of the three-year war are sparse, historians estimate that roughly 100,000 Colombians were killed and many more displaced (Bushnell 2010, 35). Furthermore, as was discussed in chapter two, Colombian society and economic activities were all but decimated during this conflict.

Although Colombians worked hard to rebuild their economy and society, the country was once again thrust into civil war following the assassination of the Liberal Party's presidential candidate Jorge Gaitán in 1948 which sparked a period of intense

chaos and violence in Bogotá leading to the more prolonged and sustained partisan war known as *La Violencia* between 1948 and 1958.

As was the case during the Thousand Days War, the areas of the country that saw the most violence were rural and the victims primarily peasants and of the agrarian class. Indeed, some of the most severely affected areas of the country were the primary coffee growing regions in the south-central part of Colombia; the area that today makes up the departments of Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío, also known as *viejo* or *antiguo Caldas*.¹ The decade-long conflict resulted in an estimated 300,000 lives lost and many more displaced. Colombians in the affected zones were forced to flee their homesteads and farming land, in many cases, never to return (Palacios 2006, 136). It was also in response to this time period of prolonged violence that Colombia's only modern-day military regime took power with broad support of the populace. Placed within the context of Latin America, the military regime that governed Colombia between 1953 and 1958 was rather tame and insignificant; however, it served as a catalyst for the creation of an institutional arrangement that would be felt throughout Colombia until the ratification of a new constitution in 1991.

In an effort to regain political control from General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the two parties in Colombia instituted a power-sharing agreement that culminated into the National Front (*Frente Nacional*) which called for alternation of key political positions (including the presidency) as well as party parity on government agencies, committees,

¹ Oscar Arango Gaviria (Professor of Sociology, *Universidad Tecnológica de Pereira* and Director of Regional Development, *Red Alma Mater*) in discussion with the author, July 2011.

and boards.² It should be noted that while the FNCC's National Committee was not technically mandated to follow these provisions, it did adhere to the National Front by ensuring an equal number of Liberal Party and Conservative Party members between 1958 and 1974. Occupants of the office of the president alternated as mandated by the agreement until its scheduled end in 1974; however, many other positions and government bodies adhered to the agreement until the ratification of the new constitution in 1991.

Aside from the alternating of power between the two political parties, a primary goal of the National Front was to eliminate the political violence occurring in the country which essentially (yet unexpectedly) called for a reduction in political participation and a de-emphasis of party identification among the masses, "[...] one of the intentions of the National Front system was to demobilize the mass following of the traditional parties, diffusing the conflict between them" (Hartlyn 1986, 160). Even with the ratification of a constitution in 1991 that was aimed at ridding the country of what was left of the National Front and whose explicit mission was to increase political participation among all sectors of the populace, Colombia still has some of the lowest rates of traditional modes of political participation.

As mass political participation in Colombia decreased throughout the 1960s and 70s, the political, economic, and social influence of the coffee industry and the FNCC were increasing. Indeed, it was in regions of the country most affected by the political violence where the FNCC was (and continues to be) most active. Through the application of arguments developed by Erickson, Malloy, and others, it is plausible that the FNCC

² Aside from the requirement of parity and alternation the National Front arrangement also called for other institutional changes including a majority two-thirds vote in Congress on all legislation (this requirement was eventually eased). For more information on the development of the National Front, see Hartlyn (1988).

served as an acceptable alternative institution where citizens could exercise democratic behaviors and expect a reasonable amount of transparency from the organization's leadership. After all, since its development in the early 20th century, the FNCC has relied on contemporary democratic principles to select leaders and establish institution policy. Unfortunately, data from this time do not exist to test the notion that participation in the FNCC increased during the years of the National Front; however, it is without question that during this time the stature and influence of the organization within Colombian society and politics greatly increased. In this chapter, I argue that even as the fiscal condition of the Federation is challenged, the organization continues to influence mass political behaviors in those municipalities where it has the largest presence, conditional to that of the state.

The Contextual Connection: Municipal Effects on Political and Civic Behavior

The recognition that ecological conditions in which a person finds herself may affect her propensity to act or behave in one way or another is not a new idea in political science. Indeed, since the field's behavioral revolution in the 1950s, students of political science have been engaged in understanding how context affects political attitudes and behaviors. Most notably, in comparative politics, Almond and Verba's (1963) seminal work on civic culture contends, at least implicitly, that national-level conditions affect individual level attributes related to democratic development and modernization.

Although much of the work examining mass behaviors has looked at the phenomenon from a national or cross-national perspective, it would be inaccurate to

conclude that researchers have only shown interest at this level of analysis. Indeed, years before Almond and Verba published their study on civic culture in five countries, the US Congress commissioned a study to understand civic participation in US municipalities following the second World War. However, because of data and methodological limitations, many of the early studies examining the ecological effects on citizen behavior were almost exclusively case study or ethnographic analyses. Furthermore, for similar reasons, these studies tended to focus on economic effects on civic engagement and community welfare across US communities or counties. For example, in a study commissioned by the US Senate, Goldschmidt (1947) finds that citizens residing in communities with high concentrations of large farming enterprises typically have low standards of living and less opportunities for civic engagement than citizens living in rural communities with higher concentrations of small, independently operated farming operations. Similarly, in a separate study commissioned by the US Congress, Mills and Ulmer (1970 [1946]) conclude that “big business tends to depress while small business tends to raise the level of civic welfare” (p. 124) in US communities. Like Goldschmidt, these researchers are concerned with the level of economic concentration in US localities, yet different from the previous study discussed, Mills and Ulmer utilize aggregated sources of data to examine the effect in six (unnamed) American cities.

As social science methodologies advanced, so too did studies seeking to explain effects of local context on political and civic engagement. Using a combination of survey and census data, Huckfeldt (1977) finds that at least in the case of Buffalo, New York, “neighborhood social context has an important effect upon the extent of individual political activity and the degree to which participation is structured by individual status”

(p. 579). Although this study looked at neighborhoods in only one city, later work by Huckfeldt extended his analyses to areas in both Buffalo and Detroit, Michigan where he argues that “neighborhood social contexts have important political consequences, not only for individual behavior, but also for the political vitality of groups in the political process” (Huckfeldt 1986, 11).

It was not until the last 10-15 years when students of American political behavior and sociology began to apply large-N, comparative methodologies to inquiries of municipal or community effect on individual-level behaviors. Using a dataset of over 1,600 respondents, nested in municipalities, Oliver (1999) finds evidence that macro-economic conditions affect local civic participation in two distinct ways, “First affluent cities have fewer social ‘needs’ prompting citizen actions. Second heterogeneous cities have more competitions for public good which stimulates citizen interest and participation (Oliver 1999, 186). As a result, in those areas with more heterogeneous populations, local participation tends to be higher. Additionally, continuing the research agendas put forth by Mills, Ulmer, and Goldschmidt over a half a century ago, contemporary sociologists, using large-N methodologies have arrived mostly at similar conclusions regarding the effects of local economic concentration (Troy and Matthew 2006) and scales of agricultural production (Lyson et al. 2001) on civic behavior and community welfare.

Just as researchers focusing on the American case have long been interested in subnational conditions on individual-level behaviors so too have students of other parts of the world. Particularly in the region of Latin America, political scientists and sociologists have been, until recently, hampered by a dearth of appropriate data with which to conduct

quantitative analyses. However, in the run-up to the historic presidential election in Mexico in 2000, Hiskey and Bowler (2005) find that local political context played a significant role in individuals' evaluations of legitimacy of the system and as a result, "Citizens are more willing to participate in politics when they think the process is fair, and direct evidence of the fairness of the system is provided by the local political context" (Hiskey and Bowler 2005, 57). Finally, in a study of voting behavior in contemporary Colombia, Miguel García finds that:

The territorial consolidation of right wing paramilitaries significantly reduced the individual probability of voting; yet, citizens living in contested areas exhibited the lowest probability of participating in local elections. Violent contexts also had a tremendous influence on vote intention. In fact, going from areas dominated by left wing insurgents to regions controlled by right wing paramilitary groups, citizens were more likely to support a presidential candidate located on the right of the ideological spectrum. (García 2009, 142).

Previous studies examining local context on citizen behaviors have included a diverse range of ecological factors as key independent variables including economic segregation and concentration, political factors, and levels of violence, however, no study exists that considers how local state-society relations and non-state actors might affect individual political behaviors. Using the FNCC and its presence in Colombian municipalities relative to the strength of the state, in the following pages of this chapter, I analyze the effects of these, until now, omitted variables. The next section puts forward a theory and testable hypotheses of state-society relations and 21st century corporatism's effect on political behaviors in modern day Colombia.

The National Coffee Federation and Political Behavior

Active participation in civil society organizations has been viewed as an essential component to the democratic (and participatory) development of society since Tocqueville noted the robust associational culture in 19th century United States. In his seminal works on institutional (1983) and democratic (1993) development in Italy, Putnam attributes robust civil society to the significant advances found in the northern regions of the country and the lack of such a civic tradition to the disappointing progress in the southern regions. By participating in even non-political institutions, citizens have the potential to gain invaluable skills that will assist them in the political realm. Verba, et al. (1995) argue that participation in such organizations allow for “informal political discussions” as well as inadvertently exposing citizens to political dialogue. Also, “on the job, in church, or in organizations, individuals develop networks of friends and acquaintances from which requests for political involvement emerge” (Verba, et al. 1995, 309). In short, participating in civic life has long been seen as a gateway into political and democratic participation, at least in the American and European contexts.

The benefits of civil society on both a country’s citizenry and democracy itself are numerous. According to Putnam, civil society and voluntary organizations serve as venues in which individual citizens whose voice would otherwise be ignored, can come together and “express their interests and demands on government and... protect themselves from abuses of power by their political leaders” (Putnam 2000, 338). Civic and voluntary associations also serve as ‘schools of democracy’ according to Putnam and others. Pateman writes that “...for a democratic polity to exist it is necessary for a

participatory society to exist, i.e. a society where all political systems have been democratised and socialisation through participation can take place in all areas” (Pateman 1970, 41). Indeed, from the discussion above, the relationship is clear, for a democracy to take hold and become a reliable and stable regime, a robust, active and democratic civic society must parallel the formal, state democratic structure.

In more recent years, however, scholars have recognized possible negative effects of civil society on democratic processes and outcomes (but see Putnam’s discussion of “exceptional” organizations [2000]). A more systematic ‘dark side’ of civil society has the potential for creating inequalities within the democratic process and making some groups more powerful than others (Fiorina 1999). In fact, Armony notes, “civic involvement may... be linked to undemocratic outcomes inimical to democracy, or it may contribute to such results” (2006, 56-57). Finally, for civil society to contribute to a robust democratic regime, it must first be free from state intervention, “a country without a multitude of organizations relatively independent of the central state power has a high dictatorial as well as revolutionary potential” (Lipset 1981, 52).

In those municipalities where it has an official presence, the Coffee Federation provides numerous opportunities for its members to associate, participate, and engage with the organization and community. From regularly scheduled Federation meetings organized by the local staff, to the opportunity to elect representatives for various FNCC posts, or to even compete for such a position, it would seem that the FNCC would fit nicely into the “school of democracy” model developed and advocated by Pateman, Verba et al. and others. However, there are important caveats that much be considered. First, participation within the FNCC is not a right or privilege open to all Colombians but

only to those who meet specific requirements such as owning land, producing a requisite amount of coffee, and possessing a *cedula cafetera*. Furthermore, the Coffee Federation is not independent from the Colombian government, financially or otherwise. Indeed since the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement and the onset of the coffee crisis, the national government has heavily subsidized the organization with the understanding that this assistance will likely continue for the medium to long term.³ Finally, in many ways the FNCC does not function as a typical civil society organization as much as an alternative government.

While it is plausible that this institution could affect how citizens behave politically, it is not entirely apparent how. Thirty years ago, when Colombia was under the institutional arrangement of the National Front and a primary objective of the government was to reduce or eliminate violent political behavior, the corporatist FNCC had a clear role to play, a buffer between the masses and the state. However, since 1991 and the ratification of a new constitution, the Colombian state has both altered and created institutions to encourage traditional forms of political participation. For example, mayors and governors are now popularly elected instead of appointed and representation to the national legislature is selected using proportional allocation of seats instead of a majoritarian approach. The last point is at least partially responsible for the implosion of the traditional party system in Colombia and the disruption of the two-party dominance in national politics (Dargent and Muñoz 2011).

³ 4 August 2012. "La locomotora del café salió del taller." *Semana*. <http://www.semana.com/economia/articulo/la-locomotora-del-cafe-salio-del-taller/262405-3> (accessed 14 February 2013).

How Corporatism Affects Behavior in 21st Century Latin America

If corporatist organizations and institutions in Latin America were created to benefit the governments of the time, they have survived and remained relevant actors into the 21st century for the same reason. The difference, however, are the types of governments to whom they are benefitting; throughout much of the 20th century, these governments were often time authoritarian, autocratic, or at most, nominally democratic and their primary interest in terms of corporatism was diverting mass opinion and behaviors from the state into these approved organizations. Today, however, the situation is quite different. Essentially all countries in the region can be considered to meet at least the minimal definition of democracy put forward by Schumpeter (1942) and in many societies, Colombia included, recent years have seen improvements in democratic processes, human rights, and social accountability. Furthermore, no longer are citizens discouraged or prohibited from interacting with the state and political institutions, but indeed, are encouraged to do so. Therefore, if citizens are no longer being “funneled” into corporations in order to remove them from the political realm, what role does corporatism play in 21st century Latin America?

It is now the responsibility of corporatist organizations, who continue to be both constrained by and beneficiaries of the state to assist in areas where the government may be lacking. In Colombia, and more specifically the FNCC, this includes the actual provision of basic services, the creation and maintenance of infrastructure, and the education of the country’s youth in many municipalities where state presence may be lacking or effectively absent. In the previous chapter, I show that in municipalities where the state has a less than ideal presence, it relies upon the Coffee Federation to provide a

source of legitimacy among the municipalities' residents from which it can benefit. Indeed, among the variables analyzed, municipalities with a higher than average Coffee Federation presence but low state presence consistently held higher levels of trust in government and were more satisfied with the provision of local services than were residents in municipalities with low FNCC presence and low state presence. In this scenario, it is because of the FNCC that residents in the LS/HF municipalities hold higher levels of trust and satisfaction than their compatriots living in LS/LF municipalities. Clearly, at least in terms of mass perceptions and attitudes, the FNCC, at the municipal level, has a clear effect; however, how might this ecological condition affect 21st century political behavior, both conventional and unconventional?

In terms of the effects of the Coffee Federation on actual political behaviors among the Colombian citizenry, I expect the relationship to be similar to that which was discussed in chapter two regarding political attitudes and perceptions, at least as it relates to *conventional* modes of participation. In general, I hypothesize that in municipalities where the state may have a less than ideal presence it will rely on the FNCC to lend it support and legitimacy. Further, the FNCC's focus on civic engagement and activity in low state/high Federation municipalities will encourage citizens in these municipalities to be, in general, more engaged and active in the political process than citizens in municipalities where there is a low presence of both institutions. Indeed, given my expectations that in LS/HF municipalities the FNCC will effectively serve to substitute the government, I anticipate that the probability of a citizen participating in conventional political behaviors will be similar to those in HS/LF municipalities where the government is the legitimate provider of public goods and services and has a real and noticeable

presence in the city or town. Furthermore, consistent with its traditional corporatist role, but in an era of electoral democracy, the FNCC, just as it lends legitimacy to the state, will also serve to increase participation in conventional political behavior in municipalities where it serves to supplant the state. I expect that the likelihood of an individual in a LS/HF municipality of participating in conventional modes of behavior to be at least equal to that of a similar individual in a HS/LF municipality and significantly higher than in LS/LF municipalities.

In municipalities where the state and the FNCC have high presences (HS/HF), the Federation, instead of acting as an “alternative government” will act primarily as a standard civic society organization. In these municipalities, it will function as a school of democracy where citizens who participate in the local coffee committees by speaking with and petitioning representatives, attending Federation meetings, and voting in FNCC elections should also partake in these activities with regard to the government and political life. Therefore, in HS/HF municipalities, I expect the probability of participating in conventional political behaviors to be among the highest found in comparison to the other types of municipalities in this analysis.

However, participation in unconventional modes of political activity should vary differently than those activities considered conventional. In addition to the traditional corporatist responsibility of funneling citizens away from political participation, it was also the responsibility of corporations to ensure that citizens did not engage in behaviors that had the potential to undermine the government or political elites (Malloy 1974; 1977). In many Latin American countries throughout the latter half of the 20th century, a key responsibility bestowed onto corporations by governments was to limit participation

in non-sanctioned protests or demonstrations. Although in the case of Colombia and the FNCC reliable data do not exist to examine how effective this organization was at stifling protest in coffee municipalities in the 1960s or 70s, it is possible to examine whether there exists a relationship between the organization's presence in a municipality and citizens' propensity to demonstrate.

Results from previous analyses suggest that having the FNCC in a municipality where there is low state presence benefits the state in key ways as citizens are more trusting of all levels of government, more satisfied with basic services, and more likely to participate in conventional political behaviors. If, as I have argued above the Federation continues as a corporatist organization into the 21st century then in addition to promoting attitudes and behaviors that are beneficial to the current regime, it should also *discourage* behaviors that would be less than desirable for the Colombian government. Therefore, in municipalities where there is a significant Coffee presence, I expect the likelihood of citizen participation in unconventional modes of political participation to be less than in municipalities where the presence of the FNCC is either low or non-existent.

Political Behavior in Colombian Municipalities

Until relatively recently, political science has tended to accept a rather constrained definition of political behavior and participation. Attributed mostly to Verba and Nie's (1972, participation was typically defined as "behavior to affect the choice of governmental personnel and/or policies" through conventional means such as voting, participation in political parties, and interacting with elected officials by attending

meetings or writing letters. However, beyond the borders of the United States (and even within them), scholars quickly recognized this definition as being “too narrow” and lacking in regards to recognizing important modes of behavior in diverse cultural settings.⁴ In the case of political participation in Latin America, scholars such as Booth and Seligson (1978; Seligson and Booth 1979) identified the inadequacy of only examining political participation through a conventional lens, “Such a narrow definition... has artificially constrained analysis, directing it away from many other kinds of activity of political importance” (Booth and Seligson 1978, 4). Indeed, while Booth and Seligson’s definition of political participation as “behaviors influencing or attempting to influence the distribution of public goods” (ibid, 6) might not on its face appear drastically different from the one put forward by Verba and Nie, the fact that they explicitly include non-conventional forms of behavior is truly a point of departure from previous conceptualizations.⁵

Measuring and Explaining Conventional Political Behavior

The distinction between conventional and non-conventional forms of political participation is an important one when assessing the impact of corporatism and corporatist organization on mass behaviors. A primary motivation for the creation and continued support of corporations throughout much of the 20th century by Latin American governments was to limit or prevent mass participation in protest, demonstrations, acts of political violence, and other types of behaviors that would be

⁴ see Conge (1988)

⁵ Important to mention that Booth and Seligson were not the only scholars advocating a more inclusive definition of political participation. For a broader discussion on the topic, see Booth and Seligson (1978) and Conge (1988).

considered unconventional. Additionally, as posited here, it is also fathomable that the continued presence of corporatism into the 21st century may affect participation in conventional modes of political behavior differently than in unconventional forms. Taking these realities into account, in this analysis I will consider both conventional and unconventional types of political participation. For those considered conventional, I will look at voting behavior, party identification, petitioning local and national officials, working (or volunteering) for a political campaign, speaking about politics with others, and attending municipal meetings. Figure IV.1 below presents the proportion of residents for each municipality included in the dataset between 2004 and 2010 that reported engaging in each activity




Figure IV.1. Percentage of respondents voting in last presidential election by municipality, 2004-2010




Figure IV.2 Percentage of respondents identifying with a political party by municipality, 2004-2010




Figure IV.3. Percentage of respondents petitioning the government by municipality, 2004-2010




Figure IV.4. Percentage of respondents attending municipal meetings by municipality, 2005-2010




Figure IV.5. Percentage of respondents who attempt to convince others by municipality, 2005-2010




Figure IV.6. Percentage of respondents who worked for a political party or candidate by municipality, 2004-2010

Using data from up to seven rounds of nationally representative surveys in Colombia conducted by LAPOP, it is clear that at least at the aggregate level, significant variation of conventional behavior exists between municipalities in Colombia. Indeed, even with the most conventional of political behaviors, voting, there exist large differences among the municipalities included in the dataset. Figure IV.1 presents the percentage of respondents who reported having voted in the previous presidential election between 2004 and 2010. Of the 50 municipalities for which data is available, in 14 the percentage of respondents who reported having had voted exceeded 70% while in three municipalities, Florencia (Caquetá), Soledad (Atlántico), and Soacha (Cundinamarca), that percentage was equal to or below 50%.

Indeed, similar if not more significant variation exists between municipalities for other conventional forms of political participation. When asked whether they identified with a political party, 53.3% of respondents in Montería (Córdoba) reported doing so while only about 15% in Marinilla (Antioquia) answered yes. These proportions are similar to those regarding petitioning government officials between 2004 and 2010; about 60% of respondents in Rosas (Cauca) reported having done so while just over 10% in Bucaramanga (Santander) answered in the affirmative. When asked whether they had attended a municipal meeting in the last 12 months (Figure IV.4), 0% of respondents in Soacha (Cundinamarca) said they had, while over 38% of respondents in Ibagué (Tolima) reported having done so; interestingly, the municipality with the next highest percentage of respondents reporting having attended a municipal meeting is Quinchía (Risaralda) at 18.5%. The final two forms of conventional political behavior that will be examined in this chapter are discussing politics with other (Figure IV.5) and working or volunteering

for a candidate or party during an election (Figure IV.6). In both cases, the percentage of respondents who reported having engaged in the respective behavior ranges from a high of about 25% to a low of less than 6%.

While the data presented in the above figures are interesting in and of themselves, the analytical leverage that can be attained from them is limited at best. First, Figures IV.1-IV.6 combine responses from up to seven distinct survey rounds ranging from 2004 to 2010. Also, as was mentioned above, these descriptive results come from complex surveys whose representativeness does not extend down to the municipal level; therefore, it would be inaccurate to claim with any precision or confidence that the figures above are accurate descriptions of aggregate municipal behavior. However, through multivariate, hierarchical analysis, it is possible to, while holding individual level factors constant, understand the impact of contextual conditions on political behaviors. Of course, for this particular study, I am interested in understating how state-society relations at the municipal level affect the propensity of an individual to participate (or not) in political life. Table IV.1 below presents the results of non-linear hierarchical regression analyses estimating simultaneously the effects of both contextual and individual-level co-variates on the individual-level dependent variables while holding constant the survey year.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Vote	Party Identification	Petition	Talk about Politics	Work for Campaign	Attend Municipal Meeting
Constant	-1.9592*** (0.2393)	-4.3208*** (0.3348)	-2.4759 (0.2614)	-2.7127*** (0.2673)	-4.6202*** (0.3146)	-5.0779*** (0.4972)
<i>Contextual Level Variables</i>						
FNCC Presence	3.8342 (2.9092)	2.8686 (4.0747)	6.1409[^] (3.2568)	4.5400 (3.3666)	8.1224* (3.4693)	13.5779* (6.0191)
State Presence	0.0839* (0.0351)	0.1428** (0.0483)	-0.0263 (0.0406)	0.0551 (0.0411)	0.1028* (0.0434)	-0.0477 (0.0739)
FNCC*State	-0.7753 (1.0759)	-1.0201 (1.4497)	-1.6205 (1.1782)	-1.5657 (1.2137)	-2.6607* (1.2413)	-4.4066* (2.1107)
UBN	0.0055** (0.0020)	0.0150*** (0.0026)	0.0106*** (0.0023)	0.0046* (0.0023)	0.0123*** (0.0024)	0.0097* (0.0041)
Coffee Area	0.0063 (0.0082)	0.0033 (0.0099)	0.0107 (0.0087)	0.0017 (0.0087)	0.0009 (0.0096)	-0.0155 (0.0162)
Homicide Rate	0.0003 (0.0018)	-0.0052* (0.0023)	0.0061** (0.0020)	0.0045* (0.0020)	0.0029 (0.0022)	0.0154 (0.0037)
<i>Individual Level Variables</i>						
Education	0.2517*** (0.0527)	0.2477*** (0.0719)	0.2796*** (0.0528)	0.2227*** (0.0548)	0.3666*** (0.0650)	0.3692*** (0.0951)
Age	0.4626*** (0.0277)	0.3697*** (0.0334)	0.1808*** (0.0252)	0.0985*** (0.0260)	0.1867*** (0.0312)	0.1646*** (0.0421)
Leftist Ideology	0.0759 (0.1159)	0.8719*** (0.1617)	0.5077*** (0.1232)	0.7120*** (0.1313)	0.5391** (0.1703)	0.7545*** (0.2080)
Centrist Ideology	0.0890 (0.0987)	0.3825** (0.1449)	0.3292** (0.1069)	0.4525*** (0.1163)	0.4935*** (0.1494)	0.2043 (0.1904)
Rightest Ideology	0.1808 [^] (0.0936)	0.8756*** (0.1360)	0.5033*** (0.0996)	0.7055*** (0.1097)	0.8478*** (0.1399)	0.5744*** (0.1758)
Agricultor	-0.0508 (0.0988)	-0.0928 (0.1282)	-0.1940 [^] (0.1050)	-0.0435 (0.1055)	0.0355 (0.1271)	-0.0725 (0.1688)
Peon	0.3164* (0.1529)	0.3863* (0.1792)	0.2053 (0.1417)	0.0286 (0.1501)	0.0122 (0.1825)	0.1575 (0.2336)

Female	0.0651 (0.0673)	-0.3508*** (0.0901)	0.0124 (0.0684)	-0.3663*** (0.0715)	-0.2399** (0.0867)	-0.3693** (0.1182)
Wealth	0.0327 (0.0245)	0.0651* (0.03316)	-0.1105*** (0.0251)	-0.0027 (0.0255)	0.0610* (0.0299)	0.0370 (0.0438)
Sociotropic Evaluation	0.0013 (0.0016)	0.0002 (0.0021)	-0.0020 (0.0016)	0.0016 (0.0017)	-0.0002 (0.0020)	0.0021 (0.0027)
Political Knowledge	0.0036** (0.0012)	0.0094*** (0.0017)	0.0014 (0.0013)	0.0010 (0.0013)	0.0014 (0.0016)	0.0045* (0.0022)
N obs individual level (1)	5011	3,054	5,036	5,012	4,925	4,014
N obs municipal level (2)	323	231	323	323	323	277
N obs year level (3)	7	5	7	7	7	6
Log likelihood	-2979.01	-1731.74	-2976.64	-2804.01	-2047.00	-1,272.83

Table IV.1. Results of hierarchical non-linear (logit) models. Standard errors in parentheses. ^p>.1 *p>.05 **p>.01

Although it is difficult to interpret the substantive effects of the co-variables on the individual dependent variables in the table above, it is possible to arrive at some important conclusions from Table IV.1. First, by just glancing at the significance levels, it is apparent, in general, individual-level factors such as a person's level of education, age, and sex tend to be more robust predictors of political participation than do municipal-level factors, including the variables of interest for this particular project. Indeed, of the six forms of conventional political behaviors analyzed in this chapter, only for two, working for a candidate or political party and attending municipal meetings, does the conditional measure of Federation influence have a notable effect.

In terms of statistical significance, the results presented above, for the most part, fail to make a strong case in support for the FNCC's effect on conventional forms of political participation; however, there is other information that can be gleaned from Table IV.1. Indeed, in four of the six hierarchical logistic regression analyses conducted, the results for both the constitutive variables and the interaction, are, while not always significant, in the expected theoretical direction and consistent with the results from Chapter III. As was the case in the previous chapter, the results presented above suggest that a higher average Federation presence will have a negative moderating effect on various forms of individual-level political participation, especially as the presence of the state increases in a municipality. Furthermore, in three of the six analyses displayed above, in those municipalities where the Coffee Federation does not have an official presence (i.e. FNCC presence=0), the state presence variable has a positive and significant effect. In other words, as state presence increases in a municipality, so too does the likelihood that citizens will have voted (at the .10 level), identified with a

political party, and worked for a campaign. Similarly, the Coffee Federation has a positive and significant independent effect on having signed a petition, worked for a campaign, and attended a municipal meeting. However, given that no municipality in the dataset is completely lacking of state presence, the significance of this result is theoretical (Kam and Franzese 2007).

Among the contextual-level variables, there are others that also play a significant role in explaining individual-level political participation. For example, in municipalities where unsatisfied basic needs are higher (i.e. higher levels of macro-poverty), individuals are more likely, on average to have participated in all six forms of political participation analyzed in this chapter than are Colombians in more affluent communities. Finally, although a municipality's homicide rate is a negative predictor for party identification, it is a positive predictor in explaining whether a citizen has signed a petition or reports speaking about politics with their friends and neighbors.

The effects of the individual-level predictors are, in general, consistent with extant scholarship on political behavior. The standard demographic variables such as education, age, and sex are significant predictors of various political behaviors. For age and education, the relationship is positive and spans across all six analyses. In the case of sex of the respondent, as would be expected, men are more likely than women to engage in behaviors such as identifying with a political party, talking about politics, working for campaigns, and attending municipal meetings; the difference between men and women is insignificant for voting and petition signing. Ideology also plays a role in determining whether a person participates in conventional political life or not. Most notably, compared to those Colombians who opted not to self-place on the ideological spectrum,

those who did, regardless of *where* they placed, are in general, significantly more likely to participate in all activities aside from voting. Citizens who identify as more rightist (placing themselves as 7, 8, 9, or 10 on the 1 to 10 scale) are marginally more likely to vote than are Colombians who did not provide a valid response. Wealthier citizens (in terms of household goods) are less likely to have signed a petition, but more likely than their less wealthy compatriots to identify with a political party, or to have worked for a campaign. Finally, while sociotropic economic evaluations have no discernible effect on political participation, the above analyses do suggest that more politically knowledgeable citizens are more likely to have reported voting, identify with a political party, and have attended a municipal meeting in the past year; these results are consistent with previous research on mass political behavior in both the United States and around the world.




Figure IV.7. Predicted probabilities of having worked for a campaign by type of municipality, 2004-2010. 95% confidence intervals displayed in brackets.

Returning to the variables of interest, state presence, Federation presence, and the interaction between the two, Figure IV.7 presents the predicted probabilities of an “average” Colombian having worked for a candidate or party during a political campaign for each type of municipality. In municipalities where there is one strong institutional actor, either the state or the Federation, the probability of a citizen having worked for a campaign is highest; indeed, in the low state/high Federation municipality, the likelihood of having worked for a party or candidate is 0.27 while in municipalities considered to be high state/low Federation, the probability is 0.18. In municipalities where both institutional actors have a low presence, the probability of partaking in this type of activity is 0.11 while it is in municipalities where both the presence of the Federation and

state are considered to be high where the probability of working for a campaign is lowest at a mere 0.06.

The second conventional political activity where the conditional presence of the FNCC has a significant impact on citizen participation is attending municipal meetings. As has become routine throughout the analyses, citizens living in municipalities considered to have low state and high Federation presences are the most likely to report having participated in this type of behavior in the past 12 months. However, the results diverge from previous analyses once we take note of the other municipality types. Instead of being statistically indistinguishable from LS/HF municipalities, citizens living in HS/LF municipality types are significantly *less* likely to have reported attending a municipal meeting in the past year. A possible explanation for this result could be that in LS/HF municipalities, citizens equate FNCC meetings with local government, and as a result inflate the number of municipal meetings they have attended.




Figure IV.8. Predicted probabilities of having attended a municipal meeting in the past 12 months, 2005-2010. 95% confidence intervals displayed in brackets.

In 21st century Colombia, the conditional effect of the presence of the FNCC on conventional political behaviors while not pivotal is certainly existent. At least in terms of working for a political campaign and attending municipal meetings, citizens living in LS/HF municipalities are more likely to engage in these behaviors than are citizens living in other types of municipalities. Indeed, for both types of behaviors, citizens living in LS/HF municipality types are significantly more likely to take part in these activities than are Colombians who live in municipalities where both institutions have weak or non-existent presences. Again, this difference can be reasonably attributed to the presence (or lack of presence) of the Coffee Federation, providing further evidence that in important ways the FNCC affects citizens' involvement with the government and lends the government legitimacy in municipalities where the state presence might be less than optimal. Another important aspect of Latin American corporatism is the role it had (or

still has) on deemphasizing participation in activities that would be considered to be unconventional. The next section examines the effect of the FNCC on both participation in and approval for such modes of behavior.

Measuring and Explaining Unconventional Political Behavior

In exchange for receiving benefits such as subsidies, a monopoly on membership, and official status from governments, Latin American corporations throughout the 20th century were expected to assist governments in discouraging politically disruptive behaviors by citizens. Of course, this arrangement was put into place prior to the dual transition, and since that time countries in the region, in addition to embracing (to an extent), open-market economic reforms, have also begun to encourage democratic forms of political participation outside the traditional sort, including the freedom of citizens to participate in peaceful forms of protest and demonstrations.

Although over 20 years have passed since the dual transition swept across the region and since Colombia ratified a new constitution whose primary goal was to end the lingering effects of the National Front and encourage citizen participation in politics, corporatist institutions, at least in Colombia have continued to exist and affect mass opinions and behaviors. Therefore, in this section, I examine the extent to which the presence of the corporatist FNCC in a municipality affects the likelihood of a citizen having participated in a protest. Between 2004 and 2008 a standard question asked in the LAPOP surveys in Colombia was, “At some point in your life, have you participated in a demonstration or public protest?”⁶ Figure IV.9 presents the percentage of respondents,

⁶ The original wording in Spanish for this questions is: “¿Alguna vez en su vida ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?”

for each municipality that responded “sometimes (*algunas veces*)” as opposed to “almost never (*casi nunca*)” or “never (*nunca*)”. The percentage of respondents in the municipalities included in the dataset ranges from 0% in Abejorral (Antioquia) to 33.3% in Pasto, the capital city of the department of Nariño. The municipalities of Armenia (Quindío) and Bello (Antioquia) also have rates of protest participation exceeding 30% of respondents.




Figure IV.9. Percentage of respondents having participated in a protest or public demonstration by municipality, 2004-2008




Figure IV.10. Average levels of approval for other to participate in legal protests and demonstrations by municipality, 2004-2010

Clearly, few citizens in any democratic society choose to participate in a protest or public demonstration. Whether because of lack of interest, lack of time, or another reason altogether, most citizens will go their entire lives without partaking in this mode of participation. Given the (relatively) large investment that participation in a protest requires, here I present another, less complex measure to gauge the conditional effects of the FNCC on protest. Since 2004, LAPOP surveys have asked Colombians the extent to which they approve or disapprove “people participat[ing] in legal demonstrations.” Figure IV.10 presents mean responses on a 0 to 100 scale for each municipality. Throughout the municipalities included in the dataset, support for this form of political behavior is relatively high; indeed in no municipality does the average local level of support fall below 50 points on the 0 to 100 scale while support in eight municipalities meets or exceeds 70 points.

	Protest Participation	Support for Protest
Constant	-3.9489*** (0.3571)	59.2472*** (3.2870)
<i>Contextual Level</i>		
FNCC Presence	-9.0115[^] (5.2169)	40.6176 (44.1123)
State Presence	0.0111 (0.0549)	-0.0112 (0.5378)
FNCC*State	3.4519[^] (1.8588)	-19.375 (15.9816)
UBN	0.0020 (0.0031)	-0.0174 (0.0306)
Coffee Area	-0.0004 (0.0111)	0.0275 (0.1157)
Homicide Rate	0.0026 (0.0028)	0.0296 (0.0271)
<i>Individual Level Variables</i>		
Education	0.63678*** (0.0767)	4.4827*** (0.6993)
Age	0.0726* (0.0359)	-0.1605 (0.3402)
Leftist Ideology	0.8701*** (0.1747)	3.4693* (1.6212)
Center Ideology	0.4951** (0.1593)	2.0234 1.3852
Rightest Ideology	0.4078** (0.1555)	1.3178 (1.3048)
Agricultor	-0.0862 (0.1482)	-1.6863 (1.3594)
Peon	-0.1764 (0.2307)	0.0022 (1.9898)
Female	-0.3149*** (0.0954)	-3.3105*** (0.9127)
Wealth	0.0473 (0.0338)	-0.2576 (0.3318)
Sociotropic Evaluation	-0.0058** (0.0022)	-0.0283 (0.0214)
Political Knowledge	0.0036* (0.0019)	0.0340* (0.0170)
Variance Components		
Level 1 (Individual)		888.598
Level 2 (Municipality)		33.9378
Level 3 (Year)		0.000
N obs, levels 1, 2, and 3	4,470; 231; 5	4,871; 323; 7
Log likelihood	-1690.60	-23517.94

Table IV.2. Column one presents results of hierarchical non-linear (logistic) models; column two presents results of a hierarchical linear model. Standard errors in parentheses. [^]p>.1 *p>.05 **p>.01

Results of analyses explaining both participation in and support for public demonstrations and protests are presented in Table IV.2. Not only do the contextual variables of interest fail to reach statistical significance in explaining support for citizens to engage in legal protests and public demonstrations, but none of the contextual explanatory variables are significant predictors. At the individual-level, education and political knowledge are positive predictors in explaining support for legal protest participation. Leftist citizens hold higher levels of support for legal protest participation than do those who do not align themselves ideologically and women are, on average, less supportive of protest participation than are men.

Turning to explaining actual protest participation, the results from the analysis above are more robust than were the results associated with *support* for legal protest participation. First, in terms of individual-level predictors in explaining protest participation throughout out Colombia, we find that education and political knowledge are positive predictors of whether one chooses to partake in a protest or demonstration. Likewise, women are less likely to have participated in a protest or demonstration than are men while Colombians who self-place anywhere on the ideological spectrum (left, right, or center) are more likely to report having protested than are those who do not align themselves ideologically.⁷ Finally, more negative views of the national economy (sociotropic evaluation) are associated with participation in protests or public demonstrations.

Of more direct interest to the research question at hand, the interaction between the state presence and FNCC presence obtains a marginal level of significance ($p=0.06$)

⁷ Colombians placing themselves on the left ideologically are also significantly more likely to have participated in a protest or public demonstration compared to Colombians self-placing on the right or center of the ideological spectrum.

in explaining participation in protests. Also, while the state presence variable does not achieve statistical significance, FNCC presence is significant at the .10 level. However, given that these results are from a non-linear regression analysis, it is difficult to discern the independent effect of any one variable just from the estimated coefficients. Figure IV.11 below presents the predicted probabilities of an average Colombian in each type of municipality participating in protests or demonstrations.




Figure IV.11. Predicted probabilities of having taken part in protest by type of municipality, 2004-2008. 95% confidence intervals displayed in brackets.

The probabilities depicted in Figure IV.11 are striking. Although, as expected, the overall probabilities of participating in a protest are quite low, never exceeding 0.13, there are clear distinctions between the municipality types. However, different from the previous analyses, the differences are not between municipalities with one strong

institutional presence and two or no strong institutions, but between those with a high FNCC presence and those with a low presence. In municipalities where the Coffee Federation is considered to have a low institutional presence, the probability of an average Colombian reporting having participated in a protest or demonstration at least “sometimes” (compared to “almost never” or “never”) is about 0.13 while in municipalities with a high FNCC presence, the likelihood of the same Colombian falls to 0.04 (in LS/HF municipalities) and 0.07 (in HS/HF municipalities).

In terms of at least one type of unconventional political behavior (protest) the institutional presence of the Coffee Federation, conditional on state presence has a notable impact. However, the effect does not hold when explaining approval for people participating in legal protests and demonstrations. In the next section, before concluding, I will offer a brief discussion of the empirical finding from this chapter.

Discussion and Conclusion

In 20th century Latin America, a primary motivation for the creation and support of corporations was to affect political participation. As scholars of corporatism in the 1970s noted, citizens in countries with less than democratic governments were often times “funneled” into state-approved institutions that were commonly organized around democratic values and principles and where they could (to an extent) engage in democratic and civic behaviors. However, since the peak-days of Latin American corporatism in the 1960s and 70s, much has changed throughout the region leaving some

to believe that corporatist groups and organizations, should they continue to exist at all, are nothing more than archaic and non-influential institutions of the past.

As has been the overarching goal of this dissertation, in this chapter, using the non-obvious case of the Colombian Coffee Federation, I seek to demonstrate that even in a 21st century electoral democracy, corporatist structure continues to affect how citizens interact within their political systems. A key argument of this project that differs from much of the corporatist literature in Latin America is that to truly understand how corporatism continues to influence the political lives of citizens, one must scale down the analysis and examine corporatism at the sub-national level.

Here I examine how corporatism at the municipal-level affects citizens' political behaviors. Conventional wisdom may conclude that as the world transitioned into a new century, the influence of the FNCC in Colombian municipalities should decrease in terms of its political, economic, and social stature. After all, since 1991 the Colombian political structure has been guided by a constitution that is explicit in its support for mass participation in political processes and whose primary mission was to rid the country of the lingering effects of the National Front. Furthermore, as the geopolitical priorities of the United States and Western Europe shifted following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the conclusion of the Cold War, support for the International Coffee Agreement dissolved and with it, as did the extraordinary benefits afforded to the FNCC and Colombian Coffee industry more generally.

While the FNCC has had to take steps to reduce and restructure, a priority that has remained is the substantial presence it has throughout the primary coffee-growing areas of the country. Also, the national government has recognized the benefit of maintaining a

strong and vibrant FNCC, not only to represent Colombia in an official capacity abroad, but also to assist in tasks normally under the purview of the state, such as infrastructure development, healthcare, and education. Additionally, although in recent years the Colombian government has made an official effort to increase state presence throughout the country, the reality is that even in 2013, municipal and local governments are often times perceived as inept, corrupt, or simply inefficient, contrasted with a Coffee Federation that is, at least among many perceived as being completely opposite.

The realities described above beg the question, to what extent might the Coffee Federation affect political behaviors in the 21st century? As has become common throughout the comparative politics literature, in order to answer this question, I make a conceptual distinction between behaviors considered to be conventional and unconventional. As was mentioned above, much has changed in Colombia since political elites instituted a consociational governing agreement in 1958 that sought to decrease partisanship and as a result, at least according to Hartlyn (1987), decreased conventional forms of behavior. In 21st century Colombia, conventional behaviors such as voting, petition signing, and party identification are not only tolerated, but encouraged. Therefore, in this chapter, I argue that in terms of conventional behaviors, in areas where the FNCC truly acts as an alternative government, participation will be high. In areas where the Federation acts more in line with a traditional civic organization and fulfills a complementary role to the state, instead of substituting, we will see the highest levels of participation. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that for the LS/HF municipalities, participation in conventional behaviors is as expected, however in municipalities where the Federation and the state both have high presences, the likelihood

of participating in conventional behaviors is low. This last result, in light of the results presented in Chapter III suggests that in HS/HF municipalities the relationship between the two institutional actors may not be complementary one, but perhaps a more adversarial or competitive relationship. This is a topic that I will return to in the concluding chapter.

The results of the effects of the presence of the Coffee Federation conditional to the presence of the state in explaining unconventional behaviors differ substantially from the conventional behavior analyses. In sum, a citizen living in a municipality where the FNCC has a strong presence is less likely to have participated in a protest at least “sometimes” compared to an identical Colombian living in a municipality with a weak or nonexistent FNCC presence. As has been discussed here, it was a typical responsibility of corporations in Latin America to discourage and prevent citizens from engaging in behaviors not supported by the government. Although data do not exist to measure how successful the Coffee Federation was at discouraging protest participation during the height of its influence, the results presented in this chapter suggest that a corporatist legacy exists in municipalities where the Coffee Federation continues to be a significant institutional actor.

The primary motivation of this chapter was to examine the possibility that over 20 years after the implementation of the dual transition in Latin America, corporatism in the region still affects the political lives of citizens. Using the case of the National Coffee Federation at the municipal-level, I find evidence that the organization does influence how people interact with the state politically, both through conventional and unconventional means. Taken together with the results of Chapter III it becomes clear

that the FNCC continues to be a relevant and significant political actor in 21st century Colombia. The next chapter ties the empirical results from this dissertation together with the theoretical expectations and offers conclusions regarding the overall impact of the FNCC on citizens' behaviors and attitudes in the modern day.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The idea that institutions shape how people perceive of and interact with their government and political systems is not a new one in the social sciences. Indeed, since the advent of contemporary political science in the 1950s and 60s, scholars have been interested in understanding how ecological factors affect individual-level attitudes and behaviors. In this dissertation, I contribute to this large and distinguished body of research by examining how institutions created and consolidated during the pre-dual transition era of Latin America continue to not only exist in the 21st century, but thrive and affect citizens' behaviors and attitudes concerning the fragile democracies of the region.

Through the subnational analysis of Colombia's National Federation of Coffee-Growers, this dissertation set out to understand the continued influence of corporatist institutions on individual-level political behaviors and attitudes. Although corporatist organizations may not have the influence in national-level politics that they had prior to the third wave of democratization, here I demonstrate that in 21st century Latin America, corporate groups, and corporatism in general, still play an important role in the political development of the region. However, to notice these effects, one must go beyond the national or cross-national level of analysis and look to see how corporatism influences citizens through subnational channels.

In addition to reviewing the primary findings from the previous chapters, here, I also discuss how the research presented in this dissertation contributes to a small, yet growing literature on past institutions that continue to affect the democratization process in countries whose democracies can still be considered “consolidating.” Finally, before concluding, I discuss briefly avenues which could be taken to extend both the current research on the effects of the FNCC and, more generally, subnational institutions on citizen engagement with and attitudes toward their constantly changing democratic systems.

Corporatism and Mass Behaviors and Attitudes

Scholars since the 1970s have argued that corporatist organizations were created in Latin America to influence how citizens interacted with and perceived of their governments. Of course in those times, the vast majority of Latin American governments were not democratic and had a clear interest in creating a buffer between themselves and the masses. Unfortunately, because of both the lack of transparency and survey research in the region during this time, scholars were largely constrained to putting forth untested arguments and hypotheses concerning the effects of corporatism on political behaviors and attitudes.

In the 30 years since the beginning of the third wave of democratization in Latin America, much has changed throughout the region. However, although electoral democracy and open-market economic systems are now the, the institutions that were created before the dual transitions continue to influence politics and society throughout

the hemisphere. Using contemporary public opinion data, I find that the FNCC affects how citizens perceive of their government and behave within the political system. In municipalities where the Coffee Federation is the sole strong institutional presence, citizen trust in both the national and municipal government is roughly equal to that of municipalities where the state is the strongest institutional actor. Furthermore, as would be expected, in municipalities where both institutions are considered to be weak, trust in government is comparatively low. In considering the counterfactual that if the FNCC did not maintain its strong presence in the municipalities considered to be Low State/High Federation, then the expected values of trust in government would fall to levels similar to those found in Low State/High Federation municipalities. In this sense, from the analysis presented in Chapter III, the Federation lends a significant level of legitimacy to the state in terms of citizen trust in government. A similar relationship exists when examining Colombians' satisfaction with local services. In general, I find that the predicted levels of satisfaction with local services in municipalities with a strong Federation presence and weak state presence is about 20 points higher than in municipalities with low presences of both the Federation and the state.

In the analyses presented in Chapter IV, I find that the presence of the FNCC, relative to that of the state, affects significantly citizens' propensity to act within Colombian political life. Here I find evidence that the presence of the Coffee Federation affects both conventional and unconventional forms of political participation, although not in the same way. For citizens who live in municipalities where the FNCC is considered to have a strong presence and the state a weak one, the probability of having worked for a campaign or candidate is about 0.27, compared to 0.18 for an identical

Colombian living in a HS/LF municipality. In contrast, the probability of having working for a campaign or candidate for a citizen living in a LS/LF municipality is just 0.11 while in HS/HF municipalities, it is 0.06. Also, citizens living in LS/HF municipalities are more likely than Colombians in any other type of municipality to have reported attending a municipal meeting in the past twelve months.

Alternatively, while the presence of the Coffee Federation in a municipality does not significantly affect citizens' attitudes regarding support for others to engage in legal protests or public demonstrations, it does affect whether one actually does participate in such an event. Indeed, citizens living in municipalities where the FNCC is considered to have a strong presence (regardless of the presence of the state) are almost half as likely to report having participated in a protest or public demonstration than are citizens living in municipalities with little or no Federation presence.

The results presented in Chapters III and IV and summarized below in Tables V.1 and V.2 suggest not only that corporatist institutions continue to affect individual-level behaviors and attitudes, but that they matter at all. As I explained in the first chapter, while scholars such as Philippe Schmitter, Robert Erikson, and James Malloy theorized on the effects of corporatism on individual-level outcomes in the 1970s, because of various constraints, these arguments went largely untested. In this dissertation, I present evidence that even in an environment of democratic institutions and open-market economies, corporatist organizations continue to affect how citizens perceive of their governments and act within political life.

As Table V.1 shows, in municipalities where the FNCC acts as an “alternative government” (LS/HF), citizens are, on average, trusting of the government and satisfied

with the local services being provided in the municipality. It is reasonable to expect that if the Federation were not present in these municipalities, general levels of trust and satisfaction among citizens would be similar to the relatively low levels found in the Low State/Low Federation municipality-type. Therefore, in terms of legitimacy, the results suggest that the state benefits from having the Federation in municipalities where it does not have a significant presence.

	HIGH FEDERATION	LOW FEDERATION
HIGH STATE	Citizens least trusting in government and least satisfied with local services.	Citizens comparatively more trusting in government and more satisfied with local services.
LOW STATE	Citizen comparatively more trusting in government and more satisfied with local services.	Citizens less trusting in government and less satisfied with local services

Table V.1. Summary of Findings for Attitudes and Perceptions.

In addition to lending legitimacy to the state, another pillar of corporatist institutions prior to the dual transition in Latin America was to discourage citizens from participating directly in political life. In 21st century Latin America where governments are at least electorally democratic, the state depends on a minimal amount of citizen participation. Therefore, I hypothesize that in municipalities where the Federation has a significant presence, the likelihood of participating in conventional political behaviors will be higher; however in those municipalities

where the FNCC is a strong actor, I find that participation in non-conventional behaviors is lower. This suggests that the corporatist organization continues to influence citizen participation in the political world. Table V.2 below summarizes these findings.

	HIGH FEDERATION	LOW FEDERATION
HIGH STATE	Citizens least likely to participate in conventional behaviors and comparatively less likely to participate in unconventional behaviors.	Citizens more likely to participate in conventional behaviors and least likely to participate in unconventional behaviors.
LOW STATE	Citizens more likely to participate in conventional behaviors and more likely to participate in unconventional behaviors.	Citizens less likely to participate in conventional behaviors and less likely to participate in unconventional behaviors.

Figure V.2. Summary of Findings for Behaviors.

Although the results of this dissertation suggest that corporatism in subnational Colombia continues to influence citizens' attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors, an expectation that was not supported by the empirical analyses, was that concerning citizens living in high state/high Federation municipalities. I discuss these findings more in-depth below.

Explaining High State/High Federation Municipalities

A key argument made at the beginning of the dissertation was that, compared to other municipality types, High State/High Federation municipalities would have, on

average, the highest levels of trust in government, and satisfaction with local services. Furthermore, Colombians in these municipalities would be the most likely to participate in conventional political activities and least likely to protest. This argument developed from the notion that in HS/HF municipalities residents would essentially be receiving the best of both worlds: a highly competent and efficient state presence that would deliver reliable, high-quality public services along with an active and influential civic society organization that would step in during times of government failure and serve as a robust “school of democracy” where citizens would learn and perfect democratic activities before applying them to the political realm. The results presented in the empirical chapters however, suggest a reality that quite different from the hypothesized one described above. Indeed, for both the three measures of trust in government and satisfaction with local services, the average predicted level on the 0 to 100 scale for HS/HF is among the lowers of the four types of municipalities. Similarly, Colombians living in municipalities where both the state the FNCC are considered to have strong presences are among the least likely to partake in certain conventional political activities.

Clearly, the argument laid out in Chapter II that in HS/HF municipalities the FNCC serves as a complementary institution to the state does not hold up to the results presented in Chapters III and IV. Instead, it appears that competitive relationship between the institutional actors in HS/HF municipalities may exist. Different from LS/HF municipalities where the FNCC essentially substitutes the state, in HS/HF municipalities, a situation of “coproduction” emerges between the two where “both state and nonstate actors contribute inputs” (Tsai 2011, 48). In this situation, while the public may welcome the involvement of the nonstate actor,

From the state's point of view, the participation of nonstate actors in public goods provision may be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the state often save financial and administrative resources when nonstate actors contribute to the funding and organizing of local public goods and services such as roads, irrigation infrastructure and sanitation services. On the other hand, as nonstate actors set up institutions to mobilize resources and supervise service delivery, they may also develop into political competitors. Citizens may start to question the usefulness and legitimacy of a state that fails to take sufficient responsibility for basic public goods and services that are central to social welfare. (Tsai 2011, *ibid*).

Therefore, for Colombia and the FNCC, the effects of the organization may differ depending of municipality type. In municipalities where the FNCC effectively supplants the state (LS/HF), the effects of the FNCC on citizens' attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors is, generally speaking, a net positive for the state. In these municipalities it appears that residents may equate the work of the Federation for work being done by the state, leaving residents to be both satisfied with the public services as well as trusting of the multiple levels of government. Alternatively, in municipalities where the state and the FNCC are both considered to be strong (HS/HF), not only do residents distinguish between the two, but they fault the state for perceived shortcomings, affecting overall legitimacy of the government and causing citizens to withdraw from political life.

The empirical results from this dissertation not only demonstrate that the Coffee Federation in Colombia plays a significant role in the political lives of Colombians, but also provides evidence that Latin American corporatism affects how citizens perceive of and interact with the political institutions of the country. Throughout the country, the presence of the Coffee Federation in many municipalities translates into an increase in trust in municipal and national governments, as well as increased satisfaction with the provision of local services in areas where the state is considered to be weak. Furthermore,

while increasing citizen involvement in conventional modes of political participation, the presence of the FNCC appears to discourage citizens from engaging in protests and public demonstrations. The results suggest that in the era of electoral and procedural democracy in 21st century Latin America, corporatist organizations continue to manipulate or influence public opinion and mass behaviors in way that can generally be characterized as beneficial for the government.

In the 1970s, eminent scholars of Latin American politics such as Philippe Schmitter and James Malloy argued persuasively that corporatist-style state-society relations affected how citizens in the region interacted with their governments. However, due to the constraints of the times these arguments went largely untested. While it is impossible to go back in time and test the hypotheses laid out by these political scientists, in this dissertation I adapt the institutional argument of corporatism developed in the 1970s and, through empirical analyses, demonstrate that at least at the subnational level in Colombia, this institutional arrangement affects individual-level democratic attitudes and behaviors in the 21st century. Although this dissertation examines only one corporate group in one country, it is not beyond the realm of possibility, and is perhaps even likely, that similar arrangements and effects exist in countries that were, or still are, considered to have strong corporatist institutions and identities in the region such as Mexico, Brazil, or Argentina.

Studying the Continued Effects of Institutions of the Past

The findings from this dissertation contribute to a small, yet growing literature that examines the effects of past institutions on citizens' political behaviors and attitudes. Brusco et al. (2004), for example, find that depending on when an Argentine citizen attained voting-age status affects the likelihood of selling his or her vote for material goods; the institutional shift to neoliberal economic policies in the early 1990s created a sense of loyalty to the clientelistic party structure among those Argentine's who became electorally-active during this time. "Most prone to 'vote selling' are young, low-income Peronists, people who entered the electorate during the Menem era. These were the kinds of people who were frequently hurt by the high unemployment and reduced services entailed in Menem's neoliberal reforms" (Brusco et al. 2004, 83). Similarly, Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2011, 2012) identify mechanisms through which the legacy of Communism influences mass behaviors and attitudes in countries where this governmental and economic system was shed over two decades ago. Whether through social, socio-demographic, differing economic and political institutions or outcomes, a shadow of Communism continues to cast itself over large parts of Europe, "In the world outside the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, younger, more educated, and more democratically inclined citizens tend to have a left-wing bias in terms of self-placement on a standard left-right scale. In post-communist countries, however, it is the opposite" (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2012, 157). Even years after their supposed demise, recent scholarship has demonstrated that institutions

continue to influence how citizens behave within and perceive of their governments and democratic systems.

In key ways the research presented in this dissertation extends the theoretical and empirical findings discussed above. First, until now, research on the continued impact of past institutions on citizens' behaviors and attitudes has tended to be centered on national and cross-national explanations. As expounded upon in Chapter I, the current project recognizes and explains important variation in institutional presences at the subnational level. Just as the effect of corporatism can be, in part, explained by municipal context, it is also possible that communism's effect in Europe and neoliberalism's effect in Argentina also varies along subnational lines. Second, and perhaps more importantly, this dissertation demonstrates that some institutions of the past not only continue to influence citizens through a "legacy" effect, but are indeed thriving in post-dual transition 21st century. As scholars continue to seek to understand how institutions affect democratic development and consolidation, it should be remembered that institutions that were created in previous eras may be more dynamic and robust than originally thought.

Concluding Remarks

This dissertation has contributed to our understanding of how institutions in developing countries affect citizens' attitudes and behaviors. It speaks to a number of different literatures spanning across various disciplines and sub-disciplines including comparative political behavior, political institutions, and political sociology. Finally, the research described in these pages advances our knowledge on the role of the National

Federation of Colombian Coffee-Growers on that country's political and democratic development. However, it would be a mistake to consider this research the final word on either the role of subnational corporatism, or even the FNCC.

Here I have relied heavily on the use of quantitative methods and econometric techniques to understand the ecological effects of the FNCC on Colombians' behaviors and attitudes. While the quantitative results presented here suggest a relationship between the FNCC's presence and citizen behaviors and attitudes, this project would benefit from a more qualitative component. Through semi-structured interviews and focus groups, it would be possible to uncover the mechanisms in which the Federation affects citizens within a municipality. Are those who associate with the FNCC more affected by its presence than those who do not? Are respondents who work directly in the coffee sector more likely to be influenced by the Federation than those who work in more peripheral occupations or outside of the coffee and agricultural sector all together? Does living in one area of a municipality affect the influence the FNCC has on a Colombian? All of these questions would be difficult to answer through survey research, however, with well-designed and carefully executed qualitative research methods, I could begin to understand the varying levels of influence the Federation has, not only *across* municipalities, but *within* them.

Clearly, the conclusions presented here speak directly to only one case, the National Coffee Federation in Colombia. Do similar relationships exist in other countries? What about in countries that are traditionally more corporatist than Colombia? What about other subnational institutions? While the actual empirical approach used in this dissertation would have to be modified and would not be able to be applied exactly as

is for other cases or other countries, this research does present a strategy for systematically assessing institutional presence at the subnational-level and then assessing how that presence affects individuals' behaviors and attitudes. As comparative politics continues to understand the role of subnational context within the larger political environment, analyses such as this one will become ever more important and more useful within a broader research agenda.

Notwithstanding the continued research opportunities described above, this dissertation makes an important contribution not only to our understanding of Colombian politics and society, but also to how we understand and conceptualize how subnational institutions affect citizens' political behaviors and attitudes. In sum, this dissertation finds that at the subnational level, corporatism not only continues to exist in 21st century Latin America, but that it influences citizens in ways that would be consistent with the theorizing of scholars from the 1970s. As the region continues down its path of democratization, scholars should continue to keep in mind how institutions of the past may continue to survive and how these institutions might affect the political development of the countries in the region.

APPENDIX A.

DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES

Variable	Question Wording or explanation	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
<i>Dependent Variables</i>						
Trust in Municipal Government	“To what point do you trust in your municipal government?”	7,145	53.14	30.65	0	100
Trust in Departmental Government	“To what point do you trust in your departmental government?”	3,995	58.97	28.29	0	100
Trust in National Government	“To what point do you trust in the national government?”	7,107	62.82	30.02	0	100
Satisfaction with Municipal Services	“Would you say that the services that the municipality is providing to the people are very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad?”	7,215	54.80	20.77	0	100
Vote	“Did you vote en the last presidential elections? (1=yes)”	7,276	0.66	0.47	0	1
Party Identification	“In this moment, do you identify with a political party?” (1=yes)	5,193	0.31	0.46	0	1
Petition	Respondent report having petitioned a government official in the past year.	7,315	0.31	0.46	0	1
Talk about Politics	Respondent reported having tried to convince somebody to vote for a particular candidate at least “sometimes”	7,277	0.26	0.44	0	1
Work for Campaign	“Did you work for a party or candidate during the last presidential elections?” (1=yes)	7,183	0.14	0.35	0	1
Attend Municipal Meeting	“Have you attended an open meeting or municipal council session in the past 12 months?” (1=yes)	6,203	0.11	0.31	0	1
<i>Independent Variables</i>						
Education	Level of formal education (by cohort).	7,309	1.85	0.82	0	3
Age	Respondents’ age in years	7,314	2.63	1.43	1	6
Leftist Ideology	The respondent self-placed as 1, 2, 3 or 4 on the 1-10 ideological scale.	7,315	0.14	0.34	0	1
Centrist Ideology	The respondent self-placed as 5 or 6 on the 1-10 ideological	7,315	0.29	0.45	0	1

	scale					
Righest Ideology	The respondent self-placed as 7, 8, 9 or 10 on the 1-10 ideological scale.	7,315	0.39	0.49	0	1
No Ideology (reference)	The respondent did not provide a valid response to the question asking to self-place on the ideological scale	7,315	0.19	0.39	0	1
Agricultor	Respondent reported occupation as being a land-owning farmer	6,003	0.12	0.32	0	1
Peon	Respondent reported occupation as being agricultural worker, working on somebody else's land.	6,003	0.05	0.23	0	1
Female	1 if female, 0 if male.	7,315	0.50	0.50	0	1
Wealth	Level of wealth measured by household goods. By decile	7,301	3.37	1.64	0	10
Sociotropic Evaluation	"How would you classify the economic situation of the country? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad?"	7,264	41.24	20.26	0	100
Political Knowledge	Additive index of three political knowledge questions: current president of US; number of Colombian departments; length of presidential term in Colombia	6,083	60.31	29.85	0	100

APPENDIX B.

INFORMATION ON SAMPLE DESIGN AND MUNICIPALITIES

The individual-level data used in this project came from public opinion surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010.¹ The samples used for these surveys are probabilistic, stratified, and multi-staged with random selection of unites for each stage. They are representative of the voting-age, non-institutionalized Colombian population. For each survey round, respondents from roughly 55 municipalities were included in the sample; below is a list of municipalities (by department) included in the survey and the number of respondents for each round.

Departments	Municipalities	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total
		1,479	1,487	1,491	1,491	1,503	1,493	1,506	10,450
Antioquia									
	Medellin	70	70	70	83	70	70	70	503
	Abejorral	26	26	26	13	26	26	25	168
	Bello	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	84
	Caldas	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	182
	Marinilla	26	26	26	26	26	26	18	174
Atlantico									
	Barranquilla	42	42	42	42	42	44	42	296
	Soledad	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	84
Bogota									
	Bogota	231	231	231	231	231	229	231	1615
Bolivar									

¹ Surveys conducted during even years were done as part of the AmericasBarometer, LAPOP's flagship bi-annual, 26-country survey project on political culture of democracy in the Americas. The odd years are part of a separate agreement between LAPOP, USAID and the *Observatorio de la Democracia* at the *Universidad de los Andes* to measure political attitudes, behaviors, and perceptions of Colombians on a more regular basis. For more information, see www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop.

	Cartagena	35	35	35	35	35	36	35	246
	San Juan Nepomuceno	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	196
Boyaca									
	Tunja	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	182
	Muzo	26	22	26	26	26	26	26	178
	Sutamarchan	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	182
Boyaca									
	Manizales	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	98
	Manzanares	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	182
Caqueta									
	Florencia	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	126
Cauca									
	Popayan	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	168
	Padilla	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	168
	Rosas	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	12
Cesar									
	Valledupar	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	84
	Pelaya	28	28	28	28	28	28	29	197
	San Martin	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	196
Cordoba									
	Monteria	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	84
	Ayapel	28	28	28	28	28	27	29	196
Cundinamarca									
	Factativa	26	26	26	26	26	26	27	183
	Soacha	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	84
Huila									
	Neiva	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	84
Magdalena									
	Santa Marta	14	14	14	14	14	14	15	99
	Cerro San Antonio	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	196
Meta									
	Villavicencio	12	12	12	12	12	6	12	78
	Guamal	26	26	26	26	26	24	26	180
Nariño									
	Pasto	14	14	14	14	14	14	15	99
	Cumbitara	14	26	14	14	14	26	27	135
	Sandona	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	168
Norte de Santander									
	Cucuta	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	168
Quindío									

	Armenia	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	84
Risaralda									
	Pereira	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	112
	Quinchia	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	182
	Santuario	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	182
Santander									
	Bucaramanga	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	126
	Confines	26	26	26	26	26	26	27	183
	Rionegro	26	26	26	26	26	26	27	183
Sucre									
	Chalan	16	16	0	0	0	0	0	32
	Majagual	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	196
	Morroa	0	0	28	28	28	27	28	139
Tolima									
	Ibague	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	98
	Coyaima	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	182
	Icononzo	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	182
Valle de Cauca									
	Cali	77	77	77	77	77	76	76	537
	Buga	26	26	26	26	26	26	28	184
	Florida	24	24	24	24	24	24	25	169
	Riofrio	24	24	24	24	24	24	26	170
Casanare									
	Monterrey	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	182
Putumayo									
	Puerto Asis	18	18	18	18	18	18	22	130
Vaupés									
	Mitu	18	18	18	18	18	18	14	122

Table A.1. Municipalities and corresponding number of respondents by survey year

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Akiyami, Takamasa, and Panayotis N. Varangis. 1990. "The Impact of the International Coffee Agreement on Producing Countries." *The World Bank Economic Review* 4 (2): 157–173.
- Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*.
- Arango Gaviria, Oscar. 2000. *Pereira: Años 90's*. Pereira: Universidad Tecnológica de Pereira.
- Armony, Ariel. 2006. *The Dubious Link: Civic Engagement and Democratization*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Bailey, John J. 1977. "Pluralist and Corporatist Dimensions of Interest Representation in Colombia." In *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, ed. James M. Malloy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Bates, Robert H. 1997. *Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Batteson, Regina. 2012. "Crime Victimization and Political Participation." *American Political Science Review* 106 (3): 570–587.
- Benlley, Jeffrey W., and Peter S. Baker. 2000. "The Colombian Coffee Growers' Federation: Organised, Successful Smallholder Farmers for 70 Years." *Agricultural Research and Extension Network*.
- Beyer, Robert Carlyle. 1947. "The Colombian Coffee Industry: Origins and Major Trends, 1740-1940". Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
- Bird, Richard M. 2011. "Fiscal Decentralization in Colombia: A Work (Still In) Progress". Working Paper. University of Toronto.
- Blanchard, Troy, and Todd L. Matthews. 2006. "The Configuration of the Local Economic Power and Civic Participation in the Global Economy." *Social Forces* 84 (4): 2241–2257.
- Boidi, María Fernanda. 2009. "The Missing Connection: Trust in Legislatures in Latin America". Ph.D. Dissertation, Nashville: Vanderbilt University.
- Booth, John A. 1974. "Rural Violence in Colombia, 1948-1963." *Western Political Quarterly* 27: 657–679.

- Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds. 1978. *Citizen and State: Political Participation in Latin America*. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers.
- Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006. "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses." *Political Analysis* 14 (1): 63–82.
- Brand, Donald R. 1988. *Corporatism and the Rule of Law: A Study of the National Recovery Administration*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Brusco, Valeria, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Susan C. Stokes. In progress. *Buying Votes: Distributive Politics in Democracies*.
- Bushnell, David. 2010. "Historical Setting." In *Colombia: A Country Study*, ed. Rex A. Hudson. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
- Cárdenas, Mauricio. 2010. "State Capacity in Latin America." *Economía* 10 (2).
- Citrin, Jack, and Donald Philip Green. 1986. "Presidential Leadership and the Resurgence of Trust in Government." *British Journal of Political Science* 16: 431–453.
- Cleary, Matthew R. 2007. "Electoral Competition, Participation, and Government Responsiveness in Mexico." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (2).
- Collier, David, and Ruth Berins Collier. 1977. "Who Does What, to Whom, and How: Toward a Comparative Analysis of Latin American Corporatism." In *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, ed. James M. Malloy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Collier, David, Jody LaPorte, and Jason Seawright. 2009. "Typologies: Forming Concepts and Creating Categorical Variables." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, ed. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2012. "Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor." *Political Research Quarterly* 65 (1): 217–232.
- Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1979. "Inducements Versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism'." *American Political Science Review* 73 (4): 967–986.

- Conge, Patrick J. 1988. "The Concept of Political Participation: Toward a Definition." *Comparative Politics* 20 (2).
- Córdova Guillen, Abby Beatriz. 2008. "Divided We Fail: Economic Inequality, Social Mistrust, and Political Instability in Latin American Democracies". Ph.D. Dissertation, Nashville: Vanderbilt University.
- Corrales, Javier, and Imelda Cisnero. 1999. "Corporatism, Trade Liberalization and Sectoral Responses: The Case of Venezuela, 1989-99." *World Development* 27 (12): 2099–2122.
- Cortázar Toledo, Alfredo. 1968. "Breve Historia de la Fundación y Organización de la Federación Nacional de Cafeteros." *Revista Cafetera de Colombia* XVIII (March-April).
- Dalton, Russell J., and Christopher J. Anderson, eds. 2011. *Citizens, Context, and Choice: How Context Shapes Citizen's Electoral Choices*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dargent, Eduardo, and Paula Muñoz. 2011. "Democracy Against Parties? Party System Deinstitutionalization in Colombia." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 3 (2).
- Dillinger, William, and Steven B. Webb. 1998. "Decentralization and Fiscal Management in Colombia". Working Paper.
- Dix, Robert H. 1980. "Consociational Democracy: The Case of Colombia." *Comparative Politics* 12 (13): 303–321.
- Easton, David. 1975. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support." *British Journal of Political Science* 5: 435–457.
- Encarnación, Omar G. 1996. "The Politics of Dual Transition." *Comparative Politics* 28 (4): 477–492.
- Erickson, Kenneth Paul. 1977. *The Brazilian Corporative State and Working-Class Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Errazuriz, Maria. 1986. *Cafeteros y Cafetales Del Líbano: Cambio Tecnológico y Diferenciación Social En Una Zona Cafetera*. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
- Escobar-Lemmon, Maria. 2003. "Political Support for Decentralization: An Analysis of the Colombian and Venezuelan Legislatures." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (4): 683–697.

- Escobar-Lemmon, Maria, and Ashley D. Ross. 2011. "Does Decentralization Improve Perceptions of Accountability? Attitudes in Response to Decentralization in Colombia". Working Paper.
- Espinosa Restrepo, José Rafael, and Juan Carlos Rodríguez Raga. 2011. "Instituciones y Cultura Política: Una Mirada Exploratoria a Los Municipios De Colombia." In *Los Estados Del País: Instituciones Municipales y Realidades Locales*, ed. Mauricio García Villegas, Miguel García Sánchez, Juan Carlos Rodríguez Raga, and José Rafael Espinosa Restrepo. Bogotá: Colección Dejustia.
- Etchemendy, Sebastián, and Ruth Berins Collier. 2007. "Down But Not Out: Resurgence and Segmented Neocorporatism in Argentina (2003-2007)." *Politics and Society* 35 (3): 363–401.
- Falleti. 2010. *Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Falleti, Tulia G. 2005. "A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin America Cases in Comparative Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 99 (3): 327–346.
- Feres, Juan Carlos, and Xavier Mancero. 2001. *El Método De Las Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas (NBI) y Sus Aplicaciones En América Latina*. Santiago: CEPAL.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1999. "Extreme Voices: A Dark Side of Civic Engagement." In *Civic Engagement in American Democracy*, ed. Morris P. Fiorina and Theda Skocpol. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- FNCC. 2004. "Estatutos". Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia.
- . 2011. *Prosperidad Cafetera: Informe Del Gerente General Al LXXV Congreso Nacional De Cafeteros*. Bogotá: FEDECAFE.
- Gamson, William A. 1968. *Power and Discontent*. Homewood: Dorsey Press.
- García, Miguel. 2009. "Political Violence and Electoral Democracy in Colombia: Participation and Voting Behavior in Violent Contexts". Ph.D. Dissertation, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh.
- García Sánchez, Miguel. 2011. "Cultivos Ilícitos, Participación Política y Confianza Institucional." In *Políticas Antidrogas En Colombia: Éxitos, Fracazos y Extravíos*, ed. Alejandro Gaviria Uribe and Daniel Mejía Londoño. Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes.
- Gelman, Andrew, and Jennifer Hill. 2007. *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Giovannucci, Daniele. 2003. "Coffee." In *Colombia: The Economic Foundation of Peace*, ed. Marcelo M. Giugale, Olivier Lafourcade, and Connie Luff, 517–557. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
- Giovannucci, Daniele, José Leibovich, Diego Pizano Salazar, Gonzalo Paredes, Santiago Montenegro, Hector Arévalo, and Panos Varangis. 2002. *Colombia Coffee Sector Study*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development; Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela Country Management Unit; Latin America and Caribbean Region Office. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=996138>.
- Goggin, Malcolm L. 1986. "The 'Too Few Cases/Too Many Variables' Problem in Implementation Research." *Western Political Quarterly* 39 (2): 328–347.
- Goldschmidt, Walter. 1947. *As You Sow*. New York: The Free Press.
- Grindle, Merilee S. 2007. *Going Local: Decentralization, Democratization, and the Promise of Good Governance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Guhl, Andres. 2004. "Coffee and Landscape Change in the Colombian Countryside 1970-2002". Ph.D. Dissertation, Gainesville: University of Florida.
- Gujarati, Damodar N. 2004. *Basic Econometrics*. Fourth. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Hagopian, Frances. 1998. "Democracy and Political Representation in Latin America in the 1990s: Pause, Reorganization, or Decline?" In *Fault Line of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America*, ed. Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark. Miami: North-South Center Press at the University of Miami.
- Hammergren, Linn A. 1977. "Corporatism in Latin American Politics: A Reexamination of the 'Unique' Tradition." *Comparative Politics* 9 (4): 443–461.
- Hartlyn, Jonathan. 1988. *The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hetherington, Marc. 1998. "The Political Relevance of Political Trust." *American Political Science Review* 92: 791–808.
- Hetherington, Marc, and Jason Husser. 2012. "How Trust Matters: The Changing Political Relevance of Political Trust." *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (2): 312–325.
- Hiskey, Jonathan T., and Shaun Bowler. 2005. "Local Context and Democratization in Mexico." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (1): 57–71.

- Hiskey, Jonathan T., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2003. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37 (4): 64–88.
- Huckfeldt, Robert. 1979. "Political Participation and the Neighborhood Social Context." *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (3).
- . 1986. *Politics in Context: Assimilation and Conflict in Urban Neighborhoods*. New York: Agathon Press, Inc.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Jackman, Robert W. 1985. "Cross-National Statistical Research and the Study of Comparative Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (1): 161–182.
- Junguito, Roberto, and Diego Pizano. 1991. *Producción De Café En Colombia*. Bogotá: Fondo Cultural Cafetero, FEDESARROLLO.
- . 1997. *Instituciones e Instrumentos De La Política Cafetera En Colombia (1927-1997)*. Bogotá: Fondo Cultural Cafetero, FEDESARROLLO.
- Junguito, Roberto, and Diego Pizano Salazar. 1994. *El Comercio Exterior y La Política Internacional Del Café*. Bogotá: Fondo Cultural Cafetero, FEDESARROLLO.
- Kam, Cindy D., and Robert J. Franzese. 2006. *Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Kline, Harvey F. 2004. "Colombia: Pluralism and Corporatism in a Weak State." In *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America--Revisited*, ed. Howard J. Wiarda. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Koffman, Bennett Eugene. 1969. "The National Federation of Coffee-Growers of Colombia". Ph.D. Dissertation, Charlottesville: University of Virginia.
- Kubicek, Paul. 2000. *Unbroken Ties: The State, Interest Associations, and Corporatism in Post-Soviet Ukraine*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Kurtz, Marcus J., and Andrew Schrank. 2012. "Capturing State Strength: Experimental and Econometric Approaches." *Revista De Ciencia Política* 32 (3): 613–621.
- Lehmbruch, Gerhard. 1989. "Consociational Democracy, Class Conflict and the New Corporatism." In *Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation*, ed. Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch. New York: Sage Publications.

- Lijphart, Arend. 1971. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." *American Political Science Review* 65 (3): 682–693.
- . 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Linz, Juan J., and Amando de Miguel. 1966. "Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains." In *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research*, ed. Richard Merritt and Stein Rokkan. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1981. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- London, Christopher Edward. 1997. "Class Relations and Capitalist Development: Subsumption in the Colombian Coffee Industry, 1928-1992." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 24 (4): 269–295.
- . 1999. "Desarrollismo, Democracia y Crisis Cafetera. Una Interpretación Cultural." In *Conflictos Regionales: La Crisis Del Eje Cafetero*, ed. Gonzalo Sánchez. Bogotá: IEPRI-FESCOL.
- . 2002. "From Subordinates to Citizens: DEvelopment, Democracy and Theory in Rural Colombia". Ph.D. Dissertation, Ithaca: Cornell University.
- Lyson, Thomas A., Robert J. Torres, and Rick Welsh. 2001. "Scale of Agricultural Production, Civic Engagement, and Community Welfare." *Social Forces* 80 (1): 311–327.
- Machado, Absalón. 1994. *El Café: De La Aparcería Al Capitalismo*. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo S.A.
- Malloy, James M. 1974. "Authoritarianism, Corporatism and Mobilization in Peru." *The Review of Politics* 36 (1): 52–84.
- Malloy, James M., ed. 1977. *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Martinez Becerra, Carlos. 1988. *La Marina Mercante y El Desarrollo Nacional*. Bogotá: Carvajal, S.A.

- Mills, C. Wright, and Melville Ulmer. 1970. "Small Business and Civic Welfare." In *The Structure of Community Power*, ed. Michael Aiken and Paul Mott. New York: Random House.
- Montalvo, Jorge Daniel. 2011. "Decentralization and Participatory Democracy in Latin America: The Political Survival of Elites". Ph.D. Dissertation, Nashville: Vanderbilt University.
- Morck, Randall K., and Bernard Yeung. 2010. "Corporatism and the Ghost of the Third Way." *Capitalism and Society* 5 (3).
- Munck, Gerardo L., and Richard Snyder. 2007. *Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Muñoz Mora, Juan Carlos. 2010. "Los Caminos Del Café: Aproximación a Los Efectos Del Conflicto Armado Rural En La Producción Cafetera Colombiana." *Ensayos Sobre Política Económica* 63 (Diciembre).
- Mussolini, Benito. 1975. *The Corporate State: with an Appendix Including the Labour Charter, the Text of Laws on Syndical and Corporate Organizations, and Explanatory Notes*. New York: H. Fertig.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 1977. "Corporatism and the Question of the State." In *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, ed. James M. Malloy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- O'Neill, Kathleen. 2003. "Decentralization as an Electoral Strategy?" *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (9): 1068–1091.
- . 2005. *Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Oliver, J. Eric. 1999. "The Effects of Metropolitan Economic Segregation on Local Civic Participation." *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (1): 186–212.
- Ortiz, Sutti. 1999a. *Harvesting Coffee, Bargaining Wages: Rural Labor Markets in Colombia, 1975-1990*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- . 1999b. *Harvesting Coffee, Bargaining Wages: Rural Labor Markets in Colombia 1975-1990*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Palacios, Marco. 1980. *Coffee in Colombia, 1850-1970*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2006. *Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002*. Durham: Duke University Press.

- Pateman, Carole. 1970. *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pizano Salazar, Diego. 2001. *El Café En La Encrucijada: Evolución y Perspectivas*. Bogotá: Alfaomega.
- Pop-Eleches, Grigore, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2011. "Communism's Shadow: Postcommunist Legacies, Values, and Behavior." *Comparative Politics* 43 (4): 379–399.
- . 2012. "Post-Communist Legacies and Political Behavior and Attitudes." *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 20 (2): 157–166.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Shuster.
- Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, Raffaella Y. Nanetti, and Franco Pavoncello. 1983. "Explaining Institutional Success: The Case of Italian Regional Government." *The American Political Science Review* 77 (1): 55–74.
- Raudenbush, Stephen W., and Anthony S. Byrk. 2002. *Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods*. Second. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Reina, Mauricio, Gabriel Silva, Luis Fernando Samper, and María del Pilar Fernández. 2007. *La Estrategia Detrás De La Marca*. Bogotá: Ediciones B.
- Rincón García, John Jairo. 2005. *Trabajo, Territorio y Política: Expresiones Regionales De La Crisis Cafetera 1990-2002*. Medellín: La Carreta Editores E.U.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. 1974. "Still the Century of Corporatism?" *Review of Politics* 36 (1): 85–131.
- . 1989. "Corporatism Is Dead! Long Live Corporatism! Reflections on Andrew Shonfield's Modern Capitalism." *Government and Opposition* 24 (1): 54–73.
- Schumpeter, Joseph Alois. 1942. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Seligson, Mitchell A., and John A. Booth, eds. 1979. *Politics and the Poor: Political Participation in Latin America*. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers.

- Snyder, Richard. 2001a. "Scaling Down: Subnational Approaches to Comparative Politics." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36 (1): 93–110.
- . 2001b. *Politics After Neoliberalism: Reregulation in Mexico*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Soifer, Hillel David. 2012. "Measuring State Capacity in Contemporary Latin America." *Revista De Ciencia Política* 32 (3): 585–598.
- Taylor, Steven L. 2009. *Voting Amid Violence: Electoral Democracy in Colombia*. Hanover: University Press of New England.
- Tsai, Lily L. 2011. "Friends or Foes? Nonstate Public Good Providers and Local State Authorities in Nondemocratic and Transitional Systems." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 46: 46–69.
- UNDP. 2003. *Un Pacto Por La Región: De La Crisis Cafetera a Una Oportunidad De Desarrollo Regional*. Bogotá, Colombia: United Nations Development Programme.
- Urrutia Montaya, Miguel. 1983. *Gremios, Política Económica y Democracia*. Bogotá: Fondo Cultural Cafetero.
- Verba, Sidney, and Norman H. Nie. 1972. *Participation in Americas: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Scholzman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Wiarda, Howard J. 1973. "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model." *World Politics* 25 (2): 206–235.
- . 1974. "Corporatism and Development in the Iberic-Latin World: Persistent Strains and New Variations." *Review of Politics* 36 (1): 3–33.
- . 1997. *Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great "Ism"*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
- Wiarda, Howard J., ed. 2004. *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America-Revisited*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Willis, Eliza, Christopher da C.B. Garman, and Stephen Haggard. 1999. "The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 34 (1): 7–56.

- Young, Dennis R. 2000. "Alternative Models of Government-Nonprofit Sector Relations: Theoretical and International Perspectives." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 29 (1): 149–172.
- Zechmeister, Elizabeth J., and Margarita Corral. 2012. "Individual and Contextual Constraints on Ideological Labels in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 46 (6): 675–701.
- Zechmeister, Elizabeth J., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2012. "Public Opinion Research in Latin America." In *Routledge Handbook of Latin American Politics*. New York: Routledge.