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Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death

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ETIOLOGY AND CASE STUDIES OF MASS DEATH

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To Raphael Lemkin
(1901-1959)

International lawyer, scholar, activist, and principal
drafter of the 1948 U.N. Convention for the Prevention
and Punishment of Genocide

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

INTRODUCTION

Isidor Wallimann and
Michael N. Dobkowski

Millions have died from poverty, millions from war and, as will become evident in this book, millions have been victims of genocide. While the social sciences have long been concerned with poverty—its effects, causes, and prevention—much less attention has been given to the nature of social conflicts and their possible escalation into war and the destruction of human lives. Attempts to increase our understanding of the nature of social conflicts and ways to de-escalate them (e.g., Kriesberg 1973) are part of a relatively recent endeavor to use social science insights for the prevention of war and the maintenance of peace. Still, despite the growing number of individuals and research institutes devoted to "peace research," efforts to successfully destroy life through war far outweigh those to preserve it. When it comes to genocide, the situation is even more precarious. Although genocide has been a recurring social phenomenon and has become ever more devastating in terms of lost human life as we have moved into the twentieth century, little effort has been spent in assessing its causes in the hope of better preventing it. It is as if events of genocidal proportions have—for whatever psychological or sociological reasons—been suppressed and excluded from the researchers' agenda. Yet, it is our opinion that genocide, like poverty, war, and all other events and processes destructive of human life, should gain top attention from scholars. With this collection of essays, we wish to enhance and facilitate this process in the hope that knowledge and "scientific" effort will increasingly be directed toward and serve the preservation of life.

If such scholarly efforts are to contribute to the improvement of the human condition by preserving life, in the case of genocide we can no

longer conceive of it as a random (although relatively rare) historic phe-
nomenon. Instead, we are compelled to look for patterns which lead to
and are associated with these annihilations. Difficult as it may be to ac-
cept such a notion, we must also look upon the history and nature of so-
cieties giving rise to genocides as man-made and thereby influenceable.
Any other perspective would preclude the human agency necessary to act
preventively. Thus, postulating that the social and historic circumstances
making genocide possible are man-made, and that genocides, far from
being random events, may be associated with certain social patterns, we
must begin to penetrate the circumstances under which human beings
have been annihilated in the past so that we can establish criteria for the
prevention of similar destructions in the future.

This volume is divided into two parts. The first part contains contri-
butions of a general nature. They are primarily concerned with defini-
tions, typologies, and explanations of genocide. The essays in the sec-
ond part focus more heavily on special aspects of the phenomenon. On
the one hand, they illuminate processes or special characteristics asso-
ciated with a particular genocide. On the other hand, they attempt to test
specific hypotheses or to explain the emergence of a given event of
genocide. Ultimately, both the more general and the specific articles
complement and draw from each other. In no way can they be treated as
mutually exclusive. Both parts, we believe, bring us a step further in the
"scientific" analysis and understanding of genocide as a modern social
and historical phenomenon.

Any disciplined analysis of genocide requires that certain definitional
issues and problems be clarified. Even if such problems cannot imme-
diately be resolved, they must nevertheless be articulated. This we have
attempted to do at the outset. Here the discussion centers around such
issues as the groups that should be subsumed under any discussion of
victims of genocide. In addition to racial groups, for example, should
the annihilation of ethnic, religious, economic, or political groups also be
included in a definition of genocide? Other points concern the question
of numbers killed, intent, and plan. How many or what percentage of
members of a group must be destroyed before an event should be called
genocidal? Must this destruction be intentional or should any com-
parable destruction, intentional or not, be categorized as genocide? The
important question also arises concerning when, if at all, war is genocide
and genocide is war.

Not unrelated to definitions of genocide is the attempt to classify
events of genocide. In fact, classifications and typologies are a neces-
sary prerequisite if genocide is to be understood and explained at all.
Again, we have chosen to place contributions aiming to develop and
justify typologies of genocide in Part I, which investigates how geno-
cides have varied throughout history and to what extent this variance
may have been "caused" by differences in modes of production; differ-

ences in warfare; economic competition; the tendency to accumulate eco-
nomic power and wealth; differences in state power; the need to maintain
political control; or bureaucratization, ideology, and technology.

In many ways, typologies imply explanation because events of geno-
cide are grouped according to criteria which in themselves can serve as
explanation. Nevertheless, the first part of this volume also includes
contributions which focus, aside from any explanatory power inherent in
typologies, on more general explanations of genocide. Thus, it is dis-
cussed how genocide could be a technique of dealing with surplus popu-
lations, implying that if the rise of surplus populations could be pre-
vented genocide might not occur. Other endeavors look for an expla-
nation of genocide in the existence of severe social cleavages, and in the
outright support of (or lack of constraints placed on) totalitarian regimes
by other nations. Also, it is postulated that the inability to carry through
structural social and political readjustments induces genocide, particu-
larly when drastic changes might be called for as a result of defeat in
war, national independence, revolution, and so on. Finally, it is sug-
gested that we should begin to understand modern genocides not as
examples of a rather impersonal process of technological rationality, or
as the results of structurally induced crises, but rather as acts of societal
madness. The entire notion of purposeful intentionality is critically
explored.

More specific studies characterize Part II. By focusing on the cor-
ruption of the law as it preluded genocide, by examining the Jewish
Holocaust, and by looking at other instances of genocide such as the
Armenian case or the "genocide" perpetrated against the Aborigines in
connection with colonialism and imperialism, it is possible to improve
our understanding of mass death. In addition, the question of the
uniqueness or universality of genocide(s) can fruitfully be dealt with in
this manner. For should the Holocaust, for example, prove to be
unique, the criteria making it thus can be drawn upon as explanatory
variables for a better understanding not only of the Holocaust but also,
by inference, of other examples of mass death. Thus, it is postulated
that the Holocaust is unique because of its scope, its unprecedented
involvement of the legal and administrative apparatus, the horrible treat-
ment meted out to the individuals to be annihilated, and the concerted
ideological campaign directed against the population targeted for destruc-
tion. Yet these destructions do not occur in a vacuum. In as much as it
is individuals who carry out these atrocities, it also is important to pose
certain questions on the social psychology level. For example, which
ideology, mind sets, and personalities must already exist or be created
for individuals or even major segments of a society to feel unashamed
and justified in being part of an extermination enterprise?

It has been suggested that middleman minorities, due to their peculiar
position, and to the cleavages and conflicts in which they partake or be-

come involved, are particularly likely to be discriminated against. Could it be that, since such discrimination has often assumed high levels of intensity, middleman minorities are therefore likely to become victims of genocide? Is there a connection between middleman minority status and genocide? For, should such a connection exist, we may have come a step closer to understanding the phenomenon and possibly being able to devise ways of preventing it.

Given the issues and questions raised in this collection, where do we go from here? What points need further clarification, and what problems still are to be solved? Admittedly, they are many, and if we, as editors, now enter the discussion by pointing out some of the issues we believe need further attention, we are fully aware of the selective nature of our attempt. Yet, we maintain that these issues are pressing and important. They concern the connection between genocide, surplus population, economic gain, and middleman minorities, and the question of intentionality as it pertains to genocide.

We believe that it is of great importance to further investigate the connection between genocide and the presence or absence of surplus populations, just as it has been important to investigate the evolution of societies, their stratification systems, and the corresponding existential conditions in a manner that includes population size in relation to available resources (Lenski 1966). However, in studying the connection between genocide and surplus population, we need not necessarily confine ourselves solely to the question of how so-called surplus populations have been and are being eliminated. We can equally inquire how society has "constructively" rather than "destructively" dealt with surplus populations throughout history. For instance, we can study, as Mizruchi (1983) shows, how potentially troublesome surplus populations, far from being annihilated, have been socially controlled and regulated. Thus, by inference, ways might be found which preempt genocidal strategies of surplus population management.

Whenever the notion of surplus population is being used, it is important to distinguish between absolute and relative surplus population, something Lenski and Mizruchi fail to do. For a portion of the society may appear to us as superfluous while in fact it is not. Appearances can be misleading and superficial; our observation that some people can no longer maintain themselves or lack sufficient integration into the economic system may tempt us to conclude that a surplus of people exists. However, taking appearances for reality has more often than not been a source of great error. If, as is the case in capitalist societies, for instance, millions go hungry, are unemployed, underemployed, or on welfare while factories run at much lower than full capacity and land remains uncultivated or inappropriately used, the problem is not one of having too many people. The problem lies instead in the structure of the economy and the entire mode of production and distribution. The ap-

parent surplus population is, under these circumstances, only relative, not absolute, and should not even be called a surplus population. This term itself tends to blame the victims, i.e., those negatively affected by the politics inherent in a given mode of production. It tends to single them out as the problem's source, overlooking the real sources of the apparent overpopulation located in the economic system as a whole. In short, the problem of relative surplus population is one of political economy, not one of individuals reproducing at a rate faster than economic means can be made available. Even if one were able to show that a society or segments thereof reproduce in excess of what can be produced to maintain everyone, it must be kept in mind that fertility rates themselves are influenced by existing economic conditions. This can be observed in those cases in which some elements of the population who are marginalized economically distribute their risks by increasing the number of offsprings. All this goes to demonstrate that so-called surplus populations are rarely absolute. Should the presence of a relative surplus population, therefore, be connected with events of genocide, it follows that in order to prevent the latter, structural economic changes preventing the rise of relative surplus populations must be brought about.

The present tradition (see, for instance, Rubenstein 1983) of linking relative surplus population with genocide postulates that this surplus population consists of the chronically unproductive and generally unemployable who, in times of crisis, might be eliminated. Since large-scale elimination has been witnessed under Joseph Stalin as well as under Adolf Hitler, it is concluded that these genocides served as a means to reduce or eliminate the existing relative surplus population perceived to be problematic. It is our opinion, however, that the population eliminated in both cases should not be characterized as chronically unproductive and generally unemployable, and when they showed such "traits," as in part was the case in Germany, this was the result of a policy that systematically cut Jews off from economic activity. What we are confronted with here, therefore, seems to be a problem involving the categories employed. This problem deserves further attention and scrutiny. The following questions must be asked: Why were other groups not eliminated who readily appeared as superfluous, i.e., as chronically unproductive and generally unemployable? Why should the relative surplus population be eradicated indirectly? What can be gained, and who benefits (politically and economically) from an elimination of middleman minorities or otherwise situated economically integrated segments of a population in order to "solve" the relative surplus population problem? In a larger economic and political context, what could be the function of generating "vacancies" by eliminating groups that would not usually be called chronically unproductive or generally unemployable? Why is it that programmed and planned annihilation, historically speaking, seems to be directed more often against economically integrated non-wage labor

groups (such as middleman minorities) while wage laborers, the margin-
alized, and the poor of all ages seem to perish without explicit effort and
intention on the part of the remaining society?

The related idea that only intentional or planned massive destruction
of human lives should be called genocide can also be a very difficult and,
in our opinion, an inadequate notion. As such it has the tendency to
gloss over structural violence which through various mechanisms can be
equally as destructive of human life as many an intentional and planned
program of annihilation. In addition, the presence of structural violence
promotes the use of planned violence. The problem here lies not in the
difficulty of demonstrating what intentionality means psychologically
speaking, but rather in the neglect of those processes of destruction
which, although massive, are so systematic and systemic, and that there-
fore appear so "normal" that most individuals involved at some level of
the process of destruction may never see the need to make an ethical
decision or even reflect upon the consequences of their actions. What
prevents people from stepping outside of their particular situations and
from reflecting upon the consequences of their actions or inactions? Has
society, a product of human activity, become so objectified, so alien to
its source, that its creators feel no part of its operation, feel no possibility
of affecting its course of movement? Why is it that individuals do not
seem to be able to reflect upon the processes that have made them
anonymous actors, cogs in the system, and that have nudged many of
them to participate in genocide?

In a world that historically has moved from domination based pri-
marily on the will of given individuals (in the Middle Ages, for example)
to one in which individuals are dominated by anonymous forces such as
market mechanisms, bureaucracies, and distant decision making by com-
mittees and parliaments, the emphasis on intentionality almost appears
anachronistic. To be sure, we are not suggesting that the individual actor
qua actor, be it Eichmann, a Turkish nationalist, or a soldier sitting in a
missile silo, is not responsible and should not be held accountable for his
or her actions. Neither do we say that they would not be capable of
making existential decisions. People do have a choice. Neither are we
suggesting that a specific nation or group engaged in genocide is in-
volved in a process that has a degree of inevitability about it, hence
mitigating the issue of accountability. Rather, we are pointing to the fact
that in the modern age, the issue of intentionality on the societal level is
harder to locate because of the anonymous and amorphous structural
forces that dictate the character of our world. Technically speaking,
individuals have a will and retain the capacity to use it, but how often is
their agency the product of their will and intentions? Where in these
market mechanisms and decision-making processes lies the origin of in-
tent, and whose intentions are being carried out? If, as a result of world-
wide market involvement and market pressures, slaves in the eighteenth

century began to be worked to death within some seven or eight years, down from a much longer life expectancy, where can the plan for this large-scale destruction of members of the black race be located? And why was there no serious reflection on the part of slaveholding society concerning the long-run economic consequences for the slave system as a whole, to say nothing of the humanitarian and moral considerations, dictated by the waste of such a cruel and seemingly "irrational" system? And where was the rest of the world? Ideology, racism, and the availability of surplus labor to exploit, be it in the American South or in the Nazi slave labor camps, are certainly operative and important factors, but they are only partial explanations.

These are important questions since they force us to probe more deeply and fundamentally into the nature of social structures and systems. Aside from the presence or absence of intentions and plans, it must be investigated which forms of social organization are more likely to guarantee the preservation rather than the systematic destruction of lives through structural violence. Which forms of social organization also make it less likely for a massive genocide to occur? Along these lines it can be hypothesized that the less a society is permeated by structural violence, the lower will be the likelihood of genocide and mass destruction, for societies with lower levels of structural violence are also less likely to allow for planned large-scale genocide. The less individuals' lives are ruled by anonymous forces, i.e., the less they are subject to structural violence of any kind, the less likely it is that they will become involved as perpetrators in an event of genocide. Conversely, in societies where all are perpetrated upon, all become perpetrators in one way or another. Therefore, freedom from structural violence and the anonymous forces that dominate modern man seems to be one precondition for overcoming our age of genocide. For, if in history we have increasingly moved to more frequent and massive forms of genocide as anonymous and impersonal domination increased, it follows that, aside from personal domination and intentions, the structural domination—that anonymous domination exerted by the character of an entire social system—would have to be reversed. Not necessarily eliminating genocide resulting from personal domination or the exercise of that power (by dictator, tyrant, king, tribal chieftain, for example), this reversal may contribute to the mitigation of the massive and frequent genocides that have been part of the landscape of modern human intercourse. Making genocide by definition dependent on the existence of any intention and plan to destroy lives, therefore, seems historically and politically too limiting.

What is required, then, is a greater degree of reflection upon and awareness of the anonymous societal forces that frame and propel our existence so that we can begin the arduous task of eliminating the structural violence that leads to domination, inequality, and the possibility of

genocide. Ultimately what seems to be needed is a society that can provide an equal access to power and resources for all with a minimum degree of personal or structural coercion. We are fully aware of the utopian nature of our suggestions and recognize that such a world order may never be achieved. Nevertheless, we stress our conviction that efforts in this direction must begin. We believe that the clarification of this predicament must be attempted so that the struggle to eliminate structural violence and domination can be initiated. Correct action requires understanding. Whatever progress is made in this pursuit, be it modest or radical, will contribute to diminishing the possibility that in the future we will engage in genocide, this most pernicious of anti-life-affirming behaviors.

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PART I

Conceptualizing, Classifying, Defining, and Explaining Genocide: Some Macro Perspectives

1

A TYPOLOGY OF GENOCIDE AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA

Kurt Jonassohn and Frank Chalk

INTRODUCTION

To begin with, such a title requires an explanation. Why would any-
one try to construct a typology of genocide? The great majority of
serious studies that deal with genocide deal with a single case, usually
the Holocaust, less often with the Armenians in Turkey, and very rarely
with other cases. In doing a study of a single case no typology is re-
quired, either because the case is treated as a unique event, or because
the argument involves the internal sequence of circumstances that led to
the genocide.

The need for some method of classification becomes apparent only
when one is trying to deal with a large number of cases comparatively.
In fact, in so doing one even becomes aware of the need for a rather
rigorous and unambiguous definition; how else will one decide which
cases belong in the study and which ones really represent a quite differ-
ent phenomenon and thus should not be included? But even after this
first step has been taken, the question arises whether all of the cases that
do meet the criteria of the definition should be considered as falling into
one large group. This question tends to answer itself after some pre-
liminary work on some of the cases has been done. It is quickly appar-

ent that genocides occur in quite different societies, under vastly varying circumstances, confronting quite different people, and resulting in dramatically different outcomes. Thus, treating all such cases as if they represented an undifferentiated phenomenon seems unlikely to lead to the kinds of results that are the aim of scholarly research. What we need is to group together those cases that appear to have some crucial characteristics in common. If we can fit all observed cases into one of several such classes, then we can talk about a process of classification, the end result of which will be a typology.

The textbooks on research methods tell us that the classes in a typology must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Such a requirement is difficult enough to meet but is not sufficient. We are not interested in imposing on our data some typology for the sake of order and neatness. A typology is a tool of research; unless it can be used as a tool in the analysis of the data, it is merely a frill that looks elegant but leads neither to meaning nor to explanation. If our aim is to satisfy such requirements, then the question arises as to what to use as a basis of building a typology. It soon appears that typologies could be built around several criteria. Thus, one could look at minority-majority relations within a society as well as power relations between societies; one might classify genocides by the means employed as well as by the results achieved; or one could consider causes as well as intentions. No doubt other bases for developing a typology could be added. And good reasons for using any of these could probably be developed. The choice will depend on the kinds of questions we want to explore. But the answer is really based on a hunch about the nature of the research to be undertaken. The very word "research" tells us that we are entering the realm of the unknown; if we knew the answers beforehand, we would not be searching for them. Thus, the adequacy of any particular typology can only be assessed in terms of the research results it helps to produce.

The typology to be proposed here is based on the hunch that intent is one such crucial criterion. If a definable group of people was almost or wholly eliminated, but nobody intended this to occur, is this genocide? Some definitions of genocide do not include the intent of the perpetrator. However, the case made here is that such events, although equally regrettable, are not genocides and therefore should be called something else. This leaves us with the task of trying to classify the kinds of intentions of the perpetrators and leads directly to a major difficulty: how does one prove or infer intent?

One of the major reasons for engaging in the study of genocide from a historical and comparative perspective is to find out whether some kinds of societies are more likely to commit genocide than others. From this perspective, it seems that a typology based on intent might have a great deal of analytic utility. However, there are two problems with the criterion of intent: first, it is rarely easy to get good evidence on conscious

intent and, second, intent may be either explicit or implicit. However, the criterion of intent seems so important, and other criteria for constructing a typology seem to yield so little analytic gold, that these difficulties will simply have to be dealt with to the best of our ability. With these remarks in mind, the present chapter will discuss the need to examine events within the context in which they occurred, examine the reasons why genocidal events have been largely ignored in the literature until the middle of the twentieth century, and propose a typology of genocide.

THE BRUTISHNESS OF THE PAST
AND COLLECTIVE DENIAL

Our study of genocide has forced us on many occasions to confront the brutishness of most human societies in the past and the changing value placed on human life. It was not very long ago that many human societies sacrificed human beings to propitiate the gods, to protect the living against their displeasure, and to reassert the corporate unity of society. Human sacrifice existed throughout the ancient world, buttressed by religions that promised a good life in the afterworld to the sacrificial victim as well as the favor of the gods in this world for those who carried out the ritual slayings. The most recent discovery by archeologists excavating at Carthage of the remains of 6,000 infants sealed in individual sacrificial urns gives credence to the reports of commentators in the ancient world that the Carthaginian aristocracy gave its youngest sons to the priests for sacrifice to win the favor of the gods of war. In many societies human sacrifice continued until the society embraced an ethic that ennobled the individual in this world and adopted a code of behavior that placed this new ethic above the need to satisfy the grim appetite of the old gods for human blood.[1] Nigel Davies, who traces this change among the ancient Hebrews, credits them with transforming the "concept of life-giving . . . into that of self-giving." He contends that once the ancient Hebrews came to see God as good and just, human sacrifice ceased entirely.[2]

Yet even in those societies which abandoned human sacrifice, daily life was coarse and brutal for all but the very few. The great French historian Fernand Braudel reminds us that famines and epidemics were so common that "they were incorporated into man's biological regime and built into his daily life."[3] In Western Europe, which was favored by nature, "famine only disappeared at the close of the eighteenth century, or even later."[4] Sixteenth-century European towns worked out elaborate stratagems to divert armies of starving peasants from their gates. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, France and England developed new institutions to control the poor displaced peasants who flocked to their

cities and to harness their labor. The physically fit poor of Paris were often chained together in pairs and forced to clean the drains, while the poor of London were held in poorhouses under the new authority of the Poor Laws and put to work at menial labor. Conditions for the mass of the people were even worse, according to Braudel, in China and India, where famines struck more frequently and with greater severity than in Europe.

Peasants in Europe who reacted to their misery by stealing food or property felt the full vengeance of the law. Death or maiming were the usual penalties until the late Middle Ages. Medieval penalties for such crimes were codified in the German Empire in the *Constitutio Criminalis Carolina* of 1532, which was representative of European practice. After specifying such penalties as hanging in chains, beheading or burial alive, and impaling for the graver crimes, the *Carolina* takes up less serious crimes such as theft. For these offenses it "prescribes afflictive punishments—flogging, pillorying, cutting off the ears, chopping off the fingers, cutting out the tongue—usually accompanied by a sentence of banishment."[5] In Western Europe, following the enormous population losses of the Thirty Years' War and the start of the effort to populate overseas colonies, human life came to be more highly valued. In the mid-seventeenth century, England and France moderated their use of capital punishment in cases of crimes against property.[6] As the number of executions in England diminished, the English turned to the transportation of convicts to the colonies for terms of labor as indentured servants.[7] At the same time, France and other Mediterranean countries found it increasingly useful to sentence physically fit convicted felons to life sentences as oarsmen on naval galleys. (The argument in this paragraph follows Langbein, chapter 2.)

This coarseness and brutality of human existence throughout much of history was a subject that hardly ever appeared in the curricula of our schools. The good news was reported; the bad news was not. The great massacres of the past lay beyond the range of the telescopes designed to focus upon evidence that justice always triumphed. In high school and university-level textbooks, Athens flourished, but the massacre of the men of Melos was barely mentioned. The Romans destroyed Carthage and Corinth, but the fate of their peoples was not discussed. The authors of history textbooks hardly ever reported what the razing of an ancient city meant for its inhabitants. In other words, the fate of millions of human beings who died unnatural deaths as defenseless civilians was invisible.

Our review of the history of mass extermination and its neglect has led us to the conclusion that until very recently scholars participated in a process of pervasive and self-imposed denial. Many factors entered into the process of collective denial. Throughout most of recorded time, it was the victors who wrote the history of their conquests, and even the

victims of mass extermination accepted their fate as a natural outcome of defeat. The idea of human rights is relatively new in Western society; even today, many parts of the world still emphasize duties more than rights. The Enlightenment tradition of viewing human beings as inherently good and rational also played a part in the denial, as did the rise of nationalism. The slaughter of people of *other* races, religions, and nationalities barely offended anyone's sensibilities.

It took the shocks of the twentieth century to reverse the process of collective denial; the gap between practice and ideals simply became too great to support the intellectual foundations of such denial. The Jews who survived the Holocaust refused to accept meekly the Nazis' assault on their right to exist. They recorded their experiences for posterity. At the end of World War II, the victorious Allied powers tried and executed top Nazi leaders judged guilty of crimes against humanity, an action which created a new interest in the history of crimes against civilians. Parochialism and nationalism were undermined by the spread of the democratic ideal after the war and the increasing sophistication of the mass of the people that resulted from greater access to higher education. Increasingly, journalists in the West have cast themselves in the role of adversaries to the holders of power and as spokesmen for the underdog in national and international affairs. Emboldened by this freer, more sympathetic atmosphere, other victims of past exterminatory campaigns —the Ukrainians, the Armenians, and the Gypsies—have begun to tell their stories. Ultimately, even scholars awakened to the paucity of studies examining and analyzing the phenomenon of mass extermination in history.

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

When we began our work on genocide in 1978, we could count on the fingers of one hand the number of scholars who had written comparatively about genocide. A small group of writers, taking up the challenge of Raphael Lemkin's work, contributed to this literature.[8] The pioneering scholarly study of genocide published by Lemkin in 1944, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,* established a definition of genocide which laid out the approximate boundaries of the concept and identified a number of specific historical events within its perimeter. Lemkin defined genocide as the coordinated and planned destruction of a national, religious, racial, or ethnic group by different actions through the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of the group with the aim of annihilating it physically or culturally. What we call ethnocide was a form of genocide in Lemkin's all-inclusive definition. After the war, the French coined the term ethnocide to deal with the extermination of a culture that did not involve the physical extermination of its people.[9]

Writing as news of the Nazis' depredations flowed in from Europe,
Lemkin defined genocide to include attacks on political and social insti-
tutions, culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic
existence of the group. Acts directed against individuals because they
were also members of a group came within his definition of genocide.
These included killing the members of the group or the destruction of
their personal security, liberty, health, and dignity.

Lemkin incorporated a three-part typology of genocide based on the
intent of the perpetrator in *The Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.* The aim
of the first genocides—which he situated in antiquity and the Middle
Ages—was a total or nearly total destruction of nations and groups. In
the modern era, Lemkin argued, a second type of genocide emerged,
involving the destruction of a culture without an attempt to physically
annihilate its bearers. Nazi genocide comprised the third type of geno-
cide in Lemkin's analysis. It combined ancient and modern genocide in
a hybrid version characterized by the Nazi strategy of selecting some
peoples and groups for extermination in the gas chambers and others for
ethnocidal assimilation and Germanization. What Lemkin did not realize
was that twentieth-century genocide was increasingly becoming a case of
the state physically liquidating a group of its own citizens. Had he paid
more attention in his 1944 book to the case of the Armenian genocide of
1915 or the genocide of the German Jews, this facet of modern genocide
might have played a more prominent role in his analysis.

Until the early 1970s, there was almost no scholarly comparative
output on genocide. Since then, several authors have produced books
and articles renewing serious theoretical discourse on the subject. Hervé
Savon's typology, which appeared in his book *Du Cannibalisme au
Génocide,* consists of genocides of substitution, devastation, and elimi-
nation. These types of genocide take their meaning from the outcome of
genocidal killings.[10] While Savon's work revived interest in the prob-
lem of genocide, his typology based on outcomes fails to illuminate the
events leading up to the genocide and the possible methods of inter-
rupting the process.

In 1976, Irving Louis Horowitz tackled the subject in a short volume
titled *Genocide* which he revised and reissued in 1980 under the title
Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power. As the new title suggests,
Horowitz views genocide as a fundamental policy employed by the state
to assure conformity to its ideology and to its model of society. His
discussion of the role of the state in genocide and his critique of the
failure of modern social science to tackle the most pressing social issues
of the day ring true.

Horowitz devises a continuum of modern societies in which the level
of state-induced repression of the right to dissent and to be different is
the key variable.[11] This continuum ranges from genocidal societies at
one extreme, through less repressive and more liberal societies, to per-

missive societies at the other extreme. Horowitz' typology is based primarily on twentieth-century cases. His approach focuses on outcomes and does little to explain the process whereby an authoritarian state resorts to genocide, nor does it account for pre–twentieth-century genocides. Moreover, as Horowitz himself admits, a typology based on internal repression cannot explain by itself those genocides conducted in foreign countries.

Vahakn Dadrian, who followed Lemkin in emphasizing the intent of the perpetrator, published a somewhat confusing typology at about the same time that Horowitz' book appeared. He posits five types of genocide: (1) cultural genocide, in which assimilation is the perpetrator's aim; (2) latent genocide, which is the result of activities with unintended consequences, such as civilian deaths during bombing raids or the accidental spread of disease during an invasion; (3) retributive genocide, designed to punish a segment of a minority which challenges a dominant group; (4) utilitarian genocide, using mass killing to obtain control of economic resources; and (5) optimal genocide, characterized by the slaughter of members of a group to achieve its total obliteration, as in the Armenian and Jewish holocausts. Dadrian's lumping together of intended and unintended genocide serves to weaken the rigor of his typology. It seems to us that Dadrian has blended together the motives of the perpetrators, unintended outcomes, ethnocide, and non-genocidal massacres.[12] We learned a great deal from his discussion of the importance of perpetrator intent but have not been able to use his typology effectively in our work.

Helen Fein included two thoughtful pages on types of genocide in her 1979 book on the Holocaust, *Accounting for Genocide*.[13] Before the rise of the nation-state, Fein argues, there were two types of genocide: genocides intended to eliminate members of another faith and genocides designed to exterminate other tribes because they could not be subdued or assimilated. In her view, the nation-state has given birth to three new types of genocide: in the first, the state commits mass extermination to legitimate its existence as the vehicle for the destiny of the dominant group; in the second, the state kills to eliminate an aboriginal group blocking its expansion or development; and, in the third, the state reacts spontaneously to rebellion by totally eliminating the rebels.

Understandably, there are omissions and gaps in Fein's typology, which is only incidental to her major task. She does not provide a place for mass exterminations intended to instill terror in others to facilitate conquest, or for mass killings to further economic enrichment. These are categories that we have found helpful in our work.

Leo Kuper has contributed more to the comparative study of the overall problem of genocide than any scholar since Raphael Lemkin. In his 1981 monograph on the subject, Kuper wrestles with the problems of genocidal process and motivation. His discussion of past genocides

clusters the motives of the perpetrator around three categories: (1) geno-
cides designed to resolve religious, racial, and ethnic differences; (2)
genocides intended to terrorize a people conquered by a colonizing em-
pire; and (3) genocides perpetrated to enforce or fulfill a political ideolo-
gy.[14] Kuper is especially concerned with the increasing frequency of
genocidal events in the modern period. Since modern genocides occur
within nation-states that have the character of plural societies, the
creation of new plural societies during the period of colonization and
decolonization becomes of particular significance for his analysis.
Under the heading of "related atrocities," Kuper discusses two groups
which are excluded under the U.N. definition of genocide.[15] These are
the victims of mass political slaughter and attempts to decimate an eco-
nomic class. He examines three exterminations in this category: in
Stalin's Russia, the decimation of the peasants, the Party elite, and the
ethnic minorities; in Indonesia, the slaughter of Communists in 1965;
and in Cambodia, the mass murders of the Kampuchean government led
by the Khmer Rouge. Kuper concludes that each of these cases would
have been labeled genocide if political groups had been protected by the
U.N. Convention.

In examining a large number of cases, Kuper insists on the need to
refer to specific conditions in each case. He does not think that it is
possible to write in general terms about the genocidal process. "The
only valid approach would be to set up a typology of genocides" and to
analyze the genocidal process in each type and under specific con-
ditions.[16]

Kuper's book is the most useful contribution to the literature on
genocide thus far, but we have two major problems with it. One,
because he does not have a rigorous definition of genocide, he includes a
number of cases in his discussion which have no salient characteristics in
common. This is a serious handicap in attempting a comparative study
of genocide. Although Kuper is aware of this problem, instead of
excluding certain cases of large-scale killing, he includes them under the
category of genocidal massacre and related atrocities. Two, in his analy-
sis, he treats plural societies as particularly vulnerable to genocide. We
think that the plural character of a society is at best an intervening
variable. It is new states or new regimes attempting to impose con-
formity to a new ideology that are particularly likely to practice genocide.
When tensions between the traditional society and the new regime
escalate, it is the plural character of a society which is most likely to
provide the social cleavages that define the perpetrator and victim
groups.

A DEFINITION AND TYPOLOGY OF GENOCIDE

In order to distinguish genocide from the various misfortunes that befall people, it is important to include the criterion of planning and intent to destroy in its definition. The most widely accepted definition of genocide is that contained in the 1948 United Nations Convention on Genocide:

> In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
> (a) Killing members of the group;
> (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
> (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
> (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
> (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.[17]

While this definition certainly does include the criterion of intent, it does not cover the extermination of political and economic groups—an exclusion made necessary in order to assure the passage of the Convention. In our own work, we have broadened the United Nations definition to include political and economic groups.

We propose to use this amended United Nations definition in our work although it has serious shortcomings: it does not adequately define the victim groups; it includes acts which we would consider ethnocide rather than genocide; and it obfuscates the distinction between genocides, massacres, and wartime casualties. However, since this definition is the most widely known one and since no better definition has been devised, we shall use it for the time being. But in our usage, we shall exclude those killings which are not the deliberate physical extermination of a defenseless group, in whole or in part.

In devising a typology of genocide, we had no difficulty in deciding that it should be based on intent, but the actual categories posed a much harder problem. We have tried a number of typologies only to discard them later. When we examined actual cases, it turned out that almost all of them could fit into more than one category and thus required decisions as to what should be considered the dominant intent. The present typology is offered as a heuristic device and not as a final product. It may well be modified as a result of our own further research or in response to such critiques as interested readers are prepared to contribute.

We have classified genocides in terms of those committed (1) to eliminate the threat of a rival; (2) to acquire economic wealth; (3) to create terror and (4) to implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology. In looking at actual cases, the motives tend to be more complex than such a relatively simple scheme allows for; therefore, we have assigned cases to one of these types on the basis of what we consider to have been the dominant intent of the perpetrator.

We do not know when the first genocide occurred. It seems unlikely that early man engaged in genocide during the hunting and gathering stage. While we have no direct evidence, this seems a reasonable assumption because men lived in quite small groups and overall population densities were extremely low (1 per 10 km^2 of habitable terrain according to the estimates of McEvedy and Jones).[18]

After the discovery of agriculture, the world divided into nomads and settlers. This marked the start of systematic conflict in the form of food raiding by the nomads. The nomads quickly learned to raid their settled neighbors at harvest time for their food stores; however, they had no interest in exterminating them because they planned to repeat their raids in subsequent years. The settlers may have had much better reason to do away with the nomads, but they had neither the means nor the skills to do so.

As the settlers improved their agricultural techniques and produced significant surpluses, they were able to support cities, rulers, and armies. They accumulated wealth and engaged in significant trade. With these developments, the scene changed dramatically. Conflicts arose over wealth, trade, and trade routes. Wars were fought over the access to wealth and over the control of transportation networks (to use a modern term). At first, these conflicts were probably in the nature of brigandage and robbery. Soon they escalated to wars between city-states. However, these warring peoples soon discovered that their victories were mostly temporary: the defeated peoples withdrew long enough to rebuild their resources and their armies, and then tried to recoup their losses and to avenge their defeat. This pattern became so common that it soon appeared that the only way to assure a stable future was to eliminate the defeated enemy once and for all. People that were not killed during or after the battle were sold into slavery and dispersed. This *elimination of a potential future threat* appears to be the reason for the first genocides in history.

Genocides of this first type seem to have been common throughout antiquity, especially in the Middle East, where trade routes between Asia, Africa, and Europe crossed. The Assyrians were expert practitioners; about a number of the peoples whom they vanquished we know little more than their names.[19] When the empire of the Hittites was destroyed, it was done so efficiently that not even the location of their capital was known until an inspired German archeologist unearthed it

almost by accident in the nineteenth century.[20] Perhaps the best-known example of this type of genocide is the destruction of Carthage.[21] The so-called Punic Wars between Carthage and Rome lasted well over a century (264-146 B.C.) and were fought mostly over the control of the Mediterranean trade and economy. These wars were incredibly costly in terms of material and lives, even by modern standards. After Rome just barely won the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.), it decided that Carthage had to be eliminated once and for all. Those who were not killed in the Third Punic War (149-146 B.C.) were sold into slavery, and the city was destroyed. Looking at the available evidence from antiquity, one might even develop a hypothesis that most wars at that time were genocidal in character.

The evidence from antiquity is often contradictory, ambiguous, or missing. Such evidence as we have consists almost exclusively of written materials that were produced either by the victims or by the perpetrators; in those rare cases where we have accounts from both sides, they tend not to confirm each other's evidence. It may well be that as yet undiscovered evidence will shed new light on how and why entire peoples have disappeared. Such disappearances in themselves are not evidence of genocide because they may have been due to a variety of processes, from migration to assimilation. However, if we should ever develop an archeology of genocide, we may acquire more conclusive proof of what happened to the populations of cities that were destroyed and to whole peoples that have disappeared. One case illustrating such possibilities is the extermination, reported by Iranian historians, of whole populations by the Mongols under Genghis Kahn; these reports were thought to be exaggerated because they originated from the victims. They gained renewed credibility, however, when archeologists unearthed the pyramids of skulls that Iranian historians had described.[22]

The second type of genocide is one committed primarily *to acquire economic wealth*. It probably also originated in antiquity. People looking for greater wealth than their own territory could provide found it in the possession of others. When such wealth was in the form of fertile land and other primary resources, it could not be carried off as loot, but could only be acquired by occupying the land and enslaving and/or exterminating the indigenous population. This type of genocide has continued to occur throughout history up to the present day. It has often been associated with colonial expansion and the discovery and settlement of new parts of the world. The Tasmanians[23] disappeared in the same way that some of the peoples of the interior of Brazil are disappearing today.[24]

The third type of genocide is a somewhat later invention and was associated with the building and maintaining of empire. To conquer others and to keep them subjugated requires large armies and a permanent investment in a large occupying force. Genghis Khan probably

deserves credit for realizing that the *creation of terror* is far more efficient as well as more effective.[25] He offered his prospective conquests the choice of submitting or of being exterminated. If they did not submit, the threat was ruthlessly carried out. Although there were never more than about 1 million Mongols, using these methods Genghis Khan was able to establish an empire that comprised most of the then known world from China to Central Europe.

These three types of genocide have largely disappeared from history for the simple reason that modern states have become so large that it is no longer possible for the victor to exterminate the defeated enemy. They persist, particularly genocides committed for economic reasons, only in cases where the victim population consists of a relatively small tribe living in relative isolation. In the twentieth century, several such cases have been reported in South America.

The fourth type of genocide is quite different from the first three and is also of much more recent origin. It is based on the *implementation of a belief, a theory, or an ideology*. When conformity is enforced by church or state, deviation from the dominating belief system is, in extreme cases, punished by extermination. It is in this fourth type of genocide that the definition of the group becomes problematic because the victim group is defined by the perpetrator; since the perpetrator's definition is derived from his belief, theory, or ideology, the group may be a real one or it may be a pseudo-group that has no existence outside the perpetrator's particular conceptual framework. Similarly, the deviation that the victim group is accused of may be real or it may be imaginary, taking the form of a pseudo-conspiracy or an imagined social pollution which threatens the survival of the regime, the state, or the church.

The combination of these two variables, the group and what it is accused of, leads to the following four sub-types:

In the first sub-type, both the group and what it is accused of are real. Thus, the victims of the Albigensian Crusade were a real group of heretics who were accused by the Papacy of a real deviation—the Cathar Heresy.

In the second sub-type, both the group and what it is accused of are inventions of the perpetrator. The first occurrence of this phenomenon was the Great Witch-Hunt of the Middle Ages. We consider this a case of genocidal massacre rather than genocide; however, it is instructive because today we would all agree that there were no covens of witches flying to meetings with the Devil on the tops of mountains, that there were no pacts with the Devil to overthrow Christendom, and that no witch ever had intercourse with the Devil. Although neither the groups nor the accusations of conspiracy had a basis in reality, their horrible consequences were real enough. Accused witches were tortured to extract confessions on the basis of which they were then burned at the

stake. (We are fortunate that in the twentieth century a nation-state's belief in the Devil seems to decrease with the increase in its national debt).[26]

In the third sub-type, a real group is falsely accused of conspiracy. The Turkish genocide against the Armenians in 1915 illustrates this type. In contrast to the demonic witches, the Armenian people were a real group, based on a common language and religion many centuries old. But the Turkish charges of conspiracy against the state were wildly exaggerated. While there certainly were Armenian separatist organizations who cooperated with the Russians during World War I, their supporters were few and their ability to influence events was small. Yet the Turkish government attacked virtually the entire Armenian population when it launched its deportation and killing operations.

In the fourth sub-type, a pseudo-group is accused of a real conspiracy. This would be the case where the state had evidence of a real opposition without being able to identify its members. It might then accuse a pseudo-group and victimize it because its members are already unpopular with the regime. This is a form of scapegoating that is well known in other contexts. Such a pseudo-group can then be identified only through the definition imposed on it by the perpetrator. While such victimization does occur frequently enough, we can think of no actual case that has reached genocidal proportions.

Genocide associated with the implementation of a belief, a theory, or an ideology—our fourth type—had its origins in the Middle Ages but has become much more frequent in the twentieth century. The rising importance of theories and ideologies has produced a revival of accusations of pseudo-conspiracies which has resulted in much more frequent persecutions of real and pseudo-groups; some of these have resulted in horrible genocides and genocidal massacres. We are only too familiar with the horrors committed in Ottoman Turkey,[27] in Stalin's Russia,[28] and in Hitler's Germany.[29] One of the things that is different about this fourth type of genocide is its result for the perpetrator: For the first three types, it can be argued that genocide produced tangible benefits for the perpetrators; in the case of the fourth type, it seems clear that genocide was carried out in spite of tremendous costs to the perpetrators, costs that can be measured in economic, political, and developmental terms.

A NOTE ON METHODS

The definition of concepts and the design of a typology are an essential part of any research enterprise. However, they are essential only in making sense of the data. In the study of genocide, the data

present a set of particularly difficult problems. This is not the place for
exploring these problems in detail. However, four kinds of problems
should be mentioned that make such study especially difficult:

1. The evidence is by its very nature difficult to obtain because throughout
   most of history relevant records either were not kept or did not survive;
2. Where records do exist, they either originate with the perpetrators or with
   the victims, but rarely do we find records from both;
3. When we do have records from the perpetrators and the victims, they are
   often so divergent that it is difficult to decide what actually did occur, and
   the intentions of the perpetrator may be the most difficult evidence to
   discover; and
4. The reliability of the records presents another problem, especially in the
   premodern period. Thus, we have evidence for genocides that occurred
   but were not reported; but we also have those that were reported but never
   occurred.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA

In our century, the increasing prevalence of the conditions leading to
type four genocide is becoming a matter of serious concern to those of us
who care about human rights. If we look at societies from Horowitz'
perspective, then we must ask how they deal with deviance and non-
conformity. It seems to us that the crucial dimension in a society's
handling of deviants is the way it defines and maintains their member-
ship in the society itself. This is not a purely conceptual distinction,
because it has wide-ranging consequences not only for the victims but
also for the way the world responds to the victims and the perpetrators.

Insofar as a given society responds to its deviants and dissenters with
something other than tolerance and permissiveness, the first question to
be asked is whether such groups are defined as continuing members of
the society or whether they are deprived of such membership. Loss of
membership can be implemented in only two ways, that is, by deporta-
tion or by extermination. Any other form of repression or punishment
implicitly acknowledges the victim's continuing membership.

Torture and harassment are ways of physically punishing "deviant"
groups and individuals. But punishment is incidental to intimidating and
terrorizing the rest of society: when victims remain at large or eventually
rejoin their erstwhile groups, their membership in society remains
unquestioned precisely because they are intended to serve as a dire warn-
ing to other actual or potential "deviants." It is also precisely because
they have retained their membership and their citizenship that it is pos-
sible to take action on their behalf under various human rights legis-
lations and conventions.

Deportation and extermination pose a different problem. In the case of deportation, the victims may be helped by being granted a new membership status and the associated civic rights in another society that is willing to welcome them. However, in the case of extermination assistance is, by definition, too late to help the victims. Thus, in these cases any meaningful action would have to address the search for methods of early warning and prevention. Such a search faces daunting problems of theory and practice. Prediction and early warning of mass exterminations and deportations have barely been raised as a theoretical problem, and a great deal of work remains to be done before any such prediction can be made with some assurance of correctness. But even after such theoretical problems are solved, there still remains the practical problem of the sovereignty of the perpetrator. The history of the United Nations, with all of its conventions, stands as mute testimony to the discouragement of those of us who still believe in the worth and dignity of all human beings.

Against this background, it is understandable that human rights activism addresses itself to torture and harassment much more than to deportation and extermination. With respect to torture and harassment, much more is known about help for the victims and the possibility of prevention. Success, when achieved or seen as attainable, reinforces further activism. No such encouragement seems to be available to those concerned with genocide and deportation. While mass deportations seem to be decreasing due to growing populations which are too large to transport, the spread of the nation-state, and the disappearance of relatively empty territories, genocides in the twentieth century seem to have been increasing in number and in scope. (To cite just one example, while it was possible for England, France, Spain, and Portugal to expel the Jews at different times, it was not possible for Hitler to expel the millions of Jews living in Germany and its occupied territories.)

In discussing the persecution and extermination of individuals and groups, it is important to remember the distinction between theory and practice. Many countries have declared judicial torture to be illegal; an even larger number of countries have signed the United Nations Convention on Genocide. Yet this has clearly not meant that either practice has disappeared or even diminished. There is a huge gap between declarations of good intentions and their application and realization.

The twentieth century has seen a tremendous increase of new states, the majority of which are ruled by one-party totalitarian or military regimes. Totalitarian or military regimes usually have to deal with dissenting groups, which leads inevitably to various forms of repression and persecution, and, with increasing frequency, to genocidal massacres and to outright genocide.30 Such states are particularly prone to engage in what we have called type four genocides, that is, genocides based on the implementation of a belief, a theory, or an ideology.

Individual activists and protest groups, assisted by several international conventions on human rights, have learned a great deal about the various ways of assisting the victims of persecution in different countries. Such help, while not always successful, is usually initiated by specific reports of incarceration and torture while the victims are alive. Similar reports of killings and genocides do not elicit the same kind of action for the obvious reason that the victims are already beyond help.

Why are human rights efforts not more successful? The first reason is that the very notion of human rights is foreign to most cultures of the world. It is often seen as another Western export that is being imposed on the rest of the world from outside. Implementation of human rights legislation is possible only in a democratic regime based on the rule of law. Where military and/or totalitarian regimes are in power, the whole notion of human rights is a contradiction in terms. The second reason is that the nation-state is both the guardian and the violator of human rights. Therefore, action from within is either impossible or fruitless, and action from without conflicts with the much too widely accepted definition of sovereignty. A further consequence of military and authoritarian regimes is that they can control access to and distribution of information, with the result that violations may not even become known or that proof may not be accessible. The third reason is that international bodies and international agreements, largely supported by the West, continue to exist mostly for symbolic reasons. Their continued existence is dependent upon the degree to which they serve the interests of all sides. However, their efficacy will remain largely symbolic because no supra-national body exists that can enforce their terms. The participants are sovereign nations that will not accept any diminution of their sovereignty, especially when they are also the offenders.

For these reasons, human rights actions will have to continue to rely on publicity and on shaming campaigns, where these are successful. In addition, their mission should be to spread the ideology of human rights and to encourage and support research into the conditions and situations which seem to increase or decrease the probability of human rights violations in various countries.

Any worthwhile activism with regard to genocide will have to be radically different from other human rights efforts. In order to be of help to the potential victims, it will have to focus solely on prevention. Theo van Boven, the former Director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights, has recently made a similar plea with regard to political assassinations and extra-judicial executions. However, in order to prevent such lethal crimes, we would have to be able to predict their occurrence—something that our present state of knowledge does not yet permit. Thus, any efforts at preventing future genocides will have to start with the kind of research capable of yielding predictive indicators that would then allow concerted efforts at prevention; in addition, re-

search will be needed to uncover those conditions and techniques of external pressure that are likely to be the most effective means of prevention.

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2

HUMAN DESTRUCTIVENESS AND POLITICS: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AS AN AGE OF GENOCIDE

Roger W. Smith

We can no longer choose our problems; they choose us.

Albert Camus

Genocide has existed in all periods of human history, but prior to the contemporary period it was rare except as an aspect of war, or, in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, as an aspect of development. To a large extent genocide also appeared in a form specific to a given period —conquest, religious persecution, colonial domination. In the twentieth century, however, genocide has been a common occurrence; moreover, the forms it has taken are diverse and spring from different motives: there has been a convergence of destructive forces in our period.

Camus called the twentieth century an age of murder, but it is, more precisely, an age of politically sanctioned mass murder, of collective, premeditated death intended to serve the ends of the state. It is an age of genocide in which 60 million men, women, and children, coming from many different races, religions, ethnic groups, nationalities, and social classes, and living in many different countries, on most of the continents of the earth, have had their lives taken because the state thought this desirable. Such an age should perhaps be condemned out of hand, but it must also be understood: for we have to live as well as die in that world, and, to be realistic, a great many persons alive today have contributed to that genocide, mainly through passivity, but often through more active involvement.

There have been other ages of genocide—Assyria engaged in geno- cide almost annually for several hundred years and turned deportation

and forced labor into routine instruments of public policy, and millions
of lives were taken in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries in the name
of progress. Yet there are unique aspects to genocide in the twentieth
century—the scale, the range of victims, the technology, the variety of
genocidal forms, even the motives—that set it apart from earlier ages of
human destructiveness. It is these that this chapter will explore, but
without neglecting elements of repetition and continuity in the politics of
death.

I

Genocidal precedents exert pressure, yet each occurrence of genocide
is separate: the specific victims, perpetrators, motives, methods, and
consequences differ. Nevertheless, each genocide is related to all others
in certain ways. Genocide must be legitimated by tradition, culture, or
ideology; sanctions for mass murder must be given by those in authority;
the forces of destruction have to be mobilized and directed; and the
whole process has to be rationalized so that it makes sense to the perpe-
trators and their accomplices.[1] Victims, however else they may differ,
will be vulnerable to attack and will be perceived as lying outside the
universe of moral obligation. They will be dehumanized: "Cargo, cargo"
is the way Franz Stangl described his victims at Treblinka; "Guayaki," a
term meaning "rabid rat," is how the Paraguayans refer to the Aché
Indians.[2] They will be viewed not as individuals but only as members
of a despised group, blamed for their own destruction, and held account-
able in terms of the ancient notion of collective and ineradicable guilt.
Then, too, there is the ever present cruelty; this must be discussed at
greater length, however, since it is often either ignored or misunder-
stood.

One is tempted to say that in the contemporary period genocide is a
crime of logic, whereas in earlier ages it was a crime of passion. But
this would distort both the present and the past: much gratuitous cruelty
accompanies genocide today, and most of the genocide from the twelfth
century B.C. forward has been premeditated, a rational instrument to
achieve an end. What is proper, though, is to recognize that because
much contemporary genocide aims at the total elimination of a group,
which even with modern means of destruction takes time, sheer passion
is not likely to sustain the participants beyond the initial destruction.[3]
Thus, the fabricators of genocide today have created the image of an
"ideal killer": the "dispassionate, efficient killer, engaged in systematic
slaughter, in the service of a higher cause."[4] Nevertheless, all genocide,
over and above the actual killing of persons, appears to contain a large
measure of cruelty. Not all of this is gratuitous, however. Some of it in
earlier society stemmed from the sheer exhilaration of power that accom-
panied destruction, or was calculated to create terror or to exact retribu-

tion; more recently (though this also occurred in earlier societies), some cruelty has been ritualistic, expressive of good triumphing over evil, as in the slaying of the Indonesian Communists.[5] In many respects, then, the brutality that accompanies genocide is culturally patterned. In more modern, secular cultures, however, there is little or no support for torture, as opposed to the taking of lives, yet much sadistic behavior still occurs. Here the cruelty can perhaps be understood as the dehumanization—loss of compassion, psychic numbing, detachment—that results from the prolonged participation in mass slaughter.[6] But however one is to explain it, cruelty is everywhere the twin—not the father—of genocide.

There is another element that is found in many genocides, though there are important exceptions in earlier ages: the refusal to accept responsibility for one's acts. The refrain is familiar: we knew nothing, we only obeyed orders, it was God's will, we were defending ourselves, they had it coming. On the other hand, while most twentieth-century genocide has been preceded by crisis or great frustration, this seems not to be the case historically, except perhaps where religious genocide has occurred. Indeed, the relationship between crisis and genocide is almost the opposite of what some scholars have taken it to be.[7] And even in the twentieth century, crisis has not always existed: the Indians of Paraguay, Brazil, and Peru, for example, have been destroyed out of cold calculation of gain (and in some cases, sadistic pleasure) rather than as the result of economic or political crisis. While context and situation are important, genocide is never an accidental feature of society.

II

Genocide is almost always a premeditated act calculated to achieve the ends of its perpetrators through mass murder. Sometimes, however, genocidal consequences precede any conscious decision to destroy innocent groups to satisfy one's aims. This is most often the case in the early phases of colonial domination, where through violence, disease, and relentless pressure indigenous peoples are pushed toward extinction. With the recognition of the consequences of one's acts, however, the issue is changed: to persist is to intend the death of a people. This pattern of pressure, recognition, and persistence is typically what happened in the nineteenth century. Today, however, when indigenous groups come under pressure, the intention to destroy them is present from the outset; there are few illusions about the likely outcome. The distinction, then, between premeditated and unpremeditated genocide is not decisive, for sooner or later the *genocidal* is transformed into *genocide*.

Rather than being simply an expression of passion, genocide is a rational instrument to achieve an end. While these ends have varied from

perpetrator to perpetrator and, to a large extent, by historical period, they
have typically included the following: revenge, conquest, gain, power,
and purification/salvation. From these we can construct a grammar of
motives which, in effect, asks the perpetrator: What are you trying to do
and why is it so important that you are willing to sacrifice thousands,
even millions of lives (including those of children) to achieve it? For-
mal, but nevertheless useful, answers to these questions are contained in
the different types of genocide, arranged in terms of the grammar of mo-
tives. Classified in this manner, the pure types of genocide are retribu-
tive, institutional, utilitarian, monopolistic, and ideological.[8]

Retributive Genocide

Retribution may play a role in all genocide, but it does so mainly as a
rationalization: it is a way of blaming the victim. Though it draws from
the vocabulary of justice and of judicially administered punishment,
genocide destroys persons most often for what they are rather than for
anything they have done. In this sense, retribution flows from the de-
humanization that has been fastened to the victims before they are at-
tacked. As a principal motive in genocide, retribution is rare, but it does
seem to figure prominently in accounts of conquerors like Chingis-khan
(Genghis Khan).[9] Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how the "Con-
queror of the World," as he called himself, differed in his actions when
inspired by revenge than he and others did when they engaged in the
institutional genocide associated with warfare until about the fifteenth
century.

Institutional Genocide

Institutional genocide was the major source of politically sanctioned
mass murder in the ancient and medieval worlds. The massacre of men,
the enslavement of women and children, and, often, the razing of towns
and the destruction of the surrounding countryside, were universal as-
pects of conquest: genocide was embedded in the very notion of war-
fare.[10] As such, no explicit decision had to be made to commit genocide
—it had become routinized. In part, institutional genocide was moti-
vated by the desire to create terror, to display one's power, and to
remove the possibility of future retaliation. But it was also due to a
failure of political imagination: genocide was a substitute for politics.
Instead of ruling a city or territory, extracting tribute from it, and perhaps
even incorporating it into one's own system of power and authority, the
society was devastated. By the late medieval period this practice had
largely ended in the West (indeed, it had begun to change with the
Romans, who understood that only through politics could one build an
empire), yet it became a prominent part of the Crusades and was made all

the more deadly because of religious passion.[11] In any case, institutional genocide continued in the East with figures like Timur Lenk until the fifteenth century. For some 500 years thereafter, the genocide of conquest disappeared. It is possible, however, that both guerrilla warfare and the use of nuclear weapons signify a revival of this early form of genocide. If the means are different, the motives seem not that dissimilar, and the consequences include both widespread devastation and the massive taking of innocent life by those in authority.

Utilitarian Genocide

If utility played a role in institutional genocide, it became particularly prominent in the genocide of the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, when colonial domination and exploitation of indigenous peoples in the Americas, Australia, Tasmania, parts of Africa, and elsewhere became pronounced. It has continued in the twentieth century, especially in Latin America, where Indians have been subjected to genocidal attacks in the name of progress and development. Apart from the more sadistic aspects of this kind of destruction, the object has been Indian land—for the timber it contains, the minerals that can be extracted, and the cattle it can feed—and, at the turn of the century, Indian labor to harvest, under conditions of forced labor, the sap of the rubber tree.[12]

Richard Rubenstein has recently argued that development leads to a population "surplus," which in turn leads to programs to eliminate the superfluous population.[13] What is happening with the remaining indigenous population of Latin America, and what was the fate of millions in various areas of the world earlier, has nothing, however, to do with a surplus population (whatever that is, for Rubenstein never defines his basic term). They are being killed, were killed, because of a combination of ethnocentrism and simple greed. The basic proposition contained in utilitarian genocide is that some persons must die so that others can live well. If that proposition no longer claims a large number of lives, it is because the previous genocide was so effective and the remaining tribes so small, with at most a few thousand members each. Yet precisely because of the tenacity of the assaults against them, and the small size of the groups, utilitarian genocide, although somewhat rare in the twentieth century, tends to be *total*.

Monopolistic Genocide

Most genocide prior to the twentieth century was external—it was exacted of groups that lived outside one's territorial boundaries. There are some important exceptions—most of which are connected with religious persecution—but for the most part genocide was directed outward: its goals were conquest and colonial exploitation. Today almost all

genocide is domestic—groups within one's borders are destroyed. Again there are exceptions—Hitler committed both domestic and external genocide—but most examples of genocide in the twentieth century have been directed inward. Issues that were not at stake in external genocide are central today: who belongs, who is to have a voice in the society, what is to be the basic shape of the community, what should its purposes be?

While these questions obviously lend themselves to ideological solutions, the genocide that has emerged as a means of shaping the basic structure and design of the state and society has been more inclusive than that. Examples of such attempts come from those that are ideologically motivated (Cambodia), those that are not (Pakistan), and those that combine elements of both (Armenia). In fact, whatever the shape of the regime, the most frequent source of genocide in the twentieth century has been the struggle for the monopolization of power. While issues of international dominance, of the distribution of power, of who rules can be raised in any political system, they have been crucial to conflicts that have emerged in Pakistan, Burundi, Nigeria, and other societies that have pervasive cleavages between racial, religious, and ethnic groups. These plural societies are in large part a legacy of nineteenth-century colonialism, but their genocidal struggles take place today within the framework of self-determination.[14] Having been subjected to colonial exploitation and genocide, these societies now butcher themselves.

Ideological Genocide

Most genocide in the twentieth century has not been ideological but, where it has, the results have been catastrophic: ideology under modern conditions tends toward holocaust.[15] Most genocide in the past was also not ideological: it was an instrument not for the restructuring of society according to some blueprint of the mind, but for gaining, on the ideal plane, revenge, and on the more tangible one, booty, women, territory, public slaves, or the exploitation of "native" labor and resources. Ideology, in the form of religion, did contribute to human destructiveness—it provided rationalization to the Spanish for conquering and enslaving Indians, it formed the background for repeated attacks on Jews, and was one, but only one, ingredient in the so-called wars of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On the other hand, the Inquisition, which is sometimes cited as an example of genocide, was nothing of the kind: cruel as it was, the Inquisition took the form of a judicial inquiry, with those suspected of either heresy or of insincere belief receiving scrutiny; those convicted (and not all were) were burned en masse, but they were tried as individuals.[16] Nevertheless, some

genocide before the twentieth century certainly was ideological: the destruction of unholy cities in ancient Israel and of the Albigensians in the thirteenth century. The Crusades also to some extent had a religious basis, though many other elements (political ambition, desire for material acquisitions) became entangled in it. In all these cases, however, the aim was essentially conservative: genocide was used to protect and defend a particular religious faith, not as contemporary ideology is, to transform society. With us the attempt has been to eradicate whole races, classes, and ethnic groups—whatever the particular ideology specifies—in order to produce a brave new world free of offensive human material.

At the heart of contemporary ideology is what Camus called a "metaphysical revolt" against the very conditions of human existence: plurality, mortality, finitude, and spontaneity.[17] It is, as it were, an attempt to re-establish the Creation, providing for an order, justice, and humanity that are thought to be lacking. At the same time that it strives for a kind of salvation, it is often motivated by a profound desire to eliminate all that it perceives as being impure—be it race, class, or even, in the case of the Khmer Rouge, cities. The revolt is metaphysical, but it is also deeply moral in an ancient way: the rejection of the unclean, the fear of contamination. How else explain the constant references in Nazism to purification and the Cambodian references to the cleansing of the people? When one attempts to bring about a "perfect" society, much of the human material must be jettisoned; and since humans are going to be killed for what they are rather than for what they have done, the most primitive, but still basic, moral category surfaces, that of the unclean, the impure. Indeed, one contemporary philosopher suggests that the "dread of the impure and rites of purification are in the background of all our feelings and all our behavior relating to fault."[18] When defilement is understood ideologically, it is literally true, as Paul Ricoeur notes in a different context, that "we enter into the reign of Terror."[19] Yet it is possible to substitute one symbol of evil for another; in the Soviet Union the idea of guilt, especially the objective guilt of class origins, assumes the role played elsewhere by defilement. At bottom, ideology turns politics into a variety of the sacred. Yet holocausts are born, not in the name of God, but of biology, history, and peasant simplicity.

Tendencies, however, are not necessarily results; holocaust is not a matter of deduction. Ideology seldom exists in a pure form: its relationship to culture is of particular importance. Does the culture reinforce the ideology, as in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, or does it come into conflict with it, as in Italy and Cuba? That culture can humanize and restrain ideology gives hope; that it does not always succeed and may even buttress ideology is part of the contemporary uncertainty about the future of genocide in its most extreme form, holocaust.

III

A recent study of genocide begins with this statement: "The word is new, the crime ancient." This should read, "The word is new, the phenomenon ancient," for while the slaughter of whole groups has occurred throughout history, it is only within the past few centuries that this has produced even a sense of moral horror, much less been thought of as "criminal." Indeed, from ancient times to well into the sixteenth century, genocide was not something that men were ashamed of, felt guilt for, or tried to hide; it was open and acknowledged. Massacre, deportation, forced labor, the transfer of children from one group to another, torture—all are laid out in the Bible, in the official records and monuments of empires, in epic and dramatic poetry, in histories and memoirs. The early Hebrews, the Assyrians, Greeks, and Romans, the Church with its heretics, the Crusaders, the Mongols, and the Spanish in America—each went to great lengths to leave public records of their acts of human destructiveness. Some went further—they boasted of the number of persons killed, the amount of booty gained, the prisoners deported for forced labor, the terror their attacks had inspired.[20] In Assyria public festivals were held in celebration of the destruction of yet another people, with prisoners slaughtered as an offering to the gods. Stelae, bas-reliefs, obelisks, monuments of every sort were then erected by the king to commemorate his deeds.[21] Like us, but for different reasons, the kings thought that no act of genocide should be forgotten. But one does not have to look only at the Assyrians: similar accounts of revelling in destruction could be taken from the memoirs of the Crusaders and others.[22]

In the twentieth century, however, no country has acknowledged that it engaged in genocide. Monuments have sometimes been raised for victims, but not by perpetrators to commemorate their deeds. Turkey not only did not acknowledge publicly that it killed over 300,000 Armenians between 1895 and 1908 and over a million between 1915-1917, but even sixty years later it still denies that genocide was committed: people were relocated as a wartime security measure and some died in the war, but that, it says, is all. Nazi Germany attempted to hide its own massive destruction of the Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, and other groups, including those Germans who were, for reasons of health, considered unfit to live. The most noble chapter in German history, according to Heinrich Himmler, would never be written.[23] Civil war, the destruction of terrorists, or the repulsion of external invasion are the terms used by contemporary regimes to describe their genocidal activities. The United Nations, moreover, has only once detected an instance of genocide (despite the fact that its own trucks were used in Burundi to transport victims to their death) and that was of Communist China before it was a member of the United Nations.[24] While the Khmer Rouge was destroy-

ing the lives of 3 million of the inhabitants of Cambodia and turning others into refugees, it consistently denied that it had engaged in genocide; rather, it accused other countries of major rights violations. Occasionally, the leaders of a country have admitted privately what was taking place, and years after the event some examples of genocide have been lamented by a new leadership—for example, Nikita Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin's destruction of various nationality groups and, especially, the members of the Party.[25] Yet he also mentioned with approval the destruction of the kulaks. So genocide in the twentieth century, while justified in the eyes of its perpetrators, is not open and is not acknowledged except privately, or for reasons that reject some genocide but fully endorse other examples of it.

In the twentieth century, we find genocide to be horrifying, morally unjust, and criminal, yet we go on committing it. For us the formula goes something like this: It never happened, and besides, *they* deserved it. Prior to the sixteenth century, when the Spanish in America began to have doubts about killing men whose souls they claimed they wanted to save, the formula would have read: *We* did it, and *they* deserved it.[26] Even so, responsibility could still be assigned to a god or, better yet, the victim. But with us, as genocide has become more repugnant, as it has come to seem unthinkable, it has actually become commonplace. Contemporary man deals in bad faith as well as death.

IV

The scale of genocide in the twentieth century is staggering and helps to account in part for the sense of the incomprehensible and the unreal that conditions contemporary responses to genocide. Although genocide has claimed many victims throughout history, in terms of scale, there has never before been a century like ours: in less than one hundred years some 60 million persons have been murdered to meet the needs of the state. And with the exception of the destruction of small groups of indigenous peoples, or the admonitory genocide (a version of the struggle for power) that claims the lives of several hundred persons, genocide in the twentieth century almost never claims less than 100,000 victims—that is the minimum, and the scale quickly goes up from there. Turkey destroyed the lives of a million or more Armenians; Nazi Germany destroyed 6 million Jews, but it is often forgotten that it went on to murder other groups as well, so that a reasonable estimate for the total number of its victims, apart from war deaths, is 16 million; Pakistan slaughtered 3 million Bengalis; Cambodia brought about the death of 3 million persons; and the Soviet Union first destroyed 20 million peasants in the 1930s and then went on to take hundreds of thousands of other lives in the 1940s with its assaults on various nationality groups suspected of disloyalty.

In some ways, of course, it is a mistake to discuss numbers of victims. Every life and every group is unique, and deaths can thus never be compared. Also, numbers have the effect of dissolving the solidarity that victims might otherwise feel for each other; instead of sensing a common plight, questions of who has suffered the most come to the fore.[27] And numbers lead us into thinking that genocide is defined by some magic number of victims, whereas legally and morally that is not what genocide means. Nevertheless, numbers do indicate the massiveness of the problem of genocide in the current period. They can also help us to see some qualitative differences between genocide as it is practiced now and as it was until at least the nineteenth century, which in its often total assault on indigenous peoples began to resemble the twentieth century, with its attempts to annihilate groups as a whole.

Genocide for most of its history has been local—the conquered city, the particular group of Muslims or Jews before one, the Indians within easy reach of exploitation. It was also segmental—except for groups of heretics or, occasionally, out of desire for revenge, there was no attempt to destroy an entire group (all Jews, all Muslims, all members of a particular race or class). The reason usually given for both the local and segmental quality of genocide prior to the nineteenth century is that dominant groups lacked the means: the instruments of violence were limited and the means of communication and transportation difficult at best. While this is true, it also misses an important point: genocide previously had a *finite* quality to it; there was no aspiration to eliminate a group totally. In the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, still viewed genocide as rooted in a finite world: tied to appetite, limited in its goals, a world without demand for totality or infinity.[28] But contemporary theories of genocide (Hannah Arendt, Erich Fromm, Albert Camus) characteristically present a radically different image of genocide, coinciding with a changed set of experiences with human destructiveness. It remained for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to generate both the *means* and the *desire* to destroy entire groups.

V

Genocide of any magnitude requires a sizable number of participants, but it does not necessarily follow that a large increase in victims requires an equally large increase in perpetrators. This partly depends on the technology of destruction that is employed (some forms are, so to speak, labor-intensive, others less so); on whether the victims are concentrated in one area or must be rounded up over a large territory; and on the extent to which the victims are able to resist. It also depends on what might be called the style of destruction. Some regimes, such as that of Idi Amin, concentrate the task of destruction in the hands of specially created units, with almost no participation by wider segments of society.

Others, such as Turkey, deliberately involve the army, local officials, selected tribal and ethnic groups, and in the case of both Turkey and Indonesia, large numbers of peasants. The decision to involve a large number of groups is not due primarily to the availability of technology, but to certain political objectives. In acting as Turkey and Indonesia have, the regime satisfies the passions and greed of elements of the society, thus building support for its actions; destroys the victim group in the most vicious way possible in order to emphasize the subhumanity of the dominated; and, by plunging a large part of the population into murder, binds them to the regime.[29] In other cases still, such as that of Nazi Germany, the intended magnitude of destruction is so great, and the victims so scattered, that most social and political institutions are harnessed to one overriding aim—the taking of lives.[30]

The large-scale genocide of the twentieth century does require numerous participants, but the extent to which this is true varies from case to case. The scale of genocide in the twentieth century is unprecedented with regard to victims; with regard to the percentage of the population that participates in the actual process of destruction, it would appear to be no greater than in previous ages of genocide. But given the frequency of genocide in this century, this means that an enormous number of our contemporaries, with the support and permission of political authority, have committed mass murder.

VI

At all times, genocide has claimed a wide range of victims, but in the twentieth century it has become more extensive. Before our own period, victims came from one or more of the following categories: those subjected to conquest, those destroyed for religious reasons, and those exploited in a colonial relationship. Only a small number of these were killed because of *who* they were.

Until the early modern period, one was typically subjected to genocide simply because of *where* one was. Most of the victims of genocide in the past became such because they were on a conqueror's line of march. They died or were enslaved because they were there, not because of any special selection process that singled them out in terms of race, religion, political convictions, or the like. They were victims of institutional genocide. On the other hand, victims of religious genocide, though few in number, were chosen because of *who* they were: their views and practices were considered a threat to unity and truth. And with the beginnings of colonial domination in the sixteenth century, a much larger set of victims was killed because of *who* its members were (they came from a different race and a less technologically advanced culture) and *what they had* (land, gold, labor power). They became victims of utilitarian genocide.

In the twentieth century the range of victims has greatly increased; moreover, almost all of them have been selected for genocide because of *who* they are, because in the eyes of the stronger group (whether majority or minority) they do not deserve to live. The victims, otherwise so different, have only three attributes in common: for historical, situational, or ideological reasons they have been defined as beyond the circle of moral obligation and thus as inhuman; they are vulnerable to genocidal attacks, whether sporadic or sustained, selective or indiscriminate; and if they do survive, they often carry a greater burden of guilt than the victimizers do for attempting to take their lives.[31] The diversity and range of those who have fallen victim to genocide in this century can be suggested by the simple device of naming names and listing categories: Armenians, Gypsies, Jews, Slavs, Bengalis, Cambodians, Tibetans, Hutus, Ibos, Chinese, Achés; Buddhists, Hindus, Christians, Muslims; Communists, non-Communists; kulaks, intellectuals, workers, stone age hunters, national groups, homeless peoples; persons who are black, brown, red, yellow, white; the sick and the well; those who resist and those who are compliant; those who are killed because of their race, religion, ethnicity, physical condition, political opinions, class origins, or stage of historical development.

Falling victim to genocide has been so widespread and varied in the twentieth century that few groups can be reasonably sure that they will not be next. Even the most powerful nations—those armed with nuclear weapons—may end up in struggles that will lead (accidentally, intentionally, insanely) to the ultimate genocide in which they destroy not only each other, but mankind itself, sealing the fate of the earth forever with a final genocidal effort. Human history would assume this form (though it would never be written): mankind would have moved from the mortality of the individual (who could be murdered or, like Abraham, "die old and sated with life") to the genocidal destruction of human groups (large or small, completely or incompletely) to the extermination of the species itself.[32] The will to genocide, which began as the will to power, revenge, wealth, salvation, would have become (what perhaps in some deep sense it had been all along) the will to nothingness.

VII

All the elements of the technology of death that we associate with twentieth-century genocide—bureaucracy, modern communications, rapid transportation, even the concentration camp in a primitive form— had emerged by the late nineteenth century. But apparently the first to perceive the possibilities of this new technology to eliminate a whole group of persons numbering in the millions was the ruling clique in Turkey, which in 1915 began the systematic extermination of the Armenians, an extermination that is the prototype of genocide in the

twentieth century. It was premeditated, centrally planned (though carried
out by local officials to a large extent), and intended to be total. It was
also, to the extent possible, to be carried out without the knowledge of
the outside world. As Michael Arlen notes, "The Armenian genocide
was based on the imperfectly utilized but definitely perceived capacities
of the modern state for politically restructuring itself, which were made
possible by the engines of technology." In fact, he suggests, "In vir-
tually every modern instance of mass murder, beginning, it appears,
with the Armenians, the key element . . . which has raised the nu-
merical and psychic levels of the deed above the classic terms of mas-
sacre has been the alliance of technology and communications."[33]

If modern forms of technology do not cause genocide, they facilitate
it, extend its range, sustain its actions, and make it possible to destroy
huge numbers of victims in a relatively short time. Yet it appears that
Hitler's gas chambers were developed not only for the sake of ef-
ficiency, but to reduce the moral and psychological burdens that his
soldiers had experienced in shooting large numbers of women and
children on the Eastern Front.[34] The means that contemporary bureau-
cracy develops to destroy whole groups are calculated not only to kill,
but to neutralize any sense of guilt or responsibility for what is done.
Ideology can help overcome any feeling of revulsion or any sense of
guilt, but only a few of those who are part of the apparatus of destruction
may be ideologically motivated. More decisively, modern forms of
organization can distance most persons from the actual killing and can
routinize the work which supports the killing.[35] Most bureaucrats in
Germany, for instance, "composed memoranda, drew up blueprints,
signed correspondence, talked on the telephone, and participated in
conferences." Yet, as Raul Hilberg indicates, they "could destroy a
whole people while sitting at their desks."[36] Routinization reduces the
occasions on which moral questions can arise and encourages the job
holder to focus on the technical details of his work rather than on its
meaning.[37] Moreover, the sharp division of labor fragments the act of
destruction—those who decide to commit genocide, those who organize
it, and those who carry it out are not the same persons; no one,
therefore, accepts responsibility for the final result. Finally, because of
the hierarchical structure of the organization, everyone can insist, not
insincerely, that they were only obeying orders.[38] If organization, com-
munications, transportation, and various new implements of violence
(among them the gas chambers) have played central roles in the tech-
nology of genocide, their capacity to reduce moral awareness has also
been important.

Nevertheless, highly developed organization and sophisticated means
of destruction are not always employed in the twentieth century: often
there is a mixture of the primitive and the modern. Indian tribes are
hunted, like any other prey, in Latin America, but are also bombed from

the air; they are given sugar laced with arsenic and blankets that contain
the bacilli of fatal diseases, but are also relocated to reservations that are
little more than concentration camps. In Turkey and Indonesia, socially
induced hate and dehumanization are substituted for the bureaucratic
neutralization of moral responsibility. In Cambodia, ideology allows the
cadres of the Khmer Rouge to destroy parents in front of their children,
to desecrate age-old religious institutions, and, in place of means of
destruction that distance the perpetrator from the victim, to resort to
direct and brutal means of disposing of the "impure" portions of the
population: beating persons to death with hoes, driving nails into their
heads, and carving them open with knives. And in Uganda, victims
would often be strangled slowly and then killed with a sledgehammer
blow to the chest; thereafter, they would be driven in trucks for hours to
a river where they were thrown to crocodiles.[39]

While the capacity for organization varies—the Young Turks were
more efficient than the Sultan, the Nazis more sophisticated in the pro-
duction of mass deaths than either—the use of a low level of technology
to destroy hundreds of thousands of victims is done by choice in the
twentieth century. Cambodia did have bullets; peasants armed with ritual
knives was not the most efficient means of destruction available in
Indonesia. Rather, the technology chosen was a mirror of the purposes
of the perpetrators (to inflict as much suffering as possible, to gain
support for the regime by satisfying the appetites of groups long hostile
to the victims) and the culture of the particular society (to invoke the
symbolism of an autonomous peasant society, which when it kills uses
hoes, or, with Indonesia, emphasizes the ritual triumph of good over
evil).

The technology of genocide in the twentieth century thus offers the
perpetrator a choice of means that can be tailored to a specific situation.
This kind of choice in itself makes contemporary genocide unique, as
does its enormous capacity to destroy human life.

Prior to the twentieth century, however, there was little choice in the
technology of mass death. For several thousand years the technology of
genocide was relatively static. Weapons used were hand-held (clubs,
swords, bows) and could be used only in close contact with the victim.
The introduction of firearms increased the efficiency of killing and made
the work of destruction less physically tiring, but it still involved direct
contact. Yet if I am correct in thinking that there were few, if any, moral
barriers to genocide until the sixteenth century, this proximity to the
victim would not have generated the burdens it would for us. It is odd,
then, that those who stress the distancing from violence that is required
for contemporary man to destroy his fellows have not explored the more
direct, and bloody, genocides of the past.[40] The work was slow and
tiring; it went on for days; and in the end, sometimes literally wading in
blood, one knew what one had done.[41]

They were able to carry out these acts (which an Eichmann would not have had the stomach for) because, like us, they tended to obey orders, but mainly because—and here they are unlike us—they were not burdened with moral inhibitions against killing those outside the group. The ancient Hebrews, for example, did not worry about killing those who had betrayed the faith, but only about ritual defilement—whether, say, a man had had sexual intercourse before going into the *herem* (a term usually translated "holy war," but which means "a pact with the deity by which everything animate was devoted for destruction").[42]

In addition to various weapons of the sort mentioned, fire was used to destroy large groups. This was one of the favorite methods of the Spanish in America, but was also used by the Crusaders. Another technique, later used by Stalin, was to induce starvation: prisoners were locked up without food and left to die; crops were burned; and, not uncommonly, the available crops were seized and used by the dominant group, allowing the producers to die in a genocidally induced famine.

All of the techniques of destruction in use before the twentieth century were relatively primitive compared to what is available to us. Yet, given the finite goals of earlier genocide, smaller populations, and the absence of moral restraints, it was sufficient unto the day.

VIII

In the end, though, it is the concentration camp that is the symbol of the technology of evil in the twentieth century. It is here, in the world of the dying, that the Nazis, Stalinists, and those like them pursue their beliefs that everything is permitted and everything is possible, and thus aim at the total domination of man, stripping him initially of everything except his body, and finally of even that. Yet we know from Bruno Bettelheim, Alexsander Solzhenitzyn, and Elie Wiesel, and thousands of other survivors, that the attempt fails; under sustained assault and the most grotesque conditions, human beings can still maintain decency, can share with others, and can continue to respect life.[43] One looks for parallels to the concentration camps, but, as Hannah Arendt indicates, there are none: "Forced labor in prisons and penal colonies, banishment, slavery, all seem for a moment to offer helpful comparisons, but on closer examination lead nowhere."[44] Whether the camps serve as places of detention, forced labor, or extermination (the usual classification, but misleading since most inmates do, after all, die in the camps), they are places in which "punishment is meted out without connection with crime . . . exploitation is practiced without profit, and . . . work is performed without product."[45] It is here that one confronts what Arendt calls "radical evil": an absolute evil that cannot be punished, forgiven, or comprehended in terms of any recognizably human motives. Not surprisingly, therefore, the metaphor of pain and endless torment that

most of us fall back on is one that secular society knows only at second hand and abstractly, the image of Hell. In fact, it is through the medieval depiction of Hell, where

> The very weeping there forbids to weep,
> And grief finding eyes blocked with tears
> Turns inward to make agony greater

that the literary critic George Steiner believes we can begin to grasp the horror and meaning of the concentration camp.[46] For it is here that we find the "technology of pain without meaning, of bestiality without end, of gratuitous terror. . . . In the camps the millenary pornography of fear and vengeance cultivated in the Western mind by Christian doctrines of damnation was realized."[47] Quite true, yet the comparison is dangerously flawed: for Hell, as traditionally understood, was a place of justice, and neither those readied for mass execution in Treblinka nor those left to a Darwinian struggle against exhaustion and gradual starvation in Kolyma deserved their fate.

The fact that the analogies fail is not without its own significance. For the failure of imagination indicates that we are in the presence of a unique form of human destructiveness, one that in itself separates the twentieth century from all that has gone before.

IX

The twentieth century, then, is an age of genocide. Moreover, in terms of the number and range of victims, the variety of forms that genocide has taken, the urge toward total destruction of whole groups, the elaborate technology that facilitates death and eases conscience, the concentration camp, and the radical evil that is inseparable from it, it is a unique age of genocide. But to speak of "uniqueness" in the context of political death is, at bottom, to call attention to the acuteness of the problem; it is, in human terms, to indicate the necessity of finding means to prevent further genocide. The massiveness of genocide in this century, however, makes us feel that the task of prevention is futile. Despair stands in the way of action, knowledge leads to a sense of hopelessness. Yet we know from Sören Kierkegaard that despair is a sin, whether against God or man, and sin exists to be overcome. We cannot bring back to life the dead of this century or those who have been victims of political mass murder throughout the ages, but we can act. It is not true, as some have thought, that "he who saves the life of one, saves the world," but it is a good beginning.

NOTES

1. Cf. Neil J. Smelser, "Some Determinants of Destructive Behavior," in Nevitt Sanford and Craig Comstock, eds., *Sanctions for Evil* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1971), Chap. 2.

2. Gitta Sereny, *Into That Darkness* (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), p. 201; Eric R. Wolf, "Killing the Achés," in Richard Arens, ed., *Genocide in Paraguay* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976), p. 53.

3. Cf. George M. Kren and Leon Rappoport, *The Holocaust and the Crisis of Human Behavior* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980), pp. 4-8.

4. Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 122.

5. On ritual slaughter in Indonesia, see the Amnesty International report, *Political Killings by Governments* (London: Amnesty International, 1983), p. 36, and Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 417-21, 451-53. On the role of cruelty in early society, see Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals,* trans. Francis Golffing (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1956), especially pp. 189-202.

6. Herbert C. Kelman, "Violence Without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and Victimizers," *Journal of Social Issues* 29 (1973), pp. 50-52.

7. Cf. Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide* (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 8-9.

8. For other types of classifications, see Vahakn N. Dadrian, "A Typology of Genocide," *International Review of Modern Sociology* 5 (1975), pp. 201-12, and Leo Kuper, *International Action Against Genocide* (London: Minority Rights Group Report No. 53, 1982), pp. 5-9.

9. René Grousset, *Conqueror of the World: The Life of Chingis-Khan,* trans. Marion McKellar and Denis Sinor (New York: Viking Press, 1972).

10. Cf. Thomas Alfred Walker, *A History of the Law of Nations,* Vol. 1 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1899).

11. Antony Bridge, *The Crusades* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1982).

12. Arens, *Genocide in Paraguay;* Shelton H. Davis, *Victims of the Miracle: Development and the Indians of Brazil* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1977); and an older, but important account, W. E. Hardenburg, *The Putumayo/The Devil's Paradise* (London: Unwin, 1912).

13. Richard L. Rubenstein, *The Age of Triage: Fear and Hope in an Overcrowded World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983).

14. Kuper, *Genocide,* Chap. 4.

15. If this is the tendency, it may not, for reasons suggested later, always be the result. Yet, with one partial exception, all holocausts have been

associated with deeply ideological regimes. The Armenian holocaust was motivated in equal parts by ideology and the quest for dominance, but retribution and even utility played important roles, especially at the local level. I am uncertain whether a holocaust could ever come about wholly apart from ideology, but it may be that a strong convergence of motives could produce such a result.

16. Cf. Kuper, *Genocide*, p. 13. A. S. Turberville, *The Spanish Inquisition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932), provides an excellent factual account.

17. Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage Books, 1956).

18. Paul Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil*, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 25.

19. Ibid.

20. See the Assyrian text in James B. Pritchard, *The Ancient Near East: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 188-201.

21. Georges Contenau, *Everyday Life in Babylon and Assyria* (New York: Norton, 1966), pp. 147-56, and L. Delaporte, *Mesopotamia: The Babylonian and Assyrian Civilization*, trans. V. Gordon Childe (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1970), p. 248.

22. Bridge, *The Crusades*, pp. 237-38; Grousset, *Conqueror of the World*, p. 261.

23. Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 648.

24. On the United Nations and its response to genocide, see Kuper, *Genocide*, Chap. 9.

25. For the conversations between the Turkish leaders and the American ambassador at the time of the worst of the atrocities against the Armenians, see Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (New York: Doubleday Page, 1918), pp. 307, 333-39, 342, 351-52, 391-92. For Khrushchev's speech and commentary on it, see Bertram D. Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost* (New York: Praeger, 1957).

26. On the growing uneasiness in Spain about the conquest of the Indians, see Charles Gibson, *Spain in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), Chaps. 2-3.

27. Irving Louis Horowitz, *Taking Lives*, 3rd ed. (augmented) (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1982), Chap. 11.

28. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. J. P. Mayer and George Lawrence (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 312.

29. On crime as a binding element, see Fyodor Dostoevsky, *The Possessed*, trans. Andrew T. MacAndrew (New York: New American Library, 1962), p. 368.

30. Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, pp. 32-39.

31. On "survivor guilt," see Robert J. Lifton, "The Concept of the Survivor," in Joel E. Dimsdale, ed., *Survivors, Victims, and Perpetrators: Essays on the Nazi Holocaust* (New York: Hemisphere Publishing Co., 1980), Chap. 4.

32. Cf. Gunther Anders, "Reflections on the H Bomb," *Dissent,* 3 (1956), pp. 146-55.

33. Michael J. Arlen, *Passage to Ararat* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1975), pp. 243-44.

34. Kren and Rappoport, *The Holocaust and the Crisis of Human Behavior,* pp. 58-59.

35. Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 121-22.

36. Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews,* p. 658.

37. Milgram, *Obedience to Authority,* pp. 7, 157; Kelman, "Violence Without Moral Restraint," pp. 46-48.

38. Milgram, *Obedience to Authority,* p. 11; Kelman, "Violence Without Moral Restraint," pp. 38-46.

39. Horowitz, *Taking Lives,* pp. 74-75.

40. If one starts from the present, one asks what weakens and erodes the moral restraints against genocide. If, on the other hand, one starts with the ancients, one has to ask how these restraints came about in the first place and when, and subsequently consider why they have not been more effective. If we just assume that such moral inhibitions have always existed, we distort the history of both genocide and society. On the historical nature of morality and the invention of guilt, see Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals.*

41. Bridge, *The Crusades,* p. 111.

42. On the meaning of *herem,* see Josh. 6:17-21; Norman H. Snaith, *The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament* (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), p. 33; and *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible,* Vol. 4. (New York: Abingdon Press, 1962), p. 804. On ritual and *herem,* see Num. 31: 1-24; Deut. 23: 9-14; 1 Sam. 21: 4-6.

43. Cf. Terrence Des Pres, *The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).

44. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* new ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), p. 444.

45. Ibid., p. 457.

46. George Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle: Some Notes Towards the Redefinition of Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 53-55. The quotation is from the thirty-third canto of Dante's *Inferno* as translated by Steiner.

47. Ibid., pp. 54-55.

3

THE ETIOLOGY OF GENOCIDES

Barbara Harff

One of the most enduring and abhorrent problems of the world is genocide, which is neither particular to a specific race, class, or nation, nor rooted in any one ethnocentric view of the world. Genocide concerns and potentially affects all people. Some people have found refuge in the idea that the Holocaust was particular to the inhuman Nazis. Thus, all barbarous activities perpetrated by these subhumans had to be judged by different standards. However, evidence suggests that the many who participated in the extermination of a people were not sadistically inclined.[1] Israel Charny argues that in many societies "traditions of humanitarian concerns for victims" coincide with "the role of killer . . . or of accomplice to other more vicious genociders."[2] Often democratic institutions are cited as safeguards against mass excesses. In view of the treatment of Amerindians by agents of the U.S. government, this view is unwarranted. For example, the thousands of Cherokees who died during the Trail of Tears (Cherokee Indians were forced to march in 1838-1839 from Appalachia to Oklahoma) testify that even a democratic system may turn against its people.

It is tempting to exaggerate the role of individuals, to blame leaders for leading their citizens to genocide. But is it not the case that citizens and leaders are able to make choices? Although powerful elites in a democratic society are able to inject their political preferences into the democratic process, sometimes not consistent with the preferences endorsed by the majority, that likelihood is far greater in a totalitarian system. But the capabilities for implementing ruthless decisions are always hampered or aided by the decisions made in countless bureaucracies. Thus, all people associated with the decision-making process lend their

own motives, rationalization, and legitimation to the genocidal outcome. Although most of these people are not directly involved in executing their victims, their ability to halt the process makes them equally responsible for the executions. Clearly, the decision to destroy a certain people is a product of the many involved, and although some decisionmakers are more important than others, the role of the "helpers" surely facilitates the larger choice which delivers others to death.

Throughout the course of history genocides or massacres have been directed against specific groups in the context of larger political aims. Thus, the Nazis' aim of eliminating "foreign" elements from within by targeting Jews, Gypsies, Communists, and the mentally handicapped for annihilation was advanced by stressing mystical qualities of the dominant group. Similarly, the Turkification efforts, aided by the cry for "holy war" of the Young Turks, may have led to the destruction of the Armenians. A more recent example is Kampuchea, where under the leadership of Pol Pot all potential political adversaries were eliminated, which included the children of those perceived as reactionary elements. Though some massacres could be explained as acts of violence in the course of widespread mass hysteria, most genocides are devoid of the emotional climate which is conducive to a compulsion to murder those who are perceived as enemies of the dominant interests. In contrast, murderous leaders are voted into office, are allowed to propagate their pathological ideas, and often have ample time to plan and meticulously execute genocidal policies. What environment allows for organized officially sanctioned violence? What enables individuals to shed their responsibilities and become part of the murderous machine? In the absence of that passion which sometimes kills, how do "normal" people become vicious killers of children, old and infirm people, and the many others who have died in the genocides of modern times?

The following analysis investigates the conditions under which some genocides have taken place. The theoretical framework is provided by the author's previous efforts to shed light on why states engage in genocide.[3]

ASSUMPTIONS AND PROPOSITIONS

Scholarly persuasion has it that the state is the ultimate obstacle to a just world order, while others see ideological identity or class solidarity as the one true path to that envisioned order. Some attempts to overcome these predominant modes of analysis in international relations, such as the Club of Rome's "doom project," have met with criticism and sometimes ridicule. It is not my purpose to assess in detail the ecologists', realists', or Marxists' contribution to the analysis of international relations. Instead, this modest effort attempts to incorporate various ele-

ments of different modes of analysis into a framework which allows for an assessment of why past genocides have occurred and why future ones will occur. Ecological challenges and the international security dilemma have greatly contributed to the erosion of the state as the central actor in the world. In contrast, the durability of the state is demonstrated through its expanding role in providing social services to its citizens. The often conflicting roles of the state as provider and entrepreneur have sometimes led to increased elite domination internally or increased military/ economic adventurism abroad.[4] Here elite domination refers to people who hold the controlling positions in the state structure; in other words, they are the political elite. Under exceptional circumstances this elite domination may lead to genocide. The following identifies the conditions conducive to the occurrence of genocide in national societies. National societies are those coincidental with the emergence of the modern state system during the early seventeenth century. This does not mean that genocides are confined to modern times. But "historical" genocides are of lesser importance to my argument, which claims that the "legitimate" authority structure, i.e., the state, is the predominant culprit in genocides (for an extended discussion on the subject, see Chapter 2).

One of the emphases of my theoretical argument is on structural change as exemplified in the concept of national upheaval. National upheaval is an abrupt change in the political community, caused, for example, by the formation of a state through violent conflict, when national boundaries are reformed, or after a war is lost. Thus, lost wars and the resultant battered national pride sometimes lead to genocide against groups perceived as enemies. Post-colonial and post-revolutionary regimes are prone to internal violence during times of national consolidation, when competing groups/tribes fight for leadership positions.

Structural change is a necessary but not sufficient condition to promote the likelihood of genocide. A second factor leading to the development of genocide is the existence of sharp internal cleavages combined with a history of struggle between groups prior to the upheaval. The stronger the identification within competing groups the more likely that extreme measures will be taken to suppress the weaker groups. Polarization is usually intensified by such factors as the extent of differences in religion, values, and traditions between contending groups, and their ideological separation. There are numerous examples from past genocides in which group polarization provided the background to genocides. Gentiles versus Jews, Muslims versus Hindus, Fascists versus Communists, Germans versus Gypsies, whites against blacks and Indians— such are the genocides of Nazi Germany, Bangladesh, Uganda, German Southwest Africa, and countless others.

A third factor triggering genocide against national groups is the lack of external constraints on, or foreign support for, murderous regimes. At present, lack of international sanctions and/or interventions against

massive human rights violators is the norm rather than the exception.
Unless national interest combined with the ability to interfere dictates
intervention, few efforts are made to ameliorate the suffering of local
populations.

Who are the genociders? Here genocide is defined as public violence
—by some political actor—aimed at eliminating groups of private citi-
zens. Sometimes genociders are state officials, e.g., soldiers, police, or
special *Einsatzgruppen;* sometimes genociders are less openly linked
with state power, e.g., death squads. Usually genocide is the conscious
choice of policymakers, one among other options for repressing (elimi-
nating) opposition. However, the likelihood of genocide occurring is
rare compared to the likelihood that officials will use sporadic violence
and/or torture to repress opposition. Thus, we have to differentiate be-
tween sporadic violence used against opposition groups, i.e., state ter-
rorism, and systematic, Draconian attempts to eliminate or annihilate
them. Additional incentives to settle scores through lesser means are the
avoidance of regime instability and/or sometimes the threat of regional/
international sanctions or other forms of interference. Genocide is not
just another policy instrument of repression; genocide is the most ex-
treme policy option available to policymakers.

International wars are not genocides, because victims have no specific
group identity and are often unintended, i.e., civilians. The crime of
fighting an aggressive war, though outlawed as an instrument of inter-
national policy, is sometimes used as a coercive means to bring about
structural changes in the target state, not to eliminate the total population.
More difficult is the distinction between civil strife (wars) and geno-
cides—civil wars are contributing factors to the possible occurrence of
genocides but are not genocides themselves. In civil wars the legitimate
authority structure is weak and is opposed by strong opposition forces.
Again, as in wars, though atrocities may become a pattern on both sides,
the intent to destroy the opposition in part or as a whole is the crucial
variable in determining the onset of genocide. Burundi is a good exam-
ple, one in which civil war eventually turned into a genocide, given an
array of other contributing factors, such as previous tribal rivalries, and
lack of regional and international intervention.

In addition, my definition of genocide differs from the official defi-
nition (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide/Declaration by the General Assembly of the United Nations,
Resolution 96, dated December 11, 1946, article 2) insofar as it broad-
ens the scope of the victims and perpetrators. Thus, political opponents
are included in my definition, though they lack the formal legal protec-
tion of the Convention on Genocide. The official definition includes
those acts leading to the physical destruction of the group when "such
acts are committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group," but says nothing about political

groups. The Kampuchean mass slaughter under Pol Pot (1975) testifies to the need to include political opponents in the definition, thereby allowing the Kampuchean tragedy to be properly called genocide and thus to enjoy the unfortunately limited protection of the Convention. Political victims are not political as in contrast to religious or ethnic victims; rather, it is their *political affiliation* which singles them out as victims, not their ethnic identity. Thus, a Jew in Stalin's Russia who opposed Stalin would have been a likely victim during the murderous campaigns of the 1930s because he opposed Stalin, not because he was a Jew. Furthermore, in my conception the Holocaust is the ultimate instance of genocide, rather than a unique event defying comparison. Only through comparison with other similar or dissimilar cases of genocide can we begin to understand what triggered that monstrous episode. This is not to deny Holocaust survivors and victims their place in the conscience of humanity; rather, it is to remind us of our special responsibility to its millions of dead children, women, and men in finding ways to anticipate and eliminate future holocausts.

What follows is an analysis of information about twentieth-century governments which have engaged in genocidal activities. It describes the systemic properties, external environment, and internal conditions of states at the time of genocide. It is based on the cases listed in Table 3.1, a list which is by no means complete. What is attempted here is only the beginning of a systematic ordering of specific cases into categories. The cases are selected because they are relatively recent and well known, and because information is readily available about them; thus, their analysis should foster the kind of international reaction envisioned in the United Nations Charter. The cases may also make it possible to test the plausibility of my argument that national upheaval and prior internal struggle, combined with lack of constraints in the international environment, are conducive to genocide. It should be noted that the estimated numbers of victims vary greatly, often because "statistics" were not kept (with the exception of the Holocaust) or because population data were inadequate or dated. However, I do not believe that the *number* of victims makes a great difference: the important factor is that they were the victims of genocidal policies.

TYPES OF NATIONAL UPHEAVAL

Genocide happens in different types of political society—what types of society? The classification scheme follows from the theoretical framework and distinguishes between types of societies formed after major national upheavals. The task of differentiating among societies with ongoing fundamental political change is difficult. Obviously a successful revolution with clearly defined ideological goals is much more likely to

Table 3.1
Some Twentieth-Century Genocides

Country	Dates	Perpetrators	Victims' Identity	Estimated Numbers
German SW Africa	1904	German troops	Herero	65,000[1]
Ottoman Empire	1915	Young Turks/ Kurds	Armenians	800,000- 1.8 million[2]
Germany	1941-45	Germans	Jews Gypsies	5-6 million[3] 48,000
Sudan	1955-72	Sudanese army	Southern Sudanese	500,000[4]
Indonesia	1965-67	Vigilantes	Supposed Communists	200,000- 500,000[5]
Nigeria	1967-70	Other Nigerians	Ibos	2-3 million[6]
Bangladesh	1971	East Pakistan army	Bengalis	1,247,000- 3 million[7]
Burundi	1972	Tutsis	Hutus	100,000- 200,000[8]
Paraguay	1968-72	Paraguayans	Guayaki Aché (Indians)	1,000[9]
East Timor	1975	Indonesian army	Timorese	60,000- 100,000[10]
Kampuchea	1975-79	Khmer Rouge	Kampucheans	740,800- 3 million[11]
Uganda	1976-78	Sections of Ugandan army	Ugandans	500,000[12]

1. For an extended discussion see Jon M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Horst Drechsler, *"Let Us Die Fighting": The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against German Imperialism (1884-1915)* (London: Zed Press, 1980); Arnold Valentin Wallenkampf, "The Herero Rebellion in South West Africa, 1904-1906: A Study in German Colonialism" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1969).

2. For an extended discussion see Helen Fein, "A Formula for Genocide: Comparison of the Turkish Genocide (1915) and the German Holocaust (1939-1945)," *Comparative Studies in Sociology,* 1 (1978); A. D. Sarkissian, *Martyrdom and Rebirth* (Published by the Armenian Church of America; New York: Lydian Press,

Table 3.1—Continued

1965); Viscount Bryce, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-1916* (prepared by Arnold Toynbee; London: H.M.S.O., 1916).

3. For an extended discussion see Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966); Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization During the Holocaust* (New York: The Free Press, 1979); Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

4. For an extended discussion see Mohammed Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace* (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1975); Robert O. Collins, *The Southern Sudan in Historical Perspective* (Tel Aviv: The Shiloah Center, 1975); Cecil Eprile, *War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972* (London: David and Charles, 1974); Edgar O'Ballance, *The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1977).

5. Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).

6. For an extended discussion see John De St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972); Alexander A. Madiebo, *The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War* (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., 1980); Arthur Agwuncha Nwankwo and Samuel Udochukwu Ifejika, *The Making of a Nation Biafra* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1969); Peter Schwab, ed., *Biafra* (New York: Facts on File, 1971).

7. Kalyan Chaudhuri, *Genocide in Bangladesh* (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1972).

8. For an extended discussion see René Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi* (New York: Praeger, 1970); Norman Wingert, *No Place to Stop Killing* (Chicago: Moody Press, 1974).

9. For an extended discussion see Richard Arens, *Genocide in Paraguay* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976).

10. For an extended discussion see Jill Joliffe, *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism* (Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1978); Justus M. van der Kroef, *Patterns of Conflict in Eastern Indonesia* (London: The Eastern Press, 1977).

11. For an extended discussion see François Ponchaud, *Cambodia Year Zero* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978); Michael Vickery, *Cambodia 1975-1982* (Boston: South End Press, 1984).

12. Dan Wooding and Ray Barnett, *Uganda Holocaust* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan Publishing House, 1980).

lead to a restructuring of society than anticolonial rebellions with "reformist" goals. In other words, the greater the changes affecting society through new governments, the likelier it is that genocidal policies are implemented to insure total obedience. Thus, the extent of structural change is a major factor underlying my typology.[5]

Revolutions are a type of national upheaval. Revolutions always involve the overthrow of the ruling political elite and aim at bringing about fundamental social change.

Anticolonial rebellions, which are similar to separatist conflicts, are a type of national upheaval. Anticolonial rebellions are internal struggles with mass participation, directed against the ruling foreign power, seeking autonomy. In the case of separatist conflicts, the major struggle takes place between two movements, one trying to break away, the other to prevent it.

Coups may constitute a type of national upheaval. Coups involve the total or partial replacement of the ruling elite and lack mass participation. Thus, coups which involve the total replacement of the ruling elite are more likely to induce fundamental social change.

A special case is a takeover by duly elected or appointed political elites who endorse extreme ideologies (right-wing or left-wing). There is no abrupt structural change, but rather a move to exert total control. Such changes may lead to the creation of a climate in which people are absolved from making personal judgments and are rewarded for their total obedience to authority.

Another crucial factor in the development of genocide is the existence of sharp internal cleavages. In some societies internal violence is a way of life,[6] and some societies are preconditioned to accept political violence (coups, for example) because they frequently do occur (for example, in Bolivia). However, genocide needs more than reinforcement through societal acquiescence. Genocide is a product of state policy, with an involvement and commitment of massive resources, and is only marginally beneficial to people involved in the process.

National upheaval always intensifies internal cleavages. Depending on the preferences of policymakers, some groups may become targets of genocidal policies. Groups which are most "different" from the dominant group are more likely to become targets than those which more closely resemble the dominant group. Thus, groups different in religion, culture, wealth, education, and/or ideology have a greater chance to be singled out for genocide. Economic preponderance by some groups may be enough to induce genocidal policies against them. These cleavages usually pre-exist, but in some cases they are introduced by the new elite. Thus, for example, the targeted group may involve all those opposed to the new regime (Kampuchea), or rich peasants (Communist Russia).[7]

The structural precondition of national upheaval combined with societal receptiveness for internal violence targeted against "most different"

groups may pave the path to genocide, but a third condition may ulti-
mately provide the final incentive for the occurrence of genocide. Here
we are talking about external support for either the genocider or the target
group. Sometimes the genociders are foreign powers, for example,
colonizers; sometimes genocidal elites enjoy support/protection from
powerful neighbors. In modern times the overt or covert support of one
of the superpowers is a warrant for the survival of regimes involved in
repression or genocide. In other cases, states may neither condemn nor
praise other states engaged in internal repression. The state in question
may be too unimportant to warrant international attention, thus enjoying
the kind of freedom which comes from lack of automatic sanctions in
cases of extreme human rights violations.

Support of a different kind may come for the genocidal target. Thus,
fellow religionists or ethnic groups may induce their governments to
intervene on behalf of the potential victims. A more limited kind of sup-
port may come from international organizations in the form of protests or
boycotts. In some cases irredentist movements elsewhere may lend
military support.

COMMON ELEMENTS IN DIFFERENT GENOCIDES

The merits of this theoretical argument can be demonstrated by analy-
sis of the characteristics of cases of genocide categorized according to
their political circumstances.

Post-War, Post-Imperial Genocides

The Holocaust is undisputably the most abominable instance of mod-
ern genocide; however, it has many structural, societal, and external
similarities with lesser genocides. Hitler's rise to power, though by
constitutional means, came in the wake of a worldwide depression. The
post-war economic crises and the inability of the new democratic
government to cope with massive unemployment and extreme currency
inflation greatly strengthened the radical left and the extreme right. Fear
of a Communist takeover led to the bare victory of the National Socialist
Party, and the "Enabling Act" left Hitler with dictatorial powers, which
he used to bar any opposition. (See Chapter 10.)

The emergence of the nationalist movements of the "Young Turks"
came in the wake of a disintegrating Ottoman Empire. A prior rebellion
in 1908, which briefly restored a constitutional monarchy, led to a coup
in 1913 and the total takeover by the Young Turks under their leader,
Enver Pasha. During the Balkan wars (1912-1913) the Ottoman Empire
lost almost all its territory in Europe, which left the new nationalist
movement with little sympathy for the national aspirations of the

remaining ethnic minorities in Turkey. (See Chapter 11.)

Both countries—Turkey and Germany—did experience a major re-structuring of their respective governments following loss of territory in war and a rapid succession of different versions of government. The German Empire was replaced by a democratic government, which lacked the strength to unite the warring factions of Communists and Monarch-ists. In Turkey the Sultan was briefly replaced by a constitutional Sul-tan, who, however, was in no position to halt the nationalist movement of the Young Turks, who tried to propel Turkey into the twentieth cen-tury with sweeping reforms. The national upheavals following the takeover by both nationalist movements had disastrous consequences for some ethnic/religious minorities in both countries—Armenians in Turkey and Jews and Gypsies in Germany.

The annihilation of Jews and Gypsies in Germany and the genocide against Armenians in Turkey followed a similar pattern. In both coun-tries domination of the state apparatus by a tightly controlled political elite was complete. Both the Young Turks and the Nazi movement introduced a kind of myth, exalting the likeness of the dominant group, i.e., "Aryan"-Germans and Turks. Germanization and Turkification both emphasized pureness of race and common cultural/ethnic and religious values. Thus, all "real" Germans were to be Christian, Aryan, and non-Communist, as all Turks were to be Muslim, Turkoman, and pro Young Turk. Both Jews and Armenians were easy targets, for they were different in religion, "racial" heritage, and culture. The age-old division between Christians and Muslims and Christians and Jews accel-erated receptiveness for a renewal of a crusade against infidels and the people of the book. The readiness to massacre Jews and Armenians was not new to either society. Sporadic violence or planned massacres had taken place prior to both genocides. But the Holocaust and the Genocide of 1915 against the Armenians were exceptional, because they were pre-meditated acts by policymakers to eliminate a people. Why?

I have argued that once preconditions such as structural changes, lack of external constraint, and internal cleavages combine, *the stage is set for genocide*. In both cases external constraints were either nonexistent or too late and too little to halt the slaughters of thousands of innocent victims. Neither meager German protest in 1915 (Turkey's major ally) nor an international boycott by World Jewry did much to stop impending disaster. Russian threat of intervention against Turkey was superseded by World War I, similar to Allied lack of intervention due to World War II. International sympathy for Jews was virtually nonexistent, evidenced by the refusal of other countries to grant entry permits to fleeing Jews. Armenians fared little better in the wake of competing nationalist move-ments elsewhere in Europe and the impending Russian Revolution, and the making of new alliances culminating in World War I.

But neither structural change nor external conditions *fully* explain why policymakers decide to eliminate or annihilate a people rather than engage in *sporadic* violence, i.e., why they resort to genocide rather than state terrorism to suppress opposition. Internal conditions may provide the final clues to why states engage in genocide. Often the strength of a new government greatly depends on its ability to mobilize mass support. Often divisions within culturally heterogeneous societies are overcome by declaring one group responsible for the other's misfortunes. Sometimes that is the case in socialist revolutions, where capitalists serve as scapegoats for the misery of the workers. Turkification and Germanification both served to unite people in their pride of belonging to a people, both inheritors of a long history, i.e., heirs of the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire. Armenians may have been a legitimate threat to the Young Turks because they were collectively organized and demanded limited autonomy within the new state. Jews, however, were no threat to the Nazis; they were neither politically organized nor particularly visible as a group—Germany boasted a more assimilated "enlightened" (non-religious) Jewish population than most other European countries. Yet Nazi propaganda had singled out the Jew from its beginning. If Jews in Germany were at all special as a group they were so because of achievements in the professions. A disproportionate number of them were doctors, scientists, literary greats, and artists. Leading lights of Marxism/Socialism included many Jews, e.g., Karl Marx, Rosa Luxembourg, Ferdinand Lassalle, and Eduard Bernstein. Why did the Nazis single out the Jews? Anti-Semitism has long been part of European history. It was probably the single most appealing prejudicial doctrine available to the Nazis, who were trying to consolidate their power. Different groups in Germany may have had different animosities, but the Jews offered more value as scapegoats than other groups such as Gypsies or Communists. Communists were after all "genuine Germans," whereas Gypsies were too small in number and not a settled people. The successful merchant image of the Jews spelled competition for the average shopkeeper in Germany; the dominance of Jewish scientists may have caused envy among their colleagues; legendary Jewish international finance connections added to the image resented by others. The liberal image of artists residing in the capital did nothing to persuade the provincial German that the Jew was part of their world. Hitler's claim that Marxism/Communism was after all a Jewish invention thus was easily absorbed into an ideology offering an escape for many. The Jews had something for everyone, and those enlightened enough to realize the demagoguery thought that Hitler could be controlled. Once the Nazis realized the appeal of anti-Semitism, propaganda made full use of it. Nazis, once in power, fulfilled their promises to put people to work and "clean" the towns of Jews. Once the Nazis realized that the

world was not eager to take "their" Jews, the "final solution" was to take care of the Jewish "problem." Who was to stop the murderous engine? In 1944 the Germans, their cities bombed, were losing the war, yet the death camps were working to full capacity.

Killing the Jewish population of Europe may have been the rational choice of the Nazis, yet the utility of doing so was utterly irrational. The costs of keeping the camps going despite the war effort were immense. Thousands of people were involved in killing Jews; trains transporting Jews had priority over those aiding the war effort.[8] The fanatic pursuit of "finishing the job" was part of the robot-like performance of those selected to serve the "higher cause" of Nazi ideology.

Post-Colonial Genocides

The genocides of Southern Sudan, Biafra, Bangladesh, Burundi, and East Timor all took place following massive internal rebellions. Bangladesh, Biafra, East Timor, and the Southern Sudan sought to secede —from Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia, and the Northern Sudan, respectively. Bangladesh was successful; Biafra, East Timor, and the Southern Sudan were not. In Burundi the Hutus tried unsuccessfully to throw off the minority rule of the Tutsis. All five genocides happened in the wake of colonial liberation. In each case euphoria over liberation soon gave way to a *reemphasis* of existing cleavages.

The Northern Sudanese, Muslims who claim Arab descent, saw their future tightly bound to the Arab world. For the Southern Sudanese, mostly Negroid, animist (though including many Christians), and multi-ethnic, the traditional societies of East Africa seemed a more likely ally. The racial division is somehow arbitrary, since many Northerners who claim to be Arabs are Negroid in appearance and many Southerners called Negroid have non-Negroid features.[9] More important, Southern economic development was grossly inferior to the North. It was no surprise that the politically and economically powerful (and more populous) North should dominate the South after independence in 1956. Thus, domination by the British was replaced with domination by the North. Even before independence came to the country the South revolted against the North, which resulted in the slaughter of many thousands of innocent people.

Nigeria after independence in 1960 was united under a federal system. But unity was fragile among the three dominant ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani (about 15 million), the Yoruba (about 10 million), and the Ibos (about 10 million). The three were different in language, religion, and social organization.[10] The Ibos who became the targets of genocide, were mostly Christians and animists, in contrast to the Hausa-Fulani, who were Muslim and organized in the traditional Arab way under a strong central authority. Adding to the problem was the Ibos' domi-

nance in education and industrialization. The North, with a high illiteracy rate and a largely agrarian economy, nevertheless controlled the federation by sheer weight of numbers (the total Northern region numbered about 35 million people).[11] The Ibos who attempted to secede in 1967 capitulated to the federal government of Nigeria in 1970. During the years of warfare hundreds of thousands died either in battle, during massacres, or by starvation.

The process of decolonization in India brought the division of India and Pakistan, strongly fostered by religious cleavages. Pakistanis were largely Muslims, and most Indians were Hindus; intermingling between the two groups was prohibited because of the caste system of the Hindus. Caught between the two groups were the Sikhs, who were divided between the emerging states of India and Pakistan. Before partition the Sikhs were embroiled in a "holy war" against the Muslims. Communal strife during this time took on mass proportions as an estimated 1 million people lost their lives. Upon partition Pakistan was divided into West and East Pakistan, separated by 1,000 miles of India. As in the Sudan, one region, West Pakistan, was considerably more industrialized, whereas the East was predominantly agricultural. In addition to economic domination, political domination was secured by a bureaucracy consisting largely of West Pakistanis. Negotiations for greater autonomy for the East in 1971 ended in massive retaliations by the West Pakistani government. During the following months genocidal policies were implemented which resulted in the indiscriminate deaths of men, women, and children numbering well over 1 million.

Burundi became independent in 1962 after years of extended rebellions against Belgian authorities. The country has a majority of Hutus—about 85 percent of the population—ruled by a minority government composed of Tutsis, who make up about 15 percent of the population. This domination by a minority was over 400 years old, established when the warrior Tutsis invaded the country from Ethiopia. Three aborted coups in 1965, 1969, and 1972 against the unwanted minority government led to severe reprisals by the Tutsis and in 1972 to genocide against the Hutus which claimed about 200,000 lives.

East Timor was a Portuguese colony which was to become independent in 1978 but preempted that step in 1975 by unilaterally declaring independence. The people are largely of Malay and Papuan stock, with a majority of Christians and some Muslim minorities. Past rivalries were confined to interparty conflicts. The most popular party, FRETILIN, which enjoyed 60 percent of the popular vote, was anticolonial and anti-Indonesian and was thought to be left-leaning. Two other parties, APODETI and UDT, called for union with Indonesia. This division erupted into violence during August 1975. Indonesia immediately reacted by initiating a blockade against East Timor and subsequently invaded the country in December 1975. With the help of UDT and

APODETI forces, independence was exchanged for union with Indo-
nesia; the invasion resulted in looting, torture, and slaughter, with the
result that nearly 10 percent of the population was killed.[12]

In all five cases foreign intervention significantly added to the success
or failure of the secessionist movement. The intervention by India in
December 1971 ended the genocidal massacres and also secured the in-
dependence of the new state of Bangladesh. Not so typical was the
international support given to Nigeria/Biafra. China, France, Portugal,
Israel, and South Africa supported Biafra, while Great Britain and the
Soviet Union supported Nigeria. The latter "alliance" was probably due
to Britain's effort to curtail growing Soviet influence in Nigeria. Biafran
support came in the midst of conflicting European and big-power politics
(e.g., France's oil interest in Biafra and China's tensions with Moscow),
while Israel mostly confined its support to humanitarian relief efforts.
The United States paid lip service to a united Nigeria. The Organization
for African Unity (OAU) also supported Nigeria.[13] The Southern Su-
danese enjoyed almost no support from outside sources, while Egypt,
Libya, Algeria, Kuwait, East Germany, and the Soviet Union were said
to have armed the North. In Burundi, no international action was taken
to halt the massacres, although protests through diplomatic channels
were plentiful. So, for example, the OAU supported the Burundi gov-
ernment, as did China, North Korea, and France. The greatest concern
was shown by the former colonial power, Belgium, which early on
protested against Burundi's genocidal policies. East Timor received
verbal support from Australia and Portugal, and Indonesia received mili-
tary support from the United States, while others claimed ignorance
about accusations of genocide in East Timor. In all cases United Nations
actions were confined to humanitarian relief efforts.[14]

Post-Coup and Post-Revolutionary Genocides

The genocides of Kampuchea, Uganda, and Indonesia took place
after a revolution in Kampuchea, after a coup in Uganda, and after an
attempted coup in Indonesia, each conflict causing massive internal
upheaval.

With the deposal of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1970 a relatively
tranquil period ended in Cambodia. Increased involvement in the Viet-
nam War led to increased turmoil in the Khmer Republic. Forces of the
Khmer Republic fought the Khmer Rouge in a civil war, which ended in
the takeover by the Khmer Rouge Communists in 1975 and the estab-
lishment of Democratic Kampuchea. From 1975 to 1979 the Khmer
Rouge expelled all foreigners and instituted one of the bloodiest regimes
known in the twentieth century. Under the leadership of Pol Pot the
urban population was sent to the countryside to become part of the
"new" productive forces. He designated as expendable all those unable

to perform the task. Pol Pot's "Marxist" revolution was but a peasant uprising against the feudal class represented by the townspeople.[15] Though his fury was mainly directed against townspeople, former collaborators including loyal peasants were also eliminated; thus, all perceived as opposing the regime were targets of genocidal policies. The failure of the regime was sealed with the invasion by Vietnamese forces in 1979; Vietnam is still occupying the country.

In January 1971 Idi Amin overthrew Milton Obote of Uganda in a coup, setting in motion a regime which ruled with unprecedented brutality. Amin, the dictator of Uganda who is often compared with Hitler, during his first three months in office was responsible for the deaths of 10,000 civilians and 2,000 soldiers. Like Pol Pot, Amin immediately chose to expel all foreigners from the country. His genocidal policies extended to all perceived as opposing his regime. His henchmen were members of his own tribe, the Kakwa, Nubians inside Uganda, and mercenaries from the Southern Sudan. In the effort to consolidate his power, Amin was responsible for the slaughter of an estimated 500,000 people. His regime ended with an invasion by Tanzanian forces in 1979, leaving behind a legacy of tyranny.[16]

On October 1, 1965, six Indonesian generals and a lieutenant were murdered in an uprising against President Sukarno. Although the truth may remain forever a secret, the events were thought to be Communist inspired and/or initiated.[17] In a predominantly Muslim society, the Communist party was something of an enigma (membership estimated at 10 million or one-quarter of the adult population). The short-lived uprising was crushed a few days later and led to the *systematic* slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Communists over a period of two years. Participating in the slaughter were soldiers and civilians trained for the purpose. Some officials of the Suharto regime later explained the slaughter as the "people's revenge," suggesting a spontaneous mass reaction to avenge the death of some of their leaders—hardly convincing in light of the fact that the slaughter continued over two years.

International support for the revolutionaries in Kampuchea came from Vietnam and China, while the regime was supported by American arms and aid. The faltering United States effort in Vietnam led to an abandonment of the pro-American Lon Nol regime, which enabled Pol Pot to take over. The subsequent fall of the Pol Pot regime was in part due to the growing antagonism between China and Vietnam, eventually leading to the invasion by the latter, whereupon Pol Pot fled to China. Uganda's Amin received full support from Libya but was criticized by the leaders of Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia. By and large, however, the OAU remained silent about the indiscriminate killings of Ugandans. Only after Uganda invaded Tanzania did Tanzania respond with a counterinvasion. Supported by renegade Ugandan soldiers, the invasion successfully removed the murderous regime, and Amin fled to Libya. In Indonesia

the coup was thought to be inspired by Peking, though no direct link with China could be detected. American sympathies went to the Suharto regime. In all cases the United Nations did little other than express its dismay and verbally condemn these flagrant violations of human rights.

Genocides of Conquest

During the imposition of German colonialism in what is today Namibia, the Hereros became the target of genocidal policies. In the early 1970s "the International League for the Rights of Man, joined by the Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom, charged the government of Paraguay with complicity in genocide against the Guayaki Indians."[18]

In the short-lived colonial history of the German Empire (ending in 1918), early efforts of peaceful colonization in Southern Africa were soon replaced by measures which reduced the indigenous people to serfdom. The Hereros, a pastoral people noted for their large cattle herds, saw themselves slowly stripped of their land by German settlers. From 1903 to 1907 they revolted against the German colonizers—with devastating results. Successful at first, the Hereros were eventually defeated by superior technology and firepower. Thousands lost their lives in the actions following the uprising. The Germans "hunted them down like wild beasts all during 1905."[19] An estimated 65,000 Hereros lost their lives.

The Guayaki (Aché) Indians, a hunting and gathering people, were targets of genocide when "modern" Paraguayans encroached upon their traditional lands. During 1974 the Paraguayan government was blamed for allowing the slaughter, torture, and enslavement of the Indians by hunters and slavetraders.

International action was negligible in the first case. Wars against native Africans warranted no attention from other colonizers. There was some international attention given to the Aché Indian case, and verbal condemnation of Paraguayan policy eventually resulted in some response by the government.

CONCLUSIONS

In all the cases considered here genocides were preceded by some attempt to change the existing power structure. It should be obvious that any attempt to change existing power relations carries a certain amount of risk for the challenger. Though most potential revolutionaries accept the calculus of losing some lives, genocide would be an unacceptable risk to anyone.

Successful rebellions (Kampuchea, for example) more often resulted in massive internal upheavals than did failed attempts (Indonesia, for example). Moreover, unsuccessful coups often resulted in the slaughter of those affiliated with the rebelling faction, for example, in Indonesia and East Timor. Evidently governments utilize genocidal policies to eliminate the opposition in an attempt to maintain the existing power structure. In some cases these processes may extend to include attempts to annihilate a people, i.e., a holocaust. This does not mean that holocausts result in more deaths; it simply means that the pursuers seek the total destruction of a people rather than their partial destruction. The difference is especially apparent in cases where the victims belong to the political opposition—often the slaughter stops short of family members. The child of a Communist may not necessarily become one himself, but the child of a Jew cannot escape his/her Jewishness, as a result often becoming the victim of a holocaust. Utilizing genocide to eliminate political opposition thus appears to be a more rational choice than the attempt to annihilate a people. As such, policymakers sometimes make the argument that political victims are legitimate targets of governmental violence which aims to prevent further violence, e.g., future civil war. In contrast, one may argue that ethnic/religious victims are illegitimate targets of governmental violence because they have neither the means to fight back, nor do they compete with government, and thus are truly innocent of any wrongdoing. But what is at stake is not the characteristics of the victim group, but the motives of the perpetrators. The killing of a people for attempting to change the existing government structure cannot be based on the collective character of a group, simply because not everybody is involved in the struggle. The only public offense which warrants the execution of an individual is the murder of another (in some societies even murder does not result in death). Excluded from this principle are killings done in the process of war, although many people view war and the resulting human carnage as an unacceptable means of international interaction. In cases of no war and where no individual crime has taken place, any killing either done by or conspired in by public authorities against a group of people is a crime.

The theoretical argument advances the proposition that structural challenges result in upheavals, polarize existing internal cleavages, and —with external help or the lack of it to either the dominant group or the rebelling faction—sometimes lead to genocide. In all cases cited above the genocides were preceded by challenges to the dominant power strata. In all cases genocidal processes were accelerated through the polarization of internal cleavages. The most distinct cases are those of the Holocaust, the Armenian genocide, and Burundi, where the groups were targets of prior discrimination and/or random violence, and also were easily identified by differences in culture, religion, and ethnicity. The Southern

Sudan, Biafra, and Bangladesh similarly saw incidences of random vio-
lence and/or repression against target groups who were culturally, eth-
nically, and/or religiously different. In East Timor, Kampuchea, and
Indonesia the victim groups shared similar ethnic characteristics with the
dominant group, but, though prior internal rivalries existed in all cases,
the victims were considered enemies mainly because of their political
affiliations. Uganda is something of a special case, because victims
were neither clearly political enemies nor did they belong to one specific
religious or ethnic group. The killings, although systematic, seemed to
be instituted to consolidate the despotic power of a tyrant, similar to the
"Enabling Act" which gave Hitler the license to kill. The genocides
against the Hereros and the Aché Indians were policies designed to ex-
tend the control of the dominant "civilization." In the case of the former,
the Germans encountered a new type of warfare in the guerrilla tactics of
the Hereros, which they responded to in kind. Thus, random incidents
of "savagery" by the Hereros led to their wholesale, systematic slaughter
by the Germans. The Achés, although part of the same racial stock as
their persecutors, were culturally separated from the dominant stratum of
Paraguay. Malign neglect by the government led to their genocide,
perpetrated by those acting on behalf of the dominant interest, in a march
toward their version of civilization.

In all cases external support for either the dominant group or a
rebellious faction added significantly to the success or failure of the
undertaking. The Herero genocide is the exception, probably because
the slaughter of "savages" in 1904 by the colonizers was more acceptable
then. Today, the "savages" of the past are replaced by either the
Untermenschen or enemies of the dominant group. Nowadays, the drive
toward civilization is replaced by the search for a better world, in which
those perceived as standing in the way of "progress" are liquidated.

If we are able to explain past genocides and thus to anticipate future
genocides, the next logical step is their prevention. International organi-
zations such as the United Nations have failed to halt the use of geno-
cidal policies by sovereign states. Internal bickering and competing in-
terests have prevented the effective use of international diplomacy to
prevent or stop genocides. Yet, the emergence of numerous private
organizations, in combination with a few U.N. efforts, gives the
impression that something may yet be done.

NOTES

1. For an extended discussion see Israel W. Charny, *How Can We
Commit the Unthinkable? Genocide: The Human Cancer* (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1982), and Herbert C. Kelman, "Violence Without Moral

Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and Victimizers," *Journal of Social Issues* 29 (1973).

2. Charny, op. cit.

3. Barbara Harff, *Genocide and Human Rights: International Legal and Political Issues* (Denver: University of Denver Monograph Series in World Affairs, 1984).

4. Richard Falk, *The End of World Order: Essays on Normative International Relations* (New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 1983).

5. D. E. H. Russell, *Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force: A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa* (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

6. Helen Fein, "A Formula for Genocide: Comparison of the Turkish Genocide (1915) and the German Holocaust (1939-1945)," *Comparative Studies in Sociology*, 1 (1978).

7. Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

8. Fein, op. cit.

9. Cecil Eprile, *War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972* (London: David and Charles, 1974).

10. Peter Schwab, ed., *Biafra* (New York: Facts on File, 1971).

11. Ibid.

12. This discussion draws in part upon an unpublished paper by Christian C. Mattioli, "Invasion and Genocide in East Timor," Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, 1983.

13. Schwab, op. cit.

14. Mattioli, op. cit.

15. Michael Vickery, *Cambodia 1975-1982* (Boston: South End Press, 1984), and Kuper, op. cit.

16. Dan Wooding and Ray Barnett, *Uganda Holocaust* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan Publishing House, 1980).

17. Kuper, op. cit., and Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).

18. Kuper, op. cit., p. 33.

19. Jon M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

4

GENOCIDE AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL THEORY: OBSERVATIONS ON THE EXCLUSIVITY OF COLLECTIVE DEATH

Irving Louis Horowitz

The subject of genocide in general and the Holocaust in particular threatens to become a growth industry in the Western cultural apparatus. Books, plays, and television dramatizations on the subject pour forth relentlessly. Sometimes they are presented soberly, other times scandalously; but all are aimed at a mass market unfortunately more amazed than disturbed by their implications. There is danger in this massification of Holocaust studies. Western culture is inclined to adopt fads; even Holocaust studies may become a moment in commercial time—interest in them may decline as well as grow, and even peak out, leaving in its wake a void. The residual debris will probably be summarized in musical comedy; we have already seen examples of this in *The Lieutenant* (Lieutenant Calley) and *Evita* (Eva Peron) on Broadway. Peter Weiss' play *The Investigation* led one commentator to suggest that the major character in the play, in order to elicit shock from the audience, read lines "as if he were saying: 'Let's hear it for genocide.'"[1] This may be a sign of things to come.

One of the least attractive features of post-Holocaust studies is the effort of a few to monopolize the field. As a consequence, a linguistic battle looms among survivors over which exterminations even deserve the appellation "holocaust" (the total physical annihilation of a nation or a people). Such a bizarre struggle over language remains a grim reminder of how easy it is for victims to challenge each other and how difficult it is to forge common links against victimizers.[2] I do not wish to deny Jewish victims of the Nazi Holocaust the uniqueness of their experience. But there are strong elements of continuity as well as discontinuity in the

process of genocide, in the evolution of life-taking as an essential dimension by which state power can be measured in the twentieth century.

Writing with compelling insight, Elie Wiesel personifies the mystic vision of the Holocaust. Those who lived through it "lack objectivity," he claims, while those who write on the subject but did not live through it must "withdraw" from the analytic challenge "without daring to enter into the heart of the matter."[3] More recently, it has been suggested that "for Jews, the Holocaust is a tragedy that cannot be shared" and "it may be unrealistic or unreasonable or inappropriate to ask Jews to share the term holocaust. But it is even more unreasonable and inappropriate not to find a new name for what has taken place in Cambodia."[4] Since what took place in both situations is a holocaust—from the demographic point of view—we need not invent new terms to explain similar barbaric processes. Those who share a holocaust share a common experience of being victim to the state's ruthless and complete pursuit of human life-taking without regard to individual guilt or innocence. It is punishment for identification with a particular group, not for personal demeanor or performance. These are not theological, but empirical criteria. To seek exclusivity in death has bizarre implications. The special Jewish triumph is life. All too many peoples—Jews, Cambodians, Armenians, Paraguayans, Ugandans—have shared a similar fate for victims to engage in divisive squabbles about whose holocaust is real or whose genocide is worse.

Those who take an exclusive position on the Holocaust are engaging in moral bookkeeping, in which only those who suffer very large numbers of deaths qualify. Some argue that the 6 million deaths among European Jews is far greater than the estimated 1 million deaths among Armenians. However, the number of Armenian deaths as a percentage of their total population (50 percent) is not much lower than the percentage of Jewish losses (60 percent). Others contend that the deaths of Ugandans or Biafrans are too few to compare to the Holocaust; yet here, too, tribal deaths in percentage terms rival the European pattern of genocide. In certain instances high death rates (approximately 40 percent of all Cambodians, or 3 million out of 7 million) are indisputable; then one hears that such deaths were only random and a function of total societal disintegration. Yet it has been firmly established that such deaths were targeted against intellectuals, educators, the foreign-born, and literate people—in short, the pattern was hardly random; anyone who could potentially disrupt a system of agrarian slave labor flying under Communist banners was singled out and eliminated. Even making the definition a matter of percentages risks creating a morality based solely on bookkeeping.

There is need to reaffirm the seriousness of the subject. The problem of genocide must be rescued from mass culture. It must not be returned to academic preserves, but it must be made part and parcel of a general

theory of social systems and social structures. The positions which I would like to discuss, examine, and criticize perhaps have been articulated best by theologian Emil L. Fackenheim[5] and sociologist Leo Kuper.[6] In some curious way they represent the extremes that must be overcome if an integrated approach to the study of genocide is to become a serious subject for scientific analysis. On the one hand Fackenheim speaks with a thunderous theological certitude that approaches messianic or at least prophetic assuredness. On the other hand is Kuper, who is extremely modest in his approach, to the point where some fundamental distinctions between severe strife and mass destruction are entirely obliterated. This is not to suggest that the truth lies somewhere in the middle but rather that the need for a social scientific standpoint in the study of genocide may convince all to move to a higher ground in this area—an area of research that has truly replaced economics as the dismal science.

Fackenheim's propositions have come to represent the main trends in the theological school of Holocaust studies. They carry tremendous weight among mass culture figures for whom theological sanction provides legitimation to their endeavors and respite from critics.[7] Fackenheim does not remotely intend his views to become part of mass culture. Quite the contrary. His eight propositions distinguishing the Holocaust in particular from genocide in general represent a tremendous effort to transcend journalistic platitudes, to move beyond an articulation of the banality of evil and into the evil of banality. This deep respect for Fackenheim registered, it must also be said that an alternative perspective—a social science framework—is warranted.

Fackenheim presents his eight propositions with direction and force. A general theory of genocide and state power, which accounts for the specifics of the Holocaust, can have no better baseline.

One: The Holocaust was not a war. Like all wars, the Roman War against the Jews was over conflicting interests—territorial, imperial, and religious— waged between parties endowed, however unequally, with power. The victims of the Holocaust had no power. And they were a threat to the Third Reich only in the Nazi mind.

The Holocaust was a war; but a modern rather than a medieval variety. Earlier wars redistributed power by military means. Genocide redistributes power by technological as well as military means. Robert Lifton recently stated the issue succinctly.

The word holocaust, from Greek origin, means total consumption by fire. That definition applies, with literal grotesqueness, to Auschwitz and Buchenwald, and also to Nagasaki and Hiroshima. In Old Testament usage there is the added meaning of the sacrifice of a burnt offering. That meaning tends to be specifically retained for the deliberate, selective Nazi genocide of six million Jews—retained with both bitterness and irony (sacrifice to whom

for what?). I will thus speak of the Holocaust and of holocausts—the first to convey the uniqueness of the Nazi project of genocide, the second to suggest certain general principles around the totality of destruction as it affects survivors. From this perspective, the holocaust means total disaster: the physical, social, and spiritual obliteration of a human community.[8]

The precedent for this war against the Jews was the Turkish decimation of the Armenian population. Like the Nazis, the Ottoman Empire did not simply need to win a war and redistribute power; it had an overwhelming amount of power to begin with.[9] A war of annihilation is a war. To deny the warlike character of genocide is to deny its essence: the destruction of human beings for predetermined nationalist or statist goals.

The Holocaust is also modern in that it is an internal war, waged with subterfuge and deception by a majority with power against an internal minority with little power. Here too the Armenian and Jewish cases are roughly comparable. Although one can talk of genocide in relation to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, genocidal conflict involves internal rather than external populations. But this is an unambiguous point on the nature of war rather than a denial of the warlike nature of the Holocaust per se.

The victims of the Holocaust did have a certain power: they represented a threat to the Nazi Reich. The Jew as bourgeois and the Jew as proletarian represented the forces of legitimacy and revolution in Weimar Germany. They had modest positions in universities, in labor, and in industry. Regarding state power itself, where there were scarcely any Jews, they were powerless. Jews were locked out from the German bureaucratic apparatus much as the Turkish Beys locked out Armenians from the Ottoman administrative apparatus, except to use them in a Quisling-like manner. The Jews posed a threatening challenge to the legitimacy of the Nazi regime.

Two: The Holocaust was not part of a war, a war crime. War crimes belong intrinsically to wars, whether they are calculated to further war goals, or are the result of passions that wars unleash. The Holocaust hindered rather than furthered German war aims in World War II. And it was directed, not by passions, but rather by a plan devoid of passion, indeed, unable to afford this luxury.

This argument rests on a peculiar and misanthropic rendition of the Hilberg thesis. The Holocaust did hinder the Nazi war effort in the limited sense that troop transportation took second priority to transporting Jews. But in the longer and larger perspective, there were advantages. Slave labor was itself an advantage; unpaid labor time was useful. The expropriation of goods and materials was an economic gain for the Nazi Reich. People were liquidated at marginal cost to the

system. The gold taken from extracted teeth became a proprietary trans-fer.[10] Fackenheim questions whether war goals were furthered by the Holocaust; this is not answered simply. As a mobilizing device linking military and civil sectors of the population, war ends were enhanced by the conduct of the Holocaust. The Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews was motivated by passion, as evidenced by the fact that troop move-ments to the Russian front took second priority.

Raul Hilberg makes clear the direct collusion of the German Wehr-macht and the German Reichsbahn with respect to the systematic depor-tation of Jews and the front-line servicing of the armed forces. The management of the German railroad illustrates how irrationality can become rationalized, how a "true system in the modern sense of the term" was employed for the unrelenting destruction of human lives. As Hilberg notes, to the extent that the technification of mass society was exemplified by the transportation network, such human engineering considerations cannot be viewed as ancillary.

It illuminates and defines the very concept of "totalitarianism." The Jews could not be destroyed by one Fhrer on one order. The unprecedented event was a product of multiple initiatives, as well as lengthy negotiations and repeated adjustments among separate power structures, which differed from one another in their traditions and customs but which were united in their unfathomable will to push the Nazi regime to the limits of its destructive potential.[11]

The question of passion is a moot point at best; undoubtedly there was a collective passion undergirding the conduct of the Holocaust. It was not simply a methodical event.

Fackenheim and many other theologians overlooked parallels in the pursuit of a genocidal state following defeat. After the Turkish defeat at the hands of Bulgaria in 1912, the most massive genocide against Armenians occurred. After the Nazi defeat at Stalingrad in 1943, the most massive destruction of Jews ensued. Whatever the vocabulary of motives—fear of discovery, of reprisal, or of judgment—the use of state-sanctioned murder to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat is evident.

The largest part of European Jewry was destroyed after Germany had in effect lost the war. When the major object of the war, defeat of the Allied powers, was no longer feasible, the more proximate aim, de-struction of the Jewish people, became the paramount goal. War aims have manifest and latent elements. The manifest aim was victory in the war, but the latent aim was defeat of the internal "enemy," the Jews. The near-total destruction of the Jewish population might be considered the victory of the Third Reich in the face of the greater defeat they confronted by the end of Stalingrad.

Three: The Holocaust was not a case of racism, although, of course, the
Nazis were racists. But they were racists because they were anti-Semites, not
anti-Semites because they were racists. (The case of the Japanese as honorary
Aryans would suffice to bear this out.) Racism asserts that some human
groups are inferior to others, destined to slavery. The Holocaust enacted the
principle that the Jews are not of the human race at all but "vermin" to be
"exterminated."

Here Fackenheim represents a considerable body of thought. But the
Holocaust was a case of racism. It is not a question of which comes
first, anti-Semitism or racism; that philosophical dilemma is secondary.
Assignment of special conditions of life and work to Jews implies what
racism is all about: the assumption of inferiority and superiority leading
to different forms of egalitarian outcomes. Ultimately racism is not
about institutionalizing inferiority or superiority, but about denial of the
humanity of those involved. Jewish vis-à-vis Aryan physical charac-
teristics were studied by German anthropologists to prove that there was
such a thing as race involved. These stereotypes were the essence of
European racism, as George Mosse has fully documented in a recent
work.

Racism had taken the ideas about man and his world which we have attempted
to analyze and directed them toward the final solution. Such concepts as
middle-class virtue, heroic morality, honesty, truthfulness, and love of nation
had become involved as ever against the Jew: the organs of the efficient state
helped to bring about the final solution; and science itself continued its
corruption through racism. Above all, anthropology, which had been so
deeply involved in the rise of racism, now used racism for its own end
through the final solution. Anthropological studies were undertaken on the
helpless inmates of the camps. Just as previously non-racist scientists became
converted by the temptation to aid Nazi eugenic policies, so others could not
resist the temptation to use their power over life and death in order to further
their anthropological or ethnographic ambitions.[12]

The fact that American racism has a clear-cut criterion based on skin
color does not mean that the physical and emotional characteristics
attributed to Jews were less a matter of racism than the characteristics
attributed to American blacks. To deny the racial character of the
Holocaust is to reject the special bond that oppressed peoples share, the
special unity that can bind blacks and Armenians and Jews. To empha-
size distinctions between peoples by arguing for the uniqueness of anti-
Semitism is a profound mistake; it reduces any possibility of a unified
political and human posture on the meaning of genocide or the Holo-
caust. The triumphalism in death implicit in this kind of sectarianism
comes close to defeating its own purpose.

Four: The Holocaust was not a case of genocide although it was in response to this crime that the world invented the term. Genocide is a modern phenomenon. For the most part in ancient times human beings were considered valuable, and were carried off into slavery. The genocides of modern history spring from motives, human, if evil, such as greed, hatred, or simply blind xenophobic passion. This is true even when they masquerade under high-flown ideologies. The Nazi genocide of the Jewish people did not masquerade under an ideology. The ideology was genuinely believed. This was an "idealistic" genocide to which war aims were, therefore, sacrificed. The ideal was to rid the world of Jews as one rids oneself of lice. It was also, however, to "punish" the Jews for their "crimes," and the crime in question was existence itself. Hitherto, such a charge had been directed only at devils; Jews had now become devils as well as vermin. And there is but one thing that devils and vermin have in common: neither is human.

Here Fackenheim has a problem of logical contradiction. First we are told that the Holocaust is not a case of genocide, and then we are reminded of the Nazi genocide of the Jewish people. But more significant is the contradiction within this framework, an inability to accept the common fate of the victims. Whether they are Japanese, Ugandans, Gypsies, Cambodians, Armenians, or Jews, their common humanity makes possible a common intellectual understanding. Insistence upon separatism, that the crime was Jewish existence and that this makes the Jewish situation different from any other slaughter, whatever its roots, contains a dangerous element of mystification. It represents a variation of the belief in chosenness, converting it from living God's commandments into chosenness for destruction. This approach is dangerously misanthropic. It misses the point that being chosen for life may be a unique Jewish mission, but being selected for death is common to many peoples and societies.

The description of Jews as devils was not the essence of Nazi anti-Semitism; it was only the rhetoric of Nazism. The Ayatollah Khomeini and other Iranian clerics constantly refer to Americans as devils. The essence of the Jewish problem for Nazism was the Jew as a political actor, and beyond that, the Jew as a cosmopolitan, universalistic figure in contrast to Fascist concepts based on nationalism, statism, and particularism. The Jewish tradition of social marginality, of reticence to participate in nationalistic celebrations, makes anti-Semitism a universal phenomenon, as characteristic of France as of the Soviet Union. The special character of Jewish living cannot be easily converted into the special nature of Jewish dying. Dying is a universal property of many peoples, cultures, and nations.

Five: The Holocaust was not an episode within the Third Reich, a footnote for historians. In all other societies, however brutal, people are punished for

doing. In the Third Reich, "non-Aryans" were punished for being. In all other societies—in pretended or actual principle, if assuredly not always in practice—people are presumed innocent until proved guilty; the Nazi principle presumed everyone guilty until he had proved his "Aryan" innocence. Hence, anyone proving or even prepared to prove such innocence was implicated, however slightly or unwittingly, in the process which led to Auschwitz. The Holocaust is not an accidental by-product of the Reich but rather its inmost essence.

Response to this proposition must acknowledge the basic truths of the first part of the statement. The Holocaust was not merely a passing moment within the Third Reich. It did not occur in other Fascist countries, like Italy, for example, where death itself was alien to the Italian culture, where not only the survival of Jews but the survival of Communists was tolerated and even encouraged. Antonio Gramsci's major works were written in a prison that had been converted into a library by his jailers. The nature of national culture is a specific entity. The Italian people, the Turkish people, the German people all had a distinctive character. Social analysts do not discuss this kind of theme in public. It is not fashionable; we have become even a bit frightened of the concept of national character. Any notion of national character as that advanced by Fackenheim carries within itself the danger of stereotypical thought. But how else can we understand these phenomena? How can we understand the character of reaction, rebellion, and revolution in Turkey without understanding Turkish character, especially the continuity of that kind of character in the moral bookkeeping of development?

Ascribing guilt through proving innocence fits the framework of the Nazi ideology. But to construct a general theory of historical guilt may have pernicious consequences, in which the sins of the fathers are bequeathed to the children and further offspring. That the Holocaust was an "inmost essence" makes it difficult to get beyond phylogenic memories, beyond a situation in which a society might be viewed as having overcome its racism. When guilt is generalized, when it no longer is historically specific to social systems and political regimes, then a kind of irreducible psychologism takes intellectual command and it becomes impossible to stipulate conditions for moving beyond a genocidal state. The Holocaust becomes part of a rooted psychic unconsciousness hovering above the permanently contaminated society. To be sure, the Holocaust is the essence of the Third Reich. However, such an observation is not necessarily the core question. Does the destruction of the Jews follow automatically upon a nation that is swallowed up by the totalitarian temptation? In which forms of totalitarianism does a holocaust or genocide take place? Is anti-Semitism the essence of the Soviet Union as is now claimed? Does the existence of anti-Semitism prove a theory of totalitarian essence?

The uncomfortable fact is that genocide is the consequence of certain forms of unbridled state power. But whether anti-Semitism or other forms of racism are employed depends on the specific history of oppressor groups no less than oppressed peoples. States which demonstrate their power by exercising their capacity to take lives may be termed totalitarian. Totalitarianism is the essence of the genocidal process. This in itself provides an ample definition. If the Holocaust is unique to the Third Reich, the question of genocide loses any potential for being a general issue common to oppressive regimes. It is parochial to think that the Third Reich somehow uniquely embodied the character of the Holocaust, when since then we have seen many other societies adopt similar positions and policies toward other minorities and peoples.

Six: The Holocaust is not part of German history alone. It includes such figures as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Jajj Amin al-Husseini, who successfully urged the Nazi leaders to kill more Jews. It also includes all countries whose niggardly immigration policies prior to World War II cannot be explained in normal terms alone, such as the pressure of the Great Depression or a xenophobic tradition. Hitler did not wish to export national socialism but only anti-Semitism. He was widely successful. He succeeded when the world thought that "the Jews" must have done something to arouse the treatment given them by a German government. He also succeeded when the world categorized Jews needing a refuge as "useless people." (In this category would have been Sigmund Freud, had he still been in Germany rather than in America; Martin Buber, had he not already made his way to the Yishuv [Palestine].) This was prior to the war. When the war had trapped the Jews of Nazi Europe, the railways to Auschwitz were not bombed. The Holocaust is not a parochial event. It is world-historical.

Curiously there is no mention of any other kind of history. Is, for example, the genocide of the Armenian people part of world history or is it simply part of Turkish history? This is a very complicated point; at the risk of sounding impervious to moral claims, one has to be history-specific if anything serious is to emerge. If one blames the whole world for what took place at Van, one can construct such a theory. But it is more pertinent, more appropriate, more pointed, to blame the Turks and not the universe, and to blame the Germans and not the whole world, including the Grand Mufti. The issue is implementation, not rhetoric. The issue is neither the Grand Mufti nor the insecurities of Ambassador Morgenthau.

Fackenheim's idea that Hitler neither exported national socialism nor wished to do so represents a special reading of events. As Gideon Hausner reminds us,[13] as late as April 1945, when the Soviets were penetrating Berlin for the final assault and Hitler was imprisoned in his bunker, his last will and testament concluded by enjoining "the government and the people to uphold the racial laws to the limit and to

resist mercilessly the poisoner of all nations, international Jewry."
Hausner makes it plain that national socialism was an international move-
ment whose linchpin was anti-Semitism. Fackenheim presumes that
World War II was all about anti-Semitism, but at a more prosaic level it
was about conquest. There was a Nazi government in Rumania; there
was a Nazi government in Yugoslavia—all these regimes were exported.
The idea that Hitler was not interested in exporting national socialism is
curious. It would be more appropriate to note that wherever national
socialism was exported, so too did anti-Semitism follow. However, in
conditions where the Jewish population was not a factor, Nazism still
sought to establish a political foothold, either with or without direct
military aggression. The relation between national socialism as an
ideology and anti-Semitism as a passion is one that the Nazis themselves
were hard put to resolve. The linkage between the ideology and the
passion, which seems so close in retrospect, was far less articulated
policy than felt need in the earlier states of the Nazi regime.

Fackenheim slips in a subtle point that Jews were "trapped" in
Europe. But Jews were not trapped in Europe. They were of Europe
and had been of Europe for a thousand years. One of their dilemmas is
one rendered in almost every history where those who are to be exploited
or annihilated overidentify with their ruling masters. The Jews of
Europe were entirely Europeanized. Only a small fragment remained
outside the framework of Europeanization. The great divide of German
and Russian Jews was participation in European nationalism, identifi-
cation with enlightenment. Fackenheim's idea that the Jews were
trapped in Europe is a clever misreading of the facts. The added horror
of the Holocaust is that it happened to a people who were endemic to that
part of the world.

Seven: The Jews were no mere scapegoat in the Holocaust. It is true that
they were used as such in the early stages of the movement. Thus Hitler was
able to unite the "left" and "right" wings of his party by distinguishing, on the
left between "Marxist" (i.e., Jewish) and "national socialism" (i.e., "Aryan")
and, on the right, between raffendes Kapital ("rapacious," i.e., "Jewish"
capital) and schaffendes Kapital ("creative," i.e., "Aryan" capital). It is also
true that, had the supply of Jewish victims given out, Hitler would have been
forced (as he once remarked to Hermann Rauschning) to "invent" new
"Jews." But it is not true that "The Jew [was] . . . only a pretext for
something else." So long as there were actual Jews, it was these actual Jews
who were the systematic object of ferreting-out, torture, and murder. Once,
at Sinai, Jews had been singled out for life and a task. Now at Auschwitz,
they were singled out for torment and death.

The difficulty with this exclusivist formula is that while Jews were
singled out, so too were Gypsies, Poles, and Slavs. Hitler's appeal was
to state power, not to unite left and right; not to unite bourgeoisie and

proletariat, but to make sure that the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of
Germany were purified of Jewish elements. If one considers the na-
tional aspects of the Third Reich rather than the mystical aspects of
Jewish destruction it becomes a lot easier to fathom. German Jewish
concentration points were the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, in leftist
socialist politics and in high bourgeois economics. Liquidation of the
Jews enabled the German bureaucratic state to manage the bourgeoisie
and the proletariat of Germany without opposition.[14] The destruction of
socialism was attendant to the destruction of the Jews. Without socialist
opposition, the German proletariat was an easy mark for Third Reich
massification. The first two legislative acts of the Third Reich were bills
of labor, work, and management. The liquidation of the Jewish popula-
tion, within both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, permitted the Nazis
to consolidate state power. The Holocaust, from a Nazi standpoint, was
an entirely rational process, scarcely a singular act of mystical divination.
It was the essential feature of Nazi "domestic" policy in the final stages
of the Third Reich.

Eight: The Holocaust is not over and done with. Late in the war Goebbels
(who needless to say, knew all) said publicly and with every sign of con-
viction that, among the peoples of Europe, the Jews alone had neither
sacrificed nor suffered in the war but only profited from it. As this was
written, an American professor has written a book asserting that the Holo-
caust never happened, while other Nazis are preparing to march on Skokie in
an assault on Jewish survivors. Like the old Nazis, the new Nazis say two
things at once. The Holocaust never happened; and it is necessary to finish
the job.

On this point, Fackenheim is on sound ground. Still, the point that he
does not make and that requires emphasis is that the Holocaust did
happen and could happen again, but is now more likely to happen to
people other than Jews and Armenians. It was more likely to happen to
Ugandans, and it did; to Cambodians, and it did; to Paraguayans, and it
did; to Biafrans, and it did. It is correct to say that the Holocaust is not
over and done with. But it is not over and done with because there are
other peoples victimized by the very model created by the Turkish and
Nazi genocides.

It is important not to fit peoplehood into theories; theories must fit the
realities of people. If the restoration of human dignity is to become a
theme for social research, it becomes imperative to understand the uni-
fied character of genocide, the common characteristics of its victims, and
ultimately the need for alliances of victims and potential victims to resist
all kinds of genocide. To insist on universalism, triumphalism, or sepa-
ratist orientations is self-defeating. If there is to be any political conse-
quence of research into genocide, and if victim groups are to do more
than pay for annual memorials and remembrances, understanding of the

unity needed to confront state oppression must be made paramount; otherwise little will have been accomplished and nothing will have changed.

Although my analysis has sharply demarcated theological from sociological viewpoints, it should be appreciated that Jewish religious thought is itself far from unanimous on the special nature of the Holocaust. Orthodox segments in particular have cautioned against an overly dramaturgical viewpoint, urging instead a position in which the Nazi Holocaust is but the latest monumental assault on the Jewish people—one that is neither to be ignored nor celebrated, but simply understood as part of the martyrdom of a people. In a recent essay, William Helmreich has finely caught the spirit of this "strictly orthodox" view—which may be shared by larger numbers than either the mystifiers or the celebrationists may recognize.

He notes that this orthodox wing rejects paying special homage by singling out the victims of the Holocaust on both philosophical and practical grounds.

In their view, the Holocaust is not, in any fundamental way, a unique event in Jewish history, but simply the latest in a long chain of anti-Jewish persecutions that began with the destruction of the Temple and which also included the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition, attacks on Jews led by Chmielnicki, and the hundreds of pogroms to which the Jewish community has been subjected to over the centuries. They do admit that the Holocaust was unique in scale and proportion but this is not considered a distinction justifying its elevation into a separate category.[15]

Helmreich goes on to note that the ethical problem, in view of orthodox believers, is the same if one Jew is murdered or if 6 million meet such a fate. Since Judaism is a *Gemeinschaft* ("a community of fate"), the sheer volume killed, while awesome, does not in itself transform a quantitative event into a unique qualitative phenomenon.

The significance of this minority theological report is to call attention to the fact that in the problem of the Holocaust, while there are some strong clerical-secular bifurcations, there are also cross-cutting patterns across disciplinary boundaries. For example, certain sociological lessons can be drawn from the Holocaust: the breakdown in egalitarian revolutions of the nineteenth century, the subtle abandonment of the Palestinian mandate after the Balfour Declaration, the lofty assertion followed by a total revocation of Jewish minority rights in the Soviet Union. For orthodoxy the Holocaust is more a function of the breakdown of Jewish solidarity than of any special evils of the German nation or the Nazi regime.

The sociological view attempts to transcend sectarian or parochial concerns and develop a cross-cultural paradigm that would permit placing the Holocaust in a larger perspective of genocide in the twentieth

century rather than seeing the former as entirely distinctive and the latter as some weaker form of mass murder. For example, with the liquidation of roughly 40 percent of the Cambodian population, even the quantitative indicators of the Nazi Holocaust have been approached in at least one other situation. In the past, it has been argued that genocide of other peoples—Armenians, Ugandans, Paraguayans, Indians—has been too random and sporadic to be termed a holocaust. It has also been claimed that the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were highly selective and refined military targets and not efforts at the total destruction of a people. Whatever the outcome of such contentions, the Cambodian case would indicate the risks in vesting too much intellectual capital in the sheer numbers involved—although it is clearly a factor to be contended with.

Having argued thusly, let me note that qualitative differences do exist which distinguish the Jewish Holocaust from any other forms of geno-cide. First, there is the systematic rather than random or sporadic nature of the Holocaust: the technological and organizational refinement of the tools of mass slaughter which ultimately reduced all morality to problems of human engineering—development of the most effective methods for destroying and disposing of large numbers of people by the fewest cadres possible in the shortest amount of time. Second, there was an ideological fervor unmatched by any other previous variety of genocide. So intent were the Nazis in their policy of extermination of the Jews that they dared contact other nations, especially Axis powers and neutral countries, to repatriate Jews back to Germany to suffer the ultimate degradation. Third, genocide against the Jewish people represented and rested upon a national model of state power: the purification of the apparatus of repression by a total concentration of the means of destruc-tion in a narrow military police stratum unencumbered by considerations of class, ethnicity, gender, or any other social factors affecting Nazi response to non-Jewish groups. The liquidation of plural sources of power and authority made easier, indeed presupposed, the total liquida-tion of the Jewish population.

With all these inner disputations and disagreements accounted for, there are still those who—too guilt-ridden to face the monstrous conse-quences of the Holocaust against Jews in particular and victims of genocide as a whole—have chosen the path of evading reality. An isolated voice like that of Arthur R. Butz[16] is now joined in a quasi-intellectual movement, with all the paraphernalia of historical scholar-ship,[17] denying this massive crime. Denials of gas chambers, rejection of photographic evidence, equation of indemnification of the victims with Zionist beneficiaries are all linked to the rejection of the Holocaust's occurrence. The Nazi "revisionists" dare not speak of Nazism, but of national socialism; not of Germany under Hitlerism, but of a Third Reich. The Nazi epoch is even spoken of in remorseful terms: "Over-

whelming British, American, and Soviet forces finally succeeded in crushing the military resistance of a Germany which they accorded not even the minimum of mercy."[18] Pity the poor victim!

Even the New Nazi "intelligentsia" does not deny mass murder, but only the numbers murdered.[19] If it is not 6 million, then what number is it? No matter, those massacred were Zionists, Communists, or a hyphenated variety of the two—Jewish-Bolsheviks—any euphemism for Jews other than the admission of a special assassination of Jews as a people. The need for exacting scholarship—the sort that has begun to emerge—with respect to all peoples victimized for their existence is not simply a matter of litanies and recitations, but of the very retention of the historical memory itself. The scientific study of genocide is not a matter of morbid fascination or mystic divination, but of the need to assert the historical reality of collective crime. Only by such a confrontation can we at least locate moral responsibility for state crimes even if we cannot always prevent future genocides from taking place.

With all due weight given to the different traditions involved in the theological and sociological arguments concerning genocide, they do have a strong shared value commitment to the normative framework in which greater emphasis is placed on the protection of life than on economic systems or political regimes.[20] Both traditions are committed, insofar as their dogmas and doctrines permit, to the supreme place of life in the hierarchy of values. This is no small matter. Nazism witnessed the breakdown of religious and scientific institutions alike; and those that could not be broken down were oftentimes simply corrupted, as in decadent and exotic notions of a Teutonic Church and the equally ludicrous belief in an Aryan Science. In the larger context of world history and in the wider picture of centuries-old barbarisms, we bear witness not to a warfare of science versus theology but rather to a shared collapse of any sort of normative structure in which either could function to enhance the quality or sanctity of life.

Leo Kuper, born and banned in South Africa, is professor emeritus at the University of Southern California and the author of several excellent monographs in social stratification and race relations in African contexts. He is a good man writing about an awful subject who has produced, unfortunately, a mediocre book. The author of *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* manages to skirt just about every major issue which has arisen in the field of investigation: the relationship between the Holocaust and genocides in general; the relationship between civil conflict and state destruction; and the reasons for the ineffectiveness of international peace-keeping agencies in reducing genocide. The last omission is particularly glaring since Kuper describes this as an essential task.

On a different level, however, it is an excellent basic text, especially for individuals who are not familiar with the subject of genocide.

Definitions are invariably fairminded and essentially sound; the appendices, especially on United Nations resolutions and areas of back-sliding (such as its attitude toward the Turkish genocide against Arme-nians), are particularly revealing. The role of the United Nations, or its lack thereof, has been discussed often but understood rarely. At such descriptive levels the book provides a welcome contribution. The se-lected cases are for the most part helpful and demonstrate a keen sense of the magnitude of the problems of genocide. When we talk in terms of roughly 800,000 Armenians, 6 million Jews, and 3 million Cambodians, we have clear-cut examples of an enormous portion of a national population decimated by the authorities, giving a sober reminder that our century hovers dangerously between creativity and destruction.

The book's problems are less those of sentiment than of method. Equating such phenomena as civil strife between Catholics and Protes-tants in Northern Ireland with the destruction of German Jewry or the destruction of urban Cambodia just does not work. Even the author acknowledges that in Northern Ireland, victims have been numbered in the hundreds over a long stretch of time, whereas in most clear-cut cases of genocide the numbers destroyed are in the millions. Then there is the too simplistic equation of civil war and genocide. Equating the Nigerian Civil War or even the struggle against apartheid in South Africa with cases of undisputed genocide blurs and confuses rather than clarifies what genocide is about—namely, the vast, near-total destruction of large numbers of noncombatants innocent of any specific crime. Furthermore, burdening the United Nations as the source of the failure to control geno-cide is unconvincing since, as Kuper explains at length, this organization is primarily a composite of nations and not in itself a sovereign power. Underneath the demand to strengthen the United Nations is an implicit assumption that nationalism should be weakened—something that clearly has not taken place, nor is likely to take place, certainly not under the aegis of the United Nations.

In the balance of this critique, let me take up some of the thornier issues. The problem of genocide is not a new one, and the need for a scholarship to move beyond horrors and into analysis becomes increas-ingly critical. It is risky to equate genocide with arbitrary death. Two examples which Leo Kuper has given illustrate a problem rather than indicate a solution. He raises, for example, the case of India during the partition. Hindus and Moslems constituted majorities in different parts of the country, each with the capacity to engage freely in what he calls reciprocal genocidal massacre. However terrible and tragic that mutual destruction was, to speak of it as genocidal in the context of religious competition and conflict risks diluting the notion of genocide and equat-ing it with any conflict between national, religious, or racial groups. This error also appears in his analysis of Northern Ireland, where Protestants and Catholics engage in the meanest and most dangerous

kinds of assaults on one another. If one were to tally the numbers of deaths since 1920, they would total about 10,000, surely a terrible human loss and an indicator, according to Kuper, of the risks involved in the removal of the British presence in Ulster before a political solution is achieved. One might indicate, as have many leaders from both the Catholic and Protestant camps, that the British presence is itself a source of violence and that the removal of the occupying power would overcome a major obstacle to resolution of the civil conflict. Whether this belief is correct or not, we are dealing within the realm of political tactics and international relations, but surely not with genocide—unless we reduce the term to a fatuous notion of the cultural elimination of certain groups and ideologies.

Kuper also confounds legal identification between apartheid and genocide in South Africa with the empirical problem: the place and condition of the blacks within South Africa. As the author himself well appreciates, there is a demographic restraint to annihilation. The black African population in South Africa grew from roughly 8 million in 1945 to 19 million in 1980. The Asian population grew from 285,000 to 765,000; and the white population from 2.4 million to roughly 4.4 million. The demographics alone indicate that genocide simply has not occurred. What may have happened is the fragmentation of the African population and the consequent denial of blacks' citizenship rights. South Africa is also a classic case of exploitation of the majority by a racial minority, in a very specialized context. But it does not benefit the victims or anyone else to present South Africa as a case of genocide —which implies the absolute destruction of a people, if not completely, then in such large numbers as to affect their future survival potential.

Relativizing the issue of genocide particularly damages efforts to understand the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews. The major problem in such relativizing is that it completely fails to distinguish between the systematic, total, scientific engineering of death, and the more random occurrences that are characteristic of other events. If others were to operate under a veil of anonymity such as the Nazis did, they might also attempt a kind of "final solution." But whether that is so or not, the notion of the final solution, the sources and consequences of the Nazi destruction of the Jews, is absent in the work of Professor Kuper. While I myself have argued against celebrating the exclusivity of death, one must consider seriously differences between the almost total destruction of a population, reducing it to a remnant, and the selective, random elimination of political or religious opposition. The very concept of the Holocaust as something unique fails to appear in Kuper's work and is mentioned only in relation to a book title. It is as if the author were consciously and deliberately attempting to relativize the Jewish case as one of many, and consequently disregarding the specificity and peculiar characteristics involved in the Nazi Holocaust. This undermines not

only the moral basis of Kuper's work but also weakens his appreciation of the full meaning of the Turkish assault on Armenians. The latter was not merely an event that took place in the Ottoman Empire but is characteristic of the Kemalist democracy that followed. The genocide against Armenians, like the Holocaust against Jews, was special in its totality as well as in its movement beyond the boundaries of nationalism and rationalism. Both cases are not characteristic of any others—until we get to Cambodian communism.

Underlying his failure to distinguish between genocide and civil strife on the one hand, and genocide and total destruction such as the Holocaust on the other, is a peculiar inability to distinguish between theory and action and, more specifically, an unwillingness to deal with German and Turkish cultures. Kuper, along with others, has dedicated a great deal of futile time to problems of ideology. There is sufficient confusion within Marxism and Fascism to make one wary of this line of approach. Perhaps Marxism, in its acceptance of a theory of class polarization, yields to a Manichean vision of a world torn apart; but even a Marxism predicated on guilt by social origin may or may not translate into genocidal behavior. It certainly does in terms of the Gulag Archipelago and the years of Stalinism; it certainly does not in such places as Yugoslavia. Likewise, even with Fascism there seems to be no doubt that the Nazis analogized European Jewry to a cancer which had to be excised and identified Jews with world conspiracy. Fascism in Italy did not have the same genocidal potential. When Jewish enclaves in Asia came under Japanese dominion during World War II the genocidal pattern did not follow. Any comprehensive analysis of genocide must deal seriously with cultural canons which permit or forbid genocidal behavior. This total absence of cultural analysis—of both those who were and were not given to genocide—seriously weakens Kuper's book. Ideology rather than culture is held responsible and accountable for genocidal behavior. This is a difficult thesis to prove. The republican developmentalism of Ataturk in Turkey is absolutely at odds with imperial notions derived from the Ottoman Empire, yet both republican and anti-republican forces within Turkey carried on genocide against the Armenians. The peasant egalitarianism of the Khmer Rouge did not spare us a major genocide. Wherever one seeks an answer based on ideology the same kind of confusion presents itself, issues which Kuper unfortunately does not address.

Kuper charges the United Nations with having done much less than it should have. He argues that its capacities to curtail genocide, much less prevent or punish atrocities, have been blunted. He gives several reasons for this laxity: first, the punitive procedures of the United Nations are weak; second, the United Nations is committed to the sanctity of state sovereignty; and third, the United Nations has established commissions to deal with complaints about human rights violations which are them-

selves highly politicized and controlled by a clique of powerful nations whose vested interests are in stilling the voices of opposition. One could hardly argue with Kuper's analysis of the weaknesses of the United Nations, but from an analytical point of view, it is an extremely thin reed on which to hang an analysis of the problem of genocide. The sources of genocide are certainly not in the United Nations. The limits of the organization are well understood by most. Kuper might then have analyzed different kinds of national cultures as well as how punishment and law emerge in various countries.

There is now a burgeoning literature on just these subjects. It might be possible to develop an early warning signal, a concern about problems of law and democratic order, that might limit the possibility of future genocides taking place. But if the genesis of the problem is not in a world organization, then it is hard to believe that the solution will be found there. As Kuper knows quite well, the United Nations is itself the source of so much amoral self-righteousness that its very existence strengthens nationalism and the national ideal.

The treatment of the Holocaust as a dialogue between God and Golem, as ineffable and unspeakable, serves to return the matter of death into the antinomic and Manichean tradition of original sin versus original goodness, or, as it is more fashionably called, historical pessimism versus historical optimism. On the other hand, the treatment of genocide as a problem for the United Nations makes it a rather tepid organizational affair, denying to this "dismal science" its full meaning and significance.

If social science is to make its own serious contribution to Holocaust studies, it must get beyond the mystery of silence or the silence of mysteries. However limited the clinical analysis of collective death may be, we may at least be spared the repetition of some forms of genocide. To incorporate in the Jewish psyche the phrase "never again" requires an antecedent commitment to explain why genocide happened in the first place. Theologians must not presume an exclusive monopoly on meaning by insisting upon the mystery and irrationality of taking lives. The task of social science remains, in this area as in all others, a rationalization of irrationality. Only in this way can the victory be denied to Golem and the struggle against evil be understood as a task God assigns to humanity. This is far greater than standing in silent awe at the tragedies that have befallen our tragic century.

NOTES

1. John Vincur, "In West Berlin: A New Curtain Rises on Auschwitz," *New York Times,* 7 April 1980, p. 2.
2. Yehuda Bauer, *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), pp. 39-49.

3. Elie Wiesel, *Legends of Our Time* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 6. For an analysis of this see Terrence Des Pres, "The Authority of Silence in Elie Wiesel's Art," in *Confronting the Holocaust: The Impact of Elie Wiesel,* ed. Alvin H. Rosenfield and Irving Greenberg (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 49-57.

4. Peter J. Donaldson, "In Cambodia, A Holocaust," *New York Times,* 22 April 1980, p. 17.

5. Emil L. Fackenheim, "What the Holocaust Was Not," *Face to Face* (an interreligious bulletin issued by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith) 7 (Winter 1980), pp. 8-9. This set of propositions is derived from Fackenheim's Foreward to Yehuda Bauer's *The Jewish Emergence from Powerlessness* (London: Macmillan, 1979).

6. Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

7. For a fuller version of what has become the dominant and most widely respected Jewish viewpoint on the Holocaust, see Emil L. Fackenheim, *God's Presence in History* (New York: Schocken Press, 1972), pp. 70-73.

8. Robert J. Lifton, "The Concept of the Survivor," in *Survivors, Victims, and Perpetrators: Essays on the Nazi Holocaust,* ed. Joel E. Dimsdale (Washington, D.C.: Hemisphere Publishing Co., 1980), pp. 113-26.

9. Literature on the Armenian subjugation is uneven, and scholars are only now facing up to the herculean research tasks involved. An excellent compendium of available materials for 1915-1923 is contained in Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Armenian Holocaust* (Cambridge, Mass.: Armenian Heritage Press, 1978).

10. Anna Pawelczynska, *Values and Violence in Auschwitz* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 101-5.

11. Raul Hilberg, "German Railroads/Jewish Souls," *Transaction/SOCIETY* 14 (November-December 1976), pp. 60-74. For a general introduction to this subject see *Captured Germans and Related Records: A National Archives Conference,* ed. Robert Wolfe (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974).

12. George L. Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism* (New York: H. Fertig, 1978), pp. 226-27.

13. Gideon Hausner, "Six Million Accusers," in *The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History,* ed. Paul R. Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 521-23.

14. Irving Louis Horowitz, *Foundations in Political Sociology* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 245-46. See in this connection D. L. Niewyk, *Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew: German Social Democracy Confronts the Problems of Anti-Semitism* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971).

15. For a full discussion of the orthodox (minority) viewpoint on the Holocaust in the context of Yeshiva life, see William Helmreich, "Making the

Awful Meaningful: Understanding the Holocaust," *Transaction/SOCIETY* 19, no. 6 (September-October 1982), pp. 62-66.

16. Arthur R. Butz, *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century* (Torrance, Calif.: Institute for Historical Review, 1976).

17. See Austin J. App, "The 'Holocaust' Put in Perspective," *Journal of Historical Review* 1 (Spring 1980), pp. 81-82.

18. Charles E. Wever, "German History from a New Perspective," *Journal of Historical Review* 1 (Spring 1980), pp. 88-94.

19. The most authoritative estimate of the number of Jews killed by the Nazis—5,978,000 out of a prewar population of 8,301,000, or 72 percent —is contained in Leon Poliakov and Josef Wulf, eds., *Das Dritte Reich und die Juden: Dokumente und Aufsaetze* (Berlin: Arani, 1955), p. 229.

20. For an articulate statement of legal and social issues at an individual level which have direct relevance to our discussion at the collective level, see George Z. F. Bereday, "The Right to Live and the Right to Die: Some Considerations of Law and Society in America," *Man and Medicine* 4 (November 4, 1979), pp. 233-56.

5

GENOCIDE, THE HOLOCAUST, AND TRIAGE

John K. Roth

> Since its historical entry into world history the German people has always found itself in need of space. . . . Our people has never been able to settle this need for space, except through conquest by the sword or through a reduction of its own population.
>
> Adolf Hitler, 1928

In May 1984, the Associated Press wired to American newspapers the recent findings of the Population Reference Bureau, a Washington-based research group that studies population trends.[1] Beyond announcing that nearly 4.8 billion human beings now inhabit the earth, the bureau indicated that our planet's population has doubled since World War II. Not only did the world's population increase by almost 85 million in the past year, the report went on to say, but there will be 5 billion persons here by 1987. That number will rise to 6 billion by the end of the twentieth century. Within forty years, the world's population will double. Strangely, however, the AP's story took no notice of forces that could disrupt these trends. Such interruptions, hastened by exploding population growth, ought not to be taken lightly. Nuclear threats make that fact obvious. So does the history of genocide. More people exist than anyone needs. That condition—more or less—has always held. It makes history, as Hegel deftly said, a slaughter-bench.

Where more people exist than are wanted, man-made death is never far behind. One of the most persuasive teachers of that lesson was Adolf Hitler. Although not sufficient, his leadership was a necessary condition for the Holocaust, the Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews. As suggested by the quotation with which this essay begins, Hitler believed that

the world's population was too large, and that therefore space, entailing opportunity as well as geography, was lacking for the German people. His self-proclaimed mission was to lead them to their rightful increase and dominion.

Significantly, Hitler's statement comes from his so-called *Zweites Buch*.[2] Drafted in 1928, this sequel to *Mein Kampf* was suppressed by Hitler himself. It is not necessary to assess the various explanations that have been offered to account for that fact—the work was identified in 1958 and published in German three years later—but the issue that provoked Hitler to write is noteworthy. As Telford Taylor tells the story, "the question of the South Tyrol was an especially sharp thorn in the Nazi flesh" (p. xvi). For more than a century preceding the end of World War I, this Alpine region south of the Brenner Pass, much of it German-speaking, lived under Austrian rule. Thanks to the Treaty of St. Germain, Italy gained control of the area. Its policy toward the German population was benign until Benito Mussolini's Fascist regime introduced a program of Italianization. By March 1928, for example, Italian had become the language of religious instruction in South Tyrol, prompting strong criticism from the Austrian Chancellor, Ignaz Seipel. When Mussolini returned the favor by recalling his ambassador from Vienna, the anti-Italian reaction in Germany as well as in Austria was considerable.

Hitler, however, did not profit from this feeling. On the contrary, having praised Mussolini in *Mein Kampf,* where he also asserted that unrest in the South Tyrol was a Jewish-inspired scheme to discredit Il Duce and to threaten German-Italian cooperation, Hitler found himself "attacked from the 'folkish' and nationalist quarter as 'soft' on an issue of German irredentism" (p. xvii). Ironic though the facts just mentioned may be, Hitler's *Zweites Buch* concentrated on the status of South Tyrol. If the passing of the crisis influenced him to withhold the book when it became apparent that nothing could be gained by publishing a work that would "belabor an issue on which he and his Party were on the defensive," Hitler's *Zweites Buch* still shows that the problem of not enough space and too many people, or at least not enough space for the right kinds of people, was never far from his mind at the time (p. xx). Nor would those issues dwindle in importance as Hitler came to power and unleashed genocide in his quest for *Lebensraum.* After the *Anschluss,* Hitler may have been content to leave South Tyrol under Mussolini's jurisdiction, even though he was unsuccessful in urging its German population to emigrate to the Reich, but both outcomes drove home the governing principles Hitler had written down in 1928:

Politics is history in the making. History itself is the presentation of a people's struggle for existence. I deliberately use the phrase "struggle for existence" here because in truth that struggle for daily bread, equally in peace

and war, is an eternal battle against thousands upon thousands of resistances just as life itself is an eternal struggle against death. (P. 5)

No people have ever been wanted less than the Jews were by Hitler. His anti-Jewish campaign was so virulent that it reduced Jews to sub- or non-human status, thus making their elimination easier. Under Hitler, then, the Nazis unleashed their genocide on the Jews. The success of this attack is corroborated by the fact that even now debate rages about whether *genocide* is a category that is adequate to encompass the Holocaust. At issue in those debates is the Holocaust's uniqueness. Consider, therefore, the useful distinctions that Yehuda Bauer makes by designating the Holocaust as "the extreme case" of genocide.[3]

To Bauer, genocide suggests a continuum, each instance aimed at destroying a people in one way or another. The Holocaust belongs at its "farthest point" because, as Hitler's targets, "every Jew—man, woman, and child—was to be killed" (pp. 331-32). Genocide includes a multitude of sins, but heretofore its instances have not aimed at the total annihilation Hitler eventually directed against the Jews.[4] Hence, the Holocaust is unique. Yet, owing to the possibility that total annihilation might in some time or place become the aim again, Bauer contends that the term "Holocaust" can be "not only the name by which the planned murder of the Jewish people is known," but also "a generic name for an ideologically motivated planned total murder of a whole people."[5] Just as history contains a variety of Holocaust-related events, such as the Armenian massacres, there may also be Holocausts in the offing, a possibility made all the more real since *the* Holocaust occurred.

If genocide is a continuum with Holocaust at its farthest point, how are genocide's victims to be understood? If there is not some universal characteristic that they all share, do they at least have what the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein would have called a family resemblance? The import of such questions is more than historical; it also directs us toward the future. For if people become potential targets of genocidal campaigns for reasons that at least resemble one another, that knowledge can alert the endangered and those who care about them.

Such concerns are among those that orient the scholarship of Richard L. Rubenstein, whose writings are as far-ranging as they are controversial, as perceptive as they are discomforting. An authorship taking him from *After Auschwitz* (1966) to *The Cunning of History* (1975) has recently been enhanced by *The Age of Triage* (1983), his most disturbing and hence most important work to date. There will be more to say about that book, but first *The Cunning of History*. It not only focused on the Holocaust but did so by accenting motifs already noted in this essay.

For example, while impressed by the unprecedented features of the Holocaust, Rubenstein affirmed that more understanding is to be gained

by regarding Auschwitz as part of a continuum of human action than by putting it in a category entirely its own. Next, although *The Cunning of History* makes no mention of Hitler's *Zweites Buch,* Rubenstein knew the importance of Hitler's conviction that Germany "was always an overpopulated area."[6] Rubenstein further understood that Hitler's appraisal along those lines was not limited to quantitative considerations. Overpopulation was a qualitative matter for Hitler as well. In fact, a witches' brew of quantitative and qualitative concerns about population was not only what drove Hitler to establish the death camp as one of the twentieth century's fundamental realities. That melange could also reveal the Holocaust's significance in light of the recognition that the world's population is nearly 4.8 billion and escalating at a startling pace. With the Holocaust as the precedent, mass murder—if not genocide or Holocaust—might well be the remedy of choice to achieve a "final solution" to the problems created by hordes of people who are unwanted by the powers that be.

Stressing that the power of a political state is essential for Holocaust, if not for every form of genocide, *The Cunning of History* packs an incisive array of views into little more than a hundred pages. But none drew more vigorous response than Rubenstein's simplest and most fundamental thesis: "The Nazi elite clearly understood that the Jews were truly a *surplus people* whom nobody wanted and whom they could dispose of as they pleased. . . . In terms of German ideology, the Jews were a *surplus population* because of the kind of society the Germans wanted to create."[7] He would expand those claims in *The Age of Triage,* but already Rubenstein's point was that established interests had for centuries engaged in the riddance of redundant populations. The Nazis' handling of the Jews implemented an extremely calculated procedure for dealing with an old problem. It also involved a host of particular features—typically involving the blending of ancient strands of religious anti-Semitism with modern ideologies of nationalism and racism. But Rubenstein's major insight was that the category of "surplus people" was a crucial one to employ in relation to the Holocaust because it could help us understand not only how that event is unique but also how it is *symptomatic* of features that may be endemically destructive in our current ways of life.

Lest he be misunderstood, Rubenstein carefully stated that "the concept of a surplus population is not absolute. An underpopulated nation can have a redundant population if it is so organized that a segment of its able-bodied human resources cannot be utilized in any meaningful economic or social role" (p. 10). That qualification, however, did not prevent criticism for introducing population redundancy into an interpretation of the Holocaust. Even going on to clarify that "a surplus or redundant population is one that for any reason can find no viable role in

the society in which it is domiciled," Rubenstein is still attacked for holding that the Holocaust—though exceptional—is still one of many instances of state-sponsored population elimination.[8]

A theory is only as good as its ability to cope with the objections brought against it. By indicating some typical challenges directed against Rubenstein's view about the Holocaust and surplus populations, responding to each, and then elaborating other dimensions of his vision, Rubenstein's contributions to an understanding of the age of genocide can be appraised. As to the criticisms—some explicit, others implied— the first of seven examples comes from Jacob Katz. Responding to statements made by Rubenstein at a conference on "The Holocaust—A Generation After," he asserted that Rubenstein was mistakenly trying to analyze the Holocaust "in Darwinian terms."[9] Specifically, contended Katz, the hypothesis that the Jews were a surplus people was not credible because the Nazis, even during the intensity of the Holocaust itself, "used Jews very profitably in SS factories" (ibid.). Variants of this argument have frequently been raised against Rubenstein from time to time, but they are not telling. Katz, for instance, undermines his own analysis by acknowledging that decisions to use Jews for slave labor were often overturned and instead those workers were dispatched to the gas chambers. Or, it could be added, many others were simply worked to death, as *The Cunning of History* testifies. Coupling these notes with Rubenstein's basic qualification that population redundancy is not simply a matter of numbers, Katz' objection remains beside the point.

In the same forum, Alice A. Eckardt took a different approach. She concurred with Rubenstein that the Nazi treatment of the Jews was not adequately handled by calling it an irrational aberration. Instead there was a kind of rationality in the Nazis' anti-Jewish campaign. But, she insisted, that rationality was not to be located in any Nazi perception that the Jews were superfluous. Rather, the Nazis looked on the Jews "as an absolute hindrance, a virus, a cancer" (p. 260). They were, in short, "the incarnation of evil" (ibid.). From the Nazi perspective, then, it could have made good sense to be rid of the Jews. To suggest, however, that the Jews were targets simply because they were superfluous will not do.

Not much more than Katz' remarks do Eckardt's undermine *The Cunning of History*. Indeed, they reflect it, for her argument, ironically, has the unintended consequence of supporting Rubenstein's analysis. The concept of a surplus population is not absolute; instead it encompasses the factors that Eckardt rightly stresses. People—and the Nazi outlook did not simply deny that Jews were people—do not become classified as viruses and cancers unless those beings are already regarded as unwanted in the extreme. Propaganda and ideology utilizing such classifications do so to underscore the more effectively how radically

these people are unneeded, how they have no viable role in the scheme of things controlled by the powers that be in the region where they happen to dwell.

A third criticism has been advanced by Shlomo Avineri. He takes Rubenstein to task for being "a functional structuralist" (p. 262). Rubenstein, claims Avineri, tries too hard to subsume particular events under universal categories. Such attempts may be part of a noble tradition, but in the case of the Holocaust, avers Avineri, they will not enable Rubenstein to do what he wants. For there simply is not evidence to substantiate the claim that the Nazis regarded the Jews as surplus and therefore decided to exterminate them. On the other hand, there is abundant evidence that the Nazis were fundamentally anti-Semites. The Jews became targets not because they were superfluous but because the Nazis hated Jews so thoroughly. The full measure of that hatred was taken at Auschwitz.

One ought not trifle with a scholar of Avineri's deserved stature. Thus, it is welcome that Rubenstein can accept his points and find that the surplus people hypothesis is not jeopardized but strengthened. Rubenstein would be the first to agree with Avineri's observation that "Nazi antisemitism was not instrumental to Nazi aims but basic and immanent to them" (ibid.). Genocide, on the other hand, is instrumental. "Seldom elected by a government as an end in itself," Rubenstein has since pointed out, "genocide is always a means of eliminating a target population that challenges an economic, political, cultural, religious, or ideological value of the politically dominant group."[10] Hence, Avineri's stress on Nazi anti-Semitism indicates *why* the Jews were targeted, but in being targeted, the Jews also revealed themselves to be a surplus people as far as the Nazis were concerned. Rubenstein's point is rightly a functional one. Practically speaking, Nazi anti-Semitism meant Jewish superfluity. Already we have noted that Hitler had much to say about overpopulation, but even if Nazi rhetoric did not speak directly and consistently about the Jews as surplus people, actions spoke louder than words. Moreover, since there is no genocide without human redundancy of one kind or another, Nazi actions do support the contention that the Holocaust belongs on Bauer's continuum of genocide, albeit at its extremity. In spite of Avineri's contention to the contrary, the perspective of a functional structuralist, if the term is apt, can illumine the Holocaust's place in the larger scheme.

The previous objections find fault with Rubenstein's account because its emphasis on surplus people seems to overlook certain economic considerations and features of Nazi ideology. If those objections are much weaker than purported, the plot thickens when Berel Lang questions the explanatory power of Rubenstein's appeal to "the superfluity of a certain proportion of the population."[11] Lang does not elaborate his objection, but it seems to entail the belief that the surplus people category is itself

rather superfluous when it comes to telling us how or why mass murder takes place in particular circumstances. If Lang's briefly stated position were expanded, it might claim that Rubenstein's concept says both too much and too little. We do not know what "surplus" means until we look at particular cases where allegedly surplus people are to be found. When we do such looking, moreover, we find that "surplus" is indeed not an absolute idea but so extremely relative that its meaning incorporates any number of specific reasons why a particular people might be targeted and killed. In the process, the concept covers so much as to become nearly meaningless.

Lang's criticism, implicit as well as explicit, has not gone unnoticed by Rubenstein. The best evidence for that claim is that the author of *The Cunning of History* planned early on to produce the sequel, *The Age of Triage*, that would buttress the propositions about surplus populations that were offered only in germinal form in the earlier study. As will be pointed out in more detail below, the latter book analyzes numerous historical examples to show that man-made mass death is linked with perceptions of population redundancy. That redundancy is not merely a matter of semantics, either. Historically, people tend to be killed en masse when dominant powers deem them unnecessary and unwanted. The factors that can put people into that risk are myriad, and hence the utility of Rubenstein's theory about surplus populations emerges. If one focused only on the many and varied particulars that lead to man-made mass death, the continuities among those events would be overlooked. Genocide and even Holocaust are concepts that help us to see the links. Rubenstein's contribution, vastly meaningful, is to show that the specific reasons for genocide also involve a pattern, one to which his intentionally elastic concept of surplus population directs us. The explanatory power of the concept may not be its primary hallmark—for explanation one must go more to the details in particular cases. The concept's strength is instead in its synthesizing capacity, which in turn enables us to see before it is too late the diverse ways and places in which people might find themselves functionally redundant and destined to be targets for riddance.

Other interpreters have taken *The Age of Triage* into account and still find Rubenstein vulnerable where his theories about surplus people are concerned. John Patrick Diggins, for example, echoes Berel Lang by wondering whether Rubenstein's appeal to the problem of surplus populations really tells us why genocide happens. "For all his admirable research," Diggins says of Rubenstein, he "cannot establish the precise cause, or even causes, of genocide, and this is profoundly disturbing."[12] This critic reasons that a historian "must demonstrate that causes originated in man's conscious intentions and purposes" before claiming to know why human consequences turned out as they did. On Diggins' reading, then, population superfluity could only be a cause of genocide if

awareness of such a superfluity existed and the superfluity yielded a conscious motive that led people to kill accordingly. Such evidence, he implies with Avineri, is hard to come by not only in the Holocaust but in other genocidal scenarios as well.

Rubenstein, I believe, would be agreeable to Diggins' insistence on documentation. One issue between them, however, is where such documentation can or must be found. Again, Rubenstein's methodology places less emphasis on what people say than on what they do. People do not have to be overtly labeled "surplus" in order to be redundant; nor do the powers that be have to pronounce that there is a problem of surplus population in order for them to document through their actions that they do, in fact, think one exists. The ultimate documentation is extermination. Diggins may wish to wait for more explicit documentation, but if he does so, it is not clear that his historical positivism will show itself superior to Rubenstein's willingness to let practice document belief.

Incidentally, Diggins' skepticism notwithstanding, Rubenstein has boldly asserted that the Holocaust "can be *fully* comprehended in terms of the normal categories of history, social science, demography, political theory and economics."[13] The credibility of that claim, of course, will depend on what is meant by "*fully* comprehended," but at this juncture Rubenstein's Hegelian reach may well exceed an existential grasp. For if human experience cannot ultimately account for itself—and it cannot —then it is hard to see how "the normal categories of historical and socio-political analysis" can fully comprehend the Holocaust or anything else, for that matter. Yet, even if Rubenstein's assertion on this particular issue is not well-founded, a major point in his favor remains. He defends the Holocaust's comprehensibility to contest perspectives that mystify the Holocaust by stressing that the event eludes rational comprehension. Probably the truth is closer to Rubenstein's side than not. Admitting that we lack the requisite metaphysical certainty to comprehend fully any historical occurrence, the disciplines of history, social science, demography, political theory, and economics nevertheless do tell much about how and why Auschwitz appeared. The Holocaust's "incomprehensibility" is more in the beholder's eye than in the facts themselves.

Where the Holocaust is concerned, however, the nature of the facts remains in question, and to some extent that will probably be true forever. An example is found in the research of Steven T. Katz, who by implication disagrees with some of Rubenstein's economic emphases in interpreting how and why the Jews became a redundant population destined for mass death.[14] Particularly in *The Age of Triage,* Rubenstein has held that the West's modernization process tended to render Jews surplus as it turned them away from being an economically complementary class, rendered them instead a source of instability and

conflict, and thus set them up for the kill. Not so, says Katz. The decisive turning point on the road to Auschwitz was instead a specific kind of anti-Semitic racism. Close to Alice Eckardt's perspective, Katz' suggests that this racism was "microbial" and "parasitological." Such racism reflects and inculcates the belief that inferior races will destroy superior ones in ways analogous to those that exist when deadly disease-causing agents invade human life. Racism of this kind brooks no compromise. Be killed or kill—completely—is its imperative.

Once more, nothing in Rubenstein's theory would require him to deny that Katz' analysis has much in its favor. But Rubenstein can also reply that Katz' account itself would be more credible if it took economics with greater seriousness. Katz stresses that the content of the Nazis' anti-Semitic racism had very little relationship to any empirical realities. Its irrationality was a major characteristic, one that gave this ideology peculiar power because it was beyond disconfirmation. Rubenstein, however, urges a second look. Perhaps this anti-Semitism is not quite so irrational, not quite so much a thing unto itself, if we see it more than Katz does as an effect of economic relationships gone sour. Understanding that "no single cause can explain a historical phenomenon," Rubenstein invites us to consider that realities of all kinds are more interrelated and continuous than they are discrete and disparate.[15] Rubenstein's approach has the advantage of fitting that pattern better than Katz'. It does so by illuminating the economic factors in Nazi anti-Semitic racism, thus making the latter no less hideous but more intelligible than Katz' stress on its irrationality can do.

Although Richard Rubenstein's critics contest much that he says, even they are likely to agree that he is on target in asserting that ours is the age of triage. How we arrived there and what we might do about that outcome are two of his main concerns as his book by that title assesses the extent of fear and hope in an overcrowded world. Having explored several major objections with which Rubenstein's Holocaust theories have had to contend, plus some of the rejoinders that can appropriately be made to them, it will be well to conclude with an overview of *The Age of Triage,* drawing out of Rubenstein's total vision of our past and future his accent on the importance of religious as well as social scientific reflection.

A socioeconomic sorting that saves some ways of life by dispatching others, triage testifies to the ascendancy of a powerfully practical form of human rationality. Casting his point in economic terms, Rubenstein stresses how decisive it has been that people discovered how to produce a surplus. For thereby, he asserts, they also took *"the first step in making themselves superfluous."*[16]

Already we have observed that current concerns about global population find the world containing many more people than anyone needs. Rubenstein recognizes, in turn, that this perceived population redun-

dancy exists partly because of sheer numbers but even more because the dominant intentions that energize modern society tend to be governed by the belief that money is the measure of all that is real. More than any other, he claims, that belief drives the modernization process, which has been under way and intensifying for centuries. One effect of this process is that the intrinsic worth of people diminishes. Their worth is evaluated functionally instead. Hence, if persons are targeted as non-useful—they can be so regarded in any number of ways, depending on how those in power define their terms—a community may find it sensible to eliminate the surplus from its midst. In modern times, that action has been facilitated, indeed instigated and promoted, by governmental power. Triage, then, entails state-sponsored programs of population elimination: through eviction, compulsory resettlement, expulsion, mass warfare, and outright extermination—roughly in that order. This winnowing process, more or less extreme in its violence, enables a society to drive out what it does not want and to keep what it desires for itself.

Persistently intrigued by history's continuity as well as by its cunning, Rubenstein links modernization and mass death in a study that encompasses such *apparently* diverse events as the enclosure movement in England during the Enlightenment, the nineteenth-century famine years in Ireland, and a variety of twentieth-century events—a non-exhaustive list would include the Armenian genocide, the slaughter of Soviet citizens under Stalin, the destruction of the European Jews under Hitler, and the devastation of Cambodia. Taken alone, Rubenstein's political interpretation is stunning enough, but *The Age of Triage* does more because its author has not abandoned his grounding in religion and theology to turn exclusively to socioeconomic analysis. On the contrary, an age of triage makes the vitality of religion and theology more critical than ever. It is within this perspective that Rubenstein should be understood when he states that "no theological enterprise, that is, no consideration of the ultimate values that move men and women, can be adequate to its task if it ignores critical political and social theory, especially insofar as these modes of inquiry seek to comprehend the conditions under which men attempt to conduct their lives both individually and collectively" (p. v).

Explicitly and implicitly, God is both absent and present in *The Age of Triage*. Historically, for example, Rubenstein argues that Western monotheism desacralized the world, leaving human power free to exploit nature and to kill far too much with impunity. Ironically, the same God found in the theologies that were instrumental in unleashing the modernizing process has also been its victim, eclipsed by an advancing civilization that has produced in tandem benefit and destruction, both in unprecedented abundance. Yet, looking toward the future, Rubenstein hints at—indeed he yearns for—a religious revival that might transmute

humanity's propensity to move, as Benjamin Nelson put it, "from tribal brotherhood to universal otherhood" (p. 7). Such a revival, hopes Rubenstein, would convert us so that we are "born again as men and women blessed with the capacity to care for each other here and now" (p. 240). God's place in an age of triage ought not to be the least of our concerns. Consider, then, four of Rubenstein's fundamental propositions. Each merits a governing role in late twentieth-century theology and religious reflection.

1. "Modern civilization is largely the unintended consequence of a religious revolution" (p. 230). Western monotheism, contends Rubenstein, replaced magic and belief in a spiritualized nature by insisting that there is one and only one God who is the sovereign creator of heaven and earth. The success of Judaism and Christianity inadvertently paved the way for the secular outlooks that result in triage. True, these traditions affirmed that the earth is the Lord's. Men and women, moreover, were to be obedient to God's will. That will, in turn, would make itself known in history, and there not everything was to be permitted. Bonds of moral obligation, underwritten by God's judging power, were claimed to be in force. Human life, formed in God's image, appeared to be even more sacred than it had been prior to monotheism's eminent domain.

Neither in practice nor in theory, however, does history conform entirely to conscious intention. In spite of and even because of monotheism's moral components, a course unfolded in which nature and even human life itself came to be regarded as subject to the mastery of politics and economics. Religions predicated on revelation within history unleashed reason in ways that transmuted the moral authority of revelation itself. A biblical God inspired a secular consciousness, and at times God disappeared in the process. Providence became Progress. Progress meant the triumph of a calculating, functional rationality whose Golden Rule was *Efficiency*.

My account, if not Rubenstein's, is overly simple. Still, the power of its drift remains. Religions and theologies are loaded dice because they always contain more options for development than the limitations of immediate consciousness can comprehend. In an age of triage, we have learned that lesson to our sorrow. Yet Rubenstein's point is that we can be aware of it now. That awareness enjoins a warning, which takes us to a second proposition deserving of attention.

2. "In a crisis, a secularized equivalent of the division of mankind into the elect and the reprobate could easily become a controlling image" (p. 216). Western monotheism's emphasis on a God of History has typically included the idea that some groups or persons are specially called. They are linked together and with God in relations of covenant. At their best, these convictions have singled people out for service, but nearly all of these doctrines of election and covenant have also been

extremely volatile. Separating people, they have induced a host of rivalries. Those rivalries and their offspring, Rubenstein avers, have more than a little to do with triage.

Unintended consequences are no less real than those that are consciously desired. The former, in fact, may be the more devastating precisely because their full power remains hidden until the effects are felt. In our religious context, the crucial link between theology, religious reflection, and triage lurks in the fact that Western monotheism has much to do with economic versions of divine election and covenant. Within such perspectives, poverty and wealth are much more than economic conditions. They entail divine judgment and just desert. Thus, their driving force can be not one of ministering to the poor but rather of eliminating them so that the position of the elect remains unthreatened.

The theology of election and covenant sketched here sounds perverse. It is. But Rubenstein's point is that it is too simple, too convenient, only to protest that a tradition has been distorted. No doubt distortion exists, but perhaps the more important point is that what we say about God is usually a two-edged sword. That fact holds with respect even to the best examples of theology and religious reflection that we can cite. For the seeds that sprouted into destructive versions of election and covenant were not sowed first by the spiritually bankrupt or by the intellectually corrupt. They are gifts from the giants of Western religion. The issue that remains, then, is whether theology and religious reflection can speak in ways to avert the crises that fuel forces bent on triage because they see the world in terms of the elect and reprobate.

3. "We are by no means helpless in meeting the challenge confronting us" (p. 224). Economically, argues Rubenstein, the basic remedy for triage would be to create a social order that provides a decent job for any person who is willing to work. His optimism is muted, however, because he knows that the implementation of his economic remedy is anything but an economic matter alone. In fact, the forms of practical rationality that govern modern economic thinking tend to mitigate against policies of full employment. The challenge that confronts us, then, is largely a spiritual one. Unless men and women are resensitized religiously, the resources to avert triage are likely to be hopelessly inadequate.

Rubenstein thinks that we need nothing less than "an inclusive vision appropriate to a global civilization in which Moses and Mohammed, Christ, Buddha, and Confucius all play a role" (p. 240). To call Rubenstein's vision demanding understates the case. For, their universalizing tendencies notwithstanding, the major religious traditions have themselves been instrumental in "triaging" people "into the working and the workless, the saved and the damned, the Occident and the Orient" (p. 240). Rubenstein, of course, hopes that a new religious consciousness will build on the inclusive aspects of the major religious traditions,

excluding the exclusive features in the process. Yet a further difficulty is that, while the thinker and the theorist can point out the needed direction, they cannot manage the achievement of such a vision.

If the so-called death of God theologies have had their moment in the limelight and have now largely faded from view, the radical secularization of our time remains. Functionally, human reason in history tends toward Godlessness, a pattern that theology and philosophy may check but seem unlikely to reverse. It is Rubenstein's conviction that the needed reversal, one that would substantially reduce the prospects of triage, depends on "authentic religious inspiration" (p. 239). Such inspiration is not absent, but it cannot be called into being at will, least of all by intellectuals. Nor are religion's presently dominant forms characterized chiefly by the inclusiveness that Rubenstein advocates. If the age of triage is one in which God's best defense may be that God does not exist, our religious situation is truly a season of advent, of expectant waiting and seeking for the religious transformation we need.

4. "Theology seeks to foster dissonance-reduction where significant items of information are perceived to be inconsistent with established beliefs, values, and collectively sanctioned modes of behavior" (p. 132). Every religious tradition has to cope with evidence that disconfirms it. Triage itself is a case in point, for the experience of the death of God in our time has everything to do with the mass wasting of human life. Typically, theologians have apologized for God when the problem of evil has taken center stage. Specifically, they attempt to reduce the dissonance that arises when traditional claims about God's power and goodness collide with history.

The pertinent point here, however, is that Rubenstein's description of theology's function, whatever its validity, is not propounded by him as normative. On the contrary, his use of this description helps to identify meaningful work that remains for thinkers and theorists to do, even if they do not have the charisma to control the floodgates of religious inspiration. Rubenstein's *Age of Triage* is a theological statement, but his reflection does little to reduce dissonance. Its mood is instead quite the opposite. By calling attention to the Holocaust, to triage, to the reality that men and women too often kill with impunity, and by doing so in a way that questions the functional status of God in the world, Rubenstein's book is an exercise in dissonance production.

At least indirectly, Rubenstein suggests that an age of triage calls for more, not less, theology and religious reflection in that vein. Yet a note of caution should intrude. For the dissonance production that is needed today, Rubenstein implies, is not the kind that will intensify individualism and isolation. Rather, it ought to shatter such barriers and extend the boundaries of mutual social obligation. To move in that direction, however, is a task that will tax the best brain power we can muster, for powerful indeed are the drives and interests that find triage tempting

because such sorting offers a solution as rational as it is final. Political and economic sophistication will need to join hands with theological acumen if religious thinkers are to do their dissonance-producing responsibly.

God's fate, as well as that of humankind, hangs suspended in an age of triage. Should God be real in any sense at all, God joins humankind in responsibility for history's destruction. Yet realistic hope against fear in an overcrowded world ought not to pronounce God dead. For history itself may induce shame and sorrow in some quarters, but if the age of triage is literally a Godless time altogether, the net effect of the defenseless victims will be to testify that the powers of death are irredeemably victorious. Hence the pages of *The Age of Triage,* particularly those that deal with the Holocaust, set an agenda for Western theology and religious reflection. In sum, it consists of at least these four imperatives: (1) Deconstruct the ties between Providence and Progress. (2) Destabilize distinctions between the elect and the damned. (3) Discern, as far as thought permits, ways beyond the self-regarding individualism that so often drives propensities toward triage. (4) Deploy the right kinds of dissonance.

In his *Zweites Buch,* Adolf Hitler had a different vision. Proclaiming himself a German nationalist, he announced a National Socialist foreign policy predicated on "folkish, racial insights" and "determined by the necessity to secure the space necessary to the life of our people."[17] Knowing that vestiges and variants of that outlook are still very much a part of our world long after Hitler's demise, Richard Rubenstein assays genocide, the Holocaust, and triage to find ways beyond them. Admittedly there is little that is totally novel in that agenda, any more than Richard Rubenstein's account originated with him alone. The pieces have been lying there for some time. Yet, to Rubenstein's credit and for our benefit, he has worked the puzzle in a way that shows with particular urgency the vital tasks that must be attempted if catastrophe is to be forestalled in our overcrowded world.

NOTES

1. "World Population Nearing 4.8 Billion," *Pomona Progress Bulletin,* 9 May 1984, p. 5.

2. See Adolf Hitler, *Hitler's Secret Book,* trans. Salvator Attanasio, with an Introduction by Telford Taylor (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1983), p. 50. Additional references to this work and to others cited in this chapter are found in parentheses within the text.

3. Yehuda Bauer, *A History of the Holocaust* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1982), p. 332.

4. For further discussion on Hitler's intentions concerning the Holocaust, see my article "How to Make Hitler's Ideas Clear?," *The Philosophical Forum* 16, nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter 1984-1985), pp. 82-94.

5. Bauer, *History*, p. 332.

6. Hitler, *Secret Book*, p. 50.

7. Richard L. Rubenstein, *The Cunning of History: The Holocaust and the American Future*, with an Introduction by William Styron (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1978), pp. 18, 83. Rubenstein's italics.

8. Richard L. Rubenstein, *The Age of Triage: Fear and Hope in an Overcrowded World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), p. 1.

9. See the section entitled "Discussion: The *Judenrat* and the Jewish Response," in *The Holocaust as Historical Experience*, ed. Yehuda Bauer and Nathan Rotenstreich (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981), p. 249. The conference referred to was held in March 1975, about the time that *The Cunning of History* first appeared.

10. Rubenstein, *Triage*, p. 124.

11. Bauer and Rotenstreich, *Historical Experience*, p. 266.

12. John Patrick Diggins, review of *The Age of Triage* by Richard L. Rubenstein, in "The Book Review," *Los Angeles Times*, 20 February 1983, pp. 3-4.

13. Richard L. Rubenstein, "Naming the Unnameable; Thinking the Unthinkable: A Review Essay of Arthur Cohen's *The Tremendum*." (Typewritten.)

14. See Steven T. Katz, *The Uniqueness of the Holocaust* (forthcoming). Useful background for Katz' views can be found in his *Post-Holocaust Dialogues: Critical Studies in Modern Jewish Thought* (New York: New York University Press, 1983). His chapter on "The 'Unique' Intentionality of the Holocaust," pp. 287-317, is especially relevant.

15. Rubenstein, *Triage*, p. 146.

16. Ibid., p. 3. Rubenstein's italics.

17. Hitler, *Secret Book*, p. 45.

6

GENOCIDE AND TOTAL WAR: A PRELIMINARY COMPARISON

Eric Markusen

INTRODUCTION

Of all the problems confronting humankind during the last quarter of the twentieth century, none is more significant or urgent than the mass killing of defenseless citizens by human beings acting as agents of, or with the tolerance of, their governments.

This chapter seeks to contribute to greater understanding of this problem by comparatively analyzing two major types of state-sanctioned mass killing—genocide and total war. Since several of the other chapters in this volume address definitions, causes, and examples of genocide, the focus here is on the phenomenon of total war. Then a preliminary analysis of differences and similarities between the two types of mass killing is offered. The central thesis of this chapter is that there are important similarities between the two types. Specifically, it is suggested that ideology, bureaucracy, and technology play comparable facilitating roles in both genocide and total war. Finally, tentative lessons from this analysis of mass killing in the past and present are drawn in order to shed light on the seemingly inexorable momentum toward nuclear war.

Humankind has been afflicted by the problem of mass killing since early prehistory. Archeologists have discovered indications that lethal conflict among groups of human beings may have originated as early as a million to a half-million years ago.[1] As an organized social institution, however, warfare is a relatively recent development. According to Arnold Toynbee, the institution of war did not emerge until approximately 5,000 years ago, in the lands of what are now Iraq and Egypt.[2]

Since that time, the human and material costs of war have tended to increase steadily, despite some temporary respites. In his survey of warfare from the end of the fifteenth century through the early 1960s, Quincy Wright notes: "War has during the last four centuries tended to involve a larger proportion of the belligerent states' population and resources and, while less frequent, to be more intense, more extended, and more costly. It has tended to be less functional, less intentional, less directable, and less legal."[3]

It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that an unflinching review of past centuries—with their mounting death tolls from wars, revolutions, massacres, as well as famine and disease resulting from human malevolence and negligence—led William James in his celebrated 1910 essay, "The Moral Equivalent of War," to conclude that "history is a bath of blood."[4]

However, a number of analysts have concluded that the number of human beings deliberately killed by other human beings during the twentieth century is far greater than for any other equivalent period of time in history. The "bath of blood" that James discovered in his study of many past centuries has become a veritable ocean of blood in just a few decades.

For example, Pitirim Sorokin, in his study of wars from the twelfth to the twentieth centuries (which was published in 1937, two years before World War II began), calculated war casualties in relation to the populations of the combatant nations and concluded:

If we take the relative indicators of the casualties, probably the most important criterion of war, they tell definitely and unequivocally that *the curse or privilege to be the most devastating or most bloody war century belongs to the twentieth; in one quarter century, it imposed upon the population a "blood tribute" far greater than that imposed by any of the whole centuries compared.*[5]

The most detailed and comprehensive attempt to identify those killed by their fellow human beings during the twentieth century is British sociologist Gil Elliot's *Twentieth Century Book of the Dead*, published in 1972. On the basis of his carefully documented review of historical sources, Elliot estimates that there have been approximately 100 million "man-made" deaths during the first three-quarters of this century. Elliot asserts: "It is possible—in my view certain—that in a future perspective this explosion of human lives will be seen as the significant 'history' of this period."[6]

But even more ominously, the most powerful nations on the planet are currently devoting prodigious resources to the preparations for the ultimate mass killing project—nuclear holocaust. The United States and the Soviet Union are each annually spending billions of dollars to

maintain and expand their nuclear arsenals. At present, these arsenals combined contain approximately fifty thousand nuclear warheads with a collective explosive force equivalent to more than 3.5 tons of high explosive for each of the 4.5 billion people on earth.[7] Current plans for both nations call for adding thousands of new warheads to their arsenals during the next decade. While the United States and the Soviet Union are increasing their stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, the other nuclear-armed nations, like Great Britain, France, and China, are also making additions and refinements in their nuclear arsenals, while several nations without nuclear weapons are struggling to acquire them.[8]

If even a small portion of current arsenals is actually used in a nuclear war, the ensuing holocaust will dwarf the worst atrocities of history. A recent World Health Organization study, for example, concluded that a nuclear war fought with about one-half of present arsenals could result in 1 billion prompt deaths and an additional 1 billion serious injuries, most of which would eventually result in death due to lack of medical care, the effects of radiation exposure, shortages of food, and other lethal after effects of the initial carnage and destruction.

To these findings must be added those from recent studies of the possible climatic and long-term biological consequences of nuclear war. Among the most shocking is the possibility that the detonation of even a very small portion of existing arsenals (as few as 1,000 of the 50,000 warheads) could produce a so-called nuclear winter, which would entail plunging temperatures and a pall of darkness resulting from smoke and other atmospheric pollution generated by fires. This nuclear winter could spread across the entire Northern Hemisphere and last for months.[9] So grave could these and other consequences of nuclear war be that the researchers concluded:

Combined with the direct casualties of over 1 billion people, the combined intermediate and long-term effects of nuclear war suggest that eventually there might be no human survivors in the Northern Hemisphere. . . . In any large-scale nuclear exchange between the superpowers, global environmental changes sufficient to cause the extinction of a major fraction of plant and animal species on Earth are likely. . . . In that event, the possibility of the extinction of Homo Sapiens cannot be excluded.[10]

In view of the terrible toll of human lives due to governmental mass killing in the past, the present, and, very possibly, the future, one might expect that a life-affirming species would have mounted a massive effort to confront and reduce this problem. Unfortunately, such a massive effort has not yet been made. Despite the vital contributions of a number of individuals and organizations, the attention and energy devoted to understanding and preventing state-sanctioned mass killing have been negligible when compared with the scale and urgency of the problem.[11]

   Avoiding this disturbing topic may well assure peace of mind and contentment with the status quo over the short term. On the other hand, such avoidance may also serve to encourage the social forces favoring continued reliance on mass killing as an acceptable tool of national security and thus increase the risk that government leaders may resort to mass killing in the future. If that mass killing takes the form of nuclear war, then the final price of short-term peace of mind will be oblivion.

GENOCIDE

   Although the wholesale destruction of groups of human beings has been practiced for millennia, the concept of genocide, which depicts certain forms of such destruction, has been in existence for less than fifty years. The term was coined by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish emigré to London who lost seventy members of his family to the Holocaust. In 1943, he wrote *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,* one of the earliest and most comprehensive accounts of Nazi persecutions of the Jews and other citizens of occupied nations. It was in this book that he introduced the term "genocide," which he derived from the Greek word *genos,* meaning race or tribe, and the Latin word *cide,* meaning killing. According to Lemkin, "By 'genocide' we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group."[12]

   Thanks in large part to Lemkin's indefatigable lobbying efforts, on December 9, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Convention listed specific actions which constitute the crime of genocide. Article 2 states:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
   (a) Killing members of the group;
   (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
   (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
   (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
   (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.[13]

   More recent analysts of genocide have incorporated features of the U.N. Convention in their own definition while at the same time criticizing its limitations. Leo Kuper, for example, states that "genocide ... is a crime against a collectivity, taking the form of massive slaughter, and carried out with explicit intent."[14] He notes also that "genocide is pre-eminently a government crime."[15] However, Kuper

also questions the Convention for its exclusion of political groups from among those protected. Such an omission leaves out such cases as the murder of tens of millions of Soviet citizens under the Stalinist regime and the extermination of millions of their own citizens by the Khmer Rouge forces in Cambodia during the 1970s.[16]

Likewise, Irving Louis Horowitz defines genocide as "a special form of murder: state-sanctioned liquidation against a collective group, without regard to whether an individual has committed any specific and punishable transgression."[17] Horowitz goes beyond the "standard" type of deliberate, intentional mass killing to include "one shadowy area of genocide that permits the state to take lives by indirection, for example by virtue of benign neglect, or death due to demographic causes."[18]

A final contemporary definition is provided by Vahakn Dadrian, who defines genocide as "the successful attempt by a dominant group, vested with formal authority and/or with preponderant access to the overall resources of power, to reduce by coercion or lethal violence the number of a minority group whose ultimate extermination is held desirable and useful and whose respective vulnerability is a major factor contributing to the decision of genocide."[19] As will be discussed below, Dadrian includes a wide range of actions within his definition, including military activities that cause high casualty levels among civilians, even if the targeting of the civilians is not deliberate.[20]

Despite inconsistencies evident among these and other definitions of genocide, and despite disagreements among analysts regarding whether or not particular cases of mass killing constitute genocide, there does appear to be a strong consensus on several crucial features of genocidal acts.

First, genocide is undertaken by and for governments. The official ruling elite of a sovereign state either undertakes a deliberate campaign of intentional extermination; permits subnational groups to slaughter other subnational groups; or implements (or tolerates) practices that result in mass deaths among members of certain groups, even if such deaths are not the explicit policy objective.[21]

Second, the individual identity of the victims is in general irrelevant, as are distinctions among sex and age. What concerns the state is that the individual belongs to the group targeted for destruction. A wide range of groups has been targeted throughout history, including racial, ethnic, and religious groups; the mentally handicapped; homosexuals; citizens of enemy nations; and members of political groups. The vast majority of victims of genocide have been civilians.

Third, while the methods employed vary considerably, direct mass killing is the most characteristic form of genocidal destruction, although many additional deaths have resulted from hunger, disease, and other sequelae of direct killing and the destruction of resources necessary for survival.

TOTAL WAR

Like the concept of genocide, the concept of total war encompasses a wide range of cases and subsumes a number of components.[22] Two features of total war—a high degree of societal mobilization for war and an extremely high level of death and destruction—have been emphasized in most definitions and analyses of this type of mass killing. In considering the destructiveness of total war, most commentators note the tendency to deliberately attack noncombatant citizens of the enemy nation or group. Moreover, the direct or indirect participation of the entire nation in the war, combined with the targeting of civilians, tends to result in wars in which the very survival of one or more of the belligerents is at stake. Thus, strategist Edward Luttwak defines total war as "a war in which at least one party perceives a threat to its survival and in which all available weapons are used and the distinction between 'military' and 'civilian' targets is almost completely ignored."[23]

No recent war, even World Wars I and II, has been completely "total" in the sense that literally all of the available resources of the combatant nations have been devoted to the conflict or that the destruction of the enemy has been complete. (However, as noted above, a nuclear war could conceivably result in the latter condition, not only for the belligerents, but for uninvolved nations as well.) In practice, the concept of total war applies to conflicts in which either or both of these conditions—societal mobilization and destructiveness—exist to extreme degrees. As Frederick Sallagar notes, "What characterizes an all-out, or total, war is that it is fought for such high stakes that the belligerents are willing, or compelled, to employ, not *all* weapons they possess, but *any* weapons they consider appropriate and advantageous to them."[24]

Throughout human history, many wars have been characterized by one or both of the features now associated with the concept of total war. As J. F. C. Fuller notes in *The Conduct of War, 1789-1961,* "Primitive tribes are armed hordes, in which every man is a warrior, and because the entire tribe engages in war, warfare is total."[25] The price of defeat in such conflicts was not simply the concession of territory to the victor, but the mass slaughter of the vanquished, with the possible exception of those dragged off into slavery. Religious wars have often been total wars. Edwin Corwin, noting that most people think of total war in terms of extreme degrees of ruthlessness, observes: "While the phrase itself is of recent coinage, total war in this primary sense is at least as old as recorded history and enjoys, at times, the most exalted sanction."[26] To illustrate his point, Corwin cites a passage from the Bible, in Deuteronomy 20: "Of the cities of these people, which the Lord thy God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save nothing alive that breatheth: But thou shalt utterly destroy them."[27]

Subsequent wars of religion, including the Crusades, involved the

mass slaughter of noncombatants as a routine practice. Such total wars culminated in the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) in which as many as 8 million civilians (as compared with "only" 350,000 combatants) were killed, and the destruction of property and crops was so pervasive that many survivors were reduced to cannibalism.[28]

In the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War, a trend toward more civilized, limited warfare developed, although there were many relapses and exceptions. For nearly 150 years, most European wars were fought between relatively small mercenary armies sponsored by absolute monarchs. Killing of noncombatants was significantly curtailed, and the casualty levels among soldiers were reduced, in part to keep the financial burden on the sponsoring monarchs as low as possible. Rather than ending in the annihilation of the loser, wars tended to end in settlements that left the structure of all societies largely intact.[29]

This respite from total war began to end at the close of the eighteenth century with the French Revolution, the rise of Napoleon, and the beginning of the era of wars waged between entire nations. Napoleon's chief contribution to the revival of total war was his utilization of huge armies of conscripted soldiers. However, while the scale and intensity of military conflicts increased precipitously with the advent of mass armies, the other practice of total war, deliberate mass killing of noncombatants, remained relatively constrained.

Following the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, a war-weary Europe entered another period of relative peacefulness. Indeed, in his survey of warfare over the centuries, Sorokin found the overall intensity of war during the nineteenth century to have been exceptionally low.[30] Nations strove to prevent and limit wars through such efforts as the Vienna Congresses which, beginning in 1815, attempted to facilitate peaceful resolution of disputes, and the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, in which the United States and England agreed to limit warships on the Great Lakes. Also, as Richard Preston and Sydney Wise note in their history of warfare, the nineteenth century witnessed "the restoration of the conservative military system of the eighteenth century in place of the mass nationalistic armies of the Revolutionary era."[31]

Unfortunately, however, such restraints on war began to weaken during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and the twentieth century was to witness the resurgence of both aspects of total war to a degree that would compress the carnage of the Thirty Years' War into little more than a decade and multiply it severalfold.

In modern total wars, mobilization of the combatant nations is accomplished in several ways, including the conscription of citizens to serve in mass armies, the widespread use of propaganda to maintain morale and support for the war, and the calculated exploitation of the national economy in the service of the war.

Conscription results in large numbers of citizens being obliged to

leave their peacetime positions, often for the duration of the war. This can have a disruptive effect on individuals and families, and on the economy as well. In the case of the *levée en masse* imposed by the French revolutionary government in 1793, it has been noted that "the forced withdrawal of such great numbers from the normal pursuits of daily life disturbed the social economy profoundly, while the task that was put upon the depleted society of supplying and equipping such numbers aggravated the disturbance."[32] Conscription by one belligerent generally compels the others to adopt a similar system for building up comparable forces. In the American Civil War, for example, both sides initially relied on volunteers, but the high rates of attrition required first the Confederacy and then the Union to resort to conscription.

Mass conscription has affected not only the degree to which the nation is involved in war but also the nature of warfare itself. In the case of the Napoleonic wars, casualties among combatants increased considerably in comparison with the preceding 100 years. As Fuller observes, "Conscription changed the basis of warfare. Hitherto soldiers had been costly, now they were cheap; battles had been avoided; now they were sought, and however heavy the losses, they could rapidly be made good by the muster-roll."[33] The vastly increased size of the revolutionary French army, which grew with conscription to include 750,000 soldiers, rquired changes in administration and logistics. The army was broken up into smaller, more mobile units, and long supply lines gave way to "compulsory requisition" of shelter and food, which often entailed officially sanctioned plunder of the contested territory.[34] Similar measures were employed by the German military forces during World War II in their campaigns against Poland and the Soviet Union.

To maintain the morale of the conscripted soldiers and the support of the citizens, government propaganda tends to be widely utilized in total wars. Such propaganda, which frequently takes the form of vilifying the enemy nation, can raise passions to the point where it becomes difficult to end wars on a basis that would promote a lasting peace. In his analysis of the Napoleonic wars of the late 1700s, Fuller emphasizes how difficult it was "for a conscripted nation—that is, a nation in arms —a nation fed on violent propaganda, to make an enduring peace. The peace treaties wrung from the vanquished were generally so unreasonable that they were no more than precarious armistices; the losers only signed them through duress, and with the full intention of repudiating them at the first opportunity."[35]

During the same period that conscription was radically altering both the impact of warfare on society and the nature of war itself, the Industrial Revolution was moving both European society and warfare in the direction of ever greater mechanization. As Hans Speier notes, this trend necessitated "a particularly close interdependency between the armed forces and the productive forces of the nation."[36] As the size of

armies increased, and as armies became increasingly mechanized, the number of noncombatants needed to keep the army provided with equipment and supplies increased as well. Under such conditions, much of the adult population tends to be directly or indirectly involved in supporting the war effort. The coordination of the many sectors of the economy requires greater centralization of governmental authority. "Such a gearing-in," observes Wright, "of the agricultural, industrial, and professional population to the armed forces requires a military organization of the entire society."[37] Or, as stated by Raymond Aron in *The Century of Total War,* "the army industrializes itself, industry militarizes itself; the army absorbs the nation: the nation models itself on the army."[38]

Such processes tend to blur the distinctions between democratic and totalitarian forms of government. Noting the centralization of authority among all the involved nations in World War II, Marjorie Farrar suggests that "as a result institutional and ideological distinctions among the belligerents were reduced and the democratic regimes increasingly resembled their totalitarian counterparts."[39]

Just as industrialization decisively affected the mobilization of the society for total war, it has also had a profound impact on the second basic component of total war—the extreme levels of destruction and death affecting civilian and soldier alike. Such destructiveness reflects two trends in the era of modern total war. First, the close interdependence of the military and the economic-industrial sectors of society has created a steady expansion in the types of targets considered legitimate by military forces. Second, the long-range and highly destructive nature of modern weapons has made it difficult, if not impossible, to discriminate between noncombatants and combatants, thereby resulting in high levels of civilian casualties even when traditional "military" targets are attacked. When civilians are deliberately attacked, the death tolls are of course far higher.

The dependency of the mechanized military forces on civilian industry has meant that whole nations have become targets. As Gordon Wright observes in his analysis of World War II, "the battlefield, no longer limited or defined, was everywhere; it was occupied by civilians and soldiers alike."[40]

Some military policymakers, recognizing that total wars are fought between entire societies, rather than between armies, have urged and engaged in deliberate attacks against enemy civilians. During the American Civil War, for example, Union General W. T. Sherman conducted a campaign of killing and destruction against the civilians of Georgia. In World War I, although most of the fighting was confined to the battlefield, toward the end of the war the Germans began using submarines to sink civilian ships. Bombing of cities, which had begun early in the war, had steadily escalated during its course, although the armistice was

signed before its full potentialities were realized. Still, the noncombatant death tolls were relatively low. According to Gordon Wright, civilians accounted for only one in twenty deaths during World War I.[41] By World War II, however, such practices as the scorched earth campaign of the Nazis and the Nazi and Allied practice of firebombing population centers contributed to far greater overall casualty rates, especially among civilians, who, according to Elliot, accounted for two-thirds of the approximately 60 million deaths.[42]

It should be noted that many commentators have deplored the practice of deliberate attacks on civilians as a profound moral retrogression. In his essay "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing," John Ford argues that many, if not most, civilians killed in bombing raids were "innocent noncombatants," especially children and the elderly, who made no contribution to the war effort and therefore could not be regarded as legitimate targets.[43] The practice of targeting civilians for mass destruction, like the total mobilization of the society for war, tends to narrow the gap between democratic and totalitarian forms of government. Quincy Wright observes that "the development of the airplane by the totalitarian states in the twentieth century first extended their empires and then compelled the democracies to adopt their techniques."[44] Lewis Mumford, in his essay "The Morals of Extermination," asserts:

By taking over this method [obliteration bombing] as a cheap substitute for conventional warfare—cheap in soldiers' lives, costly in its expenditures of other human lives and in the irreplaceable historic accumulations of countless lifetimes—these democratic governments sanctioned the dehumanized techniques of fascism. This was Nazidom's firmest victory and democracy's most servile surrender.[45]

GENOCIDE AND TOTAL WAR: A PRELIMINARY COMPARISON

Genocide and total war have consumed many tens of millions of human lives during the twentieth century and many hundreds of millions of lives throughout history. The preparations are now being made for a nuclear war that could destroy billions of lives and possibly extinguish our species.

The following comparative analysis is offered in the hope of generating insights into mass killing in the past and in the hope of increasing understanding of the momentum toward mass killing in the present and future. It should be emphasized that this comparison is preliminary, tentative, and necessarily brief; it attempts to discern important differences and similarities between two ostensibly distinct types of state-sanctioned mass killing. It is hoped that it will stimulate others—including

those who disagree with its findings as well as those who find them plausible—to undertake further study along these lines.

Perhaps many others share with Horowitz the assumption that "it is operationally imperative to distinguish warfare from genocide."[46] One of his reasons for advocating this distinction is his belief that genocide involves mass killing in an intrastate, or domestic arena, whereas warfare involves lethal conflict between two nation-states. His decision to emphasize the distinction, he states, is "warranted by the weight of current empirical research that indicates that domestic destruction and international warring are separate dimensions of struggle." In further support, he cites political scientist R. J. Rummel: "There are no common conditions or causes of domestic and foreign conflict behavior."[47]

Others differentiate between genocide and warfare on moral grounds. Genocide is unequivocally evil, an entirely unjustifiable atrocity perpetrated against helpless and innocent victims by cowards who face little personal risk. On the other hand, warfare can be seen as evil or heroic, depending upon one's perspective. It has been noted above that some commentators regard the practice of bombing cities as moral retrogression. Indeed, prior to their involvement in World War II, both Great Britain and the United States issued statements condemning the practice as immoral. They expressed righteous outrage when Germany bombed such cities as Warsaw, Rotterdam, and, later, London. Both nations decried the bombing of cities as a reversion to barbarism and beneath the dignity of a democratic nation. Yet, in the course of the war, both countries—first Great Britain in Europe and then the United States in Japan—engaged in firebombing of crowded population centers on a scale far greater than the Nazis. It is perhaps noteworthy that after the war, Great Britain appeared to have second thoughts about its obliteration bombing policy; the airmen who managed to survive their extremely hazardous missions were never awarded a campaign medal, and the individual most responsible for the policy, Sir Arthur Harris, slipped into an obscurity that amounted to virtual exile.[48] In contrast, Curtis LeMay, the individual most responsible for the decision to shift American bombing policy in Japan from precision attacks on military targets to the deliberate creation of vast firestorms in the highly flammable, densely populated Japanese cities, was widely touted as a hero after the war and was rewarded with the command of the elite Strategic Air Command, the nation's atomic-armed military unit.[49]

Another basis for distinguishing between genocide and total war is the relation between goals and means. While both phenomena utilize similar means—the production of very large numbers of dead bodies—the goals are quite different. For example, Mumford suggests that, "in principle, the extermination camps where the Nazis incinerated over six million helpless Jews were no different from the urban crematoriums our air force improvised in its attacks by napalm bombs on Tokyo. . . . Our

aims were different, but our methods were those of mankind's worst enemy."[50] The difference in aims is crucial. The Nazis, as Michael Sherry points out in "The Slide to Total Air War," would not have stopped mass killing Jews if they had won the war; in fact, they had hopes and plans of intensifying their "Final Solution" to additional areas they might have conquered.[51] Some scholars suggest that the ability to exterminate the Jews was among the chief motives for Nazi aggression that led to World War II.[52] So vital was genocide as a primary goal during the war that the Nazis carried on their extermination program even at the expense of their military efforts against the Soviets and Allies. In contrast, the Allies continued their mass bombing operations only until the surrender of their enemies: as soon as their primary goal was attained, they had no reason to continue employing the means.

While these and other differences between genocide and total war support the assumption that they represent two distinct phenomena, much of the literature on mass killing is more equivocal. Even Horowitz, who was cited above as an advocate of maintaining the distinction, is inconsistent. At a later point in his pioneering study, he appears to contradict himself by suggesting that "the end of an era when formal declarations of warfare were made signifies the beginning of a new era in which the line between war and genocide becomes profoundly blurred."[53] As an example, he cites the U.S. war in Vietnam, an undeclared war which has been alleged by some critics to have had genocidal dimensions, and by others as being a case of actual genocide.[54] After citing arguments on both sides of the issue of whether or not the war was genocidal, Horowitz states, "the distinction between internal and foreign people who are being killed helps little, since it must be confessed that all genocidal practices involve a definition by the perpetrators of mass violence of those destroyed as outsiders."[55] Thus, he appears to be acknowledging the existence of an important process, depersonalization of victims, that occurs in state-sanctioned mass killing in both domestic and foreign conflicts.

Likewise, Kuper, while emphasizing that the sovereign state is the main arena for genocide, refers to both conventional and atomic bombings as genocidal when he notes that:

the changing nature of warfare, with a movement to total warfare, and the technological means for instantaneous annihilation of large populations, creates a situation conducive to genocidal conflict. This potential was realized in the Second World War, when Germany employed genocide in its war for domination; but I think the term must also be applied to the atomic bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the U.S.A. and to the pattern bombing by the Allies of such cities as Hamburg and Dresden.[56]

Finally, it has been noted that Dadrian, in developing his conceptual

schema of types of genocide, explicitly identifies strategic bombing as an example of what he terms "latent genocide."[57]

Just as careful analysts of genocide have implicitly or explicitly included certain operations of total warfare within their definitions of genocide, some definitions of war have included situations that have been regarded as genocidal. For example, in "The Social Types of War," Hans Speier develops the concept of "absolute war," which has many of the same characteristics as genocide. Absolute war, according to Speier, "is not waged in order to conclude peace with the vanquished foe. Peace terminating an absolute war is established *without* the enemy. The opponent is an existential enemy. Absolute war is waged in order to annihilate him."[58] Such wars feature a lack of moral restraint; one or both of the belligerents regard the other as subhuman or even as an animal. As examples of absolute wars, Speier mentions the wars of the ancient Greeks against the barbarians and the wars between Christians and Muslims during the Middle Ages. In the latter case, weapons and techniques that were prohibited in conflicts with other Christians were freely employed against the Mohammedans. Speier also includes clashes between heavily armed colonizers and poorly armed indigenous peoples in this category, which would appear to move it within the realm of genocide.

Thus, there does appear to be some overlap between the definitions of genocide and total war. In terms of actual practice, several common features are evident, three of which are particularly salient for this analysis.

First, both genocide and total war involve mass killing of human beings, the majority of whom are civilians. The mass nature of the killing reflects the fact that large numbers of people are killed more or less simultaneously and as anonymous members of a targeted group or inhabitants of designated areas. Second, in both cases mass killing tends to be done in a deliberate, planned, premeditated fashion. The goal of the perpetrators or implementors is clearly to kill large numbers of people, either as an end in itself, or else as a means to a different end. Finally, in both genocide and total war, mass killing is undertaken by the state as a national security measure. Both are organized and administered, or at least facilitated, by officials of the government for the ostensible purpose of assuring the well-being and security of the majority of citizens.

Another approach to comparison involves examining the role of three factors—ideology, bureaucracy, and technology—that have been cited by several analysts as significant elements in both genocide and total war.[59]

If ideology is defined as a system of psychological and political rationalizations for adopting a particular policy or engaging in a particular practice, then it is evident that the twentieth century has featured abundant ideological incentives to participate in mass killing projects.[60] In this respect the twentieth is no different from past centuries: there have always been ideological justifications for mass killing. One of the most

potent of these has been religion, which has inspired some of the most savage cases of organized mass slaughter.

In the modern world, however, religious ideologies have often been replaced by political ideologies, particularly the "religion of nationalism," to use Toynbee's phrase. This powerful ideology has been used to justify some of the most atrocious mass killing projects of the century. "Intense nationalism," notes Horowitz, "is itself an essential charac- teristic of the genocidal society. It instills not only a sense of difference between those who belong and those who do not, but also the inhu- manity of those who do not belong, and thereby the rights of the social order to purge itself of alien influence."[61] Nationalistic ideologies have also inspired wars of increasing scale and intensity. Toynbee states that "the increasing fanaticism of nationalism has exacted an increasing oblation of military human sacrifice."[62]

When the advocates of mass killing are able to justify their policies on the basis of national security, they increase the likelihood of cooperation by citizens, both in the role of direct perpetrator/implementor and in that of compliant bystander. In some cases, the official claim of a threat to national security is clearly specious, as has been the case with recent genocides. For example, the Jews in Nazi Germany certainly did not pose a real threat to the German state. But to the extent that Nazi propa- gandists were able to convince German citizens that the Jews were to blame for Germany's many grave problems, they were able to secure ac- tive complicity and passive compliance with respect to the "Final Solu- tion." In other cases, especially total wars like World War II, the threat to national survival posed by the enemy is real. But in both cases, spe- cious and real, the ideology of nationalism and the authority of govern- ment is used by leaders to promote citizen cooperation in state-sanctioned mass killing projects.

When the authority of national government is invoked, many individ- uals are willing to subdue any moral reservations they might have about a particular policy or practice in order to continue service to their nation. This was the defense of many of the war criminals on trial at Nuremberg; however, the Tribunal consistently refused to respect their claims of hav- ing had to obey "superior orders." As the infamous "Obedience to Authority" experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram disclosed, normal individuals are willing to inflict severe pain on other people when in- duced by a convincing authority figure.[63]

If the government begins to fear waning support for its policies, it can employ propaganda or outright deception. During World War II, there is evidence to suggest that bomber crews were given briefings that inten- tionally exaggerated the military significance of such targets as Dres- den.[64] The British government attempted to restrict information about the Dresden raids from the general public to avoid "jeopardizing public support for the war."[65]

In addition to capitalizing on the tendency of both civilians and soldiers to defer personal scruples in favor of conforming to authority, the invocation of national security can create a "kill or be killed" mentality. The targets of the government killing project, whether members of a despised minority group or citizens of an enemy nation, must be eliminated in order for the vitality of one's own group or nation to be preserved. In his study of Nazi doctors, "Medicalized Killing in Auschwitz," Lifton notes that "killing was done in the name of healing. It is not too much to say that every action an SS doctor took was connected to some kind of perversion or reversal of healing and killing. For the SS doctor, involvement in the killing process became equated with healing."[66] Likewise, Charny states, "Incredible as it may seem, virtually every genocide is defined by its doers as being on behalf of the larger purpose of bettering human life."[67] In his article, "American Military Ethics in World War II: The Bombing of German Civilians," Ronald Schaffer cites excerpts from a wartime memo by U.S. Army Air Forces commander Henry H. Arnold in which Arnold stated that the bomber, "when used with the proper degree of understanding . . . becomes, in effect, the most humane of all weapons."[68] Schaffer comments:

These sentiments appear to conflict with Arnold's willingness to burn down cities, his desire to see robot bombers fall indiscriminately among the German people. . . . Yet they are more than lip service or words for the historical record. They represent a moral attitude inherent in air power theory, a position that goes back to World War I—the idea that the bomber is a way of preserving lives by ending wars quickly and by providing a substitute for the kind of ground warfare that had killed so many soldiers a quarter century earlier.[69]

Among the most important forms of ideological justification for mass killing is the dehumanization of the victims. "Dehumanization," according to Kuper, "might be conceived as the relegation of the victims to the level of animals or objects or to a purely instrumental role."[70] Herbert Kelman suggests that dehumanization entails the removal of two fundamental qualities from the victims, identity and community; the individual identity of each victim is submerged in the group to which he or she belongs, and the group as a whole is considered as subhuman or nonhuman.[71] In Helen Fein's terms, the victims are placed "outside the sanctified universe of obligation—that circle of people with reciprocal obligations to protect each other whose bonds arose from their relation to a deity or sacred source of authority."[72] If the invocation of national security and official authority provide initial inducement for both participants and bystanders to accept the necessity of harsh measures against a targeted group, dehumanization of that group further erodes any moral or empathic restraints on the willingness to perpetrate massive and indiscriminate violence. As Kelman notes: "Thus when a group of people is

defined entirely in terms of a category to which they belong, and when this category is excluded from the human family, then the moral restraints against killing them are more readily overcome."[73]

Both total war and genocide are characterized by the dehumanization of victims. When the victims are members of a different religion or race, dehumanization is greatly facilitated. For example, when the United States shifted its bombing policy in Japan from "precision" attacks against military targets to deliberate efforts to create huge firestorms in urban areas, accounts of the raids in the popular media were replete with images suggesting that the Japanese were more similar to insects than people and that the bombing campaign was closer to pest extermination than a traditional military operation. The image of pest extermination was also frequently used by Nazis who were involved in the attempt to exterminate the Jews.

A final element in the ideological justification of mass killing to be considered in this preliminary analysis is the role of the academic and scientific communities. In the case of the Holocaust, the entire campaign against the Jews—from the earliest official persecutions in 1933 through the implementation of the "Final Solution"—was intellectually rationalized by members of the German academic and scientific community. The medical profession, for example, as has been documented by Lifton, played very important roles, both by contributing to such legal measures against the Jews as the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, which made it illegal for Jews and non-Jews to be married or have sexual relations (on the assumption that interbreeding with Jews would pollute and weaken the German-Aryan "blood"), and by direct participation in the mass killing operations.[74] Scientific authority was also invoked to justify the shift from precision to area bombing by the British during World War II. The military and political leaders who favored such a shift in targeting policy eagerly seized on the fact that certain prestigious scientists had purportedly found evidence indicating that such a policy would significantly help the war effort. Other scientists, who reached a contradictory conclusion—that "de-housing" the German workers was less efficient than continuing to attack specific industrial targets—found far less receptivity among the policymakers.[75]

A second contributing factor emphasized by analysts of contemporary mass killing is the pervasiveness of bureaucratic political and social organization. According to Richard Rubenstein in his study *The Cunning of History: The Holocaust and the American Future:*

Usually the progress in death-dealing capacity in the twentieth century has been described in terms of technological advances in weaponry. Too little attention has been given to the advances in social organization that allowed for the effective use of the new weapons. In order to understand how the moral barrier was crossed that made massacre in the millions possible, it is neces-

sary to consider the importance of bureaucracy in modern political organization.[76]

Sociologist Randall Collins sees bureaucracy as a reason for the "ferocious" face to face cruelty of the past to have been replaced by a new kind of cruelty: callousness, or "cruelty without passion." While he notes that callous cruelty has existed throughout history, he suggests that it is "especially characteristic of large-scale, bureaucratic organization," and that "the structural organization of bureaucracy seems uniquely suited for the perpetration of callous violence."[77]

Ongoing mass killing projects—like the operation of killing centers or the undertaking of a sustained incendiary bombing campaign against densely populated cities—require a complex and efficient organization. For every individual who is directly involved with the mass killing (e.g., operating the gas chamber or serving as crew on the bomber), there are many others who must decide and promulgate the policy; design, build, and service the necessary machinery; coordinate the logistics of transport and supply; generate, distribute, and file paperwork; monitor and evaluate.

Several features of bureaucratic organizations serve to promote the overall efficiency of mass killing projects as well as to enable individual participants to carry out their tasks with a minimum of questioning or doubt. Insofar as the positions within a bureaucracy are arranged in a formally hierarchical structure, individuals at the lower levels tend to have a reduced sense of personal responsibility for either the policy they are helping to implement or its final outcome. They are, after all, only "following orders" that have descended through all the levels of the organization above their own. This is particularly true of the military with its strongly indoctrinated tradition of unquestioning loyalty to authority. Another feature of bureaucracy, division of labor, breaks down complex tasks into compartmentalized sub-tasks. "Microdivision of labor," according to sociologist Don Martindale, "has made the goal of activity invisible, depriving it of meaning for the individual."[78] For example, the distinguished physicist and U.S. defense consultant Freeman Dyson, reflecting on his involvement as a scientific analyst in Bomber Command, the organization responsible for British strategic bombing during World War II, notes:

Bomber Command was an early example of the new evil that science and technology have added to the old evils of soldiering. Technology has made evil anonymous. Through science and technology, evil is organized bureaucratically so that no individual is responsible for what happens.[79]

A further diminishment of personal responsibility results from the formal separation of the individual from the position which he or she occupies

within the organization. According to Collins, this separation is "the fundamental principle of bureaucracy."[80] The assigned task is performed during working hours, after which the individual is free to pursue other activities and interests.

Bureaucracy facilitates the crossing of the "moral barrier" to which Rubenstein referred by its deliberate effort to render humane considerations irrelevant with respect to the performance of the task at hand. As Max Weber noted, a bureaucratic organization, "develops the more perfectly the more the bureaucracy is 'dehumanized,' the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation. This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue."[81]

Such amoral rationality augments the effects of the other features to help create technically proficient functionaries who perform their specialized assignments with a minimized tendency to concern themselves with the fundamental nature of the overall project or its ultimate goals and results. As Fein observes, "Bureaucracy is not itself a cause of the choice of destructive ends, but it facilitates their accomplishment by routinizing the obedience of many agents, each trained to perform his role without questioning the ends of action."[82]

Technology is the third factor that has contributed decisively to the unprecedented death tolls of the twentieth century. It has made this contribution by providing killers with weapons of ever-increasing lethality and by creating a physical and emotional distance between killers and victims.

Throughout history, technology has always had a powerful impact on warfare. In his analysis of the historical development of weaponry from preliterate peoples through the 1950s, Francis Allen concludes that technology is "the clearcut, outstanding *variable* of importance" in determining the nature of war.[83] This conclusion is shared by Quincy Wright, who states that "the outstanding characteristic in which modern war has differed from all earlier forms of war has been in the degree of mechanization."[84]

The lethality of weapons has increased tremendously during the modern era. In his classic study of the increasing rate of social change, sociologist Hornell Hart has documented several dimensions of the "accelerating power to kill and destroy." These include the range over which weapons can be projected and, as a function of this range, their "killing area." Hart notes that from 1 million B.C. until approximately A.D. 1450, the maximum range of available weapons remained under one-third of a mile and the killing area under one square mile. The only weapons developed during this entire period capable of attaining these results were the catapult and the ballista (a giant crossbow). Between 1453, with the invention of cannons, and 1912, with the development of

coastal artillery, the range increased from 1 mile to 11.4 miles and the killing area from 3 square miles to 408 square miles. However, between 1915, with the first Zeppelin raid on London during World War I, and 1954, with strategic bombers and in-flight refueling, the range grew from 200 miles to 12,500 miles and the killing area from 126,000 square miles to 200 million square miles. This killing area exceeded the total surface area of the earth, approximately 10 million square miles.[85]

Hart also traced the increase in the killing power of the explosives that can be delivered over the above ranges. One measure that he uses is deaths per ton of explosive. During the German bombing raids on London during World War I, for example, about 3 people were killed for each ton of TNT bombs dropped. By World War II, the rate had risen precipitously; in the American incendiary bombing raid on Tokyo on March 9, 1945, deaths per ton was 50. By the end of the war, the invention of the atomic bomb had raised the death toll per ton of explosive even higher, up to "about 10,000 persons killed per ton of normal bomb load for the B-29 that made the raid."[86] Hart concludes his analysis of increased killing power by noting that "the five centuries from 1346 to 1875 saw several times as much increase in explosive power as had been achieved in the previous million years. The 70 years from 1875 to March, 1945, saw several times as much increase in explosive power as the previous five centuries."[87] With the development during the war of atomic weapons, and after the war of thermonuclear weapons, destructive capabilities have climbed even higher.

The combination of long-range delivery capability and high levels of destructiveness has made modern weapons indiscriminate. During World War II, even efforts to precisely target key industries frequently created large death tolls among civilians living in the vicinity, as the result of either errant bombs or conflagrations that started in the designated target areas and then spread to surrounding residential areas.

Warfare is not the only type of mass killing that has been vitally affected by technological developments. As Horowitz notes, "What makes genocide a particularly malevolent practice in this century, with wide-ranging consequences, is the role of modern technology in the systematic destruction of large numbers of innocents."[88] In the case of the Holocaust, technology played a crucial role in at least two ways. First, existing technology was utilized by the killers to facilitate their tasks. For example, communications technology enabled them to coordinate a killing project that involved millions of intended victims scattered throughout Europe, and transportation technology was exploited to ship the Jews and other victims from their far-flung homes to the killing centers. Second, new technologies of killing and corpse disposal were developed in order to increase the "output." This included gas chambers with a capacity of 2,000 people at one time, huge ventilation systems designed to evacuate the poisoned air from the gas chambers, and

crematoria capable of disposing of thousands of corpses per day. While none of this technology was particularly sophisticated or esoteric, its efficient exploitation definitely helped the perpetrators to attain higher "body counts" than would have been the case had they continued to resort to more "primitive" methods like shooting, drowning, and burying victims alive.

In addition to affecting contemporary mass killing by increasing the destructiveness of the tools used by the killers, technology has also decisively affected the mass killing process by imposing physical and emotional distance between killers and their victims. Not only can killers annihilate great numbers of people in short periods of time, but they can do this often without even seeing their victims. As Allen notes, "The increasing tendency is to wage war at a distance. . . . Modern scientific war thus becomes depersonalized."[89] For example, during World War I, the crews of heavy artillery pieces fired across no man's land into the area of enemy trenches rather than at individually sighted enemy soldiers. During World War II, many of the bombing raids were obscured by cloud cover or by smoke rising from fires started by earlier strikes. In the Holocaust, the heavy psychological toll on the *Einsatzgruppen* killers engaging in the face-to-face mass shooting of men, women, and children was greatly reduced when the killing methodology shifted to the large gas chambers into which technicians would pour gas crystals through openings on the roof, without having to watch the victims die.[90]

An important effect of technologically imposed distance between killers and victims is an increased tendency to dehumanize the victim.[91] "In general," notes sociologist Lewis Coser, "the perception of the humanness of the 'other' decreases with the increase in distance between perceiver and perceived."[92] Such dehumanization further erodes any moral restraints that might intrude upon the effective performance of function by the killer. A case in point is provided by the strategic bombing campaigns of World War II. Kennett observes:

The escalation of the air war was made easier by the fact that those who directed the bombing offensives and those who carried them out remained curiously insulated and detached from the consequences of their work. Photographs taken at thirty thousand feet gave no clue to the human effects of a raid, nor did other sources. In this vacuum, imagination and extrapolation could picture the population of an enemy town deprived of its homes but not of life and limb. . . . Anodyne, antiseptic phrases such as "dual target" and "area attack" further served to mask the fact that human lives were being destroyed.[93]

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Despite apparent differences between genocide and total war as forms of state-sanctioned mass killing, this preliminary comparison has disclosed several significant similarities and parallels.

Both genocide and total war are undertaken by the nation-state as national security measures. Democracies as well as totalitarian governments have perpetrated genocides and engaged in total wars. Indeed, participation in a total war tends to narrow the gap between the two forms of government by centralizing authority and encouraging governmental propaganda and secrecy.

Ideological elements such as dehumanization of the targets of violence are common to both genocide and total war, as is the conviction that the vitality of one's own group or nation can be preserved only by willingness to destroy masses of people in a different group or nation. The invocation of a threat to national security, and governmental authorization for measures that would ordinarily be considered atrocious, facilitate the suppression of moral and empathic restraints among citizens who participate directly in the mass killing, as well as those who tacitly support it as "good citizens."

In the modern era, both genocide and total war tend to be bureaucratically organized. This form of social organization results in a diminished sense of personal responsibility for those who are directly or indirectly involved in the mass killing project. It also routinizes the performance of specialized tasks that are removed from the reality of the end results, but which collectively and cumulatively contribute to those results.

Technology plays an extremely important role in both forms of mass killing in at least two ways. First, it makes the task of killing large numbers of people easier and more efficient, and second, it eases any potential mental burden on the killers by interposing physical distance between them and their victims. This distancing reinforces the effects of dehumanizing ideology noted above.

The result of all three facilitating factors is to create a momentum that tends to increase levels of destructiveness until the goal has been reached or an outside force prevents continuation of the policy.

This comparative analysis has been admittedly preliminary and brief. The roles of such facilitating factors as ideology, bureaucracy, and technology need to be explored in greater detail, and other differences and similarities need to be identified and analyzed.

On the basis of this initial effort, however, it does appear that the line between genocide and total war has become very blurred in many cases. Warfare in the twentieth century has become increasingly genocidal, and

several genocides—with the German genocide against the Jews as the exemplary case—resemble military campaigns and utilize military forces in the killing process.[94]

The lessons of this study for the problem of the nuclear threat are very ominous. The same facilitating factors that expedite genocide and total war also characterize the preparations for nuclear war. The build-up of nuclear arsenals and the willingness to use them are justified on the grounds of national security. Elaborate ideological rationalizations are used to convince citizens of the need for more and better nuclear weapons. In both the United States and the Soviet Union, government propaganda and secrecy surround the making of nuclear policy and the plans for nuclear combat. Those who are closest to the policies and the weapons see them as being absolutely essential for the preservation of their nations, even to the point of being willing to risk destruction of those nations. The leaders and citizens of each "side" are vilified and dehumanized by official rhetoric and propaganda on the other side. The Soviets are demonized as "Godless monsters" dwelling in an "evil empire," while citizens of the United States are caricatured as "evil imperialists" and "heartless capitalists."

The preparations for nuclear war take place in vast bureaucracies in which many thousands of patriotic individuals make their livings by performing compartmentalized tasks that contribute to the readiness to engage in nuclear holocaust. The destructive capacity of nuclear weapons technology is beyond the comprehension of most, if not all, potential victims of nuclear war, which decreases their ability to recognize and confront the risk that such technology poses. The weapons themselves will be launched by young men and women buried in underground missile silos, submerged beneath the ocean in submarines, or flying high above the ground in airplanes. Most of those who will be responsible for actually using the weapons do not even know their precise destination.

These and many other features of the nuclear threat make it very difficult for human beings to comprehend and confront it. Yet, if they fail to even try, then factors that contribute to the growing likelihood will be allowed to grow stronger, and the efforts of the minority of the people who have dedicated themselves to trying to prevent the holocaust will be in vain. The problem of state-sanctioned mass killing—in the past, present, and future—must be elevated to the highest level of our priorities as citizens, scholars, and parents. We must confront the ugly issue of mass killing in order to avoid becoming victims ourselves.

Although the following words of Bruno Bettelheim were originally addressed to the question of why the Jews became ensnared in the unimaginable madness of the Holocaust, they have much to say to us in an era of genocide, total war, and the preparations for nuclear holocaust:

When a world goes to pieces and inhumanity reigns supreme, man cannot go on living his private life as he was wont to do, and would like to do; he cannot—as the loving head of a family, keep the family living together peacefully, undisturbed by the surrounding world; nor can he continue to take pride in his profession or possessions, when either will deprive him of his humanity, if not also of his life. In such times, one must radically reevaluate all that one has done, believed in, and stood for in order to know how to act. In short, one has to take a stand on the new reality—a firm stand, not one of retirement into an even more private world.[95]

NOTES

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3. Quincy Wright, *A Study of War,* p. 248.

4. William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," in Richard Wasserstrom, ed., *War and Morality* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970), p. 5.

5. Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics,* Vol. 3 (New York: The Bedminster Press, 1962), p. 342. Emphasis in original.

6. Gil Elliot, *Twentieth Century Book of the Dead* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), p. 1.

7. Ruth L. Sivard,*World Military and Social Expenditures 1982* (Leesburg, Va.: World Priorities, 1982), p. 15.

8. See, for example, Lewis A. Dunn, *Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

9. International Committee of Experts on Medical Sciences and Public Health, *Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1984), p. 5. R. P. Turco et al., "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions," *Science* 222 (December 23, 1983), pp. 1283-91.

10. Paul R. Ehrlich et al., "Long-term Consequences of Nuclear War," *Science* 222 (December 23, 1983), p. 1299.

11. For example, Robert Jay Lifton, a psychiatrist who has undertaken pioneering studies of such holocausts as the atomic bombings of Japan and the Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews of Europe, notes that, until recently, Western society was reticent on the subject of death itself, let alone mass death and mass killing. "Next it became permissible to speak about individual death and dying," observes Lifton, "but not holocaust. Now holocaust is increasingly discussed, but mainly in terms of the past, not in relationship to future holocausts or to our own capacity for mass murder." Robert Jay Lifton, "Witnessing Survival," *Society* 15 (March/April 1978), p. 41. Like-

wise, Israel Charny, on the basis of his detailed study of the psychosocial dimensions of genocide, concludes: "At this point in its evolution, mankind is deeply limited in its readiness to experience and take action in response to genocidal disasters. Most events of genocide are marked by massive indifference, silence, and inactivity." Israel Charny, *How Can We Commit the Unthinkable? Genocide: The Human Cancer* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), p. 284.

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13. International Military Tribunal, "Charter of the International Military Tribunal," *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law Number 10,* Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), p. xii.

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16. Ibid., pp. 97, 154-60; see also Richard Rubenstein, "The Agony of Indochina," in Richard Rubenstein, *The Age of Triage: Fear and Hope in an Overcrowded World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), pp. 165-94.

17. Irving Louis Horowitz, *Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980), p. 1.

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20. Ibid., p. 206.

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26. Edwin Corwin, *Total War and the Constitution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), p. 3.

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28. Fuller, *The Conduct of War,* p. 15.

29. Ibid., p. 15-25.

30. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics,* Vol. 3, pp. 340, 345, 349.

31. Richard A. Preston and Sydney F. Wise, *Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 207.

32. Corwin, *Total War and the Constitution*, p. 7.

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7

SOCIAL MADNESS

Ronald Aronson

I

In *The Dialectics of Disaster: A Preface to Hope* I have analyzed the "Final Solution to the Jewish Problem" as an act of societal madness.[1] We ordinarily use this term "madness" quite freely in conversation, but then abandon it upon moving into serious discourse and study—perhaps in trying to be more precise, objective, or scientific, perhaps to avoid a contentious descriptive term. I would argue, however, that sophisticated thought has ignored an important spontaneous insight. Used carefully and self-consciously, the term "madness" illuminates much of the century's genocidal history, including above all the Nazi project to exterminate Europe's Jews.

Mad: untutored and casual reflection contains an insight to be preserved and deepened, not suppressed, by systematic and scientific study. Nazi policies toward the Jews were mad, as were Stalin's attacks upon Russian society, as was the American near-destruction of Vietnam. And in the dynamic structures of these and other quite different madnesses we can find guides for understanding and perhaps combatting the nuclear madness menacing all of us.

Yet to describe social policies as mad immediately exposes one to a raft of doubts: about indulging in rhetorical excess, about being imprecise, about confusing the social with the individual, injecting normative conceptions that have no place in social analysis. For example, even if we grant that individuals may be described as mad—and this language is contestable as being value-charged, unscientific, and obsolescent—how can psychological terms appropriate to individual mental functioning be

applied to collective behavior? After all, don't societies function accord-
ing to different processes than do individuals?

This and similar objections are reinforced by the functionalist premise
that generally guides studies of social life. It is no great leap from as-
suming, quite appropriately, that all social policy is intentional, to seeing
that intentionality as rational—thus gilding rulers' acts with the ration-
ality of those studying them. If it had a *function* and *purpose,* the "Final
Solution" was done "in order to . . .": to unite Germany, say, or to
divert it. It had a particular function, then, a logic. The executioners
were guided by or manipulated according to this logic. But such formu-
lations tend to cast genocide as another human project among the
universe of projects—whose rationality is either assumed or lies beyond
the specific study in question—rather than as a policy whose logic is
fundamentally rooted in illogic. Yes, it was just another human act, but
it was also an insane one. Yes, understanding it demands that we use
customary explanatory categories, but it also stretches them to their limit.

The Nazi policy and practice of extermination was—in spite of its
overwhelming technical rationality, in spite of the palpable reality of the
extermination-camp universe—as supremely irrational as can be
imagined. Yet its madness, if felt and intuited, is difficult to locate, more
difficult to argue. Was it in the decision to exterminate, in the machinery
itself, in the mental functioning of those who ordered it or those who
carried out their orders, in the society that made it possible? Although
the debate continues, it is at least plausible for us to see an organizer of
the "Final Solution," Adolf Eichmann, as did Hannah Arendt, as banal
and mediocre rather than as pathologically mad.[2] And it is at least pos-
sible to argue, as did Richard Rubenstein, that the key to the Holocaust
is not a crazed intentionality but a rather indifferent and impersonal
process of twentieth-century technological rationality.[3]

Certainly I agree that "madness" is a methodologically troubling term
—a culturally bound concept whose use for socio-historical processes is
so problematic and controversial that it would be preferable to avoid it
altogether. But discarding the term will not dispel what it would convey.
How else can we preserve what is essential to it—the systematically and
radically *deranged* character of the "Final Solution"? How do justice to
the intuition that at its core it was insane, beginning to end?

Yet aren't these *subjective* responses? Rubenstein has argued that we
should bracket our emotional responses as interfering with our objective
understanding of this event.[4] Is not our sense of its madness similarly
subjective and distortive? Won't dwelling on it slant our discussion in a
hopelessly colored personal direction? Shouldn't we limit ourselves to
presenting and understanding the facts without adding any such personal
evaluation to them?

On the contrary, if the Holocaust commands our attention it is because
we cannot separate data—the numbers of dead, for example—from our

definition of their meaning. The event's impact and significance is indeed *subjectively* based: the sheer scale of the catastrophe cannot be disentangled from our sense of its grotesque character. The "Final Solution" was an end in itself. There is no value-free way of characterizing the Holocaust—its very definition as the worst catastrophe imaginable short of nuclear war is rooted in our respect for life, our sense of what humans should be and how they should and should not treat each other. Objectivity, insofar as history and society are concerned, is an intersubjective product constituted by those who share this same space, the earth. It is assumed, perhaps elaborated, as our sense of the collective conditions for survival, let alone well-being. In its utter gratuitousness, the Nazi extermination program so violates even the most minimal of these norms—proper behavior in wartime—that we cannot help but perceive it by using such terms as "unspeakable," "evil," "barbaric," "horrifying," or "demonic."

We *perceive* it this way: our lenses are inescapably emotional— subjective *and* objective, and give us the event already laden with meaning. We perceive it this way: it *is* this way. In the human world "subjective" reactions are indeed objective: they claim to illuminate not our feelings about the Holocaust but its very structure and character. Conversely, as a human project it has a structure and character only within the human world whose norms it so systematically outraged. Our objective-subjective reactions claim to mark it off from other historical events and tell us how and why it is unique. In this sense such terms do not call for being bracketed out at the start, but rather for being retained—clarified and understood, in order to better guide us to the event itself.

II

But what does it mean to call social policy and collective behavior "mad"? How can the intuition be preserved and rendered usable for research and analysis?

Let us be clear what we do when we call an act "mad." First, our assertion may be of various strengths, and our emphasis may vary accordingly. We may simply mean that it is severely and systematically abnormal—that it departs considerably from our sense of the normal. "Normal," of course, is a subjective-objective notion which, strictly speaking, conveys our judgment of the range of proper human behavior —the norm we apply. But even if we try to restrict this judgment to behavior, it is hard to escape an accompanying reference to the psychological state underlying the behavior. In other words, in addition to considering a "mad" act as extremely abnormal, we imply that its source is in a mind that is somehow deranged. A mad action, we may suggest,

proceeds from a disordered psyche. Indeed, if we call an act "insane" we complete this shift and our emphasis falls more heavily on the mental state of the actor. Between the milder emphasis on an action's abnormality and the stronger focus on its subjective source, I propose to explore "madness" in the middle sense, as suggested by "deranged"—as judgment of an act which opens toward, but does not immediately insist on focusing on, its subjective source.

Second, we must insist on the normative claim implied at each stage so far. When we speak of individuals as mad/deranged, we may have in mind three possible areas: systematic derangement of perception, systematic derangement of intention, or systematic derangement of affect. The individual may claim to see things that are not there or not see things that *are* there, may seek to do things that are inconceivable, or may show feelings or responses that are seriously and systematically inappropriate. In each type of madness, a standard is implied against which the act is measured: what is really there to be perceived, what is really possible to do, what is normal for human beings to feel. Obviously we cannot restrict ourselves to common-sense judgments of reality for our standard—revolutionaries, inventors, and poets constantly break beyond and redefine what are assumed to be the limits of reality and are frequently falsely thought to be mad. This does not deny that there are standards, however; just that a given society's definition of what is real—as in the case of Nazi Germany—must in turn be judged against more solid standards.

What is their source? Daily life is underpinned by a shared sense of the real world, its structures and limits. Science uses but sees beyond this, remains guided by its own, and corresponding, shared sense of reality, which is continuously and collectively refined and redefined just as is that of common sense. Even a revolutionary social philosophy, Marxism, which projects social transformation—a radically different reality which, if glimpsed, has not yet been achieved—bases its claim to truth on its *scientific* character. In other words, it is no more than utopian speculation if its projections are not based on actual, observable tendencies and possibilities of *this* society.

Even if it is now regarded as intersubjectively based rather than independent and external to us, a structured real world is central to all our experience. The rebellious—or revolutionary—rejection of the common-sense version of these structures is not mad, nor are the transcending visions of great poets, artists, and scientists. *Their* visions have seen through to deeper layers of the reality and have allowed future generations access to them. To be sure, sometimes we cannot tell for sure whether we are witnessing a transcendence of common sense or a mad break with reality—a vision of a madman. But then no normative concept is without its gray areas. Despite these, judgments of abnormality/

derangement still rest on a shared and demonstrable sense of objective reality, its spheres including intention and feeling as well as perception.

III

The three categories of individual madness demand closer examination to see which are useful for societal analysis. First, what does it mean to see what is not really there? The Nazis saw the Jews as the source of Germany's problems: they perceived them as sub- and super-humans, as a danger, a pollutant, a parasite, an evil.[5] I do not mean "see" and "perceive" literally in terms of the physiological/optical fact of perception, but inferentially, as in the case of a belief. When someone sees the devil we assume not a perceptual but a mental malfunctioning: madness is not color-blindness but a mental disorder in which we believe our world of experience to form a causal pattern which is radically false. Patently absurd connections or processes of causation are invented, beings are created for which there is no basis in reality. *These* specific people, the Jews, were endowed by large numbers of Germans with certain menacing qualities and were linked mentally to their actually experienced problems.

To see this as madness is to concede that at its core were not the manipulators and the manipulated, but rather, more disturbingly, people who believed the inanities they spoke. Like the madman who sees the devil, those who thought the Jews were racially defiling them were sincere. They believed in their fantasies.

To see what is not there is also to *not* see what is there. If one looks at nuclear weapons and does not see danger but instead security we may speak of a similar double, and similarly radical, misperception. Again, the term "perception" is used loosely: the derangement lies in the mental, not the optical, process.

Why not simply speak of an *error?* Why is it not enough simply to label as *mistaken* the man who sees the devil or the Nazi who sees the Jew as the devil? After all, we are first of all talking about a mistake. The problem is that to call misperception a mistake locates it within the realm of reason and evidence we presume in all discourse and indeed perception. Within that realm a mistake may be corrected, for example, by demonstrating it to be false. But to call it madness underscores on the one hand its depth and seriousness, on the other its psychological roots and quality of being beyond reason and demonstration. If we regard a belief as mad we see it as being both willful *and* beyond reach.

This is a remarkable combination of opposites: a mad belief is beyond control, unreachable by any customary process of evidence or reasoning, yet it is willful. It proceeds with determination and from a definite intention.

Madness of the first sort, then, suggests a willful turning away from both normal perception and inference and its standards of evidence and truth, and a turning away which proclaims—and acts on—the inexistence of what is real and the existence of what is not. Of course, no individual or social movement turns completely from reality. Hitler not only showed normal perceptual capacities when he ate and drank, but in rising to power he demonstrated a brilliant grasp of the political situation down to the smallest detail of timing. If he was deranged it was only in certain specific areas. The same is true for those judged and treated as clinically insane: however far from normal reality they may be in specific areas, they know where and how to eat, how to walk, what it means to sleep. Total derangement, if possible, would deprive the would-be pathological killer of the very capacity to kill: *every* reality would be scrambled. Derangement is always selective and limited, leaving intact most of the vast web of one's other ties to reality as well as abilities to function within it.

Which is why we must see madness as lying along a continuum which stretches from the impossible extreme of seeing and acknowledging reality completely to the other impossible extreme of breaking with it totally. If the second is inconceivable for the reasons just given, Sigmund Freud has made clear why the first is also conceivable: civilized life demands repression and neurosis. If sane people stand somewhere along the continuum, the insane stand further along, having broken with *more* of reality. It is, however, a quantitative change which becomes qualitative. To speak of "madness" implies that reality is being denied more fully and in an area that is decisive for functioning. One could scarcely imagine functioning without denying *some* aspects of reality—this is the meaning of repression and neurosis as Freud articulated them. Repression is necessary to civilized life as such—for example, generating the sublimations that yield culture as well as protecting humanity from the impulses that would threaten it. Neurosis, differentiated from madness only by degree, afflicts every member of Western society in *some* way(s) which at *some* time(s) may become disruptive. Madness is more pronounced, more disruptive, more systematic.

If the phenomenon of denial characterizes all neurosis and suggests the (relatively) easy reversability that treatment or time can bring, a stronger term is needed to describe the willful, radical, systematic departure from reality we mean by "madness": a *rupture* with reality. This formulation captures all of the meanings I have been exploring: the fact that madness involves a relationship with reality; the normative character of the description; the seriousness of the derangement; its willful character; and the difficulty of return.

A second meaning of "madness" emphasizes the derangement not of perception but of intention. Of course, the two are linked: belief is an act whose derangement proceeds from an *intention* to rupture with reality

and so believe. Moreover, madness has consequences—and is thus talked about and studied—only when it becomes yet more active and produces practical results. Nevertheless, "madness" has still a further implication, within the practical sphere, of an act that is undertaken contrary to evident possibility and in spite of that evidence. To attempt unaided flight from a tall building is so patently pursuing the impossible and courting death as to be mad. Of course, as with the earlier qualifications of misperception, acts that seek to "do the impossible" are regarded as mad when they are sustained, serious, and far-reaching. If this madness indeed contains strong elements of misperception, the emphasis falls on the misperception of causal relations between act A and intended result B. "If I leap I will fly." The absence of any conducting path between A and B is rejected, replaced instead with magical belief. B can be accomplished by doing A, in the face of all contrary evidence and experience. Reality is defied.

The intention is mad not insofar as it is felt or desired, but insofar as it is *willed against reality*. I focus on this as a distinct kind of madness because the intention dominates so wholly as to be pursued in spite of its patent impossibility. My desire to fly goes against reality, but instead of submitting to that reality I attack and disregard it by jumping from the window. If I disregard it with reference to the laws of physics, I attack it with regard to my own body. In this sense the realities in and through which the action takes place are violated in decisive ways—my body in particular—in hope of achieving B. Madness: an extreme and systematic violation of reality in the intention of achieving an impossible result.

And yet common sense tells us that many things are impossible which are later accomplished. Was flight impossible in 1900? Black-white equality in the American South in 1950? I select a technical *and* a sociopolitical example, both of which were susceptible to change over time. Yesterday's impossibility becomes tomorrow's common sense: space travel, for example, or women's equality with men. This implies that special caution is necessary when talking about madness. Moreover, systematic analysis of social structures and tendencies may reveal certain possibilities which are roundly denied by established ideologies: social movements sometimes suddenly and momentously extend the field of possibilities, as when Russian workers created the Soviets in 1905.[6]

Thus the intention for social change—even for revolutionary change —cannot be *a priori* characterized as mad any more than can the impulse to invent what has not yet been invented. Defenders of the status quo may see a given project as mad because of interests which understandably limit their sense of what is possible. Here it is important to note not that "madness" is and can be falsely applied—true of any normative term—but that it is used, and with a precise but incorrectly applied meaning: to attempt what is plainly contrary to possibility.

A third meaning of "madness" needs to be considered: systematic and radical estrangement from oneself. Psychopathic mass murderers are often regarded as mad not only because they kill but also because they do so without normal affect. "Cold-blooded murder": the assumption is of an appropriate complex of motivations and feelings which *this* killer utterly lacks. We see him as having thus ruptured with *his own* moral sensibilities and human fellow-feeling. He does not feel or react as one is *supposed to,* meaning in turn that he is not only abnormal but quite probably radically separated from *himself.* Acts of extreme cruelty which spread beyond specific acts of self-defense or revenge can be easily seen to express this divorce between the person's actions and underlying feelings.

Rather than exploring the various problematic aspects of this meaning of "madness," it will be useful to note that, like the others, it rests on demonstrable standards of reality and normality and makes no sense without them. Like the others, it may be arguable, but those who employ it as a normative concept would willingly shoulder this burden of argument.

IV

I have so far been discussing "madness" as we usually use it—to describe individuals. In what ways, and with what qualifications, can it be applied to the social world? Certainly if we focus on a given ruler we can assess his mental state and describe his acts using the definitions just developed: Hitler's "Final Solution" was mad. To the extent that an individual decides policy, we might conclude that any and all analysis of individual behavior can be used. Was Hitler's perception deranged? His intention, or his affect? How are these reflected in Nazi policy?

But if we make no distinction between individual and social we would ignore the specifically *societal* character and determinants of the acts of even the most powerful dictator. Hitler matters not because he was an individual but as the one who managed to become absolute ruler of that specific society. He became absolute dictator in the most intimate relation with those specific social and historical conditions—his character expressing and focusing that situation, right down to and including his insanity. Moreover, his individual qualities themselves were produced in and through a specific history of a specific social class in a specific society. Above all, they became reflected in policy only as Hitler took power: insofar as he led the movement that became the dominant political force in Germany.

The point is that every step and layer of the madness that became the "Final Solution," even the most individual, was *social.* This suggests that the above meanings of "madness" cannot simply be grafted from

individual to social process without prior reflection on their suitability. Hitler may have been mad in all the senses described above: our question turns on the madness of the social policy and collective behavior he directed.

This difference between the individual and the societal becomes clear as soon as we ask how political behavior can be mad in the third sense used above, as systematic and radical estrangement from self: derangement of affect. What is the "self" of a society from which it would become estranged in acting madly? Certainly it might be possible to describe a "sane society" or a "sick society" in terms of specific internal relations and standards of health. But such an exercise would require a totally new definition of categories rather than a translation of the individual into the social. Such a redefinition would mark the considerable difference, *pace* Plato, between character structure and social structure.[7]

Political behavior is not individual behavior writ large—the body politic is a rather different animal than the individual human being. The affective character that is inextricable from relations between individuals, for example, has a wholly different place, if any, in collective relations these individuals direct or participate in.

John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev confronted each other in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 not as individuals but as leaders of nations. That the difference was decisive can be gathered from a reading of Robert Kennedy's memoir on the near-catastrophe.[8] It was a *political* conflict which, however it may have used or been reinforced by individual feelings, was conducted in political terms, according to a political logic, for political ends. Kennedy and Khrushchev acted not as private individuals might—concerned above all, for example, about their children—but as rulers of nations—concerned about power. For example, the political consequences of being seen to be backing down were central in Kennedy's calculations *because of* his self-conscious role as president of the country that saw itself as the most powerful in the world. As such, an abstraction as remarkably distant from the fate of the world's people—or of his own children—as "national interest" largely controlled Kennedy's behavior in the conflict. However we interpret this psychologically, we must clearly put its peculiar political character at the center of our interpretation.

Thus the example suggests that the third area of our definition of individual madness, estrangement from self, offers serious resistance to being applied to political behavior. But the other two meanings can be more readily applied. When its rulers organize a society against false enemies, when they believe and propagate the view that the society is being mortally threatened although it is not, when they organize to combat the threat—then we may speak of madness as surely as when an individual does the same. For systematic misperception is involved.

But how can we say that the *society* perceives or misperceives? Es-

pecially when a society is fragmented into warring classes or groups? Here the shift from individual to societal "madness" may complicate our efforts but not cancel them. In speaking of a ruler we may say, simply, that he sees what is not there and does not see what is there. Rulers' perceptions of themselves and their situation may be so deranged as to merit the term "madness."

In certain situations, however, this deranged perception is not theirs alone, but rather becomes *collective* madness. I would cite as an example, insofar as it has been believed, the Communist "threat" to the United States, or Soviet society's organization against Leon Trotsky's "threat" to the Bolshevik Revolution, or (taking a less controversial example) the Jewish "threat" to Germany. In each case—however different from each other—the character and extent of a societal derangement was so extreme as to at least arguably warrant the description of "madness." What makes it a matter of a specifically *societal* derangement is not only the obvious fact that it was shared by vast numbers of people, but that this sharing, beyond being an imposition by a powerful ruler or dominant class, had deep social roots. The "Final Solution" became policy as a response to what vast numbers crazily regarded as a real threat to their society. To be sure, along the road to Auschwitz there had to be manipulators and manipulated—those who, for reasons of power, consciously *used* paranoid anti-Semitism without sharing it, as well as those who acted according to it because they saw no alternative. But the manipulations of and obedience to authority were not the secret of the Nazi madness but only its inevitable corollary. Bullying and manipulation, submission and obedience may have a place in any social movement, but they never explain it.[9]

But isn't everything we have been saying served adequately by the term "ideology"? Nazism was an ideology—a class-centered vision of social reality which was offered, and accepted, beyond the German lower middle class because it made sense of the experience of vast numbers of people and gave them a program of action. As such it had to distort aspects of reality, just as it had to render aspects of it adequately. Nazism, anti-Communism, Stalinism—in speaking of madness am I not really describing ideologies which in these key respects are similar to all other ideologies?

Where I quarrel with such analysis is in emphasizing that some ideologies must be seen as mad. A central question, in spite of all relativism, is how far ideology corresponds to reality. At what point do we call it deranged? Granted, all ideologies distort in service of specific social classes; granted, also, that Marxism set itself up as the scientific critique of ideology but in power has become just another ideology. The original Marxist distinction between a more or less distorted and a more or less accurate vision of social reality is decisive. The psychological spectrum, stretching from (impossible) complete sanity to (impossible)

complete madness, requires only slight alteration to become as relevant to the discussion of societies as of individuals. The rulers of any society may impose a more or less distorted vision of reality on all other social groups and classes, but at a certain point along the continuum ideological distortion can become so severe as to fundamentally lose touch with reality. The image of the Jew in Nazi ideology is an example. Quantity becomes quality: the degree of willful yet believed obfuscation is so great as to merit description as "madness." Even in class societies, then, ones governed by grotesque lies and absurdities, a point may be reached when the ruling vision crosses a line, the line of madness.

To explain Auschwitz means looking at those who *believed* that the Jews were menacing German society, and humanity, and were a threat that could only be eliminated by extermination. A "misperception" on this scale, as I have said, stems from an intention: the various stresses and traumas of their experience were shaped by the Nazis and their supporters into a deranged vision which placed the evil Jew at its center and called for action. The Nazis who so believed ruptured with the reality before them to create instead a fantasy-universe which "explained" their problems and directed them toward a "solution." That it was evil, that it was barbaric and ultimately self-destructive, did not deter (and perhaps attracted) those who chose it. It motivated and united them, gave them moments of victory and indeed mastery, successfully propelling them far from their original pain and stress. Since they were able to re-shape the world around them according to their mad vision, we might say that their madness "worked"—the mental rupture led to an actual physical rupture in which the menacing subhuman parasites were progressively deprived of human rights and human treatment, and then were exterminated.

V

I have differentiated derangement of perception from that of intention, but the "Final Solution" certainly crosses the line. In perceiving, then treating, people as people-who-are-not-human, the Nazis clearly acted contrary to reality. Yet they *succeeded* whenever they exterminated a Jew, insofar as they did remake reality according to their mad fantasy. Nevertheless, testimony of survivors indicates that they failed, utterly. Not only did many of these people retain their sense of humanity while in the camps, as was demonstrated in acts of solidarity, compassion, cunning, and outright resistance, most dramatically in the successful destruction of Treblinka. But afterwards, even those who felt themselves nearly reduced to subhumans by the Nazis but survived *returned:* to reconstitute their sense of humanity, to testify, to remember, to remind us. Those who later demonstrated—or whose children demonstrated—

against wars they saw as inhumane testified to a resilience of human fellow-feeling and moral sense which will forever mock the Nazis' effort to redefine their reality as human beings. Indeed, the only way the Nazis were successful in remaking reality according to fantasy was by committing genocide.

I originally spoke of the madness of intention in relation to an individual trying to do the impossible. We are dealing with *action*, the category where analyses of individuals have the easiest societal application. As with the individual, so with social policy: trying to do what cannot be done is mad. I have emphasized that it must be clearly differentiated from trying to do what *common sense* says is impossible, for common sense always sets its boundaries in keeping with the prevailing social structures and their accompanying universe of discourse. But the criterion remains valid nevertheless: it is not madness to seek to transform society in keeping with its possibilities and tendencies, according to its demonstrable capacities. It was not madness to attempt to enslave another people when the differences of power and of culture were so great as to render this possible. It is madness to seek to realize a vision which has no basis in fact, actual tendencies, human relations, or human capacity.

And so we may judge the Nazi vision: the Reich sought to subjugate other "Aryans," to destroy the national identity of "non-Aryans" like Slavs or others judged "inferior," and to exterminate the "subhumans." Even if extermination could be carried out—and it was the most successful of all the Nazi policies—the rest of the vision could not. Indeed, even without the Normandy invasion, the Soviet Union alone eventually would have destroyed Nazi Germany.

It is not mad to attempt a brutal or benevolent social policy whose success is unlikely, nor to attempt an action in order to test its possibility. The madness, rather, lies in going against reality, willfully and obdurately, when it is quite clear that success is impossible. Great destruction is a likely corollary in such cases, because those bent on changing what is unchangeable easily seek to coerce it if they have the means. In *The Dialectics of Disaster* I have explored the dynamic whereby impotence, in power, can lead to genocide. Societal mass murder, in our century, has been rooted in ruptures with reality in which the project of transformation can only be achieved through violence. Human reality may be recalcitrant, even to those with political and military power, but human beings can be *forced:* threatened, beaten into submission, destroyed if they refuse. Violence is indeed the only way of reshaping what resists. Thus was "socialism" created by Stalin; thus was an "independent non-Communist South Vietnam" pursued by the United States after its unattainability became clear in late 1964. In each case reality was madly assaulted by those with power to do so, violently

made over to resemble the guiding vision. In each case a grotesque mutant was created, and at frightful human cost.

VI

I have tried to develop a working notion of "madness" as a rupture with reality and to indicate how it might be useful for understanding catastrophic events like the Holocaust. A number of unresolved questions remain, above all regarding the kinds of societal processes that can produce mad societal behavior. If a society is not an individual writ large, how does it become deranged to the point of producing the kinds of acts we have indicated? And how is this derangement different from the "normal" social conflicts and class struggles that make up so much of history?

In *The Dialectics of Disaster* I have explored the dynamics of uneven historical development within and between societies in search of an answer. For now, however, a more immediate question involves staying on the terrain of the concept and its application: how to employ the meanings of "madness" described above to clarify *current* political behavior? It may be possible to reflect fruitfully on the past, but can the understanding help us to clarify the far more volatile and difficult world in which we ourselves are immersed? Above all, I have in mind the impending nuclear holocaust. How are we to regard the casual intuition that the current process of nuclear escalation is mad?

Certainly the notion of radical misperception can be our starting point. Do the nuclear planners, we may ask, not see what is there and see what is not there? The question may be posed from two directions—one regarding their perception of the Soviet Union, its behavior and its intentions; the other concerning how they perceive danger and security vis-à-vis the spread of nuclear weapons. The point is not to fall into labeling a given policy "mad" just because it is unpalatable, but to use the notion rigorously as a significant evaluation. It is possible that social policies are mad; it is possible that *this* policy is mad. The task is to evaluate the policy of nuclear escalation to determine whether it is indeed a rupture with reality of the sort we have been describing.

Second, we may ask whether it displays a madness of intention: trying obdurately to achieve what is demonstrably impossible, assaulting reality in doing so. Here our terrain would be the supposed quest for security involved in increasing and diversifying nuclear arsenals: "peace through strength." Does this in fact only increase the general *insecurity?* Is this not self-evident to all but those who insist on building more weapons? Again, the point is not whether the policy is mistaken, but rather whether it systematically flouts what is possible and falsely redefines reality in doing so. To destroy a village "in order to save it," as

was done during the Tet offensive in 1968 (and indeed describes much of American conduct during the war in Vietnam), is more than a violation of sense. It is a madness of intention, trying to do the impossible and then resorting to destruction.

We cannot yet talk about the nuclear planners actually destroying the world in order to achieve its security, because they have not done so *yet*. Still, we must not be mystified by the peculiar character of nuclear destruction: it is all prepared, waiting to happen, the missiles ready to be launched. If a mistake sets off the holocaust it will not only, or even primarily, be the fault of the mistaken machinery or persons, but of the entire process which lies waiting at this very moment. If the world's destruction depends on a computer error, we are justified in exploring whether the human process leading to this state of affairs was mad. In other words, *then* (and only then, alas, after the fact) will the intuition about the systematic rupture with reality be proven incontrovertibly true. The question now is, how do we regard the system that endangers us? How do we analyze this derangement of intention *now*, before the catastrophe? In short, the intention to achieve security by expanding nuclear arsenals can and must be evaluated *today*, before the holocaust.

Finally, I have left aside the question of estrangement of self as offering too many difficulties for societal analysis. Trying to assess the possible madness of nuclear war would force us to reconsider this. It may well be that the structure and governing logic of states are drastically different than the structure and governing logic of individuals, and that this makes it extremely difficult to diagnose a political rupture with normal human fellow-feeling. After all, states have quite "normally" engaged in wars, and virtually all have habituated their young men to fight and die and their people to support their killing. But adequately describing nuclear policy brings a new perspective to such questions.

Ultimately, the purpose of a society is to further the well-being of its people. I say "ultimately" understanding that most societies have been marked by class and other social struggles—because they have also been characterized by class and other social consensus. When the consensus has totally broken down—and the rulers decide to survive by permanently suppressing a major part of the population—the society is ripe for revolution. Most often a state apparatus has contradictory functions—it serves all of its people in some fashion even while guaranteeing the exploitation of some by others. The point is that even slaves must be fed and kept alive at a human level adequate to their functioning. The slave-owners who declare all-out war on their slaves are destroying *their own* conditions of survival. Mad? Our earlier reservations about the psychological origins of the concept no longer apply because we are dealing with a self-rupture which is far more basic. They would be made in a structural sense similar to the estrangement from self discussed earlier.

Similar, yet more profoundly so: actions which attack one's own survival itself are the most radical rupture with one's own reality.

Of course, to return to the individual level, suicide is not necessarily mad, even if it is the most extreme possible rupture with self. Great pain or suffering or a loss of all purpose can lead one to choose death over life, just as death in struggle may rationally be preferable to a life of subjection. The Warsaw Ghetto uprising, although suicidal, asserted for all time the dignity of the fighters and their refusal to die passively. It was a sane act. Their suicidal struggle was self-consciously seen as a *testimony:* it implied a world that would continue beyond this battle and even the Nazis, and it spoke to that world.

Are those who declare "better dead than Red" threatening the same courageous battle to the death? Not at all. First, nuclear policymakers are choosing not only their own death, but that of tens of millions of others. Certainly the Warsaw Ghetto fighters brought German retribution down upon the entire ghetto, but this happened in the process of the Nazi attack on the resistance. The primary targets of nuclear war are civilian population centers themselves, *because* they are population centers. Thus he who would save Americans from an alleged Communist victory would "save them" by having them killed. Moreover, the threat itself is an absurdity. The belief in the Communist or Soviet threat is one of those madnesses of perception which has operated, and continues to be revived, against all evidence, by those whose perception is systematically deranged. But above all, the nuclear planners are mad because nuclear war would destroy the world as we know it. Even assuming for a moment that their cause were real, the war they plan on its behalf would leave no one alive to struggle for a better social system than the one they would combat.

Are there no conditions under which it would make sense to risk destroying all human life for an end superior to life itself? Or is it mad to risk destroying all of life? We can find our direction in answering this by asking how we would respond if the Soviet Union were indeed Nazi Germany and threatened the rest of the world with nuclear weapons unless it surrendered. This is the deranged perception of some anti-Communists, notably the Committee on the Present Danger; let us suppose it were true. Even then, it would be mad to deprive tens of millions of people who had made no such decision, as well as virtually all of humankind, present and future, of the chance of struggling against and overthrowing such a monster. Yes, surrender under such conditions would not only be the best course, it would be the only *sane* course. Even the mass suicide at menaced Masada left Jewish communities intact *elsewhere:* otherwise no one would recall it today. It would then have had no meaning at all. Destroying the outside world as well as those locked in a struggle, however righteous, against an evil system would render their own struggle absurd. A continuing existence is a presuppo-

sition of every struggle, just as the continuing existence of an outside world is a presupposition of every individual suicide.

In short, omnicide—the destruction of everything—is mad in a way that individual or group suicide is not. It is mad without regard to its reason, mad because it attacks the basis of all life, all value, all meaning. To risk this—virtually unimaginable—total death is totally different than risking death amidst an abiding world. Today, "better dead than Red" points us toward the ultimate rupture with reality, the nuclear planners' flirtation with destroying the human adventure as such. Or rather, we must say that they have *already* decided to do so—under such and such determinate conditions.

I have willy-nilly begun characterizing nuclearism while still in the process of asking whether our categories could be useful in describing it. The reason lies in the nature of omnicide itself—it is unlike any evil humans have yet encountered in that it promises destruction without appeal, the world at an end. It alone threatens the premise of continuing human existence implied by other, more partial disasters, indeed, by suicide itself. Madness, in all forms, suggests a partial but significant and systematic rupture with reality. How, then, to characterize the preparation for total and ultimate rupture, the destruction of reality per se? We can understand the relevance of the category as we have done only by briefly exploring the situation itself.

The rigorous use of "madness" is deeply disturbing, of course, which is perhaps one reason why it has been so conspicuously avoided in a century so rife with madness. The functionalist bias of most systematic thought assumes that there is a reason for every societal act, a more or less rational intention behind political action. It offends the intellect to suggest that there is *no* reason behind a major policy—or that indeed its reason is profoundly and systematically irrational. "Madness" is even more unsettling in suggesting that we may be living admist a profound and destructive irrationality, one which lies beyond the traditionally understood irrationalities of history—those of mad individual leaders, for example, or of irrational class societies in a state of crisis. Moreover, our conventional political sense is deeply troubled by ascriptions of such madness: what political countermeasures will move the crazy leaders of mad societies? To describe a major social policy as "mad" and to suggest that it is rooted in fundamental societal dynamics is to rule out the hope of simple reforms improving the situation, of leaders seeing the light.

Above all, as if these implications were not disturbing enough, much of this essay, and the study where these reflections began, points to *our* society, today, in the United States and the West. If it can be seriously discussed whether the Vietnam War was mad, whether nuclear escalation is mad, then all of the above problems may apply to us, our social

structures, our daily life. Not that they do not or have not applied else-where—in the Soviet Union, for example, or in the genocidal transfor-mation of Kampuchea—but we who study and think and act here have responsibility for understanding the situation we would influence. Did most Germans between 1933 and 1945 see the sickness of their society, or were some of them too deeply immersed to even question it, others deluded by false hopes? What assumptions did they share with those who ruled them, and with the genocidal policies they themselves carried out? Can the same question be asked, today, by ourselves, of our-selves? Can we afford to wait until the blinding flash to acknowledge that the nuclear planners are mad?

Such are some of the challenges of pursuing, rather than abandoning, a term like "mad" to describe events such as the "Final Solution." Daunting to the intellect, certainly, and to the will as well. But too much is at stake to ignore the challenge.

NOTES

1. Ronald Aronson, *The Dialectics of Disaster* (London: Verso, 1983).

2. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (New York: Viking Press, 1965).

3. Richard Rubenstein, *The Cunning of History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).

4. Ibid., p. 2.

5. See Eberhard Jackel, *Hitler's Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1972).

6. See Jean-Paul Sartre's interview with Daniel Cohn-Bendit on the events of May 1968 in *The French Student Revolt,* trans. B. Brewster (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968).

7. See Plato, *The Republic,* trans. F. M. Cornford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941).

8. Robert Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Macmillan, 1969).

9. This is Stanley Milgram's error in the famous experiments described in *Obedience to Authority* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).

PART II

Understanding Occurrences of Genocide: Some Case Studies and Investigations of Related Social Processes

8

WAS THE HOLOCAUST UNIQUE?: A PECULIAR QUESTION?

Alan Rosenberg

The question of the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust has itself become a unique question. However, when we approach the Holocaust we are at once confronted with the following dilemma: if the Holocaust is the truly unique and unprecedented historical event that it is often held to be, then it must exceed the possibility of human comprehension, for it lies beyond the reach of our customary historical and sociological means of inquiry and understanding. But if it is not a historically unique event, if it is simply one more incident in the long history of man's inhumanity to man, there is no special point in trying to understand it, no unique lesson to be learned.[1] Of all the enigmas, paradoxes, and dilemmas facing Holocaust scholarship,[2] the "uniqueness question" is surely the most vexing and divisive, the one question most likely to evoke partisan debate and to generate emotional heat in discussion.[3]

In my own efforts at analysis of the issues underlying the "uniqueness question" I have been struck by the very oddity of the question itself, for it is strange that there should be argument about it at all. What strikes me as peculiar about it is the fact that the legitimacy of the question as such is so taken for granted, that it is so readily assumed that the uniqueness of the Holocaust is not merely a fit subject for analysis but is a problem of the very first rank in importance. The anomaly here is just that the "uniqueness question" itself is taken to be crucially relevant to an understanding of the Holocaust although it is relevant to few—if any—other landmark events of history. One finds little discussion, for example, of the "uniqueness" of the Protestant Reformation or the Industrial Revolution. The atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—surely qualified as "unique" and "unprecedented" in terms of

their implications for the future of mankind—is simply not the subject of debate concerning its "uniqueness" involving controversy and serious divisions of opinion. While scholars often draw comparisons and mark the contrasts of the American and French revolutions, little time is spent in analysis or discussion of the "uniqueness question" with respect to either. If the "uniqueness" of such events as these, events that have radically altered our world, is not in question, why is it that the "uniqueness question" has assumed such prominence in the context of Holocaust studies? Why is the question itself so hotly contested? Why do some authorities on the history of the Holocaust go so far as to claim that the stance that one takes with respect to the "uniqueness question" determines the way in which one relates the Holocaust to the rest of human history, influencing every dimension of one's interpretation and evaluation of the event itself?

According to Saul Friedländer, for example, before we can begin analyzing any number of the central issues surrounding the Holocaust we must first deal with "a preliminary issue of crucial importance for every aspect of the Holocaust: are we dealing with a phenomenon comparable with some other historical event or are we facing something unique not only within any traditional and historical context, but even within Nazism itself?"[4] George Kren and Leon Rappoport call the "uniqueness question" very important, for, "depending upon how it is answered, the general orientation of interpretive analysis will obviously vary a great deal."[5] And again, insistence upon its historical uniqueness may, according to Yehuda Bauer, render the Holocaust irrelevant except as a specifically Jewish tragedy. Here is the thrust of Bauer's argument:

If what happens to the Jews is unique, then by definition it doesn't concern us, beyond our pity and commiseration for the victims. If the Holocaust is not a universal problem, then why should a public school system in Philadelphia, New York or Timbuktu teach it? Well, the answer is that there is no uniqueness, not even of a unique event. Anything that happens once, can happen again: not quite in the same way, perhaps, but in an equivalent form.[6]

In what follows I shall be addressing the problems and issues that are raised by texts like these, texts cited here simply as evidence that—for Holocaust studies—the "uniqueness question" is at once paramount and problematic.

It is clear, moreover, that the "uniqueness question" has become a matter of concern to the Jewish and Christian lay community as well as to the professional scholars in the field. One need only think of the public debate over the issues of the inclusion of the Holocaust in the social studies curriculum of the New York City school system or the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council to see how sensitive the issue has become, especially within the Jewish community itself.[7] We may ask if this spe-

cial sensitivity is not itself an impediment to more widespread dialogue, thus hampering the very cause of understanding which Jews support. For, as Professor Ismar Schorsch states, the Jews' "obsession" concerning the uniqueness claim "impedes genuine dialogue, because it introduces an extraneous, contentious issue that alienates potential allies from among other victims of organized human depravity. Similarly, our fixation on uniqueness has prevented us from reaching out by universalizing the lessons of the Holocaust."[8]

Considerations such as these clearly imply that, if we are to widen and deepen our understanding of the Holocaust, we must deal with the claim of "uniqueness" by developing a strategy that will free us from the conceptual muddles that presently cloud the issue. We must be clear as to the *meaning* of the claim itself if we are to escape the mystification that frequently has surrounded it.[9] We appear to have three principal options: (1) We can dismiss the whole question of "uniqueness," as Schorsch suggests that we should, simply on the grounds that it adds nothing of value to our understanding of the Holocaust. (2) We can attempt to account for why it is that the "uniqueness" claim has become integral to the discussion of the meaning of the Holocaust while it has been treated as merely peripheral to the analysis of other historical events of major consequence. (3) We can concentrate our analysis upon how the "uniqueness question" helps as well as hinders us in our quest to elucidate the meaning and significance of the Holocaust.

Though I am sympathetic with those who confine their strategy to the first option, I shall reject it as unrealistic. For, while it is true—as Schorsch points out—that the claim to uniqueness sometimes does pose a difficulty for those who would gain a better understanding of the Holocaust by comparing it with other cases of mass human destruction, it does not seem to me that we can duck the "uniqueness question" by simply disregarding it. The "uniqueness question" is much too central to the Holocaust to be ignored. Since, as I shall go on to show, an adequate strategy for dealing with the "uniqueness question" will *include* —rather than *preclude*—grounds for developing comparative historical analysis and evaluation, the second option is of decisive import, for it is always helpful to understand what lies behind any particular perspective on an event, and especially so when the range of perspectives on the event is so much a part of the event itself and gives rise to so much controversy. Although I shall be exercising the third option, since it builds upon the second—depending as it does upon clarification of the meaning of the claim of "uniqueness" with respect to the Holocaust—so it will be necessary for me to say something about this issue, though a full account of the matter lies beyond the scope of this chapter. In the end I shall try to show why "unpacking" the "uniqueness question" is the strategy that is most fruitful in understanding the Holocaust itself. However, although I shall be adopting this third option, let me first

sketch some of the factors that have tended to make the "uniqueness question" itself a part of the problem in understanding the Holocaust. Before we can see how it can be treated as part of the "solution," so to speak, we must see why it has become "part of the problem."

It seems to be beyond question that the peculiar role that the "uniqueness question" has come to play in relation to the historical accounts and understanding of the Holocaust is largely due to the insistence of the Jewish community that the Holocaust *must* be viewed as unique.[10] It was a segment of the Jewish community, in fact, that devised and accepted the very label "Holocaust" in order to express the uniqueness of the event,[11] literally *defining* it as such by the name that they gave it.[12] The process by means of which a series of historical incidents becomes known as an "event" is well known, for it is only by gathering into meaningful clusters the apparently separate and unrelated facts of historical happenings that we are able to form coherent concepts of what has happened in the past. The naming of such a cluster is but one step in the process of self-understanding, and so it is easy to see why a segment of the Jewish community has come to view the naming of the Holocaust as an attempt to capture and preserve the uniqueness of meaning which is implicit in the facts so named. As those facts became known in the aftermath of World War II they immediately gave rise to a numbing horror in which the human mind seemed to be incapable of dealing with them, of grasping them in the normal fashion that we deal with the factual materials of history. The awful depth and scope of these "incidents," of these particular historical facts, were of such horrible dimensions as to seem completely incomprehensible. It is from this response that the claim to the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust is generated.[13] And it is in the context of this response that the search for those characteristics and traits that mark the Holocaust as unique must be understood. For it is precisely this search, and the various proposals which have issued from it, that is responsible for making the "uniqueness question" a part of the event which the "Holocaust" names: it has become part of the problem of the understanding and comprehension of what happened. The peculiar question of "uniqueness" may not have been an inevitable component of the problem, but it is clearly, at this point, an inescapable one.

Quite aside from the origins of the "uniqueness question" and its integration into the total problematic of the Holocaust, there are at least three other substantive problems concerning the characterization of the Holocaust as "unique." They can be readily stated, though not so readily solved. We must, first of all, be clear about what we mean when we claim an event to be unique. Secondly, we must be clear as to what element or elements of the event make it unique. And, lastly, we must at least try to be clear about the implications of the decision to classify the Holocaust as unique and try to understand how that decision may affect our interpretation of the event itself.

Existing Holocaust scholarship, surprisingly, is of little help in determining criteria for what constitutes "uniqueness" with respect to a historical event, whether it be the Holocaust or any other. And, should we consult ordinary language, we are helped even less. The *American College Dictionary* gives three possible definitions of "unique": (1) "of which there is but one"; (2) "having no like or equal"; and (3) "rare and unusual." In such terms, *every* event can be called unique, for *no* event of history is ever literally duplicated or "happens" twice, or is exactly "like" any other event, or its "equal." Moreover, it would seem to trivialize the importance of an event such as the Holocaust to call it simply "rare" or "unusual." In order to avoid such trivialization we must look at the actual use of the claim itself, we must analyze the intentions of those who have insisted upon the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust, and we must try to grasp the point of the claim. In this way, it seems to me, we can make sense of the question. For it is clear that what the claim of "uniqueness" is intended to do is to set apart from other historical events just that singular event that has the potential of transforming a culture, or altering the course of history, in some profound and decisive way. If the Industrial Revolution, for example, is said to be a "unique event" in the history of the West, it is because it is viewed in this transformational light; it changed our Western culture, altered its values, and so can be viewed as a cause of a major "turning point in history."[14] Such a way of defining the "uniqueness" claim corresponds closely to the definition offered by Emil Fackenheim, for his "epoch making event"[15] is just what is meant by terming an event as actually—or potentially— "transformational" of the *status quo ante,* as radically altering the course of history.[16] Given such a definition we can see how it is possible to claim that the Holocaust, as well as other events, such as the atomic bombing of Japan, can be classified as "unique."

And yet we must be cautious about such claims. I have used the words "see how it is possible to claim" since it must be emphasized that no historical event comes with its meaning already attached. As Walter Wurzburger has said:

Historic events possess only the kind of meaning which historians assign to them. Since there is no objective meaning inherent in any historic event that awaits discovery, meaning is not given but is created. The meaning of any particular event is not a function of its objective properties but hinges upon the choices of categories selected by a given subject for its interpretation. Hence, history teaches only the lessons that people choose to learn.[17]

For my own part, even Wurzburger's statement puts the matter too weakly and accounts for only a small portion of the process whereby meaning accrues to a historical event. For it is not merely the ascription of meaning by "historians" that counts, but the *construction of meaning*

by the culture that matters. It is by means of those processes that we have come to understand, after Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, as the "social construction of reality," that the past can become meaningful.[18] It is not the ascriptions of historians that make certain events rather than others "transformational" events or "turning points" in history. It is only through the actions of the individual members of a culture and the consequences of those actions—both intentional and unintentional—that any event becomes transformational of meanings and values. Only through those practices which Anthony Giddens has called acts of "structuration" can events of transformational *potential* become *actual* transformations of culture.[19] And yet, while these are undoubted features of the historical process of change and the acquisition of meaning, we find interpreters of the Holocaust seriously divided over the *preliminary* question of uniqueness—a question that must surely be resolved if the event itself is to be transformational.

In the first instance, there are those who view the whole issue of uniqueness as unimportant, for there is, as we have seen, a trivial sense in which *all* historical events are unique.[20] They see the Holocaust as unique only to the extent that every historical event is necessarily different from every other historical event; since "history never repeats itself"—contrary to what has sometimes been popularly believed—it follows that the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust is affirmed. But such an affirmation is clearly a "trivialization" of the "uniqueness question."

There is yet a second group that falls within the camp of the "trivialists." They are quite willing to see the Holocaust as an event of major importance, but they nevertheless agree that the claim of uniqueness cannot be sustained in any non-trivial form. They argue that too much has been made of what have been called the "exceptional" features of the Holocaust. Without denying the existence of these features, this group concentrates on showing that these features are just what might have been expected to follow from the events leading up to the Holocaust as such. In their view the Holocaust may simply be regarded as just one more incident—albeit a flagrant one—of man's inhumanity to man, one more horrible atrocity in a century filled with them. They cite such precedents as the destruction of the Armenians by the Turks[21] and pogroms in Poland and Russia, even reaching back to the genocidal near-extermination of the American Indians for parallel cases. Some of these critics grant that whatever uniqueness the Holocaust may possess can only be seen within the context of Jewish history.[22] But some Jewish intellectuals, Jacob Neusner[23] and Arnold Eisen[24] for example, go so far as to hold that even within the context of Jewish history the Holocaust cannot be viewed as unique. They contend that the Holocaust should be understood as one event in a succession of events, one link in a long chain of events aimed at the elimination of the Jews as a people commencing with the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C.E.

In sharp contrast, those that I have called "absolutists" are certain that no other event in history even remotely resembles the Holocaust or furnishes a precedent for understanding it. Its singularity is such that it exceeds the power of language to express; its meaning is such that it belongs to "another planet." It is incomprehensible, completely outside the normal dimensions of our terrestrial history, beyond all historical explanation and appraisal. It is, they say, not merely unique; it is, to use the Eckhardts' phrase, "uniquely unique."[25]

Menachem Rosensaft sums up this view succinctly: "Holocaust stands alone in time as an aberration within history."[26] And Elie Wiesel writes that "the universe of concentration camps, by its design, lies outside if not beyond history. Its vocabulary belongs to it alone."[27] In Bauer's striking characterization, the Holocaust is viewed by these writers as an "upside down miracle."[28] These absolutists see the Holocaust as unique simply because it happened, and concerning their view nothing needs to be added.

Those reluctant to accept either the trivialist or the absolutist position may be termed "relativists." Other turning points in history, other great crises, they suggest, contain elements comparable to and related to the Holocaust. Accordingly, they view it as *relatively* unique," for there will always be distinct features of the Holocaust that set it apart and which remain of more importance than its similarities and resemblances to other events. Approached from this angle the Holocaust is neither "extra-historical," in the sense claimed by the absolutists, nor yet just another atrocity, as the trivialists maintain. It is central to the relativist thesis that the Holocaust must be viewed *contextually*. This means that it is possible to view the Holocaust as unprecedented in many respects, that it is an event of critical and transformational importance in the history of our world, and yet it is still an event that must be addressed as a *part of that history*. It can and should be compared to other genocidal incidents, described and analyzed in language free from the "mystification" which only blocks our understanding, and made as accessible to explanation as possible. It should not be assumed, on *a priori* grounds of its absolute "uniqueness," that what *caused* the Holocaust is forever beyond the reach of the tools of historical analysis, or that the consequences cannot be explored by means of social theory. For, if we fail in our efforts at historical comprehension, and if our social theories are inadequate to the task of *explaining* such events, we are almost sure to experience similar catastrophes in the future. Indeed, if our conceptual tools and analytical methods are baffled by the Holocaust, we must devise new concepts and new methods.

It would be misleading to claim that all those scholars that I have categorized as relativists—possibly the term "contextualists" would be more appropriate—speak with a single voice concerning the "uniqueness question." Steven Katz[29] and Saul Friedländer,[30] for instance, take an

"intentionalist" approach. They hold the view that it is the "intention" of the Nazis with respect to the *total elimination of Jewry* that marks the Holocaust as unique among comparable pogroms and genocides. Others, such as Richard Rubenstein[31] and Henry Friedlander,[32] take a more "methodological" point of view. They see the uniqueness of the Holocaust more in terms of the distinctive bureaucratic and technological *methods* of destruction employed. These very sharply defined differences of focus on what accounts for the uniqueness of the Holocaust are responsible for serious divergences of interpretation of the event itself. For it is clear that both the intentionalists and the methodologists employ their respective views of the "uniqueness question" as interpretive frameworks for understanding the Holocaust itself. The preliminary question of uniqueness helps to determine, by the way in which it is solved, the conceptual apparatus for exploring the other problems of the Holocaust.

Some idea of how decisively this preliminary step figures in the eventual perspective upon the character of the event itself can be gained from comparing the following texts. In "Whose Holocaust?" Yehuda Bauer takes the intentionalist approach:

The uniqueness of the Holocaust does not . . . lie in numbers. It does not lie in the method of mass murder. . . . What makes it unique is the existence of two elements: planned total annihilation of a national or ethnic group, and the quasi-religious, apocalyptic ideology that motivated the murder.[33]

By contrast, here is Robert E. Willis representing the approach from the methodology standpoint:

For whatever similarities are present between Auschwitz and other cases—and there are many—the former is distinguished by being the first instance of a situation in which the full bureaucratic and technical apparatus of the state was mobilized for the primary purpose of extermination.[34]

With these very different approaches to the Holocaust locked into the different interpretive grids through which the event itself is to be viewed and interpreted, from the preliminary stage on, it is small wonder that the eventual interpretations that are reached should themselves be widely variant.

What concerns me here is not that we should accept any one approach to the "uniqueness question" as *true*—and the others as *false*—but that we should try to discover which of these approaches yields the most coherent and intelligible results, which framework elucidates the problems of understanding the Holocaust most clearly and is the most promising for understanding its historical and moral significance. It is not a simple matter to decide, and the fact that there are subtle differences within each of the two basic types of approach does not make the task any easier. Some methodologists, for example, make it clear that they fully recog-

nize the important role which the intentionalists ascribe to the "unique-
ness" of the Nazis' emphasis on "total extermination," while insisting
that the special bureaucratic and technological means employed in that
destruction are the more decisively unique feature of the event.[35] Both
forms of relativist interpretation have great appeal owing to their com-
mon stress upon understanding the Holocaust in contextual terms, and
the great illumination that results from such analysis of the "uniqueness
question" leads to a preference for both over either the trivialist or abso-
lutist stands. And yet between them, I lean most to the methodologist
explanation as providing the framework that most clearly helps in com-
prehending both the uniqueness of the event and the event itself. For it
is the emphasis upon *method* in the apparent "madness" of the event that
helps us most to grasp the significance of the event for our own lives and
for the world we live in. After all, we *do* live in a depersonalized bu-
reaucratic world, a world in which almost every facet of public and
private life is subject to the mindless influence of bureaucratic methods.

But it is not merely that the methodologists appear to shed more light
upon the relevance of the Holocaust to our own situation that leads to my
rejection of the intentionalist approach. For there are internal problems
with the intentionalist position itself, problems of internal coherence, as
well as problems with the facts and assumptions upon which it is predi-
cated. In order to show the dimensions of some of these difficulties, I
have chosen to analyze them in the context of Yehuda Bauer's position,
for he is clearly the strongest exponent of the intentionalist view and the
most popular of its recent defenders. It is not my purpose to refute
Bauer—for both "proof" and "refutation" are hardly apposite when we
are dealing with frames of reference such as these—but I do intend to
show how Bauer's insistence that it is the intention of the Nazi state—the
policy of *total* annihilation of the Jews—that determines the uniqueness
of the Holocaust can be more of a hindrance than a help in dealing with
the meaning of the Holocaust.

Bauer's argument is most forcefully presented in his important book,
The Holocaust in Historical Perspective, in which he devotes his second
chapter to an analysis of the various implications of the "uniqueness
question." Titled "Against Mystification: The Holocaust Phenomenon,"
this chapter puts the central dilemma of uniqueness this way:

If what happened to the Jews was unique, then it took place outside of his-
tory, it becomes a mysterious event, an upside down miracle, so to speak, an
event of religious significance in the sense that it is not man-made as that term
is normally understood. On the other hand, if it is not unique at all, then what
are the parallels and precedents?[36]

Bauer wants to escape the dilemma by developing a conception of the
Holocaust that will account for its uniqueness by placing it *within* the

context of history. He argues that the historical uniqueness of the Holocaust does not consist in the fact that it involves the practice of genocide, for he acknowledges that there are precedents and parallels where genocidal practices have been politically instituted. He does, however, find that there is something unique and unprecedented in certain special features of the genocidal policies and practices of the Holocaust. These features, he claims, show that what happened to the Jews is different from what befell other victims of mass murder, both within the Nazi "universe of death" and outside it. For it is clear that Bauer wants to give full weight to the fact that mass murder as practiced by the Nazis—as well as by others—has not been confined to attempts specifically aimed at the elimination of the Jews as a people. But he also wants to claim that there is something quite different about the Nazi policy with respect to the Jews. Bauer argues that *only* the Jews were the victims of a deliberate policy of total extinction.

He acknowledges that some two and a half million Soviet prisoners of war were killed by Nazi practices and policy, by ill-treatment in the prison camps, malnutrition, and starvation. He points out that "tens of thousands of Poles were brutally murdered as resistants, real or imagined."[37] But he goes on to argue that the policies which sponsored these atrocities, while "genocidal" in character, were not aimed at the *total* extinction of either the Poles or the Soviets. Bauer cites Raphael Lemkin, coiner of the term "genocide," in order to support his contention that "clearly, what was happening to quite a number of people in Nazi Europe was genocide."[38] But he goes on to distinguish such general Nazi practices from the *intentions* embodied in the Holocaust:

The difference between that and the Holocaust lies in the difference between forcible, even murderous, denationalization, and wholesale total murder of every one of the members of a community. Contrary to legend there never was a Nazi policy to apply measures used against the Jews to other national communities.[39]

In short, Bauer's contention is that the only group that the Nazis intended to *totally* annihilate was the Jews. Accordingly, he concludes, the term "Holocaust" should only be used with reference to the extermination of the Jews so that its uniqueness does not become blurred and the Holocaust confused with other mass murders committed by the Nazis, murders to which the term "genocide" also applies.

It is this last contention that weakens Bauer's argument by introducing into it an element of conceptual confusion and incoherence. When Raphael Lemkin first introduced the term "genocide" he intended that it should be used to denote only those instances of mass murder directed at the total extermination of a people, and not merely intended to bring about their "denationalization." Lemkin states:

Denationalization was the word used in the past to describe the destruction of a national pattern. The author believes, however, that this word is inadequate because: (1) it does not connote the destruction of the biological structure; (2) in connoting the destruction of one national pattern, it does not connote the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor; and (3) denationalization is used by some authors to mean only deprivation of citizenship.[40]

Bauer does not appear to recognize that Lemkin himself was fully satisfied that the Nazi policy of genocidal destruction *was* aimed at total annihilation, whether directed at the Jews or at the Czechs or the Poles. Lemkin specifically stated that "genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of a national group."[41] Genocide is instituted, Lemkin argued, as "a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves."[42]

The incoherence of Bauer's use of the term "genocide" as applicable to the policies aimed at less than total annihilation is made even more perplexing when it is recalled that, in an earlier work, he employed the term—as Lemkin did—to denote the intended total destruction of a people. There he stated: "The Holocaust was a crime of genocide—that is, an attempt to exterminate all members of a particular national or racial group simply because they were members of that group."[43] It is clear that in this statement the "Holocaust" and "genocide" are not seen as denoting two different types of event. One can, of course, argue, as Bauer does, that the Holocaust was a unique event, distinguishable from other events of Nazi mass murder. One might even be able to argue that the Nazi *intention* was different in kind, with respect to the Jews, from what it was with respect to other national groups. But one cannot, as Bauer has done, cite Lemkin as sponsoring authority for such arguments. For it is undeniable that Lemkin views what happened to the Gentile populations that fell victim to Nazi genocide as more, rather than less, like what happened to the Jews. Lemkin sees the Nazi intent in all such cases as the same, i.e., total destruction.

On the factual side, Bauer's argument is similarly weak. He argues, for example, that the Nazis' intention with respect to the Gypsies and other groups was very different from that toward the Jews. Although debate over this matter cannot be entered into here, there is substantial evidence to indicate that the Nazis did indeed intend the total elimination of the Gypsy population. As Bauer himself had earlier acknowledged: "History records other actions which qualify as genocide by the strictest definition. Hitler himself sought to annihilate the Gypsies as well as the Jews."[44]

Assuming that my criticism has cast doubt upon the adequacy of

Bauer's thesis as to the "uniqueness question" and shows that there are
serious difficulties to be overcome in the intentionalist position, we now
have to ask about the alternative methodological view. Is it, perhaps, a
more adequate perspective in terms of which to approach the "unique-
ness question," and from which to proceed to the substantive interpre-
tation and understanding of the Holocaust itself? Can it be said, for
example, that the Holocaust is a *unique form of genocide*—using that
term, indeed, as Lemkin originally defined and used it? As we have
seen, Lemkin treated genocide as the intentional attempt to destroy a
group in its ethnic and biological totality. With that definition in mind
are there discernable features of the Holocaust that distinguish it from
other such genocidal events?

I believe that these questions can be answered affirmatively.
Although I cannot deal with the evidence here in detail,[45] I can suggest at
least *four kinds of evidence* that can be offered as showing how and why
the Holocaust should be understood as a unique genocidal event, gen-
uinely unprecedented in the annals of our world and its history. First,
there is evidence of uniqueness in the simple fact of the size and scope of
the destruction, in the enormity of the numbers alone, which are of an
entirely new order of magnitude when compared with other genocides.
Second, there is the far more complex fact of the means employed in the
Holocaust, for no other genocidal event has so deeply involved the entire
structure of the legal and administrative machinery of a government in its
implementation. There are simply no similar instances of a legally con-
stituted government adopting anything like the extensive bureaucratic and
technological apparatus that was created to carry out the genocidal inten-
tion of the Holocaust. Third, the Holocaust is unique in the varied
physical and psychological qualities used to reduce the intended victims
to their barest physical qualities as "objects" in order that they might be
more efficiently processed in the mechanical production line of the death
camps. And, finally, the Holocaust is unique in the vast and determined
attempt by the Nazis to transform the victims into the image that the
Nazis had of them. The scope of this massive effort at creating an
"image" of the intended victims of genocide is such that it vastly exceeds
similar efforts; its scale is literally unprecedented.

It will be evident, then, that I am among those who believe that it is
the various processes, techniques, and methods of destruction charac-
teristic of the Holocaust that justify the ascription of "uniqueness" to it.
And it is because of these same features of the Holocaust, features that
help us to understand not merely why the Holocaust is unique but also
features that help us to understand how it was possible that such an event
could occur in our history and in the context of our age, that I reject the
absolutist view. That view, I believe, tends to render the Holocaust
incomprehensible by putting the event outside of our history, by treating
it as outside the context of our age, our language, and our capacity for

analysis and understanding.[46] This rejection of the Holocaust as something that *could* occur in our time, and which could clearly occur again for much the same political and sociological reasons, seems to me simply unacceptable. It virtually amounts to the denial that it *did* occur, a denial that seems to me almost an invitation for it to happen again. For if we are to avoid such an event in the future we must surely attempt to grasp its meaning in political and sociological terms. If the Holocaust seems somehow to be beyond the grasp of our usual categories of political and sociological analysis, to be beyond the reach of our normal concepts of historical interpretation and explanation, the lesson is *not* that we should give up the attempt at analysis and explanation. The lesson is that we must develop *more adequate categories and concepts*.

Finally, it is for this last reason that I reject all forms of trivialism with respect to the "uniqueness question." By drawing attention away from just those novel features of the Holocaust process that *are* unprecedented, by trivializing them, the trivialists divert our attention from the very features of the Holocaust that we ought to be trying to understand and explain, features that we must be able to cope with if we are to avoid such events in the future. By taking the view that the Holocaust is just one more atrocity, we are unlikely to see its deep and unique significance as an event with potential transformational consequences for our culture and our age. We are unlikely to see the possible implications of the Nazi abuse of science and technology, the application of bureaucratic techniques, principles of managerial efficiency and "cost-benefit" analysis, and all such unique features of the Holocaust process for our own situation, our own lives. For there *are* analogies to be drawn between our own situation and that of the victims of the Holocaust, analogies that depend upon understanding as clearly as possible how such things as science and technology, bureaucracy and managerial "efficiency" were employed in the destruction of the Jews and how they might well be employed for our own destruction somewhere down the road. Moreover, as I have emphasized, we cannot accept the simple situation of the Jews and the special "intention" of the Nazis with respect to their total extinction. Not only does this emphasis on the particularity of the Jewish situation tend to obscure relevant analogies with the predicaments of other groups—possibly even with our own situation as hostages to the threat of nuclear war—but it also obscures the more universal implications for the future of *all* mankind that the Holocaust raises. For, as even Bauer himself once asked, if the Holocaust has no universal lesson for all men, why should anyone study it?[47] In the end it is those who emphasize the uniqueness of the methods, processes, and techniques of the Holocaust that best enable us to draw the analogies and explicate the event itself. In the end it is possible that by understanding those methods, techniques, and processes by means of which an oppressed population can be destroyed we can avoid such destruction in the future.

If we can succeed in this purpose, the Holocaust will truly have been a transformational event.

NOTES

1. For different formulations of this problem, see Emil Fackenheim, *To Mend the World: Foundations of Future Jewish Thought* (New York: Schocken Books, 1982), p. 20; Henry L. Feingold, "How Unique Is the Holocaust?," in *Critical Issues of the Holocaust*, ed. Alex Grobman and Daniel Landes (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center and Rossel Books, 1983), p. 397; and Robert McAfee Brown, "The Holocaust as a Problem in Moral Choice," in *When God and Man Failed: Non-Jewish Views of the Holocaust,* ed. Harry James Cargas (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), p. 99.

2. For a more detailed analysis of the enigmas and paradoxes facing Holocaust scholarship, see Alan Rosenberg, "The Problematic Character of Understanding the Holocaust," *European Judaism* (forthcoming); and Alan Rosenberg, "The Crisis in Knowing and Understanding the Holocaust," in *The Holocaust: Its Philosophical Impact,* ed. Alan Rosenberg and Gerald Myers (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, forthcoming).

3. See Pierre Papazian, "A 'Unique Uniqueness'?," and the symposium it generated, "Was the Holocaust Unique?: Responses to Pierre Papazian," *Midstream* 30, no. 4 (April 1984), pp. 14-25.

4. Saul Friedländer, "On the Possibility of the Holocaust: An Approach to a Historical Synthesis," in *The Holocaust as Historical Experience,* ed. Yehuda Bauer and Nathan Rotenstreich (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981), p. 1.

5. George Kren and Leon Rappoport, "Failure of Thought in Holocaust Interpretation," in *Towards the Holocaust: The Social and Economic Collapse of the Weimar Republic,* ed. Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 380.

6. Yehuda Bauer, "Right and Wrong Teaching of the Holocaust," in *The International Conference on Lessons of the Holocaust,* ed. Josephine Z. Knopp (Philadelphia: National Institute on the Holocaust, 1979), p. 5.

7. See Ismar Schorsch, "The Holocaust and Jewish Survival," *Midstream* 17, no. 1 (January 1981), p. 39; and Paula E. Hyman, "New Debates on the Holocaust," *The New York Times Magazine* (September 14, 1980), pp. 80-82.

8. Schorsch, "The Holocaust and Jewish Survival," p. 39.

9. For the significances of the issue, see Henry Friedlander, "Toward a Methodology of Teaching about the Holocaust," *Teacher's College Record* 80, no. 3 (February 1979), pp. 524-25; and Rosenberg, "The Crisis in Knowing and Understanding the Holocaust."

10. Schorsch, "The Holocaust and Jewish Survival," p. 39.

11. Lucy S. Dawidowicz states, "The Holocaust is the term that Jews themselves have chosen to describe their fate during World War II." *The War Against the Jews: 1933-1945* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975), p. xv.

12. For a brilliant historical analysis of how the term "Holocaust" became the name for what happened to the Jews under Hitler, see Gerd Korman, "The Holocaust in American Historical Writing," *Societas* 2, no. 3 (Summer 1972), pp. 259-62.

13. Rosenberg, "The Problematic Character of Understanding the Holocaust."

14. On the question of transformational events, see George M. Kren and Leon Rappoport, *The Holocaust and the Crisis of Human Behavior* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980), pp. 12-15; and Alan Rosenberg and Alexander Bardosh's critique of the same in *Modern Judaism* 1, no. 3 (December 1981), pp. 337-46.

15. Emil Fackenheim, *The Jewish Return into History* (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), p. 279.

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27. Elie Wiesel, "Now We Know," in *Genocide in Paraguay,* ed. Richard Arens (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976), p. 165.

28. Yehuda Bauer, *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), p. 31.

29. Steven T. Katz, "The 'Unique' Intentionality of the Holocaust," *Modern Judaism* 1, no. 2 (September 1981), pp. 161-83.

30. Saul Friedländer, "On the Possibility of the Holocaust," pp. 1-6.

31. Richard Rubenstein, *The Cunning of History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp. 6-7, 22-35.

32. Henry Friedlander, "Toward a Methodology of Teaching About the Holocaust," pp. 530-31.

33. Yehuda Bauer, "Whose Holocaust?," *Midstream* 26, no. 9 (November 1980), p. 45.

34. Robert E. Willis, "Confessing God after Auschwitz: A Challenge for Christianity," *Cross Currents* 28, no. 3 (Fall 1978), p. 272.

35. See Leo Kuper, *Genocide* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 120-22, 135.

36. Bauer, *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective,* p. 31. For a more complete assessment of Bauer's book, see Mark Rosenblum and Alan Rosenberg, "Holocaust Scholarship: Breaking New Ground," *Cross Currents* 29, no. 3 (Fall 1979), pp. 344-49.

37. Bauer, *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective,* p. 33.

38. Ibid., p. 35.

39. Ibid.

40. Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), pp. 79-80.

41. Ibid., p. 79.

42. Ibid. In a paper published some two years after *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective,* Bauer attempted to respond to this criticism. He argued that Lemkin's "definition" of genocide "contains a contradiction," for if it is total annihilation that is intended it makes "no sense" for Lemkin to talk about such methods as "interfering with the activities of the Church," or the "debasement" of morality through dissemination of pornography and the encouragement of alcoholic consumption. The fact of the matter is that Lemkin mentions such factors as these as constituent elements of planned total destruction because he recognized that such planning "does not necessarily mean the *immediate* destruction of a nation." (Emphasis added.) By failing to acknowledge Lemkin's carefully drawn distinctions in the body of his text, and by limiting himself merely to the outline of Lemkin's thesis in the preface to the book, Bauer once again distorts Lemkin's position. (See Bauer, "Whose Holocaust?," p. 43-44, and Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,*

pp. 79-82.) It is clear that the elements that "make no sense" to Bauer in Lemkin's description of genocidal techniques are all part of the "coordinate plan" to weaken "the essential foundations" of various groups with the *long-run* "aim of annihilating the groups themselves."

43. Yehuda Bauer, *They Chose Life: Jewish Resistance in the Holocaust* (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1973), p. 11.

44. Ibid., pp. 11-12. See also Donald Kenrick and Grattan Puxon, *The Destiny of European Gypsies* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972), pp. 76-100, and Leon Poliakov, *Harvest of Hate: The Nazi Program for the Destruction of the Jews of Europe* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1979), pp. 263-80. Bauer also claims in *The Holocaust and Historical Perspective* "that the Holocaust is unique in intent when compared with the Armenian Massacres" (pp. 36-37). For a refutation of this position, see Papazian, "A 'Unique Uniqueness'?," pp. 14-18; and for Bauer's response, see "Was the Holocaust Unique?: Responses to Pierre Papazian," pp. 19-20.

45. For more extensive analysis, see Alan Rosenberg, "The Genocidal Universe," *European Judaism* 13, no. 1 (Autumn 1979), pp. 29-34, reprinted in *Genocide and Human Rights,* ed. Jack Nusan Porter (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), pp. 46-58.

46. For an excellent analysis of the problem of incomprehensibility, see Dan Magurshak, "The Incomprehensibility of the Holocaust: Tightening Up Some Loose Usage," *Judaism* 29, no. 2 (Spring 1980), pp. 233-42, and Papazian, "A 'Unique Uniqueness'?," p. 18.

47. See note 6.

9

THE HOLOCAUST AND
HISTORICAL EXPLANATION

Robert G.L. Waite

I

Those who reflect on the nature of the Holocaust will confront the question of its uniqueness. Was the Holocaust the culmination of over 2,000 years of active anti-Semitism and persecution, or was it unique, forming a radical break from the past?

Both sides of this ancient historical debate, continuity versus change, are important. Certainly there is much continuity with the past. Indeed, the Holocaust was made possible, in large part, because German history had shown a continuum of virulent anti-Semitism. It is of course true that anti-Semitism existed in every country of the Western and Slavic worlds. But in no country in the world did so many influential leaders over so long a time champion so vicious a hatred of the Jewish people.

Martin Luther, for example, preached hatred and persecution of the Jews 400 years before Hitler. As early as 1543 Luther demanded that Jewish synagogues and schools be set afire, that their silver and gold be taken from them, their houses and prayer books seized and destroyed, that brimstone and pitch should be thrown upon them, and that they be driven away "like mad dogs"[1]—a program which Adolf Hitler would put into practice on a national scale beginning with the infamous *Reichskristallnacht* of November 9-10, 1938, a date which, by a quirk of chronology, fell on Luther's birthday.

For centuries Catholic bishops and priests joined Lutheran pastors in thundering against an imaginary "Jewish menace." Indeed, the anti-Semitic record of both Christian confessions is one of the most appalling chapters in the entire history of religion. Published statements made by

saints of the Catholic Church were later used as texts for scurrilous anti-Semitic broadsides. Saint Gregory of Nyssa (d. 396) described Jews as "slayers of the Lord, murderers of the prophets, haters of God, advocates of the devil, a brood of vipers." St. Ambrose, Augustine's teacher, said that Jewish synagogues should be burned to the ground and boasted that he personally had set fire to one. St. John Chrysostom (d. 406) called Jews "lustful, rapacious, greedy, perfidious bandits." He preached that "it is the duty of Christians to hate the Jews" and concluded that the Jews are "fit for slaughter."[2] Saint Thomas Aquinas, the most influential theologian in the history of the Catholic Church, argued that it was morally justifiable for Jews to serve Christians as slaves because, as the slayers of God, they were bound to "perpetual servitude."[3]

The Church practiced what its Fathers preached. Official Church councils set forth decrees which clearly foreshadowed Hitler's infamous Racial Laws. The Synod of Elvira of 306, for example, forbad inter-marriage and sexual relations between Christians and Jews. The Synod of Claremont (535) decreed that Jews could not hold public office. The Third Synod of Orleans of 538 made it illegal for Jews to walk in public streets during Passion Week. The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 decreed that Jews must mark their clothing with a special badge. The Council of Oxford (1222) forbad the construction of new synagogues. The Council of Basel of 1434 prohibited Jews from obtaining academic degrees.[4]

One day in April 1933 when Catholic bishops protested to Hitler that his government was mistreating Jews, Hitler replied that he was "only putting into effect what Christianity had preached and practiced for 2000 years."[5] He had a point.

The historian Uriel Tal is therefore probably justified in concluding that the Christian church bears heavy responsibility for the virulent anti-Semitism of the Third Reich.[6] German Christians agree. In January 1980, the Synod of the German Evangelical Church of the Rhineland, the most populous of the twenty-seven regional units of the EKD, passed overwhelmingly the official declaration, *Zur Erneurung des Verhältnisses von Christen und Juden* (For the Renewal of Relations between Christians and Jews). The first sentence of this historic declaration reads: "Stricken, we confess the co-responsibility and guilt of German Christendom for the Holocaust."[7]

Religious anti-Semitism, it bears repeating, had shown great continuity in Germany. But it was only in the Second Reich—Imperial Germany after 1871—that religious persecution gave way to a *racial* anti-Semitism which explicitly anticipated the Third Reich.

When Adolf Hitler was still a babe in his doting mother's arms, Germany's most influential thinkers were inciting racial anti-Semitism with slogans which Hitler would later take over as his own. In the 1890s, for example, the prodigious scholar Paul de Lagarde (whom

Thomas Mann hailed as "one of the giants of our people")[8] coined portentous metaphors: "Jews are decayed parasites . . . usurious vermin" and warned that "with bacilli one does not negotiate: one exterminates them as quickly as possible."[9] The long list of racial anti-Semites includes Germany's most popular historian, Heinrich von Treitschke, a best-selling novelist, Gustav Freytag, and probably the most influential Jew-baiter of them all, Richard Wagner.[10]

Hitler exploited this legacy of hatred. But while showing continuity with the past, Nazi anti-Semitism was different from its predecessors. Here was not merely prejudice, persecution, and invective. Here, for the first time, was a calculated program of mass murder set forth by the legal government of Germany—a government unique in all history.

This was no mere "authoritarian state" of which we have so many and varied examples in world history. This was a government conceived in oppression and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created unequal. This was social and moral cannibalism. This was the very "negation of God erected into a system of government."

This government promised that Jews would be traduced, persecuted, vilified, destroyed. Such was the promise and such was the practice. The horror of Hitler was this: he was no hypocrite; he meant what he said; he practiced what he preached; he kept his promises. Indeed, as Elie Wiesel has noted with bitter irony, "Hitler is the only one who kept his promises to the Jewish people."[11]

Hitler's policy of genocide was not designed to remove subversives who were a threat to the German state. Quite to the contrary, German Jews through the centuries had proven their devotion to the Fatherland by supporting its government and fighting gallantly in its wars. Their loyalty was shown even after Hitler came to power in 1933. One example: the *Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldaten* (National Association of Jewish War Veterans) hailed the advent of Hitler in 1933 and publicly promised support of his government.[12] (They soon changed their minds.)

Nor were the Nazi executions designed to punish criminals and malefactors. The Jews were killed not because they had *done* anything but merely because they existed—because they had been born. Jews were criminals *by definition*. In occupied Russia, for example, the Nazi conquerors decreed death for the following crimes: (1) sabotage, theft, espionage, and (2) also for "*Judenverdacht*"—those suspected of *being Jewish*.[13]

The Nazi Holocaust was also different in the extent of the cooperation it received from the German social infrastructure. The Holocaust enjoyed the support or the benevolent neutrality of Christian churches, the civil service, the judiciary, educators, and thousands of the railroad officials who handled the complex logistics of transporting millions of people to their death. Army generals—the evidence is now incontro-

vertible—also knew of the mass murders and gave their approval.[14]
Thus this genocide succeeded because its perpetrators could count on the
cooperation or acquiescence of German state officials, of religious, civic,
and military leaders, and of the German public at large. Recent studies
have shown that the German people really did know about the genocide
and reacted with "a mixture of private sympathy and public passivity."[15]
A German historian of public attitudes toward Jews during the Third
Reich has concluded that there was "scarcely another country whose
population accepted the carrying away of its Jewish fellow citizens with
so little opposition."[16]

There is another reason why the Holocaust could take place: the vic-
tims cooperated with their executioners; they collaborated in their own
destruction. I find this to be one of the most disturbing and least under-
stood problems of the Holocaust. But here we must sound a clear note
of warning about the use of the words "cooperative" and "collaboration."
If they suggest a voluntary desire to be helpful, the words are badly
misused. As Lucy Dawidowicz has emphasized in her valuable studies,
there was no voluntary Jewish cooperation; there were no Jewish col-
laborators in the sense of the word made infamous by Quisling and
Laval. Not one Jew wanted to cooperate with the Nazis. No Jew
wanted Hitler's "New Order" in Europe.[17] The *Judenräte* (the Jewish
Councils approved by the Nazis and elected by the Jews themselves)
cooperated with the SS by selecting Jews for transport to their deaths,
but they did so only under the most extreme duress. When the Nazis
threatened more drastic enlargement of the death quotas they were
obliged to fill, the councils had little choice but to obey. Constantly they
confronted soul-destroying decisions: choose for extinction either the
young or the old. The *Judenräte* —it must be repeated—had virtually no
choice. They tried desperately to do the very best they could under im-
possible circumstances. They were *coerced* into compliance. That much
needs to be said and remembered. And yet the hard conclusion reached
by eminent Jewish authorities on the Holocaust must be squarely faced
and carefully pondered: however compelling the reasons, however ex-
treme the duress, the fact is that Jews actually did become tragic
accomplices in their own extinction. Raul Hilberg, Hannah Arendt, and
Isaiah Trunk have demonstrated beyond dispute that leaders of the
Jewish communities in Berlin, as in Amsterdam, Antwerp, and Warsaw,
cooperated with the Nazis and smoothed the way to deportation and
death. It is true that there were notable exceptions among the Jewish
Councils, but the predominant pattern is clear. Most of the *Judenräte*
implemented SS directives, published benign Nazi cover stories, denied
warnings given by the Jewish underground, selected those who were to
die, arranged their transportation, and collected money to pay their trans-
portation to the death camps—thereby helping the Nazis achieve their
goal of making the Final Solution "self-financing." The Councils gen-

erally opposed sabotage and active resistance and ordered compliance with Nazi directives.[18] Most Jews followed the orders of their leaders, and many displayed what Hilberg has called "anticipatory compliance": in pathetically futile efforts to pacify the Nazis, they sedulously collected and turned in their jewels and gold and arrived well ahead of time at the designated staging areas, having paid their railway fare in advance. "They attempted to tame the Germans," Hilberg writes, "as one would attempt to tame a wild beast. They avoided 'provocation' and complied instantly with decrees and orders."[19]

The Nazis were surprised and pleased by the passivity and cooperation they received from their victims. It made their job much easier. Adolf Eichmann, the SS official chiefly in charge of the mass murders, testified during his trial in Jerusalem that the Jewish Councils were so effective in implementing SS orders that German personnel could be released for other service.[20] Hannah Arendt concludes bitterly that without Jewish help, the murder of millions of Jews would not have been possible: "To a Jew, this role of the Jewish leaders in the destruction of their own people is . . . the darkest chapter of the whole dark story."[21]

An even darker role was played by the Jewish Police of the ghettos, an agency which the Nazis created with Satanic cunning to implement their orders and to shatter and demoralize the Jewish community by setting it against itself. After the war, Jewish "Courts of Honor" established that the Jewish Police actively participated in the destruction of their fellow Jews. They ferreted them out of their hiding places, arrested them in the middle of the night, beat them up in the streets, and filled their own pockets with bribes from their victims. A Jew who was to pay with his life for their vicious treachery angrily recorded in his diary: "Every Warsaw Jew, every woman and child, can cite thousands of cases of the inhuman cruelty and violence of the Jewish Police. Those cases will never be forgotten by the survivors, and they must and shall be paid for."[22]

Later we must consider some of the explanations which Jewish writers have given for the extent of Jewish cooperation with their executioners. But first something else must be said. For it is true, as Reuben Ainsztein has shown in his massive book on Jewish resistance to the Nazis, that many, many heroic Jews fought back at hopeless odds. Their gallant resistance was most tragically demonstrated in the uprisings against their oppressors in the Warsaw ghetto during the spring of 1943 —was it not the *only* urban uprising against the Nazis in Europe?—and in the death camp of Sobibor in October 1943.[23]

And yet it must be recorded that the overwhelming majority of the Jews of Europe, by the hundreds and hundreds of thousands, did indeed go, as furious Jewish activists charged at the time, "like sheep to the slaughter." Shortly before he and his family were killed, one of the

heroes of the Warsaw ghetto noted "the passivity of the Jewish masses" and asked some anguished questions: "Why are they all so quiet? Why does the father die, and the mother, and each of the children without a single protest? . . . Why did everything come so easy to the enemy? . . . This will be an eternal mystery—this passivity of the Jewish populace even toward their own police."[24]

These questions of Emmanuel Ringelblum and the mystery he could not solve will continue to haunt historians of the Holocaust.

The Holocaust differed from other genocides in other ways as well. For the first time in history, a cultivated and articulate people, confronted by unimaginable suffering and death, left records of immense value to survivors who seek to understand what happened. Philip Friedman has called the details of these harrowing experiences "test tubes . . . in a vast psycho-sociological laboratory such as had never been set up before."[25] These records do indeed provide insight into the ways in which the human psyche reacts to stress. They also cast new light into the human soul, probing not only the depth of wickedness and evil, but also—in the memoirs of Anna Frank, Emmanuel Ringelblum, Viktor Frankl, Chaim Kaplan,[26] and thousands of others—the light that human courage, faith, and goodness can shed in the darkest pits of hell.

In short, these precious records display the human capacity both for evil and for good. There is a *political* as well as a moral and a psychological lesson here, for the duality of human wickedness and human goodness proclaims the dangers of dictatorship and the saving promise of democracy. The political lesson of this human duality was best stated in Reinhold Niebuhr's memorable aphorism:

> Man's capacity for good makes democracy possible;
> Man's inclination to evil makes democracy essential.

The Nazi genocide was also unique in its senselessness. Yehuda Bauer has well asked, where else in history has a government of a civilized nation set out to kill *everyone* whose grandfather was of a particular religion or ethnic group? "For the first time in history a sentence of death had been pronounced on anyone guilty of having been born."[27] And where have mass murders been so injurious to the perpetrator's own self-interest? In 1943, 1944, 1945, beleaguered Germany desperately needed railway transport and skilled labor supply. Yet Hitler allocated billions of work hours and massive amounts of transportation to one purpose: the killing of a nonexistent "menace." For the Jews were not then and had never been a threat to the German Reich. The whole thing was quite literally senseless.

But was this genocide really *unique?* Was there no historical precedent or parallel? Historians will recall other mass murders, other

slaughters of the innocent. One thinks of Herod and Genghis Khan, or of Stalin's murder of some 15 million kulaks, minority groups, and Russian prisoners of war.[28] We recall the massacres perpetrated by Idi Amin Dada of Uganda[29] and the calculated starvation in Cambodia, where over 50 percent of the entire population was killed between 1975 and 1980.[30]

Two parallels to the Holocaust of the Jews seem particularly close. In 1915 Turkish authorities ordered the annihilation of the entire Armenian people. The proportion of Armenians killed was about the same as that destroyed in Hitler's Holocaust of the Jews: two out of every three people died.[31] The Nazi genocide of the Gypsies also shows close parallels to the murder of the Jews. Gypsies too were killed for no other reason than the alleged threat of "racial pollution" of German blood. As with the Jews (and unlike the Poles) *all* Gypsies were to be executed. They too (unlike other Nazi victims) were gassed at Auschwitz.[32]

So what can be concluded on this issue of continuity versus change? Many eminent Jewish authorities insist that this Holocaust was *unique*— it alone deserves a capital letter. Alvin Rosenfeld has called it an event without analogy, "something new in the world, without likeness or kind."[33] Yehuda Bauer has said that any comparison with other genocides is misleading and inaccurate.[34]

An American sociologist, John Murray Cuddihy, has noticed something revealing about the very intensity of Jewish insistence that it is only *their* genocide which is worthy of the name "Holocaust." He finds that this affirmation of uniqueness and denial of universality is a modern reworking of the ancient "Chosen People" concept: "Chosenness is found . . . even in such horrible context as the Holocaust in the attempt to define victimization in such a way as to exclude all other groups besides Jews."[35]

Elie Wiesel illustrates Cuddihy's point. When historians refer to other holocausts, such as the massacre of the Armenians or the Gypsies, Wiesel is disturbed because such parallels question the special status of the Jewish victims. He is sorely afraid, he says, that "they are stealing the Holocaust from us . . . [which] we need to regain our sense of sacredness."[36]

There are obviously differences of opinion on this question, but I would say that despite close parallels, the uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust is striking. It was unique in Hitler's avowed purpose of killing *all* members of a religious, cultural, ethnic community—a calculated effort to annihilate one of the most creative people on earth.[37] This genocide was unique in the endorsement of leading social institutions and agencies; unique in the senselessness of the whole program; unique in the help the victims gave to their murderers; unique in the consequence it has had on both Jewish and Christian thought.

II

Let us turn to a second group of questions that highlight the problem. *How adequate are the explanations and theories that attempt to account for the Holocaust? What approaches seem most fruitful? What new approaches are needed?*

First, how adequate are the explanations? The answer to this is simple: there is no adequate explanation of the Holocaust. This event will continue to stagger the mind and trouble the soul of anyone who investigates it.

Yet several approaches are particularly helpful in leading us to a deeper understanding—though we shall never know the full and final truth about it, just as we shall never know the final truth about any historical problem that is worth its intellectual salt.

In our search for understanding, insights can be gained from sociological and psychological studies. Helen Fein,[38] for example, following closely the monumental work of Raul Hilberg, has examined the social setting for the Holocaust and found answers to such questions as: What made the social environment congenial to genocide? She provides careful comparative statistics from different countries to show that the extent of cooperation with the SS depended upon a number of factors, but the most important of these was the amount of anti-Semitism that existed historically in each country (thus the importance of the first question about continuity). Fein shows, for example, that there is a direct relationship, a positive correlation, between the amount of anti-Semitism —and the support it received from church, army, and the civil service— and the number of Jews killed. Where anti-Semitism was extensive, as in Germany, Rumania, Hungary, and Poland, genocide was extensive. Where anti-Semitism was not strong historically, and where popular sentiment and civic and religious leadership did not support it, as in Denmark and Bulgaria, killing was minimal. Bulgarians and Danes refused to carry out SS orders and helped thousands of Jews to escape death.

Thus the congeniality of the social environment helped determine the extent of the Holocaust. So too did the degree of effective political power. Where political power is overwhelming—as in Stalin's Russia, Amin's Uganda, or Hitler's Germany—where opposition is silenced and bureaucracy is obedient, mass murder can become routine.

Fein's comparative approach, which encompasses sociological and quantitative analysis, is a valuable aid to a fuller understanding. So too are the contributions made by psychologists and psychoanalysts.[39] We particularly need their help because the very irrationality of the Holocaust makes traditional political and historical explanations distressingly inadequate.

Psychologists can tell us a great deal about the personalities of the perpetrators. What kinds of people, yes, what kinds of *human beings,* were the Nazis? For it is important, though admittedly distasteful, to remember that the Nazis were human. To dismiss them as "monsters" or "freaks" or "demons" is too easy and far too dangerous. We shall learn little about this historic event until we recognize that the Holocaust was a *deeply human phenomenon.*

In all people there is a propensity for murderous aggression. Even the unspeakable events of the Holocaust are not "bestial" in the literal sense of the word. To call the Nazis beasts is to defame beasts. Animals in the jungle do not kill except for food or self-defense. Such events as the Holocaust, Heinz Kohut has written, are "decidedly human, an intricate part of the human condition."[40] That is a disturbing and unpalatable thought, but it is a basic fact of psychological life. Hannah Arendt reached the same conclusion. In her brilliant study of Eichmann in Jerusalem she observed that Eichmann was no monster—if he *had* been, the entire case against him would have collapsed immediately. "The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were and still are terribly and terrifyingly normal. . . . This normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together."[41] Elie Wiesel found the same things to be true about Franz Stangl, commandant of the Sobibor and Treblinka death camps: "It is not the murderer in Stangl that terrifies us—it is the human being."[42] We need to know more about the mechanisms which permit normal people to commit such awful crimes, and psychologists can help provide some answers.

Psychologists have also helped by demonstrating what the "anti-Semitic personality" is like.[43] Germany has no monopoly on such twisted human beings. Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Eichmann, and the rest were very much like American anti-Semites: they too reveal infantile personalities incapable of development; they too swing radically between swaggering confidence and abject despair. Like American anti-Semites, the Nazis exalted the strong and despised the weak. They too projected their personal problems onto others, namely, the Jews. They too tended to be sado-masochists with inclinations to perversion.

Psychologists can help us understand the anti-Semitic person. So too can philosophers. Jean-Paul Sartre, quite without realizing it, has painted a discerning picture of Adolf Hitler and his vicious but frighteningly human colleagues:

We are now in a position to understand the anti-Semite. He is a man who is afraid. Not of the Jews, to be sure, but of himself. . . . He is a coward who does not want to admit his cowardice to himself; a murderer who represses and censures his tendency to murder without being able to hold it

back. . . . The existence of the Jew merely permits the anti-Semite to stifle
his anxieties. . . . The anti-Semite is a man who wishes to be pitiless stone,
a furious torrent, a devastating thunderbolt—anything except a man.[44]

Biographers, aided by psychology, can reach a deeper understanding
of the individual perpetrators of the Holocaust. One recalls Peter
Loewenberg's penetrating study of Himmler,[45] Richard Hunt's pioneer-
ing work on Joseph Goebbels,[46] Gidda Sereny's sensitive insights into
Franz Stangl,[47] as well as Hannah Arendt's study of Eichmann.

Certainly we need to know a great deal more about the personality of
the one person who was finally responsible for the Holocaust: Adolf
Hitler.[48] We need to understand the psychodynamics of the process by
which his personal hatred of the Jews was rationalized and projected into
public policy. We need to see how the personal prejudice of one
demented person was transmuted into a horrendous historic force.

Psychologists have also widened our horizons and deepened our
knowledge of how it is possible for average people to follow orders
which debase and destroy their fellow human beings. Here, two studies
by two American social psychologists offer insights—only partial
insights, it is true, but nevertheless revealing glimpses of an answer—to
that simple but terribly complex question: How could decent people
commit such evil crimes? *How could they possibly do it?* Stanley
Milgram at Yale and his colleagues in several other American universities
have reached deeply disturbing conclusions about the propensity of ordi-
nary people—in this case hundreds of American citizens—to follow bru-
tal orders commanding them to turn on electric currents which appeared
to inflict suffering on fellow citizens. Professor Milgram concludes:

Subjects will obey the experimenter no matter how vehement the pleading of
the person being shocked, no matter how painful the shocks seem to be and
no matter how much the victim pleads to be let out. This was seen time and
again in studies and has been observed in several universities where the ex-
periment was repeated. It is the extreme willingness of adults to go to almost
any lengths on the command of an authority that constitutes the chief finding
of the study and the fact most urgently demanding explanation.

This is perhaps the most fundamental lesson of our study: ordinary people
simply doing their jobs and without any particular hostility on their part can
become agents in a terrible destructive process.[49]

If this is true of average American citizens, how much more it is true
of German Nazis whose attitude and inclinations were powerfully rein-
forced by an environment which not only permitted the destruction of
their fellow men, but demanded it.

Philip Zimbardo of Stanford University has demonstrated that college
students carefully selected for their normality can become perverted by
the pathology of power. These students illustrate Stendhal's assertion

that "power is the greatest of all pleasures." In his experiment, Zimbardo simulated a prison situation and had students act out the roles of prison guard and prisoner. The experiment showed how much American students delighted in that greatest of all pleasures and used it to humiliate and hurt their fellow students. It also showed that the victims of this power—also normal college students—became depressed and disoriented, and meekly followed the commands of their persecutors.

Zimbardo's experiment, which was planned to last two weeks, was aborted after six days because in those few days Professor Zimbardo was alarmed by a frightening metamorphosis he witnessed in the students. Those who were serving as guards grew increasingly abusive and sadistically cruel to the "prisoners"; the students who were prisoners became so depressed that they were on the verge of psychological disintegration and suicide. Zimbardo concluded that

in the contest between forces of good men and evil situation, the situation triumphed. Individuals carefully selected for their normality, sanity, and homogeneous personality traits were, in a matter of days, acting in ways that out of this context would be judged abnormal, insane, neurotic, psychopathic and sadistic.[50]

If that can happen to average American college students in six days, it is small wonder that Germans who had been carefully conditioned to Nazi ideology could become brutal instruments of Hitler's "wicked will," or that humiliated, frightened, starving, and disoriented Jews who felt the utter futility of resistance should yield to brute force and passively obey commands.

Psychoanalysts such as Bruno Bettelheim have further increased our understanding of the difficult question—and to Jews a very sensitive question—of why the Jewish people cooperated in their own destruction. Bettelheim believes that the aggressive-destructive drive so obvious in the SS was also present in their Jewish victims. Feeling helpless and abandoned, they were unable to direct aggressive impulses outward against their hated oppressors. They therefore made both an excuse and a virtue out of futility and used it as a psychological defense against self-accusations of cowardice. Thus they continually exaggerated their own utter helplessness and the total omnipotence of the enemy, and then turned aggressive-destructive drives *inward* against themselves, thereby cooperating in their own destruction. Bettelheim concludes that Jews were already suicidal before they walked toward the death chambers.[51]

Such analysis, not surprisingly, has brought a storm of protest and denial from Jewish writers. But it is ironic that these writers who denounce the conclusions reached by Bettelheim, Arendt, and Hilberg, and who vehemently deny that the Jews died with meek resignation,

nevertheless in their own books offer explanations of *why* the Jewish people were compelled to do just that. They give a number of reasons, all of which have considerable merit.

First, they argue that Jewish tradition did not encourage active resistance to persecution. They point out that for centuries Jews had been conditioned to obey, to suffer, and to survive. As Lucy Dawidowicz has written, "[their] religious tradition elevated powerlessness into a positive Jewish value. It fostered submissiveness."[52] Jews believed that their vaunted capacity to submit and yet to endure would carry them through even this persecution, as it had so often in their past. They made a catastrophic mistake. As Richard Rubenstein has noted, "The Jewish reaction to the Nazis was one of the most disastrous misreadings of the character of an opponent by any community in all of human history."[53] Jews did not understand that Hitler did not plan merely to humiliate them; he planned to kill them. This sensible, legally minded, and cultivated people simply could not believe that the German government really meant to murder them all. That just did not make sense. In this the Jews were quite correct. It did not make sense. But it happened.

Second, Jewish writers argue that to this tradition of "suffer and survive" was added the psychological defense of denying. Jews denied that they were to be transported to death camps. Such horror stories could not be true. Gladly they accepted the Nazi fiction that they were merely being "resettled" in the East. Their psychological *need* to believe that fantasy led them to cooperate and obey SS orders because to do so was a way of denying what they dreaded might be true. Notice how psychological denial is reflected in their euphemisms. Jews did not talk of killing centers, of gas ovens or death camps; they referred to them as "bakeries"; a person who had given up all hope was a "Moslem"; a depot holding the belongings of recently gassed victims was called "Canada."[54]

Third, as Helen Fein has noted, there was a general belief—particularly among Western Jews—that the Nazis were "punishing" only Eastern Jews, not the rest. Many German Jews, for example, said that Polish Jews must have done something terribly wrong to merit their fate.[55]

Fourth, Yisrael Gutman believes that thousands of devout Jews went quietly to their death with prayer shawls gathered about them in the faith that they were participating in a *Kiddush Hashem*—a sanctification rite in which they bore witness to their devotion to God. They agreed with a revered rabbi who said, "The quintessence of martyrdom is dying for one's Jewishness."[56] And psychologically it was easier to believe that they were dying as martyrs to their faith in God than it was to entertain the awful thought that their God had forsaken them.

Fifth, to many Jews, death in Hitler's gas chambers was atonement for individual or collective sin. Devout Jews found it more bearable to

believe that it must be they themselves—and not the God of Abraham and Sarah, Isaac and Jacob—who had broken the sacred covenant which Jehovah had made with his Chosen People.

Sixth, historically, Jews tended to trust their spiritual leaders. As we have noted, official *Judenräte* urged Jews to obey orders for shipment to the East and not to resist. As Dawidowicz has written, they feared—with ample justification—that any act of resistance would only increase the wrath of the SS.[57]

Finally, and this is the point that needs most emphasis, we must recognize that European Jews, like the kulaks of Russia or Idi Amin's victims in Uganda, yielded to a *force majeure.* The Jews, isolated, intimidated, and confronted by the institutionalized terror of a modern police state, had no other effective choice. They were overwhelmed by sheer power.

It seems to me that all these explanations—including Bettelheim's—deserve an examination that is as careful, as courageous, and as dispassionate as this emotion-laden issue will allow.

The Holocaust clearly required perpetrators; and we need to understand the psychodynamics which drove them. Here, by and large, were frighteningly normal people who were given great power and trained to exploit universal human frailties for horrendous purposes. The Holocaust also required victims, and they too can teach us much about the human condition—how even under the most brutal tyranny, people can retain their humanity and refuse to be broken. But the Holocaust also shows how the cowed and frightened and disoriented can succumb to brutal power and cooperate in their own psychic and physical destruction. The Holocaust is indeed a terrifying but profoundly revealing laboratory of human behavior.

Which is to say that the Holocaust was a human event—an event of shattering and unspeakable inhumanity, but one perpetrated by humans upon humans. It was an event unique in history and yet within the human experience.

III

Historians, as well as psychologists and sociologists, can also contribute to our understanding of the Holocaust because of their long experience with a third issue: the role of the commanding personality.

We see in the Holocaust yet another example of the ancient historical interplay of man and circumstance. But it is doubtful if ever in the past there has been so close a relationship, so fateful an interconnection, as there was between this peculiarly compelling man and these peculiarly receptive circumstances.

First consider the man, Adolf Hitler, the originator and mover of the Holocaust, the one person without whom this event could not have been possible.[58] He was both a consummately cunning political opportunist and a pathological fanatic. And both aspects determined his program for the Jews. As an astute political operator he recognized the appeal of anti-Semitism to Germans of the 1920s and 1930s. This "Terrible Simpli-fier" offered a simple explanation for all difficulties: Jews were respon-sible for the defeat and humiliation of 1918, for the economic disasters of 1923 and 1930-1933, for all the political and moral problems of the time. It was not "our" fault: the Jew was to blame. There have been other racists, other political anti-Semites before Hitler. Three things made Hitler special: the depth and intensity of his hatred for the Jews; the extent of his effective political power; the opportunity given to him by a compliant and cooperative society.

Hatred of the Jews and the desire to murder them was a lifelong obsession of Hitler, the organizing principle of his life. One can feel the venom of his hatred in an early conversation, now recorded in the archives of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich.

As soon as I have power [he said in 1922] I shall have gallows erected, for example in Munich in the Marienplatz. Jews will be hanged one after another and they will stay hanging until they stink . . . then the next group will follow . . . until the last Jew in Munich is exterminated. Exactly the same procedure will be followed in other cities until Germany is cleansed of the last Jew.[59]

This personal obsession became his political program. His promise was kept. Both his last and his first political statements confirmed his obses-sion with a nonexistent "Jewish Menace." His last political statement, delivered on April 30, 1945, was dictated just before taking a lethal dose of cyanide: "Above all I enjoin the leaders of the Reich to scrupulous observance of the Racial Laws defending against the universal poisoner of mankind, international Jewry." In his first public speech, of which we have one faded shorthand report dated August 7 or 8, 1920, Salzburg, Hitler had sounded the same ominous note:

Don't be misled into thinking that you can fight diseases without killing the carrier! . . . Don't think you can fight racial tuberculosis without ridding the nation of the carrier of racial tuberculosis! This Jewish contamination will not subside, this poisoning of the nation will not end until the carrier himself, the Jew, has been banished from our midst.[60]

That promise was also kept.

The extent of Hitler's anti-Jewish phobia is manifest. The psycho-logical reasons for it are complex and cannot concern us here.[61] Let us simply reiterate that the Holocaust was not possible without Hitler. It

was also not possible without a supportive society. For, once again in history, man and circumstances worked together to produce the event.

German society exhibited attitudes and values recognizable in any country. What made German circumstances peculiar was the intensification and distortion of those attitudes and values through the force of unusual historic pressures and the manipulative skills of the man, Adolf Hitler. We should consider some of these attitudes and notice the way Hitler used them to his advantage. His program required anti-Semitic racism, and German history, as noted, obliged him with a particularly virulent variety. He manipulated it with diabolical cunning. Anti-Semitism not only provided a simple explanation for all Germany's recent disasters, it allowed Hitler to fulfill his contradictory claims that he was, at the same time, a conservative and a revolutionary; that he would preserve traditional society and transform it through a New Order; that he was the champion of both capitalism and socialism. "The Jew" enabled him to have it both ways and to win both capitalist and proletariat to his banner. He convinced capitalists that he was the enemy only of "Jewish finance capitalism"; he persuaded socialists that his program of National Socialism fought only "Jewish Marxist Socialism." He also applied anti-Semitism in another way. His success as mass leader was due in part to his psychological insight that man is both evil and good, beset by two conflicting tendencies: an impulse for aggression, destruction, hatred; and a capacity for creation, cooperation, sacrifice, and service. Hitler appealed to both impulses. His regime institutionalized brutality and aggression, channeling them against the Jews. But we do not understand his appeal, particularly to the youth of Germany, unless we understand that he also inspired them with faith and hope—a shining hope for the future, faith in him as their Messiah. Through the magic of his charisma and the cunning of his propaganda he convinced millions that barbarism was heroic, brutality was strength, and nihilism was an exalted ideology. And the lofty goals of Germany strong and triumphant could be achieved only when the country was cleansed and purified by removing the Jews who defiled the Fatherland.

Hitler manipulated German anti-Semitism to his own advantage. He also gained mightily from another national tradition: obedience to the state. Surely the German people have no monopoly on obedience and capacity to obey inhuman orders, as Milgram's chilling experiments have shown. Yet in Germany, since Luther and the Prussian kings and the Imperial Army, obedience to *Obrigkeit* (authority) was raised to the highest virtue of citizenship. At Nuremberg, as at a score of Nazi trials since, the phrase *Befehl ist Befehl!* (an order is an order) was recited as a litany.

Hitler's Holocaust was helped along by yet another circumstance: general indifference to the suffering, humiliation, and murder of the Jews. Here again a common human phenomenon was intensified in

Germany. People in most societies are indifferent to the existence of
social evil in their midst. Edmund Burke's justifiably famous warning
about evil prospering because of the indifferent silence of good men and
women is, unfortunately, true of most good people. Certainly the
silence of many good and influential people—people like Pope Pius XII,
Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Felix Frankfurter, and Rabbi
Stephen Wise[62]—helped Hitler carry out the Holocaust. Silence was
international. But the indifference of the elite of German society was
particularly pronounced and peculiarly helpful to Hitler, as Rainer Baum
and Dieter Hartmann have graphically shown.[63]

Hitler was also aided by the psychological phenomenon of defensive
denial. People have a remarkable capacity to deny what they prefer not
to believe. Turks deny that an Armenian massacre took place in 1915;
Englishmen denied the existence of concentration camps in the Trans-
vaal; Americans denied the Christmas bombing of Hanoi; Israelis denied
all responsibility for massacres of Palestinians. But denial was pan-
demic during the Holocaust. And Jews joined the chorus of those who
insisted that the genocide was not actually taking place. Since they could
not believe they were being transported East to their deaths, they denied
it, and their denial expedited their extinction. To a large degree, as was
noted, Jews accepted their own victimization. But attitudes of resigna-
tion and cooperation with one's oppressor are emphatically not an
exclusively Jewish trait. As Barrington Moore has demonstrated, human
beings in vastly different social, religious, and political settings all
display a remarkable tendency to accept maltreatment and make a virtue
out of humiliation. Such is true of Christian ascetics and saints, the
Untouchables of India, Chinese coolies, and German steel workers in
the Ruhr in the 1890s. Acceptance is a social norm, Moore has ob-
served; resistance is an acquired taste.[64] But here again, during the
Third Reich there were specific psychological, social, and political
reasons *why* the Jews put up so little resistance and helped Hitler to
direct a human condition to inhuman purposes.

We seek to understand the Holocaust, to explain it, and to establish
the truth about what happened. We shall never explain it adequately,
never find the final truth. But there is no cause for despair. We can find
comfort in the words of a wise old rabbi:

> Who says the Truth was meant to be revealed?
> It has to be *sought,* that's all.

I have suggested that we begin our search by considering the interplay
of a peculiar man with peculiarly fortuitous circumstances; that we seek
enlightenment from such disciplines as sociology, psychology, and

history; and that we recognize this event both as a part of a historical continuum and as a phenomenon with distinctive features of its own.

NOTES

This chapter draws upon papers originally presented to the International Scholars' Conference on the Holocaust held at Indiana University, November 3-5, 1980, and at Tel Aviv, Israel, June 20-24, 1982. The present version revises those remarks and incorporates comments made at the conferences.

1. Martin Luther, "The Jews and Their Lies," in *Luther's Works,* vol. 47 (St. Louis: Concordia, 1971), pp. 135, 258, 266-68, 272, 292.

2. Larry E. Axel, "Christian Theology and the Murder of Jews," *Encounter* 40, no. 2 (Spring 1979), pp. 135-36, and Rosemary Radford Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism* (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), pp. 179-80. See also Edward H. Flannery, *The Anguish of the Jews: Twenty-three Centuries of Anti-Semitism* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 47-51.

3. Thomas Aquinas, *De Regimine Principum* (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1979), as quoted by Axel, "Christian Theology," p. 136.

4. Ibid., p. 135.

5. Hitler's *Tischgespräche* as quoted by Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide,* p. 224.

6. Uriel Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany: Religion, Politics, and Ideology in the Second Reich, 1870-1914,* trans. Noah Jonathan Jacobs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1975), pp. 304-5.

7. As quoted in A. Roy Eckardt, "Preparatory Paper: Indiana University Conference, November 3-5, 1980" (unpublished), p. 13.

8. Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of Germanic Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), p. 87.

9. Paul de Lagarde, *Deutsche Schriften,* 5th ed. (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1920), pp. 33-37, 348; Stern, *Politics of Cultural Despair,* pp. 62-63.

10. For a brief discussion of Wagner's influence on Hitler, see Robert G.L. Waite, *The Psychopathic God: Adolf Hitler* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 99-113. It is, of course, true that many German intellectuals opposed anti-Semitism, championed Jewish emancipation, and paid tribute to Jewish thought and culture. This list includes Gotthold Lessing, Johann Herder, Johann Schiller, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and Friedrich W. Nietzsche. But other Germans were vocal and influential anti-Semites. The great Prussian liberal reformer Baron vom Stein wanted to ship all the Jews out of Germany. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin, spoke—jokingly, he later said—of "cutting off all Jewish heads." Kant asserted that Jewish thought was devoid of spirituality; Hegel said it amounted to a "dunghill." For a general survey of the problem

see Alfred D. Low, *Jews in the Eyes of Germans: From the Enlightenment to Imperial Germany* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979), and Nathan Rotenstreich, *The Recurring Pattern: Studies in Anti-Judaism in Modern Thought* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963).

11. As quoted by Alvin Rosenfeld, International Scholars' Conference on the Holocaust, Bloomington, Indiana, November 5, 1980.

12. Ulrich Dunker, *Der Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldaten, 1918-1938: Geschichte eines jüdischen Abwehrvereins* (Düsseldorf: Dreste, 1977).

13. Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), p. 657.

14. See Heinz Artzt, *Mörder in Uniform: Organisationen die zu Vollstreckern nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen wurden* (Munich: Kindler, 1979).

15. Lawrence D. Stokes, "The German People and the Destruction of the European Jews," *Central European History* 6, no. 2 (June 1973), pp. 182, 191. See also the perceptive article by Dietrich Strothmann, "Die Schrift an der Wand," *Die Zeit* 6 (February 9, 1979).

16. Gerhard Schoenberner, ed., *Wir haben es gesehen. Augenzeugenberichte über Terror and Judenverfolgung im Dritten Reich* (Hamburg, 1962), p. 8, as quoted in Stokes, "The German People," p. 182.

17. Lucy Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews: 1933-1945* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975), p. 348.

18. Hilberg, *Destruction,* pp. 122-25, 297, 316, 343, 662-69. See also three later essays by Hilberg: "The *Judenrat:* Conscious or Unconscious 'Tool,' " *Proceedings of the Third Yad Vashem International Historical Conference 4-7 April 1977* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1979),"The Ghetto as a Form of Government," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 450 (July 1980), and his introductory essay in Joel Dimsdale, ed., *Survivors, Victims and Perpetrators: Essays on the Nazi Holocaust* (Washington, D.C.: Hemisphere Publishing Co., 1980). Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil,* rev. ed. (New York: Viking Press, 1964), pp. 18, 284. Isaiah Trunk, *Judenrat: The Jewish Councils in Eastern Europe under Nazi Occupation* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 550-57, 570-73, the same writer's *Jewish Responses to Nazi Persecution: Collective and Individual Behavior in Extremis* (New York: Stein and Day, 1979), p. 53, and his essay, "The Typology of the *Judenräte* in Eastern Europe," *Proceedings of the Third Yad Vashem International Historical Conference* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1979), p. 29. Yehuda Bauer disputes the conclusions reached by Hilberg, Arendt, and Trunk and argues that some Council members did in fact resist the Nazis—a point which can be accepted without destroying what he calls the "myth" of Jewish passivity. See his valuable collection of essays, *The Holocaust as Historical Experience: Essays and Discussion* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981). This volume reprints comments made orally at a conference of scholars of the Holocaust. In the midst of a heated debate on the role of the Councils, a judicious observation was made by Saul Friedländer, who suggested that the

"polemics" over the *Judenräte* were due to a confusion between the objective *function* of the Councils and the *intentions* of the Council leaders. He noted that Hilberg and Trunk stress the former while Bauer emphasizes the good intentions of the Councils and implies that their function was benign—it was actually not to abet the Nazis but to safeguard their communities. Friedländer concludes with a question: "Could we not say . . . that *objectively* the Judenrat was probably an instrument in the destruction of European Jewry, but that *subjectively* some of them—or even most of them—tried to do their best . . . in order to stave off destruction?" I would agree with that point and accept the conclusion reached by Hilberg: "That the Council was pained we are convinced. That in desperation Council members committed suicide is a matter of record. But that notwithstanding, . . . they went on doing what they were asked—that is a matter of record too." (Discussion reprinted in Bauer, *Holocaust as Historical Experience,* pp. 236-37, 254-55. Emphasis in original.)

19. Hilberg, *Destruction,* p. 343; see also Yisrael Gutman and Livia Rothkirchen, eds., *The Catastrophe of European Jewry: Antecedents, History, Reflections* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1976), pp. 423-32, and Trunk, "Typology," p. 29.

20. George M. Kren and Leon Rappoport, "Resistance to the Holocaust: The Idea and the Act," in Bauer, *Holocaust as Historical Experience,* p. 214.

21. Arendt, *Eichmann,* p. 118.

22. Emmanuel Ringelblum, *Notes from the Warsaw Ghetto: The Journal of Emmanuel Ringelblum,* ed. and trans. by Jacob Sloan (New York: McGraw Hill, 1958), pp. 331-32.

23. See Reuben Ainsztein, *Jewish Resistance in Nazi-Occupied Eastern Europe: With a Historical Survey of the Jew as Fighter and Soldier in the Diaspora* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1974), Miriam Novitch, *Sobibor: Martyrdom and Revolt* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1980), and, for a brief account, Yisrael Gutman, "Rebellions in the Camps: Three Revolts in the Face of Death," in *Critical Issues of the Holocaust,* ed. Alex Grobman and Daniel Landes (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1983).

24. Ringelblum, *Notes,* pp. 332-33.

25. Philip Friedman, "Problems of Research on the European Jewish Catastrophe," in Gutman and Rothkirchen, *Catastrophe,* p. 644.

26. See, among many, many memoirs, the following: Viktor Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning* (New York: Pocket Books, 1971), Chaim A. Kaplan, *The Warsaw Diary of Chaim A. Kaplan,* ed. Abraham I. Katsh (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), Terrence Des Pres, *The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), and Ringelblum, *Notes.*

27. Yehuda Bauer, *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), p. 32.

28. The numbers killed during Stalin's reign of terror have been variously estimated. Nicholas Riasanovsky sets the figure at about 5 million

in his *History of Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 551, but that figure seems much too low. Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974-1978), vol. 3, p. 350, says that some 15 million peasants alone were murdered. Alec Nove in *Stalinism and After* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1975), estimates between 12 and 15 million (p. 56). Robert Conquest, in his huge monograph, *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), says that the total number, including kulaks, political "opponents," and those worked to death in the gulag system, almost certainly reached 20 million (p. 533).

29. Idi Amin Dada, according to the International Commission of Jurists, probably killed over 250,000 people in a population of some 9 million. See Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 213, and Thomas and Margaret Melady, *Idi Amin Dada: Hitler in Africa* (Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1977).

30. Peter J. Donaldson, *The New York Times,* 22 April 1980.

31. Marjorie Housepian, "The Unremembered Genocide," *Commentary* 42 (September 1966), pp. 55-61.

32. Bohdan Wytwycky, *The Other Holocaust: Many Circles of Hell, A Brief Account of the 9-10 Million Persons Who Died with the 6 Million Jews under Nazi Racism* (Washington, D.C.: Novak Report on the New Ethnicity, 1980).

33. Alvin H. Rosenfeld, "The Problematics of Holocaust Literature," in *Confronting the Holocaust: The Impact of Elie Wiesel,* ed. Alvin H. Rosenfeld and Irving Greenberg (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 12.

34. Bauer, *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective,* p. 36.

35. As quoted by Paula E. Hyman, "The New Debate on the Holocaust," in *The New York Times Magazine* (September 14, 1980), p. 82. For a thoughtful and critical commentary on Cuddihy's observation, see Henry L. Feingold, "How Unique Is the Holocaust?" in *Critical Issues of the Holocaust,* pp. 397-401.

36. Quoted in Hyman, "The New Debate . . . ," pp. 82, 109.

37. Dawidowicz, *War Against Jews,* pp. xiv-xv.

38. Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization During the Holocaust* (New York: The Free Press, 1979).

39. See Lita Linzer Schwarts, "A Psychohistorical Perception of the Holocaust," a valuable paper prepared for a symposium on Hitler, The Citadel, April 25, 1980.

40. Heinz Kohut, *The Search for the Self: Selected Writings of Heinz Kohut, 1950-1978* (New York: International Universities Press, 1978), vol. 2, p. 635.

41. Arendt, *Eichmann,* p. 276.

42. Wiesel in a review of Gitta Sereny's book, *Into That Darkness: An Examination of Conscience* (New York: Vintage Press, 1974), in *Midstream: A Monthly Jewish Review* 3, no. 9 (November 1975), p. 73. See also Peter Loewenberg, "The Unsuccessful Adolescence of Heinrich Himmler," *American Historical Review* 76, no. 3 (June 1971).

43. See Nathan W. Ackerman and Marie Jahoda, *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation* (New York: Harper, 1950), Martin Wangh, "National Socialism and the Genocide of the Jews: A Psychoanalytic Study of a Historical Event," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 45 (1964), pp. 386-95, and the essays in Ernst Simmel, ed., *Anti-Semitism a Social Disease* (New York: International Universities Press, 1946).

44. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew,* trans. George J. Becker (New York: Schocken Books, 1948), pp. 26-27, 54-55.

45. See note 42.

46. Richard M. Hunt, "Joseph Goebbels: A Study of the Formation of His National-Socialist Consciousness (1897-1929)" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1960).

47. See note 42.

48. I have attempted such a study in *The Psychopathic God: Adolf Hitler* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), and have commented on the historical question of the extent to which Hitler was personally responsible for the Holocaust in my chapter, "The Perpetrator: Hitler and the Holocaust," in *Human Responses to the Holocaust,* ed. Michael D. Ryan (New York: E. Mellen Press, 1981).

49. Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 5-6.

50. Philip G. Zimbardo, "Transforming Experimental Research into Advocacy of Social Change," in *Applying Social Psychology: Implications for Research, Practice and Training,* ed. Morton Deutsch and Harvey A. Hornstein (Hillsdale, N.J.: Halsted Press, 1975), pp. 33-67.

51. Bruno Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age* (New York: Avon Books, 1971), pp. 243-45, and *Surviving and Other Essays* (New York: Knopf, 1979), pp. 100-101.

52. Dawidowicz, *War Against Jews,* pp. 343, 346.

53. Richard Rubenstein, *The Religious Imagination* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), p. xvii.

54. Hilberg, *Destruction,* p. 668, and Bettelheim, *Informed Heart,* pp. 253-54.

55. Fein, *Genocide,* p. 317.

56. Gutman, *Catastrophe,* p. 377.

57. Dawidowicz, *War Against Jews,* pp. 287-88, 348.

58. Gerald Fleming's decisive monograph, *Hitler und die Endlösung: "Es ist des Führers Wunsch . . ."* (Wiesbaden and Munich: Limes, 1982),

proves Hitler's direct responsibility for the Holocaust and puts finally to rest the spurious claims of the so-called revisionists that Hitler was ignorant and innocent of the mass murders. For a different approach to the same problem, but one that reaches the same conclusion, see my chapter, "The Perpetrator: Hitler and the Holocaust," in Michael D. Ryan, ed., *Human Responses to the Holocaust: Perpetrators and Victims, Bystanders and Resisters: Papers of the Scholars' Conference on the Church Struggle and the Holocaust* (New York: E. Mellen Press, 1981).

59.   Quoted in Waite, p. 16.

60.   Ibid.

61.   See Waite, *Psychopathic God,* and his article, "Adolf Hitler's Anti-Semitism: A Study in History and Psychoanalysis," in Benjamin Wolman, ed., *The Psychoanalytic Interpretation of History* (New York: Basic Books, 1971). See also Norbert Bromberg, *Hitler's Psychopathology* (New York: International Universities Press, 1983).

62.   Henry L. Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Admin-istration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970), Walter Laqueur, *The Terrible Secret: An Investiga-tion into the Suppression of Information about Hitler's Final Solution* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), Martin Gilbert, *Auschwitz and the Allies* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), and especially David S. Wyman, *The Abandonment of Jews: America and the Holocaust* (New York: Panther Books, 1984).

63.   Rainer C. Baum, *The Holocaust and the German Elite: Genocide and National Suicide in Germany, 1871-1945* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), and Dieter D. Hartmann, "Anti-Semitism and the Appeal of Nazism," paper presented at the Oxford Conference of the International So-ciety of Political Psychology, July 1983.

64. See Barrington Moore, Jr., *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

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DISCRIMINATION, PERSECUTION, THEFT, AND MURDER UNDER COLOR OF LAW: THE TOTALITARIAN CORRUPTION OF THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 1933-1945

Gunter W. Remmling

The German dictatorship did not materialize quite as suddenly as Pallas Athena, who sprang fully armed from the forehead of Zeus. The Third Reich, something the German resistance fighter Ernst Niekisch called the "realm of the lower demons,"[1] had numerous links with the past.

SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE GERMAN DICTATORSHIP

The anti-Semitic rabble-rousers of imperial Vienna kindled Adolf Hitler's murderous hatred of the Jews. "Then I came to Vienna," he wrote in his political autobiography *Mein Kampf,* as he set out to explain the origin of his anti-Semitism.[2] The chief designer of the National Socialist death machine was never in the mood for hiding his megalomania: "So I believe today that I am acting in the spirit of the Almighty Creator," Hitler raved. *"By struggling against the Jew I am fighting for the Lord's work."*[3] When the Austrian moved across the northern border he joined the strident chorus of German anti-Semites.

World War I and its aftermath influenced the political drift toward authoritarian regimes in Germany. When Hitler entered the political scene in Weimar Germany, he promised to restore the power of the military and garnered support among the warlords.[4] When the ex-corporal promised to "tear up" the Treaty of Versailles, he won over many nationalistic and conservative voters.[5] When Hitler echoed the *"Dolchstoss"* legend he appealed to chauvinists and militarists who

peddled the fantasy that radical Social Democrats, pacifists, and Jews in Berlin had plunged a dagger into the back of the victorious army.[6]

The National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) received financial support from German industrialists and bankers who were convinced that Hitler could destroy the trade unions and the Communists.[7] In the crucial election of July 31, 1932, the inhabitants of upper-class and upper-middle-class residential districts of large cities cast a disproportionately high Nazi vote.[8] Available statistics show that the social "elite" was overrepresented in the party leadership and membership.[9]

The Nazi party, however, was not the movement of a single class. All strata of German society contributed to the growth of the Nazi vote and the buildup of the NSDAP. The National Socialist program offered something to some Germans in every segment of society—with the exception of the German Jews.[10]

FREE CORPS ACTIVITIES AND VEHMIC TRIALS

Apart from the wider connections between the Nazi phenomenon and the German past,[11] there are two developments which directly influenced the course of events leading to the totalitarian corruption of the legal system.

The first development began in World War I, when German Army commanders built up Storm Troops (*Sturmbataillone*). These highly trained "princes of the trenches" had a special mission. They were to tear apart the unity of the enemy's defenses and open the way for the regular infantry attack.[12] According to G. S. Graber, the storm battalions of World War I were the forerunners of the SS or *Schutzstaffel* (Protective Squad). They anticipated the Nazi SS as regards recruitment and the relationship between the men and their leader. The storm battalions also left their imprint on the SS in other ways: in the creation of an elitist self-image and in the practice of a "blind savagery which was taken over from the heightened conditions of war into peacetime bourgeois life."[13]

Unwilling to lay down their weapons after the war, many members of storm battalions enthusiastically supported the formation of the Free Corps (*Freikorps*). These paramilitary volunteer units brutally went to war against the German Communists and against the Poles, Latvians, and Russians on the country's eastern borders. *Freikorps* soldiers used the German salute (*Heil!*), the brown shirt, and the swastika.[14] When the government disbanded the volunteer units in 1921, thousands of *Freikorps* fighters joined the SA and the SS.[15]

The second development which is especially important for the corruption of the law began after World War I with a series of illegal Vehmic trials—imitations of secret medieval blood trials or *Vehmegerichte*.[16]

In 1920, ex-*Freikorps* leader Hermann Ehrhardt founded a secret society in Munich: *Organisation Consul*. This organization of right-wing conspirators held Vehmic trials of postwar political leaders and others who were condemned to death as traitors.

On August 26, 1921, two members of *Organisation Consul* killed Matthias Erzberger, Catholic Center politician and chief signer of the armistice. Another famous victim of the Vehmic trials was the Jewish industrialist and German foreign minister Walther Rathenau; members of *Organisation Consul* murdered him on June 24, 1922.[17] In 1922 and 1923, Major Buchrucker's nationalistic *Schwarze Reichswehr* or Black Army conducted Vehmic trials of so-called traitors which resulted in numerous brutal murders.[18]

Ehrhardt's and Buchrucker's roles were not limited to the sphere of Vehmic murder (*Fememord*). Both men were involved in attempts to overthrow governments which the German people had elected.[19]

The German judicial system treated the right-wing extremists who had participated in Vehmic murders and political insurrections with great leniency. The legal liquidations of political insurrections such as the Kapp, Küstrin, and Hitler putsch created a pattern that became typical for the treatment of right-wing offenders: law breakers were allowed to flee the country or go into hiding; highly placed offenders were never brought before a court; cases against defendants were dropped; convicted criminals received light sentences; prisoners only served a fraction of their time.[20] After the Beer Hall putsch, Hitler was sentenced to serve five years at *Festung* Landsberg; he was paroled after a few months. In the preface to *Mein Kampf,* he described his comfortable stay at Landsberg prison as a chance to relax and start work on his autobiography.[21]

While the courts treated right-wing extremists very leniently, they handed out severe—often unjustified—sentences to left-wing Germans.[22] The operation of this double standard revealed the fatal flaw of the entire judicial system: tacit approval of Fascist and anti-Semitic terrorism. Over the years most jurists proved to be disloyal to the Weimar Republic.[23] The same lack of loyalty characterized the behavior of many civil servants, administrators, and military officers who had sworn to uphold the republic.[24]

BATTLE LAW AND SECRET POLICE TERROR

The National Socialists knew that they could count on the cooperation of most established jurists and civil servants when they set out to create law in their own image. The totalitarian corruption of the German legal system began as soon as the NSDAP came to power on January 30, 1933. The Vehmic courts provided a murky background as Nazi jurists began to demolish the existing legal system. The National Socialists

called their new law *Kampfrecht,* or battle law.

"*Heil,* Comrade jurists!" wrote Hans Frank, the *Führer* of the German Law Front (*Deutsche Rechtsfront*), ushering in the year of the bloody Röhm Purge, "you are gathering around the flag of Adolf Hitler . . . you have committed your entire being . . . to the battle against the enemies of our State and Community."[25]

In 1935, Frank told a meeting (*Gautagung*) of the National Socialist Jurists League: "There is only one source of law . . . the sovereign National Socialist people, and there is only one center of will for Reich and people and the Movement, and that is the *Führer.*"[26]

In this roundabout way German jurists were ordered to accept blindly the will of Hitler as the only legitimizing principle. Now one man's pathological hatred and thirst for revenge came to determine what was considered justice in Germany. The National Socialists transformed the German legal profession into an army of soldiers taking its orders from Hitler, the supreme commander. On January 30, 1934, Roland Freisler wrote: "So we also have our task. We, the soldiers of law. . . . We must create a law, a German, a National Socialist law . . . Therefore criminal law must be combat law. . . . like the weapon's tip which in battle is pointed at the enemy . . . it must view the lawbreaking will of the . . . antisocial and antinational . . . individual as the object of . . . destruction."[27]

Nazi battle law changed all parts of Germany's legal system; the transformation was most lethal in the area of criminal law. The National Socialists invented a plethora of nebulous new crimes such as "insulting the people," "affront to the folk tradition," "economic treason," and "assaults upon the racial continuance of the German people."[28] The National Socialists also escalated the severity of punishment—death penalties became as common as fines for littering.

With unprecedented ruthlessness and brutality, the dictator and his henchmen used all the levers of power to transform Germany into the monstrous thing Hitler liked to call the "total state." Battle law served the purposes of the new rulers well—but they wanted more. Therefore the Nazis accepted *SS-Gruppenführer* Reinhard Heydrich's idea to institutionalize protective custody (*Schutzhaft*): a dreadful penal twilight zone supervised by the SS Main Security Office (*Sicherheits-Hauptamt*). Now official pseudo-law was linked with the naked terror of secret police activity. Graber has described the sequence of events. Under the guise of *Schutzhaft* any local Gestapo official could suddenly arrest anybody he viewed as an "enemy of the state." The victims of protective custody were never brought to trial: without ever finding out what crimes they were charged with they languished in police prisons until they were herded into cattle cars and transported to concentration camps.[29]

Among the first victims of protective custody were the leaders and

members of Germany's workers' mass movements and so-called paci-
fists. On March 9, 1933, the Nazi Minister of the Interior, Wilhelm
Frick, proclaimed gleefully that Communists and Social Democrats were
being sent to concentration camps.[30] On March 20, 1933, *Reichsführer-
SS* Heinrich Himmler announced the opening of Dachau concentration
camp during a news conference in Munich.[31]

The destruction of the workers' movement entailed the arrest, torture,
and murder of proletarian leaders and activist workers, the theft of all
properties and funds belonging to trade unions, workers' organizations,
the German Communist Party (KPD), and the Social Democratic Party
(SPD), and the prohibition of all working-class activities. On March 31,
1933, the National Socialist government decreed that "crimes against
public safety" were punishable with death by hanging. The last blow fell
on June 22, 1933, when the Nazis used Article 48 of the Weimar Con-
stitution to outlaw the SPD. With the "voluntary" dissolution of the
Catholic Center Party on July 5, 1933, all political parties—with the
exception of the NSDAP—ceased to exist.[32]

The Nazi leaders used battle law and secret police terror to destroy
their opponents, to cow the people, and to accelerate the establishment of
a totalitarian social system. Nazi totalitarianism was a reign of terror
benefiting only a few: Hitler, the National Socialist leadership, high-
ranking military officers, large landowners, the big capitalists, and the
top civil servants.[33] The rest of humanity paid an exorbitant price for the
twelve-year rule of the Nazi mass murderers. When World War II
ended, 50 million people had been killed, 30 million were crippled, and
half of Europe lay in ruins.[34]

THE ASSAULT ON GERMAN JEWRY

When the destruction of the workers' movement and the demolition of
the democratic political structure were in their final phase, the Nazis in-
tensified their official assault on the German Jews. On March 28, 1933,
the leadership of the NSDAP organized the nationwide *Judenboykott,*
centered around the long-standing Nazi slogans "Don't buy from the
Jews" and "The Jews are our misfortune." The boycott took place on
April 11, 1933. This anti-Jewish action unleashed members of the SA
and SS who terrorized Jewish retail merchants, physicians, professors,
lawyers, and their clients. Uniformed Nazis also prevented Jews from
entering universities, libraries, and law courts.[35] During the boycott
many Jewish merchants and professionals were taken into "protective
custody" and sent to concentration camps.[36]

The continued oppression and persecution of the German Jews deep-
ened the corruption of the legal system. During the period 1933-1939,
the National Socialists created a huge body of anti-Jewish law—their

Judengesetzgebung, which they published in its entirety in 1939.[37] As
Joseph Walk and his co-workers have shown in their recent collection of
anti-Jewish laws, decrees, ordinances, secret orders, etc., the legal
transformations took place during the entire Nazi period, continuing until
the last year of World War II.[38] The fate of the roughly 565,000
German Jews[39]—eventually shared by the other victims of the Holo-
caust throughout Nazi-ruled and Nazi-occupied Europe—indicates that
modern large-scale genocide must be prepared for. And among the
prerequisites of genocide, the corruption of the law occupies a prominent
place.

THE FIRST PHASE OF ANTI-JEWISH LEGISLATION

The first phase of the Nazi anti-Jewish legislation began on January
30, 1933, with the National Socialist seizure of power, and ended on
September 15, 1935, with the enactment of the "Nuremberg Laws."[40]
The anti-Jewish measures belong to a body of laws made possible by
actions of the *Reichstag* which met for one day on March 23, 1933. The
Nazi-dominated legislative body suspended all constitutional provisions
protecting the political and civil equality of all German citizens. On the
same day, the *Reichstag* transferred its legislative powers to the cabinet,
thereby giving the Hitler government unquestioned authority to issue any
kind of dictatorial edict. The enabling law *(Ermächtigungsgesetz),*
which empowered the government to enact laws deviating from the con-
stitution, provided the legal smoke screen for this drift into totalitarian-
ism. By a vote of 441 the *Reichstag* adopted the law—a creation of the
NSDAP and the *Deutschnationale Volkspartei.* Only the Social Demo-
crats cast their 94 votes against the enabling law. The KPD had already
been forced to leave the *Reichstag* on March 8, 1933.[41]
The drift into extraconstitutionality which began in the final phase of
the Weimar Republic had been speeded up by the Reich President's
Emergency Decree on the Protection of People and State of February 28,
1933. The provisions of Paul von Hindenburg's decree included the
revocation of the citizens' basic constitutional rights.[42] With the subse-
quent enabling law of March 24, 1933, the extraconstitutional power
passed into the hands of Hitler.[43]
During the first phase of the anti-Jewish drive, German government
authorities enacted numerous laws and issued many decrees, regulations,
ordinances, directions, and explanations. In keeping with the Party
Program of the NSDAP[44] this "legal" onslaught was designed to pub-
licly humiliate Jews, baptized Jews, non-Jews of Jewish descent, non-
Jewish spouses of Jews, and persons of "doubtful Aryan descent."[45]
The term "Aryan" formerly designated groups of languages. The Nazis
arbitrarily used the term in their crackpot racial theory claiming that "non-

Aryans" were inferior to "Aryans." Nazi agitation and legislation was programmed to brand all "non-Aryans" as pariahs.

The National Socialists combined the public humiliation of the Jews with their campaign of discrimination and persecution. On April 7, 1933, shortly after the boycott of Jewish business, Reich Chancellor Hitler, Reich Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick, and Reich Minister of Finances Count Schwerin von Krosigk promulgated the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service. Paragraph three of the law, the so-called Aryan paragraph, began with the statement, "Civil servants who are not of Aryan descent are to be retired; honorary officials are to be dismissed from office."[46] Many Germans of Jewish descent were deprived of their jobs by a stroke of the dictator's pen.

On April 11, 1933, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Finances promulgated the First Decree to the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service. The second paragraph of this decree extended the expulsion to civil servants with only one Jewish grandparent. The decree also appointed an "expert on racial research" (*Sachverständiger für Rasseforschung*) in the Ministry of the Interior to whom persons of "doubtful Aryan descent" had to apply for an opinion. Paragraph one of the decree ordered the dismissal of all civil servants with Communist affiliations of any kind—an afterthought in view of the earlier mass arrests of German Communists and Socialists.[47]

The Second Decree to the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service of May 4, 1933, annulled all service contracts of "non-Aryan" clerks and workers in civil service organizations such as health insurance and social work.[48]

On May 6, 1933, the Third Decree to the Law caused the dismissal of "non-Aryan" judges, notaries, public school teachers, and salaried and unsalaried university teachers.[49]

The National Socialists deployed the "Aryan paragraph" as a major "legal" weapon in their offensive against the economic underpinnings of the Jewish community: a tidal wave of discriminatory legislation followed the attack on Jewish civil servants.

When the Nazis enacted the Law on Patent Lawyers on September 28, 1933, they completed a series of laws which excluded Jews from all forms of legal practice and all positions in the judiciary.[50]

The beneficiaries of this campaign quickly responded with a public display of their servile obedience to the Nazi rulers. On October 1, 1933, the judges of the Reich donned their blood-red robes and assembled in front of the law court in Leipzig. There the judges and other jurists swore an oath of loyalty to Nazi battle law.[51]

The arbitrary and inhuman expulsions of Jews from the civil service, education, and law were coordinated with other ousters to bring about the blighting effect upon Jewry which the Nazis had been planning from the start.

Other laws which the Nazis enacted to surround their illegitimate campaign of Jewish annihilation with the mantle of legality removed and excluded Jews from tax assessment and tax consultancy. The anti-Semitic legislation destroyed the likelihood of Jewish physicians, dentists, and dental technicians working with social health plans which covered almost the entire population. Other laws removed and excluded Jews from journalism, literature, the film industry, the theatre, broadcasting, music, the plastic arts, the ownership of hereditary rural homesteads, public orders and contracts, the stock exchange, the produce exchange, and executive positions in trade unions.[52]

On July 14, 1933, the cabinet passed the Law Regarding the Seizure of Anti-folkish and Subversive Assets, which was aimed at Marxist organizations. However, the Nazis also used this law to steal Jewish property; later they promulgated specific anti-Semitic laws designed to rob Jews of their possessions.[53]

The Nazis used boycotts, forced sales, and terror to oust Jews from commerce and trade. The Law Concerning the Ordering of National Labor of January 20, 1934, intensified the process of excluding Jews from executive positions in the German economy.[54]

During the Party Day rally of September 1935 (Parteitag der Freiheit), Hitler ordered officials of the Ministry of the Interior to Nuremberg, where they had to draft legislation which became known as the "Nuremberg laws." On September 15, 1935, the Nuremberg law on citizenship (Reichsbürgergesetz) officially transformed Jews into second-class citizens. Unlike "Aryans," Jews were not allowed to attain the new status of "citizen of the Reich" (Reichsbürger) and consequently lost all political rights.[55] The blood protection law (Blutschutzgesetz) of September 15, 1935, prohibited marriages and extramarital relations between Jews and "citizens of German or kindred blood." Jews were not allowed to employ "Aryan" females below the age of forty-five in their households, and they could not display the German flags.[56]

THE ROAD TO GENOCIDE

The second phase of anti-Jewish legislation began on September 15, 1935, with the Nuremberg laws and ended on November 9, 1938, with the start of the officially prompted pogrom which the Nazis dubbed the night of crystal (Kristallnacht).

During this period the Nazis intensified the anti-Jewish drive by using the weapon of prohibition of profession (Berufsverbot). The ousters devastated additional occupational groups such as construction engineers, cattle dealers, auctioneers, arms dealers, realtors, nurses, etc.[57]

The Nazis continued to expropriate Jewish companies and enacted oppressive measures which excluded Jews from doctoral examinations;

imprisoned Jewish violators of racial laws and returning emigrants in concentration camps; prohibited changes of Jewish names; enforced the registration of Jewish businesses, assets, and persons; and ordered Jews to carry special identity cards and to use the middle names Sarah or Israel.

After the annexation of Austria, the Nazis disenfranchised the Austrian Jews on March 16, 1938. On October 5, 1938, the German government seized all Jewish passports. The Minister of the Interior also limited the issuance of new passports, which had to be marked with the letter J. On October 26, 1938, Himmler ordered the deportation of all Polish Jews. Two days later the Gestapo arrested these Jews and transported them to the border, where SS officials brutally forced them into an unhospitable Poland.[58]

The third phase of anti-Jewish legislation extends from the pogrom night of November 9-10, 1938, to the start of World War II on September 1, 1939. During the November pogrom Hitler unleashed hordes of sadistic SA and SS hooligans who murdered Jews, burned down their synagogues, demolished their stores and apartments, and carried out mass arrests.[59]

A wave of legislation followed the pogrom which accelerated the isolation and impoverishment of the Jews. On November 11, 1938, Jews had to surrender all weapons in their possession to the police. On November 12, 1938, Hermann Göring signed three decrees in his capacity as plenipotentiary for the (economic) Four-Year Plan. The first decree and subsequent legislation levied a punitive payment in the amount of 1 billion marks upon all Jews. The second decree excluded Jews from cooperatives and forbade them to engage in business, artisanry, or management. The third decree forced Jews to pay for the enormous damages which Nazi hoodlums had inflicted upon Jewish property during the November pogrom and to surrender all insurance claims to the Third Reich.[60]

The discriminatory legislation of the third phase sharpened the isolation and confinement of the Jews. On November 12, 1938, the president of the Reich Chamber of Culture, Joseph Goebbels, issued an order barring Jews from theatres, movie houses, concerts, exhibitions, etc. Subsequent legislation forbade Jewish children to attend public schools, subjected Jews to curfews, limited their freedom of movement, invalidated their driver's licenses and automobile registrations, expelled them from non-Jewish apartments and houses, and forced them to move into buildings occupied solely by Jews.[61] On July 4, 1939, the Minister of the Interior, Wilhelm Frick, established the SS-controlled Reich Association of Jews in Germany and decreed that all Jews inside Nazi territory had to belong to the association.[62]

The fourth phase of anti-Jewish legislation and activity extends from the start of World War II to the destruction of the Jews in Nazi-domi-

nated Europe and covers the period September 1, 1939 to May 8, 1945.

The legislation of this phase aimed at the complete impoverishment and isolation of the Jews and their physical destruction. On September 12, 1939, Heydrich issued an edict which limited the access of Jews to food stores and subjected their apartments to police searches.[63] Other measures forbade Jews to do the following: leave their apartments after eight in the evening; own radios; buy clothes; have telephones; use public transportation without restrictions; move without permission; write checks; own typewriters, bicycles, cameras, binoculars, etc.; use public telephones; keep pets; subscribe to newspapers and magazines; receive an education; purchase meat, meat products, eggs, milk, and books; send letters abroad.[64] These measures and others of similar nature dissolved the everyday world of Jews.

Behind this nightmarish scene smoldered the Polish horizon; there the SS was herding Jews into city ghettos. By December 1939, Poles and Jews were pouring into Nazi-dominated Poland, where the SS was carrying out executions of hundreds of thousands.[65]

On March 4, 1941, the Nazis subjected German Jews to forced labor; on September 1, 1941, they ordered them to wear a yellow Star of David; on October 23, 1941, they forbade them to emigrate; on November 4, 1941, the transportation (*Abschiebung*) of Jews to Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe went into high gear and the Minister of Finances, Schwerin von Krosigk, organized the seizure of the deportees' assets.[66]

On July 31, 1941, Göring, as head of the Four-Year Plan, charged the chief of the Security Police and the Security Service (SD), *SS-Gruppenführer* Heydrich, with the preparation of the Final Solution of the so-called Jewish question.[67] On January 20, 1942, Heydrich summoned top officials of all ministries and offices involved in anti-Jewish activities to a villa in Wannsee, a swank Berlin suburb. Under SS direction the assembled civil servants developed a plan for the Final Solution. Authorized by Hitler and supported by the Nazi leadership, the Wannsee planners developed a detailed schedule for the destruction of Europe's 11 million Jews.[68]

After the Wannsee Conference Nazi legislation and policy operated in support of genocide. The consequences were horrendous and bestial: Jews became the slave workers of German corporations, which profited enormously from their misery; Jews were systematically worked to death by the SS; Jews were murdered in the torture chambers and gas chambers of the concentration camps.

The Nazi program of large-scale genocide, resulting in the death of 6 million Jews and millions of Poles, Russians, and other non-Jews, conjured up a final wave of legislation. On April 25, 1943, the Minister of the Interior cynically decreed that Jews and Gypsies—who were continually being destroyed in Nazi death factories—could not become German citizens.[69] On June 9 and 10, 1943, the Nazis dissolved the

Reich Association of Jews in Germany and seized the assets of the organization.[70] On July 1, 1943, Jews officially lost all legal protection and were subjected to the power of the police and Gestapo. In the event of death, Jewish assets were seized by the Reich.[71]

And so the Nazi death machine rattled on. The horrifying operation of the machine of mass extermination was supervised by brutal SS hordes and accompanied by the dry pronouncements of miserable bureaucrats. These debased representatives of a perverted legal and administrative system continued their lethal labor to the last moments of the Hitler regime—down to that *Runderlass* of the Minister for Economics, Walther Funk. The minister's circular of February 16, 1945, ordered the destruction of all files containing references to anti-Jewish activities in order to prevent the capture of these documents.[72]

The Nazi technicians of hell tried to shroud the scenes of mechanized mass murder with an impenetrable veil of secrecy. Against concealment, ignorance, and indifference a united humanity must set the watchword of the Italian anti-Fascists: *Non dimenticare!* Don't forget!

NOTES

1. See Ernst Niekisch, *Das Reich der niederen Dämonen* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1953). In 1937, Niekisch was sentenced to lifelong imprisonment. He left the penitentiary in 1945 as a cripple. He was not alone. In April 1939, Nazi concentration camps were filled with more than 300,000 Germans. Approximately 35,000 non-Jewish Germans left the country as émigrés between 1933 and 1941. The figures are cited in David Schoenbaum, *Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. xiii.

2. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Munich: Franz Eher Nachfolger, 1925-1927), p. 55.

3. Ibid., p. 70 (emphasis in original; my translation). The last paragraph of Hitler's testament of April 29, 1945, ordered all Germans to continue their "merciless resistance" against "international Jewry." The last page of the testament is reproduced in Helmut Eschwege, ed., *Kennzeichen J: Bilder, Dokumente, Berichte zur Geschichte der Verbrechen des Hitlerfaschismus an den deutschen Juden, 1933-1945* (Frankfurt a.M.: Röderberg-Verlag, 1979), p. 286.

4. See John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918-1945* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954).

5. Hitler attacked the Treaty of Versailles, which concluded World War I, at the start of his political activity. For his early speeches and writings on the treaty see Hitler, *Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen, 1905-1924,* ed. Eberhard Jäckel and Axel Kuhn (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1980), pp. 92-94, 113-15, 143-46, 157-63, 237-41, 265-69, 305-11, 398-400, 897-901.

6. See Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, pp. 216-25. In reality sailors of the imperial battle fleet at Kiel started the German revolution. Rebellious soldiers joined the navy mutineers in early November 1918. The military revolt made possible the formation of the armed Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets that supported Friedrich Ebert's "social republic." For the chronicle of these events see Cuno Horkenbach, ed., *Das Deutsche Reich von 1918 bis Heute* (Berlin: Verlag für Presse, Wirtschaft und Politik, 1930), pp. 27-35.

7. See Ulrike Hörster-Philipps, "Conservative Concepts of Dictatorship in the Final Phase of the Weimar Republic: The Government of Franz von Papen," in Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann, eds., *Towards the Holocaust: The Social and Economic Collapse of the Weimar Republic* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 120. See also Fritz Thyssen, *I Paid Hitler* (New York: Cooperation Publishing, 1941). Thyssen expanded his father's steel company into the giant *Vereinigte Stahlwerke*. The authoritarian magnate wrote his revelations after his flight from the Nazi Germany he had helped to create. Many industrialists and bankers subsidized Hitler and his NSDAP (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*), including Krupp, Siemens, Bosch, Flick, Vögler of the United Steelworks, and Schacht of the *Reichsbank*. See Daniel Guerin, *Fascism and Big Business*, 2nd ed., trans. Frances and Mason Merrill (New York: Monad Press, 1973).

8. See Richard F. Hamilton, *Who Voted for Hitler?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 121, 137, 219, 223-25, 228.

9. See Michael H. Kater, *The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919-1945* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 155-61, 229-33.

10. See Schoenbaum, *Hitler's Social Revolution,* pp. 1-42.

11. Prager and Telushkin view Nazi anti-Semitism as the outgrowth of practically all the popular ideologies which influenced the course of German history: "Christianity, the Enlightenment, Marxism, nationalism, and racism." For this statement see Dennis Prager and Joseph Telushkin, *Why the Jews? The Reason for Antisemitism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 157. See also Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), Peter Viereck, *Metapolitics: From the Romantics to Hitler* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), and Rohan Butler, *The Roots of National Socialism, 1783-1933* (New York: Dutton, 1942).

12. See G. S. Graber, *History of the SS* (New York: David McKay, 1978), pp. 24-25.

13. Ibid., p. 25.

14. Ibid., p. 31.

15. Ibid., p. 30. SA or *Sturmabteilung* means Storm Detachment. See also Robert G.L. Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Post-War Germany, 1918-1923* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952). On November 8, 1933, delegations of the Free Corps handed over their flags to the SA in Munich's Königsplatz. The ceremony and the speech of SA *Stabschef* Röhm are reported in Cuno Horkenbach, ed., *Das*

Deutsche Reich von 1918 bis Heute (hereafter cited as *Reich*) (Berlin: Presse-und Wirtschafts-Verlag, 1935), p. 533.

16. The modern German word for *Vehme* is *Feme*.

17. See Cuno Horkenbach, ed., *Das Deutsche Reich von 1918 bis Heute* (Berlin: Verlag für Presse, Wirtschaft und Politik, 1930), pp. 131, 143-45.

18. See Erich Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic,* Vol. 1, trans. Harlan P. Hanson and Robert G.L. Waite (New York: Atheneum, 1970), p. 263. See also Emil J. Gumbel, *Vom Fememord zur Reichskanzlei* (Heidelberg: Schneider, 1962).

19. Captain Ehrhardt's brigade supported the Kapp Putsch in March 1920; Ehrhardt also assisted Hitler's Munich Beer Hall Putsch of November 8, 1923. Major Buchrucker was guilty of the Küstrin Putsch of October 1, 1923. For these events see Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic,* Vol. 11, pp. 147, 263, 272.

20. Ibid., pp. 160, 263.

21. Hitler, *Mein Kampf,* p. xxvii.

22. See Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die Deutsche Diktatur: Entstehung, Struktur, Folgen des Nationalsozialismus* (Cologne and Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969), p. 112. See also Heinrich Hannover, *Politische Justiz 1918-1933* (Frankfurt: Fischer Bücherei, 1966).

23. For the problems of German interwar society see Gunter W. Remmling, "Prologue: Weimar Society in Retrospect," in Dobkowski and Wallimann, *Towards the Holocaust,* pp. 3-14.

24. See Uwe Dietrich Adam, *Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1972), pp. 38-46; Gotthard Jasper, *Der Schutz der Republik* (Tübingen: Mohr Verlag, 1963).

25. Hans Frank, "Deutsche Juristen," *Deutsches Recht* 4, no. 1 (January 1934), p. 1 (my translation). The old system of law, Frank gloated, has been replaced by the "crystalline hardness of the decision-making power of National Socialist fighters." For this statement see Frank, "Das ewige deutsche Recht ist unser Ziel," *Deutsches Recht* 4, no. 11 (June 1934), p. 250. In this speech a power-drunk Frank frequently refers to battle law and the role of jurists as servants of Hitler and the NSDAP. In another speech Frank referred to Hitler as "our highest leader who is also our highest judge *(Gerichtsherr)*." For this statement and other comments on the subordination of the Nazi legal system under Hitler's will, see Frank, "Aufgabe des Rechtslebens nicht die Sicherung der Paragraphenanwendung, sondern vor allem Sicherung des Volkslebens," *Deutsches Recht* 4, no. 18 (September 1934), p. 427 (my translation). In 1933, Frank became a *Reichsminister* and *Reichsleiter.* He was also *Reichsjuristenführer* and leader of the League of National Socialist German Jurists, which had replaced the German Bar Association. He directed the "coordination" of the legal system as *Reichskommissar für die Gleichschaltung der Justiz.* The Nazis quickly formed their own organizations and outlawed all other associations of the legal profession. From 1939 to 1945, Frank was overlord of the General Government of

Poland, where he dedicated himself to the eradication of the Jews. Convicted
by the International Military Tribunal, he was executed in 1946.

26. Cited in *Frankfurter Zeitung,* October 29, 1935.

27. Roland Freisler, "Deutsches Strafrecht, Vermächtnis und Aufgabe,"
Deutsches Strafrecht, Neue Folge, 1, no. 1 (January/February 1934), pp. 2, 5
(my translation). Freisler achieved notoriety as the Nazi judge presiding over
the bloody People's Court which "tried" many German army officers and
civilians accused of involvement in the attempt on Hitler's life of July 20,
1944. For the development of the totalitarian legal system in Nazi Germany,
see the following legal periodicals: *Die Juristische Wochenschrift; Zeitschrift
der Akademie für Deutsches Recht; Schriften Der Akademie fur Deutsches
Recht; Das Recht der Nationalen Revolution; Deutsches Recht; Jahrbuch der
Akademie für Deutsches Recht.* See also Ernst Brandis, *Die Ehegesetze von
1935* (Berlin: Verlag für Standesamtswesen, 1936); Hans Frank, *National-
sozialistisches Handbuch für Recht und Gesetzgebung,* 2nd ed. (Munich:
Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1935); Hans Frank, *Nationalsozialistische
Strafrechtspolitik* (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1938); Hans Frank,
Rechtsgrundlegung des nationalsozialistischen Führerstaates, 2nd ed. (Mu-
nich: Zentraverlag der NSDAP, 1938); C. Haidn and L. Fischer, *Das Recht
der NSDAP* (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1936); Ernst Rudolf Huber,
Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches (Hamburg: Hanseatische Ver-
lagsanstalt, 1937-1939); Otto Meissner and Georg Kaisenberg, *Staats- und
Verwaltungsrecht im Dritten Reich* (Berlin: Verlag für Sozialpolitik, Wirt-
schaft und Statistik, 1935); Karl-Friedrich Schrieber, ed., *Das Recht der
Reichskulturkammer* (Berlin: Junker and Dünnhaupt Verlag, 1935); E. Volk-
mar, A. Elster, and g. Küchenhoff, eds., *Die Rechtsentwicklung der Jahre
1933 bis 1935/36* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1937); Wissenschaftliche Ab-
teilung des NS. -Rechtswahrerbundes, ed., *Der Deutsche Rechtsstand* (Ber-
lin: Deutscher Rechtsverlag, 1939). For a recent analysis of the Nazi judicial
system see Ilse Staff, ed., *Justiz im Dritten Reich* (Frankfurt: Fischer-
Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1978).

28. See Hans Frank, "Zur Strafrechtsreform," *Deutsches Recht* 4, no. 3
(February 1934), p. 49. Writing in his capacity as *Reichsjustizkommissar,*
Frank demanded the "severest punishments" for the perpetrators of these
"terrible crimes."

29. See Graber, *History of the SS,* pp. 88-95.

30. *Reich,* p. 106.

31. Ibid., p. 123. Oranienburg concentration camp opened on March
21, 1933.

32. *Reich,* pp. 41, 74, 83, 106, 115, 120, 150, 209, 220, 255, 258,
260, 263, 271, 274, 275.

33. See Reinhard Kühnl, *Faschismustheorien: Ein Leitfaden* (Hamburg:
Rowohlt, 1979), p. 209. For the names of the top civil servants, bankers,
and industrialists closely linked with the Nazi leadership, see *Reich,* p. 439.
On totalitarianism see Hannah Arendt, *Elements and Origins of Totalitarian*

Dictatorship (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1951); Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956); Karl Dietrich Bracher, *The German Dictatorship* (New York: Praeger, 1970).

34. See Kühnl, *Faschismustheorien,* p. 9.

35. See *Reich,* pp. 145-46, 153. For connections between anti-Nazi demonstrations and boycotts in the United States, England, Poland, France, etc., and the Nazi and anti-Jewish boycott, see Edwin Black, *The Transfer Agreement* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 7-68.

36. See Eschwege, *Kennzeichen J.,* p. 38.

37. Hans Peter Deeg, ed., *Die Judengesetze Grossdeutschlands* (Nuremberg: Der Stürmer Verlag, 1939).

38. See Joseph Walk, ed., *Das Sonderrecht für die Juden im NS-Staat: Eine Sammlung der gesetzlichen Massnahmen und Richtlinien—Inhalt und Bedeutung* (hereafter cited as *Sonderrecht*) (Heidelberg: Karlsruhe: C. F. Müller Juristischer Verlag, 1981).

39. See American Jewish Committee, *The Jews in Nazi Germany: A Handbook of Facts Regarding Their Present Situation,* reprint (hereafter cited as *Jews*) (New York: Howard Fertig, 1982), p. 3. *Jews* was first published in 1935. The official census of June 1925 indicated that the Jews in Germany numbered 564,379 or 0.9 percent of the total population. The census of June 16, 1933, revealed that the number of Jews had dropped to 499,682 or 0.77 percent of the total population. In 1933, about 60,000 Jews emigrated from Germany. In 1934, Jewish emigrants numbered approximately 23,000; in 1935, they numbered about 21,000; in 1936, about 25,000; in 1937, about 23,000. Between January 1, 1938, and the start of World War II on September 1, 1939, about 157,000 Jews emigrated from Germany. By May 17, 1939, forced confiscatory emigration, deportation, and murder had reduced the Jewish population in Germany to 213,930. On May 8, 1945, there were about 15,000 German Jews who had survived the Holocaust in Nazi-ruled and Nazi-occupied Europe. In Europe the Nazis had murdered about 6 million Jews. These statistics are cited in *Jews,* pp. 3, 116, and in Eschwege, *Kennzeichen J.,* pp. 349, 350, 351, 354, 355, 363.

40. For the distinction of the different phases of the Nazi anti-Jewish legislation I am indebted to Eschwege and Walk. See Eschwege, *Kennzeichen J.,* p. 5, and *Sonderrecht,* p. xi.

41. See *Jews,* p. 75; *Reich,* pp. 106, 140.

42. The decree of February 28, 1933, based on Article 48, paragraph 2 of the Weimar Constitution (*Reichsverfassung*), was the fundament of the Nazis' totalitarian police state. See *Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zum Schutze von Volk und Staat, Reichsgesetzblatt* (hereafter cited as RGB1) I, 1933, p. 83.

43. *Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich* (*Ermächtigungsgesetz*), RGB1 I, 1933, p. 141. Article 3 of this enabling law empowered the

chancellor, i.e., *Reichskanzler* Hitler, to engross and promulgate the laws of the Reich.

44. Points four and five of the Party Program of February 24, 1920, declared that Jews could not be German citizens and that they should be subject to alien legislation. Cited in *Sonderrecht*, p. 3.

45. The American Jewish Committee uses the concept non-Jews of Jewish descent. See *Jews*, p. 76. The Nazis publicized their intention to cause "the humiliation of the Jews of Germany." See *Völkischer Beobachter*, April 3, 1933.

46. For the "Aryan paragraph" and its consequences see *Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums*, RGB1 I, 1933, pp. 175-77. See also *Jews*, pp. 123-29. Exceptions concerning Jewish war veterans and their families were rendered nugatory in practice.

47. *Erste Verordnung zur Durchführung des Gesetzes zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums*, RGB1 I, 1933, p. 195. Paragraph 2 of this decree defined as "non-Aryan" anybody "who is descended from non-Aryan, in particular Jewish parents or grandparents. It is sufficient that one parent or one grandparent is non-Aryan. This shall be deemed to be so, in particular, if one parent or one grandparent belonged to the Jewish religion."

48. *Zweite Verordnung zur Durchführung des Gesetzes zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums*, RGB1 I, 1933, pp. 233-35. In contrast to many other countries, health insurance and social work are civil service organizations in Germany.

49. *Dritte Verordnung zur Durchführung des Gesetzes zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums*, RGB1 I, 1933, pp. 245-46. In Germany judges, notaries, public school teachers, and university professors are civil servants. See also Hans Mommsen, *Beamtentum im Dritten Reich* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1966).

50. The restrictive laws excluded Jews from admittance to the profession of law, juries, commercial judgeships, labor and arbitration courts, the lawyers' and patent lawyers' association, etc. See RGB1 I, 1933, pp. 188-89, 217-18, 522-23, 669-77. See also *Jews*, pp. 139-48.

51. See *Reich*, pp. 436-37.

52. These discriminatory laws, decrees, ordinances, orders, instructions, and rulings were promulgated in 1933. For the text of this legislation see *Jews*, pp. 149-77. Subsequent legislation increased the severity of these measures and extended their range to all other professional activities.

53. See RGB1 I, 1933, pp. 479-80. For subsequent legislation see RGB1 I, 1937, p. 1161; RGB1 I, 1938, pp. 404, 414-16, 973, 1579-81, 1638-40, 1709; RGB1 I, 1939, pp. 282-86. See also *Sonderrecht*, p. 233, No. 503; p. 263, Nos. 52, 53; p. 264, No. 57.

54. See *Reichsarbeitsblatt* I, 1934, pp. 45-56.

55. See RGB1 I, 1935, p. 1146.

56. For the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor *(Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre)* see RGB1 I, 1935, pp. 1146-47.

57. See RGB1 I, 1935, pp. 1524-25; RGB1 I, 1936, pp. 11-12, 317-18, 347-58, 524-26, 563-64; RGB1 I, 1937, pp. 28-29, 191-202; RGB1 I, 1938, pp. 40-44, 115, 202, 265-69, 823-24, 1309-15, 1403-6, 1545-46.

58. See *Sonderrecht,* p. 187, No. 290; pp. 191-92, No. 310; p. 203, No. 363; p. 210, No. 400; p. 222, Nos. 452, 453; p. 223, Nos. 457, 458; p. 226, No. 471; p. 227, No. 475; p. 229, No. 487; p. 233, Nos. 503, 506; p. 237, Nos. 524, 526; p. 244, Nos. 556, 557; p. 247, No. 569.

59. See Herrmann Graml, *Der 9. November 1938: "Reichskristall-nacht,"* 6th ed. (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst, 1958).

60. See RGB1 I, 1938, pp. 1573, 1579-81, 1638; *Reichssteuerblatt,* 1938, pp. 1073-75. See also Adam, *Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich,* pp. 211-12.

61. See *Sonderrecht,* p. 255, No. 12; p. 256, No. 17; p. 260, Nos. 34, 37; p. 262, No. 47; p. 292, No. 190; p. 293, No. 192.

62. See RGB1 I, 1939, pp. 1097-98. The *Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland* was controlled by Heydrich, chief of the SS Main Security Office. In 1938 and 1939, the Nuremberg laws were extended to Nazi-dominated Czechoslovakia.

63. See *Sonderrecht,* p. 304, No. 10.

64. Ibid., p. 305, Nos. 12, 16; p. 306, No. 17; p. 307, No. 24; p. 312, No. 48; p. 325, No. 115; p. 350, Nos. 241, 244; p. 355, No. 264; p. 360, No. 287; p. 364, Nos. 308, 310; p. 377, No. 376; p. 379, No. 386; p. 387, No. 426; p. 389, No. 437; p. 402, No. 501.

65. See Graber, *History of the SS,* pp. 137-39.

66. See *Sonderrecht,* p. 336, No. 174; p. 347, No. 229; p. 353, No. 256; p. 354, No. 261.

67. See Eschwege, *Kennzeichen J.,* p. 148.

68. Ibid., p. 228.

69. See RGB1 I, 1943, pp. 268-69.

70. See *Sonderrecht,* p. 398, No. 485; p. 399, No. 487.

71. See RGB1 I, 1943, p. 372.

72. See *Sonderrecht,* p. 406, No. 525.

11

THE ULTIMATE REPRESSION: THE GENOCIDE OF THE ARMENIANS, 1915-1917

Gerard J. Libaridian

INTRODUCTION

Exterminations of families, tribes, and ethnic or religious groups have been known to occur since the dawn of history. The particular heinousness of mass death, however, has brought the gradual recognition of such acts as crimes against humanity. Planned and systematic genocides have even acquired a wider scope, while technology has increased their efficiency. Given the technological advances in military and biological hardware, the degrees to which many groups depend on governmental policies for their survival, the abrupt changes which traditional societies undergo when facing the challenge of modernization, and the increase in tensions between nations due to the diminishing resources available for distribution, one can expect governments to have recourse to radical solutions such as genocide to solve real or imaginary problems. Genocide thus may become merely another manifestation of what differentiates a state from other institutions: its monopoly of the right to kill enemies of society and to ask its citizens to kill enemies of the state or to be killed doing it.

A corollary to the above hypothesis is that certain groups that seek change in a system, particularly a traditional one, are more likely to be victims of genocide. This is especially true when the ideology of the state characterizes a potential victim as both an enemy of society (of the internal order) and of the state.[1]

The genocide of the Armenian people during World War I is the earliest case of a documented modern day extermination of a nation. Planned and carried out by the Ittihadist (Ittihad ve Terakke Jemiyeti, or the Committee of Union and Progress) government of the Ottoman

Empire, this first genocide of the twentieth century may also be a para-digm for a type of "political" genocide likely to become the pattern of twentieth-century genocides.

The purpose here is to suggest the possibility that twentieth-century genocides may have become radical means used by governments to resolve political problems. This chapter will briefly present the facts and impact of the Armenian genocide, discuss the generally accepted explanations of the holocaust as the final solution to a thorny national problem, introduce some newly discovered evidence on the relations between Armenian and Turkish leaders preceding the genocide, and sug-gest that the Ittihadist government perceived Armenians not only as an unwelcome ethnic group but also as a social group which threatened the traditional authoritarian order of Ottoman society.

The events between 1915 and 1917, the worst years of the genocide, are quite clear and documented in gruesome detail.[2] In early 1913, the Young Turk government was taken over by its militaristic and chauvin-istic wing led by Enver, Talaat, and Jemal Pashas.[3] This triumvirate led the country into World War I on the side of Germany. Sometime in early 1915 that same government developed and put into effect a plan for the extermination of its Armenian population, variously placed at be-tween 2 and 3 million subjects. Most Armenians lived in the rural and small-town environment of historic Western Armenia, a part of the Otto-man Empire since the sixteenth century.[4]

The plan was carried out in phases. In April 1915, the religious, po-litical, educational, and intellectual leadership of the Armenian people, close to 1,000 individuals, most educated in the Western tradition, were taken into custody throughout the Empire and killed within a few days. Then Armenian draftees of the Ottoman army, estimated at 200,000, were liquidated through mass burials, burnings, executions, and sheer exhaustion in labor battalions. Finally, the remainder of the population, now composed largely of elderly people, women, and children, was given orders for deportation in all parts of the Empire (except the capital and a few cities with European presences).[5] While a few cities and dis-tricts resisted the orders, most followed them, with the faint hope that they might be given a chance to come back.[6]

The fate of the deportees was usually death. Caravans of women and children, ostensibly being led to southern parts of the Empire, became death marches. Within six months of the deportations half of the de-portees were killed, buried alive, or thrown into the sea or the rivers. Few reached relatively safe cities such as Aleppo. Most survivors ended up in the deserts of Northern Mesopotamia, where starvation, dehydra-tion, and outright murder awaited them. Subsequent sweeps of cities en-sured the elimination of the Armenian people from the western and largest portion of their historic homeland.

The extermination was accomplished under the supervision of a secretive organization which functioned as part of the government, the *Teshkilat-i Mahsusa* or Special Organization, run by the highest government officials, manned by convicts released from jail, and acting under the immediate supervision of select members of the Ittihad Party.[7] The release of the vilest, unbridled animal passions served well the government's purpose of ensuring extermination in the most humiliating, dehumanizing fashion. The torture of thousands of women and children became a source of satisfaction for hundreds who sought and found official sanction from government officials as well as Muslim clergymen, since the murder of Armenians was characterized, like the war against the Entente, as a *jihad* or holy war. Human imagination labored to devise new ways of mutilating, burning, and killing. The suicide of hundreds of women and children attests to the particular brutality of the methods used.

The carnage took place in full view of the military and diplomatic representatives of governments allied with the Ottoman state, such as Germany, and neutral ones, such as the United States (until 1917). In addition, Western missionaries, journalists, travellers, and even sympathetic officers of the Ottoman army described the death marches and atrocities in daily letters and accounts. Reports of the extermination and its methods forwarded to Washington, Berlin, and other capitals by eyewitnesses confirm the stories told by thousands of survivors in subsequent memoirs and oral history interviews.[8]

The methods used to bring about the extermination of the Armenians are very significant, since they attest to the participation of an important segment of the general population. The acquiescence of Turkish, Kurdish, and, to a limited extent, Arab civilians was made easier by the promise of loot, of appropriation of children and women, and of an afterlife in heaven. A governmental decree making it illegal to assist refugees or orphans might ultimately have been responsible, however, for the absence of wholesale assistance from Turks to their former neighbors and friends. The penalty for such assistance was death by hanging in front of one's own house and the burning of that house.[9] This did not stop some, nonetheless, from resisting orders. A number of Turkish governors and sub-governors were removed from office for their unwillingness to follow orders. Many Turks and Kurds, especially in the Dersim region, risked their lives to save straggling Armenians, and Arabs throughout the Empire's southern provinces accepted and helped the survivors.[10]

It is not clear whether it was the absence of technologically viable means to exterminate swiftly or the desire to keep the appearance of "deportations" that led the government to achieve extermination through such methods. The Ottoman government had a record of massacres, some against Armenians. Of these, the 1894-1896 and 1909 are the best

known.[11] But this was the first time such a wholesale operation was conducted, ending in the uprooting of a whole nation.

The impact of the genocide was devastating. Of the 2 to 3 million Western Armenians, 1.5 million perished during the holocaust. Up to 150,000 of those who had accepted Islam or had been kept, stolen, or protected by Turks and Kurds survived in Western Armenia without, however, any possibility of preserving a sense of religious or national identity. Close to 400,000 survived by fleeing to Russian Armenia and the Caucasus (where many more died as a consequence of disease and starvation) or Iran; perhaps 400,000 survived by reaching the southern or Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.[12]

In addition to the death of some 50 to 70 percent of Armenians living under Ottoman Turkish rule, Armenians lost the right to live as a community in the lands of their ancestors; they lost their personal property and belongings. They left behind the schools, churches, community centers, ancient fortresses, and medieval cathedrals, witnesses to a long history. Survivors were forced to begin a new life truncated, deprived of a link with their past, subject to upheavals in the new lands where they suddenly found themselves as foreigners. The remnants of the largely peasant and rural population were now a wretched group of squatters on the outskirts of cities poorly equipped to handle an increase in population.

The genocide constituted a radical break with the past for Western Armenians. The normal transmission of ethical and cultural values was cut off. The traditional ways of explaining tragedies could not accommodate the final solution. Orphans grew to remember and tell the stories of childhood years; they did not know what to think of their Turkish neighbors and found it difficult to imagine that they had once lived together in relative peace.

ENEMIES BY DEFINITION

The victims of twentieth century premeditated genocide—the Jews, the Gypsies, the Armenians—were murdered in order to fulfill the state's design for a new order. . . . War was used in both cases (an opportunity anticipated and planned for by Germany but simply seized by Turkey after World War I began) to transform the nation to correspond to the ruling elite's formula by eliminating groups conceived of as alien, enemies by definition.[13]

So argues Helen Fein in *Accounting for Genocide*. This provides a basic and adequate explanation for the dynamics of the Armenian genocide. Whatever political, sociological, and other explanations one may end up accepting as part of the causal process, only such an encompassing, exclusive characteristic of the human mind can account for the radical nature of the "solution," for the act of genocide. It is when man

plays God and wants to recreate the world in his own image—however perverted man or the image—that the *other* can be reduced to a nuisance, to an enemy that by definition must be destroyed regardless of his or her actions and policies.

Explanations of the Armenian genocide have generally agreed with Fein's conclusion. The "formula" which historians have ascribed to the Ittihadist elite may vary; some stress a Pan-Islamist vision at work, others a Pan-Turanian one. Most have focused on the rise of an exclusive Turkish nationalism underlying or in the service of Pan-Turanian and/or Pan-Islamic dreams.[14] This nationalism was tied to Anatolia, the "birthplace" of Turkism, a last bastion after the loss of European Turkey. In some cases, as if to moderate the burden of the crime, some have argued that the genocide was the violent manifestation of an otherwise predictable and historically natural clash of two nationalisms in conflict, Armenian against Turkish; this explanation allows for the equation of the motivations of the two groups, with a difference only in the means used by each to achieve their goal.[15]

Evolving Turkish nationalism was, in fact, the major factor which determined the course of Ottoman history during the first two decades of this century. Whatever subjective satisfaction Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanian dreams gave to its adherents, whether under Sultan Abdul Hamid II or the Young Turks who replaced him, these ideologies remained vehicles by which energies outside Turkish nationalism could be harnessed to its service. The Young Turk-Ittihadist elite cared not under what ideology it continued its domination. Religion worked for a while, in some places. It was particularly potent in moving the ignorant masses, in ensuring the support of the *mollahs* (priests) and the *softas* (students of religion) for the Holy War. The idea of unification of Turkish groups across Asia had some success as well; but Pan-Turanism too remained an abstraction for most of the people it was supposed to inspire.

By the time the Ittihadist triumvirate decided to sign an alliance with Germany, its members had determined that whatever ideology emerged, and regardless of who won the war, drastic measures were needed if the Turkish elite were to continue to rule over the remains of the Empire. Long before the war, the Ittihadists were already pursuing a policy of Turkification which went beyond Pan-Islamism.[16] Arabs and Albanians were to speak Turkish; it was not sufficient that they were largely Muslim. The problem with the Ittihadists was that they had not as yet given up on the idea of an empire, which required an ideology and a basis of legitimation wider than Turkish nationalism or dynastic allegiance.

Conditions were ripe for genocide to occur during a period of transition from the concept of an empire based on dynastic allegiance to that of a nation-state. Pan-Turanian and Pan-Islamic ideologies were stages that

helped the Ottomans accept the break from a tradition of conquest. One of the vehicles for the building of Turkish nationalism was the identification of "enemies" of the yet to be born nation; a second vehicle was its resistance to the loss of territory and dignity to Western imperialism. The self-definition in relation to the Armenian enemy was convenient, since Armenians were neither Turks nor Muslims; and the long history of the Armenian Question as an integral part of the Eastern Question made identification with outside enemies, in this case France, Great Britain, and Russia, easy.[17]

The Ottoman government had used wholesale massacres before against "enemies" of the state. Wartime conditions provided justification for extraordinary measures. Western governments, traditionally the only ones interested in and capable of intervention, were already at war, on the wrong side, as far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned. Germany, the Ottoman Empire's major ally, was capable of making a difference but opted not to.[18] Armenians, based on their history of past victimization, could easily be perceived as enemies of society or the state, given the paranoia of Ittihadist leaders.[19]

It is possible to paraphrase Helen Fein, then, and reconstruct a Turkish "design for a new order." This would be based, on the one hand, on the assertion of sovereignty vis-à-vis the West by reversing the series of losses of territories; on the other hand, this design would insist on the establishment of "order" within the country, an order which was threatened by elements for whom the symbols of Turkism, Islamism, or Turanism could not mean much and who were seeking an alternate framework for identification with the state. In addition, these elements, i.e., Armenians, could be charged with collusion with the traditional enemy, Russia.[20]

The basic explanation provided by Fein, however, does not preclude the further elaboration of the vision of the criminal state in its specific and more complex historical context. Many scholars have contributed to the understanding of genocide and to the identification of factors leading to genocide. Leo Kuper and Irving L. Horowitz have developed new perspectives on genocide as a political weapon in the twentieth century and argued for its study as a new category in social research.[21] Vahakn Dadrian, a sociologist pioneering in studies on the Armenian genocide, has concentrated on the victimization theory and has pointed out sociological factors involved in the process of dehumanization leading to genocide resulting from the search for power.[22]

The Kurdish historian Siyamend Othman, in his doctoral dissertation and a subsequent article, attempted to explain the reasons why Kurds played such a prominent role in the deportations and massacres. His argument is that for Kurds within a feudal structure the tribe provided group identity and therefore allegiance was to the chief, who was manipulated by the Ottoman government. Othman also points out that the

common Kurd may have been harboring some resentment toward Arme-
nians, who tended to be the usurers and capitalists in the marketplace.[23]

In a recent paper Ronald Suny attempted an analysis of the socio-
logical makeup of both Turks and Armenians and suggested that the
existence of an Armenian upper class in control of many critical sectors
of the economy might in fact have accentuated antagonisms.[24]

Of major importance is the analysis provided by Robert Melson.
Melson has recently argued that one must go beyond victimization theo-
ries that generally point to victims of genocide as scapegoats or as pro-
vocateurs. He found instead that groups that have social mobility and
adaptability to modernization, and thus tend to disturb the traditional
orders, may tend to become victims in times of crisis. Melson has called
for a somewhat more complex model within which the paranoia of the
victimizer is as important in understanding—and foreseeing—genocide
as the "success" of the victim.[25]

These recent points of view can be seen as suggestive and important
efforts that provide specificity to the case of the Armenian genocide and
help shed light on the "formula" operative in the minds of the Turkish
leaders that made possible the dehumanization and, eventually, the exter-
mination of Armenians.

A Populist Agenda and the Alienation of the State

To the extent that the Ittihad decision to exterminate Armenians in the
Ottoman Empire can be explained by the history of relations between the
two, the period from 1908 to 1914 is obviously the most important.
Armenian political parties, the revolutionary Hunchakians and
Dashnaktsutiune, had opposed the Sultan's government until 1908, as
had the various Turkish groups known as the Young Turks, of which
the Ittihad ve Terakke was the most important. When the Young Turks
took over the government in 1908 and restored the Constitution that had
been promulgated in 1876 and prorogued in 1878, Armenian
revolutionaries ended their armed struggle and pledged allegiance to the
new regime and kept their pledge until the beginning of the genocide.

Thus, the first point to be made regarding the pre-genocide period is
that Armenian political parties functioned as legitimate Ottoman
institutions, whose goals and bylaws were recognized by the Ottoman
government. While they differed in their assessment of the chances for
successful reforms under the Ittihad government, there was and there
could have been nothing in their programs or actions which could have
been considered illegitimate or detrimental to the Constitution.

The second important fact with regard to these relations is that, along
with a change in the ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire, the 1908 Consti-
tution also produced a change in the representation of the Armenians. To
negotiate Armenian demands for reform the Ottoman Turkish govern-

ment had to deal with Armenian leaders of the revolutionary and guerrilla movement. The new spokesmen for the Armenians had won the right to represent Armenians by waging an armed struggle on behalf of economic and political rights; their religion had been Enlightenment. These new leaders supplanted the largely conservative clergymen of the Patriarchate who were bound by the dictates of the *millet* system which defined Armenians as a religious community and denied them an essentially political character.

A third important characteristic of the pre-genocide Armeno-Turkish relations is that they evolved between 1908 and 1914. The major factor which determined this change was the gradual elimination of the liberal program which some Young Turks had advocated prior to and immediately after the 1908 takeover. As a whole, the Young Turks had linked the imperative of preserving the territorial integrity of the Empire with the need to introduce general reforms. This willingness to recognize the importance of domestic social, economic, and political policies affecting the larger population had satisfied Armenians in their struggle to improve their situation, particularly the lot of the peasant and rural populations. Generally speaking, the Ittihad government discarded its liberal democratic ideals; it moved toward despotism and began relying, as its predecessor had done, on the reactionary classes, repressive measures, and symbols to secure its position in power.

Based on documents being studied for the first time, it is possible to argue that the critical period when the fundamental change occurred was between 1909 and 1911.[26] By 1909, the excitement of the first days was over. Elections for the first Parliament were completed. The Ittihad Party had run on a platform with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) or Dashnaktsutiune, and won. Furthermore, following the massacre of Adana, the government promised to take concrete steps to introduce long promised reforms, consolidate the constitutional regime, and resolve domestic issues which caused hardship to Armenians.

An agreement signed between the Ittihad and the Turkish Section of the Western Bureau (highest executive body) of the Dashnaktsutiune seemed a secure path toward the realization of reforms throughout the Empire. In 1911 the Sixth World Congress of the Dashnaktsutiune reached the conclusion that the party could no longer hope that the Ittihad would realize the reforms and consequently it could no longer remain in an alliance with the Ittihad.[27]

According to the agreement, the two parties were to develop a joint committee, above and beyond formal contacts and parliamentary negotiations. This committee would be composed of high-level officials whose task it was to find ways to strengthen the Constitution, educate the public on political issues and against the reaction, educate the Turkish masses on anti-Armenian prejudices, and increase political rights for all. In addition to the main committee in Constantinople, regional and district

joint committees were also to be organized. The agreement was reached at a meeting between representatives of the Turkish Section of the ARF Bureau and the Central Committee of the Ittihad held in Salonika in August 1909, four months after the massacres of Adana. These negotiations may have been the price paid by the Ittihad in return for the willingness of the Dashnaktsutiune to ascribe the massacres to the reaction, when in fact at least local Ittihad members were implicated.

The institutionalization of contacts at all levels appeared a good way to avoid future misunderstandings, to decrease tensions, and to open the way to important reforms. However, from the beginning, the Dashnaktsutiune had difficulties in ensuring the functioning of the committee. The first and most important committee, to be established in the capital, did not get its Turkish appointees until early 1910. In addition, the Ittihad avoided regular meetings from March to June 1910, and none of the important issues, foreign or domestic, was placed on the agenda by the Ittihad.

The Dashnaktsutiune had its own agenda, which constituted basically its minimum and practical program. The party demanded:

1. The end of feudal structures, laws, and practices in Anatolia.
2. A change in the government's policy of total indifference toward social and economic development and the concomitant crises affecting all segments of society; economic development was necessary to provide opportunities for the improvement in the standard of living.
3. The solution of the most critical issue, the agrarian crisis, which resulted both from inherent inequities and the feudal system as well as from the conscious policies of officials to expel Armenians from their farms, expropriate their lands, and give them to *muhajirs* or Muslim immigrants. The latter, often coming from the formerly Ottoman Balkan districts, were systematically directed into Armenian districts for resettlement, which would then take place at the expense of Armenian farmers.
4. The end of regressive, extralegal, and illegal taxes, which particularly affected Christians, but generally had a negative impact on all subjects.
5. The end of insecurity of life, honor, and property, particularly for Armenians whose communal existence was threatened by continuing pillaging, lawlessness, and renewed overt aggression and discrimination.[28]

These issues, and especially the agrarian crisis and the tax laws, were pointed to as threatening the economic foundation of the Armenian community.[29]

The Dashnaktsutiune placed these and other, more specific, items on the agenda on many occasions. None of the issues, however, received

satisfactory solutions. A second trip was needed to Salonika to determine why there was no action. In March 1911 two party plenipotentiaries went to meet again with the Ittihad Central Committee. The result was renewed promises for reform, once a new study was completed by two Ittihad leaders who were sent on a tour of the provinces. The Ittihad leaders seem to have agreed with the Dashnaktsutiune representatives that the problem was not between Armenians and Turks or Kurds but between the poor and the rich, and that Turkish and Kurdish peasants often suffered as much as Armenians. Despite the agreement in principle and the promise to seriously confront the problem, the tour by the two dignitaries produced no changes in government policies. Reporting from Van, a member of the Dashnaktsutiune's local Central Committee echoed the observation of many Armenians when he wrote: "[The two representatives] are here now and, frankly, we cannot understand what they are doing. They have shied away from all contacts with the popular masses and the rural folk; they are constantly surrounded by the local notables and government officials."[30]

Following two years of intense efforts and accommodation to an Ittihad agenda which seemed to be lacking focus, the Dashnaktsutiune came to the conclusion that it no longer could expect basic changes to come from the Ittihad. A Memorandum accompanying the Report to the Congress listed a number of reasons for the inability of the Ittihad to respond:

1. Feudalism was still not such an abhorrence to the Ittihad; at any rate, its leaders did not wish to alienate the Kurdish chieftains and local landlords, whose support they ultimately considered more important, and safer—since they demanded nothing in return—than that of the Armenians.

2. The Ittihad allowed reactionary elements, such as great landowners and *mollahs,* to become members of the local Ittihad clubs, changing the liberal character of the organization; it was gradually taken over by those forces which constituted the backbone of the previous regime and which had opposed constitutional change and parliamentary government.

3. The fear ascribed by Ittihad leaders to Kurds but in fact shared by some Turks that should Armenians have an equal chance in the system they would overwhelm others by their numbers and achievements.

4. The Ittihad did not wish to see the Dashnaktsutiune or any other Armenian party strengthened.

5. The Dashnaktsutiune's unqualified support of the Ittihad allowed them to take that support for granted; the Ittihad did not need to return any favors for the support.

6. The Ittihad did not wish to see an element in Asia Minor strengthened which might be favored by the Russians, particularly

when the more important friend, Germany, had other plans for Asia Minor.

7. The disagreement between two Dashnaktsutiune members of the Ottoman Parliament on the best methods to develop the proposed railroad in Eastern Anatolia.

8. Instability in the cabinet and its inability to make decisions.

In addition to the absence of reforms and the Ittihad's disregard for its own pledges, the authors of the Memorandum listed the following governmental actions to support their conclusions:

1. The Ittihad government had stopped prosecuting Kurdish chieftains accused of crimes against Armenians; one prominent criminal, Huseyin Pasha, had in fact been invited back into the country with a pardon.

2. The Ittihad had favored the Bagdad railway line which, in the view of the Dashnaktsutiune, would only enrich foreign capitalists; the party had recommended instead the Anatolian railway, which would help the economic development of this poor region.

3. No concrete steps were taken to return to Armenian peasants and farmers their lands, their principal means of livelihood. Such a distribution would hardly have affected the Kurdish or Turkish peasant, but it would have hurt the large landowners and *muhajirs*. The Dashnaktsutiune's proposal to achieve such a return through administrative decisions was frustrated by the Ittihad's recommendation that the regular courts be used for that purpose; pleas that the courts had not yet been reformed since the revolution and that peasants did not even have money to go to court or to bribe the corrupt officials were hardly heeded.

4. Where joint committees had been formed, the CUP representatives had on occasion made unreasonable and suspicious demands, such as assimilation of the Dashnaktsutiune into the Ittihad ve Terakke or turning over the lists of party members to the Committee of Union and Progress.[31]

The Sixth World Congress of the Dashnaktsutiune determined that the party could no longer be in alliance with the Ittihad, and that it would continue its efforts as a party in friendly opposition in Parliament.

Thus, during the period of intense relations following the revolution, when the two groups were able to know each other and act on this knowledge, Armenian leaders discussed security of life, land reform, economic development, and political equality, rather than autonomy or independence. Their disagreements and ultimate break were over bread and butter issues rather than over boundaries. Simon Zavarian, one of the founders of the party and a member of the Buro's Turkish Section,

argued in 1912 that of all the elements in the Ottoman Empire, Armenians had been the most supportive of the Constitution:

This sympathy was not the consequence of [the Armenians'] high morals, [their] pro-Turkish inclination, or [their] political maturity. Rather, it is a question of geo-political realities and the current situation. Dispersed all over Asia Minor and mixed with Turks and other nationalities over the centuries, Armenians could not seek their future in a territorial autonomy, to lead an even more isolated political life. Armenians have tried to create [favorable] conditions for all Ottomans by supporting reform for the Ottoman state, [and to change] for the better the status of Armenians and Armenia.[32]

He observed, however, that Ottoman subjects had very little to show for the four years they had lived under a Constitution: "End of the internal identification cards, a few students to Europe, and some road projects. . . . But what do peasants and craftsmen have to show? . . . One also cannot hope much from the new Parliament, since most new deputies have titles such as *beys, zades, pashas* and *mufties*."[33] The alienation of the Armenians from the state was most dramatically illustrated in the final defense statement of the Hunchakian Paramaz in 1915, who after having been accused of plotting against the government, was hanged along with twenty other Hunchakian leaders. "I am not a separatist," said Paramaz. "It is this state which is separating itself from me, unable to come to terms with the ideas which inspire me."[34]

It seems, then, that long before the beginning of World War I the Ittihad, as well as the Armenian parties, had concluded that the Young Turk revolution had failed. Jemal Pasha, one of the triumvirate, argued in his memoirs that the Ittihad failed to take root.[35] In 1912 Zavarian had been more explicit in his explanation of the failure of the Ittihad:

Instead of waging a struggle, of establishing a popular militia, of creating a democratic party, a party with [political] principles, [the Ittihadists] went the way of their predecessors: they chose "the easy path." They kissed and allied with all the dignitaries and created a "union" of coreligionists.[36]

Armenian political parties wavered between clear signs that the liberal era had ended and the hope that they were mistaken. Meeting in Constanza in September 1913 for its Seventh World Conference, the Hunchakian Party had perceived the dangers inherent in Ittihad mentality. A new party policy was based, among other arguments, on

the fact that the fundamental principles [of the Ittihad] call for the preservation of a Turkish bureaucracy and that they do not allow for the emergence of a new state, and that it is the [Ittihad's] obvious goal not only to assimilate but also to eliminate, and if need be, exterminate, constituent nationalities.[37]

The Hunchakians concluded that Armenians should at least be ready for self-defense. Nonetheless, they, along with others, were determined to pursue the search for peaceful solutions. The Dashnaktsutiune continued to advocate reform, whatever the source. In 1914 the Dashnaktsutiune was still insisting on the need for reforms advocated in a June 1912 editorial published in the party organ, *Droshak*. That editorial had listed six critical issues, in addition to land reform:

1. Better administration throughout the Empire;
2. Decrease in taxes on the poor and implementation of progressive taxation;
3. Abolition of all feudal taxes;
4. Balanced budget by decreasing the number of officials and building up an economic infrastructure;
5. End to acts and policies which create fear of Turkification and Islamization of minorities;
6. Safeguarding of freedoms.[38]

After 1912, Armenians welcomed the renewed Western, and especially Russian, interest in pressuring the Ottoman government for reforms in the Armenian provinces of the Empire, reforms which would be realized under the supervision of European governors.[39] This, however, did not change the fundamental relationship between the leaderships of the Ittihad government and Armenians and the political program each represented for the other.

LIMITATIONS OF THE NATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE

While the issues raised by Armenians were in the area of social and economic development and political equality, general interpretation of the genocide which followed this period remains mired in the limited and limiting perspective of Turkish and Armenian nationalisms.

The nationalist perspective creates many obstacles to an understanding of the full and real picture of Armeno-Turkish relations and mutual perceptions during the period preceding the genocide. It is true that the nature of the crime and its inhumanity are such that it is difficult to imagine that the Armenians and Turks were able to have a relationship other than that of victim and victimizer; it seems that it was always in the nature of the relations of these two peoples to massacre and to be massacred; that it was in the spirit of the times for both peoples to develop traditions of modern nationalism; that these two nationalisms were bound to clash as they did; and that it was natural for the Turks to be the killers and for the Armenians to be the victims. Moreover, the current domination of the

theme of genocide in Armenian life, the bitterness and resentment in the absence of international recognition, and the increasing intensity of the Turkish denial of the genocide strengthen the misleading impression that all events preceding the genocide led to the genocide, and all events succeeding the genocide have been caused by it.

Turkish historiography has had particular difficulties with the Young Turk period, which remains little studied. While critical of the Ittihad ve Terakki on many grounds, Turkish historians have followed the policy of recent Turkish governments in either denying the genocide or justifying "deportations" during which "unfortunate" deaths occurred.[40] More so than is the case with Armenian writers, Turkish historians have denied Armenians any role in Ottoman politics except to assign them dreams of "independence," of which pre-genocide Armenians had to be disabused. Charges of separatism have become convenient vehicles to avoid discussion of the real problems then facing Ottoman society and the failure of the Young Turk government to solve them by means other than war and genocide.

The absence of Armenian life in Western Armenia (now Eastern Turkey), the success of the genocide, and the depoliticized existence of a contemporary Armenian community denied its memory in Istanbul make it easier for some Turkish historians to characterize Armenians and their aspirations as they do the Balkan peoples: once happy Ottoman subjects who were carried away by romantic nationalism. Turkish historians treat Armenians as an important political factor only in the context of a separatist threat that had to be dealt with.[41]

In other words, students of the period have difficulty imagining that Armenians were an integral part of Ottoman society for many centuries. This integrality was based on more than the physical occupation of lands under Ottoman dominion. It involved parallel developments in folk cultures, integration through a single economy, and mutual adjustments of social mores and values between Armenian and Turkish as well as Kurdish societies.[42] Thus Armenians constituted an integral part of the political life of the Ottoman Empire, whether defined as a *millet* or as an ethnic group with parliamentary representation under the Young Turks.[43]

Yet terms such as nationalism and independence have re-created a reality which places Armenians outside Ottoman history, just as the genocide placed Armenians outside Ottoman society; and analysis revolving around conflicts over irreducible categories such as race and religion turn history into a field where, instead of human beings interacting, abstract concepts do battle. It is as if hordes of individuals think and act as prescribed by ideologies of nationalism, religion, or race. Terminology then comes to reconfirm the view imposed by the genocide that, ultimately, one need not account for real Armenians leading real lives whose disappearance from their homes and from history must be accounted for; one is comforted by the thought that Armenians can be

reduced to a corollary of a concept. The politician dehumanizes a nation in order to get rid of it; the historian does so to explain it away. Genocide becomes its own explanation; ultimately, it becomes its own justification.

The Young Turks, including the Ittihad ve Terakke, evolved in opposition to the despotic, reactionary, and corrupt rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II as well as in reaction to his ineptness in protecting the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire against separatist tendencies and Western imperialistic encroachments. The latter were often justified in the name of persecuted minorities in the Empire. Therefore there evolved a linkage between domestic reforms, particularly those that might affect non-Muslims and non-Turks, and the defense of the territorial integrity of the Empire.

While all Young Turks agreed that the Sultan must go and that the prorogued Constitution of 1876 must be reestablished, it was obvious from the start that not everyone agreed on the best possible solution to the problem of territorial disintegration. One group, led by Prince Sabaheddine, promoted the idea of a multinational empire, with not only equal rights to the non-dominant groups, such as Armenians, but also a decentralized government which recognized a degree of regional autonomy to these groups.[44] Ahmed Riza, on the other hand, whose views became the more dominant after the revolution, believed in an Ottomanism which minimized differences, in a centralized state which, while recognizing the equality of all under the law, would promote the evolution of a homogeneous, corporate body politic. According to one historian:

[Ahmed Riza] used the word "Ottoman" freely in connection with individual inhabitants of the Empire, Muslim and Christian, as did Sabaheddine, but in Riza's vocabulary the word did not connote so much an individual with supra-national citizenship as a person who, if he was not already a Turk, must be hammered into a reasonable likeness to one.[45]

In 1908 the Young Turks took over the government and restored the 1876 Constitution. An era of brotherhood and renovation was thought to have begun; there was popular support for the move, and all problems were expected to be resolved soon with a new parliament.[46] Parliamentary elections were held twice during this period, in 1909 and 1912. These parliaments included representatives of various religious and ethnic groups, including Armenians, although there seems to have been constant haggling over the number of deputies each group was allotted, the Turks always retaining a comfortable majority.

But the Ittihad government, already weak in its commitment to democratization, was frustrated in its attempts to implement significant reforms. Between 1908 and 1914 the Ottoman Empire had to fight two

wars against Balkan states during which it lost the remainder of its European holdings; the Ottomans also lost Libya to Italy. Thus, their revolution had not guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Empire. The Young Turks were particularly irritated by France and England, the two bastions of liberalism and the principal external sources pressuring for internal reform, who stood by while more and more Ottoman lands were taken away. The Ittihad ve Terakke was also naive in its belief that a parliament in and by itself constituted reform and could change a society. Impatient about criticism and unwilling to undertake reforms which they thought would weaken the authority of the state, the Ittihad ve Terakke itself moved toward despotism, just as Abdul Hamid II had done over three decades earlier. The Ittihad leadership gradually eliminated not only opposition parties but also elements within the Ittihad who still linked the salvation of Ottoman society to domestic reforms and a vigorous constitutional life.[47] The coup d'etat in 1913 led by Enver, Talaat, and Jemal Pashas came as the logical conclusion of the evolution of the Ittihad toward a dictatorship. The three continued to believe that they embodied all the wisdom necessary to lead the Empire toward salvation; and the salvation of the Empire was couched in terms of molding the character and thoughts of the citizens of the Empire in the image of some ideal Ottoman.

From the promise of reform and equality and political rejuvenation springing from the dedication to the ideal of a state which provided equality under the law, the Ittihadids had moved to the position of a corporate state within which not only non-Turks would be designated "enemies" by definition, but also all liberals who insisted on a different vision than the one articulated by the Ittihad, however vague and shifting that may have been. Liberalism, which sought to reject the use of ethnic, religious, or national identity as the basis for legitimation of power, was seen as a weakness, as the lot of the forces of particularism and dissent, as a source of chaos and further disintegration, unworthy of the various visions of greatness that were motivating the Ittihad—the "true" successor of the once powerful sultans.[48]

The Ittihad distaste for liberalism is critical for the understanding of their policies before and during the war. In the Ottoman Empire liberalism and ethnic issues had been intertwined since the nineteenth century. Western pressures for reform always focused on the status of Christians. The Turkish and Kurdish masses in the Empire had been denied a systematic exposure to the need for reform from their own revolutionaries.[49] They consequently viewed the Ottoman Constitution as a privilege only for Christians.[50] Moreover, the Turkish people felt a false sense of power through identification with the ruling dynasty and ruling elite. Ramsaur, who tends to see all minorities as budding nationalists, nonetheless recognizes that

the Moslem minorities, such as those Albanians who professed Islam, were beginning to feel the sweep of nationalism as well, but they were somewhat weakened in their aspirations by the fact that they enjoyed better treatment than did the Christian minorities and because they had a religious bond with the dynasty that the latter did not possess.[51]

Naturally, non-Turks found it easier to understand and appreciate reforms. Being more affected by the corrupt and decrepit taxation and legal systems than others, Armenians had long developed a tradition of political thought of their own in reaction to Ottoman misgovernment, Turkish superiority, and despotic rule.

Nonetheless, these non-Turkish parties constitute as much a part of Ottoman history as those founded by Turks. The Armenian focus of their parties, for example, is a reflection of the religious/ethnic structure created by the Ottoman government, not a natural result of Armenian nationalism.[52]

By 1914 the idea of liberal reforms had been eliminated from the agenda of the Ittihad. By 1914 as well, Armenians were the only significant non-Muslim people left in the Empire, the only non-Turkish political element in Anatolia capable of measuring the actions of the government beyond the rhetoric of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism—a rhetoric which certainly could not inspire Armenians. Armenians were also the only segment of the electorate still supporting the parliamentary system and the Constitution. While the promise of Russian-sponsored reforms may have diminished the need to see political reform for the majority in the Armenian vilayets (administrative divisions) of the Empire, Armenians in central Anatolia, Cilicia, and the western provinces had no other hope.

A CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT

Armenian liberalism was the legacy of the revolutionary movement which developed following the failure of the signatories of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 to deliver on their promise of reforms for Ottoman Armenia. Armenians developed a liberation movement which, while having as an inspiration the Balkan movements, grew in reaction to Ottoman policies and Armenian realities and needs. Armenian groups were motivated much more by the socioeconomic disintegration of their society than by dreams of a renewed Armenian dynasty.[53] Even the Hunchakian Party, the first revolutionary party and the only one to advocate independence when founded in 1887, did so because it argued that since there were no positive results to be seen decades after the promise of internal reforms and almost a decade after the Congress of Berlin, Armenians could no longer hope to see reforms general enough

to bring a change in their status.[54] The Dashnaktsutiune, founded in 1890, which in 1892 advocated a degree of autonomy and the opportunity to create "political and economic freedom," made clear that their purpose was not the replacement of a Turkish sultan with an Armenian one.[55] It was not surprising, therefore, that neither the Church nor the wealthy classes in Armenian society supported the revolutionaries; both remained very much part of the *millet* mentality fostered by the Ottoman government and, ultimately, were manipulated by it.

The liberation movement among Armenians, which turned into an armed struggle in the 1890s, acquired depth and an inter-ethnic scope in the 1900s. This included prodding Young and liberal Turkish groups into action against despotism and cooperation among the anti-sultan forces. One of the issues raised by the Armenian political parties during these early years was the need for Turkish liberalism to acquire a popular basis by addressing social and economic issues and by being ready to engage in an armed struggle to achieve the goal of a democratic and parliamentary regime. They also urged Turks to provide for a popular defense mechanism against any possible reaction following a revolution. In other words, the Young Turks were urged to make a revolution rather than a coup d'etat. These positions were articulated clearly over a decade of relations between Armenian revolutionaries and Turkish liberals in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire.[56] The last time the Dashnaktsutiune had insisted on the need for an Ottoman revolution was in 1907, during the second congress of Ottoman opposition forces, which had been convened on its initiative. Armenians did not have much faith in revolutions from above.

Although in 1908 it was the Ottoman army and not the people that toppled the Sultan, the move was radical enough to invite the support of many segments of Ottoman society, and particularly Armenians for whom liberalism and reform had become political solutions as well as ideological tenets. The Young Turk revolution of 1908 produced important changes in the Armenian political scene. The oldest of the political parties, the quasi-Marxist and revolutionary Hunchakians, met in 1909 for their Sixth General Convention and decided to discard the party's demand for political independence for Armenia and voted to realize their ultimate goal, socialism, within the Ottoman context. Nonetheless, the Hunchakians registered their distrust of Ittihadist nationalism and absence of commitment to reforms.[57] The Dashnaktsutiune put into place a mechanism for realizing the federal structure it had envisioned in its Fourth World Congress in 1907, in collaboration with the Young Turks.[58] Finally, the Armenian bourgeoisie and well-to-do, who had never felt comfortable with the armed struggle and socialistic rhetoric of the two existing parties, created a third party, the Ramgavar-Sahmanatragan or Democratic-Constitutional Party, which rejected violence and adopted capitalism as the proper form of economic development for

the Ottoman Empire and the appropriate way to solve Armenian socio-
economic problems.[59]

All three parties worked within the bounds of the Constitution to
achieve gains and to realize their goals. The coalition of the Dashnak-
tsutiune and the Ittihad produced parliamentary victories for both. The
Hunchakians formed an alliance with the Ittilaf Party of Prince Saba-
heddine. More important, all three Armenian political parties shared a
vision of the society which they wanted to see evolve in the Ottoman
Empire. This vision was based primarily on the need to address the
problems facing a disintegrating Armenian rural society and a frustrated
middle class. Equality, reform, and progress were slogans which
everyone used and no one found to be against the interests of the state in
1908.[60] They were inspired by what educated Armenians considered the
universal values of the Enlightenment. Armenians believed in progress
and in change at the expense of the traditional because, to paraphrase
what has been said of German Jews, these attitudes facilitated emanci-
pation from the political and social disabilities that had oppressed them
for centuries; the Enlightenment gave them optimism, faith in themselves
and in humanity. It was this general belief that led the Armenians, but
especially the Hunchakians and Dashnaktsutiune, not only to participate
vigorously in the first Russian revolutionary movement in 1905 but also
to play a role in the Persian Constitutional movement before World War
I. This role was critical enough for one of the leaders of the Dash-
naktsutiune, Yeprem, who had led his guerrilla fighters into many
battles, to end up with the responsibility for the security of Tehran until
his death in 1912.[61]

Among the Turks, enlightenment and progress were adopted by
Prince Sabaheddine and the Liberal Party. However, they were small in
number and lacked a popular base. Even the nascent Turkish bour-
geoisie supported the Ittihad policies of economic nationalism and placed
their hopes on a strong central government which might find it easier to
make room for the growth of Turkish capital, as opposed to the tradi-
tional Ottoman capital that had been accumulated in trade by Armenians,
Greeks, and Jews. The masses were more easily swayed by the rhetoric
of glory, whether of the imperial or religious variety. When faced with
the Western challenge, the Turkish reformers, whose liberalism was "ill
digested," were more likely to be impressed by the technological and
military advances—advances which, when borrowed, could have re-
solved the Ottoman problem as seen by Turks: military weakness
against European powers and humiliation at the hands of former sub-
jects.[62] Some also internalized Social Darwinism, which made it pos-
sible for them to rationalize their insistence on the primacy of Turks in
the Empire, their internal imperialism.[63]

Even in 1908, therefore, there were two visions of society at work,
both in opposition to the Sultan, both favoring the Constitution, both

based on the dual principles of internal reforms and territorial integrity of the Empire. It was the first time since the articulation of Armenian political demands that so much common ground existed and that there was an opportunity for the solution of both problems. Yet for those in the Ittihad who had believed in some degree of equality and justice, the promise of reforms may have been the price to be paid in return for territorial integrity, and possibly aggrandizement. With the continued loss of territories in the Balkans and the threatened loss of the Arab provinces, the Ittihad lost even its weak interest in limited reforms and sought its aggrandizement elsewhere.

Armenian political parties, meanwhile, had been willing to make all the necessary adjustments to strengthen the Constitution: it was a welcome alternative to an otherwise difficult position. Armenians, particularly the Hunchakians and Dashnaktsutiune, made serious compromises on the degree of socioeconomic reform needed in order to provide the best possible support to the liberal elements in Turkish politics. And while among the Young Turks they had always associated with Sabaheddine, the Dashnaktsutiune agreed to run joint election campaigns with the Ittihad, which, as the party in power, the Dashnaktsutiune thought needed the largest dose of liberal presence.

The Armenian parties made it clear, however, that their commitment to the Ottoman fatherland, their willingness to defend its territorial integrity and the search for Armenian reforms in the context of the empire-wide changes, were contingent upon one condition: the Ottoman Empire had to be a "democratic and parliamentary state."[64] This feeling was shared by the larger Armenian population as well. A letter to the editor of the *Droshak* stated it clearly:

For citizens states are not goals. They are means to develop, to progress, to become strong. If a means to reach a goal is inappropriate, inadequate or weak, it becomes necessary to exchange it for a better and more appropriate form. . . . The issue is not separation or inclusion in the Ottoman state, since these are fundamentally related to the larger purpose—our welfare. We, Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgars, Kurds and other citizens like to remain and live and even, yes, sacrifice and be sacrificed, in a state where our welfare is [considered]. We shall shed our blood only for the flag which knows how to keep our heads up. Flags which are miserable, shameful, often defeated, subject to derision and mockery do not deserve our blood.[65]

The Hunchakians in 1913 reaffirmed their intention not to seek a separate homeland; but they also made it clear that they did not intend to accept a regime where any group dominated the others.[66] In October 1913 all Armenian parties functioning in the Ottoman Empire signed a joint statement which, in addition to promising an end to internal conflicts, also reasserted their dedication to the Ottoman Parliament and Constitution.[67]

In other words, for Armenians allegiance was to basic forms of political association or organization rather than to a dynasty, a nationalism, a religion, or a race. They were ready to support a political system which allowed for the equitable and just solution to ethnic and religious as well as social and economic problems.[68] This was a form of social contract which was reminiscent of what Sabaheddine had come to learn and respect from contemporary readings.[69] With their concern for social, economic, and agrarian reforms and a democratic system of government, Armenians were thus part of the Ottoman political spectrum. But they occupied the left wing of the spectrum.

Two other issues were problematic for the Ittihad government. First, Armenian parties had strong popular bases due both to their long struggle and sacrifices and to their populist platforms. Secondly, given the socialistic nature of their programs, they had also made serious efforts, beginning in 1900, but especially after 1908, to spread the liberal creed among Turks, and even Kurds in Anatolia.[70] While they had had very limited success, there always was a danger that Armenian revolutionary parties with socialistic tendencies could create politically viable coalitions of peasants and rural craftsmen, supported by a liberal bourgeoisie.

WAR AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE

It was no accident that the Ottoman Empire entered World War I and did so on the side of Germany. A crisis situation, martial law, and war conditions in general would change the rules of politics and the need for accountability for failures, while creating the possibility of territorial expansion. Siding with Germany was in character with an elite in power increasingly hostile toward any element which reminded them of their promises and failures. Fighting the war on the side of Germany could free the Ittihad from its commitment to reform just as the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 had freed Abdul Hamid II from the pledge he made in 1876 to create a constitutional government.[71] A war which was to be fought against France and England, the liberal states of Europe, allowed the linkage between external threats and internal reform to be articulated in the measures taken against Armenians, now seen as the main threat, the enemy of the Ittihad "vision"; the Turkish elite considered Armenians ideological allies of the French and British or as a population sympathizing with the traditional enemy, Russia, which in 1912 had resumed its role as the sponsor of Armenian reforms. The war provided an opportunity for the Ittihad to create a coherent world: an opportunity to prove Turkish military prowess by fighting on the side of a strongly militaristic non-liberal empire such as Germany, and against the bastions of liberalism, France and England.

But the war also made it possible to eliminate the particularities and dissent in the political arena by eliminating Armenians, who could never be part of the new vision since they were not Turks or Muslims, and who, by their political consciousness, were bound to become a permanent source of dissent and discontent, a particularity in a society which was expected to find solace in the Pan-Turanian, Pan-Islamic creeds or in Turkish nationalism rather than in the search for equality, justice, and a dignified human existence. Jemal Pasha, one of the Ittihad triumvirate and Minister of the Navy, conceded a fundamental relationship between the decision to enter the war, domestic policy, and the Armenian "problem":

Of course, it was our hope to free ourselves through the World War from all conventions, which meant so many attacks on our independence. . . . Just as it was our chief aim to annul the capitulations and the Lebanon Statute, so in the matter of Armenian reforms we desired to release ourselves from the agreement which Russian pressure had imposed upon us.[72]

Jemal certainly did not imply that reforms were not needed, since in these memoirs he confesses having promised Armenians reforms as soon as the war was over, if Armenians functioned as a fifth column in Russian Armenia against Russia.[73] In a strange but intriguingly vague style, Jemal stated that "it was an active domestic and foreign policy" that drove the Ittihad to war. The most important domestic problem was the question of the minorities, Jemal asserted, and, among the minorities, the Armenians were the most critical.[74] Subsequent justifications of the deportations and massacres clarify the meaning of "active" policy. It seems to have been nothing less than the domestic equivalent of war on enemy states.

The desire to proceed with state building unfettered by any external or internal accounting was, according to Jemal, one of the reasons for the Ittihad's decision to enter the war. Of course, as soon as the war started, the two European governors who had just arrived in the country to supervise reforms in Armenian provinces were sent back. But the war allowed the Ittihad to do more. The purpose of the deportations and massacres, wrote the German missionary and eyewitness Johannes Lepsius, "seems to be to drive the idea of reforms out of the Armenians' minds once and for all."[75] Perhaps this will explain why the murder of the intellectuals took on such a gruesome character. It is said by eyewitnesses that on more than one occasion their skulls were crushed with stones and the brains were thrown to the ground with an invitation to the victim to dare to "think again."

When the news of the deportations and massacres reached Europe, many Turks dissociated themselves from the policies of the Ittihad. Attempting to do so publicly, Mehmet Sherif Pasha, the son of the first

Grand Vizier of the constitutional regime in 1908, described the Armenians as industrious and peaceful people. Attempting to explain the carnage taking place in his homeland, Mehmet Sherif added that "the Armenians' agitation against despotisms in Turkey and Persia [is a quality] one suspects has not endeared them to the autocratic 'reformers' of the Young Turk regime."[76]

GENOCIDE: A RADICAL FORM OF POLITICAL REPRESSION?

The relationship between genocide and domestic change is a theme which precedes the Young Turks in Ottoman history. Evaluating the meaning of the Constitution first introduced by Midhat Pasha under the young Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1876, Harry Luke wrote that, "[Midhat Pasha] was sufficiently shrewd and realistic a statesman to know that only by drastic internal reform, self administered, could the rapidly dissolving Empire stave off the coup de grace which Russia was impatient to administer."[77] Soon after he felt secure, the Sultan exiled Midhat Pasha and replaced the Constitution with an administration repressive enough to invite a revolution from his most resilient subjects, the Turks. In the introduction to an unsigned study published in 1913, "Turkey: The Situation of Armenians in Turkey Introduced with Documents, 1908-1912," a commentator discussed the repression of the massacres of 1894-1896 in the following way:

The top officials of the old regime were convinced that repression is essential to despotism and reforms are deadly weapons. Seeing the determination of Armenians to obtain reforms and to make their Turkish compatriots companions in their aspirations, they preferred to massacre the Armenians as the ones responsible for the situation, instead of undertaking general reforms which could have brought the end of despotism and their rule.[78]

Given this strong sense of the relationship between repression and wholesale massacre felt by Armenian leaders and nurtured by events, it is not surprising that both major parties as well as conservative leaders could see by 1913 that the Young Turks might be moving in the same direction as the Sultan. "Turkey is promising reforms for European consumption," argued a *Droshak* editorial in June 1913, "but is actually aiming at the destruction of the Armenian element in Anatolia." Only the method would be different from the Hamidian massacres, argued the editorialist.[79] The Hunchakians thought that the scope would be different too.[80]

They were both correct, although it seems that none wanted to believe that the worst actually could happen. The parties did caution the Armenians not to give any reason for provocations. During the initial stages

of the roundups of leaders, the drafting of young men into the army, the inspections for caches of arms, and other preliminaries to the actual deportations and massacres, Armenians tended to accede to demands, avoided any actions which might have been construed as opposing the state, and hoped that the whole episode would ultimately be forgotten and that the community would survive with minimum damage. Local measures such as the murder of a few hundred intellectuals or a few thousand enlistees were nothing compared to what had been predicted. In most communities where any self-defense was possible the realization that the small incidents were part of the larger event came too late to be of any use. Where communities acted early, such as in Van, Shabin Garahisar, Musa Dagh, and Urfa, the self-defense became part of the justification for the genocide while the genocide was progressing.[81]

To complete the preliminary stages of the genocide, the emasculation of the nation without risking much resistance, the planners of the genocide had, in fact, counted on the infinite belief of Armenian leaders in the possibility of political solutions to their problems. Armenians were, after all, students of the Enlightenment and devotees of political discourse once discourse had been made possible by the elevation of the "revolutionary" Young Turks to power. To believe that their colleagues from the days of exile in Europe and from the Ottoman Parliament could in fact use the methods of the Sultan and improve on them was to undermine the basic motivation for their adoption of the best that the West had to offer: belief not only in progress by man but also progress in man, in his perfectibility, in his ability to reason and to do what is reasonable.

When the Young Turks determined to exterminate the Armenians, they were not just ridding themselves of another ethnic group; they were also eliminating the social basis for a substantial change in the regime. They were not guaranteeing just a turkified Turkey, but also a Turkey which was closer to the model of the Empire in its heyday: virile and run by elites who were inspired by ideas beyond the reach of common men and women, particularly those of a lower race and religion, by ideas beyond the reach of discourse, abstracted from reality and, ultimately, from humanity.

The genocide of the Armenian people may be a paradigm for twentieth-century "political" genocides, where the elite's vision was predicated upon the political and sociological dimensions of the society they wanted to rule over. The return to a traditional order where hierarchies are in place and unchallenged may be one such vision. Recent genocides, especially the Indonesian, the Cambodian, and the Ibo, have been more brazenly political in nature, confirming the worst fears that knowledge of evil does not necessarily result in abhorrence of evil; that human reasoning can always find ways to characterize evil as being

something else and to conclude that some societies must be destroyed or must destroy parts of themselves to be saved.

NOTES

The transliteration system used in this text is based on the phonetic values of Western Armenian.

1. The relationship between genocide and modernization has been discussed by George L. Mosse, *German Jews Beyond Judaism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press/Hebrew Union College Press, 1985), with regard to the Jewish holocaust, and by Robert Melson in a recent paper entitled "Neither Scapegoats Nor Provocateurs: A Preface to a Study of Genocide with Special Reference to the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and the Holocaust," presented at the Conference on Genocide at Harvard University, April 13, 1985.

2. The best reference work for non-Armenian sources on the Armenian genocide is Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Armenian Holocaust: A Bibliography Relating to the Deportations, Massacres, and Dispersion of the Armenian People, 1915-1923* (Cambridge, Mass.: National Association for Armenian Studies and Research, 1978 and 1980). Other sources include Aram Andonian, *The Memoirs of Naim Bey: Turkish Official Documents Relating to the Deportations and Massacres of Armenians* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1920; repr. Armenian Historical Research Association, 1964 and 1965); Dickran H. Boyajian, *Armenia: The Case for a Forgotten Genocide* (Westwood, N.J.: Educational Book Crafters, 1972); Gerard Chaliand and Yves Ternon, *The Armenians: From Genocide to Resistance* (London: Zed Press, 1983); Irving Louis Horowitz, *Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980); Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Garden City. N.Y.: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1926; French ed., Paris: Payot et cie., 1919); Martin Niepage, *The Horrors of Aleppo, Seen by a German Eye-witness* (London and New York: Fisher Unwin, 1917 and George H. Doran Co., 1918; repr. New Age Publishers, 1975); Gerard J. Libaridian, ed., *A Crime of Silence: The Genocide of the Armenians. The Permanent People's Tribunal* (London: Zed Press, 1985); Jack Nusan Porter, *Genocide and Human Rights* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982); Yves Ternon, *The Armenians: History of a Genocide* (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1981); Arnold Toynbee, *Armenian Atrocities: The Murder of a Nation* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915; reissued New York: Prelacy of the Armenian Apostolic Church of America, 1975); Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Falloden* (London: J. Causton and Sons, 1916).

3. For the early history of the movement, see Ernest E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); for the prewar years see Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).

4. Historic Armenia was divided between the Ottoman and Safavid Persian empires, once in the sixteenth century and finally in the seventeenth century. The eastern, and smaller, part was occupied by Persia until the Russo-Persian war of 1827-1828, when it became part of the Russian Empire. That segment of historic Armenia became independent in 1918 and was sovietized in 1920.

For the social makeup of Western Armenian society, see Gerard J. Libaridian, "The Changing Self-Image of the Armenian in the Ottoman Empire: *Rayahs* and Revolutionaries," in *The Image of the Armenian in History and Literature,* ed. R. G. Hovannisian (Malibu Beach, Calif.: Undena Press, 1981).

5. Because of the presence of the diplomatic corps and an international community, Armenians in the capital were spared deportations, although their leadership there was rounded up and murdered. The regions of Izmir and Adrianople were spared because the chief of the German Military Mission during the war in the Ottoman Empire, General Liman von Sanders, threatened to use force against the Turkish soldiers and gendarmes should they implement the deportation orders. He told his story in Otto Liman von Sanders, *Fünf Jahre in der Türkei* (Berlin: A. Scherl, 1920), and repeated it during his testimony at the trial of Talaat Pasha's self-confessed executor, Soghomon Tehlirian, in Berlin in 1921. See *The Case of Soghomon Tehlirian* (Los Angeles: ARF Varantian Gomideh, 1985), pp. 83-85.

6. The cities and districts which resisted included Van, Musa Dagh, Urfa, Shabin Karahisar, and Hajin. Only the first two were able to survive long enough to receive assistance from the outside and save their people: Armenians in Van were saved by the Armenian volunteers with the Russian army; those in Musa Dagh were rescued by French ships off the coast of the Mediterranean. Resistance in most cases was not undertaken with the hope of ultimate salvation but rather to have a choice in the manner of death.

7. Information on the role of this organization is fragmentary, often from oral history sources. The only substantial research on the subject, done as a doctoral dissertation by Philip Hendrick Stoddard, is silent on the organization's role in Anatolia and the Armenian provinces where the deportations occurred; see Philip Hendrick Stoddard, "The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911-1918: A Preliminary Study of the Teshkilat-i Mahsusa" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1963).

8. Over 4,000 interviews have been taped on cassettes with eyewitnesses and survivors of the Armenian genocide. Significant numbers of interviews have been conducted by Professor V. L. Parseghian (Rensselaer Institute),

Professor Richard G. Hovannisian (University of California at Los Angeles), and their associates as well as by organizations such as the Armenian Library and Museum of America (Belmont, Mass.) and the Armenian Assembly of America (Washington, D.C.). The Armenian Film Foundation of Los Angeles has a collection of filmed interviews with survivors, while the Zoryan Institute for Contemporary Armenian Research and Documentation (Cambridge, Mass.) has over 300 videotaped interviews.

Some press accounts of the deportations and massacres have been republished in *The Armenian Genocide, as Reported in the Australian Press* (Sydney: Armenian National Committee, 1983), *The Canadian Press and the Armenian Genocide* (Montreal: Armenian National Committee, 1985), and Richard Kloian, ed., *The Armenian Genocide: News Accounts from the American Press* (Berkeley, Calif.: Anto Printing, 1985).

9. Cipher telegram, Mahmud Kiamil, Commander of the Third Army to Governors General, July 10, 1915; cited in Gerard J. Libaridian, "The Ideology of the Young Turk Movement," in *A Crime of Silence,* ed. Gerard J. Libaridian (London: Zed Books, 1985), p. 49.

10. See, for example, Yves Ternon, "Report on the Genocide," in *A Crime of Silence,* p. 116.

11. The 1894-1896 massacres claimed over 200,000 Armenian victims throughout the Ottoman Empire; for an analysis of the events, see Robert Melson, "A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894-1896," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24, No. 3 (July 1982), pp. 481-509. The 1909 occurrence, known as the massacre of Adana, was in fact a series of massacres in many Cilician cities. It claimed over 20,000 Armenian lives. Coming less than a year after the revolution, the outbreak was embarrassing to the Young Turks trying to project a new image in Europe. The government sent Enver Pasha to participate in joint ceremonies condemning the massacres; see Msgr. Mouchegh, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes* (Alexandria: Della Rocca, 1909), and the report of an Armenian deputy of the Ottoman Parliament, a member of the Ittihad, Hagop Babigian, *Deghegakir* [Report] (Paris: N.p., 1919).

12. There are no exact numbers or reliable census figures with regard to the various peoples of the Ottoman Empire. Figures proposed by the Armenian Patriarchate or the Turkish census have been challenged on various grounds. Figures used here are on the conservative side. See Hovannisian, *Armenia,* pp. 34-37; Turkish census figures have more recently been used by Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities* (New York: New York University Press, 1983).

13. Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 29-30.

14. This has been the dominant view among Armenian writers for decades. The most widely known works in this category are Haygazn Ghazarian, *Tseghasban Turke* [The Turk, Author of Genocide] (Beirut,

1968), and Zarevant, *Miatsyal ev angakh Turania gam inch ge dsrakren turkere* [United and independent Turanian or what the Turks are planning] (N.p., 1926).

15. The most prominent scholar to advance this view is Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 356. As Robert Melson has pointed out in his recently delivered paper (see note 1), the equation between the nationalism of a Turkish elite with access to resources such as an empire and that of a relatively small and altogether unarmed subject people as the Armenians is not a valid one.

16. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 218-19.

17. The Armenian Question, i.e., the interest which the Great Powers had regarding the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire as part of their imperialistic designs or occasional humanitarian concern should not be equated with the Armenian revolutionary movement, however the two were connected for tactical or strategic considerations. The revolutionary movement involved Armenians in Russia and Persia in addition to those in the Ottoman Empire; it also developed its own dynamics, which included cooperation with non-Armenian and non-Muslim peoples. See Gerard J. Libaridian, "Revolution and Liberation in the 1892 and 1907 Programs of the Dashnaktsutiune," in *Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change,* ed. Ronald Grigor Suny (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1983).

18. Tessa Hofmann, "German Eyewitness Reports of the Genocide of the Armenians, 1915-1916," in Libaridian, *A Crime of Silence,* pp. 61-92; Susan K. Blair, "Excuses for Inhumanity: The Official German Response to the 1915 Armenian Genocide," *Armenian Review* 4 (1984), pp. 14-30; Ulrich Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

19. Melson, "Neither Scapegoats Nor Provocateurs."

20. Armenian sympathy for Russia has a long history. In some respects it is the continuation of a medieval belief that Armenians would be freed of the rule of the infidel by a Christian savior; particularly for Armenians in border provinces such as Erzerum and Van, which were constantly ravaged by Ottoman armies during intermittent wars with Russia, and given the inability of the Ottoman government to implement reforms, Russian Armenia seemed a better place to be than Ottoman Armenia. Russia, of course, used these feelings for its own expansionist purposes. But Russia was also concerned that a revolutionary movement among Armenians inspired by the principles of democracy and equality might turn against the Romanov regime, which in fact did occur in 1903 and later, when the tsar's government adopted an assimilationist policy toward Armenians and fomented Armeno-Tatar clashes between 1905 and 1907.

It should also be pointed out that there were large segments of the Armenian population who thought the Ottoman system was preferable to the Russian, since the Ottomans had allowed a *millet* structure to develop, had

given more privileges to the Church, and had not tried to assimilate the Armenians. A debate on this issue raged in the newspapers intermittently.

21. Despite the fact that the genocide of 1915-1916 has a central position in Armenian consciousness and history, there is as yet no comprehensive, systematic history of the genocide.

22. Vahakn N. Dadrian, "A Theoretical Model of Genocide, with Particular Reference to the Armenian Case," *Armenian Review* 2 (1979); idem, "The Structural-Functional Components of Genocide: A Victimology Approach to the Armenian Case," in *Victimology*, vol. 3, and "The Common Features of the Armenian and Jewish Cases of Genocide: A Comparative Victimological Perspective," in *Victimology*, vol. 4, ed. Israel Drapkin and Emilio Viano (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1974 and 1975); idem, "A Typology of Genocide," *International Review of Sociology* 2 (1975).

23. Siyamend Othman, "La participation des kurdes dans les massacres des Arméniens, 1915," *Critique Socialiste* 13 (1982), pp. 31-48.

24. Ronald Suny, "Background to Genocide: New Perspectives on the Armenian Massacres and Deportations of 1915," paper presented at the Conference on Genocide, Harvard University, April 13, 1985.

25. See note 1.

26. Studies of the 1908-1918 period are rare; existing works also have made rare use of existing Armenian sources; historians have functioned under the assumption that Armenians could not have been that important in the minds of the Turkish leaders, even when the issue was the state's attitude toward the Armenians. See, for example, Tarik Z. Tunaya, *Turkiyede Siyasi partiler, 1859-1952* [Political parties in Turkey, 1859-1952] (Istanbul: N.p., 1952).

For brief discussions of this period see Hovannisian, *Armenia,* pp. 28-34, and Mikayel Varantian, *H. H. Dashnaktsutian Batmutiun* [History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation], vol. 2 (Cairo: N.p., 1950), pp. 183-235.

27. This agreement has been referred to briefly by Varantian, ibid., pp. 203-4. Members of the Turkish Section of the Dashnaktsutiune's Bureau were asked by the Sixth World Congress of the Dashnaktsutiune in 1911 to prepare a comprehensive report on the relations between the party and the Ittihad. The resulting study consists of two documents. The first is a diary-like notebook of about forty-six pages with entries on meetings between ARF and CUP leaders between 1909 and 1911 (Archives of the Dashnaktsutiune, File 78/a-1). The second is entitled a "Memorandum" on the same issue; the document has forty-six pages (File Number 78/a-2). These archives contain extensive files on the period under study and are certain to yield much critical information once studied. Both documents mentioned here are drafts; it is hoped that further research may unearth the final versions, although drafts often provide clues on difficult points which may be covered in the final draft.

28. Archives of the Dashnaktsutiune, File 78/a-1.

29. Simon Zavarian, "Asdijanagan vochnchatsum" [Gradual extermination], *Azadamard,* August 9 and 26, 1911. The article provides statistical evidence of the dramatic decrease in the number of Armenians and Armenian-owned houses, farms, and farm utensils in a number of districts over a period of thirty years.

30. Shamil, to Western and Eastern Bureaus of the Dashnaktsutiune, August 10, 1911. Archives of the Dashnaktsutiune, File 671, Doc. 46.

31. Archives of the Dashnaktsutiune, File 78/a-2. For the last point, see also Jemal Pasha, *The Memoirs of a Statesman* (New York: Dial, 1919), p. 254. Jemal states that the Ittihad asked the Dashnaktsutiune to come under the umbrella of the Ittihad as should all other parties. The argument was that there was no need for divisions when everyone was now an Ottoman.

32. Simon Zavarian, "Paregamutian Artunke" [Result of friendship], *Azadamard,* April 19, 1912.

33. Simon Zavarian, "Himnagan vdanke" [The fundamental danger], *Azadamard,* May 17, 1912. The titles indicate either large landownership, other great wealth, or positions of traditional authority.

34. Arsen Gidur, *Batmutiun S. T. Hunchakian gusagtsutian* [History of the Social Democratic Hunchakian Party], vol. 1 (Beirut: N.p., 1962), p. 389.

35. Jemal Pasha, *Memoirs,* p. 256.

36. "Azadakrutian janabarhe" [The path to liberation], unsigned editorial, *Azadamard,* May 18, 1912.

37. Gidur, *Batmutiun S. T. Hunchakian,* p. 365.

38. Unsigned lead article, *Droshak,* June 1912.

39. Hovannisian, *Armenia,* pp. 38-39.

40. The denial/justification pattern was set during the genocide itself and consecrated by none other than Talaat Pasha, the Minister of Interior of the Ittihad most responsible for the holocaust, in his memoirs, "Posthumous Memoirs of Talaat Pasha," *Current History* (November 1921), pp. 287-95.

41. It is difficult to find in Turkish historiography a serious treatment of the history of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. In addition to limitations to archival sources imposed by the Turkish government even to some Turkish historians, the discussion of the genocide is a politically dangerous undertaking, unless one is denying it. To justify silence on the genocide, historians must also remain silent on pre-genocide relations.

42. To prove his humanitarian concerns, Jemal Pasha remembers having argued against deporting and killing all Armenians since these actions would have disastrous effects on the economy, especially the agriculture of Anatolia (*Memoirs,* p. 278). Zavarian had characterized the role of the Armenians in the Empire as "the milking cow" (*Azadamard,* August 5, 1911).

It should be noted that Armenians were involved in the reform movement, although in a different way, in the first constitutional period too, under Midhat Pasha. Krikor Odian, a Paris-trained lawyer who had played a major role in the development of the Armenian "National Constitution" for the *millet* in

1860-1863, was an advisor of Midhat Pasha, and is thought to have been instrumental in the writing of the 1876 Ottoman constitution.

The integration was particularly strong in folk culture, where language and other barriers break down; comparative studies in folk music and dance should be revealing.

43. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, Volume 1, The Central Lands* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981).

44. Prince Sabaheddine, who was related to the Sultan and whose family went into exile, became one of the leading figures of the Young Turk movement. He became the founder of the Hurriyet ve Ittilaf Firkasi (Freedom and Private Initiative Party), which included Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Arabs, and Bulgarians. See Ahmad, *Young Turks*, p. 99, and Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, pp. 82-83.

45. Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 92.

46. Ibid., p. 44.

47. Ahmad, *Young Turks*, p. 163.

48. Ibid., p. 158.

49. Ramsaur points out that one of the reasons why the Young Turk Damad Mahmud's critique of the Sultan's regime was effective with Turks was that "he was a Turk and a Muslim himself, as well as a member of the royal family" p. 59.

50. *Droshak* (Geneva), October-November 1909; Garo Sasuni, *Kurd azkayin sharzhume ev hay-krdagan haraperutiunnere* [The Kurdish national movement and Armeno-Kurdish relations] (Beirut: Hamazkaine Press, 1969), pp. 155-57.

51. Gidur, *Batmutiun,* p. 319; Ramsaur, *Young Turks,* p. 73.

52. It seems to this writer that had the political, economic, and social reforms supported by Armenian political parties been part of the program of Turkish parties, Turkish historians would have found them relevant for understanding Ottoman history; some of them also might have found echoes in the concerns of more contemporary perspectives.

53. The most readily available studies of the subject are Louise Nalbandian's *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement* (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California, 1967), which covers the early stages of the movement to 1896, and Anaide Ter Minassian, *Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Liberation Movement, 1887-1912* (Cambridge, Mass.: Zoryan Institute, 1984).

54. "Dsrakir" [Program], *Hunchak* (London), October-November 1888; also in Gidur, pp. 32-37.

55. Unsigned editorials, "Heghapokhutian ayp pen kime" [The ABC of the revolution], *Droshak,* November 1893 and January 1984.

56. "Kordsi propagand" [Propaganda for action], *Droshak,* October 1907 and passim.

57. Gidur, *Batmutiun*, p. 323.

58. *Chorrort enthanur zhoghovi voroshumner* [Resolutions of the Fourth World Congress] (Vienna, 1907); unsigned proclamation on the occasion of the Young Turk revolution, *Droshag*, September 1908.

59. The Hunchakian Party and the Dashnaktsutiune continue to function to this day; the Ramgavar-Sahmanatragan Party joined with two smaller groups in 1921 to form what has since been the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party.

60. Mosse, *German Jews Beyond Judaism*.

61. H. Elmasian, *Eprem* (Tehran: N.p., 1964), and Andre Amourian, *Heghapokhakan Yepremi Votisagane* [The odyssey of Yeprem the Revolutionary] (Tehran: Alik, 1972).

62. Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 147.

63. Ramsaur recognizes the role of the resentment of European interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire in the beginnings of Turkish nationalism, but he adds, "In their attitude toward the Armenians and other subject peoples, the Young Turks are basically imperialistic" (p. 44).

64. *Droshak*, September 1980.

65. *Droshak*, February-March 1914.

66. Gidur, *Batmutiun*, p. 328.

67. "Kaghakagan hay gusagtsutiunneru hamerashkhutiune. Haydararakir" [The harmonious cooperation of Armenian political parties. Proclamation], October 1913, Constantinople. Archives of the Dashnaktsutiune, File 53-179. The document was signed by the Hunchakian Party, the Reformed Hunchakian Party, the Ramgavar-Sahmanatragan Party, and the Dashnaktsutiune.

68. *Droshak*, January 1913.

69. Sabaheddine seems to have been impressed by Edmond Demolins, *Anglo-Saxon Superiority: To What It Is Due* (New York: R. F. Fenno & Co., 1889), in which the author argues that patriotism works when it is "founded on the independence of private life" in which the individual will defend his fatherland to protect his own freedom, when the state exists to facilitate the individual's own independence, and when the fatherland is made for man and not the other way around. See Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 82-83.

70. Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 70; see also Gerard J. Libaridian, "Nation and Fatherland in Nineteenth Century Western Armenian Political Thought," *Armenian Review* 3 (1983), and "A Perspective on the Armenian Liberation Movement," paper presented at a University of Michigan conference on new interpretations in Armenian history, Ann Arbor, 1983.

71. Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 8.

72. Jemal Pasha, *Memoirs*, pp. 97, 276.

73. Ibid., p. 276.

74. Ibid., p. 97.

75. Johannes Lepsius, *Der Todesgang des armenisches Volkes. Bericht über das Schicksal des armenisches Volkes in der Tünkei rährend des Weltkrieges* [The deathmarch of the Armenian people. Report on the fate of the Armenian people in Turkey during the World War] (Heidelberg: N.p., 1980), p. 227.

76. *Daily Telegraph,* October 9, 1915.

77. Ramsaur, *Young Turks,* p. 7.

78. *Droshak,* February-March 1913.

79. *Droshak,* June 1913, p. 97.

80. Unsigned editorial, *Hunchak,* November 1913.

81. *Aspirations et agissements revolutionnaires des comités Arméniens avant et après la proclamation de la Constitution Ottomane* (Constantinople: N.p., 1916 and 1917).

12

RELATIONS OF GENOCIDE: LAND AND LIVES IN THE COLONIZATION OF AUSTRALIA

Tony Barta

I think of land as the history of my nation. It tells of how we came into being and what system we must live. My great ancestors who lived in the times of history planned everything that we practise now. The law of history says that we must not take land, fight over land, steal land, give land and so on. My land is mine only because I came in spirit from that land, and so did my ancestors of the same land. . . .

My land is my foundation. I stand, live and perform as long as I have something firm and hard to stand on. Without land . . . we will be the lowest people in the world, because you have broken down our backbone, took away my arts, history and foundation. You have left me with nothing. Only a black feller who doesn't care about anything in the world. My people don't want to be like you![1]

—Galarrwuy Yunupingu

The basic fact of Australian history is the conquest of the country by one people and the dispossession, with ruthless destructiveness, of another. The recorded effects of this encounter are as clear as they are terrible. Of the black people who inhabited the continent as "Aborigines," "from the beginning," and who had developed complex languages, cultures, and social organizations in more than 50,000 years of tribal life, only small minorities survived the first generations of contact with the white invaders. Driven from their lands, deprived of traditional food supplies, decimated by introduced diseases, many thousands died of causes the Europeans would list as "natural." Thousands more—perhaps 20,000—were killed in the raids and reprisals of frontier war, in massacres, in countless individual acts of violence.[2] Wherever Euro-

peans were determined to settle, Aborigines were fated to die. Not only in Tasmania but in all the rapidly occupied south and east of Australia the processes of colonization and economic expansion involved the virtual wiping out of the Aboriginal population. Australia—not alone among the nations of the colonized world—is a nation founded on genocide.

This is not a view which many white Australians share. The majority have in any case little consciousness of the violence in their past and resent the increasingly outspoken Aboriginal references to it. They would prefer to celebrate their bicentennial in 1988 free of black counter-demonstrations and untroubled by the mounting Aboriginal claims for restoration of land. Among the historians who have shaped the Australian consciousness of the past only very few, very recently, have emphasized the destruction of the Aborigines as a central fact. If they have not spoken of genocide—the word appears very rarely[3]—it is for reasons of definition which have made the concept inadequate in a case crying out for its use. What we need, I shall argue, is a conception of genocide which embraces *relations* of destruction and removes from the word the emphasis on policy and intention which brought it into being.

That genocide must be seen as a *policy,* for which individuals could be held responsible and called to account, was the main argument behind Raphael Lemkin's conception. The new word was meant "to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves."[4] This emphasis on *intention* and scope, on purposeful annihilation, has given the word its terrible leading edge. It has succeeded in devaluing all other concepts of less planned destruction, even if the effects are the same. To be *really* terrible, an ordeal inflicted on a people now has to be "genocidal." These essays, too, are written under that shadow.

"The *deliberate* destruction of a race or nation"; "acts committed *with intent* to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such": all subsequent definitions of genocide have pressed home the emphasis on planning and purpose.[5] Yet we know that the destruction of many peoples, genocidal *outcomes,* have been the result of complex and only obscurely discerned causes, and in that respect genocide should properly lose its uniqueness—the uniqueness of having intentionality as its defining characteristic. It should not be possible after more than a century of Marxism and other varieties of historiography intent on teasing out dialectics of change behind apparently singular events to accept the construing of policy as a substitute for explorations of its contexts. This is the issue Karl Marx addressed early on, when he attempted to establish the sets of relationships structuring historical reality as the proper object of historical enquiry, rather than only the intentions and actions of individuals.

In the investigation of *political* conditions one is too easily tempted to over-look the *objective nature of the relationships* and to explain everything from the *will* of the persons acting. There are *relationships,* however, which determine the actions of private persons as well as those of individual authori-ties, and which are as independent as the movements in breathing. Taking this objective standpoint from the outset, one will not presuppose an exclu-sively good or bad will on either side. Rather, one will observe relationships in which only persons appear to act at first.[6]

Marx did not have genocide—or Australia—in mind; nor was he yet thinking primarily in terms of economic relationships. Discussion of capitalism, of imperialism, of colonialism has of course embraced the kinds of violence associated with the clash of cultures and the imposition of an alien economic, social, and political order. It is in this way that Leo Kuper (somewhat reluctantly, it seems to me) acknowledges a con-tribution of Marxism to our understanding of genocide. He quotes Eric Wolf on the extermination of hunting and gathering peoples in the name of civilization, whose representatives then inherit the land: "The prog-ress of civilization across the face of the earth is also a process of primary accumulation, of robbery in the name of reason." And while Jean-Paul Sartre is seen as too readily equating colonization with geno-cide, Kuper recognizes in Sartre's reference to Americans "*living out* . . . a relationship of genocide" with the Vietnamese as a way around some of the more legalistic approaches to the problem of intent.[7]

It is this kind of "living out a relationship of genocide," one structured into the very nature of the encounter, which I wish to explore in the case of Australia. I will not, I hope, beg the question of how relationships might be expressive of intentions; I expect to construe intentions from action (and inaction) and from words as well. But I will assume of ac-tions that they imply relationships, and entail consequences, which people do not always envisage clearly. Genocide, strictly, cannot be a crime of unintended consequences; we expect it to be acknowledged in consciousness. In real historical relationships, however, unintended consequences are legion, and it is from the consequences, as well as the often muddled consciousness, that we have to deduce the real nature of the relationship.

In Australia very few people are conscious of having any relationship at all with Aborigines. My thesis is that all white people in Australia do have such a relationship; that in the key relation, the appropriation of the land, it is fundamental to the history of the society in which they live; and that implicitly rather than explicitly, in ways which were inevitable rather than intentional, it is a relationship of genocide.

Such a relationship is systemic, fundamental to the type of society rather than to the type of state, and has historical ramifications extending far beyond any political regime. Irving Horowitz (misleadingly, in my

view) calls Germany "a genocidal society" because during one terrible period of *political* aberration the "state bureaucratic apparatus" was used for "a structural and systematic destruction of innocent people."[8] My conception of a genocidal *society*—as distinct from a genocidal state—is one in which the whole bureaucratic apparatus might officially be directed to protect innocent people but in which a whole race is nevertheless subject to remorseless pressures of destruction inherent in the very nature of the society. It is in this sense that I would call Australia, during the whole 200 years of its existence, a genocidal society.

Nothing could have been further from the minds of its founders. Captain James Cook had taken possession of eastern Australia as "terra nullius," land not effectively belonging to anyone, so that there was never any negotiation with the Aboriginal inhabitants.[9] In this certainly were the seeds of the subsequent genocide: because the Aborigines had never mixed their labor with the soil to make it productive they had no right to it and would be cleared from it by those who did. However, when Captain Arthur Phillip arrived with the first fleet at Botany Bay in 1788 his instructions were unequivocal: he was "by every possible means to open an intercourse with the natives," to "conciliate their affections," and to enjoin everyone to "live in amity and kindness with them." He must punish all who should "wantonly destroy them, or give them any unnecessary interruption in the exercise of their several occupations."[10] The problem, of course, right from the beginning, would be in defining "wanton destruction" and "unnecessary interruption." Colonizing activity in itself—founding a settlement, planting crops, pasturing animals—could not be considered under either heading. To "wantonly destroy" the Aborigines was something very different from taking land they appeared to make no use of, and the distinction became more important in the maintenance—and modification—of colonial attitudes as the area of settlement expanded and Aboriginal resistance increased.

The impulse to expansion was economic. In 1812 it was demonstrated that Australian wool could sell profitably to the Yorkshire mills. Having displaced the peasant farmers from the British countryside by enclosures and larger-scale farming (a process of social dislocation not unrelated to the rise in urban crime and the pressure to transport convicts to Australia), the agrarian revolution in Britain now helped finance an expanding textile industry which it could not supply with raw materials from home production. In 1822 the British government dropped the duty on wool from its own colony on the other side of the world to one-sixth of that on German wool. A new wave of free settlers, often only with sufficient capital for a small starting flock, knew that enterprise and determination—with much of the frontier hardship borne by convict or ex-convict stock-keepers—might bring rich rewards. Sheep may seem unlikely instruments of genocide, but together with the cattle that

trampled edible plants and fouled the water holes, they were the innocent embodiment of historical pressures which wrought massive and irremediable destruction. The tide of strange animals loosed on the Aborigines' carefully tended grazing lands displaced the Aborigines' game and the Aborigines themselves. If the kangaroo, so curious to the eyes of white men, represented the ecologically delicate economy of the hunter-gatherers, the sheep, equally odd in the eyes of the blacks, were suitable representatives of the incomprehensible concepts of individual ownership and private property. The imported animals and the appropriated land were soon shown—like Byron's stocking-frame—to have a higher value than human life. The most drastic demonstration was in Tasmania.

In 1817 the European population of Van Diemen's Land stood at 2,000, the Aboriginal population at about the same. By 1830 the Europeans' numbers had increased to 23,500, some 6,000 of whom were free settlers with capital to invest in the pastoral industry. They had been granted almost half a million hectares, which they stocked with 1 million sheep—more than in the whole of New South Wales.[11] Nobody seriously considered the effect of this on the few Aborigines encountered; the settlers were more worried about escaped convict bushrangers. But the Aborigines were shortly to make their attitude plain, and in the necessity of fighting a virtual war to protect the settlers Australia was to at least brush with that more classical mode of genocide, the direct sanctioning of violence by the state.

The imperial administrator called on to test the viability of humane principles on the frontier was Colonel George Arthur. He arrived in Hobart as Lieutenant Governor of Van Diemen's Land in 1824 with a reputation for having stood up to the slave owners of British Honduras in defense of an indigenous people, the Mosquito Indians. One of his first duties, indicative of the way things were to develop, was to approve the trial and execution of the first two black resistance leaders—one of them called Mosquito. He also issued a proclamation, in accordance with Colonial Office instructions, placing the Aborigines under the protection of British law and warning the stock-keepers that if they continued to "wantonly destroy" the Aborigines they would be prosecuted. Neither during his tenure of office, which saw the rapid escalation of frontier violence, nor in the subsequent history of the colony was any European charged, let alone committed for trial, for assaulting or killing an Aboriginal.

Arthur was no doubt sincere in his desire to protect the Aborigines. But attacks on settlers continued, and in November 1826, only two and a half years after his arrival, he gave the settlers the right to drive off any Aborigines they suspected of meaning them harm, and if their own force was insufficient they could call on assistance from the nearest detachment of troops. There followed three years of warfare during which Arthur could find no alternative to the policy being urged on him by the

settlers; the Aborigines would have to go. As the clamor increased for their forcible removal to some kind of reserve—or else for a free hand to the settlers—he confessed, "I cannot divest myself of the consideration that all aggression originated with the white inhabitants," but it is not clear that he ever saw this aggression as being synonymous with the very act of settlement. Settlement, after all, was Arthur's business; whatever Colonial Office principles of fair treatment might be, they did not include the re-embarkation of the colonists and the restoration of the land to savages who had never known how to make it productive. If the blacks would not allow white expansion to proceed uncontested (and thirty white deaths in 1827 showed that they would not) their exclusion from the settled areas was the only option. Under pressure from the local press—the *Hobart Town Courier* recalled the removal of the Indians to the other side of the Mississippi forty years earlier—the final solution came to be envisaged as removal of all Aborigines from the main island of Tasmania.

Arthur was only reluctantly pushed into declaring martial law, into sponsoring the Black Line, a drive across the entire island which despite ridicule hastened success in clearing the settled areas of Aborigines, and into the removal of the remainder to special camps on outlying islands. He was persuaded that the Aborigines were ready to go for their own good, that removal was necessary for their protection, that once removed from their traditional lands they would more readily accept the blessings of white civilization—Christianity and the work ethic—as the only means to survival. He knew that they might "pine away"; he also knew that their end would be more violent if they were left among the settlers. The despair and disease which finished off the last full-blood Aborigines was not ameliorated by Arthur's hope that their passing be attended by "every act of kindness." Nor was this decline confined to the southern-most colony, with the smallest black population. In fundamental re-spects the pattern was repeated in the rest of Australia: pastoral invasion, resistance, violent victory of the white men, mysterious disappearance of the blacks.

When a House of Commons Select Committee in 1837 attempted to understand what was happening to the Aborigines it quoted the Bishop of Sydney:

They do not so much retire as decay; wherever Europeans meet with them they appear to wear out, and gradually to decay: they diminish in numbers; they appear actually to vanish from the face of the earth. I am led to appre-hend that within a very limited period, a few years, those who are most in contact with Europeans will be utterly extinct—I will not say exterminated —but they will be extinct.[12]

The bishop had observed well. By 1850 whole tribes from the region of Sydney had disappeared. The story was the same at Newcastle,

further north. In the Port Phillip area, after the settlement of Melbourne in 1835, the numbers dropped from more than 10,000 to less than 2,000 in eighteen years—a decline of over 80 percent. Around Geelong, a center of pastoral expansion, the decline was from 279 to 36. In the new colony of South Australia, the number of Aborigines in the region of Adelaide fell from 650 to 180 in the fifteen years after 1841. Relatively few of these deaths—perhaps a fifth of them—were the result of direct violence. The countless undocumented atrocities and the known killings on the advancing frontier of settlement do not account for the vast proportions of the disaster. By far the greatest number—possibly two-thirds—were killed by the previously unknown illnesses against which Aborigines had no resistance (chiefly smallpox) but also by alcohol and malnutrition. Aborigines had a low resistance to alcohol and tobacco and the respiratory complaints which were exacerbated by the European conventions of clothing (often worn when wet) and housing (now fixed, but without adequate sanitation). Malnutrition, in the almost instantaneous adaptation to a high carbohydrate European diet—flour and sugar were irresistible innovations—played a part in the dramatically lowered birthrate, as did venereal disease.[13] A greater part, too easily underestimated, was played by demoralization and despair. If the Europeans only half understood the inability of the Aborigines to withstand civilization and too readily saw them as a race doomed to extinction, Aborigines themselves had reason to be fatalistic. With many of their women bearing mixed-race children to white men, the black birthrate dramatically in decline, their social structure destroyed, and their traditional culture impossible to maintain, many Aborigines could hardly envisage a future in such a cataclysmic world. They knew the white men's ways, and they knew that the kind of statements now treated as empty rhetoric by many historians expressed the white man's view of the real relationship between the races, the genuinely historic terms of the encounter.

We cannot shut our eyes to the inevitable destiny of the Aborigines—the incontrovertible fact that the propagation of the race has ceased—and the consequence, that the present generation of Aborigines is the last that will have existence. . . . we have already expressed an opinion, which under the expectation of receiving obloquy of pseudo-philanthropists, we unhesitatingly repeat, that the perpetuation of the race of Aborigines is *not to be desired.* That they are an inferior race of human beings it is in vain to deny; (the probable extinction of the race from natural causes is a proof of this); and it is no more desirable that any inferior race should be perpetuated, than that the transmission of an hereditary disease, such as scrofula or insanity, should be encouraged. In the case of the Aborigines, the process of their extinction is the result, in a great degree, of natural causes; and even if not beyond cure, is scarcely to be regretted. . . . This may be considered a harsh, cruel view of

the question, but it is founded upon clear conviction, and is not unkindly meant.[14]

The immediate context of this statement, an expression of editorial opinion by *The Geelong Advertiser* in 1846, was a discussion—intended to be realistically supportive—of missionary efforts to help the Aborigines. The larger context was Geelong's new status, within a decade of its foundation, as one of the busiest wool ports in the world, the center of pastoral expansion into that area of potential wealth called by its white discoverer "Australia Felix." In these vast grasslands individuals with sufficient capital and pioneering spirit could take up "runs" as "squatters" on Crown Land.[15] If not every squatter had to kill for the land which would now be his, he knew that the necessity to protect his flocks and stockmen from Aborigines might arise and that if the Aborigines did not threaten him it was because some of them had already been killed—"taught a lesson"—by other settlers. *The Geelong Advertiser,* which since the previous year had added *"and Squatters' Advocate"* to its masthead, was vocal in retailing the "depredations" and "outrages" of the blacks and in demanding military protection from a too philanthropic government. So the reality of land seizure by whites, and clearing or at least "pacification" of blacks, was the context of all government policy in Victoria, too, as it had been in Tasmania.

The strategies adopted by a harassed, undermanned administration were to be the same elsewhere, until every yard of the continent had been appropriated. "Protectors" would be appointed to round up the Aborigines and "civilize" them, while saving them from the settlers. Those who resisted this path to social and cultural destruction risked more immediate annihilation at the hands of a new and deadly force of black troopers formed in response to settler demands. Expert at tracking down and "dispersing" Aborigines accused of crimes against people or property, the Native Mounted Police were an effective instrument for securing the displacement of one people by another in most of Australia. Nowhere was the displacement achieved without official and unofficial killing. Everywhere the killing—whether officially sanctioned or not— was understood as necessary to the establishment of the new economic and social order.

The connection between appropriation and violence was lost on no one. From the first expansion of the zone of settlement around Sydney there had been official encouragement for the settlers to form vigilante groups, and in 1824, to protect the flocks and herds spilling out onto the plains beyond the mountains, martial law was declared for five months. No casualty figures were ever reported, but in that time the Aboriginal problem was generally considered solved: there was no more trouble in the Bathurst area. Later the missionary L. E. Threlkeld gave an account of what had been told to him. It is thick with the language of genocide.

One of the largest holders of Sheep in the Colony, maintained at a public meeting at Bathurst, that the best thing that could be done, would be to shoot all the Blacks and manure the ground with their carcases, which was all the good they were fit for! It was recommended likewise that the Women and Children should especially be shot as the most certain method of getting rid of the race. Shortly after this declaration, martial law was proclaimed, and sad was the havoc made upon the tribes at Bathurst. A large number were driven into a swamp, and mounted police rode round and round and shot them off indiscriminately until they were all destroyed! When one of the police enquired of the Officer if a return should be made of the killed, wounded there were none, all were destroyed, Men, Women and Children! the reply was;—that there was no necessity for a return. But forty-five heads were collected and boiled down for the sake of the skulls! My informant, a Magistrate, saw the skulls packed for exportation in a case at Bathurst ready for shipment to accompany the commanding Officer on his voyage shortly afterwards taken to England.[16]

Such massacres took place on every colonial frontier: in Australia the terrible story of shootings, decapitations, and poisonings continued into the twentieth century.[17] There was open discussion of atrocities in the press, many of them involving troopers supposedly upholding the law, and many more incidents than were ever reported lived on in Aboriginal memory. One of the best documented, because the Attorney General of New South Wales was determined to show that the law (unlike the land) could not be taken into private hands, was the Myall Creek Massacre of 1838. Some thirty peaceful and friendly Aborigines on Myall Creek station were kidnapped by twelve white stockmen and the entire group, men, women, and children, slaughtered. Although the bodies were burned beyond recognition, seven of the killers were tried and—at the second attempt—convicted. Amidst enormous public outrage at this victimization of men who had acted no differently (it was asserted) from government agents in the same area some weeks before, and despite a defense lobby organized by the squatters, they were hanged. Their jailer reported that right to the end all of the men maintained "that as it was done solely in defence of their masters' property . . . they were not aware that in destroying the aboriginals they were violating the law, or that it could take cognizance of their having done so, as it had (according to their belief) been so frequently done in the colony before."[18]

It is true that the colonial government, prodded by the disquiet expressed in the House of Commons, now attempted to assert its authority over the settlers and to make its protection of the Queen's black subjects more effective. But the government knew it was dealing with a larger historical encounter whose effects it could at best mitigate. It knew that its own position represented a fundamental denial of Aboriginal claims "whether as sovereigns or proprietors of the soil," and the settlers knew it, too. When they demanded that "energetic and effectual steps" be

taken against the Aborigines because they were "convinced that such a course will eventually prove to be the most humane and merciful," they knew there was after all no dispute about the necessity to protect "the laudable and enterprising pursuit of a pastoral life in the interior" or their status as "pioneers of civilisation."[19] The government was able to proceed with the appointment of protectors because it was understood that their mission would be a civilizing one—rounding up Aborigines and showing them the benefits of Christianity. They would not interfere—and would in fact stop the Aborigines from interfering—with the "laudable and enterprising" incorporation of the continent into the capitalist economy.

The settlers won on the ground, and it is their history, pioneers of civilization in a harsh continent, inevitably displacing the stone age tribes, which remains the conventional view. Very few Australians are aware of the ruthlessness of the process; sympathy for Aboriginal fringe-dwellers, out of sight and out of mind, is low. Claims for land rights are often met with derision. References to the subsequent history of attitudes to the Aborigines—"smoothing the pillow of a dying race," removing children from parents, forcing assimilation of half-castes, insisting that the majority culture of white Australians *must* be embraced by Aborigines if they are to survive (this has remained the basis of policy in most areas up to the present)—are assumed to be either excusable ("that's the way they thought in those days") or, in common-sense way, inevitable. Certainly nobody now, despite occasional remarks later passed off as jokes, thinks in terms of extermination. So the idea that the consistent, indeed mounting pressure toward incorporation in the now even more internationalized Australian economy is in some way related to genocide is incomprehensible. In fact, all the subsequent pressure on the Aborigines *as a people* is a direct result of their losing the unequal war for possession of the land. It is possible that a people less weakened by disease might have resisted more successfully; it is not possible to imagine a settler class less determined to break that resistance. The killing on the frontier, then, had to be of a kind that would destroy the ability of Aborigines to survive as independent peoples, with their own social organization, ethnic separateness, and cultural value system in conflict with the world view and economic interest of the invaders. This was clearly understood at the time, by both sides. The Europeans knew that if they could not establish their right to secure property—possession of the land—they had no future; the Aborigines knew that when they lost the fight for the land, all was lost. The fatalism of the black people's "fading away" from those areas where the white man's civilization so quickly triumphed was not very mysterious. In the ten years to 1849 only twenty births were recorded amongst all the seven tribes around Melbourne. But without the land to which their whole being belonged, without the sacred sites and ceremonies which ex-

pressed the meaning and purpose of Aboriginal life, how could a future life be envisioned? Derrimut, of the Yarra people, said to a European in the 1840s:

You see . . . all this mine, all along here Derrimut's once; no matter now, me soon tumble down. . . . Why me have lubra? Why me have piccaninny? You have all this place, no good have children, no good have lubra, me tumble down and die very soon now.

And Billibellary, an elder of the same group, apparently explaining the increase in the traditional practice of infanticide:

The Black lubras say now no good children, Blackfellow say no country now for them, very good we kill and no more come up Pickaninny.[20]

To veil the realities of this conflict behind the cloudy rhetoric of "the fatal impact" is to deny historical responsibility by refusing historical analysis. "We Australians," a Melbourne sociologist recently assured newspaper readers, "have inherited the wreckage of one of the many cultural tragedies that litter human history. When a strong and a weak culture meet, the latter invariably dies." It was not a matter of anyone being at fault in the past, so we should not overreact in the present— notably by "rushing in dripping with guilt to give away huge sections of the country" which might (through mining) be of benefit to all Australians.[21] I am aware that the large-scale "relations of genocide" I propose can imply a similar "no one is to blame" approach. The difference, I hope, is in an insistence that relations imply connections within systems, and that the whole system needs to be critically explored.

What Marx said in 1843 referred to the economic and societal pressures on the Moselle wine growers, but it is equally apt to the situation of Australian wool growers at the same time. It was not "an exclusively good or bad will on either side" which caused the destruction of the Aborigines but "the objective nature of the relationships" between (white) capitalist wool producers and (black) hunter-gatherers. Local encounters were always between individuals, and individual attitudes could make an immediate difference between life and death. The quality of personal relationships varied according to the whole range of individual character and circumstance, but the larger encounter and the *inescapable relationship* was between totally incompatible forms of economy and society.

At the center of this relationship—both in consciousness and in actuality—was the land. Both peoples, the Aboriginal inhabitants and the invaders, needed the land. Because of the uses for which each people needed the land, and because of the cultural gulf in understandings about the land, coexistence was impossible. The black people

belonged to the land, their being was part of it and it was part of them. Collectively and individually, it was their life. To the white people it was land to be brought into production; that production was at the center of their culture and the basis of their social order. Collectively, taking over the land was the driving force of the colonists; individually, they saw the land as potential and then actual property. Once appropriated by one man it belonged to him alone—even if normally owned by the state power which had claimed it all. Very few of the invaders had a sense of alienating the land from the Aborigines; how extreme a form of alienation it was they understood even less. The men who put their capital into land knew they had a relationship, through wage labor, with the men who helped them make the land productive, even if they would not have recognized any alienation of labor into capital through that relationship. With the Aborigines there were generally no relations of production, only relations—again by means of capital—through the land. So the key relation between white and black was one of total alienation: that was the condition of the triumph of a taken for granted economic, social, and political order in an "alien" land.

It will still be objected that taking over a continent and destroying its inhabitants are two very different things. And—as I have been at pains to agree—the determination to do one did not imply the *intention* to do the other. Only a minority "had to" kill, as they saw it, in defense of their property, or in defense of their own lives—lives on the line because of commitment to property. But the violence accompanying the appropriation of the land was of a scale and ruthlessness—largely uncurbed by official intervention—which could leave no doubt in black or white minds as to the fate of those who resisted the "inevitable" course of events, and it can be no coincidence that it was accompanied, among those with no thought of murder in their minds, by much talk of the "inevitable" dying out of the black race. I do not think it is too simplistic to see in this dominant opinion the most comfortable ideological reflection of a relationship which could not be recognized in good conscience for what it was—a relationship of genocide.

In some larger human reckoning, it has been pointed out, the economic development of Australia benefited more people than it harmed. By the end of the nineteenth century, "three million Australians and millions of people in other lands were being fed by a continent which in its tribal heyday had supported only a fraction of that number." The new sheep industry in Australia provided work in English mills and warmth to millions in Europe and North America.[22] And it was the blanket, a typical and beneficent product of the new capitalist world economy, which provided the symbol both of the production relations and the relations of dispossession which came together in the appropriation of the land. Made productive according to the original justification for its

seizure, the land was never acknowledged in principle or practice as having been taken from previous owners. Therefore no payment or compensation was ever offered. But for many years the acknowledgment that a black fringe-dweller was a full-blood Aborigine, deserving at least of government charity, was the issue of a new blanket, completing its journey from the wool of the seized grasslands, through the mill of the industrial economy, to the survivors of the dispossessed.

We were hunted from our ground, shot, poisoned, and had our daughters, sisters and wives taken from us.... What a number were poisoned at Kilcoy.... They stole our ground where we used to get food, and when we got hungry and took a bit of flour or killed a bullock to eat, they shot us or poisoned us. All they give us now for our land is a blanket once a year.[23]

Times change, commodities at the center of the economy change, ways of negotiation change. Aborigines in the far north of Australia, where the climate and landscape were less congenial to European settlement, met the white onslaught later and with greater numbers. Some who still remember the massacres—the last shooting by a police party took place in 1928—finally, in the 1970s, acquired rights to significant areas of reserve land. But the pressure at the frontier of the yet more transnational economy has not let up. Bauxite, industrial diamonds, uranium—a substance whose genocidal potential for the first time threatens the white peoples of the world as well—have joined pastoral products as necessary commodities which black peoples, in the name of the greater good, should not stand in the way of. Some would have the Aborigines stand firm against uranium mining. The Aborigines know the uranium will be mined when there is a market for it and that their choices in the future are not separable from what has happened in the past. They know that the relations of power between black and white may still be modified, but that their fundamental weighting will not be changed.[24] In that sense the relations of genocide are alive, and every negotiation will continue to be witnessed by the Aboriginal dead.

NOTES

1. Galarrwuy Yunupingu, Northern Land Council, in a letter to white people, Black News Service, 1976. Quoted by Janine Roberts, *From Massacres to Mining* (London: War on Want, 1978), p. 6.

2. The estimate of numbers of Aborigines killed in direct conflict is from Henry Reynolds, *The Other Side of the Frontier* (Townsville: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1981), p. 99. This is an indispensable account of the colonial encounter between whites and blacks.

3. Exceptions include Bernard Smith, *The Spectre of Truganini,* ABC Boyer Lectures (Sydney: The Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1980),

and Annette Hamilton, "Blacks and Whites: The Relationships of Change," *Arena,* no. 30 (1972), pp. 34-48.

4. Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), p. 79.

5. *Concise Oxford Dictionary;* 1946 U.N. Genocide Convention, re-printed as Appendix 1 in Leo Kuper, *Genocide* (New York: Penguin, 1981), pp. 210-14. Emphasis added.

6. Karl Marx, "The Defense of the Moselle Correspondent: Economic Distress and Freedom of the Press," 1843, in Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat, eds., *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967), pp. 144-45. Marx's concept of relations is usefully elucidated in Bertell Ollman, *Alienation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

7. Kuper, *Genocide,* pp. 34, 40, quoting Eric R. Wolf, "Killing the Achés," in Richard Arens, ed., *Genocide in Paraguay* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976), and Jean-Paul Sartre, *On Genocide* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

8. Irving Louis Horowitz, *Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976), p. 18.

9. Alan Frost, "New South Wales as *Terra Nullius:* The British Denial of Aboriginal Land Rights," *Historical Studies* 19, no. 77 (October 1977), pp. 513-23.

10. W.E.H. Stanner, "The History of Indifference Thus Begins," *Aboriginal History* 1 (1977), pp. 3-26.

11. Lyndall Ryan, *The Aboriginal Tasmanians* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1981), p. 83. The account of Arthur's policy is also derived from Ryan, chaps. 5-9. See also Lloyd Robson, *A History of Tasmania,* Vol. 1 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983), Parts 1 and 2.

12. Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines, 26 June 1837 (extract), *Historical Records of Victoria,* Vol. 2A, Melbourne (1982), p. 62.

13. Richard Broome, *Aboriginal Australians* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 61. Subtitled "Black Response to White Dominance 1788-1980," this is the best overall survey. Noel Butlin, *Our Original Aggression* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1983), speculates on the possibility that the Aboriginal population of southeastern Australia was already severely depleted by smallpox before most contact with settlers occurred.

14. *The Geelong Advertiser,* 22 April 1846. Italics in original. From Darren Baillieu, *Australia Felix* (Mount Maceden, Victoria: The Hawthorn Press, 1982).

15. Edward M. Curr, *Recollections of Squatting in Victoria (1841-1851)* (first published 1883), 2nd ed. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965), is a lively and reliable account. A later history with the same qualities is Margaret Kiddle, *Men of Yesterday* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1961).

16. L. E. Threlkeld, *Australian Reminiscences and Papers*, ed. Niel Gunson (Canberra: Institute of Aboriginal Affairs, 1974), Vol. 1, p. 49.

17. See Part 1, "The Nigger Shall Disappear," in Raymond Evans, Kay Saunders, and Kathryn Cronin, *Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination: Race Relations in Colonial Queensland* (Sydney: Australia and New Zealand Book Company, 1975).

18. Sharman Stone, ed., *Aborigines in White Australia, A Documentary History of the Attitudes Affecting Official Policy and the Australian Aborigine, 1697-1973* (Melbourne: Heinemann Educational Books, 1974), p. 58. For a fuller account of the massacre and trials see R.H.W. Reece, *Aborigines and Colonists: Aborigines and Colonial Society in New South Wales in the 1830s and 1840s* (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1974). The incident is set in its larger context by Judith Wright, *The Cry for the Dead* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1981), and C. D. Rowley, *The Destruction of Aboriginal Society* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1970).

19. The correspondence between Governor Gipps and "The Memorialists" is reprinted by S. G. Foster, "Aboriginal Rights and Official Morality," *Push from the Bush*, No. 11 (November 1981), pp. 68-98. He shows how the House of Commons' recognition that the land had been taken from the Aborigines "without any other title than that of superior force" was suppressed in official pronouncements.

20. Broome, *Aboriginal Australians*, p. 62.

21. John Carroll in *The Age*, 10 May 1984.

22. Geoffrey Blainey, *A Land Half Won* (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1980), p. 98.

23. Rowley, *The Destruction of Aboriginal Society*, p. 158. At Kilcoy, in 1842, perhaps more than one hundred Aborigines were poisoned; in the 1928 massacre thirty-one Aborigines were officially admitted to have been shot—justifiably, in self-defense.

24. As I write, an advertising campaign by the mining industry, estimated to have cost a million dollars, has paid off. Faced with elections, the West Australian and Federal Labor governments have announced that they will not allow Aborigines to block mining on Aboriginal land. Jan Mayman, "How White Money Feeds White Fear," *The Age* (19 September, 1984), and further reports 27-29 September. Galarrwuy Yunupingu (see note 1) has become a leading advocate of the necessity for Aboriginal communities to negotiate royalty agreements with the uranium mining companies.

13

MIDDLEMAN MINORITIES AND GENOCIDE

Walter P. Zenner

Africans have rioted against Asians in South Africa and Kenya. The Asians were expelled from Uganda. Chinese have been persecuted throughout Southeast Asia and expelled from Vietnam. Japanese Americans in the United States were interned in 1942. Armenians by the hundreds of thousands and Jews by the millions were slaughtered in this century. All of these events have given rise to the connection between middleman minorities and the victims of genocide.[1] "Middleman" or "trading" minorities are ethnic groups which are disproportionately represented in occupations related to commerce, especially in the small business sector. As minorities, they are not part of the ruling elite, although many may become quite affluent. It is this lack of power which makes them vulnerable to violence. The connection is certainly present in the last two cases, although the other cases, while reporting inter-ethnic conflict and violence, do not refer to genocide per se.

Genocide is defined legally in terms of the intentional physical annihilation of all or part of a group of people on racial, religious, or ethnic lines. This definition approximates what Helen Fein, following Vahakn Dadrian, has called "optimal genocide" and the manner in which Yehuda Bauer has distinguished the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews from most other "genocides."[2] Genocide is a species of the more general category of "massacre," which involves "the intentional killing by political actors of a significant number of relatively defenseless people." Genocide, however, differs from ordinary massacres, because of its scope and aims. In the case of genocide, the aim is to transform a social field by removing a whole group of actors, not merely to terrorize the

group's survivors. It also differs from another favored form of population elimination, namely, expulsion or enforced emigration.[3]

Genocide by this definition has been directed at a wide variety of peoples. Probably the largest number of ethnic groups in recent times subject to genocide, although usually involving small numbers of individuals, have been peoples subsisting by hunting, gathering, and shifting horticulture (see Chapter 12). Other groups have also been subjected to genocide and various other forms of liquidation, such as the kulaks (or so-called wealthy peasants) in the Soviet Union under Stalin, or the Communists of Indonesia after the attempted coup of 1965, or the Muslims of Hamah (Syria) in 1982. None of these events points to a connection between middleman minorities and genocide. Still, the fact that two large-scale genocides were committed against groups generally identified as middleman minorities means that the link cannot be ignored. Indeed, the international convention against genocide was formulated in the wake of the Nazi campaign against the Jews, which can be seen as the prototype for the concept of genocide itself.

In this essay, those theories which have examined the middleman minority phenomenon will be examined in terms of what they say about the victimization of these ethnic groups in general and with regard to genocide in particular. This will be followed by a brief comparison of middleman minorities which have or have not been subjected to various forms of persecution.

MIDDLEMANISHNESS AS A PRECONDITION FOR VICTIMIZATION[4]

Middleman minority theories in modern social science began with theories which strove to explain the special position of the Jew in medieval and modern Europe. Several of these theories, particularly those of Werner Sombart and Max Weber, debated the role of the Jew in the creation of modern capitalist economies, not in understanding the reasons for hostility toward the Jew. Indirectly, both sociologists suggest that Jewish culture is responsible for hostility against Jews. Sombart was generally hostile to the bourgeois-capitalist form of enterprise, for which the Jews as well as other ethnic groups were responsible. Weber saw traditional Jewish forms of capitalism as being quite different from the rational capitalism that arose out of Puritanism. Unlike the Puritans, according to Weber, the Jews practiced a double standard of economic ethics, treating out-group members differently from members of their own group and not viewing work and business as a sacred vocation. While Sombart and Weber differed in their views on the roles of Judaism and Puritanism and in their politics, neither dealt with the victimization of the Jews per se.[5]

Wilhelm Roscher, Georg Simmel, and Ferdinand Toennies saw the Jewish problem in terms of intergroup relations. Roscher, the earliest of these three, analyzed the Jewish role in the medieval economic European economy, although he compared Jews with other groups as well. Roscher, based on then available historical data, found that the Jews controlled commerce in the early Middle Ages, only to be displaced by Christian merchants in the latter part of that period. In the early period the Jews were dominant, because they, as strangers, introduced monetary commerce into a feudal economy. They occupied a niche in the society as traders. As the society grew, Christians aspired to the position which Jews occupied, and through use of their power they displaced the Jews.

Simmel and Toennies considered the role of the trader as an intermediary between different groups of people, as one who is simultaneously within a society and outside it, as one who is distant even when physically nearby. The marginality of the intermediary makes him more objective, thus serving his success as a trader (and in other roles), but causing ambivalence on the part of others. They suggest a dialectical relationship between the intermediary who may or may not be a member of an out-group and members of a particular community.

An important part of the "stranger-intermediary" involves credit. In borrowing, the debtor reveals much of himself to the borrower. One may prefer to borrow from a stranger, who has little power over other aspects of one's life, but the high cost of such credit also breeds resentment. The ambivalence toward credit from a "stranger," even a familiar alien, lies at the heart of commercial arrangements involving minority middlemen and their majority clients.[6] Even though the role of intermediary may be a necessary one, it may produce deep-seated hostility.

The elements of "middlemanishness" stressed by these five authors continue to be the ones which form the basis for middleman minority theory. The term "middleman minority" comes from Howard P. Becker, but the theories, which increasingly have been concerned with Asian immigrants and others rather than with Jews, have continued to make use of ideas formulated in an earlier time. The minority's ethnic specialization, in the first instance, is created by a status gap. The societies need people to do certain jobs in commerce and crafts; this is especially true of feudal and colonial societies, but such gaps may appear in modern industrial societies as well. The minority which occupies this niche is generally of foreign origin or otherwise distinguished from the rest of the population. Its success in occupying this niche is enhanced by its ethnic solidarity and by certain attributes such as frugality and a double standard of economic ethics. Hostility toward the minority is the result of the tensions between the minority as successful traders and entrepreneurs against majority group members who are their clients, employees, and

competitors. As more and more majority group members compete with the minority, hostility against the minority increases. The minority is also a convenient scapegoat, because of its frequent association with the ruling classes, who were their initial patrons.[7]

Edna Bonacich's revision of middleman minority theory by applying it to immigrant groups in contemporary capitalist societies has renewed interest and debate. She has connected the middleman minorities to other ethnic groups by showing the similarities between the split-labor market and the situation of immigrant small businessmen. Both pertain to sectors of the economy which are shunned by natives because of the paltry rewards for hard labor, but, at the same time, both the immigrant laborer and the alien small businessman are seen as unfair competitors. While pointing to empty niches in the economy which minority middlemen fill, she did not see the necessity of positing a status gap in these societies.[8]

From the debates of Weber and Sombart on, those explaining the connection between ethnicity and commerce have often disagreed with each other quite sharply. Rather than thinking of a single theory of middleman minorities, it is more appropriate to see middleman minority theory as a subset of hypotheses and propositions which deal with the meeting of economics and ethnicity.

One issue in the discussion of middleman minorities and victimization is determining situations in which these minorities escape persecution. Among the factors which appear to cause such reactions are competition with the out-group (or groups), visibility as strangers, and visibility as a separate ethnic group.

The first of these involves objective features of the economic scene. In the ideal model of the Indian caste system, there is a caste division of labor into which foreign groups could be incorporated. Each group contributes to the whole, and the society is permeated by an ideology recognizing the role of each without challenge. Indeed, we find that the Parsis, a fairly typical middleman minority in western India, and the Jews of India, who served in various occupational roles, did not suffer from persecution.[9] In the ideal status gap setting, such as in early medieval Germany or even in eastern Poland during the inter-World War period, the situation is similar. Again, various authorities suggest that persecution of Jews in pre-Crusades Germany, pre-World War II Volhynia, and the Belorussian areas was not as severe as in other times and places.[10]

Another objective feature is that minority members are more likely to be seen as non-threatening in an open society with a growing economy. Then they may be seen as individuals, not group members, and their contributions are welcome. The openness to innovation may be limited to certain sectors or regions of a country or may encompass the whole society. Thus, in frontier areas minority members will be welcomed

more than in old areas, while they may find opportunities in either abandoned sectors of the economy, such as urban slums, or in new lines, such as the film industry in the early 1900s. Thus, such niches will be filled by disproportionate numbers of minority members.[11] Contrariwise, a shrinking economic base with growing impoverishment is likely to result in anti-minority sentiment. This is especially true if the minority is growing and if its share of the societal wealth is growing. Perception of such growth, even if only apparent, may be sufficient to cause a rise in xenophobia.[12]

The perception of the minority by the majority is important when theorists speak about such variables as visibility and ethnic solidarity. Bonacich, who isolated ethnic solidarity as a factor in both the success of the minority and in their persecution, has also pointed to the fact that such minority communities are frequently rent by intense factionalism and other rivalries.[13] If there is much solidarity, it is most frequently found at an interpersonal familial level or in friendships formed in the community of origin. Yet, to outsiders, the minority is often *seen* as more united than it is: the famous psychological principle that all out-groupers look alike.

The effects of discrimination and persecution are twofold. On the one hand, they may induce group members to seek assimilation into the majority, especially its elite. On the other, they may react defensively and thus such action may reinforce group solidarity. These two reactions may come simultaneously, affecting different segments of a single minority. Thus we find that European Jewry during the late nineteenth century spawned assimilationists, Christian converts, and universalistic revolutionaries on the one hand, and Zionists and fervent Orthodox Jews on the other.

While most middleman minority theories see ethnic solidarity as reinforcing the xenophobia of the majority, assimilatory trends may have a similar effect. Minority members attempting to assimilate compete even more directly with majority members for places in universities, the army, the civil service, and other niches in the society. Since the majority tends to perceive all members of the minority as being part of a unified whole, it is easy to see how they may come to see all members of the minority, whether assimilationist, radical, conservative, or religious, as playing different roles in a single conspiracy against the majority.[14]

The proportion of the minority to the majority may play a role in the way it is perceived by the majority. Stanislav Andreski has argued that if the minority is 10 percent or more of the population, it has reached a critical point of conspicuousness.[15] The only exception he claims to a high proportion leading to such molestation is in New York City, where the position of the Jews has made it possible to fend off persecution. He sees the importance of numbers in that it leads to points of friction be-

tween majority and minority members. On the other hand, he does not claim that smaller numbers inevitably lead to freedom from discrimination.

Numbers and proportions, however, are tricky indeed. Germany in 1933 gave rise to the movement which caused the Holocaust par excellence. The proportion of Jews was less than one percent of the total population. Yet the total "war against the Jews" was initiated and organized by a German, not a Polish, government. Again, perception is important. The proportion of Jews in prominent social positions and in the major German-speaking cities, including Vienna, was higher than in the country as a whole. There also were Jews throughout the country, including many in rural areas. This made the Jew in early twentieth-century Germany loom larger than percentages would suggest.

An important part of a perception is whether one is seen as a "native" or as a "stranger." (Alternatively, a minority member may wish to be seen as an individual on one's own account, rather than as a representative of a collectivity.) Entrepreneurs in early nineteenth-century Britain might be primarily Scots or Dissenters, like Quakers—i.e., members of distinctive groups within the society, but natives. The businessmen of Casablanca include Berbers from the Sous region and Arabs from the city of Fes, both groups of Moroccan Muslims, albeit distinctive ones. In addition, there are Jews, who are Moroccans but not Muslims, and Frenchmen who are neither.[16] Thus there are degrees of "nativity" and "strangerhood."

Urbanization and other forms of internal migration may upset the feelings of neighborliness which may have come to mark relations in rural areas. In the older cities or in the countryside, an equilibrium based on complementarity and toleration may have been established. With massive urbanization, however, all out-groupers may be seen as hostile strangers, and competitiveness and envy of successful minority members may be the new order of the day. Large-scale international migrations would amplify such a perception. The mass emigration of Jews from Russia and the Polish provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the late nineteenth century upset relations between the small Jewish populations of Western Europe and the United States and their Gentile neighbors. The large-scale emigration of Chinese to Southeast Asia in the late nineteenth century had similar effects for the more acculturated Chinese in those countries.

Visibility of the minority is heightened by its own characteristics, such as concentration in certain occupations, a special religion or religious practices, racial signs, and speaking a separate language. This occurs most obviously when the minority consists of recent immigrants, but in multilingual or multi-religious areas, members of several ethnic groups may have shared a single region for generations, such as in much of Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

For these elements of estrangement to result in conflict, other elements must be added. Political mobilization which may utilize the minority as a target is an important one. In such a case, the members of the minority are seen as representatives of a group. Usually such a political mobilization is connected with an ideology. Two elements combine in anti-middleman ideology. One is to view commerce, especially that engaged in by stranger-middlemen, as evil and as violating the rights of natives. In its extreme form, moneymaking is seen as diabolical.[17] The second is to view the minority middlemen as foreign agents who are enemies of the nation, whether this is the Bolsheviks, the Pope, or the Japanese Empire. Both serve to dehumanize the minority middlemen; when combined they form a potent weapon to use against them, and this helps exacerbate the normal frictions between businessmen, their competitors, and their clients.

While those opposed to particular minorities follow strategies to convince the majority and the ruling classes of the minorities' estrangement, the minorities follow various strategies with an opposite intention. They may seek to lower their profile and to be less conspicuous. Thus they may refrain from open political activity as an ethnic group and may give up their language, religion, and the like. They may strive to convince their fellows that while they maintain a separate identity, they are full members of the nation. Thus they may stress their participation in the struggle for independence by the nation-state. They may try to change the ethnic group's occupational structure and otherwise reform themselves so as to answer their critics. Finally, they may stress a political ideology that gives them full rights of citizenship as individuals. In post–World War II North America, several ethnic groups once labeled middleman minorities have made considerable progress along these lines, including the Jews and the Japanese.[18]

Middleman minority status thus seems to cause victimization when the friction derived from trade relationships is compounded by ethnocentrism and by ideologies which dehumanize all alien-traders. Even if the minority, however, is in some ways victimized, the types of victimization range from mild discrimination to optimal genocide. Middleman minorities have a special vulnerability to attack because their social position is one with some wealth but with little authority or power. Even if most members of the minority are extremely poor, there are usually some who are affluent and excite envy. The minority is usually dependent on the ruling class, which sacrifices the minority as a scapegoat. The minority is generally unarmed. Because of its business connections, it must be essentially sedentary.[19]

Some of these qualities may under some circumstances be a strength. The weak, unarmed nature of the minority may make it possible for the majority to tolerate the minority. Such was indeed the position of the Jews under Islam, where for centuries they were outside the power

struggle. Jewish officials might serve as scapegoats, and mobs might attack Jews as a whole when they fell, but they were also to be tolerated if they showed proper deference for the majority. The occasional attacks can be seen as a ritual to restore the proper deference.[20]

Middleman minorities as groups may have some protection through their dispersion, in that one place may be a refuge when another is perilous, although if the net used against them is wide enough this is of little avail. Since such minorities are often recent immigrants, their former homeland may offer protection and/or refuge. This, however, has often proven hazardous, especially if the homeland is the enemy of their present place of residence and makes the sense of threat seen by their hosts realistic, as in the cases of the Jews of Syria after 1948 and the Japanese Americans during World War II.

PROBLEMS IN THE COMPARISON OF GENOCIDES

Certain problems of comparison can be found throughout the social sciences. First, no two situations, events, or other units of analysis are identical. When taken to the extreme, realization of this fact would make any comparison impossible, but it should be kept in mind. Two, studying more than one case often necessitates spending less time and effort on each case than if one were devoting all of one's attention to a single instance. While several examples will bring out crucial features which need to be compared, the presentation of each case becomes more superficial as the number of cases increases. Where a great many cases are used, as in cross-cultural or cross-national correlational studies, complex patterns must be reduced to relatively simple abstractions. Three, the definition of the units of analysis is always a difficult task. Four, studies on particular cases are often quite different in quality.

These problems are acute in the study of genocides. Uniqueness has, of course, been argued with regard to the Jewish Holocaust of 1941-1945, although in the process both Bauer and Dawidowicz have compared these events to others. Bauer comes close to admitting that the Holocaust does have some resemblance to the Armenian genocide during World War I.[21] The second problem is one endemic to comparison and not particular to this area. Problems of unit definition are, however, important. Social scientists are accustomed to dealing with nation-states as units; yet problems spill over national frontiers. This is especially true in times of armed conflict. The Jewish Holocaust and attendant genocides of other groups during World War II took place at a time when Germany rapidly spread its control over most of the European continent and then retreated. Thus the nation-state approach has had to be modified considerably.[22] The Armenian genocide was contained within the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, in the East African cases of

Asian expulsions possible demonstration effects of the Kenyan partial expulsion on Uganda must be taken into account. In addition, the reaction of receiving countries, particularly Great Britain, depended on internal factors. This was also relevant with regard to other expulsions, as we shall see, such as the role of Malaysia and Indonesia at the time of the 1978-1979 refugee crisis involving ethnic Chinese. In defining the unit of analysis, attention must be paid to temporal dimensions as well as spatial ones. In considering European Jewry, does one begin the Holocaust in 1933 with the rise of the Nazis to power or in 1939 with the invasion of Poland? Does one consider the 1894 massacres under Abdul Hamid II as forerunners of the 1916 genocide or as part of it? When one concentrates on the preconditions, this question is less crucial than in dealing with other aspects of the genocidal events, but the question is still relevant. Scale also plays a role in our consideration since some ethnic groups discussed here are much smaller than others.

A problem faced by comparativists is that of the differing bodies of literature on each group or crisis. There is an immense and growing literature on the Holocaust and a smaller but substantial body of material on the Armenian massacres and genocide. Those dealing with Asians in East Africa and Chinese from Vietnam are much smaller, especially since these are events which occurred much closer to the present. The former two literatures are dominated by participants and historians, while the latter two are dominated by social scientists. The richness of the work on European Jewry, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust is overwhelming, compared with the much thinner data available on the other communities.

In this essay, I will compare a number of middleman minorities, beginning with those who were not subjected to extreme harassment. They will be compared to those persecuted and expelled, as well as to those subjected to "optimal genocide." The comparison made here is suggestive and not definitive; the units used are not strictly comparable. For our cases of non-persecution or only minor harassment, the Parsis of western India and the Jews of Morocco will be used. In dealing with expulsions, recent cases from Africa and Asia are cited. One such example, that of the Chinese in Vietnam, is considered in greater detail. This particular instance was quite recent and, at the same time, suggested many parallels to one phase of Nazi persecution which preceded genocide proper, namely, the refugee crisis of 1938-1939. It is important that we understand what differentiates such forms of population elimination from the full-scale Holocaust.

There is some agreement that total or near-total murder of peoples occurred in only two cases of persecution of middleman minorities—that of the Jews by the Nazis and that of the Armenians by the Young Turk regime. The material on these two cases is better formulated than that on the others. Dadrian and Robert Melson, in particular, have analyzed the events which led up to the deportations and liquidation of Armenians in

1915 in social scientific terms, which makes comparison easier.[23] The work done on the Nazi "war against the Jews" is huge; various authorities, such as Bauer, Dawidowicz, and Fein, have addressed themselves to a number of issues of interpretation in which they have summarized the literature available. Rather than summarizing the history of the Armenian and Jewish holocausts again, I will refer to these events, assuming some knowledge on the part of the reader. In all cases, descriptions will be brief, and those interested are referred to the sources listed in the notes.[24]

All of the minorities in question are concentrated occupationally in commercial and related occupations. While the ramifications of this vary from place to place, this is not gone into here. Among the points to be compared are the following:

a. recency of foreign origin;
b. visibility of the group;
c. degree to which the minority is separated from the majority on cultural, racial, religious, and linguistic lines (nativity and strangerhood);
d. degree of impoverishment of the society at large at the time of conflict;
e. the minority's proportion of the population at large;
f. the minority's perceived share of the national wealth (separate occupational role);
g. extent of complementarity and/or competition with the majority;
h. the absence of common foes and the relationship of the internal ethnic conflict to external relations of the nation.

These points of comparison suggest that the occupational specialization of the minority is but one aspect influencing its ultimate fate.[25]

EXAMPLES OF MIDDLEMAN MINORITIES

Just as middleman minorities are not the only victims of genocide, so they are not inevitably the subjects of persecution. One example is that of the Parsis of western India, who were neither persecuted in premodern times nor in the twentieth century when India was the scene of much inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflict. Previously, the Indian Parsi and Jewish cases were explained in terms of the complementarity implicit in the traditional caste system, but this does not explain why no persecution (apart from two minor instances of riots) took place when other conflicts and massacres engulfed India. Here structural explanations have some cogency. The Parsis are neither Hindu nor Muslim;

rather, they belong to the ancient Persian religion of Zoroastrianism. They have been in western India for a thousand years and they speak Gujerati, the local language. While the Parsis were clearly demarcated as an ethno-religious group which was concentrated in certain sectors of the economy and were more prosperous than the general populace in an impoverished nation, they were a small and declining group. In 1971, there were approximately 91,000 Parsis in India, approximately 70 percent living in Bombay. This was fewer than in 1941, in a country where the population was over 400 million and growing. Even within Bombay their proportion of the population was declining and their once great local political power had vanished. Until very recently Bombay had prided itself on its inter-religious harmony, and the Parsis benefited from that as well. Although the Parsi community as a whole had favored a conservative pro-British course, enough Parsis, including Indira Gandhi's husband, had been proponents of independence to give them a place in the national constellation. Many of the Parsis who feared the consequences of independence emigrated quietly, thus contributing to the community's decline. Intermarriage was increasing. Despite their coolness to Indian nationalism, the Parsis were not identified with either China or Pakistan, the main enemies of the Indian Republic since independence.[26]

Another case where no major persecution took place in a potentially threatening situation is that of the Jews in Morocco. Again we have the instance of a middleman minority which (although containing numerous poor people) is more prosperous in the aggregate than the majority in a Third World nation. Like the Parsis and the Jews of Europe, the Moroccan Jews had lived in the country for many centuries; they were not recent immigrants. They spoke the local Arabic dialects. Later, many adopted French as a domestic language. As in India, the Moroccan Jews occupied specific economic niches in a traditional pre-industrial economy, although there also was some competition in commerce between Jews and Muslims. Jewish occupations ranged from craftsmen and rural peddlers to international traders.

The Jews were clearly subordinated to the Muslims in traditional Islamic fashion. While this resembles the hierarchy of the Indian caste system, there is a difference. The Jewish and Christian religions are viewed as past and potential rivals of Islam. The Jews could also convert to Islam. Moroccan history contains instances of pogroms against Jews, especially when Jewish officials were deprived of office, and scholars dealing with North Africa dispute the degree to which Jewish-Muslim relations were marked by subordination and persecution or by peaceful symbiosis, based on patron-client relations.[27] There is little dispute, however, that these relations were never marked by such massive upheavals as the Rhineland massacres during the Crusades, the

medieval expulsions from England, France, Portugal, and Spain, or the Cossack depredations of the seventeenth century.

Like the Parsis in British India, the Jews in both Spanish and French Morocco welcomed the protection offered by European colonialists. They were perceived as being collaborators. At the same time, they were subjected to French anti-Semitism, but when this came to a head during World War II under the Vichy regime, the Moroccan Sultan, Mohammed V, protected them as his subjects. The postwar period was marked by the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Moroccan struggle for independence. While some Moroccan Jews identified with Moroccan nationalism, others stood aside, preferring the continuation of French rule or emigration to Israel, France, or Canada. Although far to the west of the Levant, Morocco is a member of the Arab League and contributed troops to various countries fighting Israel in 1967 and 1973. The potential for large-scale violence and/or government sponsored restriction and harassment has been present, but it has not occurred.[28] Indeed, in April 1984, Morocco was the scene of a public meeting between Moroccan and non-Moroccan Jews and the King of Morocco in Rabat. The Jewish leaders included members of the Israeli Parliament. This was an unprecedented event, especially since Morocco is a member in good standing of the Arab League.

Several structural features may explain why Morocco has not been the scene of such persecution. One is that the patron-client relationships which were marked by dyadic contracts between an individual Jew and his family on the one hand, and a powerful Muslim and his family on the other, characterized intergroup relations in many parts of the country. The patron would consider an attack on his Jewish client as an attack on himself. While such patronage was primarily found in rural areas, it could be extended to urban areas, and the present king and his father have considered the Jews as their clients.[29] This serves as a deterrent to persecution, although such patronage has not been unknown elsewhere in countries where pogroms have occurred.

The rapid and unimpeded emigration of Jews since 1950 has made the Jews less vulnerable. Anticipating trouble, the Jewish community has declined from over 200,000 to less than 20,000 today. This is a much more rapid decline in numbers than that of the Parsis. While it has increased the perception of the Jews as a foreign and unassimilable minority, it also makes them less and less of a threat and a scapegoat.[30] Few Jews are prominent in politics.

In post-independence Africa, Southeast Asian and various middleman minorities have been affected by legal discrimination and expulsions, involving either the whole community or particular segments of it. The groups involved have generally been of recent immigrant origin and, for the most part, bearers of foreign nationality. Victims of persecution have included civil servants and labor migrants as well as those involved in

commerce. In West and East Africa, for instance, victims of forced repatriation have included both Africans from neighboring countries and Asians.[31] Many of the migrants entered these countries during the colonial period to serve in the newly expanding economy, crossing what were basically provincial boundaries between colonies of the same metropolitan power. There were some exceptions to this, such as the Chinese and Lebanese. Many Indians from British India migrated into French-controlled areas. While the expulsions of this variety which have drawn the greatest world attention have been those of Asians from Kenya and Uganda and of Chinese from Vietnam, equally large expulsions have occurred involving labor migrants from neighboring countries. For instance, Idi Amin's actions against the Indians and Pakistanis in Uganda in 1971 were preceded by the expulsion of the Kenyan migrant workers, especially members of the Luo ethnic group, by his predecessor, Milton Obote.[32] This earlier event was less publicized outside of Africa because the expellees were repatriated to a neighboring country, requiring little action on the part of European countries. The Asians, however, attracted greater world attention because many had claims as British subjects; but Britain was reluctant to accept non-white commonwealth subjects as immigrants. On the other hand, India and Pakistan, the lands of origin of these expellees, felt that those who claimed British nationality were the responsibility of Britain, which at the time of Ugandan independence had promised them protection.[33] While there have been massacres, pogroms, and other genocidal actions in Africa since independence, they have generally not been directed primarily against middleman minorities. One possible exception is that of the massacres directed at the Ibo in northern Nigeria in 1966, which led to the attempted secession of Biafra and a hard-fought civil war. These massacres, however, had been preceded by a military coup in which Ibo officers had overthrown a government dominated by northerners and in which northern officials had been assassinated. Subsequently the Ibo-dominated junta was violently overthrown and pogroms were conducted against Ibo outside of their region in Nigeria. Dadrian (1975) sees the anti-Ibo pogroms as retributive genocide.[34]

The separateness of the groups considered here varies. As recent immigrants to the various countries where they live, they are generally separated by culture and social structure. In some cases, they are racially similar, as in the case of Nigerians in Ghana or Thais in Malaysia. The degree of linguistic separation also varies, as does willingness to intermarry with the local populace. Most separated from the local populace were probably the Indians and Pakistanis in East Africa. In addition to their linguistic and racial distinctiveness, most South Asian groups also maintained rigid caste and sectarian boundaries and did not even intermarry with other Asians. This was more true for Hindus than for Muslims.

Some of the instances of expulsion from African and Asian nations have evoked images which remind many in the West of events related to the Holocaust. The massacres in northern Nigeria were very effectively used by proponents of Biafran independence. The homelessness of Asian refugees from East Africa and the "boat people" from Indochina reminded many of the refugee ships of the World War II era which went from port to port with unwanted people, sometimes sinking under the weight of their overcrowded passengers in a hostile sea. It is clear, however, that these middleman minorities have not suffered the "optimal genocide" which constituted the holocausts of the Armenians and the Jews. One instance of this variety will be examined in some detail before considering the similarities and differences between that case (as representative of such expulsions) and that of the holocausts.

THE CHINESE OF VIETNAM AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN CONTEXT

The vast majority of Chinese immigrants in the world, especially prior to the revolution, came from the southeastern provinces of China. Prior to the nineteenth century, junk trade between China and Southeast Asia was carried on through these provinces. The vast labor migrations to both Southeast Asia and the Americas were primarily from this region during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While most of the migrants were farmers by origin, commerce and moneymaking were familiar to countryfolk there, and commerce carried greater prestige in the southeast than in other parts of China.

The initial migration as part of a traditional trade diaspora, and later migrations of single men unaccompanied by families, produced a situation in which Chinese men frequently formed liaisons with or married local women. In many places, their offspring assimilated into the local population, although in some places, such as Java, they formed a distinctive part of the local Chinese community. Through such intermarriages and unions Chinese communities had kinship links with the non-Chinese population. However, a large immigration of Chinese families during the twentieth century changed this and led to greater isolation of the Chinese from the local population. Coupled with rising Chinese and local nationalisms and fears of the "Yellow Peril," conflict between the Chinese and host populations increased. The immigration into Vietnam and other parts of French Indochina followed this pattern. In fact, the high point of Chinese immigration was reached during the civil unrest and the Sino-Japanese war of the 1930s.

Chinese participation in the economies of the various Southeast Asian countries followed two patterns. One was labor migration. During the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, Europeans recruited

many Chinese to work in mines and on plantations throughout Southeast Asia, as well as in other areas of the world. Such laborers were indentured or otherwise indebted to their employers. The vast majority were single males, often leaving spouses and children behind in China. The second pattern was for Chinese migrants to open enterprises of their own, ranging from small mining operations and truck farms to large rice mills and rubber-trading corporations. While many laborers returned home, others went into business for themselves or worked for Chinese employers.

The situation of the Chinese in Vietnam was fairly typical of such populations throughout Southeast Asia, with some special conditions stemming from Vietnam's proximity to China itself. The history of Sino-Vietnamese relations prior to the French conquest in the nineteenth century was marked by trade, tribute, and occasional warfare. Although not expansionary in the Western sense, Chinese civilization did incorporate areas south of its original heartland, some of which are seen by modern Vietnamese as part of their own homeland. In premodern times, Vietnam was seen by the Middle Kingdom as a tributary state, even when it was independent. Struggles for independence from Chinese domination are part of Vietnamese history; at the same time, Vietnam absorbed important cultural complexes from China. This history has ramifications for contemporary Sino-Vietnamese relations.

During the early Ching or Manchu period (seventeenth-eighteenth centuries), Chinese fleeing from Manchu rule were settled in Cochin China (what is now the southern part of Vietnam, including Saigon/Ho Chi Minh City). The Vietnamese rulers of the time encouraged such immigration. Under French rule (1859-1954), Chinese immigration increased. By the end of the French administration, the majority of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam were either immigrants themselves or the descendants of recent immigrants, many of the earlier migrants having been assimilated. In 1978, there were approximately 1.5 million Chinese in Vietnam, only 300,000 of whom lived north of the 17th Parallel, which divided the two Vietnamese states from 1954 until 1975. The Chinese were approximately 10 percent of South Vietnam's population and under 5 percent of Vietnam's population as a whole.[35]

The Chinese practiced a wide range of occupations, although they were, to a large extent, involved in trade. In northern Vietnam (especially Tonkin), there were Chinese factory workers, fishermen, and miners. Prior to independence, certain avenues to economic mobility were reserved by the French for themselves, including mining, forestry, and large plantations. Most Chinese business firms were small in terms of their capital and simple in their organization. The most important industry in which the Chinese were predominant was rice-milling, crucial in a rice-exporting country. At one time, this industry appears to have been monopolized by the Chinese. In 1958, 60 percent of the rice-mills

in the Saigon area were still owned by Chinese. The Chinese also invested in spinning and weaving shops, generally small in size. Chinese also owned groceries, medicine shops, rice shops, second-hand goods stalls, export and import firms, inland and maritime transportation, banks, and insurance companies. Some Chinese, especially those originally from the island of Hainan, specialized in the cultivation of specific crops, such as pepper. In general, the Chinese in South Vietnam in particular played central roles in the commercial economy.[36]

As with other minorities, the political status of the Chinese throughout Southeast Asia and in Vietnam was problematical. This status was further complicated by the continuing struggle for international recognition and for the sympathies and loyalties of overseas Chinese by the rival governments of Peking and Taipei during most of the post-1949 period. The Peking government in particular varied between policies encouraging overseas Chinese to assimilate and measures to recruit these people for its cause and for their protection. On the one hand, the Peking government would tell overseas Chinese to be good citizens in their host countries. On the other hand, overseas Chinese students would be encouraged to study in the homeland. When governments persecuted their Chinese residents, Peking sometimes sent a ship to repatriate overseas Chinese from that country.[37]

The nationality of the Chinese in Indochina was complicated by various arrangements which the French had established for the control of Chinese populations in their colonies. During the colonial period, the French administration ruled the Chinese indirectly through "chiefs" whom they appointed to maintain law and order. The chiefs ruled the Chinese "congregations," which thus helped segregate the Chinese from other Indochinese. This system was abolished by both the Communists in the north and by the Diem regime in the south. The Chinese in Indochina remained Chinese nationals but were granted rights combining those given to the natives and those granted to French nationals. They were technically under the protection of the Chinese government. The status of Chinese in Vietnam was thus comparable to that of Europeans who had been granted extra-territoriality in various Asian and African countries, although as nationals of a weak power the ability of China to help them effectively was limited.[38]

After the partition of Vietnam the situation became more complicated, since there were two Vietnams, each of which had diplomatic ties with a different Chinese government. In the north, there was a partial maintenance of the status quo ante but with encouragement for the Chinese in Vietnam to become naturalized. In 1961, the People's Republic of China recognized North Vietnamese jurisdiction over its Chinese residents and ceased issuing Chinese passports to such residents of Vietnam. In South Vietnam, the Diem government followed a policy of forced naturalization

by which many Chinese residents became citizens in order to remain in business there. Their importance for the economy of the region remained intact. After the fall of Saigon, the Vietnamese government viewed the Diem measures as valid, but the Chinese government contended that they were invalid as the products of an illegitimate government.[39]

The dispute over the citizenship of the South Vietnamese Chinese was entangled with other issues. There were some unresolved territorial disputes and trouble over Cambodia, in which China sided with the Pol Pot regime.[40] In addition, Hanoi's decision to nationalize the South Vietnamese economy and to integrate South Vietnam with North Vietnam impinged on the Chinese large and small businessmen of the Saigon area. By May 1978, Hanoi had decided to clamp down on the Chinese businessmen of South Vietnam, and China reacted by announcing an intention to send two ships to Vietnam to evacuate Chinese residents. As relations between Hanoi and Peking worsened, negotiations over this and other issues broke down. By the summer of 1978, ethnic Chinese residents of both former North and South Vietnam were encouraged to leave, and refugees began flowing over the Sino-Vietnamese border and into the seas off Vietnam.

While this precipitated the refugee crisis of 1978-1979, the exodus was initially illegal. Extortion and departure taxes were demanded from potential refugees. Often Chinese businessmen acquired a boat and fares were paid in cash and gold, half of which would go to the government and for bribes to officials. In this way, it was similar to the departure of ethnic Vietnamese, who were the majority of "boat people" during the other refugee waves out of Vietnam since 1975. By July 1979, nearly 300,000 ethnic Chinese had fled from Vietnam.

What made this refugee crisis comparable to the pre-World War II crises was the attitudes engendered in other nations, especially those of Southeast Asia and the West. The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan did accept refugees who arrived by land or sea. In the case of the PRC, however, refugees in some cases had to undergo re-education, much like that which they were trying to avoid in the New Economic Zones of Vietnam. This was less of a problem for proletarian refugees from northern Vietnam than for those from Saigon.[41]

Vicissitudes of travel by sea in an open boat were many. The ships and boats were often barely seaworthy. The passengers faced storms, but also pirates. Many of the pirates were Thai fishermen who found that robbing refugees was a lucrative occupation. At the height of the refugee crisis, many ships avoided sealanes where there were refugees. If landfall was achieved, there was no certainty that one would be allowed to land. Even the predominantly Chinese "city-states" of Singapore and Hong Kong were reluctant to accept refugees. Other neighbor-

ing countries, particularly Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, were unwilling to accept ethnic Chinese refugees because each had its own "Chinese" problem.

In Indonesia and in the Philippines, the Chinese constitute a small percentage of the population (in both cases less than 5 percent). In these countries, conflict between local "native" populations and the Chinese, who are seen as controlling certain sectors of the economy, has been acute for the past century. In both, dual nationality of the Chinese has been an issue, with alternate policies of exclusion or forcible assimilation of Chinese having been followed. In both, one also finds high degrees of assimilation by certain segments of the Chinese population. "Mestizos" of partial Chinese ancestry have played an important role in Philippine life; Jose Rizal, the father of Philippine nationalism, was such a mestizo. In Indonesia, many people of mixed Chinese and Indonesian ancestry speak the local language. However unwilling they were to accept Chinese refugees, these countries played a less prominent role during this crisis than did Malaysia.[42]

The government of Malaysia was quite vocal during this period. In the summer of 1978 it threatened to tow refugee boats back into the sea if they reached land in its territorial waters, and at times it backed up its threat. The Chinese constitute 35 percent of Malaysia's total population. Thus an ethnic Chinese wave of settlers would threaten a delicate ethnic balance. Malaysia had quietly resettled Muslim refugees from Indochina in 1970. The balance between Chinese and Muslim Malays can, in fact, be seen as crucial to the formation of the present Malaysian federation. Singapore was expected to be part of this federation, but was excluded, in part because it would have made a Chinese majority in the federation possible. The Chinese had come to Malaysia as laborers to work in the mines and the plantations, and many have continued to do so. The range of Chinese occupations is broader in western Malaysia than in other Southeast Asian countries. While the Chinese in Malaysia cannot be seen exclusively as a middleman minority, they are prominent in commerce, and Singapore, with a Chinese majority, is the financial center of the region. In general, the politically dominant Malays have felt that they were weak economically relative to the Chinese and that the latter would take over their country. The present Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammed, expressed this fear in a controversial book published in 1970.[43]

The dramatic events of 1978 and 1979 filtered to the West with reports that the South China Sea was full of refugees who were being cynically allowed to leave Vietnam after paying extortionate taxes and bribes; robbed, raped, and killed by pirates; and refused permission to land by various governments, especially that of Malaysia. This aroused memories of the late 1930s and early 1940s, and a wave of sympathy

swept over certain Western countries. An international conference was called. Pressure was put on Vietnam to control the flow of refugees and on Malaysia to allow them to stay until other arrangements could be made. Certain countries, especially France and the United States, accepted substantial numbers of these refugees. This relieved the transit camps in various Southeast Asian countries, though large numbers continue to live in such camps and continue to leave the Communist nations of Indochina through a variety of means. It is my impression that the "boat people" of 1978 and 1979 were viewed by most Americans in a manner similar to previous and subsequent groups of Southeast Asian émigrés and not as ethnic Chinese. While all of the Indochinese refugees in the United States have encountered anti-alien racist prejudices and opposition, no specifically anti-Sinic current differentiated the 1978-1979 wave from the others.

The Sino-Vietnamese case shares many features with other such instances, although it resulted in a rather brutal expulsion rather than an optimal genocide. In Vietnam proper, especially southern Vietnam, the minority was visible and conspicuous. Poverty was general and aggravated by many decades of war, both domestic and foreign. The minority was apparently more prosperous than the majority, and the occupation of the south by the north increased poverty. While the minority was probably not increasing relative to the majority, it did control more wealth than did the majority Vietnamese population. The minority's economic role was resented, and the Chinese were blamed for economic problems in South Vietnam as early as 1957. This was also the case under the Hanoi occupation.[44] Clients and competitors, as well as the officials of a nationalistic and socialistic government, all resented the role of the Chinese. After 1975, the Chinese in Vietnam were no longer related to a fraternal socialist government on the one side or to an anti-Communist ally (Taiwan) on the other, but to the enemies of Vietnam, i.e., the Chinese to the north and the Americans. They did have wealth to plunder, through taxation and extortion.

So far, the preconditions for expulsion and genocide coincide. Why, then, did the Vietnamese government carry out the former program rather than the latter? There may be several reasons. One, the Vietnamese government at this time was justifying its invasion of Cambodia on the basis of the brutality of the Pol Pot government. While governments are not particularly consistent in this regard, some form of legitimation plays a role in political actions. Two, at least some of the Chinese were accepted by China proper. Three, the Vietnamese were themselves vulnerable to attack by China and the United States, although neither was in a strong military position in 1978-1979. Still, some retaliation was possible. Four, the creation of a refugee crisis by expelling or encouraging emigration is useful in embarrassing one's neighbors and foes. This

crisis did do this, although not as effectively as the Mariel refugee flow
from Cuba in 1980. Five, the Vietnamese were not ideologically pre-
pared for an optimal genocide.[45]

COMPARISONS WITH HOLOCAUSTS

Looking at a number of examples is instructive. The two holocausts
of middleman minorities were committed on groups who were long-
standing residents in the regions where they were murdered, not rela-
tively recent immigrants. In this way, the Jews of Germany and Eastern
Europe and the Armenians of Anatolia, the main bodies of victims,
resembled the Parsis and the Moroccan Jews more than they did the
Indians in East Africa or even the Chinese in Vietnam.

In Europe, however, the Holocaust had been preceded by a period of
great migrations and urbanization. The Jews, in particular, were part of
these migrations, especially after the pogroms and May Laws in Russia
in the early 1880s. While the anti-Semitic movement in Germany began
well before that period and anti-Semitic ideas were commonly held at an
earlier time, large numbers of East European Jewish immigrants in
Germany and throughout Western Europe and North America certainly
reinforced the view that Jews were essentially an alien people. The
growing numbers of foreign Jews similarly lent credence to fears of
Jewish domination.

The recentness of migration is also relevant to the degree to which the
minority is visible as a separate group, although both the Jews in Eastern
Europe and the Armenians in Anatolia remained loyal to a separate
language for a long period of time. Such language loyalty, however,
was breaking down in Eastern Europe during the interwar period, and
many Armenians spoke either Turkish or a mixture of Turkish and Ar-
menian. Genetic markers are also blurred with durable co-territoriality,
since sexual relations between members of the various groups take place,
whether in the form of marriage or of illicit seduction, rape, and
concubinage. While linguistic, genetic, or sumptuary markers may per-
sist as ideals or as stereotypes, their breakdown may give anxiety about
assimilation and/or infiltration on the part of both groups in contact.

The fact of being old-timers in the region should also mean that a
minority is viewed as "native." At the very least, one would expect them
to reinvest resources in the country of their residence rather than sending
them abroad. Yet in most of the cases discussed here, such an ex-
pectation was upset for both old and recent residents. The major excep-
tion was probably pre-1914 Germany. One cause of such foreign
investment was the general impoverishment of the country. In most
cases, this was strengthened by moves of discrimination coupled with
fears of escalating persecution. To a lesser extent this was found among

the Parsis of India, but it is certainly true of the other cases.

While it is hard to describe economic trends simply, most of the countries under consideration have had economic difficulties during the period preceding persecution (or expected harassment). Population growth in many developing areas, depression, and inflation all contributed to a sense of impoverishment in the countries under consideration. The other part of the economic picture is the relationship of different classes with the minority, which had characteristics of a class in itself. In India and Morocco, there were a variety of mercantile groups competing with reasonable success. In Vietnam, East Africa, and Poland, the minority was perceived as having some kind of monopoly on trade and was particularly resented. In the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians were one of several non-Muslim minorities who were perceived as controlling commercial enterprise; the degree to which Muslim Turks desired to compete is not indicated in the literature. Germany, of course, has been studied and dissected, and yet the results are inconclusive. It should also be pointed out that those who were most integrated into the society, whether in Poland or Germany, often competed most directly with members of the majority ethnic group. It was the German-speaking or Polish-speaking Jew who sought to enter the university, become a professional or civil servant, or pursue success as an artist. When positions of this kind are limited, competition is often intense. While anti-Semitism was central to the Nazi ideology, it is still unclear whether anti-Semitism itself was part of the core of its appeal to those who became Nazis or voted for the Nazi party. Andreski, when offering his economic interpretation of anti-Semitism, explicitly argued that anti-Semitism in Germany was weaker than in Poland and Hungary, roughly corresponding to the relatively small percentage of the population which was Jewish. Lately even the thesis that it was the lower middle class that was most in competition with Jews and in the forefront of German Fascism has been called into question. Istvan Deak agrees with Andreski's argument that anti-Semitism was secondary to other factors in drawing Germans to the Nazi movement and in leading them to comply with the systematic genocide which followed.[46] Still, the Nazis incorporated the stereotype of the Jew as an alien middleman into their propaganda.

Where does this leave middleman minority theory in its relationship to genocide and ethnic conflict in general? As indicated early on, middleman minority theory is primarily applicable to the preconditions for inter-ethnic conflict and genocide as a manifestation of such conflict. Like most sets of theory, it provides us with questions to ask. Unquestionably, economic conflict between competing merchants, workers and employers, and buyers and sellers takes on an ethnic dimension when those on one side tend to be members of a different ethnic group from those on the other side. There is a wide range of options for the

end results of majority–middleman minority relations, including substantial assimilation, occupational integration, or the development of complementarity, all with minimal conflict, as well as the conflicts resulting in voluntary emigration, harassment, expulsion, and genocide. There is thus no necessary connection between middleman minority status and victimization.[47] In a period which has seen the mass murder of Indians in Brazil, Paraguay, and Guatemala; Communists in Indonesia; large segments of the total population in East Timor and Cambodia; landowners and others in China; the ruling Afro-Shirazis in Zanzibar; the dominant Tutsis in Rwanda; Hutu in Burundi; and dissident members of ruling groups in the Soviet Union, it is difficult to say that any group is not subject to genocide. Still, the vulnerability of middleman minorities is related to their economic position and has been demonstrated dramatically in this century. In all cases of victimization, other factors were present, but the images of minority middlemen as economic parasites and collaborators with alien enemies of the nation were intertwined and served to justify their liquidation from the body social.

As noted earlier, middleman minority theory's historical roots are shared with the ideologies used to justify anti-minority actions. The denigration of trade and moneylending and the ideal of a national economy controlled by members of the national community, excluding strangers, were important in the foundation of the social sciences as well as in the formulation of both socialist and nationalist ideology. Jacob Katz[48] in his study of modern anti-Semitism concluded that many of the observations of anti-Semites on the Jewish position in Europe were empirically based, but the conclusions which they drew were colored by extremely negative attitudes toward the Judaic heritage and the Jews themselves. This observation can be extended to attitudes toward middleman minorities elsewhere and to social scientists studying these groups. As social scientists and scholars, we must pursue the economic reasons for inter-ethnic conflict, even though our writings may be used to justify oppression and persecution. With this awareness, however, we might paraphrase Avtalyon: Beware scholars of your words, for evil may follow from your speech.[49]

NOTES

1. This chapter is a product of a long research project in which I examined theories dealing with middleman minorities, for the purpose of comparing Jewish and non-Jewish communities globally. In that work, however, I was only partially concerned with genocide as one form of "host-hostility" and anti-minority actions.

2. Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 7-10. Vahakn Dadrian, "A Typology of Genocide," *International Review of Modern Sociology* 5 (1975), pp. 201-12. Yehuda Bauer, *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), pp. 34-37.

In recent years, the term "genocide" has been applied to a variety of events. The term "cultural genocide," for instance, has been used to describe the Soviet campaign against Jewish culture in the U.S.S.R. Raphael Lemkin, who first introduced the concept of genocide in 1944, also injected a measure of ambiguity into it. While defining genocide as "the extermination of nations and ethnic groups," he wrote that genocide is carried out through a variety of attacks on the peoples affected.

These include destroying institutions of self-government; colonization by the invaders; killing and removing national elites (e.g., the intelligentsia); disrupting social cohesion; prohibiting or destroying cultural institutions and activities; prohibiting higher education; shifting wealth to the invaders; extermination; and moral debasement (through promotion of pornography and alcohol). Lemkin introduced this concept during World War II, when the full extent of the Nazi program and the fine distinctions made by the National Socialists themselves were not fully comprehended, although the basic outlines had been revealed. See Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), pp. xi-xii.

3. Robert Melson, "A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894-6," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24 (1982), pp. 481-509.

4. For other reviews of middleman minority theory, see Edna Bonacich and J. Modell, *The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity: The Case of the Japanese-Americans* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 13-36; and the following works by Walter P. Zenner: *Middleman Minority Theories and the Jews: A Historical Assessment* (New York: YIVO Working Papers in Yiddish and East European Jewish Studies Series, No. 31, 1978); "Theories of Middleman Minorities: A Critical Review," in *Sourcebook on the New Immigration*, ed. Roy S. Bryce-Laporte (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980), pp. 313-26; "The Jewish Diaspora and the Middleman Adaptation," in *Diaspora: Exile and the Jewish Condition*, ed. E. Levine (New York: Jason Aronson, 1983), pp. 141-56, and *Minorities in the Middle: A Cross-Cultural Analysis* (manuscript). Also see Jack Nusan Porter, "The Urban Middleman," *Comparative Social Research* 4 (1981), pp. 199-215.

5. See especially Max Weber, *Ancient Judaism* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952), especially pp. 336-55, and W. Sombart, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951). The general work of both sociologists also reflected their views on commerce, ethnicity, and religion.

See Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (New York: Bedminster, 1968), and
W. Sombart, *The Quintessence of Capitalism* (New York: E. P. Dutton,
1915). Both Weber and Sombart tended to view Jewish economic activities
in a negative light. Sombart incorporated anti-Semitic racial explanations into
his analysis long before he actually joined the Nazi party.

6. For an English translation of Roscher's 1875 essay, see W.
Roscher, "The Status of the Jews in the Middle Ages from the Standpoint of
Commercial Policy," *Historia Judaica* 6 (1944), pp. 13-26. For Toennies'
views on "intermediaries," see F. Toennies, *Community and Society* (East
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957), and Toennies, *On
Sociology: Pure, Applied and Empirical* (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1971), pp. 308-10. Cf. Georg Simmel, "The Stranger," in *The
Sociology of Georg Simmel*, ed. K. Wolff (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press,
1980), pp. 402-8. For a discussion comparing Weber's "pariah" concept
with the Toennies/Simmel ideas of intermediary and stranger, see W.
Cahnman, "Pariahs, Strangers and Court Jews," *Sociological Analysis* 35
(1974), pp. 155-66. On the use of the stranger concept in the social sciences,
see Donald N. Levine, "Simmel at a Distance: On the History and System-
atics of the Sociology of the Stranger," in *Strangers in African Societies*, ed.
William A. Shack and Elliott P. Skinner (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1979), pp. 21-36.

7. Cf. H. P. Becker, "Constructive Typology in the Social Sciences,"
in *Contemporary Social Theory*, ed. H. E. Barnes, H. Becker, and F. B.
Becker (New York: Appleton-Century, 1940), pp. 17-46. Also see I.
Rinder, "Strangers in the Land," *Social Problems* 6 (1958), pp. 253-60; S.
Stryker, "Social Structure and Prejudice," *Social Problems* 6 (1958), pp.
340-54; T. Shibutani and K. Kwan, *Ethnic Stratification* (New York:
Macmillan, 1965); W. Wertheim, *East-West Parallels* (The Hague: Mouton,
1964).

8. Cf. E. Bonacich, "A Theory of Middleman Minorities," *American
Sociological Review* 38 (1973), pp. 583-94, Bonacich, "Middleman
Minorities and Advanced Capitalism," *Ethnic Groups* 2 (1980), pp. 211-20,
and Bonacich "Class Approaches to Ethnicity and Race," *Insurgent
Sociologist* 10 (1980), pp. 2, 9-23. Jonathan Turner and Edna Bonacich,
"Toward a Composite Theory of Middleman Minorities," *Ethnicity* 7 (1980),
pp. 144-58. Also see Bonacich and Modell, *Economic Basis*. For a critique
of Bonacich's application of middleman minority theories to modern societies,
see F. Bovenkerk, "Shylock of Horatio Alger: Beschouwingen over de
Theorie der Handelsminderheden," in *Neveh Ya'akov: Jubilee Volume Pre-
sented to Dr. Jaap Meijer*, ed. L. Dasberg and J. N. Cohen (Assen: Van
Gorcum, 1982), pp. 147-64.

9. Cf. Stryker, "Social Structure and Prejudice." Richard A. Scher-
merhorn, "Parsis and Jews in India: A Tentative Comparison," *Journal of
Asian Studies* 1 (1976), pp. 119-22, and Schermerhorn, *Ethnic Plurality in*

India (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1978). E. Kulke, *The Parsees in India* (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1974).

10. Stanislav Andreski, "An Economic Interpretation of Anti-Semitism," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 5 (1963), pp. 201-13. Bauer, *Holocaust in Historical Perspective,* pp. 55-58. As for Poland, one finds that during World War II Jews were assisted much more in these areas, especially Belorussia, than elsewhere in the former Polish Republic.

11. Cf. S. Kuznets, "Economic Life and Structure of the Jews," in *The Jews: Their History, Culture and Religion,* ed. L. Finkelstein (New York: Harper, 1960), pp. 1597-1666. Also see Ellis Rivkin, *The Shaping of Jewish History* (New York: Scribner's, 1971).

12. Andreski, "Economic Interpretation."

13. Bonacich, "A Theory," and "Middleman Minorities and Advanced Capitalism."

14. See Abraham J. Duker, "Acculturation and Integration: A Jewish Survivalist View," in *Acculturation and Integration: A Symposium,* ed. J. L. Teller (New York: American Histadrut Cultural Exchange, 1965).

15. Andreski, "Economic Interpretation."

16. John Waterbury, *North for the Trade* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972).

17. For a discussion of the diabolic nature of moneymaking in a peasant context, see Michael Taussig, "The Genesis of Capitalism among a South American Peasantry: The Devil's Labor and the Baptism of Money," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 19 (1977), pp. 130-55.

18. Bonacich and Modell, *Economic Basis.* Walter P. Zenner, "American Jewry in the Light of Middleman Minority Theories," *Contemporary Jewry* 5 (1980), pp. 11-30. Richard Alba and Gwen Moore, "Ethnicity in the American Elite," *American Sociological Review* 47 (1982), pp. 373-82.

19. Some of these attributes are paradoxical. In the ultimate case of optimal genocide or total expulsion, the scapegoat is permanently eliminated and can never serve that purpose again. This has been pointed out by writers who reject the scapegoat theory with regard to the Holocaust. Yet, since many leaders think in the short term, it is sufficient to make the sacrifice once. Similarly, the strangers may be sojourners or recent immigrants, but relative to true itinerants, they are sedentary.

20. Ralph Austen (personal communication) has suggested that some reports of attacks on Jews in Moroccan Muslim historiography are fabricated, because each new dynasty begins by "overthrowing the Jews," whether they actually do this or not. Of course, for such a ritual to occur, there must be Jews in the society. The situation was similar to that of the popes who saw the Jews as witnesses to Christ, even if they rejected them. See Norman Stillman, "Muslims and Jews in Morocco," *The Jerusalem Quarterly* 1 (1977), pp. 76-83, and Allan R. Meyers, "Patronage and Protection: The Status of Jews in Pre-colonial Morocco," in *Jewish Societies in the Middle*

East, ed. S. Deshen and W. P. Zenner (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), pp. 85-104.

21. Cf. Bauer, *Holocaust in Historical Perspective,* pp. 30-38; Lucy Dawidowicz, *The Holocaust and the Historians* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 4-21.

22. Cf. Fein, *Accounting.*

23. Cf. Vahakn N. Dadrian, "A Theoretical Model of Genocide with Particular Reference to the Armenian Case," *Sociologia Internationalis* 14 (1976/1980), pp. 99-126, and "The Common Features of the Armenian and Jewish Cases of Genocide: A Comparative Victimological Perspective," in *Victimology: A New Focus* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), vol. 4, pp. 99-119. Robert Melson, "Provocation or Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry into the Armenian Genocide of 1915" (Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Chicago, November 4-7, 1983).

24. Bauer, *Holocaust in Historical Perspective;* Dawidowicz, *Holocaust and the Historians;* Fein, *Accounting.*

The controversy over whether the Armenian massacres in Anatolia were a state-sponsored genocide or the product of an extremely bloody civil war continues. The latter viewpoint is presented in a volume using demographic data by Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire* (New York: New York University Press, 1983). Nevertheless, my own reading of the historical record is that the deportations of 1915, which were ordered by the Ottoman government, were genocidal. A full-scale comparison dealing with both the differences and similarities between the Nazi "war against the Jews" and the deportation and massacres of Armenians is sorely needed. It is beyond the scope of this already lengthy chapter.

25. These points are largely based on Andreski, "Economic Interpretation."

26. Kulke, *Parsees.*

27. Stillman, "Muslims and Jews"; Lawrence Rosen, "Muslim-Jewish Relations in a Moroccan City," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 3 (1972), pp. 435-49; Meyers, "Patronage and Protection." One must be careful in generalizing from Morocco to other parts of the Middle East.

28. See Mark Tessler, "The Identity of Religious Minorities in Non-secular States: The Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and the Arabs in Israel," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20 (1978), pp. 359-73, and Mark Tessler and Linda Hawkins, "The Political Culture of Jews in Tunisia and Morocco," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 11 (1980), pp. 59-86. The anticipatory exodus of Jews from Morocco is also well portrayed in the documentary film *Routes of Exile: A Moroccan Jewish Odyssey* (New York: First Run Films, 1983).

29. On patronage, see L. Rosen, "A Moroccan Jewish Community During the Middle Eastern Crisis," *American Scholar* 37 (1967), pp. 435-51, for an excellent illustration.

30. But why has anti-Semitism been so potent in postwar Poland, where the numerical decline of Jews was even more precipitous? Ideological anti-Semitism was much more of a force in Poland during the twentieth century, and Jews were more prominent in the ruling Communist elite during the early phases of post-World War II Poland than was the case with regard to anti-Semitism or Jews in the governments of post-independence Morocco.

31. See William Shack and Elliott P. Skinner, eds., *Strangers in African Societies* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), for descriptions of various stranger-groups in Africa, both African and non-African, which have been affected by partial and total expulsions. The best general survey of the Chinese in Southeast Asia before 1975 is Mary F.S. Heidhues, *Southeast Asia's Chinese Minorities* (Hawthorn Victoria: Longman Australia, 1974). On the less publicized expulsion of Indians from Burma, see Usha Mahajani, *The Role of Indian Minorities in Burma and Malaysia* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973). A general consideration of anti-Indian and anti-Chinese violence is found in Fred R. von der Mehden, "Pariah Communities and Violence," in *Vigilante Politics,* ed. H. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter C. Sederberg (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976), pp. 218-33.

32. Ali Mazrui, "Casualties of an Underdeveloped Class Structure," in Shack and Skinner, *Strangers in African Societies,* pp. 261-78.

33. On the Asians expelled from East African countries, see Y. Tandon, *Brown Briton* (London: Runnymede Trust, 1972); Michael Twaddle, ed., *Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Uganda Asians* (London: Athlone Press, 1975); Bert N. Adams and Mike Bristow, "The Politico-Economic Position of Ugandan Asians in the Colonial and Independent Eras," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 13 (1978), pp. 151-66; B. N. Adams and M. Bristow, "Ugandan Asian Expulsion Experiences: Rumor and Reality," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 14 (1979), pp. 190-203. Two works which report African attitudes toward Asians in neighboring Kenya during the period of the partial expulsion are Peter Marris and Anthony Somerset, *The African Entrepreneur* (New York: Africana, 1971), and Donald Rothchild, *Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).

34. See Dadrian, "Typology." A problem in any typology is that various factors may contribute to a complex event such as a genocide. Officially, *Kristallnacht,* when the Nazis broke into Jewish homes, burnt synagogues, and sent large numbers of Jewish men to concentration camps in November 1938, was an act of retribution for the assassination of a German embassy official in Paris. In Nigeria in 1966, the massacres were associated with a realistically based interpretation of an open power struggle for control of the government, not with a minor "provocation" linked to a mythical conspiracy.

35. A major source on the Chinese in Vietnam is Luong Nhi Ky, *The Chinese in Vietnam: A Study of Vietnamese-Chinese Relations* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1963).

On the crisis of 1978-1979, see the following: Bruce Grant and the *"Age"* Investigators, *The Boat People: An Age Investigation* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979); Nguyen Manh Hung, "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict: Power Play among Communist Neighbors," *Asian Survey* 19 (1979), pp. 1037-52; Gareth Porter, "Vietnam's Ethnic Chinese and the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 12, no. 4 (1980), pp. 55-60; Charles Mohr, "A Vietnamese Refugee's Story: War Hero to Unwanted Alien," *New York Times,* September 11, 1979, p. A6; Sheldon Simon, "China, Vietnam, and A.S.E.A.N.: The Politics of Polarization," *Asian Survey* 19, no. 12 (1979), pp. 1171-88; Judith Strauch, *The Chinese Exodus from Vietnam: Implications for the Southeast Asian Chinese,* Occasional Papers, No. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Cultural Survival, 1980).

36. Ky, *Chinese in Vietnam,* pp. 27-60, 62-107; Tsung-to Way, "Overseas Chinese in Vietnam," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* (January 2, 1958), pp. 20-21.

37. See Stephen Fitzgerald, *China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study in Peking's Policies* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

38. Ky, *Chinese in Vietnam,* pp. 131-41, 175-76.

39. Ibid., pp. 151-66; Hung, "Sino-Vietnamese Conflict."

40. Hung, "Sino Vietnamese-Conflict," points out that the Chinese government never protested the treatment, often extremely harsh, which the Chinese in Cambodia received from the Pol Pot government alongside other urban populations.

41. On refugees in China, see James P. Sterba, "Some Refugees Safe at Home in China Again," *New York Times,* September 5, 1979; and "Some Vietnamese Ethnic Chinese Find Life Hard in China," *New York Times,* September 11, 1979, p. A6. On the reasons for avoiding repatriation in Taiwan, see "After Nightmare of Vietnam: Valedictorian at City College," *New York Times,* May 24, 1984, pp. B1, B8.

42. For an overview of the Chinese in the area as a whole, see Heidhues, *Southeast Asia's Chinese.* A brief survey concentrating on citizenship is H. and P. C. Mabbett and C. Coppell, *The Chinese in Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia* (London: Minority Rights Group Report No. 10, n.d. [ca. 1971]). Also see Strauch, *Chinese Exodus.*

43. See Simon, "China, Vietnam, A.S.E.A.N." Strauch, *Chinese Exodus,* briefly deals with the implications of other overseas Chinese. The Prime Minister's analysis of Malaysia's problems, including ethnic conflict, is Mahathir bin Mohammed, *The Malay Dilemma* (Singapore: Donald Moore, 1970).

44. Tsung-to Way, "Overseas Chinese"; Hung, "Sino-Vietnamese Conflict."

45. William Shawcross, "In Vietnam Today," *New York Review of Books* 24 (September 14, 1981), pp. 62-72, reports a visit to a Chinese-run factory in Cholon. This indicates that some Chinese remain in Vietnam.

46. Cf. Istvan Deak, "How Guilty Were the Germans?," *New York Review of Books* 31 (May 31, 1984), pp. 37-41.

47. Whether such a status is the product of deliberate action on the part of the minority or the lack of success in being accepted on the part of minority members as it was in Germany and much of East Europe makes no difference.

48. Jacob Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction: Anti-Semitism, 1700-1933* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 257-59, 324.

49. Abot I:11. The original is "Beware sages of your words lest you incur the penalty of exile and be exiled to a place of evil waters, and the disciples who come after you drink thereof and die and the Name (of God) be profaned." In a secular context, taking ethical consequences into account is the equivalent.

AFTERWORD: GENOCIDE AND CIVILIZATION

Richard L. Rubenstein

Although there have been thousands of books written about the de-
struction of the European Jews, few have been devoted to the more
general problem of genocide per se. Indeed, a number of contributors to
this volume have commented on the avoidance of the subject by political
and social researchers. Kurt Jonassohn and Frank Chalk observe that
until recently scholars participated in a process of pervasive, self-
imposed denial concerning the importance of genocide in history. In
their introductory essay, editors Isidor Wallimann and Michael Dobkow-
ski note the relative silence of social scientists on the subject. They
argue that social scientists have, e.g., been far more interested in poverty
than in the "nature of social conflicts and their possible escalation into
war and destruction." At the 1983 convention of the American Political
Science Association, a session on genocide, which featured papers by a
number of leading authorities, drew an audience of no more than ten. It
is this writer's thesis that the relative silence on the subject of genocide
stems from the unwillingness of both scholars and their audiences to
confront the fact that, far from being a relapse into barbarism, genocide
is an intrinsic expression of civilization as we know it. Put differently,
the genocidal destructiveness of our era is an expression of some of its
"most significant political, moral, religious and demographic ten-
dencies."[1] If indeed genocide expresses some, though obviously not all,
of the dominant trends in contemporary civilization, it would hardly be
surprising that few researchers would want to spend much time on the
night side of the world we have made for ourselves.

In the present volume the connection between civilization and geno-
cide is raised most directly by Tony Barta's chapter, "Relations of Geno-

cide: Land and Lives in the Colonization of Australia." A professor at an Australian university, Barta asserts that the basic fact of his nation's history has been the conquest of the country by one people and the dispossession "with ruthless destructiveness" of another people, the Aborigines, those who were there *ab origine,* "from the beginning." Barta argues that, although it was by no means the initial intention of the British government to destroy the Aborigines, Australia is nevertheless a "nation founded on genocide." According to Barta, genocide was the inevitable, though unintended, consequence of the European colonization of the Australian continent. Barta's thesis puts him somewhat at odds with those scholars, such as Walter P. Zenner, who hold that genocide is "the *intentional* physical annihilation of all or part of a group of people on racial, religious or ethnic lines." According to Barta, in order to comprehend genocide we need a conception of the phenomenon that embraces *relations of destruction* and removes from the term the emphasis on policy and intention with which it is normally associated. Barta argues that the history of his own country amply demonstrates that genocidal outcomes can come into being without deliberate state planning. Moreover, he fully appreciates the degree to which the destruction of Australia's Aboriginal population was not the consequence of the actions of isolated men acting out their aggressions on a lawless frontier far from metropolitan centers of civilization but was in fact *the outcome of economic, social, political, and religious transformations in the mother country,* the first European nation fully to enter the economically rationalized world of the modern era.

If we wish to comprehend the roots of genocide in the modern world, the beginnings of the modernization process in Great Britain may provide an excellent starting point.[2] The beginnings of English modernization are to be found in the acts of enclosure which transformed the subsistence economy of premodern English agricultural into the money economy of our era. In the process, the customary rights to land usage of the economically unproductive English peasant class were abrogated and that class was largely transformed into a congeries of individuals whose survival was entirely dependent upon their ability to find wage labor. Absent gainful employment, the dispossessed peasants could only turn to a harsh and punitively administered system of poor relief, vagabondage, or outright crime. A crucial social by-product of England's economic rationalization was the creation of a large class of people who were superfluous to England's new economic system.

A class of more or less permanently superfluous people is a potential source of acute social instability. Having no hope of receiving society's normal rewards, it has little incentive, save fear of punitive retaliation, to abide by society's customary behavioral restraints. Even if such a group is tied to the rest of the population by common ethnicity and religion, it is likely to be perceived and to perceive itself as having been cast outside of

society's *universe of moral obligation*. Implied in a universe of moral obligation is the expectation that, consistent with their social location, its actors will, under normal circumstances, subordinate their individual inclinations to the good of the whole. A measure of self-sacrificing altruism rather than self-regarding egoism will normally characterize the behavior of members of such a universe toward each other. At a minimum, members will not normally regard other members as potential sources of injury or even personal destruction. To the extent that trust is possible between human beings, the actors within a shared universe of moral obligation will normally trust each other, an attitude they will find impossible to extend to strangers. Such attitudes have less to do with the moral virtuosity of individuals than with the way social relations are structured. The enclosure laws had the effect of expelling England's displaced peasants from the only universe of obligation they had ever known, that of the manor and the parish. This was clearly understood by English decisionmakers as early as the enactment of the Elizabethan Poor Laws, which were as much police measures aimed at controlling England's first redundant population as they were philanthropic efforts to supply that population's irreducible needs for survival.

In the case of the modernization of England, the arable land taken from the displaced peasants was devoted to sheep raising, a cash crop, and economically rational large-scale farming. Out of the vast social dislocation engendered by the process, England was able to finance its first large-scale modern industry, textiles. However, the transformation of arable land to pasture seriously diminished England's ability to produce its own food supply. Moreover, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, that country was no longer able to produce all of the raw materials necessary for its burgeoning industry.

Australia was an ideal land for sheep raising. It was also a convenient outlet for the relatively humane elimination of a significant portion of England's redundant population. As Barta points out, the convict population exported by England to Australia was not unrelated to the dispossession of England's peasantry by the acts of enclosure. In addition, England contained large numbers of undercapitalized small holders and artisans who were faced with the prospect of downward economic mobility in an increasingly capital-intensive home economy. Many of the more enterprising small holders took their meagre assets to Australia in the knowledge that an ever-increasing demand for both sheep's wool and sheep's flesh in the mother country presented the undercapitalized free colonizers, who were willing to work and capable of prudent management, with opportunities for prosperity which could not be duplicated at home. Australia was thus an important safety valve for those segments of England's population made redundant by the progressive rationalization of its economy and society.

As we know, Australia was not an unsettled country. Its Aboriginal

people had developed a viable human ecology which was altogether incomprehensible to the settlers, as indeed the ways of the settlers were incomprehensible to them. Moreover, sheep raising and the settlers' rationalized agrarian economy was incompatible with Aborigine land use. Since both sides were absolutely dependent upon the land, albeit in radically different ways, loss of the land necessarily entailed the complete destruction of the defeated way of life. As Barta writes, co-existence was impossible.

The issue was decided by the superior power and technology of the settlers. Since their survival was at stake, the Aborigines had no choice but to resist. The predictable response of the settlers was to root out the menace to their way of life. There were a number of bloody massacres. There were also government-sponsored attempts to diminish settler violence, but even without direct violence the Aborigines were destined to perish. Having lost their way of life and having been deprived of a meaningful future, most of the Aborigines who were not killed by the whites "faded away." Barta writes that between 1839 and 1849 there were only twenty births recorded among the seven Aboriginal tribes around Melbourne. He concludes that, whatever the official British intent, the encounter between the white settlers and the blacks was one of *living out a relationship of genocide, a relationship that was structured into the very nature of the encounter.* Barta distinguishes between a genocidal society and a genocidal state. National Socialist Germany was a genocidal state. Its genocidal project was deliberate and intended. Australia was a genocidal society. It had no conscious genocidal project. Nevertheless, its very existence had genocidal consequences for the original population. According to Barta, the basic pattern of the colonization of Australia was everywhere the same. It consisted of white pastoral invasion, black resistance, violent victory of the whites, and finally the mysterious disappearance of the blacks.

Although Barta confines his description to Australia, it is clear that the process he describes was repeated in other European colonial settlements. In his biography of Oliver Cromwell, the English historian Christopher Hill comments:

A great many civilized Englishmen of the propertied class in the seventeenth century spoke of Irishmen in tones not far removed from those which the Nazis used about the Slavs, or white South Africans use about the original inhabitants of their country. In each case the contempt rationalized a desire to exploit.[3]

What Hill could have added was that Cromwell was fully prepared to exterminate those Irish Catholics who resisted exploitation and to turn their lands over to Protestant colonizers. The towns of Drogheda and Wexford refused to surrender to Cromwell. They were sacked and those

inhabitants unable to flee were massacred. In the case of Wexford, after all the inhabitants had been killed, Cromwell reported that the town was available for colonization by English settlers. An English clergyman commended the place for settlement: "It is a fine spot for some godly congregation where house and land wait for inhabitants and occupiers."[4] Even in the seventeenth century, it was clear to England's leaders that the more Ireland was cleared of its original Catholic inhabitants the more available it would be for Protestant English settlement.

The extremes to which England was prepared to go to empty Ireland of its original inhabitants became clear during the famine years of 1846-1848. It is estimated that within that period the population of Ireland was reduced by about 2 million out of an estimated 1845 population of 9 million. Approximately 1 million perished in the famine. About the same number were compelled to emigrate in order to survive.[5] Elsewhere, this writer has attempted to show that the relief given by the English government to the Irish, who were, technically speaking, British subjects at the time, was deliberately kept at levels guaranteed to produce the demographic result which came to pass. Moreover, the demographic outcome was welcomed by leading members of England's society and government. The deaths by famine and the removal by emigration were lauded as achieving for Ireland what the enclosures had done for England, namely, clearing the land of uneconomic subsistence producers and making it available for rationalized agricultural enterprise.[6] The candor of an 1853 editorial in *The Economist* on the benefits of Irish and Scottish emigration is instructive:

It is consequent on the breaking down of the system of society founded on small holdings and potato cultivation. . . . *The departure of the redundant part of the population of Ireland and Scotland is an indispensable preliminary to every kind of improvement.*[7]

Unfortunately, the "departure" welcomed by *The Economist* entailed mass death by famine and disease for a very significant proportion of Ireland's peasant class. In the eyes of the British decision-making class of the period, Catholic Ireland was an inferior civilization.[8] A class that was indifferent to the fate of its own peasants was hardly likely to be concerned with that of the Irish.

The basic colonizing pattern described by Barta, namely, white settlement, native resistance, violent settler victory, and, finally, the disappearance of most if not all of the natives, was played out in North and South America as well.[9] If Australian society was built upon a genocidal relationship with that of the indigenous cultures, so too was American society. There was a time not so long ago when it was taken for granted that "the only good Indian was a dead Indian."

The connecting link between genocidal settler societies of the eight-

eenth and nineteenth centuries and twentieth-century genocide can be discerned in Adolf Hitler's *Lebensraum* program. As a young man, Hitler saw the settlement of the New World and the concomitant elimination of North America's Indian population by white European settlers as a model to be followed by Germany on the European continent. As John Roth points out in his chapter, Hitler was keenly aware of Germany's population problems. He was determined that there would be no surplus German population even if a significant portion of Germany's Slavic neighbors were exterminated to provide "living space" for German settlers adjacent to the homeland. Put differently, Hitler proposed to repeat in Europe, albeit with infinitely intensified viciousness, the exploitative colonialism practiced by other Europeans overseas. In Hitler's eyes the Slavs were destined to become Europe's Indians. They were to be displaced, uprooted, enslaved, and, if necessary, annihilated to make way for Germany's surplus population. Unlike the earlier colonizers, Hitler had no illusions concerning the genocidal nature of such an undertaking. He had the historical precedents of earlier European efforts at colonization and imperial domination. He regarded the defeat of native cultures by white settlers and colonists as evidence for his version of Social Darwinism, the belief that history is the theater in which the races enact their life and death struggle for survival and the superior races destroy their racial inferiors. As is well known, this same Social Darwinism became an important component in the legitimating ideology for the Holocaust. In Hitler's eyes, the Jews were the most contemptible of all of the inferior races destined by fate and German strength for destruction.

As noted above, there was a fundamental difference between the behavior of the older European colonizing powers and Hitler's in that his policies were intentional and deliberately formulated. If the destruction of the Aboriginal cultures of Australia was an unintended consequence of state policy, the destruction and eventual extermination of Germany's neighbors was fully intended by Hitler and National Socialist Germany. Nevertheless, that difference should not obscure the fact that (a) both colonizing policies were intended to solve the same fundamental problem, namely, the relatively humane, non-genocidal elimination by the mother country of a redundant or potentially redundant sector of its domestic population, and that (b) both could be successfully implemented only by the merciless elimination of the indigenous population of the colonized lands. Moreover, the very success of the earlier projects invited their repetition by political leaders, such as Hitler, who believed their nation to be faced with the problem that had led to the original colonization. Such leaders could no longer pretend ignorance of the consequences of their policies. One of the differences between Hitler and his predecessors was his lack of hypocrisy and illusion concerning the extent to which his project entailed mass murder. Nevertheless, it is

clear from the history of the English in Ireland and Australia as well as that of Europeans in the New World that the destruction of the indigenous population never constituted a reason for calling colonization to a halt. There is thus a historical continuum between the unintended genocides of the period of Europe's demographic projection beyond its original territorial limits and that of the period of Europe's deliberate auto-cannibalization.

If the above argument has merit, it will be possible to define genocide as *the most radical means of implementing a state or communally sponsored program of population elimination.* It should be noted that (a) the issue of intention is not raised in this definition, and that (b) genocide is grasped conceptually within the wider context of programs of population elimination. This definition allows for a comprehension of the larger historical conditions under which a population is likely to be identified as redundant and targeted for one or another form of elimination. This definition also helps to structure the connections between population redundancy, emigration, expulsion, colonization, modernization, and genocide.

According to Walter P. Zenner, the *aim of genocide* is to transform a social field by removing a whole group of political actors. Without necessarily disagreeing with Zenner, Roger Smith argues that the fundamental issue in genocide is *Who belongs, who is to have a voice in society?* It is this writer's conviction that, unless the identity of society and the political order is assumed, a highly questionable assumption, the real issue is *Who is to have a voice in the political order?*

The issue of a voice in the political order is in turn related to the universe of moral obligation. In ancient Greece, members of the polis belonged to a common universe of obligation. This was especially evident in war. Only those who shared common origins, belonged by *inherited right* to the same community, and saw themselves as partaking of a common fate could be trusted in a life-and-death struggle. Neither the slave nor the stranger could be so trusted. Hence, they were regarded as outside of the shared universe of obligation.

A very grave problem arises when, for any reason, a community regards itself as having within its midst a sub-community or a group of strangers who cannot be trusted. The problem is especially urgent in time of war. The perception of disloyalty may be mistaken, as in the case of the Armenians in Turkey during World War I and Japanese Americans during World War II. The fundamental reason for the mass incarceration of the Japanese Americans was the belief of most Americans that the majority of Japanese Americans were loyal to the Emperor rather than to their adopted country. Similarly, Rabbi Meir Kahane's extremist agitation to expel all Arabs from contemporary Israel ultimately rests upon the conviction that Israelis can only trust each other and that as long as the state contains potentially hostile elements, the safety of the

community remains precarious. This author is convinced that, were Kahane's policies ever implemented, the consequences would be disastrous. Nevertheless, even those Israelis who find Kahane's "solution" abhorrent do not advocate opening the ranks of the Israeli armed services to its Arab population. The problem Kahane proposes to "solve" is the classic problem of the nature of membership in a community.

Sometimes the question of a voice in the political community takes on a class rather than an ethnic dimension. When Kampuchea fell to the Pol Pot regime in 1975, the victors had a very clear idea of the kind of agrarian Communist society they proposed to establish. Rightly or wrongly, they regarded Kampuchea's entire urban population as being *objectively hostile* to the creation of the new political order. This perception was consistent with the Marxist idea that the bourgeois class is destined to disappear with the coming of socialism. Not content to let this process take its course nonviolently, the regime determined upon the immediate elimination through genocidal measures of all those who were regarded as either incapable of fitting into the new system or of being objectively committed to its destruction.[10] In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, a very similar logic compelled the departure from the Soviet Union of millions of "objective enemies" of the new system. Similarly, the Cuban revolution resulted in the enforced emigration of over a million Cubans who could not fit into Fidel Castro's system, primarily to the United States.

A related development is currently taking place in South Africa. Because of the overwhelming number of blacks and their indispensability to the functioning of the economic order, it is impossible for the Afrikaners to eliminate them. Indeed, save for some ultra-rightist groups, there is no evidence of any Afrikaner interest in so doing. Nevertheless, the Afrikaners have answered the question "Who shall have a voice in the political community?" by excluding non-whites. Of crucial importance is the consistent refusal of the Afrikaners to admit the blacks to any meaningful kind of suffrage. Apartheid and the denial of electoral rights are attempts to define membership in the political community without resort to outright mass murder. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that all of the policies cited above—segregation, concentration camp incarceration, expulsion, and genocide—are attempts to cope with a common problem.

Gunter Remmling's discussion of the progressive steps taken by the Third Reich to deny legal rights to the Jews is especially helpful in acquiring an overview of the process by which Jews were stripped of membership in the German political community until finally even the right to life itself was denied them. The question "Who is to have a voice in the political community?" was absolutely decisive for National Socialism. The political emancipation of the Jews in Europe in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries bestowed upon the Jews a voice in

the political communities in which they were domiciled. With the dour wisdom of historical hindsight, the extermination of the Jews can be seen as an unintended consequence of their emancipation. Emancipation made membership of the Jews in Europe's political communities a political issue for the first time. Emancipation was opposed by all who believed such membership should be restricted to Christians. An important reason why so little was done to assist the Jews during World War II, both in Germany and in the occupied countries, was the almost universal European acceptance of the National Socialist objective of excluding the Jews from membership in the political communities in which they were domiciled. This certainly was true of the mainstream Protestant and Catholic churches, which everywhere saw the denial of political rights to the Jews as a beneficial step toward the creation of a Europe that was culturally, intellectually, socially, and politically Christian. The fundamental difference between Hitler and the churches was that Hitler had no illusions concerning the measures necessary to carry out such a program. The churches never faced frankly the question of implementation. Nevertheless, one must ask whether the silence of the overwhelming majority of Europe's church leaders during World War II concerning the Holocaust may have been at least partly due to the fact that church leaders fully understood that extermination was the only viable means of eliminating the Jews. Having no direct responsibility for carrying out the process of elimination, they preferred to wash their hands of the question of implementation. In any event, it is now clear that the insistent calls for the elimination of the Jews from membership in the body politic of the European nations was in fact a demand for their extermination.

The question of uniqueness looms large in the discussions of the place of the Holocaust in the larger subject of genocide. Surprisingly, none of the writers discusses one aspect of the Holocaust which was absolutely unique. *In no other instance of genocide in the twentieth century was the fate of the victims so profoundly linked to the religio-mythic inheritance of the perpetrators.* In Christianity, the Jews are not simply one of the many peoples of the world. They are the people in whose midst God himself reigned to be incarnated. According to the classic Christian account, instead of being the first to recognize this supreme act of divine graciousness, the Jews both rejected God-in-the-flesh and were responsible for the violent and vicious way in which he was removed from the human scene. The Jews are depicted as the God-bearing and the God-murdering people par excellence. No other religion is as hideously defamed in the classic literature of a rival tradition as is Judaism by Christianity. Moreover, starting with the fall of Jerusalem in 70 C.E., Christianity has taken the disasters of the Jewish people to be a principal historical confirmation of its own truth. These have been interpreted in the classic sources to be God's punishment of a sinful Israel for

having rejected Christ. The practical consequences of (a) the ascription of a demonic identity to Jews and (b) the interpretation of their misfortunes as just chastisements of a righteous Lord was to cast them out of any common universe of moral obligation with the Christians among whom they were domiciled. In times of acute social stress, it had the practical effect of decriminalizing any assault visited upon them, as Hitler and the leading National Socialists fully understood. The implementation of the Holocaust was greatly facilitated by the deicidal and demonic interpretation of the Jewish people in the Christian religious imagination. If the Holocaust was to some extent a unique event, its religio-mythic dimension constituted a significant component of that uniqueness.

In addition to the religious aspect of the Holocaust, there was a highly significant economic element. The European Jews were a middleman minority. The question of the proneness of middleman minorities to genocidal assault is raised by Walter P. Zenner. Zenner points out that the Armenians were also a middleman minority targeted for extermination. He also points out that a third middleman minority, the Hoa or ethnic Chinese of Vietnam, were the object of a large-scale, state-sponsored program of population elimination.[11] Zenner ends his examination of middleman minority theory with the conclusion that there is no necessary connection between middleman minority status and genocide. Nevertheless, he concedes that such a status can be a precondition for genocide if other factors are present. According to Zenner, middleman minority theory has yet to face the question of why "economically integrated non-wage labor groups" are more likely to be victimized, while wage laborers, the marginalized, and the poor are not usually targets. In actuality, middleman minorities are permitted domicile in a community in order to do work that, for some reason, is not being done by the indigenous population. Their presence as strangers is tolerated because they constitute an *economically or vocationally complementary* population. They are most likely to be targeted for elimination when their roles can be filled either by the state or by members of the indigenous population. When this development takes place, the minority members become competitors of members of the majority. Usually, they compete against one of the most dangerous and potentially unstable groups within the larger population, the majority middle class. In the case of indigenous wage workers, the marginalized, or the poor, the same bitter rivalry with a dangerous class does not arise. When political leaders perceive vocationally redundant members of the majority to be a source of social or political instability, they have encouraged emigration, as was the case in Western and Central Europe during much of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, there is usually some residual sense that, even when they become redundant, the marginalized or the poor remain to some extent part of the community's shared universe of moral obligation. This is not the case with middleman minorities, especially when they are outside of

the majority religious consensus. They are often tolerated only as long as they are needed. Moreover, in premodern societies it was not socially or economically functional for middleman minorities to share a common religion with the majority. The impersonal, objective attitudes necessary for successful commerce were less likely to develop between people who considered themselves to be kin with the same gods. Commerce rested on an in-group, out-group double standard. It was only with the rise of Protestantism that the personalized ethics of tribal brotherhood gave way to universal otherhood and a universal money economy could come into being.[12]

Elsewhere, this writer has attempted to show that the situation of Europe's Jews became progressively more hopeless as the economies of Western and Eastern Europe were modernized.[13] For example, as the agriculture of Eastern Europe was rationalized, large numbers of Polish and Russian peasants were dispossessed of their holdings and forced to seek scarce wage labor in the villages and cities. Desperate for any kind of work under conditions of massive unemployment and underemployment, members of the former peasant class began to compete with the Jews for wage labor and those middle-class slots which had previously been predominantly Jewish. In seeking to displace the Jews, the dispossessed peasants and their urbanized offspring had the support of the Tsarist government, which, after 1881, made the Jews the targets of one of the most highly successful state-sponsored programs of population elimination in all of history. From 1881 to 1917, the fundamental objective of the Tsarist government vis-à-vis the Jews differed little from that of the National Socialist regime in Germany. Both sought the elimination of the Jews as a demographic presence in the areas under their control. Most American Jews are alive today because the two regimes did not share a common method of implementation.

In addition to serving as a method of radically redefining and restructuring society, genocide has since ancient times been the most unremitting kind of warfare. According to Kurt Jonassohn and Frank Chalk, genocide began in ancient times when warring peoples realized that their victories were only temporary. Elimination of a potential future threat became a powerful reason for wars of genocide. Undoubtedly, the human cost to the perpetrator played an important role in determining when a war was carried to such an extreme. After total defeat, the cost to the victor of eliminating a future threat was minimal. Since the enemy was outside of the victor's universe of moral obligation, defeat removed the only practical impediment to genocide. As long as an enemy retained the power to injure, a would-be perpetrator had to weigh the relative costs of a precarious peace against those involved in genocide. If neither side had the power to achieve a decisive victory, there was no possibility of a "final solution." In the case of the Holocaust, the Jews were perceived as a defenseless enemy with no significant capacity to retaliate.

The problems involved in their extermination were reduced to the bureaucratic management, transport, and elimination of the target population. A principal Jewish motive for the establishment of the state of Israel was to escalate the cost of killing at least those Jews who are Israeli citizens. There is little doubt that the cost now includes nuclear retaliation.

Irving Louis Horowitz points out that genocide very frequently follows military defeat. An important element in the decision of the Young Turk regime to initiate the program of extermination against its Armenian Christian minority was Turkey's defeat by Bulgaria in 1912. Similarly, Germany's defeat in World War I created the conditions in which a radically anti-Semitic, revolutionary, revisionist National Socialist movement could come to dominate German politics. As a consequence of defeat, the fringe became the center.

Horowitz also argues that the most massive destruction of Jews during World War II began in earnest in 1942 after Stalingrad. When German defeat appeared inevitable, extermination of the Jews became a paramount goal. In a similar vein, Barbara Harff suggests that a lost war sometimes leads to genocide against defenseless minorities regarded as enemies. While Harff stresses the element of battered national pride, a related element may be that military defeat intensifies the urgency with which the question of membership in the community is posed. As noted above, a fundamental issue in genocide is the question of who can be trusted in a life-and-death struggle. All minorities suffer some discrimination and experience some degree of resentment and incomplete identification with the majority, a situation which is as obvious to the majority as to the minority. In normal times, such tensions can be held in check. In the aftermath of catastrophic military defeat, they can get out of hand. Aggressive energies can achieve cheap victories over a defenseless minority. The reality of defeat itself can be denied and responsibility for the misfortunes of war ascribed to the minority's hidden "stab in the back." The accusation of secret treachery can legitimate genocide against the minority. If such a group is perceived as bringing about national catastrophe, *while appearing to be loyal,* it can become a matter of the greatest public urgency to eliminate them from the body politic.

Almost from the moment Germany lost World War I, the Jews were accused of bringing about its defeat through treachery, an accusation that appeared ludicrous in view of the extremely high proportion of German Jews who had served as front-line soldiers and who had made the ultimate sacrifice for what they regarded as their Fatherland. Elsewhere, this writer has argued that the tradition of Judas betraying Jesus with a *token of love,* a kiss, provided an enormously powerful religio-mythic identification of the Jew with betrayal to German Christians.[14] Since the identification of the Jew with Judas takes place in earliest childhood and is constantly reinforced by religious tradition, it is more deeply rooted

and less subject to rational criticism than beliefs acquired at a later stage in the life cycle. When Hitler and the German right ascribed Germany's defeat to the Jews, they had working for them this immensely powerful pre-theoretical archetype. Here too, we discern a unique religio-mythic element of enormous power that sets the Holocaust apart from other instances of genocide in our times.

Given the presence of religio-mythic elements in the Holocaust, it is not surprising that many scholars have argued that the Holocaust was irrational in its objective if not in its method. Barbara Harff has argued that though the Holocaust may have been a "rational choice of the Nazis," the utility of its implementation was thoroughly irrational. Robert G.L. Waite, a historian of preeminent rank, concludes that there is no adequate explanation for the Holocaust. By contrast, Roger Smith argues that genocide is a "rational instrument to achieve an end." In order to understand the force of Smith's argument, it is important not to confuse that which is humane with instrumental rationality. The experience of our era should leave no doubt concerning the enormous potential for inhumanity present in autonomous practical reason.

Ronald Aronson argues that the Holocaust systematically outraged the norms of the "normal world." He insists that the Holocaust was a product of madness, which he defines as a systematic derangement of perception, a seeing what is not there. The National Socialists saw the Jews as the source of Germany's problems and their riddance as a major element in the solution. Aronson argues that when rulers organize a society against false enemies and propagate the view that society is being mortally threatened by them when it is not, we may speak of madness as much as when an individual behaves in the same manner.

Aronson's arguments summarize the thesis he presents with greater force and detail in his book, *The Dialectics of Disaster*.[15] It is not surprising that Aronson and Roger Smith do not agree on the rationality of genocide. Smith sees genocide as a violent means of determining who is to have a voice in a community. Aronson stresses the patently false character of the defamation of the intended victim and of the analysis of society as mortally endangered by his presence. However, Aronson does not deal with the underlying reason why the question of "who shall have a voice in the community" is raised in the first place. A community is more than a congeries of individuals living in close proximity. As noted above, it is a group whose members may have to sacrifice their lives in a life-and-death struggle with external enemies in a crisis. When the group regards itself as secure, it can afford to take a relatively benign view of the presence of a limited number of strangers in its midst. However, in times of acute national stress, such as war, economic dislocation, or military defeat, the group is likely to view strangers with suspicion and hostility. In an extreme situation, it may decide upon the total elimination of strangers.

Aronson insists that the Nazi attempt wholly to eliminate the Jews as a demographic presence first in Germany and then in all of Europe was insane because the Jews in no way constituted the threat the National Socialists alleged them to be. The issue of the truth of National Socialist defamations is, however, irrelevant to the crucial fact that the overwhelming majority of Germans regarded even the most assimilated Jews as aliens whose elimination would be a positive benefit. The Germans were not duped by mendacious Nazi propaganda. They wanted the volkisch homogeneity Hitler promised them. When it was all over, some of them regretted the *methods employed* but not the fact that Europe was largely free of Jews.

If Aronson were right, it would be irrational to want an ethnically or religiously homogeneous community consisting of those with whom one shares a sense of kinship and trust. In reality, there is nothing irrational about the desire for such a community. One wonders whether Aronson considers the colonization of the Americas and Australia, which was largely achieved through genocide, to be instances of madness. It is not the irrationality of such communities that is the problem, but the extreme cruelty and inhumanity which all too frequently attend their creation. Neither Hitler's ends nor his methods were irrational. They were obscenely cruel and graphically demonstrate what citizens of one of the world's most advanced civilizations were willing to do to other human beings for the sake of national homogeneity.

Finally, there is the issue of genocide and national sovereignty. Roger Smith observes that the United Nations never detected a single instance of genocide by a member nation. Kurt Jonassohn and Frank Chalk argue that the sovereignty of the perpetrator is the practical problem in cases of deportation and extermination because the nation-state is both the most dangerous violator and the ultimate guardian of human rights. Elsewhere, this writer has argued that National Socialist Germany probably committed no crime at Auschwitz.[16] It was under no circumstances this author's intention to mitigate the inhumanity and the obscenity of what the Germans did, but to point to one of the most urgent moral dilemmas involved in the notion of political sovereignty in our era. Crime is a violation of behavioral norms defined by political authority. Homicide, for example, is only a crime when the victim is protected by the state's laws. Even in National Socialist Germany, there were actually a very small number of SS officers who were punished for the *unauthorized* murder of Jews during World War II. The state determined when homicide was an offense against its law and when it constituted the implementation of those same laws.

If it be argued that the National Socialist state was by its very nature a criminal state because it violated God's laws or the laws of nature, one must ask what practical difference such violations made to the perpe-

trators. As long as the leaders of National Socialist Germany were free to exercise sovereignty, no superordinate system of norms constituted any kind of restraint on their behavior. As is well known, neither the German churches nor the Vatican ever asserted that the genocidal program of the National Socialist state was a violation of God's law, although the program was well known. *In reality, there are no human rights there are only political rights.* That is why the question "Who is to have a voice in the political community?" is the fundamental human question. Membership in a political community is no absolute guarantee of safety. Nevertheless, to the extent that men and women have any rights whatsoever, it is as members of a political community with the power to guarantee those rights. This was clearly evident in the fate of the Armenians in Turkey during World War I and the Jews of Europe during World War II. Genocide is the ultimate expression of absolute rightlessness.

While highlighting the extreme moral limitations of contemporary civilization, genocide is nevertheless an intrinsic expression of that civilization. Genocide is most likely to occur when men and women refuse to extend the benefits and protection of their societies to strangers whom they cannot or will not trust. Obviously, that perception is highly subjective and may very well be in error. Nevertheless, one of the privileges of power is the ability to define social reality. The objective facts are of far less practical consequence than the subjective perceptions of the majority.

NOTES

1. This thesis is a generalization of the author's fundamental thesis concerning the Holocaust as expressed in Richard L. Rubenstein, *The Cunning of History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 6.

2. This conviction is spelled out in some detail by the author in Richard L. Rubenstein, *The Age of Triage: Fear and Hope in an Overcrowded World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), pp. 34-59.

3. Christopher Hill, *God's Englishman: Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), p. 113.

4. R. P. Stearns, *Hugh Peter: The Strenuous Puritan, 1598-1660* (Champagne and Urbana: Illinois University Press, 1954), p. 356; cited by Hill, *God's Englishman,* p. 117.

5. Cecil Woodham-Smith, *The Great Hunger: Ireland, 1845-1849* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1980), pp. 411-12.

6. See Rubenstein, *The Age of Triage,* pp. 120-27.

7. "Effects of Emigration on Production and Consumption," *The Economist* (February 12, 1853), pp. 168-69 (emphasis added). See this author's comments in Rubenstein, *The Age of Triage,* p. 122.

8. See "The Irish Priesthood and the Irish Laity," *The Economist* (June 19, 1852).

9. For a study of the fate of the Indians of North America, see Bernard W. Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973).

10. See Rubenstein, *The Age of Triage,* pp. 165-94.

11. For a discussion of the elimination of the ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, see Rubenstein, *The Age of Triage,* pp. 165-94.

12. See Benjamin Nelson, *The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood,* 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

13. Rubenstein, *The Age of Triage,* pp. 128-64.

14. Richard L. Rubenstein, *After Auschwitz* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 30-64.

15. Ronald Aronson, *The Dialectics of Disaster* (London: Verso, 1983).

16. Rubenstein, *The Cunning of History,* p. 90.

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