METZ, Donald S., 1916—

The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1961
Education, history

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE INTERACTION OF NATURALISM AND IDEALISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY, 1860-1960

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
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Bethany, Oklahoma
1961
THE INTERACTION OF NATURALISM AND IDEALISM IN
AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY, 1860-1960

APPROVED BY

[Signatures of committee members]

Dissertation Committee
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people have contributed to the completion of this study. The subject was selected after several conferences with Dr. Lloyd P. Jorgenson, formerly of the School of Education of the University of Oklahoma. A special tribute is due Dr. Lloyd P. Williams, Associate Professor of Education at the University of Oklahoma, for his prolonged interest, personal and academic, in the completion of the thesis. Dr. Paul Unger, also of the School of Education of the University of Oklahoma, made many incisive criticisms of the manuscript which resulted in a more scholarly production. Another most helpful friend was Miss Kathryn Paschall, assistant librarian at Bethany Nazarene College, who secured several essential publications through inter-library loan. Finally, a tribute is due a long-suffering family, each of whom has encouraged the final culmination of many years of academic aspiration.
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CHAPTER I

POLAR TENSION

The history of American educational theory in the century between 1860-1960 has been characterized, among other things, by a polar tension involving opposing philosophical approaches to education. At one polar position was traditional idealism, usually couched in Christian terms and symbols. The other polar position expressed educational theory in naturalistic concepts. Since the culture of the United States has pluralistic origins, it is necessary to state that other philosophies in additional to naturalism and idealism have exerted formative influences on American educational theory. However, it appears that the philosophies of naturalism and idealism have exerted the greatest impact on American educational thought. Since these two philosophical positions, naturalism and idealism, are polar opposites, a prolonged tension has been evident in American educational thought. A major source of tension in contemporary educational philosophy is the persistence of naturalism and idealism in educational theory.
Statement of Purpose

The primary purpose of this investigation is to ascertain the influence of the philosophies of naturalism and idealism on educational theory and practice in the United States between 1860-1960. Another purpose is to attempt to discover significant trends in educational philosophy in the century under consideration. A final purpose is the statement of relevant conclusions based on the data presented by the study.

Objectives of Study

While the particular problem under consideration in this study is the interaction of idealism and naturalism in American education between 1860-1960, it seems necessary to present a brief summary of the historical developments of these two philosophies, as well as a survey of their influence on educational theory. For, as Brubacher points out, the problems of philosophy and the problems of education have been closely interrelated:¹

Sometimes educational innovations have been instituted without awareness of the philosophical problems involved. At other times new departures have been made in education under the deliberate guidance of philosophy. In either event, educational practice down the centuries has been persistently dogged by philosophical implications. Perhaps no century has been so aware of these implications as the twentieth.²

²Ibid.
Keeping the idea of the interrelation between philosophy and education in mind, it is proposed in this study (1) to discuss briefly the origin and the development of naturalistic philosophy, indicating its salient concepts and pointing out its expression in educational theory; (2) to present a survey of the history of idealism in its various types, accompanied by a discussion of its impact on educational thought; (3) to describe succinctly the tension between religious idealism and scientific utilitarianism in American education between 1860-1960; (4) to depict the struggle between idealism and naturalism as both traditional colleges and sectarian institutions gained strength; (5) to investigate, in representative fashion, the tension between idealism and naturalism in the curricular development of higher education; (6) to discuss the tension between idealism and naturalism as these philosophies were expressed in rational idealism and pragmatic naturalism; (7) to analyze the philosophy and the educational theory of John Dewey as the outstanding expression of naturalism in American education; (8) to discuss the reaction to the naturalism of Dewey in the idealistic philosophy of Herman H. Horne; (9) to attempt to point out salient points of comparison or contrast between Dewey and Horne.

Value of Study

This study has possible value and significance in two areas. (1) It has value to the writer because of his position as an instructor in the philosophy of education in a college
that is accredited by the State of Oklahoma in the area of
teacher preparation; (2) the study may have significance be­
cause of the contemporary reassessment of educational theory
and practice.

Problems Involved

The writing of a dissertation inevitably presents a
number of problems to the writer. The outstanding problems
involved in this thesis are four in number: (1) the subject"The Tension Between Idealism and Naturalism in American Edu­
cational Theory Between 1860-1960" indicates a topic with an
almost too comprehensive scope. Because of the comprehensive
nature of the study, it was necessary to select arbitrarily
or to omit certain aspects of the period under consideration.
Such arbitrary selection or omission could appear to be the
result of deliberate bias or of a lack of awareness that such
material existed; (2) another problem was the prolific amount
of material produced by John Dewey as contrasted with a
paucity of material available from the pen of H. H. Horne.
However, since eight publications of Horne were secured, these
eight works were regarded as furnishing sufficient sources of
research; (3) a third problem was the matter of historic per­
spective. The primary aim of the study was to consider the
interaction between idealism and naturalism between 1860-1960.
However, the writer decided that it would be desirable to
structure the problem in its historic setting. This decision
to present the historic background of idealism and of
naturalism resulted in the treatment of these two philosophies in separate chapters at the beginning of the thesis; (4) another problem was the retention of a spirit of objectivity. Prior to the initiation of the study, almost all the information regarding John Dewey had come from secondary sources and from educational cliches. Admittedly, such information did not engender a heightened appreciation of Dewey. On the other hand, the writer had studied under Horne and was highly appreciative of his personal qualities and of his philosophical concepts. The problem of objectivity was solved rather early in the investigation, for in spite of a heavy and a ponderous writing style, Dewey presents his philosophy with such profound scholarship and such logical consistency that it is easy to join the ranks of those who regard him as one of the most influential thinkers in the history of American thought.

Review of Research

Since World War II the United States has experienced a resurgence of interest in educational theory and practice. The educational philosophy of John Dewey has undergone critical reassessment. Representatives of idealism have been extremely articulate in the past two decades.

Representing a sympathetic reassessment of Dewey are (1) John L. Childs in *American Pragmatism and Education*; (2) Boyd H. Bode in *Progressive Education at the Crossroads*; (3) C. Frankel in *The Case for Modern Man*; (4) George S.
Counts in Dare the School Build A New Social Order; (5) Sidney Hook in Education for Modern Man; (6) George Geiger in John Dewey in Perspective. Representing those who have attacked Dewey and have supported either idealism or essentialism in education are (1) Bernard I. Bell in Crisis in Education; Clyde M. Hill and C. Winfield Scott in Public Schools Under Criticism; (3) Robert M. Hutchins in Higher Learning in America; (4) Arthur Bestor in The Restoration of Learning; (5) Nels Ferre in Christian Faith and Higher Education; (6) Jacques Maritan in Education at the Crossroads; (7) Walter Moberly in The Crisis in the University; (8) M. Cunniggin in The College Seeks Religion; (9) Donald Butler in Four Philosophies; (10) G. O'Connell in Naturalism in Education.

Typical of objective, expositional presentations of educational philosophies is Modern Philosophies and Education, edited by Nelson B. Henry.

This study differs from the various studies mentioned above in the following ways: (1) a specific historical period is used as a background in which to structure the study; (2) instead of presenting general propositions, the study attempts to focalize the investigation in two representative men; (3) the cultural impetus to particular philosophical approaches is stressed; (4) the attempt was made to present an objective exposition of opposing points of view.

Sources of Information

Two sources of information were used to secure material
for the first two chapters, dealing with the historic development of idealism and naturalism. One source of information was the writings of accepted authorities in the history of philosophy. In addition to the writings of recognized scholars in the history of philosophy, wherever possible, information was gained from the original writings of the men under consideration.

In chapter three, dealing with the growth and the development of colleges and universities in America, the histories of individual institutions were used extensively. Another source of information also treating the rise of academic institutions was the writings of officials associated with the establishment and the expansion of such institutions. Wherever possible, catalogues of the institutions under consideration were used, as well as the writings of educational historians. In the final chapters, the sources of information were limited to the literary productions of the men selected for discussion.

**Method of Procedure**

The following steps were taken in the fulfillment of research involved in this study:

1. Much important literature in the fields of philosophy, philosophy of education, and the history of education was studied for the purpose of background and perspective. This study included a survey of (1) the history of ancient philosophy, (2) the history of modern philosophy, (3) the
history of American philosophy, (4) the history of education, and (5) a study of the various schools of educational philosophy.

2. One week of a summer vacation was spent in the Library of Congress securing material from periodicals and books not available in Oklahoma.

3. Arrangements were made with the library of Bethany Nazarene College, Bethany, Oklahoma, to secure copies of essential books through inter-library loan. Books were borrowed from Southern Methodist University, New York University, and Columbia University.

4. For the school year 1959-1960 the library of the University of Oklahoma granted the use of a study "cage," making possible a more consistent and effective use of the university's library facilities.

5. Approximately two years were spent in collecting data from the sources already stated. These data were surveyed, analyzed, and evaluated, and formed the basis for this report.

6. Beginning in October, 1960, rough drafts of proposed chapters were submitted to the committee. Changes and revisions were made in the manuscript as suggested. Copies of the complete dissertation were deposited in the graduate office of the University of Oklahoma in accordance with regulations.
CHAPTER II

EDUCATIONAL THEORY STRUCTURED WITHIN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURALISM

The earliest attempt to explain the nature of the universe in Western culture at least, was the naturalistic philosophy of the pre-Socratic Greeks. Because the Greeks had no dogma, no ultimate authority, and no sacred scriptures, they were free to ask penetrating questions regarding the nature of the world and of existence. This freedom to question and to probe for rational answers was one of the primary causes in the birth and the development of Greek philosophy. The first school of Greek philosophy attempted to explain the universe in terms of nature. Later Greek philosophy interpreted the universe in rational, or idealistic terms. The combination of Greek idealism and Christian thought eclipsed the early philosophy of naturalism for many centuries. Yet naturalistic concepts have persisted in human thought.

During the last four centuries, beginning with the Renaissance, naturalism has won an increasingly large following. In the first half of the twentieth century the philosophy of naturalism appears to have dominated the intellectual life of Occidental culture. Naturalism has
served as a rich source of ideas for such diverse movements as dialectical materialism, industrial individualism, political and religious liberalism, and educational progressivism.

Naturalism is defined by Sellars as follows:

Naturalism is a term which is largely self-explanatory. It takes the common world . . . as the real and only world; and it is skeptical of those religious and philosophical traditions which want to reduce it to illusion or to dependence upon something more real back of it all in some mysterious sense. To the naturalist the physical universe is self-sufficient and substantial . . . that which is physical is real, and that which is real is physical.¹

Hocking presents a brief and concise definition of naturalism in this statement: "Naturalism is that type of philosophy which takes nature as the whole of reality."² Naturalism is described in a negative sense by Joyce in these words: "Naturalism is a system whose salient characteristic is the exclusion of whatever is spiritual, or indeed, whatever is transcendental, from our philosophy of nature and of man."³

It appears to be sufficient to limit the discussion of naturalism to three aspects of its development. First, the attempt is made to present a brief history of naturalism by discussing the development of the various types of naturalism. Then the endeavor is made to discuss the concepts of naturalism which would be relevant to this particular study.

Finally, the direct application of the principles of naturalism to educational philosophy is discussed.

**Types of Naturalism**

Generally, naturalism has been divided into three types, or three schools of thought: (1) reductionistic naturalism, (2) mechanistic naturalism, and (3) developmental naturalism. However, because of changing trends of thought within a scientific and technological culture, a fourth category, that of dialectical materialism may be added to the above list.

Reductionistic naturalism has been called by some "naive naturalism." According to Donald Butler naive naturalism includes all attempts to designate some one substance as the be-all and end-all of nature, and therefore of existence itself. Naive naturalism may be further classified as materialism and energism.

The earliest attempts to reduce reality to a substance were carried on by the early Greek schools of speculation, and is called materialism. Prior to the sixth century B.C. the idea of a single substance underlying all things had never been reasoned out, nor had there been any attempt to argue a description of its nature based on a methodical observation of

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phenomena. After the sixth century B.C. two representative schools arose among the Greeks, both endeavoring to explain the universe in terms of a single substance. These schools were called the Milesian School, and the Atomistic School.

The Milesian School was founded by Thales, who was born about 624 B.C. The solution to the problem of reality, or the "World-stuff" was, according to Thales, to be found in Water. Water was the World-stuff to which all the variety and complexity of natural phenomena could be reduced. Anaximander, a follower of Thales, reasoned that the essence, or principle, of things is not water, as Thales proposed. Rather the essence of reality was the Boundless, or the Infinite, conceived as an eternal, imperishable substance out of which all things are made and to which all things return.

A third Milesian philosopher was Anaximenes, 588-524 B.C., who was supposed to have been a pupil of Anaximander. According to Anaximenes, the first principle of things, or the underlying substance was neither the Water of Thales nor the indeterminate Boundless of Anaximander, but was air, vapor, or mist. The common feature of the Milesian school was the attempt to explain reality in terms of a simple, observable substance.

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That the one substance, whatever it was, had a variety of aspects and appearances, the Milesians admitted. But the Milesians completely ignored any ground, or reason, for this ceaseless change of the cosmic matter which was accepted by them as something living, as something which was animated. Partly because of the idea of nature as alive and dynamic, the Milesian doctrine is usually known as "hylozoism."^9

Another important contributor to a monistic concept of the nature of reality was Parmenides who wrote about 490 B.C., and who is considered the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy. Parmenides carried the idea of a single substance to its logical, reductionistic conclusion. One writer lucidly states the position of Parmenides in these words:

Here, then, Parmenides, seems to say is the logical conclusions: if anything is seriously meant by the statement that the world is one, it must be a continuous homogeneous body and nothing else. . . the world being is an absolutely continuous body, it is not devisible . . . nor can it move, for motion implies empty space, to which is nothing and does not exist. ^10

The extreme, rigid universe of Parmenides, with its one limitless substance, appeared to be unsatisfactory to the Greek mind. In order to solve the dilemma suggested by Parmenides, another group of thinkers, called the Atomists, came into prominence. Among the Atomists the names of Empedocles and Democritus are representative.

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Empedocles, born about 495 B.C., offered a solution to the problem of the nature of reality by suggesting that there are beings, or particles which are permanent, original, imperishable, and underrived and which are not subject to change. However, these bits of reality can change their relations to each other. What man calls change is thus only a change in the relationship of these particles. Empedocles has expressed his ideas in poetic form:

... there is no birth
of all things mortal, nor in ruinous death;
But mingling only and interchange of mixed
There is, and birth is but its name with men.
... Now grows the One from Many
into Being, now Even from One departing
Come the Many, -- Fire, Water, Earth, and
Awful heights of Air.11

Democritus (460-370 B.C.) modified the ideas of his predecessors in the Atomistic school, namely Empedocles, Leuceppus, and Anaxagorus. Democritus accepted the idea of an infinite number of elements, and organized the atomistic concept into a systematic pattern. To Democritus the nature of external things was in small existences, unlimited in number.12 It was Democritus who first advanced the following principle: "... nothing is created out of the non-existent or is destroyed into the non-existent."13 Reality, then, is a matter of the arrangement of atoms in an object.

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This atomic structure of reality, however, revealed disturbing weaknesses. Democritus suggested that the ethical problems, good and evil, could not be stated in atomic relations. Therefore the atomic theory did not include all of reality. Anaxagorus had also stated that if reality is expressed by atomic relations, then the mind which expressed the relations must be outside nature. Nature appeared to be deficient as a means of solving the problems of existence, so the Greeks turned toward the dialectical philosophy of Socrates and toward the idealistic philosophy of Plato. While naturalism appears in a limited degree in the writings of Aristotle, it does not reappear as a prominent philosophy until after the Renaissance and the Reformation. At that time it recurred as "Energism."

While the materialists reduced reality to a substance, or to elements, a secondary principle underlying their approach was the idea of hylozoism. By hylozoism is meant the belief that matter, whatever its ultimate essence, contains a kind of vitality which is equivalent to self-generation. Aristotle seems to have accepted the idea of self-generation without any serious questions. But it remained for Herbert


Spencer to formulate a naturalistic system in which reality was reduced either to energy, or to the principle of hylozoism.  

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) was an exponent of the idea that energy was the ultimate reality. To Spencer matter was indestructible, for to accept the annihilation of matter was unthinkable. But Spencer would define the indestructibility of matter in terms of energy, for he believed that the force exerted is the ultimate measure of matter. The appearance of matter may change, said Spencer, but the force it exerts remains constant. He writes: "... thus, by the indestructibility of the force with which matter affects us is seen the indestructibility of matter."  

Spencer was one of the latest thinkers to interpret reality in terms of either substance or of a single entity. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in particular, the more common approach among naturalistic thinkers was to interpret reality in terms of structure rather than substance. This approach to naturalism has been called mechanistic naturalism.  

Beginning with Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, and Newton in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, physical scientists tended to place more emphasis upon a mechanical and a deterministic view of the physical world.  

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18 Ibid., p. 183.  
the rise of the mechanistic view in science and philosophy one
historian wrote:

Physical scientists at the beginning of the modern period of thought accepted mechanism as a sound principle of explanation for all physical phenomena. However, to most of them, the mechanical aspect of nature was regarded as subordinated to the purposive will of God. 20

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the mechan- ical naturalistic position appears to have rejected any supra-natural purpose in nature. The tendency was to accept as valid and real only scientifically observable data. This view was named positivism and found classic expression in Auguste Comte.

According to Comte, the advance of natural sciences appeared to call for a complete revolution in man's interpretation of the universe. His theory is set forth in the famous dictum:

... each of our leading conceptions, each branch of our knowledge, passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: the theological, or fictitious; the metaphysical, or abstract; and the scientific, or positive. ... Hence arise three philosophies, or general systems of conceptions on the aggregate of phenomena, each of which excludes the other. The first is the necessary point of departure of the human understanding. The third is its fixed and definite state. The second is merely a state of transition. 21

Comte states that all theological and metaphysical

20 ibid.

21 Harriet Martineau (trans.), The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte (London: George Bell and Sons, 1896), 1, 2.
philosophy proceeds to explain the phenomena of the external world from the starting point of our consciousness and human phenomena, while positive philosophy would subordinate the conception of man to the external world.\textsuperscript{22} Hence a study of the world, or of natural phenomena, is the starting point of true science. The direct study of the universe, says Comte, suggests and develops the great idea of the laws of nature, which is the basis of all positive philosophy, and which is capable of extension to the whole of phenomena, including at last those of Man and Society.\textsuperscript{23} Carrying the concept of a mechanical universe to its logical conclusion Comte states:

"All phenomena, inorganic and organic, physical or moral, industrial or social, are all subjected in a continuous manner to rigorously invariable laws."\textsuperscript{24} From the concept of natural, invariable law a specific task emerges for the philosopher and for the scientist:

Our business is . . . to pursue an accurate discovery of these Laws, with a view to reducing them to the smallest possible number. . . . our real business is to analyze accurately the circumstances of phenomena, and to connect them by the natural relations of succession and resemblance.\textsuperscript{25}

From such dogmatic assertions of naturalism were derived mechanical schools of psychology, mechanistic concepts of sociology, and deterministic ideas of natural phenomenon.

\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Ibid.}, II, 1. \textsuperscript{23}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 2.


\textsuperscript{25}Martineau, \textit{op. cit.}, I, 6.
Due to advances in the field of natural science, particularly in the area of physics, since the beginning of the twentieth century, it was seen that physical laws, like social laws, are in the nature of statistical averages.26 With the presentation of the idea of indeterminancy in physics, it appeared that crass materialism had to be abandoned in favor of a more non-quantitative, non-mechanical theory of nature.27 A new type of naturalism, called developmental naturalism, became generally accepted because it allowed for the inclusion of the ideas of indeterminancy and of development. In developmental naturalism the processes of nature became the key to an interpretation of nature, rather than substance or structure.

In contrast to the older naturalism of the eighteenth century, which resulted in a mechanistic, "world-machine" concept, the new naturalism of the second half of the nineteenth century was stimulated in part by the theories of evolution and by the ideas of the conservation of matter. Perry suggests a distinct difference between the older and the newer naturalism:

The older naturalism had represented the cosmos as a system of moving bodies governed by mathematical law, while the newer naturalisms represented the cosmos as a majestic process of natural history, or as a fixed quantity of matter, force or energy having multiple and

26Gamertsfelder, op. cit., p. 314.
27Ibid., p. 421.
variable manifestations.\textsuperscript{28}

The new approach to naturalism may be described as finding expression in two different ways, one of which was evolutionary naturalism which stressed the concept of emergence. The other point of emphasis in the new naturalism was the attention given to final results in experience, which was called pragmatism.

As early as the Eleatics, represented by Heraclitus, (535-475 B.C.), philosophers had wrestled with the concept of "Becoming," the polar opposite of "Being." Heraclitus believed that life is an invisible activity, a ceaseless cycle of change. Greek thinkers who succeeded Heraclitus turned their attention to different problems in philosophy, and the problem of change remained relatively obscure until the early years of the nineteenth century.

Lamarck, early in the nineteenth century, presented the hypothesis that the direct effect of the environment upon individual organisms, and the reaction of the organism to the environment, produced changes in the organisms. These changes, according to Lamarck, were inherited by the descendants of the original organism, resulting in the appearance of new varieties and new species. Shortly after Lamarck's ideas were presented, Charles Darwin presented his revolutionary theory of Natural Selection. With the introduction of Darwin's theory of evolution, scientists and philosophers were given a ready-made

\textsuperscript{28}Ralph Barton Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Past (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926), p. 19.
vehicle by which to transfer the emphasis from substance and structure to process. The consequent stress on the processes of nature found expression in evolutionary naturalism.

Charles Darwin (1809-1882) made two major contributions to biology, and through biology to scientific naturalism. His first contribution was the theory, based on available data and comprehensive inductions, of the natural origin of new species of plants and animals. Secondly, Darwin formulated and presented evidence for a specific hypothesis he gave the name of "natural selection." The point of departure in Darwin's thinking, variation within the species, was partly due to natural selection, or the ability of the organism to adapt to the environment. Essentially, this concept of adaptability was called "the survival of the fittest."

While Darwin was essentially a biologist with no great concern for metaphysical speculation, his ideas did tend to reduce nature to an all-pervading and ceaseless flux. Platonic and Christian idealism had always pervaded the interpretation of nature with eternal forms or paternal benevolence. As Perry said: "All these moorings seemed to be dissolved into a flood sweeping blindly on without origin, destination, of fixed landmarks."²⁹

With Darwin evolution was a biological law, but with Herbert Spencer it became cosmic generalization. To Spencer the law of evolution applied to all phenomena. All the special

²⁹Ibid., p. 27.
laws in the various fields of investigation were expressions of the law of evolution, according to Spencer:

Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of function; during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.30

Both Darwin and Spencer regarded evolution as a cosmic law. In the years following the Civil War the theory of evolution was applied to religion, to political science, and, in fact, to every phase of culture. After the beginning of the twentieth century, however, many thinkers, having accepted the idea of evolution, turned their attention to the results, or to the products of the evolutionary process. This type of naturalism, stressing the results of the process, applied the principle of evolution to practical affairs and was called Pragmatism.

Most of the philosophy in America seems to have its roots in English and European thought, but Pragmatism is the most distinctly American in its outlook.31 Pragmatic thinkers, such as Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George H. Mead were profoundly affected by two developments within science and philosophy. The first development within science and philosophy to influence the founders of American pragmatism was the theory of evolution and its application to

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fields of study other than the biological field. The impact of the concept of evolution on pragmatic thought is expressed in the following statement:

Peirce adopted an evolving concept of natural law rather than the fixed mechanical view. James formulated a dynamic, functional view of mind rather than a static, "substantial" theory of mind; Santayana conceived the human ideal of reason as having a naturalistic or animal origin; Dewey accepted a biological basis of inquiry.32

The founders of pragmatism also perceived that the method of experimental science made it necessary, and at the same time, provided the basis for a new interpretation of nature and a fresh approach to the pattern of reflective thought.33 John L. Childs expresses the methodological approach of the pragmatists in these words:

Rejecting the role of the apologist who seeks to reconcile the procedures of experimental inquiry with the authoritarian and intuitive assumptions of the traditional logic, the pragmatists turned to the construction of a logic frankly grounded in the principles and practices of experimental science.34

The name "pragmatism" originated with Charles S. Peirce, who in 1878, published his epoch-making article entitled "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." In this paper Peirce laid down the thesis that the whole meaning of any object consists in the habit or reaction it establishes or induces in us.35 He writes:

32Ibid., p. 241.


34Ibid., p. 10.

Consider what effects which might conceivably have practical bearings we consider the object of our conceptions to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.  

In essence Peirce states that to develop the meaning of a thought is to determine what habit it induces, for meaning is determined by the habit it involves.

Pragmatism, while widely accepted, seemed to avoid several basic philosophical problems which persisted in spite of the attempt to make philosophy a practical science. The problem of metaphysics was a particularly challenging one to pragmatic naturalists. In recent years some naturalistic thinkers have openly faced the metaphysical aspects of their philosophy. This most recent development within naturalism has been called "dialectical naturalism."

In more recent years a new type of "open-ended" naturalism has found acceptance among some scholars who were dissatisfied with the older materialistic, mechanistic, or process approach to the scientific study of nature. This new type of naturalism is called by its followers "a spirit of investigation" rather than a system. Pratt describes the new approach to naturalism in these words:

An earnest and courageous desire to find out and face the truth is the first characteristic of the genuine upholder of naturalism. Naturalism believes that the truth is what it is, no matter what we think about it. Nature, the world of reality, has a character, a structure of its own, and our opinions are true in so  

36Ibid., p. 293.
far as they conform to this actual situation.\footnote{James Bissett Pratt, \textit{Naturalism} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), p. 4.}

Dialectical naturalism disavows any relation to both dogmatic materialism and to instrumentalism. Neo-naturalism has much in common with instrumentalism, but in so far as instrumentalism denies to reality an antecedent structure, the new naturalism refuses to join forces with it.\footnote{Ibid.}

The latest form of naturalism also has much in common with pragmatism, but disagrees with pragmatic naturalism in some basic concepts. The new naturalism believes that it was not only the practical need of dealing efficiently with the environment that led man to investigate the nature of the world in which he lived. In addition to the pragmatic motive, there was also a purely intellectual one, according to dialectical naturalism. Man's response to nature is thus based on both practical and theoretical needs, or impulses.

Naturalism, according to Pratt, is characterized by (1) its aim, (2) its method, and by (3) its resulting system. But the system that naturalism builds is not only less important, but also less fundamental to naturalism than to its methods. Further, the method is less permanent and less essential than its aim, which is to ascertain the truth of the world we live in.\footnote{Pratt, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 10.} Romanell, a contemporary naturalist, describes the new approach in concise words:
In short... present day American naturalists have abandoned the Democritean theory of nature and have replaced it with novel and subtle forms of Aristotelian, Spinozist, and Baconian outlooks.40

The new type of naturalism operates on the idea of levels of nature, such as matter, life, and mind. Each of these levels is controlled by laws that are not only peculiar to itself but also in accord with those laws that are common to all levels. The kind of naturalism which emphasizes the opposing considerations that must be taken into consideration when dealing with different levels of nature is termed dialectical naturalism.41 Dialectical naturalism is characterized by what Cohen names "the principle of polarity," which he describes as follows:

... opposites such as immediacy and mediation, unity and plurality, the fixed and the flux, substances and function, ideal and real, actual and possible. ... like the north (positive) and south (negative) poles of a magnet, all involved each other when applied to any significant entity.42

By the principle of polarity the neo-naturalist is saved from a position of reductionistic insularity and is able to approach the totality of nature, on all levels, with a method which permits nature to relate its own story. One might draw the conclusion that contemporary American naturalism approaches the theory of nature from the fact of living, rather than from the fact of doubting, for the very evident reason that nature on

41 Ibid., p. 6.
examination turns out to be a dynamic, productive system of interrelated processes.  

In discussing the history of naturalism, consideration has been given to four types, or phases, of naturalistic thought. The Greeks helped to develop the most primitive form of naturalism which has been labeled Materialism. Subsequently naturalism became more mechanical, with the emphasis being shifted from substance to structure. As evolutionary concepts arose, emphasis in naturalism was turned away from both substance and structure and toward the processes of nature. Contemporary naturalism tends to be more open-ended than was the case in earlier periods of history, and appears to be more concerned with nature qua nature.

Having reviewed the historic development of naturalism, it seems appropriate next to discuss some of the concepts of naturalism that are particularly relevant for educational philosophy.

**Concepts of Naturalism**

Any philosophical attempt to interpret the meaning of life and of nature inevitably involves several fundamental concepts such as the nature of reality, the problem of knowledge, and the nature of value. For the purposes of this study it seems essential to limit the discussion to naturalistic metaphysics, naturalistic epistemology, naturalistic axiology, and

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43Romanell, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
The springboard of all naturalistic metaphysics is the rejection of supernatural cosmology and ontology. Campbell, a militant naturalist, states his position bluntly:

Belief in the supernatural is an epiphenomenon of human existence which is more or less an active menace to an ethical, eugenic and altogether worth-while living out of one's natural existence in this world. . . . the postulate of the supernatural is not something to enhance the values of this life, but to belittle them.44

A romantic naturalist, Santayana, discussing the idea of the supernatural, writes: "What is called the supernatural is only ultra-mundane, an extension of this world on its own plane, and a recognition of forces ruling over it not reckoned with in vulgar commerce."45 Haeckel calls the idea of the supernatural a "ridiculous imperial folly," and continues: "... only when we have abandoned this untenable illusion, and taken up the correct cosmological perspective, can we hope to reach the solution of the 'riddles of the universe.'"46

Naturalism stands for the self-sufficiency and intelligibility of the world of space and time. Negatively, naturalism is the rejection of the supernatural. Otto has stated the naturalistic position in these words:


At first tentative, but becoming ever more distinctly conscious of its real motive, naturalism has always arisen in opposition to what we may call "supernatural" propositions, whether those be the naive mythological explanations of world-phenomena found in primitive religions, or the supernatural metaphysics which accompanies the higher forms.47

While rejecting the metaphysical concept of any supernatural reality the naturalists accept "nature" in some form or another, as the only reality. Santayana refuses to state any formal concept of nature, but presents a panoramic, pictorial concept of nature by describing nature in this statement: "... it is public experience. ... the stars, the seasons, the swarms of animals, the spectacle of birth and death, of cities and wars. ... the facts before every man's eyes."48 Sellars states that matter is the only reality possible to the scientist and adds these words:

... the materialist as a philosopher has nothing factual to add to the account of the scientists. The materialist holds that philosophers cannot improve upon the descriptive concepts of matter supplied by the working scientist of his time. He accepts what the physicist, chemist, biologist, histologist, etc., say as the best approximation at any given time.49

Woodbridge, a serene naturalist who confessedly is not greatly concerned with the problems of philosophy, is a naturalist who accepts nature as ultimate reality, but who refuses


to define nature. To Woodbridge nature is described as a realm of possibilities. He says: "A naturalistic philosophy should not think of nature as something first created or first defined, which only tolerates the existence of man in some mysterious way." Expanding the idea of nature as a realm of possibilities Woodbridge continues:

. . . the world does not exist for other purposes than its own. It exists as something to be experienced in order to discover the possibilities its existence offers. Metaphysically considered . . . the world is something out of which something can be made. . . . Nature is not a creation, but the challenge and the opportunity to create.

In conclusion, three elements may be drawn from the metaphysical aspect of naturalistic philosophy. First, naturalism rejects any concept of the supernatural. Secondly, for its tools of discovery and for verification, naturalism is based on the various branches of natural science. Finally, naturalists may regard nature either as a created given, a substance, a realm of experiences, or as an area of possibilities. Growing directly out of the naturalistic idea of reality, is the closely related idea of naturalistic epistemology.

The mind of man may be studied in two ways, rationally or empirically. Assuming some metaphysical system one may

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deduce rationally the plan of the human mind in that system. On the other hand, assuming no such system, one can investigate the phenomena of mind by empirical observation, or by experiment. Naturalism accepts the study of the problem of knowledge from the standpoint of empirical observation. According to Dampier the method of empirical observation stresses man's affinity with the animal world, and with the totality of nature.

As Copernicus and Galileo deposed the Earth from its position at the center of the universe, so Darwin took man from his cold pedestal of isolation as a fallen angel, and forced him to recognize his Kith and Kin in Saint Francis' little brothers, the birds.53

Woodbridge succinctly states the naturalistic approach to the problem of knowledge in these words: "We begin our reflections as animals living in a visible world around us."54 This approach of Woodbridge, which is scientific and evolutionary, rejects the philosophical expression of the eighteenth century glorification of reason in favor of empirical and rational observation. Discussing the nature of mind Woodbridge further states metaphysics has never succeeded in revealing by analysis a mind and a body as primary facts from which the distinction between the mental and the physical is derived.55 Santayana echoes the thought of Woodbridge:

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53Ibid., p. 333.
Belief, in its very soul, is belief about nature; it is animal faith. To entangle faith in anything non-natural, or avowedly tangential to action, would be to cheat at the game. Honest speculative belief is always speculative physics.  

Some naturalists regard mind and consciousness as wholly physico-chemical in their nature, as are all parts of the body. In naturalistic terms both mind and consciousness are often reduced to physical reactions:

... the immediate unknowns whose mutual association constitutes consciousness become themselves inferentially known as functionings of the body. That is, the immediate terms whose mutual association constitutes the operations of consciousness can be none other than brain functionings or cerebration. Cerebration is a series of physico-chemical processes mutually related in association fashion. All the relations of consciousness are immediately present in the relations of these cerebral processes.

Pratt, representing a later school of naturalism, rejects all older naturalistic theories which attempt to reduce man, including his mind, to physical action, or interaction. Pratt appears to reverse the historic concepts of naturalism by picturing the entire universe as a natural spiritual organism, with mind as one aspect of the purposeful, organismic Cosmos. Pratt expresses his "spiritualized" naturalism in these words:

It is perfectly consistent with a very real naturalism to take into serious consideration the hypothesis that the Cosmos as a whole is permeated with immanent purpose, that it is a teleological and, therefore, a

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56 Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 6.
57 Campbell, op. cit., p. 85.
Naturalistic epistemology appears to run the gamut from regarding mind as a chemical reaction to external stimuli to the expression in nature of an intelligent, on-going purpose. Whatever the position of the naturalist, the psychical is enclosed in the physical, and man's ability to think and to know is a natural function of a natural organism. Directly and logically derived from naturalistic concepts of reality and knowledge is a naturalistic concept of axiology.

The naturalistic thinker rejects all ideas of ethics based on conventional, traditional, institutional or authoritarian approaches. Naturalistic ethical concepts vary greatly. One naturalistic approach is illustrated by David Hume, who feels that the descriptive approach to ethics is the only rational position. Other naturalists such as John Stuart Mill, are hedonistic in their approach. Still others approach the problem of ethics from the more abstract level of Santayana, who feels that ethical concepts should be individualized.

Among the earliest of naturalistic proposals in the area of ethics was that suggested by David Hume. Hume proposed that the empirical thinker should merely observe and record the various forms of approval and disapproval which different social groups have revealed. Hume applied the

\[58^\text{Pratt, op. cit., p. 142.}\]
descriptive approach to the area of ethics, stating that philosophy has no proper grounds for fixing the structure of ethics. Regarding this relative, descriptive approach to ethics Hume writes:

They think it a reproach to all literature, that philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundations of morality, reasoning and criticism; and should for ever talk of truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the source of these distinctions.59

To the utilitarian naturalist natural rights and standards of morality are arbitrary fictions corresponding to nothing in human nature. The utilitarian would not limit relational activity to mere observation and recording of data. From the utilitarian point of view all action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action take their whole character and color from the ends and purposes to which they are subservient. Pleasure and pain are the great teachers of morality, according to the utilitarian. Nature has put within each man a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery, and these natural tendencies influence all our actions. Following the tendencies of a desire to happiness and an aversion to misery Mill calls that good which affords pleasure and labels that evil which causes pain.

Mill presents a formal definition of the utilitarian

concept of ethics in harmony with his utilitarian philosophy:

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.60

According to the "Greatest Happiness Principle,"
the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable, is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality. To the utilitarian not only is happiness the end of human action, it is also the standard of morality. Morality may be defined as the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence may be secured which assures happiness to the greatest extent possible.61

In the philosophy of utility, then, pleasure and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends. Further, utilitarian, naturalistic ethics presumes that all desirable things are desirable either from the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as a means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.

In the naturalistic approach to ethics, concepts of ethical activity may be regarded as descriptive, as utilitarian, or as highly individualized. The common strand

61Ibid., p. 17.
running through the various naturalistic interpretation of ethics is the rejection of any external authority as a basic source of ethics, and the acceptance of nature, or of natural processes, as the source of ethics.

The great difficulty confronting traditional naturalism was the task of including man in nature in a way that would do justice to all his distinguishing characteristics. As Sellars stated it, an adequate naturalism must not belittle man in order to press him into some rigid mold. Prior to 1859, the Achilles heel of naturalism appeared to be that of the problem of man. When Charles Darwin wrote the Origin of the Species in 1859, naturalistic thinkers were given a focal theory of interpretation, toward problems, not only of man, but also toward every aspect of physical phenomena. The theory of evolution had been in the academic air for at least half a century before it was presented by Charles Darwin. However, before Darwin's time, it was more of a speculation that a coherent principle. Regarding the impact of the theory of evolution on the natural sciences Shafer writes:

> It gave to the sciences of organic life the center of the intellectual stage, while to science as a whole it gave a unifying concept of apparently unlimited application.

According to naturalism, the nature of man and the nature of nature go together. Woodbridge places man at the

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62 Sellars, Philosophy of Physical Realism, p. 3.
64 Woodbridge, Nature and Mind, p. 254.
center of nature, as indicated by the remark:

Guided by the philosophy of naturalism we have incorporated man wholly within nature. This now means that, with respect to human life, there is propriety in nature fully as much as in any other instance. Man, from his lowest physiological functions to the highest aspiration of thought, illustrates the propriety of nature.65

Naturalistic concepts of man vary from the mechanical stimulus-response concept to the idea of man as a purposeful, self-determining organism. The one distinctive aspect of all naturalistic interpretations of man is that he is one with nature.

Naturalism In Education

The Protestant Reformation of the early sixteenth century had reinforced the Judeo-Christian approach to education and had expanded the ideals of humanism. But in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the religious Reformation appeared to lose both its dynamic spiritual quality and its intellectual vigor. With the waning of religious and humanistic forces the era of naturalism and sense realism began to be theorized in terms of education. New discoveries and novel inventions led many to regard nature as a source of knowledge and to view education as a natural rather than an artificial development. Wolfgang Ratke and John Amos Comenius began to apply the Baconian principles that pertain to the discovery of truth in nature to the area of education. Three

65Ibid., p. 258.
men appear to be the leaders in introducing naturalistic concepts into education. These three thinkers are John Locke, Jean J. Rousseau, and Herbert Spencer.

Those who are acquainted with Quintilian, Comenius, and Montaigne will not discover any startling innovations in Some Thoughts Concerning Education by Locke. Quintilian stated that the general assumption that only a few well-favored people could learn was false. He thought that most people were quick to reason and ready to learn, for he wrote:

"Reasoning comes as naturally to man as flying to birds, speed to horses and ferocity to beasts of prey: our minds are endowed by nature with such activity and sagacity that the soul is believed to proceed from heaven."

Montaigne, like Quintilian, reacted to the practice of imposing artificial study patterns in the child. He taught that the child should be taught according to his capacity, learning such things as he can from self-discovery and from open investigation to free discussion.

Comenius also emphasized the importance of conducting education in accordance with nature. As a Protestant bishop he accepted the traditional Christian doctrine of the innate depravity of man. Yet he did not regard nature as antithetical to human growth. On the contrary, in his most renowned educational work, Didactic Magna, he stated: "If we wish to find a remedy for the defects of nature, it is in

nature herself that we must look for it, since it is certain that art can do nothing unless it imitates nature."  

However, it is with John Locke, empiricist and free-thinker, that the tendency toward naturalism in education becomes clearly defined. Referring to the naturalism of Locke Monroe states: "In a sense, Locke is the founder of the naturalistic movement in education, for in many respects Rousseau freely acknowledges indebtedness to him." The great influence of the theories of education advanced by Locke arises from the fact that these theories expressed precisely the type of education preferred by the practical business men of England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Locke begins his discussion on educational philosophy by rejecting the popular concept of innate ideas. He states: "No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never knew, which it was never conscious of." Locke says that if there are innate ideas, the person will have innate thought, for there can be no ideas without thoughts. Locke goes even further by suggesting that there are no such things as innate moral principles, and no innate ideas of God. To Locke all  

ideas arise from experience making an impression on the mind, which is completely blank at birth.71

The educational objectives of Locke are stated simply in the phrase "a sound mind in a sound body."72 Any one possessing these two has little more for which to wish, while a person lacking in either one will not attain happiness, according to Locke. While the molding of the mind is important to Locke, yet education should begin with the "clay cottage" in which the mind resides.

Discipline is the basic principle in Locke's approach to the educational process:

As the strength of the body lies chiefly in being able to endure hardship, so also does that of the mind. And the great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth is placed in this, that a man is able to deny himself his own desires, cross his own inclinations, and purely follow what reason directs as best.73

A strict hand kept over children in the beginning will result in submission to reason later and thereby assist in developing the good life, in the thinking of Locke.

However, Locke thinks that discipline is best achieved by rewards and punishments. But he does not mean physical punishment or reward, for he writes: "Esteem and disgrace are, of all others, the most powerful incentives to the mind, when once it is brought to relish them."74 But discipline

71Ibid., p. 121.

72John Locke, Some Thoughts on Education (Boston: Library of Education, 1830), I, 1.

73Ibid., p. 27.  74Ibid., p. 50.
should be exercised carefully and should not interfere with innocent folly, playing, or childish actions. Discipline is a means to the end of establishing proper habits. Desirable habits, further, are established by practice, not by memorizing rules. Regarding the method of learning by doing Locke writes:

This method of teaching children by a repeated practice, and the same action done over and over again, under the eye and direction of the tutor, till they have got the habit of doing it well, and not by relying on rules trusted to their memories, has so many advantages that I wonder why it could possibly be so much neglected.\(^{75}\)

Children should be allowed, according to Locke, to follow their inclinations, with favorable seasons of aptitude and inclination serving as a starting point in learning anything. The subject should be adapted to the age level of the pupil, with the development of the body first, then the inculcation of the various phases of morality, to be followed by language, geography, arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, history, rhetoric, logic and natural philosophy. But whatever the subject or method, it must, in Locke's thinking, harmonize with natural tendencies. It appears sound to conclude that Locke's naturalism was primarily in the area of methodology, rather than in any revolutionary concept of the curriculum. In fact, it would appear that Locke was not advancing far from the trivium and the quadrivium of the medieval age along with Renaissance-Reformation embellishments.

\(^{75}\)Ibid., p. 60.
Similar ideas are found in the educational theories of Jean J. Rousseau. Rousseau belonged to a revolutionary age and seems to serve as the spokesman of the intellectual rebellion during the eighteenth century against what the intelligentsia regarded as formal, artificial and hypocritical thinking. For Rousseau himself, education was regarded as an essential part of a revolutionary plan to lead mankind from absolutism and authoritarianism toward freedom and independence. In his Social Contract Rousseau launched the back-to-nature movement along with the idea of the inherent quality of human freedom. In Emile Rousseau presented the educational counterpart of his political writing, Social Contract, in order to make, it was hoped, the educational revolution an ally of the proposed social revolution.

On the negative side, the historical significance of Emile seems to rest in its protest against the educational practices of the eighteenth century. Education, according to Rousseau, should be based on the principle that the child is by nature innately good. Rousseau was aware that he was directly contradicting one of the fundamental tenets of historic Christian doctrine, the idea of innate depravity. The keynote of the educational platform of Rousseau is found in the famous statement: "Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the author of nature, but everything degenerates in the hands of man." Since evil is the result of man's

76Ulich, op. cit., p. 383.
social activity, the teacher's primary task is protective—to prevent the pupil from coming into contact with society until he has matured sufficiently to cope with society.78

Education offers, to Rousseau, the one grand possibility of shaping human lives. Few men present the potential of education in more exalted terms than the following statement of Rousseau:

We are born weak, we need strength; helpless, we need aid; foolish, we need reason. All that we lack at birth, all that we need when we come to man's estate, is the gift of education.79

This education, so essential in Rousseau's thinking, comes from nature, from men, or from things. The inner growth of the organs and faculties is the education of nature, the use one learns to make of this growth is the education of men, and what is gained by experience from our surroundings is the education of things. In this way each person has three teachers: nature, men, and surroundings. If these three schoolmasters agree and work in harmony, the person under this instruction is happy and well-educated. If these three teachers are in conflict, then the pupil is unhappy and ill-educated.

Rousseau rejects both classical education and vocational training as such. He reasons that in the natural order men are all equal and their common calling is that of manhood, for he writes:

78Ibid., p. 18. 79Ibid., p. 6.
It matters little to me whether my pupil is intended for the army, the church, or the law. Before his parents chose a calling for him nature called him to be a man. Life is the trade I would teach him.  

The grand objective, of education, says Rousseau, is to make a man. Because the individual has learned to live as a man, he will quickly learn how to be a magistrate, a soldier, or a priest.  

Since man cannot control nature, then in education he should learn how to cooperate with nature. Everything should be done to bring the processes of education into harmony with the natural tendencies of the child. The educational text of Rousseau could be the statement: "Fix your eye on the nature, follow the path traced by her." All the habits of the individual should be self-developed, not imposed from without. The only habit the child should be allowed to contract is that of having no habits.  

To Rousseau, life consisted of a series of stages, ranging from infancy, through puberty and adolescence into maturity and manhood. The great need, then, is to adapt the learning process to the age, or stage, in which the pupil finds himself. With the help of education the pupil learns the art of self-discipline, he learns how to meet suffering and he learns how to adapt to life's many novel situations. But this process takes time. It develops, then, that one of the main functions of education in the years of childhood up

80 Ibid., p. 9.  
to twelve, is that of retardation, or of prevention. However, by retardation, Rousseau means the slowing down of the possibility of the pupil's acquaintance with the evils of society, not the prevention of natural and desirable self-discipline and growth. Rousseau writes:

May I venture to lay down the greatest, the most important, and most influential rule of education. It is this, not to gain time, but to lose it... the first part of education, therefore, ought to be purely negative. It consists, neither in teaching virtue nor truth, but in guarding the heart from vice, and the mind from error.82

Up to the age of twelve or thirteen, the wants of a child are primary. After this age his faculties develop rapidly and he is ready to learn from nature and the questions engendered by nature. From a study of nature it is a natural step in later stages to develop the rational and the aesthetic powers.

The writing of Spencer, Education, appeared in 1861, two years after the work of Darwin, The Origin of the Species. In this book Spencer, following the naturalistic trend in education, launched an attack on current education by the statement: "Men dress their children's minds as they do their bodies, in the prevailing fashion."83 Subjects are taught, says Spencer, not because of their intrinsic value, but because they are socially acceptable:

Not what knowledge is of most real worth, is the consideration; but what will bring most applause, honor,

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82 Ibid., p. 45.
respect—what will conduce to social position and influence—what will be most imposing... in education, the question is, not the intrinsic value of knowledge, so much as its extrinsic effects on others. Rather than learning useless subjects simply because these subjects are socially acceptable, the process of education should prepare one for complete living, according to Spencer.

Spencer approached the matter of education from the physical side. Fundamentally, the child is an animal, but the human animal must be directed in the habits that are beneficial, for Spencer writes: "People are beginning to see that the first requisite to success in life, is to be a good animal."85

While Spencer regarded the child as an animal, he is unique in that his period of infancy is a relatively long one. Whereas animals are born with a set of behavior patterns all ready to function, the human animal has to learn everything except his vital body processes. Prolonged infancy, says Spencer, which requires a period of guidance and thus provides the occasion for the learning needed by human beings, outlines the purpose and function of education in the human race.86

The objectives of education, to Spencer, are elemental and clear:

Is it not that education of whatever kind has for its proximate end to prepare a child for the business of life—to produce a citizen, who, at the same time that

84*ibid.*, p. 11.  
he is well conducted, is also able to make his way in the world.  

The objectives of education, then, are determined by the leading kinds of activity that constitute life. According to Spencer it is easy to classify, in the order of their importance, these life-satisfying activities. They are arranged naturally as follows:

1. Those activities which, by securing the necessaries of life, directly minister to self-preservation;
2. Those activities which, by securing the necessaries of life, indirectly minister to self-preservation;
3. Those activities which have for their end the rearing and discipline of offspring;
4. Those activities which are involved in the maintenance of proper, social and public relations;
5. Those miscellaneous activities which make up the leisure part of life, devoted to the gratification of the tastes and feelings.

Spencer realizes that the educational objectives which he suggested are contrary to the traditional, classical education of his day. But he also was aware that there was much dissatisfaction with current educational ideas and practices. The ready acceptance of his objectives by the practical middle class indicated that Spencer was an educational prophet who was honored in his own time.

The educational process, according to Spencer, is not to be turned indiscriminately toward the forces of nature. Spencer states that the two aspects of human nature which requires direct supervision by adults are (1) the prolonged period of infancy and (2) the nature of human nature itself.

87Ibid., p. 178. 88Ibid., p. 18.
Spencer offers no formal concept of human nature, but does reject the idea of innate goodness in favor of a tentative acceptance of depravity:

We are not among those who believe in Lord Palmerton's dogma, that "all children are born good." On the whole, the opposite dogma, untenable, as it is, seems to us less wide of the truth.89

In stating his objectives Spencer is naturalistic, but refrains from the free rule of nature. He favors a program of education directed and controlled, but harmonious with the nature of the child as such.

Spencer regards the educative process as a deliberate and positive program. The distinctive character of the prolonged educative process by which Spencer proposes to guide the pupil through his extended infancy can be summarized in eight principles.90

The first principle is that education must conform to the natural processes of growth and mental development. It is the make-up of the learner that determines the character of the learning process, not the designs of teachers or of society. A second principle in Spencer's system is the idea that the teacher should attempt to make the acquisition of knowledge pleasurable rather than painful. This idea is based on the assumption that at each age the intellectual action which a child likes is a healthful one for it. Another fundamental

89Ibid., p. 173.

90Cf. Ibid., pp. 104-110.
concept of Spencer is that education should engage the spontaneous self-activity of the child. Spencer believed that the child largely educates himself by those things he discovers in his own active relations with things and people. The remaining concepts of Spencer are: acquisition of knowledge is an important part of education; education includes the physical as well as the mental; precocity should never be encouraged, for education should practice the art of delay, or provide for natural maturation; methods of instruction should be inductive, rising out of the child's personal observations; all punitive aspects of the educational process should fit into a natural consequence of actions and should be administered with sympathy.

From Spencer's point of view, the classical, artificial education of the nineteenth century was an imposition on the child which ran directly counter to the child's natural development. By suggesting a concept of education which recognized the child as an integral aspect of nature Spencer hoped to make education more efficient as well as more enjoyable. Many of Spencer's educational ideas became an accepted part of later naturalistic philosophies of education.

Within the confines of this chapter an attempt has been made to present a brief, yet comprehensive, survey of the historical development of naturalism, particularly of those ideas in naturalism which are relevant for naturalistic educational philosophy. In developing the study of naturalism first the various types of naturalism were defined as: (1)
reductionistic naturalism, (2) mechanistic naturalism, (3) developmental naturalism, and (4) dialectical naturalism. Reductionistic naturalism was described as the attempt to reduce nature to a substance, or to a state, such as energy. Mechanistic naturalism involved the interpretation of the world as a gigantic machine operating according to fixed and immutable laws. Developmental naturalism presented the idea of nature as a process in which the principle of evolution was dominant. Finally, dialectical naturalism was depicted as an open-ended approach to nature, characterized by a spirit of investigation concerned with the functions of nature as such, rather than by the attempt to explain nature completely.

Following the discussion of the development of the various types of naturalistic philosophy, those concepts of naturalism which have direct bearing upon educational theory were presented. The concepts of naturalism considered were naturalistic metaphysics, naturalistic epistemology, naturalistic ethics, and the naturalistic concept of man. Negatively stated naturalistic metaphysics is the rejection of the idea of the supernatural. Positively stated, naturalistic metaphysics is the acceptance of nature, in some form or another, as the only reality. Naturalism accepts the study of the problem of knowledge from the standpoint of empirical observation. In the area of axiology naturalism rejects external authority, regarding ethics from the descriptive, the utilitarian, or the relativistic point of view. Guided by the
philosophy of naturalism, man has been incorporated wholly within nature, although concepts of man may vary from the mechanical stimulus-response concept to the idea of man as a purposeful, self-determining organism.

Finally, the chapter is brought to a close by a brief survey of representative attempts to apply the concepts of naturalism in educational theory. Three writers were chosen as representative of naturalistic educational philosophy. These three thinkers were John Locke, Jean J. Rousseau, and Herbert Spencer. Many ideas of these naturalistic thinkers were in agreement and became a part of naturalistic educational theory, such as: (1) developing proper habits by physical activity, (2) learning by doing, (3) finding pleasure in the learning activity, (4) allowing the pupil to follow his individual interests, and (5) producing an effective human being, capable of effective social living. However, Locke, Rousseau, and Spencer had some sharp points of difference in their systems. Rousseau believed human nature was innately good, Spencer accepted a modified type of natural depravity, while Locke seemed to regard human nature as neutral, or rather, as having no tendencies toward either goodness or badness. To Locke man became what his environment brought to him experientially. Another point of difference between the three previously mentioned thinkers was the nature of society. Locke and Spencer appeared to accept the existing social morality as an ideal objective for education, while Rousseau was critical
of society. Also, both Locke and Spencer, more than Rousseau, stressed the importance of physical vitality and self-discipline for health's sake.

During the last decade of the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth century, the impact of naturalistic ideas on American political and educational thinking was pronounced. These naturalistic ideas found expression in writers as varied as Thomas Payne and Thomas Jefferson. The introduction of naturalism into American political and educational theory was the occasion of prolonged tension between naturalism and another philosophy already existent in America, the philosophy of idealism. The following chapter presents a discussion of idealism, its concepts, and its educational significance.
In the Western world, idealism as a technical philosophy began with Socrates and Plato. The compatibility of the idealistic approach to philosophy with Christian concepts made idealism, in some form, the dominant philosophy in Western thought until the challenge of naturalism after the Renaissance. From the Renaissance until the twentieth century idealism and naturalism were the two dominant philosophies. The philosophy of realism has also won a large following.

Idealism, like naturalism, has many variations and is therefore difficult to define concisely. According to Hocking idealism is the philosophy which states that the essence of reality is mind. Kemp Smith defines the term "idealism" as covering all those philosophies which agree in maintaining that spiritual values have a determining voice in the ordering of the universe. A comprehensive definition of idealism is attempted by Cunningham, who writes:

1Hocking, op. cit., p. 247.

Idealism is that philosophical doctrine which undertakes to show that, in order to think matter on the spatio-temporal order of events in its ultimate nature, we are logically compelled to think mind or spirit along with it as in some sense foundational to it.3

A. O. Ewing also attempts to given an all-inclusive definition in the following statement: "Idealism proceeds from the conclusion that physical objects depend on God or the Absolute, or are themselves psychical in character, or things are abstractions of collective human experience."4

Hocking states that the idealist's position may be expressed in two propositions, one negative and one positive.5 The negative proposition is that the apparent self-sufficiency of nature is illusory. Nature appears to be independent, to operate according to its own laws, to require no ground outside itself, but in reality nature does depend on something else. The second proposition of idealism according to Hocking, is that ultimately nature, and all reality, can be explained only in terms of mind. Brightman states that it is both difficult and urgent to define idealism, for in defining the term the entire concept evaporates into triviality.6 However, Brightman does present a general definition of idealism in


4Ewing, op. cit., p. 4.

5Hocking, op. cit., p. 248.

the following words:

Nevertheless we shall have a vague working definition if we say that all idealism is characterized by belief in the ultimate reality or cosmic significance either of mind (using the term in its broadest sense) or of the ideals and values revealed to and prized by mind. 7

From the preceding definitions it appears sound to state that idealism, in any of its various expressions, regards ideas, values, or mind as the ultimate real.

Historic Development of Idealism

Brightman has pointed out that historically idealism has found expression in four types. 8 The first type, Platonic Idealism, asserts the objectivity of value and is sometimes called Objective Idealism. The second type, sponsored chiefly by Berkeley, holds that all knowable reality is of the nature of consciousness, and is labeled Subjective Idealism. An impersonal idealism was proposed by Hegel who taught that the coherence of one absolute system is the only true value, or existence. Hegelian idealism is sometimes called Organic Idealism. A fourth type of idealism is called Personalism, which states that only persons, or selves, are real.

With the rise of the Sophists in ancient Greece, Greek thinking took an anthropological, or subjective, direction, studying the inner activities of man, his ideation and his volition. This subjective approach of the Sophists denied

7 Ibid., p. 172. 8 Ibid., p. 171.
all transcendental realities, attempting to identify reality with what man knows of it. Reality is what is known, according to the Sophist, to man. Reality is immanent in knowledge. Referring to the "subject-man" approach to knowledge, Mueller wrote: "This metaphysics of immanence absolutizes the subjective side of knowledge."9

Protagoras, most eminent of the Sophists, stated that there is no belief that is not of this subjective character. The natural result is skepticism. Protagoras argued that sense qualities are clearly dependent upon the actual operations of the senses, and all knowledge may be reduced ultimately to sense experiences. This skeptical subjectivism is well stated in the following statement of Protagoras:

The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling; there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire, fear, and many more which are named. . . with each of them is born an object of sense,—all sorts of colors born with all sorts of sights and sounds in like manner with hearing, and other objects with the other senses.10

The Sophistic teaching of man as subject was accepted by Socrates in the early dialogues of Plato. However, Socrates avoids the pedantic relativism of the Sophistic movement by insisting that all truth is contained in the subject, but only in so far as it is universal. Consequently the searching out of universal conceptions was for Socrates the essence of science, and thus determined the outer form of his

philosophy. The fact that the Sophistic discovery was sanctioned by Socrates and was carried to its ultimate meaning indicates that Plato preserves and clarifies rather than destroys the concept of the subject. Yet he does so without yielding to the extreme subjectivism of the Sophist.

Socrates has used dialectics as a method of discovering universals, but the universals were always embodied in experience. Plato expanded the dialectics of Socrates into a system, as indicated by Jowett in these words: "Where Socrates used universal axioms, Plato developed a system. Further, that which Socrates laid down as a principle of knowledge, Plato announced as a principle of metaphysics."

Another writer describes the conclusions of Plato in these words:

... Plato had come to the conclusion that the basis of objective reality in our moral judgments lay in these perfect or ideal forms which were never discovered or realized completely in the world known to sense-perception. But they were real and knowable in exactly the same sense as the objects of mathematical science.

Another Plato scholar, Paul Shorey, also states that Plato accepted the objective existence of universals, for he says: "Universals, ideas, notions, are treated as things, hypostatized entities. They belong to the world of true being and unchanging reality."

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11 Ibid., p. xlv.


Our examination of Plato's writings seems to support the idea that all objects exist primarily as forms, or ideas, and only secondarily as sense objects. In the "Philebus" Plato indicates that the eternal god made the world according to a preconceived pattern. In order that the universe may represent the idea of living things of which it is a copy, it was made to contain the four types of living things corresponding to the four elements and inherent in that idea, namely, heavenly bodies, birds, fishes and land animals.\(^{14}\) Again, in the "Politicus," Plato says: "Yes, we still affirm the reality of these eternal ideas, which is as certain as the distinction between pure intelligence and right opinion."\(^{15}\) He also says that our philosophy must take account of three things: the idea, its namesake, and the sensible copy.\(^{16}\)

Two more recent thinkers, Josiah Royce and William E. Hocking, may be quoted as supporters of the idea that reality is of the nature of mind, or idea. Josiah Royce is considered the most outstanding idealist that America has produced.\(^{17}\) Royce's basic work is *The World and the Indi-


vidual. Royce's philosophy seems to reflect not only the impact of German idealism and romanticism, but also the influence of Peirce and James.

Two focal questions for Royce are: What is our idea? How can an idea be related to reality? An idea, we are told, must be defined in terms of its internal purpose and in terms of its external reference. The external function is secondary to the internal meaning, which is always the expression of an interest, a desire, or a purpose. Royce explains the external function of an idea in these words:

... what the idea always aims to find in its object is nothing whatever but the idea's own conscious purpose or will, embodied in some more determinate form than the idea by itself alone at this instant consciously possesses. When I have an idea of the world, my idea is a will, and the world of my idea is simply my own will itself determinately involved.18

The external meaning of an idea is the idea's reference beyond itself to an object. The internal meaning of an idea is the expression in experience of desire, purpose, and volition, as indicated by these words: "All finite ideas, even the vaguest are already in one aspect contents of experience, imperfectly fulfilling purpose."19 There is thus no opposition between the internal and the external meaning of ideas, for the validity of an idea is primarily determined by its internal meaning. It follows then, in Royce's thinking, that the World

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19Ibid., p. 334.
as Idea, when fully developed, expresses through itself the World of Fact. Royce is careful to point out that private will does not create nature, but conscious will does logically determine what objects in reality are. He says: "What is, or what is real, is as such the complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfillment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas."²⁰

The concept of the World as Idea discloses four relations between the internal and the external meaning of reality, according to Royce: (1) They are inseparably joined; (2) The Other which is sought in knowledge is an Individual which requires the unity of the internal meaning (the What) and the external meaning (the That); (3) The two meanings are mutually determining, for the external meanings must answer the questions raised by the internal meanings; (4) In the end meanings are supreme.²¹ The Other, which knowledge seeks, is in reality the completion of the idea's own embodied purpose, or will. A completely determined idea would end the quest and this object would be the real object. Thus Royce holds that truth and reality are complete Idea.²² This Idea, he tries to show, is a Self-Conscious Knower.²³

Hocking based his idealism on the reality of the creative power of the human mind, which he felt gave substance to

²⁰Ibid., p. 339. ²¹Ibid., p. 34.
²²Muelder, op. cit., p. 213.
²³Ibid.
the hypothesis of objective idealism. While admitting that
the experience of nature was first given by an outside agency,
Hocking reasoned that the mind proceeds to interpret and re-
produce what is given by nature, and in this way changes from
a passive receptor to an active creator. To him this idea of
mind as creative is the foundation of objective idealism, for
he states:

It is the extraordinary extent and power of this silent
activity which alone justifies the audacious hypothesis
of objective idealism that a mind could create nature,
that the reality behind and within nature could be mental. 24

The supreme mind, or ultimate reality, would differ
from the human mind, says Hocking, not merely in greatness,
but also in quality. Where the human mind can create only
after it has learned from experience, the world-mind must bring
forth the qualities of experience from itself, without previous
pattern and must be wholly active, not partly passive. 25

Hocking concludes that the reality of nature consists
in its being willed by a creative mind. 26 He presents further
indications that nature depends upon a creative mind by the
following propositions:

That as life comes only from life: so mind comes only
from mind. . . . That causality is purposive. . . .
That law is an expression of intelligence. 27

From these propositions Hocking states that it is justifiable

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25 Ibid., p. 275.
26 Ibid., p. 276.
27 Ibid., pp. 277-279.
to regard the order of nature as the literal presence of a
Reason in nature.

In 1710, Bishop Berkeley took the subjective approach
to knowledge, and made it positive, so that it became the basis
of a unifying ontology. Like Socrates, Berkeley avoided a
subjective skepticism, arriving at the existence of objective
reality through subjective experience. In presenting his sub-
jective philosophy Berkeley focuses attention on two assump-
tions.

The first assumption of Berkeley is the principle, or
the interpretation, of the conception of substance under the
form of spirit. The second idea presented by Berkeley is to
regard the objective order of nature under the form of the mind
of God. In discussing Berkeley's approach to philosophy, Perry
states that there are two motives at work in Berkeley.28 The
first motive is the epistemological motive, which restricts
reality to perceptions and thoughts. The second motive is the
metaphysical-religious motive, which leads Berkeley to ulti-
mately define reality in terms of perceiving and thinking
spirits. Referring to these two motives Perry writes:

... from the time of Berkeley these two principles,
phenomenalism and spiritualism have remained as distinct
and alternating phases of subjectivism. The former is
its critical and dialectical conception, the latter its
constructive and practical conception. 29

28 Ralph Barton Perry, *The Approach to Philosophy*

29 Ibid., p. 272.
Since phenomenalism and spiritualism have both found classic expression in Berkeley's writings, a brief discussion of these phases of his thinking seems desirable.

Berkeley's phenomenalism states that the objects of human knowledge are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses or are the result of mental activity or mental perceptions. In a classic expression of phenomenalism Berkeley states:

Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistency having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple; other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things: which as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth.

This radical doctrine of epistemology meant the denial by Berkeley of all finite objects outside the mind. Berkeley appeared to be desirous, by his subjectivism, of establishing a common-sense philosophy of experience. This philosophy of experience, or of common-sense, Berkeley regarded as an innovation in philosophy, although the Sophists had presented an approach involving the same principle. In the dialogue between Hylas, the advocate of traditional philosophy, and Philonous, who represents the introduction of the new philosophy of common-sense, Berkeley writes in dialogue form:

Hylas. You were represented in last night's conversation, as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion


that ever entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing as material substance in the world. Philonous. That there is no such thing as what Philosophers call material substance, I am seriously persuaded.\textsuperscript{32}

By these words Berkeley indicates that he accepts the extreme empirical contention that knowledge applies only to its own psychological moment, that its object in no way extends beyond that individual situation which we call the state of knowing.\textsuperscript{33} However, Berkeley does not conclude his philosophy with a study of epistemology. From a phenomenological concept of knowledge, Berkeley progresses to his primary purpose, which was to a metaphysics of spiritualism.

Berkeley actually uses the problem of knowledge to establish a metaphysics. In his epistemology Berkeley argued that the essence of things consists of perceptions. In making his transition to metaphysics Berkeley introduces a more fundamental principle. This new principle is that the essence of so-called material objects is not in perceptions, but in perceivers. The world consists not in perceptions, but in perceivers. Perceivers are intellectual, or spiritual, in essence. Hence the nature of reality is spiritual, not material.

Berkeley states his sweeping proposition in this statement:

\textit{... all the choir of heaven and furniture of the Earth, in a word, all these bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind.}\textsuperscript{34}


\textsuperscript{33}Perry, \textit{The Approach to Philosophy}, p. 277.

\textsuperscript{34}Berkeley, op. cit., p. 249.
At this juncture Berkeley appears to be leaning toward the relativistic subjectivism of the Sophists. But, like Socrates, Berkeley avoids the Sophistic relativism by appealing to a universal. Berkeley's reasoning suggests that no object can exist except as it is perceived. However, finite mind is unable to perceive all the experience of man and all the phenomena of the universe. Here Berkeley presents his concept of a universal mind, which does perceive all the objects of experience. He writes:

When I conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that, seeing they depend not on my thought, and have an existence distinct from being perceived by me, there must be some other mind wherein they exist. As sure, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it.  

Berkeley has finally arrived at his metaphysical objective, that of proving by rational means the existence of God. However, the problems of the objective nature of knowledge persisted in philosophy. This problem, combined with the rise of empirical thinking, made Berkeley's system of thought untenable to most thinkers of the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century idealism was most commonly associated with Hegel.

Hegel is regarded as one of the great system builders of philosophy. His system of idealism does not stress the ultimate objectivity of ideas as found in Plato, nor does it make reality subjective, as in Berkeley. Rather Hegel tends

35 Berkeley, op. cit., p. 276.
to impersonalize reality while incorporating it into the natural process. For Hegel nature and mind, or reason, are one natural process. For Hegel nature and mind, or reason, are one, and further, being and reason are identical. The same process that is at work in reason is present everywhere, with the result that whatever is real is rational, and whatever is rational is real.\(^{36}\) This position of Hegel seems to imply that there is a logic in nature as well as in history and that the universe is basically a logical system. Reason, to Hegel, includes substance, power, and form, for he says:

Reason is Substance as well as Infinite Power; its own Infinite Material underlying all the natural and spiritual life which it originates, as also the Infinite Form—that which sets this Material in motion. . . . Reason is not so powerless as to be incapable of producing anything but a mere ideal, a mere intention—having its place outside reality, nobody knows where; something separate and abstract, in the heads of human beings. It is the infinite complex of things, their entire Essence and Truth.\(^{37}\)

In Hegel's thinking Reason supplied its own nourishment and was the object of its own operations. Not only was Reason, to Hegel, its own basis for existence, and absolute final aim, but it was also the energizing power realizing this aim, developing it not only in the phenomena of the Natural, but also of the Spiritual Universe—the History of the World.\(^{38}\)

This rationalism of Hegel makes the essence of reality

\(^{36}\)Thilly, op. cit., p. 463.


\(^{38}\)Ibid.
an organic whole and an organic process, a process of evolution. As Thilly interprets Hegel, every stage in the process contains all the preceding stages and foreshadows all the future ones, for the world at every stage is both a product and a prophecy, with all the lower forms both negated and included in the higher processes. It is the business of philosophy, according to Hegel, to study and to know the Reason which is the essence of reality. Since reality is at bottom rational, a necessary process of thoughts or notions, it can be known only by thought. The function of philosophy is to understand the laws or necessary forms according to which reason operates. Logic and metaphysics, to Hegel, would be one and the same.

As stated, to Hegel the world is not static but is an on-going process. Thought, reason, the Idea is something which advances by a process of evolution. This process of evolution is achieved by a dialectic in which the Idea advances to an infinite antithesis, and is described by Hegel as follows:

The universal Idea exists thus as the substantial totality of things on the one side, and as the abstract essence of free volition on the other. This reflection of the mind on itself is individual self-consciousness—the polar opposite of the Idea in its general form, and therefore existing in absolute Limitation. This polar opposite is consequently limitation, particularization, for the universal absolute being.

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40Ibid.  
41Hegel, op. cit., p. 72.  
42Ibid.
The idea of polarity as developed by Hegel implies that contradiction, or opposition, is the root of all life and movement, that the principle of contradiction rules the world, that everything tends to change, to pass over into its opposite. Conversely, without contradiction there would be no life, no movement, no growth, and no development. Concerning the principle of contradiction as the governing aspect of reality Hegel writes:

In actual existence Progress appears as an advancement from the imperfect to the more perfect. . . thus the imperfect, as involving its opposite is a contradiction, which certainly exists, but which is continually annulled and solved; the instinctive movement—the inherent impulse in the life of the soul.43

Hegel calls God Idea, meaning the potential universe, the timeless totality of all the possibilities of evolution.44

Hegel's organic idealism was widely accepted in the nineteenth century and was introduced into American education by William T. Harris. Most great systems of thought tend to undergo modification, or rejection, by succeeding generations. In the instance of the idealism of Hegel, the modification was the result of a shift to another form of idealism which was latent, but never developed, in Hegel's system. This new type of idealism is called Personalism.

The type of idealism represented by Personalism suggests that reality is a universal society of rational and free individuals.45 The fundamental thesis of Personalism can be

43Ibid., p. 108. 44Thilly, op. cit., p. 470.
45Muelder, op. cit., p. 214.
briefly stated. Werkmeister states that Personalism is an idealism which takes as its primary unit the individual in his highest expression as an ethical and religious personality. As a metaphysical theory it is the conception of reality as a world of persons with a supreme person at the head. Personality is in effect the primary idea, and nature is a derivative idea. Personalism is not only a world view held by individual thinkers; it is also a more or less definitely organized movement. At a meeting held in Philadelphia on December 26, 1940, the following theses were accepted as defining and outlining the personalistic doctrine:

I. Basic Definition

Personalism or "personism" is the philosophical theory that a person is (or many persons are) the supreme reality; i.e., highest in value and dominant in power.

II. Premises Underlying Personalism

1. There is experience. This is the one primordial and indubitable fact.
2. Experience has a discoverable meaning.

III. Principles of Personalism

1. The personistic principle: Every experience belongs to some self.
2. The empirical principle: All knowledge is an interpretation of experience by a self.
3. The presence of ideas in knowledge: What is present in knowledge is always conscious experience, referring beyond itself; no nonmental object is ever present.

Among the Personalistic thinkers Borden P. Bowne and Edgar S.

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47Ibid., p. 326.
Brightman are perhaps the most representative. Bowne expresses the idea that God is infinite and all other persons are finite. Brightman states that all persons, including God, are finite. First the position of Bowne is presented, then the concepts of Brightman.

Bowne structures his personalism on two ideas, the nature of knowledge and the notion of causality. Bowne states that all knowledge is based on some form of interaction between a person and a person, or between a person and a non-personal object. He explains his position in these words:

In all interaction between things the reaction is but an expression of the agent's own nature, for the manifestation of which other things but furnish the occasion. Hence the mental reaction which we call knowledge can be looked upon only as an expression of our mental nature according to principles immanent in itself.

Following the lead of Kant, Bowne states that knowledge is not something which can be imported ready-made into a passive mind, but something which the mind must actively construct for itself. He writes: "Thoughts are not things to be exchanged or handed along. They exist only through thinking, and to perceive another's thought is to think for ourselves." But thinking, according to Bowne, is impossible apart from personality. Regarding the relationship between experience in the sense world, the act of thinking, and personalism Bowne writes:

49 Ibid., p. 63. 50 Ibid., p. 65.
The world of experience exists for us only through a rational spiritual principle by which we reproduce it for our thought, and it has its existence apart from us only through a rational spiritual principle on which it depends, and the rational nature of which it expresses.51

A second foundational principle for Bowne's personalism is the concept of causality in the physical world. In Bowne's thinking the world may be considered from the standpoint of contents and meaning. However, to understand the contents and the meaning of the world there is the necessity of accepting the idea of causality, according to Bowne. In dealing with the concept of causality Bowne proceeds with the same method of reasoning that he applied to the concept of knowledge. To Bowne there are only two ways of interpreting the events of nature, the mechanical and the volitional.

The mechanical interpretation of nature, says Bowne, makes all events in nature groundless and all experience chaotic.52 In addition, all perceptions could never be related to a real world and would be only groundless phenomena in the individual consciousness. Nebulism is the result.53 He concludes, therefore, that the fact of causation cannot be eliminated from philosophy. And since causality cannot be eliminated, it must be rationally explained, for apart from intelligence final causality is preposterous.54

Bowne then rests his case for the necessity of personality by making active intelligence the basic fact of both

51 Ibid., p. 110. 52 Ibid., p. 164.
53 Ibid., p. 165. 54 Ibid., p. 181.
knowledge and causality and arrives at the following conclusion:

When we consider the world as an object of knowledge, we come to personalism as the only tenable view. When we consider it from the standpoint of causality, we come equally to personalism as the only tenable view. 55

American philosophers have been divided on Bowne's significance. He has been accused of substituting faith for reason, theology for philosophy. On the other hand, he has been cited as one of the keenest of American metaphysicians. 56

Another outstanding personalist is Edgar S. Brightman. To Brightman any interpretation of the real world must include and explain both particulars and universals. 57 Naturalism attempts to explain reality in terms of particulars, according to Brightman, by reducing particulars to solid objects existing in space or by reducing reality to states of consciousness, or sensations. 58 Idealism, says Brightman, err in regarding reality apart from all particulars, and in some instances, apart from mind. 59 Brightman rejects both materialism and idealism in these words:

Atomism makes reality granular, crummy, disjointed, with no real connections and laws; Platonic realism makes reality organic, connected and rational, but unfortunately provides no place for any particular facts or events. Personalism finds room both for particular facts or events. Personalism finds room both for particular facts and for universals; for it is the nature of mind to be an individual that universalizes. 60

58 Ibid. 59 Ibid., p. 138. 60 Ibid.
The underlying principle in the approach of Brightman is that reality is actually person, for he states: "The personalistic theory of substance may be summarized in the words 'substance is person.'" Edg G S. Brightman, Person and Reality (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1958), p. 199. This does not mean that every commonly "so-called" substance is a person. But substance is person in the sense of efficient final cause, or that all that is exists in a complex unity of active consciousness. With person as substance and substance as person, in a greater or lesser degree the philosophy of personalism is able, according to Brightman, to combine all phases of experience with purposeful efficient causation in an all inclusive and intelligent system.62

Four types of idealism have been discussed in this chapter. These classes of idealism are Objective Idealism, Subjective Idealism, Organic Idealism, and Personalism. The common feature of all four types is that reality can be defined in terms of mind or spirit. Having discussed the various types of idealism, the study attempts to discuss some concepts of idealism which appear to be relevant to educational philosophy.

Concepts of Idealism

For the purposes of this thesis it seems advisable to discuss three areas of idealistic philosophy, namely idealistic

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62Ibid., p. 208.
epistemology, idealistic axiology, and the idealistic concept of self-hood. Idealistic metaphysics is not included in the following discussion because it was treated at length in the previous pages. The first concept of idealism to be discussed is idealistic epistemology.

The one common feature of the various schools of idealism is that reason is the instrument of achieving a knowledge of reality. The avenue to knowledge is not, as Protagoras maintains, the natural and individual element (the pig) in man, but the universal (the god) within him, the reason, that is the measure of all things. Plato always emphasized the antithesis of opinion and knowledge as against the falseness of opinion. Plato bluntly states that all other wisdom except wisdom of contemplation, or reason, is misleading, for he writes: "All other kinds of wisdom or cunning, which seem only, such as the wisdom of politicians, or the wisdom of the arts, are coarse and vulgar." Knowledge does not come from the sense world according to Plato in "Theaetetus," for the purpose of the dialogue is to examine and reject the claim that the sense-world can furnish knowledge.

To Plato there is no sure and easy pathway to truth. The only pathway goes through the arduous exercise of the

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individual intellect in a Socratic dialectic, examining and sifting the relevant evidence. Only then is it possible to see truth. The individual intellect alone is the test of truth. The essence of the dialectical method of arriving at truth is the dialogue, which is the habit of seeking truth by means of question and answer. Walter Pater describes the Platonic dialogue in these words:

. . . a dialogue concerning those first principles, or "universal definitions," or notions, those ideas which, according to Plato, are the proper objects of all real knowledge: . . . Justice, Beauty, Perfect Polity, and the like, in outlines of eternal and absolute certainty; --they were to be apprehended by dialectic, literally by a circuitous journey, presented by Platonic dialogues in its most accomplished literary form. 66

The Platonic dialogue entitled the "Theaetetus" is entirely devoted to the question, what is knowledge? The dialogue is divided into two parts. In the first part the idea is developed that sensation, though an element in knowledge is not knowledge itself. In Part I of the "Theaetetus" Plato emphasizes the idea that the senses cannot perform acts of comparison and judgment. 67 Neither is true knowledge to be confused with opinion, or mere judgment. In Part III of the "Theaetetus" Plato draws his conclusion regarding knowledge in these words:

Socr. yes; and when we are inquiring after the nature of knowledge, nothing could be sillier than to say that it is correct belief together with a knowledge of difference or of anything whatever. So Theaetetus,


67"Theaetetus," Part I, 184 D.
neither perception, nor ture belief, nor the addition of an 'account' to true belief can be knowledge.68

A noted Plato scholar, Francis M. Cornford, states that from the discussion in the "Theaetetus" the Platonist will draw the necessary inference. True knowledge has for its object things of a different order—-not sensible things, but intelligible forms and truths about them. Such objects are necessarily unique. They do not become and perish or change in any respect. Hence we can know them and eternal truths about them.69

Immanuel Kant is another important contributor to the concept of knowledge as held by idealists. Immanuel Kant, as described by Hoernle, was a critical idealist who virtually ignored metaphysics and attempted to establish philosophy as a system of knowledge.70 In Kant's analysis of knowledge he described the following aspects of the process of knowing:

(1) pure sensation was a chaotic process in which all kinds of sensory stimulations are passively received by mind; (2) the chaos of sensation is resolved into orderliness by the two categories of perception, space and time, which group sensory qualities into objects and events; (3) further unity of a conceptual and ideational sort is achieved by such rational categories of the mind as the need for linking causes and

68"Theaetetus," Part III, 210 B.


effects, et cetera. An act of knowledge is thus an act of judgment. An act of judgment is an act of synthesis. An act of synthesis implies a principle of synthesis. Hoernle summarizes Kant's approach as follows:

... nature is not a mere stream of sense-data, but a world, a system, a whole ordered according to laws, it is not in virtue of mere seeing or hearing or touching that we thus know nature, but in virtue of acts of judgment affirming the universal relations in which sense-data stand to each other.

While Kant's approach appeared to solve the problem of a common-sense knowledge of nature, its great weakness to idealists was its inability to find a self or mind behind the phenomenal world. The critical idealism of Kant has been described as a half-way house in which it is always possible to retire, but in which it is impossible to stop or to hide. Its ultimate significance was that it formulated explicitly the ideal of synthetic philosophy which found its logical fulfillment in Hegel's absolute Idealism.

Hegel seems to have in mind Kant's idea of knowledge as an act of judgment when he says:

The easiest thing of all is to pass judgments on what has a solid substantial content; it is more difficult to do both together and produce the systematic exposition of it.

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71 Butler, op. cit., p. 183.
72 Hoernle, op. cit., p. 184.
73 Ibid., p. 307.
Hegel's system of interpreting the world is to regard the world as a rational system defined in terms of the absolute. Reason, to Hegel, is the sovereign of the world. The history of the world presents a rational process. In an exalted concept of reason as the Absolute reality Hegel writes:

On the one hand, Reason is the substance of the Universe; viz. that by which and in which all reality has its being and subsistence. On the other hand, it is the Infinite Energy of the Universe. . . . It is the infinite complex of things, their entire Essence and Truth.75

By philosophical reflection Hegel brought the entire realm of human experience and the total history of the world into a rational system which could be understood through the processes of dialectical logic.

While later philosophical idealists either modified or rejected the Hegelian dialectic, the one great contribution of Hegel is that reality is apprehended by reason. Later idealists such as Mary W. Calkins, J. E. Creighton, Josiah Royce, Borden P. Bourne and Edgar S. Brightman carried Hegel's philosophy a step further, even as Hegel had expanded Kant's concept of knowledge to its inevitable conclusion. It was a normal sequence from Kant's idea of knowledge as an act of judgment to Hegel's principle that any act of judgment necessarily involves reason, and that Reason, or the Rational Process, is the Absolute. Similarly, it was a normal sequence from Hegel's rational Absolute to Personalism, or the necessity

75Hegel, op. cit., p. 52.
of self-hood as a basis for rationality and purpose. In regard to its impact upon educational philosophy the idealistic approach consistently supported the primacy of reason as the instrument of knowledge, along with the secondary idea that self-hood is essential to rationality and purpose.

The essence of idealism as a philosophy is that significant structures of intellectual apprehension are objectively real. Idealism is particularly dependent upon an acceptable theory of values. It seems necessary to discuss three aspects of idealistic axiology, namely, the autonomy of values, the reality of self-hood, and the mental nature of value.

Idealism has traditionally asserted that there are certain values embedded in the structure of the universe and that the validity or worthfulness of these values does not depend upon the mere existence of any fact or situation whatsoever. From the idealist point of view, certain values remain significant and valid because their worth is intrinsic and is not borrowed from any prior existing situations. In referring to the independent existence of values, Adams remarks:

> We are to understand by an objective good, an autonomous value, something which is coincident neither with any external matter-of-fact situation or decree, nor with psychological matter of fact, such as desire, pleasure, or feelings of approval.76

> If ideals exist independently, they cannot be directly related to factual results, or to the dictates of an actual

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sovereign, or to God, or to civil power. The autonomy of ideals suggests that the idea of value as conformity to the laws of nature is untrue. For while values are embedded in the structure of the universe, they cannot be identified with natural processes.

Many idealists also reject the concept that values are related to obedience to the decrees of God. It follows that values to be objectively existent cannot depend upon individual desires or wishes, for when a value depends upon individual desire or preference, it has become subjective, which is a denial of its objective status.

Another idea involved in idealistic axiology is that values are of necessity related to self-hood, or to personality. Wilbur Urban, a leading exponent of idealistic axiology, has stated in positive terms the relationship of personality and values:

I hold that there can be no existence without value and no value without existence. Reality is neither mental or material, but a realm in which thought and thing, fact and value, are inseparable.

In his discussion of values Donald Butler has pointed out that there may be an apparent contradiction between the idea of the autonomy of values and the relationships of values to individual self-hood. The problem, as Butler sees it, is to accept a concept of valuational autonomy which does not

77Ibid., p. 144.

destroy the reality and the uniqueness of individuals. Butler suggests that a synthesis is possible by regarding values as rooted in existence while at the same time believing that the principles of individuality and value are closely identified. 79 Butler, accepting, at this point, Berkeley's epistemology, explains the possible harmony of autonomous values and individuality in these words:

Value exists only for the individual person when he works out those adjustments which realize value for him and when he has the emotional experience which is the enjoyment of value. However, God exists, and in Him all value resides, in Him is that perfection in which all possible positive values are fully realized and enjoyed. 80

Value, in idealism, originates beyond itself. The supreme concern of idealism is, according to N. K. Smith, to show that esthetic and spiritual values have more than a merely human significance. 81 However, values have significance only in relation to that aspect of reality known as the self.

According to Brightman, there is no single, consistent doctrine of the self which is shared by all idealists. 82 However, there are four propositions which conspicuous idealists have held. The propositions are: (1) The self is a system (organic); (2) The self is a self-existent

79 Butler, op. cit., cf. 196-197.

80 Ibid., p. 197.


unity (monadic); (3) The self is conscious experience
(mentalistic); and (4) The self is active (activistic).\textsuperscript{83}

To state that the self is organic means that every
phase and every experience of the self is so interrelated with
every other self, and with every other event in nature, that
no single experience can be understood until it is inter-
preted in the light of its relation to the organic whole.
Hegel describes the organic nature of reality, and of the
self, in an all-inclusive concept:

\ldots the universe is a single spirit, of whom or of
which all appearances are manifestations; that all its
manifestations fall within a single experience, compact
of experience; that all of its life and activity, and
that outside this living experience there can be
nothing.\textsuperscript{84}

The philosophy of idealism also regards the self as a
self-existent unity. A "thing," in contrast to a "self,"
appears to be made up of separable parts which enjoy an inde-
pendent existence both before and after their organization
into the object called a thing. But the parts of a self exist
only in the organic unity of the experience of the self to
which they belong.\textsuperscript{85} Regarding the unique nature of the self
Brightman comments:

Each self, then, is a unique unity, a unit that exists
only for itself and shares its immediate existence with
no other self, although experience shows that it knows
and communicates with many other selves.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{83}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 172.

\textsuperscript{84}Quoted by Hoernle, \textit{Idealism as a Philosophy}, p. 261.

\textsuperscript{85}Brightman, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 173.

\textsuperscript{86}\textit{Ibid.}
Conscious experience, or self-consciousness, is another feature of the idealistic concept of the self. In traditional and scholastic thinking consciousness was frequently attributed to the existence of a soul, either substantial or spiritual. Berkeley, as indicated earlier, conceived of mind as a center of bare activities. Kant regarded mind as the focal point of the categories essential in knowledge and in conduct, according to moral law. Hegel regarded mind as a focus in which objects meet. The one common feature of the mentalistic concept of mind is that consciousness exists only as a self, so that to be conscious means to be a self, or conversely, selfhood consists of conscious experience.

A final quality in the idealistic interpretation of the self is the concept of mind as activity. According to Brightman, idealists have generally opposed the view that the mind is a tabula rasa and have been critical of all theories which have emphasized the passivity of the self in relation to the learning process. Hoernle describes several aspects of mental activity. The basic aspect of mental activity is perceiving, as suggested by Berkeley. Another insight into the nature of mental activity, according to idealism, is the idea of Kant that all knowledge is thinking, in the sense of judging, and that judging is a synthetic activity possible only in a state of self-consciousness. A third

87 Ibid., p. 175. 88 Hoernle, op. cit., pp. 238-239.
quality involved in mental activity is the discovery, or the acceptance, of universal principles. Finally, idealistic mental activity is possible only when the self relates the whole of individual experience to the particular problem or event undergoing analysis.

Individual self-hood, involving self-conscious experience, is a cardinal principle of idealism. Because of the variety of approaches to idealism, there is no widely accepted concept of the nature of human nature with reference to natural depravity. Generally, idealism has held to an optimistic interpretation of human nature, regarding the development of rational powers as the major method of improving man.

**Idealism In Education**

Idealism appears to have exerted a profound influence on educational theory from the time of Plato. Following Plato the idealistic approach to education was incorporated into Christianity and was an educational bulwark for centuries. At the beginning of the twentieth century idealism was strongly entrenched in American thought, but rapidly gave way to naturalism.

Plato described two kinds of education. The first was education for practical affairs, received by the craftsmen and business classes. The second was education for service to the state. The first aims at the acquisition of wealth or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from intelligence
and justice. The second is the only real and genuine education which makes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship, and teaches him to rule and to obey rightly. Plato accepted the definition of education which was generally accepted in his day. A famous passage from the Laws states Plato’s definition of education:

Now, I mean by education that training which is given by suitable habits to the first instincts of virtue in children; when pleasure and friendship, and pain, and hatred, are rightly implanted in souls not yet capable of understanding the nature of them, and who find them, after they have attained reason, to be in harmony with her. This harmony of the soul, taken as a whole is virtue; but the particular training in respect of pleasure and pain, which leads you always to hate what you ought to hate, and love what you ought to love, from the beginning of life to the end, may be separated off; and, in my view, will be rightly called education.

In this definition Plato defined education as that training which is in full harmony with the rational life when it appears.

The first objective of education, according to Plato, was state unity, or social cohesiveness. The relation that education should foster between the state and the individual is expressed in the following statement:

For every physician and every skilled artist does all things for the sake of the whole, directing his effort toward the common good, executing the part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part.

90 Ibid., 653.
91 Ibid., 903.
A second and more important objective of education in Plato's thought was to establish the rule of reason in the growing life of the child.\textsuperscript{92} Reason is potentially present in the soul of the child. To exalt the intellect above the sensibilities and the soul above the body, by awakening the rational faculty, is the most distinctive work of education.\textsuperscript{93}

The idealistic emphasis of the philosophy of Plato was adopted, to a large extent, by Stoicism.\textsuperscript{94} Stoicism served as a religion as well as a philosophy, for it gave man armor when the world was predominantly evil, and it encouraged him forward when the world was predominantly good.\textsuperscript{95} It thus was important in preserving the idealistic tradition until idealism was integrated into Christianity.

The Christian interpretation of life is basically idealistic in its outlook although there are Christian realists and Christian existentialists. The nature of personality, as represented in the doctrine of the Trinity and in man as a subject of the creative power of God and as an object of redemptive concern, of necessity reflects an idealistic philosophy. So specific and pronounced are the historic concepts of Christian thought that it appears unnecessary for this

\textsuperscript{92}Plato, "Republic," 590.
\textsuperscript{93}Ibid.
study to discuss or to elaborate the stress on idealistic philosophy as an aspect of the Christian faith. However, since the seventeenth-century colonists in America were children of the Reformation, it is important to introduce the educational thinking stemming from the religious controversy known as the Reformation.

With his conception of the spiritual priesthood of all believers, it was logical for Luther to regard the educational system of the church as antiquated and insufficient. In 1516, several years before his final break with the established church, Luther stressed the importance of education. In an emotional appeal Luther remarks:

O how unjustly we deal with these poor young people who are committed to us for direction and instruction! We must give a terrible accounting for our neglect to set the word of God before them.

But it was not until 1524 that he addressed his appeal to the councilmen of all German cities, urging them to establish and to maintain schools. Among the outstanding features of the educational program suggested by Luther in his appeal to the councilmen, several are noted as important contributions to educational practice and theory. Luther regarded the establishment and the support of adequate schools as one of the most important obligations of the secular authorities, for he asks:


97 Martin Luther, Works of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1931), II, 151.
If it is necessary, dear sirs, to expend annually such great sums for fire arms, bridges, dams, and countless similar items, in order that a city may enjoy temporal peace and prosperity, why should not at least as much be devoted to the poor, needy youth, so that we might engage one or two competent men to teach school?98

Though Luther has in view primarily the Latin or higher schools, he does not ignore the necessity of common or public schools, and he desires that girls as well as boys be educated.99 There is even the suggestion of compulsory education, and the proposal of free scholarships for advanced pupils. The popular objections to education are stated and rejected with the determination of a reformer and the conciseness of a trained schoolman. Though the religious motive is dominant, and largely determines the curriculum suggested, Luther is emphatic regarding the civic, social and cultural benefits derived from a liberal education. Referring to the ecclesiastical schools as purgatories in which pupils were tormented with cases and tenses, Luther advocated an approach which affords pleasure in learning.100

Luther not only requested the civil authorities to establish schools, but he also advised the parents to cooperate in the educational program by keeping their children in school:

Therefore I hope that the citizens will acknowledge the fidelity and the love of their lords by keeping their children in school and honestly helping to support this work, because they see that, without cost to themselves,

98Ibid., IV, 106.  99Ibid., II, 152.  100Ibid., 123.
their children are so richly and diligently cared for and that everything is provided for them.\textsuperscript{101}

Because of his comprehensive program of public education Luther is often referred to as one of the most influential men in the history of educational theory and practice.

In addition to Luther the Reformation era produced, among others, Philip Melancthan, who introduced a detailed plan for a school system as well as several widely-used textbooks, and John Sturm, the organizing genius of Christian Humanism in Northern Europe. In establishing the classical gymnasium Sturm attempted to realize three educational aims: piety, knowledge, and the art of speaking.

When, after the Reformation, the philosophy of idealism united with practical Christianity, it became in most instances a kind of religious moralism. Education, after the Reformation, was regarded by most Protestants as an ideal which would prepare Christian men and women to discharge any and all duties. Brubacher summarizes the combination of philosophical idealism and religious morality in these words:

They realized the close interdependence of character and religion, and advocated an education that would develop physical, mental, and moral powers to bring about not only personal salvation but the moral regeneration of society. Religion, morality, and education were to be man's major interests, the "fixities and verities" of life; and they deemed it impossible to consider them separately.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{101}Ibid., p. 137.

Since the religious motive was a predominant aspect of the settlement of the United States, it was natural that the combination of philosophical idealism and religious moralism should exert a powerful influence on the educational philosophy of the American school. The following chapter attempts to present a representative analysis of the impact of idealism on American education, as well as the increasingly powerful challenge of naturalistic thought to American educational philosophy between 1860-1960.
CHAPTER IV

PRACTICAL IDEALISM VERSUS SCIENTIFIC

UTILITARIANISM

Among the most persistent problems in the history of higher education in the United States is the question of whether the college should retain its religious functions and aims or should it become an increasingly secular and non-sectarian institution. It seems desirable, therefore, to attempt a study of differences that existed between naturalism and idealism as they were expressed in educational practice and theory after 1860. Following the survey of historical differences between these two schools of thought, an endeavor will be made to narrow the discussion to two representative thinkers: John Dewey, a naturalist, and Herman H. Horne, an idealist. The purpose of this chapter is to relate the tension, or the interaction, between naturalism and idealism in American educational thought in the century under consideration to three phases, or areas, of discussion.

After 1860 an area of tension between idealism and naturalism centered about the struggle between practical

religious idealism and technical, utilitarian naturalism. The second area of tension between the philosophies of idealism and naturalism seemed to exist in the interrelated areas of curricular development. The third and final aspect of the tension between idealism and naturalism is reflected in two opposing philosophical approaches, rational idealism and pragmatic naturalism.

**Religious Idealism Versus Scientific Utilitarianism**

The dissension in educational philosophy in America between 1860 and 1960 was not only intense, but also far-reaching. In the early years of the period the traditional, denominational college seemed to dominate the scene, and by contrast during the latter years the secular university had effectively challenged and, to a great degree, had supplanted the religious institution as the leader of educational philosophy in the United States. The challenge of the secular university to the religious college became the academic battleground of the nineteenth century. However, the battle was more frequently fought on the practical rather than on the theoretical or the philosophical level.

The underlying reason for the practical nature of the struggle between religious idealism and scientific utilitarianism is two-fold. First the religious institutions were as diverse as the groups which sponsored them. The denominations were usually motivated by the practical aims and
objectives which tended to degenerate into factional rivalry. Regarding this frequent rivalry among the religious bodies one historian made the following comment: "Colleges came in many cases to be regarded as the agents of a type of denominational imperialism, and as a means of sectarian aggrandizement and aggression.\(^2\) Because of their diversity and due to their practical nature the religious institutions failed to develop a comprehensive philosophy of education to sustain their colleges. On the other hand the universities that were established after 1860 were founded along the lines of the University of Michigan which was organized to meet the apparent practical needs and the diverse interests of social groups and of non-sectarian intellectual leaders. Because of its utilitarian nature the university was late in developing an educational philosophy that was in harmony with its inherent structure. Since neither the traditional colleges nor the universities had formulated adequate philosophies of education, the tension between the two types of institutions of necessity had to be expressed in practical terms.

In light of the tension between religious idealism and scientific, secular utilitarianism it is essential to discuss three aspects of the problem. First, it is necessary to give a brief resume of the historic development of the religious college, accompanied by representative statements of

its objectives. Also included in the survey is an evaluation of the weaknesses which developed in the denominational institutions which made them susceptible to attack by secular interests. Second, it appears necessary that a similar historical sketch be presented depicting the rise of the utilitarian university, including an evaluation of its objectives and of its weaknesses. Finally, it may be assumed that supporters and champions of both religious idealism and scientific utilitarianism should be allowed to speak, thus indicating the reality of the tension between the two opposing concepts of education in the years between 1860 and 1890.

Fortunately for the development of American education, the leaders of the earliest settlers were favorably inclined to intellectual pursuits. So, a few years after the Puritans had founded the town of Boston, the General Court of Massachusetts Bay Colony casually passed the legislative act that founded Harvard College. Samuel Eliot Morison, official historian of Harvard University, describes the legislation in a concise statement:

... and finally, almost at the end of a heavy day's business, the Court passed the legislative act that founded Harvard College: The Court agreed to give 400 pounds toward a school or college, hereof 200 pounds to be paid the next year, and 200 pounds when the work is finished, and the next Court to appoint where and what building.\(^3\)

Referring to the passing of this piece of legislation a

contemporary writer states:

This simple enactment marked the beginning of the institution which three years later was given the name Harvard College, and which was destined to become the forerunner not only of the eight-hundred-odd liberal arts colleges existing independently today . . . but also indirectly of the hundreds of technical and professional schools, which together are presently dispensing higher education to three million Americans.¹

During the early colonial period, from 1620-1701, the religious pattern of thought was dominant, particularly among the civic and the academic leaders. Under the auspices of the Congregational Church in New England and of the Anglican Church in the South, the three earliest of American colleges were established. Harvard (1636) and Yale (1701) were founded by Congregational interests. William and Mary was founded in Virginia (1693) by the Anglican Church, primarily, but not solely, to meet the need for an educated ministry.² During the eighteenth century the religious revival which was called the "Great Awakening," along with the intellectual awakening that followed, a demand for additional colleges was created by denominational interests. Six other denominational colleges were founded within a quarter of a century. Four of these colleges were regarded as "nurseries of ministers," while two were indirectly influenced by religious activity and by religious sentiment.

The College of New Jersey, which later became Princeton University, was founded by the Presbyterians Church, 1746;

²Tewksbury, op. cit., p. 58.
Dartmouth College by the Congregational Church, 1769; Rutgers University by the Dutch Reformed Church, 1766; Brown University by the Baptist Church, 1764; and Kings College, later to become Columbia University, was founded in cooperation with the Anglican Church in 1754. The Anglican Church was also instrumental in the origin, in 1753, of the College of Philadelphia, which in later centuries became known as the University of Pennsylvania. 6

In the light of this brief resume of the Colonial period it seems apparent that all colonial colleges were founded more or less as a direct result of church activity, and were dedicated almost entirely to the propagation of traditional forms of religious culture. Regarding the founding of the early colleges one historian has observed: "Education in colonial America was the child of religion." 7 Moreover, with the possible exception of Columbia University and of the University of Pennsylvania, all the colonial colleges were designed primarily, but not solely, as institutions for the education of ministers. In addition to the ministerial curriculum provision was also made for study in medicine and in law.

In the nineteenth century, the establishment of colleges by denominational interests increased prolifically. Following the growing secularism of the late eighteenth and

6Ibid., p. 59.

the early nineteenth centuries the Religious Revival, sometimes called "the Second Great Awakening" paralleled the common school movement and the renewed migration to the West.

The nineteenth century was thus a period in which denominations and religious sects multiplied rapidly in the United States. Each religious group established schools peculiar to its individual beliefs and doctrines in order to develop leaders in a short period of time and to expand the group numerically. Describing the intense rivalry among religious groups in starting schools immediately prior to the Civil War one observer reported:

There has arisen within a few years an earnest, not to say, violent competition among several religious denominations in respect to educational arrangements. Each denomination seems anxious to outdo the other in the number of colleges and schools.8

Of the two hundred and forty-six colleges founded before the Civil War, only seventeen were state sponsored and only three were independent.9 Of five hundred and eighty-eight institutions of higher learning created between 1653 and 1915, four hundred and ninety-two were founded by religious groups and ninety-six by the state. In other words, religious groups created eighty-two per cent of the colleges, univer-


sites and technical schools in this period. 10

While religious motives seemed to be paramount in the development of early American life, the secular motive was ever present in the colonies. The presence of conflicting religious and secular motives in colonial culture provided the rationale for the Great Awakening and for the Great Revival of 1800. But by 1860 it was evident that the earlier religious motives were losing in the struggle against secularism, which was gaining strength from many sources, such as the growth of industrialism, and of scientism. The increased strength of secularistic concepts after 1860 was reflected in education.

Having its source in a utilitarian concept of life and in a naturalistic philosophy, a secular concept of education arose which threatened to engulf, for a period, the educational framework of America. The secular concept of education is embodied in the university ideal. With the expansion of non-religious colleges and universities the tension between idealism and naturalism became more pronounced. The rise of the university is thus the next area of study to be considered.

The great era of the founding of state universities came after the Civil War. Before the Civil War, education was

almost exclusively the function of the various denominations,
although the University of Virginia, established in 1825,
attempted to present a pattern of non-sectarian education.
Of the fifteen religious denominations interested in higher
education in the pre-Civil War period the most active were
the Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists,
Roman Catholics and Episcopalians. Among these groups one
hundred and sixteen out of the one hundred and eighty-two
permanent colleges were established before 1861.\textsuperscript{11} The
opposition of these groups to the rise of universities was
vigorouss, according to Freeman Butts. He states that religious
groups waged a continuing battle to prevent the passage of
laws establishing these schools and attempted to divert funds
earmarked for the universities to religious purposes.\textsuperscript{12}

However, the changing culture in the United States
appeared to make the rise of the university inevitable. A
plurality of causes existed which were favorable to the growth
of the independent state university. These causes are to a
great extent interrelated and any separation of the causes
may appear to be arbitrary. But clarity of presentation seems
to demand such a distinction.

The first cause for the rise of the university may
have been the weaknesses within the church colleges, which
led to the failure of traditional education to appraise

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Butts, op. cit.}, p. 226.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 227.
properly the problems stemming from the social ferment of the post-Civil War period. A stimulus toward university growth originated with the utilitarian demands for the incorporation of new fields of knowledge such as science and modern languages into the curriculum in order to serve the requirements of an expanding society. Government legislation granting state schools favorable economic assistance was also a prime factor in the expansion of the university. The impact of state-supported German universities also afforded a powerful thrust to the university ideal, as did the inauguration of the elective system in many schools. The theory of evolution offered a framework within which the new academic outlook could express itself, especially in the area of psychology and in the natural sciences. Finally, the gradual acceptance in America of a pragmatic philosophy strengthened the cause for the secular university. Each of these contributing factors is considered briefly.

When most of the older colleges and religious leaders failed to respond adequately to the demands of the more practical and scientific age after the Civil War, the educational initiative passed into the hands of those who were intensely concerned with the establishment of universities. Referring to the attitude of traditional educators toward social changes after 1860 one historian has said: "Educators after the Civil War exhibited no great sensitivity to the forces that were transforming American life, and they failed
to appraise correctly the social conflicts of their day."^13

The refusal of the traditional college to adjust to
the new culture found classic expression in the Western
Review of Cincinnati in 1820 in the following statement:

Should the time ever come when Latin and Greek should
be banished from our universities, and the study of
Cicero and Demosthenes, of Homer and Virgil, should be
considered as unnecessary for the formation of a
scholar, we should regard mankind as fast sinking into
absolute barbarism, and the gloom of mental darkness
as likely to increase until it should become uni­
versal.14

With a static curriculum, the religious school had little
hope of gaining widespread public support. According to
another writer the sectarian activities of the denominations
and the privileged positions which some of them insisted upon
brought down upon the Church a measure of discredit and
diverted the energies of many educated men to secular idealism.15

Public interest in the establishment of state-
supported college received a new stimulus from the Morrill
Act of 1862. By the Morrill Act the federal government
donated public lands, or land-script, to those states which
would use the proceeds from their sale for the support of at
least one college where the leading objective would be to teach
such branches of learning as were directly related to agri-
culture and the mechanical arts. The Morrill Act reflected

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^13Newton Edwards and Herman Richey, The School in
the American Social Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,

^14Butts, op. cit., p. 226.

the growing demand throughout the country that colleges should expand beyond the limited and rigid classical curriculum.  

With the financial assistance gained from the passage of the Morrill Act, new universities were founded and older ones expanded. One half of the schools now classified as universities appeared subsequent to 1865, and one half of the colleges were started after 1875. Since the universities which received state or federal assistance were under obligation to meet the demands of society, it would be natural for such institutions to become the servant of the state. In becoming the servant of the state, and by accepting its role as a utilitarian institution, the university increased the tension between idealism and naturalism in education.

As the colleges had been based upon transplanted English conceptions, the state institutions were molded largely on the pattern of German universities, with their emphasis on pure research; their ideal of academic freedom was completely free from sectarian influence; and in their concept of service to the state, the German universities had taken a commanding position among the universities of Europe. Since


American universities offered little in the way of graduate work immediately following the Civil War, many American scholars went to Germany to pursue their graduate studies. Referring to the influence of German education on the American university one writer states the following:

All the great architects of the American university, from Ticknor to Gilman, White, Woolsey, and Hall, had been profoundly influenced by direct observation of the universities of Germany. One of the great pioneers of the university idea before the Civil War, Henry P. Tappan, had attempted during his presidency of the University of Michigan to follow the German model in the most direct way.18

As a result of the influence of German methods of research and of the renewed attempts to apply scientific methods to other fields of knowledge besides the natural sciences, the curriculum of the universities, by the beginning of the twentieth century, had been expanded enormously by the addition of such new sciences as those of language and philology, history, economics, politics, sociology, anthropology, archeology, music, psychology, education and religion.19

The most notable attempt to organize a state university after the German model, prior to 1876, when Johns Hopkins University was established was the attempt made by Henry P. Tappan during his presidency of the University of Michigan. Tappan, installed as president in 1852, introduced many fea-

18Hofstadter, op. cit., p. 62.
19Butts, op. cit., p. 162.
tures of the German university into the program at Michigan. Among these innovations were the addition of a science curriculum leading to the degree of Bachelor of Science, the introduction of the lecture system as a replacement for textbook recitation, the inauguration of co-education and the abolition of college dormitories. While Tappan did not achieve all his aims, he did make the University of Michigan a model of educational vigor.

One of the greatest sources of tension between private, sectarian schools and public colleges resulted from the "Dartmouth College case," in which the state of New Hampshire sought to reorganize the college as Dartmouth University. Since Dartmouth College had been organized in 1769 as a school to promote missionary work among the Indians, it was regarded by its trustees as a private, denominational college. The case was first argued in the courts of New Hampshire, where the trustees lost their case. But when the trustees carried the case to the Supreme Court of the United States the decision was reversed by Chief Justice Marshall in 1819. The Dartmouth case established the right of a private college to retain its status, but it also increased the tension between private and secular interests.

Another source of tension between idealism and naturalism in the years between 1860 and 1960 was the increasing

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impact of the theory of evolution on scientific and educational thought. From the time when *Origin of Species* appeared in 1859, the theories of natural selection and mutability of the species created widespread interest in scientific investigation. These same theories also engendered bitter controversies in the intellectual atmosphere of the later nineteenth century. The most significant impact of the theory of evolution was upon the traditional, idealistic concepts of the origin of the universe and of life. Led by men like Herbert Spencer, the evolutionary premise was applied to the academic areas of ethics, politics, history, economics, and the social life in general. The resulting intellectual conflict is described in these words:

... the authority of religion was challenged in the intellectual field, and the authority of the religiously sponsored liberal education of a classical and linguistic kind was bound to be challenged by scientific studies that clamored for a place of dignity in liberal education.21

Running parallel to the growth of the university was the rapid expansion of denominational colleges. With both types of institutions, the state and the independent university, and the sectarian college, manifesting vigor and strength, it would be normal that tension between the two would become sharp. This tension between idealism and naturalism was expressed in various ways. Referring to the opposition between the two philosophies in Michigan, Andrew

21Butts, op. cit., p. 163.
D. White writes:

... the worst difficulty by far was the steady opposition of the small sectarian colleges scattered throughout the state. Each, in its own petty interest, dreaded the growth of any institution better than itself; each in its religious assemblages, its synods, or conferences sought to stir prejudice against the state institution as "godless."  

Similar opposition occurred when a bill was introduced to the New York State Legislature to establish a university at Ithaca, New York. The first president describes the uproar caused by the introduction of the bill as follows:

The introduction of this new bill into the legislature was a signal for war. Nearly all the denominational colleges girded themselves for the fray, and sent their agents to fight us at Albany; they also stirred up the secular press, without distinction of party... and also the religious organs of their various sects in the great cities.  

President White continues:

... the struggle for our university charter was long and severe. The opposition of our twenty sectarian colleges, and of active politicians, from every quarter of the state where there colleges had been established, made our work difficult.  

Religious interests did not confine their opposition only to the legislative halls and to the printed page, but in many instances, they carried the battle to the campus itself. At Ohio State, for example, the religious struggle was directly involved in the resignation of two of its presidents, Edward Orton in 1880 and Walter Q. Scott in 1883. In a dis-

\[22\] White, op. cit., p. 279.
\[23\] Ibid., p. 334.
\[24\] Ibid., p. 334.
cussion of this resignation a student in the history of the university writes that:

One of the causes of President Orton's resignation and one which does not appear on the official records was that he was not in sympathy with those who believed that some sort of religious exercises should be held daily at the college. . . . Holding these sentiments he could not consistently and conscientiously conduct the usual chapel exercises common in other colleges.25

President Orton remained adamant, never conducting chapel services during his term.

It was largely with a view of allying the opposition of religious groups that President Orton's successor was chosen. The new president was the Rev. Walter Q. Scott, a Methodist minister from Easton, Pennsylvania. A short time before his election in 1881 a resolution was passed by the trustees which stated: "Resolved, that the President and the Faculty are hereby instructed to arrange for holding daily a general meeting of the students in the university chapel."26

The neglect of the new president to provide for the daily assemblage of the students resulted in a further resolution calling attention to the failure, with added recommendation that reading the Scriptures and prayers become part of the daily services. In November, 1882, the Board of Regents expressed its surprise that no action had been taken to carry out their instructions. The following March still

25Cope, op. cit., p. 76.
26Ibid., p. 77.
another such resolution was directed to the president. Scott failed to comply, and at the June meeting of the board he was not re-elected as president. 27

The chapel situation at Ohio State was a source of agitation for several years after Scott's dismissal. When William O. Thompson was elected to presidency in 1899, he immediately recommended that daily chapel services be discontinued and that a weekly convocation of students and faculty be held to occupy one recitation period. 28 The recommendation was accepted, ending a longer and bitter controversy.

Another area in which religious groups exerted pressure on the state universities was in the selection of faculty members. This issue was particularly crucial during the administration of Henry Tappan at the University of Michigan. When Tappan reacted indifferently to their demands the clergy took action, which one writer described in these words: "... the clergy were letter writers and lobbyists who kept the regents in ferment over Dr. Tappan's alleged indifference to their demands." 29 The assaults of the clergy had little effect on Tappan, with his Prussian idea of education. With austere dignity Tappan replied to the demands of sectarian groups regarding professorships:

27 Ibid., p. 78.  
28 Ibid., p. 298.  
the idea which has prevailed in the university
that the professorships should be decided with some
equality and fairness among different denominations
was entirely a wrong one; the only proper tests for
fitness being neither political bias nor sectarian
affiliations, but simply good character and intel-
lectual superiority.30

Indiana University, founded in 1820, also experienced sec-
tarian controversies during its early history. Members of the
Presbyterian and Methodist denominations, in particular,
struggled to dominate the selection of faculty members.31

In reviewing the handicaps of the university, eighty years
after its founding, one writer refers to the following handi-
cap:

...it was hampered by the antagonisms of religious
sects, whose adverse influence was seen sometimes in
the management of the institution, but more often in
the unkind and uncalled for opposition to its manage-
ment and interests.32

By the end of the nineteenth century the religious
interests had definitely lost their fight to influence or to
control the universities. The reasons for the emerging in-
dependence of the university were easily discerned. First,
the legislative acts of state and federal agencies had
guaranteed the universities ample funds and had provided
chapters assuring independent operation. As state univer-
sities abolished chapel services the hold of religion, at

30Andrew C. McLaughlin, History of Higher Education
in Michigan (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office,
1891, p. 51.
31William L. Bryan (ed.), Indiana University, 1820-
1920 (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University, 1921), p. 102.
32Samuel B. Harding (ed.), Indiana University, 1820-
1904 (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University, 1904), p. 31.
least directly, was greatly reduced. The appointment of faculty members without regard for church relationship was also a step in throwing off denominational influence. Finally, the practical, utilitarian, scientific spirit of the age seemed to offer a natural atmosphere in which the university could function.

Another area which reflected the tension between idealism and naturalism was the area of curricular development. Religious and rational idealism advocated one type of curriculum, while scientific and pragmatic naturalism supported a curriculum in harmony with its practical and philosophical objectives. The second area of tension between religious idealism and naturalism in curricular development begins with the Civil War and ends with World War II. The third period is regarded as a period of reassessment, beginning in the years immediately following World War II.

**Idealism, Naturalism, and the Curriculum of Higher Education**

The relation between religion and the curriculum of higher education falls into three clearly defined periods. The first period dates from the founding of the nine colonial colleges, beginning with Harvard in 1636.

Referring to the early colleges and their curriculums, Arnold Nash of the University of Toronto, writes:

These colleges were modelled on the Oxford and Cambridge pattern, suitably modified to accord with the demands of a pioneer culture... but nevertheless
they retained a definite Christian orientation. Their main aim was to educate the leaders, lay and clerical, of church-centered communities.33

During this period the colleges were Christian in the sense that the members of their governing bodies and teaching staffs in the main were professing Christians, while attendance at college chapel or parish church was an almost universal custom.

The curriculum of the early colonial college was traditional and religious, revolving around classical literature, languages, and moral philosophy. Commenting on the colonial curriculum one writer has said:

"Our colonial ancestors studied and taught in an atmosphere of religion which they had inherited from the middle ages... the ecclesiastical hand was at the helm, and the church formulated and fixed the purpose of the different branches."34

All students of the history of higher education in America are familiar with the well-known passage in New England's First Fruits which gives the reason for the founding of Harvard College:

"After God had carried us safe to New England, and we had builded our houses, provided necessaries for our livelihood, rear'd convenient places for God's worship and settled the Civil Government: one of the next things we longed for, and looked after, was to advance learning and perpetuate it for posterity; dreading to leave an illiterate ministry to the churches, when our present ministers shall be in the dust."35


35Quoted by Tewksbury, The Founding of American Colleges and Universities Before the Civil War, p. 62.
The founding of King's College (Columbia University) was also motivated by religious concerns. The traditional aim to train ministers was absent, but a more practical and broader aim took its place. The aim is stated in these words:

The aim was to teach students to know God in Jesus Christ... and to train them up in all virtuous habits, and all such useful knowledge, as may render them creditable to their families and friends, ornaments to their country, and useful to the public weal in their generation.36

For better or for worse, the forces of denominational and sectarian religion gained a dominance in American life that was to remain largely unchallenged until after the Civil War. The total impact of religion upon American life, including education is illustrated by a statement from a famous French traveler who visited America in 1831. Of religion in America, Alexis De Tocqueville writes:

In the U. S. the sovereign authority is religious... there is no country in the whole world in which the Christian religion retains a greater influence over the souls of men than in America; religion directs the manners of the community, and by regulating domestic life, it regulates the state.37

Following the Civil War several forces combined to break the control of religion over higher education. First was the widespread acceptance of the evolutionary concept of the origin of life, resulting in the eventual replacement of theology by science as the foundation of the curriculum of

36Butts, op. cit., p. 67.
higher education.

Not only was the religious control over education challenged by science, but also the philosophical position of idealism and the "genteel tradition" was attacked by the new and uniquely American philosophy of Pragmatism. The original tradition of Calvinism in America and the early nineteenth century influence of German idealism had led most American thinkers to accept concepts in which every person had a predetermined place and where truth was fixed and eternal. Pragmatists denied all this, making the world relative and incomplete.\textsuperscript{38} The rise of the social sciences also tended to weaken the hold of religion.

Another important factor in the elimination of religion from the curriculum of higher education after the Civil War was the introduction of the elective system, with the resulting specialization. Leaders in establishing the elective system and in the practice of specialization were such educational authorities as Charles Eliot of Harvard, Frederick A. Barnard of Columbia, Andrew D. White of Cornell, David C. Gilman of Johns Hopkins, David Starr Jordan of Stanford, and William R. Harper of Chicago. Butts summarizes the work of these men by stating that they actively transformed the nature of college education. Among the changes mentioned was the eclipse of religion. Butts writes:

\textsuperscript{38}Butts, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 261.
... the religious tone of college education began to lose ground to the advancing secular aim to prepare for citizenship or occupation to an increasingly secular curriculum.39

Perhaps the most important reason for the eclipse of religion from the curriculum of higher education after the Civil War was the utilitarian demands of the new state universities. The astounding growth of mechanical technology, the rapid expansion of large-scale industry, and the exploitation of the West, linked to the idea of personal acquisitiveness, generated a utilitarian concept in some areas of educational thought. Charles A. Beard makes the following comment regarding the role of utilitarianism in the latter half of the nineteenth century: "Triumphant business enterprise, with its bitter struggles with organized labor, gave the dominant tone to the intellectual and moral temper of the later decades."40

The growing universities seemed to respond to the call for a practical education, particularly those in states predominantly agricultural, such as Ohio and Wisconsin. In discussing the proposed charter for the newly founded Ohio State University Governor Rutherford Hayes pointed out that by law the proceeds of the land script should be appropriated to the endowment, support, and maintenance of a college where the leading object was to teach such branches of

39 Ibid., p. 203.

learning which were related to agriculture and to the mechanical arts. In harmony with the governor's wishes, an intensely practical curriculum was adopted. The general pattern of curricular offerings was divided into ten areas. These were: (1) The Department of Agriculture; (2) The Department of Mechanic Arts; (3) Mathematics and Physics; (4) General and Applied Chemistry; (5) Geology, Mining, and Metallurgy; (6) Zoology and Veterinary Science; (7) Botany, Horticulture and Vegetable Physiology; (8) English and Literature; (9) Modern and Ancient Languages; (10) Political Economy and Civil Polity. Such a curriculum, no doubt, was completely in keeping with the concept of utility.

Another mid-western university, the University of Wisconsin, reflects a similar implementation of the practical curriculum. A native son describes the objectives of the university in the following words:

The object of the university, as set forth in the beginning, was to offer practical courses. ... and the most important criterion in the determination of the organization and the course of study was utilitarian.

The stress on a utilitarian curriculum appeared to be one of the primary objectives of the new universities. Ezra Cornell, the founder of the university which bears his name, in his opening address at the inaugural ceremonies of

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41James E. Pollard, History of the Ohio State University (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1952), p. 16.
the university, said:

I hope we have laid the foundations of an institution which shall combine practical with liberal education, which shall fit the youth of our country for the professions, the farms, the mines, the manufactories, for the investigations of science, and for mastering all the practical questions of life with success and honor. 44

The statement of its founder, emblazoned on the Cornell University seal, became the watchword of the university: "I would found an institution in which any person can find instruction in any subject." 45

When Ohio State University opened its doors as the Ohio Agricultural and Mechanical College in 1873 the theme of its inauguration was also practical. A practical education, according to the dedication address, was one that could be applied to the interests and the necessities of every day life, that could be used in doing the work of the world. 46 Even the traditional subjects, when included, should serve a practical purpose. The practical purpose of English and Logic was stressed in the following reference; "... is not the training that enables us to detect a flaw in a definition or a fallacy in an argument as directly practical as the ability to test the strength of iron or the purity of white lead?" 47

The utilitarian nature of the

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46 Pollard, op. cit., p. 43.
47 Ibid., p. 44.
university was given classical expression in the oft-
repeated statement of President Coffman, of the University
of Minnesota: "The state universities hold that there is
no intellectual service too undignified for them to per-
form."48

Apparently the state universities responded to the
practical demands of a culture vitally influenced by the
technological and scientific spurt of the late nineteenth
century. Some universities, particularly the older ones, did
retain an appreciation for the more traditional studies. But
on the whole it seems safe to conclude that in the last
decades of the nineteenth century the desire to be practical
and scientific was the prime motive in university education.

When World War II occurred religion in the curriculum
of higher education was either lightly regarded or completely
ignored as a whole. Beginning with a complete mastery of the
educational curriculum in the colonial period, religion was
seriously challenged in the Revolutionary Period, but managed
to maintain its control over higher education until after the
Civil War. In the decades following the Civil War higher
education was almost completely secularized, with the excep-
tion of the church college.

In the decades from 1940-1960 American Colleges
undertook a more thorough-going revision of their courses of

48Henry Pratt Fairchild (ed.), The Obligation of
Universities to the Social Order (New York: New York
University Press, 1933), p. 28.
study than had taken place in any similar period of our history. One of the recurrent themes in recent years has been the problem of religion and of spiritual values in education. However, not all educators joined enthusiastically in the attempt to reinstate religion in the curriculum of higher education. Educators may be said to display three attitudes toward the place of religion, or of values in higher education; namely, those who are indifferent to religion in higher education, those who oppose any religious instruction in higher education, and those who advocate religion in higher education.

Bernard Iddings Bell states emphatically that "the American University does not in reality care a button about religion." He continues:

It regards religion not as an experimental technique which, along with science and the arts, helps man to understand the universe sufficiently so that he can live in it without being reduced to boredom or despair. It looks on religion as one of the minor amusements, like china painting or playing the flute, pleasant for those who enjoy that sort of thing, but not an intellectual or practical necessity.

In consequence, Bell says, the university is willing to relegate consideration of religion to a minor, decreasing, hardly more than microscopic place in the curriculum. This indifference, in the mind of Bell, is not so much due to the

50 Ibid., p. 153.
51 Ibid.
American university's forgetfulness of God as to its debased conception of man. Its tacit assumption is that man is one of the animals and that his happiness, significance and greatness can be achieved by providing his animal needs.

Another writer who laments the indifference of the university toward religion is Arnold Nash of Oxford University, who defines a university as follows: "It is a place where a multitude of studies are conducted, with no relationship between them except those of simultaneity and juxtaposition." As a consequence of this indifference modern man has exchanged, says Nash, the intellectual idolatry of scholasticism for the intellectual polytheism of scientific positivism.

Not all writers agree with Nash and Bell as to the indifference of the universities to religion. For instance, Merriman Cuninggim of Yale writes:

The secularization of higher education seems to have reached its peak around the time of the First World War, since then the colleges have recaptured much of their lost concern for the religious development of their students and have increasingly assumed responsibility for such nurture.

Since Bell wrote his statement in 1948 and Cuninggim expressed his opinion in 1947, apparently both statements cannot be correct. Evidence presented later will indicate Bell is unduly pessimistic, for some institutions, including

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52 Nash, op. cit., p. 259.  
53 Ibid., p. 258.  
state schools, have established Departments of Religion since 1925. However, it is possible that Cunninggim is seeing the picture through the background of New England, for the present status of religion is not as respectable as he indicates. It would seem to be true that there has been a renewed interest in religion on the part of the state and independent universities and that the indifference of the first quarter of the twentieth century is gradually giving way to a cautious reconsideration of religion in higher education.

In contrast to the attitude of indifference to religion in higher education is the attitude of active opposition to the inclusion of religion in the curriculum. Three men aptly present the case against religion. These men are John Dewey, Sidney Hook and V. T. Thayer.

To Dewey, as the father of the so-called "progressive education" movement religion in the usual sense was little more than sectarianism, consisting of a special body of beliefs and practices having some kind of institutional organization. Education in a democracy can have nothing to do with this body of beliefs, according to Dewey. He points out, however, a difference between "religion, a religion, and the religion." The adjective "religious" denoted "attitudes that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end or ideal." Thus the "religious attitude" is sanctioned, and

56ibid., p. 3.
57ibid., p. 10.
progressive education seeks to foster it. But religion in the traditional sense is taboo. As a naturalist, Dewey objects to any attempt to include the supernatural, and his use of the term "religious," in contrast with "religion" refers only to "the use of natural agencies."\textsuperscript{58}

The approach of Dewey to religion has logical consequences in education. The whole process of education must be creative rather than transmissive. Learning takes place through activity, through participation in life situation, through the use of the project method. Teaching consists not of indoctrination but of guidance. Knowledge itself is viewed as life experience and is therefore evolutionary, with complete trust placed in the scientific method for arriving at tentative truth. The ultimate result of this philosophy is to eliminate religion from the curriculum. Most progressives followed Dewey in their opposition to religion in the curriculum.

Another outspoken critic of religion in the curriculum of higher education is V. T. Thayer. Thayer's opposition is directed against the idea that religion is essential because it is the basis of all morality. He writes:

\begin{quote}
Only the parochial mind continues to ground morality in Presbyterianism, shall we say, as against Catholicism, or in Christianity as against Buddhism. But is it not equally provincial to ignore the fact that the basic principles of morality are found as well in the daily
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{58}Ibid., p. 81.
practices and conviction of men of no religious faith? Thayer's opposition is directed at the traditional approach of teaching religion as a body of doctrine and against the wide claims made for religion as the source of democracy and morality. He admits that the resources for acquainting young people with the religious institutions of the community and the faiths men hold are richer than the schools have realized. He candidly admits the following:

... there are professional possibilities of an intellectual character in this field which schools might well explore—provided only that a professional attitude is strictly maintained.

A third opponent of religion in the program of higher education is Sidney Hook, of New York University. His opposition is also against the doctrinaire, traditional method of teaching religion. He states: "... the demand for the introduction of required religious and theological study is not motivated merely by the desire for the cultural enrichment of the curriculum." Hook believes that a study of history reveals that religious truths do not have a monopoly on the discovery and effective teaching of moral ideals. Neither the meaning nor the validity of moral ideals rests on supernatural foundation. His conclusion on the matter is


60Ibid., p. 225.


62Ibid.
To introduce these studies is to make a sharp break with the critical methods of inquiry followed in other disciplines in the curriculum. . . to prescribe these studies in a community of many different faiths and revealed truths is to revive the insoluble religious controversies of the past with all their dangers. 63

The opposition of Dewey, Thayer, and Hook to religious studies in the curriculum of higher education reflects basic educational philosophies, rather than an overt antagonism to religion. Thayer accepts the validity of the Christian faith, but feels that it is aggressive in an attempt to impose sectarian concepts into the realm of education. Dewey is a naturalist who rejects any religion within a supernatural framework, and thinks religion, as commonly understood, is superfluous in the educational process. Hook denies the claims of religion as the unique source of morals and democracy, accepting instead a pluralistic concept of the origin of morals and of democratic ideals. He also feels that reintroducing religion into education would engender strife.

The third attitude toward the place of religion in the curriculum of higher education embodies the conviction that religion is an integral part of the educational process. Since this group is aggressive in dealing with the problem, there is a prolific output of literature advocating religion as an academic discipline. Some insist on the inclusion of religion because it is part of the cultural heritage of our nation.

63 Ibid., p. 110.
Others feel religion should be a part of the academic core because it contributes to a "liberal" or general education. Still others state that religion is essential for an understanding of the world.

One of the most positive spokesmen on the side of religion is Robert Ulich of Harvard University who states: "Those who hold that religion is no longer important should at least present the role of religion as one which played a unifying part in shaping that conception of the dignity of man on which our civil liberties still rest." To Ulich the problem of understanding and appreciating our cultural heritage is vital, for he continues:

So far as we know, never has a culture survived that has severed itself from its original roots. We are today in this danger, for one of the roots of our culture is the Judaic-Christian form of religion, which so many of us no longer understand. According to Ulich, it is impossible to convey the meaning of the democratic cultural heritage if religion is omitted.

Jacques Maritan and John M. Moore represent those who feel that religion is an essential in a sound liberal or general education program. Moore reflects this concept in these words:

It is impossible for education to be either liberal or general unless it puts intellectual concerns at the center of the process, for the intellect is simply the

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65 Ibid., p. 15.
generalizing function and ideas are the means by which we achieve general understanding. To this writer the ultimate goal of liberal general education is today as it has been for centuries, the harmonious development of all our powers. And at bottom this is a moral and spiritual undertaking.

Jacques Maritan agrees in essence with the above statement. He states that man cannot progress in his own specific life, either intellectually or morally, without being helped by collective experience previously accumulated and preserved, and by a regular transmission of acquired knowledge. The purpose of transmitting knowledge is to develop the individual. In this development religion is necessary. Maritan continues:

If the aim of education is the helping and guiding of man toward his own human achievements, education cannot escape the problems and entanglements of philosophy, for it supposes by its very nature a philosophy of man.

An educator in a state university department of education also supports the place of religion in general education. Everett J. Kircher, writing in Progressive Education, makes a strong case for religion. To Kircher the effective teaching of religion as one of the liberal studies has this


67 Ibid.


69 Ibid., p. 4.
in common with all vital teaching, that new dimensions are built to the understanding. Only by including religion, says this educator from Ohio State University, can the university attain a judicious balance in its effort to learning in all the major concerns of a culture. He writes:

... at the present time the greater proportion of our institutions of higher learning are serving our culture in general and our students in particular with some degree of adequacy in every major area except religion.

To include religion, in Kircher's opinion, would make religion a respectable discipline and also reduce and transform the parochialism of most present-day religious knowledge.

There is much to support the contentions of these writers, according to Ward Madden, who states that traditional religious outlooks represent judgments based upon ages of religious experience. They command the loyalties of millions of persons. Rather than start with a clean slate, it seems better to make use of the generations of experience and loyalties which may be used as springboards toward a religious way of life appropriate to the scientific, democratic and organismic outlook of our age.

Others, such as the classical thinkers, would accord religion a place in the academic program similar to any other

70 Everett J. Kircher, "Religion and the Liberal University," Progressive Education, XXXIII (July 1, 1956), 97.
71 Ibid., p. 99.
discipline or interest. It would be included, but only in its intellectual aspect. Great religious thought, as represented in the Bible and other great books, together with the history of its development, would be included. But to the classicist religion as an attitude toward the whole of life, as worship, as activity is outside the responsibility of the college and enters into its program incidentally, if at all. 73

The list of writers advocating a place for religion in higher education is almost endless. Wallace Donham, for twenty years dean of Harvard Business School, states: "... the omission of any real emphasis in American colleges on the essentials of religion... is a national calamity." 74 Nels Ferre, author and teacher writes: "The integrity of education demands that it scrutinize the claim of religion to be a legitimate subject for public instruction." 75 Christian Gauss, dean emeritus of Princeton University, states that it is impossible for the undergraduate to understand the cultures of other nations without a knowledge of religion.76

In summary, there appears to be an increasing and persistent demand for a place for religion in higher education. Some declare that the national heritage must of necessity in-

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73 Cunningham, op. cit., p. 108.
elude religion as an authentic academic area. Still others feel that religion is important in a comprehensive and authentic understanding of world cultures. The advocates of religion rank among the outstanding scholars and thinkers of the nation.

To complete the historical survey of the tension between idealism and naturalism in education in the United States between 1860 and 1960, it seems essential to discuss briefly two contrasting philosophies which influenced educational thought in the last century. These two opposing approaches to philosophy are rational idealism and pragmatic naturalism.

**Rational Idealism Versus Pragmatic Naturalism**

By the beginning of the twentieth century the conflict between idealism and naturalism had been transferred from the practical and utilitarian approach to intellectual and academic consideration. The university, with its stress on the practical, scientific and non-authoritarian approach to education had gained a secure foothold in American culture and no longer felt threatened, to any serious degree, by religious interests. On the other hand the denominational, or religious-type institution, was by tradition an essential part of the national life, and thus felt no need to make any concessions to the newer educational institution, the university. Since neither the religious institution nor the secular university could interfere with the development and
growth of its counter-part, the struggle was transferred to the philosophical area. This philosophical struggle eventually crystalized into tension between rational idealism and pragmatic naturalism.

It appears to be sound to assert that at the beginning of the twentieth century practical religious idealism was overshadowed, in education at least, by a rational idealism which reflected religious concepts. George P. Adams, writing in 1919, comments:

The practical attitude and organization of human life which eventuates in the idea system of idealism is, historically, bound up with certain of the more profound traits of religion. Not that religion, as an historical fact and institution, exhibits in unmixed form the substance and texture of idealism. Yet it had none so sufficiently to warrant our saying that idealism is the theological framework for religion.77

The shift in emphasis from a practical Christian idealism to a rational religious idealism was influenced, to a great degree, by the growing popularity of German philosophy in the United States, particularly following the Civil War. The most important factors in bringing German influence to America were the exodus of American students to Germany for graduate study and the reverse flow of German scholars to American universities. Since idealism was the dominant philosophy in Germany in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it was natural that the interchange of scholars should

result in the importation of philosophical idealism into the United States.

The first deliberate step to establish philosophical idealism in formal American education was made in St. Louis, Missouri. In 1866 William T. Harris founded the St. Louis Philosophical Society and in 1867 the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* was launched. According to Donald Butler, in the pages of "the Journal" Hegel was made to speak English over a period of twenty-six years of publication, 1867-1893. Referring to the place of Harris in educational thought Butler continues:

Inspiration of many in the St. Louis group, founder and editor of the first philosophical journal in this country, one of the most important national leaders in education, and popular lecturer, William T. Harris, it can justly be said, was the fountainhead of the American idealist movement.

Harris became an enthusiastic follower of Hegel and put the Hegelian philosophy to work in everyday life. Harris writes: "Even the hunting of wild turkeys or squirrels was the occasion for the use of philosophy, and we use it to solve all problems connected with school-teaching and school-management." Two works of Hegel impressed him more deeply than all other books: the *Logic* and the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. Harris echoes his complete acceptance.

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of Hegelian idealism in the following statement, referring to his reaction to Hegel's *Logic*:

The mental atmosphere of the book has a quieting and soothing effect on the student. All the collisions and petty details of terrestrial affairs seem to fall away, and one gazes, as it were, into their eternal archetypes, and sees the essence of the conflict, the problem reduced to its lowest terms.\(^1\)

Hegel had put a master key to the universe in the talented hands of Harris, and with this key he hoped to unlock the door to enlightenment, first to St. Louis, and ultimately to the entire nation. Harris adopts the Hegelian definition of education as the process through which the individual man becomes ethical.\(^2\) However, the school was only one of five institutions which developed the free, ethical person. In addition to the school there was the family, civil society, the state, and the church. Harris felt that it was impossible for the school alone to give the education which the five institutions together could give. The school was, to Harris, one of the agencies which should contribute to developing ethically responsible citizens. At one time or another he challenged the tenets, in whole or in part, of Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Spencer, Herbart, Froebel, Darwin, Parker, Stearns, the McMurrys, James, and Dewey.\(^3\) Harris remains as one of the great representatives of idealism in American educational theory, serving as United States Commissioner of Education from 1887-1909.

\(^1\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 111.}\)
\(^2\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 120.}\)
\(^3\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 128.}\)
A second representative of idealism in educational philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century was William C. Bagley. Bagley states that in order to study the concrete problems of education, a guiding principle is needed that will cover every case that is presented. Although an idealist in education, Bagley accepts the experiential approach to learning, for he states that fundamentally the possibility of education depends upon the capacity of the organism to profit by past experiences. He defines education as the acquisition of experiences that will serve to modify inherited adjustments. Thus the capacity to profit by individual experience is the principle which Bagley feels is applicable to every phase of the educative process.

Formal education, or directed experience in the schools, is essential in that it provides the opportunity to assimilate racial experience as well as the occasion for individual experience. Bagley defines the school as an institution for turning environmental forces to a definite and conscious end. It is at the point of specifying the ends and objectives of education that Bagley places himself in the idealistic tradition, for he writes:

It is safe to assert that the main aim in education is to instill ideals that will function as judgments, and that, in one sense at least, the subject-matter of instructors must be totally subservient to this aim. The classical


85 Ibid.
education of the past undoubtedly had little worth in so far as the intrinsic value of its subject-matter was concerned; but it has immeasurable worth in so far as the ideals that it instilled were concerned. Bagley appeared to approach education from the experiential side in regard to method, but the aims and outcomes desired were specifically idealistic.

The values, or ideals of education are divided into five classes by Bagley: "(a) the utilitarian, (b) conventional, (c) preparatory, (d) theoretical), (e) sentimental." The utilitarian value of knowledge implies that its direct application may serve in the solution of the problems and situations that life presents. Conventional values are those which a person needs to be acceptable in his social environment. Preparatory values are those facts and principles which serve as a basis for the acquisition of other facts and principles. Theoretical values are items of knowledge that have little or no significance in the practical affairs of life, but which may be necessary to a system of knowledge. Sentimental values are those which one acquires to satisfy his curiosity or his emotional needs.

William T. Harris and William O. Bagley are typical and representative of the idealistic school of educational philosophy in the early part of the twentieth century. However, the most articulate spokesman for the cause of educational idealism was Herman Harrell Horne, whom we shall

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consider in detail in a later chapter. Idealism suffered a decline after the first World War and pragmatic naturalism appears to have been the dominant educational philosophy between 1915-1945.

In the early years of the twentieth century idealism began to enter a period of eclipse. As rational idealism declined a new approach called "pragmatism" was widely acclaimed. Unlike idealism, which had become somewhat detached from educational philosophy, pragmatism was popularized in the field of education by such outstanding educational theorists as John Dewey, William H. Kilpatrick, George S. Counts, and Boyd H. Bode. It is now generally recognized that American pragmatism had its origin in the theory of meaning which Peirce derived from his study of the procedures of experimental science. All the leading pragmatists, moreover, have affirmed the view of William James that the essence of pragmatism is not a doctrine but a method. The pragmatic attitude and the pragmatic method may be summarized in the following words:

A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns toward concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power. That means the empiricist temper regnant and the rationalist temper sincerely given up.89

89Childs, op. cit., p. 23.

Next to John Dewey, whom we shall discuss later, one of the most influential advocates of pragmatism was William Kilpatrick. Kilpatrick was profoundly influenced by Dewey and became one of the outstanding exponents of Dewey's educational theories. Kilpatrick's attack on the traditional school system centered on its book-centered approach, which he criticizes as follows:

Education in the school sense came to mean learning the contents of books, with what this could offer, and this only. And the believers in this type of school had great faith in such memorizing. . . . So deeply and widely did this kind of education take hold that today most people . . . find it difficult to conceive of any other kind of education for school or college.91

Kilpatrick equates the bookish approach with the Christian religion, suggesting that Christianity adopted from the Greeks at Alexandria the idea of learning as master of book content, for he writes:

Later, when Christianity had formulated an authoritarian written creed, the same type of school was used to teach the written word. . . . The schools of the Protestant Reformation continued the same type of school, stressing specifically their new religious outlook. . . . In these ways the Alexandrian type of education for acquiring the content of the written word became universal throughout Christendom.92

Turning from the content-centered approach of traditional education Kilpatrick states that all human learning,

92 Ibid.
of whatever degree or kind, must go on within human experience.\textsuperscript{93} According to Kilpatrick the process of experiencing, or learning, implies organism and environment, for life everywhere is a continual interactive process between organism and environment.\textsuperscript{94} Learning is defined by Kilpatrick as follows: "Learning is the tendency of any part or phase of what one has lived so to remain with the learner as to come back pertinently into further experience."\textsuperscript{95} With the behavioral pattern of learning in mind Kilpatrick suggests three characteristics essential to any experimental, and acceptable, system of education:

1. Education must primarily seek character and behavior, all-round character of a kind to lead to proper behavior.
2. Learning, the key constituent of education, must be understood in behavioral terms.
3. The concomitant learnings, especially as accumulated through successive experiences, must be taken fully into account in all guided or directed learning.\textsuperscript{96}

Kilpatrick's own term for his educational program is "the project method." To him the project method was acceptable because it involved wholehearted purposeful activity proceeding in a social environment.\textsuperscript{97}


\textsuperscript{94}Ibid., p. 41.

\textsuperscript{95}Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 239.

\textsuperscript{96}Ibid., pp. 226-227.

act Kilpatrick was influenced by experimental studies in the psychology of human behavior and learning, and by the new outlook in philosophy associated with pragmatism. The project method, as proposed by Kilpatrick was the only valid approach to education in a democratic culture in which the experimental sciences were becoming dominant. By this method, the method of involving the learner in purposeful activity, the character so essential to an on-going democracy would be developed.

George S. Counts is another outstanding educational philosopher who structured his thinking in a pragmatic, evolutionary, naturalistic framework. Counts, like Kilpatrick, was in full accord with the attempt of the pragmatists to develop a philosophy in harmony with evolutionary principles, with the attitudes and the methods of experimental inquiry, and with the values of democracy. Counts joins in the condemnation of the book-centered Alexandrian educational approach, which he calls "the vestibule idea of education." In condemning traditional education Counts remarks very critically:

We cannot be too critical of any school procedure which lacks present significance and is justified solely on the grounds of remote future utility. Life during the

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99 Ibid., p. 216.

period of guardianship is not suspended or postponed. It has its own problems and values which a wise system of education can never neglect.  

Counts is in agreement with pragmatic concepts that learning takes place by the interaction of the organism with the environment. However, Counts feels that both traditional education and much pragmatic education placed too much emphasis on individual development. To Counts the important aspect was not the physical or biological environment, but the social matrix in which one functioned, for he writes:

If an educational movement, or any other movement, calls itself progressive, it must have orientation; it must possess direction. The word itself implies moving forward, and moving forward can have little meaning in the absence of clearly defined purposes. . . . The weaknesses of Progressive Education thus lies in the fact that it has elaborated no theory of social welfare, unless it be that of anarchy or extreme individualism.  

The primary objective of education to Counts was adaptability to social change. With almost prophetic fervor Counts describes the need to educate people for the new civilization:

... a new civilization is rising in America and throughout the earth—a civilization that is coming to be called industrial—a civilization so strange in its forms, so vast in its reaches, so complex in its patterns, and so mighty in its energies that thoughtful men and women fear that the control of its operation is beyond the powers of its creator.  

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101 Ibid., p. 172.


To Counts education is responsible for producing citizens equipped to participate intelligently in the constantly changing cultural pattern.

A third and final representative discussed briefly as typical of pragmatic naturalism is Boyd H. Bode. Bode attacks idealistic educational philosophy sharply and vigorously. Academic philosophy, according to Bode has tended to perpetuate the Platonic notion that man is a citizen of two worlds. Since the world of ideas is the true goal of knowledge in Platonic thinking, education would direct men into harmony with such objective reality. But such a concept of knowledge leads to a dualism which is objectionable to Bode. To Bode the idea of two worlds, the world of mind and the world of sense-experience, is aristocratic in its origin, and therefore incompatible with democracy. Referring to the Greek ideal of self-development by a knowledge of objective forms, or ideas, Bode writes:

Self-perfection or harmonious development is supposed to be achieved by acting in accordance with an inner principle, but is in fact derived from the principle of aristocracy, and it traces back to the model set by the Greeks.104

Bode thus regards the classicist as the old-time aristocrat doing his turn on a twentieth century stage. According to Bode, the influence of this concept of "two-worldism" was not confined to the sphere of academic philosophy. Its

pattern of interpretation was adopted, he says, by Christian theology and thus managed to keep itself in a dominant position throughout all the succeeding centuries, with the result that it became firmly embedded in Western culture.  

Two developments of the twentieth century have seriously challenged the "two-world" approach, according to Bode.  

One of those developments is the impact of scientific method, the second is the advance of the democratic ideal.

Having rejected both classical and Christian concepts of education Bode presents his own pragmatic naturalistic understanding of education. But Bode's ideas differ from those of Kilpatrick and Counts. Kilpatrick makes character development through purposeful activity the arm of education. Counts regarded social adaptability as the primary objective of the educative process. Bode, however, makes the continual reconstruction of experience as the primary goal of education.

The focal point of Bode's philosophy is his theory of the mind. To Bode the mind is not a thing—whether a substance or a collection of mental states—but a function, and is described as follows:

Mind, then, is a function of symbolizing or forecasting, or, as we sometimes say, of understanding or foreseeing. . . . This conception of mind, with its

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106Childs, op. cit., p. 251.

107Bode, op. cit., p. 254.
emphasis on adaption is an integral part of pragmatic philosophy. The term "experience" is a name for situations in which this function called mind is in some sense operative.\textsuperscript{108}

The exercise of mind as a function to Bode was directly related to the transformation and reconstruction of the experiential situation.\textsuperscript{109} Further, this process of reconstruction goes on inevitably. The school does not invent it, but undertakes to speed it up and to give it direction.

The three pragmatic thinkers discussed--Kilpatrick, Counts, and Bode--all agreed that the theory of evolution, the progress of experimental science, and the nature of democratic society had made traditional education obsolete and called for the widespread acceptance of a new educational approach based on naturalistic principles.

In this chapter the discussion has centered on the tension between idealism and naturalism in education in the century between 1860-1960. The tension between these two opposing approaches to education appear to have found expression in three ways. First there occurred the struggle between practical religious idealism and scientific utilitarianism. At this level the struggle erupted into actual warfare as the church college fought the rise of the utilitarian university and as the university in turn challenged the traditional church school.

\textsuperscript{108}Ibid., p. 225.

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid., p. 255.
At the beginning of the twentieth century the university was securely established, and the religious school was strongly entrenched. So the tension between idealism and naturalism was transferred from the practical area to the area of academic philosophy and to the area of curricular revision. Spokesmen for both sides of these areas were presented.

In the first three chapters the dissertation has attempted to present the development of idealism and naturalism, with the subsequent tension which arose when these conflicting philosophies became a vital part of American educational philosophy. The remainder of the dissertation will be devoted to a particularized discussion of the men generally regarded as the greatest exponents of the two systems, John Dewey an educational naturalist, and H. H. Horne, an educational idealist.
CHAPTER V

THE PERSPECTIVE OF NATURALISM

IN JOHN DEWEY

Alfred N. Whitehead classes John Dewey with Augustine, Aquinas, Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and with Auguste Comte as men who made philosophic thought relevant to the needs of their own day. By this, Whitehead meant that Dewey disclosed great ideas relevant to the functioning of the social system in which he lived. While Dewey is popularly associated with distinct educational theories, it seems essential to point out that he was a profound philosopher with a commanding knowledge of the historical development of philosophy. However, it is generally admitted that Dewey's greatest impact and his widest influence were in the field of education. George R. Geiger calls John Dewey America's most influential and controversial educational thinker. Neil G. McCluskey states that John Dewey has in some measure touched every stone in the modern


American educational structure. Robert L. Kelly states that Dewey was destined, on the side of philosophic theory, to be the greatest American guarantor of liberty in the educational process. Among the almost endless tributes to John Dewey and his influence on American educational thought the acme of praise is rendered by his close associate, William H. Kilpatrick:

Pestolozzi had prepared the ground. Froebel and Herbart had helped. Horace Mann, Henry Barnard, William T. Harris, Stanley Hall, Francis W. Parker, and others carried America further along the Pestolozzi road. But one thing was lacking. No one of these men, nor all combined, had given an adequate theory for a thorough-going democratic, science-respecting education. This Professor Dewey has done.

Dewey entered the educational world at a time uniquely favorable to his democratic pragmatic concepts of philosophy and of education. An old order was passing, and the new order welcomed a spokesman who could express in academic, even pedantic language, the restless spirit of the industrial, scientific, democratic age.

Dewey represents naturalism unlimited. In his naturalism Dewey approached every philosophical problem—metaphysical, epistemological, axiological, logical and aesthetical—with the aim of presenting a historical, logical and scientific rationale for man and his environment. In

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advancing his naturalistic position Dewey attempts to discredit traditional philosophical and formal educational approaches as untenable in the scientific, industrialized, and urbanized twentieth century.

In this chapter the attempt is made to present a summary of Dewey's general philosophical interpretation of the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, logic and the nature of man. Following the discussion of Dewey's basic philosophical concepts, the discussion shifts to the specific application of his naturalistic ideas to educational theory in the next chapter.

**Metaphysical Concepts of Dewey**

Evolutionary and biological concepts appear to be the basis of Dewey's philosophy. Born in 1859 in Burlington, Vermont, of parents following traditional religious patterns, Dewey gradually shifted his thinking from idealism and absolutism to experimentalism. While still an undergraduate student at the University of Vermont he began to express dissatisfaction with the closed and rigid systems of philosophical and religious thinking prevalent in his day. Referring to the classic of traditional religious philosophy, Butler's *Analogy*, Dewey stated: "... with its cold logic and acute analysis it was ... in a reversed way, a factor
in developing scepticism."6

On the other hand, a book expressing the naturalism of Thomas Huxley appeared to have a strange fascination for him, for he writes that it aroused the following feeling in him:

... a sense of interdependence and interrelated unity that gave form to intellectual stirrings that had previously been inchoate, and created a type or model of a view of things to which material in any field ought to conform.7

While taking graduate work at Johns Hopkins University, his philosophical interests were attracted by the writings of Hegel. It seems that the great magnet in Hegel's thinking, for Dewey at least, was the suggested solution to the problems involved in traditional dualistic concepts, for he writes:

Hegel's synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the human, was... no mere intellectual formula; it operated as an immense release, a liberation. Hegel's treatment of human culture, of institutions and arts, involved the... dissolution of hard and fast dividing walls.8

During the twenty years following his graduation from Johns Hopkins University Dewey appeared to find an idealistic position completely unacceptable, while finding the concepts of naturalistic thinking as expressed by such leading thinkers as Charles S. Peirce, William James, and George H. Mead more

7Ibid., p. 13. 8Ibid., p. 19.
and more satisfactory. His philosophical pilgrimage thus led Dewey to a position which he called "instrumentalism" or "experimentalism." The following discussion is an attempt to present the idea of metaphysics as expressed in Dewey's experimental philosophy. However, since it is impossible to understand Dewey's metaphysical ideas apart from his philosophical method, it is necessary to first discuss Dewey's approach to the problem of metaphysics.

There are, according to Dewey, two approaches to the goal of philosophy. The first approach begins with experience, and by means of its distinguishing features and distinctive trends, investigates the world of experience. The second method begins with a priori, or with refined selective methods and works back to the primary facts of life. Dewey accepts the first method or approach; for to him the method of beginning with an a priori premise results in the use of the accepted principles of the day as the foundations of a system of interpretation. When these principles are rejected by a succeeding generation, Dewey points out, the system of interpretation also fails because it has been structured, not on experience, but on a priori premises of interpretation.

The crux of Dewey's position is that experience is not the subject-matter of philosophy but is the method of

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9Ibid.

philosophy. That is, it is "denotative" rather than "designative." The value of experience for philosophy is that it asserts the finality and comprehensiveness of the method of pointing, of finding, of showing, and the necessity of seeing what is pointed to, accepting what is found in good faith and without discount. To begin to analyze experience with ultimate concepts is "to begin with loaded dice," for the philosopher achieves the result he is desirous of achieving.  

Dewey believes that the empirical approach, as indicated by denotative classification, eliminates both the problems of realism and idealism and the problem of rational thought as opposed to sensuous knowledge. It also prevents one from accepting as original, primitive, and simple, distinctions that have become familiar to us. The great advantage of empiricism, in Dewey's thinking, is that the empirical approach protects one from the philosophic fallacy, the conversion of eventual function into antecedent existence.

With experience as his method, Dewey rejects all but a fragment of the ideas of classical philosophy. Such things as the Platonic division into ideal archetypes and physical events are outside of experience, as are the Aristotelian division of reality into form, actuality, matter, and potentiality. Kant's division of reality into the noumenal,
things-in-themselves, in contrast with natural objects as phenomenal, cannot be found in experience; hence these divisions are rejected. The dualism of appearance and reality, of idealism and realism are similarly disposed of as non-experiential.

The only fragment gleaned from classical thinking by Dewey is the concept of flux proposed by Heraclitus and Bergson. But even here experience modifies the "flux" of nature into the "precarious" of experience. Experience consists of the precarious and the stable. Here one finds the only ultimate reality. Ontology is dismissed as a fabrication of detached philosophers. Dialectical truth also fails to pass the scrutiny of experience. From the traditional point of view, there is no metaphysics. From Dewey's point of view experience offers the only ground for a scientific metaphysics. In this regard he observes:

Anthropologists have shown incontrovertibly the part played by the precarious aspect of the world in generating religion with its ceremonies, rites, cults, myths, and magic, and it has shown the pervasive penetration of these affairs into morals, law, art, and industry.14

Dewey argues that classical philosophy, by which he means both Greek and Christian philosophies, has used metaphysics as a substitute for custom as the source and guarantor of higher moral and social values.15 Because philosophy was

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14Ibid., p. 41.

a substitute for custom, according to Dewey, it approached its task in a biased manner, aiming to conserve values inherent in tradition. He writes: "It became the work of philosophy to justify on rational grounds the spirit, though not the form, of accepted beliefs and traditional customs." Dewey rejects the classical distinctions between "Being" and "Becoming." He would include both the stable and the unstable as integral aspects of experience. This inclusion banishes the mixture of the problematic with the assured and the complete, of the division of existence into the natural and the supernatural; any and all dualistic concepts are rejected. The union of the hazardous and the stable, of the incomplete and the recurrent, is the condition of all experienced satisfaction as truly as predicaments and problems.

Empiricism is the only philosophy which is able to harmonize the precarious and the stable, as Dewey says:

A philosophy which accepts the denotative or empirical method accepts at full value the fact that reflective thinking transforms confusion, ambiguity and discrepancy into illumination, definiteness and consistency.

Empiricism also points to the contextual situation in which thinking occurs. It notes that the starting point is actually problematic, and that the problematic phase is a part of an actual situation. In this problem situation, thinking is deprived of all ontological meaning; thought is no different

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16 Ibid., p. 18.
in kind from the use of natural materials and energies. Reflection occurs only in a problem situation. Thought and reason are not specific powers, but natural procedures employed to solve problems arising from a mixture of the precarious and the stable in life.

Dewey rejected all concepts of a supernatural Being. To Dewey, belief in an ultimate Being was impossible because of the conflict of such a belief with science. Relevant to the point, he asks:

"Is not the belief in the single, final, and ultimate an intellectual product of that feudal organization which is disappearing historically and of that belief in a bounded, ordered cosmos... which has disappeared from natural science?"

Dewey appears to assume that the crisis in contemporary culture, including a belief in an ultimate Being called God, arises from a division of authority. Scientific inquiry seems to tell one thing, while traditional beliefs about ends and ideals that have authority over conduct tell something quite different.

To Dewey the problem of method is all important, for he states:

"What is not realized... although it is more definitely seen by the fundamentalists than by liberals, is that the issue does not concern this or that particular item of belief, but centers in the question of method."

The introduction of scientific method would replace feudalistic, rigid concepts with democratic, scientific concepts. The acceptance of scientific method as a basis for


19 Ibid., p. 32.
belief would also be the occasion for a new concept of authority. In dealing with the problem of authority, Dewey does not advocate the rejection of authority as such, but rather the introduction of a scientifically based authority, which is conducive to change. He writes:

We need an authority that, unlike the older forms in which it operated, is capable of directing change. In the older forms of authority cooperative, orderly change are conspicuous by their absence.20

While Dewey feels that the acceptance of scientific method eliminates the concept of God as a transcendent Being, he does accept the use of value symbols which point to common elements in experience. The implications of using symbols is, to Dewey, far-reaching. Such usage of symbols provides a view of "God" which is the polar opposite of the traditional view. In traditional, or even in liberal religion, the word "God" refers to a particular Being. But to Dewey the word denotes "the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and action."21 From this point of view the term "God" means the ideal ends that, at a given time and place, one acknowledges as having authority over his volition and emotion, the values to which one is supremely devoted.

The Deweyan concept of God admittedly stands in opposition to the doctrine of religion that "God" designates some kind of Being having prior and therefore non-ideal


existence. In religion, the Supreme Being has moral and spiritual attributes which are thought of as properties of a particular existence and are thought to be of religious value because of the embodiment of an existent Being. Here, in Dewey's thought, is the ultimate issue as to the difference between a religion and the religious as a function of experience.

The idea of God as the unity of ideals that prompt to action and arouse loyalty is also connected with all the natural forces and conditions that promote the growth of the ideal and that further its realizations. For there are forces in nature and in society, according to Dewey, that generate and support the ideals. These ideals are further unified by the action that gives them coherence and solidity. It is this active relationship between the ideal and the actual that Dewey calls "God."

The object of faith to Dewey, then, is not a transcendent Being with given and immutable qualities which possess value as they are apprehended by man. Rather, the object of faith exists in the unity of ideals, and in the possibility of growth and change, which incite devotion and excite to activity. In such an approach Dewey seems to think that faith is not eliminated by the change in intellectual climate resulting from the acceptance of scientific method. Historic religions may be affected, but the religious values of common experience remain.
Classical philosophy had accepted a closed world, a world consisting internally of a limited number of fixed forms, and having definite boundaries externally. The early empiricists had accepted a mechanical, orderly, fixed world also. Dewey believes that the world of modern science has shown the world to be an open world. On this he comments:

The world of modern science is an open world, a world varying indefinitely without possibility of assignable limit in its internal make-up, a world stretching beyond any assignable bounds externally.22

Dewey's world is an open world, an infinitely variegated world. And change rather than fixity is the measure of reality, for change is omnipresent. The laws by which the modern man of science operates, according to Dewey, are the laws of motion, of generation, and of consequence. The man of scientific temper does not try to define or to delimit something remaining constant in change. He tries to describe a constant order of change. However, the word "constant" must be defined, for Dewey states:

... while the word "constant" appears in both statements, the meaning of the word is not the same. In one case, we are dealing with something constant in existence, physical or metaphysical; in the other case, with something constant in function and operation. One is a form of independent being; the other is a formula of description and a calculation of interdependent changes.23

To Dewey nature did not consist of the totality of objective ideas or external objects. Neither was nature to

22Dewey, Reconstruction In Philosophy, p. 54.
23Ibid., p. 61.
Dewey merely a process. But every natural object was an event continuous in space and time with other events, to be known only by experimental inquiries which would exhibit a multitude of complicated, obscure, and minute relationships.

In rejecting the concept of fixed unchangeable types and species in favor of a philosophy of experience Dewey writes:

... there was a time when men believed that each object in the external world carried its nature stamped upon it as a form, and that intelligence consisted in simply inspecting and reading off an intrinsic, self-enclosed complete nature. The scientific revolution brought a change in this point of view.

By the use of scientific method operating in the area of experience Dewey attempts to resolve the ancient problems of matter-spirit, temporal and permanent, particular and universal. To Dewey the notion that the universe is split into two separate and disconnected realms of existence, one physical and the other psychical presented the acme of incredibility.

Nature was one, a unified, continuing whole, and as such offered the possibility of precise knowledge.

**Epistemology of Dewey**

Dewey's epistemology seems to be a logical outgrowth of his metaphysics. Since experience as method negates the metaphysical reality of objects, experience as method should

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25 Ibid.

be used in the area of epistemology. In his early writings Dewey regarded experience primarily as biological, arriving at a concept of knowledge based on the interaction of natural events and natural objects. However, in his later writings Dewey seemed to regard experience from the standpoint of physics, leading him to develop the idea of knowledge as a transaction, with no distinction between the knower and the object known. In the following discussion the idea of interaction is presented extensively, while the discussion of the idea of knowledge as transaction is limited. In discussing Dewey's naturalistic concepts of epistemology it appears to be necessary to present his ideas of the nature of knowledge, of the function of mind, of the knowing process, and his interpretation of reason, or intelligence.

Dewey approaches the problem of the nature of knowledge by stating that the development of a psychology based upon biology had made possible a new scientific formulation of the nature of knowledge. In the new psychology which Dewey accepts, knowledge is not something separate and self-sufficing, but is involved in the process by which life is sustained and evolved. Knowledge is relegated to a derived position, secondary in origin. Criticizing traditional concepts of knowledge as spectator concepts, Dewey observes:

27 Dewey, *Reconstruction In Philosophy*, p. 84.
28 Ibid., p. 87.
But in truth, historic intellectualism, the spectator view of knowledge, is a purely compensatory doctrine which men of an intellectual turn have built up to console themselves for the actual and social impotency of the calling of thought to which they are devoted.  

With this biological approach to knowledge Dewey claims that the true nature of knowledge is operative and practical. From the operational and practical point of view, the structures and the objects which science and philosophy set up in contrast to the things and events of daily experience do not constitute a realm apart in which rational contemplation may rest satisfied. The practical approach to knowledge makes, instead, the events of daily experience the selected obstacles, the material means and ideal methods of giving direction to changes which are inevitable. Regarding the impact of the practical approach to knowledge, Dewey writes:

When the practice of knowledge ceased to be dialectical and became experimental knowing became preoccupied with changes, and the test of knowledge became the ability to bring about certain changes.  

To Dewey mind is not an organ, nor an entity, nor a distinct part of the physical organism. Rather mind is a characteristic way of inter-activity. The mind, like personality and selfhood, consists of eventual functions that emerge with complexly organized inter-actions, organic and social. There are individual minds, but not individuals

29Ibid., p. 117.  
30Ibid., p. 121.  
32Ibid., p. 208.
with minds, according to Dewey, for experience, being social, cannot be confined to particular isolated events or persons. In describing mind as the complex response of the organic totality to its environment, Dewey writes: "Mind as individualized could be recognized in other than a pejorative sense only when its variations were social, utilized in generating greater social security and fullness of life."^33

The social context in which mind functions is the basis for the Deweyan distinction between a bodily, or a psychic self, with a mind and mind as individual.

To Dewey the basic mistake of traditional philosophy was the acceptance of the Greek-Christian idea of the separate existence of a "soul" or "mind." Even when philosophy revolted against the Christian tradition, it still retained the mistaken idea of the mind as a distinct entity, according to Dewey.^34 The philosophical dualism making a distinction between mind and body was disastrous, in Dewey's thinking, for he states:

... philosophical dualism is but a formulated recognition of an impasse in life; an impotence in interaction, inability to make effective transition, limitation of power to regulate and thereby to understand.^35

Dewey attempted to solve the problems of philosophic dualism by regarding life and mind as aspects of the highly complex and extensive interaction of events. By regarding life,
mind, the soul, and the self as interaction in social and natural events the psychophysical phenomena and higher mental phenomena could be admitted to their full empirical reality.\textsuperscript{36} Dewey's position regarding the mind is well summarized in the following statement:

To see the organism in nature, the nervous system in the organism, the brain in the nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the problems which haunt philosophy. And when thus seen, they will be seen to be in, not as marbles are in a box, but as events in history, in a moving, growing, never finished process.\textsuperscript{37}

In consistency with his concept of the mind as a function of the interacting organism, Dewey developed a theory of knowing and of knowledge called instrumentalism. Dewey describes instrumentalism as follows:

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Instrumentalism is an attempt to establish a precise logical theory of concepts, of judgments and inferences in their various forms, by considering primarily how thought functions in the experimental determinations of future consequences.\textsuperscript{38}
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From this point of view knowledge is reality making a particular and specific change in itself. The instrumental approach of Dewey rejected the classical logical approach which regarded qualitative determinations as fixed properties of objects.\textsuperscript{39} According to Dewey the classical approach to knowledge reduced the knowing process to either intuition or to the mechanical enumeration of items or properties. In

\textsuperscript{36}ibid., p. 266. \hfill \textsuperscript{37}ibid., p. 295.


\textsuperscript{39}ibid., p. 94.
Dewey's instrumentalism all propositions are symbolic, and the meaning of any proposition is ascertained by going beyond it, by using the proposition as a clue to discovery of a qualititative situation, in which certain qualities are experienced.

When the process of knowing centers in experience rather than in existential objects, thinking and reasoning become matters of desire and interest. Reasoning is affective, not intellectual activity. Regarding the affective nature of thought, Dewey writes:

... an organism has certain basic needs which cannot be supplied without activity that modifies the surroundings; that when the organism is in any way disturbed in its "equilibration" with its environment, its needs show themselves as restless, craving, desiring activity which persists until the acts thus induced have brought about a new integration of the organism and its relation to the environment.40

Since the process of knowing depends upon the interaction of an organism with its environment, the process begins with sensation. However, the senses are stimuli to action, not gateways of knowing.41 All sensations became urgent, not cognitive in quality, because the sensation marks an interruption in a course of action previously entered upon.42 Sensations thus act as pivots in readjusting behavior, and are provocations, incitements, challenges to an act of inquiry which terminates in knowledge.43 Sensations are the beginning

40 Ibid., p. 119.
41 Dewey, Reconstruction In Philosophy, p. 87.
42 Ibid., p. 88. 43 Ibid., p. 90.
of knowledge, but only in the sense that the experienced shock of change is the necessary stimulus to the investigating and comparing which eventually produces knowledge.

By making reason a phase of the generic function of creating a new relationship between organisms and the conditions of life, Dewey appears to make thinking, or reason similar to other organic functions, subject to the control of need, desires, and progressive satisfactions. The raw material of thought all comes from the past. Past experiences are retained so that they may be recalled and used when there is a need to use them in attaining the new and determined by the needs and desires of the affective nature. However, the retention of the past is not intellectual, according to Dewey. Retention is a matter of organic modifications, of change and disposition, attitude and habit. The whole purpose of the retention of the past is the development of a new environment as the condition of sustaining a new and more fully integrated self.

Dewey rejects reason as a faculty, separate from experience, which arrives at a knowledge of a superior realm of universal truths by means of contemplation. He also rejects the Kantian idea of mind as a faculty that introduces generality and regularity into experience as the unnecessary creation of men addicted to traditional formalism and elaborate terminology. Rather scornfully Dewey declares that

\[44\textit{Ibid.},\ p. \ 119.\quad 45\textit{Ibid.},\ p. \ 95.\]
reason as employed by historic rationalism has tended to carelessness, to conceit, to irresponsibility and to rigidity, in short, to absolutism.\footnote{Ibid., p. 97.}

Reason, as described by Dewey, is the result of a fine balance of instinct, or impulse, and habit. Rejecting the concepts of distinct and separate instincts which are the expression of an entity within the self called mind, soul, or consciousness, Dewey states that an instinct is simply an impulse to activity.\footnote{Ibid., p. 94.} Further, impulse, when it asserts itself deliberately against an existing custom, is the beginning of individuality in mind. When impulses become organized in dealing with a situation, habit is formed. However, habits as organized activities are secondary and acquired, not native and original. They are outgrowths of unlearned activities which are part of man's endowment at birth.\footnote{Ibid., p. 89.} All thinking, knowing or reasoning, flow out of habit, in Dewey's epistemology, for he states:

Concrete habits do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving, and reasoning that is done. Consciousness, whether as a stream or as special sensations and images, expresses functions of habits, phenomena of their formation, operation, their interruption and reorganization.\footnote{Ibid., p. 177.}

Reason, then, is experiential intelligence, conceived in a scientific fashion, used in the creation of social arts and is always subject to the test of experience. In agree-
ment with this concept of mind and of reasoning, Dewey makes intelligence a matter of practical adjustment. Intelligence, to Dewey, is a practical aspect of the needs and the possibilities of the different situations in which one is required to perform some activity. The ability to envisage things in terms of the adjustments and of the adaptations they make possible or hinder is intelligence, according to Dewey,50 who states his position as follows:

One objective test of the presence or absence of intelligence is influence upon behavior. No capacity to make adjustments means no intelligence. Conduct evincing management of complex and novel conditions means a high degree of reason.51

From this statement it appears that Dewey feels that intelligence is not something possessed once for all. It is in constant process of forming, and its retention requires constant alertness in observing consequences, an open-minded will to learn and courage in re-adjustment.52

Apparently because of the rise of new concepts in science, particularly in physics, Dewey changed from the biological concept of interaction to the physical concept of transaction. In his idea of transaction Dewey states that there can be no known apart from a knowing and no knowing apart from a known. Knowledge involves a transaction between the knower and the known in which there is no separation.53

50Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, p. 41.
51Ibid., p. 41.
52Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 97.
53John Dewey and Arthur Bentley, Knowing and the Known (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1940), p. 120.
Dewey summarizes his idea of transaction in the following statement:

Transaction: where systems of description and naming are employed to deal with aspects and phases of action, without final attribution to "elements" or other presumptively detachable or independent "entities," "essences," or "realities," and without isolation of presumptively detachable "relations" from such detachable "elements."  

In his epistemology Dewey illustrates his basic concept that experience is the only reality. When experience presents new and different approaches, these novel approaches must shape the concept of knowledge.

Axiology of Dewey

In the area of values, as in the areas of metaphysics and epistemology, Dewey structures his concepts in a naturalistic framework. In applying naturalistic principles to values, Dewey rejects both supernatural origins of values and traditional philosophical beliefs about value. To Dewey values originate within social relationships, and have meaning only as they contribute to man's adjustment to his environment. In this discussion of values, first attention is given to Dewey's rejection of supernatural and traditional values, followed by an exposition of his naturalistic values.

Dewey levels three charges at the traditional practice of associating values with the supernatural. First, he claims that the churches have lagged behind in most important

54Ibid., p. 108.
social movements, directing their attack on individual vices instead of economic and political injustices and oppression. Second, he claims that by stressing relation to the supernatural traditional religion has tended to depreciate natural social values and relations. Further, he states that traditionally natural relations are not merely depreciated, but have been regarded as dangerous rivals of higher values.55

Not only does Dewey reject all supernatural ideas of values, but he also disdains the rational approach to value apprehension by traditional philosophy, as indicated by the statement:

The philosopher erects a realm of values in which to place all the precious things which are extruded from natural existence because of isolations artificially introduced.56

The traditional philosophical approach to the study of values raised three insurmountable problems, according to Dewey. First, is the world of value that of ultimate and transcendent Being from which the existence of the world is a derivation or a fall? Or is it a manifestation of human subjectivity, a factor somehow miraculously supervening upon an order complete and closed in physical structure? Or are detached subsistences as "real" as are physical events, but having no temporal dates and spatial locations, and yet at times and places miraculously united with existence?57 Dewey's idea

57Ibid., p. 394.
of progress in man's development calls for a rejection of both traditional religion and traditional philosophy.

In adopting a naturalistic concept of value two things are essential, according to Dewey. First, one must surrender the identification of natural ends with good and perfection. Second, one must abandon the notion of a predetermined limited number of ends arranged in an order of increasing comprehensiveness and finality. This abandonment recognizes that limits, closures, and ends are experimentally and dynamically determined. It involves the idea of a moving adjustment of various energy-systems in their cooperative and competitive interactions, not something belonging to them of their own right.\(^5\)

To Dewey, history reveals there are three stages of growth. In the first stage, human relationships were thought to be so infected with the evils of corrupt human nature as to require redemption from external and supernatural forces. In the next stage, what is significant in these relations is found to be akin to values esteemed distinctly religious. Dewey believes that some liberal theologians have arrived at this stage. The third stage, of which Dewey was a conscious prophet, would realize that the values prized in the various traditional religions are, in fact, idealizations of things characteristic of natural association, which have been pro-

\(^{58}\text{ibid.},\ p.\ 395.\)
jected into a supernatural realm for safe-keeping and sanction. In summarizing his conclusions about the social basis of traditional values, Dewey states:

The values of natural human intercourse and mutual dependence are open and public, capable of verification by the methods through which all natural facts are established. By means of the same experimental methods, they are capable of experience.\(^{59}\)

Dewey felt that the acceptance of the social origin of values would emancipate mankind from crippling traditions and release the inherent powers of mankind for the progress of the human race.

Dewey observed that both traditional religion and traditional philosophy had accepted the idea that ultimate values are a matter of special revelation and are embodied in life by means radically different from the arts of action that deal with lower and lesser ends. According to the religious and philosophic tradition of Europe, the valid status of all the highest values, the good, the true, and the beautiful, was bound up with their being properties of an ultimate and supreme Being, namely God. All went well, says Dewey, as long as what passed for natural science gave no offense to this conception. Trouble began when science ceased to disclose in the objects of knowledge the possession of any such properties.

Modern thought started, according to Dewey, with the accentuation of the gulf between values which are intrinsic to the real, and hence not dependent upon action, and those

\(^{59}\)Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 73.
which are the objects of practical activity. Dewey further states that modern philosophy has contributed so little in bringing about an integration of what is known about the world and the direction of conduct because it persists in the belief that knowledge is concerned with the disclosure of the characteristics of antecedent existences and essences. In discussing the failure of both traditional and modern philosophy, he writes:

If the validity of beliefs and judgments about values is dependent upon the consequences of action undertaken in their behalf, and if the assumed association of values with knowledge capable of being demonstrated apart from activity is abandoned, then the problem of the intrinsic relation of science to value is wholly artificial. It is replaced by a group of practical problems.60

As a result of the claims of science on the one hand and the assertions of religion and philosophy on the other, most people live in a state of divided confusion. Practically, says Dewey, people are frenetically absorbed in mundane affairs in ways which, if they were formulated for intellectual acceptance, would be repudiated as low and unworthy. Emotionally and theoretically people give assent to principles and creeds which are no longer actively operative in life. This confusion regarding the status of values produces, usually, one of two results. There is an irrational acceptance of enjoyments experienced irrespective of their method of operation, or there is a rejection of values apart

from activity. The essential difference is that difference between a mind which beholds or grasps things from outside the world of things, physical and social, and one which is a participant, interacting with other things and knowing them.

From the naturalistic point of view, all modes of human association are affected with a public interest, and full realization of this interest is equivalent to a sense of significance that is religious in its function. To Dewey, this type of socialized religious function appears to be the basis of human advance, for he writes:

> Were men and women actuated throughout the length and breadth of human relations with the faith and ardor that have at times marked historic religions and the consequences would be incalculable.61

Ultimately, Dewey feels that there are only three possible courses of action possible to modern man in the area of value. One may give up the whole struggle as hopeless. Or he may choose dependence upon the supernatural. The latter position is both inconsistent and unscientific. The third alternative is the use of natural agencies, which to Dewey, is the only intelligent approach. He says:

> In the human community are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or face. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicitly and militant.62

The end result of Dewey's approach to value concepts appears to be a substitution of method for given content.

One of the later chapters of *The Quest For Certainty* is entitled "The Supremacy of Method." And a contemporary interpreter of Dewey, Henry W. Stuart, makes the following comment on Dewey's elevation of method:

Thus experimental inquiry, or method, is the locus within which, or the supreme principle by which, conceptions of philosophy that are really significant can be understood. It is in this sense that method—that is to say, the method of experimental inquiry—is supreme.63

That the interpretation suggested by Stuart correctly states this position is substantiated by the statement of Dewey: "... the value of any cognitive conclusion depends upon the method by which it is reached, so that the perfecting of method, the perfecting of intelligence, is the supreme value."64 Dewey is aware that such an extreme emphasis on method is directly opposite traditional doctrines which associate value with the existence of a transcendent Being:

The essential difference is that between a mind which beholds or grasps objects from outside the world of things, physical and social, and one which is a participant, interacting with other things and knowing them, provided the interaction is regulated in a definable way.65

Because of his pragmatic approach, Dewey would deny that there is any predestined course values should follow. Instead, human experience, consciously guided by ideas,

evolves its own standards and measures and each new experience presents an opportunity for new ideas and fresh ideals. The contrast between "given" values and pragmatic values is illustrated in the following statement:

Moral theory cannot emerge when there is positive belief as to what is right and what is wrong, for then there is no occasion for reflection. It emerges when men are confronted with situations in which different desires promise opposed goods and in which incompatible courses of action seem to be morally justified. . . when an individual is tempted to do something which he is convinced is wrong the occasion is not one of moral theory.66

In the area of value apprehension, as in the area of the object of faith, Dewey appears to struggle to retain values, but attempts to place value content on a pragmatic basis. He writes:

To frame a theory of knowledge which makes it necessary to deny the validity of moral ideas, or else to refer them to some other and separate kind of universe from that of common sense and science, is both provincial and arbitrary.67

By the inclusion of the pragmatic concept of value in his philosophy, Dewey seems to feel that he is avoiding two weaknesses inherent in contemporary culture. One weakness is the assumption on the part of traditionalists that values have objective status. The second weakness is the opinion of the skeptic or agnostic that modern life has no place for value concepts. By relating value content to scientific method,

Dewey hopes to retain the benefits derived from an apprecia-
tion of values, and at the same time to make values scien-
tifically tenable.

Logic of Dewey

Since Dewey's philosophy is completely and aggressively
naturalistic, it would follow that instrumental and experi-
mental logic is naturalistic. Dewey's logic presents a logic
of natural events which function on a meaning level rather than
an abstract logic of a separate, transcendent order. Dewey's
logical theory is an elaboration of the thesis that the only
way to secure rational continuity is to recognize it when it
is detected as an empirical fact of ordinary experience.

Dewey speaks of "the existential matrix of inquiry," by which
he means that the origin of logic is biological, that it con-
sists of natural events.68 Regarding the biological basis of
logic Dewey writes:

When biological functions are recognized to be indis-
pensible constituents of inquiry, logic does not need to
get enmeshed in the intricacies of different theories
regarding the relations of mind and body. It suffices to
accept the undeniable fact that they are necessary fac-
tors in inquiry, and then consider how they operate in
its conduct.69

Logic, then, to Dewey, appears to be a theory of
experiential naturalistic subject matter. Dewey states that
the areas of art and law aptly illustrate the fact that new

69Ibid.
formal properties accrue to subject matter in virtue of its subjection to certain types of operation. He would apply the same principle to logic. Regarding the operational nature of legal conceptions and its extension to the area of logic, Dewey writes:

However hypothetical may be the conception that logical forms accrue to existential materials in virtue of the control exercised over inquiries in order that they may fulfill their end, the conception is descriptive of something that verifiably exists. The development of forms in consequence of operations is an established fact in some fields; it is not invented ad hoc in relation to logical forms.70

From this point of view expressed above, it is evident that logical inquiry is as accessible to objective study as are any other modes of behavior. Logic is thus a pattern of inquiry, and inquiry is defined as follows:

Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole.71

Logic is transferred by Dewey from a consideration of abstract ideas to an analysis of concrete events in nature. Nature undergoes inquiry when natural events act upon human organisms in specified ways. By reason of this interaction of organisms within the processes of natural operation natural events behave differently, acquire new properties, become subject to a measure of control. When control, or inquiry, is imposed on a natural event the properties involved in the event reveal

70Ibid., p. 102.  
71Ibid., pp. 104-105.
hidden structural relations among themselves. The immediate problem in any situation, according to Dewey, is the kind of responses the organism shall make.\textsuperscript{72}

The function of logic, according to Dewey, is to detect the representations of other things that may follow from a given event. The objective method by which things point to other things Dewey defines as the primary relation of inference. Inference is the sign-significance relation.\textsuperscript{73} Inferences are drawn from existential situations, not from abstract ideas. In consistency with his total philosophy Dewey centers the origin of logical inquiry in a problem solving situation.

In Dewey's system of thought judgment may be identified as the settled outcome of inquiry. Judgment has direct existential import.\textsuperscript{74} A literal instance of judgment in the sense defined by Dewey is provided by the judgment of a court of law in settling some issue which, up to that point, has been in controversy. The settlement or judgment is the outcome of inquiry conducted in the court-hearings. In describing logic as the function of forming judgments Dewey states:

The final settlement arrived at is a settlement. The case is disposed of; the disposition takes effect in existential consequences. The sentence or proposition is not an end in itself but a decisive directive to future activities. The consequences of these activities bring about an existential determination of the prior situation which was indeterminate as to its issue.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{72}ibid., p. 107. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{73}ibid., pp. 51, 56.
\textsuperscript{74}ibid., p. 120. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{75}ibid., p. 121.
By the naturalistic, existential concept of logic, Dewey converts problematic subject matter into an object of knowledge. To Dewey, an object and an object of knowledge are basically the same thing, both are subject to discovery and invention by scientific method. Dewey makes inquiry experimental. Another function of logic, for Dewey, is to formulate and to generalize the conditions under which inquiry can operate.

All logical forms arise within the operation of inquiry and are concerned with control of inquiry, so that it may yield warranted assertions. This means that the forms originate in operations of inquiry.\footnote{Ibid., p. 130.}

The Nature of Man

In addition to a consideration of Dewey's metaphysics, his epistemology, his concepts of axiology and logic it seems necessary to consider briefly his idea of the nature of man, since it is closely related to his educational theory. Dewey regards as anacronistic the concept that man has a nature which is rational and spiritual in essence. To Dewey, both the old metaphysical and the traditional theological philosophies reflected the social conditions in which they were formulated.\footnote{Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 155.} When these traditional approaches are forced on contemporary culture, says Dewey, confusion and conflict result. According to empirical philosophy, which Dewey accepts, science provides the only means available for learning
Dewey regards man as part of a total natural process rather than an individual who lives in isolation. According to Dewey, all men live in association with other individuals and with nature, for he writes: "Individuals who are not bound together in associations, whether domestic, economic, religious, political, artistic or educational, are monstrosities." So-called human nature is merely another aspect of the larger framework of the natural process. From Dewey's point of view personality, selfhood, and subjectivity are eventual functions that emerge with complexly organized interactions, organic and social.

In regard to the condition of natural man Dewey rejects the idea of innate depravity as well as the concept of innate goodness. The mistake, he claims, is to associate human nature with any external moral realm. When man's activity is separated from external attempts to control it, then conduct becomes an interaction between elements of human nature and the environment, natural and social:

When we look at the problem as one of an adjustment to be intelligently attained, the issue shifts from within personality to an engineering issue, the establishment of arts of education and social guidance.

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81 Ibid., p. 10.
82 Ibid.
According to Dewey, human nature is not a mystical essence with immutable, invariable qualities or characteristics. Instead, human nature is the totality of individual interaction with natural events and natural processes. Man is a responding organism, not an inert, passive creature who waits for objective and external forces to move him. Out of the matrix of natural events and social processes personality is developed and takes form:

To learn to be human is to develop through the give and take of communication an effective sense of being an individually distinctive member of a community; one who understands and appreciates its beliefs, desires and methods, and who contributes to a further conversion of organic powers into human resources and values.83

Since man is a functioning organism in nature, there is no need to furnish him with incentives to activity. However, there is, in Dewey's approach, every need to induce man to guide his actions by intelligent perceptions of its results. Man's activities arise from impulses which interact with the environment. Such impulses as the medley of impulses listed under the caption of the belligerant impulse may lead to war or to a fight against disease:

Social conditions rather than an old and unchangeable Adam have generated wars; the ineradicable impulses that are utilized in them are capable of being drafted into many other channels.84

War is thus seen to be a function of social institutions, not of what is natively fixed in human constitution. What is

83Ratner, op. cit., p. 389.
needed, says Dewey, is a general social re-organization which will redistribute forces, immunize, divert, and nullify wrong impulses.\textsuperscript{85} The principle used to illustrate the social origin of warfare can be applied to every aspect of man's activity, according to Dewey.

With the concept of selfhood arising from the interaction of an organism with natural and social processes, it follows that upon everything that is legitimately characteristic of human nature, society has laid a finger.\textsuperscript{86} But this does not imply that the individual is engulfed by society. For society is not an abstraction, but an aggregate of interacting organisms. Dewey states that society does not stand over against the individual any more than the alphabet stands over against the letters composing it.\textsuperscript{87} From natural events and social processes, which are basically one, man derives his significance. This idea is revealed in the statement:

> But individuals are always closely geared to other individuals, and biological factors— their influence in no way being depreciated—act by contributing to the normal or abnormal interaction between individuals.\textsuperscript{88}

To Dewey, individual significance is possible only within the framework of society.

Carrying the idea of the natural and the social origin of individuality to its ultimate conclusion, Dewey states that man is not governed by reason, but by habit.

\textsuperscript{85}ibid., p. 115. \textsuperscript{86}Schilpp, op. cit., p. 348.
\textsuperscript{87}ibid., p. 347. \textsuperscript{88}ibid., p. 348.
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Social institutions and social expectations shape and crystallize impulses into dominant habits.\(^9\) Man is a creature of habit, not of reason, nor even of instinct.\(^9\) The individual lives by habit when a predisposition to ways or to modes of response is acquired. Habit, as Dewey defines it, is a particular sensitivity or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli.

To Dewey habits are the basic condition of intellectual efficiency.\(^9\) Habits are essential for intellectual effectiveness because they restrict the scope of the operation of intellect and direct its activities, thus preventing aimlessness. Dewey's position is stated precisely in these words: "Concrete habits do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving and reasoning that is done."\(^9\)

Since human nature, according to Dewey, arrives at distinctive selfhood by interacting with natural events and social processes, it follows that such human nature is dynamic rather than static. Finding significance in the process of interaction, human nature retains meaning only by remaining flexible enough to continue the process of interaction as new environmental situations arise.

In order to approach the study of Dewey's educational


\(^{90}\)Ibid., p. 125. \(^{91}\)Ibid., p. 172.

\(^{92}\)Ibid., p. 177.
philosophy it seemed necessary to present a brief exposition of his metaphysics, his epistemology, his logic, his axiology, his concept of the nature of man. Each of the various facets of Dewey's philosophy is consistently naturalistic, focalizing in the theme of the interaction of an organism with its environment. Substituting method for traditional philosophy, Dewey establishes a metaphysics based on scientific experiment. Growing out of this methodological metaphysics Dewey arrives at a theory of knowledge in which empirical inquiry is the only acceptable epistemology. Dewey's logic and his axiology are both expressed in functional terms of problem-solving instrumentalism. Human nature was, to Dewey, the result of intelligent habituation produced by the process of interaction.

The problem of the following discussion is to ascertain how Dewey applied his naturalistic theory of interaction in the area of education.
CHAPTER VI

EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF JOHN DEWEY

When John Dewey accepted a position as an instructor in philosophy at the University of Michigan in 1884, he was committed to Hegelian idealism, which nurtured his hostility to dualism of every sort and left him dubious as to the validity of all such dichotomies as those between education or culture and society or life.¹ In 1894 Dewey moved to the University of Chicago, where he opened his experimental school in 1896. Growing out of a practical, pragmatic approach to educational problems, Dewey's first educational treatise appeared in 1899 under the title *The School and Society*. Seventeen years later, in 1916, Dewey elaborated his position in *Democracy and Education*. Between 1916 and 1952 Dewey wrote prolifically, constantly criticizing traditional education and continually presenting his own suggestions for the improvement of American education.

In presenting Dewey's educational philosophy it seems sufficient to limit the discussion to four aspects: (1) his concept of philosophy and education; (2) his idea of the aims

and the objectives of education; (3) his curricular pattern; (4) his idea of educational methodology.

**Philosophy and Education**

To Dewey, philosophy is thinking what the known demands of us—what responsive attitude it exacts. Philosophy is an idea of what is possible, not a record of accomplished fact. Its value, says Dewey, lies not in furnishing solutions but in defining difficulties and in suggesting methods for dealing with them. Philosophic problems arise, according to Dewey, because of widely felt difficulties in social practice.

Where a system becomes influential, its connection with a conflict of interests calling for some program of social adjustment may be discovered. At this point, the intimate connection between philosophy and education appears.

Dewey proceeds to identify education and philosophy. Abstract philosophy is rejected as mere verbalism, sentiment, or dogma. If a theory makes no difference in educational endeavor, it is artificial, in Dewey's thinking.

If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward native and fellow men, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education. Unless a philosophy is to remain symbolic, or verbal, or a sentimental indulgence for a few, or else mere arbitrary dogma, its auditing of past experience and its program of values must take effect in conduct.

A philosophy is effective in producing public agitation, prop-

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3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., p. 383.
agenda, legislation and administrative action in the degree that it becomes educative.

It is precisely at the point of divorce between philosophy and education that Dewey launched his attack on the educational system of the early twentieth century. Not only did Dewey attack the educational system of the first decades of the twentieth century, but he also declared it to be a failure, for he writes: "It is time to take stock and to consider why and how the existing educational system has failed to meet the needs of the present and the immanent future." A little later Dewey criticizes current educational practices even more sharply in these words:

The system is a system only by courtesy. In fact, it is more like a patchwork, and a patchwork whose processes do not form a pattern. It is a patchwork of the old and the new; of unreconstructed survivals of the past and of things introduced because of new conditions. This statement applies equally to the things taught, the ways they are taught, and the social control of the educational system, and its administration. There are too many studies and too many courses of study, and the result is confusion.

Dewey states that one reason the existing educational system has failed is the educational tradition itself, which in the elementary stages is dedicated to the promotion of literacy and in the higher levels is controlled by the concern for the transmission of symbols, such as mathematics and

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Dewey admits that in an advanced culture much of the experience of the group is of necessity expressed in symbols. While admitting the value of cultural symbols, Dewey rejects the theory that the transmission of academic symbols is the fundamental task of education. When the symbol is made primary, education is divorced from life and becomes artificial, according to Dewey.

... the tragic weakness of the present school is that it endeavors to prepare future members of the social order in a medium in which the conditions of the social spirit are eminently wanting."8

Another reason for the failure of existing educational patterns, Dewey states, is the failure of the schools to recognize and to adapt to the new social conditions resulting from the industrial revolution and the consequent passing of pioneer culture. In a primitive culture there was always something which was to be done, and a real necessity that each member of the community or household do his own part faithfully and in cooperation with others. In this environment of social solution to pressing problems the child learned discipline, character-building attitudes, and a sense of social obligation. Further, educational purposes were realized in the close and intimate acquaintance with nature at first hand, with real things and materials, and with the actual processes of their manipulation for desired ends. Referring to

7Ibid., p. 3.

the educational benefits of a pioneer culture, Dewey comments:

In all this there was continual training of observation, of ingenuity, constructive imagination, of logical thought, and of the sense of reality acquired through first-hand contact with actualities. The educative forces of the domestic spinning and weaving, of the saw-mill, the gristmill, the copper shop, and the blacksmith forge, were continuously operative.9

With the passing of a pioneer culture, with its natural educative environment, society had accepted an artificial, imposed approach to education, in Dewey's thinking. Dewey felt that the dilemma in education had occurred because the old values of the pioneer system had been lost in traditional education. To restore the natural educational advantages of pioneer culture Dewey would suggest radical action, by the remark:

There is only one way out of the existing educational confusion and drift. That way is the definite substitution of a social purpose, controlling methods of teaching and discipline. . . for the traditional individualistic aim. And, in the schools, as in society generally, that change will signify more genuine development of individuality for the mass of individuals. For, in the first place, it signifies the substitution of methods of inquiry and mutual consideration and discussion for the methods of imposition and inculcation.10

In Education and Experience Dewey suggests a series of alternative positions in which he contrasts traditional education with experience centered education.11 Traditional education involves imposition from above while the newer edu-

9Ibid., p. 8.
cation involves expression and the cultivation of individuality; the older education stressed learning from texts and from teachers, while the new education stressed learning by experience; one system promoted the acquisition of isolated skills and techniques by drill and repetition, while the proposed system encourages the development of skills by direct participation in activity; one hoped to prepare pupils for the remote future, while the other points to the opportunities of the present; the older approach revolved around static aims, while the new approach is involved in acquaintance with a changing world.

It should be pointed out that Dewey's ideas are not entirely negative, for he writes:

A philosophy which proceeds on the basis of rejection, of sheer opposition, will . . . tend to suppose that because the old education was based on ready made organization, therefore it suffices to reject organization in totum, instead of striving to discover what it means and how it is to be attained on the basis of experience . . . . When external authority is rejected, it does not follow that all authority should be rejected, but that there is need to search for a more effective source of authority.12

Having rejected the traditional philosophy of education Dewey proceeds to replace it with an educational philosophy based on experience. The experiential basis of Dewey's educational theory is indicated by his definition of education: "It is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which

12 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience." An activity which brings education or instruction with it is a natural event which makes one aware of some of the connections which had been previously imperceptible.

The key to Dewey's educational philosophy is "experience." But, as Geiger points out, the following elements need to be kept in mind when considering Dewey's use of the term experience: (1) The word "experience" designates a special kind of existence, related to existence or to nature as part is to whole; (2) Dewey always regards experience as a process rather than as a thing, as an organic transaction rather than as the contents of a container; (3) since experience extends from the trivial, causal, and the blind to the incandescence which illuminates everything men prize, it involves discrimination, choice, meaning, and quality. Selectivity must always play a part in helping to achieve the richness, completeness and consummation of experience which Dewey regards as the only authentic moral direction.\(^{14}\)

It is the point of selectivity and discrimination which connects experience and education for Dewey. Indiscriminate experience as such does not necessarily involve education. On the contrary, an experience is miseducative if it has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience. Out of discriminating experience, to

\(^{13}\)Dewey, Philosophy of Education, pp. 89-90.

Dewey, arises the expression and development of individuality which alone can justify the aims and objectives of the educative process.\(^{15}\)

**Aims and Objectives of Education**

Dewey offers the following criteria by which to judge the educational value of an activity:

> We say that the kind of experience to which the work of the schools should contribute is one marked by executive competency in the management of resources and obstacles encountered; by sociability, or interest in the direct companionship of others; by aesthetic taste or capacity to appreciate artistic excellence in at least some of its classic forms; by trained intellectual method, of interest in some mode of scientific achievement; and by sensitiveness to the right and claims of others—conscientiousness.\(^{16}\)

Dewey's educational aims are as wide as the range of natural events and human interests. His objectives for education include the social, the moral, the intellectual, the aesthetic and the utilitarian.

The general aim of education in Dewey's philosophy is to enable individuals to continue their education. Another way of stating the educational aim of Dewey is that the object and reward of learning is continued capacity for growth.\(^{17}\) Educational aims arise from the activity so inherent in biological or social activity. Dewey stresses the point that educational aims should not be imposed upon the educative process.

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\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 117.
from without. Stressing the importance of natural activity as the logical process by which to arrive at educational aims, Dewey states:

To talk about an educational aim when approximately each act of a pupil is dictated by the teacher, when the only order in the sequence of his acts is that which comes from the assignment of lessons and the giving of directions by another, is to talk nonsense. It is equally fatal to an aim to permit capricious or discontinuous action in the name of spontaneous self-expression. An aim implies an orderly and ordered activity, one in which the order consists in the progressive completing of a process.18

A precise, yet general, criteria of establishing correct aims is suggested by Dewey.19 First, the aim set up must be an outgrowth of existing conditions and must point to directed activity in arriving at desired results. Second, the educational aim should be flexible. It must be capable of alteration to meet circumstances. The aim is thus experimental and is constantly adjusted as it is tested in action. Finally, the aim must always represent a freeing of activities. Dewey uses the term "end in view," as it suggests the termination or conclusion of some process in which activities are directed to the solution of a problem.

Using the above criteria for the evaluation of educational aims, the following discussion attempts to present three objectives of education which appear to be prominent in Dewey's educational theory. These three aims are the growth of social efficiency, the attainment of moral patterns of

18 Ibid., pp. 118-119. 19 Ibid., p. 121.
response and the development of judgment.

Although Dewey's educational philosophy is consistently and relentlessly naturalistic, it is most generally known for its emphasis on the social. Many consider Dewey's social interpretation of education his most distinctive contribution to educational theory.\(^{20}\) To Dewey it was essential to combine an all-prevading naturalism with an all-inclusive regard for the distinctly human, or social. His naturalism required Dewey to accept without reservation the concept of continuity between man and the rest of nature. But his interpretation of man's role in the natural process also required that he recognize the extraordinary differences that mark off the activities and the achievements of human beings from those of other biological forms.\(^{21}\) The social environment in which man operates provides the natural bridge from behavior that is organic to behavior that is distinctly human.\(^{22}\)

A society, says Dewey, is a number of people held together because they are working along common lines in a common spirit, and with reference to common aims.\(^{23}\) The common needs and aims of a given society require an expanding


\(^{21}\)Dewey, *Logic*, p. 43.

\(^{22}\)Schilpp, *op. cit.*, p. 436.

\(^{23}\)Dewey, *School and Society*, p. 11.
interchange of thought and a growing sense of unity, according to Dewey. Dewey criticizes traditional education for its lack of social stimulus, as indicated by the following words:

The radical reason that the present school cannot organize itself as a natural social unit is because just this element of common and productive activity is absent. . . . There is no obvious social motive for the acquirement of mere learning, there is no clear social gain in success thereat.24

Dewey regards the school as an institution erected by society to do a certain specific work, to exercise a certain specific function in maintaining the life and in advancing the welfare of society.25 Within the school as a social institution the child is regarded as a social being who should not be isolated from natural social prowess. The social nature of the school is emphasized in the following statement of Dewey:

The child is one, and he must either live his social life as an integral unified being, or suffer loss and create friction. . . . We must take the child as a member of society in the broadest sense, and demand for and from the schools whatever is necessary to enable the child intelligently to recognize all his social relations and take his part in sustaining them.26

Education is considered social, in Dewey's thinking, for several reasons. The first reason is that meanings are properties of a kind of behavior which appears only in a society in which language had made voluntary communication possible. This process of linguistic communication transformed


26Ibid., pp. 8-9.
the natural environment into a cultural environment and in so doing created the realm of meanings. 27 Since the realm of meanings and values is created and conserved by the organized life of society, the materials of education—its content and purposes—are social in nature. 28

A second reason for Dewey's belief that education is primarily a social process is that the child learns the behaviors which are characteristic of person-hood by participation in the activities and meanings of society. To Dewey a being whose activities are associated with others has a social environment. Regarding the molding force of environment Dewey writes: "What he does and what he can do depends upon the expectations, demands, approvals and condemnations of others." 29 Thus it is society, Dewey claims, which functions as the great educative force because of its established modes of action and thought which pattern the behavior of the child.

Dewey further claims that education should be interpreted as a social process because the establishment of the aims and the objectives of education requires study of the child in connection with the conditions and institutions of which he is a part. All education, as Dewey sees it, is achieved indirectly, through the environment. 30 The point of

28 Schlipp, op. cit., p. 437.
30 Ibid.
difference in education, he comments, is whether we permit chance environments to do the work, or whether we design environments for specific educative purposes.

Another reason for Dewey's stress on the social nature of education is his belief that society insures its continuance by the means of education. Education is particularly essential to insure the continuance of democracy, according to Dewey:

Only as the coming generation learns in the schools to understand the social forces that are at work, the directions and the cross-directions in which they are moving, the consequences that they are producing... only as the schools provide this understanding, have we any assurance that they are meeting the challenge which is put to them by democracy.51

Regarded from a social point of view, education affords a continual opportunity for the reassessment of the patterns of life developing within a given society. Dewey is especially anxious that democracy be continually re-evaluated, for he writes: "The very idea of democracy, the meaning of democracy, must be continually explored afresh; it has to be constantly discovered, and rediscovered, remade, and reorganized."32

Finally, Dewey contends that education should be regarded as a social process because those who pass through the institution called the school will become members of a society in which they will be called upon to participate.

32 Ibid., p. 47.
Among the desired social aims of education are the ability to exercise the responsibility of citizenship, the ability to fulfill family obligations, the development of beneficial vocational skills, the appreciation of cultural values, and the realization of leadership qualities.³³

Another aim of the educational process, according to Dewey, is the development of patterns of conduct which may be regarded as moral. However, it is necessary to state two things regarding Dewey's interpretation of moral. The fundamental idea of Dewey in regard to morality is that morals do not consist of ideas or standards of conduct imposed from without, but are behavioral directives gained from experience. The second foundational concept of Dewey in his approach to morality is that, since moral behavioral habits are derived from experience, such patterns of morals are never static, but are dynamic, or open-ended.

Dewey makes a distinction between moral ideas and ideas about morality. To Dewey moral ideas are ideas of any sort which take effect in conduct and improve it, making it better than it would be otherwise. Conversely, he describes immoral ideas as any ideas which result in making behavior worse than it would be without the idea. Non-moral ideas are those ideas or pieces of information which leave conduct uninfluenced for either the better or the worse.³⁴

³³Dewey, Moral Principles In Education, pp. 9-10.
writes that ideas about morality may be morally indifferent or immoral or moral: "There is nothing in the nature of ideas about morality, of information about honesty or purity or kindness which automatically transmits such ideas into good character or good conduct." Since changing behavior, or the modification of conduct, is the essence of education, then it follows that any idea or experience which moves conduct toward a desired goal is moral. It also follows, in Dewey's thinking, that the moral purpose, thus defined, becomes the universal and dominant purpose in education:

The business of the educator is to see that the greatest possible number of ideas acquired by children and youth are acquired in such a vital way that they become moving ideas, motive forces in the guidance of conduct.

In the process of the realization of the desired moral ends of education it is impossible, as Dewey sees it, to keep direct moral considerations constantly predominant. He thinks that moral education is practically hopeless when the goal of character development is linked to the acquisition of knowledge which has nothing to do with character. Dewey states that morality is induced by direct instruction only in authoritarian situations. He states that such an approach is not possible in a democracy:

... direct instructions in morals has been effective only in social groups where it was a part of the authoritative control of the many by the few. Not the teaching as such but the reinforcement of it by the whole regime of which it was incident made it effective.

35ibid. 36ibid.
To attempt to get similar results from lessons about morals in a democratic society is to rely upon sentimental magic.37

But from the experiential approach of Dewey it is both desirable and possible to aim at making the methods of learning, of acquiring intellectual power, and of assimilating subject-matter such that they will make behavior more enlightened, more consistent, more vigorous than they would be otherwise. In keeping with his social approach to education Dewey states that the child ought to have the same motives for right doing and to be judged by the same standards that exist in the social environment.

In addition to developing social efficiency and achieving moral patterns of response Dewey places the development of reflective thinking, or judgment, as one of the foremost educational aims. Thinking, according to Dewey, is defined as that operation in which present facts suggest other facts in such a way as to induce belief in what is suggested on the ground of real relations in the things themselves.38 Dewey repeats a familiar theme when he states that thinking is not an activity which may be artificially imposed from without by exhortation or moralizing. He also distinguishes reflective thinking from discontinuous daydreams and from disconnected beliefs. The demand for the solution of a perplexity is the steadying and guiding factor in the entire process of reflection. In this way, says Dewey, the nature of the problem fixes

38Dewey, How We Think, p. 12.
the end of thought, and the end controls the process of thinking.\textsuperscript{39}

The development of reflective thinking is important for three reasons, according to Dewey.\textsuperscript{40} First, it emancipates people from merely impulsive and merely routine activity. Stated in positive terms, thinking enables the individual to direct his activities with foresight and to plan with ends-in-view, or with known purposes. A second advantage of the development of reflective thinking is that it makes possible systematic preparations and inventions. By the processes of thought man develops and arranges artificial signs to remind him in advance of consequences and of ways of securing and avoiding them. Finally, reflective thinking enriches physical events and objects by conferring upon them a different status and value from those which they possess to a being that does not reflect. The first two values mentioned are of a practical kind, resulting in increased power of control. The third value is an enrichment value apart from control.

Dewey is empirical and naturalistic in advancing the derivative role of thought and in positing the dependence of thought upon non-logical subject matter. To Dewey thought is an agency for reconstituting experience. Thought as an agency of reconstructing experience is essential because every living creature is in constant interaction with its surround-

\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., p. 15. \textsuperscript{40}Ibid., pp. 17-19.
ings. It is engaged in a process of give and take, of doing something to objects around it and in return receiving impressions and stimuli from its environment. The point at which thinking begins, Dewey says, is the point of curiosity aroused in the organism by the process of interaction.

Speaking of curiosity as the source of thinking Dewey says:

But we also have tendencies that are forward-reaching and out-reaching, that go out to make new contacts, that seek new objects, that strive to vary old objects, that revel, as it were, in experiences for their own sake and so are ceaselessly active in enlarging the range of experience. These various tendencies are summed up in curiosity.41

However, curiosity, in Dewey's thinking, must transcend the organic and social level to the reflective, or to the intellectual level. On the intellectual level curiosity is transformed into interest in finding out for oneself the answers to questions and the solutions to problems aroused by contact with persons and with things. Thinking then, is developed by a scientific, natural process. First the individual experiences, or is confronted by a situation which arouses curiosity or which presents a felt difficulty. The second step in developing thinking, or judgment, is to analyze or to investigate the nature of the perplexity. Another step is taken in developing discriminating judgment, or intelligence, when the individual begins to conjecture and to invent hypothetical explanations for the problematic features revealed by observation. A further level of thinking occurs

41 Ibid., p. 36.
when particular hypothesis are selected and tested, and the problem is solved. By the approach of problem solving Dewey proposed that thinking, or intelligence, is no more and no less than the ability to discover solutions to the inevitable problems which arise as an organism functions in a natural and a social environment. Because of the natural, practical method of developing thinking as an instrument of problem solving Dewey's approach has been called instrumentalism.

The educational aims which appear to be paramount to Dewey are social efficiency, moral habits or attitudes, and the development of intelligence. Since Dewey felt that traditional education either ignored or was greatly deficient in achieving these educational goals, he proposed a drastic revision of the curriculum. In a new and more scientifically slanted curricular pattern, Dewey thought the aims of education could be developed more satisfactorily and more efficiently.

Curricular Pattern

The curriculum, as Dewey proposed, would be experience-centered and scientifically oriented. Regarding the need for a new concept of the curriculum Dewey writes: "... new methods of inquiry and reflection have become for the educated man the final arbiter of all questions of fact,
existence, and intellectual assent." In discussing the importance of the curriculum Dewey seemed to place priority on three things: (1) the social nature of the curriculum; (2) the curriculum as an outgrowth of natural activity; (3) and the problem-solving aspect of the curriculum.

To Dewey, the first great step toward better education, as far as subject matter and method were concerned was to construct an educational system that informed students about the present state of society in a way that enabled them to understand the conditions and forces at work. Social change seemed to make educational change natural and desirable.

The modification going on in the method and curriculum of education is as much a product of the changed social situation, and as much an effort to meet the needs of the new society that is forming, as are changes in modes of industry and commerce.

The social context of Dewey's curricular approach is a natural consequence of his concept of mind. For the mind cannot be regarded, says Dewey, as an individual, monopolistic possession, but represents the outworkings of the endeavor and thought of humanity, and that social needs and aims have been most potent in shaping it.

The radical change from a pioneer culture, where learning took place naturally in connection with the struggle for survival.

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43 Dewey, Education and the Social Order, p. 10.
44 Dewey, School and Society, p. 4.
for survival, to an urbanized mode of living called for equally radical changes in education, according to Dewey. The basic problem of education, to Dewey, was the problem of retaining the values innate in pioneer life by introducing into the curriculum occupations which exact personal responsibilities and which train the child in relation to the physical realities of life. In Dewey's approach the emphasis is shifted from subject matter as content to subject matter consisting primarily of meanings which supply content to existing social life.46

Of basic importance in Dewey's curricular pattern are play and work. However, he is incisive in stating that work and play are not to be introduced for entertainment or simply as time-consuming devices, but are to be used for intellectual and social purposes.

The problem of the educator is to engage pupils in these activities in such ways that manual skill and technical efficiency are gained and immediate satisfaction found in the work, together with later usefulness, these things shall be subordinated to education—that is, to intellectual results and the forming of a socialized disposition.47

To Dewey any curricular programs which simply resulted in the reproduction of ready-made models or in muscular dexterity were as ineffective as traditional educational procedures. Play is introduced into education in the hope that it will lead to more activity. Activities, as they become more com-

47 Ibid., p. 231.
plicated, gain added meaning by greater attention to specific results achieved and thus become work. In an ideal situation, which Dewey proposed, both work and play are equally free and intrinsically motivated. Work, to Dewey, is simply an activity which consciously includes a regard for consequences as a part of itself. Work, when permeated with the play attitude, has attained the level of art.48

In Dewey's curriculum history and geography are the information studies par excellence for schools.49 History and geography, he claims, enrich and liberate the more direct and personal contacts of life by furnishing their context, their background and outlook. Geography is important because it emphasizes the physical setting in which experience occurs. History is important because it stresses the social activities in which the individual operates. Both history and geography are areas of study which lead to natural learning activity:

Nature is the medium of social occurrences. It furnishes original stimuli; it supplies obstacles and resources. Civilization is the progressive mastery of its varied energies.50

The principle of study in both geography and history is to trace the process of its development, to follow it through the successive stages of growth. By tracing back current problems or processes to their origin the student gains an understanding of the present and is able to manipulate,

48ibid., p. 242. 49ibid., p. 246. 50ibid., p. 247.
control, or modify present and future developments.

Science also occupies a prominent place in Dewey's concept of curricular studies. By science Dewey means that knowledge which is the outcome of methods of observation, reflection and testing which are deliberately adopted to secure a settled, assured subject matter. Science also involves an intelligent and persistent endeavor to revise current beliefs, to eliminate error, and to assure greater accuracy. Science, to Dewey, is the perfecting of knowing. Science marks the emancipation of mind from devotion to customary purposes and makes possible the systematic pursuit of new ends. It is the agency of progress in action, the chief means of perfecting control of means of action. It is the sole instrumentality of conscious as distinct from accidental progress.

While science is the chief instrumentality of progress, Dewey does not subject everything to science. Man is always central in Dewey's thinking. Science is man's best method for perfecting man. Dewey, like Jefferson, would put his faith in man as a social being, not in science. Quoting Jefferson, he said: "... the well-being of France depends not on the state of science, not matter how exalted it may be in a select band of enlightened men, but on the condition of the general mind."
In addition to geography, history, and science Dewey would include in the curriculum activities that would lead to an appreciation of values, the ability to use leisure time beneficially, skill in the art of communication, and some degree of vocational achievement. Any area of investigation that could develop social efficiency, and arouse a natural understanding of nature and a degree of control of natural processes could be included in Dewey's curricular plan.

**Educational Methodology**

Directly related to the experience-centered curriculum of Dewey there is a parallel experience-centered method by which the pupil is directed in his learning process. In his methodology, as in his concept of the curriculum, Dewey rejects the traditional approach in favor of methods which are in harmony with natural processes. The traditional idea that mind and the world of things and persons are two separate and independent realms carries with it the conclusion that method and subject matter are separate affairs, according to Dewey. From the traditional point of view, says Dewey, subject matter becomes a ready-made systematized classification of the facts and principles of the world of nature and of man. Further, as Dewey interprets the traditional approach, method consists of the various ways in which this antecedent subject matter may be presented to and impressed upon the mind, or it con-

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sists of a consideration of the ways in which the mind may be externally brought to bear upon the matter so as to facilitate its acquisition and possession. Since any dualism is unacceptable, and since thinking is of the nature of problem solving activity in his theory, Dewey rejects the split between content and method.

But since thinking is a directed movement of subject matter to a completing issue, and since mind is the deliberate and intentional phase of the process, the notion of any such split is radically false.55

To Dewey, method is never something outside of the material. Method to him means the arrangement of subject matter which makes it most effective in use. Method is simply an effective treatment of material with a minimum of waste of time and energy. Again, method is not antithetical to subject matter, but is the effective direction of subject matter to desired results. Dewey states that method as the effective direction of subject matter to desired ends has four advantages over traditional methods.56 First, in traditional methods there is a neglect of the concrete situations of experience, while in Dewey's approach the method is derived from observation of what happens, with a view to seeing that it happens better next time. Again, traditional methods produce a false concept of discipline and of interest, while the natural approach elicits interest and produces discipline because the material under consideration constitutes a problem

55Ibid., p. 194.  
56Ibid., pp. 197-198.
which involves the spontaneous interest of the pupil. Further, in traditional education learning is made a direct and a conscious end in itself. In Dewey's thinking learning should be the result of an impulse to utilize the factors present in a situation to achieve a desirable goal. Finally, in traditional methodology methods tend to become reduced to a cut and dried routine, consisting of a series of mechanical steps to be mastered. In contrast to the static routine in learning Dewey proposes methods which are flexible.

Method, then, is to Dewey the method of an art, of action intelligently directed by ends. There can be no specific method of teaching any more than there can be specific methods of painting a work of art or of the diagnosis of a disease by a physician. Both the artist and the physician bring to the situation an expert knowledge of the background, the general structure of the situation, and a knowledge of objects or of instruments to be used. But each project or case is an individualized experience.

Dewey transfers the artist concept to methodology, stating there are certain general principles which are included:

They are the features of the reflective situation: problem, collection and analysis of data, projection and elaboration of suggestions or ideas, experimental application and testing; the resulting conclusion or judgment.57

While there are general features to his methods, Dewey

57Ibid., p. 203.
believes that the specific elements of an individual's method or way of attacking a problem are found ultimately in his native tendencies and his acquired habits and interests. In this way, the method of one will vary from that of another, as his original instinctive capacities vary, as his past experiences and his preferences vary. In addition to the general features of any method suggested above, Dewey states that, from the standpoint of the teacher, several attitudes are necessary in effective intellectual ways of dealing with subject matter. Among the most important attitudes are directness, open-mindedness, single-mindedness, and responsibility.58

Dewey's methodology places the child at the center of the teaching-learning situation when he writes: "In this case the child becomes the sun about which the appliances of education revolve; he is the center about which they are organized."59 While Dewey makes the child the center of the educational process, and regards the natural activities of the child as the point of departure in learning, he clearly points out that direction is essential in the learning process in the following statement:

The child is already intensely active, and the question of education is the question of taking hold of his activities, of giving them direction. Through direction, through organized use, they tend toward valuable results, instead of scattering or being left to merely impulsive

58Ibid., p. 204.

59Dewey, School and Society, p. 35.
With the child as the center of the educational process Dewey suggests that any adequate methodology should capitalize on four impulses which are natural and available in the schools. There is the social instinct of the children as shown in conversation and personal communication. Since the language instinct is the simplest form of the social expression of the child, it is the greatest of all educational resources, according to Dewey, and is the second natural quality which should be considered in teaching methods.

Then there is the instinct of making, or what Dewey calls the constructive impulse. Since the child does not have much instinct for abstract inquiry, but does have an impulse to do and to make, an effective teaching method should utilize the child's impulse to do things and to see things happen. Again, the key to effective teaching or learning is directing the constructive impulse to give results of value.

A final natural impulse of the child is the impulse to investigation. In Dewey's thinking there is no distinction between experimental science for little children and work done in the carpentry shop. Work that children do in physics or in chemistry is not for the purpose of making technical generalizations or even at arriving at abstract truth. Children, says Dewey, simply like to do things and to watch to see what will happen. This impulse, properly directed, can be a factor in

60 Ibid., pp. 37-38.  61 Ibid., pp. 42-43.
effective method.

From the natural impulses innate in the human organism—the interest in conservation or communication, the artistic expression as symbolized in language, the interest in making things, and the impulse to investigation—the teacher derives the basic aspects of method. When the individual teacher directs these natural impulses into problem solving activities, with the aim of achieving desirable results, the method is natural, effective, and educative. In his methodology, as in all his educational concepts, Dewey is consistently naturalistic.

Dewey applied his naturalistic philosophy to educational theory to the degree of equating philosophy and education. The aims of education were naturalistic, namely social efficiency, the development of discriminating judgment, and moral patterns of response. The curricular content, emphasizing the natural and the social sciences, was designed to appeal to the native impulses of the pupil. Dewey's methodology was a flexible, problem-solving approach which involved the directing of natural impulses toward particular goals.

During the first quarter of the twentieth century Dewey's philosophy, with its penetrating criticism of traditional educational theories and practices and its emphasis on democracy and scientific method, met little opposition and gained widespread support. By the third decade of the century, however, the opposition to Dewey began to crystallise.
Among the most articulate of the opposition was Robert M. Hutchins. Hutchins attacked vigorously the naturalistic relativism of the progressive-education position. The objection of Hutchins was directed mainly at what he described as the anti-intellectualism of the naturalism of Dewey. In its stead he favored a humanistic education based on universal and eternal truth, arrived at in Aristotelian fashion by distinguishing that which is essential to a thing constituted from that which is merely an accident of its individuality.

Opposition to Dewey also came from F. S. Breed and later from John Wild under the caption of the "new-realism." According to Wild, the realist holds that the world exists in itself, apart from our desires and knowledge. The naturalism of Dewey had enclosed man in the natural process, thus eliminating his independence. The realist also holds that the human intellect and will cannot be adequately understood in terms of purely physicalist categories. Realism also accepts the concept of personal dependence and contingency, and is therefore more hospitable to religion.

In addition to the opposition of the classical humanists and the philosophical realists, further opposition

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64 Ibid.
to Dewey came from a group led by William O. Bagley. This
group sponsored an educational philosophy called "essentialism," in which they sought to stabilize educational aims
and methods by emphasizing the tried and true in experience.
Sharp criticism to Dewey and his naturalism also came from
within naturalistic philosophy itself. Boyd H. Bode, in
Modern Educational Theories, opposed the scientific deter­
mination of educational objectives. Science, according to
Bode, could determine what society actually desired, but it
could not determine what society ought to desire. 65

Perhaps the sharpest and the most penetrating critic
of Dewey, was Herman H. Horne, a contemporary of Dewey teach­
ing at New York University. Horne was an idealist who felt
that the system of Dewey was unsound philosophically and
unsatisfactory educationally. The next chapter considers
Horne's philosophy from the perspective of idealism.

65Bode, Modern Educational Theories, p. 203.
CHAPTER VII

THE PERSPECTIVE OF IDEALISM: HORNE

Even as John Dewey was a conscious prophet of a revolutionary approach to education, so Herman H. Horne was a self-appointed critic of the new education, particularly of its Deweyan philosophical assumptions. As Dewey first rejected traditional philosophy, and then proposed his own system, so Horne rejects Dewey's concepts, offering the philosophy of idealism as a substitute. Horne is generally recognized as the leading exponent of idealism in educational philosophy in America in the twentieth century. Brubacher assigns Horne to a place of leadership in idealistic thought in the following comment:

Most prolific writer on the idealistic philosophy of education in the twentieth century was Herman Harrell Horne (1874-1946). At a time when idealism was already fast fading as the dominant American theory of education, Horne managed to draw together the various strains of idealism into their more systematic educational exposition.¹

Butler also pays tribute to the work of Horne in the comment:

Probably no man in recent American education has been as much an exponent of the idealistic philosophic tradition as the late Herman Harrell Horne, who, throughout a thirty-three year professorship at New York University,

¹Brubacher, History of the Problems of Education, p. 126.
Horne subscribed to the philosophy of personal idealism, which he defines as follows: "It is the philosophy which finds both the reality and the values of life in the experience of persons who feel themselves not orphans, but at home in a purposeful universe." In more technical terminology Horne presents a precise definition of idealism:

Idealism is the conclusion that the universe is an expression of intelligence and will, that the enduring substance of the world is of the nature of mind, that the material is explained by the mental. Idealism as a philosophy stands in contrast with all those systems of thought that center in nature (naturalism) or in man (humanism).

Before discussing the philosophical concepts of Horne it is essential to analyze his approach to the nature and to the content of philosophy, particularly in the areas where he differs from Dewey. Horne states that Dewey had not provided a real, logical refutation of classical, speculative philosophy. Dewey had used the genetic approach to philosophy, assuming that philosophy arose from certain social conditions. Further, Dewey holds that since these social conditions have changed, the conclusions drawn from them are invalid. About the social origin of philosophic ideas Dewey states: "It

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2Butler, op. cit., p. 211.

3Herman H. Horne, This New Education (New York: Abingdon Press, 1931), p. 11.

seems to me that the genetic approach is a more effective way of undermining this type of philosophic theorizing than any attempt at logical refutation." Stating that the social origin of a theory does not determine its truth Horne writes:

The fact that Plato wrote under aristocratic social conditions does not settle the question of the truth of his theory of ideas. Let it be noted that the same social conditions saw the birth of the Sophists, the first pragmatists and humanists.

In addition, Horne contended that the problem-solving attitude to which Dewey reduced philosophy was too narrow, for two reasons. First, the individual needs findings as well as seekings; second, the individual needs aesthetic enjoyment as well as intelligent action. Dewey, says Horne, fails to give adequate recognition to these two aspects of life. Further, Horne charges that Dewey has not eliminated dualism from his philosophy. For Dewey speaks, says Horne, of the world having a measure of order, but offers no theory of the nature or origin of this order. Dewey's world has the flux of Heraclitus, but not the permanence of Parmenides.

Horne also rejects the concepts of Dewey in the area of method. Horne feels that Dewey's socio-centric universe cannot be proved by experimental inquiry nor sustained by scientific theory. Horne writes:

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6Horne, This New Education, p. 107.
7Ibid.
8Ibid., p. 110.
But how can a socio-centric universe be either proven by the method of experimental inquiry or speculatively defended in the light of Eddington's cosmology set forth so majestically in his Science and the Unseen Universe.9

In fact, Horne states that Dewey's position is more narrow than medievalism, for medievalism at least had Divinity above and humanity below, while Dewey reduces everything to man's ability to solve his own problems. In Dewey's system, says Horne, habit formation takes the place of ontology and cosmology.10

While rejecting the Deweyan ideas of the nature and the method of philosophy, Horne follows the traditional approach to philosophic interpretation. Philosophy, according to Horne, is the mind of man wrestling with the universe.11 Horne states that the instrument of philosophy is thought, as it attempts to follow out in some final and self-consistent fashion the intimations of partial experience.12 With thought as the instrument of philosophy, the characteristic method of philosophy is to take what facts it can find in a given field of human experience and then to seek logically to determine their meaning. Referring to the validity of his philosophical method Horne comments:

It is a perfectly legitimate method of mental procedure, as used and vindicated by both science and art; only

9Ibid., p. 101. 10Ibid.
the whole which philosophy seeks is larger, even reality itself. In brief, the method of philosophy is reflection.13

Horne, by accepting the idealistic interpretation of the nature and of the method of philosophy, also accepts the implications of such an interpretation of philosophy in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and the nature of man.

Metaphysical Concepts of Horne

The two traditional phases of metaphysics, ontology and cosmology, are focal in the approach of Horne to the problem of the nature of reality. Writing in general terms, Horne states that idealism finds ideas and purposes to be the reality of existence, and personality, which is the union of ideas and purposes, to be the ultimate reality.14 Speaking more specifically, Horne defines ontology, or the nature of being, in these words: "... according to idealism, to be is to be experienced by an absolute self."15 He defines cosmology, or the nature of order in the world as follows: "... idealism holds that the order of the world is due to the manifestation in space and time of an eternal and spiritual reality."16

If the universe is interpreted from the naturalistic

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13Ibid., p. 258.
16Ibid., p. 140.
point of view, then the burden of proof rests on substantial concepts, mechanical processes, developmental procedures, or a spirit of investigation. But if the nature of reality is described in idealistic concepts, the central ideas are the experiencing mind and the nature of order. Upon these two rational principles, the experiencing mind and the nature of order, Horne focalizes his attempts to explain his idealism, which ends ultimately in the concept of God as the essence of reality.

Horne begins his mentalistic interpretation of reality by asserting that mind, as mind, is the only plausible principle of explanation. In a vigorous statement he asserts:

Mind is the principle of explanation. There is no denying this fact. It is our minds that raise problems, face problems, and seek the solution of problems. Mind is the explainer. Mind as the explainer is real. Mind, the real explainer, cannot consistently regard itself as unreal. Neither can mind, the real explainer, consistently say that anything else than itself is more real than itself. For this supposed thing other than itself supposed to be more real than itself, is itself a conception of the mind.  

Referring to the attempt of naturalism to interpret nature, or reality, in terms of natural law, Horne writes that the assertion that the universe is governed by the action of mechanical law is itself a mental judgment, an effect of mind as cause. Mechanism itself is thus a construction of the human mind. So called "natural laws," says Horne, are human

17Ibid., p. 142.

formulations which fairly describe but do not exhaust nature. As Horne interprets mind, it is not only with mind but also by mind that we explain, that is, by concepts framed by the mind. Mind, subjectively used and objectively applied, is the sole principle of explanation.

Horne attempts to describe the nature of mind by using the idea of negative elimination. Thus mind is not matter, for matter is a product of mind in the sense that the mind ascribes the qualities of space, weight, dimensions, and quantity. Further, the mind has qualities which matter cannot possess, such as a remembered past and an anticipated future. Again, mind has meanings, while matter has no meaning to itself. Also, says Horne, mind perceives the qualities of the world, such as colors, tones, tastes, odors; but matter, though it may be composed of waves, perceives no qualities. In summarizing the difference between mind and matter Horne concludes:

For these reasons and many others of a like import, we must conclude that mind is too qualitatively different from matter ever to be regarded as matter or as a product of matter, though matter may be regarded as objectified mind, or mind in its 'otherness,' as painting objectifies the thought, feeling, and purpose of the artist.

In his interpretation of reality in ontological terms Horne has thus far stated that mind is the only plausible

19Ibid.
21Ibid., p. 143.
principle of explanation and that mind is not matter. A third concept of Horne regarding mind is that mind comes from mind. In his thinking mind is too unlike matter to be a derivative of matter. But he thinks that finite minds may be derived from an infinite mind, for he writes: "... the presence of any finite minds at all in the stream of time may be to the self-manifestation of an infinite mind, just as the law of gravity manifests itself in every falling body."22 Rejecting the theory of emergent evolution as an adequate explanation of mind, Horne writes:

There must be a realized actual mind before there can be a potential derived mind. There must exist a reservoir of universal mind before any streamlets of mind can trickle through matter... It is both common sense and reason to hold that if mind is itself and not matter, then it came from mind and not from matter.23

Horne accepts mind as a rational explanation of reality because mind is the only adequate source of explanation; mind is and cannot be matter, and mind is derived only from mind.

The concept of purpose in the universe is used by Horne to support his idealistic cosmology. Accepting the theory of evolution, Horne uses it as a support to his idealism, for to him evolution itself would appear to be a purposive process. His use of the idea of evolution to support purposive idealism is indicated by the statement:

Every event in the process has its antecedent cause and its consequent effect. The cause is not only efficient but also final. The end is a purposive outcome of the

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22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., p. 144.
process. Emergent evolution itself is the outcome of an immanent design or intention. This immanent design in time really is not self-explanatory but implies an eternal and universal purpose.\textsuperscript{24}

In addition to the acceptance of mind and of order as a rationale for the metaphysics of idealism, Horne also appeals to several general propositions related to man as subject. Horne reasons as follows: "An object is always an object of thought. The subject is a thinker. The thinker thinks an object... An alleged world of objects without a thinker to think them is a self-contradiction."\textsuperscript{25} Further, man as subject has an inalienable conviction that personality is reality. By personality Horne means the quality or state of being a person, with person defined as a self-conscious center of experience. Again, man as subject has the conviction that he is a free moral agent. According to Horne, this conviction is justified, if idealism is true.\textsuperscript{26} Finally, man as subject, in his racial development, has accepted the idea of the immortality of the soul. In Horne's thinking, however, immortality as a supporting idea for idealism does not rest entirely on the history of the race. The evidence of immortality lies in the rationality of the universe. Horne explains his position regarding immortality as follows:

\textldots if the death of the body, which is itself a creature of mind, meant the death of the mind too, then mind would not be the reality after all. But in a rational world whose order expresses mentality, it

\textsuperscript{24}ibid.
\textsuperscript{25}ibid., p. 146.
\textsuperscript{26}ibid., p. 149.
would be sheer waste and contradiction to destroy what mind has produced. The belief in man's immortality is a logical consequence of accepting the reality and universality of mind in our world.27

Both ontological concepts and cosmological ideas culminate in an infinite being, according to Horne. For the transition is easy in thought from the world as the object of finite thinking to the world as the object of infinite thinking. The world then would exist in itself as the object of infinite thinking just as it exists for us as the object of finite thinking. Similarly personality might conceivably be in the line of descent from the super-natural, but it could not be in the line of ascent from the impersonal. Thus the personality of man and the values inherent in man proclaim an infinite mind that thinks the universe in personal terms. But, as Horne states it, to think the universe in terms of an original Person expressing himself in finite persons is idealism as a philosophy.28 More particularly, Horne accepts God as ultimate reality.

Horne accepts a position of idealistic theism, which he describes as follows:

Our conception is neither a transcendent dualism, nor an immanent pantheism, but an idealistic theism. God is the self-conscious unity of all reality. Within His life falls the life of nature and of man. We are the content of his consciousness, and not we only, but all that which is, all that we know is a part of the infinite fullness of the content of His consciousness.29

27Ibid.  28Ibid., p. 147.  29Horne, Philosophy of Education, pp. 269-270.
The approach of Horne avoids dualism by making the world immanent in the life of God, for God is the infinite Person in the unity of whose consciousness all things exist. Matter, then, is not something distinct or antithetical to God, for matter is the objective thought of the infinite consciousness. As the objective expression of God's thought, matter remains substantial and solid in man's experience. The concept of idealistic theism has a direct relation to man's view of the universe, as suggested by Horne: "... the awareness that man's life is lived as a part of the permeating Universal Life. This is not impersonal pantheism, nor artificial dualism, nor degrading materialism, nor hesitant agnosticism, nor anthropomorphic theism, but real monotheism."  

Horne sponsors an interpretation which he prefers to call idealistic theism, or absolute idealism. To him the nature of mind, the evidence of purpose in the world, plus the history of the human race appear to be sufficient to justify the acceptance of the existence of an infinite mind, or self. He concludes his discussion of the idea of God as a sound metaphysical position with the words: "In the light of the foregoing discussion, there is no content we can ascribe to the term 'God' quite so worthy as the whole of experience, all reality, the Absolute."  

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30 Horne, Idealism In Education, p. 175.
31 Ibid., p. 167.
Theory of Knowledge

Horne approaches the problem of knowledge as he did the problem of metaphysics, by attempting to show the fallacies of the Deweyan interpretation. Following his objections to the ideas of Dewey, Horne discusses the nature of truth, and then deals with the problem of knowing, or grasping the truth.

Several criticisms are made of Deweyan concepts of knowledge by Horne. The first criticism is that while Dewey proposed the experimental method as the only legitimate method of apprehending truth, yet he himself did not arrive at his focal concepts by experimentation. Horne expresses this criticism of Dewey as follows:

But Dr. Dewey uses the literary and dialectic methods, methods which he denies, not the experimental method which he praises, in advocating his views. He does not go into the laboratory and experiment; he goes into his study and writes a book advocating the experimental method. . . . Besides, having stated his beliefs, he is transmitting them with whatever authority attaches to his great reputation. 32

A further criticism is made by Horne of the assumption of Dewey that dualism in epistemology is the result of divisions in society. Horne points out that both naturalistic and monistic theories of knowledge have arisen from similar social settings. More pointedly, Horne states that dualistic theories of knowledge have arisen from the same social matrix from which Dewey derived his theory of knowledge. Finally

Horne claims that Dewey asserts that contemporary society is only nominally democratic. Yet such social conditions offered no barrier to Dewey proposing a philosophy of continuity far different from the social context of his day.\textsuperscript{33}

Horne also rejects the teaching of Dewey that experience as such, knows, with one experience giving meaning to another. To Horne both reason and common sense recognize that experience cannot know any thing, that to know experience involves a knower and a known.\textsuperscript{34} Horne also asserts that the acceptance of the doctrine of evolution, which he as well as Dewey accepts, involves a philosophic principle rather than a fact of experimental science. Finally, Horne rejects the inclusive problem-solving approach to knowledge. Commenting on the problem-solving approach Horne writes:

Some problems having been solved, it is not necessary or desirable that the schools should be devoted only to problem solving; some of their time may well be spent in learning what others have found out, in appreciating it, and in laying adequate foundations for adding to it.\textsuperscript{35}

For the reasons presented above Horne regarded the approach of Dewey to the problem of epistemology as inadequate. In his approach to the problem of knowledge Horne expresses the concepts of traditional idealism.

Truth, asserts Horne, is the mind of man mirroring

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 484.
\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 485.
\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 491.
reality. Ideas change, facts change, but an idea correctly representing a fact at a given point in time establishes a relationship that is changeless. Truth does not change; it is eternal, it is godlike, according to Horne. In his thinking the agreement of idea and fact is truth. Ideas have two purposes, a functional value in guiding conduct and a substantive value in representing fact. False ideas may function temporarily, but only true ideas work best in the end.

However, facts in themselves, writes Horne, are only nature's symbols of inner meanings. It is the function of science to ascertain and to manipulate the symbols, but it is the task of philosophy to reveal the meanings of such symbols. The problem of philosophy is to read properly the universal meaning of the facts. All the symbols of nature must ultimately be interpreted by mind, for Horne states: "Matter to us is symbolic of meanings we do not fully grasp, while mind to us is meaning itself."37

With truth defined as the mind of man mirroring reality, Horne proceeds to elaborate the process by which mind is adequate to properly reflect reality. The process of arriving at an acceptable interpretation of reality is described by Horne in the observation:

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36Horne, *This New Education*, p. 263.

If we should name the successive stages in the intellectual development of the race or the individual, they would appear in some such order as this: sensations, perception, memory, imagination, conception, judgment, and reasoning. Following perception there is apperception, which is rather a process of, than a period in, intellectual development. Sensation, then, is the alpha, and reasoning is the omega of knowing.38

Horne assumes the distinction between mind and body without hesitation, for he writes: "Without attempting to solve this dark difficulty... it is intelligible to say that the child to be educated has a body and a mind."39 However, Horne avoids a dualistic interpretation by suggesting that the mind does not live in the body, but grows in the body as a plant in its soil. The connecting apparatus between the body and the mind, according to Horne, is the nervous system. His idea of the relation of body and mind is indicated by the following statement:

It is man's nervous system that makes sensation and movement possible. From these two, sensation and movement, develop all the final powers of consciousness. Sensation interpreted becomes knowledge, movement directed becomes will, the activity involved in each of these giving a tone of feeling to consciousness.40

The nervous system, then, underlies consciousness, and sensations become the gateways to knowledge. Sensations are the response of the nervous system to environmental stimuli. Sense-perception thus has a significance for knowledge, for feeling, and for action. For knowledge sense-perception

39Ibid., p. 57. 40Ibid., p. 61.
signifies that sensation is the only way by which the mind gets information of the material objects of existence.41 Since mental activity is dependent upon sensations and the resultant nervous activity in the brain, according to Horne, it follows that the degree of mental activity and of understanding depends upon the state of the brain and the state of the physical body of which the brain is an organic part.

Following sensation, the next step in the process of knowing is perception, by which Horne means the knowledge, or awareness, of individual objects. The first problem faced by the learning organism is the problem of coordinating sensations, to recognize the seen thing as also the felt thing. Relative to the reconciliation of sensations Horne remarks: "This unification of sensations gives concrete objects of experience, things, the knowledge of which through a single sensation or more is perception."42 When sensations symbolize things, knowledge is acquired.

To sensation and perception, as powers of the mind acting in harmony with the body, Horne adds the beginnings of memory and imagination as important aspects of the process of arriving at valid knowledge. Memory, to Horne, is the recall of the earlier impressions of sense, while imagination is the reforming of the images of the past in new forms.43 In the earlier stages of life, says Horne, both

41Ibid., p. 95.  
43Ibid., p. 212.
memory and imagination are almost exclusively the result of pleasure and displeasure, although other emotional reactions would also contribute to memory and imagination.

A most important aspect of the process of arriving at a valid knowledge is the development of the powers of conception. Horne delineates between perception and conception as follows:

Perception is the knowledge of individual objects, conception is the knowledge of general objects; perception gives immediate experience, conception gives mediate or generalized experience; perception gives mental growth, while conception gives mental development, that is, through perception we add to our store, and through conception we come to think in new ways.  

Conception is the fulfillment of the lower stages of sensation, perception, memory, and imagination. To conceive a thing, says Horne, is to think of it as a universal distinguished from the particulars which it unifies. Discussing the higher level of conception Horne states:

Conceiving is a higher power of mind than perceiving, for whereas perceiving gives us experience, conceiving takes it up and mediates it with thought, thus bringing out a new power of thought and also making our experiences significant.  

Conception, then, is the discernment of relations among particulars, and the arrangement of individual perceptions into classes.

The powers of conception are magnified in judgment and reasoning. Judgment is the mind's power to comprehend and

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44 Ibid., p. 155.  
45 Ibid., p. 158.
to estimate situations, whether facts or principles. Judgment is, according to Horne, the climax of mental activity: "It is the highest intellectual power. It is the power to think. It comes as the result of training. The man of judgment is the man of intellectual power." Judgment and reasoning are complementary, for reason is the mind at work discriminating and evaluating among perceptions and conceptions. Horne places reasoned judgment as the capstone of the knowing process, and summarizes his position as follows:

... the trained judgment reports facts as they are, sees their meaning, foresees their consequences, and glimpses the whole of which they are fragments. Judgment is the mind's assertion about reality; it reaches beyond the content of individual consciousness and lays hold of that which is objectively true; it is the typical act of intelligence in its effort to comprehend the world.

In his approach to the problem of epistemology Horne follows traditional idealistic procedures, except in two significant instances. First, he makes sensation the gateway to all knowledge of the objective physical world, and second, he transcends the level of sensual experience by accepting a mentalistic concept of mind, and ultimately, of truth. His epistemology, as his metaphysics, culminates finally in God, for he writes:

All truth is God's truth. ... In man, in nature, the truth is the thought of God. This of course means utter justification for the common feeling that any least shred of truth found anywhere, in remotest star,

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in solid earth, in a stirring emotion, or in a quieting thought, is sacred, having somewhat of divinity about it. 49

Theory of Value

In approaching the problem of axiology Horne begins by leveling several criticisms at the value concepts of Dewey. Horne first attacks the idea of Dewey that all moral concepts and all ethical activities are aspects of a unified, continuous process. Dewey had accepted this axiological approach in his attempt to solve the problem of dualism in value concepts. Horne, on the other hand, states that there is a difference between the inner motive and the outer activity. Horne illustrates the difference between the inner and the outer as follows:

In the case of a multiple personality. . . . the unity and continuity of behavior is disturbed. The different personalities within the same organism alternate; successive states of the same personality are continuous with each other but are discontinuous with the alternating personality. In the case of a deranged personality there is but little unity and continuity left. 50

Not only does Horne state that Dewey has not solved the problem of dualism in his philosophy, but he also states that Dewey has actually arrived at a dualistic interpretation by speaking of "different phases of experience." Horne also rejects the Deweyan theory of the social origin of ethical concepts. Again, Horne asserts that the reduction of all

49 Ibid., p. 49.

activity to interest motives is untrue and undesirable. Horne expresses his disagreement with Dewey as follows:

> Interest is presented as the adequate motivation of work. This overstates the case. Work done under coercion is not done through the motive of interest in the work; it is done through fear of the consequences of not doing it. . . . Probably most of the world's work is actually done under extrinsic motivation.51

Finally, Horne states that Dewey fails to establish a distinction, a working criterion, of good and evil.52 Dewey fails at this point, according to Horne, because of the emphasis on the occupational and the instrumental approach to values.

In his interpretation of values Horne attempts to harmonize subjective experience with eternal, objective value concepts which are embedded in the structure of reality. From the standpoint of experience the term "values," according to Horne, refers to those experiences that are most worth having.53 Regarding values from the standpoint of objective existence Horne states:

> . . . all human values are but temporal expressions of an eternal order which has value in itself. This eternal order is spiritual in character and changeless in nature. It is the world of essential ideas and ideals.54

Since Horne incorporates the subjective aspect of

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51Ibid., p. 517.
52Ibid., p. 523.
54Ibid., p. 183.
experience in his discussion of values, he regards the basic needs of human nature as directives in determining the values of life. Beginning with the values of human nature associated with the physical body, Horne ascends to the values necessary to man as man seeks to find meaning in the universe. In summarizing his ideas about the values associated with man as a physical organism living in a socio-spiritual environment, Horne writes: "Here then is our list of the values of human living, the realization of which constitutes our true objectives of living and learning: health, character, social justice, skill, art, love, knowledge, philosophy, and religion." From the practical side, all the values mentioned above are necessary for the completion of man's being, and as such constitute the objectives of man's living and learning.

Horne, however, does not terminate his value concepts at the level of human existence, for he states: "Life, rightly understood, is just the development of man toward the infinite pattern of perfection." Expanding his idealistic interpretation of values Horne comments:

.. the idealist answers that his ideal world is the most real world, that it exists in its own eternal way, that the eternal world is the only adequate, ultimate explanation of the existence of the temporal changing world and its values, and that man's progress consists in realizing more and more the eternal values in the temporal order.

Reason, common sense, and experience support the view

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55 Ibid., p. 182. 56 Ibid., p. 183. 57 Ibid.
that values have cosmic status, according to Horne.\(^{58}\) Reason says something cannot come out of nothing. Common sense realizes that life at its best lives by ideals. Individual experience also indicates that the existence of eternal ideals has played a vital role in the lives of mystics. Horne admits that reason, common sense, and experience, all combined, do not conclusively demonstrate the truth of the idealistic concept of values. But they do make it plausible, according to Horne, to accept the idealistic interpretation. The lack of demonstrable proof does not present a serious problem to Horne, for he claims that any other philosophical position faces a similar problem, that of absolute proof.

On the basis of immediate objectives and ultimate objectives, Horne develops a hierarchy of values.\(^{59}\) The criterion by which values are arranged in hierarchial order is the contribution that each value makes to the realization of man's absolute goal, his likeness to the spiritual order. At the top of the scale of values Horne places worship, since it brings man into conscious relation to the infinite spirit of the universe. Following worship comes character in the individual and justice in society as evidences of the adjustment of the will of man toward the eternal right. The next level of values is the production and the enjoyment of the beautiful as revealing infinite perfection. Next would come

\(^{58}\) Ibid., p. 184.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., p. 59.
knowledge as reflection upon the ideas embodied in the structure of the universe. The skill requisite to one's economic independence is also regarded as a value, for it is related to personal character and to social justice. Good health is placed at the bottom of the hierarchy, yet it is esteemed highly as a basic value for all the others, enhancing the worth and richness of all other values. All values are interrelated in the idealism of Horne. The body and the mind and all the various functions of mind constitute one unity. The ideal for human life, as suggested by the hierarchy of values, is the integrated individual in an integrated society growing in the image of an integrated universe.

In considering the philosophical concepts of Horne which are relevant to his educational philosophy the attempt has been made to summarize his theories of metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology. It is necessary, for a complete understanding of his educational theory, to discuss an additional concept, his idea of human nature.

Theory of Human Nature

In his theory of human nature Horne agrees with naturalism in holding that man is a product of evolutionary processes. Horne disagrees with naturalism, however, in his view of mind and in his idea of experience. First, the discussion deals with the evolutionary aspects of the biological development of man, then considers the nature of experience. The nature of mind has already been treated in the presentation
of the metaphysical position of Horne.

Horne accepts the evolutionary theory that man, as animal, is the result of natural development. However, he does not limit man to animal classification, for he writes:

Man is not a mere animal, nor even a mere man. An animal is not a mere animal, but, like man, has affinities in his nature with those beings that come both before and after him. The creation is one from lowest matter to highest mind, and nothing occupying a place in this creation is merely itself.60

Three problems emerge, according to Horne, when human nature is assigned a positive affinity with animal nature. These problems are the relation of the instincts to educability, the significance of prolonged infancy, and the relation of mind and brain. Man does not have fewer instincts than the lower animals, but he has a greater capacity to delay reaction to stimuli, to learn from past experience, to adjust himself to new situations, and to form new and delicate nervous reactions. Horne regards an instinct as an inherited nervous mechanism which goes off when properly stimulated. In man's development he has learned, by the various processes of education, to be less and less dependent upon his instincts for his survival and more and more dependent upon judicious selection among his instincts and upon knowledge acquired from past experiences.

Another significant problem rising from man's biological affinity with nature is the prolonged period of

60Horne, Philosophy of Education, p. 18.
human infancy. Horne accepts the explanation that the length of infancy is determined by the degree of complexity in the mental life of the organism and by the degree of complication inherent in the physical situation in which the organism operates. Prolonged infancy is thus a sign that the organism possessing it has a complicated destiny. Since nature cannot fully prepare man in the pre-natal period for his complicated role in life, then all the essential adjustments, except the instinctive, must be learned after birth.

A final problem related to the analysis of human nature as a biological organism by Horne is the relation of the mind to the brain. To Horne the brain is the organ of the mind. While mental functioning is correlated with the functioning of the brain, Horne admits such functioning is extremely vague. Referring to the educational significance of regarding the brain as the organ of the mind Horne remarks:

... it is manifest that education consists in structural modification of the brain and of the central nervous system of which the brain is headquarters. Without the development of the sensory and motor regions of the brain, the fruits of education in the mental powers of observation, perception, reasoning, and volition cannot be reached. Mental habits are primarily brain habits. Mental inefficiency is first brain inefficiency.

The nature of experience, as well as man's biological affinity to nature, is important in the interpretation of

61 Ibid., p. 31. 62 Ibid., p. 34. 63 Ibid., p. 36.
human nature accepted by Horne. Here again Horne differs with Dewey. For Dewey, thinking begins with experience, while Horne regards experience as the outcome of reflective thought. To Dewey, experience, being an active-passive or a passive-active affair, is not cognitive or intellectual, but practical. To Horne experience is an event grasped by a self-conscious being who predicates meaning to experience. Horne also claims that Dewey, in his reduction of experience to interaction between the organism and its environment, has omitted the exceedingly important idea of the interaction of the individual with other individuals. Horne also rejects the Deweyan attempt to limit thinking to experience. Relative to the projection of thinking beyond experience, Horne writes:

We do indeed think in terms of experience, but we can also think beyond the limits of experience. Thus Kant could examine the very conditions of all experience. Astronomers can formulate theories of the formation of the earth prior to any experience of man. . . . In all these ways thinking can transcend the doing and undergoing of concrete experience.

Horne further states that if all thinking is to be regarded as a function of experience, the concept of experience must be enlarged to cover Plato's vision of ideas, Kant's intellectual perception, and Hegel's absolute Idea. But if experience is expanded to include the contemplation

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of abstractions, the philosophical fulcrum has shifted to idealism.

As an idealist, Horne regards personality as ultimately significant in human nature. He writes: "Personality has ultimate worth, that is, we know and can think of nothing higher or more valuable than selfhood, or personality." To Horne the greatest quality of personality is the possibility of growth. Referring to the potentiality of selfhood he writes:

The person seems endowed with unlimited capacities for growth in the attainment of knowledge and wisdom, in the production and enjoyment of the beautiful, and in the acquisition of ideal virtues of understanding, sympathy, cooperation, forgiveness, and self-sacrifice.

In summary, Horne regards man as a finite person, growing, when properly educated, into the image of an infinite person, that his real origin is deity, that his nature is freedom, and that his destiny is immortality.

As a background for the consideration of the philosophy of education accepted by Horne the discussion of this chapter has revolved around his metaphysical concepts, his interpretation of epistemology, his idea of axiology, and his understanding of human nature. Horne is idealistic with every aspect of his philosophy focalizing ultimately in an Infinite Being who is the ground and the completion of

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67 Ibid.
all existence. Because the general thesis of the disserta-
tion deals with the tension between idealism and naturalism
in American education, the various points of divergence
between Dewey and Horne, as representatives of these two
systems of thought, have been emphasized. Having discussed
the general philosophical position of Horne, it is now
possible to consider his educational philosophy. The next
chapter is thus devoted to an analysis of the idealistic
educational philosophy of Horne.
CHAPTER VIII

EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF HORNE

In contrast to Dewey, who structured his educational philosophy within the processes of nature, Horne interpreted educational theory against a background of universal meaning and purpose. An idealistic philosophy of education, according to Horne, is an account of man finding himself as an integral part of a universe of mind.¹ Horne, however, represents a modified type of idealism, for he avoids an antagonistic dualism by incorporating nature into his philosophical system as an aspect of a universal mind, or person.

Horne, in agreement with Dewey, regards American education as deficient and in need of severe scrutiny, for he writes:

Our educational procedures in America have been what the philosopher Kant would call "dogmatic," that is, we have gone on somewhat blindly believing in education and in its ability to make men and women, as Kant himself did, without once thoroughly raising the question whether and to what extent education could make a man. There are many signs today that "A Critique of Education" would be welcome.²

²Horne, This New Education, p. 23.
Horne, however, seems to assume that a critique of American education is primarily a criticism of Dewey, for he confines his analysis of educational theory and practice to a review of the Deweyan interpretation of education. The philosophy of Dewey was, according to Horne, an embodiment of American social idealism, American practicality, American faith in education, and the Darwinian method of inquiry. The following comment by Horne relevant to the background of Deweyan theories is illuminating:

Doctor Dewey's educational philosophy has both fallen in with the spirit of the times and, in a certain respect, run counter to it. It is democratic and scientific, but antagonistic to our economic order. It is consequently just the kind of educational philosophy to be seized upon by progressives everywhere. Unfortunately, however, his educational views have been accepted without a thorough examination of their presuppositions and implications.

The root of the difficulty in Dewey, as Horne sees it, is that Dewey is an intellectualist in method and an anti-intellectualist in results. By this statement Horne means that Dewey establishes the controlling function of thought and rejects, or at least subjects, its representative function in science and its reflective function in philosophy. To Horne such an approach is the denial of philosophy altogether, for the "reconstruction of philosophy" becomes in reality the destruction of philosophy. Continuing his criticism of Dewey, Horne states:

3Ibid., p. 98.  
4Ibid.  
5Ibid., p. 107.
... it is amazing to see the connotations of philosophy shrink to the theory of education in its most general phases. Behold, philosophy, the mother of sciences, become the pedagogue of modern industrial society facing undemocratic economic conditions.6

Horne summarizes his objections to Dewey in these words:

This view is objectionable in that it unduly limits both philosophy and the philosophy of education. It limits philosophy to human experience and it limits the theory of education to its own data, instead of setting education in some more general theory of the universe, such as Dewey himself has provided.7

Two fundamental, unfavorable consequences are implicit in the philosophy of Dewey, according to Horne.8 If the ideas of Dewey are accepted, education becomes the reconstruction of experience, which is impersonal, instead of the growth of self-conscious personality in a universe of persons. A more unfavorable result of Deweyan concepts is that it becomes intellectually undemocratic to deny the possible validity of non-pragmatic types of educational philosophy. Horne regarded his criticisms as more than a reflection of his personal views, for he writes:

We badly need a critical evaluation of Doctor Dewey's educational philosophy. ... Perhaps half the teachers of the subject, philosophy of education, do not accept his views, but they are not saying much about them in print.9

Having justified his criticism of Dewey as the representative of contemporary education, Horne is prepared to present the idealistic philosophy of education.

6Ibid., p. 101. 7Ibid. 8Ibid., p. 104. 9Ibid., p. 99.
Horne approaches the discussion of a philosophy of education by defining his concept of educational theory in these words: "By a philosophy of education we may reasonably agree to mean an interpretation of the meaning of education in the light of a world view." Horne regarded the formation of a philosophy of education as a two-way process, for he believed that the facts of education could be utilized in determining a world view, or one's world view could be utilized to interpret educational phenomena. Referring to the necessity and the value of a philosophy of education Horne writes:

Just as there is a philosophy of art, religion, the state, human conduct, etc., so there is a philosophy of education. Like these other departments of human life, education has its own facts suggesting meanings in their own way. Its facts are like other facts in that they are closely woven into our unitary human life; and the meanings they suggest... ought to fit in harmoniously with the meanings already wrought out in the philosophies of other subjects.

With the philosophy of idealism as a world view in mind Horne proceeds to define education as follows: "Education is the process of realizing the values of life. It is the process of life itself at full tide." In another definition of education Horne shifts the emphasis to the transmissive concept, as indicated by these words: "In the broad sense of the term, education is the social transmission of

10 Ibid., p. 100.


12 Horne, This New Education, p. 151.
ancestral experience to posterity; in the narrow sense of
the term, education is the contribution of the school to
this process of social transmission."\(^{13}\) A third definition
stresses the environmental concept, and is reflected in these
words: "Educating is the purposeful providing of an environ­
ment; at bottom it is personality in and behind the environ­
ment that counts most; so educating is really a relation
between personalities of different degrees of maturity."\(^ {14}\)
The preceding definitions of education are not contradictory,
but represent different facets of the idealism of Horne.

As an introduction to the educational philosophy of
Horne the discussion has dealt with his criticism of American
education primarily as it is particularized in Dewey. Also
included in the introductory discussion is the relation of
education to philosophy, followed by three definitions of edu­
cation. The remainder of the chapter includes a discussion
of four pivotal concepts of Horne related to the pupil, the
curriculum, the educative process, and the objectives of
education.

The Pupil

Horne regards the learner as a finite personality
growing into the likeness of an infinite ideal.\(^ {15}\) By viewing

\(^{13}\)Ibid., p. 14.

\(^{14}\)Horne, _Idealism In Education_, p. vii.

the learner as a finite personality with unlimited potential
Horne thinks it is possible to utilize the strengths of other
approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. The traditional
view of the pupil as a distinct self possessing soul, body,
and mind is accepted by Horne. In presenting his concept
of the nature of the pupil Horne writes:

In our conception of the learner we may progress from
the atomic organization of the naturalist to the selec­
tive nervous system of the realist, then to the behaving
organism of the pragmatist, and then on to the growing,
finite personality of the idealist. In our conception
of the responses of the pupil, we may progress from the
mechanical reactions of the naturalist and realist to
the creative response of the pragmatist and then to the
personal, chosen, response of the idealist.16

As indicated earlier, human nature is, according to
Horne, the product of an evolutionary process. Man's origin
is described by Horne in these words: "... man is what the
labor of the heavens and the earth has brought forth. He
stands at the summit of the evolutionary process as so far
unfolded. What greater beings may later arise we can only
surmise."17 Specifically, Horne regards man as having a
body and a soul.

To Horne the term "soul" is synonomous with self.
Regarding the origin of the soul, Horne admits the impos­
sibility of accurately tracing its beginning, for he writes:
"Just how the living cells from the parental loin that con­
stitute the body of the new child also convey to him his soul,

16Ibid.
we cannot say." Horne apparently followed traditional theology in accepting both body and soul as the product of his ancestors.

There are three main functions of the soul, according to Horne. These three functions are willing, feeling, and knowing. Willing is the activity of the soul in such varied forms as instincts, impulses, imitation, suggestion, habit, choice, and attention. Feeling is the accomplishment of the activity of the soul, agreeable when activity is normal, disagreeable when activity is abnormal in any way. Knowing is first the result and then the guide of activity. It is the content of the soul representative of fact. These three functions of the soul are not really distinct from each other, as Horne describes them. They overlap as a twisted cord composed of three strands. Our acts give basis for our emotions and reality to our ideas. Our ideas interpret our emotions and guide our conduct. Thus the soul of man is a unity in variety. Though each function has a field of its own, it also overlaps each of the other two.

The function of the body is to be the medium of adjustment of the mind and soul to their environment, according to Horne. Describing the two-way communication effected by the body Horne writes:

18Ibid., p. 19.
The body is material, and so is one with the physical universe. At the same time through its arrangement of afferent and efferent nerves, it effects communion of the soul in some unknown way. Thus the soul can receive impressions from the eternal world by means of the body and also manifest expressions of its own nature in the form of reactions upon the external world. The body is able to perform its functions most ideally in a state of health. Health and physical vigor are a golden mean between asceticism, which subjects the body to the interests of the soul, and professional athleticism, which subjects the soul to the interests of the body.

The body as a physical entity has a highly important relation to education, in Horne's thinking. Horne distinguishes between physical heredity and social heredity, and places great emphasis on physical heredity, which he describes as follows:

Physical heredity is the transmission from parent to offspring of certain distinguishing characters of structure and function. . . . By this process of transmission of distinguishing characteristics, physical heredity introduces a certain unity into the living organisms of past, present, and future. In terms that appear to excessively emphasize the importance of heredity, Horne writes:

Our mental and moral gifts and defects, the emotional tendencies toward grave, or gay, the moral inclination toward right and wrong, the peculiar little mental twists and twins that charm or frighten our associates—all these we inherit from our ancestors as truly as we inherit their blood, race, and nationality.

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20 Ibid.
21 Horne, Idealism In Education, p. 15.
22 Ibid., p. 21.
The intellectual child, then, is not an accident; nor is the lazy child, nor the weakly, emotional child, nor the industrious child, nor the honest child. These, and all other mental traits, constitute a physic complex which is the equivalent of certain definite elements in the nervous system inherited from one's ancestors. Another significant fact about the action of heredity is that inherited qualities do not all appear at birth, but develop as the offspring grows.

Horne does not accept the transmission of either specific traits, or of acquired characteristics. He accepts, however, the idea that the human organism does inherit several things highly important to educational theory, namely instincts, temperament, constitution, and capacity. Relating these qualities to education, Horne writes:

"The greatest of these is capacity. Instincts are inherited nervous mechanisms, which enable us to act usefully without having to learn, as the instinct of acquisition. Temperament defines our general emotional and practical attitude toward the world. Our physical constitutions, whether strong or weak, are likewise the fruits of inheritance. And most significant of all for the man, capacity, which is the limit of possible attainment, is an inheritance."

To Horne every potentiality of development is an inheritance. While capacity is inherited, character is not inherited. Education cannot change capacity given by heredity; it can only develop inherited capacity. Because individual capacities vary, there is no possibility of democracy in education, in the sense that the school turns out equal minds.

\[23\] Ibid., p. 30.
The business of the school, as Horne defines it, is to enable each type of mind to put its own inherited talent to work. Education develops innate ability, but it cannot endow the pupil with something he does not possess by nature. Concluding his remarks on the importance of heredity, Horne writes: "Education cannot begin at the beginning; it must take account of a foundation that is already laid."24

In addition to the soul and the body, which are both inherited, Horne regards the pupil as possessing a mind, by which he means self-awareness, or mentality. He further divides the mental into the volitional, the emotional, and the intellectual. While accepting the concept of mind, Horne rejects the idea of the mind as an isolated entity, as indicated by the following words:

Education must yield the theory that the mind is an isolated entity caught in this mundane sphere and detained in the body as its prison-house, in favor of the theory that mind and body together constitute one organic unity.25

Each of the constituent elements of the mind is important to education.

In order to avoid possible misconceptions regarding the organic unity which is a self, Horne points beyond the individualistic concept of the pupil to the social aspect of the pupil's life. Of the social nature of the pupil he writes:

24Ibid., p. 45.
The individual is a whole and he is also a part of a larger whole. It is the nature of an individual to be both himself and a socius. Individuality is not a narrowly circumscribed sphere, but is a large circle inclusive of one's fellows. The individual really finds his own unity in the service he can render to many selves.26

There is an additional aspect of the pupil which is significant to Horne, as an idealist. The pupil is regarded as a spiritual being in a spiritual environment. Referring to the quality of spirituality in both the individual and the environment Horne states:

The environment of the person to which his chosen responses are made may properly be regarded as spiritual. By this it is meant that the social environment exists for a purpose and that the physical environment exists for a purpose.27

The pupil as a spiritual being in a spiritual environment is understandable only when regarded as part of a purposeful process which is rooted and grounded in Ultimate mind, which is both self-active and actually realized. The pupil's true mission in life is self-realization through a process of becoming. Relative to the pupil as an active self in the process of becoming, Horne comments:

The self-activity of man, conditioning his education, is the clearest expression in the limits of time of the immanent and transcendent self-activity of reality. It is as though in man, realizing his destiny through self-activity, the absolute beheld himself reflected. The Absolute is; the finite becomes.28

26Ibid., pp. 142-143.


The pupil, then, is an organic unity, consisting of soul, body, and mind. As such the pupil is a finite personality moving in the direction of the perfection personified in Infinite Being. Education occupies a place of prime importance in the process of self-realization, in which the pupil uses the capacities inherent in his being to move toward the perfection which is his basic purpose in life. In addition to the central importance of the pupil, the curriculum also is important in the philosophy of Horne. The idealistic approach to the study of the curriculum is the next topic to be considered.

The Curriculum

Horne proposes a curriculum in harmony with his idealistic philosophy. He rejects the approach to the curriculum which is based on a method that makes knowledge function only in a situation involving a problem. To Horne the functional approach of Dewey produces a cultivated vocationalist because the curriculum is limited to providing the full meaning of a vocation. Horne does not object to the inclusion of the vocational phase of life in the curriculum. But he believes the educated man should not be merely a cultivated vocationalist, but also a cultivated human being, who is sympathetically acquainted with his race's performance in action, in art, in knowledge, and in thought.²⁹ Horne states his

²⁹Ibid., p. 311.
views on the curriculum as a background for a cultivated person in these words:

The conception of education is bigger than the conception of culture at work; it is the conception of culture at both work and play. A cultured vocationalist, yes; but more, a cultivated man, whose mind will be free in both his vocation and his vacation.30

To Horne the curriculum involves more than acts of learning and quiet study. It involves occupations, productions, achievements, exercise, and activity.31 In determining the content of the curriculum, regard should be given to three things, according to Horne: the ability and needs of the children, the legitimate demands of society, and the kind of universe in which the pupil lives. The ability and the needs of children are derived from psychology, the valid demands of society upon the school are suggested by sociology, while the nature of the universe is determined, to a great extent, by philosophy. Any subject included in the curriculum should serve a two-fold purpose, to acquaint pupils with some set of naturalistic or social facts, and to give ideas of rightly regulated conduct.32

In accord with his view of the nature of man as a being who thinks, feels, and wills, Horne asserts that the curriculum should be divided into three parts, the sciences, the

30Ibid., p. 313.


fine arts, and the practical arts. Horne thinks that the natural sciences have the greatest appeal to the intellectual nature of man. Among the sciences disclosing the intellectual nature of man are physics, chemistry, biology, geography, mathematics, astronomy, psychology, and sociology. In the area of the fine arts such subjects as drawing, painting, sculpture, architecture, the various forms of poetic and prose literature, and music are considered as essential by Horne.

In the production and the appreciation of the various phases and forms of the fine arts man's need for emotional expression is met, as well as man's need for discriminating taste. In addition, Horne prescribes some practical art, or vocational training. In these subjects, practical arts or manual training, the ideas of honesty and accuracy are realized in concrete instances, and the value of attainment is experienced. Such practical subjects as agriculture, lumbering, manufacturing, trade, carpentry, plumbing, printing, and politics should be included in the curriculum; for all of these subjects reveal man as an active agent, having a will to change and to improve conditions. What, then, are the essential studies? Horne answers:

... the student must familiarize himself with the scientific method and with some of the sciences. ... He will need also to appreciate one of the arts, like literature or music. And he will need to become himself a skillful agent at some one of the arts and to know the record of man's achievement in the past. ...
And still, in addition, the student will acquire for himself, by his experience and observation, a total view of the world.  

The total curriculum is the work of man, it is the effect of the life of man in his world, and it is both a social product and a social heritage. As such it is vital in the educative process.

The Educative Process

Education is, according to Horne, self-development through self-activity for self-hood and social service. The three elements contributing to the educative process are heredity, environment and will, or effort. Man, the product of education, is partly born, partly made, and he partly makes himself. Since education has as yet exerted, in the view of Horne, no great influence on heredity, its activities must deal with the environment and the will. The following discussion presents the place of environment in the educative process, the role of will, or effort in the educative process, and the function of the teacher in the educative process. Finally, the discussion deals with the actual process by which the student learns, involving such ideas as imitation, interest, effort, discipline and self-activity.

The pupil who is initiated in the educational process

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34Ibid., p. 162.

has a certain capacity, which is the result of heredity. The school provides an environment in which the pupil, an organic unity, has occasion for development. The adaptations to environment show what the inherent capacities were. To provide opportunity for capacity is the prime function of environment. Horne specifies two kinds of environment that influence living organisms, the physical and the social. The physical environment includes such elements as soil, air, light, heat, climate, water, food, scenery, and even the body. The social environment influences all animals activated by group impulse, including man. It includes all forms of association, the use of language, the expression of emotions in the crowd, habits, customs, conventions, facts, fashions, and moral standards. The greatest element in the social environment of man is ideas, or public opinion, for men adjust themselves to the ideas of other men, to what society as a whole approves. The influence of environment may be stated in the form of a law, which is one of the fundamental laws of biology. Horne comments on the law as follows:

The living organism must be adapted to its environment. This process of adaptation means that the environment modifies the organism, that the organism in turn modifies to some extent the environment, resulting in the outcome that the organism becomes physically and socially like its environment.  

Both the physical environment and the social environment exert specific influences on the organism. Physical

36Horne, *Idealism In Education*, p. 64.
environment calls out the capacities of heredity. It leads to the development of inherited qualities through use. It also represses certain functions by giving them no opportunity. The primary function of the physical environment, as Homme puts it, is selective rather than productive. Homme assigns a selective rather than a productive role to the physical environment because environment does not produce qualities, but provides opportunity for inherent qualities to show themselves. He states his position in these words: "The origin of an organism and its characteristics is due to heredity; the survival of an organism, the prominence of certain qualities, the repression of others, is due to environment."37

The specific influences of the social environment are summarized in the meaning of such comprehensive terms as competition, imitation, suggestion, and instruction. Competition is the struggle between the individual and the social environment. The tension created by the struggle involved in social opposition leads to the development of greater individuality and to greater achievement. Homme points out that imitation is the result of social pressure to do as others do. Imitation is instinctive, unless there is inhibition. The instinct of imitation is thus one of the means by which the environment brings the organism into conformity with itself. Suggestion is doing as another says. The social environment

37Ibid., p. 69.
exerts pressure, not to simply imitate, but also to follow out ideas and directions. The influence of the social environment is consciously brought to bear in instruction. By instruction the lessons of the past are orally transmitted. By instruction new ideas are released in society. By instruction the elders and teachers deliberately plan to bring the young into conformity with their social and spiritual environment.38

In his emphasis on the environment Horne apparently attempts to find a mediating position between stimulus response naturalism and detached idealism. He seems to recognize an organic affinity of the organism with natural processes, yet he transcends the realm of nature. Because of his concept of the organic unity of the pupil, the environment becomes a foundational aspect of his theory of the educational process. Commenting on the importance of the environment in the educative process Horne writes: "Put into the environment of the young what you want their souls to incorporate, and the laws of survival, of imitation, and of the power of impression will effect such incorporation."39

The three elements paramount in the educative process of Horne are capacity, environment, and effort, or will. The discussion thus far has considered the importance of heredity, which supplies capacity, and the role of the environment,

38 Ibid., p. 77.
39 Ibid., p. 76.
which provides opportunity. Another element which is essential in the learning process is will, or effort. The idealistic pupil is characterized, according to Horne, by the will to perfection. Horne admits that the element of will is the least regarded among educational theorists, who explain education in physical terms. Writing of the importance of the will in education Horne states:

That the conclusions of this book go beyond the forces of heredity and environment into the region of individual will in the explanation of men and women is to be credited rather to the philosophy of life that I hold than to the science I have learned. . . . We need today a popular philosophy that shows how the mechanism of science is itself a product of the free inquiring spirit of man.

The term "will" is defined by Horne as the active aspect of consciousness which determines a person's individuality. Horne claims that the tendency to eliminate will in the explanation of the individual is closely associated with the tendency to eliminate will and personality in the explanation of the world.

The contributions attributed to the will by Horne are significant for the educational process. In the first place, it is through will that we develop or neglect the capacity bestowed by nature. He writes: "It is by will that we realize capacities, that we neglect capacities, that we choose to be or not to be what our inherent potentialities

41Horne, Idealism In Education, pp. xi-xii.
allow." Secondly, will uses or abuses the opportunities of environment. The opportunity is the gift of the environment, while the proper use of the environment is a matter of will. Within the limitations of inherited capacities and of environmental opportunities, man becomes what he wills. The will, as an energetic or responsive element of consciousness, influences the development of the organism by the following process:

Now when the conscious organism by its own will influences its own making and that of its kind, the process is that of attention to ideas. Attention to ideas result in thought, and the control of one's thought is the secret of all individual attainment. Thoughts then lead to deeds and deeds through repetition to habits, and our habits taken together are our character, and our character leads by cause and effect to our destiny.  

Since the element of will is basic in the educative process, the will itself requires a degree of education. In considering the right way to educate the will, the aim of such education is decisive. The aim of educating the will is two-fold, according to Horne, to socialize it and to make it effective. Socializing the will makes it right, and effectualizing it makes it capable. The aim of education is to build the right and the capable will.

Horne lists five aspects of the process of educating the will. The first education of the will is indirect and reaches the will by action rather than by ideas. The emphasis belongs on action rather than on ideas until adolescence. A

42 Ibid., p. 120.  
43 Ibid., p. 123.
second approach involves the use of object-lessons, for the object-lesson is concrete, simple, sensible, obvious, and actual. Another device used in educating the will is the direct suggestion of the power of the will. Relative to the direct suggestion of the use of the will Horne writes:

"Pupils often can, if they only will, and many times they can will. Effort is something to be put forth." The fourth step in educating the will becomes even more distinct, for Horne urges, at this point, an insistence on effort, for he writes:

Insist on effort from the beginning. . . . Effort is not a popular word in the interest-loving, deterministic, Herbartian traditions in educational theory and practice, but we can never outgrow effort so long as duties sometimes prove disagreeable.

The culmination of the process is discipline. Discipline consists, as Horne sees it, in an approach which has exactly defined expectations applied in a gentle but firm manner. In extreme cases, where the need is evident, the use of force is permitted to insure discipline.

In summary, it is again stated that heredity bestows capacity, unchangeable in the individual but subject to improvement. Environment provides opportunity. Effort of will realizes the inherited capacity and utilizes the opportunities offered by the environment. These various elements, capacity, opportunity, and will, are things inherent in the pupil or included in the environment. But it is the unique

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44Ibid., p. 131.  
45Ibid.
function of the teacher to coordinate and to stimulate capacity, opportunity and effort into a harmonious process. The teacher thus becomes focal in the idealistic educational process.

The idealistic teacher, like the idealistic pupil, pursues the method of perfecting, while subscribing to the ideal of a cultivated personality. Because the teacher is in a singular position of determining what the students opportunities for learning and growing shall be, he is the key to the educative process. Particularly in the early years of the pupil's education the teacher represents, to a great degree, the society in which the pupil operates. The teacher organizes subject matter, determines objectives, selects methods, and in so doing represents the single most important influence in the educative process.

To Horne the four indispensable qualifications for teachers are a knowledge of the subject taught, knowledge of the pupil taught, the ability to teach, or a knowledge of methods, and a worthy character. Horne reduces the concept of a teacher's mastery of subject-matter to five principles: (1) He cannot teach what he does not know; (2) He must know the principles of the subject taught, which means he will know more than he teaches; (3) He is more enthusiastic about teaching when he knows his subject; (4) A knowledge of the subject engenders self-confidence; (5) A teacher who knows
his subject is more apt to win the respect of his students. 46

A knowledge of the pupils taught is an important qualification for teaching. The teacher needs a knowledge of the individual pupil in the class. Horne asserts that the teaching relation is at its full power only when there is a real person at each end of it. The importance of a knowledge of the pupil is indicated by the following statement of Horne:

. . . the constant variation inherent in individuality demands a constant adjustment of principle to personality. . . the teacher will find that the best place to learn his pupils individually is not in the classroom, but on the playground, on trips, down the street, and in the home. 47

Horne accepted without reservation the necessity of study in the field of psychology as the avenue of arriving at a knowledge of the pupil. Since the teacher's task is the development of self-conscious personality, and since psychology deals with the developmental phases of conscious mentality, a teacher needs thorough grounding in psychology, in Horne's approach. He teaches that the descriptive and the explanatory conclusions of psychology should, for the sake of efficient service, be transformed into the applicable and the practical principles of education. Few writers have affirmed the benefits of psychology in more sweeping terms than Horne:

Psychology describes how the mind learns; it is the business of teaching to cause the mind to learn. Psychology

46 Horne, Psychological Principles of Education, p. 44.

describes how the mind appreciates beauty; it is the business of teaching to cause the mind to appreciate beauty; psychology describes how character is formed; it is the business of the teacher to assist in character formation; psychology describes the nature of the religious sense; it is the business of teaching to stimulate the religious sense. This psychology is one of the sciences of which teaching is the art.\footnote{Ibid., p. 59.}

In addition to knowledge of the subject and knowledge of the student, the teacher should have the ability to teach, or a knowledge of teaching methods. To Horne method is unavoidable. In introducing his idea of method Horne writes:

In the last analysis, method is but the way of doing a thing, and all teachers, whether trained or not, have and must have some way of setting about their work. . . since method of some kind is inevitable, we ought to use the best available.\footnote{Ibid., p. 64.}

While accepting all teaching methods as sound, Horne is particularly critical of the lecture method and the quiz method of teaching. He states that the lecture method is an autocratic institution in which the lecturer states his own views without giving the class the option of accepting or rejecting such views. The lecture method makes no allowance for developing thoughtfulness on the part of the student. Horne regards the quiz method as little better than the lecture method. Criticizing both the lecture method and the quiz method Horne observes:

The quiz method is little better than the lecture. The student answers what the book says, or is supposed to do so. In the first case the lecturer is the final authority; in the other the textbook; neither method, as ordinarily used, leads the individual student to
independent thinking.\textsuperscript{50}

To avoid aristocracy in the classroom Horne suggests the use of the discussion method. By discussion the class group undertakes the search for truth. The function of the professor is to be the leader of the discussion, to keep it to the point, to secure considerations for different phases of the problem and to make the summarizing statement. Horne is aware of possible weaknesses in the discussion method, for he writes: "The use of the discussion method, unless in the hands of a skilled leader, can waste a lot of time and get nowhere. For successful use it presupposes experience, study, observation and knowledge on the part of those participating."\textsuperscript{51}

The project method is not rejected by Horne, but he does recommend supplementary methods. The project method is inadequate to carry the whole burden of instruction. At times it is too slow and too limited in its range, and always it is unsystematic. There are also some practical disadvantages related to the project method, such as the expense it may involve, interference with a regular schedule of work, its imposition on pupils by teachers, the difficulty of defining it exactly, and the lack of teachers trained to use it. The experimental method, while worthy of a place in classroom methodology, also receives criticism by Horne, who writes as follows regarding this method: "Yes, we learn to do by doing."

\textsuperscript{50}Horne, \textit{This New Education}, p. 122.

\textsuperscript{51}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 82.
But this is not all—we learn also to think by doing; also to think by thinking; also to do by thinking. . . the experimental method is a very expensive way of transmitting funded knowledge. "52 In the area of methodology Horne prefers the discussion approach, under the guidance of a democratic-minded and a well informed teacher.

In harmony with his idealistic philosophy Horne regards character as the most important quality of a teacher. Pointing to the almost universal desire for character in a teacher he writes:

It will be noticed that the colleges and universities in their preparation of teachers have underemphasized the knowledge of the pupils and the ability to teach, that the normal schools have underemphasized the knowledge of the subject, while all have agreed in affirming that a worthy character is necessary.53

While Horne regards acceptable character as essential in a teacher, he refrains from an extensive elaboration of specific qualities of character. The teacher should present a character that is sane, decisive, stable, honest, and righteous. By sanity of character Horne means poise, balance, or proportion. Decisiveness is the quality of intelligent choosing by which a person delineates his individuality. Stability of character raises the teacher above response to solicitation or pressure. Honestly implies the willingness to condemn poor work and shoddy academic practices. Righteousness of

52 Ibid., p. 84.
character involves a profound respect for personality combined with a desire for the pupil's fullest development.

The teacher is one who helps awaken dormant powers in younger selves. As such he is an apostle of progress and a companion in the process of developing personality. His primary function is to assist in the birth of the new generation spiritually and to inspire in the pupil the purposes which history ultimately will realize. The teacher's task is the perfecting of the mind, the highest form of existence in the cosmos.

The discussion of the educative process has considered the capacity of the pupil, the environment in which the pupil learns, and the role of the teacher in developing capacities and providing opportunities for development. The climax of the educative process comes as the teacher, and the school, provide opportunities for innate capacities to develop through imitation, interest, effort, discipline, and self-activity.

By imitation Horne means the tendency to repeat the thought of the action of another. Its influence is bound up with the social order and permeates all conduct. The importance attached to imitation by Horne is reflected in the following statement:

In a large sense imitation is synonymous with learning, and accounts for all the content of civilization except

54Horne, This New Education, p. 75.

that small but weighty fraction added by invention. In the limited sense of the term, it means the influence of personal example, and in this sense only is its discussion of practical moment.56

While recognizing the benefits derived from the use of some models of work in art, literature, or music, Horne thinks that the most effective use of imitation is in focusing attention on great personalities. Two selections from Horne present his idealistic principle of learning by imitation:

It is in the realm of personality and its influence that the principle of imitation has its highest educational service.57

The child through imitating others, becomes aware of his own capacity for a wide variety of acts that he otherwise would have believed were beyond his powers.58

Among the more prominent mental effects which imitation tends to produce are the power of speech, voluntary movements, self-consciousness, originality, and morality and religion. Children are going to imitate somebody, according to Horne, and if there is no worthy model to offset the suggestion of the unworthy, the imitation is also inevitably of the unworthy.59

Not only does the impulse to imitate provide unlimited opportunity to learn, but his impulse also provides, in the thinking of Horne, a solution to the quandary of the school as to how to cultivate morality and religion without direct instruction, by the provision of teachers with personalities

56Ibid., p. 279.
worthy of imitation by the pupils.

The transition from imitation to interest is easy, according to Horne. The child imitates that which interests him. Interest, to Horne, is a feeling, and feeling is an immediate experience of consciousness. Horne thus defines interest as a pleasurable activity of the self. Horne agrees with Dewey that interest is one of the great themes of education, for it removes drudgery from the school, puts the motive power of the feelings at the disposition of the teacher, and is the immediate aim of all instruction. In addition to imitation and interest, effort is essential in the educative process. Horne differs with Dewey in his interpretation of effort, for to Horne effort begins when interest ends. Relative to effort Horne writes:

At the moment when interest fails but attention continues we have effort. And at any moment when the right thing to do is not the most interesting there is the opportunity for effort. . . . Effort is the strain consciousness puts upon itself in performing uninteresting work.

Effort, a volitional quality of consciousness, requires discipline. By discipline Horne means some extraneous action by the teacher to stimulate the pupil to complete the task in which he is involved. Interest, effort, and discipline are closely related. Interest is essential and desirable, but it is not a sufficiently broad base to direct the total educational process. Horne comments relative to the limitations

60bid., p. 189. 61bid., pp. 198-199.
of interest as follows: "Doing a thing because one loves it is too ideal to be always practical, and at times too individualistic to be socially desirable." Effort and discipline are necessary because life requires both immediate and remote interests. Horne states that one weakness of "the new education" is that it relies too much on immediate interest and involuntary effort, and is thus not in harmony with the demands of life.

Interest, effort, and discipline are, to Horne, methods which lead to self-activity. It is self-activity that constitutes the actual educational process. Horne is in full agreement with the new education regarding the importance of self-activity, as indicated by the statement: "The educational process is not so much the stimulus shaping the individual, as the individual responding to the stimulus." Summarizing his concept of the entire educative process Horne writes:

The development of mind is from within out, not from without in. . . . The teacher may lead the pupil to the fonts of learning, but he cannot make him drink. Teaching is not so much the cause of learning. . . . as it is the occasion or condition of learning. The cause of learning is the pupil himself and his effort. . . . The ultimate responsibility for winning an education rests with the will of the pupil.

In his approach to the educative process Horne uses the traditional concept of a finite personality possessing

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62 Horne, This New Education, p. 85.
63 Ibid., p. 96.
64 Horne, Philosophy of Education, pp. 273-274.
distinct qualities of soul, mind, and body. These qualities are inherited and determine the capacity of the pupil to learn. Education cannot bestow capacity upon an organism, but education does structure the environment in which the human organism finds opportunity for development. The teacher is the most important aspect of the formal educational environment. As a focal point in the learning process the teacher should have a knowledge of the subject, a knowledge of pupils, the ability to teach, and an acceptable character. The educative process utilizes the natural impulse to imitate, incorporates the principle of interest, stresses the need of effort and discipline as essential to self-activity. Having discussed the nature of the human organism called the pupil and the nature of the educative process, the discussion now turns to a consideration of the objectives of education.

The Objectives of Education

As an expression of his idealistic philosophy Horne discusses two groups of educational objectives. The first group is divided into immediate objectives and remote objectives. The second group is divided into individual and social objectives. For the purposes of this study it seems sufficient to discuss only the individual and the social objectives of education.

Individual objectives are suggested in the form of ideals being defined as more or less remote ends of action whose realization is sought through mediation of reflection
and effort.\textsuperscript{65} The objectives for the individual are well stated in the portrait of the educated man presented by Horne in one of his latest writings. The list includes the following:

1. He is physically fit.
2. He lives near the maximum of his efficiency.
3. He has a body which is the ready servant of his will.
4. He is capable of earning a living for himself.
5. He is constantly doing his work better and better through study.
6. He knows about the human factors of the situation of which he is a part.
7. He regards other persons as having the same rights as himself.
8. He keeps old friends and makes new ones.
9. His social interests are constantly widening.
10. He is indignant at social wrongs.
11. He is a suitable life partner for another, or becoming so.
12. He is tolerant of opinions different from his own.
13. He has good will toward all sorts and conditions of people.
14. He gives wisely of himself and his means.
15. He stands for the welfare of the larger group in the clash of human interests.
16. He holds existing social arrangements to be improvable.
17. His loyalty extends beyond family and friends to good causes.
18. He is self-controlled without being inert, and active without being nervous.
19. He loves nature.
20. He prizes the creative more than the possessive.
21. His intellectual horizon is constantly expanding.
22. His opinions are based on evidence, not on emotional attitude.
23. He is careful in expressing judgments.
24. He is good company to himself.
25. His is a happy life.
26. He can enjoy a vacation.
27. He prefers that useful articles be also aesthetic.
28. He has the courage to do right against odds.
29. He feels at ease in the presence of those greater than himself.
30. He can make something with his hands.

31. He is democratic in his attitudes.
32. He can play with children and have a truly fine time.
33. He senses his kinship with all men and with the Reality of which they are an express part.66

The personal objectives of education in the idealistic philosophy of Horne culminate in man's spiritual or religious education. Commenting on religious education as the capstone of the educational process Horne writes: "Religious education is the natural and logical conclusion of all education, just as religion is the natural and complete expression of man's being. . . religion is simply and clearly the whole consciousness in its relation to deity."67 To Horne the education of the spirit is the goal of all education as well as its capstone, for all the personal objectives have ultimate meanings. Health is the divine blessing of conformity to natural law. Skill is cooperation with God in making a more useful and a more beautiful universe. Intellectual activity is thinking God's thought after Him. Emotional responses are manifestations of the perfections of God. Moral achievements is interpreting the good as the will of God. Social aptitude is the ability and the willingness to establish right relationships as the kingdom of God among men.68

Horne expands his educational objectives beyond the individual to the social. Referring to the social objectives

66Horne, This New Education. Paragraph headings in Chapter VI, "Are We Educated?" pp. 125-136.
68Ibid.
of education he writes:

The end of ends, the goal of goals, according to idealism, is the increasing realization of the Absolute Idea for the individual, society and race. It includes the conception of an ideal social order, which may very well be a social democracy.

It may be stated concisely that the social objectives of Horne are simply the individual objectives expanded to all society in a democratic manner. The basic motivation of such democratic application of individual objectives on a universal scale is the recognition that the environment of man is God. God is defined as the self-conscious unity of all reality.

Commenting on the role of democracy in education Horne writes:

Democracy in education must cultivate the sense of unity between the social classes, the various races, the many nations. Democratic education is inter-class, inter-racial, inter-national, in understanding, in sympathy, in co-operation. Democracy is a spiritual unity in a social variety. But it does not demand that all classes become one class, that all races through miscegination become one race, that all nations be merged in a super-world government.

By the application of the individual educational objectives in an all inclusive manner, Horne attempts to provide adequate goals for education.

The discussion presented in this chapter has attempted to succinctly summarize the salient features of the idealistic educational philosophy of Horne. The opening remarks of the chapter presented the criticism of Horne relative to progres-

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69 Horne, Philosophy of Education, p. 301.
70 Ibid., p. 272.
71 Horne, This New Education, p. 118.
sive education as represented by Dewey. Following the criticism of the Deweyan concepts, the idealism of Horne was discussed as it relates to the educational theory. The next area of discussion was the nature of the pupil, dealing with the pupil as a unified organism possessing body, soul, mentality, and as such was a finite personality moving toward perfection. The curriculum of education was discussed next, followed by a description of the educative process. Finally, the discussion presented the objectives of the educational process, individual and social.

To Horne education reveals in man a capacity for infinite growth. He believes that there is an opportunity for man, guaranteed by his universe, and unabridged by the incident in life called death, to finish his education, to achieve his destiny, and to grow unceasingly into the likeness of the Infinite Being. The idealism of Horne leads to the following definition of education:

Education is the eternal process of superior and partly controllable adjustment of physically and mentally developed, free, conscious human beings to God, as manifested in the intellectual, emotional, and volitional environment of God.73

72 Home, Philosophy of Education, p. 283.
73 Ibid., pp. 315-316.
CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

From the study of educational theory and practice in the United States between 1860-1960, it is possible to draw several significant conclusions. The first conclusion to be drawn is that naturalism and idealism represent the two most vital and dynamic approaches to educational philosophy in American educational theory. Both idealism and naturalism have long histories, beginning centuries before the Christian era. Each of these philosophical approaches has undergone consistent modification from within and each has been the object of attack from without. But despite internal modification and external criticism, idealism and naturalism appear to be the two most influential interpretations of life in contemporary society.

Naturalism first interpreted reality in terms of substance, then rejected the substantial interpretation in favor of a mechanical concept of the universe. Primarily due to the rise of evolutionary thought, after 1859 naturalism regarded nature, or reality, in terms of a process. In the twentieth century naturalistic thinkers have rejected, to a great extent, the narrower reductionism of earlier thinking.
and have adopted an approach which is basically a spirit of investigation to the world as it is. In the field of educational theory the outstanding naturalists, prior to the twentieth century, were John Locke, Jean J. Rousseau and Herbert Spencer. Among the influential naturalistic educational philosophers of the present century are such theorists as George Mead, William Kilpatrick, Boyd Bode, John Dewey, and Sidney Hook. The fact that the impact of these and other naturalistic thinkers is evident in contemporary educational theory and practice attests the persistent influence of naturalism.

Idealism has also experienced modification and continues to exert itself as a force in educational philosophy. The various types of idealism have been designated as objective idealism, subjective idealism, organic idealism, and personalism. In the history of idealism the names of Plato, Berkeley, Hegel, Bowne, Royce, and Brightman are accepted as leading exponents of its various phases. In idealistic educational theory some of the recognized leaders have been Plato, Martin Luther, William T. Harris, and Herman H. Horne. The persistence of idealism in the structure of American education supports the conclusion that idealism, like naturalism, is a vigorous and a dynamic philosophical approach.

Another conclusion drawn from the study of American education is that education inevitably reflects, or incorporates, some basic philosophical assumptions. In the
colonial period of American history the emphasis of education grew out of a practical Christian idealism. The purpose of the early colleges was primarily practical, to train young men for the ministry, for law, and for medicine. After the middle of the nineteenth century, however, a practical utilitarianism developed in American educational theory, particularly as it applied to the rapidly growing universities. It is evident that many educational leaders were not openly antagonistic to idealistic concepts in general. But the emphasis placed on the practical, utilitarian and technical concept of education initiated the process of secularizing completely a large segment of American education. After a period of prolonged tension between practical idealism and utilitarian naturalism, the breach was openly sponsored by advocates of rational idealism and pragmatic naturalism. When John Dewey appeared as the spokesman for a completely naturalistic interpretation of education, naturalism was generally regarded as the most advanced concept of education developed by man.

In spite of the fact that Dewey reduced philosophy to educational procedure and had reduced thinking, or learning, to methodology, his system itself is the result of antecedent philosophical assumptions. Dewey, the prime advocate of the experimental method, did not arrive at his position by experimentation. Further, Dewey did not teach by experimentation, preferring rather to lecture and to write.
Similarly, Horne approached educational theory with a fundamental view of the world in which he structured his ideas. The second conclusion of the study is that any formal attempt to educate of necessity involves fundamental philosophical assumptions regarding the nature of reality, the nature of knowledge, the nature of value and the nature of man.

Dewey and Horne interpreted educational theory from opposing philosophical positions. It seems that Horne was more objective in his acceptance of a world view in that he frankly acknowledges his idealistic bias. Dewey, on the other hand, claims that his position is the ultimate in objectivity. But Dewey finally arrives at a position which is more narrow than the position of Horne, for in reality he sponsors a type of reductionism without an apparent awareness of the limitations involved in his approach. Horne is deliberately metaphysical in his approach, positing his entire philosophy on a theistic idealism. Dewey reflects the impatience of much of naturalistic thought with problems of a metaphysical nature. A theory of knowledge, rather than a theory of metaphysics, is the point of departure in the attempt of Dewey to reconstruct philosophy.

To Dewey the problem of knowledge did not involve the endeavor to get a previously distinct and subjective knower and an objective world of objects and ideas together again. Dewey regarded the problem of knowledge as contextual problems in which the investigator, himself part of nature, initiated
and directed a series of inquiries called into existence by difficulties to be overcome. Horne accepted a traditional concept of knowledge, with a subjective, separate knower apprehending objective things, events, and ideas. In consistency with his epistemology of transaction Dewey regards intelligence as the ability to discover connections, relationships, and consequences behind the events which comprise experience. Horne regards intelligence as the ability to discover meaning, order, and purpose in the events of life. The process of knowing is, to Dewey, operational, while the process of learning is, to Horne, the acquisition and the application of facts or ideas inherent in reality.

In his understanding of axiology Dewey follows the demands of evolutionary continuity, while Horne accepts a hierarchy of values culminating in an Infinite Mind. Dewey requires that values be closely related to the world in which man finds himself. To Dewey objects or events do not possess qualities which contribute to their value, but the processes of nature assign values to specific objects and to particular events as these objects and events contribute to the realization of goals, ends, purposes and outcomes. Dewey regards the separation of value from the processes of nature, of which man is a part, as the imposition of an artificial dualism on nature. In a philosophy of naturalism, values are recognized when man makes choices that assist in his adaptation to his environment. In a philosophy of idealism man discovers values
when he achieves insight into the significance of an individual event or of a specific object as the event or objects are related to cosmic values.

Philosophical assumptions are also the focal point in the concepts of human nature held by Dewey and Horne. Both Dewey and Horne regard the physical organism as the product of biological, evolutionary processes. To Dewey man remains as a part of the natural processes, without any additions or modifications from without nature. Human nature, to Dewey, is simply nature expressed in one of its aspects called humanity. Horne thinks of human nature as the combination of the physical organism and a soul. While Horne accepts the existence of a soul, he passes hastily over the discussion of the source of man's soul. Nevertheless in the philosophy of Horne the soul is essential, for it is the bridge between the physical organism enclosed in nature and the Infinite Mind transcending nature. Consciousness, to Dewey, is the result of the interaction of the organism with its environment, but to Horne consciousness is the self-awareness inherent in personality which transcends its physical environment. Mind, to Dewey, is a function of the brain, while to Horne mind is the reflective aspect of individual personality. Neither Dewey nor Horne accepts romantic or traditional concepts of human nature. Both men regard human nature as a concrete given which becomes what the environment causes it to become. Both Dewey and Horne seek to avoid dualistic concepts of human
nature, and both succeed, although the method of eliminating dualism is different in each man.

Dewey and Horne apply their philosophical assumptions to educational theory without reservation. Dewey regards the pupil as a physical organism involved in the total processes of nature. As a physical organism the experiences of the pupil constitute a transaction between the organism and its environment. The ultimate objective of education, according to Dewey, is to solve problems to enable the organism to adapt itself to its environment. The primary method of education grows out of the necessary activity of the organism as it attempts to adapt itself to its environment. The foundation of the experimental method is the natural, spontaneous interest of the pupil. Dewey states that the school should be a miniature of society in which the pupil could learn without the use of artificial motivation. Horne places more emphasis on the transmissive nature of education. To Horne the pupil is the product of heredity, environment, and will. Heredity, according to Horne, endows the pupil with his innate capacity, the environment furnishes the pupil with developmental opportunities, and will is the decisive factor in which the pupil utilizes the opportunities afforded by the environment for self-development. Because of his emphasis on will as an essential aspect of the educative process, Horne accepts the necessity of external motivations and of discipline in the learning process. Education is, to Dewey, the modification
of behavior. Education is, to Horne, self-development toward the perfection inherent in all personality. Since it is impossible to sustain, without serious qualification, either the naturalism of Dewey or the idealism of Horne by empirical data, it seems sound to assert that their educational theories are based on philosophical assumptions.

A third general conclusion derived from this dissertation is the idea that educational theory, regardless of its philosophical outlook, tends to become static at certain levels. Idealism became identified, to a great degree, after 1860, with a prescribed curriculum and an accepted social order. Supporters of the idealistic type of education too often attached undue import to particular areas of subject matter and to distinct, unchanging methods. In so doing idealism lost the ability to meet the needs of a changing cultural atmosphere. Naturalism also became rigid in many instances by its stress on method, by its emphasis on problem-solving, and by its encouragement of freedom.

Theoretically, idealism regards personality as the greatest value in life and as the only adequate explanation of life. Yet the values and the purposes inherent in personality were frequently neglected by idealistic educational practice. The neglect by idealism of the values and of the purposes inherent in personality is indicated by an apparent lack of social concern, by the absence of a dynamic methodology, and by the frequent indifference to life issues.
In theory, naturalism proposed to adapt man to his environment and to develop a cultured vocationalist. In practice, naturalism with its stress on individual freedom, frequently produced men who misused and exploited their environment. Instead of a cultured vocationalist naturalistic education often produced a self-indulgent functionalist who saw no particular significance in life. From the evidence of the study it seems possible to state that educational concepts tend to crystallize, or to become static at certain levels of development.

A fourth conclusion resulting from the study is the principle that in a democratic, pluralistic society, it is both impossible and undesirable to impose permanently any philosophy of education on the educational structure. From the inauguration of Harvard College until the Civil War the ecclesiastical interests were predominant in the United States. But running parallel with the dominance of idealism, even during the late eighteenth century, was a stream of antagonistic naturalistic thought. Ultimately naturalistic educational theory became dominant in the first half of the twentieth century. The reaction of idealists, such as Horne, to naturalism and the resurgence of idealism in some current educational theory and practice indicates that a democratic, pluralistic society will probably retain both naturalistic and idealistic philosophies and that these two philosophies will continue to exist in polar tension.
A principle closely associated with the one mentioned above is that American educational theory and practice reflect the social and the intellectual atmosphere of the society in which it operates. As long as the cultural background of the United States was agrarian and traditional in religious outlook, traditional idealism dominated the educational pattern. But when the cultural pattern was revolutionized by the development of a technical, industrial, commercial and urban society, the concepts inherent in naturalism became increasingly influential in educational theory. The role of the school in society, whether the school should reflect its cultural background or modify it, appears to be one of the unsettled problems of American education. From the history of education in America between 1860-1960 it seems that, with a few notable exceptions, educational theory and practice does reflect the spirit of American culture. This tendency of educational theory to reflect the cultural environment is significant in that materialistic and secularistic trends in society may provide increasing support for naturalistic education at the expense of idealism.

The study of American educational theory and practice also indicates a growing desire among certain intellectual leaders to assume more and more intentional control of the social process. Both Dewey and Horne agree that education has a responsibility to change the nature of society. Horne would go so far as to support a program of enforced eugenics
to improve the quality of the race. Dewey thought that the scientific method, as practiced in the school-room, should be the source of continual enlightenment and consistent application to society. Dewey was particularly critical of traditional religious concepts which he regarded as obstructions to the advancement of the democratic ideal. Contemporary educational theorists, of whom Sidney Hook is representative, also feel that the school should be in the vanguard of those directing American life toward desirable goals.

The history of American educational theory reveals that the American people possess an almost naive faith in the limitless possibilities of education. When the colonial leaders wanted to insure the propagation of their religious faith, education was accepted as the instrument for the preservation of faith. Later, when phenomenal church growth required a sharp increase in trained clergymen, the denominations founded colleges to help provide leaders. During and following the Civil War the technical, mechanical, and utilitarian needs of society resulted in the establishment of agricultural and mechanical institutions. In the twentieth century the nation has again turned to the school to provide for diverse needs ranging from citizenship to driver-education to a conquest of space. While the faith of the American people in the results of the educational process has not been completely justified, this faith has been the source of much of America's technical and scientific progress.
In addition to the preceding general conclusions, it appears to be permissible, on the basis of the data presented in this dissertation, to state several weaknesses in American educational theory which deserve further consideration. The tension between idealism and naturalism has been a contributing factor in the development of the weaknesses listed below.

It is apparent that American educational theory and practice have not been successful in incorporating formal religious ideas and axiological concepts in its approach. The pendulum of valuational concepts has varied from extreme sectarianism to relativistic materialism. A continued neglect of religious and ethical aspects of education could conceivably result in the fragmentation of American education or in a system of education characterized by technical efficiency and moral impoverishment. Further study should include the problem of the separation of church and state as one aspect of the problem of adequately incorporating religion and values in educational theory.

A second problem still unsolved is involved in the ideal of education for citizenship. At the present in American educational theory, the assumption appears to be that a specified number of years spent within a formally structured academic environment is equivalent to good citizenship. Further, if spending a particular amount of time in a formal academic environment produces good citizens, what is the status of
those who do not qualify in numerical attainment? Further, would not a longer period of formal education produce still better citizens?

The history of educational theory and practice in the United States between 1860-1960 also seems to indicate that those who have inaugurated educational institutions, those who have administered educational programs, and those who have conducted educational procedures have frequently been deficient in understanding or devoid of insight regarding the underlying philosophies involved in various educational programs. Many politicians, administrators, and teachers apparently have stressed methods and functions without an awareness of the implications inherent in their educational program.

A final problem arising out of this study is the apparent paradox between the traditional faith of the American people in the power and the necessity of education on the one hand and the anti-intellectual attitude of a large segment of the population on the other. Education as a utilitarian program or as a status standard is apparently acceptable. But education for the purpose of individual self-realization and for artistic enjoyment has never appealed to the American people to any considerable degree.
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