

points of view of the two previous chapters to bear upon the question of valuation in the individual and the human species. In Chapter 5, on Morality as Value, through a statement and criticism of the systems of morality the author prepares the way for the presentation of his own constructive view which he denominates 'egocentric rigorism.' In this system, conscience is the supreme value, not however as an end in itself, but as an instrument of realization. It has both an individual and a social function. In this way he is able to deny that there exist freak consciences (Sondergewissen) and hence a morality outside of the moral community. He recognizes, however, that the human life of the individual is much richer than any system of morality however complete, so that there is room in the moral life no less for men of action like Bismarck, than for men of principle like Kant.

The book may be recommended as a particularly pleasing contribution to the discussion of ethical problems. It is written in a style that places no unnecessary obstacles in the way of the foreigner, and the notes to the chapters, which have been grouped together at the end of the book, are particularly rich in bibliographical material.

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DISCUSSION

THE UNCONSCIOUS BIAS OF LABORATORIES

In my recently published review and critique of the work centering about the problem of the content of thought,¹ I have attempted to show that the failure of certain investigators to discover imageless factors might be attributed to "a predisposition on the part of the 'trained' observer which is decidedly prejudicial to the discovery of *meanings* in experience." This point I have illustrated, in a striking manner, as I thought, by reference to the analyses of conscious attitudes made by Miss Clarke. Miss Clarke's subjects, I have said, "lay all stress on the sensory factors in their experiences, and whenever meaning factors appear, they are either passed over by the author, or referred to as *Kundgabe*. It is interesting to note, however, that in the analyses given of some sixty attitudes such as approval, caution, difficulty, surprise, etc., there appear several which, as named, clearly involve an element of *knowing*. For instance, the

¹Cf. this journal, 8, 183-197.

'consciousness that the letter was too small,' 'fear that I had reacted too quickly,' 'I ought to know that,' etc. Yet each of these is unblushingly analyzed into 'muscular strain and organic sensation,' 'slight sinking of the stomach and diaphragm,' and the like."¹

My attention has been called to the use of 'unblushingly' as seeming to impute dishonesty on the part of Miss Clarke in handling her data. This has surprised me greatly, for I had no thought that the 'predisposition' of which I accused Miss Clarke and others should be interpreted otherwise than as an unconscious determining tendency which led always to the discovery of sensations and never to the discovery of thoughts.

It is my belief that when one is predisposed to the discovery of *meanings*, sensations become secondary phenomena, and when one is predisposed to the analysis of sensations, meanings are not focal. It is impossible, I think, that both should be focal at the same time, hence the discrepancy in the results of two sets of investigators each working on the same problem but with fundamentally different biases. The average 'trained' observer of our laboratories is one whose training has consisted in manifold analyses of sensation and images. These are the things for which he will naturally look, and without a counter suggestion, these are the only factors which his analysis may be expected to reveal.

I wish publicly to disclaim any intention of accusing the Cornell investigators or those of any other laboratory of wilful distortion of the data which they have obtained. Furthermore, I have never harbored the thought that undue influence was exerted on these investigators by the attitudes and beliefs of the directors of these laboratories. But surely, in problems as delicate as these, it is not overt acts on the part of director, investigator or observer with which we have to deal, but rather with attitudes which unconsciously pervade the laboratories and bias accordingly the work which is done there. I doubt if any laboratory can be entirely free of such a prejudice. I have taken pains in my review to call attention to at least two instances in the work of Binet and Moore, respectively,² in which a predisposition favorable to the imageless content has, I believe, led the authors to conclusions which the data do not unequivocally support.

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¹L. c., p. 194.

²L. c., pp. 188, 191.