

II.—FEELING AND THOUGHT.¹

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I.—THE AMBIGUITY OF 'FEELING'.

THE problem of psychology in dealing with its complex subject-matter is, "first, to ascertain its constituent elements".² This fundamental problem has been discussed times without number and the conclusions reached are on the whole unanimous. Psychologists are generally agreed that Feeling, Thought and Conation are the universal and therefore inseparable constituents of all mental states. But they do not always attach the same meaning to the terms; and it has been noticed that this ambiguity is especially prominent in the case of the first term, Feeling. Some authorities attempt to confine it to the expression of pleasure and pain. Others use it with a more extended significance to include indifferent feelings neither pleasurable nor painful, such as a neutral excitement would be supposing it were a fact. Others urge that Feeling must at least include the common element of pleasure and pain, an element that it seems can be neither one nor the other.

In the last place, Feeling is used in a sense which the experiences of pleasure and pain, the emotions, passions and sentiments have played no part in determining; but the common meaning of the verb 'to feel' has supplanted the influence of the class that we name 'The feelings'. We feel warm or cold. We feel the rapid movement of thought or its sluggish state; we feel the vigour of our resolutions, the eagerness of our desires, and also our weakness and inconstancy. In this sense, Feeling is taken as the equivalent of "immediate experience,"³ of "sentience or anoetic consciousness,"⁴ of the mere fact of "presentation" in distinction from "discursive thought" which identifies the character of this feeling or presentation and refers it

¹ Read before the Aristotelian Society.

² Prof. Ward, "Psychological Principles," *MIND*, viii., p. 465.

³ F. H. Bradley, *MIND*, N.S., vol. ii., p. 212.

⁴ G. F. Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, vol. i., p. 50.

to an object. And so the special sensations have to be regarded as varieties of this Feeling, those varieties not interpreted by thought to be subjective, but on the contrary referred to external objects. It is at this point in the logical extension of the term, as the equivalent of immediate experience, to include the special sensations as also immediately experienced, that the technical and popular meanings divide. For in the ordinary use of the verb there is a markedly subjective reference. We do not 'feel' a colour or a sound. Our sensations are objective; our feelings subjective; but, in this technical sense, Feeling is simply experience, and its objective or subjective reference an affair of thought extraneous to it. But, here as elsewhere, the popular use is not consistent. People say, 'I felt you were there before I saw you,' or that they "feel" the presence of their dead for some time after their departure from this life. This feeling is not the objective experience it is taken to be, unless there be a spiritual or telepathic sense; but it is something so like the immediacy and convincingness of sensation that no other term so well expresses the meaning.

While in the popular meaning of the verb 'to feel' direct or immediate experience is a prominent constituent, thought is not excluded. It is merely less prominent, and to feel in the popular sense is to think, and to identify however vaguely what we are feeling. Sometimes it is a process of thought we identify, or a resolution, or a doubt, or warmth, or a spirit-presence. But, in the technical meaning of the term, we seek to exclude this second constituent 'thought' and confine the term to the single constituent 'feeling'. Thus 'thought' and 'feeling' in this strict sense are mutually exclusive in their meaning, though in the actual psychoses the two constituents which they signify may be inseparable and complementary.

Feeling, then, as immediate experience is not what is meant when we speak of 'The feelings'. What these suggest to the mind, what is found under this heading in text-books of psychology, is the class formed of the emotions, passions and sentiments, and all varieties of pleasure and pain. But organic sensations are sometimes included in this class, partly because of their close connexion with pleasure and pain, partly because of their subjective character; for through an insufficient analysis no consistent use of the term is reached. "Pleasure-pain" is not essential to this class if there be neutral feelings; but in common cases and in the common meaning it is the prominent feature.

II.—THE ANTITHESIS OF THOUGHT AND FEELING.

While "immediate experience" is not what is meant by the fundamental class of the feelings, feeling as immediate experience may also claim to have a fundamental character. If it does not form an ultimate class of mental facts, it is held to enter all of them as an ultimate constituent. What is the character of this constituent? Can we analyse it? Can we define it? What is ultimate we cannot in the strict sense define: but we can reach the same end and in a broad sense define it by contrast. We can hardly think of Feeling without recalling to mind its contrary. For it suggests the antithesis of thought; and the character of each becomes clear and definite in contrast with the other.

Thought in a broad sense is defined as consisting in "objective reference". Feeling is distinguished from it "because it involves no objective reference".¹ It has been noticed that, as far back as Reid, we have a clear expression of this negative character of feeling. "There is no difference," he says, "between sensation and the feeling of it—they are one and the same thing."² Again, he says, in sensation as distinguished from perception, that is to say, in 'feeling' in the present sense of the word, "there is no object distinct from that act of the mind by which it is felt".³ And Mr. Bradley expresses the same conclusion: In feeling, there is not "anything like a subject and object".⁴ The "objective reference" of thought, in contrast, is the reference of this very feeling or presentation to an object. What is this object? Is it some other feeling or presentation? The answer that has come down to us from Kant is that it cannot be. The object that we mean and intend "cannot be a modification of our own consciousness at the time we mean or intend it".⁵ We may put the conclusion in another way. Of the two universal constituents of "noetic" consciousness, feeling and thought, the one is not, and as immediate experience cannot be, the object of the other. At first sight, this theory may seem to deny the palpable fact that we often make our present feeling the object of our present thought. But this apparent contradiction illustrates an inconvenient use of the term 'object' rather than a denial of this fact. The present

¹ *Analytic Psychology*, G. F. Stout, vol. i., p. 41.

² Reid's *Works*, Hamilton's edition, vol. i., p. 310. Quoted by Mr. Stout, *op cit.*, p. 51.

³ *Works*, p. 310. ⁴ *MIND*, xii., p. 365. ⁵ G. F. Stout, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

sensation or feeling about which our thought turns is not called 'object'; but the objective reference precisely consists in the turning of thought about this feeling. In this reference, thought inevitably transcends feeling and invests it "with attributes and relations which are not themselves immediately experienced at the moment".¹ If we choose to call our present feeling, when we think about it, the object of our thought,—which from the logical point of view is called the subject of the proposition we are in process of forming,—it follows none the less that in order to think about this present feeling we must transcend it and refer it to something beyond itself. We identify a present sensation as of some colour or of some shape; and this is a reference to other objects with which it has points in common. These may have been experienced in the past: they are not experienced at the moment.

III.—THE RELATION OF THOUGHT TO FEELING.

To identify a present sensation we must discriminate it from its context. "All processes of thought are *eo ipso* processes of discrimination."² The feeling or sensation must lend itself to our discrimination. We cannot by sight discriminate objects in the dark, and, being unable to discriminate, cannot identify them. A sensation must present a sufficient difference from its context for us to be able to discriminate it. And in discriminating, as in identifying, our thought transcends the sensation. But the thought-reference is different in the two cases. In discrimination it suffices for thought to refer to the context of the sensation, which like it is immediately presented, and to distinguish the sensation from this context.

Thus "thought is discriminative only so far as it has presentation for its vehicle,"³ and so far as this presentation is sufficiently differentiated. This is true whether we are or are not thinking of our sensations. In perception we may be thinking of external objects; but it is through our visual, tactile and auditory sensations that we are able to perceive them. However objective our thought, however much removed from the attitude of the psychologist or painter, we still in some measure discriminate and identify these sensations. We merely do not regard them as our sensations. We take them to be the colours and shapes of external things, and the sounds which they produce, and the solid resistance which they offer to us. It is only the changes which the object

¹ G. F. Stout, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

undergoes according to our position and distance from it that we frankly acknowledge to be subjective. But from the psychological point of view we must reclaim from the external object, not merely these its changing appearances, but its colour and shape, and all that we directly experience in it, as indubitably our sensations. And in all perception we are constantly discriminating some sensations, though we neglect the changes of visual magnitude. We identify the kind of object we perceive through identifying the sensation of its shape or colour, or the sensations of its movement. Through this constant dealing of thought with what is presented to it or directly experienced, we are able to think of other qualities which are not presented, and to form an accurate judgment of what the thing is. It is probable that the farther we went back in the mental history of the race or the individual the more should we find thought in perception engrossed with its immediate experience, though it would still less than in the present identify this experience as its own feeling. With a weaker and less independent thought, with a thought bound to sensation and sensation itself a recent acquisition, the less could we fill out the sensory presentation with the qualities which a richer experience discovers to us. The very tables and chairs which give us so many changing appearances according to our position, which we have connected with such different uses, to the infant must be much less complex unities. The mere sensations must engross him, and only the bright and intense among them, or those to which his attention is directed through hereditary bias, or those which move rapidly through the visual field. It is to these sensations that what little thought he has is directed. It is these immediate experiences which he discriminates and identifies.

IV.—THE FEELING-CONTINUUM.

If we study the field of vision we do not find any absolute breaks in it. Its dividing lines and its blanks, its empty and its filled appearance, are still nothing but visual sensation. It is a genuine *continuum*. And our organic sensations have also this character of a mass in which we can neither find a breach nor make one. Both are *continua*: but the break which cannot occur within the limits of each is found between them. There is no greater gulf in nature than this between the field of vision, which our uncritical thought interprets as objective and independent of us, and the mass of organic sensa-

tion which we think of as wholly subjective, as exclusively our own property. But apart from the opposite interpretation which our thought places upon these distinct masses of sensation, in themselves as mere experiences or feelings they present the deepest contrast. The colours and gradation of light and shadow of the field of vision wholly disappear as we enter the mass of organic sensation, and as we depart from it we lose its specific character penetrated with varying degrees of warmth, and can find no trace of it in visual sensation. When we pass to auditory sensation we come upon another of those deep gulfs in our experience, whether we approach it from the side of organic, or from that of visual sensation; and we have this difficulty in dealing with it. Are the sounds we hear detached existences forming no *continuum*, discrete sensations with real gaps between them, or is there an auditory as there is a visual *continuum*? Do these sensations of sound float like colours in a medium of their own? Do they float in the silence and contrast with it? And as there is a field of vision, ever present, from which in the darkness all colour passes, is there something like a field of silence into which sounds break and which persists when these pass from it? "Into the awareness of the thunder . . ." says Prof. James, "the awareness of the previous silence creeps and continues; for what we hear when the thunder crashes is not thunder *pure*, but thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it."¹ And so the silence creeps into the thunder and continues through the succession of sounds as their true bond of continuity, not merely in their succession and between their pauses, but each isolated sound contrasts with the silence around it. On this view, silence is no more a mere negation than is darkness. It is a positive sensation. And between the degrees of sound and silence, as between the degrees of darkness and light, there is a character which both have in common, though in degree unequally distributed.

If the human mind is possessed of at least three *continua*, what is the relation between them? Are they just masses of sensation continuous in themselves but with no bond of connexion between them, or where the specific character of each vanishes at the limits of each, is there a deeper character hidden in the gulf between them? Throughout the darkness and the light, the sound and silence, the mass of organic sensation, and within their deepest con-

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 240.

trasts there is the all-pervasive character of "presentation" of "immediate experience," of feeling. Within us is "a continuous mass of presentation in which the separation of a single element from all context is never observed".¹

Feeling is then a *continuum* which contains *continua*, and these *continua* in relation to one another are discrete masses in respect of the specific character of each, but, in respect of that universal character they share, they form one *continuum*. But is feeling continuous with itself through the succession of time? Is it never broken in the life-history of the individual? This is a question we might answer if we could observe ourselves in states of sleep and so-called unconsciousness. But as in such states thought is either interrupted or incapable of voluntary attention, so through its absence or inefficiency we cannot verify the continued existence of feeling. We may find ground for assuming this as a working hypothesis, as the physicist assumes the continued existence of matter. This is the utmost we can expect. But whatever be our attitude to this question feeling as interpreted by psychological analysis, as statically considered, is a *continuum*: and it is continuous through the stream of change, so far as we can directly observe it.

What is the relation of this feeling-*continuum* to the thinking of which it is the vehicle? Do they together form one *continuum*? Can thought itself possibly be feeling? If not we seem face to face with a psychological dualism as absolute as the dualism of scholastic theology.

From another point of view the relation is a perplexing one. Are all the feelings actually present in the mind identified and discriminated by thought? Do their differences precede our discrimination of them; do they come into existence at the moment of our discrimination; or are these differences and our discrimination different names for one and the same fact?

V.—THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE RELATIVE PRIORITY OF FEELING.

"It is easy to show," says Mr. Stout, "that there is by no means a complete coincidence between the existence of presentations and their significance for thought. . . . At this moment I am thinking about psychological topics. I receive at the same time a multitude of diversified impressions from surrounding things which certainly enter

¹ F. H. Bradley, *MIND*, xii., p. 357.

into my total experience. But if I refer them to an object at all I do so in a very indeterminate way. My thought discrimination is very far from keeping pace with the differentiations of the sensory data as immediately experienced."¹ But where is our evidence for concluding that, beside what we do discriminate in a total experience, there are other differences contained in it which we do not discriminate? We have a direct knowledge only of those differences which we do discriminate. The other differences supposing them to exist are experienced, but not known: how then can we know them to exist? For feeling gives no information about itself. It is blind, and like everything else in the world can only be interpreted by thought.

It is generally held by psychologists that attention is a selective process and that, outside its narrow area, there is a wider area of inattention. The moment we attempt to make a direct assertion about any item within this wider area, we are met by the objection that, in the process of making it, we have brought this item within the area of attention. The only method we have for reaching any conclusion about this wider field or even for justifying our assertion as to its existence is to deal with it through memory. As any psychosis is passing away and giving place to a new one in its stead, we must ask what there was in the former over and above the clear attentive thought which we can recall. But over and above this clear thought which we can recall, there is nothing more than a vague and untrustworthy memory. While occupied in our work we may remember hearing some one put coals on the fire or the rattling of a cart by the house. But it is doubtful whether these obtrusive events were in the field of inattention. It is more probable that they momentarily deflected attention to themselves.—If we have this difficulty in demonstrating anything of the field of inattention, to which there is often supposed to be some vague thought present, how much greater must be our difficulty when we attempt to demonstrate the existence of differences not in any degree thought of or discriminated!

There is then no direct evidence for asserting the existence of anything in consciousness not in some degree discriminated or thought of. What indirect evidence can we find? There must be something to account for the belief of men in more in their minds than they can discriminate. When we momentarily attend to some organic sensation, we believe

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 48.

that it preceded our discrimination. And in this way we come to believe in the field of inattention. We make momentary excursions outside of the ordinary objects of attention to objects that we do not commonly notice—the rumble in the street, the ticking of the clock, the pressure of the seat on which we are sitting, the vague visual sensations outside the focus of vision, the mass of organic sensation; and we infer that whatever among these various sensations seems constant, and not due to a present change in our environment, preceded that moment's thought which revealed them to us, and will continue in the future as in the past independent of it. For if these apparently constant facts do not precede our momentary thought of them, we seem driven to the conclusion that the thought which discovered created them. And we know that our thought cannot create them. We cannot make what differences we please. Our judgments of subjective facts are no more capricious than our judgment of objective facts. The sensations we discriminate "determine our judgment": they "are not created by it".¹—That something determines such judgments is indubitable; can we infer that they are determined by feeling as relatively prior to and independent of the thought which thinks it?

VI.—THE EXCLUSIVELY PHYSIOLOGICAL HYPOTHESIS.

There "are not three things in question—conscious processes, unconscious mental processes, and merely physical brain-changes, but only two, on the one hand conscious processes and on the other hand nervous processes without consciousness . . ." ² In every state of noetic consciousness there are thought and feeling and there is precisely that amount of feeling which is discriminated or thought of. There is no more. There is no unconscious feeling such as seems to precede our clear discrimination. There is no feeling present that we do not consciously discriminate. The moment before we discriminated this feeling it was non-existent; and that which constrained our thought, so that we had no choice but to discriminate this feeling, was the brain-change which caused it. This is the second hypothesis we may adopt for interpreting the facts of our mental life and the conviction that the thought which discriminates cannot create these facts. Like the first, it may

¹ G. F. Stout, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 49.

² W. McDougall, *MIND*, N.S., vol. vii., p. 20.

assume a confident air as if it rested on direct evidence ; but neither is better than a hypothesis. We cannot prove by observation the existence of feelings in the mind undiscriminated nor their non-existence. This physiological hypothesis is narrower and more dogmatic than the first. The first is ready to admit that for every undiscriminated feeling there corresponds some brain-state. The second denies the undiscriminated feeling and posits the solitary existence of the brain-state. It is more the hypothesis of a physiologist than of a psychologist. In psychology as in physiology, we try to interpret the facts in accordance with the terms of our science. But this hypothesis excludes a psychological interpretation of the facts : not on the ground that a psychological interpretation cannot be furnished, but on the ground that a physiological interpretation can be. But we have the right and duty to give a psychological explanation of the facts wherever we can ; and neither science has the right to exclude the complementary explanation which the sister-science from its standpoint legitimately furnishes.

On this hypothesis every mental process or factor of a mental process that we identify and discriminate by thought comes into existence at the precise moment of this thought-discovery, and endures only so long as it remains thought of. When some movement takes place on the margin of the visual field and we turn our eyes in the direction of the movement and accommodate them for the object, we know that this physiological process does condition the uprising of a number of sensation-differences which before were non-existent. The indefinite shape of the object gives place to a definite shape : a number of details appear which were not present in the confused state of the sensation. Why should this not be the rule in all cases, and the movement of attention be accompanied by a physiological process which creates the mental fact at the moment we attend to it ? But we can discriminate the cases in which the mental event is almost synchronous with our discrimination from those cases in which it appears to have preceded it by an indefinite time. New sensations are constantly thrust upon us ; and we identify them as new events. Their character may be old and familiar, but their occurrence is fresh. Other facts in our experience we identify as old and not new occurrences. They do not come with any shock of surprise to us. " Does not every sudden shock, appearance of a new object, or change in a sensation create a real interruption, sensibly

felt as such?"¹ The continuity of our lives is not broken by such new events, but we sensibly feel the shock of them.

In cases of lingering illness and where a pain of low intensity is an almost constant accompaniment, the sufferer will say that he is able to forget it at times, using the word 'forget' in reference, not to past feelings of pain which he no longer remembers, but to present feelings of pain which he ceases to discriminate. "It is always there," he will say, "but at times I forget it." The physiological hypothesis can offer no interpretation of this experience. On its assumption we must maintain that pain as a present fact was not for a moment forgotten, and that when it was forgotten, it had ceased to exist. And it can offer no interpretation of the distinction we constantly draw between mental events which we identify as new occurrences and those which seem either to be constant factors in our experience or at least to have been some time present in it. How is it that all mental events, at the moment we discriminate them, do not strike us as new and equally new occurrences, if a moment before they were mere brain-states? How is it that while we treat some of them as old events, we treat our recollection of them as a new event? What is the meaning of this delicate distinction which popular thought, not given to subtlety, yet habitually draws? As with a fresh throb in the intensity of pain the sufferer is recalled to his suffering, he exclaims: "Ah! this terrible pain, will it let me forget it for so short a time?" The pain is worse. Its higher intensity is a new change in its process, which provokes anew his recollection of it. The feeling of the pain he identifies apart from its changed degree as old, but his recollection of it as a new event. He was mistaken, he should have said that it was all new, equally new as a mental occurrence, the feeling and his recollection of it. He should have said what he sometimes says, though significantly not always: "Ah! this terrible pain has come back, will it leave me for so short a time?" There ought to be no discrimination between the two cases, and the existence of this discrimination as a fact is that which the present hypothesis is unable to explain.

This example of painful experience is no exceptional case. What is true of it applies also to our discrimination of organic feelings, marginal imagery, and in general all factors in our experience which are normally too vague and too unimportant to attract our attention. When we discriminate them, we are aware that they are old factors in our experi-

¹ Prof. James, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 166.

ence. Our discrimination alone feels like a new occurrence ; whence we infer that they were prior to our discovery. The premises of this inference are not unexceptionable evidence. It is easy to object to them ; but it is well to remember that every distinction we draw within our experience between what is constant and changing in it, between what is old and new in it as an event, is substantially of the same character.

VII.—THE HYPOTHESIS THAT FEELINGS WHICH APPEAR UNDISCRIMINATED ARE VAGUELY DISCRIMINATED.

Feelings which appear to precede our discrimination of them, so far as they do precede it are not reduced to mere brain-states, nor are they "anoetic" feelings, they are discriminated, but thought of so rapidly, so vaguely, so inattentively, that no memory of them remains.¹ This is the third hypothesis. Because of this rapid and complete forgetfulness we must not infer that these differences are undiscriminated ; but the argument is double-edged and gives us no warrant for concluding that they are discriminated. It is, then, like the others, a mere hypothesis of what does or does not take place in processes inaccessible to direct observation. There are two prominent conceptions in this hypothesis : the one is of vague, rapid and inattentive thought ; the other, of rapid forgetfulness. Dreams furnish us with familiar examples of this kind of thought, so vague, so rapid, that as soon as we wake we find ourselves unable to recall them. Yet the very effort shows that our forgetfulness is not complete. We remember that we have dreamt, that we have been consciously aware of some train of images, though what these images were or what was our thought-attitude to them, we cannot remember. But on our present theory if these images had persisted they would, as long as they persisted, have been the vehicle of the conscious thought which discriminated all that was present in them. No memory would be required to assure us of the presence of this thought : no forgetfulness could overtake it, so long as it remained present. Thus "our own bodily position, attitude, condition, is one of the things of which *some* awareness, however inattentive, invariably accompanies the knowledge of whatever else we know".² For the presence

¹ Compare James, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 165.

² Prof. James, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 241.

of this awareness we have not to rely upon an act of memory. We have only then to observe the fact and verify its existence. But it is precisely due to the fact that we cannot verify its existence that we owe the construction of the present hypotheses. We are not consciously aware at every moment of our thought-life of all our organic sensations and all their differences and all the changes they undergo,—still less of the subtle differences and momentary changes of the thought itself. We are only aware of some of these sensations and some of their differences and some of the changes they undergo, sometimes, when pain, pleasure, emotion or psychological experiment recalls us to their presence. But it is all of them of which on the present hypothesis we must be conscious.

Like the second hypothesis this one must also deny the spontaneous testimony which ordinary people give as to the forgetfulness of pain. We think, when the pain is of a low intensity and the attention becomes absorbed in a pursuit disconnected with it, that, during shorter or longer intervals, we may completely forget the presence of pain. This we must put down as an illusion of memory. At the moment at which we "recollect" the presence of pain, we are only clearly aware of what we were vaguely aware the preceding moment. The inattentive process of thought has simply passed into an attentive process. We then neither forget the presence of pain, nor is our recollection of it a new event. But our spontaneous judgment on the contrary is that we do forget the presence of pain, and that our recollection of it is a new event. The hypothesis contradicts and cannot interpret this spontaneous judgment. The judgment may be false; but we cannot get closer to the facts than its indirect assertion of them. But do we distrust this judgment because some other spontaneous judgment contradicts it? No: this judgment is contradicted by a mere hypothesis whose function properly understood is to interpret, not to contradict it. So we fail on this hypothesis to interpret the distinction we draw between the pain as an old event and the recollection of it as a new event. If both are of the same age and have the same life, why do we not identify both as old events or both as new events? The ordinary man believes that he can distinguish between the shock of a new event and the mere continuing in the mind of a former experience. This distinction we must assure him is not to be trusted, inasmuch as it leads him to identify a present feeling as old and his identification of it as new, and

through these fallacious premises to impose on the logical mind the false conclusion, that this feeling prior to his identification was an "anoetic" experience, and, in the ordinary sense of the term, an unconscious feeling.

VIII.—THE MEANING OF VAGUE THOUGHT.

When we say that we have a vague thought of something, we mean that our thought is inadequate to its object. Whether the object of our thought be enveloped in a physical or moral darkness, there we can but vaguely discriminate it or identify its character. We know that there is more detail in the object than we discriminate, and that our identification of its character is abstract and incomplete. And it is due to this inadequacy of our thought to its object that we call our thought vague. It is not due to the character of its object. The imagery on the margins of the visual field is at its maximum of vagueness; but it does not follow that our thought of it is vague. If our attitude is 'objective,' if we are trying to guess what the object so vaguely presented to us really is, our thought of this object may be most vague, hesitating and inadequate. If our attitude is psychological and subjective; if we make the visual imagery itself our object, and have an adequate thought of its vague character, its indefinite colours, its misty outlines, it would be a misuse of words to call our thought vague. On the contrary, we have the clearest thought of the peculiarities and character of this marginal imagery, because we have an adequate thought of it.

If we then have so often a vague thought of what is taking place in our minds, if the rapid change and the delicate differences of the thought-process within us, and the less intense and vaguer sensations, almost wholly escape us, our thought is vague because it is inadequate to its object, because there is so much more in the psychosis of the moment than it discriminates. Is this the vague thought which the third hypothesis conceives as lying outside the attentive process, and accompanying all the experiences which are not in the focus of attention?—then this hypothesis is suicidal. In analysing its conception, which it has so inadequately understood, we have transformed it into the conception of the first hypothesis.—There is more detail in our experience than we succeed in discriminating. We are converted to the hypothesis of the relative priority of feeling.

But if we maintain our third hypothesis, we must be able

to give some other interpretation of the vague inattentive thought, so rapidly forgotten, which is its central conception.

Our thought is sometimes vague and confused, especially where it is dealing with a new and difficult subject. But to any man who loves clear thinking these states of confusion are painful and oppressive. They are not like the vague thought of this hypothesis rapidly forgotten, like many painful experiences they carry a good memory. Some, on the contrary, are not pained by vague thought, it pleases them and they live contentedly in it. They have a partiality for difficult subjects, and especially for metaphysical speculations, which appeal to their love of mystery. When they speak you recognise that their thoughts have no definiteness in themselves, and no coherence among each other, converge to no conclusion, and might without injury be arranged any way you please. But their thinking, such as it is, occurs in an attentive process, and cannot be that inattentive thought which the hypothesis has in mind. As an attentive process, clearness of some kind is essential to it;¹ and they are clearly aware of the darkness and mystery of the subject which fascinates them. Their love of mystery tends to foster it. The sentiment of mystery conquers the love of truth. They preserve the obscurity of their subject, in order to be clearly aware of its mystery. This thinking is only vague so far as its object is taken to be that adequate knowledge in relation to which its present thinking is vague because inadequate; but it is clear so far as its object is that sensible mystery directly present to it which it broods over and fosters. But this attentive process, and this thought essentially clear in relation to the object of that process, this thought which carries a good memory, cannot be the vague, inattentive thought, rapidly forgotten, which this hypothesis has in mind.

Is such a thought anywhere a fact within us, a thought vague, inattentive, rapidly forgotten, which yet adequately discriminates all present experience in the mind? Let us assume it to be a fact. Then all changes and gradations in the mass of feeling, are adequately discriminated, so that nothing present escapes. But in logically developing this conception of the hypothesis, the vague thought which it posits outside the area of attention has been transformed into the clearest thought we can possibly have. For if all gradations in the mass of organic feeling with all its vague

¹ "An Analysis of Attention," *MIND*, N.S., vol. iii.

differences are discriminated, with the varying warmth that pervades it, with the pressure of objects on different parts of the body which almost melts into it, with the pleasurable or painful tone which penetrates its parts,—as that the head aches while the feet on the fender feel warm and comfortable,—if all these differences are accurately and fully discriminated, then we have that clear and adequate awareness in the inattentive process which it is our ideal to reach in the attentive process, to which we there make some approximation. In logically developing the hypothesis on this side of its conception we have transformed its inattentive process into an ideal process of attention.

IX.—THE IDENTITY-HYPOTHESIS.

Feeling and the conscious awareness of it, the difference between feelings and their discrimination in thought, are numerically one and qualitatively the same. Language here as elsewhere leads us into error. We have distinct ways of expressing the same mental fact, one passive, the other active. We speak of presented difference and our discrimination of it, of sensations and our consciousness of them; and it is almost impossible to escape from the illusion which this habit of language fosters. We regard it as indisputable that thought and immediate experience are distinct mental constituents. We introduce a sophistical dualism in the mind.

This identity-hypothesis would hardly obtain a hearing if it maintained the absolute identity of thought and immediate experience. A restricted interpretation of it alone concerns us. Where "we look before and after," there presentation and thought are not the same: where and so far as we deal with presented experience, the presented experience is all. There is no second element, no awareness of it. It is the awareness. Thought only begins where this awareness, this presentation ceases.

On this hypothesis we cannot maintain that our "thought-discrimination is very far from keeping pace with the differentiation of the sensory data as immediately experienced". Whatever difference exists in the mind that must be discriminated. We must be consciously aware of this difference. The difference and our awareness of it are the same.

There is one fundamental fact which all of these hypotheses have to interpret. In all perception, and in every judgment about our sensations, we must recognise, if we think of it,

that our thought is constrained, that it cannot make the fact. This presented difference between two colour-sensations in the centre of the field constrains me to accept it as the difference between blue and green. I cannot make it other than I find it. When we pass to other mental facts the amount of the constraint may be sensibly diminished. I can make them other than I find them ; but I try not to. The delicate, quickly changing process of thought, upon that I can foist almost any interpretation. Its differences may not be as my discrimination of them. They may pass undetected. I may discriminate where there is no difference. Still here too there is something of constraint, some touchstone of the truth and adequacy of our discrimination ; and the greatest psychologist in this respect is he who is most sensitive to it.

In all this, an open mind must surmise some dualism of elements, functions, aspects or whatever you please to name them. But this hypothesis, as it rejects the dualism, finds itself in the same straits with the physiological hypothesis which likewise denies the existence of any undiscriminated mental factors—of any factor of which we are not, in the ordinary sense, conscious. Hence, like this hypothesis, it cannot interpret, it can only deny those spontaneous judgments of ordinary thought that pain and other experiences, while they still subsist in the mind, may be forgotten, that as we recollect them we can distinguish our recollection of them as a new event from their existence as of relatively longer standing ;¹ that the common mind has grown sensitive to a difference in its experiences and that common thought submits to this constraint and interprets it,—the difference between persistent factors in its experience which it habitually forgets, like organic sensation, and the irruption into experience of something new as event, however familiar in character.

There is an experiment in attention which should convince us of the essential duality of feeling-difference and thought-discrimination. While the eyes remain accommodated for one object, we direct attention to the marginal images on the right or left of the field. Through this transference of attention we become clearly conscious of the vague difference between these marginal sensations with their misty outlines, while we become less clearly conscious of the clear differences in the centre. Before the experiment we may be as unaware of marginal as of organic sensations.

¹ See *ante*, p. 487.

Suppose even that we are vaguely aware of them with all their differences, still how great a change between the obscure awareness and the clear awareness of these sensations! The clearness of the sensations and that of our awareness of them do not correspond, hence they cannot be the same: and the essential duality of these elements we bear witness to whenever we speak of the *movement* of attention over the visual field while that field itself remains constant.

X.—THE HYPOTHESIS OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS.

The experiments to which many hysterical patients have been subjected have brought to our notice facts of which the hypothesis of double consciousness is given as the explanation. Each consciousness may develop a distinctive character of its own. And these personalities do not appear always to be successive, if the facts be rightly interpreted, they are sometimes co-existent.¹ While the first consciousness maintains a conversation with one individual, the second self writes intelligent answers to questions which another individual whispers from behind, and performs acts which are held to involve intelligence. This secondary self, according to this interpretation, cannot be anoetic. It is more than a separated tract of sentience. It has its centre of thought and attention distinct from the thought and attention of the primary self. In any normal individual an attempt to carry on two simultaneous operations both requiring selective attention for their performance would lead to an interruption of one or the other, and an oscillation of attention between them. In some hysterical women this does not seem to be the case.

This hypothesis of Double-Consciousness in its restricted application is not an alternative to the hypothesis of the Relative Priority of Feeling. For as there is much detail of sensation which the primary self, at any given moment, fails to discriminate, so it is reasonable to suppose that the secondary self, attentive to the commands or questions of the operator, overlooks, like the primary self, such irrelevant details. Before the one hypothesis can be set up in opposition to the other, we must broaden and develop it so that (1) every one must be held to possess a secondary consciousness

¹ This is still in dispute. See *L'Automatisme Psychologique*, Pierre Janet, 2^{me} partie, ii.; *Les Alterations de la Personnalité*, A. Binet, 2^{me} partie; *Subliminal Self or Unconscious Cerebration*, by F. Podmore, *Proceedings of Psy. Soc.*, vol. xi., part xxviii., p. 325.

co-existing with the primary, that (2) discriminates all the detail of immediate experience which the primary fails to discriminate, that (3) never relapses into mere sentience, as the first appears to do in deep sleep, in cataleptic trance, in fainting and anæsthesia. * That a secondary consciousness exists in each of us possessed of this marvellous talent of subjective observation is a hypothesis which no known facts justify and which has never been advanced by any scientific intelligence.

In judging between these different hypotheses, in deciding which of them we should adopt for interpreting this enigmatical side of our mental life, we have a clear principle to guide us. We have to select that hypothesis which faithfully interprets the facts, without having to deny or distort them. Mental facts as a rule are not "stubborn things". They are as delicate as the wings of an insect, and must be as delicately handled. We have only found one hypothesis which is in harmony with this principle—the hypothesis that feeling, so far as each individual feeling is concerned, is prior to and independent of the thought which discriminates it. In every consciousness thought may be present to feeling, and the two constituents complementary and inseparable; but thought is not present to every feeling, nor to every difference between feelings.

XI.—FEELING AS A CONTINUUM CONTAINING RELATIONS.

As our "thought-discrimination is very far from keeping pace with the differentiation of the sensory data as immediately experienced," so we fail to identify the common characters which pervade these same sensory data. Like their differences, we are convinced our thought discovers, but does not create, the common characters of feeling,—the warmth which commonly pervades all but the outlying parts of organic sensation, its faintly pleasant or painful tone, the quality of the sounds which meet our ears from the crowded street, the heavy rumble of the omnibus, the groaning and creaking of brewers' drays, the quick rattle of the cabs, and under present conditions of light and atmosphere, the actual colour of our visual sensations. And not only does our thought not create these several qualities of sensation, but it is not synchronous with them. A moment before our identification they were not, any more than the undetected differences, mere brain-states. They exist in the sensations though our thought-reference be absent. While we identify some other class-character,

they await our later identification; and our whole life may pass without discerning them. And in thought itself while it exists in constant change, how many of its fleeting and subtle characters do we detect? Do we detect the changes in a question as it passes through doubt into the answering judgment? Do we detect at each moment the change of the judgment, its problematic, hypothetical and disjunctive phases? There is a wealth of common characters in the mind which, at any given moment, we fail to identify.

It is a curious fact that those psychologists who have been foremost in the enunciation of feeling as at least relatively prior to thought, have either been silent concerning the presence of relations in feeling or have explicitly denied them. Thus Mr. Bradley says there are "no relations and no feelings, only feeling. It is all one blur with differences, that work and that are felt, but are not discriminated."¹ But if the differences persist in it undiscriminated, why should not the relations involved in them, in their co-existence, in their change, and in the fact that these differences "work" and have a tendency, and the relations involved in their common character of feeling, why should not all these relations be independent of our thought of them?

The atomistic psychology of Hume and the Mills produced two contrary explanations of the unity of the mental life, one of its own and known as the laws of association, the other produced by its German adherents. Those who were deceived by the metaphorical language of Kant posited a mysterious activity in the mind, the pure Ego, whose function it was to produce unity where without there would be only a discrete manifold. Hence the phrase, the "relating activity" of the Ego, and the belief that all relations of the sense-manifold were due to this activity. But with altered premises comes a changed conclusion. "There is no manifold of co-existing ideas: the notion of such a thing is a chimera."² The most rudimentary mind is a *continuum* and not a discrete manifold of sensations; and this mysterious activity is no longer required to unite what is already united.

XII.—THOUGHT-REFERENCE AS EXERCISED WITHIN THE LIMITS OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE.

A *continuum* of feeling filled with difference and other relations, pervaded by common and distinctive characters,

¹ MIND, xii., p. 363. ² James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i., p. 278.

will suggest to us the possibility that thought may sometimes find exercise for itself within this complex unity. What will thought gain by its more ambitious and developed attitude? It will but have a wider range of objects from which to select, a greater multitude of distinguishable characteristics, a fuller insight into the conditions on which events depend, a more complex attitude, and the thought of an infinite whole which embraces all realities. That in adult life we do apparently transcend the whole of immediate experience, that in thought, desire and volition we think of objects and ends which are not existent facts in present experience, is certain: that the most rudimentary thought formed in the infant or animal mind assumes at the outset this attitude, is doubtful. And our doubt will be increased if we can show that, in the mass of feeling and the sensations of the special senses, there is present to thought all the material which it requires for the adoption of its simplest thought-attitude. For this mass of feeling is not a statical *continuum*, but a process of change continuous with itself through successive moments. The limitation of thought to immediate experience does not confine it to any mathematical point of time within which its reference would be impossible. The psychological present contains a genuine portion of the stream of change. And in this psychological present are differences and vague changes which we recognise that we fail to overtake in thought. The effort to discriminate them will then be an exercise of thought within the limits of immediate experience.

But can thought be confined to discrimination alone, must we not also identify in some degree, in the simplest way, the sense-material discriminated? And wherever we identify the character of an experience, we inevitably transcend it. For its character is something universal which cannot in thought be confined to it, which obliges us to refer to objects "which are not themselves immediately experienced at the moment".¹—Thought universally refers the object or presentation from which it starts to other objects outside of this. We think inevitably of the relation of identity of this first object to them, or of its difference from them, or of its various other relations. But while we necessarily transcend the first object or presentation, we do not necessarily transcend the entire complex of immediate experience. Here is a wealth of 'items' already present in the field of immediate experience with the character of 'feeling' which

¹ G. F. Stout, *op. cit.*, vol. I., p. 44.

they share in common and the distinguishable character of their groups. Why should our thought not be confined to them, to their common character, or to the character of their groups? Doubtless there are countless other items not presented which also share in this common character. Why must our thought be troubled with them? It has already a number among which its "discursive" thought can roam and verify the presence of a common character.

XIII.—THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTION OF THOUGHT.

In the work of the older writers, the psychological and metaphysical treatment of thought were often confused. Thought, according to Kant, was objective reference, and if we take the semi-psychological interpretation which has often been placed, but now held to be mistakenly placed, on his language, then our sensations were, in the first place, subjected to the pure forms of space and time and then transformed into objects through the action of the categories or universals. Thus thought seemed to consist, in this half-psychological conception, in the activity of universals. These universals were not presentations, were not immediate experiences, on the contrary they were the agents which transformed these experiences into objects. This doctrine has markedly influenced all our conceptions of thought at the present day; and the confusion between psychological and logical thought is partly due to it.

We have found relations and a universal character in the heart of the feeling-*continuum*. What is this universal character? It is not a feeling. It cannot be presented. It is a symbol of other realities. It is an idea. It is thought.—But this universal, this thought which is never an experience is not the thought of psychology. The thought of psychology is experienced. It is "the present pulse of thought". And it is in these pulses of thought in constant change, and by their activity, that this universal, this world-thought, is discovered. The universal penetrates all reality, including our immediate experience, whence the universal character which we discover in it. We find what the universal character of our experience is: this universal character *makes* our experience what it is. Our thought—the thought of Psychology—discovers the character of its object,—discerns the identity as it discerns the difference: this thought—the thought of logic or metaphysic—constitutes its character.

But in psychology we have nothing to do with this

idealistic interpretation of the nature of every object as thought. For us this nature is simply a common nature. And at all events it is not *our* thought. Our thought deals with it, discovers it, identifies it. Our thought is now occurring: and as well might we confuse it with the difference of its object as with that object's universal character or identity. Yet it is due to the confusion between this metaphysical and this psychological conception of thought, that we owe the false doctrine in psychology that thought must necessarily transcend immediate experience. Once speak of universals as "symbols," "ideas," thoughts, transfer this conception to psychology, and it is obvious that we cannot limit thought or the universal to the experience which it qualifies: thought in this sense must transcend immediate experience. Surrender this metaphysical conception of thought, with which we have nothing to do, take thought as the discriminator, the identifier of objects, as the witness not the constructor of experience, and the doctrine that this passing thought must transcend its immediate experience is no longer obvious; and when we apply it to interpret the infant-mind becomes in the highest degree doubtful.

It is, then, at least possible that thought may be confined to the complex of immediate experience. There is nothing in its referring, discursive character which necessitates any other objects than a multiplicity of different presentations contained in the *continuum* of immediate experience. The definition of thought which has come down to us from Kant, that thought is a reference of presentations to objects which are not themselves presentations, is at least non-proven. And as applied to the infant-mind, it is not merely improbable, it is an unreasonable assumption to make, because it is not required for the interpretation of the facts. The only objects that we need assume are the distinguishable and co-presented sensations. And as far as we can judge the earliest thought in the infant-mind begins with some discrimination between these sensations. Preyer remarks¹ how very early, as early as the first few days after birth, the difference between light and darkness appears to be discriminated. With the constant opening and shutting of the eyes, it must be one of the first, as well as of the most marked, of the changes that we directly experience. It may be that this simple discrimination of light from darkness is the infant's earliest thought, and there is no ground for

¹ *The Senses and the Will*, ch. i.

assuming that it must be complicated by the identification of the light as light and the darkness as dark. The discrimination of bright light and bright colours from the duller sensations around them seems also to be one of the earliest thoughts. But it is more difficult to say what is the first thought of the *same*. It may lie between co-presented sensations of the same class as distinguished from other sensation, or what is more likely, between a sensation which has been several times experienced and the reproduced images of similar sensations. If a few days after birth a child is apt to cry if turned away from the light, it may well be that the image of the light is still with him, contrasting with his present duller sensations, and when he is again turned round to the light he may identify this image with the fresh sensation at the moment of their fusion.

We have then to give a definition of thought which is strictly universal, and which does not make the assumption that thought commences with the conception of an object not contained in immediate experience. Thought universally transcends that from which it starts, universally refers to some object beyond it. But what does 'transcend,' what does 'refer,' mean? It means that we can never confine thought to the central 'item' from which it starts, that it inevitably thinks of what is outside this item, even if that be only the sensational context. All definitions of thought are deceptive. They are not strictly definitions. They have only a suggestive value. The *differentia* of thought is irreducible; we cannot decompose it; and if we press the meaning of the term 'reference' we have to explain it by the term 'thought'. It is the same with the terms 'discrimination' and 'identification,' which we have so frequently employed. They are more suggestive than 'thought,' but like the phrase 'objective reference,' they are no simplification of its conception. Discrimination is the conscious thought of difference, and identification the conscious thought of agreement or identity. Like so much in the mind which we vainly attempt to analyse, the *quale* of thought defies analysis and remains absolutely unique.

XIV.—THOUGHT AS FEELING.

We are so accustomed to the antithesis of Thought and Feeling, of thought and sensation, of the knowing subject and its experiences, of attention and the field of presentation—in one form or another, of the dualism of consciousness—that the contradiction does not strike us when, in the

exigencies of our situation, we are forced to take the present thought in its relation to sensation to be an occurring thought, the knowing subject to be, not its bare abstract character, as if that could work independently, but the present particular knowing attitude which has this abstract character; and attention to be no more than attending. For this attending, this knowing attitude, this thinking about sensation, is itself, as process of change, part of the continuous stream of immediate experience. Thought, that "central part of the self, is felt". It is "no mere *ens rationis*, cognised only in an intellectual way; no mere summation of memories or mere sound of a word in our ears. It is something with which we have direct sensible acquaintance. . . ." ¹ Were it not so we could no more form a conception of its unique and irresolvable character directly present to us in all our experience of thought, than we could of the unique character of a visual or auditory sensation without a direct experience of them. But if thought is itself an immediate experience or feeling, what becomes of the familiar opposition between them? We can no longer maintain that the universal character of feeling is absence of objective reference, since in thought we have a variety of feeling of which the specific character is objective reference. But if feeling cannot be defined by absence of objective reference, how are we to distinguish it from thought? Our problem is now to describe feeling positively, not in negation to thought, and to regard thought not as opposed to, but as a variety of feeling. Feeling, then, may or may not have objective reference, may or may not identify and discriminate objects. But, whether or not, it has the positive character of immediate experience. Its essence is "in being felt". ² And this holds true of thought itself, as well as of the sensations of the special senses. And although all feeling cannot think, cannot identify and discriminate objects, all feeling can be thought of, can be identified and discriminated object: and this holds true of thought itself, as well as of all sensation. But any particular feeling may not be thought of—may neither be identified nor discriminated: and this holds true of thought itself, which in greater part is undiscriminated. Feeling universally lies open to thought; and thought as feeling lies open to itself.

Feeling then has two universal characteristics: it is felt; it is capable of being thought of. With regard to this second

¹ William James, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 299.

² G. T. Ladd, *Psy. Ex. and Des.*, p. 165.

characteristic we may predicate of feeling, what the philosopher predicates of the world: it is intelligible. What more can we say? We cannot analyse feeling into anything simpler: we cannot define it. We cannot contrast it with anything in the mind which is not feeling, because all is feeling. We can only contrast it with its own unique varieties. Feeling is not essentially visual sensation, not even organic sensation: feeling is not essentially thought. The last contrast is the most striking and suggests the clearest negative conception. But if we desire a positive conception we must be able to grasp what is meant by 'experience,' which we try to make clearer and more emphatic by the qualification of the adjectives 'direct,' or 'immediate'.

We come next to the character of thought, how do we distinguish it? Its positive character is to have an object distinct from itself. Its objective reference means "reference to an object other than the mental state itself".¹ Its object is not essentially outside the field of presentation, but is essentially other than itself. And this restriction of primitive thought to the field of presentation does not affect its universal character. Its range is more limited. But within this limited range the same relations await the identification of thought as outside, relations of co-existence and succession, of difference, resemblance and identity. It is this reference of thought to something other than its present thinking which distinguishes it from all varieties of feeling that are not thought—from organic and muscular sensations, from sensations of temperature and all special sensations.

XV.—THE ANTITHESIS OF THOUGHT AND SENSATION.

"There are two kinds of knowledge, broadly and practically distinguishable . . . *knowledge of acquaintance* and *knowledge-about*." They are broadly distinguishable but still "relative terms". For "the same thought of a thing may be called knowledge-about it in comparison with a simpler thought, or acquaintance with it in comparison with a thought of it that is more articulate. . . ."² The words *feeling* and *thought* give voice to the antithesis. Through feelings we become acquainted with things, but only by our thoughts do we know about them."³ This is what the words mean in their ordinary sense—feeling does but emphasise the constituent of immediate experience, and thought

¹ W. James, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 186. ² *Ibid.*, p. 221. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

that variety of it which has a reference beyond itself. Neither term in this popular sense wholly excludes the meaning of the other: it is but a difference of degree. And we have only to identify this ordinary meaning of the terms with the character of the facts, and the conclusion is reached that feeling though in a lesser degree is universally thought, and thought though in a lesser degree is feeling. The "feelings from our viscera" and all our sensations are thoughts having a cognitive function, and objects distinct from themselves. "They may be faint and weak; they may be very vague cognisers of the same realities which other conscious states cognise and name exactly . . ." ¹ but they still remain conscious, never become unconscious—they are always noetic, never anoetic states.

But this identification of the meaning of the terms with the character of the facts, on what evidence does it rest? While for instance I am thinking about some present organic sensation, how do I know that this organic sensation is not thinking about something else? I cannot directly know the contrary. I cannot directly prove that sticks and stones do not think. If, as appears to be the case from hypnotic experiments, consciousness "may be split into parts which co-exist but mutually ignore each other," ² why should not every sensation, as long as it is a present fact, enclose a world of its own and deal with that, as *we* deal with it? All this is conceivable: we cannot directly prove its non-existence: we cannot prove its existence. There is one and only one thought we can experience, our own. Our present thought may be dealing with a state of the body, an organic sensation. This present organic sensation about which we think, may have a thought of its own about something else, perhaps about our own inquisitive attitude toward it. But of its thought, if it exist, we have no experience; we only experience our own. There is no evidence for asserting that it has a thought: there is direct evidence for asserting our own. But supposing that when our thought is introspective and thinks of its sensations, there were as many other thoughts within us as there were sensations discriminated, these thoughts would still not be the same as the sensations that had them. Does this require any proof? Our thought experiences the sensations; but it has no experience of their thoughts. There must then be some difference between them. Nothing can ever make an organic sensation qualitatively the same as its thought if it have one. If a

¹ W. James, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 174.

² *Ibid.*, p. 206.

sensation of blue discriminate between two sensations of green contiguous with it, this discrimination is not the blue sensation. The thought may be one with the sensation, and no more than its inner and hidden reality; but analytical psychology must distinguish between them. The antithesis between thought and sensation is based on the unique character of each, and like that character is irresolvable.

But will not this distinction break out even in thought itself, which we have taken to be a peculiar variety of feeling? What kind of a feeling is thought? Can we localise it in some part of the *continuum* of feeling? "Whenever," says Prof. James, "my introspective glance succeeds in turning round quickly enough, . . . all it can ever feel distinctly is some bodily process, for the most part taking place within the head." The "acts of attending, assenting, negating, making an effort, are felt as movements of something in the head".¹ And "if the thinking be *our* thinking, it must be suffused through all its parts with that peculiar warmth and intimacy that make it come as ours".² This warm sensation in the head is the feeling of our thought? Yet our thought may clearly discriminate it, and be obscurely aware of itself. Our thought in its reference to this feeling may take up several attitudes: 'Is this feeling what I am? it may be: let us suppose it is'. But the feeling itself is not successively these three attitudes: it is neither a question, nor a problematic judgment, nor a supposal. And if the warm feeling in the head be, in some sense, the feeling of thought, thought is certainly distinguishable from it. There is a qualitative difference between them.

But in what sense is this sensation in the head the very feeling of thought? Is the sensation anything more than a constant accompaniment of the thought? A muscular sensation ordinarily accompanies will and conation, and a sensation in the head, thought. This is the only verifiable connexion between them. In the next case, we can point out in what the feeling of thought consists; and it does not consist in this warm feeling in the head. Thought is at least qualitatively different from this feeling. Thought has by general agreement a unique and irresolvable character. We should never have any conception of this unique character, unless we experienced the thought which has this character. And we must experience it in its qualitative difference from those warm feelings in the head with which it is connected. These feelings in the head we also experience: these feelings

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 300.

² *Ibid.*, p. 200.

we also identify and interpret by thought. As so interpreted, they are found to have the peculiar quality of organic sensation interpenetrated with the sensation of warmth. Our thinking we also experience: our thinking we also identify and interpret by thought. As so interpreted this feeling is found to have the peculiar quality, not of warm sensation, but of *thought*. The feeling in which thinking consists is this unique feeling. It has its own character. It no more has the character of organic sensation, than of visual and auditory sensations, which likewise have their own unique quality.