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level of empirical consciousness. The real, accordingly, is that which evidences itself through the sheer force of self-affirmation. The unreal lacks this self-assertive coefficient. We come, therefore, to deny reality to every concept which appears under contradictory aspects. The fundamental law of thought is the law of identity; it, moreover, is perfectly and satisfactorily comprehensive. From this fundamental postulate the author deduces the unreality of the phenomenal world, and, inasmuch as science has to do exclusively with the phenomenal, it must, therefore, be a science of the unreal. In other words, the phenomenal world necessarily resists all attempts at unification. There can never be a metaphysic of science. The phenomenal must be received merely at its face value. A further interpretation, a deeper significance, a final generalization are alike impossible.

The real, therefore, is that which lives, moves and has its being in the realm of pure thought. The essence of reality is personality and the essence of personality is freedom. Hence, it is possible to deduce the being of God, and God thus conceived becomes the norm of reality, and the supreme object of religion, which is the necessary complement of reality. Such, in the main, is the rough outline of the system. The author's point of view, it seems to me, presents the evident limitations of a too refined abstraction; his thought, therefore, lacks that wealth of content which only the concrete can give. There are two ways of rising to the higher level of pure thought, one by leaving the lower level absolutely and thereby denying its reality altogether, the other by so sublimating the lower that it preserves and manifests its reality in the higher. The author, it seems to me, labors under the disadvantage of pursuing the former of these two methods rather than the latter.

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The Utilitarian Estimate of Knowledge. PROFESSOR JAMES SETH.

The Philosophical Review, July, 1901, pp. 342-358.

This article is of special interest at the present time in the light of the recent publication of Mr. Leslie Stephen's 'Utilitarianism.' The difference in point of view is of course a radical one. Professor Seth's insistence upon the value of knowledge for its own sake, irrespective of its utility, is a most timely service. His conclusions may well be taken as an antidote to the doctrines of Mr. Stephen, as expressed in his 'Utilitarianism'; at least, they fulfil the function of emphasizing the fact that there may be another side to the question, and that it has a case which merits at least a considerate hearing.

Professor Seth's position is briefly as follows:

There is such a thing as knowledge which has no instrumental value, and yet carries with it a worth of its own. It is to be assessed not by any external standard, but by one which lies within. Much of knowledge is for the will, but not all knowledge. If it is regarded as having merely a practical value, it tends to lose even that value. There is here a paradox which is similar to that of hedonism. Moreover, the reflex influence of the disinterested pursuit of truth upon the scholar himself has an ethical value which can not be too highly estimated. The discussion is, however, generally epistemological rather than ethical.

The article abounds in historical allusions to the various systems of philosophical thought which have failed wholly or in part to allow a non-utilitarian factor in knowledge, notably the undue estimate on the part of Kant of the importance of the practical reason.

This plea for pure science is one which merits very grave consideration, whatever may be one's particular views concerning the general doctrine of utilitarianism. The tendency of the present day thought is to emphasize unduly the art of knowledge and to overlook completely, in certain quarters at least, the science of knowledge. This fact has a marked pedagogical significance. The average student to-day in our universities, if not the whole student body, determines his choice of studies in a large measure by their supposed utility in reference to the work or profession of life; and interest in intellectual pursuits rises and falls with barometric exactness according as there may or may not be evidence of the possibility of some practical application. This is but one of the many indications at the present time, that these exclusively utilitarian ideas are in the air, and have become all-pervasive. It seems to me that the essential characteristic of a scholar is his devotion to some form of pure knowledge for its own sake and that as there is a categorical imperative in ethics, so likewise there is a categorical imperative in scholarship. And in so far as the scholar comes to pursue knowledge with an eye askance as to the benefits which may accrue either to himself or the world at large, he is so far forth less worthy of the name of scholar.

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THE EMOTIONS.

Les Timides et la Timidité. PAUL HARTENBERG. Paris, Alcan. 1901. Pp. xv + 264.

Those who have any regard for the 'old' psychology are sufficiently warned in the preface that this book is not for them. It is a monograph in scientific psychology; and this is neither more nor less than