

valuable details as to the three papers he controlled during his campaigns in Italy and Egypt, as to his own numerous contributions to the *Moniteur*, and as to the once famous Peltier case (1803). Napoleon's acute sensitiveness to foreign criticism, to what he described (1805) as 'phantoms born of English fog and spleen', is well known, and he was fantastically careful as to what should or should not be published even with regard to matters of no moment. M. Périvier, while doubtful of the wisdom of Napoleon's rigid censorship, regards him as a writer 'of the first rank' in respect of both style and ideas. The lies and libels, with which the *Moniteur* and other officially inspired papers were filled, are hard to reconcile with such a claim. He was, however, the first statesman in modern Europe to realize the potentialities of newspaper propaganda, and few men have undertaken the task with more astuteness and zeal. G. B. H.

In *La Diplomatie de Guillaume II* (Paris: Bossard, 1917) M. Émile Laloy essays the task of sketching the diplomatic history of the years 1888-1914, especially from the emperor's point of view. It is necessarily based only on printed sources, and those used are of very unequal value. In the first chapter, dealing with the emperor's character, scarcely any use is made of the works of Hinzpeter and Lamprecht on that subject, and review articles are extensively quoted. M. Laloy's good sense leads him to reject (p. 55) the much advertised theory as to the 'encircling' of Germany by Edward VII; he rightly describes it as a series of agreements for ending Britain's differences with France and Russia. He is wrong, however, in ascribing to Reventlow regret that Germany did not join the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902; for Reventlow distinctly says (*Auswärtige Politik*, p. 178) that to do so would have enabled England to check Germany's naval construction, thereby ending her *Flottenraum*. Neither was Schiemann really favourable to the Anglo-German-Japanese Alliance wished for by us and Japan. The emperor's naval plans are here discussed, and the author believes that the German fleet on August 1, 1914, was ready to bombard Havre and Cherbourg and cover a landing at Morlaix for the seizure of Brest. The authority for this statement is M. Georges Blanchon in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. The question as to the times and circumstances of the mobilizations ordered by the Continental Powers on July 31-August 2, 1914, is well handled according to the evidence now available. M. Laloy is right in stating that the general mobilization of Austria was ordered a few hours before that of Russia. Whether, as he says, Russia did not know of the mobilization at Vienna is doubtful. In an interesting Note (pp. 410-11) he combats the view of M. Muret (*L'Évolution belliqueuse de Guillaume II*) that the emperor was sincerely peaceful but was overcome by the warlike tendencies of the German people. M. Laloy holds that he skilfully posed as the friend of peace but merely awaited the favourable conjuncture for declaring war, which occurred in July-August 1914. There is much to support this contention. J. H. RE.

Sir John Scott Keltie's perseverance in continuing the publication of *The Statesman's Year-Book* (London: Macmillan) during the war claims recognition, and his issue for 1918 is as usual very carefully corrected.