

touched by the history of philosophy—the writings of the great philosophers. This method is not everywhere applicable, notably not in the sections devoted to ancient philosophy which are for the most part based on the excerpts in Ritter and Preller. But in the chapters on modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant it yields admirable results. These five hundred pages (which are well translated) might well be published separately as a text-book of modern philosophy. They would find many readers who take no interest in the scholasticism of the middle ages or of the post-Kantians, and who would desire more authentic accounts of ancient philosophy than can be found in the first volume.

The translation is in the main correct and fairly readable. 'Gruppe's attempt to vindicate Plato's far more developed astronomical conceptions' (§ 78,4) hardly represents the 'Plato viel ausgebildeter astronomische Vorstellungen zu vindiciren' of the original, and Plato's *στασιῶται τοῦ ὄλου* after transfusion from Greek to German and German to English are hardly recognizable as the 'all-consolidators.' The philosophic terminology has been doubtless much benefited by the revision of the editor, but perfect consistency and accuracy have by no means been attained. The words *Anschauung*, *Vorstellung* and their paronyms present the chief difficulties. It is probably safer to render *Anschauung* everywhere by 'intuition,' *Vorstellung* generally by 'presentation,' and

*vorstellbar* by picturable or, rarely, 'thinkable.' But in the present work the Hegelian misuse of *Vorstellung* in antithesis now to *Begriff* and now *Idee* makes the translator's task very difficult. Where Greek terms which have not yet become technical, as *αἰσθησις*, *δόξα*, *νοῦς*, etc., find their way into English through translation of their supposed German equivalents, the confusion becomes hopeless. Compare page 113 where *vorstellbar* representing presumably the Platonic *δοξαστόν* is translated 'capable only of being imagined'; page 118 where *Anschauulich* is rendered 'clear to perception' but means rather 'picturable in imagination'; p. 134 where the student would certainly be misled by finding 'theoretical understanding' glossed by *τέχνη*; and page 183 where among several other confusing statements we have an identification of *ὀρθὴ δόξα* with *ὑπόληψις*. On page 143 we read that Aristotle calls rhetoric the complement of dialectic. *Gegenstück* here represents Aristotle's *ἀντίστροφος* and should be rendered 'counterpart.' Misprints and careless accents, though by no means wanting, are not sufficiently numerous to impair the value of the book. I note among others *ἀφθαρόν* (p. 22), *δοφία* (p. 109), *μονογένης* (p. 116), *φύλαι* (p. 124), *τύπτωσις* for *τύπωσις* (p. 187). The chapters from Kant to Hegel are an exception to the general excellence of the translation. Vol. II. p. 361, for example, is a literary curiosity.

PAUL SHOREY.

#### ROHDE'S PSYCHE.

*Psyche. Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen.* Von ERWIN ROHDE. Erste Hälfte. Freiburg-i.-B. 1890. Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr. 7 Mk.

THIS monograph has a value for mythologists beyond its avowed intention. In his examination of the belief of the Greeks as to the future state of the soul and the ritual practices founded on it, Herr Rohde starts from the Homeric poems, but he is well aware—and this constitutes the peculiar value of his monograph—that the Homeric poems are in reality for mythology no starting-point, but a poetic break, a fault—if we may borrow the metaphor—in the regular stratification of autochthonous tradition. So long as the mythologist insists on beginning with the

poetic and ultimately orthodox Olympian system, so long will he work with the cart before the horse and any intelligible sequence be impossible. No better instance of this could be found than this question of the belief in the after state of the soul, and it is in his clear recognition of the principle of the Homeric *break*, rather than in any special novelty of either fact or theory, that Herr Rohde claims our gratitude. We have only to regret that he tells his story at such needless length and with such tedious iteration.

The gist of his contention is this. Homer (taking Homer for epic tradition generally) believes that *something* persists after death: that something is no more life, though it is called *Psyche*; rather it is the very opposite of life, it is the shadowy double of a man deprived of all the charac-

teristics of life. This something, *as soon as the body is burnt*, goes away to a place apart, remote, from which there is no possibility of return. Further, this something, once gone to Hades, has no power for good or for evil on the living. In a word the Homeric world is haunted by no ghosts—Patroklos himself, once his body burnt, can reappear no more: hence after the funeral there is no cultus of the dead, no offerings at the tomb, no oracular utterance: all is done. In this respect Homeric faith is markedly different from that of most primitive peoples. Usually the dead man's ghost haunts his tomb, is locally powerful, must be tended and appeased. Moreover, in post-Homeric times we find an elaborate cultus of the dead, hero-worship, and the whole apparatus of a faith that recognises the power of the departed soul. Whence and when did this arise? Herr Rohde contends, and we believe rightly, that this faith and this ritual existed before Homer, and that in his poems there are traces of its survival; that during the period of epic influence it slept for a time, and re-awakened to fresh power and new developments: he believes, in fact, in the epic *break* in tradition. The break he abundantly proves: the reason is harder to determine. He conjectures—but all here *is* conjecture—that the reason for this break in traditional faith is to be sought in the general tribal upheaval consequent on the Doric invasion and the movement of the displaced tribes towards the coast of Asia. In a word, when you are moving about from place to place, when conditions almost nomadic compel you to burn your dead, you tend to drop a cultus that is local and ancestral; your gods, we may add, tend to remove themselves from their tribal seats and collect into a remote Olympus equally convenient at all points and always remote; your dead, instead of hovering about their ancestral graves, go to a common Hades, and revisit you no more, uncertain where you

are. But when you settle again, rebuilding home and hearth, the old local ancestral faith and ritual revive.

To the existence of the Homeric break Hesiod gives incidental and most interesting testimony. His five ages are characterised not more by their moral standard than by their status after death. One after the other they follow in regular decadence, with but one break in their continuity, and that for the epic heroes. The golden race after death are happy daimons, guardians of men: the remotest tradition then known to Hesiod shows a belief in the *activity* and *local* presence of souls after death. The men of the silver race, disobedient to Zeus, buried in the earth, but still were powerful and worshipped after death. The iron race went down to Hades nameless. The fourth race, the heroes of Thebes and Troy, interrupt the downward sequence—a part of them 'death covered,' and they reappeared no more; a few, the exception always, Zeus kept alive, they never suffered death, but they were translated to remote regions, islands of the blessed. This is perfectly consistent with Homeric faith—if you die, you end; if you are favoured by the gods, you are translated. After this break the downward sequence goes on uninterrupted.

We have no space to note in detail the many interesting points dealt with in relation to this main contention, *e.g.* the gradual modification of the original Homeric view as seen in the later 'descent of Odysseus into Hades' and the other cyclic poems, the exceptional criminals like Sisyphos and Tantalos, hero-worship, cave oracle gods, ritual of the dead, chthonic deities, and especially the Eleusinian cults: everywhere the absence of any doctrine of moral retribution in primitive Greek faith is clearly demonstrated. The present monograph, it should be noted, is only a first part.

JANE HARRISON.

**Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Ilias.** Von HERMANN KLUGE. Cöthen. Schulze, 1889. Pp. viii, 200. 8vo. Mk. 4. 50.

THIS little book is an attempt to analyze the *Iliad*, and to determine the relative age of the different portions, by a study of the metre. The first part aims to discover the origin of the Homeric hexameter, and to ascertain the characteristics of its earlier forms. Previous theories are summarily set aside. In the first chapter the author endeavours to show that the original foot was the spondee. The constant increase in the percentage of dactyls in demonstrably later epic poems points to this conclusion; in the *Odyssey*

the dactyls are  $2\frac{2}{3}$  as many as the spondees; in Apollonius of Rhodes the figure becomes  $3\frac{2}{3}$ , after a steady increase in intervening writers. The author's second contention is that the original metrical principle is the accent of recurring syllables. The lengthening of short vowels is very common, and cannot otherwise be accounted for. The shortening of long syllables (as in B 537, I 382); the insertion of particles like  $\gamma'$ ,  $\beta'$ ,  $\tau'$ , often in a succession of lines (A 671—715,  $\Phi$  489); synzesis (as in A 273) and other similar devices resorted to, for the purpose of making the verse fit the type, show—says our author—that the original type was not quantitative but accentual.