

Comparative Reconciliation Politics in Rwanda and Burundi

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Abstract

Comparative Reconciliation Politics in Rwanda and Burundi

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This thesis functions as a comparative exercise juxtaposing reconciliation politics in Rwanda and Burundi from a bottom-up perspective. Rwanda and Burundi have been labeled 'twins' before. Both countries have a very similar population structure and history of mass violence. However, their post-conflict processes differ. This fact renders them ideal candidates for comparison. Rwanda's 'maximum approach' is compared to Burundi's 'non-approach' to reconciliation politics on two levels: official and informal. The 'official' level examines intention and politico-economic context from the government's side, the 'informal' level looks at how these policies have been perceived at the grassroots and if they succeeded in reconciling the population with regard to the key objectives memory, acknowledgement, apology, recognition, and justice.

The thesis analyzes and compares the advantages and disadvantages of both models thoroughly and identifies pitfalls and solutions with regard to breaking the cycle of alternating revenge and dominance by re-orienting national reconciliation politics towards the perceptions and insights of the rural population at the grassroots. The thesis concludes that the strong governmental focus on controlling the reconciliation discourse in Rwanda and the self-absorption of the political elite in Burundi in politico-economic power struggles are the main obstacles to reconciliation as they risk to marginalizing and alienating large parts of the population.

Summary

This thesis examines and compares the domestic political efforts towards reconciliation in Rwanda and Burundi. It understands reconciliation in the broadest sense of the word, incorporating national approaches towards identity politics, commemoration and historical memory, governmental assistance for victims, and transitional justice. Rwanda and Burundi have been characterized as 'twins' before. They share very similar traits: size, population, language, ethnic composition and, sadly, parallel histories of civil war and genocide. They however differ with regard to how their respective conflicts ended: in Rwanda, Paul Kagame's RPF achieved a complete victory after the genocide of 1994. In Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza came to power after an internationally brokered power sharing agreement in 2005. With regard to reconciliation politics, these two East African states become almost ideal candidates for comparison because of their diverging post-conflict points of departure.

The thesis approaches reconciliation politics from a bottom-up perspective, trying to uncover the relationships of power and dependency that drive actors towards aggression or reconciliation. Deriving from qualitative research (semi-structured life story-interviews) in five communities in Southern Rwanda and Northern Burundi as well as Kigali and arguing from the perspectives of rural dwellers, the thesis refuses to take the publicly stated aims of reconciliation politics at face value and instead examines the politico-economic backgrounds of policy design and the grassroots perception of policy implementation. Even though the governments of both countries display increasingly authoritarian features, their approaches could not differ more. While Rwanda relies on controlling its population and political discourse through unifying the conflictive identities and narratives into an encompassing Rwandan identity and narrative, Burundi attempts a consociational solution that balances out the interests of Hutu and Tutsi but (until now) leaves the interpretation of the past to the population itself.

The thesis assumes a rather critical stance towards top-down social engineering and re-education programs in Rwanda. At the same time, it recommends achievements and approaches towards bridging the societal trenches that genocide and mass violence have left, if the participants' evaluation is positive. Particularly when comparing the overarching Rwandan policy of unity and reconciliation to the essentially absent Burundian strategy towards reconciliation and justice, certain advantages of the rather partial but nonetheless ambitious approach towards reprocessing the past to come to light. Apart from establishing quota regulations for a Tutsi minority representation in the army, administration and government in 2005, concrete steps to address the atrocities of the past have continuously been postponed in Burundi until very recently.

The thesis analyzes and compares the advantages and disadvantages of both models thoroughly and identifies the pitfalls and seeks out solutions with regard to breaking the cycle of alternating revenge and dominance by re-orienting national reconciliation politics towards the perceptions and insights of the rural population at the grassroots. The thesis concludes that the strong governmental focus on controlling the reconciliation discourse in Rwanda and the self-absorption of the political elite in Burundi in politico-economic power struggles are the main obstacles to reconciliation as they risk to marginalizing and alienating large parts of the population.

For Elena and Henry

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¹ Name changed upon wish of research assistant.

² Name changed upon wish of research assistant.

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Abbreviations

ADC-Ikibiri	Alliance des démocrates pour le changement, Burundian coalition of opposition parties that boycotted the elections in 2010.
AFDL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo.
AI	Amnesty International
AMI	Agence Modeste et Innocent. Association for Reconciliation in Rwanda.
APRA	Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000.
APRODH	Association pour la protection des droits humains et des personnes détenues, a Burundian human rights organization headed by Pierre Claver Mbonimpa.
ARJ	Association Rwandaise des Journalistes.
BIF	Burundi-Franc
BNUB	Bureau des Nations Unies au Burundi (UN Office in Burundi). Scaled down version of the BINUB established 16.12.2010.
BINUB	Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (UN integrated Office in Burundi). From January 1, 2007 to December 12, 2010.
CCA	Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. Agreement between the CNDD-FDD-government and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL signed in September 2006 and fully implemented in early 2009.
CDR	Coalition pour la Défense de la République - Extremist Hutu Party, banned after the Genocide.
CLADHO	Collectif des Ligues et Associations de Defense des Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda, Umbrella Organization for Human Rights in Rwanda.
CNDD-FDD	Congrès National pour la Défense de la Démocratie / Forces Nationales pour la Défense de la Démocratie - Burundian rebel movement. The CNDD-FDD is Burundi's ruling party since 2005.
CNDP	Congrès Nationale pour la defense du people. Laurent Nkunda's rebel movement in the DRC, Tutsi-dominated. Officially disbanded in 2009.


CNLG	Commission Nationale pour la Lutte contre le Génocide – Rwanda’s Anti-Genocide Commission.
CSOG	Civil Society Organization
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FAB	Forces Armées du Burundi. Regular Burundian Army.
FAR / Ex-FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises. Habyarimana’s army that took an active role in the Genocide. Called “Ex-FAR” after being driven out from Rwanda in DRC by the RPF.
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo.
FARG	Fonds d’Assistance pour les Rescapés du Génocide. Rwandan Genocide Survivors’ Fund.
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques Pour la Libération du Rwanda - last active guerilla movement fighting against the Rwandan government, based in the DRC.
FDU-Inkingi	United Democratic Forces. Victoire Ingabire’s banned opposition party (Rwanda).
(PALIPEHUTU)-FNL	Forces Nationales de la Libération. Predominantly Hutu Burundian guerilla movement. Used to be the armed wing of the PALIPEHUTU (<i>Parti pour le liberation du peuple Hutu</i>) but this name was given up to appear more inclusive after they signed the peace agreement in 2008.
FRD-Abanyagihugu	Forces pour la Restauration de la Démocratie. Burundian rebel movement founded by Col.Pierre Claver Kabirigi in 2011.
FRODEBU	Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi. Melchior Ndadaye’s mainly Hutu opposition party in Burundi that one the elections in 1993.
GBS	General Budgetary Support.
GCA	General Ceasefire Agreement between the Burundian transitional government and the CNDD-FDD in 2003.
GNU	Government of National Unity - Rwandan Government since the end of the genocide, 18 July 1994
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IRDP	Institute for Research and Dialogue for Peace. Rwandan Think Tank.
JNR	Jeunesse Nationale Rwagasore – UPRONA youth wing (up to 1967)
JRR	Jeunesse Révolutionnaire Rwagasore – UPRONA youth wing. (from 1967 on).
LIPRODHOR	Ligue Rwandaise pour la PROMotion et la Défense de Droits de l'homme - Largest Rwandan Human rights NGO
M23	March 23rd Movement. Congolese Guerilla Movement. Successor of the CNDP. Tutsi-dominated. Routed in 2013.
MDR	Mouvement Démocratique Républicain - Hutu-led Rwandan opposition party that emerged out of President Kayibanda's PARMEHUTU, banned 2003.
MINECOFIN	Rwandan Ministry of Economy and Finance
MINEDUC	Rwandan Ministry of Education
MINAGRI	Rwandan Ministry of Agriculture
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Up to 2010 called MONUC.
MRND(D)	Mouvement Républicain National pour le Développement - ruling single party of President Juvénal Habyarimana 1973-1994. Renamed MRNDD (Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement after the introduction of multipartyism in 1991. Increasingly tending towards Hutu extremism since the beginning of the civil war 1990 and is broadly seen as main party of the perpetrators. Banned after the Genocide.
MSD	Mouvement pour la solidarité et la démocratie, Burundian party founded by the former radio journalist Alexis Sinduhije.
NEC	National Electoral Commission (Rwanda)
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NRA	National Resistance Army. Ugandan rebel movement turned political party. Headed by Yoweri Museveni.

ONUB	Opérations des Nations Unies au Burundi (United Nations Operations in Burundi). From May 2004 until 31.12.2006 (changed into BINUB).
NURC	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (Rwanda)
PDC	Christian Democratic Party (Rwanda)
PL	Liberal Party (Rwanda)
PSD	Social Democrat Party (in both Rwanda and Burundi)
RANU	Rwandan Refugee Welfare Organization – Precursor of the RPF in the 1980s
RCD(-Goma)	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie. Congolese guerilla movement turned party. Rwanda-backed.
RDF	Rwandan Defense Forces. Merged from RPA and Ex-FAR.
RNC	Rwandan National Congress. Rwandan Opposition Movement in Exile. Headed by RPF-deserters.
RPA (APR)	Rwandan Patriotic Army. National Army of Rwanda since the end of the genocide 1994.
RPF (FPR)	Rwandan Patriotic Front (Front Patriotique du Rwanda).
RTL	Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines.
RWF	Rwandan Franc.
SCUR	Students Club for Unity and Reconciliation. Rwanda.
SNF	Burundian National Intelligence Service (Service Nationale du Renseignement).
TIG	Travail d'intérêt général. Rwandan re-integration program for ex-convicts.
TRC / CVR	Truth and Reconciliation Commission / Commission vérité et réconciliation.
UNAR	Union Nationale Rwandaise. Rwandan nationalist party at the time of decolonization.
UNGC	United Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
UNSC	United Nations Security Council.
UPD-Zigamibanga	Union pour la paix et le développement, Burundian party.
UPRONA	Unité et Progrès National – Union for National Progress. Ruling party in Burundi from 1962 to 1993 (Ndadaye’s election) and from 1996 to 2003. Mainly supported by Tutsi.

Map of Rwanda and Burundi



Rwanda and Burundi with approximately situated Research Sites.
Source: <https://www.google.com/maps> (24.4.2014)

Introduction to the Thesis

For centuries, Rwanda and Burundi's histories have been inextricably intertwined with each other. The historical dynamics in one country have always exerted a great influence far beyond neighborly coexistence. They have shaped each other's history. In the past decades, sadly, both countries have risen to notorious fame for their recurring episodes of mass violence and genocide. These episodes in particular cannot be analyzed from a single state-perspective without ignoring some of the most crucial factors contributing to the massive death tolls that have been amassed in the Great Lakes Region. Each outbreak of violence in one country has always evoked violent repercussions within its twin³. Conversely, reconciliation and reconstruction in one state are bound to affect the situation in the other as well.

Next to their parallel history of mass violence and genocide, these two small, land-locked African countries share a considerable number of similarities such as size, language⁴, heritage, and culture. A comparative study of their experiences with peace building and reconciliation thus appears promising. Most particularly with regard to their differing political developments in the "*post-conflict*"⁵ phases after the genocide in Rwanda 1994 and the end of the Burundian Civil war in 2003 resp. 2005⁶.

The intertwined history of the two states has produced similar societies erupting in closely resembling and overlapping dynamics of violence. Even though genocide and crimes against humanity should not be conflated, the dynamics of violence and the genocidal form violence has taken are very

³ Chapter 1.1.3. in particular analyzes how Rwanda's so-called Hutu revolution in 1959 led to an ethnic polarization of politics in Burundi and eventually shaped the reaction of Burundi's Tutsi elite to Hutu uprisings, culminating in the immense bloodletting of 1972. Cf. Lemarchand, 1970.

⁴ Kinyarwanda and Kirundi, the two national languages share the same structure, grammar and a great part of their vocabulary. Rwandans and Burundians usually understand each other's language. At times, the two languages have even been described to me as mere dialects of each other.

⁵ In reference to Paul Collier's (2009, pp. 75-100) and Bruce Baker's (2006, 31ff) thoughts about the tendency of many African wars to reignite after relatively peaceful "*post-conflict*" periods, I actually prefer to speak about "*post-settlement*" (Burundi) or "*post-genocide*" (Rwanda) rather than "*post-conflict*" societies because the conflicts as such are still in the process of being resolved. For purposes of generalization, I will however use "*post-conflict*" frequently when I speak about both countries together. In this context, "*post-conflict*"-Rwanda refers to the period after 1994 and "*post-conflict*"-Burundi signifies the time after 2005.

⁶ For the purpose of this dissertation, I consider the swearing in of the former rebel movement CNDD-FDD's leader Pierre Nkurunziza after the elections of 2005 which were widely considered democratic as the official end of the civil war that begun with Melchior Ndadaye's assassination on October 21, 1993. Many sources, among them Vandeginste (2011, 2012) however consider the signing of the last protocol of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement (CCA) by the last remaining rebel movement, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL in December 2008 respectively its transformation into the political party FNL in early 2009 as the official end of the war. In my opinion, this interpretation, although legally correct blocks out that from 2009 on, the political climate actually worsened and grew more violent again whereas the years between 2005 and 2009 had been comparatively calm. Please refer to chapter 1.3.

similar in both cases⁷. Particularly the highly localized nature of violence (neighbors killing neighbors) has been a recurrent feature in both countries and implies that a strong focus on local processes would be warranted with regard to reconciliation as well. These similarities are contrasted by the converse paths that these societies, their leaders and citizens chose to reconstructing and reconciling their countries after the hot phase of the conflict. Comparing two relatively similar country settings, their parallels as well as their uniqueness, and studying the popular reaction to diverse approaches towards reconciliation and reconstruction might teach us a great deal about the nature of reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region.

In a nutshell, the objective of this dissertation is to compare national politics aimed at reconstruction and reconciliation after mass political violence with regard to their perception by the rural population affected.

The thesis will try to assume a perspective as holistic as possible. Observing Rwandan and Burundian reconstruction efforts through the lens of popular perception, it will compare processes of recovery and the ways in which diverse political strategies have permeated towards the grassroots. It takes an interdisciplinary, exploratory approach, combining research techniques from social and political science in order to analyze the current state of affairs regarding the distinctive post-settlement/ post-genocide reconstruction. Research has been conducted in communities in Southern Rwanda (Huye and Gisagara districts in Southern Province) and Northern Burundi (Kirundo and Ngozi Provinces) in close proximity to each other. The multi-sited investigation provides a descriptive account of local views of national post-conflict politics collected during my field research in 2011, focusing on the nature and perception of political intervention for reconciliation in the local context. Specific subjects touched upon include the management of coexistence and identity, memory and commemoration, and transitional justice.

The purpose of the thesis is less to develop a comprehensive theory of reconciliation and conflict resolution in Rwanda and Burundi, but rather for the opinions of populations in post-conflict environments to be explored and their voices to be heard. An analysis of peasants' experiences may contribute strongly to the debate about post-conflict reconstruction, particularly when comparing the high profile, donor-supported and top-down approach of the Rwandan regime to the protracted, power-sharing based process in Burundi.

⁷ Cf. Lemarchand, 2009 and Prunier, 2009. Both of these books also cover the massacres in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which will only be treated marginally in this thesis even though the conflict in the DRC is central to the developments in Rwanda and Burundi and all the conflicts in the Great Lakes region are deeply intertwined. Even though the dynamics of violence in the DRC are deeply correlated with (and some would say caused by) the genocide in Rwanda and to a lesser extent, the Burundian civil war, I chose to limit my analysis to the two countries I conducted field research in.

Twenty years after the Rwandan genocide and almost 10 years after the CNDD-FDD's ascent to power, the time is ripe for a medium-term assessment of both countries reconciliation politics. By taking a comparative perspective, the study hints towards strategies and sociopolitical settings beneficial to reconciliation but at the same time remains able to pinpoint counterproductive developments and constellations. Above all, the comparative view focuses on the sociopolitical context of reconciliation politics in both countries.

Ultimately, analyzing the popular reaction towards post-settlement/post-genocide politics and comparing the results in two societies also asks about the place of reconciliation within the framework of reconstruction. How important are goals such as transitional justice, acknowledgement, apology or commemoration within the bigger societal framework? Are basic requirements such as governmental mediation, legalistic equality and economic development to be fulfilled in order to heal society? Alternatively, is a complete transformation of national identities necessary? Applying a comparative perspective, reconciliation as a guiding political concept itself has to be questioned. Is the design of reconciliation politics the key to societal recovery or is their success rather determined by their agents or manners of implementation?

For decades, Western governments and African elites have tried to implement their theories, values and dogmas on African populations from the top down, often with catastrophic consequences. Through the findings from over ninety semi-structured life-story interviews in Southern Rwanda and Northern Burundi, this thesis tries to reflect the views and insights from the rural population back into the political realm, producing a bottom-up assessment of politics aimed at reconciliation and reconstruction in Rwanda and Burundi.

Outline

In the first chapter of the thesis, the history and sociopolitical constellations of both countries as well as the principal problems they face with regard to reconciliation are roughly outlined. In chapter two, the theoretical definitions and backgrounds utilized in the thesis are established. As some terms discussed later are actually shaped by the policies investigated⁸, such an anticipation of the political background of the terms and issues discussed makes sense in order to understand the thesis outline. After the historical and theoretical settings are established, chapter three will elucidate the approach, structure and methodological tools of the thesis in detail and already delve into some of the more delicate problems of analyzing reconciliation politics. It will expound some theoretical concepts that help understanding the post-conflict environments in the Great Lakes such as a working definition of reconciliation, different notions about post-colonial statehood in Africa and some elementary

⁸ Please refer 3.2.5

thoughts about nation- and peacebuilding. Chapter four will comprise a comprehensive analysis of the findings of my field research in Rwanda with a strong focus on the dominant discourse of unity and reconciliation and the vision of the RPF whereas the albeit short chapter five will be dedicated to the 'non-approach' to reconciliation politics in Burundi. In the final chapter six, the experiences and findings in both cases will be summarized and compared, followed by the conclusion.

All interviews are cited in clean verbatim.

1. Historical Background: Genocidal Twins

1.1. Parallel Histories

1.1.1. Alternating Episodes of Mass Violence and Genocide

Similar Structure and History

One of the main reasons why Rwanda and Burundi are ideal candidates for comparative research is their close resemblance with regard to size, population density, language, culture, economic structure⁹ as well as their unique ethnic constellation, which is strongly influenced by German and particularly Belgian colonization.

During the Belgian colonial rule that began in 1916, Rwanda and Burundi were jointly ruled as one territory called *Rwanda-Urundi* until their simultaneous independence on July 1, 1962. Next to being landlocked and ranking among the most densely populated countries in Africa, the two states also parallel to each other in their very rural settlement patterns where most people live in small, scattered homesteads typically built on one of the many hills forming the landscape. Settlement in villages or even cities is a relatively recent occurrence and even in bustling cities such as Kigali, subsistence farming and cattle-ownership have remained culturally relevant for almost all parts of the population. Both countries furthermore display an extreme age structure: 42-43 % of Rwandans and 46-47% of Burundians are younger than fourteen years¹⁰. This percentage has not changed much in the last ten years, resulting in a perpetual “youth bulge¹¹”. Population density, age structure and agricultural settlement patterns are important factors with regard to the countries’ parallel history of mass violence and important to the understanding of why mass violence in the Great Lakes Region has taken the form of veritable population purges that often relied on recruiting the peasants themselves¹².

⁹ **Rwanda:** Area: 26’338 km²; Population: 11.7 Mio. (July 2012); Languages: Kinyarwanda, English, French; Economic Structure: 90 percent agriculture, 10 percent industry and services. Cf. CIA, The World Factbook: Rwanda <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html> (26.August 2012)

Burundi: 27’830 km²; Population: 10.5 Mio. (July 2012); Languages: Kirundi, French; Economic Structure: 93.6 percent agriculture; 2.3 percent industry; 4.1 percent services. Cf. CIA, The World Factbook: Burundi <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html> (26.August 2012)

¹⁰ Cf. Heinsohn, 2003, 66 for 2003 and CIA, The World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html> (26.August 2012) for 2012.

¹¹ Heinsohn, 2003, 13.

¹² Gunnar Heinsohn (2008) makes a convincing point about the likelihood of war and genocide increasing rapidly given an excessive number of well-fed young men with little hopes for acquiring employment or status. In agrarian cultures such as Rwanda or Burundi where land tenure and ownership of cattle have defined wealth and settlement for centuries and population pressure led to a dramatic land scarcity, the attractiveness of mass violence for young men with regard to gaining access to land and prestigious positions are obvious. Many of my interviewees saw greed as a main motivation for participating in the killings and most ex-convicts admitted to looting. Cf. 4.1.5. and 5.2.1.

The ethnic quotas in both countries, even though they are still mostly based on colonial censi¹³ look roughly the same: 85-86 percent Hutu, 14-15 percent Tutsi, 1 percent Twa¹⁴. Even if it could be argued that up to 70 percent of Burundians (and probably Rwandans as well) are of mixed ethnic descent¹⁵, ethnicity has been traditionally inherited patrilineally. These ethnic identities and their forced stratification during the Belgian colonial rule are commonly situated at the origin of the genocidal tragedy and the controversies surrounding it.

Rwanda and Burundi both were ancient kingdoms roughly sharing the size of the present states before colonization. These kingdoms were governed through a complex system of personal dependencies headed by the *Mwami*, the king. Cattle breeding played a dominant role for social stratification. The question if 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' represent actual ethnic identities or if their 'ethnic' determinant is the result of a Western (miss-) interpretation of the ancient social structure¹⁶ is contested. It seems plausible and is widely accepted that the terms originally seem to have signified hereditary social positions determined by personal dependencies and cattle ownership¹⁷. René Lemarchand, in his groundbreaking work "Rwanda and Burundi" speaks of "*castes*"¹⁸. The Rwandan royal house was traditionally Tutsi while in Burundi, the 'Ganwa' represented a royal class separated from ordinary Tutsi. Nevertheless, the social system was permeable to a certain extent and Hutu-Chiefs as well as poor Tutsi (*Petits Tutsi*) could be found in both countries¹⁹.

Ethnic Identities and Genocide

The official Rwandan historiography²⁰ adapted by the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front)²¹ maintains that ethnic identities in Rwanda and Burundi have been almost entirely manufactured by European colonists in order to facilitate a 'divide and rule'-policy, which was later appropriated by colonial and post-colonial Rwandan elites to bolster their claims to power²². There is a consensus among scholars that the strict colonial categorization into Hutu, Tutsi and Twa at the very least exacerbated ethnic

¹³ Cf. Lemarchand, 1996, 6 criticizes these numbers in the Burundian context because they originate from the 1930s, do account neither for the Ganwa-princes nor the Hutu victims of the various episodes of mass violence in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1991, which have also caused a mass exodus. He maintains that the estimate of 20 percent Tutsi might not be far off but that "Tutsis" themselves represent a very heterogeneous category.

¹⁴ Cf. e.g. Reyntjens, 2000, 11; Southall, 2006, 202 (Burundi); Prunier, 1995, 23-40 (on the colonial construction of ethnicity in Rwanda); Eltringham, 2004, 1-34 (on Rwanda); CIA: World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html> (26.August 2012)

¹⁵ Cf. Watt, 2008, 26.

¹⁶ Cf. Shyaka, 2004, 6ff.

¹⁷ Regarding pre-colonial history in the Great Lakes, please refer to Cf. Chrétien, 2003, 165- 191.

¹⁸ Lemarchand, 1970, xiii.

¹⁹ The system seems to share some parallels with the European feudal system in the middle ages. There is even a word in Kirundi that signifies "promotion" into another category: *kwi hutura* – to "de-Hutuize" – cf. Watt, 2008, 27

²⁰ For a blueprint of Rwandan historiography as it is taught in Rwanda today, cf. Byanafashe & Rutayisire, 2011.

²¹ Cf. RPF: <http://www.rpfinkotanyi.org/en/?-history-> (29.11.2012).

²² Cf. Byanafashe & Rutayisire, 183ff; 213f or RPF: <http://www.rpfinkotanyi.org/en/?-history-> (29.11.2012).

divisions in Rwanda and later in Burundi²³. The Europeans, arriving in the late 19th century, associated the tall, slender Tutsi with the cattle breeding upper echelons of society and the royal court²⁴. The mostly short, stocky Hutu were considered a lower race of poor peasants and cultivators²⁵. Racist theories such as the notorious “*Hamitic Hypothesis*”²⁶ had their heyday during colonization. Belgian colonists systematically favored the Tutsi over the Hutu with regard to granting access to education or administrative posts. The Belgians started to reverse this policy towards the end of colonial rule. Their intent was mostly to preserve Belgian influence in central Africa because many educated Tutsi, particularly the UNAR in Rwanda, had turned into nationalist advocates of independence²⁷. This sudden change of heart in favor of “*numerical democracy*” raised a class of radical Hutus such as Grégoire Kayibanda to the surface in Rwanda. In their efforts to stop the anti-colonial triumph of the UPRONA in Burundi, the Belgians also conspired with the PDC, assassinating premier minister Prince Louis Rwagasore in 1961 and probably destroyed Burundi's only hope for an ethnically unified future²⁸. The colonial era in Rwanda ended in the so-called *Hutu revolution* of 1959, pogroms that removed the Tutsi royal court and displaced many Tutsi. After Rwagasore's assassination Burundi's post-independence period was plagued by intense power struggles within the UPRONA and due to the proximity of the Rwandan conflict, increasingly between Hutu and Tutsi, culminating in a coup by Michel Micombero in 1966. The seeds of mass violence had been sown²⁹.

The racial dichotomy between Hutu and Tutsi was exacerbated by post-colonial totalitarian regimes determined to obtain power over the post-colonial state in both countries. Once again, ethnicity was used as a tool to divide and rule, reinforcing its divisive qualities. This struggle for state power is the actual origin of the recurring episodes of mass killing and genocide. It resulted in massacres against Tutsi in Rwanda in 1959, 1963, 1967, 1973 and the Rwandan genocide in 1994³⁰ as well as

²³ Cf. e.g. Chrétien, 2003, 291-347; Des Forges & HRW, 2002, 55-66; Mamdani, 2002, 41-102. In Burundi, the first interethnic clashes took place after the elections of 1965.

²⁴ The *mwami* (King) in Rwanda was always a Tutsi. In *Burundi*, the *Ganwa* (princes) were considered a separate group. They were the holders of power during the monarchy. The *Ganwa* however lost most of their influence during and after colonization and came to be seen as ordinary Tutsi after decolonization. Cf. Watt, 2008, 23-33; Lemarchand, 1996, 34-58.

²⁵ During my own field research, I was able to detect some remains of this mixture of social and ethnic stratification in some figures of speech of my participants. Particularly old participants in Burundi used the words “*I used to be his Hutu*” or “*they were my/our Hutu*”, referring to a systemic relationship of dependency where the Tutsi owned the land and the Hutu tilled it – Cf. Interview “Etienne”, „Kamenge“, 29.11.11., Interview “Sylvestre”, „Kamenge“, 30.11.11.

²⁶ This thesis, made popular by Christian missionaries, claimed that the Tutsi were of Nilotic origin, placing them closer to the “*superior*” European race. Proponents of the thesis assumed that the Tutsi had immigrated into Central Africa from the northeast and subjugated the inferior Bantu-culture of the Hutu. Cf. Sanders, 1960, 521-532.

²⁷ Cf. Chrétien, 2003, 201-291.

²⁸ Cf. Lemarchand, 1970, 324-360.

²⁹ Cf. Chapter 1.1.3.

³⁰ Cf. Mamdani, 2002.

massacres in Burundi in 1965, 1988 and 1991, the extermination of the Burundian Hutu elite in 1972, and the more than decade-long civil war that started in 1993³¹ and included “*acts of genocide*”³² against Tutsi as well.

This post-colonial heritage dominated by genocide and mass killing in both countries has to be re-garded from a broad historical and regional perspective in order to understand the approaches that Rwandans and Burundians take towards reconciliation. This intertwinedness of ethnic identity and political exclusion leading to recurrent episodes of violence must to be seen in a regional dimension. The Rwandan genocide of 1994 perpetrated by Hutu extremists against the Tutsi-minority and their real and alleged Hutu-sympathizers alone has cost a staggering number of lives. Estimates vary from 500’000 to over a million people³³. Burundi has witnessed a genocidal purge by the Tutsi-dominated army against the Hutu elite in 1972³⁴ killing at least 100’000³⁵ and a protracted civil war along pre-dominantly ethnic lines with mass killings on both sides from 1993 to 2003³⁶ that saw 300’000³⁷ people killed. Furthermore, the Rwandan genocide and the Burundian civil war had a major influence in both wars in Zaïre/the Democratic Republic of Congo DRC (1996-1997 and 1998-2003 with regional

³¹ Independent of the official statement of the UN Commission cited above, opinions about calling the diverse incidents of mass violence genocide differed among my participants. Referring to 1972, Lemarchand (1995, xxvi and 2009, 71) characterizes the violence as clearly genocidal as does Meisler (1990, 384-393).

³² UN Commission of Inquiry, *Final Report*, 2002, 62f. characterizes the atrocities against Tutsi in Burundi 1993 as “*acts of genocide*” and recommends re-examining the events of 1972 which they strongly suggest constituted genocide as well

³³ Cf. Des Forges & HRW, 2002, 34. Estimates about the death toll of the genocide vary wildly. Des Forges uses the UN numbers from demographer William Seltzer. In his article in the International Herald Tribune (2 July 2012), Longman cites the number of 500’000 victims. Prunier, 2009, xxxiv agreeing with the official UN position, estimates a number of 800’000 victims. There always has been a dispute about the number of victims. Differing from international sources, Rwandan sources such as the ministry of local government MINALOC and the survivor’s association IBUKA usually estimate a higher body count of over one million. Cf. IRDP, 2003,35; Republic of Rwanda: <http://www.rwandahope.com/RPFhistory.pdf> (29.11.2012). Another dispute exists about the numbers of Tutsis killed. While the Rwandan sources speak of 97.3 percent or 1.04 million Tutsi victims killed in the genocide and the civil war from 1991 to 1994, scholars such as Jennie E. Burnet (2009, 101) point out that according to the Rwandan census of 1991, the number of the Tutsi population in the country was estimated at 700’000.

³⁴ Cf. e.g. Reyntjens, 2000, 7 and Meisler, 1990, 384-393.

³⁵ Meisler, 1990, 384 speaks of 100’000 to 200’000 casualties. Lemarchand, 1996, xv, mentions 100’000 victims as well.

³⁶ Reyntjens (2005b, 117) speaks of a “*decade of war*” when addressing the civil war in Burundi. This refers to the period between President Ndadaye’s assassination on October 21, 1993 and the signing of the Pretoria peace agreement between the government and the main armed opposition movement, the CNDD-FDD, signed on October 8, 2003. However, the last remaining armed faction, the Palipehutu-FNL only signed a ceasefire on September 7, 2006 and shelled the capital Bujumbura again in 2008. Nowadays, the political situation remains fragile and the FNL is again active at the border to the DRC. (cf. Reyntjens, 2005b, 117-137; International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 131, 28 August 2007; Southall, 2006, 201-220; Vogel, 2014).

³⁷ Cf. Lemarchand, 2006, 15 and 2009, 141; Reyntjens (2000, 19) speaks of 200’000 victims up to the year 2000, of which 50’000 had been killed in 1993 alone. Southall (2006, 201) speaks of “*up to 350’000*” casualties. The death toll varies to a large extent and is difficult to verify, as the conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC are intertwined. No government was able to keep track of all of its citizens, many of them refugees. Malnutrition and diseases related to war conditions sometimes are counted as well, and, particularly in the DRC, thousands of refugees just ‘disappeared’.

and low-level conflicts particularly in the east continuing to this day). In the DRC, the initial crisis in 1996 sparked by the exodus of Rwandan Hutu refugees in the aftermath of the genocide. The conflicts in the DRC have produced a death toll of up to four million lives³⁸ and seen Rwanda as well as Burundi engaging in military operations within Congolese territory. The war in the DRC is generally recognized as the bloodiest conflict since the end of the Second World War.

While violence in the eastern regions of the DRC is still ongoing, Rwanda is currently enjoying a period of relative peace after the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) ended the genocide and won a decisive victory in the parallel civil war against the genocidal interim government in 1994. The RPF has held power in Rwanda ever since³⁹.

After an internationally brokered peace process under South African leadership brought “*la crise*”⁴⁰ to an end, Burundi has officially managed the political transition to formally democratic rule in 2005/2006. After the first democratic elections of 1993 plunged the country into violence, Burundi saw the *Congrès National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD)* rise to power in a remarkably peaceful manner in 2005⁴¹ but has become increasingly authoritarian ever since while the security situation remains fragile.

Political stability and a promising perspective of tolerant coexistence and mutual respect between former antagonists are by no means guaranteed. In both countries, victims and perpetrators are forced to live together as neighbors. This proximity reinforces the acuteness of the problem and thus the need to strive for peace and reconciliation, though it renders the situation highly volatile.

Refugee Streams

Another dangerous factor is that conflict in the region is prone to regionalization. With the Banyarwanda/Barundi-diaspora settling in various parts of the Great Lakes Region, many conflicts have always spilled into each other, particularly in the form of huge refugee streams after episodes of mass violence. Notably Uganda in the beginning of the 1990s⁴², Rwanda, and to a lesser extent Burundi, in 1996 effectively ‘outsourced’ their domestic conflicts. Uganda supported the RPF when it invaded Rwanda in 1990, the RPF and the UPRONA-led government of Burundi chose to safeguard their bor-

³⁸ Cf. Prunier, 2009, xxxvi

³⁹ Cf. Reyntjens, 2005a, 15-47; Waugh, 2004, 146-165.

⁴⁰ Many of my participants used the French term “*la crise*” to refer to the civil war.

⁴¹ Cf. Reyntjens, 2005b, 117-135; Uvin, 2009, 10-17; Lemarchand, 2006, 1-20

⁴² Cf. Chapter 4.1.1. and 4.1.3. About the effects that the Ugandan “*crisis of citizenship*” had on the founding of the RPF. Also cf. Mamdani, 2001, 159-184.

ders from Hutu rebels by destroying the refugee camps across the border and fighting their domestic rebels on Congolese soil by supporting Kabila's ADFL⁴³.

Lemarchand⁴⁴ understands political, economic and social exclusion of certain ethnic groups as the principal dimension of conflict in the Great Lakes Region. With economic pressure weighing down on these countries and large amounts of the population being excluded from opportunities of socio-economic advancement⁴⁵, exclusion leads to insurrection, insurrection leads to violent repression and thus, refugee streams and regional instability. In many cases, a conflict's losers allied themselves to a warring faction in their country of exile. In exile, they often fight similar ethnic groups as before, further exacerbating the tensions there. Rwandan Tutsi joined the Ugandan NRM⁴⁶, Radical Burundian Hutus killed among the *Interahamwe*-militias⁴⁷. In the DRC, the steadily shifting alliances between diverse Congolese ethnic groups and their local forces, the Congolese army, external intervention forces and refugee warriors such as the Rwandan Ex-FAR or the Burundian FNL actually drove the conflict into hyper-localization and a state of affairs where peace-builders barely knew where to begin and who to address⁴⁸.

The diagram below displays the diverse refugee streams and invasions. If combined with the timeline on the right, the temporal proximity of conflicts demonstrates how refugee streams have sparked insurrections and in many cases, destabilized the host country. Peace in any country remains fragile as long as the neighboring states remain unstable.

⁴³ Cf. Lemarchand, 2009a, 3-45 and Prunier, 2009, 37-72.


⁴⁴ Cf. Lemarchand, 2009a, 30f.

⁴⁵ Cf. Chapter 2.3.

⁴⁶ Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 159-184.

⁴⁷ Cf. Des Forges, 173-177; 510.

⁴⁸ Cf. Autesserre, 2010, 126-176.



1. 1959-90 Rwa: Tutsi exodus
2. 1962-64 Rwa:Tutsi invasions
3. 1972-2005 Burundi: Hutu refugee and rebel movements to and from Tanzania
4. 1990 RPF-invasion from Uganda
5. 1993 Burundi: Hutu flight after Ndadaye assassination
6. 1994: Rwanda: Hutu exodus to Zaire after the genocide
7. 1994-96; 96-03: Hutu rebel raids into Rwa; RPA-invasion of the DRC
8. 1996-03 Hutu rebel raids into Burundi, FAB-invasion of DRC
9. 1996-03, Ugandan invasion of DRC

Regionalization of Conflict: Refugee Influx and Invasions

1.1.2. Post-Settlement/ Post-Genocide Period: Differing Points of Departure

Post-settlement periods in African conflicts are all too often shaped by political instability, widespread low-level violence and authoritarian tendencies⁴⁹.

In the post-conflict period, the comparative dynamics between Rwanda and Burundi become particularly interesting: not only do their historical parallels set up the two states as perfect candidates for comparison, but also diverging recent political developments have rendered comparison even more interesting. Furthermore, enough time has passed since the official end of the 'hot' phase of the conflicts in both countries to speak about long-term developments and challenges. Since the success of reconstruction and reconciliation efforts ultimately requires long-term monitoring to reveal itself, we are in the fortunate situation to already assess and compare some of the short- and middle-term strategies employed.

The points of departure resemble each other: two poor Central African countries with similar histories of colonialism and inter-ethnic violence that choose to address their violent past. They however address this past in multiple ways, ranging from radically differing to rather similar. Even though both countries have implemented new laws to deal with ethnicity, their approaches differ wildly.

⁴⁹ Cf. Furley, 2006, 1-5

Rwanda has decided to ban ethnic identities while Burundi opted for quota regulations, anchoring ethnic identities in law. While Rwanda chose to prosecute the entirety of perpetrators of the genocide, transitional justice in Burundi remains largely stalled. Such differences account for radically different strategies in dealing with reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation. With regard to gaining a deeper understanding about how to build peace in the Great Lakes Region however, new policies and laws only account for largely theoretical developments. Rather than the policy itself, the socio-political context of its emergence and implementation often is the determinant factor. This context often defines the success or failure of projects aimed at reconciliation. Keeping this in mind, this dissertation will concentrate and emphasize upon the local and individual contexts within the analysis of reconciliation politics.

1.1.3. 1959: The initial Spark of Mass Violence

The different episodes of ethnic mass violence and exclusion in the Great Lakes Region have followed distinct patterns, starting with the so-called 'Hutu revolution' in Rwanda. These events from 1959 to 1962⁵⁰ supplanted the Tutsi-monarchy with a Hutu-dominated republic under radical PARMEHUTU-rule. Although circumstantial politico-economic factors and societal structure were probably more important for the subsequent outbreaks of violent confrontation between Hutu and Tutsi than the mere existence of juxtaposed ethnic identities, the events of 1959 delivered a blueprint for ethnic division and violence, which all subsequent episodes essentially followed. The revolution of 1959 and its after-pains until 1964⁵¹ were eventually determinant for both Rwanda's and Burundi's conflict-laden history in three different respects:

- They consolidated the ethno-political Hutu-Tutsi antagonism in Rwanda and successfully exported it to Burundi
- They shaped the reaction of Burundian Tutsi-elites to political challenges from the Hutu majority.

⁵⁰ Officially, the 'Hutu revolution' ended when Rwanda was granted independent as a republic on July 1, 1962. Cf. Chrétien, 2003, 299ff.

⁵¹ Incursions by monarchist Tutsi rebels continued until 1963/64, when the last 'inyenzi'-invasion from Burundi failed, causing widespread massacres against Tutsi in Rwanda and another 200'000 refugees. As a consequence, the Rwandan regime banned the parties UNAR and RADER and executed its members. Cf. Lemarchand, 1970, 197-227.

- They laid the foundation for the RPF's understanding of Rwandan history and thus coined their nationalist, anti-colonial ideology and the narrative, which shapes current Rwandan politics⁵².

In order to reconcile or even overcome the antagonistic identities emerging from the turbulent final period of colonization, it is of fundamental importance to bear in mind the intimate correlation between the enterprise of nation building in the Great Lakes and the genesis of ethno-political identities. The questions of ethnic affiliation and exclusion are situated at the heart of these seemingly endless cycles of insurrection and repression, populist incitement and elitist appetites for modernization.

The 'Hutu Revolution'

Before colonization, Rwanda was, apart from a few autonomous fiefs in the north, a Tutsi-kingdom. "*Despite occasional instances of cultural syncretism, the Rwandan monarchy was a Tutsi creation*"⁵³, writes Lemarchand. *Mwami* Kigeri IV Rwabugiri had conquered northern Rwanda in the 19th century⁵⁴ and established a unified and centralized kingdom with a two-tiered class system, in which the Tutsi formed a 'hegemonic' caste in the Gramscian sense, meaning that they were politically and economically dominant and considered themselves morally superior. This "*premise of inequality*"⁵⁵ was reinforced during the period of Belgian *tutelage*. The 'Hamitic' myth propagated by the colonial elite successfully reconstructed the identity of Rwandan Tutsi as a non-indigenous race of settlers, 'black Caucasians' that filled the contradictory middle position of a subject race between white colonizers and Hutu 'natives'⁵⁶. Favored by the colonial administration, Tutsi formed the native authority left in charge of customary law, an intermediate class between colonists and their subjects. The racialization of the Tutsi, their construction as a nonnative settler community by law 'naturalized' the political differences between Hutu and Tutsi⁵⁷. A big percentage of Tutsis, the 'petits Tutsi', however remained excluded from colonial benefits, but still could not escape the stigmatization as members of this 'intermediate race'⁵⁸.

When demands for modernization and popular participation became more and more pressing in the 1950s, the Belgians reversed their sympathies and started backing the Hutu majority. The Hutu intellectuals, among them a seminarist called Grégoire Kayibanda, were few, and much more likely to

⁵² Cf. Chapter 4.1.

⁵³ Lemarchand, 1970, 490.

⁵⁴ Cf. Chrétien, 2003, 160f.

⁵⁵ Lemarchand, 1970, 473.

⁵⁶ Cf. Eltringham, 2004, 1-34; Prunier, 1995, 1-40. Cf. chapter 1.1.3.

⁵⁷ Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 34f

⁵⁸ Cf. Prunier, 1995, 122; 249

uphold tight connections to the colonial power in order to 'prepare the population for democracy' than the royalist Tutsi elite, which pushed for independence in order to maintain its oligarchic control over the majority⁵⁹. Rwandan colonial society hence was split vertically along ethnic lines. Inter-caste mobility was minimal. A reversal of caste superiority would have put monarchic rule in jeopardy. Thus for the Tutsi elite, who had only conquered the north shortly before German colonization, the choice was suppression rather than accommodation. For the Rwandan Hutus however, independence and equality implied the abolition of the monarchy. In particular, among northern Hutus, independence was primarily understood as emancipation from indigenous imperialism. The yoke of European colonialism was only considered of secondary importance because the Belgian trusteeship was never meant to be permanent.⁶⁰ Demands for modernization and political participation joined hands with protest against ethnic oppression, fueled by the general frustration about the bureaucratization of clientage, land hunger⁶¹, and the pre-modern, messianic tradition of peasant revolts in the north. The fact that in Rwanda, social stratification coincided with ethnic division made the system vulnerable to social change and revolution.

The 'Hutu revolution' started after the death of king Mutara Rudahigwa when the radical Tutsi formed the UNAR to bring about an immediate end to Belgian rule. In November 1959, mutual provocations between Hutu and Tutsi turned into a PARMEHUTU-directed jacquerie that rapidly devolved into ethnic cleansing, killing several hundred⁶² Tutsi and displacing thousands. The Belgian colonial administration's decision to throw its weight behind the Hutu insurgency and thwart the crown's attempt to repress the jacquerie when Hutus started to burn houses and attack Tutsi officials, accelerated the downfall of the monarchy considerably⁶³. The Belgians and PARMEHUTU subsequently formed an autonomous Belgian-Rwandan government and deposed king Kigeli V in a coup on January 28, 1961⁶⁴. Tutsi started to flee the country in an exodus that continued up to 1994, among them Paul Kagame's family. The revolutionary government formed by the radicalized Hutu-counter-elite uncritically adopted the 'Hamite' construct and propagated a Rwandan democracy for the 'indigenous native' majority while excluding the 'non-indigenous' Tutsi. Kayibanda, author of the 'Hutu manifesto' became president. With regard to institutional discontinuity, the events from 1959 to

⁵⁹ Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 76-201.

⁶⁰ Cf. Lemarchand, 1970, 469 ff.

⁶¹ Land hunger has been a persistent driving force of conflict in the Great Lakes from 1959 to present (Cf. chapters 4.1.5. and 5.2.2.). Lemarchand (1970, 482f.) maintains that the Anti-Tutsi violence and ethnic cleansing in 1963 and 1964 were met with a 'laissez-faire'-attitude by the new Hutu officials because they felt the obligation of ceding the lands of the Tutsi to their Hutu clients. Tutsi properties were the price for peasant support during the revolution. Hence, even if the revolution was about social change, it left the tradition of clientage untouched but only replaced the patrons.

⁶² Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 123.

⁶³ Cf. Lemarchand, 1970, 485ff.

⁶⁴ Cf. Chrétien, 2003, 303 f.

1961 can be considered a revolution: Rwanda abolished the monarchy and became a republic. For the peasants however, not much changed. Clientage and patrimonialism were not abandoned, the clientage ties merely shifted to a new class of patrons that recruited itself from the Hutus who had before formed the "*rural proletariat*⁶⁵". Despite its revolutionary rhetoric, the new government did not exact fundamental democratic changes but inherited the monarchy's centralism and paternalist attitude focused on advancing rapid modernization. Social change and modernization remained bound by the tradition of exclusion. The new government merely substituted the guiding principle of Tutsi superiority with the numerically legitimated concept of Hutu supremacy. PARMEHUTU not only reversed the colonial roles, but also factually transformed the Tutsi into a minority with very limited rights, barred from the army and with very restricted access to government jobs or higher education⁶⁶. With the initial displacement of tens of thousands of Tutsi and by depriving the domestic Tutsi community of their rights, the PARMEHUTU and its Belgian friends initiated the dynamics of exclusion, oppression, mass violence and bitter ethnic antagonism that plague the Great Lakes Region up to today. Mamdani considers the refusal to transform the political legacy of colonialism to be the biggest failure of the postcolonial state and the greatest liability of Hutu rule⁶⁷ from 1959 to 1990.

Burundi's Destabilization

Sharing Rwanda's ethnic structure but not its rigid two-tiered political structure and absorbing a large percentage of Tutsi refugees, Burundi was strongly affected by the Hutu revolution. The weak regime of *Mwami Mwambutsa IV* was not able to prevent ethnic polarization. The demonstration effect of the Rwandan revolution did not fail to inspire Burundian Hutus who transferred the supremacist motives of the Rwandan Tutsi-leadership to Burundian Tutsi, whereas the Burundian Tutsi became increasingly scared of the vast numerical superiority of Hutus. Even though neither ethnic group initially had the motive of capturing state power exclusively, their behavior subsequent to the Rwandan revolution elicited exactly the feared reactions in the other group, rendering ethnic polarization a "*self-fulfilling prophecy*⁶⁸".

Burundian politics up to the 1960s were mostly defined by factional rivalries between clans of the ruling *Ganwa*-princes. The *Ganwa* had Hutu as well as Tutsi clients, and the horizontal rather than vertical cleavages in society allowed for much greater upward mobility than in Rwanda⁶⁹. The *Ganwa*,

⁶⁵ Lemarchand, 1970, 479.

⁶⁶ Cf. Waugh, 2004, 7-27

⁶⁷ As René Lemarchand (*Review of "When Victims become Killers"*, in: The Journal of African History, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2002), 309) points out in his review, Mamdani (2001) fails to clearly define the ideological movement of Hutu Power. Most scholars speak of Hutu Power in reference of the racist movement committing the genocide that started to emerge in the civil war from 1990 to 1994. Mamdani however uses the term in a far more inclusive way, describing the ideology of Hutu dominance since 1959.

⁶⁸ Lemarchand, 1970, 344.

⁶⁹ Cf. Lemarchand, 1970, 324-342.

few in number, considered themselves to be a group apart and behaved rather flexible with regard to caste relations. Prince Louis Rwagasore, probably the most able Burundian leader at the time, winner of the elections of 1961 and the only hope for national unification, catered to both Hutu and Tutsi, a behavior unimaginable for a prince in Rwanda. Sadly, Rwagasore was assassinated on October 13, 1961 on behalf of his *Ganwa*-competitors and their Belgian backers. For Belgium, the template of the Rwandan Hutu revolution was a much more attractive scenario than a nationalist Burundian regime with a charismatic leader pushing for independence⁷⁰.

After Rwagasore's assassination, his political successors fought for the spoils and the multi-ethnic nationalist UPRONA-party rapidly disintegrated into different factions, which soon behaved like separate parties. The 'Monrovia'-group consisted mainly of Hutu politicians such as Paul Mirerekano or Pierre Ngendadumwe and was supported by Belgium and the USA. The 'Casablanca'-group comprised mainly Tutsi- and *Ganwa*-politicians. It was supported by the Rwandan Tutsi-refugees, for whom a Tutsi-dominated government in Bujumbura was the only chance for reinstalling Tutsi-rule in Rwanda, and, at least up to 1965, by Communist China.

Since the riots in Kamenge sparked by the radical Tutsi youth wing *Jeunesses Nationales Rwagasore* (JNR) in early 1962, Burundian politics polarized rapidly due to three main factors. First, the escalating refugee situation⁷¹ and the repeated incursions of exiled Tutsi fighters from Burundi into Rwanda led to tensions between the two countries. This as well as inner-Burundian confrontations between radical Tutsi and Hutus multiplied the disintegrating effect of the Hutu revolution. The Burundian Tutsi elite saw the Rwandan refugees as a safeguard against Burundian Hutus and natural allies, particularly when a Hutu-government came to power. This culminated in the assassination of Hutu Prime Minister Pierre Ngendadumwe by a Rwandan Tutsi refugee on behalf of the Casablanca faction in 1965. Second, repeated attempts of incumbent Tutsi governments (Muhirwa, Nyamoya) to eliminate their Hutu competition through plots, counter-plots and assassinations consolidated the ethnic factions, weakening the moderates. Thirdly, in order to mobilize followers, politicians from both groups sought to politicize their segments of society, especially the students radicalized.

The only institution that introduced a modicum of stability into this muddled scenario was the monarchy. From 1962 to 1965, King Mwambutsa acted as an umpire between the rival factions of UPRONA, alternating Hutu-dominated with Tutsi-dominated governments. Mwambutsa was not a strong ruler and mainly relied on the traditional oligarchy and patrimonialism to uphold his reign. Il-equipped with an erratic, instable and neo-traditionalist system of rule, Burundi stumbled into independence in 1962. The court balanced Hutu and Tutsi-interests but it could neither control them nor

⁷⁰ Cf. Lemarchand, 1996, 51-62.

⁷¹ By 1965, around 52'000⁷¹ Rwandan Tutsi refugees lived in Burundi. Cf. Lemarchand, 1970, 384.

prevent the influx of powerful modernist ideas such as popular participation and mass mobilization. The new Burundian elites comprised of army officers, foreign-educated intellectuals, youth leaders and bureaucrats hated the monarchy but their hatred against their ethnic antagonists eclipsed their hatred against the monarchy⁷². Hence, precisely because of its relative weakness, the crown was able to capitalize on ethnic divisions. This situation changed when the elections of 1965 brought a Hutu majority to power. The elections activated ethnic loyalties. Worried about the implications of majority rule, Mwambutsa attempted to regain control over the National Assembly by appointing the *Ganwa* Léopold Biha as Prime Minister and drastically curtailing the rights of parliament, factually reducing it to a rubber-stamp. The Hutus, deprived of their electoral gains, protested and perceived themselves as victims of discrimination in an ethnically biased system. On October 18, 1965, a group of Hutu officers attempted a coup against Mwambutsa and Hutus in the provinces, particularly Muramvya and Cibitoke, started rioting. Even though the coup was quelled by loyal elements of the army under Captain Micombero, the minister of defense, Mwambutsa fled the country, never to return. The retaliation of the Tutsi officers left in charge was swift and ruthless. 68 Hutu leaders and politicians, among them Paul Mirerekano and ex-prime minister Joseph Bamina were summarily executed. Many Hutus in the provinces lost their lives. The army was purged from most Hutu officers⁷³.

With the abortive coup of 1965, the monarchy collapsed. Even though the Mwami's teenage son, Charles Ndizeye assumed the crown as Ntare V in June 1966, thereby deposing Mwambutsa, this was only an ultimately secondary intermezzo. Factually, the army had taken power in October 1965. In November 1966, Micombero also dethroned Ntare V while he was abroad and proclaimed the republic under 'revolutionary' rule. In three subsequent coups, the army, headed by a tight-knit group of young Tutsi-officers had become a political actor and ridded itself from the political competition. In 1965, they defeated the Hutu elite, in July 1966, they destroyed the hopes of the old *Ganwa*-aristocracy for a political comeback, and in November 1966, they ousted the monarchist competition. Subsequently and up to 1967, the army proceeded in remodeling the party, disassembling the national assembly and purging Burundian politics from the radical Tutsi elements from the *Union Etudiante Burundaise* (UNEBA) and the JNR who were able to challenge army rule from the left⁷⁴.

In a way, Micombero initiated a revolution from above to avert a revolution from below. The 'Micomberist' revolution however was an 'interrupted' revolution. Despite its rhetoric, the army acted largely similar to the monarchy, shying away from democracy. As in Rwanda, the new class in power did not introduce any fundamental societal changes⁷⁵. Kayibanda as well as Micombero uti-

⁷² Cf. Lemarchand, 1970,

⁷³ Cf. Lemarchand, 1996, 70f.

⁷⁴ Cf. Lemarchand, 1970 447ff.

⁷⁵ Cf. Lemarchand, 1970, 460-466.

lized the authoritarian tools the monarchy had used before them but disguised them in revolutionary rhetoric.

Threatened Army-rule and the Genocide of 1972

Like the crown before it, the army consistently tried to root out its competition. The hierarchic tradition suited the army's needs and fear of the Hutu majority drove Burundian politics back into clientage and patrimonialism. Caught between revolutionary aspirations and traditional ethnic underpinnings, Micombero acted increasingly isolated and was never able to eliminate threats to his rule permanently. A minor Hutu revolt in 1969 prompted another purge against Hutu in politics, the army and education. By now the army was almost exclusively Tutsi and the potential for ethnic violence was steadily rising as the Hutu sought support among the rural population. The Hutu peasant masses were traditionally minded. They had accepted the legitimacy of kingship in the early 1960s but had no loyalty towards the new elite who had broken the monarchic tradition. Furthermore, another royalist plot was uncovered in 1971. Thus, when a Hutu revolt broke out in Rumonge and Gitega in April 1972, Micombero acted fast, against both Hutus and Monarchists. He placed Ntare V who had been flown in from Uganda under house arrest only to execute him shortly afterwards and ordered the army and the newly founded UPRONA youth wing *Jeunesse Révolutionnaire Rwagasore* (JRR) to kill every Hutu possessing influence or a higher education⁷⁶.

The influence of the Hutu revolution of 1959 on the decision of the Tutsi-dominated army to 'decapitate' the emerging Burundian counter-elite can hardly be overemphasized. The Burundian Tutsi witnessed the displacement of over 50'000 Rwandan Tutsi and heard harrowing stories of massacres in 1962 and 1963, when the Hutu population killed thousands of Tutsi and ethnically cleansed whole regions⁷⁷. In 1964, the Tutsi-parties UNAR and RADER were prohibited in Rwanda and the last Tutsi politicians murdered⁷⁸. With regard to the demographic numbers, a political comeback was all but closed off to Tutsi in the Rwandan ethnocracy from 1964 on. Since the elections of 1965, the new Burundian Tutsi elite understood that without the monarchist symbols of legitimacy (which Rwagasore had possessed), they would not stand a chance in elections. They had furthermore repressed two Hutu-led coup attempts in 1965 and 1969. Confronted with the wanton killings of Tutsi in Rumonge, Micombero and his fellow Tutsi officers decided that the only way to subjugate the Hutu for an extended period of time was to eliminate every possible Hutu leader for the foreseeable future. Even though this strategy succeeded it simultaneously dramatically increased subsequent Burundian leaders dependency on armed force and also sowed the seeds for another round of genocidal violence in 1993.

⁷⁶ Cf. Lemarchand, 1996, 76-105.

⁷⁷ Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 129-131.

⁷⁸ Cf. Waugh, 2004, 28.

The Failure of UNAR and the RPF

With some qualifications, UNAR could be considered the ideological predecessor of the RPF. It was essentially a nationalist party with a strong anti-colonial stance and mainly Tutsi-dominated. Next to the fact that the UNAR ultimately failed whereas the RPF succeeded, the great difference between the two is owed to the fact that the UNAR was essentially monarchist and thus bound to the 'premise of inequality'. The RPF on the other side is a decidedly republican movement that, despite being founded and led by Tutsi, emphasized its accessibility for all ethnic groups from the beginning⁷⁹. Furthermore, both UNAR and RPF were political parties in exile. The latter was founded in Ugandan exile, the former became exiled due to its prohibition by the Kayibanda government. Whereas the UNAR was unable to fight for a return of the diaspora and quickly faded into obscurity after the *inyenzi* attacks petered out in 1966, the RPF successfully overthrew the genocidal interim government in 1994.

Kagame did have contact with UNAR-veterans in his youth⁸⁰ and the RPF must have learned from UNAR's mistakes. For one, the dedication to upholding the monarchy and with it Tutsi privilege deprived UNAR of any meaningful Hutu support. They thus suffered a crushing defeat in the local and parliamentary elections of 1960 despite Hutu- grassroots sympathies for the *mwami*. Paradoxically, UNAR combined its monarchist stance with a left-leaning ideology, receiving financial and diplomatic backing from the socialist members of the UN trusteeship council⁸¹. This 'communist influence' later turned against the party when it sought international backing against the increasing Hutu oppression. The *inyenzis'* attempts at fighting their way back into Rwanda were repeatedly blundered by internal discord, political and military incompetence, cruelty against Hutu, and personal differences, involuntarily strengthening the inner cohesion of the first republic and eventually committing political suicide. In the end, the UNAR in exile "*achieved precisely the opposite of what it had set out to do*"⁸².

The RPF learned a great deal from these failures. When they invaded Rwanda in 1990, Kagame's soldiers already were a unified, disciplined, combat-hardened army, which was even able to stomach its initial defeat and the loss of its commander in the first days of war. The RPF's extremely well-managed information politics and its obsession with controlling its external image are well documented⁸³. Tutsi privilege today remains well hidden under a guise of meritocracy⁸⁴. The discipline during the civil war and the rigid top-down hierarchy structured around Paul Kagame as undisputed commander have attracted considerable international backing which steadily increased through dis-

⁷⁹ Cf. Waugh, 2004, 27-46.

⁸⁰ Cf. Waughm 2004, 28.

⁸¹ Cf. Waugh, 2004, 234.

⁸² Lemarchand, 1970, 227.

⁸³ Cf. Pottier, 2002; Chapter 4.1.4. and 4.2.2.

⁸⁴ Cf. Reyntjens, 2005, 15-40.

seminating the carefully crafted 'liberator' narrative, controlling the diaspora and maintaining very active public relations with the West. An integral part of the RPF's PR-work is to convince the Rwandan population and the international donors that the RPF is in fact a Rwandan, not a Tutsi-party. Nevertheless, they make sure that this claim will not be challenged in elections with unpredictable results, which happened to the UNAR in 1990. Like its external image or its centralized development process, even elections are tightly controlled and part of the RPF's PR-work⁸⁵. I will go into further detail about the RPF's system of internal dominance and external accountability in chapter 4.2. Suffice it to say, that the RPF took the example of the Tutsi counterrevolutionaries to heart and devised new strategies where the UNAR failed, notably with regard to abandoning the idea of officially reestablishing the monarchy and Tutsi privilege, tighter organization, military experience and information management.

⁸⁵ Cf. Reyntjens, 2013, 26-56.

1.2. Rwanda: A Victor's Peace

“Rwanda has undertaken what is, in all probability, the most ambitious attempt any society has ever undertaken to ensure accountability for atrocity⁸⁶.”

RPF: Politics of Unity and Reconciliation

Rwanda's politics in the years since the genocide could be characterized as a high modernist experiment of social engineering. Not even the names of cities and villages have remained the same as before the genocide. President Paul Kagame's government, emerging from the victorious rebel force that chased the *génocidaires* into the Congolese jungle in July 1994, has taken a very active stance with regard to reforming the ills, which in its eyes, caused the genocide. In Rwanda, forging national unity and reconciliation has become the official government doctrine.

The divisions of the genocide are an immense obstacle to overcome. Confronted with an unprecedented outbreak of popular violence, the government of national unity has opted for a maximum approach towards accountability and changing social identities.

Coined as a cautionary tale about the effects of 'divisionism', the officially propagated narrative of the genocide against the Tutsi manifests an ideological cornerstone of the *"New Rwanda⁸⁷"* which the RPF erected from the ashes of the genocide. Not unlike the Holocaust's significance for the Jews, the genocide represents a unique and harrowing experience to every Rwandan Tutsi. It stands as a drastic example reminding Tutsi of what could happen if they lose the power to defend themselves⁸⁸.

The RPF has dedicated itself to maintaining this power. It presents a nine point-program of national unity and reconciliation:

- “1. Restoration of unity among Rwandans;*
- 2. Defending the sovereignty of the country and ensure the security of people and property;*
- 3. Establishment of democratic leadership;*
- 4. Promoting the economy based on the country's natural resources;*
- 5. Elimination of corruption, favoritism and embezzlement of national resources;*
- 6. Promoting social welfare;*

⁸⁶ Gahima, 2013, 303.

⁸⁷ Pottier, 2002, 67.

⁸⁸ Cf. Pottier, 2002; Lemarchand, 2009, 99-108

7. *Eliminating all causes for fleeing the country and returning Rwandan refugees back into the country;*

8. *Promoting international relations based on mutual respect, cooperation and mutually beneficial economic exchange;*

9. *Fighting genocide and its ideology*⁸⁹

Most of these points are at least partially relevant for national reconciliation. This is however not the place to explore the Rwandan approach to unity and reconciliation in detail⁹⁰. The complementary strategies employed by the Rwandan state and its main agents concerned with the legacy of the genocide, particularly the NURC⁹¹ (*National Unity and Reconciliation Commission*) and, to a lesser extent, the CNLG⁹² (*Commission Nationale pour la lutte contre le Génocide*) will be fleshed out in chapter 4. The point to take home here is that Rwandan society has been rebuilt and remodeled from the top down in order to make sure that genocide will never happen again.

The annual commemoration of the “*genocide against the Tutsi*” as it is officially referred to, is the biggest public event in Rwanda all year and the slogan “*never again*” has become not only a credo, but also a source of legitimization for a government that proudly calls itself “*nationalist*”⁹³. The new patriotic pride of ‘being Rwandan’, which particularly inspires the more well off and urban segments of the population, has been propagated as a natural rallying call for the regime, seemingly replacing the sectarian ethnic ideologies. Ethnic references have been banned altogether. Seeing itself as the main guarantor for peace, justice and development, the RPF imposed laws against ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’. The party enforces the anti-genocide legislation very strictly to the point where NGOs and scholars⁹⁴ criticized the practice as actually exploiting the genocide in pursuit of authoritarian political goals.

Top-Down Reconstruction

Today, there is no meaningful opposition against the RPF in Rwanda. The few officially admitted opposition parties are weak and mostly serve the purpose of ‘bridesmaids’ in elections, providing democratic legitimation for the unusually high election-victories of Kagame and his RPF⁹⁵. On the other hand, Rwanda’s economic recovery in the last few years has been remarkable and the state has

⁸⁹ RPF: <http://www.rpfinkotanyi.org/en/?-history-> (29.November2012)

⁹⁰ Please refer to Chapter 4.

⁹¹ <http://www.nurc.gov.rw> (15. March 2013)

⁹² <http://www.cnl.gov.rw> (15. March 2013)

⁹³ Cf. Kagame, 2008, xxi-xxvi

⁹⁴ Cf. E.g. Reyntjens, 2005; Lemarchand, 2008; Prunier, 2009

⁹⁵ Cf. Longman, 2011, 31-34; Sommers, 2012; Dieterich, 2010: For a Rwandan view that only sees slight advantages for the RPF (with regard to media coverage) and places the blame for shortcomings on the media, see ARJ, 2010.

made genuine efforts towards good governance, which have translated into attention from investors and the creation of new jobs for all ethnicities alike⁹⁶, even though increasing aid cuts poorly affect the job situation⁹⁷.

At least on the surface, Rwanda today conveys the image of a dynamic state that has successfully overcome its genocidal past, has abandoned its conflicted ethnic categorizations and makes room for the new, seemingly inclusive “*Rwandan*” identity. Today, the regime faces increasing international criticism because of its alleged human right violations in the DRC⁹⁸ and its very limited tolerance for political dissent⁹⁹. Despite that, Rwandan elites proudly promote a picture of societal stability. The current opinion leaders regard the tensions of the past as a harrowing, but mostly resolved experience. Remembering is necessary but optimism prevails. The homepage of the National Commission for the Fight against Genocide (CNLG) states: “*Africa is often dismissed as the home of bad news, but Rwanda today is quite the opposite; peaceful, stable and increasingly prosperous. It would be naive to think that the legacy of the genocide can be ignored, but optimism is never far away in a land this beautiful*¹⁰⁰”.

Such a remarkable recovery measured against such extreme odds sounds almost too good to be true. The depicted success of the ideology of unity and reconciliation has to be placed under meticulous scrutiny in order to distinguish between official propaganda and reconciliation as perceived by Rwandan peasants in the countryside. Remaining an ultimately contemporary document, this thesis will not be able to provide a definitive assessment of the successes and failures of the Rwandan top-down reconciliation process for “*the challenge of crafting appropriate responses to legacies of past violence, and particularly violence involving genocide or mass atrocity, is the work of not one, but*

⁹⁶ Cf. Zakaria, *Africa's New Path*, Newsweek, 2. August 2009, 5; Hermann, *Das afrikanische Wunder*, Tages-Anzeiger, 6. July 2012, 8.

⁹⁷ In 2012 and 2013, many important donors such as the USA, Germany, and the Netherlands did cut down on their aid budgets for Rwanda because of Rwanda's alleged involvement in the ongoing crisis in the Kivu region of the DRC. As a consequence, Rwanda is now short of 12 percent of its national budget. With the state as the main employer this might jeopardize the economic development and result in public discontent. The FDLR, loosing influence due to coordinated Congolese-Rwandan military actions in the last few years, hopes for the masses of poor disgruntled Rwandan Hutu to join its ranks once more. Cf. Brehm, *USA gehen auf Distanz zu Kigali*, St. Galler Tagblatt, 28. July 2012, 5; Brehm, *Die Krise in der Krise für Ruanda*, St. Galler Tagblatt, 5. February 2013, 7.

⁹⁸ Cf. Kron, *UN Report says Rwandans recruited to fight in Congo*, New York Times, 28. May 2012 (www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/africa/un-says-rwandans-recruited-to-fight-in-congo.html?_r=0 (6 February 2013)); Brehm, *Schmutziger Krieg in Ostkongo*, St. Galler Tagblatt, 14. July 2012, 5; Brehm, *Was will Ruandas Präsident Kagame in Ostkongo*, 3. August 2012, 7.

⁹⁹ Cf. Gettleman, *In orderly Rwanda, little room for dissent*, International Herald Tribune, 29. April 2010; Sommers, *The Darling Dictator of the Day*, New York Times, 30. May 2012. Longman, *Stifled dissent hobbles Rwanda's development*, International Herald Tribune, 2. July 2012;

¹⁰⁰ CNLG, <http://www.cnl.gov.rw> (15. March 2013)

*many generations*¹⁰¹.” It may however provide a more nuanced picture by comparing the propagated success stories to individual experiences on the ground.

¹⁰¹ Gahima, 2013, 305

1.3. Burundi: A Deteriorating Democracy

Burundi, for its part, has implemented a consociational constitution since the government and the main (Hutu-) rebel movement CNDD-FDD signed an internationally brokered agreement on power sharing in Pretoria 2003. This agreement followed a long and arduous peace process¹⁰² and an even longer civil war that left over 300'000 dead. The first ceasefire agreement was signed in Arusha in 2000 already. The war, however, raged on until the CNDD-FDD and the Tutsi-dominated army signed the Pretoria Protocol under considerable international pressure, notably from chief negotiator South Africa¹⁰³. Several other rebel groups, among them the longest-standing Hutu rebel movement, PALIPEHUTU-FNL however never were part of the agreement. Even though the FNL remained active and periodically raided Burundian territory from its rear bases in the DRC, culminating in the shelling of Bujumbura in 2008, a period of relative peace followed Nkurunziza's election. In 2009, even the FNL abandoned its armed struggle and registered as a political party. Violence, however, increased again around the elections of 2010, culminating in a series of political murders, attacks and arrests¹⁰⁴.

Probably the most remarkable factor for defusing ethnic tensions in the post-settlement political structure of Burundi is the implementation of binding ethnic quotas for Hutu, Tutsi and Twa with regard to parties and political institutions¹⁰⁵. On the political level, the consociational power sharing agreement has visibly reduced the ethnic dynamics of the conflict. Competition and political opposition have lost their ethnic character to a certain degree¹⁰⁶. Nevertheless, the peace is very fragile. Political progress and sincere efforts to deal with the violent past are largely stalled. Three UN commissions of inquiry have produced rather negligible results and the country remains severely underdeveloped¹⁰⁷. In recent developments, even the ethnic power balance runs the risk to be unraveled as Pierre Nkurunziza plans to alter the constitution in order to run for a third term. The altered constitution would arrange for the two vice president posts that need to be occupied by a Hutu and a Tutsi to be abolished in favor of a powerful prime minister post, which is guaranteed to upset the old, mainly Tutsi ruling party UPRONA (*Unité et Progrès National*), which has cooperated with the CNDD-FDD¹⁰⁸ up until now.

Growing Political Tensions

¹⁰² For a detailed and informed account of the peace process, see Southall, 2006 or Wolpe, 2011.

¹⁰³ Cf. Southall, 2006.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. HRW, 2012.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Lemarchand, 2006; Southall, 2006, 214-220

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Reyntjens, *Briefing Burundi*, 2005, 132

¹⁰⁷ Cf. IRIN News Africa: *Analysis: Tensions high in run-up to Burundi elections*, March 4, 2010; IRIN News Africa: *Burundi: "Peace" villages come with a price*, March 30, 2010

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Reuters: *US Urges Burundi to Drop Constitution Changes, Avoid 'Dark Days'*, 8. April 2014, on: <http://www.voanews.com/content/reu-us-urges-burundi-to-drop-constitution-changes-avoid-dark-days/1889081.html> (10. April 2014)

Since 2005, the democratic credentials of Pierre Nkurunziza's CNDD/FDD-government have increasingly shed feathers. Worrisome trends such as the growing dominance of the ruling party since 2010¹⁰⁹, inter-party violence, banditry, widespread corruption¹¹⁰ as well as quarreling political elites¹¹¹ acting largely isolated from the population have consolidated themselves. On a positive note, the violent struggle for political power has lost much of its ethnic character. The societal fault lines now run across ethnic identities. Nowadays, antagonisms are rather based on party affiliation¹¹².

Tension rose again in the forefront of the turbulent 2010 elections, which, boycotted by most of the opposition parties, left Pierre Nkurunziza and his party in a position of absolute power¹¹³. Agathon Rwasa, the FNL's leader went into hiding shortly after the elections and remained absent for three years. New rumors about rebellion and extra-judicial killings by the government have since been once again a consistent part of Burundian daily life¹¹⁴. The increasing number of disgruntled politicians, officials and ex-guerillas is reflected in frequent news about newly armed groups such as FRONABU-TABARA or FRD (*Front pour la restauration de la démocratie*), emerging in remote provinces or the DRC. Frequent violent clashes of party youth wings¹¹⁵, increasing numbers of politically motivated arrests¹¹⁶ and even extrajudicial killings of opposition members¹¹⁷ have become the status quo.

¹⁰⁹ The Burundian government increasingly cracks down on dissent. A wave of extrajudicial killings of members of the opposition has swept the country after the elections of 2010 and in 2013, the CNDD-FDD-dominated parliament has passed a very controversial media law that has been criticized by the UN. Cf. SAPA: *Burundi death squad kills 300 – claim*, on: <http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Burundi-death-squads-kill-300-claim-20111122> (March 6, 2014); Reuters: *Burundi parly passes tough media law*, on: <http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Burundi-parly-passes-tough-media-law-20130404> (March 6, 2014); HRW, 2010.

¹¹⁰ Cf. ICG, 2012.

¹¹¹ Cf. Uvin, 2009, 43-80

¹¹² Cf. HRW, 2009, 2010, 2012.

¹¹³ Cf. HRW, 2010.

¹¹⁴ Cf. e.g. Ligue Iteka, Rapport 2010 & 2011; IRIN News, *Burundi: A new Rebellion*, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/94346/burundi-a-new-rebellion> (10. April 2014); SAPA: *Burundi death squad kills 300 - claim*, on: <http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Burundi-death-squads-kill-300-claim-20111122> (10. April 2014).

¹¹⁵ Cf. IRIN News Africa: *Analysis: Poll puts Rwanda under scrutiny*, March 11, 2010, on: <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88392> (March 11, 2010)); IRIN News Africa: *Analysis: Tensions high in run-up to Burundi elections*, March 4, 2010 (cf. <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88313> (March 11, 2014)).

¹¹⁶ E.g. in December 2013, the vice-president of FRODEBU who wants to stand for election in 2015 has been arrested under very questionable charges. Cf. Nininahazwe, Pacifique: *La vérité sur l'arrestation de Bamvuginyumvira Frédéric*, on: <http://burundi24.wordpress.com/2013/12/08/la-verite-sur-larrestation-de-bamvuginyumvira-frederic/> (December 12, 2013).

¹¹⁷ 392 murders in 2011 alone Cf. Ligue Iteka: Rapport annuel de la ligue Iteka 2011, 29. Mars 2012, on: www.ligue-iteka.africa-web.org/article.php3?id_article=3664 (September 11.2012). SAPA : *Burundi death squads kill 300 – claim*, on : <http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Burundi-death-squads-kill-300-claim-20111122> (March 3, 2014)

Even though recent developments in Burundian politics strongly evoke the assumption that Pierre Nkurunziza's government is trying to mimic the RPF's success¹¹⁸ in Rwanda, Burundi's approach of dealing with the consequences of its violent past differ fundamentally from the maximalist strategies in its neighboring country. The government is largely absorbed by retaining its power and is not pushing a reconciliation agenda in any meaningful way.

Transitional Justice: A Stalemate

The power-sharing agreement between UPRONA and CNDD/FDD in 2003 and even the agreement between Nkurunziza's government and later the registration of the FNL as a political party in 2009 supplied most major players of the civil war with positions of power. Efforts to introduce transitional justice were thus never a national priority and have largely been stalled by political stalemates, even though transitional justice is a publicly declared policy goal¹¹⁹. Debating historical tragedies in Burundi has the potential to seriously destabilizing the political establishment. Hence, Burundi is hoping to bring about peaceful coexistence by acknowledging and defusing existing ethnic tensions rather than by establishing new identities by governmental decree and ending impunity through maximum justice. Reconciliation politics are oriented towards the recognition of continuing struggles and divisions. Such goals could be described as more "*minimalist*"¹²⁰ than the complete transformation of identities which Rwanda pursues. Burundi, however, experiences difficulties implementing even minimal proceduralism despite the popularity of 'forgiving and forgetting' among many Burundian peasants¹²¹. Disillusioned by decades of mass violence and quarreling elites, the idea of overcoming the logic of mass violence through chosen amnesia gains additional momentum because of the popular understanding that both sides have committed massacres in Burundi. The logic of mass violence is much less straightforward than in the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

Geographic Segregation

Also see HRW, 2009, 5-10.

¹¹⁸ Even before the elections in 2010, the ruling CNDD-FDD has increasingly started to crack down on opposition parties and media. It also heavily manipulates jurisdiction in order to maintain its grasp on power. The CNDD-FDD however does neither share the RPFs dedication with regard to social engineering and good governance nor its absolute power over the state. Cf. HRW, May 2010; Ligue ITEKA, Annual Reports April 2011 & March 2012. Crackdowns on private media using the same arguments as the RPF ("*inciting hatred*") have intensified since the landslide victory of the CNDD-FDD in 2010. Cf. Nikiza: "*Muzzling the Media over Gatumba Massacre*", 29.11.2011, on: <http://thinkafricapress.com/burundi/muzzling-media-over-“Gatumba“-massacre> (October 10, 2013).

¹¹⁹ Cf. Vandeginste, 2007, 25ff

¹²⁰ Cf. Verdeja, 2009, 12-20. Verdeja distinguishes "*minimalist*" and "*maximalist*" approaches towards reconciliation. Whereas Minimalists focus on the establishment of formalistic and legalistic basic requirements, maximalists put an emphasis on institutionalizing personal forgiveness and transforming identities.

¹²¹ Cf. Interview with "Marguerite", 55, Hutu resident, «Gakombe», Kirundo; Interview with "Odette", 25, Hutu resident, «Gakombe», Kirundo: «*Il faut mieux oublier ce qui c'est passé.*» All interviews have been conducted between May and December 2011.

Although the political quota system defuses ethnic tensions on the top-level to a certain extent, partial geographic segregation and conflicts over land ownership have the potential to drive a new wedge between Hutu and Tutsi. The multiple crises culminating in the civil war have increasingly segregated the two ethnic groups, particularly in rural areas. While many Tutsi fled to settlement centers and refugee camps under army protection, most Hutu remained on their hills or fled to neighboring countries, particularly Tanzania¹²². Many internally displaced persons still distrust the fragile peace and prefer to stay where the war has pushed them. The former camps for internally displaced persons, where predominantly Tutsi and sympathizers of the old ruling party UPRONA sought refuge have grown into villages nowadays. Many of their inhabitants remain estranged from their old neighbors, as my research in the camp-turned-village „*Rohero*”¹²³ in the province of Ngozi demonstrates. Over 100'000 predominantly Hutu refugees are still living abroad and expected to return home as the camps in Tanzania and the DRC are closing¹²⁴. In a country where over 90% of the population are dependent on agriculture and arable land is scarce, this situation provides for continuing conflicts over land ownership between returnees and occupants. Given the miserable state of Burundi's judicial system¹²⁵ and the rising crisis of corruption stemming from the governing party's dominance of the public sector, the prospects for resolving land conflicts in a timely and impartial manner do not look promising.

The Burundian civil war could be interpreted economically as a very brutal distribution battle for controlling the spoils of the state¹²⁶. The warring factions utilized ethnic identities and grief over historical injustices to rally up their followers. Interpreted in this way, politically defusing ethnic tensions might be a fruitless endeavor as long as the country stays poor and its sparse resources remain in the hands of a small, albeit ethnically diverse, oligarchy. Even though the first steps towards reconciliation have been successfully undertaken, particularly with regard to the ethnic power-sharing design in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (*APRA*) of 2000, extensive reconciliation programs as in Rwanda are nowhere to be found. The population is largely left to its own devices. Most attempts to account for the crimes of the past, such as the formation of a national truth and reconciliation commission or the implementation of a special court, have been delayed for years. They have fallen victim to what Vandeginste describes as a “*sophisticated bypassing mechanism*”¹²⁷, subordinated to the preservation of political stability and convenience. This is particularly

¹²² For a brilliant in-depth analysis exploring the life conditions and state of mind of Burundian (Hutu-) refugees in Tanzania, cf. Malkki, 1995.

¹²³ The names of the villages have been changed to protect the participants. Cf. Chapter 3.2.1.

¹²⁴ Cf. UNHCR: 2013 country operations profile - Burundi, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c056.html> (18 March 2013)

¹²⁵ Cf. OAG, 2011, 38ff.

¹²⁶ Cf. ICG, 2012, 11ff.

¹²⁷ Vandeginste, 2011, 189.

problematic when regarding impunity from a historical perspective. The purge against the Hutu elite in 1972 has never been processed or even investigated. Ingelaere speaks of an actual “*policy of amnesia*”¹²⁸. Unaddressed anger about this unpunished crime has served as a catalyst in the killings of Tutsi in 1988 and 1993. Many Hutu saw these killings as acts of revenge¹²⁹. Without at least symbolic acts of justice and reconciliation, nobody knows if a political crisis would not result in a new episode in this “*cycle of revenge*”¹³⁰.

Even though a truth and reconciliation commission under the leadership of catholic bishop Jean Louis Nahimana (a Hutu) and Anglican archbishop Bernard Ntahoturi (a Tutsi) was installed in December 2014, it is largely perceived as the CNDD-FDD's commission. President Nkurunziza has handpicked its members and the opposition parties UPRONA and FRODEBU as well as most Burundian CSOGs boycott its work¹³¹.

Strongly simplified, the comparative perspective thus contrasts two fundamentally different approaches: the Rwandan politics of unity and reconciliation are governmental projects with enormous ambition and scope, aiming at nothing less than re-inventing the country itself. In Burundi, top-down measures aiming at reconciliation up to now mainly addressed the ethnic balance in government, the administration and the army. Up to now, they contented themselves mostly with implementing the main reforms agreed upon in the peace process. Apart from localized issues, such as solving land disputes or re-integrating refugees, official efforts to assist the traumatized population address the past, are kept at the minimum. Comparing the post-conflict experiences of Rwanda and Burundi thus not only contrasts power sharing with a victor's peace but also pitches highly interventionist reconciliation politics against a political de-facto attitude of governmental amnesia.

¹²⁸ Ingelaere, 2009, 5.

¹²⁹ Cf. Lemarchand, 1996, xxxi; Interview with Venantie, 35, Hutu resident, “Kamenge”, Ngozi; Interview with Violetta, 30, Hutu resident from “Kamenge”, Ngozi and Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident from “Gakombe”, Kirundo who said that the Hutu told him personally that Tutsi would be persecuted as a revenge for 1972.

¹³⁰ Interview with Marie-Goreth, 33, Hutu resident from “Kamenge”, Ngozi. *All interviews are cited clean verbatim.*

¹³¹ Cf. Hirondelle News Agency: *Burundi: Truth Commission Elected Amid Opposition Boycot*, 4 December 2014, on: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201412050134.html> (25 March 2015).

2. Theoretical Background: Defining Reconciliation Politics

2.1. Working Definitions and Key Objectives

2.1.1. Restoration or Creation of a Relationship?

Armed conflicts do not end with peace by default. Sustainable peace is the desirable result of an often decades-long post-conflict phase. Next to power sharing, institutional and economic reconstruction, rule of law and justice, reconciliation has become increasingly recognized as a fundamentally significant goal for a successful peacebuilding process to address, particularly in the aftermath of genocide and mass atrocities¹³².

Reconciliation after mass violence is a long and arduous road. Communal and interpersonal bonds and relations are destroyed, often with the most brutal intent possible: to dehumanize the 'other' as completely and utterly that even common humanity is denied. Perpetrators break even the last cultural taboos in order to do so¹³³. Unspeakable crimes such as beating people to death in front of their relatives, targeting infants or hacking off limbs are applied consciously to divide communities. Facing such atrocities, joining the killers or becoming a pariah – us against them - becomes the only viable option for the members of the perpetrating group¹³⁴. In the moment of committing the crime, the thought of a collective future that includes the victim has already been rejected definitely and irreversibly. Restoring a shared society takes time and effort, not only for survivors and perpetrators, but for their families, communities, the state and the international community as well. Confronted with such atrocities, we have to ask: can a normal, peaceful status quo ante be established? Is the status quo ante even desirable in countries with a long history of ethnic, social or economic discrimination?

In his Arendtian argument, Schaap¹³⁵ postulates that society is not a fixed entity in need of restoration but a process shaped by the actions of its participants. In his opinion, the act of reconciliation, (re-) integrating former adversaries into a shared world and changing this world by introducing new perspectives, is by definition political and continues perpetually. The act of reconciliation thus practically incorporates every aspect of political change. I agree with Bashir¹³⁶ that Schaap's theory of reconciliation as a complete and exhaustive framework for politics stretches the concept too far. It loses its distinctive value as a precise concept suited for addressing historical injustices in a transitional phase. Nevertheless, I concur with the idea that reconciliation is an inherently political concept and

¹³² Cf. Lambourne, 2004; Lederach, 1998; Verdeja, 2009

¹³³ Jessee, presentation at ASA annual meeting, 2010.

¹³⁴ Cf. Sémelin, 2007, 205-212

¹³⁵ Cf. Schaap, 2004.

¹³⁶ Cf. Bashir, 2008, 68.

that we should focus less on restoring a status quo ante from decades ago¹³⁷, but instead, on constantly developing an increasingly tolerant society at peace with itself.

Following this reasoning, reconciliation politics could be understood as the totality of a society's diverse efforts ultimately aiming at the achievement of a new societal structure that integrates erstwhile adversaries. First, we have to define reconciliation.

2.1.2. An Attempt at Definition

Transitional Societies

Lederach calls reconciliation "*the building of a relationship*¹³⁸". Mass violence destroys the bonds of social cohesion. Societies in transition deal with the problem of reconstructing these bonds, respectively the creation of new bonds. Successful peacebuilding thus has to address the specific underlying causes of conflict, particularly within the local population.

In principle, politics of reconciliation need to accommodate difference instead of trying to eliminate it. While recent debates in consolidated Western democratic systems have been focusing on concepts such as multicultural citizenship and "*politics of difference*¹³⁹", 'reconciliation politics' rather emerged in the context of 'transitional' post-colonial countries moving towards democracy. In this context, the South African model of truth and reconciliation commissions¹⁴⁰ and the idea of restorative justice often influence reconciliation politics heavily. The South African model has influenced both post-conflict environments covered in this thesis: while Rwanda, like South Africa, adopted the idea of de-ethnicizing citizenship in favor of an inclusive 'one-nation' model, Burundi's peace process was actually minted by the South African leadership during the peace process. Mandela pushed through the consociational power sharing agreement¹⁴¹.

Interestingly, the two ideas of reconciliation politics and western politics of accommodating difference have rarely overlapped with the effect that in many transitional societies, the victims seeking reconciliation are minorities that first have to fight for the recognition of their distinct identity¹⁴².

There is a broad consensus that a peaceful coexistence between Hutu and Tutsi is the ultimate goal of reconciliation politics in Rwanda and Burundi. Nevertheless, defining the complex process of reconciliation itself is already a challenge. Peace and stability are probably the best we could hope for in

¹³⁷ The currently dominant narrative of Rwandan history recreates a harmonious precolonial past as closest thing to the status quo-ante. Cf. Byanafashe & Rutayisire, 2011; RoR, *RPF – History of Rwanda*, on: <http://www.rwandahope.com/RPFhistory.pdf> (29. November 2012). Burundi celebrates the late prince Louis Rwagosome and (to a lesser extent) Melchior Ndadaye as great unifiers whose vision Burundi should follow.

¹³⁸ Lederach, 1997, 23.

¹³⁹ Bashir & Kymlicka, 2008, 2.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Tutu, 1999.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Watt, 2008, 67ff. and Southall, 2006, 201-220.

¹⁴² Cf. Bashir & Kymlicka, 2008, 1-24

the short term in a region historically prone to crisis such as the Great Lakes region. Sacrificing certain difficult challenges of reconciliation in favor of superficially peaceful coexistence however, breeds discontent and all too often only postpones the renewed eruption of conflict.

Key Objectives of Reconciliation

It is important to note at this point that this discussion of reconciliation only refers to reconciliation as a societal endeavor, and not to the psychological journey that is necessary for a person affected by genocide to reach the point of reconciliation and forgiveness. The manifold challenges in addressing trauma, denial and living in the past deserve a treatment of their own and surpass the scope of this thesis¹⁴³.

Thorough, encompassing reconciliation represents the ultimate aim of social reconstruction and the foundation of sustainable peace. Reaching normative goals such as forgiveness, mutual respect, restorative justice, rule of law, acknowledgment of guilt, apology, restitution or reparations and an equal democratic footing between former antagonists simultaneously in a few years and proceeding to business as usual, however, is utopian. Objectives like e.g. (retributive) justice and reconciliation might even oppose each other on certain levels and will strongly affect governability. Nevertheless, each of these key objectives is at the same time necessary and in itself insufficient to achieve reconciliation. The process is multi-faceted, uneven and, should reconciliation be successful, occurs on multiple levels of society. Given the enormity of the task, a realistic set of goals is necessary. Minimalist solutions that equalize the former adversaries legally and recognize their identity can serve as a starting point but a nominal recognition of coexistence is usually too thin a layer to bridge the gaps in a society polarized by mass atrocity. Likewise, maximalist approaches often advanced by religious peace scholars propagating willfully embracing the 'other' and turning disdain into esteem with the ultimate goal of social harmony may work very well in individual cases but probably aim too high for entire societies divided by genocide. The other party has to be acknowledged in its inherent value, respected as equals. Nevertheless, political conflicts and disagreements will and should persist as they do in every society. A peaceful society is not an apolitical society. The important point is that a continuous relationship is sustained.

Verdeja's definition of reconciliation emphasizes moral respect and tolerance among former adversaries as a realistic and morally defensible basis for transitional societies: "*Reconciliation, I argue, refers to a condition of mutual respect among former enemies, which requires the reciprocal recognition of the moral worth and dignity of others. It is achieved when previous, conflict-era identities no*

¹⁴³ About overcoming trauma after genocide cf. Waintrater, 2003. About the relationship between macro-political interventions and personal psychological processes cf. Hamber, 2009. For portrayals of survivors and how they deal with trauma cf. Hatzfeld, 2008.

*longer operate as the primary cleavages in politics, and thus citizens acquire new identities that cut across those earlier fault lines*¹⁴⁴.”

Next to the emergence of mutual respect between former enemies, Verdeja considers the public dissemination of the truth about past atrocities, the accountability of perpetrators, the public recognition of the victims and a commitment to the rule of law as essential to reconciliation¹⁴⁵. These normative goals are almost congruent with Sebarenzi's¹⁴⁶ requirements for reconciliation: acknowledgement, apology, restorative justice, empathy, reparation and forgiveness. Furthermore, in Rwanda's case, Sebarenzi insists on the accompanying measures consensus democracy, peace education and international assistance as crucial for reconciliation. With regard to reconciliation's complex and encompassing nature, we could however broaden the definition almost at random until it encompasses politics completely as in Schaap's view. Hence, I will limit my analysis to the three core principles identified by Bashir *“memory, acknowledgement, and responsibility and apology”*¹⁴⁷ and add justice for three reasons. First, justice is necessary for ending the culture of impunity, which lowers the inhibitions for partaking in 'retributive' atrocities in every new episode of mass violence. Second, justice is important with regard to appeasing survivors and providing closure. Third, justice fulfills an important function as it reveals the truth and creates a common foundation of knowledge upon which society may build and move on, hence the expression 'transitional' justice¹⁴⁸.

Rigby defines reconciliation as the *“restoration of fractured inter-group relations between former antagonists in violent conflict”*, embracing *“both initiatives intended to bring about socio-economic and political institutional changes that might facilitate the restoration of new relationships, and initiatives aimed at changing people's perceptions of themselves and former enemies as such that new constructive relationships might be created”*¹⁴⁹. The critical points in Rigby as well as Verdeja's definitions are restoring inter-group relationships and establishing the framework conditions for the emergence of new and mutually respectful identities. These changing identities resp. self-perceptions in turn alter the former fronts of conflict. In Burundi e.g. the political fault lines are less about being Hutu or Tutsi today than before 1993. The faceless, *“essentialized”*¹⁵⁰ enemy whose utter dehumanization enabled the perpetrator to execute the actual crime has to be 're-humanized' into an individual human being who deserves respect. The 'other' needs to be re-inserted into society as an equal.

¹⁴⁴ Verdeja, 2009, 3.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Verdeja, 2009, 28-66.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Sebarenzi, 2009, 213-247

¹⁴⁷ Bashir, 2008, 67.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Clark, Kaufman & Nikolaidis, 2008, 381-391.

¹⁴⁹ Rigby, 2006, 47.

¹⁵⁰ Chiro and McCauley, 2006, 81

This transformation requires the combination of the key concepts mentioned above and the structural and relational transformations that Lederach¹⁵¹ emphasizes for peacebuilding as well.

Reconciliation Politics and Peace Building

Lederach¹⁵² maintains that the key characteristics of contemporary conflicts derive from their internal nature: the conflicting groups are both neighbors and enemies. Both groups associate experienced trauma and grievance with each other, sometimes accumulated over generations. Ethnic entrepreneurs exploit these deep-rooted, subjective animosities fueled by “*the imaginary constructs of social destructiveness*”¹⁵³ in times of crisis. They produce cycles of violence, which render statist diplomacy, and rational methods of conflict resolution such as peace negotiations ineffective. Traditional conflict management often fails to implement basic structural changes essential to long-term peace and stability, such as the protection of human rights and the promotion of tolerance and pluralism. What Lederach calls ‘Peace building’ comes very close to what Rigby calls ‘reconciliation’, meaning the sustainable construction of society-wide frameworks focusing on the restoration of fractured relationships. According to Lederach, peace building “*must be rooted in and responsive to the experiential and subjective realities shaping people’s perspectives and needs*”¹⁵⁴. Just as reconciliation, Lederach comprehends conflict transformation as a long-term process that requires the contextualization of our immediate actions with regard to the ultimate aim of designing social change¹⁵⁵.

Considering the points above, we could define reconciliation politics as ***the totality of a society’s diverse efforts aiming at creating or restoring constructive relationships between erstwhile adversaries that cut across the cleavages of the conflict-era identities***. This definition however has to take into consideration the key objectives mentioned above and must also pay attention to their various levels and interdependencies.

2.2. Framework Conditions for Reconciliation

2.2.1. Elite Behavior, Economic Development, Democracy

Interdependencies in Field Research

Concrete political programs usually emphasize one particular key objective of reconciliation over others. The topic of reconciliation politics being incredibly extensive, I chose to focus on the core principles commemoration, acknowledgement, recognition and justice as mentioned above and how

¹⁵¹ Lederach, 1997, 20; 82-83.

¹⁵² Cf. Lederach, 1997, 23ff

¹⁵³ Cf. Sémelin, 2005, 10-53

¹⁵⁴ Lederach, 1997, 24

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Lederach, Beyond Violence, 1998, 240

they manifest themselves with regard to identity politics and sociopolitical culture, memory and commemoration, governmental assistance and transitional justice.

The anticipation of eventual side effects, which the primacy of one objective might have on other objectives, constitutes the main difficulty in analyzing programs aiming at reconciliation. The analysis of the context of implementation represents one of the main tasks of fieldwork. Designing a national policy oriented towards reconciliatory core principles, as extensive as they may be, does not guarantee reconciliation. The framework conditions of society as a whole, the political system, elite behavior and economic progress may at times be more critical to the success of social reconstruction than reconciliation politics themselves.

The Dilemma of the Elite

The visions of elites and the political establishment for balancing ethnicity or forging a new national identity may contribute greatly to reconciliation. They may enable the public discussion and reflection of the past through the establishment of commemoration ceremonies or sites, by adhering to principles of non-violence, furthering the rule of law and being committed to reforms aiming at the above-mentioned key objectives. Elite-driven reconciliation, however, also carries a number of risks, which clearly become apparent in the Rwandan and Burundian examples. By definition, post-conflict politics have to be concerned with the immediate needs of legitimacy and stability. Tasks such as establishing a working environment and political ground rules with former adversaries are particularly difficult after power sharing agreements. In situations of persisting threats to peace or if a post-conflict coalition is still tenuous, demands for restitution, justice or apology, which are of great importance for the victims, may be shelved because the new government needs to strengthen its legitimacy and efficacy. In the worst cases, members of the elite have an active interest in hiding the truth or deferring justice because they were implicated in human rights violations and war crimes themselves. Burundi's transition serves as a prime example of how particularly substantive justice claims that might jeopardize political power holders get postponed and sidelined in favor of strengthening the precarious balance of state stability and legitimacy. Even if the Burundian government respects the UN's prohibition of amnesties pro forma, it has stalled the matter and little has been done so far to address the complex challenges of guilt, responsibility, apology and memory¹⁵⁶.

Economy, Security and the international Community

Although they have not explicitly been mentioned as key objectives in the definitions above, physical as well as social security and particularly poverty alleviation are crucial prerequisites to post-conflict reconstruction. Even if demands for reconciliatory key objectives are sidelined in favor of stability,

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Chapter 5 and Vandeginste, 2011, 189-211.

the population assesses reconciliation increasingly positive if security and economic stability are given. Stover and Weinstein¹⁵⁷ along with specialists on disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration such as Johanna Spear¹⁵⁸ insist on economic development and transformation as critical elements of social reconstruction, particularly regarding the aftermath of civil wars. Paul Collier¹⁵⁹ maintains that economic factors such as rebel movements' war-related opportunities for financial gain¹⁶⁰, a national dependency on primary commodity exports, and financial aid from the diaspora for 'the cause' actually are more important factors with regard to renewed outbreaks of conflict than the attitudes of the domestic population. Economic development and the opportunity to lead productive lives are crucial for reconstruction as well as reconciliation. Secure jobs in multi-ethnic work places establish interaction across lines of social demarcation. Employment provides idle men and youth with self-worth and the opportunity to care for their families while unemployment and lack of perspectives furthers alcoholism, domestic violence and ultimately the temptation to take up arms again¹⁶¹. Longman, Phuong and Weinstein's studies in Rwanda detected a strong correlation between perceptions of improved economic conditions and approval for transitional justice¹⁶² even though most of their participants did not explicitly link poverty alleviation and reconciliation¹⁶³.

For objectives such as economic and institutional reconstruction as well as for monitoring and safeguarding the peace process, funding and assistance from the international community is needed¹⁶⁴. Facing the arduous task of rebuilding poor states ravaged by war, the temptation for former rebels and warlords coming to power is high to simply use the state as a 'cloak of sovereignty' in order to gain access and redistribute the spoils of the state among themselves and their supporters¹⁶⁵. A population used to violence, unaddressed grievances, polarized politics and an intact rebel infrastructure double the risk of a relapse into conflict during the first decade after the settlement¹⁶⁶. Next to external checks and balances provided by the international community, regional alliances, neighboring states or donor countries, mechanisms need to be established, so that the population could hold elites accountable.

Reconciliation Politics and Democracy

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Stover and Weinstein, 2004, 328-339

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Spear, 2006, 63-80.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Collier, 2005, 158-162.

¹⁶⁰ E.g. Plunder, the exploitation of Gold- or Coltan-mines in the DRC or the diamond trade in Angola.

¹⁶¹ The four Burundian ex-combatants I interviewed all said that life was easier as a soldier/rebel. Two of them, Ezechiel and Abel from "Rohero" took up arms again after the peace process. As reasons, they cited lack of perspectives.

¹⁶² Longman, Phuong and Weinstein, 2004, 206-225.

¹⁶³ Ibid. 223. Ingelaere's (2009) and my field work results in Burundi however suggest that peasants in Burundi consider immediate economic relief one of the primary concerns for peaceful coexistence.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Sebarenzi, 2009, 231f.; Furley and May (eds.), 2006; Collier, 2009.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Reno, 1998.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Collier, 2005, 158f.

Even if the key objectives are reached, reconciliation politics are not suitable as a replacement for ordinary politics in divided pluralistic societies. Bashir understands reconciliation politics as a backwards-oriented “*supplement to deliberation*”¹⁶⁷. Reconciliation can only fulfill a complementary role next to (deliberative) democracy and vice-versa. Most authors perceive a strong connection between democracy and reconciliation, particularly with regard to the importance of equality between victim and perpetrator, as well as the balance of power, democracy seems to be the only alternative. Survivor Joseph Sebarenzi clarifies: “*without fairness, there is no democracy, without democracy, there is no reconciliation*”¹⁶⁸. Even if deliberately separating both concepts, it is very difficult to talk about reconciliation without any kind of democratization process because reconciliation is all about the population itself. One of the few but very interesting treatises about un-democratic politics of reconciliation is Raftopoulos and Savage’s “*Zimbabwe. Injustice and Political Reconciliation*”¹⁶⁹. Mugabe’s experiment in reconciling Shona, Ndebele and white farmers from the top down however was a complete and utter failure. It resulted in brutal ethnic cleansing against the Ndebele in Matabeleland 1982-85 and the expulsion of white farmers in 2000. Without democratic control, reconciliation politics rapidly deteriorate into cultural imperialism where the dominant group universalizes its perspectives of history, culture and memory and constructs them as the norm. People who do not share this perspective become outsiders and dissidents associated with negative stereotypes and considered inferior. All too often, the dominant group soon starts to perceive the views of outsiders as defective and in need of re-education or correction. In this logic, dissenters need to be civilized, controlled, administrated, educated or even imprisoned. Progress and the common good then legitimize the exercise of coercive policies and even structural violence in the eyes of the dominant group¹⁷⁰.

Thus, demands for inclusion ultimately have their roots in historical exclusion and discrimination. Demands for reconciliation function as an insistence on co-determination and the acknowledgement and redemption of historic wrongs. This happens via the inclusion of the discriminated in the decision-making processes that shape a country. The democratic element is inseparable from a genuine debate about reconciliation. Moreover, with regard to the pluralistic nature of most post-colonial states such a democracy needs to accommodate ethnic diversity. “*Any process of democratization that does not make conscious attempts to ensure the fair recognition and representation of diversity will quickly become (and become perceived as) a form of domination by one group over others. To be successful, therefore, the politics of reconciliation must itself be framed in lights of ideals of democratic inclusion for a pluralistic society*”¹⁷¹. It is important to note that elections and majoritarian de-

¹⁶⁷ Bashir, 2008, 67.

¹⁶⁸ Sebarezzi, 2009, 225.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Raftopoulos & Savage, 2004

¹⁷⁰ Cf. Bashir, 2008, 52.

¹⁷¹ Bashir & Kymlicka, 2008, 5.

mocracy alone do not necessarily promote reconciliation. Habyarimana's Rwanda was a nominal democracy but with Hutu making up 85% of the population, it was a 'dictatorship of the majority' with the Tutsi being marginalized. If the minority remains in power on the other hand, like in Burundi before 2005, the regime cannot trust democracy because it does not trust the majority and has to rely on oppression and discrimination of the majority¹⁷². As Mamdani¹⁷³ notes about Rwanda - the Tutsi demand justice, the Hutu demand democracy. Reconciling the two demands is difficult without alienating one group. This dilemma can only be resolved by reconciliatory strategies as outlined above: either changing the group identities or codifying political representations, e.g. in 'consociative' models¹⁷⁴.

¹⁷² Cf. Collier, 2005, 155.

¹⁷³ Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 39ff.

¹⁷⁴ About consociationalism and power sharing in the Great Lakes region, cf. Lemarchand, 2006, 1-20.

2.3. The African State, the Elite and the Peasantry

After having established the parameters for reconciliation politics and emphasizing the importance of an approach towards reconciliation that includes multiple levels of society and the state, we now turn the focus towards the post-colonial state. One of the main interests of this thesis¹⁷⁵ is investigating feedback loops between the rural population and the central government with regard to coping with the past, overcoming divisive identities and working towards reconciliation. If the government aims at engaging the energy and loyalty of local farmers, traders and craftspeople, legislature and executive have to incorporate feedback loops and extend patronage to society as a whole, not merely a selection of beneficiaries or urban areas¹⁷⁶. There are however several difficulties when it comes to assessing politics with regard to their popular or democratic credentials. One area often overlooked by political theorists focusing on mass violence is the mode of operation and the limitations of the African post-colonial state.

2.3.1. Elite Reproduction and Peasantry

The State as economic Facilitator

Bayart, in his seminal work "*The State in Africa*¹⁷⁷" regards the elites' hegemonic quest for the accumulation of wealth and political domination as the primary *raison d'être* of the post-colonial African state. He emphasizes the state's function as an 'incubator', a principal economic initiator that is exploited to the benefit of its developing dominant classes. In underdeveloped countries where the importance of the private sector is negligible and officials appropriate the few lucrative business opportunities such as e.g. the commodity trade, the patrimonial state often represents the only possibility for socioeconomic advancement¹⁷⁸. The personal advantages of positions within the state allow functionaries to over-exploit the peasantry and enrich themselves. Thus conflicts considered 'ethnic' by Western observers are often little more than struggles for the control of the state's means of wealth accumulation. Wealth enables the maintenance of powerful patronage networks, which in turn often function along ethnic lines.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. Chapter 3.1.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Mamdani, 1996

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Bayart, 2009.

¹⁷⁸ For a gripping account of how Zaïre carried patrimonial practices to such extremes that the state actually became 'predatory' against its own population and economy cf. Young & Turner, 1985.

The arbitrarily drawn colonial borders of post-colonial African states¹⁷⁹ provided for a merely weak basis of nationalism. Hence, ethnicity or kinship presented themselves to politicians as pre-existing entities to fall back upon when aiming at enlisting popular support. The supporters however expect their share of their leader's success. *"The social struggles which make up the quest for hegemony and the production of the State bear the hallmarks of the rush for spoils in which all actors – rich and poor – participate in the world of networks"*¹⁸⁰. Bayart does not differentiate between the domains of state and civil society, as both penetrate each other and many actors are active inside as well as outside state institutions. Whereas the political discourse in Western countries is often shaped by the exchange between official politics and the protagonists of the economy or civil society, these lines of distinction are blurred in the African state. The vertically integrated *"system of reciprocal assimilation"*¹⁸¹ between elites and their clients is reflected in the tendency of African elections to divide the electorate along ethnic lines as well as the tendency that African incumbents get re-elected because they have already established networks of politico-economic dependencies¹⁸².

Hyden's 'Economy of Affection'

Bayart strongly emphasizes on this interpenetration of state and society but for the main part, he considers it detrimental to the peasantry, which in practice is overexploited to fulfill the elite's hunger for wealth. Noted Africanist Goran Hyden¹⁸³ on the other hand understands the dynamics of patronage networks mainly as an effect of elites adapting to the dominance of an independent peasantry. Analyzing the relationship between the peasantry and the post-colonial state, Hyden speaks of the *"economy of affection"*¹⁸⁴ emerging from the pre-capitalist peasant mode of production. In his opinion, capitalism has never perpetrated African societies because an independent peasantry owning its own means of production has largely remained uncaptured by colonial and post-colonial politics. The African peasantry does not need the political class as much as the elites are dependent on the peasants' agrarian surplus for their reproduction. Thus, the uncaptured peasantry can rely on subsistence farming as an *"exit option"*¹⁸⁵ from the market economy and is able to manipulate and influence the political class to further its own socioeconomic existence within the economy of affection. The economy of affection functions according to conservative peasant egalitarian values: the corporate household, lineage or group needs are superior to the needs of the individual; status trumps wealth; competition is about positional access rather than direct acquisition. In practice, the

¹⁷⁹ Rwanda and Burundi as ancient kingdoms are actually an exception to this rule, a fact that the 'New Rwanda'n nationalism builds upon heavily. Cf. Byanafashe & Rutayisire et al., 2011.

¹⁸⁰ Bayart, 2009, 235.

¹⁸¹ Bayart, 2009, 174.

¹⁸² Cf. Collier, 2009, 15-50.

¹⁸³ Cf. Hyden, 1980.

¹⁸⁴ Hyden, 1980, 18.

¹⁸⁵ Hyden, 1980, 139.

modern post-colonial state is permeated by the obligations that the economy of affection produces and the only way to change the peasant mode of production in keeping with Hyden is through coercion. Hyden however does not consider the typical African state strong enough to transform its economy through the coercion of its citizens such as e.g. the Asian tiger states. The African state is too swamped by its patronage obligations - its primary *raison d'être*. According to Hyden, the post-colonial state has no structural roots in society, and resembling "*a balloon suspended in mid-air, is being punctured by excessive demands and unable to function without an indiscriminate and wasteful consumption of scarce societal resources*"¹⁸⁶. Employing a case study of the the *Ujamaa*-villagization project in Tanzania, Hyden comes to the conclusion that the subordination and coercion of the independent peasantry is a necessity for development but considering the limited capacity to transform the peasants' structural environment, the elite adopts the peasant mode of social reproduction based on patronage relations rather than capitalist logic to survive.

Hyden's theory is of great value, particularly with regard to the mode of social reproduction. Nevertheless, there are certain essential points of criticism, particularly if we try to apply the theory to Rwanda and Burundi.

First, Hyden, as a critic of the dependency-theory en vogue among Marxists at the time, might have underestimated both the role of capitalism as a driving factor of 'tribalism' and the heterogeneity of the peasantry in order to make his point.

Second, the 'exit option' of the peasantry depends on a surplus of land. With a land surplus, productivity is negligible elsewhere and Tanzania during the *Ujamaa*-campaign was able to provide land to settle on. Rwanda and Burundi on the other hand are two of the most densely populated countries in Africa. Land scarcity demolishes the fallback option of subsistence farming and makes the need for higher productivity acute.

Third, Hyden did not factor in the huge economic importance of international assistance, alternative or external funding¹⁸⁷. With international assistance accounting for shares as high as 50 percent¹⁸⁸ of the national budget or even more, international donors have in many cases replaced agricultural export and thus, domestic patrimonial networks as primary sources of wealth. International donors supplanting the local population as most important claimants of accountability create a new problem in its own right. Furthermore, warlords and elites have become increasingly efficient in meddling in the international commodities market, exploiting natural resources such as timber, diamonds or pre-

¹⁸⁶ Hyden, 1983, 19.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Uvin, 1998 and 2004. Cf. also chapter 4.2.2.

¹⁸⁸ Rwanda in 2008. Cf. Zorbas, 2011, 103.

ciuous metals and selling them through clandestine networks¹⁸⁹. These incomes reduce the elite's dependence on the agricultural surplus and further destroy the advantages of the peasantry.

Despite the points of criticism above, Hyden's economy of affection, especially with regard to the peasant value system, is integral to Rwanda's and Burundi's political history in general and the dynamics of conflict in particular. The salient point in these cases is less the potential for resistance among the peasants, a potential that is diminished significantly by population pressure and the growing significance of external funding, but the adaptation of the economy of affection by the elite.

If we compare Hyden's and Bayart's conclusions directly and adapt them to the cases in question, I would rather understand the peasantry in Rwanda and Burundi as 'captured', as a part of the economic network that gets exploited by the elite. Nevertheless, the peasants' value system and mode of production as described by Hyden permeates these networks, at least to a certain degree. The blurred limits and ambiguous relationships between the peasantry and the political class molds elite behavior into an explosive hybrid between the officially desired politics of modernization and the reality of the 'peasant mode' of social reproduction – patronage, clientelism – what Bayart calls the "*politics of the belly*¹⁹⁰". Even if the peasantry is captured, its traditional mode of thinking still heavily influences the behavior of its captors. In a political context that demands majorities to access the state's spoils, group identity and positional access once again trump purely capitalist or meritocratic values. Some important consequences of this hybrid mode of political management – attempts at modernization while remaining rooted in 'traditional' notions of social reproduction – are demonstrated in Nyerere's *Ujamaa*-campaign that aimed to resettle Tanzanians into model villages as well as in the Rwandan genocide, at least to a certain extent. The following examples explain how high modernist ambitions interact with the value system of the "*peasant mode of production*¹⁹¹".

2.3.2. Traditionalized Modernization and Genocide

Ujamaa: An Example for the Mass Mobilization of Peasants

We could interpret the character of violence both in the genocide in Rwanda as well as in the various ethnic massacres in Burundi in the context of the hybrid way of thinking. Looking at the high degree of peasant compliance to what Straus calls the "*order of genocide*¹⁹²", we automatically assume a highly organized and efficient state apparatus and a bureaucracy effectively capturing the peasantry to the point where peasants followed even the authorities' most gruesome commands.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. Reno, 1998.

¹⁹⁰ Bayart, 2009, lxxvi.

¹⁹¹ Hyden, 1983, 7.

¹⁹² Straus, 2006.

Although it is certainly true that Rwanda as well as Burundi could be considered hierarchical societies where authority is rarely questioned, one factor that made the inclusion of peasant society in the genocide so eerily successful was its adoption of the 'peasant mode of production'. Hyden comes to his conclusion about the uncaptured peasantry through analyzing the failure of Nyerere's *Ujamaa*-campaign in the 1970s. The campaign however succeeded in an entirely different aspect than originally intended.

James C. Scott, also analyzing the Tanzanian experiment of (ultimately) forced villagization¹⁹³ as well as James Ferguson examining development policy in Lesotho¹⁹⁴ both come to the conclusion that high modernist attempts at social engineering under the aegis of 'development', although failing with regard to their immediate goals of transforming the economy, succeeded in asserting government control over the peasantry. Scott maintains that gaining total control over the peasantry became increasingly important to the Socialist cadres in Tanzania as the resistance to the villagization campaign grew. From this perspective, the Tanzanian government actually followed Hyden's argument that the subjugation of the free peasantry is necessary to transform the economy. It succeeded in subjugating the peasantry, but it failed with regard to economic transformation. The officials, viewing themselves as reformers and following a modernist aesthetics and teleology, failed to comprehend that the peasants with their intimate knowledge of the soil and local conditions were the true empiricists¹⁹⁵. Blindly following 'modern' assumptions about agriculture and ignoring local knowledge, *Ujamaa* performed catastrophically concerning its primary goal of agricultural reform. Nevertheless, it succeeded in resettling the peasants into model-villages designed for purposes that effectively facilitated the central management of the population and thus enhanced government control. In their self-serving paternalist attitude towards the peasantry, the emancipated post-colonial Tanzanian elites mimicked and even expanded Mbembe's "*commandement*"¹⁹⁶, the colonial practice of governing by coercion. Through the glorification of progress and development aesthetics, state power became a fetish for the post-colonial elite in the context of the development state.

If we argue along Hyden's lines, the peasants withdrew from the transformative enterprise of villagization in Tanzania because it did not support their own socio-economic existence within the economy of affection, producing a massive socio-economic failure. Scott on the other hand considers the elites' unilateral fixedness on generic development aesthetics, their stubbornness, the lack of feedback loops and the paternalistic attitudes underlying the drive towards political control of the peasantry as the main reasons for failure.

¹⁹³ Cf. Scott, 1998, 223-261.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. Ferguson, 2003

¹⁹⁵ Cf. Scott, 1998, 252-255.

¹⁹⁶ Mbembe, 2001, 24

Peasant Support during the Genocide

As pre-colonial kingdoms with administrative continuity throughout the era of colonization, the reach of the state in Rwanda and Burundi was already refined for African proportions. Mandatory obligations towards the state such as *'umuganda'* (communal work) had a long, even pre-colonial tradition. The killing methods practiced during the genocide and the words that Rwandan peasants used for the killings such as *gakura* - "work"¹⁹⁷, suggest that they understood killing their neighbors in the context of the *'commandement'*. Killing was understood as a service they were required to perform due to coercive orders from the authorities. Drawing from a traditional practice (mandatory communal work) and altering its substance however was not the only reason why the genocidal *Akazu*-elite and the instigators of violence in Burundi succeeded. Whereas the Tanzanian authorities failed to garner the support of the rural population because the peasants did not see direct advantages in villagization, the incitement to genocide exploited the peasants' deepest fears and desires. The promise of looting the land and cattle of their neighbors were powerful motivations for peasants suffering from abject poverty and population pressure¹⁹⁸. Fear that the other group would take lethal revenge was equally based on a long history of recurrent and alternating episodes of mass violence. Hutu hardliners in the Rwandan interim government did not only wield governmental authority, they exercised this authority through local networks, peer pressure¹⁹⁹ and a re-interpretation of traditional practices in order to achieve total and exclusive political dominance of the state²⁰⁰. Applying the logic of the 'economy of affection' or the 'politics of the belly' to the genocide, state power was interpreted in ethnic terms by using a societal fault-line generally understood by peasants (Hutu vs. Tutsi). The peasants had to be captured at any cost to safeguard the power gained in the 1959 Hutu revolution, which was threatened by multiparty-politics and civil war²⁰¹.

Ethnic strife in the Great Lakes Region has always been interpreted as a bipolar struggle deciding between absolute rule or servitude respectively elimination. There was no middle ground for the extremist elites. Taking into account the history of ethnic violence, the atmosphere of turmoil within the civil war and the mentioned circumstantial factors such as peer pressure, fear, poverty, economic decline, a culture that greatly values conformity and an open political power struggle, the *Akazu* rightly assumed that peasants could be polarized and mobilized along ethnic lines. Political dominance had to be complete because the Hutu hardliners did not want to risk having to share the spoils of the state with the resented enemy. Even if the RPF would win the war, the argument goes, they

¹⁹⁷ E.g. Hatzfeld, 2005, 60; cf. Sémelin, 2007, 186ff.

¹⁹⁸ Cf. e.g. interviews with Annunciata, Anasthase, Ben, Costasie, Elias, Gaspard, Jeanne d'Arc, Umubyeyi, Yohani N. Interviews in all three Rwandan research locations.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. Fujii, 2009, 128-180.

²⁰⁰ Cf. Straus, 2006, 87ff.

²⁰¹ Cf. Mamdani, 2002, 231.

would rule over an empty country because the genocide eliminated the RPF's ethnic power base and thus its economic foundation. This genocidal argument resonates deeply with the logic of a political system predominantly understood as a vertical network of loyalty and ethnic kinship aimed at the accumulation of wealth. Even the mode of killing, hunting the victims down one by one with machetes, a common tool for field work, was adapted from the 'peasant mode'.

Arsène, a teacher from "Gakombe", Kirundo, exemplified the successful adaptation of the 'peasant logic' by the elite perfectly, when we talked about his interpretation of the Burundian civil war ('la crise'): Interviewer "Do you think the crisis was ethnic or political?" Arsène: "It was political but when Burundians are [were] trying to do those politics, they found out that, maybe they don't have supporters. They don't have them, they need the population. Then the only thing the population can understand is the ethnic groups, so they just started that because they knew that it would be understandable in the population and then they used it for political ends²⁰². "

Politics: Transformation from Above or Adaptation from Below?

Hence, violent politics in both countries sought to mobilize their respective power bases, drawing from the 'economy of affection' and aiming at capturing state power in order to assess its economic potential. Now the question is how the current political leaderships of Burundi and Rwanda interpret these experiences with regard to rebuilding their societies. The fact that Pierre Nkurunziza needs the support of the peasantry is strongly reflected in some of his most popular policies. Free healthcare for pregnant women and infants as well as free primary education have made him very popular among Hutu peasants. His pious public presence as a devout born-again Christian also suggests that he is aware of the fact that swaying the generally very religious peasant masses is a surefire way to guarantee him public support despite a very mediocre economic performance. Thus, the CNDD-FDD's system could be interpreted as a fairly traditional form of clientelism in a fragile security situation.

The Rwandan government on the other hand is trying to completely transform its society and economy in a decidedly paternalist manner resembling the high modernist schemes described by Scott²⁰³. The official aim is to erase corruption and to replace the 'economy of affection' with a 'modern' political system and a detached administration. With the *Imidugudu*-policy starting in 1996, the RPF has embarked on a similar villagization²⁰⁴-project as Tanzania in the 1970s. Even the practice of prescribing cash crops to peasants, which also had been practiced in Tanzania, has already been implement-

²⁰² Interview with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo.

²⁰³ Cf. Scott, 1998.

²⁰⁴ Cf. Newbury, 2011, 223-239.

ed²⁰⁵. The result is similar as in Tanzania: although the *Imidugudu*-policy seems not to have produced substantial results in regard to transforming rural income-generating activities²⁰⁶ and with elite ambitions surpassing rural realities by far²⁰⁷, the grasp of the state has increased greatly since 1996²⁰⁸.

Nevertheless, Rwanda has produced an impressive number of economic successes in the past 20 years. It could be argued that high modernist experiments mainly failed in Africa because of the discrepancy between the envisioned transformation of the economy and the rent-seeking behavior of the bureaucratic elite still entrenched in the economy of affection. These trends effectively often neutralized each other. In the face of overpopulation and land scarcity, the need for enhanced productivity is obvious. If however the state wants to succeed in convincing the peasantry of a market economy's advantages, it has to grant these exact advantages to the peasants through the consequent application of the rule of law. Instead, the relentless pursuit of high modernist utopias under authoritarian pretensions mainly benefited the elite. No peasant opts for difficult transformations voluntarily without the opportunity of raking in the benefits.

Rwanda has achieved a great deal with regard to service provision for all citizens and the development of a bureaucratic elite that is effectively detached from its constituents. On the other side, clientelism and favoritism on the local level are still widespread and the current government strongly relies on coercion to build modern structures.

2.3.3. Straddling Public and Private Spheres

Bayart's observations about the economic significance of the state for its elites are important for both Rwanda's and Burundi's reconciliation processes. If we would characterize the conflict in Burundi as "*a struggle for power and control of the state apparatus and its sinecures*²⁰⁹", its reconciliation politics would have to be seen less as an attempt to resolve a purely ethnic conflict, but rather through the lens of a continuing opportunistic struggle for the spoils of the state with changing alliances. Even though Burundi is not a failed state of Congolese proportions, the behavior of certain politicians and their clientele closely resemble the strategies of guerilla-entrepreneurs during the Liberian civil war as Stephen Ellis describes them in "*the mask of anarchy*²¹⁰". This behavior also bears

²⁰⁵ Cf. Interviews with Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Paul, 44, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; "Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

²⁰⁶ Cf. Isaksson, 2013.

²⁰⁷ Cf. Ansoms, 2011, 240-251.

²⁰⁸ Cf. Chapter 4.2.

²⁰⁹ ICG, 2012, 1

²¹⁰ Cf. Ellis, 2001.

certain hallmarks of “*warlord politics*”²¹¹ in William Reno’s sense: maintaining unstable alliances aimed at occupying state power for profit, profiting from uncertainty in the provinces (at least the guerilla movements), embezzling and appropriating taxes and development aid and generally fostering a culture of impunity. In such a lawless environment, actors strive for political positions of power in order to gain access to the few lucrative opportunities an impoverished state such as Burundi can still provide such as e.g. palm oil plantations. Since the internationally recognized elections of 2005, and bolstered by international aid, the state has become a much more potent distributor of positions of wealth and power than the guerilla movements, which also might have been a factor for the FNL to join peace talks.

Bayart and Mbembe remind us that, in the context of the African state, the distinction between the political domain and civil society is by no means categorical. Their boundaries overlap and penetrate each other²¹². In Rwanda, the traditionally strong governmental control of NGO’s and grassroots organizations or the state’s interconnections with genocide survivor CSOGs are examples for this ‘*straddling*’ of public and private domains by political players. Despite increasing signs of a developing Western state with its pronounced focus on good governance and its emphasis on institutionalization, Rwanda exhibits characteristics of a typically post-colonial and paternalist state. A ‘benevolent dictator’ who seeks to educate his citizens with little tolerance for dissent rules the country without meaningful opposition. In this respect, Kagame is an ‘*old*’ new leader in the tradition of Kwame N’Krumah or Julius Nyerere whose *Ujamaa*-campaign resembles Kagame’s *Imidugudu*-reform very closely²¹³. Like the first generation of post-colonial leaders, he is aiming at reforming the rural population, improving the access to services, aligning village structures and encouraging non-agricultural ways of generating income. Furthermore, the RPF places emphasis on fostering reconciliation and alleviating conflicts over land²¹⁴. Reforming the political sphere is not enough, the Rwandan as such is to be reformed.

A cautionary Approach to Peace and Transformation

We have to be cautious about seemingly simple democratic resolutions to conflict and development. Actually, we should remain skeptical with regards to the benefits of state intervention in general.

Collier²¹⁵ hints at the fact that implementing democratic processes such as elections in a post-conflict context when power is still obtainable often fails to establish popular support for sound political strategies or candidates. Elections rather divide society into different camps expecting exclusive ben-

²¹¹ Cf. Reno, 1998

²¹² Cf. Bayart, 2009, 207-227; Mbembe, 2001.

²¹³ Cf. Scott, 1998, 223-261 and Newbury (D. & C.), 2000, 832-877.

²¹⁴ Cf. Isaksson, 2013.

²¹⁵ Cf. Collier, 2009, 15-50.

efits if their candidate wins. Merely establishing a new government by power-sharing or election processes without transforming the conflictive identities or the dynamics of wealth accumulation will perpetuate the conflict in all likelihood. At the latest, when the funds deplete or a group becomes fed up with the results of the peace process, the peace process will unravel. The worst scenario happened in Rwanda after Habyarimana allowed democratic competition: sudden democratization radicalized group competition between vertical networks to such an extent that it devolved into an anarchic struggle for national resources. Simply transferring the power to the people by staging elections is an ill-advised strategy in the context of a state that is primarily seen as a socio-economic facilitator or an 'election prize' by its population and political parties.

Scholars focusing on the state, such as James C. Scott²¹⁶ or Zygmunt Bauman²¹⁷ warn against high modernist transformative top-down experiments, particularly audacious social engineering on a grand scale. Such endeavors encourage proselytizing by ignorant elites and often produce strong authoritarian undercurrents while failing with regard to their proclaimed goals. The risk of violent escalation is fundamentally ingrained in the high modernist ambition to make society work in the manner of a well-functioning machine. The 'backwards' peasant subjects are usually the last people to be asked about their own ideas regarding their development and the temptation of coercion in the tradition of the colonial '*commandement*' is high.

Thus, the permeability and direction of state politics is a very sensible subject integrative of reconciliation politics, but exceeding its borders by far. Suffice it to say, this thesis is interested in the existence and particular constellation of popular feedback loops and economic opportunities and how they influence Rwandan and Burundian politics.

²¹⁶ Cf. Scott, 1998, 87-102.

²¹⁷ Cf. Bauman, 1989.

3. Approach and Structure of the Thesis

3.1. Comparative Research at the Grassroots

The thesis attempts to contribute to a holistic understanding of reconstruction and reconciliation after mass atrocities in the Great Lakes. The interviews were compiled shortly after elections took place in both countries, deliberately opting for a less charged political atmosphere²¹⁸. The findings are based on a series of 95 semi-structured life history interviews that mix quantitative (survey/questionnaire) and qualitative (life history interviews) parts. The participants²¹⁹ are rural (and to a lesser extent) urban dwellers in both countries that were at least six years old in 1993 resp. 1994. The interviews focus on the impact of politics on personal life-stories with a special focus on overcoming the violence of the past and fostering a culture of peace and reconciliation.

Even though the sample is not representative in a strictly quantitative sense²²⁰ and the decision to follow personal networks of trust and affinity adds an impressionistic connotation to the analysis, the sociopolitical trends it identifies are easily comprehensible through the method of data triangulation explained in chapter 2.2.7 and open to scrutiny for every keen observer of the region.

3.1.1. Identifying the Problem

The underlying assumption of the thesis is that a profound, open and pervasive effort towards reconciliation²²¹ is necessary to overcome the recurring cycles of intra-communal and inter-ethnic violence in Rwanda and Burundi. Due to the popular nature of violence in these conflicts, the reconciliation process should involve the population as much as possible and ideally be driven by it. This assumption about the necessity of a defined and stringent policy of national reconciliation will be questioned in its own right, particularly when comparing the effects of the Rwandan approach of maximal “*accountability for atrocity*”²²² to the consequences of the Burundian practice of delaying matters of

²¹⁸ Collier, 2009, 15-50, makes the valid point that in the months preceding elections in post-conflict societies, the situation is often at its most volatile as different factions try to mobilize their supporters, often by using other groups as scapegoats. In both countries, there were instances of mass violence and genocide starting immediately after elections (Burundi 1993) respectively in the wake of the introduction of multiparty democracy (Rwanda 1994). Post-settlement violence in Burundi increased in the forefront of the 2010 elections as well (cf. HRW, 2010). Thus, I chose a time-window for research when flared tempers would ostensibly have calmed down in order to have a less distorted view on ethnic antagonisms.

²¹⁹ For the purpose of convenience, I will always use the male form for “participant” in this dissertation.

²²⁰ Cf. Schnell, Hill & Eiser, 1995, 251-295.

²²¹ The opinions about the definition of reconciliation, which divisions it should address, which societal areas it should include or which sociopolitical strategies are suited to induce it, differ widely. Different approaches towards the terms „*reconciliation*” and “*reconciliation politics*” are discussed in chapter 2.1.

²²² Gahima, 2013, XXXIII

transitional justice for reasons of short-term political stability²²³. On a very general level however, most relevant political groups, power-holders and every single participant I had the pleasure to interview identified the need to reconcile as necessary for a peaceful future, even though definitions, expectations and ways to achieve it vary to a great degree.

Considering the difficult societal conditions described in chapter 1, a simple and elegant strategy addressing acknowledgement, apology, restorative justice, reparations and forgiveness²²⁴ seems almost impossible in this poor region prone to war and political instability. During the post-settlement resp. post-genocide phase, both countries have implemented strategies to resolve societal divisions and recalibrate the social balance. To me, the effects of these differing approaches on the people affected by the violence triggered the strongest interest. I wanted to understand how ordinary citizens in two countries with similar points of departure rebuild their societies after having been divided by genocide and where their approaches and views differ.

3.1.2. A Bottom-Up Perspective

The direction from which I chose to approach the theme of societal reconstruction is mostly bottom-up. Extraordinary analysts working on Rwanda and Burundi such as Scott Straus²²⁵ or Bert Ingelaere²²⁶ convinced me that if politics of mass mobilization, regardless of their intentions, shall succeed, they have to be assessed with regard to their impact at the grassroots and seen in historical context²²⁷. While well-conceived national programs and sufficient international assistance might promote and facilitate or predetermine the path of reconciliation, forgiving and overcoming the harm done in the past ultimately is left to the population itself. Focusing on local perceptions, reactions and context allows us to understand whether official measures are perceived as actual solutions to the problems that caused mass violence. Analyzing local perception also strongly hints at the reasons why policies fail, if they are based on and responsive to popular feedback or if their implementation might actually pursue a hidden agenda driven by the political economy of internal conflict. My research in Rwanda puts a strong emphasis on understanding the national politics of unity and reconciliation in the context of the RPF's history and vision, but it does so by looking at the RPF's policies from the peasants' perspective.

²²³ Cf. Chapter 5.3. and Vandeginste, 2007, 13ff.

²²⁴ These are the five conditions Sebarenzi (2009, 214) considers necessary for true reconciliation.

²²⁵ Cf. Straus, 2006.

²²⁶ Cf. Ingelaere, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c.

²²⁷ Scott Straus e.g. has made a convincing argument about the Rwandan genocide having been so staggeringly effective because the command structures of the MRND-state were organized very tightly and thus not only reached the grassroots, but wielded enough power to convince and coerce Hutu-peasants far from the capital Kigali to engage in the slaughter of their neighbors. Cf. Straus, 2006, p. 65-94. Emmanuel Viret adds that the increasingly fierce political competition since the introduction of multipartyism in 1991 made it attractive for local Hutu Power cadres to consolidate their organizations tightly in order to capture political power faster in the event of a civil war. Cf. Viret, 2009.

Given the popular character of violence in both conflicts and taking into account Hyden's theory of social reproduction in the 'peasant mode'²²⁸, I figured that reconciliation would have to take root in the population in order to minimize the elite's temptation to exploit pre-existing divisions in times of crisis. The fact that violence in both conflicts followed top-down networks, instigated by the authorities but often executed by ordinary citizens, prompted me to focus on compliance and resistance to authority at the grassroots²²⁹.

The historical discourse of the RPF-regime²³⁰, heavily promoted for the past twenty years, constructs a very specific discourse of the genocide, often interfering with scientific research as such²³¹. Even though finding access to the field is very difficult, research at the grassroots is the only way to investigate reconciliation politics in Rwanda without tacitly accepting the preconceived results of the government-appointed National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). The official discourse consistently assures the global public that Rwandans are almost completely reconciled and that a stunning 97% of the population accepted the new national Rwandan identity²³². It defends these findings rather aggressively against any criticism.

In adopting a bottom-up perspective to politics of reconciliation, I hoped to discern if and how the political attitudes and approaches mentioned above are transferred to the local level and especially, if these policies address the causes or just the symptoms of violence. Personally, I did not see many signs of ethnic hatred in previous visits to the Great Lakes region. Recognizing that the socio-political key decisions between resistance, indifference or joining the killing formed in and through local group dynamics²³³, I chose to follow the networks of trust and affinity in the opposite direction in order to assess the popular entrenchment of reconciliation. As countless failed high modernist experiments demonstrated: if reform is not (at least) appropriated by its addressees or if it is implemented in a context where it provokes popular resistance, it will ultimately fail.

Except for the internal logic of power and ethnicity of the RPF, which is instrumental to understand the design and implementation of reconciliation politics in Rwanda²³⁴, the thesis only touches the intricacies of policy design and institutional logic superficially. The emphasis of the thesis rests on the dynamic interplay between the post-conflict state and the popular perception of politics.

²²⁸ Cf. Hyden, 1980 & 1983.

²²⁹ Cf. Fujii, 2009 and Straus, 2006.

²³⁰ Cf. Chapter 4.1.

²³¹ Cf. Pottier 2002; Ingelaere, 2010a and 2010c.

²³² NURC, Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer 2010, 9f or, for 2012: Kabeera: *Reconciliation efforts attain 80 percent milestone – NURC report*, in New Times, February 1, 2012.

²³³ Cf. Fujii, 2009 and Straus, 2006.

²³⁴ Cf. Chapter 4.1. and 4.2.

By analyzing the dynamic relationship between the behavior of a country's elite – party officials, administrators and military officers on one side and the overwhelming majority of peasants on the other - and comparing their different perceptions and ideas, a comprehensive picture of two societies trying to leave behind their past emerges. By comparing said picture against the backdrop of the post-conflict state of affairs in the neighboring country, the influence of these specific relationships between 'top' and 'bottom' allows us to identify the prospects and pitfalls of the respective models.

3.1.3. Research Questions

My approach, based on the guidelines of the Concordia University Doctoral Program in Humanities, combines the academic fields of history, political science and social science. The research question reads as follows:

“Which effects do the politics of reconstruction and reconciliation in Southern Rwanda and Northern Burundi have on the attitudes of local communities in the aftermath of mass political violence?”

The overall objective deriving from the research question is to assess the impact of politics aimed at reconciliation on the coexistence of formerly antagonistic groups in the Southern Rwandan and Northern Burundian countryside.

Conceptual Objectives:

1. To determine the nature of government intervention for reconciliation in communities in Rwanda and Burundi and compare them with regard to their sustainability and efficiency as perceived by the rural population in multiple sites.
2. To assess the significance of the political, social, cultural and economic context with regard to politics of coexistence and reconciliation.
3. To examine the extent to which the attitudes of rural populations might shape local politics of reconciliation (feedback loops politics-civil society).

3.1.4. Academic Significance

In a very general sense, the thesis functions as a modest, grassroots-based contribution to the still emerging field of conflict transformation and more generally “*peacebuilding*²³⁵” in the understanding

²³⁵ Lederach, 1998, 20. For details, see chapter 2.1.

of John Paul Lederach. The findings of the thesis are of significance for policy-makers in Rwanda and Burundi insofar as the thesis constitutes an independent analysis of governmental efforts to foster reconciliation and lets the (potential) beneficiaries of these policies speak for themselves. Despite the structural similarities and the parallel histories that Rwanda and Burundi share, direct comparisons between the two post-conflict political frameworks are still rare. Although the thesis' main emphasis lies on multi-sited communal research, the two-tiered analytical approach ('official' and 'informal' level) allows for a direct comparison between governmental policy on one hand and the perceptions and behavior of the local population on the other. The semi-structured interview method utilizes relatively open life history-interviews on one hand and a predetermined questionnaire on the other, which furthermore, allows for precisely situating lived experiences in contemporary history and closely keeps track of changing individual attitudes as the transitions in both countries progress.

The results of the thesis will help to determine the local priorities in reconciliation. Distinctions between local 'homegrown' reconciliation, participation in the projects of central authorities, passive compliance and resistance crystalize through the bottom-up view. The perspective of the thesis thus bridges the gap between classical ethnographic and sociological studies that focus on the lived realities of rural dwellers in the Great Lakes Region²³⁶, research on the behavior of local actors during and after the genocide²³⁷ and comparative studies that focus on the dynamics of genocidal violence from a regional and historical perspective²³⁸.

Up to date, there is an increasing amount of excellent theoretical literature with regard to transitional reconciliation politics in general²³⁹ and literature about reconciliation in Rwanda²⁴⁰ in particular. Furthermore, a growing number of Rwandan agencies such as the NURC or the IRDP publish their own assessments of reconciliation in Rwanda²⁴¹ as well. Literature about Burundi's transition since 2005 is harder to come by²⁴² and accounts that compare the experiences with politics of reconstruc-

²³⁶ Cf. e.g. Newbury, 1988 & 2000; Chrétien, 2003; Malkki 1995; Uvin, 2009.

²³⁷ Cf. e.g. Hatzfeld, 2005; Straus, 2006; Fujii, 2009 and Thomson, 2013.

²³⁸ Cf. e.g. Lemarchand, 2006 & 2009; Lemarchand & Niwese, 2007; Prunier, 2009; Mwakikagile, 2013.

²³⁹ About reconciliation in general, cf. e.g.: Lederach, 1995 & 1998; Kymlicka & Bashir (eds.), 2008; Verdeja 2009. About reconciliation in concrete post-settlement contexts: Rigby, 2001 & 2006, 47-62; Abu Nimer (ed.), 2001; Pouligny, Chesterman & Schnabel (eds.), 2007. About the South African experience with TRC that had a major influence on the design of reconciliation politics, e.g. in Burundi: Tutu 1999. For a criticism of the South African TRC: Wilson, 2004.

²⁴⁰ Cf. e.g. Three excellent anthologies exploring Rwandan post-genocide politics including reconciliation from multiple angles are: Stover & Weinstein (eds.); Clark and Kaufman (eds.), 2009 and Straus & Waldorf (eds.), 2011. See also Eltringham, 2004. Specifically on reconciliation in Rwanda cf. e.g. Longman, Pham & Weinstein, 2004; Lemarchand, 2007; Buckley-Zistel, 2009; Ingelaere, 2010a & 2010c; Thomson, 2013.

²⁴¹ Cf. e.g. IRDP, 2003; IJR, 2005; NURC, 2004; NURC 2009 and NURC 2010.

²⁴² About Burundi's history and transitional politics: Lemarchand, 1996 & 2009a; Ould Abdallah, 2000; Reyntjens, 2000 & 2005; Southall 2006; Watt, 2008; Wolpe, 2011; Vandenginste, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2012 & 2013; Mwakikagile, 2013. For a grassroots perspective, cf. Malkki, 1995; Uvin 2009; Ingelaere, 2010b.

tion and reconciliation at the grassroots in both countries remain extremely rare²⁴³. Particularly the post-conflict experiences of the population in Northern Burundi remain largely uninvestigated.

Most of the authors choosing to write about the regional dynamics of genocide and mass violence rank among the most experienced and renowned in the field. Scholars such as René Lemarchand, Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Gérard Prunier and Filip Reyntjens have observed the region for decades and, sadly, their warnings about new episodes of mass violence have rarely been heard. This thesis attempts to add a qualitative bottom-up view to their analyses.

Although certain quantitative methods have been utilized in the scaled questions section of the interviews compiled for this thesis, the analysis takes a qualitative perspective similar to the work of Ingelaere, Thomson, Straus or Malkki and shares their strong focus on popular perception and socio-political context. My interview questions, particularly the scaled questions furthermore employ questions corresponding to Bert Ingelaere's work²⁴⁴ with Rwandan and Burundian peasants in other communes and regions, which might increase the dissertation's overall significance.

The strategies of the Rwandan and Burundian governments should be comprehended in a context of limited means in a region devastated from decades of war and heavily influenced by its colonial heritage. In the context of the African state outlined in chapter 2.3., even reconciliation politics often only function as a smokescreen for the obtainment and perpetuation of political and economic power²⁴⁵. A perspective that follows the chains of informal influence and elite wealth accumulation is indispensable for understanding the background of Rwandan and Burundian politics. Hence, the thesis resorts to research on the mode of operation of African states as published by Bayart²⁴⁶, Reno²⁴⁷, Mamdani²⁴⁸, Uvin²⁴⁹ or Chabal and Daloz²⁵⁰. These scholars focused on patterns of informal policy-implementation and the inner dynamics of power in African states rather than official politics as stated in programs, strategy papers and official evaluations.

²⁴³ Two notable exceptions are Bert Ingelaere's articles "*Living together again*" (2009), "*Living the Transition*" (2010b), and "*Peasants, Power and Ethnicity*" (2010a), where he compares peasants life trajectories in Rwanda respectively Burundi with regard to political transition and transitional justice (although in separate articles) and Carla Schraml's book "*the Dilemma of Recognition*" (2012). Schraml is principally interested in the experienced reality of politicized ethnicity in both countries.

²⁴⁴ Cf. Ingelaere, 2009, 30-40; Ingelaere, 2010a, 273-292. Ingelaere (2009) spread his research sites all over Rwanda and Burundi whereas my research concentrates on Northern Burundi and Southern Rwanda.

²⁴⁵ A gripping example is Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe. Cf. Raftopoulos & Savage, 2004.

²⁴⁶ Bayart, 2009.

²⁴⁷ Reno, 1998.

²⁴⁸ Mamdani 1996 & 2001.

²⁴⁹ Uvin, 1998

²⁵⁰ Chabal & Daloz, 1999.

For lack of detailed field work, African conflicts are often lumped together under diffuse genera such as “*post-modern conflicts*²⁵¹” or particularly the “*failed state*²⁵²” paradigm often referenced in African conflicts. Rwanda and Burundi differ in many aspects from these paradigms, because in these ancient kingdoms, the state has traditionally played a strong role²⁵³. The interview data places special emphasis on the relationship between the interviewee and the state, it also analyzes preferences and discrepancies between the different groups. Although there are a growing number of authors that base their findings on the narratives of survivors²⁵⁴ or perpetrators²⁵⁵, reliable comparative data on political and social attitudes of the rural populations in Southern Rwanda and Northern Burundi is still scarce. Furthermore, the comparative perspective between the two countries might illuminate some perceived differences in the nature of the violence and its social effects in Rwanda compared to Burundi.

3.1.5. Thematic Delimitation

Reconciliation, particularly if analyzed in a comparative setting, is an incredibly complex and multi-faceted process. Readers expecting a theoretical recipe for ‘instant reconciliation’ or a functioning policy design for successful peace building in the Great Lakes region will probably be disappointed.

If we take into account the sheer multiplicity of factors influencing reconciliation politics and the highly complex motivations pushing these processes, it is easy to lose sight of the big picture and to become obsessed with details. The thesis will thus limit itself to describing how people in Southern Rwanda and Northern Burundi understand *ubwiyunge* –reconciliation in the context of contemporary events and national politics. It will abstain from exhaustively discussing specific policies and assert no claim to completeness with regard to the different aspects of reconciliation politics.

My participants commonly referred to the topics ethnic identity, memory and commemoration, transitional justice, and especially questions of governance and development as most important for reconciliation. The thesis will thus strongly focus on the intersections of identity politics, governance and assistance as well as how the political management of identity and memory respond to each other. The analysis of transitional justice in Rwanda, arguably one of the most interesting topics in the context of reconciliation politics in the Great Lakes, will however be mostly limited to its public percep-

²⁵¹ Jackson, 2006, 21

²⁵² Jackson, 2003, 296

²⁵³ Cf. Straus, 2006, 206-236;

²⁵⁴ Cf. e.g. Hatzfeld, 2008; Clark & Kaufman (eds.), 2009 – Clark and Kaufman actually publish some accounts by survivors such as Solomon Gasana or Jean-Baptiste Kayibanda;

²⁵⁵ Cf. Hatzfeld 2005; Straus, 2006; Fujii, 2009;

tion in the multiple research sites. Various excellent monographs, anthologies, and reports have covered transitional justice extensively²⁵⁶ and a simple chapter in this thesis would not do the complex topic justice. In Burundi, the institutions to deal with the injustices of the past are mostly still in their planning phase²⁵⁷, reducing most discussions about the effects of transitional justice in Burundi to hypothetical considerations.

Furthermore, the thesis does not function as a comprehensive listing of different strategies undertaken by the Rwandan and Burundian governments or political elites in order to facilitate reconciliation and reconstruction. The focus is clearly set on the context and the effects of policy implementation, not on policy design. The conditions of implementation and the views of the recipients matter more to the thesis than the original intent of the program itself. In particular, the constellations of political power that shape official policies are indispensable for grasping the manner how politics permeate to the grassroots level. Hence, this context will be taken into account and explained where necessary. Nevertheless, the details of Rwanda's and Burundi's political history as a whole will only be treated in a rather general manner as they have already been brilliantly documented by scholars with far greater reputations²⁵⁸.

The thesis is limited to domestic actors. International impact will only be treated marginally in the sense of a factor that exerts influence on national policy-makers. Looking at the continued and repeated failings of the international community in successfully managing conflict transformation²⁵⁹ in the Great Lakes Region, it is my firm belief that an internationally brokered transition to durable peace would prove impossible without national and local actors taking the lead towards peace and reconciliation. As Séverine Autesserre²⁶⁰ rightly concluded with regard to local violence in the DRC, local tensions are one of the prime factors fueling violence in war and post-conflict situations but they have to be addressed from the grassroots first instead of giving precedence to international

²⁵⁶ Cf. e.g. Temple-Raston, 2005; Rettig, 2008; Clark & Kaufman (eds.), 2009; Clark, 2010; HRW, 2011; Gahima, 2013.

²⁵⁷ About popular expectations towards planned institutions of transitional justice, cf. Ingelaere, 2009, 93-110. About delaying the establishment of proposed transitional justice mechanisms as an instrument to circumvent the UN amnesty prohibition: cf. Vandeginste, 2011, 202ff.

²⁵⁸ For a general history of the Great Lakes: cf. Chrétien, 2003. Prunier, 2009; Lemarchand, 2009; Mwakikagile, 2013. For the recent history of violence in the region. Des Forges et al. 2002 on the Rwandan genocide. Eltringham, 2004, on post-genocide debates in Rwanda; Lemarchand, 2006, 1-20 and Vandeginste, 2006, 173-208 on power-sharing and consociationalism in the Great Lakes Region; Clark, 2009, 297-320 and Gahima, 2013 on the *Gacaca*-Jurisdiction and transitional justice; Pottier, 2002 and Kinzer, 2008, for two different views of RPF-Politics; Reyntjens, 2005, 15-47 about Burundi's transition to peace and Vandeginste, 2009 about transitional justice in Burundi. Just to name a few authors and topics.

²⁵⁹ Rwanda was the scene of two of the most shocking examples for the inadequacy and the lack of will of the international community to address acute conflicts in Africa during the genocide and afterwards in the refugee crisis that sparked both wars in the DRC (Cf. below and Prunier, 2009). Séverine Autesserre (2010) has furthermore written a brilliant book on local violence in the Congo and the incapability of International peacebuilding to pacify the eastern DRC.

²⁶⁰ Cf. Autesserre, 2010, 231-272.

intervention. The dominant paradigm in international peacebuilding however often “*orients intervention strategies away from local conflict resolution and toward popular, but harmful tactics such as the rapid organization of elections*”²⁶¹.

The will to intervene in the face of genocide and mass violence is often insufficient. Harnessing support for intervention in remote countries that are not prioritized geopolitically often proves very difficult as the mixed results of the *responsibility to protect (R2P)* norm demonstrate²⁶². Particularly long-term deployments are unpopular in the West. Thus, despite growing evidence of a paradigm shift when it comes to humanitarian interventions²⁶³, the international community in its current shape may be a valuable supporting actor with regard to reconstruction and reconciliation, but it is not a protagonist. Domestic solutions are paramount and will be exclusively considered here. The same holds true for international NGOs. Although NGOs like *Search for Common Ground* or *Studio Ijambo* perform groundbreaking reconciliation-oriented work in Rwanda and Burundi, taking the contributions of international organizations into account would not only overextend the frame of the thesis but also blur the focus on the unique dynamic that the interplay between power politics, reconciliation and development has created in Rwanda and Burundi. In Rwanda, the ruling party keeps NGOs on a tight leash. The RPF actively dictates its perceived needs for the country to the international donor community²⁶⁴. For the effects of international peace-building efforts in the Great Lakes region, please refer to the experts on the topic²⁶⁵.

Although the methodology is sound, the thesis exhibits a rather impressionist nature and should by no means be regarded exhaustive with regard to popular positions towards reconciliation politics in Rwanda and Burundi. The thesis does not claim to speak for the majority of Rwandan or Burundian citizens, but it does let single and unheard voices speak for themselves, and nonetheless, interprets general trends where additional sources corroborate the findings. The voices of these interviewees are voices important to recognize, as they talk about problems necessary to address, should reconciliation politics penetrate to the grassroots. With immense political pressure and a fragile security situation often complicating and muzzling free expression, detecting the nuances of perception becomes important to anticipate future fault lines and perils for peaceful coexistence. In many inter-

²⁶¹ Autesserre, 2010 271.

²⁶² Cf. Chalk, 2010.

²⁶³ In recent years, French troops have intervened in Côte d’Ivoire 2011; Mali 2013 and the Central African Republic 2014 in order to stop human rights violations. International humanitarian interventions have taken place e.g. in Darfur, Sudan in 2004 and Libya 2011. Even though some of these interventions may have had ulterior motives or even deepened the crisis in question, it cannot be denied that R2P has rapidly become an important and much-discussed doctrine in international law and politics.

²⁶⁴ Cf. Chapter 4.1.

²⁶⁵ Cf. On the international community and the Rwandan genocide: e.g. Dallaire 2004; Des Forges & HRW 1999; Melvern, 2006; Power 2003. On the UN in Burundi: Stephen Jackson, 2006; Ould Abdallah, 2000; Southall 2006; Wolpe, 2011. On the Crisis in Congo: Autesserre 2010, Prunier 2009.

views, omissions or evasive answers actually felt graver and more threatening than the repeated reassurances of peace and reconciliation provided for optimism. In cultures of pronounced silence, where every side seems to have their own agenda, determining the truth as an outsider is almost impossible. Consequently, the thesis strongly focuses on qualitative research and individual perceptions and not on establishing an objective and definitive narrative about reconciliation in Rwanda and Burundi.

To propose readymade solutions for these two post-conflict scenarios would be arrogant and would grossly underestimate the incredibly complex societal problems emerging from genocide and mass political violence. Rwanda and Burundi face difficulties on a massive scale bordering disintegration. Observing reconstruction after mass violence from the somehow detached perspective of a Western scholar has been a humbling experience. Even with the distance of an external observer, the problems that my participants had to face on a daily basis have to be characterized as brutal, immediate and overwhelmingly complex. I went to East Africa with the naïve idea of compiling a roadmap for reconciliation based on the experiences of my participants. The success of reconciliation however is depending on more than sound policies – culture, realpolitik, history, ideology, propaganda, assistance, popular perceptions – they all play their part and the thesis tries to highlight these cross-connections. Assuming to have grasped the situation in all its complexity as an outsider and presenting a brilliant and easy solution would not only be preposterous and indicative of lacking depth in research, but it would further do grave injustice to the ingenuity of Burundians and Rwandans to solve their own problems.

3.2. Data Collection and Methodology

Out of necessity, this chapter will already delve deep into the actual subject of the thesis. Ingelaere maintains: *“in a society in which daily life itself is politicized, it is difficult for an observer to interpret or gain a balanced understanding of the social milieu. An active interference in the scientific construction of knowledge, the cultivation of an aesthetics of progress, and a culturally specific ethics of communication all lie at the heart of difficulties in understanding life after genocide²⁶⁶.”* The Foucauldian discourse about the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda has been so thoroughly dictated and constructed by the RPF-regime that a discussion of the topic is practically impossible without utilizing terms coined by the official discourse. E.g. we refer to the Rwandan genocide as ‘*genocide against the Tutsi*’, which has become the official wording due to international pressure from the Rwandan government²⁶⁷. This is problematic for scientific research because the RPF has been and still is an active party in Rwandan politics, pursuing its own agenda. Thus, already the methodology has to be thoroughly reviewed in order not to unwittingly perpetuate a victor’s narrative, which, even if it is largely based on facts, always interprets Rwandan history in a self-serving way. This is particularly important with regard to the categorization of interview partners treated in chapter 3.2.5.

Academic literature covering the topics of conflict and identity transformation, genocide studies, the African state and society, as well as the contemporary history of Rwanda and Burundi²⁶⁸ serve as references to place the findings of the field research in context and compare the domestic impact of Rwandan and Burundian politics to external assessments. Being an interdisciplinary study, the thesis draws from different approaches with regard to data collection and methodology. The data collection mixes quantitative and qualitative methods. It functions as a hybrid between techniques utilized in sociological and ethnographic research (semi-structured life-story interviews, participant observation), political science (rankings, quantitative analysis) and historical (press analysis, sources from official agencies, oral history) techniques.

Chapter 3.2 will mainly explain the research design and approach to field work. First, it is important to recognize that there was no uniform experience of conflict in Rwanda or Burundi, the character and the responses to violence vary a great deal. Thus, the first chapter is dedicated to the selection of research locations as well as a short description of research conditions. The second chapter will explain the interview procedure and structure in detail. Following a small chapter about the recruitment and impact of translators, chapter 3.2.4 will delineate the sampling process, and, as mentioned above, chapters 3.2.5 (Rwanda) and 3.2.6. (Burundi) will strongly focus on the intricacies of categori-

²⁶⁶ Ingelaere, 2010c, 42.

²⁶⁷ Cf. Kagire, ‘*Genocide against the Tutsi*’ – *It’s now official*, The East African, 1. February 2014, On: <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/UN-decides-it-is-officially-genocide-against-Tutsi/-/2558/2169334/-/2q2s7cz/-/index.html> (19 March 2014).

²⁶⁸ Cf. chapter 3.1.4.

zation according to ethnic identity and personal history. The last chapter takes a detailed look at the process of verification and data triangulation.

For a look at the Questionnaires and Consent Forms (in English, French and Kinyarwanda) please refer to the Appendix.

3.2.1. Research Environment

Research Locations



Rwanda and Burundi with approximately situated Research Sites.

Source: <https://www.google.com/maps> (24.4.2014)

Even though the Rwandan genocide swept the whole country in little more than three months and the Burundian civil war affected all the communities in Burundi I did research in, the episodes of violence were far from uniform and were experienced differently in every community. Thus, in order to enable comparison, establishing variance between the regional dimensions of experiencing conflict was one of the main research objectives in order to identify overarching trends to deal with the past. A total of 95 interviews have mainly been conducted in five rural communities with differing histories of inter-communal violence: „Gatsata“ (Gisagara District) and „Gatumba“ (Huye District) in the Southern Province of Rwanda as well as right across the border in „Kamenge“ (Ngozi province), „Rohero“ (Ngozi province) and „Gakombe“ (Kirundo Province) in Northern Burundi. I opted for research

locations in close proximity of each other for reasons of comparability. All the rural research sites are situated in the same region. Variance in the experience of violence, a possible familiarity with the neighboring country's experience²⁶⁹, geographic accessibility, and a common history of violence featuring differing experiences²⁷⁰ were decisive for the selection of research sites. The interviews were conducted between May and December 2011.

Because of the personal and highly political nature of the interviews, the names of all communities have been changed to ensure the security of participants. In each rural community, between 14 and 20 interviews were conducted²⁷¹. A total number of eight interviews have also been conducted with participants in Kigali in order to highlight the diversity of perceptions between center and countryside, urban and rural dwellers. In Burundi, two additional interview partners came from Ngozi and Bujumbura. To account for maximum variance, I chose four different starting points for recruiting participants. In Kigali, Bujumbura and Ngozi, I chose my own personal network of acquaintances, mainly from the educated elite. In "*Gatumba*", Huye, Rwanda, I contacted a CSOG focused on reconciliation work. In "*Gatsata*", Gisagara, Rwanda and "*Gakombe*", Kirundo, Burundi, I interviewed the neighbors and acquaintances of a local translator as well as their neighbors and acquaintances. In "*Kamenge*", Ngozi, Burundi and "*Rohero*", Ngozi, Burundi, key informants or local members of a national human rights organization established the first contact to participants. In most research locations²⁷², the recruitment process took on a life of its own after a few days as people informed their neighbors and came by their own accord or pointed us towards other possible candidates. I worked with alternating research assistants²⁷³ in the various communities in order to maximize diversity in this aspect as well. The interview process in each community except "*Gakombe*" took me several weeks during which I returned to the community daily. I often fixed appointments a day before the actual interview. Participants either came to predetermined interview locations themselves or we visited them at their homes and asked if they wanted to talk with us.

In distinction to grassroots research done by Hatzfeld²⁷⁴, Ingelaere²⁷⁵ or Thomson²⁷⁶, I did not focus on 'hills' or 'collines' as such, the typical form of scattered subsistence farm settlements in which most Rwandans and Burundians live. I usually set myself up in the bigger administrative centers,

²⁶⁹ Border regions are often affected by events in neighboring countries - refugee influx etc.

²⁷⁰ Genocide in Southern Rwanda, massacres in Northern Burundi in 1972, 1988 and during the Burundian civil war.

²⁷¹ „Gatumba“ (Huye, Rwanda): 19 Interviews. „Gatsata“ (Gisagara, Rwanda): 20 interviews. Kigali: 8 interviews. „Rohero“ (Ngozi, Burundi): 16 interviews. „Kamenge“ (Ngozi, Burundi): 16 Interviews. „Gakombe“ (Kirundo, Burundi): 14 interviews. Bujumbura & Ngozi-town: 2 interviews.

²⁷² Except „Kamenge“ where I relied on a key informant (Pierre).

²⁷³ Cf. Chapter 2.2.3. « Translation »

²⁷⁴ Cf. Hatzfeld, 2003.

²⁷⁵ Cf. Ingelaere, 2009; 2010a; 2010c.

²⁷⁶ Cf. Thomson 2013.

which could be called 'villages', perhaps best described as 'sector' (*imirenge*) to use the Rwandan administrative language. Most of the participants however resided in the surrounding hills, not in the center itself. Thus, if I speak of rural 'communities' or 'research sites', I refer either to sectors (Rwanda) or to the centers of the communes (Burundi). This distinction is particularly important in the Burundian context because many participants distinguished clearly between the 'center' of the communes where Tutsi-IDPs fled for protection from the army units stationed there and the 'hills', their original places of residence, where most Hutu stayed if they did not flee into exile.

Research in Rwanda

One of the greatest challenges of my field research was obtaining access to participants in Rwanda. In order to receive a research permit, I had to apply at MINEDUC (*the ministry of education*) and hand in a detailed research proposal, two recommendation letters from my alma mater in Canada, as well as an affiliation with a Rwandan institution. Fortunately, Professor Rutayisire from the Center of Conflict Management at the National University of Rwanda was kind enough to receive me and fill out the necessary forms. After a detailed interview at MINEDUC and a waiting period of two months during which I was lucky to find work with CLADHO, *the Collectif des Ligues et Associations de Defense des Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda*, I finally received my research permit. It proved to be indispensable for research in rural Rwanda. The permit facilitated negotiating with local authorities immensely and made sure I was free to choose the participants myself. Without a research permit, local officials would have prevented me from speaking to peasants. Even after producing a valid permit, some local administrators remained hesitant to grant access. Deriving from these administrative difficulties and the official eagerness to control the discourse about the genocide, I actually became interested in the discrepancies between official and informal interpretations of reconciliation. A great part of my thesis now is dedicated to the official understanding of unity and reconciliation in Rwanda and how it relates to the grassroots²⁷⁷. In the following paragraphs, I will shortly describe the research sites and their local history as far as I have compiled them from the participants' stories in Southern Rwanda.

"Gatumba"

"Gatumba" is situated about five kilometers from Butare-town, nestled between rolling hills, it is a fairly typical Rwandan settlement with a small center and a market. There are a remarkable number of newly roofed houses in *"Gatumba"*, which have been built with the assistance of the *'Anti-Nyakazi'*-program of the Rwandan government and a private organization called Abasoro cooperative in Butare. Two of the genocide survivors I interviewed, Annunciata and Boniphilde, lived in such houses. I was told by survivors that after the genocide, the new government resettled genocide sur-

²⁷⁷ Cf. chapters 4.1. and 4.2.

vivors in close proximity of each other in the center while most Hutu stayed on their hills²⁷⁸. My personal experience confirms this as most survivors and refugees lived rather close to each other near the center whereas the homes of ex-convicts and bystanders often took longer to reach.

While piecing together the different narratives, I remarked that many older participants still remembered the Hutu revolution of 1959²⁷⁹. Most participants however made a strong distinction between 1959 and 1994. Regarding 1959, they only talked about sporadic killings of “VIPs²⁸⁰”, Tutsi, particularly rich families, fled and some Hutus robbed cows and land but everybody agreed that apart from discrimination in education, coexistence became peaceful again shortly after 1959 and up to the genocide. In “*Gatumba*” as in Southern Rwanda in general, Hutu and Tutsi had lived side by side and intermarriage was common. Even though they could see that ethnic relations were becoming problematic from following the news and through the Gatabazi-Bucyana incident²⁸¹, many participants described the genocide as something that broke out almost immediately and without any warning. It appears that the burgomaster of “*Gatumba*” initially resisted the violence when they saw smoke from houses burning in Gikongoro. He imprisoned a man who was trying to burn a house. An influential woman (she drove a car) however sprung the arsonist free and started inciting the local Hutu. Between the 18th and 25th of April 1994, gendarmes from Tumba and soldiers from Butare town arrived and started killing people. It must have been an indescribable carnage. Every survivor I spoke to lost most of his/her family and survived through sheer luck or by fleeing to Burundi or neighboring communes²⁸². The Hutu were then recruited by the *conseiller* to help hunting the remaining Tutsi down. When the RPF invaded Huye, most Hutu from “*Gatumba*” fled to Kibeho camp²⁸³ or to Gikongoro²⁸⁴. Thus, some of my participants witnessed the massacre against Hutu IDPs enclosed on Kibeho Mountain. Apart from that and the killing of Yohani’s son, stories of RPF-killings in “*Gatumba*” were scarce. Most of the ex-convicts however spoke of wanton arrests and very long jail stints after returning home despite claiming innocence. Rumors about corruption, harassment and revenge killings with impunity are rife.

²⁷⁸ Cf. interview with Luce, 42, survivor, “*Gatumba*”, Huye.

²⁷⁹ Cf. interviews with Anasthase, 71, returnee; Costasie, 65, survivor; Teresa, 72, survivor; Rugango, 81, ex-convict.

²⁸⁰ Interview with Costasie, 65, survivor, « *Gatumba* », Huye.

²⁸¹ Félicien Gatabazi, the chairman of the PSD, which was popular in Butare, was assassinated in February 1994. His supporters suspected the CDR behind the plot and lynched the CDR-chairman Martin Bucyana. Cf. interview with François, 52, bystander, “*Gatumba*”, Huye; Interview with Françoise, 53, bystander, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara; Des Forges & HRW 2002, 509f.

²⁸² Rugango, 81, ex-convict, however maintains that the burgomaster took the Tutsi to Karama and that they were killed there. He states that there were not much killings in “*Gatumba*”. Paul, 44, another ex-convict, said that he immediately moved to Butare when he saw houses burning but that he did not witness any killings.

²⁸³ François, Rugango, Paul, Yohani N., Boniphilde.

²⁸⁴ Teresa, Thasienne.

Lacking contacts in “*Gatumba*”, we gained access to most participants²⁸⁵ through a Butare-based CSOG called AMI (*Agence modeste et innocente*) that I got to know through a friend. AMI holds courses about reconciliation and tries to get victims and perpetrators to talk and work together, promoting reconciliation on the local level through collaboration and so-called ‘teachings’. The organization is nominally private and church-sponsored but when observed closely, appears to follow the guidelines of the NURC, which supports such associations by offering “*teaching and mobilization tool kits*²⁸⁶”, funding as well as speakers for various sensitization programs²⁸⁷. A participant said about AMI: “*it used to get funds from the government and it also follows some government programs*²⁸⁸”. Because of these proceedings, the numbers of genocide survivors interviewed was disproportionately high. In „*Gatumba*“, once I had produced my permit and it was established that I was working with a recognized association, the interviews progressed smoothly. Nevertheless, I could not shake the feeling that many participants, particularly the ex-convicts (Maurice, Rugango, Paul, Yohani, Yohani N.) followed an ‘invisible script’ or “*rehearsed consensus*²⁸⁹”, and became evasive when politically inconvenient questions were asked. After completing the interviews in “*Gatumba*”, I decided that I needed to get closer to the participants in Gisagara district.

“*Gatsata*”

“*Gatsata*” is a community in Gisagara district next to the Burundian border. It is situated in a remote valley and only accessible from Butare by a dirt road, which is impassable when the rainfall is heavy. The experience of the genocide in “*Gatsata*” was similar to “*Gatumba*” insofar as the onset was late and the local authorities (burgomaster, conseiller) tried calming down the population at first. Tutsi from other communities fled to “*Gatsata*” because their houses were burnt down and in “*Gatsata*”, they were lodged in the church. According to my respondents, it was not clear at first who was targeted because especially wealthy people were robbed²⁹⁰. The message from the authorities however soon started to change. First there were rumors that the refugees in the church were attacking the local population, so villagers of both ethnicities started attacking the refugees holed up in the church. Soon it became evident that only Tutsi were targeted and Tutsi from the community started fleeing. The bulk of the killing however took place when people from abroad, particularly police officers from Kibirizi as well as soldiers and militiamen from other communes arrived²⁹¹. They killed all the Tutsi in

²⁸⁵ Annuciata, Boniphilde, Christine, Costasie, François, Jeanne d’Arc, Luce, Marcel, Maurice, Paul, Thasienne, Teresa, Yohani, Yohani N..

²⁸⁶ NURC, 2002, 11.

²⁸⁷ Sensitization programs namely include the “*Itorero ry’Igihugu*” and “*Ingando*” programs as well as Seminars and National Summits. Cf. NURC, 15 Years of Unity and Reconciliation, 2009, 10-16.

²⁸⁸ Interview with Luce, 42, survivor, „*Gatumba*”, Huye.

²⁸⁹ Ingelaere, 2010, 53.

²⁹⁰ Cf. Interview with Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, “*Gatsata*”.

²⁹¹ Cf. Interview with Peter, 46, bystander, “*Gatsata*” and Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, “*Gatsata*”.

the church using grenades, guns and machetes. Some villagers joined them. As in “*Gatumba*”, looting and eating cattle seems to have been very popular among the perpetrators. After the church-killings, there was apparently a formal meeting of the burgomaster with military officers where the order was given to kill all remaining Tutsi, which was swiftly obeyed²⁹². Two respondents told me that a dozen militiamen just rounded up hundreds of Tutsi, telling them they would escort them over the border to Burundi, but instead killed them next to a lake²⁹³ and threw their bodies in²⁹⁴.

When the RPF started getting closer, most Hutu in “*Gatsata*” fled to Burundi, with a better-off minority fleeing to Zaïre. In difference to “*Gatumba*” however, RPF-soldiers in Gisagara seem to have gone on a killing spree and murdered the Hutu males they found indiscriminately²⁹⁵. After the Burundian Army²⁹⁶ destroyed the camps in Burundi in 1996 and forcefully repatriated the Hutu refugees, many male Hutu were jailed immediately upon return²⁹⁷ and without formal charges. Others such as Yusuf were imprisoned later, incriminated by the people already jailed. In recent times, forced agricultural reform seems to be one of the main problems in “*Gatsata*”.

Because of my experiences in “*Gatumba*”²⁹⁸, I tried a slightly different approach in „*Gatsata*”. Here, I worked with a translator originating from the area who pointed out people with different backgrounds to ensure diversity. This endeavor however almost failed. It was in “*Gatsata*” where I had to recognize that I was dependent on my research permit. The executive secretary of „*Gatsata*” was very hesitant about granting me access to the village. He wanted to propose interview partners to me, the leading heads of the community who had internalized reconciliation reconciled exceptionally well, as he portrayed them. He became increasingly nervous when I told him that I needed to select my participants myself, but calmed down immediately when I produced the official letter from MINEDUC. This personal episode exemplifies where power is situated in the 'new' Rwanda. Despite a highly publicized decentralization-policy, officials are clearly held accountable by their superiors in Kigali and not by their constituents²⁹⁹. Thanks to the familiarity of my local translator with the interviewees, many respondents in Gisagara district proved to be much more accessible and their answers often had much more of an individually distinct quality compared to respondents in Huye district.

²⁹² Cf. Interview with Innocent, 55, ex-convict, “*Gatsata*”.

²⁹³ Cf. Interviews with Robert, 25, bystander, “*Gatsata*”; Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, “*Gatsata*”.

²⁹⁴ Cf. Interview with Vincent, 43, bystander, “*Gatsata*”.

²⁹⁵ Cf. Interviews with Robert, 25, bystander, “*Gatsata*”; Françoise 53, bystander, Gisagara; Marita, 47, bystander, “*Gatsata*”. Kibonge, 43, bystander, also lost relatives to killings in Ndora camp in Gisagara.

²⁹⁶ Robert and Innocent even claim, RPF-soldiers in Burundian uniforms destroyed the camps. Marita maintains that at least the trucks were supplied by the Rwandan government.

²⁹⁷ Cf. interviews with John, 56, ex-convict, “*Gatsata*”; Françoise, 53, bystander, “*Gatsata*”; Marita, 47, bystander, “*Gatsata*”; Dusabe, 50, bystander, “*Gatsata*”; Innocent, 55, ex-convict, “*Gatsata*”.

²⁹⁸ The above average number of interviewed genocide survivors and the often generic answers – cf. Chapter 2.2.4.

²⁹⁹ Cf. Ingelaere, 2011, 67-79.

Burundi

In Burundi, pursuing an approach to field research focusing on grassroots-perception was much easier. Local authorities never demanded to see governmental permits even though I received a letter from the minister of external relations and international cooperation that openly encouraged my research and proposed cooperation with the yet-to-be-established national truth and reconciliation commission as well as the special court that would succeed it³⁰⁰. Research in Burundi however was very challenging with regard to the unstable security situation³⁰¹ and the almost negligible amount of secondary literature compared to Rwanda. The collaboration I established with the Burundian human rights organization “*Ligue Iteka*” proved invaluable with regard to getting around and establishing contacts with communities in “*Rohero*” and “*Kamenge*”. In “*Gakombe*”, I employed a research assistant originating from the community facilitating the contacts to participants.

“Rohero”

„*Rohero*“ is a village in Southern Ngozi province that has grown quickly along a dirt road leading to Gitega. Of all the sites I visited, it experienced the most severe outbreak of violence in 1993 and the army moved in swiftly. The army gathered the Tutsi in the commune center in order to protect them from gangs of Hutu that roamed the countryside and killed every Tutsi in sight. During 'la crise', „*Rohero*“ turned into an IDP-camp as Tutsi and Uprones from the region flocked to the center in need of shelter. Most participants witnessed violence in one way or another. Even after the civil war ended, the IDPs did not dare to return to their hills because they still fear their neighbors³⁰². Some do not even return to tend to their fields. Thus, the camp slowly became a village. Old bags from the World Food Program used as covering material for ceilings and the linear arrangement along the main road still bear witness to the settlement's former purpose. Many Tutsi-participants in *Rohero* do not trust the government. Even though most of them knew about the killings of Hutu in 1972, they only consider the events of 1993 genocide (against the Tutsi) and often refer to a Hutu conspiracy that had to be quelled in 1972³⁰³. The Hutu I met in „*Rohero*“ were mostly UPRONA-voters who fled as well. All

³⁰⁰ As of this writing, almost three years later, the national commission of truth and reconciliation has finally been established but the members have been handpicked by the ruling party and the decision was boycotted by UPRONA and FRODEBU. If the special chamber of the court will be established remains uncertain at the moment. Cf. Chapter 5.3.; Nduwimana, *Burundi creates reconciliation body that divides public opinion*, 18. April 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/18/us-burundi-politics-idUSBREA3H0E020140418> (July 23, 2014); Amnesty International, *Burundi: Annual Report 2013*, on: <http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-burundi-2013> (March 6, 2014);

³⁰¹ All my Burundian associates strongly advised me to stay at home after dark. During one of my first nights in Ngozi, “*bandits*” in a neighboring community I planned to do research in murdered two European NGO-employees.

³⁰² Cf. E.g. Interview with Léocadie, 50, Tutsi IDP, “*Rohero*”, Ngozi.

³⁰³ Cf. Interviews with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident; Juvénal, 59, Tutsi resident; Marie, 52, Tutsi IDP; “*Rohero*”, Ngozi.

of them shared the views of their Tutsi neighbors despite the fact that they leaned towards more moderate positions in their evaluation of the current government³⁰⁴.

Participants in „Rohero“ in general had the most negative attitude about the current state of affairs. Opinions such as *“everything was better before”*³⁰⁵ or that Tutsis are discriminated against or even killed today³⁰⁶ were prevalent in „Rohero“.

“Kamenge”

As far as civil war dynamics go, “Kamenge” is almost exemplary for the Burundian countryside. Situated between Ngozi and the border to the neighboring province of Karuzi, “Kamenge” witnessed deportations and killings of Hutu in 1972, interethnic strife and continuing segregation of Hutu (hills) and Tutsi (center), as well as the occupation of the center by army units in 1993. However, with the local FRODEBU authorities keeping extremist Hutus calm in 1993, “Kamenge” was spared large-scale massacres in 1993. The bulk of the violence in “Kamenge” occurred in one week in 1994, when a gang of Hutus murdered the entire Tutsi-population of a neighboring hill. This provoked a string of revenge killings by the soldiers stationed in “Kamenge”-center assisted by some local Tutsi³⁰⁷. I actually interviewed both a Tutsi IDP whose family was murdered in said night and the Hutu he blames for killing them. Although the situation seems to have improved from 1996³⁰⁸ on, Etienne, the Tutsi whose family got killed still lives in the center among the larger part of the displaced Tutsi who still fear returning to their hills. The continued presence of a large group of Tutsi in the center however causes much discomfort to Hutus from the surrounding hills that think that the Tutsi are against reconciliation³⁰⁹, and that they should return to their hills. The military also seems to have armed the Tutsi IDPs in the center³¹⁰, which is congruent with stories about marauding “*Sans Eché*”-Tutsi militiamen in “*Gakombe*”³¹¹ and in Ngozi-city³¹². Many participants described what happened between 1993 and 2005 as mutual “*revenge*”³¹³-killings between Hutu and Tutsi. Defining which episode of killings amounts to genocide or which side is to blame varies from participant to participant.

³⁰⁴ Cf. Interviews with Ferdinand, 56, Hutu refugee; Générose, 43, Hutu resident; Janvière, 38, Hutu resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi.

³⁰⁵ Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, „Rohero”, Ngozi.

³⁰⁶ Cf. Interviews with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident; Irankunda, 30, Tutsi IDP; Marie, 52, Tutsi resident; Léocadie, 50, Tutsi IDP, “Rohero”, Ngozi.

³⁰⁷ Cf. interview with Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP; Pierre, 53 Hutu resident and Sadi, 45, Hutu resident, “Kamenge” Ngozi.

³⁰⁸ Cf. Interview with Violetta, 30, Hutu resident, „Kamenge”, Ngozi.

³⁰⁹ Cf. Interviews with Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee; Venantie, 35, Hutu resident; Venantie K., 25, Hutu resident, « Kamenge ».

³¹⁰ Cf. Interview with Gertrude, 46, Hutu refugee, “Kamenge”, Ngozi.

³¹¹ Cf. Interviews with Juvénal H, 53, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo; Dominique, 37, Hutu refugee, “Gakombe”, Kirundo; Viola, 37, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo.

³¹² Cf. Interview with Candide, 50, Hutu resident, Ngozi.

³¹³ Cf. Interviews with Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP; Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, „Kamenge”, Ngozi; Marie-Goreth, 33, Hutu resident, “Kamenge”, Ngozi.

“Kamenge” was the only research location where I exclusively relied on a key informant. “Pierre” is a school headmaster, former FRODEBU cadre and member of the Ligue Iteka. He knew the life stories of many participants and selected them according to our need for diversity, which helped greatly. In 1993, “Pierre” had helped to prevent the violence from escalating in “Kamenge”, making use of his function as a local administrator. Hence, people from many different groups trusted him.

“Gakombe”

“Gakombe” in Kirundo province borders the Gisagara district in Rwanda. While many inhabitants remember that “rich people³¹⁴” or “*abamenja*³¹⁵” got deported and never returned in 1972, the community faced its main crisis in the middle of the events of ‘Ntega-Marangara’ in August 1988 that claimed the lives of about 15’000³¹⁶ to 25’000³¹⁷ people. The events that started the violence in 1988 are still heavily disputed, even among citizens of the commune. Most likely, the driving factors polarizing the population along ethnic lines seem to have been a mixture between the general sociopolitical climate of unrest after Buyoya’s coup in 1987, provocation by local Tutsi, cross-border PALIPEHUTU-instigation thriving on Hutu fears of a repetition of 1972³¹⁸ and desires for revenge with regard to 1972³¹⁹. According to several sources, a Hutu uprising seemed to have started when a reknowned Tutsi notable opened fire on a group of Hutu. According to different sources this either happened at a wedding³²⁰ or because his house was under siege by a gang of Hutu³²¹). The shots prompted the Hutus to attack and kill him and his family, the violence rapidly spreading to Tutsi in general. The army intervened shortly thereafter, slaughtering Hutu indiscriminately³²² and provoking ten thousands of Hutus to flee to neighboring Rwanda. Other sources speak of a Hutu conspiracy to overthrow the government, which attacked Tutsi officials and families unprovoked and had to be sup-

³¹⁴ Interview with Marie C., 55, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo.

³¹⁵ The word “*Abamenja*” was used by several participants. In general, people getting deported from “Gakombe” in 1972 were described as merchants, teachers and members of the elite who were suspected to ‘steal money from the state’ or ‘having taken money to kill people’. Regarding ‘*intellectuals*’, there were little sympathies in Burundi, even among members of the same ethnic group. Pascal M. and Juvénal H. from “Gakombe” and Juvénal from “Rohero” considered 1972 to be a “*triage*”. Cf. e.g. Interviews with Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident; Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident and Pascal, 54, Hutu resident; „Gakombe”, Kirundo.

³¹⁶ Cf. Lemarchand, 1995, 126.

³¹⁷ Cf. Genocide Watch: Country Profile on Burundi, February 2012 on: www.genocidewatch.org/images/Burundi_12_02_xx_Country_Profile.doc (17.05.2014). Burundian ex-president Sylvestre Ntibantunganya (Ntibantunganya & Ndadaye, 1999, 195) speaks *about* “entre 5’000 et 25’000 personnes tués.” 5’000 being the official number published by the Burundian government right after the massacres took place.

³¹⁸ Cf. Lemarchand, 1995, 118-130; Watt, 2008, 41;

³¹⁹ Cf. Interviews with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident; Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident; Frédéric, 59, Hutu resident; Odette, 25, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo.

³²⁰ Cf. Interview with Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo.

³²¹ Cf. Lemarchand, 1995, 125; Ingelaere, 2009, 31.

³²² Cf. Lemarchand, , 1995, 118-130;

pressed³²³. Frédéric, an old man who survived four crises ('72, the Tanzanian-Ugandan war of '79, '88, and '93) invoked strong parallels between the dynamics of a Hutu uprising and relentless army reaction in 1972 and 1988. Almost all of my participants in Kirundo lost family members in 1988.

In the crisis following 1993, "*Gakombe*" remained mostly calm and I only heard of sporadic acts of violence particularly in neighboring communes³²⁴. A local FRODEBU-administrator apparently seems to have tried to calm the situation down³²⁵. The general atmosphere of fear however prompted almost all Hutu³²⁶ to flee to Rwanda temporarily and many Tutsi³²⁷ to move into the center where the army and the Tutsi youth militia '*Sans Echech*' demonstrated a strong presence. The commune only came close to a renewed outbreak of violence when some Hutu extremists, apparently including Rwandan *Interahamwe*, killed a Tutsi counselor in 1994³²⁸. The authorities however were able to calm the situation. Participants' views diverge with regard to the improvement of interethnic relations: when asked to name a year when they thought the situation became less dangerous and strife calmed down, opinions differed widely³²⁹. Even with regard to the issue of segregation, "*Gakombe*" seems to be polarized. Whereas some claim that there are no more Tutsi IDPs in the center³³⁰, others still regard the community as segregated³³¹ or even claim that the notorious '*Sans Echech*' are still operating in "*Gakombe*"³³². Contrary to "*Kamenge*" or "*Rohero*" however, the Burundian government seems to have made an effort to rebuild burnt down houses after the crisis of 1988³³³.

As in "*Gatsata*" in Rwanda, I worked with a research assistant originating from the community, a Hutu university student called Pascal³³⁴. This simplified access to the community and shortened the time for research significantly. As Pascal knew some of the local teachers, we were invited to set up

³²³ Cf. Rutamucero, 2007, on: http://www.tutsi.org/rutamucero_livre3_ntega.pdf (14.05.2014)

³²⁴ Cf. Interview with Marie-Chantal, 29, Hutu-resident, "*Gakombe*", Kirundo. Marie-Chantal claims that her Tutsi-neighbors killed her mother (also a Tutsi) for marrying her father) but as far as I understood, this seems to have happened in the commune of Kirundo, not in "*Gakombe*". Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, says he was saved by soldiers who killed the Hutus who were attacking the school he was hiding in but it happened in a neighboring commune as well.

³²⁵ Cf. Interview with Dominique, 37, Hutu resident, «*Gakombe*», Kirundo.

³²⁶ E.g. Dominique; Frédéric; Juvénal H.; Marguerite; Marie C.; Odette; Pascal; Pascal M.; Thérèse.

³²⁷ E.g. Arsène (already moved to the center before); Marie-Chantal; Marie M.

³²⁸ Cf. Interview with Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident, "*Gakombe*", Kirundo.

³²⁹ Marie M., 80, Hutu resident and Pascal M., 29, Hutu resident maintain that the conflict calmed down after 1996-1997. Marie-Chantal, 29, Hutu-resident said relations improved in 2001 and Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident claimed that things changed when Nkurunziza was elected in 2005. For many other participants such as Arsène, Marie-Chantal or Juvénal H. the situation today however isn't decidedly better than in 1993 as the elite still behaves in a similar way.

³³⁰ Cf. Interview with Dominique, 37, Hutu refugee, „*Gakombe*“, Kirundo.

³³¹ Cf. Interview with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "*Gakombe*", Kirundo.

³³² Cf. Interview with Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "*Gakombe*", Kirundo.

³³³ Arsène, a Tutsi resident as well as Frédéric, a Hutu resident claimed that the commune had rebuilt their houses. Pascal, a Hutu resident in "*Gakombe*" at least received bricks to rebuild his house.

³³⁴ I also did the first three interviews (Arsène, Frédéric, Viola) with Vanessa, a Tutsi translator from Bujumbura with whom I also worked in "*Rohero*" and "*Kamenge*".

shop in a classroom of the local school. All the interviews could subsequently be conducted within a week because of the great assistance of the local school and the teachers who helped in recruiting participants from the community that fit the specific categories we were looking to interview in order to diversify the sample.

3.2.2. Interview Procedure and Structure

Bypassing Political Correctness

The post-conflict environments of Rwanda and Burundi are, as Thomson mentions, “*highly politicized*”³³⁵. The violent history, the hazardous security situation in Burundi and the strong pressure of the Rwandan regime to embrace its new brand of Rwandan nationalism have resulted in a profound distrust towards strangers. Careless talk, particularly about politics, can be dangerous. In such environments, direct questions can easily trigger politically correct answers. The participant repeats what he considers the officially sanctioned position in order not to put himself in jeopardy. When asking questions about current politics, this happened frequently in Rwanda, if the participant did know neither the research assistant nor me³³⁶. As a rule of thumb, the less represented or protected by the regime the participants felt, the more likely they were to answer in a politically correct way. Returnees and survivors were much more likely to speak their minds than bystanders or ex-convicts³³⁷.

In Burundi, the group answering politically correct rather were government supporters confident in having won the elections whereas the group feeling most excluded, Tutsi in “*Rohero*”, made sure to express their anger against the current government even in non-political questions.

In order to bypass politically correct answers, I chose to base my research design on a mixed method between individual life history-interviews including some specific questions and quantitative subjective rankings. By asking the respondent about his personal life-story, he was able to address how he witnessed violence, transition and possibly reconciliation in a natural way without being obliged to leave his comfort zone. As a researcher vice-versa, I was presented with the opportunity to tie specific political questions to the interviewee’s personal experiences in the third part of the interview. Following a semi-structured questionnaire³³⁸ that grew during my field research, my familiarity with the topic allowed me to approach the interview structure rather freely and allowed the interviewee to steer the interview process if he wished so.

³³⁵ Thomson, 2010, 19.

³³⁶ Cf. chapter 4.1.4.

³³⁷ Please refer to chapter 3.2.5. “Participant Categories in Rwanda” for a detailed explanation of the groups.

³³⁸ Cf. Appendix.

The interviews were administered orally, usually with the help of a Rwandan or Burundian research assistant³³⁹ and utilized basic audio recording equipment (Olympus VN-2100PC). An interview took about 45 to 120 minutes, always depending on the enthusiasm of the respondent. Structurally, the interviews were divided into an introductory part that explained our work, two qualitative parts focusing on the participant's life-story and his or her general perception, opinion and understanding of reconciliation politics, and a quantitative part consisting of scaled questions evaluating the participant's changing living conditions and views.

Introductory Part

Talking about very sensitive and at times personal topics, the security and comfort of the interviewees was paramount to the interview process. To most of my respondents outside Kigali, I was a stranger, even though my assistants and I always tried to make the purpose of the interview and the secrecy of the data very clear, and we usually spent several weeks in a community so that people came to know us. I briefed my research assistants very carefully about explaining the consent form³⁴⁰ and to assure that no pressure of any kind was exerted on the participant. We needed to make sure the respondent understood the consent form very clearly, which is why I carried along prints in four different languages (English, French, Kinyarwanda, Kirundi) and always had the consent form orally explained to illiterate participants. It had to be unmistakably clear that the participant took part in the interview freely and voluntarily, that he was informed about the different levels of anonymity he could choose from and that he understood that he could stop the interview any time or leave out questions he did not feel comfortable answering. Particularly with regard to the term definitions and some scaled questions, many peasants made use of this provision.

³³⁹ Except if participants spoke English or French which happened frequently with participants that enjoyed a higher education.

³⁴⁰ Cf. Appendix.

In order to preclude any negative consequences for participants related to being identified and also to minimize the pressure to answer questions in a politically correct way, I only asked participants for their first names and made sure to carefully and openly explain the options for them regarding the disclosure of their identity. Regarding anonymity, participants could choose between four different options: *'Open Public Access'* meant that respondents agreed to be cited by their first names and that their interview data (audio and transcript) would be available for further research in the IRIBA center for Multimedia Heritage in Kigali³⁴¹ and the Concordia Centre for Oral History and Digital Storytelling³⁴² in Montreal. If a participant selected *'Partial Public Access'*, he provided a false name³⁴³ and furthermore, chose if he wanted the audio material plus the transcript stored in the two centers or just the transcript while I would destroy the audio material after transcription (*'No audio storage'*). *'Complete Anonymity'* translated into giving a false name and no data being made available to the two centers. I also pledged to destroy the data after finishing the dissertation. To make sure participants understood, I also used different symbols on the consent form in order to demonstrate the different options to illiterate participants. In the thesis, I chose not to use quotation marks for fake names. The only true names belong to participants who chose *'open public access'*. A table of participants and the anonymity-options they chose is listed at the end of chapter 3.2.4.



Symbols on the Consent Form (Partial without Audio Storage)

In order to ensure confidentiality and an atmosphere of security, the interviews took part in quiet and private places, often of the participant's own choosing. In most cases, we visited participants in the privacy of their homes (*"Gatumba"* and *"Gatsata"*), were able to use the house of a neighbor (*"Rohero"*, Burundi), a church building (*"Kamenge"*), or a school building (*"Gakombe"* and three interviews in *"Gatsata"*). If there was no such opportunity, we stayed in remote places outside or sat in my car. Even though I made sure to have all the necessary official permits and produced them when asked, government buildings were consistently avoided for interviews because my recognition as an independent researcher could have been tarnished in the eyes of the respondents.

Classification

Following the introductory part, the interviewees classified themselves with regard to seven different criteria: Age, gender, education, profession, residence, personal history during the conflict and ethnicity (in Burundi). In practice however, profession and education often coincided in the cases of most peasants and informal workers. No participant that enjoyed a higher education than secondary

³⁴¹ <http://www.iribacenter.org/> (29. April 2014)

³⁴² Cf. Website: <http://storytelling.concordia.ca> (29. April 2014)

³⁴³ For the purpose of this dissertation, I will not use any quotation marks for the names of participants regardless of their anonymity. There is a chart in chapter 3.2.4., which lists the choices and categories of all participants.

school worked as a farmer. Practically all respondents outside Kigali and Bujumbura that enjoyed a higher education worked as teachers, a small minority identified as (ex-) students and NGO-workers. Teachers and older men were the most valuable sources of information when it came to local history and societal observations, whereas most of the younger peasants and particularly peasant women were generally more interested in the tangible local results of politics.

In Rwanda, categorization according to personal history intersects heavily with ethnicity³⁴⁴. The popular and encompassing character of violence made the Hutu-Tutsi divide the main frontline of the diverse conflicts, actually turning Rwanda and Burundi into bi-polar societies. This is where reconciliation has to take root. Thus, I treated ethnicity / personal experience of the conflict as the most important distinction, which also explains the very small amount of Twa and post-war immigrants as well as the absence of Ganwa as interviewees.

The introductory part ended either with the signing of the consent form or a recorded oral declaration of consent.

Life History Interviews

Semi-structured interviews especially focusing on the last two decades of the interviewees' life stories formed the second part of the interviews. They started with short classificatory questions about the participant's age, gender, place of residence, education, job and self-description of his or her role during the genocide or the civil war³⁴⁵. Since ethnic identities have officially been banned from public discourse in Rwanda, I did not ask people explicitly about their ethnicity here.

The life story-questions were open-ended, but usually followed a chronological timeline starting in the participant's childhood and slowly progressing to the present. Typical questions that came up frequently were e.g. *"Can you tell me about your family's relations to your neighbors when you grew up?"*; *"how did the relationship to your neighbors change when Habyarimana got assassinated?"* or *"What are the biggest differences between Burundi now and Burundi during the crisis?"*

The participant set the pace of the interview. In all cases, the conversation about the participant's life touched certain topics about coexistence, past violence or reconciliation, which were then elaborated on in the specific questions forming the third part. The main objective of the second part of the interview was to anchor the perceptions and sociopolitical opinions of the respondent in his personal history. In most cases, the life stories already indicated if participants were content with the post-conflict transition so far and provided valuable information about the local perception of conflict.

Specific Questions about the Understanding of political Terms and personal Views

³⁴⁴ Cf. Chapter 3.2.5.

³⁴⁵ Chapter 3.2.5. and 3.2.6. take a closer look at issues of classification.

The third part of the interview built on the life story-interview and delved deeper into the specific opinions of the participant. The questions were roughly arranged along following themes

- 'Identity', focusing on the participant's self-perception and his experience with the state's management of ethnic identity in the post-conflict period;
- 'Memory', examining attitudes towards official commemoration, its inclusiveness and its value for prevention;
- 'Term questions', evaluating personal understandings of core concepts such as 'peace', 'reconciliation' and 'democracy';
- 'Reconciliation and the state' analyzing the participant's points of contact with reconciliation politics, assistance programs, and his opinions with reference to these programs.
- 'Transitional Justice', focusing on experiences with as well as plans for restorative and retributive justice.
- 'Fears'. Here, participants were asked about their hopes and fears for the future.

The 'term questions' might need some elaboration: in order to understand the priorities of my interviewees, I asked all respondents about their personal understanding of concepts such as peace (*amahoro*), reconciliation (*ubwiyunge*), and democracy (*demokarasi*). The idea behind these questions was to detect nuances in local and personal interpretations of these concepts, to carve out predominant interpretations and to compare them with the goals propagated in official politics.

The interviewees were always asked if they could connect existing policies to reconciliation and peace as they had defined it in the terms before and what they thought the government is doing to achieve these goals. The questions about personal views and the understanding of terms allowed conclusions to be drawn about the degree of popular entrenchment that reconciliation programs and policies enjoy in local populations. Simultaneously, they highlighted the rural respondents' priorities with regard to peace, reconciliation and politics in general.

Scaled Questions

The scaled questions attempted to generate a rudimentary quantitative measurement about how the participants' subjective views of selected topics changed in the last two decades. They were not audio-recorded but took the form of a little survey³⁴⁶ that was filled out by the participants with the help of my Rwandan and Burundian research assistants³⁴⁷.


Even though it is impossible to speak about a large-scale survey in the context of 95 interviews, the subjective rankings reduce the complexity of the qualitative research. While the life-story interviews provided thought-provoking insights about why and how people acted during the conflicts and tran-

³⁴⁶ Cf. Appendix: „Questionnaire Rwanda“ or „Modified Questionnaire Burundi“-

³⁴⁷ Cf. Next chapter.

sitional phases, it was difficult to detect clear trends from interviews in which the emphasis was left to the interviewee. Only by layering the data, was it possible to filter out unusual elements or individual issues and to identify returning themes.

The subjective rankings consist of a set of assessment questions about different topics, which are applied to different years in the participant's life. The participant awards positive and negative points to these dates in his life according to his personal perception. +5 is the highest number that can be awarded to a specific situation at a specific point of time, -5 is the lowest number with 0 signifying indifference. The ranking system is based on Ingelaere's concept of the *"ladder of life"*³⁴⁸. I also borrowed the visual to facilitate and visualize the interviewee's evaluation of the different points in his life from Ingelaere³⁴⁹.



As fixed points in time, I chose 1990³⁵⁰, 1994³⁵¹, 2003³⁵² (new constitution) and 2011³⁵³ for Rwanda and 1988³⁵⁴, 1993³⁵⁵ (election Ndadaye), 1993³⁵⁶ (assassination Ndadaye, begin of civil war), 2005³⁵⁷ (election Nkurunziza) and 2011³⁵⁸ in Burundi. Ideally, the historical start date could be tied to the participant's personal history and we proceeded from there, the participant tying a number to each subsequent date. The following topics were assessed

- Overall relations with people of differing ethnicity;
- Change of personal economic situation;
- Personal approval of transitional justice;
- Perceived political impact;
- Perception of democratic governance;
- Influence of ethnicity on holding a political office;
- Trust in neighbors;
- Trust in the army and the police;

³⁴⁸ Cf. Ingelaere, 2010a, 278

³⁴⁹ Cf. Diagram on this page and Ingelaere, 2009, 35 and Ingelaere 2010a, 278.

³⁵⁰ Starting date of the Rwandan civil war, time "before the genocide"

³⁵¹ Rwandan Genocide

³⁵² Rwanda adapts a new constitution, first term of Paul Kagame.

³⁵³ Time of Research.

³⁵⁴ Ntega-Marangara Crisis in Northern Burundi, „Before the civil war“

³⁵⁵ Election of the first Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye

³⁵⁶ Assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, start of the civil war.

³⁵⁷ Pierre Nkurunziza gets elected, official end of civil war.


³⁵⁸ Time of Research.

- Trust in the government;
- Respect for Human Rights.

The results were compiled, analyzed and visualized in statistical diagrams that display the changing perceptions over the course of time.

Economic Situation Rwanda

	1990	1994	2003	2011
Bystanders	2.6	-0.9	0.9	2
Ex-Convicts	-1.6	-2.6	-3.6	0.7
Returnees	0.2	-1.2	2.4	2.4
Survivors	2.4	-3.6	1.8	1.1
Rwanda Average	1.6	-2.0	0.7	1.5



Example: Change of Economic Situation in Rwanda

3.2.3. Translation

In most interviews, a translator/ research assistant had to be employed in order to translate the interviews from Kinyarwanda or Kirundi into English or French. I conducted the interviews with English- or French speakers myself without assistance. Although my knowledge of Kinyarwanda and Kirundi is very limited, I was able to learn basic words and expressions prior to my field research, allowing me an elementary supervision of the translation. It was however rarely necessary to intervene in such matters as I guided every interview and my translators, after being thoroughly briefed before starting the interview process. The translators memorized the consent form by heart, displayed a high level of understanding with regard to the delicacy of the research. To guarantee for an optimum diversity and to minimize the possibility that translator might affect the participants' answers, I worked with four different translators of differing ethnicity and, if the opportunity arose, counterbalanced them with interviews I conducted alone.

The translators alternated between research sites:

Location	Translator, job	Translator's identity
Kigali – Rwanda	None (8 Interviews conducted by myself)	European
„ <i>Gatumba</i> “ – Huye - Rwanda	“Christophe ³⁵⁹ ” – Student (19 Interviews)	Rwandan student - Mixed – Hutu father, Tutsi mother. From Kigali.
„ <i>Gatsata</i> “ – Gisagara - Rwanda	“Gilbert ³⁶⁰ ” – Student (20 Interviews)	Rwandan student – Hutu originally from “ <i>Gatsata</i> ”
Ngozi & Bujumbura, Burundi	None (2 Interviews conducted by myself)	European
„ <i>Kamenge</i> “ – Ngozi - Burundi	Vanessa – Translator (16 interviews)	Burundian professional translator – Tutsi from Bujumbura.
„ <i>Rohero</i> “ – Ngozi - Burundi	Vanessa – Translator (16 interviews)	Burundian professional translator – Tutsi from Bujumbura.
„ <i>Gakombe</i> “ – Kirundo - Burundi	Vanessa (3 interviews) & Pascal (11 interviews), Student	Burundian student – Hutu from “Gakombe”.

Apart from Vanessa, the research assistants were university students, not trained translators, which were very hard to come by on a student's budget. Nevertheless, all my research assistants performed their jobs with outstanding professionalism and apart from some minor mistakes, gave little reason to criticize.

My first field assistant was “*Christophe*”, a student of mixed ethnic origin³⁶¹ that I came to know during my traineeship at CLADHO. We conducted interviews in Huye district together. As we were both unfamiliar with the inhabitants of “*Gatumba*”, we facilitated contact to participants with the help of AMI, a local CSOG that proved highly successful with recruitment. I however strongly suspected that our lack of familiarity elicited many generic, politically correct answers from participants. Some answers appeared as if they were recited directly from *Ingando*-lessons or official texts from the NURC. The number of participants who refused to answer certain questions was the highest in “*Gatumba*”. In particular, 5 out of 19 participants refused the scaled question, “*Do you think your country is a democracy?*”

³⁵⁹ Name changed upon wish of translator

³⁶⁰ Name changed upon wish of translator

³⁶¹ „*Christophe*“ was born to a Hutu father and a Tutsi mother. He once told me that during conversations with Hutu, they would address him as one of their own but the same would happen when he chatted with Tutsi.

In order to change these dynamics, I chose a local translator for the interviews in “*Gatsata*”. Although “*Gilbert*” was a student as well, he was from a well-known Hutu-family in *Gatsata*. The respondents in “*Gatsata*” knew him and his family and were much more willing to share their personal opinions with us than in “*Gatumba*”. This resulted in slightly different, rather critical evaluations of the post conflict situation in the qualitative parts, but did not translate to the subjective rankings.

To keep the research in both countries comparable, I repeated the same selection of translators in Burundi. Vanessa hails from a middle-class Tutsi family in Bujumbura. She was not familiar with the research sites “*Rohero*” and “*Kamenge*” and told me that she was visiting the north for the first time in her life. She handled the interviews very professionally. We relied on Human Rights activists from *Ligue Iteka* to facilitate contact to the participants in the two communities mentioned above. In “*Rohero*”, the recruiting process soon took on a life of its own after the activist from *Ligue Iteka* had introduced us to the community. Respondents came to the house where we did interviews by themselves, asking to be interviewed. In “*Kamenge*”, as mentioned above, we relied on the key-informant ‘Pierre’, who was well known in the community.

My second Burundian research assistant was a Hutu bachelor student I met through a colleague at the University of Burundi. I selected Pascal specifically because he was from “*Gakombe*”, the community where I planned to conduct research. Still, in Burundi, my subjective feeling that the familiarity of the translator with the participants influenced the interviews was less pronounced than in Rwanda.


The answers in “*Kamenge*” and “*Rohero*” differed much more than between “*Kamenge*” and “*Gakombe*”, and the participants seemed to be generally more outspoken in Burundi. In the ex-IDP-camp of “*Rohero*”, some participants might have been a little more comfortable in confiding in another Tutsi, but in general, I was not able to detect measurable differences in the reactions with regard to the ethnic identity of my translator. There were only two interviews, both in Gisagara, where the participants explicitly stated that they would only say this because they knew and trusted the translator who shared their history.

3.2.4. Participant Sampling and Classification Criteria

Anonymity and Sample Size

As mentioned above, political research in Rwanda and Burundi is difficult. Many participants were very reluctant about having their identities revealed even if it was just their first name and happily chose some form of anonymity. When asked about their consent to the interview being published,

59.6 percent of all participants chose partial or complete anonymity, while the number in Burundi was only 29.2 percent.



Anonymity in Rwanda and Burundi (47 interviews in Rwanda, 48 interviews in Burundi)

In such environments, compiling a representational sample of the population as scientific practice suggests, is difficult to achieve, particularly if the researcher is alone and plans to ask a highly vulnerable set of the population personal and politicized questions.

In general, I was only interested in people who were at least six years old at the beginning of the conflict, so they could actively remember the conflict. The average participant was 45.3 years old. In countries with populations of 42-47 percent³⁶² under 14, this figure of course is not representative but I was primarily interested in the views of people directly affected by mass violence.

Networks of Trust and Affinity

In general, I chose an open-ended explorative approach to finding and interviewing my participants. I opted for a variation of respondent-driven or “*Snowball Sampling*”³⁶³, which is particularly popular in anthropology or ethnographic research, but combined it with some questions of rather quantitative character typical of political science and history, namely scaled questions and analyzing documents from official sources. The selection procedure of rural³⁶⁴ participants could probably be best characterized as an open partial network analysis³⁶⁵, with the inhabitants of the different communities

³⁶² Cf. Heinsohn, 2003, 66 (in 2003).

³⁶³ Cf. Schnell, Hill & Eiser, 1995, 282; Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snowball_sampling (25 March 2013)

³⁶⁴ In Kigali, as well as Bujumbura and Ngozi, I mainly interviewed people that I knew personally. Nearly all of them had a higher education and belong to the elite (except Jean-Claude). These interviews mainly function as a comparative backdrop to the rural views I was mainly interested in. As many of the urban interviewees benefit disproportionately from the current power settings, I expected that urban and rural views strongly differ.

³⁶⁵ Cf. Schnell, Hill & Esser, 1995, 244ff.

forming these neighborly networks. While following these networks, I made sure that I would talk to people with differing backgrounds regarding their role during the genocide or civil war. I often asked people if they knew somebody from the former antagonist group they had reconciled with or people who had experienced similar things as they had. Most participants were very open to these suggestions and sent their friends and neighbors to be interviewed the next day.

Reimbursement

Once word had gotten around that a western researcher was doing interviews in the community, particularly in Burundi, many people came themselves and asked if I wanted to interview them. I never ran out of interviewees, which might also have to do with the fact that I reimbursed respondents with a sum of 1000 RWF resp. 2000 BIF³⁶⁶ for their time. While this sum barely represents a token of appreciation in the west, it can amount to more than an average peasant's daily wage in certain regions in Rwanda and Burundi. Initially, I planned to reimburse participants by giving them phone cards in order to reduce the material incentive but, as most of my participants had little use for phone cards, and would probably have sold them anyway, I gradually progressed to reimburse my respondents in cash. Nevertheless, many participants seemed to be genuinely thankful for the possibility to share their views and experiences. Luce for example, a genocide survivor from "Gatumba", talked for almost three hours and told us in the end that she was very happy we had asked her because she had never shared her story before. The promise of reimbursement may have been a strong motivation for agreeing to an interview. I however do not believe that it influenced the interview as such significantly. We always made it clear in the introductory part that we wanted to hear the 'participant's version' for academic purposes and made sure the respondent knew he would be reimbursed regardless of what he said.

Overrepresentations

Even though the thesis goes to great lengths to make sure that every relevant group (survivors, perpetrators, bystanders, ex-combatants, refugees old and new) are sufficiently represented in the survey, there is a certain intended bias: Among the participants, there is a disproportionately large number of genocide survivors³⁶⁷ in Rwanda, and generally Tutsi³⁶⁸. This has two plausible reasons: Having been victimized over decades, genocide survivors are still one of the most vulnerable groups in Rwanda. Even if today, an ethnic Tutsi rules Rwanda and a plethora of organizations try to support

³⁶⁶ This roughly equaled 2 Canadian Dollars in 2011.

³⁶⁷ According to Rwanda Focus, the FARG provides assistance to 21'039 survivors (cf. Kamana, Laurent, *FARG increases allowance for Genocide survivors*, The Rwanda Focus, 2. June 2013, <http://focus.rw/wp/2013/06/farg-increases-allowance-for-genocide-survivors/> (13.April 2014); whereas Kayitare (Ex-IBUKA) spoke of 30'000 survivors which makes up for 0.18-0.26% of a population of 11.7 Mio.

³⁶⁸ About 35 percent (I did not ask about a person's ethnicity in Rwanda) in all 95 interviews. By comparison: only 14-15 percent of Rwandans and Burundians are believed to be Tutsi.

genocide survivors, their desire for security as a minority with a history of victimization is naturally higher and their voices are crucial for a peaceful coexistence. In Burundi, where the Tutsi at risk of becoming politically marginalized, their plight might even be more urgent. In both countries, the Tutsi are in the minority, meaning they are more likely to feel vulnerable and more sensitive to political tremors that might unsettle the process of nation building. Hence, a minority overrepresentation parallel to the quota regulation in the Burundian parliament³⁶⁹ offers itself in order to assess and weigh attitudes towards reconciliation.

In Rwanda, the great focus on survivors (15=31.9 percent) and ex-convicts³⁷⁰ (8=15 percent) is self-evidently not representative. These are the people who were most severely affected by the genocide and its aftermath, either as victims, prisoners or family members of victimized people. As their experiences are more likely to have pushed them to assume extreme positions, they can be considered the principal targets of reconciliation politics. With politics having affected and still affecting their lives to such an extreme extent, their standpoints are usually rather distinctive. In Burundi, there are probable overrepresentations of Tutsi (18 participants =37.5 percent), ex-combatants (4 = 8.3 percent) and refugees/IDPs³⁷¹ (10 participants =20.8 percent). With the focus clearly lying on overcoming the past, it made sense to seek out participants whose lives were strongly affected by genocide and civil war.

There are furthermore overrepresentations of people with a secondary school or higher education (27.7 percent in Rwanda, 27 percent in Burundi) as well as urban dwellers³⁷² in Rwanda (8 participants=17 percent). This however does not pertain to Burundi³⁷³. As 'the intellectuals' in the centers generally were seen as the instigators as well as the benefactors of ethnic conflict and usually felt sociopolitical changes prior to the rural populations, their views were important for understanding the relationship between center and periphery, and also as an indicator for the homogeneity of political views. In Rwanda, more men (29=61.7 percent) than women (17=38.3 percent) were interviewed, whereas the ratio in Burundi was fifty-fifty (24 men, 24 women).

Despite these statistical inconsistencies, the sample manages to involve a great variety of groups affected by the conflicts and provides an expressive and holistic overview of the diverse perceptions

³⁶⁹ 60 percent Hutu, 40 percent Tutsi Cf. Lemarchand, 2006, 7f.

³⁷⁰ Straus, 2006, 117 estimates about 175'000 to 210'000 perpetrators. That would make 1.5%-1.8% of the population.

³⁷¹ Even with the highest number of displaced persons I found, Uvin (2009, 15) speaks of 500'000 refugees and 800'000 IDPs, they only make up for 10.38 percent of the population.

³⁷² Kigali has about one Million inhabitants, making up for about 8-9% of the Rwandan population.

³⁷³ In Burundi, the figure is probably too low with two urban participants (4.2%). With Bujumbura and agglomeration estimated at 1 Mio. inhabitants, at least 9-10% of all Burundians live in an urban environment. However with the government not being nearly as concerned with shaping the population's views in Burundi, I concentrated on rural environments. With 91.5% of Burundians relying on agriculture, the great majority of Burundians still live in a rural setting.

of reconciliation and reconstruction. Thomson³⁷⁴, Uvin³⁷⁵, Straus³⁷⁶, Fujii³⁷⁷ or Ingelaere³⁷⁸ have employed similar techniques. I am particularly drawing from Ingelaere in utilizing a similar set of scaled questions³⁷⁹, and by strongly encouraging the comparison of our results.

However, with the participant sample not being statistically representative, the frequently employed diagrams taken from an analysis of the subjective rankings should be mainly seen as illustration, accentuation and further corroboration of the qualitative findings and not as authoritative proofs.

In the following pages, all the participants are listed with a complete description of the categories applying to them.

Rwanda: Participant Allocation in Categories

Name ³⁸⁰	Country	Location	Anonymity	Gender	Age	Education	Job	Additional Job	Background
Augustin	Rwanda (47)	Gatsata, Gisagara	Open Public Access	M	50	No Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Bystander (not accused)
Canisius	Rwanda (47)	Gatsata, Gisagara	Audio Partial	M	61	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Bystander (not accused)
Cécile	Rwanda (47)	Gatsata, Gisagara	Open Public Access	F	40	Vocational & Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Bystander (not accused)
Dusabe	Rwanda (47)	Gatsata, Gisagara	Open Public Access	F	50	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Bystander (not accused)
Emmanuel	Rwanda (47)	Gatsata, Gisagara	No Audio Partial	M	37	Vocational & Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)	Pastor	Survivor (persecuted in 1994)
Faustin	Rwanda (47)	Gatsata, Gisagara	Open Public Access	M	40	Vocational & Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)	Counselor	Survivor (persecuted in 1994)
Francoise	Rwanda (47)	Gatsata, Gisagara	No Audio Partial	F	53	Vocational & Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)	Health Counselor	Bystander (not accused)
Gaspard	Rwanda (47)	Gatsata, Gisagara	No Audio Partial	M	26	Higher Education	Teacher / Public Sector Employee		Bystander (not accused)
Innocent	Rwanda (47)	Gatsata, Gisagara	Open Public Access	M	55	No Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Ex-Convict (accused)
Jean-Pierre	Rwanda	Gatsata,	No Audio	M	29	Higher	Teacher / Public Sector		Bystander (not

³⁷⁴ Cf. Thomson, 2010, 19-34; Thomson, 2013.

³⁷⁵ Cf. Uvin, 2009.

³⁷⁶ Cf. Straus, 2006.

³⁷⁷ Cf. Fujii, 2009.

³⁷⁸ Cf. Ingelaere, 2010b.

³⁷⁹ Please refer to the Questionnaire in the Appendix

³⁸⁰ The names of people who selected any form of anonymity have been changed according to their own wishes.

	da (47)	Gisagara	Partial			Education	Employee		accused)
John	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatsata</i> , Gisagara	No Audio Partial	M	56	No Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Ex-Convict (accused)
Karemera	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatsata</i> , Gisagara	Audio Partial	M	72	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Returnee
Marie-Francoise	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatsata</i> , Gisagara	Audio Partial	F	29	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)	Informal worker	Survivor (persecuted in 1994)
Marita	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatsata</i> , Gisagara	No Audio Partial	F	47	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Bystander (not accused)
Peter	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatsata</i> , Gisagara	Audio Partial	M	46	Vocational & Primary	Informal Worker	Construction Worker	Bystander (not accused)
Robert	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatsata</i> , Gisagara	No Audio Partial	M	25	Higher Education	Student		Bystander (not accused)
Umubyeyi	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatsata</i> , Gisagara	Audio Partial	F	27	Higher Education	Teacher / Public Sector Employee		Bystander (not accused)
Vianney	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatsata</i> , Gisagara	Open Public Access	M	52	Church School	Farmer (Cultivator)		Bystander (not accused)
Vincent	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatsata</i> , Gisagara	Open Public Access	M	43	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Bystander (not accused)
Yusuf	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatsata</i> , Gisagara	Audio Partial	M	56	Primary Education	Informal Worker	Construction Worker	Ex-Convict (accused)
Anasthase	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatumba</i> , Huye	No Audio Partial	M	71	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Returnee
Annunciata	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatumba</i> , Huye	Open Public Access	F	58	No Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Survivor (persecuted in 1994)
Boniphilde	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatumba</i> , Huye	Audio Partial	F	50	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Survivor (persecuted in 1994)
Christine	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatumba</i> , Huye	Open Public Access	F	49	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Survivor (persecuted in 1994)
Costasie	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatumba</i> , Huye	No Audio Partial	F	70	No Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Survivor (persecuted in 1994)
Francois	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatumba</i> , Huye	No Audio Partial	M	52	Vocational & Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)	Farmer & Ex-Head of Sector	Bystander (not accused)
Jeanne d'Arc	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatumba</i> , Huye	Open Public Access	F	34	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Survivor (persecuted in 1994)
Jeanne	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatumba</i> , Huye	No Audio Partial	F	32	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Returnee
Kibonge	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatumba</i> , Huye	No Audio Partial	M	43	Primary Education	Unemployed		Bystander (not accused)
Luce	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatumba</i> , Huye	Complete Anonymity	F	42	Secondary School	Farmer (Cultivator)		Survivor (persecuted in 1994)
Marcel	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatumba</i> , Huye	No Audio Partial	M	40	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Survivor (persecuted in 1994)
Maurice	Rwanda (47)	<i>Gatumba</i> , Huye	Open Public Access	M	58	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Ex-Convict (accused)

	da (47)	Huye	Access			Education			
Mukaga Kwaya	Rwanda (47)	Gatumba, Huye	No Audio Partial	F	52	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Bystander (not accused)
Paul	Rwanda (47)	Gatumba, Huye	Open Public Access	M	44	No Education	Informal Worker	Construction Worker	Ex-Convict (accused)
Rugango	Rwanda (47)	Gatumba, Huye	No Audio Partial	M	81	No Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Ex-Convict (accused)
Teresa	Rwanda (47)	Gatumba, Huye	No Audio Partial	F	72	Primary Education	Unemployed		Survivor (persecuted in 1994)
Thasienne	Rwanda (47)	Gatumba, Huye	Open Public Access	F	38	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Bystander (not accused)
Yohani	Rwanda (47)	Gatumba, Huye	Open Public Access	M	54	Primary Education	Informal Worker	Carpenter	Ex-Convict (accused)
Yohan N.	Rwanda (47)	Gatumba, Huye	Open Public Access	M	68	Primary Education	Farmer (Cultivator)		Ex-Convict (accused)
Ben	Rwanda (47)	Kigali	No Audio Partial	M	25	Higher Education	Student		Bystander (not accused)
Chris	Rwanda (47)	Kigali	Open Public Access	M	29	Higher Education	Public Sector Employee	Self described, works for CSOG	Survivor (persecuted in 1994)
Delta Foxtrott	Rwanda (47)	Kigali	Complete Anonymity	M	39	Higher Education	Teacher / Public Sector Employee		Returnee
Elias	Rwanda (47)	Kigali	Open Public Access	M	29	Higher Education	Private Sector Employee	Journalist	Survivor (persecuted in 1994)
Jean Claude	Rwanda (47)	Kigali	No Audio Partial	M	23	Higher Education	Private Sector Employee		Bystander (not accused)
Maximilien	Rwanda (47)	Kigali	Open Public Access	M	38	Higher Education	Private Sector Employee	CSOG-worker	Survivor (persecuted in 1994)
Nadine	Rwanda (47)	Kigali	Open Public Access	F	25	Higher Education	Private Sector Employee		Survivor (persecuted in 1994)
Théodosine	Rwanda (47)	Kigali	Audio Partial	F	24	Higher Education	Private Sector Employee		Returnee

Overview: Participant Categories in Rwanda

Burundi: Participant Allocation in Categories

Name ³⁸¹	Location	Anonymity	Gender	Age	Education	Job	Additional	Background	Ethnic Group
Arsène	Gakombe, Kirundo	Open Public	M	35	Higher	Teacher / Public Sector	Teacher	Tutsi Non-Combatant Resident	Tutsi
Domini-que	Gakombe, Kirundo	Open Public	M	37	Primary	Informal Worker	Handyman for	Hutu refugee	Hutu

³⁸¹ The names of people who selected any form of anonymity have been changed according to their own wishes.

							School		
Frédéric	<i>Gakombe,</i> Kirundo	Open Public	M	59	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Jacques	<i>Gakombe,</i> Kirundo	Open Public	M	26	Higher	Teacher / Public Sector	Teacher	Tutsi Non- Combatant Resident	Tutsi
Juvénal H.	<i>Gakombe,</i> Kirundo	Complete Anonym.	M	53	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Mar- guerite	<i>Gakombe,</i> Kirundo	Open Public	F	55	No Edu.	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Marie M.	<i>Gakombe,</i> Kirundo	Open Public	F	80	Church School	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu (?)
Marie- Chantal	<i>Gakombe,</i> Kirundo	Open Public	F	29	No Edu.	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Marie C.	<i>Gakombe,</i> Kirundo	Open Public	F	55	Church School	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Odette	<i>Gakombe,</i> Kirundo	Complete Anonym.	F	25	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Pascal	<i>Gakombe,</i> Kirundo	Open Public	M	54	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Pascal M.	<i>Gakombe,</i> Kirundo	Open Public	M	29	Higher	Unemployed	Ex- Student	Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Thérèse	<i>Gakombe,</i> Kirundo	Open Public	F	60	No Edu.	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Viola	<i>Gakombe,</i> Kirundo	Open Public	F	37	Higher	Teacher / Public Sector	Teacher	Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Abel	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	M	23	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Ex-Combatant	Tutsi
Candide	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Audio Partial	F	50	Higher	Teacher / Public Sector Employee	Teacher	Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Claver	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	M	66	Se- condary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Tutsi Non- Combatant Resident	Tutsi
Ezechiél	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Open Public Access	M	31	Primary Educa- tion	Other (self- employed)	Self- employed	Ex-Combatant	Tutsi
Ferdi- nand	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	M	56	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu refugee	Hutu
Généro- se	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	F	43	No Edu.	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Imma- culée	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Audio Partial	F	52	Higher Edu.	Teacher / Public Sector Employee	Teacher	Tutsi IDP/Refugee	Tutsi
Irakun- da	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Audio Partial	F	30	Primary Educa- tion	Farmer (Cultivator)		Tutsi IDP/Refugee	Tutsi
Janvière	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	F	38	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu

Juvénal	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	M	59	Church School	Farmer (Cultivator)		Tutsi Non- Combatant Resident	Tutsi
Léocadie	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Audio Partial	F	50	Church School	Farmer (Cultivator)		Tutsi IDP/Refugee	Tutsi
Maniriho	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Audio Partial	M	32	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Tutsi IDP/Refugee	Tutsi
Marie	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Complete Anonym.	F	52	No Edu.	Farmer (Cultivator)		Tutsi Non- Combatant Resident	Tutsi
Marie- Rose	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	F	52	Church School	Farmer (Cultivator)		Tutsi Non- Combatant Resident	Tutsi
Michel	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Audio Partial	M	65	Primary	Teacher / Public Sector Employee	Works as a nurse in veterinar- ian hospi- tal	Tutsi Non- Combatant Resident	Tutsi
Egide	<i>Rohero,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	M	50	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Tutsi IDP/Refugee	Tutsi
Alexand- re	<i>Kamenge,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	M	46	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Ex-Combatant	Hutu
David	<i>Kamenge,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	M	28	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Ex-Combatant	Hutu
Déogra- tias	<i>Kamenge,</i> Ngozi	No Audio Partial	M	59	Higher	Teacher / Public Sector	Teacher	Tutsi Non- Combatant Resident	Tutsi
Etienne	<i>Kamenge,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	M	72	No Edu.	Farmer (Cultiva- tor)	Retired	Tutsi IDP/Refugee	Tutsi
Gertrude	<i>Kamenge,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	F	46	Higher	Teacher / Public Sector	Teacher	Hutu refugee	Hutu
Hari	<i>Kamenge,</i> Ngozi	Open Public Access	M	50	Church School	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Hen- riette	<i>Kamenge,</i> Ngozi	Audio Partial	F	49	Higher	Teacher / Public Sector	Teacher	Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Izabel	<i>Kamenge,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	F	37	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu refugee	Hutu
Madel- eine	<i>Kamenge,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	F	54	No Edu.	Farmer (Cultivator)		Twa	Twa
Marie- Goreth	<i>Kamenge,</i> Ngozi	Audio Partial	F	33	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Pierre	<i>Kamenge,</i> Ngozi	Audio Partial	M	53	Higher	Teacher / Public Sector	Teacher	Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Sadi	<i>Kamenge,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	M	45	No Edu.	Informal Work- er		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	(Pro- bably) Hutu
Sylvestre	<i>Kamenge,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	M	69	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu
Venantie	<i>Kamenge,</i> Ngozi	Open Public	F	35	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non- Combatant Resident	Hutu

Venantie Kamazi	Kamenge, Ngozi	Open Public	F	25	Church School	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non-Combatant Resident	Hutu
Violetta	Kamenge, Ngozi	Open Public	F	30	Primary	Farmer (Cultivator)		Hutu Non-Combatant Resident	Hutu
Vanessa	Bujumbura	Open Public	F	25	Higher	Unemployed	Ex-Student	Tutsi Non-Combatant Resident	Tutsi
Labruyère	Ngozi	Complete Anonym.	M	35	Higher	Private Sector Employee	NGO-worker	Tutsi Non-Combatant Resident	Tutsi

Overview: Participant Categories in Burundi

3.2.5. Participant Categories in Rwanda

Ethnic Identities in Rwanda: A Legal Grey Zone

In order to provide for a nuanced understanding of personal life histories, I did not categorize my Rwandan participants according to their ethnicity and never asked them about their ethnic identity directly. This also served the purpose of not getting into conflict with official Rwandan interpretations of “sectarianism”, “divisionism”³⁸² or the law on “genocide ideology”³⁸³. While these laws' aspirations are legitimate, they are kept so vague that they conflate any ethnic discourse with genocide ideology and negationism punishable by prison. Their application suggests that they are increasingly used as a weapon to silence criticism³⁸⁴. Instead, I chose to categorize respondents with regard to their self-professed role during the genocide. Interviewees were able to choose freely between the categories “survivor”, “bystander”, “perpetrator”³⁸⁵, “returnee” and “ex-combatant”³⁸⁶. These categories helped to get a clearer perspective on personal backgrounds. I routinely asked interviewees to choose the category, which they believed they would fit into best. I explained the categories thoroughly if there were any questions, which rarely happened. These categories have already become such a defining part of Rwandan public life as 'Hutu', 'Tutsi' and 'Twa' had been before.

References to ethnicity occupy a dangerous legal grey zone in Rwandan public life³⁸⁷. Ethnic identity is officially emphasized with regard to the narrative of the genocide, but at the same time, the gov-

³⁸² The law against Sectarianism (Republic of Rwanda, 2001, Art. 3) forbids making “use of any speech, written statement or action based on ethnicity [...] with the aim of denying one or a group of persons their human rights provided by Rwandan law and international Convention to which Rwanda is party”. The Rwandan law does not actually define „divisionism“but it is frequently applied in a similar way as sectarianism and considered illegal. This is the main problem with Rwandan laws concerning genocide ideology and the fight against denial – they are deliberately kept vague and thus can be applied against almost any form of criticism against the current regime. Cf. Waldorf, 2011, 48-66; Amnesty International, 2010; Article 19, 2009.

³⁸³ Republic of Rwanda, 2008.

³⁸⁴ Cf. Waldorf, 2011, 48-66; Article 19, 2010; Gahima, 2013, 266.

³⁸⁵ Later changed to “ex-convict” – see below.

³⁸⁶ Except for Emmanuel in “Gatsata” who fought for the RPF briefly during the genocide but defined himself as a genocide survivor, I did not interview any Rwandan participants who fell into the “ex-combatant” category, RPF- or Ex-FAR-personnel, but it was an option they could choose.

³⁸⁷ Cf. Article 19, 2009.

ernment actively attempts to erase ethnic labels when it comes to the 'New Rwandan' identity³⁸⁸. Thus, ethnic identity has become a variable practically impossible to examine empirically in post-genocide Rwanda. Many participants were reluctant to use the words 'Hutu' or 'Tutsi' when it came to current events, instead utilizing auxiliary terms such as e.g. 'survivors', 'perpetrators' or the "other group"³⁸⁹. 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' as terms have become cultural taboos, particularly for bystanders.

Changing Connotations

The problem is that the categorization I utilized in order to obtain official clearance for my research automatically adapts the new language of ethnicity³⁹⁰ as imposed by the RPF-government. As I will explain in chapter 4.1., the official narrative about the genocide against the Tutsi propagated by the current Rwandan government ethnicizes victimhood to such an extent that the label "survivor" is almost exclusively reserved for Tutsi, whereas the label "perpetrator" or even "prisoner" only refers to Hutu. Jean-Pierre, a teacher I interviewed in „Gatsata“ explained to me that the word "inyenzi" (cockroaches), which was initially used for Tutsi rebels infiltrating Rwanda in the 1960s³⁹¹ changed significance and increasingly started to include all Tutsi³⁹² in the months before the genocide. In a very similar analogy, John, an ex-convict from "Gatsata", understood that the word "Interahamwe" had changed significance after the genocide. In his opinion, the word "Interahamwe" became exchangeable with the word 'Hutu': "Interahamwe moved on to include not only the other band of Interahamwe-killers in Kigali, who were based in Kigali and other places. But [...] it came to include all Hutu like that"³⁹³. Marie-Françoise, a survivor from Gisagara used the word similarly, talking about "people who fled, they call them Interahamwe"³⁹⁴. This assessment corresponds to Jennie Burnet's findings that in post-genocide Rwanda, terms such as "abacengezi" (infiltrators) or "perpetrator" exclusively apply to Hutu³⁹⁵. Even in Burundi, a participant said that in Rwanda, "Hutu" would signify "killer", whereas Burundians would be more willing to commemorate all sides and did not apply stigmata³⁹⁶.

³⁸⁸ Cf. Eltringham, 2011, 269-282.

³⁸⁹ Cf. E.g. Interviews with Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali; Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. The term "other group" was particularly used by Gilbert, my translator in "Gatsata", who was very aware of the potentially aggravating consequences a gratuitous use of the words "Hutu" and "Tutsi" could have. Participants may have used different expressions than "other group".

³⁹⁰ Cf. Burnet, 2009, 88ff.

³⁹¹ "Inyenzi" was the name the Rwandan government gave the insurgents. In a surprise attack from Burundi in late 1963, they came close to overthrow the PARMEHUTU government. The "inyenzi" and particularly the Chinese-trained "Red Battalion" were a considerable political factor in Burundian politics in the 1960s. Cf. Le-marchand, 1970, 197-227; 343-360; Chapter 1.1.3.

³⁹² Cf. Interview with Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

³⁹³ Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

³⁹⁴ Interview with Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

³⁹⁵ Cf. Burnet, 2009, 88ff.

³⁹⁶ Cf. Interview with Immaculée, 52, Tutsi-IDP, „Rohero“, Ngozi.

Exclusive Labels focusing on the Genocide against the Tutsi

Helen Hintjens welcomes that it is no longer acceptable to reduce Rwandan history to an “*age-old conflict between “two races”, Hutu and Tutsi*³⁹⁷”, allowing perspectives that are more complex to emerge and defusing the tensions surrounding these terms. New official categories of identity such as “*survivors and génocidaires, 'old' and 'new' caseload refugees, rural and urban Rwandans, Anglo-phone and Francophone, have all taken on great significance in post-genocide Rwanda*³⁹⁸.” Hintjens expresses the need to create spaces for more complex voices, such as Rwandans of mixed Hutu-Tutsi descent, returning refugees and Hutu who are neither perpetrators nor survivors. While cautiously welcoming the refusal to publicly debate ethnic categories, Hintjens however remains skeptical of the governmental approach to fostering a sense of national unity by eliminating dissent and demanding obedience. In her view, the foundational myth of collective victimhood exonerates the current leadership from its own human rights violations by comparing them with the greater crime of genocide, hence continuing the culture of impunity on another level.

I contend that the new identities have not emancipated themselves from the genocide. Quite the opposite, the genocide has become a strong reference point that actually determines a Rwandan's identity from the government's point of view. Speaking in categories exclusively relating to the genocide has become so widespread that these categories have polarized the discussion in Rwanda. The labels exclude people with life stories not fitting the official narrative and serve to globalize Hutu guilt³⁹⁹. Even though many participants claimed that to be called a Hutu or a Tutsi “*has no importance*⁴⁰⁰”, many scholars maintain that ethnic identities are “*more rigid than ever*⁴⁰¹” despite not being uttered anymore. In all of my interviews, I met only two Hutu who claimed to be 'survivors', Annunciata and Boniphilde. Both had married Tutsi men who were killed in the genocide and both explained to me that they were facing problems with regard to being accepted as survivors by the authorities and even by other survivors. I never met a single Tutsi or even heard of a Tutsi who identified as a 'perpetrator'. Grave human rights abuses by the RPF/RPA are documented, but the character of these abuses strongly deviates from the killings of the genocide. RPF/RPA-killings mostly took the form of extrajudicial executions by the army or militia in cordoned off areas. They largely excluded killings by ordinary citizens that characterized the genocide against the Tutsi, and thus, defined the 'perpetrator'-label. With the label 'perpetrator' invoking the picture of a potentially drugged machete-wielding peasant or militia-member, even the mental image does not correspond well with the picture of the disciplined soldier who liberated the country. This dichotomy between 'victims' and

³⁹⁷ Hintjens, 2009, 97

³⁹⁸ Hintjens, 2009, 97

³⁹⁹ Cf. e.g. Lemarchand, *The Politics of Memory*, 2009, 65-76; Burnet, 2009, 88-100; Thomson, 2013, 16-23.

⁴⁰⁰ Interview with Jeanne d'Arc, 34, survivor, „Gatumba“, Huye.

⁴⁰¹ Zorbas, 2004, 42.

'perpetrators' strictly reduced to the default roles during the genocide categorizes Rwandan society just as much and largely along the same lines as the notorious ethnic identities did before and during the genocide. Yes, Tutsi were the ethnic group targeted in the genocide and the expression "*genocide against the Tutsi*" is technically correct when it comes to the legal definition of genocide as determined by article II of the UNGC⁴⁰². Bluntly characterizing Tutsi as victims and Hutus as perpetrators however does not account for the complexity and the multiple facets of violence surrounding the genocide, its prologue and its aftermath. To be clear: the genocide in Rwanda 1994 was perpetrated against the Tutsi as an ethnic group. Rwandan Tutsi manifest the ethnic group targeted for elimination as a whole. The genocide against the Tutsi is also responsible for the overwhelming majority of casualties in Rwanda. In this respect, the government narrative is correct.

The genocide against the Tutsi does however only account for part of the violence that occurred in the Great Lakes and the focus on the genocide in its horrific efficiency and swiftness tends to block out the violence that was not directed toward Rwandan Tutsi from April to July 1994. These mass killings remain largely unpunished.

Ill-fitting Life Stories

Thomson speaks of "*multiple and sometimes contradicting layers of victimhood and perpetratorhood that go back for decades among individual Rwandans*"⁴⁰³. Sometimes, participants even combined categories: Emmanuel, a survivor from Gisagara went on to fight for the RPF during the genocide⁴⁰⁴, Yohani N., a peasant from „*Gatumba*" who was imprisoned for fourteen years for his alleged participation in the genocide, asserts that he used to hide Tutsi⁴⁰⁵. Such fates surpass simple categorizations. I also encountered many life stories that defy the narrative of one-sided ethnic killing: Ben says his father, a Hutu businessman with MRND-affiliation was targeted by the Interahamwe not because he had married a Tutsi but rather because he was rich⁴⁰⁶. Thasiene claims she has to pay reparations for goods she used to hide for her Tutsi neighbors⁴⁰⁷ who got murdered. Marita's⁴⁰⁸ relative, Robert's⁴⁰⁹ father and Françoise's⁴¹⁰ son, brother and daughter were killed by RPF troops when they en-

⁴⁰² Cf. UN, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9. December 1948, on: <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volumepercent2078/volume-78-I-1021-English.pdf> (26.March 2014)

⁴⁰³ Thomson, 2013, 17.

⁴⁰⁴ Emmanuel identified himself as a survivor because he only fought for the RPF for a very short period of time. Cf. Interview with Emmanuel, 37, survivor, „Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁴⁰⁵ Cf. Interview with Yohani N., 58, ex-convict, „Gatumba", Huye.

⁴⁰⁶ Cf. Interview with Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali. Ben asserted that the Interahamwe only came looking for his father to pay them for sparing the family but not for his Tutsi mother.

⁴⁰⁷ Cf. Interview with Thasiene, 38, bystander, „Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁴⁰⁸ Cf. Interview with Marita, 47, bystander, „Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁴⁰⁹ Cf. Interview with Robert, 25, bystander, „Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁴¹⁰ Cf. Interview with Françoise, 53, bystander, „Gatsata", Gisagara.

tered „Gatsata”. Yohani’s⁴¹¹ son was killed by RPF-soldiers in „Gatumba”. Gaspard’s⁴¹² family disappeared as refugees in the DRC when he was still a child. Rugango’s relatives were killed in Rwanda 1995 when he was in prison⁴¹³ and the list goes on.

Mostly Hutu tell these stories even though some survivors also mention abuses by the RPF⁴¹⁴. Other Hutus such as Mukaga Kwaya (daughter of an ex-convict) or Paul (ex-convict) steadfastly deny having seen any killings at all in 1994 or just admit to seeing single acts in order to distance themselves from the genocide as far as possible. For these people, embracing the new national Rwandan identity and rejecting ethnic identities proves to be difficult as long as they are constantly reminded through commemoration and re-education that although “*today there is no Tutsi, and there is no Hutu, we are all one Rwandan [sic.]*”⁴¹⁵, they and their relatives are simultaneously labeled 'perpetrators' and viewed with general suspicion.

The Use of Categories in the Thesis

Tutsis from the Banyarwanda-diaspora who came back to Rwanda after 1994 refer to themselves as 'returnees' in the common convention of speech. Because all Tutsi inside the country were targeted during the genocide and thus identify as 'survivors', the only possible 'bystanders' are Hutu. As I have never met any exceptions to this understanding of categories, these became my definitions: 'survivors' identified as people inside Rwanda and persecuted during the genocide; 'bystanders' describe people who were in Rwanda in 1994 but were not targeted in the genocide; people who came back to Rwanda after 1994 were listed as 'returnees'.

During most of the interview-process, I listed the fourth category, 'ex-convicts', as 'perpetrators'. Halfway through my research, I however started to understand that most 'perpetrators' I interviewed claimed to having been incarcerated innocently. From a group of eight ex-prisoners I interviewed, only one, Innocent⁴¹⁶, admitted having taken part in the killings. Maurice, Yohani, and John admitted to looting and/or burning houses but Yusuf, Paul, Yohani N. and Rugango⁴¹⁷ all claimed to having been jailed innocently. Because it was impossible for me to verify their statements, I changed the category 'perpetrator' to 'ex-convict', meaning people who were imprisoned for their alleged crimes

⁴¹¹ Cf. Interview with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, „Gatumba”, Huye.

⁴¹² Cf. Interview with Gaspard, 26, bystander, „Gatsata”, Gisagara.

⁴¹³ Cf. Interview with Rugango, 81, ex-convict, „Gatumba”, Huye.

⁴¹⁴ Chris, a public employee from Kigali e.g. talks about witnessing the beating and killing of Hutu prisoners. Cf. interview with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali.

⁴¹⁵ Interview with Anasthase, 71, returnee, „Gatumba”, Huye

⁴¹⁶ Cf. Interview with Innocent, ex-convict, 55, „Gatsata”, Gisagara.

⁴¹⁷ Some parts of Rugango’s interview were contradictory. He claimed that he had to pay reparations for goods he did not steal and that actually he was acquitted by *Gacaca*. Later he admitted that the *Gacaca* court had only acquitted him from killing but not from looting but still adhered to the fact that he did not steal. In general, he was very evasive about his own role in the genocide. Cf. Interview with Rugango, 81, ex-convict, „Gatumba”, Huye.

during the genocide. The term 'ex-convict' is also less fraught with prejudice because it leaves open the possibility that either the people actually perpetrated crimes or that they were jailed innocently. It is not my intention to raise a participant's integrity to question. On the opposite end of the scale, 'bystander' is an accumulative category for people who claim to not having been involved in the genocide or were acquitted without being jailed. Even if it is possible that some of the candidates who characterized themselves as 'bystanders' actively took part in killings and just lied to me, I left them in the categories they chose for themselves. Hence, the defining feature of the 'ex-convict' group is less proven guilt as a perpetrator and rather the fact that the participant was imprisoned at some point because of his alleged involvement in the genocide.

Old Identities, New Terms

As established above, these categories do not live up to the complexity of Rwandan history in the past two decades. With very few exceptions⁴¹⁸, they amount to ethnic distinctions masked in new terms. People who identified themselves as 'ex-convicts' and 'bystanders' are always Hutu; 'survivors' and 'returnees' are usually Tutsi. Pottier maintains that the “*official discourse on the 1994 genocide maintains in practice the ethnic division which the RPF-led government denounces in theory*”⁴¹⁹ because it only allows for one dominant feature and thus divides the population. Looking at post-genocide narratives in Rwanda, Eltringham⁴²⁰ came to similar conclusions: by emphasizing the ethnic character of genocide while at the same time proscribing ethnic identity in the forward-looking discourse of reconstruction, the government deepens the wedge not only between 'survivors' and 'perpetrators', but also denies Rwandans an open reflection that might lead to a relativizing of ethnicity. Furthermore, the official doctrine of condemning all aspects of the Rwandan state from 1959 to 1994 puts eventually positive memories from the time before the genocide⁴²¹ in a dubious light because the period is considered fundamentally flawed in the official discourse. Not only are the roles of 'guilty' and 'innocent', 'bad' and 'good' periods clearly established and inalterable, but not using the proper terms of the official “*language of recovery and restoration*”⁴²² potentially makes you a proponent of 'genocide ideology'. Thus, even such rudimentary labels given to categories of people with reference to the genocide already shape our perception of history and reflect an interpretation of events⁴²³ heavily propagated by the current regime. Despite the old identities being prohibited, the

⁴¹⁸ Annunciata and Boniphilde, the Hutu survivors mentioned above.

⁴¹⁹ Pottier, 2002, 126.

⁴²⁰ Cf. Eltringham, 2004, 72-99 and 2011

⁴²¹ Most of the people I interviewed who lived in Rwanda prior to 1990, even survivors, characterized their relations with neighbors and authorities as smooth and trouble-free before the civil war or even the genocide changed the dynamics. Cf. chapter 4.1.2.

⁴²² Eltringham, 2011, 270f.

⁴²³ The emphasis on the genocide against the Tutsi cancels out or justifies violence originating from the RPF that occurred before, during or after the genocide.

new identities do not “*cut across those earlier fault lines*”⁴²⁴ as Verdeja’s definition of reconciliation demands, the old fault lines just have been given new names.

Still, pragmatically, I needed a reference point in order to compare and contextualize my interviewee’s life story. The genocide is a historic watershed event. It brutally and inevitably shaped the lives of all Rwandans that lived through it. The thesis is interested in the views of former antagonists about reconciliation and its political implementation. Thus separating the interviewees into groups the genocide created makes sense in the context of the thesis. Even if such a categorization may have its flaws due to its ideological connotations, it ultimately serves the goal of making differences in the perceptions and attitudes of people whose lives were touched differently by the genocide visible. Even though the Rwandan state’s grip on civic (re-)education often shines through, especially in the ratings-part of the interview, and Rwandan participants demonstrated more criticism during the qualitative parts, the scaled questions are particularly interesting when comparing Rwanda to Burundi.

3.2.6. Participant Categories in Burundi

Ethnic Categorization in Burundi

In Burundi, no legal bans on ethnic discourse were imposed and with massacres taking place on both sides, the roles of victims and perpetrators in the civil war never seemed as clear-cut as in the Rwandan genocide⁴²⁵. With the power sharing agreement implementing 60 /40-quota regulations for Hutu and Tutsi on the top-level of government, ethnic identities in Burundi are codified in law instead of being banned. Hence, it was possible to categorize people according to their ethnic identity in Burundi. Participants could identify as the following categories:

- 'Non-Combatant Tutsi residents' and 'Non-Combatant Hutu residents', designating ordinary Hutu and Tutsi who stayed in their homes during the civil war or only fled for short periods of time.
- 'Hutu refugees and returnees'; this category pertains to Hutu who came back from exile after Nkurunziza’s election in 2005.
- 'Tutsi IDPs, refugees and returnees'. In practice, this category was mainly reserved for internally displaced Tutsi as few Tutsi fled abroad;

⁴²⁴ Verdeja, 2009, 3.

⁴²⁵ Cf. Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, 2002.

- 'Ex-combatants', identifying retired fighters from the FAB, FNL and CNDD-FDD whose stories proved to be rather surprising in many cases; and
- "Twa", a category that basically comes down to Madeleine in „*Kamenge*“, my only Twa-participant.

Even though these categories are less politicized in Burundi, which handles ethnicity in a far more non-restrictive manner than Rwanda, the problem here was of a different nature.

How to categorize Refugees?

Categorization has been a challenge in Burundi because most non-combatants fled at some point, but not all went abroad for longer periods. Because almost everybody had been displaced for a shorter or longer period, the label 'refugee' could be interpreted either restrictively or expansively in the Burundian context. Several episodes of violence forced hundred thousands of Burundians to flee their homes over the decades. The purge against the Burundian Hutu elite in 1972 which left any number from 100'000⁴²⁶ to 300'000⁴²⁷ dead and which Lemarchand ascribes a selective "*genocidal quality*⁴²⁸", produced around 300'000 Hutu refugees⁴²⁹ who stayed outside Burundi's borders for decades. Furthermore, the crisis in Ntega and Marangara in 1988 produced another 60'000⁴³⁰ refugees and the civil war from 1993 to 2005 claimed over 300'000 victims and created anywhere from 400'000⁴³¹ up to 700'000⁴³² refugees who fled to surrounding countries, mainly Tanzania⁴³³ and tens of thousands of internally displaced persons⁴³⁴. Trying to record the differences in attitudes towards reconciliation as meticulously as possible, I wanted to distinguish long-term Hutu refugees who often developed a distinctively Anti-Tutsi "*mythico-history*⁴³⁵" from Hutu who had remained in the country. Liisa Malkki, in her groundbreaking work "*purity and exile*" has noticed fundamentally differing attitudes between the isolated Hutu refugees in Mishamo, an organized camp largely dependent on the UNHCR and the Tanzanian government, and Hutu refugees in the Tanzanian town of Kigoma who had

⁴²⁶ Meisler, 1990, 384 speaks of 100'000 to 200'000 casualties. Lemarchand, 1996, xv, mentions 100'000 victims as well.

⁴²⁷ Mwakikagile, 2013, 563 and Lemarchand, 2009, 129 speak of 200'000 to 300'000 victims. Watt, 2008, 34 speaks of about 200'000 victims and 300'000 refugees. Uvin, 2009, 10 speaks of "at the very least 80'000" victims.

⁴²⁸ Cf. Lemarchand, 1996, 100,

⁴²⁹ Cf. Lemarchand, 2009, 36 ; Watt, 2008, 34.

⁴³⁰ Cf. Ntibantunganya & Ndadaye, 1999, 195.

⁴³¹ Cf. Lemarchand, 2009, 36.

⁴³² Cf. Watt, 2008, 48; Lemarchand, 1996, xxxi. Uvin (2009) speaks of 500'000 refugees and 800'000 IDPs.

⁴³³ UN, Yearbook of the United Nations 2005, 23.

⁴³⁴ Cf. Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, 2002, 61.

⁴³⁵ Malkki, 1995, 52(ff). In her fascinating analysis of the Burundian Hutu refugee camp Mishamo, Malkki reconstructs how the exiled and isolated Hutu made sense of their present predicament by constructing an elaborate mythico-historical narrative that retrospectively validated their journey and made sense of the genesis through ethnic conflict. In their interpretation of history, the Tutsi were cast as the oppressor trying to keep the Hutu in a position of perpetual serfdom. I was able to detect some of the traces of Malkki's narratives in the interviews with Gertrude and Izabel, both Hutu returnees from "*Kamenge*" who had spent their youth in Tanzania.

assimilated into Tanzanian society and were less of a “community”⁴³⁶. Whereas the isolated refugees from Mishamo nurtured and preserved their ‘pure’ identity as exiled Hutus and dreamed of a triumphant collective return to Burundi, the refugees in Kigoma behaved much more pragmatically, adjusting their identities to their daily lives in Tanzania⁴³⁷. Following Malkki, I presumed that a group’s isolation and its proximity to the former antagonists strongly influence its views on reconciliation. Interested in seeing which groups embraced or resisted reconciliation most actively and what their particular worries were, I thus chose to further divide Hutus and Tutsis into ‘residents’, ‘refugees/IDPs’ and ‘ex-combatants’.

Even though the communities I researched differed from the rest of the country with regard to the preferred country of refuge because of their geographic proximity to Rwanda, every community witnessed at least temporary ethnic segregation and flight. In „Gakombe” and „Kamenge”, the Tutsi fled under the protection of the army in the center of the commune while the Hutu stayed on their hills or fled to Rwanda or Tanzania. In „Rohero”, the army gathered Tutsis and UPRONA-supporters to protect them more efficiently. Whereas most IDPs returned to their hills after the crisis of 1988 in „Gakombe”, many Tutsi in „Kamenge” stayed in the center after 1993 causing continuous discomfort among Hutus⁴³⁸ who feared riotous assemblies of Tutsi targeting them, which did happen frequently during ‘la crise’. The IDP-camp in „Rohero” turned into a village over the years as the Tutsi inhabitants were too scared to return to their hills. In this situation, the differences between residents and refugees were much more clean-cut in „Gakombe” and „Kamenge” whereas in „Rohero”, the lines between resident and IDP have blurred over time. Interestingly, some of the Hutu in “Rohero” call 1993 a genocide “against Upronistes”⁴³⁹, not against Tutsi, thus they deliberately downplay the differences between them and their Tutsi neighbors.

Refugees and IDPs in Burundi have turned residents and vice-versa, so I chose to only categorize people as ‘Hutu refugees’ who explicitly referred to themselves as such and who had remained abroad for more than several years during the civil war, similar to the ‘returnees’ in Rwanda. The same applied to Tutsis: if they identified as IDPs, had come to the center because they fled the violence and were still staying there, I labeled them ‘Tutsi IDP’.

Ambiguous ethnic Identities

⁴³⁶ Cf. Malkki, 1995, 153-196

⁴³⁷ Cf. Malkki, 1995, 197ff.

⁴³⁸ Cf. Interviews with Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, „Kamenge”, Ngozi and Venantie K., 25, Hutu resident, „Kamenge”, Ngozi and Violetta, 30, Hutu resident, „Kamenge”, Ngozi.

⁴³⁹ Interview with Ferdinand, 56, Hutu refugee, “Rohero”, Ngozi.

Another, very surprising problem in Burundi was clearly assigning ethnic identities. Contrary to Rwanda, ethnicity is openly discussed in Burundi. Paradoxically however, the different ethnic categories appeared to be less determining than in Rwanda, at least in times without political turmoil.

Despite the efforts to erase ethnic identities in Rwanda, participants' ethnicities frequently came up when people told their life stories. I never asked anyone about his ethnicity explicitly, but most Rwandans told me voluntarily at some point. During the Rwandan civil war and genocide, knowing one's identity was essential for survival and even before, most Rwandans had learned their ethnicity through head counting in school⁴⁴⁰. In Burundi however, some participants claimed not to know their identity⁴⁴¹ or to only having learned it by coincidence⁴⁴². More than half the participants told me that they only came to know it because massacres were taking place (in 1972, 1988 and 1993), so they had to choose sides⁴⁴³. In difference to Hutu, many Tutsi, the privileged group in Burundi before 1993, often knew their ethnic identity since they were children⁴⁴⁴.

Ethnic identities in Burundi (as in Rwanda) were heavily instrumentalized during the conflicts of the last few decades. They had a political rallying function⁴⁴⁵ as soon as the (Tutsi-) leadership was challenged. However, in between the outbreaks of violence, the Tutsi dictators tried to whitewash ethnic discrimination in order to legitimize their rule. Not unlike Kagame today, Jean-Baptiste Bagaza (1976-1987) emphasized on national unity through reforms such as making Kirundi the first official language and embarking on a very unpopular project of villagization. Silently however, he left the blatantly discriminatory policies and institutions in place⁴⁴⁶. His successor Pierre Buyoya (1987-1993 / 1996-2003) still did not break the stranglehold of a small group of Tutsi on military and political power but he saw the need for democratization and conflict transformation and initiated limited reforms in the 1980s, which were however hampered by repeated outbreaks of violence⁴⁴⁷. Since the

⁴⁴⁰ Many Tutsi talked about the same experience in primary school. As Umubyeyi (27, bystander, "Gatsata") explains: *"Sometimes teachers at school [had] a list where students could fill in and say, this is a Hutu. This is a Tutsi. Stuff like that, clarifying which ethnic group. And sometimes even they could say, 'Ah, Hutu or Tutsi stand up.'"*

⁴⁴¹ Cf. Interview with Sadi, 45, Hutu or Tutsi resident, „Kamenge”, Ngozi.

⁴⁴² Cf. Interview with Généroise, 43, Hutu resident, „Rohero”, Ngozi; Sylvestre, 69, Hutu resident, „Kamenge”, Ngozi.

⁴⁴³ Cf. e.g. Interview with Marguerite, 55, Hutu resident, „Gakombe”, Kirundo; Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident „Gakombe”; Frédéric, 59, Hutu resident, 59, „Gakombe”, Kirundo; Pascal, 54, Hutu resident, „Gakombe”, Kirundo; Thérèse, 60 Hutu resident, „Gakombe”, Kirundo; Violetta, 30, Hutu resident, „Kamenge”, Ngozi; Labruyère, Tutsi resident, Ngozi; Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, „Rohero”, Ngozi.

⁴⁴⁴ Cf. Interview with Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, „Kamenge”, Ngozi; Interview with Egide, 50, Tutsi IDP, „Rohero”, Ngozi.

⁴⁴⁵ Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident from „Gakombe”, said that Burundian politicians knew that “Hutu” and “Tutsi” would be the only categories the population understands.

⁴⁴⁶ Cf. Lemarchand, 1996, 107 ff.

⁴⁴⁷ Cf. Vandeginste, 2009, 65 ff.; Even though supporting multiparty democracy, liberalization and the depolarization of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict, Major Pierre Buyoya cracked down on the Hutu uprising of 1988 in Ntega and Marangara with the full force of the army, leaving at least 20'000 dead and killing another 3'000 in 1991

UPRONA lost its multi-ethnic character with the death Prince Rwagasore in 1961, the ruling Tutsi elite from Bururi felt threatened by the thought of a democracy that, if ethnically interpreted, would marginalize the Tutsi. Ethnic discrimination however was hidden as much as possible. Talking about ethnicity was not received well in Burundi during the decades of military dictatorship and the parallels to Rwanda today cannot be denied. This “*conspiracy of silence*”⁴⁴⁸ also surrounds the killing of the Hutu elite in 1972, which has received so little attention by scholars and politicians that Lemarchand characterizes it as “*a forgotten genocide*”⁴⁴⁹. Thus, it is not surprising that people often only came to know their ethnic identity when not knowing it became life threatening.

Furthermore, the traditionally patrilineal heredity of ethnic identity and its prominence in the diverse episode of mass-killings clouds the fact that even among people from the Great Lakes region unfamiliar with each other, distinguishing Hutu from Tutsi quickly comes down to guesswork. There probably are a very large percentage of people of mixed descent⁴⁵⁰. Hence, some participants were able to navigate and switch between different ethnic identities according to what the situation necessitated: Marie-Goreth told me that she was not targeted by the military because of her “*Tutsi-nose*”⁴⁵¹. Ezechiel⁴⁵² and Abel⁴⁵³, both Tutsi, joined the strictly pro-Hutu FNL in 2002 resp. 2005, they were not eligible for integration into the new army after the ceasefire because as former child-soldiers. For several years, they fought on the Hutu side in order to get a better D,D,R & R-deal. David⁴⁵⁴, on the other hand, a Hutu from “*Kamenge*”, fought for the FAB in Burundi and the DRC from 1999 to 2004, despite his father being killed by Tutsi and the army being traditionally Tutsi-dominated⁴⁵⁵ before the signing of the Pretoria Protocol. All these cases point toward a strong interwovenness of ethnic and politico-economic factors during ‘*la crise*’. When fighting for economic survival, ethnic affiliation often was considered secondary.

Despite the fact that the peace process and the subsequent implementation of power sharing by quota regulations has taken much of the sting out of interethnic relations in Burundi, ethnic identi-

(cf. Lemarchand, 1996, xxv). After losing to Ndadaye in a landslide in 1993, he seized power via military coup again in 1996, only to hand it over to FRODEBU-member Domitien Ndayizeye in 2003. His opacity and his cunning have earned him the nickname “*Gustave*” among the Burundian population, after the legendary man-eating crocodile of Lake Tanganyika.

⁴⁴⁸ Lemarchand, 2009, 71.

⁴⁴⁹ Lemarchand, 2009, 70.

⁴⁵⁰ Of course, the situation in Rwanda is similar. Ethnicity was transmitted patrilineally there as well and many Hutu might have been ‘accidentally’ killed in the roadblocks of the Rwandan genocide. Watt (2008, 26) estimates that up to 70% of all Burundians are of mixed heritage.

⁴⁵¹ Interview with Marie-Goreth, 33, Hutu resident, “*Kamenge*”, Ngozi.

⁴⁵² Cf. Interview with Ezechiel, 31, Ex-combatant FAB & FNL, “*Rohero*”, Ngozi.

⁴⁵³ Cf. Interview with Abel, 23, Ex-combatant FAB & FNL, “*Rohero*”, Ngozi.

⁴⁵⁴ Cf. Interview with David, 28, Ex-combatant FAB, “*Kamenge*”, Ngozi.

⁴⁵⁵ The FAB expanded its personnel massively after the coup 1996 but large numbers of Hutu were only integrated after. Cf. Longman, 1998, 110-113 and Nindorera, 2012, 25f.

ties are still fraught with prejudice and fear in the grassroots. Marie M.⁴⁵⁶, a peasant woman from „Gakombe” did not trust us enough to tell her ethnic identity. She identified as a Hutu first only to take it back afterwards, stating that she did not want to reveal her ethnic identity. With Sadi⁴⁵⁷, an ex-convict and informal worker from „Kamenge”, it was similar. He hemmed and hawed claiming not to know his ethnic identity, but said people would call him a Hutu. Both participants are listed as Hutu because it is the category they first identified as. Many participants, particularly Tutsi in the ex-IDP camp „Rohero”, such as Juvénal⁴⁵⁸, Irankunda⁴⁵⁹ or Marie-Rose⁴⁶⁰ maintain that ethnic relations are still hostile. Marguerite⁴⁶¹ argues that the interethnic relations were better before the civil war, even though she states that Hutu were discriminated and that she lost three children during 'la crise'. With the authoritarian drift of the governing party CNDD-FDD perceived as predominantly Hutu, declaring oneself a Hutu seems to be the better option in an increasingly volatile environment.

3.2.7. Data Triangulation

The approach towards interview-analysis consists in three different layers of analysis: The 'official' level focuses on reconciliation politics as conceived on the national level, the 'informal' level looks at their local manifestations and compares official politics with the views articulated by the interviewed population. On the regional level, the differences between the popular attitudes towards reconciliation politics are compared by country.

I approached the research question in three steps: First, I compiled the 'informal' interviews as described above. The 'informal' part did take up most of my research (three months of preparation in both countries and four months of active interviewing) and relied on the interview process and participant observation in everyday life.

In a second step, the findings from the interviews were cross-referenced with 'official' sources: policy documents, media, and reports from international and domestic organizations as well as secondary literature. The objective was to evaluate the intent and context of reconciliation politics and identifying potential feedback loops between the government and the population on a national level.

In a third step, the state of affairs regarding reconciliation politics are compared countrywise in order to filter out similarities and differences, chances and pitfalls of the individual approaches towards societal reconstruction in the Great Lakes Region.

⁴⁵⁶ Cf. Interview with Marie M., 80, Hutu or Tutsi resident, „Gakombe”, Kirundo.

⁴⁵⁷ Cf. Interview with Sadi, 45, Hutu or Tutsi resident, „Kamenge”, Ngozi.

⁴⁵⁸ Cf. Interview with Juvénal, 59, Tutsi resident, „Rohero”, Ngozi.

⁴⁵⁹ Cf. Interview with Irankunda, 30, Tutsi IDP, „Rohero”, Ngozi

⁴⁶⁰ Cf. Interview with Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, „Rohero”, Ngozi.

⁴⁶¹ Cf. Interview with Marguerite, 55, Hutu resident, „Gakombe”, Kirundo.

The “official” Level in Rwanda

The research on 'official' positions with regard to reconstruction and reconciliation essentially describes official state politics and delineates the narratives of the political and socio-economic elites. The analysis relies on official documents and reports, an analysis of Rwanda's most important foreign language newspaper, the “*New Times*”, which reflects the views of the RPF⁴⁶², as well as foreign and domestic commentaries by scholars, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, interviews with officials, etc.

The body of source material regarding the 'official' position is richer in Rwanda, where the state has actually set up agencies such as the NURC or the CNLG to grapple with the legacy of the genocide and propagate a view of Rwandan history officially considered correct⁴⁶³. Rwanda's exposed position as site of one of the most atrocious genocides in human history, its pioneering strategies with regard to transitional justice (particularly *Gacaca*), and its relative stability and security for researchers have led to a flood of journalistic essays, academic publications, NGO-Reports, novels and even movies about the difficult legacy the small central African country has to deal with. Nowadays, writing about Rwanda has not only become difficult with regard to creating new knowledge, it has also become difficult to remain non-partisan in an increasingly aggressive conflict about the prerogative of interpretation as soon as the Rwandan genocide and its legacy come up for discussion⁴⁶⁴.

The “official” Level in Burundi

In contrast to Rwanda, Burundi's transitional process remains severely under-researched. Although many official documents concerning transitional justice and reconciliation have been created, only very small parts of the proposed measures have actually seen implementation on a national level. Domestic NGOs like OAG (*Observatoire de l'Action Gouvernementale*) and *Ligue Iteka* however have proven to be vigilant observers of political action. The media in Burundi is a more reliable watchdog of government and generally offers a wider spectrum of views than the heavily controlled Rwandan media. During the civil war, some outlets in Burundi such as the “*aube de la démocratie*” or “*le carrefour des idées*” actively disseminated ethnically motivated hate speech⁴⁶⁵ similar to Hassan Ngeze's notorious *Kangura* in Rwanda, but in distinction to Rwanda, Burundi's media landscape featured

⁴⁶² Cf. ARJ, 2010.

⁴⁶³ Cf. Pottier, 2002, 109-129 for a comprehensive analysis of knowledge construction in present-day Rwanda and cf. Byanafashe & Rutayisire et al., 2011 for current Rwandan positions on Rwandan history.

⁴⁶⁴ Some of the most pitched intellectual attacks I have witnessed so far have taken place in the column-pages of the „*New Times*“, Rwanda's biggest daily newspaper. Where Rwandan intellectuals accused the authors of the book “*Remaking Rwanda*” (Waldorf & Straus (eds.), 2011) of being “*vultures*” (Rwagatare, J.: *Why vultures have no chance*, in *New Times*, 4.4.11, p.8) and “*genocide deniers*” (Rwagatare, J.: *Remaking Rwanda: Only Rwandans can do it*, in: *New Times*, 19.4.11, p. 8.)

⁴⁶⁵ Cf. Frère & Marthoz, 2007, 16ff

critical and reconciliatory voices as well. Projects such as the famous *Studio Ijambo*⁴⁶⁶ and activists like Adrien Sindayigaya used the medium radio from early on in the civil war to foster reconciliation and to search for common ground between Hutu and Tutsi. I also briefly consulted Burundian newspapers "*Le Renouveau*" (a government publication) and "*IWACU*" (an independent newspaper), but never conducted an in-depth analysis of the same proportions as in Rwanda. This omission derives largely from the fact that an officially sponsored narrative of the past of Rwandan proportions is largely absent in Burundi. Despite public consultations and regularly repeated announcements of a TRC and special tribunal, the ruling party up to 2014 considered the past of secondary importance. Furthermore, the individual opinions professed in the media and personal interviews proved to be much more divergent and sometimes more partisan than in Rwanda.

To summarize: the thesis compares 'official' and 'informal' data about the following sociopolitical areas investigated in order to provide a descriptive account of local perceptions of reconciliation:

- The management of coexistence and identity politics⁴⁶⁷
- Historical narratives and the politics of memory and commemoration
- Government initiatives aiming at peace and reconciliation
- Approaches to transitional justice

⁴⁶⁶ Cf. Studio Ijambo, www.studioijambo.org (24.March 2013) Personal conversation with Adrien Sindayigaya, 5. March 2011.

⁴⁶⁷ Please also refer to chapter 3.2.5.

4. Politics of Reconciliation and Reconstruction in Rwanda

Initial Situation after the Genocide

The prerequisites for reconstruction and reconciliation in Rwanda could not possibly have been more adverse from the start. When the RPF captured Kigali on July 4, 1994, the brutal ca. three months-long genocide left practically the whole Tutsi-population of the country dead, with many of their Hutu neighbors belonging to the perpetrators. Over two million Hutu had fled the country in fear of retaliation. The conquering guerilla army had no experience in governing, and for many Rwandans, represented a minority of Tutsi-refugees who had fled the country from 1959 to 1973. Furthermore, the genocidal interim government had plundered the government coffers and the judicial apparatus was in ruins. The international community had done nothing to stop the genocide, but was now supplying the refugee camps in Zaïre with humanitarian aid. At that point, the UN was ignoring the needs for rehabilitation in Rwanda itself and through its refusal to disarm the remnants of the genocidal regime was actually enabling the ex-government to build a powerbase in the camps⁴⁶⁸. The remnants of the old army and the Hutu Power militias, the notorious *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi*, still ruled the refugee camps across the border, only lurking to attack again. An insurgency in the northwest of Rwanda already sparked in the immediate aftermath of the genocide and the constant instability eventually caused the Rwandan invasion of Zaïre in 1996⁴⁶⁹. Up to today, peace and stability have still not returned to the eastern DRC with a plethora of rebel movements terrorizing the Kivu-provinces.

Given these circumstances, even the prerequisites in Mandela's South Africa of 1994 could be considered favorable for reconciliation in comparison. With reference to the immense tasks with reference to reconstruction, reconciliation, repatriation, stability, national security, transitional justice and poverty reduction, the fact that Rwanda today is an orderly, functioning state with some tendentious but promising progress towards unity and reconciliation is little short of a miracle. The past 20 years bear testament to a hard-working, forgiving and forward-looking population and a leadership unyieldingly determined and stopping at nothing to form a new country according to its own vision.

Reconciliation vs. Justification to Rule

The need for politics of reconstruction and reconciliation in Rwanda was acute and immediate from the beginning. The country was in a state of turmoil and lawlessness. Political solutions were direly needed and had to be applied to a catastrophic situation of unheard proportions. They had to be implemented by a guerilla movement-turned-government whose leadership consisted mainly of returnees who were met with distrust by large parts of the population. Matters such as the refugee

⁴⁶⁸ Cf. Prendergast, 1997, 170ff.

⁴⁶⁹ Cf. Prunier, 2009, 1-72. Waugh, 2004, 102-145.

crisis, the impunity of perpetrators and the instability of the region necessitated direct responses. They were addressed by the RPF from a victor's position, yes, but this victor had yet to firmly establish his authority. The RPF was still fighting a war against the remnants of the old system. Given the permanent external challenge to its newly acquired power by the exiled *génocidaires* claiming to represent the majority of the Rwandan population, the new government was never a neutral arbiter of reconciliation. Even though it incorporated other parties into the post-genocide government of national unity, the RPF was primarily interested in consolidating its own power and eliminating threats to stability in order to rebuild the country⁴⁷⁰. Hence, politics of reconciliation and reconstruction in Rwanda were highly politicized from the beginning. They did not serve as ends in themselves, but always had to take the dynamics of political power into account. Even before the genocide, the RPF promoted national unity regardless of ethnic affiliation. The regime propagated that "*the institutionalization of unity and reconciliation is the only way that peace, security and harmony among Rwandans can be restored*"⁴⁷¹ and that "*national unity constitutes the pillar for durable peace and development in Rwanda*"⁴⁷². However, next to promoting peace and reconciliation among Rwandans, the politics of unity and reconciliation always had and still have an implicit mandate to justify the rule of the RPF and thus contribute to the stability of the 'New Rwanda' that the new rulers built from scratch. Many of the problems with reconciliation politics at the grassroots stem from this conflict of interests.

The goal of chapter 4 is to take a look at the context and implementation of reconciliation politics in Rwanda and examine their success in building new relationships that cut across the conflict-era identities. The chapter attempts to understand the Rwandan government from its own perspective and to comprehend how its politics relate to interviewees' perceptions of memory, acknowledgement, apology and justice at the grassroots.

4.1. will focus on the RPF's origins, its transformative ambitions and the official narrative emerging from it. This specific interpretation of Rwandan history will then be juxtaposed to alternative readings of the genocide and its causes in order to find reconciliatory blind spots. The second chapter will take a closer look at Kagame's system of rule and the implementation of politics. Chapter 4.3 will focus the diverse programs aimed at reconciliation, whereas the chapters on politics of memory and commemoration respectively transitional justice will examine the effects of specific policies on the population. The main findings are summarized in chapters 4.6 and 4.7.

⁴⁷⁰ Cf. Reyntjens, 2005, 15-47

⁴⁷¹ Law No. 03/99, 12. March 1999 about the establishment of the NURC, in: NURC, "*Annual Activity Report*" 2002, 2004, 4.

⁴⁷² *Ibid.* 4.

4.1. The Order of Reconciliation

The title of this chapter is a reference to Scott Straus' groundbreaking work "*the order of cide*⁴⁷³". Through a meticulous empirical analysis of the local dynamics of the Rwandan genocide, Straus convincingly argues against understanding the genocide as the result of a racist ideology of deep-seated ethnic hatred. Similarly to Lee Ann Fujii⁴⁷⁴, he identifies local peer pressure feeding on the traditional civil obedience to state power, the uncertainty of civil war and pre-existing ethnic categories as the primary factors driving violence in Rwanda. The call for killing the Tutsi became the principal policy of Hutu hardliners to ensure the loyalty of local Hutu. Genocide became "*the law*⁴⁷⁵" for coercing recalcitrant members of the own ethnicity into participation. In the 20 years after the genocide, Rwanda has taken huge steps towards reconstruction, peace and development. Paradoxically however, it is at times difficult to avoid the impression that the current regime relies on very similar top-down mechanisms to implement reconciliation as the genocidal interim regime used to mobilize the peasants for genocide.

The tendency to impose policy on the population and, reciprocally, the widespread culture of conformity with the authorities is a recurring feature of Rwandan politics. It surfaces often when discussing the genocide or reconciliation politics. Thus, the title struck me as oddly appropriate. Does this approach actually address the root causes of the conflict or does it merely suppress its symptoms?

In order to understand the design and direction of the Rwandan politics of unity and reconciliation, it is necessary to take into account the motives behind the RPF's interpretation of history. This first part portrays the RPF. It focuses on its transformative approach and the party's interpretation of the past forming the official Rwandan discourse on unity and reconciliation. The objective of the chapter is to carve out the discourse about genocide and reconciliation in Rwanda, to identify its shortcomings and to explain why the politics of unity and reconciliation are implemented top-down, evoking the image of an 'order of reconciliation'.

4.1.1. The RPF's History

To understand the approach to reconciliation and the transformative ambitions of the RPF, it is necessary to understand the movement's origins.

Paul Kagame, like most of his RPF-fighters who invaded Rwanda in 1990 and eventually put an end to the genocide, was up to that point a refugee for most of his life. His mother carried him over the

⁴⁷³ Straus, 2006.

⁴⁷⁴ Fujii, 2009

⁴⁷⁵ Straus, 2006, 89.

Ugandan border when they were targeted by the so-called 'Hutu revolution' in 1959⁴⁷⁶. He grew up poor and exiled with the harrowing stories of his family's expulsion in 1959. Kagame had to fight his way up into the upper ranks of Yoweri Museveni's *National Resistance Army* (NRA) and into his intelligence service, all the while dreaming of returning home⁴⁷⁷.

After successfully staging a coup in 1973, Juvénal Habyarimana installed the 'second republic' in 1973. He attempted to ethnicize⁴⁷⁸ the racialized identities in order to ease the tension between Hutus and Tutsi. Habyarimana, however, excluded the Rwandan diaspora that had fled the country since the pogroms of the 1960s. In 1990, the initially moderate president returned to a pronounced ideology of Tutsi-discrimination. Habyarimana's shift can be mostly explained by years of economic decline, external pressure arising from demands of the international community and the threat of Rwandan refugees from their Ugandan exile⁴⁷⁹. Operating with decreasing means and challenged from all sides, Habyarimana's government limited patronage to an ever-smaller coterie of loyal Hutu, especially from the North. The *akazu* was dependent on Habyarimana's party MRND's power over the state in order to maintain its socioeconomic status, thus perceiving every political challenger as a threat.

The Ugandan Crisis of Citizenship

Habyarimana's categorical rejection of any claim of Tutsi repatriation before the Arusha Accords of 1993, best captured in his metaphor about Rwanda as a full glass that would be spilled over if the Tutsi refugees would be allowed back into the country⁴⁸⁰, provoked the self-organization of Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda into a political movement, the RANU (*Rwandan Refugee Welfare Organization*).

Although many Rwandan refugees filled high ranks in Museveni's NRA, the Rwandans, who had been loyal to Museveni from the start, were loathed as 'non-indigenous' competitors for land and feared as parvenus by Ugandan natives⁴⁸¹. The initial reasons for this fear were that Museveni, only six months after having come to power, announced a simplified process for the Banyarwanda minority to acquire Ugandan citizenship if they could prove ten years of residence. This was a major policy shift compared to the earlier practice that had only granted citizenship upon proof of ancestry⁴⁸². The policy shift aroused fear among Ugandans that Museveni would favor the Banyarwanda because of

⁴⁷⁶ Cf. Waugh, 2004, 7-27.

⁴⁷⁷ Cf. Kinzer, 2009.

⁴⁷⁸ In the sense of an ethnic difference that does not automatically imply a difference of status, such as 'racial' difference does. Mamdani, 2001, 103-158 is very strict in this differentiation.

⁴⁷⁹ cf. Mamdani, 2001, 126; 270

⁴⁸⁰ Cited in Kinzer, 2008, 52 – Also cited by Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, Gisagara, in her interview.

⁴⁸¹ Cf. Prunier, 1995, 61-73; Newbury, 2005, 274f

⁴⁸² Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 173f

their support in the civil war and their influence within the NRM. The losing parties of the Ugandan civil war immediately applied pressure on Museveni to prevent what they feared would become an unholy alliance between a land-hungry non-indigenous group and a power-hungry government. They succeeded in placing ethnicity and indigeneity at the center of the debate on land entitlement rights, in which natives competed directly with Banyarwanda, thus eroding the cohesion within the government by 1988. A debate arising from the demands for land of Rwandan squatters in Southern Uganda in 1990⁴⁸³ then led to an increasing anti-Rwandan bias in Ugandan politics, rendering the naturalization of the Rwandan Diaspora in Uganda all but impossible and in fact orphaning the Tutsi refugees. Mamdani employs a comparison with the European Jews⁴⁸⁴. Being denied full citizenship in Uganda, the diaspora was trapped “*between the Rwandan devil and the Ugandan deep blue sea*”⁴⁸⁵.

When it became evident that no full citizenship and no political future was to be expected in Uganda, the RANU renamed itself into RPF and became an armed guerilla movement negotiating and fighting for repatriation and political participation in Rwanda. The RPF’s core leadership was made up from Banyarwanda cadres of the NRM⁴⁸⁶. Uganda thus actually re-exported its political crisis to Rwanda after it had inherited the Rwandan refugee-problem in 1959. This pattern of exporting national conflict was reproduced by Rwanda and Burundi when they decided to fight their national rebel forces on Congolese territory in 1996. Perhaps even more than the initial Hutu revolution of 1959, this “*crisis of citizenship*”⁴⁸⁷ is a key factor for the RPF-invasion and civil war beginning in 1990⁴⁸⁸. In the climate of fear emerging during the civil war, the political identities of Hutu and Tutsi, exploited by extremist propaganda aimed at maintaining the control over the state, polarized Rwandan politics and eventually erupted into genocide.

The Civil War and the Genocide

The FAR could only stop the RPF’s initial October 1990 invasion with strong French support just before it entered Kigali. Despite losing its commander Fred Rwigyema, the RPF was still able to take hold in northern Rwanda where it set up its base until 1994. Habyarimana’s regime, weakened by economic decline and pressured towards democratization by growing domestic opposition and, perhaps more importantly, the international donor community pushing for multiparty democracy, soon entered negotiations with the RPF. The war however gave rise to an extremist Hutu movement originating within the governmental party MRND. “*Hutu Power*”⁴⁸⁹ also spread to other parties, notably

⁴⁸³ Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 172-179

⁴⁸⁴ Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 182f

⁴⁸⁵ Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 184f

⁴⁸⁶ Cf. Waugh, 2004, 37-43; Mamdani, 2001, 159-184.

⁴⁸⁷ Mamdani, 2001, 36.

⁴⁸⁸ Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 159-184

⁴⁸⁹ Cf. Waugh, 2004, 73

the newly founded extremist CDR. These Hutu hardliners did not trust the Tutsi-dominated RPF and feared that the RPF's secret aim consisted in the restoration of Tutsi domination, turning Rwandan Hutus into serfs again, or even genocide⁴⁹⁰. The negotiations between the government and the RPF eventually led to the Arusha Accords of August 1993, which included provisions regarding the constellation of the transitional government, the return of refugees, and the reconfiguration of the armed forces including quotas for Tutsi. The Hutu-extremists in the *akazu* however were never seriously committed to negotiations that would ultimately transfer considerable power from the government to the Tutsi-dominated RPF⁴⁹¹. They were already planning the genocide against the Tutsi. When the situation escalated after president Habyarimana's assassination on April 6, 1994, the RPF immediately took up the fight again and systematically conquered the country while the genocide was raging simultaneously. It only ended when the RPF captured Kigali in mid-July 1994⁴⁹². It has been one of the worst cases of genocide since the Second World War. Many of the RPF-soldiers who stopped the genocide had relatives and friends who were killed and witnessed the immense brutality of the killing firsthand. As refugees and later as liberators, they witnessed the consequences of the Hutu-dictatorship in some of the worst ways possible. When the refugees from 1959 to 1973 came back into Rwanda as soldiers of the RPF and realized the carnage, they immediately associated it with the ethnic discrimination that had expelled them and their parents.

4.1.2. Residents: From Discrimination to Genocide

Differing Memories

Most returnees share the understanding of post-colonial Rwanda as an essentially racist ethnocracy that systematically excluded and periodically persecuted Tutsi and ultimately culminated in the genocide. As Karemera, a 73-year old returnee from "*Gatsata*" told me: "*when you are cultivating; you always have to start cultivating. [...] What happened in 1994: they started cultivating that field in 1959. That's when they identified who was the enemy, who was the enemy to be finished off. Then once already the enemy was identified, they were trying to hunt down the enemy wherever they could*⁴⁹³." In the eyes of returnees, the first pogroms in 1959 that pushed them into exile and the genocide of 1994 happened for the same reasons even if the intensity of persecution varied. According to this interpretation, both events are the immediate consequences of ethnic segregation during the era of colonization: "*the simple reason was because Hutus, they were poor. Like Tutsis were more*

⁴⁹⁰ Cf. Waugh, 2004, 57-63

⁴⁹¹ Cf. Newbury, 2005, 276; Waugh, 2004, 55-62

⁴⁹² For detailed overall accounts of the genocide, see e.g. Des Forges, Human Rights Watch, 2002; Melvern, 2004; For the local dynamics of the genocide, see e.g. Straus, 2006; For survivor's accounts, see e.g. Dallaire, 2005; Kayigamba in Clark & Kaufman (eds), 2008, 33-42 or Gasana, in Clark & Kaufman (eds), 2008, 145-170.

⁴⁹³ Interview with Karemera, 73, returnee, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

educated than them. Even white people, like colonizers, they have been motivating them: (...) 'Yeah: 'kill Tutsis then get the power!'⁴⁹⁴" The theory of a long-term genocidal enterprise that was originally instigated by white colonialists and started being executed by the Hutu in 1959 is popular among returnees because of three reasons:

- It is consistent with their self-image as an unjustly persecuted people.
- It portrays the first and second republic as fundamentally flawed, racist and illegitimate states.
- It acquits the RPF as an army of invading returnees from any share of the blame for the escalation of conflict because the genocide had been planned far ahead by extremist Hutu circles.

Even though some rural interviewees who resided in Rwanda in 1994 mention 1959 as a historical antecedent of the genocide⁴⁹⁵ or speak about "*cycles of violence*"⁴⁹⁶, resident genocide survivors in general however characterize the second republic before 1990 as a time of peaceful coexistence with their Hutu-neighbors⁴⁹⁷. There was Anti-Tutsi discrimination in higher education⁴⁹⁸ and in the army,⁴⁹⁹ but for most rural Tutsi residents, this was not relevant as long as the government did not interfere with their daily lives. As Costasie, a 65-year-old genocide survivor from „Gatumba” states: "*on Habyarimana's rule it was more or less good except when genocide happened*"⁵⁰⁰. The majority of pre-1994 residents actually point to the RPF-invasion (October 1, 1990), the introduction of the Multiparty-system (from June 1991 on), or even to Habyarimana's murder (April 6, 1994) when asked to pinpoint the point of time when inter-ethnic relations became hostile. For the overwhelming majority of residents, the events of 1959 did not have a direct influence on the genocide. The diagram below demonstrates that returnees who did not live in the country before 1994 generally saw the Hutu-Tutsi coexistence in Rwanda in a more negative light than residents did.

⁴⁹⁴ Interview with Anasthase, 71, returnee, „Gatumba”, Huye.

⁴⁹⁵ "I think it rooted from 1959 when we fled, so I think it was an ethnic reason." Teresa, 72, survivor, „Gatumba”, Huye.

⁴⁹⁶ Interview with Vianney, 52, bystander, „Gatsata”, Gisagara.


⁴⁹⁷ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Costasie, 65, survivor, „Gatumba”, Huye; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Faustin, 40, survivor, „Gatsata”, Gisagara; Jeanne d'Arc, 34, survivor, „Gatumba”, Huye; Emmanuel, 37, survivor, „Gatsata”, Gisagara.

⁴⁹⁸ Cf. e.g. interviews with Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali; Marcel, 40, survivor, „Gatumba”, Huye; Christine, 49, survivor, „Gatumba”, Huye.

⁴⁹⁹ Cf. interviews with Jeanne d'Arc, 34, survivor, „Gatumba”, Huye; Faustin, 40, „Gatsata”, Gisagara.

⁵⁰⁰ Interview with Costasie, 65, survivor, „Gatumba”, Huye.

Overall Relations Rwanda	1990	1994	2003	2011
Bystanders	1.9	-4.1	1.8	4.2
Ex-Convicts	1.7	-4.7	-0.9	3.9
Returnees	0.2	-3	2.2	4.1
Survivors	1.9	-5	1.6	3.9
Rwanda Average	1.7	-4.3	1.3	4



Overall relations in Rwanda

In the eyes of returnees, peaceful coexistence before the genocide was in fact repression by an abusive dictatorship catering to the ethnic majority. Rwandan residents (survivors, bystanders, ex-convicts) on the other hand, having grown up inside the system, have a much more sophisticated view and abstract the relationships with their neighbors from the political leadership. Even if most residents emphasize that life in general has improved since the genocide, not even the survivors evaluated the social relations during the Habyarimana-years as predominantly negative. In addition, the initial reaction towards the RPF when it conquered the land was fear, proven by the mass exodus of Hutu, and distrust.

Internal Grievances – From Discrimination to Threat

The divergence between residents and returnees' points of view corroborates Collier's⁵⁰¹ thesis that a rebel movement has to create first the grievances it stands against in order to recruit combatants and start an armed resistance. An active diaspora who does not have to bear the costs of the fighting is highly instrumental to the construction of a successful rebel movement. The rebel movement, aiming at political inclusion or even the conquest of political power by military means inculcates the grievances among the ethnic group that forms its recruitment base. "Conflict is not caused by divi-

⁵⁰¹ Cf. Collier, 2005, 143-162.

sions; rather it actively needs to create them. When such conflicts are viewed during or after the event, the observer sees ethnic hatred⁵⁰².”

It is evident that Tutsi were discriminated in Habyarimana's Rwanda. Practically all of the survivors I interviewed could tell stories of discrimination such as “some of our relatives wanted to join [the] army but because they were Tutsis [...] they were chased out⁵⁰³” or “a typical example I can illustrate is my brother Philmin who got great marks. He was supposed to continue at university. His family sold a cow to get some stuff, you know, school fees... [...] Surprisingly, he went there, he missed his name. Then, when he went to school, he missed his name; they told him you are not supposed to come to study here. So that was discrimination⁵⁰⁴.” Nevertheless, for most peasants, this was just a part of daily life: “so when I grew up, we had no problems with our neighbors. We used to cooperate and share, then the tragedy came in 1994 when genocide happened⁵⁰⁵.” Discrimination was a part of life ever since they could remember. Marcel recounts “so when it could come [to] umuganda, public works... Yeah. For those who could escape and go to the fields to cultivate [sic], actually they were supposed to pay 500, as a punishment but there was discrimination. There was [sic] the people who were called Hutu. So like, if Hutu and Tutsi could all escape, when it comes to punish, they used to punish only Tutsi and tolerate Hutu. So that was bad leadership⁵⁰⁶.”

Ethnic discrimination was also mixed in with regional discrimination against people from the South who used to be called “*Nduga*⁵⁰⁷”. Even though Tutsi suffered under this quasi-Apartheid system, it is very difficult to imagine that these people contemplated active rebellion. To the contrary, they were mostly used to the system and frequently found ways around it. Maximilien, a Tutsi survivor originally from Kibuye explained that he was refused admission to secondary school because he was a Tutsi even after passing the exam four times, but he eventually was admitted to a private school⁵⁰⁸. Faustin, a trader from “*Gatsata*” as well as the father of Vianney, another “*Gatsata*”-resident, were able to bribe an official and change their identity cards from Tutsi to Hutu. Most of the residents I interviewed were too used to discrimination and too caught up with the difficulties of their daily lives to be thinking about insurrection.

Changing the Dynamics: The Civil War, the Multiparty-System and Habyarimana's Assassination

⁵⁰² Collier, 2005, 153.

⁵⁰³ Interview with Jeanne d'Arc, 34, survivor, „Gatumba“, Huye.

⁵⁰⁴ Interview with Marcel, 40, survivor, „Gatumba“, Huye.

⁵⁰⁵ Interview with Christine, 49, survivor, „Gatumba“, Huye.

⁵⁰⁶ Interview with Marcel, 40, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye.

⁵⁰⁷ “*Nduga*” seems to have been a derogatory expression akin to “*accomplice*” because intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi was very common in the Southern Region surrounding Butare. Hutus in the North rather married within their own group. Cf. Interviews with François, 52, bystander “Gatumba”, Huye and Françoise, 53, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.

⁵⁰⁸ Cf. Interview with Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali.

Interviewees mention three events that clearly marked the passage from daily interethnic discrimination to life-endangering tensions: the start of the civil war⁵⁰⁹, the advent of multiparty-democracy⁵¹⁰, which resulted in an increasing loss of power on the side of the ruling party MRND⁵¹¹, and the assassination of Juvénal Habyarimana that sparked the genocide⁵¹².

During Habyarimana's reign up until 1990, the differences in status between Hutu and Tutsi were only visible in certain limited areas of public life such as higher education and the military. Hutu peasants such as Annunciata⁵¹³, Marita⁵¹⁴, Françoise⁵¹⁵, Peter⁵¹⁶ or Augustin⁵¹⁷ even denied having witnessed any discrimination at all. The invasion of the RPF in 1990 was the first event that made the usually hidden differences between Hutu and Tutsi become starkly apparent and at the same time dangerous: *"so at that age, they did not yet know to differentiate Hutu and Tutsi. So things changed a lot when [the] RPF came in 1990. That's when they started to know: 'this is a Hutu. This is a Tutsi'⁵¹⁸."* Marie-Françoise reflects: *"Shortly before the genocide, some people could say that a child is from a Tutsi family and the message could be passed on even to children. And children, once they are leaving school, or when they are going back home, some of them could get beaten up because they are from the Tutsi families⁵¹⁹."*

Still, not only the war, but also the violent quarreling between the newly formed political parties since June 1991 caused discomfort among many peasants in the South. Particularly the Gatabazi-

⁵⁰⁹ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Canisius, 61, bystander, "Gatsata, Gisagara; Cécile, 40, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Luce, 42, survivor, Gatumba", Huye; Emmanuel, 37, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Faustin, 40, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jeanne d'Arc, 34, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali; Nadine, 25, survivor, Kigali; Thasiennne, 38, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Vianney, 52, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Yohani N., 68, ex-convict., "Gatumba", Huye; Yusuf, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁵¹⁰ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Dusabe, 50, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Innocent, 55, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Kibonge, 43, bystander, Huye; Marcel, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Vincent, 43, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara;

⁵¹¹ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Dusabe, 50, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Faustin, 40, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Innocent, 55, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Kibonge, 43, bystander, Huye; Marcel, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara;

⁵¹² Cf. e.g. Interviews with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Thasiennne, 38, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Teresa, 72, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Yusuf, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁵¹³ Cf. Interview with Annunciata, 58, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁵¹⁴ Cf. Interview with Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁵¹⁵ Cf. Interview with Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. The enormous significance of the civil war for the genocide will be covered in detail in chapter 4.1.6.

⁵¹⁶ Cf. Interview with Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara

⁵¹⁷ Cf. Interview with Augustin, 50, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara

⁵¹⁸ Interview with Luce, 42, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye. Clean verbatim from translator who speaks about Luce in third person.

⁵¹⁹ Interview with Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

Bucyana incident, when the popular PSD-leader Félicien Gatabazi was gunned down and Martin Bucyana, chair of the CDR, was killed in retaliation by an angry mob in Butare on February 23, 1994, left the strong impression of a country descending into chaos. Many interpreted the political quarrels ethnically: *“The things turned to be against Tutsi with accusations and counter-accusations from political parties. People from MDR could say PSD, they are from Tutsi people. They are against us and MRND also could step in with their accusations. That’s how it started to turn against Tutsi. [...]Tutsi now have attacked the country. So, they were like rallying people for their [...] cause, saying ‘you see? Yeah, we are being invaded by Tutsi. They came to govern us once again, they are coming to oppress us once again.’⁵²⁰”* Many interviewees⁵²¹ believe that the fierce political competition paved the way for hatred and extremism. Vincent argues, *“Political parties had laid the ground for the genocide. They had preached everything, people hating each other and then, by that time MRND exploited that and that’s how the genocide started⁵²²”* The patrimonial understanding of politics, in which winning the election determines socioeconomic ascent or fall, accounts for the polarizing character and the ethnicization of political competition between 1991 and 1994. The old ruling party MRND was fighting a rearguard battle against internal and external opposition, opting for extremism to rally the Hutu.

Despite the climate of fear and hostility that started to grow during the civil war, the genocide came very abruptly for most survivors. Up to that point, they still had maintained good relationships with their neighbors. The night Habyarimana was assassinated then marked an absolute and sudden change from ethnic tensions to outright war and genocide for most. Elias from Kigali recounts: *“When Habyarimana[’s] plane was shot down, [...] it was shot down in the evening at around 8:00. I think after 30 minutes the killing started. So the next day, it was all the killing everywhere⁵²³.”* Everybody immediately knew that something had changed. The genocide spread very fast and it changed the dynamics between neighbors as a radicalized vanguard of militiamen, policemen, soldiers and officials aimed at uniting the Hutu community *through* the act of violence⁵²⁴. Peter⁵²⁵, describes this process in a fairly typical manner: *“Shortly after the plane crashed in 1994, the president[ial] plane crash in 1994, that’s when things started changing for him. When they started patrols during the night. During the evening, they start[ed] the patrols. They used to be done by both Hutu and Tutsi. I mean it used to be a mix but it started to be like Tutsi were somehow isolated. They started to be left*

⁵²⁰ Interview with Innocent, 55, ex-convict, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.

⁵²¹ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Vincent, 43, bystander, 43, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Innocent, 55, ex-convict, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Marcel, 40, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye; Françoise, 53, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.

⁵²² Interview with Vincent, 43, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.

⁵²³ Interview with Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali.

⁵²⁴ Cf. Fujii, 2009, 154-179.

⁵²⁵ Again, the citation is a transcript from the translator’s version, thus speaking of Peter in the third person.

out. And he also adds that people who had served in the army, who were maybe living in Kigali, they started coming back to their rural communities. And that they could be propagating some ideas, some hatred. And they were the ones who more or less started the genocide⁵²⁶."

View of the External Rebellion

Contrary to most pre-1994 Tutsi residents I interviewed, the diaspora was highly politicized and many of its members already underwent military training in the Ugandan civil war⁵²⁷. Thus, despite the continued ethnic discrimination in Rwanda, the demands for inclusion and equal citizenship were initially carried into the country by the diaspora living abroad. Umubyeyi, a teacher from Gisagara assumed that Hutu killed because the genocidal mindset had developed over time in the civil war against the "inyenzi⁵²⁸": *"Tutsi were accomplices of inyenzi. They were the real people who had come to attack Rwanda. And they were the ones who had killed their president and their final objective was to conquer Rwanda, and oppress everybody in the country. So it was kind of... If they killed, they were like counterattacking⁵²⁹*. Regarding the fact that none of the Tutsi peasants I interviewed had any RPF-connections before the war, the 'accomplice'-argument, by all means, is a *Hutu Power*-fabrication. The aggravation of ethnic tensions during the civil war and particularly after Habyarimana's murder however was very real, exactly because most residents regarded the RPF as a Tutsi-force. Françoise, a farmer from "Gatsata" recalls: *"the news was that President Habyarimana had already been killed and they were blaming the RPF for the killing of the president. And they knew that there [were] rumors that RPF soldiers are everywhere. They are traveling everywhere in the country. They are in neighboring countries like Burundi, Congo, Uganda. So they were like, 'So if they had killed our president, we are the next target. We are the next target. They are going to kill us as well⁵³⁰."*

To most peasants, even Tutsi, the RPF was initially perceived as an external enemy. The local self-defense rounds, *amarondo* in Kinyarwanda, that were organized during the civil war at first included Hutu and Tutsi⁵³¹. Even though nowadays Rwandans usually use the word "*liberation*⁵³²" when it comes to the RPF-victory in the civil war, many Tutsi in 1994 were just as scared of the RPF as their Hutu neighbors: *"[I]was scared, even people in the neighborhood fled, when the inkotanyi attacked*

⁵²⁶ Interview with Peter, 46, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara. Clean verbatim from the translator, speaking about Peter in the third person.

⁵²⁷ Cf. Waugh, 2004, 7-45.

⁵²⁸ "Cockroaches" – derogatory term Hutus used to describe Tutsi fighters from the Diaspora. The RPF calls its members "Inkotanyi", invincible warriors.

⁵²⁹ Interview with Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara. Clean verbatim from the translator, speaking about Umubyeyi in the third person.

⁵³⁰ Interview with Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara – Here, the research assistant translated her answers indirectly, speaking of the interviewee in the third person.

⁵³¹ Cf. Interview with Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁵³² Cf. e.g. Interviews with Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Interview with Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali.

*the country.⁵³³” Jeanne d’Arc, a survivor from “Gatumba”, sums up the gradual progression from discrimination to genocide that started with the civil war very precisely: “*With the state, there was no problem with the parents but things changed when [the] RPF came around 1990. So that’s when there was a bad atmosphere, saying that ‘these guys from RPF are your relatives, they are Inyenzi and one day they will come and kill us.’ So that’s the bad intention, I mean that’s how the bad tensions started to come but before, with the state, it was okay*⁵³⁴.”*

4.1.3. Returnees: The RPF’s transformative Ambitions and hidden Discrimination

The Need to Discredit the Past

Even with the memory of the genocide fresh in mind and the “Hutu Power” interim regime utterly discredited and defeated, the RPF essentially was an army of foreigners. Most Rwandan residents had only heard horrible rumors about the guerilla movement. Françoise remembers initially distrusting the invaders: “*the other chaos was brought by the RPF and they did that time when they started moving inside the country, that’s when the news started filtering in that they were taking people, putting them in the mortar and grinding them and also raping people, women and young girls. The other people are going to come from Burundi. So she [the interviewee] was like afraid and some of her relatives also got killed [in Byumba] in the meantime*⁵³⁵.” The ‘Hutu Power’-government and its agents in the media had spread fear and propaganda very effectively. Fantastic and dehumanizing rumors such as “*people in the RPF have tails*⁵³⁶” were widespread among peasants. The stories especially emphasized on rape and inhuman ways of killing: “*they could kill someone, and take your hands and make them enter the belly once you are killed and you [would] be like a statue, and it is a kind of, it’s like you are wearing a coat. You know, it is like a coat you are wearing*⁵³⁷.”

After the genocide, these rumors had to be dispersed. The genocide had demonstrated to most Hutus that the agents of the interim government actually perpetrated the atrocities they attributed to the RPF on a far larger scale. Nevertheless, the genocide had utterly disrupted trust and confidence in the authorities as well as between Rwandans themselves, so the new regime opted for a ‘tabula rasa’ approach. In order to overcome the widespread belief among Hutus that the RPF had come to renew Tutsi-dominance⁵³⁸, they had to convince the peasantry that the ‘majoritarian democracy’ in

⁵³³ Interview with Faustin, 40, survivor, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

⁵³⁴ Interview with Jeanne d’Arc, 34, survivor, „Gatumba“, Huye.

⁵³⁵ Interview with Françoise, 52, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara. Clean verbatim from the translator, speaking about Françoise in the third person.

⁵³⁶ Interview with Vincent, 43, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.

⁵³⁷ Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.

⁵³⁸ Cf. e.g. Interview with Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.

the first and second republics had in fact been racist dictatorships in disguise and that the RPF would change the whole dynamic of Rwandan society.

The RPF aimed to change everything: governance and economic structures, social identities, cultural norms, individual behavior, even the names of provinces, districts and towns. In the eyes of the RPF, the memory of Rwandan society between 1959 and 1994 or even between 1897⁵³⁹ and 1994 is mostly a dirty spot on the country's history best to be erased. They aimed at change with the establishment of the government of national unity with the Hutu Pasteur Bizimungu as acting president, the popular consultations at *Urugwiro*-village, the ostracism of ethnic identities as well as the RPF's sweeping attempts at educating the peasants through *ingando*, *itorero* etc. All these steps towards national unity, as genuine and positive as they may have been planned, had the simultaneous side effect of legitimizing the rule of a rebel-movement that was initially mainly composed from members of the diaspora.

The 'Ugandan' Elite

Despite the readiness of most Rwandans to embrace the vision of a new society, resistance against the ideology of unity and reconciliation is growing wherever the pre-1994 residents detect favoritism from the new, diaspora-led elite. The evidence of the English-speaking diaspora's dominance is apparent: Rwanda has quit *la Francophonie* and has joined the Commonwealth⁵⁴⁰. English, a language that historically never has had any importance in Rwanda, has become the second official language and has replaced French as the preferred language of the elite. The RPF has also factually held power for the past twenty years.

Particularly young, well-educated Hutu mistrust the rhetoric of national unity e.g., when they look at their own chances on the labor market: *"It is like today here everybody says that there is no more ethnic group, but it is still inside the heart. And also you will find [if] it comes to get like [a] job, it is a big challenge. [...] If you are not a Tutsi, if you are not from Uganda you cannot get a good job. Or even if you can get a job, you will be the chief but you cannot take strong decision[s]. Always they will put your subordinate, he will be the one to sign; you know, to take strong decisions. [...] There is something like hidden discrimination⁵⁴¹."*

Rwandan politics are dominated by the diaspora. Next to senior RPF-personnel who already fought in the civil war like Tito Rutaremara or the current minister of Defense James Kabarebe, a great many members of the inner circle of power are Tutsi who grew up in Uganda. Important ministries such as

⁵³⁹ Begin of the German Colonization in Rwanda. For an 'official' view on how colonization perverted the pre-colonial system cf. Shyaka, 2004, 3-8.

⁵⁴⁰ About the diverse negotiations surrounding Rwanda's admission to the Commonwealth in 2009, cf. Reyntjens, 2013, 122-133.

⁵⁴¹ Interview with Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali.

the ministry of finance led by Claver Gatete and his predecessor James Musoni or the National Security Services, which used to be headed by Emmanuel Ndahiro⁵⁴² are only a few examples. Hutus appointed to leading positions such as Jean Damascene Ntawukuriryayo, the current president of the senate and Pierre Damien Habumuremyi, the current prime minister, have spent most of the years before the genocide abroad and were not politically active before the genocide. The new elite distrust pre-1994 Rwandan residents fundamentally. Evidentially so-called 'moderate Hutus'⁵⁴³ who opposed the *génocidaires* in 1994 such as ex-prime minister Faustin Twagiramungu, political outsiders like Pierre Célestin Rwigema or even survivors like ex-speaker of parliament Joseph Sebarenzi got sidelined and declared *personae non grata*, the two Hutu Twagiramungu and Rwigema for harboring 'genocide ideology', the Tutsi Sebarenzi for plotting for a 'return to monarchy'.

Distrust in pre-1994 residents is not just a matter of national politics though. It permeates down to the local level. François for example, a local administrator from "Gatumba" who was aspiring for a leading position in his local church talked about being skipped for promotion by the new leaders from Uganda despite having resisted the call to genocide and never having been sentenced⁵⁴⁴. Even young educated survivors from Kigali, despite acknowledging the achievements of the RPF, level some moderate criticism against the claim to leadership of the diaspora: "*Les gens de l'Uganda voulaient aussi partager dans leur pays, posséder de pouvoir, eux aussi, parce qu'ils avaient connu une idée qu'ils étaient... donc c'est eux qui avaient pris ces... donc c'est eux qui avaient gagné*"⁵⁴⁵.

4.1.4. Constructing Knowledge – The 'official' Narrative of the Genocide

A Specific Version of History

To build a new and inclusive society under the aegis of the RPF, the achievements of the so-called 'Hutu revolution' of 1959, celebrated as the emancipation from Tutsi-rule by the former rulers, had to be discredited entirely, specifically the notion of being a 'majoritarian' democracy. In the RPF's eyes, Rwandan history follows a linear trajectory from colonization up to 1994. The ICTR's 'media-

⁵⁴² Cf. Sim, *Classified cable from the American Embassy in Kigaly to the Secretary of State*, August 5, 2008, on: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KIGALI525_a.html (March 12, 2014). Ndahiro was fired when his role in the failed assassination attempt against Kayumba Nyamwasa became public in 2011.

⁵⁴³ Hutu extremists targeted moderate Hutu politicians such as Twagiramungu, Lando Ndasingwa or Agathe Uwilingiyimana in 1994.

⁵⁴⁴ Cf. Interview with François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁵⁴⁵ Interview with Nadine, 25, survivor, 25, Kigali. Translation: "*I do not see any change on their [RPF's] side but I see changes in the history that we lived through. They had to first unite many people who had different cultures. There were many problems, different problems too. [Rwandan] People from Uganda wanted to take part in their country too, they wanted to possess power too because they knew who they were. Thus, it is them who took... It is them who won.*"

trials⁵⁴⁶ against Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Ferdinand Nahimana from RTLM and Hassan Ngeze from the extremist newspaper *Kangura* demonstrated the genocidal potential of the 'Hutu Power'-mindset to the world very publicly. According to the RPF, the genocide is the necessary culmination of this ideology whose roots already became visible in 1959.

An increasing number of scholars however challenges the theory that ethnic hatred, genocide ideology and hate media were the main causes of genocide⁵⁴⁷. The theory remains very popular among the returnees who form the core of the RPF's leadership⁵⁴⁸ because it is consistent with their "*fairly one-dimensional and sharply negative view of past Rwandan society and culture*⁵⁴⁹" adopted in exile. Concisely, the RPF's founding narrative reads as follows:

*"After Rwanda gained its independence in 1962, the MDR-PARMEHUTU (1962-1973) regime as well as the MRND (1973-1994) regime decided to carry on the segregation legacy of the colonial masters and the problems were compounded further. Those regimes were characterized by bad methods such as: openly spreading segregation propaganda; propagating hatred among Rwandans; exclusion of some Rwandans in school, work and politics; oppression of fellow Rwandans, destroying and burning their homes, killing them and sending them into exile, even culminating into the 1994 genocide; no democracy and no opportunity for the people to participate in their leadership; no effective economic agenda for the development of Rwanda, leaving the Rwandan people in poverty, disease, ignorance and dependence on foreign aid; promoting the profit of the leaders above the people's welfare giving rise to corruption, favoritism, waste and embezzlement of national resources; the RPF-INKOTANYI was formed with the objective of fighting bad governance that characterized Rwanda's history and to solve all the problems that resulted. Both the political and the armed struggle were aimed at liberating Rwanda from the bad dictatorial leadership in order to build a nation that abides by law, and upholds democracy, peace, security, justice and development*⁵⁵⁰."

The RPF has gone to great lengths to realize its vision and most Rwandans do see progress if they compare the country to the time before the genocide. The diagram below illustrates how trust in the government has grown in the past twenty years. It however also shows how MRND-rule in 1990 was

⁵⁴⁶ About the trials against Barayagwiza, Nahimana, Ngeze, and their backgrounds cf. Temple-Raston, 2005.

⁵⁴⁷ Cf. Chapter 4.1.5. and 4.1.6. or Des Forges, 2002, 902ff.; Hatzfeld, 2003; Straus, 2006; Fujii, 2009.


⁵⁴⁸ The RPF sought to diversify itself from a very early point on, in order not to be perceived as a "Tutsi"-party. Its strategy of ethnic inclusion was also reflected in the government of national unity that took power in 1994. E.g. the first president, Pasteur Bizimungu was a Hutu, the first prime minister, Faustin Twagiramungu, as well. The speaker of the parliament, Joseph Sebarenzi was a genocide survivor. Nevertheless, the real power remained with vice president Paul Kagame, who became president himself in 2003. Key positions in the Rwandan government with more than representative power tend to be filled with English-speaking returnees and Tutsi. Cf. Sim, *Classified cable from the American Embassy in Kigali to the Secretary of State*, August 5, 2008, on: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KIGALI525_a.html (March 12, 2014).

⁵⁴⁹ Straus & Waldorf, 2011, 8.

⁵⁵⁰ RPF, history, <http://www.rpfinkotanyi.org/en/?-history-> (March 14, 2014).

still evaluated positively among bystanders. Given that 1990 marked the beginning of a war after years of economic decline and taking into account the dominant narrative that has discredited the MRND-regime for twenty years, most bystanders still do not comprehend the second republic in the same categorically negative manner as returnees do. Furthermore, the ex-convicts and, less obviously, the bystanders' answers with regard to trusting the government in current years appear oddly overzealous. Why would they have obeyed a government they did not trust in 1994 and approve wholeheartedly of a regime that imprisoned them today? Innocently, as most say⁵⁵¹? It appears that the attempts of the RPF to foster a new interpretation of the past and promoting a negative view of their predecessor regimes have been extremely successful even with regard to people's opinions about their own life stories. Many residents seem to have retroactively revised their originally incompatible opinions so they fit the dominant "mythico-history"⁵⁵² of the returnee-led RPF that has superseded the old ideology of ethnic identity.

Trust in the government	1990	1994	2003	2011
Bystanders	0.9	-3.6	2.4	4
Ex-Convicts	0	-4.9	0.9	4.3
Returnees	-2	-2	3.8	4.2
Survivors	-0.7	-5	3.2	3.7
Rwanda Average	0.0	-4.0	2.5	4.0



Rwanda: Trust in the Government

The Unifying Power of Nationalism

⁵⁵¹ The small spike in the ex-convict's curve in 2003 coincides with the time around which most of the ex-convicts I interviewed were released.

⁵⁵² Term borrowed from Liisa Malkki, 1995. "Mythico-history" describes a narrative that is shared and handed down among members of a group in such a way that the group's shared interpretation of its historical experiences becomes a myth of origin for the group itself, its purpose and destiny.

Not unlike other postcolonial regimes focused on national development, the transitional Government of National Unity (GNU) that took power in 1994 and the RPF-government that replaced it in 2000 demonstrate a strong focus on national unity. The promotion of Rwandan nationalism with its multi-ethnic assimilative power serves the RPF as a suitable vehicle to combat societal divisions, replacing the old ideology of 'majoritarian democracy' that in reality translated into Hutu dominance. *"Nationalism is the glue that binds a nation. It means commitment to the values of the nation as well as commitment to the responsibilities of building the country, be it at the economic, social or political level. It also means being ready, if necessary, to make individual sacrifices for the good of the country"*⁵⁵³.

The brand of nationalism practiced by the Rwandan elite manifests itself in the promotion of an essentialist, at times simplified *"idealizing narrative of Rwanda's pre-colonial past"*⁵⁵⁴, painting the picture of a benevolent and in principle multi-ethnic elite that ruled the country through time-tested institutions and laws⁵⁵⁵. Notably, it emphasizes the facts that clan and lineage were more important than the Hutu- and Tutsi-identities⁵⁵⁶ and the permeability of group identities through practices such as e.g. *'Kwihutura'*⁵⁵⁷, the co-optation of wealthy Hutu into the dominating class of Tutsi⁵⁵⁸. Nevertheless, even if the identities were less stratified, precolonial clientship-practices such as *'ubuhake'* and *'uburetwa'* that revolved around cattle-ownership actually attributed a serf-like status to Hutus. Sylvestre, a 69-year old man recounts about his childhood: *"He got to know that he is a Hutu when he was a child because his father had asked for a cow to a Tutsi person and then from the day he gave him the cow, they were his Hutus"*⁵⁵⁹. Even if it might not have been explicitly ethnic in nature, there was definitely a difference in status between Hutu and Tutsi. These status differences are more difficult to trace in Rwanda where social engineering during two Hutu-dictatorships and the rule of the RPF largely superimposed the remains of the traditional system. In Burundi however, where the change from colonial rule was only gradual under the rule of the Mwami and later Tutsi officers from Bururi, participants reference the word 'Hutu', signifying 'dependent serf of a Tutsi', frequently⁵⁶⁰.

⁵⁵³ NEC, 2007, 18

⁵⁵⁴ Pottier, 2002, 205

⁵⁵⁵ Cf. Mbonimana, 2011, 85-172. Cf. Interview with Delta Foxtrott, 39, returnee, Kigali.

⁵⁵⁶ Cf. Shyaka, 2004, 5; Mbonimana, 2011, 172.

⁵⁵⁷ Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 64-75.

⁵⁵⁸ Cf. NEC, 2007, 29f; Pottier, 2002, 110-129

⁵⁵⁹ Interview with Sylvestre, 69, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. Even though, this quote is from a Burundian interview, the practices were widely congruent. The expression *"being someone's Hutu"* is much more common in Burundi, where the system of cattle clientship was officially practiced well into the 1970s. Clean verbatim from translator who spoke about Sylvestre in the third person.

⁵⁶⁰ Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 64-71. Rutayisire (2011, 298f.) maintains that the reality of *uburetwa* (cattle-clientship) was much more complex than just the exploitation of Hutu clients by Tutsi patrons. Nevertheless, the way in which the word *"Hutu"* was equated with serfdom in some interviews, particularly through the expression *"Umuhutu wanyje"*- 'my Hutu', or the frequent assertion that Hutu used to work for Tutsi in return for cows in Burundi, has led me to believe that precolonial practices are indeed sugarcoated by the Rwandan narrative. Cf.

The official Rwandan history focuses on shared aspects of the past and mainly ascribes ethnic conflict to the morally tainted, negative impact of the colonial practice of 'divide and rule'⁵⁶¹. In doing so, the narrative builds a nationalist foundational myth not unlike the ones cultivated by Western nations⁵⁶². It however also inadvertently reconnects with the views of the privileged, monarchic elite that felt entitled to rule Rwanda by tradition.

Mamdani⁵⁶³ emphasizes the need to historicize the identities of Hutu and Tutsi because we are facing the existence of two fundamentally opposed paradigms regarding the origins of these categories. He dismisses the 'no difference'-thesis brought forward predominantly by the proponents of the new regime which concentrates on common culture and only concedes socioeconomic differences, yet he also dismisses the 'distinct difference'-thesis, predominantly articulated by the Hutu potentates in the first and second republic emphasizing sociobiological aspects. Instead, Mamdani opts for an overarching perspective that takes into account the truths of both theses. He does not consider the misty historical origins of Hutu and Tutsi as Bantu-agriculturalists or pastoralist Hamites of primary importance but thinks of Hutu and Tutsi as one cultural group with distinct and polarized political identities whose definitions changed with each shift of power in the Rwandan state. The Rwandan historiography acted largely corresponded to these shifts of power. 'Ethnic' identity as such hence becomes a highly dynamic vessel that may be charged with diverse meanings made to fit the needs of political entrepreneurs. As long as an identity is of relevance to a sufficient group of persons, it can be charged with sectarian or uniting meaning. To return to our definition of reconciliation politics: the cleavages of conflict-era identities have not entirely been bridged or cut across. The conflict-era identities have rather been re-configured. Compared to the 'objective' ethnic identities of the genocide, which were defined by ID-cards, exclusion nowadays is much more subjective from the power holder's perspective and not as encompassing⁵⁶⁴. The authorities demand absolute interpretational sovereignty on what it means to be 'Rwandan'. Disagreeing or recalcitrant citizens may be excluded or subjected to re-education by governmental decree⁵⁶⁵.

The promotion of Rwandan nationalism and the establishment of a consciousness of national unity appears to be one of the areas where the RPF's attempts to change the population's mentality has its

Interviews with Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Gertrude, 46, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, Gakombe, Kirundo; Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. For the mythico-history of Hutus as serfs of Tutsi in Burundi, also see Malkki, 1995, 52-103.

⁵⁶¹ Cf. Rutayisire, 2011, 173.

⁵⁶² From the „*Mayflower*“ in the USA to the „*Rütlichschwur*“ in Switzerland, most countries have mythicized historical or semi-historical events in order to build up a sense of national pride. Such a narrative always needs a overly powerful antagonist. On nationalism and its significance for African emancipation, cf. Anderson, 2006.

⁵⁶³ Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 41-75.

⁵⁶⁴ Even though the fault lines of conflict remain unchanged in many cases. Cf. chapter 3.2.5.

⁵⁶⁵ Cf. Chapter 3.2.5; Tertsakian, 2011, 210-222; Thomson, 2013, 107-127.

greatest success. The expression “*we are all one Rwandan*⁵⁶⁶” is very popular among all categories of participants and has become something like a slogan. The reaffirmation of the new national identity was usually brought forward in direct response to questions about ethnic identity: “*there is no importance of that because it brings divisionism in Rwanda, there is no need to say this is a Hutu this is a Tutsi we are all one Rwanda*⁵⁶⁷.” In fact, the answers resembled each other so strongly that it appeared as if they had been learned by heart. Here is another answer from a different participant: “*it’s a very bad saying to say this is a Hutu, this is Tutsi because it brings divisionism. The good thing is to say one Rwandan, not to say this is someone from an ethnic group*⁵⁶⁸.” And yet another interviewee from another community: “*we all want to be Rwandans and not talk again about ethnic identities*⁵⁶⁹.” Furthermore the usage of words such as ‘divisionism’, ‘genocide’ or ‘genocide ideology’ were frequently used by English-speaking interviewees and, according to my research assistants, these loan-words were also used frequently by peasants. Even the term definitions of *ubwiyunge*-reconciliation resembled each other closer in Rwanda than in Burundi. This implies that the population has absorbed the nationalist discourse about 1994.

Complete Dissociation from the Past

The insistence on a flawed colonial and post-colonial Rwandan culture that divided a once united people and caused the genocide goes a long way to explaining the high modernist attempt at social engineering that characterizes the politics of post-genocide Rwanda. Nowhere is the focus on ‘divisionism’ as the main reason for the genocide more apparent than in the publications of the CNLG and the NURC, the organizations commissioned with maintaining the memory of the genocide respectively implementing the policy of unity and reconciliation: “*The miss interpretation [sic] and falsification of history that saved to spread divisionism among Rwandans are over. To day [sic], Rwandans are proud to be what they are and are in the way [sic] to make themselves what they want to be*⁵⁷⁰”, writes Bishop John Rucyahana, chairperson of the NURC in the foreword of the ‘Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer’. These words exemplify perfectly, how unity, patriotism, nationalism and reconciliation merge into one encompassing virtue in the ideology of the New Rwanda whereas the culture of the past and divisionism, denial, and genocide ideology merge as well: they become the realm of evil. Even the NURC’s ‘Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer’, an official surveys that compiles the views of Rwandans on reconciliation, does not ask its participants freely about their opinions. Rather, it supplies answers such as “*before the genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda*

⁵⁶⁶ Interview with Anasthase, 71, returnee, „Gatumba“, Huye or Interview with Annunciata, 58, survivor, “Gatumba“, Huye.

⁵⁶⁷ Interview with Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, „Gatumba“, Huye.

⁵⁶⁸ Interview with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, “Gatumba“, Huye.

⁵⁶⁹ Interview with Marita, 47, bystander, “Gatsata“, Gisagara.

⁵⁷⁰ NURC, Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer, 2010, 7.

*created divisions in society*⁵⁷¹” or “*today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan history encourages reconciliation*⁵⁷²” and only measures the participant’s rate of approval. On one side, this kind of research produces stunning quantitative approval rates for the politics of unity and reconciliation. On the other side, it effectively conveys the state’s expectations towards the participants. The survey itself already serves as a re-educational measure. Deviation or even criticism is beyond the accepted discourse. It becomes a ‘sectarian’ opinion, which in turn becomes ‘divisionism’ and ultimately ‘genocide ideology’ because according to the official discourse, societal division is what caused the genocide⁵⁷³.

The trend towards juxtaposing current events with the evils of the past and justifying policies by the act of dissociation from the ancient regime frequently repeats the same expressions and spreads throughout most government publications. For example: in its Facilitator’s Manual for the National Civic Education Programme (NCEP), the NEC states “*divisions led to war, massacres and the 1994 genocide. Post genocide government policy establishes the imperative that all Rwandans distance themselves from divisionism ideologies and stand together to work for sustainable development*⁵⁷⁴”. In the Annual Activity Report of 2002, the NURC explains the background of its establishment in similar words: “*since the advent of colonialists, Rwanda has been characterized by anti-people leadership that institutionalized sectarianism and discrimination among the Rwandan population. This system led to the culture of impunity that enabled leaders to institutionalize ruthless and despotic administration*⁵⁷⁵..” Thus, the genocide becomes the foundational myth for Rwanda’s journey into the future. The new Rwanda does not celebrate its independence, it only mourns the beginning of the genocide on April 6.

On the surface, this strategy of dissociation with pre-genocide Rwanda appears to work well with peasants. Optimistic statements, especially about the president, are frequent: “*if it keeps on going the same way and if we should remain with our president, even there would not be any danger in the future, citizens should stay peaceful*⁵⁷⁶.” Nevertheless, most peasants also speak positively about the time before the genocide. Young educated Hutu like Robert do understand the underlying motives, e.g. when talking about undergoing *Ingando*: “*What I am hating [sic] now about what they told me is that they interpret the history in their favor. They have their version of history. I mean history, whether it is bad, whether it is good, you teach it as it is because it is your history. So they were saying only*

⁵⁷¹ Cf. NURC, Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer, 2010, 52.

⁵⁷² Ibid. 53.

⁵⁷³ Cf. Pottier, 2002, 109-129.

⁵⁷⁴ NEC, 2007, 39

⁵⁷⁵ NURC, 2002, 4.

⁵⁷⁶ Interview with Maurice, 58, ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye.

*the bad things of the past government.*⁵⁷⁷." How far does the new ideology reach? Have the old ideas actually been replaced or just covered up? Furthermore, given the very small number of unapologetic Hutu I interviewed⁵⁷⁸, was this genocidal ideology as pervasive, widespread and significant for genocide as the official discourse claims?

Root Causes or Legitimation of Rule?

For the RPF-government, it is abundantly clear which factors were responsible for the genocide against the Tutsi. Bad governance, the Anti-Tutsi ideology originating in 1959, institutionalized ethnic discrimination inherited from colonial rule, political sectarianism, the hate media and the uneducated peasantry. They all contributed to a culture of impunity that inevitably culminated in the long-term planning and execution of the genocide⁵⁷⁹. The unjust patrimonial system of the past, the genocide, the racist propaganda and discrimination against Tutsi, the international inactivity and the fact that they were the only ones to fight and end the genocide are the parts of history the RPF and its academic supporters chose to emphasize on with regard to their program of national renewal. The grievances are real - their case is legitimate.

But are conflictive ethnic identities and ethnic discrimination actually the determinant root causes of the genocide or have the focus points of the country's national unity and reconciliation politics also been chosen because they conveniently legitimate RPF-rule and discredit the old system?

The general outlines of the narrative are true. The Tutsi were the principal target of the genocide. Members of the extremist Hutu-elite planned at least its initial stages by organizing militias, distributing weapons and drawing up death lists. The Tutsi were discriminated against from 1959 to 1994. Colonialism had exacerbated the Hutu-Tutsi divide, and perpetrators of earlier massacres against the Tutsi during that time were never held accountable. These facts all resonate in the work of international scholars⁵⁸⁰. Nevertheless, this narrative about the genocide is partial and somehow unilinear.

Interpretational Sovereignty

The problem that poses itself with the narrative of the genocide as taught by most recent Rwandan sources is less one of historical correctness but one of weighting the diverse factors and finding what was deliberately left out. Given the regime's emphasis on having stopped one of the greatest atrocities of our time, perhaps the most important blind spot is the role of the RPF itself with regard to

⁵⁷⁷ Interview with Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁵⁷⁸ Only three participants from "Gatsata", two bystanders and an ex-convict, were fundamentally critical of the RPF and actually championed the Hutu cause with regard to the genocide in some way.

⁵⁷⁹ Cf. Rutembesa, 2011, 517-585; Byanafashe & Rutayisire, 2011, 695f. Also, compare Pottier, 2002 and Eltringham, 2004.

⁵⁸⁰ Cf. E.g. Des Forges, 2002; Melvern, 2004 or Prunier, 1995.

Human Rights violations during the civil war, the genocide, and particularly the conflict in Zaïre/ DRC starting in 1996.

Pottier attributes the RPF's narrative a simple yet persuasive quality, which, in connection to Rwanda's donor-friendly behavior, managed to convince many foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers, particularly in the Anglophone world⁵⁸¹. Within international academia however, the RPF's version has been increasingly raised to question by academics familiar with the region's history such as e.g. Alison Des Forges⁵⁸², Johan Pottier⁵⁸³, Nigel Eltringham⁵⁸⁴, Filip Reyntjens⁵⁸⁵ and René Lemarchand⁵⁸⁶. The Rwandan elite never accepted what they understand as malicious external interference with problems they consider quintessentially Rwandan. In a nutshell, the argument often heard in speeches by RPF-politicians works as follows: 'the West and the international community have left Rwandans to fend for themselves during the genocide, now who are these Westerners to criticize the way Rwanda manages its own problems'. Analyses of the genocide focusing on the importance of underlying circumstances, local networks, peer pressure and compliance with authority instead of the "*ideology of ethnic hatred*⁵⁸⁷" or the "*climate of corruption, hegemony and exclusion*⁵⁸⁸" are rarely considered worthwhile by Rwandan sources. If academic articles or books are perceived to have an anti-RPF undertone, it occurs that they are actively fought⁵⁸⁹. "*The mobilization of academic RPF-supporters and the consistency with which they ignore or misrepresent post-independence scholarship on Rwanda took British [and international] academia by surprise*⁵⁹⁰." Any criticism of the RPF's actions is suspiciously absent from the discourse about the genocide or tagged with labels such as "*negationism*⁵⁹¹" or the discredited "*theory of double-genocide*⁵⁹²." The RPF and their academic supporters do not consider diverging views as part of an academic debate but rather

⁵⁸¹ Kagame's close ties with Bill Clinton and Tony Blair have widely been covered by the media. One of the first and most important western journalists convinced by the RPF-narrative was Philip Gourevitch, author of the award-winning book "*We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families*", Picador, New York, 1998.

⁵⁸² Cf. Des Forges, 2002. "*Leave none to tell the story*" is still the standard reference with regard to the genocide in Rwanda. Kagame's regime however declared her a persona non grata and banned her from entering the country in 2008 because she insisted that the RPF should be held accountable for its war crimes and crimes against humanity.

⁵⁸³ Cf. Pottier, 2002.

⁵⁸⁴ Cf. Eltringham, 2004.

⁵⁸⁵ Cf. Reyntjens, 2005a and 2013, 124-158.

⁵⁸⁶ Cf. Lemarchand, 2007; 2009a, 99-109; 2009b.

⁵⁸⁷ Shyaka, 2004, 23.

⁵⁸⁸ Shyaka, 2004, 20.

⁵⁸⁹ Cf. e.g. the attacks against Straus' and Waldorf's anthology *Remaking Rwanda* (2011) in the New Times: Rwagatare, J.: *Why vultures have no chance*, in New Times, 4.4.11, p.8; Rwagatare, J.: *Remaking Rwanda: Only Rwandans can do it*, in: New Times, 19.4.11, p. 8) or President Kagame's personal (!) rebuttal of René Lemarchand's conclusions in Clark & Kaufman, 2008, pp. xxi-xxvi.

⁵⁹⁰ Pottier, 2002, 109.

⁵⁹¹ Cf. Rutembesa, 2011, 579. IRDP, 2008,83-90.

⁵⁹² IRDP, 2008, 90.

as attempts to sabotage either their efforts towards unity and reconciliation or even the memory of the genocide itself⁵⁹³. Ingelaere characterizes the government's behavior as "*active interference in the scientific construction of knowledge*"⁵⁹⁴."

The Rwandan state and its institutions assert absolute interpretational sovereignty with regard to the genocide and Rwandan history in general. Rwanda disseminates its own version actively and aggressively defends its interpretational sovereignty against any form of criticism. The official narrative of the genocide represents the centerpiece of Rwanda's unity and reconciliation politics. This streamlined '*mythico-history*' is heavily propagated among the Rwandan population through diverse means⁵⁹⁵ and constitutes one of the pillars of Rwandan foreign policy when dealing with criticism or applying for budget support. The state also actively encourages and commissions a growing literature on Rwandan history that incorporated national history lessons in Rwanda's school system for the first time. MINEDUC strongly relies on new literature from Rwandan scholars⁵⁹⁶.

Not only are politics of unity and reconciliation in Rwanda inextricably linked to the RPF and President Kagame's claim to leadership, they have become the rationale for the RPF's dominance. The official narrative's bias however does not necessarily annul the policies' effectiveness for reconciliation. To the contrary, many interviewees seemed to be pleased with recent political developments and claimed to be completely reconciled⁵⁹⁷. Despite strong pressure for conformity from above, many of these statements seemed honest, genuine and were backed up with credible and logical arguments. In other interviews, e.g. with Mukaga Kwaya⁵⁹⁸, Maurice⁵⁹⁹ or Rugango⁶⁰⁰ in "*Gatumba*", the answers appeared politically correct and learned, conveying the image that these participants had believed in a different version of history before but opportunistically accepted the new version in order not to run into problems with the authorities. In general, Rwandans appear very educated about the genocide and reconciliation, which is probably related to the relentless government campaigns. The NURC e.g. claims that a total of 115'228⁶⁰¹ people passed through *Itorero ry'Igihugu*, 92'835⁶⁰² Rwandans did undergo the *Ingando*'solidarity camps' up to 2009.⁶⁰³

⁵⁹³ Cf. IRDP, 2008, 77-98.

⁵⁹⁴ Ingelaere, 2010c, 42.

⁵⁹⁵ The NURC lists public education programs such as Ingando and Itorero, conferences and consultative discussions, summits, student clubs, seminars and research works (NURC, 2009, 10-15).

⁵⁹⁶ Cf. E.g. Byanafashe & Rutayisire (eds.), 2011; Shyaka, 2004; IRDP, 2006. About the introduction of Rwandan history classes: IRDP, 2006, 340ff.

⁵⁹⁷ Cf. e.g. Interview with Vianney, 52, bystander, "*Gatata*", Gisagara and Vincent, 43, bystander, "*Gatsata*", Gisagara.

⁵⁹⁸ Cf. Interview with Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "*Gatumba*", Huye.

⁵⁹⁹ Cf. Interview with Maurice, 52, ex-convict, "*Gatumba*" Huye.

⁶⁰⁰ Cf. Interview with Rugango, 81, ex-convict, "*Gatumba*", Huye.

⁶⁰¹ Cf. NURC, 2009, 12.

⁶⁰² Cf. NURC, 2009, 11.

Thus, if we are to dissect Rwandan politics of unity and reconciliation and the discourse underlying it, it is important to note “that history is invariably politicized and that Rwanda’s future hinges on the ability to navigate divergent interpretations of the past⁶⁰⁴”

4.1.5. Gaps in the official Discourse – The Genocide from Below

Contextualizing the Genocide

As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, there are alternative more grassroots-oriented explanations with regard to the root causes of genocide than the version of the RPF. The official narrative focuses heavily on the role of the extremist regime and its ideology but mostly omits the patterns of execution of the genocide. Even if the official version is based on facts and should not be dismissed as pure propaganda, it’s the emphasis on root causes such as ‘bad governance’, ‘divisionism’ or ‘genocide ideology’ that have to be scrutinized meticulously. If the ‘official’ analysis misinterprets the root causes, politics at the grassroots consequently address the wrong problems.

The carnage in the Great Lakes Region has erupted along ethnic lines. There is no doubt about that.

The thesis present however tries to understand ethnic polarization in the context of the sociopolitical and economic processes that caused society to break up along these lines in such a violent manner. The colonial practice of ‘divide and rule’ was not only implemented in Rwanda or Burundi. Corrupt and/or incompetent elites at some point have governed most African states, yet recurring episodes of mass violence and genocide have been an oddly specific feature of the Great Lakes’ history.

Broad categorizations often obstruct important nuances. I am very reluctant to classifying Rwanda’s experience as a “*dispossessive genocide*⁶⁰⁵” or “*retributive genocide*⁶⁰⁶”. The thesis does neither define the killings of 1972 in Burundi as “*politicide*⁶⁰⁷” nor 1993 as “*ethnic civil war*”. These labels may have their merits for broadly summarizing what happened in the Great Lakes Region or for reasons of comparison. Nevertheless, they tend to reduce the complexity of the conflict either to a simple Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy based on revenge (*‘retributive genocide’*), land-hunger and state control (*‘dispossessive genocide’*) or an elite-driven extermination of political competition that happened to be ethnic (*‘politicide’*). These general descriptions all have their merits. Nevertheless, a rather elusive mixture

⁶⁰³ Cf. Mgbako, 2005; Thomson, 2011; Thomson, 2013.

⁶⁰⁴ Clark and Kaufman, 2009, 8.

⁶⁰⁵ Valentino, 2004, 70.

⁶⁰⁶ Fein, 1993, 86ff. As Frank Chalk pointed out to me, the term ‘retributive’ is actually deceptive. If innocent people are killed, this is not actual retribution but rather a new crime that demands punishment on its own. Genocide per definition does not distinguish between the guilty deserving retribution and their innocent relatives but aims at exterminating a group in whole or in part.

⁶⁰⁷ Harff & Gurr, 1988, 360.

of factors drove perpetrators. Scientific terms focusing on one specific aspect of conflict such as e.g. revenge usually neglect other, equally important factors. The primary fault lines of the conflict, Hutu against Tutsi, can be historically explained - as the official narrative does. Nevertheless, the question why peasants joined the genocide is probably more important to reconciliation than the question why ethnicity became the distinguishing feature of persecution. Thus, a great part of the semi-structured interviews I conducted revolved around the topic of motivation. Why did people kill? Why do they think their neighbors killed? Understanding the reasons behind participation in the genocide allows us to draw conclusions on the efficiency and responsiveness of reconciliatory efforts.

Peasants: No 'Tribal Hatred'

One of the most fascinating aspects of my field research was the earnest assurance of many rural participants that they had in fact reconciled with their neighbors. Regardless of the category they belonged to, the majority claimed to having laid the past to rest and living together without major problems. Participants, especially members of AMI, frequently talked about sharing beer, a very common Rwandan symbol for peaceful relationships, Costasie, a survivor: *“so we are trying to live together like my[self] personally, I have cleaned my heart. For example, I drink beers, sometimes we go in the pub. He [the perpetrator] can buy a bottle, we drink together and I also buy another one, we drink it together. So there is... We no longer look at someone then we say 'this is a Hutu, this is Tutsi' because we are doing the good things between us. Because they also saw finally that the people who lied [to] them to kill, they took the airplane, then they went abroad⁶⁰⁸.”* Costasie deemed the political instigators responsible, not her neighbors. Maurice, an ex-convict shared her assessment: *“if you would come back here in the evening and look at us when we are sharing the beer in the pub, so you would see that things are smooth now⁶⁰⁹.”* Actions symbolic for peace and reconciliation such as sharing traditional beer or intermarriage were brought up frequently when talking about the current relationships between the former antagonists. *“When you can see perpetrators going and asking for forgiveness to genocide survivors, when you can see intermarriages, when you can see people sharing everything, people chatting. For him, he thinks the state is doing enough. People he says, people have already reconciled⁶¹⁰.”* If not for the occasional critical or disappointed voices encountered when talking to people who were not members of sponsored *ubudehe* organizations such as AMI, it would have been easy to just believe Boniphilde that *“today, almost all Rwandans have reconciled, there is no more fear between Hutu and Tutsi⁶¹¹.”*

⁶⁰⁸ Interview with Costasie, 65, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye.

⁶⁰⁹ Interview with Maurice, 58, ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye.

⁶¹⁰ Interview with Vincent, 43, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara – Clean verbatim from the translator who speaks of Vincent in the third person.

⁶¹¹ Interview with Boniphilde, 40, survivor, “Gatumba” Huye.

A crime such as genocide usually divides victims and perpetrators for generations. So what distinguishes Rwandan peasants from e.g. the population of Ex-Yugoslavia where people considered sustained coexistence inside a common state unbearable?

One main difference is the strong popular conviction of having been manipulated by the *Akazu*-elite. As Yohani, the former head of cell in “*Gatumba*” recounted: *“They used to tell us that the airplane was shot by Inyenzi and Inyenzi were Tutsis, so as we ordinary people who were governed, we couldn’t escape. We thought that what our leaders told us was true.”*⁶¹² Coercion through the state and dangerous resistance are popular rational explanations for participation in the genocide among Hutu. *“A soldier could come in the community and say: ‘look if we are to be winning this war, you have also to start killing those Tutsis because they are the accomplices, you have to kill them. It’s like we are on the battlefield but you also, that is another battlefield of yours.’ Yeah...”* Interviewer: *“Did you believe the soldiers?”* Augustin: *“Yeah, [I] believed the soldiers because otherwise you could be beaten up or even like killed[...].”*⁶¹³ Ex-convicts in general passed on the guilt. They depicted themselves as small cogs in the wheel who failed to understand the sociopolitical dynamics at work: *“As ordinary people we didn’t know how it changed into... I mean into killings. Except, like members of different parties, they knew already what is going to happen but us we didn’t know anything”*⁶¹⁴.

In “*Gatumba*” as well as “*Gatsata*”, soldiers, police officers or *Interahamwe* from other places entered the community before the massacres started on a grand scale. The fact that *“soldiers came to tell the rest of the population that Tutsi and the Inkotanyi are the ones who killed their president, that they have to get rid of them”*⁶¹⁵ is very important to Hutu. Being pressured into acting out the plan of the ‘*Hutu Power*’-elite at least partially absolves them from the guilt of having taken part in the genocide. François recounted: *“some Interahamwe who killed the people from this hill were citizens of this hill but there was other Interahamwe from other hills because there was a sensitization. Like the army, some soldiers sensitized that there is killing on the other side, [so] you should also kill”*⁶¹⁶. As we will see with reconciliation programs, the ‘sensitization’ and the ‘order’ in the sense of conditioning by the state are very important to many Rwandans.

In an attempt of perpetrators to reclaim their innocence respectively of survivors to live among Hutu without constant fear, the genocide is conceived as the result of elite interference with the population: *“It’s always the high officials that bring divisionism but us ordinary people we don’t have any*

⁶¹² Interview with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, “*Gatumba*”, Huye.

⁶¹³ Interview with Augustin, 50, bystander, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara.

⁶¹⁴ Interview with Paul, 44, ex-convict, “*Gatumba*”, Huye.

⁶¹⁵ Interview with Faustin, 40, survivor, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara.

⁶¹⁶ Interview with François, 52, bystander, “*Gatumba*”, Huye.

*problem*⁶¹⁷.” The killings were commanded from above and executed by the population, just as clearing the bush in *umuganda*. The Kinyarwanda-word *Muyaga* (*wind / wind of destruction*), which Rwandans adopted for violent episodes before the genocide, particularly in 1959⁶¹⁸, captures the character of interethnic violence perfectly: a sudden, extremely violent change of the societal parameters that suspends the basic rules of humanity and is over as swiftly as it started. It begins and ends upon the command of an official. Most interviewees agreed with Cécile who stated that there were orders to kill which “*came from top-leaders, from leaders at the upper level*⁶¹⁹.”

After these episodes of violence, Hutu and Tutsi go back to being good neighbors again. As bizarre as that sounds, Hatzfeld⁶²⁰ and Fujii⁶²¹ have made similar experiences and the answers of my participants corroborate their findings: ‘tribal’ hatred between the groups was not the main motivation for killing. Even the settlement patterns of Hutu and Tutsi suggest otherwise. Groups that fundamentally distrust each other tend to move into segregated sectors of the community, trying to live closer to members of their own group. This happened in Burundi during the civil war, “*Rohero*” being the perfect example⁶²². To a lesser extent, it also happened in “*Gatumba*” after the genocide, when the government provided new houses for survivors and grouped them together. If we look at the scaled questions, we can detect that returnees assessed neighborly relations before the genocide much worse than residents did. Bystanders and survivors described the relations with their neighbors positively, similar to today.

Trust in Neighbors

	1990	1994	2003	2011
Bystanders	3.3	-2.6	2.2	4.3
Ex-Convicts	2.3	-3.1	0.6	4.3
Returnees	0.3	-0.8	2.2	4.3
Survivors	3.8	-4.8	1.8	4
Rwanda Average	2.9	-3.1	1.8	4.2

⁶¹⁷ Interview with Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, “*Gatumba*”, Huye.


⁶¹⁸ Cf. Sebarenzi, 2009, 14.

⁶¹⁹ Interview with Cécile, 40, bystander, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara.

⁶²⁰ Cf. Hatzfeld, 2005.

⁶²¹ Cf. Fujii, 2009.

⁶²² Cf. chapter 6.



Rwanda: How much would you trust your neighbors if you compare your situation in....?

The diagram corroborates that the population never saw their neighbors at the origins of the genocide. It was less a matter of ethnic hatred but a matter of governmental intervention. A study from the Rwandan think tank IRDP also confirms the findings that the majority of Rwandans (53 percent) considers the social relations very good⁶²³. The assessments of my interviewees could even be interpreted as being more positive than the NURC's 'Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer' where 24.7 percent agreed to the statement, *"it is difficult for me or my family to trust Rwandans who found themselves on the other side of the conflict during the genocide"*⁶²⁴.

If the genocide however was not the product of interethnic hatred among neighbors but a product of massive governmental manipulation, why did the population comply?

Motivations of Perpetrators

As mentioned in chapter 2.3., the Rwandan genocide could be interpreted as a struggle for absolute dominance of the state, which the extremist Hutu elite reinterpreted as an ethnic life-and-death struggle in order to exert pressure to participate among the population⁶²⁵. Even though this aspect plays a tangential role in the official narrative, some interviewees understood it similarly: *"I think it was more economic and power play. Because these people were killing these other people because they didn't want them to take the property."*⁶²⁶ Motivations for joining the genocide however are heterogeneous and manifold. They have to be understood in context, not as a linear trajectory.

⁶²³ Cf. IRDP, 2010a, 33.

⁶²⁴ NURC, *Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer*, 2008, 68.

⁶²⁵ Cf. Straus, 2006, 224-246.

⁶²⁶ Interview with Théodosine, 24, returnee, Kigali.

Regarding thoughts and motivations during the genocide, Rwandans speak of a unique mixture of feelings mostly based on war-related rumors: fear⁶²⁷, greed for Tutsi-properties⁶²⁸, lack of education and proper information⁶²⁹, rage about Habyarimana's assassination and the consequential desire for self-defense⁶³⁰.

When it came to the question "*Why do you think people killed?*", there was an interesting but very clear difference between ex-convicts, survivors, bystanders and returnees. 'Greed' or ogling Tutsis' land and property was one of the most stated reasons why participants thought Hutu had joined the genocide⁶³¹. This motivation however was mostly proffered by survivors and late-born bystanders. In a poor and overpopulated country such as Rwanda, the material incentive seems plausible. Nevertheless, material gain as a main driving force of genocide was supported neither by Straus⁶³² nor by the statements of ex-convicts whom I conducted interviews with. Although "*eating cows*⁶³³" and looting was a popular practice among perpetrators, only Yohani actually considered "*getting their properties*⁶³⁴" a principal motive behind the genocide. The other ex-convicts cited different reasons. The ex-convicts testimony that greed was only understood as a secondary motive for joining the genocide runs contrary to what most other Rwandans and Burundians believe. Etienne for example, a Burundian IDP explained the violence with the sentence "*a hungry man is an angry man*⁶³⁵." There is no doubt that poverty exacerbates political tensions but according to almost all ex-convicts I interviewed, 'greed' does not seem to be a strong enough motivation on its own to taking part in the persecution and murder of one's neighbors. Next to 'greed', the practice of 'bad governance' in the old regime⁶³⁶, the pre-existing history of violence between Hutu and Tutsi⁶³⁷, ignorance and illiteracy, as

⁶²⁷ Cf. interviews with Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Vincent, 43, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Augustin, 50, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁶²⁸ Cf. Interviews with Anasthase, 71, returnee, "Gatumba", Huye; Annunciata, 58, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Jeanne d'Arc, 34, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Yohani N., ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁶²⁹ Cf. e.g. Interviews with François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Paul, 44, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Kibonge, 43, bystander, Huye.

⁶³⁰ Cf. A surprisingly high number of Hutu in "Gatsata" said that the killing of Tutsi was perceived as an act of self-defense. Cf. interviews with Innocent, 55, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁶³¹ Cf. Interviews with Anasthase, 71, returnee, "Gatumba", Huye; Annunciata, 58, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Jeanne d'Arc, 34, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Yohani N., ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Dusabe, 50, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁶³² Cf. Straus, 2006, 150f.

⁶³³ Interview with Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁶³⁴ Interview with Yohani 68, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁶³⁵ Interview with Etienne, 59, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi, Burundi.

⁶³⁶ Cf. interviews with Canisius, 61, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Christine, 49, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁶³⁷ Cf. chapter 4.1.2. and Interviews with Vianney, 52, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Teresa, 72, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Karemera, 72, returnee, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

well as the influence of supernatural evil forces such as the devil⁶³⁸ were the most-quoted reasons among all participant categories combined.

Bystanders and ex-convicts mention obedience to orders⁶³⁹ and the circumstances of war⁶⁴⁰ much more frequently than survivors⁶⁴¹ and returnees. Ex-convicts emphasize on the increasing fear and insecurity invoked by officials, soldiers or Hutu refugees from Byumba and Bugesera⁶⁴² that pushed them to follow the extremist script in a perceived act of self-defense⁶⁴³. *“They used to tell us that the Tutsis who had fled in 1959, they were the ones who were back to take again the power⁶⁴⁴.”* Innocent explains that *“had to kill them as a kind of self-defense vis-à-vis the unfolding leadership of the Tutsi regime⁶⁴⁵.”*

The one aspect that practically all⁶⁴⁶ of the ex-convicts focus on most is that they had to obey the orders of the authorities⁶⁴⁷. Many ex-convicts believe that trapped between their outraged neighbors and the extremist authorities, they had no choice but to join the killing⁶⁴⁸. Both John and Maurice made an analogy between killing and public work: *“When there is Umuganda - public works, so if you see all the people they are going to Umuganda, how can you stay alone? So you have to follow them. So it’s like my neighbors plus local authorities pushed me to [do] the killings⁶⁴⁹.”* Asked about the recruitment of peasants during the genocide, John answered: *“you simply have to obey. If they say go to the community work, you go to the community work⁶⁵⁰.”*

⁶³⁸ Cf. e.g. interviews with Rugango, 81, ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye; Jeanne d’Arc, 34, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye; Marita, 47, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Boniphilde, 40, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye; Dusabe, 50, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.

⁶³⁹ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Cécile, 40, bystander, Gatsata; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye; John, 56, ex-convict, “Gatsata”, Gisagara

⁶⁴⁰ Cf. interviews with Gaspard, 26, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Innocent, 55, ex-convict, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Augustin, 50, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Vincent, 43, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Françoise, 53, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; John, 56, ex-convict, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.

⁶⁴¹ Emmanuel, 37, survivor from “Gatsata”, Gisagara is a notable exception.

⁶⁴² Byumba was captured by the RPF first. Cf. Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

⁶⁴³ Interview with Innocent, 55, ex-convict, „Gatsata“, Gisagara; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye.

⁶⁴⁴ Interview with Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye.

⁶⁴⁵ Innocent, 55, ex-convict, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

⁶⁴⁶ Yusuf, 56, ex-convict from “Gatsata”, Gisagara blames the genocide on the ignorance of the people who did not understand that there are no differences between Hutu and Tutsi.

⁶⁴⁷ Cf. Interviews with Innocent, 55, ex-convict, „Gatsata“, Gisagara; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye; Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye; John, 56, ex-convict, „Gatsata“, Gisagara; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye.

⁶⁴⁸ Although other Hutu-participants of the same age such as Canisius, Augustin, Vincent, Vianney or Peter claim that they could actually stand apart without arousing too much suspicion. Vincent, a fisherman, e.g. claims that he was spending his days at the lake, apart from the rest of the village; Canisius has a bad leg and was acquitted because he could not have possibly hunted down Tutsi due to his injury.

⁶⁴⁹ Maurice, 58, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye.

⁶⁵⁰ Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

Irrespective of the question if Maurice or John participated in the genocide willingly or were pushed to do so, we can proceed on the assumption that every Rwandan was well aware of ethnic identities as part of a script of violence dictated by the Hutu extremists struggling for power. Still, in most cases this ethnic awareness did not translate into indifferent hatred or racism. Peer pressure, fear and uncertainty seem to have been more important. According to Straus, racism and exposure to propaganda only explain which perpetrators behaved the most violent, not why they joined⁶⁵¹. No, the reasons for joining the genocide, according to the ex-convicts themselves, were mostly circumstantial and not possible outside of wartime conditions.

4.1.6. Gaps in the official Discourse II – Civil War and Pressure from Above

The Significance of the Civil War

The view of the genocide as the culmination of the 'divisionist' Rwandan culture of the first and second republic deemphasizes the effect of the RPF-initiated civil war⁶⁵². The fact that the civil war exacerbated interethnic tensions is a connection that the majority of Rwandan residents from 1994 still are aware of when asked about the start of the genocide⁶⁵³. Even survivors such as Emmanuel state that the genocide could not have taken place without the circumstances of war⁶⁵⁴ or at least that the war poisoned the interethnic relations⁶⁵⁵. Some Rwandans, particularly Hutus, even use the word 'war' as a substitute for 'genocide' when speaking about the events of 1994, emphasizing on the dire situation of both sides.⁶⁵⁶ Rwandans however also often use the politically correct word 'liberation' instead of 'invasion'⁶⁵⁷ when speaking about the RPF, as if to emphasize the victims on both sides while at the same time not offending the powers that be.

Scott Straus emphasizes that the 'law'-character of mandatory participation in the genocide and Hutu peer pressure in general intensified through the circumstances of war, which drove most Hutu perpetrators to join⁶⁵⁸. Jacques Sémelin, a comparative scholar of genocide, concurs that the traumatization from four years of war had set the stage in which the genocidal propaganda could flourish.

⁶⁵¹ Cf. Straus, 2006, 135.

⁶⁵² Cf. Des Forges, 2002, 74-82 on the RPF's attack; Fujii, 2009, 103-127 on „*the enigma of ethnicity*“ and Straus, 2006, 153-174 and 224-246 on the effect of circumstances of civil war on the genocide.

⁶⁵³ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Chris (survivor, Kigali), Jeanne d'Arc (survivor „Gatumba“), John (ex-convict „Gatsata“), Maximilien (survivor, Kigali), Umubyeyi (bystander, „Gatsata“), Thasiene („Gatumba“), Vianney (bystander, „Gatsata“), Yohani N. (ex-convict, „Gatumba“), Yusuf (ex-convict, „Gatsata“).

⁶⁵⁴ Cf. Interview with Emmanuel, 37, survivor from „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

⁶⁵⁵ Cf. Interview with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali.

⁶⁵⁶ Cf. interviews with Jean-Claude, 23, bystander; Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, « Gatsata », Gisagara. Marita, 47, bystander, « Gatsata », Gisagara.

⁶⁵⁷ Cf. e.g. Interview with Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Interview with Maurice, 58, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye.

⁶⁵⁸ Cf. Straus, 2006, 219ff.

ish⁶⁵⁹. Manus Midlarsky makes the case that genocide requires for a regime to be in the “*domain of losses*”⁶⁶⁰, thus already involved in a war and suffering from repeated defeats (the loss of the north to the RPF) for massacres to cross the threshold into genocide. Jean Hatzfeld, a journalist who interviewed a group of killers for a prolonged time, doubts if his interviewees even hated Tutsi at all⁶⁶¹. Finally, Lee Ann Fujii’s empirical study of interpersonal networks during the genocide postulates a “*constructivist theory of mass violence*”⁶⁶². She comprehends the genocide itself as the actually divisive endeavor, not pre-existing ethnic divisions: “*What the data show most clearly, in other words, is that ethnic hatreds seem to have been a consequence of the genocide, not a cause*”⁶⁶³.

We thus have to question 'ethnic hatred' as well as 'genocide ideology' as primary motivations and should focus more on the conditions under which the genocide happened. Here, the comparison with Burundi elucidates certain dynamics.

Parallels to Burundi

An interpretation focusing on the influence of framework conditions instead of the diabolical plan-



Assassination of M. Ndadaye by Tutsi. Extremist Cartoon from La Médaille-Nyiramacibiri, November 1993, Nr. 17, p. 10

Un assistant : Achez ce stupide Hutu, les organes génitaux que vous lui enlèverez, suspendez-les sur notre tambour.

Ndadaye : Tuez-moi mais vous n'exterminerez pas les Ndadaye au Burundi.

Kagame : Achez-le vite. Ne savez-vous pas qu'à Byumba et à Ruhengeri. Nous avons fait du travail. Les femmes, nous leur avons retiré les enfants de la matrice, les hommes, nous leur avons enlevé les yeux.

Le tambour : Kalinga du Burundi

in: Chrétien, 1995, 365.

ning of Hutu extremists places the genocide against the Tutsi much closer into the vicinity of large-scale massacres following Ndadaye’s assassination in Burundi 1993. In Burundi, despite a

⁶⁵⁹ Cf. Sémelin, 2007, 205-212.

⁶⁶⁰ Midlarsky, 2005, 84.

⁶⁶¹ Hatzfeld, 2003, 216-221

⁶⁶² Cf. Fujii, 2009, 21.

⁶⁶³ Fujii, 2009, 183.

speech by the future FRODEBU-leader Jean Minani who called on Hutus to resist the putschists⁶⁶⁴, there is no evidence of planning mass killings at the national level⁶⁶⁵. Even a former FRODEBU-cadre explained to me that the Anti-Tutsi violence was largely determined by local dynamics⁶⁶⁶. Nevertheless, the dynamics and methods of violence were similar: public outrage about the president's death, a culture of impunity, roadblocks, burning houses, and ordinary Hutus forming killing squads armed with machetes and traditional weapons. The body count was stunningly high⁶⁶⁷ and many Burundians speak of genocide⁶⁶⁸, sometimes on both sides⁶⁶⁹. Except for the national army intervening early and mercilessly on behalf of the Burundian Tutsis, the mass killings followed a script very similar to the genocide but apparently without central planning.

Furthermore, we should not underestimate the significance of the Burundian massacres of 1993 for the unfolding of the Rwandan genocide. The first time the extremist propaganda radio RTLM adapted a radical anti-Tutsi stance was after Ndadaye's assassination by Tutsi army officers⁶⁷⁰. If we look at the headlines of extremist Hutu media in Rwanda, the observation of the progression of the Burundian civil war might have had two consequences. First, it might have instigated a plan among Hutu hardliners to kill the president in order to provoke a Hutu uprising, which happened in Burundi. Second, it certainly reinforced the fundamental distrust against the Tutsi, who in their eyes did apparently neither shrink back from murdering the president nor the whole Hutu elite (in 1972) in order to retain power over the state⁶⁷¹. In this respect, it was the inverted situation from the early sixties, when a leery Burundian Tutsi elite vigilantly observed the 'Hutu revolution' in Rwanda and decided to strike pre-emptively in order to stifle any possible Hutu uprising⁶⁷². In the eyes of Rwandan Hutu extremists, the RPF had invaded Rwanda in 1990 to re-establish Tutsi dominance just as in Burundi. Taking into account the rumors about killings in RPF-occupied territory, the Tutsis' alleged plan for renewed domination and even extermination was considered general knowledge to many Hutu, not just extremists. Canisius e.g. states that he *"was really scared about the Inkotanyi because he knew*

⁶⁶⁴ Cf. Watt, 2008, 48 and Interview with Violetta, 30, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

⁶⁶⁵ Cf. Watt, 2008, 47-56; Lemarchand, 2009a, 145f.

⁶⁶⁶ He recounted that some young Hutu came to him and asked for the order to strike out against the Tutsi but because the local FRODEBU officials told them to keep calm, very few killings happened in "Kamenge" in 1993. Cf. Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

⁶⁶⁷ Reyntjens, 2005b, 117 speaks of 50'000 casualties in 1993 alone.

⁶⁶⁸ Cf. Interviews with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Claver, 66, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatant, "Rohero", Ngozi; Ferdinand, 56, Hutu refugee, "Rohero", Ngozi; Généroise, 43, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Juvénal, 59, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Maniriho, 32, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

⁶⁶⁹ Cf. Interview with Marguerite, 55, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Pascal, 54, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; David, 28, ex-combatant, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. Venantie K., 25, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

⁶⁷⁰ Cf. Chrétien et al., 2002, 69.

⁶⁷¹ Cf. Chrétien, 1995, 133f.

⁶⁷² Cf. Lemarchand, 1970, 436-468, chapter 1.1.3.

*that they were coming to kill them*⁶⁷³.” Nevertheless, an argumentation about the causes of genocide focusing on the circumstances of civil war would place partial responsibility on the RPF who started the war, thus compromising the image of the guerilla army who stopped one of the worst atrocities in human history. After an acknowledgement of partial guilt, it would be much more difficult to demand justice and reprimand the international community for their inaction during the genocide⁶⁷⁴. Hence, the RPF emphasizes on the central planning of the genocide against the Tutsi⁶⁷⁵, the ideology of ethnic hatred and the discriminatory and nepotistic features of the ancient regimes.

The Leviathan

After Habyarimana’s murder, the extremists acted fast. They quickly filled the vacuum of power by immediately eliminating the moderate opposition that challenged their claim to Hutu leadership and rallying the outraged but completely disoriented Hutu-mob behind them. The context of the lasting civil war, the rage about Habyarimana’s murder⁶⁷⁶ and the frequent rumors about the RPF’s viciousness in the occupied territories in the north all worked in favor of the extremist conspiracy⁶⁷⁷. The extremists’ allegations sounded plausible to many Hutus. Françoise, a bystander from “*Gatsata*” had relatives in Byumba who were allegedly killed by the RPF and she believes the reason for “*her friends and other people from her family who partook in the genocide, it was partly self-defense*⁶⁷⁸.”

From the 6th of April on, the extremists summarily denominated Tutsi residents as ‘accomplices’ of the RPF that had to be exterminated as a part of local self-defense, interpreting it as a further stage of the war⁶⁷⁹ and mimicking established public practices such as *umuganda*. Straus, comparing different local dynamics of the genocide, even argues that the rapid expansion of the genocide was less the result of meticulous planning by the *Akazu* and more the result of circumstances of “*acute uncertainty, heightened anxiety, fear, and confusion*⁶⁸⁰”. The hardliners were able to successfully convincing the population that they were controlling the state after having eliminated the moderate competition. Fujii postulates that for people joining the genocide, these groups of killers became “*sites of*

⁶⁷³ Interview with Canisius, 61, bystander, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara. Clean verbatim from the translator who talked about Canisius in the third person.

⁶⁷⁴ The inaction of the international community is without a doubt one of the major reasons for the escalation of the genocide but will not be treated here. It has been covered extensively, inter alia in my master’s thesis (Rieder, 2005) or by e.g. the following excellent works Dallaire, 2004; Des Forges, 2002; Melvern, 2004;

⁶⁷⁵ Cf. e.g. Melvern, 2004.

⁶⁷⁶ Cf. Interviews with Maurice, 58, ex-convict, “*Gatumba*”, Huye, Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara; Françoise, 53, bystander, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara.

⁶⁷⁷ Cf. Chapter 4.1.2. and Interviews with John 56, ex-convict, „*Gatsata*”, Gisagara; Yusuf, 56, ex-convict, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara; Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara.

⁶⁷⁸ Interview with Françoise, 53, bystander, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara. This is a clean verbatim from the translator, thus Françoise is mentioned in third person.

⁶⁷⁹ Cf. E.g. Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, „*Gatsata*”, Gisagara.

⁶⁸⁰ Straus, 2006, 87

sense making⁶⁸¹". The act of killing created "order out of disorder, certainty out of uncertainty, and power out of powerlessness⁶⁸²." The new unification of Hutus was forged *through* killing. It did not exist prior to it. When the first peasants started to kill, instigated, instructed and supervised by the army and the militias, violence gained momentum. The peasants who killed did not want to stand alone and coerced other peasants to follow the "script of violence⁶⁸³". The dynamics of fear, rage, peer pressure and opportunity quickly devolved into "Rwanda's leviathan⁶⁸⁴". The "conspiracy to murder⁶⁸⁵" on the central level existed but local dynamics driven by the uncertainty of war might have been more important for the rapid expansion of the genocide than the genocidal ideology itself.

The Culture of Obedience

"Uko zivuze ni ko zitambirwa – One dances the way the drum is beaten" Rwandan Proverb

One last interesting aspect I became familiar with during my fieldwork in Rwanda is the 'culture of obedience' already broached above and thematized by scholars of the region⁶⁸⁶. This topic is mostly mentioned in connection with the unusually powerful state apparatus in Rwanda. It often gets brought up as a reason for genocide by Rwandans themselves⁶⁸⁷. Joseph Sebarenzi, ex-speaker of the Rwandan parliament characterizes obedience as a defining Rwandan character trait. "It's customary to listen to your parents and your teachers but above all else, you listen to your leaders. [...] And you listen closely, for what he says could mean the difference between life and death. When you hear him, you don't form opinions. You nod your head in agreement⁶⁸⁸." Straus speaks of "high levels of civilian compliance before the genocide⁶⁸⁹". Since the precolonial kingdom, the state has a long tradition of commanding citizens to perform certain duties such as mandatory public labor. Even the integration of the local population into the defense framework of a territory is customary. *Amarondo*, the practice of nightly patrols by squads of neighbors has been mentioned frequently in the interviews⁶⁹⁰. Rwandans are used to carrying out governmental demands.

In a densely populated agrarian state, mutual cooperation and intact group ties can mark the difference between death and survival. With rumors about impending extermination through the hands of the RPF⁶⁹¹ and shaken up rage because of Habyarimana's murder, peer pressure to participate in the genocide was immense. Noncompliance could mean pariah-status, punishment or worse. As Lee Ann

⁶⁸¹ Fujii, 2009, 178.

⁶⁸² Ibid. 179.

⁶⁸³ Fujii, 2009, 185.

⁶⁸⁴ Straus, 2006, 201.

⁶⁸⁵ Melvern, 2004.

⁶⁸⁶ Cf. Clark, 2010, 19; Straus, 2006, 37

⁶⁸⁷ Cf. Rucyahana, 2007, 93, 128, 208.

⁶⁸⁸ Sebarenzi, 2009, 6.

⁶⁸⁹ Straus, 2006, 151.

⁶⁹⁰ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Yohani, 54 and Yohani N., 68, both ex-convicts from "Gatumba", Huye.

⁶⁹¹ Cf. interviews with Jean-Pierre, 29 and Gaspard, 26 and Vincent, 43, bystanders, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

Fujii⁶⁹² remarks, many perpetrators hence played a double role, saving the Tutsi they cared about despite joining the genocide and hunting down other Tutsi. The roles of rescuer and killer, perpetrator and victim are interchangeable with regard to different episodes of mass violence and sometimes even within the genocide of 1994 itself. John recounts: *“having a Tutsi wife he got a lot of people coming to his house for rescue. And in kind of self-defense and just showing to other killers that he was with them, he could just go out a little bit, and wave his machete as a symbol of saying: ‘yeah I am together with you’⁶⁹³.”* Surviving outside of the community is extremely difficult in Rwanda. So many Hutu men waited to see which side would take control in their community and when the Hutu extremists gained the upper hand, they joined the genocide because it was the less costly alternative and directly addressed their deepest fears.

The violence snowballed very rapidly and took most Tutsi by surprise⁶⁹⁴. The sudden shift from coexistence to killing was so inexplicable that for many interviewees, the work of the devil himself is the only plausible explanation for the course of events⁶⁹⁵.

Even though many Hutus figured out that the connections between the RPF and their own Tutsi neighbors were artificial and pure propaganda, they followed, fearing the consequences of dissent. Maurice claims that they were pushed to join by the local authorities. *“At a point local leaders made us to kill, if I could see my neighbors joining them, so I could not go aside, so I had to follow them to show that I participated, even if I couldn’t kill but I had to prove that I agree, I participate⁶⁹⁶.”* Maurice’s case is interesting because it crystallizes this tendency to comply with authorities against better judgment. However, even after eight years in jail and his *Gacaca* trial, Maurice does not seem to question his behavior in relation to authorities in general. He complains about the reparations he has to pay⁶⁹⁷ and generally appears to understand the genocide as something bad that primarily happened to him, not because of his actions but because he followed the authorities. To him, *Gacaca* was a positive experience because it set him free. He wrote a confession as was demanded, and the government, not the victims, *“forgave us⁶⁹⁸”*. Therefore, in Maurice’s eyes, his behavior of compliance with authority works. He seems content with the politics of national unity and reconciliation but

⁶⁹² Cf. Fujii, 2009, 139ff.

⁶⁹³ Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, „Gatsata“, Gisagara. Clean verbatim from translator who spoke about John in the third person.

⁶⁹⁴ Straus, 2006, 95-122. Fujii, 2009, 154-180.

⁶⁹⁵ Cf. Interviews with Jeanne d’Arc, 34, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Rugango, 81, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Gisagara.

⁶⁹⁶ Interview with Maurice, 58, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye

⁶⁹⁷ Practically all the ex-convicts and many bystanders in Rwanda complained that they had to pay reparations. On the other hand, most survivors recounted that they would not get any reparations and I never found any mention of reparations in NURC-texts.

⁶⁹⁸ Interview with Maurice, 58, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye

he just exchanged one authority for another. This can be described neither as genocide ideology nor as reconciliation. It is plain opportunism.

Hatzfeld made similar experiences while interviewing perpetrators in jail: *“the killers worry only about their own fates and essentially feel no compassion for anyone but themselves⁶⁹⁹”*. Nevertheless, this almost compulsive conformity is not limited to the genocide or ex-convicts, it pervades the attitudes of participants regarding their behavior towards authority. Rwandans often mention the state’s influence with a certain amount of fatalism. Thasiene, a bystander from *Gatumba* e.g. states the following about having to pay reparations for her parents’ deeds during the genocide: *“as it is a rule, it’s like our cross we have to carry every day. So, at the beginning it was hard but today we came to understand because there is no other choice we have to pay⁷⁰⁰.”* What the state, embodied by the person of the president orders, is the law, regardless of the topic being reparations, commemoration or ethnic identity: *“So the president, the parent of the country said we are all one people, so there is no importance to say this is a Hutu, this is a Tutsi, we are all one⁷⁰¹.”* The culture of conformity even is reflected in Yohani's view of reconciliation. It strongly affects the perception of reconciliation politics. Politics are less seen as the will of the people but as unalterable laws imposed from above - like forces of nature. With president Habyarimana killed, his ‘lawgiving’ authority was up for grabs and the Hutu hardliners exploited the population’s fear and disorientation to the fullest.

Thus, involvement in the genocide should perhaps be considered less as the enthusiastic fulfilment of orders but as choosing conformity because of fear, social pressure, disorientation, convenience and opportunism. This obedient behavior is not limited to participation in the genocide but with certain qualifications, also applies to reconciliation politics⁷⁰². Unsurprisingly, it corresponds to a sense of paternalistic responsibility on the side of intellectuals. Even among critically thinking members of the elite who do not believe in exclusive top-down measures, there is a tacit consensus that peasants should be 'guided' in their way of thinking, particularly with regard to identity: *"For example, for those people in the rural areas, these people who are illiterate. These people who just follow, who need a head, I mean someone to lead them, someone to guide them, a mentor. So for those people, it’s really good not to rely on ethnicity as we have had the preachings of ethnic hate a lot of times. Yeah, between Hutu-people telling 'do you know Tutsi have colonized you after the white people?' Telling people, 'yeah you know the Tutsis have killed your people afterwards, after genocide.' So it’s good for people not to think, or talk about, or do things on the basis of their ethnic groups. But for us who are, let’s say eloquent, who have been to school, who have some capacity of analysis and under-*

⁶⁹⁹ Hatzfeld, 2005, 241.

⁷⁰⁰ Interview with Thasiene, 38, bystander, “Gatumba”, Huye.

⁷⁰¹ Interview with Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye.

⁷⁰² Cf. Thomson, 2013, 207-226.

*standing, we believe banning the ethnicity doesn't mean setting up a good relationship with people*⁷⁰³." I principally agree with Chris' argument that more education is necessary. The subject of my criticism is the coercive and unidirectional manner in which knowledge is transferred, a discourse which leaves no room for dialogue nor dissent which I criticize.

If we take the statements of ex-convicts and residents into account, the fear to be left alone and the compulsion to conform to external demands were far more important for the rapid expansion of the genocide than hatred or racism., even though ethnicity determined these groups.

Reconciliation: Addressing the wrong Problems?

To summarize: if we look at the reasons why the peasants killed during the genocide, manipulative state intervention within circumstances of extreme instability and rooted in a culture of conformity with authority seem to have been the main driving force.

Unfortunately, the RPF-government tries to reverse the effects of the genocide and the conditions that caused it by relying on manipulative state intervention as well. Circumstantial factors such as paranoia under war conditions or genocidal group dynamics are difficult to tackle by state intervention from above. The culture of conformity and the pervasive state apparatus that were instrumental in the implementation of genocide are actually conducive to the RPF's plans for fundamentally changing Rwandan society. As Waldorf and Straus state: *"Interestingly, the RPF partly blames a Rwandan culture of obedience for the genocide, but its social engineering has sought only to reinforce habits of obedience in the population"*⁷⁰⁴.

Chapter 4.1. established the official interpretation of genocide by the Rwandan state and its perception from below. As we have seen, the RPF assumes a very dominant role with regard to the public discourse about the genocide and dealing with its consequences. Before we however delve deeper into the design and implementation of reconciliation politics in Rwanda, it is necessary to take a closer look at the power political context forming these policies and their relation to the core principles of reconciliation determined above, *memory, acknowledgement, responsibility / apology and justice*. Is 'the order of reconciliation' actually aiming at the restoration or creation of new relationships based on mutual respect that cut across the conflictive identities or might factors such as the provision of stability, the historical prerogative of interpretation or the retention of power be equally decisive for Rwandan reconciliation politics in practice?

⁷⁰³ Cf. Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali.

⁷⁰⁴ Straus and Waldorf, 2011, 9.

4.1. Kagame's System

"Everyone fears Kagame, from ordinary citizens to generals." Joseph Sebarenzi⁷⁰⁵

Paul Kagame always had and still has ambitious goals for Rwanda. His statement that he would turn the poor, landlocked, agrarian country into a knowledge-based economy, the *"Singapore of Africa"*⁷⁰⁶ is on record and Rwanda is well on its way to reach at least two Millennium Development Goals: universal free education and promoting gender equality. Kagame is renowned and internationally lauded for reaching almost impossible objectives in the past two decades, yet he has also gained notoriety with regard to unceremoniously removing people from power who do not share his vision.

The strength of Kagame's government and the attraction it exerts on Western donors mainly rests on three pillars: Post-genocide Rwanda's outstanding record with regard to effectiveness, order, security and economic development; its exceptional standing with regard to Western guilt because of the international reaction to the genocide; and the desire for African success stories in the aid industry⁷⁰⁷. Whereas the reasons for Rwanda's development can be mostly ascribed to Kagame's close-meshed management of the state, the rationale for the other two parameters lies in Rwanda's complex historic relationship with the international community. Kagame's system could be described as a hybrid between introversive dominance and extroversive accountability.

4.2.1. Introversive Dominance

"Ijambo rigukunze rikuguma mu nda – The word that loves you stays inside" (Burundian proverb)

In its own way, the RPF has advanced Jean-François Bayart's colonial notion of *"extraversion"*⁷⁰⁸, the ability of African dominant classes to exploit foreign occupation and using the state as an 'incubator' for their emerging dominance and accumulation of wealth, into the 21st century. Kagame has successfully eliminated any meaningful domestic competition for dominance and has transformed large

⁷⁰⁵ Sebarenzi, 2009, 184.

⁷⁰⁶ Prunier, 2009, 326

⁷⁰⁷ Cf. Zorbas, 2011, 104. Zorbas also emphasizes the RPF's donor-friendly language and positioning as well as broad domestic support for the party in the UK and the USA. I do consider these factors important. However, Kagame is renowned for repeatedly lashing out against international aid organizations, culminating in the expulsions of NGOs such as Médecins sans frontières or terre des hommes and 36 others in 1995. I would not characterize the government's language donor-friendly but rather its overall performance, which strives to satisfy donor's expectations while at the same time remaining independent with regard to policy design. Domestic support for the RPF in donor countries surely is an important factor. The Rwandan diaspora is widespread and with the limited media attention given to Africa in the Western Media, the RPF is still rather perceived as the Guerilla movement that stopped the genocide not as the dominant party with authoritarian tendencies it has become in recent years.

⁷⁰⁸ Bayart, 2009, 20.

sections of Rwandan society into a highly effective network of dependents⁷⁰⁹. This network includes the governmental administration, most parts of civil society, the media, and even reaches individuals at the grassroots through various means such as workshops, summits, conferences⁷¹⁰, solidarity camps, associations and propaganda. These networks have been thoroughly instructed about the official narrative of the past and its failures⁷¹¹, the sociopolitical topics worthy of promotion or hushing up, and the president's vision for the future, summarized in Rwanda's "*vision 2020*". Order-recipients usually understand and follow explicit as well as implicit demands from the center swiftly and efficiently, often even with preemptive obedience, thus creating the external image of an effective, harmonious and unified system that does not fail to impress casual observers. In deviance to Bayart's model, the 'dominant class', the RPF's inner circle, has not bypassed official institutions in order to accumulate wealth. The state has rather been socially re-engineered so thoroughly that local officials, civil society organizations and even individual citizens gear themselves to what they interpret as the will of the elite on top⁷¹². This behavior ranges from wholehearted support to outright self-censorship.

CSOGs

The government supports and promotes certain grassroots organizations, particularly genocide survivor associations like AVEGA or IBUKA⁷¹³. They allow the government to cultivate its international image as "*post-genocide spiritual guardian*"⁷¹⁴. Many of these groups display strong ties to political institutions. The RPF for instance installed a member of its central committee as president of IBUKA in 2000 and IBUKA has supported the RPF in elections⁷¹⁵. Despite this close relationship, the government does not accept fundamental criticism by interest groups, at least not officially⁷¹⁶. Although there is an overwhelming abundance of associations, clubs and CSOGs dedicated to reconciliation, the paternalistic tendencies associated with post-colonial elites resurface in the little confidence that the Rwandan government displays in the self-organizing capabilities of its society. "*For the sake of political steering, most associations are either dependent on the state or confronted with discouragingly bureaucratic requirements*"⁷¹⁷.

⁷⁰⁹ Cf. Gready, 2011, 87-102.

⁷¹⁰ Cf. NURC, 2009, 7-16.

⁷¹¹ Cf. Chapter 4.1.

⁷¹² Cf. Gready, 2011, 94f.

⁷¹³ Hirondellenews.com, 15. 07.09, on: <http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/12602/182/> (October 27, 2009)

⁷¹⁴ Pottier, 2002, 202.

⁷¹⁵ Cf. Waldorf, 430 – IBUKA's vicinity to the government varies, the organization has criticized the government on various issues concerning the interests of survivors and has also been punished for it. The first secretary general of IBUKA, Anastase Murumba, had to flee to Canada. cf. e.g. Hirondellenews.com, 12.12.07. (October 27, 2009); Sebarenzi, 2009, 209.

⁷¹⁶ Cf. BTI, 2008, 10; Hirondellenews.com, 12.12.07.

⁷¹⁷ BTI, 2008, 10

In 2004, the government crushed down on 13 domestic and international CSOGs, including the country's largest human rights organization LIPRODHOR. They accused them of 'divisionism' and the promotion of 'genocidal ideology', and ultimately dissolved five organizations⁷¹⁸. LIPRODHOR, threatened with dissolution, issued an apology and several activists who refused to sign it fled the country. Subsequently, many CSOGs started to engage in self-censorship to avoid prosecution.

In the spring of 2011, I volunteered with CLADHO for three months. CLADHO is the umbrella organization for Human Rights Organizations in Rwanda in which all other Rwandan human rights organizations are mandatory members. I had the opportunity to follow the work of the organization closely and was able to attend their meetings and official government hearings for CSOGs. In official meetings, delicate human rights questions that would put the RPF or the government in a negative light were never publicly uttered even though my co-workers voiced sophisticated opinions about these topics in private. In conferences with high officials, most civil society representatives stuck to theoretical keynote speeches about human rights and the intricacies of government-CSOG cooperation. In other cases, they limited their advocacy to less politicized topics which allowed room to maneuver such as details of national budget allocation or RPF-approved core issues such as women's and children's rights or the right to food and shelter heavily promoted in the '*Anti-Nyakazi*'-program⁷¹⁹. Although the work of Rwandan CSOGs in the mentioned areas is nothing less than outstanding given the difficult circumstances, the Rwandan CSOGs I witnessed never publicly addressed the elephants in the room such as extrajudicial killings, the stifling of political dissent or Rwandan involvement in the DRC. On the contrary, an acquaintance even told me that he was fired from CLADHO for "*being to frank*"⁷²⁰. Considering the repeated crackdowns⁷²¹ on international and domestic NGOs and human rights organizations, focusing on government-approved topics seem to be the only viable survival strategy for CSOGs in Rwanda.

Politics

Opposition against the RPF from parliamentary committees has been observed, particularly during the early years of the transitional Government of National Unity but the parliamentary opposition is very weak. Opposition parties that could become real challengers to the RPF have repeatedly been excluded from political competition on accounts of 'genocide ideology' and promoting 'divisionism'. Ministers and members of parliament acting out of line are removed unceremoniously. Prime Minis-

⁷¹⁸ Cf. US Department of State Country Report Rwanda 2005; Hintjens, 88

⁷¹⁹ "*Nyakazi*" are straw huts. The program's aim is that all Rwandans live in modern and orderly houses. Thus, the government destroys traditional straw huts and builds standardized houses with roofs made from corrugated metal. Sometimes however, recipients are waiting for their houses for years, and are left homeless in the meantime. Cf. Interview with Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁷²⁰ Personal Conversation in Kigali, April 2011. The person in question asked me to remain anonymous.

⁷²¹ Cf. Reyntjens, 2005a, 30-35; BTI, 2008, 10.

ter Faustin Twagiramungu, along with ministers Seth Sendashonga⁷²², Immaculée Kayumba, Alphonse-Marie Nkubito, and Jean-Baptiste Nkuriyingoma resigned or were made to leave in 1995 already⁷²³. In 2006, the strongest opposition party MDR was banned⁷²⁴ and before the elections of 2010, three opposition parties, the FDU-Inkingi, Parti Social-Imberakuri and the Democratic Green Party were excluded from the elections because they did not comply with the National Electoral Commission's requirements⁷²⁵. The Green Party's vice president André Kagwa Rwisereka has been found assassinated soon thereafter. The other parties in the Rwandan parliament, PSD and PL, who accounted for a combined voter share of 20.63% in the parliamentary elections of 2008⁷²⁶ and less than 7% in the presidential elections of 2010 are little more than 'bridesmaids', providing the RPF with a democratic legitimation⁷²⁷. With the creation of the forum of political parties in 1999, the RPF has devised an effective way to control members of parliament because the forum allows the parties to enforce loyalty to the fraction up to effectively firing an insubordinate MP⁷²⁸. Since the RPF took power, dozens of politicians have been sacked or even imprisoned and killed. Many fled the country after losing their position⁷²⁹. Murdered or disappeared politicians, officials, businessmen, and journalists such as most recently Patrick Karegeya or Théogène Turatsinze are rarely genocide suspects. These victims are most often RPF-dissidents from the inner ranks of the party⁷³⁰, people who allegedly possessed or disseminated politically charged information about RPF or its cadres⁷³¹, or opposition figures with a clean slate that could have become popular threats to the RPF⁷³². Genocide suspects usually are arrested and face trial.

⁷²² Seth Sendashonga was assassinated in 1998 in Kenya after founding an opposition movement in exile.

⁷²³ Cf. Prunier, 2009, 42-46.

⁷²⁴ Cf. Reyntjens, 2005a, 17ff; Lemarchand, 2006.

⁷²⁵ Garrison, "Rwanda Green Party leader assassinated", on: <http://digitaljournal.com/article/294629> (March 13, 2014)

⁷²⁶ Cf. Longman, 2011, 40f.

⁷²⁷ Cf. Longman, 2011, 31-34; Sommers, 2012; Dieterich, 2010: For a Rwandan view that only sees slight advantages for the RPF (with regard to media coverage) and places the blame for shortcomings on the media, see ARJ, 2010.

⁷²⁸ Cf. Sebarenzi, 146 ff.

⁷²⁹ Cf. Reyntjens, 2005a, 17ff; Lemarchand, 2006; Sebarenzi, 2009, 137-182;

⁷³⁰ E.g. ex-RPF-intelligence chief Théoneste Lizinde, most recently the former head of foreign intelligence services in Rwanda, Patrick Karegeya, ex-RPF supreme court judge Augustine Cyiza, ex-deputy chief of justice Vincent Nsanabaganwa; General Kayumba Nyamwasa.

⁷³¹ E.g. Manasse Mugabo, Emmanuel Munyemanzu, Jean-Léonard Rugabage, Théogène Turatsinze, Charles Ingabire. Cf. The Journalists Memorial: http://thejournalistsmemorial.rsrf.org/?pays_decès=54&pays_naissance=54&id_article=243 (October 11, 2014)

⁷³² E.g. Ex-Minister of the interior Seth Sendashonga, Bizimungu's advisor Assiel Kabera, MP Leonard Hitimana, deputy green party leader André Kagwa Rwisereka. Up to today, the Rwandan government has summarily denied all claims of involvement in these cases. Cf. Sebarenzi, 2009, 208 ff. (about exiled members of government); Prunier, 2009, 365-368 (about Seth Sendashonga's murder); Amnesty International: Annual Report 2012, on: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/rwanda/report-2012> (March 7, 2014) and HRW, World Report 2012: Rwanda, on <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-rwanda> (March 7, 2014) - about general suppression of opposition; BBC (Ally Yusufu Mugenzi): Patrick Karegeya: Rwandan exile 'murdered' in Johannesburg, on: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25572814> (March 7, 2014) - on Karegeya's murder.

Even though the RPF's totalitarian tendencies are worrying and have been criticized frequently by Western observers or the opposition in exile, for many of my participants, security, stability and development were more important. In many interviews, intact perspectives for socioeconomic advance within a secure environment were considered equivalent to democracy and participants did not care much about political parties or free speech but rather about societal harmony: *"democracy is when people have the same understanding, when people have the same ideas"*⁷³³. Consistent with the culture of obedience cultivated over years of autocratic governance, many peasants did understand politics or democracy as an exclusive domain of intellectuals and saw the government's task in the provision of freedom, peace and development, largely independent of the participation of the peasant population. The concept of democracy is rather vague and often heavily influenced by the public sensitization with regard to unity and reconciliation: *"Whenever you have unity and reconciliation, that's democracy. Development can come. Also democracy for her implies freedom, I mean human rights, stuff like that, that's democracy"*⁷³⁴.

There however are critical voices: *"Democracy in African countries, it is just rhetoric. We don't have democracy. That's what he is saying. Because he is saying let's take an example: I see it even here in elections. Let's give, let's share with you what I see in elections for instance. Have you ever seen elections where you go to elections and someone is there to dictate you and write there for instance? [...] This is commonplace here in Rwanda."*⁷³⁵ Concerns about the totalitarian direction of Rwandan politics are particularly prevalent among young intellectuals and students. Robert: *"Democracy for me... means dissent voices. [...]. Someone with a, who is voicing different ideas than yours, you label him just as an enemy, that's not democracy. That's not democracy. Because for me in my country today, you can't tell me that we have genuine political parties because in the end for me, we don't have political parties, we have something to present to the west. We say: 'look we have a system, we have whatever but everything is kind of RPF. It's kind of RPF political party. Others just... It's kind of an umbrella, it's an umbrella political party where other political parties are inside and whoever is voicing different opinions, they just say that you are serving, you are serving a particular interest"*⁷³⁶. Older peasants are usually content with peace, security and development. Members of the younger, well-educated generation however do worry that the repression of dissent and the absence of genuine democracy might lead to a new crisis. *"When people keep repressing things they think they feel, or because they can't talk about it in public, when people keep repressing this ethnicity idea, at some point, these things will have power, or control over them. And they will burst out and appearing up in*

⁷³³ Interview with Annunciata, 58, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁷³⁴ Interview with Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. Clean verbatim from translator who spoke about Françoise in the third person.

⁷³⁵ Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara. Clean verbatim from translator who spoke about John in the third person.

⁷³⁶ Interview with Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

*other killings*⁷³⁷.” To these citizens, the RPF's utter dominance over the discourse about the past is politically explosive because it creates taboos that may prove a liability for politics in the future: “*The big danger is that some people can't talk openly what happened. It is just a detonator*⁷³⁸.”

Media

The independent media is subjected to severe limitation, legal repression and even harassment⁷³⁹. As mentioned above, disappearances and even murders of journalists have had their precedents. Next to not being very diverse, the media is also concentrated in Kigali. Journalists censor their work because speaking about certain topics such as human rights abuses by the RPF leads to defamation charges, prosecution⁷⁴⁰ or worse e.g. in the case of the director of the newspaper *Umucyo*, Bonaventure Bizuremyi, who disappeared in 2006 after publishing critical reports⁷⁴¹. To give censorship and political limitation a sense of popular legitimacy, the practice often seen is that quasi-governmental supervisory institutions representing ‘civil society’ such as the Office of the Ombudsman or the High Press Council recommend the government to ban certain parties or suspend media institutions. The government subsequently acts according to the recommendations of these bodies it effectively controls⁷⁴². Many Rwandan newspapers closed down and several journalists had to flee. Others, like Jean-Léonard Rugambage⁷⁴³ in 2010 or Charles Ingabire in 2011 have been killed or disappeared. In 2013, reporters without borders list Rwanda 161th out of 179 with regard to press freedom⁷⁴⁴.

Similar to democracy, most rural interviewees in Rwanda did not consider the absence of a critical media to be a fundamentally worrying issue. Many still remember RTLM. They expressed a certain appreciation for a tight governmental control of the media to prevent further incitement⁷⁴⁵, even though particularly Hutus and intellectuals consider the censorship too heavy-handed⁷⁴⁶. Intellectuals criticized the instrumentalization of the media to disseminate the official discourse: “*Sometimes I*

⁷³⁷ Interview with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali.

⁷³⁸ Interview with Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁷³⁹ Cf. EURAC, 2009, 1; Freedom House Country Report Rwanda 2009

⁷⁴⁰ E.g. Agnès Uwimana Nkusi and Saidat Mukakibibi from the private newspaper *Umurabyo* were arrested for inciting civil disobedience, 'divisionism' and genocide denial. Cf. Reporters without borders, "World Report Rwanda", October 2012, on: <https://en.rsf.org/report-rwanda,38.html> (13. March 2014).

⁷⁴¹ Cf. BTI, 2008, on: <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/83.0.html> (26 October 2009)

⁷⁴² Cf. Freedom House Country Report Rwanda 2009

⁷⁴³ Cf. Reporters without borders, "World Report Rwanda", October 2012, on: <https://en.rsf.org/report-rwanda,38.html> (13. March 2014).

⁷⁴⁴ Cf. Reporters without borders, "Press Freedom Index 2013", on: <http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html> (March 13, 2014)

⁷⁴⁵ Cf. Interviews with Augustin, 50, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Delta Foxtrott, 39, returnee, Kigali; Annunciata, 58, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Innocent, 55, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali; Vianney, 52, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁷⁴⁶ Cf. Interviews with Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Théodosine, 24, returnee, Kigali; Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Paul, 44, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali.

think the media is quite opinionated. Like it just says things that they want people to hear about the genocide. In my view, I think they would display the genocide as it was. And then about reconciliation, they would try to talk about everyone equally instead of keeping on bringing out the fact that it was the Tutsis that were killed all the time, I don't think that is right⁷⁴⁷." As with politics, the absence of differing opinions makes people wonder if the media as de-facto agents of the government are rather interested in reconciliation or in the propagation of a certain narrative. "If helping people to reconcile means [...] airing the government policies in line with reconciliation, then the media is doing a great job. But if reconciliation rather means also looking at the other side of the story, I mean other people who were killed - not necessarily because of the genocide - well, other killings. I mean, if media is to be holding accountable, if we look at the 'holding people accountable'-aspect of media, then I don't think journal-, I mean media is doing a great job to reconcile people⁷⁴⁸."

Participants frequently mentioned examples of radio soap operas and programs aimed at reconciliation such as *Urunana*⁷⁴⁹, *Musekeweya*⁷⁵⁰, and *Isano*⁷⁵¹. Interviewees felt that these radio programs helped them to understand the issues of reconciliation in their communities and that they followed them frequently. The NGO "Search for common Ground" has pioneered many of these programs aimed at reconciliation. Its most recent radio program is called "*Turi Umwe*⁷⁵²".

Population

Individual interviewees often followed the government narrative's 'invisible script' when it came to questions about politics, trying to orient themselves with reference to what they perceived as the 'official' position. This behavior is called *kwibwizira* – a mix between indoctrination and self-censorship that is applied when confronted with questions that could get the interviewee in conflict with the values of officially promoted 'Rwandanness'⁷⁵³. When I asked interviewees to voice their opinions about controversial topics such as transitional justice or the banning of ethnicity, many followed the 'official narrative' of the genocide outlined above as close as possible or just steadfastly clung to the notion that what the ruling party or the president did was the right thing to do. In general, many participants dreaded being perceived in opposition to the government: "*we follow what is*

⁷⁴⁷ Interview with Théodosine, 24, returnee, Kigali.

⁷⁴⁸ Interview with Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁷⁴⁹ *Urunana* is a long running radio soap on the BBC's Great Lakes Service that centers around two clans from different hills. Cf. Interviews with Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Luce, 42, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye and Interviews with Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁷⁵⁰ A public health program. Cf. Interviews with Luce, 42, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye and Interviews with Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁷⁵¹ A life-action theater about reconciliation that gets acted out with members of the community. Cf. Interview with Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁷⁵² Cf. Ndabananye, Jean-Baptiste, "Reconciliation through Radio", <https://www.sfcg.org/reconciliation-through-radio/> (11 October 2014).

⁷⁵³ Cf. Ingelaere, 2010, 53f.

accepted, what is accepted in our country is genocide against Tutsi, that's what we follow, that's what we are remembering. [...] You can't tell me that someone maybe went to Congo, because he was tired, maybe he fell down and died, stuff like that. So we are not remembering those people. We are remembering what is accepted and what is accepted, it is genocide against Tutsi⁷⁵⁴."

In some cases, participants feared questions about politics altogether. When Jeanne, a 32-year old returnee and farmer from Huye saw my recording device before the interview, she half-jokingly asked the translator "do you want the government to kill me?" Even if it was meant as a joke, her answers became very evasive and pro-government as soon as I started the recording device. She usually dismissed sensitive questions by repeating fragments of official policy and assuring me that everything was okay: "Today, you know there is unity and reconciliation, you know, today people give one another the water, the fire, yes, things are going well there is no more problem in Rwanda⁷⁵⁵." The interview was very short. Particularly peasants repeated catchphrases or sentences they must have heard during community meetings, in government workshops, or on the radio. They sound like interchangeable sound bites from a propaganda speech:

- *"Democracy is when Rwandans are together, there is unity among Rwandans⁷⁵⁶."*
- *"I strongly refuse [to talk] about ethnicity problems. I don't belong either to Hutu or Tutsi because we are one Rwandan as even God has created us as one people, so we are one Rwanda⁷⁵⁷."*
- *"We all want to be Rwandans and not talk again about ethnic identities⁷⁵⁸."*
- *"Yeah, the government always looks for the reconciliation and unity of Rwandans. It never brings divisionism among people so it can bring reconciliation⁷⁵⁹."*

Through clubs such as the aforementioned AMI or SCUR, meetings and 'sensitizations' offered by the NURC, the RPF's own brand of patriotism and unity has been successfully disseminated among the population. However, regarding this culture of silence and conformity, the question remains if people are truly convinced that they are reconciled or, if in reality, it is rather as Stephen Kinzer describes it: "citizens are required to repeat platitudes about reconciliation but hatred festers in many hearts⁷⁶⁰." Even though the multiple publications of the NURC and other Rwandan associations such as the IRDP or the ARJ appear to be very well-informed about popular perceptions and fulfill all the statistical necessities to provide sound research, their often benevolent assessments and approval ratings of government policies raise suspicion among independent researchers. In a country with a long tradition of obedience to authority and one all-powerful party, the person of the inquirer might actually

⁷⁵⁴ Interview with Vianney, 52, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

⁷⁵⁵ Interview with Jeanne, 32, returnee, Huye.

⁷⁵⁶ Interview with Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye

⁷⁵⁷ Interview with Jeanne, 32, returnee, Huye.

⁷⁵⁸ Interview with Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁷⁵⁹ Interview with Costasie, ca. 65, survivor, „Gatumba“, Huye.

⁷⁶⁰ Kinzer, 2008, 4.

be more important than the question itself. Thus, NURC-publications such as the Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer should be read cautiously. Because non-compliance historically always had undesirable consequences, many peasants are eager to comply with what they perceive as the consensus: *“The government has said that way, they have to live. I mean, it is favored by the government. It’s okay, they are living well, there is no problem⁷⁶¹.”* As soon as a policy becomes *“the law⁷⁶²”*, most Rwandans rather adapt to the new directive than protesting against it. My conversation with Jean-Claude, a bystander from Kigali, illustrates this attitude very well: *“Yeah to bring reconciliation, so that is the program of the government. It’s not the program of the people. The people remain in that ideology [of ethnicity]. The ideology remains inside with them, [...] in their minds but it can, it cannot remain in public⁷⁶³.”*

My own experiences during field research corroborate the observation that many Rwandans are very reluctant about revealing their political opinion to strangers. Especially participants in *“Gatumba”*, were much more prone to following the official narrative, the 'invisible script' described above and rather cautious about voicing criticism against government policies. In *“Gatsata”* a interviewee explicitly stated that he only felt at ease to speak their minds because of their familiarity with the research assistant: *“So he is saying that he is telling, he is able to be open to this extent, because he is seeing me, he knows me. He thinks nothing bad is going to happen to him because of what he saying. But if you had come with another person, he couldn’t be telling you this⁷⁶⁴.”*

Kagame's Popularity

Despite or perhaps even because of his draconic policies and paternalism, Kagame remains very popular among many Rwandans. Even participants like Chris, Christine⁷⁶⁵ or Françoise who were critical of many policies, genuinely believe that Paul Kagame is a great leader. Tutsis such as Chris are very worried about what will happen when Kagame steps down. Others are genuine supporters and ascribe most of the positive developments to the president while the blame for failure comes upon local officials: *“In Girinka-policy, usually Kagame gives cows to widows but there is still corruption in local authorities⁷⁶⁶.”* The top-down system of policy-implementation *imihigo⁷⁶⁷* where local officials

⁷⁶¹ Translator in interview with Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor from *“Gatsata”*, Gisagara. clean verbatim from translator who spoke about Marie-Françoise in the third person.

⁷⁶² Karemera, 73, returnee from *„Gatsata“*, Gisagara about official commemoration: *„it helps with reconciliation because there is no other way out, there is, it is like, it is the law.”*

⁷⁶³ Interview with Jean-Claude, 23, bystander from Kigali.

⁷⁶⁴ Translator in interview with John, 56, ex-convict from *„Gatsata“*, Gisagara. clean verbatim from translator who spoke about John in the third person.

⁷⁶⁵ Cf. Interview with Christine, 49, survivor, *„Gatumba“*, Huye.

⁷⁶⁶ Interview with Boniphilde, 40, survivor, *„Gatumba“*, Huye

⁷⁶⁷ *Imihigo* works as a performance contract for community-management between the central power and the executive secretaries at the commune-level. The lower officials pledge to reach certain objectives with regard to the implementation of central policies. They are held accountable by their superiors at the end of the period. Cf. Ingelaere, 2011, 68-75.

are held accountable by Kigali regularly, makes sure of this perception, so in a way, even his policy of greater accountability perpetuates Kagame's dominance: *“there’s no problem with our President Kagame. There’s no problem with him. The problem is with people who govern with him”*⁷⁶⁸.

Paradoxically, Kagame might not even have had to imprison Victoire Ingabire or ban the FDU-Inkingi before the elections in 2010 and win by a suspicious margin of 93.08 percent. Rwandans of both ethnicities do appreciate his politics and might have elected him anyway. As Peter said: *“it is a pleasure that we have our president today. He has done everything possible, everything in his power to facilitate reconciliation. So he thinks he can't add anything more”*⁷⁶⁹.

Sebarenzi's statement at the beginning of the chapter however holds some truth too. Many participants, particularly ex-convicts, were almost too eager to profess their love for the president that had imprisoned them. In many cases, a participants' silence with regard to criticism did not come across as contentedness but because of outright fear⁷⁷⁰.

4.2.2. Extroversive Accountability

Obsessed with external perception

Joseph Sebarenzi, the exiled speaker of parliament, calls Kagame's vision an *“ultracapitalist economy and a multiparty communist type of democracy. Free market, totalitarianism, and elections paradoxically coexist”*⁷⁷¹. The expression 'communist type of democracy' aims at the RPF's transformative agenda with such ambitious projects as forging a 'New Rwandan identity, renaming the Rwandan territory, sweeping agricultural reforms and the unity and reconciliation policy. Elsewhere, Sebarenzi calls Rwanda a *“cosmetic multiparty system”*⁷⁷². The word 'cosmetic' is at the essence of the RPF-government's success with donors. Kagame has incorporated the *“aesthetics of progress”*⁷⁷³. He knows what donors and the international community expect and he makes sure they will see what they paid for. The RPF has proven repeatedly that it has thoroughly studied information management and knows about the importance of external appearances⁷⁷⁴. Contrary to Burundi, you will not see

⁷⁶⁸ Interview with Françoise, 53, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

⁷⁶⁹ Interview with Peter, 46, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara. clean verbatim from translator who spoke about Peter in the third person.

⁷⁷⁰ Particularly Dusabe, 50, a bystander from "Gatsata" who's husband was still in prison appeared very harried. Others like Cécile (40, bystander, "Gatsata"), Peter (46, bystander, "Gatsata"), Jeanne (32, returnee, Huye), Vincent (43, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara); Teresa (72, survivor, "Gatumba"); Innocent (55, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara) or Paul (44, ex-convict, "Gatumba*") behaved very evasive when it came to current politics.

⁷⁷¹ Sebarenzi, 2009, 209.

⁷⁷² Sebarenzi, 2009, 225.

⁷⁷³ Ingelaere, 2010c, p. 51

⁷⁷⁴ Particularly with regard to human rights violations in the DRC, the RPA became notorious for tightly managing the access to war-related information. The RPA was closing off conflict scenes and only letting in interna-

any peasants dressed in rags and walking barefoot on Rwandan streets. The government has imposed a system of heavy fines for failing to look and behave like a “*self-respecting Rwandan*”⁷⁷⁵. Even if obeying instructions such as dressing the part or paying the mandatory health insurance places heavy financial burdens on the poor peasantry⁷⁷⁶. The consequences of non-compliance to official policy are often dire, as ex-convict Yohani N. explains: “*the problem that we always have is that the government always asks us [for the] mutuelle de santé [health insurance] and we are poor we cannot afford that money. So they come and they take our livestock they go to sell them in the market to get that money of mutuelle de santé*”⁷⁷⁷.” With the enforcement of a mandatory per capita payment for the *mutuelle de santé*, the government has furthermore introduced an artificial poverty trap for families with many children, thus effectively supporting its own policy against overpopulation. However, considering the fact that survivors and even returnees are de facto more likely to receive governmental assistance than other Rwandans, this might deepen the gap between former antagonists⁷⁷⁸.

“Genocide Credit”

Complaints as the one above rarely reach the donor community and if they do, they apparently fail to impress. Considering its size, post-genocide Rwanda receives assistance above average, a relationship that is inextricably linked to the international inaction during the genocide. The government constantly reminds Western donors of their guilty conscience and their failure⁷⁷⁹. It claims an exceptional status for Rwanda’s post-traumatic recovery when criticized with regard to democratic deficits. It justifies the Rwandan involvement in the DRC with security concerns stemming from the genocide. The government constantly reminds Western donors of their guilty conscience and their failure to prevent the genocide⁷⁸⁰. It claims an exceptional status for Rwanda’s post-traumatic recovery when criticized with regard to democratic deficits and they justify the Rwandan involvement in the DRC with security concerns stemming from the genocide. It uses references to the genocide to assert that its unchallenged authority in allocating aid resources. In most cases, this reasoning has been accepted⁷⁸¹.

Kagame’s strongest argument remains having stopped the genocide in the face of international failure, rendering him almost immune against human rights-related criticism. “[...]For a long time it was not considered politically correct to acknowledge the reality of widespread ‘disappearances’, assassi-

tional observers when there was nothing left to see. Cf. Reyntjens, 2005a, 30ff.; unpublished UN Mapping Report 2010, 78ff.

⁷⁷⁵ NURC, 2009, 12.

⁷⁷⁶ Ingelaere, 2011, 73f

⁷⁷⁷ Interview with Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye.

⁷⁷⁸ Cf. Chapter 4.3.

⁷⁷⁹ Cf. Pottier, 2002, 130-150.

⁷⁸⁰ Cf. Pottier, 2002, 130-150.

⁷⁸¹ Cf. Zorbas, 2011, 106f.

*nations and massacres*⁷⁸²” writes Filip Reyntjens, a veteran analyst of the region and long-term critic of both the Habyarimana- as well as the RPF-regime. Reyntjens speaks of a “*genocide credit*⁷⁸³” the regime enjoys. “*Of course, the genocide is a massive reality with a lasting impact, but it has also become a source of legitimacy astutely exploited to escape condemnation, not unlike the way in which the holocaust is used to deflect criticism of Israel’s policies and actions towards the Palestinians*⁷⁸⁴”.

Despite strong growth rates matching and surpassing donor expectations, particularly in the first decade after 1994, Rwanda is still heavily aid-dependent. Rwanda’s ministry of economy and finance quantifies the percentage of foreign grants in the country’s budget with 28.5 percent⁷⁸⁵ as well as 23.9 percent deriving from foreign borrowing⁷⁸⁶. International sources speak of over 40 percent aid dependency⁷⁸⁷. This number seems to have declined from over 50 percent in 2008⁷⁸⁸.

Donor concerns

Donors have repeatedly voiced concerns about authoritarian policies such as the *Imidugudu* practice⁷⁸⁹ of resettling as much as 20 percent of the population⁷⁹⁰ or the law on 'genocide ideology' and 'divisionism'⁷⁹¹ becoming effective before the election in 2003. However, with the exception of the repeated Rwandan involvement in the DRC⁷⁹² that at least temporarily resulted in some severe aid cuts from the UK in 2004⁷⁹³, Kagame has managed to disperse donors’ reservations. Already in 2006, when concerns about the DRC were raised again, the RPF chose a different route, arresting CNDP-leader and Rwandan proxy Laurent Nkunda, intensifying relations with Joseph Kabila and launching a joint military operation with the Congolese government in 2009⁷⁹⁴. The donors were appeased.

Even though Kagame’s image in the international media has suffered considerably in the past few years, the donors stuck with Rwanda, the voicing of political concerns notwithstanding. Rachel Hayman says that despite evidence to tinkering with elections and excluding candidates not convenient to the party, Rwanda’s key donors “*consider the country moving sufficiently in the right direction on*

⁷⁸² Reyntjens, 2005a, 30f.

⁷⁸³ Reyntjens, 2005a, 32.

⁷⁸⁴ Reyntjens, 2005a, 32.

⁷⁸⁵ 12.8 percent general budgetary support, which accounts for donor trust as it guarantees policy independence.

⁷⁸⁶ MINECOFIN, 2013, 11.

⁷⁸⁷ For newer numbers cf. Murphy: *Why Blair and Buffet are wrong about giving international aid to Rwanda*, on: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/12/rwanda-kagame-blair-aid> (March 9, 2014).

⁷⁸⁸ Cf. Zorbas, 2011, 103.

⁷⁸⁹ Cf. Newbury, 2011, 223-239.

⁷⁹⁰ Cf. Isaksson, 2013.

⁷⁹¹ Cf. Lemarchand, 2007, 25. Or Article 19, 2009.

⁷⁹² Cf. Unpublished UN Mapping Report – Office of the High Commissioner, 2010; Stearns and Borello, 2011, 152-169; Reyntjens, 2011, 132-151.

⁷⁹³ Cf. Zorbas, 2011, 110ff.

⁷⁹⁴ Cf. Prunier, 2009, 285-327.

*democracy to quality for continuing support*⁷⁹⁵.” Kagame is aware that aid agencies are under increasing pressure to produce results to justify their budgets. His governance thus exhibits features resonating with the donors' needs: good governance, anti-corruption, unity and reconciliation, institution building etc. Western recommendations furnished with an African 'homegrown'-label. Here, Kagame's streamlined apparatus comes in handy. His policies actually show results. Moreover, even though the aid agencies are far from naïve, they become caught up in the 'phoenix from the ashes'-story that development in post-genocide Rwanda represents. The story and the survey results⁷⁹⁶ are too good; hence, they are willing to compromise and accept “*good enough democracy*⁷⁹⁷.”

4.2.3. Parallels to Habyarimana

The patterns of interaction between the state and the aid system observed above, although held decidedly anti-ethnic, display some strong parallels to the Habyarimana-regime. Uvin⁷⁹⁸ comprehends development aid as “*symbiotic to the process of structural violence*⁷⁹⁹.” He identifies both a direct and an indirect relation between the aid system and structural violence, understood here as inequality, prejudice, humiliation, desperation, infantilization and exclusion from progress⁸⁰⁰.

Unequal Distribution and Development Focus

Under Habyarimana, the direct impact on inequality derived from the top-down implementation of development assistance in Rwanda that favored the urban class of Hutu *évolues* while excluding the Tutsi, the poor and generally non-northerners. Uvin demonstrates how the economic and technocratic focus of development aid in Rwanda willfully ignored the channeling of resources and benefits to certain regions and groups. Participative programs providing incentives for new 'progressive' farming techniques or microcredits⁸⁰¹ generally benefitted the wealthy participants and the bureaucracy disproportionately⁸⁰². Just like Kagame today, Habyarimana was the darling of the aid industry up to 1990 and displayed a strong development-focus in his rhetoric.

In the perception of farmers, development aid and the state under Habyarimana were essentially two sides of the same system that paternalized, disempowered and infantilized them⁸⁰³. Regarding the still thriving culture of conformity described in chapter 4.1, little has changed with regard to the

⁷⁹⁵ Hayman, 2011, 127.

⁷⁹⁶ Cf. NURC, “*Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer*”, 2010.

⁷⁹⁷ Hayman, 2011, 127.

⁷⁹⁸ Cf. Uvin, 1998, 141-150

⁷⁹⁹ Uvin, 1998, 141

⁸⁰⁰ Cf. Uvin, 1998, 122-136

⁸⁰¹ Cf. Copestake, 2002, 743-755

⁸⁰² Cf. Newbury, 2011, 223-238; Isaksson, 2013.


⁸⁰³ Cf. Uvin, 1998, 123-136.

top-down direction of development policy. Marita, a farmer from Gisagara mentioned that the patronization even increased to the point where the government is ordering farmers which crops to plant: *"they are asking us to uproot our sweet potatoes, our tomatoes, our eggplants. They are asking us to plant one crop yet that one crop can't feed us, can't help us live⁸⁰⁴."*

Excluded from the benefits, frustrated by the absence of progress and constantly on the receiving end of the political and technical messages of the dual system of aid and state power, the pre-1994 population became a fertile soil for the ambitions of ethnic entrepreneurs. The structural violence against the poor majority combined with state-sponsored prejudices against the Tutsi lowered the barriers for the transition from structural violence to actual violence. According to Uvin, ethnicity provided the script for genocide; structural exclusion produced the framework conditions and helped the extremists recruit frustrated young men⁸⁰⁵. Even though corruption was much more widespread under Habyarimana, many Rwandans today feel excluded from the benefits of development and harassed by the strict guidelines of the government⁸⁰⁶.

Economic Situation Rwanda

	1990	1994	2003	2011
Bystanders	2.6	-0.9	0.9	2
Ex-Convicts	-1.6	-2.6	-3.6	0.7
Returnees	0.2	-1.2	2.4	2.4
Survivors	2.4	-3.6	1.8	1.1
Rwanda Average	1.6	-2.0	0.7	1.5



⁸⁰⁴ Interview with Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. clean verbatim from translator who spoke about Marita in the third person.

⁸⁰⁵ Cf. Fujii, 2009, 11-18

⁸⁰⁶ Cf. interviews with Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Teresa, 72, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Paul, 44, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Karemera, 72, returnee, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Rugango, 81, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye.

Economic Situation in Rwanda

The satisfaction with economic progress is highest among returnees who became part of the new elite. Survivors, despite being eligible to assistance still find it hard to cope with economic realities and feel even more disadvantaged when seeing the ex-convicts leaving prison (the ex-convicts I interviewed left prison after 2003) and advancing economically. Bystanders did not feel the impact of the genocide as hard as other parties and may even have been able to profit, whereas ex-convicts often assess every aspect of the period negatively either because of what it did to their life, because of pressure for political correctness or because of what they learned in *ingando*. Neither survivors nor bystanders consider their economic situation significantly better than before the genocide.

Similar Perceptions among the Population

Another commonality between the two regimes is the popularity they both enjoyed among peasants⁸⁰⁷. Both presidents are viewed as the "*parent of the country*"⁸⁰⁸. Many peasants, survivors as well as bystanders compare the interethnic relations today with the situation under Habyarimana before 1990, considering both to be equally well adjusted: "*prior to the genocide, ethnicity was not such an issue. I mean people didn't even worry about that, it was like they used to be living well, they were in good terms with neighbors.*"⁸⁰⁹ Regarding such statements, assertions of unity and reconciliation should be taken with a grain of salt and the absence of open criticism should not be prematurely interpreted as a sign of peace and general contentment.

Whereas Tutsis complained about higher education or the army being closed off to them during Habyarimana's reign, nowadays ex-convicts and their families remonstrate the financial burden of paying reparations⁸¹⁰ and their renounced voting privileges. Hutu in general complain about being sidelined with regard to 'real' power⁸¹¹ or receiving reduced governmental assistance compared to survivors⁸¹². Even though the army is mixed nowadays, its highest positions are filled with old 'Ugandan' RPF-cadres, as are the intelligence services and the key ministries⁸¹³. Effectively the army and security services are controlled by a small group of Tutsi similar to the *Akazu* before. Even the

⁸⁰⁷ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Christine, 49, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁸⁰⁸ Interview with Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁸⁰⁹ Interview with Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. Jeanne d'Arc (34) and Annunciata (58), both survivors from "Gatumba", Huye said similar things about coexistence before the genocide.

⁸¹⁰ Cf. Interviews with Thasiene, 38, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Mukaga Kwaya, 53, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁸¹¹ Cf. E.g. Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali; Jean-Pierre, 29, "Gatsata", Gisagara

⁸¹² Cf. e.g. Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali; Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁸¹³ Cf. Sim, *Classified cable from the American Embassy in Kigaly to the Secretary of State*, August 5, 2008, on: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KIGALI525_a.html (March 12, 2014).

political window-dressing was already present during Habyarimana's reign: Habyarimana's government featured Tutsi-ministers to look inclusive⁸¹⁴ and even though Kagame appointed Dr. Jean Damascène Ntawukuriryayo, a Hutu, as the speaker of the senate, judging from Joseph Sebarenzi's memoir, the speaker has no real power in Kagame's system⁸¹⁵.

Paternalism

Even in official texts highlighting good governance, citizen involvement and high degrees of government trust, the paternalist attitude often shines through. Paternalist expressions such as “*mentoring leadership*⁸¹⁶”; “*transformation of negative attitudes and ideologies*⁸¹⁷”; “*molding a self-respecting [sic] Rwandan*⁸¹⁸”; or the wish for an “[...] *efficient state capable of unifying and mobilizing its population*⁸¹⁹” are very popular. A declaration from the NURC’s 15-year-anniversary-report captures the attitude very well: “*Considering that national unity was such an essential element in the life of a nation, it was resolved that unity of a nation was not an option that an individual can choose to accept or reject at will*⁸²⁰.” This paternalist attitude towards the 'backward' population has been observed by a plethora of scholars who worked at the grassroots level in recent years⁸²¹. They come to similar conclusions about the way politics are handled in Rwanda as analysts of Habyarimana’s regime⁸²².

Democracy in Rwanda	1990	1994	2003	2011
Bystanders	0.2	-4.2	2.2	3.9
Ex-Convicts	-0.2	-5	-0.2	3.3
Returnees	-3.5	-2.4	0.9	3.3
Survivors	-0.9	-4.9	1.5	3.1
Rwanda Average	-0.5	-4.3	1.5	3.6

⁸¹⁴ Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 140.

⁸¹⁵ Cf. Sebarenzi, 2009, 139.

⁸¹⁶ NURC, 2009, 6.

⁸¹⁷ NURC, Annual Activity Report 2002, 2004, 4.


⁸¹⁸ NURC, 2009, 12.

⁸¹⁹ Shyaka, 2004, 32

⁸²⁰ NURC, 2009, 8.

⁸²¹ Cf. Burnet, 2009; Thomson, 2010, 2011 & 2013; Ingelaere, 2010a, 2010c & 2011; Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004, 162-182. C. Newbury, 2011, 67-78.

⁸²² C.f. e.g. Des Forges, 2002, 67ff.; Mamdani, 2001, 132-158; Uvin, 1998, particularly 23ff. about “*development as legitimization*”; For a comparison of Habyarimana’s and Kagame’s development politics, please refer to Zorbas, 2004, 29-52.



Question: Do you consider your country a democracy in following years?

Fact is that even though Rwanda prides itself with being a democracy⁸²³, surprisingly few Rwandans think that they actually can influence politics. In the quantitative part, I asked my participants a few questions about democracy. One of them was: “Would you consider your country a democracy in the following years?” The other one was “how do you think did your family's impact on politics changed in ...?”⁸²⁴


The outcome reveals that the keyword 'democracy' triggered the reaction of affirming the positive developments during the reign of the current government and condemning the old regime. If the question however omitted the keyword 'democracy' and referred to the individual participant and his family's political impact, which is arguably what democratization should further, the ratings, except for returnees, were not significantly higher than what people remembered from Habyarimana's rule, who, in the years before the genocide also implemented some democratic reforms⁸²⁵.

Political Impact Rwanda	1990	1994	2003	2011
Bystanders	-1.1	-2.3	-0.6	-0.1
Ex-Convicts	-0.5	-1	-1.6	-0.9
Returnees	-2	-1	1.8	2.2
Survivors	0.1	-3.1	0.9	1.2
Rwanda Average	-0.7	-2.3	-0.1	0.4

⁸²³ Cf. e.g. Musoni, 2004; NURC, 2009, 26.

⁸²⁴ As mentioned above, Rwandan participants were to assign a number between -5 (very bad) and +5 (very good) in four different years: 1990 (begin civil war), 1994 (genocide), 2003 (new constitution), 2011 (today).

⁸²⁵ Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 132-158.



How do you think did your family's impact on politics change in?

Although most of my participants perceived improvements of their political impact, they are still largely indifferent towards politics. This question being more personal than the question about democracy, the assessments of different groups start to differ much more, moving away from the homogenous picture from the 'democracy'-question. The diagram also indubitably illustrates, which groups feel politically represented in Rwanda nowadays. Tutsis, survivors and particularly returnees, reckon that they can advocate their interests through politics whereas bystanders are largely indifferent with regard to their political impact and ex-convicts are not even eligible to vote or to take public office⁸²⁶. The rising tendency of ex-convict ratings from 2003 to 2011 should probably be viewed in relation with their release from jail, as the same spike can be seen in diagrams about their economic situation or their approval of transitional justice after being released.

Pressure from Above

This evaluation parallels the demonized ethnocratic practice of the second republic, disguised in the rhetoric of unity and reconciliation. Although ethnic discrimination officially does not exist, the rumors of "twinning"⁸²⁷ representative Hutu officials with Tutsi executive secretaries as actual decision-makers are shockingly persistent and not just limited to disgruntled dissenters longing for power. The old identities have not vanished but they are concealed. A ban on ethnic identities is no guarantee for inclusive politics. Habyarimana spoke about all Rwandans 'being one' after his Putsch in 1973⁸²⁸. Tutsi dictators Micombero and particularly Bagaza in Burundi did the same⁸²⁹.

Habyarimana's regime mainly radicalized and rallied behind the Hutu-identity when it was challenged by the RPF and domestic opposition. The fear of losing power prompted it to devise the genocidal plan. The RPF still is far from being fundamentally challenged. Kagame's continued involvement in

⁸²⁶ Cf. Tertsakian, 2011, 210-220.

⁸²⁷ Cf. Cf. Sim, *Classified cable from the American Embassy in Kigali to the Secretary of State*, August 5, 2008, on: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KIGALI525_a.html (March 12, 2014); Waldorf, 2011, 25-47.

⁸²⁸ Cf. Sebarenzi, 2009, 11 & 28.

⁸²⁹ Cf. Interviews with Henriette, 49, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

the DRC, the RPF's sweeping attempts at history construction, the repression of dissent and the sheer number of critics imprisoned, exiled, killed or missing however speak an unmistakable language about the self-perception of a leadership under siege.

The strong pressure from above with regard to the national policy of unity and reconciliation is, ironically enough, the strongest parallel to Habyarimana's regime⁸³⁰. Both governments relied heavily on social control. On one side, peer pressure has been used extensively by the *Akazu*-network to execute the genocide, the RPF on the other side instrumentalizes Rwandan history, identity and memory in order to stifle domestic and international criticism and justify its rule. With reference to his dedication to re-educating ordinary Rwandans and uniting the country under his specific brand of African nationalism, Kagame is rather a 'traditional' African leader than a new breed of politician and some features of his state resemble his predecessor's more than meets the eye. Furthermore, the West, particularly its aid industry, supports Kagame in almost the same naïve and apolitical way as it did Habyarimana.

4.2.4. Remodeling the Rwandan State from Above

“Without government, without the state, there wouldn't be any reconciliation.” Luce, 42, genocide survivor, Huye.

Covert and militaristic Politics

The RPF approaches the task of changing Rwandan society with militaristic discipline. *“The RPF's entire background and experience, first in Uganda and later in Rwanda made it rely on a military mode of managing political situations and spaces⁸³¹”* writes Reyntjens. The government is very aware of its external perception⁸³² and enforces many of its 'unpopular' measures covertly while using every channel open to it for publicly promoting their achievements and 'popular' policies such as the empowerment of women or their anti-corruption programs. Even orders are often given implicitly and only on a need-to-know-basis. This brings about the paradoxical situation that a CSOG-representative in Kigali regrets that the perpetrators were never forced to pay reparations in the course of transitional justice⁸³³ whereas ex-convicts and their families in „*Gatumba*“ and „*Gatsata*“ complain about

⁸³⁰ Cf. chapter 4.2.3.

⁸³¹ Reyntjens, 2011, 145.

⁸³² This awareness of the international opinion is probably both the reason why the RPF government hasn't lost the goodwill of the donors despite serious and ongoing allegations of human rights violations as well as why Rwanda effectively pressured Laurent Nkunda's CNDP (2009) and Bosco Ntaganda's M23 to stop their rebellions. (cf. Reyntjens, 2011, 141-146).

⁸³³ Cf. Interview with Maximilien, 38, survivor Kigali

the massive amounts reparations they have to pay⁸³⁴. Similarly, peasants in „Gatsata” were complaining about the army uprooting their crops if they refused to plant the crops demanded by agricultural reform⁸³⁵. However, when I confronted a high-ranking RDF-officer I knew about the policy, he claimed that they would have stopped that practice long ago and that he did not know about it⁸³⁶. Joseph Sebarenzi, the ex-speaker of Rwandan parliament, describes this behavior as follows: “*the more I dealt with the RPF, the more I felt that they were behaving like rebels fighting a guerilla war in the bush*⁸³⁷.” Filip Reyntjens considers the strict control of the population by army and secret services “*an obsession since the beginning of the war in 1990*⁸³⁸.” Reyntjens⁸³⁹, as well as a growing number of other authors such as Sebarenzi⁸⁴⁰ or Waldorf⁸⁴¹ list an abundance of strategies the RPF uses to silence its international and domestic critics, ranging from suing and denying visa over character assassination and imprisonment to murder⁸⁴². This covert culture is accentuated by the mutual distrust that the genocide sewed into the social fabric of the Rwandan communities. The silence, particularly with regard to massacres perpetrated by the RPF in the aftermath of the genocide and in the DRC is even comparable with the “*forgotten genocide*⁸⁴³” of 1972 in Burundi, where the Burundian elite pretended it did not happen for years. The resulting grid of distrust and deferral makes it very difficult to receive honest answers. A culture of silence and mutual observation however is not without merit for the people in power. Constant observation and uncertainty about one’s position reinforces the position of the persons in the center who know everybody’s secrets, in other words: Paul Kagame and the inner circle of the RPF.

⁸³⁴ Cf. e.g. Interviews with François (bystander, „Gatumba”), Gaspard (bystander, „Gatsata”), Maurice (ex-convict, „Gatumba”); Rugango (ex-convict, „Gatumba”), Yohani (ex-convict, „Gatumba”), Thasiennne (bystander, „Gatsata”).

⁸³⁵ Interview with Marita, 47, „Gatsata”, Gisagara; Paul, 44

⁸³⁶ Personal Conversation.

⁸³⁷ Sebarenzi, 2009, 118.

⁸³⁸ Reyntjens, 2005a, 24.

⁸³⁹ Cf. Reyntjens, 2005a, 30-35

⁸⁴⁰ Cf. Sebarenzi, 2009, 137-182; 213ff.

⁸⁴¹ Cf. Waldorf, 2011, 48-66.

⁸⁴² Cf. Prunier, 2009, 365-368.

⁸⁴³ Lemarchand, 2009a, 129.

4.2. Reconciliation Programs in Rwanda

Among Rwandan peasants, reconciliation programs are mostly associated with receiving or providing assistance. *Ubudehe*⁸⁴⁴ – associations for mutual self-help, *Girinka* – a governmental program that donates cows to poor families, the above-mentioned 'Anti-Nyakazi' public housing-program, the genocide survivor's fund FARG, Health Insurance, and equal access to education were mentioned most frequently when participants were asked about programs that benefit reconciliation. 'Teachings' and 'sensitizations' were also mentioned quite often, particularly in „Gatumba“. Here, many participants were part of AMI and attended these sensitization programs as a part of *Ubudehe*. Governmental assistance is an important factor with regard to coexistence and reconciliation but also divides the population when people perceive themselves treated unfairly and accuse authorities of corruption or nepotism. Peasants very rarely mentioned governmental programs aimed at civic education (*Ingando, Itorero*) or justice (TIG, *Gacaca*) in the context of reconciliation. Intellectuals, local leaders and ex-convicts – people who have gone through *Ingando*, referred to sensitizations more frequently. Commemoration was generally not mentioned as a program aimed at reconciliation. The NURC lists *Ingando, Itorero ry'igihugu, Gacaca, Umuganda, abunzi* (communal mediators) and the *Girinka*-program as “homegrown approaches”⁸⁴⁵. *Abunzi*⁸⁴⁶ were mentioned very rarely by participants and thus will be left out here. The other programs however were mentioned frequently and will be discussed in detail below.

4.3.1. Official Agents of Reconciliation: The NURC

The NURC was established in 2003 as a means to promote unity and reconciliation among Rwandans. Relying on multiple strategies of communication and homegrown concepts for transitional justice and civic education⁸⁴⁷, the NURC intends to sensitize and educate the population about the official discourse of genocide, unity and reconciliation. Complementary projects such as workshops, reconciliation summits, leadership academies, and inter-community exchanges are employed, addressing

⁸⁴⁴ The literal translation of *Ubudehe* is “mutual assistance”. The expression was used in many slightly differing contexts. According to the IRDP, *ubudehe* is a “community-based poverty reduction scheme” (IRDP, 2010, 48). As far as I understood, local associations get involved in community development planning, collaboration in community work and helping each other out, thereby increasing the positive social interactions between victims and perpetrators. Furthermore, such associations were also instrumental in disseminating the government's message of unity and reconciliation. It never became clear to me in how far these associations were financed or even established by the state, (Luce, a survivor from “Gatumba” told me that AMI used to receive state funds) and to what extent they were a grassroots-based initiative.

⁸⁴⁵ NURC, *Homegrown Approaches*, Official Website, <http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=81> (24. March 2014)

⁸⁴⁶ Vincent (42, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara) mentioned *abunzi* in the context of *Gacaca*. He said that they were a “committee of harmony” and guaranteed that justice was impartial.

⁸⁴⁷ IJR, 2005, 3ff.

different causes of the genocide and diverse subsets of the population such as university students, party cadres, politicians, or ex-convicts.

The NURC maintains a vast and very detailed system, which addresses all crucial parts of Rwandan society and reaches down to the community level. In a country where most adults have only a few years of primary education, this equips the civic education programs of the NURC with a factual monopoly concerning the creation of political knowledge in rural regions. The three pillars of the NURC system are *“civic education; peace building and conflict management; support to unity and reconciliation community initiatives”*⁸⁴⁸. Its official tasks read as follows:

- *“Preparing and coordinating the national programme for the promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation.*
- *Developing and implementing strategies to restore and consolidate Unity and Reconciliation among Rwandans.*
- *Educating and sensitizing the population on matters relating to National Unity and Reconciliation.*
- *Conducting research, organizing debates on unity and reconciliation, disseminating ideas and producing publications to strengthen that process.*
- *Denouncing and banning any acts, writings and attitudes of discrimination, intolerance and xenophobia and making suggestions for appropriate measures in order to eradicate divisionism among Rwandans and strengthen Unity and Reconciliation”*⁸⁴⁹.

While these aims are laudable in theory, the last point de facto transforms the NURC into the enforcement agency of the national discourse on genocide.

The following points are core issues of the politics of unity and reconciliation. They are implemented by a mix of governmental agencies such as the NURC, the FARG and the CNLG and NGOs and CSOGs such as e.g. IBUKA, AVEGA, IRDP (Institute for Research and Development), CLADHO, or LIPRODHOR, often under informal governmental supervision and with funding from international donors:

- **Ending impunity:** Strict laws banning the use of ethnic affiliations combined with an approach towards maximum justice aiming at the punishment of every *génocidaire* have been conceived to act as deterrents against the culture of impunity.
- **Rule of law and good governance:** Rwanda has gone to great lengths to promote good governance and the rule of law⁸⁵⁰, resulting in a professional and streamlined administration and

⁸⁴⁸ NURC, 2009, 10. NURC, Annual Activity Report 2002, 2004.

⁸⁴⁹ Shyaka, 2004, 38

a steady flow of international financial aid in the 1990s and 2000s. Kagame's "Vision 2020" intends to transform Rwanda into a prosperous, information-based economy modeled after the Southeast Asian Tiger States⁸⁵¹, alleviating the huge socio-economic pressure and combating cases of blatant nepotism typical of other African states.

- "Never again": Official, memorials, memorial events and the above-described, carefully crafted narrative of the genocide against the Tutsi promoted through schools, charitable organizations, parties and official organs make sure that nobody forgets the genocidal tragedy and its causes. Commemoration ceremonies and prevention research are mainly the tasks of the CNLG.
- Justice: Next to transitional justice institutions such as *Gacaca*, Genocide survivor's associations such as IBUKA⁸⁵² or AVEGA⁸⁵³ have been established to assist the victims and their families. A public fund, the FARG⁸⁵⁴ provides financial assistance to survivors. Convicted perpetrators (and their families⁸⁵⁵) are forced to recompensate victims in monetary form and work for the benefit of society in TIG .
- Enhancing social cohesion and sustaining peace: National unity and mutual forgiveness are encouraged through multiple public and private associations, promoting a better collective future for all Rwandans.

The more educated participants in Kigali generally felt more at ease with the government and considered themselves as being part of the 'New Rwanda', which needs to hear critical voices to advance. These people, with whom I was personally familiar in most cases were much more eager to voice criticism against government policies. In the rural sites, many participants reacted with preemptive compliance to the official discourse to political questions. This compliance to official directives, 'the law', is reflected strongly in the NURC's surveys. My experiences in field research thus convinced me that the overwhelmingly positive ratings of the NURC with regard to unity and reconciliation⁸⁵⁶ should be taken with a grain of salt. The national reports were compiled by government officials or at least people the peasants associated with the central authority and thus were probably,

⁸⁵⁰ It however has to be mentioned that the RPF's promotion of the rule of law has been repeatedly compromised by the party itself when it came to matters of state security or maintaining their tight grip on power. Joseph Sebarenzi, former speaker of the Rwandan parliament e.g. tells a gripping account about the party's growing autocratic tendencies beginning in the late 1990s. Cf. Sebarenzi, 2009, 137-182.

⁸⁵¹ Cf. Kinzer, 2008, 209-252.

⁸⁵² IBUKA("remember") – www.ibuka.rw (7. March 2013)

⁸⁵³ AVEGA – Association des veuves du genocide – www.avega-ruanda.net (7. March 2013)

⁸⁵⁴ FARG – Fonds d'assistance pour les réscapés du genocide – www.fag.gov.rw (7. March 2013)

⁸⁵⁵ Cf. Interview with Thasienne, 38, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Personal conversation with Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁸⁵⁶ Cf. E.g. NURC, Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer 2010, 9f or, for 2012: Kabeera: "Reconciliation efforts attain 80 percent milestone – NURC report", in New Times, February 1, 2012.

if not certainly met with anticipatory compliance in many cases. In this case, the status of the interviewer might actually be more decisive for the results than the questions he poses.

If we e.g. compare the official NURC-publication Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer with my quantitative findings about the perception of political impact above, 56.5 percent of participants in the NURC-publication strongly agree or agree with the statement *"I have space and opportunities to influence those that make the laws of the country"*⁸⁵⁷. 34.2 percent strongly agree or agree with the statement *"I have very little say in the public decisions that affect my life"*⁸⁵⁸. In my assessment, which also has to consider a certain amount of political correctness, Hutu participants evaluated their impact in 2011 negatively (-0.1 for bystanders and -0,9 for ex-convicts), Tutsis positively (1.2 for survivors, 2.2 for returnees) and the Rwandan average evaluation is 0.4. Apart from the differences between Hutu and Tutsi, transferred to the NURC-scale, this would assessment would have to be interpreted as a majority that regards its political impact rather skeptical than a majority of satisfied citizens.

4.3.2. Re-education

Participants referred to *Ingando*, *Itorero ry'igihugu* and other civic education programs such as AMI or SCUR generally as *"teachings"*⁸⁵⁹, *"workshops"*⁸⁶⁰ or *"sensitizing"*⁸⁶¹. Except for ex-convicts, who were re-educated in prisons or re-education centers like *Gishamvu*, participants generally made no difference between receiving civic education by a state representative or by a nominally private organization such as AMI. The teachings usually transmitted the same Foucauldian discourse about the genocide, unity and reconciliation. Participants in such workshops were usually encouraged to spread the message in their villages. Students such as Robert or teachers such as Umubyeyi were specifically chosen to disseminate the government's unity and reconciliation-message: *"One time, she was chosen alongside other people in her Umudugudu community. In her Umudugudu, they were chosen to take part in trainings by the government aimed at unity and reconciliation. And they were told that, once they have come, once those trainings were over, they could come to their community, to their*

⁸⁵⁷ NURC, 2010, 38.

⁸⁵⁸ Ibid. 38.

⁸⁵⁹ Cf. e.g. Innocent (55, ex-convict, „Gatsata“); Karemera (73, returnee, „Gatsata“), Maurice (58, ex-convict, „Gatumba“), Peter (46, bystander, „Gatsata“), Robert (25, bystander, „Gatsata“), Thasiene (38, bystander, „Gatumba“), Vianney (52, bystander, „Gatsata“), Umubyeyi (27, bystander, „Gatsata“).

⁸⁶⁰ Cf. e.g. Marcel (40, survivor, „Gatumba“), Annunciata (58, Hutu Survivor, „Gatumba“), Boniphilde (40, Hutu Survivor, „Gatumba“), Ben (25, bystander, Kigali), Robert (25, bystander, „Gatsata“).

⁸⁶¹ Cf. e.g. Boniphilde (40, Hutu survivor, „Gatumba“), Costasie (65, survivor, „Gatumba“), Luce (42, survivor, „Gatumba“); Yohani (54, ex-convict, „Gatumba“). Interestingly, the word *"sensitize"* was also used when participants talked about receiving or listening to orders to kill during the genocide, this might however also be a translation problem related to the limited vocabulary of the translator. Cf. e.g. François (52, bystander, „Gatumba“), Marie- Françoise (29, survivor, „Gatsata“), Maurice (58, ex-convict, „Gatumba“).

respective communities and try to spread that message to the rest of other children for instance. [...] She thinks that it helped her a lot⁸⁶²."

Through this pyramid of communication incorporating communal opinion leaders, intellectuals and even ex-convicts into the circulation of the narrative, the 'official version' is disseminated. The government attempts to influence and ultimately overwrite the 'informal' discourse, forming the 'invisible script' mentioned above. This does not have to be interpreted negatively. The message after all is reconciliation and the NURC also facilitates communication by "*encouraging setting up the cooperatives that gathers both, the offended, the genocide survivors and the genocide perpetrators⁸⁶³."* *Itore-ro* for example is a program conducted at the community level where people talk about what happened and exchange experiences in the style of a self-help group.

Ingando

The essential program to "*sensitize genocide perpetrators to tell the truth about what happened and to confess and repent while at the same time sensitizing surviving victims of the genocide to have the courage to forgive those who offended them⁸⁶⁴."* however is *Ingando* – Peace Education. *Ingando* is mandatory for certain key groups such as convicts, prostitutes, *génocidaires*, ex-combatants, soldiers, *Gacaca*-judges, and university students and it is highly encouraged for people who want to assume a leading position in Rwandan society such as university professors, church leaders, military officers or politicians⁸⁶⁵.

According to the NURC itself, *Ingando's* most important objectives for participants are "*to clarify the history of Rwanda; To analyze and understand the origin of divisions among the people of Rwanda and decide on what should be done to eradicate [sic] them; To have active participation in finding permanent solutions to Rwanda's problems and contribute to national unity; to promote patriotism and learn to resolve their conflicts peacefully and support government programs; to participate in national reconstruction and shun divisive tendencies; to fight genocide ideology⁸⁶⁶."* The objectives read like guidelines to complete re-education.

Ingando derives from the word "*kugandika*" – stopping normal activities to reflect and find solutions for national problems. There however is an important distinction between *ingando* solidarity camps, which are for politicians, civil society and church leaders, *Gacaca* judges and incoming university stu-

⁸⁶² Interview with Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. clean verbatim from translator who spoke about Umubyeyi in the third person.

⁸⁶³ Interview with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali.

⁸⁶⁴ NURC, 2009, 9.

⁸⁶⁵ Cf. NURC, 2009, 10ff.; Mgbako, 2005, 212.

⁸⁶⁶ Cf. NURC, 2009, 10f.

dents, and *ingando* re-education camps for ex-combatants, ex-soldiers, *génocidaires*, released prisoners, prostitutes, and street children⁸⁶⁷.

In official texts, *Ingando* is often praised as a revolutionary program that yields immediate benefits. The NURC e.g. claims that the "*majority of people who past [sic] through ingando won the trust of the citizens and were elected in various positions of leadership*"⁸⁶⁸. In reality however, most participants view these camps rather soberly. "*It's a kind of training where every student who are getting [sic] to the higher universities, or other higher institutes have to spend at least a month, or three weeks. They study about the different government policies but they also bring different persons. Like the people how have been ex-FAR in Congo forest. They can talk about how much they killed. They can talk about how much they suffered from Congo forest. On the other side you will find, you will listen to people who lost their relatives. So when you listen to both sides you can feel guilty then you say we have to reconcile, because both sides have suffered*"⁸⁶⁹.

The opinions are divided. Some Rwandans such as Chris claim that they learned a lot about reconciliation from *Ingando*: "*We were told that we are one people, with one language, we don't have differences despite the differences that were talked by the former government. So from then on, when I was encouraged to think in this line of, you know, reconciliation, being with people, considering each other no matter how different we are. I learned from Ingando that we can live in harmony despite the diversity of characters or things. [...] Actually we were given the reality as they thought it, and so this really shaped my thinking*"⁸⁷⁰. Others such as Robert believe that *Ingando* is an attempt to indoctrinate citizens with the government's narrative and see it as a compulsory chore for advancing in society: "*there you have no choice. You have to. By our time, we had to go. Either you had to attend the ingando or your place at university, you couldn't get it because you had neglected*"⁸⁷¹. Critics as Susan Thomson, who spent some time in a solidarity camp herself, maintain, "*Ingando teachings are an instrument for consolidating state control*"⁸⁷².

Ingando approaches reconciliation by teaching ex-convicts that *génocidaires* are actually victims themselves, that their leaders, which made their life miserable, indoctrinated them⁸⁷³. Hence, not unlike a religion, *Ingando* provides them with a fresh start where the sins of their past life are forgiven. Mgbako characterizes the 12-week *Ingando* re-education camps⁸⁷⁴ for *génocidaires* as follows:

⁸⁶⁷ Cf. Thomson, 2011, 333f.

⁸⁶⁸ NURC, 2009, 11.

⁸⁶⁹ Interview with Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali.

⁸⁷⁰ Interview with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali.

⁸⁷¹ Interview with Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁸⁷² Thomson, 2011, 332.

⁸⁷³ Cf. Mgbako, 2005, 222f.

⁸⁷⁴ Cf. Thomson, 2011, 331-341.

"the RPF-dominated government has employed *ingando*, or solidarity camps, both to plant the seeds of reconciliation, and to disseminate pro-RPF ideology through political indoctrination"⁸⁷⁵. At the end of *ingando*, there is a test to make sure the *génocidaires* have understood their lessons. If they fail, they will not be allowed to join their communities. Mgbako also maintains that *génocidaires* are reimbursed for completing *Ingando*, invoking the resentment of survivors just as reparation payments do reciprocally⁸⁷⁶.

Regarding the fact that Rwandans from all walks of life are required to undergo *ingando*, this sheds some light on the peculiar uniformity of answers regarding history and the current government. This hypothesis is underlined by the fact that the NURC, already in 2005, believed that the frequency with which civil society approached the organization to hold *ingandos* was an "*indication of the mainstream status ingando currently enjoys in Rwandan society*"⁸⁷⁷. Taking into account that it has become necessary for a great many careers in Rwanda, the number of *Ingandos* has multiplied over the years. Next to its own camps, the NURC has started to offer *Ingandos* in collaboration with communities⁸⁷⁸. Up to 2009, 92'835 people have undergone official *Ingando*-workshops⁸⁷⁹. After the success of the program, the government launched *Itorero ry'igihugu*, an even more ambitious program of communal reflection focusing on the objective of re-creating "*a Rwandan characterized by values founded on culture and on national vision*"⁸⁸⁰. From 2007 to 2009 alone, 115'228 Rwandans completed *Itorero*. This amounts to re-education on a truly grand scale. Its benefits however are controversial. First, the impact on people's opinions is doubtful because the time spent within *ingando* or *itorero* is probably too short to change people's way of thinking beyond merely paying lip service. Second, *ingando* is very one-sided. It steadfastly orients itself towards the official narrative, thus denying an open discussion of such fundamental topics as ethnicity, and finally because "*the focus on political indoctrination also severely undermines ingando as a reconciliation mechanism. Moreover, the government's continued attacks on civil society and perceived political opposition threaten to undermine reconciliation programs like ingando*"⁸⁸¹.

4.3.3. Assistance and Poverty Reduction

Assistance Programs and the Promise of Progress and Development

⁸⁷⁵ Mgbako, 2005, 202.

⁸⁷⁶ Cf. Mgbako, 2005, 212.

⁸⁷⁷ Ibid. 224.

⁸⁷⁸ Cf. NURC, 2010b.

⁸⁷⁹ NURC, 2009, 11.

⁸⁸⁰ NURC, 2009, 12.

⁸⁸¹ Mgbako, 2005, 224.

Paradoxically, with all the efforts of the NURC to devise specific programs aimed at reconciling Rwandans, the most lasting contribution to peace and reconciliation might have come from projects that only indirectly contribute to reconciliation such as the fight against corruption, the *mutuelle de santé*, *Girinka*, the *Anti-Nyakazi*-programs or equal access to education. Contrary to the ‘teachings’ and ‘sensitizations’ common in *Ingando* or *Itorero ry’ Igihugu* that directly try to change the way Rwandans are thinking, the assistance programs, as unfair, random or clientelistic as they may be in certain aspects, actually render progress and poverty reduction visible and attainable.

Even though interviewees reassured me that they profited from the ‘teachings’ by getting closer to their former antagonists and learning to appreciate their worth as human beings, most Hutu also stated that they had in fact never hated their Tutsi neighbors and used to collaborate and even intermarry before the genocide. According to Sebarenzi, neighbors always resumed normal interactions after massacres⁸⁸². Institutions like *Ubudehe* certainly do have a positive impact with regard to (re-)building personal ties and mutual respect between victims and perpetrators and almost all participants recommended the attempt to bring victims and perpetrators together⁸⁸³. However, the sensitization-part, which teaches the Hutu to accept their guilt and adopt the view of the civil war’s victor without asking critical questions, is often met with passive resistance or paying lip service⁸⁸⁴. The Hutu-participants who deviated from the ‘invisible script’ declared that they followed the official line because it was dangerous to question the official ideology. John used a Rwandan proverb: “*law weighs more than a stone. So, the leaders are telling us this, and we are forced to do it*⁸⁸⁵.” Gaspard, who came back from the DRC as an orphan goes even further: “*In this country, if we say something that is against what the state says, you will be punished or will be killed*⁸⁸⁶.” Dissent is unwelcome and socio-politically marginalized but the addressees of re-education possess intimate knowledge and personal experiences with regard to Rwanda’s post-genocide history as well. The difference between what is taught in *Ingando* and during *Ubudehe* and what the RPF practiced in the DRC or during the civil war is apparent to most Hutu and it provokes resistance among the rural population, subtle and non-confrontational resistance for the most part, but resistance nonetheless.

Financial Assistance

⁸⁸² Cf. Sebarenzi, 2009, 25.

⁸⁸³ Costasie (65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye) e.g. stated that *Ubudehe* helps her to forgive because the perpetrators help her with her daily chores: “*Like you know I'm old, I am no longer able to work but when they sensitize them to help us, like in our work, everyday works I always feel that I for, I can forgive them and we live peacefully with them.*”

⁸⁸⁴ Cf. Thomson, 2013, 127-159; Interview with John, 56, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali.

⁸⁸⁵ Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.

⁸⁸⁶ Interview with Gaspard, 26, bystander, “Gatsata” Gisagara,

The difference between teachings and the assistance programs is that peasants immediately see the advantages that the regime brings for the beneficiary parties. The implicit promise of progress and development assured through neighbors' positive experiences with programs that provided material benefits such as the president's cow-donation program *Girinka* persuaded many to stay loyal to the current government. Rural dwellers and peasants are pragmatic, if policy yields direct results; they participate regardless of the message conveyed: *"I don't know those programs but when the government holds the meetings where it teaches good relations. [...] So we have a cooperative where we meet and cultivate, then we get some sponsorship from the government"*⁸⁸⁷.

Many peasants I interviewed were very fond of the government's assistance programs. Vianney in particular, a 52-year old bystander from „*Gatsata*“, consistently kept lauding the achievements of the government. When we asked him about his personal benefits from reconciliation, he mentioned that he hoped for a cow: *"I mean I haven't benefitted yet from the Girinka-program. But, I am hopeful; I have been promised that, because I can see neighbors they already have cows"*⁸⁸⁸. It is easy to see how in a poor, agrarian country where cattle-ownership is a sign of wealth, such a promise, if credible, would keep peasants loyal. Peter and Augustin from "*Gatsata*", the only bystanders I met who had received livestock from these donation programs, talked very favorably about the government and its reconciliation politics⁸⁸⁹. Furthermore, peasants associated the cow-donations directly with the president. It is his personal program⁸⁹⁰, reinforcing his position even when the local authorities neglect the promise. As Boniphilde, a widow and Hutu survivor from „*Gatumba*“ said: *"The problem is always those local leaders who never give those donations from the president to [their] destination. Like if they must reach widows and they give them to other people, so that's where the problem is"*⁸⁹¹. If the program is considered one-sided however and people cannot profit for political reasons, such as e.g. ex-convicts, the approval rapidly shifts to criticism of the national reconciliation policy: *"So they tell us to reconcile, unity, stuff like that. But for instance for me I can't get a cow. Then I was hitting back on him that GIRINKA cow project is like: if you are legible, if you have somewhere to keep that cow and you are poor you can easily get that cow. So he said no, that is totally wrong. Because if I am a convict I served some time in jail, automatically I am erased from the list, even my children they can't get that cow"*⁸⁹².

⁸⁸⁷ Rugango, 81, ex-convict, "*Gatumba*", Huye.

⁸⁸⁸ Interview with Vianney, 52, bystander, „*Gatsata*“, Gisagara.

⁸⁸⁹ Cf. Interviews with Peter, 46, bystander, "*Gatsata*" had received a goat and Augustin, 50, bystander, "*Gatsata*" received a cow.

⁸⁹⁰ Cf. NURC, "*Homegrown Approaches*", <http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=81> (14 October 2014)

⁸⁹¹ Interview with Boniphilde, 40, Hutu survivor, „*Gatumba*“, Huye.

⁸⁹² Interview with John, 56, bystander, "*Gatsata*", Gisagara.

No matter whether talking about the FARG, *Ubudehe*, *Girinka*, *Anti-Nyakazi* pension annuity, and the mandatory *mutuelle de santé* – participants understood almost everything that supported them in their daily lives as reconciliation policy. The focus was always placed on fostering greater equality and creating social cohesion, less on apology, recognition or acknowledgement.

Most Rwandans desperately want to believe in the declarations of good governance. In “*Gatumba*”, the positive experiences of some members of AMI with assistance programs⁸⁹³ encouraged the others to hold on, even though ex-convicts seem to be excluded from the assistance. Regardless of frequent allegations of corruption⁸⁹⁴ or inequality⁸⁹⁵ in assistance programs, the equal access to education clearly represents an improvement by comparison to the old regime. Several participants lauded the education system⁸⁹⁶ even though some Hutu complained that survivors would have it much easier to afford school fees because of the FARG⁸⁹⁷, thus creating a new Tutsi-elite. Interestingly, many peasants complained about local corruption and nepotism in assistance programs⁸⁹⁸ but at the same time implicitly expected to be rewarded for their loyalty just as was the case during the ancient regime⁸⁹⁹. The degree of contentment with the RPF-Regime is mostly related to the financial assistance or the possibilities of social ascension the regime can provide. As long as most Hutu consider the current government a credible guarantor for progress, meritocracy and a better future, they may tolerate the disadvantages of the current system.

Jealousy and Necessity

The most disaffected groups in the 'New Rwanda' are often survivors that slip through the safety net and do not profit from assistance for various reasons. Christine, Costasie, Teresa, Annunciata, and Boniphilde are examples. Next in line are young educated Hutu who see their dead disavowed and their criticism outlawed such as Robert, Ben, Gaspard, Jean-Pierre, and Umubyeyi, as well as the families of perpetrators who are not eligible for support and suffer under the burden of the reparations they have to pay to the Tutsi victims of the genocide. Even though most ex-convicts took care not to say anything that could be interpreted as criticism against the regime except perhaps com-

⁸⁹³ Christine and Annunciata are paid the *mutuelle de santé*. Christine, Boniphilde and Annunciata got new houses from sponsors. Marcel, Costasie and Augustin spoke very positive about *Girinka*.

⁸⁹⁴ Cf. Interviews with Boniphilde, 40; survivor, “*Gatumba*”, Huye; Christine, 49, survivor, “*Gatumba*”, Huye; Françoise, 53, bystander, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara; Thasiennne, 38, bystander, “*Gatumba*”, Huye.

⁸⁹⁵ Cf. interviews with John, 56, bystander, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara; François, 52, bystander, “*Gatumba*”, Huye.

⁸⁹⁶ Cf. Interviews with Robert, 25, bystander, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara; Christine, 49, survivor, “*Gatumba*”, Huye; Thasiennne, 38, bystander, “*Gatumba*”, Huye.

⁸⁹⁷ Interviews with Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali; Gaspard, 26, bystander, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara.

⁸⁹⁸ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Annunciata, 58, survivor, „*Gatumba*”, Huye; Boniphilde, 50, survivor, „*Gatumba*”, Huye; Christine, 49, survivor, Huye.

⁸⁹⁹ Cf. E.g. interviews with Vianney, 52, bystander, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara; Costasie, 65, survivor, “*Gatumba*”, Huye.

plaining about the sum of reparations, their families were often less reluctant and at times even jealous of the assistance bestowed on survivors⁹⁰⁰.

On the other side, many survivors who lost their families had to struggle incredibly hard to survive. Some Hutu interviewees might have considered the FARG's provisions as unfair advantages for survivors in the educational system or perceived *Gacaca*-trials as partial but many survivors believed that *Gacaca* mainly helped the prisoners and the state, releasing thousands of killers⁹⁰¹. Even though most survivors, particularly the well-educated survivors in Kigali, were supported by the state, they lacked the support of a family, the most important frame of reference in Rwandan society. Most survivors have decided to make their peace with the past and their tormentors⁹⁰² only in default of another solution: *“Les Hutu et les Tutsi n'ont pas de choix. Ils doivent vivre ensemble. Au moins, j'ai dû accepter ça”*⁹⁰³. The necessity of coexistence is the simple but often inconvenient truth in Rwanda.

Nevertheless, survivors such as Nadine or Luce found it difficult to forgive and feel secure in the face of recurring trauma and fear. The new houses for genocide survivors in *“Gatumba”* stand apart from the others. Marie-Françoise stated that survivors had to forgive due to official policy not because of personal desires: *“Yeah, the government wants we forgive. The government is forgiving, so that's it”*⁹⁰⁴.

⁹⁰⁰ Cf. E.g. Interviews with Françoise, Marita, Gaspard, Jean-Claude, Thasienne, Mukaga Kwaya.

⁹⁰¹ Cf. E.g. Interviews with Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali; Nadine, 25, survivor, Kigali; Luce, 42, survivor, *“Gatumba”*, Huye.

⁹⁰² Cf. Interviews with Boniphilde, 40, survivor, *“Gatumba”*, Huye; Costasie, 65, survivor, *“Gatumba”*, Huye; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Faustin, 40, survivor, *„Gatsata”*, Gisagara;

⁹⁰³ Interview with Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali.

⁹⁰⁴ Interview with Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, *“Gatsata”*, Gisagara.

4.4. Identity and Memory

4.4.1. Erasing ethnic Identities and Memory

Ethnic Amnesia

One of the most interesting debates in the context of memory, identity and commemoration unfurled between President Kagame himself and renowned Great Lakes scholar René Lemarchand on the pages of the collected edition "*After Genocide*"⁹⁰⁵. Lemarchand contends that the ban on mentioning Hutu and Tutsi identities complicates any attempt to re-examine the root causes of the genocide, as even mentioning the tabooed ethnical identities offers a possible ground for indictment and thus criminalizes ethnic memory. Lemarchand maintains that by imposing a de-ethnicized victim-centered narrative of the genocide, the Rwandan authorities seek to exonerate themselves from all responsibilities, especially from their own human rights violations. They exclusively assign the roles of victims and perpetrators to Tutsi and Hutu, by no means interchangeable⁹⁰⁶. According to Lemarchand, the absolutist narrative prevents the emergence of a critical memory that would allow memory work, the 'working through' of the traumatizing events and their complex causes by both parties of the conflict⁹⁰⁷. Criminalizing the reference to ethnic memory while at the same time officially commemorating the genocide against the Tutsi, keeps the Hutu community in a permanent position of culpability as it erases the memory of moderate Hutu victims and righteous Hutu who died protecting their Tutsi-neighbors. It rules out the process of reckoning by denying recognition to the plurality of perceptions of the past, thus preventing communities come to terms with their responsibilities.

President Kagame addresses Lemarchand's position personally in his preface, unsurprisingly dismissing Lemarchand's interpretation as flawed, because in his eyes, the scholar's view of ethnicity is based on the wrong premises. According to Kagame, the reference to Hutu/Tutsi terminologies is not the basis of the problem of ethnicity in Rwanda, "*it is the distortions and prejudices that for decades were associated with these terms for political ends*"⁹⁰⁸. Kagame regards Lemarchand's attempt to "*see everything in Rwanda through the ethnic prism*"⁹⁰⁹ as hardly helpful for reconciling Rwandans and furthermore rejects the accusation that his government globally criminalizes the Hutu community because "*the population knows who is guilty of genocide crimes*"⁹¹⁰. In Kagame's eyes view, which represents the official Rwandan government narrative, there has never been a clash of memories because the facts of the genocide are clear and straightforward: the Tutsis have been the target of a

⁹⁰⁵ Clark and Kaufman (eds.), 2009.

⁹⁰⁶ Also see chapter 3.2.5.

⁹⁰⁷ Cf. Lemarchand, 2009b, 75

⁹⁰⁸ Kagame, 2009, xxiii

⁹⁰⁹ Kagame, 2009, xxiii

⁹¹⁰ Kagame, 2009, xxiii

government-sponsored genocide and the RPA fought to stop it. There has been no mass revenge, only massacres by rogue elements of the RPA, for which these elements have been punished severely. The commemoration ceremonies remember the Tutsi primarily as the group targeted for extermination, while Hutu heroism is recognized. According to the president, Hutu guilt thus is not globalized⁹¹¹. This argumentation, of course, leaves out the fate of the Rwandan refugees in the DRC.

The facts that "*Hutu victims of the civil war and genocide remain largely unacknowledged in official terms*⁹¹²", that no RPA-members have been tried before the ICTR⁹¹³ and the common critique that the *Gacaca*-courts have neglected to address crimes against Hutu⁹¹⁴ have to be addressed to thoroughly work through the country's traumatic experiences. These legacies make it easy for the emerging opposition in exile, revisionist or not, to castigate the regime as an ethnically exclusive dictatorship despite its anti-ethnic legislation. According to Hintjens⁹¹⁵, the polarized 'race' identities will not vanish under the consensual carpet of Rwanda's shared citizenship. They only take the new forms of '*génocidaire*' and 'survivor' if the regime perpetuates its stranglehold on memory and if it refuses to allow the emergence of more complex political identities⁹¹⁶. My field research corroborates Hintjens' evaluation of identity dynamics. I encountered largely consistent groups with changing denominations as chapter 3.2.5 describes.

4.4.2. The Relevance of Ethnic Identity for Reconciliation

For most Rwandans belonging to an ethnic group does not seem to have much practical importance. The genocide has been such a shock and re-education has been so thorough that a vast majority deems ethnic identities the cause for misery and nothing more. Many participants are happy to see them vanish: "*she doesn't have to bring back those ethnicities because they have no value at all. Like those who did the killings, they are even the ones who cultivate our lands. So she doesn't see any importance of ethnicity today*⁹¹⁷." They however disagree regarding the question if banning ethnic identities actually makes them vanish or just pushes them underground. Most participants who argue that ethnic identities will vanish bring forth three arguments:

- Deleting the category ethnicity from the ID cards makes identifying Hutu and Tutsi much more difficult.

⁹¹¹ Cf. Ibid. xxiv.

⁹¹² Hintjens, 2009, 83

⁹¹³ Cf. Hintjens, 2009, 83;

⁹¹⁴ Cf. Clark and Kaufman, 2009, 11

⁹¹⁵ Cf. Hintjens, 2009.

⁹¹⁶ Cf. Hintjens, 2009, 90.

⁹¹⁷ Interview with Boniphilde, 40, Hutu survivor, "Gatumba", Huye. clean verbatim from translator who spoke about Boniphilde in third person.

- By banning ethnic identity from public discourse, it will lose importance and future generations will grow up without knowing their identity, which has happened before according to some participants. The generation still knowing their ethnic identity will slowly die away. Many participants however are quick to add “*it’s only God who knows what the people think*⁹¹⁸”
- Rwandans are one people now, ethnic identities are irrelevant (government narrative).

Participants who think that ethnic identities will remain relevant categories in general put forth following counter-arguments.

- Even if ethnic identities are publicly banned, people know their neighbors. Ethnic identity slips under the surface of political discourse but is passed down within the families and in the private sphere, particularly if hidden ethnic inequalities remain.
- The past lingers on: the genocide has been too much of a caesura to move beyond distrust and hostility, particularly for survivors and other people who have been most brutally hit by the events of 1994.
- Inequalities like the one-sidedness of commemoration, stripping ex-convicts off their political rights and the permanent and public repetition of the government’s narrative of the genocide make Hutu painfully aware of their guilt and their losses, not simplifying turning a new leaf for them. Many Hutu intellectuals talk about hidden discrimination under the guise of meritocracy.

The hidden Significance of the Ban on ethnic Identities

The rationale behind the ‘divisionism’-laws of 2003, according to official Rwandan sources⁹¹⁹, was to eliminate the principal cause of the genocide according to the official narrative. To do away with colonially constructed artificial categories that have brought Rwanda nothing but harm. The idea to ban all reference to the ethnical identities of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in order to bridge divisions among the Rwandan people and reconstructing Rwandan political identity along non-ethnical lines is laudable. At least it would be, if these laws had been implemented without confirming well-founded suspicions among long-term observers of the region and participants alike that the laws would in fact be used to amplify the RPF’s political dominance.

Article 33 of the 2003 constitution proceeded to condemn all forms of ‘divisionism’ defined as the “*propagation of ethnic, regional, racial discrimination or any other form of division*⁹²⁰” and made them punishable offenses. Article 1 of law 47/2001 defines discrimination as “*any speech, writing, or*

⁹¹⁸ Interview with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye.

⁹¹⁹ NURC, 2009 and see Waldorf, 2011,55.

⁹²⁰ Republic of Rwanda, 2003, 5.

actions based on ethnicity, region or country of origin, the color of the skin, physical features, sex, language, religion or ideas aimed at depriving a person or group of persons of their rights as provided by Rwandan law and by International Conventions to which Rwanda is a party⁹²¹." Sectarianism is understood as any expression or action that might divide people or spark conflict⁹²². The enforcement of the 'divisionism'-laws have provided the RPF with the legal means to consolidate their political dominance and quell any dissent with reference to the genocide⁹²³. Other opinions are seen as revisionism. This not only stands in conflict with freedom of thought and opinion, the campaign against 'genocide ideology', has actually blurred the line between actual genocide denial and criticism. It lumps together legitimate critics with dangerous revisionists and conspiracy theorists. This complicates the fight against actual genocide denial⁹²⁴. Tutsis have the "*monopoly on suffering*"⁹²⁵." If bystanders or ex-convicts are asked directly if Hutus should be commemorated, they try to ridicule the question⁹²⁶, explain that the RPF were justified in revenge-killing Hutu⁹²⁷, become evasive⁹²⁸, or bluntly refuse to answer⁹²⁹.

Young Hutus are very aware that dissent is not tolerated from their side. When asked about the lessons he thinks Rwandans should learn in order to reconcile, Robert answered: "*I would say it in one word - that whoever is with a differing opinion, be it political or whatever, is not an enemy*"⁹³⁰." In the lead-up to the presidential elections of 2010, the three prominent political opponents, Victoire Ingabire (FDU-Inkingi), Bernard Ntaganda (PSI) and Déogratias Mushaydi were arrested on charges of 'genocide ideology'.⁹³¹

Ethnic identities maybe have disappeared from ID cards but in daily life, they are still important. This is manifested in 'twinned' positions mentioned above, security-relevant posts not going to Hutu⁹³² and in the private sphere. Jean-Claude for example a young man from Kigali, said that it would be difficult for him to marry a Tutsi-girl⁹³³ Ben recounted that his ex-girlfriend's family refused him be-

⁹²¹ Official Gazette of the Republic of the Republic of Rwanda, 2001, 2.

⁹²² Cf. Lemarchand, 2007, 25.

⁹²³ Cf. Article 19, 2009.

⁹²⁴ Cf. Waldorf, 2011, 48-66; Thomson, 2013, 112-125.

⁹²⁵ Cf. Burnet, 2009, 88.

⁹²⁶ When asked about Hutu who got killed in the DRC, Vianney (52, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara) answered: "*you can't tell me that someone maybe went to Congo, because he was tired, maybe he fell down and died, stuff like that.*"

⁹²⁷ Cf. interview with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye

⁹²⁸ Cf. interview with Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁹²⁹ Cf. e.g. interview with Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁹³⁰ Interview with Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁹³¹ Cf. Waldorf, 2011, 57ff.

⁹³² Interview with Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁹³³ Cf. Interview with Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali. The same was stated by Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

cause his father was Hutu⁹³⁴. The same thing happened to Umubyeyi, who wanted to marry her Tutsi-boyfriend⁹³⁵. One survivor also admitted that he would have personal reservations towards marrying a Hutu⁹³⁶. Thus, contrary to the official claim that people are almost completely reconciled⁹³⁷, ethnic prejudices are still widespread when it comes to relevant matters such as careers or marriages. *"The greatest danger I see for Rwanda is they live together today it is like today here everybody says that there is no more ethnic group, but it is still inside the heart. And also you will find it comes to get like job, it is a big challenge.[...] If you are not a Tutsi, if you are not from Uganda you cannot get a good job. Or even if you can get a job you will be the chief, but are you not, you cannot take strong decision. Always they will put your subordinate, he will be the one to sign; you know to take strong decisions. [...] There is something like hidden discrimination⁹³⁸."*

4.4.3. Commemoration and its Perception

Commemoration excludes

According to survivors Maximilien and Kayitare⁹³⁹ as well as scholars such as René Lemarchand⁹⁴⁰ or LarsWaldorf⁹⁴¹, Commemoration used to be more inclusive and centered on the individual stories of survivors in the first years of the transitional government but that changed with time. In the past twenty years, commemoration has increasingly become a tool to manifest dominance and demonstrate moral superiority than a tool for prevention. This change of direction is exemplified e.g. by changing the name of the official ceremony to *'Kwibuka jenoside yakorewe abatutsi'* - commemoration of the genocide against the Tutsi, a term the Rwandan government has lobbied hard to establish in international use⁹⁴². While from a genocide scholars' perspective, the term itself is correct, the political use of the expression is problematic as it excludes Hutu victims.

Changing the name from 'Rwandan genocide' to 'genocide against the Tutsi' not only runs contrary to the inclusive ideology of 'Rwandanness' but it labels Hutu as perpetrators by default and automatically locates human rights violations committed by Tutsi into the realm of 'justified revenge'⁹⁴³.

⁹³⁴ Cf. Interview with Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali.

⁹³⁵ Cf. Interview with Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁹³⁶ Cf. Interview with Maximilien, 38, bystander, Kigali;

⁹³⁷ Cf. Kabeera, *"Reconciliation efforts attain 80% milestone – NURC report"*, New Times, Kigali, February 1, 2012, <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=14888&a=49569> (5 February 2014).

⁹³⁸ Ben, bystander, 25, bystander, Kigali.

⁹³⁹ Cf. interviews with Kayitare, 31 and Maximilien, 38 both from Kigali.

⁹⁴⁰ Cf. Lemarchand 2009a, 99.

⁹⁴¹ Cf. Waldorf, 2011, 48-66.

⁹⁴² Kagire, *Genocide against the Tutsi' – It's now official*, The East African, 1. February 2014, On: <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/UN-decides-it-is-officially-genocide-against-Tutsi/-/2558/2169334/-/2q2s7cz/-/index.html> (March 19, 2014)

⁹⁴³ Cf. Burnet, 2009, 88ff.

Whereas the official, unified memory of genocide serves to “consolidate Tutsi-power⁹⁴⁴”, commemoration simultaneously globalizes the guilt of the Hutu-community. Tutsis are ascribed the role of victims in this Manichean interpretation, thus “the only category left are the *génocidaires*⁹⁴⁵”. Instead of bypassing them, the official memory perpetuates ethnic divisions. As Umubyeyi, a teacher from Gisagara explains: “there is no way for ethnic identities to vanish one day, because she says that in the families old people are still believing in that. And though the government is not supporting that [ethnic groups], there is also chances for the young generation to keep knowing that. Because she says each and every time when they are commemorating the genocide, they talk about genocide against Tutsi⁹⁴⁶.”

Hutu are forced to keep their feelings hidden during commemoration. “I have to follow the government line. I follow what the government is telling us, during that particular period. But for me internally, it is like I am almost bursting⁹⁴⁷.” This is particularly frustrating for Hutu who actually want to discard ethnic identities but who have a personal history that makes it difficult for them to embrace the re-imagined history such as Robert whose father was killed by the RPF: “I reconcile with them but you can't tell me that commemoration is helping with reconciliation. I'm reconciling because I'm noticing that the whole thing was bullshit, those ethnic identities, just like labels on us but we are human beings. There's no need for that but you can't tell me that commemoration is helping me with reconciliation because I know that there is my story which is in a box, which... my father was killed and I'm not allowed to open that box. I know it in my heart only.” Even the Rwanda-based IRDP, which is generally very cautious with criticism, states “participants in the focus groups revealed that remembering the beloved ones is the source of conflict and is not inclusive. Since the independence, the regimes in place have imposed their own perceptions of remembering the beloved ones, without organizing any debate in the society, as if they were imposing their own perception to everyone⁹⁴⁸.”

The commemoration discourse has become so dominant and is imposed in such an aggressive manner that many participants felt intimidated by the question “do you think that commemoration is inclusive?” In a particularly dramatic example, an ex-convict denied commemorating his son who had been killed by the RPF because it was not in line with the official commemoration policy. “We shouldn't commemorate them because if the Hutu are the ethnic group that was killing, so how should we commemorate them, we don't have to commemorate them even the one who can bring

⁹⁴⁴ Lemarchand, 2009b, 72

⁹⁴⁵ Lemarchand, 2009b, 72

⁹⁴⁶ Interview with Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara. Directly transcribed from translator who spoke about Umubyeyi in the third person.

⁹⁴⁷ Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.

⁹⁴⁸ IRDP, 2010, 33.

that idea to commemorate them, he would be stupid." Interviewer: *"So you don't commemorate your son?"* Yohani: *"No, I can't commemorate him"⁹⁴⁹.*"

Forced to forget

Attendance in commemoration ceremonies is mandatory: *"they have to follow the government line. Because if you dare staying home, while others are trying to remember, there are even fines for you. So you can get fines if they find, they find you home whereas others are remembering, you are accused of genocide ideology."⁹⁵⁰* Official commemoration has become so synonymous with the RPF's dominance that Susan Thomson⁹⁵¹ who has conducted in-depth field research in rural post-genocide Rwanda actually describes conscious non-attendance to mourning week and *Gacaca* as *"everyday acts of resistance"⁹⁵²*. This in turn worries the survivors who in some cases interpret Hutu-resistance against the dominant narrative as an indication of a secret genocidal mentality⁹⁵³. To avoid accusations of 'genocide ideology', bystanders' and ex-convicts' automatic reaction is to preventively deny that they consider commemoration for their dead to be necessary and downplay RPF-violence. *"If we come and say: 'you know, your people got killed in the genocide, my people got killed in massacre', reconciliation wouldn't be happening because no one could be going to ask for forgiveness. [...] there is no problem that Hutu died because you can't tell me that you come and you find that everybody of your family got killed and... So they just killed them, just on vengeance because it was understandable to kill them"⁹⁵⁴*. Interviewees who did not want to criticize the government or were not interested in the discussion usually attempted to justify the official practice with silent recognition⁹⁵⁵. Maurice: *"I think the government is our parent. So there are people who got killed during [the] genocide and there are other people who got killed out of genocide but personally I think the government commemorates all of them"⁹⁵⁶*. The idea that Hutu are remembered as well, just not explicitly is a great example of pragmatic and positive thinking that is widespread among the Rwandan population. It however ignores that 'moderate Hutu' are rarely ever mentioned in commemoration and that particularly after banning ethnic identities, the expression 'Hutu' has often become synonymous with 'killer'⁹⁵⁷. If the first objective of commemoration was indeed reconciliation, and it would attempt facilitating acknowledgement, it would have to take the government's directive of national unity

⁹⁴⁹ Interview with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, ex-head of cell, „Gatumba“, Huye

⁹⁵⁰ Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara. Transcript directly from translator who referred to John in the third person.

⁹⁵¹ Cf. Thomson, 2013, 145-159.

⁹⁵² Thomson, 2013, 145.

⁹⁵³ Cf. e.g. Interview with Luce, 42, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁹⁵⁴ Interview with Innocent, 55, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁹⁵⁵ Cf. e.g. interviews with Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Boniphilde, 40, Hutu survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Vincent, 43, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Yusuf, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Faustin, 40, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁹⁵⁶ Interview with Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁹⁵⁷ Cf. chapter 3.2.5. and interview with Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi.

more seriously. To use a participant's words: *"as it was a tragedy of Rwanda, we should commemorate all Rwandans that were killed that time⁹⁵⁸."*

Once they talked about it for a while, the majority of my participants agreed that commemoration should become more inclusive for being beneficial for reconciliation and not merely as a deterrent example serving prevention⁹⁵⁹. Even though most participants could not spontaneously think of a way to integrate Hutu-victims into official commemoration as it is currently managed, most would welcome the thought. *"If that could happen that other people who got killed could also be acknowledged in any way, if there could be an advocacy for that, that would help more with reconciliation but today, there is fear. You can't say that⁹⁶⁰."*

⁹⁵⁸ Interview with Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁹⁵⁹ Cf. e.g. interviews with Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Kibonge, 43, bystander, Huye; Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Annunciata, 58, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Christine, 49, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Gaspard, 26, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Augustin, 50, bystander; Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali; John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Mukaga Kwaya, 43, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁹⁶⁰ Interview with Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

4.5. Transitional Justice

To assess the whole array of transitional justice in Rwanda, including the ICTR, Rwandan courts, foreign courts, and the *Gacaca*-courts with regard to their significance for the reconciliation process would exceed the frame of this thesis by far. The ICTR has been rightly criticized for being too detached from the Rwandan population to really affect reconciliation in the country⁹⁶¹, thus this chapter will only address the problems of balancing justice and reconciliation in the context of the *Gacaca*-courts because they are a project of the Rwandan government embedded in Rwandan civil society.

As important as its impact may be for international law, I did not consider the ICTR in the context of this thesis. From the beginning, Kagame was furious at the international community for its passivity during the genocide, castigated the ICTR from the beginning for its slow bureaucratic procedures, its corruption affairs and its inability to bring swift justice. He always put international justice in second place. When chief prosecutor Carla del Ponte intended to prosecute RPF-personnel as well, relations had cooled down to the point where the RPF even blocked testimonies and fine-tuned releases⁹⁶². This tense relationship combined with distance between Arusha and Rwanda accounted for the fact that not much information permeated to the ordinary population. Even intellectuals such as Gaspard and Théodosine criticized that justice did not focus enough on the leaders of the genocide, seemingly unaware of the trials in Arusha⁹⁶³.

The *Gacaca*-courts on the other hand were highly visible for everyone and had an impact on most Rwandans' life. The overwhelming majority of my interviewees understood transitional justice and *Gacaca* to be identical. Most peasants had individual experiences with *Gacaca* as defendants, accusers, witnesses or attendees but only knew the ICTR from rumors⁹⁶⁴.

4.5.1. An African Solution for African Problems

“It was [necessary] to take into consideration that punishment aspect of Gacaca because given the scale of what had happened in Rwanda. But also keep in mind that forgiveness aspect, because at the end of the day people came to live together.” Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

Gacaca – Objectives and Implementation

⁹⁶¹ Cf. Kagame, 2008, XXV.

⁹⁶² Cf. Prunier, 2009, 348-351; Temple-Raston, 2005, 227-241.

⁹⁶³ Cf. Interviews with Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Théodosine, 24, returnee, Kigali.

⁹⁶⁴ Cf. the ICTR was only explicitly mentioned in the interviews with Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye and Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara, who both mentioned it in passing.

Rwanda's *Gacaca*-courts have been called "one of the most ambitious transitional justice experiments in history"⁹⁶⁵ and an "African Solution to African problems"⁹⁶⁶. Research on the Rwandan *Gacaca*-courts describes the approach as locally anchored, combining restorative and retributive jurisdiction⁹⁶⁷. The emphasis lies on confession, apology, and forgiveness. According to the official Rwandan description, *Gacaca* have their origins in the Rwandan tradition to solve small disputes through arbitration by a tribunal of lay elders⁹⁶⁸. In *Gacaca*, these judges are called *Inyangamugayo*. The courts represent the unique centerpiece of Rwandan reconciliatory justice and judged more defendants than the ICTR, transnational and ordinary Rwandan courts together⁹⁶⁹.

The devastation of the Rwandan justice apparatus during the genocide, the overwhelming number of potential perpetrators, and the overcrowding of Rwandan prisons forced the government of national unity to take innovative measures in order to timely deliver justice and involve the population. Thus, *Gacaca*-courts were set up in rural Rwanda, where 'ordinary *génocidaires*' confessions were heard and sentenced by lay judges mostly picked from the survivor community. The idea was to establish participative justice rooted in tradition. Transitional Justice in Rwanda however both borrowed from international models TRCs and displayed a rather retributive tendency - judges were able to convict defendants, thus introducing a decidedly Western element⁹⁷⁰. Participation by the population was mandatory and great emphasis was given to debate by the general assembly⁹⁷¹. The objectives were to integrate the population into the process of transitional justice, to eliminate the backlog of the justice system, to end impunity by trying every perpetrator and to achieve closure for the victims⁹⁷². The *Gacaca*-courts officially ended in 2012 but their impact remains a very controversial topic among scholars, international NGOs and Rwandans⁹⁷³.

Participants' Experiences

Whereas the formal component of the courts served the purpose of punishing the perpetrators, the restorative component assured that the needs of victims stayed at the center of jurisdiction. For justice to bring about genuine reconciliation, the court had to earn the trust of the community, thus in the ideal case, respected members of communities were chosen as judges. *Gacaca* aimed to address victims not only in their function as witnesses. It had to take their pleas seriously, so the witness-

⁹⁶⁵ HRW, 2011, 1.

⁹⁶⁶ Paul Kagame at the International Peace Institute, New York, September 21, 2009. Cited in HRW, 2011, 1.

⁹⁶⁷ Cf. Karekezi et al., 2004, 70-75

⁹⁶⁸ Cf. NEC, 2007, 56f or NURC, "*Homegrown Approaches*", <http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=81> (13 October 2014).

⁹⁶⁹ Cf. Rettig, 2008, 25

⁹⁷⁰ Cf. Ingelaere, 2009, 11.


⁹⁷¹ Cf. Schabas, 2008, 221-227.

⁹⁷² Cf. NEC, 2007, 57

⁹⁷³ For a discussion of the diverse evaluations, cf. Ingelaere, 2010c, 45ff. and Clark and Kaufman (eds.), 2008.

es could claim ownership of the process. All of my participants were very well informed about *Gacaca* and many had taken part.

Transitional Justice Rwanda				
	1990	1994	2003	2011
Bystanders	0	0	0.8	3.4
Ex-Convicts	0	0	-0.9	3.7
Returnses	0	0	0.8	1.7
Survivors	0	0	1.6	3.6
Rwanda Average	0.0	0.0	0.8	3.3



Approval of Transitional Justice in Rwanda

In general, most of my participants perceived transitional justice as a positive experience.

Nonetheless, the diagram above is a bit surprising, specifically with regard to ex-convicts' spike after 2003. Half of the ex-convicts claimed having been imprisoned innocently; however, their satisfaction with transitional justice in 2011 even trumps the survivors, soaring as soon as they were released. Returnses do not deem transitional justice that important.

Most rural participants referenced *Gacaca*-courts in positive terms. All participant-categories considered punishing the guilty and liberating the innocent as the main benefit of *Gacaca*-courts. Ex-convicts and bystanders mostly welcomed the fact that it hastened the justice process and liberated prisoners⁹⁷⁴. Survivors, even though often critical about the sheer numbers of perpetrators released, appreciated the confessions⁹⁷⁵ that in some cases brought them closure as well as the fact that the perpetrators were held accountable and that justice was administered locally.

⁹⁷⁴ Most of the ex-convicts I interviewed were released following *Gacaca* after having spent as much as 14 years in prison without trial (Paul). There were however no "category 1"-convicts (the most ruthless killers) among my interviewees.

⁹⁷⁵ Particularly answering the question where the bodies were buried was of utmost importance to survivors. E.g. Chris, 29, a survivor from Kigali recounted that he visited all the *Gacaca*-courts in the province he used to

With reference to the approval of transitional justice among Rwandans, there was a fundamental difference between Hutu and Tutsi when criticizing the shortcomings of justice. Whereas bystanders and ex-convicts rather criticized the one-sidedness of the verdicts - that the *Gacaca* only punished Hutu and survivors as well as RPF-personnel were beyond reproach⁹⁷⁶; some survivors perceived *Gacaca*'s as too lenient. In their eyes, far too many perpetrators were released too early⁹⁷⁷. Only a minority considered the approach to maximum justice exaggerated and would have opted for a reduced version of transitional justice focusing on the organizers of the genocide and the leaders of the interim regime⁹⁷⁸. Most participants believed impunity had to be fought in every case. Umubyeyi: *“Everybody was to be tried and because, [...] nobody took you by the rope and [made] you come and kill someone. It’s like there is a shared responsibility. It’s like they were also willing to kill⁹⁷⁹.”*

Ex-Convicts: Free at Last

Contrary to my initial conjecture, particularly perpetrators and bystanders considered the introduction of *Gacaca*-courts a blessing. All parties agreed on benefits such as localized justice, combating impunity and finding out the truth. Whereas survivors emphasized on closure (burying the dead, confessions) and seeing justice done, perpetrators and bystanders rather focused on liberating the innocent and unclogging the justice- and prison system. The consequential reparation payments however are perceived as huge financial burdens for poor families. Ex-convicts as well as bystanders never fail to complain about them⁹⁸⁰. Interestingly, many ex-convicts declared their prison terms to having been necessary for peace and reconciliation. E.g. in Yusuf's eyes, a prisoner who, according to himself, was imprisoned innocently, the government had to round up almost all the Hutu men, interrogate them and make them stand trial even if it took years in order to bring justice to Rwanda⁹⁸¹. Such a statements appear odd considering the fact that almost no RPF-soldiers were ever arrested

live in but he still cannot find any closure because nobody could tell him where the body of his father was buried.

⁹⁷⁶ Cf. Interviews with John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Jean-Pierre, 29, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁹⁷⁷ Cf. E.g. Interviews with Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali; Nadine, 25, survivor, Kigali; Kayitare, 31, survivor, Kigali. Rettig (2008, 45) however argues that 92% of the community he interviewed would have supported reduced sentences.

⁹⁷⁸ Cf. e.g. Interviews with John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Théodosine, 24, returnee, Kigali; Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Teresa, 72, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Cosatasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁹⁷⁹ Interview with Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. clean verbatim from translator who spoke about Umubyeyi in the third person.

⁹⁸⁰ Cf. Interviews with Rugango, 81, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Thasiene, 38, "Gatumba", Huye; François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁹⁸¹ Cf. Interview with Yusuf, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara. Original transcript from translator who spoke about Yusuf in the third person.

but the double standards of Rwandan transitional justice were notoriously difficult to address in interviews with ex-convicts who have gone through *ingando*⁹⁸².

Other Hutu emphasized on the positive aspect of unburdening Hutu families by liberating the convicts. Because *Gacaca* and TIG released their husbands and fathers from prison, the double burden of earning a livelihood and supporting and nourishing a family member in jail - a reason for holding resentments⁹⁸³ - was taken away. Robert: *"it helped to get people out of the prisons. Some people served some, did some TIG and then they rejoined their home because most of people, at least [the] ones that I know have been taking food to their parents to prisons. They are no longer doing that and TIG kind of brought reconciliation because, I'm now more or less on good terms with neighbors because I'm no longer taking foods to my parents, it relieved me in some way*⁹⁸⁴."

For many Hutus such as Dusabe whose husband is still in prison, the situation however remains dire. Marita furthermore criticized that supporting relatives in prison had become increasingly difficult since the prison authorities now demand money for nourishing the inmates. *"Well what the government is doing with regard to reconciliation is sufficient only that it should also try to get everybody out, other people out of prison. Because she's saying people who have their parents, their relatives in prison, they can't know what, we don't know what is going on in their mind. Like today, they are suppressed. They are like, it's not, no more allowed to take food to those prisoners. It's like they just contribute some money and they... it's the penitentiary authorities who are going to take care of them as [long as] food is concerned. But she's saying but now they are not getting money.*⁹⁸⁵." Peter recommended the point that summary punishment combined with lighter sentences facilitated closure and expedited renewed coexistence: *" Actually reconciliation started from the transitional justice, specifically with Gacaca. Because that's when perpetrators could be given lighter sentences, compared to what they had done during the genocide. And that's how genocide survivors and people who eventually completed their sentences came to live together. So for him transitional justice is important for reconciliation*⁹⁸⁶." Umubyeyi's statement sums up the main benefits of *Gacaca* for Hutu: *"Transitional justice was necessary, because it kind of increased the social bonds among people. For instance she says at one particular Gacaca court session that she attended, she noticed that people were being*

⁹⁸² Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Tertsakian, 2009, 210-220.

⁹⁸³ Robert (25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara) and Jean-Claude (23, bystander, Kigali) both recounted stories of acquaintances who held grudges against the government because they had to support their parents in prison.

⁹⁸⁴ Interview with Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁹⁸⁵ Interview with Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. clean verbatim from translator who spoke about Marita in the third person.

⁹⁸⁶ Interview with Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

*open, speaking, telling the truth what happened, everything that happened and thanks to it some people got out of prison*⁹⁸⁷.”

Participative Justice with a retributive Edge

In Clark's⁹⁸⁸ view, *Gacaca's* importance for reconciliation and simultaneously its biggest risk lies in consigning the central process of transitional justice to a traumatized population. According to him, the government hoped to kick-start reconciliation through communal dialogue and debate, driven by an ethos of popular ownership and participation⁹⁸⁹. This discursive approach to justice had the advantage of bringing together victim and perpetrator in a controlled face-to-face interaction. Furthermore *“the plea-bargaining system, and in particular the use of community service as punishment for certain crimes, reintegrates perpetrators more rapidly in to the community and involves them in labour programmes*⁹⁹⁰”. Participants, especially survivors, also generally recommended these labor programmes called TIG, because they supplied cheap labor for community work, shortened sentences and enabled the families of convicts to meet their relatives⁹⁹¹.

According to Clark, the *Gacaca's* emphasis on compensation and reparation as punishment underline the sincerity of perpetrator's reconciliatory statements and may improve the living conditions of victims, hence fostering true reconciliation. In my experience however, these payments were a heavy burden, a source of complaints and even of intolerance against 'greedy' survivors: *“The government can facilitate reconciliation as when it says to genocide survivors not to ask the people who did the stealing to pay them and they should also accept*⁹⁹².” Yohani, an ex-convict from "Gatumba" also mentioned that without signing the reparation agreements they would have to return to prison, where the majority of the perpetrators I interviewed had already spent more than a decade, even if they merely looted. There are no recompensations for Hutus, who were imprisoned innocently. They were released after years of imprisonment and left to their own devices, as Yusuf, Paul and Yohani N., who were acquitted after their trials had to find out⁹⁹³. This unapologetic behavior towards ex-convicts is where the unequal treatment of Hutu and Tutsi becomes manifest most blatantly.

⁹⁸⁷ Interview with Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁹⁸⁸ Cf. Clark, 2008.

⁹⁸⁹ Cf. Clark, 2008, 311-319

⁹⁹⁰ Clark, 2008, 315

⁹⁹¹ Cf. Interviews with Christine, 49, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali; Nadine, 25, survivor, Kigali; Anasthase, 71, returnee, "Gatumba", Huye; Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

⁹⁹² Interview with Rugango, 81, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁹⁹³ Cf. interviews with Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Gisagara; Yusuf, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Paul, ex-convict, 44, "Gatumba", Huye.

The reconciliatory achievements of the courts differ from community to community. Clark⁹⁹⁴ observed communities where *Gacaca* provided an open forum to the communal discussion of legal and non-legal issues that helped survivors, particularly women, to articulate their pain and start the healing process. In other communities however, *Gacaca* exacerbated the tensions between the different groups through heated debates. Clark as well as some survivors⁹⁹⁵ identifies low public participation to be the biggest danger to the reconciliatory potential of *Gacaca*. He relates the refusal of popular participation mostly to the time-consuming hearings, the fear of survivors, the opening of old wounds, or the climate of confusion and uncertainty that was prevalent in certain hearings.

4.5.2. The difficult Relationship between Transitional Justice and Reconciliation

Is Justice necessary?

Clark, Kaufman and Nikolaïdis⁹⁹⁶ emphasize the interdependence of reconciliation and justice. They consider *transitional* justice necessary to reveal the truth and foster a common foundation of knowledge necessary for a society to move on to a new state of affairs, thus the emphasis on *transition*. In their understanding, transitional justice describes, “*The field of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms used to respond to atrocities, and the tensions raised in doing so*”⁹⁹⁷. Because of the fundamental importance of truth, they ascribe primacy to justice even though it may create tensions with other objectives of social reconstruction such as reconciliation and accountability. According to Clark, Kaufman and Nikolaïdis, attempts to promote other aspects of social reconstruction without addressing matters of truth and justice will probably fail to encourage genuine reconciliation or even exacerbate tensions⁹⁹⁸. They however acknowledge that particularly retributive interpretations of justice may have inflammatory effects and create tensions that jeopardize the transitional endeavor.

The importance that Clark et al. associate with justice is contested. The relation between transitional justice and reconciliation proves very complex and much less straightforward than one might suppose. The danger of trials actually being more divisive than engaging is often bigger than their possible benefits for reconciliation. A survey on Rwandan transitional justice conducted by Longman and Rutagengwa has resulted in 70.1% Hutu and 43.4% of Tutsi agreeing to the suggestion “*It is better to try to forget what happened and move on*”⁹⁹⁹ and Ingelaere¹⁰⁰⁰, after similar field work in Burundi, comes to the conclusion that a majority of respondents preferred to leave the past behind. My find-

⁹⁹⁴ Cf. Clark, 2008, 311-319; Clark, 2010.

⁹⁹⁵ Cf. Interview with Luce, 42, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Marcel, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

⁹⁹⁶ Cf. Clark, Kaufman & Nikolaïdis, 2008, 381-391

⁹⁹⁷ Clark, Kaufman & Nikolaïdis, 2008, 390

⁹⁹⁸ Cf. Clark, Kaufman & Nikolaïdis, 2008, 385-391

⁹⁹⁹ Longman and Rutagengwa, 2004, 175

¹⁰⁰⁰ Cf. Ingelaere, 2009, 54-69.

ings in Burundi corroborate this evaluation¹⁰⁰¹, in Rwanda however, many participants favored their government's approach to maximum justice. The results of the scaled question-survey above should be interpreted cautiously with reference to *kwibwizira* - self-censorship - and considering the fact that most ex-convicts had already completed their prison terms. When the discussion approached the topic of reparations, a still tangible result of transitional justice, the opinions of ex-convicts and bystanders usually changed to rejection. Even an official opinion survey of the government in 2008 painted a bleak picture of *Gacaca*'s impact on reconciliation¹⁰⁰². The NURC however corrected its view to the usual positive evaluations a year later after pressure from above had been applied¹⁰⁰³. The fact that Stover and Weinstein, in their analysis of post-conflict Rwanda and Ex-Yugoslavia, found no direct link between criminal trials and reconciliation also challenges the absolute necessity of bringing perpetrators to justice for reconciliatory purposes¹⁰⁰⁴.

Next to establishing the truth and ending impunity, the restoration of social harmony has to be a crucial component of transitional justice. Retributive justice that solely pursues the punishment of the guilty parties is bound to provoke resentment if one group feels treated unjustly. Anticipating possible tensions, the designers of the TRC in South Africa thus waived retributive justice altogether. The TRC in South Africa has limited itself to establishing the truth and offered amnesty in exchange for disclosure¹⁰⁰⁵. Regarding the divided and distrustful society that Apartheid left behind, this approach made sense. In a post-conflict society where social cohesion is lacking, the introduction of retributive justice is quickly perceived as victor's justice, particularly if it only addresses one set of perpetrators as in Rwanda.

Tensions between Reconciliation and Justice

On the other hand, justice with regard to the genocide was necessary, not only to put an end to impunity but also because of closure. Nadine, a young genocide survivor from Kigali, told me that she considered her generation lost. She could not forget all the atrocities she witnessed. Thus keeping the next generation free from prejudice according to her has to be the priority, even though this exacts harsh measures in the present: *"le stratégie qui est là, c'est chercher comment les gens peuvent coexister malgré leurs différences. Ils [le gouvernement] essaient d'imposer les gens. Mais s'ils essaient d'imposer les gens et que quelqu'un dit: 'mais tu vois, on impose les gens!'. Mais oui, il y a un problème qu'on impose les gens mais dans le stade que nous avons, nous avons besoin d'être imposées pour pouvoir au moins coexister. Parce que, avec le temps ça va alléger, ça va s'alléger. On va*

¹⁰⁰¹ Cf. Chapter 5.3.

¹⁰⁰² Cf. NURC, 2008.

¹⁰⁰³ Cf. NURC, 2009, 59ff.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Cf. Stover and Weinstein, 2004, 323-342

¹⁰⁰⁵ Cf. Clark, 2009, 191f

*pas tâcher une autre génération*¹⁰⁰⁶." Chi Mgbako states "reconciliation without accountability is neither possible nor desirable"¹⁰⁰⁷." Hence, in order to not creating resentment that perpetuates itself, justice has to address every form of violence and has to recognize and affirm the victimhood of all people affected.

As Nadine mentioned, the generation that has lived through the horrors of genocide and civil war is forever scarred by these experiences, which have produced what Mamdani calls "a guilty majority alongside an aggrieved and fearful minority in a single political community"¹⁰⁰⁸". The disgruntled among the majority conceive justice as a "self-serving mask for fortifying minority power"¹⁰⁰⁹" whereas the minority fears that the hidden agenda of completing the genocide hides underneath calls for democracy and reconciliation. Tensions between reconciliation and *Gacaca*-justice include:

- The *de facto* limitation of the jurisdiction to genocide crimes with the exclusion of war crimes
- Cases of corrupt judges and witnesses¹⁰¹⁰
- Verbal abuse, harassment, intimidation and even murder of testifying witnesses¹⁰¹¹
- The abuse of *Gacaca*-trials in pursuit of economic interests (false accusations)¹⁰¹²
- Widespread popular skepticism about the truth being spoken in the trials¹⁰¹³
- Manipulation of the outcomes by political and social power-holders¹⁰¹⁴
- Enforced attendance of the population and the opening of old wounds¹⁰¹⁵

Maximum Justice?

When asked about the causes of the genocide, most peasants do hold the interim government and its extremist propaganda responsible for setting the carnage in motion. Even though a majority of interviewees believes that every perpetrator of the genocide had to be punished, most Rwandans consider their neighbors or relatives that killed as small fish who were caught up in the situation. Gaspard explains: "they are not those ones who has [sic] responsibility... the small people, those ones... Okay. Because they told them, that if you kill somebody, you will be a possessor of their prop-

¹⁰⁰⁶ Interview with Nadine, 25, survivor, Kigali. Translation: "The strategy that is here is to look for ways how people can coexist regardless of their differences. They [the government] try to impose it on people. But they try to impose it on people and someone says: 'but don't you see? You impose it on people!' Yes, there is a problem that we impose on people but in the state we have, we need to have things imposed on us in order to at least coexist. Because with time, it will get easier. With time, it will get easier – we will not stain another generation."

¹⁰⁰⁸ Mamdani, 2001, 266

¹⁰⁰⁹ Mamdani, 2001, 274.

¹⁰¹⁰ Cf. Interview with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Thasiene, 38, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹⁰¹¹ Cf. Interviews with Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹⁰¹² Cf. Interviews with Yohani N, 68, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁰¹³ Cf. Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Rettig, 2008.

¹⁰¹⁴ Cf. Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁰¹⁵ Cf. Clark, 2008, 307-319; Buckley-Zistel, 2008, 141.

erties. *That is the encouragement to the people who suffer from poverty.*¹⁰¹⁶” Apart from very few exceptions however, the interviewees demand that everybody who took part in the genocide takes responsibility. *“Those who prepared the genocide and implemented it, they should be punished but also those who were taught to kill, they should also had to be punished because [...] like I, myself,, if I was sensitized to follow others to the killing and I did, why did I accept what I was told? Maybe if I hadn’t accepted I would have been killed but if I had accepted to follow others, it means I had to be punished because I followed others to kill*¹⁰¹⁷.” The consensus is that even though the authorities issued the 'order of genocide' and incitement took place, many people obeyed all too willingly. Overpopulation, scarce resources, overwhelming poverty, a history of ethnically interpreted oppression and a prevailing culture of impunity have made killing during such episodes a viable option to improve the perpetrator’s socioeconomic status. Intimate knowledge of the attractiveness of individual push- and pull-factors such as greed, rage and fear under conditions of impunity and insecurity is the reason why many Rwandans insist on maximum justice. Participants mentioned the recurring cycles of violence since 1959 frequently¹⁰¹⁸. Not necessarily in the context of a long-term extermination plan against the Tutsi¹⁰¹⁹ but definitely as a spiral of escalation that needs to be interrupted. Kibonge states *“transitional justice was necessary for reconciliation because if it wouldn’t have been there, there would be revenge*¹⁰²⁰.” Paradoxically, the knowledge that destabilization boosts the conditions under which these factors become motivations for violence makes the majority of Burundians opt for the contrary 'forgive and forget'-option¹⁰²¹.

Although justice might help the victims to come to term with their past, it does not guarantee healing and forgiveness. As strict as Rwandans are with respect to transitional justice for the genocide, there is a sense of political realism in demands for justice regarding RPF/RPA-crimes. Even though many Hutu would welcome an acknowledgement and apology from the government, the overwhelming majority does not demand the same practice of maximum justice that was administered after the genocide. Similar to many survivors, they mostly demand closure and knowing what happened to their relatives: *“We can’t remember because we don’t know where our dead are*¹⁰²².” Even some of the fiercest critics of the regime’s politics I interviewed would be satisfied with a symbolic sign of remorse. Everybody knows that upsetting the RPF too much would be risky and potentially destabiliz-

¹⁰¹⁶ Interview with Gaspard, 26, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.

¹⁰¹⁷ Interview with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye.

¹⁰¹⁸ Cf. interviews with Delta Foxtrott, 39, returnee, Kigali; Karemera, 72, returnee, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Teresa, 72, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye; Vianney, 52, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye.

¹⁰¹⁹ Only Karemera, 72, returnee, “Gatsata”, Gisagara, mentioned, *“They started cultivating that field in 1959. That’s when they identified who was the enemy, who was the enemy to be finished off.”*

¹⁰²⁰ Interview with Kibonge, 43, bystander, Huye.

¹⁰²¹ Cf. chapters 5 & 6.

¹⁰²² Interview with Canisius, 61, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

ing¹⁰²³. As much as critics deplore the many inequalities and injustices in the current system, nobody wants to hazard the consequences of renewed polarization and potentially armed conflict in Rwanda.

"The Government wants us to forgive"

One of the main advantages but simultaneously one of the biggest problems with transitional justice in Rwanda is the government's relentless push for maximum justice, unity and reconciliation. The government's discourse seeks to implement a unified national identity from above. It did not only summarily arrest Hutus and sort out the guilty parties later but it also provided templates and incentives for reconciliation and even exerted pressure on survivors to forgive. The government wants success-stories¹⁰²⁴. Boniphilde recounted even being paid for forgiving: *"she is benefiting a lot from this association AMI through the workshops they have been attending. She says there was a four days training where we were even paid thousand a day. So there were génocidaires and the side of genocide survivors, where AMI focuses all on reconciliation. Génocidaires should confess and genocide survivors should forgive so that they keep on building one country, one Rwanda¹⁰²⁵."*

Ex-convicts on the other side emphasized on the mandatory character of confessions and how the government prepared them before they entered *Gacaca* in order to make sure everything went according to plan. For them, confession was mainly a necessary step to before amnesty and was rather understood as a duty towards the state than the victims. Yohani: *"When I got released we went to Gishamvu in the centre of re-education it means rehabilitation so after we came to wait that Gacaca will start. [...] When we were still in the prison, there were people who came to sensitize us to confess and apologize. Some of us couldn't understand. They thought, it's like [the] RPF was very clever, we thought they wanted to kill us after all, so but for me with the time I came to understand that I should confess and apologize. So, we wrote some papers to confess then they separated those who wanted to confess and who didn't want to confess, so far that's how I came out of the prison. Then we went to the centre of Gishamvu. So after the centre of Gishamvu, we waited the trial of Gacaca. [...] I had like those traditional arms of Rwandan culture [Spear], so even if I didn't kill someone but I was in the same group that killed. So I felt guilt, I had to confess to the Rwandan society, even to the government¹⁰²⁶."* Even Paul who summarily denies having done anything wrong or being accused or mistreated by the government, explains that they were strongly advised to write confessions and apologies: *"For me when I was in the prison, they used to come in the prison then teach us the consequences of what we did. The consequences of what is happening, so that if today we are released, we*

¹⁰²³ Interviews with Robert, 25, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara; Gaspard, 26, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.

¹⁰²⁴ Cf. Interviews with Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali and Kayitare, 31, survivor, Kigali.

¹⁰²⁵ Interview with Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye. clean verbatim from translator who talked about Boniphilde in the third person.

¹⁰²⁶ Interview with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye. About the necessity of confessions also see interviews with Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye and John, 56, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

*should go on the genocide [survivors] and confess. Then we apologize [to] each other*¹⁰²⁷.” Regarding the horrors of the overcrowded prison system, the incentives to confess or accuse others were very strong and the reward for admitting guilt was freedom.¹⁰²⁸” With these incentives, repentance, confession and apology become issues between the perpetrator and the government, not between the perpetrator and his victim. Naturally, survivors like Kayitare or Luce do not take seriously apologies that were forced in such a way: *"she says, she's trauma[tized]. Cause... even if those génocidaires have apologized publicly, they should even come face to face... To those they made the crime [committed the crime against] and apologize. And talk about the thing and handle it. So but since they didn't come to them and apologize, whenever they meet them, they have [bad] feelings*¹⁰²⁹.” Moreover, ex-convicts know that they could be sent back to prison as soon as a survivor accuses them again¹⁰³⁰. Thus, they try not to arouse any suspicion: *"so if a genocide survivor can insult you for instance, you just keep quiet, don't respond. [...] He can punch you and it is like you can think it is your mistake and keep quiet."* Interviewer: *"So keep a low profile."* John: *"Yeah a low profile. Keep a low profile. Actually he is saying that's the picture, that's how we live*¹⁰³¹.” The result of this mutual fear is a society that deeply distrusts itself and strongly adheres to political correctness.

Impunity vs. One-Sidedness

Clark does not consider the one-sidedness of justice to be a major factor for the retrogressive support or even the rejection of *Gacaca*. In the face of the horrendous crime of genocide, he claims, *"political and legal pragmatism must shape moral responses to the crimes of 1994: in an impoverished country like Rwanda, whose national judiciary was decimated by the genocide, not every perpetrator can be prosecuted. Therefore, it is necessary focus first on the most severe cases, while leaving open the possibility of dealing with lesser criminals later*¹⁰³²". With regard to the priority of the greater crime of genocide, Clark dismisses the ICTR's former chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte's intention to prosecute human rights violations by the RPF. In his eyes, such endeavors just withdraw resources from dealing with the caseload of the *génocidaires* who were already surpassing the ICTR's capacities and soured the climate of cooperation between the institution and the Rwandan government. As the crimes against Hutu are smaller, they should, according to Clark, be addressed at a later point.

¹⁰²⁷ Interview with Paul, 44, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹⁰²⁸ Cf. Interview with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹⁰²⁹ Interview with Luce, 42, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye. clean verbatim from translator who talks about Luce in the third person.

¹⁰³⁰ Yohani N. (68, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye) and Yusuf (56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara) maintained that they were imprisoned based on rumors.

¹⁰³¹ Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara. clean verbatim from translator who talks about John in the third person.

¹⁰³² Clark, 2008, 10f

The problem with such a strategy is that it does not take into account how such a prioritization of the genocide against the Tutsi affects the thinking of the Hutu community. Mamdani states: "*By refusing to prosecute alleged RPA crimes, the government has failed to present itself to an often skeptical population as an honest broker*¹⁰³³." Furthermore, the *Gacaca*-courts completed their work in 2012 and there are still no signs indicating the RPF's will to start trying army-personnel apart from a very few prominent cases in the 1990s.

Mamdani strongly advocates political reconciliation and "*survivor's justice*¹⁰³⁴", which he interprets as a form of political justice that shifts the primary focus of reform from individuals to institutions. To finally breaking the cycle of killers and victims, the institutions have to be recalibrated instead of subjugating the majority of the population to the exclusive justice of an armed victor¹⁰³⁵.

Eltringham also emphasizes the urgent need to end the culture of impunity. He although considers the current approach of the government to be partial because the small numbers of convictions of RPA soldiers in court martials for massacres from 1990 on. The absence of any convictions against RPA-members by the ICTR leaves these issues unresolved¹⁰³⁶. The international accusations of the RPA/RDF for alleged massacres in the DRC have not led to any significant measures domestically, which feeds feelings of victimization and being denied justice among the Hutu community, encouraging the refusal to participate in the justice process, and even revisionist endeavors¹⁰³⁷. I concur with Eltringham. Postponing the trials of RPA-members and the investigation of alleged massacres is a dangerous practice with regard to national reconciliation. The handing over of some RPA-cases to the ICTR might have served as a strong symbol towards the Hutu population that the government takes their grievances seriously and has nothing to hide. It however would also have meant giving up the aspired monopoly on the construction of memory and admitting responsibility for some of the escalations of the past, thus undermining the government's position of absolute moral certainty, which has become increasingly contested in recent years but, with reference to *realpolitik*, is almost the RPF's only choice¹⁰³⁸.

A restorative model of justice could change these dynamics of finger-pointing and allocating blame. It might be more fitting because it does not rely on confessions, admissions of guilt and punishment. Restorative justice revolves around the victim and the local community, dialogue and reparations¹⁰³⁹. Rwanda has initiated some profoundly interesting programs of restorative justice. The TIG and

¹⁰³³ Rettig, 2008, 45.

¹⁰³⁴ Ibid. 272.

¹⁰³⁵ Cf. Ibid. 270-273

¹⁰³⁶ Cf. Eltringham, 2004, 144-146.

¹⁰³⁷ Cf. Clark, 2008, 317f

¹⁰³⁸ Cf. Chapter 6.2.3. and 6.2.4.

¹⁰³⁹ Cf. Karekezi et al., 2004, 74

Ubudehe are initiatives where the perpetrator can atone by actually helping his victims or at least the community. These are very promising rudiments to make transitional justice work in favor of reconciliation. The monetary reparation payments coupled with the refusal of assisting perpetrator's families or reimbursing acquitted ex-convicts however, produce a two-class society before trust between victims and perpetrators is re-established. *"Local justice that depends on the participation of the population can succeed if community trust is strong. But if community trust is weak, then local justice (particularly punitive justice) will fray the social fabric. The genocide and civil war destroyed social capital in Rwanda, and the Rwandan government did not rebuild social trust, or trust in government, before launching Gacaca¹⁰⁴⁰."*

In conclusion, the signs of reconciliation emerging from the process of transitional justice might be cautiously interpreted as positive. Schabas¹⁰⁴¹ emphasizes that the process of transitional justice sends *"odd messages of reconciliation¹⁰⁴²"*. Although he deems it implausible that a majority of Rwandans who mostly fall into the 'perpetrator'-camp would have voted for a government, which plans to prosecute a large portion of the electorate and that in a democratic context, prosecution would probably end, this is not what seems to happen. Rather, great parts of the population seem to welcome the prospect of closure and (limited) debate in the context of *Gacaca*. The government is also cautiously moving away from a purely retributive stance towards justice, illustrated by the abolishment of the death penalty in 2007 and the increasing numbers of suspects being pardoned and released. This positive evaluation however mostly applies to the current point of time: *Gacaca* have already ended now and many prisoners are free. It does also only apply with certain qualifications regarding the partiality of justice and the feelings of discrimination lurking beneath the surface.

4.5.3. A Nation of Prisoners

"Rwandan society is yet to openly acknowledge and address the violence that victims in the Hutu community experienced during the conflicts of the 1990s. The Hutu community largely perceives the transitional justice processes undertaken as no more than exemplars of victor's justice. Rwandan society remains deeply divided along ethnic lines¹⁰⁴³." *Gérald Gahima, Ex-Prosecutor General*

Despite the estimations of about 175'000 to 210'000 perpetrators in the Rwandan genocide¹⁰⁴⁴, the government, according to its own estimates has sentenced one million genocide suspects through

¹⁰⁴⁰ Rettig, 2008, 46.

¹⁰⁴¹ Cf. Schabas, 2008, 227.

¹⁰⁴² Schabas, 2008, 227.

¹⁰⁴³ Gahima, 2013, 304.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Cf. Straus, 2006, 117.

*Gacaca*¹⁰⁴⁵ by 2010. By the official end of *Gacaca* in 2012, the official number rose to “close to 2 million¹⁰⁴⁶”, Human Rights Watch speaks of “approximately 1.2 million¹⁰⁴⁷” in 2011. Clark¹⁰⁴⁸ speaks of a number of 120'000 suspects imprisoned at the beginning of *Gacaca*, Rettig of 125'000¹⁰⁴⁹. The number gradually decreased to 59'311 in 2008¹⁰⁵⁰ and, according to Reyntjens¹⁰⁵¹, there were still 40'000 genocide suspects imprisoned in 2012. Thus, *Gacaca* can be said to have succeeded in reducing the backlog of genocide cases and the congestion of the judicial system.

Random Arrests after the Genocide

Most genocide suspects including all of my eight participants were rounded up immediately after the genocide or when they returned to Rwanda from the camps in Burundi and the DRC. The extent to which Hutu guilt is globalized by the RPF is demonstrated very clearly in the manner how they were arrested. Some, like Yohani N. were arrested because of suspicions by genocide survivors: “I was arrested by Tutsis then they took me in the prison, it was on 16th June in 1994. So I spent some 14 years in the prison.” Interviewer: “So the people that arrested you didn’t know you?” Yohani N.: “They knew me. They were Tutsi-children who used to say ‘let’s put all the Hutus in the prisons¹⁰⁵²’.” Others were arrested arbitrarily when coming back from refugee camps like Paul, Maurice and Rugango. Fleeing made them appear guilty. Hutu who stayed at home however appeared guilty as well, as Yohani recounts. “I didn’t flee, I didn’t want to leave my house, only my wife and children fled so I stayed there and when they came back they found me in the same house but I was arrested on September 15th 1995¹⁰⁵³.” When asked about the cause of his arrest, John said he was jailed “Because I’m a man. And as a man by that time I could take part in different battles. [...] But I was jailed, because they could catch us and jail us, because they were saying I was an Interahamwe.¹⁰⁵⁴” Rugango describes a similar picture: “Either you killed or not, they used to say that ‘you are all killers!’ So they used to take us in the prison¹⁰⁵⁵.” The arrests had a very global character: “men, either those who partook in the genocide or other people who didn’t even take part in the genocide were just being taken to jails¹⁰⁵⁶.” The practice of reducing sentences for convicts who identified accomplices and of

¹⁰⁴⁵ Cf. Clark, 2010, 51 & 175. Although Clark characterizes this number as “grossly overstated” and probably chosen because it matches the official Rwandan estimation of one million victims (cf. Clark 2010, 175).

¹⁰⁴⁶ BBC, *Rwanda’s ‘Gacaca’ genocide courts finish work*, 18. June 2012, on: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18490348> (25.03.2014)

¹⁰⁴⁷ HRW, 2011, 1.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Clark, 2010, 175

¹⁰⁴⁹ Cf. Rettig, 2008, 30.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Cf. *ibid.* 175

¹⁰⁵¹ Cf. Reyntjens, 2013, 227

¹⁰⁵² Interview with Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye.

¹⁰⁵³ Interview with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Interview with Rugango, 81, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Interview with Françoise, 53, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagar.

punishing the failure to assist prosecution¹⁰⁵⁷ furthermore led to increasing numbers of arrests among Hutu who had been spared immediately after the genocide. Yusuf was one of the victims of this practice: *"He was among the first who came back to the country, when the other people who had partaken the genocide came back as well, they started accusing him for his absence. [...] I mean people who had killed, they started associating him in every battle they went to kill people, saying: 'We were together with him' and yet he was not there¹⁰⁵⁸."* Yusuf spent six years in prison before he was tried and acquitted.

Constant Fear

As ex-convicts were often arrested under arbitrary circumstances, many feel uneasy in their environment to this day, trying their best not to anger the authorities. John sent his son outside the house during our interview to see if anybody was eavesdropping; Maurice went out of his way to paint the conditions of his arrest and prison term as positive as possible; Innocent considered any criticism against the RPF counterproductive to reconciliation and Yohani even denied commemorating his son who was killed by the RPF. Except for John who was very frank, all ex-convicts claimed to be reformed and reconciled. They learned their lessons: *"I agree in what I have been taught nowadays because, let me give you an example: at one particular time even president Kagame and some other top leaders came to teach us where we worked [TIG] and in the end they [the prisoners] noticed that: 'no, we were wrong in what we were saying, in what we were doing¹⁰⁵⁹."*

Carina Tertsakian who worked with Rwandan prisoners explains: *"Released prisoners in Rwanda are always afraid of being re-arrested. That fear is well founded and still rules their lives from day to day. [...] Beyond the anxieties of individual prisoners, this fear has led to a deeper, moral confusion and uncertainty, which runs throughout Rwandan society¹⁰⁶⁰."* Human Rights Watch has a similar opinion, that fear to trespass the anti-genocide laws has effectively silenced the population: *"Rwandans have come to realize that any statement given as part of Gacaca can have negative repercussions for them, and many individuals with relevant information chose to remain silent¹⁰⁶¹."* The victim-perpetrator dichotomy that replaced the ethnic identities allows for few exceptions, thus Rwandans rather remain silent. *"[...] Fear has become a way of life for Rwandans whose individual and familial experiences of violence do not fit into the nationalized mythico-histories about the genocide¹⁰⁶²."*

Getting out of Prison

¹⁰⁵⁷ Cf. Rettig, 2008.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Interview with Yusuf, 56, ex-convict, „Gatsata“, Gisagara. clean verbatim from translator who spoke about Yusuf in the third person,.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Interview with Innocent, 55, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara. clean verbatim from translator who spoke about Innocent in the third person.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Tertsakian, 2011, 217.

¹⁰⁶¹ HRW, 2011, 131.

¹⁰⁶² Burnet, 2009, 100.

The Rwandan prison system was originally built to contain a number well below of 50'000 prisoners¹⁰⁶³. From the people arrested in the wake of the genocide, over 10'000 died, often before trial¹⁰⁶⁴. John compares his suffering to genocide survivors: *"when he tries to think about the prison it gives him trauma even more than the one genocide survivors do have. So inmates he saw dying on his side traumatized him. He was jailed in a hole. So, he is saying that's because he didn't flee the country, though he was a Hutu¹⁰⁶⁵."* The horror in the overcrowded prisons is almost beyond words. Stories of abuse are rife: *"I found many people who were killed, I mean who have died maybe because of the disease that was Macinya [diarrhea]. It killed many people, so I remember they used to put them in the bathroom and at a given time, they go to bury them on the hills. [...] Yeah, at the beginning we were always beaten, they used even to put us outside the prison, then they beat us. So the security came after but the soldiers they used to beat us seriously¹⁰⁶⁶."* Chris, a survivor describes the conditions in the prisons that he witnessed from outside as 'revenge': *"So people were beaten, people were, some of them were killed. I know some people who were, who immediately died in the prisons. Sometimes, yeah, people could go to the prisons take out the corpse. So we saw them. People were taking revenge in one word, yeah¹⁰⁶⁷."* Considering these harrowing conditions, it is no surprise that most convicts did what they could to reduce their sentences. Naming accomplices and writing confessions were the main avenues to stand trial fast. *"As we had written all we did [confession, in 1998], they could select like the person who wrote the true story. They could pick him and take him to the trial¹⁰⁶⁸."* The idea behind this practice was to find out the whole truth and punish every perpetrator but as the stakes were very high, it rather provided an incentive to lie or tell half-truths¹⁰⁶⁹. John e.g. recounts, *"If you don't accept guilt of anything [sic], you risk spending your life in jail. So, to some extent he is saying that, 'I could lie. I could lie of what I did, yet I didn't do it for the sake of me to go out.¹⁰⁷⁰."*

Before trial, the convicts all had to undergo *Ingando*, where they were taught the history lessons as re-imagined by the RPF and how to promote unity and reconciliation. Susan Thomson who has undergone *Ingando* herself describes it as outright indoctrination similar to prison¹⁰⁷¹. In combination with the horrible prison conditions, the practice of re-education through *ingando* sheds light on most ex-convicts strict adherence to the government narrative and formidable knowledge. When I asked

¹⁰⁶³ Clark speaks of 46'700 prisoners as the official number for 2002 (cf. Clark, 2010, 175).

¹⁰⁶⁴ Cf. e.g. BBC, "Rwanda's 'Gacaca' genocide courts finish work", 18. June 2012, on: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18490348> (25.03.2014)

¹⁰⁶⁵ Interview with John, 56, ex-convict. "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Interview with Yohani, 54, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Interview with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Interview with Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Cf. Rettig, 2008.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁰⁷¹ Cf. Thomson, 2011,331-339.

him directly, Innocent, who followed the 'invisible script' the closest, admitted that he changed his way of thinking because of his punishment¹⁰⁷². According to Thomson, *"the graduates of these ingando camps that I met do not believe in the national unity of the re-imagined past or in the reconciliation of a re-engineered future. Rather, they see the camps and their ideological discourse as efforts to exercise social control over adult Hutu men"*¹⁰⁷³. " Actual persuasion is only a part of re-education. For the most part, convicts were intimidated and taught to keep their heads down. Having witnessed the horror of the prison system, most are ready to confess to anything in order to prevent being sent back. Most ex-convicts share Yusuf's existentialism: *"the most important thing to you is that you don't die. [If] you don't die in jail, you eventually get the chance to get out"*¹⁰⁷⁴."

All of my ex-convict participants spent years in overcrowded prisons before trial and were released after they confessed. The stigma of having been in jail however stays with them, even if acquitted. Ex-Convicts are not allowed to vote and do not receive any reparations for their often decade-long confinement.

Survivor's Grief

As horrible as these fates are, we must not forget that many survivors still live in fear of Hutu prisoners. Many survivors believe that the government pardoned too fast and was contented with superficial confessions and apologies. They are frightened by the staggering numbers of prisoners having been released through *Gacaca*. As Kayitare, a survivor from Kigali explains: *"J'ai visité le meurtrier de ma famille en prison et il m'a demandé de lui pardonner. Mais j'ai pas eu l'intention qu'il fût sincère. J'ai dit que ce serai pas possible pour moi dans ce moment. Il haussa les épaules et a dit que peut-être cela viendra avec le temps. Comment est-ce qu'on peut pardonner des gens qui n'osent même pas de se confesser à vous et de demander votre pardon, mais pensent en fait que l'acte de devoir est votre - 21'000 et encore 16'000 en 2008 [released prisoners]. Tu ne penses pas que ça va effrayer les rescapés qui souffrent encore des conséquences du passé ?"*¹⁰⁷⁵

These fears and grievances of survivors should be taken seriously and they need to be accommodated. Survivors do need governmental assistance and the guarantee of security in their communities more than other groups. That notwithstanding, genuine social cohesion with regular interchange (as

¹⁰⁷² Cf. Interview with Innocent, 55, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara. clean verbatim from translator who spoke about Innocent in the third person.

¹⁰⁷³ Thomson, 2011, 338.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Interview with Yusuf, 56, ex-convict, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Conversation with Kayitare, 31, survivor, Kigali. Translation: *"I visited the murdered of my family in prison and he asked me to pardon him but I didn't have the impression that he was sincere. I said that this wouldn't be possible at the moment. He shrugged and said that perhaps this would come with time. How can you forgive if people do not even dare to confess to you and ask for your pardon but actually think that the act is your duty? In 2003, more than 24'000 génocidaires were freed, in 2006 there were 21'000 more and once again 21'000 in 2008. Don't you think that this will scare the survivors who still suffer from the consequences of the past?"*

e.g. in AMI), a collective memory and shared symbols would probably have the strongest impact on feeling secure¹⁰⁷⁶.

It is highly questionable if long prison terms without trials and reparations that place such heavy burdens upon the families of perpetrators that they often descend into poverty¹⁰⁷⁷ is actually aiding social cohesion. With assistance almost exclusively extended to survivors¹⁰⁷⁸, this practice rather promotes jealousy, greed and further division. Re-education and indoctrination without assistance and opportunity will only temporarily silence and intimidate ex-convicts. It will not turn them into convinced supporters of the 'New Rwanda' as long as the positive change is not also reflected in their daily life. The only ex-convict who argued from a personal standpoint and actually involved himself in a debate about unity and reconciliation, John, hated the system with a passion¹⁰⁷⁹. Approaches that open up the debate about reconciliation and justice and do not just impose the government's perception by codifying their opinions into laws, e.g. by establishing a special court that handles RPF crimes¹⁰⁸⁰, would be direly needed.

4.5.4. Guilt, Coexistence and Conformity

The RPF, massacres and the G-Word

Even though the genocide against the Tutsi and its consequences are addressed in an almost exemplary fashion for a poor state such as Rwanda, quite the opposite is true with regard to killings by the RPF before, during and after the genocide. Almost every bystander or ex-convict I interviewed knew stories about RPF-killings, during the genocide or in the DRC. Nevertheless, only a handful of RPF-soldiers have been punished so far. The government steadfastly pretends no such massacres happened. The only two official reports dealing with RPF-massacres, the so-called 'Gersony-report' about RPF-massacres in the Rwandan civil war and the UN's 'mapping report'¹⁰⁸¹ were shelved before publication respectively toned down due to a mix between pressure from the Rwandan government and the jeopardized situation of the international community¹⁰⁸². However, the leaked 'mapping report'

¹⁰⁷⁶ Cf. IRDP, 2010, 36ff.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Cf. e.g. Interview with Dusabe, 50, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁰⁷⁸ The only nonsurvivor who reported having received material or financial governmental assistance in all of the interviews was Augustin (50, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara) and it did not become 100% clear if he had received livestock through the *Girinka*-program or through a private donation.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Cf. interview with John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Cf. Rettig, 2008, 131.

¹⁰⁸¹ Original title: "*Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003*"

¹⁰⁸² The "*Gersony-report*" was mostly shelved because of the international community's bad conscience immediately after the genocide. The partnership with the new regime was not to be endangered. Cf. Des Forges, 2002, 851-854. The publication of the "*mapping report*" was significantly toned down when Rwanda threatened to immediately withdraw its approximately 3000 peacekeepers from the AU-mission in Darfur. Cf. Stearns & Borello, 2011, 162-164.

maintains, “*that some of these alleged massacres could constitute acts of genocide¹⁰⁸³*” against Hutu from Rwanda, Burundi and Zaïre. The accusations are heavy: “*these attacks resulted in a very large number of victims, probably tens of thousands of members of the Hutu ethnic group, all nationalities combined. In the vast majority of cases reported, it was not a question of people killed unintentionally in the course of combat, but people targeted primarily by AFDL/APR/FAB forces and executed in their hundreds, often with edged weapons. The majority of the victims were children, women, elderly people and the sick, who posed no threat to the attacking forces¹⁰⁸⁴.*”

The ‘mapping report’ does stop short of issuing a final verdict about the crime of genocide in the DRC, neither do I. Due to the war conditions, inaccessibility of the terrain and the lack of investigative personnel, it’s almost impossible to determine what actually happened during the AFDL-rebellion. Approximately 200’000 Hutu refugees however remain unaccounted for¹⁰⁸⁵. I do not want to classify the RPA’s actions in Rwanda or the DRC as genocide because the ‘g-word’ and its implications cloud a sober analysis of what is happening in Rwanda and, even worse, invite the negation of the tremendous development in most areas of societal life that the country has achieved since year zero – 1994. Nevertheless, it is important to note that mass violence in Rwanda includes various episodes, not just the genocide against the Tutsi and that the sides of victims and perpetrators are less clear-cut than the official narrative suggests.

The lasting Impact of Genocide

As long as I was speaking about Hutu as a group, surprisingly many Hutus displayed a strong willingness to take the blame for the genocide without requiring the RPF to admitting partial responsibility for starting the civil war or committing atrocities in the 1990s. It would be shortsighted to ascribe this willingness solely to strong pressure from above. Rather, a very complex set of factors is at play here.

First, the genocide as an experience has been a watershed-event in the life of every Rwandan. Most interviewees struggle to find explanations why they themselves, their neighbors, family or friends committed such abhorrent atrocities. Some participants like Marita¹⁰⁸⁶ or Rugango¹⁰⁸⁷ actually refer to Satan’s influence because they cannot explain how people who, according to the unanimous opinion of residents, lived together as peaceful and charitable neighbors, could possibly commit such atrocious crimes. The shock is still reverberating in the minds of all people who lived through the genocide. Compared to the catastrophe of 1994, the totalitarian aspirations of the RPF are consid-

¹⁰⁸³ UNHCHR, 2010, 279.

¹⁰⁸⁴ UNHCHR, 2010, 279.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Cf. Minorities at Risk, *Assessment for Hutus in the Dem. Rep. of the Congo*, 31. December 2006, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupid=49009> (6.7.2014)

¹⁰⁸⁶ Cf. Interview with Marita, 47, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Cf. Interview with Rugango, 81, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye.

ered relatively moderate and, with regard to the FDLR still active across the border¹⁰⁸⁸, even understandable.

Second, most Hutus blame the genocide on the political elite of the time, which consciously lied to them and would like to see those people punished harder. People only know the ICTR's work vaguely and many participants think that the organizers actually escaped. On the surface, the distrust versus the political elite only pertains to the *génocidaires*. It does not perpetuate itself to the current elite.

In the same way the interim government is blamed for the genocide, the RPF and president Kagame are credited with bringing peace and reconciliation. Unsurprisingly, survivors are the group that welcomed the government's efforts to reconcile Rwandans the most. *"without government, without the state, there wouldn't be any reconciliation¹⁰⁸⁹."* There however are increasingly skeptical views with regard to government's permanent pressure to reconcile as well. To Vincent, forgiveness should *"be departing from the people themselves instead of having the state putting pressure on people to forgive. Because, you can do that because the state is preaching that but internally you haven't forgiven. It's like you are still there but you have done so because you are under pressure from somebody else¹⁰⁹⁰."*

¹⁰⁸⁸ The numbers of the FDLR have been dwindling for years now due to crumbling alliances with Congolese forces and military pressure from Rwanda, its proxies, MONUC/MONUSCO and, in irregular intervals the FARDC. It has also split into multiple factions such as the FDLR/FOCA (main faction), the FDLR Soki/Kasongo and the RUD-Urunana who style themselves as a moderate alternative ready to surrender war criminals to Rwanda. Even FDLR-commanders are known to have come back and surrendered to the government. In recent years, the FDLR have to rely heavily on the abductions of child soldiers to fill their ranks. In 2014, there are increasing signs that the main faction is about to lay down its weapons. Cf. McCormick: *Will Congo's Rebels finally come in from the Cold?* 10. July 2014, on:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/10/will_congos_rebels_finally_come_in_from_the_cold_fdlr_m23?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2AMorning+Brief&utm_campaign=2014_MorningBrief+07+11+14 (12. July 2014)

¹⁰⁸⁹ Interview with Luce, 42, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Interview with Vincent, 43, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

4.6. Conclusion: Kagame's "Window of Opportunity"

Universal Recognition of Suffering

Viewed from a general perspective, Rwanda has made tremendous progress if we look at the efforts concerning reconciliation for the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. 21 years after the catastrophe, the country is stable and Hutu and Tutsi coexist under nominally equal terms. If we look at the initial definition of reconciliation determined in chapter 2, understanding reconciliation as *"the totality of a society's diverse efforts aiming at creating or restoring constructive relationships between erstwhile adversaries that cut across the cleavages of the conflict-era identities"* with the key objectives memory, acknowledgement, responsibility, apology and justice, Rwandans have come a long way. Despite hidden antagonisms and discrimination below the surface, most of my participants genuinely felt the need to transform interethnic relations. Many survivors did not only coexist with perpetrators, they had forgiven them. Most of the ex-convicts I worked with actively tried to apologize and get back into the good graces of survivors. To determine in how far these efforts were due to socio-political pressure or how much was owed to individual initiative is difficult because the lines between personal opinions and conformity often blur in Rwanda. Nevertheless, most of my participants welcomed the national unity, reconciliation, and transitional justice in retrospective. They believe in a shared future for Hutu and Tutsi, maybe with the terms themselves disappearing.

With regard to the genocide against the Tutsi, reconciliation politics in Rwanda have been exceptional in view of the core principles memory, acknowledgement, recognition, apology, and justice:

- The majority of perpetrators had to stand trial.
- Ex-convicts were required to take responsibility, pay reparations and apologize to their victim's families¹⁰⁹¹.
- There is an official commemoration of the victims each year in a week of official mourning to acknowledge and recognize the grief of survivors.
- The NURC and the CNLG have implemented a plethora of associations, workshops and assistance programs to sensitize the population about genocide and alleviate its long-term-effects.

Nevertheless, even if we completely agree with the NURC's assessment of reconciliation in Rwanda and take its achievements in working through the genocide at face value, there is a huge and glaring blind spot in the Rwandan discourse – the one-sidedness of the reconciliation process and the discussion about the human rights violations of the RPF/RPA. Even though the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994 was by far the most brutal and the swiftest episode of mass killing in the Great Lakes

¹⁰⁹¹ Survivors often criticized the government for not insisting on personal and/or public apologies enough. Cf. Interviews with Luce, 42, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Annunciata, 58, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

Region and perhaps the only one that deserves the denomination 'genocide', it has to be considered one episode in a continuum of mass violence, which did not end in 1994. Encompassing reconciliation would have to take other episodes and other victims into account as well. The state should recognize their suffering even if the crimes against them do not necessarily amount to genocide. Forced silence about the RPF's transgressions renders the reconciliation process dishonest in the eyes of many Hutus and might actually disrupt a fundamentally successful peace process if it translates into further suppression of critical voices.

Transformative Appearance

Regarding the juxtaposition between politically and economically dominant returnees on one side, politically marginalized ex-convicts and tightly controlled bystanders on the other side, and survivors trying to make ends meet while fitting into neither group, Rwanda has still not managed to overcome its cleavages and conflict-era identities. On the surface, ethnic identities may be banned and the country reconciled but in reality, they have only been superficially covered by a regime obsessed with the "*aesthetics of progress*"¹⁰⁹². The conflict-era identities, even though now explicitly taking the genocide as a reference point instead of questionable historical concepts of ethnicity, have not lost their significance as conflictive fault lines. They have only been labeled differently and now provide a modicum of space for exceptions¹⁰⁹³. Discrimination might not be as evident as during the Habyarimana-years. The school system in particular is open to everybody¹⁰⁹⁴ but many Hutus perceive a lack of equality when it comes to chances of socioeconomic ascension, commemoration or justice¹⁰⁹⁵.

The relative peace and order in Rwanda is at least partially the result of the RPF's strong pressure from above and its 'outsourcing' of the internal Hutu-Tutsi conflict to the DRC. With heavily armed soldiers occupying every street corner in Kigali and the remaining media preoccupied with praising the current president, his sapience and foresight, it is clearly evident that the dominance of the RPF cannot be challenged for the moment. Domestic critics keep a low profile or flee into exile. This is partly because with the population under rigid control and the prospects of development and non-violent coexistence intact under RPF-rule, they lack a vocal basis among the peasantry but mostly because any fundamental criticism of the government results in character defamation, accusations or

¹⁰⁹² Ingelaere, 2010c, 50.

¹⁰⁹³ Cf. chapter 3.2.5.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Nevertheless, the state can take a strong influence in the selection of students through assistance with school fees. Most Rwandans need financial assistance to afford their school fees. The FARG e.g. helped Elias and Nadine (survivors) get through university. Théodosine (returnee) and Robert (bystander) were given an official scholarship.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Cf. Interviews with Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali; John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

worse¹⁰⁹⁶. It is difficult to predict how Rwandan society would react if the RPF loosens its tight grip on power. The question that poses itself is how to preserve the past twenty years' achievements with regard to reconstruction and stability while at the same time creating room for dissent and the inclusion of alternative views.

The 'invisible Script'

Institutions such as *Gacaca* and *Itorero* have pioneered transitional politics and, despite valid criticism against many of their features, could serve as blueprints for involving the community in reconciliation politics just like the South African TRC. By design, these institutions would actually provide almost ideal feedback loops between government and population. Unfortunately, the governmental imposition of perceptions, the latent lopsidedness of the justice- and memory work, and especially the barely concealed secondary objective of legitimizing and safeguarding RPF-rule override their participative features. Much too often, attempts at reconciliation are transformed into exercises in obedience and exclusion through power politics.

Looking at the frequent use of keywords of the policy of unity and reconciliation such as e.g. 'unity', 'one Rwanda' or 'divisionism', the reach of the state and its ideology is easily distinguishable in interviews. The regime's message of national unity however is propped up on a foundation of Hutu guilt. In order to preserve its image as the beacon of peace, unity and civility in the face of accusations of mass violence and totalitarianism, the elite has to sustain the concept of an enemy. Thus, it created a category of citizens that is banned effectively from political participation and attempts to connect criticism to genocide. These people, whose consciousness as historical losers is reinforced regularly by official commemoration ceremonies or public re-education, are keeping their heads down for now. They are often less persuaded than intimidated. In order to strengthen social cohesion among Rwandans, alternative life stories, which do not fit the official narrative of Tutsi victimization and Hutu guilt would have to be accepted. Suffering from all forms of violence, not only genocide would have to be recognized and acknowledged. This would also mean that public education and reconciliation politics would have to include more free debate and less teaching. They would need to be consciously separated from the RPF and its vision for Rwanda.

The RPF's Logic

Regarded from a realpolitik-perspective, the RPF however does not have much to gain from opening up the political space, acknowledging its transgressions, apologizing, and surrendering its claim to

¹⁰⁹⁶ Assassinations of prominent opposition figures and journalists, even in exile, have occurred with disturbing regularity in post-genocide Rwanda. The latest victim was the former head of foreign intelligence services Patrick Karegeya who was murdered on December 31, 2013 or January 1, 2014 in South Africa. Cf. Mugenzi, Ally Yusufu: *Patrick Karegeya: Rwandan exile 'murdered' in Johannesburg*, BBC News Africa, 2. January 2014. On: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25572814> (March 7, 2014)

interpretational sovereignty. The danger of appearing vulnerable, of an ethnic entrepreneur taking advantage of the RPF's acknowledgement of human rights violations and propagating extremism based on ethnic identity as before the genocide, cannot be fully denied. Kagame and his party knew from the start that with an estimated quota of 85% Hutu, they would always have to fight against demographic realities. In an ethnically interpreted election, they could never win¹⁰⁹⁷. Thus, they decided to change the framework conditions and play for time by banking on Rwandan nationalism.

The plan of re-educating the population according to the RPF's vision and keeping peasants under tight administrative supervision while simultaneously trying to rapidly modernize the country does make sense from the RPF's point of view. In fact, this might be the only strategy to realize the vision of a unified Rwandan state while simultaneously assuring that the RPF's original Tutsi clientele plays a defining role in building the nation and without the many unpredictable variables of democracy. Rwanda today is stable and secure for survivors and returnees. The price was waiving impartial transitional justice, freedom of speech and confining the right to political co-determination.

Vague Notions of Democracy

Despite many interview-questions focusing on abstract matters such as politics, commemoration or justice, intellectuals were almost the only ones to complain about matters such as freedom of speech, the cooptation the media, or the culture of silence. Just as before the genocide, the peasants are primarily concerned with securing their basic needs. They only mobilize when their survival or their livelihoods are in danger. Hence, they are very sensitive to issues such as governmental assistance, agricultural administration and mandatory payments. In general, many peasants equate peace with security and credit the RPF with having established peace. The expression "*peace is when there is security*¹⁰⁹⁸" was uttered almost verbatim by several participants from different research sites. Peasants also often confound peace, unity and security with democracy. When asked to define 'democracy', peasants were inclined to add sentences such as "*democracy is peace for all Rwandans*¹⁰⁹⁹" or "*democracy is when Rwandans are together, there is unity among Rwandans*¹¹⁰⁰" to general catchwords such as "*independence*¹¹⁰¹" and "*freedom*¹¹⁰²". Elections and freedom of opinion are al-

¹⁰⁹⁷ Cf. Mwakikagile, 2013, 585-596. Mwakikagile proposes a segregation of Rwanda and Burundi into "Hutuland" and "Tutsiland" as the only democratic solution for the conflict.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Cécile, 40, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Paul, 44, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye; Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye. Cf. also interviews with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye; Christine, 49, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Nadine, 25, survivor, Kigali; Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Interview with Augustin, 50, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

¹¹⁰⁰ Interview with Yohani N., ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye. 'Unity and Reconciliation' was also stressed by Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara and Annunciata, 58, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹¹⁰¹ Cf. interviews with Karemera, 73, returnee, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Vincent, 43, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹¹⁰² Cf. Interviews with Anasthase, 71, returnee, „Gatumba“, Huye; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Jeanne, 32, returnee, Huye; Boniphilde, 40, survivor, „Gatumba“, Huye.

most exclusively associated with democracy by intellectuals¹¹⁰³. Thus, one could say that the absence of political freedom is felt less sorely among the rural population as long as the RPF is able to guarantee peace and security.

If the ban on ethnic identities can be held up long enough, the parliament remains mixed and the official interpretation of history becomes the only history that future generations of Rwandans know, the RPF will perhaps no longer be seen as 'predominantly Tutsi' but as 'Rwandan'. Preventing ethnic identities to become the main factor in bi-polar elections is the primary objective behind the promotion of Rwandan nationalism and outlawing ethnic identities. Many interviewees actually appreciated the ban exactly for this reason: properly applied and under conditions of equal politico-economic treatment of all ethnic groups, banning ethnic identities could lay the past to rest.


The generation that lived through the genocide however cannot forget the old labels. The horrors of the genocide have etched themselves into their memories. Many participants nonetheless hoped that their children might grow up without knowing about the divisive identities. The problem is that by promoting its own 'mythico-history' as liberators through official commemoration, the RPF counteracts its own reconciliation strategy. Forgetting about ethnic identities proves difficult if reparations, imprisoned relatives and annual commemoration weeks constantly remind Hutus of their collective guilt or their losses, particularly when addressing these grievances publicly could be interpreted as 'divisionism'¹¹⁰⁴. Altering the concept of official commemoration again, hence it would explicitly recognize the suffering of all Rwandans (as it did in the first years after the genocide) and perhaps even include casualties in the DRC, would be a very strong symbol of reconciliation even if it would jeopardize the carefully crafted narrative.

Thus, Rwandans are left with a rather inconsistent approach towards reconciliation. Forgetting is actively encouraged with regard to the contemporary significance of ethnic identities but at the same time, the government constantly reminds people of their group affiliation and the burden of conscience it implies. Despite this paradox, Rwandans seem to consider the political relevance of ethnic identities recede, which is a good sign for reconciliation.

Impact of Ethnicity	1990	1994	2003	2011
Bystanders	-2.2	-3.9	1.1	2.5
Ex-Convicts	-0.9	-4.9	1.1	2.8
Returnees	-3.8	-3.8	1	3.75
Survivors	-2.5	-4.5	1.6	3.8
Rwanda Average	-2.1	-4.0	1.2	3.0

¹¹⁰³ Cf. E.g. interviews with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Thasiene, 38, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali.

¹¹⁰⁴ Cf. Thomson, 2013, 145 ff.



Rwanda: Impact of Ethnicity (Question: How would you estimate the chances of people of your ethnicity to gain access to political office if you compare the situation in... (- =high significance; + =low significance)

Dangers and Opportunities

Next to a general optimism and the pressure towards political conformity with regard to ex-convicts, the diagram reflects the hopes of an overwhelming majority of Rwandans that ethnicity actually is on retreat and this should be seen as a good premise for reconciliation. In general, Rwandans are ready to accept the politics of unity and reconciliation if they see its benefits for the country and their community. Most of my interviewees regarded reconciliation politics rather pragmatic. Karemera, an old caseload refugee from Gisagara, illustrates this beautifully in his comment on the wording of the commemoration ceremony: "*if they can keep the terminology [genocide against the Tutsi] and it doesn't disturb the cohesion of people, it's fine. If they can leave it out, it is also fine. What matters with [sic] him is the cohesion of people living, having them living peacefully*¹¹⁰⁵."

Thus, not all is lost. The current government has a unique 'window of opportunity' to critically address its own past and to prove that Hutus or dissenters are no second-class citizens. This has to happen as long as the memory of the genocide is still strong enough to deter politicians from exploiting ethnicity and while the prospects of development and economic recovery are still intact. The appointment of the Hutu Jean-Damascène Ntawukuriyayo as head of senate and programs that benefit all such as universal health care, equal access to education or the *Girinka*-program already point into a good direction. The government has to relentlessly combat corruption or favoritism with regard to welfare, scholarships and assistance. *Imihigo*, the performance contract, is a good start but the best way to hold local administrations accountable would be through giving elected local councils more power instead of appointing party officials to the positions that possess fund-allocating power, as is the practice nowadays¹¹⁰⁶.

¹¹⁰⁵ Karemera, 73, returnee, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹¹⁰⁶ Cf. Ingelaere, 2011, 67-78.

Hopes must not be disappointed!

The RPF's ambitious plans for national agriculture and its proneness to coercive measures for pushing through its visions are a dangerous gamble. The famine of 2006 in Bugesera which the government flatly denied¹¹⁰⁷, as well as the drought of 2009, when farmers suffered from malnutrition but weren't allowed to change the government-selected crops clearly show the risks of a "*top-down developmentalist agenda that leaves little room for bottom-up mechanisms*"¹¹⁰⁸. A failure of these high modernist visions the way it failed in Tanzania's *Ujamaa*-campaign could have catastrophic effects on the peasantry and the economy. It would rapidly radicalize the population again. The poverty gap is widening already¹¹⁰⁹.

When the pace of economic development slows down and the hopes for governmental assistance and progress are disappointed, many Hutu will remember that they still pay reparations but have not received cows, rents or even rights to co-determination yet. They will remember their unacknowledged dead, the partiality of transitional justice, and long prison terms. The promise of prosperity and development faces increasing threats by the drying up of aid revenue due to the RPFs totalitarian tendencies. If Kagame and the RPF insulate themselves internationally¹¹¹⁰ and at the same time refuse to open up political space, Rwanda might become a second Zimbabwe. Isolated and ruined with a paranoid old dictator who desperately clings to power. This scenario appears considerably more threatening in Rwanda because of its legacy of mass violence. The next Victoire Ingabire is probably not too far away and creating divisions and recruiting fighters among a society shaped by obvious inequalities is comparatively easy. It has been a successful strategy for the RPF itself.

One of the most worrying points in this scenario is the extreme population growth in Rwanda after 1994, which despite a strong governmental focus on family planning is only slowing down very gradually. Despite the genocide, the Rwandan population has grown from approximately seven mio. in 1989¹¹¹¹ to 11.7 millions¹¹¹² in 2013. At this pace, Rwanda would need nothing short of an East Asian development miracle to provide the youth with jobs. Considering that 88-90% of Rwandans are still

¹¹⁰⁷ Ingelaere, 2010c, 47f.

¹¹⁰⁸ Ansoms, 2011, 248.

¹¹⁰⁹ Cf. Reyntjens, 2013, 163-186.

¹¹¹⁰ Kagame started to counteract his isolation by presenting himself as one of the only reliable African partner to Western countries that will send peacekeepers to instable regions threatened by mass violence. His threat to retract Rwandan peacekeepers from Darfur led to the shelving of the original UN mapping report about the DRC in 2010. Currently, he has pledged Rwandan peacekeepers for the crisis in the Central African Republic. In a similar step, Burundi has deployed peacekeepers in Somalia.

¹¹¹¹ Cf. Prunier, 1995, 4.

¹¹¹² World Bank, "*Population Total*", Web: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL> (13.September 2014)

subsistence farmers and that most of the forests have already given way to agriculturally productive lands, the high-modernist experiments in agriculture¹¹¹³ seem quite a dangerous endeavor.

So far most Rwandans seem pleased with the strong development of the country and are still ready to blame signs of abuse on local authorities instead of the national government. The idea that "*we are all Rwandan people, we speak one language and one culture*"¹¹¹⁴ appears to be deeply rooted in most peasants who have lived together in peace before and after the genocide. Nobody wishes for a return to the state of affairs of the 1990s. Taking their statements at face value, the majority of ex-convicts and bystanders see the death of their relatives or their own imprisonment as a necessary price they had to pay for the sin that was the genocide. In their eyes, they sacrificed themselves for peace, development and reconciliation. It is crucial for the future of a unified Rwanda that these hopes for an equal and free future will not be disappointed. Thus, economic development will have to be accompanied by much stronger measures in poverty reduction and capacity building in the realm of truly critical thinking and freedom of expression, including but not confined to the difficult past. Genocidal politics were able to rely on a peasant culture of obedience towards the state groomed by the monarchy, the colonial powers and two successive dictatorships. The genocide exploited bottled-up economic and political frustrations. It thrived on insecurity, impunity and relentless competition over politico-economic power. Many of these factors are still present. In order to achieve genuine reconciliation, these problems need to be openly addressed instead of suppressing (ethnicity) or accepting them (obedience). Readiness to voice and accept criticism from the grassroots is the first step to truly transforming the Rwandan state. Taking responsibility, acknowledging past transgressions and apologizing is first and foremost the duty of the state, particularly if the state in question considers itself an educator and a paragon of virtue such as Rwanda does.

¹¹¹³ Cf. interview with Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara and Ansoms, 2011, 240-250. For earlier examples of disastrous top-down intervention in Rwandan agriculture, cf. C. & D. Newbury, 2000, 832-877.

¹¹¹⁴ Interview with Paul, 44, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

5. Politics of Reconciliation and Reconstruction in Burundi

From Power Sharing to Single Party Rule – A Summary

In contrast to the extensive chapter on reconciliation politics in Rwanda, this chapter will be rather short and focus mostly on the attempt to establish a TRC in Burundi. Burundi's reconciliation politics are primarily defined by their absence, a 'non-approach' so to say. The chapter will thus function as a summary with a pronounced emphasis on transitional justice whereas the other aspects of reconciliation in Burundi will be mostly covered in the comparative part in chapter 6.

The Arusha Peace and reconciliation agreement APRA has stipulated a 60/40 power sharing formula for Hutu and Tutsi, which led to parties becoming ethnically inclusive and a coalition government between CNDD-FDD, UPRONA and FRODEBU after the elections of 2005. On the national political level, this consociational solution has taken ethnic competition out of the equation.

The power sharing agreement, combined with the fact that the last armed opposition movement FNL, still had to be convinced to lay down its arms, however, led to a political stalemate. All the parties had been active in the civil war and as long as no party could be certain if transitional justice or commemoration would affect them adversely, they rather chose to stall and focused on expanding their influence. The country was in a state of stagnation that bordered political paralysis. Every party that had secured a place in the transitional government tried to safeguard its sinecures, effectively promoting corruption and crippling development¹¹¹⁵. Consequentially, inter-party quarreling, corruption, and rent seeking increased, whereas assistance for the victims of the civil war, finding the truth or ending impunity were neglected.

In the last decade, Burundi only had less violent episodes, but no actual peace. Human Rights Watch understands the transformation of the FNL into a political party in 2009 as the actual end of the civil war¹¹¹⁶ but as soon as campaigning for the elections 2010 started, violence between political parties surged again¹¹¹⁷. Frustrated by the behavior of political parties, most Burundians voted for the president's party CNDD-FDD in order to end the bickering and to level the playing field. The communal elections resulted in a 65.5 percent-landslide victory of the CNDD-FDD, which prompted the opposition alliance *ADC-Ikibiri* to boycott the parliamentary and presidential elections. This resulted in over 91.6 percent approval for Pierre Nkurunziza¹¹¹⁸.

¹¹¹⁵ Cf. ICG, 2012.

¹¹¹⁶ Cf. HRW, 2012, 11.

¹¹¹⁷ Cf. HRW, 2010.

¹¹¹⁸ Cf. OAG, 2011; HRW, 2011 & 2012; Ligue Iteka 2011 & 2012. UPRONA and FRODEBU decided to take part in the parliamentary elections in order not to hand over the parliament to the CNDD-FDD without opposition.

Without checks and balances however, the CNDD-FDD quickly consolidated its authoritarian leanings and corruption as well as violence against the opposition continue to soar. Even though the CNDD-FDD now commands over the absolute majority of seats in the National Assembly, the clear power relations still have not translated into good governance or a reprocessing of the past, except for the government's plan to establish a TRC¹¹¹⁹. Violence and lawlessness are widespread throughout the country. The rampant corruption in the justice system is particularly grave because it makes fair and impartial transitional justice highly unlikely and establishes a culture of impunity where being imprisoned is seen as *"bad luck, victimization or ethnic prejudice rather than just retribution"*¹¹²⁰.

Immaculée stated: *"from the day they started talking about transitional justice, they have done nothing. She doesn't know if the problem is the lack of willingness or it's because of the unstable political situation, maybe they are still looking for positions, looking for stability where they are. Maybe after, they will start to do it but until now nothing was done"*¹¹²¹.

5.1. From "ethnic" to "political" Conflict

5.1.1. Power Sharing and Foot-dragging

Differing Narratives

One of the most obvious differences between post-genocide Rwanda and post-civil war Burundi is the absence of a dominant narrative such as the one of the RPF in Rwanda. Peace emerged from a brokered peace deal and power sharing negotiations that took from June 1996 until the elections of 2005¹¹²² and necessitated sustained involvement by multiple international actors and from African political heavyweights Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela and Jacob Zuma. Without a definitive winner, the narratives of all sides remained intact and participants in Burundi often recount radically differing accounts of the past. This especially pertains to the question of genocide. Could the massacres in Burundi be characterized as genocide? In Burundi, both ethnic groups have been the victims of large-scale massacres and depending if you speak with a Hutu or a Tutsi, an Uprontist or a member of the ruling party, the views about which acts constitute genocide, or who the victims were, are often diametrically opposed. The three most violent episodes in the north, the purge against the Hutu elite in 1972, the massacres in Ntega and Marangara in 1988 and the civil war from 1993 on, were experi-

¹¹¹⁹ Cf. Chapter 5.2.

¹¹²⁰ Watt, 2008, 157.

¹¹²¹ Interview with Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹¹²² Cf. Southall, 2006, 201-220. The PALIPEHUTU-FNL agreed to a ceasefire in 2006 and, renamed into FNL became a regular political party in 2008. Some remnants however still maintain an armed presence along the Burundian border with the DRC and take part in irregular raids. Cf. Vogel, Christoph: The evolving Landscape of armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, June 2014, on: <http://christophvogel.net/mapping/> (July 23, 2014).

enced radically different from community to community and by the various categories of participants. Whereas Hutus often downplay or justify the violence against Tutsi in the communities¹¹²³ in 1988 and 1993, Tutsi often understate the violence against Hutu emanating from the military¹¹²⁴. There is a widespread consensus among Burundians that reconciliation is necessary. Many furthermore agree, at least hypothetically, that some form of justice, preferably restorative in nature¹¹²⁵, should be administered in order to leave the troubled past behind¹¹²⁶. Particularly participants critical of the current government expressed the desire that the members of the elite who were responsible for massacres should stand trial, but they still did not trust the impartiality of the justice system enough for a genuine process of transitional justice¹¹²⁷. Despite this general desire for justice, the opinions multiply in all directions as soon as the discussion approaches concrete measures.

In many ways, this inconceivability of a clear strategy due to the plethora of perspectives, constraints, dangers and imponderables of Burundi's sociopolitical reality parallels the foot-dragging of the Burundian political elite when it comes to justice and reconciliation. Burundi's approach to reconciliation politics and transitional justice has been shaped by tactical proceedings, cautious weighing of interests and extended risk calculations by all parties involved. The most important instruments of national reconciliation stipulated by the APRA, the national truth and reconciliation commission (*Commission Vérité et Réconciliation - CVR*) and the special tribunal, were not yet established during the time of my field work in 2011. Thus, some of my questions remained in the realm of the theoretical (e.g. "What do you think about the South African TRC as a model for Burundian transitional justice?"). By design, the twin judicial and non-judicial mechanism would account for victim recognition and contribute to a shared understanding of history through the TRC. It would also combat impunity and ascribe responsibility through the special tribunal. It is however highly questionable if the TRC would have any transformative potential in the current political climate of authoritarianism and insecurity. Furthermore, it has yet to be seen if the special tribunal will even be established¹¹²⁸.

¹¹²³ Cf. e.g. Interview with Gertrude, 46, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

¹¹²⁴ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Claver, 66, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Marie, 52, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi;

¹¹²⁵ Many Burundians were for a form of justice that would not upset the balance of power. Cf. e.g. Interview with Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, «Rohero», Ngozi; Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹¹²⁶ Cf. Comité de Pilotage, 2010, 62ff.

¹¹²⁷ Cf. e.g. Abel, 23, ex-combatant, « Rohero », Ngozi ; David, 28, ex-combatant, «Kamenge», Ngozi ; Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident ; Ezechiél, 31 , ex-combatant, « Rohero », Ngozi ; Jacques, 26, Tutsi resident, « Gakombe », Kirundo ; Marie-Goreth, 33, Hutu resident, « Kamenge », Ngozi ; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, « Rohero », Ngozi.

¹¹²⁸ Cf. chapter 7.2.

5.1.2. The Peace Process and Burundi's consociational Arrangement

The APRA

In contrast to Rwanda, where the RPF emerged as the clear victor, the Burundian civil war between the Tutsi-dominated army and Hutu-dominated guerilla groups CNDD-FDD and FNL-PALIPEHUTU was settled in lengthy negotiations between multiple parties and a plethora of international actors. The first round of negotiations resulted in the negotiated Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (APRA). On the 28th of August 2000, the APRA was signed, implementing a transitional government with subsequent elections; a formula of ethnic power-sharing; administrative, military- and judicial reform and an international military force provided mostly by South Africa as a guarantee for the implementation of the transition. Despite the main rebel movements CNDD-FDD and FNL not being a part of the agreement, the understandings of the APRA in 2000 built the foundation of Burundi's post-conflict political system. It is also the backbone of its 2005 constitution. The agreement signed by the predominantly Tutsi 'G10'-alliance headed by UPRONA and the predominantly Hutu 'G7'-alliance headed by FRODEBU arranges for a complex system based on proportionality, minority over-representation, ethnic quota regulations with regard to the parliament, army and the government and makes arrangements for a grand coalition. The consociational system Lijphardt recommended for divided societies has never been as thoroughly implemented in Africa¹¹²⁹. Southall¹¹³⁰ considers the Arusha agreement a major achievement as a framework of reference, and considers its success to be intimately linked with the enormous multilateral diplomatic investment. The OAU and especially South Africa backed the peace process by deploying peacekeepers. The war lost most of its intensity when the biggest guerilla movement, the CNDD-FDD, joined the transitional government in 2003. In 2005, the CNDD-FDD and its leader Pierre Nkurunziza went on to win the national elections and in 2006, the last remaining guerilla group, the FNL, joined the peace process¹¹³¹.

Ethnic Balance through Quota Regulations

As part of APRA, Burundi has implemented a consociational system¹¹³² that stipulated that certain national institutions had to mix Hutu and Tutsi in order to prevent the front lines of the civil war taking hold in post-conflict Burundi. The same stipulations applied to parties who wanted to register nationally. The APRA prescribes 60 percent Hutus and 40 percent Tutsis in the national assembly government, senate and the army, 67% Hutu / 33% Tutsi at the communal level¹¹³³.

¹¹²⁹ Cf. Lemarchand, 2006; Vandeginste, 2011, 193f.

¹¹³⁰ Cf. Southall, 2006, 218

¹¹³¹ Cf. Prunier, 2009, 288f

¹¹³² Cf. Lemarchand, 2006, 1-20.

¹¹³³ APRA, 2000, Protocol II, 24ff.

In contrast to the Rwandan politics of national unity, which deny the very existence of ethnic identities, the Burundian constitution explicitly recognizes them. *"The post-transition constitution is markedly consociational, attempting as it does to combine majority rule with minority protection. This is achieved by classical instruments, such as minority over-representation, quota, and minority veto¹¹³⁴."* By changing political competition from a zero-sum game where the winner takes it all into a permanent grand coalition where policies have to be fair and appropriate to achieve a majority of Hutu and Tutsi, both present in legislative and executive according to fixed quotas, this approach balances ethnic interests. The specific ethnic quotas are of special importance in the army, which has been traditionally dominated by Tutsi and has always been the most erratic factor in Hutu-Tutsi relations. Due to the overrepresentation clause for the Tutsi minority in the constitution, traditionally Hutu-dominated parties such as the CNDD-FDD started recruiting Tutsi representatives in the 2005 elections resulting in ethnically diverse political parties¹¹³⁵. Subsequently, the powerful ethnic fault lines that have dominated Burundian politics since 1965 lost a great deal of their populist attraction because the parties have to develop partnerships across ethnic lines to stand any chance in elections. Although the success of the Burundian consociational experiment is by no means certain in regard of the authoritarian and violent political culture that still has to assume primary accountability towards its citizens, its achievements regarding ethnic depolarization can indeed be seen as a possible alternative to Rwanda's authoritarian policy of banning ethnical identities¹¹³⁶.

Participant Views

According to most of my participants, the quota regulations reduce ethnic tensions, but they do not eliminate them: *"This is helpful because from what she sees, now it's a bit better than during the past because now they are sharing the power there are Hutu and Tutsi in power¹¹³⁷."* Particularly the fact that one group can no longer dominate the other is appreciated: *"From what she sees with the quota regulations, everybody has his place. And it should stay like that, because if there was no quota regulation, like the big population, meaning the Hutu will discriminate the Tutsi, because they will be the big number¹¹³⁸."* Critics however fear that the quotas provide the wrong, anti-meritocratic incentives *"because they don't really look on the competences of the person but only look on the ethnic group¹¹³⁹."* Others claim that quota regulations and multipartyism have only been implemented on paper¹¹⁴⁰ or that political affiliation nowadays trumps ethnicity¹¹⁴¹. The main criticism however is the

¹¹³⁴ Reyntjens: Briefing Burundi, 2005, 119

¹¹³⁵ Cf. Lemarchand, 2006, 7-12: Reyntjens, 2005, 119-133

¹¹³⁶ Cf. Lemarchand, 2006 15-16

¹¹³⁷ Interview with Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹¹³⁸ Interview with Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.


¹¹³⁹ Interview with Immaculée, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹¹⁴⁰ Cf. Interview with Candide, 50, Hutu resident, Ngozi.

¹¹⁴¹ Cf. Interview with Générose, 43, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

same as with land disputes or party politics " *Oui, il y a la réduction de l'éthnicité mais, il y a une chose qui reste le népotisme. On donne un poste à une personne à qui vous avez des relations ou il appartient à sa famille*¹¹⁴². " In the eyes of a majority of participants, at least with regard to temporarily changing the fault lines of conflict, the APRA seems succeeded: "*Les élections de 2005... celles de 2010, on a constaté que le gouvernement installée à partir de 2005, c'était un bon gouvernement puisque il y a...., il y a la cohésion sociale, même les Hutus, les Tutsis et les Twa sont représentés au pouvoir. Tout le monde est représenté*¹¹⁴³. "

Political Impact	1988	1993/1	1993/2	2005	2011	
Hutu N-C Resident	-0.8		0.6	-3	0.5	1.4
Tutsi N-C Resident	0.3		1.4	-2.4	1.6	1.2
Hutu Refugee	1.3		-0.8	-2.5	0.5	-0.3
Tutsi IDP / Refugee	-0.2		0.3	-2.5	1.7	-0.3
Ex-Combatants	-0.5		1.5	-0.3	4	1.3
Bdi Average	-0.1		0.7	-2.6	0.7	0.8



Burundi: Perceived Political Impact

The diagram however shows clearly that hopes for more political impact peaked after the elections in 2005, especially among ex-combatants. They were optimistic when the army was integrated and generally were disappointed after demobilization¹¹⁴⁴. Naturally, Hutu refugees felt devoid of impact before 2005. The gros of the population in 2011 were indifferent with regard to their own political impact with Hutu residents, the president's core constituency, slightly optimistic and Tutsi increasingly pessimistic due to the CNDD-FDD's authoritarian tendencies and their isolation.


¹¹⁴² Interview with David, 29, Hutu ex-combatant FAB, "Kamenge", Ngozi. Translation: "Yes, there is a reduction of ethnicity but what remains is nepotism. A post is handed out to a person with whom you have relations or who belongs to your family."

¹¹⁴³ Interview with Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident, Gakombe.

¹¹⁴⁴ Cf. Interviews with ex-combatants Abel, 23, "Rohero"; Ezechiel, 31, "Rohero"; David, 29, "Kamenge"; Alexandre, 35, "Kamenge".

Democracy	1988	1993/1	1993/2	2005	2011
Hutu N-C Resident	-2.3	2.3	-4.3	1.8	1.5
Tutsi N-C Resident	0.3	0.9	-3.5	0.7	0.5
Hutu Refugee	-2	1.3	-5	3	1.8
Tutsi IDP / Refugee	1.5	-2.8	-5	-1	-0.5
Ex-Combatant	-0.8	2.8	-2	3.3	1.3
Bdi Average	-1	1.4	-4.1	2.1	1.7

Perception of Democracy in Burundi




Despite the quota regulations, Tutsi, particularly IDPs, think that they lost influence in comparison to 1988. Ex-combatants and Hutu refugees' confidence in democracy peaked in 2005 and diminished since. Hopes for democracy under CNDD-FDD-rule are fading in all groups except for Tutsi IDP's who always viewed it negatively. To many Hutu, Ndadaye was the big promise of democracy under Hutu-rule. Nkurunziza disappointed them: "*The thing they have in common, for Ndadaye and for Nkurunziza is that they called the population and they voted for the president they wanted. But the difference is that Ndadaye, even if he ruled for only 3 months, during the period, there [were] no killings, nobody was killed. They didn't hear about killings. But instead for Nkurunziza, since he is there people are being killed every day*"¹¹⁴⁵.

Despite the declining enthusiasm with regard to the economic situation and democracy, ethnic discrimination seems not to be a conflict-defining issue anymore. Since 2005, ethnic representation has been stabilized. Hutu, particularly refugees however feel much more confident with their representation than Tutsi who were slightly happier with pre-war conditions. The authoritarian tendencies of the ruling party however risk upsetting the balanced system of 2005, as the approval curve wanes in both ethnic groups. Rwandans in general believe in the decreasing impact of ethnicity stronger.

¹¹⁴⁵ Interview with Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

Impact of Ethnicity	1988	1993/1	1993/2	2005	2011
Hutu N-C Resident	0.1		3	-2.4	3.2
Tutsi N-C Resident	3.9		1.6	-1.9	1.3
Hutu Refugee	0.5		-0.3	-5	1.5
Tutsi IDP / Refugee	1.8		-0.8	-2.5	2
Ex-Combatant	-1.3		2.8	-1.3	0.8
Bdi Average	1.1		1.8	-2.5	2.3



Impact of Ethnicity on Politics in Burundi

5.2. Burundi's Main Problems

5.2.1. Poverty, Revenge and Impunity

Poverty seems to be a much more determining conflict factor in Burundi. While Rwanda officially has replaced the ideology of ethnic discrimination with the ideology of national unity, but still understands the conflict as “*identity-based*”¹¹⁴⁶, the quota regulations in Burundi have cleared the view on the socioeconomic root causes of the conflict. In Rwanda, clever technocratic management, a carefully maintained image of meritocracy and sustained economic recovery cushion the public outrage about authoritarian tendencies and have made an extension of patronage to broad parts of society possible. The dismal economic performance and rampant corruption of Nkurunziza’s government, on the other hand, forced the CNDD-FDD to steadily reduce its patronage to its core constituency, mainly Hutu-peasants, leaving the application of force the only option open to deal with the opposition without conceding power, which would further reduce the free resources for patronage.

Fortunately, the efforts to de-ethnicize Burundian politics from timid reforms during Buyoya’s reign¹¹⁴⁷ through the quota-system agreed upon in Arusha to the ethnic integration of the army in 2006 did have a lasting effect so far. Arsène, a Tutsi teacher from “*Gakombe*” explains the difference between Ndadaye’s election and Nkurunziza’s first election as follows: “*2005 it was not really... It was not only ethnical [sic], because even many Tutsi had been in the, the rebels. They had been*

¹¹⁴⁶ Shyaka, 2004, 8.

¹¹⁴⁷ Cf. Lemarchand, 1996, 118-120; 131-159

*fighting in the bush, others had been giving money in the political party of the rebels, so most of them were, were really looking for something else than ethnic groups*¹¹⁴⁸.” The increasing international pressure towards ethnic integration of the conflict parties revealed the political and economic undercurrents of the ‘ethnic’ power struggle in Burundi. While the war did not threaten the economic dominance of the Tutsi elite, they knew that they had to co-opt Hutu in order not to become targeted by the new leadership. Thus, according to the International Crisis Group, the war “*has increased corruption and favoured the rise of an ethnically diverse oligarchy*¹¹⁴⁹.” Not only intellectuals, but an increasing number of peasants, start to think that ultimately, ‘*la crise*’ was political, not ethnic in nature¹¹⁵⁰. At least from 2005 on, the conflict lines in Burundi shifted from ethnic groups to political parties, but even during the civil war, questions of politico-economic advantage and affiliation sometimes overwrote ethnicity. The most striking examples here are Ezechiel and Abel, two Tutsi from “*Rohero*” who joined the FNL despite its radical Anti-Tutsi leanings¹¹⁵¹. David, a Hutu, joined the FAB in 1998¹¹⁵². Several life stories do not fit the ethnic stereotypes and instead point to politico-economic motivations, such as Hutus who joined UPRONA and were persecuted by other Hutus¹¹⁵³. Généroise, representative for many Burundians, boils the problem down to its essence: “*it’s not ethnicity, almost everybody lacks money or food, everybody wants a piece of the pie!*¹¹⁵⁴”

Distrust in Politics and Revenge

The perception of an elite pre-occupied with exploiting its position and dragging the population from one conflict into the other has led to both a certain resignation pertaining to politics and a rather paradoxical anti-political and anti-intellectual sentiment among many Burundians. On one side there is little to no sympathy for intellectuals and politicians even on one’s own side: many Hutus who were not personally affected by the massacres against Hutu students and intellectuals in 1972 speak of a “*triage*¹¹⁵⁵” against “*bad people*¹¹⁵⁶” or “*abamenja*¹¹⁵⁷” – traitors, people who “*took money from*

¹¹⁴⁸ Interview with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo.

¹¹⁴⁹ Cf. ICG, 2012, i.

¹¹⁵⁰ Cf. e.g. interviews with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo; Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, “Kamenge”, Ngozi; Ferdinand, 56, Hutu IDP, „Rohero“, Ngozi; Jacques, 26, Tutsi resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo; Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo; Marie, 52, Tutsi resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi; Violetta, 30, Hutu resident, “Kamenge”, Ngozi. Pascal, 54, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo.

¹¹⁵¹ Cf. interviews with Abel, 23, ex-combatant, „Rohero“, Ngozi and Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatant, „Rohero“, Ngozi.

¹¹⁵² Cf. interview with David, 28, ex-combatant, „Kamenge“, Ngozi.

¹¹⁵³ Cf. interviews with Ferdinand, 56, Hutu IDP, „Rohero“, Ngozi; Généroise, 43, Hutu resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi.

¹¹⁵⁴ Interview with Généroise, 43, Hutu resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi.

¹¹⁵⁵ Interviews with Juvénal H. 53, „Gakombe“, Kirundo; Juvénal, 59, Tutsi resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi; Pascal M., 29, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo.

¹¹⁵⁶ Interview with Sylvestre, 69, Hutu resident, „Kamenge“, Ngozi.

¹¹⁵⁷ Interviews with Pascal, 54, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo; Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo; Juvénal H. 53, Hutu resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo; Juvénal, 59, Tutsi resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi.

*the state*¹¹⁵⁸. Many peasants share a general distrust towards intellectuals and their motives¹¹⁵⁹ regardless of their ethnicity. *"Politics isn't there for the people but to make money*¹¹⁶⁰*"* is a common opinion. Juvénal e.g. thinks that the lack of jobs makes intellectuals opt for politics¹¹⁶¹.

For most Burundians, the political parties are at the origin of every crisis. Déogratias believes that *"the political parties are an obstacle to the development and the reconciliation of the country because they make us go backwards, we can't even unite when they are not united*¹¹⁶²*."* Many participants called for a grand coalition or even a single-party government because in their understanding, only a unified political elite could actually reconcile Burundi and start to benefit of the population instead of bickering and quarreling over the spoils of the state. In Arsène's eyes, *"they are not reconciling the population. They are not reconciling until now and they belong to the political parties and when they are there, they don't have liberty of expression because if they talk, maybe they will have some problems from the political party in power and that is even the reason why some of them are being killed these days*¹¹⁶³*."* No reconciliation, no justice and a culture of impunity are the driving factors for revenge. Contrary to Rwanda where the genocide was only very rarely connected directly to the so-called 'Hutu-revolution', many Burundians who witnessed the massacres in 1972, understood the violence in 1988 or 1993 as revenge for earlier massacres of the army: *"it was because of '72. People were angry about what happened in '72. And had kept it in their hearts, because he doesn't see anything else. Here they lived together in peace without problems*¹¹⁶⁴*."* Juvénal H. concurs: *"La crise de '88, c'était pour se venger les faits qui ont eu lieu en 1972. Oui, les gens, les personnes se lançaient des paroles en disant que: 'toi, tu as tué les Hutus à partir de '72. Tu ne le feras plus, je pourrais même, même le faire avant toi!*¹¹⁶⁵*"* Etienne explains that the killings in "Kamenge" in 1994 happened for the same reasons as in "Gakombe" in 1988: *"They didn't kill them in '93 but when they were coming to kill them in '94, they said that they were taking revenge of what happened in '72*¹¹⁶⁶*."* Impunity breeds revenge. This is why the current corruption of the judicial apparatus is extremely dangerous for reconciliation in Burundi. *"The big issue we have here is that impunity because if they don't punish, then they're like permitting people to commit crimes. So, for him they should sit and and first settle the truth about what happened, and then punish those, and then punish those who did*

¹¹⁵⁸ *"...qui ont mangé les frais de l'état. On les a appelé les bamenja, abamenja"* - Interview with Juvénal H. 53, Hutu resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo.

¹¹⁵⁹ Cf. e.g. interviews with Sadi, 45, Hutu resident, Kamenge, Ngozi; Egide, 50, Tutsi IDP. "Rohero", Ngozi;

¹¹⁶⁰ Interview with Claver, 66, Tutsi resident, „Rohero“, Ngozi.

¹¹⁶¹ Cf. Interview with Juvénal, 59, Tutsi resident, „Rohero“, Ngozi.

¹¹⁶² Interview with Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge"., Ngozi.

¹¹⁶³ Interview with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

¹¹⁶⁴ Interview with Frédéric, 59, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

¹¹⁶⁵ Interview with Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

¹¹⁶⁶ Interview with Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

*that*¹¹⁶⁷." The process of judicial reform however has been co-opted by the party in power in order to legitimate and facilitate its expansion of political power.

Creeping Authoritarianism and Corruption

The process of creeping authoritarianism is similar in Rwanda and Burundi. As soon as the ruling party firmly holds the reins of government like the RPF in 2000 and the CNDD-FDD in 2010, quotas and representative considerations become secondary and inconvenient. Expanding neo-patrimonial networks and ensuring or demonstrating loyalty quickly becomes more important than actual governmental performance, when the party actually appoints and controls the officials, instead of their local constituency¹¹⁶⁸. The difference between Rwanda and Burundi here is one of discipline. The RPF takes technocratic performance seriously and works toward its 'Vision 2020' with great vigor. Kagame implemented the *Imihigo* performance contracts, which allows for the close monitoring of local authorities by the president and parliament¹¹⁶⁹. Rwanda has put much more effort into establishing a viable bureaucracy that respects the rule of law and punishes petty transgressions more severely than cash-strapped Burundi. Here, many officials and dignitaries are exempted from paying taxes and treat their functions as personal fiefdoms. Burundi currently ranks 157th of 177 countries in Transparency International's corruption ranking (Rwanda ranks 49th)¹¹⁷⁰. Nepotism is widespread, while the party is mainly interested in getting its share. With the judiciary directly dependent on the executive, authorities practically act with impunity¹¹⁷¹. Claver from "Rohero" states: "*Politics isn't there for the people but to make money*¹¹⁷²." Burundi established the nominal institutions like the Ombudsman to ensure accountability towards the population, and the *Commission Nationale des Terres et autres Biens CNTB* to settle land disputes between returning refugees and settlers to foster reconciliation. The government has also held national consultations on the establishment of a TRC. However, both the Ombudsman as well as the CNTB are considered corrupt and infiltrated by the governing party. "*The Ombudsman, he is the person who is there for the population, he is understood by the government, this is a good thing but the problem is that he is not neutral; he came from the political party on power, so if he was neutral, it would be better*¹¹⁷³."

With its dominance established, the leadership relapses into totalitarian behavior oriented towards the main objective of staying in power. This situation becomes even worse when the regime faces a

¹¹⁶⁷ Interview with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

¹¹⁶⁸ Cf. Ingelaere, 2011, 67-78.

¹¹⁶⁹ Cf. IRDP, 2010b, 38-49.

¹¹⁷⁰ Cf. Transparency International, "*Corruption by Country/ Territory: Burundi*", http://www.transparency.org/country#BDI_DataResearch (14 September 2014).

¹¹⁷¹ Cf. Ligue Iteka, 2011, 34-40.


¹¹⁷² Interview with Claver, 66, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹¹⁷³ Interview with Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

crisis that threatens their access to the spoils of the state. Midlarsky¹¹⁷⁴ expounds that genocide becomes much more likely given a state’s experience and expectation of loss in the context of war and often is the extreme reaction of a cornered regime that feels existentially threatened. This happened in 1972 when Michel Micombero decided to ‘decapitate’ the whole Hutu elite in reaction to a locally limited insurrection in the South of Burundi. The same mechanism could also be applied to the MRND in Rwanda, which was fighting a war against an external enemy, while simultaneously being challenged by the domestic opposition. Even the massacres in the DRC follow similar patterns as Rwanda and Burundi originally intervened to protect their borders (and thus the state they captured) as well as the Banyamulenge, the Tutsi settling in the Kivus.

Fortunately, such an existential crisis is not yet acute even though Burundi does not seem to come to rest. Regarding the scaled questions, the trust in neighbors, government, the army and the police still seems to be intact even though it is declining.


Trust in Army and Police		1988	1993/1	1993/2	2005	2011
Hutu N-C Resident		-1.8		1.4	-3.2	2.3
Tutsi N-C Resident		2.4		3.1	1.7	1
Hutu Refugee		-2.5		-2.8	-2.8	4.5
Tutsi IDP / Refugee		2.7		2.3	1.8	3.2
Ex-Combatant		-1.3		2.3	-1.8	3.5
Bdi Average		-0.2		1.6	-1.4	2.6



Burundi: How much do you trust the army or the police?

¹¹⁷⁴ Cf. Midlarsky, 2006.

Trust in the Government						
	1988	1993/1	1993/2	2005	2011	
Hutu N-C Resident	0.1		3.2	-3.4	2.4	2.7
Tutsi N-C Resident	2.9		0.9	-2.6	2.5	2
Hutu Refugee	-2.8		-1.3	-5	5	3.3
Tutsi IDP / Refugee	3		-0.8	-3.3	3.2	1.7
Ex-Combatant	-1.3		2	-3.3	3.3	0
Bdi Average	0.8		1.7	-3.4	2.6	2.3



Burundi: How much do you trust the Government?

5.2.2. Land Disputes

When it came to power, Nkurunziza's government knew that in an agrarian country such as Burundi, land disputes are one of the main sources of civic unrest and crime. I however heard multiple stories of IDPs who couldn't return to their fields and the courts did nothing: *"He has his land but he can't go back there because they would kill him and even when he sends somebody to cultivate, they will send the shepherd with the cows and they will just destroy what he has cultivated. And even when he was trying to grow bananas and then they were destroying it before it grows up¹¹⁷⁵."* Michel from Rohero recounts the same story of Hutu in the hills uprooting his crops before he is able to cultivate¹¹⁷⁶. Arable land is an extremely scarce and sought-after resource in Burundi, thus these problems are a mature source of grievance exacerbated by the years-long segregation during the civil war and the streams of returnees who come back after having fled in 1993 or even in 1972.

¹¹⁷⁵ Interview with Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹¹⁷⁶ Cf. Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

Land disputes however do not only pertain to problems between returning refugees and settlers¹¹⁷⁷, most land disputes I encountered were within families but even here, the courts usually ruled in favor of the party that paid better, leaving returnees disgruntled. Abel, an ex-combatant, recounts: *"The uncle and his father were sharing the same land, and they had never like, ah, shared it and divide it. So he went to see him and ask him for land to cultivate. Then he was asking him that he doesn't know him, that he is not one of the family, because if he was, he would have been there when his dad died. When his grandparents died, he would have been there. So he didn't want to give him any land. He said, if you want you can go on justice and fight for it. But he knows that the, the uncle has money, so he will never get it, and he doesn't have money to go to court. So when he was demobilized, he took the money that they gave him and bought a, a land for him and that's where [he is today]"*¹¹⁷⁸. Similar stories of life-and-death disputes within families are frequent¹¹⁷⁹ and the hope to win one's case for the often-penniless returnees, ex-combatants or ex-convicts is mostly small. Sadi: *"when he came back from prison, he found that his uncle had taken everything they had in the family especially the cows, and now he is richer from his father's cows and he can't ask for it, he has like 20 cows and he can't get them back and even when he tells people, nobody listens to him"*¹¹⁸⁰.

Under such circumstances, the high hopes of returnees or ex-combatants are disappointed quickly and the poorest stay poor. In general, Burundians consider themselves poorer than before the crisis. The country stagnates. Tutsi, better off before the crisis, are hit harder by the adverse economic conditions than Hutu. Particularly IDPs without access to their fields and Hutu refugees who came from abroad still feel the repercussions of the civil war.


Economic Situation	1988	1993/1	1993/2	2005	2011
Hutu N-C Resident	3.4		2.3	-3	1.3
Tutsi N-C resident	3.1		2.4	-1.9	-0.1
Hutu Refugee	4.3		1.3	-4.3	1.5
Tutsi IDP / refugee	3.6		-0.2	-4.8	-2.2
Ex-Combatant	0.8		4.3	-4.5	1.3
Bdi Average	3.2		2.1	-3.2	0.7

¹¹⁷⁷ Cf. E.g. Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹¹⁷⁸ Interview with Abel, 23, ex-combatant "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹¹⁷⁹ Cf. Interviews with Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Janvière, 38, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi;

¹¹⁸⁰ Interview with Sadi, 45, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. clean verbatim from translator who spoke about Sadi in the third person.



Economic Situation in Burundi

Considering these conditions, it is no surprise that returning refugees are viewed with suspicion and the divisions between the groups deepen once again. For Michel, the returning Hutu add nothing to the community, *"the people who are returning most of them are western Hutu who are here. They are really bad people from what he says. They can't live together¹¹⁸¹."* Irankunda who was chased from her land during the civil war agrees: *"It creates land problems. People are coming from outside and on their land, there are other people who have lived there for years. Then they have to leave¹¹⁸²."* For Izabel on the other hand, returning from Tanzania, the Tutsis do not want reconciliation: *"L'ethnicité dura longtemps puisque les Tutsi ne veulent pas partager les mêmes opinions que les Hutu. Les Hutu veulent la réconciliation mais, les Tutsi ne veulent pas même les déplacés ont préféré rester dans les camps alors que les Twa ont regagné leurs collines¹¹⁸³."* It is easy to see how this situation breeds conflict and could easily be exploited by ethnic entrepreneurs.

5.2.3. Unresolved ethnic Fault Lines – Tutsi IDPs and Segregation

"There can't be any truth and reconciliation like he is living, he can't forgive the people who have wronged him when the house he lives in is about to fall down, when he doesn't know where he will live in a few days. So for him, if the government doesn't help him, he can't think of forgiving those people. Maybe, if they could help him then, if he's not hungry, if he knows what he has, where to live, he could think of forgiving them but he doesn't understand how they ask him to forgive when he is still in the poverty they put him into¹¹⁸⁴."

¹¹⁸¹ Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹¹⁸² Interview with Irankunda, 30, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹¹⁸³ Interview with Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹¹⁸⁴ Interview with Etienne R., 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

The discrimination of Hutu before 1993 was very pronounced in Burundi. Mwakikagile speaks of “*black apartheid*¹¹⁸⁵” and its after-effects are still perceptible in the expressions of older interviewees. Etienne R. for example, an old Tutsi farmer who used to own a lot of land, speaks of “*Umuhutu wanyje*¹¹⁸⁶” – my Hutu, and Thérèse, a peasant from “*Gakombe*” recounted: “*Les Tutsis étaient nés pour gouverner, tandis que les Hutus étaient au service des Tutsis. [...], c’est à dire chez les Tutsis, il y avait une discrimination puisqu’ils ne se partageaient pas les mêmes gobelets. Même s’il y avait la bière locale on devrait utiliser le gobelet pour donner les Tutsis. Ils ne partageaient pas les mêmes chalumeaux*¹¹⁸⁷.” The story about the different cups for Hutu and Tutsi was told almost identically by Izabel in “*Kamenge*¹¹⁸⁸”. For Déogratias, the discrimination started with Micombero: “*During colonial times, there were no social differences between Burundians, then maybe it started after independence when started the republic with the Prince Louis Rwagasore, then after the republic that’s when they started that the Tutsi were leading when the Hutu were not leading. And then that’s when the problems started but then in 71-72 that is when he started working and that is when the problems started in 72*¹¹⁸⁹.” In 1972, Micombero and the Tutsi-dominated army killed almost every educated Hutu, down to high school students: “*They were taking only the people who were educated. Grown-up people in secondary school, and then business men and even those who are working in the offices. Those were the ones who were taken [...] Everybody was taken to the car [truck] and then later on, they learned that they had died*¹¹⁹⁰.” Hutus were discriminated before, but then they were slaughtered like cattle to prevent a counter-elite from forming¹¹⁹¹. According to my participants cited above, this started the cycle of violence: the oppressed Hutu majority against the oppressive Tutsi minority.

The civil war has reversed these conditions. With the election of Pierre Nkurunziza, many rural Hutu considered their cause fulfilled and often, Hutu rebels actually self-demobilized voluntarily¹¹⁹². Largely, ethnicity does not concern them anymore because the two biggest parties in conflict over power with each other, the CNDD-FDD and the FNL, both emerged from Hutu rebel movements. Thus, the principal issue that complicated their relationships with their Tutsi neighbors, ethnic discrimination, is gone. The main grievance Hutus still seem to have with Tutsi in Burundi is that groups of Tutsi IDPs

¹¹⁸⁵ Mwakikagile, 2013, 107

¹¹⁸⁶ Interview with Etienne R., 72, Tutsi IDP, “Kamenge”, Ngozi.

¹¹⁸⁷ Interview with Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo. Translation: “*The Tutsi were born to rule whereas the Hutu served them. This means there was discrimination, the Tutsi did not even share the same cups. Even if there was local beer, one had to use different cups to give to the Tutsi, they would not share straws.*” – Rwandans and Burundians typically drink local beer from straws and drinking together is seen as a sign of peace.

¹¹⁸⁸ Cf. Interview with Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, “Kamenge”, Ngozi.

¹¹⁸⁹ Interview with Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, “Kamenge”, Ngozi.

¹¹⁹⁰ Interview with Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, “Kamenge”, Ngozi.

¹¹⁹¹ Cf. Meisler, 1990, 384-393

¹¹⁹² Cf. Uvin, 2009, 177

have settled in the administrative centres and represent a source of unrest there. The hope that the IDPs would return to their hills – “[...]que les déplacés regagnent leurs terres¹¹⁹³” was uttered frequently.

Many Hutu peasants nowadays are relatively content with the power relations in the country and its leadership. They support Nkurunziza because he is a down-to-earth, devout Christian, because he introduced free health care for pregnant women and infants, and especially because he is a Hutu. When asked whom she voted for, Venantie K. exclaimed enthusiastically: *“it’s the CNDD-FDD, the political party in power. As they see that now there is peace, it’s better than before. They chose the political power, the political party in power¹¹⁹⁴.”*

5.2.4. Differences between Research Sites

Whereas the interethnic relations slowly ameliorate in “Gakombe” and “Kamenge” because Tutsi IDPs slowly return to their fields, the situation in “Rohero”, the ex-camp predominantly inhabited by Tutsi IDPs and Upronists remains dire. Here, the emotional conviction of having lost the war and living under siege-conditions permanently is most pronounced. Particularly the fear of the *Imbonerakure*, the CNDD-FDD’s youth wing, is widespread: *“And if you go out at night most of the time they can be killed by Imbonerakure [...] that are working here. They’re supposed to work for the security in our country but they are the ones who kill them and also the documentation here in Burundi... During nights that’s when they start working and if they find you and they don’t know you, they will kill you¹¹⁹⁵.”*

Considering the differing ethnic narratives of the conflict and a lack of exchange, both narratives reinforce themselves within their respective communities. Fears and conspiracy theories become ‘mythico-history’ in segregated communities.

Lasting ethnic segregation leading to increasingly radicalized views is one of the biggest problems for reconciliation in Burundi. As with Rwandan survivors, Tutsi are overrepresented in the Burundian sample. „Rohero“ evidently demonstrates a heavy overrepresentation of Tutsi views (75 percent) whereas Tutsi participation in „Kamenge“ (18.75 percent) and „Gakombe“ (14.2 percent) come closer to the commonly cited statistical estimation of 14-15 percent. As in Rwanda, people who were displaced by atrocities or lost family members are the ones most likely to harbor revanchist feelings. Tutsi, having lost their privileged status, risk becoming marginalized if Nkurunziza follows through

¹¹⁹³ Interview with Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, “Kamenge”, Ngozi.

¹¹⁹⁴ Interview with Venantie K., 25, Hutu resident, “Kamenge”, Ngozi. Clean verbatim from translator who spoke about Venantie in the third person.

¹¹⁹⁵ Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi.

with his plans to alter the constitution¹¹⁹⁶. Thus, in "Rohero", where ethnicized interpretations of the past and the feeling of having lost influence and property in the civil war seemed to be more prevalent, an overrepresentation of Tutsi-views appeared reasonable.

As in Malkki's¹¹⁹⁷ research site Mishamo, exclusive mythico-historical identities and narratives were preserved in this isolated and strongly homogenous community. For some residents, the narrative of Tutsi-discrimination even included a continued plan for extermination against the Tutsi: "*from what is happening today, if it doesn't change, the minority will disappear one day. There will be no more Tutsi people*"¹¹⁹⁸. Should the political conflict in Burundi once again come to involve an ethnic dimension, communities such as "Rohero" would form a reservoir for potential fighters not unlike the refugee camps in Tanzania did during the civil war. Desperate Hutus such as Alexandre¹¹⁹⁹ and Dominique¹²⁰⁰, recruited in camps abroad, built the backbone of the rebel movements whereas the national army recruited the youth of badly affected Tutsi IDP-settlements, such as Abel and Ezechiel from "Rohero"¹²⁰¹. Such communities of disenfranchised Tutsi thus also run a higher risk of becoming targets for militias such as the *Imbonerakure* sent to repress rebellion. In order to heal Burundi, the suffering and economic hopelessness of communities such as "Rohero" has to be alleviated and segregation has to be reversed by providing security for everybody.

The assumption that views radicalize in isolation has been strongly affirmed by the statements of Tutsi in "Rohero" as well as Hutu participants in "Kamenge" demanding that the IDPs return to their hills, considering their continued presence and concentration in the center as one of the main obstacles to peace¹²⁰². The deviating views in "Rohero" are also reflected in the answers to the scaled questions, particularly with regard to transitional justice and the economic situation.

Scaled Questions		1988	1993 election	1993 crisis	2005	2011
Approval of Transitional Justice	Gakombe, Kirundo	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	1.2
	Rohero, Ngozi	0	0	0	-0.2	-0.6
	Kamenge, Ngozi	0	0	0	1	0.5
	Bujumbura & Ngozi	0	0	0	1.5	0
	Burundi Average	0	0	0	0.6	0.3

¹¹⁹⁶ Cf. Reuters: *US Urges Burundi to Drop Constitution Changes, Avoid 'Dark Days'*, 8. April 2014, on: <http://www.voanews.com/content/reu-us-urges-burundi-to-drop-constitution-changes-avoid-dark-days/1889081.html> (10. April 2014)

¹¹⁹⁷ Malkki, 1995, 197 ff.


¹¹⁹⁸ Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹¹⁹⁹ Cf. Interview with Alexandre, 46, ex-combatant CNDD-FDD, "Kamenge", Ngozi.


¹²⁰⁰ Cf. Interview with Dominique, 37, Hutu refugee, "Gakombe", Kirundo. Dominique wanted to join the rebels in a Rwandan camp but changed his mind after absolving the initial trainings.

¹²⁰¹ Cf. Interviews with Abel, 23 and Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatants FAB and FNL from "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹²⁰² Cf. Interview with Venantie, 69, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.




Scaled Questions		1988	1993 election	1993 crisis	2005	2011
Economic Situation	Gakombe, Kirundo	3.2	1.2	-2.7	1.2	0.7
	Rohero, Ngozi	3	2.5	-3.5	-0.7	-0.7
	Kamenge, Ngozi	3.3	2.4	-3.7	1.7	1.5
	Bujumbura & Ngozi	4	4	0.5	1	1
	Burundi Average	3.2	2.1	-3.2	0.8	0.6




This feeling of discrimination is also reflected in the ratings for human rights and democracy, which Tutsi evaluate significantly lower than Hutus.

Respect for Human Rights						
	1988	1993/1	1993/2	2005	2011	
Hutu N-C Resident	-2.3		1.3	-4.8	2.2	2.3
Tutsi N-C Resident	2		0.8	-4.1	1.1	1
Hutu Refugee	0		-0.3	-5	3	3.3
Tutsi IDP / Refugee	2.7		0.0	-4.2	2.7	-0.8
Ex-Combatant	0.5		3.8	-1.3	2.5	1.0
Bdi Average	-0.2		1.1	-4.3	2.2	1.7



Democracy						
	1988	1993/1	1993/2	2005	2011	
Hutu N-C Resident	-2.3		2.3	-4.3	1.8	1.5
Tutsi N-C Resident	0.3		0.9	-3.5	0.7	0.5
Hutu Refugee	-2		1.3	-5	3	1.8
Tutsi IDP / Refugee	1.5		-2.8	-5	-1	-0.5
Ex-Combatant	-0.8		2.8	-2	3.3	1.3
Bdi Average	-1		1.4	-4.1	2.1	1.7



These diagrams indicate that Tutsi in Burundi feel proportionally more disadvantaged in the post-conflict period and among them, IDPs assess the state of their current situation even more negatively. In order to implement a successful reconciliation policy, IDPs have to be understood as a separate category in society and their worries should be taken seriously.

Anonymity

With regard to choosing anonymity, there is a slight correlation between ethnic identity and the fear of disclosure. If we only count the cases with clearly assignable¹²⁰³ ethnic identity (27 Hutus, 18 Tutsi, 1 Twa), we can say that Tutsi (8 out of 18 participants =44.4 percent) rather chose some form of anonymity than Hutu (6 out of 27=22.2 percent). In the two 'mixed' communities of „*Gakombe*“ (12 of 14 participants=85 percent) and „*Kamenge*“ (12 of 16 participants=75 percent) chose open public access.. In „*Rohero*“ however, people were more prudent and only 9 out of 16 participants (56.25 percent) chose open public access. 60% of Tutsi in „*Rohero*“ chose some form of anonymity (6 out of 10=60 percent). In all probability, this is related to feelings of discrimination, marginalization, and distrust in the government, also expressed in the scaled questions. Among all Burundian Tutsi interviewed, the IDPs further stand out (4 out of 5=80 percent choosing some form of anonymity) as particularly prudent. The six Hutu interviewees choosing to protect their identity were all residents, thus, as with Rwandan returnees, one could say that former Hutu refugees feel secure in the country and represented by its leadership.

Regarding the 14 people who protected their anonymity in Burundi, six of them (42.8 percent) enjoyed a higher education. These six participants are equivalent to 54.5 percent (6 out of 11=54.5 percent) of all participants with a higher education. This number again hints at of the political character of violence in Burundi today. Educated people and community leaders have to fear more than ordinary peasants do.

¹²⁰³ Excluding the interviews with Sadi („*Kamenge*“) and Marie M. („*Gakombe*“).

5.3. Transitional Justice in Burundi: A Matter of Timing

A judicial Stalemate

In Burundi, practical efforts to set up institutions for transitional justice have been stalled from the very beginning¹²⁰⁴ despite being stated policy. The stalemate derives mostly from the immense difficulty of reaching a negotiated political settlement. The parties are very reluctant to jeopardize the fragile short-term stability by dealing with the violent past¹²⁰⁵. Vanderginste however maintains that Burundi is more stable and peaceful than ever before in the last fourteen years despite refusing to deal with its violent past¹²⁰⁶. Criticizing the lack of popular consultation on matters of transitional justice, he raises the fundamental question if an outcome of such a consultative process that “*favors peace, stability and a return to normalcy instead of establishing accountability mechanisms, prosecuting and punishing*”¹²⁰⁷ would even be acceptable to the international community.

Regarding their attitude towards justice, not only the elite but also the population itself is deeply divided. As Ingelaere suggests, “*a fundamental decision needs to be made between ‘digging up the past’ or ‘burying the past’*”¹²⁰⁸. Whereas a majority would like to leave the past behind, most Burundians consider the unfettered impunity and the violent political culture the scourge of the country. Many participants are torn between longing for peace, closure and forgiveness on one side and understanding the necessity of punishment as a preventive measure for future violence on the other. Particularly because the reason for the mass killings of Tutsi in 1988 (Ntega-Marangara) and 1993 is commonly interpreted as the Hutu’s “*revenge*”¹²⁰⁹ for 1972 and the killing of ‘their’ president Ndadaye, the correlation between impunity and the resurgence of violence is crystal clear to every Burundian. Thus, many interviewees such as Thérèse waver with their assessments of forgiving and justice: “*Il faut pardonner les gens. Même en dieu, il nous donne pardon. S’il faut punir, on punira beaucoup de personnes.*” Interviewer : “*Et vous [ne] croyez pas que punir les gens aide à la réconciliation?*” T.: “*Ça pourrait aider. Puisque ça donnait... s’il y a une sanction, [ça] donnait un modèle pour les autres. Même ceux qui n’ont pas encore commis une faute vont craindre si, s’ils vont commettre ça, ils seront aussi punis*”¹²¹⁰.

¹²⁰⁴ Cf. ICTJ, <http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region1/512.html> (19.10.2010)

¹²⁰⁵ Cf. Vanderginste, 2007, 3f.

¹²⁰⁶ Cf. Vanderginste, 2007, 26

¹²⁰⁷ Cf. Vanderginste, 2007, 26

¹²⁰⁸ Ingelaere, 2009, 5.

¹²⁰⁹ E.g. Interviews with Déogratias, 59, Tutsi Res, “Kamenge”, Ngozi; Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo; Etienne R., 72, Tutsi IDP, “Kamenge”, Ngozi; Frédéric, 59, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”; Juvénal H., Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo; Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, “Kamenge”, Ngozi; Générose, 43, Hutu resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi.

¹²¹⁰ Interview with Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo.

This dilemma is strongly reflected and even exacerbated on the political level. This is mainly because many of the power holders of the civil war are still active in politics and a thorough judicial investigation into the pasts of many Burundian politicians and parties might still destabilize the fragile peace. Thus, transitional justice is mainly limited to land issues and even there, the apparatus is corrupt and slow as some of my interviews revealed¹²¹¹.

5.3.1. The cautionary Tale of Burundi's Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The establishment of the CVR in Burundi is the perfect example of how the Burundian government deferred the implementation of mechanisms of transitional justice that could eventually reveal inconvenient truths about the current leaders of the country and their possible implications in war crimes and crimes against humanity, particularly during '*la crise*'. However, equipped with a factual monopoly on power after its smashing electoral victory in 2010, the CNDD-FDD has suddenly become interested in decisively pushing matters of transitional justice forward and working through the various episodes of mass killing in Burundi. This has not always been the case.

The establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission¹²¹² and an international tribunal for crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes¹²¹³ (should a UN inquiry find any evidence of such crimes) was already stipulated in the APRA. The implementation of these articles was however repeatedly re-negotiated, postponed and delayed for over a decade, thus the question of what might effect such a sudden shift of opinion in the last few years becomes particularly interesting. According to Vandeginste, there are three main reasons for this peculiar timing for launching the TRC: the prioritization of the peace process over transitional justice, the shift in the negotiated power equilibrium after 2010 and the decreasing influence of international actors¹²¹⁴.

Nevertheless, before we analyze the reasons behind the eventual launch of the CVR, it is important to understand the long and arduous history of its establishment. Listed below is a timeline marking the most important developments with regard to its implementation in the past fifteen years¹²¹⁵:

28. August 2000 the APRA stipulates for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a UN commission of inquiry to "*establish an international criminal tribunal to try and punish those responsible should the findings of the*

¹²¹¹ Cf. Interviews with Abel, 23, ex-combatant FAB and FNL, "Rohero", Ngozi; Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; See chapter 5.2.2.

¹²¹² Cf. APRA, 2000, Art. 6 (11), 18

¹²¹³ Cf. APRA, 2000, Art. 8, 22

¹²¹⁴ Vandeginste, 2012, 355-365.

¹²¹⁵ Cf. Vandeginste, 2011 & 2012; *IRIN News Africa, Justice in a lawless World*, June 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/indepthmain.aspx?InDepthId=7&ReportId=59485>. (July, 25 2014)

*report point to the existence of acts of genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity.*¹²¹⁶”

28. October 2001 the provision of the twin judicial mechanism (CVR and special court) is integrated into the transitional constitution
- July 2002 President Buyoya formally requests the establishment of an international judicial commission of inquiry.
- November 2003 the General Ceasefire Agreement (GCA) with the CNDD-FDD is signed.
- January 2004 the government approves of an UN assessment mission.
- December 2004 Legislation for the establishment of a TRC is passed.
- 2004-2005 the UN sends an assessment mission to investigate the feasibility of establishing transitional justice mechanisms. Their report, submitted in May 2005, recommends the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms as foreseen in APRA, but proposes a hybrid national-international commission and a special chamber within the Burundian court system.
20. June 2005 the UN Security Council Resolution 1606 backs the creation of the TRC and a Special Chamber of the Burundian court system modeled after the Bosnian war crimes chamber.
- 2005-2007 the UN and the Burundian government negotiate about the implementation of the “Kalomoh report” of the assessment mission. Particularly the questions of amnesty prohibition, the relationship between the commission and tribunal as well as the degree of autonomy of the tribunal’s prosecutor become the subjects of long disputes¹²¹⁷. The investigative independence of the prosecutor and the possibility of amnesties are still unresolved as of 2013¹²¹⁸.
12. December 2006 Burundi submits its “*Plan Prioritaire pour la Consolidation de la Paix*”¹²¹⁹, which declares impunity and the absence of public institutions for memory work to be the main obstacles for national reconciliation.
- November 2007 the government and the UN discontinue their negotiations and commission a tripartite steering committee (*Comité de Pilotage*) to hold national consultations about the establishment of the TRC and special tribunal. The committee consists of state representatives Festus Ntanyungu and Francoise Ngendahayo, representatives of civil society Joseph Ndayizeye and Eularie Nibizi and Ismaël A. Diallo for the UN (represented through UNHCHR and BINUB)¹²²⁰.

¹²¹⁶ APRA, 2000, Art. 6, 18.

¹²¹⁷ Cf. Vandeginste, 2011.

¹²¹⁸ Cf. Amnesty International, *Burundi: Annual Report 2013*, on:

<http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-burundi-2013> (March 6, 2014).

¹²¹⁹ Comité de Pilotage, 2010, 10.

¹²²⁰ Cf. CSVR, Justice in Perspective, October 2011, <http://webfactory.co.za/csvr/csvr/africa/burundi/80-country/mechanism/431.html> (25 July 2014).

4. December 2008 the last remaining rebel movement, the FNL agrees to a cease-fire in the CCA.
20. April 2010 the tripartite Committee completes its report. It concludes that Burundians would desire a mixed truth commission with local and international personnel examining the period between 1962 and 2008 (“*up to present*”). According to the consultations, more than 80% of Burundians desire a judicial process through the establishment of a hybrid special tribunal (with a preference for Burundian judges). Furthermore, the population expresses the wish for broad mandates and reparations¹²²¹.
28. June 2010 the CNDD-FDD wins the presidential, parliamentary and communal elections with strong majorities, also due to the boycott by the opposition.
- December 2010 the tripartite Committee submits its Report to the UN and the President.
- 2010 President Nkurunziza commissions a Technical Committee to prepare the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms.
26. July 2011 President Nkurunziza announces the launch of the TRC for 2012¹²²².
- October 2011 the Technical Committee submits its report, which rather downsizes international involvement and proposes an essentially national TRC composed of 11 Burundian members that is to select its cases independently. The mandate emphasizes truth telling more than justice and suggests that an eventual tribunal should only start its work after the TRC fulfilled its mandate¹²²³.
17. April 2014 the CNDD-FDD pushes through the launch of the TRC. FRODEBU as well as UPRONA boycott the vote¹²²⁴.
3. December 2014 the Burundian parliament, boycotted by the opposition, elects the eleven members of the CVR under the leadership of Catholic bishop Jean Louis Nahimana and Anglican archbishop Bernard Ntahoturi. The establishment of a special chamber of the Burundian court system is still uncertain.

The participation in the national consultations on reconciliation and justice was massive. 3887 of 4837 invited participants took part¹²²⁵. The participants were however only asked to rate the already proposed mechanisms. They were neither asked if they favored other strategies nor encouraged to contribute to solutions themselves.

Before 2012, the party factually pursued a strategy of ‘forgiving and forgetting’, bypassing the UN’s prohibition of amnesties through sophisticated mechanisms, even though the official rhetoric has

¹²²¹ Cf. CSVr, Justice in Perspective, October 2011, <http://webfactory.co.za/csvr/csvr/africa/burundi/80-country/mechanism/431.html> (25 July 2014); Comité de Pilotage, 2010.

¹²²² Cf. ReliefWeb, *Burundi slates truth and reconciliation panel for 2012*, 27. July 2011, <http://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundi-slates-truth-and-reconciliation-panel-2012> (25 July 2014)

¹²²³ Cf. Vandeginste, 2012, 362-364.

¹²²⁴ Cf. Nduwimana, *Burundi creates reconciliation body that divides public opinion*, 18. April 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/18/us-burundi-politics-idUSBREA3H0E020140418> (July 23, 2014);

¹²²⁵ Cf. Comité de Pilotage, 2010.64.

promised a truth and reconciliation commission and a special court since the APRA of 2000 and never spoke of an amnesty for war crimes¹²²⁶. The newest development is that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission has been established, but its members have been picked by the president, stirring up fear among members of the opposition that the CVR will leave members of the ruling party untouched and corroborate impunity¹²²⁷. Contrary to the suggestions of the UN, the TRC to be launched is also strictly national, with its commissioners to be picked by president Nkurunziza himself. In the worst case, the CNDD-FDD will imitate the RPF's strategy and use the TRC to discredit its political opponents, alienating its remaining partners FRODEBU and UPRONA.

5.3.2. Justice or Forgiving and Forgetting?

Values and Institutions

In the national consultations about the appointment of a TRC and a special tribunal 83,39 percent of participants said that a judicial mechanism for grave crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity would be necessary¹²²⁸. The profound disappointment with the establishment of functioning institutions of transitional justice is even shared by the UN. In 2005, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, wrote to the president of the UN Security Council: *"Three United Nations commissions of inquiry have been established in the last decade at the request of the Government of Burundi... No legal or practical effect, however, has been given to any of their recommendations, and no action has been taken by any of the United Nations organs"*¹²²⁹.

Contrary to the national consultations about the establishment of the TRC and Special Tribunal¹²³⁰, many Burundians I spoke to would prefer an international tribunal to a national court because they fear that a national tribunal would be dependent on and influenced by political powerholders such as the justice system today¹²³¹. Immaculée was one of the only participants in favor of Burundian judges, but even she said, *"if it's not possible, they should take the international tribunal"*¹²³². Supporters of president Nkurunziza in general are much less enthusiastic about transitional justice than others. In their eyes, people should forget the past because the advantages have turned their way recently

¹²²⁶ Cf. Vandeginste, 2011, 189-211.

¹²²⁷ Cf. Nduwimana, *Burundi creates reconciliation body that divides public opinion*, 18. April 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/18/us-burundi-politics-idUSBREA3H0E020140418> (July 23, 2014).

¹²²⁸ Cf. Comité de Pilotage, 2010, 62.

¹²²⁹ IRIN News, *Justice in a lawless World? Rights and Reconciliation in a new Era of International Law*, June 2006, on: <http://www.irinnews.org/indepthmain.aspx?InDepthId=7&ReportId=59485> (July 25, 2014).

¹²³⁰ Comité de Pilotage, 2010

¹²³¹ Cf. e.g. interviews with Abel, 23, ex-combatant, "Rohero", Ngozi; David, 29, ex-combatant, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Ferdinand, 56, Hutu refugee, "Rohero", Ngozi; Hari, 50, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹²³² Cf. Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi.

and they consider the conflict resolved. Nevertheless, even among the critics of the government, the focus of transitional justice rather rests on restorative justice with a strong communal focus on cohabitation and the acknowledgement of suffering which would actually strengthen social cohesion. In general, participants long for judicial institutions helmed by people of integrity like the *Bahingantahe*¹²³³-counsels used to be before and (in some cases) during the civil war. These courts, committees of wise men in small communities, were seen as mediators and as a source of peace and unity on the local level. Their possible reinstatement as a tradition-based approach similar to *Gacaca* was discussed in the APRA, but they have not been installed officially as of today. Ingelaere¹²³⁴ has examined the opinions of the local population with regard to the *Bashingantahe*-counsels and learned that people distinguished between the set of values the *Bashingantahe* represented, the *Ubushingantahe*, and the *Bashingantahe* as a concrete an institution. The counsels were generally seen as sources of peace and social cohesion. Their values were beyond reproach. However, particularly Hutus and ex-rebels challenged their legitimacy because some *Bashingantahe* were implicated in 'la crise'. Burundians' trust in institutions as such is shattered, but they long for people who embody the traditional values, the *Ubushingantahe* such as righteousness, integrity, sociableness, sagacity, compassion, social cohesion, coherence, faithfulness, transparency and justice¹²³⁵. These are exactly the values, which Burundians do not see in most of their politicians. *"What Burundi needs is true people who can sit and work on justice, people are punished, or are advised. They give a lot of lessons, then it would work. But if we go on building our country on lies it won't work"*¹²³⁶.

In his discussion of the *Bashingantahe*-counsels, Ingelaere concludes that rather than a reprocessing of the troubled past through new institutions such as *Bashingantahe*-counsels, Burundians would wish for a revitalization of universal Burundian values in their institutions, values which would place the needs of the many above the needs of the few. Mere transitional justice will fail here but *"general socio-economic and typical development related initiatives can facilitate these expectations"*¹²³⁷.

Access to Donor Funding

From the perspective of Burundian peasants, symbolic acts of justice and reconciliation (e.g. sharing beer) combined with communal assistance to facilitate cohabitation, and a reform of the justice system that fights the current culture of impunity makes much more sense than pouring international funding into a donor basket for transitional justice as stipulated in Burundi's 'Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper'¹²³⁸. Regarding the international prohibition of amnesties for crimes against humanity,

¹²³³ Translation: "wise men". The militants of the UPRONA used to call themselves *Bashingantahe* as well.

¹²³⁴ Cf. Ingelaere, 2009.

¹²³⁵ Cf. Ingelaere, 2009, 12f.

¹²³⁶ Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹²³⁷ Ingelaere, 2009, 116.

¹²³⁸ Cf. Vandeginste, 2012, 361f.

war crimes and genocide, the government however is obligated to implement transitional justice in order to access the money¹²³⁹. Thus, an internationally funded TRC that acts on the wishes of the CNDD-FDD-dominated government is much more likely than respecting the desire of the population to move on. Such a donor-investment will probably increase the international legitimacy of the ruling party and provide much-needed jobs for the elite. However, given the context of single party dominance in its implementation, it will most likely have a divisive effect on the peasantry, which, at least in non-segregated areas is already on the way devising non-violent ways of interethnic coexistence without governmental interference.

Burying the Past

Contrary to these current developments, a majority of Burundian peasants would be content to 'bury the past'¹²⁴⁰. Although generally ready to reconcile, great parts of the population have resigned from expecting justice after decades of impunity. Particularly the (Hutu-) government supporters and the peasant-women I spoke to do not believe anything good could come from reviewing the injustices of the past again¹²⁴¹. Resistance against forgiving and forgetting was mostly submitted from the side of isolated Tutsi, e.g. in "Rohero", the factual losers of the civil war. These Tutsi and Upronists have been internally displaced and many claim to still being discriminated against¹²⁴². The longer the government waits to address the wrongs of the past, the further they will get marginalized and subsequently radicalized. For many Tutsi IDPs, transitional justice is necessary if they want to get back their lands. Thus for them, any kind of commemoration or symbolic reconciliation without justice is ultimately worthless¹²⁴³.

The resignation, respectively the popularity of a 'clean slate'-approach probably has its roots in the war-weariness of the population and the political postponement of any meaningful measures until more than a decade after the APRA had been signed. Many Burundians are fed up with being disappointed by halfhearted attempts to establish mechanisms of reconciliation and transitional justice

¹²³⁹ Cf. Vandeginste, 2011; Ingelaere, 2009, 18.

¹²⁴⁰ Cf. Ingelaere, 2009.

¹²⁴¹ Cf. interviews with Abel, 23, ex-combatant, "Rohero", Ngozi; Ferdinand, 56, Hutu IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, „Kamenge“, Ngozi; Janvière, 38, Hutu resident, „Rohero“, Ngozi; Madeleine, 54, Twa, „Kamenge“, Ngozi; Marie M., 80, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Marie C., Hutu resident, 55, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Marie-Chantal, 29, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Odette, 25, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo; Venantie K., 25, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Venantie, 35, Hutu resident, „Kamenge“, Ngozi; Violetta, 30, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Egide, 50, Tutsi IDP. "Rohero", Ngozi; Frédéric, 59, Hutu resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo; Sadi, 45, Hutu resident, Kamenge, Ngozi; Henriette, 49, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹²⁴² Cf. e.g. interviews with Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Irankunda

¹²⁴³ Cf. e.g. interviews with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo; Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Léocadie, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Maniriho, 32, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

A further question to be posed would be where and when to begin and how to make amends. There are still thousands of Hutus such as Hari from "Kamenge", who are waiting for justice for their relatives killed in 1972. However, the government is not the same as 1972 and there are no funds for reparations... While Rwanda might have alienated parts of its Hutu population with its strict albeit one-sided approach to justice, impunity is a cancer that gnaws at Burundi's social fabric. *"The problem we still have here is that people are hungry, they are greedy, they want what others have, so they are still killing other people because they want to steal what they have and you can find like a family who has been killed. The following day, they go file a report to the governor, saying that people have been killed here and they were killed by thieves¹²⁴⁴."*

Pro Justice

Both Burundians and Rwandans mainly blame their elites for causing the conflicts and view rural perpetrators as *"people who just follow¹²⁴⁵"*, as 'small fish'. The consensus among many participants is that local perpetrators have to be punished in order to combat impunity and prevent further massacres because they knew what they were doing. Statements that address the need to punish the complicity of ordinary people such as *"I had to be punished because I followed others to kill¹²⁴⁶"* or *"the nation should show all the people that when you did that, you were punished like that because the only thing Burundians fear is the punishment¹²⁴⁷"* are very common in both countries. The extremist politicians and intellectuals however are clearly identified as the main culprits¹²⁴⁸. Even intellectuals such as Arsène advise to *"punish the leaders because the small population they are, most of them, everybody is illiterate. So they are somehow not conscious of what they are, they are ing.¹²⁴⁹."* This emphasis on elite-guilt allows the rural population to detach the perpetrator from the deed and thus to hope for renewed peaceful coexistence: *"it helps us as we know that was the rule of Hutu to kill. We can't blame them, we have to forgive them¹²⁵⁰."* (Hutu-)supporters of the current Burundian government such as Marie M., Izabel, Janvière, Madeleine, Marie C., Odette, Ferdinand, Venantie or Thérèse in general place much more emphasis on forgiving and forgetting. In their eyes, the struggle is over and people should overcome the past. Janvière e.g. *"doesn't believe in punishing them. For her they should rather forgive everybody¹²⁵¹."* Others have practical reasons to waive the idea of transitional justice altogether such as Violetta whose father was killed by the army in the civil

¹²⁴⁴ Interview with Etienne R., 72, Tutsi IDP, Kamenge, Ngozi.

¹²⁴⁵ Interview with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali.

¹²⁴⁶ Interview with Yohani, 54, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹²⁴⁷ Interview with Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi

¹²⁴⁸ Cf. chapter 4.6.

¹²⁴⁹ Interview with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

¹²⁵⁰ Interview with Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹²⁵¹ Interview with Janvière, 38, Hutu resident, „Rohero“, Ngozi. Transcript directly from translator who talked about Janvière in the third person.

war: *“they can catch a person who has killed or done something bad and they will start the investigation. They will put the person into prison. He will go there. He is fed. He can sleep and then after some years he comes back. And then he goes to live with, where he used to live with same neighbors whose people he killed¹²⁵².”* Although Tutsi in general insist on justice more, many among them fear that punishing the perpetrators could reignite old conflicts: *“he would prefer reconciliation to justice, if they want to punish those people for example those from Tanzania, they will go back and maybe they would start another war. So, better work on reconciliation only¹²⁵³.”* This fear that punishment would destabilize the country is widespread. Odette even says that *Gacaca*-courts as in Rwanda would be *“la naissance à la crise¹²⁵⁴”* – the birth of a crisis. Many CNDD-FDD-supporters in theory would be in favor of a TRC, reparations or even tribunals¹²⁵⁵, but are afraid that with all the concurrent narratives, it would lead to further quarrels and would probably not end well. Henriette states: *“so much has happened, perhaps it would be better to just forgive¹²⁵⁶.”* Many Burundians joined the ruling party because they wanted a strong party to bring peace to the war-torn country. Burundians were fed up with political parties risking the peace process to obtain a bigger share of political power, which was one of the main problems prolonging the peace process from the signing of APRA on¹²⁵⁷. The landslide victory of the CNDD-FDD in 2010¹²⁵⁸ confirmed this longing for more continuity, stability and unity in a powerful way. Although Nkurunziza’s government leaves much to be desired with regard to peace and stability, at least the president represents the majority¹²⁵⁹ and publicly vows for peace and reconciliation. The prevention of new conflicts is the most important issue for the majority of Burundians, and the danger of opening Pandora’s box is too high when re-addressing the atrocities of the past, as Venantie K. thinks: *“they should not look for old issues because Burundians don’t like that. They don’t like punishments. [...] Yes, we should forget about that. Even here, since Pierre Nkurunziza is in power, they have already started forgetting about that, because they live in peace, there is no war¹²⁶⁰.”* Burundians recognize that there are guilty parties and innocent victims on both sides of the conflict and many think it is impossible to punish them all, thus, they consider forgiving and forget-

¹²⁵² Interview with Violetta, 30, Hutu resident, „Kamenge“, Ngozi.

¹²⁵³ Interview with Egide, 50, Tutsi IDP, „Rohero“, Ngozi. Transcript directly from translator who talked about Janvière in the third person.

¹²⁵⁴ Interview with Odette, 25, Hutu resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo.

¹²⁵⁵ Cf. Interview with Madeleine, 54, Twa, „Kamenge“, Ngozi.

¹²⁵⁶ Interview with Henriette, 49, Hutu resident, „Kamenge“, Ngozi.

¹²⁵⁷ Cf. Southall, 2006, 208-220.

¹²⁵⁸ Even though the opposition alliance ADC-Ikibiri accused the CNDD-FDD of *“massive fraud”* in the local elections and thus boycotted the presidential elections, it is highly questionable if they would have beaten the CNDD-FDD in fair elections. Cf. Irin News, *“Analysis: Burundi’s Election Wobbles”*, 11 June 2010, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89446/analysis-burundi-s-election-wobbles> (21 September 2014)

¹²⁵⁹ Cf. Interview with Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo. Many Hutu participants such as Thérèse stated that they longed for a Hutu president after so many years of discrimination. Pierre (53, Hutu resident, „Kamenge“, Ngozi) assumed that the Burundians in 2005 would have voted for anyone who promised to put an end to the war, as long as he was Hutu.

¹²⁶⁰ Interview with Venantie K., 25, Hutu resident, „Kamenge“, Ngozi.

ting or at most a non-punitive truth and reconciliation commission like in South Africa the only realistic approach towards dealing with the past. The main concern is not to upset the ethnic balance.

5.4. Conclusion Burundi: 'Non-Approach to Reconciliation'

The 'Non-Approach' to Reconciliation

Let us return briefly to the question about the necessity of a defined and stringent policy of reconciliation. With regard to Burundi's experiences after 2005, the answer would have to be 'yes, but...' For many peasants, the civil war was a consequence of what happened on the national level. A surprisingly big percentage of rural participants saw the events from 1993 to 2005 as a political crisis with ethnic undertones¹²⁶¹. A political problem needs a political solution and although the consociational design of Burundian politics defuses ethnic competition and although most peasants claim that they have personally reconciled with their neighbors and to a certain extent mutually recognize victimhood, the situation remains unstable mainly because of party politics. Burundian communities need good governance, economic development and a reliable justice apparatus, but they do not have the means or the power to achieve this on their own. The initiative needs to come from the political center¹²⁶². This is also the view shared by most peasants: *"small people don't know. It's an intellectuals' issue, they are the ones who raised the first wars, they can raise another again but till now, there is hope, they are reassuring them that there is no war that can happen again and they hope that it's true but they are not the ones to decide"*¹²⁶³.

The perception of the civil war as a tragedy that emerged from the center as a national political crisis and the fact that Hutu as well as Tutsi were victimized helps many Burundians to dissociate their neighbors from the massacres and pin the blame on intellectuals and politicians. The question 'do you believe ordinary Burundians are reconciling faster than the government?' In the modified questionnaire was generally reaffirmed¹²⁶⁴, but in most cases, participants emphasized the insecurity and poverty that occupied their thoughts to a far greater extent: *"where she lives, she says that there is some kind of peace. But from what she hears on the radio every day, people are being killed, so she says"*¹²⁶⁵.

¹²⁶¹ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; tu resident (?), Kamenge, Ngozi; Sylvestre, 69, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Générose, 43, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Ferdinand, 56, Hutu refugee, "Rohero", Ngozi; Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Venantie K. 25 Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Egide, 50, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹²⁶² Cf. Ingelaere, 2009, 3-11.

¹²⁶³ Interview with Egide, 50, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹²⁶⁴ At least in "Gakombe" and "Kamenge". In "Rohero", some participants, particularly Tutsi spoke about troubles with Hutu. Cf. Interviews with Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatant Tutsi, "Rohero" and Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Michel, 65, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹²⁶⁵ Irankunda, 30, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi. Clean verbatim from translator who spoke about Irankunda in the third person.

Hence, Burundian reconciliation politics are defined by a 'non-approach' to central issues concerning commemoration and memory, explicit recognition and apology or transitional justice. Assistance for victims is almost completely lacking and the population is left to its own devices while the elite is competing for political power. On one side, the fact that this ignorance from above pertains to all sides prevents greed and jealousy to emerge and breed ethnic resentment. Most of the hostility and disappointment in Burundian society today is directed against the political establishment. On the other side, the absence of a stringent, defined and effective reconciliation policy leaves old chasms such as segregation, poverty, unpunished crimes and ethnic competition in the grassroots intact. Particularly in isolated, rather monoethnic communities, the old wounds fester despite the consociational design on the national level that made Burundi's ruling oligarchy ethnically diverse. With 'revenge' being the reason mentioned most as to why people killed in '88 and '93¹²⁶⁶, working through the past and building narratives should not be left to ethnically exclusive communities, particularly if grievances about being discriminated exist. Liisa Malkki¹²⁶⁷ has described how such "*mythico-histories*" were instrumental in radicalizing Hutu refugees after 1972. The Tutsi in "*Rohero*" might share a similar fate if their marginalization continues; they already see themselves more as victims of genocide than Hutu¹²⁶⁸ and feel threatened above average. Facing an almost complete absence of reliable justice, revenge becomes an option as it did among Hutus in 1988 and 1993.

¹²⁶⁶ Cf. Interviews with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Dominique, 37, Hutu refugee, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Maniriho, 32, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Sadi, 45, Hutu resident (?), "Kamenge", Ngozi; Sylvestre, 69, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Frédéric, 59, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Généroise, 43, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Juvénal, 59, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Marie-Goreth, 33, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Venantie, 35, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹²⁶⁷ Malkki, 1995, 52-104.

¹²⁶⁸ Cf. e.g. interviews with Irankunda, 30, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Michel, 65, "Rohero", Ngozi.

6. Comparative Analysis

This chapter will compare the national approaches towards reconciliation and their local perceptions in the main areas of power and identity politics, coexistence and commemoration, and transitional justice. It will thereby try to incorporate the core principles of reconciliation politics identified in chapter 2.1.: *memory, acknowledgement, apology and recognition, justice.*

Ethnic strife in Rwanda and Burundi in its essence has always been linked to power politics and the struggle for controlling the state. In these two poor countries, state power has always been the main avenue for the accumulation and reproduction of the dominant class¹²⁶⁹. Reconciliation thus is not only a question of acknowledgement, apology or justice, but it must also take identity politics and the balance of power into consideration. Equal (or at the very least proportional) distribution of power within a liberalized and democratic environment is widely considered a cornerstone for mitigating inter-group tensions¹²⁷⁰ as a “*framework within which a peace constituency can be identified and built*”¹²⁷¹. Reconciliation, understood as the building of a relationship based on mutual respect, can only be (re-)built on a solid foundation where both parties feel secure. In international relations, power sharing is often treated as the first step towards multiparty democracy, which still represents the standard prescription of the international community for reconciliation, security and just governance in post-conflict societies.¹²⁷² The detrimental effects of (externally imposed) democratization in the absence of strong national identities and consensus-based political culture however have thoroughly been demonstrated by the collapse of the transition to democracy in Burundi in 1993 and in Rwanda 1994. While Rwanda subsequently has rather chosen the path of building a strong national identity, Burundi emphasized the construction of a consensus-based political culture as the main strategy of peace building. Today, with both states dominated by strong ruling parties, they both stand at a crossroads. If the authoritarian forces within the ruling parties prevail, acknowledgement, memory, justice, apology and recognition will probably remain one-sided, as has been the case in Rwanda; or the tragic events will be buried in silence, as has been the case with the mass killings of 1972 in Burundi. A democratic opening of political space, including a new and open debate about the atrocities of the past might reconcile the former antagonists and make genuine acknowledgement, apology and recognition possible, but it also risks destabilizing the state and would entail the willingness of the state to assist or reimburse the newly recognized victims. This proves very difficult for poor countries and carries the risk of generating new conflicts between those eligible for assistance

¹²⁶⁹ Cf. Straus, 2006, 201-223; Reyntjens, 2000, 5; 22-26

¹²⁷⁰ Cf. Bashir & Kymlicka, 2008, 1-24; Bashir, 2008, 48-69; Verdeja, 2009.

¹²⁷¹ Lederach, 1997, 150.

¹²⁷² Cf. Human Security Centre, 2004, 1

and the ones who come away empty-handed, as illustrated by some Rwandan Hutu reactions to assistance programs for genocide survivors.

Up to now, we could speak of a “*protracted transition*”¹²⁷³ to democracy in both countries with both countries limiting political space after initially more open and consociational phases marked by overarching coalitions. The mix of electoral democracy with elements of neo-patrimonialism and authoritarian rule however reinforces societal fragmentation along particularistic interests. Such a political environment is conceivably ineligible for reconciliatory endeavors or for bringing all perpetrators to justice. Interestingly, the current situations in Rwanda as well as Burundi exhibit striking parallels to historic precedents in the other country.

6.1. The National Level: Historical Parallels

*“Rwandan history has shown that exclusion of one group or another over an extended period of time is a recipe for disaster”*¹²⁷⁴. The same is true for Burundi.

The two main national approaches towards dealing with the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy and implementing national unity and reconciliation, namely banning ethnic identities altogether and respectively creating a balance of power between the groups through consociational regulations, do have historical antecedents in both countries. In order to assess the potential for peace and reconciliation as well as the possible pitfalls of these models, it makes sense to revisit these predecessors and compare them with current politics. Interestingly, it does appear as if Rwanda and Burundi have switched places with regard to both the ethnic identity of power holders as well as the approaches towards national unity and reconciliation.

6.1.1. A “Rwandan Bagaza”?

Today, Rwanda suppresses ethnic identity under the leadership of a party that is de facto controlled by returnees, most of them Tutsi who grew up in Uganda. The approach towards reconciliation, outlawing public references to ethnic differences in public, strongly resembles the Burundian elite’s strategy to foster national unity by suppressing ethnicity during Michel Micombero’s and particularly Jean Baptiste Bagaza’s reign (1976-1987)¹²⁷⁵. As Déogratias, a Tutsi from “Kamenge” recalls: *“Before, it was Micombero, then came Bagaza but it was always military forces, military government, then came Buyoya. With Micombero and Bagaza they couldn’t talk about Hutu and Tutsi*

¹²⁷³ Barkan, 2006, 18

¹²⁷⁴ Prendergast, 1997, 177.

¹²⁷⁵ Henriette, 49, a Hutu resident from “Kamenge”, Ngozi actually indicated these parallels. She said that the government tried to shun ethnic identities under Bagaza but the war came anyway.

*problems, it was hidden*¹²⁷⁶.” Next to banning all mentions of ethnic groups, Bagaza apparently started some important reforms such as ending open discrimination¹²⁷⁷, but effectively kept the political favoritism towards Tutsi from the south in place, even aggravating the situation with regard to severely limiting access to education for Hutus. Even though Bagaza's regime did not commit any large-scale massacres, it carefully maintained the ethnic status quo that Micombero's purge against the Hutu elite had established in 1972.

Bagaza's parallels with Kagame start by downplaying ethnic problems in favor of national unity, but do not end there. The anti-clerical direction of his politics aimed at the centralization of power in the state and the UPRONA closely resembles the RPF's efforts to control civil society and international NGOs¹²⁷⁸. Bagaza's unpopular top-down villagization project demonstrates parallels to the RPF's *Imidugudu*-policy¹²⁷⁹ as well as Nyerere's *Ujamaa*-project in Tanzania¹²⁸⁰ with regard to their high modernist nature¹²⁸¹. Both Kagame's and Bagaza's reforms display a highly paternalistic character, aiming at the fundamental transformation of 'backward peasants' into model citizens. The NURC describes the envisioned process as *“molding a self respecting Rwandan, marked by distinct Rwandan values, and ready to accept positive changes for sustainable development*¹²⁸².” The same focus on technocratic reform and development coupled with the elite's blatant disregard for the traditions, conflicts, needs and views of the peasant masses is reflected in Bagaza's reforms of settlements, church-state relations and agriculture that paved the way for the Hutu uprisings of the late 1980s and early 1990s¹²⁸³. *“Bagaza had nothing against peasants, even if most of them were Hutu, as long as they remained peasants and got no ideas above their*¹²⁸⁴.” Finally, as Kagame in 2010, Bagaza won his 'reelection' in 1987 by more than 90 percent of the popular vote¹²⁸⁵ and heavily relied on omnipresent secret services to safeguard his rule. Nevertheless, with regard to genocidal violence, Bagaza, with his extensive security apparatus managed to keep public safety and order: *“The only period where it didn't*

¹²⁷⁶ Interview with Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, „Kamenge“, Ngozi.

¹²⁷⁷ Cf. Interview with Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, „Gakombe“. Michel, 65, Tutsi resident from „Rohero“, Ngozi says that Bagaza abolished Hutu's tribute payments.

¹²⁷⁸ Cf. Lemarchand, 1995, 112-117 and Pottier, 2002 or Reyntens, 2013, 57-80

¹²⁷⁹ Cf. Kay, 1987 and Newbury, 2011, 223-239.

¹²⁸⁰ Cf. Scott, 1998, 223-261 and Hyden, 1980.

¹²⁸¹ Cf. chapter 4.2.

¹²⁸² NURC, 2009, 12.

¹²⁸³ Cf. Newbury, 1990, 509-510; Lemarchand, 1995, 109-112.

¹²⁸⁴ Watt, 2008, 41.

¹²⁸⁵ Cf. Watt, 2008, 40.

happen was during Bagaza[’s] time. Then nothing happened¹²⁸⁶.” The price for keeping the calm was the development of an increasingly paranoid, corrupt and omnipresent police state that cracked down on dissent and sought total control of the population. The erosion of legitimacy progressed so far that it eventually led to Bagaza’s deposition by Major Buyoya’s coup in 1987¹²⁸⁷.

If Kagame's method for keeping the peace differ from Bagaza, then mostly because his attempts at population control and social engineering are even more extensive. The main difference between the regimes is that corruption has rather been reduced under the RPF's rule, which translates to a higher degree of trust in the state and an improved faith in socioeconomic mobility that cools the raised tempers of the disadvantaged to a certain point. For the moment, the RPF is in firm control of the country, but nobody knows what would happen if the regime faced an economic crisis and would become unable to sustain its extensive control of the population. Would the population remain ‘reconciled’ or would they once again follow politicians propagating ‘Hutu emancipation’? Furthermore, as in Bagaza's case, a regime that excessively relies on secret services and population control is vulnerable to the influence of these enforcement agencies and ultimately palace revolutions, which in turn have the potential of utter destabilization.

6.1.2. A “Burundian Habyarimana”?

Burundi is increasingly moving into the realm of Hutu majority rule. After the 2010 elections, the CNDD-FDD has stopped the dialogue with the opposition and subordinates state business as well as transitional justice under the goals of the party¹²⁸⁸. If Nkurunziza follows through with his idea of changing the constitution to run again and in the process eliminates the ethnic quota regulations stipulated in the APRA, there is a substantiated fear that the de facto single party will become more and more ethnically exclusive. Diminishing resources force the CNDD-FDD today to focus on its core constituency of rural Hutu due to its miserable economic performance and rampant corruption. Isolated Tutsi in particular feel marginalized already and fear of the CNDD-FDD’s youth wing, *the Imbonerakure* is widespread and well founded. Even more alarming are the rumors that the ruling party is arming and militarily training its youth wing. This information was recently leaked in a UN Cable and publicly criticized by Pierre Claver Mbonimpa, the head of APRODH, one of Burundi’s leading human rights groups. Mbonimpa has been arrested on May 15, 2014, a few days after his statement and

¹²⁸⁶ Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, „Rohero“, Ngozi.

¹²⁸⁷ Cf. Lemarchand, 1995, 114-117.

¹²⁸⁸ Cf. ICG, *Burundi: Bye-bye Arusha?*, 12 October 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/192-burundi-bye-bye-arusha.aspx> (27 August 2014).


accused of endangering Burundi's internal security¹²⁸⁹. The violent experiences with other youth militias such as the Sans Echech in Burundi's civil war or the notorious *Interahamwe* in Rwanda have been too recent and too horrifying to shrug such information off.

Originating from a rebel movement, the CNDD-FDD has gone the reverse direction of Habyarimana's MRND. The Burundian party has only started to pursue its single-party ambitions relentlessly after successfully expanding its political dominance through the elections of 2010. Even though the parties had to be ethnically inclusive to register, Nkurunziza clearly was elected into office in 2005 because he represented the hopes of the Hutu-population to finally gain access to political power. Not unlike Habyarimana in Rwanda, Nkurunziza is extremely popular among large parts of the Hutu peasantry, his core clientele. Congruent with the statements most Rwandan peasants made about life under Habyarimana before the genocide¹²⁹⁰, many Burundian Hutus are actually content with the current state of affairs and characterize interethnic relations as generally good. Hutu residents particularly believe that their political impact has been amplified whereas many Hutu returnees seem disappointed with the political realities in Burundi. Tutsi, particularly IDPs and people living in segregated areas, however feel increasingly excluded by the current regime. While trust towards the government stagnates in general, the poorest elements of society, the Tutsi IDPs and the former Hutu refugees, who feel the effects of the economic recession the most and feel the most disenfranchised.

Burundi: Trust in Government					
	1988	1990 (Rwa) /	1993-2 (Bdi)	2003 (Rwa) /	2011
Burundi Ave	-0.2	1.1	-4.3	2.2	1.7
Rwanda Average		-0.1	-4.8	1.5	4.0
Burundian H	-0.3	2.6	-3.6	2.9	2.4
Burundian T	2.6	0.2	-2.7	2.6	1.8


¹²⁸⁹ Cf. Bekele & Fardeau, *When Pierre Claver Mbonimpa is Jailed, All Burundians Are At Risk*, HRW, 3 June 2014, <http://www.hrw.org/de/node/126105> (27 August 2014).

¹²⁹⁰ Cf. Chapter 4.1.2.



Trust in government: Rwanda and Burundi compared

Perceived political impact in Burundi						
	1988	1993/1	1993/2	2005	2011	
Hutu: Average	-0.5		0.6	-2.8	0.6	1.3
Tutsi: Average	0.1		0.9	-2.1	0.9	0.4
Hutu refugees	1.3		-0.8	-2.5	0.5	-0.3
Tutsi IDPs	-0.2		0.3	-2.5	1.7	-0.3



Perceived political impact in Burundi

It has been frequently overlooked that when Habyarimana took power from Kayibanda in 1973, he announced a ‘moral revolution’ and shifted the political identity of the Rwandan Tutsi from a race to an ethnic group, officially acknowledging their right to Rwandan citizenship¹²⁹¹. As long as MRND-rule was not threatened, Habyarimana’s government even featured Tutsi ministers and despite being discriminated in public education, a disproportionately high number of Tutsi managed to attain high

¹²⁹¹ Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 132-159.

positions in parastatal companies. Not unlike Burundi in 2005, Habyarimana introduced an affirmative action quota system based on the population census: over 85 percent of the posts were reserved for Hutu, 10-15 percent for Tutsi and 1 percent for Twa¹²⁹². Forced by economic stagnation and dependency on donors, the MRND had to open up political competition in the early 1990s. In the face of internal and external challenges to power, the MRND radicalized more and more, attempting to rally the Hutu masses behind the “*Hutu Power*”-ideology and recapturing its waning grip on power. The result was genocide.

Just as the MRND with CDR and MDR, the CNDD-FDD has to share its core constituency with the FNL, another (former) Hutu party. In Rwanda, this fierce intra-ethnic competition for power and influence led to an increasing insecurity and lawlessness, culminating in the Gatabazi-Bucyana incident¹²⁹³ and the purge of moderate Hutu at the beginning of the genocide. This climate of political violence in the wake of the introduction of the multi-party system is actually comparable to Burundi today. Hutu Power, the extremist, party-spanning movement that blamed the Tutsi for everything only emerged as a major political player when the external threat posed by the RPF became too strong for the weakened MRND to handle and many Hutu became worried of losing the political dominance altogether. Fortunately Burundi currently does not face a predominantly Tutsi threat of any kind.

Economic stagnation and a high degree of donor dependency however are both given facts in Burundi today. Even though Nkurunziza entered the presidential palace by a democratic election and his victory in the 2010 election rather than a coup awarded the CNDD-FDD its political dominance, the behavior of the party has started to resemble Habyarimana’s MRND in many deeply disconcerting ways. Militant youth wings, harassment, intimidation and even murder of opposition members are the order of the day. Corruption is rampant in the justice system, the party’s radicalized youth wing receives military training and fights members of other parties, wealth accumulation mostly requires political connections and now, even the quota regulations that prevented political competition from adapting ethnic fault lines are in danger of being waived. This worries many Burundians. In Juvénal H.’s words: “*Si on ne fait pas la régulation des quotas, le Burundi va s’écraser*”¹²⁹⁴.

¹²⁹² Cf. Mamdani , 2001, 139.

¹²⁹³ Des Forges and HRW, 2002, 508-510.

¹²⁹⁴ Interview with Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident, Gakombe, Kirundo. Translation: “*If we’re not regulating the quotas, Burundi will crash.*”

6.1.3. Doomed to repeat the Past?

If we examine these historical parallels with the Bagaza- and Habyarimana-regimes, we have to ask if it might lie in the nature of the political economy in the Great Lakes (or in Africa) to impel these regimes to act in seemingly preordained manners.

Burundi: Patronage and Marginalization

As long as it keeps other Hutu-parties such as the FNL in check, the predominantly Hutu CNDD-FDD can rely on a comfortable ethnic majority. It will always be tempted to marginalize the Tutsi if it serves its political agenda in any way, e.g. as a scapegoat. In a democracy, the Hutu, constituting the vast majority of the population in both countries, “*will never lose an election to the Tutsi on the basis of one man, one vote*¹²⁹⁵.” The only two options open to Tutsi as a group in Burundi are either to ally themselves with another ‘Hutu’-party and thus becoming the tip of the scale in Burundian politics or to integrate themselves further into the ruling party while trying to shift the focus away from ethnicity permanently. Both these options however become increasingly difficult in a de facto one-party system if the quota regulations are abolished.

Considering the persistent lack of economic growth and the general disappointment of growing parts of society with the regime in Burundi, a scenario like in Zimbabwe becomes increasingly probable. In Zimbabwe, after years of economic decline, the ruling ZANU-party concentrated its patronage on its core constituency, the Shona, who represent the ethnic majority (82%). This concentration came at the price of marginalizing the Ndebele minority. Just like the CNDD-FDD in Burundi, the ZANU started as a rebel movement that came to power after a peace deal and had to deal with the disastrous economic costs of a political crisis. Facing ever-increasing obstacles challenging his rule, President Mugabe gave up on the painfully negotiated reconciliation politics that had ended the protracted war and instead focused on elite-centered redistribution of the state’s assets to keep his followers in line. In order to turn the focus away from its own corruption and enrichment, the ruling party subsequently radicalized itself. The old enemies became scapegoats for economic and political failure and the rhetoric quickly turned against the predominantly Ndebele ZAPU-party, culminating in ethnic cleansings against the Ndebele in Mataberland from 1982 to 1985¹²⁹⁶.

With reference to the fears of Tutsi in “*Rohero*” and “*Kamenge*”, the current armament and training of the *Imbonerakure*, the CNDD-FDD’s increasingly authoritarian record, and the neo-patrimonial tendencies of the government, this worst-case scenario does not seem too far-fetched. As a consequence of the consociational design, political divisions and ethnic categories in Burundi do not over-

¹²⁹⁵ Mwakikagile, 2013, 589.

¹²⁹⁶ Cf. Raftopoulos, 2004.

lap for now. Political violence is far more likely than ethnocide. However, even though most Hutus no longer consider their Tutsi neighbors as principal opponents in their fight for political self-determination and economic patronage, the Tutsis themselves have a different view. The poor and internally displaced Tutsi feel pushed at the margins of society. A new rebel movement rallying behind 'being Tutsi' or adopting an ideology of national renewal, such as the UNAR in the 1960s in Burundi or the RANU/RPF 1980s in Uganda, could easily exploit the grievances and frustrations of young Tutsis. If the examples of Ezechiel or Abel tell us anything, it is that young, disgruntled men do not need a lot of convincing to join an armed movement¹²⁹⁷. An insurrection that in some way could be interpreted as 'pro-Tutsi', however, would probably re-ethnicize politics and entail serious repercussions by the CNDD-FDD government, possibly resulting in ethnic cleansing or even genocide. By abandoning consociationalist norms, the government runs the risk of instigating a similar development as in Zimbabwe or pre-genocide Rwanda. Let us hope that Burundian politics actually have moved beyond issues of ethnicity as successfully as many participants claimed.

Rwanda: Disguising or Deconstructing Ethnic Identity?

If we return to the demographic imbalance between Hutu and Tutsi and turn to Rwanda, the RPF which was perceived as a predominantly Tutsi movement during the Rwandan civil war from 1990 to 1994, did not have many other choices other than to deconstruct and discredit ethnic identities¹²⁹⁸. Similar to Bagaza, Kagame understood instinctively that an openly Tutsi-government would be exposed to strong external criticism and domestic resistance from the beginning. The previous Rwandan Hutu-regimes had publicly interpreted the events of 1959 as the 'Hutu revolution', the emancipation from the oppressive Tutsi-monarchy. A regime consisting of mainly Tutsi would have immediately re-invoked memories of Tutsi domination. Thus, the Hutu Pasteur Bizimungu became the first president of the transitional government and the RPF made fostering national unity and constructing a national 'Rwandan' identity two of its main objectives. The reasoning is straightforward: statistically speaking, the RPF could only rule with democratic legitimation if it shed its image as a 'Tutsi'-party respectively if the connection between ethnic identity and political affiliation could be successfully eliminated.

The RPF has worked tirelessly to publicly decry the politicization of ethnicity. The regime has made successful use of commemoration as well as transitional justice to demonstrate the profoundly negative effects of sectarian politics and ethnic divisions. Its ultimate goal is a unified 'Rwandan' identity because it would overrule the need for reconciliation altogether. Maximilien, a Tutsi intellectual working for a CSOG in Kigali boils it down to its essence: *"La réconciliation? Ah... c'est quelque*

¹²⁹⁷ Cf. interviews with Abel, 23 and Ezechiel, 31, both ex-combatants FAB and FNL, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹²⁹⁸ Cf. chapter 4.1.3.

chose... Ah, je préfère dire 'l'unité'¹²⁹⁹." With ethnic identity out of the picture, Rwandan society would finally be ready to turn a new leaf. In theory, this does sound like the perfect solution.

The problem however is that in practice the RPF implemented its policy of unity and reconciliation with the ulterior motive of simultaneously securing and justifying its politico-economic dominance. While preaching unity and political maturity, the Rwandan government has never actually trusted its (Hutu-) population. Tacitly, the Tutsis' need for protection is *raison d'état*. Transitional justice, commemoration and the fight against genocide denial have demonstrated the negative impact of ethnicized politics and bad governance very clearly and scientifically correct for the most part. Even so, these policies have also been utilized systematically to globalize Hutu-guilt, to solicit support and demand compliance from the international community via shaming, and to disrepute opposition candidates, particularly Hutu. The RPF has steadily refined its ideology, its networks, population control, and information management techniques to perpetuate its internal dominance and the full control of its external image¹³⁰⁰. The result is an elusive state of affairs: with ethnic identities forced underground, their relevance among the population has become extremely difficult to measure. Even after months of in-depth field research, it is very delicate to evaluate to what extent the official ideology of national unity and reconciliation has truly permeated Rwandan society, respectively, if people just comply with the official policy because they fear the consequences of disobedience.

With reference to my interview data, I would describe the mindstate of most interviewees as a mixture between the two. Well-educated urban dwellers and returnees in particular seem to embrace the new, nationally unified identity. Peasants often condition their opinion of government politics with respect to the possible personal benefits that their support could yield them¹³⁰¹. Young educated Hutus, Hutu bystanders who lost family members in the various atrocities and in some cases genocide survivors who feel abandoned represent the most critical groups. Ex-convicts often demonstrate the strongest compliance with government politics but they also admit having been utterly traumatized by their prison stints and many are afraid of being re-arrested. Their statements far too often have the appearance of memorized slogans expressed primarily to dispel any kind of suspicion for harboring revisionist thoughts. Many others, particularly the apolitical, just go along with the new

¹²⁹⁹ Interview with Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali.

¹³⁰⁰ Cf. chapter 4.2.

¹³⁰¹ Cf. e.g. interviews with Vianney, 52 and Peter, 46 bystanders from "Gatsata", Gisagara or Augustin, 50, bystander, also from Gisagara, who said he came to *"get a cow as well as a part of that [Girinka] and for him, it shows him that people are being treated equally. And that's good for him and for reconciliation."* Straus (2006, 87ff) and Fujii (2009, 128-180) both emphasize the importance of local dynamics conditioning the responses to the 'order of genocide'. Despite the pressure from authorities and peers, peasants would meticulously ponder the dangers and benefits of joining the killing. Under the current circumstances, buying into the current ideology of unity and reconciliation yields much more possible benefits than continuing to think in the old categories. Political opportunism however does not manifest a strong foundation for reconciliation.

national identity and follow the directions of the authorities as they did before, placing a strong but rather nondescript emphasis on the importance of good leadership: *"There will not be any new violence because of our president Kagame. As God even created us as human beings not with ethnicity groups, there will not be a new violence with our president Kagame¹³⁰²."*

Nevertheless, there are promising signs that even participants who view the government skeptically demonstrate a fundamental disposition to accept the new Rwandan identity and an eagerness to reconcile. Statements such as Jeanne d'Arc's, who believes that ethnic identities will vanish, are increasingly common: *"For me I need always to be called umunyarwanda - Rwandan, because I go in many places and you can't discover if I am either Hutu or Tutsi. So I wish I couldn't either be called Tutsi or Hutu. It has no importance¹³⁰³."* Such statements restore hope for a shared future, but sadly, these positive assessments are always interspersed with frequent mentions of government repression and stories of discrimination when it comes to political rights¹³⁰⁴ or access to posts and services¹³⁰⁵. Furthermore, many peasants who characterize the current interethnic relations as problem-free said the same when asked about the pre-genocide period. Hence, despite the favorable dispositions of large parts of the population, the question of whether Hutus and Tutsis could coexist on truly equal terms and on a basis of mutual respect in Rwanda largely depends on the government's capacity for inclusion into the infrastructure of power and the opening of the political discourse. While there are certain steps the government has undertaken to ensure the representation of Hutus (implicitly), the confines of the political discourse about the past remain very narrow in Rwanda.

Partition?

Looking at the recurring episodes of mass violence, the politico-economic scenarios in Rwanda and Burundi share the appearance of a vicious circle doomed to repeat itself. If Hutus are in power, they can opt for democracy where majority rule puts them into the driver's seat permanently. If Tutsis rule the country, they try to protect themselves by tightly controlling the access to power and attempting to obfuscate, discredit or change identity politics. The poisoned historical legacy, the demographic realities and the entanglement between politics and the accumulation of wealth exacerbated by the poverty of both countries perpetually pits both groups against each other.

¹³⁰² Interview with Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹³⁰³ Interview with Jeanne d'Arc, 34, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹³⁰⁴ Ex-convicts are not allowed to vote in Rwanda, even if they have served their sentence.

¹³⁰⁵ Both Hutus who identified themselves as survivors, Annunciata and Boniphilde, reported difficulties with regard to accessing funds reserved for genocide survivors. Jean-Pierre, Ben and Gaspard, all young educated Hutu, made remarks about some jobs not being open to Hutu or only in purely representative functions. Most ex-convicts and some bystanders (Thasienne, Gaspard) complained about the financial burden of reparations. Furthermore, no Hutu who has been innocently jailed and acquitted is eligible for reparations.

According to the Pan-Africanist Godfrey Mwakikagile, for Rwandan or Burundian Tutsi, *“to accept democracy or majority rule is suicidal”*¹³⁰⁶. He compares Tutsis to the Whites in South Africa and believes that there can only be democracy if they accept majority rule, which, taking into account the experiences of the past, would probably result in their marginalization if not worse. Mwakikagile dismisses coalition governments because of the vast numerical Hutu majority and believes that the bloody and longstanding conflict over power and land has exacerbated mutual hatred in a way that has rendered coexistence all but impossible. *“The fundamental question is whether or not they want to live together”*¹³⁰⁷, he argues and takes up Daniel Arap Moi’s idea of a partition of Rwanda and Burundi into independent ethnostates. He seriously doubts that any plan of maintaining the territorial integrity of both states would be possible without further violence because it would only mean to *“[...] forcing tribes which are enemies to live together and to work together regardless of how much they hate each other and kill each other, making cooperation of any kind almost impossible”*¹³⁰⁸. Mwakikagile contends that a separation of the states along ethnic lines might prevent further bloodshed and save hundred thousands. In his opinion, the only way to guarantee the safety of the Tutsis would be within their own state. Furthermore, according to Mwakikagile, a partition would have the additional advantage of not requiring international peacekeepers¹³⁰⁹.

There are obvious problems with such a plan of separation: it would include uprooting millions of people and ethnic cleansing, it would probably even further destabilize the region and it would almost certainly exacerbate and expand the conflict over land on a local, regional, and national level. I strongly doubt that it could be managed, let alone without international involvement and funding. Who would voluntarily give up his homeland? The Hutus in Rwanda? The Tutsis in Burundi? Both groups live in predominantly mixed settlements. Which criteria would determine who has to leave? When Israel was established with the support of the international community after the Holocaust, decades of violent conflict between Israelis and Palestinians followed, including frequent involvement by their neighboring states. Why should this partition work any better? Furthermore, pluralistic societies such as Switzerland that chose permanent consociational coalitions as their ruling bodies have survived in the longterm without their tiny minorities even feeling marginalized. If a reliable system of minority protection is in place, the primary fault lines of political problems may change according to question.

I however mainly disagree with Mwakikagile with regard to the reasons for the conflict. One point that has become perfectly clear during the interview process and furthermore gets support from the

¹³⁰⁶ Mwakikagile, 2013, 590.

¹³⁰⁷ Mwakikagile, 2013, 586.

¹³⁰⁸ Mwakikagile, 2013, 586.

¹³⁰⁹ Cf. Mwakikagile, 2013, 585-596.

field research of other scholars¹³¹⁰ is that 'mutual hatred' is not the main reason for the bloodshed in the Great Lakes region. In periods of peace, both groups coexist without too many violent incidents, mixed settlements and intermarriages are common in most regions¹³¹¹. We should rather focus on the modus operandi of the state, the economic significance of political power, the exploitation of ethnic identity for political (and thus economic) gains and the circumstances of impunity and insecurity that drive violence. This becomes evident by analyzing local coexistence and the progression of society-state relations. Ethnic violence has always boiled up in the context of a crisis in which national leaders exploited ethnic identity for political gains. The killing takes the character of a sudden outbreak that suddenly returns to normal. Changing these dynamics leaves us with two main leverage factors: changing the identities and thus the fault lines or changing state-society relations and thus political culture. Rwanda as well as Burundi have attempted both, albeit in very different manners.

6.1.4. Changing the Hutu-Tutsi Dichotomy: Diverging National Strategies

Lessons learned?

With regard to all these worrisome developments, one might be tempted to paint a very dark picture of the future for both countries. There is hope however. Despite some striking parallels between the current regimes and their historical predecessors, both countries have made serious efforts with regard to alleviating the Hutu-Tutsi polarization. Despite their partly fundamental differences, both national strategies show some results.

In Burundi, the status differences between Hutu and Tutsi initially were not as extreme as in Rwanda and were mitigated to a certain extent by the *Ganwa*-monarchy. The Tutsi-elites first reacted by violently thwarting the emergence of a Hutu counter-elite. Under constant pressure for modernization and political participation and after the carnage of 1972 created an atmosphere of constant danger, Bagaza and Buyoya however started to realize the necessity of compromise¹³¹². Even though the civil war triggered violence on a genocidal scale, strong voices for peace such as e.g. Adrien Sindayigaya from Studio Ijambo were active throughout the whole conflict and the country became a laboratory for conflict resolution activities for over twelve years. The APRA in 2000 laid the foundation for a consociationally shared collective future and by no later than the signing of the GCA by the CNDD-FDD in 2003; the war changed its nature from a conflict fought predominantly along ethnic fault lines to an armed political struggle between parties. Already in 1993, Hutu members of the ruling party

¹³¹⁰ Cf. Hatzfeld, 2003; Straus, 2006; Fujii, 2009.

¹³¹¹ Although the civil war has segregated the ethnic groups in Burundi, "Gakombe" and "Kamenge" have become increasingly mixed again in recent years.

¹³¹² Cf. chapter 1.1.3.

UPRONA had to flee as well because they were persecuted along their Tutsi friends, as the life stories of Ferdinand and Généroise in “*Rohero*” bear witness¹³¹³. Since Prince Louis Rwagasore, the great symbolic figure for Burundian unity, the readiness to share the power was higher in Burundi than in Rwanda, which Uvin also attributes to “*Burundi’s deep political culture, which has always had stronger elements of consociationalism and compromise than Rwanda’s*”¹³¹⁴. The views of the population reflect this process: many Burundians did not consider 2005 an ‘ethnic’ election anymore. Some Tutsi voted CNDD-FDD and some Hutu remained Upronists. The quota system provided for the ethnic amalgamation of the political parties even though many Burundians assured me in private that the CNDD-FDD and FNL at large have retained their ‘Pro-Hutu’-character whereas e.g. UPRONA or MSD are still implicitly considered ‘Tutsi-parties’.. For a majority of rural Burundians, this however is a secondary problem. Almost a decade of power sharing without permanently establishing peace, order and prosperity have convinced many Burundians that the political parties themselves, regardless of their ethnic affiliation, are at the origin of the country’s crisis. Burundians have become profoundly distrustful and cynical towards the state and politicians in general. Calls for a single-party state or a grand coalition are very common because in the citizens’ eyes, “*most problems come from the top, from the leaders because here, there are no problems. They live together. And the only people that can get problems are those, who are maybe representatives of a political party on the hill*”¹³¹⁵.

In Rwanda, the RPF took up the cause of ethnic inclusiveness right from its humble beginnings in Uganda¹³¹⁶. Even though it started mainly as a movement of Tutsi exiles, the RPF always took care to present its prominent Hutu members publicly. Prominent members include e.g. Pasteur Bizimungu, the first Rwandan president after the genocide or Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe, the former RPF chairperson and minister of the interior. Nevertheless, the rumors that most Hutu officials are in fact straw men to front for their Tutsi staff members proved to be very tenacious¹³¹⁷ and difficult to disband. It cannot be denied that Rwandans, particularly Hutu, who resided within the country as adults in 1994 have very slim chances of gaining access to political office without having accusations brought up against them¹³¹⁸. At least the education system has clearly become more meritocratic. Young Hutu such as Robert, Ben, Umubyeyi, Gaspard or Jean-Pierre are allowed to study alongside young Tutsi such as Nadine, Elias or Chris and in some cases are even given scholarships. Even though

¹³¹³ Interviews with Ferdinand, 56, Hutu refugee and Généroise, 43, Hutu resident, both from “*Rohero*”, Ngozi.

¹³¹⁴ Uvin, 2009, 172.

¹³¹⁵ Interview with Viola, 37, Hutu resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo.

¹³¹⁶ Cf. Chapter 4.1.1.

¹³¹⁷ Sim, “*Classified Cable from the American Embassy in Kigali to the Secretary of State*”, Kigali, 5. August 2008, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KIGALI525_a.html (12. March 2014); Reyntjens, 2013, 18-21. Cf. also interviews with Ben, 29, bystander, Kigali; John 56, ex-convict, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara; Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara; Gaspard, 26, bystander, “*Gatsata*”, Gisagara.

¹³¹⁸ Cf. Reyntjens, 2005, 22-28; Waugh, 2004, 152ff.

some young Hutu complain that the FARG makes it easier for survivors to study¹³¹⁹, discrimination is nowhere near the scale of 1980s and early 1990s, which seriously hampered Tutsi such as Maximilien¹³²⁰ to pursue a higher education. Furthermore, the young educated Hutu I spoke to, despite being critical of the current government, do not care for another 'Hutu revolution' or a return to ethnicity-oriented politics. Many would wish for an acknowledgement of their families' suffering by the government or a gesture of apology with regard to the Hutu-victims of the RPA's campaigns in Rwanda and the DRC but they still agree with the general orientation of politics towards national unity and reconciliation. Most of these participants identify as 'Rwandans' rather than 'Hutu' as explained above.

'Guided Transition' or 'Whitewashed Despotism'?

The consociational arrangements in Burundi and the RPF's emphasis on being an inclusive movement for Hutu and Tutsi do keep the government and administration of both countries ethnically inclusive up to a certain point. Despite the protestations of officials as well as many interviewees that the politicization of ethnicity and the Hutu-Tutsi-polarization are problems of the past and that both countries have moved on from their violent history, the new balance however remains fragile as long as large parts of the population remain excluded from political co-determination. Consociational power sharing between ethnic groups is still a relatively new idea. Its routine implementation and resilience in times of crisis still has to be tested. The controversy with regard to the 2015 elections in Burundi could very well prove to be the endurance test for the quota-stipulations of the APRA.

As mentioned above, banning ethnic identities has also been tried before and it failed, even if the RPF takes it a step further with regard to opening up the government and the army to their former ethnic antagonists than e.g. Bagaza or Buyoya did. The RPF compensates for this decision by subjecting the whole population to encompassing re-education according to the RPF's vision and extensive surveillance¹³²¹. The vaguely worded laws against 'divisionism' and 'genocide ideology' thereby fulfill the function of a failsafe against insubordinate politicians or journalists¹³²².

Both countries are trying to advertise their newfound national unity to the international donor community as a story of repentance and recovery, rising like a phoenix from the ashes as reformed multi-ethnic polities. Yet, ethnic inclusiveness does not give the impression of being the central political cornerstone of either state when it comes to realpolitik. Rather, ethnic inclusiveness too often serves as just that: an advertisement, a façade providing legitimacy and justification for one-party rule with

¹³¹⁹ Cf. Interviews with Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali and Gaspard, 26, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara.

¹³²⁰ Cf. Interview with Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali.

¹³²¹ Cf. Chapter 4.2.

¹³²² Cf. Waldorf, 2011, 48-66; Article 19, 2009.

some token posts and functions given to members of other ethnic groups or parties¹³²³. In this respect, ethnic inclusion fulfills the same function as elections: to satisfy external donors and to neutralize accusations of exclusive Hutu- respectively Tutsi-rule¹³²⁴. In times of relative peace and prosperity, this might be enough to quell criticism and keep extremism in check, but during critical episodes in the recent history of the Great Lakes, with political alliances becoming brittle and unstable, leaders always reverted to the primordial ethnic allegiances they knew their constituencies would understand instinctively.

Interestingly, there were genuine efforts to build truly ethnically inclusive governments in both countries immediately after the hot phase of the respective conflicts ended. In Rwanda, the transitional government of national unity assembled a Hutu president and prime minister (Pasteur Bizimungu and Faustin Twagiramungu, later Pierre-Célestin Rwigema) a Hutu minister of the interior (Seth Sendashonga), a Tutsi defense minister (Paul Kagame) and a genocide survivor as speaker of parliament from 1997 onward (Joseph Sebarenzi). Twagiramungu had fled to Belgium in 1994 already, Sendashonga was assassinated in 1998, both Rwigema and Sebarenzi fled into exile in 2000, and when Bizimungu was forced to step down in March 2000, it *“was the confirmation that the multi-ethnic façade of reconstruction in Rwanda was now at an end”*¹³²⁵. In 2000, twelve ministers were Tutsi and nine were Hutu compared to twelve Hutu and nine Tutsi in 1994¹³²⁶. In the same timespan, the RPF increased its ministerial portfolios from 8 of 21 in 1994 to providing eleven of twelve ministers in 2000. In 2003, Paul Kagame who had led the RPF since 1990 got elected as Rwandan president with 95.1% of the votes, to be reconfirmed in 2010. The RPF-controlled National Electoral Commission ensures that candidates who do not support government policies (and thus the RPF’s ideology) are not admitted to the electoral process¹³²⁷ and elected local officials are often removed from office by the RPF¹³²⁸. With many high-ranking RPF-cadres deserting in the past twenty years and a new generation of politicians moving up in the party's ranks, loyalty to the RPF’s ideology in some cases has replaced ethnic identity as a criterium. As of 2008, the cabinet was evenly split between Tutsi and Hutu with the key ministries remaining in the hands of Tutsi¹³²⁹. Nevertheless, the RPF keeps a tight grip on

¹³²³ In his autobiographical account *„God sleeps in Rwanda“* Joseph Sebarenzi describes in great detail how members of parliament, particularly former president Bizimungu, occupy important offices but at the same time are kept from exercising any real political power. He also describes how Kagame keeps the parliament and his party in check through an elaborate network of informants, confidants and yes-men, deliberately spread rumors, and skillfully hidden threats. Cf. Sebarenzi, 2009, 137-182.

¹³²⁴ Cf. Reyntjens, 2013, 18-21c and 26-56.

¹³²⁵ Waugh, 2004, 152.

¹³²⁶ Cf. Reyntjens, 2005b, 123.

¹³²⁷ Cf. Reyntjens, 2013, 36.

¹³²⁸ Cf. Longman, 2011, 38ff.

¹³²⁹ Cf. Cf. Sim, *Classified cable from the American Embassy in Kigali to the Secretary of State*, August 5, 2008, on: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KIGALI525_a.html (March 12,2014).

power: In the Rwandan parliament of 2014, the two officially allowed opposition parties PSD and PL only occupy 11 of 80 seats, reducing them to the role of extras.

In Burundi, as mentioned above, the CNDD-FDD went through a similar transformation from a rebel movement to single party. From the APRA in 2000 to the signing of the GCA with the FNL in 2008, the peace process was very fragile. Nineteen parties were listed in the APRA¹³³⁰ and even micro-parties that failed to cross the threshold of two percent in the elections of 2005¹³³¹ were fighting for the spoils of the state. Peace and fair elections could only be achieved through strong South African pressure and support¹³³² and because the population was war-weary. Even the elites eventually realized that neither side would be able to decisively defeat the other. However, with amnesties for crimes against humanity prohibited by the international community while simultaneously needing an incentive for rebels to join peace negotiations, the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms were always considered a secondary priority after establishing a ceasefire¹³³³. Furthermore, almost every side of the conflict had committed atrocious crimes, thus the authorities postponed transitional justice indefinitely. Even though Nkurunziza clearly won the parliamentary elections in 2005, which were widely considered fair, he feared competition over his core constituency by the FNL. Hence, he re-established his movement as an ethnically inclusive ruling party with the objectives of attracting Tutsi voters as well¹³³⁴, with the main objectives of bringing peace and stability, and ameliorating the living conditions of peasants. His programs promoting free primary education, free maternal care and childbirth and his devout behavior as a born-again Christian made him very popular among the Hutu peasantry. The years from 2005 to 2010 remained relatively calm apart from the FNL's shelling of Bujumbura in 2008. However, when the FNL and other opposition parties failed to drum up enough support to seriously challenge the ruling party, they boycotted the elections. The subsequent landslide victory gave the CNDD-FDD almost absolute power. Facing stiff opposition, a number of corruption scandals, a stagnating economy, and waning popularity, the party defends its grip on power increasingly aggressive. Since before the elections of 2010, violence, threats and harassment against opposition members have increased again and so has corruption. After the elections, the relations between the ruling party and the opposition, particularly FNL and MSD, grinded to a standstill with both sides accusing each other of grave human rights violations, corruption, and endangering peace. Under these circumstances, violence with impunity has become a daily occur-

¹³³⁰ Cf. APRA, 2000, 1.

¹³³¹ Cf. Reyntjens, 2005b, 123.

¹³³² Cf. Southall, 2006, 201-220.

¹³³³ Cf. Vandeginste, 2011 & 2012.

¹³³⁴ The CNDD-FDD which had split from FRODEBU in 1994 was always considered the less extremist Hutu rebel movement when compared to the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, the '*parti pour la liberation du peuple Hutu*'.

rence yet again and the police often seem to be involved¹³³⁵. Even though Nkurunziza does not acknowledge the political character of these killings and blames them on 'bandits', the targets and the sites of the crime often imply political motives. *"While the political motives behind some of these attacks remain obscure, they illustrate, at the very least, the state's inability to stem the rising insecurity, enforce law and order, and ensure protection for the population"*¹³³⁶.

Persisting violence and insecurity remains the main impediment to transitional justice and to a normalization of politics that would allow a depoliticization of reconciliation. The majority of my interviewees agrees with Dominique's view of the resurgence of violence in Burundi: *"il croit qu'il aura une autre crise, mais ce ne sera pas une crise ethnique, mais une crise des partis politiques"*¹³³⁷. For most Burundians, political violence is a persisting occurrence. They share the apprehension that extrajudicial killings and attacks might escalate once again if impunity remains unaddressed and the political parties refuse to cooperate. Hence, reconciliation in Burundi is not only a question of memory, acknowledgement, recognition, apology and justice. It is also one of personal security.

As the ethnic fault lines of conflict have been swiftly overlaid by new political fault lines, the issue of ethnic reconciliation has moved to the back of the political agenda in Burundi. Nowadays, reconciliation politics would have to take into account the victims of political violence and the conflict between FNL and CNDD-FDD as well. Thus, the consociational design of the power sharing agreement has been successful with regard to the aspect that it allowed new alliances to *"cut across those earlier fault lines"*¹³³⁸ as Verdeja says. The implicit mutual acknowledgement and recognition of suffering seems to gain acceptance, particularly in mixed communities. Nevertheless, with core issues of reconciliation such as transitional justice either remaining unaddressed or running the risk of becoming one-sided, and the explicit acknowledgement and recognition of guilt representing a risk for the political prestige of any party, reconciliation work is still at its very beginning in Burundi. The harmonization and mutual recognition of all the different narratives about the various crises alone might be a project too painful and stirring for such a fragile state to master, as the cautious approach towards establishing a national TRC suggests. In the current political climate, a public national debate would probably escalate into mutual accusations, finger pointing and victim shaming. Uvin explains: *"Most people on both sides see themselves as victims and the other as aggressor; each sees its own acts as necessary for survival while the other group's acts are patently unjust"*¹³³⁹. Even though e.g. Ezechiel

¹³³⁵ Cf. Ligue Iteka, 2011, 35-39; HRW, 2010 & 2012.

¹³³⁶ HRW, 2012, 46.

¹³³⁷ Interview with Dominique, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. Translation (verbatim translator): *"He thinks that there will be another crisis but it won't be ethnic, it will be a crisis of the political parties."*

¹³³⁸ Verdeja, 2009, 3.

¹³³⁹ Uvin, 2009, 169.

who had fought in the war said that he would accept punishment for his deeds¹³⁴⁰, he hinged it on the condition of punishing the leaders as well. At least the readiness of having the political and military representatives of one's own group during the civil war stand trial however was higher than expected. Taking into consideration the general distrust in politicians and intellectuals in Burundi, this however is hardly surprising.

Still, with the discussion about crime and punishment necessarily debated by politicians who may seek political advantage through accusing the other side, in Burundi's case, it might actually be better to lay the past to rest and concentrate on the future, as a majority of my participants recommended. On the other hand, Burundi has tried glossing over an episode of mass violence before, and the bottled-up hatred and frustration from 1972 violently erupted in 1988 and 1993. Even with ethnic enmities moved to the background in current conflicts over political power, the old fears and grievances might resurface in new rebellions as soon as the framework conditions change. Adding an ethnic dimension to the current political conflict in Burundi might be the most dangerous escalation.


¹³⁴⁰ Cf. interview with Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatant FAB & FNL, "Rohero", Ngozi.

6.2. Local Perception of Reconciliation Politics

6.2.1. Coexistence and Forgiveness

In general, Rwandans as well as Burundians evaluated their overall relations with people of differing ethnic backgrounds as positive. Many interviewees expressed views stating that the population as such was already reconciled, that they had forgiven the people who wronged them, and that ongoing problems were only the consequences of the elite’s struggle for power (in Burundi) or of people harboring old reactionary ethnic ideologies respectively governmental repression (in Rwanda). The positive ratings curve in Burundi however flattens in recent years and particularly Burundian Tutsis are significantly less satisfied with the current interethnic relations than their Rwandan counterparts are.

Overall Relations with people of differing ethnicity: Rwanda and Burundi					
	1988	1990 (Rwa) / 1993-2 (Bdi)	2003 (Rwa) / 2005 (Bdi)	2011	
Burundian Hutu	1.6	2.6	-3.4	3.1	3.9
Burundian Tutsi	2.2	0.1	-3.4	2.4	2.5
Burundi Average	1.9	1.6	-3.4	2.9	3.5
Rwa: bystanders & ex-convicts		1.8	-4.4	0.5	4.1
Rwa: returnees & survivors		1.1	-4	1.9	4
Rwanda Average		1.7	-4.3	1.3	4




Overall relations with people of differing ethnicity: Comparison Rwanda and Burundi

The Dangers of Segregation

The scaled questions monitor that the differences between communes in Burundi are more pronounced than the differences between ethnic groups. The differences between the communes and the national average are almost negligible in Rwanda. The one point that could be argued is that the elite in Kigali perceived a faster improvement of interethnic relations after the genocide than the rural dwellers.

Overall relations with people of differing ethnicity						
	1988	1990 (Rwa) /1993-1 (Bdi)	1993-2 (Bdi) / 1994 (Rwa)	2003 (Rwa) / 2005 (Bdi)	2011	
Gatsata, Gisagara		2.1	-4.7	0.8	3.8	
Gatumba Huye		1.3	-4.6	1.2	4.2	
Kigali		1.8	-3.1	3.1	4.2	
Rwanda Average		1.7	-4.3	1.3	4	
Gakombe, Kirundo		2.4	2.6	-3.8	3.2	4.4
Rohero, Ngozi		2.5	0.1	-4.3	2.1	2.3
Kamenge, Ngozi		1.6	1.3	-3	3.4	3.6
Burundi Average		2.1	1.6	-3.4	2.9	3.4



Overall interethnic Relations: Comparison Research Sites

In Burundi however, the picture differs. "Rohero" represents the remnants of ethnic segregation during the civil war and, as described in chapter 5.2.4., its inhabitants still adhere strongly to the conflict-era identities and fault lines due to the loss of their lands. With regard to ethnic animosities, the Tutsi IDPs settling in the centers are also the main source of anxiety among the Hutu from the surrounding hills, who wish for the Tutsi to return to the hills: "Burundians just come together. The Tutsi go back to their lands and they live in peace¹³⁴¹." For this to happen however, impartial security and justice with regard to territorial disputes have to be guaranteed. Otherwise, the Tutsi will opt for the comparatively safer option of settling close to each other and necessarily leaving their fields to the Hutus like Etienne, Michel, Maniriho or Irankunda factually have¹³⁴², leaving them poor and frustrated. Uvin¹³⁴³ recommends that aid agencies specifically target vulnerable communities such as "Rohero". As the example of Rwanda demonstrates, providing economic opportunities tends to tone down

¹³⁴¹ Interview with Venantie K., 25, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹³⁴² Cf. Interviews with Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Irankunda, 30, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Maniriho, 32, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹³⁴³ Cf. Uvin, 2009, 183f.

radicalized views as do regular contacts with people from the other group as in the other communities "Kamenge" and "Gakombe".

"Gatumba" in Rwanda actually is a good example about how to mitigate segregation. Here, the government and as well as a private collective called *Abasoro* have provided houses for genocide survivors in the center. The houses are grouped together, so the survivors feel relatively safe in the immediate vicinity of other survivors and returnees. Most of the survivors I interviewed in "Gatumba", however, are members of AMI and stay in regular contact with ex-convicts. They collaborate in community work and help each other tending their fields or building their houses, sometimes with financial assistance from the government. Even though the government takes influence in such associations through seminars and speeches, all the group members of AMI report an amelioration of relations with members of the other group. The regular contact has re-humanized the 'other' and with understanding the emotions and feelings of their neighbors, the disposition towards trust and coexistence slowly improved and the fear of survivors was mostly reduced to specific persons¹³⁴⁴.

Detaching the Perpetrator from the Deed

In general, participants do not consider coexistence with people from differing ethnic groups as a major problem today. This points to the fact that ethnicity, at least among the rural majority of the population, only assumed a stratifying quality in times of crisis whereas ethnic identity does not seem to have been particularly important during times of economic prosperity and political normalcy. It however also cautions us to take the current normalization of interethnic relations for granted and durable as long as there is no fundamental political crisis.

In Rwanda as in Burundi, many survivors claim to have forgiven their malefactors because they understand the necessity to live together. They place the bulk of the responsibility on the elite for inciting the population. Often, the harmonious relations before the conflict are invoked as a counter-image to express hope and confidence in the future. *"If they confess, she could forgive them, because even before genocide happened in Rwanda, Tutsi used to marry Hutu and other Hutu used to marry Tutsi, they used to live in a good harmony in a good relation"*¹³⁴⁵. Inter-marriage is a powerful image that comes up very frequently when people are asked to explain reconciliation: *"reconciliation is when they get together once again and, he can give his daughter to marry to the other ethnic group and vice versa"*¹³⁴⁶. The other very powerful image that frequently appears as a figure of speech is the act of 'sharing beer' (*Akayoga* - traditional Banana Beer) which is seen as synonymous for reconcil-

¹³⁴⁴ Cf. e.g. interviews with Luce, 42, survivor; Maurice, 58, ex-convict; Annunciata, 58, survivor; Jeanne d'Arc, 34, survivor; Yohan N., 68, ex-convict; Costasie, 65, survivor; Boniphilde, 40, survivor; François, 52, bystander, all from "Gatumba", Huye.

¹³⁴⁵ Interview with Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹³⁴⁶ Interview with Frédéric, 59, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

iation in both countries: *"la réconciliation pour elle, c'est le partage de la bière, ici et là, entre la population*¹³⁴⁷. " The symbolism even works in the opposite direction: Etienne, an IDP from "Kamenge" told me that he discovered that the relations between Hutu and Tutsi were deteriorating when he prepared a big vat of traditional beer and his Hutu neighbors refused to come and drink with him as was custom¹³⁴⁸.

These definitions of reconciliation do reveal some interesting facts about the rural perception of the conflicts. In general, genocide and civil war are understood as disasters that had their origins elsewhere, as a sudden leviathan that swallowed whole communities, victims as well as perpetrators. Most rural dwellers perceive peasants in general as the victims of the ruling classes. Even though some Burundians speak of 1972 and say that in *"'93 they take revenge and kill the Tutsi people*¹³⁴⁹", they still place vengeance in the context of the political struggle for power and Ndadaye's assassination. Mutual hatred between Hutu and Tutsi was rarely mentioned reasons for the killings. Rather, the killings are understood as the result of elite manipulation, thus reconciliation is also considered a task for intellectuals and politicians, even though particularly Burundians do not fully trust them.

6.2.2. Politics and Economy: interlocking Dynamics

When I asked Rwandan participants about governmental programs they considered beneficial to reconciliation, peasants mostly mentioned programs that do not explicitly aim at reconciliation as such but rather assist the disadvantaged. Civic education schemes like *Ingando* or *Itorero* and projects aimed at establishing justice such as TIG and *Gacaca* were only mentioned in the context of reconciliation when participants were explicitly asked about the significance of these programs for reconciliation¹³⁵⁰. Commemoration was never spontaneously referred to as a reconciliation program in Rwanda, which actually puts answers with regard to its reconciliatory benefits into perspective. While most participants did not differentiate between governmental projects and NGOs, programs that provide assistance in some manner, preferably financial, were generally seen in a positive light.

Poverty and Conflict

In poor countries such as Rwanda and Burundi, the focus on assistance that alleviates the consequences of the civil war and the genocide is understandable. Poverty is still considered one of the

¹³⁴⁷ Interview with Généroise, 43, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹³⁴⁸ Interview with Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹³⁴⁹ Interview with Henriette, 49, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹³⁵⁰ Only Thédosine, 24, a returnee from Kigali started to talk about *Gacaca* when asked about reconciliation politics.

main problems and for many participants¹³⁵¹ remains a principal reason for the violent character of conflict. In Rwanda as well as Burundi, reparations are often the main demand with regard to transitional justice. Examples of rich people being targeted first during episodes of mass violence are abundant and can be found in almost all conflicts. Costasie recounts that in the Rwandan 'Hutu revolution' of 1959, mostly the rich Tutsi were targeted because the Hutu wanted their property¹³⁵². Marie C. repeats the same thing about the victims of 1972 in Burundi¹³⁵³ who were actually targeted because they aspired to join the elite. In Rwanda, I heard stories about Hutu who were harassed by the *Interahamwe* because they were rich and influential¹³⁵⁴ or successful Tutsi that were marked as targets and beaten before the genocide even started because others were lusting for their position, as was the case with Chris' father¹³⁵⁵. With reference to the relationship between poverty and insecurity, Déogratias explains that "*Burundians are poor, so when you come and propose them to go to fight for the good of the country, they will come because they have nothing to do. So for him, when he is looking at that, with this disorder, nothing is done, and truth and reconciliation can't work*¹³⁵⁶." Abel and Ezechiel, the Tutsis who joined the FNL after they had been involuntarily demobilized as former child soldiers in the FAB both cited economic reasons for joining a movement where being Tutsi actually endangered them personally¹³⁵⁷. Under these conditions, becoming a rebel was a career choice for disenfranchised youths like them. Poverty changed the significance of war from a tragedy for society to a viable economic opportunity for Abel and Ezachiel as individuals. Hence, the economic and political realms cannot be separated in the Great Lakes. "*When people are poor they think that it is in politics that they will find richness and they will go look for it as they could maybe in doing bad things and going in rebel groups.*¹³⁵⁸."

Assistance, Reparations and Jealousy

Thus, governmental assistance and poverty alleviation are extremely important with regard to reconciliation. It is no coincidence that Burundian participants counted free healthcare for infants and pregnant women and free primary school¹³⁵⁹ among governmental efforts benefitting reconciliation

¹³⁵¹ Cf. Interviews with Alexandre, 35, ex-combatant, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi

¹³⁵² Cf. interview with Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹³⁵³ Cf. Interview with Marie C., 55, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

¹³⁵⁴ Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali says the *Interahamwe* were looking for his father, threatened the family and asked for money

¹³⁵⁵ Cf. Interview with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali.

¹³⁵⁶ Interview with Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹³⁵⁷ Cf. interviews with Abel, 23 and Ezechiel, 31, both ex-combatants from "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹³⁵⁸ Interview with Maniriho, 32, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹³⁵⁹ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Odette, 25, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi-resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

or that Rwandan interviewees emphasized on the public housing program 'Anti-Nyakazi'¹³⁶⁰, *Girinka*¹³⁶¹ or the free *mutuelle de santé* for survivors¹³⁶². Especially genocide survivors reported on having received assistance, either through the FARG¹³⁶³ or through various other state programs such as *Girinka*¹³⁶⁴ or NGOs like *Abasoro*¹³⁶⁵. For many genocide survivors such as Nadine, Kayitare or Elias, this assistance proved vital to survive and to pursue a career.

Governmental assistance however also arouses jealousy. For one, even survivors need to be well-connected and have the proper documentation to be eligible for assistance through the FARG. While all survivors I interviewed in Kigali had received funding, Costasie, Teresa and Boniphilde were denied assistance¹³⁶⁶. The possession of cows is a symbol of status in Rwandan culture, thus particularly the *Girinka*-program that aims to supply each Rwandan family with a cow combined high hopes with bitter disappointment and accusations of corruption. Whereas people who still hope for a cow, rent or some form of assistance seem remarkably well-disposed towards the government¹³⁶⁷, others are becoming increasingly disillusioned over broken promises and what they consider unfair state allocation policies. Marie-Françoise recounted that her house was knocked down due to the Anti-Nyakazi policy, but the government failed to build a new one¹³⁶⁸. John, Françoise, Mukaga Kwaya and Boniphilde felt cheated by the *Girinka*-program¹³⁶⁹. Paul and Yohan N. complained that they could not pay the health insurance but the government was forcing them¹³⁷⁰, and almost all ex-convicts as well as

¹³⁶⁰ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Annunciata, 58, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Anasthase, 71, returnee, "Gatumba", Huye; Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Vianney, 52, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara;

¹³⁶¹ Cf. Ibid.

¹³⁶² The *mutuelle* is paid by the state for genocide survivors, thus mainly survivors mentioned it positively. Cf. Interviews with Annunciata, 58, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Christine, 49, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹³⁶³ Cf. Nadine, 25, survivor, Kigali; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Annunciata, 58, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali; Christine, 49, survivor, "2Gatumba", Huye; Marie-Françoise, 52, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹³⁶⁴ Cf. Interview with Marcel, 40, survivor; Augustin, 50, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. With Augustin, the interview does not make it perfectly clear if he received a cow through *Girinka* or through another program.

¹³⁶⁵ Cf. Interview with Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹³⁶⁶ Cf. Interviews with Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Teresa, 72, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹³⁶⁷ Cf. Interviews with Vianney, 52, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara and Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹³⁶⁸ Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye. The 'Anti-Nyakazi'-program is a great example for the Rwandan government's obsession with its external image as a fast-developing economy. *Nyakazi*, houses with traditional straw-roofs are systematically demolished and should be replaced with stable, government-funded houses with roofs made from corrugated metal. However, as Marie-Françoise's example demonstrates, demolishing the unattractive, backwards *Nyakazi* often takes priority over building new houses for their owners.

¹³⁶⁹ Cf. Interviews with John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹³⁷⁰ Cf. interviews with Paul, 44, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Yohan N., 68, "Gatumba", Huye. Yohan N. even reported that the government takes away his livestock, when he fails to pay for the *mutuelle de santé*.

many bystanders felt suffocated by the burden of reparations¹³⁷¹. Many Hutus think that the state should assist the perpetrators with regard to reparations or that the payments should stop altogether because they mostly strain people who are poor already¹³⁷². Even though most participants agreed that genocide survivors should be eligible for assistance, there are increasing calls for equal treatment of Hutus: *"I may give you a suggestion because if you see how the genocide survivors are helped from primary to secondary. Until they attend the university and for the other side, they don't attend classes. They [the genocide survivors] have many privileges. That is a barrier of keeping reconciliation or prevention because someone have advantages and another one can't even get"*¹³⁷³.

The perception of unequal treatment with regard to governmental assistance eats away at social cohesion. This is where Hutus really feel discriminated against because in many cases, governmental assistance is the key to higher education: *"it's not the orphans only who have the problem in this country. Yes, they were hurt, they were hurt in a bad way but they are not the only people who have problems in this country. Because, you know, there is some organization, which helps the children of survivors. Yeah. They help them to pay them the money of school fees and the others but that organization [was] made [by] the government. But if you see: They, they don't care about the other people, the other children of the other people who are poor"*¹³⁷⁴. Although the concept of aiding survivors is laudable, its exclusiveness combined with reparations and unacknowledged crimes against Hutu, risk destroying the image of meritocracy that the RPF is so eager to build.

Under conditions of abject poverty, the degree of contentment with the current regime in Rwanda is closely associated with the financial benefits and the opportunities for socio-economic advancement the regime is able to provide. If people feel unfairly disadvantaged, support can change to the opposite rapidly. The most disgruntled parties in Rwanda today are often survivors that are excluded from assistance as well as the families of perpetrators or killed Hutus who are not eligible for support and yet suffer under the burden of reparations and mandatory taxes such as the *mutuelle de santé*.

In Burundi, there were never any reparations. Apart from "Gakombe", where the state apparently paid the community to rebuild the destroyed houses of some of the victims after the Ntega-

¹³⁷¹ Cf. Interviews with François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Paul, 44, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Rugango, 81, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Thasienne, 38, "Gatumba", Huye;

¹³⁷² Cf. Interviews with Rugango, 81, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Thasienne, 38, "Gatumba", Huye; François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye. Interestingly, Maximilien (38, survivor, Kigali) claimed that nobody has to pay reparations.

¹³⁷³ Interview with Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹³⁷⁴ Interview with Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali.

Marangara-crisis in 1988¹³⁷⁵, the government has generally remained inactive when it came to support. *"He doesn't see anything been done here to address those who, most of them, they lost people, they have lost their cows, their houses were burnt, they have lost everything but they weren't.... There was no reparation, nothing was given to them, so there is nothing been done here."*¹³⁷⁶ Although the population considers assistance and reparations important¹³⁷⁷, assistance is mostly only provided by NGOs such as CARE or Agro-Action Allemande¹³⁷⁸. Burundians of all ethnicities are frustrated with the situation and usually blame it on power-hungry politicians. In Michel's opinion, *"it's even getting worse. People are being killed and it is as it had been before with only one political party"*¹³⁷⁹.

A paradoxical Situation

Thus, we have a paradoxical situation: in Rwanda, where the state attempts to address the dire situation of genocide survivors and to alleviate the effects of the genocide through assistance, jealousy directs itself against the beneficiaries because the non-beneficiaries feel treated unfairly. This constellation is predetermined to cause further ethnic divisions. In Burundi, however, where the state does almost nothing, the anger concentrates on politics in general, affecting interethnic reconciliation to a lesser extent.

The lesson here is clear and similar to commemoration and the debate on ethnic identity: if Rwanda wants to become the ethnically inclusive state it professes to be, it needs to open up the discourse about the genocide or finally put it to rest without constantly reminding the Hutus of their guilt as a group. Most of all, it needs to extend assistance to Hutu in a way that reduces the jealousy. Equal access to education¹³⁸⁰, old age-pensions and health insurance (as far as it does not impoverish people further as in Yohan N.'s case) are good starting points, but highly visible programs such as *Girinka* or '*Anti-Nyakazi*' should become more inclusive. Reparation payments do have an important moral function with regard to atonement but they strain the development of social cohesion if they continually keep the families of perpetrators at the brink of abject poverty¹³⁸¹. This pertains especially to perpetrators who were merely convicted of theft or looting and did already serve long prison sentences and TIG.

¹³⁷⁵ Cf. Frédéric (59, Hutu resident) and Thérèse (60, Hutu resident) both from "Gakombe", Kirundo recounted that the government (Buyoya's government) had rebuilt their houses.

¹³⁷⁶ Interview with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

¹³⁷⁷ Cf. E.g. Interview with Etienne R., 72, Tutsi IDP, Kamenge, Ngozi.


¹³⁷⁸ Cf. Interviews with Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo and Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngpzi.

¹³⁷⁹ Cf. Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹³⁸⁰ Robert, 25, bystander from "Gatsata", Gisagara was very thankful for his government grant. Of all the 13 Rwandan interviewees with a higher education, he however was the only Hutu who talked about receiving a grant.

¹³⁸¹ Thasienne (38, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye) mentioned that she had to pay reparations on behalf of her parents who disappeared. Gaspard (26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara) mentioned something similar in a private conversation.

In Burundi, already the decision to introduce welfare or some other kind of assistance program for the victims of past atrocities would improve the situation greatly. If the CNDD-FDD continues to ignore the suffering of the peasants, it risks alienating the losers of the civil war in the short-term and even its own constituency in the long term. The discontent of badly integrated groups such as ex-combatants, former refugees and IDPs is increasing already.



Burundi: Trust in the State


Corruption and Trust in the State

In Rwanda, the RPF’s rather successful fight against (petty) corruption is an improvement that should not be underestimated. Whereas the ‘politics of the belly’ thrived under his predecessors, Kagame's regime has fared comparatively well in combating corruption. The government installed a number of administrative bodies such as the Ombudsman or the Public Procurement Authority, which are independent to a certain degree and dedicated to the objective. The regime has even forced some high officials to stand down because of corruption allegations¹³⁸². Even though there are serious allegations that Rwanda's inner circle of power is accumulating its wealth in an informal greyzone through unregulated and untaxed trade with commodities from the DRC as well as profits from financial in-

¹³⁸² Cf. Transparency International, “Country Report Rwanda”, <http://www.transparency.org/country/#RWA> DataResearch Reports (29. August 2014). It should however be noted that 'corruption' is a very popular accusation to 'persuade' inconvenient politicians to stand down. This happened e.g. to Sebarenzi and Rwigema.

terests in protected businesses with domestic monopolies untouched by the abovementioned institutions, such operations rarely affect ordinary Rwandans directly¹³⁸³.


Technocratic efforts towards effectively establishing the rule of law are important to reconciliation because they foster equal opportunities in societies long shaped by favoritism and exclusion. Particularly the fight against petty corruption is important in the local context because it builds confidence in the state and in meritocracy despite other shortcomings of the regime. Many Hutus can envision a future in the new Rwanda because they perceive the authorities (at least on the national level) as legitimate, relatively fair and impartial. In Burundi, where corruption is rather out in the open, most crimes remain unprosecuted, and impunity reigns supreme¹³⁸⁴, citizens have lost their trust in authorities and intellectuals. Increasing parts of society view the state as inherently exploitative and corrupt. Hence, the disposition towards resorting to violence in order to achieve goals such as justice and co-determination is comparatively higher. Peter Uvin thus advises a preventive approach to law enforcement for Burundi, which would not necessarily address the crimes of the past but focus on combating impunity in current cases, enhancing local accountability, restraining central leaders from utilizing violence for political aims and generally providing an improved climate of political and economic fairness¹³⁸⁵. For the situation to improve, Burundians need a vision. They need the confidence that their hard work actually pays off and that the wealth they generated cannot be taken away by corrupt officials or armed bandits acting with impunity. The decreasing confidence of Burundians in the state and its organs manifests itself clearly in almost all the scaled questions addressing the participants' relationship with the government. It is even more pronounced among Tutsis.



¹³⁸³ Cf. Reyntjens, 2013, 163ff.
¹³⁸⁴ Cf. HRW, 2010 and 2012.
¹³⁸⁵ Cf. Uvin, 2009, 176ff.

Trust in the government: comparison Rwa/Bdi

Trust in the Army and the Police: Comparison Rwa/Bdi					
	1988	1990 (Rwa) /1993-1 (Bdi)	1993-2 (Bdi) / 1994 (Rwa)	2003 (Rwa) / 2005 (Bdi)	2011
Burundian Hutu	-1.9	0.9	-3.3	2.7	2.4
Burundian Tutsi	2.2	2.8	1.7	2.3	1.4
Bdi Average	-0.2	1.6	-1.4	2.6	2.1
Rwanda Average		-0.4	-3.2	2.9	4.3



Trust in Army and Police: Comparison Rwa/Bdi

As demonstrated, the assessments regarding trust in the government, trust in the army and the police closely resemble each other. Trust in the government quickly fades if a regime fails to provide security or opportunities to improve the population's economic situation, hence increasing competition, exacerbating tensions and hampering reconciliation on a very fundamental level. In such an economically difficult situation, the army and especially the police, as the state's main security agents, often become the increasingly corrupt instruments of governmental repression¹³⁸⁶ because they are dependent on public funding. With all the emphasis on righting historical wrongs, such correlations should not be taken lightly because they already breed the next crisis before the last has been resolved. Regardless of ethnic tensions, acknowledgement, recognition and apology, poverty is still a main driving force for young men to join armed movements and repression of any kind fuels it. Burundi is still a country of recently demobilized warriors ready to resort to violent measures if the state fails to provide opportunities. With rumors about new rebel movements circulating, most Burundians are sure that the next crisis is looming if economic ascent remains limited to the members of the political elite. As Alexandre, a demobilized CNDD-FDD rebel from "Kamenge" said: *"the main*

¹³⁸⁶ Cf. HRW, 2009 and HRW, 2012.

*problem is poverty. People are poor and he knows that with poverty, with that hunger, they can do whatever they're asked to do*¹³⁸⁷."

6.2.3. The political Management of Ethnicity

Rwandan vs. Burundian Approach

In general, many Burundians favor the Rwandan approach to national unity, but not to justice and commemoration.

Despite frequent criticism by international scholars against its authoritarian approach, Rwanda does seem to get a lot of strategies right with regard to reconciliation politics, at least from the perspective of ordinary Burundians. Many Burundians across all participant categories actually consider the Rwandan strategy of abandoning ethnic categorization as superior to the Burundian approach of introducing ethnic quotas. *"Le modèle Rwandais est meilleur, le fait de parler des ethnies n'a plus d'importance. Il trouve que même les partis politiques, ce sont des partis politiques qui sont à l'origine des problèmes. Il vaut mieux que tous les partis politiques se rassemblent et se consentent mutuellement, après il vont comprendre qu'ils sont tous des Burundais*¹³⁸⁸."

In Rwanda vice versa, only a few intellectuals actually consider the Burundian quota system as a worthwhile alternative, mainly because it would prevent the dominance of one group¹³⁸⁹. Opinions such as *"il faut mettre fin aux ethnies, puisque ce sont les ethnies qui ont été à l'origine des massacres*¹³⁹⁰" are prevalent among many rural Burundians. Even though most participants consider the prevailing violence in the country to stem from the greed and power hunger rather than ethnic divisions, ethnicity is still considered to perpetuate discrimination and sectarian thinking¹³⁹¹. The preference of most Rwandans for a national identity is shared and reflected by many Burundians such as Etienne, Ezechiel or Venantie K. who believe that equality within an overarching Burundian identity would eventually also bring political unity¹³⁹².

In mixed communities such as *"Gakombe"* or *"Kamenge"*, many participants, particularly Hutus, consider the ethnic problem a matter of the past that has successfully been resolved. Now, they urge to

¹³⁸⁷ Interview with Alexandre, 35, ex-combatant, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹³⁸⁸ Interview with Dominique, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. Translation (transcript from translator who speaks about Dominique in the third person): *"the Rwandan model is better, the fact that speaking about ethnicity has no more importance. He even thinks it's even the political parties, the political parties are at the origin of the problems. It would be better if all the political parties would assemble and mutually consent. Afterwards they would understand that they are all Burundians."*

¹³⁸⁹ Cf. Interviews with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹³⁹⁰ Interview with Térése, 60, Hutu resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo: *„We have to terminate ethnic groups because the ethnic groups have been at the origin of the massacres."*

¹³⁹¹ Cf. e.g. interview with Ferdinand, 56, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹³⁹² Interviews with Etienne R., 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Dominique, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Ezechiel, 31, ex-combattant FAB and FNL, "Rohero", Ngozi; Venantie K., 25, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

address the political divisions: *“L'homme fait ce qu'il sait. [Il] ne faut pas dire que... comme cette place est réservé pour les Hutu, il faut amener les Hutu et les mettre là. Plutôt il fallait faire que tout le monde... Plutôt... un Burundais soit considéré comme un Burundais toujours. Sinon les choses des ethnies, je pense que ça n'a plus d'importance pour le moment. [...] Quant à moi, je pense que ces choses de dialoguer ces ethnies n'a plus de valeur. Plutôt il faut songer à développer le pays en tout¹³⁹³.”* However, considering persistent fears concerning marginalization among Tutsi who still think ethnic identity is very important¹³⁹⁴, this assessment seems a bit premature.

Among people with a higher education, the argument that the quota-regulations deny access to office to the most capable people and prevent meritocracy is very common. *“I think that ethnic tensions remain because the way we are doing that, when they are working, those quota regulations, they must look on your ethnic group and this means that if you are not the ethnic group that they want you'll not get a job. (...), I think that we should much more look on the capacities of the person instead of looking on the ethnic group¹³⁹⁵.”* Even if the promotion of Rwandan nationalism is built upon a convenient and ideologically framed image, it appears to be met with a positive response in the region. My Burundian translator Vanessa believes that e.g. the successful fight against corruption and the orderly towns reflect the regime's efforts towards instilling a sense of pride and communal spirit in Rwandans that Burundians lack.¹³⁹⁶ Even the more controversial aspects of Rwandan post-conflict politics such as maximum justice and banning ethnic identities were often lauded in Burundi, where impunity is considered one of the most pressing problems by many including Human Rights Watch¹³⁹⁷.

Deceptive Appearances and dysfunctional Politics

There are people who beg to differ however. Burundians such as Immaculée comprehend how the policy of national unity in Rwanda globalizes Hutu-guilt: *“for her she thinks the quota regulations is better. For her, when you say a Hutu or a Tutsi, you are not insulting the person, it's an identity, the person is like that. She thinks that later on, maybe when they want to balance it first so that nobody feels neglected and after all, maybe we will find out that when you say you are a Hutu, it doesn't mean you are killer. But in Rwanda she thinks that when you are still afraid of that, when they say a Hutu. But for her, it's an identity. Just say it like that. Do not say that 'you are all Rwandans'. Yeah,*

¹³⁹³ Jacques, 26, Tutsi resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo. Translation : *“Man does as he knows. We shouldn't say something like this space is reserved for Hutus and bring them there. Rather we should... Rather a Burundian should always be considered a Burundian. With regard to ethnic groups, I think this has no more importance at the moment. [...] I for one think that these things such as dialogues between ethnic groups are useless. We have to think about developing the country as a whole.”*

¹³⁹⁴ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Juvénal H., 53, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatant, "Rohero", Ngozi; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹³⁹⁵ Vanessa, 25, Tutsi resident, Bujumbura.

¹³⁹⁶ Personal Conversation with Vanessa.

¹³⁹⁷ Cf. HRW, 2012

*there are categories of people. There are ethnic groups and it's like that. Consider it like ethnic groups not like a qualification*¹³⁹⁸. " Such insights into the exercise of power through categorization in Rwanda however usually come from Burundians with higher education such as Immaculée or Pierre, who even considers the ethnic situation in Rwanda to be a time bomb: *"ce sont les apparences trompeuses. Nous, je me dis que même s'il y a des problèmes, on est tous avancé. Parce que nous, on se parle ouvertement entre Hutu et Tutsi. [...] Moi je pense que ce qui se passe là au Rwanda, c'est pour moi une bombe en retardement qui risquera un jour d'embraser toute la région*¹³⁹⁹."

In Rwanda, particularly young intellectuals share these insights¹⁴⁰⁰. However, even in rural Rwanda, most of the participants do not make the connection between quota regulations and preventing one ethnicity to usurp complete power. Rather, political discord itself is considered dangerous and undesirable. Most of the participants make the connection between politics, conflict and *"le grand ventre*¹⁴⁰¹", the role of politics as the sole economic incubator for power holders. They know from their own painful experiences that political conflicts in these two poor, overpopulated countries all too often escalate into feuds and end in mass violence. Thus, many members from all Rwandan groups, not just survivors and returnees, are actually content with the way Kagame runs his country without meaningful opposition, as long as he keeps the peace¹⁴⁰². They seem to be used to a top-down system that expects them to comply with the authority's orders. Some, as Vianney¹⁴⁰³ or Yusuf¹⁴⁰⁴ even consider speaking about ethnic identities in the open (as practiced in Burundi) a potentially sectarian practice, demonstrating the Rwandan penchant for secrecy.

In Burundi, public opinion chooses a similar direction. Calls for a grand coalition¹⁴⁰⁵ or even a single party government¹⁴⁰⁶ that provides national unity are widespread among the population. These wishes are consistent with the assessment of many Burundians that *"the problem lies in the fact that*

¹³⁹⁸ Interview with Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹³⁹⁹ Interview with Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. Translation: *"Those are deceptive appearances. We... I tell myself that even if there are problems, we all advanced. Because we speak with each other openly, Hutu and Tutsi. [...] I think what happens in Rwanda, for me, it's a time bomb that risks to burn the whole region one day."*

¹⁴⁰⁰ Cf. Interviews with John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Interview with Robert, 25, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Gaspard, 26, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Jean-Pierre, 29, "Gatsata", Gisagara. Cf. chapter 3.2.5.

¹⁴⁰¹ Cf. interview with Marie M., 80, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

¹⁴⁰² Cf. Interviews with Vincent, 43, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Vianney, 52, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Christine, 49, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Marcel, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye;

¹⁴⁰³ Cf. Interview with Vianney, 52, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁴⁰⁴ Cf. Interview with Yusuf, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁴⁰⁵ Cf. Interviews with Pascal M., 29, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Dominique, 37, Hutu refugee, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹⁴⁰⁶ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Marie M., 80, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Marie-Chantal, 29, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Abel, 23, ex-combatant, "Rohero", Ngozi; Venantie K., 25, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

leaders are not working together, political parties have problems. And even in '93 it was the same. People were living together they just follow the movement, which was starting but coming from the leaders¹⁴⁰⁷." Multiparty-democracy, one of the Western standard prescriptions for nation building, is rather considered a danger by peasants in Burundi: *"the political parties are an obstacle to the development and the reconciliation of the country because they make us go backwards; we can't even unite when they are not united¹⁴⁰⁸."* Even if some dismiss the Rwandan model as deceptive, the conflict in Burundi persists even without ethnic antagonisms: *"you can always say there is no Hutu, there is no Tutsi, they are all Rwandans when they know that one group is discriminated. Even if they go to school [together], when they finish they can't get a job. It is better here, where it is determined 60%-40%. But here the problem is that even Hutu among themselves they don't agree, they all look for political power and it's a problem¹⁴⁰⁹."*

For most peasants in both countries, the ideology of national unity and reconciliation still seems more attractive, as they comprehend ethnic differences as harmful.

Consociational Experiments

As mentioned above, there is some admiration for the consociational Burundian solution among Rwandan and especially Western intellectuals. In 2006, René Lemarchand cautiously lauded the meticulous arrangement following Lijphardt's¹⁴¹⁰ consociational formula with regard to ethnic power sharing that stood in strong contrast to largely one-sided attempts at peace and reconciliation in Rwanda and the bargaining process between the diverse warring factions that went on in the DRC at the time. *"If the Burundi experiment holds any promise, this is in large part because of the carefully calibrated distribution of ethnic identities and party affiliations in the government, the National Assembly, the Senate, the communal councils, and, most importantly, the army¹⁴¹¹."* Apart from that, Lemarchand concluded that in 2005, the conditions for power sharing were favorable in no small parts because of the 'political conjuncture' and the course of the conflict, with the parties being war-weary, ready for compromise and exposed to international pressure.

The Burundian intellectuals I interviewed were divided on the issue of ethnic quotas. Jacques, Vanessa, Immaculée and Candide thought that these stipulations provide the wrong incentives: *"Ce qui est mal c'est qu'on ne considère pas... donc la moralité de quelqu'un, la personnalité et même les compétences¹⁴¹²."* Candide added that multipartyism only exists on paper and that the people who actually

¹⁴⁰⁷ Interview with Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Interview with Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹⁴⁰⁹ Interview with Sylvestre, 69, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹⁴¹⁰ Lijphardt, 1977.

¹⁴¹¹ Lemarchand, 2006, 19.

¹⁴¹² Interview with Candide, 50, Hutu resident, Ngozi.

benefit from peace are the former warlords who fought their way to the negotiating table¹⁴¹³. She said that ultimately, quota regulations only serve the powerful, just as the single party system did before. Tutsi often claim that quotas are not implemented or are bent to benefit Hutu on the local level¹⁴¹⁴ whereas others complain that only 50/50 would be a fair representation¹⁴¹⁵.

The other half of the intellectuals I interviewed staunchly supports the quota regulations. "*They should use the quota because when you have the quota, everybody is taken into account, not like [Rwanda]... they don't talk about it, there is no Hutu, there is no Tutsi but the majority has more force and can discriminate the minority. Then it's better that they use the quota regulations and it teaches them to respect one another, that they divide, they share the power and they respect one another*"¹⁴¹⁶. Pierre, Déogratias, Viola and Gertrude all agree that the introduction of the quota-system significantly reduced ethnic tensions even though they have not eliminated the problem¹⁴¹⁷. Not unlike the policy of unity and reconciliation in Rwanda, the quota system heralded in a certain notion of national citizenship and inclusion that also caught the peasants' eye¹⁴¹⁸. "*Noone is excluded from the society, there would be even a hope that maybe in some years we will even forget about it and live together in peace without thinking about ethnic groups*"¹⁴¹⁹.

Differences and Similarities in Perception

In general, intellectuals trust the state less and are rather skeptical with regard to the success of its reconciliation policies. Nevertheless, there is a certain overarching consensus in both countries that the impact of ethnicity on gaining political office has declined since the conflicts. In theory, whereas ethnic identities were banned in Rwanda and thus should have lost importance significantly more, in Burundi, they should theoretically have gained relative importance because of the quota regulations. In public perception however, the impact attributed to ethnic identity in politics has declined similarly in both countries.

¹⁴¹³ This strategy of guerilla attacks and remaining outside the peace process until conditions are favorable for negotiating has been a well-documented feature of the Burundian peace process and was probably one of the reasons why it took so long. Cf. Reyntjens, 2005b.

¹⁴¹⁴ Cf. interviews with Irankunda, 30, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi and Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatant, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹⁴¹⁵ Cf. interviews with Venantie K., 25, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Hari, 50, Hutu resident, Kamenfe


¹⁴¹⁶ Interview with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, teacher, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

¹⁴¹⁷ Cf. Interview with Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹⁴¹⁸ Cf. Interviews with Hari, 50, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Violetta, 30, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Sylvestre, 69, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident "Gakombe".

¹⁴¹⁹ Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, Ngozi.

	1988	1990 (Rwa) / 1993-1 (Bdi)	1994 (Rwa) / 1993-2 (Bdi)	2003 (Rwa) / 2005 (Bdi)	2011
Impact of Ethnicity					
Rwa: Higher Education		-4.3	-4.8	-0.2	2.0
Rwa: Lower Education		-1.5	-4.0	1.7	3.5
Bdi: Higher Education	2.3	1.6	-0.7	1.9	2.3
Bdi: Lower Education	0.7	1.9	-3.1	2.4	2.5
Burundi Average	1.1	1.8	-2.5	2.3	2.5
Rwanda Average		-2.2	-4.2	1.3	3.1




Com-

parison: Perceived Impact of Ethnicity (higher rating=less impact)

With regard to the question 'How would you estimate the chances of people of your ethnicity to gain access to political office?', there are however pronounced differences between the countries, which actually speak for the Rwandan option, external reasons such as security and economic development notwithstanding. In Rwanda, people perceive a general improvement of conditions (decreasing impact of ethnicity) when they compare current conditions with pre-war conditions. In Burundi, the change is only considered minor and even becomes problematic if we compare the perceptions of Hutu and Tutsi.


	1988	1990 (Rwa) / 1993-1 (Bdi)	1993-2 (Bdi) / 1994 (Rwa)	2003 (Rwa) / 2005 (Bdi)	2011
Impact of Ethnicity					
Burundi Average	1.1	1.8	-2.5	2.3	2.5
Rwanda Average		-2.2	-4.2	1.3	3.1
Burundian Hutu	-0.1	2.5	-2.8	3	3.3
Burundian Tutsi	2.8	0.9	-1.9	1.1	1
Rwa: Survivors & Returnees		-2.8	-4.3	1.5	3.8
Rwa: Bystanders & Ex-convicts		-1.9	-4.1	1.1	2.7



Comparison: Impact of ethnicity on politics according to ethnic groups

Apparently, most Rwandans including ex-convicts and bystanders believe that their groups' chances of gaining political office have rapidly increased since the genocide. This evaluation might be retroactive and coined by national re-education, but it still speaks to social cohesion. On the contrary, most rural Burundian Tutsi feel disadvantaged with a former Hutu movement governing the country even though their minority rights as a group are constitutionally established. This impression only deepens if we look at the responses to the scaled question: 'would you consider your country a democracy in the following years?'

Democracy	1988	1990 (Rwa) / 1993-1 (Bdi)	1993-2 (Bdi) / 1994 (Rwa)	2003 (Rwa) / 2005 (Bdi)	2011
Burundi Average	-1.0	1.4	-4.1	1.5	1.1
Rwanda Average	-	-0.5	-4.3	1.5	3.6
Burundian Hutu	-2.2	2.3	-4.1	2.1	1.7
Burundian Tutsi	0.7	-0.3	-4	0.3	0
Rwa: Survivors & Returnees	-	-1.5	-4.4	0.5	2.6
Rwa: Bystanders & Ex-Convicts	-	-0.1	-4.6	2.0	4.2



Comparison: Is your country a democracy?

Even Hutus are disappointed with the development of Burundian democracy since 2005. Tutsi are even more pessimistic and their ratings are already on the verge of becoming negative. In Rwanda on the other hand, bystanders and ex-convicts even give the government better marks than survivors and returnees, painting a picture of interethnic harmony. This evaluation should however be treated with caution. As mentioned before, the Rwandan government goes to great lengths to influence public opinion¹⁴²⁰. Furthermore, seven participants in Rwanda (approximately 15 percent) refused to answer the question pertaining to democracy, whereas all Burundian participants agreed to answer.

Even though Rwandans give their democracy higher ratings than Burundians, Burundians do think that they have a higher impact on politics, peaking in the elections of 1993 and 2005. In Rwanda, the question about interviewees' perceived political impact is where the dominance of Tutsi becomes manifest. This is hardly surprising considering the fact that ex-convicts in Rwanda have their political rights revoked but it does give rise to questions about the validity of their assessment of democracy. Marks of +5 among ex-convicts without political rights¹⁴²¹ do leave a strong impression that the participants tried to answer politically correct. The answers with regard to the definition of the term 'democracy' in the qualitative parts of the interviews however hint at the fact, that most participants have no clear definition of democracy and rather rated their overall satisfaction with the government¹⁴²². The fact that questions relating to 'trust in the government' got very similar ratings as the


¹⁴²⁰ Cf. chapter 4.2.1.

¹⁴²¹ Yusuf and Innocent from "Gatsata", Gisagara as well as Rugango and Yohani N. from "Gatumba" gave marks of +5 with reference to democracy in Rwanda 2011.

¹⁴²² The diverse definitions of „democracy“ proved extremely heterogeneous. They ranged from popular sovereignty (cf. Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali) over „freedom“ (e.g. Jeanne, 32, returnee, Huye), „independence“ (Karempera, 73, returnee, „Gatsata“, Gisagara), and „peace“ (Christine, 49, survivor, „Gatumba“, Huye or Augustin,

'democracy-question' also suggests that participants understood the question as an evaluation of the government's work.

	1988	1990 (Rwa)/ 1993-1 (Bdi)	1993-2 (Bdi) / 1994 (Rwa)	2003 (Rwa) / 2005 (Bdi)	2011
Political Impact					
Burundi Average	-0.1	0.7	-2.6	0.7	0.8
Rwanda Average		-0.7	-2.3	-0.1	0.4
Burundian Hutu	-0.5	0.6	-2.8	0.6	1.3
Burundian Tutsi	0.1	0.9	-2.1	0.9	0.4
Rwa: Survivors & Returnees		-0.4	-2.5	1.1	1.5
Rwa: Bystanders & Ex-convicts		-0.9	-1.9	-0.9	-0.3



Comparison: Personal political impact

Which Approach works better?

In sum, we can adhere to the idea that both the ideology of unity and reconciliation and ethnic quota regulations have their distinct merits with regard to bridging the trenches between the former antagonist groups. The majority of the population in both countries perceives interethnic relations in general as less of a political factor than before the conflicts. In general, the old ethnic divisions are believed to have lost considerable importance. Have Rwanda and Burundi successfully reconciled? Are ethnic divisions a problem of the past?

50, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara), to concepts such as "social welfare" (Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye), "development" (Vincent, 43, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara) and "unity and reconciliation" (Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara).

Sadly, such an assessment would be premature. Popular perceptions only reflect a certain point of time and are only conditionally convincing when it comes to determining overarching societal trends. As mentioned before, ethnicity only obtained its divisive quality in times of crisis, and there are worrying signs here.

In Burundi, the ratings for the government are dropping in almost every aspect since the elections of 2005. Particularly the Tutsi feel underrepresented in politics. The impression that politics only serve a self-centered, greedy and quarrelsome elite is widespread. Looking at the declining democratic credentials, the constitutional minority rights and quotas seem to actually only serve a few well-connected Tutsi politicians who arranged themselves with the party in power, while Tutsis in rural communities become increasingly isolated. Against the background of chronic quarrels, rampant insecurity, rent-seeking behavior and the reproach of moral bankruptcy against the parties, the calls for a coalition government or a single-party state are quite understandable. Regarding the political developments since 2010, the more likely scenario is that the CNDD-FDD attempts to remove the last remnants of checks and balances as long as it holds unmitigated power. Up to now, the opposition, the media, and civil society are still putting up resistance, but the government is increasingly cracking down on dissent¹⁴²³.

At least on the surface, the Rwandan government fared better in the opinion of its population. This is in no small part due to the establishment of security, law and order, and economic recovery. Rwandans, particularly the Hutu majority, do not seem to care too much about the unilateral management of society and their insufficient political impact as long as the government provides opportunities and assistance¹⁴²⁴. To the contrary, they perceive the country as more democratic than it used to be.

Many Rwandans actually do believe that ethnic division was the reason for the genocide and there is a genuine hope among Rwandans that without practical use, ethnic identities will vanish with time¹⁴²⁵. This hope relies on the conditions in Rwanda remaining favourable for development, with a strong and determined government promoting national unity that is able and willing to integrating the growing elite of young, critical Hutus and addressing their grievances openly and constructively. Up to today, the RPF however has defended its claim to leadership aggressively and often equates criticism with 'genocide ideology' or 'genocide denial', forcing Hutus who have lost their relatives to either accept "*enforced ethnic amnesia*"¹⁴²⁶ or to choke back their anger. This behavior breeds resistance and it is mostly Kagame's strict discipline, his iron grip on power, good technocratic record,

¹⁴²³ Cf. HRW, May 2010; Ligue ITEKA, Annual Reports April 2011 & March 2012.

¹⁴²⁴ Cf. Chapter 4.7.

¹⁴²⁵ Cf. e.g. interviews with Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Karemera, 73, returnee, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali; Jeanne d'Arc, 34, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Umubyeyi, 27, "Gatsata", Gisagara;

¹⁴²⁶ Lemarchand, 2009, 73

public emphasis on meritocracy, and his access to (international) funds that keep the Hutu calm for now and the anger below the surface. Some Tutsi understand this very well: *“My first worry is at the leadership level. We are very grateful that we have had someone like Kagame, for the moment, who didn’t encourage revenge, who didn’t encourage any divisionist ideas, who also punished people from his government who brought him that idea. So my first worry and my first fear is not having someone stepping in his shoes, and staying in the middle of these ethnic groups.”*¹⁴²⁷ From this perspective, a threatening undertone suddenly resonates in an ex-convict’s statement about the relevance of ethnicity: *“The first thing is when we have peace and security, otherwise if I know your ethnic group and you are my neighbor I will always know who you are. But what matters is peace and security”*¹⁴²⁸.

6.2.4. Commemoration and Apology

When comparing the two countries, it should be remarked that Rwandans talk about personal forgiveness as a part of reconciliation far more often, while in Burundi, the focus still rests on the mere management of coexistence. In Rwanda, asking for forgiveness is mandatory to get out of prison, thus confession and apology are acts that much more Rwandans than Burundians have experienced. Even though many Rwandan genocide survivors complain that these apologies are not personal and sincere enough, many appreciate the closure and recognition of suffering that apology, commemoration and transitional justice may provide. In Rwanda, genocide survivors maintain that commemoration ceremonies help them address their grief. Even if they run the risk of being overwhelmed and re-traumatized, most survivors consider commemoration necessary for reconciliation and particularly for prevention.

Criticism brought forward against Commemoration

No participants I encountered in Rwanda actually wanted to deny survivors the right to commemorate. According to the statements I recorded, there is a strong overarching consensus about commemoration being necessary for genocide prevention and reminding the population about the horrors of genocide. The main criticisms relate to the graphic and traumatizing manner in which commemoration is celebrated¹⁴²⁹, its ethnic specificity evoking feelings of exclusion among Hutu¹⁴³⁰, and

¹⁴²⁷ Interview with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali.

¹⁴²⁸ Interview with Paul, 44, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye.

¹⁴²⁹ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali; Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Faustin, 40, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Rugango, 81, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Christine, 49, survivor, "Gatumba", Gisagara.

¹⁴³⁰ Cf. e.g. interviews with Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Kibonge, 43, bystander, Huye; Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Annunciata, 58, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Christine, 49, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Gaspard, 26, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Augustin, 50, bystander; Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali; John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Mukaga Kwaya, 43, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye.

the fact that commemoration itself keeps ethnic identities relevant¹⁴³¹. Still, in comparison to Burundi where the majority opts for a 'forgive and forget'-approach, only very few participants, mainly bystanders, said that they wanted to forget¹⁴³². Although commemoration as a concept for prevention is rarely questioned fundamentally, commemoration's benefits for reconciliation and its unilateral manner of implementation is subject to much criticism. As Kibonge, a bystander from Huye pointed out: "*if we commemorate only one side, there is no unity and reconciliation*"¹⁴³³.

In Burundi, forgiveness and commemoration are secondary topics compared to insecurity and justice. Most interviewees prefer to forget about '*la crise*' because they do not see how a public debate or commemoration about the atrocities committed in the past could ameliorate the current conditions. For most participants, especially those who have lost relatives, remembering the past holds no consolation: "*Il faut mieux oublier ce qui c'est passé. [...] Il ne faut pas se souvenir de ce qui s'est passé. Il faut mieux oublier ça. Puisque c'est un des évènements malheureux*"¹⁴³⁴. Particularly among the losers of the civil war and among men, the feeling is prevalent that commemoration would only remind them of what they lost and add to their frustration¹⁴³⁵. For these participants, the fear that ethnic tensions could resurface by establishing official commemoration ceremonies like in Rwanda outweighs the hope that commemoration could have a preventive effect. Participants such as Marie-Chantal are wary of the whole topic and believe that "*Commemoration only brings hate and pain*"¹⁴³⁶. The Non-performance of Burundian politics plays into this assessment. Many Burundians profoundly distrust the ability of their politicians to establish national commemoration without globalizing guilt or using it to further their own political agenda, particularly if said politicians were the actors instrumental in the unfolding of the catastrophes they are about to commemorate and have a motive for hiding the truth. The past still has such a strong impact on Burundi's political reality that a non-partisan, statesmanlike perspective on reconciliation, which would be necessary to establish national commemoration in a form that acknowledges the losses of both sides and functions integratively, is still difficult to imagine.

Truth first

¹⁴³¹ Cf. interviews with Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara and Kibonge, 43, bystander, Huye.

¹⁴³² Cf. interviews with Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jeanne, 52, returnee, Huye; Augustin, 50, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali; Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara;

¹⁴³³ Interview with Kibonge, 43, bystander, Huye.

¹⁴³⁴ Interview with Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. Translation: "*It's better not to remember the past. [...] We should not remember what has happened. We should forget that. These are sad events.*"

¹⁴³⁵ Cf. interviews with Juvéal, 59, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi-resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Juvéal H., 53, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Frédéric, 39, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Dominique, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Abel, 23, ex-combatant FAB and FNL, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹⁴³⁶ Interview with Marie-Chantal, 29, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

Furthermore, the succession of steps towards reconciliation is of importance. One of the reasons that the process of acknowledgement, recognition and apology in Burundi has not yet made significant progress is that the events of the past remain shrouded in rumors. Even though the TRC should finally take up its work, the narratives differ widely and in many cases, there is no national consensus about which atrocities actually happened in the civil war and who caused them. In Rwanda, the governmental narrative about the genocide is narrow, onesided and focuses on placing the guilt on the *génocidaires* and their ideology. Nevertheless, this narrative is clearly defined and could serve as a starting point for an open public debate if the RPF would allow it. Burundi on the other side still has to go through the difficult process of acknowledgement and recognition - reconciling the differing narratives with each other. The argument that *"the truth is necessary but not the commemoration"*¹⁴³⁷ is valid particularly with reference to the convoluted process of establishing Burundi's TRC¹⁴³⁸. Its potential for socio-political transformation and contribution to political accountability remains questionable in the highly politicized context of its operation¹⁴³⁹.

If commemoration should support reconciliation, Burundi first needs a narrative established through the active and free participation of the population and the diverse groups it consists of. *"After the truth and reconciliation commission, then they could sit together and try to settle a day, even build some memorial centers to remember what happened. Because they would have said that this happened, why this happened, why and when and maybe set one day or set different memorial centers and each of these days, the whole country would remember the people they have lost"*¹⁴⁴⁰. The narrative hence should recognize the diverse reasons for suffering and address each group's particular grievances. Without a narrative, every attempt at explicit acknowledgement and recognition, be it in the form of a commemoration ceremony, a national day of mourning or even a museum, will most probably be doomed to fail. People will either perceive commemoration as rather exclusive and one-sided like the Rwandan ceremonies are seen by the majority of Hutus I interviewed, or, perhaps even worse, remain segregated from the start with Hutu mourning Hutu and Tutsi mourning Tutsi and thus even deepen societal divisions. *"Même aujourd'hui, ici, il commémore le 15.8.1988. Ils se souviennent des gens qui ont trouvé le mort par la crise de 88. Les Hutus sont invités par les Tutsis, mais il ne trouve pas que les Tutsis ont un intérêt à commémorer la crise de 88 puisque les Hutus ont manqué"*¹⁴⁴¹.

¹⁴³⁷ Interview with Abel, 23, ex-combatant FAB and FNL, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹⁴³⁸ Cf. Chapter 5.2.

¹⁴³⁹ Cf. Vandeginste, 2012.

¹⁴⁴⁰ Interview with Déogratias, 52, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹⁴⁴¹ Interview with Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. Translation (the translator speaks about the participant in the third person): *"Even today, here, he commemorates the 15th of August 1988. They re-*

Arguments in Favor of Commemoration

Burundian commemoration ceremonies are mostly local¹⁴⁴². Thus, in general, most interviewees in Burundi had rather unofficial commemorations in mind. For most Burundians, the question if official commemoration would help them to address their grief was theoretical in nature. Proponents of commemoration mostly emphasize on the preventive and cohesive impact they hope commemoration would have and dissociated the issue from their personal grief¹⁴⁴³. Among the Burundian participants who would welcome official commemoration, an above-average number were women¹⁴⁴⁴. Contrary to the opponents of commemoration, they emphasize the integrative character of mourning together and, similar to many Rwandan survivors believe that the process of grieving together could actually have a cohesive and preventive impact on society. The consensus here is that commemoration would remind people of the horror that ethnic divisions created¹⁴⁴⁵ and make everybody understand that they are " [...] *not the only one[s] who suffered from that, it was the whole country*¹⁴⁴⁶". Particularly reconciliation associations where Hutu and Tutsi could sit and talk such as AMI in Rwanda¹⁴⁴⁷ and religious ceremonies were frequently mentioned: "*Quand les Tutsi et les Hutu sont à la messe ils se comprennent puisqu'ils partagent la même prière. On ne peut pas se méfier du Tutsi qui s'assoit à coté de toi et à un Hutu qui s'assoit à côté de toi. Tout le monde partage la même prière. [...] La commémoration religieuse est très importante car les chrétiens se rendent à la messe pour prier ensemble sans aucune discrimination, mais ça dépend de la volonté des gens*¹⁴⁴⁸."

Most participants who lost family members in Rwanda viewed official commemoration ambiguously. On the one hand, survivors are often thankful that commemoration acknowledges and recognizes

member the people who died in the crisis of 1988. The Hutus are invited by the Tutsi but he does not think that the Tutsi are interested in commemorating the 1988 crisis because it was the Hutu who lost."

¹⁴⁴² Frédéric, 59, Hutu resident from "Gakombe" speaks about commemoration ceremonies in Bugabira; Hari, 50, Hutu resident from "Kamenge" speaks about ceremonies taking place in Chimimba and Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident from "Gakombe" says that he commemorates the 15th of August 1988, when the massacres started.

¹⁴⁴³ Cf. e.g. interviews with Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatant, "Rohero", Ngozi; Léocadie, 50, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Hari, 50, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Frédéric, 59, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Pascal M., 29, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

¹⁴⁴⁴ Cf. Interviews with Générose, 43, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Léocadie, 50, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Venantie K., 25, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Irankunda, 30, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Janvière, 38, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

¹⁴⁴⁵ Cf. Interviews with Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatant FAB & FNL, "Rohero", Ngozi; Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Frédéric, 59, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Générose, 43, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

¹⁴⁴⁶ Interview with Karemera, 73, returnee, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁴⁴⁷ Cf. e.g. interview with Irankunda, 30, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹⁴⁴⁸ Interview with Générose, 43, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. Translation: "*If Tutsi and Hutu meet at the mass, they understand each other and share the same prayer. You cannot be wary about the Tutsi who sits next to you or the Hutu who sits next to you. Everybody shares the same prayer. [...] Religious commemoration is very important because the Christians go to mass to pray together without any kind of discrimination but it depends on the free will of the people.*" Cf. also Interview with Henriette, 49, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

their suffering¹⁴⁴⁹ and unites them with other survivors¹⁴⁵⁰. On the other hand, the majority of survivors stated that they suffer from retraumatization during commemoration week¹⁴⁵¹: "*since she attends commemoration, she gets trauma, she finally got a permission never to attend commemoration*"¹⁴⁵². Very frequently, participants even stated that they would feel "*angry*"¹⁴⁵³, "*scared*"¹⁴⁵⁴, "*humiliated*"¹⁴⁵⁵ or "*excluded*"¹⁴⁵⁶ again. Thus, even though a majority of Rwandan participants evaluated commemoration positively with regard to its preventive function and appreciated the lessons they were taught, its contribution to social cohesion has to be taken with a grain of salt.

Instrumentalization of Commemoration Ceremonies

Next to the much clearer situation with regard to guilty parties in the genocide, Rwanda had a long period of relative peace that allowed the wounds of the genocide to heal to a greater extent than in Burundi, where peace is still relatively new and fragile. Fear that commemoration might resuscitate the old divisions thus is much more common in Burundi. This fear is often reflected in Burundians' rather cautious and assessing attitudes towards memory and commemoration.

Rwanda is at the opposite end of the spectrum. The official narrative of the genocide has been so pervasive that the proponents of commemoration in Rwanda often view people who do not join the ceremonies as revisionists or old *génocidaires* with a guilty conscience. Commemoration week, when public life in Rwanda shuts down for '*Kwibuka jenoside yakorewe abatutsi*', is not only a week of national mourning. The omnipresent mantra-like repetition of the official narrative¹⁴⁵⁷ that has replaced the recounting of individual stories of suffering in many official ceremonies¹⁴⁵⁸ is not only a pledge for 'Never again'. It has also become a demonstration of power for the RPF and its mythico-history. There is a strong peer pressure and pressure from above to join commemoration if you want to avoid being socially shunned. "*So the problem is still on those people who did the killings because they nev-*

¹⁴⁴⁹ Cf. interviews with Annunciata, 58, Hutu survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Luce, 42, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye

¹⁴⁵⁰ Cf. interview with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali.

¹⁴⁵¹ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Faustin, 40, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Christine, 49, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Boniphilde, 40, Hutu survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Annunciata, 58, Hutu survivor, "Gatumba", Huye;

¹⁴⁵² Interview with "Boniphilde", 40, Hutu survivor, "Gatumba", Huye. Transcript from translator who spoke of Boniphilde in the third person.

¹⁴⁵³ Cf. interviews with Emmanuel, 37, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹⁴⁵⁴ Interview with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹⁴⁵⁵ Interview with Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁴⁵⁶ interview with Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁴⁵⁷ Cf. chapter 4.1.4.

¹⁴⁵⁸ Some Rwandans complained that ceremonies used to be different, focusing more on the victims whereas today, the focus rests more and more on how the government has turned tragedy into a success story (cf. interviews with Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali and Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali). Others criticize the traumatizing character of commemoration ceremonies and would rather have them changed into something more wholesome (cf. interviews with Théodosine, 24, returnee, Kigali; Rugango, 81, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye). Cf. Thomson, 2013, 127-159.

*er wish to participate in commemoration ceremonies*¹⁴⁵⁹ is a very popular view, particularly among survivors and ex-convicts. Although personally, I considered commemoration week extremely one-sided when I attended the national ceremony at Amahoro-stadium and analyzed the press coverage in 2011, many participants did not seem to care too much about Hutu-victims not being explicitly mentioned. Yusuf considered 'genocide against the Tutsi' to be *"simply a term being used at the moment. Maybe we don't know how long it will last, maybe one day it will change"*¹⁴⁶⁰ and Vincent believed that *"nobody is growing a bad heart because of that. Because he thinks it is inclusive, that's what he says. And when it comes to going to remember, everybody can go to the council memorial site. They can gather there and remember people who died during the genocide"*¹⁴⁶¹. There are also other views however: *"I don't see it really helping with reconciliation because it's just one-sided. Because for me, my father got killed by the RPF. [...] For me, I'm not even allowed to speak out in the open that my father was killed by the RPF yet I know that. You can't erase that in my memory as I said"*¹⁴⁶².

Not a Priority

In general, we could say that reprocessing memory is important particularly on an individual level. Many bereaved found consolation in the public acknowledgement and recognition of their suffering. However, neither Rwandan Hutu nor Burundians consider official commemoration a top-priority for reconciliation. As commemoration is always connected to trauma, most survivors do not look forward towards commemoration week and others fear that the old divisions might resurface through commemoration. In general, its merits with reference to prevention and closure are less disputed than its benefits with reference to reconciliation, particularly considering the current character of commemoration ceremonies in Rwanda.

Although most Rwandans would welcome the inclusion and acknowledgement of Hutu victims in official commemoration, they would probably tolerate the partiality of the narrative if it would be limited to commemoration. The main grievances lie elsewhere¹⁴⁶³. Concerning Burundi, the question of commemoration and memory closely relates to the other issues tied into the process of coming to terms with the past: truth and reconciliation, transitional justice, and identity politics. The government has to make a definitive decision between 'burying' the past or working through these issues and coming to terms with them. Should 'working through' succeed, it would require a fundamental

¹⁴⁵⁹ Interview with Anasthase, 71, returnee, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹⁴⁶⁰ Yusuf, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁴⁶¹ Vincent, 43, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. Original transcript from translator who speaks about Vincent in the third person.

¹⁴⁶² Interview with Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁴⁶³ The issue that upset Rwandan peasants the most was inequality with regard to financial assistance and state repression regarding various official policies (planting crops, ethnic identity, reparations, justice).

effort in harmonizing the different narratives and an explicit acknowledgement and recognition of all victims of the various Burundian crises.

6.2.5. Transitional Justice

Rwanda: Justice as Regime Legitimation

Nowhere is the difference between Rwanda and Burundi's post-conflict politics more conspicuous than in the area of transitional justice. Whereas Rwanda went to considerable lengths to punish every perpetrator of the genocide, the Burundian government has only announced the definitive establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission in 2012. The special tribunal to preside over crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, which the APRA stipulated as well, has not been instated yet, as of the time of this writing.

My research questions regarding transitional justice in Rwanda mainly concerned the *Gacaca*-courts because most of my participants had experiences with Rwanda's unique form of transitional justice. *Gacaca*-courts have precipitated very controversial evaluations among Rwandans as well as international observers. While the proximity to the population and the unclogging of the justice system are mostly lauded, the latter criticize the refusal of access to lawyers for defendants, the strong emphasis on pressing confessions, the overextension of the lay judges, the insufficient security for witnesses, as well as the influence of the RPF combined with its refusal to prosecute RPF-crimes¹⁴⁶⁴. The former emphasized the positive attributes of reducing sentences, facilitating closure and finding the truth through confession, combating impunity, and unclogging the justice and prison systems. Participants' complaints about *Gacaca* were related to similar issues as the scholars mention, but apart from the perceived onesidedness of the courts and their exploitation for revenge and enrichment¹⁴⁶⁵, they placed much more emphasis on the difficulties of paying reparations.

Most people I interviewed emphasized the positive points over the negative. Especially survivors agreed that punishment was necessary in order to prevent revenge or further atrocities¹⁴⁶⁶ as well as

¹⁴⁶⁴ Cf. Particularly the laws against 'genocide ideology' and 'divisionism' had a detrimental effect on Rwandans' willingness and ability to express themselves. Cf. HRW, 2011, 131; Rettig, 2008, 45.

¹⁴⁶⁵ Cf. interviews with François, 52, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Thasiene, 38, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Paul, 44, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Yohani N., 68, "Gatumba", Huye; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jean-Pierre, 29, "Gatsata", Gisagara. Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁴⁶⁶ Cf. Interviews with Anasthase, 71, returnee, "Gatumba", Huye; Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali; Vianney, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Delta Foxtrott, 39, returnee, Kigali; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Innocent, 55, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Jeanne, 32, returnee, Huye; Kibonge, 43, bystander, Huye; Nadine, 25, survivor, Kigali; Canisius, 61, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

for the perpetrators to make amends for their deeds¹⁴⁶⁷. Taking the killers off the streets for the security of the survivors and enable coexistence was generally perceived as a requirement for continued coexistence: *"Those who did the killings, if they could stay near them, there would be another... [...] No there would be another killing. They would kill again, if they didn't put them in the prison¹⁴⁶⁸."*

Even though participants frequently criticized the corruptibility and amateurism of judges, one of the factors that was recommended the most, was the local character that made the experience of justice immediate and speaking about what happened in the genocide necessary¹⁴⁶⁹. This allowed some survivors to achieve closure, particularly with regard to the disclosure of the location of the bodies of their relatives, which is culturally significant in Rwanda¹⁴⁷⁰. Confessions and apologies, which were mandatory to be released from prison, helped survivors to cope with the loss and to forgive, even though some survivors considered the apologies not heartfelt enough¹⁴⁷¹, not personal enough or even felt forced to forgive¹⁴⁷². Nevertheless, acknowledging their suffering and making the truth be heard through confessions and punishments was a probably the most important point for survivors even if the apologies were not satisfying¹⁴⁷³. *"The importance of Gacaca was to explain what happened. Those who did the crime, they had to explain the process of what happened¹⁴⁷⁴."*

The *Gacaca*-courts are mainly controversial because of their exclusive focus on the genocide against the Tutsi. Three years after the courts ended, it remains to be seen if the government reacts to the main criticism and addresses RPF-crimes as well. The outlook however is rather bleak with Kagame publicly stating that the elements responsible for extrajudicial killings have already been punished¹⁴⁷⁵. Transitional justice in Rwanda certainly had its benefits particularly with regard to closure, prevention, accountability (at least partial) and public information. It may however also have deepened the divisions between the communities when it comes to coexistence and reconciliation¹⁴⁷⁶.

¹⁴⁶⁷ Cf. Interviews with Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹⁴⁶⁸ Interview with François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye. Also see interview with Canisius, 61, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁴⁶⁹ Even though there were many stories of abuse and manipulation regarding the *Gacaca*-courts and some said that the lay character of the courts invited corruption (cf. Thasiene, 38, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali; Jeanne d'Arc, 34, survivor, "Gatumba", Kigali; Paul, 44, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Gisagara; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Marcel, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Luce, 42, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye. Chris, 29, survivor from Kigali attended many *Gacaca* courts and is still looking for his father's body. He says he knows that it is irrational but as long as he hasn't found it, a part of him still thinks he is alive.

¹⁴⁷¹ Cf. Conversation with Kayitare, 31, survivor, Kigali; Luce, 42, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Annunciata,

¹⁴⁷² Cf. Interview with Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁴⁷³ Cf. interviews with Christine, 29, survivor, "Gatumba", Gisagara; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Marcel, 40, survivor, "Gatumba"; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹⁴⁷⁴ Interview with Teresa, 72, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹⁴⁷⁵ Cf. Kagame, 2009, xxiv.

¹⁴⁷⁶ Cf. In Interviews with François (53, bystander) and Yohani N. (68, ex-convict), both told me about murders in "Gatumba" after the genocide where the survivors who perpetrated the crimes were not held accountable.

The Rwandan think tank IRDP pointed out that the *Gacaca*-courts as an exercise of transitional justice left wounds that have to heal in the post-*Gacaca* period, hinting at the partiality of the process. The report emphasized the importance of a social space of exchange that would "*include the citizens' ownership of strategies aiming at solving ethnic related conflicts*"¹⁴⁷⁷. Hence, despite the fact that *Gacaca* were anchored at the local level and the concept planned to include restorative elements from the beginning, there is a certain understanding in Rwanda that justice was imposed by the victor of the civil war. There is still a strong need for the restoration of relationships on equal footing, and for a truly collective memory, which can only emerge through an open debate on ethnicity and the genocide.

Burundi: A long Prelude to Justice

Burundians have slightly different objectives for transitional justice than the traditional ones such as accountability, truth, reparation or reconciliation¹⁴⁷⁸. With impunity and lack of economic opportunities representing the biggest problems of the post-conflict period, governance and development in the sense of poverty reduction are at the top of the list, making justice a secondary priority. Déogratias explains: "*we have first the problem of poverty, which makes people do whatever they want, they are looking for food and they will do whatever they can to get it. Another thing is the overpopulation because with the family planning, they are trying to teach the population. The president is trying to work well, he has a code of conduct that he follows, but the people around him, other politicians are not working, that's where the problem lies*"¹⁴⁷⁹. Disillusioned and distrustful with regard to the current political establishment in Burundi, most participants have very little hope in the establishment of an impartial institution for transitional justice. In Burundi, rather than acknowledging the inter-ethnic crimes of the past, which too often becomes a global condemnation of entire communities, it would be necessary to rebuild trust and confidence in the state and the justice system first¹⁴⁸⁰.

If transitional justice is viewed in the narrow sense of punishing the guilty, if the CNDD-FDD takes a cue from the RPF's authoritarian handbook and uses transitional justice to satisfy need to legitimate its rule and promote its specific discourse; it will only divide and destabilize the country instead of reconciling it. Even though an assessment might be premature, the timing of the establishment Bu-

Yohani N. (68, "Gatumba") maintains that survivors could get anybody arrested based solely on rumors. For other examples pertaining to problems with *Gacaca*, c.f. interviews of Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Umu-beyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Thasienne, 38, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Gaspard, 26, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali.

¹⁴⁷⁷ IRDP, 2010, 37.

¹⁴⁷⁸ Cf. also Ingelaere, 2009.

¹⁴⁷⁹ Interview with Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹⁴⁸⁰ Cf. Lemarchand and Niwese, 2007, 165f.

rundi's TRC and the reaction of the opposition parties suggests the conjecture that the TRC will be heavily influenced by the CNDD-FDD and that it will shield the party from having to take responsibility for past crimes¹⁴⁸¹. In the current volatile environment, the CNDD-FDD government should in any case resist the temptation of resorting to punitive justice for the time being, even though the APRA and the Burundian law of 27 December 2004 oblige it to deny amnesty for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide¹⁴⁸². The fact that Burundi has to establish institutions of transitional justice in order to access the donor funds supplied for these purposes further complicates the issue of amnesty prohibition. A tribunal widely considered partial that convicts political opponents of the ruling party might be the final straw that brings the situation to boil over into violent conflict.

Despite the lingering legacy of the war and the tense economic situation that exacerbates competition, there is a social basis for issue-based non-ethnic politics in Burundi¹⁴⁸³. Burundians do want to move beyond ethnocentricity. Considering my data, even punishing the leaders of the civil war would not fundamentally disrupt interethnic peace¹⁴⁸⁴, if an independent, impartial (and possibly international) authority would judge these leaders fairly¹⁴⁸⁵. This would ring true especially if immediate economic relief for the population would accompany justice. Both a TRC as well as a special tribunal could be beneficial to reconciliation as long as the TRC encourages cohabitation respectively the tribunal acts impartially, does not condemn globally and builds back trust and confidence in the state. Up to now however, Burundi has blatantly disregarded any recommendations and the advice of the multiple commissions of inquiry with regard to transitional justice¹⁴⁸⁶.

'Maximum Justice' versus 'No Justice'

At first glance, it may appear paradoxical but the truth is that Burundi had very similar reasons for its 'non-approach' to transitional justice as Rwanda had for its 'maximum justice'-approach. The crux of the matter is the difference between the Rwandan and Burundian points of departure with regard to power political settings and their influence on justice.

¹⁴⁸¹ Cf. Nduwimana, *Burundi creates reconciliation body that divides public opinion*, 18. April 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/18/us-burundi-politics-idUSBREA3H0E020140418> (July 23, 2014).

¹⁴⁸² Cf. Vandeginste 2011, 200.

¹⁴⁸³ Cf. Uvin, 2009, 189.

¹⁴⁸⁴ In general, the leaders of the civil war have lost most of their sympathies among the population. Compassion for politicians is very limited. Cf. e.g. interviews with Henriette, 49, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Déogratias, 59, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹⁴⁸⁵ Cf. Interviews with Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Abel, 23, Tutsi ex-combatant, "Rohero", Ngozi; David, 29, Hutu ex-combatant, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi.

¹⁴⁸⁶ Cf. IRIN News Africa, *"Justice in a lawless World? Rights and Reconciliation in a new Era of International Law"*, June 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/indepthmain.aspx?InDepthId=7&ReportId=59485>. (25 July 2014)


The RPF in Rwanda started out as the victorious party of a civil war that had defeated the Hutu extremists but consisted primarily of Tutsi, a persecuted national minority. In order to stabilize the country and make it secure for Tutsi, it made absolute sense from the RPF's perspective of dominance to chase down and imprison every alleged perpetrator, embark on a policy of national unity, and to outlaw the ethnicist ideology. For the Tutsi and thus the RPF, this was a matter of life or death, and transitional justice was their chance to end impunity and instill a change of thinking in the Hutu majority.

In Burundi on the other hand, the CNDD-FDD came to power through negotiations and elections. The ex-rebel movement was not even part of the APRA in 2000 but actually fought its way to the negotiating table later, committing numerous atrocities. When the CNDD-FDD came to power in 2005, the main other rebel movement, the FNL, remained outside the peace process. For persuading the FNL to join the peace process, the CNDD-FDD needed to provide an incentive, which they found in offering temporary immunity from prosecution, which implicitly had been granted to the original signatories of the Pretoria agreement as well¹⁴⁸⁷. The power sharing agreement in Burundi thus functioned as an elite bargain that established a power equilibrium between guilty parties that had not managed to defeat each other by military means. In order to keep the peace and ensure stability within this fragile power-sharing framework, transitional justice had to be put on hold for reasons of political expediency and stability. The inherent danger, that unearthing the past would provoke parties to opt out of the peace process were so clear to all parties involved that even the international community did not press the issue¹⁴⁸⁸. The 2010 elections however shifted the power equilibrium. From its new position of dominance, the CNDD-FDD could justify its rule and consolidate its position by hand picking the members of the TRC and potentially the special tribunal. They can influence the TRC's work or the tribunal's judgements much in the same way as the RPF has utilized transitional justice and commemoration to solidify its interpretational sovereignty over the genocide. Exploited in this context, transitional justice becomes a tool for political defamation, exclusion and division.

Thus, on a power political level, political stability and expediency has been one of the main rationales behind transitional justice in both countries. The question is how this translates to the perceptions of transitional justice at the grassroots.

¹⁴⁸⁷ Even though Burundi formally accepts the amnesty prohibition of the United Nations. Cf. Vandeginste, 2011, 189-211.

¹⁴⁸⁸ Cf. Vandeginste, 2011 & 2012.



Transitional Justice: Comparison Rwanda and Burundi

The answers to the scaled questions suggest that Rwandans in general are content with the course transitional justice has taken whereas Burundians grow increasingly wary of their justice system's non-performance.


There are multiple factors that may explain the positive evaluation of transitional justice in Rwanda:

- The understanding of transitional justice mentioned above: at least some Tutsi were able to find truth and closure; among many Hutus, the *Gacaca*-courts are viewed as the institution that released them, not the reason for their imprisonment.
- Strong pressure for conformity exerted from above to give politically correct answers¹⁴⁸⁹.
- The extensive re-education of the Rwandan population was applied to my research questions.
- Justice with regard to the genocide is generally interpreted as more important than the crimes of the RPF,

With regard to Burundi, the decreasing curve suggests that something has to be done with regard to transitional justice. This becomes even clearer when we compare the research sites:

¹⁴⁸⁹ Although top-down socio-political pressure for political correctness is a given, particularly with regard to ex-convicts (highest approval rate of 3.7), I would hesitate to interpret the high approval rate as a result pure coercion. In reality, approval of transitional justice is probably considerably lower but considering participant observation, I met many Rwandans who were genuinely impressed by the process of transitional justice and had sophisticated opinions about its benefits and failures. Cf. chapter 4.5.

Approval of transitional Justice: Comparison Research Sites					
	1988	1990 (Rwa) / 1993 election (Bdi)	1994 (Rwa) / 1993 crisis (Bdi)	2003 (Rwa) / 2005 (Bdi)	2011
Gakombe, Kirundo	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	1.2
Rohero, Ngozi	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.2	-0.6
Kamenge, Ngozi	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	0.5
Burundi Average	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.3
Gatsata, Gisagara	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	3.7
Gatumba, Huye	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	3.1
Kigali	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	2.7
Rwanda Average	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	3.3



Transitional Justice: Comparison Research Sites

The comparison between research sites illustrates clearly that the appreciation for efforts towards transitional justice in "Gakombe", where twelve out of fourteen participants were Hutu, still rises while it has already dropped below zero in "Rohero", which is predominantly populated by Tutsi. As with matters of coexistence, assistance, or the management of ethnicity, Tutsi in Burundi start feeling marginalized. Transitional justice however is the most dangerous political issue because a partial reprocessing of the events of 1972 and or the behavior of the Tutsi-led army in the civil war might reignite old anti-Tutsi-sentiments. This time, the Tutsi would however not be protected by the army. Rwanda did have its share of problems with regard to Tutsi-victims getting intimidated or even murdered but in general, the RPF regime was interested in most of them speaking out against their torturers and abusers because making the atrocities of the genocide public, furthered the RPF's political agenda. In Burundi however, the CNDD-FDD would not have much incentives to let Tutsi-IDPs or other victims accuse the powerholders. Given the miserable record of the police and the justice system¹⁴⁹⁰, Tutsi plaintiffs or truth-tellers would have to live in constant fear of retaliation, which is not a conducive societal climate for establishing a TRC. To Ingelaere, even the *Gacaca*-approach in Rwanda

¹⁴⁹⁰ Cf. HRW, 2012.

is a deterring example: *"Before the state-sanctioned installation of the Gacaca courts, popular practices and narratives show that the past was primarily tacitly explored without much discursive content. The Gacaca courts substantially altered this non-discursive process of cohabitation due to the introduction of a logic of prosecution in the midst of a peasant society¹⁴⁹¹."* In his eyes, the Western model of 'forensic truth-telling' antagonizes groups further, while traditional forms of justice are rather non-discursive and lack prosecutorial logic¹⁴⁹².

As the diagrams above show, next to the almost complete impunity for crimes that perpetrators currently face in Burundi, even the Rwandan approach of one-sided justice is preferable to most, as long as it implements a modicum of rule of law. In Burundi, transitional justice as well as reconciliation needs to be initiated on the national level with a strong focus on communal issues such as trust building, truth telling, confessions and pardon, joint activities, cohabitation initiatives that end segregation, governmental mediation and process facilitation. The social tissue has to become strong enough so that it is not disrupted by a public debate or a judicial reprocessing of the past.

It is too early for a final evaluation but even if we consider Rwanda's approach towards transitional justice partial and Hutus feel treated unfairly, the Rwandan population in general views this status quo as a strong progress from the culture of impunity that reigned in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994. In Burundi, impunity is still prevalent, if a basic level of security and justice cannot be established, key objectives of reconciliation such as acknowledgement, memory, apology and recognition will continue to be put in second place after security and stability. Retroactive transitional justice might help to reestablish trust and confidence in the state if it proves fair and impartial but in the current situation, the feasibility of establishing an independent national institution of transitional justice has to be questioned. If it primarily focuses on the present, an impartial justice system could help defuse tensions between parties. The promises however look bleak. In Rwanda, the dominance of the ruling party has turned transitional justice into a tool to globalize and perpetuate Hutu guilt and to silence critics. For the CNDD-FDD, this is even simpler. Although they had to take their coalition partners and minority representatives into consideration before 2010, the floodgate has been opened by the elections. With the CNDD-FDD representing the majority of the population and international funds available for transitional justice, the temptation for utilizing it for regime legitimation is high, while the obstacles are negligible.

¹⁴⁹¹ Ingelaere, 2009, 117.

¹⁴⁹² Cf. Ingelaere, 2009, 117.

7. Conclusion

7.1. Coexistence: Ethnic Balance vs. National Unity

A Summary

Both Rwanda and Burundi attempt to change their dynamics of violence through changing sociopolitical frameworks and establishing peace, ethnic coexistence and reconciliation. The overall objectives coincide. Their approaches however diverge strongly.

Burundi mainly concentrated on balancing out politics at the national level. In this aspect, the post-settlement political design succeeded. The consociational political design with ethnic quotas has substantially reduced ethnic tensions on the top level. By its explicit acknowledgement, Burundi from 2005 onward has successfully utilized ethnicity as an instrument of de-escalation instead of radicalization. Contrary to Rwanda, where the conflict potential of polarized ethnic identities has been buried underneath restrictive laws, the political move to make explicit ethnic inclusiveness mandatory has led to new cross-ethnic alliances among the Burundian elite. There has always been a disposition towards consensus and power sharing in Burundian political culture. Much more than in Rwanda, the character of crisis is distinctively political¹⁴⁹³ and has been since the later stages of the civil war, when Buyoya recognized he could not withhold power from the Hutu forever. These political fault lines actually add more exceptions to the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy than the Rwandan victim-perpetrator differentiation does¹⁴⁹⁴. In direct comparison to Rwanda, ethnicity is out in the open, public opinion is still a lot less controlled and the private media and civil society are mostly independent. The intermingling of categories as well as the fact that the main conflict nowadays takes place between the Hutu parties FNL and the CNDD-FDD makes it difficult for politicians to play the ethnic card, thus reducing the danger of widespread ethnic massacres as in the civil war. Even though no significant new identities have emerged and the process of de-polarization could still be reversed by changing the constitution, the fault lines of conflict at the top-political level have at least changed through acknowledgement and recognition of ethnic identity as a source of conflict, at least on the national political level.

¹⁴⁹³ Labruyère, 35, a Tutsi resident from Ngozi speaks about the "*masque ethnique de la violence*", describing the tactics of extremist politicians to disguise politico-economic interests as ethnic differences.

¹⁴⁹⁴ Some examples are e.g. Ferdinand, 56, and Généroise, 43, Hutu Upronists who fled to Rohero as well as Sylvestre, 69, from "*Kamenge*", also a Hutu who joined UPRONA. Abel, 23 and Ezechiel, 31, are Tutsi from "Rohero" who fought for the FNL. Sadi, 45, from "*Kamenge*" claims steadfastly not to know his ethnicity. Déogratias (59, Tutsi resident, "*Kamenge*") and Arsène (35, Tutsi resident, "*Gakombe*") who are Tutsi but joined the CNDD-FDD. In Rwanda on the other hand, there were only Boniphilde and Annunciata who, as Hutu characterized themselves as survivors because they were widows of Tutsi husbands. Bystanders, returnees and ex-convicts are ethnically exclusive categories. Cf. chapters 3.2.4. to 3.2.6.

On the grassroots and with regard to apology, recognition and particularly justice and memory, the state of affairs in Burundi looks much worse. The state has postponed and dragged on the implementation of mechanisms for transitional justice for more than a decade. It mostly left memory work and reconciliation to civil society and Burundian citizens themselves. Although the regime implicitly acknowledges both the suffering of Hutu and Tutsi during the civil war, up to now the actions to implement justice mechanisms or alleviate the consequential hardships have been limited to a bare minimum. The families of the victims of 1972 or 1988 still wait for explicit acknowledgement, recognition and apology for their suffering from the government.

The past as a whole remains largely unaddressed. In the wake of 1972 and 1988 as well as during the long and arduous peace process and after the civil war, international as well as domestic actors considered the government's legitimacy and stability to be more important than memory work or reconciliation politics. This foot-dragging with regard to justice and generally the silence pertaining to past atrocities have led many Burundians to the conviction that forgiving, forgetting and moving forward is the most promising way to cope with the complicated past. Nevertheless, the past lingers on in old prejudices, land disputes, and conflicting narratives. The continuous segregation of the population in many areas has the potential of reversing the interethnic peace process should Tutsi be further marginalized in national politics.

Before the elections of 2015, the country remains in limbo. Although Nkurunziza is still popular among peasants and even Tutsi voted for the CNDD-FDD, insecurity and corruption are rampant, the political parties refuse any meaningful dialogue since 2010 and major political players are mostly preoccupied with defending their positions of political power. Burundians in general have lost hope in politics. Distrust in the state and the justice system is on the rise. Key issues such as ethnic segregation, impunity and land reform have not been approached resolutely enough. After more than a decade of avoiding coming to terms with the past, the government seems to be ready to finally make a decision between 'digging up' or 'burying' the past¹⁴⁹⁵. However, judging from the reactions of civil society, international observers, and opposition parties, it is the wrong decision, solely designed to support the partial narrative of the ruling party.

Rwanda has achieved some important key objectives of reconciliation politics, at least with regard to the genocide. Concerning justice, the Rwandan state has succeeded in trying the majority of genocide suspects with the exception of some who managed to hide abroad. It has also spearheaded the development of community-based trials, the *Gacaca*. With regard to the recognition of suffering, the state has established assistance programs for genocide survivors such as the FARG, re-integration

¹⁴⁹⁵ Cf. Ingelaere, 2009, 5.

programs for perpetrators such as TIG, and supports a wide array of civil society initiatives that aim at facilitating reconciliation. Furthermore, through institutions such as the NURC and the CNLG, the regime has succeeded in thoroughly sensitizing its population about its national discourse on the genocide. National Unity and the common culture of all Rwandans are emphasized everywhere and seem to have permeated to the general population.

These signs of progress however cannot hide the fact that there is an increasing controversy with regard to the design and implementation of Rwandan reconciliation politics. Rwanda's official discourse about acknowledgement, recognition, apology and justice is very narrow, partial and mostly reflects the views of returnees. It monopolizes truth-telling and only applies it to the genocide against the Tutsi but not to alleged RPF/RPA-crimes in Rwanda or the DRC. To a certain degree, the regime utilizes cultural imperialism with regard to identity politics and commemoration. It has all but silenced dissent and open debate. This has forced ethnic identities underground and makes their extant rallying power difficult to assess. With the atrocities against Hutu remaining unaddressed for reasons of national stability, Hutu-guilt globalized, high modernist experiments in agriculture and effective political power limited to a few hand-sorted key players, Rwanda risks producing a growing class of disgruntled Hutu-intellectuals and perpetuating a feeling of oppression among rural Hutu. So far, the state's attempts at 'Rwandification' might actually work as long as the population perceives opportunities for personal socioeconomic advancement and the conditions of the economy and national security do not deteriorate. Kagame and the RPF are still very popular among Rwandans, but they need to turn a new leaf.

This becomes even more urgent as the RPF-regime's 'genocide credit' with international donors crumbles because the atrocities and shady dealings with conflict minerals and gold in the DRC gain international coverage. Rwanda regularly severs ties with its proxies in the DRC due to international pressure. Such was the fate of the RCD-Goma, the CNDP and the M23, which all slumped after Rwandan backing was pulled¹⁴⁹⁶. It however gets increasingly difficult for Kagame to dissociate Rwanda from the conflict in the DRC. Despite its status as darling of the aid industry¹⁴⁹⁷, the continuous destabilizing involvement in the DRC risks drying up Rwanda's international budget support, which in turn is necessary to develop the country and sustaining the confidence of the population.

To summarize the two national approaches to coexistence: while both countries strive for reconciliation and coexistence, Rwanda emphasizes on national unity and tries to implement it through high modernist, top-down policies with the aim of eliminating ethnic identities altogether. Burundi focus-

¹⁴⁹⁶ Revealingly, CNDP-leader Laurent Nkunda was arrested in Rwanda and M23-general Bosco 'Terminator' Ntaganda also turned himself in to the authorities in Kigali.

¹⁴⁹⁷ Cf. Chapter 4.2.2.

es on establishing a constitutional balance between ethnic groups, but apart from sharing power at the top level, has adopted almost no concrete measures to address issues such as transitional justice, commemoration, or assistance for victims. Both ruling parties demonstrate increasingly authoritarian tendencies in order to stabilizing the country, justifying their rule and securing peace and reconciliation with due regard to the respective party's particular needs and visions. Finally, in both countries, the practice of linking reconciliation politics to the necessities of power politics risk derailing the very peace process they are attempting to safeguard.

7.2. Inconsistent Approaches towards Coexistence and Reconciliation

The main problem of the approaches to coexistence described above, 'national unity' respectively 'ethnic balance' is that their strategic application with simultaneous consideration of power politics renders them inconsistent. Both approaches to coexistence are implicitly combined with two different concepts of reconciliation. We could roughly describe these as 'working through' and 'forgive and forget'. The combinations of the approach to coexistence and the approach to reconciliation are less than ideal in both countries.

Rwanda: 'National Unity' and 'Working Through'

As set out in chapter 4, the RPF started out as a party representing a minority. Its only two possible scenarios for building a common future for Rwandans where the RPFs core constituency, the Tutsi, remain a co-determinant political force to be reckoned with are:

- a) Following through with its policy of unity and reconciliation and ultimately eliminating the very concept of ethnic groups in the process, thus establishing the RPF as a Rwandan unity party, or
- b) Switching to a consociational arrangement as Burundi has and hoping that the RPF will be perceived as a national party crossing ethnic boundaries or that a united Tutsi minority becomes the tip of the scale in a political arena of predominantly Hutu parties.

Option B is highly unlikely, as it would negate the discourse of national unity that the RPF has been promoting for the past twenty years. A system-switch would also add a rather unpredictable component to Rwandan politics and it would almost certainly imply a significant loss of power for the incumbents, as Buyoya's defeat in Burundi after introducing multiparty democracy in 1993 has demonstrated. Furthermore, a quota model does not seem to be very popular among peasants, who fear it might lead to sectarian politics again. Hence, the RPF will most likely abide by its distinct program of promoting national unity while legitimizing its rule with recourse to the genocide against the Tutsi

that followed the last experiment with unchecked multiparty democracy. This recourse to the genocide including its distinct projects, namely national commemoration, transitional justice, and specific assistance programs for survivors, however, is exactly what renders the discourse of national unity inconsistent.

If "*we are all one people*"¹⁴⁹⁸ as the RPF promotes and the historical differences between Hutu and Tutsi are about to be reduced to the point of non-existence, then a policy of forgiving and forgetting as many Burundian peasants call for would be much more effective for promoting national unity and reconstructing society from scratch. Instead, the RPF has fully dedicated itself to 'Never Again'. The genocide is omnipresent in Rwandan public life, especially during commemoration week. The country does not officially celebrate its independence; it does only mourn the beginning of the genocide on April 6. The ubiquitous lessons and sensitizations informing citizens about the genocide are inescapable and mandatory for ex-convicts, politicians and university students. The party's drive for 'maximum justice' has imprisoned masses of innocent Hutu, many died in prison, adding further grievances to the old wounds. Official commemoration acknowledges the victims of the genocide but by glossing over the Hutus who were killed from 1990 up to the Congo Wars, it consistently reminds their relatives of historical Hutu guilt while neither acknowledging nor recognizing their losses. Renounced civil rights for ex-convicts and reparation payments; respectively almost exclusive assistance for survivors finally makes Hutu painfully aware of the unequal treatment of Rwandans in Kagame's state. Transitional justice, commemoration, apology, acknowledgement and recognition are pillars of the Rwandan policy of unity and reconciliation but they are implicitly reserved for the victims of one side. Abandoning the identities that brought about so much grief in Rwanda and building a common future is a noble goal, but it is doomed to fail as long as the genocide is still allowed to categorize Rwandans, dividing them through the inequality created by the very policies designed to eliminate its legacy.

Actually, even the Burundian 'non-approach' to transitional justice would have probably harmonized far better with politics of national unity and the outlawing of ethnic identities. With a two-sided strictly restorative or symbolic approach to transitional justice such as e.g. in the South African TRC, *Gacaca* might have avoided the tense atmosphere with mutual accusations of defendants or the practice of abusing courts for settling personal scores. Such an approach might have truly urged the population to apologize, forgive and move on as equals instead of having the side effect of globalizing guilt and permanently reducing the defendants to second-class citizens by renouncing their rights. The genocide is universally considered an atrocity never to be repeated and participants in general never questioned assistance to survivors. The only point of critique with regard to assistance

¹⁴⁹⁸ Interview with Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

frequently uttered in interviews was that the families of (dead) perpetrators or Hutu who were jailed innocently receive neither assistance nor reparations. In the current scenario however, commemoration is forced upon the losers of the civil war by the victors as an annual admission of guilt. The purported inclusiveness of the new Rwandan national identity is voided by the unequal treatment of Rwandans at the hands of a government that still does not trust the majority of its population.

Burundi: 'Ethnic Balance' and 'Forgiving and Forgetting'

Due to the long, fragile and difficult peace process, the state of Burundi and its international partners have up until now treated transitional justice as a secondary priority, which factually amounts to almost fifteen years of practiced 'forgiving and forgetting' even though the government has formally accepted the amnesty prohibition of the international community¹⁴⁹⁹. It is still too early to evaluate the impact of the newly formed TRC or if and when the Burundian government will follow through with establishing a special tribunal but the context of operation for an impartial truth finding commission is rather unfavorable since the elections of 2010.

For facilitating coexistence, Burundi is pursuing a strategy of balancing the intact ethnic conflict era-identities through a complex system of proportionality, ethnic quotas, qualified majorities and Tutsi overrepresentations in the key areas of the army, administration and parliament. This is the approach generally favored by Western scholars and, if applied correctly, it guarantees equal chances for Hutu and Tutsis and reduces the significance of ethnicity as a political conflict factor. On the top-level, this works. Nevertheless, there are certain problems with the consociational approach: even with a political balance established, the historical conflict potential as well as the groups' self-awareness and their differing narratives remain untouched. Mutual accusations of having started the conflict are also more common in Burundi than in Rwanda.

In order to address and heal the historical grievances and to establish a narrative of the collective past that is shared by both groups, would mutually recognize their suffering, and lay the fundament for a shared memory, the consociational approach would necessitate 'working through' the violent past¹⁵⁰⁰. One of the aspects of the Rwandan policy of unity and reconciliation often evaluated positively by survivors was closure, apology and recognition. Survivors felt enabled to turn a new leaf after they knew that the truth was established and their loss was officially recognized. In Burundi, interviewees considered the impunity of perpetrators as one of the biggest obstacles to peace and reconciliation next to poverty and the struggle for politico-economic power. Combating impunity, establishing the truth and offering recognition however, requires a conscious and proactive effort by

¹⁴⁹⁹ Cf. Chapter 5.2.

¹⁵⁰⁰ Cf. Rigby, 2006, 52f. and Lemarchand, 2009b.

the government to address the past and reprocess it. In a country where many politically active national leaders are responsible for atrocities in the past and where a group's historical suffering is inextricably linked with its ethnic identity, this of course may put political stability in jeopardy. Hence, Burundi's political establishment has tacitly agreed to a conspiracy of silence as long as nobody has the upper hand. Crimes committed in the context of civil war or ethnic strife as in 1972 are conveniently forgotten.

The Burundian population, particularly the supporters of president Nkurunziza would actually welcome a consistent policy of 'burying the past'. Even some Rwandans less affected by the past such as bystanders and returnees would agree with this view. However, the ongoing struggle for political power between the CNDD-FDD and the opposition parties, especially the FNL, has extended the conspiracy of silence into the present, leading to a widespread culture of political violence and impunity. Revenge and vigilantism are daily occurrences while the wounds of 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993 remain untreated and only wait for a political entrepreneur that demands justice for his ethnic group to exploit them. It speaks for the design of the Burundian power sharing agreement that the political conflict did not take on an ethnic dimension so far. Unfortunately, this could change soon if Nkurunziza abolishes the post of the Tutsi vice president and perhaps even further minority representations or if the new Burundian TRC handpicked by president Nkurunziza will act as partial as assumed by the opposition.

Paradoxically, even though Burundi has undertaken far less measures to facilitate reconciliation than Rwanda did, this has also prevented Burundian reconciliation politics to become instrumental to oppression in an authoritarian state as of yet. In a balanced-out system without commemoration or a shared memory, neither transitional justice nor explicit acknowledgement of suffering from the state, all parties remain silent. They however remain apart.

General Requirements for Reconciliation Politics

Considering all four approaches to coexistence and reconciliation and their inconsistent combinations, we can identify a few prerequisites to reconciliation and peaceful coexistence that are important regardless of the approach.

First, **equality** is probably the most important requirement for reconciliation to succeed. If citizens call the equal treatment of all conflict parties into question, reconciliation is always perceived in the context of dominance and thus considered partial and dishonest at best. In such a scenario, people feeling oppressed will only pay lip service to the policy regardless of its specific design. Next to politics, equality in the sense of recognition particularly pertains to assistance and support for poor

members of the community and victims of mass violence. Poverty is a direct driving force of conflict and if it is combined with jealousy and greed against aid-recipients from another group, it breeds extremism. Vulnerable groups such as survivors and families of convicts in Rwanda or marginalized Tutsi and demobilized soldiers and rebels in Burundi should be targeted for assistance specifically, but without denying support to others. Ex-convicts should have their civil rights reinstated after having served their sentence. Being rehabilitated as a full-fledged member of society is the whole purpose of punishment, atonement and reintegration via TIG, thus political rights should be reinstated as well.

Second and closely related to equality is the imperative of **impartiality** with regard to justice and commemoration. If a post-conflict state chooses to 'work through' the past or combat impunity, it is paramount that all defendants are treated equally. I disagree with Clark¹⁵⁰¹ here, who maintains that the genocide in Rwanda has been such an outstanding crime that it had to be brought to justice first and that there would be room to judge RPF/RPA-crimes later. The exclusive focus of *Gacaca* on the genocide led to their perception as victor's justice among Hutus even if these Hutu acknowledged that the genocide had been primarily a crime against Tutsi and that its resurgence should be prevented. As long as the defendant conceives his trial as fair and impartial, he may understand his punishment as an act of cleansing not as an act of oppression and deprivation of liberty. Some ex-convicts I interviewed tried to make sense of their prison terms in this manner, but mostly they were just glad to having survived the prisons. Even though a society can opt for not addressing the past, impartial rule of law is just as important with regard to transgressions in the present because the rule of law acts preventively if it is truly impartial. Conversely, impunity for crimes in the past perpetuates itself and incites revenge if the group dynamics remain unchanged or if the justice system is corrupted. Hence, the most urgent problem the Burundian government needs to address is impunity, at least with regard to current crimes, because it perpetuates the suffering.

Third, reconciliation politics are a matter of **balance**. Most participants in Rwanda as well as in Burundi expressed their preference for transitional justice and commemoration compared to forgiving and forgetting, provided that these endeavors would not disrupt the balance between Hutu and Tutsi or would disturb the peace. Post-conflict societies are very fragile environments and conflicts are easily sparked anew when old grievances are dragged forth or (tacit) agreements are broken. I do welcome the amnesty prohibition for crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, but in the contexts of Rwanda and Burundi where the future hinges largely on social cohesion and a common interpretation of the past, restorative or symbolic justice are less conflict-laden than traditional punitive justice. Therefore, I would favor a hybrid approach that combines 'forgiving' with restorative

¹⁵⁰¹ Cf. Clark, 2009, 297-320.

justice and truth-telling. The value of acknowledgement and apology for restoring balance is often underestimated. In both countries, many people affected by the violence said that they would not necessarily be appeased by the punishment of the perpetrator, but by his heartfelt apology and the alleviation of the hardships that his actions caused. Even with regard to RPF/RPA-crimes, most Hutu said that they would be content with a symbolic admission of guilt. Punishing the leaders either needs a societal consensus about their guilt as in the case of the *génocidaires* or Ndadaye's murderers or it requires a strong social tissue that could bear the conviction of a popular leader without disaggregating into ethnic camps again. For the ethnic balance to remain intact, the Burundian government should provide targeted support particularly to disgruntled Tutsi-communities such as "Ro-hero", and leave the stipulations of the power sharing agreement untouched if it does not want the conflict to aggravate and spill into identity politics.

Lastly, an **open debate** about identity issues and the past dissociated from politics would be highly desirable. Even if the country opts for forgiving and forgetting, divided societies are usually in dire need of a collective past and shared symbols. Without forcing it upon people through heavy-handed re-education, which often only intimidates them to the point of remaining silent, such a merging of narratives needs time, effort, open-mindedness and social cohesion. Furthermore, scientific research should not be constrained or interfered with, even if it differs from the dominant opinion. Trying to control the historical discourse means closing one's eyes to new insights and will eventually breed more criticism. By co-opting or silencing civil society and the media and aggressively defending interpretational sovereignty with regard to criticism from academia or international NGOs, the Rwandan government has blocked almost every unfiltered feedback loop when it comes to the negative aspects of its policies. Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD demonstrates the same totalitarian ambition and seeks to imitate the RPF's success, but lacks the discipline that a stern leader such as Kagame and mechanisms such as *Imihigo* have instilled in Rwanda. If Rwanda however remains ignorant towards criticism, particularly from its own peasants, its ambitious policies will probably fail as well. If we take other African experiences with large-scale top-down development – projects as references, high modernist projects lacking popular feedback loops are prone to arrogance, ignorance and ultimately disaster¹⁵⁰².

7.3. The Framework Conditions of Policy Implementation are Key

Popular Preferences

¹⁵⁰² Cf. chapter 2.3.

The establishment of security and rule of law as far as it pertains to the everyday life of Rwandans may have been Kagame's greatest contribution to Rwanda's medium-term stability. It may also be the biggest difference to Burundi, where violence has never fully stopped and is sanctioned by "*blanket impunity protecting the perpetrators*"¹⁵⁰³."

With respect to popular perceptions about changing the lethal Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy, the important aspect in certain cases may not be the approach chosen, but its implementation. As a Swiss citizen who grew up in a consociational state that has managed its plural society reasonably well by introducing a complex system of balances, quotas and minority representations, I do have a strong preference for the consociational Burundian model. Although the preconditions in Switzerland did not involve mass violence and the system is reformed permanently, its design enabled the Swiss government to include emerging counter-elites gradually, thus avoiding violent confrontations for over 150 years. Instinctively, it seems more honest to me to acknowledge the divisions that run through society and to address the problems they cause directly by sharing power between the antagonist groups than to brush over these divisions and declare them an externally imposed (colonial) invention. Nationalist leveling down is particularly problematic if the public profession of unity is undermined by hidden discriminatory practices as described above.

Personal preferences notwithstanding however, Rwanda's policy of unity and reconciliation is the subject of much more praise among the Rwandan and Burundian rural populations than Burundi's consociational experiment, which finds most of its adherents among intellectuals and foreign scholars. Policy design itself however is not the principal reason for this popular preference. There is plenty of criticism among Rwandans, especially Hutus, with reference to the one-sidedness of commemoration¹⁵⁰⁴, transitional justice¹⁵⁰⁵ or the repression of dissent¹⁵⁰⁶. Conversely, even though it did not end impunity or stop the violence completely, a majority of Burundians also acknowledges that the establishment of quota regulations succeeded to change the fronts from 'ethnic' to 'political'¹⁵⁰⁷.

¹⁵⁰³ HRW, 2012, 2.

¹⁵⁰⁴ Cf. Interviews with Canisius, 61, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Cécile, 40, Bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Gaspard, 26, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara; Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatata", Gisagara; Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Vincent, 43, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali; John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara.

¹⁵⁰⁵ Cf. e.g. interviews with Thasiene, 38, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatata", Gisagara; Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Rugango, 81, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; John, 56, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali.

¹⁵⁰⁶ Cf. interviews with Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Jean-Pierre, 29, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Gaspard, 26, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Paul, 44, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye.

¹⁵⁰⁷ Cf. e.g. Interviews with Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Venantie K. 25, Hutu resident, "Kamenge"; Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Juvénal H.53, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Pascal M., 29, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Abel, 23, ex-

Thus, the model itself is only a secondary point of criticism. No, the main reason for preferring the Rwandan model is that through the determined implementation of the national reconciliation policy, the Rwandan government has visibly demonstrated its will to break the cycle of violence – on its own terms. Programs such as *Gacaca*, *Girinka*, the *FARG*, and even camps, and workshops such as *itorero* and *ingando* have had a serious impact on the lives of almost all Rwandans. Even though the partiality and controversies remain, the Rwandan government has backed up its claims with concrete measures. In Burundi on the other hand, most rural dwellers cannot identify any concrete government programs intended to alleviate the consequences of the civil war or the previous episodes of mass killing. In most cases, consociationalism did not permeate into the daily life of rural Burundians. Apart from sporadic mentions about speeches or seminars that promoted reconciliation¹⁵⁰⁸, the interviewees did not experience any significant initiatives from above aiming for change and the CNDD-FDD is considered a Hutu-party by disappointed Tutsi ex-members such as Arsène¹⁵⁰⁹. There is a growing subset of the population, which believes that the conditions in Burundi today are the same or worse¹⁵¹⁰ compared to the crisis.

Politico-economic Overlaps and the Significance of Exclusion

Regardless of opting for a national unity approach, quotas, 'working through' or 'forgetting', one of the most important factors for defusing these conflicts is to separate the close association between politics and wealth accumulation. This factual overlap turns political conflict into a matter of life or death for opposing groups. Referring to the recent history of the Great Lakes, the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy has always been about politico-economic dominance and exclusion. With the exception of some small intermezzos, both groups have always treated politics as a zero-sum game with a clear winner and loser. The case of post-2005 Burundi and the behavior of the MRND prior and during the genocide in Rwanda illustrate this very well. With ethnic differences losing importance due to the quota regulations in Burundi, the main fault lines of the conflict are now political party affiliations. The loser-winner-dynamic however did not change. Rather, it was exacerbated through the elections of

combatant, "Rohero", Ngozi; Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Gertrude, 46, Hutu refugee, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Alexandre, 35, ex-combatant, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; David, 29, ex-combatant, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Janvière, 38, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi.

¹⁵⁰⁸ Alexandre, 35, ex-combatant from "Kamenge", Ngozi mentioned that the commune and an NGO called MI PAREC assisted his demobilization and sent him to seminars. Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident and Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, both from "Kamenge" talked about officials trying to sensitize people for reconciliation. Izabel, Viola (37, Hutu resident, "Rohero") and Michel (65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero") also spoke about associations similar to AMI in Rwanda where they could find assistance. Apart from that, Nkurunziza's projects of free primary school, healthcare for children and birth assistance were mentioned but even if these developments are positive, they are not specifically aimed at reconciliation

¹⁵⁰⁹ Cf. Interview with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo;

¹⁵¹⁰ Cf. Interviews with Juvéanal, 59, Tutsi resident, „Rohero“, Ngozi; Marguerite, 55, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Hari (50, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi) even said that he would actually prefer the UPRONA back in power even though they killed his brother during the civil war.

2010. As David, an ex-combatant from "Rohero" states: "*L'ethnicité disparaîtra mais après sa disparition il y a d'autres divisions qui vont naître*"¹⁵¹¹.

This dynamic is lethal. According to Lemarchand, the central pattern of violence in the Great Lakes is exclusion: "*ethnic polarization paves the way for political exclusion, exclusion eventually leading to insurrection, insurrection to repression, and repression to massive flows of refugees and internally displaced persons which in turn become the vectors of further instability*"¹⁵¹². Even though Burundians (as well as Rwandans) consider their leaders responsible for the crisis, the same leaders are simultaneously considered responsible for initiating change and including the former enemies in the country's politics. In Burundi, there is a growing disillusion with the non-performance of politics. Particularly in isolated communities such as "Rohero", far too less is being done to facilitate communal cohabitation. The steps taken in Rwanda may be one-sided and can rightly be criticized for their top-down implementation, but in Burundi, there has been little to no national initiative with regard to truth-telling, acknowledgement, apology, justice or joint communal activities. On the local level, many Burundians have already made tremendous progress with regard to collaborating again, pardoning each other or even intermarrying. The local problems would be solvable, but on the national level, progress remains blocked due to the interconnection between political power and wealth, which means the local level remains deprived of economic assistance, justice, good governance and initiatives for more social cohesion¹⁵¹³. Due to the dependence of the economy on politics in Africa, the absence of service delivery from the center to the periphery risks derailing the Burundian reconciliation process as a whole. Abject poverty and the absence of economic opportunities are important driving forces for armed insurrection as the stories of the veterans Abel and Ezechiel demonstrate who served in both the FAB and later the FNL. The combination of political standoff, corruption, overpopulation, dependence on agriculture with very limited land resources and an ongoing culture of violence and impunity makes the situation in Burundi extremely volatile. Up until now, most Burundians consider the newly established institutions that should promote accountability and good governance such as the CNTB (*Commission Nationale Terre et autres Biens*), the office of the ombudsman or the CENI (*Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante*) as little more than figleaves for the ruling party's corruption and authoritarian ambitions. The Burundian CVR in its current design risks sharing the fate of these institutions. The very limited functionality of public institutions that should actually act as political warchdogs or guarantee the equality of Burundians before the law will exacerbate the tensions further, leaving either the recourse to sectarian violence or the establishment of a dictatorship (including the complete repression of dissent) as the two most likely scenari-

¹⁵¹¹ Interview with David, 29, H. ex-combatant FAB, "Kamenge", Ngozi. Translation: *Ethnicity will disappear but after its disappearance, other divisions will appear.*

¹⁵¹² Lemarchand, 2009a, 31.

¹⁵¹³ Cf. Ingelaere, 2009.

os. If political power and accumulation of wealth are not dissociated from each other, politics will continuously tend to deteriorate into sectarian life and death struggles prone to ethnic radicalization in the Great Lakes.

7.4. Conclusion and Outlook

Considering society as a whole, reconciliation is primarily a politico-economic problem in both countries. Citizens themselves, even those haunted by horrible memories and trauma, are mostly ready to forgive, reconcile and move on. Rwanda and Burundi are poor and densely populated. There simply is no alternative to coexistence for them. Thus, most participants choose to live with the past. Either by forgiving and forgetting, or by addressing it through workshops, building communal associations, attending *Gacaca* or collaborating in self-help groups. Even with promising signs of reconciliation at the grassroots however, politics and particularly the relation between political power and wealth accumulation remain great problems. Elites under pressure resorting to politics of exclusion have driven the population into genocide and mass violence. Hence, true reconciliation has to begin by changing the dynamics of politics in both countries.

Violence: Patterns and Regionalization

With the CNDD-FDD fighting the FNL and the RNC establishing a Rwandan opposition movement recruited primarily from RPF-dissidents, not mainly exiled *génocidaires* like the FDLR, a decidedly political dimension has been added to the ethnic fault lines that shaped the violence in the 1990s. Despite conflicting accusations, rumors and suspicions on all sides aiming to accuse the antagonist movements of ethnic discrimination¹⁵¹⁴, the conflicts in both countries have assumed the dynamic of ruling party versus opposition movements with the latter permanently on the verge of taking up arms or already in armed insurrection. Most of the armed movements however are too weak to topple a government and do not have significant international or domestic support at their disposal. Thus, they often cross the border into the vast territory of the DRC where they can hide better than in the overpopulated hills of Rwanda and Burundi and support themselves through plunder or the exploitation of the local population. Some of these groups are little more than armed bandits, but they still represent a security threat to Rwanda or Burundi.

¹⁵¹⁴ The RPF is working hard on proving an alliance between RNC, FDLR and FDU-Inkingi and blaming it for grenade attacks in Kigali in order to discredit the external opposition. Cf. Rolley, Sonja: " *Général Joseph Nzabamwita: «L'alliance entre le RNC et les FDRL est une alliance criminelle»*", 28 January 2014) on: <http://www.rfi.fr/sports/20140127-general-joseph-nzabamwita-alliance-entre-rnc-fdrl-est-une-alliance-criminelle-proces-terreur-karegeya-nyamwasa/> (6 October 2014). Hutus on the other side accuse the RPF of hidden ethnic discrimination (Cf. chapter 4.4. and 6.2.3.). In Burundi, particularly Tutsi accuse the government of discrimination whereas Hutu mostly consider ethnic problems resolved. Cf. chapter 5.1.2. and 6.2.1.

Since the refugee wave in 1994 and at least since the ADFL-insurrection in 1996, Rwanda and Burundi have increasingly exported their conflicts into the eastern DRC¹⁵¹⁵. Tens of thousands of Rwandan Hutu refugees disappeared here since 1996. The eastern DRC effectively is a lawless territory where guerilla movements thrive on the rough terrain, natural resources and the very weak central power. Sites of mass crime can easily be cordoned off. Particularly Rwanda fell back on the guerilla tactics of resource exploitation by proxy after the successful invasion of Zaïre in 1996, providing its army and elites with an increased income. There are even rumors that Rwanda is planning to annex the Kivus and that the CNDD-FDD is training its *Imbonerakure* in the eastern DRC¹⁵¹⁶. One of the main reasons why the situation in the DRC is not coming to rest is because the Kivus serve as retreat area for Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian insurgents and as a resource-rich arena for the Great Lakes' power holders. Hence, many national crises tend to spill over into the DRC. If the RPF or the CNDD-FDD alienate their opposition to the point that armed insurrection or should the ruling parties lose their grip on power, the eastern DRC will almost certainly be pulled into the conflict as long as the Congolese government or the MONUSCO cannot get these eastern provinces under control, which still seems very unlikely. Invasions from abroad in times of weak central power already have a long tradition in the Great Lakes: the RPF invaded from Uganda in 1990, and Rwanda and Burundi both invaded the DRC in 1996 and 1998. Even the massacres in Rwanda in the 1960s happened after armed invasions of exiled Tutsi from Burundi.

Genocidal violence in the Great Lakes thus follows a very distinct pattern: distribution battles for politico-economic power provoke a political crisis and force politicians to rally their supporters. In such situations, politics often quickly assume an ethnic dimension and the confrontation expands rapidly and through a cataclysmic event (e.g. the assassination of the president in 1993 and 1994, insurrections in 1963 (Rwanda), 1965 and 1972 (Burundi)), the violence unfolds and either the revolt or its suppression become genocidal. To stop these genocidal dynamics, the distribution battles need to at least lose their element of ethnic competition. The rule of law thus has to separate political power from wealth accumulation as well as build new identities that bridge the ancient chasms.

Comparing my findings in Rwanda and in Burundi, I would probably ascribe better chances for peace to Rwanda, which can count on a much greater international aid budget and invests it wiser, particularly by furthering the rule of law and the private sector, thus limiting the possibility of an economic crisis that pitches the groups against each other. Nevertheless, I still think that Burundi would have the better long-term chances for eliminating ethnic competition and truly reconciling its ethnic groups because the dialogue is much more open and the group interests run across ethnic borders.

¹⁵¹⁵ Cf. Prunier, 2009.

¹⁵¹⁶ Cf. Bekele & Fardeau, *When Pierre Claver Mbonimpa is Jailed, All Burundians Are At Risk*, HRW, 3 June 2014, <http://www.hrw.org/de/node/126105> (27 August 2014).

Burundi however faces massive problems with impunity and corruption and its almost complete isolation from global revenue streams renders economic competition political and political competition lethal. In addition, the Burundian elite is too self-absorbed with internal power struggles to tackle these problems.

Rwanda, with its seemingly amazing recovery, its complex schemes and paradox developments, is the more interesting subject for foreign scholars than Burundi. Because the Rwandan regime is obsessed with its external image and its information management, academic scholars themselves quickly become an active part in the discussion of Rwanda's historiography. Furthermore, even with all the alleged atrocities of the RPF-government in the wake of the genocide and in the DRC, Rwanda is for the most part safe for Western researchers, making it a popular destination for doing research.

If Rwanda could be considered an African miracle with a well-hidden double bottom, Burundi represents the umpteenth installation of the failure of democracy in Africa by an externally brokered peace agreement. It is a tragic example for how little the world still cares for politics of exclusion and human rights violations in remote African regions – despite the international wake-up call, that was the Rwandan genocide. A fortiori because Rwanda has attracted such a large crowd of Western analysts, the neglect bestowed on Burundi is even more startling.

Rwanda: Life after Kagame is uncertain

The success of the different measures taken by Rwanda and Burundi to prevent the ethnicization and thus the escalation of conflict from repeating themselves depend on the factor time and the credibility of national politics. The true opinion of Rwandans is well hidden and difficult to uncover by outsiders.

With all the rumors about massacres in the DRC, the prevailing culture of silence and the rise of authoritarianism, Kagame's legacy with regard to reconciliation will only become truly apparent when he steps down and the country opens up to genuine political competition. Only an open political competition will reveal if 'divisionist' tendencies have really been resolved and the RPF is considered a national party for all Rwandans or if these tensions were only suppressed.

Even though partially, the Rwandan past has been reprocessed rather comprehensively with regard to certain aspects of the genocide such as ethnic extremism, combating impunity and prevention through (re-)educating the population. Other root causes such as the culture of obedience, the authoritarian organization of society, and the zero-tolerance approach towards political dissent remain as dominant and widespread as before the genocide. Suppressing a public debate about the past keeps everyone in the dark about how prevalent sectarian ideology still is among the population. Even worse, the RPF's rigid censorship, which makes addressing the grievances of Hutu or Tutsi impossible

under the current law could tempt disgruntled Hutu politicians to exploit ethnic identity as a rallying flag against 'Tutsi-rule' just like before the genocide. This is particularly sad because with the exception of the opposition in GB, there are currently only negligible traces of ethnic competition in the daily lives of Rwandan peasants, they do appear mostly reconciled. Paradoxically, Kagame might even have been elected in 2010 without excluding every serious opposition candidate from the presidential race before the election. Many Rwandans see the merits of his development policies, security and economic recovery. Particularly assistance programs such as *Ubudehe* or *Girinka* are viewed almost universally positive. If the state does not perform according to its public declaration, locals usually blame local officials.

Considering the still fresh memory of the genocide in Rwanda, most Rwandans take the message 'Never Again' seriously. Understanding the genocide as the watershed it has been for the current generation and viewing Rwanda as a nation of young people who grow up without ethnic labels, many of my participants actually expressed the hope that ethnic identities might increasingly lose importance and vanish with time. The RPF however has to seek the dialogue with the desperate, the disappointed and the discontent. The president and his party have enough political sway to allow the discourse about accountability for the past to leave more room for dissenting voices without having to renounce their leadership or jeopardizing the project of national unity.

In a first step, the government should reduce the application of Rwanda's laws against 'divisionism' and 'genocide ideology' to truly revisionist attempts of denial and stop utilizing them broadly to quell any form of criticism. The party should also make good on genuine reconciliation by acknowledging the RPF's transgressions (at least symbolically), looking for a way to explicitly including Hutu victims in commemoration and ending covert ethnic discrimination. Particularly the last point, combined with extended governmental assistance for vulnerable Hutu, is paramount for the anti-ethnic ideology to take hold among bystanders and ex-convicts. There is a growing elite of Hutu intellectuals who feel as if they and their (often deceased) parents serve as scapegoats for the RPF's ideology and justification to rule. If these intellectuals become susceptible to resorting to ethnic identities for rallying their fellow Hutus because of the RPF's censorship or the partiality of its reconciliation politics, the reconciliation process of twenty years would have to be declared a failure and the ensuing competition would probably become violent rapidly.

With regard to international criticism, I would like to point out that, in my opinion, the failure to interfere in Rwanda during the 1990s does not remove the international community's right to criticize the Rwandan regime. To the contrary, the international community and particularly the West do have an obligation to help rebuilding the country we did nothing to stop from burning. Exactly because we failed in 1994, we should remain vigilant with regard to negative developments. The geno-

cide could probably have been stopped before it started if the many Western representatives of diplomacy and development assistance would not have turned a blind eye on Rwanda's politics or even supported structural violence with their actions. Hence, if it proves to be founded and aims at eliminating injustice, criticism of the current regime is not only appropriate, but also necessary.

Combined with sticking to certain governmental initiatives currently in place e.g. in the areas of good governance and implementing the rule of law, adherence to the recommendations outlined above would probably help to prevent further bloodshed. In such a scenario, time and stability work in favor of the RPF. As long as the country prospers, develops and wealth at least trickles down to the peasants, Kagame's '*window of opportunity*¹⁵¹⁷' stays open. Most Rwandans are willing to accept authoritarian leadership and even the discourse of the 'liberators' if they detect concrete advantages for their daily lives. They can see their own unequal treatment or suffering either as a sacrifice for peace and prosperity or as an offence against their human rights by an unjust oppressor. With Kagame's ruthlessness starting to show and international goodwill and funds drying up however, the window is closing fast.

Burundi: Disappointed Hopes

Burundi's story is less promising, but also less cryptic. Nkurunziza, apart from his excentric brand of born-again Christianity and the fact that he is the first Hutu president, falls in line with other fairly typical African 'big men'. His rule disappointed many of the initial hopes as a representant of the Hutu majority who was elected in free and fair elections.

The CNDD-FDD proceeded to plundering government coffers and appeasing the now multi-ethnic elite with rents and government posts up to the point of economic stagnation. Facing democratic challenge, the ruling party ultimately reacted increasingly violent to keep the opposition at bay. Despite new institutions such as the Ombudsman or the Anti-corruption court, there is no good governance-policy as in Rwanda. There is no radiant development record and no hidden truth in the shadows to uncover.

Burundi's misery is out in the open and it has been at least since the elections of 1993. Whereas Rwandans cultivate a culture of silence regarding ethnic identity, most Burundians talk about their ethnicity and its instrumentalization by political parties rather freely. Nevertheless, we could talk about a conspiracy of silence in Burundi when it comes to past atrocities because most parties are at least partially guilty for either promoting violence or prolonging the war. Even if the quota regulations did change the dynamics of conflict, they did resolve neither the inherited problems of the past nor the deadliness of political competition. Although members of opposition parties are disappearing

¹⁵¹⁷ Cf. chapter 4.7.

now instead of Hutu intellectuals as in 1972, some Burundians perceive the practices of eliminating politico-economic competition as eerily similar¹⁵¹⁸. The disassociation of political competition from ethnicity however marks the difference between a low-intensity guerilla war shaped by extrajudicial killings and outright mass violence.

Nevertheless, there is a chance to resolve the conflict altogether and even more than in Rwanda; external influence is highly instrumental for peace building. In a state utterly dependent on international assistance such as Burundi, there is leverage on the side of the donor community. Repression of the media should not be tolerated as long as no hate speech is involved; neither should the outlawing of demonstrations or the arrests of opposition members, journalists or human rights activists on bogus charges. The donor community should push significantly harder for the establishment of (bottom-up) accountability on every level of the bureaucracy and for anti-corruption legislation and for criminal justice to be rigorously enforced. What Burundi needs most however is international attention. Its tragic history has too long stood in the shadow of the drama that unfolded in Rwanda. Even compared with Rwanda, its similarly small and poor northern twin, Burundi has often been treated as a secondary priority by the international community. In 2015, a new round of elections will attract at least some international attention. Thus, it is of prime importance to voice criticism now, as long as the violent tendencies can still be reversed.

The road towards the 2015 elections is a crossroads for Burundi. There are still chances for democracy if the campaign proceeds undisturbed and Nkurunziza follows the advice of Kagame and Kenyatta to give up on his idea of ruling for an unconstitutional third term. The ruling party has to resist the temptation to use its influence to give itself an advantage by e.g. banning candidates or limiting freedom of speech or assembly, eventual spoilers will face strong difficulties in persuading the population that armed insurrection would change anything for the better. With a broadly supported coalition government and increased international assistance closely monitoring the progress, Burundi would have a new chance for reconstructing its political system and implementing good governance practices and the rule of law. The CVR could pursue its work in a far less politically charged atmosphere and perhaps even the issues of acknowledgement, recognition and apology of past crimes could finally be addressed without risking the destabilization of national politics.

If the authoritarian tendencies however consolidate themselves and the CNDD-FDD proceeds on its path taken, the scenarios described above, the marginalization of Tutsi and opposition, armed insurrection, despotism and even a re-ethnicization of conflict sadly appear far more likely.

¹⁵¹⁸ Cf. e.g. interview with Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.

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Appendix

Consent Form English

Consent Form

I (the participant/ Interviewee) agree to participate in an oral history study / program of research conducted by Philippe Rieder for his dissertation under the supervision of Dr. Frank Chalk of the Department of History of Concordia University (email: drfrank@alcor.concordia.ca)

PURPOSE: I have been informed that the purpose of the project is to collect life stories and opinions about local reconciliation after the violent history of the last twenty years. This study is interested in the change of relationships between neighbors due to political developments since 1990. The interviews are conducted in Southern Rwanda and Northern Burundi and will be used as field data for a comparative doctoral thesis on local reconciliation in Rwanda and Burundi.

PROCESS: The interview will take about two hours but I can quit or prolong the interview any time I want. The interview can be conducted at any place that I am comfortable with (e.g. my home). The interviewer will use audio equipment to record my life story and the answers I give to questions.

I can choose to discuss any aspect of my life in the last twenty years. **I can also refuse to answer any questions.** The interviewer will ask open-ended questions and hopes for me to respond at length and guide the course of the interview. I'm free to answer questions in any way I wish and ask the interviewer questions myself.

Everything spoken in the interview between the interviewer, the translator and me is confidential. **I will not have to state my name at any time and can use a fake name.**

After the interview, I will be shown the transcript (written version) of the interview as soon as it is written down. At this point, **I may change my answers or withdraw my consent if I want to. If I withdraw consent, the transcript and audio recording will be destroyed.** The interview data will only be made available to the public in an archive and/ or published in the thesis if I agree explicitly.

RISKS AND BENEFITS: Reconciliation, genocide and civil war are very delicate subjects. **The consequences for expressing one's political opinions could in certain instances be very severe, involving physical harm.** In Rwanda and Burundi, sadly there have been cases where people with differing political opinions have been assaulted and even killed by disagreeing parties. **As the interviewer is critically aware of this risk, confidentiality and trust between the interviewer, the translator and the interviewee will be very important and the interviewer will do everything in his power to ensure the confidentiality of the interview data.**

If I (the participant) agree to speak about my personal feelings, opinions and experiences, I can always remain anonymous. I do not have to reveal information I am not comfortable to speak about. This includes my ethnicity (which is illegal in Rwanda), my party affiliation or any of my activities during the time of violent conflict that could endanger my security. **The interviewer has also informed me that I should not tell him about eventual crimes I have committed but have not already been convicted of in order not to make him complicit, even though everything said in the interview stays confidential.**

I however may speak about these things if I choose to. The interviewer and the translator are bound to the confidentiality. The interviewer will only note my name if I agreed to use it and even then, only my first name will be cited in the research. For anonymous participants, pseudonyms or job descriptions (“peasant”; “unemployed youth”) will be used. My data will be treated with the utmost confidentiality.

The process of revisiting the painful experiences of mass violence can also be deeply emotional and even traumatic for participants. The interviewer will make sure I have access to free, local and culturally appropriate counselling if he or I feel this would be necessary (FACT (Forum des Activistes Contre La Torture), Women for Women International, and the Women's Polyclinic of Hope).

As the interview will contribute to a dissertation and possibly a book, with your permission, your story and opinion will be heard and may contribute to a better understanding of local needs and views of reconciliation.

CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION: Please look at the following conditions and options with the interviewer. Feel free to ask questions if anything appears unclear.

___ I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent at any time during the interview or stop and discontinue the interview.

Regarding public access to my interview, I agree to (please choose one):

___ **Open public access** – My identity (first name) may be shown in any publications or presentations that may result from this interview.

___ I agree to the possible broadcasting and reproduction of sound from my interview (by any method and in any media by the interviewer).

___ I agree that my interview, or portions of it, be made available on the internet (through web pages and/or on-line databases).

___ I agree that transcripts and/or recordings of my interview will be stored at a Canadian local archive for long-term preservation. My interview may be accessed by researchers and the public at the Iriba Center for Multimedia Heritage in Kigali and the Centre for Oral History and Digital Story-telling in Montreal that hold copies to preserve my answers for history.

OR

___ **Anonymity including public storage:** My identity will only be known by the translator and the researcher but will not be disclosed in the dissertation.

___ I however give permission to store my written interview data (transcripts) for public access at the Centre for Oral History and Digital Story-telling in Montreal and the Iriba Center for Multimedia Heritage in Kigali. The securely filed audio files will be destroyed.

___ I agree that the written version of my interview, or portions of it, be made available on the internet (through web pages and/or on-line databases) as long as my complete anonymity is preserved.



OR

___ **Complete Anonymity** – My identity will be known only to the interviewer and the translator; others will not gain access to my identity unless they gain special permission from myself, the interviewee. Once the dissertation is completed, the securely filed audio recording will be destroyed by the interviewer Philippe Rieder (though a copy of the interview may be given to you).



I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY.

INTERVIEWEE (Fake name possible):

NAME (please print) _____

SIGNATURE _____

Date and Place (optional) _____

INTERVIEWER:

NAME (please print)

Philippe Rieder _____

SIGNATURE _____

DATE: _____

TRANSLATOR:

NAME (please print)

SIGNATURE _____

DATE: _____

If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research Ethics and Compliance Advisor of Concordia University, at 514.848.2424.x 7481 or ethics@alcor.concordia.ca. Regarding all other questions, please contact Philippe Rieder at +250 78 278 96 96

SCRIPT FOR READING THE CONSENT FORM OUT TO ILLITERATE PARTICIPANTS

(to be translated into Kinyarwanda in the same way as the consent form)

Co-investigator: If I want to hold an interview with you, I am required to ask you for your permission to record and document what you say. This is necessary, so you have a guarantee that I do not take advantage of you and I can document that you have worked with me voluntarily.

It is very important for you to understand that you do NOT have to answer any of my questions if you don't want to and that you can stop the interview any time. You can also ask me to destroy the recordings after the interview if you do not want them to be published or used for any reason.

I will now read the consent form out to you. The purpose of the consent form is to inform you about the proceedings of the interview, its risks and benefits for you and especially the options you can choose from with regard to anonymity. You can interrupt me at any time and ask if sentences are not clear to you.

(Reading out the Consent Form)

The most important parts about the consent form are the information about the possible risks that could arise from this interview and the options you can choose with regard to publication. I repeat that the interview contains questions about your political opinions and perhaps you want to remain anonymous if you fear that people disagreeing with you might react aggressively if they hear about your positions.

I also have to repeat that if you have committed crimes that you have not been convicted of yet, you should keep information about them to yourself or speak of them in general terms in order not to incriminate yourself even though everything said in the interview stays confidential.

With regard to publication, you can either stay completely anonymous – that means you make up a fake name and the recordings of the interview will only be heard by me and my translator. The recordings will be stored securely and only for my own use.

The second option is to state a fake name but agree that the recording is stored publicly in Canada for scholars and the public to view. It may also appear on a restricted Internet-platform by the Centre for Oral History and Digital Story-telling in Montreal and the Iriba Center for Multimedia Heritage in Kigali.

The third option is open public access. This means that you state your name and agree that the recording is stored publicly in Canada and perhaps on the members-only Internet-platform of the Centre for Oral History and Digital Story-telling in Montreal and the Iriba Center for Multimedia Heritage in Kigali. Open public access also means that you allow me to cite you by name in my dissertation.

Before we start the interview, I will now ask for your permission to interview you and record your answer before we start. Please state the date of the interview, and say

“I _____ (your first name or fake name) take part in this study freely and voluntarily. I have been explained the consent form and understand it completely. I choose complete anonymity/anonymity including public storage/open public access.”

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Questionnaire Rwanda

Explain how recording Equipment works / Interview process

Introduction of researcher and translator

Introduction of research project: Dissertation at Concordia University, Researching about reconciliation between neighbours in the aftermath of mass political violence, life-story interviews with some questions about political knowledge, personal opinions and changing attitudes

Explain Structure of Interview:

Life-story interviews (qualitative); Questions about the understanding of political terms and personal priorities (qualitative); Scaled questions about the participant's changing status in society (quantitative)

Explain process of Question-translation-Response-translation

Explain how Olympus VN-2100PC works – Recording Sample, Storage on the internet, anonymity...give to participant to try...

Script Consent Form

(Provide a consent form in Kinyarwanda / Kirundi or translate on the spot – see above)

Qualitative semi-structured interviews

Life-story

In this part, I would like to hold a conversation where participants allow me to compare their **life conditions and attitudes towards their neighbors during the conflict with the current conditions they live in**. Ideally, this conversation will touch certain topics about coexistence, past violence or reconciliation which might be further elaborated on in the discussion about the understandings of terms in the second part. The fat questions are the most important and the ones marked Rwanda/Burundi are only to be applied in the respective country.

Classification

The participant will be asked to state following information about themselves:

Gender, Age group in 2011 (Young adults 20-30 years, adults 30-50 years, seniors 50 years +)

Education (illiterate, primary, secondary and higher)

District or city the participant lives in

Profession (Farmer/stock breeder/unskilled worker, public-sector employee, private sector employee and self-employed, unemployed, student)

Now, the participant can choose from one of the following groups to classify himself:

Rwanda:

Survivor (persecuted in 1994, lived in country when genocide started)

Ex-convict –*In the first interviews characterized as perpetrator (accused in Gacaca/ Trial – this would also apply to non-accused people who characterize themselves as perpetrator)*

Bystander (not accused in *Gacaca/* trials, not persecuted but in Rwanda when the genocide started)

Returnee (immigrated after genocide, since 1994).

Ex-combatant (RPF (and Ex-FAR as far as they have not been accused in *Gacaca /* Trials)

Burundi: Since transitional justice has been largely stalled and ethnic identities are still legal, the categories in Burundi will be slightly different:

Non-combatant Hutu residents during civil war period (1993-2005) who lost relatives (survivors)

Non-combatant Hutu refugees who returned during or after the civil war (returnees)

Non-combatant Tutsi refugees who returned during or after the civil war (returnees)

Non-combatant Tutsi residents during civil war period (1993-2005) who lost relatives (survivors)

Army soldiers or pro-Tutsi rebels in the civil war (ex-combatants)

Hutu rebels during the civil war (ex-combatants).

Twa

Possible Questions

“Did you live here all the time or did you come here?” / “When and why did you come here? Was it difficult to begin your life here/ rebuild your existence?”

“Tell me about your family’s relations to your neighbors when you grew up?/ started primary school/ started elementary school/ married?”

“How do you remember your parents’ (or your) relationship to the state authorities when you grew up?/ started primary school/ started elementary school/ married?”

“Why did you/ your parents flee / who killed them?”

“Were there any specific challenges to rebuilding your existence after the war/genocide?”

Rwanda

“How did the relationship to your neighbors change when the RPF attacked in 1990 (Rwanda)/ during the civil war? / When Habyarimana got assassinated and the genocide started? / When the RPF became the government (Rwanda)? / After 2003?”

“How has your economic / political situation changed since the genocide ended? / you came here? / the last elections?/ the *Gacaca*?”

Burundi

“How did the relationship with your neighbors change when Ndadaye got assassinated and the war started? / When Buyoya took power? / When the Pretoria Peace agreement got signed? / When Nkurunziza came to power? / After the last presidential elections?”

“How did your economic / political situation change when Ndadaye got assassinated and the war started? / When Buyoya took power? / When the Pretoria Peace agreement got signed? / When Nkurunziza came to power? / After the last presidential elections?”

Discussion of the Understanding of terms - Question Groups

Identity

Is belonging to an ethnic group important for you to understand your place in history / society?

Do you care about a person's ethnicity? Does knowing one's ethnicity change the way you look at him/ her?

How would you describe your relation to members of the former antagonist group?

Can you trust people from the former antagonist people / friends / would you marry somebody from the other group?

Burundi: How would you characterize the most important group you belong to? National, ethnic, political, family, religion, profession?

Rwanda: Do you believe the banning of ethnic identities in Rwanda improve the relationship between former antagonists?

Burundi: Do you think the quota regulations for Burundian parties reduce ethnic tensions?

Will genocide ideology (Rwanda)/ ethnic categories (Burundi) remain relevant in the families or will they gradually vanish – what do you think?

How do you assess the role of the media in your country, does it help people to reconcile?

Memory

What do you think about (official) commemoration?

Did you lose relatives due to violence in the last two decades? If yes, do you feel official commemoration ceremonies help you to address your grief and make it socially acceptable?

Rwanda: Do you think official commemoration ceremonies help people to reconcile?

Rwanda: Do you think keeping the memory of the genocide helps prevention?

Rwanda: Does commemoration help ALL Rwandans? Is it good the way it's organized or should it change?

Burundi: Do you think anything is done to address the violent past in Burundi?

Burundi: Is there any way the government has helped you to overcome the grievances of the past?

Burundi: What do you think should be done to address the grievances and injustices of the war in Burundi?

Do you think you can forgive the people who wronged you? / Do you think the people you wronged can forgive you? Do you feel guilty? Do you feel hate?

Term questions

How would you describe "Peace" (*amahoro*) personally?

How would describe "reconciliation" (*ubwiyunge*)?

How would you describe "democracy" (*demokarasi*)?

Reconciliation and the State

Can the government facilitate reconciliation/ forgiveness (or is it a personal/ social matter?)

Are there any specific policies you know that you believe might help neighbors to forgive each other and live together?

Have you ever in the past or do you currently benefit from a governmental program aimed at reconciliation? If yes, how has it helped you?

Does the government do enough for reconciliation?

What are the most important lessons Rwandans/Burundians should learn in order to live together peacefully and that genocide/ war does not occur again?

Burundi: "Do you know of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission? Do you think such a commission would help people to reconcile?"

If you would be president, how would you improve the way Burundi/Rwanda is governed today?

Justice

Is (transitional) justice necessary for reconciliation?

Rwanda: Do you think transitional justice in Rwanda has been fair and impartial? Was it necessary to try everyone or would the planners have sufficed?

Rwanda: What do you think of *Gacaca*? / Have you been personally affected by *Gacaca*? / Was the punitive aspect of *Gacaca* necessary?

Rwanda: Has everybody who deserved it been tried? Who should be tried additionally? (RPF-massacres? / fugitive génocidaires?)

Burundi: Do you think enough is done for bringing justice to those who killed in the war? Do you think transitional justice is important for peaceful coexistence?"

Burundi: Do you know of any government initiatives to bring justice to those who killed in the war?

What should the government do differently in the future with regard to transitional justice and reconciliation?

Fears

Where do you see the greatest dangers for Rwandans / Burundians living together peacefully in the future?


Are there groups of people in the country you feel threatened by?

Do you think there will be renewed violence in our lifetimes?

Will it be ethnic in nature?

Scaled Questions

These questions are based on Ingelaere’s (2010, 278f) concept of the “ladder of life”. These are subjective rankings based on individual perception of relations over a number of years. The interviewee is asked to rank his individual perception of certain circumstances of his life on a ranking from (+6 (positive change) to 0 (indifference) to -6 (negative change)) in the years 1990 (begin war), 1994 (genocide), 2003 (new constitution), 2011 (Rwanda) resp. 1990, 1993 (begin civil war), 2005 (Pretoria agreement), 2011 (Burundi). The criteria encompass :



Overall relations

How have your overall relations with people of differing ethnicity changed if you compare your situation in

- 1990 _____
- 1993 (Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _____
- 2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _____
- 2011 _____

How did your personal economic situation change?

- 1990 _____
- 1993 (Bdi) /1994 (Rwa) _____
- 2003 (Rwa) /2005 (Bdi) _____
- 2011 _____

How much do you approve of transitional justice if you compare your opinion in

- 2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _____
- 2011 _____

Political representation

How do you think did your family’s impact on politics change in

- 1990 _____
- 1993 (Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _____
- 2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _____
- 2011 _____

On a scale from -5 to +5 would you consider your country a democracy in following years

- _____
- 1993(Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _____

2003(Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _____

2011 _____

On a scale from -5 to +5 how would you estimate the significance of ethnicity for political power if you compare the situation in

1990 _____

1993 (Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _____

2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _____

2011 _____

Personal physical security

On a scale from -5 to +5: How much would you trust your neighbors if you compare your situation in

1990 _____

1993 (Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _____

2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _____

2011 _____

On a scale from -5 to +5: How much do you trust the army/police?

1990 _____

1993 (Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _____

2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _____

2011 _____

On a scale from -5 to +5: How much would you trust the government today compared to 21(Rwa)/ 18 (Bdi)/17 (Rwa)/8 (Rwa)/6 (Bdi)years ago??

1990 _____

1993 (Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _____

2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _____

2011 _____

Do you think human rights are more respected today than 21(Rwa)/ 18 (Bdi)/17 (Rwa)/8 (Rwa)/6 (Bdi) years ago?

1990 _____

1993 (Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _____

2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _____

2011 _____

Modified Questionnaire Burundi

Audio Consent

“I _____ (your first name or fake name) take part in this study freely and voluntarily. I have been explained the consent form and understand it completely. I choose complete anonymity/anonymity including public storage/open public access.”

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sign Consent Form

Qualitative semi-structured interviews

Life-stories during last two decades

In this part, I would like to hold a conversation where participants allow me to compare their life conditions and attitudes towards their neighbors during the conflict with the current conditions they live in. Ideally, this conversation will touch certain topics about coexistence, past violence or reconciliation which might be further elaborated on in the discussion about the understandings of terms in the second part. The fat questions are the most important and the ones marked Rwanda/ Burundi are only to be applied in the respective country.

Classification

The participant will be asked to state following information about themselves:

Gender

Age group in 2011 (Young adults 20-30 years, adults 30-50 years, seniors 50 years +)

Education (no education, primary, secondary and higher)

District or city the participant lives in

Profession (Farmer/stock breeder/unskilled worker, public-sector employee, private sector employee and self-employed, unemployed, student)

Now, the participant can choose from one of the following groups to classify himself:

Burundi: since transitional justice has been largely stalled and ethnic identities are still legal, the categories in Burundi will be slightly different:

Non-combatant Hutu residents during civil war period (1993-2005) (survivors)

Non-combatant Hutu refugees who returned during or after the civil war (returnees)

Non-combatant Tutsi refugees who returned during or after the civil war (returnees)

Non-combatant Tutsi residents during civil war period (1993-2005) (survivors)

Army soldiers or pro-Tutsi rebels in the civil war (demobilisés, ex-combatants)

Hutu rebels during the civil war (demobilisés, ex-combatants).

Twa

Possible Questions

“Did you live here all the time or did you come here?” / “When and why did you come here? Was it difficult to begin your life here/ rebuild your existence?”

“Tell me about your family’s relations to your neighbors when you grew up?/ started primary school/ started elementary school/ married?”

“How do you remember your parents’ (or your) relationship to the state authorities when you grew up?/ started primary school/ started elementary school/ married?”

“Why did you/ your parents flee / who killed them?”

“Were there any specific challenges to rebuilding your existence after the war/genocide?”

Burundi

“When did you become aware of your ethnic identity?”

“How did the relationship with your neighbors change when Ndadaye got assassinated and the war started? / When Buyoya took power? / When the Pretoria Peace agreement got signed? / When Nkurunziza came to power? / After the last presidential elections?”

“How did your economic / political situation change when Ndadaye got assassinated and the war started? / When Buyoya took power? / When the Pretoria Peace agreement got signed? / When Nkurunziza came to power? / After the last presidential elections?”

“What was the difference between Ndadaye’s election and Nkurunziza’s election?”

“What are the biggest differences between Burundi now and Burundi during the crisis?”

“Did genocide happen in Burundi and if yes, who committed genocide?”

“Do you think “la crise” was an ethnical or a political conflict?”

Discussion of the Understanding of terms - Question Groups

Identity

Is belonging to an ethnic group important for you to understand your place in history / society?

Do you care about a person’s ethnicity? Does knowing one’s ethnicity change the way you look at him/ her?

How would you describe your relation to members of the former antagonist group?

Can you trust people from the former antagonist people / friends / would you marry somebody from the other group?

Burundi: How would you characterize the most important group you belong to? National, ethnic, political, (family), religion, profession, region?

Rwanda: Do you believe the banning of ethnic identities in Rwanda improve the relationship between former antagonists?

Burundi: Do you think the quota regulations for Burundian parties reduce ethnic tensions?

Will ethnic categories (Burundi) remain relevant in the families or will they gradually vanish – what do you think?

How do you assess the role of the media in your country, does it help people to reconcile?

Memory

What do you think about (official) commemoration, could it help reconciliation or would it divide former enemies?

Did you lose relatives due to violence in the last two decades? If yes, do you feel official commemoration ceremonies help you to address your grief and make it socially acceptable? – 21.10.? How can commemoration be designed as an inclusive event?

Do you think keeping the memory of the genocide helps prevention?

Burundi: Do you think anything is done to address the violent past in Burundi?

Burundi: Is there any way the government has helped you to overcome the grievances of the past?

Burundi: What do you think should be done to address the grievances and injustices of the war in Burundi?

Burundi: “Do you know of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and special tribunal in Burundi ? Do you think such a commission would help people to reconcile? / Is finding out the truth about the past necessary for reconciliation?

Do you think you can forgive the people who wronged you? / Do you think the people you wronged can forgive you? Do you feel guilty? Do you feel hate?

Term questions

How would you describe “Peace” (*amahoro*) personally?

How would describe “reconciliation” (*ubwiyunge*)?

How would you describe “democracy” (*demokarasi*)?

Reconciliation and the State

Can the government facilitate reconciliation/ forgiveness (or is it a personal/ social matter?)

Are there any specific policies in place now that you believe to help neighbors to forgive each other and live together?

Have you ever in the past or do you currently benefit from a governmental program aimed at reconciliation? If yes, how has it helped you?

Burundi: If you regard the boycott of the elections 2010 by some parties: do you believe ordinary Burundians are reconciling faster than the government?

Does the government/do political parties actually play a beneficial role with regard to reconciliation?

Are you involved in land conflicts? What do you believe the government should do in order to resolve land conflicts?

Burundi: Is it important for peace and reconciliation that all the refugees return to Burundi or does their return create further problems? Which problems?

Burundi: Regarding governmental efforts such as decentralization, the establishment of an independent Human Rights Commission and the institution of the Ombudsman – do you think civil society and individual citizens have more effective power today than before “la crise”?

What are the most important lessons Burundians should learn in order to live together peacefully and that genocide/ war does not occur again?

If you would be president, how would you improve the way Burundi is governed today?

Justice

Is (transitional) justice necessary for reconciliation?

What do you think of Rwandan *Gacaca*? (explain *Gacaca* if necessary)

What do you think about the South African TRC as a model for Burundian transitional justice? (explain Model)

Burundi: Do you think enough is done for bringing justice to those who killed in the war? Do you think transitional justice is important for peaceful coexistence?

Burundi: Do you know of any government initiatives to bring justice to those who killed in the war?

Burundi: Regarding the many army officers and rebel leaders holding power in Burundi: Could punishing the war criminals of “la crise” actually be dangerous for peace and stability in Burundi?

Burundi: Can a Truth and Reconciliation Commission/ Special Tribunal even be successful with so many leaders of the civil war still holding political office? What would be necessary for such a Commission to succeed? Would an **International Tribunal** be an alternative or would such a tribunal be too distant from ordinary Burundians to have any effect on reconciliation?

What should the government do differently in the future with regard to transitional justice and reconciliation?

Fears

Where do you see the greatest dangers for Rwandans / Burundians living together peacefully in the future?


Are there groups of people in the country you feel threatened by?

Do you think there will be renewed violence in our lifetimes?

Will it be ethnic in nature?

Scaled Questions

These questions are based on Ingelaere’s (2010, 278f) concept of the “ladder of life”. These are subjective rankings based on individual perception of relations over a number of years. The interviewee is asked to rank his individual perception of certain circumstances of his life on a ranking from (+6 (positive change) to 0 (indifference) to -6 (negative change)) in the years 1990 (begin war), 1994 (genocide), 2003 (new constitution), 2011 (Rwanda) resp. 1990, 1993 (begin civil war), 2005 (Pretoria agreement), 2011 (Burundi). The criteria encompass:



Overall relations

How have your overall relations with people of differing ethnicity changed if you compare your situation in

- 1988 _____
- 1993 (Bdi) election _____
- 1993 (Bdi) crise _____
- 2005 _____
- 2011 _____

How did your personal economic situation change?

- 1988 _____
- 1993 (Bdi) election _____
- 1993 (Bdi) crise _____
- 2005 _____
- 2011 _____

How much do you believe in the progress/ implementation of transitional justice if you compare your opinion in

- 2005 (Bdi) _____
- 2011 _____

Political representation

How do you think did your family’s impact on politics change in

- 1988 _____
- 1993 (Bdi) election _____
- 1993 (Bdi) crise _____
- 2005 _____

2011 _____

On a scale from -5 to +5 would you consider your country a democracy in following years:

1988 _____

1993 (Bdi) election _____

1993 (Bdi) crise _____

2005 _____

2011 _____

On a scale from -5 to +5 how would you estimate the chances of people of your ethnicity to gain access to political office if you compare the situation in...

1988 _____

1993 (Bdi) election _____

1993 (Bdi) crise _____

2005 _____

2011 _____

Personal physical security

On a scale from -5 to +5: How much would you trust your neighbors if you compare your situation in

1988 _____

1993 (Bdi) election _____

1993 (Bdi) crise _____

2005 _____

2011 _____

On a scale from -5 to +5: How much do you trust the army/police?

1988 _____

1993 (Bdi) election _____

1993 (Bdi) crise _____

2005 _____

2011 _____

On a scale from -5 to +5: How much would you trust the government?

1988 _____

1993 (Bdi) election _____

1993 (Bdi) crise _____

2005 _____

2011 _____

How do you assess the general respect for Human Rights in following years?

1988 _____

1993 (Bdi) election _____

1993 (Bdi) crise _____

2005 _____

2011 _____