STATE IDEOLOGY AND LANGUAGE POLICY IN NORTH KOREA:
AN ANALYSIS OF NORTH KOREA’S PUBLIC DISCOURSE

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I consider myself very fortunate to have been able to access the North Korean public discourse data that undergirded this study, data that is not easy to find. For this, I offer my thanks to the librarians of Hamilton Library at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa who have built the North Korean collection there. I am also hugely indebted to the 21st Century Sejong Project of the National Institute of Korean Language in South Korea, which gathered North Korean public discourse corpus data and allowed me to use it for my study.

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ABSTRACT

This study examines how ideology has affected North Korea’s language policy since the beginning of its nation-state-building project in 1945, as well as North Korea’s public discourse as a result of this language policy. This dissertation aims to contribute to the language planning and policy field by shedding light on the ideology and language norms produced by the North Korean authority regarding its language policy and language use. Using discourse analysis and corpus linguistics as methodological approaches in a socio-historical context, this study investigates what ideological/political motivations have driven North Korea’s language planning policies, and the consequential characteristics of the North Korean public discourse, which have rarely been addressed in previous studies.

North Korea’s language policy has developed and thrived in conjunction with its state ideology, Juche (self-reliance), which is bound up with a popular ethno-nationalism. Political authority in North Korea has viewed language as an ideological weapon against the enemies of the Korean nation and socialism and as a tool to remold people into patriotic socialists. This ideology has driven language policies in North Korea: the hankul (vernacular Korean script)-only use policy that banned the use of Chinese characters in writing, linguistic purification, linguistic etiquette, and stylistic planning. By examining various data from North Korea’s state-controlled public discourse, including mass media, school textbooks, literature, and magazines, this study suggests that North Korea’s language policies have been generally successful, at least in the public discourse. This study also touches on the critical role of political power in the design and implementation of North Korea’s language policy, mass media, and pedagogy in terms of appropriating and educating the people in the language policy.
Finally, this study examines linguistic etiquette and stylistic planning as part of corpus planning in North Korea. Discourse analyses on the data in this study demonstrate that one of the major language norms in North Korea is modeling the state leaders’ language styles: using special terms that are predefined by political authorities, quoting the leader(s), using political slogans of the leaders and the Party, using expressions of reverence for the state leaders, and practicing linguistic dichotomy.
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**ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Accusative particle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH</td>
<td>Addressee honorific</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Declarative sentence-type suffix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRHP</td>
<td>Dative referent honorific particle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>First Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GN</td>
<td>Genitive particle</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNM</td>
<td>Honorific nominative case particle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hon.</td>
<td>Honorific word</td>
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<tr>
<td>HT</td>
<td>Honorific title</td>
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<tr>
<td>IN</td>
<td>Indicative mood suffix</td>
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<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td>Infinitive suffix</td>
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<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>Last Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>NM</td>
<td>Nominative case particle</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOM</td>
<td>Nominalizer suffix</td>
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<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Plural suffix</td>
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<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Polite speech level, suffix</td>
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<tr>
<td>PST</td>
<td>Past tense and perfect aspect suffix</td>
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<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Professional title</td>
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<td>Q</td>
<td>Question marker</td>
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<td>QT</td>
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<td>RT</td>
<td>Retrospective mood suffix</td>
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<td>SH</td>
<td>Subject honorific suffix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Topic-contrast particle</td>
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1 These abbreviations are adapted from Sohn (1999).
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Aims of This Study

The overarching aim of this study is to examine how ideology has affected North Korea’s language policy since the beginning of its nation-state building in 1945 and language practice in the public discourse as the result of this language policy. There have been numerous studies on the linguistic features of North Korea in dealing with differences between South and North Korean language communities. However, it is rare to find studies that address the question of how North Korea’s state ideology has constructed public discourse such as speech style via its language policy in the sociolinguistic context. Ideology can be defined most broadly as a set of beliefs, ideas, or judgments. Woolard (1998, p. 6) writes that ideological concepts are viewed “as derived from, rooted in, reflective of, or responsive to the experience or interests of a particular social position, even though ideology so often represents itself as universally true.” Among ideologies, this study focuses on the influence of North Korean state ideology, especially the ‘Juche’ (self-reliance) ideology or philosophy,’ on its language. The Juche ideology is purported to be the invention of Kim Il Sung (1912–1994), North Korea’s charismatic leader, and has been characterized as North Korea’s peculiar brand of socialist autonomy that has manifested itself in all national matters (King, 2007) since the end of the 1960s. Kim Il Sung was the dominant figure in North Korea from the end of World War II until his death in 1994, and even after his death continues to be revered as the “eternal leader.” His Juche ideology influenced North Korea’s language ideology and policy. Language ideologies

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2 When available, I have used North Korean convention in the romanization of the names of famous North Korean ideological terms, persons, and places, e.g. Juche, Kim Jong Un, and Pyongyang. Otherwise, the Yale Romanization system is used in transcribing Korean, with the exception of personal names. For personal names, individual romanization preferences are honored, if known, otherwise I have used the simplified McCune-Reischauer system. Unless stated otherwise, all English translations in this study are the author’s.

3 Korean names are ordered family name followed by given name (the latter generally composed of two syllables, with or without hyphen, when Romanized), e.g. Moon Jae-in (the South Korean President) or Kim Jong Un. When I initialize given names, I follow Western name order, e.g. J. S. Lee.
are “shared bodies of commonsense notions about the nature of language in the world” (Rumsey, 1990, p. 346). Any study dealing with language ideology requires socio-historical context if it is to examine how seemingly universal and natural ideas of and about language are actually produced by political or social authorities such political leaders or the mass media (Woolard, 1998).

Language planning, as an academic discipline, was established at the end of the 1960s as an offshoot of sociolinguistics and with the optimistic belief that language planners could solve language problems in society in the process of the nation-state building of newly independent states in post-World War II Asia and Africa (Jernudd & Nekvapil, 2012). There are many different definitions of language planning, but the common understanding of the term, and the one that will be employed here, is that language planning describes a future-oriented deliberate language change that results from, or leads to, language policies in a social context (Rubin & Jernudd, 1971) and for the goals or purposes of an authoritative body, such as a government or person (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997). However, some linguists prefer the term, ‘language management’ to ‘language planning,’ considering language plans as strategies that set ideology and direction, but which require continuous modification to meet specific goals and changing conditions (Spolsky, 2012). In this study, I also use the term, ‘language management’ to highlight the authority’s control over members’ language practice in a speech community. The term ‘language planning’ may be misleading in that language planning has been framed in the classical language-planning tradition as problem-solving (Cooper, 1989). However, this term is used in my study, since it is still widely used by many sociolinguists internationally.

Language policy is a policy mechanism that influences the form, function, use, or acquisition of language and includes official regulations, implicit mechanisms connected to language ideologies, and processes of policy creation, interpretation, and appropriation (Johnson, 2013). Language planning and language policy are coalesced but have differences. One of the major differences between the two concepts, in general, is that in language planning there is the implicit assumption of an agent(s) who creates the plan to change language form or function in language planning; however, there are examples of unplanned language policy (Johnson, 2013). For this study, when I refer to language policy I am referring to the entire language planning and policy field.
There are different types of language planning and policy (hereafter LPP), but Kloss’s (1969) classic distinction between status planning and corpus planning are widely accepted in the LPP field. Status planning is concerned with the social status of a language or a variety of a language, i.e. the choice of a language or a variety of a language as a national or official language. And while status planning is related to macro-level social issues, corpus planning seeks changes in a chosen language or variety of a language, such as standardization, reforming orthography, purification, and vocabulary (Wardhaugh, 2010). These two types of practice are generally complementary: once a certain variety of a language gains official status, its corpus needs to be defined by codification (Clyne, 1997a).

LPP arose out of efforts at modern nation-state building, from the classical case of the French Revolution (one language, one territory, one people) to endeavors following decolonization during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Wright, 2012). Notably, it is essential for many post-colonial states, including Korea, to establish its own “national language” as one way of marking one’s status as an independent state. At the end of World War II in 1945, Korea was liberated from Japanese occupation, but soon thereafter divided along the 38th parallel, with the North under the control of the Soviet Red Army and the South under the US Military Government. Since this division, the two Koreas have each carried out autonomous language policies. North Korean (hereafter NK will be used to designate North Korea/North Korean) LPP is an exemplary case of politically driven language planning. This study researches the NK LPP, ideologies, and public discourse in order to answer to the following research questions:

(1) How has NK state ideology influenced NK language policy and public discourse?
(2) How successful has NK LPP been?
(3) What are the mechanisms of the NK language planning process?
(4) What are the characteristics of NK LPP?
(5) How much do the two Korean languages differ due to their variant language policies?

The focus of this study is NK LPP; however, I will compare this with its South Korean (SK) counterpart. The characteristics of NK LPP become clearer when compared with LPP in
South Korea, which shares the same language as the North but has since 1945 had a different LPP, reflective of very different socio-political and socio-economic conditions vis à vis the North. By investigating the questions stipulated above, this study aims to contribute to the LPP field by shedding light on the ideology produced by the NK authorities regarding its LPP. This study also aims to help our understanding of North Korean language use, to include its use by North Korean defectors.

1.2 Organization of the Study

The organization of this dissertation is as follows: Chapter 2 will provide a review of previous studies on LPP focusing on linguistic purification and linguistic divergence in the two Koreas. Chapter 3 will explain the paradigm and methodological approaches of this study. This includes a review of critical paradigm as well as critical language policy, critical discourse analysis, corpus linguistics, and the data for this study. Chapter 4 will examine NK LPP from 1945 to the present comparing it with South Korea. It will introduce the history and development of LPP in North Korea and discuss the major conceptual goals that motivated these policies, including linguistic purification and the emergence and nature of North Korean standard dialect, namely Cultured Language, from an historical-structural perspective. This chapter includes a discussion of the role of North Korean mass media in LPP. Chapter 5 will investigate linguistic etiquette including the linguistic norms regarding using address/reference terms among ordinary people and towards the NK state leaders⁴, as well as honorifics for those state leaders. Chapter 6 will examine North Korea’s stylistic or discourse planning including modeling the state leader’s speech style and using invectives towards its enemies as part of its corpus planning. Chapter 7 will conclude with the findings and implication of this study.

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⁴ When I refer to the "North Korean (NK) state leader(s)" or the "NK leadership" in this study, I refer specifically to the three historical NK state leaders: Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un, not other North Koreans in lesser political leadership roles.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

There has been extensive research on LPP in the two Koreas, mainly focusing on the linguistic divergence in linguistic forms such as vocabulary, spelling, and grammar as a result of their discrete language policies. The case of the Koreas has been spotlighted by many linguists due to its singularity, wherein a political division engendered different varieties of the same language over the course of seven decades. The language policies of both Koreas after the peninsula’s 1945 division into northern and southern states were established under the nationalist belief of one nation-state sharing a single language and culture. This was an ideological approach each state required to promote and establish the notion of a homogeneous identity to unify their respective populations. This approach also had practical benefits, in terms of establishing a common language for more efficient governance. Like many other classical LPP cases in the 1960s, the language plans and policies to “solve” problems in language use were driven prescriptively by the ethno-national linguists of both Koreas. In South Korea, studies of the LPP of North Korea started at the end of 1980s. Though this period marked the end of the international Cold War, the Korean Peninsula continued to exist under high Cold War tensions. In fact, this tension has continued into the 21st century, despite brief periods of detente between the two Koreas. The two Korean states of the divided peninsula have generally maintained the status of intense rivalry with virtually no communication between them.

In 1988, at the end of the international Cold War, some NK print resources were allowed to be published by the government in South Korea (K-H. Yi, & P-W. Yi, 1997). Since the 1990s, in the context of the post-Cold War, more resources, including NK mass media have been introduced to South Korea with limited access, and many South Korean linguists began actively examining NK texts. However, in general, the public as well as informal discourses of both Koreas have not been freely and mutually accessible. This means those studies done by South Korean linguists had some limitations, in that they were not able to freely use various data, such as authentic language data that were not controlled by the NK government. After all, linguists outside of North Korea have limited access to authentic data and speakers in the target society due to North Korea’s isolated nature. These shortcomings can be applied to most studies on the same subject, including my study, whether done by South Korean or non-Korean linguists. For
instance, linguists, including myself, who have been unable to go to North Korea are incapable of verifying whether the components of official North Korean public discourse, such as the refined nativized vocabulary listed on a North Korean dictionary, are actually used by speakers in informal settings. However, despite this problem, the World Wide Web era has allowed people like myself who are outside of South Korea to at least widely access timely NK public discourses. For instance, the NK government provides the *Rodong Sinmun* (the *Workers’ Newspaper*), the *Workers’ Party* Paper, on-line daily, although the South Korean populace is generally unable to access NK websites legally. The NK on-line public discourse is controlled by the NK government, and although NK public discourse data are much more accessible in the Internet era, this does not apply to South Korea, where access to such materials is still restricted.

Some of the South Korean linguists who pioneered studies on NK LPP in South Korea were motivated by an ethno-linguistic nationalism. Through their work, scholars such as Kim Min-Su (2002), Ko Yong-Kun (1999) hoped to prevent linguistic divergence between the two Koreas and prepare for the establishment of a common Korean language after unification. This motivation led those studies to focus on linguistic differences between the two Koreas and provide prescriptive solutions (‘language plans’) for the once and future unified Korea. In this context, many South Korean linguists from the early stage of the language policy field from the 1980s undertook studies on North Korean linguistic purification in order to clarify the linguistic divergence of the two Koreas. Many South Korean linguists have blamed this linguistic divergence on the changes in vocabulary that resulted from North Korea’s linguistic purification policies. As a result, in the 1990s and 2000s much research on linguistic purification as part of NK LPP was published in South Korea. Many of these studies (C-W. Kim, 1992; Y-K. Ko, 1999; Sohn, 2004) concur that the divergence in the two Koreas as a result of NK’s linguistic purification efforts is not at the level as to hinder communication between language users in the two Koreas. One of the main reasons mutual intelligibility between the languages of the two Koreas has been retained even after this vocabulary reform is the principle in NK of using native Korean vocabulary, which is comprehensible to the South, when replacing loan words and Sino-Korean words. This principle has been maintained by NK political leaders, linguists for the whole language management process in that state so as to prevent linguistic divergence between
two Koreas to the extent that intelligibility and communication would be lost (C-H. Choe & C-S. Pak, 1999/2000).

However, some linguists, such as Y. Hong (1991), strongly blame NK language purification efforts for linguistic divergence, positing that neologisms accompanied with semantic change in NK have created some mutual unintelligibility among speakers of the two Koreas. H-B. Lee (1990) also argues that North Korea’s politically motivated language policy, such as linguistic purification, has resulted in and continues to accelerate, linguistic divergence between two Koreas. Such studies may lack balance in their approaches. From the North Korean perspective, South Korea is also blamed for adopting too many foreign words, especially anglicisms, and thus contributing itself to this linguistic divergence. In fact, anglicisms have proven a major obstacle in the adaption of North Korean defectors to life in the South. When it comes to examining the linguistic divergence of the two Koreas, researchers need to take both sides into account.

Many South Korean linguists and non-Korean linguists have stated that North Korean language practice is rigid and mandated by the state to conform with its language policies. For instance, Kumatani (1990) mentions that exclusive use of native Korean words, either long-existing ones or newly coined, instead of their corresponding loan words became compulsory. Though using “purified” native Korean words was the teaching of Kim Il Sung, Kim also said in 1964:

We should use words of our own whenever possible instead of using loanwords…. Naturally, we cannot just abolish all the loanwords in our language, for it is possible to avoid using words of foreign origin, at least to some extent, and some new ones may even have to be introduced. We have to use a considerable number of borrowed words, especially in our scientific and technical vocabulary. (I. S. Kim, 1984a, pp. 20–21; official North Korean translation)

우리는 필요할수 있는대로 외래어를 쓸지 말고 자기 나라 말을 쓸도록 하여야 합니다…. 물론 외래어를 다 없앨수는 없습니라. 외래어를 어느 정도 쓸는것은 피할수 없으며 얼마나간은
This may be interpreted to mean Kim did not make use of pure Korean words compulsory but advised what the language user “should do.” Linguistic purification was a social movement rather than a forced law in North Korea. In fact, North Korea’s official texts have had many loan words. For instance, *Kwuklip.kwuk.e.wen* ‘the National Institute of Korean Language’ (1993) in South Korea listed a total of 178 loan words from its sampling of the *Rodong Sinmun* over the period of one month (April 1992, surveying every even-numbered page on even-numbered days), and four other different NK popular magazines (a total of 321 pages) published in January and June 1992. In this survey, it was found that the NK media used loan words that actually had corresponding Korean words, for instance, *ku.lwup* ‘group,’ and *in.they.li* ‘intellectual’. Indeed, Kim Il Sung himself employed a loan word in explaining his idea of linguistic purification in his teaching on language policy in 1966:

> The task of revising our vocabulary should not be done hastily but should be tackled word by word over a long period…. Since this work has a bearing on the language in daily use among all the people, it is absolutely wrong to tackle it in haste ( dışı, *kkamppa.niya*) out of subjective desire. You should not try to revise a large number of Chinese ideographic words or borrowed words at a time but do so gradually, finishing them one by one. (I. S. Kim, 1980d, pp. 289–290; adapted from the official North Korean translation; emphasis mine)

He used the Russian loan word, *kkamppa.niya* ‘campaign’ to mean hasty work. His use of a loan word may suggest that his idea of linguistic purification was not completely rigid,
with the understanding that it is impossible to control linguistic ecology completely. This loan word is listed in the on-line version of *Korean Dictionary (Co.senmal Tay.sa.cen)*:  

\[kkamppa.niya\] [from the Russian кампания]

noun

a campaign or a drive to achieve a particular objective for a temporary project, measure, or method. (“K kamppa.niya ,” ca. 2012)

Loan words, including 깜빠니야 (kkamppa.niya ‘campaign’), have been used in North Korea, formally or informally, despite the socio-political movement to promote the use of nativized Korean words. Vocabulary management is meant to make the language function better as a tool of communication among the people, such that rigid linguistic purification that endeavors to change all words of foreign origin is not pursued nor desired in NK. Rather, NK language management retained loan words and Sino-Korean words that were rooted in the language community and are used internationally or used as if they were nativized words, such as ko.ppwu ‘cup’ (C-H. Choe, & C-S. Pak, 1999/2000). Therefore, the Kumatani’s assertion (1990) on the compulsory use of native Korean words in North Korea is exaggerated.

From this frame of “rigid language policy,” some linguists evaluated the NK LPP to be “absolutely top-down” wherein Kim Il Sung sought no participation of language users in the language planning (Kaplan & Baldauf, 2009). However, North Korea had a bottom-up aspect to the formulation of language policy as part of its long-term language planning process, even if, in

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5 The publication year of the on-line version of *Korean Dictionary (Co.senmal Tay.sa.cen)* is not clear, but its preface reads that this on-line version was published in commemoration of the centenary anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth, which is 2012. Therefore, I took 2012 as its publication year.

6 Unless stated otherwise, all English translations in this study are the author’s.
the big picture, this bottom-up approach was always subordinate to a top-down politics. Kim Il Sung said in 1966:

Furthermore, in order to make our words well polished, newspaper debates should be encouraged. Language, too, needs to go through the appraisal of the masses. Technical terms and the like should also be printed in newspapers two or three times a week; some 15 newly proposed words at a time should be carried in the papers, so that the masses can write critical essays and submit questions about them. The new proposals should be published in both central and local papers. Opposing views should also be fully canvassed. In the newspaper debates it is essential to make all the views which are submitted know to the public so that the wisdom of many people can be enlisted…. It is advisable to offer the words for mass criticism, pool good opinions and finally decide on standard words for use. (I. S. Kim, 1980, p. 289; official North Korean translation)

As Kim directed, there was a process whereby through various newspapers speakers of the community provided their opinions regarding the vocabulary refinement movement. Indeed, the language users’ suggestions on the vocabulary management movement were reflected in the resulting policies. According to C-S. Pak (1999/2000), a North Korean linguist, more than dozen periodicals, both newspapers and magazines, published about 1,500 ‘Discussion’ articles concerning language refinement regularly for about ten years from the late 1960s in which some 25,000 words were discussed. Among these, about 6,000 (or 24%) were discussed by readers via about 400 ‘Discussion’ submissions. Through this process, some words that the readers suggested were included as refined words, such as the native word sa.tung.ppye ‘spine’ (사등뼈)
for the corresponding Sino-Korean word, *chek.chwu.kol* (척추골). Therefore, the classification of “absolutely top-down” language policy toward North Korea is not accurate.

Further, in the context of the putative “rigid language policy,” the continuing modification of managed words from the end of the 1960s in North Korea is not fully taken into account by some scholars of linguistics. In some cases, in the language management process the North Korean government discarded refined words that went unused by the public and allowed North Korean language users to use both the old forms of the vocabulary as well as their corresponding refined forms, nativized Korean words. For instance, both the Sino-Korean term, *hongswu* ‘flood’ and its nativized Korean word, *khunmwul* ‘flood’ are used.

This dual usage had the effect of preventing severe linguistic divergence from the South, while the North Korean speakers could adapt to using the refined vocabulary through a transitional phrase. According to a survey done by the National Institute of Korean Language (1996) in South Korea, the *Korean Dictionary* (*Co.senal Tay.sa.cen*, 1992) published in North Korea enlists 6,513 words that have both original forms (Sino-Korean words or loan words) and corresponding refined nativized forms along with a transition sign (⇒) indicating the word underwent refinement, or nativization. The on-line version of the *Korean Dictionary* (*Co.senal Tay.sa.cen*) has this system for some of those words as follows.

\[
\text{노크 (no.khu) @knock 《영》 } \\
\Rightarrow \text{손기척 (sonki.chek ‘knock’) (“No.khu,” ca. 2012)}
\]

These shortcomings delineated above regarding descriptions and characterizations of NK LPP by some scholars derive from various factors. First, the perspective of some of the scholars was ideologically opposed to the North Korean state. This perspective influenced their idea that language practice in North Korea was “abnormal,” reflective in their opinion of the socialist state relative to the “norm” of the South or non-socialist societies. Some words in North Korea acquired political connotations and meanings in the context of socio-political change in that society, but this should not be considered as ‘distortion’ in language use. This change is a sociolinguistic phenomenon that occurs universally. While language practice in North Korea has changed in the process of the establishment of a centralized socialist state, language practice in
South Korea has also changed in the course of its compressed economic development and globalizing society. My approach is that language change accompanies social change, whether in a capitalist, socialist, or any other type of society.

Second, some of the shortcomings of earlier studies are attributable to the fact that very little of past research has focused on language ideologies as part of state ideology. In NK, state ideology drove the NK LPP and was embedded in the LPP in the socio-political context. The fundamental idea of Juche ideology is that education is essential in the formation of ideal communists, therefore language, as a tool, should be easy to use in order to meet this socio-political goal. From the NK state’s earliest stages, all NK language policies, such as literacy campaign, elimination of Chinese characters, and hankul (the vernacular Korean script)-only use policy, derive from this basic tenet of language ideology. It was in this context that North Korea’s vocabulary management movement commenced, since unfamiliar loan words and difficult Sino-Korean vocabulary were obstacles to comprehension on the part of uneducated laborers and farmers. Since the communicative function of language was the primary focus, the state allowed the use of dual forms of a word—original and refined—in the process of the vocabulary management movement. In the same vein, many unused nativized words were officially discarded. Further, the language management process included a bottom-up aspect to serve the practical goal of the popularization of the language movement via the praxis of its speakers. Therefore, labeling NK language policy as rigid and a forced prescription is questionable.

While many studies have concerned the linguistic purification of North Korea, linguistic etiquette or politeness, a linguistic norm in North Korea’s language management, has not received much attention as part of corpus planning. One of the primary studies on this subject was carried out by South Korea’s National Institute of Korean Language in 2013. This study compared linguistic etiquette between the two Koreas in terms of address and reference terms, honorifics, and greeting expressions. This research was synthetically conducted through not only a comparison of the prescriptive literature regarding linguistic etiquette published in both Koreas, but also by confirming the linguistic practice from the analysis of various genres of NK public discourse data, such as novels, school textbooks, dictionaries, films, and television
dramas. However, this study limited its scope to comparing vocabulary and honorifics regarding linguistic etiquette, but did not cover discursive styles in politeness strategy, a discourse pattern, such as quoting the leader’s words as part of the corpus planning. Although this study described linguistic etiquette from the North Korean perspective, such as the common address terms (tongci/tongmwu ‘comrade’), a socio-politico-historical approach was beyond the scope of the study, thus it did not explain this practice in the context of its language ideology. By contrast, my study is concerned not only with the highly codified register that formulates NK state ideology, but also with the discursive patterns in a constructed official text and how these serve the ideological needs of NK society.

In sum, the primary focus of the scholarly literature dealing with North Korean language practice has been the phenomenon of linguistic divergence. This is reflective of scholarly concerns regarding national unification and the integration of the Korean language of the two discrete standard dialects on the Korean Peninsula and derives from a strong ethno-linguistic nationalism. Many leading scholars in South Korea have published proposals for recovery ‘plans’ for linguistic divergence, such as Kim Min-Su (2002) and Ko Yong-Kun (1999). These studies are based on the ardent belief that the two Koreas should have a single language if the Korean nation as a whole is to maintain its common ethnic identity in preparation for the reunification of the two disparate states and societies. In this context, many South Korean scholars have discussed how to formulate standardized linguistic norms, such as the linguistic unification or integration of the two Koreas’ vocabulary (J-I. Kwon, 2015) as part of corpus planning, or choice of a variety as standard dialect between the Seoul-based dialect and the Pyongyang-based one (H-S. Min, 2011). Most of these studies are devoted to solving the linguistic divergence ‘problem’ rather than embracing the notion of diversity and multiple valid norms of the Korean language, including the South and North varieties. Since the South and North Korean varieties are both linked to the identities of their respective populaces, the selection of one over the other as a standard common language may give rise to various sociolinguistic issues, such as discrimination in language use.

From the perspective of taking North Korean language practice, as well as its Southern counterpart, as a valid norm, my study aims to analyze the sociolinguistic characteristics of
North Korean public discourse under its language policy in the context of the socio-political development of that state; presenting a ‘remedy’ to language divergence in favor of monolingualism on the Korean Peninsula is neither the focus nor purport of this study.
CHAPTER 3. PARADIGM, METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH, AND DATA

3.1 Critical Paradigm

For this study, I employ a critical paradigm since this approach focuses on the link between LPP and social structure. Any attempt to analyze public discourses, such as found in mass media texts, without keeping in mind their social context would be incomplete. In the critical paradigm, the nature of reality is made up of historically situated structures that have a strong impact on individuals. Kress explains this perspective:

In critical linguistics the social is prior; it is a field of power; and power (and power differences) is the generative principle producing linguistic form and difference. Individuals are located in these fields of power, but the powerful carry the day, and the forms which they produce are the forms which shape the system. (2001, p. 36)

This paradigm has been strongly influenced by post-structuralism in language, which tends to focus on the relationship between language and power, such as how social structure and discourse shape individual behavior, including language use (Johnson, 2013). In this paradigm, knowledge is subjective and inherently political, thus values are seen as integral to the research process. In conjunction with this, researchers position themselves politically and make an effort to expose the structures that were controlled and maintained by those in power. Seen from this context, the implied or expressed object of such studies is to expose the oppression of the people and appeal for awareness, resistance, and transformation that can result in positive social change (Hatch, 2002). The following from Teun van Dijk further expresses some of the aims and goals of studies using this paradigm:

Beyond description or superficial application, critical science in each domain asks further questions, such as those of responsibility, interests, and ideology. Instead of focusing on purely academic or theoretical problems, it starts from prevailing social problems, and thereby chooses the perspective of those who suffer most, and critically analyses those in power, those who are responsible, and those who have the means and the opportunity to solve such problems. (van Dijk, 1986, p. 4)

As van Dijk states above, the critical paradigm focuses not just on revealing social problems but also on engagement to solve those problems. Therefore, scholars using the critical paradigm
produce critiques of the perceived material world, for instance, language policies in a society, to expose the structures that maintain control by the powerful (Hatch, 2002). As a Korean American linguist who grew up in South Korea and now lives in the US, I examine language policies in North Korean public discourses using the critical paradigm to reveal how language policy and use in North Korean society are controlled by those in authority.

### 3.2 Critical Language Policy (CLP)

Critical linguistics along with sociolinguistics influenced the language planning field, eventually giving rise to Critical Language Policy (CLP) in the 1990s with increased interest in the sociopolitical and ideological aspects of LPP. CLP emerged from critiques of traditional language planning research. The main criticism of earlier language planning work was that it focused only on the technical issues of language planning “science” while ignoring the social, political, and ideological aspects of language policy (Tollefson, 2006). Tollefson (1991) criticized what he called the neoclassical approach for its focus on an interest in the individual and neutral stance, and in response he presented a historical-structural approach with the aim of “discovering the historical and structural pressure that lead to particular policies and plans and that constrain individual choice” (p. 32). Therefore, in the historical-structural approach, the subject of analysis is the historical process that cannot be separated from social-political-economic structure. The underlying assumption of Tollefson’s historical-structural approach is that LPP serves the interests of the dominant social class. This approach has further developed as CLP with the central tenet that language policies produce social inequality among dominant and minority language users. Following this awareness, CLP aims at social change, such as the development of policies to reduce inequality and promote the maintenance of minority languages with the influence of critical theory (Tollefson, 2006). CLP research widely accepted two assumptions from critical theory: first, that structural categories such as class, race, and gender are central factors; and second, the need for ethical and political consideration for social justice (Tollefson, 2006). For instance, CLP research on the Ebonics controversy in the United States examined standard language ideology toward African American Vernacular English in the context of school language policies in racist educational systems (Baugh, 2000).
I take the approach of CLP when I discuss North Korea’s LPP, since North Korea’s LPP requires Tollefson’s historical-structural approach to examine the sociopolitical and ideological aspects of them. Although my study cannot aim at social change in North Korea due to the country’s unique and isolated political status, this study could assist our understanding of North Korean defectors’ language use and language ideology and help them linguistically adjust to life in South Korea.

3.3 Methodological Approach: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Corpus Linguistics

One of the critical approaches in applied linguistics is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Generally speaking, in the field of linguistics CDA is considered a loose combination of approaches rather than a single method. Although the terms Critical Linguistics (CL) and CDA are often used interchangeably, CDA is considered to have originated from CL, which appeared in the late 1970s in the work of British scholars such as Roger Fowler, Robert Hodge, Gunter Kress, and Tony Trew at the University of East Anglia in the UK. Their classical publication, *Language and Control* (Fowler, Hodge, Kress, & Trew, 1979) is credited as the origin of CL. CL sought to examine how language and grammar are used as ideological tools. CL views language as a form of social practice and a part of the way people seek to promote particular perspectives of the world and naturalize them (Machin & Mayr, 2012). The aims and main assumptions of CL were later developed into Critical Discourse Analysis, mainly by Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen, and Ruth Wodak. One of the main criticisms of CL has been its failure to develop sufficiently the nature of the links between language, power, and ideology (Fairclough, 1992). Thus, more recent CDA researchers have sought to develop methods and theory that could better analyze the relationship between discourse, power, and ideology. Machin and Mayr (2012) explain that CDA is not so much interested in linguistic features themselves but regards why and how these features are produced and what possible ideological goals they might serve. In line with this, Fairclough (1989) defines the meaning of ‘critical’ in CDA as the notion of aiming to analyze linguistic elements to reveal connections between language, power, and ideology that are hidden from people. Among these, power, especially institutionally reproduced power, is a central tenet of CDA (Blommaert, 2005). The
CDA approach is very relevant to my study, because this study deals mainly with the links between “institutionally reproduced power,” such as state-controlled mass media, and the ideology embedded in public discourses.

CDA scholars agree that CDA paradigms are not homogenous; however, they do have three common concepts: power, history, and ideology (Wodak, 2002). In a similar vein, Fairclough (2010, pp. 10–11) provides some criteria for an analysis being termed CDA:

(a) It is not just analysis of discourse (or more concretely texts), it is part of some form of systematic transdisciplinary analysis of relations between discourse and other elements of the social process.

(b) It is not just general commentary on discourse, it includes some form of systematic analysis of texts.

(c) It is not just descriptive, it is also normative. It addresses social wrongs in their discursive aspects and possible ways of righting or mitigating them.

In terms of the above CDA criteria, this study focuses on (a) and (b) more than (c), since I am not able to participate in or interact with NK society, though I provide a critique of its public discourse. I agree with the view of CDA on discourse as being socially situated and contextualized, and especially its focus on institutional environments, since these are key elements to analyzing North Korean public discourse. Fairclough (2010) states that language use is socially shaped, but it is also socially shaping, or constitutive. To analyze discourse in relation to its sociopolitical and sociocultural contexts, Fairclough suggests a three-dimension model, and they are text, discourse practice, sociocultural practice (2010). Blommaert (2005) illustrates Fairclough’s three dimensions of discourse analysis extensively. The first dimension is discourse-as-text, which focuses on linguistic features and organization of discourse. Text analysis such as vocabulary (e.g. wording, metaphor), grammar (e.g. modality), cohesion, and text structure (e.g. episode marking, turn-taking system) should be dealt with systematically in this dimension. The second dimension is discourse practices, i.e., speech acts, coherence, and intertextuality, that link a text to its wider social context. Intertextuality describes how texts draw upon other texts, such as how quoted utterances are selected and contextualized. The third dimension is sociocultural practice, discourse-as-social-practice, in which the ideological effects and hegemonic processes are explained drawing upon social theory. From this third dimension,
Fairclough derives his approach to social change against regimes of power (Blommaert, 2005). Similar with the Fairclough’s sociocultural practice in his three-dimension model, CDA assumes that all discourses are historical and, thus, should be understood with reference to their context, such as their extra-linguistic factors: culture, society, economy, politics, and ideology (Meyer, 2002). I employ this discourse-historical approach in CDA approaches for my study, since the aim of the approach is identical with the aim of this study, namely drawing out ideologies embedded or hidden in texts in the broader socio-political and historical contexts.

CDA adopts various methods adequate to investigating a specific research subject. To address how North Korean state ideology influences its LPP and public discourse, such as found in state-run media and educational texts, I employ the methods and tools of Corpus Linguistics. A corpus is a large and structured collection of computerized texts available for analysis using a corpus software package (O’Keeffe, 2006). CDA, in general, investigates discursive strategies and linguistic devices in terms of their qualitative dimension. Corpus Linguistics is able to supplement a quantitative dimension to the CDA analysis.

3.4 Data

The data in my study comprise mostly public discourse in North Korean print media. Notably, all public discourses in North Korea are created, run, and controlled by the state, in essence to propagate the Workers’ Party line and the state leaders’ thinking. In addition, public discourses also demonstrate discursive patterns constructed by the state. My study is concerned with public language in North Korea that the state has managed in order to maintain its socialism through language policy and ideology. Therefore, this study does not include naturally occurring discourses of non-public everyday life in North Korea.

The main source of the corpus data in this study consists of various official texts: newspapers including the Rodong Sinmun ‘the Workers’ Newspaper,’ popular periodicals, dictionaries, school textbooks, novels, biographies, and the state leaders’ works published between 1989 to 2004 under the Kim Jong Il’s power. This corpus data was built by the National Institute of Korean Language, a South Korean government institute. Besides this, I used the Workers’ Newspaper on-line version, and other North Korean state-run mass media data under
the Kim Jong Un’s leadership in the 2010s. Although I include various NK mass media, the main source of data among mass media is the *Rodong Sinmun*. This is not only a major press organ in North Korea, but also the official mouthpiece of the North Korean Workers’ Party. The Workers’ Party is one of the most politically significant entities representing the state and its leader.

The dictionaries printed in North Korea are also used as normative codexes that reveal how the NK authority articulates and controls the meanings and usages of vocabulary. From the 1945 division onwards, all Korean monolingual dictionaries in NK have been published by linguists under the control of the NK government, and the dictionaries naturally underwent a process of politicization. NK’s *Dictionary of Korean* (*Co.senmal Sa.cen*), the first large-scale NK dictionary and published between 1960 to 1962 in six volumes with 187,137 entries, states in its closing remarks:

The lexicographers of this dictionary have endeavored to raise the political ideology of this dictionary and maintain loyalty to the Workers’ Party throughout the compilation process. The lexicographers struggled firmly against even trivial expressions of bourgeois thinking, while opposing formalism and dogmatism in accordance with the Party’s teaching in establishing *Juche* for science and research. These principles are reflected in the choice of included words, the definitions of those words, and especially in intensely socio-political terms and their usages. (1962/1990, p.1)

This explains that the linguists who compiled the dictionaries focused on socio-political terms and their meanings to conform to the ideological goals of the North Korean state. This corpus planning is connected to Kim Il Sung’s ideas as manifested in two conversations with linguists in the 1960s in which he argued that dictionaries needed to be parallel with NK language policies, necessitating the selection of entries and control of content. Therefore, NK dictionaries are important reference works reflecting the institutionalized NK language policies. According to S-
G. Chong and K-W Yi, the NK linguists, language users are required to understand and employ the words as the state has defined them in the national dictionaries for its ideological goals (1984). Similar practices were found in Germany under Hitler. In 1942, Joseph Goebbels, Nazi Minister of Propaganda from 1933 to 1945, wrote about redefining words in his diary:

I have given instructions for our Ministry to prepare dictionaries for the occupied areas in which the German language is to be taught. They are, above all, to use a terminology that conforms to our modern conception of the state. Especially those expressions are to be translated that stem from our political dogmatism. That is an indirect form of propaganda from which I expect rather good results in the long run. (Goebbels, 1948, p.80–81)

Under the Nazi Party’s control, German words underwent changes in meaning (Young, 1991). For instance, Hitler coined the phrase, ‘German democracy,’ in contrast with the parliamentary form of democracy, and defined it as the free choice of the leader, but then that leader exercises absolute power and responsibility over the people (1940). Hitler indeed achieved his own definition of ‘German democracy.’ In line with this, South Korea’s President Park Chung-hee, the authoritarian president of South Korea from 1961 to 1979, also conceptualized the notion of ‘Korean-style democracy’ in the 1970s. Park justified his dictatorial measures, such as the dissolution of the National Assembly and political parties and severe crackdown on political protesters, by using the phrase, ‘Korean-style democracy,’ arguing that Western-style democracy was not suitable for South Korea (J. I. Kang, 2017). Park formulated this Korean-style democracy as the most proper and efficient political system, and one which was implemented as the Yushin System in 1972 that granted Park being the status of absolute leader of South Korea for life. As totalitarian regimes use language for their own goals, redefining and reconditioning of words to suit ideological purposes is also practiced in North Korea.
CHAPTER 4. NORTH KOREA’S STATE BUILDING AND ITS LANGUAGE
PLANNING AND POLICY

Since Korea’s 1945 liberation and the subsequent formation of two Korean states, the NK government has actively carried out LPP out of two primary motivations. One is its socialist ideology about language as reflected in its language theory. The other is to assist in the success of its drastic social transformation—from a feudal colonial state to a new socialist one. These two aspects are intertwined. The NK government took language as a tool for educating the people in socialism in order to successfully establish a socialist state. The following section seeks to explain language ideology and theory in North Korea, especially the early stage of LPP immediately following the formation of the NK state.

4.1 Background to Language Ideology and Theory in North Korea

As NK linguists have acknowledged (C-H, Choe & C-S, Pak 1999/2000), North Korea’s official language theory developed out of its Marxist leaders’ ideas on language and as part of their philosophical materialism, which held that language cannot be separated from thought. In The German Ideology (1932/2000), Karl Marx and Frederick Engels state that consciousness is a social product, and language is practical consciousness to intercourse with other people. For Joseph Stalin (1950/2000), language was not only an instrument of intercourse but also a medium of struggle and social development. Complementing these beliefs, Kim Il Sung took language as a powerful medium in building a socialist society. The following argument of Kim Il Sung from 1964 reveals his concept on language in the context of the construction of socialism:

Now, as always, our spoken and written language serves as a powerful weapon in the development of the economy, culture, science and technology of our country, in all fields of socialist construction. If we did not have a good spoken and written language, if we did not have our history and cultural traditions which have been shaped and handed down through the medium of the language, if our written language was not accepted by the entire people today and if, accordingly, it were failing to help raise the ideological consciousness and the technical and cultural levels of the working people rapidly, then
we could not be able to advance quickly in socialist construction in the saddle of Chollima. (I. S. Kim, 1984a, pp. 16–17; official North Korean translation)

Kim Il Sung recognized that the Korean language, especially the written form, played a vital role in educating the people in socialist ideology in the process of building a socialist society. This ideology concerning language was developed into the language theory in NK’s ‘Juche ideology or philosophy.’ According to North Korea specialist, J-S. Lee (2000), Juche ideology was an ideology of self-reliance formulated in the 1960s in order to establish North Korea’s independence in the face of Chinese and Soviet influences. In line with this, in 1966, Kim Il Sung told NK linguists that Juche-based linguistics needed to be established by “systemically developing the Korean language, and ensuring the people took ethnic pride in its use” (I. S. Kim, 1982b, p.347).

The Juche language theory was developed primarily out of two concepts Kim Il Sung held about language—language as a powerful tool for reeducating humans and language as the most important symbol of ethno-nationalism (C-H. Choe, & C-S. Pak, 1999/2000). Understanding these language ideologies is necessary to comprehend the historical and societal context in which NK LPP was developed and promoted.

The first concept, the role of language as a tool for reeducating and refashioning people is based on the idea that thinking and language are intimately connected. Therefore, a person’s consciousness and social relationships are predicated on language. In this sense, according to the Juche language theory, language both forms and expresses ideas and emotions (C-H. Choe & C-S. Pak, 1999/2000). This idea is connected to the theory of linguistic determination of thought developed by the linguists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf. Although I have not found any citation of these two linguists in the NK literature, the concept of linguistic determination in the Juche language theory is very similar to the strong version of the Whorf hypothesis (Carroll,
1956)—namely, the linguistic system of a language, such as its specific grammar or semantics, shape the speaker’s worldview. However, Whorf’s linguistic determination of thought has not been proven. Some linguists refute this idea by pointing to such things as that multilingual speakers can express the same worldview using different languages (Bright & Bright, 1965). Whorf’s theory also cannot explain speakers who use the same language but express different worldviews. Likewise, even if the Juche language theory insists that people can be remolded or converted to socialism through language alone, this theory cannot explain why some North Koreans decided not to become communists and fled North Korea to a capitalist society such as South Korea.

However, some researchers believe that language influences thought, so that, as Carroll (1994) states, certain thought processes may be easier for speakers of one language group relative to those of a different language group—the weak version of Whorf’s hypothesis. For instance, Lucy (1992) researched how different grammatical categories for numbers between English and Yucatec Maya affected their respective speakers’ cognition of those languages. English has count nouns, such as “a pen” and uncountable mass nouns, such as “milk.” In English, all count nouns can be plural and marking number is obligatory, if semantically required; however, in Yucatec marking number is optional and only applied to animate beings. Lucy hypothesized that English speakers would mention the numbers of objects when describing a picture, whereas Yucatec speakers would not. This hypothesis was confirmed.

The NK state leaders and linguists focused on influence of language on thoughts: the language as a tool for accessibility to the way in which people think. By voicing the unproven statement—people cannot think without language and language forms ideology (T-S. Kim, 1983)—NK linguists emphasize their view on the critical role of language in social and personal development. Further, Juche ideology highlights the decisive role of humans as socio-politico lives in revolution. In this worldview, history develops through the struggle of people to reach a state of independence, such as people moving from a state of subordination to society and nature to establishing and living in a socialist society. Kim Il Sung and NK linguists viewed language as the key to reformulating people’s thoughts and their society, and thus critical in the effort to establish a communist society. The following reveals this view:
We should remake society, nature and remold the people by means of language in order
to realize and maintain the independence of the masses…. In remolding the people, one
of the most important things is educating and raising the people into communism with
Juche style…. It is unthinkable that we can educate the people in the Juche style and
inculcate Juche thought in all realms of society without using language. Therefore,
language is a powerful weapon that actively serves ideologically educating and
remolding the masses of the people into Juche-style humans. In this context, language
carries out the function of ideological education…. Without using spoken and written
language, we are not able to learn, research, interpret, and propagate the great Juche
ideology. (C-H. Choe & C-S. Pak, 1999/2000, pp. 75–76)

In short, Kim Il Sung believed people could be reformed into model communists through
education in which language played a critical role. This belief explains why he was deeply
involved in NK LPP from the time he acquired political power in North Korea soon following
the 1945 liberation. This is also the reason that NK LPP had developed systematically under the
guiding control of the NK leadership and the state.

The Juche language theory recalls George Orwell’s novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four. In that
novel Orwell criticized totalitarian rulers’ control of language. In Nineteen Eighty-Four, citizens
of a future society, which Orwell named Oceania, are controlled through a newly created
language, Newspeak:

Newspeak was the official language of Oceania and had been devised to meet the
ideological needs of Ingsoc, or English Socialism…. The purpose of Newspeak was not
only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible. (Orwell, 1949/2003, pp. 309–310)

Although Orwell’s world in Nineteen Eighty-Four is fictional, the goal of controlling language, meeting ideological needs, conforms with the aims of Juche language theory.

The second main concept of language in Juche philosophy is the notion of a single nation-ethnicity and a single-language ideology, characteristic ideas of most nationalists everywhere. The Juche language theory inspired by Kim II Sung views language as the most important symbol of ethno-nationalism. Whereas the state is a legally defined polity, the nation is a population sharing a common mass public culture, territory, and sense of identity (Barbour, 2000a). National consciousness, and nationalism, in North Korea is based on Korean ethnicity, an important aspect of which is a common Korean language. As Kim Il Sung stated:

Language is one of the most important common features which characterize a nation.

Even though a people are all of the same stock and live on the same territory, they cannot be called a nation if they speak different languages. (I. S. Kim, 1984a, P.13; official North Korean translation)

언어는 민족을 특징짓는 공동성가운데서 가장 중요한것의 하나입니다. 피줄이 같은 한령토안에서 살아도 언어가 다르면 하나의 민족이라고 말할수 없습니다. 조선인민은 피줄과 언어를 같이하는 하나의 민족입니다. (I. S. Kim, 1982a, p.14)

Kim Il Sung clearly insisted that a shared language was the most important defining criterion of a nation, such that a common language was the single marker distinguishing a nation from a shared territory or members of the same race. This is an unproven thesis. Language is no single marker of a nation, although linguistic differences can distinguish ethnic groups. For instance, Serbo-Croatian is a single language with different preferences in vocabulary but used by two different groups, the Serbs and Croats. As the conflict between these two groups—who have different historical, cultural, and religious backgrounds—grew, the country (Yugoslavia) and the language split apart (Wardhaugh, 2010). In the case of Irish, its nationalist movement lacked the promotion of the national language, yet it achieved a sovereign independent state with an Irish national identity. Although the Republic of Ireland has its national language, Irish, most Irish people seem to maintain linguistic identity with Irish varieties of English and use this in
everyday life (Barbour, 2000b). Therefore, the defining characteristic of a nation should be a shared sense of identity, rather than a shared language per se. However, on the Korean Peninsula, linguistic nationalism was enthusiastically accepted and was used to identify and unify Korean ethnicity in both Koreas. One reason for this is Koreans share a single language, with its varieties and regional dialects being, in general, mutually intelligible. This made the Korean language the natural representative identifier of the nation. The other reason is that historically the Korean language was intimately tied to the Korean nationalist movement. Korean linguistic nationalism predates the Japanese colonial period (1910–1945) and forms one aspect of Korea’s modernization process in the 19th century. But it was during the Japanese occupation of Korea from 1910 that the Korean language became bound cohesively with Korean identity and the independence movement. In the colonial period, the Korean language was equated with Koreaanness, and the mother tongue as a marker divided life and death in some tragic situations. For instance, when enraged Japanese, reacting to false rumors that Koreans had committed arson and robbery following the gigantic 1923 Tokyo Earthquake, killed some six thousand Koreans living in the Kanto region of Japan, Koreans were identified through language—Koreans were asked to say a certain Japanese word that was difficult for Korean speakers to pronounce, and if the Korean failed, they were attacked and even killed (Ryang, 2007).

These brutal colonial experiences inextricably connected Koreans with their mother tongue. From the late 1930s, as the Japanese wartime mobilization was intensified, the Japanese used Korea as an important supply base for their wartime needs. In this context, Japan sought to make Korea an intrinsic part of the Japanese empire rather than just a colonial outpost (J. Kim, 2012). The Japanese colonial government in Korea established a policy of “Japan and Korea are one” (naisen ittai in Japanese) and forced Koreans to become the patriotic Japanese subjects. As part of this policy, in 1938, Korean language was banned from public use, an overt attempt to obliterate Korean identity and compel Koreans to assimilate to Japanese culture. From that date, Korean students could only use Japanese as their “national language,” and students were penalized by school authorities, such as their Japanese teachers, for using their ethnic tongue on school grounds. From 1940 until liberation in 1945, Koreans were even forced to adopt Japanese names.
In this context, the work of the Korean language scholars of the Korean Language Society (Co.sen.e.hak.hoy) to standardize the Korean language through such things as a unified orthography, defining standard Korean, and planning a Korean monolingual dictionary, was considered an aspect of the Korean national liberation movement by the Japanese colonial government. Many Korean language scholars were even imprisoned and tortured, with some of them dying in prison for their language efforts. This oppressive Japanese assimilation policy in its Korean colony produced great animosity among Koreans, one effect being that Koreans more than ever began to identify their mother tongue with their ethnicity as a foil to Japanese imperialism.

In this historical context, NK has long propagated the story that Kim Il Sung, during the colonial period, fought the Japanese by educating Koreans in the Korean language, in defiance of Japanese colonial laws and promoting linguistic nationalism. According to the NK government, in 1936 Kim Il Sung founded the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland (Co.kwuk.Kwangpok.hoy), an anti-Japanese united front organization in Manchuria, and formulated the Ten-Point Program (I. S. Kim, 1971). These ten rules formed a revolutionary blueprint that was widely implemented in post-liberation North Korea (S. Kim, 2013). One of these rules regards education: education was to be compulsory, free, and carried on in the Korean language (I. S. Kim, 1971).

Linguists who spearheaded NK LPP after the 1945 liberation from Japan were also strong linguistic nationalists. Some of them were the leading linguists of the Korean Language Society (Co.sen.e.hak.hoy) under Japanese colonial rule. For instance, K. Li, who was in charge of compiling and publishing the first Korean monolingual dictionary as an aspect of the Korean national independence movement of the Korean Language Society, was sentenced in 1942 by the Japanese colonial government to six years imprisonment for his activities. He has been called the leader of the Korean language movement during the colonial period, since he received the longest prison sentence among the four main linguists who were imprisoned for the same lexicographic work (Y-K. Ko, 2006). K. Li feared that the Korean language would gradually disappear under Japanese rule. Accordingly, as a nationalist who identified the Korean language with the nation, he led the Korean language movement in order to strengthen the national consciousness among the Korean people and to help foment the independence movement (Li,
After liberation in 1948, Li, who supported Kim Il Sung, traveled to the North from the South, choosing to live there until his death in 1978. During his life in North Korea, Li became both a prominent political figure as well as a leading linguist (Li, 1947/2014). Li’s linguistic nationalism is identical with Kim Il Sung’s. In fact, most Korean intellectuals and activists who fought against Japanese imperialism ruled adopted a linguistic nationalism, and approach that was generally accepted by the Korean people of both Koreas in the process of post-colonial nation-building. However, in the case of North Korea, which came to be ruled by socialist authoritarianism, linguistic nationalism was able to be mobilized as a more powerful and important vehicle in its drive for national unity, compared to South Korea, which in its formative years was more pluralistic with various and discordant beliefs on language.

4.2 The Literacy Campaign, Elimination of Chinese Characters, and Standardization: The Early Stage of LPP in North Korea

North Korea’s language planning and policy following liberation followed a trend among postcolonial states, wherein a change in the official language marked a break with the colonial period. Another example of this is Taiwan, where the official language was changed from the Japanese of the Japanese colonial period to Mandarin Chinese in 1945 following liberation (Heylen, 2007). Though many postcolonial states opted to retain their colonial languages or chose a regional lingua franca as their official languages for various reasons (Wright, 2012), the first North Korean language policy immediately following liberation included the officialization of Korean language as the national language, status planning, the selection of a new official language (Cwu. chey. sa. sanguy, 1982; Oliver, 1993). Although this occurred under the Soviet authorities who occupied North Korea until 1948 and had obvious practical imperatives. The officialization of the Korean language was a powerful symbolic act, marking national independence and contravening colonial Japan’s ban on the Korean language. North Korea’s officialization of the Korean language from the colonial language of Japanese was a natural and simple transition since Korea was a linguistically unified society with a strong linguistic nationalism. In contrast, in South Korea under US military occupation after the 1945 liberation, English was announced as the official language for the period of the US occupation (1945–
General Douglas MacArthur’s first official document to the people of the South, Paragraph 5 of Proclamation No. 1, declared:

ARTICLE V

For all purposes during the military control, English will be the official language. In event of any ambiguity or diversity of interpretation or definition between any English and Korean or Japanese text, the English text shall prevail.

(DOUGLAS MacARTHUR, General of the Army of the United States, Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, 1945, September 7, p.34)

The fact that English was announced as the official language in the South during the period of US military control drives the view that the US came to the South as an occupying force rather than a liberating one by some progressives in South Korea. Kang Joon Mann (2014), an established South Korean progressive scholar, argued that the US military at the time perceived Korea as its enemy based on the contents of various US military-issued proclamations: Proclamation No. 1- declaring English as the official language, and No. 2- proclaiming the punishment of any Koreans who violated orders issued under the US authority with death or other punishment. However, many South Koreans are unaware of Proclamation No. 1, since for all practical purposes, except for the operations of US military forces, Korean was the official language in the South. Despite the contents of Proclamation No. 1, on September 29, 1945, US authorities made the Korean language the official language of public education in South Korea (National Institute of Korean Language, 2008).

Although the Korean language was in a practical sense recovered as the official language in the South right after liberation, Proclamation No. 1 symbolized the different starting points of the language policies of the two Koreas from 1945. The power and prevalence of English in South Korea has been particularly demonstrated since liberation, with North Korea even calling South Korea a linguistic colony of the US.

Along with the establishment of Korean as a national language, one of the most prominent NK language policies was its anti-illiteracy campaign (King, 2007; Kumatani, 1990). Kim Il Sung promoted a national anti-illiteracy campaign as an urgent task to grounding a newly established socialist nation. He estimated that at the time of liberation in 1945 most NK women and farmers, as well as a large percentage of laborers, were illiterate, some 2.3 million adults (I.
S. Kim, 1979b). This was about a quarter of the NK population. However, the NK government claimed that by 1949, at the conclusion of its first anti-illiteracy program (December 1947 to March 1948), a 100 percent eradication of illiteracy had been achieved (Kaplan & Baldauf, 2009). My personal memories run parallel with this claim. I grew up in Pusan, a city in southern South Korea where many North Korean refugees settled after the Korean War (1950–1953). My mother, a South Korean, told me that none of the North Korean refugees she met were illiterate, a result of the North Korean authority’s literacy program. In the South, one survey indicated the illiteracy rate for those over 12-years-old right after the 1945 liberation stood at 78 percent (National Archives of Korea, n.d.). After the Korean War, from 1954 to 1958, South Korea also implemented a literacy movement, albeit on a smaller scale than the North’s. By 1966, Statistics Korea, a SK government organization, surveyed South Korea’s illiteracy rate among those over six years of age and without any formal education at 8.9 percent (J-C. Yoon, 2009). Considering this, the two Koreas’ literacy movements as part of their respective nation-building processes can be evaluated as successes. Between the two Koreas, the North’s literacy campaign was more successful over a short period time due to the full-scale social nature of the movement led by central authorities.

North Korea’s literacy campaign was connected to two other prominent NK language policies: the 1949 hankul (the vernacular Korean script)-only use policy made through a ban on the use of Chinese characters in writing, and the standardization of hankul. Although Chinese characters from one to nine for Arabic numerals were used in NK newspapers until April 1956, the ban on Chinese characters in orthography has been applied generally to public publications. These NK language policies in the early stages of North Korea’s nation-building were related to its earliest social reforms: for instance, land reform was to take cultivable land from the landholding elites, who were often Japanese collaborators, and redistribute it to landless tenant farmers. Therefore, educating the farmers and laborers, who were mostly illiterate, regarding this reform was critical to the reform’s success (Y-J. Ko, 2012). The land reform was necessary for the NK political regime to gain the support of the majority of the Korean peasantry, since most of the farmers owned no land and survived at a subsistence level. In conjunction with this, eliminating Chinese characters (a foreign writing system to Koreans) in writing was needed to achieve literacy at a rapid pace. Korean words consist of three different lexical stocks: native,
Sino-Korean, and loan words. Sino-Korean words make up approximately 60 percent of contemporary Korean vocabulary. Native words and loan elements make up the remainder: 35 percent and 5 percent, respectively (Sohn, 1999). Because of their Chinese origins, Sino-Korean words can be written in either Chinese characters or their hankul equivalent. Naturally, if written in Chinese characters, Koreans who cannot read Chinese characters are unable to comprehend the texts. These language policies were also associated with the ideological aspects of the early stage of North Korea’s “anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution,” which was conducted between March and August 1946 (Armstrong, 2003, p.75). The officialization of the vernacular Korean script (hankul) was promoted as an anti-imperialist movement against Japanese imperialism. Later, the imperialist adversary shifted from Japan to the US, since the NK political powers-that-be contended that after 1945 liberation South Korea had taken on a colonial-like status vis-à-vis the US. On the other hand, eliminating Chinese characters in orthography was considered an anti-feudal ruling by NK’s political leaders as well as by many Korean language scholars in North Korea, since traditionally only the educated noble class in Korea was able to use Chinese characters and it was the noble class that had held power in feudal Korean society (Y-J. Ko, 2012).

In sum, the language policies in the early stages of NK state-building between 1945 liberation and the 1950 Korean War were undertaken for practical reasons to ensure the success of drastic social reforms, such as land reform. At the same time, the NK political authorities imbued these language policies with ideological righteousness and rationalized them in the context of socialist revolution. The motivation of the mass literacy movement in North Korea was similar to those in other socialist states. Lenin in 1921 argued that illiteracy was the enemy of political educationalists, such as communists, and if illiteracy existed, political education was useless (1965). In the case of the Soviet Union, the literacy rate of those ages 9 to 49 increased to 98.5 percent by 1959, up from 56.6 percent in 1926 in the wake of the October Revolution of 1917 (Comrie, Stone, & Polinsky, 1996). In China, the Communist Party directed literacy campaigns and language reform to spread its political message effectively. As a result, 23.5 percent of the populace over 12 years of age were classified as illiterate or semi-illiterate in the mid-1980s, a significant decrease from the over 80 percent illiteracy rate among the Chinese
population estimated in 1949, the year of the communist victory in the Chinese civil war (Fengyuan, 2004).

Compared to North Korea’s language policy regarding the exclusive use of hankul for promoting literacy, since 1948 the South Korean government’s hankul-only-use policy has swung like a pendulum between the exclusive use of hankul and the sanction of limited use of Chinese characters in the education system. This is the result of various contending opinions regarding language policy among mainly South Korean scholars and political leaders. The first South Korean law in 1948 regarding exclusive use of hankul in official documents was ambiguous.

Official documents are to be written in hankul. However, when needed, Chinese characters may be used alongside hankul temporarily. (National Archives of Korea, p.113)

Although this law declared South Korea’s official documents were to be written in hankul, it gave permission to use Chinese characters “when needed” and “temporarily.” First, “when needed” is a subjective judgment, different for each person. Second, “temporarily” is also a vague and unlimited period of time. Furthermore, this law resulted in two different interpretations in terms of utilizing Chinese characters, either writing them without their corresponding hankul, as illustrated in (a), and the parallel use of hankul and the equivalent Chinese characters in parentheses, as in (b).

(a) 국어 사랑 (love for national language)
(b) 국어(국어) 사랑 (love for national language)

This vague law was the result of a compromise between the exclusive hankul proponent scholars and the opponents (Y-G, Choi, 2003). In consequence, in South Korea Chinese characters have been written in one form or the other. The South Korean government’s inconsistent policies regarding exclusive use of hankul since 1948 can be summarized below (Sohn, 2013, pp. 443–444):

1948: Proclamation of the law of exclusive use of hankul
1949: Permission to use necessary Chinese characters alongside hankul
1950: Decision to use Chinese characters mixed with hankul
1955: Announcement of the law of exclusive use of hankul
1964: Pronouncement of the revised law on the exclusive use of *hankul*, permitting the teaching of 1,300 Chinese characters in elementary and secondary school textbooks

1970: Enforcement of the *hankul*-only policy, removing all Chinese characters from the textbooks of elementary and secondary schools

1972: Reinstatement of the education of 1,800 Chinese characters in secondary schools


These inconsistent policies finally settled as the *hankul*-only use for official documents, including primary and secondary school textbooks, as part of the National Language Basic Law of 2005 (National Archives of Korea, 2003, p. 8). Although this law allows the use of Chinese characters or foreign letters parenthetically beside *hankul* when authorized by a Presidential decree, it is actually perceived as the exclusive use of *hankul*.

However, unlike its universal application in North Korea, the *hankul*-only use regulation has been limited to official documents in the South. The *hankul*-only use policy has prevailed in South Korea since 2005, there have been strong opinions expressed in favor of using Chinese characters by South Korean scholars and intellectuals, who have challenged the South Korean government’s policy, to include a legal challenge to the *hankul*-only use law in 2016.

By contrast, the *hankul*-only use policy in North Korea was settled well from the beginning of the policy’s implementation, and required standardization, such as revising orthography, grammar, compiling dictionaries, and language purification—wherein Chinese terms as well as Japanese and English loan words were nativized. These language standardization activities took place at the end of the 1940s, and especially after the NK government was officially established in September 1948. Policies during this early period of NK LPP sought to make the Korean language as accessible as possible to the populace at large. From the time Kim Il Sung obtained political power in 1945, he insisted that language be used in a simple and easy way so that the people might understand (I. S. Kim, 1980a). In this way, the government could educate the people in its socialist ideology. Although Chinese character education was revived in 1953 in order to study past literature as well as works produced in South Korean (Sohn, 2013), which still employed Chinese characters, North Korea, in general,
has maintained its ban on using Chinese characters in orthography since 1949. NK newspapers, such as the Rodong Sinmun used Chinese characters for numbers until April 15, 1956, but these are easy to understand. Besides Chinese character education, one exception of using Chinese characters in North Korea is in the monolingual Korean dictionary. Parallel use of hankul and Chinese characters with parentheses for Sino-Korean words has been used since the publication of the monolingual dictionary, ‘Korean Dictionary (Co.senmal.Tay.sa.cen)’ in 1992, after originally refusing to use Chinese characters in the Dictionary of Contemporary Korean (Hyentay.Co.senmal.Sa.cen) published in 1968. This change was ostensibly to better serve one of the important functions of a dictionary as reference source, while also providing etymology to distinguish many Sino-Korean homonyms that would otherwise not be distinguishable if written only in hankul. Besides these exceptions of using Chinese characters, the hankul-only use policy has prevailed in North Korea for reasons of accessibility of language, one of the primary thrusts of North Korea’s language policy and meant to facilitate the inculcation of the people with its official state ideology.

4.3 Linguistic Purism and North Korea’s New Standard Dialect (Cultured Language): 1960s Onwards

North Korea’s overtly expressed and officially documented LPP in both status and corpus planning began in a systemic way with Kim Il Sung’s deep involvement in the process from 1964. Kim Il Sung actively participated in NK LPP from 1945, such as with the literacy campaign, but his absolute authority in NK LPP really came to fruition in the 1960s. The full-scale stage of the NK LPP began with two putative conversations in 1964 and 1966 between Kim Il Sung and Korean linguists, which in dialogue form record what Kim Il Sung said regarding various ideas on the LPP. Although many of the ideas in the two conversations had been discussed by Korean linguists before, these statements have since assumed the role of powerful rules and guides for LPP in North Korea. According to C-S. Pak (1999/2000), a North Korean linguist, up until the early 1960s the language reformative movement, including vocabulary management and linguistic purification, had been done not by unified planning but by through the efforts of individual scholars, and therefore the movement did not bear much fruit until the
leader’s “teaching” on language. This indicates the critical role of political power in the formulation of NK language policy.

In the two aforementioned conversations, Kim Il Sung connected linguistic purism to ethnic identity and expanded this to ethnic nationalism and national independence. In a broad sense, linguistic purism seeks to eliminate all undesirable elements in language—such as those originating in foreign languages, regional dialects, and sociolects—from a given perspective, for instance the perspective of the ruling authority (Langer & Nesse, 2012). In a narrower sense, as Trask (1999) defines, linguistic purism is the belief that words, and other linguistic features of foreign origin are contaminating the purity of a language, therefore linguistic purism is limited to combatting foreign-language elements in order to preserve a language variety. Kim Il Sung’s linguistic purism conforms more to the broader sense of this term. However, when it comes to linguistic purism in both Koreas, the narrower sense of this concept has been propagated socially. In this study, linguistic purism refers to this narrower meaning.

In his conversation with linguists in 1966, Kim Il Sung called the Korean language min.cok.e ‘the national language,’ and insisted that Sino-Korean and loan words needed to be replaced with indigenous Korean words in order to preserve the national language and then urged the systemic development of the national language (I. S. Kim, 1982b, p.338). Under these ideas, which were called Juche ‘self-reliance’ language ideology in parallel with the larger Juche philosophy, Kim Il Sung guided corpus planning through such things as vocabulary management, orthography, spacing, linguistic reform, dictionary compilation, and status planning for the selection of a new standard language in North Korea, Mwunhwa.e ‘Cultured Language.’ Among these activities, I examine policies on vocabulary management, especially the language refinement movement in linguistic purism, and the emergence of Cultured Language due to the great impact they have had on the Korean language in NK.

4.3.1 Linguistic purism in the two Koreas

North Korea’s so-called Mal Tatumki Wuntong ‘language refinement movement,’ takes as its aim the maintenance of the “purity” of the ethnic language and the promotion of native, “pure” Korean words by replacing those of foreign-origin. In general, linguistic nationalism
drives this pursuit of linguistic purism. In the 19th century, nearly all European states underwent 
linguistic purism in part of their nationalist movements. For instance, during the building of the 
German Empire, established in 1871, linguistic purism was the task of the new German nation-
state. In the German Empire period, the Germanization of words was largely directed against 
French influence. Likewise, during the later regime of the National Socialist German Worker’s 
Party (Nazis), foreign words were purged in an effort to maintain a pure German identity. 
Linguistic purism in the task of German nation-building from the German Empire to the Nazis 
had a common tenet. This was the belief that using a purified German language would enhance 
German national identity and unity (Barbour, 2000c). This is the same ideology that North 
Korean political leaders and linguists have promoted. The linguistic purists in German under the 
Nazis associated linguistic purism with race (Aryan blood) and linked this with chauvinism. This 
national patriotic chauvinistic view on language under the Nazis is also found in Kim Il Sung’s 
comments in his 1964 conversation with NK linguists.

Korean is, as a matter of fact, a very good language. Our language flows easily, 
with rising and falling cadences and long and short sounds; it has good intonation, as 
well, and sounds very pleasing to the ear. Our language is so rich that it is capable of 
expressing with clarity any complex thought or delicate feeling; it can stir people, make 
them laugh or cry. Our language is also highly effective in educating people in 
communist morality, because it can express with precision matters of good behavior. Our 
national language is so rich in pronunciation that in it we can pronounce almost freely the 
sounds of any other language of the Eastern or Western countries. We can justly be proud 
of our spoken and written language, and we should love it. (I. S. Kim, 1984a, p.17; 
official North Korean translation)
사실 우리 조선말은 아주 좋은 말입니다. 우리 말은 류창하며 높고낮음과 길고짧음이 
있고 역량도 좋으며 듣기에도 매우 아름납니다. 우리 말은 표현이 풍부하여 복잡한 
사상과 섬세한 감정을 다 잘 나타낼수 있으며 사람들을 격동시킬수 있고 올릴수도 
있으며 웃길수도 있습니다. 우리 말은 레의범절을 뚫뚫히 나타낼수 있기때문에 
사람들의 공산주의도덕교양에도 매우 좋습니다. 또한 우리 나라 말은 발음이 매우 
풍부합니다. 그렇기때문에 우리 말과 글로써는 동서양의 어떤 나라 말의 발음이든지
This linguistically invalid and national-socialist idea was used to justify language purification in North Korea. Kim Il Sung viewed the use of foreign words, such as Sino-Korean words and other loan words—Japanese, Russian, and English—as a deficiency in the ‘proud beautiful national language,’ and suggested replacing the foreign elements with native Korean ones (I. S. Kim, 1982a, 1982b). The following is the guideline provided by Kim Il Sung for linguistic purism in 1966 (I. S. Kim, 1982b):

(a) If there are Sino-Korean words and native Korean elements with the same meanings, take the native words discarding the Sino-Korean ones

(b) When coining new words, words need to be found among native Korean sources in order not to add Sino-Korean words

Kim focused on preventing the import or creation of new Sino-Korean words as well as replacing Sino-Korean words with existing native Korean ones. Chinese characters have been used productively to coin new words when needed over the long course of the development of the Korean language, since Chinese characters represent morphemes, while the number of native words has remained relatively stable. However, Kim’s guidance was flexible and was applied practically to the language environment. For instance, he mentioned that replaced Sino-Korean words needed to be discarded from the dictionary, but he kept open the possibility that they could later be rehabilitated if the people continued to use them. In addition, Kim advised that those Sino-Korean words that had been assimilated into and accepted by Korean speakers as Korean words, such as *hak.kyo* ‘school’ should be retained. He also recognized the necessity of continuing to use Sino-Korean words in science and politics (I. S. Kim, 1982b). Though Kim did not explain the reason for this, one may surmise two main reasons: first, the numbers of Sino-Korean words are predominant over native words in the academic fields of the social and hard sciences and technology; and second, Sino-Korean words can deliver meanings efficiently and transparently compared to native Korean words, since each syllable is composed of a morpheme, as in *ca-cwu* (self-owner) ‘self-reliance’. Therefore, without using Sino-Korean words, it is almost impossible to compose political or technical texts.
By contrast, Kim emphasized the need to replace difficult Sino-Korean words with native Korean ones for the sake of those who were illiterate or had limited literacy in Chinese characters. In 1964, he said even when Sino-Korean words were written in hankul, those Sino-Korean words that had homonyms could still cause confusion without knowledge of the underlying Chinese characters (1982a). As an example, Kim pointed to the word sang.cen, which has several meanings that all appear the same when written in hankul, but which are written differently in Chinese characters (Table 1). Therefore, replacing difficult Sino-Korean words with native ones became the main object of vocabulary management. This was related to Kim’s idea of popularism in language use.

Table 1. An example of Sino-Korean word that had homonyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>hankul</th>
<th>Chinese characters</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>상전 (sangcen)</td>
<td>上典</td>
<td>one’s master</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>상전 (sangcen)</td>
<td>桑田</td>
<td>a mulberry field, plantation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: I. S. Kim, 1982a, p. 20)

Through the leader’s guidance, about 50,000 words were refined and published for distribution as ta.tum.un mal ‘managed words’ up through the 1970s (C-S. Pak, 1999/2000). However, as a result of the practicality-based idea in the language refinement movement, half of these went unused by users and were in reality began to be discarded from the 1980s. This was because some loan words were revived due to their internationality and commonly used foreign terms were accepted in language ecology. For instance, the loan word, ai.su.khu.lim ‘ice cream’ was replaced with a native Korean version, el.um.po.swungi, which was then included in the North Korean dictionary, Hyentay Co.senmal Sa.cen ‘Dictionary of Contemporary Korean’ (1981). However, the discarded loan word ai.su.khu.lim revived in the 1992 North Korean dictionary (Co.senmal Tay.sa.cen), while the corresponding native Korean word el.um.po.swungi was discarded. I could confirm that the NK society uses the loan word, ai.su.khu.lim ‘ice cream’ from
a NK television program (MBCNEWS, 2018b). According to the SK linguist Y-K. Ko (1999), when he met NK linguists at a professional conference in Beijing, he heard from NK linguists that the NK government was compelled to accept some revived loan words, in cases where NK language users simply did not use their corresponding native versions. As a result, according to Y-G. Choi (2010), after re-examining the original 50,000 words in 1986, the North Korean government published about 25,000 refined and managed words as updated *ta.tum.un mal*. Among these refined words, unused words by the people were again discarded, thus about 12,000 are listed in the *Korean Dictionary* (*Co.senmal Tay.sa.cen*) of 1992 (Y-G. Choi, 2010). This process shows that a key characteristic of North Korea’s linguistic purification movement is its pursuit of practicality (C-S. Pak, 1999/2000) and continuous efforts to moderate the managed words to meet its objective of practicality under systemic social control and within a long-term LPP process.

As North Korea endeavored to purge foreign words immediately following liberation, linguists in South Korea also started a campaign of linguistic purism at the outstart of their own nation-building efforts. However, there are some differences in linguistic purism between the two Koreas. South Korean linguists targeted Japanese elements rather than Sino-Korean words. The National Language Purification Committee (*Kwuk.e.cenghwa.wiwenhoy*), under the Ministry of Education in the US military government in South Korea, distributed the following measures in 1948:

- When a native Korean word is available for its corresponding Japanese word, we discard the Japanese word and use the native form.
- When a native Korean word is unavailable, the old native lexical stocks are referenced for synonymous terms. If found, the term is assigned a new definition and adapted into the lexicon ⇒ success case: *tosilak* ‘box lunch, packed meal’
- If a synonymous term is not found in the old native lexical stocks, existing native words are used to create a new native term: ⇒ success case: *thwi.kim* ‘deep fried food’
- Replacing Sino-Japanese words with Sino-Korean words that have been used for a long time is needed: ⇒ success case: *wuphyo* ‘stamp’

(adapted from South Korean Ministry of Education, 1948)
The fact that replacing the Sino-Japanese words with the Sino-Korean words that had been used in Korea reveals that the SK linguists took Sino-Korean words as assimilated Korean words. In general, Sino-Korean words are perceived as Koreanized words rather than loan words by South Koreans due to Korea’s long history of using Sino-Korean elements, possibly since the first century BC, and their predominance over native words in the Korean lexicon (Sohn, 1999). However, Kim Il Sung differentiated frequently used Koreanized Sino-Korean words from Sino-Korean ones that were difficult to understand without in-depth knowledge of Chinese characters. His guidance was to preserve frequently used Koreanized Sino-Korean words but replace difficult Sino-Korean ones with native Korean equivalents. This is related to Kim’s struggle against elitism that alienated the undereducated or uneducated and hindered effective communication. In this context, the differences between the two Koreas’ linguistic purism in the beginning stages of this movement following liberation were that South Korea focused more on linguistic decolonization from Japanese, while Kim Il Sung aimed at fighting elitism and targeting difficult Sino-Korean words as well as Japanese and Sino-Japanese words. Kim Il Sung said in 1964:

Since just after liberation, we have been urging that simple—not difficult—words be used; nevertheless, there are still many people who use words that simply go over the heads of the masses.

Some people think that using a great many words that have been borrowed from Chinese ideographs and which are incomprehensible to others is a mark of learning, but such people are really nothing but ignoramuses. We must let people know that it is wise and more civilized to speak and write simply and clearly.

In fact, people who are versed in Marxism-Leninism can explain all its theories perfectly well without using difficult words. But those who lack a profound theoretical knowledge are more apt to copy phrases from books and mystify other people by letting loose a long-winded display of difficult words. (I. S. Kim, 1984a, p.24; adapted from official North Korean translation)

우리는 해방직후부터 힘든 말을 쓰지 말고 쉬운 말을 쓸 것을 주장하여왔으나 아직도 대중이 알아듣지 못할 어려운 말을 쓰는 사람들이 많습니다.

41
This statement by Kim Il Sung reveals that his linguistic purism was driven not only to promote nationalism but also to educate general public in the socialist theory through comprehensible and effective communication.

Similarly, SK linguists also tackled difficult Sino-Korean words in the 1960s. The South Korean government under the military dictatorship of Park Chung-hee campaigned for linguistic purification. In 1967 the Korean Language Society in South Korea published its Dictionary of Plain Words (Swiwun Mal Sa.cen) with 15,924 enlisted words in support of the South Korean government’s campaign (as cited in Y-G. Choi, 2003; Korean Language Society, n.d.). In this dictionary, difficult and archaic Sino-Korean words were the first targets for replacement, while words of Japanese and Western origin were also considered ‘impure’ elements (Y-G. Choi, 2003). However, since this was done by a non-governmental linguistic group, this had minimal influence on language use by the public. The peak of linguistic purism in South Korea occurred in the 1970s under the President, Park Chung-hee, who had accumulated absolute power following his military coup in 1961. Park, in competition with North Korea in the socio-political, economic and military realms, ordered ‘language purification’ in 1976. The goal of his linguistic purism reveals the ideology behind this measure:

The linguistic purism campaign takes place in order to raise the spirit of independence among the people as well as to contribute to unifying the people by creating a sense of unity and purifying the emotions of the people in using correct and beautiful our language. (South Korean Ministry of Education, 1976, p.1181)

바르고 고운 우리말을 쓰게 함으로써 국민 정서를 순화시키고 일체감을 조성하여 국민 총화에 기여함은 물론, 주체성 있는 국민 정신을 배양하기 위하여 국어 순화 운동을 전개한다.
In parallel with North Korea, Park Chung-hee’s linguistic purism also took the position of the Whorfian belief on language: By using “purified” words, people’s emotions and spirits could be “purified and unified” as one with self-reliance. In addition, the leaders of the two Koreas emphasized “self-reliance” as language ideology based on linguistic nationalism driving the linguistic purification movement. However, the main target in the South was the Japanese element. The following report written in 1976 by the South Korean Ministry of Education demonstrates that the priority of the South Korean government’s linguistic purism was combatting foreign words, especially Japanese ones. The difficult Sino-Korean words were the last purification target on the report.

The issues in using the national language:

a. Abuse or over-use of foreign words (Japanese, Western words)
b. Popularity of slangs
c. Tensification in pronunciation (i.e., changko-changkko ‘storage’)d. Weakness of using honorifications
e. Intemperate use of regional dialects
f. Use of difficult Sino-Korean words

(adapted from South Korean Ministry of Education, 1976, pp. 1182–1184)

As with North Korea, the linguistic purification effort of South Korea under Park Chung-hee was to police people’s language use in order to unify the people in the way those in power wanted. In addition, the diffusion strategy for linguistic purism in the two Koreas was the same: education and mass media. From the beginning of the 1970s, schools actively participated in this language purification campaign (National Archives of Korea, n.d.). I was an elementary school student in the late 1970s in South Korea and remember a list of a few Japanese loan words and their corresponding “purified” versions, either Sino-Korean or native Korean words written by my teacher or some classmates in the corner of the class blackboard. I do not recall western foreign words on these lists. The list was changed weekly, one example being the following:
I recall many residents of my hometown using Japanese words in daily life in the 1970s, although mass media and school textbooks did not use them. I no longer saw these lists on the blackboard after elementary school, that is, from the early 1980s, but this campaign was effective, and my generation tried consciously to not use Japanese words, although my parent’s generation used Japanese words habitually. Since Japanese words mark the language of Korea’s erstwhile colonial oppressor, there was popular consensus about purifying Japanese words from the language in the South.

However, as a modernizing and westernizing society, South Korea was at first generally tolerant in regard to adopting English loan words, particularly from the United States, South Korea’s most influential ally. For instance, from the 1970s, signboards on the streets of Seoul, the South Korean capital, began to overflow with English words, and many South Korean TV programs took English words for their names, such as Nyu.su.Lain ‘News Line’ and Kulayntu Syo ‘Grand Show’ (J-M. Kang, 2014). In parallel with this trend, many popular entertainers, especially pop singers, adopted English stage names, such as Phay.thi Kim ‘Patti Kim’. When Park Chung-hee ordered linguistic purification in 1976 in all areas of society in the pursuit of cultural nationalism, South Korean mass media forced popular entertainers to change their stage names to Korean ones. As a result, pop singers, musical groups, and actors who used western—mostly English—names, as well as TV programs adopted Korean names. The SK government gave tax benefits to business owners who substituted their loan words on billboards with Korean ones (National Archives of Korea, n.d.). However, this linguistic purification did not last long in South Korea. Entertainers recovered their western stage names soon after the end of the Park Chung-hee era in 1979.

In post-authoritarian South Korea, since 1991 the linguistic purification campaign has been continued by a government-run-institute, the National Academy of the Korean Language under the Ministry of Culture (National Institute of Korean Language, n. d.). However, relative
to the number of purified Korean words that have been introduced to the South Korean public as part of this campaign, a very small ratio has actually found real-world acceptance and use (J-I. Kwon, 2014). In contrast, in the North, the linguistic purification movement has continued under the leadership of the central authorities, currently the Linguistics Research Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences (Sahoy.kwahakwen En.ehak.yenkwuso), and many of the refined words have found general use by the public due in great part to the NK authority’s systematic control over language use. The fact that North Korea’s linguistic purism is explicitly coded in its constitution as below demonstrates how the political leadership set the language agenda as an important mission.

Article 54. The State shall safeguard our language from all attempts to obliterate it and shall develop it to meet present-day needs.

(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter, DPRK), n.d.; official North Korean translation)

제 54 조: 국가는 우리 말을 온갖 형태의 민족어말살정책으로부터 지켜내며 그것을 현대의 요구에 맞게 발전시킨다.

In sum, in the South Korea’s linguistic purification movement, the purging of Japanese words gains much more popularity in comparison with the purging of western words, while North Korea focused on combatting elitism and anti-nationalism by “purifying” difficult Sino-Korean, Japanese, and other foreign words. Linguistic purification in both Koreas was driven by linguistic nationalism and peaked with the direct involvement of authoritarian leadership. The linguistic purification movements of both Koreas have been led by government-run language institutes, and mass media and education were the two main vehicles of its promulgation. The South’s language purification campaign has not been as successful as that of the North, because the case of South Korea is in general suggestive social campaign.
4.3.2 North Korea’s new standard dialect (Cultured Language)

Along with the vocabulary management, Kim Il Sung proclaimed the new standard North Korean language, namely *Munhwae ‘Cultured Language,’* based on the Pyongyang dialect in his 1966 conversation. Before the 1945 division, the standard Korean language was defined by the Korean Language Society in 1933 as below:

The standard language is in general the language currently used in Seoul by the middle class. (Y-G. Choi, 2003, p. 58)

This definition of the standard language delimits speakers as those of the middle class and the region as Seoul, the capital city of South Korea. This definition was revised in 1988 as “contemporary Seoul dialect widely used by educated/sophisticated people” by linguists in South Korea and has been maintained ever since (Y-G. Choi, 2003, p. 60). From North Korea’s perspective, this definition of the standard Korean language was economically discriminatory and so was not in harmony with its socialist ideology. Furthermore, after the division, Seoul was out of North Korea’s territory, although the two Koreas’ governments do not legally recognize each other. Therefore, it is not difficult to assume that North Korea changed the definition of the standard language from the South to fit its own political circumstances. NK’s *Dictionary of Korean (Coсенmal Sa.cen)* (1960–1962/1990) defined the standard language differently from the 1933 definition:

Standard language: the most complete form of language norms that is refined by language practice of people for a long time (“Phyocwun.e,” p. 3735).

표준어: 인민의 오랜 언어 생활의 실천에 의하여 다듬어지고 가장 완성된 언어 규범의 종체

This definition has neither the delimitation of economic class and region, nor an explicit socialist ideological drive. Further, the two Koreas referred to the standard language with the same word: *phyocwun.e* (standard language). However, Kim Il Sung desired to differentiate the NK standard language from its Southern counterpart, and so in 1966 coined a new word for the NK standard language, Cultured Language.

We should preserve and develop the national characteristics of our language with Pyongyang as the centre and the speech of Pyongyang as the standard, because
Pyongyang is the capital city and the cradle of the revolution where the General Staff of our revolution is located and where its strategies and tactics are planned for all political, economic, cultural and military fields. And the term “standard language” [phyocwun.e] must be replaced with another. This term may give rise to misunderstanding as if the Seoul dialect were the standard. So, there is no need to use it. It is proper that the language we, the builders of socialism, have developed on the basis of the speech of Pyongyang, the revolutionary capital city, be given a name other than “standard language”. Though the term “cultured language” is not perfectly suitable, it will, nevertheless, be acceptable. (I. S. Kim, 1984b, pp. 288–289; official North Korean translation)

Kim Il Sung insisted that the South Korean standard language, phyocwun.e, could not be the NK “standard,” since the South Korean language included words with Western, Japanese, and Chinese origins, such that the national characteristics of Korean language were disappearing. Thus, he called for the development of North Korea’s own standard language based on native Korean language and socialism (1982a; 1982b). The construction of group identity through the cultivation of difference, with a focus on ethnolinguistic purity and political otherness, as found in other nations’ status planning processes (Blommaert, 2014), resulted in the selection of the Pyongyang-based dialect as the NK standard language. Ideologies, such as anti-South Koreanism, ethnic nationalism, and the superiority of socialism, were all involved in creating the concept of Cultured Language. The norms of Cultured Language in the preface to the Dictionary
This dictionary is made to directly assist the workers in the correct use of our language and to actively contribute to the development of our language along Juche lines. Thus, replaced Sino-Korean words and loan words were not enlisted in the dictionary, and native Korean forms were found and enlisted and defined correctly reflecting their real world, practical meanings.

This dictionary follows the norms of Cultured Language that parallel the new ideology and class orientation of the socialist laborers of North Korea.

This statement demonstrates that the norm in Cultured Language is to make the speaker use language “correctly.” The “correctness” in this context denotes language that is ideologically parallel with the state Juche ideology, such as nationalism displayed through the use of refined native Korean words instead of Sino-Korean and loan words. Politically, this correctness is also linked with socialism, such that the people should use socialist political terminology and discourse in the way the state wishes them to use it. In this, some political terms were defined exclusively by Kim Il Sung, and are so designated by a star (★) mark in the dictionary.

...some of the terms were defined exclusively with Comrade Kim Il Sung’s words not by anything else. (Dictionary of Contemporary Korean, 1968, in the preface with no page number given)

...일부 올림말에 대해서는 김일성동지의 교시만을 얻고 따로 뜻풀이를 하지 않았다

For instance, tangseng ‘party spirit; party loyalty’ is defined:
★ *tangseng* ‘party spirit; party loyalty’ is defined as the spirit of combat that is infinitely loyal to the North Korean Workers’ Party and struggles to accomplish the policies and decisions of the Party no matter what, even at the risk of one’s own life if required. (Kim Il Sung) (“Tangseng,” 1968, p.285)

《당성이란 당의 정책과 결정을 관철하기 위해서는 물불을 가리지 않고 자기의 모든 힘, 필요하다면 생명까지 바쳐 싸우려는 당과 인민에게 무한히 충성을 다하려는 그러한 전투정신을 가리켜 말하는것입니다.》 (김일성)

Previously this word had been defined in North Korea by its general meaning, and only supplemented with Kim Il Sung’s interpretation, as can be seen in the Dictionary of Korean (1960–1962/1990):

*Tangseng* ‘party spirit; party loyalty’: loyalty that makes one actively struggle to thoroughly protect the benefits of the class and the North Korean Workers’ Party to which a person belongs… “*tangseng* ‘party spirit; party loyalty’ is defined as the spirit of combat that is infinitely loyal to the North Korean Workers’ Party and people and which struggles to accomplish the policies and decisions of the Party no matter what, even at the risk of one’s own life if required.” (Kim Il Sung) (“Tangseng,” p.895)

자기가 속한 당과 계급의 리익을 철저히 옹호하며 그를 위하여 적극적으로 투쟁하는 충실성...당성이란 당의 정책과 결정을 관철하기 위해서는 물불을 가리지 않고 자기의 모든 힘, 필요하다면 생명까지 바쳐 싸우려는, 당과 인민에게 무한히 충성스러운 그러한 전투 정신을 가리켜 말하는 것입니다. (김일성)

After the Cultured Language movement, this word was defined only by the words of Kim Il Sung, as in the dictionary published in 1968. As of 2018, this word is defined using the words of Kim Jong II, Kim Il Sung’s son and the leader of North Korea from his father’s death in 1994 until his own death in 2011. The meaning of this word has expanded from loyalty to the North Korean Workers’ Party and people to encompass loyalty to the Supreme Leader.

*tangseng*

“‘party spirit; party loyalty’ is defined, in a nutshell, as loyalty to the Supreme Leader.”

《Kim Jong II’s works Vol. 9, p. 122》 (“Tangseng,” ca. 2012)
당성 [黨性]

《당성이란 한마디로》
말하여 수령에 대한 충실성입니다.》(《김정일선집》 9권, 122페이지)

The words of the Supreme Leader, Kim Il Sung, have been treated as the core of Cultured Language. According to NK linguists S-G. Chong and K-W. Yi (1984), this phenomenon expanded during the era of Kim Il Sung’s son and successor, Kim Jong Il. Juche ideology identifies the Party and the Supreme Leader as one, and the one to whom the people should be loyal.

In contrast, some of the words that were considered against “the norms” of Cultured Language were discarded. For instance, unlike in the Dictionary of Korean (1960–1962/1990, Co.semnal Sa.cen), in the Dictionary of Contemporary Korean (1968), the Sino-Korean word, ka.chwuk ‘livestock’ is discarded and replaced with its native Korean equivalent, cipcimsung.

Some words that were considered in opposition to socialist society, such as no.lum ‘gambling,’ were also either removed from published dictionaries or their meanings delimited, such as by glossing their definitions “from old society,” i.e. archaic (“No.lum,” 1968), implying this word was no longer used in North Korea from the 1960s.

The Seoul-dialect was defined by NK as an anti-laboring class, anti-national language, since, according to the North Korean government, it had lost its national uniqueness by mixing with foreign elements. From this perspective, the Seoul-dialect should be blocked to preserve the “Koreanness” of North Korea (S-G. Chong & K-W. Yi, 1984). North Korea’s primary critique of the Seoul-dialect was that it employed loan words recklessly and ran counter to North Korea’s language ideology and norms. This demonstrates that Cultured Language was driven by political imperatives and was meant fundamentally to educate the populace in NK ideology, such as nationalism, and to control the people’s consciousness through language. Therefore, Cultured Language differs from South Korean standard language by its fundamentally political-ideological objectives, such as using “correct” wording to harmonize with the goal of constructing socialism, rather than its linguistic features. For instance, although Cultured Language is by definition based on the Pyongyang dialect, it is in actuality similar to the Seoul-based Standard Language. Cultured Language, for example, does not include words of the Pyongyang dialect, such as omani ‘mother’. Instead, it uses the corresponding Seoul-based
standard forms, such as e.me.ni ‘mother’ (Sohn, 2004, p.151; K-S. Pak, 2009). The ‘Dictionary of Contemporary Korean’ (1968) listed some Pyongyang dialect forms such as monci ‘dust,’ po.sen ‘traditional Korean socks,’ instead of the Seoul-based standard forms, menci, pe.sen (Yano, 2009). However, North Korean dictionaries published after 1968, such as the Cultured Language Dictionary (C.osen.Mwunhw.a.e.Sa.cen, 1973), have recovered the counterpart of Seoul-based standard forms discarding the Pyongyang dialect forms. In terms of including vocabulary from North Korean regional dialects as Cultured Language in its corpus planning, by 1980 about 3,100 words were known to have been selected as alternatives to corresponding Sino-Korean words (P-J. Kim, 1980), such as namsay ‘vegetable’ for yachay or chayso. However, in general, according to the NK linguist, C-S. Pak (1999/2000), words from regional North Korean dialects were excluded from Cultured Language as a hindrance to linguistic unity.

In addition, the guidance of Kim Jong Il made the NK language policy more flexible in order for users to use Cultured Language more easily. Following Kim Jong Il’s guidance, NK dictionaries published since 1981, such as the second edition of Dictionary of Contemporary Korean (Hyentay. C.osenmal. Sa.cen) (1981), include both “purified” words and their corresponding original forms in order to help language users in transitioning from the old terms to newly refined words (S-G. Chong & K-W. Yi, 1984). In other words, both newly coined “purified” native Korean words and their original forms have been employed by users. After all, in its language management movement North Korea has maintained a principle of using native Korean vocabulary that is comprehensible to the South.

As a result, although about 12,000 newly coined words from native Korean sources resulted from the language purism movement (Y-G. Choi, 2010), the meanings of many NK refined words are easily understandable to South Koreans. For instance, the South Korean term, hongswu ‘flood’ is called khunmwul in North Korea. The former is a Sino-Korean word, and the latter is a native “pure” Korean one. I believe most South Koreans would have no problem understanding the later NK counterpart. Further, North Korea did not discard the Sino-Korean, hongswu ‘flood,’ but uses both terms as synonyms, as found in the on-line dictionary published by North Korea:

홍수 [洪水] hongswu ‘flood’
= 큰물. = khunmwul (“Hongswu,” ca. 2012)
The NK dictionary, *Korean Dictionary (Co. senmal Tay. sa. cen)* (1992), listed 6,513 words that are doublets, that is, having purified words and correspondent original forms (National Institute of Korean Language, 1996). This means that many refined words are used with their pre-refined forms so that this dual use fills the divergence gap.

Words found in NK literature, but not in SK dictionaries, are another index showing the degree of divergence in vocabulary use between North and South. South Korea’s National Institute of Korean Language (1998) compiled about 1,500 words from twenty-four full-length NK novels (totaling about 5,100 pages) published between 1974 and 1990. These words include native and regional dialects, newly coined words, and managed ‘purified’ words. This also supports the argument that from the South Korean perspective linguistic divergence, especially for frequently used words, between North and South could be minor. However, for North Koreans this divergence may be a larger problem, because South Korea, which follows the international trend of globalization, has many more words, including loan words, that North Koreans do not use in their society. The National Institute of Korean Language published a book, *South Korean Words that North Koreans Do Not Know* (Pwukhan cwu. min. i mo. lu. nun namhan e. hwî) that lists about 3,600 words, mainly from the SK mass media and daily life (2000). These words consist of native Korean, Sino-Korean, and loan words. However, according to a survey conducted by the National Institute of Korean Language (2006), the percentage of NK defectors in South Korea surveyed who answered that they did not feel or felt very little inconvenienced (43%) in their daily life due to language divergence was higher than those who felt somewhat or very inconvenienced (21%). That said, the majority also answered that it took from one to three years before they stopped feeling the language divergence.

By Kim Jong Il’s guidance Sino-Korean words and loan words that were used in the writings of Kim Il Sung and Party documents became part of Cultured Language that people should learn, even if there were corresponding refined native Korean words (S-G. Chong & K-W. Yi, 1984, p.19). As a result, many Sino-Korean words, especially in political texts such as state leadership and Party documents, became part of Cultured Language and are used productively.

In addition, as C. Kwak (2001) insists, common daily vocabulary is largely identical or very similar between the two Koreas. Rather, the major linguistic differences between the two
Korean languages are matters of spelling and pronunciation of the word-initial *l* and *n* (before *i/y*) and the insertion of the epenthetic ‘s’ between nouns in many compounds, differences which rarely interrupt mutual communication. Thus, in terms of divergence between the languages of the two Korean, different language use paralleled based on their different politico-economic systems and embedded ideologies demand more focus than any linguistic aspects. The ideological demand of Cultured language is reflected in its definition in the *Korean Dictionary (Co.senmal Tay.sa.cen)*:

Cultured language

The language that is used in the capital city of revolution, Pyongyang. Cultured language is not limited to any region or dialect. This dialect has been shaped and developed by modeling the revolutionary language style established by the great leader [Kim Il Sung] and the respected general [Kim Jong Il]. Cultured language is a superior language showcasing the excellent features of our national tongue. (“Mwunhwa.e,” ca. 2012)

In sum, North Korea underwent two different phases of status planning. Its first status planning was the official restoration of the mother tongue that marked the end of the colonial period and which was driven by a strong ethnic nationalism. Its second status planning in 1966 aimed to differentiate itself—primarily ideologically rather than linguistically—from its rival polity South Korea during the Cold War era and in the context of socialist nationalism. There are differences between the two status planning phases in the North, but their common ground is nationalism.

Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s guidance on LPP, such as differentiating the NK standard language from the Seoul-based South Korean standard, has been consistently carried out to the present day. NK newspapers have reproduced and propagated the NK LPP and language ideologies since 1945, touting such things as the superiority of the national language by using the
words of the state leaders. In the following section I examine the role of North Korean mass media in that state’s LPP.

4.4 The Role of North Korean Mass Media in Language Planning and Policy

In general, codices such as dictionaries and spelling and grammar guides are meant to disseminate the normative corpus, but models such as media texts, school textbooks, and the speeches of political leaders are also crucial to transmitting norms to language users (Clyne, 1997b). In the case of North Korea, as in other totalitarian states, modeling the state leaders’ speeches is a critical part of its corpus planning, and official discourses, including media and school textbooks, follow these speech models. For instance, Kim Il Sung’s use of the address term, tongci/tongmwu ‘comrade,’ institutionalized and popularized this norm in North Korea through the official media organs such as newspapers and radio immediately after the 1945 liberation, just as Mao Zedong did in China (Lee-Wong, 1997).

Mass media generally play a critical role in social change, including linguistic change, by their ability to speak to the masses cumulatively in everyday life with the notion of “delivering facts in neutrality.” In contrast to the “neutrality” stance in Western media, in North Korea media actively and overtly serve to create a collective consciousness, such as regarding the rationalization and/or legitimacy of the LPP. This subjective stance in NK media is related to the fundamental function of the press in North Korea that is to produce propaganda in order to “educate” the people in state ideology. This notion is clearly reflected in Kim Il Sung’s view on media: “The Party paper plays a very important role in properly educating Party members and the masses of people and in mobilizing them for revolutionary struggle” (I. S. Kim, 1980a, p.318). The definition of the press by NK media scholars Pay and La (1967) also illustrates the role of media as “the most sharp, combatant, and mobilized weapon among ideological arms in struggling between classes” (as cited in Y. Kim & P. Yi, 1991, p. 48). Keeping these characteristics of North Korean mass media in mind, in this chapter I examine the role of NK media in NK LPP.
4.4.1 Media’s mobilization for language planning and policy

Media function not only as exemplaries in appropriation of language policies, but also provide rational criterion regarding what is desirable and not in language use. The NK mass media have taken part in the appropriation of LPP, and rationalized both corpus and status planning, such as the language refinement movement, selection of Cultured Language as its standard language, and standardization of Cultured Language. This section presents the main findings regarding media appropriation of language policies.

First, NK print media have actively appropriated NK language policies. For instance, generally speaking, NK print media implemented the hankul-only use policy from the moment the NK government first promulgated it in 1949 (Y-K. Ko, 1999, p.237). Although I found that the Rodong Sinmun used Chinese characters for Arabic numerals 1 to 9 until April 15, 1956, these were considered easy characters. Besides these numerals, there was no printing of Chinese character in this paper. Zero was written as an Arabic numeral (Table 2). As seen in Figure 1, text direction of the Rodong Sinmun was generally vertical, and when Arabic numerals were used, the paper printed them in Chinese characters. I believe that writing Chinese characters for numerals was for better readability. In vertical text, Arabic numerals can hinder readability, especially when a number has multiple digits. When the Rodong Sinmun used horizontal text direction partially before April 16, 1956, Arabic numerals were used as seen in Figure 2. Even if the print media used some Chinese characters, the fundamental motivation for doing so was making it reader-friendly.
Table 2. *Rodong Sinmun* used Chinese characters for Arabic numerals 1 to 9 until April 15, 1956

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic numerals</th>
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<td>9</td>
<td>九</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Rodong Sinmun 1956, Jan. 4. p. 3
Figure 2. *Rodong Sinmun* April 15, 1956, p. 1
When the *Rodong Sinmun* began to have completely horizontal text from April 16, 1956 (Figure 4), the newspaper printed *hankul* only and Arabic numerals, as shown in Figure 3. For text written in *hankul*, horizontal text direction is generally believed to have better readability. The same change from vertical to horizontal text direction in conformity with the *hankul*-only-policy, and the corresponding use of Arabic numerals, can be found in another North Korean state-run daily newspaper, *Minju Chosun* ‘Democratic Korea’ (the official mouthpiece of the Cabinet of Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea), during this same period.

Figure 3. *Rodong Sinmun* 1956 April 16. p. 1
Therefore, it can be said that newspapers in North Korea adhered to the hankul-only use policy completely from the adoption of horizontal text direction from April 16, 1956 and in parallel with Kim Il Sung’s thoughts on the populism of language. This is a reformative language practice compared to its South Korean counterpart. In the South, the first hankul-only national daily newspaper with horizontal text direction to appear after liberation in 1945 was Hankyoreh, which began publication in 1988. Following this, in the 1990s most major South Korean dailies that had printed Chinese characters, generally began printing using mostly hankul and with horizontal text direction.

In North Korea, besides the hankul-only use policy, print media have actively adopted refined native Korean words and disseminated them through the language purism movement. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Rodong Sinmun, along with other print media, has participated in the bottom-up process of LPP. In accordance with Kim Il Sung’s guidance on LPP, various institutions, including mass media organs and schools, were mobilized for the language refinement movement. The following is Kim’s guidance related to the role of the mobilized media institutions for the language refinement movement via the aforementioned conversation in 1966 (I. S. Kim, 1982b):

a) Newspapers need to publish ‘Discussion Papers’ on language refinement so that people and linguists can participate in the language campaign.
b) To distribute refined words, the mass media needs to adopt new words in a timely manner, and schools should teach the new words from the first grade.

Following this direction, between 1966 and 1973 the Rodong Sinmun published a total of some 575 ‘Discussions’ on language refinement (Mal Tatumki) (M. Seo, 2014), or one every 2–3 days, with about 15 words per Discussion as an article in a box as seen in Figure 5. About 80 percent (459) of these Discussion articles were provided by linguists, and through them newly refined words (classified by themes such as medical terms or soccer terms) were introduced as well as high-frequency daily words, while the remainder, 20 percent (116), comprised readers’ opinions on language refinement (M. Seo, 2014).

Figure 5. Rodong Sinmun, 1966, Discussion on Language Refinement
(“Wu.limal,” 1966, p. 4)
According to a North Korean linguist, C-S. Pak (1999/2000), not only the *Rodong Sinmun* but also about fifteen other periodicals—newspapers and magazines—published this ‘Discussion’ on language refinement regularly from 1966 to 1978. Through approximately 1,500 of these ‘Discussions,’ a total of about 25,000 refined words were discussed and introduced. Among these words, about 6,000 (24%) were discussed by the reading public, while the rest was screened and introduced by North Korean linguists (C-S. Pak, 1999/2000). Through such discussions, people’s opinions were reflected in the selection of refined words. For instance, one reader, a medical doctor, suggested the refined native word *sa.tung.ppye* ‘spine’ (사등뼈) for the corresponding Sino-Korean word, *chek.chwu.kol* (척추골), after the NK linguists introduced several options for the word (N-S. Kim, 1966). This reader pointed out that *sa.tung.ppye* ‘spine’ seemed to have been excluded from the options in the refinement process by linguists, because this word was a regional dialect. However, this person suggested the word be used, since this native Korean word represented the word accurately and that many people had long used this word regionally. The reader further suggested the use of existing words, when possible, in language refinement, rather than creating new words. As this reader suggested, the term, *sa.tung.ppye*, replaced its Sino-Korean version and was enlisted in the North Korean dictionary. I found this word in a headline from the on-line North Korean newspaper, *Urimginzokkiri* ‘Our Nation’:

체육인의 억센 주먹으로 사등뼈를 분질리놓겠다

Our athletes will break [the enemy’s] spines with their powerful fists. (K-H. Yu, 2017)

This reveals that this word has been successfully used by language users in NK society from the language refinement movement in 1966 onward. As seen in this case, in terms of participation of the masses, this is a democratic process among language movements; however, this bottom-up process was designed and controlled by the head of the state, who represented the state and the elite linguist group, to ensure the success of the linguistic management. In the big picture, North Korea’s language refinement movement has been a top-down process, but the process of the movement had a bottom-up aspect in parallel with the state leader’s guidance. This bottom-up process has been an effective driving force in making the NK language movement a success in terms of harnessing the collective consciousness and intelligence, to include the feedback of average language users.
Besides print media, radio and television have also been employed in the appropriation and rationalization of language policies and ideologies. Radio and television used those refined words and educated the people in their use (C-S. Pak, 1999/2000). The peak of this language refinement movement was from the 1960s to the 1970s, though it has continued to the present. While managed words and newly coined words went through a socially controlled distribution processes, the public accepted and used many of them “naturally.” I agree with the NK linguist’s evaluation on language refinement (C-S. Pak, 1999/2000), that it would be difficult to find a case like NK language purification in terms of scale of the subject of vocabulary, mobilization of social institutions, duration (from the 1960s to the present), and consistency in the history of language purification movements worldwide. NK’s mass media and the continuous rule of the Kim family and the Workers’ Party have played a critical role in the success of NK’s language purification movement.

4.4.2 Dissemination of language ideologies by the North Korean press (1998–2004)

The NK mass media have disseminated not only linguistic norms, including refined words, but also language ideologies, such as the superiority of socialist language use, to the people. In this section, I examine NK print media corpus to determine what language policy and ideology the North Korean state power propagated in what methods. I use corpus data and interpret the data from the critical discourse analysis approach as I explained in Chapter 3.

4.4.2.1 Corpus data

Table 3 shows the corpus data I employ for this study. The data that I term Corpus Data A includes four different state-run NK newspapers, and a total 2,082,451 e.cel, (a spacing unit in the Korean language). Corpus Data A was gathered by the National Institute of Korean Language in 2007, which runs the 21st Century Sejong Project, the name of the Korean Language Information Project and a national policy initiative led by the South Korean government (S-K. Seo, 2007). According to S-K. Seo, the 21st Century Sejong Project includes North Korean print mass media texts as well as various other print texts in order to construct a Korean language database with the aim of overcoming the divergence between the two Korean languages and to prepare for the unification of the two Koreas (2007). The major source of
Corpus Data A is the *Rodong Sinmun* the most representative North Korean newspaper, which comprises more than 70 percent of Corpus Data A. Since Corpus Data A was published in the early 2000s during the rule of Kim Jong Il, I examined the *Rodong Sinmun* published in 2014, when Kim Jong Un was the head of state, to find any differences or similarities in the discourse regarding language policies and ideologies. I searched articles using the search word, *en.e* ‘language,’ via the *Rodong Sinmun* website for the period January 1 to September 3, 2014 (since at the time of my search on September 3, 2014, the website only searched and retrieved items dating back to January 1, 2014). This search produced a corpus of a total 2,792 sentences with 43,110 *e.cel*. I distinguish this data as Corpus Data B, as shown Table 4. The reason I decided to use the search word, *en.e* ‘language’ is that this word produced the largest amount of data regarding the NK LPP relative to other similar terms, such as *wu.li.mal* ‘our language’ or *co.senmal* or *co.sen.e* ‘Korean language.’
Table 3. Corpus Data A built by the 21st Century Sejong Project of the National Institute of Korean Language. (1998–2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper name</th>
<th>Type of publication</th>
<th>Publishing date</th>
<th>Number of <em>e.cell</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tongil Sinbo (Unification Newspaper)</td>
<td>weekly</td>
<td>January 2001 (3 days)</td>
<td>27,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minju Chosun (Democratic Korea)</td>
<td>daily (except for Monday) official newspaper of the Cabinet of North Korea</td>
<td>January 2001 (7 days)</td>
<td>77,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Sinmun (Pyongyang Newspaper)</td>
<td>daily official newspaper of Pyongyang City People’s Assembly</td>
<td>January 1–31, 2002</td>
<td>236,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of <em>e.cell</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,082,451</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Using these two reference corpora, I examine what messages are attributed to a certain term, such as *en.e* ‘language,’ by language users who choose particular lexical items. Language users choose or avoid certain kinds of words when they refer to a certain phenomenon or people, and these choices or avoidances signify particular sorts of values, realities, and identities. Thus, lexical analysis is one of the most basic types of linguistic analysis in CDA. A well-known example is the use of the terms ‘terrorists’ or ‘freedom fighters’ when referring to a group of people (van Dijk, 1995, p. 259). The term ‘terrorist’ is usually associated with ‘extremist,’ but from a different perspective the same group of people can be referred to as ‘freedom fighters.’ This lexical choice shows the ideological stance of the speaker, institution, or group that the speaker represents.

In conjunction with lexical choices, examining collocations (the co-occurrence of one word with another) is important to the investigation of the salient beliefs related to a particular phenomenon and determining how the phenomenon is usually framed in discourse (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 406). I focus on collocates, which are categorized into thematic groups in order to identify recurrent language ideologies as rationales behind the language policies surrounding the search term *en.e* ‘language’ in North Korean state-run print media contexts.

Let me present the main findings regarding language ideologies that have emerged from the two reference corpora. In Corpus Data A, I examined every occurrence of the search word, *en.e* ‘language,’ using the concordancing tool in the Hanmalwu corpus software program. Concordancing is a computer-aided search to find every occurrence of a particular word or phrase, and a core tool in corpus linguistics that allows for qualitative investigation regarding discursive patterns of data (O’Keeffe, 2006). This tool provides concordance lines with the
A search for the word *en.e* ‘language,’ as *e.cel*, spacing unit, in the NK newspaper corpus returned 96 sentences out of a total 132,502 sentences with 2,058,827 *e.cel*. Among the 96 sentences, I deleted irrelevant ones, such as a sentence which has computer language in explaining computer systems. After this process, 65 sentences with 67 *e.cel* were left and the concordance lines were subsequently categorized into eight thematic groups. In some cases, the same *e.cel* could belong to more than one thematic group (See Table 5).
Table 5. Concordance lines of *en.*e ‘language’ (categorized into eight thematic groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency of <em>e.cel</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>single-nation ethnicity and single-language belief</td>
<td>23 (34.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>language purification (language refinement)</td>
<td>20 (29.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>superiority of Korean language and ethnicity</td>
<td>11 (16.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>language and unification of the two Koreas</td>
<td>9 (13.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>propriety in language use</td>
<td>9 (13.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>criticism of globalization (anti-English)</td>
<td>3 (4.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standardization (Pyongyang dialect)</td>
<td>3 (4.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>criticism of South Korean language use (being contaminated)</td>
<td>2 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4.2.2 Single-nation ethnicity and single-language ideology

As Table 5 indicates, in NK state-run print media, the word *en.*e ‘language’ was most frequently associated with notions of single-nation ethnicity and single-language belief. This belief is clearly embedded in the texts:

Extract 1
Headline: Wisdom and talent of Korean ethnicity

The great leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung taught as follows:
“Ethnicity is characterized by the commonality of blood and language. Korean ethnicity cannot exist without our language.”
Language is one of the basic marking symbols of ethnicity. Without language, a people cannot talk about a common ethnicity or think about that ethnic nation’s cultural
development. Our ethnic language is very ethnically unique and excellent one that has been formed and developed over a long period. (Nam, 2001, p. 5; emphasis mine)

제목: 조선민족의 슬기와 재능

위대한 수령 김일성동지께서는 다음과 같이 교시하시었다.
“민족이라는것은 무엇보다도 먼저 피줄과 언어의 공동성에 의해 특징 지어집니다. 우리 말을 떠나서는 조선민족이 있을수 없습니다.”
언어는 민족성을 특정짓는 기본정표의 하나이다. 언어를 떠난 하나의 민족에 대해 말할수 없고 그 민족의 문화발전에 대해 생각할수 없다.
우리의 민족어는 오랜 역사를 거치 형성되고 발전해 온 독자적이고 민족성이 뚜렷한 매우 우수한 언어이다.

Extract 2

Headline: The task of independent unification will be accomplished through the power of national independence

The great leader, Comrade Kim Jong Il pointed out as follows:
“Our people have a homogenous ethnicity. We have lived with the same blood and occupied the same territory while sharing a single language and culture, and we are a wise people who share a five thousand-year history and excellent culture and traditions.” (Y. Ho, 2004, p. 5; emphasis mine)

제목: 민족주체의 위력으로 진전하는 자주통일위업은 반드시 승리한다

위대한 령도자 김정일동지께서는 다음과 같이 지적하시였다.
“우리 인민은 예로부터 한피줄을 잇고 하나의 언어와 문화를 가지고 한강토에서 살아온 단일민족이며 반만년의 유구한 역사와 우수한 문화와 전통을 가지고있는 슬기로운 민족입니다.”
As I mentioned in section 4.1, Kim Il Sung insisted on the tight bond between the nation and its language. His statement regarding single-nation ethnicity and single-language belief has often been quoted by authors in the NK public discourse, including the Rodong Sinnun, especially in the opening of an article, as shown in Extract 1. Quotations or naming authority occur when the speaker’s own power is weak, such as in ‘Mom says you’ve got to come’ in children’s conversation, or ‘The authorities order you must come with me’ (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.190). In this case, the power of the writer of the Rodong Sinnun article is weaker than the power of the leaders of North Korea, thus quoting the leader’s statements lends authority and legitimacy to statements on single-nation ethnicity and single-language belief.

Extract 2 also shows the same discursive pattern as Extract 1 in terms of quoting or naming the leader, in this case Kim Jong Il. This quoting discursive pattern is related to Fairclough’s intertextuality as a part of discourse practices in his three-dimensional model. Using NK leadership statements relates the messages the authors intend to deliver while contextualizing them with the texts and connecting those texts to their wider social context. Moreover, the verbs “kyo.si.ha.si.yess.ta” ‘taught’ and “ci.cek.ha.si.yess.ta” ‘pointed out’ situate the leaders as ones who “teach” or “point out” great lessons for the people. In terms of quoting styles, both Extracts 1 and 2 do not include the quoted statements as embedded indirective clauses but as independent directive quotations in order to signal the importance of the statements. Moreover, the fact that the quotes in Extracts 1 and 2 are positioned at the beginning portion of the articles also shows the importance of the leaders’ words. Chapter 5 has the discursive patterns in detail.

In terms of the broader socio-political and historical contexts within which the discursive practices are embedded (Richardson & Wodak, 2009), one of the reasons Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il focused on a single nation-race and single-language ideology was because their major political goal was unification with South Korea. Kim Il Sung in particular continuously stated that as long as people spoke the same language, they would remain a single ethnic group and a single nation (I. S. Kim, 1984a). Therefore, according to Kim Il Sung, although the two Koreas were divided by “American imperialism,” the South and North were supposed to be one ethnic group and nation, since they were homogenous and monolingual (1984a, p.13). This linguistic nationalism continued into the era of Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Il insisted on the alleged primordial
ethno-linguistic oneness of Koreans, supporting a single nation-race and single language ideology (as cited in M-S. Kim, 1997, p. 319).

Investigating the collocation of the search term *en.e* ‘language’ also shows that this term is strongly associated with nationalism and/or patriotism, as seen in Tables 6 and 7.

Table 6. Frequent collocates of *en.e* ‘language’ in the top five thematic groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Collocates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>single-nation ethnicity and single-language belief</td>
<td>one, we, blood line, homogenous, superiority, unification, culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>language purification</td>
<td>ethnic character, pure native Korean words, unique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>superiority of Korean language and ethnicity</td>
<td>superior, wise, rare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>language and unification of the two Koreas</td>
<td>one, one people, desperate mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>propriety in language use</td>
<td>beautiful, elegant, educational revolutionary ethic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. *E.cel* frequency list in concordance lines with the search term *en.e* ‘language’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank order</th>
<th><em>E.cel</em> with the word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><em>e.cel</em> with the word <em>min.cok</em> ‘ethnicity/race’</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><em>e.cel</em> with the word <em>wu.li</em> ‘we’</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><em>e.cel</em> with the word <em>ha.na</em> ‘one’</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For a long time, South Korea also maintained a single-nation race and single-language belief; however, in more recent years this belief has been challenged due to South Korea’s transition to a multi-ethnic, globalized society in the twenty-first century. The single-ethnicity myth gradually disappeared from school textbooks in South Korea from 2007 (Y-D. Yoon,
2010). Thus, this ideology has grown weaker in the South. Relative to the situation in the South, in North Korea the single-nation ethnicity and single-language belief has continued to function powerfully. This ideology serves as a fundamental belief justifying other related ideas, such as language purification, unification of the two Koreas, and the superiority of the Korean ethnicity. According to NK print media, language purification is needed to maintain and defend the nation’s homogenous ethnicity against foreignisms, such as loan words, and the two Koreas need to be unified since they are of a single ethnicity and share a common language and bloodline, and the Korean people are superior due to their rare maintenance of linguistic and blood homogeneity for more than “five thousand years.”

4.4.2.3. Language purism

Language purification, as ranked in the second category in Table 5, is also one of the most commonly discussed themes in this data. For instance, on January 1, 2000, Kim Jong Il, then the North Korean leader, delivered his idea of language purification as part of his New Year’s message. New Year’s messages from leaders in North Korea are considered very significant, since they impart the leadership views on various issues, such as the economy, national security, culture, and the unification of the two Koreas, and inform the public of the country’s main polices in the form of editorials in the three major newspapers of North Korea:

Extract 3
Headline: The leader’s New Year message (Joint Editorial)

Our style of socialism is a socialism devoted to the country and the nation that has the traits of self-reliance and ethnicity. No matter what people say, we should live consciously in our own style with the idea of “our ethnic nation is the best.” We should destroy the imperialist scheme of “globalization” and keep our own political system, economic structure, and life. We should deepen our struggle to establish self-reliance in every field including education, health, literature, art, and sports, and we should turn ourselves to meeting the demands of building a powerful and prosperous great country. We should make good and active use of our native language in language life. In moral
and cultural-emotional life, we should raise high our outstanding ethnicity (J. I. Kim, 2000, p. 1; emphasis mine).

In Extract 3, I focus on modality and evaluation as parts of the discursive patterns of the speaker to examine linguistic tools that NK public discourse employs to deliver their language ideologies. Modality is a term covering a range of semantic notions of the speaker’s opinion, such as obligation, possibility, probabilities, factuality, imperative meanings, and certainty.

There are many different definitions and types of modality; however, one common feature to all modal utterances is that they represent the speaker’s stance in discourse (Sohn, 2013). Modality includes modal auxiliaries, lexical verbs, verbal affixes, nouns, adverbs, adjectives, hedging, particles, mood, and prosody in speech (Facchinetti, Krug, & Palmer, 2003). In other words, in a very broad sense, modality refers to any unit of language that delivers the speaker’s opinion of or commitment to what he or she says (Machin & Mayr, 2012). However, many linguists focus primarily on verbal expressions in modality, such as auxiliary verbs in English, since they are the principal means of expressing modality.

There are various classifications of modality depending on the use of different parameters, but traditionally modality comprises a three-fold distinction between epistemic, deontic, and dynamic modality. Epistemic modality is concerned with the speaker’s attitude or judgment of the truth, or probability of a proposition. For instance, John must have been at home deals with the speaker’s degree of certainty that what the speaker is saying is true (de Haan, 2006, p. 29). By contrast, deontic modality mainly refers to “the necessity or possibility of acts.
performed by morally responsible agents” (Lyons, 1977, p. 823). Depraetere and Reed (2006) interpret that deontic modality as implying an authority responsible for imposing permission (may) or obligation (must). As Machin and Mayr (2012) simply put it, this is concerned with influencing people and events. If one says Students must go home (obligation), the speaker expresses a high degree of influence. In other words, deontic modality indicates “the degree of moral desirability of the state of affairs expressed in the utterance, typically, but not necessarily, on behalf of the speaker” (Nuyts, 2006, p. 4). Coates’ explanation regarding deontic modal, must, also supports the aforementioned arguments (1983). She provides the following features as core prototypical meaning of a deontic modal: (a) speaker is interested in getting subject to perform the action, (b) speaker has authority over subject. Dynamic modality is defined as an ascription of a capacity to the subject that is able to perform the action described by the main verb in the clause (Nuyts, 2006). In other words, dynamic modality has to do with possibility and the ability of the subject internally not attempting to influence others (Machin & Mayr, 2012).

Starting with epistemic modality, the first sentence in Extract 3 is a straightforward truth claim without having a modal element in the predicate. As Fowler (1991) pointed out, this does not mean there is no modality, rather that it does not need to be expressed. In terms of epistemic modality, “is” in the first sentence provides authority to the writer’s opinion with no-doubt certainty. Turning to deontic modality, besides the first sentence, all the sentences of this paragraph have a deontic modal element, ‘should/must’ (-ya hata). This expresses high value in deontic modality (obligation or required) (Halliday, 1994). Using this high value modality, the speaker urges the readers that they ‘should or ought to’ perform the actions that the speaker mentions in the propositions. In line with this, applying terminology coined by Bybee, Perkins, and, Pagliuca (1994), all sentences, except for the first, have speaker-oriented modality whereby a speaker, who has the enabling condition, tries to move addressees to action. Similarly, this deontic modality can be called the ‘participant-external modality’ as proposed by van der Auwera and Plungian (1998), since the speaker and the North Korean social norms obligate the participants to engage in the state of affairs. As Coates (1983) explained, deontic modality denotes that the speaker has authority over the subject.

In terms of desirability, the propositions that are related to deontic modality are desirable in this context and they are connected to the deontic meaning that is the “moral desirability of the
state of affairs expressed in the utterance” (Nuyts, 2006, p. 4). As illustrated above, with high degree of certainty in epistemic modality and high value in deontic modality, this North Korean media discourse example shows that the modal elements as a linguistic tool serve to provide the righteousness, rationalization and/or legitimacy of the state’s policies. Especially with the deontic modal, the speaker urges that readers ‘should/must’ perform the actions that the speaker mentions in the propositions.

Although these are speaker-oriented, these utterances have the power of making statements on behalf of “all of us” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 171), since all have either ‘we’ and/or ‘our’ promoting solidarity. Regarding ‘I-statements’ vs. ‘we-statements,’ this Extract has either ‘we’ and/or ‘our’ in every sentence. In this case, the ‘we-statement’ has not only the power of making statements on behalf of ‘all of us’ (Fairclough, 2003, p. 171), but also the in-group concept that goes against that of the out-group in a collectivism culture (H-G. Lee, 2007). The ‘we-statement’ promotes the belongingness and solidarity of members of the in-group, whereas it excludes ‘others’ who do not belong to the in-group (H-G. Lee, 2007, p. 160). In this context, keeping our own system in Extract 3 implies maintaining the unique socialist society against the forces of capitalist “globalization,” with the leader of the state insisting on the use of native Korean words instead of loan words with the aim of preserving the socio-political system.

Kim Jong Il promotes a socialist ideology through a language purification policy and constructs the ideology of “our ethnic nation is the best.” Therefore, “we” as the in-group should “destroy” the ‘other’ (i.e., enemy), and this is desirable. In terms of desirability, all the adjectives, adverbs, nouns, and noun phrases that are related to ‘we’ are desirable (good), whereas the words related to the others (the imperialist) are undesirable (bad). For instance, ‘globalization’ in Extract 3 is undesirable and collocated with the imperialist scheme by others. Since it is part of the leader’s New Year’s message, it was recited and elaborated upon many times in various NK newspapers.
4.4.3 Dissemination of language ideologies by the North Korean press in 2014

I examined the *Rodong Sinmun* website for the period January 1 to September 3, 2014 to compare it with Corpus Data A regarding the same topic. I searched articles using the same search word, *en.e* ‘language,’ and this search produced a corpus of a total of 2,792 sentences with 43,110 *e.cel* (Corpus Data B), as seen in Table 4. Among them, 73 sentences with 79 *e.cel* have the search word. After examining the 73 sentences in context, I deleted those irrelevant to my study, and then categorized the remaining 36 sentences with 42 *e.cel* into four thematic groups, as seen in Table 8. In some cases, the same *e.cel* could be categorized into more than one thematic group.

Table 8. Concordance lines of “language” (*en.e*) categorized into four thematic groups from Corpus Data B.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency of <em>e.cel</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>single-nation ethnicity and single-language belief</td>
<td>10 (23.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>language use in socialism, including language purification</td>
<td>8 (16.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the leaders’ thoughts on language</td>
<td>5 (11.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>criticism of South Korean language use (being contaminated)</td>
<td>4 (10.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 shows similar thematic groups with Table 5. For instance, Extract 4 discusses the ideas of the current leader Kim Jong Un as well as the previous leaders’ thoughts regarding language: 1. choosing Pyongyang Cultured language as “our” ethnic language; 2. language use in socialism; 3. language purification.

Extract 4

Headline: Symposium in the field of social sciences held for the shining superiority of national language

[The Speakers at the symposium] talked about actively using Cultured Language, which embodies our unique characteristics and the superiority of our national language in a
modern and refined way. They emphasized that with heightened class consciousness people should not let words unsuited to our people’s ideologies and emotions interfere in language life, and that people should fight resolutely against even trivial phenomenon. They also mentioned that we should fight against all remnant loan words in all spheres of our language life and actively use our language correctly. (“Symposium,” 2014)

The themes in Extract 4 are organically related to one another, so it can be interpreted that using “purified” Cultured Language excluding loan words best fits the socialist ideology. In the same vein, Extract 5 shows that using Cultured Language is emphasized as part of a socialist ethic.

Extract 5

Headline: Let’s brim over with socialist ethical life

When talking we should speak in Pyongyang Cultured Language, and even when singing we should sing to meet our people’s emotions, and when wearing clothes, we should wear clothes with national characteristics. (“Let’s brim,” 2014)
While unifying people in society through one chosen variety of language, the discourse of the NK language policy in the newspaper also endeavors to differentiate NK society from its other, South Korea, which shares the common language. Criticism of South Korean language use for being contaminated is also closely connected the NK campaign for language purification. As seen in Extract 6, South Korea is called a linguistic colony of the US due to its heavy use of Anglo-American loan words. Framing South Korea as a linguistic colony serves to value and legitimize the NK language policy as the symbol of an independent socialist nation. This example shows clearly how a language policy frames identities or stereotypes of ‘the other’ in social, political, and ideological contexts.

Extract 6

Headline: Annihilated autonomy and completed colony of the US

The fact that the average number of loan words used in a daily South Korean newspaper is over 800 and only 12.7 percent of the signs in Seoul are written in our language clearly shows that South Korea has become a linguistic colony. (“Annihilated,” 2014)

According to Fowler (1991), vocabulary may be regarded as a symbolic representation of a culture. The vocabulary employed in the North Korean newspapers to frame the two Koreas in terms of their language use reveals their mutual structural opposition (Table 9).
Table 9. Lexical choices for language use of the two Koreas in the Rodong Sinmun in North Korea in 2014 from Corpus Data B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexical choices for language use in North Korea</th>
<th>Lexical choices for language use in South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• national/ethnic superiority</td>
<td>• linguistic colony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• socialist national language</td>
<td>• loan words and jumbles of words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• actively utilize our language</td>
<td>• disordered slang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• keeping national purity</td>
<td>• terribly destructive of our language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• polished Pyongyang Cultured Language</td>
<td>• culture without nationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• independent</td>
<td>• annihilation of ethnic traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ethnic character</td>
<td>• submission to the stronger country and betrayal of one’s own country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• unique characteristics of the national language</td>
<td>• annihilation of independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• fighting to eradicate remnant loan words</td>
<td>• slaves who have to use the language of an occupying country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Very different sets of word choices are used to represent the two Koreas’ respective language use in the Rodong Sinmun. Language use in North Korea is described as eliminating loan words, actively utilizing our language with the result that North Korea has a national language that is independent, pure, and superior. These are all positively evaluated words from the perspective of ethno-nationalism. By contrast, South Korea is evaluated by NK media as terribly destructive of our language through its use of loan words, and a linguistic colony without independence where the people must use the language of an occupier. The vocabulary dichotomizes the two Koreas into two communities, an independent ethno-linguistic homogenous nation on the one hand, and a linguistic colony (i.e., occupied by the US), on the other. As Fowler (1991) points out, this categorization by vocabulary is a crucial part of the reproduction of ideology in the newspaper. Besides lexical processes, over-lexicalization—the excessive use of quasi-synonymous terms for
entities and ideas (Fowler, 1991)—is also a useful indicator for analyzing the ideological dimension in discourse.

Table 10. *E.cel* frequency list in concordance lines with the search term *en.e* ‘language’ from Corpus Data B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank order</th>
<th>Examples of <em>e.cel</em></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><em>e.cel</em> with the word <em>min.cok</em> ‘ethnicity/race’</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><em>e.cel</em> with the word <em>wu.li</em> ‘we’</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><em>e.cel</em> with the word <em>ha.na</em> ‘one’</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As both Table 7 and 10 show, the most frequently used word in both of the corpora is *min.cok* ‘ethnicity.’ Overemphasis on terms (overlexicalization) gives a sense of over-persuasion (Machin & Mayr, 2012). For instance, the fact that NK newspaper articles often refer to the Korean language as *min.cok.e* ‘an ethnic language’ reflects the ideological need to tightly bind together the notion of the Korean ethnicity and Korean language. In addition, a quasi-synonymous term for *min.cok.e* ‘an ethnic language,’ *wu.li* ‘our language’ was also excessively used for both of the corpora. The three most frequently use of the *e.cel min.cok* ‘ethnicity,’ *wu.li* ‘we,’ and *ha.na* ‘one’ with the search term *en.e* ‘language,’ as seen in the concordance lines, suggests that North Korea demands monolingualism in the name of unity. This monolingualism of the North Korean case is connected to the ideology of ‘single-nation ethnicity’ and ‘single language,’ seen in the context of totalitarian socialism and contravenes current global trends regarding racial and cultural diversity.

In sum, when the NK print media talk about language, they try to deliver the notion of a single-nation ethnicity and single-language, the most fundamental idea for the unity of the two Koreas, followed by the notion of language purification against imperialism or/and globalization. While emphasizing the unification of the two Koreas, NK language purification policy has been used to distinguish North Korea’s language from South Korea’s Seoul-based “contaminated” standard language through emphasized using of its Pyongyang-based “beautiful” standard NK
language (Cultured Language). Thus, the guiding ideologies residing within NK language policies in NK print media are nationalism and socialist-Juche philosophy. The myth of a single-nation ethnicity and single language and the idea of language purification serve the political ends of the NK leaders and power groups, to include NK linguists. This ideology is found in other capitalist societies in promoting national unification, especially in the context of modern nation-state-building efforts. However, in the case of North Korea they serve not only the goal of national unification but also to enforce the socialist lifestyle and ethos through socially imposed “correct” language use.

Extract 7

Headline: Our language life and Pyongyang Cultured Language

People’s ideology, emotions, and cultural ethos are mostly expressed through their language…. Using Standard Cultured Language, Pyongyang dialect is the principle of our cultural life. We will flourish in the socialist lifestyle, which showcases our independence and the characteristics of our ethnicity by not mixing with words from other countries or nonstandard dialects. (S-L. Kim, 2013)

제목: 우리의 언어생활과 평양문화어

사람들의 사상감정과 문화도덕수준은 거의 나 말을 통하여 표현되기 됩니다…. 표준문화어, 평양말을 쓰는것은 우리의 문화생활의 원칙이다. 우리는 문화어에 다른 나라 말이나 표준어가 아닌 말이 절대로 섞여들어오지 않도록 함으로써 주체성과 민족성이 높이 발양되는 우리 식 사회주의생활양식을 더욱 완전 꽃피워나가야 할것이다.

Extract 7 illustrates the message that the major NK state-run newspaper tries to deliver regarding language use: the people’s ideology is expressed through language and using only Cultured Language without foreign words or other varieties of the language such as regional dialects is to promote “our” own socialist lifestyle. In other words, NK language policies are used for inculcating socialist ideology and controlling the thoughts of the people through language use. While emphasizing the “correct” or “right” way of language use, NK newspapers spread and
reproduce anti-South Korea and anti-globalization ideologies, using the leaders’ words and the structural opposition of vocabulary in describing the two Koreas’ language use. The following section discusses the use of regional dialect, which in NK LPP has been taught as an “incorrect” use of language.

4.5 Oppressive Policy About the Use of Regional Dialect

Linguistic homogenization in North Korea also includes an oppressive policy about the use of regional dialect. With the exception of about 3,000 regional dialect words that were selected as Cultured Language through the linguistic purism campaign (P-J. Kim, 1980), using unchosen regional dialect has been taught as an “incorrect” use of language. Some regional native Korean words that were evaluated as well known among general language users were accepted, but words used only within a limited area were considered non-normative language and subjects for discarding (S-G. Chong & K-W. Yi, 1984). Here are anecdotes related to language from the Rodong Sinmun, and the state-run news agency, Korean Central News Agency:

Extract 8
Headline: Cultured Language and a dialect

When the beloved General visited a family in Lyonghyenli, he found that the youngest daughter of the family spoke using a dialect. Smiling, he said that a school should teach Cultured Language well. Everybody was very moved by this story that the General had caught upon an important issue and taught a wise lesson just from hearing a little girl speak. (S. Choy, 1998, p. 2)
One day in September 2005, the great leader Kim Jong Il gave his field guidance to a company in Hamhung City. He met workers in the company and listened to an explanation about a product from one worker. The worker unintentionally spoke a dialect…. After listening to his speech, the General inquired as to the location of the worker’s hometown. The answer was *Hamkyengpwukto*, and the General smiled and said that was why the worker spoke in a dialect. The worker felt so ashamed about his speaking in a dialect that he decided he would never use his regional dialect again. The leader said the worker should do that and laughed brightly. The workers who accompanied the leader could not be more moved regarding the leader’s thoughtfulness in his concern for the speaking style and expressions of the warriors. After this incident, the workers of the company endeavored to use Cultured Language and stopped the chronic habit of speaking in dialect. (*Co.sencwungangthongsin* ‘Korean Central News Agency’ n.d.)

제목: 고쳐주신 사투리버릇

주제 94(2005년 9 월 어느날 위대한 령도자 김정일동지께서 함흥시의 한 기업소를 현지지도하실 때였다.

경애하는 장군님께서 어느 한 제품에 대하여 설명해드리던 기업소의 일군은 저도 모르게 《옆파린사투리》라던 사투리를 했다. 장군님께서는 그의 설명을 끝까지 들이주시키고나서 고향이 어디인가 물으시었다. 함복도라는 대답을 들으신 그에게는 그러니 《옆파린사투리》, 《옆파린사투리》라던 말한다고 하시며 웃으시었다.

《옆에》라는 표준어가 아니라 《옆파린사투리》라던 사투리로 말씀드린 일군은 너무도

83
송구스러워 어쩔바를 물라하며 그이에게 사투리를 다시는 쓰지 않겠다고 결의 바지였다. 그이에게는 그래야 한다고 하시며 환하게 웃으시였다. 동행한 일군들은 전사들에게 자그마한 흔이라도 있을세라 말투하며 표현까지 걱정해주시는 그이의 다심한 어버이사랑에 격정을 금할 수 없었다. 그후 기업소의 일군은 문화어, 표준어를 쓰기 위해 애써 노력하여 고질적인 사투리버릇을 뚝 떼었다.

In Extract 8, using Cultured Language as a standardized variety is an important issue, and a child who speaks a dialect—a nonstandard or substandard version of the official language—needs to be taught the “correct” language at school. Since this story comprises a “great” teaching of the leader, Kim Jong Il, using the Cultured Language as a norm and eliminating the other varieties becomes a powerful rule of linguistic behavior.

A similar anecdotal story in Extract 9 shows—in both its headline and contents—how a nonstandard variety is perceived negatively through lexical choices. The headline—“Correcting the Habit of Speaking in Dialect [by the leader]”—establishes that a dialect is a “bad habit” in need of rectification. In Extract 9, the leader, Kim Jong Il points out a worker’s use of a regional dialect, and from that moment the worker endeavors to use Cultured Language and stops the irksome habit of using dialect. These kinds of ongoing standardization processes as communicated through the newspapers serve to unify the people naturally through a strong emphasis on their shared variety of language and cultural identity, while denying diversity in regional dialects in the name of cultured socialism.

Besides single-nation ethnicity and single-language belief, suppression of regional dialects is one of the characteristics of language policy in totalitarian societies. While South Korea was under totalitarian leadership up until 1987, its government also oppressed regional dialects in mass media. Klein (1989) uses the word, dialectophobia, for the language policy during the fascist period in Italy, which denied regional autonomy in the myth of a fascist “Empire” (p. 51).

In this chapter I have discussed the background to NK LPP with primary focus on the role of NK mass media in LPP, discursive patterns, and the choice of vocabulary in NK newspapers regarding language policies, in order to disclose the ideologies underlying the NK LPP. In the following chapters, I examine linguistic norms, especially linguistic etiquette, that
are influenced by these language ideologies and language use befitting the socialist lifestyle of North Korea.
CHAPTER 5. LINGUISTIC ETIQUETTE

Linguistic etiquette (en.e. lyey.cel) is one of the most salient language features to be influenced by language ideology and policy in North Korea relative to its South Korean counterpart. Especially, common address/reference terms and honorifics for state leaders in NK public discourse, including mass media texts, have been greatly influenced by the linguistic norms and NK state ideology. The terms ‘linguistic etiquette’ and ‘linguistic politeness’ are used interchangeably in the sociolinguistic field. Between these two, I prefer ‘linguistic etiquette,’ since this term refers to linguistic action that is viewed as appropriate for a communicative event in a particular socio-cultural context, while linguistic politeness connotes deference (Kasper, 2005).

When the NK government explains linguistic etiquette, it includes not only deference but also invective or insult as appropriate language use toward an enemy, such as the United States. This phenomenon falls under the suggested definition of linguistic etiquette. Linguistic etiquette also overlaps with other various concepts, such as political correctness, language management, and linguistic engineering. Political correctness is about appropriateness in language, social norms, and ideologies. However, it mainly means semantic and lexical change and censorship derived by not one recognized authority but minorities in capitalist Western societies since about 1970. This concept generally refers to conformity with the notion of political correctness, focusing on correcting prejudicial expressions or attitudes related to the inequalities of disadvantaged people (Hughes, 2010). Language management refers to direct efforts to intervene in a language situation in a particular sociolinguistic setting by an authority or by the language users (Spolsky, 2004). Similar to the term language management, linguistic engineering is in a broad sense defined as “any attempt to change language in order to affect attitudes and beliefs” (Fengyuan, 2004, p. 3).

Fengyuan (2004), who examined linguistic engineering during China’s Cultural Revolution as directed by the Communist Party, summarizes two aspects of this: first, semantic and lexical change for the “correct” expression of socialism-Mao Zedong thought; and second, enforcing the habitual use of established expressions and standardized scripts to influence people’s beliefs and language use. In this sense, NK linguistic etiquette has very similar features
with the China’s linguistic engineering. In particular, the Cultural Revolution era in China and
the 1960s onwards in North Korea had many linguistic parallels, such as lexical and semantic
changes for ideologically specialized vocabulary and numerous fixed expressions. However, I
use the term, ‘linguistic etiquette,’ since the two Koreas use this term in common when the two
societies explain appropriateness in language use in terms of the sociolinguistic context.
Therefore, using this term makes the most sense when comparing the two Koreas.

Linguistic etiquette was mentioned by Kim Il Sung as an important part of communist
morality education (1982a). In North Korea, linguistic etiquette is highly emphasized, “because
it makes people harmonious and reinforces unity based on collectivism” (T-S. Kim, 1983, p. 36).
According to Korean Language Etiquette (Co.senmal.lyey.celpep), a North Korean book whose
object is to educate people in linguistic etiquette, linguistic etiquette is defined as “a style of
linguistic expression that reflects the social relationships between people and is maintained as a
social norm under a given social system” (T-S. Kim, 1983, p. 20). In this context, this language
normative text from North Korea explains that linguistic etiquette reflects North Korea’s socio-
politico system, i.e., socialism. For instance, one of the most common address-reference forms in
South Korea, the title suffix -ssi ‘Mr. or Ms.,’ is not used in North Korea because it is perceived
there as reflecting feudal and capitalist relationships (T-S. Kim, 1983). Instead, address-reference
forms that reflect a socialistic relationship, i.e. tongmwu/tongci ‘comrade’ have found common
usage in North Korea.

Another example that reveals a salient aspect of linguistic etiquette in North Korea
compared to South Korea concerns honorifics for NK state leaders, which are considered a social
norm in that society. This chapter examines address/reference terms in general and honorifics for
NK state leaders, since these are contrastively unique aspects when comparing linguistic
etiquette, in other words, appropriateness as linguistic norms, in the two Koreas.

5.1 Address-Reference Terms: Comrade

In comparison with South Korean address-reference terms, the striking different ones in
North Korea are tongmwu and tongci ‘comrade.’ According to the Korean Language Etiquette
(Co.senmal.lyey.celpep), in North Korean society the commonly used address terms are tongmwu
and tongci ‘comrade’ (T-S. Kim, 1983). Between these two terms, ‘tongmwu’ is the most symbolic and representative of words that diverged in meaning and usage in the two Koreas due to those states’ ideological and socio-politico differences since their 1945 separation. Originally, this native Korean word meant “a peer, or a friend of the same age” (C-H. Choe, 1983, p. 129). This original meaning has been maintained in South Korea, although the use of this word has been gradually ceased being used among South Koreans since the Korean War, because it has been associated with the socialist North Korea’s comrade. In contrast, in North Korea the meaning of this term has evolved and become “a person who fights together for [socialist] revolution” (“Tongmwu,” ca. 2012). According to C-H. Choe, a North Korean linguist, the semantic shift of the term tongmwu, from ‘a friend’ to ‘a comrade’ occurred in the period of the anti-Japanese struggle in the colonial period (1983). Tongmwu/tongci meaning ‘comrade’ were also used by Kim Il Sung as common address/reference terms, and this practice has been demonstrated publicly 1945, when Kim Il Sung assumed power. The Great Leader’s use of these terms functioned as modeling and an effective vehicle to socialize this practice throughout the entire society. While the term, tongmwu obtained its new meaning, ‘comrade,’ when indicating a friend, ‘chinkwu,’ a Sino-Korean word for ‘friend’ has been used actively in North Korea.

The evolution of the meaning of tongmwu reveals not only how a socio-political system and ideology affects the meaning of words, but also how NK state power systemically and effectively controlled semantic change in words. The dictionaries that the NK government has published reveal the chronological change in the meaning of the tongmwu, as follows:

The Dictionary of Korean (Co.senmal Sa.cen) gives a representative definition of tongmwu that is similar to the South Korean definition (1960–1962/1990). Although part of this dictionary’s definition of this word is “a person who has the same opinion or political ideology” (p. 991), this is explained as the word’s nuance not its representative meaning. After this, the NK definition of tongmwu came to gradually be conceptualized into a socialist ideological term. The dictionaries published in North Korea reveal the incremental change in the meaning of the tongmwu, as follows:

*Tongmwu*: ① a friend/companion. [nuance] a person who has the same opinion or political and ideological opinion. ② an informal general term of address (“Tongmwu,” 1960–1962/1990, p. 991)

동무: ① 같이 어울리여 사귀는 사람. D 일정한 일에 대한 견해 또는 정치 사상적 견해를 같이 하는 사람. ② 일반적으로 남을 무간히 부를 때에 쓰는 말.

b. *Dictionary of Contemporary Korean (Hyentay Co.senmal Sa.cen) (1968)*

*Tongmwu*: ① a person sharing the same political ideology and opinions in carrying out revolution. [nuance] address/referent term for a revolutionary comrade. ② a friend/companion. [nuance] an informal general term of address (“Tongmwu,” 1968, p. 322)

동무: ① 혁명을 수행함에 있어서 정치사상적 견해를 같이하는 사람. D 혁명동지를 부르거나 가리키는 말. ② 같이 어울리여 사귀는 사람. D 일반적으로 남을 무간히 부를 때에 쓰는 말.

c. *Cultured Language Dictionary (Co.sen Mwunhwa.e Sa.cen) (1973)*

*Tongmwu*: ① a friendly address term for a fellow fighter in a revolutionary group who fights in order to achieve the revolution of the laboring class. [nuance] address/referent term for a revolutionary comrade. ② a friend/companion. ③ informal general term of address (“Tongmwu,” 1973, p. 242)

동무: ① 《로동계급의 혁명위업을 이룩하기 위하여 혁명대오에서 함께 싸우는 사람》을 친근하게 이르는 말. D 혁명동지를 부르거나 가리키는 말. ② 같이 어울리여 사귀는 사람. ③ 일반적으로 남을 무간히 부를 때에 쓰는 말.
Tongmwu: ① a friendly address term for a fellow fighter for revolution in a revolutionary group ② a friend/companion ③ an informal general term of address (adapted from “Tongmwu,” ca. 2012)

동무
① 《혁명대오에서 함께 싸우는 사람》을 친근하게 이르는 말.
례구: ~ 들의 사업을 도와주다. ▷ 혁명동지를 부르거나 가리키는 말. 레구: 옛 ~
= 동지
② 같이 어울리여 사귀는 사람. 레구: 고향 ~.
③ 일반적으로 남을 무관하게 부를 때에 쓰는 말. (adapted from “Tongmwu,” ca. 2012)

In the Dictionary of Korean (1960–1962/1990), which was published about seven years after the Korean Armistice Agreement (1953) that ended open hostilities in the Korean War, the first meaning of tongmwu was ‘friend or companion,’ the same as in South Korea. However, by the time the Dictionary of Contemporary Korean appeared in 1968, the word had “a person sharing the same political ideology and opinions in carrying out revolution; address/referent term for a revolutionary comrade” as its first meaning (p. 322). The original (1960–1962) meaning of the word, ‘a friend,’ now became its second meaning in 1968. As the Cold War lengthened and Juche ideology became prevalent in all aspects of NK society, the word took on a yet more ideologically meaning. The Cultured Language Dictionary (1973), defines tongmwu primarily as “a friendly address term for a fellow fighter in a revolutionary group who fights in order to achieve the revolution of the laboring class” (p. 242). This meaning has been maintained in NK dictionaries and can be found today in the NK on-line dictionary, Korean Dictionary (Co.senmal Tay.sa.cen, ca. 2012).

Another common address/reference term in North Korea, tongci, a Sino-Korean word, also means ‘comrade’ and has evolved in its meaning and sociolinguistic usage to reflect the dominant NK ideology, Juche. Tongci was long associated with nationalism since as term of address or noun it was used among independent movement activists who were struggling against the Japanese before the 1945 liberation.
However, following the 1945 liberation and national division, *tongci* underwent semantic changes in the NK corpus planning. In the NK dictionaries published in 1960–1962 and 1968, *tongci* is defined briefly: “a polite way of calling *tongmwu*” (*Dictionary of Korean* 1960–1962/1990, p. 1001; *Dictionary of Contemporary Korean*, 1968, p. 324). However, in the *Cultured Language Dictionary* (1973), ‘*tongci*’ is defined as “an honorific address/reference term for a revolutionist who fights together with other revolutionists in order to achieve the great revolution of the laboring class (an honorific address/reference term that used with either the given or surname among revolutionists)” (p. 244). Based on the definitions of the above dictionaries, one can see that ‘*tongci*’ developed from use as the honorific term for ‘*tongmwu*’ to a revolutionist fighting to achieve the great proletariat revolution. The sociolinguistic usage of this word is also clearly defined as a deference term that is addressed among revolutionists and used after either the given name or surname. Further, from *Dictionary of Contemporary Korean* (*Hyentay Co.senmal Sa.cen*) this word is defined using Kim Il Sung’s own words:

*Tongci* [同志]

“a likeminded person; a person who shares one’s ideology; a person who shares one’s ideology and fights with one towards the same goal ([quoted from] Kim Il Sung collected writings, Vol. 6, p. 408).

(address term that is used right after name) word that shows respect and admiration


동지 [同志]

《동지라는 말은 뜻을 같이하는 사람 다시말하여 사상이 같은 사람이라는 말입니다. 같은 사상을 가지고 같은 목적을 위하여 투쟁하는 사람을 가리켜 동지라고 부릅니다.》

(경철성 저작선집 6 권, 408 페이지)

(성함아래에 쓰여) 《존경과 흉모의 정》을 나타내는 말. D (이름아래에 쓰여 《동무》의 뜻을 높여 이르는 말.

In terms of using the state leader’s words, the *Dictionary of Korean* (1960–1962/1990) began defining some politically charged key words by using quotes from Kim Il Sung, and this practice has since been expanded to many political terms. The on-line dictionary managed by the NK
government, *Korean Dictionary* (ca. 2012), has kept the definition of Kim Il Sung for the term, ‘tongci,’ and added the political meaning of this word:

a person who has the same ideology, and intention and fights together for the same goal.

To us tongci means a revolutionist armed with the Great Leader’s revolutionary ideology who fights together in the same group in order to achieve the revolution. Tongci is an honorable and precious address term among revolutionary comrades and a signal of trust and love about revolutionary comrades. (adapted from “Tongci,” ca. 2012; emphasis mine)

Although tongci and tongmwu have similar meanings, the fact that only tongci is defined by Kim Il Sung’s words implies this term is more socio-politically and ideologically weighted than tongmwu. According to this definition, tongci is a person who is armed with the Great Leader’s revolutionary ideology, and in North Korea the Great Leader, swu.lyeng, generally refers to Kim Il Sung. Therefore, this definition suggests people should learn the great leader’s revolutionary ideology, the Juche ideology, and fight for the revolution in order to be addressed as a tongci (honorable form of tongmwu, ‘comrade’), the idealized person in NK society. In parallel with tongci, the on-line NK dictionary, *Korean Dictionary* (ca 2012), has some political terms that are defined prescriptively by the words of either Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il. This dictionary explains in the preface:

> The essential meanings or concepts of some of the entries in this dictionary are defined by the Great Leader Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The meanings of these words are described honorably based on the words of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. These words are defined accurately based on the eternal Juche ‘Self-Reliance’ ideology and explicated based on the principles which are to meet people’s direction and demand (ca. 2012).
The NK dictionaries provide definitions of some politically and ideologically specialized vocabulary based on the words of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. For instance, NK dictionaries define *Mincwu.cwuuy* ‘democracy’ as “a policy comprehensively expressing the will of the masses of the working people” (“Mincwu.cwuuy,” 2002, p. 999). According to the on-line NK dictionary, *Korean Dictionary*, this definition is a direct quote from Kim Il Sung’s writing. In addition, this NK dictionary states that there is only one true democracy and that is a socialistic democracy, such as the NK society in this context (“Mincwu.cwuuy,” ca. 2012). In contrast, the following is a definition of the same word from the Merriam-Webster dictionary:

- a: government by the people; especially: rule of the majority
- b: a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections. (“Democracy,” n.d.)

In general, democracy is considered the political sovereignty of the entire population of a country of polity, not just of a certain class, such as the laboring class. The definition of the Merriam-Webster is very similar with the South Korean definition of the word: “an ideology which aims at government for the people, in which they have sovereignty” (“Mincwu.cwuuy,” n.d.).

The definitions of ‘democracy’ in the dictionaries of the two Koreas demonstrate how meanings of the same word can differ depending on the political-economic system. When NK public discourses talk about democracy, the meaning is socialistic democracy, to the exclusion of any other non-socialist polities. This also explains how North Korea can have the official state name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

In totalitarian societies, the defining or redefining of words by the state leadership or powerful elite, or by institutes instituted with authority from such groups, is done to instruct or indoctrinate the people, control people’s thoughts, maintain the political system through language. By learning the concepts of words as defined by the leaders, people come to socialize the perspectives of the leaders’ ideology, that is, the state ideology. In the case of North Korea,
this ideology is *Juche*. Similar practices can be found in China under the influence of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s. *A New English-Chinese Dictionary*, published in 1976 in China, contains quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong to provide examples of words in use (as cited in Fengyuan, 2004). Fengyuan has compared these entries with the earlier edition of the same dictionary published in 1965 that does not contain Mao quotations as follows:

Teach (1965) v. Teach a child to read / this will teach you to speak the truth

Teach (1976) v. The principle of officers teaching soldiers, soldiers teaching officers and soldiers teaching each other [Mao quote] / Chairman Mao teaches us to serve the people heart and soul. (2004, p. 232)

Fengyuan, who was educated during the Cultural Revolution period in China, interprets the inclusion of Mao’s quotations in the dictionary as a tool for serving current political goals linking users’ thoughts with the Maoist worldview. In other words, control over the meanings of words in the dictionary was a way of institutionalizing the current political line, in this case the Cultural Revolution. Similarly, in North Korea, using the words of Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il to explain or define the meanings of words in dictionaries is meant to influence the people’s thoughts and guide their linguistic norms, by such things as the use of “appropriate” address terms. The two address/reference terms, *tongci* and *tongmwu*, have gained wide use in North Korea. These two terms can be used as either nouns or address/reference titles, as in (2).

(2) a. Noun

\[ ^7 \text{tongmwu/tongci-uy} \quad \text{sasang} \]
\[ \text{comrade-GN} \quad \text{ideology} \]
\[ \text{동무(동지)의 사상} \]
\[ \text{the ideology of the comrade (noun)} \]

---

7 In this study, transcriptions are presented according to the Yale Romanization system, unless indicated otherwise. The Korean expressions are romanized in the first line. A morpheme-by-morpheme gloss that provides the literal meaning of each unit appears in the second line. The grammatical categorizations are adapted from Sohn (1999). The Korean expressions are presented in *hankul* (the Korean alphabet) in the third line. In the fourth line of the transcripts, an English translation is provided.
b. Professional title (PT)

*Cipayin*  *tongci*

Manager (PT)  comrade (address/reference term)
지배인 동지

Comrade Manager

c. first name (FN) + title

*Myengswu*  *tongmwu*

*Myengswu* (FN)  *tongmwu* (address/reference term)
명수 동무

Comrade *Myengswu*

d. last name (LN) + title

*Song*  *tongci/tongmwu*

*Song* (LN)  *tongci/tongmwu* (address/reference term)
송 동지 (동무)

Comrade Song

e. Full name + title

*Song*  *Minho*  *tongci/tongmwu*

*Song* (LN)  *Minho* (FN)  *tongci/tongmwu*
송민호 동지 (동무)

Comrade *Song Minho*

Through his research on NK novels and videos, D. Lee (2013) confirms that these address/reference terms are most frequently found in various social arenas, such as at work,
The popular use of these two terms is also confirmed by the Frequency Dictionary of Korean (1993) published in NK. According to this dictionary, tongmwu is the fiftieth most frequently used word, while tongci is the seventieth, based on text data composed of 1,047,367 words in various genres published in North Korea between 1946 and 1987.

Let me further examine the two terms, tongmwu and tongci, pragmatically. As I explained previously, ‘tongci’ is an address term towards someone of higher social rank, status, or age, while ‘tongmwu’ is a term of address towards someone of similar or lower level in terms of social status or age relative to the speaker (C-Y. Yi, 2005). This norm is confirmed by K-S. Pak (2009), a scholar who traveled to North Korea from Australia and resided in the North for his study of Cultured Language. This NK usage of address terms is also found in NK’s state-run television program for teaching its viewership linguistic etiquette at work. In this program, titled “Linguistic Etiquette at Work” (n.d.), all the linguistic models address one another in a work environment using tongmwu or tongci, with or without the other’s name or title, as in “comrade Yengmi” (Yengmi-tongmwu,) or “comrade manager” (pancang-tongci), depending on the interlocutor’s age or status differential relative to the speaker. Especially the commentator in this
TV program instructs that people at work should use the address term tongmu toward those of younger age or lower status relative to the speaker to show them some respect, rather than simply calling them by only their given name. Therefore, both address/reference terms, tongmu and tongci, are appropriate at work with different pragmatic usages. These usages conform with the linguistic norm guidance provided by NK dictionaries. However, tongci can overlap in usage with tongmu. K-S. Pak (2009) notes that the address term tongci is used cheerfully in spoken language among people who have the same goals and intentions and work together, rather than being a term of deference (p. 299). For instance, Kim Jong Un called the audience “tongci-tul, plural for tongci, comrades)” in his 2018 New Year’s Address, although Kim Jong Un has the highest social status of anyone living in NK society (J.U. Kim, 2018).

A story about address/referent terms of a person in North Korea also demonstrates that tongci can be used to focus on ideological encouragement, regardless of age or status. A person named Kim Tong-gi wrote that he was referred to as tongmu from the time he was an elementary school student to the time he became a soldier and was called tongci by higher level persons after becoming a member of the Workers’ Party and by his fellow students once at university.

I enlisted in the military in June 1950…. Everyone called me Kim Tong-gi tongmu ‘Comrade Kim Tong-gi’…. In 1951, when I was nineteen years old and became a member of the Workers’ Party, I was addressed as “tongci” ‘comrade’. When I received the Party’s red ID, the head of politics said to me, “Kim Tong-gi tongci, Congratulations on becoming a member of the Workers’ Party,” and shook my hands firmly…. After the Korean war, I was discharged from the military and became a college student. In the college, students always called one another tongci. My days were filled with happiness and faith. (T-G. Kim, 2006, no page number)

1950 년 6 월 나는 인민군대에 입대하였다…. 모두가 《김동기동무》라고 불렀다….주제 40(1951)년 내가 19 살 나던 해 당에 입당할 때에는 《동지》라고 불리주었다. 당에 입당하고 봉은 당증을 받을 때 정치부장은 《김동기동지, 조선로동당 입당을 축하합니다.》 하며 내 손을 굳게 잡고 홍명한 당원이 되라고 하였다….전후 제대되어 대학시절에도 동무 호상간에는 반드시 아무개동지라고 불렀다. 그야말로 믿음으로 가득찬 행복한 나날이었다.
In general, *tongci* is the honorific form of *tongmwu*, but can be used regardless of age or status when speakers are more focused on the ideological meaning of the word. However, the usage of *tongci/tongmwu* has expanded widely to the degree that the terms are used widely regardless of ideological emphasis or political connotations (K-S. Pak, 2009).

In contrast, *tongmwu* and *tongci* are rarely used as address/reference terms in South Korea. In the South, *tongmwu* is used for its original meaning, friend, though *chinkwu*, a Sino-Korean synonym of *tongmwu*, is more commonly used in the South. The meaning of *tongci* in South Korea is a person who shares the same goal or intention. This meaning is somewhat similar with the North, however, the goal in this SK context is not limited to socialist revolution as in the North. In South Korea, *tongci* is used as an address/reference term by people who share the same goal, mostly in the context of politics. For instance, when I used a South Korean on-line search engine for this word, most newspaper articles with the word were related to politicians, who employed the term to refer to his/her fellow political party members, as follows:

My fellow citizens, Party member comrades.


저는 오늘 바른정당 대표직을 내려놓는다.

In this case, *tongci* is used as an address term in the political context, like its usage in the North, however, in South Korea this term is not used as a common address/reference term in interpersonal communication at all.

Unlike South Korea, in China, which has a socialist political system, *tongci* is used similarly with North Korea. This word derives from the Chinese *tongzhi* 同志. According to Lee-Wong (1997), in China ‘*tongzhi*’ (*tongci* in Korean) has since ancient times been used to mean a person who shares similar ideals. Mao Zedong spread its use widely during the period of struggle against the Japanese and the nationalist Kuomingtang Party. Then, in China’s pursuit of modern nation building, this word, comrade, was used as a form of address among members of the Chinese Communist Party to connote egalitarianism and nationalism in the context of socialism. While *tongzhi* was accepted as the most appropriate term and an honorific marker by the public, traditional Chinese address terms, such as *xianshen* ‘mister,’ *xiaojie* ‘little miss’ became inappropriate due to their bourgeois implications. However, *tongzhi* went through another
semantic shift under the Cultural Revolution (1966–1969). When high-ranking cadre, who were called tongzhi, became targets of criticism, and the status of the term declined pragmatically. As Chinese society has shifted toward a market economy, the status of tongzhi has further declined, while xianshen (mister), xiaojie (miss), and other traditional terms have regained their status as normal forms of address. This phenomenon demonstrates how corpus planning is deeply influenced by social change. From the late 1990s, tongzhi came to be used in official settings or in public discourses such as its state-run mass media and as an honorific term among members of the Chinese Communist Party and government officials. However, it was no longer an appropriate term in general interpersonal communication. And this word underwent yet another semantic shift in China, acquiring a new connotation to mean sexual minorities, due to its innate meaning of solidarity. For example, the Beijing LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) Center is called the Beijing Tongzhi Zhongxin ‘Beijing Comrade Center’ (Qin, 2016). Although China’s socialist government intervened in urging Party members to use tongzhi as an honorific political term, the state cannot completely control people’s language use. Tongzhi, once a linguistic symbol of solidarity and political consciousness in the context of socialism, has come to be used only for top leaders such as for the president, as in Xi Jinping tongzhi ‘Comrade Xi Jinping,’ even as its meaning has morphed beyond the Party’s direction.

Unlike in China, in North Korea, which has experienced relatively little socio-politico-economic changes, the use of tongci has expanded to the degree that the term is used as general address term without any political meaning, as K-S. Pak noted (2009). Another salient feature regarding use of the term “comrade,” North Korea has the two different forms, tongci and tongmwu. Most socialist societies that use “comrade” have only one such term, since they adopted it in part to pursue egalitarianism. For instance, under Mao Zedong in China everyone, from Mao to the simple farmer, was calling each other tongzi. However, in the case of North Korea, between the two terms, tongci and tongmwu, people should only use tongci for state leaders, the honorific form for tongmwu. This phenomenon implies, first, that Korea’s traditional hierarchical culture has been practiced and reflected in language use in North Korea, although North Korea is a putative socialist state that practices and pursues egalitarianism. Second, this practice may be from one of the salient characteristics of the Korean language, namely, that it is
an honorific language with systemic honorifics. In the following section I examine reference terms for North Korean state leaders.

5.2 Reference Terms for the State Leaders

According to a NK language guidance book, among various address/reference terms for that country’s leaders, ‘tongci’ has been commonly used (T-S. Kim, 1983). This is confirmed by my research using the corpus data gathered by the 21st Century Sejong Project of the National Institute of Korean Language in 2007. The data that I employ for this section cover not only NK print press texts, which is Corpus Data A, but also various NK print public discourses, including school textbooks, literature, history books, the works of state leaders, and magazines covering culture, education, women’s issues, health, and economics. This data, which I distinguish as Corpus Data C, was published between 1991 and 2004, primarily during the period of Kim Jong Il’s rule. In other words, the combined Corpus Data A and other various public print discourses becomes Corpus Data C. Table 11 illustrates samples from Corpus Data C.
Table 11. Corpus Data C: gathered by the 21st Century Sejong Project of the National Institute of Korean Language.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of publication</th>
<th>Title of publication (publication year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
*Tongil Sinbo* (Unification Newspaper) 통일신보(2001)  
*Minju Chosun* (Democratic Korea) 민주조선(2001)  
*Pyongyang Sinmun* (Pyongyang Newspaper) 평양신문(2002) |
| Magazines            | *Chollima* 천리마 (1996)  
*Co.sen Yenghwa* (Korean Film) 조선영화 (1996)  
*Co.sen Yeyswul* (Korean Art) 조선예술 (1996)  
*Atong Mwunhak* (Children’s Literature) 아동문학 (1996)  
*Co.sen Mwunhak* (Korean Literature) 조선문학 (1997)  
*Chengnyen Mwunhak* (Young Adult Literature) 청년문학 (1997)  
*Tongil Mwunhak* (Unification Literature) 통일문학 (1999)  
*Kumswukangsan* 금수강산 (1999)  
*Saynghwal-kwa Kenkang Cangswu* (Life and Healthy Long Life) 생활과 건강장수 (1999)  
*Co.sen Nye.seng* (Korean Women) 조선녀성 (2000)  
*Kyengcey Yenkwu* (Economic Research) 경제연구 (2001) |
| Memoirs and works of state leaders | *Seyki-wa te pwul.e* (With the Century) Vol. 1, 2. 세기와 더불어 (1992)  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of publication</th>
<th>Title of publication (publication year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elementary School 1, 2, 3, 4. 김정일원수님 어린시절 (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elementary School 1, 2, 3, 4. 김일성대원수님 어린시절 (2000–2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle-High School 1, 2, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elementary School 1, 2, 3, 4. 국어 (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- <em>Kwuk.e Mwunpep</em> (Korean Language Grammar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle-High School 2, 3. 국어문법 (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- <em>Co.sen.lyek.sa</em> (Korean History)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle-High School 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 조선역사 (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- <em>Kongsancwuu y Totek</em> (Communist Ethics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elementary School 1, 2, 3, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle-High School 1, 2, 3, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>공산주의 도덕 (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- <em>Mwunhak</em> (Literature), Middle-High School 4, 5.문학 (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elementary School 4. 항일의 나라영웅 김정숙아미님 어린시절 (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>항일의 나라영웅 김정숙아미님의 혁명력사 (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of publication</td>
<td>Title of publication (publication year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novels</td>
<td><em>Unceng</em> (Love) 은정 (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Yengkwang-uy nal.ey</em> (On the Glorious Day) 영광의 낭에 (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Ssangpa.wi</em> (Twin Rocks) 쌍바위 (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Paektu.san-uy nwun</em> (Snow of Mount Paektu) 백두산의 눈 (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Sa.lang-uy lo.ceng</em> (The Journey of Love) 사랑의 로정 (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Salm-uy sin.nyem</em> (The Belief of Life) 삶의 신념 (1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History books</td>
<td><em>Co.sen.cengchi.cey.tosa</em> (History of Korean Political Systems) 조선정치제도사 (1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Co.sen.kyo.yuk.sa</em> (History of Korean Education) 조선교육사 (1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Co.sen.swu.kwun.sa</em> (History of Korean Naval Forces) 조선수군사 (1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Ilcey-uy Co.sen.chim.lyak.sa</em> (History of the Japanese Invasion of Korea) 일제의 조선침략사 (1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Co.sen.min.cok-uy Wen.si.co Tan.kwun</em> (The Original Founder of the Korean Race, Tankwun) 조선민족의 원시조 단군 (1999)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total number of e.cel | 6,501,372 |

In general, in the Korean language address/reference terms are positioned right after the person’s name. Corpus Data C illustrates ‘*tongci*’ as the most commonly used reference term* for both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in NK public discourses, especially among those reference terms positioned right after the names of the leaders as shown in Table 12 and Table 13.

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*8 I have not located address terms for the head of state in North Korea, since I am not able to find authentic conversations between the leader and others. Thus, I use ‘reference term,’ when it comes to the NK state leaders instead of using ‘address/reference terms.’*
Table 12. Reference terms for Kim Il Sung.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference term for Kim Il Sung</th>
<th>frequency</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tongci ‘comrade’ (동지)</td>
<td>4,036</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tay.wenswu ‘generalissimo’ (대원수)</td>
<td>1,544</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cwu.sek ‘president’ (주석)</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cangkwun ‘general’ (장군)</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wenswu ‘commander-in-chief, head of state’ (원수)</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kak.ha ‘excellency’ (각하)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total appearances of “Kim Il Sung” in the data</td>
<td>10,214</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Corpus C: total sentences: 445,678, total e.cel: 6,501,372

Table 13. Reference terms for Kim Jong II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference terms for Kim Jong II</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tongci ‘comrade’ (동지)</td>
<td>10,030</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cangkwun ‘general’ (장군)</td>
<td>3,585</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wenswu ‘commander-in-chief, head of state’ (원수)</td>
<td>1,519</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lyengto.ca ‘leader’ (령도자)</td>
<td>1,132</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kak.ha ‘excellency’ (각하)</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total appearances of “Kim Jong II” in the data</td>
<td>18,266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Corpus C: total sentences: 445,678, total e.cel: 6,501,372
Figure 7. Reference term for Kim Jong Un in *Rodong Sinmun* on June 13, 2018
(Reference term, 2018)

Corpus Data C does not include the era of Kim Jong Un. When I searched the leader’s name, Kim Jong Un at the website of the *Rodong Sinmun*, all the headlines that contained the leader’s name had the reference term, tongci ‘comrade’ immediately following the name (Kim Jong Un tongci ‘Comrade Kim Jong Un’) as shown in Figure 7.

While in North Korea the state leaders have from the establishment of that state been dominantly and consistently called tongci ‘comrade,’ in South Korea, the address/reference terms for the state leader, the president, have evolved alongside sociopolitical changes. Kak.ha ‘excellency (閣下),’ the highest honorific title and the address/reference term for the South Korean president, was used for the first president of South Korea, Syngman Rhee (e.g., tay.thonglyeng-kak.ha, ‘His Excellency the President (대통령각하),’ whose presidency was from 1948 to 1960 (as cited in Y-I. Yu, 2000). This term had been used for the president of the Provisional Government of Korea in China before the 1945 liberation during the period of Japanese rule in Korea. J-B. Lee (2008) argued that the use of this title for the president was an
indicating the acceptance of Japanese culture (kakka 閣下 かっか ‘your honor,’ in Japanese) as a result of occupation. One Korean newspaper article from 1924 stated that high-ranking Japanese officials, such as the prime minister, were referred to by this honorific title in Korea, as this same honorific title, ‘kakka 閣下(かっか),’ was used in Japan (“Hoyngsel swu.sel,” 1924, p. 1). The original meaning of kak.ha is an honorific address/referent term for a high-ranking government official, and Korean dictionaries in South Korea have maintained this sense of the word. However, pragmatically, this term was used predominantly for the presidents of South Korea, as the highest honorific title, rather than for other high-ranking government officials. Notably, this term was almost normatively used for in public discourses the President Park Chung Hee, who ruled South Korea for 18 years following his military coup in 1961. According to one South Korean newspaper in 1966, the South Korean government decided that the people we obligated to refer to or address the president with the honorific address term, kak.ha:

Ministry of Government Administration has decided to always call the President as tay.thonglyeng-kak.ha ‘His Excellency President. (“Hoyngsel swu.sel,” 1966, p. 1)

The imposition of terms for disseminating attitudes or consciousness among the populace is a facet of corpus planning in totalitarian regimes (Clyne, 1997a), and imposition of the address term, kak.ha, for the President in South Korea falls under this case. In the era of the President Park Chung Hee (1961–1979), among various titles, the honorific term kak.ha gained the highest and most exclusive status, for only with the president. For instance, in 1979, Prime Minister Shin Hyun-hwak, the second-highest SK government official, declined to be called “kak.ha,” insisting that “nobody can be called kak.ha except for the president” (“Tay.thonglyeng,” 1979, p. 3).

From the presidency of Park Chung Hee, kak.ha has become the symbol of authoritarianism due to exclusive imposition of the term. Undoing this corpus planning, which is correcting or relaxing earlier corpus planning (Clyne, 1997a), occurred as a result of sociopolitical upheaval in South Korea. After South Korea’s institutional democratization, such as direct presidential elections, began in 1987 in the wake of the June Democratic Uprising of that year, use of this term was officially discarded by then President Roh Tae Woo. When Roh commenced his presidency in 1988, he announced the abolishment of kak.ha, both formally and informally, as part of his efforts to dismantle authoritarianism (“Kak.ha,” 1988). This was done because the
vast majority of the SK population demanded a change in political direction from dictatorship to
democracy. In accordance with Roh’s decision, South Korea’s Department of the Education
revised the curriculum from elementary to high school, which included education on presidential
address terms (“Cho.cwung.ko,” 1988). However, use of the term _kak ha_ for the president
persisted, and this practice gradually began to disappear only from the beginning of the
presidency of Kim Dae Jung, who is known as South Korea’s first progressive president. When
President Kim Dae Jung started his presidential term in 1998, he suggested he be addressed as
_tay.thonglyeng-nim_ ‘Mr. President’ (대통령님) instead of _tay.thonglyeng kak ha_ (Sung, 1998)
and this has been practiced widely ever since. _Nim_ ‘honorable’ (님) is an honorific title, but it
is not an exclusive title for a president, but rather a general term used with occupational titles, in
kinship terms, or with other general titles such as _sensayng_ ‘sir,’ _yesa_ ‘lady.’ This was redoing
corpus planning (Clyne, 1997a) that involved a change to the language to demarcate his
presidency from the previous conservative and authoritarian regimes.

Although calling the president _tay.thonglyeng-nim_ ‘Mr. President’ in public discourses
has become common practice since the presidency of Kim Dae Jung, there are still some people,
especially among politicians, who continue to use _kak ha_ for the president. This occurred
especially in reference to the conservative President Park Geun-hye, who is a daughter of Park
Chung Hee, by her fellow conservatives. Those politicians who did use _kak ha_ for the president
were criticized by the SK mass media, who claimed their use of this term reflected their
authoritarian dispositions. Such criticism also reveals how this term has come to be perceived
sociolinguistically in South Korea. _Kak ha_ was the official term for the president until the
country’s 1987 democratization, but the term has become very inappropriate since that
democratization. This term is also used to refer to conservative presidents in a sarcastic way, as a
way by political progressives. The change in the use of the address/reference term _kak ha_ reveals
that in South Korea there were political factors behind the change of corpus planning, to include
the undoing and redoing of corpus planning. At the same time, changes in corpus planning
reflect sociopolitical change.

At the surface, compared with the South’s _kak ha_, North Korea maintains some equity in
language use insofar as address/reference terms, since _tongci_ is used for both state leaders and
ordinary people in social life. However, the state leaders in North Korea are described with the
ultimate highest honorifics in every aspect of Korean public discourse. The use of honorifics for NK state leaders as part of corpus planning is taught to, or imposed upon, language users through the mass media, the education system, and normative guides in the name of etiquette, propriety, or politeness in language use in North Korea. The next section deals with honorifics for NK state leaders in public discourses.

5.3 Honorifics for the State Leaders: The Core of Propriety in Language Use

In Korean, certain factors determine how the honorific system is used. Among those factors age is in general considered as the most important due to the historical influence of Confucianism. Other factors include social rank/class, solidarity, and the setting of discourse (public or private). Overall, the two Koreas have similar norms in determining honorific use, with the exception of the honorific norms for North Korea’s state leaders and their family members. In general, in South Korea institutionalized public discourse, such as mass media or school textbooks, use neutral forms for the state leaders. In contrast, in North Korea, using honorifics for the state leaders in public discourses is a norm. According to North Korea’s language norms, the most fundamental language etiquette is that communists should maintain limitless deference toward the Great Leader (T-S. Kim, 1983). In terms of imposition or educating patterned discourse to disseminate particular attitudes, using absolute deference toward the state leaders has been practiced as part of corpus planning in North Korea. This section examines discursive planning in North Korea, to include grammatical honorifics, patterned expressions, and specialized words developed and used exclusively for the state leaders to meet the ideological goals of the NK state.

5.3.1 Lexico-suffixal patterns of honorifics

The Korean language is known for its systemic honorifics. In general, honorifics in Korean are divided into grammatical and lexical forms in normative politeness as social indexing regarding the addressee and the referent (Sohn, 1999). For subject honorification, inflectional
suffix -(u)si is attached right after a predicate stem, subject honorific particle –kkeyse, and indirect object honorific particle-kkey according to the speaker’s judgment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Honorific particle</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kkeyse</td>
<td>ka/i</td>
<td>nominative (subject)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kkeyse</td>
<td>eykeyse/hantheyse</td>
<td>source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kkey</td>
<td>eykey/hanthey</td>
<td>dative/locative/goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suffix</td>
<td>(u)si</td>
<td>ø</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(adapted from Sohn, 1999, p. 412)

The use of honorification for state leaders in North Korean public discourses has been common practice from the early stages of that state. I found this practice in the Rodong Sinmun from the beginning of 1952, the earliest date for that newspaper that I am able to access. According to the language norm in a North Korean elementary school textbook, when a subject of a sentence is the state leader(s), all of these honorific forms have to be used, as explained in (3).

(3) honorific particles and suffix

For honorific particles and suffix, there are–(u)si, -kkey, –kkeyse. In speaking of the beloved generalissimo and the great commander-in-chief, you should use the honorific particles and suffix.
존경의 뜻을 나타내는 토에는 “께, 까서, 시”가 있습니다. 경애하는 대원수님과 위대한 원수님에 대하여 말할 때에는 언제나 존경의 뜻을 나타내는 토를 써야 합니다.
We should be loyal to the beloved leader, Generalissimo Kim Il Sung, forever.

The great leader, Commander-in-Chief Kim Jong Il, asked us to gather around him closely.

You should also use the honorific particles and suffix for one’s seniors

This demonstrates that linguistic etiquette such as honorification toward state leaders, is much more emphasized than the general use of honorification toward one’s senior. This norm also conforms to North Korea’s language management regarding linguistic etiquette toward state leaders. North Korean authority teaches children this norm through school textbooks, and all public discourses comply with this norm. In critical approaches, the school textbook is viewed as a unique resource, for it is oriented towards shaping the values, attitudes, and knowledge of the future generation (Macgilchrist, 2017). Especially in a society like North Korea, where the expression of different views beyond that of the state is not allowed, textbook discourse has a very powerful role in the construction of the young generation’s worldviews and epistemologies. The textbook discourse above has a deontic modal element, ‘should/must’ (는야한) in “you should use the honorific particles and suffix.” As I explained in section 4.4.2.3, this modal element leads to the notion that using honorifics toward the state leader is a morally desirable action. The North Korean authority explicitly makes children internalize and socialize this linguistic norm, expressing loyalty to the state leaders, as natural and desirable language practice via the textbook discourse.

However, it would be difficult to examine the use of this honorification with a mechanical syntactic analysis rule, such as that of grammatical gender in French nouns. In French, all nouns are classified into masculine and feminine, and the linguistic gender is predetermined and free from the speaker’s judgment (Lee & Ramsey, 2000). By contrast, Korean honorification is controlled by the speaker’s judgment. For example, observe the following sentences:

(4) Assumed context:

Speaker = a student in a classroom
Hearer = the speaker’s classmates in a classroom
Referent of Subject = a teacher who is coming to the classroom
In example (4a), the honorific nominative case particle (HNM) –kkeyse and the subject honorific suffix (SH) –si in the predicate express the speaker’s respect toward the teacher. By its lack of –kkeyse and –si, sentence (4b) does not show the speaker’s deference toward the teacher, though it does use –님-nim ‘honorable,’ an honorific title. In the case of (4c), there is no honorification at all. The three sentences are all functional in reality among Korean native speakers, whether with the honorific particles and suffix or without, so one cannot state that the honorific expressions are grammatical obligatory. The use of the honorific particles and suffix depends highly on the speaker’s intent of showing deference toward the referent. However, it is not totally an individual decision either. There are social norms controlling referent honorifics in Korean. For instance, in the above examples (4b and 4c), if the teacher happens to hear the utterance, the teacher would probably instruct or admonish the student that a student should use honorification toward his/her teacher. This reflects that there is a social norm in reference to honorific use in sociolinguistic context.

In the cases of NK public discourse, the social norm that using deference toward the state leaders is obligatory, not grammatically but sociolinguistically and pragmatically. Especially in
reference to state leaders, in North Korea it is noteworthy that the normative politeness is further extended into a unique way of honorifics. First, the subject honorific particle, *-kkeyse* attached to the noun, and the subject honorific suffix *–si* attached to the predicate, must be used for the state leaders in public discourse. In general, when multiple predicates are used for an honorific subject in a sentence, the last predicate, which is the main predicate in general in Korean, has the suffix *–(u)si* only due to the economy principle in language as in (5a).


father TC early get-up and work to go-SH-PST-DC

아버지지는 일찍 일어나서 회사에 가셨다.

Father got up early and went to work.


father TC early get-up-SH-and work-to go-SH-PST-DC

아버지지는 일찍 일어나서 회사에 가셨다

Father got up early and went to work.

The above sentences are acceptable and can be used in Korean texts; however, the first one is used more commonly, since the main predicate with the suffix *–(u)sye* (variant of *–(u)si*) represents its honorific mode, so the positioning of the suffix *–(u)sye* in other predicates is unnecessary. In contrast, NK language norms teach that all predicates that describe the state leaders in a sentence should be encoded with the subject honorific suffix *–(u)si*,

(6) If a sentence is related to the Great Leader, the honorific suffix *–(u)si* is to be attached to the predicates of the sentence as much as possible in order to express the most deference toward the Leader. (T-S. Kim, 1983, p. 116)

“위대한 수령님과 관련되었을 때 그 문장의 접속술어에도 가능한한 존칭토 《시》를 붙이여 최대의 존칭 표현을 한다.
The Great Leader is the genius of the revolution, the sun of our ethnicity, and the hero of legend. (T.-S. Kim, 1983, p. 117; emphasis mine)

This practice is common in NK public discourse, as follows.

(7) Kim Jong Il yengtoca-kkey-se-nun ku nal-to saypyek 2-si-ka
Kim Jong Il leader-HT-HNM-TC that day-also dawn 2-o’clock-NM
	nemese-ya cenyeksiksa-lul ha-sy-ess-nuntey siksa-lul
over-even dinner-AC do-SH-PST-but eating-AC

machisiu-nun killo cipmwusil-ey ka-si-ye tesssahin yelekaci pokose,
finish-SH-RL way office-to go-SH-INF piled up-RL many reports,

thongpocalyo, ceyuye, tangposasel tung-ul po-si-mye
announcements, suggestions, Party paper editorials etc.-AC look-SH-and

ttotasi pam-ul cisaywu-si-yess-ta
again night-AC spend-SH-PST-DC
The Great Leader, Kim Jong II, took his dinner after 2 am on that day, and right after having dinner he went to his office and spent another sleepless night reviewing piles of various reports and documents such as suggestions, announcements, and the Party paper’s editorials. (T-M. Kang, 1996; emphasis mine)

Although most NK public discourse follows this norm, a few examples in my corpus data show that –(u)si is not used in all predicates that describe the state leader in one sentence. This supports my argument that this norm is not an obligatory syntactic rule, but a sociolinguistic norm.

Excessive use of honorifics is also found in auxiliary predicate construction. In the Korean language, the first predicate in an auxiliary construction carries the main meaning, while the second predicate has the auxiliary function of denoting aspectual and/or modality (Sohn 1999). This auxiliary predicate construction, in general, has the subject honorific suffix –(u)si in the auxiliary second predicate, if needed. However, NK public discourse has the suffix –(u)si in each stem of the auxiliary construction as subject honorification for the state leader, as follows.

(8) …kyengayha-nun cangkwun-nim-kkeyse-nun choycensenkil-ul
… respected-RL general-HT-HNM-TC frontlines-AC

ie ka-si-ko kyey-si-nu-n kes-i-ta
continuing go-SH-and doing(Hon.)-SH-IN-RL fact-be-DC

…경애하는 장군님께서는 최전선길을 이어 가지고계시는것이다.
…The beloved General [Kim Jong Il] is continuously heading to the frontlines. (C-M. Pak, 2002; emphasis mine)

Further, use of –(u)si is extended into conjunctive words, such as -m-eyto pwulkwuha-si-ko (-에도 불구하고) ‘although/in spite of,’ which is unusual in South Korea. The basic form of
this conjunctive word is *pwulkwuha* ‘despite’ (불구하다), but this verb has become an idiomatized conjunctive word, and generally honorifics are not applied to conjunctive words in Korean. In order to revere the state leader, the honorific suffix is used in excessive and unusual ways in North Korea as follows.

(9) taywen-tul-i ku-chelem manlyu-hay tuly -ess-um-eyto members-PL-NM that-like keep back-INF-for (Hon.)-PST-NOM-even

pwulkwuha-si-ko kkuthnay cangkwun-nim-kkeyse-nun despite-SH-and finally general-HT-HNM-TC

pyengwen kwithulcip-aney tul-e-ka-si-ye…
hospital log cabin-inside-to enter-INF-go-SH-and

대원들이 그처럼 만류해드렸음에도 불구하고 결국 장군님께서는 병원 귀틀집안에 들어가시어…

Despite the members kept the General [Kim Il Sung] back to prevent him from going into the hospital, in the end the General went into the hospital… (T-S. Kim, 1983, p. 120; emphasis mine)

In line with this, excessive use of honorifics drives the repeated and uncommon use of the subject honorific particle –*kkeyse*. When two North Korean state leaders are connected via the connective particle, -*wa* (after a vowel, -*kwa* after a consonant, ‘and/with’), both state leaders have the subject honorific particles as shown in the following sentence, though two nominals can be represented by one set of particle positioning after the second nominal. This phenomenon is rarely found in SK texts.
The Great Leaders Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Kim Jong Il have prioritized and contributed to educating the next generation during the entire time they were leading the revolution. (“Seysangeyse,” 2016; emphasis mine)

However, this is not a normative usage but a socially imposed norm. I found some cases that did not use ‘-kkeyse’ before (-wa) in Corpus Data C, as in normal South Korean usage. Though this excessive use of honorifics is not an obligatory linguistic norm, this exemplifies how an ideology drives deference toward the state leaders and influences language practice.

Another contrasting usage in terms of using honorific suffixes for the state leaders is –op-, the suffix in a predicate stem as part of addressee honorification,
(11) Halwu lato han si- lato phyenhi swi-si-op-ki-lul
A day even one moment even comfortably rest-SH-AH-NOM-AC
swu.lyeng-nim, swu.lyeng-nim inmin-tul-un pala-op-ni-ta
supreme leader-HT, supreme leader-HT people-PL-TC wish-AH-IN-DC

하루라도 한시라도 편히 쉬시 يول기를 수령님, 수령님 인민들은 바라옵니다.
The people wish that the supreme leader would take a rest even just for a day or one moment. (T-S. Kim, 1983, p. 120; emphasis mine)

This -op- is an archaic super polite form in contemporary Korean in the South (Sohn, 2015). In South Korea, this honorific pattern is used for a highly revered figure, such as God in religious texts, and rarely used in general cases. The fact that North Korean public discourse applies this super polite addressee honorific suffix to the state leader reflects the status of the leader, the sacred figure of that society.

In NK public discourse, this linguistic etiquette toward state leaders is expanded to the family members of those leaders. Kim Il Sung’s family members, including his father, mother, and wife, are subjects of the use of honorific particles and suffixes. The following demonstrates the use of honorific forms regarding Kim Il Sung’s father, Kim Hyong Jik.

(12) …Kim Hyong Jik-sensayng-nim-kkeyse-nun Juche15(1926)nyen 6-wel
…Kim Hyong Jik-teacher-HT-HNM-TC Juche15(1926)year 6-month

5-il 32-sal-ul ilki-lo nemwuto ilcciki seysang-ul
5-day 32-year-old-AC life time too early world-AC

tena-si-y-ess-ta
leave-SH-PST-DC

…김형직선생님께서는 주체 15(1926)년 6월 5일 32살을 일기로 너무도 일찍이 세상을 떠나시였다.
While in the South, public discourse such as mass media generally does not use honorifics toward its political leaders, NK public discourse uses honorifics towards its state leaders and their family members, but not for anyone else.

Besides the particles and suffix explained above, Korean language has limited numbers of honorific lexical forms in nouns and predicates, including plain or humble predicates to refer to one’s own or an inferior person’s action (Sohn, 1999). These lexical honorifics are used for the state leaders as a social norm in NK public discourse, while South Korean mass media do not practice this norm.

North Korea’s language etiquette guide book states that, if there are honorific words, these words should be chosen when referring to and describing the state leaders. Below are samples of honorific that official guidance says should be used in reference to state leaders (T-S. Kim, 1983).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Honorific</th>
<th>Plain</th>
<th>Gloss</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>noun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conham</td>
<td>ilum</td>
<td>‘name’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>malssum</td>
<td>mal</td>
<td>‘words’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pwun</td>
<td>salam</td>
<td>‘person’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>predicate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kyeysita</td>
<td>issta</td>
<td>‘stay’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cwumusita</td>
<td>cata</td>
<td>‘sleep’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humble</td>
<td>Plain</td>
<td>Gloss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>predicate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poypta</td>
<td>pota</td>
<td>‘see’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tulita</td>
<td>cwuta</td>
<td>‘give’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mosita</td>
<td>teylita</td>
<td>‘accompany’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(adapted from Sohn, 1999, p. 412)
NK language guidebooks mandate this honorification for states leaders:

(13) When a subject of a sentence is the great supreme leader and the predicate has the meaning of 《issta ‘stay’》, the predicate must be 《kyeysita ‘stay’》.

위대한 수령님께 대하여 정중히 표현한 단어가 주어로 되는 경우 그 풀이하는 말에 《있다》라는 뜻이 표현될 때에는 반드시 《게시다》를 쓴다.

[example]
Salyengkwan tongci-kkeyse-nun cenpang choso ey
commander-in-chief comrade-AH-TC front-line guard post at

kyeysi-p-ni-ta
stay(Hon.)-AH-IN-DC

사령관 동지께서는 전방초소에 계십니다

The Comrade, commander-in-chief is at a guard post on the frontline. (T-S. Kim, 1983, p. 122; emphasis mine)

In this case, kyeysita ‘stay/be,’ the honorific form for issta has to be used as part of the subject honorification. This linguistic etiquette guidebook as well as school textbook discourses regarding the use of honorifics for state leaders also have a deontic modal element (should/must) that reveals this language practice as a morally desirable norm.

The use of the highest-level honorifics for state leaders in North Korea is a socio-politico-cultural practice that was driven by the development of that state’s Juche (self-reliance) ideology. The Revolutionary Swu.lyeng (supreme leader) Theory, the core of the Juche ideology that began to be theorized from the early 1970s, in particular demands the highest level of loyalty and respect toward the swu.lyeng (J-S. Lee, 2000). Before this signature ideology of Kim Il Sung had been fully developed, the North Korean state argued that the North Korean communists had adapted the most practical form of Marxism-Leninism for the country. In fact, articles in the Rodong Sinmun for 1963 do not reveal systematic use of honorifics towards Kim Il Sung. The
following sentence in an opinion piece had no honorifics towards Kim Il Sung besides the address term, tongci:

(14) Kim Il Sung tongci-nun taumkwa kathi cicekha-yess-ta
Kim Il Sung comrade-TC below as point out-PST-DC

감일성 동지는 다음과 같이 지적하였다

Comrade Kim Il Sung pointed out as below. ("Sahoycwuy," 1963, p. 2)

However, from the end of the 1960s, the Juche theory as the single ruling ideology replaced Marxism-Leninism as the guiding state ideology as explained below,

We do not know any other ideology but Comrade Kim Il Sung’ revolutionary ideology, our Party’s Juche ideology, and are willing to risk our lives whenever and wherever in order to protect the Party and the supreme leader. We think the way Comrade Kim Il Sung thinks and behave the way he behaves and accept the supreme leader’s teaching and the Party’s decisions unconditionally, thus raising high the revolutionary pillar

("Swu.lyenguy wi.tay.han," 1968, p. 1)

A contributing factor to this shift was the conflicts between North Korea and both the Soviet Union and China in the 1960s. During the 1960s, North Korea criticized both these states for their interference in the internal affairs of North Korea and took the path of developing its own ideology (E. S. Kim, 2012).

According to the Juche ideology, people are the master of nature and society, but without a leader (swu.lyeng), the people are merely unorganized and unconscious masses. Therefore, empowered masses under the teaching and guidance of the leader can be the independent subject who is the master of everything. This theory equalizes swu.lyeng, the Party, and the masses as one system. Being loyal to the swu.lyeng as a system not an individual means being loyal to the
Party and the masses (J-S. Lee, 2000). This same loyalty toward the leader’s successor is required for the same reason. The following explains the status of the leader’s successor in NK.

The great leader Comrade Kim Jong II taught the following.

“A successor is a successor to a leader (swu. lyeng) but also a leader who has succeeded to the status and role of leader in relation to the people. (“Swu. lyenguy ciwiwa,” n.d.)

위대한 영도자 김정일동지께서는 다음과 같이 교시하시였다.

《후계자는 선행한 수령과의 관계에서는 후계자이지만 인민과의 관계에서는 수령의 지위와 역할을 그대로 이어받은 지도자이다.》

In NK, the Juche ideology contributed to the excessive honorification of state leaders, in turn, this language norm contributed to boosting and enhancing the ideological effects of Juche. One of the effects was the institutionalization of the status and role of the state leader as the decisive and absolute core component of the society.

5.3.2 Special words for the state leaders

Besides lexico-suffixal patterns of honorifics, another characteristic of the NK public discourse regarding expressions for its state leaders is that certain vocabulary is used exclusively for the leadership. This linguistic special treatment of political leaders was also practiced in South Korea, especially under its authoritarian presidents. For instance, in the era of President Park Chung-Hee (1961–1979), the president and his family members were referred to by the exclusive expressions: kak. ha 각하 (honorific addressee/reference term for the president), yeng.pwuin 영부인 (honorific addressee/reference term for the wife of the president), yengay 영애 (honorific reference term for a daughter of the president), yengsik 영식 (honorific reference term for a son of the president). These terms were originally honorific words that could be used with ordinary people, but during the Park Chung-Hee era the meanings of the words narrowed, coming to refer exclusively to the president and his family. The South Korean mass media used these terms solely for President Park and the first family. Since South Korea began the process of democratization from 1987, these terms gradually disappeared from the South Korean mass media. As J-B. Lee (2008) states, using exclusive expressions for the president and the first family, an aspect of linguistic authoritarianism, convinces the people that the president and
his/her family are honorable figures who are different from ordinary people, the way perhaps one thinks of a king and royal family, and so internalized the absolute authority of the ruler as a natural phenomenon.

In NK public discourses this linguistic authoritarianism is commonly found in expressions pertaining to the NK state leaders. In particular, family terms have been used for ‘the Great Leader (Kim Il Sung)’ such as e.pei.swu.lyeng ‘Parent Leader’ (어버이수령). In North Korea, this expanded familism was evolved alongside Juche ideology. Familiar terms have been actively used in parallel with the concept of ‘socio-political life’ mentioned by Kim Il Sung in explaining of Juche ideology in 1972. He said, “For a human being, as a social being socio-political life is more precious than a physical life” (I. S. Kim, 1984c, p. 396). This concept was developed into the ‘Theory of Socio-Political Life,’ which was allegedly established by Kim Jong Il in the 1980s as part of Juche ideology (J-S. Lee, 2000). This theory views all of society as a single organic unit where the leader is the center of life of the socio-political community, as the brain is the center of a human being (J.I. Kim, 1986). According to Kim Jong Il (1986), the mortal physical life of a human being is bequeathed by the parents, but one’s socio-political life, which is immortal and much more important than one’s physical life, is given by the ‘parent or fatherly leader’ (e.pei.swu.lyeng). Therefore, the masses are required to give their loyalty to the fatherly leader for having given them their socio-political lives. The term, e.pei.swu.lyeng ‘Parent Leader’ (어버이수령) was created specifically to refer to Kim Il Sung in North Korea’s corpus planning as defined in the Dictionary of Contemporary Korean (Hyentay Co.senmal Sa.cen) below, in line with Juche’s leader-centered ideology.

E.pei.swu.lyeng ‘Parent Leader’
A word denoting endless respect and used by forty million Korean people to refer to the beloved Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, whose deep love and thoughtfulness for the people surpasses even that of one’s own parents. (“E.pei.swu.lyeng,” 1968, p. 1218) 어버이수령
자기를 낳아기른 어버이보다 더한 깊은 사랑과 두터운 배려를 돌려주시는, 4 천만 조선인민의 경애하는 위대한 수령 김일성동지를 무한히 존경하여 이르는 말
This expression consists of the two words, \( e.pei \) ‘parent’ and \( swu.lyeng \) ‘state leader’. Both words underwent semantic change to become a special term for Kim Il Sung as a combined word.

\( E.pei \) ‘parent’ (어버이) is used as the referent term or modifying word for the state leaders to express the people’s pride at having a parent-like leader, along with other modifying words such as \( wu.li \) ‘our’ (우리), as the NK language etiquette guidebook explains:

We also modify the great leader, whom we regard like our real parents with limitless love and pride, by putting words such as ‘our,’ ‘parents,’ ‘father’ before the expression, the great leader. (T-S. Kim, 1983, p. 129)

These words strengthen exclusive solidarity between the people and the referents, i.e., the leaders. Among these words, \( e.pei \) exemplifies how ideology influences semantics. \( E.pei \) is defined as ‘parents’ in North Korea’s Dictionary of Korean (1990/1962), Dictionary of Contemporary Korean (1968), and Cultured Language Dictionary (1973) the same as it was in South Korean dictionaries. However, in North Korea’s Dictionary of Contemporary Korean (1981) this term took on a new meaning,

\( e.pei \)

1. father and mother
2. a friendly honorific word carrying endless respect that describes a person who grants their most precious political life and generously shows love and thoughtfulness toward the people beyond even what one’s own parents could do. (“E.pei,” 1981, pp. 2691–2692)

어버이

1. 《아버지》와 《어머니》를 아울러 이르는 말.
2. 《인민대중에게 가장 고귀한 정치적 생명을 안겨주시고 친부모도 미치지 못할 뜻거운 사랑과 두터운 배려를 베풀어주시는분》을 끝없이 희모하는 마음으로 친근하게 높이여 이르는 말.
Since this definition appeared, this meaning of the term has been maintained in North Korea. Thus, the original meaning of this word has been expanded to refer to the state leaders as part of the ideological encoding of NK society. The change in meaning of this term, *e.pei*, is explained in North Korea as below:

People call leader *e.pei* ‘parents’

While *cwu.sek* ‘president,’ or *chongpi.se* ‘secretary general of the Party’ refer to the highest official position in the most comprehensive and highest level of political organization in a country, *e.pei* ‘parents’ refers to father and mother who give birth to a child and raise the child in a family. The terms, *cwu.sek* ‘president,’ or *chongpi.se* ‘secretary general of the Party’ carry political meaning, but the term, *e.pei* hints at blood ties….

For a long period of time the term *e.pei* had meant ‘parents,’ but our people changed the conceptual usage of this word to refer to the leader of a country and have revered our leader by referring to him as ‘*e.pei*.’

Referring to the great leader as the people’s *e.pei* is a sincere cry from the hearts of our people, who have been loved by the leader. This love is beyond what even their biological parents could give….

Even before being the Commander-in-Chief of the Party and state, the great Comrade Kim Il Sung is a father who has been a strong pillar of our hearts, while also a limitlessly benevolent, lovely, and thoughtful mother. (“Inminuy,” 2016)

인민의 부름-어버이

주석이나 총비서는 한나라의 가장 포괄적인 정치조직과 최고의 정치조직에서 가지게 되는 공식적인 최고 직무를 가리키는 표현이라면 어버이라는 말은 낳아주고 키워주는 한가정의 부모를 뜻하는 개념이다. 주석이나 총비서라는 직함이 정치적의미를 내포하고있다면 어버이라는 말은 혈연적인 의미를 안고있다….

우리 인민들은 력사적으로 군어져내려오던 어버이라는 개념의 용도를 변화시켜 나라의 수령을 어버이로 높이 우리리모시였다.

인민의 어버이라는 부름은 위대한 수령님의 숲하에서 천부모에게서도 다 받을 수 없는 사랑을 받으며 살아온 우리 인민모두의 마음속진정의 웨침이었다….
This explains that the authorities used this term \textit{e.pei} deliberately to impose blood ties on the relationship between the people and their political leader. The intention behind the semantic change in this word is explicitly stated as a means of forging loyalty between the people and their leader, not only as their political leader, but as a parent. The concept of \textit{e.pei} is related to quasi-familism, but this goes beyond quasi-familism ideology. Quasi-familism is defined as an expanded familism, wherein acquaintances should treat each other as family (T. H. Park, 2004); however, according to NK public discourse, \textit{e.pei} is far more important than one’s own biological parents, as described above.

The semantic alteration of this term to meet the state’s ideological needs has been successful in terms of the term’s usage pragmatically in NK public discourses. In Corpus Data C, \textit{e.pei} is found in 5,651 out of 6,501,372 \textit{e.cel}, in which it refers solely to the state leaders, Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il, and not one’s real parents. Among these, \textit{e.pei.swu.lyeng.nim} ‘the fatherly leader’ (어버이수령님) refers to only Kim Il Sung. Since \textit{e.pei}, a native word, refers only to the state leaders in pragmatic usage; when referring to one’s own parents in NK, the Sino-Korean synonym \textit{pwu.mo} ‘parents’ (부모) is used.

Like \textit{e.pei} ‘parent,’ \textit{a.pe.ci} ‘father’ also gained a new meaning in North Korea. Although the basic meaning of this term, \textit{a.pe.ci}, ‘father’ has not changed in the two Koreas, in the North, the following meaning has been added and used—“a friendly honorific term that refers to a person whom everyone admires and who grants socio-political life” (”A.pe.ci,” ca. 2012). Like \textit{e.pei}, \textit{a.pe.ci} has been used to refer to the state leaders as \textit{e.pei} has done. However, unlike \textit{e.pei}, \textit{a.pe.ci} has also been used in the North for its basic meaning, one’s biological father. In the case of \textit{a.pe.ci}, this term had the same meaning in the NK dictionary (\textit{Dictionary of Contemporary Korean}) published in 1968 as it had in the South, but the additional meaning as a reference to the state leader (i.e., “fatherly leader”) was clearly added in the 1981 NK dictionary (Dictionary of Contemporary Korean, p. 2629).

Besides the fact that Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il have been commonly referred to as ‘parent’ or ‘father,’ as in the parent leader or fatherly general, the use of many other familial
terms for its political figures are found in NK public discourse. The Workers’ Party is referred to as *e.me.ni.tang*, ‘motherly Party’ (어머니당), the socialist state is termed *tay.ka.ceng* ‘a big family’ (대가정), and the people are called *cangkwun.nim.sik.sol* ‘family members of the state leader’ (장군님 식솔).

Kim Jong Il insists that the ‘motherly Party’ plays the role of the caregiver and leader/guardian to the people. In this context, the people of North Korea are, metaphorically, the children of the state leaders and the Party. Thus, the state is called *tay.ka.ceng* ‘One Big Family,’ and these family-related terms are actively utilized in NK public discourses.

Extract 10
Title: One Big family

One Big Family is a reference to our socialist society using the symbolic imagery of the harmonious family in the home.

Our family has a grandfather, grandmother, father, mother, and children, likewise, our Big Family—our society—has parents and their children.

In our socialist Big Family, the parents (*e.pei*) are the beloved Generalissimo (Kim Il Sung) and the Commander-in-chief (Kim Jong Il), and all of us are their sons and daughters. (“Ha.nauy tay.ka.ceng,” 2002)

Extract 10, which derives from the official North Korean school textbook, demonstrates how the usage of familial terms is expanded to the discourse regarding the state. In Extract 10, the most frequently used word is *wu.li* ‘we/our/us,’ which appears in every clause, seven times in total.
This overly used we-statement promotes belongingness and bonding among members of the in-group, in this case as members of the Big Family, i.e., the state. In terms of modality, the last sentence of Extract 10 has ‘be-verbs’ in all the clauses, and these verbs provide authority and doubtless certainty to the writer’s voice. This gives the effect of making this sentence a true proposition. This discourse, in turn, is designed to help young students internalize the ideology embedded in the statement. Whereas the familial term, e.pei is commonly used pragmatically in North Korea to refer to that state’s leaders, in the South e.pei has kept its original meaning, i.e., one’s own parents, and not the state leaders. This exemplifies how the two-different socio-political systems influence the semantics of a common language.

In the combined word, e.pei.swu.lyeng ‘parent leader,’ swu.lyeng ‘leader’ is also a special term for the state leader of NK. In the South, swu.lyeng is an archaic term denoting a leader of a group or the magistrate of a province during the Yi dynasty. This original meaning of the word can be found in Korean dictionaries published before the 1945 division (as cited in Yano, 2009). However, in the North this term underwent semantic change and has been defined by Kim Jong Il in the NK on-line Korean Dictionary as follows.

swu.lyeng

the center that unifies the people as one after analyzing and synthesizing the people’s independent demands and interests as well as the uniformly leading center of the people’s creative energies.


수령[首領]
수령은 인민대중의 자주적인 요구와 리해관계를 분석종합하여 하나로 통일시키는 중심인 동시에 그것을 실현하기 위한 인민대중의 창조적활동을 통일적으로 지휘하는 중심입니다.
(《김정일선집》 8 권, 448 페이지)

As I explained in section 5.1 some of the important NK political terms, such as swu.lyeng are defined in NK dictionaries by using the words of the NK leaders as a way of imbuing the meaning with authority.
The use of swu.lyeng referring to Kim Il Sung can be found as early as March 1952 in the Rodong Sinmun I am able to access. However, this term did not always refer to North Korean state leaders, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The Dictionary of Korean (1960–1962/1990), after defining the term swu.lyeng to mean a supreme ideological or political leader, provides Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and the Party itself as examples. In the Dictionary of Contemporary Korean (1968), Kim Il Sung’s words are cited to explain the term, and then Kim Il Sung is referred to swu.lyeng in the Cultured Language Dictionary (1973) as the supreme leader of the Party and the people. The semantic change of this term also runs parallel with the development of Juche ideology in the 1970s, which emphasizes the critical role of the supreme leader in the socialist state.

Another synonym of swu.lyeng in North Korea is lyengto.ca. Although the fundamental meaning of the two words swu.lyeng and lyengto.ca is the same (leader), NK public discourse texts have the pragmatic tendency of associating swu.lyeng ‘leader’ with Kim Il Sung and lyengto.ca ‘leader’ with Kim Jong Il.

Table 14. Association of swu.lyeng ‘leader’ with Kim Il Sung and lyengto.ca ‘leader’ with Kim Jong Il

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>number of e.cel</th>
<th>swu.lyeng ‘leader’ positioned before the name</th>
<th>lyengto.ca ‘leader’ positioned before the name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kim Il Sung</td>
<td>10,214</td>
<td>4,755 (47%)</td>
<td>11 (0.001%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Jong Il</td>
<td>18,266</td>
<td>40 (0.002%)</td>
<td>7,620 (42%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Corpus C: total sentences: 445,678, total e.cel: 6,501,372

As seen in Table 14, in Corpus Data C, Kim Il Sung is mostly referred to with swu.lyeng, while Kim Jong Il is predominantly called lyengto.ca. In this data, the total number of e.cel of Kim Il Sung is 10,214, and when swu.lyeng is measured as a modifying referent just before a leader’s name, it was used with Kim Il Sung about 47% (4,755 instances) of the time, while lyengto.ca was used for Kim Il Sung only about 0.001% percent of the time (11 instances). By comparison, in this same data, the total numbers of e.cel of Kim Jong Il is 18,266, and among these, in about
7,620 (42%) lyengto.ca was used as a modifier (appearing right before his name), whereas in only 40 instances (0.002%) was swu.lyeng used.

According to the Juche ideology, the successor of the swu.lyeng becomes swu.lyeng (“Swu.lyenguy ciwiwa,” n.d.), but NK public discourse tends to differentiate each state leader with a different special term. This is also a politeness strategy to lend a uniqueness to each authority figure.

Like swu.lyeng, lyengto.ca ‘leader’ underwent changes in meaning in North Korea. Lyengto.ca means a leader in South Korea, but this term has been developed in North Korea to denote ‘an outstanding state leader’ as below,

(15) Lyengto.ca

a. leader.

[example] The Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is one of the most outstanding leaders of the international communist movement and labor movement on behalf of the forty million Korean people (Dictionary of Contemporary Korean, 1968, p. 378)


c. an outstanding leader who wisely leads the Party, military, and people and drives them to victory (Korean Dictionary, 2006, p. 1392; the on-line version of Korean Dictionary, ca. 2012)

당과 군대와 민중을 현명하게 영도하여 승리에로 이끌어나가는 탁월한 지도자.
According to the NK dictionaries above, lyengto.ca refers specifically to ‘outstanding socialist state leaders.’ In general, swu.lyeng refers to Kim Il Sung and lyengto.ca to Kim Jong Il in the NK public discourse especially under the Kim Jong Il’s rule as shown in Table 14. However, after the death of Kim Jong Il, both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong II are referred to ‘eternal swu.lyeng’ (“Co.sen Lotongtangun,” 2018). Similarly, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong II are called tay.wenswu ‘generalissimo’ (대원수); Kim Jong Un is also referred as wenswu ‘commander-in-chief’ (원수), the highest status in the military, but tay.wenswu is more honorific than wenswu. Tay.wenswu ‘generalissimo’ is used for the two deceased state leaders, Kim Il Sung and his son and successor Kim Jong II.

In comparison to swu.lyeng and tay.wenswu, cwu.sek ‘president’ (주석) is used solely for Kim Il Sung among the NK state leaders, as defined this term in the NK dictionary as follows.

cwu.sek ‘president’

① The President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK]. By amendment to the Socialist Constitution the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung became the eternal President of the DPRK in September 1998.

② In some countries, a person who is the leader of a political party, state, or social organization. (adapted from “Cwu.sek,” ca. 2012)

주석 [主席]

① 조선민주주의인민공화국 국가주석을 대표하는 최고직위 또는 그 직위의 최고형도자. 주석 87(1998)년 9 월 세롭게 수정보충된 사회주의헌법에서는 위대한 수령 김일성동지를 공화국의 영원한 주석으로 모신데 대하여 화합하고 국가기관체계에서 주석제와 관련한 조항들을 없애버렸다.

② 일부 나라에서, 당과 국가, 사회단체 등의 책임직위 또는 그 직위에 있는 사람.

According to the Rodong Sinmun, Kim Jong Il declared that only Kim Il Sung could be honored with the title of cwu.sek (“Inminuy,” 2016). This norm became a constitutional law in 1998 as explained above. Although the term, cwu.sek is used in both Koreas to refer to other countries’ presidents, i.e., Xi Jinping cwu.sek ‘President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping,’ in NK this term is used solely to refer to Kim Il Sung among the NK state leaders. Similarly, the position, kwukpang.wiwencang ‘chairman of the National Defense Commission’ is used exclusively for Kim Jong Il. Just as the use of cwu.sek was reserved exclusively for Kim Il Sung.

This practice exemplifies that exclusive special words, especially titles of state leaders, are used to maintain the unique and absolute authority/power of each of the state leaders. While some terms are used for a specific leader(s), there are also terms for all three state leaders (Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un), such as Paektu.lyengcang 백두령장, Paektu.hyelthong 백두혈통, and choy.ko.con.em 최고존엄. In the dictionary Paektu lyengcang 백두령장, means “an outstanding general, an honorific word for only Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il” (“Paektu.lyengcang,” ca. 2012). However, Kim Jong Un has been referred to this term since he became the leader of NK (Y-M. Ho, 2017). Paektu in the term, Paektu.lyengcang, refers to Mount Paektu on the China-North Korea border, that is known as the highest peak on the Korean Peninsula and long a sacred place to Koreans. According to official North Korean history, this mountain is where Kim Il Sung established his military base in his guerilla struggle against the Japanese during the Japanese colonial era (1910–1945). By official North Korean ideology this mountain is also said to be the birthplace of Kim Jong Il. For this reason, the bloodline of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un is termed in official NK parlance, the “Mount Paektu Bloodline” Paektu.hyelthong 백두혈통. As of December 2017, this expression was not found in the on-line dictionary at the North Korean state-run website, but the lineage of Paektu is used frequently in North Korean public discourse as follows.

No matter how much water flows under the bridge and no matter how frequently a generation is replaced by new one, the lineage of Paektu will remain unchanged and irreplaceable. Our party, state, army and people do not know anyone except Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un.
Our service personnel and people will never pardon all those who dare disobey the unitary leadership of Kim Jong Un, challenge his absolute authority and oppose the lineage of Paektu to an individual but bring them to the stern court of history without fail and mercilessly punish them on behalf of the party and revolution, the country and its people, no matter where they are in hiding. (“Traitor Jang,” 2013; official North Korean translation)

Likewise, the term, *choy.ko.con.em* 최고존엄 ‘dignity of the DPRK supreme leadership’ refers exclusively to the NK state leadership, as described below.

Pyongyang, November 20 (KCNA) – Trump during his visit to south Korea slandered the dignity of the supreme leadership of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, daring say that he came to the Korean peninsula to convey his message to someone.

… an insult to the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK is the biggest insult to its army and people and an intolerable challenge to human mentality and conscience.  

(“Trump hit,” 2017; official North Korean translation)

In this discourse, the NK leadership is identified with the NK people, so the people devote their lives to protect the “dignity of the supreme leadership” of the state. Using special terms to refer exclusively to the NK state leaders not only embodies their absolute authority in NK society, but also their sanctity. Table 15 summarizes the special terms used to refer to NK state leaders.
Table 15. Special terms that have been used to refer to North Korean state leaders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominantly used special terms for each state leader</th>
<th>Kim II Sung</th>
<th>Kim Jong II</th>
<th>Kim Jong Un</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-swu.lyeng 수령 state leader</td>
<td>-lyengto.ca 령도자 (state) leader</td>
<td>-choy.ko.lyengto.ca 최고령도자 supreme leader</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-cangkwun 장군 general</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusively used special title for each state leader</td>
<td>-cwu.sek 주석 president</td>
<td>-kwukpang.wi.wenhoy wiwencang 국방위원회 위원장 chairman of the National Defense Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-e.pei.swu.lyeng 아버이수령 Parent leader</td>
<td>-kwukmwu.wiwenhoy wiwencang 국무위원장 chairman of the State Affairs Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Lotongtang chongpise 로동당 총비서 general secretary of the Workers’ Party</td>
<td>-Lotongtang wiwencang 로동당위원장 chairman of the Workers’ Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonly used special terms for the state leaders</td>
<td>- e.pei 아버이 parent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (tay)wenswu (대)원수 generalissimo/(supreme) leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- choy.ko.con.em 최고존엄 dignity of NK supreme leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Paektu.lyengcang 백두령장 an outstanding general</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Paektu.hyelthong 백두혈통 the lineage of Paektu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not only are these special terms use in reference to the state leaders, but there are also specific words associated with the state leaders of North Korea. For instance, the word, kyo.si-hata, ‘to teach’ has been used exclusively for Kim II Sung. A typical example of this word in NK public discourse is in (16).
The great leader comrade Kim Il Sung taught as follows. (T-S. Kim, 1983, p. 4; underlining mine)

Among total 445,678 sentences with 6,501,372 e.cel in Corpus Data C, the numbers of e.cel that have kyo.si, ‘teaching’ (교시) is about 2,600. Among these, only 2 sentences have this word when the subject is Kim Jong Il. Corpus Data C covers the period from 1991 to 2004, mainly during the period of Kim Jong Il’s rule. According to the NK on-line Korean Dictionary, Kyo.si (교시) is defined by Kim Jong Il as the teachings of the swu.lyeng ‘leader,’ Kim Il Sung that form the law and guidelines for all activities in North Korea (“Kyo.si,” ca. 2012). The definition of this term denotes clearly the “authority” of the agent, the great leader in this case, who teaches the people and makes this a social norm. When Kim Jong Il was the state leader, the word, kyo.si ‘teaching’ was mostly used for Kim Il Sung.

During the rule of Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Il’s instruction or guidance was described using different words, such as “The great leader Comrade Kim Jong Il pointed out as follows” (emphasis mine) in the preface of the NK on-line Korean Dictionary. The expression used for quoting Kim Jong Il’s words, ‘cicekha-si-yess-ta ‘pointed out’ (지적하시였다) has the subject honorific suffix -si, but this expression was not used exclusively for the state leaders; it was also in reference to other people, though without using the honorific suffix -si. After Kim Jong Il’s death, the use of ‘kyo.si’ came to be applied to both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. But as of November 2017, this word is not applied to Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader since the death of Kim Jong Il in 2011. Kim Jong Un’s instruction has been also described using honorific expressions, but not with any exclusive to him, such as cicekha-si-yess-ta ‘pointed out’ (지적하시였다) or malssumha-si-yessta ‘said’ (말씀하시였다). The fact that among the three leaders, most exclusive special terms are associated with Kim Il Sung demonstrates how Kim Il Sung carries the most authority as the founder of the state and its ruling ideology, Juche ideology.
Another special word linked with the state leaders is *hyenci.ci.to*, ‘on-the-spot field guidance’ (현지지도). *Hyenci.ci.to* is used exclusively for the three NK state leaders: Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un. According to NK on-line Korean Dictionary, the term means the giving of guidance while visiting a site, usually by a person who is respected/admired (“Hyenci.ci.to,” ca. 2012). However, according to my corpus data, besides the three NK state leaders this word is not used to apply to anyone else in North Korea.

In parallel with the word *kyo.si* ‘teaching,’ *hyenci.ci.to* ‘on-the-spot field guidance or field guidance’ implies that the agents of *hyenci.ci.to* are worthy of guiding people and that the people are subject to being guided, as if the people cannot do things correctly without the leader’s guidance. The ‘normative’ NK dictionary defines this word as one of the most desirable forms of leadership (“Hyenci.ci.to,” ca. 2012). This definition itself embodies the honorific meaning of this special expression.

Field guidance conducted by the state leaders is one of the most frequently covered stories in NK mass media. For instance, in 1999 the *Rodong Sinmun* covered more than 40 instances (on average more than 3 times per month) of the leader’s field guidance (Korea Institute for National Unification, 2010). Along with *hyenci.ci.to* ‘[in-person] on-the-spot field guidance,’ words carrying the sense of ‘in person’ or ‘personally’ in North Korean public discourse are overwhelmingly (more than 95% of Corpus Data C) used for the state leaders, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong II. These include such terms as *chinhi* ‘in person’ (친히), *momso* ‘in person’ (몸소), and *chinsol* ‘to lead a group in person’ (친솔).

(17) Kyengayha-nun swu.lyeng-nim-kkeyse momso 5chalyey-na tanye
Beloved-RL leader-HT-HNM in person 5times-even visit

ka-si-ko witayha-n cangkwun-nim-kkeyse chinhin 3chalyeyyna
go-SH-and great general HT-HNM in person 3 times

chaca cwu-si-n yeki yengkwang-uy iltheey cenlyekcungsan-uy
visit for-SH-RL here glorious-GN workplace increasing of electricity
This glorious workplace where the beloved leader [Kim Il Sung] visited [in person] five times and the great general [Kim Jong Il] came [in person] three times has been demonstrating an unprecedented increase in electric output. (Y-I. Kim & M-N. Ho, 2002; emphasis mine)

The example in (17) shows that momso and chinhi are not required in the discourse, since the term ‘visiting’ already implies ‘in person.’ Such redundancies are practiced pragmatically to amplify the authority and sanctity of the leaders’ activities. In line with this, a special word, *kyelsa.ongwi* (결사옹위), means to desperately protect the state leadership. In accordance with its dictionary definition in (18), the 1,284 instances of this word that I found in Corpus Data C are used solely for the state leaders.

(18)  *kyelsa.ongwi*

Devotedly defending the state leader (*swu.lyeng*) by preparing to die [on his behalf]
(“Kyelsa.ongwi,” ca. 2012)

결사옹위

죽기를 결심하고 한몸바치 수행을 옹호하고 보위하는 것.

This kind of deification is also found in a word related to the body and which is used solely for the state leaders, such as *ankwang* ‘brightness of the eyes’ (안광). While *nwunpich*, ‘the gleam in one’s eyes; one’s expression’ (눈빛) is used for ordinary people, *ankwang* is used exclusively for the state leaders to emphasize their greatness. Although *ankwang* is not limited in its usage to the state leadership in the on-line NK dictionary, Corpus Data C reveals it was used pragmatically only for the state leadership.

In sum, specialized vocabulary for exclusive use in reference to the state leaders are twofold in nature. One concerns unique titles or referents for the state leaders, and the other are ideologically encoded words controlled by the state, such as *hyenci.ci.to* ‘[in-person] on-the-spot...
field guidance.’ This linguistic special treatment is designed to contribute to the fashioning making these leaders as charismatic, even divine, figures who deserve the people’s unwavering loyalty. These special words are expanded into fixed expressions to enhance the honorific effect toward the state leaders and their family members. The following section examines this patterned discourse with fixed expressions.

5.3.3 Fixed expressions

A NK language normative rule states that “In order to express deference to the great leader, honorific modifying words are added when referring to the great leader” (T-S. Kim, 1983, p. 129). In the case of Korean, modifying words are located before the noun they modify. As explained in section 5.3.2, Corpus Data C demonstrates that the leader’s name, ‘Kim Il Sung’ is co-located with swu.lyeng ‘leader’ as its modifier, and ‘Kim Jong Il’ is co-located with lyengto.ca ‘leader’ as its modifier. With both swu.lyeng and lyengto.ca the state leaders have another modifying word, the most frequent being wi.tay.han ‘great’ (위대한), as seen in Table 16, 17.

Table 16. Honorific modifying words when referring to Kim Il Sung.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corpus Data C</th>
<th>Number of e.cel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corpus Data containing the search term, ‘Kim Il Sung’</td>
<td>10,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corpus Data containing the search terms as a phrase, wi.tay.han swu.lyeng Kim Il Sung ‘great leader Kim Il Sung’</td>
<td>3,852 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of e.cel</td>
<td>6,501,372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Corpus C: total sentences: 445,678, total e.cel: 6,501,372
Table 17. Honorific modifying words when referring to Kim Jong Il.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corpus Data C</th>
<th>Number of e.cel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corpus Data containing the search term, ‘Kim Jong Il’</td>
<td>18,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corpus Data containing the search terms, as a phrase, ‘wi.tay.han lyengto.ca Kim Jong Il’</td>
<td>7,560 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of e.cel</td>
<td>6,501,372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Corpus C: total sentences: 445,678, total e.cel: 6,501,372

Although the two words, swu.lyeng and lyengto.ca already carry deferential meaning, NK public discourse adds the modifier wi.tay.han ‘great’ before the two words to further emphasize their reverence for the leaders. In addition, modifiers such as wi.tay.han swu.lyeng ‘great leader’ or wi.tay.han lyengto.ca ‘great leader,’ are often repetitively used in the same text when the leader’s name appears in NK public discourses, as seen below.

Extract 11

Headline: The great leader Comrade Kim Jong Il visited the Kumsusan Memorial Palace to pay tribute to the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung on New Year’s Day.

The great leader Comrade Kim Jong Il, General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and Chairman of National Defense Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, accompanied by senior Party and government officials, visited the Kumsusan Memorial Palace to pay tribute to the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung on New Year’s Day in 2001….

The great leader of our Party and people Comrade Kim Jong Il entered the hall where the standing statue of the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is located. ("Wi.tay.han lyengto.ca,” 2001, p. 1; emphasis mine)
This practice of repeating fixed modifiers in public discourses, such as in the Rodong Sinmun, has been maintained for all three NK state leaders. The current leader, Kim Jong Un, is modified by lyengto.ca ‘leader’ or choy.ko.lyengto.ca ‘supreme leader.’ Before these words, another modifier, kyengayhanun, ‘beloved or respected’ is also at times co-located. As shown in Figure 8 from the NK state-controlled website, Uriminzokkiri ‘Our Nation,’

Figure 8. Fixed modifiers for the NK state leaders.

These honorific modifiers reflect the intention of the state’s language management, which is to enhance and maintain reverence for the leader (Kim Jong Un) as seen in the following article.

Extract 12
Headline: The respected Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un Arrives in Singapore

The respected Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un, Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, arrived in the Republic of Singapore on the afternoon of June 10...
The Chinese plane carrying the respected Supreme Leader arrived at the airport at 3:00 p.m. local time.
The respected Supreme Leader disembarked the plane, exchanged warm greetings with the Singaporean government senior officials who came to greet him, and headed for his lodging quarters. (“The respected supreme leader,” 2018; underlining mine; adapted from the official NK translation)

Korean is a situation-oriented language so that various parts of sentences may be reduced if discursively recoverable. In this context, the modifiers before the leaders could be omitted after their first use in a text, yet those fixed modifiers are not reduced as an act of reverence for each of the leaders at the expense of conciseness.

In terms of fixed expression for the state leaders, there is another norm in NK mass media. As seen in Extract 12, the state-controlled media, both print and oral, usually commence any story related to the NK leader, Kim Jong Un, with the three main socio-political and military positions of that state leader. The positions of the leader of the Party, state, and army of North Korea are positioned at the beginning of articles in NK mass media every day. This practice is also found as a norm related to Kim Jong Il, as follows.

The official funeral of the great leader Comrade Kim Jong Il, General Secretary of the Workers’ Party, Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission,
Supreme Commander the Korean People’s Army, was conducted solemnly on the twenty-eighth in the city of revolution, Pyongyang. (“Wi.tay.han lyengtoca Kim Jong Il tongciwa,” 2011; emphasis mine)

조선로동당 총비서이시며 조선민주주의인민공화국 국방위원회 위원장이시며 조선인민군 최고사령관이신 우리 당과 인민의 위대한 령도자 김정일동지와 영결하는 의식이 28 일 혁명의 수도 평양에서 엄숙히 거행되었다.

This norm of adding lengthy official titles to the state leaders hinders conciseness of mass media discourse, thus demonstrating that in NK, honorification of the state leaders is more important than conciseness, normally a universal feature of media discourse.

This discursive pattern, which is to display exaggerated reverence for the state leaders in mass media, is an aspect of authoritarian and/or dictatorial systems. In the same line, the South Korean media had a similar feature during its own period of dictatorship. The three South Korean presidents, who are known as dictators, have the term that has been used to revere the leadership in North Korea, lyengto.ca ‘leader,’ before their names and titles in a press media as seen below,

(19)

a.President Rhee Syngman

Headline: The meaning of President Rhee’s visiting to Japan

South Korea’s state leader, President Syngman Rhee has won another victory in foreign affairs with Japan by his visiting Tokyo on January 5th. (“Rhee-tay.thonglyeng,” 1953, p. 2; emphasis mine)

제목:방일의 의미

한국의 영도자 이승만대통령은 일월오일 동경을 방문함으로써 일본에 대한 또 하나의 외교적승리를 거두었다.
b. President Park Chung-hee

Headline: Thoughts on New Year’s Day and opening a new chapter in history

…President Park Chung-hee, the leader of our nation, who has established the state’s grand appearance, was elected again as the eighth president. (“Sayyeksauy,” 1973, p. 2; emphasis mine)

제목: 새역사의 장을 여는 연두에 생각한다

… 오늘의 국가위용을 구축한 민족의 영도자 박정희 대통령을 다시 제 8 대 대통령으로 선출했다.

c. President Chun Doo-hwan

Headline: One year of President Chun Doo-hwan, the leader of harmonious and reformative politics (“Hwahap,” 1982, p. 2; emphasis mine)

제목: 화합 개혁정치의 영도자 전두환대통령의 1 년

These overtoned honorific expressions for state leaders in the South were not a fixed discourse to the degree found in the North. However, most major mass media in the South followed this trend and became mouthpieces of the government in the dictatorship era. Especially during the Chun Doo-hwan presidency (1980–1987), journalists who opposed government control of the press were arrested, tortured, and sometimes terminated from their jobs. In May 1980 about one thousand newspaper reporters were terminated for their opposition to government control (J-H. Yi, 2018). According to Kim Hoon, who was a reporter for the Hankook Daily, one of the South’s major dailies, in the early 1980s, stated that he had to write articles “worshipping” Chun Doo-hwan and had to implore an agent of the government’s intelligence agency who censored his work not to torture his fellow journalists who were arrested (cited in K-T. Ko, 2000). In the case of the South, this honorific discourse for the state leaders gradually disappeared
concomitant with the democratization process that commenced from 1987, while the North has only strengthened or maintained honorification for its state leaders in various ways.

The following newspaper articles regarding the 2007 leadership summit between the two Koreas reveal the striking differences in the mass media discourses of the North and South.

(20) a. The first sentence of the South Korean newspaper article:

Headline: Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the [DPRK] National Defense Commission, surprise meeting on President Roh’s arrival

Kim Jong Il kwukpang.wiwencang-i Roh Moo-hyun
Kim Jong Il Chairman of the National Defense Commission-NM Roh Moo-hyun
tay.thonglyeng-ul cikcep macihay-ss-ta
president -AC in person meet -PST-DC

제목: 김정일 국방위원장, 류대통령 ‘깜짝 영접’

김정일 국방위원장이 노무현 대통령을 직접 맞이했다.

Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the [DPRK] National Defense Commission greeted President Roh in person. (C-U. Chong, 2007)
b. The first sentence of the North Korean newspaper article:

Headline: <Inter-Korean summit held> The General Kim Jong Il greeted President Roh

Co.senLotongtang chongpise-i-si-mye
the Workers’ Party General Secretary-be-SH-and

Co.sen.Minewu.cwuuy.inmin.konghwakwukkwukpangwiwenhoy
DPRK National Defense Commission

wiwencang-i-si-n wu.li tang-kwa wu.li
Chairman-be-SH-RL our Party-and our

inmin-uy wi.tay.han lyengto.ca Kim Jong Il tongci-kkeyse-nun
people-GN great leader Kim Jong Il comrade-HNM-TC

2il Pyongyang-ul pangmunha-n Roh Moo-hyun
2 date Pyongyang-AC visit-RL Roh Moo-hyun

tay.thonglyeng-ul maciha-si-yess-ta.
president-AC greet -SH-PST-DC

제목: <북남수뇌상봉> 김정일장군님께서 로무현대통령을 맞이하시였다

조선로동당 총비서이시며 조선민주주의인민공화국 국방위원회위원장이신 우리 당과
우리 인민의 위대한 영도자 김정일동지께서는 2일 평양을 방문한 로무현대통령을
맞이하시었다.
The great leader of the Party and people, Comrade Kim Jong Il, General Secretary of the Workers’ Party, Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission greeted President Roh Moo-hyun who arrived to visit Pyongyang on the 2nd. (“Pwuknam swunoysangpong,” 2007; underlining mine)

The South Korean newspaper article (20a) has no honorific patterns, such as an honorific suffix, a particle or lexical items due to its norm of neutrality stance. It also takes the inverted pyramid style, the main events at the beginning of the story with a concise sentence to save reader’s time and editor’s space, as is norm in most traditional news writing (Brooks, Kennedy, Moen., & Ranly, 2004). However, the first sentence of its NK counterpart (20b) is long, due to the titles (underlined) of the state leader, and the deferential modifiers and fixed expressions for the leader (“great leader”), and honorific suffix and particles (italicized) for the leader. The long titles, deferential modifiers, particle/suffixal patterns of honorifics for the leadership in North Korea are considered essential components of the news story, since according to its language norms in the Juche ideology communists should express deference toward the great leader. Therefore, every NK news story that includes the leader(s) has similar features. In the following section, I further examine the distinctive state leader-centered honorific norms of North Korea compared to the South.

5.3.4 State leader-centered honorific norms

In both Koreas, broadcasting media such as television or radio use addressee honorifics towards their viewers or listeners as a way of indicating the speaker’s regard for the addressee. For instance, in a television news story, the speaker, i.e., a news anchor, uses addressee honorifics toward viewers through predicate suffixes, such as the addressee honorific suffix – sup, and the deferential ender –ni-ta as follows.

뉴스를 시작하겠습니다.

Nyusu-lul sicakha-keyss-sup-ni-ta
News-AC-start-will-AH-IN-DC
I will begin the news.
This is due to the ‘viewer and listener-centered’ honorific norm in the broadcasting media in South Korea (S-J. Kim, 2002). By this norm, the audience member (viewer/listener) is considered a ‘senior,’ so that, in general, and especially in the television and radio news, honorifics are used for the audience but not for others (subject or referent), to include heads of the state. The NK counterpart also follows the ‘viewer and listener-centered’ honorific norm except in regards to state leaders and their family members. Below depicts this difference in two Koreas’ mass media texts.

(21) a. South Korean broadcast media:

Cwungkwuk-ul kwukpin pangmwunha-nun Moon Jae-in
China-AC guest of state visit-RL Moon Jae-in
tay.thonglyeng-i onul Beijing-ey tochakhay-ss-sup-ni-ta
president-NM today Beijing-at arrive -PST- AH-IN-DC

중국을 국빈 방문하는 문재인 대통령이 오늘 베이징에 도착했습니다.
President Moon Jae-in has arrived today at Beijing as a guest of the state. (KBS, 2017)

b. North Korean broadcast media:

Co.senLotongtang wiwencang-i-si-mye
the Workers' Party of Korea chairman be-SH-and

Co.sen.Mincwu.cwuuy.inmin.konghwakwuk kwukmwuwiiwenhoy
DPRK the State Affairs Commission

wiwencang-i-si-n wu.li tang-kwa kwukka, kwuntay-uy
chairman-be-SH-RL our Party-and state, people-GN
The Supreme Leader of the Party, state and army of the DPRK, Comrade Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party and Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK, arrived in Beijing, capital of the People’s Republic of China. (MBCNEWS, 2018a)

Both sentences in (21) have addressee honorification, which is the addressee honorific suffix – sup, and the deferential declarative ender –ni-ta. While the NK sentence has all kinds of subject honorifications for the leader: honorific modifiers choy.ko.lyeng.to.ca, ‘supreme leader,’ honorific address title tongci, ‘comrade,’ subject honorific particle kkeyse (cf, neutral ka/i), and subject honorific suffix –si, its South Korean counterpart has no honorification related to the subject (referent), save for the professional title, tay.thonglyeng ‘President.’ Therefore, North Korea’s conventional social norm of honorification in both print and broadcasting media is a state leader -centered norm, while the South adopts an ‘audience-centered’ norm.

NK language norms have taken honorifics use for state leaders a step further. One complicated form of honorification in the Korean language is the ‘apconpep’ (honorifics-suppressing rule), whereby the speaker does not use honorifics for all people in a sentence based simply on the person’s seniority relative to him/her. Rather, honorifics will be used for the addressee if that person is senior, but not for those who are juniors to the addressee, even if they
are seniors relative to the speaker. For instance, between the two sentences below, the first one is incorrect in terms of traditional honorific expression:

(22) A grandchild to his/her grandfather

a. Halape-nim, ape-nim- kkeyse o-sy-ess-sup-ni-ta  
   Grandfather-HT, father-HT-HNM come-SH-PST-AH-IN-DC

할아버지님, 아버님께서 오셨습니다.
   Grandfather, father has come.

b. Halape-nim, a.pe.ci-ka wa-ss-sup-ni-ta  
   Grandfather-HT, father-NM come-PST-AH-IN-DC

할아버지님, 아버지가 왔습니다.
   Grandfather, father has come.

According to this rule, (22b) is appropriate, since the addressee (the grandfather) is senior to the referent (the father), although both are seniors to the speaker. In the South, the formal language etiquette published by the South Korean government’s language institute, National Institute of Korean Language (2011), states that ‘apconpep’ is a norm within the family but not at work. However, this strict traditional honorific expression is generally not used in reality in South Korea. By contrast, in NK public discourse, relative to the state leaders and their family members, all others are considered juniors, regardless of their ages or any other factors. Therefore, non-honorific expressions for other people, when they are in the same text with the leaders or the leaders’ family members is considered proper. While ‘apconpep’ is an outdated honorific expression in South Korea, it is a socially normative rule in North Korea, as follows.
The highest honorification for the great leader (swu.lyeng) can be expressed by limiting the honorification of others who are subjects in the same discourse with the great leader.

위대한 수령님께서 다른 사람이 이야기에 오를 때 그 사람에 대한 존경 표현을 제한하거나 표현을 낮춤으로써 위대한 수령님께 대한 최대의 높은 존경을 나타낼 수 있다.

e.g.) Wu/li hal.a.pe.ci-ka iyakiha-nunty
e/my/our grandfather-NM talk-and

Kim Il Sung cangkwun-nim-kkeyse-n hangilmwu.cangthwucayng
Kim Il Sung general-HT-HNM-TC Anti-Japanese armed struggle
siki tong-ey penciçek se-ey penciçek
during east-at appearance west-at appearance
ha-sy-ess-ta-te-n-tey-yo.
do-SH-PST-DC-RT-RL-POL

예) 우리 할아버지가 이야기하는데 김일성장군께서 항일무장투쟁시기에 동에 번째 서에 번째 하셨다던데요.

My grandfather said that during the anti-Japanese armed struggle era General Kim Il Sung made frequent appearances here and there. (T-S. Kim, 1983, p. 130; emphasis mine)

This norm has been applied to almost all NK public discourse as shown in (24).

(24)
a. e.me.ni-nun a.pe.ci-chelem nwuweiss-ciman kyengay.ha-nun
   Mother-TC father-like lie-in bed-but respected-RL

cangkwun-nim-kkeyse ponaycwu-si-n theylleypicyon-to.
General-HT-HNM send SH-RL television-even

150
My mother lay ill in bed like my father did, but she watches the television that the respected General (Kim Jong Il) sent her and reads books. (T-U. Chong, 2000; emphasis mine)

b. Headline: Echoing voice of belief in the middle of night

It was in October 1950 during the Korean War.

E.pei.swu.lyeng-nim-kkeyse-nun … maynaph-eysetkwuci-lul
fatherly leader- HT-HNM-TC… front-at cart-AC

kkulko- ka-nun loin-eykey takase-si-mye eti-se
pull and go-RL old person-to approach-SH-and where-from

o-nun talkwuci-i-n-ka-ko mwulu-si-yess-ta.
come-RL cart-be-IN-Q-QT ask-SH-PST-DC

loin-un kwuntay.tongmwu-tul-kwa kathi
old person-TC military friend-PL-with together

Kim Il Sung cangkwun-nim-ul chaca-ka-nun kil-i-la-ko
Kim Il Sung general-HT-AC look for-go-RL way-be-DC-QT
Malssum-tuli-yess-ta.
Talk (Hon)-give(Hon)-PST-DC

제목: 야밤에 올린 신념의 목소리

(1950)년 10월 전시의 어느날 밤이었다.
어버이수령님께서는 … 밤에 달구지를 끌고가는 로인에게 다가서서 어디서 오는 달구지인가고 물으시였다. 로인은 군대등부들과 같이 김일성장군님을 찾아가는 길이라고 말씀드리였다.

It was in October 1950 during the Korean War.
The fatherly leader came to an old man who was pulling a cart and asked where he came from. The old man told the leader that he was on his way to see General Kim Il Sung (without realizing he was talking to General Kim Il Sung). (“Yapamey,” 1998; emphasis mine)

In (24a), the author talks about her mother, who is almost ninety-years old, in an essay. The author did not use any honorification towards her mother but did use honorification for the state leader (Kim Jong Il). Similarly, in (24b), even though the old man was much senior in age relative to Kim Il Sung (Kim was in his 30s in 1950), the honorifics were used only for Kim. The humble/addressee honorific form, malssum-tuli-yess-ta (‘told’), was used for the old man to express deference toward Kim. ‘Apconpep’ for the state leaders is practiced when the state leaders are described with other countries’ presidents, including those of China and Russia, allies of North Korea as in (25). NK public discourses use honorifics only for their own leaders.

(25)

a. Headline: The supreme leader Kim Jong Un held a summit meeting again with Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Kim Jong Un-wenswu-nim-kkeyse cwungkwuk kongsantang
Kim Jong Un-supreme leader-HT-HNM China Communist Party
The respected Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un departed in the presidential plane on the morning of May 7th. …Comrade Xi Jinping came to Dalian to kindly greet Comrade Kim Jong Un. (“Kim Jong Un wenswunimkkeyse,” 2018)

b. Headline: Ground-breaking milestone in North Korea-Russia relations

2000-nyen 7wel lossiya.lyenpang tay.thonglyeng wey.wey.ppwuccin-i
2000-year July Russian Federation President V.V. Putin-NM
wu.li nala-lul pangmwunha-yess-ta.
Our country-AC visit-PST-DC
As seen in (25), in NK mass media, hononification using subject honorific suffix (SH), honorific nominative case particles (HNM), and honorific words such as “respected,” is only applied to the NK state leadership and not to the leaders of any other states. This special treatment for the NK state leadership is expanded to include their family members. For instance, the sentence (26) contains words that are honorified towards Kim Il Sung’s father, such as the subject referent, a.pe.nim (neutral form a.pe.ci, ‘father’), referring to Kim Il Sung’s father, and the honorific particle and suffix as well as honorifics atu.nim (neutral a.tul ‘son’), referring to Kim Il Sung.

(26)

Ape-nim-kkeyse-nun wu.li inmintul-uy hankyel kathun
Father (Hon)-HNM-TC our people-GN same like

maum-ul tam.a atu-nim-kkey sengcwu-la-nun ilum-ul
mind-AC with son (Hon)-to(DRHP) Sengcwu-DC-RL name-AC

ci-e cwu- si-yess-sup-ni--ta.
Make- INF for SH-PST- AH-IN-DC

아버님께서는 우리 인민들의 한결 같은 마음을 담아 아드님께 성주라는 이름을 지어 주시였습니다.
The father (Kim Il Sung’s father) named his son (Kim Il Sung) Sengcwu with our people’s same mind. (“Lesson 1 Mankyengtay Chokacipeyse,” 1999).
This feature of honorification has been applied to other family members of Kim Il Sung, such as his mother, uncles, and wife. In sum, by NK press language norms, state leaders and their family members are subjects of honorification, while the rest of the populace is the subject of neutrality. This may be because, in NK public discourse, the state leaders and their family members are considered as one group that deserves the speaker’s deference, unlike in South Korean language norm.

NK mass media do not pursue neutrality as a virtue or ideal. Rather, linguistic etiquette/norms are used to convey the people’s reverence for the state leaders and their family members. This practice is a clear example demonstrating how language use is deeply influenced by a country’s language policy and ideology. NK language policy and ideology have also influenced its discursive styles, such as discursive structure, in order to inculcate the people in the state ideology. I will examine discursive styles in following section.
CHAPTER 6. DISCURSIVE STYLISTIC PLANNING

There are particular norms—either normative rules or sociocultural conventions—for communicating in certain situations in a given society. Discursive styles differ depending on the purpose and function of the communication, ranging from writing a business email to a news story as a journalist. In North Korea, the fundamental purpose of public discourses, including mass media, is as ideological weapon for socialist revolution. In 1946, in a speech at a meeting of propagandists of various political organizations, Kim Il Sung stated:

The struggle in Korea now is not armed struggle; it is political struggle and propaganda and cultural warfare. We must win this battle…. To explain the concepts of truth and justice to the masses, we have to speak and write only in a language they can understand. (official North Korean translation, 1980b, p. 207–208)

지금 조선에서의 싸움은 무장투쟁이 아니라 정치투쟁이며 선전전, 문화전입니다. 우리는 이 투쟁에서 반드시 승리하여야 합니다…. 우리는 오직 인민이 이해할수 있는 말과 글로 정의와 진리를 대중속에 잘 선전하고 해설하기에 힘써야 합니다. (I. S. Kim, 1979a, p. 233)

In his congratulatory message on the foundation of the newspaper Minju Chosun ‘Democratic Korea’ (민주 조선), the mouthpiece of the Provisional People’s Committee of North Korea, Kim Il Sung said that the most important mission of the newspaper was to become a genuine propagandist, agitator, and organizer in order to educate and inspire the Korean people in the work of nation-building (1980b, p. 230). Therefore, the discursive planning for public discourse in North Korea is for the purpose of interpreting the Party’s political line, policies, and the state leaders’ thoughts in order to educate the people and bring them into conformity with the thinking of the Party and leadership. Further, Kim Jong Il taught that the most important duty of media was to propagandize the Juche idea and the greatness of the leader, Kim Il Sung. In a talk with journalists and officials of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party in 1966, Kim Jong Il presented detailed discourse planning regarding coverage of the state leader’s political activities:

The leader’s diplomatic activities and the political functions attended by him should be reported in such a way to vividly show his preeminent leadership ability, his appealing
character and the warm feelings of reverence engendered for him by our people and the world’s people. Even in the use of an epithet, care should be taken to express intimate feelings and courtesy, and the titles of news stories focusing on him should be given more prominence than other titles so as to ensure his high prestige.

Particularly in newspapers and other publications the photo of the leader should be presented properly. Since the people see the great leader’s noble and benevolent image through his photographs carried in publications, both camera work and editing must be done skillfully and with the utmost care in order to ensure his prestige.

The spot news coverage, articles covering events, and accounts of visits should also analyze successes and experiences and emphasize their being the results of the leader’s wise guidance rather than merely dealing with facts in a cold manner. In this way, all the articles and compilations that are carried in publications will contribute to giving the Party members and working people a deep understanding of the validity of the leader’s lines and policies along with the sagacity of his leadership. (1992, p. 164; official North Korean translation)

NK mass media had practiced some of these norms from the earliest days of the North Korean state, but from the end of the 1960s, they have more systemically and consistently conformed to these norms. This teaching of Kim Jong Il parallels the Revolutionary Swu.lyeng ‘Supreme Leader’ Theory that demands the people display absolute loyalty to the Swu.lyeng. As a result, NK public discourse has particular discursive styles as part of this corpus planning; it includes quoting the state leaders, political slogans and policies of the Party and state leaders (and highly positive interpretation of them), and expressions of gratitude toward the state leaders, the Party, and the state. Among these the most important task of the media is publicizing the great leader’s revolutionary thoughts and activities domestically and internationally, thus the media cover leadership activities as the top news story. One type of such articles covers the leader’s field guidance. Below I lay out the common discursive structure of this type of article.

1. The state leader visits a site such as a farm or factory.
2. The names of the officials who accompanied the state leader on the visit are listed.
3. The workers at the site welcome the state leader.
4. The state leader inspects the work and the people at the site.
5. The state leader provides feedback to the people at the site.
6. The state leader puts forward the tasks to be carried out by the people at the site.
7. The people at the site express their appreciation of the state leader and pledge to achieve their tasks in the field.

This structure above can be applied to any story on the state leader’s field guidance appearing in North Korean public discourse. In this standardized discourse, the state leader is always at the center teaching the people, while the people learn from and follow the leader’s thoughts, as illustrated below.

Headline: Kim Jong Un Visits Farm No. 1116 Run by KPA Unit 810

Pyongyang, September 30 (KCNA) -- Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea and chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK, gave field guidance to Farm No. 1116 under KPA Unit 810.…

He walked round the newly built greenhouse, experimental and cultivated plots, etc. to learn in detail about the work for breeding seeds and their growing. He was pleased to see water-field rice, dry-field rice, kaoliang-maize, black maize, sugar-reed and others growing in the modern greenhouse with full material and technical conditions for breeding seed in all seasons. He stressed the need for the farm to take deep attention to distributing high-yielding varieties of crops throughout the country, to say nothing of the research work.…

Officials and working people of the Farm succeeded in breeding and raising high-yield strains, which are adapted for the physiographic features of Korea with limited arable land, highly resistant to harmful insects and short in growth period with high and stable yield even under the unfavorable weather conditions, to prove the validity and vitality of our Party’s policy for seed improvement that it is vital to farming, he stated, adding that all the units should learn from the experience gained by the farm.
He put forward the important tasks to be carried out by the farm. He was accompanied by Choe Ryong Hae, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the C.C., WPK, vice-chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK… (“Kim Jong Un Visits,” 2017; official North Korean translation)

Another common discursive pattern is using the words and teachings of the state leaders as guidance. NK public discourses use and interpret the leaders’ words in order to educate the people and rationalize the state’s political line. In this discourse style, the state leaders’ words become the absolute single truth for the people to follow. Further, NK authorities highly encourage the learning of the state leaders’ speech or discursive style, mwunphwung (문풍). This norm is termed ‘following Kim Il Sung’s and Kim Jong Il’s speech style.’ The on-line Korean Dictionary (ca. 2012) published in North Korea explains speech/discursive style:

Learning and following the great Swu.lyeng (Kim Il Sung)’s and the respected general (Kim Jong Il)’s popular and revolutionary language style, which is the great model of language style of our time, is the principle way of raising the social function of speaking and writing to meet the demands and orientation of the masses (“Mwunphwung,” ca. 2012)

This norm is known to have its origins in one of Kim Jong Il’s teachings. According to a 1964 article in the Rodong Sinmun ‘Workers’ Newspaper’ (C-C. Hwang, 2016), when Kim Jong Il taught college students about Kim Il Sung’s ideas on developing the Korean language, he said that the people had to follow Kim Il Sung’s writing style, contents, and words. This style is called the great leader’s revolutionary writing style. Kim Jong Il said that the standard of the Korean language is based on the Pyongyang dialect (Cultured Language), and the standard of the Pyongyang dialect is the words of the great leader, Kim Il Sung. Therefore, using Cultured Language properly means using the words of Kim Il Sung.

In parallel with this norm, the Rodong Sinmun, along with other NK public texts, have quoted the aphorisms of the great leaders since the end of the 1960s as a full-scale social norm. I found that since at least 1952 (the oldest edition I could consult) the Rodong Sinmun began to
use bold font and the quotation marks 《 》 whenever it quoted the words of Kim Il Sung, as well as those of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. However, from the end of the 1960s, whenever an aphorism of the great leaders was given it was positioned as a new sentence with its own line to both emphasize the words and make them more noticeable to the reader. The appearance of an aphorism of the great leaders is first signaled by introducing quote,

Comrade Kim Il Sung taught the following. (“Editorial,” 1970, p. 2)

김일성동지께서는 다음과 같이 교사하시였다.

From my searches on this direct-quoting style with such a signaling sentence among the New Year’s editorials of the Rodong Sinmun from the 1960s, I found that this style began to appear in the New Year’s editorials from 1970. This stylistic planning in both the content and structure of print media has been actively practiced since at least 1970 in North Korea. This emergence of this practice also parallels the development of Juche thought, that came to be the prevailing social ideology from the 1970s. For instance, when I surveyed the first two pages of the Rodong Sinmun for every month in 1997, I found about 50 percent of articles (58 out of 120) directly quoted either Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il.

In addition, Kim Jong Il stated that clear, simple, and comprehensible writing for better communication was the model of Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary writing style (C-C. Hwang, 2016). To the modeling of Kim Il Sung’s writing style was later added Kim Jong Il’s writing style. Kim Jong Il’s writing style has common features with his father’s: both use popular language—simple words, including native Korean words, and clear, simple, and persuasive writing. According to a NK scholar, H-C. Chang (2016), Kim Jong Il’s populist tendencies incorporated various writing methods, such as contrasting, figures of speech, and question-and-answer style, in order to deliver his messages persuasively.

In addition to this populism, Kim Jong Il’s speech/writing style emphasized militancy, something related to his signature idea, senkwun.sa.sang ‘military-first ideology.’ Kim Jong Il used many military terms and metaphors, and coined martial expressions, such as senkwun.hyekmyeng ‘military-first revolution’ (선군혁명), chongtay.chelhak ‘military-force-first philosophy’ (총대철학), and chongtay.ka.ceng ‘military family’ (총대가정) (H-C. Chang, 2016).
After all, Kim Jong Il standardized a full range of honorifics for his father Kim Il Sung and named important socio-political concepts after Kim Il Sung. In this context, through the 1990s, Kim Jong Il created proper nouns containing the name of his father: *Kim Il Sung-min.cok* ‘Kim Il Sung Nation’ (김일성민주), *Kim Il Sung-cokwuk* ‘Kim Il Sung Country’ (김일성국주), *Kim Il Sung-henpep* ‘Kim Il Sung Constitution’ ‘NK Constitution’ (김일성헌주), and *Kim Il Sung-cwuuy* ‘Kim Il Sung Ideology’ (김일성주의) (H-C. Chang, 2016). Kim Jong Il’s speech and writing style has prevailed into the Kim Jong Un era.

The characteristics of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s speech/writing style can be summarized as exhibiting loyalty to the state leaders through the use of the leaders’ words and honorifying the leaders, populism, and the militarization of language. Making such styles the norm makes the public discourse one of uniformity in voice with repetitive and cliché-ridden political statements. As a result, it is hard to discern any uniqueness in an author’s voice in North Korean public discourse.

In terms of the content of public discourse in North Korea, linguistic dichotomy—good revolutionaries versus evil reactionaries—has prevailed. Kim Il Sung wrote in 1946 that the media had to be a powerful weapon in crushing all anti-revolutionary and reactionary propaganda, and only by doing so would the media be able to serve as a correct guide in the building of the state (1980c). In line with this, in 1966, Kim Jong Il stated that there was no ideological middle of the road. In his talk with propagandists, Kim Jong Il said that revolutionary forces and reactionaries should be made distinct, and that the media must deliver to the people offensive and hate-filled language regarding “the puppet south Korean clique,” and “US and Japanese imperialists” (1992, p. 168). Therefore, using humiliating and violent language in reference to the enemy is normative in North Korean public discourse, even in children’s books. When this ideological and cultural battle against its enemies is discussed, military terminology is often used, with such metaphors as *chontay* ‘military force’ (총대), *pokem* ‘precious sword’ (보검), *censen* ‘frontline/fighting line’ (전선), *centhuw* ‘battle’ (전투), and *kici* ‘military base’ (기지).

This discursive stylistic planning, intended to ensure the people have the “correct” attitude and thinking toward the state leader and ideology, is a common feature of totalitarian societies. For instance, at the peak of Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong’s aphorisms were printed
in virtually every article that appeared in Party newspapers and journals, and for a while in late 1966 the quotations were even printed in these media articles in big red characters (Fengyuan, 2004, p. 152). When South Korea was governed by authoritarian military governments between the 1960s and 1980s, the state controlled the media for its political ends. One of the measures by which the state-controlled media was through its “reporting guidelines,” issued daily by the government from 1973 to 1987, that ordered media outlets how and what to report (K. Kwak, 2012, p. 16). These reporting guidelines were more pronounced under the Chun Doo-Hwan government in the 1980s. Chun’s government decided not only what could be covered, but also the titles, wording, images, and page layout of newspapers and periodicals. For instance, guidelines stated that President Chun’s visit to a certain museum should be reported “with loyalty [to Chun],” that coverage of President Chun’s activities should be the top news of the day, or that statements made by opposition members should not be reported (“Po.to.ci.chim,” 1986). South Korean journalists were either forced or volunteered to follow these ‘guidelines,’ and all the major media organs functioned essentially as the government’s propaganda tools.

However, the government of South Korea has not issued its “reporting guidelines” since its democratization commenced in 1987. Another difference between the two Koreas is that “reporting guidelines” under South Korea’s authoritarian military government were a hidden tool, since the government did not want to be viewed as a repressive regime. By contrast, the North Korean government has controlled the media explicitly and justified this practice for the sake of its leaders’ ideological goals. Another distinctly different norm in stylistic planning between the two Koreas is North Korea’s use of offensive language against its enemies. This feature is examined in the following section.

6.1 The Language of Vilification: Dehumanizing Counter-Revolutionaries

The notion of bad and good language is an ideological call. Every society has a different sociolinguistic context, so the criteria for bad language will differ between them, although universal values do exist. In terms of universal values, obscene, profane, sexual, discriminatory or violent expressions are generally considered bad language. Constraints on bad language can be instituted explicitly, such as through laws, or implicitly, such as through social conventions or
parental/family guidance. In the United States, many local governments have laws about bad language. For instance, the state of Georgia regulates obscenity as a misdemeanor (Spolsky, 2004). In many societies, including that of South Korea, broadcast media uses a beep sound to mask profanity.

The fundamental belief that underlies this constraint on bad language is that language influences people’s consciousness and behaviors. The very same belief about language and its power manifests itself in a different way in North Korea. One of the distinctive norms of NK language etiquette in public discourse is aversion expressions, including profane or violent language toward its perceived enemies, such as US imperialists, Japanese imperialists, South Korean “puppets,” and reactionaries. The use of these expressions in NK public discourses is considered appropriate and correct as follows.

The important part of language etiquette in insult is using language correctly towards one’s enemies, who are opposed to [our] labors and people. Hating and struggling against enemies—US imperialists, Japanese imperialists, South Korean land owners, subordinated capitalists, and bureaucrat reactionaries—is the instinct of the working class and one of the fundamental demands of our revolutionary development. Therefore, we should raise our spirit of struggle in the stance of the working class that never compromises, hating our enemies and using words of hatred against them, even in daily communication. (T-S. Kim, 1983 p.180)

In accordance with this norm, in NK public discourse, the term ‘imperialism’ has become synonymous with the US.
Table 18. Referent to the US.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent to the US</th>
<th>e.cell</th>
<th>ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mi.kwuk ‘the US’ (미국)</td>
<td>8,341</td>
<td>56.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mi.cey ‘US imperialism’ (미제)</td>
<td>6,367</td>
<td>43.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of the two terms (the US, US imperialism)</td>
<td>14,708</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of the corpus data C</td>
<td>6,501,372</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examining the total 6,501,372 e.cell of Corpus Data C, when the US was referred to, the neutral term mi.kwuk ‘US’ was used 56.71% of the time (8,341 e.cell), while the ideologically charged term mi.cey ‘US imperialism’ was used 43.29% (6,367 e.cell) (Table 18). In other words, about half the time NK public discourse referred to the US, it referred to it as imperialist. Since the foundation of North Korea, “US imperialism” has been viewed in NK discourse as the foremost target among the country’s various enemies. Kim Il Sung stated in 1968:

US imperialism is the Korean people’s sworn enemy which has engaged in aggression against our country for over 100 years, ever since the intrusion of the USS General Sherman. (I. S. Kim, 1985, p. 392; official North Korean translation)

미제국주의는 ‘샤만’호의 침입으로부터 시작하여 오늘에 이르기까지 100여 년동안이나 우리 나라를 침략하여온 조선인민의 철천지원수입니다. (I. S. Kim, 1983, p. 472)

In this context, Kim Il Sung insisted “US imperialism is the most ferocious and shameless aggressor and plunderer of modern times and the principal enemy of all progressive peoples of the world” (I. S. Kim, 1986, p. 273, official North Korean translation). In his words, the term, wensswu ‘enemy’ (원쑤) referring to the imperialistic US, appears in the NK on-line dictionary:

wensswu
a person or group that is the object of one’s irreconcilable grudge due to the severe harm they have done to one.

e.g.) The imperialist US is our bitter enemy who has launched invasions of our country from long ago. (“Wensswu,” ca. 2012)

원쑤
① 모진 해를 거처여 끊수 없는 원한이 면한 사람이나 집단.
The term, wensswu, ‘enemy’ (원쑤), is one of the few words that has changed its spelling since the division of Korea. Prior to separation this word had three main meanings, depending on the Chinese characters. South Korea has kept these three different meanings, as follows.

a. wenswu (元首) 원수
   the head of state [a country]
   <법률> [같은 말] 국가 원수(한 나라에서 오름가는 권력을 지니면서 나라를 다스리는 사람).

b. wenswu (元帥) 원수
   General of the Army
   <군사>장성 계급의 하나. 대장의 위로 가장 높은 계급이다.

c. wenswu (怨讐) 원수
   enemy, foe
   원한이 벗힐 정도로 자기에게 해를 깔친 사람이나 집단. (“Wenswu,” n.d.)

Without knowing the associated Chinese characters, this term can mean a state leader or an enemy, and thus can cause confusion. I have not been able to determine the reason North Korea changed the spelling of this word, but it seems they did so to distinguish the homonyms of the term without having to use Chinese characters. The Chinese characters for this term in the online NK dictionary are not revealed, whereas other Sino-Korean words are shown with their Chinese characters to show etymology. So this term, wensswu, ‘enemy’ (원쑤) is used as if it is a native Korean word. North Korea has rarely changed spelling of homonyms to distinguish them, but this term is too important to be confused since it can mean both a state leader and an enemy.

While honorifying the state leaders of North Korea, the subjects of wensswu, ‘enemy’ (원쑤) to North Korea are described with invectives in public discourse. There are mainly three
external enemies to North Korea—US imperialism, Japanese imperialism, and the Southern puppet government/puppets, as described below.

We have come to the frontlines of a do-or-die battle with the imperialist-US enemy, the imperialist-Japan enemy, and [the Southern-government] puppet enemy, loading guns for the vengeance of Juche Korea, with its fists of limitless, striking might and self-regeneration. (M-I. Tong, 1998)

Among these, when North Korean public discourse talks about “wenßwu,” it primarily refers to the US, according to Corpus Data C. This is followed by Japanese imperialists and the Southern puppet government as seen in Table 19.

Table 19. E.cel frequency list in concordance lines with the search term “enemy” (wenßwu).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent term</th>
<th>frequency (within 15 e.cel on either side)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US imperialists or Americans</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese imperialists or Japanese people</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern puppet government or puppets</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total e.cel with the term wenßwu</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,953</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The terms, ‘Americans’ or ‘US imperialists’ are also associated with a number of rhetorical expressions, such as chelchengi.wenßwu ‘deadly enemy’ (철천지원수) and min.cok-uy wenßwu ‘enemy of our people’ (민족의 원수). Further, the US is often referred to by a derogatory animal term, mi.cey.sungnyanginom.tul, the ‘US imperialist wild dog bastards’ (미제승냥이놈들) as follows:

If US imperialists invade even a fraction of a millimeter of our holy fatherland, the Youth League that has raised its fighting spirit and courage will not miss the opportunity to wipe the US imperialist wild dog bastards forever from the Earth under the leadership of the three generals of Mount Paektu.’ (“Mi.ceyuy,” 1998)
만일 미제가 신성한 우리 조국강토를 0.001미리메터라도 건드린다면 백두산 3대장군의 슬하에서 원추격멸의 투지와 용맹을 키워온 청년동맹은 기회를 놓치지 않고 미제승냥이놈들을 이 지구상에서 영영 쏙어버리고야말것이다.

As illustrated above, all the words collocated with wensswu, ‘enemy’ are violent invectives used as weapons in an ideological struggle fight.

Similar public language use of invective is found in other totalitarian societies. During the Sandinistas’ socialist revolutionary regime in the 1980s in Nicaragua, the term ‘imperialism’ was routinely used in reference to the US, and derogatory terms for Americans were used in public discourse (Lipski, 1997). In the case of China, during the Cultural Revolution invective was used in public discourse to label certain people as class enemies (Fengyuan, 2004). This phenomenon was empowered by the totalitarian authority to achieve their political goals as part of a large revolutionary struggle. Similarly, in North Korea the norm of invective use towards its enemies has been practiced very systemically and consistently, and taught to all age groups, even as young as preschoolers, since the establishment of the North Korean state. In 1945, immediately following liberation from Japan, in a talk to workers in the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party, Kim Il Sung called the US military government in the South an imperialist army and part of the reactionary elements the people had to fight against. In contrast, Kim Il Sung referred to the Soviet Red Army then occupying the North as a heroic force that had helped liberate Korea (I. S. Kim, 1980a).

This norm in NK public discourse of using vituperative toward its perceived enemies has been promulgated and inculcated through school education, mass media, and books which deliver the state leaders’ words. A NK scholar, K-J. Kang (1991) described the educational norm in North Korea, even for kindergarteners, since the end of the 1960s: loyalty to the great leader (Kim Il Sung), the people, and the fatherland, and hatred for the enemy. As per this norm, in North Korea anti-Americanism indoctrination begins as early as kindergarten (“How North Korean,” 2012). North Korea’s second-grade math textbook published in 2003 demonstrates this norm.

During the Fatherland Liberation War [North Korea’s official name for the Korean War] the brave uncles of the Korean People’s Army killed 265 American Imperialist bastards in the first battle. In the second battle they killed 70 more bastards than they had in the
first battle. How many bastards did they kill in the second battle? How many bastards did they kill all together? (as cited in Lankov, 2013 p.63)

This violent language develops further into violent behavior by the fourth-grade textbook, the Great Leader Kim Jong Il’s Childhood (2002). In this work, the ‘US imperialist wild dog bastards’ are the targets of shooting practice, and children are told to bear hatred toward their target (“The Great Leader Kim Jong Il’s Childhood,” 2002).

While hateful expressions are taught in school, mass media maintain this practice on a daily basis in North Korea. In North Korea mass media, Park Geun-hye, the former president of South Korea, was not addressed as president while she was in office, but by various profane words. For instance, during her presidency, articles in the Rodong Sinmun referred to her as yekto ‘traitor’ (역도), paykchi ‘idiot’ (백치), mwu.ci.mwu.nunga ‘ignoramus’ (무지무능아), nwunttun so.kyeng ‘blind fool’ (눈뜬 쓴경), ma.nye ‘witch’ (마녀), and sa.tay.may.kwuk.no ‘sycophant and traitor’ (사대매국노). Such derogatory expressions become even heavier when the target is an internal enemy, such as Jang Song Taek, the husband of Kim Jong Il’s sister, Kim Kyong Hui. Jang was believed to be one of the most powerful figures in North Korea by many North Korean specialists, but he was executed in 2013 after being convicted for treason. In the Rodong Sinmun, Jang was described as kay.manto mos.han chwu.ak.han in.kan.ssu.ley.ki ‘disgusting human trash’ (개만도 못한 추악한 인간쓰레기) and was continuously referred to nom ‘a bastard’ (놈) (“Rodong Sinmun,” 2013).

These violent expressions are considered inappropriate and banned in South Korean public discourse both by law and social convention. For instance, South Korean government regulations that profanity generally should not be used in broadcasting (Korea Communications Commission, 2017). However, according to some NK defectors, while they lived in North Korea they considered these expressions and their use appropriate and felt satisfied when they listened to profanity regarding North Korea’s enemies. One NK defector mentioned that she did not realize such words were profane, because she had heard them from her childhood (Channel A, 2014). These experiences of NK defectors demonstrate how language influences people’s consciousness and behavior to some degree. On the other hand, NK defectors have also revealed that language cannot completely control a person’s thinking; after all, they had opted to live in the society of their ‘enemy.’
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

North Korean language planning/management and policy offer an interesting case study in the field of language policy considering the fact that NK’s unique sociolinguistic practices have been generally successful, at least in the public discourse, while similar experiments in other societies have ultimately failed. The case of North Korea suggests that when language management and policy are driven strongly by a long-term ruling political power that enjoys ultimate authority in the design and implementation of that language policy, success is more likely to occur. The fact that the two Koreas have been a relatively monolingual society (though Korean language has linguistic variations) is another important factor in the success of NK’s language policy, such as its status planning. However, the role of political power in the success of NK language policy becomes clearer when compared to the results of similar language policies, i.e., that of linguistic purism introduced in South Korea post-1945. Political authority in North Korea, which interprets language as an ideological “weapon,” has remained the same since that state’s foundation, unlike South Korea, which has had various and changing political voices on the same subject. Moreover, since its inception from the foundation of the North Korean state, NK language planning policy has been touted as the “teaching” of the charismatic “Great Supreme Leader Kim Il Sung.” This language policy has developed and thrived in conjunction with Kim Il Sung’s signature ideology, Juche.

In the process of the creation of the North Korean nation-state, North Korea’s official ideology and language policy, bound up with a popular ethno-nationalism, have been generally well accepted by language users in that society. North Korea’s ideology accords with the transformation of that society from a Japanese colony to a socialist system imbued with strong nationalism, so that there were sufficient impetuses for its language users to accept the state’s language policy in order to be, or appear to be, patriotic socialists. After the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, the country’s language planning policies have been carried out consistently and systematically by his political successors with the same ideological motivations.

How has ideology affected North Korea’s language policy and language practices in NK public discourse? First, let me discuss a clearly successful NK language policy that was driven by ideology. This is the hankul (vernacular Korean script)-only use policy that banned the use of Chinese characters in writing from the 1950s. This policy was instituted by Kim Il Sung as he
sought success in the socialist revolution in the infant North Korea and reflects his idea of making the Korean language as accessible as possible to the populace at large. This policy enjoyed remarkable success relative to the same policy of the South Korean government, which since 1948 has vacillated between the exclusive use of *hankul* and the permission to use of Chinese characters as a result of various contending views regarding this policy by South Korean scholars and political leaders. This is also a good example of the critical role long-term political power plays in the success of a state’s language planning and policy.

Second, as J-B. Lee (2014) insists, it is hard to find a case comparable in terms of scale, longevity (it has lasted for some 70 years), and uniformity to NK’s language purification efforts in the history of linguistic purification movements throughout the world. There are three main reasons for the success in NK’s linguistic movement. First, the North’s ideology of linguistic purism, which is linked with its *Juche* ideology, is inculcated continuously from a very early age in its national education system. The second factor is the NK’s state-controlled media. The NK mass media has played a critical role in terms of appropriating the official language policy as a model for communication and propagating its essential ideological features, such as one nation-one language, and “correct” language use as befitting a socialist society. Lastly, there is the practicality principle. That is, the selection of “purified” or “refined” words with the input of language users and linguistic experts to determine the usability of such words in praxis, a people-centered (*sa.lam cwungsim*) approach that is at the core of *Juche* philosophy.

From this practicality principle, North Korean authority has allowed the limited use of loan words, if the word in question is used internationally and using the refined version causes too much inconvenience to the language user (C-S. Pak, 1999/2000). This implies that the political authority in North Korea could not completely control language use by the public. Even NK state-run media reveal that NK people do use loan words, despite the existence of nativized versions, contrary to the country’s official language purification policy. For instance, an article in the NK weekly newspaper, *Tongil Sinbo* ‘Unification Newspaper’ (통일신보) quotes a restaurant worker in Pyongyang using the word *haympe.ke* ‘hamburger,’ a loan word (“Suppa.keytti,” 2015). This word has a correspondent nativized Korean word, *ko.ki.kyepppang* (고기겹빵). In fact, of these two words, only *ko.ki.kyepppang* is found in the North Korean on-line dictionary as of January 2018 (“Ko.ki.kyepppang,” ca. 2012). This article demonstrates that at least some NK
people used the loan word instead of its nativized Korean equivalent. When North Korea’s state-run television covered Kim Jong Un’s visit to the cafeteria of Kaeson Youth Park, an amusement park in Pyongyang (Image 1), the restaurant menu included this English loan word, *haympe.ke* ‘hamburger,’ as shown in Image 2.

![Image 1](image1.jpg)

*Image 1. Kim Jong Un’s visit to the cafeteria of Kaeson Youth Park, an amusement park in Pyongyang (“Restaurant menu,” 2018)*
These demonstrate that when the NK public opts for a loan word instead of its nativized Korean equivalent, North Korean authority accommodates the choice, at least in some cases.

Nonetheless, North Korea uses far fewer loan words compared to its sister polity, South Korea. According to a survey aimed targeting NK defectors who settled in South Korea, 89.5 percent of NK defectors answered that one of the greatest difficulties they faced in adjusting to life in South Korea was the many unknown loan words they encountered in the South (C. Yi, K. Kim, & H. Kim, 2011). Much media coverage in South Korea has spoken of the NK defector belief that South Koreans use too many loan words, especially English ones. However, the degree of loan word use in the two Koreas stems not only from their respective degrees of language policy consistency and enforcement, but also the degree of isolation or openness of the two societies. Whatever the primary factor, even those NK defectors opposed to the North Korean regime said that at least NK used “our pure language” and criticized the perceived reality that “all words used in South Korea were loan words, whose origins were not even clear” (S-H. Kim, 2006, p. 53). This notion is the very message North Korea’s state-run media has
promulgated. In other words, this demonstrates that North Korean language users have deeply internalized the NK state’s ideology of linguistic purism, even if they oppose the politics of that state.

Besides linguistic purism, North Korea’s public discourse, in general, follows the guidelines of North Korea’s language norms, including linguistic etiquette and stylistic planning as part of its corpus planning. One of the major language norms in North Korea is modeling the state leaders’ language styles. This includes using special terms for the state leaders that are predefined by political authorities, such as e.pe.i.swu.lyeng ‘fatherly leader’ (어버이수령).

Quoting the leader(s), using political slogans of the leadership and the Party, and linguistic dichotomy—socialism good/those against socialism bad—types of discourse are also part of this stylistic planning. Both in content and discourse style, since the development of Juche ideology in the 1970s the fundamental norm of language use in North Korea is the expression loyalty and reverence for the state leaders, who are identified with the Party and the people. This norm has been well developed and manifested in North Korean public discourse, since the Korean language is by nature a systemic honorific language. This language norm has led to the excessive use of honorifics for the state leaders. This norm has also resulted in lengthy and redundant discourse patterns due to the need to “properly” address and revere the state leadership with words, such as “great,” or “respected,” and to add honorific suffixes and particles to the names of those leaders.

In addition, repetitions of the state leaders’ teachings, utterances, and political slogans makes the discourse even lengthier. This lengthy discourse style runs counter to the principle of economy, seen in such things as the speaker’s tendency to reduce redundancy or strive for conciseness. Interestingly, this phenomenon seems to contradict a major language principle of Kim Il Sung based on linguistic populism, and which forms part of corpus planning, i.e., employing a clear and easy style to allow language users to efficiently comprehend texts. In other words, the formalistic reverence toward the supreme leaders in North Korea’s discourse planning trumps all of its other language norms, such as popularism.

Further, the standard types of public discourse in NK’s stylistic planning create discourses that are ready-made, cliché-ridden political statements. For instance, media stories of the state leader’s field guidance almost always run as follows without much variation: the great
leader visits a site, the workers welcome him enthusiastically, the great leader provides teaching or guidance at the site, the workers show appreciation for the leader and resolve to be more productive. Most stories in the public discourse in North Korea have one core voice—the greatness of the national socialist state and the evilness of capitalist societies. Under the NK state’s control of language use, this stylistic planning has resulted in the creation of a single style of text: The Supreme Leader’s style, which is the same as the Party’s. Therefore, in NK discourse it is exceedingly difficult to find a text imprinted with the author’s unique style or voice.

In terms of the characteristics of the LPP of North Korea, most North Korean language policies share features with those of other authoritarian societies: prescribed and ritualized ideological speech, panegyrics to the Supreme Leader(s), use managed language, and linguistic dichotomy—good for “us” and evil for “them” (Skovajsa, 2011). Among these, using excessive honorifics towards the state leaders is also a result of the core teaching of Juche ideology, a supreme leader-centered politics. In contrast, linguistic dichotomy drives the linguistic vilification of perceived enemies. North Korea’s constant battle against its enemies has also resulted in the excessive use of militaristic language (Young, 1991). These language practices are based on the language ideology—language influences thought and behavior, and the state leaders’ intent to control people’s thoughts and behaviors through prescriptions on language use. The question then is, to what degree does language use that follows official NK linguistic norms actually influence the thinking of the language user.

Since it is impossible for me to survey North Koreans in their own society, I reviewed surveys of NK defectors. In one of these studies published in 2017 but based on surveys conducted annually from 2011 to 2017 of NK defectors recently arrived in the South, the respondents answered that they thought more than 50 percent of North Korean residents took pride in Juche ideology (B-H. Suh, 2017). In the same study, NK defectors answered that at the time they still lived in North Korea (so for the years between 2013 and 2017, depending on the defector) they estimated North Koreans’ approval rate for their leader, Kim Jong Un, exceeded 58 percent. Many factors may have contributed to the results of these surveys. However, they can be interpreted to mean that prolonged exposure to state-controlled public discourse informed by NK language norms and ideology resulted in NK language users adopting or internalizing the
state ideology, including reverence for the state leader, either consciously or subconsciously. NK state ideology is reflected in such aspects of language use as using honorifics for the state leaders. In turn, this language use may reinforce the tenets of state ideology in the minds and psyches of the people. Some may argue that every society faces to some degree the problem of the group in power managing language for its own politico-economic ends, especially in political discourses. However, a democratic society has freedom of speech, so that various voices contend, while North Korea has no such a thing.

To what degree do the two Korean languages differ due to their variant language policies? One survey (I-C. Mun, 2017) conducted in South Korea mentioned that NK defectors and South Koreans ranked language use as the second greatest area of divergence between the two Koreas, after electoral systems. This study insists that difference in the two Korean languages in terms of language use and style reflect those two state’s different politico-economic systems and cultures, to include their respective ideologies, rather than being differences in linguistic features, as many Korean linguists have argued. In other words, the two Korean languages are not much different in terms of their underlying grammatical structures or semantics. Their differences are found largely in their respective vocabularies, especially in technical or political terms, and in regional pronunciation and variations, differences that generally do not hinder their mutual intelligibility.

The mutual intelligibility of the two Korean languages has been demonstrated through the many North-South interactions, such as the historic summit meeting on April 27, 2018 in the Southern part of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). When the leaders of North and South Korea met, there were no barriers to their communication. When some parts of the meeting were broadcast live to the world, many listeners, myself included, re-affirmed that the two Koreas share the same language, and any linguistic differences were but minor variations. Many senior officials and athletes from North Korea participated in the 2018 Winter Olympics held in South Korea, and the numerous oral interviews South Korean media conducted with those North Koreans were largely intelligible to South Koreans. Therefore, more than seven decades after the 1945 division, the two Koreas still share a common language.

What is the future of the North Korean language, such as it is? If North Korea undergoes socio-cultural change, its language norms will change accordingly, as seen in the legacies of
totalitarian languages in other parts of the world, such as the Soviet Bloc or China, in the post-totalitarian era (Andrews, 2011). If that socio-cultural change is the unification of the two Koreas, this change would likely lead to linguistic convergence in some ways, as seen in the cases of Germany and Vietnam (Clyne, 1997b). It is my hope that the two Koreas will choose the path of embracing diversity and the multiple valid norms of the Korean language, including its now Southern and Northern varieties.

By examining North Korean language ideologies related to language policies from the sociolinguistic perspective, it is also my hope that this study will contribute to our understanding of North Korean language use, such as the preference for nativized Korean words, to better prepare for the peaceful future of the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, I expect this study will enhance our understanding of language use by North Korean defectors, thus assisting such things as language education programs meant to assist NK defectors adjust to life in South Korea. A critical awareness of language use in North Korea, and the influence thereof of NK language policies and ideologies, is essential for a better understanding of the challenges faced by NK defectors, since some of the difficulties these defectors face in adjusting to life in South Korea derive from the autonomous language policies and variant language ideologies of the two Koreas. I also hope this study will advance the education of communication skills of those who might have contact with North Koreans (whether government officials, aid workers, or everyday citizens). Lastly, through discourse analysis, I hope to contribute to the language planning and policy field by shedding light on the ideological/political motivations behind North Korea’s language planning policies, and the consequential characteristics of the North Korean public discourse in the social context.


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