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Consciousness and Intentionality in Anton Marty’s Lecture on Descriptive Psychology

Abstract: In this study, I propose to examine Marty’s reconstruction of the general framework in which Brentano develops his theory of consciousness. My starting point is the formulation, at the very beginning of the second chapter of the second book of Brentano’s Psychology, of two theses on mental phenomena, which constitute the basis of Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary objects. In the second part, I examine the objection of infinite regress raised against Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary objects and Marty’s interpretation of Brentano’s theory of the unity of consciousness. The third part bears on the important distinction between implicit and explicit consciousness, which Brentano introduces in his lectures on descriptive psychology. Here, I analyse Marty’s principle of individuation in light of the modifications which Brentano made to his theory of consciousness after the publication of his Psychology in 1874. The last section is an examination of Marty’s conception of consciousness as self-consciousness with respect to his principle of individuation.

1 Introduction

Consciousness presently attracts a great deal of interest in Brentanian studies.¹ Anton Marty’s lecture on descriptive psychology, published recently, contributes in an original way to these discussions on consciousness and more generally to Brentano’s philosophical program.² For, as Antonelli points out in the substantial introduction to his edition of Marty’s lecture, this work can be considered a ‘systematic summary’ of Brentano’s psychology which takes into consideration the evolution of Brentano’s thought from his 1874 Psychology to a series of lectures on descriptive psychology that he held in the late 1880s. In this study, I propose to examine Marty’s reconstruction of the general framework in which Brentano develops his theory of consciousness. The originality of Marty’s reconstruction lies

¹ See Fisette and Fréchette (2013, section I); Leclerc and Silva (eds.) (2015); Fisette (2015a, b).
² A. Marty’s book Deskriptive Psychologie contains the edition by M. Antonelli and J. C. Marek of his lecture on descriptive psychology held in Prague in the winter semester of 1894–1895. I will also use another version of Marty’s lecture on descriptive psychology, the so-called Chitz-Mitschrift, which Marty held in Prague in 1904.

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among other things in the importance he attaches to the notion of self-consciousness with respect to several questions still pending in the early writings of Brentano’s Vienna period, and more specifically in his 1874 Psychology. One of the important questions left open in the Psychology is the question of the individuation of mental states, which Marty emphasizes in his lecture. Marty claims that the individuation moment is the soul, the self, or what he also calls the mental substance. Marty draws several consequences from this principle that bear on Brentano’s initial definition of mental states as conscious states, namely that internal consciousness must be considered self-awareness.

My main contribution to this collective work on Marty consists in analysing several aspects of Marty’s reconstruction of Brentano’s theory of consciousness. My starting point is the formulation, at the very beginning of the second chapter of the second book of Brentano’s Psychology, of two theses on mental phenomena, which constitute the basis of Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary objects. In the second part, I examine the objection of infinite regress raised against Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary objects and Marty’s interpretation of Brentano’s theory of the unity of consciousness. The third part bears on the important distinction between implicit and explicit consciousness, which Brentano introduces in his lectures on descriptive psychology. In the third part I analyse Marty’s principle of individuation in light of the modifications which Brentano made to his theory of consciousness after the publication of his Psychology in 1874. The last section is an examination of Marty’s conception of consciousness as self-consciousness in relation to the principle of individuation.

2 Two theses on mental states

In his lecture on descriptive psychology, Marty examines two theses explicitly formulated by Brentano at the beginning of the second chapter of Book II of his Psychology (§2):

1. Every mental phenomenon is (a) consciousness.
2. Every mental phenomenon is conscious.

In the first thesis the term consciousness is used in its transitive sense, i.e. as consciousness of something, such that it therefore stands for intentional consciousness. In Marty’s own words: ‘It is characteristic of every mental process, that it is a consciousness, i.e. that it has a relation to an immanent object’ (2011: 11). Like most students of Brentano, in his lecture Marty advocates an ontological interpretation of intentionality, according to which intentionality
stands for a particular class of relations whose characteristic feature is that one of their terms is an immanent object that exists intentionally in an act.

This intentional relation has the characteristic that it is a real relation of which only one terminus is real, the other one is not real. For one of the terms, we have no other name than just judgment, love and hate, or, in the most general expression, consciousness, self, and I. The other terminus is the object, the recognized, the loved, etc. But this second term is not real, because what is meant by that is not the real but merely the intentional object which inhabits in me, and what is represented, loved, and judged as such is not even real. (Marty 2011: 166)

Marty’s main argument in support of his interpretation is based on cases like misperceptions, where the perceived object is a mere intentional object. Hence the essential characteristic of psychical phenomena, to wit, that they always have an immanent object that inhabits the act and of which it is the content (Marty 2011: 166, 16).

The second thesis constitutes the basis of Brentano’s theory of consciousness, which he develops in the second book of his Psychology. There he claims that every mental phenomenon has the property of being conscious. Accordingly, Brentano’s main question in the second book is what it is for a mental state to be conscious. One of his responses in the Psychology is that every mental phenomenon is an object of consciousness, i.e., in the hearing of a sound, for example, the mental phenomenon of hearing a sound is about the sound, whereas the act of hearing is itself an object of consciousness. This interpretation is consistent with Marty’s reformulation, at the beginning of his lecture, of the second thesis:

Every mental act is a consciousness. Manifestly, however, it also happens that the mental act itself is in turn the object of a consciousness. […] For example, I hear a sound, which is an awareness of a sound. But I am also aware that I hear a sound, and the consciousness of the sound is itself the object of a consciousness, and indeed of internal consciousness. (Marty 2011: 11)

In light of Marty’s own formulation, Brentano’s two theses can be reformulated in the following way:

1b. It is characteristic of every mental process that it is a consciousness, i.e. that it has a relation to an immanent object;
2b. The mental act itself is in turn the object of a consciousness.
Marty’s theses fit well with Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary objects, by means of which he articulates his two first theses on consciousness.¹ But his own formulation also raises several issues related to his interpretation of the two main concepts involved in the two theses, i.e. intentionality and consciousness. The first issue pertains to Marty’s ontological interpretation of Brentano’s first thesis on the intentional character of mental states, an interpretation which is actually the object of a lively controversy on Brentano’s conception of intentionality.⁴ Nevertheless, I shall take Marty’s ontological interpretation of intentionality for granted and focus on his understanding of the second thesis on consciousness, which presents difficulties of its own.

There are several ways of understanding Brentano’s second thesis on consciousness. The first consists in conceiving of consciousness as internal perception and the latter as a judgment, i.e., as an immediately evident cognition of the primary object. This emphasis on the epistemic function of internal perception amounts to reducing consciousness to a kind of cognition. But as Marty explains at length in §§ 6–10 of the first chapter of his 1894–1895 lectures, this option faces many difficulties, namely the fact that judgment is just one of the modes by which inner consciousness relates to its objects. Marty’s main argument against the identification of internal consciousness to judgment is based on the important distinction, introduced by Brentano in his Vienna lecture on descriptive psychology, between implicit and explicit consciousness, which I will examine further below. In a nutshell, Marty claims that internal consciousness, understood as a secondary relation of a mental state to itself, is a noticing (Be-

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¹ According to Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary objects, every mental phenomenon refers at the same time to a primary object (a sound that is heard) and to itself as a ‘secondary object’ (the hearing of the sound), i.e. the presentation of the primary object is always accompanied by a consciousness of itself: ‘In the same mental phenomenon in which the sound is present to our minds we simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon itself. What is more, we apprehend it in accordance with its dual nature insofar as it has the sound as content within it, and insofar as it has itself as content at the same time. We can say that the sound is the primary object of the act of hearing, and that the act of hearing itself is the secondary object.’ (Brentano 1973: 126).

⁴ As Mauro Antonelli points out in his introduction to Marty’s lecture, this ontological interpretation of intentionality does not go without saying. He argues that Marty’s ontological interpretation of intentionality is highly problematical due to his ‘Gleichsetzung des intentionalen Objektes bzw. Gegenstandes eines psychischen Aktes mit dessen intentionalem Korrelat. Denn ein solcher Objektbegriff entspricht in keiner Weise demjenigen Brentanos, der sich den klassischen, im Mittelalter gebräuchlichen und letztlich auf Aristoteles zurückgehenden Begriff des Gegenstandes zu Eigen gemacht hat’ (Antonelli 2011, XXXIII). On the current debates in the interpretation of Brentano’s theory of intentionality, see Cesalli and Taieb (2013), and especially Fréchette (2015, 2013) for a good discussion of the ins and outs of these debates.
merken) (Brentano 1995: 36–37), i.e., ‘an explicit recognition of what is given or included in perception’ (Marty 1950: 92; see Marty 2011: 13) However, we shall see that noticing understood as an explicit consciousness presupposes primary or implicit consciousness.

Another way of understanding the idea that the representation of a primary object is always accompanied by a consciousness of itself is in terms of self-representation: a mental state has a self-representational structure in virtue of which it represents its own occurrence (see Kriegel 2003). According to a self-representational theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious in virtue of self-representing, i.e., in virtue of its self-referential structure (self-directed intentionality). But we shall see that Marty’s notion of self-consciousness is slightly different from such a reductive analysis of consciousness insofar as self-consciousness is understood quite literally and involves the participation of the soul understood as a mental substance.

An alternative to self-representationalism is based on the notion of a mode of consciousness, which refers to one’s stance, attitude, or perspective towards an object or, more precisely, to the modes by which an object can be present to the mind.⁵ According to Marty, the intentional relation has different modes depending on one’s attitude (Stellungsnahme) towards the object, and these stances are considered the modes through which the mental agent relates to its objects. There are three general modes by which consciousness stands in relation with its objects: presentational, judgemental, and emotional. The mode of relation to the object that includes a presentation alone is the poorest and consists merely in the fact that the object is present to consciousness. The other two modes presuppose the active stance of consciousness with regard to its objects and are characterized by the opposition between recognition and rejection in the case of judgement, and by love and hate in the case of emotions. However, the class of presentations is not only the simplest, it is also ontologically independent from the class of judgments, while the classes of judgments and emotions one-sidedly (einseitig) depend on the class of presentations. It follows that consciousness has more extension than internal perception (in its epistemic function), as it applies equally to all classes of mental states, including that of presentations.

Now, there are at least two ways of understanding what Brentano and Marty mean by mode of consciousness. There is a psychological sense, which stands

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⁵ It is worth mentioning that this notion of ‘mode’, or what John Searle calls ‘aspectual shape’, has a central function in Tim Crane’s theory of intentionality, which is itself inspired by Brentano’s psychology (see Crane 1998).
out clearly from Brentano's use of this concept in the context of his classification of acts. In the psychological sense, the notion of a mode corresponds to the quality of an act on which Brentano's classification is based and the ways in which consciousness is related to its objects. On the other hand, in the ontological sense, this notion stands for the attributes or moments of a substrate and it corresponds to what Brentano in his metaphysics calls a 'metaphysical part'. In his *Psychology*, Brentano uses the notion of *Divisiv*, by which, as we shall see, he characterises mental phenomena as parts or attributes of a complex and unitary phenomenon.

2 The objection of infinite regress and the unity of consciousness

In Book II of *Psychology*, Brentano examines several objections raised against his theory of primary and secondary objects, particularly what has been known since Aristotle as the threat of infinite regress. This objection is discussed by Brentano in connection with the hypothesis of unconscious mental states and the duplication problem, i.e., the idea that in any mental state a physical phenomenon would have to be represented twice (once in the representation of the sound and once again in the hearing of the sound, i.e., the representation of the representation of the sound). The threat of infinite regress is in fact the fourth objection Brentano addresses in §7 of the second book of his *Psychology* (p. 93 sq.). For if one denies that the presentation that accompanies the hearing of a sound is unconscious, as most higher-order theories of consciousness maintain, it would seem that one must therefore necessarily postulate an infinite number of mental states. Brentano's answer consists in denying one of the premises shared by both objections, namely that the consciousness that accompanies the representation of the sound is numerically distinct from such a presentation. Thus, Brentano attempts to demonstrate that they both belong to one and the same mental act, i.e., the presentation of the sound and the presentation of the presentation of the sound are one and the same act about two objects, a primary and a secondary object. Marty claims that there is in fact no regression because the series comes to an end with the second term (Marty 2011: 30).

Brentano's response to the infinite regress objection and moreover his theory of primary and secondary objects raise what I shall call the complexity problem. This is clearly visible in the following quote:

Every mental act is conscious; it includes within it a consciousness of itself. Therefore, every mental act, no matter how simple, has a double object, a primary and a secondary
object. The simplest act, for example the act of hearing, has as its primary object the sound, and for its secondary object, itself, the mental phenomenon in which the sound is heard. Consciousness of this secondary object is threefold: it involves a presentation of it, a cognition of it and a feeling toward it. Consequently, every mental act, even the simplest has four different aspects under which it may be considered. It may be considered as a presentation of its primary object, as when the act in which we perceive a sound is considered as an act of hearing; however, it may also be considered as a presentation of itself, as a cognition of itself, and as a feeling toward itself. In addition, in these four respects combined, it is the object of its self-presentation, of its self-cognition, and (so to speak) of its self-feeling. (Brentano 1973: 119)

To address the problem of complexity, Brentano makes recourse to the principle of the unity of consciousness, which Marty examines in §15 of his 1894 – 1895 lectures. This principle is first invoked by Brentano as a criterion in his classification of mental and physical phenomena, in order to explain why multiple mental phenomena that are involved in the simplest mental acts appear to consciousness not as an aggregate or a bundle, but rather as a unified reality. It is in this context that Brentano refers to his theory of wholes and parts, in which mental phenomena are conceived as ‘parts (Teilphänomene) of one single phenomenon in which they are contained, as one single and unified thing’ (Brentano 1973: 74). This principle is required both in the context of the complexity problem, which stems from the theory of primary and secondary objects, and of the infinite regress problem, which seems to be insoluble unless one presupposes with Marty that ‘all simultaneous mental states, which we experience in ourselves, make up one single reality’ (2011: 31 – 32). Thus, as Marty points out in this lecture, the purpose of this principle is not to do away with complexity in favour of simplicity, but to account for the fact that what is present to the mind is experienced, despite this complexity, as something unified.

The next question raised by Marty in his lecture pertains to the nature of this unity. Marty argues that this unity is not a collective (Kollektiv) (Marty 1894: 145), i.e., to use Brentano’s definition, ‘a multiplicity of parts grouped under the same point of view and each of these parts is an independent thing’ (Brentano 1954: 225). A collective such as, for example a company of soldiers or the trees of a forest, may be apprehended from the point of view of a unity and represents in itself a homogeneous totality. However, in contrast to the whole, the elements preserve their independence in their relationship to the collective, to which they belong, as their existence does not depend upon their participation in this whole. Conversely, the collective is dependent neither on the existence of its parts nor on the relations between its parts, since one can take away a tree or modify the relations between the trees and still have a collective. Marty argues that these parts form a whole, of which they are the moments, the metaphysical
parts, or the divisives, which stand in a relation of dependence to the whole. Every mental activity constitutes a whole whose mental states are divisives. In this respect, consciousness of the primary object and consciousness of the secondary object are both metaphysical parts that belong to one and the same phenomenon and reality. Hence the principle of the unity of consciousness, through which Brentano attempts to account for the relationship of these elements as a whole to one and the same reality (1973: 124–125) The originality of Marty’s analysis of this principle consists in his taking into account an important dimension, which Brentano left undetermined in his Psychology, i.e., the individuality moment. Marty claims that this unity is a ‘real individual unity’ and maintains that this unity is individually experienced and that ‘the awareness of personal particularity is only given in this way’ (Marty 1904: 146). But the connection between unity and individuality in Marty’s lecture also presupposes the existence of the soul, as we shall see below.

3 Unconscious mental states and the distinction between implicit and explicit consciousness

Should we take for granted that there is no unconscious mental state in the field of our experience? Not necessarily, responds Marty, if one means by unconscious what is unnoticed, or even indiscernible (unmerklich):

One has overlooked the fact that much in our mental life is indiscernible (unmerklich). Very often, when one has presupposed unconscious presentations, the correct explanation is rather that the presentation was indiscernible, and this indiscernibility is a well known fact. (Marty 2011: 13)

Following Brentano (2011: 120), Marty distinguishes the active from the passive meaning of unconscious, i.e., in the sense that ‘unconscious’ is said of a thing of which one is not aware. Applied to consciousness, this amounts to saying that in the hearing of a sound, the act of hearing, in the active sense, is about the sound, while in the passive sense, the act of hearing is itself an object of consciousness in accordance with the second thesis. In his lecture, Marty introduces another important distinction between primary consciousness (thesis I), the Genewärtighaben of a primary object, from the secondary consciousness (thesis II), which refers to the internal perception of a secondary object. In light of this latter distinction, the question arises as to whether ‘there could not be a consciousness which would not be itself an object of a consciousness. [...] That there
is a consciousness which is not itself an object of a consciousness is not *a priori* contradictory' (Marty 1904: 107).

As we saw above, the central notion of noticing, which roughly corresponds to the epistemic mode of consciousness in Brentano’s *Psychology*, is closely related in Marty’s lecture to the notion of explicit consciousness (or consciousness understood in the narrow sense), which he opposes to implicit consciousness. In his own lectures on descriptive psychology, Brentano applies this distinction to the external perception of a primary object and argues that one can implicitly see or hear something that one does not explicitly notice.

Whoever sees a lark in the blue of the sky does therefore not yet notice it, and hence will just as little notice his seeing of the lark, even though his seeing of the lark is concomitantly experienced (*mitempfinden*) by him. However, were he, at some point, not only to see the lark, but also to notice it, then he would certainly notice simultaneously that he sees it [...]. To see is different from being clear about what is seen. And thus, the concomitant experience of the seeing will be different from being clear about this concomitantly experienced seeing. (Brentano 1995: 26)

Brentano supposes that the lark is not the explicit object of the act even though it appears in the subject’s visual field, and that the subject is only implicitly conscious of it. Brentano also applies this distinction to the hearing of a chord and argues that one can be conscious of the chord without distinguishing or being explicitly conscious of the particular notes. This amounts to maintaining that a state may be implicitly conscious, without the subject being explicitly conscious of it. Conversely, Brentano maintains that the subject can only be explicitly conscious of experiencing something (say, a lark) if she is implicitly conscious of it (Brentano 1995: 36). Explicit consciousness, or consciousness in a narrow sense, constitutes an act of noticing (*Bemerken*), conceived by Brentano in these lectures as an explicit perception of what is implicitly contained in consciousness (Brentano 1995: 36).

Self-awareness is intrinsic and pre-reflective. However, the question arises as to whether *explicit* consciousness (noticing) involves the will or a form of reflection.

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6 ‘If someone hears a chord and distinguishes the notes which are contained in it, the one has a distinct awareness of the fact that she hears it. But if one does not distinguish the particular notes, then one has only an indistinct awareness of them. In such a case, he does hear them together and she is aware of the whole which is this hearing and to which the hearing of each of the particular notes belongs; but she does not hear the whole in such a way that she distinguishes each of its parts. Particular hearings of particular notes are contained in the whole and she does not distinguish them’ (Brentano 1981: 117).
4 The mental substance and the principle of individuation

In his lecture, Marty takes the changes that occurred in Brentano’s conception of psychology after the publication of his Psychology in 1874 into account, namely in his Vienna lectures on descriptive psychology from the late 1880s. One of the important modifications made to Brentano’s views on consciousness after 1874 bears on the second thesis on consciousness that Brentano criticizes in the well-known passage of the 1911 appendix to his Psychology:

As I have already emphasized in my *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, however, for the secondary object of mental activity one does not have to think of any particular one of these references, as for example the reference to the primary object. It is easy to see that this would lead to an infinite regress, for there would have to be a third reference, which would have the secondary reference as object, a fourth, which would have the additional third one as object, and so on. The secondary object is not a reference but a mental activity, or, more strictly speaking, the mentally active subject, in which the secondary reference is included along with the primary one. (Brentano 1973: 215)

This taking into account of the ‘mentally active subject’ has major metaphysical and psychological consequences, not only on the second thesis on consciousness but also on Brentano’s conception of psychology as a whole. The secondary object is no longer a mental state about itself (in *parergo*) as a secondary object, as Brentano seems to hold in his *Psychology*, but rather the mentally active subject that includes both primary and secondary objects. Let us bear in mind that a mental state as such cannot be conscious or unconscious without taking into account the mentally active subject which is the bearer of that state.⁷

Another important change after the publication of Brentano’s *Psychology* concerns the distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology and the shift from psychology understood as a science of mental phenomena to what Brentano defines in his lecture on descriptive psychology as the science of the

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⁷ Does this move involve a shift from state to creature consciousness, i.e., of the attribution of the predicate ‘is conscious’ to the self rather than to mental states? To use David Rosenthal’s terminology, does this shift involve one’s giving up an Aristotelian conception of mind and instead adopting a Cartesian and immaterialist conception of mind, according to which the predicate ‘is conscious’ stands for an intrinsic and intransitive property of the mind? Even though this hypothesis cannot be discarded out of hand, we can leave the question open because Brentano’s main question remains the same—i.e., What it is for a mental state to be conscious?—and there are no signs that he ever abandoned his theory of primary and secondary objects. However, as Brentano makes quite clear in the excerpt from 1911, as in several other writings, an adequate answer to our question now involves taking into account the creature or the self understood as a mental substance (see Fisette 2015a, b).
human soul\(^8\) (see Marty 2011: 3). Recall that as early as 1869, in his paper ‘Auguste Comte und die positive Philosophie’, Brentano criticised Aristotle for the metaphysical presuppositions in a number of his doctrines, notably in that of substance and accidents (see Brentano 1968: 132). Brentano raises the same objection at the very beginning of his Psychology, when he compares the Aristotelian conception of psychology as a science of the soul to that defining it as a science of mental phenomena. Brentano criticised Aristotle for conceiving of the object of psychology, i.e., the soul, as a substance, and of psychical phenomena as its accidents or essential properties. He argued that, from an empirical point of view, this is nothing but a metaphysical postulate, i.e., a fiction, which, because it is not (and cannot be) an object of experience, consequently cannot constitute the object of psychology. Hence the alternative conception, based on a ‘psychology without a soul’—i.e., a psychology free of metaphysical presuppositions, which Brentano advocated in his Psychology. However, the later Brentano maintains that the mental substance is not a mere \textit{a priori} postulate but an object of experience insofar as ‘each of us is conscious of himself as being a determinate individual and as being the one individual substance that underlies all our psychical activities’ (Brentano 1981: 121)

According to Marty, the shift to psychology as a science of the soul brings about another important modification to the first thesis, more precisely to the terms of an intentional relation. In the 1904 version of his lecture on descriptive psychology, Marty argues that the bearer of the intentional relation is the soul and, indirectly, mental states because, from this new perspective, the intentional relation ‘primarily belongs to the soul’ (Marty 1904: 7). Accordingly, the intentional relations are subordinated to the subject–object relations: ‘What I have called the mental relation in an eminent sense is by its nature a subject-object relation, the relation of a subject to an object, which is present in a peculiar way’ (Marty 1904: 68–69).

The modes of consciousness can henceforth be considered the modes of subject–object relations, as we shall see below.

Finally, the most important modification is associated with the problem of individuation, which Brentano left pending in his Psychology. \(^9\) This important

\(^8\) In his lecture on descriptive psychology, Brentano proposes the following definition: ‘Psychology is the science of the soul. As such, its task is, above all, to analyse the phenomena of the soul in order to arrive at the parts of which all phenomena of the human soul are composed, and to determine each of these parts according to its manifold characteristics’ (Brentano 1995: 165).

\(^9\) In the conclusion to his analysis of the unity of consciousness, Brentano deliberately leaves open the question of the individuality of mental states, arguing that the unity of consciousness and the unity of the conscious self are two distinct things: ‘Finally, the unity of consciousness
topic is directly related to our own interest in consciousness insofar as the problem of individuation boils down to the question of what gives consciousness its own individuality. In Marty’s own words, the main question is ‘what is it that gives this individual determination to the content of our consciousness?’ (Marty 2011: 33). The required individualizing principle has to account for the invariant element in our conscious self, understood as an individuum which, by analogy with the domain of physical phenomena, is based on a physical substrate abstracted from the relations between sensory quality and spatial location (Marty 2011: 34). However, the self cannot be individuated through location because mental states are never experienced as localized and extended. Marty considers several other options, including that of mental states, which he rules out because mental states are constantly changing whereas my individuality remains constant and invariable. The psychical substance, the invariant in our mental life, is nothing but the soul, which constitutes the foundation of mental states and the individualizing moment that Marty is looking for in his lecture. According to Marty, what preserves one’s identity through the constant changes in one’s internal life and also constitutes the individuality of one’s mental life is the soul, which, in the final analysis, is what distinguishes the self from any other individual.

Psychology is the science of the soul and the psychical relations, whereby the soul is what distinguishes, in our mental life, what is mine and what is yours in the last instance. Each of us, as he is inwardly present, appears to himself in a personal unity and peculiarity, and what constitutes this unity and peculiarity is the soul. It would be conceivable that someone presents, judges, hates and loves what someone else presents, etc., but he would not be me, but someone else. There is something in all similarity that constitutes the difference between me and you, and that is the soul. (Marty 1904: 7)

does not imply that the mental phenomena which we ordinarily refer to as our past mental activities, were parts of the same real thing that encompasses our present mental phenomena. [...] It remains an open question, then, for the moment, whether the continued existence of the self is the persistence of one and the same unitary reality or simply a succession of different realities linked together in such a way that, so to speak, each subsequent reality takes the place of the reality which preceded it’ (1972: 129–130).

German original: “die Psychologie ist die Lehre von der Seele und den psychischen Beziehungen, wobei Seele das ist, was in unserem psychischen Leben das Mein und Dein in letzter Instanz unterscheidet. Jeder von uns sowie er sich innerlich gegenwärtig ist, erscheint sich selbst in persönlicher Einheit und Besonderheit und das was diese Einheit und Besonderheit ausmacht, ist die Seele. Es wäre denkbar, das einer dasselbe vorstellt, urteilt, haßt und liebt, was ein anderer vorstellt etc. trotzdem wäre er nicht ich, sondern ein anderer. Es gibt etwas was bei aller Gleichheit doch die Verschiedenheit von ich und du ausmacht, und das ist die Seele”.

The ‘mentally active subject’ to which Brentano refers in the appendix can thus be considered an individual substance, a soul, whose moments or properties are mental states (Marty 1904: 135). However, in virtue of what Marty calls the law of noticing—i.e., ‘the unchanging, the unique is not noticeable for us and not graspable in its nature’ (Marty, 2011: 35)—, since the thinking substance is itself invariant and unchanging, it cannot therefore be directly noticed or apperceived, but only indirectly through the changing mental phenomena. To use Brentano’s distinction between implicit and explicit consciousness, the soul is always implicitly experienced but cannot, for reasons of principle, be explicitly noticed or apperceived: ‘This individualizing principle is also with our psychical relations implicitly apperceived, but it is not by itself apperceivable. That is why we are not able to describe it in a proper way because we are not capable to explicitly notice it’ (Marty 1894: 135).

5 Marty’s third thesis: Consciousness as self-consciousness

Let us now turn to what I will refer to as Marty’s third thesis, according to which internal consciousness is self-consciousness. Marty’s first step in his reconstruction rests on the individuality of the conscious self, or what he calls in §16 of his 1894–1895 lecture the individualizing moment of our mental life, which, as we saw above, is what confers an individual character on our mental contents, or what makes me (‘me’ in the sense of my consciousness) an individual (Marty 2011: 32). Accordingly, Marty’s first step can be formulated as follows: conscious states are mental states of one’s own. I can only be aware of my experiences, not yours. The content of a state of pain, for instance, can be formulated as follows: ‘I now have (or feel) pain’. All conscious states are one’s own in the sense that a pain or any other state can only be experienced in the first person.

Marty’s second step, which he emphasises in the 1904 version of his lecture on descriptive psychology, rests on the fact that one does not have direct access to the individualizing moment, but can access this only through one’s mental states, and more specifically via one’s intentional relations to objects: ‘The psychical relations are the main subject matter of psychology. For the soul itself can only be experienced and present in these activities and conscious relations to objects’ (Marty 1904: 8).

It is in this sense that one speaks of the self as the psychisch Tätige, i.e., in terms of the intentional relations that one entertains with one’s objects. And being conscious of a state is a relation that a subject bears to that state. According to Marty, internal consciousness ‘always has simultaneously the threefold character of presenting, judging and taking interest in something’:
Thus one may say that in each primary psychical act, be it a presentation, a judgment or an interest, the soul manifests itself simultaneously in all three modes of consciousness in so far as every mental activity is accompanied by a triple secondary consciousness. (Marty 2011: 27–28)

Marty’s argument is based on the so-called principle of noticing, whereby self-awareness is not to be accounted for in terms of an explicit judgment and it is not graspable in itself solely through internal perception or cognition. How then does he explain the implicit self-awareness that is presupposed in his overall analysis of consciousness? In the last quote, Marty acknowledges that internal consciousness involves the three modes, including judgement, even in the mere hearing of a sound. Internal consciousness is therefore not reducible to one of its modes and the self as such is not accessible through an isolated single mode. Moreover, there is a significant difference between ‘consciousness of’, which characterizes the primary consciousness of physical phenomena, and ‘consciousness de se’ which, according to Marty, seems to replace the secondary consciousness that was meant to accompany all mental states. And the self cannot be the intentional objet of one of its modes. Moreover, as Brentano points out in his Theory of Categories, the self is a whole that is not reducible to its parts.

If one thinks of anything at all, then one is not completely devoid of self-awareness. For if he thinks or senses distinctly, then at the same time he is distinctly aware of himself as one who is sensing or thinking. And if he thinks or senses indistinctly, then the self is comprised in a larger complex which is at least apperceived as a whole, even if not in respect to its relevant particular parts. In such a case one has a confused self-awareness with no distinction of the relevant particular psychical activities. (Brentano 1981: 123)

We now have a good idea about what implicit self-awareness is not, but we do not have yet the relevant information about what it is.

Let us now consider the next step in Marty’s reconstruction, which bears on his interpretation of secondary or internal consciousness as self-consciousness. The term secondary consciousness is opposed to primary consciousness, which Marty seems to associate with the external perception of physical phenomena such as colour and sound. He seems therefore to interpret the first thesis on consciousness, whereby every psychical phenomenon is consciousness, literally. This interpretation raises another important question about Brentano’s early theory of consciousness, which, as I said above, was limited to internal consciousness in so far as only mental states were internally perceived. The question is whether consciousness as a whole extends beyond intentional mental states to the primary consciousness of physical phenomena, as the case of the lark and that of the chord that Brentano uses in his Vienna lectures to exemplify the dis-
tinction between implicit and explicit consciousness seem to suggest. There are reasons to believe that the qualitative dimension of experience is itself a datum of implicit primary consciousness and that it pre-exists secondary consciousness. This of course presupposes a broadening of the limits imposed on experience in Brentano’s theory of 1874, but as Marty suggests in his lecture, this broadening would leave enough room to integrate both primary and secondary consciousness in the agent.

Be that it as it may, Marty understands self-consciousness in terms of the consciousness of consciousness, i.e. as secondary consciousness.

This consciousness of a consciousness is called internal consciousness or self-consciousness in the scientific sense of the word. It is rightly called self-consciousness, because our self can only be grasped and apperceived in its activities in this way. One can call it internal or secondary consciousness, and the other, with which it has always been, primary consciousness. (Marty 1904: 106)

That is to say, according to the first thesis, when I hear a sound, my representation is in fact about the sound heard, but my consciousness of that state shall be understood as my being aware that I am hearing a sound.

But taking into account the psychical agent in this formulation still does not explain the role of self-awareness in the agent’s experience of the primary object. It only shows that:
- A mental state is conscious iff the mentally active subject is somehow conscious of that state.

A further step seems to be needed in order to account for self-consciousness. For this formulation does not seem to take the fact that mental states are the agent’s own into account, i.e., the initial presentation is not any state but a state in which the subject is. Moreover, our formulation has to take Brentano’s important remark in the passage of the 1911 appendix into account, which I quoted above and according to which secondary consciousness stands in relation not to a mere object, but to the mental agent in which both the intentional object and the state are included. I take it that Brentano means that the hearing of a sound is a state that the agent is in and that a state is conscious only if she is conscious of being

in that state. In short, an adequate response to the question ‘What makes a state conscious?’ could be formulated along the following lines:

– A mental state is conscious iff one is aware of oneself as being in that (intentional) state.

This formulation is consistent with Marty’s reconstruction insofar as it combines Marty’s four steps:

1. Mental states are conscious.
2. Conscious states are mental states of one’s own.
3. Mental states are conscious iff the mentally active subject is somehow conscious of these states.
4. A mental state is conscious iff one is aware of oneself as being in that (intentional) state

This formulation seems to be consistent with Brentano’s conception of self-consciousness in his late writings, specifically in a passage of his Theory of Categories where he explains his conception of self-consciousness through the distinction between implicit and explicit consciousness.

Self-awareness, too, is sometimes distinct and sometimes indistinct. If a person feels a pain, then he is aware of himself as one that feels the pain. But perhaps he does not distinguish the substance, which here feels pain, from the accident by means of which the substance appears to him. It may well be that animals have only an indistinct self-awareness. But in the case of man, the substance which thinks in him (die in ihm denkt), and experiences, judges, loves and hates, can be brought to awareness as a result of the frequent change of its accidents; the indistinct awareness is then replaced by a distinct awareness of the subject. One then grasps this substance as that which permanently underlies this change and which gives unity to its manifold character (als das, was bleibend ihrem Wechsel und einheitlich ihrer Mannigfaltigkeit unterliegt). (Brentano 1981: 117)

Just as in the case of the hearing of a chord we presuppose that one is aware of the fact that one hears the chord, and in the case of pain we assume that one is aware of being in that state, Brentano also assumes in this passage that explicit self-consciousness involves implicit self-awareness and confirms the thesis that one cannot be explicitly or distinctly aware of being in this state of pain, for example, unless one is implicitly aware of it (Brentano 1982: 34). This implicit self-awareness is not reflective; it does not require, as Brentano says, the participation of the will (1981: 123); it is therefore pre-reflective, i.e., an awareness that we have before explicitly reflecting on our experience. Self-awareness is therefore intrinsic and seems to pervade our experience as a whole.
References


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