

SEEKING HARMONIZATION: MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE  
COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science, Concentration European Governance.

Chapel Hill  
2013

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**Abstract**

DREW SAMPSON - Seeking Harmonization: Measuring the Effectiveness of the Common European Asylum System  
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This thesis is an examination of the effectiveness of the European Union's efforts to create a unified asylum system. For over two decades, the EU has been taking action to ensure the upholding of human rights; create an efficient system via the fusion of national systems and implementation of EU institutions and instruments; and to better integrate immigrants. While there have been many new developments in the last decade alone, this thesis observes continuing human rights violations, insufficient coherency in the between member states, and a lacking effort to truly integrate migrants. In conclusion, this thesis advises that greater oversight and enforcement, more binding directives, and increased efforts made directly by the EU to integrate migrants are all necessary actions which could alleviate burden disparities and foster a more effective, efficient, and coherent common system of asylum.

### **Acknowledgements**

I would like to take a brief moment to acknowledge all whom have assisted me in this endeavor. This thesis has given me the chance to explore a topic of great importance, and without the help of those with similar interests in the betterment of governances and advancement of human rights, I would not have achieved this feat. Dr. Milada Vachudova, thank you very much for your enthusiasm and the many reminders of the more pragmatic components of this process. I would also like to thank Dr. Ingo Peters for the many discussions we have had, the times of sheer abstraction, and for taking on this challenge with me in a new field. I would also like to thank the faculties of UNC – Chapel Hill, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, and Freie Universität zu Berlin for their consistent support during the months it has taken to write this thesis and for having provided me necessary coursework to expand my understanding of yet another component of the social sciences. Lastly, but certainly not of any lesser importance, I want to thank my family, friends, and academic colleagues. You all have provided support each in your own unique ways, and for this I am very grateful.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

1. EU – European Union
2. CEAS – Common European Asylum System
3. UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
4. EASO – European Asylum Support Office
5. EIF – European Integration Fund
6. ERF – European Refugee Fund
7. EURODAC – European Dactyloscopy
8. FRONTEX – European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

## **Introduction**

For over twenty years, the European Union has been taking many actions to create a common system of asylum. The effectiveness of the EU asylum system is largely due to inadequate legislation which seeks to harmonize national asylum systems via the creation of new institutions and instruments matched with further funding to states and existing programs. Faced with new patterns of forced migration and varying, counteractive national approaches, the EU has implemented these actions with the goal of maintaining human rights standards, minimizing expenditure through the convergence of institutions and instruments, and furthering integration of refugees. The effectiveness of these unifying actions however continues to be seen by many as poor and insufficient (Bouteillet-Paquet 1997; Balzacq & Carrera 2005; Juss 2005; Neumayer 2005; Hatton 2012). There are still many human rights violations derived from national behavior; the convergence of instruments and institutions have not decreased the difference of burden; and integration still remains an often neglected component of asylum. Despite the member states' and EU's high regard of the issue and their efforts, their attempts have been ineffective for a broad, complex, and interdependent set of reasons. Major shortcomings of the EU asylum system are: Abdication of international law and European law concerning human rights, aversion to a convergence of European asylum systems, and a lacking success of integration efforts are major components to this divided, ineffective system. Neither the member states nor the EU have been able to take on these endogenous and exogenous challenges. Further complicating this facet of modern governance is the reality that member state actions are often incongruent if not contrary to

the actions and desired outcomes of the European Union to which these states are members. The result of these interactions is an ineffective system of asylum which ultimately results in devolution of a cornerstone of modern, democratic governance.

In more recent times, Europe has been faced with further influxes of migrants seeking asylum. The main points of origin of these people are from Syria, Afghanistan, and Russia, with Syria having the largest increase in applications and Afghanistan displaying the largest quantity of refugee seekers. What is even more interesting about the recent figures is that the increase in applications has only risen by a mere 1% of the 11% increase in applications both new and pending. This most recent influx is precisely the new pattern forced migration has taken since the early 1990s with the only main difference between then and now being point of origin. In the foundational actions of the EU building a unified systems, many of the influxes originated from within European regions, but currently many are coming from outside of Europe. The most current data estimates 330,000 in 2012 according to Eurostat statistics (EUROSTAT 2012). This has complicated the national and supranational perspectives and approaches towards asylum. Because much authority still remains at the national level, border states have been circumnavigating much of the EU's efforts to create an effective, unified system with the use of bilateral readmission agreements, aversion of non-binding EU legislation, and domestic border control. It is important to measure the effectiveness of the EU's asylum policies to shed light on how national and supranational factors have interacted over time.

Although judging effectiveness can often be a highly subjective and problematic endeavor, it is nevertheless needed in assessing such an important subject as asylum (Cameron 1986; Jorgensen 1998; Jorgensen 2004; Underdal 2004; Howlett et. al. 2009;

Thomas 2012). To achieve a valid, objective measurement, it is necessary for main components of the regime changes to be operationally defined as well as developing a clear method of measurement. In the case of the effectiveness of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), effectiveness will naturally have a differing operational definition than that of, for example, the effectiveness of the European Central Bank. Though both topics may share similarities in what signifies a system (or group of systems) effective or not, the difference of inputs and outcomes remain unique. More importantly, the issue of asylum is and will always be highly dynamic in nature for the inconsistent set of circumstances which increase or decrease refuge-seeking along with the ever changing interests of European states remain themselves non-static entities. Thus, forced-migration creates moving targets for all nations which seek to provide international protection

A main interest of the EU is the need to protect individual's human rights through the provision of international protection when warranted (COM [2008] 360 Final). This is not only reiterated throughout all EU legislation and communications, but is a key criterion of governance to which the EU and member states are bound by international laws and treaties concerning human rights and asylum protocol ("European Pact on Immigration and Asylum" 2-15). While there remain many potential causes of the incapacity to uphold internationally recognized laws on human rights, there is no single factor which is solely responsible for this outcome. The non-binding legislation concerning bilateral agreements, a lack of enforcement, and idiosyncrasies manifested from ever changing international relations and migration patterns may all well be the cause of human rights violations. Regardless of this uncertain set of variables, the main focus is placed on the ineffectiveness of the EU's asylum system in remedying these issues, not that these issues are occurring. In this section of the



thesis, I will explore, deficiency of convergence measures, bilateral readmission agreements, differences in the degree of *burden* between member states (see figures *one*, *two*, *three*, and *four*), and lacking oversight/enforcement by the EU as factors contributing to a declining capacity in fostering an effective asylum system. Penultimate to the need to maintain the European ethos of human rights, there remain other reasons as to why effectiveness of the CEAS is of great importance to the EU.

The convergence of asylum systems would not only further ensure maintaining human rights standards, but would also decrease the overall costs and lessen the *burden* of those providing refuge. Through the creation of new institutions and instruments along with the unification of existing national and supranational systems, the EU would certainly create an effective system of asylum during times of high influx emigration due to warfare and revolution in the Middle East and Africa. However, despite these sought after benefits of a unified system, the EU has not been able to fully reach this end. Unbinding legislation concerning procedural obligations, incoherent allocation of funding to vague objectives and the perpetual contrary interests between nations (which in effect alters the composition of EU legislation) bring about a system of contradiction and usurpation. This lack of convergence limits the effectiveness of security, keeps costs to states higher than needed, and diminishes uniformity in international-EU relations.

Lastly, I seek to establish a lack of effectiveness of the CEAS by observing the failures to better integrate those who arrive to Europe in order to not only seek refuge but also have a fair chance in building a new life. Asylum is a three part process for the refugee-seeker and the host country – before he/she arrives, reception, and post-reception. Seemingly, European nations are more concerned with the primary and secondary phase while the

tertiary remains often overlooked (see figures *five* and *six*). Not only can effectiveness be measured by observing the interactions occurring before and upon reception of a refugee applicant, but one ought to also observe what occurs after reception. Provision of necessary entitlements, such as, healthcare, employment, and education are crucial to the success of refugees (Farwell 2001) and decreasing the likelihood of refugees remaining a liability to the host state. Furthermore, public perception of migrants or how much a state and other states have contributed enable one to further see the likelihood of assimilation of refugees while also indicating the lack of effectiveness of an EU asylum system in advancing tolerance. Without this exploration, this thesis would be but an attempt to see how non-porous European borders are. If human rights standards and the European promise of a *better life* were not integral to EU aims, then such an exploration of asylum systems would be sufficient, but this is certainly not the case.

Though there are continually changing influxes of forced migrants and ever changing national interests, the EU's objective attempts to create a unified, effective system of asylum have been ineffective for over twenty years now. Not only is this outcome important in a fundamental sense (providing international protection for human life), but it is also of great importance in regarding the capacity of the EU as a center form of governance in a globalized arena. The latter remains true for in the globalized world, where super powers are aligning and slowly disintegrating national sovereignty, such issues like asylum are a litmus test of effectiveness of supranational governance. If these super powers cannot successfully govern a matter so fundamentally important and clearly defined as protecting human life from persecution, murder, and attrition of liberty, then how is the world at large to relinquish

sovereignty in political, economic, and cultural forms additionally to the developing super powers?

In the conclusion of this thesis, I argue that in order for the EU to create an effective asylum system, the Union will need to make greater advancements in protecting human rights with greater oversight and enforcement of binding legislation, converging institutions and instruments with centralized institutions and instruments rather than converging national systems, and integrating refugees through both unified entitlements and funding of integration programs outside of national control. In all these components of asylum, there are repeated patterns of lacking capability to enforce directives, maintain thorough oversight of funds, converging national systems, and non-binding language in the legislation defining protocols and standards. Without these advancements, the CEAS will remain in a similar ineffective form as it has now for twenty years.

### **Methodology:**

In order to measure the effectiveness of the EU's asylum system, I create a yardstick with which to measure the operationally defined form of effectiveness. There has been much research considering the effectiveness of regimes, and while measurements vary, the end goal is of great importance. As Underdal argues, neither the measurements of effectiveness need not observe the efficiency nor the differences between cost and impact, but should look to determine whether the goals set out by a regime are met (Underdal 2004). Due to the multiple parties involved in asylum (refugee, state of entry, point-of-origin nation, host nation, EU institutions, national institutions, etc.), the measurement of effectiveness is not as clear cut as simply proclaiming the CEAS effective if it converges systems, decreases

expenditure, and manifests a higher sense of solidarity. As Jorgensen argues, one must forwardly define whether effectiveness is externally or internally measured (Jorgensen 1998), but seeing as asylum policies inherently aim to protect externalities (refugees) and restructure national asylum systems, this thesis' measurement is naturally one measuring both internally and externally. The binding international treaties on human rights, EU law and political rhetoric concerning human rights, and the need for integration in a sociological sense are also inherent in the measurement of effectiveness of these institutions. Therefore, measuring effectiveness has three major components: Upholding human rights standards and a real prospect of improving the quality of life for the refugee through integration, and increasing the uniformity and efficiency of national systems. To exclude the human aspect of asylum solely to observe the functionality of the asylum system in and of itself would be erroneous and narrow-sighted.

*The sequence of themes and supporting evidence in this thesis are as follows:*

- 1. Effectiveness of the CEAS to prevent human rights violations**
- 2. Effectiveness of existing and created institutions and instruments, the coherency of these systems, and the mitigation of *burden* disparities.**
- 3. Effectiveness of integration efforts put forth by the EU.**

*Operationalization:*

The operationalization of key terms is crucial to the understanding of this effort to measure effectiveness. As effectiveness is not a one-dimensional entity, the operationalization of *effectiveness* of the EU asylum system is the efficacy to maintain and implement a uniform system which is able to solve major outstanding issues at the individual, national, and supranational level. This is to denote that the EU asylum system is

effective if human rights and integration are maintained and highlighted, costs are diminished, efficiency of transnational systems is increased, and disparities in the form *burdens* to states are remedied. *Human rights* are easily operationalized via the defining criteria of the Geneva Convention and EU laws and principles, which are often in line with said international treaties. *Convergence* and *coherence* however are more difficult to differentiate for there are many forms through which both can occur (Hertog and Stross 2011). For the scope of this essay, the former is occurs when national systems are unified through over-arching EU systems, for example, if national border control is relinquished to European systems of border control. The latter remains similar to convergence, but instead assesses how uniform and accessible information concerning applicants, refugees, and criminal activity is between nations via EU information systems. While convergence has much to do with the *effectiveness* of a common EU asylum system, coherence is more related to the *efficiency* of the system, but the two should not be mistaken as the same characteristic (Hertog and Stross 2011; Thomas 2012). In summation, efficiency is a key component of any effective system. Hertog and Stross provide in their 2011 conference paper a listing of operationalized definitions compiled from policy research which is quite fitting for the goals of this thesis. They define convergence as inherently including coherency, but that coherency comes in many different forms. Their conceptualization of vertical coherency is of the most fitting form as the EU is seeking to build coherency between the supranational and national level. Thus, coherency in this form is, “Coherence between a policy of the Community level and the individual EU member states policies in the same sphere.” (Hertog and Stross 2011). *Integration* is defined with consideration to a *biopsychosocial* approach to understanding individuals. The biological component questions whether refugees are integrated by means of

available healthcare and basic physiological necessities, such as water, food, and shelter. Psychologically, the refugee is in a healthy psychological standing and receives psychological assistance. As many forced migrants are leaving catastrophic living circumstances which have created not only major psychological problems but also comorbidities (see figure *nine*), psychological health is to be addressed by the EU as a major facet of the effectiveness of integration programs. Lastly, socially, integration is key to the success of refugees in a new society. Public opinion polls are in this sense very useful to measuring this aspect of integration, as well as the funding of civil society programs (see figures *seven* and *eight*). The utilization of the biopsychosocial paradigm is essential to this thesis' measurement of the effectiveness summated by a simple fundamental truth: How are the refugees and host states to be successful if refugees are in poor physical and psychological health while having little prospects to be socially integrated into their new society? In these circumstances, not only do individuals lose, but the host states lose prospective economic assets, thus maintaining refugees as expenditure. Lastly, burden is a theme which appears often in literature pertaining to asylum in Europe. For the scope of this paper, burden is not only the financial differences which exist between states, but also the perceived burden of host states integrating refugees economically and civically.

*Measurement of Effectiveness:*

The criteria for the measurement incorporate both the functionality of the systems themselves as well as the maintenance of human rights standards and success of integration efforts. The former criterion will then explore the convergence of systems under a uniform EU system, the coherence of systems in the sense of shared information, decreasing the

expenditure of asylum systems, equalization of *burden* (financially and socially), and creating a uniform foreign relations in the sense of a common *safe third country* (Collinson 1996) listing and common readmission agreements. The latter aspect of the measurement of effectiveness is constituted by maintaining internationally and European recognized human rights standards, the reception and processing components, and a *real prospect of improving the standard of living* in the host country via the means of civic and social integration. The main subset criteria for the integrative aspect of the human component of this analysis is thereby derived from available entitlements for the refugee, available social integration programs, employment opportunities, and EU investments made in effort to bolster integration of refugees. While the spectrum of this form of measurement seems broad, it fully measures the effectiveness of a common EU system of asylum outcomes.

Another point of consideration concerning the methodology to measuring effectiveness is in regard to theory of migration. Without a foundational understanding of why *forced migrants* are on the move in comparison to voluntary migrants, I cannot with logical reason create a proper form of measurement. According to Miller, there are economic theories, interdisciplinary models, and transnational theories as to why people move (Castles & Miller 2009). The economic model maintains that people move because of rational reasons of self-interest, whereas the interdisciplinary and transnational models incorporate a more mixed theoretical understanding stating that there are greater means of knowledgeability of different lands and great means to reaching new lands. The difference between voluntary and forced migrant then remains one of cutting losses and settling for the best minimum outcome whereas voluntary migrants have the benefit of waiting for maximum gains. From this theoretical standpoint, the measurement of effectiveness is to account for the EU's capacity

to provide similar outcomes for others as they do for refugee-seekers. In considering the effectiveness of the CEAS, it is also of importance to observe if the benefits provided by the EU are better than those of international systems.

Lastly, in gauging the effectiveness of the CEAS, I maintain that effectiveness should not be considered black and white, but rather a spectrum. From this sense, effectiveness is either in a low, moderate, or high status. Given human rights standards have improved, convergence methods have created a more coherent system, and integration increases, it is clear that the CEAS is of high effectiveness. If only two of the three, are met, the CEAS is moderately effective. Logically, if the CEAS meets only one criterion, then the system is of low effectiveness. In summation, the methodology implemented in determining the effectiveness is derive mainly from the achievement of goals set out by the EU, the maintenance of European values concerning human rights, and the domestic efforts made to better integrate migrants economically and civically.

### **Human Rights and Asylum:**

Since the end of the Second World War, human rights have been integral to the foundation of the post-war re-developmental era. International institutions began to develop, mostly composed of western states with the main goals of preserving peace through cooperation; in a more specific sense, this cause is also the catalyst through which the European Union first began with the vesting of German and French Coal & Steel. Not only were international institutions and third party non-governmental organizations on the rise, but major treaties were passed often also focused with a need for peace and human rights. The massive amounts of war casualties were a justifiable cause of the need for peace and human



rights. Furthermore, the displacement of many various groups of people played a large role not only directly after the end of the Second World War but also onward until the Iron Curtain fell, where once again a massive influx of displaced peoples were again on the move to a different land to call home and seek refuge (see figure *ten*) (Hatton et. al. 2004; Marshall 2007; Vachudova 2007). While the groups of migrants seeking refuge or replacement have varied over the course of the last six decades, two aspects remain the same: Migrants are moving in influxes without a current or predictable rate as in earlier times in history, and, the responsibilities of states taking these migrants in are bounded by internationally recognized and longstanding treaties and laws.

Much of the treaties and international, normative recognitions of human rights have even been further integrated into domestic law. In the case of the EU, human rights and rule of law are cornerstones of the democratic foundation upon which the EU (and subsequently) the member states are built. Looking deeper into EU political rhetoric, one can easily observe the focus put on a need for maintaining human rights in its actions and outwardly projected positions on current international affairs. However much valuation the EU gives to the maintenance and recognition of human rights, its rhetoric remains overshadowed by failures in the EU asylum system, whereby bilateral agreements, improper use of safe third countries, loosely-based procedural directives, and lack of convergence all contribute to the susceptibility of human rights violations.

#### *Protocol Directives, Bilateralism, and Enforcement*

The first observable factor contributing to a lax approach to upholding human rights is found in EU directives and legislation of the procedural and collective objectives presented

throughout the last half of a decade. Because much of the legislation is non-binding, in that the EU often *invites* member states to take part in these convergences in the *spirit of solidarity* (C115/01), nations can easily circumnavigate EU approaches. As this thesis will later explore, these national differences in interests, and thus behavior, are not the sole cause of ineffectiveness of EU asylum objectives. Furthermore, the EU directives are naturally passed through a system which ultimately is run by the heads of states. If the European Parliament had more political power, it could very well be that the legislation passed would be more binding and impose a uniform solidarity instead of simply *inviting* member states to act as the EU desires and the current influxes of forced migrants need. Again, effectiveness in the form of vertical coherency would mean that national policies would be in line with policies at the EU level. The non-binding nature of the EU legislation is too open for coherency to occur which has resulted in nations behaving within their own self-interests. While one would not presume nations are seeking to push applicants back to third countries or points of origin, the EU legislation is not binding enough to prevent this.

The second aspect of the human component of an ineffective, common asylum system is in the (still) open nature of bilateral agreements in EU legislation. As the EU cannot simply force nations to relinquish sovereignty in this sense, many nations which experience more *burden* than those countries of the interior or northern regions of Europe are creating bilateral agreements. These bilateral agreements make it easier for states to circumnavigate non-refoulement clauses in international and EU law, and what further complicates matters of oversight and enforcement is that many of these agreements can and do occur in informalized settings (Cassarino 2007). A recent case of this, and by far the most publicized, is that of the Italian-Libyan relationship. Libya has become a popular point of

transition for on average 80,000 African migrants annually looking to flee their homelands (Hamood 2008). Since Italy is of closest proximity, it is sensible that they would receive most of the forced migrants looking to enter Europe. In response to this, Italy has created specific bilateral readmission agreements which abdicate the obligations held by the Geneva Convention and EU law. As a direct result of high influx, the conditions in which asylum-seekers live in are below proper terms). Human rights violations occur in southern Italy not only in the bilateral readmission agreements which are related directly to *non-refoulement* criteria in international law, but are also occurring in mass deportations and inaccessible health services (Andrijasevic 2009). The bilateral agreements which have been set up seek to usurp international and EU law by creating vague, ambiguous terms with which Italy can abdicate responsibility to take a refugee-seeker into protection upon first arrival. These human rights violations are not just occurring in Italy, but in other countries on the perimeter of European land. The border between Greece and Turkey also experiences many influxes. The situation with Turkey however remains different from Libya in one major way which is that Turkey is often viewed as a *safe third country* whereas Libya is not commonly seen in such a light. Because of this difference, it has been easier for Greece to abdicate responsibility to take in and process applicants. Because the relation between exit and entrance country is not so clear cut as the Italy-Libya relationship, push backs not only are a matter of international law but also the intertwinement of politics at the national level (Gil-Bazo 2006). To further complicate issues of international law and relations, the EU has also played a part in human rights violations it claims to fight against. In 2010, there was an influx of irregular, illegal land and maritime border crossings. In response to this influx,

Greece requested additional assistance from FRONTEX. As Carrera and Guild argue in their article examining the 2010 push back by Greece and FRONTEX:

The presentation of Frontex Operation RABIT 2010 as ‘the solution’ to the situation at the external borders of Greece with Turkey illustrates the kind of responses that the EU priorities in situations such as those taking place in Greece: more security (FRONTEX) and not going at the heart of the issue, which is that of human rights protection of refugees and undocumented migrants. (Carrera & Guild 2010)

The non-binding EU legislation, remaining sovereignty to implement bilateral readmission agreements, and varied conceptualizations of which countries are considered as safe third countries all have made a landscape where human rights violations are occurring. As long as the EU does not directly assess the issues concerning the coherency of the CEAS while continuing to grant states with these open-ended options, these violations will continue to occur.

Thirdly, ineffectiveness concerning the maintenance of human rights is seen in both an insufficient method of oversight and a subsequent lack of enforcement. Again, key to this problem are issues of sovereignty and structural reconfiguration. While there has been much progress made in the sense of continual funding (see figure *twelve*) to asylum causes and structural changes at the European level of governance, there remains a problematic obstinacy at the national level wherein states do not (and are not obliged to) relinquish sovereignty to the supranational institutions via convergence of systems and border control. Oversight is necessary in a fundamental sense but as national transparency is not obligatory, the EU and third party organizations have a difficult time maintaining oversight. Without observation and enforcement, funds cannot be properly allocated and tracked. Enforcement is necessary in the sense of the *proper* and most effective use of the funds as well as decreasing illegal or gauche actions. In the latter, this aspect of the need for enforcement is clear not in just achieving a coherent, effective CEAS, but in also protecting the rights of those fleeing

their points of origin. Later in this thesis, I explore furthermore the precise weaknesses in institutions and instruments which create this incapacity for oversight and enforcement.

Lastly, there is a large issue with the institutional uniformity of the EU as an international actor. While superficially this aspect seems unconnected to the human rights aspect of the EU asylum system, it remains a final component of ineffectiveness. This is not to denote that the Union should see all refugee applicants as equal but has more to do with international relations. The need for a *safe third country* listing is as crucial to the human rights component as the bilateral agreements component. The bilateral agreements issue is the same problem as the safe third country issue, in that they both defy uniformity of action with the only difference between the two being at which level of governance this abdication is occurring, respectively at the national and supranational level. To delve further into this matter, one can easily observe that member states would naturally be inclined to abdicate responsibility and refute invitations in the name of solidarity when the EU is doing precisely the same act with a non-uniform approach to international relations as the member states are doing.

### **Regimes, Institutions, and Instruments of the EU:**

Not only has the EU asylum system failed to achieve a higher standard of human rights, but the system also fails to achieve an equalized distribution of *burden* between member states and does little to create a more cost efficient system. In large part, the EU asylum system is not only an attempt to manage the poor national handling of forced migrants, but it is also to diminish financial inequalities, converge systems into a more coherent one in order to decrease expenditure, and lastly to create a system which more

effectively secures the borders. While the EU has indeed created many new structures (ERF, EIF, EASO, and the protocol directives), the overall effectiveness of these new approaches have not rendered any better outcomes than those of the past twenty years. Member states still believe that they each absorb their *fair share* (see figures *one, two, three, four* and *eleven* [many nations have felt they have cared their *fair share* but in comparison with the most recent data, there are still major differences between application rates and acceptance rates), the EU still has problems enforcing new directives, and there has been further investment into the asylum system where one could infer that the CEAS is not any more cost efficient than it has been before.

Three main objectives the EU has sought to achieve by converging asylum systems are to diminish the difference in burden to states, create a less costly expenditure towards asylum practices, and to better secure European borders (COM [2008] 360 Final). Furthermore, economic welfare is of great concern to member states, in that each is trying to maximize the benefit of increased labor supply via the form and context of EU legislation. To these ends, many changes have occurred in the last decade, and furthermore, the EU is developing more approaches for the next decade. In the last ten years, the EU has made institutional changes in the sense of which members and institutions have authority in asylum issues; implemented a new set of directives and procedural legislation concerning reception, qualification, processing, and post-reception responsibilities; is working to create a central institution for claims and processing (EASO); created the European Refugee Fund; and enacted FRONTEX and further developed advanced information systems (EURODAC); although these systems denote a high regard and care the EU has to the issue of asylum, the success of these approaches have not fully resolved disparities between states nor have they

created a more efficient system. The latter is of high importance solely because, as previously mentioned, a characteristic trait of an *effective* system is a system which is also *efficient*.

### *Restructuring and Transference of Authority*

Throughout the period of 2000-2010, there was much effort put forth to change *whom* has the leading authoritative role concerning asylum. The greatest of these changes was seen with a transition of asylum from the second pillar to the first pillar. While the Lisbon Treaty abolished this pillar system entirely, this shift of authority is still of relative importance to understanding the effectiveness of the EU asylum system. On the one hand, the movement into the first pillar shows an increase of priority of international protection. On the other hand, the transition may well further abdicate and confound a direct authority over the subject. In essence, the transition from second pillar to first pillar, then followed by the abolishment of the pillar system as a whole denotes a constant state of change relative to the competencies governing asylum. Despite the effort to increase the priority and importance of asylum, the last decade has seen a perpetual shift in authorities. Therefore, a constant shift in competencies has occurred. Furthermore, when one observes the increased bilateral approaches made by states at the national level, one can see that the normative aspects of governance are becoming more path-dependent, in that more restrictive action against asylum-seekers is becoming a common denominator (Byrne et. al. 2004). States on the border do not want to take on burden simply due to geopolitical circumstances and the interior states do not wish to pay more to equalize burden. Lastly, concerning the issue of outstanding authority, one should consider the intertwinement of politics spanning from regional to international. A highly complicating issue comes in the form of maritime

movement where polities often have the open interpretation of laws since much of maritime geopolitical authority is still without a governing body (Haddad 2008; Moreno-Lax 2011). Since much of the EU legislation concerning asylum is written in a manner of invitation, cooperation, and a *spirit* of solidarity, this has devolved the obligation and effectiveness of the governing departments not due to one department or branch governing better than the other, but due to an inconsistent coherency between the many parties involved in creating an effective, European system of asylum.

### *Convergence through Legislation*

Beyond the realm of institutional changeover and restructuring, the EU has in the last decade implemented an omnibus protocol system which ranges topics from reception and qualification criteria to emergency actions and integration/resettlement clauses. These common guidelines are but once again a step in the right direction towards creating a unified system of asylum, but there remain major issues concerning the logistics, semantics, and enforcement of these baseline directives. The directives will go into effect in the next years and therefore the impact/outcome components of these actions are still in a larger sense ungraspable. However, when one observes the content, stipulations, and enforcement capacities set out by the governing authorities, one can already see foreseeable problems and shortcomings of the legislation (Peers 2012). In an overall understanding of why this has occurred, one should not look further than the structural processes which have drafted and passed these directives; due to the specific political structuring of the EU branches of government, it is clear why such a low common denominator has been reached, thus,



providing a uniform but lacking set of directives, non-binding by nature and without much enforcement on behalf of the EU.

Some main points the EU directives set out have much to do with waiting periods, provisions of goods and services, and a general foundation for qualification. The waiting period which will be implemented is reasonable in determining that now processing should last longer than 6 months. This directive is especially fitting considering that most of the influx states are experiencing today are not of new migrants, but those who still have pending applications (I ask myself how one then can say this is an influx...). The directives concerning provision of goods and services contain much about the general provisions, but again, without oversight and enforcement of these directives, states are able to circumnavigate the quality and extent to which these goods and services are provided. As this section will later explore, a weakness in the directives concerning this area leave states in too much control as to what they provide asylum-seekers. Lastly, the directives also speak to qualification. This is by far the soundest aspect of the directives in that they set out a foundation which all nations can follow in discerning whether or not an asylum-seeker qualifies for asylum, regardless of which state he/she has entered or applied to. Regardless of the fact that the Geneva Convention has set these qualifications since 1951, the EU directives modernize qualifications in times which are greatly different from the middle 20<sup>th</sup> century. Overall, the intention of the directives is constructive, but in many regards, these directives mean nothing if there is insufficient oversight or enforcement of these directives.

### *The New Institutions and Instruments*

Structural reconfiguration and the new directives are only one side of the convergence efforts made by the European Union. There have also in the last decade been new institutions created to directly assess newer obstacles and objectives to the issue of asylum. The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) came into fruition in 2010 and is to be a unifying entity between the EU and national level governances. EASO's main approach to unifying these polities is through informational exchanges and, in a secondary sense, through support in processing asylum cases ("Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2012" 2013). Lastly, of due importance is the fact that the EU truly does retain much authority over the department which denotes an opportunity to express and implement mainly European perspectives and actions respectively. How the EASO plays into the measurement of effectiveness of the CEAS lies in the limited expanse of the department in the sense that it does not act in lieu of national processing centers. While arguably the department has not been in existence long enough for it to have clear spill-over effects and override path dependencies of national asylum systems, this truth remains an important piece of evidence of the suppressed authoritative powers of the EU in forming a unified system of asylum. In essence, the department is adding to effectiveness by increasing the overall coherency of national systems with the spread of information concerning influxes and migration patterns, but the small parameters of processing leave the national systems able to override the EU system. In this sense, if the department cannot override the national systems, then EASO is, much like FRONTEX, an underused institution.

Not only are the governing institutions playing a key role in the ineffectiveness of the CEAS, but instruments are also of great affect in the matter. Another recent development

towards converging systems is the European Refugee Fund (ERF). This fund is manifested through national allocation of funds and is therefore available to all contributing states. The main purpose of this instrument is to assist in decreasing the difference of financial burden between states of high and low migration flows. More so, the fund exists to better ensure that refugees have access to legal and social assistance as they apply and are processed. The most recent update of the allotted funds is from the time period of 2008 until 2013, wherein the fund had accumulated 630 million euros for disbursement in said time period. While this amount is indeed a great increase from the last overall funds made available to states, again the key to effectiveness is not only the availability of needed funds but the utilization of funds.

While the ERF is a step in the right direction, there remain some major flaws which hinder its capacity to truly create a strong affect in regard to the burden issue. Control of the money is of a main concern because as mentioned previously, both the EU and national levels have proven that a general consensus towards unified action is often hard to meet, thus, simply applying a slush fund for vague and ambiguous expenditures does not imply effectiveness (Thielemann 2005). This is by no means to detract from the existence of the funds, which is indeed a positive change and beneficial factor. How the money is utilized and by whom is of great concern in observing the effectiveness of such an instrument. Since the funds are distributed through shared competencies, there is a lacking uniformity in allocation of funds. For example, many nations have both a financing department in control of the contribution and allocation of funds per the request of a separate department dealing with migration solely. Because of these discrepancies, coherency is diminished and there is much room for the varied interpretation of interests between national departments.

Not only are there issues with coherency in the mechanisms fueling the ERF, but there is also an issue pertaining to the usage of funds. According to the structuring of this instrument, there are baseline funds and contributions which are created by an omnibus of statistical data pertaining to the amounts of first applications, granted protection, migration flows, resettled peoples, and number of effected returns. While these criteria are certainly proper in assessing the needs of various nations, the EU has decided that these funds provided by the ERF are to be run through national programs instead of through the European Asylum Support Office or another EU institution. Because of this decision, one can infer that the use of funds is only as good as the national offices which control asylum, and, since the states with the most need will receive the highest amount of funding, this action further funds deficient systems. As mentioned in the previous section, Italy has had major problems in maintaining a migration system which adheres to both international and EU law, resulting in what many have justifiably deemed as contributing to human rights violations. For the 2014-2020 set of funding, Italy will receive over 325 million euros, which is second only to the UK (“Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2012” 2013). How Italy will utilize these funds through *national* means is of great concern to all invested parties. Simply providing funds not only does not prove an effective system, but can clearly exasperate outstanding problems found in the national level, which the CEAS in many senses was created to resolve.

The current set of instruments the EU has at its disposal is not just in the form of funding, but also in the form of direct assistance. As a final example speaking to the area of convergence in instrumental terms is observable in the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the

European Union (fortunately and commonly known as FRONTEX). The agency has been in action for more than eight years now, but the overall impact of it in relation to the effectiveness of EU instruments is yet to be seen as highly effective. A main foundation for this argument is derived not from the institutional functionality of the agency itself, but rather, the EU legislation concerning in which manner the agency is to be used. Again, the cause of this problem is founded in the vague, abdicating nature of the EU legislation wherein the EU cannot seize full authority over the use of the agency. Instead, the EU has drafted legislation which states the use of FRONTEX is dependent on the request of additional manpower by nations either experiencing influx in illegal or dangerous migration patterns or in times of emergency. Most of the use of FRONTEX is in the areas of longstanding, high patterns of entry, namely, Greece and Italy. If the use of FRONTEX were of the discretion of the EU itself, then uniformity and convergence of systems would be much more effective rather than leaving each nation to utilize its own form of border control based on its own protocol legislation. In a larger scope, one can also argue that the agency is a waste of funds since the EU does not fully have control over the use of the agency, thus, the agency remains a passive entity to be funded constantly but used seldom.

In the sense of informational competencies of the EU, which is clearly of great importance in fighting illegal and nefarious forms of migration, coherency is institutionalized in the form of European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC), or in a more understandable form, the information database of fingerprints and biometrics compiled by the Commission. In one sense, the availability of this information is increasingly expanded to various crime fighting entities at the regional, national, and EU level, but in another sense, this instrument can also counteract the common directives established through the means of *red flagging* individuals.

In effect, if one is not processed according to the common directives set out by the EU, then this omniscient system will make reversing an error of processing much more difficult. Further complicating matters, the EU's guarantee of free legal aid has been insufficient mainly due to lacking funds ("Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2012" 2013). Without legal assistance, language assistance, or a common appeals system, these technologically advanced security systems create a deficient relationship between applicant and host country. In order for the informational systems to be truly effective, there must also be convergence of national systems as a foundation to which this information/legal system would then truly benefit the greater goods the EU wishes to obtain.

With the many changes which have occurred structural in the last years leading up to the second phase of the CEAS, there have clearly been path-dependencies which are too difficult for the EU to break. Though the creation of new instruments and institutions are indeed examples of the European prioritization of asylum, their effectiveness in bolstering an effective, unified system continues to be lacking. The provision of more binding policies, more specific use of funds, and a greater focus on the need for oversight and enforcement are all solutions to the structural problems the CEAS is experiencing.

### **Integration and Post-Asylum Processing Challenges:**

The last measurement of effectiveness of the EU asylum system I define are the efforts and implementation of integration programs, the degree to which EU authority affects civic assimilation, and the influence of the EU on national perspectives regarding refugees and state obligation. Without this measurement, inferring the effectiveness of the EU asylum system remains solely focused on before and during the process of application; what occurs

after the acceptance or denial of asylum to an applicant is a defining feature of the institution, for if a refugee cannot achieve a safer, better quality of life, then why have the institution of asylum at all?

### *The Biopsychosocial Approach of Measuring Health*

In the field of psychology, a paradigm of understanding the general health of an individual and the contributing factors to one's health is known as the biopsychosocial paradigm. Though this approach to understanding individual health is often utilized in addiction rehabilitation methods, it can also be implemented to assess the health of any individual. For the scope of this essay, one should not delve too deeply into the philosophical aspects of why this argumentation holds true, but suffice it to say, we all have vices, seek homeostasis, and work within this paradigm for the influences of our behavior (and thus health) are both internally and externally derived while most certainly interdependent upon another. The biopsychosocial approach claims that an individual's behavior is derived from biological influences (neurological, physiological, and organ systems), psychological influences (capacity of the brain and nervous systems, presence of psychological pathologies, and personality traits), and social influences (exogenously and endogenously derived social interactions; dyadic, familial, and interpersonal relationships; and integration/belongingness factors) (Frankel 2003). All of these influences attribute to the behavior of an individual, the overall health of an individual, and his/her interaction with other people.

In assessing the effectiveness of the EU efforts towards creating a better, more effective asylum system, it is of great use to utilize this paradigm in measuring the provisions of states to asylum seekers. Redundant as it may be, one should keep in mind that forced

migrants are not typically in the best of health in any of these realms of the paradigm. Refugees may be forced to leave because of biological reasons, such as agricultural deficiency or governances withholding resources resulting in starvation and other biological comorbidities derived therefrom. Norredam et. al. conducted research concerning the accessibility of healthcare to asylum-seekers upon entry and discovered that nearly half of member states are providing healthcare only in emergency circumstances and that there are practical barriers, such as language, which often decrease the accessibility of healthcare to asylum-seekers (Norredam et. al. 2005). In many other cases, refugees are fleeing warfare, persecution, and other acts inflicting stress disorders, depression, and many other psychological reactions to such atrocities. To only sparsely offer emergency care does not in large apply to those with psychological pathologies, and from this standpoint, states are only providing a bare minimum of health services. And lastly, one should not overlook the social aspect of the paradigm in forced migrants. Many have been separated or displaced from friends and families, witnessed loved ones tortured or murdered, and have lost their sense of security and belongingness in their point of origin. Social integration is not only a matter of individual health and prosperity as a citizen to a host country, but is also a security issue. Immigrants are inherently prone to ethnocentric violence. Without civil society and social integration programs, this form of conflict is not one which can be remedied with only policing, for this too is a liability to the state and does not truly deal with the core issues (Krell et. al. 1996). In order for the directives concerning protocol to increase effectiveness of the CEAS, the baseline directives and allocation of funds need to be better implemented to better care for the biological, psychological, and social health of all asylum-seekers. One ought to keep in mind that rarely is the case that a forced migrant has problems in only one



aspect of the paradigm, resulting in both the need for healthcare services and an often deeply complicated set off pathologies which may well be very difficult to cure (Farwell 2001). In measuring the effectiveness of the EU asylum system, it is of great importance to not only observe the human rights and convergence issues, but also to observe what the EU is doing to integrate asylum seekers in economic, social, and health terms.

### *Integration Efforts of the EU*

What is most perplexing of the entire issue of European asylum efforts is that the EU is often hindered if not entirely stopped from taking full authority of the area of refuge due to shared national interests to retain sovereignty in this area. More so, by taking authorities over solely EU level institutions, the spread of norms is increased in the sense of collective perception and spill-over effects, “Norms research suggests that the origin of many international norms lie not in the preexisting state interests but in the strongly held principled ideas (ideas about right and wrong) and the desire to convert others to those ideas (Sikkink 1998). A component which the EU could indeed strengthen without much national contradiction is in the area of integration. The creation of integration programs, basic fundamental entitlements via the ERF, and influencing national perspectives are all approaches which the EU could implement without member states having much political power to oppose these actions. Unfortunately, much of the focus is placed on issues directly related to before and during an applicant is processing, and, to the domestic issues explored in the second section.

First and foremost concerning this aspect of the EU’s attempts to reconcile integration of non-EU persons, one should consider the EU directives of protocol. Within this legislation

are directives concerning the entitlements, rights, and necessities of refugees. What is more complex about this facet of integration is the integration of refugees. Despite the general animosity held against refugees, While refugees do not provide as abundantly to a host country economically (this is not to say they never, but rather are less likely than one who chooses to migrate), refugees provide states with reinforcement of the values modern, democratic states maintain and project socially (Hatton 2004). In other words, refugees are clear evidence that the society both citizens and refugees live in is indeed a free, peaceful, and prosperous land. To further extend this argumentation, one should consider the dynamics which are tied to economic and civic assimilation. Without *social* inclusion, how could one then presume that an individual can or would desire to contribute to the collective whole economically or civically?

Directly related to this aspect of assimilation and inclusion are the possibilities of benefits and opportunities refugees can receive after gaining asylum. Relative to the issue of burden, integration provides a further conceptualization wherein states that face the influxes at the border are not the only states experiencing burden. There are also the states with high acceptance rates, and to these states, integration is a far more important aspect of an effective asylum system (Marshall 2007). The EU has worked to set out basic timelines for processing which in turn affect the right to work, receive basic health services, and secure a sound means of shelter. Furthermore, the EU has set out access to vocational training regardless of whether or not he/she has access to a labor market, basic healthcare and screenings are to be provided upon reception, and that educational services are to be granted relative to national trends. While these are a good foundation for assimilation following the biopsychosocial paradigm, they fall short of true effectiveness because of both the differences in social

provision of member states and the unbounded nature of the EU directives. A key example of this is found in the legislation of the baseline directives themselves. In the case of reception needs, the EU has made two negatively affecting mistakes: The right for nations to provide applicants with nearly the same benefits that nationals receive and the right to ask for a refund of these provisions the protected receive. The former is problematic in that political economies differ from one another; thus, one state may provide nationals with more benefits than other nations provide their citizens. From this standpoint one must observe the difference of social benefits from the states with high influx migration from the states with low influx migration. States which have high influx, namely those of the southern region of Europe, do not have systems of benefits which work on a sheer individual basis and, more importantly, the benefits are more so *buy-in* systems whereby one needs to contribute before merely receiving benefits (Ferrera 1996). This circumstance then makes for a lower yield of benefits to asylum seekers who do not have the right to contribute thus they will receive an inadequate form of assistance, which he/she may very well have to reimburse the state for anyway. The latter condition remains problematic because the insufficient integration of refugees may in fact make for untenable means through which one granted asylum would be able to reimburse a state for. The ultimate question in observation here is: If the goal of asylum is to provide protection and a better standard of living for a fleeing migrant, then how can it be that one will receive this *human right* without full civic and economic inclusion? The double standards and openness of interpretation of the EU directives concerning basic rights and entitlements make for an unsustainable standard of living which very well could result in further forced migration, even if the cause of migration has transformed itself from fleeing persecution to fleeing unlivable economic standards.

Another newly implemented approach to the CEAS is the European Integration Fund (EIF). This program is another more recent program which is similar to the ERF in that it is managed through shared competencies and is funded through allocated EU funds. The main goals of the fund are to better integrate non-EU citizens, which implicitly incorporates those who have been granted refuge by member states. The fund's most recent term of disposable funds spans from 2008-2013 in excess of 825 million euros (considerably larger than the ERF – but one should keep in mind the expanded demographical interests the EU has in this field for the recipients of this fund are not only refugees and asylum-orientated institutions and instruments). In measuring the effectiveness of the CEAS, the EIF is crucial to a deeper understanding of European interests.

As previously mentioned, the EIF is not merely aimed towards refugees but does indeed include them as recipients of funds put forth to integration programs. Because of this over-arching purpose of the EIF, the objective outcomes and impacts the fund seeks to achieve are that of an economic benefit, *not* that of an overly normative objective of integrating cultures and fostering solidarity between naturals and foreigners. Quite the contrary, this component of EU efforts to integrate foreigners is to reach an economic outcome of inclusion thus resulting in greater labor supply, diverse supply of skills and experiences, and additional revenue from the taxes paid by immigrants. This is a clear-cut, rational aim of the EU for if immigrants remain unassimilated, they will ultimately remain expenditure. As long as the EU rhetoric concerning integration focuses particularly on the economic benefits while nations continue to see refugees as economic liabilities, the EIF will continue to feed this contradictory relationship. Certainly the economic benefits are just as available with refugees as they are with migrants of free will and volition. More so, the

socio-cultural benefits of integration of both free and forced migrants is of great benefice in that the diversity provided by foreigners has the capability to reiterate in a collective sense the very ethos Europe proclaims in its rhetoric concerning modern, democratic principles.

The efforts to integrate foreigners in both rational and normative terms in order to reach greater assimilation economically, socially, and cultural are not increasing effectiveness of the EU asylum system because it treats free migrants differently from refugees, and the directives concerning provisions do not have the power to converge national systems whereby refugees would be treated more equally and in a more coherent manner. As mentioned before, integration is the key final step to ensuring an effective asylum system for the main goal in providing international protection is to provide protection and a better standard of living than the original state a migrant has fled. If the EU cannot take more steps to ensure integration as a direct result of EU action (rather than abdication to national levels of governance), then regardless of how efficient the asylum system may be, it will fail to reach the end goal which is indeed the main reason why this twenty year endeavor has continued.

### **Discussion and Conclusions:**

Within the next years, the CEAS will inevitably continue to grow. As I have explored in this thesis, there is still much to correct if the system is to be effectively mitigate issues concerning human rights, efficiency of converged systems, and integration of immigrants. Much relies on the EU's capacity to legislate more binding directives while also increasing oversight and enforcement of these protocols. After having explored these issues in greater depth, I argue that the current state of the CEAS is of low effectiveness in mitigating the

existing endogenous and exogenous challenges. It is imperative that the EU further invest in European level institutions and instruments, such as the ERF, EIF, and EASO while also seeking to differentiate and separate these structures from the national systems already in existence. The creation of new structures will be inevitable, but these structures ought not to be susceptible to the same political pathology deteriorating most of the CEAS: abdication of responsibility with the false perception that more restrictions bring forth less expenditure. In summation, the next policy cycle would be much more effective if convergence went beyond *invitation*, funding to EU endeavors were allocated and controlled fully by the EU itself, oversight and enforcement were increased with further involvement of third-party organizations as well as authorities controlled solely by the EU, and integration were recognized before, during, and after the asylum process takes place. To the last aspect listed in this broad prescription of plausible solutions, I remind the reader that the rights of all individuals remain and will continue to be the only real common denominator we as humans share. What a state can provide its own citizens, they most certainly can provide all, and more importantly, if this end is achieved, normative spill-over is the true end effect thus lessening the *burden* western states have already obliged themselves to take.

Asylum is by far one of the most complex issues governments are faced these days, and what should be simple in understanding (the need to protect those who cannot protect themselves) is indeed quite complicated when states confuse domestic priorities with collective, humanistic priorities. In order to better understand how states can more effectively govern the latter, the study of effectiveness of asylum systems is integral to these advancements and will without a doubt continue to be further developed in the decades to come.

## Appendix

### TABLES AND DATA:

Figure One

Annex C.5: Top 15 Countries of citizenship in terms of highest increases and decrease in total applicants for international protection in EU-27 2012; sorted in decreasing order of the number of highest changes

Highest increases in total applicants for international protection 2012/2011

	Total asylum applicants				New asylum applicants				Repeated asylum applicants			
	2012/2011	2012	2011		2012/2011	2012	2011		2012/2011	2012	2011	
1 Syria	16,225	206%	24,110	7,885	14,235	230%	20,430	6,195	1,160	108%	2,230	1,070
2 Russia	5,950	32%	24,280	18,330	4,755	38%	17,405	12,650	675	22%	3,730	3,055
3 Serbia	5,080	36%	19,060	13,980	3,025	29%	13,540	10,515	1,940	61%	5,105	3,165
4 Albania	4,405	144%	7,465	3,060	3,940	139%	6,780	2,840	385	203%	575	190
5 FYROM	4,080	74%	9,625	5,545	2,170	48%	6,690	4,520	1,875	204%	2,795	920
6 Pakistan	3,995	25%	19,695	15,700	190	1%	14,435	14,245	145	40%	505	360
7 Georgia	3,770	53%	10,830	7,060	3,680	61%	9,715	6,035	60	9%	735	675
8 Bosnia and Herz.	3,240	125%	5,835	2,595	2,630	113%	4,965	2,335	290	161%	470	180
9 Somalia	2,070	17%	14,265	12,195	1,580	15%	12,010	10,430	135	18%	885	750
10 DR Congo	2,000	32%	8,285	6,285	1,620	28%	7,380	5,760	365	86%	790	425
11 Iran	1,720	14%	13,585	11,865	1,290	13%	11,560	10,270	65	7%	1,040	975
12 Stateless	1,085	45%	3,510	2,425	1,020	50%	3,165	2,105	85	85%	185	100
13 Eritrea	700	12%	6,395	5,695	-55	-1%	5,495	5,550	35	32%	145	110
14 Morocco	660	34%	2,625	1,965	300	20%	1,835	1,535	40	57%	110	70
15 Montenegro	630	100%	1,260	630	545	104%	1,070	525	45	50%	135	90
Western Balkans	17,775	50%	53,455	35,680	11,840	42%	40,110	28,270	5,335	85%	11,590	6,255

Highest decreases in total applicants for international protection 2012/2011

	Total asylum applicants				New asylum applicants				Repeated asylum applicants			
	2012/2011	2012	2011		2012/2011	2012	2011		2012/2011	2012	2011	
1 Tunisia	-4,095	-65%	2,240	6,335	-4,980	-82%	1,065	6,045	5	8%	65	60
2 Nigeria	-4,020	-35%	7,450	11,470	-5,625	-53%	5,005	10,630	55	17%	375	320
3 Côte d'Ivoire	-2,720	-51%	2,645	5,365	-3,150	-64%	1,785	4,935	-185	-48%	200	385
4 Ghana	-2,255	-52%	2,050	4,305	-3,030	-73%	1,145	4,175	-25	-42%	35	60
5 Bangladesh	-2,000	-24%	6,290	8,290	-3,055	-41%	4,460	7,515	375	56%	1,040	665
6 Iraq	-1,995	-13%	13,175	15,170	-1,810	-14%	10,920	12,730	5	0%	1,325	1,320
7 Armenia	-1,585	-22%	5,520	7,105	-1,605	-28%	4,040	5,645	-160	-13%	1,065	1,225
8 Libya	-1,445	-50%	1,445	2,890	-1,400	-52%	1,300	2,700	-45	-56%	35	80
9 Mali	-1,210	-33%	2,415	3,625	-1,995	-56%	1,540	3,535	0	0%	70	70
10 Comoros	-710	-50%	705	1,415	-715	-52%	670	1,385	10	40%	35	25
11 Guinea	-610	-10%	5,635	6,245	-1,230	-23%	4,235	5,465	390	54%	1,110	720
12 Sudan	-610	-10%	5,635	6,245	-1,230	-23%	4,235	5,465	390	54%	1,110	720
13 China	-495	-9%	5,045	5,540	-556	-11%	4,284	4,840	40	9%	490	450
14 Burkina Faso	-495	-50%	500	995	-620	-65%	335	955	10	25%	50	40
15 Niger	-480	-58%	345	825	-545	-70%	235	780	10	29%	45	35

Data Source:

• Eurostat (ER 862/2007), data extracted on 08.05.2013. Data from the Netherlands not yet available at Eurostat database, provided separately to EASO.

Figure Two

Annex C.4: Top 30 Countries of citizenship of total applicants for international protection in EU-27 in 2012, numbers and changes 2011-2012; sorted in decreasing order of the number of total applicants in 2012

	Total asylum applicants				New asylum applicants				Repeated asylum applicants			
	2012	2011	2012/2011	%	2012	2011	2012/2011	%	2012	2011	2012/2011	%
1 Afghanistan	28,005	28,015	-10	0%	19,600	22,130	-2,530	-11%	2,010	1,325	685	52%
2 Russia	24,280	18,330	5,950	32%	17,405	12,650	4,755	38%	3,730	3,055	675	22%
3 Syria	24,110	7,885	16,225	206%	20,430	6,195	14,235	230%	2,230	1,070	1,160	108%
4 Pakistan	19,695	15,700	3,995	25%	14,435	14,245	190	1%	505	360	145	40%
5 Serbia	19,060	13,980	5,080	36%	13,540	10,515	3,025	29%	5,105	3,165	1,940	61%
6 Somalia	14,265	12,195	2,070	17%	12,010	10,430	1,580	15%	885	750	135	18%
7 Iran	13,585	11,865	1,720	14%	11,560	10,270	1,290	13%	1,040	975	65	7%
8 Iraq	13,175	15,170	-1,995	-13%	10,920	12,730	-1,810	-14%	1,325	1,320	5	0%
9 Georgia	10,830	7,060	3,770	53%	9,715	6,035	3,680	61%	735	675	60	9%
10 Kosovo	10,210	9,870	340	3%	7,065	7,535	-470	-6%	2,510	1,710	800	47%
11 FYROM	9,625	5,545	4,080	74%	6,690	4,520	2,170	48%	2,795	920	1,875	204%
12 DR Congo	8,285	6,285	2,000	32%	7,380	5,760	1,620	28%	790	425	365	86%
13 Albania	7,465	3,060	4,405	144%	6,780	2,840	3,940	139%	575	190	385	203%
14 Nigeria	7,450	11,470	-4,020	-35%	5,005	10,630	-5,625	-53%	375	320	55	17%
15 Sri Lanka	7,330	7,375	-45	-1%	5,945	6,460	-515	-8%	1,260	875	385	44%
16 Eritrea	6,395	5,695	700	12%	5,495	5,550	-55	-1%	145	110	35	32%
17 Bangladesh	6,290	8,290	-2,000	-24%	4,460	7,515	-3,055	-41%	1,040	665	375	56%
18 Turkey	6,210	6,455	-245	-4%	4,540	5,010	-470	-9%	885	935	-50	-5%
19 Bosnia and Herz.	5,835	2,595	3,240	125%	4,965	2,335	2,630	113%	470	180	290	161%
20 Guinea	5,635	6,245	-610	-10%	4,235	5,465	-1,230	-23%	1,110	720	390	54%
21 Armenia	5,520	7,105	-1,585	-22%	4,040	5,645	-1,605	-28%	1,065	1,225	-160	-13%
22 China	5,045	5,540	-495	-9%	4,284	4,840	-556	-11%	490	450	40	9%
23 Algeria	4,805	4,385	420	10%	3,740	3,525	215	6%	340	300	40	13%
24 Stateless	3,510	2,425	1,085	45%	3,165	2,105	1,060	50%	185	100	85	85%
25 Unknown	3,315	3,095	220	7%	2,140	2,475	-335	-14%	815	515	300	58%
26 India	3,220	2,785	435	16%	2,575	2,115	460	22%	175	185	-10	-5%
27 Egypt	2,650	2,100	550	26%	1,980	1,860	120	6%	95	85	10	12%
28 Côte d'Ivoire	2,645	5,365	-2,720	-51%	1,785	4,935	-3,150	-64%	200	385	-185	-48%
29 Morocco	2,625	1,965	660	34%	1,835	1,535	300	20%	110	70	40	57%
30 Sudan	2,605	3,130	-525	-17%	2,265	2,895	-630	-22%	220	145	75	52%
<b>Western Balkans</b>	<b>55,455</b>	<b>35,680</b>	<b>19,775</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>40,110</b>	<b>28,270</b>	<b>11,840</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>11,590</b>	<b>6,255</b>	<b>5,335</b>	<b>85%</b>

Data Source:

- Eurostat (ER 862/2007), data extracted on 08.05.2013. Data from the Netherlands not yet available at Eurostat database, provided separately to EASO.



Figure Three

Annex C.2: Applicants for international protection in EU-27 by Member State and changes in 2011-2012; sorted in decreasing order of the change in the number of total applicants 2012/2011

	Total asylum applicants				New asylum applicants				Repeated Asylum applicants			
	2012/2011	2012	2011		2012/2011	2012	2011		2012/2011	2012	2011	
Germany	24,305	46%	77,650	53,345	18,800	41%	64,540	45,740	5,505	72%	13,110	7,605
Sweden	14,235	48%	43,945	29,710	14,240	48%	43,930	29,690	-5	-2%	15	20
France	4,120	7%	61,455	57,335	2,140	4%	54,280	52,140	1,980	38%	7,175	5,195
Poland	3,850	56%	10,755	6,905	4,000	80%	8,985	4,985	-150	-8%	1,770	1,920
Austria	2,995	21%	17,450	14,455								
Denmark	2,090	52%	6,075	3,985	2,090	52%	6,075	3,985	0		0	0
United Kingdom	1,810	7%	28,260	26,450	1,955	8%	27,410	25,455	-145	-1%	850	995
Romania	790	46%	2,510	1,720	725	43%	2,420	1,695	65	260%	90	25
Bulgaria	495	56%	1,385	890	525	74%	1,230	705	-30	-16%	155	185
Hungary	460	27%	2,155	1,695								
Greece	265	3%	9,575	9,310	265	3%	9,575	9,310	0		0	0
Slovakia	240	49%	730	490	230	72%	550	320	10	6%	180	170
Malta	190	10%	2,080	1,890	195	10%	2,060	1,865	-5	-20%	20	25
Finland	140	5%	3,115	2,975			2,920		195		195	
Lithuania	120	23%	645	525	155	38%	560	405	-35	-29%	85	120
Portugal	20	7%	295	275				275				0
Estonia	10	15%	75	65	10	15%	75	65	0		0	0
Czech Republic	0	0%	755	755	30	6%	515	485	-30	-11%	240	270
Slovenia	-55	-15%	305	360	-45	-15%	260	305	-10	-18%	45	55
Luxembourg	-100	-5%	2,055	2,155	80	4%	2,000	1,920	-180	-77%	55	235
Cyprus	-135	-8%	1,635	1,770	-135	-9%	1,590	1,745	20	80%	45	25
Latvia	-135	-40%	205	340	-145	-43%	190	335	10	200%	15	5
Ireland	-335	-26%	955	1,290	-340	-27%	940	1,280	5	50%	15	10
Spain	-855	-25%	2,565	3,420	-620	-21%	2,355	2,975	-235	-53%	210	445
Netherlands	-1,500	-10%	13,100	14,600	-1,900	-16%	9,665	11,565	400	13%	3,435	3,035
Belgium	-3,985	-12%	28,285	32,270	-7,135	-28%	18,450	25,585	3,150	47%	9,835	6,685
Italy	-16,765	-49%	17,350	34,115				34,115				0
EU 27 MS	32,260	11%	335,365	303,105	3,630	1%	260,575	256,945	10,515	39%	37,540	27,025
Switzerland	4,760	20%	28,640	23,880	6,520	34%	25,965	19,445	-1,760	-40%	2,675	4,435
Norway	730	8%	9,785	9,055								
EU+	37,750	11%	373,790	336,040	10,150	4%	286,540	276,390	8,755	28%	40,215	31,460

Data Source:

\* Eurostat (ER 862/2007), data extracted on 08.05.2013. Data from the Netherlands not yet available at Eurostat database, provided separately to EASO.

Figure Four

Annex C.1: Applicants for international protection in EU-27 by Member State and % share in EU-27 in 2011-2012; sorted in decreasing order of the number of total applicants in 2012

	Total asylum applicants				New asylum applicants				Repeated Asylum applicants			
	2012	2011	% in EU	% in EU	2012	2011	% in EU	% in EU	2012	2011	% in EU	% in EU
1 Germany	77,650	53,345	23%	18%	64,540	45,740	25%	18%	13,110	7,605	35%	28%
2 France	61,455	57,335	18%	19%	54,280	52,140	21%	20%	7,175	5,195	19%	19%
3 Sweden	43,945	29,710	13%	10%	43,930	29,690	17%	12%	15	20	0%	0%
4 Belgium	28,285	32,270	8%	11%	18,450	25,585	7%	10%	9,835	6,685	26%	25%
5 United Kingdom	28,260	26,450	8%	9%	27,410	25,455	11%	10%	850	995	2%	4%
6 Austria	17,450	14,455	5%	5%								
7 Italy	17,350	34,115	5%	11%		34,115		13%		0		0%
8 Netherlands	13,100	14,600	4%	5%	9,665	11,565	4%	5%	3,435	3,035	9%	11%
9 Poland	10,755	6,905	3%	2%	8,985	4,985	3%	2%	1,770	1,920	5%	7%
10 Greece	9,575	9,310	3%	3%	9,575	9,310	4%	4%	0	0	0%	0%
11 Denmark	6,075	3,985	2%	1%	6,075	3,985	2%	2%	0	0	0%	0%
12 Finland	3,115	2,975	1%	1%	2,920		1%		195		1%	
13 Spain	2,565	3,420	1%	1%	2,355	2,975	1%	1%	210	445	1%	2%
14 Romania	2,510	1,720	1%	1%	2,420	1,695	1%	1%	90	25	0%	0%
15 Hungary	2,155	1,695	1%	1%								
16 Malta	2,080	1,890	1%	1%	2,060	1,865	1%	1%	20	25	0%	0%
17 Luxembourg	2,055	2,155	1%	1%	2,000	1,920	1%	1%	55	235	0%	1%
18 Cyprus	1,635	1,770	0%	1%	1,590	1,745	1%	1%	45	25	0%	0%
19 Bulgaria	1,385	890	0%	0%	1,230	705	0%	0%	155	185	0%	1%
20 Ireland	955	1,290	0%	0%	940	1,280	0%	0%	15	10	0%	0%
21 Czech Republic	755	755	0%	0%	515	485	0%	0%	240	270	1%	1%
22 Slovakia	730	490	0%	0%	550	320	0%	0%	180	170	0%	1%
23 Lithuania	645	525	0%	0%	560	405	0%	0%	85	120	0%	0%
24 Slovenia	305	360	0%	0%	260	305	0%	0%	45	55	0%	0%
25 Portugal	295	275	0%	0%		275		0%		0		0%
26 Latvia	205	340	0%	0%	190	335	0%	0%	15	5	0%	0%
27 Estonia	75	65	0%	0%	75	65	0%	0%	0	0	0%	0%
<b>EU 27 MS</b>	<b>335,365</b>	<b>303,105</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>260,575</b>	<b>256,945</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>37,540</b>	<b>27,025</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
Switzerland	28,640	23,880			25,965	19,445			2,675	4,435		
Norway	9,785	9,055										
<b>EU+</b>	<b>373,790</b>	<b>336,040</b>			<b>286,540</b>	<b>276,390</b>			<b>40,215</b>	<b>31,460</b>		

Data Source:

- Eurostat (ER 862/2007), data extracted on 08.05.2013. Data from the Netherland not yet available at Eurostat database, provided separately to EASO.

Figure Five

<b>Asylum &amp; Migration Fund</b> €3.85 bn	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Union actions</li> <li>• Emergency Measures</li> <li>• EMN</li> <li>• Technical Assistance</li> </ul>		
	± 16% (€637 m)	Basic amounts (74%) (Fixed amounts + Statistics)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CEAS</li> <li>• Integration / Legal Migration</li> <li>• Return</li> </ul>
	National Programmes ± 84% (€3.23 bn)	Variable amounts (21%) (Willingness of Member States to develop specific actions)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Specific actions (Annex II)</li> <li>• Resettlement</li> <li>• Relocation</li> </ul>
		Additional amount (5%) (mid-term review)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Specific needs</li> </ul>

Figure Six

	Asylum	Integration	Return	Border Controls	External Dimension
2007 - 2013	European Refugee Fund	European Integration Fund	European Return Fund	European Border Fund	No Funds
					External cooperation funds
2014 - 2020	European Migration and Asylum Fund (AMF)			European Internal Security Fund (ISF)	AMF and ISF
					External cooperation funds

Figure Seven

Table 4: Preferred Level for Decisions on Immigration and Refugee Policy in the European Social Survey 2002/3

	International level	European level	International or European level	Regional, national or local level
Austria	28.4	29.7	58.0	42.0
Belgium	39.8	34.0	73.8	26.2
Czech Republic	35.5	26.3	61.8	38.2
Denmark	18.6	28.9	47.4	52.6
Finland	14.0	17.6	31.6	68.4
France	39.9	30.9	70.9	29.1
Germany	24.1	31.5	55.6	44.4
Greece	33.3	29.9	63.1	36.9
Hungary	23.4	23.6	47.1	52.9
Ireland	23.6	20.9	44.5	55.5
Italy	30.8	31.1	61.9	38.1
Luxembourg	36.4	27.2	63.6	36.4
Netherlands	37.4	35.0	72.4	27.6
Poland	49.2	23.4	72.7	27.3
Portugal	39.8	31.3	71.0	29.0
Slovenia	31.3	29.4	60.7	39.3
Spain	44.4	22.1	66.6	33.4
Sweden	17.5	21.3	38.8	61.2
United Kingdom	31.8	15.9	47.7	52.3
Average	31.5	26.8	58.4	41.6

Source ESS Round 1, edition 6/.2 from Norwegian Social Science Data Services at: <http://ess.nsd.uib.no/>.



Figure Eight

Table 2: Attitudes in the European Social Survey 2002/3

Country	Country has more than its fair share of people applying for refugee status		Government should be generous judging applications for refugee status	
	% agree	% disagree	% agree	% disagree
Austria	56.3	21.7	29.7	43.7
Belgium	69.6	14.2	17.9	59.5
Czech Republic	67.2	11.4	14.3	62.5
Denmark	46.2	35.2	30.7	50.2
Finland	41.9	33.9	33.4	33.1
France	62.8	15.5	62.0	18.7
Germany	64.9	15.4	15.1	60.8
Greece	89.2	3.5	44.3	30.9
Hungary	63.8	16.6	12.3	64.8
Ireland	78.9	8.8	55.5	21.1
Italy	54.6	16.4	26.2	38.1
Luxembourg	75.9	11.2	30.9	45.6
Netherlands	68.2	14.5	10.2	74.9
Poland	40.3	25.6	63.1	13.0
Portugal	56.5	17.6	59.0	12.9
Slovenia	64.4	11.7	19.6	49.4
Spain	64.5	15.0	48.3	19.6
Sweden	47.2	22.1	41.5	23.1
United Kingdom	82.2	5.9	28.0	46.6
Country average	62.9	16.6	33.8	40.5

Source ESS Round 1, edition 6/2 from Norwegian Social Science Data Services at: <http://ess.nsd.uib.no/>.

Figure Nine


Table 1

Sources Of Trauma: Events Identified by Participants as Most Traumatic

Pre-flight	During Flight	In Exile
Active conflict/combat	Fear itself	Personal threats, violence:
Bombardment, air raids	Fear of capture by the enemy	Persecution
Shooting	Actual encounters with enemy troops	Insults and name-calling
Presence of enemy troops	Encounters with soldiers from rival liberation groups	Cruelty and injustice
Persecution or harassment by occupying forces	Animals and poisonous snakes encountered in crossing the wilderness	Beatings by camp guards, police, or military
Burning of houses	Burning of houses in villages en route by the occupying troops	Harassment and/or denial of access to transportation, jobs
Massacre of villagers	Bandits	Burning of Eritrean schools and imprisonment of Eritrean teachers
Slaughter, fear of slaughter	None	Beatings by local people when gathering wood for cooking fuel
Execution of family members		Separation from relatives in homeland
Murder of militia members		Subsistence crises/deprivation:
Death threats to family members		No money
Death, both feared and observed		Hunger
Fear itself		No work
Sexual abuse and threats to girls and women (observed and feared)		No status as a refugee—no access to land or work
*Amputation: Loss of limbs (observed and feared)		Not knowing the language
Looting or destruction of livestock and crops		Fear of Islamic fundamentalist action in camps
None		None


## Figure Ten

Figure 1  
Asylum Applications to the EU by Source Region, 1980-2003



Source: UNHCR (2001a), Tables I.19, II.21 and III.28; UNHCR (2004), Table C.4.

Figure 2  
EU Asylum Policy Index, 1980-1999



Source: Hatton (2004).

## Figure Eleven

Table 2: Attitudes in the European Social Survey 2002/3

Country	Country has more than its fair share of people applying for refugee status		Government should be generous judging applications for refugee status	
	% agree	% disagree	% agree	% disagree
Austria	56.3	21.7	29.7	43.7
Belgium	69.6	14.2	17.9	59.5
Czech Republic	67.2	11.4	14.3	62.5
Denmark	46.2	35.2	30.7	50.2
Finland	41.9	33.9	33.4	33.1
France	62.8	15.5	62.0	18.7
Germany	64.9	15.4	15.1	60.8
Greece	89.2	3.5	44.3	30.9
Hungary	63.8	16.6	12.3	64.8
Ireland	78.9	8.8	55.5	21.1
Italy	54.6	16.4	26.2	38.1
Luxembourg	75.9	11.2	30.9	45.6
Netherlands	68.2	14.5	10.2	74.9
Poland	40.3	25.6	63.1	13.0
Portugal	56.5	17.6	59.0	12.9
Slovenia	64.4	11.7	19.6	49.4
Spain	64.5	15.0	48.3	19.6
Sweden	47.2	22.1	41.5	23.1
United Kingdom	82.2	5.9	28.0	46.6
Country average	62.9	16.6	33.8	40.5

Source: ESS Round 1, edition 6/2 from Norwegian Social Science Data Services at: <http://ess.nsd.uib.no/>.

Figure Twelve

Table n° 1.

Member State (MS)	External Borders Fund		Return Fund		European Refugee Fund		European Integration Fund		Solidarity Programme	
	Total 2007-2011	% of MS totals	Total 2008-2011	% of MS totals	Total 2008-2011	% of MS totals	Total 2007-2011	% of MS totals	Total 2007-2011	% of MS Totals
Austria	8.442.614 €	0,97	7.786.258 €	2,53	19.270.313 €	5,65%	8.595.933 €	1,92	44.095.118 €	2,24
Belgium	9.824.765 €	1,13	13.491.237 €	4,38	14.982.449 €	4,39%	9.328.501 €	2,07	47.626.952 €	2,42
Bulgaria	13.950.799 €	1,60	2.766.736 €	0,90	2.790.046 €	0,82%	3.666.146 €	0,82	23.083.726 €	1,17
Cyprus	14.040.530 €	1,62	4.840.330 €	1,57	6.838.782 €	2,01%	4.371.469 €	1,02	30.091.111 €	1,53
Czech Republic	9.447.920 €	1,09	4.139.218 €	1,34	4.234.424 €	1,24%	10.813.644 €	2,40	28.636.204 €	1,46
Denmark	4.315.396 €	0,50							4.315.396 €	0,22
Estonia	15.594.520 €	1,80	2.083.721 €	0,68	2.014.205 €	0,59%	4.833.465 €	1,08	24.525.912 €	1,25
Finland	28.917.754 €	3,33	2.712.046 €	0,88	8.817.007 €	2,59%	4.677.788 €	1,04	45.124.595 €	2,30
France	62.184.829 €	7,17	34.513.360 €	11,20	40.018.672 €	11,73%	38.050.457 €	8,02	172.767.318 €	8,79
Germany	42.768.968 €	4,93	15.411.899 €	5,00	39.587.353 €	11,61%	61.704.687 €	13,75	159.472.896 €	8,12
Greece	119.037.305 €	13,72	52.242.014 €	16,96	14.759.821 €	4,33%	12.470.570 €	2,78	198.509.710 €	10,10
Hungary	33.767.136 €	3,89	3.661.329 €	1,19	4.145.879 €	1,22%	6.999.594 €	1,56	48.573.939 €	2,47
Ireland			2.546.771 €	0,83	6.956.580 €	2,04%	5.173.109 €	1,15	14.676.459 €	0,75
Iceland	190.218 €	0,02							190.218 €	0,01
Italy	112.757.272 €	12,99	25.587.542 €	8,31	22.236.090 €	6,52%	77.549.528 €	17,48	238.130.423 €	12,12
Latvia	9.485.365 €	1,09	2.158.371 €	0,70	2.029.950 €	0,60%	5.422.663 €	1,43	20.096.349 €	1,02
Lithuania*	18.192.082 €	2,10	2.397.111 €	0,78	2.297.989 €	0,67%	3.643.988 €	0,81	26.531.170 €	1,35
Luxembourg	287.920 €	0,03	1.345.227 €	0,44	2.056.571 €	0,60%	2.726.433 €	0,61	6.416.150 €	0,33
Malta	34.414.837 €	3,97	2.847.680 €	0,92	4.200.776 €	1,23%	2.669.576 €	0,60	44.132.870 €	2,25
Netherlands	20.263.969 €	2,34	14.933.800 €	4,85	15.594.599 €	4,57%	10.751.280 €	2,40	61.543.647 €	3,13
Norway	5.285.983 €	0,61							5.285.983 €	0,27
Poland	41.422.092 €	4,77	9.388.530 €	3,05	9.605.751 €	2,82%	9.753.952 €	2,17	70.170.325 €	3,57
Portugal	15.067.748 €	1,74	3.952.478 €	1,28	1.847.353 €	0,54%	10.275.101 €	2,28	31.142.680 €	1,58
Romania	22.554.225 €	2,60	4.161.258 €	1,35	2.730.771 €	0,80%	4.485.189 €	1,00	33.931.444 €	1,73
Slovakia	5.548.801 €	0,64	3.731.112 €	1,21	4.267.157 €	1,25%	3.150.123 €	0,70	16.697.193 €	0,85
Slovenia	26.413.735 €	3,04	4.156.573 €	1,35	2.467.806 €	0,72%	4.321.641 €	0,96	37.359.755 €	1,90
Spain	179.323.908 €	20,66	32.673.439 €	10,61	6.318.706 €	1,85%	66.812.626 €	14,65	285.128.880 €	14,51
Sweden	6.656.777 €	0,77	7.368.330 €	2,39	60.153.005 €	17,64%	9.607.677 €	2,13	83.785.790 €	4,26
Switzerland	7.713.651 €	0,89							7.713.651 €	0,39
United Kingdom			47.173.639 €	15,31	40.799.508 €	12,29%	67.311.661 €	14,96	155.284.809 €	7,90
<b>Member States' Totals</b>	<b>867.781.320 €</b>		<b>308.070.000 €</b>		<b>341.021.555 €</b>		<b>448.167.000 €</b>		<b>1.965.039.875 €</b>	
Community actions	55.958.680,00 €		14.930.000		25.007.048 €		33.733.000 €		129.628.728 €	
Specific actions	35.000.000,00 €								35.000.000 €	
Transit Scheme (to be added to allocation for Lithuania)	76.000.000,00 €								76.000.000 €	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1.034.740.000,00 €</b>	<b>46,91</b>	<b>323.000.000 €</b>	<b>14,64</b>	<b>366.028.603 €</b>	<b>16,58</b>	<b>481.900.000 €</b>	<b>21,85</b>	<b>2.205.668.603 €</b>	<b>100</b>

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