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Japan's Southward Advance and Her Rapprochement with the Soviet Union, 1939-1941*

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I

The conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact on 22 August 1939 caused the immediate breakdown of the ongoing Japanese-German negotiations for an alliance directed against the Soviet Union, making closer ties with Germany impossible for the moment. Most of Japanese political and military leaders felt Germany betrayed them by violating the spirit of the Anti-Commintern Pact of 1936.

Soon after the signing of Non-aggression Pact, the Japanese army immediately carried out a re-examination of foreign policy. Three policy options were debated. Firstly to come to terms with the Soviet Union and form a Japanese-Soviet-German alliance; and secondly a conciliatory policy with Great Britain, the United States and France. The third option was a policy of non-intervention in the European war. Eventually, Japanese government policy settled on option three that is non-intervention. The army's stand in the course of the evolution of this policy is one of great interest.

Even though the German-Soviet Pact had been signed the Japanese army did not believe that Japan and Germany had necessarily entered into an antagonistic relationship. There was no alternation in the perception that as for the goal of "defense against communism" Japan and Germany

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were on common ground. However, the German-Soviet rapprochement also demonstrated a case of the possibility of anti-communist ideology being subordinated to "power politics" lay in how to use the change in the international situation arising from the German-Soviet Pact to settle the China war.

The Japanese army anticipated that over the later half of 1938 through to the summer of 1939 Anglo-German antagonism would increase and that by around 1942 a "World war" break out between the Japan-German alliance and a Anglo-Soviet alliance. In East Asia this "World War" would take the form of a Japanese-Soviet war. Accordingly, in order to prepare for this Japanese-Soviet war there needed to be an early settlement to the China war and a strengthening of military preparedness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. However, following the carrying out of military operations in the China war in the autumn of 1938 any means of settling the war all but disappeared. The army emphasized the view that the Chungking (Chiang kai-shek) government being able to stubbornly continue resisting was based upon the diplomatic and military aid provided by third nations, in particular Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. In accordance with this line of thinking bringing on end to the British, French and Russian assistance to Chinese government was a precondition to settling the China war.

Taking this viewpoint, option one was by for the most desirable. This was because the army anticipated that option one, that is a Japan-German-Soviet alliance, would have the effort of putting pressure on Great Britain and also being an end to the Soviet assistance to Chinese government. In particular the middle-ranking officers within the army supported this policy line. This due to their heightened perception that the present Japan and Germany's common enemy was Great Britain rather than the Soviet Union. Throughout the Anglo-Japanese Tokyo Conference on the question of the blockade by the Japanese army of the British concession in Tientin (in July 1939), the army's anti-British sentiments rose and Britain was seen as being the nation most responsible for hindering a settlement to the China war. The army noted Germany started in the Spring 1939 to make contact with the Soviet Union but its response to these important
moves slow. One can think of the reason for this as being because the army's deepening perception of Britain rather than the Soviet Union as being Japan and Germany's common enemy. Actually, on 22 August it was suggested to Ambassador Oshima Hiroshi by State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker that German was in a position to act as an intermediary in improving Japanese-Soviet relations and that it was necessary to switch the common enemy of Japan and Germany from the Soviet Union to Great Britain.

Eventually, for two reasons option one was not adopted by either the army or by the political leaders. Firstly the outcome of the British-German war was unclear and secondly, there was a deepening sense of suspicion toward Germany and that in domestic politics there was a strengthening trend to being pro-Anglo-American elements rather than pro-German elements.

The Third option, non-intervention policy, meant that Japan would not commit herself to any of the belligerent powers in the European conflicts. On the other hand, this option indicated an important policy course in regard to co-operating with the Soviet Union and the United States which still un-involved in the European war. Especially, the policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union came to be taken rather seriously because of impact of the Nomomhan Incident which turned out to be a total defeat of the Kwantung Army at the end of August. However, this is not to say that the middle-rank officers relinquished option one. In the early Summer of 1940 Germany launched Blitzkrieg on the European front and within Japan the power of the pro-Anglo-American elements weakened, once again this first option was proposed by them.

One objective of this essay is to re-examine the role of the middle-rank officers within the army and the navy in the policy-making process of Japan's Southward advance from the early summer of 1940 to the summer of 1941. A Second objective is to gain further insight about the interaction of Japanese plans to terminate the war in China and the development of "Southern advance and Northern defense" policy.
The outbreak of the European war in September 1939 forced the western powers with colonial possessions in Southeast Asia to become totally preoccupied with Europe. This opened up a magnificent vista for Japan for aggressive expansion into the Southern Area. Suddenly it seemed quite within the bounds of possibility to conquer the Dutch East Indies, French Indochina, British Malaya and Singapore. But such a radical switch in Japan's national policy, could hardly win the support of the more cautious naval and army leaders. In fact, their policy was based on the premise that Japan must not become involved in the European war. Instead, it gave foremost priority to a speedy bilateral settlement of the China war, emphasizing to make third parties stop their assistance to the Chungking government through diplomatic and military means. This non-intervention policy endorsed by the Foreign, Army, and Navy Ministers in late December.\(^8\)

In the early summer of 1940 Japan's policy of non-intervention in the European war and the highest priority given to a bilateral settlement of the China war underwent a sudden turnabout. The smashing German successes in the West during May-June had so dazzled Japanese officials as to generate a fever for an 'opportunistic' southern advance that would take advantage of an imminent (so it was believed) German victory. Significantly, the initiative in translating this mood into national policy was taken by the middle rank officers within the army. It needs to be emphasized here that the army's new southern policy had little in common with the navy's plan; the latter regarded expansion into the Southeast Asia area as quite distinct and separate from the China war. On the other hand, the army tended to subsume southeast Asia under the program to construct the New Order in East Asia. The problem the army faced was how to terminate the war with China by linking it with a southward advance that, in turn, would involve Japan in the European war.

Counting on an early German invasion of the British Isles, a handful of middle-ranking officers in the army hastily drew up a blueprint for forceful southern advance centering on the capture of Britain's colonial
possessions in the Far East. The essence of the army's first draft of a national policy paper (3 July) was that Japan should first conclude the China Incident and then strike southward; but it could also be construed to imply that, if presented with a favorable opportunity, Japan might attack Britain's Far Eastern possessions. The army planners expected the German invasion of Britain to take place in late August.\(^{(9)}\)

This army draft was referred to the navy on 4 July. The navy, the traditional exponent of the strategy of 'defend the north, advance to the south', accepted the army draft 'in its general outline', but pointed out that its greatest weakness was that it 'did not consider seriously enough' relations with the United States. The army took a position that Japan would be able to start a war with Britain without provoking American entry; thus it stated that military operations would be 'restricted insofar as possible to Britain alone'. But the navy, convinced of the 'inseparable connections between Britain and the United States', stressed that any attack on Britain's Far Eastern possessions could lead directly to war with the United States. At this point, this was the central difference between the army and the navy.\(^{(10)}\)

The army, committed to the China war far more deeply than the navy, had been making agonizing efforts in search of an early settlement. By early 1940 the army leaders had come round to the conclusion that it would be impossible to defeat Chiang Kai-shek Government by military means. Did the army abandon the settlement of the China war by the summer of 1940 and turn instead to a forceful implementation of a southern advance? Or were the army planners developing some effective measures to terminate the war in China by negotiation and/or force?

Since the autumn of 1938, the army, refraining from large-scale military operations, had been focusing its efforts on settlement of the China war through political means. This aim was to be attained in two different ways; establishment of a puppet regime under pro-Japanese Wang Ching-wei; and direct negotiations with the Chiang Kai-shek government on Chungking. The expectations the army held for collaboration with Wang Ching-wei gradually faded as the weakness of his political and economic base became increasingly apparent. By late 1939 the Japanese army came
to believe that the only chance for a negotiated settlement was simultaneously to deal with the Chiang Kai-shek government.

From May to June in 1940 the negotiations with the representations of Chungking dealt with concrete conditions for a cease-fire. The Japanese army leaders placed great hopes on the success of negotiations with Chungking, although eventually they fell through in October 1940. The significance of these peace maneuvers was that while they lasted they gave promise of a cease-fire with China; this expectation, in turn, became an important factor which attracted the army planners to the southern advance policy.\(^{(11)}\) While the peace maneuvers in China set the stage, the more important factor that triggered the army's decision for southward expansion was the optimistic assumption that Japan would be able to settle the China war by linking southward expansion with the anticipated German conquest of the British Isles.\(^{(12)}\) It was against such a background that a southward advance policy was decided upon. Essentially it was based on the army's draft of 3 July 1940. Approved by the top army and navy leaders, this policy was sanctioned on 27 July 1940 by Japanese Government.\(^{(13)}\)

III

The implementation of the southward advance policy of July 1940 depended to a large extent on improvement of relations with Germany and the Soviet Union. As for Germany, Japanese leaders (especially in the army) considered it essential to strengthen ties with the Nazis (in the form of a military alliance) in order to establish the New Order in East Asia and to dominate Southeast Asia. At the same time, however, there was a fear among the Japanese that the sweeping German conquest of the Netherlands and France might tempt the Germans to extend their control over Southeast Asia as well. The central question was the extent to which Japan was willing to offer military assistance to the German war efforts against Britain. Army and navy staff officers advocated an attack on Singapore.

Initially conceived as a military alliance directed against Britain, the
pact with Nazi Germany was transformed into an instrument to deter the United States when newly appointed Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke revised the draft treaty to include the United States as a target of the alliance. He argued that Japanese expansion to the south would inevitably lead to war with the United States, and that only by aligning with Germany could Japan stop this pernicious drift. Although Matsuoka repeatedly emphasized that a tripartite pact was aimed at preventing a Japanese-American war by placing Japan in a position of strength, its result was to dangerously provoke the United States. It is of interest to note that the army’s plan for a tripartite pact (27 July) contained the prototype of grand design to include the Soviet Union into this pact. Such a four-power pact, the army expected would bring strong pressure to bear on the United States. On the other hand, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, deeply concerned about the possibility of aggravating of German-Soviet relations, rejected any such four-power plan out of hand. However, the idea of a four-power pact was soon taken over by Foreign Minister Matsuoka. New Prime Minister Konoe also sided with Matsuoka on this issue.

In the negotiation of the Tripartite Pact in Tokyo, Konoe suggested to Matsuoka that it would be of no use to conclude an alliance pact with Germany and Italy unless the Soviet Union joined it to make it a four-power pact. But, German envoy Heinrich Stahmer pressed Japan for a prompt conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. The Japanese Government finally met his request when Stahmer promised that Germany would be an ‘honest broker’ between Japan and the Soviet Union.

As already mentioned, the Japanese initiative for Tripartite Pact was made on the assumption that Germany would soon defeat Great Britain. But the result of ‘Battle of Britain’ proved this assumption to be an illusion. This result affected both Berlin and Tokyo. Berlin, which had previously show a cold shoulder to the earlier Japanese proposal for the Pact, made a volt-face by sending Ribbentrop’s special envoy, Stahmer, to Tokyo for a prompt conclusion of the Pact. The motive behind this demarche was to involve Japan in the war against Great Britain. More concretely, what Hitler had in mind was Japanese attacks on Singapore, Malaya, Australia and New Zealand. Therefore Stahmer tried very hard to persuade Japan into automatically participating in the European war.
Tokyo, which had hoped to establish a Japanese sphere of influence in Southeast Asia after the probable demise of Great Britain, started to look at the value of the Pact rather differently since mid-September upon realising that German conquest of Britain was quite unlikely.\(^{(18)}\)

For Tokyo the Pact would serve to deter the United States from blocking the Japanese southward advance. Konoe and Matsuoka began to regard the Pact as the only available means to secure Japan’s Southern policy and to avoid war with the United States. In this connection it is worth noting that in the Tokyo negotiations with Stahmer, Matsuoka succeeded in retaining the Japanese right to decide when to enter the war. The conclusion of the Pact gave the world the impression of German-Japanese comradeship in arms, but in fact Japan had no intention of being drawn into the war only to help Germany. The existence of the Pact itself was of paramount importance to Tokyo after Britain’s ‘finest hour’. And Tokyo’s strategy could also potentially allow Soviet participation in the Pact. From then on Matsuoka’s efforts were devoted to a four-power pact, which would more effectively deter the United States from war. Evidence shows that Tokyo at that time sincerely believed in Germany’s ability to act as an ‘honest broker’ despite the fact that German-Soviet relations had already deteriorated considerably since the summer of 1940.\(^{(19)}\)

IV

Soon after the Japanese thrust into northern Indochina (on 22 September 1940) and the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact (on 27 September) the peace maneuvers with Chinking failed, leaving Japan with no choice but to recognize the Wang Ching-wei regime. This meant that Japan had to abandon the idea of a bilateral settlement of the China war; inevitably the war became drawn-out even further. From this time onward, the army become convinced that the only ‘positive’ means left for terminating the China war was to depend on a successful armed Southern advance to obtain the resources.\(^{(20)}\)

The prerequisite for any southward expansion was the removal of the threat from the north. The Army General Staff had been pursuing a policy
of reconciliation with the Soviet Union since the settlement of the Nomonhan incident, its primary aim was to put an early end to the China war. For example, the Intelligence Division had its eye on shutting down Soviet assistance to the Chungking government. \(^{(21)}\) With rising clamor for southern expansion in the summer of 1940, however, the emphasis of Japan’s policy switched to assuring security in the north to protect the flank of her southern advance. The negotiations with the Russians that began in August were aimed at enabling Japan to redeploy her forces in Manchuria and North China to Central and South China. \(^{(22)}\)

These diplomatic efforts, beset with difficulties from the beginning, were doomed to failure. The Japanese, especially the army, desired to establish close relations with the Soviet Union somewhat comparable to the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, but they could not offer the Russians anything tangible in return. When Japan proposed a neutrality pact in July 1940, the Soviets demanded liquidation of oil and coal mining rights in northern Sakhalin. The navy in particular opposed the Soviet demand because it refused to give up the high-grade oil in northern Sakhalin. \(^{(23)}\)

In early October the Japanese Foreign Ministry established a new policy toward Moscow based upon Matsuoka’s idea. The upshot of this policy was to conclude a Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact instead of a neutrality pact. Matsuoka further aimed at combining the tripartite Pact with this non-aggression pact in a form of a four-power Pact. Such a Pact, in Tokyo’s opinion, was to be based upon recognition by Berlin and Tokyo of Soviet exclusive interests in Outer-Mongolia, Afghanistan and Iran. \(^{(24)}\) Towards the end of October, Moscow was informed of the Japanese proposal for a non-aggression Pact through the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow. A month later the Soviet government responded to Tokyo with a counter proposal of a neutrality Pact, to which Moscow even attached the condition that Japan should abandon her interests in Northern Sakhalin.

During the Molotov-Ribbentrop negotiations in Berlin in mid-November the latter proposed a four-power Pact, but the Soviets’ reaction was very negative. After Molotov’s visit to Berlin, Hitler discarded the plan of four-power Pact and ordered preparation for “Barbarossa”. But, Matsuoka.
deeply enchanted by the idea of the four-power Pact, still desired to make such a pact by reality persuading Hitler and Stalin during his visit to Berlin and Moscow.

To his chagrin Matsuoka realized in his Berlin negotiations (27-29 March 1941) that Hitler had no interest at all in Matsuoka's grand design of a four-power pact. Also, Matsuoka was informed that Berlin would not act as an 'honest broker' between Tokyo and Moscow. That meant Matsuoka had no other option but to conclude a Japanese-Soviet pact without German's good offices. There is no denying that Matsuoka must have been very disappointed at the bleak prospect for attaining his main goal, namely a four-power pact. However, as far as the possibility of concluding an accord with Moscow was concerned, Matsuoka was encouraged in his conversations with Ribbentrop. The German Foreign Minister offered him two promises. Firstly, a Germany war with the Soviet Union would not require Tokyo's declaration of war on Moscow. Secondly, should Japan be at war with the Soviet Union, Berlin would automatically declare war on Moscow.  

There is one more thing to be mentioned regard to this. Soon after his arrival in Berlin, an anti-German coup d'etat occurred in Yugoslavia (Belgrade). Surprisingly, Moscow showed its solidarity with the new Yugoslav Government by promptly concluding a Pact of Friendship and Non-Aggression with it. Germany began invading Yugoslavia when Matsuoka was heading for Moscow. Although Matsuoka witnessed the rapid deterioration of German-Soviet relations, it in turn offered him an opportunity for his successful negotiations in Moscow. In fact when he arrived in Moscow, the German army had already crushed the new Yugoslav regime. Matsuoka thought that Moscow, now facing an ever growing threat from Germany, would be receptive to his proposal for a pact. Such a pact would enable Moscow to concentrate its military defense against Germany and would possibly enable Japan to move southward. After some futile negotiations with Molotov, a breakthrough took place when Matsuoka met with Stalin on April 12, 1941. Stalin proposed a Treaty of Neutrality, leaving aside the sticky problem of Northern Sakhalin. On the following day the Treaty was signed.
Japanese officials seem to have considered that there was a reason for Stalin's decision to conclude a Neutrality Pact with Japan: through the Neutrality Pact Stalin could prevent Japan's invasion of the Soviet Union, yet he could also help the Chongking government. If he had concluded a Non-aggression Pact, he could not have continued military assistance to Chiang Kai-shek; the conclusion of Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact would logically have meant the termination of the Soviet-Chinese Non-aggression Pact of 1937.\(^{(27)}\) In fact, Moscow continued its military assistance to China, which made it even more difficult for Japan to militarily resolve the China war. The Japanese army was dissatisfied with the conclusion of a Neutrality Pact, rather than a Non-aggression Pact in regard to the following two points. Firstly, the pact would have a negative psychological impact upon the Chongking government. Secondly, the Pact would not secure Japan's armed southward expansion. In fact, the army did not change its military posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.\(^{(28)}\) Nor did the army activate its southern policy after the conclusion of the Neutrality Pact.

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On 5 June 1941 Tokyo received information from Ambassador Ōshima Hiroshi in Berlin to the effect that a German-Soviet war was imminent. Since April the rumors of German-Soviet hostilities had been conveyed by Japanese attachés in European capitals, but they could not be substantiated. On 3 June Ambassador Ōshima was told about Operation Barbarossa directly by Hitler and Ribbentrop.\(^{(29)}\) The navy demanded a policy of non-intervention in the event of German-Soviet hostilities. However, in regard to Southern expansion, it immediately accelerated its demands for the construction of military bases and the stationing of troops in southern Indochina and Thailand.\(^{(30)}\) In the Army, as well, the news of the outbreak of the German-Soviet war further accelerated this move.\(^{(31)}\) On 10 July the Joint conference of the Army and Navy bureau chiefs reached an agreement that the stationing of troops and the construction of air bases in southern Indochina be carried out as soon as possible.\(^{(32)}\)
The German attack on the Soviet Union of 22 June not only shattered Matsuoka's grand design of a four power pact but also tipped the balance of powers against the Axis powers by driving the Soviet Union into the arms of Britain and the United States. However, this development did not tempt the Japanese leaders to demand abrogation of the Tripartite Pact; on the contrary, they chose to continue supporting the Pact. They predicted that the Soviet-German war would end in a quick and overwhelming German victory and believed that this war would provide a chance to remove the traditional threat from the north, not to mention an opportunity to strike south. Since the Japanese army received Ambassador Ōshima's dispatch of 5 June, the army had been formulating a new national policy; its conclusion was that Japan should expedite stationing her troops in southern Indochina, while preparing resort to arms against the north (the Far Eastern territory of the Soviet Union)\(^{(233)}\) in case the war situation should turn out to be 'extremely advantageous' for Japan. On the other hand, the navy was opposed to a war against the Soviet Union, but in the end it acquiesced to the army's policy on condition that 'preparation against the United States and Britain would not be compromised'. This new agreement was reconfirmed and sanctioned at the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941.

On the following day, orders were issued to prepare for south. The army and the navy proceeded to prepare for both peaceful and armed advances, and on 28 July Japanese troops commenced to march 'peacefully' into the southern Indochina. On 3 August, immediately after a total oil embargo went into effect, the navy's First Committee (that was composed of middle-rank officers) drafted a paper stating that diplomatic negotiations and war preparations should be pursued in parallel until late October\(^{(34)}\). If a compromise with the United States should fail then, Japan must open hostilities. A handful of the First Committee took initiative in policy making within the navy and even preempted the army in forcing the decision for war with the United States. The Imperial Conference of 6 September adopted a new national policy based on the demands of the First Committee set out on 3 August\(^{(35)}\).

Middle-rank officers of each section within the military policy
machinery were proccupied with their immediate and parochial bureaucratic interests, and were often guided by narrowly strategic views in making a chain of fateful decisions leading to war with the United States.

notes


(2) "rikū kaigun kōdan naïyō" [Proceedings at the meeting among army and navy staffs] (November 25, 1938) in Takagi Sōkichi Shiryō [Papars relating to the Rear Admiral Takagi Sōkichi]; WHD Archives "nichi doku 1 kyoutei teiketsu ni kansuru daihon-ei rikugunbu no iken" [The opinion of Army General Staff regarding on concluding of Tripartite Pact] (April 28, 1939), in Boei chō senshi shitsu [War History Department, the Japanese Defense Agency] (compiled), Senshi sōsha; Dai hon-ei rikugunbu [War History Series; Army General Staff], vol.1 (Tokyo: 1967), pp.589-592. "gun sanbōcho kōdan sekijo ni okeru jichō kōen yōshi" [Summary of speech of a Vice-chief of General Staff at the meeting among army staffs] (April 1, 1939) in Gendaishi shiyo, vol.9 (Tokyo: 1964), pp.559-560.


(4) For detailed account on the army intervention in the anti-British movements in Japan, see Nagai Kazu, "1939-nen no haei undō"[Anti-British movements in 1939], in kindai nihon kenkyūkai (ed.), shōwa ki no shakai undō [Social movements in Shōwa period], (Tokyo: 1984), pp.191-258.

(5) Miyake Masaki, "Yōroppa shorekkyō no doukou to nihon" [The Western


(7) "Ōshu sensō ni tomonau tōmen no taigaïsesaku" [Immediate Foreign Policy coping with the outbreak of the European war] (A draft of the army, September 18, 1939), deposited in Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives (hereafter *JFM Archives*); A.1.0.0.30/1.

(8) This description of Japan's reaction to the outbreak of the war in Europe is based on the *JFM Archives*; A.1.1.0.30 ('Shina jihen shori ni kansuru seisaku') [Policy relating to the settlement of the China Incident], 3 vols.

(9) *Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai* [The Japan Association of International Relations] (ed.), *Taiheiyō sensō e no michi: Kaisen gaikō shi* [Road to the Pacific War: A diplomatic history of the origins of the war] (Tokyō: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1963), Vol.8; *Bekkan shiryō hen* [Separate volume, Documents], pp.315-316.

(10) *Ibid*.

(11) For details on the relationship between the peace maneuvers ('Kiri Project') and the decision to move south, see Hatano Sumio, 'Nanshin eno senkai, 1940' [Swing to a policy of advancing south, 1940], *Ajia keizai*, Vol. 26, No.5 (May 1985). pp.30-33.

(12) Morimatsu Toshio (ed.), *Sanbō jichō Sawada Shigeru kaisoroku* [Recollections of Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff Sawada Shigeru], (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 1982), pp.172-173.


(16) "Konoe Fumimaro-kō tsuikaidan" [Records of interview with Konoe Fumimaro], October 27, 1943, *Takagi Sōkichi Shiryō*.


(18) Army General Staff, "Kokusai jōhō gepp" [Monthly report on the international situation], No.20 (Sept 25, 1940), *WHD Archives*.


(22) “Tsuchihashi Yuichi kaisoroku”. *WHD Archives*.

(23) “Takagi Sōkichi shiryō”, *WHD Archives*.

(24) Hosoya Chihiro, “The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact”, in J. W. Morley (ed.), *The Fateful Choice*, pp.51-55. This work remains the most authoritative study of the subject. Most of the Japanese materials on the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact are deposited in *JFM Archives*: A1.0.0.6/1, A1.0.0.9, B1.0.0/J/R.


(26) “Matsuoka gaishō hō-ou fukumei naisou” [Report of the Foreign Minister Matsuoka to the Emperor on his European journey] (April 19, 1941), *JFM Archives*: B1.0.0/J/R.


(28) Sanbo honbu senso shido han (War Guidance Section, the Army General Staff), “Kimitsu sensō nisshi” [Secret War Diary], April 5, 1941, *WHD Archives*. 
(29) Ambassodor Ōshima to Foreign Minister Matsuoka. No. 636 (sent on June, 4 1941): Nos. 638, 639 (sent on 5 June). (Contained in the papers of Konoe Fumimaro, at Yōmei Bunko, Kyoto).

(30) "Fujii shigeru nisshi" [The Diary of Commander Fujii Shigeru], p.125, pp.243-244, WHD Archives.

(31) "Kimitsu sensō nissihi", June-July, 1941.

(32) Ibid., July 10, 1941.

(33) Ibid., June 1941.

(34) "Fujii Shireru nisshi", pp.243-244.