and Public Service
Reform Initiative

CIVIL SERVICE
TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROJECTS
IN THE FORMER COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES: AN ASSESSMENT

GYÖRGY GAJDUSCHEK AND GYÖRGY HAJNAL

LGI Studies

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Tables, Comparative Tables and Figures

TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE STUDY

CIDA: Canadian International Development Agency, a Canadian government donor.

Critical mass approach: One of the three main identified approaches for executing a training assistance project (TAP). This type of approach is close to the usual training strategy followed by national civil service training systems. The essence of this approach is to train a sufficient amount of civil servants to induce the expected change or improvement.

DFID: Department for International Development, a U.K. government donor.

EC: European Commission, an organization of the European Union, frequently referred to as the quasi-cabinet of the EU. PHARE operates under the direct supervision of the EC.

Elitist approach: One of the three main identified approaches for executing a TAP. The characteristic feature of this approach is that it concentrates on high-level public managers in order to increase TAP impact. The success of this approach is questionable.

EU: European Union.

PHARE: The European Commission's program for supporting post communist countries that are not part of the former Soviet Union and the Baltic states. A similar organization, TACIS, has been set up for assisting countries of the former Soviet Union. Due to the almost identical structural and operational attributes of these two organizations, statements about PHARE generally refer also to TACIS.

PTD: Participant-training-day. A measurement of TAP output. For a certain training course it is calculated as number of training days multiplied by the number of trainees trained. It is relied on for calculating a rough efficiency measure. A detailed description and definition of the term is provided in Section 2.1.3. of this volume.

Sustainability approach: One of the three main identified approaches for executing a TAP. Sustainability-style TAPs do not aim to train a significant amount of civil servants. Instead, they mainly produce outputs that are useful only if they are utilized in other, subsequent training activities, which are supposed to be financed and run by the beneficiary government once the project itself has ended. Typically, a sustainability-type project contains preparation of curriculum and training materials, a training-of-the-trainers element and perhaps some "pilot training" courses. A larger-scale training could be based on these outputs, but not part of the TAP itself. Sustainability-type TAPs hardly ever turn out to be sustainable in practice.

TACIS: See Phare.

TAP: Training assistance project. These are civil service training programs that are financed by foreign donor organizations for a certain period. A detailed description and definition of the term is provided in Section 2.1.2. of this volume.

USAID: United States Agency for International Development, a U.S. government donor.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. Background

The research on which this volume is based was aimed at evaluating the efficacy of civil service training programs financed by foreign donors. These programs are referred to as training assistance projects (TAPs). The objective of this study is to assess the efficiency of TAPs, as well as their impact on the public administration and civil service system of the beneficiary countries. The research focused on the so-called post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CEE/CIS) during the time period between 1997 and 2000. The countries of the CEE/CIS region have been going through a transition period, from communist, command economy systems to democracies with free-market economies. These countries, therefore, have many similarities in terms of problems and, to some degree, solutions. We have chosen to focus on four countries of the region—Hungary, Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine—because they represent a high variance in factors that may be relevant to TAP efficacy. The research concentrated on the largest and most significant TAP donors, which are, in alphabetical order: the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID), the European Commission's PHARE/TACIS (PHARE), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Despite the amount of resources spent on TAPs in the region over the past decade, there have been surprisingly few attempts to provide an overall assessment of their impact. Indeed, one can only find a limited number of published papers that are both theoretically and empirically founded and aim at a broad assessment of TAP activities in the region.

Four country teams were formed, to work with the initiating team in implementing the study. In the course of the summer of 2001, these country teams conducted research, including a literature review and field work, in their respective countries. This work was supplemented by additional studies, most of it field research, of three donors: CIDA, USAID and PHARE. Though the research faced serious difficulties, we attempted to rely on empirical evidence as much as possible. We therefore used a limited scope of "second-best" quantitative approaches, which involved sensitivity analyses, to test the plausibility and consequences of various assumptions regarding TAP efficiency. But overall, we had to rely extensively on case-based evidence, observations of the country team members and interviews with the stakeholders.

The evaluation project presented in this book differs from most evaluation exercises in a few important points:

- The scope of this research is much wider, in all dimensions, than the standard evaluation exercise, which usually aims at assessing only one TAP, or a set of TAPs from a single donor in a single country. The types of questions asked by this research are also broader than usual. We extend our study to questions about the kind of factors and interest patterns that are responsible for the TAPs' characteristics, successes and failures—which we identified in the fact-finding phase of the research.
- A typical evaluation study compares program results to program objectives. But in our approach, the efficacy of a program is understood solely from the point of view of the beneficiary. In other words, a "desired" effect that promotes the national interests of the donor country is not treated automatically as a benefit, while an unintended side effect advantageous for the recipient country is counted as a benefit.
- Civil service training is, of course, not only a donor activity. It is also widely present in the beneficiary countries' own public administration systems. Therefore, due to our focus on the needs of beneficiaries, we found it useful to compare TAP efficiency with that of civil service training programs that were organized by the beneficiary country's responsible organs.

II. Findings on the Efficacy of TAPs

A number of micro-level—in other words technical and content related—differences between TAP courses and national civil service training courses were identified. The most important differences were the following:

- TAPs focus more on skills improvement, unlike national civil service training, which focuses more on knowledge transfer.
- TAPs are more practice oriented, while national civil service training is theory oriented.
- TAPs concentrate on more general issues, as opposed to national civil service training, which is specific to the current circumstances of the beneficiary country's public administration.
- TAPs concentrate more on issues of management and policy-making skills, instead of legal issues.
- TAPs are more interactive in style, as opposed to the lecturing style that is characteristic of national civil service training courses. This means that TAPs make wider use of various interactive training techniques—such as case studies, group work, etc.—and equipment—such as flipcharts, overhead projectors, etc.

Table 1

Key Characteristics of Training Assistance: Summary of Findings

Issue	Donor				Importance
	PHARE	**DFID**	**USAID**	**CIDA**	
1) Dominant project approach[*]	More of a critical mass approach.	More of a sustainability approach, with some elitist orientation.	Not very characteristic; resembles critical mass approach.	Elitist approach.	The best strategy seems to be the critical mass approach. The elitist approach can also be successful, if very carefully planned and implemented. The sustainability approach builds on assumptions that often don't hold true in the CEE/CIS context, therefore these types of projects are rarely successful.
2) Implemen-tation	Project type implementationtation: For each project, the donor sets a project framework, then contracts the implementing organization.				Project-type implementation—as opposed to a permanent implementation structure—can lead to a number of problems, such as: rigidity caused by the strict temporal and functional separation of strategic decisions and operative implementation; limited project synergy; and experts' limited awareness of local policy and organization.
3) Project cycle	Inflexible: Very long planning and short imple-mentation phase.	More flexibility due to shorter planning and longer implementation phase. This is especially true of USAID.			The longer the planning phase, the more severe the rigidity. Short implementation cycles, on the other hand, can decrease effectiveness, because, often, sustained efforts are needed to attain lasting effects.
4) Selection of contractors	Non-EU imple-menting organi-zations might play some minor role.	Organizations from the donor country are almost always used.			Relying exclusively on foreign implementing organizations and experts leads to very high expenses, problems related to the language barrier and problems related to limited familiarity with the administrative system and the cultural environment.
5) Selection of implementing experts	The bulk of the tasks, especially in terms of expert costs, are fulfilled by Western experts.				
6) Transparency and accountability	PHARE has a remarkably high degree of trans-parency.	There is a large variance among field offices located in different countries. Usually, transparency is severely limited; even basic project information is often treated as a business secret.		CIDA has an acceptable level of transparency.	Lack of transparency prevents stakeholders, especially on the beneficiary side, from overseeing and effectively influencing the assistance process.
7) Training content	PHARE is often unresponsive to expressed needs, but the training is relevant because EU accession has high political priority.	The content varies widely. There are some novel topics taught, which are also relevant, but much of the TAP content is not fully relevant or useful for beneficiaries.			Training content is crucial. Deficiencies in TAPs arise due to the "one-size-fits-all" approach, which incorrectly assumes that the same content is useful in all beneficiary environments; and due to the assumption that solutions that work in the donor-country are adequate to beneficiary-country problems.

*   The meaning of the three types of approaches are briefly reviewed in the section on terms at the beginning of this volume.

- Unlike many national civil service training programs, TAPs hardly ever end with an exam or any explicit measure of the knowledge or skills that the participants obtained.

In seeking to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of TAPs, we analyzed, by donor, the key features of TAP management that have an impact on their efficacy. The main results of these findings with regards to individual donors are summarized in Table 1.

In addition to identifying the above key factors of TAP success, we estimated and compared the direct efficiency of TAPs run by the various donors. The notion of direct efficiency was measured as the unit cost of training: the amount of money necessary to train one trainee for one day in the given training project. This unit is called a participant training day (PTD). The direct efficiency of TAPs was compared to that of national civil service training activities run by the beneficiary public administrations.

Table 2
Unit Costs of Training by Donors and Beneficiaries

Characteristic unit cost for			
Donors		National civil service training	
Donor	USD/PTD	Country	USD/PTD
USAID	357	Hungary	20
CIDA	400	Lithuania	25
DFID	580	Ukraine	10
PHARE /TACIS	300	Romania	15
		UK	142

The fundamental result of assessing unit costs of training was that one "unit," or PTD, of TAP output is 12–58 (!) times more expensive than that of a typical national civil service training course. And this disproportion can be even higher. For example, in the Ukraine, the ratio can be as high as 1:250. This striking difference is even more surprising because TAPs are usually designed and managed in a more professional manner than national civil service training.

Our initial rough measure of efficiency may be misleading, because it is calculated on the basis of a rough output indication. Naturally, a training day in a "good" training project is worth much more than a training day in a poor one, and the above PTD unit cost figure does not reflect this fact. We attempted to account for potential factors that can be quantified and may mean that TAP outputs are more valuable than those of national training. In doing so, we intentionally sought to overestimate the potential superiority of TAPs: We only considered those factors that may

increase TAP effectiveness and omitted those that would decrease it, and we used unrealistically high values to assess the effectiveness of TAPs.

But even after adjusting for the possible superior quality of TAPs, the above-mentioned robust differences in efficiency are still present, though to a somewhat smaller degree. After this adjustment, TAPs are "only" six-to-30 times more expensive—in other words less efficient—than national training. Still, the effect of training content was not analyzed quantitatively.

III. Further Conclusions

The findings presented in the previous section point to a number of phenomena that lead to the sub-optimal performance of TAPs. These, and other related deficiencies, may appear in individual evaluation reports as errors in project planning and management. But our findings revealed that these "errors" are far too systematic and persistent to be simply due to accidents.

Instead, an alternative explanation for the systematic occurrence of the same problems or "mistakes" is that goals other than the improvement of beneficiary civil service are followed by donors and implementing organizations. Donors prefer to promote the interest of, and values and approaches characteristic for, the donor country. Both the donor and the implementing organizations are interested in spending as much of the TAP budgets as possible within the donor country. Furthermore, implementing organizations are interested in maximizing their profit in TAP activities. While this assumption might sound trivial to many, it is also probably offensive for others. Some arguments supporting the hypothesis are listed in Table 3.

Aside from pointing out the problems caused by TAPs, the study also identified some apparently unintended beneficial side-effects that arise due to the practice of using TAPs. These positive effects do not come from individual TAPs—which are limited in scope, time span and number of civil servants trained—but instead are due to the accumulated outcome of a host of various TAP activities. These benefits include the following:

- TAPs help the beneficiary countries understand the importance of training as a human resource development tool and a means of public administration reform. This appreciation of training was, and to some extent still is, missing in the beneficiary countries.
- TAPs introduce new approaches to running public administration. Throughout the region, a lack of systematic approaches, and a corresponding abundance of ad-hoc and controversial decisions and actions, is a fundamental feature of the daily functioning of public

Table 3

The Function of Key TAP "Deficiencies" in Ensuring Maximum Economic Benefits for TAP Implementers

Phenomenon ("Mistake")	...and its Function in Maximizing Profits/"Rents"
The sustainability strategy that "teaches a man how to fish instead of giving him a fish" is followed by many TAPs, despite its high unit cost and low chance of success.	Sustainability-type projects allow a large proportion of project funds to be spent on difficult-to-control expert work, instead of actual training.
Donors and implementing organizations seem to exhibit minimal interest in ensuring the sustainability of sustainability-type projects, especially after the project itself has ended.	True sustainability of the results of a TAP is not a necessary prerequisite of realizing the profit inherent in it, unless another project is launched "to ensure its sustainability."
The project-type implementation framework is followed, instead of a permanent implementation framework, even though a permanent framework is frequently more practical.	Applying a permanent implementation structure would exclude powerful pressure groups, such as Western consulting organizations and "amphibious" freelance experts.
Implementing organizations and experts contracted for implementing TAPs almost always have the same country of origin as the donor.	This is the most obvious way to spend TAP funds in the donor country. From the implementing organizations' perspective, being contracted is a major prerequisite of realizing profits.
The transparency of activities is often minimal, and there seems to be a "negative correlation" between unit costs and transparency.	It is a common interest of implementing organizations, experts and the donor that the image of TAPs be attractive—and that the pursuance of latent goals does not become too obvious.

administration. In addition, in many of the beneficiary countries, an overly legalistic approach toward public administration prevails. Public policy and management approaches, which are the subject of much TAP content, may play an important role in gradually renewing approaches, techniques applied and attitudes toward public administration in the beneficiary countries.

- TAPs initiate a new, rational-purposive approach to training. In this approach, training goals and objectives are defined first, and content and methods are chosen accordingly. The level of goal attainment is measured via monitoring and evaluation, and other beneficial practices are followed. This approach is generally missing from national training systems.
- TAPs introduce new training techniques that may increase training efficiency in terms of transferring knowledge and skills and enabling civil servants to use the newly obtained knowledge in their everyday administrative practice. Here we refer to the dissemination of the interactive training approach and application of related techniques, such as case studies, role-play, group work, individual problem solving, etc.

IV. Recommendations

Recommendations for the Beneficiary Side

Most of the deficiencies on the beneficiary side stem from general issues that cannot be changed within the narrower scope of TAP issues. Such general problems include low

civil service wages, the high level of uncertainty in the transition period and the fact that neither individual nor organizational actors within the national public administrative system are really interested in turning TAPs into activities that are truly useful for the country's public administration system. Therefore, the potential to significantly change how TAPs are hosted by beneficiaries is limited. But some things can be improved.

Recommendations—starting at the policy level and ending at the management level—include the following:

Recommendation 1

The potential of TAPs to improve the civil service training system should be utilized to the greatest extent possible.

1.1 The value of training as a tool of human resources development needs to be recognized and acknowledged.

1.2 Beneficiary civil service training systems could be substantially improved by adopting certain elements of the content and style of TAPs.

Recommendation 2

In deciding whether to host a given TAP or accept support from a donor, not only the benefits, but also the costs, of the TAP should be considered.

2.1 Recipients should be more aware of, and use, their bargaining power with donors and implementing organizations.

2.2 Administrative and similar obligations, and the resulting beneficiary costs related to hosting TAPs, should be specified and considered in advance.

2.3 Care must be taken to avoid the possible harm that some TAPs can cause to the beneficiary public administration.

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2.4 Requirements of national security should be observed in dealing with TAP implementers.

2.5 Recipients should have a clear training strategy and priorities, and they should try to put these priorities forward in any TAPs that will be launched.

2.6 Large-scale TAPS should be given priority over small-scale TAPs.

2.7 Appropriate trainee attendance should be ensured for training courses.

Recommendation 3

Those personally involved in hosting TAPs should be more familiar with the management and communication culture of donors and TAP implementing organizations.

3.1 Obtain the necessary skills and attitudes to communicate effectively with donors.

3.2 Not only the communication style, but also the motivation system and management practices of donors/implementers, should be understood.

3.3 Having a devoted and motivated team, with appropriate competencies, authority and infrastructure for effective TAP project management, along with centralized "docking" of foreign technical assistance, could significantly increase the efficacy of running TAPs.

Recommendations for the Donor Side

Recommendations that may be utilized either by the donor organization or an organization carrying out the project on an operational level are as follows:

Recommendation 4

TAPs should be planned and managed with an awareness of the recipient's specific circumstances; in other words, one size does not fit all.

4.1 In identifying beneficiaries' needs and in devising solutions, donors and TAP implementers should be prepared for the formidable difficulties of understanding and dealing with different administrative cultures.

4.2 Already existing training solutions and—especially—content should be adjusted to meet the client's actual needs.

Recommendation 5

TAP goals should be realistic and achievable.

Recommendation 6

Project implementation arrangements should be geared more towards ensuring better understanding of the beneficiary environment.

6.1 Communication among foreign consultants working in a given country on various projects should be promoted.

6.2 Involvement of local experts in both the planning and implementation phase of TAPs should be promoted.

6.3 Permanent experts, at the donor and implementing organizations, should be relied upon more often.

6.4 Donors should consider whether the "project arrangement" is always the best way to implement TAPs.

Recommendation 7

Reducing training unit cost and, correspondingly, increasing training volume may significantly increase TAP effectiveness.

7.1 It should be carefully considered whether it is a good idea to launch "sustainability-type" projects. Instead, large-scale training courses may often be more fruitful.

7.2 Reliance on local resources can decrease costs.

7.3 Successful projects should be repeated, because this is often more effective than elaborating new and questionable projects.

Recommendation 8

The implementing organization should try to control as many aspects of TAP implementation as possible.

8.1 The "advertisement" of the TAP should not be left up to the beneficiary. Instead it should, at least in part, be handled by the implementing organization.

8.2 The selection of trainees also requires special attention.

8.3 Donor and implementing organizations should try to improve communication between various stakeholders on the beneficiary side.

8.4 Whenever possible, projects should be started a few months after elections, or at least not before elections.

8.5 Collaborators on the beneficiary side should be sufficiently "motivated."

8.6 Long-term utilization, or sustainability, of the TAP should be ensured.

Recommendation 9

The beneficiary should not be saddled with an excessive and useless administrative burden.

9.1 Steering committees should be made truly functional.

9.2 The number and duration of "stakeholder interviews," and the like, should be limited.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1   Public Administration Technical Assistance

Addressing the social, economic, environmental and other problems, of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CEE/CIS) in the first decade after the transition naturally required determined and sustained action from societies in the region. It is therefore not surprising that analyses and recommendations pertaining to future policies in these countries frequently point out the urgent need to re-establish and strengthen their governance capacity. Correspondingly, liberal democratic values and principles of government took root. Meanwhile, at a lower level related to the administration of government, a multitude of constitutional, institutional and process and management reforms and development programs were launched.

Western donors played an important role in the administrative reform process from the beginning—usually through various types of public administration technical assistance projects. Considering the length of time that has elapsed since these projects began, and the amount of aid that has been spent in this area, it is surprising how little work has been done to explore the field. Not much is known about the actual process of administrative reform, its main features, or even the important question of what sort of impact public administration technical assistance has had in the region.

The existing information about the effectiveness of public administration technical assistance projects comes from two main sources: donor evaluations and scientific studies.

In practice, donor evaluations—conducted by, or on behalf of, the donor organizations that fund these projects—do not provide suitable information for establishing more general conclusions. This is true for various reasons: Evaluations are commissioned by the donors themselves, so it is the donors who create the framework of these evaluation projects. As a result, questions relevant for operative program management are emphasized. Questions relevant for beneficiaries and other external stakeholders, about the impact and sustainability of the projects, receive less attention in donor evaluations. Furthermore, since these evaluations often have important practical consequences, there is an understandable but definite pressure to emphasize positive achievements while playing down failures. This tendency is exacerbated by the substantive difficulties of evaluating public administrative technical assistance. These difficulties include the characteristic presence of vague and conflicting program goals, intangible program outcomes and interference due to vested professional and business interests and high-profile

international politics. In their 1994 study, Carlsson, Köhlin and Ekbom provide convincing evidence and arguments as to how and why donor organizations might actually "misuse" the tools of evaluation. These authors maintain that it would be more correct to perceive donor organizations as a loose framework of interactions by a number of self-interested individuals forming coalitions and alliances to realize their own interests. Donors, therefore, use evaluations to promote ambitions and aspirations that may not be linked, or may even oppose, the official goals of their organization.[1]

Along with the above-described problems, there is another reason why donor evaluations of public administration technical assistance projects do not provide adequate information for broader study: Although "in theory" aid programs are, if not primarily, at least in a substantial part, about beneficiaries—their needs, problems and viewpoints—these aspects do not appear in sufficient quality and quantity in most evaluative works. There is an urgent need for a deeper and more sophisticated view of the historical, social, political, economic and cultural differences, including differences between donors and beneficiaries and differences between the "East" and the "West." Without this, not only beneficiaries but, to some extent, donors lose many of the benefits of any aid money that is invested. And they even run the risk that the aid may actually have adverse effects. The philosophy of this study is characterized by a kind of "beneficiary orientation." The same is true of the team that worked on it: Being researchers or practitioners from the region, the people behind this study are closely tied to the perspective of the people of the CEE/CIS region.

The other major source of information about public administration technical assistance projects in the CEE/CIS region, scientific studies on the topic, varies in breadth and ambition. There are a limited number of such studies, including Buss–Vaughan (1995), Cooley (2000), Dollar-Pritchett (1998), Hesse (1996), Jenei–LeLoup–van den Berg (2002), Wedel (1998), Ahonen (2002), Khapova (2002) and Prigozhin (2002). More general, but still important, insights are to be found in Carlsson-Köhlin-Ekbom (1994).[2] While these works point out a number of achievements of western technical/training assistance, they are usually fairly critical towards either the donor, or—much more frequently—towards the recipient.

It is interesting to note that most issues highlighted by these works—and most issues we will cover—were discussed extensively decades ago, in the context of U.S. aid to the developing world during the 1950s and 1960s. Important studies were made into the so-called "development administration" problem, especially by the Comparative Administration Group, headed by F. Riggs. Studies produced out of the work of this group include Montgomery–Siffin (1968),

Brown (1968) and LaPalombara (1963).[3] It is surprising that the current discussion of the topic reflects so little of the empirical and theoretical results of this vast and important body of literature.

The key findings of existing literature on public administration technical assistance for the CEE/CIS region are summarized in Table 4.

The above conclusions are typically drawn through case-based observations of informed project participants—instead of being based on systematic and methodologically sound research. In sum, available knowledge on the role played by Western public administration technical assistance projects in the region suffers some important limitations:

- The substantive and methodological difficulties encumber the application of clear and unbiased success criteria. As a result, conclusions are often vague, uncertain and controversial.
- The questions asked and the motifs followed are mostly based on the donor's point of view. Beneficiaries' viewpoints rarely show up in the design of evaluative research.
- Comparison of various donors, especially in a systematic manner, is fundamentally missing from the picture. This is the case despite the fact that comparative work would be essential to identify important factors of project success and failure.

To address these challenges, this study will focus on a specific, though important, sub-field of public administration technical assistance projects: those aimed at training public administration personnel. This choice is explained in the section below.

1.2   Civil Service Training and Civil Service Training Assistance

Technical assistance, defined broadly as "helping others to help themselves,"[4] can take one of two basic forms when it is provided for public administration. To put it rather simplistically, this assistance can either take place in a pure training setting or as a consultancy, which implies a different relationship between the client and the assistance provider. There has been very little discussion of the former type of assistance, civil service training. Most of the research and evaluation efforts referred to in Table 4 either focus on the general realm of public administration reform and development of the region or on consultancy type activities. This study will focus on civil service training assistance. The position of this subject area, within the broader realm of foreign aid, is illustrated in Figure 1.

Table 4

Problems Identified by Existing Studies on Public Administration Technical Assistance for the Former Socialist Countries

Problems on the Recipient Side	Problems on the Donor Side
- the general complexity, unpredictability and opacity of the political and social environment; - moral/cultural difficulties: promises and agreements are not kept, aid funds are misused; - clan-type, quasi-criminal networks superseding formal structures (in some CIS countries); - the general inability of the beneficiary government to think and act strategically; - limited organizational capacity of the recipient country's public administration.	- organizational politics pushes donors to sustain useless or even harmful programs; - insufficient understanding of, and unresponsiveness to, the problems of the client; - one-fits-all-style, inappropriate consultancy products; - the West puts money into its own pocket by sending its own consultants to the East.
Problems on Both Sides and General Problems	
- incompatibility of values, and thus, management practices and systems; - limited ability to understand the other party's point and to communicate effectively one's own; consequently, limited ability to cooperate effectively; - presence of illegitimate personal or organizational goals—a result of which might be the self-sustaining process of "cooperation for cooperation"; - professional incompetence of cooperating partners, both Western consultants and local managers; - creation of a robust and persistent "state of transition and reform" leading nowhere and thus conserving the status quo.	

Figure 1
The Subject of the Study

In preparing this study on public administration technical assistance, researchers chose to focus on the sub-field of civil service training and development for several reasons:

While assistance in the form of a consultancy and general public administration technical assistance have been the subject of some overarching reviews, civil service and civil service training systems have been discussed much less.[5]

Furthermore, civil service training is important because the new institutions and new practices being established in CEE/CIS will only be operational if those people who run them are both able and willing to do so. Training offers a fundamental means of systematically giving workers capabilities and motivation to do things in a new and different way. Creating the concepts, institutions and procedures capable of providing adequate training to the entire civil service is a central task for operation of the government machinery in CEE/CIS countries. The authors therefore believe training is a central tool of human resource development within the public sector. Training is also important in the broader policy field of public administration reform and development. Despite this importance, training is undervalued, not only by beneficiary governments but also as a topic of research.

Another reason to study civil service training is that the output produced by training projects, while being difficult to evaluate, is substantially more tangible than the output of consultancy-type projects. Thus it is much more plausible to assess and compare training projects with one another. This latter point deserves additional attention for this particular study, because it is comparative in nature: Assistance projects that have taken place in various beneficiary coun-

tries, with funding from various donors, will be compared with one another.

Along with the above-mentioned reasons for the focus of this study there is also a personal element among the factors motivating and justifying the research. In this case, it is the basic discontent of the authors with their experience in the field of public administration technical assistance in the CEE/CIS region. The authors have gained this experience working as researchers, consultants or, sometimes, actual participants in such projects. Our purpose is not only to demonstrate deficiencies inherent in the field of civil service training assistance. We also hope to go beyond pure description and enhance the understanding and explanation of a segment of reality, with a possible further aim of improving the situation.

1.3 Questions Asked and Structure Followed in This Volume

As explained above, this study will concentrate on the less-often studied area of civil service training. The focus of the study will be sharpened further through attempts to address certain key questions. The general questions posed by this volume are as follows:

- *Question 1:*
  In what state are the civil service and civil service training systems of these beneficiary countries at the end of the first decade of transition?
  There is little information on how the civil service training systems of these countries developed during the

1990s and what their developmental stage is now. Although this issue is not the core focus of this study, it still sets the basic context in which Western assistance takes place, and it is the subject of this assistance.

- *Question 2:*
  What are the important characteristic features of assistance projects—and the training these projects provide?
  This brings up some related questions: How can various donors be ranked according to these important features? And, how do these features influence the efficacy of foreign technical assistance?

- *Question 3:*
  How truly effective are the activities of the various donors?
  This is the central question of this study. In order to deal with this question, we must answer a few preliminary questions, including: How can efficiency be defined and quantified? What is the basis of comparison—should we compare donors to each other, or to the nationally organized training activities? Should costs be weighted against the immediate output of number of trainees trained for a certain period—which is relatively easy to measure—or should costs be judged against outcomes and impact on the beneficiary's public administration system, which is a much more relevant but much more difficult-to-measure variable?

The genre of this study is intended to be somewhere between that of an evaluation report and a "standard" academic work. The targeted audience includes stakeholders from both the donor and the beneficiary community—executives, policy makers, field managers and technical experts. Accordingly, theoretical arguments will be kept to a minimum and will be subordinated to the basically practical orientation of the study. Similarly, a formal, full-fledged literature review is omitted; instead, references to relevant literature are made where necessary.

The volume seeks to answer the above questions in the following structure: Chapter 2 presents the background and the methodology of the research and the specific questions that will be asked. Chapter 3 concentrates on Question 1, by describing the key features of the civil service training systems of the recipient countries. Chapter 4 deals with the second main question, by identifying the relevant variables potentially affecting success and failure of training assistance projects. Chapter 5 addresses Question 3, by giving a comparative analysis of the efficiency of training assistance projects. Chapter 6 gives an overview of the results and draws some further conclusions on the basis of previous analyses. In Chapter 7, we give a number of recommendations.

This volume often makes reference to a number of papers prepared within the framework of the current research.

These papers have been made available on the web site of the publisher, at http://www.osi.hu/lgi. These papers offer grass-roots-level insight into the problem by presenting a number of specific cases. This study will refer to four papers on the four countries researched—Hungary, Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine—and three papers on three selected donors, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the European Commission's PHARE/TACIS program and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Material from the cases will serve, in part, as illustrations, but the cases will also supplements key points made in the book. For more details on the organization of the research, see the relevant subsection in the next chapter.

Throughout this volume, certain types of information are structured into standard formats. Comparative information on specific donor or country characteristics are presented in similar tables, which we call "comparative tables." In cases where some kind of ordering within these comparative tables seemed to be meaningful, the ranking of countries/donors is indicated with numbers in the first column of the table.

Another format for presenting information on particular examples is to *pull out* specific cases at certain points in the text to highlight them as illustrations of the points we are trying to make.

2. CONCEPTS, SCOPE AND DESIGN OF THE STUDY

2.1 Basic Concepts Used in the Study

The subject of this evaluation is civil service training assistance projects (hereinafter referred to as TAPs) in the so-called transition countries of CEE/CIS. In the following section, we provide a brief explanation of the important terms we will use in this study.

2.1.1 *Civil Service and Civil Service Training*

Civil servants, in this study and in most of the countries involved in the research, are salaried employees of public administration who work in the offices of central and local governments. Thus, according to our definition, elected politicians, such as members of parliament, ministers and mayors, are not civil servants. Similarly, so-called public servants, like teachers, nurses and doctors in public hospitals, are not civil servants. Furthermore, the personnel of uniformed services, the army, the police, etc. are not part of the

civil service. Throughout this study, this definition of the term "civil servant" is adhered to consistently, though we are aware that, in different legal and historical contexts, this term is often used with a somewhat different meaning, or is not used at all.

The notion of central government encompasses ministries and government agencies that have nation-wide jurisdiction but not ministry status, as well as related central public administration organizations, such as cabinet offices or the president's office. Local government includes all other government organizations, local and territorial, irrespective of whether these organizations function as relatively autonomous municipal self-governments or so called "de-concentrated organs," which are hierarchically subordinated to a central agency.

The term "civil service" thus primarily refers to the human dimension of public administrations. In fact, one could say that the civil service is the human-resources element of public administration. Key policy and administrative issues related to the operation of the civil service are usually dealt with by various legislative instruments, laws and other regulations covering the civil servants and their employment.

A central function assumed by any civil service system is the continuous, systematic development of its human resources. The recurrent and central element in developing the human capital available for public administration is training.

In the context of this study, training means those activities which:

* aim at inducing a change—be it cognitive, behavioral or oriented more towards skills or attitudes—in the individual civil servants;
* chiefly consist of a purposefully planned and implemented, systematic effort by specialized experts, usually trainers, in a specialized setting, usually training;
* take place in a well-defined, limited scope in terms of participants, time allotted, goals and subjects covered.

Thus, by training we mean all types of training, whether it be interactive or lecture format and whether it focuses on knowledge or skills development, etc. But school education, provided by secondary schools, colleges and universities awarding diplomas, is not considered training. We consider training to be only those activities that are implemented in a "classical training setting," so that consultation and conferences are not included in the term either.

Training activities are implemented continuously in every civil service system of the region. These civil service training activities can be funded/managed by the "national," (i.e. beneficiary) government or its relevant organs. In such a case, it would be called "national civil service training." The totality of knowledge, skills, attitudes and/or behavioral changes that are supposed to be transferred by a given training event is called "training content."

2.1.2 Training Assistance by Foreign Donors

But not all training is part of the national civil service training system. In most countries of the region, foreign bilateral and multilateral assistance, predominantly from the West, plays a key role in civil service training. It is exactly these types of programs, or TAPs, that form the basic subject of our study.

What is a TAP? Within this research project, TAP refers to programs that satisfy the following criteria:

* training is provided;
* the training is entirely, or to a substantial extent, for civil servant participants;
* the training is financed exclusively, or mostly, by foreign, Western, donor organizations.

Donor activities that satisfy the above criteria are called TAPs. But in some cases, where it seems justified, the definition is applied a little more "flexibly," so as to include, for example, training activities based on study trips.

An additional issue is the practical classification of TAPs. How can one identify a TAP and separate it from other donor activities? In this field, one faces at least three different sources of difficulty:

a) Ideally our focus is on "pure" training projects. But there are several foreign aid programs that contain a certain proportion of training activity, along with several other types of activities, such as other kinds of technical assistance, institution building, etc. These are called "mixed projects." In this case, the definition of the TAP is narrowed down to include, as much as possible, only the training component.

b) A related version of the problem mentioned above occurs when the project includes a large start-up training element—such as the preparation of curricula and training materials, training of trainers etc.—which is expected to operate and yield a "profit," or benefits, chiefly in the longer term. This type of TAP will be called a "sustainability-style TAP," because its real values appear only if the training is run several times in the future, after the TAP itself has ended. Sustainability-style TAPs will be discussed in detail later.

c) TAPs may be difficult to identify, even among projects whose only purpose is training. Frequently, training is provided for a mixed group of trainees, such as civil and uniformed personnel of some public organizations, mayors, elected officials and civil servants of local gov-

ernments. The problem in these cases is that only a part, and in quite a few cases an unidentifiable part, of the trainees are civil servants. In order to address this issue, we first attempted to identify the quantity of civil servants within the group of trainees and, based on the available information, we decided case-by-case if the given training project can be regarded as a TAP.

2.1.3   The Three 'E's of Training Assistance Projects

Most evaluation studies in the TAP field break down the notion of a TAP's value or quality into such analytically differentiated dimensions as, for example: operative, direct efficiency; effectiveness; impact; and sustainability. These criteria are usually measured by the standards set forth in the given program's planning documents, or terms of reference. When talking about the effectiveness or the efficiency of a given activity, organization or, more generally, system, it is not unusual to envisage it in terms of a simple input-output model. We principally follow this framework, outlined in Figure 2.

Training input is conveniently measured by the financial resources used to produce the activity. This is justified as long as all, or at least most, inputs are assigned a financial value, and no substantial indirect or spillover costs occur.

Training output is the immediate product generated by the training activity. It is generally measured in participant training days (PTD), which is the number of training days times the total number of participants.[6] A great advantage of this measure is that, unlike other measures, such as number of participants, etc., PTD enables one to sum up the outputs of different training activities in an adequate manner. But it is also clear that many important quantitative features of training programs' output cannot be grasped by this simple output measure. This problem is solved, at least theoretically, by the introduction of the concepts of "outcome" and "impact."

The outcomes of a program or activity are its consequences, actual benefits or harm, from the point of view of the goals of the project or those of the beneficiary civil service system. This notion emphasizes the wider, more indirect and longer-term consequences of the program, as opposed to the more visible and immediate ones called outputs. The term "impact" is used with a similar content, but this

Figure 2
Concepts Related to Training Efficiency and Effectiveness

term emphasizes even more strongly the indirect and longer-term nature of project consequences.

The classical "three 'E's" of policies and programs—economy, effectiveness and efficiency—can be interpreted in relation to these notions. Economy is the extent to which the project uses its resources in a sparing and non-wasteful manner. Efficiency, on the other hand, refers to the relationship or ratio between total inputs consumed—which includes resources rather than simply costs—and outputs produced. This is sometimes expressed by the formula: efficiency = output/input. In our case, this ratio usually takes the form of PTD/USD. Unit costs of training, on the contrary, relate to the same issue but from a different perspective. Unit costs are essentially the reciprocal of efficiency, so that unit costs equal total input per total output. For our purposes, that means that, generally, unit costs = USD/PTD. The third "E," effectiveness, refers to the utility of the given TAP for the country's civil service system—in other words, the extent to which the given training program is able to improve the administrative capacity of a recipient countries' civil service system. This measure may, or may not, coincide with the stated goals of the given project. The "three 'E's" of economy, efficiency and effectiveness together will often be denoted as "efficacy."

2.1.4   Main Players in the National Civil Service Training System and TAP Field

For the sake of clarity, we list the terms used to describe the key institutional actors in the TAP field:

- "Donors"—sometimes also called aid agencies—are the organizations outside the national civil service system that provide financial resources for TAPs. Donors also manage these programs, either on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Typically, donors determine the overall objective of a TAP and, possibly, other key characteristics of the TAP.
- A "TAP implementer" is the organization generally responsible for the practical implementation of a TAP. This implementation often, but not always, occurs in a contractual relationship with the donor.
- "Trainees" or "participants" are those trained within any training program.
- "Docking organizations" is an umbrella term referring to those national, in other words beneficiary-side, organizations involved in the management of TAPs. A docking organization could be a government office that defines training needs or recruits trainees for a certain TAP.
- "Beneficiaries" are the entities receiving the aid. The notion of beneficiary can often be split into two: 1.) the

people trained; and 2.) the institution responsible for the TAP management on the beneficiary side. In some contexts, the term may refer to the countries that are receiving aid, or their governments. These countries or governments are also sometimes called "recipients."

- Finally, we may differentiate at certain points of the text between the "donor side," which refers to all institutions involving the donor, and the "beneficiary side," which refers to institutions involving beneficiaries or recipients.

2.2   The Methodological Background and Approach of the Study

Both the evaluation of training programs and the evaluation of foreign aid programs involve a number of practical and theoretical difficulties. And the difficulties can be even worse in evaluation of training programs that are implemented as foreign aid. These issues are reflected in the relevant literature to a varying degree. While some of these difficulties have been discussed in the past to a significant extent and in detail, others have been largely neglected. In the forthcoming section, our intention is to give a brief overview of existing issues, practices and results—and to place our study within the "universe" of existing approaches.

2.2.1   Evaluating Training Activities

Unlike administrative systems in CEE/CIS, most Western administrative systems have a relatively long history of employing evaluation as a field of applied social science. There is definitely some degree of scholarly diversity, which is mainly due to different epistemological approaches and/or different emphases in, and interpretations of, an evaluator's work.[7] There is also a substantial unity with regard to the practice of evaluation: The questions asked, the methods applied and the roles assumed by evaluation practitioners converge both in time and space.

But the picture is more controversial when it comes to the evaluation of training activities. Most theoretical and practical work in assessing training and education programs falls into one of two different types of disciplinary approaches.[8]

The first type of disciplinary approach is characterized by a relative adherence to the "classical" view of evaluation. This approach is best exemplified by Kirkpatrick's often-cited work, which has formed the basic point of reference in training evaluation methodology in recent decades.[9] To put it very briefly, Kirkpatrick's four-level model seeks to find

an answer to the question of a training's effectiveness on four distinct levels, hierarchically built on one another. These four levels of investigation are:

1) Immediate reaction of participants: Did they like the program? Did they think it was useful?

2) Learning: Did the participants actually acquire the knowledge or skills that the training was intended to transfer?

3) Behavior on-the-job: Did the participants' behavior, as exhibited in their work settings, actually change in the required direction?

4) Final results in the organizational context: Did the expected positive changes occur in the actual working of the organization? Did its efficacy improve?

While the first, more immediate, levels of investigation are generally a necessary condition for the ultimate usefulness of training, they are not sufficient. That is, training is successful only if all four levels of questions are answered positively. The techniques or methods for answering these questions are fundamentally identical with those found in the general area of evaluation research. Depending on the ambitions of, and the resources available for, the evaluation, experimental, quasi-experimental and non-experimental research designs are applied. These types of research typically rely on questionnaire surveys conducted with program participants or other stakeholders, program files and more qualitative information, such as stakeholder interviews. Although the four-level model of training evaluation has been subjected to criticism from various directions in recent years, the model still functions, to a large extent, as a standard approach of practitioners in the field.

The other influential approach in training evaluation is rooted in economics. It uses statistical and econometric methods to calculate—on the basis of earnings, productivity increase and similar data—the economic value of training activities, in terms of increases in human capital, using non-experimental research design. This approach is more often used in relation to macro-level policy issues. For example, it is influential in the work of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the World Bank. These calculations typically rely on data showing expected increases in trainees' earnings. The weakness of this approach is that it makes "strong" assumptions about the competitive and undistorted nature of the labor market. This weakness is magnified when it comes to the strictly regulated labor market segment of governmental employees.

It is generally agreed that evaluations of the efficiency and effectiveness of training is especially prone to both theoretical and practical difficulties, whether choosing the former

or the latter approach. Our approach to the problem resembles the classical evaluation model described first. This is justified by four factors: 1) the micro-level focus of our study; 2) the complete implausibility of the free-market assumptions of the economic approach in the context of CEE/CIS— or any—civil service "labor markets"; 3) the type of data and information available for the purpose of the research; and 4) the general practice of the TAP evaluation field, which restricts itself to classical—in other words, non-economic— evaluations.

Before further describing our approach, we will first examine another basic ingredient of our problem field: the arena of evaluating foreign aid programs.

2.2.2 Evaluating International Technical Assistance

As mentioned above, there are few existing endeavors into the evaluation of technical assistance—especially TAP activities—in the CEE/CIS region, and existing evaluative work faces numerous difficulties.

Compared to evaluations of most types of foreign aid, evaluations of public administration technical assistance are less likely to use quantitative, "scientific" methods. Aid programs in the fields of environment, energy, transport, health, social work and other areas are usually evaluated using ostensibly more rigorous methods of social cost-benefit analysis, evaluation research and similar approaches. But technical assistance programs, especially those aimed at improving the performance of the governmental sector, are rarely, if ever, evaluated on such sound methodological bases.

This contrast is not attributable to the specifics of the international aid field. Instead, the less scientific approach to evaluating public administration technical assistance is caused by the fundamental problems and constraints in understanding—let alone quantifying or evaluating from a wider, systemic point of view—sequences of events occurring within the arena of public administration. It is no wonder that most such evaluations rely on first-hand observation and/or other methods that are less rigorous and more intuitive and qualitative. In establishing, supporting and presenting evaluative and analytical statements of public administration technical assistance, it is more common to use expert ratings or qualitative-judgmental assessments.[10] This methodological choice seems justified in many respects. Despite this fact, and despite the problems outlined above, our approach to evaluating TAPs has certain ambitions extending somewhat beyond the mostly intuitive and qualitative way of drawing and presenting conclusions.

This ambition is reflected in two features:

- First, it is clear that many statements, opinions and observations are difficult to support with "empirical evidence" in the stricter, positivist sense of the term. In the field of public administration, statements like "X is more frequent than Y" are rarely supported by the probability distributions of the quantified variables X and Y, measured under different circumstances for a large sample. Many of the more qualitative methods, like case studies, "participatory observations," etc., do not offer a basis for such rigorous measurement. Despite these difficulties, we strive, wherever possible, to offer an insight for the reader into at least some of the facts from which we draw our conclusions. Thus, we try to benefit from the strengths of qualitative methods. Accordingly, in examining hypotheses, we use not only case-based, qualitative evidence, but also findings and conclusions of other evaluative studies and research, analytical trains of thought and, at some points, more intuitive considerations rooted in the first-hand observations of some of our interviewees, our colleagues and ourselves.

- Second, great effort is made to quantify as much as possible. Epistemological and practical problems attached to quantification are manifold, and these problems are extensively exposed and discussed by both academics and practitioners of evaluation.[11] In our view, the benefits of at least some degree of quantification outweigh the costs. Nevertheless, the lack of "facts," let alone hard data, poses great difficulties and forces the analysis to apply some unusual or creative solutions at some points.

This creative approach is mostly used in some of the central findings that are based on the comparative analysis of different training programs' efficiency. The methods applied in doing this are detailed in the introductory section of the relevant chapter (Chapter 5). At this point, it suffices to say that a lack of sufficient data is, we hope, counterbalanced by the robustness of key findings and the use of a number of analytical approaches and means of argumentation.

2.2.3 Beneficiary Orientation

Most evaluative exercises in the field of public-administration-related international aid are, understandably, specified, commissioned, funded and used—or rather, not used—by the donor organizations themselves. Beneficiaries rarely if ever engage in such activities for a variety of reasons, the more obvious ones being: lack of an evaluation culture, lack of access to vital information, lack of expertise and, most importantly, lack of financial resources available for this purpose.

This situation causes many problems. One major problem is the resulting incompleteness and one-sidedness of our view on, and knowledge of, TAPs—their actual role and their effects in the beneficiary countries. A more practical problem is the lack of empirically grounded, systematic guidance, which could assist beneficiary countries' governments and docking organizations in dealing with public-administration-related foreign aid. Such guidance could also help beneficiaries represent their interests more effectively. This is important not only for the beneficiaries but also for donors: Many of the problems inhibiting the representation of beneficiary interests in the TAP decision-making and management process are, or should be, simultaneously perceived as problems by the donors as well. Our purpose and attitude towards this evaluation is reflected well in the words of Pollitt and O'Neill who, in the context of EU aid programs, note: "One way of avoiding the question of who an evaluation is for is to claim that it is for all stakeholders […] Our findings, and our wider knowledge of the evaluation literature, leads us to be dubious of this proposition. […] This echoes academic doubts about the fashion for multi-stakeholder evaluations."[12]

The approach of this study is explicitly based on a degree of "beneficiary orientation." But this orientation is, by no means, intended to carry any kind of covert or otherwise illegitimate bias in favor of beneficiaries as opposed to donors. Instead, it aims at reflecting more the beneficiaries' views, criteria of judging TAPs and interests in their process of implementation.

The specifics of the "beneficiary orientation" approach, as opposed to the "donor orientation" that is used for most evaluations, are reflected in several features:

For one thing, the composition of the "evaluation agenda" and the types of questions being asked are somewhat changed by the beneficiary orientation. In this study, the beneficiary countries' individual circumstances, including institutional, legal, cultural, historic and other specifics, are examined in greater detail and are given more weight than usual.

Furthermore, the bases and standards used in making judgements or comparisons are also somewhat different. For example, measures of effectiveness of a program typically compare results to the program designer's goal, as laid down in the planning documents. In our approach, the "effectiveness" of a program is measured solely in relation to the beneficiary country's needs and interests.

While it might be an expressed and legitimate policy of a donor to promote the national interests of the donor country, or to activate and nurture consulting companies and other such professional organizations, these effects will not be counted as benefits in this study. Looking at programs

from the beneficiaries' viewpoint can also change opinions about the adequacy of training content. From the perspective of the donor, what is important is whether the actual training content is adequate to the objectives of the TAP. For example, a donor wants to know that a TAP aimed at providing training in applying municipal bond systems conveys that knowledge. But from the perspective of the beneficiary, the question is whether the given TAP actually has a significant positive effect on the public administrative system. For example, the beneficiary is more concerned whether training in municipal bond systems really promotes the situation of local governments. In an extreme example, the training may, hypothetically, promote practices that are prohibited by law in the beneficiary country.

2.3   Technical Aspects of The Research

2.3.1   Scope

As to the geographical scope of the research, four countries have been chosen in order to represent the highest variance across the most important factors that may be relevant as explanatory variables of TAP characteristics—most of all their efficacy. The four countries are: Hungary, Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine. Naturally, the number and the selection of countries reflect the material and technical constraints of the research.

Within the given time and geographical boundaries, many donors have been active in the TAP field. Therefore some "filtering" was inevitable. Only the most important donor organizations and TAPs funded by these organizations were included in the investigation. The sample of "most important donors" surveyed in the research was identified as those donors providing training for the greatest number of civil servants, or those having the largest annual total TAP budget. But, in cases where it seemed justified, relatively "smaller" donors were included too.

The list of donor organizations analyzed includes the European Commission's PHARE/TACIS program (hereinafter: PHARE), the U.K. government's Department for International Development (DFID), CIDA and USAID.[13] While there are other significant donors in one or the other of the four examined countries, the donors mentioned are active in all of these countries. This is the reason why these donors were included in the research, while others were not.

The main temporal focus of the investigation is the time period of 1997–2000. But, in order to assess trends and longer-term developments, we needed to make reference to some

points in the 1990-97 period, as well as to the present time. The manuscript was closed in August 2002.

2.3.2   A Closer Look at the Basic Questions of The Research

It would be dishonest and implausible to say that, prior to the study, the authors hadn't had any opinion about the subject matter of the research. Of course the research did not start on a "blank page": The authors had previous experience in the field of TAPs—as experts working for these projects and also working on behalf of beneficiaries, as members of the docking organizations hosting these projects. They therefore had a number of basic and intuitive observations, which influenced the choice of questions and variables—and thus the design of the research. A non-exhaustive list of these observations is as follows:

1) TAPs are often only of sub-optimal usefulness due to such problems as: inadequate selection of trainees; inadequate training content; cultural controversies, especially regarding the expectations of trainers and trainees, which inhibit effective learning; and inflexible and cumbersome project management.

2) TAPs tend to be very expensive and, thus, considering the previous point, inefficient. For example, the absurd situation in which a civil servant receives training that costs as much as three years' salary of the given civil servant can happen easily. Training can have high unit costs because: expert costs related to project preparation and training development are high, both in relative and in absolute terms; and the implementation methods of training events—such as study trips abroad—have a high resource requirement.

3) TAPs tend to be consistent in that, despite the above problems, they are implemented by contracted organizations and experts from the same country as the donor. This is so, even if many—although certainly not all—of the problems with TAPs, such as cultural and language problems, high expert fees and related costs, are directly linked to this practice.

4) There is frequently an air of secrecy around TAPs, even for those local experts who are otherwise intimately involved in their management or implementation. This is primarily the case when it comes to such "sensitive" issues as budget details of the project at hand.

These observations were thought to apply to the different donors to a varying degree. But, with a few exceptions, such as cumbersome project management, these problems apparently plagued projects funded by all donors to a sub-

stantial degree. When designing and implementing the research, the authors made efforts to give a real chance for these observations to be disproved or weakened when examined on a much broader empirical basis. Although most of these statements remained applicable on the broader empirical basis, after investigation with the stronger methodological techniques of the current research, not all statements held true. As later chapters of this volume will show, some of these observations have limited validity, and a number of additional points emerged that had not been anticipated beforehand.

2.3.3   Research Design

As explained above, this study will use the individual TAP as the primary unit of analysis and explore the population of TAPs run by four key donors in four countries. It was anticipated that insufficient access to data would create a major obstacle in the research. As a part of the problem, it was thought to be unrealistic to either perform data collection for the whole population of TAPs or to apply a formal sampling procedure. Therefore a "softer" approach was applied: On the basis of available information, the field research was to identify the "dominant," "typical" value of the various variables. In the case of some key quantitative variables, such as the unit cost of training, the distribution of the variable was sought by identifying "relatively low," "typical" and "relatively high" values. It is noted here that, in some countries, certain pieces of data are not based on official statistics. Sometimes these statistics do not exist for areas such as civil service personnel and wage data. In these cases, informed judgements and estimations are used.

The comparative character of the research is maintained by looking at a given, standard set of TAP characteristics and comparing them across various sub-sets of TAPs. The research examines training events within the various beneficiary countries and those run by various donors, comparing TAPs along these two dimensions simultaneously.

It was anticipated that, in some cases, the lack of data would encumber this comparison. In other words, many cells of the imaginary four-donors-by-four-countries table would remain empty. Therefore, in addition to a specific TAP, the country and the donor became important units of analysis, too. For example, it makes more sense to examine the evaluation practices on the analytical level of the donor than on the level of individual TAPs.

2.3.4   The Research Process

Data and other types of evidence and arguments used in the study stem from two sources. One of them is the field research that took place in the first phase of this study. The other is written data from a variety of sources.

The process of the field research was organized in the following manner:

1) In the first, "inception," phase, a detailed technical proposal was prepared. The proposal envisaged that four country teams would be involved, one team per beneficiary country under study. The proposal consisted of a detailed "Issue Paper" explaining the problem, its interpretation, the methods and concepts used and the terms of reference to be used. It also contained a description of country teams' expected outputs and a proposed project schedule.

2) Then four experts, one per country, were identified and contracted as the "country team leader" of the respective country. Because they were managers or experts of key institutions of civil service training, these experts had substantial experience in the civil service training field of the given country. In addition, it was required that they have a similar familiarity with TAPs and public administration foreign assistance in general. Within the framework of this research project, they were generally responsible for the fulfillment of the field research tasks defined in the terms of reference of the research, for identifying and contracting further collaborators and for managing the budget allocated for the field research.

3) Subsequently, the appropriate material was sent to the country team leaders and discussed at a project meeting. The donors to be selected for detailed analysis were also determined at this project meeting. The methods, the supporting methodological materials and the schedule were finalized after the meeting.

4) During the summer of 2001, empirical data collection performed by the country teams took place. It consisted of the completion of:
   - one "Country Information Sheet" per country;
   - three to five "Donor Information Sheets" per country, depending on the number of relevant donors present in the given country as well as data availability.

   These sheets were in fact highly structured questionnaires to be filled in by the country teams on the basis of a number of interviews conducted with beneficiary and donor side stakeholders, documentary analysis, literature review and Internet research.

5) Gathering of donor-related information in the four beneficiary countries was supplemented by research con-

ducted at certain donors' headquarters, namely, at CIDA, USAID and PHARE. This research, conducted in Winter 2001–Spring 2002, was based on face to face or telephone stakeholder interviews, document analysis and Internet research. The results of this research were summarized in one "Donor Paper" per donor.

6) On the basis of the research conducted in the four countries, four "Country Papers," one for each country, have been prepared by the country teams. These papers summarize, with a flexible format and content, the main points and results of research by the country teams. The Country Papers are published at the electronic publishing site of the publisher of this volume.

Table 5 summarizes the main quantitative characteristics of the field research.

The other source of information was a number of project files and documents, evaluation reports, research articles and papers, etc. reviewed by the authors of this volume. This research did not produce any "intermediary products," like the Information Sheets produced by the country teams. Instead, this information was utilized by directly incorporating it into the analyses. (Table 6)

3. CIVIL SERVICE AND CIVIL SERVICE TRAINING IN THE RECIPIENT COUNTRIES

In this chapter, we discuss some major issues regarding the civil service systems of the four countries being analyzed. Then we describe the national civil service training systems of the four countries. The main questions asked refer to the legal and institutional background, major procedural characteristics, major actors and their responsibilities and typical characteristics of national civil service training courses, especially obligatory courses.

Table 5
Number of Interviews Made with Donor ("D") and Beneficiary ("B") Side Stakeholders

	PHARE		USAID		DFID		CIDA		Other*		Total
	D	B	D	B	D	B	D	B	D	B	
Hungary	1+	4+	—	—	2+	2+	—	—	—	1	10+
Lithuania	—	2+	—	—	—	2	1	3	—	—	8+
Romania	1	2	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	3+	10+
Ukraine	—	3	—	—	1	2	1	1	—	—	8
Headquaters	2	—	1+		—	—	4	—	—	—	7+
Total	4+	11	2+	3	3+	6	6	4	—	4+	43+

* *LGI in Hungary, Matra in Romania. Plus sign (+): Other, unnamed interviewees—typically trainees, or discussions with various persons that happened outside this project. Names, positions and/or titles of interviewees are available from the publisher.*

Table 6
Number of Training Projects Mentioned ("M") and Analysed in Detail ("A")[14]

	PHARE		USAID		DFID		CIDA		Total	
	M	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M	A
Hungary	83	28	—	—	7	6	—	—	90	34
Lithuania	80	2	—	—	6	1	1	1	87	4
Romania	9	3	4	2	—	—	—	—	13	5
Ukraine	1	1	2	2	4	1	3	2	10	6
Total	173	34	6	4	17	8	4	3	200	49

3.1 Civil Service in Recipient Countries—Regulation and Reality

The parliaments of each of the four countries analyzed had adopted a law on civil service/public service by the year 2000. These laws were adopted in Hungary in 1992, in Lithuania in 1999[15], in Romania in 1998 and in Ukraine in 1993. Because the civil service laws in Lithuania and Romania were adopted as late as the 1997–2000 period of this investigation, the legislation in these two countries had only a limited effect on national civil service training in the period that is the focus of the research. The Hungarian law was amended several times, and in 2001 there were major changes, including significantly increased civil service wages and modifications in the form and function of compulsory advanced training. At the time the research was conducted, the Lithuanian government was considering whether to virtually abolish the merit-based civil service system. These changes, however, fall outside of the time scope of our research, thus we do not go into detail on recent developments but return to the 1997–2000 period.

At least two out of the four laws analyzed were developed with foreign assistance. The Lithuanian law was developed with the active assistance of PHARE, whereas development of the legislation in Romania was assisted by DFID and PHARE. In the case of PHARE, assistance was accompanied by political pressure from the European Commission Delegation to introduce a merit-based civil service system.

Most of the laws analyzed define civil servants as officers working in the offices of the central, territorial and local governments. The Lithuanian law is somewhat different, since it regulates the public sphere in general, including public servants, the armed forces, etc. The Ukrainian law includes such political positions as the prime minister, ministers of the cabinet and mayors of local governments within the body of the civil service. This group is estimated to amount to about 10 percent of the total civil service personnel.

The laws contain most of the elements that a merit-based civil service regulation would normally contain. Such elements are, among others, a grading system, a career system, a kind of a performance appraisal system, a system of selection and recruitment and guarantees against unfair redundancies or dismissals. A type of a grade-related pay system is also present in all four countries. It seems that all these laws are somehow copies of "Western solutions." The laws "import" most of their crucial elements, such as the subsystems of merit-based civil service systems.

But these elements are not "polished" to perfection by practice and do not really function together smoothly as a real system. For example, the analysis of the Hungarian civil service law, which has perhaps been tested the longest, shows that a civil servant's career path is not based on their personal appraisal; their personal appraisal is not based on their job description, let alone work performance; and the allocation of training opportunities to a civil servant is not adequately based on their planned career. In other words, while the various subsystems are in place, they do not operate in synergy, and, therefore, individual elements do not appropriately perform their function.

- *In Hungary, a relatively strict grading system is in place. Civil service grades usually depend on education level and years of civil service experience. But grades are determined on the basis of the education level and work experience of the individual civil servant, rather than on the requirements for the specific position. Such explicitly stated, written requirements rarely exist at all. Thus a Hungarian civil servant with a master's degree in sociology will be in Grade I, the highest grade, even if he or she fills a position where a secondary-level education in agriculture is the specified requirement—if there is any specified requirement at all.*

While the civil service laws postulate a purely neutral civil service, the specific regulations of the laws do not effectively protect civil servants from wide-spread and harsh forms of political intrusion.

- *The Ukrainian Civil Service Law is especially ambiguous in the regulation of political interference. Whereas the law stipulates that civil servants must be politically neutral, the same law includes purely political positions, such as ministers and mayors, within the civil service.*

All the laws define the civil service as a politically neutral body of paid officials. But the system of legal guarantees is not strong enough. Of course, laws cannot do much if they are not followed, if they are neglected or if fraud is widespread—as is the case, to a greater or lesser extent, in all four countries. Indeed, our country teams unequivocally noted that civil service positions, especially the higher managerial positions, are the spoils of the winning political parties. Moreover, even if the same party appoints a new minister, major changes may appear in the management of the ministry. These changes can extend two-to-four levels down from the highest civil service management status. In other words, these positions depend on personal confidence. It is somewhat characteristic that, while the philosophy of the civil service laws are reminiscent of the British civil service system, the practice is closer to the U.S. system, or even goes beyond that in terms of politicization.

The political and personal dependence of managerial civil service positions has a great impact on the implementation process and the outcome of TAPs. The lack of

neutrality results in a high turnover rate that affects TAPs in at least the following three ways:

- Trainees may be forced to leave the civil service soon after the training ends. This is generally a major source of ineffectiveness in TAPs. Many TAPs concentrate on managers as potential trainees, because they hope to achieve greater impact this way than by training lower-level civil servants. But there is a high chance that the trained managers will be laid off after a change in political leadership.

  - *A somewhat extreme, but still characteristic, case of personnel change is that of a PHARE TAP that provided training for a relatively large number of civil servants in the 1992–1995 period. In 1996, one year after the project ended, evaluators found that only about one fifth (!) of the trained persons were still in the civil service.*

- The beneficiary counterparts of donors are usually in a managerial position. It is quite common that the previous national contact person is laid off or forced to leave the civil service after elections, and the donor, or the contracted implementing organization, has to restart with another contact person.
- In a few cases, the newly appointed government was suspicious about the donor and/or implementing organization assisting the previous government, and there was no neutral local agent or civil servant who could act as a liaison between the docking organization and the beneficiary government.

Another major element of the civil service system is remuneration. The remuneration system has direct impacts on TAPs, perhaps most importantly because of the extremely low level of civil service salaries. These wages are low compared to any relevant reference group. Wages are low not only in comparison to Western wages but also in comparison to the private sector wages of the country concerned. The wage gap between the public and the private sector is especially high among relatively young, well-educated professionals who speak at least one foreign language, which is a typical target group of TAPs.

In Table 7, we provide some comparative data on the civil service wages in the region.[16]

It seems quite typical in the region that managerial salaries are much higher than "ordinary" civil servants' salaries. From the TAPs' aspect, low wages result in high turnover rates with a similar impact to that described above: There is a high turnover in national counterpart personnel and a low retention rate for trainees in the civil service.

Another way in which the civil service remuneration system has a direct impact on TAPs is that donor organizations have to cooperate with a poorly motivated administrative body. Obviously, working morale is lower among poorer paid workers. As the common saying goes: "If you pay peanuts, you'll get monkeys." Donors often find that civil servants at the national docking organizations do not fulfill their obligations on time, or at all; promises are not kept, or workers even deny that the promises were made; meetings are unexpectedly cancelled at the last minute, etc. If two persons work on the same project, one on behalf of the donor or implementing organization, another on behalf of the national public administration, it is somewhat reasonable to expect that they are paid similarly—that they receive a comparable wage for comparable work. But, if one person earns more than USD 300 daily, while the other earns USD 150 monthly, the same rationale works in the opposite direction: It is reasonable to expect that the lower wages will lead to lower performance. In addition to the rational aspects, low wages may also induce frustration and greediness in the TAP environment. These ill-effects can be expected to further decrease the performance of national civil servants.

3.2 National Civil Service Training Systems: Procedures and Structures

3.2.1 Legal Regulation of the Field; Compulsory and Non-compulsory Training

Practically all civil service laws have a reference to civil service training. Training is typically treated as both a right and

Table 7
Monthly Salaries in the Recipient Countries on Various Levels of the Civil Service [USD][17]

Country	Clerical	Decision-making	Managerial
Hungary	120–200 (150)	140–350 (220)	350–450 (400)
Lithuania	160–300	267–527	527–1,000
Romania		50–400 (150)	360–460
Ukraine	50	72–115 (90)	

an obligation of civil servants. All four civil service laws state that it is the civil servant's right and obligation to take part in training courses that provide the knowledge and skills necessary to carry out the civil servant's task lawfully and efficiently and enable him/her to serve the public interest to the highest possible degree.

In some cases, the laws, or secondary legislation, determine that civil servants are eligible for, or are required to participate in, training courses of a certain length within a certain period.

Comparative Table 1
Regulations on Civil Servants' Training Eligibility

Hungary	According to the cabinet decree on national civil service training in Hungary, civil servants are entitled to receive 30 hours of training within every four-year period.
Lithuania	The Lithuanian law approaches the issue from a budgetary angle. Budgets of public administration organizations shall contain a line for national civil service training, and the amount earmarked for training shall not be lower than 1 percent of the civil service wage bill at the organization.
Romania	The issue was not regulated during the period of the research.
Ukraine	In Ukraine, civil servants are required to get a passing grade in a retraining program once every five years.

Most of the countries' relevant regulations determine some forms of obligatory training and/or require the successful passing of certain exams.

There are some general characteristics of obligatory training in the region that could be summed up as follows:

- Obligatory training sessions end with exams. In other cases, training may be simply an optional opportunity to prepare for an obligatory exam. The method of examination is similar to university exams.
- Content analysis of the compulsory training measures, as well as their strong reliance on examination, shows that training focuses on knowledge transfer, rather than skills improvement or attitude change.
- It seems, at least in Hungary and Ukraine, where compulsory training has been in place for a longer period, the topic of law is a major element of this type of training and examination.

There is no separate central training budget for training in the region. The only exception is Hungary, where such a budget was established in 1999, with quite modest funding. The typical means of financing training in all four countries is that public administration organizations earmark training costs in a separate line in the organization's budget within the "personnel expenses" section. Another way of financing training is to finance the training provider directly from the central budget. This practice is quite significant in Ukraine and is present to some degree in Hungary and Lithuania.

Comparative Table 2
Obligatory Training Courses and/or Exams

Hungary	In Hungary, all civil servants—except for those holding a degree in public administration, law or economics—must pass the so-called General Civil Service Exam within one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half years of entering into the service. About 90 percent of the candidates take part, before the exam, in three-day preparatory courses. Ninety percent of the content of the exam, and thus the preparatory training, pertains to law. Those in managerial positions are required to pass the Advanced Civil Service Exam. The content of the advanced exam is also centered on legal issues. About half of those who take the advanced exam participate in a preparatory course before-hand. Ministries may determine obligatory exams and/or training for the narrower segment of civil servants working in a given field, irrespective of whether the civil servants are employed by the central government or a local self-government.
Lithuania	In Lithuania, the law determines three different types of obligatory national civil service training: initial training, continuous (in-service) training and training for senior civil servants. Training development, delivery and testing is performed by the Lithuanian Institute of Public Administration. Civil servants are required to pass the initial training and exam when they step up from the lowest level of a given category to the next level. Ministries may determine obligatory exams and/or training for the narrower segment of civil servants working in a given policy field, irrespective of whether the civil servants are employed by the central government or a local self-government.
Romania	In Romania, ministries may determine obligatory exams and/or training for the narrower segment of civil servants working in a given policy field, irrespective of whether the civil servants are employed by the central government or a local self-government. However, there is no general obligatory training and/or exam for civil servants.
Ukraine	In Ukraine a relatively sophisticated national civil service training system exists. There is a two-week-long program that is generally obligatory in the civil service. The program includes three parts: a legislative part, which makes up about 30 percent of the content; a management part, which also makes up about 30 percent of the content; and a professional part, which contains some legal elements as well and makes up about 40 percent of the content. All participants are required to take a final examination. The training and examination are based on a centrally developed curriculum, and both are carried out by a centrally controlled network of regional training facilities. Twenty-seven such facilities exist all around the country. Ministries may require an obligatory exam and/or training for the narrower segment of civil servants working in a given policy field, irrespective of whether the civil servants are employed by the central government or a local self-government.

3.2.2 Responsibilities, Activities and Actors

From an institutional point of view, there is a great similarity among the four countries. The set of responsible authorities is almost identical. Theoretically, the cabinet—and/or the president's administration—is responsible for the formulation of an overall, national civil-service training policy. However, no well-developed, sound and consistent national civil service training policy exists in any of the countries analyzed.[18]

It is usually the interior ministry that is responsible for policy formulation, implementation and control of implementation.

Generally, obligatory courses are centrally designed. The training materials, usually manuals, are centrally produced and distributed. For other, non-compulsory courses, training curriculum and training materials are typically created by the training provider.

We found no evidence that a general, wide-ranging national civil service training needs assessment has been carried out by the competent national authorities in any of the countries. But, in some cases, foreign donors financed such activities, either as part of a larger training project or as a separate project. For instance, we have heard about three needs assessments, with varying scope, carried out in Romania within two years. Nonetheless, we found no evidence that any of these needs assessments has ever really been utilized by the national government.

It is more common that governments determine, in some less structured way, their main priorities.

So-called priorities sometimes turn out to be overly general: They embrace practically everything, so they can hardly be considered priorities.

On the general issue of demand for training, the country teams mentioned that there is low interest in training,

Comparative Table 3
Civil Service Training Policy and Implementation Responsibilities

Hungary	Whereas national civil service training policy is in the portfolio of the Ministry of Interior, civil service management training is in the portfolio of the Prime Minister's Office. A special body, the Council for National Civil Service Training, operating under the Ministry of Interior, has a major part in the utilization and allocation of the above-mentioned central training budget.
Lithuania	Until 2000, the Ministry of Public Administration Reform and Local Authorities was responsible. Since 2000, the Ministry of Interior is responsible for policy formulation and implementation.
Romania	The National Agency of Civil Service (NACS) is the responsible authority. The NACS was directly subordinate to the cabinet. Later on, its supervising authority became the Ministry of Interior.
Ukraine	Ukraine is an exception to the rule in this regard. The responsible body is the Chief Committee of Public Service at the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. This committee is responsible for the co-ordination of the overall training policy development and implementation. On behalf of this committee, one of its members determines curricula and training materials to be adopted. All of these are obligatory for sub-national training centers. To deliver a training activity, this committee adopts the training centers' budget and finances their activity through the State Treasury system.

Comparative Table 4
Official List of Training Priorities

Hungary	The priorities were determined by a cabinet resolution in 1999, and a reporting system was set up to monitor how many civil servants are trained in the priority areas. Priorities are as follows: a) EU-related issues, including general EU training of all civil servants; b) foreign language skills; c) computing skills; d) management skills; e) law-making skills. Despite the diversity of priorities, legal knowledge is still the focus of obligatory training courses, and even EU training. EU training forms an overwhelming majority of the centrally managed courses.
Lithuania	The government is required by a recent law to set up a national civil service training strategy. Other public administration institutions, in turn, are required to create annual training plans that reflect the general training strategy, as well as the specific needs of the organization and the civil servant. These requirements are spelled out in the civil service law adopted in 1999. We have not been able to collect information on its implementation yet.
Romania	We found no official list of priorities in Romania.
Ukraine	The previously mentioned Chief Committee of Public Service at the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine set up the following training priorities: a) management skills; b) communication skills; c) legal knowledge; and d) specific professional knowledge and skills.

and sometimes even resistance toward participating in training courses. Training may be regarded as a "penalty" rather than a reward. This issue seems to be more serious in Ukraine and Romania, but it is present quite significantly in Hungary and Lithuania, too.

We found no evidence that evaluation of the national civil service training system, or evaluation of compulsory courses, is present in the countries examined.

- *Hungary seems to be an exception to the lack of evaluations, because there was an evaluation of the so called General National Civil Service Training system, one of two generally compulsory training courses. But this was rather more of a research activity initiated by researchers than an evaluation required by the stakeholders.[19] The evaluation results and recommendations were not utilized, and the report was, at least in the initial and most relevant period after its completion, practically classified.*

Some training providers may ask trainees at the end of the course to fill in a questionnaire and collect feedback on trainees' impressions. However, even this limited effort can be considered an exception rather than the rule in national civil service training environments.

Another way to classify civil service training in the countries studied is according to the level of centralization involved in managing training. One may reasonably require a precise definition of, or even a measurement method for, the term "centralization." When we talk about a "centralized" system, we mean it uses centrally directed public training providers instead of other means of providing training, such as courses given by for-profit and non-profit organizations. We cannot provide a measurement method, because there is no quantitative data available. The authors must rely on intuition, and we can provide only a qualitative explanation. Our ranking with explanation is presented in Comparative Table 5.

- *We know of a few cases in Hungary, for instance, where a former trainee utilized TAP training to set up a small enterprise and offer training for a market price. Meanwhile, the government's institutional memory has completely forgotten about the TAP.*

- *Due to the lack of an established national civil service training institution in Romania, TAP courses could be replicated only by for-profit and non-profit organizations.*

Donors play quite a significant role in financing civil service training, especially in terms of inputs, or funding, but also in terms of outputs, such as number of civil servants trained or PTD. There is no reliable quantitative data that would allow a sound assessment of the proportion of TAPs within the total national civil service training activity. In Hungary, where access to data was the best, about one fifth of total civil service training spending in the country comes from foreign donors, and between 1–3 percent of the total PTD stems from TAPs. Comparison is, of course, even more difficult than description of an individual country. However, based on information we could obtain, we set up the ranking, presented in Comparative Table 6 in ascending order, by the proportion of civil service training that is nationally organized compared to the number of TAPs.

Comparative Table 5
Ranking of Countries According to the Level of Centralization in Civil Service Training Infrastructure

1. Ukraine	Ukraine has a relatively well-established and institutionalized training system, providing general, obligatory training sessions. Aside from this system, we could not identify additional relevant training providers or other major training courses in the national civil service training field.
2. Hungary	Hungary could be regarded as the second most centralized system, with its obligatory courses and relatively stable training network. At the same time, there is a wide training market open for for-profit providers. Indeed, we estimate that about one third to one half of the training needs are satisfied by such training organizations. Major training fields dominated by for-profit organizations are those of skills improvement—such as computing, language skills, communication, etc.—and finance.
3. Lithuania	Lithuania made the first steps towards the establishment of a centralized training system in 1999.
4. Romania	Romania, on the opposite pole, seems to lack all these characteristics. Instead, for-profit and non-profit organizations seem to dominate the supply side of the national civil service training market. Meanwhile, the demand side hardly exists.

The degree of centralization of the national civil service training system may be a crucial factor in determining the success of TAPs, especially when it comes to long-term TAP impact. It must be clear that different environments require different strategies for success. In a centralized system, donors or implementing organizations can only achieve a long-term impact and sustainability if the TAP is somehow integrated into the national civil service training system. In a decentralized environment, on the other hand, curricula and training materials could be picked up by profit-oriented training providers and offered in the national civil service training market.

We emphasize again the ultimate uncertainty of the assessment. However, we are more confident regarding the first and the last position.

Comparative Table 6
Proportion of Nationally Organized Training versus TAPs

Hungary	There were only two major donors active in the investigated period, and it was only PHARE that was present with several TAPs. PHARE is present in all four countries, but there are several other donor organizations in the three other countries. Additionally, Hungary runs a centralized training system that affects almost all civil servants, and there is also a wide private-market supply of civil service training.
Lithuania	Lithuania is considered more developed and less dependent on foreign aid in general terms. Additionally, the new law established a central training institute and formed the Public Administration Training Association, a group of already-existing educational institutions that are accredited to provide national civil service training courses. Furthermore, there are three types of obligatory training. However, the law was only adopted in 1999, at the end of the investigated period. By the year 2000, the central training center could train only 1,000 civil servants annually, which seems to prove that national civil service training is quite weak. Meanwhile, several donor organizations are present in the country.
Ukraine	Ukraine has a long-established national civil service training system. Its institutional background seems relatively firm, and obligatory courses were run during the investigated period. At the same time, foreign donors are also strongly present in the country. But we are still somewhat uncertain whether it is Lithuania or Ukraine where TAPs play a more important role within civil service training.
Romania	In Romania, there were several donors quite active in public administration reform and, within that, TAP activity was quite significant. At the same time, no centrally coordinated network of national training institutions exists. Nor are generally compulsory national civil service training courses determined. The establishment of a National Training Agency has been planned for several years, with the active involvement of PHARE, but it has not been implemented yet. According to the plans, the agency, and over 50 percent of its activities, would be financed by foreign donors in the first three years of its existence. Our country team reported that, though the civil service training supply side is relatively strong, with non-profit and for-profit organizations offering a wide range of courses, the demand is close to zero. The reasons for the slack demand are two-fold: a) the lack of understanding of the importance of quality training; b) more importantly, the lack of money to finance training. We took into consideration all these issues when judging Romania as the most dependent on foreign money in financing civil service training.

3.3   Cultural Environment

The culture of trainees, and of their general public administration environment, determines their behavior in training courses and determines how they value various aspects of training. Usually, the general national civil service training practice forms the values, attitudes and expectations of civil servants towards training. National civil service training sets up the general standards. If civil servants experience a lecture-style training, aimed at transferring legal knowledge, they may be convinced after a while that this is the ideal training. Designers and trainers of national civil service training courses are instinctively aware of the cultural environment in which they work. This cannot be said about designers and trainers of TAPs. Below, we address some cultural issues that may directly influence the success or failure of TAPs.

Training is generally undervalued and perceived by civil servants of the region as a burden rather than an opportunity. Civil servants are frequently over-burdened by everyday work. Participation in a three-day training course can mean a civil servant must catch up on other responsibilities by working overtime, in the evenings or on the weekend. Furthermore, the value of training is rarely recognized by ordinary civil servants. This leads to a situation where there

is no inherent, widely shared demand for training on the part of individual civil servants. Frequently, the training courses that are popular are those that may help civil servants to leave public administration and find a job in the private sector. Such training events could be, for instance: project management, public relations and media relations, interpersonal communication—or simply language and computing skills courses.

It is also less-often recognized by the potential trainees, or even their supervisors, that participation from the beginning to the end of a training course is necessary. It may easily happen that someone sits in on the morning of the first day of a training course, then leaves at lunchtime because he receives a call from his boss. He might send someone to replace him on the second and third day of the course, and this substitute might not be able to stay on the afternoon of the third day. Absenteeism is probably more common with TAPs than with national civil service training, especially the obligatory training courses that end with an exam. Some human-resources managers suggest that the cost of training should be passed on to the trainee if he or she leaves the course—or else the trainee's supervisor should pay, if the supervisor interrupts the training. No such enforceable rule currently exists in any of the observed countries. In the case of TAPs, it would be possible to sign an agreement with the

trainees or the beneficiary public administration organization, or both, setting out the obligations of the trainee, on one hand, and the training provider, on the other. This agreement could also specify certain sanctions if one party—practically speaking, the trainee or the beneficiary organization—fails to fulfil their obligations. However, we have not found any such functioning arrangement among the analyzed TAPs, even though various evaluations suggested such a system. The reason may be that drawing up such an agreement requires immense knowledge of the beneficiary's civil service system—knowledge that is usually missing on the donor's side.

Another cultural issue is the training method. Lecturing has been the typical, and thus generally accepted, method of training in the region. Indeed, training is often regarded as a "small-scale," "on-the-job" form of university education.

- *A good example of the tendency toward university style classes can be seen in Ukraine. There, the regulation differentiates between three types of training: training, re-training and in-service training. The first two categories are practically full- and part-time university education. The major training institution, the Ukrainian Academy of Public Administration, provides a master's degree in public administration.*

- *Similarly, in Romania, various government initiatives to set up a central training institution always involved plans for an academic, university-style institution, rather than a training-type institution.*

- *In Hungary, the Hungarian Institute of Public Administration was originally a semi-academic research institute. The institute's training function was added later. It still does not have any full-time professional trainers among its personnel.*

Interactive training may be quite frustrating for ordinary civil servants. These trainees expect that the trainer will provide them with the necessary knowledge by telling them important things that can be written down and learned. Generally, trainees expect that the trainer knows everything and that they will learn from this wise person. When civil servants find out that their trainer does not answer questions directly, but instead passes the question on to other trainees, the civil servants can become suspicious. Trainees can be doubtful about learning from other trainees instead of one wise person who stands in front of the group, lecturing. This situation can result in frustration, aggression, or even in trainees leaving the training venue.

There is often disagreement over the different perceptions that donors and beneficiaries have when it comes to the relevant skills of the trainer. In the donor's culture, a trainer should be an expert in the process of training itself.

Training expertise requires specialized skills that can be obtained through learning and practice. Once this expertise is obtained, a trainer may provide training in a very wide range of fields, according to the view of most donors. But, in the beneficiary's culture, training is not regarded as a set of specific skills or a profession. Only immense knowledge of the topic at hand is thought to qualify someone to train others. In this culture, only the content of the course is valued. These two contradictory approaches may easily lead to conflict.

Actually, a trend towards increasing understanding of the values of interactive training can be detected in the region. In our view, TAP activities played a crucial role in making decision-makers and stakeholders in the field of national civil service training, as well as the trainees themselves, aware of the value of an interactive training style. In fact, this may be one of the most important, unintended, side effects of TAPs in the region.

But an interactive training style may not always be the best approach. Interactive training may function well if trainees have some experience in the field, so that they can share their experience with one another. Yet TAPs frequently address new issues, or introduce new approaches, so they may cover areas in which trainees have no prior experience. In the U.K. or Sweden, training in efficient project management could easily be provided in an interactive setting. But, for civil servants who perceive public administration as simply executing laws—civil servants who have never worked on projects and who possibly do not even understand the concept of a project—interactive training as a first step in learning may not be appropriate. Similarly, purely interactive training in policy making may be dangerous if the word "policy" is not explained carefully first, because the whole concept is largely unknown in the region. Even the word denoting the concept of policy has only existed in many Continental languages for a relatively short period of time, if at all.

Generally, we believe that the trainer is expected to have some knowledge of the content area of the training. It seems to us that, sometimes, training is held in an "interactive" way to disguise the trainer's lack of competence in the substantive field of the training. On several occasions, we have witnessed the situation where the trainer actually turned out to lack any educational background or work experience in the subject area of the training.

It must be emphasized that all the cultural issues listed above may not necessarily appear as a problem. Actually, most of these issues will not arise during an individual TAP. Still, it is necessary that trainers be prepared for one or more of these culture-related problems.

4. KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF DONORS AND THEIR TAPS

In the following section, we will describe and compare the four donors examined: CIDA, DFID, PHARE and USAID. As envisioned in the introductory chapter, the analysis focuses on characteristics having a significant impact on the efficacy of TAPs.

These characteristics will be presented below in the following structure:
1) weight and presence;
2) dominant strategies;
3) what knowledge and skills are to be transferred: the training content;
4) management and organizational framework and practices of TAPs;
5) technical aspects of the training process;
6) some cross-cutting issues of flexibility and client orientation of TAPs.

4.1 Weight and Presence

In the CEE/CIS region, the four donors analyzed may be ranked with regards to their weight as presented in Comparative Table 7.

The basis for determining donors' presence in a beneficiary country is vague. It could be measured by the amount of money spent on TAPs, the number of civil servants trained, the number of total PTD or some kind of overall impact indicator. Because hardly any of these indicators are available for any donor in any of the four countries, we relied on our country teams' assessment to measure presence of various donors.

It is noteworthy that, except for PHARE, all of these donors are from Anglo-Saxon countries. This fact reflects the general donor landscape. Anglo-Saxon donors generally play a crucial role in the region, and, consequently, they are important in the TAP field too. Paradoxically, the majority of the recipient countries followed a public administration model different from the Anglo-Saxon one. For instance, Hungary has always been greatly influenced by the German public administration model, and Romania is more influenced by the French model. Overall, the communist public administration systems were also in line with the bureaucratic-Continental model rather than with the Anglo-Saxon public administration model.[20] It is generally considered logical that, when undertaking reforms in countries where public administration is to be rebuilt from scratch, a first step involves setting up the bureaucratic-style frameworks—such as strict accountability systems, clear communication lines, division of competencies, etc. These structures play a crucial role in most of the Continental public administration sys-

Comparative Table 7
Ranking of Donors by Their Presence in the Region

1. PHARE	PHARE is undoubtedly the most important donor in the TAP field, regardless of which of the potential indicators listed above are used. This donor was analyzed in all the four countries, and all the country teams describe it as the most significant donor in the TAP field. The weight of PHARE, especially in public administration reform, is strengthened by the fact that it is an EU organization, and most of the countries analyzed are striving to become members of the EU. Accession countries do not have any real freedom to decide whether they need the offered technical assistance or not. If a technical assistance program is not utilized, the country is accused of revealing low "absorption capacity." Low absorption capacity of EU funds, in turn, may disqualify a country from accession to the EU. Thus, the foreign affairs administrations of these countries exercise strong pressure on the national administrations to utilize PHARE funds already earmarked, even if there is no need for them, or the project turns out to be controversial.
2. DFID	It seems that DFID is also strongly present in the four countries analyzed. It was the only major donor identified in Hungary besides PHARE, and its presence was quite significant in Romania and Ukraine and, to a somewhat lesser degree, in Lithuania. DFID activities were analyzed in three out of the four countries. The Romanian team indicated that it is one of the most important donors, though the team did not devise a "donor sheet" on DFID. However, the British donor has changed its priority structure since the beginning of our researched period. As a result, DFID is gradually leaving the "Visegrád countries" of Central Europe and shifting its activities to the South and East. Meanwhile, more and more DFID resources are devoted to Africa and Asia, and to poverty reduction, as opposed to public administration reform assistance in CEE and CIS countries. DFID seems to concentrate on central rather than local government, and this may make its presence even more visible than other donors, who focus their activities more on local governments.
3. USAID	USAID seems to be present more actively at the local government level than other donors. Thus, it is quite possible that our country teams undervalued its presence. Still, USAID seems to be one of the major TAP donors in the region, most of all in Romania and Ukraine. This donor has not been present in Hungary since the late 1990s.
4. CIDA	It seems that CIDA is the "smallest" of the four major donors analyzed. Nonetheless, CIDA's TAPs seem to be more successful than the "average TAP."

tems, but they are generally less sophisticated in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and their presence has further decreased since the New Public Management movement appeared. Thus there seems to be an inherent contradiction between the specific needs of the beneficiary countries in the given period and the assistance that donors can offer. We will return to this issue in the section on training content.

4.2   Dominant Strategy

The term "strategy" is used to mean the concept or logic of how a given training project would reach its desired goals. Formulating a strategy involves making assumptions about the environment of the organization where a training project will take place. It also involves making assumptions about those possibilities and restrictions, within this environment, that are relevant to the goals that the person formulating strategy hopes to achieve. Therefore, each strategy implies a given set of basic assumptions regarding the operating environment of the training project, as well as a corresponding perception of the role of the TAP.

Strategy is not only important because it fundamentally affects the chance of a given TAP to succeed. It is also worth analyzing because there are important differences between the training strategy that various TAPs seem to follow. It is not only individual TAPs that have different strategies from one another. Various individual donors tend to rely more heavily on one particular strategy, which is called the "dominant strategy" of the given donor. With regards to the broader realm of public administration technical assistance, David Brown identified a more detailed and analytical typology of strategies.[21] The one applied here, though it resembles that of Brown, is more practical and operational in nature.

Three training strategies were identified. In the following subsections, each of these three strategies is analyzed and briefly evaluated.

4.2.1   The 'Sustainability' Approach

"If you give a hungry man a fish, he can feed himself for a day. If you teach him to fish, he can feed himself for life." This saying expresses the philosophy behind the sustainability strategy. From the point of view of the knowledge transferred, this means two things:
- The knowledge transferred is relevant and useful in solving the recipient's problem.
- The knowledge has a unique, restricted nature in that it is only in the possession of the donor, not of the recipient.

We will describe the first of these two qualifications as the "usefulness" of a training project, while the second qualification will be described as the "uniqueness" of the project's content.

If these assumptions hold true, then the best way to maximize the efficiency of technical assistance is not to "give fish," caught by high-salary fishermen from the donor country, but rather to "teach fishing," which minimizes the use of expensive resources. Consequently, this strategy intends to focus efforts on creating scarce resources of expertise, which are integrated into the national training system of the beneficiary country after the original project ends. But, if any one of these two assumptions does not hold true, then the project will be useless.

"Sustainable projects" do not actually produce a significant volume of training output. Instead, they mainly produce outputs that are useful only if they are utilized in other, subsequent training activities. A typical instance of this strategy is presented by "training-of-the-trainers" projects. This is what Brown calls the "multiplier effect strategy."[22] With sustainability-type training projects, there is also an overlapping set of projects that produce new training curricula and training materials—which are usually "tested" in a small "pilot project."

Using this technique is rational and justified as long as the above two assumptions hold true. After all, creating training resources, including trainers and training materials, is definitely one of the cheaper and more efficient methods of transferring scarce and valuable expertise from the donor to the beneficiary public administration realm.

The fishing analogy may help us identify potential problems with the sustainability strategy. The hypothetical "how-to-fish course" will work only if each of the following assumptions are fulfilled:
- The method of fishery learned works in the hungry man's homeland. This means, for example, sea-fishery should not be taught in a land-locked country.
- The fishing equipment is inexpensive, or the hungry man has enough money to buy it.
- The hungry man knows and accepts that fishing really has the potential to soothe his hunger—in other words the man likes fish.

The first of the above three assumptions refers to the training content. In this regard, the sustainability strategy is very similar to the classical ideology behind technical assistance, in which relatively advanced Western expertise that is fundamentally missing from the beneficiary's repertoire is used to bridge the wide gap between the current situation and what is technologically possible. Examples of this kind of assistance might include helping a country create a flood

control system, helping establish basic medical services or helping set up a central bank.

It is a fundamental question underlying the assessment of all Western public administration technical assistance to the CEE/CIS region whether public administration solutions propagated by Western donors are indeed purely "technical," in this classical sense of the word. The preliminary answer given to this question at this point is that this is relatively seldom the case. CEE/CIS countries in this regard—and in many others as well—are fundamentally different from third-world countries, which have been, and generally still are, the typical beneficiaries of Western technical assistance. In addition to the subsequent section on training content, we will return to this issue in the concluding chapter, approaching the issue from a broader perspective.

The second of the above three assumptions—that once he is taught how to fish, the hungry man will have the material means necessary to apply these capabilities in practice—is also questionable. In most CEE/CIS countries, before the economic transition and the resulting fiscal austerity of the 1990s, there used to be a relatively well-developed training system, including permanent facilities and staff. Most of this infrastructure disappeared in the first years of transition, due to deep budget cuts in all fields of government. The lack of money still is a major obstacle in reestablishing civil service training systems. In addition to these practical difficulties, in the initial years of the transformation, and to some extent even now, there was an ideologically and politically motivated attitude that "nothing from the dark past should be used in the future." This attitude contributed to the problem of decreasing training capacity. So did restrictions on

public service expenditures and personnel that the International Monetary Fund put on countries throughout the region in the 1990s.

Aspects of the third assumption, that the man will want to use what he has been taught to catch fish, have already been discussed in the chapter on the cultural characteristics of beneficiary civil service systems. It is by no means certain that the role and importance of training as a method of human resource development is understood and accepted by the beneficiary public administrations.

In addition to questions rising from the three basic assumptions behind sustainability-style TAPs, there is also cause for doubts about this strategy due to some other technical factors. The most important factor may be the poor project administration that occurs both on the donor and on the beneficiary side—an issue that will be discussed more in the subsequent section on TAP management. In the course of the field research, the authors' previous experience with administration problems was strongly reinforced: Not only the training participants, but even the lists of the participants' names, proved to be unavailable within one or two years of a project's completion. The same holds true for training materials produced. It is clear that, if the resources of trainers and training materials produced by a sustainable-type TAP cannot be accessed, then they will not be utilized—even if someone wants to utilize them.

In sum, the plausibility of the assumptions underlying the sustainability strategy is questionable in the CEE/CIS context. No wonder the actual findings of the field research show a very unfavorable picture of sustainability-type projects. Although it was a specific task of the field research

Comparative Table 8
Degree of Sustainability of Sustainability-type Projects and the Underlying Reasons for the Existence or Lack of Sustainability

PHARE	The few sustainability-style TAPs run by PHARE do not seem very sustainable. In Lithuania, where we could obtain detailed information, we found that most of the project documents were not available, only two or three out of the 50 trained trainers served later as trainers,[23] and none of the courses were repeated, due to the lack of demand. The Romanian team also found that most participants who were trained as trainers do not actually serve as trainers later.
DFID	In Lithuania, sustainability-type projects were relatively successful, but the opposite is true in Hungary. The major difference was that the TAP in Lithuania was deployed at the central civil service training institute of the country. All training materials were left with the institute, and the trained trainers were employed by the institute. Some of the courses have been repeated at least once since the initial TAP ended. But, in Hungary, various TAP elements were deployed at organizations—an agency and two ministries—that were not heavily involved in training. Due to a lack of familiarity with the relevant Hungarian laws, about half of the trained trainers were not legally eligible to train civil servants. None of the courses have been repeated since the TAP ended, which was a year before this volume was written.
USAID	Our Romanian team notes that, because the implementing organizations prefer contracting individual trainers as opposed to, for example, contracting local training organizations, there is less of a chance for true sustainability. The reason for this is that the "institutional memory" of training organizations is much more effective than that of individuals.
CIDA	No relevant information was available.

to locate sustainability-type TAPs that were indeed sustainable, there were hardly any.

A closer look at donor practices, especially those of DFID, may help us to understand better the "sustainability approach"—and it might provide us with some clues on how to reduce the chances that this approach will fail.

In sum, practical experience seems to support theoretical considerations. Sustainability-type projects are, in fact, rarely sustainable. Practical experience—which is reviewed above and will be addressed below in the section on additional features of the strategy context—also supports our reservations about the availability of TAP documents. Because these documents, including curriculum and training materials, rarely survive long after the initial TAP, it is difficult or practically impossible to reconstruct training that is supposed to be repeated by national organizations.

But we did find at least one way of increasing the overall efficacy of the sustainability approach. Analyzing the differences between the relative success in Lithuania and the lack of success in Hungary of two DFID sustainability-type TAPs, the crucial factor seems to be that the Lithuanian project was given to a civil service training institution with a relatively stable, central position in civil service training. Thus, the professional and infrastructure background was given, and TAP documents were available at a hub for the country's public administration. Both the institution itself and the trained trainers were interested in offering the courses elaborated under the original TAP. Furthermore, even if the curriculum and training materials were not fully available—because a detailed curriculum in the form of a new trainers' manual was not prepared—the trainers could rely on their memory to reconstruct, and thus repeat, the courses.

4.2.2 The Elitist Strategy

The elitist strategy, called the "power elite strategy" by Brown,[24] concentrates scarce project resources on the highest possible echelon of the civil service. The theory behind this strategy is that, once the top layer is convinced about the necessity and possibility of change—and is endowed with the necessary abilities—the desired change in the public administration can happen much easier. People in leading positions in the civil service may have a greater effect on public administration because their influence on procedures is, of course, much greater. Additionally, positive side effects may occur via various mechanisms: The managers may later send their own subordinates for similar training events or may require them to obtain the same knowledge or skills through other means. In order to fulfil the supposedly high expectations of the target groups, elitist projects are developed and implemented with relatively high expenses.

Out of the four analyzed donors, CIDA and DFID seem to rely strongly on the elitist approach.

Clearly, from a budgetary point of view, the national civil service training systems themselves can handle the training of a relatively small number of high-ranking officials. Consequently, with regards to its underlying assumptions, international donors using this strategy are focusing on the importance of the training content transferred. In this way, the elitist strategy is very similar to the sustainability strategy: Donors assume that the main contribution of elitist-type assistance projects is, again, not the material resources necessary for training but the transfer of unique and valuable Western expertise. The key difference between the "sustainability" and the elitist strategy is that fishing is not taught to everyone in the hungry man's country—it is only taught to the leaders.

Therefore the problems of the elitist approach are similar to the problems already enumerated with regards to the sustainability strategy. In many cases, either the uniqueness or the usefulness of the content transferred is questionable.

In addition to questions about the training content, there are some more technical problems with this strategy, including the following:

- Donors practically compete for the attention of high-level civil servants. The higher the rank of a civil servant is, the more donors compete for the attention of the person. In practice, this simply means that administrative state secretaries are quite unlikely to attend training courses, and the same can be said about their deputies and ministry directors, though the chance is higher that directors appear than state secretaries. Instead, lower ranking officials are usually trained as if they were senior ones. But this practice means that the implementation of the elitist strategy deviates from some core guidelines of the given strategy.

- *In the case of the Lithuanian Public Administration Development in the Baltic States (PADBAS) project, our country team noted that project efficiency was diminished because senior management did not become interested in participating in the training. The main objective of this project, therefore, was not achieved, and is not likely to be achieved in the future, either. The composition of the trainee groups, both during project implementation and subsequent replication of the training program, did not meet the objective of the project—to train top civil servants. Although training was supposed to be limited to top managers in the first year, only 54 percent of those receiving training were from the target group. In the second year, this number rose slightly, and 62 percent of the trainees were from the target group. In the second year, the managers from regional and local administrations were also eligible to apply, a situation that boosted attendance.*

- Some additional problems result from the cultural and working environment that is typical for senior civil servants. Many senior officials do not really attend courses to learn, but do so instead for other, symbolic or demonstrative reasons. Risk avoidance is high in the case of senior civil servants, and they tend not to use their new knowledge if doing so could result in the slightest risk to their position. And, even if senior civil servants are ready to use their knowledge, they do not have much time to do so.

    - *Bakenova quotes a failed element of the Public Administration Reform (PAR) project reported by CIDA officials. Mayors of nine Ukrainian cities were brought on a study tour to Canada to receive training in policy and practical issues related to municipal operations. Soon it became perfectly clear that participants did not have any interest in the subject. The project managers realized that "it would have been more beneficial to bring professionals in the field of municipal policy issues."[25]*

    - *Lazareviciute claims that most of the top managers seem to be uninterested in attending TAPs.[26]*

Considering the above-mentioned problems, the elitist approach rarely has the kind of beneficial impact on TAP efficacy that some on the donor side tend to believe, or at least to state. Our impression is that the invitations for, and involvement of, high-ranking officials in TAP activities are not about increasing efficacy. Rather, the intention is to improve the prestige and good image of the donor and its TAP, particularly when it comes to influencing the views of decision-makers back in the donor's home country.

4.2.3   The Critical Mass Strategy

The critical mass strategy operates on the assumption that there are no easy solutions for success, and the above-mentioned strategies will not be sufficient to tackle the fundamental problems of the host civil service. This strategy is based on the belief that the crucial bottleneck in national civil service training is not the access to unique Western expertise. Instead, constraints hindering adequate training are considered to be factors like a lack of money, poor attention to policy and an insufficient supply of "policy entrepreneurs" or legal-institutional background. If this assumption is true, then what assistance projects should do is simply train a mass of civil servants large enough to achieve a qualitative difference in the public administration system.

Besides being a TAP strategy, the critical mass approach closely resembles the approach used by the national ser-

vice training systems. The reasons donors give for not using this strategy more often is either the high cost of mass training or the need for a sustainable impact. Without entering into a deeper analysis of these arguments at this point, we note only that the argument on high costs is countered by the fact that several national civil service training projects train a large amount, sometimes more than 10,000 civil servants, using the kind of budget that would only be sufficient to train 100–200 trainees in a sustainability-type TAP.

4.2.4   Evaluating Strategies and Locating Donors in the 'Strategy Space': A Summary

In the above sub-sections three strategies were identified. Our general findings on these strategies could be summarized as follows:

- The sustainability strategy has a relatively low potential to be successful. This low potential is due to circumstances that apply in a largely uniform manner across time and space.
- The elitist strategy is also problematic in many cases. Still, it seems that, if it is carefully planned, and trainees are carefully recruited, the elitist strategy has a better chance to succeed than the sustainability strategy.
- The assumptions behind the critical mass strategy seem to fit the beneficiary environment best of all. This strategy, therefore, has the highest potential to succeed.

It is emphasized that these assessments of the success potential of the various strategies are contingent on time and space. In other words, they apply only to the transition period of the 1990s in the CEE/CIS region.

Another comment with regards to the interpretation of what a "strategy" actually is should also be made here: The term strategy does not so much refer to what is accomplished as it refers to what is intended. Therefore, the central factor determining the strategy followed by a TAP is not whether it (i) creates resources that are expected to be put into use by the beneficiary after the project ends, (ii) trains senior civil servants or (iii) trains a lot of people. The decisive moment is the basic assumption underlying the given TAP. In other words, a TAP's strategy is determined by whether the project is *conceptualized* as (i) a project transferring unique Western expertise by creating adequate training resources, (ii) a project transferring unique Western expertise by implanting this expertise into the elite of the civil service or (iii) a project contributing material, organizational and/or financial resources to solving the problems of the beneficiary civil service.

This means, for example, that a project designed to train senior civil servants in how to negotiate effectively can be

considered an elitist project or a critical mass project—depending on the concept or the logic of the project. Of course, the underlying concept is likely to exert an important effect on a lot of features of the TAP: what the training content will be, who will provide the various services necessary for implementing the training event, how these services will be provided and so on. It is the total of these features that helps one determine what the underlying philosophy/role perception of the given TAP actually is.[27]

Comparative Table 9 shows the typical donor practices that we found.

Comparative Table 9
Strategies Applied by the Donors: A Summary

PHARE	PHARE, more than any other donor, relies on the critical mass strategy. PHARE can afford to use this strategy and frequently has to do so. PHARE is by far the largest donor by all indicators, but especially as far as overall TAP budget is concerned. PHARE finances large-scale language and general EU training activities in Hungary with 3,000–4,000 trainees. It is not only PHARE's financial capability but also the political and administrative necessity of its mission that inspires this kind of mass training. It is in the EU's interest to ensure that civil ser-vants in the various fields are prepared to implement the EU law immediately after accession. Sustainability-type TAPs funded by PHARE are relatively rare. In Hungary, we found that 2 percent of PHARE's TAPs followed the sustainability strategy, while in Lithuania, 5.7 percent followed this strategy. Interestingly, the unit cost of sustainability-type TAPs is somewhat smaller than the average—apparently because sustainability TAPs funded by PHARE also aim at training a relatively large number of participants. For example, in the case of the one Hungarian sustainability-type TAP funded by PHARE, 700 persons were trained. The elitist approach is present in PHARE activities only to a limited extent, though we could not collect quantitative data in this regard. PHARE concentrates on training officials who will implement EU laws, either as bureaucrats or as specialists in various public offices. This goal requires a critical mass strategy rather than an elitist approach.
DFID	DFID favors both the sustainability and the elitist approach. This donor is by far the most active of all those analyzed in running sustainability-type TAPs. We found that all of the DFID TAPs we analyzed in Lithuania, and two thirds of those analyzed in Hungary, were sustainability-type TAPs. We had no reliable information from Romania and Ukraine, where TAP elements are usually embedded in mixed projects. Though it is not based on incontestable evidence, an analysis of existing budget data seems to indicate that the unit cost of sustainability-type TAPs is significantly higher than that of non-sustainability TAPs. According to the Lithuanian country team, sustainable-style TAPs cost twice as much as non-sustainable ones. DFID also frequently applies the elitist approach. We estimated that, in Hungary, the proportion of managers participating in DFID TAPs, from among all TAP participants, was much more than 30 percent—and quite likely more than 50 percent. In Lithuania, this proportion was even higher, around 80 percent. A small, non-representative sample of one course group in a Ukrainian TAP funded by DFID revealed that 33 percent of the participants were managers. Although DFID often aims its courses at top managers, this aspiration rarely succeeds.
USAID	USAID's approach could most often be characterized as following the critical mass strategy. We found no evidence that this donor ever chose to follow the sustainability approach. Only our Romanian country team mentioned some practices that might be considered part of the sustainability approach. USAID's TAPS are also not characterized by a strong elitist approach. This is apparently because this donor aims its TAPs at local, rather than central public administration.
CIDA	CIDA's strategy is characterized by highly individualized, "elitist-like" TAPs. This approach requires great effort invested in every participant. Such investment only gives good returns if the participants are of relatively high rank. In one project analyzed, the Baltic Economic Management Training Program, the selection criteria limited the course to managers only. But the selected participants were mid-level managers, rather than top-level managers. Nonetheless, it seems that the program helped participants to gain promotion in their public service careers, and some of them later gained top positions. Out of a small, non-representative sample from a course list of a Ukrainian TAP funded by CIDA, we found that 45 percent were managers. CIDA's TAPs were not typical sustainability-style projects. But—in an interesting and quite unique phenomenon among donors—CIDA was ready to finance a project in Ukraine that was almost identical to another one run previously in the Baltic states.
Conclusion	PHARE seems to follow the critical mass strategy, and, to some degree, so does USAID. DFID is the leading user of the sustainability approach. CIDA seems to follow an elitist approach, as does DFID, to a somewhat lesser extent.

4.2.5 Some Additional Features of the Strategy Context

There are certain features of the CEE/CIS context that have a deteriorating effect on all kinds of training activities, but the extent of this effect varies. In the case of certain strategies—usually the sustainability and the elitist approaches—the effect is more severe, while it might be less of a problem if the critical mass strategy is followed. These deteriorating features are as follows:

- There is high turnover in the civil service. The annual civil service turnover rate, in our estimation, is well over 10 percent in the region. The turnover is especially high among civil servants who are in managerial positions, who speak foreign languages or who have skills for which there is a market demand in the private sector—such as training or management skills. This is also usually the group targeted by projects based on the sustainability and elitist strategies. So these types of TAPs can be expected to have a lower-than-average success rate in CEE/CIS.

  - *In Hungary, which is far from being the "worst country" in this regard, statistical data show that the administrative state secretaries and their deputies, who are supposed to represent administrative stability in the central government machinery, hold their positions for an average of about two years.[28] This means that, during a four-year election cycle, two administrative state secretaries are recruited and discarded by the politico-administrative process.*

  - *The Lithuanian country team notes on the PADBAS project of DFID that "top civil servants trained in the program did leave their posts at one or another point in the future. Although exact data on this is not available, both the [British] Embassy and the representatives of LPA [the docking organization] mentioned that this was a real hindrance in sustaining the impact on the civil service."[29]*

- Organizational arrangements are fluid. The docking organization that worked on the given TAP may be abolished, its function changed, etc. Policy and training priorities may change quickly. These factors mean that TAPs that invest heavily into producing valuable outputs are at a disadvantage, because their outputs—whether these outputs are trained trainers, training materials or more knowledgeable senior civil servants—have a limited chance to exert their beneficial effects to their full potential.

- The inappropriate selection of participants of training projects is often a problem as well. Selection is usually left to the beneficiary civil service. Since low organizational capacity is a basic justification for running TAPs at all, and, furthermore, there is little incentive for the beneficiary-in-charge to perform this task effectively, it is no wonder that the selection is often inappropriate. This problem is often exacerbated by other ones, such as the language problem or the unavailability of senior officials. Clearly, the larger the investment into one trainee, the larger the loss caused by inappropriate selection of trainees.

- The already mentioned fact that there is little or no understanding of the role and value of training also contributes to the failure of the sustainability approach and the elitist approach.

4.3 Training Content

In this section, we list descriptive pieces of information on how TAPs differ from nationally organized civil service training courses, which we call "national training courses" for brevity. We analyze differences among the main clusters of TAPs, from the point of view of content. Then we provide a review on practices determining TAP content. On a more analytical level, we investigate the adequacy of TAP content to beneficiaries' needs and circumstances. At the end of this section is a subsection in which we attempt to assess the validity of the—generally shared, though usually implicit—view of the donors that the real value of TAPs is the unique know-how they bring into the beneficiaries' public administration system.

4.3.1 A Comparative View of Training Content

Needless to say, various civil service training courses, as well as various TAPs, differ greatly from one another. Still, there are some general differences between nationally organized training on one hand and TAPs on the other. The most important of these differences are as follows:

- TAPs focus more on skills improvement or attitude change, as opposed to knowledge transfer.
- TAPs are more practice oriented, as opposed to national training courses, which are more oriented toward theory. National courses are usually very similar to university lectures, regarding both their content and style.
- TAPs concentrate more on general issues that are not bound to the circumstances of a given country's public administration, whereas national training courses are strongly tied to the present situation in the given country.

In the first half of the 1990s, typical TAP topics included operation of a market economy and the role of the public sector within such an economy. More recently, TAPs are likely to address various issues of public management and

public policy—topics that are typically covered by TAPs in the 1997–2000 period under analysis. TAPs are also likely to have an "international" focus, especially TAPs run by PHARE. PHARE's TAPs provide general and sector-specific EU knowledge, but they are not the only ones with an international focus. All donors investigated promote international approaches and presentation of "international best practices."

National training courses, on the other hand, tend much more to reflect the domestic "status quo," and they tend to focus on the legal regulation and everyday practice of the given field. Indeed, teaching currently valid laws of the country is a major topic in all countries studied.

It is worthwhile noting here that the choice of content has a direct impact on several other elements of training courses. For example, skills improvement, some would argue, requires stronger reliance on an interactive training style, including the application of such methods as case studies, group work, etc. Skills-based content and interactive training styles are much more characteristic of TAPs than national courses. Meanwhile, knowledge transfer, such as the teaching of legal texts that is typical of national training courses, lends itself to a course followed by an exam, to test the amount of knowledge transferred. Such an exam would

be more difficult in the case of skill-improvement courses. Not surprisingly, we found that national training courses quite frequently end with an exam, whereas we could hardly find any exams among TAPs.

After determining the general characteristic differences between the content of nationally organized training and TAPs provided by donors, we turn now to the question of how TAPs differ from one another. Ukraine faces, in many respects, different problems from those faced by Hungary, and the same is true of Romania and Lithuania. These countries have a different past, they have different political and constitutional systems, and the structure of public administration and administrative procedures are different. Some of these countries have finished privatization and gained a relatively stable and productive market economy, while others are only now facing the challenges of economic transition. And there are many other differences. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the characteristic focus of TAPs differ among the four analyzed countries.

Nonetheless, we found the major "clusters" of TAPs can be related to donors rather than to beneficiary countries. In other words, it is the differences among donors, and not the recipient countries, that determines major differences in typical TAP content.

Comparative Table 10
Typical TAP Content by Donor

PHARE	Since 1998, PHARE has concentrated its efforts on conveying knowledge regarding the structures and functioning of the EU as well as the EU laws (the *acquis*). The training content provided by PHARE is mostly knowledge, frequently legal knowledge, and it is closest to that of typical national civil service training content. In addition, PHARE projects provide professional-technical training for those performing special services, such as border guards and veterinary control officials, in order to enable these civil servants to carry out their functions within the EU. In the past few years, PHARE has also helped launch some large-scale language TAPs. The special professional training and language training were applied in countries that were expected to join the EU in the first round.
DFID	DFID is active in transferring experience and practices that have proven to be successful in the British public administration environment. DFID is the leader in spreading methods of "New Public Management" as applied in the U.K. Such courses include those on citizens' charter and performance appraisal in Hungary, agencialization in Ukraine, etc. DFID is also quite active in training capacity building via training of trainers programs and support for existing training institutions.
USAID	USAID promotes the objectives laid down in its strategy, one of which is spreading U.S. values as well as U.S. approaches and practices. This donor seems to be more present than other donors in the economic sphere, including projects on privatization, restructuring of the banking sector, etc. Within public administration, USAID does more than other donors in providing training for local government officials on public finance, U.S.-style budgeting techniques, management of municipal revenues and assets, etc. Furthermore, USAID promotes solutions that assure that local governments operate in a more responsive, accountable manner, with a stronger citizen-client orientation. It is only USAID that runs programs allowing countries of the region to learn from each other's experience. For example a USAID project in Ukraine included study trips to Poland.
CIDA	Two of the three analyzed CIDA projects were about economic policy development, and they included Canadian university instruction and some study trips to Canada. Another TAP assured that Ukrainian civil servants learn from Canadian administrative practices.

4.3.2 How is the Training Content Determined?

The fact that typical TAP content is more characteristic of the donor's orientation than that of the beneficiary raises the question of how TAP content is determined, and by whom.

It is generally agreed that TAPs should reflect the beneficiaries' needs. Indeed, it is a frequent complaint that none of the beneficiary countries have elaborated a national civil service training strategy that would allow donors to offer TAPs that match local priorities. The only country out of those analyzed that elaborated such a strategy was Hungary, which developed a relatively precise list of training priorities. Unfortunately, by the time this list was developed, all donors had left the country except for PHARE. And PHARE projects have not been demand driven since 1997. Thus we could not obtain any information as to how donors would act if such a strategy really existed.

Presently, training needs assessments are considered major tools of determining adequate TAP content in the beneficiary country. After analyzing needs assessment approaches of the donors, we could not detect crucial differences. But we did find that donors are often actually looking for problems that the donor or one of its potential implementing organizations can solve—using already existing and to-be-sold solutions.

This is why donors can sometimes identify training "needs" that greatly surprise those, like the authors, who regard themselves as relatively well-informed about the region and its typical training needs.

Regarding the needs assessment practices of various donors, we sum up our findings in Comparative Table 11.

Although it is often emphasized by the donor and/or the implementing organization that the curriculum and training materials are specifically prepared for the beneficiary's environment, we found that the curriculum and the training material is frequently the reselling of existing know-how with some modifications made to "adapt to local circumstances." This adaptation may simply mean that "foreign names are changed to Romanian ones."[33]

Comparative Table 11
Needs Assessment Practices of the Donors

PHARE	PHARE practice in this regard has changed greatly since 1998. The earlier PHARE program was said to be demand-driven. From 1998, PHARE became accession driven. Hence the main objective of the EU PHARE became, "to assist the candidate countries in their preparation for membership in the EU." This implies that the planners in the PHARE program assume that they know better than the beneficiary countries themselves what sort of training is needed. To some extent, this is the case indeed. Therefore, paradoxically, PHARE meets beneficiary training demand much more than before.
DFID	DFID also carries out some form of needs assessments. In addition, DFID has a full-time expert on public administration systems in the region. This expert plays a significant role in determining needs.[30] Nonetheless, it was clear that the content of the Hungarian project did not reflect wide-spread demand within the Hungarian public administration. Our Lithuanian team describes a DFID TAP in which a managerial competence framework was elaborated based on the results of Lithuanian civil servants' training needs analysis. In spite of this, the content of the training courses did not reflect the results of the needs analysis, but was based on some of the British experience adapted to the Lithuanian situation. We found no evidence of any systematic consideration of how, and with what kind of modifications, those methods can be used in the very different public administration environment of the CEE and CIS countries.
USAID	USAID also carries out needs assessments. However, as Bakenova critically notes: "needs have been already identified before the actual consultation takes place and the donor [USAID] already knows what the areas of intervention should be. However, in order to meet diplomacy criteria and present TAPs not as an imposition but as assistance programs, and in order to receive official consensus from national stakeholders, those consultations are necessary."[31]
CIDA	CIDA does not rely heavily on needs assessment in determining training content. Bakenova provides a five-element bulleted list on sources of information that are utilized.[32] None of these refer to needs assessment. Beneficiary needs are supposed to be identified "by Canadian embassies in the region." Still, CIDA runs a very successful program in the Baltic states, at least in terms of participant satisfaction. This program was based on a proposal from the Dalhousie University. The program's success was not due to careful needs analysis before the project started. Instead it is probably attributable to the sensitivity of the leader of the implementing organization during the implementation phase. This sensitivity allowed the organization to tailor individual programs to individual trainee needs.

4.3.3 Adequacy of TAP Content in a Beneficiary Environment

It seems that the following practices are quite wide-spread:
- A kind of "one-fits-all" approach is present. Similar, TAPs, with or without some minor modifications, are utilized in various countries, irrespective of the specific situations of these countries.
- Donors and the contracted implementing organizations tend to provide training that is based on values, approaches and practices present in the donor country. These solutions are presented as the "international" best practice, to be used within and by the beneficiary's public administration.
- In sharp contrast with some donors' claims, TAP activities are, more often than not, supply-driven rather than demand-driven. TAP content is determined by the donor. This content is frequently part of a general strategy or else it is based on offers or suggestions from would-be implementing organizations.

These practices raise the issue of adequacy of training content for the beneficiary's needs and circumstances. Some examples of the actual situation highlight this problem.

- *There have been quite a few TAPs—together with large-scale consultancy activities—on the introduction of a civil service ethics code. Such TAPs took place in almost all the CEE and CIS countries. In our view, the function of the ethics code is to give civil servants guidelines in areas that are not regulated in the laws—moral issues that must be laid down in societies with a pluralist culture and value system. Therefore, extensive efforts designed to build an ethics code seem somewhat inadequate, or at least premature, in the CEE/CIS environment, where, in some countries, even basic elements of an appropriate legal regulation of the civil service is missing. Even where these basic laws exist, they are not always executed, and they are infringed upon regularly by the government itself. As we have noted, CEE/CIS is a region where civil servants earn a few dollars a day. Of course adopting well-formulated ethics codes is cheaper than increasing civil service wages,[34] but the latter approach is surely a more promising means of fighting corruption. It is difficult to believe that—in a situation where basic laws are missing or regularly infringed upon, where corruption is wide-spread and well-known and where organized crime plays a significant role in the economy and politics—an ethics code could have a major impact. Still, millions of dollars were spent on projects focused on ethics codes.*

- *Project management training is another example. Project management training may be of limited use in administrative systems that seldom use the project model—as is the case with most public administration organizations in Continental systems. A PHARE project in Hungary taught project management for projects financed from EU structural funds. In this case, the training was relevant, because EU funds are utilized within the framework of projects, and the target group consisted of civil servants who will work on those projects in the future. Unfortunately, it turned out that knowledge of project management would be necessary only about five years after the TAP took place. An almost identically "premature" case is quoted by our Lithuanian country team.*

- *Certain methods of "New Public Management," including agencialization and performance contracting are another example of training content that may be inappropriate for the beneficiary. New Public Management might be a good way to increase efficiency by allowing greater managerial discretion and market-type mechanisms. It also greatly relies on creativity. But in a period of confusion and corruption, when billions of dollars in national property is disappearing, allowing managers more discretion and encouraging creative thinking may not be the best way to solve problems. TAPs that encourage New Public Management may increase confusion and further weaken accountability arrangements—thereby creating more problems than they solve.*

Even though the authors are convinced of the inadequacy of the above-mentioned training topics—and could easily provide examples of the problems with these topics—they also admit that others may present convincing counter-arguments. What is really embarrassing is that such discussions have not taken place, at least not to the authors' knowledge.[35] Millions of dollars have been spent on training in topics whose applicability, let alone usefulness, was not seriously considered. Millions of dollars were spent on TAPs that may have been useless and, in quite a few cases, may have even been harmful to the beneficiaries.

The donors often seem to neglect the fact that a solution that works in one certain environment may fail in another. This issue was widely discussed in the 1960s, when problems of Western aid to developing countries in Africa and other continents became apparent.[36] It is somewhat surprising that these findings about development administration have been so easily "forgotten" by the donors. Indeed, rarely does anyone seriously consider the applicability and the suitability of using a solution from country Y in the social and administrative environment of country X.[37] We found the following three potential outcomes of this kind of knowledge transfer:
- Implanting alien approaches into the public administration system may stir the status quo in a positive direction and may lead to introduction of practices that were previously not utilized but turn out to be useful. In this case, the TAP has a significant positive impact.

- Another possibility is that the "immune system" of public administration will throw out the "alien body." The beneficiary's administration may simply reject the foreign concepts conveyed in the training. In this case, the overall impact of the TAP is zero or insignificant. Our impression is that this may be the most typical case.

- In some cases, the newly implanted knowledge just increases the internal confusion of the public administration system in transition. In these cases, a TAP causes a significant negative impact.[38] This type of TAP outcome is not at unknown. Learning approaches and practices that cannot be used in a given administrative environment may frustrate civil servants. An even worse situation can arise if the civil servant still tries to apply the learned methods and causes administrative confusion or dysfunction—or breaks the laws or organizational rules.

We believe that the training content should reflect the specific needs of the beneficiary. At the very least, the following aspects should be taken into consideration when the TAP content is determined:

- *Continental administrative systems:* Administrative systems of all the CEE/CIS countries follow the so-called Continental administrative tradition. The term "Continental" is widely used in Europe to differentiate from the Anglo-Saxon political-administrative systems. Some general differences include: multiparty systems, as opposed to two-party systems, and the resulting coalition governments, with all their consequences; the differences between the Continental legal system and common law, including the concept of public/administrative law; and the Continental concept of public administration as a branch of government responsible for executing laws, which makes for a very legal approach to public administration and the administrative culture. It seems quite problematic that, except for PHARE, the main funders of TAPs are Anglo-Saxon donors, who, as we have noted, are quite eager to promote their own practices, regardless of the applicability of Anglo-Saxon methods to Continental systems.[39]

- *Historic background and its consequences:* All countries left behind a communist period in their near past, and this determines some of their major needs. Nonetheless, a decade after the communist systems collapsed, the differences between these countries seem to grow. Some countries gained independence after several decades of forced unity. Other countries were never independent—or were only independent centuries ago—and now have to establish not only a state but also a national identity. The countries of the region also differed in

the past as far as access to Western administrative know-how. Scholars, and even practitioners, from countries like Poland or Hungary attended conferences and had relatively open access to Western literature from the 1960s and 1970s. Other countries, like the Baltic states, were mostly isolated from the Western impact, but were always culturally oriented towards the West, so once they gained freedom, they could easily keep up with Western solutions. Meanwhile, scholars and practitioners in some other countries still do not have easy access to information about Western solutions—due to cultural, linguistic and political barriers.

- *Transition situation:* It is useful to understand that all these countries are still in a state of transition. Although this factor may be the most important of those we have listed, it would be difficult to define here what transition means, and what its consequences are. Just a few consequences of transition include a high level of political, legal uncertainty; uncertainty of values and administrative hierarchy; a rapid rate of change, including policy priority changes, which result in an unpredictable atmosphere; corruption; and economic austerity.

If these aspects are taken into consideration when the TAP content—and, for that matter, management arrangement—is determined, TAPs can be more useful and can have a greater impact than they do now.

4.3.4 Uniqueness of the TAP Content in the Beneficiary Country

Donors and implementing organizations—especially those pursuing the elitist or the sustainability strategy—like to depict TAPs as a major way of transferring know-how that otherwise would not be available in the recipient country. According to this point of view, the specificity of the know-how, and not the cost of training, makes the real value of a TAP.

We examine the above assumption from both a practical and then a more theoretical point of view, by addressing two key questions:

- *Is the content of a typical TAP always so unique in the beneficiary country's training practice?* This is an important question because the above assumption is made dubious by the finding that TAP contents are, in fact, rarely unique.

- *What is the relationship between the uniqueness of a TAP and the value of the given TAP?* The preliminary answer to this question is that there is a negative relationship between the uniqueness of TAP content and the value

of the TAP. Thus, even if the content was in fact unique—which is usually not the case—this would probably not increase the value of the given TAP but rather decrease it.

With respect to the first question, we found that TAP topics are almost always somewhat new, at least compared to the existing compulsory training courses and to the typical non-compulsory national civil service training topics. But if we approach the issue from the "supply side" in the given country, the answer is different. Several, perhaps most, of the TAP courses offer know-how that is already available in the beneficiary country. High-quality courses are available in the training market of the countries concerned for subjects like management and communication and negotiation skills development. In several other fields, such as policy-making, economics and the overwhelming majority of EU issues, the know-how is available at the universities, research institutes and think tanks of most, though not necessarily all beneficiary countries. In most cases, this know-how could be bought at a much lower price, in the local language and in a form that is indeed adapted to the specific target group. Still, the know-how is brought and bought from abroad.

Of course, one could argue that the for-profit training providers, who typically sell their services to private companies, cannot reflect the specificity of public administration. A counter-argument could be that, frequently, the same is true of TAP implementing organizations: They often do not reflect the specificity of public administration systems—especially the public administration system of the beneficiary. The argument against universities may be that university instructors cannot provide real interactive training, which is also true, though many TAPs in the content area concerned are usually lecture-type TAPs, like PHARE training on EU issues.

Another, perhaps more valid, argument against hiring local trainers might be that donors would face more difficulties in controlling local implementing organizations.

It could also be argued that the TAPs bring a wide range of topics to the national civil service training field that were missing earlier, and that this is the most important aspect of TAPs. For example, while communication skills training is widely present in the private sphere, it is almost unknown in public administration. This argument is accurate. TAPs not only bring in new and relevant topics to the national civil service training field, but, with their prestige in the beneficiary country, they may also contribute to the understanding of the importance of these topics within national civil service training systems.

Indeed, we found that one major, though unintended, positive impact of TAPs in general is that they draw the attention of decision-makers to potential training topics that are useful in the beneficiary environment but have not been part of the national training system before.

The second key question, about the relationship between the uniqueness of the knowledge and the value of a TAP, can be answered with a more theoretical approach.

The impression gained in the course of the research was that this relationship is negative. The more unique a training topic is in the beneficiary country, the less likely that it will be useful. After all, it is reasonable to expect that the most needed training topics have already been introduced into the national civil service training system. In other words, it is reasonable to expect that beneficiary governments are able determine the most needed pieces of training content, and they finance courses with exactly these pieces of content from their limited financial resources.[40] Very unique topics may be difficult for trainees to understand and even more difficult to utilize in a potentially alien environment. In brief, the greater the uniqueness of the training content, the greater the probability of inadequacy, and thus, project inefficiency.

A similar trade-off can be detected between TAP efficiency—as we use the term—and general uniqueness of training. The less unique a course is, the lower the level of inputs required. If a course already exists, and it only needs to be repeated in order to train additional civil servants, the money needed for curriculum and training material development, and other such expenses, can be saved.

Given both of the above arguments, it could be said that a more effective and efficient TAP scheme would be to run/finance courses whose content was determined mostly by the beneficiary government—perhaps with assistance from foreign experts but not with total dominance of these experts, as is the present case. Furthermore, TAPs should be part of the beneficiary's training system. This would allow for training of more civil servants, with content that is regarded as really important by the beneficiary. Another way to increase TAP efficacy would be to repeat successful TAPs for an additional, perhaps larger, pool of civil servants.

Both approaches assure a large probability that the training will be adequate and also relatively cheap. In other words, these approaches would assure a higher level of overall TAP efficacy than presently exists. And yet we found no evidence of either a foreign donor financing useful national training or of a repeat offering of a TAP that had proven successful. Explaining the reasons for this somewhat surprising state of affairs requires considerations that are not related to training content. We will therefore address this situation later in this volume.

4.4   TAP Management

It is not easy to draw a solid line of demarcation between the functions of managing the donor and the functions of managing the donor's TAP. This is true especially because many key features of how a TAP is managed are highly characteristic and specific to the donor of the project. Thus, "TAP management" is, to a large degree, determined by "donor management," which involves addressing the policies and organizational culture and practice of the given donor.

For this reason, it is relevant and meaningful to analyze how TAPs are managed in a comparative, cross-donor manner. In the section that follows, the term "management" refers to a set of practices that are expected to ensure the achievement of the broad goals that the donor has decided upon, and for which the donor has provided the necessary funds. TAP management involves devising a detailed plan of activities; acquiring and ensuring adequate material, expertise, administrative and other resources; arranging these resources into an adequate organizational framework; setting up the necessary system of external and internal controls; etc. In this section, six features of TAP management will be reviewed:

1) the organizational setting of TAP implementation—the project framework;
2) time span and the resulting inflexibility of assistance projects;
3) selection of contractors;
4) transparency of operations;
5) administrative burden on the beneficiary;
6) the role of personality.

4.4.1   The Basic Organizational Setting for Implementing Assistance: The Project Framework and its Consequences

Practically all TAPs analyzed were implemented by external, third-party organizations, contracted for the limited task of implementing the given project. In other words, implementation takes place in a so-called project framework. Unlike the other characteristics of TAP management, the project arrangement is so regular and general among various donors, and it is so common for those who work in the international aid field, that it may seem meaningless to discuss it. But this arrangement does have an impact on TAPs.

Even though nearly exclusive reliance on third-party implementing organizations is currently the norm, their presence is a relatively new phenomenon. For example, in the great development era of the 1950s and 1960s, most U.S. aid programs were implemented by permanent personnel. Meanwhile, the inclusion of third parties, which at the time primarily included universities and individual experts, was considered almost an interesting innovation.[41] Some organizations—such as OECD and Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern European Countries (SIGMA)—still presently rely on more permanent implementation structures, including permanent experts.

Many might consider it an outmoded approach to implement assistance using permanent organizational frameworks—called "hierarchy" in the terminology of neo-institutional organization theory—instead of a project framework with contractors—a so-called "market" setup.[42] But the alternative, using temporary, project-type frameworks, has numerous and far-reaching consequences.

Some of these consequences flow directly and unavoidably from the inherent nature of the project type implementation framework. These consequences are uniform among the various donors. For example, because launching a new assistance project means hiring a new contractor, essential experience accumulated and lessons learned during previous projects will be lost or go unutilized.

The remainder of this sub-section concentrates on the consequences of the project framework and how they occur. First we give an overview of what a project-type implementation framework is and how it differs from its main alternative, the bureaucratic implementation framework. Then we present some arguments, which are rooted in organization theory and devise general criteria for deciding whether to rely on the project type or the bureaucratic implementation framework. In the end of the section, the key consequences, both beneficial and detrimental, of the project-type implementation framework are enumerated and assessed.

What is a Project?

Distinctive characteristics of the project framework are as follows:

*   The planning and the implementation phase of the project are strictly separated.
*   Main, strategic features of the assistance—including its goals, objectives, budget, target group, schedule, etc.—are clearly defined and determined during the planning phase, well before activities start.
*   Activities are planned for a given and limited time frame.
*   The above-mentioned main, strategic features of the project assistance cannot be changed during the implementation phase, or at least it is very difficult to make changes.
*   Strategic and operational decisions are not only separated by time. Strategic decisions are usually made by the donor, with some involvement from the beneficiary. Operative decisions are generally made by the implementing organization—again, with some involvement of the beneficiary.

- Implementing organizations are typically chosen on a competitive basis, utilizing "market-type mechanisms."
- It is the donor who chooses the implementing organization in a bidding process, and, once that choice is made, the donor finances the project.
- The bidders calculate their offers based on the proposed plan—in the form of terms of reference—presented by the donor.
- The donor makes its choice among bidders by comparing cost to benefits. Benefits are estimated mainly on the basis of the bidders' experience in the field and/or the region.

A Theoretical Perspective on the Question of Project vs. Permanent/Bureaucratic Implementation Structure

As noted a few paragraphs earlier, in a previous historical epoch, public administration technical assistance was generally provided using permanent organizational structures for implementation. In other words, hierarchy and bureaucracy (in the non-pejorative sense of the word) played a crucial role, instead of market forces. As the overview of CEE national civil service training activities presented in Chapter 3 suggests, the recipient countries, unlike TAPs, strongly rely on hierarchy-based implementation arrangements.

The practicing policy maker or manager is not "left alone" by management theory when it comes to choosing between these two alternatives. Organization theory offers some general guidelines and criteria that help decide which solution has a higher potential to succeed under various circumstances. Some of these perspectives are presented below.

Management theory would classify TAPs, and most other types of foreign assistance to the governmental sector, as a "knowledge based industry"—in other words an industry that is very much dependent on human expertise. According to Mueller-Dyerson a key problem of managing such knowledge-based organizations involves the organization's need to control its assets.[43] While the organization is able to control much of its physical assets almost completely, employees, and most of all experts, are much more difficult to control.

In the past few years, both researchers and practitioners have shown an increasing recognition of the problems of strategic control over an organization's knowledge or expert base. The study of strategic management recommends three basic solutions that an expert organization can use to address these problems, with the first solution being a prerequisite of the next two:[44]

- Increase the reliance on internal sources of expertise, as opposed to contracting experts externally.
- Increase the "asset specificity" of the expert resource base, by promoting the specialization of experts and their knowledge and skills.

- Create morally-based, non-opportunist teams. This latter objective can be mainly achieved by creating sustainable and enhanced career and reward systems that emphasize continuity—and also by nurturing a strong, supporting professional and organizational culture.

All of these three recommendations prescribe organizational solutions that, in many key respects, strongly contradict the usual project arrangement of TAPs, and instead favor permanent implementation arrangements—which are also known as "bureaucratic" or "hierarchy-based" arrangements in other terminology.

A somewhat different viewpoint is offered by the neo-institutionalist school of organization theory—rooted in transaction cost economics. Still, this viewpoint further undermines the alleged supremacy of the project arrangement in the TAP context.[45] According to this argument, a central question of "organization" as a general phenomenon is whether any given economic transaction should be performed within the framework of two basic alternative forms: either markets or hierarchies. For example: In most organizations, a taxi service is regularly bought from external service providers, performing the given transaction using "the market," while executive management positions are filled internally, by one or more employees of the organization, using "hierarchy" as the framework for the given transaction.[46]

For each economic transaction, an organization must decide whether to rely on markets or hierarchies. According to the theory, this fundamental question is answered on the basis of the overall costs attached to it. These costs—the so-called "transaction costs"—are costs of all types that are borne by any actors in relationship to the specification, the negotiation, the monitoring and enforcement and the actual delivery of the given transaction. Referring to the previous example, the taxi service is bought on the market. It appears the service is easy to specify, because "a taxi is a taxi"; it is easy to negotiate the terms of the transaction, because the only parameter is the price; and it is easy to monitor the transaction, because the taxi drives to the required location and the customer pays the bill. On the other hand, business unit managers are rarely contracted as external service providers, or consultants, because this transaction is almost impossible to specify, monitor or enforce.

What kind of normative advice can be derived from these considerations for an organization that faces a "make or buy" decision? How should a manager decide whether a given product or service should be "contracted out"—in other words bought on the market—or provided internally, by a sub-unit of the given organization? Williamson suggests that hierarchy, rather than market, should be relied on if:

- The exchange of the given product or service—the "transaction"—involves a high level of uncertainty. A degree of uncertainty is inevitably conveyed by any transaction, because the provider may go bankrupt, may fail to provide the required type of goods in the required quality and manner, may break the law and pursue opportunistic behavior, etc.
- It is difficult to specify the required product or service in an exact, legally enforceable manner and doing so requires a large input of expensive expert resources, such as lawyers and auditors.
- The given transaction takes place relatively regularly. For example, a small school does not need to employ a full-time lawyer if it only requires a few days per year of legal expertise.

On the other hand, a market-type solution, or contracting out, is more beneficial if the transaction is simple, easy to define and enforce and takes place relatively infrequently. Applying these criteria, hiring a taxi service clearly seems to be best bought on the "market," while large-scale, regular civil service training assistance, run by Western donors, is something that should be chosen according to "hierarchy."

Pros and Cons of Market versus Hierarchy

When applied to the real problems of training assistance, the above, rather theoretical considerations translate into quite tangible and practical consequences of choosing "market" instead of "hierarchy." These consequences can be briefly summarized as follows:

- *Clarity of organizational goals:* The project approach seems to be clearer about such cornerstones of assistance activities as objectives, target group and time frame of the TAP. Meanwhile, in the bureaucratic arrangement of national civil service training, the explicit definition of the training is often missing, and, frequently, even the awareness of what exactly the training is aimed at is also missing. In a bureaucratic setting, procedures, inputs and activities are usually much more important than overall objectives. Indeed our empirical evidence seems to support this observation. We could not find any national civil service training program, including the generally compulsory ones, that had clearly defined policy goals and objectives. The authors' subjective evaluation is that TAPs seem to be generally superior to national civil service training in this respect. But this, and other pros of the market arrangement that one might expect to occur on the basis of public choice and organization theory literature—such as the reduction of bureaucratic dysfunction, goal displacement and "budget-maximizing bureaucrats" and the resulting increase in organizational efficiency—are counter-balanced by a number of other factors listed below.

- *Short term thinking or insufficient degree of continuity of assistance efforts:* In general, public administration should be characterized by continuity. It is a common experience that any change in the public administration system, especially in most Continental systems, requires a significant amount of time. The limited time span of TAPs is somewhat at variance with this aspect of public administration, because training is also usually something that should be continuous. TAPs, evidently, only provide training for a finite amount of time. Theoretically, in the long-term, the national civil service training system should ensure the continuation of training activities. But this may be difficult, mainly because the national government may not have the necessary resources for continuous training.[47] There are only exceptional cases where either a donor or a beneficiary continues to finance successful training courses for which great demand was evident by the time the TAP's implementation period was over.

- *Severely limited organizational learning and project synergy:* Fluctuation among implementing organizations is high, which can cause the following problematic scenario: TAP "A" is implemented by one contractor, who learns hard and valuable lessons about the working environment, clients and problems specific to a given type of assistance. Then TAP "B," which is very similar to TAP "A," is implemented by another contractor, who starts the cumbersome and costly learning process anew. In sum, implementing organizations can only do a limited amount of learning and correcting failures.

- *Measurable aspects and results of project activities are overemphasized, while intangible aspects tend to be neglected:* Contracts must be framed in tangible, operational terms. Therefore, a contract-based relationship between the donor and the implementing organization naturally leads to a situation where the implementing organization is evaluated on the basis of its outputs, most of all on quantitative output measures. For example, implementing organizations need to make statements like: "One hundred civil servants were trained in performance appraisal." Consequently, real project outcomes and qualitative aspects are de-emphasized.

- *Information asymmetry:* A textbook case in which microeconomic theory predicts the outcome of market competition to be sub-optimal is present when the supplier and the customer have unequal or asymmetric information regarding the features of the product or service to be exchanged. Relevant expertise and the general ability to implement a TAP effectively and efficiently definitely falls into this category: It is much more difficult for the donor to actually assess the quality of service that will be offered by the bidders than it is for the bidders themselves. This situation introduces a problem that

renders the outcome of a market-based donor-implementer transaction sub-optimal, even if it is based on a truly open market relationship.

- *Inflexibility of operations:* Strict separation of planning and implementation may have several advantages, but also some disadvantages. One of the biggest problems is the resulting rigidity of the training project. The implementing organization may face several difficulties that require substantial changes in the planned objectives, activities, etc.—especially because of the volatile and uncertain project environment offered by the recipient public administration systems. The strict organizational and temporal separation of planning from implementation makes the flexible and quick adaptation to such changes nearly impossible. The modification of the project plan requires intensive communication and coordination between the implementing organization and the donor, and later, among various segments of the donor organization. Generally, a major modification may require as much, or even more time, than the whole project planning phase originally required. The resulting high transaction costs act to discourage changes that prove to be clearly necessary during the implementation phase.

- *Quasi-market instead of real-market arrangements:* The reliance on project-type implementation, or contracting out, is justified both theoretically and empirically by the beneficial effects of market competition among potential contractors. This competition ensures that the most efficient service provider is contracted. But the implementation of a TAP requires that the bidders possess a set of rare and specific capabilities. Among the most important such capabilities are: relevant experience in the given subject field, experience in the beneficiary environment, an expert pool willing and able to travel and work in the region, experience in working with the given donor and knowledge of the given donor's operational rules and procedures. These requirements greatly limit the number of potential bidders, and thus—on top of the above-mentioned anti-competitive effect of information asymmetry—they encumber true market competition. In fact, instead of true market competition, an oligopoly, or even a monopoly, can emerge: A few insiders who know "the rules of the game" may share large segments of the TAP implementation market among themselves.

In sum, organization theory suggests good reasons to harbor doubts about the expedience and universal applicability of the project-type implementation framework of TAPs. From the theoretical perspective of neo-institutional organization theory, permanent, hierarchy-based implementation structures often seem to be more viable in implementing TAPs.

From a comparative perspective, it is important to note that there are some questions that follow from the project-type implementation framework that can be, and are, answered in different ways by the different donors. For example, the extent of rigidity caused by the cyclical nature of projects can be quite different in the case of TAPs run by various donors, depending on the donors' practices. The means of selecting contractors has a similarly high impact on TAP success. These issues, which have a character varying across donors, are discussed in the next two sub-sections.

4.4.2 Time Span and the Resulting Inflexibility of the Project

As was briefly mentioned in the previous sub-section, assistance activities experience a certain amount of rigidity because all donors rely on the project-type implementation arrangement. The extent of this rigidity varies, due to variations in the typical time span and schedule of the project cycle.

The project cycle can be divided into two main parts. The first part is project planning. During this period, decisions are made about all the major elements of the TAP, including objectives, target group, major outputs, draft schedule of activities, etc. The second major part is the implementation phase. In between these two periods, there is usually a tendering procedure, when the overall project plan, typically in the form of a terms of reference, is advertised, bidders submit their proposals and the donor decides which bidder will be the implementing organization. At this point, we will analyze the time span of the process. When performing this analysis, we regard the bidding process as part of the planning period and not part of the implementation phase.

Here again, we find a difference between PHARE and the three other donors analyzed. Compared to the projects of other donors, PHARE projects are characterized by a significantly longer planning phase and a shorter implementation phase.

The length of the planning phase is an important issue in such a dynamic and uncertain environment as public administration in the CEE/CIS region. Topics of importance change quickly. A major problem related to a project cycle like that of PHARE is that, when a training topic is especially vital, the national government cannot wait for PHARE TAPs to be introduced some two or three years later.

As for implementation, promoting change in public administration takes a longer time. Furthermore, good training with relevant content usually requires a continuous supply to be effective. Both considerations suggest a longer implementation phase.

Comparative Table 12
Time-span and Inflexibility in the Project Cycle:
PHARE versus Other Donors

PHARE	The planning phase of a PHARE TAP takes about two years, if everything goes smoothly. The first step takes about one year or more and results in the signing of a so-called "financing memorandum," a general plan for PHARE activities in the beneficiary country. Heil writes in this regard: "It is interesting to note that, since 1998, all annual financing proposals have been finalized by the Hungarian authorities no later than May. Still, the signing ceremony had to wait until mid-December. This means that the internal decision-making procedure of the EU—during which the financing memorandum was no longer modified—took about as long as the whole cycle from the first project ideas to the finalized proposal!"[48] Due to the great level of uniformity within PHARE, the system is practically identical in the other countries, though Hungary may be a bit more successful than the average in dealing with EU administration. Once the financing memorandum is adopted, detailed project plans, called "project fiches," can be developed. These are also subject to careful and time-consuming scrutiny by the delegation of the EU. Once the project fiche is adopted, the terms of reference can be prepared and submitted again to the delegation. If the delegation adopts the terms of reference, the bidding process can start. At this point, the beneficiary may expect that there is only another three-to-four months before the implementation can start. We must note here that the process described above is a relatively new and simplified one. At the beginning of the research period, the so called "DIS system" required the development of a financing memorandum, a "strategic plan" and then a "work program," on which the terms of reference had to be based. By contrast, the implementation phase of PHARE projects is exceptionally short. The implementation period may be between 12 and 24 months. Typical TAPs are 18 months long.
DFID, USAID, CIDA	Other donors require a shorter planning period and a longer implementation period. A five-year implementation period is not at all exceptional for USAID projects. DFID TAPs are typically two-to-four years long. CIDA TAPs are about three years long. We could not find any major difference in the planning period among the three donors. All of them require a shorter and simpler planning procedure. The British donor had an image of being especially flexible and quick in responding to local needs. However, this has greatly changed with the much more "strategic" approach introduced with the establishment of DFID. And flexibility was reduced even further by DFID's policy of relating its assistance effort to other, larger donors, especially the EU.

4.4.3 Who Implements TAPs?

Another problem identified above is the limited competition among potential contractors, and the resulting loss of efficiency of the market-based, project-type implementation arrangement. As was the case with problems caused by project time-span, the extent of the problem of limited competition differs from donor to donor.

In the following paragraphs, the focus of the problem's analysis is narrowed down to one specific question: To what extent are beneficiary-side implementing organizations and beneficiary-side experts involved in implementation? The importance given to this question is justified by the fact that it has implications beyond the issue of competition. For example, the question is also important because, as is discussed at various points in this volume, TAP efficacy is often strongly limited by the inadequate awareness of specific beneficiary needs and circumstances. This situation arises because local experts, who obviously know the local context much better, are usually under-utilized in TAP implementation. Another reason why it is important to look at the relative exclusion of local experts from TAP implementation is that this exclusion is surprisingly systematic, and it is difficult to explain on the basis of overt, "official" TAP policies or principles.

The fact that TAPs generally tend to be implemented by contractors and experts from the same country or region as the donors will be an important element of the argumentation presented in the conclusion of this volume.

The selection of the implementing organization of a given TAP takes place in the bidding and contracting phase of the project cycle. In this process, a lot depends on how widely the terms of reference was advertised, how the scope of potential bidders is limited, what aspects are taken into consideration when the contracting decision is made, etc.

A review of donor practices during bidding procedures seems to indicate a general tendency toward explicitly or implicitly excluding organizations originating in the beneficiary country, while favoritism is shown toward organizations from the donor country.

Once the implementing organization is selected and contracted, another question is the selection of experts, both consultants and trainers, taking part in the actual implementation. This is a general practice, because most implementing organizations don't possess a pool of experts who are both appropriate and available for performing the various specialized tasks involved in the given project. From the point of view of quality, the way experts are contracted for a given project is a key question.

Comparative Table 13
The Origin of Implementing Organizations

PHARE	Rules of PHARE do not explicitly prohibit contracting organizations from the beneficiary country. Nonetheless, we found no single case in which a TAP was carried out by an organization originating entirely from the recipient region. We suppose that it is the large number of intricate and specific rules that deter beneficiary-origin organizations from bidding for PHARE TAP contracts. We found that organizations of the recipient country may appear as members of a consortium, which is always led by an organization originating from the EU. There are other cases where "local branches" of international firms, like International House, DHV Hungary or Bishop and Chalmers Lithuania, were contracted. Smaller projects, with a value of less than USD 300,000, are usually carried out by so-called framework contractors, without the bureaucratic bidding procedures. There were 13 such framework contractors, all of which were of EU origin.
DFID	According to the previous official rules of DFID, contracts could only be awarded to organizations of U.K. origin. This rule was changed to one that allows only organizations of EU origin. Still, all the implementing organizations mentioned by our country teams were from the U.K.
USAID	We found that, for all the projects mentioned, the contractor was of U.S. origin. In the field of training, USAID works with two organizations, one for the CEE and another in the CIS countries. Additional U.S. companies may win other projects—such as mixed public administration development—through a limited competitive bidding procedure.
CIDA	All implementing organizations of the four projects mentioned in our research were of Canadian origin. The CIDA web site emphasizes that the majority of foreign aid has actually been spent within Canada, on financing Canadian organizations and individuals.
Conclusion	There is a general tendency among donors to contract donor-country-origin organizations as TAP implementers, irrespective of whether this requirement is laid down in the donors' official rules or is only an informal practice. This fact is considered natural and is rarely, if ever, questioned in the donor community.

Local experts can be involved either in identifying the exact training objectives and in elaborating the training curriculum and training materials or adapting them to local needs, or they can be involved as trainers who actually provide training. There may be several advantages of including local experts or trainers in a TAP:

- Local experts, even those having very high prestige among the target group, are significantly cheaper than foreign experts. They have lower honoraria and no travel, hotel or per-diem expenses.

  - *Our Lithuanian team describes a TAP for which, exceptionally, financial data are available. The project was implemented by a foreign organization. Curriculum and training material already existed, but adaptation was necessary, and it was made by local experts. The materials were then translated, and all the training courses were run by local trainers. Even with such a distribution of labor, expert fees for local experts was USD 8,400, while fees for foreign experts was USD 79,161. In other words, almost 10 times more was spent on foreign consultants.*

- As was argued in the section on training content, a key success factor in any TAP is that those identifying training objectives and developing the training materials are familiar with the needs and institutional, legal and cultural specifics of the beneficiary. This is one weakness of many—maybe most—foreign experts, but it can be corrected by involving carefully selected and managed local experts.

- The trainees themselves may be impressed because they are being trained by the "big names" in the field, names who they know from the local scene.
- Local trainers may handle the audience much better than foreign trainers, who usually face the problems of cultural and language gaps.

It is surprising that, despite all the advantages of relying on local trainers in curriculum development and/or training, local experts are utilized to a relatively low extent.

One possible reason why TAPs do not use local experts to a greater extent may be the low quality of local trainers, who may either have poor training skills or limited knowledge of training content. Indeed, experienced local trainers in the national civil service training field are relatively rare. Either they lack the knowledge and understanding of the public administration system, as is the case with trainers from the private sector, or they lack the experience in interactive training techniques, as is often the case with lecturers in the field of public administration.

  - *In Hungary, high-quality professional trainers can be found at various training organizations that provide services for banks, management of private companies etc. But there are almost no full-time trainers, let alone trainers with interactive training experience, within the relatively well-established network of organizations providing national civil service training.*

Comparative Table 14
Selection of Experts

PHARE	Local experts play a relatively small role in preparation of curriculum and training material for PHARE TAPs. But local trainers often play a significant role in the actual training delivery. One reason for this may be that PHARE TAPs are frequently large-scale training events. Carrying out such activities with foreign consultants would increase costs to such an extent that the bidder would loose the competition for the project. Nonetheless, PHARE procedural rules generally prohibit civil servants of the beneficiary country from taking part as paid experts in TAPs—even though these civil servants often possess most of the relevant knowledge. Similarly, if the direct beneficiary is a civil service training institution of the recipient country, employees of this institution are also prohibited from acting as paid TAP experts.
DFID	DFID relies quite strongly on U.K. experts and trainers. The reason may be that most of their projects are sustainability-type TAPs. This was the case in Hungary and Lithuania. In Ukraine—in a project that was less clearly designed for sustainability—the implementing organization relied to a greater extent on Ukrainian trainers.
USAID	It seems that USAID is relatively active in involving local trainers in actual training delivery. The reason for this may be the rather large-scale training that they support and the fact that training venues are often far away from the main airports and hotels, because USAID mostly runs courses for local governments.
CIDA	CIDA seems to rely mostly on Canadian experts. The main exception is that of a Ukrainian project where Baltic instructors were used extensively. But the reason for this exception was that the Ukrainian participants did not speak English.
Conclusion	Involvement of local trainers varies among donors. It seems there is a general tendency among projects that use local experts that these experts are only used in actual training delivery, rather than in elaboration of curriculum. In general, it seems to be a problem that donors expect employees of the docking and beneficiary organizations will take part in the TAP activities without any reimbursement, since it is their regular job responsibility. But these employees carry out TAP-related activities in addition to their regular scope of work, without any additional compensation. They are therefore not eager to assist TAPs.

Still, the argument that there is a "lack of local resources" can be countered with at least two arguments: First, we can enumerate good examples of available local experts, including Romanian NGOs that are ready and able to provide professional training services for the civil service and the previously mentioned Lithuanian Institute of Public Administration. The services of these institutions are not really utilized by TAPs. The second argument is that foreign trainers are not necessarily better. The authors themselves have experienced several training events provided by foreign trainers that were quite poor, either in terms of the trainers' technique or their knowledge of the specific field. It is quite common that training is run not by a qualified trainer but by a consultant.

- *The Hungarian team knows about some cases in which TAP courses ended when the participants unanimously left the course. They also experienced one training in which the course was only saved when the Hungarian organizer stepped in and finished the training, instead of the foreign consultant.*

Another, more understandable, reason for the limited use of local trainers, is that the donors lack control and/or trust of local experts. This may be an especially serious problem if the local trainers develop training materials and teach in the local language.

In this section, and in some previous ones, we looked at the pros and cons of relying on local organizations and experts in the implementation of TAPs. It has become clear that this is a complex problem, with many interrelated elements and trade-offs. Therefore, despite the importance of the question, it is impossible to give an unambiguous assessment of current practices or to give clear guidelines on improving these practices. However, some relevant cornerstones can be laid down, and some considerations deserve the attention of stakeholders. These are summarized in Table 8.

4.4.4   Transparency of Operations

Accountability for results and transparency of operations is usually, quite understandably, a major requirement of the stakeholders of any organization. In the case of activities paid for by taxpayers, especially in advanced governance systems, transparency is a prerequisite of the legitimacy of an organization or activity, and it is often backed by legal norms. The issue of transparency of TAPs is analyzed separately, not only because of its general importance, but also because the experience gained in the field research is surprising and important enough to merit a closer look.

In the context of TAPs, like most public programs, various types of evaluations are used to ensure a sufficient level of transparency and accountability. In the following section, therefore, an overview of donors' evaluation practices is given first. Then we look at the transparency of the operations

of a donor, as indicated by the availability of simple and general project information, that was sought during the field-research phase of the present work.

Evaluation Practices

A fundamental function of evaluation is ensuring feed-back on the results of a project, and thus allowing organizational learning.[49] A second key function is to ensure accountability for the achievement of goals and efficacy of the assistance, thereby creating transparency and legitimacy for assistance operations. These functions have an especially important role in such a dynamic and complex environment as the public administration systems of the CEE region.

All donors carry out some type of evaluation. In this regard, we find a major difference between TAPs and national civil service training systems. As we have already noted, evaluation as a specific technique is largely unknown and unused in the national civil service training field. But even though donors do seek evaluations, they differ greatly in the type, form and regularity of these evaluations.

In the following paragraphs, evaluation practices are viewed from three aspects:

- methodological approach of donors to evaluations;
- soundness of evaluation procedures;
- public availability of evaluation materials; in other words, the extent to which donors use evaluations for internal management versus external accountability purposes.

The *methodological approach* that donors take with evaluations, and the implied function of those evaluations, make it clear that, in the four-stage framework of the classical training evaluation based on Kirkpatrick and set out in Chapter 2, the participant questionnaire contributes only to the first, least-relevant, stage to be measured.[50] In the case of TAPs, this measure is especially problematic, because trainees in the region tend to give much higher scores than they really believe the training deserves.

- *Our Lithuanian country team notes that a DFID project was evaluated by 97 percent of the participants as "useful" or "very useful," while another survey found that the same indicator is only 62 percent. Eighty-six percent of the participants indicated that they will be able to use the newly acquired skills in their workplace, but an alternative survey found the applicability of the skills and knowledge was at 27 percent.[51]*

- *USAID also relies heavily on trainee questionnaires. In that regard, Bakenova notes: "USAID recognizes that there are problems with participant evaluations (especially in CIS countries) that have been, and continue to be, characterized by participants tending to be polite and often unwilling to criticize either the program or the provider. Usually, not less than 80 percent of participants tend to regard programs as being relevant, objectives met."[52]*

Trainee questionnaires may be dubious sources of information for measuring immediate satisfaction. And these

Table 8
Arguments for and Against Relying on Local Resources in Implementing TAPs

Arguments	Argument applies to beneficiary side:	
	Contractors	Experts
Arguments supporting reliance on beneficiary-side actors:		
The costs of using local actors are a small fragment of those related to Western implementers. These costs include fees and related costs, such as travel, accommodation and per-diem costs.	✓	✓
Problems related to the language of the training. These problems were discussed in the relevant section earlier.		✓
Local experts are familiar with working in the local context, including knowing how beneficiary-side actors think, how these actors are motivated, how these actors communicate, how to identify the target group, how to recruit trainees, etc. This knowledge is crucial for flexible, effective and non-wasteful implementation.	✓	
Knowledge and familiarity with the local institutional, legal and cultural context is a crucial, but often missing, prerequisite of designing a meaningful training project.		✓
Arguments opposing reliance on beneficiary-side actors:		
Control of the actual TAP activities can be problematic, because the soundness of internal management and control and/or the integrity and sincerity of business practices can be doubtful.	✓	To some extent
Familiarity with, and acceptance of, the management culture and standard procedures of the donor can be missing, but it is important for the smooth and efficient running of the project.	✓	

questionnaires are surely not reliable for measuring longer-term effects and the utilization of transferred skills or knowledge. It is our general experience that TAPs frequently gain high evaluation scores on trainee questionnaires because of the "luxurious" circumstances of the training, rather than the inherent value of that training.

- *A PHARE training event on EU Structural Funds in Hungary was evaluated highly by most of the trainees. The variance was due to two factors. Those who had some substantial background in EU Structural Funds were less satisfied, because they realized that the knowledge transferred could only be utilized after Hungary's accession, in other words, several years after the training took place. Another, even more relevant explanatory variable was the quality of additional services, such as catering. In fact, most of the comments on the training were related to this. The majority complained that no coffee was provided in the afternoon break and that there was not enough mineral water.*

- *With regards to USAID, Bakenova found that, after a new guideline was introduced that limited the services—and especially the cash allowances—provided to the participants, the participant satisfaction rate dropped significantly.[53]*

For the sake of comparison, we note that participant questionnaires are now being used more often in national civil service training programs. Although we cannot prove it, we suppose that this practice is, to a great extent, an effect of TAPs. Before 1990, such questionnaires were hardly in use in the regions' national civil service training systems. But national civil service training programs differ greatly from TAPs in that several of them, and most of the compulsory ones, end with an exam, which is quite rare among TAPs. This feature of national civil service training may be viewed as a deficiency, because it indicates a concentration on knowledge instead of skills and a lecture style of training. Still, national civil service training with exams is at least one level higher than TAPs, on Kirkpatrick's four-step evaluation process mentioned above, because it measures the amount of knowledge transferred.

With regards to soundness of evaluation procedures, the rankings are shown in Comparative Table 15.

Public availability of evaluation results is vital from the point of view of the transparency of operations and accountability of the management for successes and failures. The crucial question is how evaluation results/materials are actually used: Whether they are only reviewed internally, by senior management, or they are made available for the narrower or broader community of external stakeholders, which is, after all, the public.

The findings in this regard are indicated in Comparative Table 16.

Comparative Table 15
Soundness of Evaluation Procedures

1. PHARE	PHARE seems to run the most sophisticated evaluation system among all donors. A wide range of randomly selected TAPs are evaluated by external evaluators, using a standard evaluation format: "Operational Monitoring and Assessment System" reports. Additionally, in-depth evaluation is provided for a number of TAPs. The other donors rarely rely on external evaluation. Evaluation is usually left up to the donor's responsible official or to the implementing organization's reports.
2. USAID	USAID also runs a sophisticated evaluation system, which relies partly on trainee questionnaires. It is interesting that, according to available information, USAID is the only donor among the four that attempts to assess longer term impact on a regular basis: Participants may be approached about six-to-nine months after the course for a follow-up survey. USAID also measures outputs against their own strategic objectives.
3. DFID	According to the stated procedural rules of DFID, detailed quantitative evaluation, including impact assessment, must be carried out on every project that costs more than GBP 5 million. But projects in the CEE/CIS region hardly ever exceed this amount. We have no knowledge of TAPs that would have been systematically evaluated. It seems that DFID relies mostly on reports submitted by the implementing organizations. Our Lithuanian team noted that the participant questionnaire played a crucial role in evaluation of projects. Additionally, consultants of the implementing organization conducted an evaluation that was carried out in a professional manner and later verified by an independent consultant. In a Hungarian project, a qualitative process evaluation was carried out by an independent expert in the first half of the project as a result of major deficiencies and dissatisfaction from both sides. Recommendations were formed and, later on, were followed up on, thus contributing to increased efficiency. Participant questionnaire results were referred to in the quarterly project reports.
4. CIDA	"Participant questionnaires and ex-post evaluation by contracted consultants is the most frequent form of evaluation […] CIDA does not have any specific and strict guidelines on the conduct of training evaluation. Most of the information that CIDA receives regarding achieved overall project results comes from the reports of executing organizations, who usually obtain this information on the bases of their own evaluation procedures. However, executing organizations' approach toward training evaluation also differs."[54]

Comparative Table 16
Public Availability of Evaluation Results

1. PHARE	PHARE is definitely the most transparent. A large number of evaluation reports, some of them quite critical towards the analyzed projects, are publicized on the internet.
2. CIDA	CIDA also publishes a great deal of evaluative and related materials on a regular basis.
3. DFID	DFID is less transparent. This donor publishes only very general information, which does not include evaluative information on specific projects.
4. USAID	USAID seems to be the least transparent of the analyzed donors. Only the "success story database" is available for the wider public.

Experience of the Field Research:
Availability of Project Documents

The amount of TAP information we were able to gain in the process of our field research depends on two independent variables: first, the extent, to which such information exists; and, second, the extent to which the donor is willing to share that information. Although this distinction is theoretically quite clear, in practice it is difficult to decide whether a given request for information was refused for the first or the second reason. It is noted here that, in the final analysis, the effect on the transparency of donors and TAPs is the same. The "only" difference is that in the former case, an additional, unfavorable impression is given regarding the regularity and soundness of the administrative processes of the given donor.

Because the impact of either variable is the same, our assessment of donor practices avoids a clear distinction between the soundness of project documentation and the willingness of donors to share basic project information for the purpose of an evaluative research project like the present one.

It is clear that, if the beneficiary government cannot obtain items like the list of participants of a TAP, any type of human resources planning is jeopardized, as is the rational utilization of skills and knowledge transferred to the trainees by the given TAP. This is especially so in the case of sustainability-type projects, or any project which is expected to produce trained trainers for use by the national civil service training system. This consideration seems to be self-evident, and it would probably not be disputed by any donor.

Given the obvious importance of basic information about TAPs, our findings are especially surprising. We dis-

covered that, in the majority of cases, no list of participants is available. It was also an exceptional case if the curriculum and training materials were available. This is so, even with the sustainability-type projects, which were designed so that the courses will be run later on by the national civil service training system.

Comparative Table 17
Availability of Training Outputs, Including List of Participants, Curriculum and Training Materials

PHARE	PHARE, despite its large and uniform administrative capacity present in all the beneficiary countries, is no better than other donors. It is a frequent critique that lists of participants, and frequently even the number of trainees, is not available. The same holds true for details about curriculum and training materials. In the past few years, the record of PHARE in this regard has improved somewhat.
DFID	In Lithuania, where the project was run at the central training institute of the country, curricula and training materials were left at the institute and thus are available. By contrast, in Hungary, where four, mostly government (i.e. not training) institutions were involved as beneficiary organizations, most of the curricula and the training materials are not available.
USAID	The list of participants is available to the donor. We found no evidence that the training materials were practically available.
CIDA	The curriculum and training materials are available to the donor. We found no evidence that the training materials were practically available.
Conclusion	Availability of project documents is quite humble. This, however, is not solely the fault of donors. Beneficiary organizations have not made any significant effort to collect TAP materials and utilize them by making them available for the country's public administration.[55]

Our personal experience is that, once a project ends, and especially once the donor leaves the country, it is difficult to even find out if there were TAPs run by the given donor, let alone what the content was, how many people were trained, how long they were trained or exactly who was trained.

Except for a few cases, it was usually impossible to access data concerning the break-down of project costs into such elements as training design in relation to effective training provision, local versus foreign expert fees and related expenses, etc. Differences between the four analyzed donors are reviewed in Comparative Table 18.

Comparative Table 18
Availability of Budget Data

1. CIDA	Budget data were available in Lithuania, and the headquarters staff provided our reporter not only data that allowed calculation of unit cost but also quite detailed budget breakdowns, consisting of information that was considered "sensitive" or a "business secret" by other donors.
2. DFID	The donor does not have a clear policy in this regard. Thus, besides the general tendency that the beneficiary's administrative culture influences the level of secrecy, a lot depends on the implementing organizations' practices. The Lithuanian team could obtain budget breakdown data that was not available for the Hungarian team. The Ukrainian team could not obtain any relevant budget information.
3. PHARE	TAP budget data, and especially budget breakdown data, are usually not available, because most of the projects are mixed ones, with some TAP elements. Inputs are defined in great detail, but input costs cannot be related to TAP outputs. Thus, irrespective of the large bureaucratic apparatus and procedures, no reliable detailed TAP budget data were available. Only Hungary had a database for PHARE training activities. In this database, some, though not all, records contained sufficient information to calculate at least unit costs. This data included overall training budget, number of trainees and number of training days.
4. USAID	Overall budget data were available. No other budget breakdown data were provided, even via personal telephone interviews with the headquarters.
Conclusion	TAP budget data availability depended most of all on the beneficiary's administrative culture. Data were least available in Ukraine and Romania. If the donor did not have a clear policy in this regard, a lot depended on the implementing organization. Large and precisely regulated project administration does not assure greater transparency in this regard. For example, PHARE could not provide basic budget data, whereas CIDA could provide detailed budget break-downs.

Another major finding is that, even information that obviously exists, such as number of participants or overall budget, is often consciously kept in the strictest confidence by some donors or their field offices. Our teams' limited access to such information is even more peculiar if one considers that these researchers themselves were intimately involved in working with TAPs in the respective country—as experts, project coordinators, members or managers of host organizations, etc.

It was also surprising to discover that it is not so much the donor as the beneficiary that determines the variance in secrecy versus transparency. For example, in Ukraine, and to a somewhat smaller extent Romania, data on TAPs are not available for "outsiders." It seems that donors follow the general practice of the beneficiary country's government. If secrecy in a country's government is wide-spread, TAP information will not be available either.

As to the level of secrecy in beneficiary public administration systems: In Ukraine, responsible national authorities collect data on compulsory training activities. This data is not available for the public, nor to our country team leader, who otherwise works in a managerial position within the national civil service training system. Furthermore, the same person could barely obtain relevant information on TAP activities. Our Romanian team faced similar difficulties. Though the situation is far from perfect in Hungary or Lithuania, our teams in those countries still usually achieved access to aggregate data that was available with the authorities.

Undoubtedly, PHARE proved to be, by far, the most transparent in all regards. Along with information on

PHARE TAPs, including external evaluation reports that are available on the internet, we were able to obtain valuable additional information from the local PHARE offices, and even requests for hard copies of some documents from Brussels proved successful. Nevertheless, most of the evaluation documents complain about the limited availability of training documents. In fact, evaluators found that, quite frequently, the available documents do not even identify the number of trainees and total training days. These gaps in information are especially shocking in the case of PHARE, because the extremely detailed procedural rules are supposed to ensure accountability and the prevention of waste, fraud and corruption. If very basic pieces of information on output are not available for PHARE's own evaluators, questions can be raised about the positive aspects of the whole procedural system—which has already-identified negative aspects, such as slowness, a lack of flexibility and responsiveness, etc. More relevant from our present point of view is the fact that PHARE runs—mostly at the expense of the beneficiary—a large and unified organizational system whose sole responsibility is to administer PHARE projects, produce and keep files in order, etc. If there is a donor that has the necessary organizational size and structure to keep TAP documents in order and available for all stakeholders, this donor is PHARE. Yet even PHARE has a poor record in that regard.

If we found more evaluation reports criticizing PHARE than other donors, it is probably because only PHARE TAP evaluation reports are widely available—not because other donors would be any better. In fact, the overall picture with

other donors is worse than with PHARE. The authors participated in a sustainability TAP run by DFID. We found that about a third of the trainees' lists were not available, from either the donor or the local coordinator. In most cases, we found no training materials on the basis of which the courses could subsequently be replicated. Major documents of study trips were not even available in the library of the beneficiary organization, whose management participated in the trip.

None of the other donors seem to be as transparent as PHARE. Field researchers in the beneficiary countries faced severe difficulties in collecting even the most basic information. Our Ukrainian team member, who at that time actually participated in a DFID project, did not have access to such information as the overall number of trained persons or the overall budget of the analyzed TAPs. USAID seems to be the most reluctant to provide information on their activities, though this may be a result of the events of Sept. 11, 2001.

As mentioned above, there is a specific but important aspect, or consequence, of availability of project information. Namely, access to certain kinds of TAP information—such as the list of participants, the subject and detailed content of the training and the training materials produced—has a fundamental effect on the chances of utilization and sustainability of the given TAPs. The unavailability of this information may render a TAP useless.

Despite this fact, donors show surprisingly limited interest in changing the current, sub-optimal situation. For example, one solution to this problem could be to set up a central database somewhere in the beneficiary countries' government structure, possibly at the organization responsible for civil service or civil service training. This database should allow the structured storage of information in electronic and hard copy form, and it should contain all relevant pieces of information, most importantly, the list of TAP participants and the field they were trained in. It is surprising to see that no donor seems to have considered financing the establishment of such a central database to facilitate the increased utility of all TAPs for the beneficiary governments. Moreover, not even the existing structures are utilized for this purpose.

- *One example of a lost opportunity to maintain TAP records is in Hungary, where the Ministry of Interior operates a Central Civil Service Database, containing all the relevant data for over 100,000 civil servants. The database, which is mentioned in the Hungarian civil service law, includes data on major training courses in which the civil servants participated. We have no evidence that any donor ever initiated a process by which its TAPs would be entered into this database. In addition to this potential resource, there is also a database of accredited civil service trainers in Hunga-*

ry. Nevertheless, we have no knowledge of any TAP that was planned and implemented in a way that the trained trainers would be added into this database.

- *Initiatives of the beneficiaries to improve this situation are received with little enthusiasm. For example, when the difficulty of maintaining sustainability became clear to the Hungarian Institute of Public Administration, which is a hub institution for national civil service training, they submitted a proposal to a major donor's small-grants fund, requesting USD 4,000 to set up an appropriate database. The staff of the institute would have collected the documents of the TAPs in order to provide information to the professional public. Unfortunately, the requested funds were not granted.*

4.4.5 Administrative Burden on the Beneficiary Government

Practically all TAPs require some in-kind contribution from the governments of beneficiary countries. Even though this contribution is rarely recognized by either the donor or the beneficiary, it may be a significant burden on national authorities. This administrative burden can be considered as a factor of TAP efficiency, since costs born by the beneficiary should be, from a normative point of view, also counted. Information with regards to the administrative burden put on beneficiary governments by the individual donors is summarized in Comparative Table 19.

The beneficiary's burden is further increased by donors' attempts to get the most senior person possible as the local head of each project. The ultimate goal is usually a minister, but donors are frequently satisfied in the end with a deputy minister. Donors usually provide a seemingly rational explanation for this behavior: They say that the public administration system of the beneficiary countries is disorganized and that high-level leadership is necessary to ensure that that project is supported and implemented on the beneficiary side. But the logic of this explanation is flawed. If, as is indeed the case, the public administration system is disorganized, then the higher up an official is in the hierarchy, the further they are from the actual project administration—and the lower their influence on implementation. This is generally true of the minister, too. And even if the minister potentially has greater power, he/she is likely to be less interested in the project, because of the large number of similar, or more important, projects and issues that a minister must deal with. If these "theoretical" explanations are not convincing enough to show the weakness of seeking high-ranking local leadership for a project, the practical experience, including a constant failure to ensure leadership by "going high," should make the case forcefully.

Comparative Table 19
Administrative Burden on the Beneficiary

PHARE	PHARE is generally considered the donor that places the largest administrative burden on the beneficiary. PHARE requires that beneficiary governments set up, run and finance a large set of organizations, which are uniform in all countries and solely serve the purpose of PHARE administration. The Hungarian team found that the cost of financing this set of organizations is about 2 percent of the total yearly PHARE budget. But the relative proportion of the administrative burden is higher on smaller projects, and TAPs are usually such small-budget projects. Indeed, the administrative burden for DFID TAPs was estimated at 6 percent, and PHARE surely requires more administrative work. Thus, it is most likely that the administrative burden is well over 6 percent of the total PHARE TAP budget.
DFID	No clear tendency could be identified. It seems that a lot depends on the implementing organization's practices, as well as on the practices of the beneficiary organization, because, in several cases, division of this burden was a result of implicit or explicit bargaining. In Hungary, the implementing organization employed a person who was responsible for several administrative and even managerial activities. This solution seemed to be successful and efficient.
USAID	USAID and its implementing organizations strive to control project activities as much as possible. Thus, TAPs of this donor place an especially small burden on the beneficiary.
CIDA	CIDA seems to place a below-average administrative burden on the beneficiary. CIDA usually requests a 10 percent contribution from the beneficiary in the form of an in-kind contribution. It seems that, except for a Ukrainian project, out of the three analyzed projects, this contribution was fulfilled, even though the management at the docking organizations did not realize this was so.
Conclusion	Calculations of the administrative burden were based on the civil service wages in the region, which are small in comparison to TAP expert fees. Still, we found that the donors place a relatively large burden on the beneficiary, though this burden is supposedly not more than 10 percent of the total TAP budget. It seems that managers at the docking organizations are usually not aware of this burden, let alone the value of their contribution to the project. Another burden that we could not systematically analyze, even though it was raised by most of the country teams regarding most of the donors, is that civil servants must spend time explaining basic issues for foreign consultants every time a new donor, or else just a new implementing organization, appears on the scene.

High ranking officials agree to play the leading role because they feel it is their obligation, otherwise the TAP, which brings foreign money, would not come to the country. But these officials are too busy to participate regularly in leading the projects. If we consider the relatively low number of ministers in a country, and the relatively large number of various foreign projects, and assume that taking a leading role in a project may require at least one day per quarter, the problem becomes clear. We may conclude that ministers, especially in countries where donors are quite active, may hardly have time for any other activities beyond their duty of leading various assistance projects. The fact that some or most donors request the establishment of steering committees staffed with high-ranking officials escalates the problem by:

- requiring the time of several high-ranking officials for the same project;
- and failing to recognize problems of availability that result either in the committee regularly having no quorum or in lower ranking officials attending on behalf of the minister.

– *DFID ran a TAP in Hungary, with six main elements, between 1998 and 2002. The total project budget was about USD 1 mil-*

lion—a relatively small amount, even by Hungarian standards. A steering committee was set up, led by the minister for the Prime Minister's Office, the most powerful cabinet minister. The committee members were mostly state secretaries or deputy state secretaries. But the steering committee never really met, and this greatly hindered the operation of the project. Finally, a so called coordination group was set up, consisting of the directors of the ministries whose units were responsible for project administration. Later on, the directors were represented by those lower-level officials who actually run the project in the ministry. The British project leader attended both the coordinating and the quasi-steering committee meeting, which were held at around the same time. By then, mostly the coordinating group members attended the so-called steering committee meetings, too. Once this setup stabilized, the project started to function. As we write this, the project is reaching its end, and a major closing event is being organized. It is hoped that the official steering committee members may meet there, for the first time.

We quote the above example not because it exposes an exceptionally severe case. One could list several similar, or even worse, cases. The example is remarkable because it exhibits not only the problem but also a potential solution. Nonetheless, the question still remains the same: Why do donors insist on high-ranking steering committee members

if that rarely ever works as it was intended and if it frequently endangers the functioning and effectiveness of the whole project? Apparently the answer is that high-ranking officials are used to promote the prestige and image of the project, the implementing organization and/or the donor, even if this does harm to the project on the ground.

4.4.6   The Personal Element

In the sections above, we considered several structural and procedural issues regarding the managing of TAPs. We described some general tendencies and factors that have an impact on TAP efficacy. But there is one major element, which we will call the "personality factor," that seems difficult to analyze exactly, or even define. There are no general rules that can be applied regarding the personality factor.

If the person who manages the TAP is devoted to the task, that may ensure TAP success. On the other hand, a "business as usual" approach, even if it includes professional TAP management, often seems to lead to failures in the region.

- *CIDA's project in Lithuania seems to be quite a successful one. Bakenova mentions the project manager at the implementing organization, who was a university professor, not even a professional consultant or trainer, and who devoted great effort to the project. It is generally agreed that the project's success was to a great extent due to this person's sensitivity and devotion.[56]*

- *A qualitative interim evaluation ordered by the donor compared two TAPs run in Hungary by DFID in the 1997-2000 period. Significant differences were found in the efficiency of the two TAPs. It was somewhat surprising that the least successful TAP was run by a professional public administration training and consulting organization. The more successful project was run by a university and managed by a university professor, who was personally interested in the country's public administration reform and devoted to the development of civil service.*

4.5   Technical Features of Training

The technical features of how training projects are actually implemented have a major effect on the efficacy of TAPs. The importance of these features is increased by the fact that, often, large losses in efficacy could have been avoided through the observance of some relatively minor technical considerations. Below, we look at three such technical features: the language, the style and the geographical location of the TAPs.

4.5.1   Language

Problems of language naturally occur during the implementation of TAPs because the training material is usually "imported" from a foreign language and because the predominantly foreign consultants and trainers employed by TAP implementing organizations hardly ever speak the local language.

Theoretically, there are several ways to circumvent the language barrier. One of them is for TAPs to utilize local trainers, who offer training in the local language. From the point of view of the quality of training this solution might have some adverse effects, because it limits the implementing organization's control over the training course's content and activities.

- *A solution to the problem of offering training in the local language without losing control of local trainers was provided by a DFID TAP in Hungary. Trained trainers ran courses in the local language. Foreign trainers also sat in on the course, and they were provided with simultaneous translation. This allowed them to follow the process, to provide feedback to inexperienced local trainers and to step in, if that was necessary.*

Another way to handle the language issue is to run the training in a foreign language. This is a widely used practice. The advantage of this arrangement is clear. It allows direct communication between the trainer and the trainees while allowing the implementing organization to maintain control over trainers. At the same time, there are potential disadvantages in this arrangement, including the following:

- The most obvious problem is that participants may not speak the language well enough to be able to get the maximum benefit from the training.
- The overwhelming majority of civil servants do not speak foreign languages. The proportion of those who do speak another language is even smaller among the older workers—a group that includes most senior civil servants, to whom the majority of TAPs are addressed.
- The small group of civil servants who do speak Western language(s) can end up taking part in several courses of very diverse content, such as public finance for local governments, policy-making in central government, management of EU SAPARD programs, ethics codes, motivation of employees, urban development, etc. The result can be the creation of a small group of "professional training participants."

- *One problem with the creation of "professional training participants" is that they may not pay much attention to the various courses they attend. This was apparently the case when a follow-up survey was conducted among former DFID TAP participants. Five*

participants out of 56 interviewed one-to-24 months after their participation in a training event could not recall the fact that they actually participated in the TAP, even after they were informed about the topic, date and venue of the TAP in which they participated.

- Those who speak foreign languages are usually more valued by the private sector. Due to the low civil service wages, they may easily leave the civil service soon after the end of their training. The training itself may contribute to this process, especially if it provides skills, like management, communication, etc., which are useful in the private sphere.

A third solution to the language problem is the provision of translation. This solution, while solving the problems identified above, raises several other ones. For example:

- Interpretation hinders the communication between trainer and trainee. The communication will be slower and "noisier." This is especially true if the training topic is not well known in the country. Sometimes the new terminology introduced is not yet present in the local language, or the interpreters do not know it.[57]
- Interpretation is not only a barrier in conveying the "message" but it also hinders the utilization of the advantages of interactive training. It is quite difficult to be interactive when the question-answer process is extended into a question-interpretation-answer-interpretation chain, with some necessary clarifications of meaning added.
- Training with interpretation is not only less effective but also more expensive.

Despite all these drawbacks, donors seem to insist that TAPs are run mostly by foreign trainers, or consultants.

There are cases when donors even seem to forget about the fact that languages other than English are spoken in the beneficiary countries.

- *Our Lithuanian team reports an especially remarkable instance of ignoring the local language: "In the case of [a DFID project carried out by the British Council] the project plan did not foresee the need for a fund for translation of the training courses into Lithuanian, which, as it was later realized, could have been a major obstacle in reaching the audience. On his own initiative, the training program manager approached UNDP, which in turn provided funds for the translation. As it turned out, the fact that the program was delivered in Lithuanian was considered to be its main advantage in comparison to other training programs developed and provided by the foreign donors." We note here that the project in question was intended to train 324 civil servants from a budget of more than USD 300,000.*

- *CIDA's project in Ukraine had to be completely restructured, because it "became clear" only in the implementation phase that hardly any Ukrainian officials speak English.*

In sum, the language barrier appears to be a major factor limiting TAP effectiveness. It seems that all solutions applied have serious drawbacks that are practically impossible to avoid. The only solution that has a potential to solve the problem without substantial negative side effects —employing local trainers—is rarely utilized.

4.5.2 Training Methodology: Lecture-based versus Interactive Training Methods

The importance of training methodology stems from its assumed positive impact on training effectiveness. Whether this assumption is supported by empirical evidence or not is examined in Chapter 5. Regarding the methodology applied in civil service training, one can differentiate between interactive and lecture-type training. In this regard, the main dividing line is between national civil service training programs, which tend to use lecture-type training, and TAPs, which tend to use interactive training. But there are differences among TAPs, as donors tend to utilize the interactive training method to a significantly varying degree as well. With regard to the extent to which conventional, lecture-based training is used, instead of interactive methods, the "ranking" shown in Comparative Table 20 can be set up:

Comparative Table 20
Ranking of Donors by Style of Training
—from Lecture to Interactive

1. PHARE	Due to the fact that many, if not most, PHARE TAPs aim at familiarizing local civil servants with EU legal regulations, it is understandable that PHARE projects rely to a greater extent than other donors on lectures. Indeed, even if the content is not law, it is usually some kind of knowledge, rather than skills.
2. USAID	According to the available data, USAID also relies heavily on lecturing techniques. This, somewhat uncertain, statement seems logical, because the average USAID training courses last two-to-four weeks, which suggests something more like education than brief, on-the-job training sessions.
3. CIDA	CIDA projects seem to combine pure education, which may be carried out in a university environment, with some highly individualized training.
4. DFID	DFID seems to rely more extensively on interactive training techniques. For example, their Hungarian project was based solely on that style of training, and it exhibited a high degree of professionalism.

4.5.3 Geographical Location of TAPs

The geographical location of the actual training course is important for two reasons: First, location can have a significant impact on the costs, and thereby the efficiency, of training. Second, location reflects significantly different approaches to training, and thereby involves a varying potential to realize the maximum possible benefits of training.

There are three main arrangements regarding the location of training:

1) In-country training, that is training that takes place in the beneficiary's country.
2) Donor-country training, in which the training takes place at a venue in the donor's country. Within this category, we may further differentiate between three typical approaches:
   - In-practice training, where the trainee is located in a work environment in an appropriate authority in the donor country. This is a kind of placement training, in which the trainee learns from peers or his/her "personal tutor" at the workplace, as well as from practice.
   - Conventional training taking place in the donor country. "Conventional" here means that the training takes place in a pure training/classroom setting.

- The third arrangement is the frequently utilized, but rarely if ever defined, "study tour." These events usually resemble tourist excursions more than they do professional training, both in form and content.

3) Third-country training, that is training organized in a third country, other than the beneficiary or the donor country. This category may also be divided into two sub-categories:
   - Third-country training aimed at utilizing the specific experience accumulated and available in a third country.
   - Training sessions that are organized only for practical reasons, convenience, lower prices, etc., in a third country.

Below we discuss how frequently the various donors utilize these three types of training, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the various location arrangements.

Most of the analysis provided in this book refers to in-country training. In the following paragraphs, we discuss one lateral issue related to geography that we call the price paradox. Then, we concentrate on analyzing the potential advantages and disadvantages of the other two options listed above.

Comparative Table 21
How donors utilize various training location opportunities

PHARE	In the case of PHARE it is theoretically difficult to differentiate between donor-country training and third-country training, simply because PHARE represents not one donor country but a group of countries. Thus, we differentiate only between training in donor-countries and in-country training. In that regard, we found that PHARE TAPs, especially the pure training projects—as opposed to technical assistance projects with some training elements—typically take place in the recipient country. Other training events within larger projects may, and sometimes do, take place in a different country. But it is quite difficult to obtain information in that regard. We note here that the so-called twinning arrangement frequently includes practical training in the donor country, at the twinning organization's venue. Indeed, it seems that this is the most typical TAP arrangement among training-abroad sessions. This is a specific feature of PHARE, and we could not identify any similar training provided by the other three donors analyzed.
DFID	DFID relies mostly on in-country arrangements. Yet, quite often, a smaller "elite" group of trainees is brought to the U.K., typically for a study trip. Other times these elite groups receive "real training" in the U.K., usually participating in training sessions organized for U.K. officials.
USAID	USAID uses all three types of locations. We found that, among USAID projects in Romania, 45 percent of the TAPs took place in the U.S., 43 percent of the TAPs took place in Romania and 13 percent of the TAPs took place in third countries. In Ukraine, the proportions were 27 percent in the U.S., 67 percent in Ukraine and 6 percent in third countries.[58] Regarding the trends, initially, an absolute majority of TAPs was implemented in the U.S.; subsequently, third-country training and, recently, training provided in the trainees' country of residence has become more and more significant.
CIDA	CIDA strongly relied on donor-country training, in the form of university-type education provided by the implementing organization. Another CIDA project in Ukraine also relied on study trips to, and training sessions in, the donor country. Third-country training is also quite significant, as a major TAP in Ukraine took place to some extent in Lithuania, and it was resourced by Lithuanian trainers. But, as noted earlier, this situation occurred only because the project had to be redesigned, due to the lack of English language skills of Ukrainian officials. Otherwise the training sessions would have taken place in Canada, according to the original design.

In-country Training: The Price Paradox of TAPs

The "price paradox" refers to the fact that, generally speaking, as we go further from the "West"—not only geographically but in terms of Western-style economic development—the difference between TAP and national civil service training unit costs increase. This tendency is reinforced from two angles: On the one hand, the unit costs of locally organized training and training-related costs gets lower as we go further into the "East," because trainers' and civil servants' salaries, and most other relevant expenses, are lower. On the other hand, services that are necessary to run TAPs may cost significantly more in the "East" than in other countries. For example, hotels achieving international quality standards are very expensive in Kiev, less expensive in Bucharest and the least expensive in Budapest. Similar trends can be found in terms of appropriate training venue rental costs, etc. Furthermore, experts, especially long-tem experts, request higher salaries and other benefits for working in an "Eastern" rather than a "more Western" CEE country.

Thus, the price paradox is that, generally, the less expensive a typical national civil service training course is in a country of the region the more expensive the TAP will be in that country. This may explain the fact that donor, and especially third-country training, can sometimes be cheaper than in-country training.

Study Trips

From available project documentation, it is often impossible to identify the number of study-trip trainees and/or the venue and purpose of their study trips, not to mention the costs of these trips. It seems that TAPs are sometimes organized in a way that suggests these trips have a "bonus" function for some, but not all, of the participants. Apparently this type of training serves as a quasi-fringe-benefit for higher-level officials involved in the implementation of the project on the beneficiary side.

This practice has some kind of indirect logic and rationality: Officials on the beneficiary side, especially in the higher ranks, are usually not at all motivated to promote the implementation of TAPs and take on all the necessary burdens, including management and other responsibilities. Informal benefits in the form of study trips can exert a motivating effect, which is often indispensable for the successful implementation of the TAP. Thus, this practice, disguised as training, may in fact increase overall TAP efficiency if it is used as a motivator for those working on TAP management on the beneficiary side. Training abroad may also be an appropriate method for motivating trainees in a larger or longer training process. In this case, the best trainees—those who participated actively in all training sessions carried out all their tasks, or passed an exam with flying colors—are entitled to a study trip abroad.

Still, in our experience, these "study trips" sometimes do not have the function of increasing TAP efficiency. Instead, they are intended to promote the image of the donor or implementing organization—and to "ensure" the appropriate evaluation results by offering study trips to participants who will make up most of the "stakeholder interviewees" from the beneficiary side.

In-practice Training in the Donor Country

The best-known example of this type of training is the PHARE "twinning" approach, which has been emphasized more and more in recent years. Twinning-based training involves the creation of a direct, but structured, framework and process of professional contacts. Within this framework, a purposeful interaction is developed between the beneficiary organization and organization members and one or more of their EU/foreign counterparts. Because it is not our task here to give a description or evaluation of PHARE twinning, we refer readers to the many evaluations of PHARE activities giving a detailed and balanced overall view of the issue.

The absolute and relative volume of this type of training abroad, within the broader field of TAPs, is not very significant. Unfortunately is it often not possible to differentiate between "twinning" programs and other types of "training abroad" on the basis of available information. But it is probably not far from reality to say that real "peer-to-peer type training abroad" represents much less than 5 percent of the total TAP volume.

'Real' Training in the Donor Country

The other common type of "training abroad" is "real," classical, classroom training, taking place in a top-quality training setting. The potential gains in terms of training efficacy inherent in this type of training are obvious because, especially in the case of longer and more in-depth or specialized training, ensuring qualified training personnel is often a fundamental problem. This problem is even more pronounced in countries that offer a living environment that is very different from Western standards. Naturally, this type of training is the least appropriate when it comes to providing beneficiary-country specific knowledge.

This category includes a few important "TAP success stories," which indicate the potential of this approach to improve TAP efficiency. CIDA's Baltic Economic Management Training Program has resulted in quite positive evaluations on both the donor and the beneficiary sides. The unit costs of these projects are not too high compared to other in-country training.

Somewhat surprisingly, these programs seem to be around the mean in terms of their unit costs. In spite of their reasonable price, and the potential gains in terms of efficacy, these types of projects are usually only modestly represented among TAPs. Available data on the proportion of "school-type training abroad" is sporadic. The USAID data for Romania in 1997 can be used as a starting point. There, as a result of a downward tendency, 43 percent of the TAPs involved donor-country training. Furthermore, it definitely seems that other donors rely substantially less frequently on this type of training. Another important piece of information here is based on the case of PHARE training projects in Hungary (1995–2000), which were already cited elsewhere. In this instance, 13 out of 83 training events involved a training venue outside Hungary. But these projects had a strong tendency towards having less than the average number of trainees; thus their proportion of participants is probably less than 5 percent.

Based on these and other, less quantitative pieces of information, it can be assumed that the proportion of "school-type training abroad" in general does not make up more than 10 percent of TAP activity, and it probably accounts for much less than that. PHARE, the largest TAP donor, very rarely uses this approach.

Third-county Training

Training may take place in a third country simply because the third country offers a venue that is more convenient or cheaper than either the donor or the beneficiary country. Another reason for relying on third-country training can be that public administration practices of the third country may serve as a source of information and experience that can be transferred by the training. The findings of our research, as well as the authors' previous experience, seem to show that this type of training can be quite useful, effective and successful. Civil servants usually learn a lot from the experience of their counterparts.

- *Somewhat surprisingly, it is only USAID that relies relatively widely on third-country training for the sake of utilizing experience that has been accumulated during the transition period and that can be transferred to other CEE and CIS countries facing similar problems. Bakenova notes the following example from USAID: "Specifically, Poland serves as a 'third-country' example for Ukraine. Poland-Ukraine-U.S. Initiative (PAUCI), a trilateral effort created in 1998, facilitates the transfer of Polish experience in economic and democratic reform to Ukraine, and supports Ukrainian integration to Europe. […] Several programs were conducted in the U.S. and in Poland, which enable participants to examine different models and practices as implemented in the three countries."[59]*

There are cases when officers of the privatization agency of a CIS country were invited to the privatization agency of a CEE country. The former were yet to tackle large scale privatization while the latter had already completed the bulk of the job—so they could share their experiences with their colleagues about risky points, what is feasible and what is not, etc. In a number of cases, this type of training can be the best way to transfer lessons learned from relevant experience. And when it comes to privatization, CEE experience is the most relevant. There has never been such large scale and rapid privatization in any of the Western countries as that which occurred in the region in the past decade.

We believe that third-country training could be especially relevant, useful and effective. In fact, unlike other TAPs, we have not heard of dissatisfied participants from this kind of training. Unfortunately, though not necessarily surprisingly, this form of "know-how transfer" is relatively rare among TAPs. But there is a tendency toward increasing reliance on such third-party training projects.

4.6 Some Cross-cutting Issues: Flexibility and Client Orientation of Donors

Thus far in this chapter, we have analyzed donor practices and attributes and made some comparisons among donors. On the basis of this information, we attempt in this section to provide a ranking of donors on some overarching issues related to the overall impact of TAPs. The issues analyzed below are (a) flexibility and adaptation to local circumstances and (b) responsiveness to local needs. In this section, more than in other parts of the book, subjective judgement is relied upon extensively.

Flexibility is a crucial feature of TAP management. Adapting to local circumstances in terms of the ways and means of project implementation may greatly increase TAP efficiency. Responsiveness, on the other hand, refers to meeting local needs through the content, as opposed to the setting, of TAPs. The authors believe that both flexibility in running TAPs and responsiveness as to the content of TAPs are equally important.

With regard to the flexibility and adaptation to local circumstances we set up the ranking that it is presented in Comparative Table 22.

In relation to responsiveness to local needs we set up the ranking shown in Comparative Table 23.

Comparative Table 22
Ranking of Donors by their Adaptation to Local Circumstances—in Descending Order

1. CIDA	CIDA seemed to be flexible in its project implementation in the Baltic states, especially because the implementing organization had great autonomy and because the donor was open and quick in reacting to local circumstances. CIDA was ready to replicate the successful Baltic project in Ukraine and was able to respond quickly and restructure the project framework when it turned out that what worked in the Baltic states may not work in Ukraine. Another Ukrainian CIDA project was specifically designed to react quickly to Ukrainian small-scale training needs.
2. DFID	The British Know-How Fund had a general image of being flexible in reacting to training needs. But the situation has greatly changed since 1998, and this could be detected in the way DFID projects were carried out in the period observed. Actually, it is questionable whether DFID is as flexible in the period observed as its image among the "informed public" would suggest.
3. USAID	We do not have much information on the flexibility of USAID or the techniques and methods applied to react on the variance in space and time of the beneficiary countries' environment. But our impression is that the flexibility of USAID's TAP management is not significant.
4. PHARE	PHARE is regarded as by far the least flexible donor. The very detailed procedural regulations, the large and uniform organizational structures and the careful scrutiny by various EU and member country organizations hardly allow for any flexibility.

Comparative Table 23
Ranking Donors by their Responsiveness to Local Needs—in Descending Order

1. PHARE	Assessing PHARE's responsiveness depends solely on the viewpoint of the evaluator. In the case of accession countries—Hungary, Lithuania and, to some extent, Romania in our sample—PHARE satisfies the needs of these countries. All these countries strive for membership in the EU. This has been one of the few policy priorities in these countries that have remained intact after numerous elections brought changes in the ruling parties. This policy priority greatly determines national civil service training priorities. Indeed, in Hungary, where training priorities were made manifest, EU-related knowledge was ranked as the first priority. In these circumstances, PHARE, which has been accession driven since 1998 and provides training solely on EU related issues for accession countries, meets the most important training needs. Moreover, it is PHARE, as part of the EU, that may be able to determine what type of training is needed. In this field, PHARE may know better than the recipient what the recipient needs.
2. CIDA	CIDA seemed to be successful because it was responsive to training needs. But a careful analysis shows that CIDA was sensitive to individual trainees' needs, and we are only projecting when we say that the donor also understands general civil service needs. The PAR project in Ukraine, which was designed in a way that responded quickly to local needs and provides national civil service training with the required training content, is in too early a stage to be assessed.
3. DFID	DFID reveals some sensitivity to local needs, though this is decreasing. At the same time, TAP content is, to a great extent, based on British public administration experience, which may not be so useful for the countries in the region. Nonetheless, the British way of governing is undoubtedly in the mainstream of public management, thus it would be understandable if there was an interest in the know-how that can be learned from British trainers.
4. USAID	USAID is less sensitive to local needs. Indeed, responsiveness has not been an ambition of USAID. As Bakenova notes: "USAID regards its training programs as a crucial factor in promoting U.S. ideologies, policies and specific regional strategic objectives and ensuring [the prerequisites of] an overall influence of U.S. presence in the region."[60] In that regard, USAID seems to follow its strategic objectives quite strictly, without much responsiveness to specific needs of the beneficiary civil service.
5. PHARE (!)	In contrast to the evaluation above, one could consider PHARE as the least responsive donor. Indeed, long project planning, overly bureaucratic structures and procedures prevent PHARE from being responsive to local needs in any area other than EU matters. It may be said that, if PHARE TAPs were about anything else than EU related issues, PHARE would clearly be the least responsive donor.

5. THE EFFICIENCY OF INDIVIDUAL TAPS

5.1   The Approach Used for Comparing Training Efficiency

Before we start to analyze quantitative "TAP efficiency indicators," it is necessary to specify what we mean by "efficiency indicators" and how we use them to compare the efficiency of various training projects. A definition of the term "efficiency" is provided in Chapter 2. But, in order to practically define this term more specifically in the context of this chapter, some further issues must be elucidated.

Efficiency indicators require the determination of the size of costs and benefits of the given activity. Costs are measured in money terms, in other words by the total TAP budget, which encompasses all costs of training, including those related to curriculum and training material development, etc.[61] In the case of so-called "mixed projects"—projects that also contain non-training elements—only expenses that are related to training are taken into account.

Determination of benefit measures is much more difficult, not only for practical reasons of data availability and measurability but also for theoretical reasons. TAP evaluations typically focus on effects that are related to project goals. It would be overly ambitious to use the outcome or impact of the training on the public administration system as an indicator of benefit. Weighing such a benefit means measuring a longer and more complex chain of causes and effects related to the given TAP. Simply trying to measure the outcome of training in the private sphere raises almost unsolvable problems,[62] but in the case of public administration, an additional difficulty is raised by the fact that organizational and social efficacy, as interpreted by Lane,[63] may greatly differ in the public sphere. Thus, even if the positive impact on an organizational level is identified, the social benefit, which is the ultimate measure of training benefit in the case of public administration, is still in question.

The standard practice of TAP evaluations is to compare key performance characteristics, such as efficiency, effects, impact and sustainability, with the requirements set forth in the project plan of the given TAP—or with some general reference value of the evaluator. TAP evaluation reports—which are already limited in scope, because they focus on a given project, and which have limited targets, because they concentrate on predetermined goals—tend also to be limited by their qualitative measures and/or expert judgements expressed in an ordinal scale. For example, PHARE evaluations use a system of expert ratings with values ranging from one to five.

The authors faced a decision with two major alternatives:

- We could concentrate on the ultimate issue, the positive social impact induced by TAPs through changes in public administration. In this case, we can provide only a very rough, qualitative, subjective and strongly debatable assessment; moreover, major influencing factors of this assessment would remain hidden.
- Alternatively, we could settle for the less ambitious, but still quite challenging, solution of using immediate output data as basic indicators of "benefit." In this case, we can provide a quantitative efficiency indicator. But the ultimate validity of this indicator will still be strongly questionable.

We chose the second solution, at least as a first step. We calculate training unit cost data, which shows how much it costs to train one person for one day. This measure is known as PTD (participant training day) unit cost. The higher the PTD unit cost, the lower the "immediate" efficiency of a project.

The main problem with this measure is that the outcome or impact of one day of training may greatly vary among various training events. One training course may induce no positive impact at all, whereas another may be very useful. Still, if the latter is somewhat more expensive, the unit cost will indicate—wrongly—that the former was more "efficient." Even though it seems impossible to handle this phenomenon completely, we attempt to correct some of the distortion caused by the limited validity of PTD unit cost by weighing several factors that may influence training impact. We will take into consideration a number of—mainly technical—factors that were identified in the previous chapter and turned out to be especially relevant regarding TAP efficacy. In this way, we hope to refine PTD as a "crude" measure of output, so that we can reach an adjusted measure of output. Some additional factors, whose effect is impossible to assess, will be discussed in qualitative terms.

In order to produce this adjusted measure, we must identify all major relevant technical factors that may seriously influence the level of TAP outcomes. In this process, two main questions must be answered, possibly in quantitative terms:

- To what extent is the influential factor present?
- To what extent does this factor, if present, influence the outcome level of the given training activity?

The following example might provide some intuitive understanding of the heuristic logic applied: One could reasonably argue—as we did in Chapter 4—that the language

of training is a relevant factor that influences TAP outcome. For the sake of simplicity, we concentrate now on TAPs that are run in a foreign language with translation, and we suppose that the unit cost of these training events is USD 200. Assessing the impact of this factor, we must first determine to what extent it is present among TAPs. Suppose we find that the proportion of foreign-language training events with translation is about 30 percent. Next we must determine the effect of this factor on training efficiency. In doing so, we may assume that translation requires as much time as the trainer needs to present her point. This means that two days of a TAP with translation is worth as much as one day in the native language of the participants. In other words a realistic efficiency measure for foreign language training would be not USD 200 but USD 400. Since 30 percent of the TAPs fall into this category, the calculation of an adjusted unit cost measure for the entire "population" of TAPs will be as follows: 0.7 x 200 + 0.3 x 400 = 140 + 120 = 260.

In other words, the adjusted unit cost measure is 30 percent higher than the original one. The real efficiency measure is, to a corresponding degree, lower than one could expect on the basis of simple, unadjusted unit cost.[64] These "adjustments," expressed in percentage values, can then be calculated for various factors and summed up to calculate the final adjusted unit cost data, which accounts for all factors.

The example reveals that a certain level of creativity is involved in the refinement-and-adjustment procedure. It also discloses that, in most cases, we use very rough estimations, rather than precise values. In order to deal with these issues, we decided to introduce a positive bias toward TAPs when compared to national civil service training in terms of efficiency. We applied the following instruments to do so:

- First, and most importantly, we only focus on those factors that potentially increase real training efficiency of TAP's, as compared to national civil service training, and disregard those factors that have an opposite effect.[65]

- Second, in estimating the actual scale of these positive effects, we will consistently and deliberately be biased in favor of TAP's rather than national civil service training. These two circumstances may ensure that the adjusted efficiency measure for a TAP will be significantly higher than we originally believed it to be, on the basis of the simple PTD measure. Still, as we will see, this fact does not change the ultimate result.

- The third factor that helps us to deal with problems of uncertain or lacking data also compensates for the pro-TAP bias. This is the robustness of the initial finding regarding the vast difference between the unit cost of the two classes of training projects: TAPs and national civil service training.

This latter issue points toward a further one, namely, the standard or benchmark, to which TAP unit costs are measured. A comparative view of training unit cost is necessary, because, by simply calculating a number as an efficiency measure we still do not answer the question of whether the TAP at hand is efficient or not.

Determining what is to be compared, and to what kind of a benchmark, requires similarly careful consideration. Regarding the question of what should be compared, the severe constraint on available information, especially on financial information of individual TAPs, was crucial. Consequently, we had to calculate using "typical" or "average" TAP unit costs for the four analyzed donors: In other words, no distinction is made between the various donors analyzed, but all TAPs are treated as members of the same class. Regarding the second question, that of what benchmark to use, we chose the "typical," or "average" unit cost of nationally organized training courses—those run and funded by the beneficiary governments. It was relatively easy to obtain such unit-cost data from the four analyzed countries.

We could formulate some general statements by comparing typical unit cost data of TAPs with those of national civil service training.[66] Aside from serving our methodological needs, this approach also seems adequate because the major dividing line is indeed between the unit cost of national civil service training and that of TAPs.

5.2 TAP Efficiency: The Basic Finding

The absence of information on training volumes or training budgets of most TAPs makes it difficult to derive a reliable overview of TAP unit costs. But first-hand experience, anecdotal evidence and data extracted from available information sources reassure us that these figures are much higher in the case of foreign training assistance than in national civil service training.[67]

In the course of the research, a significant effort was concentrated on obtaining comparable unit cost data for TAPs and national civil service training activities. As we have noted, this task often was unfeasible, especially in the case of TAPs. In tables 9 and 10, we present a summary of the work of the country and donor research teams. This summary information is based on individual training programs' cost data, some of it available from existing program files and some of it based on plausible estimates. It is natural that unit costs have a substantial variance, but the definite tendency in the data is recognizable.

Table 9 presents all the available unit cost figures for TAPs funded by different donors.

Table 10 provides comparative information on training programs run by the national civil service training systems, supplemented with data from the United Kingdom.

Table 9
Estimated Unit Costs of TAPs Run by Different Donors [USD/PTD]

Country	PHARE	USAID	DFID	CIDA
Hungary	262[68]	NA	533	NA
Lithuania	<475	NA	648	436
Romania	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ukraine	NA	NA	NA	350
Typical	**300**	**357***	**580**	**400**

* *The USAID figure is not based on actual TAP unit cost data but on an official USAID recommendation regarding training cost ceilings for third-country training programs, which probably account for a majority of all USAID TAPs in the observed countries. The estimation can be assumed to be close to the actual unit costs, because it is known from interviewees that, as a result of the introduction of these cost ceilings, actual training costs decreased by 25 percent.[69]*

Table 10
Estimated Unit Costs of National Civil Service Training Activities [USD/PTD]

Country	Charac- teristic Value	Range of Unit Costs of National Civil Service Training Activities
Hungary	20	Mostly between USD 5 and USD 50, very exceptionally exceeds USD 100.
Lithuania	25	USD 4 is considered "cheap," while USD 260 is considered exceptionally expensive.
Romania	15	USD 10 is considered relatively cheap. Typical civil service training costs around USD 10–15. There are some much more expensive courses.
Ukraine	10	In compulsory training, cost is estimated at about USD 2, in non-compulsory training at USD 10.
*United Kingdom**	*142*	

* *Source: Calculated on the basis of data provided by OECD (1999) p.14; the data are for illustrative purposes only.*

Clearly, actual unit costs have a large variance. Therefore, identifying the "characteristic" range or value of the unit cost of training is not a trivial task. Regarding the donors, this is so most of all in the case of PHARE, where

large-scale training projects in certain cases, such as those implemented in Hungary using Hungarian training providers, can cost as little as USD 8–32 per PTD. At the other extreme, there are known cases of USD 1,000 and higher TAP unit costs. The unit cost of training events run by beneficiary side actors has a somewhat narrower range.

The problem caused by the broad range of training unit costs could not be solved by such "traditional" methods as calculating mean values, because the sporadic nature of available data does not allow this. As a general rule, extreme values at both ends of the scale are not counted. Putting aside these "outliers," it can be said that, in terms of training volume, the unit cost mostly varies in a much narrower band. For the sake of simplicity, the mid-point of these bands are identified as characteristic values of the unit cost of the given set of training activities.

Comparing the two tables, it can be said that estimated average unit costs of training activities run by foreign donors is about 12-58 (!) times more expensive[70] than those run by the national civil service training providers. In the case of some countries, for example Ukraine, this disproportionality can be as high as 2:520. It is remarkable that TAPs are expensive not only by CEE/CIS national training standards, but are also expensive compared to training costs in the British civil service. In this case, the unit cost difference ranges from 1:2.1–1:4. [71]

5.3 TAP Efficiency: In Search of an Adjusted Efficiency Indicator

The very large difference in raw unit cost, or efficiency, is one of the fundamental findings of the entire research into TAPs. As foreseen in the above section on the chapter's methodology, the remaining parts of this chapter are mainly devoted to the identification and assessment of factors that might reduce this enormous efficiency ratio between TAPs and national civil service training.

We investigate the following factors that may contribute to extra TAP efficiency:
1) sustainability strategy;
2) elitist strategy;
3) more efficient training methods (interactive training);
4) training abroad;
5) additional training outputs.

5.3.1 Sustainability Approach

Sustainability-type TAPs, as we described in the relevant section of this volume, aim to induce higher value than the

kind that can be captured by simply counting training days. It is assumed that, once the TAP ends, courses are repeated from the beneficiary's budget, and thus, a much larger number of trainees than those who participated in the TAP itself will be reached. The assumed higher ultimate value of outputs is used to justify higher input measures. Sustainability-type TAPs usually involve some additional inputs devoted to carefully elaborated training curriculum and materials. Furthermore, a training of trainers is also a standard element of this kind of TAP. While all these inputs may appear as costs, the higher outcome of the TAP is not reflected by the simple output measure of PTD.

In order to correct our "crude" unit cost measure with the potential impact of sustainability-type TAPs, we will first assess the proportions of sustainability TAPs. Then, as a second step, we assess the amount of positive impact of the given factor on the value of TAP PTD. Multiplying these two numbers, we will gain an indicator of the ultimate effect of a certain factor.

We assume that the proportion of sustainability-type TAPs cannot be more than 20 percent, and is quite likely much less. Out of the total budget for PHARE TAPs in Hungary, only 2 percent went to sustainability-style TAPs. In Lithuania, the figure was 5.7 percent. It seems that neither USAID nor CIDA is eager to run sustainability-type TAPs. In fact it is only DFID that favors this form. We were only able to obtain relatively detailed information on three sustainability-type TAPs, out of which two were run by DFID and one by PHARE.

In two out of those three cases, we found no sign that the courses were repeated. In the case of the most successful project, the courses were rerun only once. If we rely on this evidence, we can conclude that, in fact, 33 percent more PTD were generated due to the sustainability approach. We do not dispute this estimation by referring to anecdotal evidence, which suggests that, in fact, sustainability TAPs rarely sustain. Moreover, we increase the assumed ratio of sustainability to 40 percent. But we must also take into consideration that a significant amount of the additional training that takes place after a sustainable-style TAP is run once is generated by inputs from the beneficiary side. For subsequent training courses, beneficiaries must pay a fee for trainers, room rental, equipment, handouts, etc. Quite modestly, we assume that this would comprise half of the inputs[72] that produce the additional 40 percent of output. Thus the impact of a sustainability TAP is 0.4, which is the rate of additional outputs, times 0.5, which is the contribution of the TAP to additional outputs—including fees for trained trainers, detailed trainers' manuals, training manuals, handouts, etc. Thus the "impact rate" will be 0.4 x 0.5 = 0.2.

Now we can calculate the overall impact of sustainability projects on the real TAP efficiency measure as follows:

Eighty percent of TAPs were not specific, so we can count with a value of "1." This is a multiplier, and it shows how the value of a TAP PTD compares the value of a PTD produced under a typical national civil service training. The fact that this multiplier is 1 reveals that, in 80 percent of the cases, the value of TAP output is not different from those of national training.

However, 20 percent of the TAPs are considered sustainability-type TAPs. And these TAPs are supposed to have a higher value. As we have calculated, a PTD of a sustainability-type TAP is worth 1.2 times more than a TAP of a typical national civil service training course.

In sum, the impact of the sustainability approach among TAPs is:

(80 percent x 1) + (20 percent x 1.2) = 80 percent + 24 percent = 104 percent.

In other words, the presence of the sustainability approach increases overall TAP output value by 4 percent.[73]

We will follow a method similar to the one presented above to assess the impact of some other factors on an adjusted measure of TAP outcome.

5.3.2   Elitist Approach

The elitist approach seems to be present most of all at CIDA, to some extent at DFID and to a much lower extent at USAID, the second largest donor. PHARE, the largest donor, is not characterized by this approach. We estimate that, overall, the elitist approach is present in not more, but rather less, than 20 percent of the cases. Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity, we assume, quite unrealistically, that the elitist approach is not present in the national civil service training.

But we also found that, regardless of the TAP's original plan, elitist TAPs practically never reach the intended strata of top managers. Instead, mid-level managers, or even officials below that level, are represented among participants. It can be said that not more, but rather less, than 25 percent of participants of "theoretically" elitist TAP's are top civil servants indeed. This means that the proportion of "real" top civil servants within the overall population of TAP participants is, in the final analysis, not more than 5 percent.

Serious doubts were raised in Chapter 4 about the additional value of this approach in the CEE/CIS environment. We concluded that, overall, this approach may decrease rather than increase TAP efficiency. Unfortunately, we could not obtain any information that could assist us in estimating the potential effect of the elitist approach. Following our intention to be "positively biased" in this information vacuum,

we must go high, and estimate that the additional value of the elitist approach is six(!) times higher than that of standard training.

Thus the effect of the elitist approach is:

(95 percent x 1) + (5 percent x 6) = 95 percent + 30 percent = 125 percent.

In other words, the presence of the elitist approach is calculated to increase overall TAP output value by 25 percent.

5.3.3 Different Training Methods

TAPs frequently employ training methods that are rarely, or not-at-all, used by national civil service training activities. The methods used by TAPs promise more results than traditional, lecture-type training. These methods—such as more interactive training settings, possibly coupled with such elements as analysis of cases, simulations and group exercises—offer a higher level of technical quality and professionalism.

In most of the CEE countries, national civil service training is still centered around the more traditional training style, which involves lecture-type training sessions. This style is characterized by one-directional, trainer-to-trainee communication and a relatively large training group size. As the findings we presented in the previous chapter show, TAPs, generally rely much more on state-of-the-art, possibly more effective training methods, such as seminar-type settings, interactive training, case studies, simulations, group exercises, etc.

It is a widely shared assumption that, compared to more traditional training procedures, the methods that TAPs employ are usually more effective in transferring knowledge and fostering skills development. Furthermore, this assumption seems more valid for the fields of knowledge and skills that are usually covered by TAPs—as opposed to national civil service training, which often covers simpler, clerical-level knowledge. We will therefore acknowledge that TAPs are, at least in many instances, characterized by a higher level of methodological sophistication and technical quality, which could lead to more beneficial effects.

The advantages and disadvantages of different training methods, like "problem-based learning" or "computer-assisted learning," are the subject of an extensive and controversial debate among experts and scholars in the field. Some important empirical results, serving as a kind of orientation, include the following:

Cromrey-Purdon compares three types of teaching in the context of college graduate courses: (i) chalk-and-talk, (ii) so-called programmed learning and (iii) co-operative learning based on group exercises. The subject of the courses compared was teaching or education methods, the duration of the study was two weeks, and the research was based on a statistically powerful, fully experimental research design. The analysis showed no significant differences between the effectiveness of the three methods.[74] Lake reported on a comparative study of lecture-only versus active learning methods on a two-week-long physiology course for physical therapy students. The study was based on a fully experimental research design. Active learning was found to be about 8 percent more effective, a result that was deemed statistically significant.[75] Gray-Topping-Carcary conducted another comparison of traditional instruction versus innovative instruction in teaching 16-year-olds about traffic rules. Instead of lectures, the "traditional" method mostly involved individual learning based on reading. The "innovative" method was based on playing a competitive board game. The game-based learning was 25 to 50 percent more effective than learning based on reading, depending on whether learning took place in groups or individually. Individual training proved the most effective.[76] It should be noted again that this latter research did not involve a comparison of lecturing, but instead treated individual reading as the "traditional" learning method. Furthermore, the "innovative" learning technology was not used on adults, but rather on adolescents, who probably profit more from learning-by-playing than adults do. Despite these qualifications, we decided to report on the results of this survey because it specifically involved the learning of practical skills.

To sum up: Innovative training methods are probably between 0 percent and 10 percent more effective when it comes to knowledge transfer, and these methods may be as much as 25 percent more effective when it comes to skills development. Thus, determining the relative advantages of different training techniques depends on various factors—most importantly whether the training is focused more on knowledge transfer as opposed to transfer of skills. When skills training is involved, one would expect that interactive and practical training has greater value.[77]

It is probably close to reality—or else positively biased toward sophisticated training methods, and thus, TAP efficiency—to hypothesize that more modern, innovative training techniques can increase training effectiveness by as much as 25 percent.

But we must determine to what degree these sophisticated training methods are present in the TAP field. We must take into account that PHARE, the largest donor, employs interactive training techniques to only a limited extent. Most of CIDA's TAP activities consisted of university style training. In fact, we found that only DFID predominantly relies on high-quality interactive training methods. Thus, we rather

overestimate the presence of this phenomenon by calculating that it is used in 30 percent of all TAPs. Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity, we also assume that interactive training techniques are not used at all within national civil service training.

Given the above assumptions an overall impact can be calculated as:

(70 percent x 1) + (30 percent x 1.25) = 70 percent + 37.5 percent = 107.5 percent.

In other words, the presence of interactive training methods increases overall TAP output value by 7.5 percent.

5.3.4   Training Abroad

Another specific feature of TAPs is that various training elements are run abroad.

For the purpose of assessing the effect of these elements, we differentiate between the following four types of training abroad:

1. *Study trips:* We found that study trips serve as a kind of holiday or fringe benefit for beneficiary stakeholders, and they do not constitute real training.
2. *School-type training abroad:* In this case, the training is held abroad, generally in the donor country, for practical reasons. Typically, it is cheaper or more convenient to hold the training abroad instead of in the beneficiary country. Naturally, in this case, no additional effect is intended outside of the reduction of cost. This cost-reduction was taken into account in a "crude" unit cost calculation. Thus, this issue does not require additional investigation.
3. *In-practice training abroad:* Learning can be based on the direct observation of, and participation in, on-the-job activities of Western peers who have a higher level of professionalism and technical expertise. This type of opportunity is especially valuable in the case of complex learning tasks involving technical, contextual, behavioral and cultural elements, such as senior officials' training in emergency management. These TAPs can offer highly specialized and targeted training for a narrow spectrum of civil servants. This means of training may significantly increase the value of TAP output.
4. *Third-country training:* This training is aimed at providing officials of CEE/CIS countries with the experience learned from peers in another CEE/CIS country. An example is a USAID TAP element in which Ukrainian privatization officers had the opportunity to learn from their Polish colleagues. The Ukrainians were facing the start up of large-scale privatization, and the

Polish experts had nearly finished with their privatization work. Polish experts were able to offer valuable information that practically no Western expert could provide. The authors believe that this type of training, if carefully targeted and organized, could be of exceptional use.

Regarding the above four types of training abroad, we found that the first has rather negative impact on output value, whereas the second one was irrelevant in this regard. The third and fourth options will be assessed below.

Regarding in-practice training, we found that it appears only in a very small number of cases. In fact, its presence is assumed to be below 1 percent. Thus, even if it caused a 100 percent increase in output value, its overall impact would be still only 1 percent. For the sake of simplicity, we calculate with this value. Thus, the benefits of in-practice training could be calculated as follows:

99 percent x 1 + 1 percent x 2 =101 percent.

In other words, the presence of in-practice training increases overall TAP output value by 1 percent.

Unfortunately, the same situation exists for third-country training. Only USAID seemed to use this kind of training in a systematic way. And even among USAID projects, third-country training only accounts for a relatively small portion of TAPs: 13 percent in Romania and 6 percent in Ukraine. It appears that the number of trainees in these courses is lower than the number of trainees on an average course. In sum, the presence of this type of training may be even lower than that of in-practice training. Therefore, if we give third-country training an especially high value, and assume that the outputs of such TAPs are worth four times as much as a typical national PTD, the increased benefits can be calculated as follows:

99 percent x 1 + 1 percent x 4 = 103 percent.

In other words, the presence of in-practice training increases overall TAP output value by 3 percent.

5.3.5   Effect of Different Budget Cost Calculations between TAPs and National Courses

The extremely unfavorable efficiency ratio between TAPs and national civil service training may be further improved if we take a closer look at the actual cost of national training. In the previous subsections, we sought to show that a unit of TAP output, measured in PTDs, is worth more in terms of outcome than a unit of national training output. In this subsection, we analyze the possibility that the cost of

national training may actually be higher than we originally calculated.

TAP budgets tend to contain the costs of training development, while national civil service training budgets do not always do so. Indeed, national civil service training costs do not reflect development costs for courses that were developed centrally and financed from the central budget— or courses that are provided by the national training institutions. Undeniably, this is a basic measurement problem.

Still, these costs, even if they were counted, would be insignificant because of the large training volume and, primarily, the much lower level of expert fees and salaries.

It is indicative that in Hungary, which is one of the "more expensive" countries in the CEE region, there is a regulation of expert fees set by the Council for Civil Service Training within the Ministry of Interior. According to these regulations, the maximum honorarium for training materials and other written expert materials is about USD 25 per page. In other words, training development funded by the council cannot include honoraria higher than this figure. Actually, this figure is higher than the average market price. This means that total honoraria/fees for 200-pages of training material is a maximum of USD 5,000. Publication costs would be around USD 4,000. If we suppose that this material is used in a two-day training event provided for 2,800 trainees, which is the number of municipal chief executives in Hungary, then the material would be used for an output of PTD 5,600. Including material development costs in the calculation would increase the unit cost of training by only USD 1.6.

It can be reasonably assumed that these numbers are similar in other countries examined, or else the budget figures are even more in favor of national civil service training. Both in Romania and Ukraine, the general salary standards are lower, while the national civil service training "market," and thus, probably, average training volumes, are greater than in Hungary.

Additionally, the problem of not including the costs of training development surely does not exist in the case of various training courses offered by organizations not financed from the central budget of the beneficiary government. These organizations definitely include training development expenses into their calculations when determining training cost.

Including the cost of training development, we calculate that the unit cost of national training is USD 21.6 instead of, say, USD 20 per PTD. This fact can be translated into a formula for measuring increased TAP PTD: 21.6/20.0 = 1.08. Thus, we suppose that the presence of adjusted cost calculation for national civil service training courses increases overall TAP output value—compared to the output value of national training—by 8 percent:

100 percent x 1.08 = 108 percent.

5.4 Technical Features Affecting TAP and National Civil Service Training Efficiency: A Summary

In the preceding sections, we attempted to correct potential mistakes that stemmed from using simple PTD output data as an indicator of outcome or impact. Now, by summing up these findings, we may get closer to an "adjusted" value, which includes in the calculation all quantifiable factors that may make a unit of TAP output worth more than the same output unit of national training. This exercise can also be considered a sensitivity analysis, which attempts to test the cumulative effects of various factors that may improve TAP efficiency indicators. The results are shown in Table 11.

Table 11
Summary of Major Factors Affecting
Corrected TAP Unit Costs

Factor	Size of Estimated Maximum Effect [%]
Sustainability approach	4.0
Elitist approach	25.0
Interactive training methods	7.5
In-practice training abroad	1.0
Third-country training	3.0
National training cost adjustment	8.0
Total	48.5

In other words, in order to reflect the effect of various technical features of training that could give TAPs higher efficacy, the original TAP unit cost being, say, 20 times the national civil service training unit cost, should be decreased by 48.5 percent. This means that the original ratio of efficiency between TAPs and national civil service training, which was figured to be in the range of 1:12 to 1:58, should be adjusted to a range of between 1:6.18 and 1:29.87.

But we have to remember that, in estimating the effect of each of these factors, we deliberately tried to be biased, so that our estimates of TAP unit cost reduction overestimate, rather than underestimate, the most probable reduction. When less information was available for an assessment, we made a higher overestimation. And these biases in favor of TAPs are added into our total summing up of factors affecting TAPS. This means that the 48 percent estimated effect is even more biased. In other words, the correct estimate is surely less than this number. Furthermore, we should re-emphasize that we assumed qualitative factors had positive impacts, even in cases where they might actually have nega-

tive effects. For example, contrary to our assumptions, the sustainability and elitist approach, or even training abroad, may easily turn out to be less effective than standard training.

5.5   Factors Not Quantified

One may reasonably argue that, out of several factors that were identified in Chapter 4 as independent variables of TAP efficiency, only a few, and not necessarily the most important ones, were assessed and then summed up in Table 11.

Indeed, quite a few such relevant factors were omitted. Some of them were omitted on the technical basis that we either could not identify or measure them. Others were omitted on the theoretical basis that we were looking solely for factors that have at least a chance to induce a positive effect on the TAP efficiency indicator. Table 12 lists the omitted factors, along with the reasons behind these factors and their assumed qualitative implications from the point of view of TAP efficacy.

Out of the listed factors, we found two that are undoubtedly a weakness of TAPs compared to national training: Critical mass strategy and language. Critical strategy, while apparently the most adequate approach in the region, is not utilized to the full extent in TAPs. Another factor, rational planning and management, seems to be in favor of TAPs. We believe that the potential effect of rational planning in the case of TAPs is debatable. National civil service training gradually, in an incremental and somewhat "unconscious" process, seems to adapt to changing needs. Still, more conscious, more sophisticated planning in national training systems could surely further induce efficacy.

We could not identify clearly the effect of two additional factors. With regards to these "questionable" factors, we can say the following: TAP implementation arrangements are seemingly more "professional" than the management of national training. However, even though we cannot quantify this factor, we believe that the professionalism of management does not contribute much to the overall efficacy of TAPs.[78] The questionable factor of content may make the real difference between national training and TAPs. And we must admit that we could not offer more than theoretical assumptions and some empirical considerations presented in Section 4.3. Undoubtedly, we could not estimate content's effect on overall TAP efficiency. But we can ask if the TAP content in general could be so unique and, at the same time, so useful that it alone is enough to counterbalance a more than 600–3,000 percent efficiency advantage of national civil service training, as calculated above.

Table 12
Omitted Factors and their Potential Effect on TAP Efficiency

Factor	Effect	Comments
Critical mass strategy	–	This is the "default" approach to training. And naturally, this is the approach of national training. It seems more adequate to the specific CEE/CIS environment than the other two approaches, which TAPs often use.
Language	–	Clearly language differences have a negative impact on TAP efficiency.
Implementation arrangement	?	The project-style implementation framework has several advantages and disadvantages. It seems that, in the CEE/CIS environment, this framework reveals some serious weaknesses. Additionally, limiting the bidders/experts to organizations and individuals of the donor country may endanger the adequacy of training and necessary flexibility and responsiveness. Still, we judge the effect of this factor not as negative, only as "questionable."
Content	?	The major advantage of TAPs is supposed to be the uniqueness of their content. Yet we have shown that uniqueness is not so much present as donors state and that, even if the content were unique, it could actually reduce the effectiveness of a TAP. We could not determine if overall TAP PTD is of higher or lower value in this regard than that of the national training. Admittedly, this issue introduces the largest amount of uncertainty into our calculation.
Rational planning and management	+	TAPs are usually carefully planned, and the goals, objectives and target group are identified before implementation starts. Needs assessments are usually carried out, and some type of evaluation exercise is present. Most of these characteristics are not detected in national training. But needs assessments of donors seemed to be either biased, to find out what the donor intended to offer, or were taken into consideration only to a limited extent. Evaluation did not seem to be an effective tool. Still, the lack of strategic thinking in national training is a deficiency compared to TAPs. But the positive effect of this factor is limited.

6. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, the results of previous findings and analyses are used to build some further conclusions and lines of argument, some of which go beyond the scope of the questions examined so far. This is done in three issue areas: First, we attempt overall synthesis of findings regarding the ultimate efficacy of donors. Next, we review dominant strategies of the various donors, from a broader perspective. In the end of this chapter, we look at the latent interests of various actors, to explain a number of controversial findings made earlier regarding TAPs.

6.1 Evaluation of Training Assistance for the Civil Service: Summary and Synthesis

Previous analyses showed that there are, indeed, significant differences between the TAPs of different donors. In trying to synthesize an overall picture, it has to be admitted that the "goodness" of a donor, or the "goodness" of a given TAP, is a multi-dimensional notion. Much of what we have tried to measure was boiled down to "direct efficiency" of TAPs and donors. In this regard, we found that, when compared with beneficiaries' national civil service training events, most TAPs, and most donors, generally achieve a very low level of direct efficiency.

Obviously, there are other factors that have not been measured. These include responsiveness to beneficiaries' needs, the quality of training materials and trainers and efforts made to ensure that the training activity leads to sustained beneficial effects. Assessing policies according to multiple and conflicting criteria is a traditional "quadrature of the circle" in policy analysis and evaluation. Not wanting to further quadrate this circle, we attempt, in the following paragraphs, to present some overall, synthesizing, yet still impressionistic, assessments of the donors.

If we try to give an overall ranking to the four donors, CIDA seems to be the most successful. A comparatively acceptable level of unit costs is coupled with high responsiveness to individual trainees' needs and a real commitment to quality. But we must emphasize that this assessment is based on a relatively narrow empirical basis: There have been only a few, rather small-scale projects involved in the analysis. Maybe it is the modest size of its operations and the corresponding "small-scale manufacture" attitude that contribute to the fact that CIDA managed to avoid the numerous traps inherent in its—fundamentally risky, elitist—dominant strategy. The comparatively small overall presence of

CIDA is important from another perspective as well: Because CIDA has such a modest training volume, it cannot achieve an outstanding overall impact, even if it has good projects.

We admit that it was an important preliminary suspicion of the authors that PHARE is among the least efficacious donors in the public administration technical assistance field. Therefore, the findings of the research came as a surprise, and the initial hypothesis had to be in part refined and in part substantially altered. While PHARE's weaknesses, such as its ponderous and bureaucratic operational procedures and inflexibility, are undeniably present, these features are supplemented and put into a different light by some other findings:

- PHARE TAPs usually emphasize the "critical mass" strategy while de-emphasizing the "sustainability" and "elitist" strategies. This means that the dominant strategy of PHARE usually fits the CEE preconditions better than other strategies.
- Along with taking the "critical mass" approach, PHARE sometimes allows much cheaper local service providers to participate in the implementation, which results in substantially lower unit costs and thus higher efficiency. The relatively low average unit cost of PHARE TAPs can also be attributed to the fact that PHARE is able and willing to finance large-scale training projects, a practice that results in quite high direct efficiency. Furthermore, this is the only donor among those analyzed that was able to run a few training events as cheaply as a national training event.
- From the point of view of their content, PHARE TAPs mainly convey standard practices of the EU. This is important because this topic is typically less alien from, and more applicable to, the CEE/CIS administrative cultures than most of the Anglo-Saxon concepts that are often conveyed by the other three donors. The focus on EU practices is also important because approaching EU standards almost "at all hazards" is a number one policy priority of all accession countries, and this priority remains relatively stable in space and time. With a grain of cynicism, one could say that, if PHARE TAPs were about anything other than EU accession related issues, PHARE would clearly be the least efficient donor.

Despite the above considerations, it has to be noted that a substantial disadvantage of PHARE, which is indicated by the study results, is that PHARE procedures place an enormous burden on national public administration. For example, as noted earlier, in Hungary, the administrative burden may be easily more than 10 percent of the TAP budget. This

cost seems to be so prohibitive that, apart from EU related issues, the national government might have been better off if the administrative expenses were spent on nationally organized training rather than on hosting PHARE TAPs.

With regards to its gross impact, the importance of PHARE is strongly increased by the sheer volume of PHARE funds poured into training civil servants. It is interesting that—after Continental European bilateral donors present in the initial years of the 1990s disappeared—PHARE remained as the only significant non-Anglo-Saxon donor in the public administration technical assistance field. Apart from PHARE, the CEE/CIS public administration technical assistance field is clearly dominated by Anglo-Saxon donors, who convey concepts and practices that are often somewhat alien to the Continental European public administration systems and cultures of the region.

DFID revealed some flexibility and responsiveness to local needs. Still, we found that DFID TAPs are particularly frequently supply-driven rather that demand-driven. DFID was quite active in presenting training in methods of New Public Management, methods in which the British government is making innovative inroads. But this strength may be a problem in a setting where there is not even a reliable "old public administration." Furthermore, there are a number of significant examples of DFID TAP failures that usually stem from the lack of knowledge—or perhaps interest in—local circumstances. What makes DFID especially vulnerable to this general fallacy of donors is the fact the DFID TAPs are characteristically designed as sustainability projects.

USAID projects seem to be carefully planned and professionally and efficiently run. It is only USAID that introduced training unit cost standards and ceilings for the CEE and CIS region. As a result, USAID TAP costs dropped by about 25 percent within a year. But it seems that, in the area of "responsiveness," USAID, to some degree, lags behind the other donors. USAID seems to be unique in running third-country training courses—for example, when Ukrainian privatization officers had a chance to learn from experience of their Polish colleagues. This is important, because, we believe, third-country training has a high potential value.

The study also identified some apparently unintended beneficial side-effects that arise due to the practice of using TAPs. These positive effects do not come from individual TAPs—which are limited in scope, time span and number of civil servants trained—but instead are due to the accumulated outcome of a host of various TAP activities. These benefits include the following:

• TAPs help the beneficiary countries understand the importance of training as a human resource development tool and a means of public administration reform. This appreciation of training was, and to some extent still is, missing in the beneficiary countries.

• TAPs introduce new approaches to running public administration. Throughout the region, a lack of systematic approaches, and a corresponding abundance of ad-hoc and controversial decisions and actions, is a fundamental feature of the daily functioning of public administration. In addition, in many of the beneficiary countries, an overly legalistic approach toward public administration prevails. Public policy and management approaches, which are the subject of much TAP content, may play an important role in gradually renewing approaches, techniques applied and attitudes toward public administration in the beneficiary countries.

• TAPs initiate a new, rational-purposive approach to training. In this approach, training goals and objectives are defined first and content and methods are chosen accordingly, the level of goal attainment is measured via monitoring and evaluation, and other beneficial practices are followed. This approach is generally missing from national training systems.

• TAPs introduce new training techniques that may increase training efficiency in terms of transferring knowledge and skills and enabling civil servants to use the newly obtained knowledge in their everyday administrative practice. Here we refer to the dissemination of the interactive training approach and application of related techniques, such as case studies, role-play, group work, individual problem solving, etc.

6.2 Assistance Strategies for CEE and CIS

Certain interrelations of TAP strategy and TAP content that were analyzed earlier deserve closer attention, because they might help us understand why and how TAPs and their donors succeed or fail.

Viewed from a geographically and historically broader perspective, post-World-War II technical assistance was typically offered by the technologically and economically developed countries, in both the West and the Soviet Bloc, to underdeveloped nations of the Third World. In the postwar era, engineers, economists, planners and other technical experts of the donor countries participated in solving important problems of the beneficiary countries—such as planning and building infrastructure, setting up various governmental processes and institutions, etc.

As we have already noted in the section on TAP strategies, all these activities were based on two major, strategic assumptions: i) that the technical expertise in the donor countries for solving these problems is clearly superior to the expertise available in the beneficiary countries; and ii) that this

technical expertise can be brought into the beneficiary country and utilized without any specific problems or considerations—in other words, that this expertise is transferable between the donor and the beneficiary country.

When it came to the kind of "classical" infrastructure and institutional problems that the traditional post-war technical assistance sought to address in under-developed countries, the truthfulness of these two assumptions was usually so self-evident that even their explication was unnecessary. In other words, the plausibility and legitimacy of the classical technical assistance philosophy was relatively straightforward in this context. In the context of civil service training assistance, this conceptualization of the classical approach to classical assistance is basically identical with the so-called sustainability strategy as it was described in Chapter 4.

In this section, these two classical assumptions of technical assistance are examined from a slightly broader perspective. We seek to identify general and theoretical arguments showing that these assumptions are not so valid in the context of "East-West public administration technical assistance." Instead of providing a full-fledged analysis, we only seek to identify some key general arguments that can be applied in judging the viability of various assistance strategies.

The knowledge transfer occurring in the course of technical assistance of any kind can be seen as a process taking place in a two-dimensional space. This process originates from one point of this space, representing the know-how offered by the donor, and leads to another point of this space, representing the know-how available for the recipient.

One dimension of this space is the absolute level of advancement of knowledge or know-how. This refers to the extent to which the given expertise is able to successfully handle the problems faced—in other words, to manipulate the natural and social environment of the actor applying the given knowledge. There is, however, a second dimension, which we might call the "national/cultural specificity" dimension. This dimension is, in some cases, of minimal importance—for example when it comes to expertise in technical fields. But in other cases it becomes increasingly important.

Viewing the transfer of public administration knowledge as one starting from one location of this space and ending in another location, it is possible to make the following statements:

- The larger the distance between the donor and the recipient in the first, "advancement" dimension, the higher the potential value of transferring the given knowledge to the recipient.
- The larger the distance between the donor and the recipient in the second, "national and cultural specificity" dimension, the lower the potential value of transferring the given knowledge to the recipient.

The second of the above statements is one that received increased attention during the past decades with regards to the realm of public administration development. From a theoretical perspective, public administration, both as a societal practice and as a field of academic study, is, to some extent, clearly a "business," characterized by marked national/cultural differences and a corresponding non-universalistic, "nationalist" approach and focus of interest.[79] This part of the problem complex became obvious during empirical studies and theoretical work conducted under the auspices of the Comparative Administration Group. The group highlighted a number of important—and often missing—preconditions of "administrative development," as well as preconditions of the transferability and sustainability of expertise and "technology" that is supposed to help realize this development.[80]

The effect of cultural differences on transferability of administrative institutions and "know-how" is a major question, not only from the narrower point of view of public administration technical assistance but also from a broader perspective of the study of public administration and management. For example, this issue is a focal point of discussions concerning the meaning, originality and applicability of New Public Management concepts and methods in administrative systems other than those of the Anglo-Saxon countries. Unfortunately, the issue of national and cultural differences is not often discussed in relation to the public administration reforms of the transition countries.[81]

In sum, the importance of the "national and cultural specificity" dimension seems to be substantial within the field of the transfer of public administration know-how.

The other statement above, regarding the advancement dimension, also points up additional difficulties in the context of Western technical assistance to the CEE/CIS region, because the assumption of technical superiority becomes somewhat questionable at this point. Most observers, though not all, would agree that German, American or even Russian technical experts have important and useful advice to give to countries of Sub-Saharan Africa in any of the above-mentioned technical fields. But in an East-West perspective, at least in the authors' view, it is much more questionable whether the assumption of technical superiority, meant either on a general level or specifically in relation to public administration, holds true without any further complication.

Until their political and economic collapse, many countries of the former Soviet Bloc—and most of all the Soviet Union—had been clearly in the global vanguard in most of the key areas of technical and technological development. Similarly, the state apparatuses of these countries had shown sufficient capacity to govern, as well as to plan and implement, governmental actions necessary to achieve the political goals set by the ruling elite. (It is, of course, an important, but still different question, lying outside the technical

realm of administrative expertise, whether the political goals followed by the state apparatuses served the "pubic good" of these countries and fulfilled basic requirements of the rule of law, human rights or democratic accountability. In these aspects, the record of these public administration systems would, naturally, look much worse.)

Given the relatively advanced state of the former Soviet Bloc in a number of important fields of development, one has little reason to assume that that the technical, administrative expertise previously available in these countries was fundamentally backward, or that this expertise has completely disappeared since the transformation.[82] On the contrary, it seems much more plausible that these countries' public administration problems, which can be attributed to societal factors lying far beyond the realm of public administration itself, left much of the previously available administrative expertise more or less intact. After all, many of the people who designed and ran the previous administrative systems are still alive and active, and many of them are, or could be, accepted by the new, democratic regimes—though the ethnic dimension of this problem, which is especially present in CIS countries, admittedly brings an additional difficulty.

Viewed from the perspective outlined above, it is easier to understand why DFID, which handled classical technical-assistance projects in countries of the Third World throughout the past decades, tends to run sustainability-type TAPs, while PHARE, which was established only recently and has dealt only with transition countries, has much less inclination to rely on the sustainability/classical technical assistance approach.

6.3 The 'Big Secret' of Public Administration Technical Assistance

Previous studies of TAPs and public administration technical assistance for CEE countries—of which a brief overview was given in Chapter 1—generally point out a number of achievements of Western technical/training assistance. But, at the same time, these studies are usually fairly critical towards either the donor or the recipient, and sometimes both.

These results are usually characterized by two features. Firstly, they have a relatively narrow focus, usually limited to individual projects or a set of projects funded by a given donor. Secondly, they tend to perceive beneficiary related problems as systematic, predictable and ensuing from difficult-to-change, cultural or administrative characteristics of the recipient environment; at the same time problems related to the "donor side" of the TAP field are understated or are presented as consequences of haphazard, contingent "mistakes" or problems caused by unforeseen, unfortunate contextual circumstances.

Partly because of its wider, inter-donor comparative focus, and partly because of its *a priori* intentions, the analysis presented in the previous two chapters went further to identify some systematic phenomena that cannot be interpreted as the results of pure accidents or mistakes. These phenomena are obviously counter-productive from the point of view of the stated goals of TAPs, as well as that of the beneficiary public administration systems—so much so that they just cannot be fitted into the stated, altruistic and "client oriented" logic or goal system of TAPs and foreign aid in general.

The first and the second column of Table 13 summarizes the phenomena, or "mistakes" that appear to be so systematically yet "unexplainably" present in the majority of TAPs. The third column, which we will discuss more below, gives possible explanations for these mistakes.

If one looks only at the problematic "phenomena" listed in Table 13, and considers further arguments presented in the earlier chapters in relation to these phenomena, they seem very difficult to explain. Even such well-known theoretical problems of organization as "goal displacement,"[83] "bounded rationality"[84] or "administrative behavior"[85] are observed. The authors believe that the above complex of TAP phenomena would force any detached observer to look for latent goals behind funding and running TAPs. These latent goals obviously exist instead of—or at least in addition to—the stated goals.

In our view, the answer to the above puzzle is relatively simple, at least for those who know the field from practice. All five "dysfunctions" become understandable and logical if viewed from the perspective of maximizing the economic profits of professional and business interests involved in TAP implementation—a group that includes consulting firms, free-lance consultants, university faculty and other experts. This so-called "big secret" of civil service training assistance is not that secret in the beneficiary countries. It is accepted as a truism and gives rise to popular expressions like "Hilton commandos." As Svetlana Khapova observes: "There was (and still is) a widely held view […] that [the West] was just putting money into the pockets of their own experts and companies."[86]

The third column of the above table provides clues as to how the various "mistakes" in fact serve the latent goal of increasing economic benefits for beneficiary-side professional and business interest groups.

It is noted as a postscript that, the conclusion that many, or most, of the problems located in relation to TAPs can be attributed to the self-interested behavior of certain groups, organizations and individuals of the donor country playing a role in the "TAP business" might seem provocative. This is especially true for those individuals or organizations that are involved in TAP implementation and pursue their business

Table 13
Controversial Findings in Relation to TAP Management and Implementation

Phenomenon	The Problem, from the Point of View of the Stated Goals of Assistance	The Actual Function, from the Point of View of the Latent Goals of Assistance
The sustainability strategy is followed by many TAPs.	The strategy has very little chance to become successful.	Sustainability-type projects require that a large proportion—often the absolute majority—of project funds are expended on expert fees instead of material expenses. Expert work is very difficult to control or to account for.
The project-type implementation framework is followed.	• This causes rigidity in a highly volatile environment. • Synergy between various projects, including the much-needed capacity for organizational/policy learning, becomes very limited.	Applying a permanent implementation structure would exclude powerful pressure groups, such as Western consulting organizations and "amphibious"/free-lance experts. In addition, contracting out is also a requirement of the *Zeitgeist*.
Implementing organizations and experts contracted for implementing TAPs are "strictly" from the same country of origin as the donor.	• These experts are very expensive. • There are language-related problems. • There are problems related to training content, but there was a higher technical quality of training, especially a few years ago.	Obviously, to be contracted is a major prerequisite of realizing profits, and the higher the fees/costs included in the contract price, the higher the profits.
Donors/TAPs seem to exhibit minimal interest in ensuring the sustainability of sustainability-type projects, especially after the project itself has ended.	Such relatively cheap but effective solutions as setting up a working data system preserving TAP outputs, or repeating previous, successful sustainability-type projects, are missing from the TAP spectrum.	True sustainability of the results of a TAP are not necessary to realize the profit inherent in the TAP—unless another sustainability-type or consultancy project is launched "to ensure the sustainability" of the previous TAP.
The transparency of activities is often minimal, and there seems to be a "negative correlation" between costs and transparency.	Transparency is a major and strictly applied criteria in most domestic policy fields of the donor countries, and it is an important policy priority for donor organizations. Yet, there is a high discrepancy between the importance given to transparency and the practice of some donors.	It is a common interest of implementing organizations, experts and the donor that the image of TAPs be attractive and that the pursuance of latent goals doesn't become too obvious.

according to high professional and ethical standards, sometimes even with a degree of altruism. But when this conclusion is viewed from a broader perspective, the picture is different. The phenomenon that certain actors seek to promote their own interests by diverting governmental operations from the original goals of those operations is, in fact, quite common within the broadest spectrum of policy and organization studies. This same core phenomenon is described in other ways, including: "rent seeking," where interest groups with a high *per capita* stake in governmental decisions try to influence these decision to their own benefit;[87] "regulatory capture," where economic or societal pressure groups, such as large polluters, "capture" governmental regulatory policy that is originally supposed to constrain them;[88] or the "implementation gap."[89] Carlsson-Köhlin-Ekbom also describe the phenomenon in the specific context of foreign aid as a less discussed, but relatively accepted, fact of life.[90]

7. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

In the section below, we formulate a few recommendations for both beneficiaries and donors. To make recommendations of any kind it is necessary to have a normative or value basis, from which the given recommendations are formulated. The present study was intentionally designed and implemented with a degree of "beneficiary orientation." This, as explained in the second chapter, primarily means that the interests and concerns of beneficiaries are given greater emphasis than is usual in most similar work. Recommendations, on the other hand, require the identification of specific problems—or deviations between the desired and the actual state of affairs—and they also require that specific solutions to these problems be devised.

A consequence of our beneficiary orientation—but also, as the authors believe, a relatively established finding—is

that most of the problems that are implied or identified in the previous chapters are related to the donors and the implementing organizations contracted by them. On the other hand, it is emphasized that this doesn't mean everything functions well on the beneficiary side, or would function well if the donor-side situation were improved. For example, our findings and conclusions regarding problems resulting from the practice that donors contract practically exclusively Western organizations does not mean that the solution to this problem would be to give grants solely to the national civil service training organizations of the beneficiaries, or to award all contracts to organizations and experts of the beneficiary countries. In the authors' view, which can be to some extent inferred on the basis of Chapter 3, in several cases this would probably even increase the present problems.

The recommendations below are in part based on our findings and conclusions presented in earlier chapters and in part on other, practical observations and considerations. In order to make sure we convey the key message of the recommendations, we will not use detailed arguments to explain how they were formulated. Instead, we employ simple statements and, possibly, some robust examples.

The same issues may appear from various angles, from a donor and from a beneficiary aspect, and this may occasionally create what appear to be redundancies. Still, we take the risk of being repetitious because we believe it is better to give the same advice in two ways than to leave out an important piece of advice. We hope that the readers will find at least some of the recommendations useful.

7.1 Recommendations for the Beneficiary Side

Most of the deficiencies on the beneficiary side stem from general issues that cannot be changed within the narrower scope of TAP issues. Such general problems include low civil service wages, the high level of uncertainty in the transition period and the fact that neither individual nor organizational actors within the national public administrative system are really interested in turning TAPs into activities that are truly useful for the country's public administration system. Therefore, the potential to significantly change how TAPs are hosted by beneficiaries is limited. But some things can be improved.

Recommendation 1
The potential of TAPs to improve the civil service training system should be utilized to the greatest extent possible.

1.1 *The value of training as a tool of human resources development needs to be recognized and acknowledged.*
The importance of training is usually significantly un-

derestimated in the beneficiary civil service systems—more so on the level of daily practice than on the level of policy declarations. Efforts need to be taken to ensure that decision makers on all levels, and practitioners in general, accept that the importance of efficient training is not just a myth.

1.2 *Beneficiary civil service training systems could be substantially improved by adopting certain elements of the content and style of TAPs.*
Advanced elements of TAPs might be worth adopting. The following elements especially need consideration in this regard:
  • purposeful and structured planning and implementation of training activities;
  • interactive training style, versus pure lecturing, and other advanced training methods;
  • emphasis of training on skills improvement and attitude change, instead of simply focusing on transfer of theoretical knowledge;
  • a management and policy approach of public administration, as opposed to a legalistic approach.

The first element is especially important in developing national civil service training programs: It should be clear what a particular training activity is aimed at, how the activities will lead to the achievement of objectives, what inputs are necessary and what the risks are. Some, or all, of these elements are usually missing from planning for national civil service training.

Recommendation 2
In deciding whether to host a given TAP or accept support from a donor, not only the benefits, but also the costs, of the TAP should be considered.

2.1 *Recipients should have a clear training strategy and priorities, and they should try to put these priorities forward in any TAPs that will be launched.*
Donors often look for formal human resource development/training strategies of beneficiary governments. Such a strategy is not only useful for helping to "locate" and fine-tune TAPs: It is also a major, still largely missing, prerequisite for the effective development of public administration. Such a strategy, in turn, can help promote the beneficiary country's own interests in the process of designing and running specific TAPs.

2.2 *Recipients should be more aware of, and use, their bargaining power with donors and implementing organizations.*
It is often the case that the donor or its representative is particularly interested in running a given TAP or set of TAPs. Failure to launch or successfully implement a TAP

thus can have negative consequences not only for the beneficiary, but also for the donor. This gives a certain degree of negotiating power to the beneficiary in deciding what the TAP is about and how it is designed. By being informed about the range of potential donors, the donors' TAPs and their standard practices, the beneficiaries can improve their chances of not being "force-fed" the TAP that the implementing organization has "on stock."

2.3 *Administrative and similar obligations, and the resulting beneficiary costs related to hosting TAPs, should be specified and considered in advance.*

Most TAPs place a burden on the beneficiary public administration. These costs include both monetary and—especially—in-kind resources, such as the time of senior executives spent on meetings, as well as report writing and operational management. Additionally, the working time of civil servants sitting in on the training should also be taken into account. The potential beneficiary should be ready to refuse TAP proposals whenever he/she thinks that costs outweigh benefits.

2.4 *Care must be taken to avoid the possible harm that some TAPs can cause to the beneficiary public administration.*

TAPs are usually welcomed by the beneficiary, who assumes that, even if a TAP is not useful, it is surely not harmful. The authors of this book believe that training may actually be counterproductive, by inoculating management solutions or ideas that are inadequate for the beneficiary's context, or by offering one-sided assessments of management solutions.

2.5 *Requirements of national security should be observed in dealing with TAP implementers.*

In the course of planning and implementing TAPs, consultants and other employees of the implementing organization or donor often have uncontrolled access to information that is sensitive from the point of view of national security. Some of this information is classified, and access to it is restricted, even for citizens and most officials of the beneficiary country.

2.6 *Large-scale TAPS should be given priority over small-scale TAPs.*

Donors often prefer to run "pilot courses" for a few dozen civil servants. These usually are not of much use. A "critical mass" training approach is more likely to be useful for the beneficiary public administration system. In addition, many expenses, both on the donor and the recipient side, grow at a reduced rate as TAP size increases, so that it appears certain "economies of scale" are definitely present with regard to TAPs.

2.7 *Appropriate trainee attendance should be ensured for training courses.*

Training money is frequently wasted because of inappropriately targeted selection of trainees. To prevent this problem:

• Training opportunities should be "advertised" widely. Otherwise, there will be several civil servants who would have attended but did not have the opportunity. In lieu of interested workers, those who are not interested or motivated will be forced to fill empty chairs in the course.

• Trainees should participate from the beginning to the end of a course—otherwise, most courses are useless. Appropriate attendance at training sessions can often be ensured only by somewhat "extraordinary" measures, including holding training in remote areas, controlling presence of trainees, giving sanctions for non-attendance, etc.

Recommendation 3

Those personally involved in hosting TAPs should be more familiar with the management and communication culture of donors and TAP implementing organizations.

3.1 *Obtain the necessary skills and attitudes to communicate effectively with donors.*

Officials of the beneficiary who serve as counterparts to donors often lack the necessary abilities and skills to effectively present and promote beneficiary interests vis-à-vis donors. The skills and abilities that they need include assertiveness, appropriate communication skills and negotiation skills. In more detail:

• Assertiveness involves the ability to express needs, standpoints and opinions in an effective but emotionally neutral manner. The most typical problem stemming from the lack of assertiveness is that critical views are not expressed about the donor and its performance. Both officials and trainees feel uncomfortable expressing their honest opinion if it is negative. Beneficiary parties may be afraid to say "this is not the type of training we need," or "I cannot use what I have learned here in my job at all," because they feel that they would hurt the feelings of the donors' representatives or the trainers. But this situation leaves the donor in an information vacuum. The donor/implementer does not get the feedback they need to improve their performance.

• Communication and negotiation skills include language skills but are much more than that. It is of key importance that the parties are able to get their real message through and can receive the other's message with as little misunderstanding as possible. This ability is especially important in getting across your interests during negotiations. But good

communication is also vital in the course of effective project planning and project implementation.

3.2 *Not only the communication style, but also the motivation system and management practices of donors/implementers, should be understood.*

It seems that a lot of misunderstanding stems from the simple fact that words and concepts might mean different things to the two sides. It is useful if beneficiaries are prepared for these types of misunderstandings and even know the typical key points of misunderstanding. Relevant examples in this regard might be how differently verbal pledges, deadlines, obligations to complete certain tasks, etc. are conceived on the two sides of the TAP "game."

3.3 *Having a devoted and motivated team, with appropriate competencies, authority and infrastructure for effective TAP project management, along with centralized "docking" of foreign technical assistance, could significantly increase the efficacy of running TAPs.*

Donors and implementing organizations usually work with a devoted, or at least motivated, team on TAPs. Beneficiaries rarely have such teams. More commonly, the choice of who deals with TAP activities is quite random. Turnover, lack of motivation—especially due to the very large pay difference between donor and beneficiary side experts—and lack of appropriate skills and experience greatly hinder effective management of the TAP processes on the beneficiary side. Aside from monetary incentives, one solution for increasing motivation could be to set up a small team of young, qualified people, who will exert a greater effort in this area because they want to work in a foreign-language environment, and are perhaps even hoping to find a Western scholarship or job opportunity in the longer-term.

It may be useful to create a central "docking" organizational unit for managing governmental activities related to foreign aid, or at least technical assistance, for public administration development projects. Aside from realizing savings and increased efficiency from economies of scale, a further advantage might be that the organization can accumulate and utilize relevant experience. Furthermore, higher-than-average salaries can be paid for the small number of people who are involved in a daily relationship with foreign consultants. Donors also prefer a counterpart with whom they can effectively communicate and on whom they can rely permanently.

7.2 Recommendations for the Donor Side

In this section, we formulate recommendations that may be utilized either by the donor organization or an organization carrying out the project on an operational level. We differentiated between these two entities earlier, but this does not seem necessary in this section. Our main message to the donor side actors includes the following recommendations:

Recommendation 4
TAPs should be planned and managed with an awareness of the recipient's specific circumstances; in other words, one size does not fit all.

4.1 *In identifying beneficiaries' needs and in devising solutions, donors and TAP implementers should be prepared for the formidable difficulties of understanding and dealing with different administrative cultures.*

Most TAP failures directly or indirectly stem from the fact that either the TAP planners, or the implementers, or both, were unfamiliar with the specific circumstances of the recipient country or the wider region. The applicability of knowledge and solutions that are apparently successful in one administrative context is often very strongly limited in another one; certain solutions might even be counterproductive. Instead, TAP planners, and especially implementing organizations and experts, should:

• accept the fact that developed countries' ideas and practices of good governance have a limited validity;

• not try to introduce sophisticated management techniques in countries where the simplest type of administration does not yet function;

• be aware of not only administrative but also cultural differences relevant in how trainer-trainee interactions are perceived; interactive training style, for instance, may result in frustration and aggression on the trainees' side.

4.2 *Already existing training solutions and—especially—content should be adjusted to meet the client's actual needs.*

It seems to be quite a general strategy that needs assessments are biased in a way that the donor can sell what it wants to sell, in other words what it already has, instead of what the beneficiary wants to buy. Another form of the same mistake is made when the donor confuses ends and means. Several TAP objectives identify problems as the lack of a certain solution. In such cases, the objective of the TAP becomes to find a problem for the given, already existing solution, such as performance appraisal systems, municipal bond schemes, etc. This

approach should be avoided by constantly and consciously focusing on what needs the given client actually has.

Recommendation 5

TAP goals should be realistic and achievable.

We have frequently seen such project objectives as "forming a consumer oriented civil service ethic" or "introduction of performance management" in country X. Yet these ambitious goals are often set by projects with a modest budget and a project period of three years—which is, of course, much less time than it took to introduce the given solution in the donor country. These types of projects, not surprisingly, fail. Instead of such over-ambitious project goals, it is important to observe "theoretical" and practical difficulties before deciding what to do and how to do it.

Recommendation 6

Project implementation arrangements should be geared more towards ensuring better understanding of the beneficiary environment.

As noted above, understanding the specificity of the beneficiary environment is crucial in ensuring TAP success. There are some solutions that might assist donor organizations in coping with this challenge.

6.1 *Co-operation among foreign consultants working in a given country on various projects should be promoted.*
During typical TAP implementation, foreign consultants go into a country that is mostly unknown to them, work on the project for some time and then leave, often without ever going back. Our experience indicates that it can be quite helpful for understanding local circumstances if consultants working for various donors and various projects share what they have learned. The lessons gleaned by "old hands in the field" are invaluable, and taking advantage of their knowledge can save a great deal of project and expert time—and even prevent painful failures.

6.2 *Involvement of local experts in both the planning and implementation phase of TAPs should be promoted.*
Local experts familiar with the specificity of the beneficiary's public administration system are of great use. We believe that TAPs should neither be planned nor implemented without such experts.

6.3 *Permanent experts, at the donor and implementing organizations, should be relied upon more often.*
The donor organizations themselves may employ someone who is expert in the region and expert in its political and governmental system. A good example, in this regard, could be the matrix structure of DFID.

6.4 *Donors should consider whether the "project arrangement" is always the best way to implement TAPs.*
Contracting out project implementation may have several advantages. But if the chosen implementing organization has insufficient knowledge and experience of local circumstances, this may lead to problems rather than benefits. More permanent organizational arrangements may, in some cases, be more beneficial. A good example is the permanent consultants of OECD/SIGMA.

Recommendation 7

Reducing training unit cost and, correspondingly, increasing training volume may significantly increase TAP effectiveness.

TAP unit costs are exceptionally high by any standards. Below, based on our findings, we suggest some ways in which unit costs can be decreased with no decrease—and possibly an increase—in TAP impact.

7.1 *It should be carefully considered whether it is a good idea to launch "sustainability-type" projects. Instead, large-scale training courses may often be more fruitful.*
For many reasons, most of which we have reviewed in this book, "sustainability-type" projects hardly ever work as expected.[91] Instead of employing such a strategy, trainers can have a higher impact by training as many civil servants from the target group as possible. The unit cost of training can be greatly reduced in this way. For example, the unit costs of a PHARE training program of 3,000 Hungarian civil servants on "basics of EU" was just a little higher than that of a typical Hungarian national civil service training course. Aside from being cost-effective, "critical mass-type" training can have a higher impact than a sustainability-type TAP.

7.2 *Reliance on local resources can decrease costs.*
In some cases, trainers who are familiar with the local culture and have a command of the local language can prevent the kind of shocking failures that stem from cultural misunderstanding between trainer and trainees. In other cases, local trainers can increase training impact and efficiency. Training courses of local service providers, with content identical to that of a planned TAP, are often available on the local market. These courses are good quality and cost only a fragment of the typical TAP cost. Nonetheless, ensuring that insufficient control, sluggish management and fraud do not endanger the achievement of TAP objectives is a crucial—and in some cases difficult—task.

7.3 *Successful projects should be repeated, because this is often more effective than elaborating new and questionable projects.*
Even if they are very successful, TAPs are very rarely repeated by the donors. This fact is surprising, because,

by repeating successful TAPs, the donor could simultaneously avoid the risks of an unknown project and significantly decrease costs by eliminating expenditures on training development.

Recommendation 8

The implementing organization should try to control as many aspects of TAP implementation as possible.

Compared to the West, public administration in the CEE/CIS region operates in an extremely uncertain and volatile socio-economic, political and cultural environment. The same is, therefore, true for TAPs themselves. This means that, every segment of TAP operational management that is not controlled by the donor may easily go wrong. Some ways of reducing the risks inherent in this context, and thereby ensuring effective project implementation, are suggested below, in ascending order of importance.

8.1 *The "advertisement" of the TAP should not be left up to the beneficiary. Instead it should, at least in part, be handled by the implementing organization.*
    The motivation and ability of the beneficiary to do a careful job in recruiting trainees might be limited, though this is a crucial part of implementing a TAP. If recruiting is not done properly, the organizers may easily end up with either uninterested trainees, who consider their required attendance a punishment from their bosses, or with people who expect a TAP on a completely different subject. The TAP could also experience increasing trainee dropout.

8.2 *The selection of trainees also requires special attention.*
    As with proper advertising of the TAP, ensuring appropriate trainee selection can lessen the risk of having trainees who lack the personal competence and skills necessary for the TAP. These skills might include language skills or relevant previous experience, such as training experience in a train-the-trainers course or communications skills.

8.3 *Donor and implementing organizations should try to improve communication between various stakeholders on the beneficiary side.*
    Communication among beneficiary-side stakeholders related to the launching and implementation of a given TAP is not always smooth and efficient. Because trivial problems in this area can seriously endanger the success of a TAP, pertinent information should be circulated to all relevant stakeholders.

8.4 *Whenever possible, projects should be started a few months after elections, or at least not before elections.*
    There is high turnover in the civil service, especially in managerial positions, after elections. This may have a negative impact on TAPs, because the contact/managerial counterpart may be replaced with a newcomer who knows nothing about the project or is even suspicious about it as something belonging to the "old regime." On the other hand, increasing tension and fidgetiness as election-time approaches may divert attention, participants and other vital resources from your TAP. Another argument in favor of this tactic is that trainees are frequently selected from managers, who may leave the civil service following an election. If they are trained after the election, they may at least be expected to be in their positions for a few years.

8.5 *Collaborators on the beneficiary side should be sufficiently "motivated."*
    The basic problem here relates to the organizational capacity of the docking organization dealing with the TAP at hand. If the local collaborating official is overburdened, they may exhibit only limited enthusiasm for dealing with the extra obligations that the given TAP adds to their usual duties. This is especially true because they may have a monthly salary of, say, USD 150. Tens of thousands of dollars in consultant time are frequently wasted because the national counterparts were not available, did not arrange meetings, did not provide the necessary materials or data, etc. It is perfectly understandable if donors are reluctant to pay local civil servants monetary incentives that may be seen as tips or a bribe. Still, from a practical point of view, it can be argued that local counterparts need to be motivated in some way, with study trips, scholarships, etc. Actually, this technique is widely used in TAP implementation, but the "target persons" of these incentives are often those rather high ranking officials on whom the evaluation of the project depends and who could assure positive feedback. We admit, however, that it is often difficult to identify the appropriate target group, and that, even if the right target group is identified, those in higher positions can easily "capture" the benefits.

8.6 *Long-term utilization, or sustainability, of the TAP should be ensured.*
    Many TAP results are lost in the long term, even if the training was successful. Most of the training materials and curricula are not available a few months after the TAP, even if the central aim of the given TAP was to transfer know-how incorporated in these materials. Furthermore, the lists of trainees are not available or do not exist. More care should be taken to document and provide this information to the beneficiary government. A good, though never implemented, solution could involve a database containing all relevant information on TAPs. The database could be kept at an embassy or, potentially, at a central place within the beneficiary government structure.

Recommendation 9

The beneficiary should not be saddled with an excessive and useless administrative burden.

TAPs frequently place an enormous burden on the local civil service in terms of management and administrative tasks. TAPs place a burden on beneficiary governments in several other ways, too.

9.1 *Steering committees should be made truly functional.*

It is a general practice that the beneficiary is required to set up a steering committee for an assistance project. The problem is that donors want to have the most senior persons in their steering committee. This usually serves a symbolic purpose rather than a practical one. From a practical point of view, having ministers in the steering committee is quite dysfunctional, given that the most likely scenario is that they will not attend any of the meetings, thereby jeopardizing the project. The problem could be partly solved by the arrangement introduced in a DFID TAP in Hungary: An operative body was set up, from among the officials who were responsible for effective implementation of TAPs. Operative level decisions were made by this group.

9.2 *The number and duration of "stakeholder interviews," and the like, should be limited.*

Consultants working on TAPs strive to meet high ranking officials for various reasons. Our impression is that, if all these requests were accepted by, say, the prime minister of a CIS country, practically no time would be left for him to deal with any other issues. Foreign consultants and donor representatives consume large amounts of precious time of high-ranking officials, time that could be better utilized in other ways. It is an especially dubious technique of consultants to request the time of civil servants so they can ask simple questions that they could have answered by reading the civil service law or other easily obtainable literature. Similarly, we have met civil servants who said they were tired of explaining the same trivialities to newly arrived consultants again and again. Instead of imposing on the beneficiary's civil service, a local expert should be relied upon to answer basic questions.

NOTES

[1]   Carlsson, Jerker, Gunnar Köhlin and Anders Ekbom (1994*): The Political Economy of Evaluation: International Aid Agencies and the Effectiveness of Aid*, Houndmills: MacMillan, pp.31–41.

[2]   The full titles of these studies are listed in the References section of this volume.

[3]   The full titles of these studies are listed in the References section of this volume.

[4]   Brown, David S. (1968): "Strategies and Tactics of Public Administration Technical Assistance: 1945–1963," in: Montgomery, John D. and William J. Siffin (1968) (ed.): *Approaches to Development. Politics, Administration and Change*, New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill.

[5]   Two exceptions are OECD 1997 and Verheijen 2000.

[6]   A more exact, algebraic definition can be given as: $PTD = \Sigma\ LengthInDays_i\ x\ NumberOfParticipants_i$, where the index i refers to individual training programs with a given (constant) length and a given number of participants, and n is the number of training programs, for which the PTD output measure is calculated.

[7]   Guba, Egon G. and Yvonna S. Lincoln (1989): *Fourth Generation Evaluation*, London: Sage; and Rossi, Peter H. and H.E. Freeman (1985): *Evaluation: A Systematic Approach*, Beverly Hills: Sage.

[8]   Bakenova, Saule (2001a): *Literature Review of the Recent Publications on Training Evaluation: Current Trends and Issues*, Ottawa, Canada: Manuscript to be published on LGI web site.

[9]   The model offered by Kirkpatrick was first published in 1959 (Kirkpatrick 1959). But later on, many additional articles and books went on to further develop and extend the model; see e.g. Kirkpatrick-Halcomb (1993).

[10]   Cooley, Alexander (2000): "International Aid to the Former Soviet States: Agent of Change or Guardian of the Status Quo?" *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 47, Issue 4, pp.34–44; and Buss, Terry F. and Roger Vaughan (1995): "Training and Technical Assistance for Local Government in Hungary: A Critique and Suggestions for Reform," *East European Quarterly,* Vol. 29. No. 3. pp.389–407.

[11]   Rossi, Peter H. and H.E. Freeman (1985): *Evaluation: A Systematic Approach*, Beverly Hills: Sage; and Fischer, Frank and Frank Forester (1993): *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*, London: UCL Press.

[12]   Pollitt, Christopher and Helen O'Neill (1999): *An Evaluation of the Process of Evaluation of EC External Aid Programmes*, Belgium: COTA, pp.30–31.

[13]   Some other donors, such as the Dutch Matra in Romania, were also included in the field research, but these results are not reviewed in this volume.

[14]   Number of "TAPs mentioned" refers to training projects that were mentioned by the country teams. Naturally, not all these projects were analyzed in greater detail.

The number of TAPs analyzed in detail are in the "A" column.

Please note that the depth of analysis may be quite different and may reflect different approaches. In the case of Ukraine, for instance, detailed information was available only on training courses that were held by local service providers. And even for these cases, no financial information was available. In the case of Hungarian PHARE projects, on the other hand, a relatively well structured database on training activities (including TAPs, and training of target groups other than civil servants) was available.

[15] In Lithuania, the first, less comprehensive act was adopted in 1995.

[16] Please note that the reliability and comparability of available data is limited. E.g. wage data expressed in USD terms has dropped by more than 50 percent between 1997–1999 in Ukraine, due to the crisis and the successive drop of the Ukrainian currency's exchange rate.

[17] Typical values are indicated in parenthesis, whenever these data were available.

[18] The Hungarian Cabinet adopted a decree on national civil service training in 1998 that may remind someone of a national civil service training policy. However, the decree concentrates on procedural issues; it introduces a central—though quite small—national civil service training budget, a—quite ambiguous and far from complete—national civil service training planning system, as well as accreditation systems both for national civil service training courses and trainers. The first, four-year national civil service training plan was adopted in 1999 by the cabinet. This plan defined major fields of training priorities and ranked these fields.

[19] See Gajduschek, György and György Hajnal (2000): *Evaluation of the Hungarian General Civil Service Training Program*, LGI Discussion Papers No. 16.

[20] Newland, Chester (1996): "Transformational Challenges in Central and Eastern Europe and Schools of Public Administration," *Public Administration Review,* Vol. 54. No. 4. pp.382–389.

[21] Brown, David S. (1968): "Strategies and Tactics of Public Administration Technical Assistance: 1945–1963," in: Montgomery, John D. and William J. Siffin (1968) (ed.): *Approaches to Development. Politics, Administration and Change*, New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Although in Latvia PHARE managed to achieve retention rates of between 18 and 55 percent (PHARE 1999).

[24] Brown, David S. (1968): "Strategies and Tactics of Public Administration Technical Assistance: 1945–1963," in: Montgomery, John D. and William J. Siffin (1968) (ed.): *Approaches to Development. Politics, Administration and Change*, New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill.

[25] Bakenova, Saule (2002b): *CIDA programmes in Central and Eastern Europe 1997–2000:* Manuscript to be published on LGI web site.

[26] Lazareviciute, Ieva (2002b): *PHARE Programmes in Central and Eastern Europe 1997–2000:* Manuscript to be published on LGI web site.

[27] For a more detailed conceptual background on assistance strategy see Hajnal, György: "Sustainability strategy or strategic sustainability? The case of civil service training assistance projects for Central and Eastern Europe," *Evaluation of Sustainablity*, May 15–17, 2003, Wien, Austria.

[28] Szente, Zoltán (1999): "Közigazgatás és politika metszéspontján: a miniszterek és az államtitkárok rekrutációja Magyarországon, 1990–1998," *Századvég,* Vol. 13. Summer, pp.3–51.

[29] Lazareviciute, Ieva (2002b): *PHARE Programmes in Central and Eastern Europe 1997–2000*: Manuscript to be published on LGI web page, p.16.

[30] This—matrix structure—arrangement is quite rare among donors and the authors find this a really useful, though not fully utilized solution.

[31] Bakenova, Saule (2002b): *CIDA programmes in Central and Eastern Europe 1997–2000:* Manuscript to be published on LGI web site.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Pascariu 2002: *Western Assistance to Civil Service Training in Romania: An Assessment*: Manuscript to be published on the LGI web site.

[34] Which is practically impossible in several countries as a result of official International Monetary Fund requirements that forbid a wage bill increase in the public sphere.

[35] The transferability of institutions, working methods, culture and policy knowledge within the realm of public administration has been heavily discussed in the scientific literature in general terms, among others by Oleary (1998) and Greenaway (1998). On the basis of a wide-range empirical study, Hofstede (1984, 1993) argues convincingly against the cross-cultural transferability of management practices and, even, theories.

36 LaPalombara, Joseph (1963a) (ed.): *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

37 This is especially interesting because most donor countries are quite reluctant to apply solutions from abroad to their own public administration system.

38 Inadequacy of a TAP should be differentiated from cases when otherwise adequate TAPs run by various donors simply contradict one another, and since both present the "one best way," together they cause confusion:

Foreign experts, especially French and British ones, played a crucial role in the formation of the Romanian local government system. Unfortunately the French system is well-known for its centralized approach, whereas the British government is more decentralized. Elements from both of these solutions were adopted. Thus, presently, the "French prefect" (an appointee and representative of the central government on the regional/ local level with a wide range of competencies and authority) now coexists with the "British mayor" (the elected leader of a strong and autonomous body on the regional/local level with wide range of competences and authority) in the Romanian public administration system. It is practically impossible to draw a line between the competencies of the mayors and that of the prefects. Cases when contradicting foreign models were jointly adopted to national laws are quoted by our Lithuanian team, regarding the elaboration of the civil service law, as well as by our Hungarian team, regarding the latest amendment of the Hungarian civil service law.

Turning now to pure TAPs: The authors participated in a conference held for city mayors in Hungary in the mid-1990s. The conference was aimed at elaborating solutions to certain problems of the existing local government system. Most of the mayors had very clear and robust ideas about the best solution and were convinced that their solution was the only way to effectively solve the problem. However, the suggested solutions differed greatly from one another, and it seemed impossible to find consensus. Soon it turned out that those who participated in a Swedish study trip advocated the Swedish way, those who were in Britain the British solution, others favored a Spanish solution, etc. A similar case was mentioned to us by a Polish colleague.

39 Even well-established and stable administrative systems on the continent, like France and Germany, find it difficult to handle issues of adaptability of Anglo-Saxon approaches, especially in the New Public Management context.

40 In economic terms, we expect that beneficiary governments act as rational actors and choose courses with content that provides the highest utility for the available scarce resources. Of course, beneficiary governments can be, and in fact are, impaired in making optimal decisions by several factors. Such factors are most of all:

1. individual and organizational interests;

2. bottlenecks in training capacity (in terms of money, institutional and human capacity) may greatly limit the realistic alternatives;

3. cultural "framing" (e.g. the overly legalistic approach may prevent decision-makers from introducing such issues as management and communication skills).

As for point 1, organizational and interest group pressures are present in the case of donors, too. As for point 2, projects, like assistance to set up or develop a training institution in the beneficiary country, including training of full-time trainers, procurement of equipment, etc., may offer really useful donor assistance. As for point 3, this problem is undoubtedly present. However, our experience is that the "cultural framing" is also present with the donor. Moreover, donors' decisions regarding TAP content is also impaired by insufficient understanding of the given beneficiary's environment.

41 Brown, David S. (1968): "Strategies and Tactics of Public Administration Technical Assistance: 1945–1963," in: Montgomery, John D. and William J. Siffin (1968) (ed.): *Approaches to Development. Politics, Administration and Change*, New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, pp.213–215.

42 Williamson, Oliver E. (1995) (ed.): *Organization Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

43 Mueller, Frank and Romano Dyerson (1999): "Expert Humans or Expert Organizations?" *Organization Studies,* Vol. 20, No. 2, pp.225–256.

44 Mueller, Frank and Romano Dyerson (1999): "Expert Humans or Expert Organizations?" *Organization Studies,* Vol. 20, No. 2, pp.225–256.

45 Williamson, Oliver E. (1995) (ed.): *Organization Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

46 In industry, this well-known practical problem has the telling label of "make-or-buy decisions."

47 Other obstacles are discussed in relation to the so called "sustainability projects."

48 Heil, Péter (1999): *The EU PHARE in Hungary. The Anatomy of a Pre-Accession Aid Programme*, Budapest: Budapest University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration.

[49] Wildawsky, Aaron and Jeffrey L. Pressman (1984): *Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland,* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

[50] Kirkpatrick, Donald L. (1959): "Techniques for Evaluating Training Programs," *Journal of the American Society of Training Directors,* Vol. 23.

[51] Lazareviciute, Ieva (2002b): *PHARE Programmes in Central and Eastern Europe 1997–2000*: Manuscript to be published on the LGI web site.

[52] Bakenova, Saule (2002a): *USAID programmes in Central and Eastern Europe 1997–2000*: Manuscript to be published on the LGI web site.

[53] Bakenova, Saule (2002a): *USAID programmes in Central and Eastern Europe 1997–2000*: Manuscript to be published on the LGI web site.

[54] Bakenova, Saule (2002b): *CIDA programmes in Central and Eastern Europe 1997–2000*: Manuscript to be published on the LGI web site.

[55] E.g. no country team reported that the copyright, the right to further utilization, was discussed or realized at all between donor and beneficiary side.

[56] Bakenova, Saule (2002b): *CIDA programmes in Central and Eastern Europe 1997–2000*: Manuscript to be published on LGI web site.

[57] As it is the case with most other problem segments posed by running and managing TAPs, it is not our intention to review the vast theoretical and empirical literature of language barriers in multi-cultural training settings. Still we note that Hofstede (1984) pp.28–29 presents some convincing evidence on the tacit and still devastating effects of those barriers.

[58] Bakenova, Saule (2002a): *USAID programmes in Central and Eastern Europe 1997–2000*: Manuscript to be published on the LGI web site.

[59] Bakenova, Saule (2002a): *USAID programmes in Central and Eastern Europe 1997–2000*: Manuscript to be published on the LGI web site.

[60] Bakenova, Saule (2002a): *USAID programmes in Central and Eastern Europe 1997–2000*: Manuscript to be published on the LGI web site.

[61] Our costs calculation does not include non-monetary and/or indirect costs emerging as a consequence of the training, such as costs on the beneficiary side related to administrative tasks or time of trainees.

[62] Kirkpatrick, Donald L. and Jane Halcomb (1993): *Evaluating Training Programs: The Four Levels,* San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler.

[63] Lane, Jan-Erik (1987): "Introduction: The concept of bureaucracy," In: Lane, Jan-Erik (1987) (ed.): *Bureaucracy and Public Choice*, London: Sage, pp.23–24.

[64] Please note that the exact unit cost data are not necessary to calculate the difference between "crude" and "adjusted" efficiency measure. The above example could be calculated with unit cost of USD X as follows: (70 percent *X) + (30 percent *2*X) = 70 percent X + 60 percent X = 130 percent X, that is 30 percent higher than X. Simplifying with X this yields e.g. (70 percent *1) + (30 percent *2*1) = 70 percent + 60 percent = 130 percent.

[65] For instance, we will not take into consideration that a significant amount of TAPs are held in a foreign language because that decreases rather than increases the efficiency indicator.

[66] When we formulate statements on "donors' TAPs," we generally take into consideration as much as possible the fact that some donors run many more courses than others. (See the section on the weight and presence of donors.) Practically speaking, this means that PHARE was taken into consideration to a greater extent.

[67] Throughout the chapter, financial figures are calculated in US dollars, using the exchange rate current at the time when the expense occurred.

[68] The range of unit cost of small scale TAPs is USD 77–USD 1,656 per PTD, while the range for large scale TAPs is USD 8–USD 32 per PTD.

[69] Bakenova, Saule (2002a): *USAID programmes in Central and Eastern Europe 1997–2000*: Manuscript to be published on the LGI web site.

[70] The lower bound is yielded as 300:25, while the upper bound is determined as 580:10.

[71] The lower bound is yielded as 300:142, while the upper bound is determined as 580:142.

[72] A more realistic, economic approach would be to calculate with those outputs (training materials, trained trainers) as fixed costs financed by the donor and not necessary to spend by the beneficiary. If we calculate this way, than as the quantity of trained persons increases, the added value of TAP outputs increases within the unit cots.

[73] This is, of course, identical with reducing the "adjusted" unit cost in the same proportion.

[74] Cromrey, Jeffrey D. and Daniel M. Purdon (1995): "A Comparison of Lecture, Cooperative Learning and Programmed Instruction at the College Level," *Studies in Higher Education,* Vol. 20, Issue 3, p.341.

75 Lake, David A. (2001): "Student Performance and Perception of Lecture-Based Course Compared with the Same Course Utilizing Group Discussion," *Physical Therapy,* Vol. 81, No. 3, pp.896–903.

76 Gray, A.R., K.J. Topping, and W.B. Carcary (1998): "Individual and Group Learning of the Highway Code: Comparing Board Game and Traditional Methods," *Educational Research,* Vol. 40, No. 1, pp.45–53.

77 The analysis of Buss-Vaughan (1994) makes the interesting point that the effectiveness of advanced training methods cannot be evaluated by directly comparing its results to that of traditional training, since it is a mixture of the two that is a basic prerequisite of effective learning (i.e. Lecturing is more appropriate for acquiring new knowledge, while interactive training is better in extending and applying existing knowledge and skills.)

78 A sign of professional management could be indicated by cost savings. However, we found anything but major "savings" in the case of TAPs vis-à-vis national training.

79 Raadschelders, Jos C.N. and Mark R. Rutgers (1999): "The Waxing and Waning of the State and its Study: Changes and Challenges in the Study of Public Administration," in: Kickert, Walter J. M. and Richard J. II. Stillmann (1999a) (ed.): *The Modern State and its Study: New Administrative Sciences in a Changing Europe and United States,* Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

80 Montgomery, John D. and William J. Siffin (1968) (ed.): *Approaches to Development. Politics, Administration and Change,* New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill; and La-Palombara, Joseph (1963a) (ed.): *Bureaucracy and Political Development,* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

81 Kaboolian, Linda (1998): "The New Public Management: Challenging the Boundaries of the Management vs. Administration Debate," *Public Administration Review* May/June 1998, Vol. 58, Issue 3, p.189, 5p.; and Rutgers, Mark R. (2001): "Traditional Flavors? The Different Sentiments in European and American Administrative Thought," *Administration and Society,* Vol. 33, No. 1, pp.220–244. Specifically in relation to civil service training see Hesse, Joachim Jens (1996): "A Crucial Bottleneck: Training and Public Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe," *Die Verwaltung,* Vol. 7, pp. 419–439.

82 The argument that running a totalitarian public administration system requires an expertise different from the expertise necessary to run a liberal democratic one deserves attention. Still, it seems plausible to think that the transferability of administrative expertise between pre- and post-transition Slovenia or Poland (let alone Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan), is at least as large as the transferability of administrative expertise between e.g. the United States and these countries. Nevertheless, this line of argument is not followed here, since it points far beyond the scope of the current section.

83 Merton, Robert K. (1968): *Social Theory and Social Structure,* New York: Free Press.

84 Simon, Herbert A. (1979): "Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations," *American Economic Review,* Vol. 4, pp.493–513.

85 Allison, Graham T. (1971): *The Essence of Decision. Explaning the Cuban Missile Crisis,* Boston, MA: Little and Brown.

86 Khapova, Svetlana N. (2002): "Assistance or Co-operation?" in: van den Berg, Frits, György Jenei and Lance T. Leloup (2002) (ed.): *East-West Co-operation in Public Sector Reform. Cases and Results in Central and Eastern Europe,* Amsterdam: IOS Press. The same view is expressed in: Prigozhin, Arcady (2002): "Ten Years of Cross-Cultural Co-operation: Lessons, Feelings, Findings," in: van den Berg, Frits, György Jenei and Lance T. Leloup (2002) (ed.): *East-West Co-operation in Public Sector Reform. Cases and Results in Central and Eastern Europe,* Amsterdam: IOS Press.

87 Tullock, Gordon (1993): *Rent Seeking,* Aldershot, Hants: Edward Elgar.

88 Stigler, George (1971): "The Economic Theory of Regulation," *Bell Journal of Economics,* pp.3–21.

89 Wildawsky, Aaron and Jeffrey L. Pressman (1984): *Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland,* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

90 Carlsson, Jerker, Gunnar Köhlin and Anders Ekbom (1994*): The Political Economy of Evaluation: International Aid Agencies and the Effectiveness of Aid,* Houndmills: MacMillan.

91 For the exact meaning of the term, see Chapter 4. A brief description is given in the list of terms and abbreviations at the beginning of this book.

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