Sexual Objectification Increases Rape Victim Blame and Decreases Perceived Suffering

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Abstract

Sexual objectification changes the way people view women by reducing them to sexual objects—denied humanity and an internal mental life, as well as deemed unworthy of moral concern. However, the subsequent consequences of sexually objectifying others remain under-researched. In the current study, we examined the impact of objectification in the domain of sexual assault. Sixty British undergraduate students were recruited to complete an impression formation task. We manipulated objectification by presenting participants with either a sexualized or non-sexualized woman. Participants rated the woman’s mind and the extent to which they felt moral concern for her. They then learned that she was the victim of an acquaintance rape and reported victim blame and both blatant and subtle perceptions of her suffering. Consistent with prior research, sexualized women were objectified through a denial of mental states and moral concern. Further, compared with non-objectified women, the objectified were perceived to be more responsible for being raped. Interestingly, although no difference emerged for blatant measures of suffering, participants tacitly denied the victims’ suffering by exhibiting changes in moral concern for the victim. We conclude that objectification has important consequences for how people view victims of sexual assault. Our findings reveal that sexual objectification can have serious consequences and we discuss how these might influence how victims cope and recover from sexual assault.

Keywords: objectification, social perception, impression formation, morality, victimization, blame, acquaintance rape
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Sexual objectification—perceiving and treating a person as a sexual object (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997; Nussbaum, 1995)—has been the topic of considerable scrutiny in social psychology. Self-objectification—the internalization of an observers’ perspective on one’s physical appearance—is robustly linked to depression, anxiety, body shame, sexual dysfunction, and poor academic performance, particularly among women (for a review see Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997; Moradi & Huang, 2008). Besides altering how people think about and treat themselves, objectification has a detrimental effect on how people perceive and treat others. In previous research, individuals who were asked to focus on the physical appearance of a woman viewed her as lacking humanity, indicating that the objectified are viewed as less human (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009). Likewise, when completing an implicit association test, people showed greater ease associating sexually objectified women with animal-related words, indicating an implicit tendency to dehumanize the objectified (Vaes, Paladino, & Puvia, 2011). In addition to shifting perceptions of humanity, objectification also alters mind attribution, meaning that objectified women are viewed as possessing a less complex, rich mind compared to non-objectified women (Loughnan, Haslam, Murnane, et al., 2010). In short, people perceive the objectified as less human (dehumanized) and attribute them less “mind” (“dementalized”).

Reduced attributions of mind and humanity may also influence perceptions of moral treatment—the extent to which someone is deemed worthy of fair treatment and should not be harmed. Decisions about who deserves moral treatment are based on the extent to which the target elicits moral concern. When we feel moral concern towards an entity (e.g., a child), we want to see that entity treated morally (i.e., not harmed; treated fairly). By contrast, when
we do not feel moral concern towards an entity (e.g., a rock), we do not care how it is treated.

Previous work has demonstrated that judgments of moral concern are partially based in judgments of mental states (H. Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Loughnan, Haslam, & Bastian, 2010) and humanity (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011). Given that the objectified are denied both mind and humanity, they may be considered less worthy of moral concern. To examine this possibility, Loughnan and colleagues (Loughnan, Haslam, Murnane, et al., 2010) asked people to rate the extent to which they felt moral concern toward sexualized men and women. The results showed that sexualization reduces moral concern for both male and female targets.

Previous research has carefully mapped the ways in which people can be viewed as object-like: through denials of humanity, mind, and moral standing. Although understanding and critiquing social perception is important, it is critical to move beyond documenting how people view women to understanding what this means for how women are treated in society. It has been established that objectification reduces perceived competence, both in general and in the workplace (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009; Loughnan, Haslam, Murnane, et al., 2010). Although these findings have important implications, particularly in the field of workplace discrimination, the impact of objectification may extend beyond competence. If objectification diminishes moral concern, it may have important implications for perceptions of women when their moral rights are violated. Sexual assault is one important domain in which women’s moral rights are clearly violated.

Sexual assault is an interpersonal immoral act requiring a perpetrator (or moral agent) to carry out the harm and a victim (or moral patient) to suffer. The perpetrator bears the moral
responsibility for the act, and the victim possesses the moral rights which have been violated (K. Gray & Wegner, 2009, 2011, in press). If judgments of victimhood rely on the elicitation of moral concern, then removing moral concern should undermine victim status. Given that objectification undermines moral concern (Holland & Haslam, in press; Loughnan, Haslam, Murnane, et al., 2010), an objectified woman may be seen as a “lesser victim” compared to a non-objectified woman. We suggest that objectification should undermine victim status by decreasing moral concern.

Rape victim blame—holding the victim partially or fully responsible for being raped—reflects one common way in which victimhood is undermined in instances of sexual assault (for recent reviews see Grubb & Harrower, 2008; 2009). Blaming the victim serves to shift the burden of responsibility for the assault away from the perpetrator and mitigate the severity of the crime. The assignment of victim blame has been thoroughly studied in forensic and social psychology. Characteristics of the victim (including physical appearance) influence blame attribution. Attractive and provocatively dressed women are held more responsible for being raped than unattractive, demurely dressed women (Brems & Wagner, 1994; Edmonds & Cahoon, 1986; Tieger, 1981; Workman & Freeburg, 1999). Although the link between sexualization and victim blame has been known for almost 30 years (Edmonds & Cahoon, 1986), no known studies have examined the psychological processes linking sexualization to increased victim blame. We propose that attractive and provocatively dressed women are objectified and therefore seen as lesser victims compared to non-objectified women. Recent research has shown that objectification can be increased by varying sexualized attire (Holland & Haslam, in press; Loughnan, Haslam, Murnane, et al., 2010; Vaes et al., 2011) and attention towards the
body (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009). If objectification reduces moral concern, then it may be part of the currently unspecified link between provocative attire and increased victim blame.

In addition to increasing victim blame, we suggest that objectification has consequences for perceived victim suffering. People assign moral concern on the basis of an individual’s perceived capacity to suffer, but also believe that those people who elicit moral concern suffer more if harmed (H. Gray et al., 2007; K. Gray & Wegner, 2009). Indeed, if the same harm befalls two individuals, people believe that the individual with moral rights will suffer more (K. Gray & Wegner, 2009). If the objectified elicit less moral concern, they may be thought to experience less suffering if harmed. Although we believe that people will see rape victims as suffering less when objectified, they may be reluctant to report that a woman who has been the victim of a sexual assault did not suffer or they may believe that it is inappropriate to overtly minimize her suffering. To help circumvent these concerns, we explored subtle, indirect measures of victim suffering: how much time and support would be needed for her recovery. If people believe that the suffering caused by rape is relatively low, they will expect faster, easier recovery from rape victims. In the context of sexual assault, objectified women may be seen to suffer less than non-objectified women.

In our study, we examined whether objectification changes the way people view the victim of immoral acts (i.e., sexual assault). Consistent with prior objectification work, we expect that the objectified would be seen as lacking mind and moral status. Combined, increased victim blame and reduced victim suffering reflect two important ways in which victimhood can be undermined. We hypothesize that objectification will increase victim blame, with the objectified held more responsible for being raped than the non-objectified. Similarly,
we predict that the objectified will be perceived to suffer less, either overtly or subtly, as a result of sexual assault. We expect these effects to be linked to the withdrawal of moral concern associated with objectification. The current research will go beyond documenting the links between objectification and reduced victimhood to examine the mediating role of reduced moral concern. We expected that it is the withdrawal of moral concern that occurs when a woman is objectified that explains the changes in perception of blame and suffering.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Sixty British undergraduate students (\(M_{\text{age}} = 22.42, SD = 5.61; 44\) female, 15 male, 1 unreported), recruited via email and electronic bulletin boards, participated in exchange for payment (£2; approximately $3 US). Participants were randomly assigned to either a non-objectification/control (\(n = 30\)) or objectification (\(n = 30\)) paper-and-pencil questionnaire on “impression formation” given in individual cubicles under experimenter supervision. In a two-step procedure, participants first completed the impression formation task in which they completed ratings of either the non-objectified or objectified woman’s mind attributions and moral concern. Next, the crime-related material was presented. After reading a vignette describing acquaintance rape, participants completed victim and perpetrator blame scales before moving on to judgments of victim suffering and ending with items recording participants’ age and gender. Finally, all participants were thoroughly debriefed.

Materials

Impression formation task. Participants were provided with a picture and brief description of “Laura,” who was described as a student, waitress, and part-time model. In the
non-objectification/control condition, Laura was pictured in a non-sexualized manner wearing blue jeans and a white top. In the objectification condition, she was shown in a sexualized manner wearing a bikini. Two images of the same model were sourced from a freely accessible website. Participants in both conditions were told that the image was taken from her part-time modeling portfolio, rather than at the time of the assault, so that participants were uninformed about her attire at the time of the assault.

To complete the impression formation task, participants first responded to a nine-item abbreviated mind attribution task. Items for this task were drawn from previous, longer scales (Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008; Loughnan, Haslam, Murnane, et al., 2010). Participants rated the frequency with which they projected Laura engages in nine mental activities (wishing, planning, reasoning, emotion, logic, passion, feeling, desiring, and abstract thinking) on a 7-point scale from 1 (hardly ever) to 7 (very frequently). The total mind attribution scale showed low reliability (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .61$) and so the four items (emotion, wishing, passion, desiring) with the lowest item-total correlations were excluded, resulting in a scale with acceptable reliability ($\alpha = .71$). Participants’ ratings on the five remaining items were averaged to create a single mind attribution score wherein higher scores indicated a stronger attribution of mental activity to the target.

To measure moral concern for Laura, participants completed a three-item moral concern scale. This scale was a shorter version of similar scales used in published objectification studies (Holland & Haslam, in press; Loughnan, Haslam, Murnane, et al., 2010). Specifically, we chose to focus on harm and fairness because they capture the two most widely endorsed bases of moral judgment (cf. Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007). Participants indicated “How bad would you
feel if you took advantage of Laura?,” as well as how bad they would feel if “you heard that Laura had been treated unfairly?” and “if you heard that Laura had been hurt?,” using a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). The scale showed reasonable reliability (α = .69) so that ratings were averaged to create a moral concern score such that higher scores indicated more moral concern toward the target.

**Rape vignette, blame, and suffering.** Participants read an acquaintance rape vignette in which the “Laura” from the impression formation task was the victim of a rape perpetrated by “Mike” (adapted from Grubb & Harrower, 2009):

Laura, then a 21-year-old, was a student at a local university in Los Angeles. She is of average height, slim build, and is considered quite attractive. She plays sports for a college team and works in a local restaurant. Laura was at a friend’s party when she met “Mike.” They were both a similar age and had hit it off when they discovered that they both had an interest in sport. They had chatted throughout the party and Laura had commented to her friend that she thought Mike was “really nice.” Mike was of average height and build and had dark hair. At the end of the party, Laura and Mike exchanged telephone numbers and then both went home separately. Laura did not hear from Mike for a few days, but then on a Friday she received a phone call from Mike asking her out on a date the next evening. Laura eagerly accepted and Mike arranged to pick Laura up at 7 p.m. on the Saturday night. The next day, Mike arrived to pick Laura up and they drove to the cinema where they watched a film they had both wanted to see. After the film, Mike suggested that they go for a drink in a nearby pub and that he would drop her home afterwards. They sat and chatted in the pub for about an hour and when it was
closing time, Mike suggested that they go back to his house for a coffee and promised that he would drive Laura home afterwards. Laura readily agreed and Mike drove them to his house. When they got there, Mike and Laura sat on the sofa and started watching television. Mike then began kissing Laura and touching her breasts. To begin with Laura kissed back, until Mike started kissing her harder and groping her breasts so that they hurt. At this point, Laura asked Mike to stop and that she wanted to leave, but Mike became angry. He then pinned her arms down and got on top of her. Laura asked Mike to stop, but he yanked down her trousers and underwear and proceeded to have sex with her. When he had finished, Mike stood up and went into the kitchen and Laura ran out of the house.

After reading through the vignette, participants completed a victim blame questionnaire which assessed the extent to which Laura was responsible for the rape.\(^1\) Five items were adapted from prior research (Grubb & Harrower, 2009) to fit the current study: “To what extent did Laura act carelessly?”; “To what extent did Laura lead Mike on?”; “To what extent was Laura’s behaviour responsible for her sexual encounter with Mike?”; “Even though you do not know much about Laura in this scenario, to what extent do you feel her character was responsible for the sexual encounter with Mike?”; and “Taking into account both Laura’s behaviour and character, how responsible was she for the sexual encounter with Mike?” Participants answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so). The scale showed strong reliability (\(\alpha = .88\)) and thus ratings were averaged to create a victim blame score where higher scores indicated more victim blame.

To measure victim suffering, we used three items. To provide a direct measure of
perceived victim suffering, we asked participants to rate “How much did Laura suffer as a result of this crime?” on a 6-point scale from 1(\textit{not at all}) to 6 (\textit{a great deal}). To provide additional indirect measures of the extent of victim suffering, we asked “How long will it take Laura to recover from this crime and go about her life as before?” (0 - 10 years, in 2-year increments) and to “indicate the amount of counseling that should be made available to Laura” (0 - 10 weeks, in 2-week increments). These two items were combined to form a measure of perceived indirect suffering.

\textbf{Results}

There was no effect of participant age or gender\(^2\) on any of the dependent variables, and thus they were omitted from further analysis. Means for all measures and their intercorrelations are reported in Table 1. As expected, mind attribution was significantly lower in the objectification condition compared with the control condition, \(t(58) = 2.22, p = .030,\) Cohen’s \(d = .58\). Further, as predicted, participants expressed less moral concern in the objectification condition compared to the control, \(t(58) = 3.42, p = .001,\) Cohen’s \(d = .90\). These results indicate that, consistent with previous research, participants denied objectified women both mind and moral concern (see Table 1).

Turning to the impact of objectification on victim status, we measured victim blame. As expected, raters attributed significantly more blame to the objectified victim compared with the control victim \(t(58) = 3.02, p = .004,\) Cohen’s \(d = .78\), see Table 1. To examine whether victim objectification influenced perceived victim suffering, we employed two independent samples \(t\)-test for direct and indirect measures. These tests revealed that when asked directly to report suffering, there was no significant difference between the objectified and control
conditions, $t(58) = 1.41, p = 0.165$. For the indirect measure, participants perceived that the objectified victim suffered less than the control, $t(58) = 2.29, p = 0.026$. Stated together, when measured indirectly, but not directly, participants reported less suffering of an objectified victim compared to the control.

Given that objectification influences both perceptions of Laura (mind, moral concern) and judgments of victimhood (blame, indirect suffering), we examined whether changes in perception of Laura might account for changes in victim blame and suffering. A set of correlations revealed that attributions of moral concern were negatively correlated with victim blame, $r(60) = -0.40, p = .002$, and positively correlated with indirect victim suffering, $r(60) = .41, p = .001$ but not direct victim suffering, $r(60) = .13, p = .32$. By contrast, mind attribution was not significantly correlated with any victim judgments (all $rs < .15, ps > .25$). Therefore, we investigated whether changes in moral concern might mediate the link between objectification and (a) victim blame and (b) indirect victim suffering.

To start, we coded condition such that positive values indicate an increase in objectification (coded 1) compared with controls (coded 0). Focusing first on victim blame, we entered condition as a predictor of blame and found a significant effect ($\beta = .37, p = .004, R_{adj}^2 = .12$). Next, we entered condition as a predictor of moral concern, yielding another significant effect ($\beta = -.41, p < .001$). These analyses show that the IV is significantly related to both the DV and the mediator. Finally, we entered condition and moral concern as simultaneous predictors of victim blame. This analysis revealed that moral concern remained a significant predictor ($\beta = -.30, p = .024$) and condition became non-significant ($\beta = .25, p = .061, R_{adj}^2 = .18$), yielding an overall significant increase in predictive power, $F(1,57) = 5.37, p = .024$. Following the protocols
of Hayes (2013), we used accelerated and bias-corrected bootstrapping for indirect effects to test the path from condition to blame via moral concern, which revealed a significant indirect effect as indicated by a 95% confidence interval that did not include zero (.02; 1.05). This analysis suggests that the increase in victim blame in the objectification condition is directly accounted for by the withdrawal of moral concern for the victim.

To examine whether changes in perceived indirect victim suffering are accounted for by a withdrawal of moral concern, we employed a similar analysis. We entered condition as a predictor of victim suffering and found a significant effect ($\beta = -.29$, $p = .026$, $R_{adj}^2 = .07$). Next, we entered condition and moral concern as simultaneous predictors of victim suffering. This revealed that moral concern was a significant predictor ($\beta = .35$, $p = .010$) and condition became non-significant ($\beta = -.16$, $p = .275$ $R_{adj}^2 = .1$), reflecting an overall a significant increase in predictive power, $F(1,57) = 7.14$, $p = .010$. Accelerated and bias-corrected bootstrapping for indirect effects revealed a significant indirect effect, as indicated by a 95% confidence interval that did not include zero (-0.85; -.02). This analysis suggests that the decrease in perceived victim suffering in the objectification condition is directly linked to the withdrawal of moral concern from the woman.

**Discussion**

The current study supports that objectification can have important consequences in situations where women have been mistreated. Examining this effect in the domain of sexual assault, our study supports that an objectified woman is blamed more for being raped than the non-objectified victim. Further, the objectified woman is seen to suffer less in a case of a sexual assault, however, only when the question is asked indirectly. The diminished victimhood and
tacit decrease in perceived suffering of the objectified is directly mediated by differences in the attribution of moral concern. When a woman is objectified, perceivers may restrict their moral concern, making the victim’s status less clear in perceivers’ eyes.

Our findings add to a growing literature on the consequences of sexual objectification. The impact of self-objectification on social and psychological functioning has been both long known and well documented in social psychology (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997; Moradi & Huang, 2008). Recently, research has started to explore the effects of objectifying other people—specifically women—and has found that objectification undermines perceived competence (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009; Loughnan, Haslam, Murnane, et al., 2010). Importantly, our current work extends these findings to reveal that objectification alters how people perceive the victims of deliberate mistreatment.

The impact of attractiveness and provocative attire on rape victim blame has been well documented (Brems & Wagner, 1994; Edmonds & Cahoon, 1986; Workman & Freeburg, 1999). Missing from this literature was an understanding of the psychological processes linking victim appearance to reduced victim blame. The results of the current study indicate that objectification plays an important and previously unrecognized role. Sexualized women are objectified through a denial of moral concern, and this reduced moral concern is linked to increased victim blame and tacitly reduced perceived victim suffering. Stated otherwise, attractive and provocatively dressed women appear to be viewed as lesser victims because they are viewed as less human and more object-like, which elicits less moral concern. This finding adds clarity to a longstanding effect in the social and forensic psychology literature.

Whereas most prior forensic psychology research has used increased victim blame as an
OBJECTIFICATION INCREASES BLAME

indicator for a general reduction of victimhood, the current study has also demonstrated similar
effects with perceived victim suffering. Although increased victim blame has an effect on legal
decision making (see Grubb & Harrower, 2008, 2009), victim suffering may play a more
important role in victim rehabilitation. If sexualized women are seen to suffer less, they may be
afforded less support in post-assault recovery, which in turn can lead to psychosomatic
symptoms, depression, and re-victimization (Ullman, 1999). Importantly, we found in the
current study that the strongest denial of this suffering occurred for indirect measures. This is a
particularly worrying finding because people’s overt statements—and indeed, judgments—of
victim suffering may not change, obscuring their insight into the impact of objectification.
Combined, our findings indicate that the effects of objectification may interfere with the
victim’s successful recovery.

There were no rater differences by gender in the current study. The lack of a rater-
gender effect is not uncommon in sexual objectification research (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009;
Heflick, Goldenberg, Cooper, & Puvia, 2011; Loughnan, Haslam, Murnane, et al., 2010). As Vaes
and colleagues (Vaes et al., 2011) have recently demonstrated, both men and women tend to
dehumanize sexualized women. It may be that because both men and women tend to
dehumanize objectified women, no significant gender difference in ratings of victims emerges.

The measures in our study showed acceptable but low reliability. The scales we
employed were tailored for our study and therefore may be expected to have somewhat lower
levels of reliability compared with well-validated measures. However, in the absence of such
validated measures, these scales represent an important first step toward establishing robust
measures of objectification. There is currently no known well-validated measure of mind
OBJECTIFICATION INCREASES BLAME

attribution, and the development of such a scale would be useful beyond the field of sexual
objectification. It is also worth noting that the low reliability likely works against finding
statistical mediation because the maximum possible correlation between two variables is
limited by scale reliability; thus, the significant mediation observed in our data indicates a
robust association between objectification, and suffering and blame.

Limitations and Future Directions

Future research may also examine the role of victims’ coping strategies. In the related
domain of stranger harassment (sexual harassment of women in public places by men who are
strangers), Fairchild and Rudman (2008) have shown that women’s coping strategies were
significantly related to self-objectification. In their study, women reported greater self-
objectification depending on their experiences of stranger harassment. This was particularly
true for those women who responded either passively or with self-blame to stranger
harassment. Future research should examine whether victims’ strategies in the case of sexual
assault may affect both their suffering and successful recovery. Specifically, future studies
should examine the mediating or moderating role of self- and other-sexual objectification on
the relationship between behavioural self-blame and coping strategies, like social withdrawal
and cognitive restructuring. Finally, the current study relied exclusively on an undergraduate
sample. Although undergraduates can be representative of the general public, sometimes this
is not the case (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). A more robust test of these findings may
involve older adults exposed to simulated courtroom materials.

Future researchers may also choose to examine the role of different types of rape
scenarios. The current scenario presented a standard acquaintance rape vignette; however, one
might also examine instances of stranger rape as another condition under which objectification might play an important role. Further, the current vignette indicated that alcohol consumption preceded the rape. It may be that depicting the presence of alcohol in the vignette interacts with sexual objectification to alter blame judgments. These future directions would help extend the scope of this finding.

**Practical Implications**

Our study may have important implications for people working with rape victims. There is a need to educate people who work with rape victims regarding potential negative social reactions from others in the aftermath of an assault (Ullman, 1999). According to Ullman’s (1999, p. 355) review “formal support providers (e.g., physicians, police) are perceived to be the least helpful and respond to victims with negative social reactions (with the exception of rape crisis centers).” By providing more information into the cognitive processes of victim-blaming and diminished perceived suffering, educational interventions with these support providers may be informed and target these erroneous cognitions in order to improve victim contact with medical, clinical and criminal justice personnel. Counseling and clinical professionals treating sexual assault survivors may wish to be aware that how the victim is perceived by others in her environment—whether she is objectified by them or not—may influence the extent to which others blame her and expect a rapid, easy recovery. It should be noted that ours is the first known study in this domain so that further replication and extension of this finding is required.

**Conclusion**

Our current work indicates that objectification has implications for the victims of sexual assault. When women are objectified, perceivers withdraw attributions of mind and restrict
their moral concern. This restriction of moral concern plays an important role in how victimhood is subsequently judged; the objectified are blamed more and tacitly seen to suffer less. Objectification may play an important role in the way people ultimately view and treat victims of sexual assault, as well as other forms of de-humanizing mistreatment.
References


Footnote

1 Five parallel items were included to assess participants' perceptions of Mike's responsibility, but this measure did not attain acceptable internal consistency reliability. Given that our hypotheses were focused more on perceptions of Laura per se, we did not include these data in our analyses.

2 The number of male participants in our study was relatively small. The required effect size to detect a difference between 15 men and 44 women on a two-tailed t-test with an alpha of .05 is $d = 1.09$. This is a large effect, but not so distant from the effects observed in our study (e.g., $d = .90$). Based on prior research, it seems unlikely that gender differences exist in sexual objectification. K. Gray et al. (2011, Study 3) sampled 565 people, 53% of whom were men, and they found no significant difference by gender for sexual objectification. Thus, we conclude that although it is possible that small numbers of male participants are responsible for the failure of gender effects to emerge, we think it unlikely.
Table 1

**Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for All Study Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratings of the Target</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<td>1. Mind attribution</td>
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<td>--</td>
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<td>.15</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td>3. Victim blame</td>
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<td>Control</td>
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<td>.91</td>
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*Note.* Different subscripts for the two means comparing the Objectified and Control conditions within each of the five ratings indicate a significant difference. *p < .05.*