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The promise of historical sociology in International Relations

Abstract

This article draws on historical sociology, in particular on historical institutionalism, in order to critique the micro, macro and meso-levels of contemporary International Relations theory. It develops a conjunctural, mid-range approach focusing on institutional development, change and disintegration that aims to capture the extent and scale of processes of large-scale change in the international realm. The article seeks to broaden this argument by outlining the broader possibilities of historical sociology to International Relations theory and practice.

Biographical Sketch

George Lawson is Lecturer in International Relations at Goldsmiths College, University of London. Dr Lawson's principal research interests lie in processes of radical change and the intersection between historical sociology and International Relations. Dr Lawson is convener of the British International Studies Association's working group on Historical Sociology and IR (www.historical-sociology.org), and his most recent book is *Negotiated Revolutions: The Czech Republic, South Africa and Chile* (Ashgate: 2005).

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Why historical sociology?*

A decade or so on from the apparent triumph of Western market democracy, world politics is marked by turbulence and instability. Perhaps reflecting the uncertain tenor of world politics, so International Relations (IR) theory too is undergoing a period of flux. The root and branch assault on mainstream approaches ushered in by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar era has shown few signs of abating in recent years. Rather, the fracture between rationalism and reflectivism, allied to splinters within these broad camps, has produced a scene of dizzying complexity. In place of the pedestrian neorealist and institutionalist inter-paradigm debate has emerged a display of ebullient plumage: neo-classical (Rose 1998), offensive (Mearsheimer 2003; Elman 2004) and defensive (Van Evera 1999) realism,¹ a rekindled liberalism (Moravcsik 1997; Legro and Moravcsik 1999),² various forms of constructivism (Onuf 1989, 1998; Adler 1997; Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1999),³ normative theory (*pace* Hoffman 1981; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Brown 2002), a *mélange* of post-positivist approaches,⁴ and a reconvened English School (Dunne 1998; Buzan 2004),⁵ all

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¹ The terms 'offensive' and 'defensive' realism were introduced into IR by Snyder (1991).

² Perhaps the main empirical focus of contemporary liberal theory is the democratic peace. On this, see Doyle (1983a and 1983b), Russett (1993), and the various contributions to Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (1996).

³ On constructivism's fissures, see Kratochwil (2000).

⁴ Post-positivism is a somewhat crude catch-all term intended to capture the array of theorists who reject the mechanistic, rationalist project associated with positivist IR. The best introduction to these diverse standpoints is Smith, Booth and Zalewski (1996).

⁵ Dunne and Buzan build on canonical English School texts by Butterfield and Wight (1966), Bull (1977), Wight (1991), and Watson (1992).

competing with neorealism (Waltz 1979, 1993, 1996, 2000; Layne 1993; Walt 1987, 2002)⁶ and institutional theory (Keohane 1984; Martin 1992; Keohane and Martin 1995, 2003)⁷ on the basis of ontological foundations, epistemological logics, and empirical substance.

One of the most striking dimensions of this blossoming of a thousand theoretical approaches has been the sociological turn in IR. Previously rather neglected by IR scholars, at least compared to the influence of economics, political science and political theory, sociology has become increasingly influential over the past decade or so. Several approaches, most notable amongst them constructivism, have discovered (or rediscovered) the work of figures as diverse as Anthony Giddens, Jürgen Habermas and Erving Goffman, not to mention Durkheim, Marx, Gramsci, and Weber. This has served to outline the importance of socially constructed norms, social processes of identity formation, culture and ideology, inter-subjective understandings, and social structures to the study and practice of world politics.

Given this vogue for sociology in IR, it is somewhat surprising that one of sociology's principal sub-disciplines – historical sociology – has received relatively little attention from the IR corpus. This omission is even more striking given that the central concern of historical sociology – processes of large-scale change – seems particularly well suited to examining the complexities of contemporary world politics. In fact, the uncertain tenor of contemporary international affairs seems to have provoked three principle strategies within the IR scholarly community: a continued focus on parsimony that is necessarily and self-consciously partial; a retreat to theoretical bunkers in order to defend a particular set of precepts, concepts and methods; and a renewed attention to micro-narratives that provide ample details about the richness of thick historical experience, but little insight into the broader patterns, trends and trajectories that make up contemporary world politics. The main aim of this article is to

⁶ In this article, neorealism is used synonymously with structural realism.

⁷ On the benefits of interdependence often associated with institutional theory, see Keohane and Nye (2001).

illustrate how a fourth option, that opened up by historical sociology, can contribute to a wider discussion about the role, content and form of IR theory. Historical sociology, as I explore in this article, aims to work alongside, and perhaps even to underpin, a range of IR paradigms. It is, I argue, through just such an approach that the major trends, causal patterns and analytical properties of contemporary world politics can be usefully unpacked, surveyed and explained.

My argument proceeds in four parts. The first section explores the sociological micro-foundations of contemporary IR theory. There will be little here that is of surprise to those who dine out on the intricacies of this subject. But the discussion provides the necessary basis for a second section in which the equally flawed macrofoundations of the discipline are examined. In both sections, insights drawn from historical sociology, and in particular from historical institutionalism, are used to broaden existing concepts and to build bridges between the apparently obdurate spheres of rational action and social structure. The third section examines the capacity of institutions to act as a conduit between structure and agency, in turn providing a viable means of generating ideal-types that can usefully probe the principal patterns of world politics. The final section highlights the main benefits of historical sociology for International Relations.

Micro-foundations

The foundations of any approach that looks to move beyond the stale yet divisive dichotomies of contemporary IR theory must start with the micro-foundations of social action: the assumption of instrumental rationality itself. Neorealism, institutional theory and

liberalism share a common acceptance of the utilitarian underpinnings of social action.⁸ For these schools of thought, actors (primarily states, but on occasion individuals, transnational firms, domestic bureaucracies, terrorist groups, and non-governmental organizations) act in pursuit of their narrowly defined self-interest. In conditions of anarchy, this self-interest is primarily characterized as survival. Preferences, whether endogenously or exogenously derived, are givens or assumptions that generate consistent outcomes.⁹ The three approaches differ about the consequences of these impulses: for neorealists, international politics represents a prisoners dilemma that obviates cooperation except in rare situations of necessity (such as the formation of alliances against a common threat); for institutionalists, cooperation is sustained through iterated tit-for-tat mechanisms in which the threat of retaliation alongside the facilitation of smoother information flows and monitoring mechanisms deters cheating (an example could be the abandonment by Libya of its nuclear program following the invasion of Iraq in 2004); for liberals, preferences are less fixed, subject as they are to the machinations of *Innenpolitik* (state-society relations, party politics, public opinion and the like) as well as transnational forces. Yet nevertheless, it is argued, even preferences derived from the ‘bottom-up’ constitute relatively firm building blocks for the development of parsimonious theory.

⁸ As Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik (1999) put it, the realist focus on resources, the liberal focus on preferences, and the institutional focus on information make up the three leading elements in the rationalist research programme. However, Legro and Moravcsik also want to include constructivist theory that they approve of. Hence, Wendt, Katzenstein and others are invited, by virtue of their insights into beliefs (ideology), to join a ‘meta-paradigm’ that acts as an overarching umbrella within which mainstream approaches to the subject can operate. An analogous argument is made by Lebow (2004).

⁹ The distinction between those who see preferences as rooted in second image factors and those who see preferences as determined either by primal drives or by the structure of the international system is regarded, at least by Andrew Moravcsik (1997), as the fundamental fault-line between neorealism and institutional theory on the one hand, and liberalism on the other. In response, Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin (1995, 2003) accept that preferences may vary according to group conflicts within the state. However, both also argue that the primacy of neorealist and institutionalist research stems from their ability to assume consistent preferences, and to explain state strategies on that basis.

The root of the difficulties that underpin these positions is the matching of rationality with instrumentality. There may well be instances where expected utility analysis is useful, but as a general theory it is overly rigid: it cannot explain behavior that does not appear to be self-interested (such as why people vote in elections when the chance of affecting the outcome directly is minute), why people act out of a sense of duty rather than self-preservation (for example by fighting in wars), or why people behave irrationally (by smoking, taking drugs or, perhaps, joining revolutionary movements).¹⁰ Assuming that preferences and interests are derived from primal drives, domestically determined tastes or the necessities of an unyielding structure may generate consistent findings, but these findings distort rather than reflect reality. For example, in political life, it is not always possible to discern what instrumental utility is. As John Elster (1989) points out, policy makers deal with degrees of probability rather than matters of objective or externally derived fact – they may have too much information or too little, may be presented with wrong evidence, or may make incorrect decisions even when confronted with sufficient evidence. Given a lack of clairvoyance, in circumstances of multiple equilibria there is little way of knowing in advance the optimal path to take. A doctor waiting to perform an emergency operation is acutely aware that the medical team runs the risk of making the patient's condition irreversible if they wait too long in trying to gather information, yet doctors could also jeopardize the success of the operation by beginning the procedure before they have sufficient knowledge of the

¹⁰ On the extent to which IR theories can be said to embrace rationality, see Kahler (1998) and, in particular, Mercer (2005a), who makes the point that rationality is not somehow removed from psychological processes, but rather *dependent* on psychological states such as emotions. As he puts it (2005a:94), 'emotion precedes choice (by ranking one's preferences), emotion influences choice (because it directs one's attention and is the source of action), and emotion follows choice (which determines how one feels about one's choice and influences one's preferences)'. Hence, psychology should be seen less as a means of explaining non-rational mistakes, but more as something that is deeply woven into the fabric of rationality itself. By draining psychology from rationality, Mercer argues, rational choice approaches collapse into normative *ceteris paribus* statements which rely, unwittingly and without acknowledgement, on what he calls 'folk psychology'.

patient's previous medical history and condition. There is no way of functionally deriving in advance the desired outcome, individual or collective, from the myriad of options available to rational actors. Given this, rationality cannot hope to infer truth. Rather, as Elster puts it, the balance between short-term and long-term outcomes, the role of belief, issues of will, and the social mechanisms that constrain instrumental action – norms, laws, conventions, and the like – indicate that instrumentality has limits, boundaries that limit its effectiveness as an overarching theory of social action.

The boundaries of instrumental rational choice are further narrowed by the law of 'unintended consequences' (Merton 1996, *pace* John Locke). Economists have long been aware that firms weather recessions by lowering wages; they are also aware that the unintended consequence of this rational action is that employees have less purchasing power, which as a result tends to deepen the recession. Political decisions such as the development of welfare systems have generated secondary problems in the emergence of poverty traps and welfare dependency.¹¹ In these instances, apparently rational instrumental action produces suboptimal or even counterproductive outcomes. Instrumental individual choice, such as having more children in order to provide for a family in old age, delivers collective counterfinality (overpopulation makes all worse off) if large numbers of families decide on the same strategy.¹² The secondary impact of instrumental action may be positive or negative; the only certainty is that unintended consequences (externalities) ensue. Just as prescription drugs contain side-effects, solving one problem while causing another, so it is with the social world. Rationality is indeterminate in terms of both design and outcome.

¹¹ Nor is the natural world immune from these processes. As Stephen Jay Gould (1985) notes, avian limbs developed to keep birds warm, only later becoming used as a means to develop wings and fly.

¹² Mancur Olsen's (1965) conception of the 'collective action problem' is no less difficult an issue today than when Olsen introduced it into social science forty years ago.

A third set of problems arises from issues of cognition. Over the last thirty years or so, Robert Jervis (1976, 1997, 1998; Jervis and Balzacq 2004) has consistently illustrated the importance of cognitive bias, motivated bias, and cognitive dissonance to foreign policy making. For Jervis, belief systems, often shorthanded as ‘lessons from history’ (such as the appeasement of Hitler at Munich, or the body-bag syndrome inherited from Vietnam), act as filters through which policy makers make decisions. Frequently, Jervis writes, events sweep aside previously held convictions. In this way, the German Socialist Party chose to support the war effort in 1914, much to the disappointment of the party’s more fervent members. Conversely, policy makers often see what they want to see, ignoring alternative possibilities and manipulating information in order to fit pre-ordained images of how the world is rather than rationally judging each decision solely on its merits.¹³ During the Cold War, ‘threat inflation’ by US foreign policy experts consistently overestimated the degree of the Soviet threat. The result was a policy that was not rational in a narrow utilitarian sense but driven, to a great extent, by the ideology of the hawks who advocated it (Mann 2004). Bob Woodward’s (2004) study of the decision making process that led up to the war in Iraq shows that many members of President Bush’s inner circle interpreted the attacks of September 11th through the prism of their predisposition against Saddam Hussein. Sometimes the ‘halo effect’ that surrounds the actions of friendly states is matched by an equally strong bias against one’s enemies, hence the repositories of ‘resolve credit’ (Snyder and Jervis 1993) that help to explain, for example, the very different reputations that the UK enjoys in the United States and Europe.¹⁴ Because there is such a lack of clarity about the intentions of others in the international realm, so policy makers frequently judge the actions of others incorrectly:

¹³ On this, also see Freedman (2003). Ronald Inglehart (1990, 1997) has, over a voluminous career, demonstrated how people’s underlying values are shaped by their material circumstances early in life. While attitudes and opinions may change, underlying deeply-held impulses remain largely stable.

¹⁴ On the importance of reputation in world politics, see Mercer (1996).

misperception and misunderstanding are a commonplace of foreign policy making. Hence, Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia on the perfectly rational basis that the British were fully aware of the extent of his territorial ambition yet, following Munich, lacking the stomach for a fight. In fact, British foreign policy makers were stunned by the invasion and Hitler's actions induced a radical change of policy, leading in turn to the advent of war (Jervis 1976).

The rational choice schema that underpins much contemporary IR theory appears to necessitate what Alexander Wendt (2001) describes as a 'rearview mirror' approach, looking backwards at decisions in order to determine actors 'revealed preferences'. Even then, rational choice is limited in its scope. As Wendt notes, rational choice envisages human beings as slaves to reason, driven by internal mechanical drives about which people can do nothing. There may be a degree of consistency to the heuristics and 'evoked sets' that policy makers work within: operational code analysis (Walker 2003), prospect theory (Farnham 1994, 1997; Levy 1997; McDermott 1998, 2004b; Mercer 2005b) and other such approaches (Young and Shafer 1998, Goldgeier and Tetlock 2001, McDermott 2004a) provide useful starting points for managing the complexity of decision making in international politics.¹⁵ But the central problem surrounding the use of expected utility theory as a guiding principle of IR research revolves around the issues of *which* assumptions should be made in order to simplify reality for the sake of theory. This should only secondarily be a competition about internal elegance; much more important is the quality of research outputs. Yet the narrowness

¹⁵ For example, prospect theory focuses on the ways in which decisions are framed either as gains or losses. If outcomes are framed as losses, perceptions of risk increase; if outcomes are framed as gains, perceptions of risk decline. On the whole people appear to be more concerned about possible losses than with potential gains; and the reference points (frames) which they operate within has a critical effect on which actions they are willing to countenance. As such, policy makers inhabiting a 'domain of loss' are more likely to take risks than those operating in a 'domain of gain'. Applications of prospect theory in IR is, as yet, relatively limited, at least outside foreign policy analysis. But research in economics has attempted to operationalize the theory by examining the failure of consumers to act instrumentally because of their fear of 'losing out', for example by paying too much for a particular service. Daniel McFadden, President of the American Economic Association, calls this process 'agoraphobia' – fear of the marketplace.

of rational, subjective instrumentality privileges presentism in a way that detracts from this goal. Just as the Cold War led to a negative reinterpretation within the Western Alliance of the Soviet role during World War Two, so the 9/11 Commission Report (2004) aptly displays how difficult it was for professionals, from air traffic controllers to White House staffers, to countenance the prospect of an attack that was so far removed from their frontal frames of reference. Policy makers and members of the public alike consistently gamble resources in schemes in which the likelihood of optimal outcomes is minimal – the ‘sunk costs’ that such ventures consume skew the instrumental utility of particular decisions. As such, a focus on subjective expected utility does little justice to the complexity of decision making in a rapidly changing world; it is as if Occam’s razor had become the Manichean foundation for the study of world politics.

Recognizing this, some sociologists have built on initial work carried out by Max Weber in order to broaden the concept of rationality. For Weber, rationality consisted of two ideal-types: *Zweckrationalität* or technical, purposive, calculating needs-based rationality and *Wertrationalität*, which was inspired by and directed to the realization of values or ‘worth’. As Weber (1978:280) put it, ‘frequently, the “world images” that have been created by “ideas” have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamics of interests’. Weber’s dual anchoring of rationality in both interests and norms inspired the work of Herbert Simon (1982, 1983), James March (1988; March and Simon 1958) and others, who studied how decision-making processes in administrative organizations operated as both a logic of consequences *and* a logic of appropriateness.¹⁶ Simon and March found that the time and space that decision-makers could devote to a

¹⁶ Contra Stephen Krasner, who claims that a foundational difference between international and domestic politics is that the former demands a logic of consequences, while the latter accommodates a logic of appropriateness. To put it another way, in the international realm, *homo economicus* trumps *homo sociologicus*. Krasner (1999:51) sums up his position pithily, ‘a bullet through the head has the same effect regardless of the cognitive perspectives of the target’.

particular issue was necessarily limited. In this way, rationality was ‘bounded’, partly due to decision-makers’ own cognitive capacities and beliefs about ‘the right thing to do’, partly because the information they received was ‘imperfect’. In ‘multi-goal coalitions’ like organizations and bureaucracies, choices were made and difficult decisions taken as much because of managers own normative frameworks and cognitive capabilities as it was because of their own *perceived* self-interest. Decision making in these organizations featured a striking level of ambiguity. For March et al., it was more accurate to see individuals as bounded ‘satisficers’ rather than as isolated egoists.

An example helps to illustrate this point further. On 6 June 1944, allied forces began an attack on German-occupied France: Operation Overlord or D-Day. Looking back at D-Day, 60 years or so after the invasion, it is difficult to recall or recapture the sense of uncertainty that surrounded it. Yet recent research indicates that those closest to the invasion were far from certain about its outcome, as indicated by a note prepared by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, General Dwight D. Eisenhower (in Van der Vat 2003:46), in the eventuality of a failed attack:

Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the air force and the navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault is attached to the attempt, it is mine alone.

Eisenhower’s note reveals many of the difficulties associated with utilitarian schema. First, despite an extensive, meticulous research exercise, allied planners were still dealing with imperfect information. They were unable to gauge the full strength of the Germans, the role which would be played (or not) by the Luftwaffe, and they could not fully unravel German communication messages. Second, there were contextual forces and hidden variables that it was impossible to control fully: the weather, which delayed the invasion for several days, the

exact depth of the ocean at their chosen landing points, the number of troops who became seasick and so on. Third, Eisenhower's note invokes a sense of the normative issues – hope, duty, responsibility – without which human history would have no meaning. Collectively held norms define what is appropriate conduct in particular social settings. People's beliefs and views of the world influence both what their interests are and what they perceive them to be. These qualities are fundamental to social life: they are at the root of human experience yet they cannot be predicted in advance. Willpower and collective spirit are the reason why apparently weaker sports teams overcome stronger opponents, and they are also the means by which small, committed bands of revolutionaries can defeat far better resourced, and better armed, adversaries. Functional, utilitarian approaches fail to understand or explain how social action takes place on the ground, and how the various units and actors of world politics play a *formative* role in the creation of their conditions and in processes of social change.

Without an adequate understanding of norms, values and cognition, in addition to building in a more nuanced analysis of risk, uncertainty and psychological processes such as framing and coding, the view of rationality offered by much mainstream IR theory appears more like a belief system relying on the false consciousness of actors who do not know why they are acting in a certain way rather than any kind of universally applicable social theory (Boudon 1998). This picture of parsimonious theory as dependent in the first instance on accepting a thick form of rational choice results in a radically stilted picture of international affairs. As John Elster (1989:54) writes, 'sometimes the world is messy, and the most parsimonious explanation is wrong'. The first dimension of a (historical) sociological turn in IR is to help shift researchers away from the use, and abuse, which follow from the widespread adoption of such a restricted view of rationality.

Macro-foundations

Understanding the intricacies that constitute the micro-processes of world politics does not mean ignoring the more general trajectories that unite states in the modern era, whether this be the triviality of national emblems or the more serious business of shared economies, peoples and history. In the contemporary world, the most powerful of these generic tendencies is modernity itself: the range of political, economic and social processes which have served to recast domestic and international orders over the last four or five hundred years. The resulting constellations – the states-system, capitalism, patriarchy and the like – are structures that contain a global reach. In many ways, therefore, global history over the last half-millennium is a shared story: struggles for and against colonialism, the extension of trade around the world and technological advances have, with varying degrees of coercion, brought the world within some kind of public commons. In this sense, modernity is, as Ernest Gellner (1983) puts it, a ‘tidal wave’ of homogenizing pressures. But the tsunami has not been equally or evenly felt: the commodification of labor, urbanization, bureaucratization, gender equality, universal suffrage and the like may have penetrated even the most inhospitable of environments, but they have not done so in a uniform manner. The systemic dislocations wrought by modernity have provoked a multiplicity of responses: global capitalism and autarky, market-democracy and authoritarianism, fundamentalism and secularism. At its heart, modernity appears to be an inherently contradictory process, one marked by greater affluence but also rising inequality; global forms of governance alongside a drive to local autonomy (Clark 1997).

This terrain – the transformation of social, economic and political orders under modernity – is the principle turf occupied by historical sociology.¹⁷ Although there was, and there remains, much variation within historical sociology, it is possible to delineate three main assumptions that historical sociologists share. First, there is an appreciation that any understanding of contemporary social relations can only be formed by knowledge of the long-term and short-term antecedents which generate them. This means accepting that contemporary conditions are inherited from the past, constraining and enabling the actions of people in the present day. At the heart of historical sociology, therefore, is recognition of the importance of ‘path dependency’ – the idea that there is a causal dependence *from* contemporary events and processes *to* prior occurrences.¹⁸ Such an understanding runs counter to the tendencies of much IR theory to truncate the study of world politics by reifying social processes and social facts – states, the market, sovereignty – as timeless analytical (and ultimately as ontological) entities. The 200 or so states that make up contemporary world politics are forced into the same timeless conceptual straightjacket as the 600,000 or so political communities that existed 3000 years ago, ignoring the historical evolution from a sparse system of states, to a society of states, and perhaps, to a world society (Wendt 2003, Buzan 2004). This has been neither a linear nor a structurally determined path. Rather, it has

¹⁷ A selective list of post-war historical sociology would include Mills (1958), Smelser (1958), Bloch (1961), Eisenstadt (1963), James (1963), Lipset (1963), Moore (1966), Aron (1968), Braudel (1972), Anderson (1974a and 1974b), Bendix (1978), Stinchcombe (1978), Collins (1979), Skocpol (1979, 1992), Calhoun (1982), Wallerstein (1983), Giddens (1984), Hall (1985), Mann (1986, 1993, 2004), Gellner (1988), Tilly (1988, 1999, 2003), Sayer (1991), Collier and Collier (1991), Spruyt (1994), Rosenberg (1994), Ertman (1997), Frank (1998), Collier (1999), Halliday (1999), Buzan and Little (2000), Parsa (2000), Shaw (2000), Mahoney (2001), Teschke (2003), Hobson (2004), Thelen (2004), Pierson (2004), and Lawson (2005). Useful collections of historical sociology can be found in Skocpol (1984), Evans, Reuschmeyer, and Skocpol (1985), McDonald (1996), Delanty and Isin (2003), Mahoney and Reuschmeyer (2003), Gould (2005), and Adams, Clemens, and Orloff (2005).

¹⁸ Although it is important to note that this does not mean a necessary acceptance of teleology, linearity and monocausality. On this point, see Sewell (1996). On path dependency, see Abbott (1990, 2001), Aminzade (1992), Arthur (1994), Ertman (1997), Isaac (1997), Goldstone (1998), Mahoney (2000), Katznelson (2003), Pierson (2004), and Sewell (2005).

been a story of conflict and struggle as individuals, groups, political communities, religions, firms, nations, and empires have interacted within rapidly shifting contexts in the construction of contemporary world politics.¹⁹

Such a move runs counter to the ahistorical tendencies of much IR theory – the mining of the past in order to confirm suppositions about the present, the smoothing out of differences, varieties and processes of change in the interests of methodological purity and theoretical rigidity, and the bracketing off of history behind an eternal ‘illusory present’ (Hobson 2006). Thus, the contest between Athens and Sparta is transplanted to the Cold War in order to elucidate the stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union; all wars, whether they be guerrilla insurgencies or total conflicts, are fundamentally explicable by the basic facts of international anarchy and instrumental action; and all political units – city-states, nomadic tribes, empires, nation-states and transnational alliances – are functionally undifferentiated. As a consequence of this, much IR theory exists *outside* history (Rosenberg 1994b), operating from a static picture of world politics which irons out differences between political units, omits global structural forces beyond anarchy and polarity, and reduces agency to the unit-level musings of statesmen, financiers and generals. Historical sociology, like classical social theory more generally, is rooted in the substantive application of social relations as they are constituted *in* time and place, followed by the examination of how far these social processes and social facts are generalisable *across* both time and space. And this focus stands in stark contrast to the ‘synchronic mystique’ (Hobson 2002) within which much IR theory labors, in which the past, the present and the future are presented as one and the same story – a giant optical illusion which distorts rather than captures the richness of history’s multiple landscapes.

¹⁹ The reduction of international politics behind reified abstractions also generates a Eurocentrism which does a disservice to the myriad ways in which the non-western world has been at the leading-edge of global political, economic and cultural developments. On this, see Amin (1988), Frank and Gills (1996), Frank (1998), and Hobson (2004).

Second, historical sociologists agree on the importance of accounting for changing temporal context. For example, modern forms of empire, revolution and war diverge fundamentally from cases drawn from previous epochs precisely because the context for action – domestic and international – as well as the structures and agents bound up with these processes of change are substantively different. The result is what we might call ‘research with adjectives’ (Collier and Levitsky 1997), or more specifically, middle-range theory: the linking of general abstractions (such as society, state or empire) with additional explanatory signifiers (industrial vs. post-industrial society; market state vs. sovereign state; formal vs. informal empire), in order to provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between conceptual abstractions and empirical research. Examples include exploration of how the general structural condition of the Cold War played out in regional contexts,²⁰ and at how time and space differentiation impacts on general abstractions such as empire (Lieven 2001; Mann 2003) and revolution (Halliday 1999; Lawson 2005).²¹

The Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori (1970) makes this point well. For Sartori, at the extreme edge of abstraction lies the possibility of ‘concept stretching’ or ‘straining’ towards vague, amorphous crystallizations, pseudo-universals without either precision or purchase. Sartori proposed that social science works within a ladder of abstraction ranging from general abstractions (genus) to mid-level taxonomies (class) to empirical analysis (species). In this way, Sartori argued, social scientists are best served by starting with medium-level abstractions or hypothesis, and working up and down the ladder of abstraction, testing whether their hunches fit both with more general concepts, and with the available empirical material. For Sartori, this process of ‘conceptual travelling’ generates

²⁰ For an application of this type of research to the Middle East, see Halliday (2005).

²¹ The term ‘theories of the middle-range’ comes from Robert Merton (1996). It is important to note that not all historical sociology adopts this approach. Indeed, there is a major strand of historical sociology, with its roots in Marxism, which is holist, structuralist and determinist. In Lawson (2006), I provide a mapping exercise which differentiates between types of historical sociology.

‘fact-storing containers’ (empirical universals) which are geared at unravelling the interplay between homogeneity and heterogeneity, and which combine explanatory purchase with a high level of empirical content. Subsequently renamed by David Collier and James Mahon (1993) as a ‘ladder of generality’, Sartori’s method allows concepts, categories and causal regularities to be rigorously assessed over time and space, while also allowing for the generation of workable, theoretically compelling taxonomies, and classificatory schemas which can differentiate between normal abnormality and abnormal normality.²²

Third, historical sociologists argue that empirically sound, comparative work can direct disciplines away from static, snap-shot approaches to a more vibrant account that can make sense of the dynamism of social action and social change. Rather than searching for a kind of functional homology between social and historical processes, history itself becomes the tool kit or route map that, as Dennis Smith (1991:184) puts it, ‘can help us distinguish between open doors and brick walls’. Over the last two centuries, several waves of historical sociologists have studied the interaction between large-scale structural processes, and the action of individuals, groups and states that has both produced and reproduced them.²³ These scholars have found enduring patterns to world politics, but have also discovered that even the most powerful social structures are historically particular, created by the actions of people

²² Sartori’s work echoes the clarion call issued by the American sociologist C. Wright Mills (1958), who long called for a social scientific enterprise which eschewed both grand theory (abstraction without application) and abstracted empiricism (behaviouralist quantifications of human action). For more on how Sartori and Mills contribute to the ‘historical sociological imagination’, see Lawson (2006).

²³ This is not to say that all historical sociologists have adopted this line. Much ‘second wave’ historical sociology exhibited a tendency to focus on the structural dimensions of social change – relative geopolitical position, degrees of modernization, class relations and so on – to the detriment of agency, both domestic and international. See, for example, Moore (1967), Skocpol (1979), and Goldstone (1991). Others have attempted to link rational choice explicitly to historical sociology, although not without attracting criticism. On this, see Hechter (1992), Hechter and Kiser (1998), Somers (1998) and the various contributions to Gould (2005). However, for the most part, historical sociologists have tended to adopt a form of relationism (Emirbayer 1997). On the various ‘waves’ of scholarship within historical sociology, see Smith (1991), Lawson (2005), and Evans, Clemens, and Orloff (2005).

in a particular time and space: empires rise and fall; world religions are forced to reform their practices or face losing moral authority; dictators delegate and slaves rebel. There are numerous homogenizing features that effect the international realm ranging from the spread of global capitalism, religions, ideologies and languages to the adoption of national flags, anthems, airlines, football teams and Olympic squads, but these processes are neither unalterable nor are they uncontested. Human beings are not puppets whose movements are controlled by unseen forces nor are people automatons, doomed to respond to stimuli in prescribed ways. If this was the case, history would offer no surprises, no tale of David defeating Goliath, no example of revolutionary change being made in unlikely circumstances. Yet, to take on this latter example, revolutions are processes in which people actively create and respond to changing contexts, constructing novel social orders that are both constrained and enabled by social structures inherited from the past. No structure, however immutable it seems, lasts forever.

The dynamism of this picture, a story of the making of the modern world rooted in the co-constitutive role played by material and ideational factors, by economic, social and political processes, and by international and domestic forces, is one that is only latently recognized within the IR lexicon. Indeed, the contrast with structural theories of International Relations, in particular neorealism, could scarcely be more pronounced. At its core, neorealism is static, denying changes to the deep structure of the international system over time and place. For structural realists, only third image explanations carry with them the prospect of genuine theory. Even a minimal interpretation of the theory sees the third level of analysis as the basic starting point for theorizing about world politics. Without accepting the explanatory implications of the anarchical international system, structural realists argue, one cannot understand the mechanism of balancing, nor the eternal security dilemma (Jervis 1978) that states labor within. The unyielding fact of anarchy breeds a world of depressing

consistency: of timeless state conflict as a necessary impulse of the self-help system, of statesmen foolishly playing dice with the loaded mechanisms of international structure,²⁴ of division within the world based only on relative material (for which the word power is often misleadingly substituted) capabilities.²⁵ This may be a theory, but it is a theory without a nuanced understanding of structure or world history.

Neorealists assert that there is a dual structure to international politics: a primary level of (constant) anarchy that compels processes of socialization, emulation and competition, and a secondary (variable) sphere of polarity, which effects the quality of balancing.²⁶ Neither of these structures seems to contain much analytical purchase. First, beyond *describing* a world without a Leviathan, it is difficult to see what *explanatory* weight anarchy carries. The absence of world government does not mean the absence of order. In various epochs in world history, empires, hegemons, and security communities have acted as the functional equivalent of Leviathans, laying down standards, both by force and by consent, and providing order within their sphere of control. In this sense, hierarchy is just as much a feature of world politics as anarchy (Lake 1996; Wendt and Friedheim 1996; Cooley 2005; Hobson and

²⁴ 'States are free to disregard the imperatives of power, but they must expect to pay a price for doing so'. Waltz (2000:37). Quite how an imperative allows the actor to be free is not a point that Waltz sees fit to comment upon. Nor is the price of this dereliction of structural (non) necessity explained in full.

²⁵ For such a central topic of analysis, power is a radically underdeveloped concept in International Relations. Power derives from the Latin word *potere*, which literally means 'to be able'. It has therefore normally been applied in the social sciences as a causal concept signifying a capacity to effect people or events. Yet, in International Relations, power has tended to be used in a static sense to denote the distribution of resources and capabilities within the anarchical system. For alternative conceptions of power as a relational, dynamic process see Clegg (1989), Wrong (1995), Hindess (1996), and Stewart (2001).

²⁶ For Waltz (1979), the ideal international system is bipolar, as it offers the best chance of regularizing contact and minimizing conflict (although it is not without the risk of overreaction to small threats). Unipolarity is inherently unstable in that rival states will form a coalition to challenge the sole power. Multipolarity is the most unstable system of all, producing shifting alliances and the likelihood of unlimited war. On the potential benefits of hegemonic systems in which a single power is responsible for laying down and enforcing global rules, particularly in the sphere of international political economy, see Kindleberger (1973), and Gilpin (1981).

Sharman 2005). Institutions, formal in the sense of international laws, international organizations and treaties, and informal as carried by conventions, rules and standards of behavior have long provided mechanisms through which international affairs can be conducted (Bull 1977, Reus-Smit 1997, Buzan 2004).²⁷ If the international structure *determined* the form and function of its constituent parts, observable effects would follow discernible causes without room for unseen or collective action, unintended consequences, creativity or surprise in world politics. How, then, to explain the capacity of a range of actors – OPEC in 1973, al-Qaida in 2001 among them – to act well beyond their underlying power capabilities and generate substantive changes to the texture of world politics?²⁸

It is also difficult to weigh with any great certainty the impact of various forms of polarity. The contemporary world is often considered to be unipolar, but this scarcely seems the case in Europe, where, given both the hard power and the soft authority held by the European Union (EU), and the current frostiness of the transatlantic alliance, the continent does not appear much like the lapdog of an overbearing hegemon.²⁹ Nor is the US unrivalled in Asia, where China, India, Japan, and Pakistan all maintain countervailing tendencies to American influence, particularly when it comes to crunch security issues such as North Korea. Sub-Saharan Africa, for its part, is perhaps better seen as a sphere without structural authority; the Middle East is a tinderbox region of arcane complexity. Thus, even a cursory glance at the contemporary world displays multiple international systems in operation: a ‘post-modern’, Kantian world inhabited by members of the European Union; a Lockean, modern system

²⁷ Nicholas Onuf (1998:61) puts this point simply: ‘rules yield rule’. On the capacity of institutions to generate ‘governance without government’ in the international realm, see Rosenau (1991). For a more assessment of these issues, see Ruggie (2004).

²⁸ It should be noted that Waltz has somewhat rowed back from the idea of anarchy as determining state behaviour. Hence (2000:24), ‘structures shape and shove, but they do not determine the actions of states’.

²⁹ Indeed, the parlous state of the transatlantic relationship has led some scholars to see European states (among others) as beginning a process of ‘soft balancing’ against the United States. On this, see Pape (2005), and Paul (2005). For a counter-argument, see Brooks and Wohlforth (2005).

experienced by the EU's 'near abroad'; and the Hobbesian, 'pre-modern' conditions which are all too pervasive in much of sub-Saharan Africa.³⁰

Historically, too, there have been countless international systems, many of which have overlapped with each other. As Barry Buzan and Richard Little's (2000) extensive analysis of international systems throughout world history shows, the international system in Ancient Greece extended beyond city-states to embrace Carthage, Rome, Egypt, the Persian Empire and barbarian tribes, perhaps extending to India. At the height of the Roman Imperium, the Han Empire in China was bigger, more sophisticated, and featured a far higher level of centralized authority than its Roman counterpart (Lieven 2001). Neither in terms of contemporary world politics, nor with reference to the historical record, does it seem a straightforward exercise even to determine the number of poles operating at any one time, let alone carry out an assessment of the logics that various polarities generate. Debates about the relative stability and durability (or not) of unipolarity, the need to distinguish (or not) within the broad category of multipolarity (for example, for a subset of tripolarity), and the lack of agreement about even the most basic characteristics of balancing, seems less a construction of a progressive research program than a numbers game designed primarily to keep academics in gainful employment.³¹ All theories need to simplify reality in order to function as theories, but when this process involves distorting history to such a degree, perhaps it is the theoretical *explanans* itself that needs addressing.

³⁰ Alexander Wendt (1999) identifies three 'cultures of anarchy' – Kantian, Lockean and Hobbesian – depending on whether other states are seen as friends, rivals or foes. This is mirrored by work carried out by the British diplomat Robert Cooper (2000) who divides the world into 'post-modern', 'modern' and 'pre-modern' zones.

³¹ This has not, of course, stopped scholars from constructing a cottage industry around issues of polarity. On this, see Waltz (1979), Gilpin (1981), Walt (1987, 2005), Christensen and Snyder (1990), Layne (1993), Schweller (1998), Wohlforth (1999), Waltz (2000). Recent work on balancing can be found in Ikenberry (2002), Paul, Wirtz and Fortmann (2004), and Schweller (2004, 2006).

An example helps to further illustrate this point. Paul Schroeder's (1994) study of European inter-state politics between 1648 and 1945 indicates that states hid from threats, bandwagoned or tried to transcend problems more often than they pursued a strategy of balancing. Different states facing the same threat nevertheless devised different strategies to deal with them. Nor did the balance of power appear as a necessary axiom of European politics; equilibrium was far less often the norm than asymmetries of power. The creation of the Concert System during the first half of the nineteenth century was a deliberate attempt to design an interconnected system that could generate an '*equilibre politique*' (Shroeder 1993) of functionally differentiated roles, duties and responsibilities.³² Crucially, it was not just interests that bought the concert system together, but a shared sense of identity. State interests were multiple and shifting rather than narrow and fixed, accommodating changes to both international and domestic contexts. Neither the move from feudal absolutism to constitutionalist, bureaucratic nation-states, nor the machinations which saw the development of British mercantile ascendancy can be seen through the prism of the anarchic system alone.³³ What parsimony gains in elegance, it appears to lose in empirical veracity.

³² In this way, Britain became the guarantor of balance, the protector of small states, and the promoter of commerce, while Russia was the guardian of the monarchical order, and defender of *ancien regimes* against revolutionary outbursts. The Netherlands and Belgium, along with other small states such as Switzerland, acted as neutral buffers between the great powers. This concert existed, as William Dougherty (1993) notes, beyond the existence of a French threat to European security; rather, it included the restored monarchy.

³³ It is worth looking at the debate which followed the publication of Schroeder's article, in particular the reply by Elman and Elman (1995), and Schroeder's (1995) withering rebuttal. As Schroeder writes (1995:194–5), Elman and Elman provide 'an elaborate word game explaining and predicting nothing about the actual historical character of the international system ... It (neo-realism) addresses only questions, the answers to which we know already, and its explanatory framework is the night in which all cows are black ... it is not even wrong'. Similarly, as Robert Jervis (1998) points out, it is not possible to explain the actions of Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia via anarchy, polarity or rational instrumentality. These states were not driven by narrow self-interest or the necessary pursuit of security, but by a desire to remake their domestic orders, and to reorder the world in this image. Much the same could be said of revolutionary states over the past two hundred years or so. On this, see Halliday (1999) and Lawson (2005).

Many contemporary realists seem to recognize the limits of the neorealist reverence for third image parsimony. Hence, in recent years there has been a shift away from many of the hardcore and auxiliary assumptions of structural realism in favor of a neo-classical approach that fills in (or perhaps does violence to) neorealist foundational axioms.³⁴ Drawing on the work of Thucydides, Carr, Morgenthau, Aron, Wolfers and others, neo-classical realists such as William Wohlforth (1993), Thomas Christensen (1997), Fareed Zakaria (1998), Randall Schweller (1998, 2004, 2006), and Jennifer Sterling-Folker (2002) look at how the systemic pressures afforded by anarchy are translated through unit-level intervening variables, ranging from perceptions to civil-military relations. These scholars show that, without building in scope for ideology, perception, domestic state-society relations and the like, structural accounts fail to explain why states balance or bandwagon, hide or transcend, chain-gang or buck-pass.

Much of the analysis offered by neo-classical realists bears what Wittgenstein might call a 'family resemblance' to historical sociology. Historical sociology aims to unravel the complexity that lies behind the interaction between social action (both deliberate and unintentional) and structural forces (socially constructed but with an enduring authority and dynamic of their own). Hence, international factors are conjoined with domestic variables in order to find patterns that explain central social processes: wars, alliances, the rise and fall of great powers and so on. Over the last twenty years, research drawing on the nexus between historical sociology and IR has borne substantial fruit: analysis of the origins and varieties of

³⁴ Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik (1999) doubt whether neo-classical realists can really be seen as realists, given that the two variables that the two groups share – the retention of anarchy (and its consequent self-help system) and rationalism – are not sufficiently distinctive to warrant the realist coat of arms. On the one hand, the shifting sands of realism can be seen as a strength, providing what Michael Banks (in Guzzini 2004:544) calls a 'vacuum effect', in which anything valuable is swallowed in the name of the paradigm. But, on the other hand, Legro and Moravcsik argue, if too much is allowed within the realist tent, the paradigm becomes internally contradictory and externally overly promiscuous, begging the question, 'Is anybody still a realist'?

international systems over time and place (Watson 1992, Spruyt 1994, Buzan and Little 2000), exposure of the ‘myth of 1648’ (Osiander 2001, Teschke 2003), analysis of the non-Western origins of the contemporary world system (Wallerstein 1983, Gills 2002, Hobson 2004), work on the co-constitutive relationship between the international realm and state-society relations in processes of radical change (Halliday 1999, Lawson 2005), examination of the social logic of international financial orders (Seabrooke 2006), and exploration of the international dimensions of modernity and globalisation (Rosenberg 1994a, 2005, 2006).

Scholars from other theoretical tribes are also contributing to this form of research. Hence, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald (1996) have used a historically sensitive, comparative analysis to show how the non-use of nuclear and chemical weapons has, in large part, evolved over the last century from the interplay between a number of domestic and international factors, constructing a standard of civilization that prohibits the use of these weapons. Similarly, Martha Finnemore (1996, 2003) has illustrated how the norm of humanitarian intervention has been constructed over time, starting with the protection of Christians from persecution by the Ottoman Empire, and carried via the fight against slavery and decolonization into a universal concept of humanity. The outcome of this journey was neither predetermined nor linear. Rather, it was the subject of conflicts played out domestically and internationally, an uneven development that generated an overarching structural norm within which international intervention could take place.³⁵ In a comparable vein, Thomas Berger (1996) has shown how the national security roles of Germany and Japan refute geopolitical interests and relative capabilities. Rather, identity, values and the culture

³⁵ Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) claim that the influence of norms in constituting change in world politics is threefold. First, norms emerge, usually via individuals and groups who act as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ framing a particular issue and creating a critical mass of support for it, whether that be women’s rights, the abolition of slavery or banning landmines. Secondly, through processes of emulation, imitation and socialization, these norms cascade around the world, carried via state departments, international organizations and epistemic networks. Finally, bureaucracies, both domestic and international, institutionalize the norms as ‘taken-for-granted’ principles that are then formalized in policy.

of foreign policy makers in these countries explains the relatively slight influence of these two great powers, at least militarily, on the contemporary world stage. Other constructivists such as Christian Reus-Smit (1999) and Michael Barnett (2002) also adopt a historical sociological take on the institutional underpinnings of international orders, and on the changing functions of international organizations respectively.

The work of these constructivists and neo-classical realists, allied to the work of other scholars such as Stephen Krasner (1999), John Ikenberry (2003), and Barry Buzan (2004), who also apply historical-comparative methods within the English School, liberal and realist traditions respectively, is not always self-identified as historical sociology. Yet it could be described as such in that each of these studies is rooted in a *diachronic* understanding of the international realm, looking at how social action and social structures, and the social facts engendered by interaction between these two spheres, inhabit a domain of both continuity and disjuncture. In the first instance, such works are empirically grounded studies of ‘sufficient similarity’, using several cases to generate causal patterns and wider inferences beyond either a universalistic program or a collapse into indeterminacy.³⁶ As such, these studies take place within a research tradition dating back to Max Weber’s attempt to provide an empirically rich, comparative study of social facts which he used as a means to generate and evaluate a general argument. This conjoining of interpretation and explanation (*Verstehende Erklärung*) uses awareness of particular contexts in order to derive a nuanced, causal explanation of ideal-types that potentially contains a wider import. It is this approach that, I argue, contains fertile ground for the study of world politics. By tacking between empirical data, conceptual abstractions and causal explanations, as Michael Mann (1986a) puts it, ‘carrying out a

³⁶ On the challenges and opportunities presented by case studies, process tracing and middle-range theory in general (the most common methodological tools employed by historical sociologists), see Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003), and George and Bennett (2005).

constant conversation between the evidence and one's theory', it is possible to refine and refute, engage with and accumulate knowledge.

As it has developed, historical sociology has been applied within a number of formal disciplines and across a number of issue areas. Historical sociologists have asked important questions, probed at interesting puzzles, provided some compelling hypothesis, and produced an array of empirical studies on subjects as varied as the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and the development of manners. By adopting a historically sensitive, comparative set of tools, historical sociologists have concentrated on how to link the broad currents of world politics with events on the ground, in other words how to marry 'organic tendencies' to historical happenstance. The principal question for historical sociologists working with middle-range theory is, how is it possible to navigate a coherent path through the complexities of world politics? What are the tools of correspondence that can mediate between international and domestic factors, material and normative issues, general and genetic tendencies? What are the *via medias* that can incorporate the logic of both creative agency and structural authority, mediums capable of uncovering, in John Searle's (1995:5) words, 'the structure of social reality'?

Meso-foundations

A number of scholars have turned to the study of institutions as a means of finding just such a conduit. Advocates of the 'new institutionalism' (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; March and Olsen 1989; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; Thelen 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005) claim that institutions can lay bare the dynamic between people's interests and preferences, and the standing conditions and patterned relations within which they act and which are

effected by their agency. Institutions, for these scholars, are the sites where international and domestic, material and normative factors, social facts and brute reality are joined.³⁷

Perhaps the most prominent element of the ‘new institutionalism’ is a rational choice approach that understands institutions as stabilizing, constraining forces. For rational choice advocates, institutions are coordinating mechanisms which sustain social equilibrium, a kind of social cartilage binding society together, and reducing the possibility of conflict. Much of this view is rooted in a common sense understanding of institutions. After all, the British House of Lords and the US Supreme Court are, by their very nature, associated with continuity, stickiness and stasis. But as Kathleen Thelen (1999, 2004) points out, what gives these institutions their staying power is actually their adaptability and capacity to *evolve* over time. Institutional survival depends on flexibility: the House of Lords, for example, has resisted the extension of the franchise and concomitantly, the increased legitimacy of the House of Commons, as well as the removal of hereditary peers and various attempts to reform it out of existence. Likewise, as Stephen Krasner (1999) examines, the long-established principle of sovereignty has endured precisely because of the multiplicity of meanings and interpretations that have been attached to it. Institutions may be sticky, but they also appear to move.

Following Thelen and others, an alternative group of scholars, sometimes referred to as ‘sociological’ or ‘historical institutionalists’, focus on how institutions develop and adapt rather than on how they function. As such, institutions are not conceived as timeless variables performing a universal task, but particular to time and place, and requiring reproduction (positive feedback) in order to keep pace with changing norms and material contexts. Margaret Weir (1992), for example, sees institutions as engaged in ‘bounded innovation’. For

³⁷ Much of the sociological literature on institutions is drawn from work originating in economic history and, in particular, from the pioneering studies of Douglass North (1990, 2004), and Brian Arthur (1994).

Weir, once changes are ‘locked-in’, they are difficult to shift; small initial differences can become substantial ones over time.³⁸ By the very nature of the interplay between agency and structural context, institutions are examples of ‘bricolage’ in which layers of changes take place over the top of others. Institutional innovation is the norm, but only on top of existing foundations and within set parameters. Institutions are at once sites of change, reproduction and transformation, a means of unraveling the continuity and disjuncture of domestic and international orders.

The main problem with the use of institutions in IR is the neorealist and institutionalist conception of institutions as *functional* necessities for generating order.³⁹ In other words, states seek to exploit their power and reduce security threats *by necessity*, often through designing institutions, brittle or robust as they may be. For neorealists, institutions are reflections of state power and the relative distribution of capabilities. In other words, institutions are doubly yoked, firstly to state interests, and by dint of this subservience, for a second time within the structure of international anarchy. Thus for Mearsheimer (1990, 1995), Krasner (1991), Waltz (2000) and others, institutions serve at the whim of the great powers or hegemons, to be used, abused and ignored as needs dictate. The first cut of institutional theory, for these scholars, should be an analysis of divergent national power capabilities. As Stephen Krasner (1991) argues, on issues where there are disagreements about basic principles and norms that underwrite institutions, or if there is a radical asymmetry of power between states, then institutions are unlikely to develop or endure. Because institutions rely on the great powers for their very existence, any effect they have is

³⁸ On the importance of time, sequence and positive feedback processes to the development of institutions and political orders, see Abbott (1990, 2001), Aminzade (1992), Arthur (1994), Ertman (1997), Isaac (1997), Goldstone (1998), Mahoney (2000), Katznelson (2003), Pierson (2004), and Sewell (2005).

³⁹ A comprehensive discussion of neorealist and institutionalist positions can be found in Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001).

weak and inconsequential, limited to those situations in which power capabilities are more or less equal, and shared interests and mutual gains will follow.

For institutional theorists, institutions are designed to deliver absolute, if suboptimal, gains under conditions of anarchy.⁴⁰ Because there are only ‘thin’ push factors towards cooperation in the international realm, states create institutions in order to overcome collective action problems, reduce transaction costs, lessen incentives for cheating, facilitate informational flows, shorten the shadow of the future by transparently providing anticipated returns, and distribute capabilities more evenly. As such, they are focal points for cooperation, providing essential monitoring and information tasks that can deliver what John Mearsheimer (1995) describes (or derides) as ‘distributional gains’. The creation and maintenance of institutions engenders system equilibrium and therefore, some degree of stability.⁴¹ In this way, institutionalists are attempting to augment rather than subvert neorealism. As Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin (2003:42) put it, ‘by seeking to specify the conditions under which institutions can have an impact and cooperation can occur, institutional theory shows under what conditions realist propositions are valid’.

Institutional theory has, as proponents admit, not done enough testing *ex ante* difficult cases; often there has been a selection bias in the choice of non-random, restricted cases by which to examine the theory. Moreover, the question over whether institutions act as dependent or independent variables in specific cases has led to questions about the problem of endogeneity that the theory contains.⁴² For their part, neorealists have yet to explain the

⁴⁰ Some institutionalists argue that, in certain cases, gains may be relative rather than absolute. Hence, Keohane and Martin (2003) agree that the interests of states may diverge in terms of the distribution of gains, particularly between strong and weak states. In this sense, there is no agreement about what Stephen Krasner (1991) calls the ‘Pareto frontier’: the realm of mutual gains.

⁴¹ An exploration of the institutional dimensions of international order contained in post-war settlements is offered by Ikenberry (2001).

⁴² A problem recognised by some of its proponents, for example, Keohane and Martin (2003).

endurance and increasing density of institutions in global affairs.⁴³ Even if institutions are endogenous to state interests and international structure, they are not necessarily epiphenomena. For example, in situations of multiple equilibria, institutions may exert a considerable degree of agency and independence. International institutions often establish a relative autonomy from the states that set them up by constructing categories of actors (like refugees), promoting new interests (such as human rights), or transferring models of political association around the world (in particular, democracy). As work on principal-agent theory shows (Gould 2003, 2004), international financial institutions like the IMF have a fair degree of latitude vis-à-vis their apparent masters. Once set up, international institutions often move in ways quite removed from their intended function, generating inconvenient commitments in the process. Thus, the states that have created the International Criminal Court are also subject to its jurisdiction, and European states that have chosen to pool economic decision making in a continent-wide central bank are thereafter constrained by its decisions.

Work by Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999, 2004) has indicated the extent to which international institutions assign meaning and normative values to certain modes of behavior, helping to construct and constitute the social world in their image. By carrying out the 'duties of office' and 'doing their job', international institutions control information and establish a level of expertise that states cannot possess. This specialized knowledge shapes rather than merely implements the policy directives of states. Hence, UN peacekeepers have an authority that stems from their role as neutral, independent actors implementing Security Council resolutions. The World Bank classifies who can be considered 'peasants', 'farmers' and 'laborers', and asserts its authority by dictating the content and direction of global development programs. The United Nations High

⁴³ Michael Barnett (2002) calculates that, while in 1860 there were just five international institutions and one international NGO, by 1940, there were 61 and 477 respectively; by the turn of the millennium, there were 260 international institutions and over 5,000 international NGOs.

Commissioner for Refugees has the power to set up camps, and make life and death decisions, without recourse to consultation with the UN's member states. International institutions fix meanings, establish rules, and transmit norms around the international realm.⁴⁴ In this way, they can act as agents of progressive change rather than as conservative constraints or as mechanisms of the status-quo ante.

Similarly, institutions are not functionally determined. Some international institutions, like the European Union, take on rather more functions than was originally intended, while others such as the Arab League, the Organization of American States and the African Union, do less. As Adam Ferguson (in Onuf 2002:215) wrote over two hundred years ago, 'institutions are the result of human action, but not the execution of human design'. Many international institutions move well away from the vision of their founders. The 'switch costs' of changing or abolishing institutions once they are established, despite changes in overarching structural conditions, engenders a degree of path dependence (Keohane and Martin 2003). Thus, the UN Security Council, set up to reflect post-war power capabilities, has to date resisted calls for fundamental reform of its make-up and functions despite the structural shift that accompanied the end of the Cold War. Nineteenth century governmental departments set up to meet the challenges of the industrial age persist despite their lack of success in tackling the thorniest issues of the information economy. As changes occur to the context within which they were formed, institutions generate effects and exhibit a capacity for persistence beyond endogenous interests, preferences, and the overarching structure within which they act.

Importantly, institutions are sites of conflict as well as tools of consensus. Disputes in the UN Security Council in the lead-up to war in Iraq, the turmoil prompted by the failure of

⁴⁴ As Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 2004) acknowledge, this does not mean that international institutions necessarily carry out these roles well. Factionalism, turf wars, cumbersome decision-making processes, and self-insulated elites do not make for high-quality policy making.

the European Union to agree a draft constitution, and the seemingly ceaseless tensions prompted by processes of EU enlargement, all indicate the ways in which institutions are units of political contestation.⁴⁵ Institutional conflicts and decay go well beyond ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (Krasner 1984:224) in which institutions lose their ‘stickiness’.⁴⁶ The process of *deinstitutionalization* is also crucial to world affairs, consider the cases of the abolition of slavery, or the decline of imperialism and colonialism with all the consequences than ensued. Institutions such as human rights and humanitarian intervention clash with those of sovereignty and self-determination; international political and economic institutions often diverge. Hence, while the UN was condemning the Chilean junta led by General Pinochet during its period of dictatorship, the IMF and World Bank were propping up the regime through beneficial loan agreements.

Likewise, neither neorealism nor institutional theory deals adequately with variation in terms of time and place. As David Stasavage (2004) points out, the optimal design of institutions varies according to changing needs, levels of public opinion, and the legitimacy of the institution. Despite operating under apparently equivalent structural conditions, Athenian hegemony favored third-party arbitration or what Christian Reus-Smit (1997) calls ‘trilateralism’, while the contemporary American version, for the most part, veers between multilateralism, unilateralism, and bilateralism.⁴⁷ The degree to which the Bush

⁴⁵ This is a particular problem for institutionalists, who claim that institutions are essentially derived from out of the need for cooperation. The result is an acceptance, at least by some institutionalists (Keohane and Martin 2003), that in certain cases, particularly those featuring large asymmetries of power, interests may diverge and gains may be relative rather than absolute.

⁴⁶ In using this term, Krasner is applying a term first mooted by the biologist Stephen Jay Gould to describe the switch-points in which long periods of stable reproduction within complex systems are punctuated by short periods of rapid change.

⁴⁷ James Lindsay, an analyst at the Council for Foreign Relations and a former adviser to President Clinton, calls this ‘multilateralism à la carte’. Mark Leonard, Director of the British Foreign Policy Centre, is more explicit, writing that the Bush administration has hit a ‘geopolitical pause button’ which is ‘unilateralist if we care about it, multilateralism if we

administration and its unilateralist perambulations have moved away from Clintonian multilateralism is striking; it also indicates that multilateralism is no necessary impulse directed by the structure of the international system. As John Ruggie (1998) posits, if Germany had won World War Two, it seems scarcely credible to hold that world politics would feature the same predilection for multilateralism as it does today. Rather, multilateralism took the form it did precisely out of a need to rebuild and contain the imperial pretensions of the Soviet Union, Germany and Japan, while at the same time bolstering the transatlantic alliance. Hence, it is not hegemony alone, as neorealist and institutional theory would have it, but *US* hegemony that explains the position of multilateralism in the world today, predominant or subaltern as it may be.

Finally, institutions are not just effects, they are also causes. In other words, they are *constitutive* rather than merely regulative. For John Ruggie (1998), the failure to understand how institutions constitute as well as regulate activity in world politics is the principal failing of the neorealist and institutionalist research traditions, missing out the way in which the *norm* of reciprocal sovereignty must be recognized *before* the state-system can operate effectively; how property rights have to be established *before* a market economy can function; and how the principle of exclusive territoriality exists *prior* to the actualization of guiding structures like the sovereign state. Barry Buzan (2004) has usefully explored the rise, consolidation, decay, and demise of international institutions over time, dividing institutions into 'primary' or 'master' types (shared practices rooted in common values), and secondary, derivative norms, rules, and practices. Hence, for Buzan, sovereignty is the fundamental ground rule which generates international law and non-intervention, in turn engendering international organizations like the UN and the International Criminal Court. The master institution of the market is derivative of trade liberalization and, in turn, global financial

don't.' Mark Leonard, 'The burning of Bush', Financial Times Weekend Magazine, 26 June 2004:6.

architecture like the WTO and the IMF.⁴⁸ Crucially, as Buzan points out, even primary institutions, although enduring, are not eternally fixed. Hence, dynasticism and colonialism, both deep institutions from past international systems, have faded to the extent that they are, to all intents and purposes, no longer legitimate dimensions of policy-making practices. Institutions may be binding forces but they can also become unstuck. The world does not come pre-constituted; it is not a ready-meal.

The utility of using institutions as analytical tools comes from the ways in which their link material practices with symbolic construction, helping to understand how capitalism is concretized through property rights, ownership and contracts; Christianity becomes 'solid' through prayer and the ritual of church-going; and democracy is formalized by voting, parliamentary debates, legislation and so on. Institutions operate at the nexus of the material and social worlds, or what Barry Buzan (2004) calls the explicit and implicit ends of social action. As such, they can be understood as *conjunctions* of social construction and material forces. Institutions are at once rules and roles, interests and identities, practices and principles. They are units where structure and agency, material and ideational factors, conflict and cooperation, intentional action and unintended consequences, continuity and disjuncture come together. As such, they are an ideal *via media* for addressing what, at first sight, appear to be unbridgeable dichotomies, and of helping to provide analytical order in a world of sometimes bewildering complexity. The primary connections that individuals experience are within networks of shared interests and identity. Institutionalization is *the formalization of these networks of shared interests and identity through adopting common rules, norms and*

⁴⁸ On the 'constitutional' role of international institutions, see Reus-Smit (1997), and Holsti (2004).

practices. Institutions are the result of this process, defined as *sets of common understandings, rules and practices operating in a particular field*.⁴⁹

Members of institutions, domestic and international, are always relatively free to articulate their interests, position themselves strategically and fix their relationships vis-à-vis others. As practices, norms and procedures are repeated and institutionalized, so the dynamic is reproduced and space opens up for new connections, relationships and networks to be institutionalized. Although they are inhibited by processes of rule making, supervision and regulation, such structures are not wholly constraining, they are also enabling and generative, open to negotiation and resistance. Delegation always features some degree of discretion and interpretation (agency), even if this takes place within set parameters and rules (structures). Institutions represent tangible sites in which to study the interplay of social action and social change as this is carried through in a number of research settings: exploring varieties of state-society relations and the particular logics which are generated from these relations (Mann 1986b); unraveling the transformation capacity of contemporary revolutions (Lawson 2005); or examining the deep-lying changes to the generative grammar of world politics over time and place (Bull 1977, Holsti 2004, Buzan 2004). As such, the potential of applying mid-range historical sociology, focusing on institutions as *via medias par excellence*, provides a strong counterweight to mainstream IR theory's functionalist straightjacket.

The promise of historical sociology

This article has explored how historical sociology and, in particular, how one of its variants – historical institutionalism – can add value to the study of International Relations.⁵⁰ The

⁴⁹ By fields, I mean what is usually referred to in IR as 'issue areas', for example energy, the environment or security.

potential impact of the (historical) sociological turn on the micro, macro and meso-foundations are fourfold. First, there is historical sociology's general orientation towards a diachronic rather than a synchronic understanding of the international realm. The rejection of universal, timeless categories and their replacement by multilinear theories of world historical development gives history the chance to breathe, and agency the chance to make a difference. The result is what we might call, *pace* William Sewell (1996), an 'eventful' IR enterprise. Such a move rejects pseudo-scientific accounts of pre-determined outcomes rooted in system functions, expected utility and material capabilities, opting instead for an awareness of contingency, uncertainty and unintended consequences within broad structural constraints. In turn, this promotes a more nuanced, complex picture of the principal causal flows that lie at the heart of world historical development, and allows for differentiation between types of social facts: empires, wars, and revolutions among them. Historical sociology in IR is a research program in which empirical work, theoretical awareness, and methodological rigor are seen as mutually important features. Taking the simple motif – 'history matters' – as its first order maxim, historical sociology aims to trace and examine the slow moving processes, sequences, and developmental paths that can, and should, constitute the principal points of enquiry in the discipline.

Second, historical sociology opens up the possibility of more effective periodization within IR. If contexts, structures and social facts move, and if there is a patterning to these processes, then a conjunctural analysis that looks both inwards at the empirical detail of an era, and also outwards at its broader causal constellations provides a potentially rich

⁵⁰ It is important to emphasise that institutionalism is just one variant within the broad corpus of 'third wave' historical sociology. For a wide-ranging introduction into the varieties of contemporary historical sociology, see the contributions in Adams, Clemens, and Orloff (2005), and, in particular, the chapter by Magubane (2005) which explicitly opens up historical sociology towards post-colonial studies and the wider 'cultural turn' within the human sciences. For a critique of the 'domestication' of historical sociology within mainstream social and political science, see Calhoun (1996).

understanding of eras and epochs in world history (Rosenberg 2005, *pace* Braudel 1972). For example, by renewing interest in temporality and, in turn, into the various logics within which world history takes place, the Westphalian moment, and indeed the entire modern European states-system, becomes just one part in a much wider canvass (Frank 1998; Gills 2002; Hobson 2006). In other words, if Westphalia is a moment within a broader ‘age of empires’, then it is open to question about precisely what its impact is: as a critical juncture which generated sufficient positive feedback mechanisms that its principal dimension (the mutual recognition of state sovereignty) became locked-in and, therefore, increasingly resistant to change; or as an event which did little more than change the rationale by which imperial polities could legitimately subsume other polities.

In a similar vein, adopting a historical sociological view of globalisation means critically assessing the extent to which, firstly, the post-war era characterised by popular sovereignty and nationalism is being superseded by an epoch defined primarily by globalisation and de-territorialization, and secondly, the extent to which these processes are themselves rooted in much longer-term historical trajectories which have proceeded, if not linearly, then at least sequentially, to the present day. Sensitising IR researchers to these tools of analysis and to this way of thinking contributes to an open-ended research programme into relatively uncharted territories: the production, reproduction, reform, and recasting of primary and derivative institutions which flow out of, and which form, particular structural conjunctures; the relationship between initial choices, developmental paths, critical junctures, and transformation in issues as varied as state formation and systems change; and investigation of the forces that act as *principia media* in driving macro-level processes of social change. At the heart of the historical sociological imagination is understanding the importance of *time* and *place* variation – the idea that development has both temporal and spatial dimensions that need to be both theoretically and empirically problematized.

The third major benefit of historical sociology in IR lies in its capacity to debunk taken-for-granted assumptions about central concepts and myths of origin in the discipline. Studying systems change, monitoring the emergence of the concept of anarchy, and conducting historical-comparative work into the functioning of the balance of power over time and place, illustrates how the core concepts of the discipline are made to *appear* natural when in fact they are rooted in particular historical conjunctures. To this end, ongoing work into the social theory of world historical development (Rosenberg 2006), the origins of the contemporary international system (Teschke 2003), the eastern origins of western civilization (Hobson 2004) and the like, present an alternative picture of the principal flows, patterns and directional processes within world politics that are relevant not just around the margins of the discipline, but speak to its very heart. A reminder of the need to study ‘in’ history rather than ‘outside’ history is a useful corrective to the tendency of scholars in IR to misapply abstract, timeless variables to ill-fitting contexts. After all, once they are applied, general abstractions soon reach their limits.

Finally, this article has looked at how historical sociology in at least one of its guises – historical institutionalism – can help to redirect understanding of institutions within IR. Potentially, institutions have the capacity to help unravel and guide researches through the intricacies, complexity and turbulence of world politics, but only if they are understood beyond the straightjacket afforded to them by much mainstream IR theory. This allows historical sociology to take its place among the number of paradigms which are seeking to push the discipline away from a narrow view of rationalism, a limited conception of social structure, and a concomitant failure to see the dynamism of the process (captured in this article by the logic of institutions), that lies between and across these spheres. Historical institutionalism is offered here as one part of a general turn in IR theory away from parsimonious parlor games, bunkerist retreats to theoretical isolationism, and banal

abstractions masquerading as timeless truths. Rather, historical institutionalism, and historical sociology more generally, offers a means of embracing the nuance, subtleties and complexities of world politics without abdication from the overarching goal of finding meaningful causal flows, patterns and trends within processes of world historical development.

As this article has explored, the research projects that arise from such an enterprise may be conducted from a myriad of different starting points. Some neoclassical realist, liberal, constructivist and English School theorists have adopted a form of historical sociological reasoning in studying the formation and development of post-war settlements, alliances, empires, global norms, and international systems across time and place. Historical sociology aims to add to this resurgence in empirically aware, theoretically rigorous and methodologically scrupulous research – research that constitutes a return-to-normal for IR as a discipline (Hobden 1998, 2002). In this sense, historical sociology is part of an open conversation that recognizes both the relative autonomy of each approach but also the common ground that unites them. And given this starting point, the promise of historical sociology in International Relations is rich indeed.

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