

Understanding the Governance of Reforms to Urban Transport in Developing Cities

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Abstract

Numerous international development agencies and researchers advocate the use of dedicated transport authorities in urban areas as a means for strengthening the institutional frameworks needed to improve transport services in cities. While such bodies are widespread in developed countries, little is known about the benefits and drawbacks of their use in developing Asian cities. The very different institutional contexts into which such management would be integrated raise some interesting questions as to how effective such models could be in these cities. This thesis examines two transport authorities that have been created to improve the coordination of urban transport in the Asian region – the Land Public Transport Commission (SPAD) in Malaysia, and the Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority (BMLTA) in Bangalore, India. The aim is to explore the motivations underpinning the reforms and the creation of these two bodies, as well as to understand how the reforms have subsequently unfolded in terms of their implementation, these agencies' abilities to implement their plans, the outcomes they have achieved and the problems they experience.

This research utilises a qualitative approach to undertake a cross-national case study through semi-structured interviews of stakeholders in the urban transport sector, including civil servants, politicians, private sector workers and academics. The data from these interviews was augmented by assessment of written materials. The findings show how the creation and empowerment of SPAD and the BMLTA have been influenced by contextual factors and constraints that arose during their implementation. These findings also provide insights into factors that determine the performance of these authorities. The creation of SPAD and BMLTA which aimed to change the way urban transport was governed in their contexts, has only provided a partial degree of success. The reforms have been successful in Malaysia to a certain extent as it has a clear operational mandate. By contrast, in Bangalore, the reforms have achieved only weak coordination. The reforms were dominated by the existing institutional landscape and power struggles. With strong political leadership, some aspects of this can be overcome, but not to the extent that these bodies have control over the range of policy tools needed to deliver a truly integrated transport strategies.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	ii
Abstract	iii
Table of Contents	iv
List of Tables	x
List of Figures	xii
Abbreviations	xiii
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Rationale for the study	1
1.3 The research questions.....	4
1.4 The structure of the thesis.....	6
Chapter 2: Literature Review	9
2.1 Introduction	9
2.2 Transport challenges in developing countries	9
2.3 Transport authorities in developing countries.....	12
2.3.1 Proposals by International Development Agencies.....	13
2.3.2 Proposals by researchers	15
2.4 Transport authorities in developed countries	17
2.5 Concepts related to transport authorities	23
2.5.1 Decentralisation	23
2.5.2 Coordination and integration	27
2.5.3 Power.....	29
2.5.3.1 Authority and autonomy	32
2.5.3.2 Accountability	33
2.5.4 Decision-making power	35
2.6 The concept of governance.....	37
2.7 Institutional complexity and reforms.....	39
2.7.1 Public management reform	41
2.7.2 Factors influencing public management reforms	43

2.7.3 The outcomes of reforms	45
2.8 Chapter summary.....	47
Chapter 3: The Case Study Sites	50
3.1 Introduction	50
3.2 Transport in Malaysia.....	51
3.2.1 Transport governance in Malaysia prior to the creation of SPAD	53
3.2.1.1 Institutional structure	53
3.2.1.2 Acknowledged institutional issues.....	57
3.2.1.3 Milestones in the creation of SPAD.....	60
3.2.2 Transport governance after the creation of SPAD	64
3.3 Urban transport in Bangalore	67
3.3.1 Transport governance in the Bangalore Metropolitan Region prior to the creation of BMLTA.....	69
3.3.1.1 Institutional structure	69
3.3.1.2 Issues in urban transport governance in Bangalore.....	76
3.3.1.3 Policies supporting institutional reform in the transport sector in the State of Karnataka	80
3.3.1.4 The creation of the Directorate of Urban Land Transport and the Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority	81
3.3.2 Transport governance after the creation of the BMLTA	82
3.4 Chapter summary.....	85
Chapter 4: Methodology	88
4.1 Introduction	88
4.2 The overall research paradigm and epistemology	89
4.3 The case study approach.....	91
4.3.1 Criticisms of the case study approach	92
4.3.2 Comparative cases versus single cases	93
4.3.3 Answering the research questions	94
4.4 Data generation methods.....	95
4.4.1 Review of documents.....	96
4.4.2 Semi-structured interviews	97

4.4.2.1	Developing the interview questions	99
4.4.2.2	The sampling method	100
4.4.2.3	The interview process in Malaysia	101
4.4.2.4	The interview process in Bangalore	106
4.4.2.5	Data storage	111
4.5	Validity and reliability	112
4.6	The limitations of the methods	113
4.7	Chapter summary.....	114
Chapter 5: Approach to Analysis		115
5.1	Introduction	115
5.2	Transcribing the interviews.....	116
5.3	Using NVivo	117
5.4	The case study analysis.....	118
5.4.1	Within case analysis	118
5.4.1.1	Coding: developing free nodes and tree nodes	118
5.4.1.2	Identifying emerging themes	127
5.4.1.3	Developing the narrative	128
5.4.2	Cross-case analysis	129
5.5	Chapter summary.....	130
Chapter 6: Case Study Analysis for Land Public Transport Commission.....		131
6.1	Introduction	131
6.2	Research Question 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of SPAD in Malaysia?	131
6.2.1	Performance of Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board	135
6.2.2	Performance of Ministry of Transport.....	138
6.2.3	Coordination issues with multiple agencies.....	139
6.2.4	Deteriorating public transport services	142
6.2.5	Push from consultants	143
6.2.6	The proximity of Singapore's Land Transport Authority ...	143
6.2.7	Reflections	144
6.3	Research question 2: What types of autonomy have been given to the authority?	147

6.3.1 Legal backing	151
6.3.2 Transport planning process.....	153
6.3.3 Regulation	156
6.3.4 Enforcement.....	158
6.3.5 Financial autonomy	160
6.3.6 Reflections	160
6.4 Research question 3: How have the reforms affected decision-making process in policy-making and the selection and implementation of transport projects?	164
6.4.1 The decision-making platform	164
6.4.2 Reflections	167
6.5 Research question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms?	169
6.5.1 The planning and implementation roles of SPAD	169
6.5.2 Respondents' perceptions of the SPAD model	172
6.5.2.1 Ministry of Transport versus Prime Minister's Department	172
6.5.2.2 The Prime Minister as the minister-in-charge.....	173
6.5.2.3 The National model versus the Klang Valley model	174
6.5.2.4 Public transport vehicle versus goods vehicle.....	175
6.5.3 Factors affecting the performance of SPAD.....	176
6.5.3.1 Inter-organisational issues	178
6.5.3.2 Intra-organisational issues	180
6.5.4 Reflections	184
Chapter 7: Case Study Analysis for Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority.....	188
7.1 Introduction	188
7.2 Research question 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of BMLTA in Bangalore?.....	189
7.2.1 The National Urban Transport Policy/74 th Constitutional Amendment.....	192
7.2.2 The push from the State Government.....	193
7.2.3 Fragmentation in the planning roles for urban transport ..	193
7.2.4 Coordination issues.....	194

7.2.5 Existing agencies were not empowered.....	196
7.2.6 The growth of Bangalore.....	198
7.2.7 Reflections	200
7.3 Research question 2: What types of autonomy have been given to the authority?.....	203
7.3.1 The BMLTA as a committee	206
7.3.2 The powers given to BMLTA.....	206
7.3.3 The BMLTA bill	207
7.3.4 Funding capacity.....	210
7.3.5 Capacity issues.....	211
7.3.6 Leadership issues	212
7.3.6.1 The Chief Secretary's role as the chairman of the BMLTA.....	212
7.3.6.2 The Commissioner's role	213
7.3.7 Working mechanism	213
7.3.8 Reflections	214
7.4 Research question 3: How have the reforms affected decision-making process in policy-making and the selection and implementation of transport projects?.....	218
7.4.1 The decision-making platform.....	220
7.4.2 The BMLTA's achievements	221
7.4.2.1 Better coordination.....	222
7.4.2.2 Priorities for non-motorised transport and the BRT.....	223
7.4.2.3 Other initiatives	223
7.4.3 Reflection	224
7.5 Research question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reform?.....	226
7.5.1 Intra-organisational issues in the BMLTA	226
7.5.2 External factors	228
7.5.2.1 Cumbersome government procedures and delays in decision-making.....	228
7.5.2.2 The strong nexus between politicians and civil servants	229
7.5.2.3 Cultural issues.....	230

7.5.3 Reflections	232
Chapter 8: Cross-Case Analysis	235
8.1 Introduction	235
8.2 Key determinants of reforms	235
8.2.1 Objectives, key drivers and the outcomes of reforms	235
8.2.2 Reform as a process	238
8.2.3 Powers to act	240
8.2.4 Accountability and responsibility	242
8.2.5 The degree of championing	244
8.3 Recommendations for SPAD and BMLTA case studies	245
8.4 Chapter summary.....	249
Chapter 9: Conclusions	250
9.1 Introduction	250
9.2 Addressing the research questions	250
9.3 The contributions of this research and its policy implications.....	257
9.4 Limitations of this research	262
9.5 Suggestions for further research.....	263
9.6 Concluding remarks	265
List of References	267
Appendix A: Interview guide	i
Appendix B: Interview Guide for SPAD.....	vii
Appendix C: Revised interview guide for SPAD.....	xiii
Appendix D: Interview guide for BMLTA case study.....	xvii
Appendix E: Findings of SPAD and BMLTA.....	xxii
Appendix F: Similarities and differences between SPAD and BMLTA.....	xxxiv

List of Tables

Table 2.1: Types of transport authorities in several developed cities.....	17
Table 2.2: Summary of factors affecting success of decentralisation	26
Table 2.3: Dimensions of Power	30
Table 2.4: Dimensions of autonomy	33
Table 3.1: Key agencies involved in management of land public transport in West Malaysia before 2010.....	54
Table 3.2: List of key agencies and ministries involved in management of land public transport before 2010	56
Table 3.3: Key agencies operating in Bangalore Metropolitan Region.....	72
Table 3.4: Features of SPAD and BMLTA.....	86
Table 4.1: Overview of the information needed.....	95
Table 4.2: Interview schedule for SPAD case study	103
Table 4.3: Interview schedule for BMLTA case study.....	109
Table 5.1: Research questions and the related <i>a priori</i> codes.....	120
Table 5.2: List of tree nodes and free nodes for SPAD case study	123
Table 5.3: Relationship between free nodes and a tree node in SPAD case study.....	124
Table 5.4: List of tree nodes and free nodes for BMLTA case study..	125
Table 5.5: Relationship between free nodes and a tree node in BMLTA case study	126
Table 6.1: Matrix showing responses to research question 1	133
Table 6.2: Matrix showing responses to research question 2	149
Table 6.3: Transport planning roles before and after the creation of SPAD.....	153
Table 6.4: Transport regulation roles before and after the creation of SPAD.....	156
Table 6.5: SPAD's autonomy compared to the dimensions of autonomy proposed by Varhoest et al. (2004) and Laegreid et al. (2006).....	161
Table 6.6: Creation of SPAD: The rhetoric and practice	170

Table 6.7: Views of respondents on factors affecting the performance of SPAD	177
Table 7.1: Categories of respondents	188
Table 7.2: Matrix showing responses to research question 1	190
Table 7.3: Matrix showing responses to research question 2	204
Table 7.4: BMLTA's autonomy compared to the dimensions of autonomy proposed by Varhoest et al. (2004) and Laegreid et al. (2006).....	215
Table 7.5: Matrix showing responses to research question 3	219
Table 7.6: Criteria which affect the performance of BMLTA	227
Table 8.1: Characteristics of LTA Singapore, TfL, SPAD and BMLTA.....	246

List of Figures

Figure 2.1: Framework showing planning levels in transport organisation and the decision-making powers proposed for transport authorities	36
Figure 2.2: Management Reform Model	43
Figure 3.1: Map showing the location of the Klang Valley Region in West Malaysia	52
Figure 3.2: Milestones in the creation of SPAD.....	61
Figure 3.3: Role of SPAD	65
Figure 3.4: The transport enforcement framework after the creation of SPAD.....	66
Figure 3.5: The State of Karnataka	67
Figure 3.6: Map showing BBMP and BMR areas.....	70
Figure 5.1: Steps taken in analysis.....	116
Figure 5.2: Model developed on NVIVO for respondent IA2.....	122

Abbreviations

ABIDe	Agenda for Bangalore Infrastructure Development
ADB	Asian Development Bank
BBMP	Greater Bangalore Municipal Corporation
BDA	Bangalore Development Authority
BMA	Bangalore Metropolitan Area
BMLTA	Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority
BMR	Bangalore Metropolitan Region
BMRCL	Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited
BMRDA	Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Development Authority
BMTC	Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation
CiSTUP	Centre for Infrastructure, Sustainable Transportation, and Urban Planning
CVLB	Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board
DOR	Department of Railway
DULT	Directorate of Urban Land Transport
EPU	Economic Planning Unit
GDTPCB	Greater Dhaka Transport Planning and Coordination Board
GTP	Government Transformation Programme
IAS	Indian Administrative Service
IISC	Indian Institute of Science
INSPAK	Integration and Restructuring of the Public Transport System in the Klang Valley
JNNURM	Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KSRTC	Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation
KUIDFC	Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development and Finance Corporation
KUTA	Klang Valley Urban Transport Authority
LPT Act	Land Public Transport Act
LPTC Act	Land Public Transport Commission Act
LRT	Light Rapid Transit
LTA	Land Transport Authority
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOT	Ministry of Transport
MoUD	Ministry of Urban Development
MPC	Metropolitan Planning Committee
MPC	Metropolitan Planning Committee
MRT	Mass Rapid Transit
NKRA	National Key Results Area
NUTP	National Urban Transport Policy
PEMANDU	Performance Management and Delivery Unit
PM	Prime Minister
PMD	Prime Minister's Department
RTD	Road Transport Department
SPAD	Land Public Transport Commission
TCPD	Town and Country Planning Department
TFL	Transport for London
UDD	Urban Development Department
UMTA	Unified Metropolitan Transport Authority

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This research aims to contribute to the understanding of governance reforms on urban transport in developing Asian countries. In particular, it examines the use of transport authorities as a means of improving coordination in urban transport by studying two such authorities in Malaysia and Bangalore (India) respectively. The aims are to explore the stated motivations behind the reform and creation of new transport bodies, and to understand how the reforms have subsequently unfolded in terms of implementation and where possible the outcomes. The importance of context is a key feature of the study. To achieve this, qualitative methods using cross-national case studies were adopted.

1.2 Rationale for the study

International development agencies and a number of researchers advocate the use of transport authorities in urban areas as a means for strengthening the institutional frameworks needed to improve transport in cities in developing countries (Imran, 2009; Jemali, 2009; World Bank, 2007a, 2005a). A transport authority is generally understood to be a public or publicly owned organisation with vested authority that operates in a specified territory to manage public transport services (see section 2.3 for definitions). Key examples of such authorities are Transport for London (TfL) and Land Transport Authority (LTA), Singapore. Under this definition, the organisations that provide the case studies for this research – the Land Public Transport Commission (SPAD) in Malaysia and the Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority (BMLTA) in India – can be considered to be transport authorities.

It is believed that transport policy requires a package of measures to be effective, and that these measures are more likely to be implemented concurrently when the relevant powers are vested in a single organisation (ADB, 2009). While such organisations are widely spread in developed countries, little is known about the benefits, drawbacks and challenges that exist for changing the way transport is managed and coordinated in

developing Asian cities. The different institutional contexts into which such approaches would be integrated raise some interesting questions about the effectiveness of applying such models in these cities (see Dimitriou, 2006).

Looking at transport authorities in developed cities reveals that they can take many forms, utilising different models and performing varying functions. Although transport authorities may all have been launched with the goal of improving coordination between agencies and transport modes, many of these authorities have evolved from coordination mechanisms to area-wide, multimodal transport authorities, with roles ranging from planning, regulation, budget control, provision of infrastructure, to traffic management and road construction (World Bank, 2008). Development agencies often hold the belief that policy reforms that have proved successful in developed countries should be implemented more widely across the developing region (Marsden and Stead, 2011), and hence that transport authorities are one such policy.

Urban transport challenges in developing countries¹ are unique, differing from those in developed cities. Thus, care has to be taken when copying models that have worked elsewhere to ensure that they are applied correctly in these different contexts. Many Asian cities are vast in size and typically grow much faster in terms of both their populations and their rates of urbanisation than European cities do (Emberger et al., 2008). This creates jurisdictional and functional fragmentation, such as overlaps among the responsibilities and activities of different organisations and the creation of vested interest in protecting and expanding revenue resources (World Bank, 2000a). A popular solution has been to create metropolitan-regional development authorities (such as the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority and the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration) that also take care of transport issues (ibid). However, *integrated* authorities are complex to manage as the regional authority has to deal with other pressing issues such as housing and sanitation. Hence, creating a *dedicated* transport authority is seen as a good way to champion the urban transport sector.

¹ Developing countries, according to the World Bank are countries which are classified as low-income and middle-income economies. Low income economies has gross national income (GNI) per capita of \$1,025 or less and middle income economies has GNI per capita between \$1,026 - \$12,475

The creation of transport authorities has been heavily advocated by international development agencies in many cities in Asia, either through technical studies or by direct involvement in the creation of such bodies under the name of institutional strengthening, which forms part of development agencies' urban transport improvement programmes. The latter usually comes with funding and technical advice (mostly undertaken by the World Bank). Despite the heavy promotion of these authorities, only a few cities have been willing to undertake such reforms, including Dhaka in Bangladesh and a number of cities in India.

Dhaka is the capital city of Bangladesh with population of 8.5 million people in 2001, covering an area of 815.8km².² In Dhaka, the creation of the Greater Dhaka Transport Planning and Coordination Board (GDTPCB) in 1999 was part of the Dhaka Urban Transport Programme funded by the World Bank to improve urban transport infrastructure and services in the Dhaka metropolitan area and to strengthen the institutional framework there (World Bank, 2000a). The project took from 1999 to 2005 to implement, and the GDTPCB was created to play a leading role in transport planning as well as to assist in policy formulation and the coordination of major urban transport operational and investment decisions. However, the World Bank's appraisal of the programme in 2007 found that the GDTPCB did not function as well as it had been expected to, with the board lacking steady and strong leadership as well as the administrative and financial authority over the implementing agencies that it required to perform its coordinating function (World Bank, 2007a). The World Bank began a similar programme in Hanoi in 2010, although to-date there is no evidence that the proposed Public Transport Authority has been created.

International development agencies did not fund the creation of transport authorities in Malaysia or India, although they have exerted some pressure on the authorities in these countries to create such bodies. In Malaysia, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) proposed that a transport authority be established on the basis of a study on Integrated Urban Transportation Strategies for Environmental Improvement in Kuala Lumpur completed in 1999, which concluded that a new body was needed to look at transport issues from a regional perspective as none of the existing agencies were doing so. A similar proposal was put forward by the World

² <http://www.bbs.gov.bd/DistrictWisePopulation/> accessed on 12th June 2013

Bank, which prepared a study on urban rail concessions in three cities including Kuala Lumpur. The World Bank proposed the creation of an Urban Transport Authority with “political legitimacy and revenue-raising powers responsible for determining and implementing strategy and regulating the sector, combined with a mechanism for coordinating decision-making with other agencies and levels of government” (World Bank, 2004:29).

In India, the World Bank’s study on India’s Transport Sector in 2002 led to a proposal for a Unified Metropolitan Transport Authority (UMTA) for large metropolitan areas (World Bank, 2002a). In 2005, it made a stronger proposal on the basis of a study that it conducted on urban transport in Chennai and Bangalore, recommending the creation of an authority for public transport in these cities to function as a policy-making and regulatory body, with technical support to be provided by a separate unit (World Bank, 2005a).

Researchers urged caution, however, in terms of both the ‘appropriateness and effectiveness’ of transferring such policy solutions from one part of the world to another (Marsden and Stead, 2011:499). To-date, there remains a lack of empirical research on whether transport authorities work in the context of developing countries. The World Bank’s proposals are also contestable, as there is still no evidence that an effective and workable transport authority has been created in the developing Asian cities. Moreover, in places where transport authority reforms have failed – such as in Dhaka – the reasons for their failures are not fully understood.

This research aims to fill these gaps in knowledge by taking two case studies; institutional reforms in Malaysia and Bangalore (India) with the aim of providing empirical evidence and theoretical insights on why the authorities were established in the ways they were and how the reform subsequently unfolded. The findings of this research will provide lessons for policy-makers in other developing Asian countries regarding the critical factors and institutional contexts that should be taken into consideration when seeking to create an effective transport authority.

1.3 The research questions

As mentioned in the previous section, this research addresses the limited presence of case studies on transport authorities in developing Asian countries. It provides new insights on such authorities through two cross-

national case studies – SPAD and BMLTA. To achieve this, the following research questions were constructed:

Question 1: *What were the motivations behind the establishment of the transport authorities?*

Previous studies contend that the motivations for governance reforms are surrounding several factors such as inadequacy in the existing institutional arrangements, impact of best practice reform models, expenditure control and to improve public service delivery (Peters, 2010; Cheema, 2005; Grindle and Thomas, 1989). Particularly, in the transport sector, the international development agencies strongly advocate creation of transport authorities to improve coordination among agencies, to promote integrated planning and strengthen the regulation of the public transport system (ADB, 2009, World Bank, 2002b, 2005a).

This question aims to discover the motivations behind the creation of SPAD and the BMLTA by identifying the key events that led to the reforms, including political changes, public transport issues, perceived inadequacies in institutional structures, the presence of key personalities, push factors from international development agencies, and policy shifts. It will also attempt to capture the views and observations of respondents regarding existing transport issues and problems and their opinions about how these issues can be resolved. A good understanding of the key factors would help in understanding the rhetoric and rationale for reform. Understanding the rationale for reform will allow a clearer interpretation of how the different actors perceived the outcomes.

Question 2: *What types of autonomy have been given to the transport authorities?*

Bauckaert and Pollitt (2011) suggest that greater autonomy for agencies leads to improvements in economy, productivity and user responsiveness. In the same vein, researchers and international development agencies stress that in order for transport authorities to be effective, they must be decentralised, given legislative support, have control over transport budget and have the ability to drive the implementation of their decisions (Naniopoulous, 2012; ADB, 2009; World Bank, 2005b; GTZ, 2004).

The reforms studied differed in their natures and in relation to the settings in which they were enacted, and this question is thus designed to explore the natures of these two transport authorities and the rationale for the models adopted in the reforms. It also explores the power and autonomy that these

two transport authorities were provided with in order to carry out their delegated functions, examining the constraints that they face and the arguments for empowering them further. Finally, this question also examines their capacities, the resources they have been allocated and the mechanisms through which they exercise their powers.

Question 3: *How have the reforms affected decision-making processes in policy-making and the selection and implementation of transport projects?*

The importance of having the right decisions making powers has been contended as an important element for transport authorities (Masi, 2009; Leach and Wilson, 2004) and this also an important element in successful decentralisation (Ebinger et al., 2007; Smoke, 2003; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). The basic idea behind improving coordination among agencies is also to promote joint decision-making (Camerer and Knez, 1997) and Bauckaert and Pollitt (2011) found that decision-making process could be used as the basis to assess reform progress – as changes in process improvement is said to have an impact on output and outcomes.

This research question has been designed to explore how the reform has affected the decision-making process - in particular and the extent to which the transport authorities have control over decisions for policy-making and transport projects. Particular focus was given to identifying the range of actors that are involved in the decision-making process. The extent of these transport authorities' powers to implement decisions or provide resources to steer other agencies was examined. Other outcomes – such as improvements in coordination between agencies or changes in planning practices – were investigated to discover the extent to which these transport authorities can justify their existences.

Question 4: *What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms?*

The final research question provides space for overarching reflections on why SPAD and the BMLTA were (not) able to do what they were set out to do, and involves examining the key factors that affect their performance and what this means more generally for such reforms.

1.4 The structure of the thesis

Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature on transport issues in developing countries, and of transport authorities in both developing and developed countries. It outlines and explains the key concepts used in this

thesis, and then describes issues relating to institutional complexity and institutional reform, paying particular attention to the public sector reforms from which transport authorities are created. This provides the analytical framework used in the analysis of the case studies, which attempt to understand the motivations, power relations, outputs, and other factors that determine the success of the transport authorities.

Chapter 3 presents a description of the case studies, focusing on SPAD and the BMLTA. It explains the institutional structure and arrangements before and after the transport authorities were created and sets the framework for interpretation.

Chapter 4 addresses issues relating to the research methods. The key methodological decisions are described, including the research paradigm and the rationale for using cross-national case studies. This includes details of the data-gathering methods, particularly in relation to interviews and the challenges and assumptions associated with them. This chapter then moves on to examine issues of validity and reliability, and the limitations of the methods that were adopted.

Chapter 5 demonstrates how the data was analysed through both an inductive and a deductive approach. It establishes how the data was synthesised and transformed into the findings, beginning by explaining how the interviews were transcribed and outlining the use of coding within case analysis. Finally, it provides a cross-case analysis by identifying similar themes, taking into consideration context-based differences in the two cases.

Chapters 6 and 7 present the findings of the study by interpreting the generated data. The case study analysis of SPAD and the BMLTA is presented in the order of the research questions. As the intention was to capture the findings that emerged from the data, the respondents' views were presented first, followed by a reflective section at the end of each set of data responding to the individual research questions. The reflective sections provide the researcher's interpretations, which are related back to the extant literature.

Chapter 8 then discusses the determinant factors that have emerged from the research in relation to the themes identified in chapters 6 and 7 concerning the creation and functioning of the transport authorities in Malaysia and Bangalore. The discussion focuses around the similarities and differences observed in the case studies, using relevant examples from the

key events, actors, processes, and activities in order to inform it. This chapter also uses the findings of the case studies to provide advice for policy-makers in other developing countries who wish to create transport authorities and presents the policy recommendations for SPAD and the BMLTA.

Finally, chapter 9 draws together some of the findings and themes discussed throughout the thesis, addresses limitations of this research, makes suggestions for future research, and ends with the researcher's personal reflections.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the governance reforms that created SPAD and the BMLTA, utilising academic literature to more tightly construct the research questions and to underpin the thesis' theoretical framework. It begins with a brief overview of transport issues in the cities of developing Asian countries, showing the need for greater institutional interactions. This is followed in section 2.3 by a discussion of the debate on the need for transport authorities, both by international development agencies and between researchers. Section 2.4 outlines the transport authority models that have been adopted in developed cities together with their best practices, with particular attention being given to the Land Transport Authority (LTA), Singapore and Transport for London (TfL). Having drawn out the key factors that are critical for the good performance of transport authorities, section 2.5 then goes on to discuss these factors (decentralisation, coordination, decision-making, power and accountability). It is noted that these factors are also key components of good governance, and section 2.6 then proceeds to discuss issues on governance. The reform process involved in the creation of the transport authorities in the selected case studies is addressed, and in an attempt to better understand it, section 2.7 highlights matters related to institutional complexity and public sector reforms, mainly relating to factors influencing the reform exercise and its outcomes. This chapter ends with section 2.8 which summarises critical findings in literature and relate them to the research questions of this study.

2.2 Transport challenges in developing countries

The majority of cities in developing countries have experienced rapid economic development and urbanisation, which in turn has resulted in a significant increase in the mobility of people and goods, together with a growing dependence on private cars. According to the World Bank, developing countries are referred to those countries which

In many developing Asian cities, the average annual percentage increase in car ownership has reached as high as 10% annually (Rameshwar et al.,

2011) and motorcycle ownership has increased between 10% and 15% (see Gwilliam, 2013). This has adversely affected traffic safety, air quality and public health. A unique characteristic of the demand for transport is the need to provide door-to-door service and this is provided partly by para-transit modes such as auto-rickshaws in India and tuktuks in Bangkok (Morita et al., 2004). The failure of public transport services to fulfil the growing travel demand due to urbanisation and to provide door-to-door service encourage a further switch to private vehicles, especially cars (ibid). For those who cannot afford cars, motorcycles have offered an excellent substitute—both in rich and poor Asian cities, including Kuala Lumpur, New Delhi, Hanoi, Bangkok, Jakarta and Ho Chi Minh. Whilst this mode of transport provides greater speed and flexibility of movement, it also poses its own problems, mainly surrounding safety issues, and in the long-run, when the income level of motorcyclists improves, they are likely to graduate to cars (Gwilliam, 2013). This is not to imply that everyone enjoys the benefits of economic growth and urbanisation with higher incomes and a better quality of life - poverty remains a serious issue with urban poverty plaguing many cities in the region. Most of the urban poor are forced to live in the urban periphery, and they can barely afford to use any kind of motorised transport, and are therefore heavily dependent on walking (Pucher et al., 2007). However, a drastic increase of motorisation has led to more street space being dedicated to motor vehicles, with less space remaining for the non-motorised transport on which the poor depend (ibid).

For Vasconcellos (2001), this unbalanced growth is linked to economic development, which does not presuppose the search for equity. There is also the emergence of middle-class families who view motorisation as mandatory (ibid). Some researchers view this situation as a matter of the government's failing to restrain car usage and maintain an adequate level of public transport service (Kasipillai and Chan, 2008; Barter et al., 2003; Rujopakarn, 2003). The failure to develop public transport system can be attributed to several factors. Kiggundu (2009), based on his research on public transport system in Kuala Lumpur, revealed that poor financial strategies were one of the main reasons for the implementation failure of privatised rail projects. Other factors included the poor control of land use with the absence of land use and transport integration, a lack of enforcement and a poor user discipline (Verma et al., 2011; ADB, 2009). Importantly, all of these factors can be attributed to poor governance and weak transport institutional arrangements.

There seems to be a consensus amongst researchers as to the importance of good governance and institutional structure as the backbone to support and develop an efficient and integrated transport service (Macario and Spandou, 2010; Imran, 2009; Stough and Rietveld, 2006, 1997). However, these researchers cautioned that there are a number of fundamental issues pertinent to many developing countries, that need to be tackled before a good transport system can be put in place. Dimitriou (2006) acknowledges the fragmentation and duplication of roles and functions of agencies, as well as the absence of an overall leadership by one agency. Sohail et al. (2006) contend that the development of transport in developing cities is not being tailored to local needs - this is attributed to the absence of a platform for the public to participate or to the reluctance of the public to get involved. This lack of public participation could also be attributed to the 'centralised' nature of many developing countries without the devolvement of necessary powers to the local bodies to manage the transport matters in their area (Agarwal, 2006; Gwilliam, 2003, 1997). Whilst these countries are associated with highly centralised governance systems, they ironically have to contend with legislative and institutional barriers in dealing with the public transport sector, which is often attributed to the split responsibilities between multiple agencies (Vasconcellos, 2001). Whilst calls for decentralisation are strong, it would still not provide a panacea, as decentralisation in developing countries has only the devolvement of administrative responsibilities without the accompanying financial resources needed for effective management (Gwilliam, 2003). This is particularly evident in India (Mohan and Mercier, 2012), Thailand (Rujopakarn, 2003), Africa (Kwayke, 1992), Indonesia (Munawar, 2006) and Malaysia (Jemali, 2009).

In addition to the fragmented regulatory framework and a lack of public consultation, other issues, such as a lack of funding and expertise, red tape and corruption, as well as the absence of clear policy objectives have made the planning and development of public transport services a rather difficult task (Fujita, 2012; Dimitriou, 2006). This is aggravated by a constant struggle between politicians and bureaucrats - the former favouring short-term benefits that enhance electoral prospects, with the latter valuing long-term benefits (Agarwal and Zimmerman, 2008). Although many developing countries adopt a master-plan approach, the main challenge is to transform the plans into action as over time they are often aborted or not implemented due to interferences from political leaders, which Flyvbjerg describes as power rule rationality (Flyvbjerg, 2001).

Several solutions for overcoming these problems have been proposed in the literature, including the decentralisation of responsibilities to local levels, strengthening local authorities, creating open decision-making processes (Vanconcellos, 2001), creating strong central planning bodies (Padilla and Autheurs, 2000, cited in Kane, 2002) and establishing single transport authorities (Imran, 2009; Gwilliam, 2003; Kane, 2002). These proposals all agree that some kind of good and efficient institutional arrangement is important, although it remains unclear what kind of institutional arrangement will work for a given issue and context. There appears to be no 'one size fits all' formula for policy-makers in developing countries to resolve the problems they face in the transport sector.

2.3 Transport authorities in developing countries

As the previous section noted, the creation of a transport authority is believed to be a key solution for overcoming the transport issues that developing countries experience. The creation of transport authorities was a popular trend in Western Europe in the 1990s, and centred on achieving service coordination and integration within the public transport service as well as managing competition between operators (Costa, 1996). Gwilliam (1997) stressed that many of these authorities had clear and explicit objectives, with adequate systems of accountability and incentives for efficient performance. These models quickly gained recognition from the international development agencies, and subsequently spawned a popular debate amongst researchers. However, there remains no evidence to pinpoint the creation of a transport authority as being the key factor in developing an efficient and reliable public transport service.

There is no uniform definition of a transport authority and no fixed model that is universally accepted. It is perhaps useful therefore to try to understand what transport authorities generally represents. 'Transport' is viewed as the movement of people or goods via one or more mode, such as roads, railroads, waterways and airways (Stough and Rietveld, 1997). The term 'authority' refers to the right to give an order, with those to whom it is addressed being required to obey it (Robertson, 2002; and see section 2.5.3.1). Thus, a transport authority is an entity with legitimate power to manage processes involving the movement of people and goods. Whilst not specified in the above definitions, this may involve planning, regulation, enforcement, providing information/education, funding, procurement, traffic management, infrastructure development and maintenance.

International transport bodies have also devised their own definitions for the notion of a transport authority. European Union Regulation 1370/2007 for public service obligations in inland transport (Regulations EC, 2007:6) defines a 'competent authority' as "any public authority or group of public authorities of a Member State or Member States which has the power to intervene in public passenger transport in a given geographical area or anybody vested with such an authority". This is a very wide definition which may include any possible type and form of body. The International Organisation of Public Transport (UITP) uses the term 'organising authorities', which it takes to be "public or public-owned organisations with a legal responsibility to plan or regulate public transport services in a specified geographic area".³ It is envisaged that an organising authority should be able to plan and control the operations of public transport and have the responsibility for managing transport budgets (Masi, 2009). These definitions suggest that a transport authority has to be a public or publicly owned organisation with vested authority operating in a specified territory to manage public transport services.

2.3.1 Proposals by International Development Agencies

Studies conducted by international development agencies identify institutional weaknesses as one of the main sources of failure for urban transport in developing cities, and strongly advocate the use of dedicated transport coordination agencies at the metropolitan/city level (ADB, 2009; World Bank, 2007b, 2005a, 2000a). They argue that transport authorities or coordinating bodies are needed to streamline the regulatory framework and to plan, coordinate as well as regulate the public transport systems in developing Asian cities. Simultaneously, the World Bank discourages public sector monopolies in the transport sector, and pushes for market-based arrangements in which regulatory and planning functions for the provision of operations are separated, with the latter being chosen through the medium of competitively awarded service contracts (World Bank, 2005b). In order to do this, developing countries are encouraged to establish an enabling framework by creating or strengthening their regulatory institutions and performance standards to ensure fair competition (World Bank, 1996). The establishment of transport authorities could help to facilitate the realisation of this agenda.

³ <http://www.uitp.org/Public-Transport> accessed 16 February 2013

According to *Cities on the Move*, published by the World Bank in 2002, managing public transport is not an easy task as it consists of many modes operating over the boundaries of autonomous municipalities, with the services being offered by both private and public sectors. It is important that the responsibility “to ensure the coordination of physical infrastructure, service systems, fares and finances are clearly allocated” (World Bank, 2002:156). It also proposes the establishment of coordinating committees for transport, with these bodies taking one of several forms including (i) regional coordinating committees (ii) regional coordinating authorities (iii) regional mixed coordinating authorities (iv) two-tier arrangements or (v) legally established independent authorities.

From the review of the documents that the World Bank prepared for individual countries, such as India and Thailand, they seem to favour a legally established independent authority, incorporating a decentralised model. For example, in Chennai and Bangalore, the creation of a Metropolitan Transport Regulatory Authority was proposed to strengthen the institutional framework (World Bank, 2005a), and in Bangkok, an Integrated Transit Authority is suggested to facilitate the strategic management of public transport (World Bank, 2005b). The World Bank has been directly involved in assisting the Urban Transport Development Programme in Hanoi since 2007, which involves the creation of a Public Transport Authority (World Bank, 2007c). To-date, however, there is no evidence that such an authority has been established.

Asian Development Bank (ADB), whilst still pushing for city-level transport authorities to provide policy direction and improve coordination, adopts a slightly different approach. This agency believes that the “political institutions which decide on transport projects must have the authority to drive those decisions”, and thus advocates the creation of city authorities with self-financing powers and the responsibility for strategic land use planning, transport, and environmental protection in its commuter catchment area (ADB, 2009:12). However, it is not clear whether it intends city authorities to be responsible for other urban management services, or whether it thinks those roles should be delegated to local authorities.

On the other hand, the German Technical Co-operation (GTZ) in its report *Sustainable transport: A Source Book for Policy Makers in Developing Countries* (2004) suggests that the establishment of public transport authorities must be defined by law and in developing countries, such models have the advantage of isolating the authority from resource constraints as

they are eligible for dedicated resources under their statutes. However, this report undermines its own proposal when it claims that it is also possible to achieve policy integration without institutional integration, like that seen in Hong Kong, where the Transport Department effectively integrates a broad range of regulatory and enforcement roles with support from the Transport and Housing Bureau which is in charge of policy-making.

2.3.2 Proposals by researchers

Several researchers have argued that copying models that have worked in developed cities, and transposing them to developing cities may not be feasible owing to differences that exist in political, social and cultural contexts, and that such an approach could in fact aggravate existing problems (Stead, 2008; Pierre and Peters, 2005; Dimitriou, 1990). Vasconcellos (2001) contends that the type of transport authorities found in Europe are not suited to the political cultures of developing cities and instead proposes a variety of models that are based on the size of a city. He reasons that, in small and medium-sized cities, the single public agency that deals with urban and transport issues is effective in terms of coordinating policies. In large metropolitan areas, where mayors often hold substantial power, he argues that open decision-making (which includes the general public) is required. In a nutshell, he points out that establishing a single transport authority is not necessary. Rather, coordination can be improved by strengthening local authorities and giving them the necessary autonomy to act based on broad goals set out by central government. Pollitt and Bauckaert (1999) share a similar view, and go on to state that centralised government provide a potential for good co-ordination that is often not taken advantage of, and thus a clear framework on performance targets and accountability should obviate fragmentation and steer agencies to the right directions.

However, other researchers have expressed their support for transport authorities. This is based on the theory that the number of authorities involved in transport is best kept to a minimum, and should preferably all be brought under the administration of a single government institution in order to minimise problems with liaising and policy conflicts (Iles, 2005). Kane (2002) stressed that transport authorities in developing countries are needed to promote greater coordination between agencies, and responsibilities need to be decentralized in order for local needs to be addressed. The need for coordination was also emphasised by Jemali (2009) on the basis of her research on the decision-making process for urban transport policy in

Malaysia. She concluded that a weak institutional framework that is fragmented with overlapping responsibilities is a barrier to the successful development of integrated transport strategies. In this case, distinct privately financed public transport systems were lacking operational integration. A structured institutional framework is required, and she recommends a single Urban Public Transport Authority to overcome coordination issues and improve integration in the planning process. Imran (2009), based on his research on transport governance in Pakistan, recommends a National Transit Authority for integrated planning in Pakistan to overcome the fragmented planning between sectors and thus deliver a better public transport service. However, these recommendations reflect dissatisfaction with existing arrangements rather than any demonstration that other approaches would work better.

Researchers who support the creation of transport authorities have attempted to envision suitable models. For example, Williams (1998) and Walters (1998) believe that authorities should have separate political and executive bodies, with the political body being responsible for policy directions and the executive body managing the implementation of these policies. However, this is probably difficult to achieve, considering that the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians is very strong in many developing countries, especially in the South Asian region (Dwivedi, 2003). The success of transport authorities has been hypothesised as very much dependent on the autonomy they are given, and in this vein Pollitt and Bauckaert (1999) reveal that there is evidence to suggest that greater autonomy leads to financial improvements in their management, greater productivity and increased user responsiveness.

According to Kane (2002), institutional fragmentation and the lack of coordination and integration between transport agencies in developing countries is a major problem, with some countries having tried a range of coordination mechanisms to address these problems. What is lacking, however, is a range of case studies on strong coordinating agencies in the developing world that can be used to learn from. Although there is much discussion on the need for the coordination and integration of public transport in developing cities, there are also further factors that must be considered if good transport services are going to be created in these contexts, such as the development of holistic policy objectives supported by evidence-based planning approach, the need to increase social inclusion, and good financial management (PROSPECTS, 2003).

2.4 Transport authorities in developed countries

This section highlights some of the characteristics of transport authorities in developed cities, with specific attention being given to LTA Singapore and TfL. Much of the emphasis is on creating authorities that mirror these approaches. In general, transport authorities vary widely in the scope of their jurisdictions, the degree of their autonomy, and the contents of their constitutions. They go under different names in different countries, mostly developed under different historical circumstances and local conditions (Naniopoulos et al., 2012). Even in developed cities, there is not one simple model that every city can adopt due to differences in local contexts and national government policies, with individual countries having to implement the framework that is anticipated to work best for them (EMTA, 2008a). This is important as it suggests that, whilst the international development agencies may propose a model or a local actor may cite some key examples, they are likely to differ quite significantly. Table 2.1 shows a summary of several existing structures of transport authorities in developed cities.

Table 2.1: Types of transport authorities in several developed cities

Structure	Countries
State owned corporations	Bologna - SRM Athens - OASA *Singapore - LTA
City owned corporations	Milan- ATM London – TFL
Region or county acting as transport authority	Madrid- CRTM Valencia- eTM Stockholm – AB Strockholms Lokaltrafik Amsterdam – Stadsregio Amsterdam Lisbon-Grande Area Metropolitana de Lisboa
Region/s and/ or County/ies (or local government/s) and local authorities	Barcelona –ATM – 7 regions, 164 municipalities Lyon – SYTRAL – urban and suburb of Lyon Torino – AMMT – Torino metropolitan area -31 municipalities Berlin – VBB – two states and several counties Hamburg – HVV GmbH- 3 regional states, 7 counties Frankfurt – RMV – 15 regional authorities, 7 cities South Yorkshire – SYPTE – 4 local authorities
Two regions	Copenhagen – Movia Public Transport
An adhoc body under the control of a region	Paris - STIF

*All the transport authorities except Singapore LTA cover only public transport
Source: adapted from Naniopoulos et al. (2012)

Naniopoulos et al. (2012) and Masi (2009) believe that these transport authorities are needed in order to fulfil the requirements for coordination as follows:

- The need for a holistic approach in public transport provision, mainly to ensure integration with urban/regional and land use planning.
- To increase social inclusion in order to enhance mobility and accessibility by designing special fares and facilities for vulnerable and physically challenged groups.
- To improve integration between various modes, services, sectoral policies, public authorities and stakeholders.

Although the main motive for the creation of transport authorities has been centred towards improving coordination, most of these authorities are decentralised with the spatial scale ranging from city levels to multiple municipalities and regions (see GTZ, 2004 for discussion). They also take various forms and diverse ranges of responsibilities, ranging from powers to set overall objectives for transport policy (long-term), managing the supply of public transport through the planning of networks and coordination (medium-term) to operating services (short-term) (Naniopoulos et al., 2012). Interestingly, it was found that although decentralization has been observed as a key trend in the creation of transport authorities, the decreasing authority of central government has also been accompanied by a decrease in state funding (EMTA, 2008b).

The general characteristics of these authorities are their involvement in planning, integrating and financing public transport services with the aim of increasing the provision of quality services to meet mobility needs (EMTA, 2011). Several authorities, such as Barcelona Metropolitan Transport Authority (ATM)⁴, Berlin-Brandenburg Transport Authority (VBB)⁵ and Singapore Land Transport Authority (LTA)⁶, are guided by policy objectives that require a high-quality service to make public transport attractive. In order to achieve this goal, significant subsidising of public transport services is provided by the government, and these authorities are required to ensure that subsidies are allocated effectively, and that they are made accountable for this (GTZ, 2004). One way is through contractual agreements between transport authorities and the operators of transport services (EMTA, 2010).

⁴ <http://www.atm.cat/web/en/veure.php?pdf=en/memoria2011> accessed on 20 March 2013

⁵ <http://www.vbb.de/en/article/about-vbb/the-company-vbb/7677.html> accessed on 20 March 2013

⁶ <http://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltaweb/en/about-lta.html> accessed on 20 March 2013

Many of these authorities are also set up as statutory bodies, with legislative backing and access to funds (although none of these authorities have been able to achieve full cost recovery), supported by continuous initiatives to improve transport performance to meet the growing demands and expectations of the public (Noniopoulos et al., 2012; GTZ, 2004). The presence of political champions and city leadership was also found to be a contributing factor to the success of transport authorities, as observed in London, Singapore, Bogota and Stockholm (Leach and Wilson, 2004; Cervero, 1998). These characteristics can rarely be observed in developing cities. Often, the cities suffer from a lack of clear policy objectives and a limited emphasis on public transport. In addition, funding is a stumbling block as there is hardly any subsidising of transport operators (Kiggundu, 2009; Iles, 2005). Hence, service quality can only be maintained at a level that permits cost-recovery, which is often poor (Iles, 2005).

TfL and LTA Singapore – which are both often held up as exemplars of best practice in reports by international development agencies (ADB, 2009; GTZ, 2004; World Bank, 2002b) - will now be examined further. It is important to note that these authorities operate at different geographical scales: LTA Singapore is a national body whereas TfL is run by London city government and this epitomises the variation that exists under the umbrella of single transport authorities. The discussion here focuses on the institutional structure, functions and autonomy granted to these bodies. Literature regarding these authorities was abundant before and immediately after their creation, but there is little several years down the line. Although they are often held as effective agencies, there is a lack of evidence concerning their real successes. Furthermore, these two authorities have gone through several changes in terms of their functions, powers and processes to make them more effective, which makes the assessment of outcomes only relevant at a particular point in time. Hence, the perception that these authorities are successful and that they should be emulated - as international development agencies suggest - is most likely based on the efficient public transport services in these cities rather than on robust empirical evidence about these agencies contributions to transport management.

Land Public Transport Authority, Singapore

LTA Singapore was created in 1995 under the Ministry of Transport through the amalgamation of four entities - the Registry of Vehicles, the Mass Rapid Transit Corporation, the Road and Transportation Division of the Public

Works Department, and the Land Transportation Division of the Ministry of Communications⁷. This structural reform led to all land transport functions being brought under a single agency. The nature of Singapore as a city state with a single tier of government creates an unusual context for policy integration and the successful implementation of the strategies (Jemali, 2009; Nguyen, 1999).

LTA is supported by the Land Transport Authority of Singapore Act (1996) and is entrusted with a wide range of functions, including planning, the construction and maintenance of roads, road pricing, vehicle and transit licensing, traffic management, and the development of the mass rapid transport system. Although the majority of land transport responsibilities rest with the LTA, it still has to work closely with three other parties: the Public Transport Council, which sets the fares for buses and trains, and regulates bus service levels and licenses for bus operations; three private companies that run the bus and metro service; and the Traffic Police, who are responsible for traffic enforcement and driver licensing (Lam and Toan, 2006). In 2010, in an attempt to better streamline its functions, the LTA took over some functions of the Traffic Police's jobs, such as gazetting speed limits, managing road closures, and parking enforcement.⁸

Although LTA is answerable to the Minister of Transport, many decisions are delegated to the LTA board. The status of single-tier government simplifies the decision-making process, and provides the LTA with wider responsibilities for implementing decisions at the local level (May, 2004). This does not mean that the LTA dominates decision-making without consultation with stakeholders; it actively engages local politicians and members of the public, although this is mainly for local implementation rather than in relation to broad policy formulations (ibid). Another key point is that land use and transport are well integrated in Singapore, and the LTA's plans are followed closely when they are implemented, which allows the LTA to control the demand for transport (Cervero, 1998). The set of tools for managing the demands for road usage are amongst the most extensive in the world with vehicle license rationing and area road pricing implemented as early as 1975.⁹

⁷ (<http://www.lta.gov.sg>, accessed on 26 January 2013)

⁸ (<http://www.spf.gov.sg> accessed on 26 January 2013)

⁹ (<http://www.lta.gov.sg>, accessed on 26 January 2013)

Finance is not seen to be a major constraint for the LTA as the government meets the costs for all road infrastructure, assets and management schemes (Lam and Toan, 2006). The LTA meets the costs for traffic management and road maintenance from its agency fees, derived mainly from demand management measures, such as congestion pricing and tax. The operators have been able to remain profitable by having only to invest for their operation, maintenance and service improvement costs, with transit fares reviewed annually to allow operators to keep up with inflation (ibid).

There are invaluable lessons that can be garnered from LTA Singapore, although Nguyen (1999) argues that Singapore's case is unique given its single-tier government status, which makes a lot of things possible. Singapore was led by a visionary Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, who wanted to build a world class transport system (Richmond, 2008). The ingredients for success could include, long-term land use - transport plans and adherence to these plans, the presence of legal backing, good financial support, effective regulation of fares and services, strong political will, decision-making autonomy, intensive application of information technology and the active participation of the public - are possible lessons to be pursued elsewhere. However, the relative importance of these factors is unclear.

Transport for London (TfL)

TfL was established in 2000 under the supervision of the Greater London Authority (GLA). The creation of GLA took place in the light of the abolition of the Greater London Council, which was dissolved in 1986 and this left London as one of the few major cities in the world without metropolitan government (Travers, 2002). Subsequently in 1999, GLA was created by the Greater London Authority Act, and it acts as the local and regional government for the capital. The main aspiration for the creation of the GLA was the notion of policy integration, which involved integrating strategies for dealing with transport, spatial and economic development, air quality, waste, noise, biodiversity and culture (West et al., 2003). The GLA is headed by an elected Mayor who dominates the policy-making, with a clear distinction made between the executive (Mayor) and the Assembly (Sweeting, 2002). The Mayor proposes both policies (in the form of strategies) and the budget of the GLA, and makes appointments to various positions in the functional bodies, including TfL. Although the Assembly can make policy proposals to the Mayor, it cannot veto the Mayor's policies.

TfL is governed by the GLA Act, which determines its powers and duties. It was established as a world-class professional delivery-focused organisation, which emphasised the importance of strong research and evidence-based decision-making, besides providing the Mayor with the authority to facilitate the accomplishment of tasks (Leach and Wilson, 2004). The main role of TfL is to implement the Mayor's Transport Strategy for London, and transport services across the capital, such as London buses, the London Underground, the London Overground, and Victoria Coach Station. It also has other responsibilities, including managing congestion charges, road maintenance, traffic management, regulating taxis and private cars, and promoting walking and cycling. TfL also operates through three subsidiary companies incorporated within the Companies Act 2006: Transport Trading Limited, TfL Trustee Company Limited, and London Transport Insurance Guernsey Limited.¹⁰

The creation of TfL made transport services more democratically accountable, by shifting accountability from the central government to an elected Mayor. In short, the Mayor enjoys decision-making power, and is accountable to the electorate. Although the Mayor has decision-making and operational powers over TfL, his financial freedom is limited and the budget remains largely constrained by central government grant funding. The Mayor has to present budget proposals, which are scrutinised by the Assembly before they are passed on to the central government for budget allocation, which is renewed on a three-yearly basis (Marsden and May, 2006).

There are several important lessons that can be learned from London: there is a good combination of strategic political leadership and professional expertise there, which has proved important and TfL's culture involves taking risks and aiming to lead the field (MacKinnon et al., 2008). It also believed that TfL has a combination of the right powers, the strategic capacity and the institutional arrangements necessary for, facilitating project delivery (ibid). This was supported by Marsden and May (2006), who contrasted TfL with West Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive, and found that the bus-franchising model operating in London delivered a much more effective service than the deregulated model in West Yorkshire.

¹⁰ <http://www.tfl.gov.uk/corporate/about-tfl> accessed on 26 February 2013

2.5 Concepts related to transport authorities

Based on the explanations on the public transport challenges in the developing countries and the proposals from international development agencies and researchers for the creation of transport authorities, there are several concepts and criteria that have been highlighted, which are perceived as critical for successful implementation. These concepts include decentralisation, power, authority, autonomy, accountability, coordination and decision-making. These concepts are subject to range of interpretations and are explained in greater detail below.

2.5.1 Decentralisation

There are many definitions and understandings of decentralisation, which draw on a variety of disciplines, the work of different authors and a wide range of characteristics. Because of this, limited progress has been made in developing an analytical framework and theory of decentralisation (Conyers, 1984). However, it is generally understood to involve the transfer of powers, responsibilities and functions from the central government level to sub-national government institutions (Nyendu, 2012). There are three main types of decentralisation: political, fiscal and administrative (Falleti, 2005; Schneider, 2003; Smoke, 2003), and it is worth noting that these dimensions do not exist in isolation, but are interrelated and often exist in combination with each other (Schneider, 2003; Smoke, 2003; Manor, 1999).

According to Ebinger et al. (2007), political decentralisation takes place when legitimised bodies comprising publicly elected officials are given the authority to make autonomous decisions on planning, financing and administrative issues (Smoke, 2003). Fiscal decentralisation is the transfer of authority for “raising revenues or access to transfers and making decisions on current and investment expenditure” (Braun and Grote, 2002:69). Administrative decentralisation, which is the most common form seen in developing countries (Rondinelli, 1983; UNDP, 1997), is defined by Rondinelli and Nellis (1986:5) as:

The “transfer of responsibility and decision making powers for the planning, financing and management of certain public functions from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide, regional or functional authorities (which include NGO’s and private firms)”.

This definition sees the creation of transport authorities as a form of decentralisation. The common theme running through these definitions is the transfer of decision-making powers to the devolved body.

Numerous researchers have debated the relevance of decentralisation in developing countries, but the main understanding of it is that it is a way to facilitate development through encouraging public participation in the decision-making and implementation processes at the local government level. Consequently, it is expected to deliver greater efficiency in the provision of public goods and services, as well as greater economic growth (Nyendu, 2012; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011). Multilateral institutions encouraged decentralisation as a solution for the stagnant economies and central bureaucracies in developing countries by including it as a component in many of their programmes. Part of the agenda of decentralisation is also to promote good governance and address issues of corruption, accountability and transparency (World Bank, 2000b). However, there is no concrete evidence that decentralisation has achieved these goals to date. In a quantitative study in twenty-one OECD countries, (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011), found a negative connection between fiscal decentralisation and economic performance, although they provide no explanation for this trend. Veron et al. (2006) studied the effect of decentralisation on corruption in Eastern India, and revealed that it had not produced the hoped-for improvements. It was pointed out that without proper upward vertical accountability – especially towards political parties – corruption can be decentralised when local communities are ready to join up with local bureaucrats and politicians, and thus become willing participants in corrupt networks.

Whilst there is a strong argument for decentralisation, a number of researchers contend that it is important to strike a balance between centralisation and decentralisation. Smoke (2003), Bardhan (2002) and Wunsch (1991), and argue that large projects which involve other jurisdictions can benefit from national, hierarchical control, whilst projects with smaller economies of scale that require close supervision might benefit from a more decentralised approach. However, the researchers note that a mix of appropriate institutional form and a good networking system is necessary to reap the optimum benefits. This is demonstrated in the Philippines, where urban transport is under the purview of local authorities, but local authorities support the central government on its planning and implementing of mega projects like mass rapid transit system as the central

government has much greater resources (Olsson, 2004). Prud'homme (1995) states that the case for decentralisation in developing countries is weak, and if decentralisation is not planned and implemented properly it can lead to increases in overhead expenditure without compensatory benefits. Thus, in developing countries, particular attention must be directed towards choosing public services that are suitable for decentralisation, as some services may be better left under the jurisdiction of central government, such as highways, rail services, the control of pollution and the management of epidemics. In short, the central government must know 'what to decentralise' and what represents an appropriate level of decentralisation.

Whilst decentralisation researchers report numerous stories of its failure, they have also attempted to pinpoint the factors that may lead to successful decentralisation. Table 2.2 highlights some of the critical factors identified in the literature.

Table 2.2: Summary of factors affecting success of decentralisation

Authors	Factors	Research Approach	Location	Theoretical Framework
Rondinelli (1983)	Strength of central political and administrative support Behavioural, attitudinal and cultural influences Organisational factors Resources	Comparative analysis	8 Asian countries	Not stated
Agrawal and Ribot (1999)	Actors with powers Types of Powers Accountability	Comparative Case studies	India, Nepal, Mali, Senegal	Decentralisation
Tang and Bloom (2000)	Financial and management capacities	Case study	Donglan, China	Not stated
Larson (2003)	Legal structure Decision making sphere Role of central government Economic incentives	Case study	Honduras, Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua	Not stated
Baviskar (2004)	Political networks Collaboration between actors Accountability Strong organisation	In-depth evaluation	Madya Pradesh, India	Not stated
Falleti (2005)	Subnational share of revenues and expenditure Policy making authority Appointment of subnational officials Territorial representation	Comparative studies	Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico	Propose sequential theory of decentralisation based on path dependence
Yamamoto (2006)	Management autonomy - Resources - Operation - Organisation Financial autonomy Organisational behaviour Competition	Questionnaire – mail survey, quantitative	Semi-autonomous bodies Japan	Agency theory and Verhoest et al. (2004) classification on autonomy
McCarten and Vyasulu (2006)	Social capitals such as trust and participation Accountability Fiscal autonomy Political will	In-depth evaluation	Mahya Pradesh, India	Social capital theory
Kaiser et al. (2006)	Transparency Accountability Participation	In depth evaluation	Indonesia	Governance
Meyer and Hammerschmid (2010)	National culture - Power distance - Individualism/collectivism Administrative traditions - Historical, culture, values Institutional arrangements - HR system	Comparative HR study Questionnaire based electronic survey	EU countries	Framework developed by Hofstede (2001) on national culture
Nyendu (2012)	Transfer of real powers Commitment from central government	Qualitative study	Ghana	Not stated

Some of the common factors highlighted in the table above are accountability, funding, presence of the strong political leadership, organisational capacity and inter-governmental relationships. Based on their study of the impact of devolution on the formulation and delivery of transport policy in the United Kingdom, MacKinnon et al. (2008) highlighted the importance of two dimensions of strategic capacity for the devolved bodies: institutional strategic capacity, which centres on assets that are essential for delivering transport strategies (such as people, funding and technology); and process capacity, which involves the ability of those charged with implementing transport policy (such as politicians, civil servants and professionals) to work together within the institutional arrangements to translate strategies into policy outcomes.

Decentralisation is centred on good governance and, with proper implementation, it can make governmental structures and processes more responsive to the pressures of rapidly changing environments (Brilliantes, 2004). In theory, decentralisation brings important decisions closer to the people, and accordingly permits higher transparency and accountability, which eventually means better service for people (Kaiser et al., 2006). However, this argument assumes that all other factors, such as an efficient political process, real power transfer, excellent network of actors, sound institutional environment and effective organisations are present, which is often far from the reality in developing countries

2.5.2 Coordination and integration

As explained in section 2.2, one of the main transport challenges in developing countries is the lack of coordination amongst different agencies and operators. This directly affects the integration of transport services on the ground and Naniopoulos et al. (2012) believe that this also has a negative impact on the overall financial management. Transport authorities are proposed as solutions to this problem, and there are many mechanisms and strategies that these transport authorities can adopt in order to improve coordination. This is explored further below.

The terms 'coordination' and 'integration' are often used interchangeably in the field of transport. For the purpose of this thesis, however, coordination will be understood as operating along a continuum, with integration being the highest level of the continuum, and cooperation the lowest (DeVelde and Didier, 2005). Coordination is defined as the act of managing interdependencies between activities performed to achieve a goal or

common output (Malone and Crowston, 1990). The need for coordination increases if the organisation's success depends on the decisions made by each group of actors (Camerer and Knez, 1997).

Transport integration is often understood as being the physical and operational amalgamation of public transport services (which is also referred to as modal or functional integration) (Roumboutsos and Kapros, 2008; Hull, 2005). It is challenging to achieve operational integration as it often entails big changes, requiring the operators to either be brought together by merging service designs and planning activities, or through regulatory mechanisms (DeVelde and Didier, 2005). May et al. (2006), move beyond **operational integration** to a more strategic form of integration. In addition to the operational integration of public transport, they propose a **strategic integration** between policy instruments of transport and land use, between policy instruments of transport and other sectors, and **institutional integration**. Some of these activities may extend beyond the roles of a transport authority, such as that of **policy integration** between transport and other sectors. They claim that the careful integration of different policy instruments will help to overcome financial and acceptability barriers, and may accordingly increase the chance of strategies being implemented. At the same time, however, they acknowledged that it is difficult to be certain of how each combination of instruments will interact, and thus to accurately predict their outcomes.

Cooperation – on the other end of the continuum – is defined as the willingness of actors to work together to reach common objectives, and it is a mechanism that is only workable if the interests of the actors are not contradictory, and where good trust and personal relations are established (DeVelde and Didier, 2005). This happens when all members participate voluntarily, producing a win-win situation, perhaps through sharing resources without any changes to powers or functions. Examples include providing timetable information and route maps, or collaborating in planning processes.

Transport is mostly coordinated through planning and regulatory functions (Banister, 2008; Iles, 2005; DeVelde and Didier, 2005). Transport **planning** is a process involving various transport systems, and links economic, environment and social issues together, which involves coordination (Jeon and Amekudzi, 2005). The adoption of a comprehensive planning for route networks, schedules, information for users and ticketing will facilitate integration within and between modes for seamless travel. This function can

be strengthened further by adopting a land use transport planning approach; as this will allow development activities to be directed towards locations well-served by the transport service, thus supporting shorter travel distances (Banister, 2008). The **regulatory** role covers several aspects of transport, such as the licensing of vehicles, operators and drivers, safety standards, fares, the supply of services, the conduct of drivers, the administration of routes and the allocation of subsidies (Sohail et al., 2006; Iles, 2005). This role is intended to ensure that high standards are maintained through testing, monitoring and benchmarking transport provision (Sohail et al., 2006). Given that this involves a wide range of different tasks, that may be undertaken by different agencies, Iles (2005) suggests that it is vital that the number of agencies involved in planning and regulation is either kept to a minimum or brought under the administration of a single agency.

There are three ways in which coordination can be achieved using planning and regulatory functions. Firstly, by traditional hierarchical coordination, which is ensured by exercising authority from the top. **Hierarchical coordination** is characterised by passing down consistent and coherent orders from the top and lower levels, with proposals checked to ensure that they fit the overarching policy and strategy, and changes made when a new situation occurs (Bauckaert and Pollitt, 2011). Many transport authorities take this form, which allows them to have a better control of the standard of service provided by operators. Secondly, through **market mechanisms** by allowing the hidden hand of supply and demand to do the job or through the network (ibid). This form of coordination, which is through market forces, is debatable, especially in developing an efficient public transport system. Market forces may fail to achieve desired results without government intervention due to the nature of the monopolistic or oligopolistic structures in some parts of transport; but on the other hand, it is anticipated that irrational and misguided intervention from the bureaucrats could do more harm than good (Iles, 2005). Third, is the coordination through the network, which involve several interdependent actors in delivering services, and this is further discussed in section 2.6.

2.5.3 Power

As explained in section 2.3 and section 2.4, it is suggested that the success of transport authorities is closely related to the powers granted to these bodies. In order to make an impact, these authorities must have the power not only to make decisions but also to drive those decisions to implementation (ADB, 2009).

Power is understood as an entity, and those subjected to power acquire beliefs that result in their consent to domination through coercive or non-coercive forms (Lukes, 2005). This reflects the fact that the powerful can transform the powerless in such a way that the latter behaves as the former wishes, and can happen with or without coercion or forcible constraint. Lukes (2005) sees power as a capacity that can be held, even when it is not used or needed. This implies that it does not have to be exercised. He also observes that the exercise of power by an individual or groups is not necessarily an observable action, and may be unconscious.

Nye (2011), based on Lukes' (2005) views on power, expands and clarifies the concept of power. Table 2.3 below shows the dimensions of power that he proposes.

Table 2.3: Dimensions of Power

Dimensions to relational power	Description	Types of power	Resources	Behaviour
Commanding change	Ability to command others to change their behaviour against their initial preferences	Hard	Force and money	Coercion – using threats and rewards
Controlling agenda	Ability to affect others preferences so that they want what you want and you need not command them to change	Soft and hard power	Institutions, ideas, values, culture Force and money	Framing and agenda setting
Establishing preferences	Ability to affect behaviour by shaping their preferences in ways that produce what you want rather than relying on carrot and sticks to change their behaviour	Soft	Institutions, ideas, values, culture	Persuasion and attraction to change belief, perception and preference

Source: adapted from Nye (2011)

Nye (2011) suggests that there are three dimensions of relational power - commanding changes, controlling preferences and establishing preferences - which comprises soft and hard power, and both forms are believed to be essential for producing effective strategies. Nye (2011) does not explain the sources of hard power, but limits his interpretation to the resources that create the push factor such as money and force. The definition for hard power suggests that 'authority' - which is defined as the right to rule with legitimacy - can be classified as a source of hard power. Soft power, on the other hand refers to the ability to affect others through the co-optive means

of framing the agenda, persuading and eliciting positive attraction in order to gain the desirable outcomes, and its sources include institutions, ideas and culture. He argues that power is context-specific and defines power resources as tangible and intangible raw materials that underlie power relationships and argues that whether or not a given set of resources produces outcomes depends upon behaviour in context (Nye 2011:9). This implies that power consists of resources that are transformed into outcomes through specific behaviour.

Foucault (1982) on the other hand sees power not as an entity which can be possessed but rather as a process and holds that what really matters is how power is exercised. He points out that where there is power, there is resistance and resistance is a part of power. Like power, there are various definitions of resistance but for the purpose of this thesis, it is understood as “a reactive process where agents embedded in power relations actively oppose initiatives by other agents” (Jermier et al., 1993:9). Resistance exists throughout power distribution networks which means there is no single centre for resistance and to better understand power relations, one has to investigate the resistance that exists within those relations (ibid). Because of the co-existence of power and resistance, Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that the state is often dependent on institutional consolidation and stable power relations for its operations.

Flyvbjerg (2001), building on Lukes and Foucault, proposes a number of key features of power. He suggests that powers should be seen as productive and positive, not only restrictive and negative, and that power is dynamic, meaning that it can be exercised through specific strategies. He suggests that, when analysing power, the focus should be directed towards the way in which power is exercised, as well as who are the winners and losers. In his rationality and power concept, (Flyvbjerg, 1998) provides a number of propositions concerning rationality and power. The central one is that although power should ideally only be used after one has enough knowledge about a problem – the rationality condition – in reality, power often ignores rationality and design knowledge at its convenience (Flyvbjerg, 2001:143). Rationality is often the retreat for those who lack power (Flyvbjerg, 1998:37).

In summary, researchers who seek to conceptualise power generally agree that power has to be exercised in a particular context, meaning that it is a ‘process in context’, with the outcome dependent on resources, behaviours and resistance, all of which are relational to particular times and situations.

Power can produce observable outcomes or non-observable outcomes, and can, at times, lead to unintended consequences. Therefore, it requires well-designed strategies and skilful leadership to produce the desired outcomes.

2.5.3.1 Authority and autonomy

Power, authority and autonomy are interrelated but distinct concepts in relation to institutions. Robertson (2002) defines **authority** as the right to give an order, which will be obeyed without question as to this right because its legitimacy is accepted by those to whom the order is addressed. The key elements in the definition are the right to give orders and legitimacy or, in other words, the moral obligation to obey. Authority is often granted to those who occupy official positions, such as public servants, where such an authority is defined by certain bureaucratic regulations. Legitimacy is a general perception or assumption that the actions of an individual or organisation are desirable, proper and appropriate within systems of norms beliefs and values (Suchman, 1995). Wolff (1998) argues that it is possible that one can have power without having actual authority. For example, in exercising power, one can use coercion or force on others to obtain agreement, but one cannot impose the obligation to comply without proper authority.

According to Christensen and Yesilkagit (2006), there are two dimensions to **autonomy**. The first one is **structural** autonomy which arises if an alternative or competing level of supervision is inserted between the agency and the departmental minister and the second is **legal** autonomy which arises when the law authorizes the agency head to make decisions. This is also seen to be closely associated with the decision-making competencies of an agency (Van Thiel, 2004; Verhoest et al., 2004). Verhoest et al. (2004) explain that making an agency more autonomous involves shifting decision-making competencies from external actors to the agency itself. The key element in autonomy is the ability to make decisions and, according to Young and Tavares (2004), autonomy *per se* is meaningless, requiring authority and resources to be utilised. For example, an organisation might be autonomous but its authority might be limited to a particular sector and area, meaning that it can only make decisions within the allowed scope. Autonomy requires resources to be effective, which may take various forms, including managerial, technological and financial ones (ibid). In transport authorities in many developed cities, powers, autonomy and authority are specified in a governmental act, which defines the transport authority's roles.

However, these powers have to be mediated by sufficient resources, including skilful leadership, if the authority is to be effective.

Verhoest et al. (2004) proposed six dimensions of **institutional autonomy** – comprising legal, structural, managerial, financial, policy-making and interventional – and these dimensions can be used as guidelines for understanding the kind of autonomy that exists within an organisation. (Laegreid et al., 2006; Cheema, 2005), on the other hand, have proposed three dimensions of institutional autonomy for assessing the powers given to an agency: policy autonomy, financial autonomy and personnel autonomy. A framework centred on assessing the autonomy held by SPAD and the BMLTA was built using the dimensions of autonomy proposed by both Verhoest et al. (2004) and Laegreid et al. (2006), and is shown in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4: Dimensions of autonomy

Autonomy	Dimensions
Personnel	<p>Strategic Personnel Matters</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Level of salaries - Criteria for promotion - Criteria for evaluation - Criteria for recruitment and downsizing <p>Operational Personnel matters</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Wage increases for individual employees - Promotion of individual employees - Evaluation of individual employees - Recruiting individual employees - Dismissal of individual employees
Financial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Make loans for investment - Set tariff/prices for products and services - Conclude legal contracts with private actors - Generates own revenue
Policy	<p>Strategic Policy Matters</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Setting own goals and objectives - Setting policies on transport matters - Approval on project proposals <p>Operational Policy matters</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Manage day-to-day activities
Legal autonomy	The extent to which the legal status of agency prevents the government from altering the allocation of decision-making competencies
Intervention	The extent to which the agency is free from 'reporting' to the government

Sources: adapted from Verhoest et al. (2004) and Laegreid et al. (2006)

2.5.3.2 Accountability

Another concept closely associated with authority and autonomy is accountability, which requires those vested with powers to be answerable for their actions. This is an element that is clearly lacking from governmental

organisations in many developing countries, which leads to corruption and transparency issues in governance (Cheema, 2005). Reforms promoted by international development agencies in developing countries demand an effective accountability system to be in place for combatting corruption (Kaufman, 2005). Accountability has also been viewed as the central motivation for restructuring various types of institutional reform (Jenkins, 2007), and is regarded as one of the critical factors affecting the outcomes of decentralisation, as shown in Table 2.2.

Accountability can be understood as a relationship of power involving the capacity to demand that someone justifies his or her behaviour, and the capacity to impose penalties for poor performance (ibid). This relies heavily on two elements: explanation and sanction (Bellamy et al., 2011). The first element involves those who hold the reins of power in society having an obligation to explain and justify their conduct to a forum; the second element involves implying sanctions may be made if the explanation is perceived to be inadequate to the forum.

Peters (2007) suggests that there are three forms of accountability. The simplest form is the requirement for an administrative organisation to render an account of what it has done, and to accordingly document its progress in an annual report. The reporting could be in the form of a financial report or it may be expressed in terms of service delivery, provided with an assessment of achievements of programmes. This form of accountability aims for transparency, meaning that reliable, relevant and timely information about the government activities is made available to the public (OECD, 2002). The second form of accountability conceptualises accountability as a form of responsibility, which relies more on the internalised values of public servants and their understanding of the law and appropriate behaviour in office. However, such personal obligations are often perceived to be inadequate for proper accountability and require the presence of external forces in order to enforce responsible behaviour (Peters, 2007). It is worth noting that imposing controls to constrain behaviour is a difficult task, and is not always successful. Thus, a mixture of responsibility and accountability is recommended in order to keep things in check (ibid). The third form of accountability can be understood in terms of responsiveness in regard to the openness or willingness of civil servants to fulfil the demands of their political masters and the public (Peters, 2007; OECD, 2002). A good civil servant is one who is willing to take directions from above and who attempts to serve the requirements of the public. In some cases, however, this might

be difficult, as political leaders may make self-interested demands (Peters, 2007).


Conventional accountability is concerned with punishment rather than improvement. Hence, little attention has historically been assigned to this element as it has been perceived as a game of 'shame and blame' (Flinders and Moon, 2011). This type of accountability is usually only raised when things go wrong – such as when there is a failure in public authority for which somebody is expected to be held to account – but it is not given any attention so long as everything is running smoothly (Gregory, 2003). Peters (2007) suggests that conceiving accountability to be a form of punishment is problematic, and that this prevents it from taking its proper central role in the process of detecting and correcting errors. He further argues that actors involved in this process must acknowledge that finding suboptimal results is not necessarily a cause for punishment, and may often instead provide an opportunity to learn and find better means for providing services. Hence, accountability should be perceived as a platform for improving performance and as a means for institutionalising a learning and steering approach to good governance.

2.5.4 Decision-making power

One of the important factors observed in LTA Singapore and TfL (see section 2.4) is the ability to make decisions on strategic matters besides having the powers to drive the implementation of those decisions. Devolving decision-making power is also the spirit behind decentralisation, as explained in section 2.5.1, and critical power for autonomous bodies (see section 2.5.3.1).

Masi (2009) highlights three different planning and control levels for transport organisation: the strategic level, tactical level and operational level. The **strategic** level defines the main policy objectives and goals for public transport; this task is often performed by the higher authority, such as the Ministry of Transport or a central planning body. The second level is the **tactical** level, which addresses the way in which objectives can be achieved, such as through service designs and development; this is the level of operations for transport authorities. The third level is the **operational** level where prescribed service requirements are put into practice; this is usually handled by the transport operators. The transport authority, which acts at the tactical level, plays a two-pronged role. On one hand, it supports the formulation of policies at the top level, and on the other hand, their specified

requirements affect the decisions at operational levels through planning and regulatory functions. In order to act effectively at the tactical level, these authorities need certain decision-making powers, and Agarwal and Ribot's (1999) study on decentralisation in Asia and Africa identified four types of decision-making power that are essential to transport authorities as decentralised authorities. Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between the different levels of planning and control, together with the decision-making powers proposed for transport authorities.



Source: adapted from Masi (2009) and Agarwal and Ribot (1999)

Figure 2.1: Framework showing planning levels in transport organisation and the decision-making powers proposed for transport authorities

In Agrawal and Ribot's model (1999), the first type of decision-making power is the power to create new rules and modify old ones. This is essential in the regulation of transport, especially for maintaining operations and service standards. The second type is the power to make decisions about how a particular resource or opportunity is to be used. This usually goes together with funding capability and subsidy control for ensuring that the correct infrastructural investments are made to support the delivery of services. This is followed by powers to ensure compliance with rules, which gives the authority to enforce regulatory requirements. Lastly, is the power to adjudicate disputes that arise in the creation of rules and to ensure compliance with them. It is important to note that decision-making powers must be accompanied by a good system of accountability (both upwards

and downwards) in order to prevent abuses of powers (EMTA, 2008a; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999).

Zografos and Tsanos (2007) examined the differences that exist in the decision-making processes for transport policy-making within different institutional settings in nine European countries. It was found that in a centralised institutional setting, such as Greece, decision-making powers lie with a few central authorities, and the opinions of other actors and interest groups receive little consideration. This was found to facilitate the attainment of European and national policy objectives and to minimise local pressures. However, it may mean the public's wants and needs do not get considered in policy decisions, which can result in poor transport policy design, which negatively affects what is delivered on the ground. In a moderately decentralised institutional setting – where policy-making power has been devolved to regional or local bodies – better public participation can be observed. The United Kingdom was above other moderately decentralised countries, such as Germany and Finland, recording very high levels of public participation in the policy-making process, which improved the solutions developed. However, this was contested by Bickerstaff and Walker (2001) who found that motivations for engaging the public in transport planning in the United Kingdom have been mainly driven by government's requirements for greater local consultation rather than to promote fairness and democratic rights. Nevertheless, Emberger et al. (2008) have warned that public participation is closely associated with cultural norms and practices, thus care must be taken when applied in non-European contexts.

2.6 The concept of governance

The term 'governance' refers to the process of governing in order to achieve goals. This differs from the term 'government', which refers to activities backed by the formal institutions of the state, such as ministries, departments and local authorities (Docherty and Shaw, 2009; Rosenau, 1992). Governance, thus refers to activities of governments (Rosenau, 1995) which means that it is a process that involves the relationship between a network of actors who may or may not have formal authority in the deliverance of public policy (Docherty and Shaw, 2009). Governance can be divided into two broad categories.

The first category consists of the **regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, administrative practices and actors** that constrain, prescribe

and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and services (Lynn et al., 2001). This category focuses on the system of rules by which a desirable societal state is approached and through which undesirable states are avoided (Schneider and Bauer, 2007). There are two types of rules – formal and informal. Informal rules consist of values, norms, practices, customs and formal rules comprise laws, statutes, constitutional provisions and regulations (Williamson, 2000). Given this, there is a feedback mechanism for governance via which powerful actors use institutional devices and resources to observe and define undesirable states, in-turn mobilising available resources for problem-solving in order to achieve what is perceived to be the desired state. In the process, institutional structures can be changed or new laws and regulations may be formulated. However, because governance is also centred on power relations, more powerful actors are also able to utilise the resources for their own benefit.

The second category of governance places an emphasis on relations **between organisations**, and the networks that exist between actors through which policy outcomes are delivered. Rhodes (1997) refers to governance as self-organising, inter-organisational networks. The term 'network' describes the involvement of several interdependent actors in delivering services and is closely associated with the mechanism to achieve coordination (see section 2.5.2) amongst conflicting interest (Wollman, 2003; Peters, 1998). Rhodes (1997) promotes the idea of 'governance without the government', and suggests that regulatory mechanisms such as public-private partnerships and joint entrepreneurial ventures may function effectively despite the fact that they are not endowed with the government's formal authority. In the same vein, Kooiman (1993) and Luhmann (1982) argue that policy outcomes are not the products of central governments alone, but the results of interactions between the local government, the private sector and the voluntary sector as well. The risk in a network partnership is the difficulties in reaching consensual decisions because it lacks formal rules, and thus there is a tendency for a superior actor to dominate discussions and decisions (Peters, 2010). In an attempt to minimise this problem, he highlights some of the instruments that may be used to improve network communication, such as formal regulations and contracts as this would bind together the actors to various rules and standards.

On the other hand, Nye (2011) points out that in complex networks, there are structural holes that prevent direct communication and the party or

actors who can bridge or exploit structural holes can use their position as a source of power to control others. Sharing similar view with Peters (2010), he also believes that networks will be more effective if complemented with 'hard power' - as explained in section 2.5.3. In addition to being bound to rules and regulations, networks need knowledgeable and resourceful actors to be effective, including strategic leaders to drive the network (Sorenson and Torfing, 2009). Moreover, Wollman (2003) highlights the importance of cultural aspects in influencing the performance of networks, observing how trust-bound rather than rule-bound approaches have prevailed in Scandinavian countries, where such approaches are culturally rooted in people's values.

Docherty and Shaw (2009) describe the way in which transport governance has become more complex over time. Policies for transport relate to the different modes and spatial scales to which they apply, and this requires more collaboration between layers of government and other stakeholders. They stress that the government (or the state) still has to be heavily involved in transport activities, as it cannot function effectively in a free market, and is responsible for ensuring that social policy goals are achieved through the provision of transport infrastructure and services. However, changes in political philosophy that reduce state-intervention and the pressure for budget cuts have led to the deregulation and privatisation of many transport services. Nevertheless, the state is said to maintain an upper hand in transport management, as it can use contracts and ownership to ensure that the required policy outcomes are delivered. Whilst the governance of transport has become more complicated and complex, Stough and Rietveld (1997) point out that there is pressure from stakeholders to achieve greater flexibility so that the 'co-production' process can deliver the specified policy outcomes and fulfil the increasing demands and expectations of transport users.

2.7 Institutional complexity and reforms

In a complex institutional environment such as transport, there can be a large number of subsystems, such as numerous levels of administration, different types of organisations with a variety of functions, and a large number of actors that may have different powers, authority, understandings and interests. It is difficult to predict and control outcomes in such an environment, as they result from the interaction of complex components (Mason, 2001). For Healey (1997), institutional complexity is unavoidable

and she proposes institutional changes as a mechanism for creating the necessary capacity for policy-making and planning, as well as for avoiding the inefficient and wasteful use of resources. However, given that these institutional changes will occur within the complex environment, the outcomes can be unpredictable, and thus such changes may not achieve the anticipated goals of reducing complexity.

Toonen (2003) contends that reform is about making improvements by removing faults and errors, or by correcting malpractice. The process is not only about changing the structure, but rather requires a change in the mental modes, that are induced by agents' shared beliefs (Srivastava, 2004; Aoki, 2001). This implies that structural and cultural reforms must go hand-in-hand. Section 2.5.3 also suggests that institutional change can be conceptualized as parties seeking to exercise their power. Changing the institution may not be as simple as one might think: it relies on other factors, such as knowing exactly what to change, existing institutional arrangements, the willingness of present institutions to accommodate change, and the political will to make things happen (Briassoulis, 2004; Beer et al., 1990). This perhaps explains why some institutional reforms or changes do not result in positive performance. Although structural changes may be achieved, the real changes – which are dependent on the willingness of actors to change their mental models – may not happen. In any policy measure, there will be winners and losers, as Chisholm (2000) argues, and this is no different in institutional changes. Understanding who is anticipated to win/lose is therefore critical in order to understand why certain reforms work or do not work in terms of achieving anticipated outcomes.

Researchers have tried to visualise how different modes of governance respond to institutional complexity and reforms. Duit and Galaz (2008), for example, suggest that a centralised government has a high capacity for dealing with complexity owing to its ability to monitor and steer unexpected developments by controlling problems associated with collective action, through being well-placed to promote coordination (Politt and Bauckaert, 1999). Collective action is claimed to be the fundamental societal problem (North, 2005; Ostrom, 2005), and the failure to address collective-action problems at various levels is perhaps one reason for the poor integration of public transport services and their high delivery costs.

Whilst centralised governance systems seem to be better at introducing more radical and large-scale reforms, studies have shown that large reforms often fail, whilst small changes are more acceptable and more likely to show

positive results (Stead et al., 2008; Tang and Bloom, 2000). Stead et al.'s (2008) study of the German regional transport authority model's application to Riga in Latvia and Wroclaw in Poland found the following important lesson behind the limited success of the programme: it is important to adapt them to the local context by taking institutional and cultural differences into consideration, that large-scale reforms may not be promising when they aim to improve performance - especially when resources are limited, the importance of key actors for driving reforms, the setting of clear practical goals and the production of visible achievements to gain confidence from other stakeholders and the public.

2.7.1 Public management reform

Public management reform refers to “deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector organisations with the objective of getting them to perform better” (Bauckaert and Politt, 2011:2). Most studies attribute the need for reform to either an inadequacy in the existing administrative structure or impact of external global best practice reform models (Peters, 2010; Cheung, 2005). Drivers for reform could also be based in competition, getting value for public money, bad institutional design, economic growth/decline, or cultural shifts (Macario and Spandou, 2010; Furubotn and Ritcher, 2000). Moreover, Cheema (2005) and Cheung (2005) highlight other public sector characteristics unique to developing countries that call for reform, such as a bloated civil service arising from the pressure to provide employment, poor expenditure control, complicated procedures, and poor systems of checks and balances that lead to corruption and transparency issues.

There are two popular types of public management reform: non-structural or process reform and structural reform. Structural reforms often need to be accompanied by process reforms for optimum impact (Toonen, 2003). **‘Non-structural reform’** or ‘process reform’ refers to transformations to develop effective working mechanisms and changes to administrative patterns without structural changes (ibid). Examples include improving the knowledge and skills of personnel, setting quality and service standards, implementing IT initiatives, improving the quality and timeliness of services and products, and clarifying agencies’ missions and objectives.

Structural reforms aim to improve the structure of the government in order to improve the coordination and cohesion of various activities within the public sector (Peters, 2010). Examples of structural reforms include the

creation of new autonomous bodies, merging the functions of existing agencies, decentralising power to local authorities, and the enactment of new laws and regulations. The new public management spirit that was heavily promoted by the World Bank in the 1990s emphasised the idea that the central government should improve operational efficiency through structural reform by establishing autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies and limiting itself to a coordination role (Bouckaert and Politt, 2011; Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 2003). This was also the approach taken in the creation of many transport authorities around the world, such as TfL and LTA Singapore.

The creation of autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies is justified on the basis that the decisions that need to be made in this area are based on economic and performance criteria rather than political considerations (Peters, 2010). However, Christensen and Laergreid (2006) argue that the creation of such bodies is not proven in terms of efficiency, and is taken for granted simply because it is a trend that is followed in many countries. They also claim that accountability can be an issue in autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies when they are exempt from political supervision. However, Bache et al.'s (forthcoming) research on the changing interplay between central and local government in the UK in relation to transport and carbon emission reduction did not find any strong evidence that politicians will deploy the problem of 'too many hands' in order to dilute their responsibility, and may still want to remain in control. However, these politicians are not willing to make strict and unpopular decisions to achieve policy outcomes, as what they most value is winning votes.

The situation is even more crucial in developing countries owing to the fact that governance integrity, such as transparency and corruption, are pressing issues. In the past, autonomous organisations were created in many developing countries to focus on economic development; unfortunately, however, it was often more political rather than economic criteria that have dominated the management of these bodies (Peters, 2010). The creation of autonomous bodies with single purpose also poses the danger that it may consequently neglect policies and objectives outside the organisation's single purpose (Wollman, 2003). This is especially critical for a transport authority as transport is a sector that is interlinked with many other policy areas and sectors; the importance of integrating the policies has been acknowledged (May et al., 2006).

2.7.2 Factors influencing public management reforms

Public management reforms are not straightforward exercises, and because they challenge pre-existing institutional orders, they are shaped or constrained by what the reforms attempt to control or define (Bauckaert and Politt, 2011). Oliver (1992) suggests that there are three sources of pressure for reform: functional, political and social. Functional pressures arise from perceived problems with the performance levels of existing institutional arrangements. Political pressures result from shifts in the interests of politicians and other powerful actors together with the underlying power distributions that have supported and legitimated the existing institutions. Social pressures usually derive from interest groups demanding improved services, such as public transport users and transport associations. Bauckaert and Politt (2011) build on Oliver's research (1992), proposing a management reform model, which helps in understanding the reform process, and is shown below in Figure 2.2.




Figure 2.2: Management Reform Model
(adapted from Bauckaert and Politt, 2011)

Elite decision-making is identified as the key in any reform process, but three other large groups of elements play a significant role: socioeconomic forces, political systems and administrative systems. The key reformers

often comprise politicians and senior bureaucrats, as they are able to put the reform on the agenda and provide the skill and knowledge to implement it (Grindle and Thomas; 1989). Reforms often involve a wide range of actors from a variety of organisations including management consultants, who help to shape it during the reform process (Bauckaert and Politt, 2011). Reformers may design a package that is based on what is desirable and feasible in the local context (ibid). Such packages display a considerable amount of rhetoric, but what is desirable is often contested. However, during the actual implementation of the reforms, the key actors often have to deal with a wider network of actors, and can be forced to change the design and instruments of the reform at this stage. This may happen as a result of the network actors putting up resistance in order to retain their powers, the competition for power, financial constraints, or a lack of authority on the reformers' side (Grindle and Thomas, 1989). Strong political leadership is may help to overcome some resistance but Toonen (2003) argues that such leaders can only change the course of policies to the degree that the environment permits them to. Although political will is a crucial element for reforms, Peters (2010) cautions that politicians have a short attention span in reform programmes because they do not produce quick results that can be used to win public support.

The importance of informal institutions also emerges. Both the administrative culture and the relationships between civil servants and politicians are seen to influence reform management as well (Bauckaert and Politt, 2011). Administrative culture helps in identifying what is normal and what is acceptable in an organisation, and sets the stage for the reform design. For example, in many developing countries, deeply-rooted cultural values such as the duty to make sacrifices for the sake of one's family, obedience, respect for authority and consensual decision-making can prevail, which subsequently influence the behaviour of civil servants (Dwivedi, 2003). The relationship between civil servants and politicians is a sensitive matter in India, as highlighted by Dwivedi, who states that 'the power and prestige of civil servants is undermined by politicisation and because of this the public service ethics decline drastically [...] This insidious subculture does not encourage citizens to attempt seeking what is legally due to them and corruption has become a way of life' (2003:514,520).

Challenges to the creation of new agencies can also occur when there are other vested interests operating within the policy field. Politicians often like to mimic established policies and proven practices (Peters, 2010; Toonen,

2003), as Van Thiel (2004) found in her study on politicians' preference for semi-autonomous bodies in the Netherlands. She concluded that the creation of independent agencies has become a path-dependent trend, with politicians following the footsteps of their predecessors as this gives them more confidence in the outcomes. This is also seen in the creation of transport authorities. These models are held to be successful, and are thus mimicked. Foucault (1982) suggests that in order to minimise uncertainties, one should reflect on history in an attempt to understand and be aware of the social arrangements that create problems as well as those that create satisfaction. Doing so aids in understanding oppressive relations of power, thus enabling decisions to be made concerning whether to oppose or promote certain arrangements (ibid).

2.7.3 The outcomes of reforms

Public management reform is a means to an end rather than an end-in-itself, which means that it is an ongoing process continually aiming at improvement, and is often far from stable (Peters, 2010). To date, there remains no accurate way to predict the outcome of reforms, or to show which structural changes will lead to what shifts in outputs or final outcomes. Moreover, there are few systematic evaluations of past reform exercises, and thus little can be learned from the experience of others. This is because reforms are often seen as being moments of 'temporary glory' (Toonen, 2003:473). In addition, not clearly specifying the outcomes of reforms could also enable accountability to be more easily side-stepped.

Grindle and Thomas (1989) suggest that the outcomes of reforms are not just about whether they have been successful or unsuccessful as there is a range of possible short and long-term outcomes that can affect different groups of stakeholders. For example, in a privatisation initiative, the company involved may raise good revenue within a short period of time and thus be regarded as successful, but this does not mean that good services have been delivered to passengers within the same time-scale. In order to deal with uncertainties about the outcome, Grindle and Thomas (1989) propose that a thorough reform plan with clear objectives should be prepared prior to implementation. This approach is supported by Bauckaert and Politt (2011), who went on to state that in addition to their ultimate objectives, reforms may have a number of intermediate ends, including strengthening the control of politicians over bureaucracy and freeing public officials from bureaucratic constraints that inhibit their opportunities.

Reforms can also produce unintended and unforeseen outcomes that require tackling (Toonen, 2003). In their study of local government decision-making on transport in three city regions in the United Kingdom, Marsden and May (2006) found that changes in organisations that produce new institutional arrangements can negatively affect their ability to deliver new policies, and argued that the cost of such disruptions should be fully justified by the anticipated benefits of the proposed reform. However, it was noted that the benefits of reforms are often not immediately seen, often taking years to happen. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the ultimate objective of a reform will be achieved, and some reforms may only achieve one or two of their objectives or fail altogether.

Accounting for these limitations, Bauckaert and Politt (2011) attempt to distinguish four different areas in relation to which reforms can be assessed for progress:

- operational results
- the management or decision-making process
- changes in the overall capacity of the political and administrative system
- the system's shift towards some desired or ideal state

In this thesis, the decision-making process is used as a basis for assessing the performance of the case study organisations, and assumes that process improvements of this type will directly lead to improvements in operational results, thus achieving better outputs and outcomes. The limitations of studying a reform process at a specific point in time are recognised, in that the reforms are relatively recent and transport outcomes can only be seen in the much longer-term.

A lack of social capital – such as trust, understanding and networking - between a new network of actors is a critical factor in poor reform outcomes. McCarten and Vyasulu (2006) highlight the importance of social capital for institutional performance with regards to creating the mutual trust that facilitates public activities, such as planning exercises and the implementation of programmes. They stress that when there is low social capital, reforms can create coordination problems that in-turn require further steering and control to resolve. However, it is important to note that actors may take time to reaffirm or develop forms of social capital following an episode of reorganisation, and this may explain why new institutions often take time to begin working effectively.

2.8 Chapter summary

This chapter has performed two main tasks: it has discussed published literature relating to the various themes and concepts arising in this thesis; and it has discussed issues associated with structural reforms, focusing on how public management can be used to address inadequacies in existing structures and thus improve efficiency. It is important to acknowledge that most of the available literature focuses on reforms in the Western world, and the Asian contexts in this study could have features that mean that some of this research is not directly applicable to the chosen case studies. Nevertheless, this literature provides theoretical knowledge about ideals, constraints on reform exercises, and differences in rhetoric and practice, all of which can be used in the analysis of the case studies and be built upon in the context of developing Asian countries.

Several conclusions can be drawn from this chapter:

- (a) The benefits of integrated policy in transport seem to be well established, and transport authorities that are set up in many developed cities are designed to promote integration at various levels. However, whether this applies to the context of developing countries is unclear.
- (b) Institutional structures are often not well aligned in terms of coping with transport challenges, particularly in the context of developing countries, in which the increasing complexity of transport governance has become an issue. All these factors call for reform (see section 2.2 and section 2.6).
- (c) In an attempt to deal with institutional weaknesses in developing cities, and accordingly achieve better integration of transport services, international development agencies have called for the establishment of transport authorities based on the widespread use of similar models in developed cities even though there is little evidence that they are financially sustainable and effective (see section 2.3.1).
- (d) There seems to be no 'one size fits all' model when it comes to transport authorities. Even within developed cities, their set-ups, jurisdictions, functions and powers vary with contextual factors, and thus the reasons for these differences need to be understood before appropriate models can be selected for cities in developing countries (see section 2.4). Whilst such models are heavily promoted by international development agencies, it is unclear exactly what *is* being promoted, and whether it can work in developing countries. There is a

clear gap in the research in this area, and filling it represents the contribution of this thesis to the extant literature.

- (e) Whilst the need for reform might exist, the details of such reforms require an in-depth understanding of existing governance structures, powers and resources. This study seeks to contribute to the substantial current body of literature on governance reforms, powers and institutional changes. It makes a specific contribution by using a multi-actor perspective to understand the often taken-for-granted goals of reform, and seeks to understand how these play out through networks over time.
- (f) Reform is a complex process, and it is generally believed that the real benefits of reforms will not be seen for several years and until many improvements have been made to the original reform package. Although it would be useful to have a general set of criteria for assessing whether reforms are moving in the right direction and how much work they still require, such criteria are lacking - possibly it is not in the interests of those working on reforms to set out such criteria, as they could make them accountable for any failures, and perhaps because they may lead to reforms that simply need further work being prematurely seen as 'failures'. However, what is most important for transport authorities is the *ability* or *potential* to deliver results on the ground over the long-term, and this requires us to look most closely at the set-up of such agencies rather than a set of achievement-based criteria.
- (g) The transference of appropriate decision-making powers has been highlighted as an important element in successful decentralisation (see Section 2.5.1), and this is also crucial for transport authorities' abilities to make a difference, especially in terms of delivering policy objectives and improving operational integration.

This literature review has given rise to four research questions:

- What were the motivations behind the establishment of the transport authorities (SPAD in Malaysia and BMLTA in Bangalore)?
- What types of autonomy have been given to these transport authorities?
- How have the reforms affected decision-making processes in policy-making and the selection and implementation of transport projects?

- What factors determine the success or failure of these reforms?

As highlighted in (e), understanding existing governance structures is crucial for comprehending reform processes, so the next chapter will describe the governance structures that exist at the case study sites.

Chapter 3: The Case Study Sites

3.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the governance arrangements in Malaysia and Bangalore that underwrite Land Public Transport Commission's (SPAD) and Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority's (BMLTA) functioning and agendas, starting with the SPAD case study in Malaysia. As SPAD's jurisdiction is limited to West Malaysia, only the governance arrangements that are related to the land transport sector in this region are included in the discussion. The description of the case study starts with an overview of urban transport in Malaysia, focusing on the capital city of Kuala Lumpur and outlining the institutional arrangement that existed before SPAD was created. Next, the milestones in the creation of SPAD are explained in order to highlight the motivations and challenges involved in creating structural changes for better governance. A description of SPAD's constitution and set-up is then provided, followed by an overview of the new institutional arrangement. The section on SPAD was mainly drafted using documents that were collected during data-gathering, including government reports, minutes of meetings, and information available on the relevant agencies' websites.

The second part of this chapter describes the BMLTA case study, focusing on matters relating to the urban transport governance structure in the Bangalore Metropolitan Region (BMR), which forms the jurisdiction of the BMLTA. This section starts with an overview of urban transport in Bangalore city, followed by a description of the institutional structure prior to the creation of the BMLTA and the issues related to the coordination and management of urban transport. Next, the proposals and active policies for overcoming the institutional barriers that the Central Government and the State Government of Karnataka pose to urban transport are explored. An outline of the new institutional structure since the BMLTA's creation is given towards the end of this section, including the proposals for further reforms. Since the Rights to Information Act (2005) came into force in India, a lot of government-related materials are readily available on the internet, including government orders, reports, transport plans and minutes of meetings, which

were very useful for the BMLTA case study. This chapter ends with a brief summary of the similarities and differences between the case studies.


3.2 Transport in Malaysia

Malaysia has a federal, constitutional monarchy with 28 million population (Department of Statistics, 2010). It is separated into West and East Malaysia by the South China Sea, and has thirteen states, with three federal territories and a total land-mass of 329,847 km². Malaysia has adopted the political system of parliamentary democracy.

Malaysia has experienced tremendous economic success over the last three decades, with spillover effects for its citizens in terms of increased disposable income. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown by 6.3% per annum between 1970 and 2010, during which the GDP per capita also rose from RM6,000 to RM30,000 (£1,000 - £6,000) (SPAD, 2012). Researchers have found a positive relationship between income and the demand for transportation (Dargay et al., 2007), and this relationship is particularly pronounced in Malaysia. Over a period of just twenty years, the registration of private motorcycles and motorcars has increased almost three-fold, from 4.7 million in 1990 to 18.6 million in 2010 (SPAD, 2012).

The capital city, Kuala Lumpur, has become one of the most modern and prominent cities in South East Asia. The total population was 1.67 million in 2010 (Department of Statistics, 2010), and has been estimated to reach 2.2 million by 2020. Around 2.125 million vehicles cross the city during peak hours in week-days, causing severe congestion.¹¹ The growth in Kuala Lumpur has produced a spillover effect into the suburban areas located in Selangor State and the wider Klang Valley region. The region is made up of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya, together with eight other local authorities under the State of Selangor, as shown in Figure 3.1.

¹¹ Draft KL city Plan 2020, accessed via <http://klcityplan2020.dbkl.gov.my> on 1 December 2012



Source: Ministry of Federal Territory (www.kwpkb.gov.my/greaterklkv/)

Figure 3.1: Map showing the location of the Klang Valley Region in West Malaysia

The central government has implemented a number of initiatives for developing a modern transportation system for Klang Valley, including the development of urban rail links, improved road networks, the provision of interchange facilities, and the application of an 'intelligent transport system'. Despite various efforts, such as the development of an urban rail system in the 1990's and early 2000's, the patronage of public transport has continued to deteriorate, dropping from 37% in the 1970's to 33% in the 1980's, 32% in 1990, and 16% in 2008 (Binafikir, 2009; Kenworthy and Laube, 2001). Barter (2004) blamed the elimination of minibuses in Kuala Lumpur and Petaling Jaya during 1995 and 1996 for the drop in the capacity and frequency of transport services that drove users away. The bus company that was appointed to replace these minibuses failed to match the level of service they provided. The increase in affluence also led to an increase in private car ownership.

A variety of hidden factors also contributed to the significant increase in car ownership, including the design of the urban fabric. Development was scattered and not very well considered, with no real attention given to transit-oriented development, public transport, or any non-motorised transport (ibid). High intensity development was undertaken, with designs oriented towards access by private vehicles, but not suitable for a very high rate of car usage (ibid). The road infrastructure project implemented under the privatisation scheme in the 90's primarily involved the construction of numerous expressways connecting the city centre with other sub-urban

areas. This encouraged city workers to move out of the city to suburban and rural areas, where housing was more affordable, thus creating a large population of commuters that needed to travel to the city on a daily basis. This brought an increased dependency on cars, as public transport did not extend to many of the outlying areas (Kasipillay and Chan, 2008). This situation was probably further exacerbated by the government's strategy of promoting its automobile industry with two home-grown car-manufacturing companies. In recent years, the central government has made serious efforts to improve the efficiency of public transport (especially in the Klang Valley region) through two major programmes: the National Economic Transformation Programme and the National Key Results Area for urban public transport. These are discussed further in section 3.2.1.3

3.2.1 Transport governance in Malaysia prior to the creation of SPAD

3.2.1.1 Institutional structure

There are three main tiers of government in Malaysia: the central government, the state government and the local authorities. Transport is itemised under the Federal List in the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, which means that the central government has the legislative power for transport policies in West Malaysia, except those involving the Penang Hill railway, which is under the State List (Federal Constitution of Malaysia, 1957). Hence, public transport policy is made at the central government level, and responsibility for it is spread between various agencies and ministries. The agencies deal with nationwide transportation plans, policy guidelines and matters covering transport administration and planning, with the state government and local authorities being limited to the provision of land matters and service delivery at the local level. It is important to note that the local authorities are in the State List of the Federal Constitution, which means that the state has direct financial powers over the local authorities. This also means that the federal government cannot interfere directly in the affairs of the local authorities even where state withholds federal contributions (Khalid, 2010). Another characteristic of local government in Malaysia is that unlike most countries, local councils do not have direct accountability to its citizens and the state government has the power to appoint the mayor and councillors of the respective local authorities (ibid).

Malaysia embraces political neutrality of civil service and the Public Service Commission has been able to maintain its independence from political pressure (Hezri, 2004). According to Puthuchearry (1978) the senior civil servants and political leaders at the federal level have close rapport and trust in each other, and together, they form the elite of the country. She also stressed that there has been little evidence of political interference in the recruitment process of civil servants and hence the 'political acceptability' clause might only apply to very few appointments.

Prior to the creation of SPAD in 2010, a number of agencies had some kind of purview over planning, management, operations and the development of land public transport services in West Malaysia, but there was no dedicated agency that could champion the sector and that had the overall mandate to ensure holistic planning and effective regulation (Jemali, 2001). Table 3.1 shows the plethora of agencies that were involved in managing the key functions in land public transport.

Table 3.1: Key agencies involved in management of land public transport in West Malaysia before 2010

Functions	Key Agencies	Functions related to transport	Transport Modes
Planning	Economic Planning Unit	Planning and approval of development projects	Rail, buses, taxis, tourism vehicles, hire and drive cars, and goods vehicles
	Town and Country Planning Department	Planning, administrating, overseeing progress of development and land use	Rail, buses, taxis, tourism vehicles, hire and drive cars, and goods vehicles
	Ministry of Works	Planning of road projects and expressways	Buses, taxis, tourism vehicles, hire and drive cars, and goods vehicles
	Ministry of Transport/ Department of railway	Planning of land transport infrastructure development and railway	Rail
	Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board	Limited planning for commercial transport service	Buses, taxis, goods vehicles
	Local authorities	Planning on land use development and spatial matters	Rail, buses, taxis, tourism vehicles, hire and drive cars, and goods vehicles
Regulation	Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board	Licensing of commercial vehicles and setting fares	Buses, taxis, goods vehicles

Functions	Key Agencies	Functions related to transport	Transport Modes
Regulation (cont'd)	Department of railway/Ministry of Transport	Licensing, approving, opening railways as well as technical regulation of railway scheme and setting fares	Rail
	Road transport Department	Driver Licensing, regulating road worthiness of transport, vehicle registration and use	Buses, taxis, goods vehicles
	Ministry of Tourism	Licensing of tourism vehicles and hire and drive cars	Tourism vehicles, hire and drive cars
	Ministry of International Trade	Regulations on conditions of freight being transported	Goods vehicles
Enforcement	Road Transport Department	Enforcement of road rules and all transport regulations	Buses, taxis, goods vehicles, tourism vehicles, hire and drive cars
	Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board	Limited enforcement on licensing conditions	Buses, taxis and goods vehicles
	Department of railway	Enforcement of technical regulations and railway operations	Rail
	Department of Environment	Enforcement of environmental standards	Buses, taxis and goods vehicles
	Police	Safety, security and traffic management	Rail, buses, taxis and goods vehicles
	Ministry of tourism	Licensing conditions of tourism vehicles	Tourism vehicles and hire and drive cars
Development	Ministry of Transport	Construction of transport infrastructure, railway projects	
	Ministry of Works	Construction of roads, expressway	
	State /local authorities	Provision of transport facilities in the local area- bus stops, terminals	
Operations	Government link companies and private entities National Infrastructure Company Limited (PRASARANA) Malayan Railways Limited Express Rail Link Sdn Bhd Taxi companies	Operations of buses, taxis, goods vehicles and rail	

Source: Adapted from Binafikir (2009)

Private sector involvement in the provision of the transport infrastructure has expanded over the years, from its original role in bus and taxi transport operations to toll road construction and the implementation, operation and maintenance of commuter, light rapid transit (LRT) and monorail. Table 3.1 shows that there are more than ten agencies involved in this, many of which were under different ministries, reported to different political masters, and had different protocols and agendas, making coordination between them very difficult. The next table (Table 3.2) shows the key agencies that were involved in land public transport and the functions of the ministries in general.

Table 3.2: List of key agencies and ministries involved in management of land public transport before 2010

Agency	Ministry	Key Functions of Ministry
Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board	Ministry of Entrepreneur and Cooperative Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of Bumiputera¹² in industrial and commercial community • Promotion of franchise system • Development of vendor schemes
Road Transport Department	Ministry of Transport	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formulation, implementation and co-ordination of policies and strategies for land, air and sea transport, including the development of ports, air traffic rights and research and planning on transportation services.
Department of Railway		
Ministry of Tourism	Ministry of Tourism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National planning and policies on tourism • Development of manpower in the tourist industry • Development of tourist facilities • Regulation and licensing of tourist agencies and tourist guides • Performs functions and exercises powers under the Tourism Industry Act 1992, the Malaysian Tourism Promotion Board Act 1992, and the Tourism Vehicles Licensing Act 1999 • Regulation of the tourism industry

¹² Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak provided in the Article 153 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia

Agency	Ministry	Key Functions of Ministry
Economic Planning Unit	Prime Minister's Department	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategies for socioeconomic development • Preparing medium and long-term development plans • Preparing the budget for development programmes and projects • Monitoring and evaluating the achievement of development programmes and projects
Ministry of Works	Ministry of Works	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning, design and construction of infrastructure projects such as roads, government buildings, airports, ports and jetties • Regulating privatised highways • Operates and maintains roads and government buildings

Source: Ministerial Functions Act 1969, Ministers of the Federal Government (No. 2) Order 2008

3.2.1.2 Acknowledged institutional issues

The Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board (CVLB) and the Bumiputera Agenda

Prior to the creation of the Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board (CVLB), the body in charge of licensing matters was known as the Road Transport Licensing Board, and was part of the Road Transport Department (RTD) – an agency under the Ministry of Transport (MOT). In 1984, the Road Transport Licensing Board was moved under the control of the Ministry of Public Industries, and in 1987 it was given legislative support and became known as the CVLB.

The CVLB's main function was to develop Bumiputera entrepreneurs in the commercial vehicle industry through entrepreneurship training and programmes. The concept of the Bumiputera ethnic group in Malaysia was coined by the first Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and it recognises the special privileges of Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak provided in the Article 153 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. The Bumiputera agenda was heavily promoted in the National Economic Policy (1971–1990), which was a socioeconomic restructuring programme aimed at reducing the economic disparities between the Malays and non-Malays (mainly the Chinese).

The CVLB Act 1987 defines commercial vehicles as public service vehicles and goods vehicles, which includes taxis, buses, trucks, lorries, and trailers. CVLB is made responsible for evaluating and approving applications for new

licenses, renewals and change of conditions for all classes of commercial vehicles, and for enforcing the conditions set for commercial vehicle licenses. Unfortunately, the criteria used for issuing permits for bus routes and taxis were not based on integrated transport planning principles (Jemali, 2001). Besides licensing, CVLB also tightly controlled and regulated fares for public transport. According to Kiggundu (2009), CVLB failed to develop a sound and well-designed subsidy scheme, and bus operators were forced to operate in areas where the demand for services was low. Most of the operators who were dependent on fare revenues could not survive under the CVLB's stringent control of bus fares, and this damaged the bus industry (ibid).

The Ministry of Public Industries – the parent ministry of CVLB – was restructured several times. It was reformed in 1995 as the Ministry of Entrepreneur Development, and re-branded again in 2004 as the Ministry of Entrepreneur and Cooperative Development (MECD). The Ministry's mission to promote the Bumiputera agenda remained strong over the years. However, the Ministry was dissolved after the new Prime Minister took office in 2009, and the CVLB was placed under the Prime Minister's Department (PMD) till SPAD was formed in 2010.

Coordination and enforcement issues

Binafikir (2009) suggests that the presence of multiple agencies has often been associated with an overlap and duplication of functions between the various agencies responsible for transport. This has led to suboptimal land public transport delivery in multiple areas: planning, regulation, enforcement, and integration with spatial development.¹³ The agencies that had the jurisdiction over transport often engaged in feasibility studies, but these were usually performed on an ad hoc basis without an active engagement with the respective stakeholders (Hezri, 2004). Hence, the outcomes of these studies tend to focus on infrastructural development in isolation, as opposed to cross-system optimisations of investments (SPAD, 2012). Besides the coordination issues, Hezri (2004: 363) suggests that “inter-agency rivalry and a lack of trust are prominent features” of the Malaysian government, and that they have resulted in a shortage of joint programmes and research, especially in terms of data-sharing.

¹³ See Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan 2020, accessed on 30 November 2012, www.apamedia.com/pskl2020

As a consequence of the lack of coordination at the government level, there was a lack of integration between the various modes (and within each mode) at the ground level (Binafikir, 2009). For example, the multiple bus companies were not complementary, but rather competed with each other to service the profitable routes whilst neglecting other ones. Transferring between the buses was difficult due to the absence of a coordinated service between the companies (ibid). Kiggundu (2009) concluded that the urban rail system, the LRT and the Monorail were built without serious consideration of their roles in the larger transport system, and were not accompanied by supportive policies such as park and ride facilities, efficient bus feeder systems and parking control. Hence, they could not secure sufficient users, and this eventually affected the viability of these projects (ibid).

Fragmentation was also seen to have impacted upon the effectiveness of enforcement. For instance, the enforcement personnel in the local authorities were not empowered by the CVLB or the Department of Railway (DOR) to regulate and enforce policies on land public transport. This meant that multiple officers from a variety of authorities and agencies had to be present for comprehensive enforcement to be put in place, and this was not practical (SPAD, 2012).

Coordination in transport planning

The presence of multiple agencies also led to fragmented planning, with each agency having its own visions, objectives and transport strategies aligned to these goals. Although the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) provided the way forward for the transport sector in its five-year development plans, there was no national transport policy to provide a direction in which the sector could develop in the long-term. This lack was often associated with the absence of a dedicated transport agency with the powers for all modes of land transport and transport planning that could also factor land-use planning and development in other sectors into its plans (Binafikir, 2009; Jemali, 2001).

There was no integration between land-use and transport planning at the federal and regional levels until the amendments to the Town and Country Planning Act 1976 (Act 172) came in during 2001 (Maidin and Mohamad, 2011). Up to 2001, land use planning was limited to local authorities and exercised through local plans that were supposed to look into transport requirements. Unfortunately, the local authorities in Malaysia lacked man-

power, technical knowledge and funding to create or enforce transport services, and were often fully engaged in overseeing the daily urban service tasks stipulated in the Local Authorities Act of 1976 (Act 171), such as sanitation, road maintenance and solid waste management (Hezri, 2004). Serious effort for land use planning at federal and regional level was seen in 2002 with the preparation of the first National Physical Plan. This plan provided the framework for a sustainable and integrated land use planning system within West Malaysia by identifying major investments.

Prior to these changes, the growth in the cities in the 1980's and 90's (particularly in Kuala Lumpur) was led by the industrial sector and real estate development. The Klang Valley region received intensive development, with a 440% increase in built-up areas in the ten years between 1988 and 1998 (Yaakup et al., 2003 cited in Maidin and Mohamad, 2011). Without a proper land use transport plan to guide development, the "predict and build approach" was used in an attempt to build a sufficient transport infrastructure to cope with the demand rather than to manage it (Barter, 2002:275).

The international development agencies were actively involved in urban transport planning in the 70's, mainly by providing technical assistance to the government in the preparation of transport studies and plans such as the Study on Integrated Urban Transportation Strategies for Kuala Lumpur. However, their role subsequently faded away as Malaysia transformed from lower income to position itself in the higher middle income economy, making it no longer eligible for development assistance from such bodies.

3.2.1.3 Milestones in the creation of SPAD

The early efforts to create a single transport authority can be traced back to the 1970's and a proposal from the World Bank in one of the transport studies prepared for the government and the proposals were repeated and considered in a number of forms over the decades that followed. A similar proposal was later seen in many transport plans, such as the JICA Report in 1999, the World Bank report on the Urban Rail Concession Project in Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok and Manila in 2004 (see section 1.2), and the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010) released by the EPU in 2006. Figure 3.2 shows the milestones in the creation of SPAD.




Figure 3.2: Milestones in the creation of SPAD

Despite these numerous proposals in transport studies over a period of decades, no serious effort was made to construct a single transport authority until the year 2000, when a special task force was created in the Ministry of Finance to monitor the various transport projects undertaken during that time. The task force comprised only four hand-picked members from four key agencies – EPU, MOT, Kuala Lumpur City Hall and the CVLB. In 2002, the task force was given a special assignment to take over the failing urban rail projects, the STAR-LRT and Putra-LRT. The task force was later dissolved in 2004 and replaced by another coordinating committee called the Integration and Restructuring of the Public Transport System in the Klang Valley Committee (INSPAK).

INSPAK was chaired by the Minister of Finance and operated without any legislative support. Its main task was to restructure the public transport system in the Klang Valley, and as part of this exercise it established two government linked companies – Rapid KL and PRASARANA – to operate and own the assets of STAR-LRT, Putra-LRT and the feeder bus system. The committee also proposed the creation of a single transport authority at the national level, which was strongly supported by the EPU. In August 2004, the Cabinet approved the creation of a National Transport Board with legislative support - a national body. To ensure its smooth implementation,

the Cabinet lengthened the period of its implementation, with the first phase being to create the Klang Valley Urban Transport Authority (KUTA) – a regional body. On 10 September 2004, the Prime Minister then announced in his annual budget speech that INSPAK would be responsible for the creation of KUTA. However, despite INSPAK's efforts, including the preparation of a bill for KUTA in 2005, a single transport authority did not materialise. Interestingly, reference to an official document prepared by the EPU and INSPAK in 2004 revealed that although all the relevant agencies agreed to the proposal to create a single authority for the Klang Valley, none of them wanted their existing powers to be taken away. After about a year of operation, the INSPAK committee became inactive, although there is no evidence that it was officially dissolved.

The proposal for KUTA was put on the back burner until May 2008, when the Cabinet decided that the EPU should study the proposal to create a single transport commission and present the findings to them. It is not clear what triggered this request, but it could have been the failure of the Monorail project in Kuala Lumpur in 2007. The EPU study on the creation of a National Land Public Transport Commission was completed in May 2009, and their recommendations provided a blueprint for reform. To facilitate the study, the EPU created a steering committee that comprised members from various agencies and ministries to seek continuous input and assistance in the preparation of a new bill for the proposed commission. Early proposals on the set-up were presented to the former Prime Minister in August 2008, who made the following decisions:

- That the commission would be known as Land Public Transport Commission or *Suruhanjaya Pengangkutan Awam Darat* (SPAD);
- That its jurisdiction would only cover *land* public transport – buses, rail and taxis;
- That the first phase of its implementation would cover only West Malaysia/Peninsular Malaysia.

When Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak took office on 3 April 2009 after the general election of 2008, one of his first acts was the re-shuffle of the ministries in 2009, including the dissolution of the MECD and the CVLB's absorption into the PMD. He also developed the Government Transformation Programme (GTP), which aimed to transform the way the government worked in order to propel the nation forward. The GTP focused on areas that needed the most attention from the government under seven

National Key Result Areas (NKRA), one of which was to improve urban public transport in Kuala Lumpur. This task was assigned to the Minister of Transport, and had clear targets, a specific time-frame and a reporting framework. The NKRA for public transport set ambitious targets, such as achieving a modal share of 25% by 2012, increasing the capacity of the urban rail, and creating rights of way for buses (Pemandu, 2012). Whilst some of these targets have been achieved, attaining the modal share remains a tall order since the rising affluence in the city is linked with a rise in private cars.

Once the study on SPAD was completed, the EPU presented the findings to the Economic Council in July 2009. The Economic Council, which is chaired by the Prime Minister comprises key economic ministers and senior government officials. It serves as the consultative body to facilitate cross-cutting economic policy decisions and focuses on strategic economic issues and overcoming bureaucratic delays.¹⁴ The council decided that the EPU should review the planning and enforcement functions given to SPAD, and include freight within its purview as well. Two months later, the EPU represented its findings, and the council approved the creation of SPAD with the following features:

- SPAD to cover land public transport; buses, rail, taxis, tourism vehicles and goods vehicles;
- The functions of SPAD to include planning, regulation and enforcement of the land public transport sector;
- The regulation of vocational licenses (the driving license for commercial vehicles) to remain with the RTD;
- The first phase of implementation to be limited to West Malaysia;
- SPAD to be supported by two pieces of legislation – the Land Public Transport Commission Act (SPAD Act 2010) and the Land Public Transport Act (PAD Act 2010);
- The CVLB and the DOR to be absorbed into SPAD. The powers of the Ministry of Tourism in regulating tourism vehicles and hire and drive cars to be ceded to SPAD.

The Cabinet then endorsed the creation of SPAD, forming an interim team to work on bills and do the groundwork for SPAD, such as identifying office

¹⁴ www.epu.gov.my accessed on 29 November 2012

space, fixing the service scheme/salary packages, and recruiting qualified members.

SPAD was formally created after the parliament passed both the SPAD and the PAD acts in May 2010. It was designed to be an independent commission placed directly under the Prime Minister in the PMD, and its functions included planning, regulation of land public transport, and enforcement. In the SPAD Act (2010), land public transport is defined as “transport on land by means of land public passenger transport and land public freight transport, and includes land public transport services, terminals, facilities, networks, systems, operations and other services associated with such transport or land public transport services”.


Although both SPAD acts were passed in May 2010, only the SPAD Act (2010), which sets out the clauses on the functions and powers of the commission, was enforced immediately, with the PAD Act (2010) being enforced six months later in January 2011. Therefore, during the first six months of SPAD’s creation, the CVLB and the DOR continued to exist and perform their functions, only being dissolved in January 2011 when their functions were finally transferred to SPAD.

3.2.2 Transport governance after the creation of SPAD

SPAD was envisaged as a one-stop centre for land transport, as shown in Figure 3.3. The blueprint for SPAD sets out its structure and role (Binafikir, 2009), which is to provide a single interface for the public and private sector/operators with regard to all land public transport matters. A dedicated public complaints and services division has been designed to handle all the public’s queries and act as an avenue for feedback, whilst the private sector only deals with SPAD on matters concerning regulations and enforcement (and will not have to liaise with multiple agencies, as they did in the previous regime). To successfully achieve its mission, SPAD should work hand-in-hand with the transport operators and relevant government agencies. A dispute resolution committee has also been created by SPAD to oversee and mediate disputes arising in the land public transport sector.

SPAD was set up to play the role of the central planner for the land public transport sector and to integrate the various plans prepared at the levels of the national, state and local authorities. In order to achieve this, SPAD has to work with both state offices and local authorities, acquiring approval for any plans from the National Physical Planning Council (NPPC) before passing them down to state and local authorities. It is also given the

responsibility for reviewing and endorsing developers' proposals on transport infrastructure and facilities in new areas, although the ultimate approval for development remains with the state government and local authorities.



Source: Binafikir (2009)

Figure 3.3: Role of SPAD

SPAD monitors and regulates standards of performance by licensing the operators of land public transport. To enable it to do so required removing powers from the CVLB, the DOR and the Ministry of Tourism. As a railway regulator, SPAD approves the railway scheme, monitors railway construction, issues licences to operators and train drivers, regulate fares, and handle accidents and inquiries. Regulation of other modes of transport is more restricted, covering the licensing of operators and the formulation of a performance-based licensing regime. SPAD is also responsible for regular review of fares and striking a balance between affordability of services for travellers and their financial viability for operators. It is important to understand that SPAD only regulates operating licences for commercial vehicles, whilst driving licences for commercial vehicles are regulated by the RTD under the MOT.

SPAD's powers of enforcement are limited to operating licenses and, due to its limited powers in this area it needs to work in concert with the RTD and

the Police. The RTD has a larger role than SPAD in the enforcement of land transport, dealing with the requirements of both the PAD's Act 2010 and its own Road Transport Act 1987, which covers areas including driving licenses, road taxes and vehicle conditions. Figure 3.4 shows the role of SPAD vis-à-vis other agencies in enforcement.




Figure 3.4: The transport enforcement framework after the creation of SPAD

It is important to note that SPAD is not a developer, thus its role does not involve it in the development of the transport infrastructure, except with regards to the implementation of transport improvement initiatives such as integrated ticketing and scheduling. In order to provide SPAD with the financial strength it requires to operate effectively, both the SPAD and PAD Acts included means for creating a public transport fund. Sources of this fund include licensing fees for operators, fines and penalties from commuters and operators, and proceeds from the travel demand management mechanism, such as road pricing and parking.

The creation of SPAD has led to several impacts. It has created a legal entity which forms an arm's length agency of central government to specifically look at the planning, coordination and enforcement of land public transport. To a certain extent, it has reduced coordination issues by merging the various land public transport modes – buses, taxis, tourism vehicles, rail and goods vehicles. It has also resulted in the removal of CVLB which was associated with mismanagement and corruption.

3.3 Urban transport in Bangalore

Bangalore is the capital of the State of Karnataka, which is the eighth largest state in India, covering 191,791km², with a population of 61.13 million people. Demographically, it is almost the same size as the United Kingdom, and double the size of Malaysia. Bangalore is the fifth largest metropolis in India and had a city population of 9.59 million people in 2011, representing 15.7% of the population of the State.¹⁵ The Bangalore Metropolitan Region, known as the BMR, covers around 8,000 km² with a population of over 13 million people. Figure 3.5 shows the BMR in relation to the State of Karnataka and the City of Bangalore.



Figure 3.5: The State of Karnataka

¹⁵ www.censusindia.gov.in

The City of Bangalore enjoys demographic and economic dominance, has developed as the administrative and educational centre of Karnataka, and has witnessed tremendous growth as an IT service centre (Mamatha and Madhu, 2007). Hubli-Dharwad, the second largest city in Karnataka, has a population of less than one million, which shows the large disparity between the rate of development in the capital city and other cities in the State. Whilst economic development has pulled a lot of investment to Bangalore, it also puts pressure on its infrastructure and services, especially with the dramatic increase in the number of vehicles there, which totalled 3.7 million in March 2011 (comprising 2.6 million motorcycles and 1.1 million cars). Notably, the percentage of car growth over the past ten years has been approximately 13%, which is much higher than the 9% growth for motorcycles.¹⁶ Mamatha and Madhu (2007) suggest that several factors underpin this growth, including the perception of cars as status symbols, the increase in household income, better access to financial institutions with reduced interest rates on car loans, and poor public transport.

Buses and trains are popular modes of travel in Bangalore, which has a good bus system in comparison to many other cities in India. They are operated by the Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation (BMTc), which moved 4.5 million commuters per day in 2012, providing bus services to the city and suburban areas of Bangalore within a thirty-seven kilometre radius from the city centre.¹⁷ In a study that compared bus services in five different cities in India (Delhi, Mumbai, Pune, Chennai and Bangalore), the BMTc was named as the only profitable provider (Menon, 2012). Commuter trains provide services between the state's satellite towns, such as Tumkur, Chikballapur, Honsur and Madya. Like many other Metropolitan cities (such as Mumbai, Chennai and New Delhi), Bangalore has embarked on a Metro project, and the first stretch between Baiyyappanahalli and M.G.Road (7km) was opened in October 2011, with the second phase currently under construction.¹⁸

¹⁶ <http://rto.kar.nic.in/> accessed on 6 Dec 2012

¹⁷ <http://www.bmtcinfo.com> accessed on 22 October 2012

¹⁸ <http://bmrcl.co.in> accessed on 7 December 2012

3.3.1 Transport governance in the Bangalore Metropolitan Region prior to the creation of BMLTA

3.3.1.1 Institutional structure

There are three main tiers of government in India: the central government based in New Delhi, the state government, and the urban local bodies. It is important to note that urban transport is considered to be a state matter in India (Agarwal and Chauhan, 2011), although the central government also plays a significant role here. At the central level, the Ministry of Urban Development is entrusted with the responsibility for planning and coordinating the urban transport system. In 2006, the Ministry produced the National Urban Transport Policy (NUTP), which outlines policy directions for urban transport development. The central government also controls the Indian Railway. Another important transport related ministry is the Ministry of Surface Transport, which administers the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 that is responsible for safety and regulates driver training and licensing, penalties, enforcement mechanisms, and vehicle registration and road-worthiness certificates. Nevertheless, the act mainly focuses on safety issues rather than controlling vehicle use or promoting public transport (Agarwal, 2006). This act is supplemented by state-level rules that apply within individual state jurisdictions. Most importantly, the central government holds the funding muscle for supporting investment in mass transit infrastructure (with almost 30% on the ongoing Bangalore Metro project), and for regulating the automobile industry (ibid).

At the state level, the Urban Development Department (UDD), the Transport Department, and the Public Works Department are the main agencies that manage urban transport matters. The UDD is responsible for the overall strategies for urban transport, and leads the Metro project. The Transport Department regulates fares and service delivery standards, with the Public Works Department having the remit for road construction and maintenance. At the city level, the Greater Bangalore Municipal Corporation (BBMP), which is the local urban body for Bangalore, is responsible for the delivery of urban services including the maintenance of road infrastructure and the provision of urban transport facilities such as bus stops.

Administratively, the BMR lies between the jurisdiction of the State Government and the City Government, with the majority of the agencies that operate in this region being under the purview of the State Government. The BMR covers an area of 8,000 km², and is under the administrative

jurisdiction of the Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (BMRDA), which oversees planning and development in the region. Besides the BBMP, there are another eleven urban local bodies operating within the BMR.¹⁹ It is important to note that the BBMP jurisdiction (popularly known as the Corporation Area), and the Bangalore Development Authority's (BDA) jurisdiction (known as the Bangalore Metropolitan Area - BMA) are both located within the BMR, as shown in Figure 3.6.




Figure 3.6: Map showing BBMP and BMR areas

The international development agencies, mainly the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) play an active role in providing loans and technical assistance for various infrastructural development programmes in the state of Karnataka such as water supply, urban infrastructure development and coastal management. In the urban transport sector, the ADB has been actively involved in the Metro Project currently being

¹⁹ <http://www.bmrda.kar.nic.in> accessed on 7 December 2012

undertaken in Bangalore and their assistance is in the form of soft loan, worth USD250 million²⁰. Besides ADB, two other development agencies – the Japan International Cooperation Agency and French Development Agency are also involved in providing funding assistance for the project. World Bank, on the other hand, has initiated the Comprehensive Traffic and Transportation Plan in 2003 and prepared the Urban Transport Study for Bangalore in 2005.

Table 3.3 lists the plethora of agencies that were important for urban transport matters in the BMR.

²⁰ http://www.business-standard.com/article/finance/adb-lends-250-mn-to-namma-metro-111040200053_1.html

Table 3.3: Key agencies operating in Bangalore Metropolitan Region

Key functions	Agencies	Overall Functions	Functions related to transport	Modes
Central Government				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy and planning • Regulation of urban rail fare 	Ministry of Urban Development	Formulate policies, support and monitor programmes related to urban development and coordinate activities between the various central ministries, State Government and other nodal authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning and coordination of urban transport systems • Responsible for town and country planning and development matter • Regulate fares for urban rail other than those funded by the Indian Railways 	All modes of urban transport, excluding railway but including urban rail
State of Karnataka				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy and planning for urban transport 	Urban Development Department (UDD)	Responsible for urban development matters aiming to develop and implement policies and schemes for all levels of citizens, to empower and support the governing statutory bodies and to establish effective monitoring and review systems in cities and towns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To facilitate and finance the infrastructure for metro rail services through Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited (BMRCL) • Preparation of City Mobility Plans (CMPs) for all urban areas in the state • technical guidance and capacity building for identification and implementation of urban transport projects 	All modes of urban transport, excluding railway but including urban rail

Key functions	Agencies	Overall Functions	Functions related to transport	Modes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project monitoring • Manage funding 	Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development and Finance Corporation (KUIDFC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation arm of UDD for the formulation, appraisal, implementation and monitoring of urban infrastructure development projects throughout the State • Plays an interfacing role with external lending agencies • State-level nodal agency under JNNURM to assist in submissions of proposals for approval to the state-level steering committee, distributing funds and monitor the physical and financial progress for initiatives undertaken under the scheme. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preparation of the Comprehensive Traffic and Transportation Plan for Bangalore, completed in 2011. • Manage funding for transport through JNNURM scheme 	No specific mode
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Land use planning • Coordinated planning and development 	Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (BMRDA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning, co-ordinating and supervising the proper and orderly development of the areas within the Bangalore Metropolitan Region. • Coordinate the planning functions of 11 urban local bodies inside the Bangalore Metropolitan Region. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transport planning forms a component of the plans 	No specific mode

Key functions	Agencies	Overall Functions	Functions related to transport	Modes
Planning and development of real estate	Bangalore Development Authority (BDA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepare master plans, layout planning and development schemes • Enforce those plans through project implementation, land use regulation and development control • Authorised to develop land 	Large road construction projects	No specific mode
Project implementation	Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited (BMRCL)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning and implementation of metro project 		Urban rail
Regulation and enforcement	Transport Department	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Transport Department administers the Motor Vehicle Act (1988) and is responsible for issuing driving licences, registration of motor vehicles, issuing and renewing permits • Regulatory and enforcement functions related to transport, such as fixing the fare structure for bus systems. • Manage the state transport corporations, which run the inter-city bus service including the Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, which operates the bus service in the city and the sub-urban areas of Bangalore 		Buses, taxis, goods vehicles, private vehicles
Operation of buses	Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC)	KSRTC operates within the central and southern part of Karnataka and also provide bus services to other cities, such as Mumbai and Chennai		Buses
Operation of buses	Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation (BMTCL)	Provides bus services to the city and sub-urban areas of Bangalore		Buses

Key functions	Agencies	Overall Functions	Functions related to transport	Modes
City Government				
Construction and maintenance of roads	Greater Bangalore Municipal Corporation (BBMP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve and coordinate infrastructure development for road and transportation network, water supply and solid waste management and upgrade the quality of urban civic services. • Responsible for overall delivery of services in its area 	Maintenance, rehabilitation and widening of local roads, parking management	No specific mode
Traffic management and enforcement	Traffic Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enforcement of traffic laws, regulation on right of ways, manning of traffic islands • Road improvement projects, such as installing road furniture, improving junctions, and promoting awareness programme 	Traffic management, road improvements and enforcement	Buses, taxis, goods vehicles, private vehicles

Source: Adapted from Sudhira et al. (2007)

3.3.1.2 Issues in urban transport governance in Bangalore

The central issues surrounding the transport governance structure in Bangalore that are highlighted in the literature and government documents involve the presence of multiple agencies with diffuse responsibilities, the weakness of urban local bodies, and the weakness of existing agencies.

Multiple agencies and diffuse responsibilities

Urban transport in the BMR is managed by different types of agencies that operate at different levels, cover various jurisdictions, and take care of different transport modes. This makes the coordination of planning and infrastructural development extremely difficult (Sudhira et al., 2007). None of the existing agencies had the jurisdiction for the planning and development of urban transport in BMR. This raises issues concerning accountability, as no agency was responsible for the overall performance of the urban transport system (Agarwal and Zimmerman, 2008). The powers for overall urban planning were vested with two parastatal agencies – the BDA and the BMRDA – but urban transport was only made a secondary responsibility for these agencies, and was not given much focus as a result.

Policies for urban transport are issued by agencies such as the UDD, which also takes care of policies and schemes for urban development sectors, including the housing, water supply and drainage for the entire State. The licensing and regulation of motorised vehicles (including buses) is handled by the Transport Department, which is a government agency operating at the State level. The operator of bus services in Bangalore city is a parastatal agency - BMTC. Non-motorised transport, on the other hand, is regulated by local urban bodies in Bangalore city, and is under the purview of the BBMP. The City Traffic Police enforces the traffic law, manages the traffic flow, and is responsible for traffic improvement projects.

In short, the modes and functions for transport planning and infrastructure were fragmented among various agencies, operating at various levels. This raised coordination problems and led to the sub-optimal use of resources, which, given the already insufficient funds for this sector, meant that urban transport services were seen to be failing to respond to the demand for

improved services needed to encourage private vehicle users to use public transport.²¹

Urban local bodies

Urban local bodies in Karnataka generally have few powers or resources, and this is a problem also experienced by the BBMP – the municipal corporation for Bangalore (Kasturirangan Committee Report, 2008). This agency has been restructured several times in attempts to improve its performance and service delivery. The latest restructuring in 2008 added seven City Municipal Councils, one town Municipal Council and one hundred and ten villages surrounding Bangalore, and this increased the area of the corporation from 226 km² to 800 km² (Mohan and Mercier, 2012). The aim was to improve and coordinate the development of infrastructure and the enforcement of rules and regulations to optimise expenditure (Government of Karnataka, 2006a).

The BBMP was created under the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976, and is run by the City Council, which is made up of one elected representative (called a "corporator" or councillor) from each of the wards or localities in the city. There are 198 wards in the BBMP area,²² and elections to the council are held once every five years, with results been decided by popular vote. The Mayor and the deputy Mayor are indirectly elected by the councillors for a period of one year, and it is important to note that it is the Commissioner and not the Mayor who exercises the executive powers in the BBMP (Kasturirangan Committee Report, 2008). This means that the channels of accountability are not clear, and led Idiculla (2009) to suggest that no local authority is democratically accountable to the people.

The 74th amendment to the Indian Constitution recognises urban local bodies as the third tier of governance, and they are supposed to function as institutions of 'self-government' at the local level, with a mandate for providing local services (Mohan and Mercier, 2012). Although schedule twelve, which lists the functions that should be devolved to the urban local bodies, does not explicitly mention transport as one of its remits, it does mention town planning as one of its priority areas, and transport planning is

²¹ Recommendations of Working Group on Urban Transport for 12th Five Year Plan (2011), <http://planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/committee/wrkgrp12/> accessed on 8 March 2013

²² <http://bbmpelections.in> accessed on 22 Oct 2012

a component of this. However, to date, the BBMP and other local urban bodies in BMR have not been adequately empowered for planning and organising public transport services in their jurisdictions (ibid). Hence, managing a fast growing city like Bangalore without sufficient powers was a challenge for the BBMP. Sudhira et al. (2007) suggest that the BBMP's lack of planning powers was the reason behind its failure to acknowledge the role of land use in generating traffic demand, which led to an over-simplified approach for addressing mobility through road widening, underpasses and conversions of roads to one-ways. Although the BBMP generates its revenue through taxes, it is still dependent on the State Government for funding support (Agarwal, 2006). For a corporation that is weak in financial terms and actual powers, to coordinate the work of so many agencies is challenging.

Instead of empowering urban local bodies, the State Government has passed their responsibilities onto a number of newly created parastatal agencies because it felt that the urban local bodies were not able to ensure good service delivery (Government of Karnataka, 2009). The parastatals were given sector-specific mandates (such as responsibilities for water supply, transport or energy) with varying territorial jurisdictions, and this led to complications and confusion in coordinating these different activities (Sudhira et al., 2007). Although the parastatals should ideally report to the urban local bodies, they are in fact accountable to the State Government that created them, and the urban local bodies are thus not in a position to question or criticise the performance of the parastatals (Ministry of Urban Development, 2011). Examples of parastatal agencies involved in the urban transport sector are the BMRDA, BDA, BMT, and the Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited (BMRCL). A brief summary of the functions of these agencies is provided in Table 3.3.

The weaknesses of existing agencies

The weakness of existing agencies (mainly the BMRDA and the BDA) has affected the planning and development within BMR. Planning has traditionally been restricted to land use planning, with the responsibility for Bangalore's urban agglomeration being assigned to the BDA, whilst the BMRDA deals with the larger peripheral area covering BMR (Sudhira et al., 2007).

The BDA was established in 1976 by amalgamating the functions of two agencies, and was given the powers to prepare, enforce and develop plans as a single agency (Government of Karnataka, 2006b). However, the BDA

performed better as a housing and infrastructure development agency than as a planning and development control authority (ibid). The lack of coordination amongst the various authorities continued with the rapid growth of the city, and to deal with this problem the State Government created the Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (BMRDA) in 1985 (ibid). The BMRDA was tasked to plan, co-ordinate and supervise orderly development in the BMR – functions that are similar to those that the BDA was given when it was created in 1976, but which cover a much larger area. In addition, the BMRDA was also made responsible for coordinating the activities of the various agencies operating in the BMR.

Although the BMRDA was officially created to facilitate the coordination between various agencies operating in the BMR, as well as to fill the gaps in the planning function, in practice, its role is to review and coordinate different authorities has had limited success (Kasturirangan Committee Report, 2008). For example, in 2005, the BMRDA prepared the structure plan for the BMR, and was also responsible for ensuring that its schemes were enforced according to its plans. Although equipped with legislative backing through section 10 of the BMRDA Act, 1985, which specifically mentions that ‘no authority or person can undertake any development prior to seeking approval from the agency’, the BMRDA has not been given overall regulatory authority over land use, which has meant that other financially strong agencies like the BDA have been free to do what they think is necessary and required for the area (ibid).

In 2006, the UDD issued a Government Order which expands the BMRDA’s function to include the development of integrated urban settlements in the BMR in order to help relieve the increasing pressure on Bangalore and facilitate balanced urban growth (Government of Karnataka, 2006c). Since then, the BMRDA has been more involved in project implementation, especially in the development of new townships within the BMR that are outside the BDA’s jurisdiction. Hence, the BMRDA’s original role in coordinating planning and development between various urban sectors (including transport) exists on paper alone. Interestingly, whilst the BMRDA enjoys a strong political management, with the Chief Minister of the state as its chairman and the Minister of Urban Developments as its vice-chairman, it has nevertheless been unable to perform as expected.

In the light of pressing institutional issues, the creation of a Unified Metropolitan Transport Authority (UMTA) proposed by the NUTP was thus seen as a viable proposition for minimising the coordination problems

among agencies and creating an authority with a comprehensive view of the planning and development of public transport initiatives in order to cope with the drastic growth in Bangalore (Government of Karnataka, 2007a).

3.3.1.3 Policies supporting institutional reform in the transport sector in the State of Karnataka

In 2006, the NUTP asserted the need for all states and local government bodies to pursue comprehensive urban transport planning that takes land use matters into consideration. The policy document also pointed to the weaknesses in the current governance of the transport sector, noting that these institutional structures were put in place before urban transport issues became critical, and thus that they may no longer be appropriate. The policy document also stressed the absence of an effective coordination mechanism, and to overcome this, it recommended that cities with populations over one million should set up an UMTA to facilitate the coordinated planning and implementation of urban transport programmes. It was also proposed that these UMTAs would require legislative backing to be successful.

Besides the creation of the UMTA, which focuses on planning and coordination, the NUTP also encouraged the creation of an umbrella body to regulate the overall performance of the public transport system in order to ensure that each city had a comprehensive and efficient system. The umbrella body would require the capacity to make scientific assessments of demands on various routes and develop contract services to be monitored. Although the NUTP said that draft legislation for UMTA would be produced for cities to consider and adopt, there is no evidence that such a document has been prepared.

In addition to the NUTP, strong recommendations for restructuring were also proposed by the National Working Group on Urban Transport for the 11th Plan in 2006. They further defined the characteristics of the UMTA, proposing that it should not be involved in any operations, but rather function as a coordinator and regulator for operators, responsible for producing visions and strategies for improving mobility, and provided with the power to drive these strategies by being given the necessary funds to allocate to implementing agencies. Moreover, it asserted that in order to ensure that the recommendations of this body would receive due consideration, it would need to be backed up by legislation and headed by a senior figure.

The Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) was introduced by the central government in December 2005 to encourage cities to achieve substantial improvements in their extant urban services. It focussed on two areas – urban infrastructure and governance; and the provision of basic services to the urban poor. In Karnataka, only the cities of Bangalore and Mysore were selected as beneficiaries under this scheme. JNNURM only provides funding support if cities fulfil pre-determined criteria, including having complete city development plans that give priority to non-motorised transport. JNNURM provides 35% of the project cost, with the state government contributing 15%, and the rest being covered by the relevant urban local body. Two high-powered state-level committees, chaired by the Chief Minister and the Chief Secretary respectively, have been set up to identify suitable projects and to monitor the implementation of approved projects.²³ It is important to note that although JNNURM does not directly support the creation of the UMTA, it does provide funding support for the implementation of NUTP proposals.

As of September 2012, thirty-eight projects worth Rs 258,411 lakhs (£315 million) have been approved in Bangalore under the JNNURM scheme, and twenty-two projects have been completed. Almost 36% of these projects are related to the construction of roads and flyovers, with 23% being dedicated to urban transport and the rest to drainage, water supply and sewerage-related infrastructure.²⁴

3.3.1.4 The creation of the Directorate of Urban Land Transport and the Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority

Based on the recommendations of the NUTP and the National Working Group for the 11th plan, the State Government of Karnataka decided to establish the State Directorate of Urban Land Transport (DULT) in 2007 (Government of Karnataka, 2007a). The DULT, which was championed by the UDD, covers seven Municipal Corporations in the State, comprising Bangalore, Mysore, Mangalore, Hubli-Dharwad, Belgaum, Gulbarga and Bellary. The key objective of the DULT is to ensure the integration and coordination of transport and land-use planning, as well as the development of transport-related infrastructure in urban areas. However, due to the rapid

²³ <http://www.kuidfc.com/website/webpage.nsf/lookupAllCat/> accessed on 17 March 2013

²⁴ <http://jnnurm.nic.in/state.html> accessed on 23 October 2012

growth in the BMR, particularly Bangalore city, another dedicated committee called the Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority (BMLTA) was established just a month later.

The Government Order that sanctioned the creation of the BMLTA stipulated an interim arrangement in which the BMLTA be set up as a committee of the BMRDA, which would provide its budgetary provision until the committee was given legislative backing (Government of Karnataka, 2007b). The BMLTA, chaired by the Chief Secretary of the state, has twenty-one members made up from various transport-related agencies, the private sector and transport experts. The functions of the BMLTA spelt out in the government order were for it to act as an umbrella organisation to coordinate the planning and implementation of urban transport programmes and projects. To carry out these functions, the BMLTA created specialised sub-committees to deal with various aspects of urban transport, such as traffic and transport initiatives, commuter systems, and inter-modal bus terminals, and there were eight different sub-committees in 2011.²⁵ These sub-committees, which are made up of relevant members from the transport industry, meet as and when necessary and report to the main BMLTA committee. Although the BMLTA bill was drafted to give it legal backing in 2008, this has been put on hold pending a final decision by the State Government. In 2010, the Ministry of Urban Development in Delhi issued a directive urging all state governments to follow the recommendations in the 6th report of the 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission on Local Governance to empower the UMTA with financial support and legislative backing, but no action has been taken to do so by the State Government of Karnataka (Government of India, 2010).

3.3.2 Transport governance after the creation of the BMLTA

The creation of the BMLTA in 2007 does not change the remit of existing agencies or the structure of existing institutions. Rather, it is an addition to the existing institutional landscape – a dedicated committee created to facilitate the planning and coordination of urban transport matters in the BMR. The main challenge for the BMLTA is how to coordinate agencies that function at the central, state and local governments through its limited powers, as it must do so to achieve common transport objectives (Kasturirangan Committee Report, 2008).

²⁵ <http://www.bmlta.org/bmltasubcommittees> accessed 30 July 2011

In 2008, the State Government commissioned a special study to review the administrative structures and legal frameworks within the BMR, and the findings of this study were documented in the Kasturirangan Committee Report. This explains that debate about future reform continues. The study identified two main areas for improvements: firstly, changes to the demarcations of the urban area and more coordinated planning through the creation of an Metropolitan Planning Committee (MPC) were suggested, and secondly, it was proposed that the region would benefit from having an elected mayor.

In examining the demarcation of the urban area, the study proposed changes to ensure that that metropolitan governance structure stayed on top of the expansion of built-up areas. Currently, the BBMP's jurisdiction covers the City of Bangalore (an area of 800 km²), with the BDA covering the metropolitan area (1307 km²), and the BMRDA being responsible for the entire region (8,022 km²).

To enable comprehensive planning to be undertaken in Bangalore and the surrounding areas, which face similar growth pressures, the committee proposed that the entire BMR be reclassified as the Bangalore Metropolitan Area, meaning that the BDA's jurisdiction would subsume that of the BMRDA's in order to streamline the planning and development functions at the regional level. To avoid creating overlapping functions between the BDA and the BMRDA, it was proposed that the BDA be divested of its planning and regulatory functions, which would be transferred to the BBMP and the BMRDA. This would result in a clear delineation of functions, with the BMRDA as a planner and regulator, the BDA as a project implementation agency for major schemes, and the BBMP empowered in its planning role.

To streamline the planning process – and in the spirit of the 74th Amendment Act 1993, which advocates the assignment of governance functions to urban local bodies – the Kasturirangan Committee proposed that an MPC be created for the Bangalore Metropolitan Area with legislative backing. The creation of an MPC would allow basic information to be transferred across a common geographical unit, and could create a robust city system for effective planning (Sudhira et al., 2007). The MPC is envisaged as a high-level policy and strategy body responsible for both planning and coordinating functions (including the preparation of development plans), and with the power to enforce its decisions. The BMRDA is proposed to play the secretariat role to the MPC, with the BMLTA having statutory powers and operating as a wing of the MPC.

The Kasturirangan committee also proposed that the BBMP have voter-elected mayors that serve for a fixed-term of five years and that are vested with the executive powers of municipal government. There is strong backing behind city leadership and the move towards a directly elected mayoral system, as they are seen to increase accountability. In such a system, the commissioner would be responsible to the mayor, and serve for a three year term compared to the current one to two year term. Unfortunately, the State Government has not taken the report or its content seriously, and none of its proposals have been implemented (Idiculla, 2009). Instead, the State Government issued a government order in December 2009 directing the urban development and planning authorities to continue with the preparation of master plans until further notice to the contrary (Government of Karnataka, 2009).

Another serious effort to improve the governance of Bangalore came in the form of the Bengaluru Governance Bill in 2009, although this also remains confined to paper (Idiculla, 2009). This bill was prepared by the Agenda for Bangalore Infrastructure Development (ABIDe), a politically constituted task force created by the Chief Minister (Mohan and Mercier, 2012). The aim of the bill is to create better administration for Bangalore and the BMR by creating an institutional structure that is responsive, transparent and directly accountable to the urban citizen. One of the major changes proposed in this bill is the creation of a Neighbourhood Area Committee with the authority to decide on proposed developments for the local area before the BBMP proceeds with their implementations. The other major proposal is the direct election of the mayor. However, nothing was mentioned in the bill about direct changes to urban transport governance.²⁶

The UMTA was envisaged as a stand-alone organisation in the NUTP issued in 2006, but in the recent 12th Five Year Plan for India (2012-2017), an MPC constitution for metropolitan cities is strongly recommended together with the creation of UMTA under the remit of the MPC.²⁷ It is also suggested that the flow of funds for urban transport projects to implementing agencies be disbursed through the UMTA in order to empower them to drive their plans forward.

²⁶ Bengaluru Region Governance Bill, 2009 accessed via <http://abidebangaluru.in/report/show/8> on 7 December 2012

²⁷ An approach to 12th Five Year Plan, <http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans> accessed on 18/10/2012

3.4 Chapter summary

This chapter has explained the institutional structure in which both the case studies are set, describing the settings and explaining the issues that existed before the transport authorities were set up, together with the outlook for the institutional framework after the creation of the transport authorities. There are clear differences between the case study sites, mainly in terms of their spatial scales and the jurisdictions and institutional arrangements in their respective transport management. Whilst the idea of single coordinating transport body is an important one, the realisation of this idea differs significantly in these two cases. Hence, the transport authorities that were created also differ in terms of their models, functions and the powers that they have been given.

However, some similarities were observed between the two case studies, including: the fast growth of both cities²⁸, which has increased the pressure on their existing infrastructures; an increase in car ownership and poor public transport services that cannot cope with demand; and problems with coordination arising from the presence of multiple agencies with gaps in their planning functions; and inadequacies in institutional structures, including the poor performance of agencies. A ‘transport authority’ was thought to be the solution for resolving some of the issues in both cases. In Malaysia, it took six years before SPAD was sanctioned, whereas in India, the push by the Central Government through the NUTP in 2006 acted as a turning point, with the State Government taking almost immediate action to create a dedicated coordinating body, the BMLTA. Table 3.4 lists the features of the BMLTA and SPAD in terms of their set up, functions and powers.

²⁸ the growth of Kuala Lumpur, which is the capital city exerted pressure for the creation for a transport authority although eventually SPAD was established at national level

Table 3.4: Features of SPAD and BMLTA

Features	SPAD	BMLTA
Title	Land Public Transport Commission	Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority
Scale	National level – West Malaysia	Bangalore Metropolitan Region
Model/set-up	Other agencies were streamlined (dissolved or functions changed)	No changes to existing agencies
	Independent Commission	Coordinating committee
Autonomy	Presence of legal support Absence of financial autonomy	Absence of legal support Absence of financial autonomy
Leadership	Has political leadership – Chaired by PM	Absence of political leadership – Chaired by Chief Secretary
Transport Modes	Land public transport: buses, taxis, rail, tourism vehicles, goods vehicles	Urban transport: private vehicles (cars and motorcycles), auto rickshaws, buses, taxis, non-motorised transport, excluding goods vehicles and rail
Functions	To plan, regulate and enforce land public transport matters	Planning and coordination
Personnel capacity	200	15
Funding	From federal government	From state government /shares funding resources with DULT

The institutional landscape at both the case study sites presented in this chapter, provides a general idea about the institutional issues in transport which could have been a contributing factor for the need of a transport authority, the process that led to the creation of these transport authorities and the powers given on paper (which informs the investigation, particularly for research question 1 and 2 – on motivation and autonomy). However, certain issues cannot be discerned from the official documents, and can only be explored and understood through talking to the people who were involved in the creation of these authorities, or else actively involved in the transport sector. Among these are the actual motivation for the creation of these authorities and why they are set up as they are, the obstacles faced in the creation of these authorities, the reasons for their lack of adequate empowerment (if any), their performance to-date (including changes on the ground for users), the changes (if any) that have resulted in the decision-making process, the factors that affect their performance, and, lastly, the

key factors for making these authorities successful. The next chapter sets out the methodology which explains how this was done.

Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 sets the importance of understanding the implementation of single transport authority reforms in developing countries and the literature suggests that this requires an understanding of power, autonomy and governance through networks. There are also not many such reforms to study developing countries and for both reasons, this suggests a rich qualitative study to be the most suitable approach.

This chapter describes the methodology undertaken to answer the research questions presented in section 1.3. The information needed to answer these questions falls into three main categories: theoretical, conceptual and empirical (Bloomberg and Volpe, 2009: 69-71). The literature review in Chapter 2 provided the theoretical grounding for this research, whilst the conceptual and empirical aspects are now outlined and examined in this chapter. These involved gathering contextual information about the selected transport authorities and obtaining respondents' perceptions about the performance of these transport authorities to date as well as the reason(s) for their establishment.

Qualitative research was used to gather information as it allowed for rich and detailed descriptions (Geertz, 1973) and interpretations of the events and decisions that were taken during and after the creation of these single transport authorities. Qualitative research is the best method for understanding areas “where little is known, and where previous understanding appears inadequate or insufficient to make sense of complex situations and shifting phenomena” (Richards and Morse 2007:29). Interviews and observations are primary or well established techniques for data generation in qualitative research. In this approach, the researchers aim to understand the perspectives of those involved in the phenomena examined and by using observations and interviews, they construct explanations and understandings of events and processes (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

A qualitative method is appropriate for answering the research questions as this research focuses on processes in specific contexts and looking for new discoveries. A quantitative method would restrict investigation to specific

variables and their outcomes (Merriam, 1998). As Chapter 2 showed, the motivations and anticipated outcomes in this kind of research are themselves contested, and their impacts will take time to fully play out, so the variables would be difficult to establish.

Whilst qualitative research can utilise many approaches such as ethnography, narrative inquiry, ethnomethodology, naturalistic inquiry etc., this research shall use the case study method, as this can help “to describe, understand, and explain a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin, 2009:2). The main difference between case studies and other qualitative research tools is that the former has the advantages of allowing understanding of the explanatory ability of the context and provide a comprehensive and rounded view (Hakim, 1987).

This research explores two case studies; the Land Public Transport Commission (SPAD) in Malaysia, and the Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority (BMLTA) in Bangalore, India, which have been described in Chapter 3. The main data gathering tool used in this research is the semi-structured interview, and the interview participants are comprised of stakeholders in the transport sector, including senior civil servants, private operators, academics and politicians. Document reviews and discussions with participants were used as supplementary tools for triangulation purposes, as well as for obtaining an in-depth understanding of the phenomena under study.

This chapter starts with discussions of research paradigms and epistemology, followed by the case study approach, data-gathering methods, validity and reliability and ends with the limitations of the method.

4.2 The overall research paradigm and epistemology

All qualitative research is interpretive in nature as it is guided by a set of beliefs and feelings about the world and how it should be understood and studied (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). There are four interpretative paradigms in qualitative research: positivist/post-positivist, constructivist-interpretive, critical, and feminist post-structural.

In interpretative research, it is assumed that the social world is “indivisible and complex and that it requires studying in its completeness” rather than through a fractured study of variables and this marries well with the case study approach used in this research, which also prioritises looking at the whole (Thomas, 2011:127). Interpretative approaches rely heavily on

naturalistic methods such as interviewing, observation and the analysis of documents – methods that enable adequate dialogue to take place between the researcher and respondents (Angen, 2000). The research design that is based on this paradigm remains adaptive and flexible, changing with the researcher's developing understanding of the subject and demanding an ongoing process of analysis as the inquiry proceeds (Shipman, 1997; Guba and Lincoln, 1989).

The research approach adopted here combines both inductive and deductive methods. It is deductive in the sense that it starts with a list of research questions and a theoretical framework in order to provide focus to the case studies, avoid data overload, and capture any contrasting views between the published literature and the participants (Yin, 2009). It is inductive in the sense that the research was left open-ended in order to capture new concepts and understandings that emerged during data analyses with the aim of helping to confirm research hypotheses and to bring new insights to the phenomenon under study (Merriam, 1998).

This research is structured by the constructivist-interpretative paradigm, which assumes that there are multiple realities (a pluralist ontology), that understanding is constructed by the researcher and the respondent (a subjectivist epistemology). Such a research design can explain 'why' and 'how' people create the meanings they do about the world (Rubin and Rubin, 2005).

In the constructivist-interpretative paradigm, the researcher takes an interpreter role – meaning that she does not just 'excavate' the findings but also builds her own understanding and tries to make sense of other people's understanding of the world. In the process, the researcher provides evidence of different perspectives and uses quotes and themes to support her interpretations as well as to construct a single explanation of events through evaluating these different perspectives (Silverman, 2001; Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Geertz (2000) pointed out that, as interpretative researchers, the researcher tells his/her version of subjects' understandings. Denzin (2001) pointed out that researchers often take sides, and that it is impossible to conduct value-free interpretative research. To overcome this weakness, as much as possible, researchers should state their prior interpretations of the phenomena they intend to study. Thus, in this study, the transport governance system in which the case studies of this research are situated is explored and described in Chapter 3, and this will provide the framework for my interpretation. The overall interpretation of the data from

the qualitative research is generated from the points-of-view of the people experiencing the problems and those of the policy makers, with one of the aims being to provide pragmatic recommendations for alleviating the identified problems (ibid).

4.3 The case study approach

A 'case' refers to the unit of analysis that can represent an event, individual, organisation, family, city, nation-state, or even the world as a whole (Gerring, 2007; Yin, 2009). Although Simons (2009:21) casts a wider net, including processes and policies, she still retains "commitment to the singularity and uniqueness of the policy and process". Merriam (1998) crystallizes differences between case studies and other forms of qualitative research, understanding case studies as intensive descriptions and analyses of clearly defined single units or bounded systems (see also Gerring, 2007). A case study should be defined in terms of the case, its scope, and time (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

In this research, the units of analysis/case are the transport authorities in Malaysia and Bangalore – SPAD and BMLTA respectively. These organisations comprise the 'heart' of the study, and provide suitable units for analysis, as the aim is to generate in-depth understanding about the impact that creating these authorities could have for transport governance as a whole. Although a unit of analysis is said to be a bounded system, it does not have to be a *closed* system. For example, Chase-Dunn and Hall (1993) argue that the unit is part of the larger social context, and warned that the interactions may extend beyond the specified boundary. Analysing a single unit is also said to be able to shed light on and provide greater understanding about a larger class of similar units (Gerring, 2004). Thus, although this research concerns two specific transport authorities, BMLTA and SPAD, understanding these authorities will also help in understanding other similar transport authorities, and lessons learnt from other transport authorities can be brought in during the analysis of BMLTA and SPAD to generate a better understanding of these units. Hence, two other transport authorities, the Transport for London (TfL) and the Land Transport Authority (LTA) in Singapore were reviewed (see section 2.4).

Bradshaw and Wallace (1991) view case studies as being particularly useful within three conditions. The first is when researchers do not have sufficient knowledge of a case to place it in a theoretical perspective, or when it does

not fit any existing theory. The second is when a case only partially supports or deviates from existing theories. The last is when the case represents a unique phenomenon and warrants intensive study. The case studies chosen for this research are critical cases, as they enable reform process within developing countries to be addressed, and the available literature and theories in this area are based mainly on studies in developed countries.

The case study method was chosen over others because its role fits best with the aims of this research, which are to explain and interpret how and why events happen, document multi-actor perspectives, explore contested viewpoints, and to demonstrate the influence of key actors and investigate the interactions between them (Simons, 2009; Yin, 2009). For Simons (2009), case studies enable the complexity of programmes and policies to be investigated, interpreted and experienced in the precise socio-political contexts in which policies and programmes are enacted. A case study is termed as an interpretation in context (Cronbach, 1975), and in the present study this involves focussing on the relevant transport authorities to uncover the characteristics of events and the interactions of specific factors in order to identify the criteria that influence their performance. The findings of this research will not only contribute to understanding of the issues within the transport authorities studied, but will also provide insights into the adoption of similar models in other Asian cities.

4.3.1 Criticisms of the case study approach

The case study method is often criticised for not perfectly representing the population and for being non-generalisable (Gerring, 2007; Flick, 2009). Other criticisms include researchers' propensity for selection bias, unknown statistical significance and the fact that findings can be shaped by the interests and perspectives of the researcher (Hakim, 2000).

It is important to note that because case studies are concerned with holistic and in-depth studies of particular situations (such as events, programmes, or organisations), they do not aim to generalise findings, but rather concentrate on the way particular groups of people confront specific issues, what has been referred to as 'particularisation' (Stake, 1995:8). Thus, although case studies do not provide statistical generalisations, they can provide analytical ones in which previously developed theories are used as templates for comparing empirical findings in which the propositions of the theories are revised or rejected (Yin, 2009; Flyvbjerg, 2001). Moreover, Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that the generalisability of case studies can be

increased by selecting critical cases that highlight general characteristics of the social order in question, thus maximising what can be learned from them. Findings from such cases permit logical deductions for similar types. Blaxter et al. (2006:72) also reveal that case studies are “ideal for the needs and resources of small-scale researchers and are able to make significant contributions in under-studied areas”. They also contribute to the accumulation of knowledge within a given field (Flyvbjerg, 2001).

Hence, despite the weaknesses of case study research, the choice of this method is appropriate for the current research because its main objective is not to develop formal generalisations for policy-making, but to present a rich portrayal of the cases, build knowledge about the topic under study and identify causal processes (Simons, 2009). In this instance, the broader implications of the work was considered through the search for strong and common themes which occur in these two different environments of the case studies.

4.3.2 Comparative cases versus single cases

Comparative case studies are preferred to single cases for a variety of reasons. Yin (2009) observes that evidence from comparative case studies is more compelling and robust, and analytical generalisation is more powerful. In addition, Sudman (1976) notes that confidence in research findings increases with the increasing number of sites, and the largest single gain occurs when the number of sites is increased from one to two. Similarly, confidence in the generalisability of results in a case study also improves when the number of cases is increased from one to two. However, the claims made by these researchers are perhaps only relevant if the case studies operate in the same context, which is not the case in this research. Hence, the case studies chosen here are treated as two individual ones with limited comparability and generalisability. The focus in this research was to provide in-depth descriptions and analyses of these two case studies within their contexts. Attempts are only made to identify the similarities and differences through cross-case analysis after the individual cases have been studied separately.

A strength of this research is that it takes a cross-national case study approach, as this may provide insights and findings about functions of transport authorities in different national contexts. Kohn (1989:20-24) argues that cross-national comparative research is more fruitful than single case studies as it allows the “examination of social phenomena within the context

of a few countries”, and can also contribute to theoretical knowledge. Due to the limited number of case studies conducted in developing countries, Kohn (1989) pushes for more intensive case studies in such regions.

The selection of appropriate case studies was one of the challenges for this research. Initially, the aim was to identify at least two similar case studies with typical attributes in relation to set-up, powers and functions, on the assumption that this would provide a greater potential for transferability and generalisability. However, this was not possible for various reasons. The funder of this research wanted the SPAD case study to be included, and this uses a national model, which means that conducting two case studies within the same nation was not possible. Within the Asian region, the only other country to have seriously considered transport authorities is India, and during the period of the research there were at least five transport authorities established in various cities in India. Each of these transport authorities had adopted a different model and set-up, each was unique in its context. Given the time and budget limitations and the in-depth nature of case studies, it was realised that only one case study could be chosen in India, and, after establishing contact through email and telephone conversations with the various authorities, only BMLTA agreed to participate in this study.

4.3.3 Answering the research questions

Four research questions were explored to gather the information needed to understand the motivation for creating dedicated transport authorities and the impact they have had on transport governance. The information required to answer the research questions was determined by the theoretical framework, and can be classified into three main categories:

- the literature that formed the theoretical grounding for the research
- documents on the structure of governance in the transport sector and institutional issues at both study areas contextual information about the organisational settings, governance issues and set-up of SPAD and BMLTA
- respondents' perceptions of the factors that motivated the creation of the single transport authorities, their involvement in the decision-making process and their interpretations of the factors that affect the performance of the authorities

Table 4.1 provides an overview of the information required for the analysis in this research. This information was collected through two main data collection methods; semi-structured interviews and document review.

Table 4.1: Overview of the information needed

Research questions	Knowledge required	Method
Question 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of the transport authorities (SPAD in Malaysia and BMLTA in Bangalore)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Previous institutional structure – its strength and weakness - Public transport issues - Influence of international development agencies/foreign models - Need for change - Involvement of key personality - Rationale for the model 	<p>Document review (mainly transport studies, policy documents, minutes of meetings, cabinet decisions)</p> <p>Semi-structured interview</p>
Question 2: What types of autonomy have been given to the transport authorities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Autonomy given to the authorities - How powers are exercised by the authorities - Additional powers which need to be acquired - Powers in rhetoric and practice - Central government control - Winners and losers of reform 	<p>Semi-structured interviews</p> <p>Document review (mainly legal documents)</p>
Question 3: How have the reforms affected decision-making processes in policy-making and the selection and implementation of transport projects?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Role of the authorities in the decision making process - Identify the key decision-makers - Mechanisms to implement the decisions 	<p>Semi-structured interviews</p> <p>Document review, (mainly minutes of meetings)</p>
Question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Capacity of the authorities - Explore the relevance of key factors as identified in the literature – political will, funding, technical expertise - Identify internal and external factors which affect the performance of the authorities - Outcomes to date 	<p>Semi-structured interviews</p>

4.4 Data generation methods

Mason (2002:51) used the term ‘data generation’ rather than ‘data collection’ to reflect the fact that a stock of knowledge is not readily available ‘out there’

to be collected, but rather has to be generated from data sources and interpreted by the researcher. Data sources can take many forms, including people, organisations, events, texts, objects and settings (ibid).

In order to collect the necessary information to answer the research questions, two main data sources were used in this study - people and text. The semi-structured interview was used as the main method for generating data from people as it supports the interpretivist paradigm adopted in this study. The findings from the interviews were augmented with the analysis of documents. One important feature of this research is its time frame. The data was generated between June and November 2011, when specific changes were taking place in the spatial dimensions of the case study organisation during that time. As discussed in section 2.7.3, reform is an ongoing process, and not an end-in-itself. Hence, the findings must be understood in relation to the temporal and spatial context.

This research did not explicitly use participant observation. Denzin (1978) argues that participation observation is difficult to apply in organisational studies as participants are widely distributed by time and place and it can thus only be used to observe a selection of persons, events and times. Observation was thus used as a complementary to semi-structured interviews. During the interviews, observable signs of body language, intonation and changes in emotions such as humour and sarcasm of the participants were recorded in the interview notes, although ultimately this was not very important.

4.4.1 Review of documents

Documents serve as records for activities that researchers cannot observe directly, and may provide unexpected clues and findings (Stake, 1995). For case studies, documents are important for “corroborating and augmenting evidence from other sources” (Yin, 2009:103). However, care must be taken in reviewing documents as they may have been written for specific audiences and purposes (ibid). In this research, documents such as plans, policies, and newspaper articles were reviewed prior to the field work (mainly for the BMLTA case study – as this site was located in a foreign country) in order to gain a better understanding of the local context and to build background knowledge. Most of the documents were sourced from the organisations’ websites.

According to Holstein and Gubrium (1995), interviewers must have a good understanding of the local setting in which they work in order to ask

questions that enable respondents to describe their views fully and appropriately, as well as to interpret the meaning of the answers that are provided. Furthermore, developing background knowledge enables the researcher to make the study more productive by connecting the researcher's interests to the respondents' experiences.

Documents were also used as a supplementary source for triangulation purposes in this study, as well as to strengthen the researcher's interpretations of the findings from the interviews. These were mostly formal ones that were collected during the field work, comprising minutes of meetings, concept papers, written responses from interviews that were conducted via e-mail and confidential government reports.

4.4.2 Semi-structured interviews

It was essential to capture the events that led to the creation of the transport authorities to understand how and why these authorities were created, and what the outcomes of their work have been. It was also important to find out whether the transport authorities are effective, for whom they are working, and how they could be improved. Semi-structured interviews provided the best way of finding such information, enabling the researcher to understand the experiences of the research participants and to reconstruct events in which she did not participate (Rubin and Rubin, 2005; Burgess, 1984). In addition, this method allows the researcher to explore people's interpretations and perceptions and to develop their knowledge of the organisation studied through conversation and dialogue (Mason, 2002; Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). It provides a chance for the researcher to probe the stories told in the field, and to challenge across interviews when there is disagreement. The interview also becomes the preferred method when it can produce more or better data at a lower cost (Dexter, 2006).

Semi-structured interviews provide a greater degree of flexibility to the interviewer than structured interviews, enabling interviewers to stay focussed whilst allowing participants to add issues and information that they feel is pertinent (Burgess, 1984). This structure means that interviews can take twists, which can sometimes lead to the emergence of unexpected discoveries and themes (Rubin and Rubin, 2005; Mason, 2002). However, semi-structured interviews are not without their challenges. Interviewers need to have enough knowledge about the topic to enable them to frame the discussion in advance (Richards and Morse, 2007), and they require the interviewer to have the ability to listen well, to handle emotional situations, to

break the ice with unknown participants, and to remain patient (Cresswell, 2007). Interviewers must ask the participants the right questions in order to invite detailed explanations (Richard and Morse, 2007), which requires rigorous advance planning and an ability to make on-the-spot decisions (Mason, 2002). Patton (1990) cautioned that, as interviewers are always reporting selective perceptions, it is important that the findings from the interviews are triangulated with other methods.

Another important element in conducting this form of inquiry is to have standards that will support the validity of the data obtained, which are achieved via thoroughness, accuracy and believability (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Hakim (2000) argues that interviewing respondents in great detail improves the potential for the researcher to discern whether their accounts of their views and experiences are true, complete and believable. For example, thoroughness can be achieved through a good sampling strategy and by designing questions that cover all the topics. In this research, purposeful sampling was used to identify relevant and suitable respondents, and the interview questions were designed using Masons' (2002) framework for interview planning (shown in Appendix A). This approach allows the interview questions and topics to be mapped clearly against the research questions, as well as allowing the identification of *a priori codes* - codes that are developed before examining the gathered data. Accuracy is demonstrated by carefully recording and reporting what the interviewer heard rather than relying on memory, and requires successfully conveying the precise meaning of what the interviewees say (Shipman, 1997). A high quality recorder was used for this purpose, together with note-taking and preparing interview memos immediately after each interview. Believability demands ensuring internal consistency and reading between the lines of the information obtained from the interviewees. This was demonstrated by cross-checking the accounts given by different respondents and asking for further clarification on certain matters whilst withholding the source of the information in order to preserve confidentiality (Dexter, 2006).

One of the main challenges of this research was to conduct interviews with the Indian counterparts as this involved a different culture, language and set of norms for the researcher. Moreover, trust and rapport needed to be developed with the participants in the BMLTA case study as most of them were unknown to the researcher. Patton (1990) highlights the fact that, whilst the data from interviews is in the form of words, words can have different meanings in different cultures, and there is thus a danger of

misunderstandings. In the SPAD case study, on the other hand, the majority of the informants were already known to the researcher from previous working engagements, and the researcher was also more well versed with the relevant norms and culture.

An important ethical requirement for any research with human actors is gaining the informed consent of the participants, as this respects the autonomy of potential contributors by enabling them to make a voluntary decision about their participation given all the relevant information about the study and how it may impact upon them (Cohen et al., 2011). All participants were briefed about the content of the consent form and the purpose of the research, in which it was clearly indicated that the interview would be recorded, materials would be used for research and publication purposes unless indicated otherwise, no reference would be made to names, and that participants had the right to withdraw at any stage. Some participants revealed confidential information that they did not want to be published, and in such cases this information was not used. Requests to switch off the recorder at particular instances were also complied with. The researcher could not guarantee complete anonymity due to the limited number of actors in the area, but guaranteed that their accounts would not be identified in the thesis and that the confidentiality, anonymity and privacy of their 'data' (tapes, charts, field notes or transcripts) from third parties would be maintained. Two participants in Bangalore refused to sign the consent forms and be recorded, although they did indicate a willingness to participate in the interview sessions.

4.4.2.1 Developing the interview questions

An interview guide was prepared for both case studies prior to the commencement of the field work. The interview guide included the list of agencies from which the participants would be sought, together with the research questions, interview topics, interview questions, follow-up questions, probes and *a priori codes*. Interview guide for SPAD is shown in Appendix B. The interview guide was reviewed several times, and changes were made to ensure that the interview questions reflected the research questions and that all the research topics were covered in a reasonable one-hour interview. To ensure validity and in search for authentic voice (Kirk and Miller, 1986), the questions were formulated in a clear and complete manner so that they would be easy for the respondents to understand.

It took almost two months to prepare the guide, as the researcher was new to qualitative interviewing and wanted to ensure that interview topics were thoroughly understood so that relevant information could be attained in the field. For training purposes, the researcher was given an opportunity to observe and learn from a senior researcher in the Institute for Transport Studies, who was at that point conducting interviews for a different study. Some of the key points picked up were the art of asking questions, confirming the researcher's understanding, good organisation of interview documents for easy retrieval, and the need for good time-management skills.

Once the interview guide was ready in May 2011, it was tested with the first pilot respondent in Malaysia via Skype. The respondent was an academic member of staff with the Malaysian Institute for Transport. Several changes were made after the pilot study, with some of the main comments being about the need to explore the powers of the authorities to drive the transport plans, the legislated functions versus the actual functions on the ground, and leadership conflicts. There were also suggestions about including several key personalities in the transport sector, whose contact details were given. The revised guide is shown in Appendix C. However, the schedule was maintained flexible to allow themes/topics that emerged from one interview be added as prompts to subsequent interviews.

4.4.2.2 The sampling method

Rubin and Rubin (2005) argue that in order to accurately capture the complexities of reality, the researcher has to ensure that contradictory views and understandings are accounted for, and one of the ways of achieving this is by using a good sampling strategy. Qualitative research often takes a purposeful sampling approach in which the researcher can choose those samples that can help to illustrate some feature or process of interest. However, it does not give simple approval to the case that we happen to choose, but instead demands that the parameters of the population of interest are critically examined, given the available time and resources (Silverman, 2001).

Purposeful sampling can be further classified into other types, such as snowballing, convenience sampling, maximum variation sampling and critical case sampling (Patton, 1990). In this study, purposeful sampling was used to identify respondents who could provide multiple perspectives on the subject under study. Respondents were identified on the basis of their

engagement with transport-related agencies, and through the theoretical framework and snowballing. For example, the theoretical framework showed that key reformers were important to drive the reform process, and therefore efforts were made to include them in the research. It also revealed the presence of winners of losers in a reform exercise, and this led to choosing respondents who could provide insights to the outcomes of the reform. Moreover, snowballing (or the chain approach) was also used to identify the respondents that could provide good insights into the case studies, and this strategy that was mainly used in the BMLTA case study, where the respondents were mostly unknown to the researcher.

The sampling targeted elite individuals, such as heads of departments, influential figures, and senior civil servants with first-hand information about the subjects under study. Dexter (2006:18) defines elite people as those “in important or exposed positions who require VIP interviewing treatment on the topics relate to their importance or exposure”. Marshall and Rossman (2006) list the advantages of interviewing elites: they can provide an overall view of their organisations or their relationships with other organisations; they can give insight and meaning to the interview through specific perspectives; and, in some cases, they can provide access to confidential documents. The disadvantages to interviewing them are the long waiting times usually required to gain an appointment, having to rely on recommendations from a third party, and that interviews with them are more demanding, with the interviewer needing to be careful in projecting the right questions. Dexter notes that interviews make elite respondents feel more special, and that they may be willing to give more information than they would under normal circumstances (Dexter, 2006).

4.4.2.3 The interview process in Malaysia

The first step in the interview process in Malaysia was to gain formal access to the site by gaining approval from the host agency, SPAD. The initial correspondence was made via email, and the host agency was happy to participate as well as to extend any additional support that was required for the research. The next step was to identify the potential respondents based on their experience and knowledge about the research problem, with the main aim being to engage individuals who could shine light on a variety of issues (Rubin and Rubin, 2005).

In the SPAD case study, most of the key civil servants and transport experts were known to the researcher due to her previous employment with the civil

service. Therefore, to minimise researcher bias and to increase the validity of the information obtained, the potential participants identified were not only civil servants, but also ex-civil servants, private sector workers, academics, members of transport associations and NGOs. It was easier to get appointments with civil servants, however, as most of them responded positively after initial contact was made via email. There was no need for a 'gate keeper' here, or approval from heads of departments. Respondents outside the civil service were introduced to the researcher through a snowballing process.

The field work in Malaysia was conducted in the second and third week of June 2011, and between mid-August and mid-November 2011. The researcher aimed to recruit heads of departments as participants in the first place, as they are directly involved in the decision-making process. In cases where the head of department was unable to allocate time within the time period of the field work, and another respondent was proposed as a substitute, a quick background check was done to identify the suitability of the proposed respondent. A total of twenty-eight interviews were conducted, comprising five unrecorded interviews in which the participants felt uncomfortable with audio recording, but in which notes were taken. Out of the twenty-three recorded interviews, three were conducted in the Malay language, as per the request of the respondents. Two out of the five unrecorded interview were conducted much later, in August 2012, when the researcher went back home for personal reasons, and this data was also included in the analysis. Table 4.2 shows the category of respondents and the months of the interviews.

Table 4.2: Interview schedule for SPAD case study

No	Participants	Codes	Interview period
1.	Head of Department – government official/board member of SPAD	G14	June 2011
2.	Head of section – MOT, government	G5	June 2011
3.	Ex-civil servant/political advisor/ex-INSPAK	G3	June 2011
4.	Senior civil servant	G4	June 2011
5.	Head of planning – operator/ex-INSPAK	O1	August 2011
6.	Legal advisor – government official	G13	August 2011
7.	Head of section – government official/ ex-DOR	G8	August 2011
8.	Head of department – local authority	G2	August 2011
9.	Chief Executive Officer – operator 2	O3	September 2011
10.	Head of section-government official/ex-CVLB	G9	September 2011
11.	Ex-civil servant	G18	September 2011
12.	Politician 2	P2	October 2011
13.	Senior government official – MOT	G6	October 2011
14.	Chief Executive Officer- operator 1/ex-SPAD	O2	October 2011
15.	Head of planning and research section – government official	G17	October 2011
16.	PEMANDU	G20	October 2011
17.	Head of department – government official	G10	October 2011
18.	Senior government official – MOT	G7	October 2011
19.	President, operator	O5	November 2011
20.	Senior government official –board member of SPAD	G1	September and November 2011
21.	Head of section – government	G12	November 2011
22.	Deputy Director General – local authority	G19	November 2011
23.	Head of section – Government	G16	November 2011
24.	President, Transport Association	O4	November 2011
25.	Politician 1	P1	November 2011
26.	Legal advisor – government	G11	August 2012
27.	Head of section – government/ex-ADB	G15	August 2012

G – Government officials, P- Politicians, O - Operators

Telephone calls were used for recruiting respondents for interviews during the field work phase. The respondents that agreed to an interview were sent an introductory email with an information sheet attached that briefly explained the purpose, aims and content of the research. When potential participants requested to see the interview questions, they were emailed to them along with the information sheet and the consent form. Such requests were more usual among the elite respondents such as the heads of departments and politicians.

After the first two interviews, the researcher realised that a 'one size fits all' list of interview questions was not ideal, and targeted interview questions were drafted for different respondents based on the interview guide prepared earlier. This was because each respondent was unique in the sense that they had different knowledge and experiences, and were involved in different events or stages of the process under study. According to Rubin and Rubin (2005:37), "if the interview questions stay close to what the interviewees know and are willing to talk about, the resulting report will be fresh and credible". However, some 'core' questions were retained in every set of interview questions in order to capture different views about important themes and areas, as well as to check for accuracy and consistency (Rubin and Rubin, 2005).

Initially, it was planned that all interviews would be performed on a one-to-one basis. However, some respondents requested that an additional person sat in, usually his/her assistant or deputy, and this was agreed to. Four out of the twenty-three recorded interviews had two respondents present. In some cases, the presence of an additional person was found to be fruitful, especially when it came to confirming the details of events. There was no major disruption in having an additional person, because all the interview questions were directed towards the main respondent, and as a deputy or assistant they only talked when asked to contribute by the main respondent. Interviews with unknown respondents were started with discussions about the respondent's work history, job responsibilities and educational background, and this was found to provide useful information as well as to be a good ice-breaker.

At the start of each interview, the researcher provided a brief explanation about the research and the consent form. All the respondents signed the consent form, but some were reluctant for the interviews to be recorded. Although the researcher explained to them that all information discussed would be kept confidential and used solely for academic purposes, some of these respondents relayed negative past experiences, especially with the media, where their statements had been manipulated. In such cases, notes were taken as a record of the interview, and an interview memo was prepared on the same day to capture important details.

Where the respondents consented, interviews were recorded using a digital recorder. As most of the respondents in the SPAD case study were senior civil servants, the interviews were conducted in their rooms, which were comfortable, with minimum background noise. Although the interviews were

recorded, the researcher also took notes during the interviews, and wrote down the follow-up questions. According to (Blaxter et al., 2006), although note-taking can be distracting, it can suggest to interviewees that what they are saying is important, and can act as backup in the event that the recorder fails.

Recording made some respondents anxious, and the researcher noticed that they were uncomfortable revealing confidential information. In these situations, after the interview session had ended and the recorder had been switched off, some of the questions were repeated for verification purposes, and notes taken where the answers differed. These respondents were observed to be more relaxed when they were not being recorded. They provided more detailed explanations under these conditions, with some of these interviews running on longer than the formal recorded interview sessions. The respondents were informed that the information provided would be used for the purposes of the research, and they did not seem to mind. When dealing with sensitive issues, it was realised that the respondents were likely to open up when it was indicated that some parts of the information were known to the researcher already (Adler and Adler 2003). This was found to help in easing respondents' reluctance to discuss certain issues, and care was taken to avoid pushing the respondents too much and to provide them with assurances that the information provided would remain confidential.

The researcher interviewed different people in order to produce multiple perspectives and, interestingly, people on one side of the argument suggested what to ask the other side. This increases the credibility of answers provided by the interviewees, because they know that the researcher will be obtaining information from all sides (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Data-gathering was ended when different points of views had been captured, and when no new information was being obtained from new respondents (Patton, 1990).

Interviews were conducted via email for respondents that the researcher could not meet in person. One of the respondents was located in Canada, and the other was a very senior civil servant who was on a business trip overseas for the period of the field work. When the emails were sent out, it was clearly mentioned that the communication via email was confidential and that all information and responses would only be used for the purpose of this study. The advantage of email interviews are that they provide extended access to participants, do not require any travelling expenses, and

give respondents time to reflect on the questions (Raymond, 2006). The disadvantages include delays, long waiting times and the absence of social cues (ibid). Another problem encountered in this research was that one email that was sent was not read by the intended recipient, who was a very senior civil servant. Instead, it was read and responded to by his special officer, who handles all the formal emails. Although the email explicitly mentioned that all correspondence between the researcher and the participant would be confidential, the special officer sent out the interview questions to the relevant agencies for feedback. When the response was returned via e-mail three weeks later, the email included the information that the senior civil servant did not have the time to look at the responses provided by the agencies. The information received in the email was interesting, as although the heads of departments had clearly indicated their dissatisfaction and disputes with each other when interviewed face-to-face, the responses received via email suggested that they worked collaboratively with each other without issue.

Email interviews were also used after returning to the United Kingdom from field work as telephone interviews would have been too costly with international respondents. These were mainly used to seek clarification from particular respondents on issues discussed during the interviews or to ask for information about specific government procedures from the agencies.

4.4.2.4 The interview process in Bangalore

The field work in Bangalore took place between 1 and 25 July 2011. The first step was to gain written approval from the host agency, the BMLTA. Although the researcher had a telephone conversation with the commissioner, who expressed her support and interest in participating in this research, written approval took almost two months to arrive, and the host agency only granted a one-month research period in Bangalore.

While the researcher was waiting for the written approval, she undertook searches for agencies involved and potential respondents, mainly through online research. Gaining access to appropriate respondents was difficult due to the combination of the physical distance involved and the fact that email contact details were not usually available on the agencies' websites. In some cases, phone calls were made to establish initial contact and obtain email addresses. However, responses to emails seeking participants were extremely poor. It was not until much later during field work that the researcher learnt that the civil servants in Bangalore had limited access to

the internet in the office, and that they are not allowed to respond to any official emails without prior approval from their heads of departments. Since the attempt to contact the respondents directly was not very fruitful, efforts were made through links with the host agency and the Indian Institute of Science (IISC) in Bangalore. During the data-gathering period, the researcher was attached as a short-term student to Dr Ashish Verma, an Assistant Professor in the Civil Engineering Department. The following international agencies based in India were also approached: the WRI Centre for Sustainable Transport (EMBARQ), the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

The researcher managed to get in touch with some promising respondents through an advisor in the ADB, who had good connections with the transport related agencies in Bangalore. After arriving in the field on 1 July 2011 things began to look more positive. A short presentation was given to students and researchers in the Centre for Infrastructure, Sustainable Transportation, and Urban Planning (CISTUP), IISC, to provide them with an overview about the study and to discuss possibilities for assistance in the data-gathering process. Suggestions were given for potential respondents and how they may best be approached.

Subsequently, the researcher had an individual session with Dr Ashish Verma to test her interview questions, primarily to check on the clarity and suitability of the questions for the local context. No changes were made to the interview questions after this session. This interview was treated as part of the interview data as the respondent answered all the questions, providing good insights and background knowledge, as well as sharing his experiences from working in the transport sector, which were valuable to this study.

Suitable respondents were identified with the help of the ADB, the BMLTA and Dr Ashish Verma of IISC, and their contact details were obtained. They were then contacted on their mobile phones and, interestingly, most of them expressed a willingness to participate. After a brief explanation about the research over the telephone (including the amount of time required), some respondents were willing to allocate time for an interview session either the same day or the next. The waiting period was slightly longer for the heads of departments, as access and appointments had to be obtained through personal secretaries, and they also requested that the interview questions be sent prior to the interview.

The interview topics covered in Bangalore were similar to those in the Malaysian in order to allow for comparisons to be made where possible (Burgess, 1984). A standard set of interview questions was used for all the respondents for the following reasons. Firstly, the researcher had only just met the respondents and was uncertain about the kind of information they could provide or their expertise. Secondly, time was a constraint, and it was best to try to cover all the interview topics with each respondent. Thirdly, after the first few interviews, it was learned that the civil servants in Bangalore often get transferred and rarely stay in one position for more than two years. Hence, some of them could provide broad perspectives on transport issues and could see them from the point of view of other agencies, especially the ones they had previously been attached to.

In total, twenty-three interviews were conducted in Bangalore, comprising seventeen recorded interviews, and two refusals to sign the consent form. All interviews were conducted in English, and most respondents were found to be fluent (although they occasionally used some words from the local Kannada language). Although the difficulties of conducting interviews in different cultures have been highlighted by many researchers (Keats, 2000: 129; Patton, 1990), the researcher did not experience major obstacles in terms of language or culture, and received very good responses. The interview schedule is presented in Table 4.3, and the interview guide is included in Appendix D.

Table 4.3: Interview schedule for BMLTA case study

No	Participants	Codes
1.	Academicians 1	IA1
2.	Academicians 2	IA2
3.	Senior planner, government	IG4
4.	Senior engineer, parastatal	IPI 8
5.	Head of department/IAS, parastatal 1	IPI 6
6.	Chief engineer, parastatal 1	IPI 3
7.	Planner, government	IG3
8.	Chief engineer, local authority	IGI 7
9.	Head of finance, private company	IPI 5
10.	Senior planner, government	IG6
11.	Vice president, consultancy firm	IC1
12.	Chief engineer, parasatal 2	IPI 2
13.	Senior planner, parastatal	IPI 7
14.	Head of department/IAS, government 1	IGI 1
15.	Chief engineer, government	IG5
16.	Academicians 3	IA3
17.	Head of department/IAS, government 2	IGI 2
18.	Head of department/IAS, parastatal 3	IPI 1
19.	Consultant/ex-BMLTA	IC2
20.	Head of department/IAS, parastatal 2	IPI 4
21.	Consultant, ADB*	IC3
22.	Traffic police	IGI 8

All interviews were conducted in July 2011 in Bangalore except * conducted in October 2011 in Delhi. Key: IA – Indian Academics, IP – Indian Parastatal officials, IG – Indian Government Officials, IC – Indian Consultants

The main problems encountered during the interviews were the regular interruptions from subordinates and the presence of other personnel in the room who did not form part of the interview. Although these did not seem to disturb the interviewee, Dexter (2006) argues that interview situations influence informant's statements and interpretations of findings. Thus, the impact of these interruptions was minimised by allowing the interviewee to settle any urgent matters, although this meant that the interviews took longer and there were disruptions to the recordings of the interviews. In some situations, interviews had to be conducted in an open office space with background noise, and this affected the quality of the audio recordings. In

such cases, the recorder was placed closer to the interviewee and more detailed notes were taken as back-ups.

The structure of the interviews in Bangalore was a little different from those in Malaysia. Since all the respondents were new to the researcher, she began the interviews with a brief introduction, then outlined the discussion topics to come. Efforts were made to build good rapport and gain the confidence of the respondents, and where necessary the researcher highlighted her civil service background in order to establish personal overlaps with the respondents (Adler and Adler, 2003). To create a good first impression and blend in, the researcher dressed in local attire, in the traditional *kurta* and *chudidar*, and aimed to be as polite as possible. These strategies proved fruitful, with all the respondents being respectful, hospitable, and willing to provide further information on request after the interviews. According to Kvale (1996), the ability to develop trust and rapport will enhance the validity of data when the respondents have enough confidence in the researcher to talk freely about their feelings and experiences.

To enhance background knowledge, the researcher subscribed to a daily local newspaper and read it through every morning to locate any transport issues that could be discussed during the interview. Most of the respondents understood that the researcher was an outsider with limited knowledge about local issues, and thus they started the interviews by offering their views on the existing problems and how they thought they could be solved. Hence, some of the interviews provided a good learning session, and the respondents appeared to enjoy the opportunity to tell the researcher about issues she was not aware of (Dexter, 2006). However, the researcher was careful not to allow the respondents to shift the focus away from the objectives of the interview, and all interview topics were covered in as great a depth as it was possible to do so in each session. After the interviews, the respondents were asked to either introduce the researcher to their head of department or to recommend suitable participants in other agencies, and most participants were happy to help in one of these ways. In some cases, the respondents provided documents that they thought would be helpful for understanding the issues better.

As with the Malaysian case study, some respondents were reluctant to have the interviews recorded, and in one recorded interview, the interviewee asked for a copy of the audio recording. A copy was provided, and given this sign of insecurity, he was also further assured regarding the anonymity and

confidentiality of the information provided. In another case, a head of department was not willing to sign the consent form or to have the interview recorded, although he agreed to answer the interview questions. He repeatedly apologised for not allowing it to be recorded, and explained that this refusal was required by the confidentiality agreement that civil servants are subjected to. Interestingly, this respondent discussed a number of confidential issues, as well as giving an in-depth outline of the power dynamics between the state and the city government and their impacts on the empowerment of BMLTA.

During the field work in Bangalore, the researcher had an opportunity to attend a workshop entitled Sustainable Development for Public Transport, which was organised by the International Association for Public Transport (UiTP) on 16 July 2011. Many prominent speakers from the transport sector (including numerous heads of departments) presented their views and highlighted critical issues that they claimed required immediate attention. This full day workshop was insightful as it provided a good platform for understanding local issues and getting to know the key figures in the transport sector. In the following week, the author gained the opportunity to interview three heads of departments through the contacts developed during this conference. During the final days of the field work in Bangalore, another presentation was made to CISTUP, focussing on some research findings mainly around the effectiveness of BMLTA and factors that influences its performance. A written report was submitted later to fulfil the requirements of a short-term research student at CISTUP, IISC.

4.4.2.5 Data storage

The original digital recordings and transcripts of person-identifiable interviews were stored on the University server only, and the anonymised transcripts of interviews, interview notes and materials were saved on the author's laptop and on an external hard drive. Original copies were saved in a special folder, and the folder was duplicated and used for analysis purposes. Hard copies of the transcripts and interview materials were stored together with the recording devices in a locked cabinet, accessible only to the project team. The analysis of the data was mainly carried out on the University' M drive, using Nvivo 9 Software, and a daily backup was made on the University's N drive.

4.5 Validity and reliability

Validity is understood in terms of the objectivity of the research, which concerns the interpretation of observations and whether or not the inferences that the researcher makes are reasonable and supported by data (Perakyla, 2011). Researchers highlight various ways of increasing validity, including acknowledging one's own standpoint and biases, the peer-review process, and member checks (Merriam, 1998; Mason, 2002). The approach taken to increase the validity of the data from the interviews is explained in section 4.4.2. The researcher bias produced by the researcher's previous role as a civil servant is acknowledged. This could have had an effect on the respondents during interviews, as most of the respondents in the SPAD case study knew the researcher. This bias was reduced by explaining to the respondents that they were being approached from a research perspective, and that all the information that they discussed would be treated confidentially.

Triangulation is a validity procedure in which the researcher looks for convergence among multiple and different sources of information in order to form themes or categories in a study (Creswell and Miller, 2000). This approach was used here to corroborate evidence collected through interviews and document reviews in order to locate major and minor themes and produce a valid narrative account. As was emphasised in section 4.4.1, the document review was used to fill in missing information, to confirm or reject respondents' arguments and claims during interviews, and to enhance validity by allowing the researcher to explore the research questions in a rounded and multi-faceted way (Mason, 2002).

During the period in which the data was gathered and analysed, any tentative interpretations were checked with the sources of the data to seek further clarification where possible, and this was mainly done via e-mail. There was ongoing engagement with the supervisors during the data collection and analysis period to ensure that the findings, emerging themes and concepts made sense, and that they were realistic and accurate. This kind of support was useful, as it challenged the researcher's thinking and assumptions about the case studies. The validity of this research has also been increased by using two case studies instead of one, which allows the results to be applied to a greater range of other situations. Moreover, rich descriptions of the settings, concepts and themes are provided in the presentation of the findings to enable the reader to make decisions about

the applicability of the findings to other settings and similar contexts (Cresswell and Miller, 2000).

Reliability concerns the extent to which the results are consistent with the data collected, and to its precision, consistency and stability. In short, the researcher should be able to explain how she arrived at her results (Mason, 2002). Several reliability strategies that have been suggested by researchers (Cresswell and Miller, 2000; Mason, 2002; Merriam, 1998) were incorporated into the design of this study. The investigator's position in this research was explained in Chapter 2 and section 4.2 (which set out the theoretical framework, assumptions and research paradigm for the study). The explanation about the open-ended interview questions and how the questions were designed and tested for clarity with pilot respondents prior to the actual interviews is given in section 4.4.2.1. However, the details within the questions to respondents varied based on their positions and experience, and this allowed the construction of a more complete picture of the subject under study. Next, the grounds for selecting the data-gathering tools for answering the research questions were explicated, and the selection of respondents justified in section 4.4.2.2. Detailed accounts of the interview process for the two case studies were given in sections 4.4.2.3 and 4.4.2.4. The data collected was given careful and detailed analysis so that a reliable picture of the respondents' views and information could be built up, and is presented in the next chapter. It is important to note the analysis of qualitative data does not yield definitive truths, but rather a set of plausible interpretations based on the available data.

4.6 The limitations of the methods

The data-gathering process had a number of restrictions and limitations. The sponsor of this research only granted a five-month field work approval to gather the data for both of the case studies, and the host agency in Bangalore only granted a one-month approval for data-gathering, which was fixed for July. The challenge was greater in Bangalore, because the research setting was new and the researcher had to make good use of the time given to gather the necessary data there. The implications of these restrictions were that not all the identified participants could be interviewed, especially those that occupied high-ranking positions and those who were involved in the reform process, who were not available for interview during the one-month set period. Although it would have been beneficial and desirable to have had participants from the Ministry of Urban Development

in New Delhi (which oversees the policy and drafts the strategies for urban transport for the entire country), it was not possible to gain access to or support from the ministry although numerous attempts were made to get in touch with the relevant authorities.

There was more time for the field work in Malaysia, which meant more time could be spent targeting the most desirable respondents. The heads of departments and senior civil servants were targeted and approached. This led to longer waiting times. Furthermore, one month of this four-month period was Ramadan, the holy month, in which Muslims observe fasting. Attempts to arrange interviews during this period were not very fruitful, as the respondents preferred sessions after Ramadan. In both the case studies, the observation was limited to the interview settings and the behaviours of respondents during the interviews.

4.7 Chapter summary

This chapter has discussed the constructivist paradigm adopted in this research, and has established the justification for both the qualitative and the inductive and deductive approaches, which make use of case studies for data-gathering. The rationale for choosing the case studies were explained and the two main research methods have been discussed; the semi-structured interview and the document review. The details of the interview process, including the ethical issues at both the case study locations have been elaborated. The final part of this chapter touched on reliability and validity of this research. The next chapter explains the analytical process that was undertaken to interpret the raw data.

Chapter 5: Approach to Analysis

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will explain the analytical steps taken to synthesise the data and arrive at the findings for each case study, as well as the steps undertaken for the cross-case analysis. As described in Chapter 4, this research adopts a case study approach under an interpretative paradigm which advocates or challenges the researcher to study the social phenomena in its completeness (Thomas, 2011). Case studies can be used for confirmatory research and/or explorative studies. The former taking a theory and testing it through the deductive approach, the latter promoting theory development through an inductive process (Gerring, 2004). The basic analytic method of this research is the use of ongoing comparisons, and this stands behind every technique in the interpretative paradigm (Thomas, 2011). This involves repeatedly looking through the data, comparing each sentence and paragraph with each other and against the research questions. The categories and themes that represent the content of the data were identified through this form of in-depth comparison, and these formed the building blocks of the analysis.

Prior to undertaking the field work, a theoretical framework and *a priori* codes were prepared for guiding the data collection and the process of analysis. These codes represent a type of 'thinking tool', and are temporary constructs that take shape for and through empirical work. The coding of the transcription and the field notes did not attempt to extract data to fit into the *a priori* codes. Instead, an open coding system approach (which forms the basis for the grounded theory approach) was applied in order to capture the essence or core elements of the data (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Hence, the respondents' accounts will be explicated and explained before the researcher provides her interpretation and relates the findings to existing theories (see Chapters 6 and 7). Figure 5.1 provides a simple illustration of the steps undertaken in the analysis.



Figure 5.1: Steps taken in analysis

5.2 Transcribing the interviews

The researcher transcribed all of the interviews personally, which although time-consuming, enabled familiarity with data to be developed. A five-minute interview took approximately forty-five minutes to transcribe using a foot-pedal transcriber so that both hands could be kept free for the keyboard. Express Scribe Software was installed free from the internet and used to facilitate the transcribing process as it supports the foot-pedal transcriber, includes variable speed playback, and is easy to use.

A total of twenty-three recorded interviews were made for the Land Public Transport Commission (SPAD) case study, and all but one of the interviews were transcribed.²⁹ Out of the twenty-two interviews, two were conducted in the local Malay language, and transcription was prepared in the local language before the appropriate information was extracted and an interview report in English drafted. To avoid misinterpretation, the interview report was prepared in the same document that contained the original transcription in Malay for cross-checking purposes, and this document was later used in the coding exercise.

All seventeen recorded interviews were transcribed for the Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority (BMLTA) case study. All these interviews were conducted in English, although some of the recordings of these interviews were of poor quality due to the high background noise from traffic. Most government offices were located along main roads and not equipped with air-conditioning, hence the open windows increased the traffic noise.

Transcribing was a time-consuming process, and given the time constraints of the research it was decided that the entire transcription notation would not

²⁹ The exception being the respondent who represented the Klang Valley Taxi Association, who mainly discussed issues surrounding the taxi industry, only a small portion of which was found to be relevant to the research questions. In this case, the relevant information was extracted from the interview, and an interview report was prepared.

be used as it was not necessary to apply such detail because the emphasis was on the actual agreement and meaning of context rather than the social structure of the conversation. However, stresses on words, overlaps in speech, and gestures such as laughter and sudden changes of emotion such as sarcasm were included. This helped to confirm the main points of argument and to view how the other person in a conversation might have influenced the speech by interrupting.

5.3 Using NVivo

The computer assisted qualitative analysis NVivo 9 software was used in managing and analysing the interview transcripts and notes. The software was useful for organising and keeping track of records for easy retrieval, as well as for organising and providing rapid access to codes and the contexts from which those codes were derived. In addition, upon completion of each transcription, the software was used to assist in developing graphical models to map out ideas and concepts in visual form, which helped in developing an understanding of the issues pertinent to particular respondents. Two separate project files were operated for the two case studies, and this allowed each case study to be examined and analysed separately in a systematic manner. Cross-comparison between the case studies was performed manually as the comparison between the cases was based on the overall narrative of each case study, and thus it was felt that NVivo could offer little help here.

Like many other software programmes, NVivo 9 is only a tool and cannot compensate for limited interpretative capacity. Although it allows for multiple coding of a particular segment of text, researchers observe that there is a danger of chopping the data into different segments and losing the overall accounts (Bazeley, 2007). To safeguard against this care was taken to select and code significant segments of the transcript that discuss particular concepts or issues and thus retain the overall meaning. According to Silverman (2010), computer-assisted software programmes do not support the analysis of the formal structure of narratives, which means that this structure has to be assembled manually by the analysts. Therefore, the use of NVivo in this research was limited to arranging the relevant text into codes, and arranging the codes in a hierarchical manner in the form of tree nodes on which further analysis was undertaken utilising a manual approach. The main advantage of using this software was that it provided the flexibility to modify or eliminate the codes that were found to be

irrelevant through the automatic reorganisation of the data segments coded under the nodes.

5.4 The case study analysis

This research involves two cross-national case studies, and there were two stages of analysis involved: within the case and across cases. For the within the case analysis, each case was first treated as comprehensive in itself, and data was gathered with the aim of learning as much as possible about the factors or issues that had bearings on the case. Once this stage was completed, the cross-case analysis began. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), cross-case analysis helps to increase generalisability mainly by assessing whether the findings make sense beyond the specific case study. Similarly, Eckstein (1992 cited in Gerring, 2004) suggests that cross-case analysis can increase the reach of causal propositions when cases that are representative of the phenomena under study are chosen. This form of analysis also strengthens the findings of the case study by providing additional cross-case evidence, hence increasing its generalisability (Gerring, 2004). This research attempted to build a detail explanation from the findings for the research questions of the individual case studies, and to then investigate the similarities and differences in the processes and outcomes that hold across the cases, providing explanations about how they have been influenced by local conditions. This helped to pin down the specific conditions that impacted on the findings, and to develop an understanding how these conditions might be related.

5.4.1 Within case analysis

This section explains the approach taken in extracting and recording the findings for each of the case studies. The coding process of the transcriptions, field notes and interview memos was undertaken for both cases. The coding exercise helped to categorise the data and to identify critical issues or issues of interest around each respondent.

5.4.1.1 Coding: developing free nodes and tree nodes

The interviews created a vast amount of data that needed to be organised through some form of indexing for easy retrieval and for follow-ups on issues that needed further analysis and explanation. This is known as 'coding' or 'categorising' and is defined as the use of a "word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing and or

evocative attribute for a portion of language based or visual data” (Saldana, 2009:3). It is often seen as a transitional process between data analysis and more extensive analysis that is not just limited to labelling, but also helps in “linking data to the idea and linking the idea to all data pertaining to the idea” (Richard and Morse, 2007:137).

The approach that was taken in coding of the data this research involved a hybrid of the grounded theory method and the responsive interviewing formal coding scheme. In the grounded theory method, an open coding method is used without an initial *a priori* coding list, and every passage is coded to develop concepts and themes from the data. This approach argues that coding, recognising concepts and themes and theory development are parts of one integrated process (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). On the other hand, in the responsive interviewing formal coding scheme (as proposed by Rubin and Rubin, 2005), a list of coding is prepared beforehand, the concepts are then refined before being marked in the text, and newly emerging concepts from the data are also taken into account. In this study, a list of *a priori* codes was identified from the published literature review, the preliminary research questions and the analytical framework. A total of twenty *a priori* codes were chosen and mapped to the relevant research questions. However, the *a priori* codes were not used to code the transcripts, which were kept aside, with the coding process taking an open coding approach. Table 5.2 shows the research questions and the relevant *a priori* codes.

Table 5.1: Research questions and the related *a priori* codes

	Research question	A priori codes
Research question 1	<i>What were the motivations behind the establishment of the transport authorities (SPAD in Malaysia and BMLTA in Bangalore)?</i>	Motivation for creation Process of creation Multi actor perspective Rationale for model Key personality
Research question 2	<i>What types of autonomy have been given to the transport authorities?</i>	Types of autonomy Source of powers Exercising powers Influence of central government Adequacy of existing powers
Research question 3	<i>How have the reforms affected decision-making processes in policy-making and the selection and implementation of transport projects?</i>	Decision-making platform Role in decision-making Network of actors
Research question 4	<i>What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms?</i>	Transparency Politics Cultural issues Capacity issues Performance/outcomes to date

The coding exercise was limited to interview transcripts and memos, whilst policy documents collected during the field work were used to clarify or confirm points raised by the respondents. This latter process involved identifying relevant parts of documents, and it was thought that it would not be useful to code everything in the documents as this would only increase the data load in the software. The documents were used later in the analysis when detailed explanation had to be sought.

The coding process started with re-reading the transcripts and preparing reflexive notes, as Corbin and Strauss (2008) propose doing. Preparation of reflexive notes helped in “reading through and beyond the data” (Mason, 1996:109), especially in identifying the relevance of data and the research question that a piece of data addresses, as well as the internal consistency of respondents’ accounts and their comparisons with the accounts of other respondents (which opened up the inquiry and moved it towards the interpretation process). An example of a reflexive memo prepared for respondent G13 is given below:

F: The advantages are a lot, of course, and the PM has the clout to influence other agencies, but so far we have not yet used that, I believe.

R: Ok, not used.

F: Aah, we have not used yet that advantage that we have.

Memo: he feels SPAD has not used the 'powers' of the Prime Minister to influence other agencies and force them to do what is required. However, respondents from X and Y agencies pointed out that SPAD always throws the PM's name in to get things done, and they have no right to question, and this seems to have negative effect on the relationship (Transcript with reflexive notes for respondent G13).

With the assistance of NVivo for data display, the transcripts were coded, and this first-level coding was called 'free nodes'. The coding process aimed at data that was most closely related to the research questions and data that was found to be irrelevant at this point was grouped under a node labelled 'KIV', to be revisited later. The codes were assigned names that captured the relevant phenomena, events, processes or personalities, and this first cycle of coding used the focus coding and descriptive coding techniques. The focus coding method uses the most significant or frequent nodes to sift through large amounts of data, whereas descriptive coding helps to capture what is seen and heard in the data (Saldana, 2009). Links between nodes were established upon completion of each transcript with the assistance of the 'model' feature in NVivo. This enables the initial mapping of dimensions and for issues relevant to each respondent to be pulled out, which was useful in laying the groundwork for analysis between the respondents. The NVivo software allows models to be developed for each respondent based on the identified nodes. Figure 5.2 is an example of a model that shows the nodes that were of interest to respondent IA2 and the relationships between them.




Figure 5.2: Model developed on NVIVO for respondent IA2

The respondents' views on central issues were later merged and explained under each research question in a case analysis report. This report was revised from time-to-time as the coding exercise progressed in order to track how the understanding on the topic changed over time and to ensure that appropriate issues were teased out. The key was to capture the views of the different groups of respondents, such as the SPAD and BMLTA employees, government officials, operators, academics and politicians.

As the free node develops, the responses and issues were put together and connected under a broader categorisation called tree nodes, which comprise the second-level coding. The second level coding used the pattern-matching technique favoured by Miles and Huberman (1994) which reduces the large number of free nodes into a smaller number of analytical units, allowing rules, causes and explanations in the data to be explored and initial themes to be captured. These nodes are not fixed, and were discarded, renamed, changed and re-sorted when overlaps and redundancy were identified. According to Patton (1990:216), the categories should be frequently revisited to ensure that they are 'sensitising', which means that they are as sensitive to the data as possible, and that the meanings of the phenomena are captured. The consistency and robustness of coding was checked by the researcher using the test for coder consistency in which some of the transcripts which have been coded were re-coded again to validate the coding scheme and this was done early in the process. Where necessary, the description and clarity about the codes were recorded in memos which were stored in the NVivo. In addition, all adjustments to the nodes were

recorded in the research journal in order to track and capture changes in the researcher's understanding.

For the SPAD case study, 17 tree nodes and 124 free nodes were identified as being relevant to the research questions. The list of the tree nodes and examples of the free nodes are provided in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2: List of tree nodes and free nodes for SPAD case study

Research questions	Tree nodes	Examples of free nodes
<i>What were the motivations behind the establishment of SPAD in Malaysia?</i>	• Rationale for SPAD	Gap in planning for public transport, justification for model, previous regime and agenda licensing , benchmarking with advanced cities, support for SPAD
	• Inadequacy of existing structure	Gap in planning, multiple agencies coordination issues, fragmentation of functions, limited powers of local authorities
	• Key personality	Chief Secretary, Prime Minister
	• Milestones in creation of SPAD	Task force, INSPAK, feedback from stakeholders
<i>What types of autonomy have been given to the transport authority?</i>	• Autonomy	Commission status, financial autonomy, legal backing, planning function, gap in existing autonomy
	• Institutional change	Challenges in merging exercise, implementation flaws, new agency vs established agencies
	• Boundary issues and pollution of functions	Confusions on functions of agencies, perceptions on SPAD's role
<i>How have the reforms affected decision-making processes in policy-making and the selection and implementation of transport projects?</i>	• Decision making platform	Approving authorities, SPAD as check point, politician-civil servant relationship
	• Public transport initiatives	SPAD's role in MRT, congestion pricing
	• Sensitive to local need	Local champion, public engagement
<i>What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms?</i>	• Capacity and human capital	Institutional memory, too much on the plate, insufficient staff, knowledge gap
	• Cultural issues	Cultural clash, structural change vs cultural change, culture of authorities
	• Institutional structure, rules, laws, regulations	Government policy, bureaucracy, central government control

Research questions	Tree nodes	Examples of free nodes
<i>What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms?(cont'd)</i>	• Politics	Many hands, political interference, political tool, political support
	• Performance/outcomes to date	Correcting CVLB, proving existence, re-registration of license, transition stage
	• Transparency	Mention about corruption, no mention about corruption
	• Working relationship	Communication element, importance of personality, name-throwing, SPAD vs local authorities

To better illustrate relationship between free nodes and tree nodes, two quotes from two free nodes – created for legitimacy and previous licensing regime – is provided as an example in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Relationship between free nodes and a tree node in SPAD case study

Free node 1 – gap in planning for public transport	Free node 2 – previous regime and agenda in licensing	Tree node
<p>Quote from respondent G14:</p> <p>There was a gap in transport planning, there was no transport policy to start things of, and the reason there was no transport policy is because there was no champion for transport to cover all the elements of transport</p>	<p>Quote from respondent O1:</p> <p>It is very tough, CVLB was giving out licenses, not on what you have basis but who you know basis, that is why some people can end up with hundreds of permits and then they rent it out and every evening they collected fifty ringgit per taxi driver</p>	<p>Rationale for SPAD</p>

For the BMLTA case study, 17 tree nodes and 111 free nodes were identified as being relevant to the research questions. The list of these tree nodes and examples of the free nodes are provided in table 5.4.

Table 5.4: List of tree nodes and free nodes for BMLTA case study

Research questions	Tree nodes	Free nodes
<i>What are the motivations behind the establishment of BMLTA in Bangalore?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inadequacy of existing structure 	Agencies own strategy, fragmentation of functions, poor planning and compliance, documented function vs actual practice
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key personality 	Chief Secretary, Chief Minister's office
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rationale for BMLTA 	Absence of holistic view for city, NUTP, coordination issues, failure of BMRDA
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public transport issues 	Bangalore's rapid growth, need to integrate various modes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External assistance from international 	Technical and funding support
<i>What types of autonomy have been given to BMLTA?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Autonomy 	Authority vs committee, financial autonomy, inadequacy of powers, role of BMLTA vs established agencies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BMLTA's function 	Anticipated functions, current functions
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Legal issues 	BMLTA act, Bengaluru Governance Bill, common legislation for UMTA
<i>How does the establishment of a dedicated transport authority affect decision-making processes in policy-making and the selection of transport projects?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Decision making platform 	Decisions by CS, BMLTA's decisions not binding, members in decision making loop
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Performance/ outcomes to date 	Better coordination, BRT, nothing at strategic level, parking policy
<i>What are the factors that determine the success or failure of the reforms?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity and human capital 	Insufficient capacity, outsourcing, technical cell at CISTUP
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cultural issues 	Incompetent officers, administrators ignoring cultural issues
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutional structure, rules, laws, regulation 	74 th amendment, bureaucracy, implementation gap, elements of democracy, limited powers for local bodies, short tenure of administration
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Moving forward for BMLTA 	Separate entity from DULT, need to strengthen BMLTA
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Politics 	Political consensus, political backing, political interference, civil servants at mercy of politics
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transparency 	Corruption as culture, combating corruption
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Working relationship 	Handholding approach, buy in from agencies

To better illustrate relationship between free nodes and tree nodes, two quotes from two free nodes – created for legitimacy and previous licensing regime – is provided as an example in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5: Relationship between free nodes and a tree node in BMLTA case study

Free node 1 - coordination issues	Free node 2 - failure of BMRDA	Tree node
<p>Quote from respondent IG3:</p> <p>There were so many institutions or organizations which deal with the transportation, we have City Corporation, Traffic Police, and the Urban Development Authority, Road Transport Department, each of them have different role in providing transport infrastructure, without any common platform to bring them out together, they were working with their own objectives and so on</p>	<p>Quote from respondent IC2:</p> <p>The planning and coordination functions should have been done by BMRDA, but the staff there were just sitting on files for years, so that was the main thing ...BMRDA couldn't do, so they went ahead and formed a new agency</p>	<p>Rationale for BMLTA</p>

The coding exercise was performed concurrently with memo writing as and when necessary in order to clarify the nodes, capture individual case synopses, explain particular problems and identify issues that needed further clarification, and all memos were labelled with dates and times. Memos are “sites of conversation with ourselves about the data” that help in understanding the issues and phenomena under study (Clarke, 2005:202). The relevant memos were treated as data, and were coded and categorised. The coding process was stopped after all the transcripts and memos had been coded, the coding structure scrutinised and refined (King, 2012) and the researcher had compiled some ideas about the recurring themes in the data and what to pursue further. The coding structure was checked by supervisors, and they agreed that the nodes made sense in relation to the data.

However, during the coding exercise the researcher realised that the data was segregated by a cross-sectional indexing pattern, and it was difficult to search for processes and practices that informed the whole data set. For example, the reasons for SPAD’s creation were not derivable just from

observing the coded data as respondents did not generally talk about it explicitly, and only small chunks of text discussed the issue of corruption in the previous regime. Such information can only be uncovered through interpretative analysis of the whole case study. Thus, to make sure that no important data was missed, an analysis of the case study as a whole was performed by re-reading the transcripts, interview memos and field notes (Mason, 1996).

5.4.1.2 Identifying emerging themes

The next step after coding was to identify the emerging themes. The theme is a phrase or sentence that “identifies what a unit of data concerns or means, and usually consists of ideas such as descriptions of behaviours, explanations of why something happens, or statements from participants” (Saldana, 2009:139). According to Rubin and Rubin (2005), themes are usually developed by combining codes on the same topic and should be stated as simply as possible to explain why something happened and what something means.

The codes generated from the data provided the mechanism through which further analysis and interpretation were gradually performed. The tree nodes, free nodes and coded data were first downloaded and printed from the NVivo software, then all the data units under the same node were examined and a summary of each node prepared to capture the information necessary for answering the research questions. In order to assemble the perspectives of the various respondent groups, all the passages under one code were sorted for each individual respondent and, where appropriate, their arguments were compared using a matrix format. At this point it was found that some of the nodes and the coded data were overlapping or not workable, so further amendments were made to the list of tree nodes and free nodes. Next, the summaries were examined, and the core issues were teased out and explained. Themes were developed by grouping the codes, re-reading the transcripts and reflecting on their implications. Table 5.6 shows an example for how two themes were developed for research question 1 for SPAD case study.

Table 5.6: Themes for SPAD case study

	Sources	Themes
Research question 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of SPAD in Malaysia?	Source 1: codes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Transparency – corruption - Previous regime and agenda in licensing - Gap in planning <p>All these codes indicate that there were inadequacies in the previous institutional arrangement</p>	Performance of CVLB
	Source 2: quote from interviewee Respondent G14: <i>I think to me CVLB was operating below 50% of its potential</i> Respondent O1: <i>CVLB issues licenses blindly, they never do any research, they don't do any studies,</i>	
	Source 1: codes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coordination issues - Multiple agencies - Absence of overall policy 	Coordination issues with multiple agencies
	Source 2: quote from interviewee Respondent O5: <i>I think there were too many agencies, they have not been well coordinated and integrated it should be, (sighs)...it should be under one entity</i> Respondent G3: <i>the essence of the restructuring is the lack of coordination between the various modes of transportation, we needed first to integrate the various modes of transportation</i>	

Other sources for themes included the concepts and themes revealed by interviews and the analysis of different interviewees comments about the same issues. The research questions were used as the main tool for guiding the extraction of theme. The themes formed the headings of the sections in Chapters 6 and 7, which present the findings of the two case studies.

5.4.1.3 Developing the narrative

The next step involved developing the narrative with the aim of providing detailed descriptions of what happened in each case, taking into account the specific contextual features involved in each. The findings were written down

concurrently with the coding exercise and a matrix was developed for each research question. This matrix presented the main interview questions and participants' responses, grouping them under related themes and concepts so that it could be used to produce a coherent story of the findings linking the respondents with the issues that were most relevant to them, and showing how their positions and experiences influenced their thoughts and preferences. The different parts of the findings were interpreted and integrated. The initial interpretation was then checked for inaccuracies and inconsistencies, and constant comparisons were made between different respondent groups to capture multi-actor perspectives. Interpretations were double-checked when they were found to side with one group over another to see if there was sufficient evidence to support them.

One of the main challenges encountered in producing the findings was how to weigh different versions of the same events or separate explanations of the same themes or concepts against each other in order to produce a single descriptive narrative. In cases where the interviewees had contradicting views, the evidence for the different positions was weighed up to check how credible each report was. This was done by looking for supporting documents, checking for slants or biases in interviewees' answers, and assigning greater weight to information that the interviewee had direct knowledge of or remembered best.

The findings for each case study were compared with the existing literature presented in Chapter 2 using both the inductive and deductive approaches, through bottom-up and top-down exercises. According to Goldthorpe (1997), generality can be established when a theory appears to fit the cases to which it is applied, and where it fails, a different theory that demonstrates sensitivity to the context is required.

5.4.2 Cross-case analysis

Although both case studies were different in numerous dimensions, and although it is difficult to compare cases by extracting their similarities and differences, both of them nevertheless showed some similar findings. According to Goldthorpe (1997), it is permissible to abstract certain features and attributes from different cases in order to perform theoretical comparisons between them provided that the cases always remain identifiable rather than being deconstructed into variables. The case-oriented comparative method proposed by Ragin (1987) was used as a guide for performing the cross-case analysis exercise. In this method:

Each case is examined as a whole, as a total situation resulting from a combination of conditions, and this makes it possible to address causal complexes, examine conjunctures in time and space...and this requires investigators to suspend assumption about the equivalence of the cases and conditions (Ragin, 1987:49).

As mentioned in section 4.3.2, the two case studies have entirely different contexts, and the differences between them may overwhelm their similarities. Because of this, the cross-case analysis was undertaken using both the inductive and deductive approaches. First, the inductive approach examines which theoretically relevant similarities and differences are operative by examining empirical cases and this is shown in Appendix E. Second, underlying similarities between the cases in terms of shared outcomes and features (Ragin, 1987) were searched for and shown to be relevant to the phenomena under study. Then, after identifying similarities between the themes, the researcher used both the deductive and inductive approaches to formulate a general explanation that showed how similar themes produced same or different results in the two case studies, and this is shown in Appendix F. Conditions and criteria that were present in once case and absent in another was also teased out to explain the observed outcomes. The themes are presented as factors which may explain the direction the reforms took and this is presented in Chapter 8.

5.5 Chapter summary

The main contribution of this chapter has been to present and justify the analytical approach that was utilised for this research. This thesis performs two in-depth individual case studies before progressing to a cross-case analysis of them, which increases the credibility and to a certain extent, the generalisability of the findings. It attempts to strike a balance between the inductive and deductive approach, as advocated by the case study method. Chapters 6 and 7 present the findings of the individual case studies, and each consists of four main sections addressing one of the four research questions. Chapter 8 then presents the cross-case analysis, following the order of the themes as they emerged from the findings of the previous two chapters.

Chapter 6: Case Study Analysis for Land Public Transport Commission

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the key findings of the Land Public Transport Commission (SPAD) case study, which are based on twenty-eight face-to-face in-depth interviews with government officials, academics, politicians and operators. The findings are presented in relation to the four research questions (see section 1.3) that were designed to explore this case study. The first research question examines the motivations for the creation of SPAD, the second explores its autonomy, the third looks at the changes that it brings to the decision-making platform and the outcomes achieved, and the final one concerns the key factors that may have significant impacts on SPAD's performance.

The emphasis throughout this chapter is on letting the participants speak for themselves, which involved contextualising the interview (reflecting and identifying key issues) according to respondent groups and only using quotations from interviews when they better reflect the views the participants or strengthen the arguments. As Chapter 4 explained, the analytical approach that was adopted was categorised using the coding approach to isolate key issues and identify relevant themes. When appropriate, information from government reports, transport plans and minutes of meetings are interwoven with interview data to augment and solidify the discussion. Towards at the end of each research question, a reflection is presented in relation to published literature in this area.

6.2 Research Question 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of SPAD in Malaysia?

The summary of responses from participants is presented in Table 6.1 in a matrix form. Respondents were divided into four main groups: government officials, SPAD, politicians and operators. Their presentation under these categories provides quick references to popular response and outliers, besides identifying the responses that are the most significant for a

particular group of respondents. The findings are summarized under key headings which are expanded in sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.6.

Table 6.1: Matrix showing responses to research question 1

What were the motivations behind the establishment of SPAD in Malaysia?					
Respondents group	Government officials		SPAD (G12, G13, G15)	Politicians (P1, P2)	Operators (O1, O2, O3, O4, O5)
Response	MOT (G5, G6, G7, G8, G10, G11)	Others (G1, G2, G3, G4, G9, G14, G16, G17, G18)			
<i>Performance of Commercial vehicles Licensing Board</i> - <i>Bumiputera agenda</i> - <i>Poor control over licensing and enforcement</i>	G5, G7, G8	G1, G4, G9, G14			O1, O2, O3, O5
		G1, G2, G3, G4, G9, G14, G18			O1, O2, O3, O4
<i>Performance of Ministry of Transport</i>	G5, G6, G8	G1, G14	G15		

What were the motivations behind the establishment of SPAD in Malaysia?					
Respondents group	Government officials		SPAD (G12, G13, G15)	Politicians (P1, P2)	Operators (O1, O2, O3, O4, O5)
Response	MOT (G5, G6, G7, G8, G10, G11)	Others (G1, G2, G3, G4, G9, G14, G16, G17, G18)			
<i>Coordination issues</i> - <i>Coordination between agencies</i> - <i>Operational coordination between modes</i>	G5, G6, G7, G8	G3, G4, G9, G14, G16 G3, G4, G16		P1	O1, O2, O3, O5 O1, O2
<i>Deteriorating public transport services</i>	G5, G7, G8	G2, G3, G4, G16		P1	O1, O2, O3, O5
<i>Push from consultants</i>	G7, G10	G1, G2, G3, G14			O1
<i>Proximity of Land Transport Authority, Singapore</i>	G5, G6, G7, G8	G1, G3			O1, O3, O5

6.2.1 Performance of Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board

The Bumiputera agenda in the Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board (CVLB)

The Bumiputera agenda, which is prevalent in Malaysia, was discussed in section 3.2.1.2. A respondent from the Ministry of Transport (MOT) succinctly described the influences that shape public transport in Malaysia:

“The public transport institution today is the creation of the political system, because there was a need to give special consideration to the Malays, and that is why CVLB was created. The public transport system is very much the creation of CVLB” (respondent G7).

Respondents from the MOT explained that the licensing function was taken out of the MOT in the 1980's, and a new agency – the Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board (CVLB) – was created to promote the Bumiputera agenda. They acknowledged that the CVLB had its own difficulties, and had to face political problems. Since the main aim of this agenda was to create as many Bumiputera entrepreneurs as possible, the licensing exercise was undertaken at the expense of transport efficiency. These respondents were firm in the view that there had been no hope in revamping the CVLB, and that it had been necessary to create a new authority:

“It was a sacred cow, nobody wanted to touch it” (respondent G7).

Another respondent explained how the Bumiputera agenda was hidden, and that the implementation of its policy was not done transparently. He commented:

“We were not truthful about it, we didn't put it as criteria to solve things, when it is about the agenda of sharing wealth, the outcome is as many people gets the share, ... but that is not so true in transport strategies, you may dilute the effectiveness because everybody is a small player. They don't have the capacity, they don't have the ability to ... engage in good management practices” (respondent G14).

Two respondents from the government sector shared their previous work experience at CVLB, one of them asserting that there was little consideration for economic viability and social responsibility in designing the delivery of public transport services. All approvals for licenses were issued by the CVLB board, whose chairman was a politician, and board membership was restricted to Malays. The other respondent shared her experience working as a junior officer in CVLB in the early nineties. She said there was no transparency in the licensing system and that corruption was a problem, with licenses being monopolised by Malay politicians and distributed among their

constituents. This piece of information was verified by respondents from the operators' group, who reported that the CVLB issued permits on a "who you know basis ... not a need basis" without a proper supply and demand study. It was reported that taxi permits were often given out to politicians who would then lease them out to individual taxi drivers for a daily rent of RM50 (£10). The quota for licenses was never strictly followed, and the CVLB often had to issue more licenses than were actually needed to accommodate requests from politicians.

Respondents were asked about the placement of CVLB, and whether it would have been better if licensing had remained a remit of the MOT. An ex-CVLB respondent (G9) disagreed, saying that it might have been politicised for the benefit of the Chinese because the MOT had a Chinese minister and that this would have led to decisions based on racial sentiments. The Bumiputera agenda shaped the operations of the CVLB, and this respondent pointed out that it was too difficult for bureaucrats in the CVLB to make any changes to long-established cultures and practices. This respondent also hinted that the CVLB was never a priority for the government because hardly anything was done to free it from political interference or to improve its performance, implying that there was no initiative for such improvements. Respondents who were involved in the Integration and Restructuring of the Public Transport System in the Klang Valley Committee (INSPAK) (G3 and O1) asserted that the Bumiputera agenda was the main obstacle to the creation of a single authority at the Klang Valley regional level in 2005 because of the strong objections from the minister of the CVLB, playing on Malay sentiments.

The CVLB and licensing control: inadequate planning and enforcement

The CVLB's lack of licensing control and enforcement was a major concern among the operators. Three respondents pointed out loopholes in the administration of the public transport sector, comprising poor planning, 'loose' licensing conditions and unfair competition in the bus industry. As a result of this, there were nineteen bus operators in the Klang Valley at one point, which Respondent O1 felt to be too many for an area of just 3,000 km². Respondents noted that the CVLB used their powers of enforcement very lightly with bus operators, most of whom operated only on profitable routes during peak periods, leading to inefficient competition. Hence, it was difficult for bigger companies that were serious about providing a good and complete service to survive. This is a nationwide issue in Malaysia where 256 bus operators are currently active. This also makes it difficult to

encourage drivers to maintain good service standards, because it is easy for suspended drivers to secure work with different companies. Respondents blamed the CVLB for creating too many operators and shaping the kind of transport system that is in place now. Interestingly, these respondents did not just criticise the CVLB for over-licensing, but also for not knowing who holds the licenses:

“CVLB did not maintain an accurate database and no one knows exactly the background of the operating companies, the whole thing was a Pandora’s box” (respondent O1).

Similarly, the taxi industry also experienced the effects of too many permit holders. Respondent O4 said that there is an oversupply of taxis, and that drivers have difficulties earning a decent living as a result. This respondent argued that this was due to a lack of policy and planning by the CVLB. The taxi operators had no idea about the kind of support available and the expectations on them. To make matters worse, old and out-of-date policies have not been reviewed. For example, during the recession period (1997-2001) the CVLB allowed taxis to operate longer than seven years, but when the recession was over, the policy remained, resulting in a multitude of old taxis. An ex-CVLB respondent (G9) acknowledged that enforcement was lacking because of the CVLB’s lack of manpower and thus its reliance on the RTD to do the job, noting that the CVLB’s enforcement team focussed on auditing the operating companies to maintain its database rather than on enforcing the licensing conditions.

In a similar vein, a senior government officer pointed out that the CVLB did not have a strategic cabinet-endorsed plan to use as a guideline for issuing licences, and hence that their decisions in this area were arbitrary:

“CVLB was lacking very much, I would say in terms of enforcement, there were a lot of taxi problems, and then the buses, they were not looking at the problem, ... just issuing the license based on [the] application, not based on what should be done. This process was not backed by any plans regarding the number of taxis that you need for a particular area” (respondent G4).

Respondent G4 pointed out that the CVLB could not follow through with some of its own policies because of political interference. For example, at one point the CVLB issued a policy stating that taxi permits would not be given to individuals, but then continued to do this due to political pressure. He felt that if the CVLB had been able to plan appropriately and integrate the various transport modes using the licensing powers that it had, a lot of coordination issues in the transport sector could have been resolved.

The issue of oversupplying licenses was prominent in both the taxi and bus industries, and an ex-CVLB respondent explained that there was a loophole in the act which meant that issued permits cannot be revoked unless the permit holder has committed a major offence. This respondent did not deny that the CVLB had policy and planning powers for commercial vehicles, but believed that it could not adequately exercise its functions because of its limited strategic capacity in terms of technical knowledge, human resources and funding. These limited it to organisational-based planning, with little planning for the bus industry, taxis and goods vehicles. Respondent G14 made a similar observation:

“I think to me CVLB was operating below 50% of potential to me, by the law that they had, by the authority that they had by the people that they had, by the power that they had, because they had the permit power, and that is very powerful, so to me in all aspects, operations, management, safety, they sub-perform, not reaching even 50%, that is my verdict” (respondent G14).

6.2.2 Performance of Ministry of Transport

The functions of the Transport Minister provided in His Majesty's Government Gazette (2008) are: “to formulate, implement and coordinate policies and strategies for land transport, air and maritime which include the development of ports, air traffic and research and development on transport services”. Whilst the responsibility for the policy and planning of land transport appears to fall clearly under the MOT's role, many respondents were not aware of this, believing that the absence of public transport policy resulted from the lack of a single champion for public transport. For example, two respondents from the government sector believed that there was no coordinated approach to the development of public transport due to the absence of an overall policy, and because none of the agencies had the purview and powers to develop the policy. Other respondents (both from inside and outside the MOT) felt that the MOT was under-performing. One respondent who was attached to an agency under the MOT (respondent G8) expressed his disappointment with the lack of attention that the MOT gives to the planning and development of the railway sector and its reliance on the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) to do the job. This respondent recalled the World Bank's proposal in the 1980's, which recommended frequent meetings among transport agencies to facilitate inter-agency coordination to be led by the MOT. Unfortunately, the MOT did not react to this proposal. Respondent G14 commented that the focus and blame was unfairly directed towards the CVLB for failing to play a coordinating role, when the MOT was

in a better position to do so. Another respondent criticised the performance of MOT officers, commenting that some of them lack the motivation and competence to carry out their duties. When it was inquired if the MOT could have performed SPAD's functions now, Respondent G1 replied in the negative, pointing out that MOT's officers are too slow and cannot match the performance of those hired by SPAD.

Respondents from the MOT did not deny that it had the requisite powers to develop overall transport policies and plans, but pointed out that it could not or did not exercise them because buses and taxis were under the purview of the CVLB, and thus it was assumed that the CVLB would take responsibility for them. Reference to the CVLB Act 1987 reveals that it was not the CVLB's remit to produce the overall policy for the transport sector, and there was no mention of planning in the act, and reference to the CVLB's old website shows that their role in planning was limited to conducting studies on new routes before issuing new bus licenses. However, these respondents argued that although the MOT had the authority to draft the necessary policies and plans, they would interfere with the jurisdiction of CVLB in implementing them. In particular, they may not have been in accordance with the Bumiputera agenda, so they did not think that interventions were desirable.

Another agency heavily involved in planning is the Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD), which is responsible for land use planning for physical, social, economic and environmental development (His Majesty's Government Gazette, 2008). Respondents who were closely associated with this department (G16 and G17) said that transport planning was a component in both the structural and local plans, but that no dedicated public transport plans were made except in relation to one or two local areas. Even these latter plans were not properly implemented because the TCPD had neither the jurisdiction to make local authorities implement them nor the monetary resources to provide 'sweeteners' to influence the local authorities.

6.2.3 Coordination issues with multiple agencies

The existence of multiple, uncoordinated agencies was cited as one of the critical reasons for needing a single transport authority. Almost all the respondents highlighted the existence of multiple agencies under different ministries with divergent goals as the stumbling block for coordinated work, and they had various perspectives and ideas about how to deal with this issue. Two areas which require improvement were cited: first, the coordination between agencies needed to produce effective outputs, and

second, the integration of public transport modes to provide seamless travel for commuters.

Seven respondents from a variety of categories pointed out that there were thirteen or fourteen agencies with jurisdiction over land public transport that have different functions and interests, and that they work to achieve their own objectives with little consideration for what others are trying to achieve. Two respondents from the government sector with research backgrounds (G2 and G14) said that the absence of an overall policy for transport was an obstacle to the development of effective transport initiatives because there were no policy statements setting priorities or directions that these agencies could use for guidance in planning their strategies and initiatives.

Stakeholders that have different needs and perceptions of the existing problems have thus come to believe that the creation of a transport authority may help ameliorate some of their difficulties. The respondents from EPU wanted a dedicated planning branch for public transport that could also evaluate proposals before forwarding recommendations to them for final approval. Although EPU has been involved in planning and coordination work for land public transport matters, one of the EPU respondents pointed out that this was not an easy process because of the presence of multiple agencies under different ministries that were difficult to bring together on a common platform. Respondents G3, G4, G16, O1 and O2 asserted that there was a lack of overall connectivity between the transport modes and that the different modes had to be brought together under one agency.

On the other hand, the operators wanted a one-stop centre to handle licensing and enforcement issues to cut down on the time they had to spend dealing with different agencies in handling land transport matters. Similar views about the time-consuming nature of interactions with other agencies were also expressed by the former INSPAK committee members (G3 and O1), who were behind the idea of the Klang Valley Urban Transport Authority in 2004. They wanted a single regulator for the newly established government-linked transport companies PRASARANA and Rapid KL, so that these companies would only need to deal with one body for operational matters. It was felt that the single regulator should have all the responsibilities and functions for regulating licenses. One INSPAK member commented:

“Meanwhile, how to make it really work more efficient and effective? Is to have this one stop authority because, even while we were doing the rail and bus integration, consolidation and operations, we had, we knew the problems – we had to go to CVLB for this and that, we had to go to DOR for other matters, then we have to go to the local authorities City Hall, MPPJ, MPSJ so, so many agencies to work with you know, at one point as I said there were twelve or thirteen agencies easily” (respondent O1).

There were two main streams of thought among respondents regarding the best way for improving coordination: that the existing institutional structure could be strengthened without having to create a new authority, and that creating a dedicated body for transport was the only way out.

Three respondents (G2, G8 and G14) did not support the creation of SPAD, and suggested that either developing coordination at the ministerial level or reforming the CVLB were the best options for improvement. One of them said that coordination issues could be improved by creating a high-level permanent committee overseen by the Prime Minister. This respondent believed that the single transport authority model that has been successfully used in developed cities may not be suitable for Malaysia where it is extremely difficult to transfer powers of existing agencies to one umbrella body. Respondent G8, representing MOT, rejected the idea of merging Department of Railway (DOR) with SPAD, arguing that the problems were only with the road transport and not rail, and thus that mergers should only focus on agencies dealing with road transport. Respondent G14 cautioned that although many parties tend to blame the presence of multiple agencies with overlapping jurisdictions for a lack of coordination and view the solution to be the creation of a single champion who could bring these agencies together, no specific studies had been commissioned to prove this claim. He suggested that this was seen as unnecessary because the answers were already known and the solutions readily available.

Those who supported the creation of a dedicated transport authority felt that it should be an authority rather than just a coordinating committee. Respondents O3 and G16 strongly rejected the idea that a coordinating committee would be sufficient, saying that an authority with adequate power was necessary to make things happen quickly. A coordinating committee model was tried in Malaysia with INSPAK in 2004. According to the ex-members of INSPAK, this committee’s success was hindered because it did not have legislative backing or the formal authority to direct other agencies, and so had to rely on strong political backing from the Finance Minister.

Although transferring all the transport powers and responsibilities to the MOT could solve the coordination issues without the need to create a brand new agency, this was not possible under the existing political structure. An ex-member of INSPAK explained that it would not be desirable to transfer all the responsibilities of these agencies to the MOT because the MOT could then become too powerful, leading to political conflicts and power struggles for the minister's post (also see section 6.5.2.1). Hence, creating a new agency was seen as the best solution available at that point in time.

6.2.4 Deteriorating public transport services

Twelve respondents stressed the deterioration in the public transport services and their falling use as an indicator of poor transport planning and management. A respondent from a local authority (G2) expressed his disappointment with the recent developments in transport, saying that the entire administration and management of the public transport system was in a mess and needed reform. This respondent attributed the decline in public transport use in the capital city to poor governmental decisions including eliminating minibuses, not increasing parking levies, and the lack of regulation on the number of bus operators. He asserted that the government had focused on providing physical infrastructure to the exclusion of 'soft infrastructure' such as effective regulation, enforcement and efficient management of services. Similar concerns were shared by respondents O3, O5 and G16.

One respondent from the MOT pointed out that although the development of public transport in Kuala Lumpur had been ahead of that in many other neighbouring cities in previous decades, it started to fall behind neighbouring cities like Bangkok in the 1990s. Respondent P1 saw that something had triggered the drastic drop in public transport usage, but he did not pinpoint a particular cause, instead blamed the presence of too many agencies dealing with transport and the urgent need for a dedicated authority. He hinted that the failure of the government urban rail projects that aimed to revive the public transport industry in the 1990's by privatising it and failure of the monorail project which had to be taken over in 2007 were the trigger for a single regulator. This point was supported in e-mail correspondence by an EPU respondent who was involved in the takeover exercise, and claimed that a single regulator was required to ensure the safety and smooth running of operations and to prevent operators under financial stress from taking shortcuts.

6.2.5 Push from consultants

The proposal for a Malaysian single transport authority was first made in the 1970s and, according to respondent G2, the idea came from foreign consultants who were contracted by the government to help with the preparation of transport plans. These consultants based their suggestion on the models that had been successful in Singapore and London. According to this respondent, the proposal was repeatedly raised in government reports over the years, and the government took the proposal seriously because the consultants had drawn lessons from successful models. Eventually, a transport authority became seen as necessary for saving the public transport industry:

“The government was trapped, and after spending millions on transport studies, they were forced into the situation where they had to implement the proposal. If the Government didn’t do anything, the harm done will be even greater than doing it” (respondent G2).

The ex-members of the INSPAK committee did not deny that the consultants had looked at models that had worked in other developed cities before designing one for Malaysia. Therefore, G2’s argument about the influence of the consultants in developing transport strategies and initiatives seems to be valid. Similarly, four other respondents from the government sector also asserted that the genesis of the idea of SPAD came from consultants, and blamed the government for acting on the consultants’ recommendations. Respondent G14 expressed his scepticism about the value of engaging consultants:

“Sometimes we tend to be guided by the consultants who doesn’t know the industry for many years” (respondent G14).

6.2.6 The proximity of Singapore’s Land Transport Authority

The creation of SPAD was also influenced by the success of the Land Transport Authority (LTA) created in Singapore in 1995. Six respondents from government officials (mainly from the MOT) made reference to the LTA, all of whom felt that the single transport authority in Malaysia should have the same powers as the LTA, which cover planning, operations, regulation, infrastructural development and the maintenance of infrastructure and systems. The ex-INSPAK interviewees said that although Malaysian policy-makers took the LTA as their benchmark, they failed to create such a powerful body as everyone defended their own turf, and thus SPAD ended up as a diluted version of the LTA. In the same vein, respondent G8 made the following comments via e-mail:

“The formation of LTA was made possible by the sheer political fiat and will of the Singapore Government headed by the strongman premier Lee Kuan Yew. A similar exercise in Malaysia would have caused a fair bit of political opposition. The formation of LTA Singapore was also made easier and logical by virtue of the fact that the whole of Singapore is actually an almost wholly urbanised city-state serving as one whole urban region, making sense to put it under a one Land Transport Authority regime. Not so with Malaysia – a far larger country, a federation of states that have their own authority and rights, making complete integration as per the Singapore scenario nigh well impossible” (respondent G8).

6.2.7 Reflections

The respondents' information shows that there was a general dissatisfaction with the existing institutional structure in Malaysia. Although coming from different perspectives, the main issues were around poor licensing and regulation, management of privatised holdings and lack of strategic coordination. The problems had been the source of discussion for twenty over years but nothing changed.

Prior to the creation of SPAD, there were multiple agencies involved in the planning and management of transport. Agency coordination was a problem and it was a problem because it took a long time to get anything done and it also affected the running of public transport services. There were other pressing problems on the ground to deal with as well. The transport modes were not integrated because they were under different agencies, and the general understanding was that this mode could be better integrated if the planning and regulatory functions of these modes were put under one body. For instance, De Velde and Didier (2005) observes that public transport could be effectively coordinated through planning and regulatory functions and that good coordination could lead to better resource efficiency and promote effective infrastructure investment. Bringing the different transport modes under one body ensures that power is consolidated for better management and control, and Flyvbjerg (2001) suggests that this gives the central government better control because it stabilises power relations. Thus, one of the reasons why SPAD was created at the national rather than at the regional level could be that it enabled the government to strengthen its grip under centralised control.

The distribution of power was uneven and mainly concentrated in the CVLB, which had a hidden motive to promote the Bumiputera agenda instead of focussing on the efficiency of the public transport delivery system. Hence, the CVLB only focused on licensing, which was a lucrative business, with the

result that planning and enforcement were neglected. Corruption was a problem, with licensing activity being heavily politicised, and whilst the Bumiputera agenda aimed to reduce the disparity between Malays and non-Malays, those who were entrusted with the responsibility for its implementation apparently misused this power for their benefit. Nye (2011) and Bellamy et al. (2011) have pointed out that power is context-specific – it is dependent upon the behaviour of those who exercise it, and can produce unintended and harmful consequences in the absence of well-designed strategies and a lack of accountability, and this was observed in CVLB.

Although politicians knew about this corruption and abuse of power, little was done to address it as it involved racial sensitivity, and the political will to get involved in this was insufficient. As a result, other agencies such as the MOT avoided becoming involved in public transport planning, although it was their responsibility. Racial sensitivity was used as an excuse, and the MOT, led by a non-Malay minister, refused to get involved in the highly politicised Bumiputera agenda. This created a chasm in planning for public transport. It was within these institutional rules/norms and practices that the public transport sector was shaped (Scott, 2001), with bureaucrats acting within these constraints to avoid stepping on anyone else's feet, and this took a toll on what was provided for the public.

There was no common view on the best way to move forward. In addition, there was a lack of evidence concerning exactly what the problems were, but among the solutions floating around was the creation of a single transport authority. This was heavily promoted by management consultants and influenced by the success of the LTA Singapore, which was used as a benchmark by policy elites in Malaysia. There were other influencing factors, such as the policy failures that led to the deterioration of public transport services, and the appointment of the new Prime Minister in 2009, who provided the ultimate push for the creation of SPAD in 2010. The policy changed occurred when the policy window opened with the right combination of problems, solutions and political condition as suggested by Kingdon (1995).

The government attempted to create a single transport authority in 2005, but it did not materialise as a result of strong resistance from the CVLB, as the proposal would have ceded CVLB's power to the single authority, revealing that agencies with power will strive to retain that power and resist change which threatens that (Agocs, 1997). Furthermore, the proposal did not guarantee that the ethnic Bumiputera would have continued privileges under

the new authority's licensing regime, which implied that some parties could lose the advantages they enjoyed, thus creating further resistance to it (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Chisholm, 2000). However, the proposal did not threaten the *survival* of the CVLB because the agency would have continued to exist as a regulator of goods vehicles, with the proposed authority only focusing on public transport. At that point, there was clearly an absence of strong political leadership that dared to challenge and implement a controversial policy that may have permanently removed the privileges enjoyed for many years by the Bumiputera in the transport sector. In a country like Malaysia, where racial tensions are always an issue and political leaders have to work hard to keep racial conflicts to a minimum, it is perhaps unsurprising that such a proposal did not see the light of day.

However, things began to change in 2008 when the *Barisan* National – the ruling alliance party since independence – failed to secure a two-thirds majority in parliament for the first time since 1969. This was an indication that the citizens were losing confidence in the ruling government and of the general dissatisfaction among non-Malays to the special privileges granted to the Bumiputeras. This sentiment was played out by opposition political parties to win support, and hence when the new Prime Minister took office in 2009, his main challenge was to strengthen racial unity, which he did under the slogan 'One Malaysia', which stresses national unity and ethnic tolerance, and one way that it seeks to promote this is by ensuring a fair distribution of resources to all Malaysia's citizens. One of the daring initiatives the new Prime Minister took was to abolish the Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Cooperative Development (MECD), which had promoted the Bumiputera agenda since the 1990's, and this meant that the CVLB, an agency that had been under the MECD, was temporarily based in the Prime Minister's Department. In this case, the presence of strong leadership dislocated the 'path' as hypothesised by Low and Astle (2009). The Prime Minister also designed some 'quick wins' for the public through the formulation of key result areas and target-setting, and one of the areas identified for major improvements was public transport.

Although the idea for SPAD was not mooted by the Prime Minister, and was already in the planning phase when he took office, the proposal complemented his strategy to put an end the Bumiputera agenda whilst also streamlining and improving the long neglected public transport sector to win back public trust. Interestingly, although the proposal for a single transport authority had only focused on public transport modes in its history until this

point, the Prime Minister decided that it should also take goods vehicles on board – a decision which made the CVLB irrelevant. The Prime Minister's strong political leadership thus made this reform possible, and he was vested with the authority to make decisions and take the necessary steps to gain legitimacy from citizens, which conforms to the findings from the literature (Bauckaert and Politt, 2011; McCourt and Lee, 2007).

Interestingly, each different group of respondents had their own views of what the single transport should look like and what it should do, emphasising that it should not take away any of *their* existing powers, but either strengthen them or provide some kind of benefit for them. Even with a successful model next door – LTA Singapore, there were arguments about what the transport authority in Malaysia should look like. In short, none of the groups wanted to be on the losing end and the impacts on the public were rarely mentioned. Respondents from the MOT argued that a dedicated authority was necessary because there was no hope of revamping the CVLB. They held that the transport modes had to be integrated, but wanted the new authority to be established under their ministry. Those from the operators group wanted a one-stop centre to facilitate licensing and enforcement so that they would only have to deal with one agency. Respondents representing the EPU wanted an agency that could play a coordinating role, fill the gap in planning, and act as a checkpoint to filter proposals before they were passed on to the approving authorities. The respondents outside these main groups had mixed feelings, some holding that the problems could have been resolved by revamping the CVLB or creating a strong coordinating body, and others holding that the creation of a single transport authority was a clean and easy way out.

6.3 Research question 2: What types of autonomy have been given to the authority?

This research questions explores the autonomy and authority given to SPAD. Table 6.2 provides a summary of the responses received from participants in relation to this research question. Although all the respondents from across the groups expressed their views, the responses received from those who were involved in the creation of SPAD in the government sector and participants in SPAD provide greater weight because the former were the key reformers who understand the rationale behind the functions and powers allocated to SPAD and the latter are involved in exercising the powers given. The first column highlights four major features

of autonomy that SPAD has – legislative support, planning functions, regulatory powers and enforcement powers. The respondents' views about each of these features were sought so that their understanding of SPAD's functions and the challenges it faces could be explored, and their views about what role SPAD should ideally play could be solicited.

Table 6.2: Matrix showing responses to research question 2

What types of autonomy have been given to the authority?					
Respondents group	Government officials		SPAD (G12, G13, G15)	Politicians (P1, P2)	Operators (O1, O2, O3, O4, O5)
Response	MOT (G5, G6, G7, G8, G10, G11)	Others (G1, G2, G3, G4, G9, G14, G16, G17, G18)			
Legal backing					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Legislative support is crucial 		G1, G3, G4			O1
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Legislative support is important but must be supported with other elements 	G5, G6, G10, G11	G2	G12, G13	P2	O1, O2
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Legislation support not necessary 		G2, G9, G14			
Planning					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SPAD fills the planning gap 	G5, G6, G8	G1, G4, G9, G14, G16, G17	G12, G13, G15		O1, O4, O5
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SPAD has powers to plan but no powers to drive the plans 		G1, G2, G17	G12, G13	P2	O1
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SPAD acts as check point for the project approving authority 	G5, G7	G1, G4	G12, G13	P1	O2, O5

What types of autonomy have been given to the authority?					
Respondents group	Government officials		SPAD (G12, G13, G15)	Politicians (P1, P2)	Operators (O1, O2, O3, O4, O5)
Response	MOT (G5, G6, G7, G8, G10, G11)	Others (G1, G2, G3, G4, G9, G14, G16, G17, G18)			
Regulation					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Merged the functions of CVLB, DOR and Ministry of Tourism 	G8, G10		G12, G13	P2	O1, O2
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Also looks into regulation of transport terminals and service standards 	G5		G12, G13		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SPAD is yet to be a single regulator 			G12, G13, G15		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SPAD should not be involved in project implementation 		G1	G13	P1	O1
Enforcement					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shares enforcement function with RTD 	G5, G6, G10, G11	G1, G9	G12,G13		O1, O2
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dispute with RTD over enforcement for vocational license 	G10, G11	G1, G9	G12,G13		O4

6.3.1 Legal backing

There were mixed views about the importance of legal backing for SPAD and the importance of legislative support for a regulatory body was discussed by four respondents; G1, G3, G4 and O1. The ex-INSPAK respondents said that legal backing gives SPAD a permanent structure and legal mandate to deal with the other agencies. One of them related their previous experience with INSPAK to this issue:

“INSPAK worked, but at the same time don’t forget that when it comes to paperwork, bureaucracy comes in, because if you are from the Department of Railway, I can’t take your powers although I am INSPAK – it is gazetted under your act, so that’s where they still hold the power. No teeth. We had the bark but not the teeth” (respondent O1).

This suggested that legal backing was important for providing a mandate about the functions of SPAD and the clarity of its role vis-à-vis other agencies. Respondent G4 believed that the INSPAK committee was ineffective due to the absence of legal backing for them. Furthermore, this respondent argued that because SPAD has regulatory powers and enforcement powers, it also needs legislative support to discharge these roles effectively.

On the other hand, respondents from SPAD felt that although the Act has given SPAD a substantial amount of power as a commission through having the Prime Minister as its head, in reality many of these things only exist on paper and have not materialised. Six respondents (mainly those from MOT) heavily criticised the performance of SPAD and blamed it for not being able to fully operationalise the act quickly by putting work procedures and consequential amendments in place, but respondents from SPAD argue that these are operational matters which takes time to settle in. Two respondents outside SPAD (G2 and O1) felt that not having powers over the local authorities is a major stumbling block for SPAD as it affects the implementation of plans on the ground and the local authorities are not obliged to follow guidelines set by SPAD.

Three respondents outside SPAD considered legal backing for a transport body like SPAD to be irrelevant to its performance. Respondent G14 said that an ability to build good communications and networks with a wide range of stakeholders in the industry, and to use these networks to get things done is crucial, but that SPAD has failed to do this. Respondent G9 pointed to the effectiveness of other bodies without legal backing, such as the Performance

Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU), which is entrusted with the responsibility to monitor national transformation projects. This respondent observed that PEMANDU has the Prime Minister's political support and lacks legal backing, but that it has nonetheless turned out to be a very powerful body. Finally, respondent G2 thought that a high-level committee with permanent members could have been a cheaper and more effective alternative to SPAD. This respondent felt that the current SPAD model is an expensive set-up, and that although it has legal backing, it does not have all the required power to operate like a single transport authority, such as power over the local authorities or funding capabilities.

SPAD was envisaged as a commission and was supposed to be given the commission status at the start of its operation. Respondent P1 explained that 'commission status' in Malaysia means that the relevant agency is free to set up its own terms and conditions for employment. However, under current government procedure, an agency can only be granted commission status if it is financially independent. Because SPAD has not proven to be able to self-finance, it has not been given this privilege. Respondents from SPAD expressed their disappointment with this because they have only been given partial separation for remuneration, which means that SPAD is allowed to manage its recruitment but must comply to the salary scheme determined by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) besides being subjected to the financial procedures of the government. They argue that the absence of full separation for remuneration prevents SPAD from capacity building, and that if SPAD was given the freedom to determine its own salary scale, they could make it more competitive to attract more talented employees to reform the industry and curb corruption. However, a respondent from EPU argued that SPAD has been given a better deal than anybody else because they have an approved salary band that gives better pay than the civil servants get. Thus, even though this pay is slightly lower than that in the private market, it is the first time that a statutory body which is financially dependent on public funds has been given such an exemption.

The absence of commission status means that SPAD has to periodically report to the PMD for administrative matters and SPAD is not happy about this, as nothing is mentioned in the Act about such reporting. Respondents from SPAD commented that it is treated just like any other government agency and cannot function effectively due to multiple reporting points. They also noted that although the Prime Minister agreed for SPAD to be full separate from government agencies for remuneration, the long

administrative process has prevented this from happening thus far. Correspondence with the officer in charge of the MOF (via telephone) revealed that there has not been a directive from the Prime Minister's Office or from any other senior civil servant regarding this matter, and therefore that this status is not about to change. An ex-SPAD employee (O2) highlighted that the delays in getting this status established could be attributed to the poor relationship between SPAD and the senior civil servants that hold the authority to approve such matters.

6.3.2 Transport planning process

This section highlights the respondents' feedback about the changes to the transport planning process prior to and since the creation of SPAD. Table 6.3 presents a summary of the changes that have occurred.

Table 6.3: Transport planning roles before and after the creation of SPAD

Transport planning before the creation of SPAD	Transport planning after the creation of SPAD
<p>Gap in planning for public transport:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MOT had the powers on paper but not in reality - EPU did some transport planning, but at the national level - TCPD did some planning at local levels, but did not have the financial autonomy and authority to drive the plans forward 	<p>SPAD fills the gap in transport planning:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Prepared transport plans – for Greater KL, MRT, HSR, tool kit for the states. However, most of these plans were prepared in silos, involving minimum consultation with the stakeholders - SPAD acts as checkpoint for EPU - SPAD needs to ensure land use transport integration planning - SPAD has powers to plan but does not have the powers for delivering the plans: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lacks financial autonomy to provide incentives to implementers • Uses the licensing mechanism to implement the plans (authority) • Uses the national physical planning council as the medium for implementation at the local level

Since its creation, SPAD has had a big focus on its planning role, which, according to a respondent from SPAD, has been given priority over its other two roles – regulation and enforcement. These two roles were put on hold for six months until the CVLB and the DOR were officially dissolved and their powers transferred to SPAD in January 2011. This respondent highlighted some of the initial planning work that was undertaken, such as the Value Management Report for the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) project, the Greater Klang Valley Master Plan, the Railway Development Plan and the Feasibility

Study for High Speed Rail. Although SPAD is empowered to plan, this respondent pointed out that the Act does not empower SPAD to implement the plans or require the delivery of the plans. Therefore, it has to work with project implementation agencies (such as local authorities and ministries) to get the plans implemented.

During the data collection period of this research, SPAD was heavily engaged in developing a toolkit to form the guidelines for local authorities in preparing their own master plans. Respondents from the operators group acknowledged that SPAD had occasionally engaged with them and presumed that they would have consulted other agencies as well. However, all the respondents from the government side said that SPAD did not consult them or inform them about the study. A respondent from a local authority (G2) noted that such a toolkit has been prepared before, and that SPAD should have taken stock of existing plans and consulted stakeholders before embarking on a brand new plan. This respondent stressed that if the local authorities are the target users of the toolkit, they should have been involved from the beginning in order for the toolkit to be developed to their requirements so that it could be smoothly implemented.

A respondent from TCPD (G17) pointed out that SPAD should familiarise itself with existing plans and ensure that land use and transport are integrated. The National Physical Plan developed by TCPD has set some broad policies and guidelines that could form the basis for transport plans for states and cities. However, according to this respondent, the local authorities do not have a dedicated transport plan for their areas, and lack capacity as well as an understanding of how the entire transport network functions. This respondent, assuming that SPAD was well versed with transport planning, proposed a close collaboration between the local authorities and SPAD to ensure that planning and development of transport facilities in the local areas would best meet local needs. Respondent G1, on the other hand, raised what he believed to be serious inadequacies in SPAD. This respondent was very concerned that senior managers in SPAD did not understand how SPAD's transport plans fit with the current planning framework, and hence thought that they would not be able to pool the appropriate resources to exercise their planning role effectively.

Interestingly, the respondents from SPAD seemed to hold a different understanding about their role in ensuring land use and transport integration than that suggested by respondent G17. They felt that it was not SPAD's responsibility to integrate transport with land use, but that of the National

Physical Planning Council (NPPC), and held that a consultation should be undertaken with stakeholders on this point.

The presence of SPAD seems to benefit the EPU as SPAD acts as a filter for new proposals to be cross-examined against their plans and evaluated prior to their submission to the EPU for approval. Respondents from the EPU pointed out that SPAD's endorsement does not necessarily mean that the EPU will approve proposals because the EPU has to assess the project budget and its financial feasibility prior to any decisions. It was also pointed out that all new proposals on public transport projects that go directly to the EPU are channelled to SPAD for initial evaluation. In addition, SPAD is tasked with the preparation of feasibility studies for mega-projects that were previously under the purview of the EPU. One example is the high-speed rail feasibility study, which is now conducted by SPAD but commissioned by the EPU.

Seven respondents cited funding capacity as the main element that SPAD required to implement its plans and make up for its lack of power over local authorities. SPAD does not currently have enough funding for physical projects, and is dependent on government grants to run its operations, although several SPAD respondents noted that it does have sufficient funding to support preparation of studies and master plans. However, respondent G17 said that it does not matter that SPAD does not have control over the local authorities, but that financial muscle is crucial and could be used as an effective tool to encourage local authorities to implement their plans. This respondent added that although SPAD does not have the capacity to provide funding for projects themselves, a mechanism through which money is disbursed through SPAD is sufficient for stakeholders to appreciate SPAD's value and its role in planning.

Their planning role requires SPAD to be a good coordinator and an authority. The coordinating role comes in during the preparation phase, which requires extensive engagement with the various stakeholders. This is important for ensuring that different perspectives are captured and that plans are well integrated both among different modes and between land use and transport. Respondent G3 asserted that SPAD cannot work alone because they do not have sole authority for land transport, which still lies with a variety of different agencies. Respondent G4 highlighted that SPAD must plan for freight and public transport simultaneously to achieve the national target for shifting freight transport from road to rail, and a lot of coordination is required here.

The 'authority role' mainly involves taking ownership of the plans and driving them forward by playing a leading role. Several SPAD respondents discussed how they have devised other mechanisms to use as push their plans through without having funding muscle, such as through licensing and the NPPC. SPAD is empowered to issue operating licenses for both transport operations and terminals, and in cases where the local authorities are reluctant to adhere to SPAD's transport plans in terms of locations or specifications, SPAD could have their applications for operating licences rejected. Moreover, SPAD can use the NPPC chaired by the Prime Minister as a medium for cascading plans to the state and the local levels. The chief minister of each state is a member of this council and responsible for communicating the plans that are to be implemented to the relevant agencies in his state.

6.3.3 Regulation

This section highlights the respondents' feedback on the changes to transport regulation before and after the creation of SPAD. The table below presents a summary of changes that have occurred. In short, the regulatory roles of the RTD remained unchanged, but the roles of the CVLB, the Ministry of Tourism and the DOR were transferred to SPAD.

Table 6.4: Transport regulation roles before and after the creation of SPAD

Transport regulation before the creation of SPAD	Transport regulation after the creation of SPAD
RTD – Driving license, registration of vehicles, road tax, vehicle use, road worthiness – for all road-based transport	RTD – Driving license, registration of vehicles, road tax, vehicle use, road worthiness – for all road-based transport (unchanged)
CVLB – fare regulation and licensing of commercial vehicles (buses, taxis, goods vehicles) Ministry of Tourism – licensing for hire and drive cars and tourism vehicles DOR – licensing for railway operations, approval for railway schemes, service standards, handling	SPAD – merged functions of CVLB, Ministry of Tourism and DOR.
Local authorities/MOT – licensing for transport terminal	Additional functions for SPAD – licensing for transport terminal operations, licensing for train drivers, regulating service standards, safety issues (new functions added to SPAD)

Section 3.2.2 explained the changes that the creation of SPAD caused in the institutional framework. Respondents from SPAD highlighted that under these changes, the regulation of public transport, rail and goods vehicles all came under SPAD. SPAD is also responsible for ensuring that the industry is developed in a proper manner, fulfilling certain performance standards. To do that, it has to develop and attach appropriate service standards to the licensing conditions. SPAD also has the capacity to advise both government and non-government entities on transport-related matters, and respondent G13 stressed that these agencies must take SPAD's views into consideration. SPAD also takes the lead when accidents involving public transport occur, playing a coordinating role between the Malaysian Road Safety Research Institute and the Police.

During the planning stage of reform, it was suggested that SPAD be given the authority to regulate vocational licensing (driving license issued to public transport and goods vehicle drivers), but respondents who were directly involved in the creation of SPAD pointed out that there was strong resistance to this from the RTD – which oversees the licensing of all the land transport vehicle drivers – and thus the plan was abandoned. Respondents from SPAD said that giving SPAD this responsibility would have provided it with control over the drivers as well as the operating permits, enabling it to regulate the sector better. On the other hand, the respondents from the RTD argued that the vocational licence is linked to the individual private driving licence, and it is not practical to separate the two as this would cause more issues during enforcement. This response was contested by respondents from SPAD, who countered that more issues arise in enforcement because of SPAD's lack of authority to regulate the vocational licence, which causes a fragmentation of its regulation and enforcement roles. They felt that they still needed to acquire the necessary powers from the RTD. This shows poor inter-agency coordination and an unwillingness to innovate in joint enforcement. The legal advisor to the RTD highlighted that the department is reluctant to give up any of its existing authority, and suggested that there were other mechanisms for empowering SPAD that do not involve making changes to the transport acts. For example, the Road Transport Act 1987 clause 4b, allows the enforcement function of the RTD to be delegated to SPAD officers upon approval from the Minister of Transport. Therefore, all that SPAD needs to do is request that the RTD delegate enforcement power to them, but SPAD has not done so.

Respondents from the MOT raised a number of boundary issues. They argued that because they no longer manage the DOR (the DOR has been absorbed into SPAD), they have lost its authority over the railway, and that as a result they should not be responsible for implementing any railway projects. Therefore, they thought that the MOT should hand over its existing railway projects to SPAD so that it did not get accused of implementing projects without legitimate authority. However, the respondents who were involved in the creation of SPAD were clear of the role that SPAD should play. It was designed to concentrate on planning and regulation, and thus should not get involved in project development. Hence, they claimed that the MOT's arguments do not stand, and are grounded in frustrations over losing some of their powers.

6.3.4 Enforcement

This section highlights respondents' feedback to changes in enforcement after the creation of SPAD. At least five respondents, G1, G3, G4, G5 and O1 asserted that enforcement was problematic in the previous system, and that this function still needs serious attention to strengthen it further. They pointed out that corruption was rampant in enforcement, mainly in relation to dealing with overloaded heavy vehicles, which enforcement officers used to get bribes and payoffs for an additional source of income.

Respondents from SPAD pointed out that SPAD has taken over the CVLB's enforcement role in checking operating licenses for public transport and goods vehicles. In addition, SPAD is entrusted with wider responsibilities, including enforcing compliance to the operating conditions of the transport terminals and that train drivers hold valid licenses. As in the previous system, in which the RTD was given the power to enforce the CVLB Act (1987), the Land Public Transport Act (2010) also delegates enforcement power to the RTD, which means that the RTD has all the enforcement powers that SPAD has. Thus, they share the enforcement role. At the moment, SPAD has 147 enforcement personnel, whereas RTD has 4,500, and both are supposed to be working together in this area.

However, respondents from the RTD commented that they are not happy with two new changes in the enforcement procedure, which they claim to have increased the procedural complexity. Firstly, the new procedure does not allow RTD enforcement officers to prosecute for breaches of licensing and servicing standards under the PAD Act (2010), with only SPAD being given this privilege. Secondly, all registered offences must be checked by the

public prosecutor prior to prosecution or the issuing of fines, whilst previously only non-compoundable offences (i.e. those that require prosecution in court) required approval from the public prosecutor.

These respondents also pointed out that the new enforcement procedure leads to more paper work, with enforcement personnel having to prepare investigation papers for submission to the public prosecutor. This causes delays in prosecuting offenders, who then remain free for longer; and the RTD's enforcement personnel losing interest to enforce the PAD Act (2010) due to an absence of prosecution powers. Two respondents outside the RTD believed that these problems have meant that the revenue from RTD's enforcement activities dropped dramatically after the new procedure was put into place, and this shows that the RTD is doing less enforcement work, which could have a direct impact on road safety.

Respondents had different theories about why the new enforcement procedure was designed. A respondent from the Attorney General's office said that its purpose was to reduce corruption in enforcement by placing the decision-making power with the public prosecutor rather than with the enforcement team on the ground. However, respondents from the RTD argued that the new procedure has nothing to do with curbing corruption, and may in fact backfire and increase corruption as the enforcement personnel may be tempted to accept favours from offenders in return for not recording the offence. Another respondent suggested that the changes were made so that the Attorney General's Department could reacquire the powers it had previously surrendered to agencies.

The new enforcement procedure does not seem to please SPAD either. Respondents from SPAD explained that they have to prepare investigation papers for both compoundable and non-compoundable offences, and they also have to seek approval from the public prosecutor prior to taking any action against the offender. One of the SPAD respondents expressed disappointment because SPAD is expected to execute its duties without being properly empowered to do so by the Attorney Generals' Office. However, any change to the work procedure will require amendments to Clause 241(2) of PAD Act (2010). It was made known that the Prime Minister is aware of the enforcement issues, and has decided that changes to the Act cannot be made immediately because SPAD has only just been established. Therefore, until the amendments are made, the relevant agencies will have to work within these constraints.

6.3.5 Financial autonomy

Both the SPAD Act (2010) and the PAD Act (2010) give SPAD resources to create its own transport funds – the SPAD fund for operational purposes and the PAD fund for industry. However, the SPAD respondents reported that only the SPAD fund is operational, and the PAD fund is not anticipated to be active in the near future. The SPAD fund generates revenue from licensing fees, administrative fees, and compound fees, and these are all used for overhead expenditure, and the PAD fund is expected to use congestion pricing for its main source of revenue.

The respondents from SPAD made it clear that SPAD is an authority and a regulator rather than a funder, although in the long-run, if and when they start to generate revenue, they may be able to provide some financial support for the project implementation agencies. They realised that their lack of financial autonomy strongly impacts on their performance, and two respondents from the operators group said that all of their proposals and ideas are being brushed aside by SPAD on the grounds of financial constraints. However, three respondents (G4, G14 and O1) claimed that financial autonomy was not crucial for SPAD, reasoning that it is under the Prime Minister's wing, and that the Prime Minister is also in charge of the EPU and the MOF, who control funding. These respondents also felt that financing is not a major issue, and that SPAD gets funding from the MOF on an annual basis as well as receiving revenue from its licensing exercise.

6.3.6 Reflections

SPAD has been delegated powers to plan, regulate and enforce the licensing conditions for land public transport under the SPAD Act (2010) and PAD Act (2010) and it was envisaged to be a commission. However, Radin (2003) pointed out that the model of the commission is partially self-defeating. He stressed that whilst they are often used as mechanisms to improve horizontal coordination, commissions often appear to shift power to a centralized level, which then makes coordination difficult. This is seen in the case of SPAD, which is placed directly under the Prime Minister's Office, and thus higher in the hierarchy than the other actors it is supposed to be coordinating, thus making them less approachable. Moreover, agencies that lost power or had to share power with SPAD after its creation, such as the RTD and the MOT, express less willingness to work collaboratively, are highly critical of SPAD, and show signs of self-protection in their behaviours because of concerns of losing further powers.

The actual autonomy given to SPAD as a commission is explored using the six dimensions of autonomy proposed by Verhoest et al. (2004) and Laegreid et al. (2006), as shown below in table 6.5.

Table 6.5: SPAD's autonomy compared to the dimensions of autonomy proposed by Varhoest et al. (2004) and Laegreid et al. (2006)

Autonomy	Dimensions	Autonomy given to SPAD	
		Strength	Weaknesses
Legal autonomy	The extent to which the legal status of an agency prevents the government from altering the allocation of decision-making competencies	Presence of legislative support	Some of its provisions have not been fully operationalised, such as its commission status
Personnel	<p>Strategic Personnel Matters Salaries, criteria for promotion, evaluation, recruitment and downsizing</p> <p>Operational Personnel matters Wage increases, promotion, evaluation, recruitment and dismissal of individual employees</p>	<p>SPAD can run its day-to-day operations and has powers for operational personnel matters.</p> <p>Free to determine its own recruitment, set criteria for promotion and evaluation</p>	Has to adhere to salary scheme determined by the MOF
Financial	<p>Make loans for investment</p> <p>Set tariff/prices for products and services</p> <p>Conclude legal contracts with private actors</p> <p>Generates own revenue</p>	<p>Revenue from licensing fees and penalties</p> <p>Can conclude legal contracts with private actors within determined limit</p> <p>Can set fares and licensing fee with approval from the board and the Prime Minister</p>	<p>Financial management is subject to government procurement procedures</p> <p>Dependent on government grants</p> <p>Not allowed to give loans</p>
Policy	<p>Strategic Policy Matters Setting own goals and objectives, setting policies on transport matters and approval of project proposals</p> <p>Operational Policy matters Manage day-to-day activities</p>	Manage day-to-day operational policy matters	Acts as a check for project proposals before they are submitted to approving authorities Proposes policies and plans to approving authorities
Intervention	The extent to which the agency is free from 'reporting' to the government		<p>Reports to PMD for administrative matters.</p> <p>Reports to the Prime Minister's Office for policies and project matters</p>

SPAD is yet to be the single regulator it was envisaged as. Its regulatory powers are incomplete because some of its powers still lie with the RTD and look unlikely to be transferred because of the strong resistance that the RTD and the MOT put up to this. SPAD has to acquire the authority to regulate vocational licensing from the RTD in order to be able to regulate the sector as a whole. However, it was pointed out that this presents some difficulties as the vocational license is linked to the private license and separating the two will raise operational issues. The only way to resolve this would be for these agencies to put aside their differences and work together, but there were no positive signs that this could be made to happen, with power struggles likely to be ongoing. There are also disputes about enforcement roles between the Attorney General's office, the RTD and SPAD. The reform was used by the Attorney General's office to strengthen its prosecution power. The former wants the RTD and SPAD to perform the enforcement process without devolving its powers, and this conforms to White's (1991: 189) thesis that governments often seek 'power-over' state agencies, as well as a number of other findings in the literature concerning decentralisation, which contend that the transfer of responsibility without actual power is the most favoured mode of decentralisation in developing countries (Rondinelli, 1983).

The provision of legislative support for a single transport authority is strongly supported by researchers and international development agencies (Naniopoulous et al., 2012; GTZ, 2004; World Bank 2002b). Legal backing can also be perceived as a source of 'hard power' in Nye's (2011) power model (see section 2.5.3), as it provides SPAD with the mandate to command and to use coercion as a mechanism for achieving its ends. Legal backing is perceived to be important for SPAD for numerous other reasons particularly to minimise the chances that the agency will be impacted by a change in political leadership. However, it emerged that whilst having a clear act is important, what is more crucial is operationalising the act and having additional powers build-in which could be operationalised when needed.

One of the important elements of the act that has not been implemented is the commission status, which is linked to financial independence. Flinders and Buller (2006) and White (1991) have argued that the government often seeks to control or influence decision-making and behaviours of its agencies and semi-autonomous bodies to achieve government objectives, and this phenomena is seen in this case study. If the central government wanted to make SPAD financially independent, then they could do so, and a proper

line of accountability could be designed to ensure that SPAD was answerable for its actions. That is yet to happen. On the other hand, SPAD sees financial independence as a way for it to be free from accountability to the central government, but Flinders and Buller (2006) has pointed out semi-autonomous agencies are still subjected to political influence and government control.

Although the Prime Minister has approved SPAD to receive full commission status, it still has to deal with procedural issues and seek approval from administrators. This fits with the conception of power outlined by Flyvbjerg (2001,131-132), who holds that “power is not only something one appropriates, but also something one re-appropriates and exercises in a constant back-and-forth movement in relations of strength, tactics and strategies”. The findings suggest that reforms are often only partially complete due to the complexity of existing interactions. In the ongoing process of negotiations between the affected parties – mainly SPAD and the central government – the outcome will be dependent on the resources, behaviours and resistance that exist at particular decision-making times and situations (Nye, 2011). This shows how difficult it is to accurately predict likely outcomes, and that having legal backing doesn’t ensure that a newly established authority will be given all the powers it needs to function well immediately, but may also require it to undertake negotiations with cleverly designed strategies.

Funding is critical for SPAD to steer the implementation of its plans and be able to control the provision of transport services on the ground by regulating the subsidy. The current mechanism which makes use of its licensing authority, the NPPC and consultation with stakeholders may not be sufficient. Without proper funding, SPAD may end up like the TCPD, which produced good plans but implemented few of them. However, giving these powers to SPAD will require the EPU and the MOF to give up some of their existing powers, and these agencies will not give them up willingly. The expectation of the central government that SPAD has to prove to be self-financing before commission status can be granted is also impractical as none of the transport authorities in the developed cities has proven to be self-sustaining (GTZ, 2004). According to Peters (2010), the profit goal should be secondary to social responsibility, especially in the case of public transportation. Hence, the central government, especially the MOF, may need to allocate a certain amount of annual funding to SPAD for providing

incentives to implementing agencies that comply with its guidelines and plans.

6.4 Research question 3: How have the reforms affected decision-making process in policy-making and the selection and implementation of transport projects?

6.4.1 The decision-making platform

All the respondents seemed to have a good understanding of the changes that occurred in the decision-making platform after the creation of SPAD. For example, respondent O5 understood that the decision-making authority for transport projects varies based on who is financing the project. If the project involves public funds, then the EPU has authority, but if it is a private sector funded project, the key decision-maker is the Public Private Partnership Unit – an agency under the Prime Minister’s Department. Large projects – projects which involve funding over RM500 million (£100 million) – require approval from the Cabinet or the Economic Council. The Economic Council is chaired by the Prime Minister, and made up of key ministers and selected senior civil servants, to which the EPU plays a secretariat role. According to respondents G1 and G13, SPAD’s current role in the decision-making process is limited to checking new proposals, but once the transport master plans are in place, SPAD will be in a better position to identify strategically important projects and policies. Respondents from EPU and SPAD confirmed that SPAD only acts as a checkpoint for the EPU as the approval of the EPU is required prior to the implementation of projects dependent on federal funds. However, according to respondent G1, there is one exception to this rule: if the state or local authorities have sufficient funding, they can plan and proceed with the implementation of public transport projects (excluding railway ones) without having to refer to the EPU or to SPAD. All railway projects must seek approval from SPAD, as the railway regulator. Respondents from the EPU agreed that the presence of SPAD reduces their workload because they previously evaluated all project proposals for public transport.

In terms of railway projects, G13 said that SPAD has a good level of decision-making autonomy. The PAD Act (2010) clause 83 (1), states: “no railway shall be constructed without the approval of the Minister, acting on the recommendation of the Commission”. SPAD holds the authority for approval of railway schemes, which includes the alignment of new railway

lines, changes of alignment, purchases of rolling stock, decisions about the locations of stations, and the commencement of railway operations. Hence, the project proponent for railway schemes has to engage with SPAD during the initial stages of any project and take into consideration SPAD's views and feedback. Respondents from SPAD explained that all railway schemes have to be approved by the Prime Minister, as he is in charge of SPAD. If SPAD approves, the project proponent will then have to secure approval from the EPU or the Public Private Partnership Unit for funding, and then work together with the relevant agencies during the implementation of the project. Thus, there is no difference between SPAD's road transport role and its rail transport role in terms of funding, but there are differences in terms of the system for approving projects, because for rail related matters, approval from the SPAD/Prime Minister is mandatory.

The process for decision-making was explored by using the BRT (Bus Rapid Transit) system as an example. For a project proposal to construct a BRT in Kuala Lumpur, respondents from SPAD said that the proponent of the project should refer it to SPAD first, and if it were to be supported by SPAD, it would then be passed on to the EPU for endorsement and funding approvals. The project proponent would then have to work closely with Kuala Lumpur City Hall in the implementation stage, as this is the local authority for Kuala Lumpur city area. Once the project is completed, SPAD would then issue the license for the operations of the BRT. It was pointed out that there are still many hands involved in the process and many veto and negotiation points.

Respondents G12 and G16 strongly believed that the decision-making process in Malaysia adopts a top-down approach. In cases where the proponents of projects have strong political connections, they have the advantage of being able to propose the project directly to the Prime Minister. However, even if approval for a project is secured, it will have to be rationalised through SPAD and the Economic Council or the EPU, and this seems to have happened with the MRT project.

Almost all the respondents felt that that the decision to implement the MRT was purely a political decision, and it was revealed that SPAD was used as a scapegoat for rationalising the project at its initial stages. The talks about the MRT project occurred before the official creation of SPAD in June 2010,

although the official approval was dated December 2010.³⁰ The project is handled by a high level committee known as the MRT Exco, which is chaired by the Chief Secretary. The committee ensures that the project runs smoothly by quickly resolving emerging issues and improving coordination among agencies. Numerous decisions regarding the project were made by this committee, including what contractors to use. Although SPAD plays the secretariat role to this committee, a representative from SPAD argued that the MRT Exco is only an administrative body, and that it is interfering with the powers that SPAD has for regulating the railways. This respondent believed that all the regulative decisions regarding the MRT project should be made by SPAD, and not by the MRT Exco. Some respondents outside SPAD shared this view, such as respondents G1 and G18, who said that the MRT Exco is over-powering SPAD. However, other respondents (such as O5 and G2) considered the MRT Exco to be effective because of its chairman (who is the Chief Secretary), and said that it improves coordination between agencies and expedites the implementation of the project on the ground. These respondents expressed doubts that SPAD would be as effective.

Other players have an important role in transport decision-making, such as the PEMANDU. PEMANDU was established by the Prime Minister after he took office in 2009. It is an administrative body without any legal backing, which functions to monitor the achievements of Ministries participating in the Government Transformation Programme (GTP) (see section 3.2.1.3). One of the GTP's initiatives is improving public transport services, but respondent G2 claimed that PEMANDU is run by people with vested interests. This respondent did not deny that PEMANDU has produced some good initiatives, such as the Bus Express Transit programme, and that it is staffed by dynamic and vibrant personalities from both the government and the private sector, but he appeared to be annoyed by how PEMANDU pushes government agencies around to achieve its agendas. A representative from SPAD claimed that PEMANDU interferes with the jurisdiction of other agencies, and similar views were shared by respondents O2 and G1. These respondents said that PEMANDU tried to influence the MRT project to the extent of preparing a cabinet paper to propose their preferred project implementer. PEMANDU is led by a minister, and although it does not have any legal backing or funding muscle, it is quite influential as it has the clout of the Prime Minister behind it. Respondent G9 compared SPAD and

³⁰ See www.spad.gov.my (accessed on 30 January 2013).

PEMANDU, commenting that SPAD should emulate PEMANDU, which can get things done without any funding power.

6.4.2 Reflections

The findings above show that that decision-making authority remains the same as it was under the previous institutional arrangement before SPAD's establishment. There is no evidence to support that the reforms have speeded up the decision-making process or impacted positively on transport outcomes – although too early for the latter. The reform may have reduced corruption and improve planning and regulation for land public transport.

The decision-making power still lies with the agencies that control funding. SPAD, which lacks funding autonomy, only acts as a proposal evaluator that makes recommendations to the approving authorities. Thus, it appears that SPAD can be passed over for political expediency. Decisions related to policies and projects are still made by funding agencies, mainly by the EPU and Public Private Partnership Unit at the federal level and by local authorities at the local level. For large projects, approval has to be sought from the Cabinet or the Economic Council. Decision-making autonomy is closely related to funding muscle, and without sufficient financial autonomy, it is unlikely that SPAD will be anything more than a weak coordinating body. That is not to deny its role in planning, regulation and enforcement, but it is still a long way away from being able to mirror the achievements of the LTA Singapore. Comparison with the decision-making framework for transport authorities (as presented in Figure 2.1) also reveal that SPAD has limited powers to create/modify rules and make decisions regarding the use of resources and opportunity, which also affects its performance. Without the decisions-making powers for control over transport budget, it is unlikely that SPAD will be able to emulate LTA Singapore or TfL.

It is also interesting to note that although SPAD is the regulator for the railway, holds the decision-making powers for technical issues related to railway matters such as alignment, land acquisition and technical standards on paper, it does not seem to hold much power here in reality either. Decisions regarding the MRT project are mainly made outside SPAD, by a higher-level committee – MRT Exco – that has a better capacity to coordinate the agencies involved in the project. This shows that that SPAD has not removed concerns about effective coordination.

It is also interesting to note that committees and bodies such as the MRT Exco and PEMANDU in Malaysia do not have any financial backing or legal

support, but produce substantial results given their strong political backing by Prime Minister, suggesting the need for political champion to make things happen on the ground. These bodies do not only enjoy decision-making autonomy, but are also able to drive their decisions using the oversight of the Prime Minister. However, these bodies are often temporary, and are dissolved when a particular programme or project is completed or with shifts in political leadership, so they are not directly comparable with SPAD as they do not have to play an ongoing coordinating role.

It is useful to compare SPAD and PEMANDU, however. PEMANDU is staffed with dynamic personnel, and has a strong combination of employees from both the civil service and the private sector, who thus understand the means and dealings of the government and have fewer problems in engaging the government network to get things done. Unfortunately, these types of staff are not to be found in SPAD. PEMANDU is not an operational body like SPAD, hence its funding capacity is perhaps not so crucial. PEMANDU also has a specific one-off task with clear strategic plans, guidelines, timelines and periodic reporting with outcomes that are of ultimate interest to the Prime Minister. However, the existence of PEMANDU and MRT Exco and its focus on aspects of public transport may be indicative of either a lack of satisfaction/expectation of SPAD or suggest an ulterior motive for SPAD being sweeping away the Bumiputera agenda and the associated corruption.

6.5 Research question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms?

6.5.1 The planning and implementation roles of SPAD

The details of SPAD's creation were presented in section 3.2.1.3. A plurality of views continues to exist concerning SPAD's current and potential roles. Those who were involved in the creation of SPAD and the ex-INSPAK members paid their tribute to the current Prime Minister for making SPAD a reality.

Respondents who were involved in the creation of SPAD said that they wanted to create a single regulator for public transport that could also take an active role in planning and enforcement issues. However, these respondents said that SPAD could not be entirely as it had originally been planned. SPAD was created by dissolving and transferring the powers of the CVLB and the DOR and merging them with some of the powers of the Ministry of Tourism. It was given legislative support and received political backing, but unfortunately it could not be given all the powers required to operate as a single regulator and a commission due stakeholders' views, time constraints, political resistance, turf wars among agencies and procedural issues. Although, SPAD was only envisaged to handle public transport modes, such as buses, urban rail and taxis, goods vehicle were later added to their remit to accommodate the view of the majority of stakeholders and the preference of the Prime Minister. Table 6.6 summarises how SPAD was planned to be, and how it actually is, followed by the implications of these differences. According to respondents from SPAD, they are now making an effort to make SPAD closer to how it had originally been intended to be by enhancing the organisation's capacity and working towards acquiring the necessary powers. Although this exercise is time-consuming, it is crucial to enable SPAD to operate effectively.

Table 6.6: Creation of SPAD: The rhetoric and practice

During planning stage (rhetoric)	What was implemented?	What was not implemented?	Why was it not implemented?	Implications
Powers of DOR, CVLB and Ministry of Tourism for regulation of land public transport ceded to SPAD	DOR and CVLB were dissolved and powers transferred to SPAD Ministry of Tourism – ceded necessary powers to SPAD	-	-	DOR and CVLB were dissolved
SPAD to be given legislation support	Enactment of PAD Act 2010 and SPAD Act 2010	-	-	SPAD has legislative support
SPAD to be a planner	SPAD is given planning powers under PAD Act 2010	Absence of strong mechanism to drive the implementation plans	SPAD was not envisaged as an implementation agency Land matters fall under the jurisdiction of local authorities	Presence of implementation gap
SPAD as an enforcement agency	SPAD is given enforcement powers under PAD act 2010	Lack of enforcement officers	Budget cut policy implemented by the government	SPAD has to rely on RTD officers for enforcement
SPAD to be a single regulator	SPAD has been given regulatory powers under PAD Act 2010	SPAD was not given powers for regulation for vocational licenses	Strong objections from RTD	Fragmentation in licensing and enforcement functions – SPAD has no powers to license and enforce drivers of public transport vehicles SPAD has not become a single regulator

During planning stage (rhetoric)	What was implemented?	What was not implemented?	Why was it not implemented?	Implications
SPAD to be a commission	SPAD was only granted partial alienation for remuneration – salary is determined by Ministry of Finance	Commission status still pending SPAD cannot determine its own salary package	Government procedure requires SPAD to be financially independent	Limited capacity – SPAD cannot attract the best talent Room for corruption
SPAD to report directly to the Prime Minister	Prime Minister is the minister in charge of SPAD	SPAD has to report to the Chief Secretary and the Prime Minister's Department for administrative matters	SPAD is not financially independent, and is dependent on government grants Prime Minister is too busy to take an active role in SPAD	SPAD subjected to procurement procedures and other relevant government circulars SPAD not represented in the cabinet and Prime Minister assigns dedicated minister which results in presence of 'many hands'
SPAD to absorb most of the CVLB and the DOR staff	Only 40% of the former CVLB and DOR staff joined SPAD at the start of its operation. Most of the senior officers left.		Cultural differences Absence of attractive offers for the ex-staff of CVLB and DOR	Clears out poor performance Absence of institutional memory Higher learning curve for SPAD
The chairman of SPAD – respectable personality from industry	Chairman of SPAD is a politician but not a full minister		Appointment by the Prime Minister	SPAD not represented in the cabinet Stakeholders contest the appointment of a politician as SPAD's chairman

Respondents who were directly involved in the creation of SPAD acknowledged the flaws in its current incarnation, but said that no significant changes could currently be made, and perhaps would only be possible in another eight to ten years because any immediate changes to a newly established organisation will be criticised by the opposition political parties. It was revealed that a number of issues were overlooked during SPAD's implementation. One of the respondents who had been involved in its creation said that SPAD managed to solve a lot of structural issues (such as uneven distribution of powers and fragmentation of functions) but highlighted that doing so might have created new structural issues. This respondent stressed that he is still convinced that SPAD is a good idea, but there were problems with its implementation involving political intrusion, recruitment, leadership, SPAD's placement and workload at the start of its operation. There was also no mention about any long-term reform plans prepared by the key reformers for SPAD. Respondent P1 did not think that it was the EPU's responsibility, commenting that:

“Because our job was to create SPAD, now that we have created, 'good luck to them, we have other things to do in life (smiles), we go on with other things, we were the midwife, we gave birth to SPAD...”
(Respondent P1).

6.5.2 Respondents' perceptions of the SPAD model

The research participants had different understandings of what constituted the real issues (see sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.3) and their own perceptions of what model the single transport authority should adopt to be effective. Their lines of argument were focused mainly around four areas: whether SPAD should be placed under the MOT or the PMD; whether it should cover only the Klang Valley region or the entire country; the practicality of having a Prime Minister as its minister-in-charge; and the rationale for including goods vehicles as part of their remit.

6.5.2.1 Ministry of Transport versus Prime Minister's Department

As a transport body, SPAD should have technically been placed under the MOT, and there was a common understanding that it was the politics that influenced the placement of SPAD under the PMD. Respondents from the MOT strongly opposed the current placement of SPAD, arguing that if SPAD were to be placed under the MOT, this would mean that all the transport-related agencies would fall within the purview of one umbrella body. One of the MOT respondents argued that placing SPAD under the PMD was not technically desirable because SPAD deals with transport regulations, which

are operational matters, whereas PMD mainly handles policy and planning. This point was also raised by a respondent from PMD (G1) who said that PMD did not have the transport expertise to manage SPAD and would not be able to provide the necessary technical support for it.

All the respondents from the MOT were aware that although the MOT would be the natural home for SPAD, it could not be placed under it because of racial sensitivities. They proposed the creation of a new Ministry of Land Transport as an alternative, under which all the agencies that handle land transport matters would be housed. This proposal was opposed by respondents outside the MOT, however, who thought that the creation of a new ministry would increase political conflicts and be perceived as a plan to shrink the powers of the MOT:

“For you to form another one, what will happen to these two things? So the next logical thing is to create a higher level at PM's office, which is what has been done with SPAD, otherwise there will be a lot of [conflict] between the ministries if you create another ministry of the same level” (respondent O5).

Ten respondents thought that SPAD should stay under the remit of the PMD mainly because SPAD is cross-cutting in terms of its functions, and has to have an overarching authority to be able to deal with other agencies.

Three respondents outside the MOT and SPAD agreed that SPAD's natural home is the MOT, and that it should eventually return to the ministry. Respondent O5 said that whilst it may seem impossible now, this could change if there was a cabinet re-shuffle after the next election. Another respondent from the PMD (G1) highlighted that there is a general dissatisfaction about placing SPAD under the PMD, and that this issue is often raised in the parliament. He predicted that after a few years SPAD would return to its natural home, like other commissions such as the Malaysian Institute of Microelectronic Systems (MIMOS), which started out in the PMD but later went to its 'home' (where it is best placed) in the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation. This clearly shows that reform is an ongoing process and it is difficult to pinpoint or accurately predict changes that might happen in the future.

6.5.2.2 The Prime Minister as the minister-in-charge

Eight respondents agreed that placing SPAD under the Prime Minister was important for reducing the turf wars and tensions between the agencies that arose because of the transfer of powers to SPAD. Respondent O1

highlighted that its placement under the Prime Minister expedites the implementation of programmes and policies, and makes it easier to push through controversial policies such as congestion pricing. However, there is no evidence that this has happened to-date.

Whilst the respondents acknowledged that there are advantages to being overseen by the Prime Minister, some of the respondents questioned whether he was the best person to perform the role, and whether he was an unwise choice because of his availability. A respondent from PMD (G4) pointed out that the Prime Minister cannot play the role of an ordinary minister, and that SPAD needs to eventually be assigned a more suitable minister outside the PMD. Respondent G14 explained that the role of the Prime Minister as the minister-in-charge meant that SPAD was not represented in the cabinet, and required another minister to be appointed to represent the Prime Minister. Respondents from SPAD were mainly concerned about his availability. Respondent G10 questioned the rationale for the appointment of the Prime Minister as the minister in-charge, commenting:

“PMD is all about policy, they are the policy makers, it is a central agency, PM department, EPU, Treasury, these are not operational department, so why should an operational body like SPAD being placed under PM’s office, directly under the PM, isn’t it ridiculous? For us, if you place an operational department under PM, what will PM decide? He can only decide on policy matters. Can he answer operational matters in the parliament? He can’t, because he has to know the operational details. So the framework of SPAD is not right to me” (respondent G10).

According to respondents from the MOT, there were instances when SPAD was assigned additional responsibilities outside its jurisdiction, such as with the MRT project. Respondents from SPAD confirmed that the project was handed over to them immediately after SPAD’s establishment, although it was not supposed to get involved in project implementation. They admitted that they could not resist the directives from the top at that point in time, although SPAD is no longer involved with this project now.

6.5.2.3 The National model versus the Klang Valley model

Another argument centres on the issue of whether SPAD should have been established at the Klang Valley regional level instead of the national level. Respondent G14 thought that SPAD needed to be set-up at the local level on the grounds that the local authorities better understand local needs and

can design public transport systems to fulfil local demand. A similar view was expressed by respondent G17, who strongly articulated the view that SPAD needed to be decentralised to be effective. However, these respondents felt that SPAD should also exist at the national level to play a coordinating role for distributing funds. On the other hand, Respondent G16 – who was attached to a local authority in his previous posting – did not think that decentralisation would work well in the Malaysian context. He argued that the local authorities in Malaysia are under-powered and lack the capacity to plan and manage the public transport system in their areas, and thus even if their powers were devolved, the local authorities could well be unable to carry out their assigned functions.

Ex-INSPAK respondents pointed out that in 2005, there was a great deal of focus on creating the Klang Valley Urban Transport Authority due to the pressing need to improve the public transport services in Kuala Lumpur, but that a national model was found to be more viable and strategic because of certain legal issues. Respondent G4 mentioned that Malaysia adopts common law and as a result it is extremely difficult to carve out the law only for the Klang Valley regional area, which was the main stumbling block for the creation of Klang Valley Urban Transport Authority. Furthermore, this respondent argued that adopting a regional model would create a regulatory barrier because the areas outside the Klang Valley region would then be neglected, making it difficult to control the public transport services outside the region. The national model was mainly favoured because of the legal issues and the types of powers that had been given to SPAD.

6.5.2.4 Public transport vehicle versus goods vehicle

There were mixed views among the respondents regarding whether SPAD's scope should include goods vehicles. Respondents from the MOT strongly believed that it should in order to minimise the fragmentation of roles and functions between agencies because, if goods vehicle were not incorporated, then the CVLB and the DOR would continue to exist. One of them commented that the only good thing to come out of SPAD has been the closing down of the CVLB. This respondent also argued that it is impossible to separate the railway scheme for passengers and freight as they share the same facilities (control rooms, signalling systems and rail track) and therefore it is more practical to be responsible for the entire railway system. Two other respondents outside MOT (G4 and G9) also supported the inclusion of goods vehicles into SPAD's remit, and provided three main reasons: firstly, to ensure that there is minimum overlap and

fragmentation in the sector; secondly, to promote holistic planning by taking both the public transport and the freight sector into consideration in any set of plans; and thirdly, to better regulate the freight sector, which has not been given enough attention in the past.

However, four respondents outside the MOT (G1, G17, O1 and O2) felt that goods vehicles should not have been included in SPAD's remit because of their lack of manpower for managing this sector. They pointed out that goods vehicles represent a very large workload, including inland depots, warehouses, freight terminals, licensing, and enforcement and SPAD lacks the knowledge and expertise to manage the freight sector. An ex-INSPAK respondent (O1) also observed that goods vehicles were not part of SPAD's original responsibilities, even when the idea of a Klang Valley Urban Transport Authority was under discussion in 2005, and that giving SPAD this role has put it under tremendous pressure because goods vehicles have not been well regulated and penalties for them were not well enforced in the past. Respondent O2 said that another commission should have been created to handle freight, whilst Respondent G1 hinted that goods vehicles could be the source of the bad blood between the RTD and SPAD given the link between the enforcement of heavy vehicles penalties and corruption.

6.5.3 Factors affecting the performance of SPAD

Structural changes were made in the process of creating SPAD, including the dissolution of the CVLB and the DOR, and streamlining the roles of the Ministry of Tourism, the MOT and the RTD. The challenges and problems that arose in the course of making these structural changes were only partially dealt with, as explained in section 6.5.1, and to add to these problems there have been further obstacles to SPAD effective performance, mainly concerning working relationships. There are problems here both inter-organisationally and intra-organisationally. Inter-organisational issues mainly concern the working relationship between SPAD and other well-established agencies, and involve how to give the impression that SPAD exists to complement these agencies rather than to threaten or overpower them. The intra-organisational issues in SPAD are related to human resource capacity (manpower), institutional memory and leadership. Table 6.7 summarizes the views of the respondents on these issues.

Table 6.7: Views of respondents on factors affecting the performance of SPAD

Respondents group Response	Government officials		SPAD (G12, G13, G15)	Politicians (P1, P2)	Operators (O1, O2, O3, O4, O5)
	MOT (G5, G6, G7, G8, G10, G11)	Others (G1, G2, G3, G4, G9, G14, G16, G17, G18)			
<i>Inter-organisational issues</i>					
- <i>Poor network</i>					
<i>Higher salary</i>	G5, G8				
<i>Ego issues</i>	G5, G8, G10	G1, G14, G17	G12		O1
<i>Communication issues</i>	G5		G13		O2, O3, O4
- <i>Cultural clash</i>	G5, G6, G8	G1, G4, G17	G12, G13	P2	
<i>Intra-organisational issues</i>					
- <i>Human resource and capacity issues</i>	G5 G10	G1, G9, G14, G17	G12, G13	P1, P2	O1, O3, O4
- <i>Institutional memory</i>	G5, G8	G9, G4, G1	G12, G13	P2	O1, O2, O4, O5
- <i>SPAD's leadership</i>					
<i>Personality of CEO</i>	G8, G5	G1, G14, G4	G12, G13		O1, O2 O3
<i>Personality of chairman</i>	G5	G1, G4	G12, G13		O1, O2, O3, O4, O5

6.5.3.1 Inter-organisational issues

Building networks

SPAD has been unable to engage other stakeholders in the industry (such as civil servants and operators) effectively, and respondents offered the following reasons for this: (i) jealousy among civil servants because SPAD enjoys a higher salary band; (ii) SPAD's ego as an authority; and (iii) expectations that SPAD has to make the first move to build rapport.

Two respondents from the government sector raised the issue of the higher salary enjoyed by SPAD members, most of whom are recruited from the private sector. They believed that that the higher salary scale is probably one of the reasons why SPAD's employees think so highly of themselves, and hence other agencies are reluctant to help SPAD out because there is a perception that it should be able to perform better with the higher paid 'more skilled' employees it has. Eight respondents were of the view that SPAD is arrogant and authoritative as well as being uninterested in involving the relevant stakeholders in any of its assignments or the preparations of its plans. Respondent O1 did not deny that SPAD has a lot of authority in terms of land transport compared to any other transport agencies in the current institutional structure; however he warned that SPAD has to be tamed to complement other agencies.

Respondent G17 and G10 said that because SPAD is a new agency it has to take the initial steps to build a rapport with the already established agencies like the RTD instead of expecting other agencies to make the first move, and this shows that the government agencies are not keen on SPAD either. A respondent from RTD asserted:

'SPAD has to work with RTD instead of RTD working with SPAD'
(respondent G10).

Respondent G5 questioned the willingness of other government agencies to help SPAD, expressing her concerns about the behaviour of some of these agencies in defending their turf and not sharing their resources or working with SPAD. This respondent observed that the relationship between SPAD and the RTD is very strained and that this affects the enforcement work on the ground. It was pointed out that SPAD's senior management prefers to deal only with the senior officials in the government department, and that all communication is carried out formally in writing.

Respondent O3 suggested that communication between the three main stakeholders – the public, the operators and the government – has been lacking in the past, and he did not think that SPAD had been able to make any progress in bridging this gap. He recalls how the suggestions he made in writing to SPAD never received any response or acknowledgement. This respondent's strong message was that the operators want to be involved in the policy making and planning that directly affects them, but that SPAD has frustratingly issued new policies regarding toll hikes and speed limits on highways without really understanding the constraints and the dilemmas of the operators. He added that this had been made worse by SPAD's issuing new guidelines without making any effort to explain their rationale to stakeholders or how they would be implemented. Interestingly, one of the respondents from SPAD admitted that communication is an issue, and that SPAD has not been able to fully engage with the stakeholders.

Cultural clashes

Respondent G1 said that the majority of SPAD's employees were from the private sector, and that the civil servants who remained in SPAD were mostly junior officers who may not be very familiar with the government working culture and procedures. This leads to a cultural clash between SPAD and other government agencies, making it difficult for SPAD to build a good network with other actors and to complement the existing institutional framework. Respondents P2 and G1 proposed that SPAD takes on some experienced civil servants to bridge this gap. Respondent G5 thought that the cultural clash could have been reduced if the central government had provided guidelines for recruitment so that SPAD could have employed the right people, and if it had also provided sufficient support until SPAD was capable of operating on its own.

Respondent G6 said that she has once proposed that SPAD take on board good officers from the RTD to strengthen the enforcement team, but she claims that her proposal was not given serious attention. Some of the possible reasons behind this were highlighted by respondents G5, G8 and G17. Respondent G5 thought that SPAD was not interested in recruiting RTD officers because they were associated with corruption, and SPAD wanted a clean break from this. Respondents G8 and G17 believed that SPAD thinks that civil servants are inefficient and incompetent, which is why few civil servants were recruited besides those who were absorbed from the CVLB and the DOR. Finally, Respondent G8 thought that SPAD was

probably unaware of the fact that the priority for civil servants is to get the process right rather than on the individual outcomes.

6.5.3.2 Intra-organisational issues

Human resources and capacity issues

Six respondents see SPAD's size and manpower as the main stumbling block for preventing it from operating effectively. They mainly cited the limited number of personnel in the enforcement team as being its most problematic manpower shortfall. Respondent G13 commented:

“Now we are operating and at the same time building our capacity, even structurally, we are just building our house. So, that's the challenge – if you ask me, that's the biggest challenge that the commission is facing now. I think ultimately we are focusing on capacity building, we have not yet made our presence felt” (respondent G13).

Recruits for SPAD were mainly sourced from the local transport industry, and Respondent G14 claimed that there was a lot of job-hopping between SPAD and transport operators at the initial stages of its operations. Respondents G5, G9 and O3 all raised concerns on this matter, worrying that SPAD had not done enough background checks on their new recruits. It was pointed out that one of the senior managers in SPAD was associated with mismanagement in his previous engagement with a bus company, and that such events affect the image of SPAD.

Besides concerns about the number of personnel, there were also worries raised about the expertise of SPAD employees, mainly from respondents outside SPAD. Respondent G17 argued that SPAD must recruit experienced people, but not necessarily from the government. She felt that the failure to recruit the right talent may result in wasting resources. In the same vein, respondent O1 mentioned that the learning curve becomes expensive with fresh, inexperienced employees leading SPAD. Respondent G8 was of view that technical expertise are crucial for the top management in SPAD to facilitate the decision-making process and assess proposals submitted by the stakeholders without having to rely too much on consultants. This respondent believed that the current senior managers and the members of the commission do not have strong enough transport backgrounds.

SPAD's lack of knowledge about the transport industry was raised as an important issue by transport operators. Respondent O3 said that SPAD has recruited a lot of inexperienced people and that they have been working in isolation without engaging with the transport operators. In addition, respondent O4 claimed that SPAD's lack of understanding concerning the history of the industry made them difficult to communicate with, and prevents SPAD from being able to adequately respond to the suggestions made by transport operators. This causes frustration among the industry players – a situation that is made worse when SPAD does not engage with this group of stakeholders on its formulation of policy.

According to SPAD respondents, its limitations in terms of its shortage in technical expertise and lack of personnel mean that it is heavily dependent on consultants, and is considering outsourcing its enforcement role to a private company as a result. They claimed that the LTA Singapore follows a similar model, and that it has proven successful. On the other hand, Respondent G1 said that SPAD has to depend on consultants not only because of its capacity issues, but also due the fact that they are not able to work effectively with the other actors in their sector. According to this respondent, SPAD has been unable to focus on goods vehicles because of its capacity issues, even though it has the necessary powers to do so. He added that to remedy these problems, SPAD is creating an advisory committee consisting of experts from the transport industry to provide it with technical advice.

Some respondents who were directly involved in the creation of SPAD (mainly those from the EPU) felt that SPAD's capacity problems are a teething issue that will get resolved over time. They held that the main issue with SPAD's human resources management is its limited autonomy in recruitment (due to its dependence on government grants and the government's new recruitment policy for addressing the budget crisis).

Institutional memory

According to one respondent from SPAD, less than 40% of the former CVLB and DOR staff chose to join SPAD, with most of these being junior officers who have a limited understanding of the industry. Respondents from the DOR and the CVLB provided a number of reasons for not wanting to join SPAD. Respondent G8 said that SPAD did not try to accommodate the senior officers from the CVLB and the DOR. They were not offered senior management positions, and hence joining SPAD was seen as a demotion

rather than an advance in their careers. Respondent G5 said that many ex-DOR and CVLB staff did not join SPAD because it failed to make them attractive offers with clear service schemes, and that there were differences in the pay scheme offered to private sector recruits and civil servants.

Respondent G8 shared details of his short engagement with SPAD. This respondent was made to report to someone who was very much junior to him, something which rarely happens in the civil service, where age, wisdom and experience are generally given the priority for promotions and senior positions according to Respondent O1. Similarly, Respondent G9 felt that she was not needed and decided not to join SPAD because it started making disparaging remarks about the CVLB without actually understanding the constraints that they faced in the previous regime. She said that if she had joined SPAD, she would have been blamed for all the wrongdoing in the past. Respondent G8 confirmed G9's claims:

“As a new organisation, if hoping to make changes, you should not disparage what's been done by people in the past, it looks as though they are not efficient. CVLB did not work effectively, but they have reasons why they couldn't do, CVLB was under a lot of political pressure” (respondent G8).

On the other hand, respondents O1 and G4 observed that as many of the senior officers in CVLB had close links with the transport operators and were thus associated with corruption, they probably refrained from joining SPAD out of fear of being accused of or questioned about past wrongdoing. However, all these factors have resulted in SPAD lacking institutional memory.

There are mixed views about the importance of institutional memory for SPAD. All respondents (except G1) who talked about institutional memory of the DOR thought that it was important because numerous technical issues are involved in the management of the railway, and the former staff of the DOR have the technical expertise that SPAD requires. However, respondent G1 thought that SPAD needed to start afresh, and that the required technical railway knowledge and skills could be learned.

On the other hand, five out of the eleven respondents that talked about the institutional memory of the CVLB felt that SPAD did not need its institutional memory, and thought that it was best for it to start afresh. These respondents mainly talked about issues surrounding the Bumiputera agenda, political interference with the CVLB, and corruption within it. They

asserted that a complete 'cut off' from the previous licensing regime was crucial. Respondent G1 said that the institutional memory of the CVLB was not important as it performed poorly, and because the new licensing mechanism under SPAD is entirely different to that under the CVLB. Instead of licensing individual vehicles, as the CVLB did, SPAD issues licenses to the operators. Respondents P2 and G13 also noted that with the new licensing mechanism, SPAD requires CVLB's previous licensing data, but not any information about its practices.

However, nearly all of the respondents felt that the complete absence of institutional memory was dangerous for SPAD, as without this there is nothing to prevent them from repeating previous mistakes and no reference points. Respondent O2 commented:

“Institutional memory is very important. You know why? Because in order for you to move forward, to make the change, you have to know the history, the processes and what not, as well as the skills and knowledge of the people in LPKP. If you don't know the history, you cannot tap the brains of these people [and] how you are going to move forward, how you are going to benchmark yourself? (respondent O2).

SPAD's leadership

All the respondents stressed that SPAD should be free from political intervention, and ten respondents questioned the rationale of appointing a chairman who is a politician but not a cabinet minister, as well as his appropriateness in terms of transport experience. An ex-employee of SPAD highlighted the difficulties of working under a chairman who wants to be in control of the operational matters. The chairman interprets the act in a slightly different manner, and is of the view that he is an executive chairman who has to be directly involved in the daily management of SPAD. However, discussion with one of the officers in the Attorney General's office reveals that the chairman of SPAD is a non-executive chairman and that the day-to-day operation is to be handled by the CEO. Respondents from SPAD pointed out that differences in perceptions about the chairman's role also create interpersonal conflicts between the CEO and the chairman, and hence they are not able to work collaboratively. Respondent G1 commented:

“The chairman feels that it is his responsibility to ensure that SPAD is operating smoothly, but the CEO thinks that the chairman is meddling” (respondent G1).

The strained relationship between the key actors in SPAD led the SPAD respondents to hold posit a communication breakdown in the organisation, and they reported that one of SPAD's main challenges has been to move everyone towards the same agenda. It was also pointed out that the CEO has been extremely busy with the MRT project, and has thus had limited time for other matters, such as building networks with the other stakeholders including the civil servants.

The personality of the CEO was also criticised by the respondents who have had worked with him. A board member of SPAD said that the CEO had hinted that he does not want the board members of SPAD to get involved in operational matters. This respondent highlighted the importance of personality in leaders, especially in a newly established agency like SPAD, and said that although SPAD needs help, the CEO is too egotistical to seek it.

An ex-SPAD employee revealed more about the personality of the CEO. He said that the CEO, with his consultancy background is a strategist and carries himself well, but he is not a grounded person, and this is his first experience as a CEO. This respondent blamed the poor leadership in SPAD for its failure to manage the merger of the DOR and the CVLB into SPAD smoothly. Respondent O1 and G8 were more concerned with the technical expertise, pointing out that the CEO does not have the appropriate technical knowledge in transport to lead an important organisation like SPAD.

6.5.4 Reflections

With the creation of SPAD, a dedicated transport body has been produced to champion the land public transport sector through amalgamating the powers from three agencies. This body has reduced the coordination and fragmentation issues that existed in the previous institutional framework to some degree and put an end to the CVLB regime, which was associated with mismanagement, corruption and politicisation.

One of the aims of this research was also to identify the winners and losers of this reform. Flyvbjerg (2001) and Chisholm (2000) argue that in any institutional reform, there will be a relationship between powers and outcomes which entail that somebody will gain and somebody will lose. The creation of SPAD clearly benefits the EPU. In the previous institutional arrangement, when there was an absence of dedicated authority for land public transport, the EPU had to play a substantial role to fill this gap. However, being a central agency, its role was limited to the federal level.

With the creation of SPAD, these functions have now been delegated, and besides reducing the administrative burden on the EPU, SPAD is also in a better position to facilitate planning and manage land public transport at the local level, with its planning and licensing powers providing an effective tool for streamlining and integrating services provided on the ground. The other winners are the operators and the public. SPAD acts as a one-stop centre for operators to sort out licensing issues, and the public has a dedicated platform for their feedback and disputes. The main loser in this reform is the MOT, which has lost its powers for railway regulation to SPAD with the cessation of the DOR. In addition, the RTD, which is an agency under the MOT, has to share its enforcement powers for land transport with SPAD. The Ministry of Tourism has also lost its powers for regulating tourism vehicles and hire and drive cars to SPAD. Interestingly, those who did not lose powers to SPAD did not show any signs of feeling threatened or being jealous, and they provided more balanced and positive responses to working with SPAD.

The Prime Minister is probably too busy to look into an operational body like SPAD, as one of the respondents notes, and it could be that he has lost interest in it, as some researchers have speculated (Politt and Bauckaert, 2011; Peters, 2010), pointing out that politicians have short-term interests in some reform programmes either because they do not fit with their personal agendas and priorities or because they do not produce quick wins, as they can take many years before actual results can be seen. However, in SPAD's case, the Prime Minister has probably achieved his agenda and hence he finds that his further deep involvement no longer an interest to him. This shows that reforms occur in a window of opportunity. They play out over a period of time and it is important to understand how it plays out because of the fuzziness of boundaries and the imperfect reform process which requires good governance through network.

There were also concerns about the Prime Minister's time and availability for SPAD and his direct political control over it. The result of this has been the creation of a situation called the pollution of remit, in which an organisation is forced to function outside its original jurisdiction due to political directives, as has also been seen with the MRT. Besides the Prime Minister, SPAD has another political master as its chairman who is not a full minister, and this complicates the structure and effectiveness of SPAD's leadership further – because the ultimate powers still vested with the Prime Minister.

SPAD experienced a number of difficulties when it became operational. The managerial autonomy it enjoys as a semi-autonomous body has been used to recruit heavily from the private sector, and this has disturbed its functioning as a public service. Moreover, this private sector recruitment is one reason why SPAD has not been successful in building a good network with other stakeholders, as there is a cultural clash between SPAD and civil servants due to differences in practices and working ethics. Other transport agencies often try to maintain their own turf and show off their 'authority', which acts as a barrier to building good working relationships. Moreover, the social capital, which involves building trust, networks and understanding, has not been built between SPAD and other stakeholders in the sector. As McCarten and Vyasulu (2006) point out, this process takes time, especially after a major reorganisation. The new networks that have been created by the reforms have not yet been stabilised, with those from the government sector thinking that SPAD is not interested in engaging with them, although this shows that they are not keen on engaging with SPAD either. Governance has to be established through these networks, and it is worth noting that one of the possible factors in the success of the TfL and the LTA Singapore has been their ability to engage with all the important stakeholders in an effective manner.

Although SPAD is a new organisation, it was established by merging two old organisations – the CVLB and the DOR – which have existed for 23 and 19 years respectively. During SPAD's planning, it was envisaged that the majority of the CVLB and DOR staff would be absorbed into SPAD, and thus that SPAD would be able to operate smoothly with the existing background knowledge or 'institutional memory' of the DOR and the CVLB to hand. However, this did not happen as SPAD chose to start afresh with new recruits to disassociate it from the corruption of the previous licensing and management regime. This left it in the dark, without sufficient knowledge and not knowing history of the industry, and thereby liable to repeat past mistakes. This shows that breaking path dependence comes at a cost.

SPAD has struggled to improve its capacity both in terms of manpower and technical knowledge. SPAD's management needs to strike a balance, and decide if they want to do the things themselves – which would require them to access many more resources – or to use the available networks instead. Klijn et al. (2010) used the policy network to show how different actors have different resources and to demonstrate that no one organisation can generate all the resources it needs. This shortcoming was seen in the SPAD

case study. Although there is a plethora of resources and expertise available within the government that SPAD could tap into, its failure to build networks with government actors and utilise their resources has left them isolated and thus struggling with poor capacity. SPAD seems to have ignored civil servants and recruited personnel from the private sector who are dynamic and competent but lack the experience and expertise of the local transport industry, and this has backfired on them.

Most of the respondents held there to be a number of problems concerning the way SPAD had been set up, and had a variety of suggestions about how it could be better improved. Those who were involved in the creation of SPAD admitted that certain issues were overlooked due to time constraints, and a lot of issues only arose after SPAD had come into existence. Hall and Taylor (1996) argued that most institutional reforms do not achieve their stated goal because of hidden agendas, such as improving the public perceptions of institutions rather than increasing their efficiency. In SPAD's case, the critical aim focus was on cleaning up the sector and creating a dedicated body to champion the land public transport sector instead of creating an effective single transport authority vested with all the requisite powers. Hence, SPAD is still struggling to justify its role, and different agencies have different views over what it should do. This is made all the more difficult by the fact that decisions can often not be reversed in government-driven reforms when they have proven ineffective because this would amount to the government admitting failure.

Chapter 7: Case Study Analysis for Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority

7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the key findings of the Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority (BMLTA) case study. It is based on seventeen face-to-face recorded interviews and six unrecorded interviews conducted in July 2011. Respondents were drawn from government and parastatal agencies, transport operators and academic institutions. The findings are presented in relation to the order of the research questions. The aim of first research question is to attempt to understand the motivation and impetus for the creation of the BMLTA. The second research question explores how reforms were implemented, and looks at the autonomy that was given to the BMLTA. The third research question then focuses on the outcomes of establishing the BMLTA, and the last one examines the key factors that have affected its performance. The focus of this chapter is to highlight the perspectives and views of different groups of respondents to show how they engage with the issues that emerge from each research question.

The emphasis throughout this chapter, like Chapter 6, is on letting participants speak for themselves, which is done by contextualizing the interviews according to respondent groups and only using quotations from interview transcripts when necessary. The twenty-two respondents were grouped into five main categories according to the agencies that they represent, as shown in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1: Categories of respondents

Categories	Respondents	Number of respondents
IAS officers	IG1, IG2, IP1, IP4, IP6	5
Government agencies	IG3, IG4, IG5, IG6, IG7, IG8	6
Parastatal agencies	IP2, IP3, IP5, IP7, IP8	5
Academics	IA1, IA2, IA3	3
Professionals	IC1, IC2, IC3	3
Total number of respondents		22

It was felt that was important to present the views of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers separately from other groups of respondents. The IAS officers who head the government or parastatal agencies have a wider experience and better understanding of the critical issues, and are able to explain why certain measures are workable or not in detail. There were three respondents from the BMLTA (IG1, IG3 and IG4), and all of these were grouped under the 'government agencies' category. Where appropriate, information from written documents (mainly government reports and minutes of meeting) is woven together with interview data to augment, challenge and solidify the discussion. Towards the end of each research question, a reflection is presented in relation to the published literature in this area.

7.2 Research question 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of BMLTA in Bangalore?

The aim of this research question was to understand the motivations behind the creation of the BMLTA. This included identifying key events, public transport issues, inadequacies in the existing institutional set-up, push factors (such as policies), and the presence of key personalities. A good understanding of both the main issues and key actors will help to explain how the structure of the BMLTA came into being and to assess this model's appropriateness for addressing urban transport problems in Bangalore. Table 7.2 summarises the participants' responses to the first research question, and a detailed explanation of these is then provided in the subsections that follow.

Table 7.2: Matrix showing responses to research question 1

What were the motivations behind the establishment of BMLTA in Bangalore?					
	Heads of departments/IAS officers (IG1, IG2, IP1, IP4, IP6)	Government agencies (IG3, IG4, IG5, IG6, IG7, IG8)	Parastatal agencies (IP2, IP3, IP5, IP7, IP8)	Academics (IA1, IA2, IA3)	Consultants (IC1, IC2, IC3)
National Urban Transport Policy (NUTP)	IG1	IG1, IG4, IG5	IP3	IA1, IA3	IC1
Pushed by State Government through key personalities	IG1, IG2	IG4, IG6	IP8	IA1	IC1
Fragmentation in the planning function for urban transport					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fragmentation in urban transport planning Lack of ownership for plans 	IG1, IG2, IP6	IG4, IG6, IG7			IC1
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No land use – transport integration 	IP6	IG6	IP8	IA2, IA3	IC1

What were the motivations behind the establishment of BMLTA in Bangalore?					
	Heads of departments/IAS officers (IG1, IG2, IP1, IP4, IP6)	Government agencies (IG3, IG4, IG5, IG6, IG7, IG8)	Parastatal agencies (IP2, IP3, IP5, IP7, IP8)	Academics (IA1, IA2, IA3)	Consultants (IC1, IC2, IC3)
Coordination was an issue among agencies and among the modes, as a result development was happening in piecemeal	IG1, IG2, IP4	IG3, IG4, IG5, IG6, IG7, IG8	IP7, IP8	IA1, IA3	IC1, IC2
Existing agencies were not empowered BMRDA was under performing BMP had limited powers	IG1, IP1, IP6 IP4	IG6 IG5, IG7	IP3	IA3 IA2	IC2, IC1 IC1
Growth of Bangalore city – mobility became an issue	IG1, IG2, IP4, IP6			IA1	IC1, IC3

**IG1, IG3 and IG4 are from the BMLTA

7.2.1 The National Urban Transport Policy/74th Constitutional Amendment

A total of eight respondents pointed to the National Urban Transport Policy (NUTP) in 2006 and the push from the central government to implement this policy as the turning point for the creation of the BMLTA in Bangalore. The academics observed that discussions regarding the need for a strategic transport authority were largely confined to academic circles prior to the publication of the NUTP. However, serious efforts to establish a single transport authority were only made after the NUTP mandated the creation of the Unified Metropolitan Transport Authority (UMTA) for cities with a population of more than one million. Respondent IA3 explained that the central government did not set stringent guidelines on the model that the UMTA should adopt, thus leaving individual states to choose ones that are suitable to their local contexts.

Most of the respondents could not accurately recall where the original arguments for the need for a coordinating authority had come from. Respondent IA1 was confident that the transport studies prepared by international development agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank had recommended a coordinating authority as one of their main proposals, but he could not recall such proposals appearing in the local transport plans. Respondent IG1 strongly linked the national Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) commissioned in 2005 with the proposal for the UMTA. She said that the creation of an UMTA was mandatory for cities that are listed as eligible to receive support from the JNNURM under this scheme. This includes Bangalore, and she said that this was the impetus for Bangalore to create the Directorate of Urban Land Transport (DULT) and the BMLTA in 2007. However, the JNNURM document published on the Ministry of Urban Development's website does not directly mention the creation of a UMTA, as respondent IG1 claimed, although the mandatory reforms listed included the implementation of decentralisation measures as envisaged in the 74th Constitutional Amendment. This states that all the states should ensure meaningful association and engagement of urban local bodies in planning as well as the delivery of services to the citizens³¹.

³¹ <http://jnnurm.nic.in> accessed on 28 October 2012

7.2.2 The push from the State Government

Four respondents representing government agencies said that the Urban Development Department (UDD) has a good team of administrators who pushed for the UMTA to be created following the central government's release of the NUTP. These administrators had the full support of the Chief Minister's Office and the Chief Secretary of the State. The proposal for the UMTA was also supported by a wide range of stakeholders, and respondent IG4 pointed out that he is not aware of anyone who was against the idea as everyone thought that a better coordination mechanism was needed. Only respondent IP3, who represented a parastatal agency, argued against the need for a UMTA in Bangalore. He stressed that a UMTA should operate outside Bangalore where more critical technical support and coordination efforts were needed.

7.2.3 Fragmentation in the planning roles for urban transport

There were many different reactions to the fragmentation in the planning roles that agencies and institutions held, and this was seen as a critical issue by respondents from the government sector in particular. The main concerns among respondents were the fragmentation in urban transport planning, the lack of integration between land use and urban transport planning, the ownership of plans, and skills shortages.

Prior to the creation of the BMLTA, one of the IAS respondents (IG2) explained that transport planning was part of urban planning and that there were many agencies involved in urban transport planning, as explained in section 3.3.1.1. Another IAS (IG1) pointed out that an overarching policy for transport that could be used as a reference point by these agencies was lacking, and hence these plans were prepared in isolation. Thus, these respondents believed that there was a critical need for a dedicated single agency that could look at the transport strategies prepared by the various agencies and coordinate their functions so that urban transport could be developed in an integrated manner.

A total of six respondents – mainly those outside the government agencies – commented on the lack of land use transport integration and the resulting development of infrastructure that gave too little consideration for the need of transport facilities to support mobility. Only two respondents from the government sector with planning backgrounds appreciated the need for integrated land use transport planning. They explained that each agency was individually doing some urban planning, and that made things difficult

because land use transport integration was not given due consideration. Although urban planning for Bangalore was mainly the responsibility of the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA), respondent IP6 – who is also an IAS officer – said that the BDA's focus was more on developing layouts for new housing schemes. This respondent stressed that an empowered authority had thus been urgently needed to ensure that urban transport planning was carried out in a more integrated manner, and that this authority had needed strong statutory backing so that it could plan holistically, coordinate major stakeholders, and make important decisions.

Respondents provided two proposals for bridging the gap in urban transport planning process. Respondent IC1 and IP6 said that an empowered UMTA must be created, whereas respondent IG4, IG6 and IA2 felt that the creation of the Metropolitan Planning Committee (MPC) was an alternative solution for providing holistic planning through integrating land use with all the other sectors, including transport. The latter highlighted that agencies have been doing their work in isolation from each other for a long time, and that they see the MPC as the medium through which stakeholders can get together and plan at the regional level.

A wide range of urban plans were prepared by the parastatal agencies in Bangalore, and respondent IC1 pointed out that although the relevant plans were in place, no one had taken ownership of them to ensure that they are implemented. This respondent felt that to do this, it was necessary to create an authority that could take ownership of existing plans and have the authority to implement them.

7.2.4 Coordination issues

The weaknesses in coordination were felt most strongly by the respondents from the government sector, all of whom asserted that this was a pressing issue that required immediate attention. A similar view was also shared by more than half the respondents from other categories. They recognised that the coordination issue affects work relations between the agencies involved in implementing transport strategies and, as a result, leads to piecemeal development and poor integration of transport services on the ground. The reasons given ranged from the agencies being under different rules, and having different visions and objectives to the attitudes and beliefs that underlie different agencies' approaches to their work.

Three respondents from the government sector (IG3, IG5 and IG7) strongly believed that the coordination issues were mainly caused by the existence of

different rules governing the agencies involved in the provision of transport infrastructure and services. The agencies are obliged to comply with their own rules and regulations, and pay little attention to what other agencies are doing and how their work affects others. For example, the Greater Bangalore Municipal Corporation (BBMP) is responsible for putting up the bus stops and the Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation (BMTC) runs the bus operations, so without proper communication between the two, the BBMP might end up constructing poorly positioned bus stops. Respondents from the local corporation (IG7) explained that the BBMP is not wrong, as their regulations allow them to determine suitable locations, and they may not be aware that such actions affect the overall efficiency of bus operations. It was pointed out that this problem is aggravated by the absence of a common platform for the agencies to meet and discuss their proposals and plans, and felt that there was a need to create one to bring the agencies together. Respondent IG5 had a contrasting proposal for facilitating coordination. This respondent felt that all the agencies involved in transport needed to be placed under one umbrella body and one set of legislation, which means amending and merging existing rules and regulations. Although this sounds like a 'big-bang' reform, this respondent was confident that it would be possible with strong political will.

Three respondents outside the government (IP8, IC1 and IA3) reported that agencies had a tendency to work towards their own visions and objectives. They felt that agencies involved in the delivery of infrastructure services are often under the impression that they are providing the optimum service, and do not realise that their efforts are sometimes conflicting with other agencies. It was pointed out that these agencies were constantly under political and public pressure to deliver something, and that they cannot wait to coordinate with other agencies plans because this process is too time-consuming. However, they realised that better coordination was required for the efficient use of the limited resources available, especially with regard to funding. Respondent IA3 described the problem in more detail – yearly budgets for development are limited, which causes everyone to struggle for scarce resources, and often a large number of projects are started at the same time without any assurance that continuous funding will be available. Thus, this respondent felt that someone had to step forward to plan, coordinate, and decide on which projects to implement and to ensure that at least one year's works is carried out efficiently within the allocated budget. For this respondent, a coordinating body with funding muscle was urgently required.

A different perspective to this was held by two respondents outside the government, however. IC2 and IP8 said that the attitudes of the agencies were part of the reason for the coordination problems, and accused the parastatal and government agencies of being too arrogant, self-centred and reluctant to share resources, especially in the implementation of large infrastructure projects. It was also pointed out that no one agency had the ultimate authority to bring the relevant agencies together for discussions before decisions were made, and no one agency had the power to control other agencies involved in the implementation of such projects. Respondent IP8 illustrated the issue as follows:

“If my duty is to supply water, I will only supply water. In doing so, if I have to dig all the roads, I take it as a given, you know –, it is part of the job. In the meantime, if the road maintenance guy comes to do some work and he observes that I am in the process of laying my pipes, he will not change his programme, he will repair the road when my work is not finished” (respondent IP8).

7.2.5 Existing agencies were not empowered

Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Development Authority was under-performing

The role of the Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (BMRDA) was described in section 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.1.2. Three out of five of the IAS respondents observed that the BMRDA did not develop and function as it had been expected to, especially in relation to improving coordination between agencies and regulating development in the Bangalore Metropolitan Region (BMR) through its planning role. Four other respondents outside the government category also raised this as an issue. Discussions focussed around its poor streamlining of the institutional framework, its lack of financial autonomy and the attitudes of the officers attached to the agency. A respondent from the BMLTA said that the BMRDA had not functioned as well as expected, and now the BMLTA is expected to fill the gap by performing the planning and coordination role in urban transport for the area that had been under the jurisdiction of the BMRDA. The same view was put forward by respondent IP1, who said that the agency did not develop like other development authorities in other cities, such as Chennai and Mumbai, where the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority and the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority have become powerful in the regional area. Respondent IG6 explained that when the regional authorities were set up in Chennai and Mumbai, the city development authorities were abolished and their powers consolidated under the regional authorities,

which has enabled them to be successful in improving coordination among agencies. However, when the BMRDA was created in Bangalore in 1986, the BDA was maintained to function alongside with BMRDA with overlapping functions and jurisdiction. Reference to the Draft Urban Development Policy (2009) for the Karnataka State reveals proposals to abolish all the urban development authorities (including the BDA) and local planning authorities and to transfer their powers to the urban local bodies as advocated in the 74th Constitutional Amendment. However, this policy has yet to be approved by the State Government.

The BMRDA's lack of financial autonomy was also cited as a factor in its ineffectiveness. Respondent IA3 said that the BMRDA could not carry out its functions because it was dependent on government grants to run its operations, and thus that money was its main constraint:

“The BMRDA is more of an advisory-cum-planning body – they have a certain amount of legislative control in terms of conversion of land and other things, but funding, NO, funding comes from somewhere else, and finally everything boils down to the dollars and cents, the money has to come... (respondent IA3).

Because of its financial limitations, the BMRDA could not facilitate the coordination of other agencies or effectively drive its plans forward. Respondent IP3 claimed that this led the BMRDA to concentrate on other functions, such as handling approvals for development, which are not financially burdensome. Coordination had to be facilitated by the UDD, but the department had other workloads, so a dedicated body was required. On the other hand, respondent IC2 did not see the absence of financial muscle as an issue, blaming the poor attitude of officers in the BMRDA for its ineffectiveness, saying that they are ‘laid back’ and unproductive.

The limited powers of the Greater Bangalore Municipal Corporation (BBMP)

Four respondents who have had close working relationships with the BBMP claimed that the agency does not have adequate powers for planning and controlling the development that happens inside its area, and that it is struggling under capacity and bureaucracy issues. Although the BBMP should ideally be a powerful urban local body for the city of Bangalore, respondents IC1 and IG7 pointed out that it is not empowered to control other agencies that provide infrastructure and services in its area, or to take action against agencies that violate rules and regulations. Respondent IG7 said that, as a local body, the BBMP should be empowered to plan, but is unable to because power has not been devolved to it by the State

Government, and thus the planning for BBMP's area was performed by the BDA instead. It was also pointed out that the BBMP receives a grant from the State Government to run its operations.

The lack of traffic professionals and the absence of powers to look at the entire traffic system in Bangalore were raised as an issue by respondents IG5 and IC1. Respondent IG5, who was previously employed by the BBMP agreed that the BBMP does not have the overall authority to manage the traffic system in the city, and that the purview lies with the Bangalore Traffic Police. This respondent revealed that its officers are unable to focus on their desk jobs because they are continually distracted by councillors who expect these officers to accompany them for site visits and meetings. This is made worse when the officers are overloaded and lack training for their daily routines. The working culture in the BBMP was also heavily criticised by respondent IC2, who pointed out that the BBMP operates like a typical government agency, filled with complex procedures and long approval processes, and all correspondence with the agency has to be done in writing. Because of this, respondent IC2 claimed that the BBMP could not play a coordinating role inside its own jurisdiction, and a respondent from the local authority felt that there was a need to create a dedicated body to facilitate planning and coordination efforts at the BBMP level.

Short mayoral tenure

At least four respondents, IA2, IP4, IG7 and IG5 viewed the lack of power given to the mayor and his short tenure negatively. The mayor and the deputy mayor only hold office for one year, after which they are re-elected by the councillors. Respondent IG5 said that although the Mayor is the head of the council, he is powerless, and it is the commissioner that enforces the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act (1976) and plays the executive role. These respondents also pointed out that a mayor has no power to command in his own area, whilst having to manage various groups, especially the councillors that elected him. All of these respondents felt that having an elected mayor would make a big difference because he would be accountable to the local citizens, and funds would then be managed more wisely for the benefit of the people.

7.2.6 The growth of Bangalore

The rapid growth of Bangalore in recent years seemed to be a major concern to all the respondents from the IAS groups that head the transport departments in Bangalore, and they all felt that the creation of the BMLTA

would help to alleviate some of the issues. Respondent IG2 highlighted the importance of transport in driving Bangalore's economy, mainly in terms of providing access to new growth areas. This respondent also pointed out that mobility improvements were urgently needed in Bangalore because its growth attracted migrants and a sharp increase in its population. Multimodal transport was developed, with new transport modes such as the METRO and taxis being introduced beside traditional modes such as auto rickshaws, buses and trains. This led to the need to integrate the different modes of transport and improve connectivity, but these modes have been under the purviews of different agencies, and therefore a special body was felt necessary for coordination purposes. Although initiatives were taken to improve the traffic conditions in the city, they were not coordinated efforts, with each agency developing their own traffic interventions and communicating little with each other about them, thus producing sub-optimum results. IP4 commented:

“Resources might have been invested by one agency, again another agency will just do something else in opposite direction, that's why I feel, there is an urgent need to have a unified agency in the city, which can have a comprehensive view, and then direct the relevant agencies” (respondent IP4).

Respondent G1 said that the state administrators looked at successful models in other developed cities in an attempt to address these problems, and seeing how successfully the dedicated transport authorities in Singapore and London were operating and they thought that a similar model could also work in Bangalore. However, it is not clear how comprehensively the administrators looked at these models.

The absence of a comprehensive view for Bangalore

The rapid growth in Bangalore was made worse by the absence of a comprehensive view on how the city should be developed, and this was picked up as an issue by heads of departments and professionals (academics and consultants). It seems to be common for cities around India to not have a clear vision, and to not know exactly what has to be done or how to do it. This is compounded by the absence of effective mechanisms to enforce agencies to deliver. Several respondents pointed out that agencies which are involved in urban planning and development prepare their own plans and programmes based on what they think is desirable rather than by referring to a common policy to set the direction. Respondent IC1 commented:

“Nobody knows what should be done in Bangalore, how it should be done which project has to come where and how it fits” (respondent IC1).

A respondent from the BMLTA asserted that a vision for the city needs to be developed to address these problems, and that all the transport initiatives undertaken must tie into the overall objectives for transport, which must also cohere with the development of other sectors guided by this vision. A similar view was shared by an academic (IA1), who said that an overall view of the city is desperately needed, together with an understanding of how projects in another sectors will impact upon transport.

7.2.7 Reflections

Multiple factors led to the creation of the BMLTA. The central government made a strong push for it by issuing the NUTP in 2006, to which the State Government of Karnataka quickly responded by creating the DULT and BMLTA in 2007. The national initiative only encourages the formation of a single transport agency, but it was an important criterion for creating access to funds. This suggests that access to resources and power was clearly a factor in this reform. The presence of key reformers consisting of senior administrators and politicians in the State Government was also a key factor in its creation (Bauckaert and Pollitt, 2011). The stakeholders supported the initial idea of creating the BMLTA, although at that point they were not aware what was changing and what they were actually supporting.

Coordination was a pressing issue, and a dedicated authority was seen to be necessary for Bangalore to improve coordination among agencies and to overcome poor integration of planning for urban transport. This means that there was an understanding that integration/coordination was crucial for transport regulation (see May et al., 2006) and that transport authorities could provide the solution (as proposed by ADB and World Bank). The reasons for poor coordination seem to centre on the fact that each agency had its own laws, objectives and functions and were competing for scarce funding. There were a large number of semi-autonomous bodies operating in Bangalore, and these agencies were unconnected. No one agency had the coordinating power to bring the agencies together for coordinated effort. They were mostly concerned about fulfilling their own objectives using the available resources rather than collaborating with other agencies to produce unitary outputs. Inter-agency rivalry was also prevalent, as Thakur (1995) observed. Christensen and Laegreid (2006) argue that the presence of too many semi-autonomous agencies increases coordination and accountability

issues, and this applies to Bangalore. Planning was carried out in a fragmented manner by all the agencies that had some role to play in urban development, and in the absence of a comprehensive view of the city and a single or a dedicated body to look at urban transport planning, an overall set of policy objective to guide urban transport development was missing, as was observed in many developed cities (see section 2.4). This disorganised structure existed for many years before the decision to create the BMLTA was made, with the eventual motivation for change being strongly driven by the NUTP and the growth of Bangalore city.

Other factors that have contributed to the need for a transport authority arose from the failure of agencies such as the BMRDA and the BBMP to perform as anticipated, which created a large gulf between their functions on paper and their actual practices. The reasons that were cited for these shortcomings were the agencies' lack of financial strength and powers. It also seemed that there was more desire to create new agencies rather than to streamline existing ones and dissolving irrelevant ones. For example, the existing institutional landscape was not cleaned up before the BMRDA was created, with the functions and jurisdictions of many agencies remaining the same, leading to overcrowding and the overlaps between these agencies. Pangbourne (2010) describes this phenomenon as 'over-stuffing', which conveys both the absence of tidying up existing institutions and cramming the institutional space. This weakened the role of the BMRDA and, combined with its lack of funding powers, made it ineffective even though it had the oversight of the chief minister and legislative support. This suggests the importance of funding capacity for coordinating agencies.

The BBMP was a weak city corporation, like many other local authorities in developing countries that Gwilliam (1997) points to. It was empowered neither in terms of authority nor capacity, and hence failed to plan and develop the city or to take control of the agencies operating in its area. This reflects the reluctance of the State Government to devolve powers for urban planning to local bodies as the 74th amendment of the Constitution advocated. City leadership was missing, as the mayoral role was deliberately made weak through a short tenure and no accountability to the citizens. The failure of the BMRDA and the BBMP also points towards the poor system of accountability, with actors from the agencies failing to take responsibility for performing their agencies' stipulated functions – a situation that was enabled by the lack of sanctions for non-performance, which may also explain the high level of corruption (Cheema, 2005).

Whilst empowering these bodies could have largely solved the problems, this was not an easy task as it would have involved major reforms and amendments to acts that may not have been very politically desirable as they would have involved significant risks to the enactors. Big reforms were certainly not favoured, and powerful parastatal agencies appear to resist any ceding of power to others as argued by Grindle and Thomas (1989) and Down (1967). Furthermore, the State Government was reluctant to devolve any powers to the city government. Hence, creating a new set-up with similar functions to BMRDA, address some of the issues without too much disturbance to the existing equilibrium of the institutional set-up was the easiest escape route for policy elites. However, without tackling basic issues such as empowerment and accountability, it is unlikely that the creation of BMLTA will bring about the anticipated changes.

7.3 Research question 2: What types of autonomy have been given to the authority?

Given the rhetoric behind the reform that led to creating the BMLTA, this research question aims to explore the extent to which the reform has become a reality. Table 7.3 shows the summary of findings for this research question. The first section explains the creation of the BMLTA as a committee and the powers given to the authority in terms of legislative support and funding. The second part touches on the capacity of the body in terms of its leadership and human resource capacity. This is followed by an explanation of its working mechanism and how it works within its boundary and power constraints.

Table 7.3: Matrix showing responses to research question 2

What types of autonomy have been given to the authority ?					
	Head of departments/IAS officers (IG1, IG2, IP1, IP4, IP6)	Government agencies (IG3, IG4, IG5, IG6, IG7, IG8)	Parastatal agencies (IP2, IP3, IP5, IP7, IP8)	Academics (IA1, IA2, IA3)	Professionals (IC1, IC2, IC3)
Powers that have been delegated: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning function, but no powers to drive the plans • Coordination function • Dispute resolution • No powers over other agencies 	IG1, IG2, IP1 IP1, IP4, IG1, IG2 IP1 IG1, IP4	IG4, IG6, IG7 IG3, IG4, IG6, IG7 IG3, IG4 IG3, IG4	 IP3 IP8	IA3 IA1, IA3 IA3	IC1 IC1 IC1 IC1, IC2
How are powers exercised? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Through BMLTA committee and sub-committee meetings • Assistance / preparation of studies and plan 	IG1, IP1 IG1	IG3, IG4, IG7, IG3, IG4, IG7			
Working mechanism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hand-holding, participatory method 	IG1	IG3, IG6, IG7		IA1	

What types of autonomy have been given to the authority ?					
	Head of departments/IAS officers (IG1, IG2, IP1, IP4, IP6)	Government agencies (IG3, IG4, IG5, IG6, IG7, IG8)	Parastatal agencies (IP2, IP3, IP5, IP7, IP8)	Academics (IA1, IA2, IA3)	Professionals (IC1, IC2, IC3)
Working mechanism (cont'd)					
• Through discussion	IG1, IP1	IG3, IG4, IG6, IG7,			
• Provide technical advice	IG1	IG3, IG4			IC2
Funding mechanism					
• Funding from JNNURM	IG1		IP8	IA1	IC1
• No funding muscle	IG1, IG2, IP1, IP4	IG3, IG4, IG7	IP3, IP8	IA2	IC1
Obstacles to pass BMLTA Bill					
Absence of consensus from relevant agencies	IG1	IG3, IG4	IP2	IA1, IA2	
Insufficient push from State Government	IG1, IP1, IP4			IA2	IC2
Proposal for MPC	IG1, IG2	IG4, IG6	IP3	IA2	
Proposal for BGB	IG1	IG4, IG5			IC2

**IG1, IG3 and IG4 are from BMLTA

7.3.1 The BMLTA as a committee

According to the BMLTA respondents, the BMLTA was created through a Government Order in 2007 to operate at the BMR level where the BMRDA also operates. It was set-up under the DULT – a wing under the UDD. There was no consultation held with stakeholders on the model and functions it would adopt prior to its creation, with the decisions being made by the State Government alone. It was felt that a consultation process was not necessary because the members of the committee were to be representatives from all the agencies involved in urban transport planning and development. Respondents from the BMLTA see themselves as the UMTA for Bangalore, providing a new platform for agencies to meet and discuss urban transport issues. It was stressed that the BMLTA is only a committee and not an authority, as the name suggest. The committee was tasked with planning and coordination roles, which were explained in section 3.3.1.4. The BMLTA's function is limited to buses, taxis, para-transit and non-motorised transport, and has no remit over rail and goods vehicles. It also has no responsibility for traffic management or safety issues.

The majority of the respondents understood the BMLTA's role to be as a coordinator and planner, but they argued about the effectiveness of the set-up, given the model and powers it holds. Respondent IC1 saw the BMLTA as a committee that only meets as and when necessary and not a proper organisation, which is a long way away from the actual function of a transport authority, which has to operate on a daily basis. He commented:

“The BMLTA is a committee, it is not a day-to-day operational body and it cannot be the kind of agent for funding... They meet once in a month, they will not be able to do every day. Ultimately we need another transport authority” (respondent IC1).

7.3.2 The powers given to BMLTA

Respondents from the BMLTA noted that the Government Order which sanctioned its creation does not give it the authority to exercise powers over other agencies and that there is an absence of legal support which formalises its roles and functions. The creation of the BMLTA does not affect the powers and functions of other agencies, all of which continue to exist and function as they did before.

It was revealed that the BMLTA was set up as a committee and not as an authority because the agencies which were supposed to surrender their powers and functions were reluctant to do so. Empowering the BMLTA was

not a straightforward issue, as respondent IG1 pointed out, because it cannot be empowered without curtailing the powers of other agencies, mainly the BDA and the BMRDA. Half of the respondents said that the planning functions it has are not effective as it does not have the power to implement plans due to a lack of funding powers. Respondents from the BMLTA claimed that it is impossible for them to coordinate without powers to dictate and issue directives to other agencies.

Respondent IA2 thought that the BMLTA was created for legitimate purposes to gain funding support from the central government. It is staffed with junior officers and is too weak to require any other agencies to attend meetings or issue any directives. Although the BMLTA bill was prepared in 2008, it has yet to be enacted, and because of its lack of legitimate authority the respondents referred to it by various other names, including a 'recommending body', and saying that it performed 'coordination without teeth'. Respondents IP1, IP3, IG3 and IG4 felt that BMLTA's only significant role could be to act as a dispute resolution body rather than a planner and a coordinator. Even though the BMLTA's powers and structure were held to be insufficient by most respondents, respondent IA3 said that the model it has adopted is appropriate in the context of Bangalore, although it may still be operating at a suboptimal level. This respondent felt that the creation of a strong coordinating authority is not practical in the context of India.

7.3.3 The BMLTA bill

Respondents provided many different reasons to explain why the BMLTA bill prepared in 2008 has not yet been passed. Besides the long process that is involved in enacting any piece of legislation, respondents pointed to the absence of collective consensus, an insufficient push by the State Government, proposals for a MPC, and the Bengaluru Governance Bill as factors.

Five respondents from different agencies said that attaining collective consensus from agencies affected by the BMLTA bill was critical before the bill could be passed in parliament. The BMLTA bill requires some of the existing agencies to give up their powers, which they are unwilling to do, and if they could be made to agree on this, amendments would then have to be made to the existing rules of these agencies. Whilst respondents from the BMLTA thought that consensus from the agencies was needed before the bill could be passed, respondent IG2 asserted that it was more important to pass the BMLTA bill first and then to get the relevant agencies to make

changes to their acts later on. But respondents from the BMLTA pointed out that it not just passing the Act that matters, but what content the Act has – i.e. what powers it assigns to the BMLTA and its role vis-à-vis other agencies.

An ex-employee of the BMLTA (IC2) was of view that that the BMLTA bill has been difficult to push through because it is not supported by senior civil servants in the State Government and lacks political backing. This view was supported by four other respondents, with one IAS (IP1) pointing out that the State Government is probably reluctant because to pass it because it will reduce their power to make decisions for the fast growing capital city. He commented:

“State Government is there for their own survival, they will not take any decisions that will reduce the importance of the State Government. The mayor and commissioners are given [a] short tenure deliberately, to make them weak” (respondent IP1).

Another respondent, IA2, expressed his scepticism about the actual intention of the State Government. This respondent believed that even if the BMLTA were to be given legislative backing, the State Government would still not provide them with resources such as manpower to enable them to operate effectively, and thus legislative support would be meaningless.

Respondents from the government sector highlighted other reasons for the BMLTA’s lack of empowerment, including the alternative proposals to reform the institutional structure in Bangalore (such as the creation of MPC) and the enactment of the Bengaluru Governance Bill. Respondent IG5 and IG6 highlighted the issue of the change in ruling parties at the state-level, which has led to a lack of continuity in policy implementation, with the new party having different priorities and visions for development. However, two other respondents, IG1 and IC1 thought that this was not a major issue as the new party also promotes development.

Creation of MPC and proposal for Bengaluru Governance Bill

Respondent IA2 said that the proposed MPC – a regional planning body for Bangalore – is part of the 74th amendment’s initiative to ensure that planning for the metropolitan area is done in an integrated way across the departments, not in silos within departments. This was supported by a respondent from the BMLTA (IG1), who said that the 74th amendment requires the creation of an organisation like the MPC – a one-stop centre where all the planning is done and transport is regulated. The proposal for the MPC is very strong as it is supported by the constitution, but the State

Government is still contemplating its creation. Respondent IG1 revealed that the proposal for the MPC is one of the reasons why the BMLTA bill has not been enacted, because if the MPC is created with legislative backing, then the BMLTA will be part of the MPC, and thus the BMLTA Act will no longer be needed. This respondent believed that the BMLTA should be placed under the MPC because a dedicated body will be needed to look at transport planning at the city level to ensure that it is done in an appropriate manner. However, a respondent from the BMLTA thought that the central government was creating conflicting directives by recommending both the creation of the MPC and the UMTA, which have overlapping functions. This respondent thought that the BMLTA is not necessary, and that its functions should be performed by the MPC instead. An IAS officer (IG2) argued that the BMLTA and the MPC cannot both exist independently because this would fragment planning roles and dilute the powers of the MPC, and thus the BMLTA should either be dissolved or absorbed as a unit under the MPC.

Respondent IG6 described the model envisioned for the MPC in more detail. He contended that when the MPC materialises, the BMLTA will have to be either dissolved or absorbed, but that DULT could continue to exist because its jurisdiction covers the state. It was pointed out that as the BMRDA is envisaged to become the MPC, the BDA will have to be divested of its planning role when it is created, and then solely focus on project development. The MPC promises to provide a good platform for integrating transport and land use, which has been neglected. Respondent IA2 was confident that the MPC would eventually be created, but was unsure if it would be properly empowered, suggesting that this would depend on the personality behind its creation.

Although the proposal for the MPC has existed for almost twenty years, it has still not materialised for various reasons. Respondents IG6 and IP3 attributed it to power issues, as its creation requires powers and roles of existing agencies to be streamlined, which means changes to governing acts and laws. It was also revealed that there are power struggles over who should lead the MPC. Thus, its creation will require numerous changes, but nobody seems sure about the kinds of changes that will have to be made for it to be effective, and hence there has been extended silence about this proposal.

Another proposal in the pipeline is the Bengaluru Governance Bill. Respondent IC2 said that some politically influential individuals are pushing for this for personal fame. This bill should ideally absorb the BMLTA bill, but

it was highlighted that the bill says nothing about transport. Respondents from the BMLTA confirmed that they were asked to put the BMLTA bill on hold because of the Bengaluru Governance Bill, and to wait until decisions were made.

7.3.4 Funding capacity

Respondents from the BMLTA said that they shared financial resources with the DULT and that they have a limited dedicated fund to carry out their own initiatives. One of these respondents pointed out that the BMLTA's status as a committee does not enable it to source its own funds, and that it is therefore dependent on the State Government for funding support, adding that if the BMLTA were transformed into a statutory body, then it would have a better chance of gaining financial autonomy. This respondent explained that the State Government has allocated Rs10 Crores (£240,000) under the city transport fund as a one-off budget, and that half of this has been pledged to the cycling project in Madiwala. Most of the agencies in Bangalore are currently required to implement the BMLTA's proposals and plans using their own funding, and this is why the BMLTA cannot be forceful in driving its plans – they are dependent on the budgets of other agencies.

Five respondents from a variety of groups noted the power of money in India, and felt that the BMLTA would be able to make a lot of things happen with strong financial autonomy. Two IAS officers proposed funding models for the BMLTA. IP4 explained that it would not be necessary for the BMLTA to provide the full funding cost for projects as a 30% share of project cost is adequate to provide the push. Alternatively, the BMLTA could be designed as the fund distributor for the various transport initiatives undertaken in the BMR, or it could be transformed into a nodal agency that distributed funds for implemented projects with assistance from international development agencies.

Financial assistance for urban transport projects undertaken in Bangalore from the JNNURM seemed to offer some relief to the pressure on the BMLTA to provide funding support for these projects. Respondents IG1 and IP8 pointed to some of the transport initiatives implemented under the JNNURM programme, such as the Vajra premium bus programme, which includes a service to the airport and the construction of transit and traffic management centres around the city. Respondent IA1 explained how the funding mechanism has changed since the arrival of the JNNURM. Procedures and guidelines have been streamlined, and there is a systematic

procedure in place for states and cities to apply for funding from central government instead of in the *ad hoc* manner seen in the past. Respondent IC1 pointed out that JNNURM's power and control comes through money and that the BMLTA would play a more meaningful role if it could do the same.

7.3.5 Capacity issues

Respondents from the BMLTA highlighted that the BMLTA is not a separate entity, but part of DULT - it is the same organisation under different names. Unfortunately, DULT's capacity in terms of manpower, technical expertise and funding is also limited. The government order which sanctioned the creation of DULT specifies its staffing criteria. Only three permanent posts were approved, and the rest of the staff was engaged on a contractual basis. The contract staff lacked commitment, however, tending to leave for better career opportunities. To bridge this gap, the BMLTA came to work through sub-committees, as explained in section 3.3.1.4.

Respondents from DULT admitted that they are not able to give full attention to the BMLTA because DULT has to deal with areas outside Bangalore, which are large and involve a substantial amount of time and work including a large amount of long distance travelling. These respondents also acknowledged that it is not easy to deal with other strong, established agencies inside Bangalore without sufficient powers and capacities. Hence most of these respondents said that the BMLTA needed to be a separate entity from DULT, with sufficient powers, resources and personnel to operate as a dedicated body, although one (IG4) criticised the arguments for increasing its capacity on the grounds that this alone would never be enough, and that the BMLTA has to choose between the ability to do things on their own or the ability to get things done (through coordination and good network), and if it is the latter, then it has a high enough capacity to do so with its existing resources.

Some respondents noted that the BMLTA has been granted approval by the State Government to use the Centre for infrastructure, Sustainable Transportation and Urban Planning (CISTUP) in the Indian Institute of Science (IISC) in order to build its technical capabilities. A respondent from the BMLTA said that this technical cell should be able to help stakeholders look at their plans from a wider perspective so that all the infrastructure projects could be planned and implemented taking the requirements and demands for public transport facilities into consideration. In addition, the

technical cell is also expected to review the various plans prepared by agencies and to integrate transport elements. This cell should ideally have the capability for assessing the technical aspects of new project proposals, for giving feedback for improvements and for providing alternatives. This respondent was confident that once this cell was fully operational, it will be able to provide the necessary platform for enabling everyone to look in the same direction, as well as inculcating awareness about the importance of public transport among local administrators who are still focused on road construction.

The BMLTA has been granted approval to increase its recruitment, but details of this were not revealed by the respondents. A respondent from the BMLTA highlighted the difficulties that exist for hiring the right talent due to the limited number of experts in urban transport planning. Two other respondents agreed that a lack of urban transport expertise is a drawback for Bangalore, and respondent IG6 claimed that to bridge this gap transport agencies there often seek assistance from international development agencies such as ADB for technical support.

7.3.6 Leadership issues

7.3.6.1 The Chief Secretary's role as the chairman of the BMLTA

Respondents from the BMLTA shared the view that having the Chief Secretary as its chairman gives its decisions a lot of strength, and claimed that stakeholders must go by what the committee decides. However, four respondents argued that although the Chief Secretary has great decision-making capacity, the decisions made by the BMLTA itself are not binding because the committee is powerless. Respondent IP8 commented:

“When the Chief Secretary ... is deciding in his capacity as the Chief Secretary, they will follow his decisions, but the Chief Secretary as somebody of the BMLTA means there'll be little authority. These agencies do not want their authority to be taken by someone else, all these while these agencies had the powers to make their own decisions” (respondent IP8).

Although the decisions made by the BMLTA may not be binding, Respondents IG2 and IC1 said that the appointment of the Chief Secretary as the chairman helps to cool the turf wars among agencies, resolve the differences between them and provide the opportunity for them to present their cases so that some decisions can be taken. This might be true in meetings, where the members might go with the decisions made by the Chief Secretary as a show of respect, but the reality on the ground appears

to be different. Respondent IA1 said that problems often occur during the execution of projects on the ground, when the agencies involved are reluctant to give up their powers and share their resources. Hence, projects are delayed and excuses are made to postpone their implementation.

Respondents from the BMLTA highlighted the disadvantages of operating under the oversight of the Chief Secretary. They said that because the Chief Secretary is very busy, it is difficult to find a time when he can chair the meetings. They felt that the BMLTA needed a full-time chairman who could look into operational matters on a daily basis, and they understand that this could only happen if the BMLTA receives a legal mandate.

7.3.6.2 The Commissioner's role

The BMLTA is led by a senior IAS officer, designated as a Commissioner. Six respondents expressed their views of the merits of the BMLTA's existing leadership, with none of the respondents expressing any criticism. Respondent IG6 said that the commissioner had undertaken proactive initiatives and received good support from the stakeholders, but that she faced difficulties because the BMLTA lacks empowerment. Respondent IA2 expressed his view that the commissioner was appointed to fill the post as she is a high-flyer whose career development her seniors want to curtail by giving her a position in a powerless body like DULT/BMLTA, where she cannot do very much to progress. This respondent claimed that good IAS officers in India get stationed in the 'parking lots' where they cannot exercise their powers, or are given multiple positions in the government so that they cannot pay full attention to one particular agency. It is worth noting that the Commissioner was also given additional responsibilities as the Commissioner for the Survey and Settlement Department in 2011, before being transferred to the Animal Husbandry and Fisheries Department in January 2012, and the secretary of the Youth Services Department in September that year.³²

7.3.7 Working mechanism

All of the respondents agreed that the BMLTA lacks the requisite powers to carry out its planning and coordination roles effectively. Because of this, the BMLTA has adopted a softer working approach with other stakeholders. According to respondents from the BMLTA, the steps it has taken include

³² <http://persmin.nic.in/ersheet/MultipleERS>, accessed on 6th November 2012

hand-holding in preparation of technical studies, and providing consultations and recommendations about appropriate strategies for improving the conditions of the urban transport system. The main aim of these approaches is to convince the relevant agencies to implement the decisions made by the committee or the recommendations proposed in the plans. The achievements of the BMLTA in securing its intended outcomes is presented in section 7.4.2.

7.3.8 Reflections

The actual autonomy given to BMLTA as a transport authority is explored using the six dimensions of autonomy proposed by Verhoest et al. (2004) and Laegreid et al. (2006), as shown in table 7.4. BMLTA does not seem to enjoy any formal autonomy as a transport authority. Although some of the respondents claim that they have looked at LTA Singapore, it appears as though they have only copied the name rather than focussing on roles and powers.

Table 7.4: BMLTA's autonomy compared to the dimensions of autonomy proposed by Varhoest et al. (2004) and Laegreid et al. (2006)

Autonomy	Dimensions	Autonomy given to SPAD	
		Strength	Weaknesses
Legal autonomy	The extent to which the legal status of an agency prevents the government from altering the allocation of decision-making competencies		Absence of legislative support
Personnel	<p>Strategic Personnel Matters Salaries, criteria for promotion, evaluation, recruitment and downsizing</p> <p>Operational Personnel matters Wage increases, promotion, evaluation, recruitment and dismissal of individual employees</p>		Shares personnel with DULT – absence of dedicated personnel for BMLTA
Financial	<p>Make loans for investment Set tariff/prices for products and services</p> <p>Conclude legal contracts with private actors</p> <p>Generates own revenue</p>		Shares financial resources with DULT- fully dependent on government grant
Policy	<p>Strategic Policy Matters Setting own goals and objectives, setting policies on transport matters and approval of project proposals</p> <p>Operational Policy matters Manage day-to-day activities</p>	Building its niche in uncontested, failed policy areas	
Intervention	The extent to which the agency is free from 'reporting' to the government		Reports to the Chief Secretary and Department of Urban Development

Although the Karnataka State Government was enthusiastic when it set up the BMLTA in 2007 on the heels of the release of the NUTP in 2006, they have not made a corresponding effort in empowering it. The BMLTA has been assigned with planning and coordination roles, but has only been set-up as a high-powered committee, not as the agency it would need to be to successfully undertake such roles. It was probably set-up in this way as this represented the cheapest form, requiring no dedicated resources and fitting the existing cultural norms. Committees are infrequently involved in day-to-day operations, only meeting as and when required, and the BMLTA is no

exception to this rule. Although a coordinating committee can also be a form transport authority, as per the World Bank definition in the *Cities on the Move* Report (2002) – see also section 2.3.1- whether this model is sufficient in the context of Bangalore is another matter. Its committee status also means that its existence is fragile – it could be dissolved if and when necessary. Egeberg (2003) observed that the impact of a committee is less profound because its participants are engaged on a part-time basis and remain primarily attached to other organisations. The credibility of the BMLTA committee as a form of transport authority can be further questioned because it has been set up without legislative backing or financial autonomy, which are crucial for driving its coordination and planning roles. Transport authorities' need for legislative backing and funding support has been highlighted as being crucial by ADB, GTZ and the World Bank (see section 2.3.1), and is observed in many transport authorities in developed cities.

Hence, the State Government's intention for the BMLTA can be questioned. It could be that the BMLTA was created for the State to gain legitimate access to the JNNURM funds provided by the central government by complying with the NUTP. The absence of a strong political champion with the adequate authority and power could have also been a reason. Or perhaps senior administrators realised that although an effective coordinating authority was crucial in Bangalore, they might have been too scared to implement bold reforms, attempting not to rock the boat too much for fear of being transferred as a punishment due to the strong politician-civil servants fusion highlighted by Dwivedi (2003). This unwillingness is probably increased by uncertainties regarding reforms whose outcomes are not guaranteed, as pointed out by researchers (Jones and Kettl, 2003; Toonen, 2003).

The creation of the BMLTA as a committee under the UDD indicates the reluctance of the State Government to devolve any powers for championing the BMLTA to the city authority. The State Government may be seeking to retain its control in Bangalore, which has experienced tremendous growth in recent years and is the source Karnataka state's wealth. This conforms to other researchers' findings that central or state governments want to retain their powers, with decentralisation (if happens) often being limited to devolving administrative responsibilities without any real powers (see Larson and Ribot, 2004; Azfar et al., 2001; Tang and Bloom, 2000). However, despite strong push for decentralisation in the State, the creation of the BMLTA cannot be considered as a form of decentralisation, as it has not

fulfilled the necessary criteria of transferring political, fiscal or administrative powers, as explained in section 2.5.1.

Many reasons were offered to explain why the BMLTA has still not been formalised five years after its creation. The strongest ones appear to be the existence of strong, embedded agencies that have no desire to relinquish any of their powers as suggested by Down (1967), the State Government's unwillingness to loosen its grip, and uncertainty concerning the best transport regulation model. In addition, the access to JNNURM funds was assured, and there has been no sanction from central government for the creation of an ineffective BMLTA. The enactment of the BMLTA bill requires consensus from stakeholders and changes to governing acts in order to create a clear line of responsibility and accountability. There were also political changes after the state election in May 2008, in which the Bharatiya Janata Party took control from the previous coalition government. It is possible that the new policy elites in the State Government were not keen to continue what the previous government had started, or that political interest in the reform programme has faded, as Peters (2010) has suggested.

The empowerment of the BMLTA is also dependent on other reforms awaiting State Government decisions, such as the MPC and the Bengaluru Governance Bill. This would fit with Toonen's (2003) description of the reform process as an ongoing process in which reform at one level can trigger or inhibit reforms at another, creating issues and problems that need to be resolved before further reform can take place. However, at this point the State Government does not seem to be keen to create the MPC. It is a clear sign that they are not ready to devolve any powers to the city-level or to make any major structural changes, indicating that they want to retain control.

7.4 Research question 3: How have the reforms affected decision-making process in policy-making and the selection and implementation of transport projects?

This research question was designed to explore the BMLTA's achievements in relation to the powers it has received and the range of actors who have been involved. It also explores the types of issues and matters discussed at the committee meetings, including the concerns of stakeholders involved in the decision-making loop. The extent to which these decisions were implemented was also explored, and the reasons for non-compliance sought. To understand the extent to which the BMLTA committee has been effective, and its achievements to-date, the views of respondents on this issue were explored. Table 7.5 presents the summary of responses.

Table 7.5: Matrix showing responses to research question 3

How have the reforms affected decision-making process in policy-making and the selection and implementation of transport projects?					
	Heads of departments/IAS officers (IG1, IG2, IP1, IP4, IP6)	Government agencies (IG3, IG4, IG5, IG6, IG7, IG8)	Parastatal agencies (IP2, IP3, IP5, IP7, IP8)	Academics (IA1, IA2, IA3)	Consultancy (IC1, IC2, IC3)
There is a platform to bring the stakeholders together under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary	IG1	IG3, IG4, IG6, IG7		IA1	IC1
BMLTA's decision is not binding, only advisor	IG1, IG2, IP1, IP6	IG3, IG5, IG7	IP2, IP3, IP8	IA1, IA3	
Achievements :	IG1	IG4, IG6, IG7			IC2
- Better planning					
- Better coordination	IG1, IG2, IP1	IG3, IG4, IG6	IP2, IP3, IP5, IP8	IA1	IC1
- NMT initiatives	IG1	IG7			IC1
- BRT project	IG1	IG3, IG6	IP8	IA1	
Failures	IG1				
- Enforcing guidelines					
- Parking and Pedestrian Policy	IG1	IG3, IG4			

**IG1, IG3 and IG4 are from BMLTA

7.4.1 The decision-making platform

Respondents from the BMLTA expressed satisfaction in relation to their success in drawing all the stakeholders involved in planning and managing urban transport in the BMR to a common table to discuss issues and make collaborative decisions under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary. However, whilst the respondents from the BMLTA were content with their success in bringing all the stakeholders together, the performance of the committee was heavily criticised by one member of the committee:

“The BMLTA is not functioning. I have attended four meetings of that coordination body, but it has nothing to do – they don’t set deadlines for completion, and after three months the same item is discussed in the meeting again. They site some reason or another why they don’t have the authority to enforce it” (respondent IA3).

As mentioned in section 3.3.1.4, there were at least twenty-one members in the BMLTA committee, and respondent IG7 said that the existence of too many committee members posed its own challenges, with each member having his own ideas and wanting to get things done his way, making it difficult to gain consensus and arrive at a common decision. Seeking consensus from the majority is important in the context of India, which is a liberal democracy. Respondents IA2, IG4, IP2 and IP1 pointed out that there is no ‘one man rule’ in India, so all decisions must be collectively agreed upon. Whilst this is sometimes seen as a stumbling block in decision-making because it causes delays, respondents IA2 and IG4 said that consensus decisions are more stable and help to expedite implementation on the ground.

One of the IAS officers pointed out that the decision-making set-up varies at each level of government. Councillors are powerful at the local level, where their writ prevails, and hence decisions by the BMLTA that are supposed to be driven by the BBMP will only be implemented if councillors give them the go-ahead. If the proposals made by the BMLTA require seeking a higher mandate from the State Government (such as the in the proposal for the parking policy), approvals have to first be sought from legislators, before the proposal moves on to the Cabinet and the Chief Minister. This means that the BMLTA does not have an ultimate say, with its decisions being dependent on approvals by other authorities.

A respondent from the BMLTA pointed out that there are pressure points in the decision-making platform and that agencies still continue to do what

they want despite objections from the BMLTA. Two respondents from the BMLTA reported that working with the strongest parastatal agencies is a real challenge, especially with their limited powers. They pointed out that a majority of these agencies have large numbers of employees and are very strong in terms of both their manpower and financial autonomy compared to the BMLTA, which has less than fifteen permanent employees. Interestingly, most of the parastatal agencies were perceived to be arrogant and egotistical by a majority of the respondents, even those representing these agencies. For example, respondent IP8 said that his agency and many other parastatals have enjoyed decision-making autonomy for a very long time because they have financial strength, which means that they are free to do what they think is right. Respondent IP3 proudly said that his agency is financially independent and can do whatever it wants using its own resources, with no need to follow the decisions made by the BMLTA. This respondent was also of opinion that the BDA could take over the coordination work because it had all the requisite powers and just needed to be given the mandate. Respondent IC2 explained that the parastatal agencies would not like being told what to do, and if they had to refer to the BMLTA for approval on their decisions, or were bound to the decisions made by the BMLTA, they would fight back.

Against his background, respondents from the BMLTA said that it was much easier to perform their coordinating role outside Bangalore, where the urban local bodies are in desperate need of support for developing an urban transport infrastructure in their areas, and appreciated the assistance and advice that is extended to them. This was cited as one of the reasons why the personnel of DULT/BMLTA prefer to work under the wing of DULT rather than that of the BMLTA. Respondent IG2 was confident that the only way for the BMLTA to deal with these agencies would be through the power extended by financial strength.

7.4.2 The BMLTA's achievements

As explained in section 3.3.1.4, the main official role of the BMLTA is to act as an umbrella organisation for coordinating, planning and implementing urban transport programmes and projects. There were mixed responses about the BMLTA's achievements to-date, with the majority of respondents holding that the BMLTA has been unable to do anything significant with its limited powers, and expecting more out of it as a coordinating authority. However, the respondents did not deny that there have been some

changes in policy since the BMLTA came into existence, and that there have been improvements in coordination amongst agencies, as described in the sections below.

7.4.2.1 Better coordination

Respondents from the BMLTA claimed to have been successful in bringing transport agencies together for discussion before they make decisions, mainly for issues relating to planning, the evaluation of new proposals, and resolving conflicts among during project implementation. The agenda of the meetings is mainly to discuss problems, resolve disputes and seek consensus among the agencies. Respondent IG7 said that the BMLTA exercises its planning role well by providing an opportunity for all the stakeholders to express their views and opinions in the committee meetings. Respondents from the BMLTA claim that through the planning exercises that have been undertaken, they now have a better understanding of the travelling patterns and transport requirements in Bangalore.

Respondent IG2 said that the BMLTA has been successful in facilitating coordination among the parastatal agencies, and between the parastatal and government agencies. A respondent from one of the parastatal agencies explained that a parastatal agency has a different status to a full government agency, and does not have the powers to direct other agencies or call them for meetings for coordination purposes, and hence that they depend on a dedicated body like the BMLTA to perform the task. This respondent felt that there have been significant improvements in working relationship between the BMTC and the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC) in providing the bus service as a result of the BMLTA's coordination role. It was also pointed out that there is better coordination now between the Metro developer - Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited (BMRCL) - and the bus company – BMTC - with the BMTC planning for the provision of a feeder bus system for the Metro. Respondents from the BMLTA seemed to be content with their role in facilitating the project on connectivity improvements to the airport through one of its sub-committees. Other achievements involve the BMLTA's coordinating role in the introduction of the integrated ticketing system.

7.4.2.2 Priorities for non-motorised transport and the BRT

There has been success in new policy areas involving non-motorised transport such as walking and cycling and the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT). Respondent G7 seems to appreciate the detailed project report for urban transport initiatives prepared for the BBMP by the BMLTA, such as the Bicycle Friendly Street Network in Jayanagar. Moreover, the BMLTA has provided funding support of about Rs5 crores (£120,000) for pedestrian and cycling facilities in Madiwala. This respondent admitted that the BBMP does not have sufficient knowledge of urban transport planning or what has to be done in the city area, and the presence of the BMLTA helps to fill this gap. On the other hand, a respondent from the BMLTA expressed frustration in being unable to make the BBMP follow its suggestions.

Another fruitful initiative was the BRT project that was revived after being shelved five years previously. The BMLTA took the initiative to conduct a series of workshops and revised the detailed project report, which it handed over to the BDA for implementation.

The BMLTA has developed a close working relationship with the NGOs such as Citizen Matters, PRAJA, Rider Cycle Foundation and Bangalore City Connect Foundation, with some of these bodies providing assistance in the preparation of transport studies. For example, the Bangalore City Connect Foundation has initiated the Bangalore Traffic and Transport Initiative (BTTI) project, which provides proposals on improving road connectives to relieve congestion, and a special sub-committee was then established under the BMLTA to review and implement these proposals. The BMLTA has also done some work in collaboration with the Rider Cycle Foundation – a special body which promotes cycling in Bangalore – resulting in a dedicated bicycle lane at Jayanagar. Some respondents still see these achievements as displaying the BMLTA's underperformance, however, with respondent IC2 highlighting the fact that the BMLTA should be encouraging public participation through providing a platform for the public to voice their opinions and concerns.

7.4.2.3 Other initiatives

Respondents from the BMLTA did not deny that they have had limited success at the strategic level. The BMLTA has prepared the draft parking policy and the pedestrian policy for Bangalore, but to-date both these policies have not been endorsed by the State Government. Respondent

IG1 expressed frustration about the draft parking policy, which has gone through numerous rounds of revisions but has yet to be approved by the Cabinet. The main difficulty has been in gaining agreement and consensus from the various stakeholders operating in Bangalore – mainly from the BBMP, who will be operating the policy in the city. The BMLTA has also prepared the guidelines for the construction of new traffic management centres in Bangalore, but like many other initiatives, this is only a recommendation, and it is entirely up to the BMTC whether or not they choose to follow it.

7.4.3 Reflection

The importance of decision-making powers for transport authorities was discussed in Section 2.5.4, with Figure 2.1 illustrating the position of transport authorities in the planning and development framework and the critical decision-making powers that they need to perform their roles effectively. It appears as though there is no significant changes to the decision-making arrangement in urban transport after the existence of BMLTA. Although BMLTA committee meetings are chaired by the Chief Secretary and has a credible Commissioner, the decisions made are not effective because the reform itself is weak – strengthening Nye's (2011) argument about the need to combine soft and hard power in order to produce effective strategies. Furthermore, the Chief Secretary is too busy with other commitments and BMLTA may not be a priority for him. A lot of decisions on transport matters are made without the BMLTA, and it is kept outside the loop, not knowing what the latest developments are unless it is informed, making it difficult for it to play an effective coordinating role.

The BMLTA had to work within its constraints, with the absence of statutory powers, and with few resources. It tries to engage on governance through network to improve coordination. For example, in addition to the main BMLTA committee, various sub-committees have been created to look at specific transport areas. The BMLTA actively adopts a handholding and participatory approach, providing technical advice, consultation and helping agencies to prepare studies and detailed project reports. It tries to exert its influence on the process of other agencies by providing them with what they are lacking (such as urban transport expertise) with the aim of changing their perceptions and addressing problems over the long-term. However, such arrangements would still require certain changes to be effective, such as the establishment of mutual trust among agencies, clear

delineations of roles and responsibilities, appropriate monitoring, sufficient capacity, and procedures to deal with non-performance. These are all still lacking in the BMLTA. There is no evidence that BMLTA has included the public in its decision-making process or any intention to include them and this strengthens Sohail et al.'s (2006) argument about the lack of public participation in public transport planning and development in developing countries.

It was noted that although the BMLTA has not been granted any decision-making mandate or powers to drive its decisions, it has nevertheless achieved a certain amount of success, particularly in new, uncontested policy areas or failed policy spaces such as non-motorised transport and with the BRT. However, outside these win-win and neutral spaces it has had little impact. Its attempts to push through the parking policy – which threatens the survival of the BBMP by requiring a much higher parking levy and makes demands on agencies to change their legislation and work procedures – have failed.

Financial autonomy was raised as an important criterion for the BMLTA's success by the majority of respondents and this has also been highlighted as an important criterion by the international development agencies (see ADB, 2009; World Bank, 2005). As a large number of agencies in Bangalore are parastatals which enjoy financial independence, the BMLTA is unlikely to be effective in the absence of any financial muscle, and respondents from the BMLTA highlighted their preference to transform it into a statutory body with legislative backing so that it could source its own funding. The BMRDA and the BDA were once created as parastatal agencies to tackle coordination issues, but they were unsuccessful, and were thus transformed into project development agencies. It was pointed out that the role of a coordinating agency cannot be played by a parastatal agency, and must be undertaken by a government agency, which means BMLTA may have to remain as a government entity to be able to play a coordinating role.

7.5 Research question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reform?

This research question was designed to explore participants' views concerning the factors that determine the success and failure of the BMLTA. Based on the outcomes revealed through considering the third research question, the factors that influenced these outcomes were pursued further in this section. There are two main groups of factors that influence the impacts of the BMLTA – intra-organisational issues and external factors. As many of the intra-organisational issues have been elaborated before, section 7.5.1 will simply provide a brief summary of these issues. This will be followed by an exploration of the external factors in section 7.5.2, which will focus on the cultural issues, political influences and government procedures that indirectly affect the performance of the BMLTA.

7.5.1 Intra-organisational issues in the BMLTA

Respondents' views were sought regarding the factors that are important in for the BMLTA to operate effectively. The responses received were mainly focused around four factors: financial muscle, legal backing, political backing and technical capacity. These respondents had their own ideas about what each of these elements should contribute, and Table 7.6 shows the weight attributed to each of these criteria based on the respondents' comments. Out of these four factors, legal backing was perceived to be the most important, followed by financial autonomy, technical capacity and political backing. Respondents pointed out that these factors do not exist independently and are interrelated.

Table 7.6: Criteria which affect the performance of BMLTA

Respondents	Financial	Legal backing	Political backing	Technical capacity
IA1		Very strong		
IA2	Very strong			
IA3	Very strong	Strong		
IC1	Very strong	Strong		
IC2		Strong		Very strong
IG1	Strong	Strong		Very strong
IG2	Very strong	Strong		
IG3		Strong		
IG4				Very strong
IG5		Very strong	Strong	
IG6		Very strong		
IG7	Strong	Strong		Very strong
IP1	Very strong		Strong	
IP2	Very strong	Strong		Strong
IP3		Very strong		Very strong
IP4	Very strong	Very strong	Very strong	
IP8		Very strong	Strong	

Respondents from the BMLTA said that legislative backing was required to strengthen the structure, model and roles of the BMLTA, but that it would not be sufficient to transform the BMLTA into an authority unless it gave them explicit powers over other agencies and increased their capacity both in terms of human resources and technical competence. It was also pointed out that the BMLTA would have to take the form of a statutory body to enable it to source funds, but however, this might then transform it into another profit-oriented parastatal body.

Some respondents, mainly those representing the parastatal agencies, showed signs of fear that the BMLTA would overpower them if it were to acquire legal backing. For example, respondent IP8 did not deny that legal support was important for the BMLTA to be able to direct other agencies, but he felt that the coordinating body must be empowered in such a way that it complements rather than threatens, and that it should be able to find a win-win situation for all involved parties. Respondent IP3 viewed the BMLTA as being fine as it is, and argued that it does not need further empowerment. Whilst all these respondents discussed a dedicated piece of legislation concerning the BMLTA, respondent IC1 expected more streamlining will

happen if the central government issued general legislation for all UMTA's in India. This would ensure that all the UMTA's in India were given legislative backing automatically, and that they would have similar characteristics and powers.

Several respondents argued that financial autonomy is the most important element that the BMLTA needs to be successful. There were three interesting proposals made by respondents to turn the BMLTA into a nodal agency for distributing funds, that it contributes 30% of project costs, or that it be given the authority to approve projects above certain costs without providing actual funding. However, all these proposals would require a lot of support, and the State Government's will to devolve some of its powers to the BMLTA.

Although the BMLTA is led by the Chief Secretary of the State, many respondents saw his presence alone as being insufficient to drive the BMLTA, and felt that strong political backing would be required to back up the decisions made by the BMLTA at the cabinet level. Respondents IP1, IP5, IP8 and IA3 pointed to the success factors of the Metro project, which they strongly linked to the presence of strong political support at all levels. References were also made to other cities in India that have developed good bus rapid transit networks, such as Ahamedabad in Gujarat, which enjoys strong political support from the chief minister and strong municipal corporation. There was a general feeling among the IAS officers that city leadership was clearly lacking in the BMLTA and that it could be more effective if it was led by an empowered mayor.

7.5.2 External factors

In addition to the four main factors listed above, respondents also raised several other issues concerning the institutional setting that influence the performance of the BMLTA, including cumbersome procedures and delays in decision-making, a strong nexus between politicians and civil servants, and the impact of various cultural issues. These will be discussed in turn.

7.5.2.1 Cumbersome government procedures and delays in decision-making

Five respondents highlighted the fact that implementing agencies are often caught up in and slowed down by complex procedures, long approval processes and poor fund flows. This is worse for projects that involve land acquisition, as the process here is very complicated and takes a

considerable amount of time, sometimes as long as two years to complete. This results in projects not commencing on time, delays, and increases in project costs due to increases in the price of raw materials. Respondent IG7 shared his experiences in seeking approval for the tender process from the State Government for a project by the BBMP, which was costed at just Rs5 crores (£120,000). Although the source of funds came from the BBMP, the approval process itself took almost a year as it had to pass through so many administrative levels. This respondent pointed out that political influence has to be used in such cases to cut down on the bureaucratic processes. This scenario probably explains why many policy decisions are not implemented on the ground. Without a strong push and good incentives, agencies are unlikely to get involved in the complex implementation process. Hence, it not just the absence of a mandate for the BMLTA to drive its decisions that is responsible for the low amounts of projects that it has successfully implemented, but also an overall administrative that is not conducive to implementing policies on the ground.

7.5.2.2 The strong nexus between politicians and civil servants

There is a strong relationship between civil servants and politicians in Bangalore, with politicians interfering in the implementation of projects and transferring civil servants, mainly IAS officers. Respondents IG5 and IG7 shared their experiences of the difficulties in implementing infrastructure projects in the Bangalore corporation area due to the political sentiment played on by councillors. Councillors have to be consulted for every change that happens at the project level in Bangalore, which leads to unwanted delays. Moreover, IG5 and IG7 also pointed out that the councillors are self-centric, being keen to draw development into their areas without much concern for other deprived areas. Councillors can also exert a strong influence on the mayor, and respondent P4 shared information about how a group of councillors were able to convince the mayor to divert Rs20 crores (£480,000) from funds allocated for creating footpaths to the Metro project and to other road projects, which were not priorities at that time.

Two academic respondents pointed to the strong control that politicians exert over civil servants, describing how they dictate who should be awarded what project, and claimed that there is hardly any transparency in the decision-making process. Civil servants are often obliged to follow politicians because any resistance or non-compliance means that they will be out of a job. Eight respondents across various groups pointed out that the short tenures for civil servants is a serious problem, and that there is a strong

relationship between politicians and the senior IAS officers that head the departments. These officers are re-shuffled as and when needed, and this is more likely to happen when new political executives are appointed. For example, the BMLTA has had three commissioners in the first five years of its operations, and the BDA had three different commissioners in 2012 alone. When the new Chief Minister for Karnataka assumed office in July 2012, he reshuffled the positions of nineteen IAS officers in the State within two months of the start of his tenure.³³ One of the IAS officers forcefully asserted that the strong link between politicians and civil servants must be broken to enable civil servants to work without fear and to curb corruption, expressing her point by saying that IAS officers must be stopped being treated as 'musical chairs' and given a fixed tenure of at least three years to ensure that there is some continuity in policy implementation.

Respondent IA2 pointed out that coordination has mainly been achieved in Bangalore through the use of political mediums. Specialised bodies such as the Agenda for Bengaluru Infrastructure and Development Task Force (ABIDE) are tasked with such responsibilities. Their members are influential personalities in the State, and they are handpicked by the chief minister to drive the agenda of the State Government forward for them so that they need not get themselves entangled in the complex bureaucratic processes. Respondent G6 thought that the role of ABIDE overlaps with the coordinating role that the BMLTA is supposed to play, and that this further weakens BMLTA's role.

7.5.2.3 Cultural issues

Respondent IA2 gave his personal view about the relevant cultural aspects of life in India:

"India is a collection of different cultures. Each one allows the other to live, and that means I don't come to you and tell you that you should live like this, as in western countries. Western countries have gone through the culture of one dominant ethnic group or dominant religious structure saying this is the way you live; we don't have that" (respondent IA2).

Respondent IC3 pointed out that if something is found to be an issue that needs attention in India, it does not mean that something has to be done about it. Actions will be taken by civil servants if they are pushed or

³³ <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-08-27> accessed on 6th November 2012

pressured, but the actions they do take often involve doing the bare minimum, and hence one does not see significant impacts. There is also a tendency against being proactive on an issue unless it is brought to attention. This laid back, unproductive attitude affects the overall efficiency of the civil service.

Respondent IA2 described the reality of policy-making in India as he saw it, claiming that most IAS officers belong to the elite group and are directly involved in policy-making although they do not understand the local cultures where they work because they are frequently posted to different cities and states, far from their places of origin. Hence, numerous policies and plans are designed by administrators based on what they think is right rather than on what really is applicable on the ground. No effort is taken to engage the local community in policy-making decisions, and public participation is limited. This situation is exacerbated by the absence of a figure-head to champion the need of citizens.

A similar view was expressed by respondent IP1 in describing the nature of decision-making in India in the context of transport regulation:

“Dubai, Singapore, Hong Kong, are 'ruler control' countries, so it is easier to decide things. But in India, the political situation is different. If the chief minister or any other political leaders were given full autonomy to decide on all transport projects and planning, things would be easier. In India, it is difficult to pinpoint one person and say that he has more autonomy to make decisions” (respondent P1).

Corruption seems to be a pressing problem in India, with five respondents (IG5, IG7, IA1, IA2 and IC3) agreeing that corruption is part of Indian culture – not limited to small petty transactions, but also present in contract agreements, recruitment and the transfers of IAS officers. The focus on corruption was stronger amongst the academic respondents, who seemed to view corruption as an infectious disease requiring eradication. Interestingly, two respondents from government agencies did not see corruption as a major problem because they claimed that work still gets done when corruption is present. An ex-civil servant (respondent IA1) believed that most civil servants are complicit in some form of corruption, and that it is difficult to disassociate oneself from the practice. He commented:

“You have to be like them otherwise it is difficult to survive – they won't let you survive, because then you are breaking the chain. There's a whole chain, and if you try to be clean, you will be an odd man in the chain and they will see you as the problem, so they will simply cut you out from there and re-fix the chain” (respondent IA1).

On the other hand, one of the IAS officers denied that corruption is part of the Indian administrative culture, but confirmed that it exists widely and that it is a serious problem. This respondent revealed that the existing procedures do not allow immediate and forceful actions to be taken against offenders, and that despite various research performed by the government on the issues of combatting corruption, hardly any of the recommendations that these studies proposed are being implemented. However, there has been strong public pressure in recent years for the government to be more transparent. Some of the recent developments have been the proposed Lokpal Bill (2011), and the enactment of the Rights to Information Act (2005), which provide the basis for a regime securing rights to information for citizens (Rights to Information Act, 2005).

7.5.3 Reflections

The State Government appreciated the need and had the actual intention to create a planning and coordinating authority for transport. However, the State Government ultimately created what was the cheapest and most convenient form of 'authority', which provided them better access to federal funds without requiring them to make many alterations to existing organisations or to devolve any powers. These outcomes conform to findings from numerous other bodies of research that find that policy elites are inclined to shape reforms based on their own desires and ends, but at the same time fit cultural norms (Bacukaert and Politt, 2011; Grindle and Thomas, 1989, Down, 1967). There is no proof to suggest that this is an evidence-based reform exercise, which means there is an absence of reliable knowledge about what will work and what needs to be changed. The creation of the BMLTA involved very little consultation with stakeholders, including other government agencies, let alone the public. Moreover, the reform was not acknowledged as an ongoing process, as many researchers have argued to be a common feature of policy reforms (see Politt and Bauckaert, 2011; Peters, 2010; Dacin et al., 2000). Hence, only the creation of the BMLTA mattered to them, not the results of the reform or the assessment of what it was set out to do. Without a political champion, a good reform strategy and sufficient empowerment, the BMLTA has been unable to prove its existence.

The BMLTA forms an additional layer, based on a coalition of willing actors, in the already crowded institutional settings. It does not enjoy any formal autonomy and its presence does not sanction or change the functions of any existing agencies, hence the BMLTA holds no accountability for urban

transport matters. At the moment, the BMLTA's remit is unclear, especially with regard to how its role complements or contradicts with the existing agencies. Hence, the BMLTA is not perceived as a coordinating authority, but rather as an advisory or dispute resolution body whose functions are limited to giving suggestions and advise but not to drive any major decisions.

The functions assigned to the BMLTA as a planner and coordinator for the BMR seems to be too heavy for a 'committee' to undertake. The stakeholders are still contemplating on the roles that the BMLTA should have and the scale that it should operate on to be effective. Whilst these decisions are being debated, the State Government has not shown any positive intention to empower the BMLTA, to provide it with adequate resources, or to increase its capacity. They have shown a clear resistance to devolving powers, not only with regard to the BMLTA, but also through not empowering the BBMP or creating an MPC. The existing agencies are recalcitrant about giving up any powers to the BMLTA to enable the BMLTA Bill to be legislated. Their clear message was that the BMLTA "must complement and not threaten". The threat of further changes to the governance with proposals for MPC and Bengaluru Governance Bill also paralyse improvements to BMLTA. Given these constraints, the BMLTA continues to exist in a form that is acceptable to the majority of stakeholders rather than the form that it was originally intended to have for being effective. Empowering the BMLTA is a complicated issue, and there is some indication that a brand new coordinating authority vested with the necessary powers is needed, but this would still require structural reforms and willingness for agencies to transfer their powers, and thus it is hard to see why this route would be likely to prove any more successful.

It is also important to understand the larger administrative culture and values that the BMLTA is located in, for example the strong fusion between politicians and civil servants, the red tape and cumbersome government procedures it must navigate, the job security that results in a bloated, inefficient and ineffective civil service (Dwivedi, 2003). Thakur (1995:175) pointed out that the strong connection between politicians and civil servants originated from the 'committed bureaucracy' enforced by the central government in the 1960's, which required civil servants to be loyal to politicians or face punishment. Civil servants responded to this political encroachment in two ways: either they associated themselves with politicians for personal gain, or they created more rules and regulations to save themselves from being punished by showing that proper procedure

had been followed, thus protecting themselves from disciplinary action, and this explains the corruption and cumbersome procedures observed in this case study. There are other deeply rooted cultures in India, such as the close-knit family, respect for authority, and religious practices and beliefs, which all have an influence on governance and must be given attention when further reforms to the BMLTA are pursued. Hence, creating an effective coordinating authority in Bangalore is not just about reform and empowerment, but must also engage with the wider political, social and cultural practices that the authority will be embedded within.

Chapter 8: Cross-Case Analysis

8.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to achieve three objectives. The first two objectives are addressed in section 8.2 which is centred around answering research question four - which attempts to determine the success or failure of reforms – and the third objective is covered in section 8.3. Section 8.2 draws out key determinants of the reforms by bringing together common factors from both the case studies as presented in Chapters 6 and 7. Whilst the contexts as well the contents of the reforms are clearly different, there were strong underlying themes that may explain the direction the reforms took, and may also be of broader relevance beyond the specific case study sites. This section also provides lessons for policy-makers and foreign aid advisors in developing Asian countries who wish to embark on or promote the creation of transport authorities. This is done by highlighting features that are responsible for transport authorities functioning well and badly. Section 8.3 presents several specific recommendations to the participating agencies – the Land Public Transport Commission (SPAD) and the Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority (BMLTA).

8.2 Key determinants of reforms

Five factors have been identified, and the similarities and differences in the case studies surrounding these factors will be highlighted in this section, with relevant examples drawn from key events, actors, processes and activities to illustrate them more clearly.

8.2.1 Objectives, key drivers and the outcomes of reforms

The two case studies shared several features in the conditions that drove the creation of the transport authorities. In both cases there were coordination problems between the agencies that affected the way the public transport services were delivered on the ground. There were also inadequacies in the existing institutional structure that most parties identified (see section 6.2 for SPAD and 7.2 for BMLTA). In both cases, administrators cited models of single transport authorities in other countries as solutions, yet, whilst they were aware of successful single transport authorities elsewhere, there was

no evidence that they looked into them in detail to draw appropriate lessons. Thus, LTA Singapore, for example, appears to have provided a merely symbolic aspiration. There was also no evidence to suggest that a proper assessment was undertaken in Bangalore or Malaysia to identify the detail of the problems in their existing institutional arrangements, or to identify the available options for resolving these issues. The problems and potential solution were known for many years and these issues remained in the background until a larger triggering factor occurred with the right political conditions, the coming together of streams as proposed by Kingdom (1995).

Political pressure and central government pushes for reform were found to be the main drivers for change in both case studies. In Malaysia, the Prime Minister made the reform possible in 2010 (see section 3.2.1.3 and 6.2.7), with the first attempt for reform in 2005 failing due to strong resistance from agencies, motives to maintain the Bumiputera agenda and a lack of political will (see section 3.2.1.3 and 6.2.1). In India, the National Urban Transport Policy (NUTP) provided the ultimate push for the State to create a transport authority (see section 7.2.1), largely because of the funding incentives associated with it. Whilst transport authorities were described as having been created to resolve wider transport issues (as mentioned above), evidence from both the case studies suggests that the key reformers had a set of objectives they wished to see achieved, which did not centre just on resolving integration issues (see section 6.2.3 for SPAD and 7.3.2 for BMLTA). The key reformers determined what went into the reform plans as they had an upper hand (Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Bauckaert and Politt, 2011). The immediate outputs were skewed to benefit the reformers rather than the wider stakeholders or the general public (see section 6.4.1 for relevant discussion of this issue with regard to SPAD and 7.3.1 with regard to the BMLTA). Interestingly, in both case studies, creating a new agency was seen to be an easier option than trying to reorganise or improve existing agencies.

Whilst political pressure is acknowledged to be essential for triggering reforms (Oliver, 1992), it played a different role in both the case studies. It acted as the main driver in Malaysia, but was one of the factors that suppressed the development of the BMLTA. However, it is worth noting that although it played a crucial role in making the reform possible in Malaysia, it also came with time constraints and politically sensitive agendas that had an impact on the outcome of the reform. The planning and implementation of the authority in Malaysia was rushed, as the key reformers acknowledged

(see section 6.5.1). This led to several unintended consequences, as Toonen (2003) speculated as outcomes of reforms, such as problems in SPAD's regulatory and enforcement functions, which could not be tackled immediately because the government couldn't let itself be seen as getting things wrong straight away. Politically sensitive issues, departmental turf wars and racial sensitivity led to SPAD being strangely configured – placed under the Prime Minister's Department (PMD) with the Prime Minister as the minister-in-charge (see section 6.5.2.2). In India, on the other hand, a change in the elected ruling political party occurred just a year after the BMLTA was formed. The new government appears to have lacked much interest in the BMLTA, which perhaps explains why the reform has stalled, and why it was thus left as an informal coordinating agency (7.3.3).

The gap between those driving the reforms and those implementing them seems to have been an issue in both cases. In Malaysia, the central government proposed SPAD's implementation at the national level, and it was created quickly because this was done through a national-national programme. The task was entrusted to the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) – a central agency that had the authority and resources to drive the reform with full support from the Prime Minister (see section 3.2.1.3). Things happened very differently in Bangalore, where reform was initiated by the central government in Delhi through the NUTP, and the State was then under pressure to comply with it. In this case, it was a national-state programme rather than a national-national one, and hence little enthusiasm was shown in making sure the reform produced a workable authority. The main reason to carry out the reform may have been to appease central government rather than to resolve the coordination issues, and the Urban Development Department (UDD) in Bangalore would likely not have had the political backing, authority and capacity that the EPU had in Malaysia. This impacted significantly on the strength of the reforms.

An interesting observation was made in both case studies regarding the support provided by the stakeholders in the creation of the transport authorities. There was no evidence of active participation from the public in either case, and this could mean that either the public were not engaged or that they were more interested in the outcomes than in participating in the reform process. Peters (2010) speculated that the public assumes that public sector reforms are largely cosmetic rather than genuine transformations to improve service delivery, and that could have been the case here. It was obvious that there was a general consensus among the

other agencies and industry players that a coordination body or an authority was needed, although each actor had their own perceptions about what the transport authority should look like and what it should do. Unfortunately, this strong support for reform only lasted until the reform plan was unveiled. In Malaysia, agencies that stood to lose power showed strong resistance from the very first day, and this continued even after the creation of SPAD, with agencies showing an unwillingness to work or share resources with it (see section 6.5.3.1). This conforms to Down's (1967:274) hypothesis that civil servants tend to oppose change that "cause net reduction in amount of resources under their control and reduces social functions entrusted to them" and concurs with previous work of Kim's (2005) and Cheung's (2005) that resistance from civil servants opposing change can make reforms difficult. In Bangalore, none of the empowerment plans for the BMLTA could be implemented due to the strong resistance from agencies to give up any of their powers or change the existing structure (see section 7.3.2), implying strong institutional inertia (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) coupled with civil servants' seeking to maintain the status quo for personal job security (Nakamura, 2005). In addition, there was no political champion here to resolve the differences and drive the reform like there was in the Malaysian case.

Several lessons may be learned here and applied to other contexts. There are multiple reasons for reforms and these are all not shared. Governing through networks with lowest common denominator politics is ineffective – as seen in the BMLTA case study. The transport authority needs to have power through legal mandate and or resources which allow it to bring other agencies together for better coordination, as there are winners and losers of the reform and some with no interest in seeing success. Although political leadership is crucial, it is noted that political focus is short-lived and so the agency needs empowering.

8.2.2 Reform as a process

Reform was not conceived as a process in either case study, and although these reforms are still unfolding, further changes would probably require radical moves that are unlikely to be forthcoming in the near future.

Reform takes time to unfold, and the full outcome may only be visible after several years, as a number of researchers have noted (Bauckaert and Pollitt, 2011; Peters, 2010; Marsden and May, 2006). However, it seems that the actors in neither of the case studies recognised or accounted for this fact. If

these reforms had been treated as being part of a process, then they would have been more long-term focussed, with dedicated committees comprising permanent members to closely monitor the implementation and evaluation of the reform process and adjust future plans. But this was not the case in either of the authorities. Although some planning was undertaken in the creation of SPAD through the preparation of the blueprint (see section 3.2.1.3), not all the recommendations in the blueprint could be implemented as a result of political barriers and strong resistance from actors. Moreover, in the BMLTA case study, there was no clear reform plan, and only brief objectives and functions for the BMLTA were included in the Government Order (see section 3.3.1.4).

There was a time-scale attached to the creation of these authorities, but this interpreted the reforms as a project that had a beginning, middle and end, and was considered to be complete once the agencies were established. In Malaysia, the key reformers from EPU (the agency which championed the creation of SPAD) did not think that it was their responsibility to ensure that SPAD was able to function in an orderly manner, and that the EPU's task was accomplished once SPAD had been created (see section 6.5.1, comment by respondent P1). In Bangalore, the UDD – which issued the Government Order for the creation of the BMLTA – formed its committee quickly. Even though the Government Order briefly outlines the BMLTA's functions and empowerment plan, none of these plans were seriously implemented on the ground, and this created a vast chasm between the policy that appeared on paper and what was actually put into practice (see section 3.3.1.4 for implementation plan and section 7.3.2 for the powers to be given to the BMLTA).

One notable similarity between the two authorities is that SPAD and the BMLTA were both expected to survive on their own from the very first day of their establishment, with little support from the top. Thus, inadequate attention was paid to resourcing either organisation.

As has already been noted, reform is a process, and the ultimate outcome may only be achieved after several improvements and amendments have been made, but the SPAD case study clearly shows that continued structural reforms may not be politically feasible as they will be seen as evidence of governmental failure. Thus, the government refrains from making such improvements or amendments for fear that this could be used as a political tool by the opposition parties (see section 6.5.1). This was also seen in their reluctance to make changes to the PAD Act even though there were serious

flaws with SPAD's enforcement powers (see section 6.3.4). Again, such amendments were perceived to represent an unacceptable risk to the image of the government. The general view was that any structural reforms could only be made a couple of years down the line. In Bangalore, on the other hand, further reforms were said not to be feasible to the BMLTA (not even the passing of the BMLTA bill) until the State Government decided on the course of other governance reforms in the pipeline, such as the Metropolitan Planning Committee (MPC) and the Bengaluru Governance Bill (see section 7.3.3). This implies that other reform initiatives in the overall governance system could influence or change the reforms needed at any point of time. In Bangalore, the politics of urban development appear to envelop those of transport.

There are several key lessons that can be learned here. It is important to acknowledge that reform is a process and must be conceived as a long-term initiative with timeline and a roadmap/reform plan for successful working. The reform has to also take into account the changes and ongoing reforms in the wider governance structure. Whilst having a good reform plan is important – with some clear goals and indicators for success, these case studies have also shown that people have different objectives and perceptions about what the reform should involve and deliver. Hence, thinking that a utopian solution can be achieved may often be naïve, as actors and agencies involved will continue to fight for their own interests and preferences. One way to overcome these problems is to build flexibility into the reforms. For example, the SPAD case study showed how it can be viewed as politically damaging to have to go back and amend the Act to add or modify existing powers. Hence, it is vital that acts that legislate for transport authorities build-in the provision for additional powers to be operationalised if it is anticipated that they could be required or used later. This would reduce the need for re-legislation and provide an incentive for collaboration.

8.2.3 Powers to act

The effectiveness levels of the BMLTA and SPAD were found to be strongly related to their powers to act, as international development agencies and researchers alike have pointed out with respect to transport authorities in general (Naniopoulos et al., 2012; ADB, 2009; GTZ, 2004). Although the LTA Singapore and TfL London were used as benchmarks, the BMLTA and SPAD far from mirror these authorities, and even the coordination roles they appear to have copied are largely symbolic. The role of SPAD as a

coordinator is strengthened through legislative backing with powers over planning and regulatory functions. Although these regulatory functions are reinforced by giving SPAD a purview to license operators, who can in turn be used to implement their plans, their lack of funding autonomy hinders the effectiveness of their capacity to ensure that these plans are in fact implemented (see section 6.3.2 and 6.3.5). The BMLTA, on the other hand, is much weaker than SPAD, as it is just a committee without any dedicated resources or legislative backing (see section 7.3.2 and 7.3.4). It coordinates through its planning role, but this is not adequate as it does not have any tools to implement its plans. The SPAD case study shows that having legislative support is not enough to be effective – the content of the act must also be clear, and the authority and autonomy given to the transport agency has to be fully operationalised and exercised to be effective, as Young and Tavares (2004) contend. For this to happen, transport authorities need to be given the necessary strategic capacities (McKinnon et al., 2008).

Despite the apparent necessity for better strategic coordination, neither transport authority was granted full powers to make transport planning and development decisions at the tactical level, as Masi (2009) and Agarwal and Ribot (1999) suggest is necessary for such agencies to be effective (see figure 2.1). Decision-making autonomy is required for a transport authority to function well (see May, 2003; Leach and Wilson, 2004 for discussion), and this is also the motive that stands behind decentralisation. The decision-making capacities of the two case-study agencies vary, even though both lack decision-making autonomy. Whilst SPAD acts as a checkpoint for evaluating transport projects for EPU, which means it has the power to support or reject proposals but not to approve or implement them, the BMLTA committee only has an advisory status, which means that there is no compulsion for anyone to refer to BMLTA for feedback on new proposals, and thus its decisions are not binding (see section 7.4.1).

It is evident in both the case studies that decision-making power is vested with the agencies that hold the resources – the EPU in Malaysia and multiple sources in Bangalore, but mainly the State Government and the various parastatal agencies. Financial resources have been cited as one of the main factors for determining the success of transport authorities and decentralisation in general by international development agencies (see World Bank 2002, ADB, 2009; GTZ, 2004). However, in both the case studies, strong reluctance of the central and state government has prevented any financial powers from being devolved (see section 6.3.1 and 7.3.4), and

it seems that this will continue during the economic downturn, where budget control is perceived to be essential. It is recognised that funding is a critical resource for mediating conflicts between different agencies with their conflicting objectives, and thus vital for playing an effective coordinating role, especially in the case of Bangalore. Without financial resources, the BMTLA and SPAD have little control over the transport budget, and thus have to exercise their influence in different ways, which limits changes. SPAD focuses on controlling regulatory functions whilst the BMLTA focuses on making improvements in uncontested areas, such as for non-motorised transport and the provision of technical support.

Several lessons can be drawn here. Money and manpower are key resources and therefore sources of power. If the transport authorities are to be effective, both these elements must be addressed. Besides that, strong legislative provision is crucial to support their functions, and other laws that have an effect on transport authority acts must be addressed so that a clear line of responsibility is created. Besides providing a permanent structure and protecting it from easy alteration through changes in political leadership, a good piece of legislation should clarify the role of the transport authorities vis-à-vis other agencies, and this is especially important if the transport authority is given regulatory and enforcement functions like SPAD. If legislative support cannot be secured, then a transport authority can build its strength in uncontested policy areas, as the BMLTA has shown. Whilst it appears that financial resources are critical for success, these case studies do not provide sufficient evidence to make this a certainty. What *is* clear, however, is that the absence of financial resources limits the effectiveness of the reforms. Although it is highly recommended that transport authorities be accorded financial autonomy, it has to be acknowledged that this is unlikely to happen in developing countries, where funding is scarce and there is a strong tendency for the central government to retain its control of budgets. In such contexts, the transport authority can be designed to act as a 'checkpoint', as SPAD does, or to act as a nodal agency for distributing funds to transport projects.

8.2.4 Accountability and responsibility

Accountability was an issue in both the case studies prior to the reforms. This was seen through the poor performance of the existing agencies, and directly raised the need for a transport authority. There were multiple reasons for their poor performance. It appears as though the relevant agencies had powers on paper, but could not exercise them because of a

lack of financial resources (as in the case of the BMRDA in Bangalore, see section 7.2.5), or else had powers and resources, but could not perform their functions due to political sensitivities (as in the case of MOT, see section 6.2.2) or because sufficient powers had not been provided (as in the case of BBMP in Bangalore, see section 7.2.5). Once such a position has developed over time, it appears difficult to undo it. There was also a weak system of accountability in place here for providing the checks and balances needed to improve performance, and this was made worse by the lack of responsibility taken by the civil service.

There was evidence of poor performance from civil servants in both case studies. They were labelled as 'laid back' and 'inefficient' (see section 6.2.2, 6.5.3.1 and 7.5.2.3), and these findings are plausible and supported by other research findings in the field (see Dwivedi, 2003; Cheema 2005 for discussion). Their performance was also found to be strongly linked to the administrative culture. In Bangalore, it was pointed out that civil servants who are caught for corruption or the misuse of power cannot be punished immediately due to cumbersome procedures (e.g. firing requires approval from central government), and there is also an element of job security involved (see section 7.5.2.3). Problems of corruption are largely accepted as well as established but it is noted that the creation of the BMLTA has nothing to do with efforts to fight corruption. In the Malaysian case, corruption and the misuse of power were acknowledged to be problems in the previous regime, but SPAD's establishment was intended to address them (see section 6.2.1). The problem of poor civil servant performance was to be tackled by giving SPAD a corporate culture, but this backfired somewhat as it triggered a cultural clash between SPAD and the civil servants (see section 6.5.3.1).

After the creation of the authorities, accountability can be seen as a factor that explains why the reforms were structured as they were. The literature on decentralisation has overstated the inclusion of the public considerably (see section 2.5.1). In the Malaysian case, SPAD was found to be accountable upwards, towards the central government that created it, thus strengthening the central government through stronger control. Horizontal accountability towards other agencies and transport bodies was found to be lacking, as there was no evidence that these actors had been actively engaged in the planning exercise (see section 6.3.2). There was also an absence of clear public accountability or evidence that such accountability was being practised at all. This can be attributed to SPAD's position as a national body

rather than a local-level one. On the other hand, the BMLTA is not accountable for urban transport matters as it has not been given any formal authority and autonomy to function as a proper transport authority (see section 7.3.2 and the discussion on the relationship between power and accountability in section 2.5.3.2).

The important lesson that can be drawn here is that reforms can be a tactic of sweeping away corrupt organisational cultures. However, it is worth noting that this requires new staff which could amount to some loss of institutional memory.

8.2.5 The degree of championing

The importance of using influential people with experience of championing this kind of change has been highlighted in the literature (Nakamura, 2005; Leach and Wilson, 2004; Cervero, 1998; Down, 1967) and this could provide an explanation for the different outcomes observed in the two case studies. The champion impacts on the effectiveness of the reform. However, if the champion is only there for implementation and the reform itself is weak, then it makes less impact, as was seen in the BMLTA case study.

The BMLTA was created by a group of elites in the State Government, but they did not continue their input to ensure that the committee was running effectively and perhaps did not want it to. There was an absence of a political champion here. The Chief Secretary of the State was appointed as the committee's chair, but even he has not been able to drive a powerless body like the BMLTA, hence few of the decisions that the committee has made have been implemented (see section 7.4.1, comment by respondent IA3). Furthermore, the Chief Secretary has been heavily engaged with other duties, and has thus had limited time to perform his role as the chair of the BMLTA. In the SPAD case study, it was acknowledged that reform would not have been possible without strong support from the Prime Minister. His leadership was important to overcome resistance of agencies, but he did not follow-through on his initial commitments, such as empowering SPAD and transforming it into a commission. As in Bangalore, the time that the Prime Minister could devote to an operations-based body like SPAD seemed to be very limited (see section 6.5.2.2, comment by respondent G10). It is desirable for SPAD to have the sort of strong political oversight that the Prime Minister affords, but in reality it seems to be impractical for a person occupying this position to perform such a role.

In addition to a political champion, the importance of good leadership is also highlighted in the literature, and it is noted that leadership is a resource that is needed to transform powers into desirable outcomes (see section 2.5.3). Although SPAD has some legitimate power and resources, it does not have the strong and skilful leadership necessary for engaging the network and using the resources it has to justify its existence (see section 6.5.3.2 on SPAD's leadership). On the other hand, the BMLTA was left in the hands of a very competent and experienced senior administrator, but there was nothing much that she could do, as the BMLTA was not given a legal mandate or sufficient resources to drive its planning and coordinating roles. Interestingly, it was made known that the Commissioner was deliberately given other positions to divert attention away from the BMLTA. A lack of continuity in leadership is a common issue in Bangalore (see section 7.3.6.2 and 7.5.2.2). Hence, both political champion and good organisational leadership is needed to make the reform effective.

There are several lessons to be learned about the need and use of a champion. Political leadership is important to initiate and implement a successful reform, provided the reform is designed to be a strong one. Whilst continued high level support is desirable, it may not be practicable, so it is essential to ensure that the transport authority is empowered adequately to carry out its functions. Although having the oversight of a Prime Minister or Chief Secretary is desirable for drawing wider support and producing quick wins, it may not be practical for them and beneficial for the authority in the long-run, thus it may be best to transfer accountability to other suitable candidates who can give their full commitment. These two case studies show that it is not enough to have a champion high up, but that transport authorities also need powers to make changes themselves. Reforms involve an interwoven net of actors using the powers and resources available to them to try and steer the outcomes where they want. But transport authorities must be given strategic capacities, such as skilful leaders with specific tenures, as well as the financial resources to control transport budgets and make changes.

8.3 Recommendations for SPAD and BMLTA case studies

Before proceeding to the specific recommendations for SPAD and BMLTA, it is perhaps useful to step back and compare the similarities and differences of these two agencies compared to two popular models – TfL and LTA

Singapore – as presented in Table 8.1, as this will provide an insight into what SPAD and BMLTA lack but require to make these agencies work.

Table 8.1: Characteristics of LTA Singapore, TfL, SPAD and BMLTA

Key factors	LTA Singapore	TfL	SPAD	BMLTA
Land use planning	×	×	×	×
Functions:				
Planning	√	×	√	√
Regulation	√ **	√	√	×
Enforcement	√	×	√	×
Project implementation	√	√	×	×
Traffic management	√	√	×	×
Transport Operations	×	√	×	×
Contract with service providers	√	√	×	×
Transport budget	√	√	×	×
Legislative backing	√	√	√	×
Decision making powers for strategies and projects	√	√	×	×
Powers to drive decisions	√	√	(through regulations mechanism)	×
Strong champion	√	√	√	×
Accountability	√	√	upwards	×
Public participation	√	√	×	×

**Public transport council sets the fares, service levels and operating licence for buses

√ - present, × - absent,

The table above highlights some key characteristics that both LTA Singapore, and TfL share. They appear to have some key powers, such as control over transport budget; a wide range of functions, which include project implementation and traffic management; legislative backing; strong champion; powers to make and drive those decisions; clear line of accountability and good public participation. Most of the characteristics are also highlighted as best practices by the World Bank, GTZ and ADB – except the functions for transport operations, which, according to the World Bank (2002), have to be separated from the planning and regulatory functions.

Recommendations for SPAD case study

Comparing SPAD to LTA Singapore and TfL reveals that SPAD shares some of the operational functions that these transport authorities have, such as planning, regulation and enforcement, which is backed up by legislation. However, SPAD clearly lacks the strategic powers, such as powers to control budget and powers to make and drive its decisions, which appear critical for a transport authority to be effective.

A resolution needs to be found to the issue of financial independence for SPAD. It has been observed in the discussion with the respondents that there were different views about what SPAD should or should not be. If SPAD is going to be run as a government agency, then this should be allowed to happen. Contrastingly, if it is going to be run as a self-financing independent structure, then it should be made to happen now so that this is not part of the ongoing debate about what SPAD is or is not. However, the balance of evidence suggests that SPAD should be allowed to operate as an independent body or commission to enable it to have financial and managerial autonomy in order to transform the sector.

The need to have access to transport funds and the powers to control the transport budget is essential for a transport authority to be effective, as observed in many transport authorities in developed cities. Hence, for SPAD to work, it appears essential that SPAD is given the powers to control the land public transport budget for transport projects/strategies, including the subsidisation of public transport services. This would allow SPAD to enforce its plans and impose its service standards and regulations. It is acknowledged that SPAD is not designed to play the role of a project implementer, and, in this case, it could distribute the funds and coordinate/monitor implementation. However, it is noted that this proposal is controversial, as it would require the EPU to willingly devolve some of its funding powers to SPAD.

The importance of a political champion to take forward transport authorities has also been identified as an important criterion (as strongly observed in TfL and LTA Singapore). Although the presence of a strong political leadership was observed during the reform process, unfortunately, this seems to have faded away. It is now proving to be impractical as the Prime Minister is heavily engaged in other matters and has very limited time to perform his role as the head of SPAD. Hence, an alternative would be for the

Prime Minister to select another minister in the Prime Minister's Department to be the minister-in-charge of SPAD or to delegate some of his powers to the chairman of SPAD.

SPAD have not yet fully engaged with key stakeholders. Greater recognition of the need to engage the whole network of actors to deliver as more inclusive governance seems to be important to improving outcomes.

Recommendations for BMLTA case study

Funding power is critically required by the BMLTA, especially for enabling it to enforce its plans and enact its coordinating capabilities. As a committee under the UDD, the BMLTA's ability to source its own funds will be limited, and it will be dependent on funding from the State. The financial position of the BMLTA could be strengthened if it could play the nodal agency role for urban transport projects undertaken in Bangalore, which means that all urban transport project funds from the Central Government, the State Government or international development agencies would be distributed through the BMLTA. This would require streamlining various functions between the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development and Finance Corporation (KUIDFC) and the BMLTA.

The current position of BMLTA seems to be far from the stated goal of what a single transport authority should look like. As shown in table 8.1, it only has the planning function and even this is not a legislated function. The BMLTA is currently proving to be ineffective and is embroiled in other arguments about governance structure; mainly the proposal for a Metropolitan Planning Committee (MPC) and the Bengaluru Governance Bill. The current status of BMLTA as a committee with secretariat support by DULT, does not provide much room for it to be transformed into a full-fledged transport authority. A strong political champion could probably make a difference to take the reform forward. Accordingly, it is envisaged that a new reform process is required, which means a new Unified Metropolitan Transport Authority (UMTA) may have to be created by legislation and given the necessary authority, leadership capacity and resources. If MPC is created, then the new UMTA should be placed under MPC. This would ensure that transport planning is integrated with land use and other urban sectors, which would enable effective strategic planning and coordination, thereby contributing to better metropolitan governance.

8.4 Chapter summary

This chapter has discussed five key factors that the analysis of the case studies revealed to be important determinants in shaping the outcome of the reform process, and which explain why the authorities have ended up as they are. These factors involve combinations of powers, actors, resources, rules and procedures and culture, which are all embedded in institutional arrangements. The key determinants provide several important factors and insights that policy-makers and foreign aid advisors who are actively involved in reform programmes for developing Asian cities need to consider when designing a transport authority. This chapter also provides policy recommendations for the BMLTA and SPAD. The next chapter focuses on summarizing the findings of this research, presents its contributions and limitations, highlight prospects for further research and ends with some general reflection.

Chapter 9: Conclusions

9.1 Introduction

This concluding chapter summarises the major findings of the current study in relation to its research aims and questions, as well as discussing the contributions and implications that this work has for transport governance research in developing countries, and its methodological contributions. The limitations of the study are identified, and suggestions for further research in this area are made. The thesis concludes with a presentation of the researcher's personal reflections on this study.

9.2 Addressing the research questions

This section draws the findings from Chapters 6, 7 and 8 together in relation to the research questions.

Question 1: *What were the motivations behind the establishment of the transport authorities?*

Using the information gained from the literature review regarding the creation of other transport authorities, it was anticipated that the motivations for the creation of the Land Public Transport Commission (SPAD) and the Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority (BMLTA) would be about enhancing coordination between agencies in order to improve the service delivery of public transport in Malaysia and Bangalore (ADB, 2009; World Bank, 2005a).

However, it was found that although coordination provided part of the reason for their establishment, there were also several other motivations for their establishment in each case. Indeed, the more central motivations comprised altering power structures, satisfying powers that already existed, and producing better access to resources. This put greater importance on the need to understand power relations in such contexts – something that Flyvbjerg (2001) and Grindle and Thomas (1989) also stress to be important.

In Malaysia, the Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board's (CVLB) mismanagement, corruption and hidden objective to promote the

Bumiputera agenda has had a significant and negative impact on the delivery of transport services on the ground. However, the Malaysian Government considered the project of reforming the CVLB to be too difficult and too politically undesirable. Thus, it was decided that the best option would be to create a new agency to replace the CVLB, which could then tackle some of the wider transport issues by bridging the gap in the planning process and integrating different transport modes. Placing SPAD under the Prime Minister's Department also meant concentrating power in the central government – a clear move to centralise control, which Rondinelli (1983) suggested would be a likely outcome in reforms despite calls for effective governance through decentralisation.

In Bangalore, the central government's National Urban Transport Policy (NUTP) provided the ultimate push for the State Government of Karnataka to create a transport authority. Although the national initiative only encourages the formation of a transport authority (without any stringent guidelines for compliance), its creation was a necessary criterion for accessing funds. In response to the policy, the state government created an informal coordinating body that complements the existing institutional landscape of Bangalore without changing its power structure.

These findings provide in-depth information about the real motivations for institutional reform in Bangalore and Malaysia. Although they could be attributed to addressing the inadequacy of previous institutional arrangements (such as coordination among agencies), as some researchers have argued (Peters, 2010; Cheema, 2005; Grindle and Thomas, 1989), it is evident from this research that a stronger motivation derived from different needs and goals. In the Malaysian case, this was the government's need to alter embedded and politically sensitive government policies, promote good governance and gain legitimacy from the public; whereas in Bangalore, it was the goal to increase the legitimacy from the central government which provided access to funds.

Question 2: *What types of autonomy have been given to the transport authorities?*

Bauckaert and Pollitt (2011) suggest that greater autonomy for agencies leads to improvements in their use of financial resources, in their productivity, and in their user-responsiveness. Other researchers and international development agencies have also stressed that in order for

transport authorities to be effective, they must be decentralised, provided with legislative support, have control over the transport budget and have the ability to drive their decisions into practice (Naniopoulous, 2012; ADB, 2009; World Bank, 2005b; GTZ, 2004), all of which involve some form of transfer of powers. However, previous studies have shown that existing power-holders resist change, especially when their existing roles or powers are threatened (Cheung, 2005; Nakamura, 2005; Down 1967). All of these considerations suggest that transport authorities need to be given sufficient powers and resources to make them autonomous and enable them to deal with other agencies so that they can deliver good transport services on the ground *and* that such reforms will not be easy to push through.

These difficulties are witnessed in the shortcomings in the empowerment of both the transport authorities studied here. SPAD has received some operational mandate to perform its planning, regulation and enforcement roles, but it is a long distance away from resembling LTA Singapore, TfL London or the 'single transport authority' model it was envisioned under. Whilst it is clear that having a legal mandate helps SPAD by making achievements on the ground easier for it, it also requires better interactions with other actors in the network, more resources, and better leadership if it is to be fully functioning. In contrast, the BMLTA – which has not received legal backing – appears to have no accountability for transport management, and has hence ended up as no more than a weak coordinating body. Because both SPAD and the BMLTA lack financial autonomy or control over a transport budget, this makes it difficult for them to implement their plans or control the levels of transport services delivered by operators, thus undermining their ability to perform the central role for which transport authorities are designed – to improve coordination and service delivery.

The outcome of the clash between power and resistance during the reform processes that created these agencies clearly affected their formations negatively in each case, though to varying degrees. The models for the structures and powers of the agencies that were eventually used to create them were those that satisfied the preferences of the majority of the stakeholders and what was politically acceptable rather than those that would lead to effective authorities. In Bangalore, the consequence of this was that there was no change in the existing power structures, which meant no tidying up of the existing institutional landscape, and accordingly the BMLTA's creation simply further overcrowded the existing institutional space (Pangbourne, 2010). In Malaysia, some structural changes were made, but

they were insufficient to enable SPAD to perform its coordination role effectively, and thus the fragmentation of roles in the transport sector remains. Although governance through networks could provide some relief to these problems, and the BMLTA has made significant efforts to establish a good network, its lack of a proper mandate has meant that the effectiveness of this network has been limited. SPAD, on the other hand, has the necessary mandate, but is unable to effectively interact with the other actors in its network as a result of continuous resistance from actors that lost powers, together with cultural clashes between actors from private sector versus public sector backgrounds.

These findings provide a deeper understanding about how the relationship between power and resistance that Foucault (1982) expounds applies to reforms. Resistance from power-holders within existing institutions who lose out (or stand to lose out) through reforms increases the complexity of existing interactions and prevents reforms from achieving their full goals. This research thus contends that understanding the power relations between various actors in a reform exercise requires far more attention in future research. The importance of governance through networks appears to be crucial for transport authorities, especially in situations where resources are not unitised. There is a significant body of literature on the topic of whether governance networks are capable of delivering good results. However, it was found that they do not deliver without providing changes in power structures and the use of resources, because in such cases the required incentives to cooperate are negligible. The BMLTA case study in particular, also showed that governing through networks with lowest common denominator of politics is ineffective.

The findings of this research support the conclusion that transport authorities need legislative backing, as international development agencies have argued. However, this research has also found that operationalising reform acts requires governance to be used through networks, and that it is vital that the acts build-in provisions for additional powers to be added to transport authorities later on in order to reduce the need for altering existing legislation.

Question 3: *How have the reforms affected decision-making processes in policy-making and the selection and implementation of transport projects?*

The decision-making power needed for policy-making and the selection and implementation of transport projects is an important attribute of transport authorities, and requires them to have control over transport budget (Masi, 2009; ADB, 2009; GTZ, 2004; World Bank, 2002a). This enables them to strengthen their coordination capabilities, and to acquire more control over the development of infrastructure and service designs. It is noted that both TfL and LTA Singapore have operational and strategic remits over transport.

It was anticipated that the reforms in Malaysia – which involved the creation of a semi-autonomous transport authority – would have involved transferring the relevant decision-making competencies to SPAD, along with the authority and resources to make it effective. However, SPAD was not given these attributes and, as a result, it was found to be struggling to exercise its powers and build its capacity.

This research has found that neither SPAD nor the BMLTA have control over their transport budgets, and hence they can both be bypassed in the decision-making process. The decision-making platform has thus changed little from how it was before the creation of these two authorities, and there is no evidence to support the idea that the reforms have speeded up the decision-making process or impacted positively on transport outcomes (although it is too early to reach definitive conclusions on the latter issue). SPAD acts as a proposal evaluator that makes recommendations to the approving authorities in Malaysia, and these authorities have thus been the main winners from these reforms. The approving authority for decision-making lies with the funding agencies, mainly represented by central government agencies such as the Economic Planning Unit and the Ministry of Finance. In Bangalore, decision-making powers lie with the State Government and parastatal agencies, both of whom have funding capacities, which means that the significant decisions here are made outside the BMLTA. Although the BMLTA committee appears to be making a lot of decisions under the oversight of the Chief Secretary, none of these are binding, as the BMLTA lacks a legal mandate.

Neither of these authorities has a significant input on strategic matters regarding transport, with the BMLTA having less than SPAD. Nevertheless, the BMLTA has achieved some positive results in uncontested and failed policy areas. On the other hand, SPAD, through its operational functions,

has been able to fill some gaps in planning, and has shown some good efforts in its attempts to streamline land public transport regulations.

The findings of the research in these areas supports the arguments of the ADB (2009), Walter (1998) and Williams (1998) that transport authorities must be given the powers to make and implement their decisions in order to be effective. However, this is acknowledged to be a controversial issue, as the findings also support the evidence that central government is seeking to retain and strengthen its control over critical resources such as funding (Gwilliam, 2003, White, 1991). This research also helps to explain the inefficiency of semi-autonomous bodies (Christensen and Laegreid, 2006) in terms of the power struggles that exist between the central government and the devolved bodies, which also relate to the tendency of the former to tighten its grip.

Question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms?

Chapter 8 (section 8.2) examined the key determinants that influence the reforms in the case studies, and this section will summarise the significance of those findings.

In both the case studies, it was evident that nobody (even the reformers) had identified the criterion for success of the reforms and there was no shared understanding about what success constitutes. Maybe it is not in the interests of those working on reforms to set out such criteria, as they could make them accountable for any failures, and perhaps because they may lead to reforms that simply need further work being prematurely seen as failures.

The importance of a political champion has been highlighted in the literature as being crucial to driving the reform process (Low and Astle, 2009; Cervero, 1998; Down, 1967), and these two case studies have provided further insights in this area. In Malaysia, the involvement of the Prime Minister was the main driver for reform, and his leadership was necessary for overcoming the resistance that some actors raised to the reforms, as well as for cooling the turf wars at the nascent stage of SPAD's existence. Nevertheless, it has proven impractical to have a political champion that is so high up the political ladder as such actors are unable to devote the required time and resources to such posts, and power thus needs to be devolved to other suitable candidates who can give their full commitments to championing and directing SPAD. The Prime Minister's attention to the

reform also appeared to be short term as suggested by Peters (2010) and perhaps it could be hypothesised that political champions cannot afford to spend too much of time on reforms as it could be taken as signs of failure.

In Bangalore, there was no political champion to drive the reform, and although the committee functioned under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary, he had little impact because the reform itself was weak. This suggests that strong political leadership must be coupled with strong reforms to make a significant impact.

Another significant theoretical contribution of this research is that it has provided new insights regarding the relevance of distance between reformers and implementers. The findings from these case studies suggest that it may be the case that the closer together the two are – as in Malaysia, where both are national-level sets of actors – the more likely that the reform will be seriously adopted and positive results produced.

Researchers have argued for the importance of path dependence in reforms (Low and Astle, 2009; Van Thiel, 2004; Toonen 2003), and the findings from the SPAD case study have shown that the 'path' has to be dislocated or broken to create the necessary changes, although this can come at a cost – as seen in the loss of SPAD's institutional memory.

Politt and Backaert (2011) have pointed to the importance of administrative culture in reforms, and these case studies have provided a deeper understanding of this element in the context of developing countries. In both case studies, but in Bangalore in particular, the reformers undertook politically feasible strategies that did not threaten their own positions, and this negatively impacted on their effectiveness. In Bangalore, the strong fusion between politicians and civil servants that resulted in frequent changes in the BMLTA's leadership also took a toll on the outcomes of the reforms there, suggesting that continuous leadership is important to sustain reforms.

The importance of treating reforms as a process that several researchers have argued for (e.g. Peters, 2010; Dacin, 2000) is further supported by the case study findings in this research. Reforms are not short-term projects with definite outputs and outcomes that can be quickly declared as being either successes or failures. Rather, they are complex, ongoing processes, and the course of the outcomes changes with time depending on the improvements that have been made. However, this does not mean that planning processes can be ignored because of uncertainties regarding

reform outcomes. Indeed, the SPAD case study shows the importance of making the correct reform decisions at the start, as such decisions cannot be reversed in government-driven reforms because this is perceived as the government admitting to failure. The BMLTA case study has also shown that reforms can be greatly affected by *other* reform initiatives that happen within the same institutional environment, and that uncertainties in their outcomes can be reduced by having good reform plans and a general set of criteria for assessing whether they are moving in the right direction.

9.3 The contributions of this research and its policy implications

The primary contribution of this research is empirical, providing an in-depth case study on the reform process involved in enacting SPAD and the BMLTA and a detailed account for other researchers and policy-makers to utilise. It shows how the creation and empowerment of SPAD and BMLTA is influenced by contextual factors and constraints that arise during implementation, and provides insights into factors that determine the performance of these authorities. To the best knowledge of the researcher, this is the first empirical study on single transport authorities in the context of developing countries. This is also the first time that an empirical study has been conducted on the reform process in Malaysia's transport sector, besides being the only research on the BMLTA to draw on the experience and knowledge of actors and policy-makers in Bangalore.

The original contribution of this research is centred around the following key areas: enhancement of political legitimacy and good governance as the outcome of reform processes, understanding about the relationship between power and resistance in reform exercise and policy transfer from developed to developing countries.

Enhancement of political legitimacy and good governance

In both the case studies, it was found that although the narrative of reform was about improving coordination, the real motivation was to tackle legitimacy. Hence, the reformers designed reforms which fulfilled these motives and once these were achieved, the motivation for further reform disappeared. In Malaysia, it was driven by the need to gain political legitimacy and fight corruption which supports Cheung's (2005), Cheema's (2005) and Hall and Taylor's (1996) argument about correcting malpractice and strengthening legitimacy as key motivations for institutional reforms.

Whereas in Bangalore, it was the need to gain legitimacy from the federal government in Delhi in order to have access to funds.

Hence, the extent of the reforms that were implemented did not completely fulfil the aspiration of a transport authority which is to facilitate coordination and integration of transport services on the ground. To achieve these objectives, more reforms are required but it appears as though the reformers in both the case studies are unlikely to take any radical moves. In Malaysia, any further structural changes is seen to be politically detrimental to the image of the government (an acknowledgement they got some things wrong), whereas in Bangalore, the strong embedded agencies and close relationship between the politicians and the civil servants clearly do not favour any further changes. Certainly if the *raison d'être* of the agencies is to improve coordination, further reform would be required. However, if the motivations were to tackle corruption (in Malaysia) and gaining access to funds (in Bangalore) which have been met, then political imperative for change is lacking. Hence, whilst the reformers could be content with the outcome of the reform to date, other stakeholders who have multitude of objectives and hold different positions – mainly the losers of the reforms - argue that positive outcomes of the reforms are not evident and continue to fight for their own interests and preferences.

Relationship between power and resistance

Foucault (1982) has propounded the co-existence of power and resistance, and this research has provided further insights into this matter. The outcome of the clash between power and resistance during the reform process that created these agencies clearly affected their formations negatively in each case. Agencies which stood to lose powers, showed significant resistance not only during the formation of the transport authorities but also during post-creation which affected how the reform unfolded over time. Hence, to varying degrees what was implemented reflected the power and influence of the majority (e.g in Malaysia the Ministry of Transport was weak and led by a Chinese Minister) and in Bangalore, the parasastals were too strong, so there was no real reform.

In Malaysia, SPAD could not be established as a single regulator which means that coordination issues still continue, whereas in Bangalore, BMLTA which was created based on lowest common denominator of politics was proven to be ineffective. There also seem to be strong preference in

Bangalore to maintain the status quo of institutional arrangements, as it is closely related to job security and corruption chain as speculated by Dwivedi (2003).

The presence of political champion – the Prime Minister in the Malaysian case- did help to overcome the resistance to a certain degree. The presence of the Prime Minister has enabled the path to be dislocated to create the punctuated equilibria as contented by Hall (1993) to allow for necessary changes to take place – with the closing down of CVLB which was associated with corruption and this seems to conform to hypothesis by Low and Astle (2009). However, as Bennister (2012) contended, the Prime Minister had his own ‘desires’ and limitations in terms of the extent of the changes that he could make. This implies that whilst the presence of a champion might be essential to drive structural reforms, the extent of changes that he can make may be bound by existing institutional framework and constraints that exist, and hence the rest of the intended outcomes will have to be achieved through the network of actors. Nevertheless, both case studies have shown that resistance from power holders within existing institutions who have lost out or stand to lose out through reforms increases the complexity of existing interactions and prevents reforms from achieving full goals, as they are likely to resist any further changes which affect them. This suggests that transport authorities need to have tools to overcome resistance – both in terms of hard and soft power as proposed by Nye (2011). The source of hard power can be in the form of funding and legislative backing, whereas soft power requires good negotiation and communication skills to get things done through the network. It is important to note that none of the so called global best practice dedicated transport authorities operate solely on soft power – these authorities are given legislative and funding support.

It is interesting to note that resistance was not only shown by agencies of the similar working level with the transport authorities, but also by the higher authority which were supposed to empower the transport authorities. This was more apparent in devolving the funding powers, in which both the case studies have shown that the federal and the state government prefer to hold their grip on funding (where budget control is perceived to be essential) and decision-making powers appear to rest with agencies that hold funding power. Literature shows that this is a common scenario in decentralization (see Yamamoto, 2006; McCarten and Vyasulu, 2006; Tang and Bloom, 2000; Rondinelli, 1983). However, due to this situation, stakeholders see the

transport authorities as being powerless and ineffective as they lack control over transport budget. It is envisaged that without the appropriate funding and decision-making powers, transport authorities are unlikely to be effective in facilitating coordination among agencies and make significant changes on the ground.

Policy transfer from developed to developing countries

Researchers such as Mark Evans (2009) and Marsden and Stead (2011) have pointed out that there has been insufficient study about transferring best practices from developed to developing countries and that that search for ideas fails to take advantage of lessons from developing countries perspectives. The international development agencies on the other hand are strongly promoting best practices model which have worked in developed countries to be adopted in developing countries. However, the danger is that these agencies may offer recommendations that are a projection of their own culture, which might fail if taken out of context (Rose 2005).

This thesis provides empirical evidence about contextual factors which have had an influence on transferring one such policy – the dedicated transport authorities – to two developing Asian countries. It was found that although the reformers were able to refer to the best practices models, what they appear to have copied is largely symbolic, without having a clear idea of what exactly has to be changed. Therefore, it was found that in both the case studies, what was implemented on the ground was strongly influenced by local factors such as political condition, administrative culture and lack of accountability and transparency issues, leading to reforms only being partially successful, although much less in BMLTA case study.

This is largely due to the fact that the international development agencies only promote the ultimate outlook of what the transport authorities should look like and neglect the reform process itself. It is more crucial for the international development agencies to provide guidelines on the reforms that have to be undertaken mainly the critical changes that have to be made to the existing institutional arrangements to enable the creation of effective transport authorities. Hence, whilst emulating lessons in policy transfer might be important as stressed by Rose (2005), what was found to be more important is good insights to the reform process itself – mainly comprehensive understanding about what is there to build on and how one should progress from the existing to the desired state.

Hence, in copying best practices, a clear understanding is required of existing conditions/context in both developed and developing countries, which include looking at the structures beyond transport, such as administrative culture, transparency issues, ethnic sensitivity, political structure and stability. Upon doing this, changes that are appropriate to the context have to be devised or, less likely, preceded by major cultural reform. The real challenge is in trying to fit the new management ideas (which demand good governance practices, expertise and funding capability) advocated by the international development agencies into the administrative structures of the developing countries which may have different priorities and capabilities.

The key criteria that was found to be crucial for both the case studies is funding autonomy for the transport authorities so that they are able to influence public transport service delivery on the ground and as a tool/incentive to facilitate coordination among agencies. However, funding is a scarce resource and there is a tendency for the federal and the state government not to devolve funding powers to agencies in order to maintain control. Nevertheless, both case studies have shown that weak accountability, poor responsibility on civil servants' side and lack of transparency are pressing issues in the public administration of both the case studies and without these factors properly set in place, it is unlikely that devolvement of funding powers to the transport authorities would make any big impact. Bangalore in particular, has shown that the strong relationship between the politicians and the civil servants had a negative impact on leadership stability which subsequently influenced the outcomes of the reform.

Big-bang versus incremental reforms

Researchers such as Stead et. al (2008), Tang and Bloom (2000) and Wei (1997) generally promote incremental reforms as they are said to be more feasible, politically acceptable, less likely to be blocked by majority and more likely to show positive results. However, the danger is that this form of reform may not achieve the desired benefits as implementation is based on agreement on the need rather than acceptance of their outcomes. In contrast, other researchers (see Roland and Verdier, 1994; Krueger 1993) promote big-bang reforms on the basis that it increases credibility of reforms, time-saving and brings benefits more quickly.

The findings from these two case studies have indicated that big-bang reforms might be the only way out if significant changes are to be seen in the context of developing Asian countries, provided they are supported by sufficient political will to make them happen and willingness of present institutions to accommodate change. The Malaysian case study has also supported arguments by Duit and Galaz (2008) that centralised government has a higher capacity to promote bigger reforms and drive necessary changes, but nevertheless it was also evident that the outcomes of the reforms were also strongly influenced by the complex interaction between the winners and losers of the reform, with the key reformers having an upper hand to achieve what they desire. Whereas in Bangalore, a less centralized government, where political consensus in decision-making is a key criteria, what was implemented was the lowest common political denominator, which hardly changed anything on the ground but nevertheless the key reformers did achieve their motives to gain access to funds.

It is interesting to note the differences in the reaction of the stakeholders in both the case studies after the initial reforms have been implemented. In Malaysia – where significant changes have been made to previous institutional arrangements to accommodate SPAD - the stakeholders no longer question the relevance or existence of SPAD but rather their arguments were focussed around the steps and initiatives that have to be taken to make SPAD perform better. The changes that originated here at a specific historical moment when constraints are weakened, which is known as critical juncture (Soifer, 2012) was observed to have long-term and transformative impact. On the other hand, in Bangalore, the stakeholders continue to argue about the existence of a weak BMLTA, with majority proposing that it should be either replaced or abolished, suggesting that weak reforms may not hold over a long period of time.

9.4 Limitations of this research

The present study has provided a valuable account of the relevance and functioning of SPAD and BMLTA. However, this study has its limitations, as presented in section 4.6. Whilst some of these limitations were tackled through good research design, others remained unresolved, and are highlighted below:

- The two transport authorities that were chosen for this research are very different in nature, as are the environments that they are embedded in, and hence it is not possible to make direct

comparisons between them. One most notable difference is that it was a national-national reform programme in Malaysia and national-state reform programme in Bangalore.

- The key reformers in the BMLTA case study could not be interviewed as most of them no longer held the same positions and had moved elsewhere. Hence, their insights and experiences could not be captured. Tracking and arranging interviews with them was not possible within the one-month time limit assigned for data-gathering by the host agency in Bangalore.
- The views of the general public and NGOs were not included in these case studies. Respondents were limited to the main actors involved in the management and development of transport sector. Given that transport is a public domain, it would have been interesting to have heard the opinions of the general public concerning government reform to change the way transport services are delivered.
- The performance of SPAD and the BMLTA were only assessed in terms of changes in the decision-making process and changes referenced by respondents during the interviews. A detailed account of the specific changes and initiatives that have been implemented by these transport authorities was not collected. In addition, reform which is a process and does not have an end, whereas the outcomes in transport could be assessed at certain intervals by evaluating improvements in integration and changes in the service delivery on the ground.
- This research was limited to examining changes in the governance of the transport sector within the spatial jurisdictions of SPAD and the BMLTA. Minimum consideration was given to the changes and reforms that happened outside the scope of these transport authorities, which might have had an impact on their establishment and performance. A comprehensive review of the policy changes in the wider governance system could have provided deeper insights for understanding why the transport authorities turned out as they have.

9.5 Suggestions for further research

Based on the overall findings of this research, further work may be carried out in a number of areas. It is acknowledged that research on institutional reform is about the process and not about outcomes, which can only be studied in a brief moment in time. As such, it is very difficult to understand the relationship between the institutional change and outcomes as they tend to happen further down the line. Although it is believed that there are short, intermediate and long-term outcomes (Bauckaert and Pollitt, 2011; Jones

and Kettl, 2003), there are no clear guidelines how one determines whether it is a success or failure. There are no definite criteria or indication as to how long such results or a particular outcome will endure, which is a significant challenge. One way would be to develop a general set of criteria for assessing whether reforms are moving in the right direction and how much work they still require – examples for criteria could be autonomy, legislative backing and staffing – however the challenge is that these concepts have to be clearly defined so that they can also be used in comparative studies. On the other hand, it is understood that outcomes in transport are often only seen in the long term and it will be useful to develop a set of indicators (an example could be modal share) to evaluate the outcomes of transport related reforms in the long-term. However, in a developing region, where transport data is not transparently available, operationalizing this poses another challenge.

This study also showed that administrative structure and culture is an important element, which also influences the reform process. Many of the reforms promoted by the international development agencies, such as single transport authorities and decentralization, use new approaches and techniques, which require certain pre-requisite criteria to be set in place, such as a good accountability system, competent civil servants, 'clean' government, empowered local authorities, which are lacking in many developing countries. Hence, further research is required to provide insights into the administrative structures and cultures in developing countries (to understand what is there to build on) and how these would match or respond to the new initiatives proposed by the international development agencies. In addition, this would provide an understanding of what kind of changes can or cannot be adopted, and address the issue of which part of the structure and process has to be changed in order to adopt the proposed reform.

The international development agencies have actively promoted transport authority models which resemble LTA Singapore and TfL which are vested with strategic and operational powers. It is not quite clear if transport authorities are to have all these powers to be effective or if a 'half-way house' model will work. The international development agencies have produced a wide range of criterion that these transport authorities should have and perhaps a set of success characteristics should be developed to identify what the transport authorities should achieve.

It would be interesting to undertake other case studies on transport authorities in a variety of developing Asian countries that are (or have been) heavily driven by the World Bank. Dhaka would provide a good case study on why the reform exercise failed, and Hanoi in Vietnam (an ongoing exercise) could highlight the strengths and constraints of involving a donor agency in the reform process. Other cities in the Asian region that have not adopted transport authorities, but have developed good transport systems (such as Ahmedabad and Chandigarh in India, Hong Kong, Jakarta in Indonesia) could provide interesting insights and lessons concerning how coordination and integration among agencies and between modes can be achieved.

9.6 Concluding remarks

This thesis has presented and evaluated the motivation for creating transport authorities and the outcomes of doing so using two case studies – SPAD and the BMLTA. The opening chapter discussed the support for a single transport authority model, which has been strongly advocated by international development agencies based on its success in developed cities, together with the arguments that some researchers have made against copying models that have proven successful in developed cities on the basis that they may not be applicable in developing cities because of contextual differences.

The findings from this research have demonstrated that the creation of SPAD and the BMLTA, which aimed to change the way urban transport was governed in their respective contexts, has only achieved a partial degree of success. In these two case studies, the reform exercise has created the need for more reforms. It is interesting to note that in both cases, the creation of a new agency was preferred – or it was the easier way out rather than strengthening or re-organizing any existing agencies. While what has been created seems appropriate for the local context, it is evident that what is deemed appropriate may not be what is effective. Although this has been successful in Malaysia to a certain extent, as it has the operational mandate – planning, regulation and enforcement functions – further reform is necessary to strengthen its role. However, in Bangalore, it appears as though a complete new reform is required to create a transport authority as BMLTA lacks mandate and clarity on its roles and functions. Their shortcomings can be attributed to institutional barriers, lack of funding, the absence of reliable knowledge, political constraints, state-resistance to

devolving or giving up existing powers, and a variety of culture-specific issues.

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Appendix A: Interview guide

	Interview topic	Interview questions	Themes/concepts	Respondents																							
A. What are the motivations behind establishment of SPAD in Malaysia and BMLTA in Bangalore?	A1. Who started?	<p>A1.1 Do you remember how the idea of SPAD came about? When did that happen?</p> <p>A1.1.1 Do you happen to know that there was some efforts earlier in 2003 to establish SPAD, but it didn't happen then, what did you hear?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>The idea re-emerged after the new PM took office in 2008? There were some efforts earlier in 2003 but did not materialise, political reasons?!</i> - <i>The current PM was the chair of the Cabinet Committee for Public Transport when he was DPM</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy transfer- emulating developed countries - Political leadership - Legitimacy vs efficiency - International agencies 	<p>A1.1 All</p> <p>A1.2 Siti Hadzar and Naimah</p>																							
	A2. Who supported and those against? Why?	<p>A2.1 As far as you know, how was the idea for SPAD received, was there a wide range of support?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Civil servants/agencies</i> - <i>Politicians</i> - <i>NGO's, associations</i> - <i>Operators</i> - <i>Public</i> <p><i>Why do you say that/why do you feel that way?</i></p> <p>A2.1.1 Were there any hints about personal individual or organization who were particularly for and those not in favour SPAD?</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; text-align: center;"> <tr> <td><i>EPU</i></td> <td><i>JPJ</i></td> <td><i>DoR</i></td> <td><i>PM</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td><i>MOF</i></td> <td><i>LPKP</i></td> <td><i>DBKL</i></td> <td><i>Minister in EPU</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td><i>MOT</i></td> <td><i>Motour</i></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table> <p><i>How do you happen to know that?</i></p>	<i>EPU</i>	<i>JPJ</i>	<i>DoR</i>	<i>PM</i>	<i>MOF</i>	<i>LPKP</i>	<i>DBKL</i>	<i>Minister in EPU</i>	<i>MOT</i>	<i>Motour</i>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Response from agencies - Network of key actors - Multi actor perspective <table border="1" style="width: 100%; text-align: center;"> <tr> <td></td> <td>Rationale for STA</td> <td>Success/perception of actors</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Actor 1</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Actor 2</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Actor 3</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>		Rationale for STA	Success/perception of actors	Actor 1			Actor 2			Actor 3		
<i>EPU</i>	<i>JPJ</i>	<i>DoR</i>	<i>PM</i>																								
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	Interview topic	Interview questions	Themes/concepts	Respondents
	A3. The rationale	<p>A3.1 We were facing quite a number of urban transport issues particularly in Kuala Lumpur, in your opinion is there any particular issue that SPAD was hoped to resolve?</p> <p>A3.1.1 As far as you are concerned, could the issue be resolved through other ways?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Respondents to highlight one main issue and how SPAD is to resolve the issue. Alternatives to SPAD is to be highlighted 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legitimacy vs efficiency - Alternatives considered? 	<p>A3.1 All particularly Dr Leong in DBKL/EPU</p> <p>A3.2 All particularly those who opposed to the idea of SPAD (linked to Question 2.2)</p>
	A4. Is the adopted model right way forward?	<p>A4.1 SPAD has quite a unique model, in a sense that it is established at national, compared to many other developed cities which adopted STA's at city or regional level, in your view, is this an advantage or constraint for Malaysia?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There are views that SPAD should be established for Klang Valley (regional body), this was the original proposal <p>A4.2 The Prime Minister is directly responsible for SPAD, can you tell me how does this benefit the urban transport sector/SPAD? Any drawbacks?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adaptation to local scenario - Politically acceptable - Political leadership - PM's delivery arm 	All particularly SPAD
B. What types of autonomy have been given to the authorities?	B1. Legislation support	<p>B1.1 The Land Public Transport Act, 2010 gives SPAD the power to plan and regulate, is there any other legislative power that is pending and need to be acquired by SPAD?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Has spad been given all the legislative powers? 	Sufficient legal backing	SPAD
	B2. Clear line of responsibility	<p>B2.1 Besides SPAD there are various other transport related agencies, does the current regulatory framework sets a clear guideline on the roles and responsibilities of the agencies? Any grey areas?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Main reason for adoption of SPAD is to streamline the transport sector, reduce fragmentation 	Clear regulatory framework	All

	Interview topic	Interview questions	Themes/concepts	Respondents
	B3. Support and intervention from central agency	<p>B3.1 What are your thoughts on the kind of support that you receive from the central Government?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Funding, technical</i> - <i>Sufficient/insufficient – too much of intervention</i> <i>How does the central government know what you need, is there some sort of periodic reporting to them?</i> - <i>Probe for what is reported, how often...to determine central Government control</i> <p>B3.2 Is there any particular authority/autonomy that is crucial for SPAD at this point of time?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Funding, independence?</i> - <i>Management autonomy, policy making autonomy, legal & structure autonomy</i> <p>B3.3 You've been fully operational for about 6months now, if you were given an opportunity to amend the Act, is there any particular thing that you would like to improve?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>If the respondents view act as an important medium to gain 'power', or if it is just rhetoric</i> 	<p>Real power</p> <p>Hierarchical control</p> <p>Central government control</p> <p>Rhetoric and practice</p>	SPAD
C. How have the reforms affected decision making processes in policy making and the selection and implementation of transport projects?	C1. Project focus – small/medium scale versus mega projects	<p>C1.1 What is your immediate target (for the next one to two years)?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Look out for transport plans and policies</i> <p>C1.2 Do you have an idea of the policies/projects that you need to implement to achieve these targets?</p> <p><i>Do you have sufficient resources?</i></p>	Clear targets and strategies	SPAD
	C2. Decision making process	<p>C2.1 Suppose that I'm a project proponent submitting a project proposal forwhich cost about RM10 million?</p> <p>Could you maybe step me through the decision-making process?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Probe for who is involved and how long it takes</i> <p>Would there be any difference if the project cost is above</p>	<p>Policy community</p> <p>Policy elites</p> <p>Public participation</p>	SPAD

	Interview topic	Interview questions	Themes/concepts	Respondents
		<p>RM500 million?</p> <p><i>Are there any other alternatives?</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Check for presence of clear guidelines for DM</i> <p>C2.2 What are the similarities and differences in the way the decisions are made now than how it was done before SPAD?</p>	Path dependence	
	C3. Justifications for new projects and policies	<p>C3.1 How do go about selecting projects in the absence of a transport plan?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Transport master plan is currently being prepared, to be completed in September. There are existing plans such as Kuala Lumpur city plan which could be used as guide, but not being adopted. Reference to 10th MP.</i> <p>C3.2 Could you tell me how the idea of MRT project came about?</p> <p><i>“Opposition questions the effectiveness of SPAD when projects can be kicked off without its input and initiative”, how would you respond to that kind of argument?</i></p> <p><i>Who made the ultimate decision? Who was involved?</i></p> <p><i>What is spad's role? Is that something that is specified in the Act?</i></p> <p><i>What are the main challenges that you are facing?</i></p>	<p>Rationality vs power</p> <p>PM's delivery arm</p>	SPAD
	C4. Funding and technical capabilities	<p>C4.1 You mentioned that you need to implement projects (such as mentioned in C1.2), are there any major constraints that you are facing at the moment?</p> <p><i>How could that be improved?</i></p>	<p>Power to drive decisions</p> <p>Insufficient capacity</p>	SPAD
D. How have the reforms affected decision making processes in policy making and the selection and implementation of transport projects?	D1. Understanding SPAD's role	<p>D1.1. What is your perception/understanding of SPAD's role in selection of transport projects/ drafting new policies?</p> <p><i>Why do you say that?</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Different actors may have different understanding of SPAD's actual role</i> 	Different perceptions	Other agencies

	Interview topic	Interview questions	Themes/concepts	Respondents									
	D2. Project focus – small/medium scale versus mega projects	D2.1. Based on your observation, do you think SPAD has clear targets and strategic measures to achieve those targets? D2.2 Do you see any significant pattern in the types of projects being approved? - <i>More mega projects</i>	Clear targets and strategies										
	D3. Decision making process	D3.1 Before the establishment of SPAD, do you happen to know how transport projects or new policies were approved? D3.2 Do you think there's any difference now? - <i>Look out for new actors, policy elites, public participation</i> D3.3 Besides SPAD, are there any new actors in the picture? What's their role? D3.4 Has your role changed? - <i>At this point, perhaps introduce the MRT project and ask, What criticism have you heard about the MRT project?</i>	Policy community Policy elites Public participation <table border="1" data-bbox="1469 775 1785 946"> <thead> <tr> <th data-bbox="1469 775 1574 868">Who was involved before?</th> <th data-bbox="1574 775 1680 868">Who was involved now?</th> <th data-bbox="1680 775 1785 868">Who is not involved now?</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td data-bbox="1469 868 1574 906"></td> <td data-bbox="1574 868 1680 906"></td> <td data-bbox="1680 868 1785 906"></td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="1469 906 1574 946"></td> <td data-bbox="1574 906 1680 946"></td> <td data-bbox="1680 906 1785 946"></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Who was involved before?	Who was involved now?	Who is not involved now?							Other agencies
Who was involved before?	Who was involved now?	Who is not involved now?											
	D4. Justifications for new projects and policies	D4.1 In the scale of between 1 to 10, how would you rate the justifications or rationality for new projects? D4.2 In the same scale, how would you rate the level of interference from the political masters in the selection of new projects? - <i>If the respondents feel there is more politics, probe for evidence</i>	Rationality vs power PM's delivery arm	Other agencies									
	D5. Funding and technical capabilities	D5.1 In your opinion, do you think SPAD has the right capacity and capabilities to drive the decisions that were made? <i>Is there any particular improvements you would like to see in</i>	Power to drive decisions Insufficient capacity	Other agencies									

	Interview topic	Interview questions	Themes/concepts	Respondents
		<p>SPAD?</p> <p>D5.2 Can you think of any examples where SPAD has been particularly successful or unsuccessful?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>What do you think was done right?/What do you think went wrong?</i> 		
E. What are the factors that determine the success or failure of the reform?	E1. Strengths and constraints	<p>E.1.1 How would you describe your success so far?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>What were the contributing factors?</i> <p>E1.2 How would you describe your working relationship with other transport agencies? Have you encountered any significant issue/problems?</p> <p>E1.3 What is your perception of SPAD? Have they been able to achieve what they were set out to do?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Probe for evidence</i> <p>E1.4 How would you imagine an ideal SPAD?</p>	<p>Structural change vs mental modes</p> <p>Resistance to change</p> <p>Social capital (trust)</p> <p>Inter-organizational relationship</p>	<p>SPAD</p> <p>SPAD and other agencies</p> <p>Other agencies</p> <p>SPAD and other agencies</p>

Question C – for SPAD

Question D – for other agencies

Appendix B: Interview Guide for SPAD

Questions and prompts	Key concepts	Comments given by pilot respondent
<p>Research Question 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of SPAD in Malaysia?</p>		
<p>1. Do you remember how the idea of a coordinating authority came about? When did that happen? <i>Was there any key personality involved?</i> For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developed cities - World Bank - Legitimacy vs. efficiency - Political will - Key personality 	<p>She talked about PT in 70, 80's and 90's and how the changes in public transport landscape (especially the ban of mini buses and LRT services) and failure to coordinate the network raise the need for a single transport authority. WB suggested mini bus service to increase employment.</p> <p>She did not mention specific key personality, but mentioned about the key person who influenced the PM to ban mini buses...which led to drastic drop in PT usage.</p>
<p>2. Why was it set up the way it was? <i>[Was there an alternative model?]</i> <i>[What was the process adopted?]</i> - <i>Any refurbishment to the existing authorities?</i> <i>[Was it to solve any particular issue?]</i> <i>Discussion to focus around transport issues: congestion, poor service</i> For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Prime Minister as the head - At national level - Institutional weaknesses/inadequacy of existing structure - Coordination issues - Bureaucracy 	<p>Although SPAD is a national body, it only focuses on Klang Valley, nothing is done on national scale.</p> <p>She suggested that I also speak to the agencies absorbed into SPAD – particularly the Director General of Railway as he is 'neglected' although he is an expert in his field as SPAD has its own group of people.</p>

Questions and prompts	Key concepts	Comments given by pilot respondent
<p>3. Did your organization support the establishment of the authority?</p> <p><i>[If so, what are the reasons?/How do you benefit from the authority?]</i></p> <p><i>[If no, were there other alternatives?]</i></p> <p><i>Other than the authority</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Alternative models - Streamline the sector - Single champion - Coordinated decision making - Policy integration without institutional integration 	<p>Her response was: “Yes, we were for SPAD, mainly for coordinated network planning, which nobody was doing”.</p>
<p>4. How does this fit the perspectives of other organizations?</p> <p><i>[Who and what were their views?]</i></p> <p><i>[Who supported and who were against?]</i></p> <p><i>Other than the authority</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multi actor perspective - Response from agencies 	<p>She thinks that CVLB and the LRT operators were against SPAD because they think they have been doing a good job.</p> <p>The local authorities were not favourable because they were not clear of the functions of SPAD.</p> <p>Overall, she thinks this question is not clear and similar to (3)</p>
<p>Research Question 2: What types of autonomy have been given to the authority?</p>		
<p>5. What powers have been delegated to you under the new structure?</p> <p><i>[Are the powers adequate to carry out the assigned functions?]</i></p> <p>For the authority</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legal backing - political backing - Functions (rhetoric vs. practice) <i>Actual functions compared to documentation</i> - authority vs. autonomy 	<p>She said that this question is relevant to respondents from SPAD</p>

Questions and prompts	Key concepts	Comments given by pilot respondent
<p>6. How are these powers exercised? Chairman and ceo, how you interpret</p> <p>What might be improved?</p> <p><i>[Is there any reporting mechanism back to the central government?]</i></p> <p><i>[Who has the final say?]</i></p> <p><i>[How do you get buy in from other agencies?]</i></p> <p><i>[What mechanism do you have to ensure that decisions are implemented on the ground?]</i></p> <p>For the authority</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Real power transfer - Hierarchical control - Centralization - Politicians vs. bureaucrats - support of citizens (public mass) - authority to drive the decisions - consensus with other agencies 	<p>It would be useful to find out how the Chairman and the CEO interpret the power they have – For this she suggested that I interview both the Chairman and the CEO.</p> <p>She thinks that the CEO may not tell the ‘truth’, so I may need to find someone else in SPAD.</p> <p>These questions are good but she felt that I need to find the right people who can answer this.</p>
<p>7. Have the funding mechanisms changed and in what ways?</p> <p><i>[What kind of support do you receive from central government?]</i></p> <p>For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Central government control - Financial autonomy/self-financing power - PPP/privatisation - Financial constraint 	<p>She mentioned about absence of strategic plan not only for Klang valley but for the whole country. And there is no basis for SPAD to select feasible projects.</p> <p>SPAD work closely with the consultants, and in a way it benefits the consultants because they then get the opportunity for further work in projects, issue of transparency...</p> <p>She raised the issue of SPAD not having the authority to direct the local authorities and no financial autonomy. Funding comes from the Ministry of Finance and EPU.</p> <p>She then suggested the following questions:</p> <p>How do you plan to implement your public transport plan when you don’t have the financial autonomy?</p>

Questions and prompts	Key concepts	Comments given by pilot respondent
		<p>(Funding before planning or planning before funding)</p> <p>You do not have the authority to direct the local authorities, in such case what mechanisms do you have to implement the plans you have made? (power to drive decisions).</p>
<p>8. If you were given an opportunity to amend the Act, is there any particular thing that you would like to improve?</p> <p><i>[How will that make a difference?]</i></p> <p><i>[What is stopping you from acquiring those powers?]</i></p> <p><i>Extension of act at local level</i></p> <p>For the authority/others?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Streamline the sector - Political resistance - Too much bureaucracy - Absence of strong political will - Power to drive implementation 	<p>She said that this is only relevant to respondents from SPAD</p>
<p>Research Question 3: How have the reforms affected decision making processes in policy making and the selection and implementation of transport transport projects?</p> <p>(projects/policies identified by respondents or found to be unique will be used to discuss these questions)</p>		
<p>8. Has there been any difference in the project/policy focus under the new structure?</p> <p><i>[Have the recent economic circumstances/changes in the central government policy influenced your priorities?]</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Master plans - Strategic plans - Policy community - Policy elites - Public participation/response to local needs - Clear decision making 	<p>She said that she does not observe any differences</p>

Questions and prompts	Key concepts	Comments given by pilot respondent
<i>For all</i>	procedure - Policy discourse - Strategy vs project level	
9. What is your/organization's role in the decision making process? <i>[Who makes the ultimate decision?]</i> <i>For all</i>	- Passive/active role - Policy elites	She raised that there is less room for participation than before, during when EPU was in charge of coordinating. She also sensed that SPAD preferred using consultants than working with existing agencies
10. How is the decision making process different now than before? <i>[Is there a clear guideline for decision making?]</i> - <i>Use example of a recent project approved under the new structure</i> <i>For all</i>	- Corporate social responsibility - Transparency - Rationality vs. power - Path dependence - Master plans/development plans - Public participation - Role of NGO's - Web sites	She raised the issue of transparency in decision making and said that there is less transparency now than before. She felt that a lot of decisions made within a group of policy elites and she is not sure who they are. She suggested that I try to probe for corruption and suggested that I ask questions related to glitches in the decision making process
Research Question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms?		
11. What have the main achievements been? <i>[Has there been any difference on the ground, for the people?]</i> <i>[What do you think is your strength?]</i> <i>[How would you imagine an ideal SPAD?]</i> <i>For all</i>	- improvements in connectivity- intra- city, regional - freight services - improvements in transport services - Less air pollution - scale issue: city vs. regional	She said her ideal SPAD resembles Singapore, LTA with good land use transport integration

Appendix C: Revised interview guide for SPAD

Questions and prompts	Key concepts	Interview topic
Research Question 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of SPAD in Malaysia?		
<p>1. Do you remember how the idea of a coordinating authority came about? When did that happen? <i>Was there any key personality involved?</i> For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developed cities - World Bank - Legitimacy vs. efficiency - Political will - Key personality 	Who started?
<p>2. Why was it set up the way it was? <i>[Was there an alternative model?]</i> <i>[What was the process adopted?]</i> - <i>Any refurbishment to the existing authorities?</i> <i>[Was it to solve any particular issue?]</i> <i>Discussion to focus around transport issues: congestion, poor service</i> For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Prime Minister as the head - At national level - Institutional weaknesses/inadequacy of existing structure - Coordination issues - Bureaucracy 	<p>The rationale</p> <p>Is the model right way forward?</p>
<p>3. Did your organization support the establishment of the authority? <i>[If so, what are the reasons?/How do you benefit from the authority?]</i> <i>[If no, were there other alternatives?]</i> <i>Other than the authority</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Alternative models - Streamline the sector - Single champion - Coordinated decision making - Policy integration without institutional integration 	Who supported and who were against?
Research Question 2: What types of autonomy have been given to the authority?		
<p>4. What powers have been delegated to you under the new structure? <i>[Are the powers adequate to carry out the assigned functions?]</i> For the authority</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legal backing - political backing - Functions (rhetoric vs. practice) <i>Actual functions compared to documentation</i> - authority vs. autonomy 	Legislation support

Questions and prompts	Key concepts	Interview topic
<p>5. How are these powers exercised? What might be improved? <i>[Is there any reporting mechanism back to the central government?]</i> <i>[Who has the final say?]</i> <i>[How do you get buy in from other agencies?]</i> <i>[What mechanism do you have to ensure that decisions are implemented on the ground?]</i></p> <p>For the authority</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Real power transfer - Hierarchical control - Centralization - Politicians vs. bureaucrats - support of citizens (public mass) - authority to drive the decisions - consensus with other agencies 	<p>Autonomy and authority</p> <p>Autonomy – powers acquired/to make decisions Authority – to influence other agencies <i>Check definition</i></p>
<p>6. Have the funding mechanisms changed and in what ways? <i>[What kind of support do you receive from central government?]</i></p> <p><i>What mechanism do you have to implement the plans?</i></p> <p>For the authority</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Central government control - Financial autonomy/self- financing power - PPP/privatisation - Financial constraint 	<p>Support from central agency</p>
<p>7. If you were given an opportunity to amend the Act, is there any particular thing that you would like to improve? <i>[How will that make a difference?]</i> <i>[What is stopping you from acquiring those powers?]</i></p> <p><i>Extension of act at local level</i></p> <p>For the authority/others?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Streamline the sector - Political resistance - Too much bureaucracy - Absence of strong political will - Power to drive implementation 	<p>Adequacy of existing powers</p>
<p>8. SPAD has been placed directly under the PM. What is your view? What are the advantages? What are the disadvantages?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 	

Questions and prompts	Key concepts	Interview topic
<i>For all</i>		
Research Question 3: How have the reforms affected decision making processes in policy making and the selection and implementation of transport transport projects? (projects/policies identified by respondents or found to be unique will be used to discuss these questions)		
<p>9 Has there been any difference in the project/policy focus under the new structure? <i>[Have the recent economic circumstances/changes in the central government policy influenced your priorities?]</i></p> <p>For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Master plans - Strategic plans - Policy community - Policy elites - Public participation/response to local needs - Clear decision making procedure - Policy discourse - Strategy vs project level 	<p>Strategy and project focus</p>
<p>10. What is your/organization's role in the decision making process? <i>[Who makes the ultimate decision?]</i></p> <p>For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Passive/active role - Policy elites 	<p>Role in decision making process</p>
<p>11. How is the decision making process different now than before? <i>[Is there a clear guideline for decision making?]</i> - <i>Use example of a recent project approved under the new structure</i> In your observation, is there any glitches in the new decision making process? For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Corporate social responsibility - Transparency - Rationality vs. power - Path dependence - Master plans/development plans - Public participation - Role of NGO's - Websites 	<p>Clear line of responsibility</p> <p>Improvements in coordination</p>
Research Question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms?		
<p>12. What have the main achievements been? <i>[Has there been any difference on the ground, for the people?]</i> <i>[What do you think is your strength?]</i> <i>[How would you imagine an ideal SPAD?]</i></p> <p>For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improvements in connectivity- intra- city, regional - freight services - improvements in transport services - Less air pollution - Scale issue: city vs. regional 	<p>Outcomes of reform</p>

Questions and prompts	Key concepts	Interview topic
13. [What have you benefited from the reform?] For all	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coordinated actions - Power to drive decisions - More capacity - Winners and losers 	Strengths and constraints Identity winners and losers of reform
14. What are the impediments to further progress? For all	Internal factors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - corruption - Financial - Technical capacity - Legal backing - Structural change vs. mental modes External factors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inter-organizational relationship - Social trust/consensus from other agencies - Rules/regulation - Political pressure - Poor urban governance - Support from public 	-
15. How is the relationship between the top management and staff in SPAD? Are there any leadership that issues you observe?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Leadership issues 	
16. Do you have any plans to seek assistance from the international development agencies? - <i>check for procedures</i> For the authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Technical/funding support 	

Appendix D: Interview guide for BMLTA case study

Questions and prompts	Key concepts	Background
Research Question 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of BMLTA in Bangalore?		
<p>1. Do you remember how the idea of a coordinating authority came about?</p> <p>When did that happen?</p> <p><i>[You were the first to establish UMTA in the country, any particular motivation?]</i></p> <p>For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developed cities - World Bank - Legitimacy vs. efficiency - Political will - Key personality - National Urban Transport Policy - 74th constitutional amendment act (1993) calls for decentralization 	<p>In 2006, NUTP was established for India and one of the recommendations is to set up UMTA, with legislation support and it gave flexibility the State Gov. to choose suitable model. Bangalore was the first to establish a coordinating agency. There was a study done by WB in 2005, and similar recommendation was made.</p>
<p>2. Why was it set up the way it was?</p> <p><i>[Was it to solve any particular issue?]</i></p> <p><i>[What was the process adopted?]</i></p> <p>- <i>Any refurbishment to the existing authorities?</i></p> <p><i>Discussion to focus around transport issues: congestion, air pollution</i></p> <p>For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National policy/directive from central Government - Decentralization-transfer of decision making authority - Institutional weaknesses/inadequacy of existing structure - Coordination issues - Bureaucracy - Job security - Issue of scale 	<p>The State Government established Directorate Urban Land Transport at state level and then established Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Authority (for Bangalore Metropolitan). Both are government bodies under Urban Development Department. Bangalore has severe congestion and air pollution problems. The institutional framework for transport is fragmented with out-dated with legislations which need amendments.</p>

Questions and prompts	Key concepts	Background
<p>3. Did your organization support the establishment of the authority?</p> <p><i>[If so, what are the reasons?/How do you benefit from the authority?]</i></p> <p><i>[If no, were there other alternatives?]</i></p> <p><i>Other than the authority</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Alternative models - Streamline the sector - Single champion - Coordinated decision making - Policy integration without institutional integration 	<p>There are different views about the ideal model</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whether UMTA should be established at State or city level • The existing municipal corporation can play role as UMTA without creating a new body • A committee with regular meetings <p>From the literature review, it seems like everyone was for UMTA</p> <p>Main agency is Urban Development Department of Karnataka</p>
<p>Research Question 2: What types of autonomy are given to the authority?</p>		
<p>4. What powers have been delegated to you under the new structure?</p> <p><i>[Are the powers adequate to carry out the assigned functions?]</i></p> <p><i>[Do you have the same powers as DULT?][What is the source of power for DULT?]</i></p> <p>For the authority</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legal backing - Political backing - Functions (rhetoric vs. practice) - <i>Actual functions compared to documentation</i> - Authority vs. autonomy 	<p>No legislation support has been provided yet but the draft Act has been prepared. BMLTA is a coordinating and planning agency, and also oversees project implementation. From the review of minutes of meeting, BMLTA seems to be deciding on projects for implementation, evaluates and approves completed studies, commissions new studies, gives directives to other agencies for project implementation. But it doesn't seem to have power to decide on project sites.</p>
<p>5. How are these powers exercised?</p> <p><i>What might be improved?</i></p> <p><i>[Is there any reporting mechanism back to the state/central government?]</i></p> <p><i>[Who has the final say?]</i></p> <p><i>[How do you get buy in from other agencies?]</i></p> <p><i>[What mechanism do you have to ensure that decisions are implemented on the ground?]</i></p> <p>For the authority</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Real power transfer - Hierarchical control - Centralization - Politicians vs. bureaucrats - Support of citizens (public mass) - Authority to drive the decisions - Consensus with other agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - BMLTA meets a few times a year but it has established sub-committees to tackle relevant issues and report back to the main committee. - BMLTA is chaired by the State's Chief Secretary which gives the authority a lot of strength. - Good decisions are made at the meetings but actions are slow...why??(refer meeting minutes)

Questions and prompts	Key concepts	Background
<p>6. Have the funding mechanisms changed and in what ways? <i>[What kind of support do you receive from central government?]</i></p> <p>For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Central government control - Financial autonomy/self- financing power - PPP/privatisation - Financial constraint - Donor agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Under the NUTP, the central government has established JNNURM fund, but it is said to be rigid and provides only partial funding. - There have been discussions to apply for WB's assistance
<p>7. The draft BMLTA Act has been prepared in 2008, but hasn't been passed, could you explain the reasons? <i>[What is the effect of Bangalore Governance Act 2009 on BMLTA when it comes into force?]</i></p> <p>For the authority/others?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Streamline the sector - Political resistance - Too much bureaucracy - Absence of strong political will - Proposals in the Kasturirangan Committee Report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not only BMLTA act, but amending any other existing legislation or creating a new piece of legislation is difficult in the State. - Draft Governance Act for Bangalore 2009 is proposed to strengthen urban governance and streamline the functions/jurisdictions of agencies, plus giving more powers to urban local bodies. It has not been passed in the Parliament, not quite sure why is it taking so long.
<p>Research Question 3: How have the reforms affected decision making processes in policy making and the selection and implementation of transport transport projects? (Projects/policies identified by respondents or found to be unique will be used to discuss these questions)</p> <p>Consider parking policy and METRO project</p>		
<p>8. Has there been any difference in the project/policy focus under the new structure? <i>[Have the recent economic circumstances/changes in the central government policy influenced your priorities?]</i></p> <p>For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy community - Policy elites - Public participation/response to local needs - Clear decision making procedure - Policy discourse - Strategy level vs project level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of BMLTA's minutes of the meeting show that more attention is given to improving basic facilities, such as bus terminals, scheduling for bus, parking facilities. There are proposals for commuter and monorail. Funding is a constraint. Seeking for funding from JNNURM, alternatively WB.

Questions and prompts	Key concepts	Background
<p>9. What is your/organization's role in the decision making process? <i>[Who makes the ultimate decision?]</i></p> <p>For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Passive/active role - Policy elites 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Chief Secretary of the State makes strong, bold decisions during meetings (<i>this is the way the minutes are recorded</i>). No evidence of other dominant decision maker e.g. Chief Minister, Commissioner, Mayor
<p>10. How is the decision making process different now than before? <i>[Is there a clear guideline for decision making?]</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Use example of a recent project approved under the new structure</i> <p>For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Corporate social responsibility - Transparency - Rationality vs. power - Path dependence - Master plans/development plans - Public participation - Role of NGO's - Websites 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - With, there is a platform for all relevant agencies to come together to discuss and make the correct decisions. Not clear if reference is made to master plans/development plans. There seems to be active participation from transport experts, NGO's, general public via PRAJA's website. However, there seems to be delays in implementing the decisions.
Research Question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms?		
<p>11. What have the main achievements been? <i>[Has there been any difference on the ground, for the people?]</i> <i>[What do you think is BMLTA's strength?]</i> <i>[How would you imagine an ideal BLMTA?]</i></p> <p>For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improvements in connectivity- intra- city, regional - Freight services - Improvements in transport services - Less air pollution - Scale issue: city vs. regional vs. state 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Based on the review of the minutes of meeting, there have been a lot of talks on increasing automobile tax, using cleaner fuel, promote walking and cycling as well as overcoming the parking woes, but not sure of the achievements on the ground
<p>12. Why have these been possible now and not under the previous system? <i>[What have you benefited from the reform?]</i></p> <p>For all</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coordinated actions - Power to drive decisions - More capacity - Winners and losers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There are proposals to transfer BMLTA to Bangalore Metropolitan Development Authority for better coordination and planning. - There is strong move towards regional coordination and planning, at Bangalore Metropolitan level.

Questions and prompts	Key concepts	Background
<p>13. What are the impediments to further progress?</p> <p>For all</p>	<p>Internal factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Corruption - Financial - Technical capacity - Legal backing - Structural change vs. mental modes <p>External factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inter-organizational relationship - Social trust/consensus from other agencies - Rules/regulation - Political pressure - Poor urban governance - Support from the public 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The existing urban governance structure needs to be strengthened and old legislations needs amendments - BMLTA has to be given statutory Act - Funding and politics are said to be big issues - The need for city leadership. Fully elected mayor is strongly proposed, so that leaders are more accountable to public (main proposal in the Bangalore Governance Act 2009). - Absence of coordinated regional planning. Proposals for Metropolitan Planning Corporation.
<p>14. What kind of assistance did you receive from International Development Agencies such as the WB or ADB?</p> <p><i>[Can you apply for assistance directly without going through the central agencies?]</i></p> <p><i>[Besides ADB and WB are there any other donor agencies involved in Bangalore?]</i></p> <p>For the authority</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Technical/funding support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WB organized UMTA workshop in June 2009 in Bangalore

Appendix E: Findings of SPAD and BMLTA

RQ 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of SPAD in Malaysia?

Findings from the SPAD case study for RQ1	Details	Interpretation/conclusion
<p>Top down push</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong political leadership – PM - Aimed to gain political legitimacy by abolishing the Bumiputera agenda - Attempted to create quick wins upon assuming office in 2009 – main areas identified were public transport and anti corruption - Supported the creation of SPAD although it wasn't his idea – the proposal complemented PM's agenda to achieve the objectives above 	<p>The Front Coalition, the ruling party lost the usual 2/3 majority in 2008 election.</p> <p>The PM was vested with the authority to make and drive decisions.</p> <p>The PM continued policy implementation for creating SPAD but he twisted the model to enable CVLB to be dissolved. SPAD turned out to be in charge of both PT and goods vehicles although it was never in the original plan accommodate goods vehicles.</p>	<p>Presence of strong political champions who dared to make changes</p> <p>Reform was undertaken to gain political legitimacy</p> <p>Policy window</p>

Findings from the SPAD case study for RQ1	Details	Interpretation/conclusion
<p>Inadequacy in the existing structure</p> <p>CVLB</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Implementation of the Bumiputera Agenda was politicised - Misuse of power and corruption in CVLB - CVLB was under-performing due to insufficient resources and politicization – the industry was poorly regulated – poor planning, poor regulation and poor enforcement <p>MOT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MOT could not exercise its powers due to racial sensitivity and reluctance to meddle in Bumiputera agenda. Respondents also highlighted poor quality officers. - POOR PLANNING - Fragmentation in the planning function, no overarching transport policy - POOR COORDINATION – presence of multiple agencies, leading to poor integration among modes on the ground 	<p>There was no clear line of accountability of proper check and balance system in place</p> <p>The agenda was to create as many Malay entrepreneurs as possible at the expense of transport efficiency- CVLB did not maintain good database –actual license holders not known</p> <p>MOT was in a better position to plan and coordinate for public transport but they neglected the function – accountability issue again</p> <p>Available options</p> <p>Option 1: Restructure CVLB</p> <p>Option 2: Create new authority</p> <p>Second option was easier and desirable as it would include rail as well. Besides overcoming the corruption issues, this option would allow for better integration</p> <p>It was also easier to create a semi-atomous body rather than a government agency – so the reformers opted for that</p>	<p>There was a need for change to be better</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improve accountability - Fight corruption - Improve planning function coordination among agencies <p>Power on paper vs power in reality</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MOT could not do what it was supposed to do for planning <p>Creating a new agency was found to be easier that revamping/improving old ones</p> <p>Reformers tend to create a model known best to them/easy which fit their purpose</p>
<p>Push from consultants</p>	<p>Involvement since 70's, their proposals for a transport authority appeared in many gov documents – it became a belief although there was no strong research evidence indicating requirement</p>	<p>Ideas disseminated by management consultants based on successful models</p>

Findings from the SPAD case study for RQ1	Details	Interpretation/conclusion
Proximity of Singapore LTA <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Senior administrators benchmarking with model that they perceived to be successful 	Malaysia tried to emulate Singapore LTA model, but it was too difficult – different context	Benchmarking with successful cities – but what was created was far from mirroring this agency
Deteriorating public transport services <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - public not happy, congestion was a problem, operators complained having to liaise with many agencies 	Privatisation urban rail projects failed	Powers needed to be consolidated – single regulator had to be created The public transport system had to be improved

RQ 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of BMLTA in Bangalore?

Findings from the BMLTA case study for RQ1	Details	Interpretation/conclusion
Top down push and bottom up push	Top down push <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National urban transport policy, strongly pushed by the central government - Decentralization under 74th amendment but actual decentralization did not happen, the State Government was not keen - Push by State Government – had good political support + stakeholders agree that there was a need, but they only created a coordinating committee – and a set-up which did not involve devolving powers to the local bodies or grabbing powers from any existing agencies Bottom up <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stakeholder agreed on the idea until there was a proposal for power transfer, then everybody 'hated' the idea - Proposals from academics 	Reform was done to gain access to central government funds Reform had minimum disruption to the existing institutional settings – small reform – which was more acceptable in the 'Indian context'
Inadequacy in the existing structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Poor planning - Fragmentation in the planning function, no land use transport integration, absence of holistic vision for city, lack of experts, 	Need for a powerful coordinator and dedicated planner - need for change to be

Findings from the BMLTA case study for RQ1	Details	Interpretation/conclusion
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Poor planning and coordination 	<p>no one takes ownership of plans</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Poor coordination – presence of multiple agencies at various levels governed by different poorly integrated law. - Agencies governed by own objectives and matters made worse by the absence of platform to integrate the functions of these agencies. Made worse by presence of powerful parastatals with own funding muscle, who went on to what they thought was right rather than what is really require 	<p>better</p> <p>There was poor social trust among agencies – they were competing for the scarce funding resources</p>
<p>Existing agencies not empowered</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - But what is created to replace is also an underpowered agency, worse still, it is only a committee 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - BMRDA not performing according to expectations (failed to play an effective coordinator and planner role) - BBMP is under powered with poor administration and frequent change of leadership - One the factors pointed out is that these agencies are not financially independent like many other agencies in Bangalore, and dependent on government grant - Poor accountability system in place which provided the check and balance on non-performing agencies 	<p>The absence of actual decentralization- power concentrated in the state</p> <p>Powers on paper vs power in reality</p> <p>Poor city leadership</p> <p>It is easier to create a new body than trying to reorganize or reform existing agencies</p>
<p>Growth of Bangalore city</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Private vehicles increasing, existing infrastructure cannot cope, poor integration among modes (because the modes were under different agencies) - No overall vision for the city 	<p>There was a need to integrate various modes to improve mobility</p>

RQ2: What types of autonomy have been given to the authority (SPAD)?

Findings from the SPAD case study for RQ2	Details	Interpretation/conclusion
<p>SPAD has not acquired all the powers – yet to be a single regulator</p> <p>SPAD was a treated as a project without a long term reform plan</p>	<p>SPAD is not a single regulator yet, the ultimate model / objective is yet to be achieved</p> <p>Not all powers could be transferred as planned – RTD refused to give up the powers for vocational licensing and this produced unintended consequences such fragmentation in the enforcement function</p> <p>The powers that could be transferred to SPAD was limited to what CVLB, ministry of tourism and DOR had, plans to take more power e.g. from RTD/MOT did not succeed.</p>	<p>Gap between planning and implementation of reform due to power and resistance issues</p> <p>Further reform is needed to empower SPAD</p> <p>Failure to acknowledge that reform is an ongoing process</p>
<p>SPAD is given legislative backing but not fully operationalised</p>	<p>Respondents argued that SPAD has not fully operationalized the Act and this affects the working mechanism especially enforcement function</p> <p>There are some dispute regarding the enforcement functions but this cannot be resolved unless amendment is made to the acts</p>	<p>Legislative support has to be flexible, with inbuilt powers – so that frequent amendments not needed</p> <p>Subsequent big reforms are not desirable (eg. amending the acts) as it is politically damaging</p> <p>Legal act provides the ‘hard power’ but it has to be operationalized with good resource capacity</p>
<p>Commission status pending</p>	<p>Central government is reluctant to grant financial autonomy to SPAD - which also affects commission status – hence SPAD is operating like another government agency.</p> <p>SPAD has to be empowered and made accountable at the same time. Currently SPAD believe that with commission status, there will be less central government control</p> <p>SPAD claim that absence of commission status affects its capacity building.</p>	<p>Central government control</p> <p>Empowerment must be followed with accountability</p>
<p>SPAD is entrusted with planning function but there is an absence of clear requirements for SPAD to implement the plans – plan implementation is not clear and SPAD is not given the incentives (funding) to drive the</p>	<p>SPAD fills the gap in planning which existed in the previous institutional framework</p> <p>There is danger that the plans will not be implemented</p> <p>Implementation of plans – dependent on relationship with other stakeholders, NPPC council and use of licensing tool</p>	<p>Funding capacity is important to drive the coordinating and planning functions. SPAD should at least be made as fund distributor</p>

Findings from the SPAD case study for RQ2	Details	Interpretation/conclusion
plans	None of the transport authority in the developed cities has proven to be self financing	
SPAD and RTD are expected to carry out the enforcement functions without proper empowerment	Longer procedures in enforcement than before. All prosecutions require the approval of the Public Prosecutor – entails more paper work, longer period, raising more safety issues on the ground	Execution without empowerment More central government control

Research Question 2: What types of autonomy have been given to the authority (BMLTA)?

Findings from the BMLTA case study for RQ2	Details	Interpretation/conclusion
<p>High powered committee with no political and legislative backing</p> <p>Absence of dedicated resources and personnel</p>	<p>Definition of 'committee' implies' that this body is 'fluid' – with no dedicated resources – members are attached to original department – less commitment</p> <p>Committee does not operate on a day to day basis</p> <p>A committee may not be sufficient in the context of Bangalore where coordination is really a problem</p> <p>BMLTA relying on sub-committees and consultants</p>	<p>Change for the sake of changing – without proper target and objectives</p>
<p>Legislation backing is still pending although the act has been prepared</p>	<p>On paper – there are indication of plans to empower BMLTA – with legislation backing – but in reality that did not happen</p> <p>Without legislation backing – BMLTA has no mandate to direct other agencies</p> <p>Functions, structure, resources – not clear</p> <p>The administrators who created BMLTA have all left – no continuity in the reform initiative</p> <p>Affected parties not giving consensus to the bill -</p> <p>Other conflicting initiatives – BGB bill and proposals for MPC</p>	<p>State Government is not serious in empowering BMLTA</p> <p>Empowerment of BMLTA is dependent on other reform proposals which are in the pipeline</p> <p>Strong resistance of agencies to give up any existing powers</p> <p>(they want 'change' without changing anything)</p>

Findings from the BMLTA case study for RQ2	Details	Interpretation/conclusion
BMLTA themselves not sure of their role, model and functions, different actors have different view of what it should be	<p>Respondents have different views of what BMLTA really does (without legal backing)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - some say it is a dispute resolution - coordinator without teeth – because it has no funding capacity - planning body 	Actors are contesting about the right model and powers to be given to BMLTA
There is a need to transform the coordinating body (BMLTA) into an authority	<p>Respondents have not indicated desires to see BMLTA change the institutional structure- most importantly they have stated clearly that it should not touch their powers and provide win-win situation</p> <p>Commissioner of BMLTA pointed out that BMLTA cannot be empowered without reducing the powers of other agencies</p> <p>It was made known that the current status of BMLTA as an authority does not allow transformation into an authority – a brand new authority has to be created</p> <p>But it was also pointed out the ‘coordinating role’ can only be played effectively by a government body and not by a parastatal agency – so BMLTA still has to take a ‘government’ form</p>	A brand new reform is needed
Funding is critical in the context of Bangalore, especially for a coordinating body like BMLTA	<p>Funding is crucial – to deal with the parastatal agencies</p> <p>Poor funding capacity- one of the reasons why BMRDA and BBMP did not develop well</p> <p>Funding has to be used as ‘carrot’ to implement plans</p> <p>At least BMLTA has to be designed as funding distribution centre</p> <p>Scenario in Bangalore – many plans exist, but poor implementation due to funding and political interference</p>	Funding is crucial to drive implementation of plans and to coordinate the agencies
Leadership issues	<p>BMLTA has Chief Secretary as chairman – it is argued that he is powerless when he heads a powerless body like BMLTA</p> <p>So decisions made by the CS in BMLTA committee is not binding</p> <p>Chief Secretary is also too busy, often changes</p> <p>Commissioner constantly changed and hold many other positions at the same time</p>	<p>Not practical to have the CS as the chairman</p> <p>Absence of continuity in leadership</p> <p>Absence of political champion</p>

Research Question 3: How have the reforms affected decision making processes in policy making and the selection and implementation of transport projects? - SPAD

Findings from the SPAD case study for RQ3	Details	Interpretation/Conclusion
<p>SPAD acts as the checkpoint for EPU</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - there is no compulsion for one to go to SPAD with new proposals, ideally that is what it should be. Highly political projects skips this 	<p>The previous decisions making arrangements remain, SPAD only forms an additional layer prior to the approval process</p> <p>SPAD checks proposals, provides evaluation and feedback to EPU. EPU holds the ultimate decision making authority because it holds the funding power.</p> <p>It appears as though the decision making powers is strongly related on funding capacity, unless SPAD is given some financial strength, it is unlikely that it will be able to make any decisions at the strategic level or play an effective coordinating role</p>	<p>Decisions are made powers not devolved, the central government still holds the grip</p> <p>Decision making power is strongly dependent on funding capacity</p>
<p>Decision making for railway – rhetoric vs practice</p>	<p>SPAD is given more powers in terms of railway regulation, but in reality a lot of decisions regarding railway are made outside SPAD - for example, by the MRT Exco</p>	<p>Actual powers on paper versus actual practice</p>
<p>Winners and losers of the reform</p> <p>Winners</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EPU, operators, public <p>Losers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MOT, RTD 	<p>Winners are happy and want more – such as the operators want to be directly involved in planning policy matters, EPU wants SPAD to have good engagement with stakeholders.</p> <p>The losers – criticizes SPAD, and does not show any willingness to cooperate. They seem to be more protective and feeling threatened.</p> <p>Those who did not lose any powers seem to be more willing to work with SPAD</p>	<p>Actors who lost powers are unhappy will the new distribution of power – arguing for a better model</p>

Research question 3: How have the reforms affected decision making processes in policy making and the selection and implementation of transport projects? - BMLTA

Findings from the BMLTA case study for RQ3	Details	Interpretation/Conclusion
<p>BMLTA's decisions only advisory and not binding</p> <p>A lot of decisions regarding transport still made outside BMLTA</p>	<p>Agencies have to implement projects using their own funding</p> <p>Agencies have final say of whether or not to implement BMLTA's suggestions</p> <p>BMLTA wants to have final say in projects – difficult without legislative support</p>	<p>Absence of legal mandate to make and enforce decisions (absence of legitimate authority)</p> <p>Absence of powers to drive decisions – mainly funding</p> <p>Holds no accountability for transport matters</p>
<p>Limited outcomes – mainly around preparation of studies and guidelines and dispute resolution, and reviving old projects</p> <p>Nothing at strategic level – parking policy failed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - better NMT initiatives - BRT project revisited - guidelines for transit management centres prepared but cannot be enforced - dispute resolution among agencies involved in MRT project - good engagement with NGO's 	<p>Without proper mandate not able to influence policies at strategic level</p> <p>Working relationship – participatory/handholding instead of 'directives'</p> <p>BMLTA builds its niche in uncontested policy areas</p>

Research Question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms? - SPAD

Findings from the SPAD case study for RQ4	Details	Interpretation/Conclusion
<p>Prime Minister as the Minister in charge of SPAD</p>	<p>Although SPAD is under PM and ideally he can direct that SPAD is granted financial autonomy and commission status – he did not do that – perhaps he did want to meddle with the administrative process and leave that to the bureaucrats to handle</p> <p>SPAD has to negotiate with the administrators using good strategies to acquire the full 'commission status'</p> <p>Possibility for pollution of remit in SPAD – PM's can direct SPAD to do what he thinks should be done – as in the case of MRT project</p>	<p>Not practical to have a political champion too high up – power has to be devolved</p> <p>Short term political interest</p>
<p>Agencies which lost powers to SPAD still show signs of resistance and less willing to cooperate</p> <p>- The 'losers' are still threatened</p>	<p>RTD still feels threatened and fear that SPAD will take the power for vocational licensing- respondents clearly indicated resistance</p> <p>But on the other hand – PM has directed SPAD to work within the constraints and big changes (those which involve amendments to act) cannot be made immediately – the government will be criticised for poor policy implementation</p>	<p>Bad blood between losers of the reform and SPAD continues</p>
<p>SPAD preferred to recruit private sector</p>	<p>Perhaps the agenda would have been to bring in private sector culture into government – to increase efficiency but unfortunately – this created a culture clash – unable to engage each other effectively</p>	<p>Cultural clash between SPAD and government agencies. SPAD does not understand the administrative culture.</p> <p>Social capital/mutual trust has to be established before the new network can be stabilised again</p>

Findings from the SPAD case study for RQ4	Details	Interpretation/Conclusion
<p>SPAD lacks capacity – human resource, technical knowledge, institutional memory</p> <p>Leadership issues</p>	<p>Some say that capacity issue is teething problem which is temporary</p> <p>SPAD can overcome this by leveraging on the capacity of the network – but to do this strong leadership is required who establishes good rapport with the network members. Current CEO is a strategist, but not a 'ground' person</p> <p>Although SPAD is an 'authority', it still has to get work done through the network</p> <p>Chairman CEO conflict – managers left for direction</p>	<p>Good network can to a certain extent overcome the capacity issues</p> <p>Institutional memory – complete cut-off might be necessary to start fresh</p> <p>Good leadership is important to be able to exercise the powers given to SPAD</p>

Research question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms? - BMLTA

Findings from the BMLTA case study for RQ4	Details	Interpretation/Conclusion
<p>Fuzzy reform without clear objectives and good implementation design</p> <p>Absence of interest to evaluate outcomes of reform or it could be 'short term interest in reforms'.</p>	<p>There was a need for a coordinating body but it is not clear what BMLTA was created to do</p> <p>It is basically a coalition of willing without changing or sanctioning functions of any agencies – adds another layer</p> <p>Key reformers no longer hold the same position, perhaps the change in the political party in 2008 disrupted the reform</p>	<p>It was the reform (the creation) that mattered and not the outcome – hence it only contributed to overstuffing</p> <p>Failure to acknowledge that reform is an ongoing process</p>

Findings from the BMLTA case study for RQ4	Details	Interpretation/Conclusion
<p>Cultural issues</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong bureaucrat-political relationship - Laid back/not proactive civil servants - Corruption - Absence of 'figure head' who can control - Policies drafted without understanding local culture 	<p>Constant transfers of senior civil servants - Affects policy implementation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Major reshuffling with change in political executive - Head of departments holding many post at the same time - Politicians interfering both at policy and project level <p>Other cultural issues – respect for authority, job security, family ties</p>	<p>Lack of leadership stability affects policy implementation</p> <p>Strong nexus between politicians and bureaucrats</p>
<p>Too much cumbersome procedures and long approval process – lack of transparency in decision making</p> <p>Lack of accountability – agencies and individuals get away with their actions</p>	<p>Corruption is a problem and being accepted as a culture</p>	<p>Poor accountability and transparency in governance</p>
<p>Poor urban transport knowledge and expertise – dependence on development agencies</p>	<p>Urban transport – new sector in India – lack of expertise - BMLTA could leverage on this and act as technical wing for urban transport</p>	

Appendix F: Similarities and differences between SPAD and BMLTA

SPAD	BMLTA
Objectives and key drivers of reform determined the set-up	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Top down push and external factors • One of the objective – gain legitimacy and fight corruption – once that was established, PM lost interest?? • Political pressure triggered the reform • Poor performance of existing agencies • Benchmarked with LTA Singapore/London • Coordination issues – need to improve • Driven by national government, implementation at national level • Transport issues on the ground 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Top down push and external factors • Access to funds – NUTP • Poor performance of existing agencies • Benchmarked with LTA Singapore/London • Coordination issues • Driven by national government, implementation at state level • Growth of Bangalore city – led to transport issues on the ground
Failure to acknowledge that reform is an ongoing process	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Absence of a long term reform design • Gap between planning and implementation of reform exercise • Short term interest – only until it was created, then EPU thought it was not their responsibility any more • Poor monitoring on the outcome, lack of initiative to strengthen SPAD – SPAD was left to survive on its own from day 1 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Absence of a long term reform design • The focus was only the creation, although there were empowerment plans stated on paper, none of this took place • After 5 years of creation, it still maintains the same structure with limited increase in human resource capacity- there were signs of power curtailing by giving the commissioner additional post in other departments • There are other reforms in the pipe line which affects the empowerment of BMLTA • One of the objective of reform is to gain legitimacy from the central government in Delhi
Powers to act	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SPAD has the authority (necessary power) – but has a weak leadership which can successfully transform 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BMLTA has weak authority – has to work within the limitations, by engaging the network to produce

SPAD	BMLTA
<p>the powers into outcomes, weak ability to engage the existing network</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Power for managing land transport is more consolidated within SPAD although some fragmentation still exists. Creation of SPAD strengthens the power of the central government (EPU, MOF) and PM– as they have an overall say on most matters related to land transport. SPAD acts as check point for filtering projects. • Has powers to plan, regulate and enforce land public transport – but does not have contractual obligation with the transport operators – to enable to control the quality of service • Absence of funding capability 	<p>outcomes – outcomes are not at strategic levels</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Absence of decision making powers • Creation of BMLTA does not structurally change the distribution of power. BMLTA is just an addition to the already crowded institutional settings • Has limited planning function • Absence of legislative backing and funding capability
The degree of championing	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Championed by the Prime Minister • Prime Minister is vested with a lot of authority and resources– which made the reform possible- he managed to transform the resources with his leadership skills in order to gain legitimacy from the citizens • Prime Minister had short term interest – impractical in the long term 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Absence of political champion but has good leadership • Consensus decision making practice which made big reforms impossible
Lack of accountability and transparency	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accountability system is in place to some extent, but no sanctions for poor performance • Decisions making process not transparent • Corruption is a problem, it is acknowledged and actions are taken to combat corruption including as one of targets under NKRA • Limited public participation in 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poor accountability system in place – politicians and bureaucrats get away with their actions, no sanctions for poor performance • Decisions making process not transparent • Corruption is a problem/culture, it is acknowledged, but nothing much is done about it • Limited public participation in

SPAD	BMLTA
decision making	decision making
Cultural environment determines the kind of administrative behaviour that exists	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religious belief and values • Job security rather than efficiency • Respect for authority • Promotions based on seniority and experience • Priority for Malay ethnic • Cultural clash between SPAD and other government actors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong fusion between politicians and bureaucrats – constant transfers affect leadership continuity • Job security rather than efficiency • Respect for authority • Promotions based on seniority and experience • Corruption is a culture • Personal contacts – most effective way to get things done
Reluctance of central government/state government to devolve actual power (decision-making and financial power)	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reluctance of central government to devolve funding power to SPAD • Execution without empowerment – in the case of enforcement for SPAD • Cumbersome procedures –too many levels of approval, too detailed and repetitive – stemming from ‘fear to make decisions’ /political interference and the ‘control-oriented’ government • Resistance from agencies – especially those who were to give up existing powers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reluctance of State Government to devolve actual powers to city corporation as per the 74th amendment • BMLTA created at State level without city leadership • Reluctance to devolve any actual powers to BMTLA – such as legal mandate, decision making and financial power • Resistance from agencies to give up any existing powers • Cumbersome procedures - too many levels of approval, too detailed and repetitive – stemming from ‘fear to make decisions’ /political interference

