

Intraparty Politics and the Local State: Factionalism, Patronage and Power in
Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality.

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on the everyday operation of the African National Congress (ANC) as a dominant party in post-apartheid South Africa. It examines the scope of intraparty politics, particularly the trajectory of factionalism in ANC local structures after 1994. Despite the dominance of the ANC in South Africa's political field, its more recent political trajectory most particularly since it became a party of government in 1994 is much less well understood (Butler and Southall 2015: 1). The party has traditionally been studied using a top-down perspective and with a focus on elite level exchanges in which dynamics at the national level are viewed to reverberate downwards whilst drawing on information from party leaders. The contribution made by this thesis is that it offers a detailed qualitative focus on the operation of ANC intraparty politics at a local level drawing on evidence from Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality. The overriding aim of this study which is informed by theoretical expositions on the dominant party approach and on patronage and clientelism, is to understand how factionalism in the ANC has evolved in the post-apartheid era.

The thesis observes that the ANC's political dominance after 1994 saw the gradual conflation of the party and state partly through two processes related to the party's transformative agenda. Firstly, the state itself had to be transformed to reflect the demographic composition of the country and for the most part the ANC deployed its cadres into the state who could tow the party line. Secondly, the party relied on the state as a vehicle for redistribution and the transformation of the broader political economy to achieve equity and growth. Hence black economic empowerment, state preferential procurement and other policies to uplift previously disadvantaged social groups became stepping stones for the emergent African middle and upper class. Whilst these processes transformed the state, they also fundamentally transformed the party itself as it became a site of accumulation. Intraparty contestation intensified over the limited opportunities for upward mobility provided by access to the state. The thesis argues that factionalism increasingly became characterised by patronage as competing groups within the party sought to ring-fence their political power and the opportunities for upward mobility provided by the state. This was also compounded by deepening neoliberalism whose consequences of unemployment, poverty and inequality especially at the local level led to increased dependence on the local state and the development of factionalism based on patronage politics. The thesis then explores how patronage operates in everyday practice at the local level. It shows how patron-client relationships are not merely the exchange of state resources for political support but rather they embody a field of power relations (Auyero 2001). Evidence from Buffalo City offers an important insight into how patronage exchanges are preceded by complex relationships of power that are established over time and through various enactments. The thesis demonstrates how patrons, brokers and clients exercise various forms of power every day that inform inclusion or exclusion into networks for distributing scarce state resources. It challenges views that regard factionalism and patronage as elite driven practices.

Keywords: Dominant Party, African National Congress, Factionalism, Patronage, Clientelism, Power

Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my work and it has been written by me in its entirety. It is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. I have not submitted it for any degree or for examination at any other university. Parts of this thesis have been published as the following journal articles:

Mukwedeya, T. G. 2015. The enemy within: factionalism in ANC local structures—the case of Buffalo City (East London). *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa*. 87 (1) 117-134.

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Whilst I have declared that this is my unaided work to abide with academic rules, this severely understates how people and various institutions have helped me to put this work together. As one scholar said, ‘to deny the social component of any knowledge contribution is to deny our common humanity - we exist and, indeed, we know because of other people’. Let me thank all who have assisted me to put this work together.

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Dedication

Mwanangu Takudzwa Darrell Mukwedeya nevamwe vachatevera, matsimba angu aya
teverai muende mberi kupfura apa

Hama dzose dzakatungamira, ndinokutendai mose nekuwumba hupenyu hwangu
kwamakaita. Tichasanga tose zvakare. Ana Vhuramai, shava mhofu yemukono
nemadzisekuru angu ana Zuruvi, basa renyu iri

Chikuru ndokutendai Mwari nerudo nenyasha dzenyu. Kuita kwenyu uku.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations (list of abbreviations)

ANC	African National Congress
ANCYL	African National Congress Youth League
APF	Anti-Privatisation forum
Asgi-SA	Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for SA
BEC	Branch Executive Committee
COGTA	Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COPE	Congress of the People
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
COSAS	Congress of South African Students
CPSA	Communist Party of South Africa
DA	Democratic Alliance
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EPWP	Expanded Public Works Programme
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
NP	National Party
NAD	Native Affairs Department
NEC	National Executive Committee
NDR	National Democratic revolution
NUM	National Union of Mineworkers
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NGP	New Growth Path
NPA	National Prosecuting Authority
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress

PEC	Provincial Executive Committee
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SACP	South African Communist Party
SANCO	South African National Civic Organisation
SECC	Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee
TAC	Treatment Action Campaign

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

At the dawn of South Africa's democracy on the 2nd of May 1994, Nelson Mandela in a speech announcing the ANC election victory at Carlton Hotel in Johannesburg said;

Tomorrow, the entire ANC leadership and I will be back at our desks. We are rolling up our sleeves to begin tackling the problems our country faces. We ask you all to join us - go back to your jobs in the morning. Let's get South Africa working. For we must, together and without delay, begin to build *a better life for all* South Africans. This means creating jobs building houses, providing education and bringing peace and security for all¹.

The promise of a 'better life for all' was prominent in the African National Congress (ANC) 1994 National Election Manifesto and was one of the party's slogans. It is a historic slogan that has become synonymous with the ANC. The post-apartheid era has witnessed improved access to health, education, human settlements, energy and water particularly for the previously disadvantaged groups. However, as the ANC celebrated its 100 years of existence in 2012, President Jacob Zuma in his State of the Nation Address conceded that, 'the triple challenge of unemployment, poverty and inequality persists in spite of the progress made'. 13.6% of South Africans live in informal settlements with limited access to basic services (Census 2011) while the Limpopo text book saga and the Eastern Cape's

¹*My emphasis.* A full transcript of the speech can be found on the following link; <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=3658>

education crisis have called into question the country's education system. These are some of the challenges that have cast doubt on the promise of 'a better life for all' that was shared by the African National Congress (ANC) as its vision for South Africa after the attainment of democracy.

Militant forms of mobilisation against this state of affairs have intensified in the last ten years. South Africa has witnessed unprecedented levels of community unrest popularly characterised as service delivery protests that have sometimes been violent, drawing analogies to a 'rebellion of the poor' and 'insurgent citizenship' (Alexander 2010, Von Holdt *et al* 2011). Militant industrial action has also been on the rise culminating in the Marikana massacre of mine workers in 2012. In 2015, university students captured the imagination of many when they combined their struggle for free education with the pertinent issue of eradicating the outsourcing of workers in a nationwide protest. The recent disruptive nature of opposition parties, particularly the Economic Freedom Fighters grandstanding in parliament is a further indication of the disruptive politics prevalent in the contemporary South African landscape. To compound these protests which in many ways are against the form of ANC rule, the party itself has been plagued by internal turmoil through intensifying factionalism. This has intensified in the last ten years leading disgruntled members to breakaway to form two opposition parties: the Congress of the People (COPE) in 2008 and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in 2013.

Despite expressions of dissent to ANC rule and an organisational integrity compromised by factionalism, the ANC has managed to garner over sixty percent of the votes since 1994 and is likely to be dominant for some years to come hence its description as a dominant

party (Giliomee and Simkins 1999, Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2011, Southall and Daniel 2005)². The party is caught in what Susan Booysen (2015: 3) describes as ‘the ANC’s double act of decay and continuous dominance’. There is significant research on the supposed indications of the party’s decay such as on service delivery protests (see Atkinson 2007, Sinwell et al 2009, Alexander 2010, Von Holdt et al 2011) and on worker insurgency that culminated in the Marikana massacre (see Alexander et al 2013, Chinguno 2013). However, whilst there has been a lot of theoretical discussion about the ANC as a dominant party (Giliomee and Simkins 1999, De Jager and du Toit 2013, Butler 2014, Southall 2013) as well as substantial empirical work (see Booysen 2011, 2015) there is little actual empirical work on the ANC as a dominant party below national level at regional and branch levels.

More broadly, Butler and Southall (2015: 1) note that ‘despite the importance of the ANC for the contemporary politics and government of South Africa, its more recent political trajectory – most particularly since it became a party of government in 1994 – is much less well understood’. This thesis contributes towards filling this gap in the literature by focusing on one aspect of the ANC, that of intraparty politics. It focuses on the operation of factionalism in everyday practice at the local level. In addressing these concerns, this study is broadly informed by the following questions: What informs contemporary forms of factionalism? How different is the factional politics to the earlier expressions of factionalism? What is the relationship between factionalism and party dominance? What

² Despite its dominance, the ANC has seen its support decreasing from a peak of 69.7% in 2004, to 65.9% in 2009 and 62.2% in 2014. In addition, the proportion of the voting-age population voting for the ANC over the years has shown a steady and marked decline, from 53.8% in 1994 to 38.8% in 2009 (Schulz-Herzenberg 2009: 24).

role do factions play in maintaining ANC power? What does the operation of the ANC at a local level tell us about dominant parties?

I address the above concerns by drawing on evidence from Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality in the Eastern Cape. I rely on a qualitative research approach utilising interviews, participant observation and various secondary sources to reveal how factionalism in the ANC has increasingly become intertwined with patronage politics that centres on the control of the state apparatus and state resources. The thesis goes further to demonstrate how patronage is in turn a function of power. I show how the relationship between patrons, clients and brokers is not merely an exchange of material resources for political support but a more complex relationship informed by practical considerations and the exercise of various forms of power available to the actors involved.

Rationale

Research that focuses on the ANC has tended to understand the party from a national perspective, focusing on the ANC as a dominant party, a party machine or a mass party (see Giliomee and Simkins 1999, Booyesen 2011, Southall 2013, Butler 2014). These perspectives tend to assume a top-down approach in which events and dynamics at the top national structures are seen to reverberate downwards to the rest of the organisation. While it is correct that politics of national structures such as the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) and Provincial Executive Committee's (PECs) affect the rest of the party, there are also particular dynamics at the regional, district and branch level that can contribute to an enhanced understanding of how the party operates. Nonetheless, there is

less research on the party at a local level and in the small towns and cities. It is therefore important to understand what ANC dominance or factionalism means and how they function at the local level.

Furthermore, this study focuses on party politics at the local scale which have been considered unimportant as they seldom change the face of the world (Béni-Gbaffou 2012). In addition to this lack of prestige, Béni-Gbaffou (2012: 179) states that 'one can add the moral discredit attached to local party politics which is considered corrupt, the realm of personal interest and of quest for power for financial gain, in opposition to the supposedly more 'authentic' politics of the people, as studied by the vast literature on social movements'. Social movement literature too has ignored the role of political parties with Sinwell (2011: 190) noting that 'the relationship between political parties and community based mobilisation has tended to be ignored in the literature or, in other cases, discredited on the same basis that political parties are corrupt or merely serve financial, personal or political interests'.

Contrary to these positions, I believe that while local party politics may not change the face of the world, it is an everyday practice for some poor people. Politics intermingles with people's everyday lives as Auyero (2001: 26) demonstrates the way in which 'some poor people solve their everyday survival needs through personalised political mediation popularly referred to as political clientelism'. In smaller South African municipalities such as Buffalo City that are characterised by limited private sector opportunities and material deprivation, there is higher dependence on local state for survival needs. In these contexts, local party politics of the dominant party entrenched in state power is central to accessing

the limited state resources crucial for upward mobility and even for survival. A consideration of local politics therefore provides ‘a way of seeing the embeddedness of political culture in problem-solving networks’ (Auyero 2001: 26).

Scholarly work on the apartheid and post-apartheid South African state has also focused on the national level (Wolpe 1990, Marais 2001, Lodge 1999). Nonetheless, Sharma and Gupta (2006) have pointed out that there is little ethnographic work that documents what lower level officials actually do in the name of the state. This is what Gupta (1995) had earlier referred to as an ‘ethnography of the state’. To quote Sharma and Gupta (2006: 212);

Research on the state, with its focus on large-scale structures, epochal events, major policies, and ‘important’ people, has failed to illuminate the quotidian practices (Bourdieu 1977) of bureaucrats that tell us about the effects of the state on the everyday lives of rural people.

Similarly, Arnold (2015: 267) refers to this approach that focuses on the quotidian practices as writing about the ‘everyday state’ whereby scholars ‘analyse the ways in which a state actually operates at a local, everyday level and the compromises and negotiations needed to work alongside it which this brings to light the politics of corruption, exploitation, subordination, and violence within the lower echelons of the state machine and its daily interaction with subaltern groups’ (Arnold 2015: 267). In line with Sharma and Gupta (2006) and Arnold (2015) this thesis argues that it is not only the practices of large institutions or bureaucrats that are important but those of ordinary people

too that deserve to be understood from their own experiences. It is important to evaluate theoretical concepts such as patronage and clientelism from those who practice them, an approach Auyero describes as ‘from the client's point(s) of view’ (Auyero 1999: 299). However, Auyero (1999) notes that this is rarely done as testimonies about the working of clientelism for instance are usually gathered from oppositional politicians, journalists, or community leaders. He adds that ‘only sporadically does one listen to the so-called clients, to the reasons they give for their behaviour (supporting a particular patron or broker, attending rallies, etc.), to their own judgments concerning what others label anti-democratic procedures’ (Auyero 1999: 299). In the tradition of Auyero, this thesis focuses on the opinions and evaluations of those involved in factionalism, patronage politics or clientelist exchanges.

Lastly, research on metropolitan municipalities tends to focus on the biggest metropolitan municipalities particularly Johannesburg, Cape Town, Pretoria and Ekurhuleni. However, it is difficult to generalise these findings to the rest of the metropolitan municipalities such as Buffalo City and Mangaung because while they experience similar high rates of urbanisation, they are significantly smaller in terms of their economies and population. In addition, municipalities like Buffalo City peculiarly incorporate rural areas and the former Ciskei homeland which affected local state formation that needs to be accounted for. Breaking with the tradition of focusing on the largest metropolitan cities, this study focuses on one of the smaller municipalities whose socio-economic conditions vary markedly from the large metropolitan municipalities. It is important to account for the political practices engendered in contexts such as Buffalo City.

To further illustrate the research problematic and contextualise this study, a brief background is necessary.

Background

During apartheid, resistance to the racially oppressive regime particularly in the volatile 1980s, was closely tied to service delivery struggles in Black Local Authorities (BLAs) which had established a reputation for inefficiency, graft and collaboration with colonial interests (Shubane 1991). As Mark Swilling notes, ‘with the exception of the crucially important election boycotts of 1984, the driving force of black resistance that effectively immobilised the coercive and reformist actions of the state emanated from below as communities responded to their abysmal urban living conditions’ (Swilling 1987: 1). The local organisations that mushroomed in African, coloured and Indian areas built up a mass support base by campaigning around such matters as housing, rents, bus fares, education and other urban services (Swilling 1987: 1-2).

With the attainment of democracy, the ANC government amongst other things sought to redress the imbalanced access to basic services that existed during apartheid. The first ten years of democratic rule witnessed a massive roll out of services such that the basic needs of a large part of the population are now being met to a greater extent than they were under the previous regime (Mc Lennan and Munslow 2009). However, from the early 2000’s new social movements began mobilising against the neoliberal trajectory adopted by the government in 1996 that was seen to be undermining service delivery. These new social movements such as the Anti-Privatization Forum (APF), the Soweto Electricity Crisis

Committee (SECC) and Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) aimed ‘to organise and mobilise the poor and marginalized to contest and engage the state around the failure or lack of policy that would effect social change’ (Mottiar and Bond 2011: 3).

At the turn of the first decade of democracy in 2004, there was a spike in community protests stemming from discontent with the level of service provision (see Alexander, 2010: 25, Booyesen 2007: 24, Atkinson, 2007). These protests have increasingly become violent and target local government through protestors’ demands to remove a mayor, a municipal manager or councillors (Alexander 2010, von Holdt et al 2011). Nonetheless, the ANC has maintained overwhelming support.

The life experiences of Thando, a resident of Duncan Village, a township just outside East London, embody the paradoxes pertinent to this study. Thando also illustrates how residents have come to manage or negotiate access to state resources crucial for their livelihood during the ANC’s rule.

Located three kilometers from East London’s central business district, Duncan Village is a 325 hectare township where about 100 000 people live³. Half of its working age population is unemployed. This is higher than the municipality’s average of 35% and 45.1% for the youth (StatsSA 2011). As Bank (2015) notes, most households in Duncan Village no longer have the dignity of having family members with permanent factory jobs, but depend on a precarious combination of odd jobs and social welfare grants for survival. Even casual work is disappearing. As crime and poverty have escalated Duncan Village

³ Duncan Village comprises just 2% of Buffalo City’s’ land area.

has evolved into what Bank terms a 'hyper-ghetto' (2011, 2015). Service delivery protests have also become a common feature. According to a Buffalo City Public Order Policing services (2013/14) report, the township experiences at least one protest every two weeks. In May 2011 when I first met Thando, he reflected on service delivery protests that he had participated in Duncan Village. Many of the protests involved drawing from past repertoires from the anti-apartheid struggle such as blocking roads and violent confrontations with policemen who also often responded with force by firing rubber bullets. Councillors' houses have occasionally also been targeted and burnt down. Thando is among the privileged that live in a formal house built during apartheid of which his parents took ownership after 1994. He shared the house with his older brother until his partner and daughter came to live with him. He then moved into the backyard shack where he has been living ever since. Thando has been on a housing waiting list since 2008 but he owns a shack in the *isiqiki* (shack areas) which he rents out. Illegal power connections by the shack dwellers popularly referred to as *izinyoka*, are blamed for the irregular electricity supply the whole area now experiences (see figure 1). A few metres down the street, there is always a pile of uncollected garbage as the weekly refuse collection is not sufficient for the densely populated area (see figure 2).

Figure 1: *Izinyoka*, illegal electricity connections to shacks in Duncan Village



Photo by Tatenda Mukwedeya June 2012

Figure 2: Uncollected refuse in Duncan Village




Photo by Tatenda Mukwedeya June 2012

Buffalo City has been plagued by moments of excessive factionalism that has led to administrative instability which has undermined the functioning of the municipality. For instance, in 2008, divisions within the ANC caucus led to a hung council that could not make any resolutions effectively paralysing the institution. In addition, several officials have been implicated in corrupt tender awards whilst enriching themselves in the process with little retributive sanctions, giving merit to accusations of an inept governance regime. In 2014 several top leaders were implicated in fraud, corruption, and money laundering of about six million rand allocated to the memorial service of former President Nelson Mandela. This included the executive mayor Zukiswa Ncitha, deputy mayor Temba Tinta, council speaker Luleka Simon-Ndzele, senior councillor Sindiswa Gomba and ANC regional secretary Pumlanzi Mkhondo (*Daily Dispatch* 23 June 2014). Most of the money was paid back after the National Prosecution Authority (NPA) froze their accounts. While their trial is ongoing and the mayor and deputy mayor have since been recalled by the ANC and redeployed to the provincial legislature (*Daily Dispatch* 24 June 2014).

Reflecting on these state of affairs, Thando acknowledged how it motivated him to participate in service delivery protests that are regularly organised in Duncan Village. He also highlighted how their protests draw on past repertoires of the volatile 1980's. Despite Thando's expressions of dissent, he stressed that he was loyal to the ANC which he had voted for since 1994 and planned to continue doing so (Interview with Thando 26 May 2011 at Duncan Village). I was initially puzzled by his unrelenting support of the ANC coupled with his despair with the socio-economic environment he and his community live in. Alexander (2012) notes that this is a generalised paradox in South Africa whereby popular expressions of dissent such as community protests against ANC controlled

councils are coupled with continued electoral support for the ANC. Similarly, Booysen (2007) also notes how communities use both voting and protest as a means to obtain more effective service delivery in what she calls ‘with the ballot and the brick’.

I understood the paradox Alexander (2012) refers to from Thando’s experiences after spending an extended period of time with him during my fieldwork. I learnt how politics was intermingled with his everyday life. His membership and continued activism in the ANC assured him access to various resources from the local state central to his livelihood strategies. He has held various positions in local civic structures and the ANC local branch. As a ward committee member he received a monthly stipend of one thousand rand per month. His partner worked in the Expanded Public Works Program when it had projects in Duncan Village. Their household receives food parcels from various organisations that are channelled through the municipality whenever they were available. As part of a group of shack dwellers, they were lobbying the municipality through protests to offer them RDP houses and they were receiving favourable responses from the municipality through support from a senior party official they supported. He attributed his access to state resources to his active participation in the ANC and he succinctly describes everyday local politics of survival when he said; ‘You cannot influence anything if you are outside the ANC’ (Interview with Thando 26 May 2011 at Duncan Village). Thando demonstrates ‘how some poor people solve their everyday survival needs through personalised political mediation popularly referred to as patronage or political clientelism’ (Auyero 2001: 26).

Thando's life experiences in Duncan Village reflect conditions in other poor parts of Buffalo City such as Mdantsane, Quigney and in other townships across South Africa. An estimated 1.6 million households live in informal settlements in South Africa with inadequate access to basic services such as water, electricity and sanitation (*Business Day*, January 28 2014). Through stories such as Thando's, this thesis examines how factionalism and patronage operate and by extension also contributes to our understanding of how the ANC as a dominant party operates.

Outline of the thesis and overview of key themes

Chapter two outlines the methodology adopted in this study and justifies the methods used to answer the research questions. In particular, it makes a case for a triangulation of qualitative research techniques including ethnographic methods through Burawoy's extended case method and interviews (Burawoy 1998). It also outlines my research experience and reflections on negotiating research at the 'local level' or in other words on doing 'research from below' on the everyday lives and experiences as advocated by Sharma and Gupta (2006).

Chapter three outlines the conceptual framework and literature review. It defines the key concepts used in this study such as factionalism, patronage and clientelism. Importantly, it places this thesis within the global and South African literature on the dominant party approach and on the party-state relationship. The chapter notes that scholars are increasingly focusing on the evident role that competition for 'resources' plays in the internal politics of the ANC therefore the chapter also broadly reviews literature on

patronage politics and clientelism to enrich contemporary discussions on the nature of ANC politics.

Chapter four traces the centrality of the local state in the political and socio-economic life of South Africa. It shows how during apartheid the state was an instrument of domination and how it became a key site in the struggle against apartheid. More importantly for this study, the chapter traces how after the democratic transition, the state was relied upon by the ANC as a vehicle for socio-economic transformation. This was coupled with an entrenchment of neoliberal principles such as cost recovery and privatisation. The chapter traces how the state at all levels became a site for upward social mobility for the previously oppressed black population through policies such as black economic empowerment, preferential procurement and affirmative action. The chapter argues that as the party became the de facto space to access these opportunities, competition to secure them especially under conditions of scarcity contributed to factionalism in the party. Thus whilst the ANC transformed the state post-apartheid, this fundamentally also transformed the internal workings of the party itself.

Chapter five examines the underlying drivers of factionalism at the local level particularly how and why factionalism actually operates in everyday practice. The chapter builds on the preceding chapter by tracing the trajectory of post-apartheid ANC intraparty politics and showing how factionalism has increasingly become intertwined with patronage networks that seek to distribute state resources along factional lines. Drawing on theories of patron-client relationships, the chapter also shows that it is not just party leaders who drive factional politics, but ordinary members also actively engage in factional politics by

making calculated decisions on whom to offer political support based on what the patron can offer. As factionalism operating through patronage politics takes root, the boundary between the party and state has increasingly become blurred thus the chapter ends by reflecting on the consequences of collapsing of the party and state on municipal functioning.

Chapter six explores the operation of patronage in Buffalo City by focusing on the practices of local politicians and residents of Buffalo City. Drawing on Auyero's (2001) work, the chapter observes that a view of patronage that assumes that votes and support come because of the distribution of resources does not fully capture the operation of patronage. It argues that the specificities of patronage in everyday practice show that the actual exchange is preceded by complex relationships of power that are established over time and through various enactments. The exchange of votes for state resources follows the demonstrations of power especially in contexts with limited resources such as Buffalo City where patrons and brokers have to efficiently target specific individuals or groups. People express their power through protests, attendance at rallies or providing political support for instance. However, in enacting their power, they in turn empower the party and party leaders who depend on a visible display of power by attracting people to their events. Thus people's enactments of power translate into power for the party or individuals in the party who in turn reciprocate by using their power over the state to distribute various resources to people. Patronage is therefore governed by these relationships of power which determine and shape factionalism in the party.

In conclusion, *chapter seven* revisits the main findings and ties together the central arguments of the thesis. It highlights how the thesis contributes to our understanding of how factionalism and patronage operate in everyday practice. Contrary to notions that focus on elite level interactions and those that offer a top-down analysis of factionalism and patronage, this thesis unpacks the complex relational character of these processes which are mediated by the exercise of power. The chapter also concludes by weighing in on the debates on the ANC's continued dominance by supporting arguments that highlight the importance of patronage for the party's endurance in power.

Chapter II

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Many studies on dominant political parties and their interactions with society focus on elite level interactions at a national level. These studies seldom focus on local level exchanges within the party and between the party and its electorate or with the local state. This thesis builds on this research with a national orientation and complements it by providing a detailed analysis of the daily operation of the ANC as a dominant party. This research inductively seeks to develop a general understanding of the operation of the ANC via the specific observations and a detailed analysis of its structures, officials and members in Buffalo City municipality.

I utilise a qualitative research design based on a triangulation of several research methods. For Shank (2002), qualitative research involves the study of subjects in their natural settings whereby the researcher conducts a systematic enquiry into meanings, attempting to interpret and make sense of phenomena and the meanings that people attribute to them. As Berg (1995: 7) suggests, qualitative techniques allow the researcher to share in the understandings and perceptions of others and to explore how people structure and give meaning to their daily lives. De Vaus (2001: 10) also adds that qualitative research studies 'things' within their context and considers the subjective meaning that people bring to their

situation. Qualitative research therefore studies a situated world, considering phenomena in their specific macro and micro, social, institutional, political, economic and technological contexts (Parker 2003).

As highlighted earlier, this thesis is concerned with how the ANC as a dominant party operates in practice. In particular it looks at how and why its contemporary intraparty politics is highly factionalised. Yin (2009: 9) suggests that, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions favour the use of case studies. As such, this study is based on the case of Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality. A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in-depth and within its real-life context and relies on multiple sources of evidence (Yin 2009: 18). In particular this study uses the Extended Case Method as expounded by Michael Burawoy (1998, 2000).

The Extended Case Method is a reflexive model of science which embraces engagement instead of detachment as the road to knowledge premised on our own participation in the world we study. As Burawoy puts it, ‘the extended case method applies reflexive science to ethnography in order to extract the general from the unique, to move from the micro to the macro, and to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on pre-existing theory’ (Burawoy 1998: 5). This is contrary to a positivist approach exemplified by survey research which limits our involvement in the world we study, standardises the collection of data and makes samples representative. For Burawoy, an extended case method has to achieve the following four objectives:

1. Extending the observer to the participant.

It is acknowledged that participation brings insight through proximity at the cost of distortion and disturbance. However, the reflexive perspective embraces participation and its resultant distortions because it is argued that a social order reveals itself in the way it responds to pressure (Burawoy 1998: 17). Extending into the world of the participant for me meant spending an extended period of time with residents of Buffalo City attending meetings, interviewing them and spending time in various social settings such as township *shebeens*⁴.

2. Extending observations over space and time.

Spending an extended period of time in the field is a prerequisite during which fieldwork is a sequence of experiments that continue until one's theory is in sync with the world one studies (Burawoy 1998: 17-18). I extended observation over time by spending a cumulative period of ten months in Buffalo City conducting fieldwork over a period four year period between 2011 and 2014. I lived in Buffalo City for four months in 2011 and another four months in 2012. In 2013 and 2014 I spent at least a month each year doing follow up interviews and observations. I extended observations over space by attending various events across the city such as community meetings, rallies, public seminars and spending time at boxing gyms in Mdantsane and Gompo Hall where many locals congregated as a past time. As well I occasionally visited various *shebeens* and bars.

⁴ A *shebeen* is an informal licensed or unlicensed establishment or private house selling alcohol. In South Africa they are popular in the townships.

3. Extending out from process to force.

This entails extending micro-processes to macro-forces or tracing the source of small difference to external forces (Burawoy 1998: 19). In this study I relate local politics in Buffalo City to broader provincial and national politics in the ANC. Also, I trace how a global force such as neoliberalism affects people at the local level and how they in turn adapt to the various constraints through a wide range of political relationships that often resemble patron-client relationships.

4. Extending theory.

Here Burawoy's position is that 'our fieldwork should not look for theory confirmations but for theory refutations' (Burawoy 1998: 20). This study recasts notions on the dominant party and party-state collapse by infusing them with ideas about factionalism and patron-client relationships.

To meet these four tenets of the extended case method, this study depended on the following data collection methods.

Data collection methods

This study is based on a triangulation of several research techniques to allow for diverse viewpoints to cast light upon the topic (Olsen 2004). Importantly, relating different kinds of methods mitigated the threats to validity identified in each method (Berg 1995: 5). Seventy two in-depth interviews with residents, local politicians and bureaucrats of Buffalo

City provide the base of primary data for this research. This total figure does not include follow up interviews with the same individuals. Importantly, it is also based on innumerable informal conversations and direct observations carried out over a ten month period of ethnographic fieldwork. In addition, document analysis or archival work was also conducted to supplement the interviews and participant observation. The ten month primary data collection period covered a four year period from 2011 to 2014. I lived in Buffalo City for four months in 2011 and another four months in 2012. In 2013 and 2014, I spent at least a month each year doing follow up interviews and observations. Thus this study had a longitudinal perspective which involved returning to interviewees to explore changes over time and the processes associated with these changes (Holland et al 2004)⁵. The longitudinal aspect is in line with one of Burawoy's (1998) requisites for the extended case method regarding extending observations over space and time. Spending a longer time in the field also has the advantage that one develops a close familiarity and social proximity to people in the research site who in turn became crucial sources of information and insight. Auyero and Swistum (2009) note that this familiarity and social proximity is extremely useful in reducing as much as possible the symbolic violence exerted through the interview relationship.

Qualitative research involves using a variety of methods in an attempt to interpret and understand the world which offers multiple perspectives of the world that incrementally add to our understanding of its operation and its implicit meanings (Denzin and Lincoln 2000).

⁵ There is a growing interest in what has been termed Longitudinal Qualitative Research but as Stephen Farrall observes, it has yet to be fully articulated as a coherent methodology. However for a full review of Longitudinal Qualitative Research see; Holland, J. Thomson, R. & Henderson, S. 2004.

Therefore the study utilised the following methods:

- I. Documentary analysis
- II. Interviews
- III. Participant observation

Documentary analysis

To familiarise myself and develop an understanding of the local political environment, I relied extensively on archival newspaper articles, municipal reports and council minutes. To examine public officials' announcements and debates pertinent to Buffalo City, I analysed articles in the local daily newspaper, *The Daily Dispatch* which has an electronic archive that I accessed during the early stages of fieldwork. Importantly, this process allowed me to identify the contentious issues, the key political cleavages and the key political actors which guided my in-depth interviews and observations.

As Neuman (1994) notes, many types of information about the social world have been collected and are available to the researcher in the form of books, reports, pamphlets and party documents. It is therefore the researcher's task to search through collections of information with a research question and variables in mind, and then reassemble the information in new ways to address the research question (Neuman 1994: 271). Documentary analysis was conducted as a secondary method. The relevant documents that contributed to this study include policy statements, technical reports, as well as newspaper reports and minutes from municipal meetings. Most of these documents are accessible to the public. Various municipal documents and reports such as the Integrated Development

Plan (IDP) which is reviewed every year and council minutes were particularly useful to corroborate the general concerns of the people and the municipality's position on them. The ANC website is another resource I made use of which provides a wealth of information about the party. Through the ANC's publications such as discussion documents, the secretary generals' report, the strategy and tactics to mention a few, one can enrich their understanding of the party. Confidential council reports and minutes are often leaked to the media making newspaper articles an important source of data.

Newspaper articles were important for the study because it is commonplace for South African media to report on the 'problem of politics' particularly on corrupt officials and political factionalism as the root cause of local government failure and service delivery challenges. Tanacković, Krtalić and Lacović (2014) observe that historical and contemporary newspapers are full of different kinds of information that can be used for scientific research. More so because newspapers 'reflect social and cultural values of a certain place and time while also often containing unique information that cannot be found anywhere else' (Tanacković et al 2014: 2). Scholarship in collective action and social movements has developed a rich research tradition that uses data culled from newspaper reports, among other sources (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule 2004: 65). Newspaper data provides what is also called 'event data' that describes actions around a particular event. Earl et al (2004: 66) go on to point out that 'event data allow researchers more leverage over processual and mechanistic elements in causal explanations'. Newspaper articles were useful for this study to trace significant political events such as how the Polokwane factionalisation of the ANC manifested itself in Buffalo City. Articles covering various ANC events such as the regional and provincial conference also proved to be

useful to understand the various cleavages of contestation that normally characterise these events. I also interviewed reporters working for the *Daily Dispatch* about politics in general and council politics in Buffalo City in particular.

Interviews

Open ended interviews were the primary data collection method used in this research. They were open ended in the sense that interviewees were given ample time to explain their viewpoints from which a conversation developed. Interviews were conducted with various stakeholders in Buffalo City including party officials, councillors, state bureaucrats, ward committee members, ordinary party members, representatives of civil society organisations, ordinary residents and people from opposition parties. I conducted seventy-two interviews, most of which were digitally recorded. As noted earlier, additional follow up interviews were conducted with some of the interviewees. The interviews were always done in a location that was best suitable for the interviewees who often chose to have them in their residences, their offices and also in coffee shops and bars. I even conducted an interview with a senior politician at the West Bank Golf Club while he was going through the 18-hole course. I have committed to maintaining complete anonymity of interviewees through the use of pseudonyms given the sensitive and controversial nature of some the information they provided. This is necessary considering that the ANC views factionalism as an act of misconduct. Section 25.17.9 of its constitution states that ‘participating in any organised factional activity that goes beyond the recognised norms of free debate inside the ANC and which threatens its unity’ is an act of misconduct.

Of all the stakeholders I interviewed, ANC officials were the most difficult to pin down and talk to. This was particularly frustrating during the early stages of the research. At this stage I spoke to mostly low ranking party officials at the branch level who were more willing to talk. I then attended various functions in the company of my interviewees who would introduce me to other party members including regional leaders. I suspect being the same age group with most of the branch officials made it easier for them to relate with me. In some instances they probably would see me as a fellow student and a possible ANC member and felt the desire to talk to me about my research. As time progressed whilst immersing myself in the local political scene, I developed familiarity and social proximity and some of the senior party officials began granting me interviews.

My unsuccessful attempts to interview a senior official in the Buffalo City ANC regional committee are worth noting. His name had come up in many interviews regarding his alleged involvement in factional practices such as vote buying and gate-keeping. I talked to him at the ANC regional offices on Oxford Street in East London which are located next to the municipal and council offices. He told me to come the next day at eleven in the morning for the interview. I got there ten minutes early and waited for an hour until I called him to find out his whereabouts. He was on his way to the office. In addition to the two people I found waiting for him, four other people were waiting after me. He arrived around 2pm, three hours late and he began his meetings mostly with smartly dressed individuals who walked into his office. Two hours later, after 4pm he informed us he could not attend to us and we had to come back the next day as he had to rush to another meeting. Two other attempts to interview this official had a similar ending and I never managed to secure the interview with him.

The other challenge that I faced was that interviews with senior officials appeared to be carefully managed and scripted as they tried to be politically correct as much as possible. This entailed sticking to technical issues such as the legislative framework that outlines their interaction with the administrative arm of municipalities. Interviews with senior local state bureaucrats were also characterised by concealment although a permission letter granting me access to do research in the municipality increased their willingness to talk to me. Nonetheless, interviews with senior ANC officials and senior bureaucrats are not cited extensively in the thesis because they were not particularly revealing. Thus not all seventy two interviews conducted are cited. The other reason for this is that some interviewees were making similar points. In the end, interviews with middle and lower ranking party and local state officials and ordinary members proved to be more informative providing the core basis of interview data.

A weakness of interviews noted in the literature is that they are susceptible to interviewer bias, which is the distortion of responses that results from the interviewer's physical characteristics, style of research and more importantly the way the researcher interprets responses (Burawoy 1998). These are well documented as interview effects in which interviewer characteristics (for example, race or gender) or the interview schedule itself (for example, order or form of questions) significantly affect responses (Burawoy 1998: 12). Being a Zimbabwean, I thought I would face challenges in gaining access and information on internal political practices due to my perceived 'outsider' status. However, I realised that this position as an 'outsider' may have allowed my respondents to fully share their opinions with me because they saw me as someone without any vested political

interest in Buffalo City or in South Africa for that matter. On many occasions, interviewees would ask me about Robert Mugabe with the conversation beginning with the question, 'how is the old man doing'? We would then have a brief discussion about ZANU (PF) and Zimbabwean politics in general and this served as an ice breaker before the interview. This also allowed me to deal with the suspicion that often permeates the public sector. The suspicions senior ANC officials and bureaucrats demonstrated is understandable considering the amount of audits, investigations and commissions of enquiry into various aspects of local government. Several interviewees would jokingly ask me whether I was a member of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation also known as the Hawks and I would refute these insinuations by retorting how unlikely it was for such a security unit to employ a foreign national.

Nonprobability sampling techniques were utilised to select interviewees amongst different groups of people. For councillors, I made use of the list of councillors available on the Municipal website to systematically set up interviews with as many councillors as I could. I also had a contact list for all councillors who served in the previous term from 2006 to 2011. In total I ended up interviewing seventeen councillors and eight former councillors. For other party officials, residents and representatives of civic organisations, purposive and snowballing techniques were used. The distinguishing character of these nonprobability sampling techniques is that 'subjective judgements play a role in the selection of the sample because the researcher decides which units of the population to include' (Tansey 2007: 769). I also used purposive sampling which entails identifying particular respondents of interest and sample those deemed most appropriate. As Kidder et al (1991) suggest, the basic assumption is that with good judgement and an appropriate strategy, researchers can

select the cases to be included and thus develop samples that suit their needs. The snowball sampling method involves identifying an initial set of relevant respondents, and then requesting that they suggest other potential subjects who share similar characteristics or who have relevance in some way to the object of study. The process continues until the researcher feels the sample is large enough for the purposes of the study, or until respondents begin repeating names to the extent that further rounds of nominations are unlikely to yield significant new information (Tansey 2007: 770). This technique was particularly useful for the selection of local activists, civil society representatives and some politicians.

I made use of thematic content analysis to analyse the qualitative data. Anderson (2007) observes that this method of data analysis is the most foundational of qualitative analytic procedures and in some way informs all qualitative methods. It entails identifying common themes in the transcripts. According to Anderson (2007: 1) 'the researcher groups and distils from the texts a list of common themes in order to give expression to the communality of voices across participants. Every attempt reasonable is made to employ names for themes from the actual words of participants and to group themes in manner that directly reflects the texts as a whole'.

Participant observation

Throughout the time I lived in Buffalo City conducting fieldwork, I attended integrated development planning meetings (IDP), public hearings, ANC branch meetings, political rallies, public lectures, seminars and council meetings open to the public. This fits into the

assertion of Atkinson and Hammersley (1994: 249) that social research involves ‘some form of participant observation because we cannot study the social world without being part of it’. I therefore engaged in participant observation which according to Burawoy et al (1991) involves joining respondents for extended periods of time as well as in different places. With participant observation, it breaks down the barriers between observer and participant and insists that the researcher shares a common world with those he/she studies (Burawoy et al 1991). Thus the ethnography adopted was a collaborative enterprise of ‘participant’ and ‘observer’ (Burawoy et al 1991). In all the settings I participated in, I kept a notebook in which I recorded my observations. Like Auyero and Swistun (2009: 4) I also ‘assign higher evidentiary value to conduct I was able to observe versus behaviour reported (by interviewees) to have occurred, and to individual acts or patterns of conduct recounted by many observers versus those recounted by only one’.

Participant observation would have been difficult were it not for the relationships I built with four key informants. I would dedicate days during which I would spend considerable time with them as they undertook their daily activities. Through them it was easier to negotiate access to certain spaces and their reassurance of my integrity facilitated the building of trust that would have otherwise taken longer to gain. Two of them were ANC members and two were opposition party officials from Congress of the People (COPE) and the Democratic Alliance (DA).

Participant observation was often coupled with informal interviews with different stakeholders that proved to be an important source of data. I had numerous conversations at meetings and rallies but also in *shebeens*, pubs and *shisa nyamas*. In addition to football

debates, I realised that discussions on national politics and local politics were always a favourite subject. This portrayed an aura of an extremely politicised society and represented the extension of the ANC's dominance into the social fabric. This was a good space to learn what was going on and also to gauge ordinary people's opinion. There are also bars frequented by councillors and other leaders where I also had fruitful informal discussions which were also a good ice breaker in setting up formal interviews. Two bars in particular were popular. These include 'Y-Knot Pub and Restaurant' located at the waterfront in Quigney and 'House of Hansa Restaurant and Bar' situated in East London CBD.

Cohen and Crabtree (2006) point out that informal interviewing is typically done as part of the process of observation and it is best used in the early stages of the development of an area of inquiry, where there is little literature describing the setting, experience, culture or issue of interest. It involves the interviewer talking with people in the field informally, without the use of a structured interview guide and the researcher will try to remember his or her conversations with informants using brief notes taken in the field to help in the recall and writing of notes from experiences in the field.

Important benefits of informal interviews are that they foster low pressure interactions that allow respondents to see them as just a conversation. Consequently, respondents may speak more freely and openly. In addition, informal interviewing can be helpful in building rapport with respondents and in gaining their trust (Cohen and Crabtree, 2006). Informal interviews were particularly valuable in this research as they provided rich narratives about the internal workings of the ANC.

Selecting the case: Why Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality?

The political dominance of the ANC in South Africa has ensured that it has won eight of the nine provinces in the country in the last two general elections. There are therefore numerous ANC dominated municipalities upon which this study could have been based. However, during the formative stages of this project in 2010, Buffalo City was experiencing massive political instability related to ANC factional struggles that were undermining the functioning of the local state. Interestingly, in 2007 the municipality had won the Vuna⁶ award for service delivery excellence posing the question of what apparently went wrong. The political instability was related to the bitter struggle for power within the ANC between Zuma and Mbeki that culminated in the former's ascendance to power at the Polokwane conference in 2007. Many municipalities witnessed the backlash as Mbeki supporters were purged from the ranks of the party and the state. The Eastern Cape Province would live up to its reputation as a political hotbed as Mbeki supporters waged the fiercest resistance to Zuma's leadership even though the wheels of change had begun turning in Polokwane.

When the Congress of the People (COPE), a breakaway party from the ANC was formed in 2008, the Eastern Cape became its key stronghold as senior ANC politicians such as Mluleki George, Nosimo Balindlela and Wiseman Nkuhlu defected to the new party.

⁶ The Vuna awards are an initiative of the Department of Provincial and Local Government and its partners - the South African Local Government Association (Salga), the Development Bank of Southern Africa, and Productivity South Africa to reward municipalities that provide excellent service and governance to their communities.

Buffalo City which fell under the Amathole Region led by Mluleki George at that time, bore the brunt of some of the fiercest factional struggles as warring groups within the ANC sought to control the party and local government. The Buffalo City council in 2009 was crippled by factional struggles to an extent that it could not make any resolutions due to the polarisation. This was exacerbated by the expulsion of nineteen ANC councillors for allegedly associating with COPE. Because of the disagreements in the council, one of the ANC councillors conceded that they would collude with opposition councillors from the Democratic Alliance (DA).

The political turmoil spilled into the administration as the municipal manager's post stood unfilled for almost 24 months, with various acting managers filling the post during that period. Buffalo City has had its entire Mayoral Committee and six Senior Managers dismissed following the employment of an Acting Municipal Manager from 23 March 2010. Andile Fani was eventually appointed as municipal manager on a temporary basis in November 2010 on a 6 months contract and was only appointed permanently in early 2012. In 2015 Fani was suspended for unauthorised and wasteful expenditure after falling out with the ANC's top leadership in the province. Between the 2006 and 2016, Buffalo City has had six mayors. A pilot study that I conducted in August 2010 further illuminated to me the political theatre that Buffalo City was and still is that offers a suitable window to look into the dynamics around a dominant party and its intra-party politics at a local governmental level.

In addition to the colourful political theatre it provides, Buffalo City makes a good case because it has a mixture of both urban and rural settlements. It is not either of the two

extremes that characterise South Africa's 278 municipalities. The extremes pertain to either being excessively urbanised or largely rural. Therefore Buffalo City avoids explanations that attribute its socio-economic and political malaise to being either too urban or too rural. Thus it is a suitable case for an inductive study that seeks to move from specific observations in Buffalo City to broader generalisations and theories about the operation of the ANC as a dominant party in South Africa. Despite attaining metropolitan status together with Mangaung (Bloemfontein) in 2011, Buffalo City is significantly smaller in economic and population terms than the other larger metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng and Cape Town. At the same time, it is significantly larger than its mostly rural neighbouring municipalities such as Mquma Local Municipality which are the source for its rural to urban migration. Buffalo City is peculiarly the only metropolitan that incorporates a former homeland, Ciskei. Its township of Mdantsane is South Africa's second largest after Soweto.


While Buffalo City municipality was the main research site, as mentioned earlier, there are multiple research sites within it where I could observe the interactions between politicians, local activists and community members. I attended meetings in community halls, participated in rallies in open fields and spent time in *shebeens* and *shisa nyamas*⁷ which can all be research sites in their own rights. Thus the study was a multi-sited ethnography in the tradition of Marcus (1995: 96-111).

⁷ *Shisa Nyama* is a Zulu phrase and, literally, means to "burn meat". It's a term used in many South African townships to describe a barbecue or braai. The site is usually provided by the butcher owner and only people who buy meat from the butcher are allowed to use the facility.

Background to the research site: Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality

Situated centrally in the Amathole District on the east coast of the Eastern Cape Province, Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality has a population of 755 200 on a land area that is approximately 2,515 km², with 68km of coastline (figure 3).

Figure 3: Location of Buffalo City in the Eastern Cape Province




Source: <http://www.localgovernment.co.za/provinces/view/1/eastern-cape>

According to the Buffalo City Metro IDP 2011-2016, 'Buffalo City is broadly characterised by three main identifiable land use patterns. The first is the dominant urban axis of East London, Mdantsane, King Williams Town, Bhisho, which dominates the

industrial and service sector centres and attracts people from throughout the greater Amathole region and other neighbouring rural areas in search of work and better access to urban service and facilities (see figure 2 showing neighbouring municipalities). The second is the area comprising the fringe peri-urban and rural settlement areas, which, whilst remaining under the influence of the urban axis, is distinct in character and land use patterns. These include the Newlands settlements, those settlements that previously fell within the former Ciskei Bantustan, and the Ncera settlements located west of East London. The third area comprises of commercial farming areas dominant in the north-eastern and south-western (coastal) sectors of the Municipality characterised by extensive land uses, with certain areas making use of intensive irrigation-based farming (IDP 2011-2016). See figure 3 for a detailed map of Buffalo City Municipality.

Figure 4: Map of region including neighbouring municipalities



Source: Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality: <http://gis.bcomm.gov.za/>

Figure 5: Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality



Source: Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality: <http://gis.bcomm.gov.za/>

The municipality has a rich political history and its towns and townships of East London, Bhisho, Mdantsane, King Williams Town, Dimbaza, that now make up Buffalo City were political hotbeds during the anti-apartheid struggle. Bhisho and Duncan Village experienced terrible massacres in the 1980s and 1990s while East London saw crippling consumer and transport boycotts and Mdantsane residents organised violent protests against the former Ciskei homeland government. The presence of Fort Hare University also made sure that the area was a centre of resistance to colonial rule. Post-apartheid, the municipality continues to have nodes of highly politicised neighbourhoods that regularly engage in service delivery protests, many of which turn to be violent. For instance,

according to a Buffalo City Public Order Policing services (2013/14) report, the township of Duncan Village experiences at least one protest every two weeks.

Buffalo City’s socioeconomic indicators are lower than the national averages. For instance, the official unemployment rate in Buffalo City is 35% against a national rate of about 25%. The youth unemployment rate is 45% whereas nationally it is about 36%. A more detailed discussion of the socioeconomic situation in Buffalo City is undertaken in *chapter four* but table 1 below provides a comparative overview of various socioeconomic indicators based on the 2011 census data.

Table 1: Buffalo City demographic and socio-economic data

	Buffalo City	South Africa
Population	755 200	51 770 560
Age Structure		
Population under 15	26.40%	29,2 %
Population 15 to 64	67.60%	65,5%
Population over 65	6.00%	5,3%
Dependency Ratio		
Per 100 (15-64)	47.90	52.70
Sex Ratio		
Males per 100 females	90.40	98.80
Population Growth		
Per annum	0.69%	1.3%
Labour Market		
Unemployment rate (official)	35.10%	25%
Youth unemployment rate (official) 15-34	45.10%	36%
Education (aged 20 +)		
No schooling	4.90%	8,6%
Higher education	13.80%	11,8%

Matric	27.10%	28,9%
Household Dynamics		
Households	223 568	14,450,161
Average household size	3.20	3.40
Female headed households	45.80%	43.8%
Formal dwellings	72.50%	77,6%
Household Services		
Flush toilet connected to sewerage	68.80%	90,6%
Weekly refuse removal	70.40%	
Piped water inside dwelling	52.60%	91,2%
Electricity for lighting	80.90%	84,6%

Source: Census 2011 Municipal Fact Sheet, published by Statistics South Africa. Also from Census 2011 factsheet:

http://www.statssa.gov.za/census/census_2011/census_products/Census_2011_Fact_sheet.pdf

Ethical considerations

Even though there are no vulnerable groups that were included in the study, ethical issues always arise when relating to other human beings. Therefore the necessary precautionary measures were taken. I have committed to maintaining the confidentiality and anonymity of informants, given the sensitive and controversial nature of the information they provided which could expose them to considerable risk. Factionalism is regarded as an act of misconduct in the ANC constitution (section 25.17.9). Hence I have concealed individual identities through the use of pseudonyms except in cases where participants indicated otherwise. In most cases I have not identified specific information about their exact location and the position they hold.

An information sheet providing the purpose and nature of the study was made available to participants after which informed consent to conduct the interview and record it was obtained. In instances where interviewees did not want to be recorded, only consent to conduct the interview was sought (see appendix 1 for the information sheet and consent forms). An ethics clearance was obtained from the University of the Witwatersrand Non-Medical Ethics Committee: Ethics Clearance Certificate Protocol number H110617.

The following chapter reviews the literature and theoretical notions relevant to this study.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

Central to this thesis are notions of factionalism, patronage and clientelism and power which I utilise to consider the workings of the ANC as a dominant party at the local level. This chapter reviews the literature on the theoretical and conceptual issues relevant to an analysis of contemporary ANC intraparty politics. It recognises the observation made by Auyero (2001) that, ‘the sterile division between theory and empirical research ignores the fact that the best theory is that which is virtually inseparable from the object it brings to light’ (Auyero 2001: 18). Auyero takes a leaf from Pierre Bourdieu who warned against such dualistic thought in scholarly work and rejected it (Bourdieu 2008: 8). Loic Wacquant in an overview of Bourdieu’s work succinctly points out that;

Bourdieu’s work presents a multifaceted challenge to the present divisions and accepted modes of thinking of sociology. Chief among the cleavages it is striving to straddle are those which separate *theory from research*, sever the analysis of the symbolic from that of materiality, and oppose subjectivist and objectivist modes of knowledge (Wacquant 1989: 26)

My understanding of the spirit of what Auyero and Bourdieu are saying is that the theoretical perspectives which inform and shape our approach to the social world need to

be embedded in our empirical analysis. However, the perspective here is that this does not deny the need for careful explication and critique of the theoretical literature before it is used to explain the world as we find it. Consequently in this chapter I introduce the literature and theoretical work relevant to this study. I also use it to establish conceptual clarity on the key concepts used in this study such as one-party dominance, factionalism and patronage. The rest of the chapters pursue a more thorough engagement with the literature introduced here while simultaneously discussing the findings. This chapter largely engages two main strands of literature. One focuses on the notion of dominant parties which has been largely developed in relation to the ANC in South Africa (Southall 2013). However, to further illuminate on the internal workings of a dominant party, the chapter also examines scholarly work that is broadly concerned with factionalism (Boucek 2009). The second strand of literature the chapter focuses on is the theories of patron–client relationships as propounded by notions of clientelism and patronage (Auyero 2001).

The dominant party approach

‘Dominant party systems are systems where one party dominates over a prolonged period in an ostensibly democratic system with regular elections and multiple parties participating in elections’. Put differently, dominant party systems refer to procedurally democratic systems dominated by one party for prolonged periods (De Jager and du Toit 2013: 3; 7)⁸. Despite widely varying definitions of party dominance, there is general consensus based on

⁸ De Jager and du Toit (2013: 5) consider a winning streak of four consecutive elections as the benchmark for a dominant party system. They also highlight five criteria that can be used to identify party dominance: the political system, the threshold or dominance, the nature of the dominance, the inclusion of opposition features; and time span (p7)

Pempel (1990) that a dominant party is one that has established electoral dominance for an uninterrupted and prolonged period, enjoys dominance in the formation and running of governments, and in determining the public agenda (see Giliomee and Simkins 1999: 3, Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2011, Southall 2005: 63, Southall and Daniel 2005: 34-35, Butler 2014). The ANC has been framed as a dominant party because it has dominated the political landscape since 1994 and faces little prospect of electoral defeat in the foreseeable future (Jeffery 2010). However, the ANC's electoral performance show a reduced majority from 69.7% in 2004 to 62.1% in 2014 and Schulz-Herzenberg (2009: 24, 27) has shown that the proportion of voters actually voting for the ANC have significantly decreased in relation to the voting age population from 53.8% in 1994 to 38.8% in 2009.

For decades, dominant parties have been in power in a diverse range of countries across the world. Dominant parties can be found in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. They are consolidating in several former Soviet republics such as Belarus, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and have also been present in developed countries such as Italy, Japan, and Sweden as well (Magaloni 2006). In Africa the dominant party system has largely replaced the one-party system that predominated after Africa's initial wave of liberation in the 1950s and 1960s.

De Jager and du Toit (2013: 3) concur that there has been a steady increase in the number of dominant party systems in southern Africa. This is particularly so with countries such as Zambia, Tanzania, Lesotho, and Malawi which were at some point after independence under one-party rule wherein all other political parties were banned but as multi-party democracy gained momentum in the 1990s, dominant party systems developed in some of

these countries. As multi-party democracy was being embraced in southern Africa, Namibia and South Africa were also gaining their freedom and the notion of dominant parties in the region developed to describe the ANC in South Africa and SWAPO in Namibia. As Southall (2013: 7) asserts, ‘the dominant party approach has been developed theoretically largely in relation to the ANC and in analysis of the political dominance of SWAPO’. More broadly, as Ibarra-Rueda (2013: 1-2) points out, ‘the importance of dominant parties resides not only in their theoretical, empirical, and normative implications, but also in their ubiquity since they can be present in authoritarian and democratic regimes’. Given their persistence across regions and over a long period of time, dominant parties have captured the attention of a wide range of scholars (see Giliomee and Simkins 1999, Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2011, Southall 2009, Arian and Barnes 1974, Sartori 1976, Pempel 1990, Butler 2009, 2014, De Jager and du Toit 2013).

These scholars that have contributed to the dominant party approach do not have a uniform view point. Rather, ‘academic studies of one-party dominance in post-apartheid South Africa suggest that it has played both positive and negative roles in the entrenchment of constitutional democracy’ (Butler 2009: 159). For those who highlight its negative role, the underlying theme in literature on the dominant party approach is that it is a phenomenon that is not supposed to happen because it undermines democracy in the liberal sense of constraining executive power, strong party competition, uncertain electoral outcomes and giving room for minorities to express their views (Thackrah 2000). This resonates strongly with some analysts who have raised concerns that the ANC’s dominance undermines the quality of democracy in the country (Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer 2001, Giliomee and Simkins 1999). Drawing on Samuel Huntington’s idea on the turnover test which

suggests that democratic consolidation is dependent on a competitive multiparty system capable of ensuring a regular circulation of elites, Giliomee and Simkins (1999) point out that there is tension between dominant party rule and democracy because ‘democracy rests on countervailing power being able to check on tendencies towards authoritarian domination’. Giliomee and Simkins (1999: 337) add that ‘the best counter is the presence of a strong opposition to guard against the erosion of democratic institutions’ and replace a governing party that outstays its welcome (Giliomee and Simkins 1999: 337). In South Africa for instance, Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer (2001:163) note that ‘because the ANC is guaranteed over 50 per cent of the vote, there are none of the shifting interest based coalitions on the lines of European democracies. As a consequence the opposition tends to be peripheral to the system and under these conditions; constraints on the ANC are very weak’.

In addition, without a strong opposition, dominant parties also run the risk of lapsing into unilateral, arbitrary decision making. They can make key appointments to the public sector institutions like courts, official commissions, and the office of the auditor general to mention a few thereby undermining the autonomy of some key institutions crucial for a democracy (Giliomee and Simkins 1999). In essence, much of the debate surrounding the incompatibility of the dominant party system and democracy are centred around the theory that the alternation of power is crucial for democracy and that one party dominance becomes problematic when a governing party sees less and less the need to respond to public opinion because it is assured of re-election (Brooks 2004: 2).

Raymond Suttner in his critique of the dominant party thesis propagated by Giliomee and Simkins argues that the framework restricts democracy to electoral politics and is hostile to popular politics. He adds that this limitation is manifest in an obsession with the ‘quality’ of electoral opposition and the side-lining of other forms of organization and opposition, which are regarded as of limited importance or as a matter separate from the consolidation of a championed version of democracy (Suttner 2006). It must be noted that electoral dominance in itself does not predetermine the impact that a party will have in government or on the society as a whole. Those effects are mediated by a variety of factors quite unrelated to the party’s electoral support, for example, the power of civil society or economic power to mention a few (Suttner 2006).

Scholars that highlight the positive role played by dominant parties such as the ANC call for more caution over branding the dominant party system as irreconcilable with the advancement of democracy (Brooks 2004). Arian and Barnes (1974 in Brooks 2004) actually hail the system as a stabilizing mechanism especially in fragmented polities like South Africa, which is fragmented along class, racial and ethnic lines. Also, like most new democracies, South Africa faces vast political and developmental challenges in a context of profound inequality and social division. Under these conditions, ‘some analysts have argued that only an extended period of political stability can establish the preconditions for the longer-term entrenchment of democracy’ (Butler 2009: 162). Therefore ‘any threat to ANC dominance according to this view, is also a threat to political stability and to the creation of legitimate political institutions. The ANC’s widely shared self-conception as a national liberation movement has helped it to contain conflict and to defuse racial or ethnic polarisation, and its consensual mechanisms have helped it to socialise and control

potentially anti-democratic leaders'(Butler 2009: 162). The positive consequences of one party dominance in relation to the ANC are best summarised by Butler (2009: 163) when he observed that,

The dominant ANC discouraged the racial and ethnic conflict that many thought inevitable. The liberation movement emphasised that tribalism was invented to 'divide and rule', control native populations, and exploit their labour. The ANC promoted non-racialism and anti-tribal conventions, regulated internal discussion of ethnicity and prevented 'factional' competition for office. Ethnic balance has been a cornerstone of ANC party lists and NEC elections, and both key ANC institutions and cabinet itself have exhibited a carefully managed diversity. Despite evident antagonisms resulting from the apartheid era's segregationist policies, the ANC has carefully contained calls for racial redress and countered political entrepreneurs' cries for racialist retribution (Butler 2009: 163).

It is also important to note that in cases where dominance has been won through competitive elections or within the democratic rules of the game, this confers legitimacy on the dominant ruling party by the electorate. The party therefore has to function within the boundaries of the democratic system. This is what Giliomee and Simkins (1999) refer to as democratic dominant parties that observe free and fair elections in which the opposition is tolerated and given the scope to organise.

Whilst both the positive and negative interpretations of one-party dominance are useful, Southall (2005: 65) correctly argues that ‘dominant party theorists tend to overstate their case, whilst their critics similarly overstate theirs and furthermore, overlook the complexities and nuances of the dominant party argument’. However, he further argues that ‘the persistence of the 'Dominant Party Debate' indicates its continuing centrality to our understanding of the dynamics and prospects of democracy in SA. However, he proposes that the debate has become somewhat static, and that we now need to concentrate our attention as much on how politics in South Africa may be changing as on how it is staying the same’ (Southall 2005: 62). In line with this, it is important to track the ANC’s relationship with the state and how it is changing because one of the central concerns of the dominant party approach is on the susceptibility of dominant party’s to collapse the boundary with the state. The following section unpacks these debates.

The party–state relationship

Globally the relationship between the party and the state has been a major area of concern in nation states characterised by a one-party system or a dominant party system. Political parties that follow Marxist-Leninist principles, often adopt a one-party system in which opposition parties are outlawed or severely constrained to establish a vanguard party. In addition to the ideological motivations for establishing a one-party state, Zolberg (1966) also points out that the overwhelming role of a single party during the anti-colonial struggle often gave rise to a one-party system. Zolberg traced how ‘anti colonial nationalist movements which were often fragile, heterogeneous blocs of local and regional interests

assumed power over highly differentiated societies and then presented themselves as the one unifying element of nations in the process of becoming. Opposition, especially regional or ethnically-based, was therefore anti-national and served the machinations of imperialism. As a result, the party, nation, and state became fused in the person and ideology of the post-colonial ruler' (Soske 2013). Therefore the character of the anti-colonial struggle (Zolberg 1966) and the Marxist – Leninist ideological orientations (Guo 2001) both contributed to the development of one-party system's in several newly independent African countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Ethiopia to mention a few.

Between 1974 and 1990, Huntington (1991) notes that at least 30 countries made transitions to democracy, just about doubling the number of democratic governments in the world. Huntington argued that 'this era of democratic transitions constituted the third wave of democratisation in the history of the modern world' (Huntington 1991: 12). As multi-party democracy become more entrenched, dominant party systems discussed earlier whereby a single party dominates over a prolonged period in an ostensibly democratic system with regular elections and multiple parties participating in elections arose in several African countries. In southern Africa, the dominant parties were usually the former liberation movements such as in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Because of their dominance in the political field, the concern for the relationship between the party and state persisted albeit not to the same extent as for one-party state's whereby the functions of the party and state are largely combined into one body, with a dominant role for the party.

Dominant party theorists argue that the boundaries between the party and state are likely to become blurred in a dominant party system because of the negative consequences pointed out in the preceding section such as their capacity to lapse into unilateral, arbitrary decision making and to ignore public opinion because it is assured of re-election (Brooks 2004, Giliomee and Simkins 1999). Dominant parties are therefore susceptible to blurring the boundary between party and state, which has the effect of reducing the likely formation of independent groups from within civil society that are autonomous from the ruling party. The collapse of the party and state leads to the abuse of office that undermines the integrity of democratic institutions, particularly that of the legislature and its ability to check the executive (Brooks 2004).

The ANC's own pronouncements on controlling all arms of the state to realise the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) have raised concern that the functions of the party and state are largely being combined into one body, with a dominant role for the party. This is supported by statements such as that made by President Jacob Zuma at the ANC KwaZulu-Natal elective conference in 2015 when he said that the ANC comes first before the country⁹. This has given ammunition to analysts who argue that the party seeks to entrench itself in state power. Butler (2005: 720) explains this tendency by pointing out that in all new democracies, practical and ideological pressures surround liberal institutions and party leaders find that it is the colonisation and the control of the state, rather than the

⁹President Zuma said, 'I argued one time with someone who said the country comes first and I said as much as I understand that I think my organisation, the ANC, comes first," he said in his capacity as party president at the ANC KwaZulu-Natal elective conference on Saturday. "Because those people, if they are not part of the ANC and there was no ANC they could be misled. They could be under... oppression forever.' (*Business Day* 8 November 2015) <http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/politics/2015/11/08/the-anc-comes-first-not-the-country-says-zuma>.

entrenchment of the state's objective that brings electoral advantage, access to party funds and individual financial gain.

In practice the collapse of the party and state is best illustrated by the deployment of party officials into public positions in the state. This is arguably related to the ANC's agenda to centralise power under a strong presidency as a strategy to claw back much ground which it lost during the constitutional negotiations which saw the establishment of the new provinces and a quasi-federalism as pointed out by Southall (2005). Southall argues that 'the enormous financial control which the state wields from the centre, with the provinces being funded almost wholly (95%) from central budget, has been deliberately utilized to curb autonomy, which has been otherwise contained by maintenance of the simultaneity of provincial with national elections' (Southall 2005: 71). This was completed by the machinery of 'deployment' whereby the ANC 'deploys' party members to key state and civil institutions and call upon their loyalty to ensure those institutions are not used to damage the interests of the party (Butler 2009). In South Africa, 'the South African Broadcasting Commission (SABC), the Public Protector, and a range of parastatals have all been accused of adopting partisan positions that favour the ruling ANC' (Butler 2009: 164).

In addition, the list system of voting whereby parties present lists of candidates and seats are awarded according to their party's share of the vote has allowed, the party leadership to place loyalists in key positions and at the same time compensate those who have lost out in internal power struggles through redeployment to comfortable but less strategic posts (Southall 2005: 71). This poses serious challenges to the independence of the state and

civil service which is supposed to serve the public impartially but is instead now driven by ANC loyalists who more are answerable to the party which appointed them. As Gumede (2008) puts it, 'elected representatives become more accountable to the welfare of the party bosses rather than to the people and the defence of the constitution'. At local government level in municipalities, this translates into the lack of responsiveness of municipal officials to the concerns of citizens undermining service delivery.

One of the other drawbacks of deployment is that it sometimes leads to the appointment of officials without the necessary capacities. Munslow and McLennan (2009) point out that political appointment to senior executive management positions in South Africa suggest that it is unlikely that existing levels of technical expertise will be maintained. They add that 'empowerment policy rhetoric has not always been used to appoint someone equally competent who was previously excluded and the problem with patronage political appointments is that despite the commitment of the appointed person, if they lack expertise, service delivery will be affected' (Munslow and McLennan 2009: 10).

The susceptibility of dominant parties to collapsing the party and state also has the consequence of creating multiple centres of power in political and administrative institutions that can be counterproductive. This is particularly evident in municipalities where politicians routinely interfere with the work of administrators like municipal managers. A party-state in this context entails political interference in administration, which undermines legislation, policies, and procedures put in place to govern local government and ensure service delivery. This formation of a party-state poses a challenge if the party is paralysed by factional fights, corruption or undemocratic practices as they

are likely to be transferred into the state affecting the ability of state institutions to deliver services impartially according to their mandate (Gumede 2008). The government itself has highlighted the need to focus on intraparty politics which it concedes can undermine the functioning of government. In a governmental report, it was highlighted that ‘party political factionalism and polarization of interests and the subsequent creation of new political alliances and elites, had contributed to the progressive deterioration of municipal functionality’ (COGTA 2009: 10). The crucial question that arises in relation to this research is therefore to what extent has factionalism penetrated local state institutions at the expense of delivery of basic services? All this suggests the need to focus on the party and its internal politics.

More so, as Giliomee and colleagues have pointed out, ‘the fact that there was little prospect of the ANC losing power after 1994 exaggerated the importance of internal party interests and undermined its accountability to the voters’ (Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer 2001:170). and that we now need to concentrate our attention as much on how politics in South Africa may be changing as on how it is staying the same’ (Southall 2005: 62)The internal party interests manifested as factionalism that has intensified from 1994 onwards. Despite its increasing importance, dominant party theorists seldom pay attention to factionalism. This study explores factionalism as a prominent feature of the ANC as a dominant party post-apartheid therefore it is important to unpack what factionalism means.

Conceptualising factionalism

Factions are a common feature of many political parties in developing and developed countries alike such as Japan, China, Brazil and India (see Totten and Kawakami 1965, Pye 1995, Huang 2006, Williams 2006). In South Africa reference to factions or factionalism has become commonplace across the board especially when referring to the ANC. Nonetheless, scholars agree that factionalism generally is still a relatively understudied phenomenon (see Boucek 2009: 1-2, Köllner and Basedau 2005: 6, Belloni and Beller 1976). This is the case in South Africa too, despite the attention factionalism attracts from the media and political commentators. Despite regular reference to factionalism there is little clarity about what it really means.

The term ‘factionalism’ denotes different interpretations, ranging from a neutral assessment of different power blocs within a party or organisation to a value-laden interpretation that associates factions with patronage, self-interest and self-enrichment (Isandla 2011). An etymology of the concept of faction is therefore necessary.

Boucek (2009) offers a valuable synthesis of key studies of factionalism since the 18th century including how they define factions. She observes that the anti-faction bias dates back to the writings of the American Founding Fathers and other 17th- and 18th-century writers and philosophers, such as Bolingbroke, Hume and Burke who viewed factions either as contrary to the public spirit or as obstacles (albeit inevitable) to majority rule. Boucek gives the example of Madison who regarded factions as divisive and potentially dangerous to republican government. Boucek (2009) also adds that before political parties

came into being and political leaders were still experimenting with forms of government, the term 'faction' was used to describe the main rival groups competing within a polity, such as the Whigs and Tories in 18th-century England, the Jacobins and Girondins in revolutionary France and the Federalist elites in the early American Republic who followed Hamilton versus those who followed Madison in the House of Representatives (Boucek 2009: 460).

As political parties became more established in the mid-20th century, Boucek notes that scholars came to view factions as intra-party groups although the negative bias persisted. For example, 'V.O Key blamed factions for sustaining one-party rule in the Deep South of the USA, for encouraging favouritism and graft among elected officials and for squelching competition between the haves and have-nots' (Boucek 2009: 460). However, other scholars in different studies began adopting a more neutral view of factionalism; for instance, Maurice Duverger (1951) saw factions as mere manifestations of diversity within the party.

In the mid-1960s, Richard Rose's work on political parties in Britain differentiated factions from tendencies. Rose (1964: 37) defined a political faction as 'a group of individuals who seek to further a broad range of policies through consciously organised political activity'. They are concerned with a wide range of political issues, including foreign affairs, colonial policy and defence, as well as economics and social welfare. He argued that factions persist through time and 'are self-consciously organised as a body, with a measure of discipline and cohesion' (Rose 1964: 37).

By contrast, Rose defined a political tendency as a stable set of attitudes rather than a stable group of politicians', which are less organised and less permanent than factions such as right-wing and left-wing tendencies within both British parties (Rose 1964: 37- 38). The key difference between Rose's categories seems to be the degree of institutionalisation of intra-party groups within any given party. Hence, factions are strongly institutionalised groups and tendencies weakly institutionalised groups (Boucek, 2009: 463).

Raphael Zariski (1960) also took a neutral view and went further to point out that factions are significant structural features inside parties worthy of academic study. Zariski suggested that:

For our purpose of comparing factions in a variety of party systems, we might define a faction as any intra-party combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organised to act collectively-as a distinct bloc within the party to achieve their goals. These goals may include any, several, or all of the following: patronage (control of party and government office by members of the faction), the fulfilment of local, regional, or group interests, influence on party strategy, influence on party and governmental policy, and the promotion of a discrete set of values to which members of the faction subscribe (Zariski 1960: 33).

Like Rose, Zariski argued that factions persist through time as they possess ‘impressive continuity’ but also noted that they may form only for the duration of one electoral campaign (Zariski 1960: 33-34). Whether they persist over a long time or are short lived, Zariski observes that;

The cognitive element is basic here: factions may be said to exist when the party member is aware of certain fundamental differences which divide him from other members of the party, and is also aware that he and other like-minded party members have certain characteristics, interests, and aspirations in common and are engaged in a collective effort to overcome resistance within the party to those interests and aspirations. There should be a certain amount of formalized interaction and joint consultation between the members of the faction (Zariski 1960: 34).

Boucek (2009) notes that the definition Zariski offered is still valid today and can easily be adapted to produce a general definition of factionalism. Drawing on this definition, Boucek understands a faction as a group within a larger group in this case a political party such as the ANC, whilst factionalism is the process of partitioning of a political party into sub-units who engage in collective action in order to achieve their member’s objectives (Boucek 2009).

This study takes a leaf from definitions provided by Zariski and Boucek because they do not have any negative bias or normative judgements about the goals or interests factions seek to achieve. In addition, the definitions do not set arbitrary boundaries between

different types of intra-party groups and, importantly, it incorporates the idea of actors' motivations which helps in explaining behaviour (Boucek 2009). This helps to understand how patronage can be a motivation for a group to organise collectively into a faction.

The ANC has experienced factionalism throughout its existence. Factional struggles have intensified at different junctures from its formation in 1912. Most of these episodes of factionalism are discussed in greater detail in *chapter five*. However, the early notable occurrences of factionalism I can mention here pertain to late 1920's under the leadership of Josiah Gumede. Gumede's call to for the right to self-determination and to work closer with the communists, particularly the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) did not sit well with the conservative chiefs in the ANC. This led the conservative faction to replace him in 1930 with Pixley ka Isaka Seme.

The 1940s also saw a division in the ANC stemming from disagreements on the strategies of resistance to colonialism and domination. The party was divided into those who insisted on a continuation of moderate methods of resistance and a youthful group who wanted more confrontational mass action. In the 1950's and 1960's, there was a strong Africanist group in the ANC that resisted working with whites and opening up membership of party to all racial groups. The disagreements eventually led Robert Sobukwe to leave the ANC to form the Pan African Congress (PAC) in 1959. Years later, the divisions at the 1969 Morogoro conference were also related to the persistence of the Africanist group in the ANC and the most controversial item on the agenda at the conference was the opening up of the party's membership to all racial groups (Ellis 2013: 75). As noted earlier, these episodes of factionalism are discussed in greater detail in *chapter five* but what is important

to note is that in all instances, ideological and policy contestation seemed to be the driver of factional politics within the ANC during the colonial and apartheid eras. The ANC was united by its opposition to apartheid (Butler 2014).

After the democratic transition, less than 24 months after the new government assumed power, the ANC government adopted a neoliberal economic policy which in essence replaced the initial Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). This represented an ideological turnaround that fuelled factional contestation in the ANC. This ideological shift also found resonance in the organised left alliance partners, the SACP and COSATU.

Whilst these struggles in the early phase of the democratic era had elements of ideological contestation similar to factional struggles in the ANC's past, the period around the 2007 Polokwane conference was different. As the power struggle between Mbeki and Zuma intensified, the faction that coalesced around Zuma was disparate and incoherent as it was united in its desire to get rid of Mbeki rather than on policy terms (Southall 2009: 325). Therefore, from this period onwards, there is a sense amongst some authoritative scholars that the ANC has transformed 'from a rule-regulated, mass based party into an organisation in which internal dynamics are mostly shaped by personal interests' (Lodge 2014: 1). It is therefore necessary to review literature on patronage, clientelism and neopatrimonialism to enhance our understanding the contemporary operation of the party.

Patronage and clientelism

Patronage in relation to political parties is understood as ‘a form of exchange between the party on the one hand, and a supporter or a group of supporters on the other hand, in which state resources, or privileged access to those who control state resources, are traded for political support within the wider society’ (Kopecký and Mair 2006: 1). Similarly, clientelism is understood as the particularised exchange of votes and support for goods, favours, and services between the poor and the elites (Guillermo O’Donnell 1996 in Auyero 2000: 19). Whilst some scholars view clientelism as a variation on patronage (Kopecký and Mair 2006), others argue that clientelism is a much broader phenomenon than patronage, with patronage simply being one specific type of clientelistic exchange restricted to the use of resources and benefits that flow from public office (Hicken 2011: 295, Robinson and Verdier 2013).

The definitions of the two concepts are similar such that some scholars use patronage and clientelism interchangeably. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 7) in their volume declare that ‘we use the terms patronage and clientelism interchangeably, though we recognize that some authors use patronage in a narrower sense to refer to an exchange in which voters obtain public jobs for their services to a candidate’. This study uses the concepts interchangeably as well in a manner best exemplified by Robinson and Verdier (2013) who point out that:

Clientelism is a political exchange: a politician (i.e., a patron) gives patronage in exchange for the vote or support of a ‘client’. The dominant stylised fact in

this body of literature is that, in clientelism, it is jobs that are exchanged for votes. In the words of Weingrod (1968, p. 379), ‘patronage refers to the way in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special favours in exchange for electoral support’ (Robinson and Verdier 2013: 262).

Definitional issues aside, important work has been conducted on how patrons’ and clients operate and on the implications of their relationship. Javier Auyero has done extensive work on clientelism in Argentina. In his seminal book, *Poor People’s Politics* (2000), he remarks that ‘an overwhelmingly negative image of clientelism permeates scholarly analyses and it is common knowledge that clientelist exchanges concatenate into pyramidal networks’. He adds, ‘the structure of these domination networks, and the key actors within them (patrons, brokers, and clients), are well studied phenomena of popular political life’ (Auyero 1999: 298). Auyero's analysis is based on extensive ethnographic research and illustrates the practical, performative, and symbolic aspects of clientelistic relationships that developed between Peronist political activists and their constituencies in contemporary Argentina. As Roniger notes, Auyero shows how clientelist networks are constructed, maintained, and performed publicly (Roniger 2004: 360). Importantly, Auyero (1999: 300, 2000: 20) argues that clientelist networks are, in effect, domination networks and clientelism is a pillar of oligarchic domination. To reveal the unequal power relations and the relationship of domination between patrons/brokers and people, Auyero says:

If they resist the broker’s domination, they will lose access to vital resources and thus make their already bad living conditions even worse. Resistance is therefore out of the question (and probably futile). If, on the other hand, they

assimilate the broker's worldview which is what I think they do, they are co-opted by the institutionalised practices of political clientelism and thus partake in the reproduction of the hierarchic relations prevailing in the local political arena and thus in their own subordination (Auyero 2000: 175).

Poor people therefore consent to systems of clientelism and patronage but importantly this decision is backed by some degree of coercion in the form of losing access to vital resources if they resist this relationship. Furthermore, patron/client relationships disempower the poor by reinforcing the existing structures of wealth and privilege as argued by Robert Fatton Jr in his study of *Clientelism and Patronage in Senegal (1986)*.

Fatton Jr argued that:

by preserving the ties of dependence between the upper and lower classes, and by blocking the ascendancy of class consciousness, the clientelist system cements the structures of domination and exploitation. It contributes to the fact that the peasantry and proletariat experience their subjection not as organized classes, but as individuals enmeshed in highly personalistic and parochial relations (Fatton Jr 1986: 64).

Fatton Jr like Auyero also draws on the implications of clientelism for domination by explaining that patron/client relationships are characterized by a forced dependence instead of genuine reciprocity. Thus patronage and clientelism result in a highly unequal relationship that tends to unilaterally benefit the patron.

In South Africa, there are scholars who have explored how clientelism and patronage politics operate at the local level. Particularly, there has been substantial research on how it interacts with and stimulates local protests (see Von Holdt et al. 2011, Dawson 2014). Von Holdt et al. (2011) argue that community mobilisation against local municipalities, often described as service delivery protests, are frequently driven by contestation within the ruling party over patronage opportunities.

There is also growing interest around patronage and clientelism in relation to understanding the operation of the ANC post-apartheid. Popular publications and academic literature alike have been deploying these concepts as a framework to make sense of South African politics under ANC rule. This follows observations noted earlier such as that made by Lodge (2014: 1) that ‘the ANC transformed from a rule-regulated, mass based party into an organisation in which internal dynamics are mostly shaped by personal interests’

Drawing on experiences from a low-income inner city neighbourhood of Johannesburg, Bénit-Gbaffou (2011) makes a rather refreshing argument that clientelism and local democracy are intertwined in practice and in their principles. She argues that ‘clientelism is a de facto form of accountability in certain conditions and also highlights how, similar to clientelism, decentralisation and local participation can lead, if uncritically praised, to undemocratic practices and ultimately to the disempowerment of the poor’ (Bénit-Gbaffou 2011: 456). Using the notion of ‘gatekeeper politics’, Beresford (2015: 3) describes how political leaders in positions of authority within the ANC or in public office control access to resources and opportunities in order to forward their own political and economic ends.

The resultant patronage based relationships provoke intense factional struggles for positions of influence and power in the party that are threatening the ANC's internal integrity and its capacity to deliver upon its electoral mandate (Beresford 2015: 5).

Another study worth noting on patronage in South Africa is by Ndletyana et al (2013) based on five diverse case studies. They note that local government is an apt setting for the study of patronage politics because it is both a direct implementer of government programmes as well as the nearest point of government contact with the citizenry. Ndletyana et al (2013: 9) reveal how patron-client relations are beneficial to both parties for instance councillors are guaranteed political support, especially within party contests over nominations, and supporters secure the much-needed material benefits such as temporary jobs (Ndletyana et al 2013: 9). While there is reciprocity in the exchange of political support and material benefits as alluded to by Ndletyana and colleagues, the analysis could be strengthened by considering Auyero and Fatton Jr's argument that this reciprocity is characterised by highly unequal hierarchic relations that tend to ultimately benefit the patron. As Auyero put it, 'they are co-opted by the institutionalised practices of political clientelism and thus partake in the reproduction of the hierarchic relations prevailing in the local political arena and thus in their own subordination (Auyero 2000: 175).¹⁰

¹⁰ For more studies that discuss the role of patronage in various aspects of the South African political field, see: Dawson, H. 2014. 'Patronage from below: Political unrest in an informal settlement in South Africa', *African Affairs* 113, 453; Von Holdt, K., Langa, M., Molapo, S., Mogapi, N., Ngubeni, K., Dlamini, J., & Kirsten, A. 2011. *The smoke that calls: seven case studies of community protests and xenophobic violence*. Research report, Johannesburg: CSV and SWOP.

There is also an emerging debate at the national scale around neo-patrimonial features in the South African political order within which concerns with overlapping dynamics such as patronage politics, clientelism and corruption can be clustered (Lodge 2014). Neo-patrimonial regimes are understood as ‘systems in which political relationships are mediated through, and maintained by, personal connections between leaders and subjects, or patrons and clients’ (Pitcher et al 2009: 129). Beresford (2015: 2) notes that neo-patrimonialism in African Studies literature is generally employed to denote the blurring or even complete breakdown of the distinction between public and private authority.

Butler and Southall (2015: 4) note that ‘while reciprocity and exchange characteristic of neo-patrimonialism are broadly benevolent or even desirable phenomena in local settings, once they are transferred to the state or to bureaucratic politics they generate pathologies such as personal aggrandisement, nepotism, administrative inefficiency and corruption’. Lodge (2014) argues that neo-patrimonial characteristics within the ANC have become more prominent under the leadership of Zuma. He describes the ANC’s mobilisation of public support as relying increasingly on patron–client relations in which public services and resources are offered in exchange for political support. However, the use of neo-patrimonialism as an analytical category has been controversial as ‘it is unclear whether the term refers to a set of social relations, a mode of rent-seeking behaviour, an economic logic based on a blurring of public authority and private gain, or a regime type associated specifically (and without clear explanation) with Africa’ (Pitcher et al 2009: 131 in Butler and Southall 2015: 4).

The notion of rent seeking has also been deployed by some scholars. Rent seeking describes persons within the state or the politically well-connected who extract rents from others in the conduct of state business as 'rent seekers'. A rent is characterised by Khan and Jomo (2005: 5) as 'an income which is higher than the minimum which a firm or an individual would have accepted given alternative opportunities'. They add that rents include not just monopoly profits, but also subsidies and transfers organised through the political mechanism: illegal transfers organised by private mafias, short-term super-profits made by innovators before competitors imitate their innovations, and so on'. Rents may thus be legal or illegal and Hyslop (2005: 777) notes that rent seeking behaviour is constituted by any activity that creates or maintains the receipt of rents. The state presents enormous rent-seeking opportunities and looting the state is an entire industry on its own, benefiting mostly the politically well-connected (Magaisa 2015).

Patronage, clientelism, neopatrimonialism and rent seeking are all useful concepts that have been deployed to understand the complex relationships between political parties, people and the state. However, this study makes use of patronage and clientelism as analytical tools because they illuminate on the unequal power relations that result from such systems as highlighted by Auyero (2000) and Fatton Jr (1986). In the South African context this is combined by the dominant party system. Whilst the ANC in South Africa has maintained political dominance, internal contestation in the form of factionalism driven by access to patronage networks has intensified post-apartheid. Therefore patronage and clientelism shed light on the operation of the ANC's domination in everyday practice by revealing the unequal power relations it cultivates with people. In addition, patronage and clientelism are used interchangeably in this study in the tradition of Robinson and Verdier

(2013) because of their conceptual clarity unlike neopatrimonialism which has been controversial about its scope.

Conclusion

This chapter engaged the main concepts central to this thesis. Importantly it has situated the study within the relevant literature and theoretical frameworks on one-party dominance and patronage politics. It has been noted that theorists who utilise the notion of dominant parties offer useful frameworks to understand the operation of the ANC more broadly at a national level. However, they seldom focus on the intraparty politics which is likely to determine the continued dominance of the party. As factionalism intensifies as the dominant feature of ANC intraparty politics there is still scant research on how and why this practice operates. Nonetheless, the chapter notes that there is an increasing realisation that competition for 'resources' is gradually playing an evident role in the internal politics of the ANC. To this regard, this chapter also reviewed literature on patronage and clientelism to enrich the discussion on contemporary ANC politics. Thus, this study bridges literature on the dominant party with that on patronage and clientelism to understand the post-apartheid operation of the ANC as a dominant party at the subnational level. The threads of arguments that bring this literature together to inform this study which will be discussed fully in the following chapters can be summarised as follows:

The ANC's political dominance after 1994 saw the gradual collapse of the boundary between the party and state driven by the ANC's two pronged agenda for transformation.

Firstly, the state itself had to be transformed to reflect the demographic composition of the country and for the most part the party deployed its cadres who could tow the party line. Secondly, the party relied on the state as a vehicle for redistribution and the transformation of the broader political economy to achieve equity and growth. Hence black economic empowerment, state preferential procurement and other policies to uplift previously disadvantaged social groups became stepping stones for the emergent African middle and upper class. Whilst these processes transformed the state, they also fundamentally transformed the party itself. Internal party contestation intensified over the limited opportunities provided by and through the state. Patronage networks which manifest as factionalism then developed to control the distribution of these limited opportunities. As patronage takes root in South African politics and poor people assimilate to this system as a means to access state resources Auyero (2000: 175) notes that ‘they are co-opted by the institutionalised practices of political clientelism and thus partake in the reproduction of the hierarchic relations prevailing in the local political arena and thus in their own subordination’. The resultant unequal power relations between patrons and clients it therefore contributing to the political dominance of the ANC. The rest of the thesis expands on these arguments drawing on evidence from Buffalo City Municipality but the following chapter offers a historical background on the socio-economic and political role of the state in South Africa.

Chapter IV

SETTING THE SCENE: THE LOCAL STATE AS A KEY POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITE

Introduction

The local state has been at the centre of South African political and socio-economic life for the greater part of the country's modern history. During colonialism and apartheid, the local state was central to the control and domination of Africans and was also a key site for struggles against the racially oppressive regime. After the demise of apartheid, the local state became the key site for South Africa's efforts to redistribute resources, consolidate democracy and manage the contradictions of neoliberalism (Hart 2013, Lodge 2002).

This chapter traces this changing role of the state. The main thrust of the chapter is on the post-apartheid era where it analyses the political implications of the state's central role in the socio-economic life of the previously disadvantaged majority. I argue that there are two processes that occurred simultaneously post 1994 that created a fertile ground for significant contestation that manifested as factional struggles in the ANC. The first one relates to the ANC's agenda to transform the state and to use the state as a vehicle for social transformation. The second involves the entrenchment of neoliberal principles such as cost recovery and privatisation from 1996 onwards. The resultant dependence on the

state fuelled contestation over access to state resources which played out as factionalism in the ANC as the dominant party that had acquired state power.

The need to transform the state was a historical necessity as state institutions were part and parcel of colonialism and the apartheid machinery. Therefore the first part of this chapter provides a historical review of the operation of colonialism and how popular resistance mobilised against it. Such a review of the historical precedents is necessary considering that institutional and historical legacies such as colonialism continue to shape our contemporary reality since the present and the future are tied to the past (Mamdani 1996, Greenstein 1998 and Kohli 2004). Reference by some ANC leaders to the legacy of apartheid as an explanation for the failure to deal with current levels of poverty, inequality and service delivery shortages is illustrative of this. For instance, the ANC's 2012 Organisational Renewal discussion document stated that, 'our gains can often be overshadowed by the persistent and stubborn socio-economic legacy of colonialism of a special type that expresses itself through the triple challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality' (ANC 2012: 9).

Service delivery protests also draw on past repertoires of resistance and community mobilisation. In addition, a historical consideration provides a background to understand how the local state transformed from being the central site of domination and resistance during apartheid to being the key site for South Africa's efforts to redistribute resources, consolidate democracy and manage the contradictions of neoliberalism (Hart 2013, Lodge 2002). The second part of the chapter which is its main contribution highlights the increasing centrality of the local state in everyday politics and basic survival. The chapter

highlights how neoliberal deepening and the use of the state for transformation have fuelled fierce contestation within the ANC as the dominant party. The last part of the chapter provides an overview of the evolution of democratic local government after 1994 to trace the institutional changes.

Early colonial history: the Eastern Cape in perspective

The political and economic organisation of pre-colonial and colonial societies shapes the development of effective states (Kohli 2004). The modern African state has been marked by the legacy of European colonial and settler domination whose institutional elements have persisted long after the collapse of colonialism as exhibited by long term continuities (Kohli 2004, Greenstein 1998). A combination of distinct imperial practices of rule created predatory states and this political trajectory is still relevant today for the new states of Africa, suggesting a possible predatory colonial legacy (Greenstein 1998). This predatory state involves authoritarianism, state assault on a weakened civil society, administrative inefficiency and corruption. This section offers a brief overview of colonial domination with special reference to the Eastern Cape from the 19th century.

Before 1870, the majority of Africans in southern Africa lived in independent chiefdoms (Marks and Rathbone 1982). The present day Eastern Cape alone contained the Thembu, Mpondo and Xhosa chiefdoms. Interactions with Europeans had begun in the 16th century and strengthened with the establishment of Cape Town in 1652. Comaroff (2001: 41) divides South Africa's pre-colonial history into two phases: '1652-1806, the phase of

Dutch mercantile rule, interrupted briefly by an English takeover and 1806-1870, the early British years in which imperial governance was restricted in both geographical and administrative scope, and during which two breakaway white settler republics (Orange Free State and the South African Republic) were established in the interior'. During this period, black South African regimes were largely pastoral and not politically stable or residentially settled. Their agro-pastoral economies fostered fewer craft skills. Black South Africans were therefore at a disadvantage which whites were not slow to exploit (Greenstein 1998: 291).

After the establishment of Cape Town, white settlers began to move inland for economic reasons such as agriculture and trade and to spread Christianity. The Xhosa populated frontier region of what is today the Eastern Cape, has the longest tradition of interaction between Africans and Europeans (Odendaal 1984, 2012). The prominence of the region is extended by the proliferation of missionaries who entrenched colonisation as well as Christianity and education that later played an important role in the rise of African politics. Missionary Christianity began in 1816 through the setting up churches and schools. 'The mission stations were outliers and harbingers of the colonial tide that would sweep through the entire subcontinent and incubators of new ideas and ways of life that would transform the local people' (Odendall 2012: 9).

By 1884, more than one hundred mission stations dotted the landscape of the Eastern Cape including Lovedale established by Scottish Presbyterians in 1841 that became an important base for political action and education (Odendaal 1984, 2012). Other Liberal mission-based schooling at institutions in the region such as Healdtown, Blythwood, St Matthews and

Peelton also produced educated Africans who were able to engage on political issues (Harrison 2003). The Scottish missionaries also established the first black tertiary institution, Fort Hare 'Native College' in Alice in 1916 which served as a cradle for African nationalism (Southall 1999).

In the late 1890s, there were a number of black-led political organizations active in the towns of the Eastern Cape. For instance, Harrison (2003) notes that the Native Educational Association (NEA) was founded in 1879 was active in areas such as Grahamstown and King William's Town and the *Imbumba yama Nyama* also known the South African Aborigines Association was formed in Port Elizabeth in 1882. The first independent black African newspaper, *Imvo Zabantsundu* (Opinion of the Black People) was launched in King Williams Town in 1884 (Harrison 2003: 8). It was the establishment of these organisations that laid down the foundation for the emergence of nationalist organisations such as the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), later named the African National Congress in 1912 (SAHO 2011).

Christianity was also important in early twentieth century nationalism. Through its organisational apparatus, its daily conventions and the impact of theology on people's thinking Christianity worked to foster a common vocabulary in which people could talk about oppression (Erlank 2012). Thus 'Christianity constituted a critical element of the political imagination of early African nationalism' (Erlank 2012: 93). On the other hand, African separatist churches commonly known as Ethiopianism supported African nationalism through their rallying cry for 'Africa for the Africans' which posed explicit

challenges to white domination. The first African separatist church, the Thembu Church, was established in the Transkei in 1884 (Odendaal 1984: 23-24).

The pre-colonial history of the Eastern Cape sets it apart from the rest of the country because it has the longest tradition of contact with and resistance to Europeans. Education, trade and Christianity that came with this contact went on to facilitate the development of a class of Africans that politically organised for equality. South African politics thus owes much to developments in this region, a legacy that has persisted to this day as a political hotbed. Prominent leaders of the liberation struggle such as Steve Biko, Nelson Mandela, Robert Sobukwe, Govan and Thabo Mbeki, Chris Hani, Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu are from the province.

It was only after the discovery of diamonds in the north-western Cape in the 1860s and gold on the Witwatersrand in the 1880s that the British sought to consolidate their grip on South Africa by defeating African regimes. The Xhosas were defeated after a series of wars in 1878, the Zulu in 1879 and the Boers in 1902 in the second Anglo-Boer War. 1870-1910 can therefore be characterised as a period of British rule. In 1910, Afrikaner and British settlers came together to form the union of South Africa independent of the British Empire, establishing an autonomous settler colonialism. It is the legacy of forms of rule during this period that has had a profound influence on post-colonial South African society. The creation of homelands and the forms of native control in urban areas also generated fierce resistance. 1910-1994 is the distinctive period of the union of South Africa, which culminated in the rise and fall of apartheid (Comaroff 2001). To explain the form of rule exercised on native peoples, Mamdani notes that direct and indirect rule was

used in colonies including South Africa in a complementary manner to deal with the dilemma of how a small and foreign minority could rule over an indigenous majority (Mamdani 1996: 16).

From reserves to homelands: indirect rule and popular resistance

The 1913 Land Act created native reserves which set aside 7% of South Africa's land area for the majority of the population classified as African (Seidman 1999). It was later increased to 13.5% by the Native and Land Trust Act which was passed in 1936. The Land Act declared that Africans could not own land outside certain designated areas. The 1927 Native Administration Act created a framework within which Africans within the native reserves were ruled indirectly through 'tribal authorities' (Wittenburg 2003: 15). This Act, and its successors, was based on the fiction that chiefs traditionally held despotic rights over their subjects.

As Mamdani (1996) remarks, chiefs in pre-colonial African societies including South Africa, operated in an advisory and consultative context with their counsellors and mostly with the wider community. Nonetheless, the Native Administration Act elevated the role of chiefs by legislatively entrenching their powers as they became part of the central state machinery (Wittenburg 2003). Similarly, Seidman (1999: 426) acknowledges that researchers in southern Africa have demonstrated how colonial administrators in the early 20th century tended to codify 'customary' practices that had previously been flexible and contested, often strengthening the power of chiefs over subjects and husbands over wives. Resultantly, colonial powers dismantled a practice of decentralised exercise of power and

laid the basis for decentralised despotism generating resentment among the traditional leadership and the western educated few (Mamdani 1996: 48). The 1927 Native Administration Act thus generalised customary law as the form that rule must take throughout the union of South Africa (Mamdani 1996: 65)

Under apartheid, the administrative powers of the chief were systematically strengthened but 'were made accountable to a new consensus, one that emphasised the state as the determiner of the consensus' (Mamdani 1996: 45). While the philosophy may have been in place with the 1927 Act, its elaboration and rigid implementation came with various Acts in the 1950s. These include the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act, the 1955 Native Affairs Act and the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act all of which created a hierarchy of tribal, regional and ultimately 'territorial' authorities (Wittenburg 2003: 15). The Bantu Authorities Act (1951) launched fully-fledged indirect rule by expanding the autonomy of Native Administration with powers to make rules in a native legislature. The pace was set in the Transkei in 1956, when the Transkeian Territorial Authority was created, growing over the next twenty years from self-government in 1963 to independence in 1976. This was emulated in Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana (Mamdani 1996: 89).

Indirect rule depended on tribal leadership as the hierarchy of the state to control an ostensibly free peasantry, which were autonomous spatially and institutionally from European settlers. Mamdani (1996: 17) points out that the experience of Natal in the second half of the nineteenth century illustrates the basic features of indirect rule. As the dominance of mining over agriculture in the economy increased, the demand for a regular supply of labour also increased. Indirect rule was therefore opted for because it facilitated

the reproduction of autonomous peasant communities that would regularly supply male, adult and single migrant labour to the mines (Mamdani 1996: 18). In addition, indirect rule through tribal authority in rural areas was about incorporating natives into a state-enforced customary order, reformulated as decentralised despotism (Mamdani 1996: 18).

The chiefs were catapulted into positions of supreme control of the homelands and had a firm belief in the ideology of separate development and extended a resolute and authoritarian opposition to pan South Africa nationalisms of the ANC and PAC that advocated for the reintegration of homelands into South Africa. Donaldson, Segar and Southall (1992) suggest that this culminated in highly personalised and dictatorial regimes such as the Matanzima regime in Transkei from 1963 to 1986. In the absence of democratic forms of accountability, autonomy and decentralisation turned into a licence for on-the-ground functionaries freely to augment the local treasury and supplement their meagre salaries through extortion from local residents (Mamdani 1996: 58).

In Transkei, Donaldson, Segar and Southall (1992) confirm that Matanzima was personally involved in extensive corruption and the auditor general estimated that about R200 million had been misappropriated between 1963 and 1986. In addition, homelands were regarded as synonymous with extreme repression and political stagnation. Homeland regimes were therefore the target of community protests associated with housing and social movements. During the mid-1980s, urban revolts such as school and consumer boycotts, strikes and demonstrations and attacks on the persons and property of collaborators also flared in homelands (Donaldson, Segar and Southall 1992).

During the negotiations prior to the democratic transition, attempts to remove homeland governments took a violent turn in the Ciskei on 7 September 1992. As many as 80,000 protesters gathered outside of Bisho, the capital city of Ciskei, and demanded an end to the military government of Brigadier Joshua Gqozo and the re-absorption of the so-called black homeland into South Africa. The protest was led by several ANC leaders including Cyril Ramaphosa, Steve Tshwete and Ronnie Kasrils and the SACP party secretary Chris Hani (SAHO 1992). Ciskei soldiers opened fire on the protesters killing 29 people and injuring over 300 in the Bisho Massacre.

After the demise of apartheid, homelands were disbanded and integrated into the rest of South Africa. However, as other scholars have pointed out, chiefs and headman have managed to hold onto and consolidate their power in the rural areas even after the demise of the apartheid state (Mamdani 1996, Ntsebeza 2005). Ntsebeza (2005: 274) argues that this is the case because the ANC as the governing party was willing to compromise on democratic principles largely for the sake of political expediency because it was keen to gain support of CONTRALESA (Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa) and its supporters. He demonstrates that the ANC government, similar to the preceding colonial and apartheid governments, came to rely on the undemocratic institution of chiefs and other traditional authorities for day-to-day governing in many rural areas (Ntsebeza 2005). 'On its part, the ANC seemed to think that the co-existence between democracy and traditional authorities was possible in a democratic South Africa' (Ntsebeza 2005: 274).

In terms of the Municipal Structures Act, traditional leaders make up 20% of a municipal council but they do not have voting rights. The Department of Cooperative Governance

and Traditional Affairs has observed that traditional leaders generally are opposed to being in municipal councils without the right to vote as they complain that theirs is a token participation (COGTA 2010). Under Zuma's leadership traditional leaders and Customary Law have become a pertinent issue as the president has for several years been wooing traditional leaders who are seen to be the bedrock of rural ANC support. In June 2015 he approved a recommendation by the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers that the country's approximately 5,000 headmen and women receive standardised annual salaries of R84,125, which will set the fiscus back R407 million and which will have to come from provincial budgets (*Daily Maverick* 6 July 2015).

The South African colonial city: direct rule and popular resistance

Direct rule was the form of control exercised in the Cape Colony by the British throughout the 1800s. Direct rule entailed a single legal order, defined by the 'civilised' laws of Europe was the initial settler response, vividly portrayed by Cecil Rhodes famous phrase, 'Equal rights for all civilised men' (Mamdani 1996: 16). Unlike in the Boer republics, the non-racial political system of the Cape Colony allowed for some African participation which stimulated African political consciousness (Odendaal 1984: 4, 2012: 20). A product of these developments was a small educated class of Africans that in the 1870s began organising politically thereby launching African protest politics. Odendaal (1984: 5) notes that convinced of the futility of continuing to oppose white expansion through war, Africans turned to the ballot box and the press which provided another channel for political expression. However, as more Africans moved into the cities in search of employment,

colonial administrators devised strategies of segregation to control natives as they increasingly became a threat by competing with white workers and as they began organising politically.

Therefore, segregation of African urban residents into separate areas called 'locations' began in the Cape in 1903. This was generalised in 1922 upon recommendation of the Stallard Commission whose native urban policy restricted and strictly controlled the entry of natives to urban areas (Mamdani 1996). Formalised in the 1923 Natives (Urban areas) Act, for those who did get the privilege of urban entry, Mamdani adds that the commission recommended municipal segregation. Each local authority then set up a Native Affairs Department to administer its own segregated residential location with African representatives chaired by a white superintendent (Mamdani 1996: 93).

Segregation of African urban residents was geared to South Africa's industrial revolution as it gained momentum from the late 1920s to mid-1930s and demand for labour surged leading to an influx of Africans into urban areas. By the 1940s, there was a discernible trend towards permanent settlement by more Africans in urban areas reflected by the explosion in the population of urban black settlements involving large numbers of women and children (Lissoni, Soske, Erlank, Nieftagodien and Badasha 2012). White municipalities were seldom willing to allocate resources to provide more accommodation leading to the squatting epidemic of the 1940s. Consequently, community protests increasingly centred either on the provision of poor services, mainly housing and transport, or the administration of pass laws (Mamdani 1996: 97). Lissoni et al (2012) add that demands and actions of Africans during this time became more explicitly about claiming

rights associated with permanence in urban areas. In addition the pre-capitalist economy in the reserves that provided a means of reproduction of the migrant labour force was collapsing with urbanisation (Wolpe 1972). As the municipalities failed to cope with the resistance and repression, the central state stepped in by centralising urban native administration under the Natives Affairs Department (NAD). The colonial government felt that there was need to control African urbanisation by keeping some Africans in rural areas and at the same time protecting white workers from increased competition from black workers.

Following recommendations of the Sauer Report, the National Party that came to power in 1948 instituted apartheid. The Sauer Report called for reversing the trend toward African urbanisation both by preventing it and by removing the 'surplus population' from towns (Mamdani 1996: 99). Those natives considered unproductive were to be flushed out to the reserves where homeland authorities were reorganised into fast-expanding populations through a traditional and autonomous system of rule. The Group Areas Act (1966) instituted strict residential segregation and compulsory removal of blacks to 'own group' areas.

Through spatial separation, influx control, and a policy of 'own management for own areas', apartheid aimed to limit the extent to which affluent white municipalities would bear the financial burden of servicing black areas. The Green paper on local government notes that the Group Areas Act restricted the permanent presence of Africans in urban areas through the pass system, and reserved a viable municipal revenue base for white areas from industries and businesses by preventing townships from attracting these

investments (RSA 1997). The centralised and coercive control of the NAD in urban areas allowed for the forced removals of Africans which uprooted more than 3.5 million people between 1960 and 1985 (Mamdani 1996: 101-102). In addition township residents such as in Mdantsane were brought under the control of Bantustans which was incorporated into Ciskei. This policy generated fierce struggles across the country.

The defiance campaign against such unjust laws begun in 1951 and involved the non-cooperation with certain laws considered unjust and discriminatory. On the 9th November 1952 1500 residents of East London's locations attended a mass meeting in Bantu square. Police reinforcements clashed with the residents as they tried to disperse the crowd. The crowd broke up into smaller groups and others begun to march towards white East London. Along the way, a white insurance salesman they came across was beaten to death. A group of youths that went in another direction came across Catholic Sister Mary Aidan who was beaten to death and burnt (Mager and Minkley 1990: 1-2).

East London and Port Elizabeth witnessed the transport boycotts of the 1950s triggered by the destruction of Old Locations, situated on the fringes of towns and whose residents were moved to townships situated too far from city centres for workers to walk to the workplace. Transport costs were either added to family expenses or had to increase with increased distances travelled (SAHO 2011). Port Elizabeth had four boycotts, two in February and November 1957, one in 1960 and another in 1961. East London and Grahamstown each had one boycott. In East London commuters boycotted for 11 days in solidarity with the Alexandra bus boycott. Grahamstown too faced a strike that was caused by fare increases in May 1961(SAHO 2011, Lodge 1983).

From the inception of the Group Areas Act various other legislation and policies were adopted to bolster racial privilege and exclusion. The 1970s saw the enactment of the Bantu Affairs Administration Act (1971) and the introduction of Community Councils (1977) which reinforced segregation and did not yield any substantial improvements and never gained political credibility. In 1982 Black Local Authorities (BLA) replaced Community Councils but they were seen as politically illegitimate from their inception. BLAs attempted to impose rent and service charges on township residents to increase revenue and this only served to anger increasingly politicized communities. Typically, structures were established through elections characterised by very low levels of voter participation and were generally regarded as illegitimate (Nyalunga 2006). These institutions were generally regarded as puppet structures controlled by the (White) National Party and comprised of politicians with a penchant for corruption (Nyalunga 2006).

The rejection of BLAs in the mid-1980s led to a popular uprising which shook the foundations of the apartheid order (RSA 1997). In the 1980s, anti-apartheid activists sought to demolish local administration in black towns in what the ANC called the 'people's war' (Jeffery 2009). This sought to turn the affected areas into semi-liberated zones where 'alternative structures of people's power would emerge to fill the political gaps (Jeffery 2009: 86). This township rebellion took root in the Eastern Cape town of Cradock through the activism of local school principal Matthew Goniwe who together with others set up the Cradock Residents Association (Cradora) in 1983 to primarily fight rent increases. The association became affiliated to United Democratic Front after its launch on

20 August 1983. Goniwe became an organiser for the UDF and intensified his activism in the area leading one of the longest school boycotts that lasted for fifteen months. The Cradock town council was one of the first to collapse in 1984 after all councillors were ordered to resign by the community and the town became the first district to be subjected to a State of Emergency in the 1980s. Street committees were established as a system of alternative structures (Jeffery 2009: 86). In 1985 Goniwe and three other leaders of the resistance were murdered and have been immortalised as the Cradock Four (Harrison 2004: 28). ‘On the day of the funeral of the Cradock Four, President PW Botha declared a State of Emergency. It was the beginning of the end. Within five years, Nelson Mandela would walk free and lead the country to liberty’¹¹. In East London, local residents also evicted the apartheid government appointed officials from the township and instituted a system of democratic street, branch and area committees as legitimate authorities in the township (Bank 2001).

The campaign to rid townships of councillors and policeman spread throughout the Eastern Cape and the country to areas in Gauteng such as in Sebokeng. In Port Elizabeth townships, councillors’ houses were attacked and town councils collapsed as councillors resigned out of concern for their lives and those of their families. Four youths died in these clashes and at a march for their funeral in Uitenhage (near Port Elizabeth) the crowd of 4000 people met a police patrol which opened fire killing 20 people and injuring 27 in what became known as the Langa shootings (Jeffery 2009: 90).

¹¹ Nelson Mandela on the commemoration marking ten years of the murder of the Cradock four said; ‘the death of these gallant freedom fighters marked a turning point in the history of our Struggle. No longer could the regime govern in the old way. They were the true heroes of the struggle’. Source: <http://www.thecradockfour.co.za/Home.html>

The resignation of PW Botha in August 1989 and the ascent of FW de Klerk followed by the release of Nelson Mandela soon after on 11 February, 1990 commenced a crucial phase of the democratic transition. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in December 1991 for negotiations was also crucial. This resulted, in repeated breakthroughs and deadlocks, but in spite of the breakdown of negotiations at CODESA, compromises and negotiation through the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) led to consensus on a democratic transition and a package of agreements, which included an interim constitution (Davenport 1998: 50 -64).

Urban and rural areas were therefore organised differently, hence the state was bifurcated as it contained a duality of two forms of power under a single hegemonic authority (Mamdani 1996:18). However, Mamdani observes that colonial powers generalised decentralised despotism as their primary answer to the native question. South Africa was not an exception as it developed a massive system of decentralised despotism through the creation of homelands/Bantustans although complemented by a centralised one in urban areas. In South Africa this is best illustrated by the Eastern Cape in which two separate Bantustans, Transkei and Ciskei for the Xhosa existed whilst the industrialised cities of Port Elizabeth and East London fell under the central administration of the colonial state.

Mahmood Mamdani's work on the legacy of late colonialism in contemporary Africa is also concerned with the resilience of colonial institutions. Mamdani focuses on the two types of colonial rule, indirect and direct rule, and how they affect postcolonial reality (Mamdani 1996). He notes that indirect rule was the generalised form of control in colonial Africa in which domination was exercised by local ethnically defined Native Authorities.

This ethnic dimension of power and domination is an enduring legacy of the colonial state. Mamdani (1996) cautions about the failure to transform colonial relations of domination and how this proved to be a serious obstacle to democratisation especially in the countryside where an ethnic power structure still exists and hence the need for detribalisation. Colonial experience therefore determines the development of an effective state in developing countries.

The national state and the local state were central in exercising control during the colonial era. Whether through direct rule in the cities and indirect rule in the rural areas, the state was primarily an instrument of domination for the majority of the population. Resistance to colonialism and apartheid therefore targeted state institutions with the intention to dismantle them and reconstitute their basis of operation.

After the democratic transition, transformation of the state itself was justifiably a priority. The state was also an instrument of change to redress the massive political and socio-economic imbalances created by apartheid. The local state in particular became central in the post-apartheid social order as it is the state structure closest to the people and therefore crucial for further democratisation of South Africa. Lodge (2002) notes that, local government is an interface for democratic consolidation and redistribution of resources hence conflicts in communities are most visible in this sphere of government. The following section unpacks these changing roles of the state after the democratic transition and the implications thereof.

The state and transformation post-apartheid

After the attainment of democracy in 1994, the ANC led government sought to transform the social, political and economic circumstances of South African society that had been based on many years of racial discrimination. As Houston and Muthien (2000: 38) remarked, ‘the word transformation is found in virtually all ANC documents, in many speeches of the ANC and government leaders, and in most policy documents of the new government’. ANC documents that refer to transformation range from the ANC’s policy guidelines for a democratic South Africa adopted at its 1991 national conference titled *Ready to Govern* to the discussion document released in November 1996 titled *The State and Social Transformation* and the draft strategy and tactics released before its December 1997 national conference titled *All Power to the People* (Houston and Muthien 2000: 38). Various speeches by former President Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki also reaffirmed the party’s commitment to transformation that included building a non-racial society and importantly the socio-economic upliftment of former oppressed racial groups.

Meanwhile, Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer (2001: 169) also observe that the other goal of transformation was the extension of party control. Giliomee and colleagues make reference to an ANC document which stated that ‘transformation of the state entails, first and foremost, extending the power of the NLM (National Liberation Movement) over all levers of power: the army, the police, the bureaucracy, intelligence structures, the judiciary, parastatals, and agencies such as regulatory bodies, the public broadcaster, the central bank and so on’ (Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer 2001: 169). The idea of transformation therefore came to encompass issues of racial redress and socio-economic

rights. Nonetheless, it is important to note that in whatever context transformation was used by the ANC government, the state would always play a central role.

Thus, it is no surprise that central to the ANC's agenda of transformation was the winning of state power which was perceived as the centrepiece of the revolutionary process (Johnson 2003). Johnson notes that this was clearly conveyed by former ANC president Oliver Tambo, whose words and message became part of the movement's psyche when he stated:

All revolutions are about state power. Ours is no exception. The slogan 'power to the people' means one thing and one thing only. It means we seek to destroy the power of apartheid tyranny and replace it with popular power with a government whose authority derives from the will of all our people both black and white (Tambo 1984: 4 in Johnson 2003: 327).

Despite assuming significant political power after the 1994 elections, the ANC's grip on state power was threatened by a civil service dominated by officials appointed by the previous regime. Thus the state itself had to be transformed to represent the interests of the majority and Jonathan Hyslop (2005: 776) succinctly observes the dilemma the ANC was confronted with regarding the civil service when it came to power when he observed that;

When the ANC entered government, the incumbent experts in the centre of the civil service in Pretoria, the people who knew how to make the administrative system work and who advised on technical questions, were not

trusted by the incoming regime. Although the ANC had some highly educated and trained cadres, few had any experience of the organisation of a modern state. The ANC had therefore the classic dilemma of an insurgent regime; they had to manage the immense risks of transition, while relying on a bureaucracy in which they had no trust. This circumstance has tended to favour a situation in which government prioritises considerations of political reliability of officials and of political stability over considerations of the effectiveness or probity of public service.

To address this dilemma and avoid an insurgent regime that Hyslop (2005) refers to, the ANC adopted a deployment policy in which it populated the civil service with party cadres it could trust. The appointment of less qualified and even unqualified ANC cadres was therefore a price that had to be paid in some cases. The ANC managed to suppress controversy over the extension of party control by arguing that 'mainly white' institutions are products of apartheid and motivated by racism. The dominant narrative was that its push to transform the state is justified, disguised, and facilitated by, racial transformation. Therefore it was able to undermine the legitimacy of institutions that provide a check on its power (Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer 2001: 169-170).

In addition to extending political control, deployment of party cadres into the state is also tied to the ANC's project to uplift previously disadvantaged groups. ANC documents such as the 2015 National General Council discussion document point out that the party sought to transform the state at the same time as they utilised its capacities to change society as a whole. Southall (2007: 210) observes that after the ANC's capture of the state in 1994, the

party put in place top officials and managers it felt it could trust and overhauled the public sector staffing policies in terms of the interrelated strategies of black economic empowerment (BEE), affirmative action, employment equity and to achieve demographic representativeness. Just as the National Party (NP) had used the state since 1948 to promote the welfare and upward mobility of Afrikaners, so now would the ANC use the state in favour of its own constituency through the programs mentioned above to ensure demographic representativity (Southall 2007: 210). In particular, the ANC's policies on state preferential procurement and staffing became pivotal to enhancing the welfare and upward mobility of the aspirant African middle class.

The use of preferential state procurement as a catalyst to empower Africans coincided with the ANC's move toward a neoliberal trajectory. Neoliberal principles that broadly limit the role of the state and encourage private sector initiative through the market set the scene for public sector reform in which the contracting out of government services to third-party providers was pivotal (PARI 2014: 5). Also, Southall (2007: 214) notes that while the privatisation of state assets under GEAR was viewed as an important tool for reducing national debt and invigorating local industry and attracting foreign investment, it was also seen as an instrument for promoting black empowerment.

The contracting out by state institutions to private companies that consider BEE policies is now so widespread that the Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI) found that 'the role of public servants has changed from that of administration to that of managing contracts. That is, when they are not complying with National Treasury, Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) and other departmental regulations, public servants are effectively

managing service-delivery contracts with private firms, other departments and parastatals. The quality of service delivery often depends on how well these contracts are negotiated and enforced' (PARI 2014: 7). The PARI researchers go on to argue that South Africa has become a 'contract state' as what was called 'state capacity' is now predicated upon the ability of the state to tap into and manage, through contractual relations, private sector capacities'(PARI 2014: 7).

The ANC's decision to transform the state itself and to use the state as an instrument for socio-economic transformation under a neoliberal framework created opportunities for upward mobility that centred on the state. The unintended consequences of this scenario are that contestation over staffing and procurement intensified fuelling factionalism in the ANC. these processes that occurred simultaneously created an environment for factional politics that increasingly centred on material interest as different groups sought to secure the opportunities for upward mobility that came with state resources such as jobs and procurement contracts. *Chapter five* focuses on these issues in greater detail but it is important at this stage to reflect on how these processes played out at the local state.

The local state as a key site in South Africa's neoliberal era

As noted earlier, neoliberal hegemony that has characterised a greater part of the post-apartheid era is underlined by the triumph of global neoliberalism although the recent global financial crisis in 2008 has spurred concern that deepening neoliberal remedies which emphasise austerity might not be the right solutions. In South Africa, whilst financial variables such as domestic debt, inflation and interest rates stabilised after South

Africa's neoliberal turn with GEAR, a heavy price was paid in the persistence of inequality, unemployment, poverty and the consequent problems like crime, HIV/AIDS and disease (Turok 2008: 135).

At local government level, the delivery of basic services suffered as municipalities embarked in cost recovery programs in line with the neoliberal frameworks. The Municipal Investment Infrastructure Framework (MIIF) of 1997 set the level of basic services at an extraordinarily low standard of urban residents who earned less than R800 per month. This meant that a large proportion of the poor still had to pay for services thus poor service quality experienced under apartheid remained intact (McDonald and Pape 2002). Access to services was also complicated by reliance on indigent policy which works on the notion that all households can afford to pay for services unless they prove otherwise. But as McDonald and Pape (2002: 5) contend, the process of proving poverty was often extremely complex as there has been no standard national process or criteria for establishing indigence and each municipality had to develop its own guidelines and administrative procedures (McDonald and Pape 2002: 5). The installation pre-paid water meters as a strategy to make people pay has also been criticised for its role in the commodification of social services (Von Schnitzler 2008, Naidoo 2007). Pre-paid electricity has also raised similar concerns.

It is no wonder that proliferating expressions of discontent in the form of service delivery protests take place in municipalities across the country. As Tom Lodge has pointed out, the material conflicts between South Africa's different communities are most evident in the local allocation of resources in local government (Lodge 2002: 86 see also Hart 2013: 97).

Hart (2013: 5) adds that ‘the local state has become the impossible terrain of official efforts to manage poverty and deprivation in a racially inflected capitalist society marked by massive inequalities and increasing precarious livelihoods for the large majority of the population’. In addition, ‘local government has to deal with tensions between fierce austerity combined with massive new responsibilities for local government and pressures to commodify basic services on the one hand, and invocations of local participation, social justice and democracy on the other’ (Hart 2013: 97).

Overall, South Africa’s neoliberal trajectory has led to increased unemployment, poverty and inequality whilst at the same time constraining access to basic services at the national and local government level. As Gillian Hart (2003: 5) points out, South Africa is faced with a crisis as the transition itself from apartheid and the ANC’s conservative policies and opening up to the global economy in the mid-1990s generated pressures that contributed to these crises and contradictions of the neoliberal post-apartheid era.

Despite these enormous constraints, it is important to add that in many peripheral contexts such as rural areas and small cities, neoliberal deepening has stifled opportunities in the economy and the local state has been left as the major institution on which people are dependent upon. This dependence stretches from cash transfers in different forms of social grants, support for social development programs such as agricultural and small business support initiatives and direct employment in different levels of the local bureaucracy. Government tenders and contracts also contribute immensely to the economies of small municipalities. Therefore the local state has become the primary agent for social mobility and redistribution through the above mechanisms.

The number of social grant recipients in South Africa has increased exponentially over the past twenty years from an estimated 4 million in 1994 to 16.7million by 31 June 2015. This illustrates high level dependence as close to a third of South Africans receive direct state assistance in the form of at least one social grant. ‘Social grants have turned out to be the single most effective anti-poverty tool deployed after 1994’ (Marais 2011: 3). Limpopo and Eastern Cape have the highest proportion of people on social grants. The table below gives a recent breakdown by province:

Table 2: Total number of social grants by region as of June 2015

Province	Total on social grants	Total Population
Limpopo	2,336,676 (43%)	5 404 868
Eastern Cape	2,731,236 (42%)	6 562 053
Northern cape	451,442 (39%)	1 145 861
KwaZulu Natal	3,907,767 (38%)	10 267 300
North West	1,177,301 (36%)	3 509 953
Mpumalanga	1,398,893 (35%)	4 039 939
Free state	967,679 (35%)	2 745 590
Western cape	1,454,260 (25%)	5 822 734
Gauteng	2,355,234 (19%)	12 272 263
Total	16,780,488 (32%)	51 770 560

Source: South African Social Security Agency. Fact sheet: Issue no 6 of 2015 – 30 June 2015

Population statistics obtained from Census 2011

In Buffalo City, at least 171 626 people are recipients of some form of a grant (Gaffney 2012). This is out of a population of 755 200 in 2011 (Census 2011). The state is also the

biggest employer in Buffalo City. This can be attributed to the Provincial Government Head Offices in Bhisho as well as the regional offices of the government departments that are in East London. The government sector employs about thirty percent of the employed in Buffalo City. This is followed by trade (22 %) and manufacturing (19 %). Employment around households accounts for eight percent of all jobs whilst Construction accounts for about six percent of the total jobs and agriculture employs two percent of the employed (LED, 2014 Buffalo City Metro IDP 2011-2016). Buffalo City's administration itself has just over 5 000 employees. There are also thousands more working in government programs such as the Expanded Public Works Program (EPWP) and Community Works Program. In Phase two of the EPWP between 2009 and 2012, Buffalo City Municipality created a cumulative total of 3 766 work opportunities over the three years (SACN 2013: 50).

In addition, there are thousands indirectly employed by the local state in contracting companies that benefit from state contracts and tenders or government procurement. In addition to high level positions in the municipality, access to state contracts and tenders has been a major platform for some people to be part of the local elite. Government procurement occurs in two classifications: (i) Goods and Services and (ii) Payment of capital assets. Whilst there are no reliable statistics for Buffalo City, a general overview provided by the Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI) is revealing. The report states that in 2012/13, the budget of national, provincial and local government combined was R 876.6 billion; R 372.9 billion (42%) of this was allocated to procurement. Most procurement expenditure occurs at the levels of local (52.2 % of the total) and provincial government (29.4 %). As service delivery in South Africa is increasingly performed by private

companies, the role of public servants has changed from that of administration to that of managing contracts (PARI 2014: 6-7).

Therefore the extension of neoliberalism in local government and the adoption of cost cutting measures such as public-private partnerships created opportunities for corruption and collusion around procurement processes. A 2015 auditor-general's report found that municipal employees, councillors, their relatives and broader public servants benefited from municipality contracts worth over R800-million between 2013 and 2014. Of the amount, the biggest chunk (R781-million) went to close relatives of employees and councillors. Among the municipalities fingered for this flouting of supply chain management regulation are three metropolitan municipalities: Nelson Mandela Bay and Buffalo City in the Eastern Cape; Ekurhuleni in Gauteng and eThekweni in KwaZulu-Natal (Corruption Watch 2015).

The dependence on the state is further exacerbated by the high levels of unemployment and inequality. The unemployment rate in Buffalo City is 35,1% whilst the youth unemployment rate is even higher at 45,1% (Census 2011). However, other researches that question the reliability of census data have put the unemployment rate in Buffalo City at 45% (Housing Development Agency, 2013:40)¹². UN Habitat in 2013 listed Buffalo City, alongside Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni amongst the most unequal cities in the world for the second year running. StatsSA data released in early 2013 revealed that there are 306 408 people in Buffalo City who earn no income and are the prototypical 'poorest of the poor' whilst at the top end of the scale there were 612 individuals classified as super-rich,

¹² Buffalo City Development Strategy (2007) estimated unemployment to be between 55% and 60% in Buffalo City municipality as a whole

with monthly incomes of more than R204 000 (*Daily Dispatch* 16 Oct 2013). Approximately 70% of households in Buffalo City earn an income of less than R1500 per month, with 28% of all households indicating no income. There is therefore a huge informal economy which itself is partly dependent on the buying power of state workers who live in Buffalo City particularly East London. Private sector employment shrunk at an annual average rate of -1.5% between 1996 and 2004. The decline in formal sector employment resulted in the growth of the informal economy of about 10% per annum between 1996 and 2004, which contributes to the economic survival of an increasing number of people in the city region.

Neoliberal deepening has increased the dependence on the local state for economic opportunities. Hence, 'the material conflicts between South Africa's different communities are most evident in the local allocation of resources in local government' (Lodge 2002: 86). These conflicts also manifest as factionalism in the ANC within which the allocation of state resources is determined. The following last section concludes with an overview of how the democratic local government as an institutional structure developed.

The Development of democratic local government in South Africa

The 1997 Green paper on local government acknowledged that South Africa's local government had been shaped by apartheid, local struggles against apartheid and the negotiations process in the early 1990s. From the onset of the democratic transition marked by the unbanning of liberation movements and the release of Nelson Mandela in

February 1990, service delivery was to be a priority issue of the new government considering that it was inheriting a highly unequal state that was based on decades of separate development. The democratic government then set out to restructure the whole system of local governance to democratise the state, to ensure a more equitable delivery of services and to redress the inequalities entrenched by apartheid.

The transition to a new democracy that started with a ferment of negotiations in 1991 set the tone for a new local government dispensation. Wolpe (1995) notes that the outcome of the negotiations included agreement on an interim constitution which provided for power-sharing in the form of a Government of National Unity, and a political settlement involving the adoption of the so-called 'sunset clauses' which politically protected incumbents of the civil service from dismissal. It allowed the gradual phasing out of white rule rather than one dramatic handover of power. The enactment of the Interim Measures for Local Government Act in 1991 which prefigured the formation of the Local Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF) allowed for negotiations and dialogue in the process of Local Government reform. The transformation of local government occurred in three phases.

The first, pre-interim phase commenced with the coming into operation of the LGTA and the establishment of the negotiating forums in local authorities pending the first local government election. The second phase began when the first local government elections were held in 1995/1996, establishing integrated municipalities although these were not yet fully democratically elected. The third and final phase commenced with the local government election on 5 December 2000, establishing the current municipalities.

Underpinning the transition process were the interim Constitution of 1993 and the final Constitution of 1996 (de Visser and Akintan, 2013).

The Local Government Transition Act of 1993 (LGTA) provided the background for the function of municipalities until the transition completed (Nyalunga 2006). According to Buhlungu and Atkinson (2007: 29) the Local Government Transition Act permitted the establishment of appointed 'transitional councils' which joined black and white areas into single municipalities for the first time. New local structures, such as transitional rural local government councils, were introduced and district councils replaced the regional services councils that lacked political legitimacy.

Special separations and disparities between town and townships which apartheid had generated made cities difficult to administer and in addition South African municipalities adopted authoritarian forms of decision making (Lodge 2002). Municipalities had to be more socially inclusive by enlarging their boundaries to incorporate formerly separated areas whilst at the same time they had to be more effective. The new democratic government then set to establish a legislative framework for this sphere of government as specified by the Constitution. The *White Paper on Local Government* of March 1998 fleshed out the framework provided by the Constitution and placed local government at the centre of driving an ambitious programme designed to address developmental backlogs, the eradication of poverty, the promotion of sustainable development and the provision of safe and secure environments (Buhlungu and Atkinson 2007).

The first important legislation was the Municipal Demarcation Act of 1998 that allowed for the re-demarcation of the geographical areas of jurisdiction of local governments and to ensure that every area of South Africa falls under democratically elected local government (Nyalunga 2006). Thus the 843 councils elected during the transitional period between 1995-6 were reduced to 299 (Lodge 2002). The elections began in October 1995 and ran through to June 1996. Buhlungu and Atkinson (2007: 29) note that the 'transitional councils' consisted of all race groups, but the white, coloured and Indian components still received protection. At least half the members of the transitional councils were drawn from these groups, so that the black communities received a maximum of 50% of the seats. The new Constitution adopted in 1996 further consolidated the development of local government by rendering it as a distinct governmental sphere with executive and legislative authority and powers (chapter 3 of the constitution).

The second legislation was the Municipal Structures Act of 1998, which determined three different categories of municipalities (metropolitan, local and district municipalities). The other important pieces of legislation were the Development Facilitation Act of 1995 which attempted to address the 'mindset' of local governments and to steer them in the direction of being more participatory processes and the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 which introduced innovations such as ward committees, a code of conduct for councillors, integrated development planning, performance management, development partnerships, and alternative service-delivery mechanisms (Nyalunga 2006, Buhlungu and Atkinson 2007). With the constitution and various legislation in place, the scene was set for a democratic local government dispensation.

Democratic local government

The December 2000 local government elections formally marked the end of the transition phase. Local government as we know it today can therefore be traced to the new municipal demarcations and restructuring which came into effect in 2000 which dramatically changed the format and style of local government in South Africa. Importantly, local/municipal government was set as the main mechanism for service delivery tasked with implementing the construction and maintenance of basic infrastructure including water supplies, electrification, housing, sanitation and refuse collection (Atkinson and Marais, 2006). According to Buhlungu and Atkinson (2007) it is in this comprehensive vision, that one may discern the seeds of the enormous expectations which came to be placed upon municipalities. Post 2000, numerous municipalities have buckled under the strains imposed by the amalgamation exercise and many have not managed to amalgamate their administrative systems successfully.

Faced with a wide array of new functions and increased developmental demands on municipalities there have been concerns over the inadequacy of administrative skills, financial systems and popular accountability in many municipalities (Buhlungu and Atkinson 2007: 30). This has affected their crucial responsibility of providing basic services. For some scholars, these challenges are linked to the past legacy of apartheid which shaped poverty spatially as homeland areas were left without industry, viable agriculture or adequate infrastructure. Makgetla (2007: 146) notes that after 1994, local governments are expected to raise the bulk of their funds from rates and taxes, with only a limited national subsidy. Therefore, former homeland areas remain in a vicious cycle of

poverty, unable to provide infrastructure because low household incomes still translate into inadequate government revenues.

The 1996 Constitution established the objectives of local government to be a democratic and accountable government; to allow for the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; and to facilitate the involvement of communities and associated organisations in local governance. The March 1998 *White Paper on Local Government* and the various legislation that were passed in the transition period from 1994 to 2000 drew from the constitution and as noted earlier, placed local government at the centre of driving an ambitious programme designed to address developmental backlogs, the eradication of poverty, the promotion of sustainable development and the provision of safe and secure environments (Buhlungu and Atkinson 2007). This is when the concept of a ‘developmental local government’ was coined to entrench its special constitutional mandate to foster development (Naude, 2001).

There are different systems of local government in a democratic South Africa; therefore it is important to briefly outline how they are structured for a fuller understanding of how municipalities operate. According to the *White Paper on Local Government* (1998), South Africa’s local government structure was designed with considerable flexibility because the democratic government inherited a highly geographically unequal landscape that required local government specific to each context (*White Paper on Local Government* 1998). Therefore many municipalities have a different institutional make up.

The South African constitution and the Municipal Structures Act: 1998 (MSA), set the ground for three different categories of municipalities. Category A municipalities are metropolitan areas, with extensive authority whilst category B municipalities (local municipalities) operate within the administrative boundary of a district (or Category C) municipality. A metropolitan municipality therefore has exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in its area whilst local and district municipalities share functional competencies and responsibilities. This means that a metropolitan municipality performs all the functions of local government for its constituency including coordinating the delivery of all services. On the other hand district municipalities and local municipalities share some functions and responsibilities (Municipal Structures Act 1998). Buffalo City Municipality attained metropolitan status after the May 2011 local government elections.

Amongst the three categories of local government enshrined in the constitution, the Municipal Structures Act (1998) explicated the different municipal council systems that may be established within each category of municipality. There are five systems of municipal government or combinations of those systems. The five systems include a Plenary executive system, Collective executive system, Mayoral executive system, Sub council participatory system and a Ward participatory system. For category A (metropolitan) municipalities, there are eight different combinations of the above systems that can be adopted but I will focus on the two main systems that are common amongst metropolitan municipalities (MSA 1998 Ch 1, Pt 2). These include the collective executive system and the mayoral executive system.

Provincial legislation must determine for each category of municipality the different types of municipality that may be established in that category in the province. In a collective executive system, the municipal council elects an executive committee that broadly mirrors the composition of the council through a proportional system. The council delegates executive responsibilities and this executive committee takes decisions on matters that fall within its delegated powers. According to the Municipal Structures Act (1998), the rationale behind this system is that if there is no executive structure, the whole council would need to meet every time a decision had to be taken. If the municipal council is large, or responsible for a wide range of powers and duties, taking decisions in plenary would result in a slow decision-making process. It is important to note that in this system the council delegates powers to the whole executive committee, and not to any individual member of the committee. This means that the executive committee must exercise its powers collectively, and no individual member of the executive committee can take decisions on behalf of the committee (Municipal Structures Act of 1998). The executive committee is elected through a proportional system and matters before the executive committee are decided if there is agreement among the majority of the members (Municipal Structures Act of 1998). Ethekwini Metropolitan municipality adopted this collective executive system.

In contrast, the mayoral executive system allows for the exercise of executive authority through an executive mayor and the executive leadership of the municipality is vested in this individual. In this system, the municipal council elects one member of council as the executive mayor, and delegates executive powers and duties to that person. The executive mayor then appoints a mayoral committee comprised of councillors to provide assistance

(Municipal Structures Act of 1998). The Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) highlights that the key advantage of this system is that it "puts a face" to local government and makes it clear who can be held accountable for decisions that the municipal council makes. In addition, it also provides for decisive leadership and rapid and responsive decision-making (DPLG undated). However it is a more centralised form of governing that can stifle participation of minority groups since a dominant party is always in a position to appoint the executive leaders.

Buffalo City Municipality operates under the mayoral executive system. The ANC, as the dominant party in council, has always had the capacity to appoint the executive leadership. This system therefore allows for greater control by the party of municipal leaders. This has raised concerns regarding transparency, accountability and inclusive decision making in the municipality.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined how the local state was important for the apartheid government project of domination and it has discussed how the local state was also an important site of resistance for the anti-apartheid movement. With the onset of democracy, the chapter traced the changing role of the state as the ANC sought to transform the state itself as well as use it as a vehicle to transform society. Whilst the local state remained important politically as the tier of government responsible for deepening local democracy, the chapter also highlighted how it became a site to redistribute wealth and economically uplift

blacks whilst managing the contradictions of neoliberalism as pointed out by Hart (2013) and Lodge (2002).

The main thrust of this chapter has been to set the scene of this study by providing a detailed description of the context. This is because the entrenchment of factionalism and patronage in the contemporary epoch can only be understood partly in relation to issues of everyday political economy. As (Beresford 2015: 5) observes, ‘the manner in which extreme inequalities of class, gender, education, and health severely reduce the ability of ordinary South Africans to survive and flourish draws political entrepreneurs and their followers towards private patron-client networks attached to the ANC as a means to exploit access to public authority in an effort to navigate poverty and inequality’. This, chapter has demonstrated that the changing role of the state post-apartheid created the conditions for significant contestation over state opportunities that materialised as factionalism in the ANC as the dominant party with state power. The entrenchment of neoliberal principles such as cost recovery and privatisation from 1996 onwards also increased dependence on the state especially in smaller and rural municipalities such as Buffalo City.

The following chapter picks up on these observations and examines the underlying drivers of factionalism at the local level. The chapter focuses on how factionalism functions in practice and how it is related to patronage networks that distribute state resources.

Chapter V

ANC INTRAPARTY POLITICS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: THE INTERPLAY OF FACTIONALISM AND PATRONAGE IN BUFFALO CITY¹³

Introduction

Any contemporary discussion of the ANC is incomplete without a consideration of the intense intraparty contestation within the party. This became apparent during the lead up to and after the ANC's 2007 Polokwane elective conference. This conference was a turning point in the party's post-apartheid history as it was characterised by deep seated divisions that led to a vicious contestation for the leadership of the party between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. Media coverage on the manifestations of factionalism in the ANC has since become a common feature and academics have analysed the consequences of factionalism on various social issues. For instance, social movement scholars have highlighted the role that factionalism in the ANC plays in service delivery protests (see Langa and Von Holdt 2012, Sinwell et al 2009, Alexander 2010, Von Holdt et al 2011).¹⁴ Other scholars have also begun to highlight how factionalism in the ANC is related to intra-elite conflict and violence in a highly unstable social order produced by South Africa's transition to democracy (Von Holdt 2013). Whilst most of these accounts offer useful descriptions of

¹³ Parts of this chapter have been published in Mukwedeya, T. G. 2015. 'The enemy within: factionalism in ANC local structures—the case of Buffalo City (East London)'. *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa*. 87 (1). 117-134.

¹⁴ The line of argument brought forward is that some of the protests in post-apartheid South Africa have been attributed to internal divisions and power struggles in local ANC structures by individuals who want to benefit from state resources (Langa and Von Holdt 2012, Harber 2009, Alexander 2010, Von Holdt et al 2011).

factional dynamics, they seldom focus on how and why factionalism operates on a day to day basis. Those that have illuminated on the nature of factional politics in the ANC, provide an overview from a national perspective and usually in reference to politics of the tripartite alliance as it was regarded as a partial institutionalisation of factionalism (see Booyesen 2011: 71,361, Butler 2007, Lodge 2004).

The previous chapter observed how the ANC's relationship to the state post-apartheid fuelled contestation over limited state resources. The main purpose of the chapter is to build on this observation and trace the trajectory of post-apartheid ANC intraparty politics by showing how factionalism has increasingly become intertwined with patronage networks that seek to distribute state resources. One authoritative account has also observed that the 'ANC has been transformed from a rule-regulated, mass based party into an organisation in which internal dynamics are mostly shaped by personal interests' (Lodge 2014: 1). Taking a leaf from Lodge's observation, this chapter examines this transformation with particular reference to the ANC in the Buffalo City region. The chapter shows how the party has become the de facto space where competition for local state resources takes place drawing on theories of patron-client relationships.

The chapter is structured as follows: It begins with a historical overview of factionalism throughout the ANC's over one hundred year history to account for the transformation from a rule-regulated, mass based party into a party in which internal dynamics are mostly shaped by personal interests. It then offers an overview of ANC factionalism in the post-apartheid era to trace how the underlying basis of factionalism shifts from being mostly based on ideological differences to contestations over patronage networks. A more detailed

discussion of how factionalism is functioning through patronage in which the party and state are conflated in everyday practice then follows drawing on experiences of local politicians, activists, councillors and ordinary party members in Buffalo City. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the consequences of conflating the party and state.

An historical overview of factionalism in the ANC

In 2012 President Jacob Zuma made the following statement whilst addressing the elective conference of Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans' Association (MKMVA) in Boksburg:

...the enemy is always present in different guises, sizes and shapes. Oliver Tambo warned us all the time to beware of the enemy within. There were *alien tendencies* within the organisation which include factionalism, lobbying for positions, ill-discipline, fraud and corruption, gate-keeping and bulk-buying of members (*The Sowetan*, 12 October 2012).

Zuma's assertion at the MKMVA conference that factionalism was a recent 'alien tendency' echoes with what other ANC officials I talked to in Buffalo City believed. They pointed out that factional struggles were associated with the political contestation that surrounded the 2007 Polokwane elective conference (Interview with Monga 5 July 2011 at Berea, East London). However, a close review of the ANC's history that spans over a hundred years reveals that factionalism has always been a prominent feature of the party. It

is necessary to trace the early expressions of factions and how they are invoked throughout the party's history. This allows us to trace the transformation within the ANC and draw continuities and discontinuities whilst helping us to understand the manifestations of factionalism in the contemporary juncture.

From its formation in 1912, the ANC was always going to be prone to factionalism because it was an amalgamation of individuals from different constituencies. As Bonner (2012: 2) observes, 'from its formation the ANC sought to appeal to, and more infrequently to mobilise, a number of distinct and potentially conflictual constituencies. These were first the traditional leaders of South Africa; second were the Christian educated elite including doctors, lawyers, journalists, clergymen and teachers; third were the urban masses and fourth were the rural populace. Later the Youth were added to this mix' (Bonner 2012: 2). Conflicts between these groups flared up at different periods after the ANC's formation in 1912.

By 1928 the ANC had taken a sharp left turn from its conservative roots under the influence of the Communist Party and the leadership of Josiah Gumede who toured the Soviet Union and 'came back declaring he had found the key to freedom in communism after being convinced that the Soviet Union had eradicated racial chauvinism' (Holland 1989: 46). After the October 1927 trip to the Soviet Union in which the ANC and the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) met with Soviet leaders including Stalin, the debate that followed resulted in divisions in both ANC and the CPSA at the time (ANC 2012). Upon returning from the trip, a draft resolution defining the Union of South Africa as a British Dominion of a colonial type and a call for the creation of an independent native

South African Republic with full equal rights for all races fuelled divisions (ANC 2012). Gumede's call for the right to self-determination and his urging of the ANC to work closer with the communists was not well received by the conservative chiefs. As the ANC acknowledges, there were other forces at work within the ANC and the conservative wing could not - and did not - remain neutral to the remarks and development of Gumede (ANC 2014). Thus in 1930 Pixley ka Isaka Seme, was elected as the ANC's 5th president leading a conservative faction that campaigned to expel communists (Holland 1989, Jolobe 2012). This brought about a breakaway group guided by former party president Josiah Gumede, to form the Independent ANC (Jolobe 2012).

The rest of the 1930s saw the ANC remaining moderate. However in the 1940s it intensified its struggles and women were admitted as full members of the ANC in 1943 for the first time, leading to the establishment of the ANC Women's League. The 1940s also saw division stemming from disagreements on the strategies of resistance. The party was then divided into those who insisted on a continuation of moderate methods of resistance and the youthful group who pushed for more confrontational mass action. The ANC's absence in the Alexandra bus boycott of 1944 in which other parties participated led to the formation of the ANC Youth League in 1944 which together with the Communist Party were responsible for the radicalisation of African politics and for the turn towards the masses in the 1940s (Lissoni et al 2012: 9).

By December 1949, the ANC adopted the 'Programme of Action' which abandoned the traditional moderate approach of petitions and deputations in favour of mass action using the tactics of boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience (Butler 2012: 30-31). The Defiance

Campaign of 1952 took the ANC beyond passive resistance and spurred various local struggles. Everatt (1992: 25) notes that ‘towards the late stages of the Defiance Campaign, an increasingly penchant anti-white outlook had begun to generate fears among communists and whites more generally that extreme nationalist sentiment was spreading within the ANC’.

In 1958 Robert Sobukwe was the mouthpiece of an Africanist group in the ANC that was critical of the ANC’s commitment to ending white domination because it worked with whites in the Congress Alliance. Robert Sobukwe believed that ‘black Africans had to liberate themselves and not depend on non-blacks to do it for them’ (IKWEZI 1978)¹⁵. As Africanists, they were sceptical of ANC cooperation with non-blacks and thought that the communist influence was so strong that the organisation had substituted class struggle for the all-important aim of achieving African Nationalism (Pogrud 1991). This Africanist faction located in the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) also rejected the founding principles of the Freedom Charter particularly its reference to white and blacks as brothers (Holland 1989: 118, Jolobe 2012). In 1955, the Congress Alliance comprised of the ANC, the South African Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats and the Coloured People's Congress declared in its Freedom Charter that ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white’. The charter unified all South Africans but for those who championed the Africanist ideological stance, they regarded the Freedom Charter as a reformist sell out of Black Nationalist interests (Louw 2004). To them, the Freedom Charter and the abandoning of the 1949 Program of Action that called for mass action was a betrayal of the struggle. Therefore in 1959, Sobukwe who was a popular proponent of

¹⁵ This is a quote of Robert Sobukwe in the London *Times* 1978 published in *IKWEZI, A Journal of South African and Southern African Political Analysis* March 1978

these ideas led a faction to break away from the ANC to form the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).

The issue of opening up the ANC to all racial groups continued to be a pressing issue within the Congress Alliance throughout the 1960s and these rifts threatened to split the movement. According to Ellis (2013: 74), the line of cleavage was largely one of colour as the critics of opening up ANC membership to all were black South Africans influenced by the Africanist ideas espoused in Tanzania and in many other parts of Africa. At the 1969 Morogoro conference, the most controversial item on the agenda was the opening up ANC membership to all racial groups (Ellis 2013: 75). Of course other issues such as the radical restructuring of the ANC and the Congress Alliance that recommended a clean sweep of the old executive were also a prominent issue at the conference (Callinicos 1999: 132). In this regard, the conference resolved to reduce the size of the NEC and to establish a Revolutionary Council.

Ndebele and Nieftagodien (2004: 596) note that these changes were intended to accommodate the interests of important constituencies and also placed party members in strategically critical positions as far as both political and military operations were concerned. With regard to the membership issue, the party hierarchy led by Moses Kotane and J.B Marks, supported by Joe Matthews, Ben Turok and others, advocated for the opening up of ANC membership to all races whilst some black and white SACP members including Brian Bunting and Ray Simons opposed this view. However, under Tambo's leadership, which now embraced a wider and more inclusive non-racial approach, the ANC

opened its membership to non-blacks. Nonetheless, factional divisions stemming from opening the ANC's membership to all racial groups persisted.

The remnants of the Africanist faction that came to be known as the 'Gang of Eight', which was led by Eastern Cape politician Tennyson Makiwane, took exception to the ANC's 1969 Morogoro conference decision to open its membership to whites, coloureds and Indians. After six years of speaking behind closed doors about its dissatisfaction, the 'Gang of Eight' publicly criticised the ANC at the funeral of Robert Resha, a senior party member, in London in 1975 (Ellis and Sechaba 1992, *Mail&Guardian* 2011). After that, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC unanimously decided to expel all eight members from the ranks of the organisation at a meeting held in Morogoro, Tanzania. According to a statement by the ANC on the expulsion of the eight members, they were accused of pursuing disruptive factionalist activities in their bid to bring about the exclusion from the ranks of the ANC of some members merely on the grounds of their race or membership to the South African Communist Party (ANC 1976).

In late 1979 and early 1980, ideological divisions led a small group of socialists to attempt to steer the ANC in a new strategic direction. They then formed themselves into a group which they called the Marxist Workers Tendency of the African National Congress (Friedman 2012: 18). They believed that the struggle against capitalism, like all others, could only be led by the working class and it was the task of the nationalist movement to strengthen worker organisation as an essential means to apartheid's overthrow (Friedman 2012: 18). This was propagated in a publication titled *The Workers' Movement, SACTU, and the ANC- A Struggle for Marxist Policies* written by Martin Legassick, Paula Ensor,

David Hemson and Rob Petersen (Friedman 2012: 19). They failed to make any impact on the strategy of the ANC at the time or to mobilize any support within the movement for their position. Rather, they were chided for their ‘economistic’ and ‘workerist’ approach. They were later said to have ‘dismissed the ANC leadership as a right wing faction whose aims ran contrary to the interests of the working class in South Africa’, a judgement which was advanced to explain why the ANC ‘viewed them as arrogant enemies of the ANC-led liberation struggle’ (Friedman 2012: 18). The ANC never responded directly to the document but the four who later became known as the ‘Gang of Four’ were all suspended from the ANC in response and, in 1985 they were expelled (Friedman 2012: 18). The expulsion of the Gang of Eight and the Gang of Four revealed the principle of democratic centralism within the ANC that limits the space for debate on certain fundamental subjects. This idea of democratic centralism has come to define the way the party is organised to this day.

Despite the existence of conflicting interests within the ANC and the Congress Alliance throughout its history, ideological contestation was the driver of factional politics within the ANC during apartheid. The Congress Alliance, a joint anti-apartheid front formed in 1954 with the ANC as the dominant and most powerful partner had brought together different groups such as the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the Congress of Democrats and the Coloured People’s Congress. The political contestation during that time can be characterised as ‘cooperative’ factionalism borrowing from Boucek (2009). Cooperative factionalism depends on the provision of a structure for cooperation between separate intra-party groups. ‘This is done such that factions articulate opinions and preferences of separate societal groups and mobilise separate memberships and

communities of interests within a single organisation. In this way, factions can diversify party appeals and can play a constructive role in building integrated parties' (Boucek 2009: 15). However, Boucek argues that key to this form of factionalism is political elites and followers with convergent preferences and attitudes. Despite the differences, all these groups in the Congress Alliance converged in the preference to dismantle the apartheid system and replace it with a democratic one. As Mandela noted in 1990, 'the ANC has never been a political party, it is a coalition united solely by the determination to oppose racial oppression' (Butler 2005: 726)

Boucek (2009: 15) also refers to what she calls 'competitive' factionalism. This denotes factions that are opposed to each other due to divergent preferences. 'They become opposed usually because of deep-seated issues that are difficult to integrate within party ideology such as the introduction of market forces in the provision of public services, which at some time proved to be so divisive within the British Labour Party and the Germany's Social Democrats' (Boucek 2009: 15). The factional politics associated with the Africanist faction that led to the formation of the PAC and the expulsion of the 'Gang of Eight' exhibit elements of 'competitive' factionalism as they were driven by the desire to steer the ANC in a new strategic and ideological direction.

Whether one characterises factionalism in the ANC during the colonial and apartheid era as cooperative or competitive, what is clear is that factionalism was largely informed by ideological and policy differences. The party drew its unity from its collective opposition to apartheid (Butler 2005, 2014). After the ANC came to power in 1994, factionalism has persisted. The question is whether there are any continuities or discontinuities in the

repertoires of factionalism? In other words, how different are contemporary factions and what informs them? Do ideological differences inform current expressions of factionalism? Butler (2012: 5) addresses these concerns when he observes that ‘it would be a mistake to believe that the conflicts within the ANC today merely represent a continuation or resurgence of historical division. South Africa is undergoing deep processes of class formation that are markedly weakening the internal cohesion of the movement’. The rest of the chapter unpacks how factionalism has changed post-apartheid and the underlying drivers of that change. The following section begins with an overview of ANC factionalism in the post-apartheid era. Drawing on political practices in Buffalo City, the rest of the chapter shows how factionalism changed from being largely driven by ideological differences to functioning through contestations over patronage.

Factionalism in the ANC Post-apartheid era

Contemporary discussions about the ANC are dominated by references to factions or factionalism. Almost on a daily basis, the media covers intensifying manifestations of factionalism in the ANC at local, regional, provincial and national level. In some instances the factional struggles have taken a dramatic turn leading to the assassinations, death threats and fist fights that have made headline stories¹⁶. The newspaper headlines captured

¹⁶ The provinces of Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal and the North West dominate the cases of political assassinations. For examples of articles referring to assassinations of ANC cadres, see: *Business Day*. Political assassinations: How the ANC is killing its own. <http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2013/08/12/political-assassinations-how-the-anc-is-killing-its-own>
Daily Maverick. The ANC’s deadly trinity: Politics, power, patronage. <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-12-05-the-ancs-deadly-trinity-politics-power-patronage#.Vk4Z3NWUdeI>
News24. ANC heavyweight assassinated in KZN. <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ANC-heavyweight-assassinated-in-KZN-20150730>

below reveal the current preoccupation with factionalism in the ANC by South African media:

Factional politics destroying ANC from within, *Thought Leader, Mail and Guardian*, 2015

South Africa: ANC factionalism battles emerge ahead of 2016 polls, *The Africa Report*, 2015

ANC cautioned to deal with factionalism, *SABC News*, 2014

Factionalism and greed are killing the ANC: Vavi, *SABC News*, 2013

Zuma declares war on ANC's 'demon of factionalism', *Mail and Guardian* 2012

ANC factionalism is holding country's democracy hostage, *The Times*, 2012

Many of these reports associate factionalism in the ANC with the politics around the Polokwane conference and broadly with contestations between national or provincial leaders but seldom consider the specific issues at a local level. Whilst factional contestation in the ANC intensified from 2005 onwards, it must be noted that these tensions had begun brewing just after the democratic transition.

From as early as 1996, less than 24 months after the new government assumed power, the ANC government adopted a neoliberal economic policy which in essence replaced the initial Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). This shift did not sit well with the organised left in the ANC led alliance. The opposition by the SACP and COSATU was on ideological terms that would feed into factional politics from early on. The introduction of neoliberal policies was an ideological turnaround that was seen as a betrayal of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). The NDR is a multi-staged instrument towards

socialism and neoliberal policies were seen as an obstacle towards achieving that goal. This fuelled factional fissure within the ANC led Alliance (Bond 2000). South Africa's transition to democracy had coincided with the triumphalism of liberal democracy and market fundamentalism following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Edigheji 2007: 10). Therefore since 1994, 'there has clearly been a calculated acceptance by the ANC government that conservative orthodoxy was inescapable to avoid massive retaliation by international and domestic capital' (Turok 2008: 12).

However, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which had been devised by various civil society organisations, represented a consensus in the democratic movement and had formed the basis of the ANC's election manifesto which was then adopted by the government of national unity after the 1994 elections as its main policy platform (Turok 2008). The RDP's central concerns included: meeting basic needs, developing human resources, building the economy and democratizing the state and society (RDP 1994). Adelzadeh (1996) notes that the release of the RDP White Paper in September 1994 signified the first major point of departure from both the goals and the ethos of the initial RDP document. This is because 'the RDP White Paper failed to reconcile the original Keynesian approach to the RDP with a set of policy statements and recommendations that were inspired by the neo-liberal framework that had long been the alternative offered by big business, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the apartheid state itself' (Adelzadeh 1996: 66).

From then on, the government continued to move away from the RDP towards exclusive acceptance of the tenets of the neo-liberal framework and its associated policies. By 1996,

the government adopted a trickle-down approach to economic development and in June 1996, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic strategy which significantly departed from the RDP (Adelzadeh 1996). With GEAR, priority shifted to fiscal discipline and to all the associated features of macro-economic stabilisation such as the budget deficit, inflation and balance of payment but there was no clearly articulated strategy as to how the masses would benefit (Turok 2008: 117). Later economic policies such as the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for SA (Asgi-SA) in 2006 and the New Growth Path (NGP) in 2010 would remain conservative as well. The policies were criticized for paying lip-service to the issues of redistribution and inequality (Robinson 2006). Like with GEAR, growth came before redistribution and it was largely a market-driven strategy, although there were some tentative shifts in the direction of a more interventionist role for the state (Robinson 2006). The current economic blueprint, the National Development Plan (NDP) launched in August 2012 makes bold pronouncements towards building a developmental state that is capable of driving the country's development but critics have pointed out how it is still business as usual.

As tensions between increasing market liberalization and meeting domestic popular demands for poverty-alleviation and socio-economic transformation increased, the ANC leadership was forced to confront 'ultra-leftists' who challenged its credentials as defender of the National Democratic Revolution which was the cornerstone in the anti-apartheid struggle (Andreasson 2006). At the 50th ANC National Conference in December 1997, then President Nelson Mandela made uncompromising and well-publicised statements of disapproval regarding internal dissent within the Alliance. This was particularly in regard to the SACP's opposition to GEAR (Andreasson 2006). The simmering tensions that were

evident under Mandela worsened during the Mbeki presidency. This is because the Mbeki-led ANC pushed forward the neoliberal policies past its allies with little consultation (Marais 2011). This strained the relationship between the ruling ANC and the other two members of its Tripartite Alliance, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), that almost led to its breakup in 2002 (Pillay 2006: 167).

The rapid implementation of market-friendly policies under the Mbeki administration essentially cast Mbeki's leadership style as centrist, non-responsive, technocratic and illiberal (Mathekga 2008: 132). Mbeki's presidency determinedly centralised through developing new cabinet cluster support systems and adopting the role of ultimate adjudicator of inter-departmental conflicts (Butler 2004: 722). In addition, Mbeki's presidency inaugurated a new type of leadership that was characterised by the consolidation of various government administrative departments into a few administrative committees that were centrally co-ordinated and controlled from the President's Office (Mathekga 2008: 132). Jacobs (1999: 4) also observed that Mbeki's formation of the Office of the Presidency had an effect of 'centralising enormous power in the hands of the President's Office'. The entrenchment of neoliberal policies and Mbeki's leadership style amongst other things antagonised the Alliance partners. Pillay adds that 'as relations with the Mbeki-led ANC worsened, COSATU and the SACP had a choice of either building a counter-hegemonic working class movement outside the Alliance, or rebuilding a proletarian presence within the ANC, to return the liberation movement to its supposed working class bias. They chose the latter, deciding to swell the ranks of the ANC with

working class activists so that the party could be made to be more pro-worker' (Pillay 2011: 58 -59).

The dismissal of Jacob Zuma as deputy president in 2005 after a Durban High Court Judge convicted his financial adviser Schabir Shaik of corruption and fraud opened the Pandora's Box of a groundswell of ANC and alliance members who wanted to unseat Mbeki. Whilst Zuma remained deputy president of the party, dissenting voices that had been brewing from the 1990s finally came together explicitly and 'unified behind a single individual who had in their eyes been publicly discarded by Mbeki for political purposes' (Rossouw 2012: 50). In other words, the battle lines had been drawn and contending factions came to the surface. For the organised left in the alliance, Southall notes that 'it was through Zuma, who had proved able to articulate multiple and often contradictory leanings that appealed to a range of groupings, that a social movement of the excluded had expressed their shared sense of moral indignation about the neoliberal modernisation project of Mbeki' (Southall 2009: 320).

Thus, ahead of the 2007 Polokwane elective conference, COSATU and the SACP put their weight behind Zuma. Other groups that felt marginalised under Mbeki's leadership such as the ANC Youth League also supported Zuma. They were driven by intense dislike and alienation, and for the purposes of obtaining influence over issues of policy and influence within the ANC (Booyesen 2011: 71). The ANC then became fragmented into two identifiable groups/factions that Susan Booyesen characterised as 'nationalist' and 'communist/socialist' factions who have relatively different policy and ideological positions (Booyesen 2011: 38, 71, 361). Other people in Buffalo City also characterised

them as ‘moderates’ or of the ‘left’ respectively (Interview with a former REC member 21 July 2011 at East London). Media reports similarly made this distinction associating Mbeki with the former faction and Zuma with the latter (*Mail and Guardian* 18 December 2009)¹⁷.

The notion of a coalition of the aggrieved is also useful to understand Zuma’s ascent to power. This idea highlights a more politically fluid backing behind Zuma than those interpretations stressing the primacy of the left. As Southall observes, ‘from this perspective, the coalition is not merely disparate but incoherent, united less in policy terms than in its desire to get rid of Mbeki. While Zuma was perceived as performing a balancing act, he was also seen as the glue holding the alliance together’ (Southall 2009: 325). The makeup of the coalition is described by Southall as follows:

COSATU and the SACP are consistently viewed as the leading elements of the Zuma coalition. But Gumede (2008) identifies three other groups as crucial. First, the ANC Youth League; second, pro-Zuma black economic empowerment (BEE) oligarchs hoping to secure future patronage; and third, ANC leaders under investigation for corruption who hope that if Zuma’s case is quashed, then theirs will be too (Southall 2009: 323 -324).

After Zuma’s ascent to power at the intensely contested Polokwane conference, officials who opposed his faction were purged. Mbeki himself was ousted from the presidency in

¹⁷Other examples of such media reports that associated Zuma with a communist faction and Mbeki with a nationalist one are: Afro-communists vs Afro-nationalists in the ANC , *Politicsweb*, 26 November 2009; Are you a nationalist or a communist? *Mail and Guardian*, 18 December 2009

September 2008, six months before his term was to end. This further polarised the party promoting the formation of a breakaway pro Mbeki party called Congress of the People (COPE) in December 2008 although many including Mbeki himself remained in the ANC. Ten ministers resigned in solidarity, among them the country's deputy president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka and ANC stalwart Ronnie Kasrils, whilst respected intellectual and policymaker Joel Netshitenzhe similarly became less influential (Nicoll 2011).

The 2007 Polokwane national elective conference was therefore a turning point in post-apartheid ANC history as the party was sharply divided along factional lines, leading to a vicious contestation for the leadership of the party. Marais (2011) observes that the manner of COSATU and the SACP's support for Zuma compounded problems. Marais notes that 'their commitment to removing Mbeki and helping Zuma to sidestep a possible prison sentence gave license to intolerance, intimidation and retaliation'. He then went further to correctly predict that 'the feuds and vengefulness they helped stoked, would plague the ANC and the state for many years' (Marais 2011: 379). The events around the 2007 conference have since inspired a series of other explicit expressions of dissent associated with factional politics within the tripartite Alliance. The ANC Youth League's antagonistic position to its mother body under Julius Malema ahead of the Mangaung Conference in December 2012 is a case in point although Malema was expelled earlier in April 2012.

Ahead of the Mangaung Conference, the coalition that supported Zuma particularly the SACP and ANC Youth League fought each other to have their way in the ANC. Within COSATU, support for Zuma fuelled fragmentation in the federation as power battles between factions led by the president Sdumo Dlamini and general secretary Zwelinzima

Vavi intensified. Therefore ahead of the ANC's 53rd National Conference in Mangaung in December 2012, there were simmering tensions between delegates aligned to various leaders in the tripartite alliance. As the secretary general of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe at the Mangaung Conference noted in his organisational report that one of the biggest challenges that confronted the National Executive Council (NEC) was factionalism that seemed to have become institutionalised (ANC 2012). He added that 'we are seeing more boldness in the provinces, where factions even give themselves formal names' (ANC 2012: 10). Ahead of the 2012 Mangaung conference, some members of the Buffalo City regional executive allegedly belonged to the ABZ faction. ABZ meaning Anyone But Zuma was a faction that wanted party deputy president Kgalema Motlanthe or anyone else to replace Zuma at the Mangaung elective conference. In the Free State, a 'Regime change group' organised to oust the pro-Zuma provincial premier, Ace Magashule whilst in the North West province, a 'Forces for change' faction led by ANC provincial secretary Kabelo Mataboge also boycotted the conference at which Zuma was nominated (Cooper 2015: 161).

After the Mangaung conference there are two important political developments that are related to or are the consequence of ANC factional struggles. Firstly, Julius Malema the former ANC Youth League president went on to form the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in July 2013. The party received 6.35% of the vote in the 2014 general election, making it the third largest party in parliament after the ANC and DA. Secondly, a year later in 2014, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) was expelled from COSATU because of its decision not to support the ANC in the 2014 general elections. NUMSA's decision was motivated by its doubt of the ANC's commitment to

left-leaning policies. The union is now playing a central role in a worker party contesting for the first time on the 2016 local government elections as the United Front.

In sum, the ANC post-apartheid has been marred by factions and Anthony Butler gives a broad overview of why this is the case. Butler (2014: 159) correctly observes that;

‘With the onset of democracy in 1994, the ANC has found it increasingly hard to maintain its broad church character and any pretence of ideological coherence. The deepest causes of the conflict in the ANC result from changes in the class character of the organisation. Previously united by opposition to apartheid, the ANC now contains an affluent bourgeoisie, a significant new middle class, a traditional working class, in the mines, factories and service industries, and a broad base among the poor and economically marginalised’. The different interests and perspectives of these classes are reflected in disputes about public policy. Such conflicts are no longer effectively managed by the tripartite alliance because the SACP and COSATU are themselves embroiled in factional politics’ (Butler 2014: 159).

Post-apartheid factional struggles in the ANC demonstrate continuities in ideological and policy cleavages as drivers of factionalism especially just after the democratic transition when the ANC abandoned the RDP and opted for neoliberalism. The earlier resistance to the adoption of GEAR by the SACP and COSATU indicated ideological disagreements that informed factional politics. However, discontinuities can be found with the ‘coalition of the aggrieved’ that came together from 2005 onwards which was united less in policy

terms but by the desire to remove Mbeki hence it did not have any ideological coherence. The shift in factional loyalty in-between the elective conference of 2007 in Polokwane and the 2012 conference in Mangaung also problematises the ideological basis of factions. What therefore do 'nationalist' and 'communist' distinctions mean and importantly what is their function? Do they function to mask other interests? The following section draws on experiences from Buffalo City to unpack the underlying driver's factionalism. It also highlights how factionalism is related to the changing role and use of the state post-apartheid and demonstrates how patronage increasingly came to play a central role.

Drivers of Factionalism in Buffalo City

Buffalo City has been plagued by factional battles and scandals that have been covered by the national media. The factional purge of Mbeki supporters after the 2007 Polokwane conference was so intense in Buffalo City to the extent that the council could not have a quorum thereby crippling the functioning of the municipality. In 2014, Buffalo City got national attention after news broke out about several senior leaders including the executive mayor Zukiswa Ncitha, deputy mayor Temba Tinta, council speaker Luleka Simon-Ndzele, senior councillor Sindiswa Gomba and the ANC regional secretary Pumlanzi Mkolo were implicated in fraud, corruption, and money laundering of about six million rand allocated to the memorial service of former President Nelson Mandela (*Daily Dispatch* 23 June 2014). In July 2015, the region was the centre of an exposé about how votes get rigged at the branch level through the manipulation of membership forms. The alleged mastermind of the scam was regional secretary Pumlanzi Mkolo who together with branch

secretaries and a bank employee engaged in backdating membership forms, forging signatures, doctoring bank deposit slips and inflating branch membership using names on the voters roll (*Daily Dispatch* 4 & 28 July 2015). Despite this, Mkolo was re-elected as the regional secretary at the regions' elective conference in November 2015.

The Buffalo City region of the ANC is one of eight in the Eastern Cape Province and has fifty branches. Prior to May 2011, Buffalo City fell under the Amathole region. After the 2011 local government elections when Buffalo City attained metropolitan status, the ANC established it as a separate region to align with the new administrative demarcation. This change, however, did not spell fundamental changes to the municipality's functional competencies and responsibilities because as the major industrial hub in Amathole District, Buffalo City always had some measure of autonomy from the district regarding service provision. According to one of the executive directors:

Buffalo city was performing most of its services at its own accord... we have always had capacity to implement our service delivery mandate... the only problem was that when finance came from treasury, it did not come to us directly but we had to get it from the district at this created a bottleneck sometimes (Interview with Khaya, 27 June 2011 at Trust House, East London).

The broader factional struggles linked to Mbeki and Zuma's contestation ahead of the 2007 Polokwane conference discussed earlier also played out in Buffalo City. In 2009 for example, opposing Zuma and Mbeki supporters were in charge of the Eastern Cape

Province and the Amathole region respectively. Phumulo Masualle was the ANC provincial chairperson and also the National Treasurer of the South African Communist Party which supported Zuma. The Amathole region was led by Mluleki George who was a well-known Mbeki supporter at Polokwane and who later went on to be the national organiser of COPE, a party associated mainly with Mbeki supporters during that time. The control of the province and the region by chairmen from opposing factions led to political instability in Buffalo City which fell under Amathole district at that time.

The provincial leadership sought to purge councillors that were allegedly Mbeki supporters. This saw the expulsion of nineteen out of the sixty nine ANC councillors in Buffalo City for allegedly bringing the party into disrepute by supporting COPE in 2009. The Amathole region (controlled by Mbeki Supporters at the time) on the other hand expelled Buffalo City mayor Zukisa Faku who has a trade union background and at the time was also a regional leader of the SACP. Mluleki George and the regional leadership initiated the expulsion of Mayor Faku after she led a group of ANC councillors to vote in collaboration with the opposition to appoint Mandla Sithole as the new Municipal Manager for the municipality against the wishes of the regional party leaders. The mayor was expelled under the pretence of misusing council property (*News24* 3 November 2009). However, contradictory positions between the provincial and regional leadership saw the province regarding the expulsion of the mayor Faku as null and void. The ANC constitution enshrines power to higher structures so the province can overrule regional resolutions (see rule 19 on authority of the PEC).¹⁸ The ANC provincial spokesperson was

¹⁸ The ANC constitution gives the following powers and duties the Provincial Executive Committee (PEC)
19.9.7 Issue and send directives and instructions to and receive reports from the Regions, Branches and other substructures in the Province;

even quoted saying that, ‘the Amatole region was intent on defying the ANC provincial leadership and killing Buffalo City Municipality’ (*Daily Dispatch* 17 November 2009).

With support from the Province, now chaired by a fellow SACP official, Zukisa Faku managed to retain her post as mayor until the end of her term in 2011. Nonetheless, Buffalo City had three mayors - Zintle Peter, Sakhumzi Caga and Zukisa Faku during the 2006 – 2011 council term. The municipal manager’s post stood unfilled for almost the whole term, with four acting managers filling the post during that period. Therefore the municipality had five different municipal managers from 2006 to 2011. Andile Fani was appointed in March 2012 after acting in this position since November 2010. However, from October 2015, the city once more appointed another acting municipal manager after Fani was suspended on charges of misconduct although it was widely reported that he had a long history of run-ins with his political bosses (*Daily Dispatch* 9 October 2015).

The appointment of Zukisa Faku had been an alleged victory for the communist faction aligned to Zuma and is one of the examples of their consolidation of power in various structures. Ahead of the 2011 local government elections, efforts to purge the remaining Mbeki supporters who had not defected to COPE or who had not been suspended reached fever pitch as the candidate list was manipulated by deliberately removing some members. Zukiswa Ncitha who was also a central committee member of the SACP and who took over from Faku as mayor after the 2011 local elections was number 53 on the party’s nomination list but was pushed to number 13 (*Daily Dispatch* 12 June 2013). So widespread were the irregularities across the country that the ANC appointed Nkosazana

19.9.8 Supervise and direct the work of the ANC and all its organs in the Province, including the ANC provincial and local government caucuses;

Dlamini-Zuma to lead a seven-member task team to investigate allegations of irregularities in the list processes for councillors leading up to 2011 local government elections. The task team found widespread manipulation involving buying of forms, creation of illicit structures, parallel meetings at different venues and gatekeeping (Butler 2014: 161) The investigation recommended three councillors in Buffalo City to reconvene branch general meetings (*Daily Dispatch* 2 October 2014).

Councillors and other political actors I talked to in Buffalo City also used the ‘nationalist’ versus ‘communist’ distinction highlighted by academics and the media. Booysen (2011: 38, 71, 361) has suggested that these factions have relatively different policy and ideological positions. However the question is; do practices on the ground reflect these ideological differences as the drivers of factionalism? The experiences from Buffalo City suggest that ideological differences have instrumental value as they are used to mask patronage. The following section critically analyses the extent to which ideological and policy differences drive factional struggles from the point of view of the actors themselves in Buffalo City.

Ideologically based factionalism?

As noted earlier, the rapid implementation of neoliberal policies by the ANC led government after 1994 did not sit well with the SACP and COSATU as the organised left members of the tripartite alliance who saw this as an ideological sell-out of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). Ideological and policy differences can never be ou-rihtly

dismissed as a determinant of factionalism. They may come to the fore or play a less significant role depending on the context, the configurations of power and the time.

Piper and Matisonn (2009:150) note that the alliance partner's support for Zuma reflected an ideological disagreement on the NDR and with the '1996 neoliberal project'. The NDR was seen as a struggle to place social needs above private profits in the concrete reality of South Africa today (SACP 2012). It was seen as South Africa's road to Socialism. The ANC's abandonment of the Reconstruction and Development Program which was the NDR's main policy platform and the embracing of neoliberalism through GEAR in 1996 was therefore a turning point in the alliance. As Adelzadeh (1996) notes, the RDP represented both a consensus across different interests and a compromise between competing objectives. Thus the sudden promulgation of GEAR was bound to be a source of strife in the alliance. Akhona, a senior COSATU official in the Eastern Cape affirmed this,

we have been fighting the ANC's shift to the right because our policies are not serving the people, but there are some who are now in business and are benefitting and they don't want any change to fulfil the NDR, so that's where we differ (Interview with Akhona, 28 May 2012 at Southernwood).

Buhle, a former Buffalo City councillor who claimed to be a victim of the communist purge of nationalists in the council pointed out that the broad polarisation in the run up to the 2007 Polokwane conference was fuelled by contrasting policy and ideological positions. She said:

I am a nationalist because I am a member of the ANC and it's the only policy I have in mind. My understanding is that the communist party is supposed to be the vanguard of the working class, not the vanguard of the ANC and yet in the ANC you have the rich and the poor yet the communists are only fighting for the poor of the poorest, so they say. While as nationalists we believe that in the world there will always be those with money because if you are from a rich family, you cannot pretend to be poor, why must I fight you because you are rich. Those with money must give to those without, so they must pay for services to the municipality so that the poor can get 50kw and 50 litres for free (Interview with Buhle, 7 June 2012 at Trust House).

There was also a sense amongst moderates that the left organising through the SACP was taking over the ANC. Linda, a Buffalo City councillor from COPE also used the term 'purist' to describe individuals who are solely members of the ANC and who were resisting the supposed 'takeover' by the left when he said:

...They call themselves the purists, they want to reclaim the soul of the ANC, they feel that the alliance has hijacked the agenda of the ANC and that they (SACP and COSATU) are using the ANC to benefit and even renew their own organisation. So they have come up saying they want to clean the soul of the ANC (Interview with Linda, 1 June 2011 at Northend).

Despite the pronouncements of ideological differences as the basis of factionalism, there is a gap in the actual practices of local political actors in Buffalo City. Actors from the whole

political spectrum including moderates/nationalists and leftists agree that ideological pronouncements are often made as rhetoric whilst in practice, personal interests to secure power and opportunities to extend ones material wellbeing associated with those positions is the primary goal. Mangaliso, an SACP activist commented on such officials in Buffalo City who they referred to as *cheese and chocolate* communists (Interview with Mangaliso, 6 October 2014 at Mdantsane City). The DA refers to this group that holds sway in this province and municipality as *pseudo communists* or *Gucci communists* (Trollip 2014). Mangaliso's metaphor and those by the DA are meant to capture individuals who engage in conspicuous consumption enjoyed by the economic elite whilst hiding under a leftist mask and rhetoric about being concerned about the poor. Similarly, Reddy (2014: 104) notes that ideological differences over specific policy issues play a role in factional competition, but the real battles are over spoils. The same sentiments were shared by a senior councillor who has been in the Buffalo City council since 2000.

I met councillor Sindi in the morning on 7 July 2012 at a restaurant in the affluent Vincent mall in East London. As we were proceeding with the interview I quickly got used to the brief pauses as she greeted people she knew coming in for coffee and breakfast meetings as we sat outside. Earlier in the interview I had asked Sindi about the popular factional struggles that received widespread media coverage between 2009 and 2010 in which the alleged communist faction emerged victorious. She disputed the ideological basis and argued that personal interest about who would occupy certain positions were the main drivers. As the interview progressed, a two door Mercedes Benz sports car then pulled up into the car park in front of us and a gentleman in his early forties came into the restaurant.

He was wearing a black coat and a black *ushanka*¹⁹ with the red star symbol of communism in front. The man recognized Sindi and they greeted each other in passing in a typical comradeship way. The councillor focused her attention back at me and said sarcastically, ‘there are your communists’ with a grin as she sipped her hot chocolate. I inquisitively asked what she meant and she explained that he is an SACP member benefiting from state tenders, a ‘*tenderpreneur*’²⁰ as she said. For Sindi, this gentleman illustrated individuals whose claims to ideological beliefs are a smokescreen that undermine the ideological paucity of factions (Interview with Sindi, 7 July 2012 at Vincent Mall).

The same sentiments were shared by Thembi a former ANC councillor and self-confessed nationalist who was allegedly purged by the communists in 2010. She argued that if the faction that assumed power at the Polokwane conference was ideologically informed the political practices of its local politicians and officials should have been different. This made Thembi to remark that:

You must not say you are fighting for the poorest of the poor whilst you are driving the latest Mercedes, like what is happening. They are fighting for themselves so it’s not about ideology or policy, they diverged a long time ago (Interview with Thembi, 1 August 2013 at Quigney, East London).

¹⁹ Russian fur cap with ear flaps

²⁰ ANC-connected businesspeople who thrive on the receipt of tenders from all levels of government; tenders that appear in many cases to be corruptly allocated (Southall 2010).

Thembi therefore points out that in practice, factional struggles in Buffalo City are over spoils as propounded by Reddy (2014). Thus the dichotomous nationalist versus communist conceptualisation of factions and its ideological connotations is suffused with the increasing influence of personal material interests that constantly fuel factions centred on rivalries between the supporters of particular local or regional personalities. Butler and Southall (2015: 2) have also pointed to the evident role that competition for ‘resources’ is now playing in the internal politics of the ANC which is becoming a growing preoccupation of scholars. The following section focuses on how factionalism operates through patronage. It unpacks the relationship between competition for resources and internal politics of the ANC.

Factionalism through patronage

Whilst factionalism has been a feature of the ANC for as long as the party has been in existence, what is apparent from the above discussion is that the underlying drivers have changed over time. After the democratic transition in which the ANC and its alliance partners became the dominant political force, factionalism appeared to be initially driven by differing ideological positions. However, as pointed out by Lodge (2014) and Southall and Butler (2015), competition for resources and personal interest are now playing an evident role in the internal politics of the ANC. Andiswa, another senior ANC local politician in Buffalo City who has also been a councillor since 2000 explained why this is the case and periodised when it began:

It is a recent thing...the 1994 era was not as bad as the 2000 era. From 2000, people started to awaken to say the first group that went in (government) it improved them so they said let's go too, it's our time. The 1994 era was the opening period, people went in wanting to work and probably they started to see things and started to gain things and we started looking and we saw that people are improving because they are in parliament, so everybody wanted to be in parliament (Interview with Andiswa 5 August 2013 at King Williams Town).

Andiswa's comments should be situated within the broader context to avoid simplistic arguments that portray party officials as avaricious individuals motivated by self-interest. Of particular importance is how the state was conceived by the ANC and its alliance partners post-apartheid. As discussed in greater detail in *chapter four*, the process of transforming the state itself was an imperative that saw cadres loyal to the ANC being appointed as state bureaucrats. Also, the state itself was central to the ANC's broader transformative agenda as a vehicle through which it could uplift the previously disadvantaged groups and create a black middle class. Therefore through policies such as Affirmative Action and Black Economic Empowerment, the black majority began accessing jobs and lucrative state contracts. The resultant upward mobility is what Andiswa refers to as cadres who went into government after 1994 when she said, 'it improved them so they said let's go too, it's our time'. Thus the opportunities for upward mobility experienced by public officials encouraged others to also join the public service. However this created the conditions for contestation within the party as struggles to secure these scarce state resources became avenues for factionalism and patronage. Sam, a senior

official in the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in Buffalo City commented on how competition for limited opportunities expressed itself as factionalism,

Everybody now wants a piece of the cake but there isn't enough to go around and that's when the problem starts. It is this scarcity of resources particularly tenders and jobs that leads to the identification of the 'other' or faction, which is not entitled to a piece of the cake (Interview with Sam of the PAC 6 June 2011 at Southernwood, East London).

Sam's observation that, 'the cake is not enough to go around anymore' reveals the other structural force that we must take cognisance of. This pertains to the shortage of resources which continue to be constricted under the neoliberal framework. At the same time that the ANC sought to transform the state and use it as a vehicle for transformation, the party also embarked on a neoliberal economic drive for the country. Neoliberal deepening 'has produced a country with one of the highest unemployment rates in the world (40%), obscene inequality (and worsening in comparison with Brazil), a deepening ecological crisis and growing hunger' (Satgar 2012). Thus as opportunities in the private sector have constricted, dependence on the state has increased. The size of the civil service has always increased since 1994 as well as the state's spending on procurement. According to its June 2014 Quarterly Employment Statistics (QES) survey there are about 2.161 million civil servants.²¹ A decade ago there were 1.574 million (Booyesen 2015: 106).²² The South

²¹ South African civil servant can be broken down as follows: 455,701 national government employees, a further 1,118,748 people working for provincial authorities, 311,361 people were employed by local authorities and 275,851 employees worked for 'other government institutions' like libraries, parks, zoos and education and training authorities. See: <https://africacheck.org/reports/does-south-africa-really-employ-more-civil-servants-than-the-us-the-claim-is-false/#sthash.iV2qhFcc.dpuf>

African civil service works on a huge annual budget that largely goes towards the wage bill. The public sector wage bill has swelled more than 80% over the last decade as annual increases averaged more than 6% above inflation (*fin24* 8 June 2015). In addition, almost half (42%) of the budget allocated to national, provincial and local government is allocated to procurement (PARI 2014)²³. This has translated to intense internal party competition within the ANC for the power to control and distribute these state resources. As Reddy (2014: 14) points out, ‘the immense predictability of election outcomes for the dominant party shifts competition for state resources into the party’.

The struggle over state resources is intense in Buffalo City which is a relatively small metropolitan city when compared with the other metropolitan municipalities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town or Ekurhuleni. As highlighted in *chapter four*, the private sector is small and unemployment especially amongst the youth is one of the highest of all metropolitan cities. There is therefore a higher dependence on the state as a source of livelihood and a vehicle for upward mobility and elite formation. Factional struggles are therefore rampant at the local government level including the patronage that informs them.

To come back to how patronage has been conceptualised, Kopecký and Mair (2006: 1) define it as ‘a form of exchange between the party on the one hand, and a supporter or a group of supporters on the other hand, in which state resources, or privileged access to those who control state resources, are traded for political support’. To fully understand

²² Susan Booyesen provides a table of the size and salary budget of South African civil service from 1998 to 2013 (Booyesen 2015: 106).

²³ The Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI) states that in 2012/13, the budget of national, provincial and local government combined was R 876.6 billion. Of this, R 372.9 billion (42%) was allocated to procurement. Most procurement expenditure occurs at the levels of local (52.2 % of the total) and provincial government (29.4 %).

how factionalism is related to factionalism in Buffalo City, it is important to highlight some of the reciprocal relations between patrons, brokers and clients in Buffalo City particularly to identify what is actually exchanged.

The political and administrative interface of municipalities offers hundreds of salaried positions. Von Holdt et al (2011) observe that, 'salaries from high level jobs in the local town council, the power to distribute both high and low level council jobs, as well as the opportunities for business with council, and the patronage networks that link the two, are the key mechanisms in the formation of the elite, especially in small towns with limited employment opportunities' (Von Holdt et al 2011: 20). An ANC councillor in Buffalo City noted that '...political office is now seen as a way out, to get paid and improve one's life especially considering that one can possibly get a good salary in the state and through tenders' (Interview with Sindi, 7 July 2012 at East London).

In local government, the immediate political position individuals can attain that results in upward social mobility is being a councillor. This marks a significant shift in one's material wellbeing through the provision of a good stable salary. For the 2011 to 2016 term, ward councillors earned close to eighteen thousand rands a month plus a cell-phone allowance of about nine hundred rands every month. This is substantial considering that about 90% of councillors elected in 2011 were unemployed according to Zolani a municipal official who provides administrative support to councillors in the public participation department (Interview with Zolani, 25 August 2013 at Trust House). This is also significant in a context where the average monthly household income for Africans was R2 200 according to the Fort Hare Institute of Social and Economic Research (FHISER).

The same survey also found that 82% of households earned less than R3 500 per month. Ndletyana (2015: 110) also observes that political office is often the only source of employment for a sizable number of politicians since they lack requisite qualifications to secure employment elsewhere. He supports his observation with a study among 4,037 councillors in 2011 which revealed that about 52% did not complete matric; 25% had managed to secure some kind of a certificate or diploma; 14% had tertiary qualifications; and 7% had post-graduate qualifications.

Other opportunities in the political arm of Buffalo City municipality include the positions of the mayor, speaker of council, council chief whip and their deputies as well as the mayoral committee. The mayor's monthly salary was R59 063 including a R14 265 car allowance and an additional R1 496 cell-phone allowance in 2011 when the city attained metropolitan status whilst members of the mayoral committee earn R44 297 inclusive of a car allowance (*Daily Dispatch* 7 July 2011). In addition to these direct jobs, there are numerous more employment opportunities that political office bearers have influence over such as secretaries and office assistants. In addition to jobs, political connections are also important in the distribution of other government support programs such as work guarantee programs, small business support and agricultural support programs.

The potential for upward social mobility stemming from attaining party positions and the power to influence decision making in the local state is best epitomised by Pumlanzi Mkhosi, the ANC Buffalo City regional secretary. This was revealed by Bantu, a local ANC/SACP activist in Mdantsane who narrated how they grew up together in the township and were involved in the student movement with the Congress of South African Students (COSAS).

Pumlani became the leader of the ANC Youth League Amathole Regional Task–Team in 2009 and was elected its chairperson in March 2010 at the ANC Youth League regional congress. In May 2011, Pumlani successfully contested in the inaugural Buffalo City regional conference and became the first regional secretary of the ANC of the Buffalo City region. Bantu stressed his similarity to Pumlani pointing out that, ‘he was just like me’ but then observed how their fortunes differed as Pumlani moved out of Mdantsane to stay in what he called a ‘2 million rand house in the suburbs’ (Interview with Bantu, 26 June 2011 at Mdantsane).

Bantu purported that Pumlani made a mark for himself politically in the ANC Youth League. It is purported that Pumlani is related to Mluleki George, the former Amathole regional chairperson who later moved to COPE in 2009 and that it was George who mentored him politically and introduced him to influential political networks. These networks set him apart from others as he could mediate between political office bearers like councillors and business people (Interview with Bantu, 26 June 2011 at Mdantsane). Bantu highlighted that even from those earlier days in the ANC Youth League, Pumlani was good with lobbying for positions and on behalf of businesses that required particular approvals, licencing and permits from the municipality for instance changing zonal land use permits which requires municipal council approval.

Bantu alleged that Pumlani lobbied with various councillors for the rezoning of land allocated for a golf range on which Mdantsane City Mall was built by the Billion Group owned by Sisa Ngebulana to whom he is close with. In April 2014, The *Daily Dispatch* reported that Pumlani ‘lived in a luxury Gonubie townhouse bought for R1.1 million from

Ngebulana in 2008. The house was still in the name of one of Ngebulana's company, Phomella Property Investments and according to Vuyokazi Njongwe of the Billion Group the house has not been transferred to Pumlanzi as he still owes R400 000' (*Daily Dispatch* 12 April 2014). His rapid upward mobility has since caught the attention of the media with the *Daily Dispatch* (12 April 2014) running a feature that traces his humble beginnings in Mdantsane where he dropped out in grade nine to his political career and sudden accumulation of wealth. Figure 6 below from the Daily Dispatch captures some his alleged properties.

Figure 6: Daily Dispatch image showing Pumlanzi Mkolo's alleged properties.



The red arrow shows the townhouse, circled in red, in Gonubie where Pumlanzi Mkolo, above, lives. Top left are examples of the two luxury cars he has recently acquired. Pictures: Alan Eason/Michael Pinyana (Daily Dispatch April 12, 2014)

Pumlanzi epitomises the increasing influence of resources on the internal politics of the ANC. Throughout his tenure in politics, Pumlanzi has allegedly been at the centre of factional politics. During his stint in the leader of the ANC Youth League Amathole

Regional Task Team in 2009, the Mzwanele Fazzie ANCYL branch advocated for his removal accusing him of factionalism in a statement it released which stated that:

The ANC Youth League together with other progressive organisations in the Branch has been observing a serious lack of political and organisational leadership from the current ANC Youth Regional Task Team led by Comrade Pumlanzi Mkhosi as convener and Terris Ntuthu as Co-ordinator. The Alliance (Progressive Youth Alliance) and some branches of the ANC Youth League in Amathole have been ignored on all critical issues affecting the ANC Youth League including issues of governance, and launch of branches. The issue of Youth Development also suffered greatly as it was not taken seriously by this Regional Task Team. *Their focus became factions and labelling alliance members as the thieves, their focus became the tenders, and who must be a mayor in the local municipalities (My emphasis)*²⁴.

In addition to political positions and high level jobs, the power to allocate the distribution of state contracts and tenders also fuels factionalism. Similarly, Beresford (2015) observes that positions of public office are hotly contested not only because they are an immediate source of wealth for the individual but they are also a means by which powerful patrons can distribute resources and opportunities to their extended networks of dependants (Beresford 2015: 233). Akhona, a COSATU provincial official suggested that,

²⁴ See appendix 6 for the full letter by the Mzwanele Fazzie ANCYL branch.

...the contestation is not about people wanting to deliver, but people wanting to position themselves to get lucrative tenders. It's not about delivery ... the reason why people are fighting is because of these tenders, that's all. People want their persons to be in strategic positions so that tenders should go down to where they are (Interview with Akhona 30 May 2012 at Southernwood).

However, struggles for power to influence the allocation of state contracts and tenders transpire in the deployment of party cadres into the local state. The Municipal Structures Act (1998) allows council to appoint the municipal managers as the administrative head of the municipality and also oversees the recruitment of departmental directors that fall under the municipal manager. This therefore means that politicians also have by extension an influence in the areas a municipal manager is responsible for, more importantly in the allocation of tenders. Bongani, an ANC member who is a business consultant with an audit firm responsible for business - government relations confirmed this and explained the involvement of party officials in state contracts when he said,

‘...our leaders have companies getting contracts in the municipality, from regional straight to national leaders. I know that a provincial executive committee member has a company that focuses on city beautification and it has been getting work here in East London, Butterworth and in other towns. I even know of NEC members who have companies being contracted here and these along with other comrades are the guys who get big contracts worth millions and are the ones who finance the party, conferences and so forth...so if you get a tender worth ten million you must at least give something back to

the organisation, that's how it is' (Interview with Bongani 18 June 2014 at Quigney, East London).

Bongani went on to describe how recipients of tenders finance various party activities such as conferences, rallies and public lectures. He noted that a substantial amount of resources is required to organise a party event such as buses, food, stipends for volunteers, hiring venue and the like. He recalled how ANC Youth league leaders on one occasion 'made a few calls and raised one hundred thousand rands for a weekend event, that's how easily these comrades can mobilise resources' (Interview with Bongani 18 June 2014 at Quigney, East London). Bongani explained how they called ANC connected business people who are also ANC members and who felt obliged to give back to party activities to maintain favour and support. The giving back to the organisation that Bongani referred to contributes to developing patronage networks as the money is usually used to finance factional support. Vuyani, a local ANC activist in East London alleged that some members of the regional leadership who are involved in companies getting tenders used the proceeds to secure their positions. He lamented how difficult it now was to get elected even at the branch level when said, 'if you don't have money forget about it unless you have someone at the top' (Interview with Vuyani 3 August 2013 at East London).

Besides the motivation to accumulate, patronage networks are sometimes defined by personal relational ties such as the relationship between Pumlani Mkolo and Mluleki George mentioned above. In 2015, two senior Eastern Cape government officials were recorded speaking openly about what comes across as political interference in the tendering process from the Eastern Cape ANC secretary Oscar Mabuyane. In the audio clip, the two

officials can be heard clearly discussing how Mabuyane wanted one of the tenders awarded to his 'boys from Ngcobo' (*Daily Dispatch* 18 July 2015). Another tender worth R631 million to build about 66000 toilets in villages was awarded to a company owned by a businessman who has strong links to a group of politically connected individuals including ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe's wife, Nolwandle Mantashe (*Daily Dispatch* 28 July 2015). The *Daily Dispatch* reported that others linked to the company include President Jacob Zuma's son-in-law Lonwabo Sambudla; Mantashe's son Buyambo Mantashe; and Small Business Development Minister Lindiwe Zulu's son Boitumelo Itholeng (*Daily Dispatch* 28 July 2015).

The media and academics alike have focused on these more visible political entrepreneurs as the drivers of factionalism and patronage. However, how do the poor whose political support the leaders are dependent on inform or shape factional politics?

After interviewing Luvuyo, a local activist in Mdantsane and member of the ANC we headed to a shebeen where a couple of his colleagues were having a drink. As we entered I could hear the loud voices debating the prospects of Tokyo Sexwale ascending to power. It was August 2012 and the 53rd ANC National conference in Mangaung was fast approaching in December of that year. A brief silence transpired as Luvuyo made quick introductions and then the discussion continued as we proceeded to purchase beverages. In about two hours that I spent with them, all they talked about was ANC politics. The topics ranged from national politics, to local politics and allegations of who had secured certain contracts. I was struck by the similarity of the conversations to the ones I had the previous weeks in a township twenty kilometres away in Duncan Village. It seemed the social fabric

of Buffalo City was heavily politicised, a character I have reflected on in the methodology section in *chapter two*.

However, what is particularly interesting about this discussion in the shebeen was how they evaluated local ANC officials by their capacity to come back to their constituencies to deliver on jobs, development projects and social services. Luvuyo's friends demonstrated a capacity by some people to exercise some agency in choosing which politician to support. They demonstrated that people make calculated decisions on who to support that provides the best offer. Auyero, notes that in the more optimistic scenarios such as those by James Scott, this instrumental calculation comes with 'resistance' to the domination exerted by patrons and brokers alike. He argues that clients, like Luvuyo's friends who abound in the poor neighbourhoods, are seen as crafting a 'hidden transcript,' that is, a 'critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant' (Auyero 2001: 13). However, in *chapter six* I argue that once the poor conform to patron-client relationships to access state resources for survival, there is little room to resist or critique the power of patrons.

For many residents of Buffalo City, political office is also closely associated with the nexus of power, status and money. Previously unemployed individuals who successfully secure political office such as being a local councillor or various party leadership positions have had their material conditions radically shift for the better. With access to salaried jobs, tenders and the capability to distribute jobs, they have made visible improvements in their quality of life. But as Luvuyo's friends demonstrated, community members and ordinary members of the party already expect to access state resources such as jobs through party leaders thereby collapsing the party-state divide. Not only does the public offer

political support in exchange of jobs, for many in a context of limited opportunities, securing employment through political connections is usually the best and only option one has.

In other words, for the indigent majority in townships and informal settlements of Buffalo City, access to the state is guaranteed through the party and its leaders. For this group of people this is usually their best and most effective way to access the state for services and jobs. Siwe, an ANC activist in Duncan village illustrates this. He is thirty three years old and does not have further qualifications beyond a matric certificate. He has been unemployed for the greater part of his adult life besides working briefly as a shop attendant in a local supermarket and as a general worker for a construction company. In 2012 when I first met Siwe, he was an active member of an ANC branch in Duncan Village and was planning to contest as the branch secretary to which he was elected in 2014. In July 2012, we had spent the greater part of one afternoon together in Duncan village when we began to talk about seeking employment. Siwe made a general comment that,

‘...here in South Africa, it’s not about what you know or what you have, it’s all about who you know in terms of getting a job. There are guys who did not even qualify to be managers of the municipality but they are managers because they have connections, they knew people in higher places’. ...my target is to work in the municipality so I am going to contest in my branch elections to be in the executive so that I can be more visible to work in the municipality...I am close with the chairwoman Zukisa Faku ... she has my

CV and my hopes are on her (Interview with Siwe, 7 July 2012 at Duncan Village).

To achieve his goal to work for the municipality, Siwe said he had begun to be more politically active, hence the decision to contest in the branch elections. He explained that he was now close to the former mayor who is the current ANC regional chair, Zukisa Faku. He supported her during the elective conference in March 2012 and after that he became active in a group called 'friends of Zukisa Faku' which was created by her loyalists to support her during her trial for allegedly using a municipal credit card fraudulently. Although he said he supported her because she is a humble and understanding leader who cares for the poor, Siwe also said; 'she has my CV ... I have put my faith in her in terms of a job'. Siwe pointed out that he attended all of the friends of Zukisa Faku meetings and pickets to be visible and he was expecting a job for which he occasionally sent her text message reminders.

It appears that Siwe's political participation and activism is his only opportunity to achieve his aspiration of working for the local government. He has put 'all his faith' in a party leader because to him the party and its leaders are his vehicle to access a state job. Managing these expectations often entails succumbing to the demands since leaders' political survival depends on delivery on the expectation of their party supporters. For Siwe, being active politically or seeking political office is the only way he can possibly secure employment in the local state. Importantly, he has to identify with a prominent figure in local politics and by extension the faction associated with that politician to increase his chances of securing employment in the municipality. Without such political

networks, it would be difficult because of his limited educational background and the high unemployment that prevails. Considering that there are many more individuals like Siwe, the competition over scarce job opportunities is very high.

The experience of Luyanda who is currently an opposition party councillor, underlines this reality. Whilst he was unemployed and living in a shack, Luyanda was active in community development projects. He decided to use the popularity he had thereby gained to compete to become local councillor for his community. He acknowledged that his first option was to contest as an ANC candidate but he soon realised that there was stiff competition within the ANC and he would not make it on the party list. Luyanda then learnt that if he signed up one hundred party members for an opposition party in his community, he could start a branch and become the first in line to contest to be a councillor. He lost in the 2011 local government elections to an ANC rival in a ward contest but with the number of votes his party got, he still managed to be appointed as the proportional representation councillor for the same community (Interview with Luyanda, 5 June 2012 at Braelyn, East London). Luyanda demonstrates the same urge to join a faction but the realisation of the intense competition in the ANC forced him to join another party altogether. Such a politics exemplified by Siwe and Luyanda has inevitably fragmented party officials and some residents into factions. However, these divisions are certainly not fundamental, neither are they primarily principled or ideological although they may appear to be. They are in fact rooted in the struggle over scarce material resources.

As state resources play an increasing role in the internal party politics, the separation between party and state becomes increasingly blurred. Dominant party theorists attribute

the collapse of the party and state to the inherent nature of the dominant party without explaining fully how this transpires. However, the preceding discussions show that as factionalism driven by the desire to control state power continues to intensify, so too will the blurred line between the party and state. Evidence from Buffalo City shows that the consequences of such a process are already manifesting themselves at the local level as discussed in the following section.

Consequences of collapsing the party and state

Withering local government structures: ward committees

South Africa has legislative structures designed to facilitate the participation of communities such as integrated development planning and ward committees in the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 and Municipal Systems Act of 2000. Ward committees are structures created to assist the democratically elected representative of a ward (the councillor) to carry out his or her mandate and they consist of members of the community representing a number of interests within the community and the ward. Piper and Deacon note that they are chaired by the ward councillor and consist of up to ten people representing ‘a diversity of interests’ in the ward, with women ‘equitably represented’. The diversity of interests varies with each ward for example it could be representatives of youth, business, women and children and the disabled to mention a few (Piper and Deacon 2009). In respect of their role, Section 74(a) of the Municipal Structures Act states that ward committees ‘may make recommendations on any matter affecting its ward (i) to the

ward councillor; or (ii) through the ward councillor, to the metro or local council, the executive committee or the executive mayor’.

Legislation and policy is explicit that ward committees should be non-partisan, and dedicated to advancing the interests of the ward collectively. However dysfunctional ward committees are one of the challenges facing Buffalo City as they are increasingly becoming partisan. An official from COSATU noted that the developmental role of the ward committee structure was being undermined by politics. He reiterated that; ‘what you find is that a ward councillor is the chair of the ANC branch and the PR councillor is the secretary of the branch, therefore they have nobody to account to, that is the trend or the chair is a parliamentarian and the secretary is the councillor’ (Interview with Akhona, 30 May 2012 at Southernwood). This is in line with Laurence Piper and Roger Deacon’s²⁵ arguments in their 2009 research in Msunduzi Municipality that ward committees are simply extensions of the local party branch and reflect the pathologies associated with the dominant party syndrome. This is exacerbated by the ANC’s structural organisation that mimics the state. This means that the party sets up structures in the geographical boundaries set up by the local state hence because Buffalo city has fifty wards, the ANC sets up branches in each of these wards. Other political parties that organise nationally like the DA have also structured their party along the same lines.

A municipal official in the public participation department which is in charge of ward committees made similar observations when she explained; ‘it is common that the ward

²⁵ They conducted their study in the municipality of Msunduzi and found that, where they actually function, ward committees are dominated by local political leaders. Piper. L and Deacon. R, 2008, Party politics, elite accountability and public participation: Ward committee politics in the Msunduzi Municipality.

councillor is automatically a member of the Branch Executive Committee (BEC) of his/her party and is deployed there by his organisation and you will find out that a member of the ward committee is also in the BEC. When the councillor is now accounting to the organisation, he is also accounting to the member of that ward committee' (Interview with Zolani 25 August 2013 at Trust Centre). This brings out Piper and Deacon's point on elite accountability or in other words a situation when elected officials or public representative become accountable to each other instated of the electorate.

She went on to add that; 'A councillor accounts to the organisation that deploys him and in as much as the councillor gives feedback to the communities, they also account to their party i.e. the BEC. If it happens that a member of the ward committee is also a member of the BEC, then the member of the ward committee has two caps, the first one as a ward committee member who is a subordinate to the councillor as the chair of the ward committee structure and the second as a BEC member to which the councillor reports to, therefore that member is now the principal of that ward councillor (Interview with Zolani 25 August 2013 at Trust Centre). This is a challenge because the BEC can undermine councillors in doing their job and that ward committee member who is in the BEC often monitors or polices the ward councillor instead of assisting the councillor. In most cases this ward committee member also wants to be the councillor thus they undermine the councillor to the BEC. However the profound drawback is that ward committees dominated by a political party can ignore community interests and prioritise party interests whilst being driven by factional party politics.

Accountability and Social distance

A party-state poses serious challenges for the public service which is supposed to serve the public impartially because as Gumede (2008) notes, a party-state means that elected representatives are more accountable to the welfare of the party bosses rather than to the people and the defence of the constitution. At local government level in municipalities, this may have translated to lack of accountability of municipal officials to the concerns of citizens undermining service delivery. This was vividly illustrated in Duncan village by Lizo, an ANC activist in the area. He bitterly complained how their local leadership did not consult with the community and how this had led to inappropriate developments. One of them was the construction of tennis courts of which Lizo had this to say about it:

‘Duncan village is a boxing area, we have produced top boxers here but we don’t have an indoor boxing complex and these people build us a tennis court...who is going to play that tennis nonsense, now it’s a white elephant and kids are playing soccer there’ (Interview with Lizo, 8 August 2013 at Duncan Village).

This example illustrates how elected representatives can forgo their communities’ involvement in favour of output measured by an external entity. Where there is party-state collapse, councillors and officials are not accountable for their actions to the people but rather to the party.

Elite formation stemming from the party- state collapse is resulting in a detachment of councillors from their constituencies. The social distance between councillors and

communities increases dramatically after they get elected. This distance pertains to physical distance as they move out to better areas as well as material distance expressed in material possession like cars, cell phones and clothes which symbolise a different class.

A councillor in his mid-twenties serving his first term from 2011 illustrates this upward mobility and the resultant social distance. Cebo worked as a contract worker loading and offloading delivery trucks for R2500 a month. In 2010 he worked full time on an NGO initiated community development program receiving a stipend of R1000. Cebo had been living in a shack in Duncan Village from the time he migrated from the surrounding rural areas in search of employment in 2008. Once elected as councillor, Cebo moved to the nearby suburb of Cambridge to lease a flat. Weary of the social distance, Cebo pointed out that a senior official had advised himself and the other new councillors to dress modestly but he regarded this as insulting because he knew how to dress appropriately. In a discussion with a fellow youthful councillor after a council meeting, they remarked; 'it's obvious that when you are going to the community you must not wear fancy stuff but when we are coming to council meetings, we must wear our best because this is council, people dress well here' (Interview with Cebo, 23 June 2011 at City Hall). In Nelson Mandela Bay, Shaidi (2013) posits the growing social distance between the elected representatives and the communities that councillors are supposed to serve is one of the major drivers of unrest in the area.

Conclusion

In considering ANC intraparty politics, this chapter has observed that factional politics is not a new phenomenon in the party but rather it has always been a feature of the party from its formation on 1912. This is probably because from its formation, ‘the ANC sought to appeal to, and more infrequently to mobilise, a number of distinct and potentially conflictual constituencies’ (Bonner 2012: 2). During the colonial and apartheid era, factional struggles were largely driven by disagreements over ideology, policy and strategy. The chapter highlighted the controversy of opening up the ANC to all racial groups and how that policy was resisted by African nationalists who later broke away to form the PAC. The case of the gang of eight and the gang of four is also another case in point.

After the democratic transition, there were continuities and discontinuities in the forms of factionalism. Ideological and policy differences were more pronounced after the ANC in 1996 adopted neoliberal policies which were seen as a departure from the principles of the National Democratic Revolution particularly by the SACP and COSATU. However, ahead of the 2007 Polokwane elective conference, coalitions that had little ideological coherence marked the entrenchment of patronage oriented factional politics divided over whether

Zuma or Mbeki would lead the party. The chapter focuses more on the period after the Polokwane conference and shows that competition for resources and self-interest informed the factional purge of Mbeki supporters which saw ideological differences assuming instrumental value.

Drawing on the experiences from the Buffalo City Region, I argue that the shift towards patronage oriented factionalism should be understood in the context of two broader processes. These include the use of the state as a vehicle for transformation and neoliberal deepening. The centrality of the state to the ANC's plan to redistribute wealth meant that there was a collapse of the party and state. Through affirmative action and black economic empowerment, the state became an important site for upward mobility. As the party increasingly became the de facto space to access the state, patronage networks that control the state became intertwined with factionalism. Therefore the ANC's use of the state post-apartheid transformed it by creating a party-state. However, this fundamentally transformed the party itself by influencing its internal politics.

In smaller municipalities such as Buffalo City where the negative effects of neoliberalism have been more pronounced, the dependence on the state is higher. The intensity of competition, the importance of the stakes, and the consequences of failure may explain the instability of networks and alliances, and may also explain the high levels of violence in some instances (Von Holdt et al 2011). Factions now coalesce around individual personalities and preferences resulting in personalistic relationships or patron-client relationships. Bettcher (2005) argues that patronage-oriented factions based on material interests are less likely to respond to social concerns since they are driven by individual concerns and networks. The following chapter narrows the discussion on the operation of patronage to unpack these political relationships.

Chapter VI

PATRONAGE AND THE EVERYDAY EXERCISE OF POWER IN BUFFALO CITY

Introduction

For two weeks between 23 April and 4 May 2012, Buffalo City was conducting its yearly Integrated Development Plan (IDP)²⁶ and Budget road shows in venues such as community halls, schools and churches. The IDP road shows are a platform to encourage residents to play a role and participate in becoming authors of their own development through making direct input into the IDP (BCMM 2012). They are also part of the municipality's public participation process that enables ordinary citizens to learn more about the IDP and budget as well as the role of councillors in reviewing them. I attended several IDP meetings across the municipality which are normally conducted as a cluster of three or four wards. At one of these meetings in the township of Duncan Village, Gompo Hall was filled to capacity by residents from wards 1, 2, 7 and 8 (see figure 7 below).

The municipality through its public participation division had publicised the road shows through various media outlets. Earlier in the day I had also seen one of the councillors with

²⁶ An integrated Development Plan, adopted by the Council of a municipality is the key strategic planning tool for the municipality. Section 35(1) (a) of the Municipal Systems Act, 32 of 2000 as amended, describes an IDP as the principal strategic planning instrument which guides and informs all planning and development, and all decisions with regard to planning, management and development in the municipality.

ANC volunteers wearing party t-shirts driving around in his car with a load hauler informing people about the meeting and giving out fliers to encourage people to attend.

Figure 7: Gompo Hall in Duncan Village filled to capacity for an IDP meeting



Photo by Tatenda Mukwedeya 23 April 2012

The meeting was scheduled to start at 5pm but it would only start forty five minutes later as residents stood in long queues to put down their names on the attendance register. We also had been waiting for some of the municipal officials who were coming from a similar meeting in Mdantsane. I sat next to the DA proportional representation councillor who I had met the previous year. As we were waiting for the meeting to start, a group of ANC volunteers started giving out fliers inviting people to an ANC event. The DA councillor took one and castigated them for distributing political material at a municipal event that is

supposed to be nonpartisan. After the meeting commenced, one of the ANC ward councillors in his address to the meeting chastised municipal officials for the slow pace of implementing projects to the applause of the audience vindicating himself in the process. He ended by reiterating to residents to use this opportunity to raise their concerns and promised that he would continue to follow up with municipal workers and ‘put pressure’ to ensure implementation of projects in the IDP.

In conversations with residents after the meeting, I was curious to find out their assessment of the meeting and why they had come to participate in the IDP meeting. I approached Unathi who had been active throughout the meeting and had made several contributions. He explained;

...these meetings are good to know what is happening with service delivery and I come here to make sure that there is service delivery in my community because if you are quiet nothing will happen.... If you stay at home, you will miss some opportunities so you have to be active in *these things*. Even my councillor knows me that I always attend different meetings and events...they must see you, you can't just sit at home and expect things to happen (Interview with Unathi, 23 April 2012 at Gompo Hall)

The IDP meeting had brought together residents, party officials and bureaucrats but did all the stakeholders at the meeting have the same agenda or understanding of the IDP meeting as prescribed by the Municipal Systems Act (2000)? Upon reflecting on Unathi's responses

and on observations from the meeting, I realised that people were at the meeting for different reasons. For Unathi this public participation process presented an opportunity to be visible to his councillor. However, his presence together with other residents can also be interpreted as an attempt to hold leaders accountable through the IDP process. For the ANC volunteers who were distributing fliers, it was an opportunity to serve the party in front of their leaders. For the ANC councillor, it was a platform to grandstand by calling the municipality into line and to show that he had some power over the local state in front of voters and his supporters.

The IDP meetings are also attended by members of the mayoral committee and other political officials, thus they are an opportunity for politicians to demonstrate that they have a large following. This explains the efforts by the councillor in the afternoon to encourage residents to attend to show his seniors that he can draw large numbers. In conversations with poor residents of Duncan Village, there was a realisation that attending such events in large numbers increased their capability to make demands on the local government. Writing their names on the attendance registers could be understood as a demonstration of their power in large numbers which they can use to make and justify claims on state resources.

Therefore upon looking closely at an IDP meeting, what can be found in everyday practice is that the meeting becomes a theatre of exercising the various forms of power that different groups of people have to negotiate access to patronage networks which is the focus of this chapter. It accounts for power relations that precede the exchange of state

resources for political support demonstrating how power is relational in patron–client relations and is not the privilege of anybody or any institution although it is unequal.

In the previous chapter I have demonstrated how factionalism in the ANC has become intertwined with patronage networks. In this chapter I show how patronage works in everyday practice by exploring the everyday determinants of inclusion or exclusion to patronage networks. The main thrust of this chapter is to illustrate that patronage is underpinned by power relations instead of just being an exchange of political support for various goods. To unpack these power relations underpinning patronage, the chapter begins by discussing the various ways in which residents of Buffalo City exercise their power. This is then followed by a focus on enactments of power by local politicians. In practice, these power relations are not mutually exclusive as residents enact their power in relation to politicians who ensure access to state resources but the discussion is separated here for analytical purposes. The last part of the chapter ties the discussion together with a reflection on the implications for democratic practices within the ANC.

Residents' enactments of power in Buffalo City

Besides the IDP meeting at Gompo Hall in Duncan Village, I also attended other IDP meetings across Buffalo City. In more affluent areas such as Beacon Bay, the residents had a noticeably different disposition in the meetings. Fewer residents attended although this could be related to the fact that their neighbourhoods are less densely populated. Their participation was more timid and there was no indication that it was a performance to a

third party in the same way that Unathi had demonstrated. These differences do not mean that affluent residents do not exercise any forms of power as political actors. However, I realised that they had access to different forms of power and they enacted it in a different way to poorer residents such as those in Duncan Village. This section unpacks the various forms of power exercised by both poor and wealthier residents. It illuminates this class distinction in terms of the exercise of power and traces the various spaces in which resources are exchanged. It argues that patronage exchanges of political support for state resources are predetermined by a longer relationship established through an exercise of power. Therefore the discussion on patronage becomes a process of tracing the forms of power people have and how they relate to each other in order to secure their place in a patronage networks.

IDP meetings are also not the only sites or theatres in which political actors enact their power. Unathi who I met at an IDP meeting in Duncan Village revealed that one had ‘to be active in these things’. In the following months, I discovered that Unathi was surely active in ‘these things’ as I met him at different municipal gatherings and at political rallies. For instance I saw him at the ANC freedom day celebration on 27 April 2012 and at the Council Open Day on 25 May 2012. For poor residents like Unathi, their greatest source of power lies in their numbers. Poor residents represent a large pool of votes for any politician or political organisation seeking political office. Politicians legitimise their existence by drawing on the support of the masses thus their power is dependent on the relations they have with the masses. The relational nature of power is demonstrated when poor residents use their numbers in a visible display of power by attending various meetings, protesting and offering support in exchange for access to rewards not readily available. In other

words, residents enact their power by physically attending events, participating and volunteering to mention a few.

As illustrated by Unathi's experiences, attending an IDP meeting or any other council event and a political rally is a crucial part of his strategies to access state resources. However, his attendance can be interpreted in two ways. On one level, Unathi can be viewed as an active participant in a local government participatory mechanism using this platform to hold leaders accountable through surveilling/gazing over councillors and local state bureaucrats. Michel Foucault in his theory on the development of disciplinary power describes surveillance as one of the techniques of power whereby a subject is constantly under the gaze of surveillance by an individual who he/she cannot see. Through knowing that one is under surveillance, even without seeing who is watching, this process disciplines the subject to act according to certain norms (Foucault 1975). Therefore residents put politicians under constant surveillance at meetings and in everyday interactions.

On another hand, Unathi's participation could have been part of his strategies to secure his place or just maintain it in a patronage network. By stating that, 'even my councillor knows that I always attend different meetings and events', Unathi was revealing that his participation is a statement to the councillor that he was doing his part to offer support. Thus when 'some opportunities' come by, the reward he expects is that he does not miss out on them. Unathi's participation at the IDP meeting was motivated by the desire to be seen as active by his councillor and he did not see himself as only making an input into the IDP as envisaged by the Municipality. His audience is not just the formal spaces of public

participation but an informal network of relations that are parallel to them. These informal relationships help to inform residents like Unathi with their decisions on who to support in local party contestations.

Upon closer analysis and after several conversations with different people, I learned that for many poor residents like Unathi, it was imperative to be visible to the political leaders to secure their favour and ensure their access to various state resources through political clientelism. Writing down names on the attendance register can be interpreted as another way of being visible. One resident commenting on the distribution of food parcels pointed out that the selection of recipients is an opaque process. While acknowledging that one can never know exactly how people are selected, she claimed that attending various events and meetings went a long way to ensure that one receives food parcels. The resident of Scenary Park which is another working class township also claimed that councillors use the attendance registers when selecting members from their community to work temporarily on development projects in the ward (Interview with a resident of Scenary Park, 24 April 2012). Contractors are mandated to employ general workers from the ward they are working in and they usually approach councillors to provide names of unemployed residents in their wards. Being visible at various events and writing names in the attendance registers is therefore an exercise of power.

In addition to attendance at various events to show their support, some poor residents also engage in a performance during the event to enhance their visibility. The performance involves making positive contributions during the meetings and volunteering for extra duties. Kanelo, an ANC activist in Mdantsane demonstrates this tendency. Within a month

of commencing fieldwork in May 2011, I noticed that Kanelo was a regular participant at most events because each time he would make a contribution that praised the ANC and in some instances particular local political actors. On almost all occasions, he introduced himself as a foot soldier of the ANC. Kanelo attended municipal and ANC events and was also a regular at the Daily Dispatch Dialogues conducted in conjunction with the University of Fort Hare in which invited guests discussed various issues around South African politics.

I interviewed Kanelo in June 2012 and he was still making regular contributions in various platforms. In the interview, he confirmed a desire to be visible to local ANC leaders similar to Unathi as he declared that, 'I am a foot soldier of the ANC and I have to be seen spreading the gospel of the ANC everywhere' (Interview with Kanelo, 7 June 2012 at Mdantsane). This again could be seen as an active participant in various political settings but this could also be part of his strategies to secure his place in the patronage networks. His attendance at various platforms could simply just have been his way of saying thank for all the things the party or councillor or other political brokers did for him. Unathi and Kanelo demonstrate that for poor residents of Buffalo City, a visible display of support is key to patronage thus attendance at various meetings and praise worshipping are important acts to guarantee visibility and the likelihood of patronage. However, it must be noted that their participation and performance is a reaffirmation of an already existing relationship. Similarly, Auyero (2001: 13) observes that;

'the rally dramatizes the already existing informal networks and shared cultural representations. These networks and these representations are key

elements in the everyday lives of many shantytown dwellers and many among the urban poor’.

While it’s true that material goods are exchanged for support at some of these events such as rallies, it must be noted that these exchanges are caused by the interplay of power relations in everyday life. This could be through establishing personal relationships with patrons, protesting, litigation and the like.

Besides being visible at municipal meetings or ANC events, other residents make targeted visible displays of support to a particular local power broker. In other words they declare and offer their support directly to an individual. I came across such an individual in June 2012 in Mdantsane while interviewing Bantu an SACP and ANC activist in the area. As we were walking out of the popular shopping complex of Mdantsane City, we came across Nomsa and stopped briefly to greet her. The front of her t-shirt was emblazoned ‘WE ARE FRIENDS OF ZUKISA FAKU’. As she walked away, the back of her t-shirt read was emblazoned by the phrase, ‘HANDS OFF OUR LEADER’.

Bantu then he revealed that she was a vocal supporter of Zukisa Faku who was the former Buffalo City Mayor and ANC regional chairperson at the time (Interview with Bantu 3 June 2012 at Mdantsane City). When we met her, Faku had just made her second appearance in the East London Magistrate's Court for nine counts of fraud relating to her alleged use of a municipal credit card when she was the mayor during a trip to Turkey in 2009. She allegedly also used the municipal credit card at boutique clothing stores and fast food outlets. Her supporters formed a support group called ‘friends of Zukisa Faku’ to

support her through the court case which they believed was a political conspiracy by an opposing faction. They organised pickets outside the court building every time she made court appearances.

Fig 8: Picket by Friends of Zukisa Faku during court appearance



Source: Friends of Zukisa Faku facebook page

Bantu alleged that Nomsa was active in this group and that the job she got a few months earlier as a cleaner in the municipal offices was facilitated by Faku using her influence as the ANC regional chairperson. He attributed her activism in the ‘friends of Zukisa Faku’ group to be the reason she was rewarded with the job. The friends of Zukisa Faku support group are also active on social media where it operates a Facebook page that it uses to communicate their support (Interview with Bantu 3 June 2012 at Mdantsane City). This presents another platform in addition to pickets to publicly display support for Faku. The figure below from the Facebook page captures how the group conceives itself as defenders

of Faku and shows an individual named Zola Capu Capu declaring their support with the chant, Viva Faku viva.

Fig 9: Friends of Zukisa Faku Facebook page

Fozf Baka Zukisa Faku
7 September 2012 ·

Hey FOZF'sters. We feel we must explain ourselves again about who we are. We r Friends of Zukisa Faku(FOZF) and came into friends in defence of our friend who is also a regional ANC Chairwoman of Buffalo City Metro Municipality, in cooked fraud charges by faceless individual politicians. We r not like other friends of ... who r hell-bent on fighting the ANC. We will not fight the ANC or the courts of the land. In actual fact we have received good reception from a number of individual ANC leaders. We want to preserve principled leadership even though people choose money to compromise principled leadership. Our country needs more selfless leaders like tata Mandela to overcome the social, economic & academic challenges the society faces.

Share

4 people like this.

Comments



Zola Capu Capu Viva Faku viva

Source: https://www.facebook.com/FOZF25?ref=br_rs

The case of Thembani and her group of informal shack dwellers also illuminates on how poor communities manage their access to the state. As chairwoman for a committee that is representing residents of an informal settlement in Duncan Village in their efforts to be allocated RDP houses, Thembani found that ANC membership was crucial for the whole group to be taken seriously. In an interview on the 13 October 2014, Thembani claimed that a mayoral committee member they approached had asked them if they were all members of the ANC. Thembani lamented how blunt the official was that they would not

get assistance if they were not ANC members. Thembani then mobilised her community and even paid up the membership herself for some who could not afford it. With signed up members, the councillor recognised them as a significant political base who could be influential branch votes and begun showing interest in the plight of Thembani and her community. In other meetings they arranged, they also begun getting favourable responses. They also embarked on several service delivery protests and in one of the protests in 2013, as part of their demands they wanted the ward councillor to be removed. The councillor was allegedly manipulating the housing list and allocating RDP houses to his supporters (Interview with Thembani, 13 October 2014 at Duncan Village). The protest and their demand to have the councillor recalled revealed that local politicians are subject the technologies of power too as residents constantly police their performance disciplining them in the process.

Residents therefore can exercise power by evaluating the performance of their local officials. If established mechanisms to voice concerns with leaders fail, which they often do, protests have become a common practice to have community demands met by the municipality. Protests are physical manifestation of people's power and they have often become violent as a result of frustrations when established mechanisms to voice concerns with leaders fail. It has been argued that service delivery protests have become 'a means of forcing the powerful to acknowledge the dignity and legitimacy of the powerless and hear their collective demands' (Von Holdt et al 2011: 27, 44). The increasing incidence of violence in protests has drawn the analogy of a 'smoke that calls' to describe how violence

is used as a language, a message, a way of calling out to higher authorities.²⁷ Similarly, Susan Booyesen observes that South Africans have crafted protest to supplement the vote, not to substitute for voting. Protest has been frequently used to pressurise the elected ANC government to do more, to deliver on election promises and to replace local leaders (Booyesen 2007). Protests therefore represent the coercive capacity of people.

Unathi and others like him who actively participate in political spaces as a means to access various state resources are demonstrating that there is a change in the understanding of what the citizen's relation to the state is as they are becoming much more instrumental. Their participation in these spaces is not about citizenship but about local struggles for power and access to resources. Chatterjee's notion of 'political society' that he juxtaposes with 'civil society' is useful to understand these different ways people relate with the state, particularly the poor residents of Buffalo City. 'Political society' is constituted by the majority of residents, whose lives can at least partly be characterized by informality (in housing, employment). They engage the state not with a full citizen's status but on more flexible, blurred and precarious terms (Chatterjee 2004, Bénit-Gbaffou 2012). The informality of their position leads them into constantly engaging in informal arrangements with party politics, local politicians, councillors and administrators. This is a permanent feature of low income resident's relationship with the state (Bénit-Gbaffou 2012:179).

²⁷The smoke that calls describes how collective violence (in service delivery protests) is understood as a language, a message, a way of calling out to higher authorities about the state of things in their town but its violence makes it a warning at the same time. For example, a respondent in Voortrekker recalled: 'Then people said, 'The premier undermines us. He'll see by the smoke we're calling him'. The violence had generated a response from distant and uncaring officials and, in this sense, the burning of property and the 'thick, black smoke which billowed over the township' was 'the smoke that calls'. (Von Holdt et al 2011), 27, 44

On the other hand, affluent residents in the suburbs of Buffalo City have access to different forms of power and exercise it in a different way to poorer residents discussed above. They compensate for their low strength in numbers by using their access to material resources and know-how of the law to organise and enact their power. Poor residents also know the law and have opted for litigation in some instances but they usually rely on more expedient mechanisms. Wealthy residents form and participate in civil society organisations such as rate payers' associations that lobby local state officials and local politicians to provide social services. It's interesting to note that wealthy residents organise collectively around issues of public interest whilst for the poor there is a tendency to advance individual interest. However, as shown with the organising of service delivery protests, the poor sometimes organise as a collective to get concessions from local leaders and the local state.

The affluent suburbs of Vincent, Beacon Bay and Gonubie are some of the areas which have active resident organisations. The difference also partly stems from the class concerns that each group has. Poor residents in Buffalo City are confronted with a high unemployment rate that is significantly higher for young people thus issues around stable livelihoods are of immediate concern for them. Distinctively, the main concerns for wealthy residents of Buffalo City pertain to maintaining their living standards by ensuring the municipality provides public services such as street lighting, refuse collection, repairing potholes, maintenance of public parks to mention a few. The table below illustrates how different the concerns of poor residents are to the concerns of affluent residents as highlighted in the 2012/13 Integrated Development Plan review. It is drawn from the issues raised in IDP meetings by residents in the affluent ward of Beacon Bay and the relatively poor working class ward of Scenary Park:

Table 3: Issues raised by residents of Beacon Bay and Scenery Park in the 2012/2013 IDP

Ward 4: Beacon Bay (upper class area)	Ward 5: Scenery Park (working class area)
<p>Issues raised :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Upgrading of Beacon Bay Library -Upgrading of the Bonza bay Lifesavers shack and ablution facilities -Resurfacing of roads -CCTV Monitoring -High traffic congestion 	<p>Issues raised:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Building of sidewalks on main roads -Four footbridges are requested -Installation of electricity in informal settlements -Tarring gravel roads -Bush clearing throughout the ward and <i>local community members should be hired to do the work (my emphasis)</i>

In addition to participating in IDP meetings, the strategies used by residents in Beacon Bay to engage the state about their concerns and demands include litigation, rate boycotts, writing letters and petitioning the municipality.

When a municipal strike resulted in the municipality not removing refuse for three consecutive weeks, the ratepayer association deployed the Waste Act which requires local authorities to remove waste once every week. The association then wrote a letter to the Department of Environment Affairs which it copied to Buffalo City stating that ‘as custodians of the Waste Act they were indicating their displeasure’ and suggested a couple of remedial actions (BCRF 2014). These strategies to engage the state are often ignored by

state officials who don't respond rendering them unsuccessful. As the chairman Buffalo City Ratepayers Forum stated, 'As you all know, the municipality do not answer letters, emails, faxes, telephone calls, and therefore it is very difficult to obtain access to information' (BCRF 2014). To deal with the nonresponsive municipality, the forum has been drawing on the Public Access to Information Act (PAIA) to force the local state to respond to their requests for information. The residents have since made many applications for information including information on an irregular tender worth about six million rand for the transport of people to Nelson Mandela Memorial events which implicated several senior ANC officials including the executive mayor, deputy mayor, council speaker, a councillor and the ANC regional secretary (*Daily Dispatch* 23 June 2014) (BCRF 2014). Through their use of the law, residents can effectively examine the municipality on whether it is functioning properly. This is another way for residents to discipline institutions and politicians. For Foucault (1975: 184), examination is another technique of power that involves observing to see to what extent the individual conforms to norms thus it incorporates surveillance. In addition it involves a standard against which to judge individuals thus the use of various legislation by residents functioned to examine.

In 2014, Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality introduced a basic electricity charge of R31.20 for every person who had an electricity meter inside their house (not a pre-paid). Beacon Bay ratepayers through the Buffalo City Ratepayers' Forum (BCRF)²⁸ which is an amalgamation of several ratepayers' associations believed that the council did not have the authority to approve this charge as it lacked tariff by laws and policy. They then wrote a

²⁸ It incorporates the Ratepayers' Associations of Beacon Bay, Berlin, Bhisho, Cambridge, Gonubie, Gompo, Haven Hills, Kaysers Beach, Kidds Beach, Nahoon Area, Quigney, Vincent and Seavale. A copy of the letter can be found at: <http://bcrf.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/BCRF-Letter-Allegation.pdf>

letter to the Municipality registering their displeasure and also ran a petition with 1200 signatures which they handed to the Mayor on 19 March 2014 (BCRF 2014). They also submitted the same petition to National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA). On the issue of water leakages, the Buffalo City Ratepayers' Forum has written a letter to the Water engineer requesting information on water losses.

The secretary for a residents' association in the suburb of Vincent also revealed that rate boycotts were another bargaining tool with the municipality. This involves withholding payments of municipal rates although in practice it has been threats to withhold payment of rates that has been used. As of October 2015 nine ratepayers from Beacon Bay had been engaged in a boycott of Buffalo City's rate system, and instead pay their rates into a private bank account. The residents claim that they decided on the rates boycott after they established that Buffalo City 'did not have binding, and properly written, by-laws to force ratepayers to pay their dues' (*Daily Dispatch* 9 October 2015). According to the *Daily Dispatch*, Johan Koekemoer and his neighbours in Beacon Bay said they were also engaging in a silent protest to show BCM the importance of crafting and adopting a rates by-law which treated all citizens equally (*Daily Dispatch* 9 October 2015).

The strategies used by the wealthier residents of Buffalo City might be different but what is similar with all residents is that they exercise various forms of power to get various concessions from local politicians and from the municipality. All residents have expectations that they need to be met therefore they are constantly monitoring local officials and evaluating them whether they are delivery on these expectations. The relationships reveal that power is not monopolised by big institutions such as the

municipality or by political parties or their officials. Rather, people use the different forms of power that they have access to negotiate and get concessions from institutions or patrons or brokers.

The ANC's exercise of power in Buffalo City

At a broader level, the ANC as a dominant party exercises its electoral power by forming the government at a national, provincial and local level and also by directing governmental policy. In Buffalo City, the ANC's dominance is more pronounced. The party has managed to secure at least seventy percent of the votes since the onset of democratic local government elections in 2000. Consequently, the ANC has been able to appoint the executive mayor and the municipal manager. The party has therefore been able to translate this influence into steering the direction and operation of the municipality. Within the party, opposing factions have also sought to steer the municipality. This section first discusses how the party in general exercises its power and then shift to a discussion of how individuals and factions within the party enact their power as well.

One of the foremost mechanisms of the ANC's enactment of power over the state is through appointing senior state officials by the use of its deployment policy. The ANC's deployment policy follows a traditional Marxist-Leninist tradition within the ANC that sees the state as an institution for capture (Habib 2013). This is spelled out by various party documents and statements. For example in his January eight statement in 2011²⁹, President

²⁹ The ANC was founded on 8 January 1912 and for many years the occasion of this anniversary was marked with the release by the National Executive Committee of a major statement for the forthcoming year. During

Zuma said; ‘We reiterate what we said in our 2007 Strategy and Tactics document that we place a high premium on the involvement of our cadres in all centres of power’.³⁰ Deployment was also informed by the need to transform the public service after 1994. As pointed out in *chapter four*, after the democratic transition, the ANC inherited a public service it viewed with suspicion as many of its bureaucrats were aligned to the apartheid regime. Hence there was a need to reconstitute the state with individuals who held the same ethos and ideals of the ruling party (Naidoo, 2013: 266, Southall 2013). Deployment of party cadres was therefore a necessary policy to assert political control of the public service. It was at the ANC’s 50th Mafikeng conference in 1997 that the party adopted a policy of deployment of its members to state offices marking a watershed in the politicisation of the bureaucracy (Naidoo 2013).

However as Habib (2013) notes, political deployment takes place in almost all democracies whereby winning elections enables a party to appoint their preferred candidates to central state positions. Similarly, Naidoo (2013) alludes that there are legitimate forms of political control over the public sector. However, it is the character of South African political control, what he terms ‘politicisation’ that has raised concerns of clientelism and corruption following the explicit espousal of party strategies to politicise the bureaucracy (Naidoo, 2013: 262-263). Habib (2013: 66) also warns that if deployment is to be consistent with democracy, it should be confined to political appointments such as ministers and the most senior levels of the public service such as the director and deputy

the height of the apartheid era such statements mapped out the main activities for the year ahead and usually named the year with these tasks in mind. This tradition has been maintained since the first democratic elections in 1994 (Source; <http://www.anc.org.za/list.php?t=January%208th%20Statements>).

³⁰ The Institute for Accountability in Southern Africa,
http://www.ifaisa.org/Cadre_deployment_in_2011.html

director generals (Naidoo 2013, Habib 2013). But as Naidoo notes, there is more politicisation in local government (Naidoo 2013: 267). This raises the question of how this politicisation happens at the local level.

Like other spheres of government, Buffalo City's most senior positions are populated by cadres of the ANC. This is particularly the case for the position of Municipal Manager who is the head of the administration. The Municipal Systems Act (2000) dictates that the selection panel for the appointment of a municipal manager must constitute at least three members including the mayor, a councillor and an independent expert. For the managers directly accountable to the municipal manager, the Act states that the municipal manager, a member of the mayoral committee and an independent expert must comprise the selection panel. The party therefore exercises political control in the appointments of municipal managers through the mayor and of departmental directors through the municipal manager who is a deployee of the party. The Municipal Systems Amendment Act which was signed into law by the President on 5 July 2011 however bars municipal managers and managers directly accountable to municipal managers from holding political office in political parties.³¹

In Buffalo City, cadre deployment has morphed into factional deployment as dominant factions within the party make appointments from within their faction. Factional deployment played out in the appointment of Andile Fani as the municipal manager in February 2012. Prior to his appointment, the City had four acting municipal managers in

³¹ The Act defines 'political office', in relation to a political party or its structures, as the position of chairperson, deputy chairperson, secretary, deputy secretary or treasurer of the party nationally or in any province, region or other area in which the party operates. Whether the person holds such a position permanently, temporarily or in an acting capacity is irrelevant. *Local Government Bulletin vol 13(4)*.

the three years between 2008 and 2011 as a result of opposing factions who could not agree on a suitable candidate. After going through the normal procedures of appointing a city manager, which is advertising, selection, interviewing and assessment, several councillors noted that Fani was less qualified than the three other shortlisted candidates. The top four were selected from a pool of thirty nine candidates including four candidates with doctorates and ten with master's degrees in either public administration or business administration (*Daily Dispatch* 28 February 2012). In addition, Sku, an ANC member who claimed to be a consultant with one of the large South African audit firms indicated that Fani had scored the worst in a psychometric test conducted by the firm.

Despite being less qualified and with timid support from a significant proportion of the councillors, Fani was appointed under direction of the party bosses. In a special council meeting to make the appointment, the interim ANC regional chairman, Mzolisi Dimaza personally oversaw that the ANC caucus voted for Fani's appointment and he even sat in the council public viewing gallery to monitor the proceedings. One councillor expressed their powerlessness to the party when she said;

‘it was an instruction, what can you do about that...we can't allow ourselves to say we were not bulldozed as if we had wisdom, they did what they wanted to do’ (Interview with Sindi 12 May 2012 at Vincent Mall).

The *Daily Dispatch* (28 February 2012) reported that Dimaza told members a few hours before the formal vote at the council meeting to vote in favour of Fani's appointment, as ordered by ‘the leadership’ and when councillors demanded to discuss the matter, Dimaza

is believed to have told them that the matter was not open to debate (*Daily Dispatch* 28 February 2012). Fani is a former provincial health department chief of staff with close ties to Pumulo Masualle the current ANC provincial chairman and Eastern Cape Premier. Fani had worked in the premier's office and their ties run into the SACP in which Masualle is the national treasurer and Fani a member. Dimaza is a former provincial secretary of the teachers' union SADTU, hence the three were identified as members of the so called 'communist' faction within the ANC. The SACP had been a strong supporter of Fani's appointment who ran on an anti-corruption ticket. The ANC regional elective had been scheduled for March 2012 and the 'communists' led by Dimaza were uncertain if they could retain control of the region. Therefore the rush to have Fani appointed was a strategy to make sure they had someone influential in the municipality in case they lost power in the elective conference which they did lose to Zukisa Faku.

The ANC also enacts its power through its influence over the distribution of state contracts and tenders to party cadres. This is closely related to cadre deployment as it is public officials deployed into government positions that usually ensure the distribution of state contracts along party lines. Several opposition councillors confirmed the findings and noted that a significant proportion of contracts were being awarded to companies owned or linked to ANC officials from local, provincial and even national leadership who had allegedly created some sort of an oligarchic system to control the distribution of tenders. A DA councillor explained how this works,

...I am seeing a more legal way rapping the state. It's almost like a collusion of people who come together and tender and it's like price fixing. For

example pens which you can pay for 1 Rand in Waltons or CNA, in Buffalo City you could be paying 30 Rand for a bic pen because it went through a competitive bidding process and that was found to be the best price. All the bidders will have almost the same high amounts, so they have colluded. It's not provable but there is no way that 5 companies can all come back with the same price for an item we all know we can get for 1 Rand in the shop. The next time a tender comes, they do the same thing to make sure the next person gets it but it's not provable. I know for a fact that in Buffalo City we are paying 7 Rand for a black refuse bag which are 19 rand for 20 in Spar or Pick n Pay so they cost just under a Rand each... but in Buffalo City were we buy about 7 or 8 million black bags every 6 months, we are paying 7 Rand for a single black bag. Again it's not illegal because we have followed the law by going through a competitive bidding process but everyone comes with a price of about 7 Rand for a single refuse bag. It's a way of getting around the law because it's legal, they followed the procedures. (Interview with DA councillor 28 July 2011 at DA offices in Vincent)

The party's influence over state contracts and tenders is also revealed in 2014 when the acting Buffalo City director of housing Thabo Matiwane was under threat of being fired after he chaired a bid adjudication committee that awarded a one billion rand housing tender to Western Cape-based ASLA Construction. It is alleged that 'the regional leadership, especially the secretary (Pumlani Mkolo), were not pleased that this tender was awarded to this company owned by unknown white people which will not even donate

anything to the ANC towards the 2016 local government elections campaign' (*Daily Dispatch* 6 December 2014).

The ANC's 'cadre deployment' policy and the distribution of tenders to ANC loyalists ensure that party affiliation is the single most important criterion for access to state-mediated economic opportunities. This is similar to Zanu PF's 'indigenisation and empowerment policy' which has ensured that supporting the party is most important criterion to access economic opportunities in the country (Mawowa 2013 in Raftopoulos 2013). However, the resultant party-state patronage system in many instances does not result in actual exchanges of political support for state resources. Rather its effectiveness lies in the fact that the ANC has the power over the state. Therefore ordinary members of the party offer their support without getting anything in exchange. However, in Buffalo City like in other local governments, the close proximity of officials facilitates more personalised exchanges of political support for state-mediated economic opportunities.

Personalising the party-state patronage system

As individual party leaders or as part of factional groups, party officials perform various acts that are directly related to themselves and their position within the party. In everyday practice, local politicians legitimise their existence by demonstrating that they have support of the base. This entails attracting people to meetings, hearings, rallies and other events. To attract people, party officials offer jobs, food parcels, tenders and other material goods. In other words they must enact their power *visa vis* the state contributing to party-state collapse.

Cadre deployment as a policy of the ANC discussed above formally operates through deployment committees at the national, provincial and local levels. However, in Buffalo City party leaders often exert their influence in appointments even at lower levels of the municipality which is more wide spread but is largely unnoticed. These jobs are usually offered as rewards in exchange for political support and they range from cleaners, security guards, junior administrators and even in local law enforcement with the metro police. Whilst this does not follow the party's policy of deployment, it is still a form of political control which contributes to the blurring of the party and state divide. Nokwanda, a former councillor and mayoral committee member in the 2007 – 2011 confirmed that there were several people she had helped to secure employment in the municipality. As she walked me out of her house in Mdantsane, a Buffalo City traffic officer arrived and was told to wait in the house. Nokwanda then remarked proudly; 'you see that girl, I got her into the traffic department so even now when I am not in the municipality, I know everything that is going on there through her' (Interview with Nokwanda 6 June 2011 at Mdantsane).

A director in Buffalo City municipality acknowledged that politicians exerted influence in the appointment of junior staff as a result of the municipalities' staff provisioning policy which allows politicians to sit on interview panels of general managers, program managers and some other positions. He claimed that this was a policy flaw that stemmed from the flexibility allowed by Section 53 of the Municipal Systems Act (2000) which directs that each municipality must define the specific role and area of responsibility of each political structure and political office bearer of the municipality and of the municipal manager and within that define how the councillors and managers and other staff members should

interact. Because of this policy, the director said, ‘if you go for an interview you might see a politician chairing or sitting in there... that is a policy flaw’. An ANC branch executive committee member affirmed his willingness to make partisan appointments:

... if I am in a panel myself and you are a candidate and if I know that you are from IFP for example and I have two other comrades who are poorly qualified than you, but because I will have an influence on these two who are from my party, I am not going to employ you, I will definitely take my comrade. The truth is if you are from a particular party, you will always be loyal to that party, there is nothing like a non-political person. What is the point of employing someone from DA who is going to listen to someone in Cape Town rather than listen to us here? That bill is trying to address that but I don’t know how because a person is chosen by panellists and I would assume that the panellists are chosen by the ruling party, be it at municipality or provincial level. A dominant party will always be dominant in the panel, that’s it (Interview with an ANC BEC member in Ilitha Township 20 August 2013).

To demonstrate their power, councillors and other party officials need people to attend in their numbers at various events to show their popularity and the support they have. Drawing on political rallies by the Peronist party in Argentina, Auyero (2000: 11) observes that ‘the rally is probably one of the most important forms of political objectification, the way of making numbers visible and showing the mayor how many people you have’. For local politicians and ANC councillors in Buffalo City, the IDP meetings, political rallies,

lectures in honour of former struggle heroes and other events represent an opportunity to demonstrate their influence and popularity to the community and to the senior ANC official present by having large number of residents present. That is probably why the councillor in Duncan Village mobilised people to attend ahead of the IDP meeting in Gompo Hall as discussed earlier.

In addition, party officials also undertake a performance to demonstrate their power. For instance, at the IDP meeting at Gompo Hall in Duncan Village, the ANC councillor who reprimanded municipal officials probably wanted to show residents that he had some influence over them. This was coupled by a widespread perception amongst councillors that they were employers of municipal officials. Anele, an ANC councillor while addressing residents at a meeting in her ward revealed that, ‘as councillors we sit in the interview panel and I have sat in one so I am an employer...I can fire these officials’. She went on to explain that as a representative of residents, they too were employers. Anele also used the meeting to distribute food parcels to demonstrate her capabilities to distribute resources (Interview with Anele, 2 May 2012 at Kidds Beach). Ward 16 Councillor Mahodi uses social media to display publicly his power to distribute various resources. He posted the photo below on his facebook page distributing blankets.

Fig 9: Councillor Mahodi handing over blankets to community members



The link between politics and material wellbeing has meant that the stakes of political contestations are high considering that it is ultimately the expanded acquisition of money which guarantees success, honour, and most importantly a large clientele (Foltz 1977: 243-45). In addition as competition over state mediated economic opportunities has intensified in Buffalo City some local officials to ensure success have resorted to undemocratic tendencies to regenerate their power at any cost as outlined in the following section.

Undemocratic practices in Buffalo City

Factionalism in Buffalo City is encouraging the proliferation of local political power brokers who influence and manage the election and deployment of individuals from their faction. The local power brokers in Buffalo City are mainly elected leaders in the regional executive committee (REC), the Branch Executive Committee (BEC) and also members of the Provincial Executive Committee (PEC). The secretaries in all these structures particularly hold a strategic position because they are in charge of administering branches

and can manipulate membership. However, in Buffalo City, it is the REC and PEC that dominate the political landscape in line with the party constitution. Susan Booysen makes a similar observation when she notes that ‘the ANC is characterised by local power enclaves where ANC power mongers or people acting in the name of the ANC to build control over who gets to be councillors and local bureaucrats’ (Booyesen 2011: 4). This is in line with Southall’s observation that the ANC becomes a ‘political machine’ central to the allocation of political and economic goods and consolidation of power and well-being of the new elite (Southall 2012: 1, 2013: 277).

Participation in local politics is therefore being smothered by the political elite or representatives as internal democratic processes are controlled by these brokers stifling ordinary member participation in local party politics. These brokers control local politics through manipulating party lists, buying voters and using ghost members (fake members). The ANC itself has conceded that ‘these tendencies have become so persistent and widespread that they in fact represent a shadow culture or parallel culture, which co-exists alongside the movement’s own organisational culture’ (ANC 2012: 31-32). The 2012 Organisational Renewal document also observes that the influence and use of money as part of lobbying for organisational positions to organise lobby group meetings, travel, communications (starter-packs) and outright bribing and paying of individuals in regions and branches to forward particular factional positions and/or to disrupt meetings is intensifying (ANC 2012: 31-32).

Party list manipulation

Manipulation of the party list pertains to positions in branch executive committees and into council. Ordinary members nominate candidates to be councillors, but some names end up not appearing on the final party list. Nominated names are submitted to a selection committee which assesses if candidates meet the criteria and compiles the final party list submitted to the Independent electoral commission (IEC). This committee is comprised of the regional and to a lesser extent the provincial leadership and it is in this committee that some individuals are deliberately removed from the nomination lists. One ANC activist said;

‘there are faceless people behind the scenes who control who gets nominated or not and if you are seen as someone who knows too much or someone who is too vocal or radical, you won’t make it...there were many cases whereby nominated people did not appear on the IEC list of candidates and there is nothing you can do if the names have already submitted to the IEC by the party, so they can just cut you off at the top especially if you don’t have someone big to stand for you’ (Interview with Bantu 26 June 2011 at Mdantsane).

The party list for the 2011 local government elections is alleged to have been grossly manipulated by the interim regional leadership that was considered to be aligned to the communist group. Several councillors claimed that the original interim secretary was a nationalist and he was suspended just before nominations by the PEC which is considered to be communist aligned. The replacement secretary who was also an SACP executive member is said to have removed individuals aligned with the nationalist faction. The appointment of Zukisa Ncitha as mayor in 2011 raised eyebrows as she was number 53 on

the party's nomination list but was pushed to number 13. At the time she served as a member of the central executive committee (CEC) of the SACP (*Daily Dispatch* 12 June 2013).

Another ANC councillor said she survived these manipulative processes because her community protested when her name was not on the party list. She said, 'I am not a member of SACP so I was considered to be in the other group, so my name was removed from the list only to be reinstated after the community toyi toyied..... but most of my colleagues did not make it back to council' (Interview with ANC councillor 17 June 2012 at East London). An ANC activist also alleged that twenty councillors in Buffalo City had made it to the list irregularly with the regional leaders' support against their community's preferred candidate. Jacob Zuma had to appoint Nkosazana Zuma and Naledi Pandor to head an ANC commission that investigated party list manipulation nationally prior to the 2011 local government elections. Zuma and Pandor arrived in the Eastern Cape on the 20th of June 2011 and outcomes of their probe were classified as confidential.

Vote buying

Vote buying is masked as lobbying. During the run up to Buffalo City's March 2012 ANC regional elective conference four identifiable groups were competing for control of the structure. All lobbied for support in branches and it is alleged that branch leaders were promised jobs for themselves or their relatives, and in rare instances financial benefits in exchange for political support. The current regional secretary, Pumlanzi Mkolo, is allegedly notorious for carrying a briefcase of money that he used to buy branch leaders to garner

their support as alleged by a former member of the mayoral committee who was purged ahead of the 2011 local elections.

Vote buying does not only involve material exchanges but sometimes promises of political protection are also used to gain support. Vote buying is also evident during elective conferences. After his involvement in a popular fraud case involving millions of municipal funds dedicated for Nelson Mandela funeral in 2013, he has since caught the media's attention. The Daily Dispatch reported how Mkolo was the mastermind behind a network of loyalist branch secretaries, who work closely with an employee of a major South African bank to run a sophisticated scam of backdating membership forms, forging signatures, doctoring bank deposit slips and inflating branch membership using names on the voters roll (*Daily Dispatch* 4 July 2015). Despite this scandal and the one involving the misappropriation of millions of rands allocated to the burial of Nelson Mandela, Mkolo was re-elected as regional secretary in November 2015.

During the inaugural Buffalo City regional conference in March 2012, an ANC councillor who attended the conference noted that some delegates were sleeping at the five star Premier Hotel whilst others who could not commute everyday slept in a municipal hall. These delegates represented supporters of different factions and putting up some of them in the hotel was a strategy to appease them and guarantee their votes. The councillor added that every faction has 3 or 4 lobbyists who garner support amongst branches. At the conference, they also police their delegates because competing groups can lure them. He said; 'in the conference you have to keep your delegates together, take care of them and watch them because others can steal them' (Interview with ANC councillor 17 June 2012).

Delegates are commonly referred to as stock like a flock of sheep that needs a shepherd. Just like sheep which should be taken to drink water, delegates should be fed and taken out to get drunk. The lobbyists are said to converse amongst themselves that it's time to feed the stock when referring to taking their delegates to pubs to get them drunk.

ANC regions in the province have also battled gatekeeping allegations. Some branch secretaries stand accused of wrongly disqualifying members who qualify to vote at Branch General Meeting's to eliminate competition for positions (*Daily Dispatch* July 10 2015). There is the use of ghost members which involves individuals who buy party membership for a number of people and then use them to vote for him/her into leadership positions. Bantu an ANC/SACP activist in Mdantsane pointed out that many ANC supporters did not have membership because they did not have the 12 Rands to pay for it. He noted that people were taking advantage of the fact that the ANC had many supporters but few members. He added that some individuals were gathering unemployed people in the township and offering to pay their membership for their support whilst being promised jobs in the municipality in return (Interview with Bantu, 26 June 2011 at Mdantsane City). Through a case study of an ANC branch in Mpumalanga, Malabela (2015, 2011) has pointed out how democracy is currently suppressed by local and regional elites rather than respected through 'ghost members', 'dirty lobbying' and other pathologies make the assertion of branch power impossible.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the operation of patronage in Buffalo City by focusing on the practices of local politicians and residents of Buffalo City. It argued that preceding the exchange of state resources for political support, patronage embodies various enactments of power by patrons, brokers and clients that relate to each other. This problematises understandings of patronage and clientelism that simply view these relationships as the exchange of goods, services and resources for votes and political support. These notions are limited because as demonstrated in the chapter, the specificities of patronage in everyday practice show that the actual exchange is preceded by complex relationships of power that are established over time and through various enactments. A view of patronage that assumes that votes and support come because of the distribution of resources therefore does not fully capture the operation of patronage. Auyero (2001:23) drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu observes that,

‘confusing the circulation with the generative principles of action, this scholastic point of view makes a serious epistemological mistake. It locates in the consciousness of the actors the model constructed by the analyst to account for the practices, assuming that the constructions that the scientist must produce to understand practice were the main determinants, the actual cause of practice’ (Auyero 2001:23).

I argue that the generative principle of patronage at the local level is the exercise of various forms of power which is the main determinant of patronage and clientelist practices. The exchange of votes for state resources follows the demonstrations of power especially in contexts with limited resources such as Buffalo City where patrons and brokers have to efficiently target specific individuals or groups. Ordinary people express their power through protests, attendance at rallies or providing political support for instance. However, in enacting their power, they empower the party and party leaders who depend on a visible display of power by a base. Thus people's enactments of power translate into power for the party or individuals in the party who in turn reciprocate by using their power over the state to distribute various resources to people. Patronage is therefore governed by these relationships of power which determine and shape factionalism in the party. Therefore the discussion on patronage becomes a process of tracing the forms of power people have and how they relate to each other in order to secure their position in a patronage network. However, as poor people assimilate to this system as a means to access state resources Auyero (2000: 175) notes that 'they are co-opted by the institutionalised practices of political clientelism and thus partake in the reproduction of the hierarchic relations prevailing in the local political arena and thus in their own subordination' (Auyero 2000: 175).

Chapter VII

CONCLUSION

As the oldest liberation movement in Africa, the ANC has been the subject of numerous books and articles that have covered different aspects of the century old movement. Some of these works have highlighted the incidence of factional politics at various periods in the party's history. The post-apartheid era saw the ANC assuming the status of a dominant party following successive electoral wins (see Giliomee and Simkins 1999, Booysen 2012, 2015, Southall 2012). However, Butler and Southall (2015: 1) point out that 'despite the importance of the ANC for the contemporary politics and government of South Africa, its more recent political trajectory – most particularly since it became a party of government in 1994 – is much less well understood'. This is particularly so for factionalism which has become an affirmed practice within the ANC during its time as a party of government (see Lodge 2004, Booysen 2012, 2015, Reddy 2014, Butler 2014, Beresford 2015, Southall 2012). Despite factionalism being a dominant feature of the ANC, there has been no systematic study that has sought to understand its operation more so in its local subnational structures. This thesis begins to address this gap and contributes to extending our understanding of the ANC's more recent political trajectory.

This study provides insight into the everyday operation of the ANC as a dominant party at the local level drawing on evidence from Buffalo City Municipality in the Eastern Cape. It analyses the practices, mechanisms and rationalities that inform post-apartheid ANC intraparty politics. At the heart of this thesis, it focuses on the contemporary manifestations

of factionalism in the ANC which I argue that are increasingly being intertwined with patronage networks. The study goes beyond linking factionalism and patronage to illuminate how patronage functions in the everyday. In this regard, I show that patronage functions through the everyday exercise of various forms of power by patrons, brokers and clients. To conclude, this chapter revisits the main arguments presented in the foregoing pages by highlighting the empirical and theoretical contributions made by this thesis.

I highlight that research on the ANC as a dominant party overwhelmingly focuses on the party at the national level. This has generated a tendency to regard the ANC as a homogeneous party and generalisations that see it as relatively united and coherent. This study contributes to achieving a greater understanding of the ANC by moving beyond national level analysis with a deliberate focus on a detailed qualitative analysis of the party at a local level. It focuses on a subnational structure of the ANC in a relatively small metropolitan municipality in comparison to the other metropolitan municipalities such as Johannesburg and Cape Town. In addition, studies on the ANC are characteristically ‘top-down’ in the sense that information is usually drawn from and is about the top echelon or leaders. However, this study has broken with this tradition and has drawn on the experiences and information from lower ranking party officials, local activists, ordinary party members and self-described ‘foot soldiers of the ANC’.

I argue that after the democratic transition, when the ANC became a party of government, there are two imperatives that informed its relationship with the state and which in turn shaped its intraparty politics. The first involved the ANC’s prerequisite to transform the

state to make it more demographically representative. Relatedly, it had to deal with an uncooperative administration therefore the ANC had to populate the state with its cadres to avoid an insurgent regime by a bureaucracy loyal to the previous regime (Hyslop 2005). The party's deployment policy therefore became its main instrument to transform the state demographically whilst populating it with officials loyal to the new regime. The second imperative that informed the ANC's relationship with the state involved using the state as a vehicle for socio-economic transformation in society. Through policies such as black economic empowerment and preferential procurement, the ANC sought to embark on a programme of redistribution to uplift previously disadvantaged groups.

Chapter four argues that both these processes created various opportunities for accumulation and upward mobility as they became stepping stones for the emergent African middle and upper class. The competition to access these opportunities increased and manifested as factional struggles in the ANC. This was compounded by the entrenchment of neoliberal principles that saw poverty and unemployment worsen thereby increasing dependence on the state especially in smaller and rural municipalities. This excessive dependence on the state also fuelled contestation over access to state resources which played out as factionalism in the ANC as the party of government. *Chapter five* expands on these arguments and shows that as the party in the post-apartheid era increasingly became the de facto space to access various state opportunities, patronage networks developed and became intertwined with factions to control access to the state apparatus. The effect of these transformation dynamics was the collapse of the boundary between the party and state and an unintended consequence was that this fundamentally transformed the party itself too by influencing the operation of its internal politics.

The thesis went further to discuss the operation of patronage in everyday practice at the local level. I argue that patron-client relationships are not merely the exchange of goods and services for political support but rather they embody a field of power relations. I have illustrated the performative aspects of patron-client relationships that have developed between ANC politicians and their constituencies at a local level in contemporary South Africa. As demonstrated in *chapter six*, the actual patronage exchanges are preceded by complex relationships of power that are established over time and through various enactments. Patrons, brokers and clients exercise various forms of power every day that develop into networks of inclusion or exclusion in the distribution of scarce state resources. These networks manifest as factionalism in the dominant party to govern the distribution of scarce state opportunities. For instance, ordinary people express their power through protests, attendance of rallies or providing political support. These enactments of power translate into power for politicians whose legitimacy depends on attracting large numbers of people to various political events. Politicians then reciprocate by using their power over the state to distribute various resources, services and information to people. Therefore I argue that the generative principle or determinant of patronage and clientelist practices at the local level is the exercise of various forms of power. Therefore votes and political support cannot be simply attributed to the provision of resources.

So what does this mean for dominant parties generally and for the ANC as a dominant party in particular? There are quite a number of scholars who suggest that the rise of patronage politics and factionalism within the ANC is beginning to erode its dominance. This is supported by the decline in its electoral performance from a peak of 69.7% in 2004,

to 62.1% in 2014 and a steady decline of the proportion of the voting- age population voting for the ANC, from 53.8% in 1994 to 38.8% in 2009 (Schulz-Herzenberg 2009: 24).

Reddy (2014: 119) suggests that ‘tensions between party and state and weak factional management result in dominant party decline’ whereas Beresford (2015: 226) argues that ‘the rise of gatekeeper politics is undermining both the organisational integrity of the ANC and its capacity to deliver on its electoral mandate’. Within the dominant party approach, there is an implicit assumption that the dominant party will eventually decline. This can be found in scholars who argue that one-party dominance undermines democracy or the quality of democracy in the liberal sense of constraining executive power, strong party competition, uncertain electoral outcomes and giving room for minorities to express their views (Thackrah 2000, Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer 2001, Giliomee and Simkins 1999).

Susan Booysen acknowledges that we are still in the time of ANC dominance and hegemony but it is in decline and no longer omnipotent (Booyesen 2015: 3). She is correct to observe that ANC power is entrenched in the state and similarly Butler also observes that patronage lies at the heart of many parties’ endurance in power (Butler 2014). However, this study in *chapter five* has shown how factionalism and patronage are weakening the party through the proliferation of undemocratic practices that are undermining internal democracy. Nonetheless, I argue that in the short to medium term, these practices are likely to be important for the maintenance of ANC dominance. This is particularly so in contexts such as Buffalo City where the private sector is limited and weakening, and where dependence on the local state will continue to intensify as well as

the patronage politics that is fueling factionalism. Factional contestation in the ANC has already led to the formation of COPE and the EFF as breakaway opposition parties as well as the United Front more recently. Despite this, many have opted to remain in the ANC led alliance. A colloquial phrase by ANC officials in Buffalo City and throughout the party that, 'it is cold outside the ANC' explains why many choose to remain in the party. This phrase implies that resistance to the party is a futile exercise since in most cases this involves losing a well-paying job or a lucrative tender vital to one's livelihood. Booyesen (2015: 20) notes that the party rewards loyalty and 'aspiring dissidents know that career prospects beyond party politics, as well as financial fortunes, suffer when individuals fall out or move away from the ANC circle'.

Therefore defeated factions opt to remain in the party and try to consolidate their power within ANC structures. Many that defected to COPE actually later came back to the ANC. Ahead of elective conferences, factionalism has intensified and this has resulted in leadership positions being highly contested at all levels of the party. In Buffalo City, intense contestation for the branch executive committee every two years and the regional executive every three years have entrenched a vibrant political atmosphere although as noted in *chapter six*, there are several undemocratic practices that have arisen which will likely undermine the organisational integrity of the party in the long term.

However in the short term, the hopes and potential by opposing factions to control the party and by extension the local state apparatus and its associated resources has meant that many remain in the ANC thereby maintaining its dominance this way. Javier Auyero speaking on Argentine Peronist politics highlights a similar dilemma when he says;

Those within the inner circle are faced with a paradox. If they resist the broker's domination, they will lose access to vital resources and thus make their already bad living conditions even worse. Resistance is therefore out of the question (and probably futile). If, on the other hand, they assimilate the broker's worldview—which is what I think they do—they are co-opted by the institutionalised practices of political clientelism and thus partake in the reproduction of the hierarchic relations prevailing in the local political arena and thus in their own subordination (Auyero 2000: 175).

While poor people might make calculated decisions on who to offer political support, their dependence on the party through patron-client relationships reproduces the power of the party at the local level. While patronage is at the heart of the ANC's endurance in power, this does not mean that other factors such as its liberation appeal or ideological positions are unimportant or nonexistent. However this study has shown that patronage and clientelism have increasingly become important features in the ANC's functioning as a dominant party at a sub-national level.

On a last note, I have highlighted that these processes are more prominent at the local level particularly in contexts where there are fewer economic options for survival besides depending the state. Therefore could this explain why the ANC's dominance is being threatened in large metropolitan municipalities such as in Johannesburg where there is a substantive private sector and comparatively less dependence on the state? While

considering the demographic make-up of Gauteng municipalities, this could be an area for further research to extend our understanding of the ANC's unfolding dominance.

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LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Akhona, COSATU provincial official, Southernwood, East London, 28 May 2012 and 30 May 2012.

ANC BEC member, Ilitha Township, 20 August 2013.

ANC councillor, East London, 17 June 2012.

Andiswa, ANC official and former councillor, King Williams Town, 5 August 2013.

Anele, ANC councillor, Kidds Beach, 2 May 2012.

Ayanda, COSATU official, Southernwood, East London, 23 August 2013.

Bantu, ANC/SACP Activist, Mdantsane, 26 June 2011 and 3 June 2012.

Bongani, ANC member, Quigney, East London, 18 June 2012.

Buhle, Municipal official and former councillor, Trust House East London, 7 June 2012.

Cebo, councillor, City Hall, East London, 23 June 2011.

DA councillor, DA offices Vincent, 28 July 2011.

Former ANC REC member 21 July 2011, East London.

Kanelo, ANC member, Mdantsane, 2 June 2012.

Khaya, Municipal Official, Trust House, East London, 27 June 2011.

Linda, COPE councillor, Northend, East London, 1 June 2011.

Lizo, ANC activist, Duncan Village, 8 August 2013.

Luvuyo, activist, Mdantsane, 7 August 2012.

Luyanda, Opposition councillor, Braelyn, 5 June 2012.

Mangaliso, SACP activist, Mdanstane City, 6 October 2014.

Monga, ANC official 5 July 2011 at Berea, East London.

Nokwanda, former councillor and mayoral committee member, Mdantsane, 6 June 2011.

Sam, PAC official, Southernwood, 6 June 2011.

Scenary Park resident, East London, 24 April 2012.

Sindi, ANC councillor, Vincent Mall, 7 July 2012 and 12 May 2012.

Siwe, ANC Activist (later became a BEC member in 2014) Duncan Village, East London, 7 July 2012.

Thando, ANC activist, Duncan Village, 26 May 2011.

Them bani, chairwoman of an informal settlement committee, Duncan Village, 13 October 2014.

Thembi, former ANC councillor, Quigney, East London, 1 August 2013.

Unathi, Duncan Village Resident/ANC member, Gombo Hall, 23 April 2012.

Vuyani, ANC activist, East London, 13 August 2013.

Zolani, municipal official, Trust House, East London, 25 August 2013.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Information sheet and consent forms

PARTICIPANT'S INFORMATION SHEET

Date: _____

Dear _____

Thank you for considering my request for you to participate in this interview. My name is Tatenda Mukwedeya and I am conducting research for the purposes of obtaining a Doctoral Degree at the University of the Witwatersrand.

The focus of my research is on the daily operation of the ANC. I therefore wish to invite you to participate in this study which will entail being interviewed by me.

What you will be asked to do in the Research: You will be asked for your insights and opinions on matters related to how the party functions as well as for any suggestions that you think might advance the research process. Should there be any matters about which you are uncomfortable or think need explanation please do not hesitate to bring these to my attention or to the attention of my supervisors- Professor Roger Southall and Professor Michelle Williams (contact details below).

Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and refusal to participate will not be held against you in any way. You may choose to cease your participation at any time. Your withdrawal will not harm or affect any relationship you, or your organisation, may currently have with the University of the Witwatersrand.

Confidentiality: All information you supply during the research will be held in confidence and, unless you specifically indicate your consent, your name will not appear in any report or publication of the research. Your responses will be safely stored and only I will have access to this information.

If you have questions about the research in general or about your role in the study, please feel free to contact me on cell **079 096 8803** or email tmukwedeya@gmail.com or you alternatively you can contact my supervisors;

Professor Roger Southall
Roger.Southall@wits.ac.za
011-717 4424

Thank you for your time
Kind regards, Tatenda Mukwedeya

Professor Michelle Williams
Michelle.Williams@wits.ac.za
011-7174433

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

I _____ hereby consent to participate in a research project conducted by Tatenda Mukwedeya for his PhD dissertation at the University of the Witwatersrand. The purpose and procedures of the study have been explained to me. I understand that participation is voluntary and that *all my responses will be kept confidential*.

I also understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time and that I may refuse to answer any questions that I feel uncomfortable with answering. I am aware that there will be no direct benefits or rewards for my participation in the study and I am not waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form.

Please indicate your consent to participate in this research process by signing below:

Signature _____

Date _____

.....

CONSENT TO RECORD (audio)

I _____ hereby consent to the tape-recording of the interview. I understand that *all information will be kept confidential* and that the tapes will be kept in a locked cabinet and will be destroyed two years after publication of the final report.

I understand the nature of this project and can refuse to answer certain questions and may ask the tape recorder to be turned off at any point. I wish to participate and agree that the conversation be recorded. I am not waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form.

Signature _____

Date _____

Appendix 4: Dilapidated swimming pool in NU2 Mdantsane





Appendix 5: IDP Meeting in Gompo Hall, Duncan Village



Appendix 6:

ANC YOUTH LEAGUE



MZWANELE FAZZIE BRANCH

BUFFALO CITY SUB -REGION

AMATHOLE REGION

STATEMENT

22 September 2009

ANC Youth League Mzwanele Fazzie Branch Call for an URGENT change in the ANC Youth League Regional Task Team

The ANC Youth League Mzwanele Fazzie Branch is calling for a change to the ANC Youth League Amathole Regional Task -Team as they failed the mandate that they were given and exceeded the time as the Regional Task Team. The ANC Youth League together with other progressive organizations in the Branch has been observing a serious lack of political and organizational leadership from the current ANC Youth Regional Task Team led by Comrade Pumlani Mkolo as convener and Terris Ntuthu as Co -ordinator. It is under this leadership that many key programmes of the ANC Youth League such as the organizational renewal and the Elections 2009 were neglected. The Alliance (Progressive Youth Alliance) and some branches of the ANC Youth League in Amathole have been ignored on all critical issues affecting the ANC Youth League including issues of governance, and launch of branches. The issue of Youth Development also suffered greatly as it was not taken seriously by this Regional Task Team. Their focus became the factions and labeling alliance as the thieves, their focus became the tenders, and who must be a mayor in the local municipalities. The Municipality today is in disarray and in a state of total collapse, due to the very same ANC Youth League Regional Task Team.

We therefore feel strongly, that this Task team was out of touch with the reality required to lead the ANC Youth League and ensure that Branches are built and have failed dismally to provide leadership to the young people and the membership of this mighty movement. Therefore for us, this RTT does not inspire confidence and as result must no longer be trusted with a huge political responsibility of leading the ANC Youth League in this Region.

It is for this reason that in the spirit of reviving and strengthening the ANC Youth League in Amathole, a new team must be given a chance to lead this organization.

We also want to reiterate that as mandated by the ANC Youth League members of the branch we will work tirelessly and fight to the bitter end to ensure that this RTT is removed completely and be replaced by the young people who want unity, who are not focusing on tenders and believe in the Progressive Youth Alliance:

ISSUED BY THE ANC YOUTH LEAGUE MZWANELE FAZZIE BRANCH

FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT:

Viwe Sidali

Mzwanele Fazzie ANC Youth League Branch Chairperson

Cell No: 072 459 0994

<http://www.mail-archive.com/yclsa-eom-forum@googlegroups.com/msg02930/ANC>. Accessed 1 July 2015