



**THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROVISION OF
CERTAINTY IN MELBOURNE METROPOLITAN PLANNING**

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Cael James Leskovec

Bachelor of Social Science in Planning with Honours (RMIT University)

School of Global, Urban and Social Studies

College of Design and Social Context

RMIT University

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DECLARATION

I certify that except where due acknowledgement has been made, the work is that of the author alone; the work has not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, to qualify for any other academic award; the content of the thesis is the result of work which has been carried out since the official commencement date of the approved research program; any editorial work, paid or unpaid, carried out by a third party is acknowledged; and, ethics procedures and guidelines have been followed.

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ACRONYMS & INITIALISMS

AEG	Audit Expert Group
AMCORD	Australian Model Code for Residential Development
CRG	Community Reference Group
CMMC	Conference of Metropolitan Municipalities Committee
DI	Department of Infrastructure
DPCD	Department of Planning and Community Development
DPD	Department of Planning and Development
DPH	Department of Planning and Housing
DPUG	Department of Planning and Urban Growth
DSE	Department of Sustainability and Environment
DURD	Department of Urban and Regional Development
IDO	Interim Development Order
GCTPA	Garden Cities and Town Planning Association
HISAB	Housing Investigation and Slum Abolition Board
LGA	Local Government Area
LGPMC	Local Government and Planning Ministers' Council
LPPF	Local Planning Policy Framework
MAASHCC	Minimum Allotment, Anti-Slum and Housing Crusade Committee
MCC	Melbourne City Council
MMBW	Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works
MMPS	Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme
MPE	Ministry for Planning and Environment
MSS	Metropolitan Strategic Statement
MSTF	Metropolitan Strategy Task Force
MTPC	Metropolitan Town Planning Commission
NPA	National Parks Association
PAG	Planning Advisory Group
PCA	Property Council of Australia

PIA	Planning Institute of Australia
SCC	State Coordination Council
SDD	Strategy Development Division
SPC	State Planning Council
SPPF	State Planning Policy Framework
SRG	Strategic Reviews Group
TCPA	Town and Country Planning Association
TCPB	Town and Country Planning Board
TPAV	Town Planning Association of Victoria
TPB	Town Planning Board
UDIA	Urban Development Institute of Australia
UGB	Urban Growth Boundary
VPP	Victoria Planning Provisions
VTPPA	Victorian Town Planning and Parks Association

ABSTRACT

The city of Melbourne, Victoria, consistently ranks amongst the world's most liveable. For nearly a century, the city has embraced metropolitan planning – strategic planning conducted at the metropolitan-scale – as one of the main processes by which improvements to its prized liveability can be made. However, in so doing, metropolitan planning may also serve another purpose. It may be used to provide assurances with respect to the development of property. While this notion has been termed certainty, it remains ill-explored in academic planning literature. Importantly, certainty has today become a significant preoccupation within Melbourne metropolitan planning. For the past two decades, the city's guiding metropolitan planning documents have increasingly stressed the importance of their actions in providing certainty. Unfortunately, no one has been able to explain how or why Melbourne metropolitan planning currently finds itself in such a situation. Applying an innovative historiographical approach informed by genealogical concepts, this thesis aims to address this gap by exploring the notion of certainty and tracing the historical development of its provision in Melbourne metropolitan planning. With respect to the former, it finds that certainty is provided through the use of statutory planning controls, which in Victoria are located predominantly within planning schemes. With respect to the latter, the thesis identifies, across three discontinuous phases, two different ways of thinking with respect to the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning. It was only in the second phase, the 1950s to the mid-1980s, that Melbourne's metropolitan plans – distinct from strategies – actually provided certainty, as during this phase the plans were implemented directly through a metropolitan planning scheme. The first and third phases, the 1900s to the 1940s and the late-1980s to the 2000s, respectively, did not provide certainty, as during these phases the metropolitan strategies – distinct from plans – relied on their transposition into local planning schemes to be implemented. Interestingly, despite rhetoric to the contrary, the more recent Melbourne metropolitan planning documents do not actually provide certainty. The thesis contends that a variety of planning, economic and political factors are responsible for these shifts. It concludes with critical reflections and insights into the metropolitan planning process.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Context

[*Melbourne 2030's*] long-term approach will provide the private-sector, local government and individuals with the certainty and confidence needed to make investments and pursue opportunities.

— Victorian Government, Department of Infrastructure, *Melbourne 2030*, 2002, pg. 19

The city of Melbourne¹, Victoria, consistently ranks amongst the world's most liveable in many of the annual surveys into the living conditions of global cities – Mercer's *Quality of Living Rankings* (2017) ranks it as the 16-most liveable city; Monocle's *Quality of Life Survey* (2017) ranks it as the fifth-most liveable city; while the Economist Intelligence Unit's *Liveability Ranking* (2017) considers it the world's most liveable city, a title that it has held for seven consecutive years. These living condition surveys are based on a number of comparative criteria, which span both the natural and built environments. While some of Melbourne's prized liveability is attributed to its natural environment, much of it is due to the city's impressive built environment. The success of Melbourne's built environment has not happened by accident but through a deliberate process. For nearly a century, the city has embraced metropolitan planning² as one of the main processes by which improvements to its liveability can be made (Townsend, 2012). A total of nine different metropolitan planning documents, both plans and strategies – where 'plan' refers to a planning document directly translated into statutory planning controls, and 'strategy' refers to a planning document *not* directly translated into statutory planning controls – have guided the future urban growth and development of Melbourne, each contributing to its continued liveability.

¹ The term 'city of Melbourne' is used to refer to the entire metropolitan region, while the term 'City of Melbourne' is used to refer to the local government area.

² The Victorian planning system, as with Australia's other state-based planning systems, comprises two main elements: strategic planning, the formulation of strategic documents to guide future urban growth and development; and statutory planning, the assessment of development relative to a statutory framework of planning controls informed by strategic planning documents (Maginn et al., 2016). Metropolitan planning is strategic planning conducted at the metropolitan-scale. It is also referred to as strategic spatial planning in Europe (Albrechts and Balducci, 2016).

However, metropolitan planning may also serve another purpose. It may be used to provide assurances with respect to the development of property. This notion has been termed certainty, yet it remains ill-explored in academic planning literature. There is no consensus on how certainty is actually provided (Fingland, 2011). Importantly, certainty has today become a significant preoccupation within Melbourne metropolitan planning. For the past two decades, the city's metropolitan plans have increasingly stressed the importance of their actions in providing certainty. This preoccupation is captured perfectly in the epigraph that heads this chapter. So ingrained has this belief in the need to provide certainty become that a leading planning academic has described it as 'Melbourne's planning *doxa*' (Hillier, 2013: 1). Moreover, the notion of uncertainty has also recently emerged as a significant preoccupation within international planning literature. There have been calls from a group of planning academics for metropolitan plans to provide flexibility, in order to deal with the increasing economic, environmental and social uncertainties found in the sphere in which planning operates (Balducci et al., 2011a). Interestingly, it is obvious that the provision of certainty and flexibility stand in antithesis to each other. Despite claims to the contrary (Vickridge et al., 2011), it is not possible to provide both. However, conflict between these two competing ideas has never eventuated in Melbourne metropolitan planning. Instead, it finds itself firmly in the certainty camp.

Despite these significant preoccupations, unfortunately no one has been able to explain how or why Melbourne metropolitan planning currently finds itself in such a situation. While several have documented Melbourne's metropolitan planning history (see Sandercock, 1990; McLoughlin, 1992; Townsend 2012), none have done so with respect to the provision of certainty. This thesis aims to address this gap by exploring the notion of certainty and tracing the historical development of its provision in Melbourne metropolitan planning.

1.2 Focus

The overarching aim of this research project is to critically investigate the notion of certainty and the historical development of its provision in Melbourne metropolitan planning.

Identified within this overarching aim are a number of key objectives that will help guide this research project:

1. To explore genealogy as a theoretical framework for researching Melbourne metropolitan planning;
2. To explore the notion of certainty with respect to metropolitan planning;
3. To critically examine the historical development of the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning;
4. To determine the implications of this research.

In response to these objectives, the following research questions have been identified:

1. What is genealogy and how can it be used to explain the historical development of the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning?
2. What is the notion of certainty in a planning context and how may it be provided?
3. How and why has the provision of certainty developed historically in Melbourne metropolitan planning?
4. What are the implications of this research for Melbourne metropolitan planning?

1.3 Approach

This research is historical in nature. As such, an appropriate historical methodology and historiography is required. This thesis uses a Foucauldian genealogical approach. First developed in the 1960s by French post-structural historian and philosopher Michel Foucault and refined over the course of his lifetime, genealogy is the term given to a collection, or, a metaphor Foucault prefers, a 'tool box' (Foucault, 1994a), of methodological principles that can be used to analyse human culture in line with his philosophy that all human culture can be understood through history (O'Farrell, 2005). At its heart, genealogy seeks to explain the historical development of a deep-seated societal practice or belief that is held to be fact (Williams, 2005). In contrast to other approaches, genealogy subscribes to the postmodernist belief that society is fluid and that knowledge about society can be understood in many different ways (Thompson, 2004). This thesis devises what it believes to be the five key, interdependent principles used in the genealogical approach: history, problem, discourse, discontinuity

and power. The principle of history is concerned with discovering how *epistemes*, the structures responsible for how we view a societal practice, have changed over time. The principle of the problem is concerned with both problematising a societal practice from the present-day and focusing on the way in which certain practices have been problematised throughout history. The principle of discourse is concerned with discovering how statements and acts have allowed specific views of a societal practice to develop and be reproduced. The principle of discontinuity is concerned with discovering how these specific views of a societal practice have changed, rather than continued. The principle of power is concerned with discovering how power relations are responsible for these specific views of societal practices.

It is through this genealogical lens that this thesis seeks to analyse the circumstances that allowed the provision of certainty to become deep-seated in Melbourne metropolitan planning. It primarily draws on the historical method of archival research to collect the research data. Secondary sources and in-depth interviews are also used where possible to supplement any gaps in this data. Moreover, it employs the use of a historical case study research design in order to explain the provision of certainty within a Melbourne-context.

1.4 Structure

The remainder of this thesis is divided into eight chapters.

Chapter 2 explains and justifies the selection of genealogy as an appropriate approach to address the research questions posed above. It firstly identifies genealogy as one of the three main approaches used in the historiography of the planning discipline – the other two being the so-called ‘empirical method’ common in history and historical materialism of Marxism – and highlights the main differences between these approaches. It secondly examines genealogy in more detail, identifying the five key, interdependent methodological principles that comprise it and explains how each will be operationalised. It finally explores examples of how genealogy has been used in planning history and the lessons to be learnt from these examples.

Chapter 3 explains and situates the certainty phenomenon within international planning literature. It firstly traces the historical development of the term certainty within planning as far back as the 1960s. It secondly traces the historical development of the planning profession from the mid-to-late-nineteenth century, exploring its initial attempts to overcome uncertainty and provide certainty. It finally determines from the reviewed literature how certainty is actually provided within planning.

Chapter 4 explains and justifies the appropriateness of the methods undertaken to complete this thesis and their methodological relationship to genealogy. It firstly explores the three main methods of investigation utilised in the research process: archival research, secondary research and in-depth interviews. It finally explores the research design of Melbourne as a historical case study.

Chapter 5, the first of the three empirical chapters, presents a chronological history of the first phase of Melbourne metropolitan planning: 1900s–1940s. This chronology is constructed around the only metropolitan planning document created during this stage – the *Plan of General Development* (MTPC, 1929) – and the way in which it attempted to provide certainty. It analyses the document in accordance with the genealogical principles outlined in the second chapter.

Chapter 6, the second of the three empirical chapters, presents a chronological history of the second phase of Melbourne metropolitan planning: 1950s–mid-1980s. This chronology is constructed around the three metropolitan planning documents created during this stage – the *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954* (MMBW, 1953; 1954), *Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region* (MMBW, 1971) and the *Metropolitan Strategy* (MMBW, 1980) and *Implementation* (MMBW, 1981) – and the ways in which they attempted to provide certainty. It again analyses the documents in accordance with the genealogical principles outlined in the second chapter.

Chapter 7, the third of the three empirical chapters, presents a chronological history of the third phase of Melbourne metropolitan planning: late-1980s–2000s. This chronology is constructed around the three metropolitan planning documents created during this stage – *Shaping Melbourne's Future* (MPE, 1987), *Living Suburbs* (DPD, 1995a) and *Melbourne 2030* (DI, 2002a) – and the ways in which they

attempted to provide certainty. Once more, it analyses the documents in accordance with the genealogical principles outlined in the second chapter.

As detailed analyses of the planning documents have been incorporated into the three respective empirical chapters, Chapter 8 provides critical reflections and conclusions with respect to the notion of certainty and the historical development of its provision in Melbourne metropolitan planning. It responds to each of the research questions in turn and discusses the possibility for future research on the topic.

2. GENEALOGY

2.1 Introduction

This research is historical in nature. As such, an appropriate historical methodology, or historiography³, is required. The purpose of this chapter is to explain and justify the selection of one such approach – genealogy. To these ends, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section situates genealogy as one of the three main approaches used in the historiography of the planning discipline – the other two being the empirical method and historical materialism – and highlights the main differences between these approaches. It finds that genealogy belongs to historiography’s postmodern turn. Ultimately, the use of any particular approach depends on the user’s view of society. The second section examines genealogy in greater detail. It innovatively determines that the approach contains five key, interdependent methodological principles – history, problematisation, discourse, discontinuity and power – and explains how each will be operationalised. The final section looks at how genealogy has been used in planning history. It finds that while genealogy has been under-utilised within this field, instances where it has been used highlight its effectiveness as an approach. Moreover, its use confirms the five key interdependent methodological principles identified in the second section.

2.2 Situating genealogy

Intrinsic to all humans is the need to understand past events – humans have been physically documenting history for thousands of years (Cheng, 2012). Understandably, many different approaches to history have been developed and refined over this time. However, it is commonly accepted that the most significant of these historiographical advancements were made following the establishment of history as a professional discipline in the early-nineteenth century (Iggers, 2005). The purpose of this section is to situate genealogy within these developments. Unfortunately, it would require an entire book to identify and explain all of the different approaches to historiography that have developed since

³ It is in this respect that the term historiography is used from hereafter. However, it is noted that the term also refers to the development of the history discipline itself and a body of work on a particular historical topic (Cheng, 2012).

this point in time – and indeed such accounts already exist (see Green and Troup, 1999; Iggers, 2005). Instead, this section presents a brief overview of what this thesis has identified as the three main approaches utilised within the field of planning history: the empirical method, historical materialism and genealogy. Its aim is to highlight the main differences between these approaches. As will be shown, their use is largely dependent on whether or not the user's view of society aligns with that underpinning the approach.

The empirical method

History was established as a professional discipline at the University of Berlin in the 1820s (Green and Troupe, 1999). Prior to this, history was confined to other disciplines and lacked a unified approach. Under the guidance, most notably, of German historian Leopold von Ranke, the new discipline was established on the 'firm belief in the scientific status of history' (Iggers, 2005: 2). This view of history as a science had its origins in the scientific revolution of the Enlightenment (Green and Troupe, 1999). Just like a science, it was thought that history could discover an objective reality through the use of an empirical methodology (Iggers, 2005). Ranke set about developing such an approach. His approach stressed the objectivity of the historian – it was their responsibility to simply document '*wie es eigentlich gewesen*', that which actually happened, rather than pass judgements on the past (Green and Troupe, 1999: 2). This was to be achieved through the examination only of written primary sources that had been rigorously verified through other primary sources – secondary and tertiary sources were deemed unscientific. It is from this collection of scientific evidence that factual events could then begin to be arranged to accurately represent the past (Iggers, 2005). Importantly, the historian was assumed to be entirely objective, devoid of all influences and prejudices. This traditional approach – which became known as the empirical method – was hugely influential and remained significantly unchallenged for the better part of a century.

However, by the mid-twentieth century, this empirical method was firmly under attack from a number of social science-influenced historiographical approaches, due mainly to criticisms over the ability of the historian to remain objective (Green and Troupe, 1999). In response to these challenges, historian Geoffrey Elton (1967) famously reaffirmed the role of the historian to present an objective description

of factual events, leading to the development of the term descriptive history. Today, the empirical method is synonymous with descriptive history (Danto, 2008). Despite the terminology used and the challenges the approach has faced, it remains to this day one of the most popular and widely accepted approaches to historiography, especially in the planning field. Its key planning historian proponents include the likes of Peter Hall (1988; 2002), Gordon Cherry (1988) and Robert Freestone (2010). Historiographies of this approach tend to focus on specific events or periods of time.

Historical materialism

Nearly 100 years before the mid-twentieth century's infiltration of social science into historiography as mentioned above, influential German historian Karl Marx began to apply principles from the social sciences – most notably philosophy, economics, and politics – to his historical analyses, forming the basis of what has become known as historical materialism or, more commonly, Marxist historiography (Green and Troup, 1999). Over the course of much of the nineteenth-century, Marx developed and refined his groundbreaking concept that it was social classes and economic conditions that were ultimately responsible for shaping history (Burke, 2005; Danto, 2008). He posited that it was in fact conditions relating to the means by which humans produced their material needs that were responsible for the way in which society was organised and developed over time (Green and Troup, 1999). As such, he approached his historical analyses by focusing his attention on socio-economic conditions. This approach was based on the assumptions that social categories and their relations are constant in capital-based societies throughout time and that society is working towards a classless society.

While Marx's approach had some support and followers, it was not until the work of a group of British historians – known as the British Marxist School – began to explore history from a Marxist perspective in the 1940s that the approach became more widely known (Green and Troup, 1999; Burke, 2005). School members – most notably Eric Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill and E. P. Thompson – conducted various Marxist analyses of historical subjects. Their studies paid particular attention to the idea of 'history from below', which involved socio-economically examining history's more marginalised groups to discover alternative voices (Green and Troup, 1999). While the term Marxist historiography may have fallen out of favour, socio-economic histories remain popular with historians to this day. In

the planning field, many historians use such an approach. Its key proponents within planning history include Leonie Sandercock (1990) and Brian McLoughlin (1992).

Genealogy

The 1970s and 1980s proved to be a period of immense social, economic and political upheaval. Not surprisingly, social theory also began to experience major changes during this period (Burke, 2005). The most significant of these changes was the emergence of postmodern thought. The postmodernist movement presented a view of society that was in antithesis to most previous views. At its heart, postmodernism believed that society is not a bastion of stability but rather instability, fluidity – society is always in a state of constant transformation (Burke, 2005). Moreover, importantly, it believed that knowledge is not as simple as previously thought – there are many different ways of knowing and knowledge is tentative and relative (Thompson, 2004). These ideas eventually made their way into historiography. Postmodern historiography challenged the modernist belief that there can be a single, discoverable, truthful representation of the past – instead, it argued that there were in fact many different interpretations of knowledge (Thompson, 2004). A number of different postmodern approaches to history emerged during this period. These included approaches that were developed in response to problems of misrepresentation of specific groups – such as feminist and queer historiographies – and oppression of specific groups – such as postcolonial historiographies – present in traditional approaches. However, arguably the most significant of these to emerge from the postmodern turn was genealogy (Danto, 2008).

Displeasure with existing approaches led French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault to develop and refine his own historiographical approach over the course of his lifetime. He termed this approach genealogy in the 1970s (1995; 1988a; 2007). Genealogy can be a challenging approach to comprehend. Without pre-empting the more detailed explanation of the approach in the next section, at its heart, Foucault's genealogy was concerned with explaining the historical development of a deep-seated practice or belief that is held to be fact (Williams, 2005). To do so, genealogy looked at how both discursive and non-discursive practices – statements and non-statements, respectively – were related by forces of power to form a wide-held belief (Foucault, 1995; 1988a; 1984). As Foucault (1990: 257)

wrote, the aim of genealogy was to uncover the ‘totality of discursive or non-discursive practices that introduces something into the play of true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought’. Importantly, genealogy was not restricted along ideological lines – its analysis was more comprehensive than just focusing on socio-economic conditions, for example. It attempted to look at all conditions responsible for shaping that particular practice or belief. The genealogical approach has experienced a small but noticeable uptake within planning history. Its key proponents include M. Christine Boyer (1983), Paul Rabinow (1989) and Raphaël Fischler (1993) – their use of the approach will be explored in the third section.

Conclusion

Since the establishment of history as a separate discipline nearly two centuries ago, there have been a number of different major approaches. However, arguably only three of these have had any significant impact within the planning history – the empirical method, historical materialism and genealogy. These approaches reflect the intellectual influences of science, social science and postmodernism, respectively. At its heart, the empirical method is concerned with discovering an objective reality through empirical research. Historical materialism is concerned with discovering social classes and economic imperatives that have influenced historiographical development. Genealogy is concerned with discovering the processes by which deep-seated practices or beliefs are held to be fact. Each of these approaches offers historians something unique. Moreover, their use depends on how the user views society, as well as the needs of the researcher and their project. This thesis has chosen genealogy because it both aligns with the author’s postmodern worldview and the aim of this thesis to discover how the belief in certainty infiltrated Melbourne metropolitan planning.

2.3 Explaining genealogy

As shown above, genealogy is a term used by Michel Foucault to describe his own unique approach. Having situated genealogy within historiography’s postmodern turn, it is necessary to explain the approach in greater detail. However, such a task is more difficult than one may initially imagine. This is because genealogy does not represent a unified historiographical approach. Rather, it is an ongoing

collection of methodological principles or, using a metaphor Foucault prefers, a ‘toolbox’ (1994a), developed and refined over two decades, which can be used to analyse human culture in line with his philosophy that all human culture can be understood through history. In its explanation of genealogy, this section innovatively identifies five key methodological principles in his toolbox: history, problematisation, discourse, discontinuity and power. These principles are interdependent, meaning there is unavoidable overlap in their explanation. It is also important to note that this section is not intended as a comprehensive account of Foucault or his methodological approach – there are a plethora of books already written on the matter (see Todd, 1993; O’Farrell, 2005; Schirato, Danaher & Webb, 2012). It is instead meant to explain genealogy in an understandable and relatable way, while also demonstrating why it is a valuable approach to planning history.

History

The first and arguably most important key methodological principle of genealogy is history. This may seem obvious for a historiographical approach. However, what makes genealogy unique is the reason for its historical concern and the way in which it approaches historical analysis. This reasoning is best explained in relation to Foucault’s philosophy. Foucault, like many of his French peers, was greatly influenced by the structuralist movement, particularly its second wave⁴ (Belsey, 2002). Foucault adopted in his philosophy the belief that all aspects of society were governed by structure. This philosophy was first expressed in *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (2001a), his second book. Five years later, having refined his thinking further, Foucault provided in an interview arguably the clearest explanation of his structuralist influence:

In every age, the way in which people reflect, write, judge, speak (right down to the street and to the most everyday conversations and writing) and even the way people experience things and react with their feelings; all of their behaviour is governed by a

⁴ The first wave of structuralism occurred in the early-twentieth century and is attributed to Ferdinand de Saussure, a Swiss linguist. Saussure argued (1983) that in order to understand language, one must understand the structure of the system and the relationship between the components it comprises. The second wave occurred several decades later in the mid-twentieth century, driven largely by Claude Lévi-Strauss, a French anthropologist. Lévi-Strauss argued (1969; 1972) that every aspect of human culture and society, not just language, could be understood in relationship to an overarching system or structure.

theoretical structure, a system, which changes with ages and societies – but which is present in all ages and all societies (Foucault, 1994b: 514).

Put simply, he believed that all human behaviour could be explained as being shaped by structures. To this Foucault also added the idea of knowledge and order, which he first expressed in *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (1970). As such, Foucault believed that knowledge about societal practices was ordered by structures. At any particular point in time, there exists a single structure that is responsible for arranging how we view a particular societal practice. Foucault eventually devised the term ‘*episteme*’ to refer to this structure. He argued that there may exist different *epistemes* over time but only one *episteme* can exist at any one time. ‘In any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one *episteme* that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge’ (Foucault, 1970: 168). *Epistemes* can also be thought of as phases, as they come to define distinct time periods. For example, in *The Order of Things* (Foucault, 1970), he identified three different *epistemes* in the development of the human sciences: the Renaissance stage, the classical stage and the modern stage. The transition from one *episteme* to another importantly represents the genealogical principle of discontinuity, which will be explored later in more detail.

However, Foucault’s thinking differed from structuralism in a number of important ways. Structuralism posited that society could be explained as a series of closed, organised and pre-determined structures or systems and there was a single, definitive truth to be uncovered by these structures, which could be applied to all things universally (Belsey, 2002). Instead, Foucault, viewed structures as variable over time (Foucault, 1970; 1988a; 1995; 2002a). This is exemplified in the above example of the three different *epistemes* identified in *The Order of Things* (Foucault, 1970). These ideas reflect the key genealogical principles of discontinuity and power, which will be explored later in more detail. Interestingly, it was such thinking that led Foucault to be labelled a post-structuralist (Murdoch, 2006).

As he believed that structures changed over time and ordered knowledge in different ways, Foucault argued that it was only through historical analysis that these existing orders could be identified and examined (1970). History would show every change in thought of a specific societal practice.

Moreover, and importantly, history was the way in which existing orders could be challenged to address an injustice. On this, Foucault once remarked:

It is one of my targets to show people that a lot of things that are part of their landscape – that people think are universal – are the result of some very precise historical changes. All my analyses are against the idea of universal necessities in human existence. They show the arbitrariness of institutions and show which space of freedom we still enjoy, and how many changes can still be made (Foucault, 1988b: 11).

To identify and challenge these orders, Foucault developed his own approach to historical analysis. His approach is commonly considered as two separate approaches: archaeology and genealogy (Schirato et al., 2012). However, such a distinction is rather misleading. This is because genealogy does not displace archaeology as an approach – it is not one or the other. Rather, genealogy refines and adds to the principles established in archaeology under a new label (Koopman, 2008). A more accurate distinction is to classify Foucault's thinking into two evolving phases: archaeological and genealogical (O'Farrell, 2005).

Throughout much of the 1950s and 1960s, Foucault referred to his approach of historical analysis as archaeology, a metaphor for the historical discipline. As such, this period has become known as his archaeological phase (O'Farrell, 2005). The term archaeology made brief appearances in Foucault's first two books, *Mental Illness and Psychology* (1987) and *Madness and Civilisation* (2001a), and a more substantial appearance occurred in his third book, *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception* (2003). However, it was not until his fourth and fifth books, *The Order of Things* (1970) and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (2002a), respectively, that Foucault began seriously fleshing out his archaeological thinking. His approach sought to dig deep to uncover the historical traces that explained historical behaviour and development, similar to an archaeologist digging deep to uncover physical artefacts that helped explain the past. However, unlike an archaeologist who finds historical traces in physical artefacts, Foucault believed that the historical traces he needed to uncover were to be found in the form of discourse, which he came to define as statements of history found

within a specific field (Foucault, 2002a). Discourse is a key genealogical principle and will be explored later in more detail.

However, while archaeology proved valuable at identifying changes in knowledge over time, it unfortunately proved incapable of being able to connect these changes to specific conditions, thereby limiting its ability to explore and understand historical behaviour and development. Foucault spent much of the 1970s and 1980s refining his approach to address this issue. In his search for explanatory abilities, he turned to Nietzsche, specifically his work *On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic* (1998). Looking at the history of morality, Nietzsche showed that, in contrast to traditional historical analysis with its single narrative, there were in fact many possible historical stories or knowledges that were repressed by relations of power. It was from this work that Foucault was largely influenced, borrowing the term genealogy and the explanatory ability of power relations that was missing with his archaeological approach, as well as the metaphor of the genealogist (Foucault, 1984). This period is known as his genealogical phase (O'Farrell, 2005).

Foucault's genealogical approach retained interest in discourse but importantly added to it the notion of power relations affecting order (Foucault, 1984). Foucault believed that knowledge and truth were created through power struggles manifested through discourse. Again, this key genealogical principle of power will be explored later in more detail. The approach sought to trace, like a genealogist, the ways in which power struggles between and over discourse were responsible for influencing historical behaviour and development. Foucault developed and refined this approach in his last two major works: *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1995), which looked at the history of the western penal system; and *The History of Sexuality* (1988a), which looked at the history of human sexuality across three volumes. Foucault continued along this genealogical path until his death in 1984.

The genealogical principle of history is ultimately concerned with discovering how the *epistemes*, the structures responsible for how we view a societal practice, have changed over time. This thesis has chosen to operationalise the principle in this research in two distinct ways. The first is at the broad level. It identifies, with respect to the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning, three *epistemes* over three distinct time periods, referred to as phases. However, two phases share a very

similar *episteme*. In this respect, the principle is very much implicit. The second way in which the principle is operationalised is at a more local level. The thesis identifies the historical circumstances of each phase that have made it possible for a particular view of a societal practice to prevail. In this respect, the principle is much more explicit. Each distinct phase begins with a historical description of the economic, social and political conditions of that period.

Problem

The second key methodological principle of genealogy is that of the problem. Foucault first introduced the concept of understanding historical problems in a paper in 1978 and, in true Foucauldian fashion, refined the concept over time (O'Farrell, 2005). However, with this refinement, he created two different understandings of the problem. The first, the main understanding, viewed genealogy as beginning with a present-day practice to be analysed. However, instead of taking that practice for granted, genealogy treated it as a problem – a process known as problematisation – and posed that problem as a question for historical analysis. In a 1984 interview, Foucault explained clearly this idea: 'I set out from a problem expressed in the terms current today and I try to work out its genealogy. Genealogy means that I begin my analysis from a question posed in the present' (Kritzman, 1998: 257). Simply put, for Foucault, genealogy was concerned with unpacking problems, rather than analysing a specific time period, person or event.

Over the course of his work, Foucault devised and revised his explanation of this difference. From the mid-1960s, Foucault began describing his focus as a 'history of thought' and the focus of the traditional historical approaches as a 'history of ideas' (Foucault, 1970). Late in his life, he provided an excellent explanation of the differences:

I would like to distinguish between the 'history of ideas' and the 'history of thought.'

The history of ideas involves the analysis of a notion from its birth, through its development, and in the setting of other ideas, which constitute its context. The history of thought is the analysis of the way an unproblematic field of experience becomes a problem, raises discussions and debate, incites new reactions and induces crisis in the previously silent behaviours, practices, and institutions. It is the history

of the way people become anxious, for example, about madness, about crime, about themselves, or about truth (2001b: 74).

The above quote highlighted the clear difference between approaches. The histories to which Foucault's approach stood in opposition tended to focus their analyses on a specific time period, person or event. Moreover, importantly, their analyses started at the beginning of a specific time period, of a person's life or of an event. Foucault's approach, on the other hand, offered a much deeper level of analysis. It started at the end – it started in the present. Genealogy analyses a present-day practice, particularly one that is ingrained within society, to identify shifts in thinking that have allowed that practice to be as it is today. This present-day focus led Foucault to famously describe genealogy as a 'history of the present', less than a decade later (1995: 31).

From this lens, it is easy to look back at Foucault's major works and identify the issues that he has problematised: how madness came to be defined as an illness in *Mental Illness and Psychology* (1987); the way in which insane people were treated by society over time in *Madness and Civilisation* (2001a); the medical profession in *The Birth of the Clinic* (2003); human science in *The Order of Things* (1970); the western penal system in *Discipline and Punish* (1995); and human sexuality in the three volume *The History of Sexuality* (1988a).

However, Foucault introduced a second understanding of the problem in the *History of Sexuality* (1988a). His concern drifted from problematising a present-day practice towards focusing on the way in which certain practices have been problematised throughout history. Put simply, he was now concerned with determining how certain practices have become problems. For instance, in the second volume of the *History of Sexuality* (1988a), Foucault did not problematise sexual pleasure as we know it today. Rather, he examined how the sexual practices of Ancient Greeks became problems for the West from the seventeenth century, leading to the present situation. As this line of thinking only emerged right before his death in 1984, it is an underexplored understanding of the principle of the problem.

This thesis has chosen to operationalise the principle in both senses. It begins by problematising the present-day practice of providing certainty within Melbourne metropolitan planning. In Chapter 3, a

literature review into this problem is conducted. One of the most important outcomes of this activity is the discovery that certainty is provided in metropolitan planning through the use of planning controls. As such, the thesis analyses the ways in which planning controls are used to provide this certainty in each Melbourne metropolitan planning document. However, the thesis also examines the ways in which practices became problems that necessitated the provision of certainty through the use of planning controls.

Discourse

The third key methodological principle of genealogy is discourse. This is one of the principles that have become most closely associated with Foucault. He first explored the idea of discourse during his archaeological phase. As mentioned above, Foucault was intent on uncovering traces of certain fields of activity left behind in history and eventually believed that these traces took the form of discourse. His initial use of the term, however, was unclear. Foucault's use did not conform to its use within other fields and, moreover, he admitted to using the term inconsistently in the early stages of his work (2002a). It was not until *The Archaeology of Knowledge* that he provided an explanation of his intended use of the term: 'The term discourse can be defined as the group of statements that belong to a single system of formation; thus I shall be able to speak of clinical discourse, economic discourse, the discourse of nature of history, psychiatric discourse' (2002a: 107). Put simply, for Foucault, discourse was the statements found within a specific field of practice. Importantly, he believed that discourses could only be discovered and analysed after they have happened. As such, discourses were to be traced through historic archives.

It was in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (2002a) that Foucault also devised ways to categorise and organise discourses. Arguably his two most widely accepted and used categorisations of discourse were discursive formations and discursive practices (O'Farrell, 2005). Foremost, Foucault argued that the systems of thought that constituted specific fields could be thought of as 'discursive formations'. Within the text, Foucault provided a useful explanation of his thinking:

Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic

choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive formation – thus avoiding words that are already overlaid with conditions and consequences, and in any case inadequate to the task of designating such a dispersion, such as ‘science’, ‘ideology’, ‘theory’, or ‘domain of objectivity’ (Foucault, 2002a: 38).

Importantly, as discussed earlier, Foucault believed that these discursive formations were shaped by unconscious rules that operated to order and produce different knowledges. He termed these rules ‘discursive practices’. He explained clearly his idea of discursive practices:

It must not be confused with the expressive operation by which an individual formulates an idea, a desire, an image; nor with the rational activity that may operate in a system of inference; nor with the ‘competence’ of a speaking subject when he constructs grammatical sentences; it is a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given period’ (Foucault, 2002a: 117).

Put simply, discursive practices were the norms that allowed a specific mode of thinking to develop and be reproduced. For example, discursive practices were responsible for thoughts regarding discipline and punishment in the western penal system (Foucault, 1995). They were the structures or systems of which Foucault spoke. Such thinking, however, was not without its criticism. Critics argued that Foucault’s approach reduced everything analysable to discourse, a claim he refuted (O’Farrell, 2005). His response was to introduce the notion of non-discursive practices. Known also as materialities, these were acts or things, such as ‘institutions, political events, economic practices and processes’, rather than statements, which demonstrated specific thinking (Foucault, 2002a: 162). Importantly, Foucault believed that non-discursive practices could not stand-alone and must instead be examined in relation to their discursive counterparts.

Yet as Foucault transitioned deeper into his genealogical phase, the key principle of discourse became less of an outright concern for him. He essentially abandoned attempts to search for determining rules,

instead choosing to focus on the personal agency of the subject, how one acts in any given environment, and how power relations over this agency could explain the way in which knowledge was ordered (1995; 1988a). Foucault, however, did retain an interest in discourse and the archival, describing it as the point at which power and knowledge intersect (1988a).

This thesis has chosen to operationalise the principle of discourse by examining the statements and acts with respect to the provision of certainty in and around Melbourne metropolitan planning documents. This has been a challenging task. With respect to the discourse of certainty in the plans, the term certainty does not appear until the more recent documents. As such, for these, the thesis examines the statements and acts surrounding the notion, rather than term, of certainty that is identify in Chapter 3 – assurances with respect to the development of property. When the term is used, the thesis examines the purpose for which it has been used.

Discontinuity

Somewhat relatedly, the fourth key methodological principle of genealogy identified is discontinuity. Despite being confined mostly to his work in the late-1960s and early-1970s, the principle implicitly underpinned much of Foucault's thinking. Discontinuity is best explained in relation to the traditional historiographies to which Foucault's approach stood in opposition. The aforementioned approaches tended to focus on the continuity of history (Green and Troup, 1999). This continuity took several forms (Green and Troup, 1999; O'Farrell, 2005). Firstly, it assumed a linear idea of history – a steady march from a beginning point to an end point (Green and Troup, 1999). Secondly, on this linear notion, it assumed that there was an end goal towards which history was working, either an ideal present or future (O'Farrell, 2005). Thirdly, within that march, it assumed that all change could be explained through several notions, such as tradition, influence and cause and effect (Thompson, 2004). Finally, it assumed that both the human experience and the classification of ideas have been constant over time (Green and Troup, 1999). Foucault was highly critical of the traditional approaches and their assumptions. He saw them as the way in which the status quo was retained, furthering injustices. Foucault famously – and somewhat sarcastically – dismissed traditional approaches in the introduction to his book, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*:

For many years now, historians have preferred to turn their attention to long periods, as if, beneath the shifts and changes of political events, they were trying to reveal the stable, almost indestructible system of checks and balances, the irreversible processes, the constant readjustments, the underlying tendencies that gather force and are then suddenly reversed after centuries of continuity, the movements of accumulation and slow saturation, the great silent, motionless bases that traditional history has covered with a thick layer of events (Foucault, 2002a: 3).

Foucault decided to instead embrace the discontinuity in history. This principle was explored largely in *The Order of Things* (1970) and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (2002a), in which it was also given many other names, including breaks, displacements, gaps, interruptions, mutations, ruptures, shifts, transformations and thresholds. This thesis has chosen to use the term discontinuity because it juxtaposes well with the continuity of the traditional approaches. On the principle of discontinuity, Foucault famously wrote, 'Within the space of a few years a culture sometimes ceases to think as it had been thinking up till then and begins to think other things in a new way' (1970: 50). Foucault's work aimed to uncover the discontinuities in ordering knowledge over time, the ways in which discursive and non-discursive practices have changed, rather than continued (1970; 2002a). This concept is central to his approach. Moreover, as discussed earlier, in *The Order of Things* (1970), he introduced the term *epistemes* to describe the different discontinuous periods of thinking separated through discontinuities. They were the unconscious structures that underlay knowledge during a specific period. For Foucault, the history of a societal practice was a series of discontinuous *epistemes* within a discursive formation.

This thesis has chosen to operationalise the genealogical principle of discontinuity by analysing continuities and discontinuities between documents with respect to attempts at planning or regulating development. As discussed earlier, it also operationalises the principle by dividing the analysis of the provision of certainty within Melbourne metropolitan planning into three *epistemes* over three distinct time periods, referred to as phases.

Power

The fifth and final key methodological principle of genealogy identified is power. This is the principle that is most closely associated with Foucault's genealogical thinking. The basis of the principle lies in the Marxist idea of power (May, 1993). Western Marxist thought reached its intellectual peak in France towards the late-1960s and early-1970s, amidst increasing social and economic instability. It was during this time that Marxist academics began to write about the effect of power on society. They saw power as the act of repression by the state and economic forces to ensure capitalist exploitation and reproduction (May, 1993). This notion of power greatly intrigued Foucault. By 1972, he had incorporated the idea of power into his work on discourse, arguing that power was responsible for the exclusion of particular discourses (Foucault, 1972). While it was clear that Foucault had adopted the Marxist view that power was repressive, he unfortunately did not explain what he meant by his use of the term power. Continual explorations of the idea over the course of the next decade did yield several explanations. However, in true Foucauldian fashion, with each exploration came an updated understanding of power. As such, it can be difficult to comprehend what exactly constitutes power according to Foucault. Thankfully, there are certain features common to each understanding.

The most important feature of Foucault's understandings of power is the belief that power is not an object but rather a relation (Foucault, 1995; 1988a; 2007). At its heart, power is the relations between different groups of individuals. However, such an explanation is inadequate – it does not explain what the term relations mean. Fortunately, two years before his death, Foucault wrote that 'power is a mode of action upon the action of others' (2001c: 341). This helps our understanding. For Foucault, power is as an action that results in action. Thus, power can be considered to be the relations between different groups or individuals that results in an action, either positive, negative or both, that affects actions (Foucault, 1995; 1988a). Foucault's notion of power is, of course, much more complex than this. It possesses a number of other unique characteristics. Firstly, groups or individuals cannot possess this power. Instead, Foucault believed that power existed only when it is being exercised, either knowingly or unknowingly. This leads to a very important point and its key difference from Marxist understandings – power could be productive, not just oppressive. It does not just serve to limit innovation and encourage a certain way of thinking – it can also produce new types of knowledge.

Knowledge is central to the idea of power, so much so that Foucault created the hyphenated term power-knowledge to refer to his belief that all knowledge is dependent on a network of power relations and that the exercise of power produces knowledge, which, in turn, reinforced the exercise of power (1995; 1988a; 2007). For Foucault, the goal of genealogy is discovering how power is responsible for creating an understanding or knowledge of something.

Over the course of his latter historical analyses, Foucault identified and explored several different configurations of power-knowledge and the way in which it controls individuals and their actions. The first of these is what he referred to as disciplinary power. First introduced in *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1995), disciplinary power is the mechanism by which the threat of discipline is used to regulate and control individual behaviour in society. It replaced sovereign power in the late-eighteenth century, which had used obedience to a single authority, such as a king, to regulate behaviour. From 1976, however, Foucault began to focus on what he referred to as biopower. First introduced in *The History of Sexuality* (Foucault, 1988a), he believed biopower to be the mechanism by which the promise of good health and life – as well as the threat of ill health and death – has been used to regulate and control from the seventeenth century onwards. Importantly, Foucault (1988a) believed that biopower did not succeed disciplinary power – they are simply different types of power that arose in the modern era.

Two years later, Foucault's attention had again shifted. This time, he replaced biopower with the idea of governmentality. First introduced in his 1978 lectures (Foucault, 2007), Foucault believed there is yet another way power can be used to control. He argued that governmentality emerged in the sixteenth century as a mechanism by which a belief in the state and government could regulate the behaviour of a population. Increasingly, Foucault's idea of governmentality began to focus on the notion of the subject and how subjects govern themselves and are governed by others (O'Farrell, 2005). The idea of governmentality marked a transition in Foucault's focus from discourse to the subject. According to Foucault (2002b), the subject is an entity capable of choosing its own courses of action. He believed that power transforms individuals into subjects and engenders in them personal agency. Despite having rejected the notion of the subject during his archaeological phase, his renewed focus was on the role that the agent, as opposed to any discursive rule, plays in shaping historical behaviour (Foucault,

1988a; 2007). However, the focus of Foucault was always on how power is exercised, not by whom it is being exercised (O'Farrell, 2005). The reasoning behind this was unclear but one can speculate that it may have had something to do with a whom-focus raising questions of why, resulting in the need to question the very nature of society. Regardless, the how-focus worked for Foucault due to his broad research foci and the long time periods in question.

The above understanding of Foucauldian power, however, is problematic for this research. It is far too abstract to operationalise, especially for a shorter time period in a more recent era and for a more politically and economically defined field. It is not enough to simply say that this research will look at how power changed the provision of certainty in metropolitan planning. This gives no real indication as to the specific elements of the power relations that are to be explored. To address this issue, this thesis has chosen to incorporate into the methodological principle a more practical conception of power: Steven Lukes' (1984) three-dimensional typology. Lukes' typology was chosen over more traditional frameworks of power – e.g. pluralist, elite-managerialist and social-class perspectives – due to its ability to explain more than just one aspect of political outcomes in society (Dobratz, Waldner and Buzzell, 2016), which is necessary for a planning context.

In his pivotal work, *Power: A Radical View* (1984), Lukes critiqued the way in which power had been used previously in sociology and proposed a three-dimensional view of power, wherein power manifests itself in three distinct but related dimensions: decision-making power, non-decision-making power and ideology power. The first dimension, decision-making power, is fairly straightforward. Lukes described it as the 'focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests' (1984: 15). It is the behavioural attribute of individuals to directly influence the behaviour of other individuals to do or not do something they would or would not ordinarily do. To put it more simply, it is the power of *A* to directly make *B* do or not do something. The second dimension, non-decision-making power, is a little more complicated but still fairly straightforward. Lukes describes it as 'the ways in which decisions are prevented from being taken on potential issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests' (1984: 20). It is the behavioural attribute of individuals to indirectly influence the behaviour of other individuals by preventing a decision from being made. To put it more simply, it is the power of *A* to indirectly prevent

B from doing something by removing it as a possibility. The third dimension, ideology power, is a little more complicated still. Lukes describes (1984: 38) ideology power as the ways in which ‘political systems prevent demands from becoming political issues or even from being made’. It is the behavioural attribute of large-scale ideologies, such as capitalism, to influence the behaviour of individuals to do or not do something they would or would not ordinarily do. To put it more simply, it is the power of *A* to affect the mindset of *B* to make them do or not do something.

Table 2.1 (below) shows the way in which all three dimensions could be operationalised in order to critically investigate the historical development of the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning. Interestingly, each dimension of power needs to be operationalised in two different ways: people; and planning documents and the planning system. People affect planning documents and the planning system with respect to the provision of certainty. However, planning documents and the planning system also affect people in the same respect. Importantly, it was decided that this thesis would examine only Lukes’ first dimension of power, decision-making power. This is because it is the dimension most accessibly operationalised. The second and third dimensions require high-level insider knowledge not readily available. As shown in Table 2.1, for decision-making power, this thesis will examine the power of people to directly affect planning documents and the planning system with respect to the provision of certainty. This will entail examining the decisions of planners, politicians, advisors, advocates and lobbyists. However, it will also examine the power of planning documents and the planning systems themselves to directly provide certainty to stakeholders. This will entail examining the effects of the planning controls contained within the planning documents and the planning system.

Table 2.1: Operationalisation of Lukes’ Power Dimensions

Dimensions / Operationalisation	People	Planning Document / Planning System
Dimension 1 - Decision-making power	Look for direct ways people influence decisions around the planning documents/system with respect to the provision of certainty	Look for indirect ways planning documents/system influence the provision of certainty for stakeholders
	e.g. politicians, advisors, planners, advocates, lobbyists, etc.	e.g. the use of planning controls
Dimension 2 - Non-decision-making power	Look for indirect ways people influence non-decisions around	Look for indirect ways the planning documents/system

	planning documents/system with respect to the provision of certainty	influence the provision of certainty for stakeholders, i.e. so stakeholders cannot challenge the provision of certainty
	e.g. politicians, advisors, planners, advocates, lobbyists etc.	e.g. the use of planning controls
Dimension 3 - Ideology power	Look for ways people use ideologies to influence decisions around planning documents/system with respect to the provision of certainty	Look for ways planning documents /system reflect ideologies that perpetuate a particular mindset
	e.g. politicians, advisors, planners e.g. ideologies such as state welfare liberalism, neoliberalism	e.g. the use of planning controls e.g. ideologies such as state welfare liberalism, neoliberalism

Conclusion

In attempting to explain Foucault’s genealogical methods, this thesis has identified what it believes to be genealogy’s five key methodological principles: history, problematisation, discourse, discontinuity and power. The sum of these principles offer a unique and valuable approach, one that seeks to understand how the ideas of discourse and power can be used to explain the historical development of a present-day problem. This section has deliberately tried to avoid using examples from outside of Foucault to explain genealogy, except with the principle of power. This is because the following section demonstrates how genealogy has been used in planning history practice. Together, both sections will explain and demonstrate the potential of genealogy.

2.4 Genealogy in planning history

Having explained Foucault’s approach through the identification of five key interdependent methodological principles, it is necessary to explore how genealogy has been utilised practically within the planning history field. While genealogy has experienced considerable uptake right across the social sciences (Thompson, 2004; Williams, 2005), its use within the planning field has been rather limited (Fischler, 1998). The main proponents of the genealogical approach within planning history were Christine Boyer (1983), Paul Rabinow (1989) and Raphaël Fischler (1993). Margo Huxley (2005) and Jean Hillier (2013) are more recent proponents. However, as the former has placed a public embargo

on her major work and the latter utilised genealogy only in a minor piece, they have not been included in this evaluation. The purpose of this section is to critically analyse the major genealogical investigations of these proponents against the five principles identified previously. It aims to demonstrate how they have been used, as well as providing opportunities upon which this thesis can improve. It will be shown that the use of the genealogical approach by Boyer, Rabinow and Fischler generally adheres to the five key interdependent methodological principles. However, there exist opportunities to make explicit these principles in the empirical chapters of this thesis.

Dreaming the Rational City

The first significant foray of planning history into genealogy is urban historian Christine Boyer's work, *Dreaming the Rational City: The Myth of American City Planning* (1983). The 322-page book is largely adapted from her doctoral thesis, *The Language of City Planning: An Essay in Historical and Philosophical Understanding* (1972), which sought to explore the historical development of planning in the United States through discourse. More than a decade later, towards the height of Foucault's popularity, Boyer revisited the data found within her thesis using a genealogical approach. The end result was *Dreaming the Rational City*. This section attempts to critically analyse this work against the five key interdependent methodological principles identified in the second section.

The key principle of history is very much present in *Dreaming the Rational City*. Boyer's work is historical in nature. It explores the historical development of planning in the United States in a period from 1890 to 1945. Interestingly, her thesis spans the period from 1890 to 1970. This exploration is achieved through the examination and discussion of planning-related discourse. As Boyer wrote (1983: ix), the aim of the book is to demonstrate how the 'quest for an order to the American city... gave rise in the twentieth century to a body of planning knowledge and a series of institutional procedures'. She ultimately finds that while planning in the United States began with the goal of creating better cities, this goal became co-opted by political-economic interests. The book is divided into four periods, not labelled as phases or *epistemes*: 1890-1909, 1909-1916, 1916-1929 and 1929-1945. Each of these periods is divided into broad themes relating to ways of thinking during that period.

The key principle of the problem is somewhat present in the work. Boyer's book does not seek to analyse a problematised present-day practice, particularly one that is ingrained within society. Rather, the book simply seeks to explore the historical development of planning in the United States for a period of only 55 years. In this sense, planning itself was the problem to be investigated. However, with respect to the second understanding of the problem, she does identify quite implicitly a variety of practices, such as the delivery of housing, which became problems that necessitated the need for a planning response.

The key principle of discourse features prominently in the work. As mentioned earlier, in order to explore the historical development of planning in the United States, Boyer seeks to examine the discourse relating to the establishment and growth of the planning profession. In doing so, she utilises a range of archival sources, most notably professional journals, including the *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*. Boyer finds that early planning discourse had its origins in a number of different altruistic ideas, such as the parks and city beautiful movement, municipal art schemes and housing reforms. These ideas helped frame the profession as a driver for the improvement of cities for the reasons of public good. However, the political-economic realities of society, mainly private property interests, conspired to shift the nature of planning discourse, particularly through the introduction of planning strategies. Soon, the goal of planning was seen to be protecting private property interests.

Very relatedly, the key principle of discontinuity is present in the work. Although she does not use Foucauldian terminology, Boyer identifies a major discontinuity in the way in which the up-and-coming profession was framed. In doing so, she implicitly identifies two different *epistemes* present in the discourse of planning in the United States discussed above: planning thought for the public good; and planning thought for the protection of private property interests.

Also relatedly, the key principle of power is present in the work. Boyer uses the principle of power to determine how, by whom and why various individuals and bodies shaped planning knowledge and thus practice. Power is used as a way to explain the relationship in the discourse between planning knowledge. The whom- and why-foci are not strictly in accordance with Foucault's use of power, instead better aligning with Lukes (1984) idea of power – her analysis focuses on the first two

dimensions of power. Interestingly, she uses the term power sparsely, preferring to keep the power relations more implicit though her analysis of power broadly aligns with the principle.

Boyer’s seminal work, *Dreaming the Rational City*, provides a fairly consistent use of genealogy. Her analysis makes use of all five key interdependent methodological principles identified in the second section (see Table 2.2). However, it is let down by its non-problematized focus on a specific time period in the development of the planning profession in the United States. Regardless, it is a solid piece of research that demonstrated the value of this approach to researching planning history.

Table 2.2: Genealogical Principles in *Dreaming the Rational City* (Boyer, 1983)

Principle / Text	Dreaming the Rational City (Boyer, 1983)
History	✓
Problem	✓
Discourse	✓
Discontinuity	✓
Power	✓

French Modern

On the surface, the inclusion of American anthropologist Paul Rabinow’s work, *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (1989), in this exploration of genealogical approaches to planning history may initially seem odd, especially as it does not identify itself as a genealogy – the term was absent throughout. However, the book, which was expanded from a previous historical project, uses the Foucauldian ideas of power and knowledge to explore the ways in which norms and forms of the social environment ultimately led to the emergence of urban regulation in the form of modern planning in France. As such, it is considered by some (e.g. Fischler, 1998) to be a genealogical analysis of planning history.

The key principle of history is present in *French Modern*. Rabinow’s work is certainly historical in nature. It explores the norms and forms of the social environment in France between the 1830s and the 1930s and, in doing so, highlights the emergence of urban regulation, manifested as French planning.

Rabinow ultimately finds that a group of men of various occupations was responsible for creating new knowledge and practices relating to social control, which led to the social regulation of urban planning. The book is divided into ten chapters each relating to a different theme, including social paternalism, welfare and urbanism. These themes are presented in a chronological fashion. Over the course of the work, links between the themes and their responsibilities in shaping planning are slowly revealed.

The key principle of the problem is implicit in *French Modern*. Unlike Boyer's work (1983), which does not truly seek to analyse a present-day practice, particularly one that is ingrained with society, Rabinow's analysis seeks to analyse a present-day practice in the form of urban regulation. He examines the then present-day practices of the 1950s to 1970s, at the beginning of the book. While he does not use the term problematisation, he explores this practice as if it was a problem for investigation. His analysis explores the events surrounding the emergence of the urban regulation of modern planning in France over a near-100-year period. Moreover, with respect to Foucault's second understanding of the problem, this analysis also explores the various practices that became problems for urban France.

The key principle of discourse is also present in the work though it is not as pronounced as it is in Boyer's work. Throughout *French Modern*, Rabinow examines the discourses relating to the social environment and urban regulation in France. Particular attention is paid to specific fields of knowledge, norms, forms, technologies and spaces. He finds that early regulation of the social environment had its origins in ideas rooted in the historical, political and cultural realities of society, which resulted in regulatory outcomes based on political outcomes and self-interest. However, the emergence of urban specialists in the early-twentieth century helped shift these discourses along an idea of the public good. It is within these fields of knowledge that the key principle of power is also explored. In much the same way as Boyer, Rabinow uses the principle to explain how relationships of people and bodies over particular knowledges relating to the social environment resulted in the emergence of various regulatory practices in France. However, as with Boyer, the use of power is rather implicitly stated throughout the book.

Closely related, the key principle of discontinuity is also found in Rabinow’s work though, as with Boyer, Foucauldian terminology is not used. Rabinow identifies two different *epistemes*, which he also terms ‘stages’, present in the development of modern planning in France: the ‘techno-cosmopolitanism’ stage in which the social environment was regulated in accordance with the historical, political and cultural realities of society; and the ‘middling modernism’ stage in which the urban environment was regulated by specialists dedicated for the good of the public (Rabinow, 1989: 12-13).

Though the Foucauldian inspiration is mostly implicit, Rabinow’s *French Modern* actually meets all of the characteristics of a genealogical investigation. It made strong use of all five key interdependent methodological principles identified in the second section (see Table 2.3). In doing so, it reveals the value – if not named – of using genealogy to understand planning history.

Table 2.3: Genealogical Principles in *French Modern* (Rabinow, 1989)

Principle / Text	French Modern (Rabinow, 1989)
History	✓
Problem	✓
Discourse	✓
Discontinuity	✓
Power	✓

Standards of Development

Arguably the most significant promoter for the use of genealogy in planning history is urban planner Raphaël Fischler. He first used the approach in his doctoral thesis, *Standards of Development: On the Birth of Zoning as a Social Practice of Regulation* (1993), which, as its title would suggest, seeks to explore the historical development of zoning regulations in the United States. Fischler synthesised this work into his famous article, ‘Toward a Genealogy of Planning: Zoning and the Welfare State’ (1998), in which he strongly advocates for the genealogical approach. As the latter work is essentially a small sample of the former, this section will focus on the doctoral thesis, critically analysing it against the five key, interdependent methodological principles identified in the second section.

The key principle of history is very much present in *Standards of Development*. Fischler's doctoral thesis explores the historical development of zoning standards, particularly those relating to residential development, as the primary form of land-use regulation in the United States. However, its exact timeframe is rather unclear. While it did examine urbanisation as far back as the ancient era, the thesis focuses largely on the 1850s to the 1930s. It ultimately finds that zoning was the result of efforts by the American ruling-class, such as business owners and politicians, to control both the urban space and the urban population. It is divided into six chapters each relating to a different line of inquiry into the problem. The key chapters investigate the emergence of the single-family home as an ideal, how the ideological values of the single-family home became institutionalised and how early forms of development control and the tenement housing code came together to form zoning.

The key principle of the problem is present in *Standards of Development*. It attempts more boldly than the previous two texts to identify the problems that necessitated planning controls, Foucault's second understanding of the principle of the problem. He does not try to explicitly problematise the present-day practice of zoning. Rather, he tries to examine the practices that became problems. Fischler (1993: 31) wrote, 'Practices, especially practices of government, may not be taken for granted. Not taking them for granted means, in this context, trying to understand what the problem is, really, that they try to solve. The question we must ask, then, is what problem – or rather, what problems (plural) – it was that the inventors of zoning tried to solve'.

The key principle of discourse is present in Fischler's doctoral thesis. However, as was the case with Rabinow, this principle is nowhere near as pronounced as that of Boyer's analysis. In fact, Fischler only uses the term discourse on four occasions. Rather, in *Standards of Development*, he implicitly touches on the discourses relating to the standards for residential planning and design. He finds that discourses around health, safety, efficiency, the single-family home and quantitative thresholds became normalised and institutionalised in land-use zoning in the United States.

Unlike the other two analyses, Fischler's *Standards of Development* does not fully adhere to the principle of discontinuity. As identified in the second section, the principle of discontinuity refers to

changes in ordering knowledge over time. Fischler’s work does not identify any such changes. Rather, it just identifies the different elements that had to be in place to allow land-use zoning to become an accepted development regulation. There was no great shift in planning knowledge during this period. Fischler finds that it was consistently about controlling both the urban space and the urban population through problem-definition. However, this may just suggest that there was one continuous *episteme* for the period in question.

On first glance, it would appear that Fischler’s analysis does not contain the key principle of power. The principle barely garners a mention in the methodology section. However, upon deeper inspection, the explanatory idea of power can actually be seen in the work, albeit only implicitly. Fischler’s analysis examines the relations between various people that allowed land-use zoning regulations to come into effect, such as the Advisory Committee on Zoning, set up by the then Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, using its influence to define the benefits of zoning. While not in strict accordance with Foucault’s use of power, in this respect, *Standards of Development* can be considered to employ the principle of power.

Fischler’s doctoral thesis, *Standards of Development*, provides a fairly consistent use of genealogy. His analysis makes use, albeit to differing extents, of four of the five key interdependent methodological principles in the second section (see Table 2.4). It is let down, however, by its inability to identify different *epistemes* and discontinuities in knowledge during the development of land-use zoning in the United States. This may be due to the timeframe employed: 1850s to 1930s. If the genealogy of zoning was followed to the present day, there may have been discontinuities in the way it is now viewed. Regardless, it is a solid piece of research that demonstrated the value of the approach to planning history.

Table 2.4: Genealogical Principles in *Standards of Development* (Fischler, 1993)

Principle / Text	Standards of Development (Fischler, 1993)
History	✓
Problem	✓
Discourse	✓

Discontinuity	✘
Power	✔

Conclusion

As can be seen in Table 2.5, the three main genealogical texts in planning history all generally follow the key interdependent methodological principles of genealogy identified in the second section. Firstly, they are all historical, which is a given considering they examine planning history. In doing so, two of the three divide their analyses into broad themes. However, this thesis has chosen to examine explanatory themes within three phases, as each phase represents an *episteme*. Secondly, not surprising given the nature of their topics of investigation, all three examples seem to support most strongly Foucault’s second understanding of the principle of the problem. That is, they seek mostly to investigate the practices that became problems, necessitating planning responses, rather than a specific problematised practice. As the topic aligns with both understandings of the principle, this thesis will make it clear that it is investigating the problem of the provision of certainty within Melbourne metropolitan planning, as well as the various practices that became problems. Thirdly, the principle of discourse is common to all three analyses, albeit to differing degrees. The examination of discourses and their effect on historical development can be explicit or implicit, depending on the aims of the research. The latter is more in line with Foucault’s genealogical turn. Fourthly, two of the three analyses strongly identify discontinuities in *epistemes* within planning knowledge over time. Finally, all of the analyses adhere to the principle of power though the analysis of power is only implicit within all works. To these ends, this section has demonstrated how well the five key methodological principles of genealogy can be utilised by planning histories. Moreover, it has shown that genealogy is a supremely suitable methodological approach to use for this project.

Table 2.5: Comparison of Genealogy Principles in Planning Practice

Principle / Text	Dreaming the Rational City (Boyer, 1983)	French Modern (Rabinow, 1989)	Standards of Development (Fischler, 1993)
History	✔	✔	✔
Problem	✔	✔	✔
Discourse	✔	✔	✔

Discontinuity	✓	✓	✗
Power	✓	✓	✓

3. CERTAINTY IN A PLANNING CONTEXT

3.1 Introduction

Academic and professional interest in certainty has grown strongly within the planning discipline in recent years. To explain and situate that interest in certainty most clearly, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section traces the historical development of the term certainty within planning. It finds that the term made explicit the notion of certainty – that planning should provide assurances with respect to the development of property. The second section traces the historical development of the planning profession from the mid-to-late-nineteenth century. It finds that the planning profession increasingly attempted to overcome uncertainty and provide certainty. The final section determines from a review of the planning literature how certainty is actually provided within planning and, more specifically, within Melbourne metropolitan planning. It finds that certainty is provided through the use of statutory planning controls, which in Victoria are contained within planning schemes.

3.2 From certainty to uncertainty: the historical development of the term certainty in planning

The term certainty first entered planning discourse in the 1960s (PAG, 1965). This section traces the historical development of this term within international planning literature. Its purpose is to document and explain the context in which the term has been used. As will be shown below, the use of the term occurred in four distinct waves: the 1960s; the late-1970s to 1980s; 1990s; and the mid-2000s to the present. Each of these waves coincided with a period of unease for the development industry, caused by either economic decline or unfavourable development conditions. As such, the planning literature increasingly responded to requests from the development industry for more certainty, known as development certainty (Fingland, 2011). These pressures also led planners to attempt to seek more certainty for themselves and their actions during the planning process, known as process certainty (Abbott, 2005). The former is the focus of this research.

The first wave: 1960s

The small and largely unknown first wave of certainty within a planning context occurred in Britain during the 1960s. The earliest recorded use of the term appears in a report by the Planning Advisory Group (PAG) into the British planning system (PAG, 1965). Commissioned in 1964 by the preceding Conservative Government against the problematic backdrop of building construction failure, for many reasons, to meet increasing demand (Ward, 1994), the PAG's report identified the inflexibility of the prevailing single development plan system and instead called for a two-plan system consisting of a guiding structure plan and more detailed local plans (PAG, 1965). The term certainty was used in the analysis of the existing development plans. PAG wrote, 'The [current] plans have thus acquired the appearance of certainty and stability, which is misleading since the primary use zonings may themselves permit a wide variety of use within a particular allocation' (PAG, 1965: para. 1.21). Unfortunately, the authors did not expand on their use of the term certainty. What is clear, however, was that they used the term to refer to certainty regarding development outcomes.

The term, or technically its antonym, appeared again in the planning sphere four years later. Friend and Jessop (1969) used the term uncertainty in their examination of a Coventry development plan, which was undertaken before the aforementioned PAG report and the subsequent changes to the British planning system in 1968. The pair found that there was a level of uncertainty amongst the planners with respect to reaching a decision on several of the proposals found within the plan. They grouped these uncertainties into three broad classifications: 'uncertainties in knowledge of the external planning environment'; 'uncertainties as to the future intentions in related fields of choice'; and 'uncertainties as to appropriate value judgements' (Friend and Jessop, 1969: 88-89). The pair then presented proposals designed to reduce these uncertainties, thereby providing certainty for planning decisions during the plan-making process. This type of certainty was different from that first mentioned by the PAG. The certainty to which Friend and Jessop referred was for the planners, rather than for developers.

The first wave of interest in the term proved more like a ripple. However, despite its limited use and uptake, this ripple was the beginning of what would eventually become a much bigger phenomenon. Unfavourable development conditions led to the term first being used with respect to development. It

was soon also used to refer to certainty within the plan-making process. Unfortunately, the specific forces that drove its use are unknown.

The second wave: late-1970s – 1980s

During the turbulent period of the late-1970s and 1980s, a second wave of the use of the term certainty within planning occurred. The term first appeared in Australian planning literature in the late-1970s. Morris (1979) argued that the Victorian planning system, typical of that found in the other Australian states at the time, was experiencing conflict between the need to provide certainty and the need for flexibility. She claimed that the traditional planning system provided certainty for those involved in the process 'by way of planning schemes and IDOs under the *Town and Country Planning Act*' (Morris, 1979: 99). However, increasing but unspecified uncertainties and a move towards discretionary approval of permits within the planning system – a move designed to aid the development industry – meant that the provision of certainty was challenged by a need for flexibility. The identification of this change was the extent to her work. Unfortunately, Morris did not elaborate on the forces responsible for these changes. Moreover, she did not identify the source of her ideas. One can only speculate that the deepening recession in Victoria at the time (McLoughlin, 1992) may have played a role. While no authors directly picked up on Morris' ideas, due most likely to the nature of her publication – a book specifically detailing the Victorian planning system (1979) – the effect of a changing planning system on the provision of certainty for development would again attract attention during the third wave of the term's use.

Two years later, the term again appeared in Australian planning literature. Freestone (1981) used it to describe the legitimisation of the early planning profession in Australia. He wrote, 'Planning promised certainty in investment decisions' (Freestone, 1981: 16). It would do this by ensuring that inappropriate development, which may have compromised the value of neighbouring properties, would not be permitted. Low (1981) also briefly discussed the use of the terms certainty and flexibility by the Victorian Minister for Planning in his outline of the objectives of the Department of Planning in the late-1970s. Low remarked (1981: 112), 'But certainty and flexibility are opposite poles. To say that the

Government wants both is to say nothing at all'. However, this referred to the corporate planning of Victorian government departments and not to development.

Christensen (1985) ensured that the term entered United States planning literature in the mid-1980s. Like the work of Friend and Jessop (1969), in an attempt to ensure responsible planning, she identified the ways in which the planning process should deal with uncertainty and thus provide more certainty – but for planners, not developers. Christensen presented a matrix comprising four squares (see Figure 3.1) to show that certainty was provided to solve planning problems when the means (technology) and ends (goals) were known. Like Morris (1979) with the idea of flexibility, Christensen argued that ‘a crucial planning task is to discover, assess, and address uncertainty’ (Christensen, 1985: 63). She then suggested a range of improvements to planning processes that aimed to fill the empty matrix squares, thus providing certainty. Christensen later built on this work (1999).

<Image removed due to copyright restrictions>

Figure 3.1: Prototype Conditions of Planning Problems (Christensen, 1985: 64)

The second wave of interest in the term was seemingly more significant than the first but still quite limited. Unfortunately, no substantive link can be found between the two waves. As with the first wave, use of the term varied between referring to development and referring to the planning process. There was also difficulty in trying to determine the forces that drove the use of the term during this second wave. The only indication was Morris’ (1979) mention of uncertainties and a move towards the use of discretion within the Victorian planning system. The 1970s and 1980s were a period of substantial economic upheaval. This instability may have been responsible for the growing interest in certainty.

The third wave: 1990s

Undeniably, the economic upheaval that accompanied the end of the long boom in the 1970s, set in motion a decades-long series of significant changes to British planning system and led to renewed academic interest in the term certainty in the 1990s.

In 1970s and early-1980s Britain, the Labour and then Conservative governments, at the behest of the development industry, embarked on a programme to reform the planning system by reorienting it towards the needs of the market (Ward, 1994). The most significant reform measure was the move away from plan-based decision-making towards negotiated decision-making for projects. Since the 1940s and prior to this reform, plans guided local development. Believing that they would be able to negotiate better outcomes for themselves on development approvals, the development industry lobbied for this reduction of state powers (Healey, 1992). However, better outcomes did not eventuate, as local governments employed specialised negotiators. Healey (1992), one of the first to pick up on the term certainty during this period, noticed that the development industry quickly became critical of the changes it originally demanded. The changes reduced the only mechanism – local plans – through which it received certainty for its projects. Of the plan-based system, Healy wrote, ‘It provided certainty, reduced risks for developers and effectively structured land and property markets and private-sector development activity’ (1992: 15). However, she did not mention how the inherent discretion of the British planning system affected this certainty. The plans served only to indicate a desired future urban form; development approvals were left to the discretion of local authorities, and this affected how much certainty could be provided (Booth, 1995). Regardless, reforms that ignored these plans and, instead, negotiate development projects reduced whatever certainty was available.

Further Conservative Government reforms to the British planning system were made in the mid-1980s (Ward, 1994). The development industry, while no doubt appreciative of the previous attempt to provide the planning process with a market-focus and increased flexibility, pushed hard for a return to plans for development, a return to certainty. Healey described this as the desire for ‘certainty-with-flexibility’ (1992: 17). Interestingly, Morris (1979) had identified this conflict between the need for

certainty and flexibility nearly two decades earlier in Australia. The government again obliged the development industry and introduced the concept of development plans, which were similar to the previous plans in that they also provided a framework for development (Healey, 1992). However, these new plans were to be far more market-aware than their predecessors. Rather than solely representing the interests of the planners, they were also to take into consideration property and development markets. Tewdwr-Jones (1999) found that these changes to the planning system did provide a framework of certainty, not just for developers but also for the others involved in the process – i.e. neighbouring property owners and planners – by indicating the acceptable type and location of future development. However, it was part of a much greater change happening within British planning. Joining the statutory plan-based system were project-based planning and strategic spatial planning. These other forms of planning were supposed to be flexible enough to respond to the needs of the market as necessary in times of economic upheaval. All in all, the changes show, as Ward summarised, that British planning ‘had a role in providing a measure of certainty within the land market that has reduced the risks of unprofitable investment’ (1994: 272).

During this period, various authors were also exploring the effect different planning systems had on the provision of certainty. Booth (1995; 1996) compared the discretionary British planning system to those regulatory and hybrid discretionary-regulatory planning systems found in other countries. He found that each planning system attempted to reduce uncertainty and provide certainty in different ways for all those involved in the planning process. Moreover, he found that no one system achieved this better than any other. Rather, each system simply needed to reach an agreement as to the level of certainty required (Booth, 1995; 1996). Similarly, Tang et al. (2002) looked specifically at the Hong Kong hybrid planning system, which involved discretionary approval for applications made within a statutory framework of legally binding land-use zoning plans. They found that this type of planning system provided ‘a considerable degree of certainty’ for development capital (Tang et al., 2002: 2481).

Seemingly unaware of the happenings in Britain, the term certainty reappeared in Australia. Western Australia’s Legislation Committee (1996) released a report on the *Planning Legislative Amendment Bill 1995*. In it, the Committee considered whether the amendment achieved an appropriate balance between providing certainty for developers and upholding environmental protection. The term was

influenced by the submission to the bill from the Urban Development Institute of Australia (UDIA), Western Australian Division, which ‘indicated that developers are seeking some certainty in the planning process’ (Legislation Committee, 1996: 14). It is interesting to note that despite its appearance within the report, the term certainty did not appear in the approved legislation. Walton (1997) also used the term in her examination of the changing NSW planning system. However, she did little more than identify the debate concerning the need for certainty within an increasingly flexible system.

The third wave of interest in the term can be summarised as an exploration of the ways in which the planning system affected the provision of certainty. This wave was born in Britain during the turbulent economic period from the 1970s to the 1990s, in which the development industry was requesting a better return on its investments. Back in Australia, the development industry was also requesting this certainty. A small collection of academics soon picked up on the idea and the term.

The fourth wave: mid-2000s – present

The release of several high-profile Australian metropolitan plans around the turn of the millennium, as well as the global uncertainty that surrounded the global financial crisis of the late-2000s, catalysed the fourth and largest wave of interest in certainty. At the heart of this wave was the reconceptualisation of strategic spatial planning theory that emerged in Europe during the same period.

As mentioned above, during the economic turmoil of the second wave, the activity of strategic spatial planning lost favour in Europe and was replaced with an emphasis on facilitating development projects (Albrechts, 2006a; 2009). It eventually returned to prominence in the 1990s and 2000s, driven by a number of factors, including concerns over improperly planned developments, environmental issues, such as climate change, and the desire to attract economic investment, as well as an increased recognition of the complexities of planning (Healey, 2004; Albrechts, 2006a). However, accompanying this return was a growing realisation that traditional approaches were no longer suitable for an increasingly complex world. As such, new approaches to strategic spatial planning began to emerge. These new approaches stressed the transformative, socio-spatial process of reimagining a city or region through the development of plans, strategies, policies and projects to manage spatial change (Healey,

1997; 2004; Albrechts, 2004; 2006a; 2006b). They differed from the traditional blueprint⁵ and synoptic⁶ approaches through their recognition of the need for flexibility. Although they did not use the terms certainty or uncertainty, their ideas were an important precursor to what would follow in the coming decades.

The fourth wave of interest in the term began in Australia in the mid-2000s. At contrast to the preceding two waves, this wave began during a seemingly favourable economic period. It was the release of metropolitan plans for five capital cities – Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth and Adelaide – around the turn of the twenty-first century that catalysed renewed academic interest in certainty. Gleeson et al. (2004) returned the term to Australian planning literature in their review of the above-mentioned plans. One of their findings was that these plans were created within two operational frames: the blueprint approach that attempted to impart certainty through the use of static goals; and/or an indicative approach that attempted to impart flexibility through the use of dynamic goals, the more recent European approach. This identification of a certainty element within Australian metropolitan planning was unfortunately the extent to their work on the term.

Bunker and Searle (2007) furthered an interest in development certainty when they similarly examined the metropolitan plans of Sydney and Melbourne. They found that both plans were, to differing extents, driven by the existing desire to provide certainty and a more recent desire to provide economic competitiveness. The authors wrote, ‘Developers seek a degree of certainty about where development is allowed and what transport and other key infrastructure will be provided to support development, especially where urban expansion is allowed’ (Bunker and Searle, 2007: 639). They found that the development industry, led by the Property Council of Australia (PCA), influenced the drive to provide certainty in the case of Sydney. The pair unfortunately did not explore in depth why the property

⁵ Blueprint planning was the primary approach to planning between the 1910s and the 1940s (Hall, 2002). Taking its name and form from the blueprint designs of architects and civil engineers, the approach specified the physical layout and design of cities and regions.

⁶ Synoptic planning covers several approaches to planning based on a process of scientific rationality (Hillier and Healey, 2008). Rational-comprehensive planning was an approach to planning that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, which involved the selection of a preferred course of action for a city or region from the identification of all possible courses of action to meet predetermined goals (Meyerson and Banfield, 1955; Banfield, 1959). The systems approach to planning introduced scientific analysis to rational planning in the late-1960s and early-1970s. The systems planning approach argued for the use of cybernetics, the scientific study and control of complex systems, to control planning systems (McLoughlin, 1969; Chadwick, 1971).

industry was requesting certainty during a period of relative economic prosperity. Later, they would explain that it was due to unfavourable conditions and that it was 'essential to attract investment to Sydney, already suffering from a decline in housing affordability and experiencing a net loss in interstate migration in nearly every year' (Bunker and Searle, 2009: 108). The Australian resources boom of this period had simply masked a more localised economic downturn. Important to the debate, Bunker and Searle (2009) also acknowledged that increasing uncertainties within the urban environment were making this provision of certainty challenging. In their subsequent reviews, the pair found that metropolitan planning in Australia was undergoing a paradigm shift similar to that happening in Europe (Bunker and Searle, 2009; Searle and Bunker, 2010). They argued that Australia was beginning to move away from providing certainty through long-term plans and towards dynamic and fluid plans that acknowledged, and could be quickly updated to deal with, uncertainties.

From the mid-2000s, another Australian was beginning to unpack the concept of uncertainty in the plan-making process. Abbott (2005; 2009; 2012) devised and tested his conceptual framework of planning as managing uncertainty, which he defined as 'a perceived lack of knowledge, by an individual or group, that is relevant to the purpose or action being undertaken' (2005: 238). This understanding was similar to that of Friend and Jessop (1969) and of Christensen (1985). The framework (see Figure 3.2) found that there were five types of uncertainty that affected planning: causal uncertainty, relating to the physical, ecological and social environment; organisation uncertainty, relating to organisations within the planning process; value uncertainty, relating to individuals within the planning process; external uncertainty, relating to events outside of the planning process; and finally chance, relating to large-scale natural and social events (Abbott, 2005). Abbott categorised these types as environmental uncertainty, process uncertainty or both environmental and process uncertainty. For Abbott, good plan making was about managing these uncertainties.

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Figure 3.2: Dimensions of Environmental and Process Uncertainty (Abbott, 2005: 245)

The increasing importance placed on certainty and uncertainty within Australian planning literature led Fingland (2011) to attempt to trace the concept of certainty. He found that ‘some kind of certainty must be delivered by the operation of the planning system, even though it does not appear to be possible to determine what this comprises in reality and how it is achieved’ (Fingland, 2011: 9). He claimed that the certainty that is provided related mainly to the predictability of the planning system and was restricted to the development industry, confirming opinion that the purpose of planning is now simply to facilitate development.

The issue of uncertainty was again brought to the fore in the early-2010s. The financial crisis just years previous typified for many the unpredictability of the system within which they plan. There was soon a realisation within planning literature that the economic, environmental and social uncertainties of a rapidly changing world pose problems for traditional forms of strategic spatial planning (Balducci et al., 2011a). Balducci et al. proposed a post-structuralist view of strategic spatial planning to bring to light the issue of how to deal with uncertainty.

While there has been increasing recognition of the uncertainties currently facing our cities and regions, there have been few attempts to devise new theories and approaches for strategic spatial planning to deal with them. Hillier (2007; 2010; 2011) presented a multiplanar theory of strategic spatial planning as a process of strategic navigation. Using the work of French post-structuralists Deleuze and Guattari as a theoretical basis, Hillier proposed that strategic spatial planning should operate on two different planes: ‘planes of immanence’ for long-term, open-ended trajectories; and, ‘planes of organisation’ for short-term, closed plans or projects (Hillier, 2010: 455-6). Strategic navigation, based on Hames’

(2007) concept for organisational management, was put forward as a method for venturing into the strategic spatial planning unknown. It required a critical understanding of the existing context in which strategic spatial planning takes place and allowed strategic spatial planning to experiment and adapt to uncertainties that may emerge.

There have been only a handful of cases where new approaches to strategic spatial planning and uncertainty have been explored in practice and documented: exploration in Milan, Italy (Balducci, 2011; Balducci et al., 2011b); an actor-relational approach in Rotterdam, Netherlands (Boelens, 2011); experimentation in Tromsø, Norway (Nyseth 2011; Nyseth, Pløger and Holm, 2010); and strategic navigation in Melbourne, Australia (Wilkinson, 2011). Influenced by a range of theorists and theories, each case presented a new approach that helped re-characterise strategic spatial planning as a flexible process of experimentation and exploration, able to adapt to unforeseen challenges, uncertainties. While the cases highlighted the successes and failures of each of the new approaches, they also highlighted the potential for a change to traditional strategic spatial planning.

However, not everyone within Australia approached the term certainty in this way. Steele and Ruming (2012) took the view that the distinction between certainty and flexibility within planning systems was actually harmful to the planning cause. They believed that flexibility existed within the more-certain, conforming-based planning system and that the flexibility envisaged by more adaptable performance-based planning systems was not possible. The pair argued that the distinction between the two was detrimental to more important issues of planning, such as environmental sustainability. This was contentious on two fronts. Firstly, it wrongly disregarded the potential of the new, more flexible approaches to strategic spatial planning mentioned above to respond to large-scale planning issues, something that they were actively trying to achieve (Balducci et al., 2011a). Secondly, it also disregarded the world in which we plan, especially the influence of particular interest groups. As shown, the development industry and residents groups have consistently requested certainty. Whether or not it is possible, or even in the best interest to provide this certainty, is largely a secondary concern. Due to the political nature of planning, those in charge have little recourse but to cater to these groups.

Importantly, the use of the term certainty has not been confined to the academic world. In recent years, the belief in the need for certainty has gained popularity with various professional planning bodies in Australia (KPMG, 2010). The Local Government and Planning Ministers' Council, a body comprising local government and planning ministers from Australia and New Zealand, listed certainty as a National Planning System Principle (LGPMC, 2009). Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this review to trace all such references. Instead, given the Melbourne-focus of this research, a brief overview of its use in Victoria will be sufficient to demonstrate its increasing use.

The need to be seen to provide certainty within plans and the planning system has slowly become explicit within Victorian state politics. Successive opposition-turned-government parties have campaigned on the platform of increasing certainty within the planning system (Victorian Liberal Nationals Coalition 2010, Victorian Labor, 2014), appealing to local residents to forestall political backlash against development. Moreover, since the late 2000s, planning ministers have been quick to stress how their actions have resulted in more certainty for all stakeholders, especially around land-use zoning decisions (Madden, 2008; Guy, 2012; 2013). The use of the term, however, has not been confined to just the political sphere. Various interests groups, such as the Victorian branches of the Planning Institute of Australia (PIA) (2013) and PCA (2010), have also been strong proponents of the provision of certainty. It is little wonder that Hillier has labelled this pursuit for certainty in Victoria, 'somewhat of a planning doxa' (2013: 8), an unquestioned truth that currently persists.

Compared to its predecessors, the fourth and most recent wave of interest in the term certainty was more like a tsunami. It can be summarised as the exploration of the ways in which strategic spatial planning provides certainty and deals with uncertainty. The term arrived in Australian metropolitan planning in the early-2000s at the behest of a development industry that had fallen on hard times. In Victoria, it quickly expanded its use in professional planning circles. The term was also extended to incorporate the provision of certainty for all stakeholders, including property owners. Meanwhile, in Europe there was emerging a small body of work attempting to devise ways that strategic spatial planning could best deal with increasing uncertainties.

Conclusion

There are many important conclusions to be drawn from tracing the historical development of the term certainty. Firstly, the term was used within the planning literature to represent two different ideas. The most common use and focus of this research – development certainty – was concerned with providing certainty for those involved in the development of property (Fingland, 2011). The other use – process certainty – was concerned with increasing certainty in the plan-making process (Abbott, 2005). Secondly, the literature, mainly from Australia and Britain, showed that the use of the term was linked to development conditions. All four waves occurred following periods of economic decline or unfavourable conditions. It was the development industry requesting certainty that drove changes to the planning system in Britain and metropolitan planning in Australia during the third and fourth waves, respectively. Interestingly, there was a lag time of several years between these changes and academics writing about certainty, attributable most likely to publication lead-time. The use of the term uncertainty itself also began to increase in the fourth wave, during which there were calls to determine the ways in which planning could deal with the issue of uncertainty. However, the most important conclusion to be made is that the term made explicit the notion of certainty – that planning should provide assurances with respect to the development of property. This notion is explored in the next section.

3.3 From uncertainty to certainty: the historical development of planning

As shown above, the term certainty made explicit the underlying notion that planning should provide assurances with respect to the development of property. This section traces the historical development of the planning profession, from the mid-to-late-nineteenth century onwards, across the three countries in which the term certainty was used: Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. It is intended not as a comprehensive chronology of planning – such accounts already exist (see Hall, 1988). Rather, its purpose is to present an alternative account of planning history by demonstrating the ways in which property interests have influenced the development of the profession. As will be shown below, despite its reform origins, it was powerful property interests that largely shaped the profession, which may have led to attempts to provide assurances with respect to the development of property.

Planning's reform origins

It is widely accepted that the origins of modern planning can be traced to the industrialisation of the United Kingdom from the late-eighteenth century, and in efforts to reform the urban problems this created (Cherry, 1988; Hall, 1988). The transformation from an agrarian to industrial economy had a profound impact on human settlement within the sovereign state. Much of the populous left their rural surrounds in search of the employment opportunities offered by quickly developing industrial urban centres (Sutcliffe, 1980). Crucially, Britain's laissez-faire economic system of the time meant there was little interference from government and, as such, much of the resultant urban development occurred without restriction. This resulted in serious health and social problems (Cherry, 1988; Hall, 1988). In these urban areas the provision of water and the disposal of refuse and sewerage were seriously inadequate. Limited water supplies became contaminated with human and industrial effluent leading to a range of health issues that spread through the increasingly overcrowded urban areas (Cherry, 1988; Hall, 1988). Moreover, much of the working class lived in sub-standard conditions as a result of poorly designed and built housing, furthering social dysfunction (Cherry, 1988; Hall, 1988). These problems necessitated urban reform.

The health of urban areas was the first problem to be addressed. Private capital initially proved unable or unwilling to provide the investment in infrastructure and services necessary to address these health problems (Ward, 1994). As such, local governments, empowered under new municipal legislation, took the lead. During the mid-nineteenth century, a series of public health acts were introduced to ensure the adequate sanitation of municipal urban areas in England, achieved eventually through building regulations (Cherry, 1988; Hall, 1988). While fears over government interference and the financial burden of regulation initially limited the scope of this legislation, its results – minimum street widths, maximum building heights and onsite sanitation provision – eventually became mandatory for all municipalities. The leaders behind this local government reform, many of who were progressive industrialists, were motivated as much or more by a sense of philanthropic altruism as they were financial interest in having a healthy, productive workforce (Ward, 1994). Importantly for the

development of planning, this legislative period demonstrated that governments could successfully interfere with market forces and private property rights in order to improve urban conditions (Cullingworth and Nadin, 2006), thereby paving the way for further government action.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the issue of worker housing in urban areas could no longer be ignored. These problems were addressed through various attempts at land and housing reform. Local governments made initial attempts through the creation of municipal housing for the working class but such efforts proved too difficult to maintain and were largely politically unpalatable (Ward, 1994). Meanwhile, several industrialists were experimenting with the creation of purpose-built industrial villages and towns to house their workers (Cherry, 1988; Hall, 1988). These communities were located in more rural areas and offered workers low-density housing close to their source of employment, open space and community facilities. While dozens of industrial villages and towns were created across the United Kingdom, the most noteworthy of these included: Saltaire, built in 1851 by textiles manufacturer, Sir Titus Salt; Port Sunlight, built in 1888 by soap manufacturer, W. H. Lever; and Bournville, built in 1894 by chocolate manufacturer Cadbury. According to Ward (1994), like the municipal public health reformers, these industrialists were motivated, at least in part, by a sense of philanthropic altruism, often religiously motivated. However, there was certainly also a financial motivation behind their creation. Importantly, this period demonstrated what was possible through the regulation of housing and land (Ward, 1994), another crucial step in the development of planning.

Meanwhile, across the Atlantic Ocean, the United States was experiencing the same urban problems as those facing an industrialising United Kingdom (Peterson, 2003). However, the US approach to urban reform was decidedly different to that of the empire from which it had separated some 100 years earlier. The approach favoured was the beautification of existing cities, which became known as the city beautiful movement – by name only as there was no concerted campaign – in the 1890s and 1900s (Cullingworth and Caves, 2003). Drawing on inspiration from Europe, most notably Baron Haussmann's mid-nineteenth century renovation of Paris, the movement sought to remedy these issues through the remodelling of cities to include efficient arrangement of public space, neoclassical public architecture, monuments, municipal art, landscaped thoroughfares and gardens. It was believed that a positive urban environment would instil a sense of civic pride, community and order amongst the

population that, in turn, would reduce crime and increase quality of life (Peterson, 2003). However, as was the case with the industrial villages and towns of the United Kingdom, there was a clear financial motivation to the city beautiful movement. It was believed that the capital improvements and reduced criminality would be beneficial to property values. City beautiful ideas were used in the redesign of several major US cities, most notably Chicago and Washington, DC. The movement also importantly showed that significant remediation of cities was possible (Peterson, 2003).

The city beautiful idea made its way across the Pacific Ocean to Australia around the turn of the twentieth century, just in time for federation and the nation's need to create a new federal capital city (Freestone, 2000). Prior to its arrival, Australia had been dealing with its urban problems in a much more disjointed approach. Its capital cities quickly outgrew their original colonial plans and they too faced the same urban problems associated with industrialisation and urbanisation as the United Kingdom and the US (Proudfoot, 2000). Not surprisingly as a British colony, Australia followed the mother country's lead and set about gradually reforming urban sanitation and housing through the use of regulations. As was the case in Britain, it introduced to the country the prospect that governments could successfully interfere with market forces and private property rights in order to improve urban conditions. Melbourne's urban reform history will be explored in greater detail in the coming chapters.

Back in Britain, the above urban reform ideas helped lay the foundations for the garden city movement, an important precursor to the planning that became popularised in turn-of-the-century-Britain. The garden city idea, attributed to Londoner Ebenezer Howard (1965; 1985), advocated for the construction of new Utopian settlements or garden cities, which were designed to combine the benefits of urban areas – economic and social opportunities – with rural areas – natural amenity and health – without the disadvantages of either (Cherry, 1988; Hall, 1988). These new settlements were originally intended to have a semi-socialist structure whereby the community would collectively own the land and rents would be used to fund public services to the benefit of the community (Pinder, 2005). The Garden City Association was founded in 1899 and later became the Town and Country Planning Association. This organisation was instrumental in the development of two early garden cities – Letchworth and Welwyn, both located in Hertfordshire, England – and the extension of this idea in the form of garden suburbs (Hall, 1988). However, within these cities, the radical, semi-socialistic element of Howard's

original garden city ideal was abandoned in favour of private ownership and capital. Importantly, this movement helped increase social awareness about potential responses to the urban problems still posing a threat to Britain.

Amidst increasing urban growth and shortages of working class housing, the National Housing Reform Council and the Garden City Association, following on from earlier urban reform efforts, lobbied strongly for the introduction of planning legislation in the United Kingdom (Ward, 2004). Their demands were eventually obliged when the reformist Liberal Government introduced and passed the world's first piece of planning legislation through the Parliament of the United Kingdom, the *Housing, Town Planning, Etc. Act 1909*, which could be considered to mark both the beginning of the planning profession and planning as a government action (Ward, 2004). The legislation gave powers to local authorities to prepare local schemes for controlling the development of new housing areas, thereby making planning a function of local government. To these ends, the origins of professional planning were grounded in this desire to overcome urban problems, to create a public good.

Planning's property subversion

While the early urban reform efforts may have led to the establishment of professional planning, it was powerful interests concerned about investment in property that decided its development at the beginning of the twentieth-century. These interests subverted efforts to ensure that planning would not be used to the financial advantage, or at the very least not to the financial disadvantage, of their investments. This section aims to demonstrate just how these property interests have shaped the development of professional planning up until the 1960s, which may explain the development of the notion that planning should provide assurances with respect to the development of property.

As mentioned earlier, Britain's *Housing, Town Planning, Etc. Act 1909* was a milestone in the establishment of professional planning as a government function. A world first, it empowered local governments to prepare planning schemes to control land-use and density (Cherry, 1998). However, the finalised legislation proved far less reformist than that envisioned by the planning movement. The Act made the creation of planning schemes voluntary, deliberately excluded established areas from

planning schemes and rendered useless a betterment fee system designed to pay for the action (Ward, 1994). This outcome was the result of the then Liberal Government and House of Lords unwilling to definitively interfere with property rights (Engels, 2015). Consequently, property owners in established urban areas were spared the possibility of having these rights challenged. This, according to Ward, saw planning 'turned into something that was less an attack on landed interests, more a process of conciliating urban land and development interests into accepting an overall approach' (1994: 38).

Under Conservative and minority Labour Governments, planning in Britain continued along a cautious path (Ward, 1994). Amidst post-Great War rebuilding and mass suburbanisation, the *Housing, Town Planning, Etc. Act 1919* replaced its predecessor, making it compulsory to prepare planning schemes for all areas with a population in excess of 20,000 residents (Cherry, 1988). However, this requirement proved effectively useless, as there were too few planners available to operate the system (Ward, 1994). As such, the Act reverted to an emphasis on new development along garden suburb ideals (Cherry, 1988). The more major advancements of the period were made in the area of housing, through both subsidised municipal and private housing development. The next iteration of legislation, the *Town Planning Act 1925*, did little but consolidate existing pieces of legislation.

Things looked set to change when, in 1929, a progressive Labour Government came to power in Britain pledging to increase the role of planning (Cherry, 1988). In 1931, the *Town and Country Planning Bill* was introduced, granting powers to include established areas within the remit of planning schemes and to ensure the collection of betterment fees (Ward, 1994). However, amidst the economic instability of the Great Depression and a reversion to Conservative government rule, the bill was amended to remove the requirement for the compulsory preparation of planning schemes and severely compromise the extension of planning schemes to established areas (Ward, 1994). The bill passed to become the *Town and Country Plan Act 1932* and British planning remained focused on new extension developments. Again, property owners were largely protected from the potential of planning to interfere with their investments. Life as usual continued for the United Kingdom until the outbreak of World War II.

Across the Atlantic Ocean, the burgeoning American planning movement was engaging in battle with a country fearful of restrictions to private property. Planning tried hard to establish itself amongst the public in early-twentieth century United States. From 1909, a series of national planning conferences was held to help raise the national profile of the profession and discuss the problems affecting cities across the country (Peterson, 2003). As in the United Kingdom, the American planning profession was facing strong resistance from powerful interests (Boyer, 1983). To combat this, planning in the United States began to take the form of a business proposition. The ideas of city beautification mentioned earlier were suffering from increasing criticism regarding their inability to respond to growing US cities and their problems of congestion (Scott, 1969). These ideas were merged in the 1910s with the increasingly popular idea of efficiency. The city efficient movement, as it would become known, built on the city beautiful movement by adding the belief that cities could function much more efficiently if, like industry and business, they were expertly planned along scientific lines (Cullingworth and Caves, 2003). The efficient transportation of people and goods became a significant focus of these plans, providing a tangible benefit to private business. Many business leaders got behind the cause and the city efficient approach became popular across the country.

The rapid growth of cities in the United States continued. This growth brought with it the problem of inappropriate development and perceived undesirable residents. Somewhat ironically, while once concerned about the prospect of planning impinging on their property rights, much of the public were now concerned about the location of industry and racial groups affecting the value of their property and looked to planning for help (Scott, 1969). However, there was also a growing realisation that the city efficient plans created to improve cities were unable to safeguard individual property. As such, the United States turned to Germany for a solution – land-use zoning. In 1916, New York became the first city in the United States to introduce a comprehensive zoning ordinance, which effectively limited property rights by assigning acceptable land-uses to each property (Cullingworth and Caves, 2003). The zoning cause was also helped along in the 1920s with the United States Department of Commerce implementing *A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act 1926*, which allowed local legislative bodies to establish zoning commissions and ordinances, as well as the Supreme Court upholding the legality of zoning ordinances in the same year. These planning controls gained acceptance amongst the American public as a way to protect their investment in property (Fischler, 1998: Cullingworth and Caves, 2003).

Other cities soon followed the lead of New York and implemented zoning ordinances (Cullingworth and Caves, 2003). However, much of this zoning was completed without the establishment of planning commissions, resulting in zoning that was created without an overall vision for the city (Scott, 1969). *A Standard City Planning Enabling Act 1928* attempted to highlight the importance of Planning Commissions by giving them powers to prepare and adopt plans. It is important to note that as the dominant form of capital investment switched in the 1920s and 1930s from business to real estate, so too did the focus of these plans (Cullingworth and Caves, 2003). The city efficient business focus was downplayed. The plans created thereafter, which became known as master plans, were concerned more with outlining general future development than specific business propositions, as the public wanted to know how planning could help benefit their property interests, just as land-use zoning had done (Boyer, 1983). The switch in plan responsibility from private business groups, such as the Merchants Club, later the Commercial Club of Chicago, as was the case of the 1909 Plan of Chicago (Burnham and Bennett, 1993), to independent planning commissions, often operating at a regional level, also evidenced this changing focus. The more balanced and accepted approach became the basis for regional planning, which carried the United States through the economic recovery of the New Deal and well into the remainder of that century.

Across the Pacific Ocean, the Australian planning movement was also trying hard to establish itself within a landscape dominated by property interests. Throughout the 1900s and 1910s, early proponents of the movement looked to both the United States and the United Kingdom to legitimise their efforts and address the problems facing Australian capital cities. City beautiful or garden city ideas inspired the creation of a number of planning proposals for existing Australian capital cities and the plan for the development of a new federal capital city, Canberra (Freestone, 2000; Garnaut, 2000). During this time, planning associations were also formed in most Australian states. These associations put forward proposals that largely reflected garden city ideas (Garnaut, 2000). The movement in Australia also sought legitimisation through national planning conferences, which were held in Adelaide in 1917 and Brisbane in 1918 (Garnaut, 2000). These conferences provided an opportunity for planners, delegates from the state planning associations and members of the general public to meet, discuss and exchange ideas.

Importantly, there was also another crucial element that helped with both the establishment and direction of planning within Australia during this period, one that was typified by the slogan, 'town planning pays' (Freestone, 1981: 16). In order to sell the idea of planning – which included the potential for restrictions to, as well as guarantees for, property rights – to both politicians and the public, the movement set about promoting the message that planning provided a tangible financial benefit (Freestone, 1981; Sandercock, 1990). According to Freestone, 'The slogan [town planning pays] was explicitly meant to convey three things: the economic commonsense of comprehensive town planning; the financial soundness of any planning proposal; and the profit making potential of planning (especially to private entrepreneurs involved with suburban development)' (1981: 16). During this period, the slogan was used in planning literature and public planning lectures and conferences. This financial promotion was much more overt than that which had occurred in the United States. Moreover, unlike the United States, the Australian planning promotion was also immediately targeted at individuals, not just businesses. For a country as obsessed with property ownership and land speculation as Australia (Sandercock, 1979; 1990), the possibility that individuals could benefit financially from planning was important to its wider acceptance.

However, like in the United States, the financial benefit to businesses also played an important role in shaping the development of Australian planning. In the late-1910s and 1920s, mounting problems associated with inappropriate development forced many Australian capital cities to undertake metropolitan planning (Hutchings, 2000). The plans that resulted largely looked to the United States and the city efficient movement for inspiration (Freestone, 1981). As such, there was a prominent focus on the location and transportation of people and goods. Significantly, these plans were justified by their ability to improve business efficiency and the proposals found within were fully costed: the first two components of how planning was financially promoted according to Freestone (1981). Moreover, they also had the added benefit of protecting existing property owners from inappropriate development that could affect the value of their property investments. As such, broadly speaking, there was a noticeable degree of support for these plans from businesses and the public (Freestone, 1981). Unfortunately, due to onset of the Great Depression and, importantly, unreceptive conservative governments in many of these states (Sandercock, 1990), little was to come of these plans (Hutchings, 2000). The future of

planning was then in the hands of government. Over the next two decades, state governments adopted piecemeal approaches to planning legislation (Sandercock, 1990). It was not until a threat from the Commonwealth Government to withhold state housing funding during World War II that each state adopted legislation and a consistent approach to planning in Australia (Howe, 2000).

It was also World War II that helped advance planning in the United Kingdom. During 1940 and 1941, aerial bombing by the German Luftwaffe significantly damaged parts of London and other key industrial cities (Cherry, 1988). Not surprisingly, the urban property market in these areas suffered and development interests sought assurances from government before they were willing to rebuild (Ward, 1994). Against this backdrop of near unanimous support amongst vested interests for some degree of planning, the Conservative-Coalition Government under Churchill advocated for the introduction of a comprehensive planning system. Throughout the early-1940s, several inquiries were held into matters relating to planning: industrial population (Barlow Commission, 1940); rural land use (Scott Committee, 1942); and compensation and betterment (Uthwatt Committee, 1942). While there was popular support for the implementation of these reports, Churchill moved cautiously, heightening suspicion that vested interests were responsible for the delay (Ward, 1994). Eventually in 1943, the Ministry of Town and Country Planning was established and the *Town and Country Planning (Interim Development) Act 1943* legislated, which extended planning controls to the entire country. The follow up *Town and Country Planning Act 1944*, known colloquially as the 'Blitz and Blight Act,' gave powers to compulsory purchase war-damaged property to assist in reconstruction efforts (Cherry, 1988). Despite these efforts, there were still concerns that vested property interests averse to the proposed planning agenda were preventing the most important aspects of the reports from being legislated (Ward, 1994). Meanwhile, master plans were being developed for London and other cities in preparation for post-war redevelopment (Cherry, 1988).

Two months after victory in Europe in May 1945, the Labour party won a landslide victory at the general elections, forming an outright majority government. Still riding the wartime consensus for planning, the Labour Government immediately focused on the development of new towns (Ward, 1994). Two years later, it introduced the *Town and Country Planning Act 1947*, which ushered in what is referred to as the 'new planning system' in the United Kingdom (Cullingworth and Nadin, 2006: 22).

This radical piece of legislation nationalised development rights. Planning permission was now required for nearly all forms of development, which was to be decided in accordance with development plans (Cherry, 1988). Property owners who had their development rights reduced by the new controls were duly compensated, while developers were required to pay substantial charges for all new development. These charges were blamed for slowing down a recovering development industry and public support for planning began to wane (Ward, 1994). The Conservative Party was returned to power in 1951, abolishing the development charges at the behest of the development industry through the *Town and Country Planning Act 1953* (Ward, 1994). Minor changes to planning legislation would continue to occur into the late-1950s and early-1960s.

Conclusion

As planning involves to some degree a limitation of property rights, it has always been subject to influence from property interests. As can be seen above, despite well-intentioned reform origins, the development of planning in Australia, Britain and the United States of America has been beholden to powerful property interests. As was the case in the United Kingdom, these interests stopped the establishment of a proper planning system until the 1940s. Even then, these interests shaped its form. In the United States and Australia, the economic benefits of planning to business and the public had to be stressed in order to ensure its uptake, resulting in the use of land-use zoning controls. Thus, to these ends, planning has developed only in so far as powerful property interests have allowed. While it is difficult to determine the exact cause of the notion of certainty with respect to planning and the development of property, it is from the above situation that the notion emerged.

3.4 The provision of certainty in professional planning

Having demonstrated that the term certainty made explicit the notion that planning should provide assurances with respect to the development of property, it is now necessary to determine how planning actually provides this certainty. This section examines the previously identified literature to determine the ways in which the profession provides certainty for property owners. Its purpose is to apply this knowledge to inform how certainty has been provided in Melbourne metropolitan planning. As will be

shown below, certainty is provided through the use of statutory planning controls that, in Victoria, are contained within planning schemes and most commonly informed by planning documents.

The provision of certainty in planning

As identified in the first section, there is a notable body of literature relating to development certainty. However, there is wide disagreement about how it is provided within planning. Most broadly, the literature identifies that certainty is provided through the use of planning documents. In the United Kingdom until fairly recently, certainty was provided through the use of structure plans and local development plans (PAG, 1965; Healey, 1992). However, since the 2000s, these two types of plans have been replaced by, respectively, regional strategies and local development frameworks, (Cullingworth and Nadin, 2006). In Australia, the literature finds that certainty is provided through both metropolitan strategy documents (Gleeson et al., 2004; Bunker and Searle, 2007) and local plans (Morris, 1979). With the location of certainty known, it necessary to determine what within these instruments actually provides development certainty.

Although the body of literature does not offer much in way of detail, there is a general consensus that it is the use of planning controls, known as statutory planning in Australia, within these planning documents that provides certainty, as it is only through these controls that development receives permission (Morris, 1979; Booth, 1995; 1996; Tewdwr-Jones, 1999; Tang et al., 2000; Gleeson et al., 2004; Bunker and Searle, 2007; PIA, 2014). While planning controls can be implemented irrespective of a guiding planning document, most rely on the strategic direction this document provides. However, there is no real agreement in the literature on what constitutes planning controls. One of the first to use the term, Morris explained that certainty – specifically in Victoria but similar for all of Australia – is provided ‘by way of planning schemes and IDOs’ (1979: 99). According to Eccles and Bryant, in Victoria, planning ‘controls are contained for the most part in each municipality’s planning scheme and operate primarily via a system of zoning’ (2011: 1). Morris (1979) stopped short of using this terminology. Australians Gleeson et al. similarly avoided the terminology, instead stating that, ‘the blueprint mapping of land uses tends to impart a sense of strategic certainty and inflexibility’ (2004: 355). While the United Kingdom does not use land-use zoning, it does use a variation in the form of

development control. Interestingly, British authors Booth (1995; 1996) and Tewdwr-Jones (1999) did refer to land-use zoning as providing this certainty. Regardless of what terminology is used, it is clear that statutory planning controls provide development certainty.

However, a small section of the literature also suggests that it is not just the planning controls informed by these planning documents that provide development certainty. Bunker and Searle (2007) and the PIA (2014) both emphasised that the planning of infrastructure is also essential to the provision of certainty. Bunker and Searle wrote, ‘Developers seek a degree of certainty about where development is allowed and what transport and other key infrastructure will be provided to support development, especially where urban expansion is allowed’ (2007: 639). The PIA also stressed the importance of infrastructure in providing certainty, albeit it more from a business perspective: ‘Urban planning and the designation of particular areas for commercial retail and industrial activity, including mixed use zones, provides certainty for businesses and investors for where business activity can be located, and where supporting infrastructure exists or is likely to be invested’ (PIA, 2014: 5). However, while the provision of infrastructure is no doubt important to the profitability of development, it is often beyond the remit of the plan-makers to provide assurances if and when it will be constructed. Large-scale infrastructure projects are undertaken at the behest of federal or states governments. It is unreasonable to assume that they will get built just because they appear in a plan. As such, infrastructure projects by themselves cannot provide certainty. Moreover, Bunker and Searle (2007) also suggested that population targets play a role in providing certainty for developers regarding future housing demand. However, population targets are essentially a prediction as to the future population of an area and, thus, cannot be relied upon to accurately provide development certainty.

To these ends, the literature shows that certainty in planning is provided through planning documents. While elements within these plans and strategies may suggest a degree of development certainty, in Victoria it is really only the planning controls contained in planning schemes that provide tangible assurance for the development of property.

The provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning

As the purpose of this research is to explore the provision of certainty within Melbourne metropolitan planning, it is necessary to understand the Victorian planning system. In Victoria, planning controls refer to a breadth of statutory tools available to planners to help regulate land-use, type of development and subdivision (Eccles and Bryant, 2011). The use of these controls in Victoria predates the concept of metropolitan planning. In the 1916, the City of Melbourne introduced a building regulation by-law to limit the maximum height of all buildings within the municipality. This was the state's first instance of regulation being used to control an aspect of planning (Freestone, 2005). Prior to this, the City of Melbourne's building regulation by-laws – which came into effect in 1850 – had only been used to control the use of building materials (Lewis, 1995). In 1921, local government by-law powers were extended to allow for the designation of land for residential use within municipal boundaries, a rudimentary form a land-use zoning. The *Metropolitan Town Planning Commission Act 1922* authorised the establishment of the Metropolitan Town Planning Commissions, which began the creation of the first metropolitan strategy for Melbourne with the goal of establishing local planning schemes (McLoughlin, 1992). By 1938, zoning powers were extended to all land-uses and were to be implemented through local zoning schemes. However, from 1944, land-use zoning was standardised and situated within local planning schemes – where they remain today – and briefly within a metropolitan planning scheme (McLoughlin, 1992). From 1954, a metropolis-wide planning scheme was created, and was in operation until the late-1980s. Eventually joining land-use zoning as planning controls were overlays – a map overlaid on the land-use zoning map to designate additional controls relating to special features, e.g. heritage overlay, bushfire overlay – and provisions – additional worded prerequisites for a range of specific features, e.g. car parking provisions, satellite dish provisions (Eccles and Bryant, 2011). As noted above, planning schemes are today the main planning mechanism used in Victoria. Planning permits adhering to the planning scheme are required for most forms of development (Eccles and Bryant, 2011). To these ends, it is important to determine whether the metropolitan planning documents for Melbourne (see Table 3.1) made use of planning schemes and what schemes they used. Moreover, it is also important to determine if and when each metropolitan planning document was gazetted and which body was responsible for administering it. Logically, they cannot provide certainty for and from development if the planning controls are never enacted or if no body is given responsibility for its implementation.

Table 3.1: Preliminary Comparison of Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Documents

Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Documents							
Title	Plan of General Development	Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954	Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region	Metropolitan Strategy / Metropolitan Strategy Implementation	Shaping Melbourne's Future	Living Suburbs	Melbourne 2030
Author	MTPC	MMBW	MMBW	MMBW	MPE	DPD	DI
Year	1929	1953/4	1971	1980-81	1987	1995	2002
Existing Planning Legislation (Principal)	None	<i>Town and Country Planning Act 1944</i>	<i>Town and Country Planning Act 1961</i>	<i>Town and Country Planning Act 1961</i>	<i>Planning and Environment Act 1987</i>	<i>Planning and Environment Act 1987</i>	<i>Planning and Environment Act 1987</i>

Conclusion

As shown above, the literature demonstrates that the primary way in which planning provides development certainty is through the use of statutory planning controls, which in Victoria are contained within planning schemes and most commonly informed by planning documents. Planning controls vary considerably between countries and even within countries. In Victoria, the main planning controls utilised are land-use zones, overlays, provisions and policies, all of which inform the primary planning mechanism available: planning schemes, the location of which has varied between metropolitan and local. As such, in order to determine how certainty has been provided in Melbourne metropolitan planning an analysis of the planning controls found within each planning document needs to be undertaken.

4. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

4.1 Introduction

All research projects require an appropriate methodological approach. That is, they require a process and design appropriately informed by an overarching theoretical framework. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate and detail how the theory of genealogy, as explained the second chapter, helps to inform the research approach undertaken in this thesis. To do so, it is divided into two sections. The first section explores the research process and its relationship to genealogy, while the second explores the research design. They help to show that the research methods and case study design selected were employed because they fitted within the theoretical framework of genealogy.

4.2 Genealogical research process

The theory of genealogy helps to inform the research process, the research methods by which the thesis research questions are investigated. The purpose of this section is to explore this genealogical research process. As will be shown, the three research methods ultimately selected – archival research, secondary research and in-depth interviews – were selected because they met the requirements of the five key interdependent methodological principles that comprise the theory of genealogy.

Archival research

This thesis uses archival research as its principle method of investigation. Archival research involves collecting and extracting evidence about past events from archival records (Hill, 1993; Danto, 2008). As indicated by their name, archival records are records of the past held in a public archive. However, it is also necessary to clarify what constitutes a record. Records are documents containing primary source accounts of the past (Danto, 2008). That is, they are documents that were created during the time period in question or created after the fact by participants in the associated activities. Records most commonly include government documents, parliamentary Hansard, newspaper articles and diaries (Hill, 1993). They importantly differ from secondary source documents, which are documents that

analyse and discuss these primary source accounts (Danto, 2008). For example, if a history book uses primary source documents, it is itself a secondary source document for researchers.

The theory of genealogy required the use of archival research as the primary method of investigation. It was innovatively determined in the second chapter that genealogical analysis was composed of five key interdependent methodological principles. These principles required methods with a very diverse capability: to uncover how present-day practice has developed, including the problems that necessitated its development; to probe how thinking about these practices, *epistemes*, has changed over time and the historical circumstances that shaped those changes; to identify which statements and acts have shaped these ways of thinking; and to map how power relations have been responsible for it all. Common to these requirements was the element of history. As such, a historical method of investigation was required. Archival research was selected not because it is the method most accepted for historical research (Hill, 1993; Danton, 2008) but rather because it can be used to address all of the requirements listed above. Confirming these is the fact that Foucault used the method in all of his historical inquiries (1970; 1987; 1988a; 1995; 2001; 2003).

Archival research, like all research methods, has its limitations. The most common complaints about the method relate to access and time (Hill, 1993; Danto, 2008). The success of archival research is largely dependent on the ability to access archival records. As Danto (2008: 48) notes, 'archives resources are essentially unlimited'. Countless documents are held across various archives, not all of which are readily accessible by researchers. As such, it can be a very time consuming endeavour for researchers to find and analyse documents relevant to their research. Moreover, the success of archival research is also dependent on the completeness and original nature and intent of the records. These limitations can be minimised through careful planning (Hill, 1993; Danto, 2008). This involves determining the relevant archival resources to search and targeted searching of records housed within these archives. However, despite careful planning, there may still be instances where relevant documents will not be available. As will be shown below, a solution to this problem is the use of other methods to supplement archival research.

The following archival resources were used to collect and extract primary source evidence about Melbourne's metropolitan planning history:

- Public Records Office of Victoria;
- The now-defunct library of the then Department of Transport collections, which included the collection of the then Department of Planning and Community Development;
- The National Library of Australia Trove repository;
- The State Library of Victoria collections;
- The RMIT University Library collections;
- The University of Melbourne Library collections;
- The Victoria University Library collections;
- Various online collections; and
- Private collections.

Too numerous to discuss in detail, the records sourced relate mostly to the metropolitan plans and their associated documentation, such as discussion papers, implementation reports, internal evaluations, Hansard, press releases and newspaper articles. Moreover, records relating to the various planning bodies involved – such as organisational charts, meeting minutes, internal memoranda – and the personal records of the key figures involved in the development of planning in Melbourne were also sourced. From these collections, thousands of documents were viewed. From these viewed records, a selection of evidence was analysed and used in this research.

Secondary research

This thesis uses secondary research as a supplementary method of investigation. Secondary research is similar to archival research. However, instead of looking for records, primary source documents of past events, secondary research looks at secondary source documents (Danto, 2008). These documents, which most commonly take the form of books and journal articles, are analyses of primary source documents. As mentioned above, the main limitations of archival research is access and time. It can be difficult and time consuming to search archives to find documents containing relevant evidence. Rather than trawling through mountains of archival data, it was decided that if someone else had already done so, such as searching through parliamentary Hansard, their evidence would be used. Moreover, it was

also undertaken to ‘fill-in’ any information gaps that could not be explained through archival research. The secondary source documents were found in books and academic journals in libraries and online collections. Secondary research was selected for identical reasons as to the archival research method: it was able to meet the historical requirements of the genealogical principles.

In-depth interviews

This thesis also uses in-depth interviews as a supplementary method of investigation. As discussed above, the effectiveness of archival research and secondary research is limited largely by the sources available to the researcher. Importantly, over the past several decades, researchers have begun to embrace in-depth interviews, known as oral histories, as a method for historical investigation (Lapan, Quartaroli and Riemer, 2012). This is due to the ability of in-depth interviews to elicit historical information not freely available through archival research alone, effectively creating new primary sources. Given all of this, and its ability to meet the historical requirements of the genealogical principles, it was decided that in-depth interviews would be undertaken to supplement the above described archival and secondary research and ‘fill-in’ any information gaps that arose.

In-depth interviews involve social interaction with an individual or individuals to uncover information held by that individual or individuals (Johnson and Rowlands, 2012). The term ‘in-depth’ refers to the level of information uncovered, which is usually ‘deeper’ than that offered by surveys and focus groups. According to Johnson and Rowlands et al., ‘Deep understandings are held by the real-life members of or participants in some everyday activity, event, or place. The interviewer seeks to achieve the same deep level of knowledge and understanding as the members or participants’ (2012: 101). This is achieved through questioning.

In-depth interviews do have their limitations. The most immediate of these involves sourcing willing interview participants (Johnson and Rowlands, 2012). As with archival research, there is an element of luck involved with finding a useful source. However, this can also be addressed through careful planning. The most significant limitation relates to the validity of the information gathered in interviews. There are numerous debates as to whether interview data can be trusted as a data source

(Johnson and Rowlands, 2012). In terms of historical research, there is a fear that interview participants may not remember past events or if they do, they may not remember them accurately and without interviewer influence (Lapan et al., 2012). To address these limitations, data gathered through interviews simply needs to be verified through other sources, a technique known as triangulation (Yin, 2009). As such, it was decided that, when possible, archival research and secondary research data would be used to verify the validity of the in-depth interview data.

Interviews can be classified as structured, semi-structured or unstructured, the latter two used for in-depth interviews (Morse, 2012). The difference between these classifications relates to the information being sought. Structured interviews are used in quantitative research and involve asking participants a predetermined set of questions with a predetermined set of answers (Lapan et al., 2012). Semi-structured and unstructured interviews are used in qualitative research and allow more variations in the answers. The former involves asking predetermined questions but allows more latitude with answers and follow-up questioning (Lapan et al., 2012). The latter allows involves no predetermined questions and is instead more of an open-ended dialogue. Given that this research seeks information regarding a specific topic, it was clear that semi-structured interviews would be best suited.

To these ends, it was decided that semi-structured, in-depth interviews would be conducted with a range of individuals who had significant experience within Melbourne metropolitan planning. After careful consideration, it was determined that individuals from the five following fields would have the experience necessary to provide valuable insights towards addressing the central research question:

- Metropolitan planning;
- State politics;
- Academia;
- Property development; and
- Interest groups.

As such, it was individuals from these fields that would be sought as interview participants.

A total of 14 in-depth interviews were conducted. The following is a run-down of all participants:

- Seven former metropolitan planners:

- A former Town and Country Planning Board planner;
 - A former Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works planner;
 - Five former state planning department planners; and
 - A former local government planner
- Three current property developers. They were predominantly large-scale, greenfield property developers;
 - Two current academics; and
 - One former state Premier.

The semi-structured questions asked were tailored to each individual interview participant. As such, it is too onerous to list the questions. Moreover, they included information that may have compromised the anonymity of the participants.

Unfortunately, there are numerous ethical risks associated with in-depth interviews as a research method (Johnson and Rowlands, 2012; Wiles, 2013). Prior to sourcing interview participants, ethics approval was sought through the RMIT Design and Social Context College Human Ethics Advisory Network (HDR CHEAN), a sub-committee of the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC). Ethics approval was granted on 15 April 2014 (see Appendix A). This approval was extended on 17 March 2015 (see Appendix B) and again on 13 April 2017 (see Appendix C). While the HDR CHEAN classified the project as low-risk, the following safeguards were put in place to ensure risks to interview participants were minimised:

- Making participation voluntary;
- Providing a Participant Information and Consent Form (PICF) prior to the interview;
- Providing an interview schedule prior to the interview if requested;
- Seeking written approval through the PICF before beginning the interview;
- Offering the right to withdraw from participation at any time;
- Offering the right to have any questions answered at any time;
- Offering the right to request that any written recording cease;
- Seeking confirmation and approval of the research data after the interview;
- Offering the right to have any unprocessed research data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can be reliably identified, and provided that it does not increase the risk for the participant;

- Maintaining the anonymity of interview participants, except if they consented otherwise in writing through the PICF; and
- Storing the research data securely in the office of the researcher for the duration of their degree and in the office of the supervisors for a period of five years, after which time it will be destroyed.

It is worth elaborating on two of the above safeguards. Firstly, rather than record the audio from the interview, as is common within the social sciences (Johnson and Rowlands, 2012), it was decided that written notes would instead be taken. The reasoning behind this is interview transcription would require additional resources and would not immediately be available for analysis. Moreover, as the notes were to be sent to the interview participant for approval, there was less chance of misinterpretation of the data. Secondly, while names and potentially identifying information was recorded, this information was kept confidential and not published unless the participant consented in writing through the PICF. It was decided that those that did not consent would be given a general, non-identifying occupation title as labels.

It was originally intended that interviews would be conducted with representatives from all three explored planning phases. However, this was not possible due to the vast time period in question. The only people still alive are those who worked in the planning field from the 1960s and onwards. Moreover, of these, most held fairly junior positions at the time and were not privy to much insider information. As such, the interview participants are skewed towards the later phase. Interview participants were initially sourced either through supervisor recommendations or Internet searches. They were contacted by email or telephone and asked if they wanted to participate. If they expressed an interest to participate, they were sent a PICF. If they did not want to participate, their contact information was destroyed and they were not contacted again. Each interview was conducted during business hours either in their place of work or a public place if they no longer had a place work. Interviews lasted between half-an-hour and one hour. At the conclusion of each interview, participants were asked to recommend additional interview participants, a technique known as snowball sampling (Morgan, 2008).

Conclusion

As shown above, the theory of genealogy helped to inform the research process. Archival research was selected as the primary method of investigation due to its ability to meet the requirements of the theory and five key interdependent methodological principles that comprise it. However, due to limitations involving access to archival records, this method was joined by the methods of secondary research and in-depth interviews. They were used both to save time and supplement gaps in data found through archival research alone. It now only remains to operationalise this data in the subsequent empirical chapters of this thesis.

4.3 Genealogical research design

This research uses a historical case study to explain the historical development of the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning. The theory of genealogy informs this research design. The purpose of this section is to explore this design in more detail, including how Melbourne's selection as a historical case study aligns with the theory. To do so, it is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section examines historical case studies as an element of research design, while the second sub-section justifies Melbourne as a historical case study.

Historical case studies

Historical case studies are a variant of case studies. As such, it is important to first define case studies. Unfortunately, there is no readily agreed definition. However, there are commonalities to some of the more widely accepted definitions. From these, we can synthesise that case studies are a research design used to investigate a specific case or cases through an understanding its context (Merriam, 1988; Stake, 2008; Yin, 2009). This definition will serve as the basis for our understanding of case studies.

Unfortunately, there is also no agreement as to what exactly constitutes a case. This is quite a highly contentious and debated issue within research methodology. On the one hand, some argue (e.g. Muir, 2008; Yin, 2009) that it is the methods of investigation that determine what constitutes a case study.

For instance, Yin defines a case study as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in-depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context and not clearly evident’ (2009: 18). As such, he argues that case studies should be used only when the research seeks to investigate a contemporary event over which the researcher has no control and one that is explainable through ‘how’ and ‘why’ research questions (see Figure 4.1).

<Image removed due to copyright restrictions>

Figure 4.1: Relevant Situations for Different Research Methods (Yin, 2009: 8)

Such a conception, however, poses a serious problem for the use of case studies in history. The rigid focus on the contemporary discounts its use in historical investigations. As one can see from Figure 4.1, Yin (2009) contends that despite the same quest for explanatory ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions and not requiring control of events, history’s focus on past events make it incompatible with a case study design. Such a view, however, is misguided, as it is possible to link past events to contemporary phenomena in a case study. This is a belief shared by Danto, who writes that, ‘Case studies allow for the exploration of all the compelling small steps (instances of intolerance, for example, as opposed to mass violence) that can help us grasp the complexities of the past by connecting them with our lives today’ (2008: 91-92). Moreover, such a view also dismisses some of the great case studies already published on historical subjects (see Stake, 2008).

As such, a better understanding of when to use a case can be found on the other side of the debate. A number of people, such as Merriam (1988) and Stake (2008) argue that it is simply the case that defines a case study. For instance, Stake contends that case studies are ‘not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied’ because ‘by whatever methods, we choose to study the case’ (2008: 199). He argues that case studies are to be used when the research seeks to better understand a particular case, known as intrinsic case studies, or when the research seeks to study a particular case or cases in order to provide insight into a bigger issue, known as instrumental case studies. Such a view importantly allows for case studies to be used for historical variations. As such, this thesis takes the latter view that it is the investigation of the case that determines the suitability of a case study. From this, it can be determined that a historical case study is simply a case or cases from the past through which the researcher seeks to comprehensively understand something.

Case studies, historical or otherwise, are a contested research design. While there are several notable criticisms of case studies, including a lack of rigour or taking too long to conduct and read, the most significant of these is that they are prone to scientific generalisations (Yin, 2009). Critics against case studies argue that what is true in one or a few cases may not be truly representative of the phenomenon more broadly and, as such, should be avoided. Following Stake’s (2008) explanation, this is only an issue if you seek to conduct instrumental case studies where you seek to provide insight into a bigger topic – intrinsic case studies that seek only to better understand a particular are immune from such criticisms. Yin (2009: 15), however, alleviates this issue entirely by suggesting, ‘case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes’. In other words, though they do not represent a scientific sample, theorising from them is valid. As long as this is addressed, there are no substantive downsides to the use of case studies.

Melbourne as a historical case study

As discussed in the previous section, this thesis takes the position that it is the investigation of the case that determines the suitability of a case study, not the methods used. As such, there can be no doubt that the case of Melbourne can be considered a historical case study. The only question concerns the value of Melbourne as a case. Melbourne was chosen as a historical case study for three main reasons.

Firstly, as mentioned in the previous chapter, there exists within Melbourne, and indeed Australia, a present-day belief that metropolitan planning must provide certainty for those involved in the process (Bunker and Searle, 2007; KPMG, 2010; Searle and Bunker, 2010). This belief in the need to provide certainty has become so ingrained that one planning academic commentator has described it as ‘Melbourne’s planning doxa’ (Hillier, 2013: 1). This aligns with the requirements of the genealogical principles listed in the previous section. It is a present-day practice that can be genealogically analysed.

Secondly, Melbourne provides a long, rich history of metropolitan planning, beginning with the establishment of the Metropolitan Town Planning Commission in 1922 and the creation of the first plan for metropolitan Melbourne, the *Plan of General Development* (MTPC, 1929). Since then, Melbourne has developed many metropolitan plans, including the *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954* (MMBW, 1953; 1954), *Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region* (MMBW, 1971), *Metropolitan Strategy* (MMBW, 1980), *Shaping Melbourne’s Future* (MPE, 1987), *Living Suburbs* (DoI, 1995), *Melbourne 2030* (DoI, 2002), *Plan Melbourne* (DTPLI, 2014) and *Plan Melbourne Refresh* (DELWP, 2017a). Melbourne as a historical case study offers a great opportunity to explore the practice of providing certainty across these numerous metropolitan plans. This likewise aligns with the requirements of genealogy. There is a vast history through which the development of the present-day practice of providing certainty can be traced.

Finally, the metropolitan planning history of Melbourne remains an underexplored case. While there have been several historical analyses of planning in Melbourne (e.g., Hamnett and Freestone; 2000; McLoughlin, 1992; Sandercock, 1990), none have done so with specific respect to metropolitan planning or the provision of certainty. These reasons make Melbourne a supremely interesting and worthwhile historical case study.

Conclusion

As shown above, the theory of genealogy helps to inform the research design. A historical case study research design was selected to explain the historical development of the provision of certainty in

Melbourne metropolitan planning. Importantly, this historical case aligns well with the requirements of the theory and the five key interdependent methodological principles that comprise it.

5. PHASE I: THE LOCAL PROVISION OF CERTAINTY, 1900s – 1940s

5.1 Introduction

This genealogical analysis of the historical development of the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning is divided into three phases, with each phase reflecting a clear *episteme* – a discontinuous period of thinking – with respect to the provision of certainty. The following chapter analyses the first such phase: the 1900s to the 1940s. It is within this phase that metropolitan planning was first established in Melbourne. As will be shown, the only metropolitan planning document created during this phase, the *Plan of General Development* (MTPC, 1929), attempted to provide certainty at the local level. While very little was to come of the strategy, it did help to form the initial *episteme* with respect to the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning; metropolitan strategies were to be used only as a guide for future urban development, with local planning schemes instead providing the certainty.

5.2 Historical analysis: 1900s – 1920s

It is no exaggeration to say that the city of Melbourne developed largely without restriction. Since its establishment in 1835, Melbourne had no regulations regarding urban growth and development, save for some local building by-laws. However, as it entered the twentieth century, the city began to experience a range of conditions that would make the continuation of unrestricted urban growth and development intolerable, and the introduction of a planning response seem unavoidable.

Economic growth and the worsening urban condition

After a long period of stagnation, economic growth returned to Melbourne in the 1910s and 1920s. This growth was driven by investment into the emerging and heavily tariff-protected industrial manufacturing sector, transitioning the city's economy away from livestock (Frost, 2005). As the Melbourne economy grew, so too did the city's population. Between 1911 and 1933, Melbourne's population increased by more than 400,000 people, pushing the population just shy of one million

(McDonald, 2005). As such, transport congestion became a serious issue (McLoughlin, 1992). Not surprisingly, the population growth also resulted in an increased demand for housing. To satisfy this demand, more than 70,000 new homes were constructed between 1920 and 1930 (Sandercock, 1990). Importantly, a consequence of the increased demand for housing was that a significant proportion of investment capital was switched into housing construction (McLoughlin, 1992). This unfortunately led to a return to land speculation and inappropriate development (MMBW, 1953). ‘Land speculators were operating again, more concerned with attaining a maximum frontage to sell than with providing open space and other amenities, or with coordinating one subdivision to another’ (MMBW, 1953: 10). Meanwhile, the city’s poor were concentrated in the inner city in increasingly slum-like conditions (Sandercock, 1990). However, unlike in past instances, the negative effects of unrestricted growth and development became too significant for Melbourne to ignore.

Some political sympathy

Politicians were also beginning to show sympathy for the worsening urban condition. Several legislative moves were undertaken to address urban growth and development. In the 1900s and 1910s, the Victorian State Government empowered local governments, under the *Local Government Acts 1903* and *1915*, and the *Health Act 1915*, to prescribe by-laws relating to the construction of buildings, thereby ensuring their safety and liveability. Several years later, in 1921, the Sir Harry Lawson-led Nationalist state government again updated the *Local Government Act*, this time giving local governments the option to create by-laws to prescribe areas within the municipality as residential areas, which prohibited or regulated the erection or use of buildings for non-residential purposes. This land-use segregation is seen by many commentators to be an important precursor to land-use zoning within Melbourne, attempting to prevent incompatible land-uses being located next to one another (Sandercock, 1990; McLoughlin, 1992). Interestingly, this piece of legislation remained in effect for nearly five decades. However, political instability at the state level made further, more coordinated responses to the worsening urban condition difficult. Between 1910 and 1930, there were 15 different state governments (Murray, 2007). For much of this period, it was virtually impossible for any political party to form government in their own right, as the Country Party often held the balance of power in both the Legislative Assembly – lower house – and Legislative Council —upper house – through an

overrepresentation of rural constituents (Sandercock, 1990). Favouring conservative values and a rural focus, the Country Party made it difficult to enact serious planning responses for Melbourne (Sandercock, 1990).

The arrival of planning ideas

International planning ideas were also beginning to arrive in Melbourne. These ideas first appeared in the city in the months following Federation. Competing claims between Melbourne and Sydney to become the new nation's capital city eventually led to the compromise of a purpose-built capital, Canberra. In May 1901, the Congress of Engineers, Architects, Surveyors and Others Interested in the Building of the Federal Capital of Australia was held in Melbourne to discuss the design of the new capital city (Congress of Engineers, 1901). The prevailing planning thought of the time, the beautification of cities as a measure of urban reform, which originated in the United States and became known as the city beautiful movement, was expressed in the discussions of the various planning elements and proposals for Canberra (Freestone, 2000). However, these ideas had only a limited impact on Melbourne.

It was not until urban growth and the associated problem of slum conditions in the inner city returned in the 1910s that planning was again brought to the fore. Slum conditions became so severe that two major public inquiries were undertaken by the state government on the issue: the Joint Select Committee on the Housing of the People in the Metropolis, which ran from 1913 to 1914, and the subsequent Royal Commission on the Housing of the People in the Metropolis and in the Populous Centres of the State, which ran from 1915 to 1918. Concurrent to the inquiries, James Morrell, an architect within the Victorian Department of Public Works, undertook a state-sponsored international fact-finding mission on all things planning-related (Sandercock, 1990). He presented his findings, *Report on Town Planning* (Morrell, 1915) to the Minister of Public Works. The report highlighted 'what is being done in other countries to avoid the danger, as threatened in most cities, by insanitary conditions, bad housing and bad town planning, and to illustrate also what may be done in Victoria for the improvement of our cities, as well as the health and welfare of our citizens' (Morrell, 1915: 3). The report looked past the city beautiful movement, instead praising elements of the prevailing British

approach, the garden city movement, which advocated for the construction of self-contained communities set amongst parkland, as well as the American turn towards proactively improving the efficiency of the city, which became known as the city efficiency approach. The state government, however, ignored the recommendations of both Morrell's report (1915) and the final report of the Royal Commission (1918). Sandercock contended that inquiries 'had obviously been a convenient way of defusing the issue' (1990: 108).

It was also around the same time that the public of Melbourne more generally first received exposure to the idea of planning. Concepts from the British garden city movement were disseminated to Melburnians through a number of public lectures. The most famous of these were a series of lectures delivered by William Davidge and Charles Read of the UK Garden Cities and Town Planning Association (GCTPA) during their 1914 Australasian Town Planning Lecture Tour (Garnaut, 2000). Meanwhile that same year, Dr James Barrett, a professional ophthalmologist and academic, formed and chaired the Victorian Town Planning and Parks Association (VTPPA). The VTPPA was an amalgamation the pre-existing National Parks Association (NPA) and the Minimum Allotment, Anti-Slum and Housing Crusade Committee (MAASHCC). Interestingly, Mirams (2002) argues that the VTPPA agenda of improving urban life through planning and nature stemmed from a moral ideology based on utilitarianism, scientific planning and eugenics. To further consolidate the planning movement in Australia, national planning conferences were also held in Adelaide in 1917 and Brisbane in 1918. It is apparent that planning thought had firmly arrived on the Melbourne stage. All that was missing was action.

5.3 Plan of General Development (1929 Strategy)

By the beginning of the 1920s, the negative consequences of Melbourne's unregulated urban growth and development were becoming a significant problem. Thankfully, a planning response to the urban condition would soon emerge. However, unlike the local piecemeal building by-laws, a metropolitan-wide response was envisioned. In July 1920, the Melbourne City Council (MCC), the largest and most powerful of the then twenty-six individual local governments that comprised metropolitan Melbourne (McLoughlin, 1992), passed a resolution recognising that the rapid, unregulated urban development of

metropolitan Melbourne was ‘creating unsatisfactory conditions which require immediate attention’ (MTPC, 1929:1). With respect to the principle of the problem, this practice of allowing unregulated urban growth and development created unsatisfactory conditions that, in turn, created the need for some form of regulation. The resolution also made calls to ‘further regulate development on modern scientific lines, so as to provide for the future demands of business, recreation, housing, traffic and other matters’ and requested there be held a conference of metropolitan municipalities to discuss how such a feat should be achieved (MTPC, 1929:1).

The key figure in this resolution was Councillor, later Alderman, Frank Stapley, a longstanding councillor and professional architect. Stapley had served brief stints as Melbourne Lord Mayor (1917-1918), president of the VTTPA (1917) and president of the Victorian Institute of Architects (1920-1921), during which time he was a strong advocate for planning in Melbourne. Interestingly, Stapley was narrowly denied a second-term as Lord Mayor in 1918 by Alderman William Cabena, a businessman who opposed Stapley’s planning focus (Dunstan, 2013). It is important to note that the resolution listed business first in its justification for planning action. This may have been a strategic attempt by Stapley to garner increased support for his resolution, especially given the property interests of the council. In 1965, Webb and Webb wrote that the Melbourne City Council in 1898 was

a most ‘respectable’ body of wealthy men; three or four being contractors, others interested in real estate, others were leading solicitors and merchants... there are no ‘parties’ in the council and not a suspicion of philanthropic sentiment: they are there in the main to improve the value of city property by economical and wise corporate action and indirectly to provide clean and well-lighted streets for the mass of the citizens (Sandercock, 1990: 201).

In October 1920, Melbourne Town Hall played host to the Conference of Metropolitan Municipalities. In attendance were representatives from 21 of the 26 metropolitan municipalities (MTPC, 1929). The Conference saw a Stapley-chaired Conference of Metropolitan Municipalities Committee (CMMC) appointed to report on how to achieve the Melbourne City Council’s resolution. In July 1921, after six meetings, the Committee presented its findings, recommending that ‘the appointment of a City

Planning Commission is imperative, and it ought not to be longer delayed' (MTPC, 1929: 1). The Conference voted that a nine-member Commission – five municipal representatives and four technical and professional members – be established and funded by the metropolitan municipalities. Planning historians Freestone and Grubb (1998) contend that the resolution to create a planning commission demonstrated a switch from its traditional Anglo-influenced planning characterised by the garden city movement, which heavily influenced the establishment of the VTPPA, to a more American-influenced style of comprehensive and remedial citywide planning to be achieved by a planning commission through a range of different measures. American planning commissions were independent bodies that operated on a level above local governments. These recommendations were submitted to the Victorian State Government and were ultimately approved in the *Metropolitan Town Planning Commission Act 1922* on 31 December 1922, two-and-a-half years after Stapley's original council resolution.

The Metropolitan Town Planning Commission (MTPC) was established in March 1923 as an advisory body that reported to the Minister for Public Works with general plans and recommendations to control urban development within the metropolitan area. The *Metropolitan Town Planning Commission Act 1922* legislated that the Commission would operate for just three years. However, following extensive local government lobbying, the MTPC's tenure was extended on four separate occasions – *Metropolitan Town Planning Acts 1925, 1927, 1928 and 1929* – to ensure the achievement of its main objective. Freestone and Grubb contended that the conditions of the MTPC's establishment 'reflected the reluctance of the government to decisively expand the role of the state to encompass town planning' (1998: 132). The Minister of Public Works at the time, Frank Clarke, justified the restrained approach by arguing that 'we are cautious because so far as Australia is concerned we have no experience of legislation of this kind and we rather want to feel our way before we branch out' (Vic Parliamentary Debates. Legislative Assembly, 1922, vol. 163).

The Victorian Governor in Council – consisting then of Governor Rt. Hon. Earl of Stradbroke, Premier Sir Harry Lawson and a select group of Ministers who had been sworn in by the Governor as Executive councillors – appointed nine members to the MTPC. Its membership comprised five municipal representatives – one Melbourne City councillor and a representative from each of the four geographical groupings of municipalities – and four members with business, technical or professional

experience. As Freestone and Grubb noted, ‘the addition of ‘business’ representation was the only amendment to the original bill made by parliament, reflecting some misgivings about the make-up of the proposed body from property interests’ (1998: 132). A representative of the Victorian Railways was added to the MTPC under the *Metropolitan Town Planning Commission Act 1925*. With this addition, four of the MTPC members had business backgrounds, four had engineering backgrounds – including one with both engineering and surveying backgrounds – and two had architectural backgrounds (see Appendix D for a more detailed look at the MTPC’s membership composition). It is interesting to note that five commissioners also shared membership with the Town Planning Association of Victoria (TPAV), formerly the VTTPA (Freestone and Grubb, 1998). The other members unanimously elected Stapley to the Chair of the MTPC. A small, full-time staff, led by senior staff members Alfred Kemsley, Secretary, and Fred Cook, Surveyor, also served the MTPC (MTPC, 1929).

The MTPC quickly commenced its work on providing recommendations to control Melbourne’s metropolitan urban development. It released its first progress report in March 1925, entitled *First Report*, which provided a detailed look primarily at proposals to facilitate the movement of traffic in the city. The MTPC stated, ‘The necessity for making some immediate provision for the relief of traffic congestion has led the Commission to present this interim Report’ (1925:7). The *First Report* also looked at and condemned as unsatisfactory outer-suburban development, which it claimed was partly to blame for traffic congestion caused by unrestricted land subdivisions, and suggested remedies to the situation. Seven other small reports on a range of specific planning issues, including traffic management, physical frameworks for development and master planning suburban land, were provided to the state government between 1923 and 1929 at the request of the Premier, various ministers and cabinet. However, all of the MTPC’s work was leading towards its final report of recommendations, the *Plan of General Development*.

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Figure 5.1: Title page of the *Plan of General Development* (MTPC, 1929)

The Metropolitan Town Planning Commission presented the finished *Plan of General Development, Melbourne: Report of the Metropolitan Town Planning Commission*, known more commonly as the *Plan of General Development*, to the Victorian State Government on 6 December 1929, more than six-and-a-half years after it first began the task of developing a general plan for metropolitan Melbourne. In accordance with the *Metropolitan Town Planning Commission Acts 1922, 1925, 1927; 1928, and 1929*, the 308-page document performed two key functions across its eleven chapters: it detailed the present state of urban development; and it created a plan to ‘control’ such development (MTPC, 1929: 15). Importantly, the outcome was less a metropolitan plan and more a metropolitan strategy. As such, it is hereafter referred to as a strategy.

In terms of the former function, the strategy used a great number of highly detailed surveys and studies to provide an insight into the present state of urban development within the defined study area: a 13-

mile radius from the Melbourne CBD, equating to approximately 1,124km² (434mi²). It is important to note that the majority of the surveys and studies related to the issue of increased traffic congestion, with car-based transport featuring most prominently. However, the strategy also provided surveys and studies more specific to urban development. It found that rapid population growth – Melbourne’s population was 1,007,529 as of 1928, having more than doubled since the turn of the twentieth century, and was expected to double again by 1948 – created increased demand for housing, which resulted in the current problem of poorly designed, overcrowded and conflicting land-use urban development.

In terms of the latter function, the strategy provided a number of recommendations designed to address the problem of near unregulated urban development. The most significant of these recommendations was the introduction of local planning schemes containing land-use zoning. These schemes would allow local councils to regulate land-uses for all land within their municipality, as well as regulate building height, size and surrounding space. As this recommendation related to the practice of providing certainty, it will be explored in greater detail in the next section. The MTPC argued that such schemes would ‘preserve and regulate the future development of both the public and private property of our city’ (1920: 184). The recommendation was not particularly groundbreaking. It was effectively an extension of land-use residential by-law powers granted under the *Local Government Act 1921* and building construction by-laws granted under the *Local Government Acts 1903* and *1915*. Accompanying the recommendation were maps zoning all land within the study area, which were to be used as an example. It was accompanied also by draft planning legislation that would enable its effect. However, it should be noted that the vast majority of the recommendations proposed did not directly address the problem of urban development. As with the surveys and studies, most consideration was given to transport improvement, highlighted by an extensive programme of urgent transport works. Also of note were a number of substantial recommendations to improve recreation facilities and civic amenities.

Problem

With respect to the genealogical principle of the **problem**, the *Plan of General Development* did not provide certainty. As determined in Chapter 3, certainty in metropolitan planning documents can only

be provided through the use of statutory planning controls. As will be shown, while the strategy recommended the introduction of such controls, they were to be implemented at the local level, irrespective of the controls detailed. As such, the strategy could not provide assurances with respect to the development of property. This section will provide a deeper examination of the proposed controls.

The fourth section of the strategy related to land-use zoning. Comprising 31 pages – approximately ten per cent of the document – it recommended the introduction of local planning schemes, referred to as zoning schemes, to ‘preserve and regulate the future development of both public and private property of our city’ (MTPC, 1929: 184). According to the Commission, ‘the growth of a city is dependent upon natural and artificial processes, and it is the object of the zoning scheme to coordinate and direct this development’ (MTPC, 1929: 155). It is interesting to note that the MTPC did not specify future growth paths for the city, instead recommending growth continue to be evenly distributed across the entire metropolitan area, particularly along and between railway corridors and main roads. The section began by outlining what the MTPC believed to be the benefits of introducing a zoning scheme. As mentioned above, it argued that the idea of zoning is not an entirely new practice for Melbourne – local governments had the power under a number of different pieces of legislation to regulate residential uses, lot size and building height. Moreover, the MTPC believed that land-use zoning made better uses of existing resources and established services, thereby economically streamlining the city.

The waste which takes place in many phases of city development as a result of the haphazard location of industries, shops and dwellings can be reduced to a minimum by the preparation of a sound scheme of zoning, so that the city and its individual components may expand in their true relation to each other and to a general scheme of city development (MTPC, 1929: 155).

In addition, it argued that the land-use zoning controls would have the beneficial effect of stabilising property values across metropolitan Melbourne.

Each particular zone could be located, not only in regard to the necessary amenities, but its area would be regulated in accordance with the probable future demand for

space within the district. Under such regulation, a wasteful allocation of land within the metropolis would be prevented, and a greater value would accrue to the lands set aside, because of the more intense use which could be made of it, and the freedom given from conflicting or injurious uses (MTPC, 1929: 155).

This was crucial to persuading hesitant landowners to agree to some form of regulation. Relatedly, the MTPC claimed that the controls would prevent incompatible land-uses from occurring next to one another and would regulate building height, size and surrounding open space to ensure that a healthy supply of light and air would be preserved for the area. Finally, they contended that the principles behind zoning had been extensively tested and utilised in other countries, mainly the United States.

The strategy next provided an analysis of existing land-use conditions in metropolitan Melbourne. This analysis looked at the residential districts, residential area by-laws, shopping and business areas, mixed-use areas, industrial areas and unimproved areas. It also looked at the municipal building regulation of building heights. The MTPC found that the regulation of building heights was a juggle of competing interests.

While the limit of height imposed must take into consideration the values of land obtaining at the time the regulations are framed, so that a reasonable return may be permitted, the authorities have also to safeguard the interests of the community from the undesirable conditions which follow and undue concentration of high buildings (MTPC, 1929: 165).

Current-day planners are still faced with the same dilemma of trying to balance the competing needs of business and the community.

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Figure 5.2: *Plan of General Development – General Scheme of Use Districts* (MTPC, 1929)

The strategy finally presented the land-use zoning controls it had recommended. As an example of how the controls would work, all land within the plan's study area was designated as one of eight possible zones (see Figure 5.2 for the original map demonstrating how each individual property should be zoned). The zones provided extensive, detailed restrictions on land-use, building height and area. There were three residential zones: Residential-A, high-class residential suburbs not to exceed 20 persons to the gross acre; Residential-B, residential suburbs consistent with Australian ideals of housing, which were not to exceed 30 persons per acre; and Residential-C, older suburbs that did not fit into the above two classifications, which are not to exceed 40 persons per acre (MTPC, 1929: 169-173). There were two business zones: Business-A, business districts that would preserve retail shops necessary for the

convenience of good class residential areas; and Business-B, already established business districts located close to railway stations or in suburbs where light industries would be carried-out (172-177). There were three industrial zones: Industrial-A, industrial districts where there was no demand for any industry other than light industry; Industrial-B, industrial districts where all kinds of industry, except noxious trades, were to be carried-out; and Industrial-C, industrial districts outside of the metropolitan area that would accommodate livestock markets, abattoirs and noxious trades (177-182). However, it would be up to the local council to designate all land within their municipal boundaries to one of the eight land-use zones, irrespective of the plan. Hence the document was a strategy, rather than a plan. Draft legislation to give effect to these controls was also included in the strategy.

Discourse

With respect to the genealogical principle of discourse, it is interesting to note that the term certainty did not appear in the *Plan of General Development*. As such, it is important to examine the discourse around the notion of certainty – assurances with respect to the development of property. The discourse surrounding the stabilisation of property values featured most prominently in the strategy, located predominantly in the chapter relating to land-use zoning. The strategy made repeated references to the stabilising effects of its land-use zoning recommendations and accompanying legislation. This was exemplified most clearly in the MTPC's justification that 'a city-wide scheme of zoning would have a very beneficial effect of stabilizing [sic] the value of property' (MTPC, 1929: 155). Unfortunately, the exact meaning of the term stabilising was not made clear. It could have referred to ensuring that property values did not decrease by limiting the possibility of inappropriate development. It could also have referred to ensuring that property values did not increase too rapidly by limiting the effectiveness of land speculation, the type of which was common in the previous century (Cannon, 1966: 1972; Sandercock, 1990). Land speculation, the purchasing of cheap, non-residential land on the metropolitan-fringe and subdividing it for housing, would no longer be possible. However, alternatively, it could have referred to enhancing property values, exemplified by the justification that 'a greater value would accrue to the lands set aside' (MTPC, 1929: 155) through a zoning scheme. In any case, the notion of certainty was present in the strategy, represented by the discourse of stabilising property values.

Power

The genealogical principle of power can be used to explain both the development of the *Plan of General Development* and the planning system more generally during this period, especially with respect to the provision of certainty. This section explores the ways in which decision-making power was exerted in all three developmental stages of the strategy: conception, contents and outcomes.

Conception

The conception of the strategy can be seen as a result of the exertion of decision-making power by two sides: the CMMC and the Lawson Government. It was reported that the CMMC, led by Frank Stapley, were to pressure both the Minister for Public Works, Frank Clarke ('City Planning Scheme: Municipalities to Meet Tomorrow', 1921), and Premier, Harry Lawson ('City Planning: Proposed Commission', 1921) for the introduction of the *Metropolitan Town Planning Commission Act 1922*, thereby exerting decision-making power through political pressure. The Lawson Government in turn exerted its decision-making power by agreeing to and successfully passing the legislation. However, it further exerted decision-making power by establishing the parameters of the MTPC and the creation of the plan. The Government established the MTPC purely as an advisory body and authorised its operation for just three years. Moreover, the Victorian Governor in Council was able to determine the membership composition of the MTPC and provided a list of topics that could be investigated.

Contents

Similarly, the contents of the strategy can be seen as a clear result of the exertion of decision-making power. As discussed above, despite the vast range of matters to consider under the *Metropolitan Town Planning Act 1922*, the MTPC chose to focus primarily on controlling traffic, transport, infrastructure, zoning, open space and recreation through a multitude of recommendations. Questions remain as to what shaped this focus. McLoughlin (1992) suggested three possible explanations for the specific concentrations: '[It] could be a reflection of the interests of the commissioners (and of their

constituencies), or a sign of the times, or the professional views and aspirations of their staff, or some function of all three' (McLoughlin, 1992: 33). Building on McLoughlin's three-point explanation, this section explores four possible explanations as to the contents of the strategy: political interests; business and financial interests; professional interests; and planning interests.

With respect to political interests, successive Victorian State Governments played only a minor role in the direction of the strategy. The Lawson Government provided the MTPC – the members of whom it also appointed – with a suggested, not mandatory, list of topics for investigation. The MTPC chose to focus on a selection of them. Moreover, McLoughlin (1992: 33) argued, 'Melbourne in the 1920s would have had many problems of metropolitan growth but it is unlikely from all the evidence that roads, traffic and recreational land would have been very high on any popular [state or local] political agenda'. As such, it is apparent that the plan reflected not a political agenda but more likely other interests.

Considering Melbourne's extensive history of land booms and subsequent speculation, there is merit in trying to determine what possible influence business and financial interests had on the end result of the strategy. Firstly, while the Lawson Government was hesitant to involve itself in the planning process, one of its conditions for the establishment of the MTPC was the addition of business representation to its membership. However, the four business, technical or professional members selected by the Victorian Governor in Council were all either architects, engineers or surveyors from government authorities (see Appendix D). The only members with business backgrounds were the municipal representatives. This suggests that the initial amendment may have been made to appease business and property interests concerned about the potential effects of planning but was never truly a concern of the Government, especially given that it had ultimate control over the outcome of the document.

Interestingly, the MTPC continually justified the recommendations put forward in the strategy by alluding to the benefits it would have for business productivity, efficiency and property values. This was most evident in the improvement and zoning schemes. While there can be little doubt that the recommendations put forward would be beneficial to business, the decision to loudly spruik the business and financial benefits may have been similar to Frank Stapley's justification of his council

resolution for planning regulation. He had argued that it was necessary to meet the future demands of business. Likewise, the MTPC was probably making a strategic attempt to garner increased support for the plan. It was apparent, though, that the MTPC were concerned with striking the right balance between the competing needs of business and the community. However, on the whole, the recommendations appeared to be in the best interest of the Melbourne public, rather than the financial situations of land-owning businesses or individuals. The introduction of land-use zoning and land subdivision controls were an attempt to stabilise property prices and ensure satisfactory urban development, not necessarily a benefit to business or financial interests and certainly not to land speculators. Moreover, if the plan did financially benefit individual property owners by increasing property values through its improvement schemes and recreation facilities, the MTPC wanted to require those property owners to pay a betterment fee although it did not specify a figure. Importantly, the local planning schemes and the potential of betterment fee had the potential to exert a governmental power over all land within metropolitan Melbourne not seen before. Thus, it is apparent that while business and financial interests may have had some effect on the strategy, they were not the only influence. Rather, the strategy appeared more to feign business and financial benefit and actually benefit much more the public as a whole.

With respect to the professional interests, the background of the MTPC's membership was also likely a key influence on the contents of the strategy. As demonstrated above, the focus on traffic, transport, infrastructure, zoning, open space and recreation issues reflected primarily the interests of the MTPC members. However, the strong, prescriptive measures put forward as recommendations for each of these issues, such as improvement works, subdivision schemes and building requirements, also reflected the engineering, surveying and architectural backgrounds of the MTPC members. Moreover, the recommendation of planning legislation may also be another reflection of the backgrounds of the members, many of whom belonged to legislated professions. Interestingly, the decision of the MTPC to focus a section on civic art and amenities reflected architectural interests, most notably those of the Chair, Frank Stapley. Thus, the professional background of its members was also likely a key influence on the focus of MTPC recommendations.

At the beginning of the twentieth-century, the newly established planning profession was beginning to develop different ideas and movements across the world. Given that planning was an emerging phenomenon in Melbourne, it is worth asking if and how emerging planning ideas influenced the development of the strategy. Though Australia belonged to the Commonwealth, the ideas in the strategy appeared to have originating in the United States of America. Foremost was the decision of the Conference of Metropolitan Municipalities and subsequently the Lawson Government to establish a planning commission and create a comprehensive, metropolitan-wide remedial plan for Melbourne. This decision mirrored the planning efforts of major US cities (Freestone and Grubb, 1998). It was contrary to the ideas emerging from the United Kingdom, which advocated local planning schemes, green belts and new garden cities, ideas popularised by the garden city movement (Ward, 1994).

The layout and contents of the strategy also replicate US planning. Freestone and Grubb noted that the strategy's layout, the responsibility of Secretary Kemsley, was 'adapted from the Bartholomew model of city planning' (1998: 139). This is of little surprise, given that both the Conference of Metropolitan Municipalities and the MTPC studied American plans and planning publications (MTPC, 1929). Moreover, during the creation of the strategy, several members of the MTPC travelled to the US on planning tours (MTPC, 1929). As such, the strategy utilised numerous concepts that originated in the US, such as land-use zoning. The MTPC also justified many of the strategy's recommendations by claiming it would provide benefits to efficiency, business and the community. This was a reflection of the US city efficiency movement, which was popular at the time. Interestingly, the focus on the benefits of civic buildings and art reflected the US city beautiful movement, a movement which had begun to lose favour amongst planners who turned increasingly to city functionalism through improved efficiency. However, the strategy's preference for town planning legislation was inconsistent with US planning, which achieved its aims mainly through zoning ordinances. Instead the MTPC's approach reflected planning ideas from other countries, noticeably the United Kingdom. The MTPC and the strategy appeared to have been influenced mostly by US planning ideas but also slightly by legislative planning ideas from other countries.

Arguably the most interesting aspect of the creation of the strategy was the ability of the MTPC to resist the powerful external pressures of political, business and financial interests. While the MTPC

acknowledged these interests, it did not indulge them. Instead, it set about trying to benefit the public as a whole, creating a multitude of recommendations to address the issues associated with the rapid and unregulated urban development of metropolitan Melbourne. The strategy's specific focus on addressing traffic, transport, infrastructure, zoning, open space and recreational issues appeared primarily to reflect the professional backgrounds and interests of the members of the MTPC and the influence of planning ideas and movements, particularly those from the United States.

Outcomes

Decision-making power was exerted during the outcomes process of the strategy. The MTPC submitted the strategy to the Minister for Public Works, J. P. Jones, of the new Edmond Hogan-led Labor Government in December 1929. One year later, on 9 December 1930, Jones introduced the *Town Planning Bill 1930* into the Legislative Assembly. The bill was similar to the legislation proposed in the plan, giving effect to the establishment of local planning schemes and a Town Planning Board (TPB) to oversee their production. Unfortunately, the bill was left to lapse and Victoria failed to secure planning legislation. It is generally accepted that a combination of the onset of the Great Depression in Australia in 1930, fears from conservative state politicians and waning support from local governments were responsible for the failure to pass the legislation (MMBW, 1953; Sandercock, 1990; McLoughlin, 1992; Freestone and Grubb, 1998). According to the Hansard of the day the bill was read for a second time (Vic, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 1930, vol. 184), the bill was deferred and allowed to lapse because several politicians had concerns, most notably about the powers of the proposed TPB impinging on the rights of local councils. Without legislation, the strategy's recommendations were almost entirely at the mercy of the cooperation of the municipalities and various authorities. These authorities did enact a number of minor individual recommendations, mainly road improvements and the preservation of rivers, creeks and coastlines. However, this limited outcome was far from MTPC's grand visions for Melbourne.

Discontinuity

As the first Melbourne metropolitan planning document, the *Plan of General Development* cannot be compared against a predecessor for discontinuities. However, it did represent discontinuities from earlier attempts at regulating urban development in metropolitan Melbourne. As mentioned above, prior to the creation of the strategy, development had the potential to be regulated through by-laws at the local level, should councils use the powers available to them, though not many did (McLoughlin, 1992). By 1915, metropolitan councils had the power to control through by-laws various aspects of the construction of buildings under the *Local Government Acts 1903 and 1915*, and the *Health Act 1915*. This was joined in 1921 by the power to prescribe areas within the municipality as residential, thereby prohibiting or regulating the erection or use of buildings for non-residential purposes under the *Local Government Act 1921*. The strategy, had it been approved, represented a discontinuity in the type of regulation available for use. It would have shifted the regulation of urban development from council by-laws to local planning schemes, overseen by an independent body – the TPB – rather than the council itself. However, these planning powers would have been voluntary, continuing the idea that the regulation of urban development was not a mandatory necessity.

5.4 Episteme discontinuity

The first phase of Melbourne metropolitan planning, the 1900s to the 1940s, represented the first *episteme* with respect to the provision of certainty. The only metropolitan planning document created during this period – the *Plan of General Development* (MTPC, 1929) – did not provide development certainty. The strategy instead delegated the provision of this certainty to local councils, proposing the introduction of local planning schemes to empower metropolitan councils to control development within their municipality. Under the resultant *Town and Country Planning Bill 1930*, these schemes did not need to conform to the plan. As will be shown in the next chapter, a discontinuity in this thinking with respect to the provision of certainty occurred, ushering in a different *episteme*.

5.5 Conclusion

Historically, the period from the 1900s to the 1940s was the one in which Melbourne metropolitan planning was born. The negative consequences of unregulated urban growth and development proved

problematic, necessitating the need for planning action. The solitary metropolitan strategy created during this period – the *Plan of General Development* (MTPC, 1929) – sought to address this problem. The strategy, however, did not provide assurances with respect to the development of property. This was because it recommended a mechanism at odds with certainty: the introduction of local planning schemes. It was in these schemes that development certainty could be found. Importantly, these schemes need not conform to the plan. In terms of discontinuity, this represented the first *episteme* with respect to the provision of certainty with Melbourne metropolitan planning. Interestingly, the strategy did not use the discourse of certainty. Rather, it used discourse around the stabilisation of property values. Ultimately, it was largely a series of ideological and decision-making power relations that were responsible for the contents and outcomes of the strategy and the phase. Most prominently, it was the decision-making power of the MTPC that was responsible for the way in which certainty was to be provided – or rather, not provided, as the resultant legislation was never passed – in Melbourne metropolitan planning from the 1900s to the 1940s.

6. PHASE II: THE METROPOLITAN PROVISION OF CERTAINTY, 1950s – MID-1980s

6.1 Introduction

The following chapter analyses the second phase of Melbourne metropolitan planning: the 1950s to the mid-1980s. It is during this phase that metropolitan planning began to take shape. As will be shown, the three planning documents created during this phase – *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme* (MMBW, 1953; 1954), *Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region* (MMBW, 1971) and *Metropolitan Strategy* (MMBW, 1980) and its supporting *Metropolitan Strategy Implementation* (MMBW, 1981) – provided certainty at the metropolitan level, made possible by changes to the Victorian planning system. The phase formed an entirely new *episteme* with respect to the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning. The metropolitan planning scheme, informed by metropolitan plans, was the location in which certainty was provided.

6.2 Historical analysis: mid-1930s – 1950s

Recovery from the difficult circumstances brought about by the Great Depression proved gradual. As Melbourne entered the mid-1930s, economic conditions began to slowly improve. Economic recovery was given a dramatic boost by the efforts associated with the Second World War. Urban growth and development returned to the city following the end of the War. Unfortunately, they brought with them significant challenges to the city's urban condition. During this time, planning legislation was introduced in Victoria. However, this was no match for the city's worsening urban condition, which necessitated further action.

Planning attempts, economic recovery and the (again worsening) urban condition

In 1936, one year after its election win, the Albert Dunstan-led Country Government introduced the *Metropolitan Council Bill 1936* to parliament. This bill proposed the establishment of a metropolitan-

wide council comprising 30 members, similar to that which had been unsuccessful from 1913 to 1915 (Sandercock, 1990). As Sandercock notes, the bill

made provision for control of water supply, sewerage, tramways, buses, bridges, highways, fire brigades, for the taking over of local council's powers under the *Health Act* and of housing, reclamation and regulation of buildings, as well as the creation of new powers to zone the whole metropolis and to purchase land for the provision of parks and gardens (1990: 115).

The bill quickly attracted criticism from the United Australia Party about the powers a new municipal council would have, particularly raising revenues, and drew the hostility of local councils fearful they would become redundant. Following a number of amendments, the Labor Party agreed to support the bill. However, the bill was quashed in the Legislative Council.

Victoria was finally able to secure stronger statutory planning controls in the late-1930s. However, they came from an unlikely source. In July 1936, the Dunstan Government established the Slum Investigation Committee, which later became the Housing Investigation and Slum Abolition Board (HISAB). HISAB presented recommendations to improve inner-city slums and housing (HISAB, 1937). The following year, the state parliament passed the *Slum Reclamation and Housing Act 1938*, which incorporated many of these recommendations. This act gave councils the option of preparing and administering local zoning schemes. Under these schemes, councils could use zones to prescribe the use and development of land within their municipality. Moreover, it also empowered the establishment of the Housing Commission of Victoria to oversee their preparation. These statutory planning controls were more encompassing than the council by-laws, prescribing more than just residential use and development. These controls remained in place for six years, until they were replaced by the introduction of proper planning legislation.

In the early-1940s, at the height of the Second World War, the Commonwealth Government became increasingly concerned about the welfare of its citizens. A Joint Parliamentary Committee on Social Security had found that an alarming proportion of the population lived in poverty (Mendes, 2017). To

address this issue, the John Curtin-led Labor Government introduced a range of social security measures, including income and health benefits (Watts, 1980). In doing so, it laid the framework for a national welfare state (Watts, 1980; Mendes, 2017). However, the Curtin Government also sought to address the issue by improving the built form of Australia's capital cities, which at the time were poorly regulated (McLoughlin, 1992). Consequently, it threatened to withhold vital housing funding for states without planning legislation. In response, the Victorian state parliament approved the *Town and Country Planning Act 1944*, which repealed the *Slum Reclamation and Housing Act 1938*. This principal act was similar to the legislation proposed in 1930. It gave councils the choice of preparing and administering, either solely or jointly with another council, local planning schemes. Under these schemes, councils could use various ordinances stipulated in government regulations to prescribe the use and development of land within their municipality. Importantly, it introduced Interim Development Orders (IDOs) as a stopgap control put in place until a scheme was approved or amended. Moreover, the act also empowered the establishment of the Town and Country Planning Board (TCPB) to oversee the preparation of the schemes and IDOs. These statutory planning controls were more encompassing than the local zoning schemes. Decades after it was originally proposed, Melbourne finally had legislated planning action.

After allied victory in the Pacific in 1945, Melbourne followed Australia into the prosperous period commonly referred to as the long boom. Australia's war effort, particularly manufacturing, successfully stimulated the nation's economic growth and addressed the unemployment problem almost instantly (Dingle, 2005a). The prosperity of the long boom, however, unfortunately contributed to worsening urban condition in Melbourne. A high birth rate combined with increasing immigration from war-ravaged United Kingdom and Europe saw the Melbourne population quickly approach one-and-a-half million – approximately one-sixth of the nation's total population – by the beginning of the second-half of the twentieth-century (MMBW, 1954). This population growth, combined with the inability of supply to meet demand for housing due to a shortage of housing materials created by the national war effort and continued land speculation, drove up housing prices and pushed many aspiring homeowners out to the urban fringe in unplanned and unregulated housing developments once building material restrictions were eventually lifted and mass construction resumed in the late 1940s (MMBW, 1954). Melbourne's urban sprawl proved particularly burdensome for the growing city (Hutchings,

2000). New urban developments were constructed with little or no regard to worker commute times or the provision of new services, schools, hospitals and recreation facilities.

Meanwhile, Melbourne had regained its title as Australia's most industrialised capital city. Industry expanded from the CBD into the quickly degrading inner city, further compounding its slum-like conditions (McLoughlin, 1992). Consequently, congestion across Melbourne became a serious problem, particularly in and around the CBD and inner city. The existing road and public transport systems were unable to effectively service the increasing population and ever-expanding metropolis of Melbourne. As such, the city experienced great difficulty in the movement of people and goods, reducing overall business efficiency and productivity. It is interesting to note, but not surprising given its eventual shelving, that Melbourne was experiencing many of the same problems that the 1929 strategy attempted to address, most notably urban sprawl, incompatible land uses next to one another, traffic congestion and the lack of provision of services.

Importantly, most of these problems occurred despite planning legislation being in place. As mentioned in the previous chapter, by the mid-1940s, Victoria had in place the *Town and Country Planning Act 1944*. This legislation gave councils the power to prepare and administer, either solely or jointly with another council, local planning schemes. Under these schemes, councils could use various ordinances stipulated in government regulations to prescribe the use and development of land within their municipality. It also introduced Interim Development Orders (IDOs) as a stopgap control put in place until a scheme was approved or amended. Moreover, the act also empowered the establishment of the TCPB to oversee the preparation of the schemes and IDOs. However, though these planning powers were available to councils, the urban condition continued to worsen. It was clear further action was necessary.

6.3 Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954 (1954 Plan)

Despite the urban development problems facing Melbourne, the uptake of the new planning powers by local councils was disappointing – only nine municipalities had any controls, schemes or IDOs, in

place by 1949 (Engels, 2018). The reasoning behind this situation was unclear. Architectural and planning historian Miles Lewis contends (1999) that the limited uptake was tied to compensation:

More or less in line with the 1929 report, the first Victorian legislation in 1944 provided for the levying of a rate of one half of the value of the betterment, but it was the threat of compensation that stopped most authorities using the planning powers that they were given (Lewis, 1999: 12).

Regardless of the reasoning, the limited uptake was the impetus for the Thomas Holloway-led Liberal-Country Coalition State Government to create the new *Town and Country Planning (Metropolitan Area) Act 1949*, an amendment to the principal *Town and Country Planning Act 1944*. This act gave power to the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works (MMBW) to establish a specific planning organisation and prepare, within a short three-year timeframe, a planning scheme for the entire metropolitan area of Melbourne. According to the MMBW, 'parliament realised that for an effective solution of metropolitan problems, a unified and coordinated study of the area as a whole would be necessary and that until this was done, planning by individual municipalities could not be effective' (1953: 15).

The first order of business for the MMBW was, under the Chair of J. C. Jessop, the establishment of an internal planning organisation to oversee the preparation of the metropolitan planning scheme. Following an expansive search, which included many international applicants, two individuals were selected to oversee this organisation: Chief Planner, E. F. Borrie; and Deputy Chief Planner, G. R. McGowan. The organisation was divided into five unevenly distributed divisions: architecture; engineering; economics and sociology; drafting; and clerical. The two largest divisions were architecture, which comprised a total of 18 staff during the preparation of the scheme, and engineering, which comprised 15 total staff. It is important to note that while more than 60 people altogether worked on the preparation of the planning scheme, the number of staff averaged just 33 across the three-year timeframe (MMBW, 1953). Of these, 26 were permanent staff, mostly draftspeople and assistants, while the rest were temporary appointments from other departments within the MMBW. Not surprising given the previous responsibilities of the MMBW, the newly created planning organisation was

composed mostly of architects, engineers and surveyors. Chief Planner Borrie was a qualified sewerage engineer and Deputy Chief Planner McGowan was a qualified engineer and surveyor (MMBW, 1953). As to be expected, most within the architecture division were qualified architects; however, there were also several qualified planners and engineers. Likewise, most within the engineering division were qualified engineers. Those in the economics and sociology division mostly held arts and commerce qualifications (see Appendix E for a more detailed look at the MMBW internal planning organisation composition). Despite the constantly fluctuating and rotating staff, the organisation was able to complete its sole task in just three short years – much faster than its predecessors. The end result was the *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954*.

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Figure 6.1: Front cover of the *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954* (MMBW, 1953)

The internal planning organisation of the MMBW released the *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954* in two parts. It released the first part in 1953: a 143-page *Report* (MMBW, 1953), which detailed the contents of the metropolitan planning scheme; and the standalone Melbourne Metropolitan

Planning Scheme itself, referred to as the MMPS, which contained the land-use zoning and reservation maps, and ordinances enabling its effect. Less than a year later, in 1954, the MMBW released the second part: a 220-page *Surveys and Analysis* (MMBW, 1954), which detailed the information from which MMPS was formulated. It is important to note that the introduction of the MMPS was not designed to remove local planning schemes. The MMBW (1953: 15) stated, 'The scheme should be considered as a framework into which the planning schemes of the local municipalities should fit and that it should be confined to the metropolitan problems and should not encroach on the field of detailed community planning, except where this might be essential for the completion of the broader framework'. The decision to publish the plan in two parts was based on a belief that it

would better meet the needs of those considering it. Those people who will want primarily to ascertain the proposals of the scheme and their effects and implications will obtain this knowledge in reasonably concise form in this report. Those who wish to go deeper and study the facts, data and conclusions on which the scheme has been based will need to read both reports (MMBW, 1953: 1).

The *Survey and Analysis* volume examined extensively the state of metropolitan Melbourne with respect to the following areas: growth and development; the planning area and its administration; the people of the planning area; agriculture; residential development; industry; commerce; public utilities; education and culture; health; recreation; road communications; public transport; and the central business area. The document revealed the major problems affecting the city. Firstly, it noticed a changing pattern of residents relocating to the city's suburban east and southeast, creating problems associated with the resultant urban sprawl. Interestingly, it made no mention of the relationship between land speculation and inappropriate urban-fringe development. It did, however, note the failing provision of schools, hospitals, recreation facilities and public utilities within and around these newer suburban developments. Secondly, it noted a significant trend of industry competing for land in the quickly deteriorating and once primarily residential inner city, resulting in the location of inappropriate land-uses next to one another and increasing slum-like conditions. Thirdly, it reported on an increasing preferential shift in households from centralised shopping to suburban shopping, particularly with the uptake of cars and the increasing congestion of the Central Business Area (CBA), an area slightly

larger than the current-day CBD. Building on this last point, fourthly, it recognised the significant congestion plaguing the city's current road and public transport systems, resulting in the inefficient movement of workers and goods across the city. These were the main problems facing metropolitan Melbourne.

Its companion, the *Report* volume, detailed how the above-mentioned problems were to be addressed. In accordance with the *Town and Country Planning (Metropolitan Area) Act* (1949), most of the problems were to be addressed through the planning controls – comprising land-use zones, land reservations and ordinances – within the MMPS. As this relates to the practice of providing certainty, the details of the scheme and the controls will be explored in greater detail in the next section. A range of solutions was proposed. For instance, with respect to residential development, it proposed the redevelopment of the inner city at higher densities by housing authorities and the control of suburban subdivisions to ensure the appropriate provision of roads, transport, public utilities, parks, recreation facilities, community facilities and shopping centres. With respect to industry and commerce, it proposed to decentralise and better distribute industrial land-uses in an effort to aid in the defence of the city from aerial attack, prevent industry from competing with non-industrial land-uses, protect sensitive land-uses from the negative effects of industry, ease congestion in the CBA and reduce worker commute times. For similar reasons, it also proposed the decentralisation of Melbourne's commercial aspects by the creation of six district business centres – Box Hill for the eastern district, Dandenong for the south-eastern district, Footscray for the western district, Moorabbin for the southern district and Preston for the northern district – to rival the CBA in terms of business and employment. However, solutions were not just limited to what could be solved using the MMPS. It also proposed a range of infrastructure projects, such as a new road system composed of arterial roads.

Problem

With respect to the genealogical principle of the problem, the practice of providing certainty was present in the *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954*. The majority of the recommendations contained within the plan were to be implemented through the MMPS itself. The MMPS was to contain a suite of land-use zoning controls and reservation controls, as well as ordinances informing these

controls. The authors listed three important purposes of zoning: to ‘preserve for the particular type of use the land most suitable for the purpose with regard to both its physical characteristics and its location in relation to land used for other purposes’; to ‘preserve within zones amenities appropriate to the particular uses’; and to ‘prevent deterioration of the amenities of an area by incompatible uses in adjoining areas’ (MMBW, 1953: 128). The land-use zoning was largely problematised around the need to protect what had already existed. Conversely, reservations served to ‘restrict the use of land to one specified purpose, usually some community service such as schools, hospitals, railways, roadways, water supply or similar purposes’ (MMBW, 1953: 128). This section will provide a deeper examination of the proposed controls.

The MMPS allocated all land within metropolitan Melbourne to either one of forty-four land-use zones or one of thirty-five land reservations. Of this 1,772km² (684mi²) area, 665km² (256mi²) was categorised as urban (see Figure 6.2 for the MMPS zoning maps included in the plan). This was a vast increase from the eight different land-use zones proposed in the 1929 strategy. One of the biggest differences between the two was the introduction of a Rural Zone that applied to land surrounding the urban area, essentially acting as an informal urban growth boundary. Under the Rural Zone, ‘residences on lots of not less than 2½ acres will be permitted’ (1953: 25). While this measure was based on the cost of the provision of essential services to new, outer-suburban developments – preserving productive agricultural land and improving overall city efficiency – it would also have served to limit land speculation, although such justification is not mentioned as a factor. A vast new suite of residential land-use zones was also provided, including a Redevelopment Zone for the inner city and a Living Zone and Reserved Living Zone for new subdivisions. Under the Living Zone, no new development was allowed until a detailed local planning scheme was prepared for the area. The Reserved Living Zone restricted development further, not allowing new development ‘until roads and public utilities and transport services can be provided economically and within a reasonable time’ (1953: 40). The MMBW could not supply services quickly enough so instead it attempted to contain growth. Again, although it was not mentioned in its justification, the latter two zones would reduce land speculation, as developers would need to first provide for the provision of essential services.

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Figure 6.2: *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954 – MMPS Maps (MMBW, 1953)*

The MMPS also included a suite of new commercial zones. Interestingly, these were location-based. CBD commercial land was categorised under one of three central commercial zones: Central Business Zone A, principally for retail trade and offices; Central Business Zone B, principally for banks and insurance companies; and Central Business Zone C, principally for wholesale business. Local commercial land was divided into three local commercial zones: District Business; Local Business; and Restricted Business. It also included a suite of eleven new industrial zones, ranging from a Service Industrial Zone to the far more intensive Dangerous Industrial Zone. Uses not covered in one of the aforementioned zones were designated as a Special Use Zone.

Administering the zoning scheme was originally intended to be the responsibility of individual local governments. However, the MMBW realised the need for a metropolitan planning authority with adequate power and financial resources to enable it to effectively carry out the MMPS. The plan recommended that parliament establish it as such an authority. Interestingly, it made mention of

providing compensation by local governments to those negatively affected by the MMPS but the 1929 strategy did not require those positively affected to contribute additional funds. Moreover, the MMBW also realised that the city was not static and that the planning scheme would have to be amended as circumstances and conditions changed.

Discourse

With respect to the genealogical principle of discourse, it is interesting to note that the term certainty did not appear in the *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954*. However, as mentioned earlier, it is important to examine the discourse surrounding the notion of certainty. Discourse relating to the value of property was far less overt in the *Scheme* than in its predecessor. Stabilising the value of property was no longer a concern and such terminology did not appear. The purpose of the MMPS and land-use zones was: 'to preserve for the particular type of use the land most suitable for the purpose having regard both to its physical characteristics and its location in relation to land used for other purposes'; 'to preserve within the zones amenities appropriate to the particular uses'; and 'to prevent deterioration of the amenities of an area by incompatible uses in adjoining areas' (MMBW, 1953: 128). The final purpose would obviously protect the value of property and the benefits that could be derived from its ownership. However, it was not explicitly justified as such. In fact, the only meaningful mention of property values occurred with respect to the issue of compensation: 'If because of the planning scheme owners are unable to sell their property for its market value, they will be entitled to equitable compensation as provided in the legislation' (MMBW, 1953: 129).

Instead, the discourse of the plan was centred strongly on the idea of efficiency. This idea was at the forefront of the plan. 'The purpose of this planning scheme is to find out what is efficient and what is not, to show how faults can be remedied and the city made more pleasant, more convenient and more efficient, a better place in which to live, work and play' (MMBW, 1953: 3). The discourse around efficiency was present in both the outline of the major problems of urban development and the measures proposed to combat them. The solutions proposed to address the issues of urban sprawl, uncoordinated development and congestion in particular were justified with the term efficiency. These will be explored in greater detail in the following section. While certainly of benefit to property owners

in the vicinity of these proposals, the efficiency focus looks to be driven by the desire to increase the profitability of Melbourne businesses and improve the liveability for ordinary citizens more generally.

Power

The genealogical principle of power can be used to explain both the development of the *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954* and the planning system more generally during this period, especially with respect to the provision of certainty. This section explores the ways in which decision-making power was exerted in all three developmental stages of the plan: conception, contents and outcomes.

Conception

The conception of the plan was a simple result of the exertion of decision-making power. The Holloway Government exerted such power when it decided that the

the MMBW should prepare a planning scheme for the area largely within a 15-mile radius of central Melbourne. The TCPB was rejected for this role in favour of the MMBW, which had the advantages of accumulated technical expertise and a structure directly representative of local government, as well as strong support from the Municipal Association (Logan, 1981: 22).

The state parliament exerted power by passing the *Town and Country Planning (Metropolitan Area) Act 1949*, which in turn empowered the MMBW to establish a specific planning organisation and prepare, within a short three-year timeframe, a planning scheme for the entire metropolitan area of Melbourne.

Contents

Similarly, the contents of the plan were a clear result of the exertion of decision-making power. In comparison with its predecessor, the plan provided a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of the metropolis. The justification for its comprehensiveness was explained in the opening chapter:

Over the years, with the development of the art and science of town planning, there has emerged, as a distinct step in the work, the process now referred to as the 'Basic Survey'. This involves the investigation and analysis of every facet of community life, so that before any solution of the problems of a city is propounded, there shall have been established a complete understanding of the city both as a physical and a social entity (MMBW, 1954: 1).

From this comprehensive analysis, the key themes of residential development, industry, commerce, road communications, public transport and the provision of services emerge to be addressed. Questions remain as to what drove the emergence of these specific foci. As with the analysis of the 1929 scheme, this section examines four possible explanations as to the development of the specific themes of the MMPS: political interests; business and financial interests; professional interests; and planning interests.

It is important to determine what effects, if any, political interests had on the creation the plan. Unlike its predecessor, successive Victorian governments played an important role in the creation of the MMPS. As discussed earlier, the threat from the Commonwealth Government to withhold vital housing funding saw the Country Government finally introduce planning legislation in 1944. Had the Commonwealth Government not delivered such an ultimatum, there is no telling when Victoria would have finally introduced its first piece of planning legislation. The *Town and Country Planning Act 1944* allowed municipalities to voluntarily prepare their own planning schemes, and established the TCPB to coordinate municipal efforts. However, a disappointing uptake of the new planning powers by local councils led the Holloway Government to create the new *Town and Country Planning (Metropolitan Area) Act 1949*. The act gave power to the MMBW to establish a specific planning organisation and prepare, but not implement, a planning scheme for the entire metropolitan area of Melbourne within a short three-year timeframe.

These events raise several issues. Firstly, why did a state government, especially one involving the Country party, decide to create a metropolitan plan? As shown with the previous plan, the Country party, in particular, was unreceptive to the idea of metropolitan planning and money being spent on the city. Perhaps the problems facing Melbourne were a significant enough state political issue to warrant action. In any case, why then did the act only provide such a short timeframe in which to create a plan and not provide for its implementation? This mirrors the events surrounding the creation of the 1929 strategy. The *Metropolitan Town Planning Commission Act 1922* established the MTPC purely as an advisory body and with a short three-year timeframe. Like the case with the plan, perhaps the Holloway Government was still hesitant to fully involve itself in planning but wanted to appear to be taking some action. Moreover, the MMBW was an independent body and the 1949 act did not specify what the MMBW was to investigate in its metropolitan plan. Thus, it would appear that political interests did not have much effect on the themes of the plan.

It is also important to determine what influence business and financial interests had on the end result of the plan. Firstly, as it was at the heart of the previous plan, there is obvious merit in determining the affect of land speculation. Although it was never mentioned as a factor, many of the measures put forward in the plan, particularly the land-use zoning and reservation controls in the MMPS, would reduce land speculation. For instance, the Rural Zone would prevent speculators from buying up cheap parcels of land and subdividing it for residential development and the Living and Reserved Living Zones would prevent speculators from realising their development until the appropriate services and infrastructure have been provided or unless the arrangements changed in the future. However, while the plan made provision for those negatively affected by its measures, it did not, unlike its predecessor, require the payment of betterment fees, so it was possible to make a financial windfall as a result of the plan. Nevertheless, it was unlikely that interests from land holders and speculators would have played a significant role in the final outcome of the plan.

Moreover, as the plan made constant reference to improving the efficiency of the city, which would in turn improve the efficiency and productivity of business, there is also merit in determining what affect private business interests had on its creation. As shown earlier, there was some doubt as to the

reasoning behind the 1929 strategy's constant reference to its business and financial benefits. Ultimately though, it appeared more to feign business benefit and actually benefit much more the public as a whole. This was not so much the case with the 1954 plan. The plan genuinely appears to be interested in improving the efficiency of the city. Many of its proposals, such as the decentralisation of industry and commerce and improvement of Melbourne's road and public transport systems, sought to achieve just that. Were business and financial interests really at play here? It would be unlikely. The MMBW was an independent public utility board. It is therefore doubtful that outside business and financial interests would have been able to affect its proposals. Moreover, unlike the MTPC, the planning organisation of the MMBW, which was responsible for the creation of the plan, consisted of full-time employees, mainly professional engineers and architects, who had no other discernible private business interests. It is most likely that the efficiency spoken so fondly of in the MMPS was actually a reflection of other interests, an indirect application of power.

There is also merit in discovering what affect the professional backgrounds of the MMBW played in the creation of the plan. The MMBW specialised in the delivery of utility services to metropolitan Melbourne. Its forced foray into the realms of planning led to the creation of a specific planning organisation. As shown earlier in this chapter, the planning organisation – overseen by Chief Planner Borrie, a qualified engineer and Deputy Chief Planner McGowan, a qualified engineer and surveyor — comprised mainly engineers, architects, drafts people and surveyors across its five divisions, together with several qualified planners. The strong, prescriptive measures put forward as proposals in the plan, such as improvements to the road and public transport systems, the metropolitan park system and the provision of other essential cultural and utility services, reflect these professional backgrounds, unified by shared professional methods and interests. The themes of residential development, road communications and the provision of services would have been themes routinely explored during the day-to-day functioning of the other departments within the MMBW. Thus, the profession background of the MMBW and its planning organisation suggest a significant influence on the focus of the plan and its proposals. This assertion is consistent with the nature of rational comprehensive planning wherein planners were shielded largely from outside influence (Ward, 1994).

Given that professional planning had begun to gain legitimacy around the world by the 1950s following post-WWII reconstruction in Europe, it is also worth determining if and how planning approaches and ideas influenced the development of the plan. Broadly speaking, the plan, like its predecessor, appeared to reflect a comprehensive approach to planning; technical expertise was used to examine a wide range of issues and devise the most suitable planning response. However, unlike the 1929 strategy, the plan responded with a blueprint document. It detailed plans to achieve a desired physical urban form for a town, city or region. Blueprint planning also aligned with the professional background of the MMBW, which consisted mainly of architects and engineers. Interestingly, the desired physical urban form was based on the continuation of current metropolitan trends. The plan simply aimed to create a metropolitan plan that would meet the requirements of Melbourne. There was an assumed confidence by the authors in the appropriateness of their surveys and associated measures, no doubt a reflection of the professional background of the MMBW and its staff. The other major approach to planning was rational-comprehensive – the selection of the most appropriate alternative, from the identification of all possibilities, which results in the preferred consequences for a town, city or region (Ward, 1994). Rational-comprehensive planning found international favour in the 1950s and 1960s, which would have been after the initial creation of the plan.

Unlike its predecessor, the plan made no mention of specific planning ideas. It also made no mention of interstate or international planning examples. This is somewhat peculiar, given the release of two high-profile plans around this time. In 1944, Patrick Abercrombie published the *Greater London Plan* (1944). Four years later, the Cumberland City Council released Sydney's first metropolitan plan, the *County of Cumberland Planning Scheme* (CCC, 1948). The former was clearly a significant influence on the latter. According to Howe (2000: 82), Sydney's plan 'echoed the *Greater London Plan* in language and style', primarily through its use of a greenbelt around the metropolitan area. Later in 1948, Abercrombie began an intensive five-week lecture tour of Australian cities, which included 'discussions with [Melbourne's] key planning agencies of the day, such as the Town and Country Planning Board, the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works and the Housing Commission (Amati and Freestone, 2009: 621). Chief Borrie was thus aware of the existence of both the London and Sydney plans, yet there is no mention of either in the plan. Moreover, there is little in the 1954 plan to indicate that the London and Sydney plans were of any influence. Freestone, Amati and Mills (2016)

provide an explanation for this apparent disconnect between the plans. They argue that in the early-1950s there was a move away from visionary plans, like those of London and Sydney, as they were too ambitious and not economically feasible. The profession moved towards more pragmatic, gradual and economically achievable plans. This pragmatic focus is clearly reflected in the 1954 plan.

The plan also reflected other existing planning ideas. Firstly, the most striking feature of the plan was the detailed land-use zoning and reservation measures proposed in the MMPS. Land-use zoning was not new to Melbourne. The 1929 strategy attempted to provide planning schemes containing land-use zoning based on US experiences, which was just one of the examples that led Freestone and Grubb (1998) to argue for the influence of American planning. The zoning and reservation presented in the MMPS, however, were far more expansive and detailed. Interestingly, the decision to allow the MMBW, a statutory government body to create a metropolitan planning framework into which local planning schemes fit, rather than a general plan created by an independent body created specifically for that purpose, appeared to reflect British planning ideas. Moreover, the decision to propose the establishment of a metropolitan planning authority also reflected British planning (Ward, 1994). However, the plan still justified its existence by arguing that it would increase the efficiency of the city, business, industry and the community. This was instead a reflection of US city functional ideas. Borrie's interest in planning is believed to have stemmed from a trip to the United States of America in the late-1930s (Dingle and Rasmussen, 2008). Thus, the MMBW and its plan appeared to resemble a blueprint planning approach and reflect different planning ideas from across the world.

Like its predecessor, the planners ultimately appear to have resisted external pressure from political, business and financial interests during its creation. However, unlike its predecessor, the plan itself seems genuinely interested in improving the efficiency of the city and its aspects, including the key themes of residential development, industry, commerce, road communications, public transport and the provision of services. This was most likely a reflection of the independence of the MMBW, the planning organisation and its staff, as well as ideas and movements in planning. There was an assumed confidence by the authors in the appropriateness of their surveys and associated data gathering measures to achieve their goals.

Outcomes

Decision-making power was exerted during the outcomes process of the plan. As specified in legislation, the entirety of the *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954* and MMPS was exhibited to the public for comment in 1954 for a period of three months – an innovation for its time (McLoughlin, 1992). During this time, more than 4,000 objections were received on a range of issues. It took the MMBW four years to work through every objection and it was not until the end of 1958 that the MMBW finally approved the MMPS, without any major changes, and submitted it to the Minister for Local Government for gazettal (McLoughlin, 1992). In the meantime, several measures were taken to aid the implementation of the MMPS. Firstly, the MMBW was empowered to recover the expenses incurred during the production of the *Scheme* by imposing an annual metropolitan improvement levy on all property owners. Secondly, a series of Interim Development Orders (IDOs) were applied to stop development inconsistent with the measures proposed in the MMPS until its eventual approval.

Discontinuity

The *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954* represented both continuities and discontinuities between it and its predecessor. Despite emerging ideas of rationality, the 1954 document continued the same approach to metropolitan planning as that of the 1929 document. Both used a comprehensive approach, wherein technical expertise was used to examine a wide range of issues and devise the most suitable planning response. However, the 1954 document was far more comprehensive, covering 14 different topic areas, something made possible by the MMBW's greater staffing resources. Moreover, the 1954 document retained the regulatory framework envisioned by the 1929 document, which was eventually created under the *Town and Country Planning Act 1944*. Planning schemes were to regulate development. However, a significant discontinuity occurred with regards to the planning responses and their use of this framework. The 1954 document was a plan. It involved a blueprint planning response, specifying a desired physical form for the city specified by the metropolitan planning scheme. In comparison, the 1929 document was a strategy. It involved a strategic response, indicating a desired physical form for the city but leaving the implementation specifics to councils through local planning schemes. Interestingly, as expected, the planning controls available for use in the planning schemes

became more numerous and specific. Eight land-use zones were proposed during in the 1929 strategy, while 44 land-use zones were included in the 1954 plan. Most importantly, this discontinuity between the two metropolitan planning documents in terms of the levels at which planning schemes were to operate actually created a new *episteme* with respect to the provision of certainty. The 1954 plan is the source of the idea that certainty should be provided at the metropolitan level, specified through a metropolitan plan rather than at the local level, merely informed by a metropolitan strategy. Lastly, the 1954 plan also represented a discontinuity in the fact that, as will be shown in the next section, it was actually implemented.

6.4 Historical analysis: 1960s – early-1970s

With respect to the genealogical principle of history, stability came to define Melbourne during the 1960s and early-1970s. Economically, the city entered into its second continuous decade of economic growth, which led to further urban growth. Politically, the city also experienced its second continuous decade of conservative government at both the Commonwealth and state levels. Born in the midst of this stability was another attempt at a Melbourne metropolitan plan.

The stability of economic and urban growth

Apart from a minor blip at the beginning of the decade caused by a credit squeeze, the 1960s were a prosperous time for Australia, joining much of the Western-world in post-war economic growth (Bolton, 2006). The nation's economic success was spurred in part by massive population growth driven largely by an influx of migration, most notably from southern and central Europe, which accounted for approximately 60% of the nation's 6.3 million-person increase from 1947 to 1976, and by the rise of the manufacturing sector, which prompted a restructuring of the Australian economy (McLoughlin, 1992). This long boom had a major impact on Melbourne. The city's population increased by nearly one million in just 17 years, from approximately 1,524,000 in 1954 to 2,503,000 in 1971 (McDonald, 2005). To accommodate such growth, the metropolis continued to sprawl outward through low-density development, aided by increased car ownership, a result of the reduction in the cost of vehicle manufacturing and increases in real wages (Frost, 2005). Interestingly, this demand for

housing fuelled another real estate boom (McLoughlin, 1992). Moreover, much of the expanding manufacturing industry found a home in Melbourne. More than 155,000 manufacturing jobs were created in the metropolis between 1947 and 1966 (Dingle, 2005b). The manufacturing industry quickly outgrew its traditional industrial home of the inner city, expanding to new industrial areas in Melbourne's outer-suburbs, competing with housing for land (Frost, 2005).

The stability of politics

Coinciding with the stability of the economic long boom was also stability in government at both the Commonwealth and state levels. At the Commonwealth level, the right-leaning Liberal-Country Coalition held power from 1949 to 1972, which included Robert Menzies' continuous 16-year stint as Prime Minister, the longest of all Australian Prime Ministers (Bolton, 2006). Meanwhile, at the Victorian state level, the then Country and Liberal Party and later just the Liberal Party held power from 1955 to 1982, including Henry Bolte's 17-year stint as Premier, the longest of all Victorian Premiers.

6.5 Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region (1971 Plan)

The lack of metropolitan planning control in Melbourne continued for much of the 1960s, during the above-mentioned stability. As discussed in the previous section, the updated MMPS was approved by the MMBW in 1958. However, the MMPS controls were stuck in limbo, awaiting final gazettal from the Bolte state government. Save for an IDO that had been imposed to stop development inconsistent with the directions proposed in the MMPS, Melbourne's urban growth was still without metropolitan control. Planning control was instead found at the local level, enforced through local government planning schemes under the *Town and Country Planning Act 1961*. It was not until the appointment of Rupert Hamer, as Minister for Local Government in 1966, that this lack of direction was addressed. One of Rupert Hamer's first official orders was to instruct both the TCPB and the MMBW, to each prepare a report outlining their visions for the future growth of Melbourne. The *Town and Country Planning Act 1958* had authorised the TCPB to oversee the process of preparing and implementing local government planning schemes (Eccles and Bryant, 2011). Hamer's orders to it and the MMBW

included the possibility of providing satellite cities, a planning idea popular in the UK for decades (Ward, 1994), and the planning policies and administration needed to achieve it (Dunk, 1966).

The responses of both organisations were quite similar. Predicting that Melbourne's population would reach five million by the turn of the twenty-first century and believing that the existing urban area could not accommodate such growth, both the TCPB's report, *Organisation for Strategic Planning* (1967), and the MMBW's report, *The Future Growth of Melbourne* (1967), recommended channelling future metropolitan growth into a pattern of corridors and green wedges, albeit in different ways. The TCPB advocated three major radial corridors of metropolitan towns in easterly and southeasterly directions. This was the same direction suggested by the MMBW in the *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme* (MMBW, 1953; 1954) due to housing preferences and the cost-effective provision of services. Remarkably, in 1967, the MMBW chose to abandon its previous eastern-focus and recommended geographically balanced radial corridor growth that incorporated the northern and western sides of the metropolis.

The reasoning behind the advocacy of the corridor pattern of growth by both the TCPB and MMBW is not fully understood. McLoughlin (1992) has speculated that corridor plans from overseas – mainly the Modern Architectural Research (MARS) Group's radical plan for London in 1942 and the Finger Plan for Copenhagen in 1947 – and lobbying from the Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA) may have influenced the visions of both bodies. Moreover, he writes that it was definitely based on the decision of 'the professionals rather than the politicians' (McLoughlin, 1992:45). However, the decision of the MMBW to alter its vision for the future growth of the metropolis soon after creating the *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme* (MMBW, 1953; 1954) – especially one that was based on such extensive research – seems odd. The decision was ultimately that of the MMBW's planning and highway committee vice-Chair, Bernard Evans, architect and former Lord Mayor of Melbourne (1959-60). Sandercock (1990) speculates that the decision to abandon eastern-growth in favour of centred-growth might have had something to do with property developers and speculators with land holdings in the underdeveloped west of Melbourne, of which Evans was one. It was alleged in the early-1970s that Evans had been using his positions to benefit from the speculation of property, which included the purchase of several properties close to proposed infrastructure projects over which he had some sway

(Hills, 1970). The Victorian Labor Party, still in opposition, requested a royal commission into the land dealings of Evans and other Melbourne City Councillors but the request was blocked in the Legislative Council ('Labor Seeks Land Deals Probe', 1970). Nevertheless, the fear of such unscrupulous activities were what led the TCPB to include within its recommendations a warning that action would needed to protect the corridors from land speculation and banking. However, such an action was unlikely to ever be realised. As Sandercock notes, 'the methods for doing this are anathema to Victorian freeholders and likely to be killed at birth by the Liberal and Country Party majority in state parliament' (1990: 193).

Only a small section of the TCPB's report (1967) was dedicated to planning Melbourne's future growth. Much of the report instead focused on identifying the critical issues of planning policies and the authority best suited to create that policy. On the latter, the TCPB recommended that it be the planning authority responsible for strategic planning, creating policies for growth, and that the MMBW be the statutory planning authority, responsible for local planning and development controls. They also called for the creation of a council for the coordination of regional planning. Not surprisingly, after recognising the need for planning to occur at three levels – state, regional and local – the MMBW recommended itself as both the metropolitan and regional planning authority (MMBW, 1967). This was despite questions from experts about the effectiveness of the MMBW to operate given insufficient staffing and funding for planning ('Town Planning in "Impoverished" State, Says Expert', 1966).

Interestingly, an alternative suggestion for the future growth of Melbourne was also put forward from an unlikely source. Under the guise of the Modern Melbourne Committee, Maurie and Ruth Crow, a husband-and-wife activist team, released over three parts their plan for Melbourne. The first part, *Plan for Melbourne, Part One: Facts and Principles* (Crow and Crow, 1969), was initially presented for the Victorian State Conference of the Communist Party of Australia. The second and third parts, *Plan for Melbourne, Part Two: Blueprints for Change* (Crow and Crow, 1970) and *Plan for Melbourne, Part Three: One Corridor of Participants – Not Seven Corridors of Power* (Crow and Crow, 1972), respectively, were released as substantial standalone publications. The third part was released as a response to the MMBW's *Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region* (1971). Together, these documents outlined a vision for the future growth of Melbourne along a single corridor out

towards Gippsland. However, just as importantly, it also outlined their vision for a fairer, more socio-economically cohesive city. Needless to say, the *Plan for Melbourne* was never realised.

Further planning advancements were afoot. Early in 1968, the Victorian parliament passed the *Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act* (1968), substantially amending the preceding 1961 act based on suggestions received the previous year from both the MMBW and TCPB, for extending the metropolitan boundaries of Melbourne. Amongst its main achievements were revising the roles of the state's planning bodies and introducing 'a three-tiered hierarchy of state, regional and local authorities, and an independent appeals body' (Eccles and Bryant, 2011: 15). The MMBW retained statutory responsibility for the extended metropolitan area of Melbourne, albeit with direct ministerial control, a concession of sorts after Premier Bolte's threat to abolish the board ('Works Board Under Minister', 1968). The State Planning Council (SPC) was established to coordinate the future works of planning authorities and semi-government authorities, as well as to consult with the TCPB on the preparation of statements of planning policy which

when approved by the Minister and gazetted, became government policy and legally binding on councils and regional authorities... These statements were required to be taken into account and given effect by relevant regional authorities and councils in the preparation of scheme amendments and in consideration of planning permit applications (Eccles and Bryant, 2011: 16).

Moreover, they also could be used to make provisions for matters already the subject of planning schemes. A total of nine policy statements were approved, with six covering areas close to metropolitan Melbourne (Spencer, 1985). Strategic planning was to be a joint effort between the TCPB, SPC and state cabinet. Local planning was still to be carried out by local authorities. However, non-metropolitan local authorities were also instructed to form regional planning authorities for the purpose of regional planning, similar to the MMPS. The contents of planning schemes were to remain the same. Minister Hamer also adopted the MMBW's proposal for the future growth of Melbourne put forward a year earlier and instructed it to prepare a new metropolitan plan to realise it (Sanders, 1969). To aid such a task, the Victorian Parliament finally gazetted the MMPS, exactly ten years after its

original submission for gazettal and nearly two decades after the original decision to produce it. These advancements culminated in the *Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region* (MMBW, 1971).

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Figure 6.3: Front cover of *Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region* (MMBW, 1971)

The MMBW released *Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region*, its second attempt at a metropolitan plan for Melbourne, in November 1971. Unlike its predecessors, its creation was not in any response to any immediate problems affecting the city; rather, the 113-page, single-volume document was designed to simply perform two key functions across its six major chapters: preemptively outline a ‘long-term planning policy over the next 30 years’ and amend the recently implemented MMPS to translate this policy direction into ‘planning control[s] to cover the whole of the metropolitan region’ (MMBW, 1971: 4).

In terms of the former function, the plan, like its predecessors, began by outlining the present state of urban development within the city. Of particular note, the MMBW found that the most populated

regions of Melbourne were still the east and southeast, despite attempts in the previous plan to achieve a more balanced distribution. The authors attributed this concentration in the east and southeast to aesthetics, the cost-effective provision of services and the locating of new industry in the north and west due to relatively affordable land. The document also provided population forecasts upon which the long-term planning policy relied. The MMBW took a very positive outlook, assuming that the population growth experienced as a result of the long boom would continue. As such, the authors projected a population of between 3,300,000 and 3,500,000 by 1985 and between 4,500,000 to 4,700,000 by 2000, a marked increase from the approximately 2,500,000 residents as of 1971 (MMBW, 1971: 21). However, the authors were quick to note that these figures were just projections and were beholden to international and domestic policies and trends – in essence, they recognised an uncertainty involved in planning. This proved a wise move, as their projections proved to be over-estimates. It took Melbourne until the turn of the twenty-first century to reach the 3,300,000 predicted by 1985 and its current population has only just met the 4,500,000 predicted by 2000 (ABS, 2016).

The document then presented its planning policies for the future growth of metropolitan Melbourne, which the MMBW translated into a detailed ‘framework plan’ (see Figure 6.4). The planning policies were founded primarily on the policy direction provided by the Bolte Government. The authors provided a summary of this direction: ‘the government’s policy is that further urban growth should be encouraged to follow a corridor type of development, primarily along the general axes of the principal rail and road routes, enabling the permanent retention of substantial wedges of open space’ (MMBW, 1971: 52). The government direction was informed by strategic consultation with the MMBW and the TCPB in the late-1960s. The authors adapted this state policy direction to the present state of urban development in Melbourne. The end result was a ‘framework plan’, a map broadly detailing the location of future urban development and permanent preservation of non-urban land. New urban development was to occur in one of eight radial growth corridors – Frankston, Berwick, Lilydale, Plenty, Merri, Sunbury, Melton and Werribee – while non-urban land was to be preserved in one of eight ‘green’ wedges – Springvale, Cranbourne, Dandenongs, Kinglake-Yarra, Woodstock, Calder, Derrimut and Werribee South. A map (see Figure 6.4) and a series of overlays helped to illustrate the location of the corridors and wedges and the reasoning behind their location.

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Figure 6.4: *Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region - Framework Plan* (MMBW, 1971: 53)

It was the intention of the MMBW that the growth corridors would accommodate all new urban growth over the next 20 years and beyond. However, the authors recognised that additional work was needed to determine the exact nature of the development allowed in the corridors – mainly whether it took the form of satellite towns or continuous development. Interestingly, the authors wrote ‘within the defined corridors, it is envisaged that suitable land would be progressively set aside for short- and medium-term development, allowing reasonable margins for growth’ (MMBW, 1971: 52). Presumably, government control of the release of land would prevent land banking and speculation. Moreover, the authors recognised the need for all development within the urban zones of the growth corridors to require permits and to occur alongside the full provision of services, such as ‘transport networks, schools, hospitals, water supply, sewerage, drainage, gas and electricity’ (MMBW, 1971: 68), which was to be funded by the State Government. This measure aimed to help prevent a lack of services to new developments, which was a significant cause of much of the inappropriate development that had plagued the city in the first half of the twentieth-century. Interestingly, it gave developers a great sense

of certainty as to what they were allowed to build, as they would know exactly what was required of them prior to development.

Also of significance, the document looked at future urban growth patterns that the metropolitan region might take beyond the original thirty-year timeframe of the plan. The first suggestion involved continuing the form proposed in the framework plan of focusing growth in the corridors. The second involved concentrating resources into a single corridor and focusing the majority of growth within it, away from the CBD. The MMBW ultimately recommended the first form of growth. However, the MMBW believed that, based on a multitude of reasons, such as a preference to live in the south-east, new transport options and government policy, Melbourne could easily abandon the centralised growth pattern recommend and head towards the second alternative. The most likely scenarios for its future growth would be expanding further to the southeast towards the Latrobe Valley, south towards Western Port and southwest towards Geelong. Ultimately, the MMBW acknowledged that the State Government would determine the location of any future population growth across Melbourne beyond the timeframe of the plan.

In terms of the latter function, the plan proposed amending the recently approved MMPS to translate the planning policies and associated framework plan into planning controls that covered the entire metropolitan region. For legislative reasons, this actually involved two separate amendments: Amendment 3, which related to the area (3,248km²) beyond the former metropolitan area designated in the *Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act* (1968); and Amendment 21, which related to rural land within the former metropolitan area (1,782km²). Combined, the total area of metropolitan Melbourne was now 5,030km². Both amendments were designed to enable the statutory designation of urban and non-urban land uses. To aid in the achievement of the desired growth in the urban corridors and conservation in the green wedges, a range of new land-use zones was also added to the MMPS. These new zones will be explored in more detail below. As with the previous plan, the amended MMPS was opened for public consultation. Objections to the plan were considered before determining whether the amendment should then be adopted and submitted to the state government for final approval and gazettal. Also as before, the MMBW sought to implement IDOs to ensure that development contrary to the new MMPS did not occur.

Problem

Regarding the genealogical principle of the problem, the practice of providing certainty was present in the *Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region*. As mentioned above, the planning policies and associated framework plan were to be implemented through the MMPS, which had finally been approved three years prior. However, the existing suite of land-use zones was inadequate to ensure the desired growth and conservation in the urban corridors and green wedges, respectively. As such, a number of new land-use zones were created. To achieve growth in the urban corridors, four new zones were created: Reserved Living Zones, which were to accommodate future ‘residential and associated development’ (MMBW, 1971: 78); Reserved Industrial Zones, which were similar to Reserved Living Zone but for industrial development; Local Authority Development Zones, which were to defer development to the existing local planning schemes (the MMPS operated side-by-side with local planning schemes, often meaning dual and sometimes incompatible sets of planning controls (Eccles and Bryant, 2011)); and Corridor Zones, which were to ‘designate areas which may be made available for urban development in the future’ (MMBW, 1971: 81). These zones, each with their own specific controls that aimed to ensure that enough land was released to meet demand for the next 20 years – 15 years of raw land and five years of subdividable land. Interestingly, the more minute details of each zone, such as permissible uses, were not included in the plan. To achieve conservation in the green wedges, six new land-use zones were created: Conservation Zone; Landscape Interest Zone; Special Extractive Zone; Intensive Agriculture Zone; General Farming Zone; and Residential D Zone (MMBW, 1971). Like the new urban zones, each non-urban zone provided specific development controls. For instance, the Residential D Zone required a minimum lot size of one acre for all residential development. A number of reservations were also included to protect public open spaces, public purpose reservations and transport proposals. An overview land-use zoning map of the MMPS, complete with its new zones and reservations was included in the plan (see Figure 6.5). All of these things considered, the document would have provided stakeholders with a fair level of certainty as to what was now considered allowable development in the future, albeit, not as much as its immediate predecessor. Greater certainty would have to be found in the actual amended MMPS itself.

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Figure 6.5: *Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region – General Zoning Proposals*
(MMBW, 1971)

Moving away from strictly planning controls, the document also used other measures to achieve its vision for the Melbourne metropolitan region. The plan recommended the introduction of a range of new financial incentives and disincentives designed to ensure that urban land was developed and non-urban land conserved. These took the form of holding charges, rates charges and tax relief (MMBW, 1971). Interestingly, a betterment fee for increases to land values that resulted from the plan was considered but ultimately not adopted. The document also recommended measures designed to ensure that the state government provided all essential services – transport networks, schools, hospitals, water supply, sewerage, drainage, gas and electricity – for the growth corridors, thereby preventing a lack of services that plagued the inappropriate development in the first half of the twentieth-century. This was also in effect the only transport and infrastructure measure put forward in the plan. Importantly, in accordance with a request from the Minister for Local Government, the plan also included a draft statement of planning policy to help guide the future development of Melbourne (MMBW, 1971: 102). Unfortunately, no real indication was given of how this policy statement would be utilised.

Discourse

Regarding the genealogical principle of discourse, it is interesting to note that the term certainty did not appear in *Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region*. However, as with the earlier plans, it is important to examine the discourse surrounding the notion of certainty: that planning should protect or enhance investment in property. Unlike the 1929 strategy, stabilising property values received little attention. The issue arose only in respect to future growth in urban growth corridors and conservation in green wedges. Proposals to gradually release developable urban land, as well as a range of financial incentives and disincentives for land holdings, were designed to prevent land banking and speculation, especially in the green wedges, thereby ensuring more stable property values. Moreover, the discourse around improving the efficiency of the city was largely replaced. One of the only mentions of efficiency was in MMBW Chair Alan Croxford's introduction:

The published plans are a first step towards making the most efficient and compatible use of the land available, channelling urban development into growth corridors within easy reach of open areas, making the best use of our existing systems, conserving our resources, preserving areas for the future and developing in a way to minimise future community costs (MMBW, 1971: 1).

However, this passage instead contained the most prominent discourses of the plan: growth and conservation.

The discourses of growth and conservation featured heavily in *Planning Policies*. The term growth was used in the document on 164 separate occasions, while the term conservation and its variations were used on 95 occasions. This extent of use was not surprising. The city of Melbourne was, at the tail end of the long boom, still experiencing strong economic and urban growth, while there was increasing awareness about the importance of protecting the environment. The use of these discourses was best explained by the MMBW in its justification of the plan: 'by defining the corridors where future urban growth will be permitted and the non-urban areas in which this type of growth will be prohibited

[conserved], the proposals provide a clear planning guide for members of the public, private developers and the public authorities' (1971: 15). To put it more simply, the discourse of growth gave assurance on where urban development was allowed, while the discourse of conservation gave assurance on where it was to be prohibited. It was through the planning controls translated from the plan into the MMPS that these assurances were given to residents and property developers. This aligns perfectly with the notion of certainty.

Power

The genealogical principle of power can be used to explain both the development of *Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region* and the planning system more generally during this period, especially regarding the provision of certainty. This section explores the ways in which decision-making power was exerted in all three developmental stages of the plan: conception, contents and outcomes.

Conception

The conception of the plan can be seen as a clear result of the exertion of decision-making power. The newly appointed Minister for Local Government, Rupert Hamer, exercised decision-making power when he first conceived of the plan in 1966. Minister Hamer instructed both the TCPB and the MMBW to each prepare a report outlining their respective vision for the future growth of Melbourne and the planning policies and administration needed to achieve it. The decision to end a near decade-long absence of metropolitan planning action came seemingly out of the blue, raising the question about why the state government suddenly reinvolves itself in metropolitan planning. This question is especially interesting, given that conservative state governments had a noted history of disdain for planning (see Sandercock, 1990). There is nothing in the newspaper archives or literature to suggest that there was much political pressure from the public for metropolitan planning action. After all, while the MMPS had not yet been gazetted, IDOs were currently in place to prevent land speculation and the inappropriate urban development that plagued the first-half of the twentieth-century, the two factors that drove the public's initial cry for planning. One explanation suggested was that Rupert Hamer, as a

‘small-l liberal’, valued planning and, having just taken on the ministerial portfolio, was eager to do something (Former TCPB Planner, personal communication, 14 August, 2014). Another was that the Chair of the MMBW, Alan Croxford, actually prompted Minister Hamer into action (Colebatch, 2014). Both of these would satisfactorily explain Minister Hamer’s request for the preparation of a new metropolitan plan for Melbourne. Regardless, Hamer again exercised decision-making power by choosing, based on the reports received, the MMBW to prepare the plan. To assist the MMBW’s efforts, the State Government exercised decision-making power by passing the *Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act 1968* and gazetting the long-awaited MMPS. Interestingly, the former action allowed for tighter ministerial control over the MMBW and its planning efforts. Moreover, the latter action actually gave decision-making power to the MMPS itself to direct urban development in Melbourne. If someone wanted to develop land within the metropolitan region, they needed to satisfy the controls stipulated in the MMPS.

Contents

The contents of the plan, both the proposed future urban form and the mechanisms through which it was to be achieved, can also be seen as a result of decision-making power. The plan recommended a future urban form consisting of urban corridors and non-urban areas and made use of the statutory planning controls of the MMPS. On the surface, Minister Hamer was clearly responsible for these actions. He exerted decision-making power, as the Minister for Local Government, by instructing the MMBW to prepare the plan using this future urban form – and only this form – and urging the Victorian parliament to gazette the MMPS so that it could be used to control development and achieve the proposed urban form. However, below the surface, things become a little more complicated. This was because Minister Hamer’s directive was not of his own devising. He had selected the one of the two future urban form options originally presented to him: eight radial growth corridors and eight green wedges, proposed by the MMBW (1967); or three major growth corridors extending towards the east and southeast, proposed by the TCPB (1967). As such, the driver of the proposed urban form shifted to the MMBW, raising question about who or what was behind the MMBW’s proposal.

As to what was behind the MMBW's proposal, no explanation could be found in the plan, in any of its surrounding documentation, or in any of the secondary literature. Moreover, no explanation could be identified through interviews. As such, one can only speculate as to the reasoning behind this form. It is irrefutable that the MMBW's proposal with its of growth corridors and green wedges bore a striking resemblance to the planning ideas that had gained traction in Europe from the 1930s (Ward, 2004). McLoughlin (1992) highlights in particular the similarities between it and both the Modern Architectural Research Group's radical 1942 plan for London, UK, and the 1947 'Finger Plan' for Copenhagen, Denmark. The question is, were these similarities coincidental or deliberate? As McLoughlin (1992) points out, Melbourne's radial transport network, which was first developed back in the late-1800s to cater for a centralised workforce, combined with the natural topography, did lend itself best to such a radial future urban form. This means one of two possibilities: the proposed form was considered best irrespective of international ideas; or the proposed form was considered best because it matched international ideas. Given that there are multiple reasons why the MMBW would have known about international ideas in planning, the latter seems most likely. Firstly, with nearly two decades planning experience, the MMBW was no longer new to the world of planning. Secondly, there had to have been an increased presence of professional planners within the organisation, meaning more awareness of planning trends. In the early-1950s, the organisation employed several qualified planners working. One can infer that with the advancements of planning education in Australia, there would have been more planners working at the MMBW. Unfortunately, this cannot be verified, as the plan does not list the names or departments involved in the creation of the plan. Thirdly, and arguably most importantly, Sandercock (1990) alludes to the likelihood that the TCPA informed the MMBW of international trends in planning. As such, it is highly probable that international planning ideas were in fact behind the MMBW's proposed urban form.

It is difficult to determine exactly who exerted the decision-making power behind the MMBW's proposal. According to McLoughlin, 'the corridor form arose from within the professional cadres rather than the democratic politic arena' (1992: 154). Unfortunately, these professional cadres were not identified. If they were planners, this would go some way to explaining the similarities between the proposed urban form and international planning examples. However, ultimately, while professional cadres may have had an increased role, the ultimate decision would not have been theirs to make. So

who was ultimately responsible? As mentioned above, the plan unfortunately did not list the names or departments involved in its creation. The only names mentioned in the entire document were that of Alan Croxford, the Chair of the MMBW, and the 52 commissioners that comprised the Board's membership. It is difficult to determine from this who was responsible. The only indications as to who may have been responsible lie not in the plan or any of its surrounding documentation but in several secondary sources. The Town Planning Research Group (1971) first put forward the idea that the proposed urban form was the work Sir Bernard Evans, who held the two key, powerful positions: Chair of the Melbourne City Council Building and Town Planning Committee; and vice-Chair of the MMBW Highways and Town Planning Committee, the organisation responsible for delivering metropolitan planning. It is important to note Alan Croxford, as Chair of the MMBW, was ex-officio the Chair of every MMBW committee (Crow and Crow, 1972). As such, it was Evans who was really in charge of the MMBW's metropolitan planning direction. The TPRG contended that Evans held significant 'political influence' over Hamer's consideration of the future growth options (TPRG, 1971: 6). The two main members of the TPRG, Maurie and Ruth Crow, expanded on this claim in their alternate plan for Melbourne, *Plan for Melbourne, Part Three: One Corridor of Participants – Not Seven Corridors of Power* (Crow and Crow, 1972). They argued that Evan's direct involvement was evidenced in his vocal support of the MMBW's proposal and criticism of the TCPB's proposal during a forum held in 1967 to discuss them. Consequently, Crow and Crow (1972: 8) called the MMBW's future urban growth proposal and subsequent plan the 'Evans plan'. Sandercock (1990) shares the view that Evans was the chief protagonist of the MMBW's proposed form. However, she takes it further, citing his substantial land holdings in the west of Melbourne. As such, it would appear that it was Sir Bernard Evans who exerted decision-making power to influence the plan.

There is, of course, the possibility of outside influence on the form of the plan. McLoughlin (1992) suggests there may have been some pressure from the MCC – within which Evans Chaired the Building and Town Planning Committee – and the Building Owners' and Mangers' Association, amongst others, for an urban form that retained a centralised business focus. No doubt, they would have been concerned about the decentralisation of Melbourne's industry and commercial activities. Unfortunately, this is next to impossible to prove. What is documented, however, is a decision to purposely allow outside influence in the metropolitan planning of Melbourne. In April 1971, Alan Hunt

took over as Minister for Local Government from Hamer who had surrendered the portfolio to take on the role of Deputy Premier and eventually Premier (Murray, 2007). Several months later, it was announced that both Minister Hunt and Alan Croxford had agreed to ongoing consultation between the MMBW and both the Land Development Conference, which became the Urban Development Institute of Australia (the body representing the property development industry) and the Urban Land Institute, a not-for-profit research and education group ('Vic Plans for Public Planning Discussion', 1971). Lobby groups could now directly try to influence the decision-making power of the MMBW, severely challenging its independence. However, given that this change occurred only one month before the plan was released, it is unlikely it had any effect on the contents of the plan. This is especially unlikely given that the plan actively discouraged land speculation.

To these ends, on the surface, it appears that Minister Hamer exercised decision-making power with respect to the contents of the plan, both the proposed future urban form and the mechanisms through which it was to be achieved. He instructed the MMBW to prepare the plan using a specific future urban form and successfully urged the State Parliament to gazette the MMPS. However, below the surface, things were not as clear-cut. Hamer's specific directive for the proposed urban form was actually that of the MMBW, which was most likely influenced by international planning ideas. Moreover, it appears that it was Sir Bernard Evans who was behind the proposed urban form, exerting his decision-making power as head of the planning organisation within the MMBW.

Outcomes

The outcomes of the plan also resulted from the exertion of decision-making power. The MMBW formally submitted the plan, in the form of Amendments 3 and 21 to the MMPS, to Minister Hunt, in December 1971 (MMBW, 1974). Pursuant to the planning legislation, which itself was also an example of decision-making power, the amendments were exhibited to the public for comment and an IDO was applied to temporarily protect all potentially affected land from development contrary to the proposed measures (MMBW, 1974). The process of public exhibition included the staging of six discussion seminars. The Chair of the MMBW, Alan Croxford, said 'assessing the public reaction to the plans was vital as some considered the proposed corridor system as a radical departure from

previous plans' ('Board to Explain Plan at Seminars', 1972: np). The first of these seminars was held at Monash University before a sold-out crowd. 'Fifteen hundred people applied for the \$2 tickets. Only 1,300 could fit into Monash's new great hall' (Clerehan, 1972: np). The \$2 price tag was the equivalent of nearly \$20 by 2016 standards (RBA, 2017) – quite a significant price tag, which no doubt excluded some people from attending. In any case, unprecedented public interest forced the MMBW to extend the exhibition period until July 1972 (MMBW, 1974). However, the public's reaction to the plan was mixed. While it was met with enthusiasm from several planning experts, who praised its conformity to 'the latest town planning developments in Washington, Copenhagen and London' (Skelton, 1971: np), the plan also drew some strong opposition from critics, many of who were concerned about it perpetuating the urban sprawl of Melbourne (Holdsworth, 1972a).

As part of the exhibition process, those critical of the plan were given an opportunity to object to the planning scheme amendments in public hearings held by the MMBW. The Board was then to report to the State Government on the objections and any final recommendations. This process was somewhat of a novelty, as objections to its predecessor were only allowed in writing. The public hearings began in November 1972 (Holdsworth, 1972a). There was initially some debate as to whether, under the existing planning legislation, objections relating to the strategic direction of Melbourne constituted a valid objection to the statutory amendments (McLoughlin, 1992). The MMBW exerted decision-making power by deciding that as the amendments were informed by the strategic direction, those objections deserved examination. All objections heard were categorised into two sections: objections to the general concepts and objections to specific proposals, such as 'particular zonings applied to particular areas' (Maiden, 1973: np). However, the hearing process was not prepared for the more than 4,000 objections received. It was estimated that the hearings would take nearly two years to complete and even longer to respond to them all (Holdsworth, 1972a). As such, Minister Hunt exercised decision-making power by granting the MMBW's request to respond in its report only to the objections related to the general concepts of the plan, while still hearing all of the other objections (MMBW, 1974)

The MMBW heard 58 objections to the general concept of the plan. The objectors comprised a mix of members of the public, politicians, local governments, state government departments and authorities,

professional associations, industry groups and private companies (MMBW, 1974). The two most common issues over which objections were made related to the level of population growth and the direction of urban growth. On the former, many were concerned about the prospect of Melbourne accommodating nearly five million people by the turn of the century, especially with the contradictory presence of Federal and State Government policies for decentralisation (MMBW, 1974). The future size of the city became a significant enough political issue that Minister Hunt had to distance the Government from the plan, saying that ‘plans for a city of five million people were no longer acceptable’ (Holdsworth, 1972b: np). Several months later, the State Labor opposition said that it would restrict Melbourne to a population of three million (Holdsworth, 1973a). While the MMBW were critical of this figure for being too low, they were in favour of tempering the state’s population growth (Holdsworth, 1973a). On the latter, many were also concerned about the proposed multi-corridor growth pattern and the urban sprawl it would create (MMBW, 1974). A handful of different patterns were suggested. Most notably, both the TCPA (Holdsworth, 1972a) and husband-and-wife activist team Maurie and Ruth Crow mentioned earlier, instead proposed a single urban corridor from Melbourne through to Gippsland (‘Urban Corridor “Would Solve City’s Sprawl”’, 1972). All in all, as one commentator noted, ‘in contrast to the Mark 1 Scheme, the 1971 proposals generated widespread debate about the nature of planning’ (Logan, 1981: 32). Many of the objections were concerned less with the land-use planning measures and more with the social impacts of the proposals. Perhaps a sign of the changing times, the public was becoming aware of the ability and the need to integrate physical planning with social planning.

While an air of uncertainty about the future of the plan hung over this period of public hearings and reporting, the Victoria Parliament passed the *Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act 1972*, giving planning schemes greater powers over environmental and heritage conservation, which were issues present in the plan. Moreover, in anticipation of rezoning to urban land, many property developers bought land in the proposed growth corridors – more than \$30 million of land was purchased (Wilkinson, 1973a). However, a final decision on the plan was delayed by more than 18 months (Maiden, 1973) This led to several property developers joining forces with local governments to try to pressure the MMBW to allow development in the proposed urban growth corridors, before a decision on them had been made, arguing that there were only 18 months worth of new home sites in

Melbourne (Wilkinson, 1973b). The MMBW was able to resist this pressure. As time passed, there was mounting speculation that the MMBW would scrap a number of growth corridors (Basile, 1974) or the plan entirely (Holdsworth, 1973b). This led to an outcry from property developers, who claimed that many of them would stand to lose millions in their land transactions if the plan was altered (Wilkinson, 1973b). In response, the State Government exercised decision-making power by passing the *Development Areas Act 1973*, known also as the 'Hunt Act' after Minister Hunt, which most significantly 'allowed it to freeze land prices while planning for new areas takes places', thereby 'stopping speculators making a fortune at the expense of the community' (Holdsworth, 1973b: np). The leader of the State Country Party, Mr. Ross-Edwards, described the legislation as 'socialist' (Colebatch, 1974: np).

The MMBW's official response to the concept objections was published in February 1974 in an 88-page document entitled, *Report on General Concept Objections 1974*. The authors made a number of recommendations regarding the proposed amendments to the MMPS and the management of metropolitan planning. Most significantly, after the consideration of five different options, the MMBW reaffirmed its decision to utilise a corridor pattern of growth for Melbourne, albeit with some alterations (see Figure 6.6). Not every growth corridor was to be immediately available for urban development. The Board recommended the designation of specific areas within key corridors as proposed urban zones, designed to accommodate short-term growth. Later in the year, the MMBW divided these proposed urban zones into development areas where infrastructure could be most economically provided (McLoughlin, 1992). The Board also recommended, under the *Development Areas Act 1973*, the designation of investigation areas, to be explored by the TCPB for their potential to accommodate future growth (MMBW, 1974). The authors also recommend the use of satellite towns – a planning idea popular in the UK for decades (Ward, 1994) – to be developed one at a time, subject to state and Commonwealth investigation and funding. They suggested that Melton be developed first. With respect to the management of metropolitan planning, the report made a number of recommendations. Most notably, it called for greater co-operation between the TCPB and the State and Commonwealth Governments on a range of policy issues. It also recommended the creation of a staged development programme for works and services, and the release of urban-zoned land, which would provide green-field developers with greater certainty (MMBW, 1974). Moreover, the report

recommended, in response to the increased public interest, further investigation into the objector-raised social, economic and environmental issues.

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Figure 6.6: *Report on General Concept Objections - Revised Strategy* (MMBW, 1974: 24)

The report was submitted to Minister Hunt for approval that same month. Before deciding on the report, the Minister sought advice from the TCPB, which one-year prior had been absorbed into the newly created Ministry for Planning (Eccles and Bryant, 2011), an act that could be considered the beginning of the politicisation of planning in Victoria. The TCPB (1974) was critical of the MMBW's approach to the distribution of the future urban growth. Nevertheless, it endorsed the Board's recommendation of investigation areas and the satellite development of Melton, adding Sunbury and Berwick to the list. The Hamer Government, amidst toughening economic conditions, exercised decision-making power by accepting the recommendations of the MMBW and TCPB, with the exception of the Berwick satellite town, and instructing the TCPB to examine the potential of the designated investigation areas to accommodate future growth. This decision, however, was not to everyone's liking. Property development groups felt the changes undermined the authority of the

MMBW and its plan (Hornstein, 1974). One of Victoria's largest property developers wrote in a newsletter to members of the industry, 'if you look beyond the report you begin to realise that there is no certainty or direction at all in the planning of the metropolis' (Hornstein, 1974: np). Nevertheless, with the long-boom coming to an end, metropolitan planning in Melbourne was due for a further shakeup.

Discontinuity

Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region represented a number of continuities and discontinuities with its predecessor. Most notably, it continued the metropolitan planning response established in the 1954 plan. The document similarly offered a blueprint response, detailing the desired physical form for the city, which was to be implemented primarily through an amendment to the MMPS. As such, it can be classified a plan, rather than a strategy. However, this time, a much smaller overview of this physical form was provided (see figure 6.5), compared to the detailed maps contained within the 1954 plan (see figure 6.2). The specifics of the controls were to be found within the MMPS itself, rather than in the document. Regardless, the use of the MMPS importantly helped to continue the *episteme* that development certainty should be provided at the metropolitan level. However, there were also some significant discontinuities between the two plans. The 1971 plan proposed a radial growth pattern for metropolitan Melbourne, a 'finger plan' most likely inspired by that of Copenhagen, Denmark. In comparison, the 1954 plan proposed that future urban growth should concentrate in the east and southeast, where it was easier and more economical to provide essential services to new developments. Moreover, there was more of a focus on environmental conservation in the 1971 plan. It proposed the establishment and protection of green wedges between the growth corridors. Finally, there was also discontinuity in the way in which the plan was to be implemented. The 1971 plan proposed more than just an amendment to the MMPS; it proposed the formulation of planning policies and a number of non-planning measures to achieve its vision, including financial incentives designed to ensure that urban land was developed and non-urban land conserved.

6.6 Historical analysis: early-1970s – early-1980s

In terms of the genealogical principle of history, if the 1960s and early-1970s could be defined as a period of stability, then the early-1970s to early-1980s could be defined as one of instability. The economic and political stability of the previous period ended in dramatic circumstances and with challenging outcomes, especially for Melbourne. A clean recovery from this shock proved difficult for the city and by the turn of the decade, Melbourne was looking at the need for another metropolitan plan.

The end of economic and political stability

The post-war economic long boom was met with a rather quick bust, catalysed by a number of key global events, most notably the OPEC oil crisis of 1973-1974, which conspired to send much of Western-world's heavily oil-reliant economies into recession. The Australian economy was no exception (McLoughlin, 1992; Bolton, 2006). Compounding these global forces was the decline in manufacturing back home. The nation's once-thriving manufacturing industry gradually proved unable to compete with cheaper imports in a progressively globalising economy, particularly with those from the Tiger economies of east and south-east Asia, resulting in its eventual decline (McLoughlin, 1992). In the five years from 1973, more than 100,000 manufacturing jobs were lost in Australia, half of which were from Melbourne (Logan, 1981). Moreover, population growth began to stagnate nationally, owing to falling birth and immigration rates (McLoughlin, 1992). The flow-on effects were wide reaching for Melbourne, not least the decline of the manufacturing industry and subsequent degradation of the once-industrial inner-city and middle ring, as well as the end of the short-lived real estate boom of the early-1970s (McLoughlin, 1992).

Political stability was also about to come to an end. In December 1972, the Gough Whitlam-led Labor Government swept into power federally, ending nearly 23 years of conservative Commonwealth government (Bolton, 2006). Amongst its many noteworthy and often radical achievements, which included increased recognition of Australia's Indigenous population and ending Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War, was the establishment of the Department of Urban and Regional Development (DURD) (Sandercock, 1990). For the first time in the country's history, there was a federal presence in the planning of urban Australia. DURD was responsible for several major urban

renewal and regeneration projects across Australia's capital cities (Sandercock, 1990). The changing economic climate and a series of miscalculations failed to prevent Whitlam winning a second term in 1974, albeit with a reduced majority (Bolton, 2006). The instability of the period, however, was best summed up in a single political event. In what has become known as the Australian constitutional crisis, Governor General John Kerr famously dismissed the Whitlam-government on 11 November 1975, following political manoeuvring by the Opposition Leader, Malcolm Fraser, to block supply (Bolton, 2006). Fraser's Liberal-National Country Coalition went on to win the December 1975 federal election, abolishing the DURD almost immediately. At the state level, politics were a little more civilised. Victoria's longest serving Premier, Henry Bolte, retired in 1972, allowing the former Minister for Local Government, Rupert Hamer, following a leadership ballot with Ray Meagher, to succeed him as Premier (Rodan, 2006; Murray, 2007).

Recovery pains and a continued changing urban condition

Recovery from the effects of end of the long boom proved slow going. Both Melbourne and Australia struggled for much of the mid-1970s and early-1980s amidst challenging economic conditions (McLoughlin, 1992; Bolton, 2006). The Australian economy experienced further restructuring. As one of the nation's two main manufacturing centres, Melbourne was hit particularly hard by this economic restructure. Thankfully, the loss of manufacturing jobs was partially offset by growth in the professional services sector, as the CBD economies of most cities began to change (McLoughlin, 1992). There was also significant growth in the resources sector, particularly oil, gas, coal and aluminium (Bolton, 2006). However, this proved of little benefit to all states and territories other than Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory. Victoria, like the other non-resource-rich states, dipped into recession by the beginning of the 1980s. Compounding the problems was the continued exodus of people from Melbourne's inner-suburbs towards the middle and outer-suburbs, even despite positive – albeit low – population growth (McLoughlin, 1992). Melbourne's population had increased by just 300,000 in the ten years from 1971 (McDonald, 2005). The MMBW was fearful of the possibility of the decline of the inner city to the extent seen in some European and American cities, eventually releasing a range of policy statements about the future of Melbourne, which were designed to address this issue.

6.7 Metropolitan Strategy / Metropolitan Strategy Implementation (1980-81 Plan)

The next stage of metropolitan planning did not get off to an auspicious start. Emerging around this period were allegations of wrongdoing by senior officials involved in the metropolitan planning of Melbourne (McLoughlin, 1992). Seemingly seeking their own Watergate moment here in Victoria, newspaper reporters began investigating shady land dealings amongst the city's more influential planners and politicians. It began in the late-1960s with allegations from the now defunct afternoon newspaper, *Newsday*. Its reporters alleged that Bernard Evans had been using insider knowledge of major infrastructure projects and population distribution measures learned as Lord Mayor of Melbourne and head of the MMBW planning committee to unscrupulously speculate on property, thereby furthering his own financial interests (Hills, 1970). Despite calls for a Royal Commission ('Labor Seeks Land Deals Probe', 1970), Evans' transactions escaped public inquiry and *Newsday* were forced to issue a public apology ("Newsday" Newspaper Apology to Sir Bernard Evans', 1973). Nevertheless, his days serving the public through local government and the MMBW were over. Allegations of wrongdoing were also levelled against the Chair of the MMBW, Alan Croxford, in the early-1970s over the windfalls gained through four transactions – either by him, his family or his companies – of land within and surrounding metropolitan Melbourne ('The Croxford Story Revealed', 1972). It was alleged that some of this land had been rezoned after its purchase. To spare attack from the Labor opposition, who were calling for the immediate termination of Croxford, the Hamer Government moved quickly to advise Croxford to sell his land holdings ('Croxford Told to Sell Land', 1972) and appointed a Board of Inquiry to examine Croxford's land transactions, during which time Croxford stood down from the MMBW ('Hamer to Query Croxford Role', 1972). Sandercock (1979) claims that the MMBW examined only the issue of insider knowledge of the provision of services, rather than the larger issue of officials influencing planning measures for financial gain. In any event, the Inquiry exonerated Croxford of any impropriety (Victoria. Board of Inquiry into the Purchases and Sales of Land in Victoria by Alan Humphrey Croxford, 1973) and he returned to his role as Chair of the MMBW ('Mr. Croxford Exonerated', 1973).

However, more serious allegations of land speculation and improper political dealings surfaced several years later. The most renowned of these involved the proposed development of a satellite town at Mt. Ridley, approximately 24km north of the CBD. This area was designated as part of a non-urban green wedge under the recently approved 1971 plan (MMBW, 1971). However, on 20 December 1976, the State Cabinet, including Alan Hunt, Minister for Planning (the planning portfolio was created in 1973) approved in principal a proposal by T&G Mutual Life (Australian and New Zealand insurance company) to create a new town of 120,000 people through the rezoning of 7,000 acres of non-urban land for urban use (Sandercock, 1979). That same day, Minister Hunt approached the TCPB to report on the possibility of modifying the recently updated MMPS to rezone the site (Sandercock, 1979). The proposal was clearly at odds with the direction of growth envisioned for Melbourne under the 1971 plan and the amended MMPS, yet was remarkably given tentative approval – the State Cabinet justified its approval citing the concept of negotiated planning, a flexible system whereby property developers and planning authorities negotiate on proposals (Logan, 1981). Similar statutory planning overruling by the State Cabinet for potential new developments also occurred at Mt. Dandenong and Geelong around the same time (see Sandercock, 1979). The public backlash over these decisions was strong. So too was the backlash over the Government's alleged involvement in the Victorian land scandals, the period of 1973-1974 in which the Victorian Housing Commission (VHC) purchased over-priced land in Melton, Pakenham and Sunbury from land speculators with prior knowledge of the VHC's intention (Sandercock, 1979). An incensed public all but forced the hand of the Government, which finally decided in 1977 to shelve all three proposals (Logan, 1981). While they were ultimately not successful on these occasions, the Mt. Ridley, Mt. Dandenong and Geelong cases left an enduring legacy: the possibility of land speculation through political lobbying over planning decisions and a reduced level of public confidence in the reliability of Melbourne's metropolitan plans (Sandercock, 1979; Logan, 1981).

With the State Government having only just accepted its proposed amendments to the MMPS in 1974, the once again Croxford-led MMBW soon began laying the groundwork for a new metropolitan plan. While significant attention had in the past been paid to the outward growth of Melbourne, the plight of the inner city was beginning to attract significant concern. The continued decline in the manufacturing industry that accompanied structural changes to the economy greatly affected the city's inner-suburbs –

Melbourne's former manufacturing heartland – and its residents – largely low-skilled workers (Logan, 1981). Rising unemployment and social problems in these areas were becoming well known to professional and political communities alike (McLoughlin, 1992). However, according to McLoughlin, the catalyst for action on these issues within the MMBW was actually an overseas study trip conducted by Croxford to Europe and the US in 1976, where firsthand evidence of the dangers of inner-city decline – 'de-industrialisation, depopulation, disinvestment, decay, crime and racial violence' (McLoughlin, 1992: 60) – was learned. Upon Croxford's return, the MMBW's planning department was tasked with investigating the possibility of reducing Melbourne's continued suburbanisation and consolidating the city's built form, which would thereby address inner-city decline. The concept of urban consolidation had already become popular in planning and public circles, driven by higher petrol prices, increasing environmental awareness and concerns over social equity (McLoughlin, 1992). This investigation was to become the beginning of a broader review by the department of its metropolitan planning policies.

As part of this review, the MMBW released a series of statements designed to elicit discussion about the development of a preferred strategy for the future growth of Melbourne. The first, *Melbourne's Inner Area – A Position Statement*, was released in April 1977. At 92-pages in length, the document predominantly explored, in detail, the current trends in eight categories – population, accommodation, employment, community facilities, social life, transport, urban consolidation and policies – of the city's inner-most fifteen municipalities (MMBW, 1977). The most important of these trends related to the aforementioned ongoing exodus of residents and jobs from the area and increased rates of unemployment and poverty amongst those that remain. Ultimately, the document posed questions for its readers about whether these trends should be allowed to continue or whether they need to be reversed. If the latter was decided, the authors argued that it was not sufficient to simply translate objectives into the MMPS. Rather, policies with development targets needed to be devised and implemented. As will be shown below, this call for more stringent measures was not followed through.

One month later, in May 1977, the State Government commenced a public inquiry into both the service and planning functions of the MMBW. The inquiry received 158 submissions in total (Darvall and Samuel, 1978). Of particular note was the State Labor Party's submission, which called for the

MMBW's powers to be transferred to a new metropolitan planning authority (Harris, 1977). Ultimately, after careful consideration, the inquiry recommended that the MMBW's planning powers remain (Darvall and Samuel, 1978).

The MMBW released the next report in its review of metropolitan planning policies, *The Challenge of Change: A Review of Metropolitan Melbourne's Planning Options*, in March 1979. As its name would suggest, the document aimed to, in light of the emergence and identification of new trends and issues, proposed new strategic planning options for metropolitan Melbourne. The options were designed to promote discussion amongst the public and government agencies about a preferred option for the future of the city. The 36-page report first presented the characteristics and trends for what it called the 'new Melbourne' (MMBW, 1979a: 3), mainly the dispersal of population and employment from the inner city to the middle and outer-suburbs, which had been identified previously by the MMBW. Next, the report identified and explored the issues associated with these trends: increased energy consumption – transport, residential, commercial and industrial; a shortage of investment capital to fund new urban infrastructure for fringe development; structural unemployment; and increased environmental conservation awareness. The authors summarised these issues as 'the four 'Es': energy, efficiency, employment and environment' (MMBW, 1979a: 22). The rest of the document was dedicated to inducing debate on how these issues could be addressed through metropolitan planning. Building on previous work, the report presented three alternative growth patterns for the metropolis: a dispersed city; a highlight centralised city; and a redirected city, a hybrid of the two. The implications of these patterns were evaluated against the basic structural alternatives to Melbourne's continued growth: 'increasing urban spread versus containment' (MMBW, 1979b: 32). The report, which was quite rational-comprehensive in nature, ultimately acknowledged that the metropolis needed to become less dispersed and more contained, asking the readers to identify a preferred strategy to achieve this.

A little over half a year later, the MMBW (1979b) released its *Alternative Strategies for Metropolitan Melbourne*. Building on the previous report and the discussion and submissions that followed, the document presented four different future development options to achieve a more contained city. The first option, dispersing growth, involved future development continuing its outward sprawl into the growth corridors designated in the 1971 plan. The authors believed that such an option would provide

almost no benefit to Melbourne and would instead be detrimental to the city through the continued decline of the inner city and the encroachment of the urban fringe onto productive land. The second option, centralised growth, involved locating future development primarily within the inner city and the CBD. The authors believed this option would make efficient use of existing infrastructure and services but would also increase traffic congestion and pollution and decrease larger housing options. The third option, suburbanised growth, was similar to the previous option but involved locating future development primarily within the existing suburban area. The authors believed this option also made efficient use of existing infrastructure and services but potentially reduced the amenity of residential areas. The fourth and final option, incremental growth, was for future development to occur in a combination of the previous three options. This option was believed to be able to achieve the benefits of the previous options but without their associated negatives. Moreover, the authors noted that this option was the only one that took into account the ‘current economic circumstances and political realities’ (MMBW, 1979b: 20) and hence, was most achievable. From this, it is clear that the authors favoured this last option. However, the document gave no preference and instead sought comment and discussion from the public and government agencies about the future growth of Melbourne. Just six months after comments had closed, Melbourne was looking at a new metropolitan plan and future urban form that closely resembled the incremental growth option.

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Figure 6.7: Title page of *Metropolitan Strategy* (MMBW, 1980)

The MMBW released its third metropolitan plan for Melbourne, referred to for the first time as a strategy. This fourth attempt at an overall metropolitan document was in two parts: *Metropolitan Strategy* (MMBW, 1980) and *Metropolitan Strategy Implementation* (MMBW, 1981). The 70-page, text-heavy *Metropolitan Strategy*, as its name would suggest, served to provide a preferred strategy for the future growth of metropolitan Melbourne, while the 124-page, glossy follow-up *Metropolitan Strategy Implementation*, also as its name would suggest, served to detail the ways in which the strategy was to be implemented. However, given that it was to be implemented using statutory planning controls, it was a strategy in name only and subsequently referred to as a plan thereafter. Interestingly, the reasoning behind its two-part release was similar to the MMBW's other two-part plan, the *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954* (MMBW, 1953: 1954): the authors did not want to obscure the initial preferred strategy with 'debate over detail' (MMBW, 1980: 1).

Published in 1980, the *Metropolitan Strategy* document could best be understood as the third and final document in the MMBW's trilogy of planning policy documents concerning the future growth of Melbourne, the first two being *The Challenge of Change* (MMBW, 1979a) and *Alternative Strategies for Metropolitan Melbourne* (MMBW, 1979b). Having discussed in detail the various problems affecting metropolitan Melbourne in the first document and the potential solutions to these problems in the second, the *Metropolitan Strategy*, across seven chapters, finally settled on a preferred solution. 'This report indicates the direction of planning policy advocated by the Board for Metropolitan growth and change in the foreseeable future' (MMBW, 1980: 1). The MMBW had to choose between the four growth options presented in *Alternative Strategies for Metropolitan Melbourne* (MMBW, 1979b): dispersing growth, centralised growth, suburbanised growth and incremental growth. It recommended that the State Government adopt the incremental growth option for the city, which it described as 'one of balanced growth' that 'seeks to ensure comprehensive planning for fringe growth and its essential services and facilities whilst at the same time encouraging as much growth in existing urban areas as can be readily accommodated there' (MMBW, 1980: 33). Put simply, this option involved both urban consolidation and urban fringe development. It is interesting to note this also involved keeping the corridor-wedge approach of previous plan. Moreover, making a return in this option was the concept of activity centres, around which higher-density development was to occur, in order to take full advantage of existing infrastructure and services, similar to what was proposed in the original 1954 plan. The reasons behind the selection of the incremental growth option were similar to those listed in the *Alternative Strategies for Metropolitan Melbourne* (MMBW, 1979b). They included making good use of existing infrastructure, encouraging a range of housing, employment and travel options, and encouraging a range of investment opportunities. Moreover, the MMBW also noted that 'it is flexible enough to be responsive to changing attitudes and circumstances and is capable of implementation within acceptable levels of Government costs and intervention' (MMBW, 1980: 33), indicating that it was aware of the realities of the political nature of planning.

However, the *Metropolitan Strategy* also served another important purpose: to develop metropolitan planning objectives pursuant to new planning legislation. In May 1979, Louis 'Lou' Lieberman replaced Alan Hunt as Minister for Planning. Upon assuming the portfolio, Lieberman expressed his desire 'to overhaul the [planning] legislation that we have', in order to simplify the planning process

and cut red tape ('Planning Portfolio Will Be a Challenge', 1979: 285). This desire was realised with the gazettal of the *Town and Country Planning (General Amendment) Act 1979* in December of that year. Importantly, this legislation allowed for the creation of local development schemes. These schemes were intended to work alongside the MMPS, eventually replacing local planning schemes with finer-grained land-use zones (MMBW, 1981). However, the local planning schemes weren't abolished and the measure added yet another layer of planning controls to metropolitan Melbourne (Eccles and Bryant, 2011) (see Appendix F). Interestingly, only one local development scheme was ever approved and gazetted, that of then municipality of Berwick (Eccles and Bryant, 2011). Moreover, in accordance with the *Act*, planning schemes were able to include 'a statement or statements of the objectives which are intended to be achieved' (1979: 668). These objectives became an additional planning provision available to help guide future development, albeit with more discretion.

As such, the MMBW devised in the *Metropolitan Strategy* draft objectives to help guide future development in five key policy areas: housing, transport, employment, community services and activity centres. Too numerous to discuss in any detail here, they simply corresponded with aims of the incremental growth option. It is interesting to note that the objectives were all quite vague, using discretionary terms, including 'encourage', 'facilitate' and 'conserve' (MMBW, 1980: 46-55). Accompanying the objectives was a list of concerns from which the objectives were developed and a more detailed list of how they were to be implemented by both planning authorities and other government agencies. It is also interesting to note that the MMBW saw the use of objectives as a 'reduction rather than a widening of regulations and controls' (MMBW, 1980: 45). There would be less of a need for controls with more discretion being given to the planners.

The MMBW released *Metropolitan Strategy* for State Government endorsement and general public comment in July of 1980. The State Cabinet endorsed it towards the end of year. Minister Lieberman said 'the incremental approach in the Board's *Strategy* report is in line with the Government's stated aim of encouraging imaginative development and redevelopment to provide for future growth in keeping with the assets and attributes of the city' (MMBW, 1981: 2). The State Labor Opposition spokesman on planning, John Cain, Jr., labelled it 'a retreat from earlier proposals' and said it 'summed

up 30 years of ‘bits and pieces’ planning by the board’ (Pinches, 1980). The public comments received were given consideration in the formulation of the follow-up *Metropolitan Strategy Implementation*.

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Figure 6.8: Cover of *Metropolitan Strategy Implementation* (MMBW, 1981)

Published in April 1981, the follow-up *Metropolitan Strategy Implementation* document was designed to perform one key function across its 18 chapters: detail ‘the means of implementing the metropolitan strategy, endorsed in principle by State Cabinet in 1980’ (MMBW, 1981: 1). The means by which the strategy was to be implemented were three-fold: the use of the planning system, which was the primary means; the use of financial measures; and the use of other actions. In terms of the first means, the document proposed to utilise both metropolitan and local planning. This took the form of adjusting the MMPS through Amendment 150 to update the land-use controls available – these changes will be touched on in more detail below. However, more importantly, the amendment also added to the MMPS objectives that were based on the draft objectives of the *Metropolitan Strategy*. These objectives were

divided into three categories: metropolitan objectives, of which there were ten, that 'provide a context for the Metropolitan Planning Scheme itself, and state fundamental principles to be reflected in all planning' (1981: 10); strategic objectives, of which there were forty-one across ten categories, that 'describe the planning intent for development of the metropolitan area' (1981: 10); and zone objectives, which were not explored, that 'extend the primary purpose of the zone' (1981: 16). According to the MMBW, the 'objectives must be seen as part of a continuing planning process, adaptable to changing circumstance, rather than a grand solution to future problems. They must, however, form a basis for commitment to a path, which ensures individual development decisions are integrated with metropolitan strategic intent' (MMBW, 1981: 9). Located alongside the objectives in Amendment 150 was the Strategic Framework Plan (see Figure 6.9), a hybrid blueprint-concept plan map highlighting the proposed future urban growth of the city. Together, these items formed a Statement of Objectives, which was 'intended to encourage and facilitate the proper use and management of the resources of the metropolitan area', especially when combined with the creation of local development schemes (MMBW, 1981: 10).

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Figure 6.9: *Metropolitan Strategy Implementation – Strategic Framework Plan* (MMBW, 1981: 11)

The second means by which the strategy was to be implemented was a number of proposed financial measures. These measures were intended to ‘support the promotion of Central Melbourne and district centres’ (MMBW, 1981: 28). They included reductions in development contributions, the temporary waving of rates and the purchasing or financing of development and redevelopment sites for councils. Interestingly, there was no mention of deterrents to prevent the banking of land and to encourage urban development and redevelopment. The final means was an extensive list of more than 100 actions, each relating to the various strategic objectives listed in the document, that were to be completed by the MMBW, local governments and other government authorities to help implement the strategy. Too numerous to detail, the actions specified for the MMBW and local governments related mainly to changes to the MMPS and local development schemes, respectively. However, these organisations were also to complete a number of other supporting measures, such as reviews and the creation of

guidelines. For measures beyond the remit of the MMBW or local governments, the document proposed the MMBW undertake a range of advocacy actions. Ultimately, it was believed that the three means proposed would ensure the proper implementation of the metropolitan strategy.

Problem

With respect to the genealogical principle of the problem, the practice of providing certainty was present in the plan. However, its provision is diminished compared to its predecessors, which can be explained by a number of factors. Firstly, only the second part, *Metropolitan Strategy Implementation*, provided certainty. This was because the first part, *Metropolitan Strategy*, served only to detail a vague outline of the proposed urban growth option for metropolitan Melbourne. In no way could this document provide stakeholders with protection for their economic investment in property – it was a proposal and lacked land-use detail. Certainty was instead provided in the *Implementation* document, albeit not fully. As mentioned above, this document specified that the chosen strategy of incremental growth would be implemented primarily through the MMPS – the use of which led one commentator to describe the plan as the 1954 plan Mark III (Logan, 1981). To aid the strategy's implementation, some substantial changes were made to a number of land-use zones and controls in the MMPS that were documented in the second part of the implementation document. The most noteworthy of these changes included the introduction of new land-use zones for Central Melbourne, district centres and the metropolitan countryside, the removal of non-essential residential zones with the intention that intensities of residential development were to be specified in local development schemes, and the removal of the planning permit requirement for dual-occupancy subdivision (MMBW, 1981). Interestingly, the removal of this requirement was one of the greatest provisions of certainty. It instantly made stakeholders aware of the potential, whether good or bad, for development. However, like its immediate predecessor, the document did not provide the more minute details of the changed land-use zones and controls, such as permissible uses. Moreover, the document did not even provide a copy of the updated MMPS map. As such, stakeholders could not look at the plan and know with any degree of certainty where and what development was allowed. This certainty would instead have to be found alongside the plan in the MMPS.

Secondly, and importantly, the MMBW's move towards the use of local development schemes also further reduced the certainty that would have usually been provided through the metropolitan plan and the MMPS. As mentioned above, local development schemes, which had been legislated for in the *Town and Country Planning (General Amendment) Act 1979*, were to provide localised planning detail now not regarded as feasible for a metropolitan-wide scheme, and were intended to replace the hodgepodge use of local planning schemes. While direction over the general nature of the local planning schemes was to be achieved by amending the MMPS to include the objectives that were listed in the plan, the vagueness and discretionary-nature of these objectives did not provide stakeholders with any real certainty as to development. Certainty for or from local development would instead only be found in local development plans themselves. Ultimately, the use of local development schemes could be seen as a move towards the localising of planning control and certainty.

Discourse

Regarding the genealogical principle of discourse, the *Metropolitan Strategy* document marked the first appearance of the term certainty in a metropolitan plan for Melbourne. The term was used on just a single occasion. Tucked away in the second-last paragraph of the document, the authors wrote that 'these actions of the Board and municipalities will provide the basic planning framework within which private enterprise may operate and must provide increased certainty and opportunities for development in addition to conservation measures where appropriate' (MMBW, 1980: 63). The MMBW was saying that planning not only needed to provide property developers with development certainty but also with increased development opportunities. However, as the only such statement in the document, it is difficult to determine if this was a deliberate commentary on a new role for planning or more of a throwaway comment. Fortunately, the MMBW's intentions were made clear in the second part of the plan.

The term certainty appeared in the *Metropolitan Strategy Implementation* document on 13 separate occasions, where it was used in two related ways: as part of an aim to which planning should aspire; and as part of a justification for the planning actions proposed within the plan. On the former, the MMBW wrote, 'The Board's overall aim is to encourage imaginative development and redevelopment

and to provide greater certainty for individual decision-making' (1981: 3). Given this aim, it is little wonder that so many of the planning actions were justified by their provision of certainty. Statements such as 'these zones and objectives are to provide certainty as to the nature of development which may occur in specific areas' (1981: 49) and 'local development schemes provide a means for councils to specify their requirements for development so as to increase certainty for developers' (1981: 68) were typical of the justifications. Importantly, for the first time, there was a clear discourse in Melbourne metropolitan planning around the need to provide certainty. The MMBW's use of this term can be seen as the beginning of an overt confirmation of the notion that metropolitan planning should provide assurances with respect to the development of property. Melbourne's previous metropolitan plans had used discourses relating to stabilisation, efficiency and growth, and conservation. By reorienting the purpose of planning towards the facilitation of property development through the provision of certainty, it would now be understood that planning should protect or enhance the economic investment of property.

Although never mentioned in the plan, the emergence of this discourse could be understood in relation to the economic condition of the city at the time. As mentioned earlier, at the beginning of the 1980s, Melbourne was facing two major problems: economic recession and inner city decline. It was believed that urban development, particularly that located in the inner city, could address both of these problems. Well-located development would stimulate the state economy and reinvigorate the declining inner city (Logan, 1981). The influences behind this reorientation of planning are explored below.

Power

The genealogical principle of power can be used to explain both the development of the *Metropolitan Strategy* and the planning system more generally during this period, especially with respect to the provision of certainty. This section explores the ways in which decision-making power was exerted in all three developmental stages of the plan: conception, contents and outcomes.

Conception

The conception of the plan can be seen as a clear result of the exertion of decision-making power. This time it was Alan Croxford who exercised decision-making power as Chair of the MMBW, to conceive of the new metropolitan plan for Melbourne. The catalyst for this was said to have been an overseas study trip taken by Croxford in 1976 to Europe and the US to learn of the dangers of inner-city decline (McLoughlin, 1992). Upon his return, Croxford tasked the MMBW's planning department with investigating the possibility of reducing Melbourne's continued suburbanisation and consolidating the city's built form, which ultimately led to the creation of the plan. Croxford's proactive approach to the future urban development of Melbourne was seemingly odd, given his lack of involvement with the creation of the previous plan. Perhaps his actions were an attempt to restore the credibility of his personal character and the legitimacy of the MMBW, both of which had suffered badly as a result of many public inquiries. Surprisingly, the State Government did not play an active role in the creation of the plan. Logan (1981) suggests that the political backlash over a request in the early-1970s by Rupert Hamer as Minister for Local Government for the Melbourne City Council to prepare a strategy to enliven the CBD, at a time when ideas of decentralisation were popular, may have contributed to the State Government's lack of involvement in planning matters in the second-half of the 1970s. Also affecting their apparent disassociation may have been Rupert Hamer's transition from Minister to Premier and the allegations of corruption within Melbourne metropolitan planning detailed earlier. In any event, it left the MMBW, as the metropolitan planning authority, to take the initiative and address the declining inner city by reviewing the city's planning options and ultimately deciding on an outcome of urban consolidation, an increasingly popular idea amongst the planning profession and public alike (McLoughlin, 1992).

Contents

The contents of the plan, both the proposed future urban form and the mechanisms through which it was to be achieved, can also be seen as a result of many exertions of decision-making power. The plan recommended an urban form for Melbourne consisting of incremental growth, which involved locating new development both within the established urban areas and also on the northern and western urban fringe of the city. There was also an increased focus on centralising Melbourne's commercial activity in the CBD, with smaller centres of activity to service the established areas. All of this was to be

achieved through the use of the MMPS. It was the MMBW that exercised its decision-making power as the metropolitan planning authority by ultimately deciding on the proposed urban form and the continued use of the MMPS, albeit with the addition of planning objectives. The real question is, who or what was behind their decision? Unfortunately, this is a difficult question to answer.

There was the potential for some outside influence on the plan's contents. The MMBW acknowledged that its creation involved background research and consultation with a number of organisations (MMBW, 1980; 1981). These organisations were listed as 'Melbourne University, the State Co-Ordination Council, the Town and Country Planning Association and the Local Government Engineers Association, as well as those municipal council which extended an invitation' and 'the elected [State] Government, including its departments and instrumentalities, and local government' (MMBW, 1980: 6-7). Unfortunately, no indication was given as to the level of influence, if any, these bodies had on the Board or its plan. The only suggestion of influence was from the State Government. The MMBW had reportedly 'borne in mind' the objectives of the government for 'the curtailment of urban sprawl' and 'the rechanneling of growth to the north and west of Melbourne in preference to the south and east so far as is practicable' (MMBW, 1980: 7). This could explain the MMBW's proposed future urban form. However, there was no directive from the State Government for such a form, as the entire plan was MMBW-led. As will be shown below, there are more plausible explanations.

Interestingly, the organisations with whom the MMBW were said to have consulted were all either public bodies or bodies representing public professions. There was no mention of consultation with the private sector. This is a little surprising, given that, as established in the previous section, the MMBW was supposed to be engaged in ongoing consultation with what became that UDIA ('Vic Plans for Public Planning Discussion', 1971). However, this is not to say that consultation between the two did not occur. Consultation could have occurred undocumented. As such, there is merit in trying to determine if the plan would have benefited the property development industry, which may suggest some possible outside influence.

While the MMBW never mentioned it as a factor, its move towards a more contained city would have reduced the prevalence of land speculation on Melbourne's urban fringe. New greenfield development

was restricted primarily to land within the northern and western growth corridors identified in the previous plan. With these developable areas already known to all and barring government influence to allow development outside of these areas, it would be difficult to further profit from speculation at the fringe. Instead, the urban consolidation strategy may have simply moved speculation into the city's established suburbs. The documents encouraged development to occur at greater densities in areas already serviced by the infrastructure necessary for their support. This would have allowed people and businesses to speculate on established properties with a variety of development potential, from multi-storey apartments to single-storey dual-occupancies. Larger developers would also have benefited through not needing to provide expensive infrastructure but this most likely would have been offset by increased development costs associated with higher densities. Interestingly, the MMBW's decision may have also have created a new range of speculators and developers. The documents put in place a measure to assist the urban consolidation of Melbourne through the removal of planning permit requirements for dual-occupancy subdivisions. This would allow 'mum and dad' investors to achieve a greater return on their family home investment and other property investments, either through the sale of their property to developers or developing it themselves.

The question is then, were speculators and developers behind the MMBW's push towards urban consolidation? It seems unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, it would have been far easier for developers to continue building single-storey, detached dwellings on the fringe, rather than more complicated, expensive and controversial developments in the city's established areas. It would have made more sense for them to lobby for continued urban expansion. Secondly, as will be shown below, the concept of urban consolidation had become increasingly popular amongst planners and the public by the late-1970s.

The proposed urban form could be better explained as a reflection of international planning ideas. The plan reflects the planning ideas of urban consolidation and regeneration, which were popular at the time in European and American cities that were experiencing inner city decline (Ward, 1994). The question is, who is responsible for it? While it is likely that Alan Croxford learnt of these ideas on his overseas study trip (McLoughlin, 1992), which has been established above as the catalyst for the plan, it is unclear whether he, as head of the MMBW, was the primary driver of the proposed urban form. On

the surface, it seems unlikely, given his lack of involvement with the previous plan. However, there are factors that may suggest the contrary. Croxford was at the time of the previous plan quite new to the Chair, and, as a former barrister, probably new to planning too. Experience as Chair may have increased his confidence and desire to get involved in metropolitan planning. Moreover, as suggested above, he may have wanted to improve his personal reputation and the legitimacy of the MMBW by getting more involved. Finally, the MMBW had undergone a significant shake-up, which led to Croxford gaining more power and responsibility (Dingle and Rasmussen, 2008). While it had been threatened with the prospect of downsizing ever since 1968 ('Works Board Under Minister', 1968), the MMBW's composition was finally reduced from 54 commissioners to just six plus its Chair, Croxford, around the beginning of the 1980s (Dingle and Rasmussen, 2008). To these ends, it was possible that he was the driving force behind the urban form.

However, it is also very possible that it was the MMBW's planning department that was again driving the urban form. The MMBW's planning department was greatly knowledgeable, with more than 30 years of metropolitan planning experience and highly qualified staff. The Chief and Deputy Chief Planners listed in the plan were D. W. Simsion and G. A. Harris, respectively, who each held appropriate planning qualifications and affiliations (MMBW, 1981). The department must have been aware of international planning ideas and trends. Unfortunately, in his short memoir as Deputy Chief Planner (2005), Harris gave no clear indication as to origins of the ideas of urban consolidation and regeneration. Relatedly, the mechanisms through which the urban form was to be achieved did suggest international planning knowledge. The MMPS was again used to specify the type and location of this growth, which reinforced the decision-making power of the MMPS itself to direct urban development in Melbourne. However, due to the introduction of planning objectives to the MMPS and the move towards local development schemes, there was less of a reliance on statutory controls. Moreover, the plan contained hardly any information with respect to the updated MMPS. Detail was found in the MMPS itself, which was now entirely separate. A more general concept map of future growth (see Figure 6.9) was instead provided. This represented a general move towards the idea of concept planning, which was beginning to replace the idea of rational-comprehensive planning (Ward, 1994). Interestingly, the intense focus on the need for and the benefits of new urban development suggests a heavy economic influence. Strangely, there was no evidence in the plan of the input of economists, nor

were there economists in the MMBW. To these ends, the document appears to be a reflection of different planning ideas and approaches from around the world.

Ultimately, the potential of international planning ideas to solve the city's deepening problems of inner city decline and economic recession most likely influenced the overall form of the plan. It was the MMBW itself, either directly via Alan Croxford or the planning organisation more generally, that exerted decision-making power by incorporating these ideas into a new metropolitan plan for Melbourne, resisting some external pressures in the process.

Outcomes

The outcomes of the plan also resulted from the exertion of decision-making power. The MMBW formally submitted the second part of the plan, *Metropolitan Strategy Implementation*, in the form of Amendment 150 to the MMPS, to the Minister Lieberman and the general public in April 1981. Lieberman said of the amendment, 'the days are gone of the uncontrolled, outer suburban sprawl... We'll be saying to developers we'd prefer you to look back toward the city and the suburbs' (Wilkinson, 1981: np). Similarly, Croxford said, 'I personally do not see any rezoning of corridor land for urban use for another 15 to 20 years. The emphasis will be on redevelopment of the existing urban area' (Colebatch, 1981: np). However, just like the economic conditions, this period proved a tumultuous time for Victorian planning. Rupert Hamer resigned as Premier two months later, allowing Lindsay Thompson to succeed him (Murray, 2007). Thompson exercised decision-making power by disbanding the TCPB and incorporating its responsibilities into the Ministry of Planning, which was restructured as the Department of Planning (McLoughlin, 1992). The 1982 Victorian state election saw the John Cain Jr.-led Labor party deliver Thompson and his Liberal-National Coalition their first electoral defeat in almost 30 years. Ron Walker was appointed Minister for Planning and the newly renamed Department of Planning was restructured as the Ministry for Planning and Environment (MPE) (McLoughlin, 1992). The Cain government exercised decision-making power by accepting amendment 150 to the MMPS in September 1983, nearly two-and-a-half years after its completion (Melbourne and Metropolitan Planning Scheme Amendment No. 150 (Part 1) Notice of Approval, 1983). This power was again exercised when the MMBW were absolved of its planning powers, under

the *Town and Country Planning (Transfer of Functions) Act 1985*, and the Planning Division absorbed into the MPE. However, the biggest change was to occur two years later with the passing of the *Planning and Environment Act 1987*, which restructured planning in Victoria. The MMPS and local development schemes – of which only one, the municipality of Berwick, had ever been approved (Eccles and Bryant, 2011) – were eventually abolished in favour of improved local planning schemes. All of these changes will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter.

Discontinuity

Metropolitan Strategy / Metropolitan Strategy Implementation represented both continuities and discontinuities between it and its predecessor. Most notably, it further continued the metropolitan planning response established the 1954 plan and sustained in the 1971 plan. The documents again offered a blueprint response, detailing the desired physical form for the city, implemented primarily through an amendment to the MMPS. Interestingly, the 1980-81 plan was the only Melbourne metropolitan planning document to explicitly prepare, consistent with a rational-comprehensive approach, a number of growth options to best accommodate the future urban growth of the city. The preferred incremental growth option continued the 1971 plan's radial growth pattern for the city, albeit with a greater emphasis on urban consolidation through in-fill development. An overview of this proposed growth was provided in the form of a strategic framework plan (see Figure 6.2), which contained even less detail than similar maps found in its two predecessors (see Figures 6.2 and 6.5). It continued the idea that the specifics of future urban growth were to be found within the MMPS, rather than the plan itself. The continued use of the MMPS did help to continue the *episteme* that development certainty should be provided at the metropolitan level. However, this way of thinking was beginning to be eroded. The 1980-81 plan continued the 1971 plan's move towards more implementation measures than just that of the MMPS, including the introduction of planning objectives. Importantly, it also recommended the introduction of local development schemes. This was where councils, with their expert local knowledge, would provide local development detail, providing it was consistent with the MMPS. While these schemes proved short-lived, they can be seen as an initial move towards the localising of planning control and certainty, which represents a discontinuity in *epistemes*.

6.8 *Episteme* discontinuity

This second phase of metropolitan planning in Melbourne, the 1950s to the mid-1980s, represented a new *episteme*, and discontinuity from the previously identified *episteme*, with respect to the provision of certainty. The three metropolitan plans created during this phase – *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954* (MMBW, 1953; 1954), *Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region* (MMBW, 1971) and *Metropolitan Strategy* (MMBW, 1980) and its *Metropolitan Strategy Implementation* (MMBW, 1981) – all provided development certainty at the metropolitan level. All of them made use of the statutory planning controls of the MMPS, which was made possible under the *Town and Country Planning (Metropolitan Area) Act 1949*. As such, the plans provided property owners with assurances with respect to the development of property, even if they had to increasingly look beyond the plan for the details of the planning controls. Interestingly, the latter two plans also increasingly relied on other means to achieve their ideal future urban form. This included the use of non-statutory planning controls, such as planning objectives to help guide future development, whose discretionary nature increased uncertainty about allowable development for property owners. The 1980-81 plan was also significant because it introduced the concept of local development schemes, which were designed to provide localised planning knowledge not feasible with a metropolitan-wide scheme. Nevertheless, the plans contributed to a new *episteme* with respect to the provision of certainty, one where metropolitan plans actually provide certainty. As will be shown in the next chapter, a discontinuity in this thinking occurred, ushering in a reversion to the previous *episteme*.

6.9 Conclusion

Historically, the period from the 1950s to the mid-1980s was one of two contrasts: political-economic stability; and then instability. The economic prosperity of the former saw the metropolis sprawl outwards, with residential and rapidly expanding industrial development competing for land on the urban fringe. The relative economic hardship of the latter resulted in significant industrial decline, which greatly impacted Melbourne's once industrial inner city. Both these problems necessitated the use of metropolitan planning to guide future development. Three metropolitan plans were created

during this phase: *Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954* (MMBW, 1953; 1954); *Planning Policies for the Melbourne Metropolitan Region* (MMBW, 1971) and *Metropolitan Strategy* (MMBW, 1980) and its *Metropolitan Strategy Implementation* (MMBW, 1981). These plans, and this period more generally, constituted its *episteme*, and discontinuity from the previous *episteme*, with respect to the practice of providing certainty within metropolitan planning. The three plans addressed the problem of the practice of providing certainty through the use of planning controls at the metropolitan level through the MMPS. However, the latter two plans also provided non-statutory planning policies to help guide future development. The discourse around certainty was different in all three plans. Discourse around the 1954 plan centred strongly around the idea of efficiency, while the 1971 plan focused on growth and conservation and the 1980-81 plan on development certainty. Ultimately, it was largely a series of decision-making power relations that were responsible for both the contents of the two plans and their outcomes. Both plans heavily reflected the major international planning trend towards the concept plan and appear to have been driven by the independence of the MMBW. However, most importantly, both plans reflected an increased recognition of the power and importance of planning to shape urban outcomes. It wouldn't be until the late-1980s that another metropolitan plan was attempted. By this time, another discontinuity with respect to the provision certainty was beginning to take shape.

7. PHASE III: A RETURN TO THE LOCAL PROVISION OF CERTAINTY, LATE-1980s – 2000s

7.1 Introduction

The following chapter analyses the third phase of Melbourne's metropolitan planning: the late-1980s to the 2000s. It is within this phase that metropolitan planning adopted its current form: primarily lengthy metropolitan strategies, which, despite increased rhetoric to the contrary, do not provide certainty. Three such strategies were created during this period: *Shaping Melbourne's Future* (MPE, 1987), *Living Suburbs* (DPD, 1995a) and *Melbourne 2030* (DI, 2002a). As will be shown, the metropolitan strategies created during this phase were distinct in their lack of statutory control; the state's planning controls had been once-and-for-all localised under an extensive overhaul of planning legislation in Victoria. Moreover, metropolitan planning became a politicised activity, which saw the use of rhetoric about the provision of certainty continue and thrive. The events within this phase conspired to form an *episteme* with respect to the provision of certainty similar to that of the first phase.

7.2 Historical analysis: mid-1980s – early-1990s

With respect to the genealogical principle of history, the condition of the economy unsurprisingly dominated the period from the mid-1980s to the early-1990s. As this was the period in which metropolitan planning became politicised, this section will focus primarily on the politics of the time. With the effects of the early-1980s recession still very much present, newly elected governments at both the Commonwealth and Victorian levels made economic growth a key priority. However, ideological differences meant that the means by which this was to be achieved differed greatly between the two levels of governments, resulting in two vastly distinct economic and political experiences. It was in the midst of this pursuit of economic growth that a fifth metropolitan plan for Melbourne was devised.

The Commonwealth experience

The Commonwealth experience during this period began with political change. In March 1983, the Robert ‘Bob’ Hawke-led Labor Party defeated the incumbent Malcolm Fraser-led Liberal-National Coalition, ending nearly eight years of conservative Commonwealth government (Walter, 2013). Unfortunately for him, Hawke inherited from Fraser a national economy that had begun to deteriorate – the average annual GDP growth rate sat barely above 2 per cent, while unemployment and inflation rates hovered just below 10 per cent (Butlin, Dixon and Lloyd, 2015). Prime Minister Hawke, who was aided by Treasurer and eventually successor, Paul Keating, made economic recovery a key priority for his new government (Walter, 2013). Influenced by the emerging theory of ‘economic rationalism’, the then-term for neoliberalism, the Hawke-Keating tandem embarked on an ambitious programme of micro-economic reform designed to liberalise the economy by reducing government regulation and spending, with the overall goal of stimulating economic activity (Borland, 2015). These micro-economic reforms included deregulating the financial system, floating the Australian dollar, reducing trade tariffs and privatising government-owned services (Borland, 2015). The Hawke-Keating programme seemed to work; by mid-1985, GDP growth had nearly doubled, while unemployment and inflation had nearly halved (Butlin et al., 2015). Not surprisingly, the Hawke Government was returned comfortably for another term in July 1987 (Walter, 2013).

However, this economic prosperity proved to be short-lived. On 19 October 1987, share markets across the world, beginning in the East Asian markets and ending in Australia the next day, experienced a single day crash larger than that experienced during the Great Depression, which led to a global financial crisis that, over the course of the next three years, saw many countries slip into economic recession (Bolton, 2006). Australia, which was rife with speculative investment following the mid-1980s boom, was hit particularly hard by the global downturn (Butlin et al., 2015). In an attempt to curb a potentially devastating inflation rate of nearly 8 per cent, interest rates were raised to nearly 20 per cent, which put significant economic strain on heavily indebted corporations and households – many of which became insolvent (Butlin et al., 2015; Keating, 2015). Unemployment rates also began to rise, peaking at 11.2 per cent in November 1992 (Butlin et al., 2015). In the midst of all of this, the Hawke Government was surprisingly returned on a narrow margin for yet another term in March 1990 (Walter, 2013). Not surprising though, the Australian economy dipped into recession in September 1990 – the first in more than 15 years (Butlin et al., 2015). Treasurer Keating famously described it as

the 'recession we had to have' (Millmow, 2015). The Hawke Government's response to the recession involved a greater Asia-Pacific trade-focus and further privatisation (Keating, 2015). In terms of planning, the Hawke Government also undertook the National Housing Strategy, a review of national housing policy (Howe, 2009). Economic recovery initially proved slow but the nation eventually returned to positive economic growth in September 1991 (Butlin et al., 2015). Three months later, Keating successfully challenged Hawke for the leadership of the party, becoming the 24th Prime Minister of Australia (Walter, 2013). In December 1992, the Keating Government released the findings of its national housing policy review, *National Housing Strategy: Agenda for Action* (A.NHS, 1992), which, amongst other things, placed an emphasis on the affordability of homes, construction of new homes and the encouragement of policies for urban consolidation. Keating continued to serve as Prime Minister until Labor's electoral defeat in 1996 (Walter, 2013).

The Victorian state experience

As with the Commonwealth, the Victorian state experience during this period also began with political change. In April 1982, John Cain Jr. – son of former Victorian Premier, John Cain Snr. – led the Labor Party to its first state election victory in 27 years, defeating the incumbent Lindsay Thompson-led Liberal Government in a historic result (Murray, 2007). Premier Cain came to power well prepared, having developed a robust policy platform, which included a strong economic focus, over its many years on the political sideline. This was necessary, as the Victorian economy followed the national economy into recession between 1982 and 1983 (McLoughlin, 1992). But unlike Hawke, Cain and his Government resisted the emerging theory of neoliberalism, opting for a more classic Keynesian response of increasing public expenditure to boost economic growth and lever new private investment (Murray, 2007; Blainey, 2013). This proved, at least initially, a smart choice, as the state recovered from recession quicker than the rest of Australia (McLoughlin, 1992; Blainey, 2013). Importantly, restoring economic growth was just one of the policy priorities for the new Government, which also embarked on a range of socially progressive reforms designed to modernise the once conservative state (Murray, 2007). From the mid-1980s, Victoria's capital was booming, driven in part by a concerted governmental push for large-scale redevelopment and infrastructure projects in and around the city centre (McLoughlin, 1992). Employment, population and urban growth in Melbourne also steadily

increased (Blainey, 2013). It was during this time that the Government began to take a keen interest in planning, a development discussed in the following section. Things were going well for the Cain Government, which was returned for a second term in 1985. Its re-election marked the first time a Victorian Labor government had served for more than one consecutive term (Murray, 2007).

However, Victoria's economic position began to crumble following the afore-mentioned share market crash of 1987, the flow-on effects from which proved increasingly challenging for the state. Increased borrowing costs rendered the Cain Government's Keynesian approach to the state's finances, which had involved budget deficits to fund its many capital works projects, no longer feasible, forcing it to cut spending and eventually raise taxes (Murray, 2007; Blainey, 2013). These budget cuts resulted in a sharp contraction of the public sector workforce, which had increased under Cain (Dixon and Mahmood, 2008). Significant job losses were also felt in the state's textile manufacturing industry, as a result of the Commonwealth decision to reduce tariffs with Asian-Pacific countries. In all, employment fell by 7.5 per cent in Victoria during the period (Dixon and Mahmood, 2008). Compounding the state's worsening economic position was the collapse of a number of high-profile institutions under the stress of rising interest rates and mounting bad debts, including the publicly owned State Bank of Victoria and the Victorian Economic Development Corporation, as well as the privately owned Pyramid Building Society. Political pressure forced the Cain Government to compensate investors for the losses (Murray, 2007, Blainey, 2013). Economic confidence and activity was low, and the state followed the nation into recession. John Cain, who had been re-elected for a third term in 1988, albeit with a razor-thin two-seat majority, could not recover from the perception, both amongst the public and his own political party, of economic mismanagement, opting instead to resign as premier in August 1990 and paving the way for Joan Kirner, the state's first female premier, to assume the role (Murray, 2007). However, the premiership proved to be a poisoned chalice, as the Jeff Kennett-led Liberal-National Coalition comprehensively defeated Labor at the 1992 Victorian state election (Murray, 2007), ushering in a new direction for the state.

7.3 Shaping Melbourne's Future (1987 Strategy)

The incoming Cain Government took a somewhat delayed approach towards metropolitan planning. Its only major actions on the issue – approving Amendment 150 to the MMPS, abolishing the State Coordination Council (SCC), which had succeeded the State Planning Council (SPC) in 1975, and restructuring the Department of Planning as the Ministry for Planning and Environment (MPE), for which Evan Walker, a former architect, was appointed the new Minister (Murray, 2007) – occurred more than half-way through its first term (Eccles and Bryant, 2011). The Cain Government was instead more concerned with stimulating economic activity through the facilitation of development or redevelopment of five key government-owned land holdings in central Melbourne, most notably Southbank (MPE, 1984). Given the substantial economic challenges faced by the Cain Government, this was hardly surprising. What was surprising, however, was the way in which it finally did involve itself in metropolitan planning. Unlike any previous state government before it, the Cain Government undertook to increase its responsibility for the matter. The abolition of the SCC meant that the new-look MPE assumed the function of formulating planning policies for metropolitan Melbourne and the state more generally (Eccles and Bryant, 2011). These actions signalled a new direction for planning in Victoria – a planning system with an increased government presence. This new direction was all but confirmed when the Labor party took to the 1985 state election a pledge to reform planning by centralising planning powers and simplifying the existing planning legislation (Eccleston, 1984; McLoughlin, 1992).

Upon its return for a historical second term in March 1985, the Cain Government quickly set about fulfilling the first part of its electoral pledge to reform planning by successfully passing the *Town and Country Planning (Transfer of Functions) Act 1985*. This legislation compounded the shift of responsibility of planning powers in Victoria to the Government by transferring metropolitan planning powers from the MMBW, as well as the more than 200 planners that comprised its Planning Division, to the new-look MPE (Clarke, 1985). These actions resulted, as McLoughlin noted (1992: 76), in the formation of a ‘super-ministry’ that comprised well over 700 staff members. Under this legislation, the super-ministry assumed responsibility for administering the MMPS (Clarke, 1985). Importantly, the legislation also abolished all local planning schemes, local development schemes and IDOs in operation within the metropolitan region (see Appendix F). In return, metropolitan local governments were delegated the power to amend the MMPS – only with MPE approval – and decide on general

planning permit applications in their municipalities. Short-lived regional planning authorities, which were comprised of several neighbouring local governments, were delegated the power to decide on planning permit applications with a potential regional impact (Eccles and Bryant, 2011). Evan Walker, who would eventually be replaced as Minister for Planning by former lawyer, Jim Keenan, justified the changes by claiming they would ‘reduce overlap and duplication in the planning system’ (Pecujac, 1984: np) and ‘streamline the planning process from applications to approvals and would also make local councils more involved in planning’ (Clarke, 1985: np). Buxton, Goodman and Moloney (2016: 29) stressed the latter justification as the significant factor for the action, arguing that the MMBW ‘clashed with Labor’s intention to localise the administration of planning while retaining state control over defined state-wide and metropolitan issues’. However, several other justifications have also been suggested. McLoughlin (1992: 76) contends that the moves were part of the Cain Government’s ‘wish to reduce the number of freewheeling bureaucratic quangos and to increase the overall accountability of government’. Buxton et al. believes also that ‘Labor seemed to distrust the MMBW and its Chair, Alan Croxford, and regarded the Board as a competitor’ (2016: 29). In any case, the Cain Government and its super-ministry worked under these parameters until it could finally reform existing planning legislation.

Nearly two years later, the Cain Government finally fulfilled the second part of its electoral pledge to reform planning by successfully passing the *Planning and Environment Act 1987*. The new act, which to this day remains the state’s primary piece of planning legislation (Eccles and Bryant, 2011), replaced the previous principal *Town and Country Planning Act 1961*. The intricacies of the legislative changes are beyond the scope of this thesis (for an in-depth analysis of the legislation, see Eccles and Bryant, 2011; however, it did not substantially restructure the planning system in Victoria. Rather, it simplified the system and gave local governments more power. According to the Act, planning authorities were required to ‘provide sound, strategic and co-ordinated planning of the use and development of land in its area’ (1987: 602). To do so, the Act once-and-for-all abolished the metropolitan-wide MMPS. It was replaced with a new version of local planning schemes (referred to hereafter as the second iteration) that were mandatory for each municipality (for an in-depth analysis of the second iteration of local planning schemes, see Buxton, Goodman and Budge, 2003). Moreover, local governments were given greater freedom in their creation. According to the Act, local planning schemes were able to

‘make any provision which relates to the use, development, protection or conservation of any land in the area’ (1987: 598). As Manton notes,

no longer was planning a power given within limits to councils which wanted it; it became a responsibility of councils to plan the development of the area, and the act was *enabling*, rather than *enabling within strict limits*. Limits were preserved in the Minister’s general control over the system (a planning scheme or amendment only comes into effect if approved by the Minister), and Parliament’s power to revoke any amendment (1993: 44).

This simplified system meant that planning was localised but that the State Government had final control (Buxton et al., 2003). However, this change was not instantaneous. The new schemes came into effect on 16 February 1988 (Buxton et al., 2003). These schemes were divided into three distinct sections: a State Section that contained provisions for matters of state significance; a Regional Section for those in the Metropolitan, Geelong, Latrobe Valley, Westernport, Upper Yarra Valley and Dandenong Ranges Regions that contained provisions for matters of regional significance; and a Local Section that contained land-use zones and maps specific to each municipality (Buxton et al., 2003). Interestingly, the contents of the defunct MMPS were merged into the Regional and Local Sections of the new schemes, ensuring a continuation of its legacy until local councils decided to amend it (Buxton et al., 2003).

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Figure 7.1: Front cover of *Shaping Melbourne's Future* (MPE, 1987)

It was, however, perhaps the release of a fifth metropolitan planning document for Melbourne, *Shaping Melbourne's Future: The Government's Metropolitan Policy*, which was referred to throughout as both a policy and strategy, by the MPE in August 1987 that truly cemented the presence of the state government in metropolitan planning. The strategy was the first metropolitan planning document for Melbourne created not by an independent body but by the State Government. This was made abundantly clear in the opening sentence of document. In his foreword, the Minister for Planning and Environment, Jim Kennan, wrote, 'For the first time, the Victorian Government has prepared a comprehensive [metropolitan] policy' (MPE, 1987: foreword). The purpose of the brief, 57-page policy document was to detail a 'strategy for managing future metropolitan development in response to [various] changes' (MPE, 1987: 1).

The strategy began, like all of its predecessors, by providing an overview of Melbourne's present and projected future development. This included discussing population growth and its effect on housing,

employment and transport. Of particular importance, the authors cautiously forecasted the metropolitan region's population to grow by 400,000 people in the fifteen years to 2011, which they conceded would, if left unchecked, largely be accommodated on the urban fringe (MPE, 1987). The authors then detailed the economic, social and environmental detriments of this fringe growth and the benefits in addressing it. This triple-bottom-line focus carried across the entire strategy. However, most attention was paid to the economic aspects of metropolitan development. For instance, the authors made a point to stress the economic benefit of addressing fringe growth. They argued that there would be 'economic benefit of about \$29,000 [1986 Figures] for each household added to the established area rather than the fringe' (MPE, 1987: 8), as expensive new infrastructure would not need to be provided. This would have been quite a significant concern for the Cain Government, which was, as discussed above, beginning to experience pressure on the state budget due to increased expenditure and declining revenue (Murray, 2007). This emphasis on fringe growth also served to foreshadow a preferred strategy involving consolidating future development.

The document then deviated from its predecessors by not immediately providing a strategy to help guide future development. Rather, the next three chapters were spent discussing the Cain Government's economic, social and environmental policies, respectively, and how they would influence and be affected by the strategy. This action, while seemingly innocuous, actually marked the beginning of the coordination of plans with other government policies, an important development in the metropolitan planning of Melbourne (Buxton et al., 2016). Prior to this, the two had always been disconnected. However, state government control of metropolitan planning meant that co-ordination was finally possible. Moreover, the inclusion of other policies also gave an indication of Government priorities. While the authors did examine the social and environmental policy areas, they focused their attention primarily on the Government's economic policies. In particular, they discussed in great detail new policies to achieve commercial and industrial growth through infrastructure provision and land-use zoning improvements, and reiterated existing policies to economise office and retailing in activity centres. As already discussed, it was around this time that Victoria began to experience economic contraction and job losses (Murray, 2007; Dixon and Mahmood, 2008). It is little wonder that the Cain Government prioritised economic policies and wanted to use metropolitan planning as a way to help spur economic activity in the state.

The final three chapters of the document were spent detailing the Cain Government's preferred strategy for managing the future metropolitan development of Melbourne. However, strangely, the authors never clearly articulated a strategy. Rather, they specified policy directions for nine separate themes relevant to urban development, which served as the State Government's designated strategy. The themes were: 'urban consolidation'; 'future outward growth'; 'activity centres and office and retailing policies'; 'employment distribution'; 'infrastructure for commercial and industrial development'; 'accessibility and transport services'; 'housing choice and affordability'; 'delivery of human services'; and 'environmental improvements' (MPE, 1987: 34). It is interesting to note that seven of the nine themes related to the Government's economic policies. Readers were left to decipher from the directions how metropolitan Melbourne would grow in the future. Aiding this task was a map conceptually detailing the pattern of future metropolitan development expected (see Figure 7.2). This was the first appearance in Melbourne metropolitan planning of what could definitively be considered a concept map.

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Figure 7.2: *Shaping Melbourne's Future* – Pattern of Future Metropolitan Development (MPE, 1987: 35)

Ultimately, the State Government was advocating for future growth almost identical in principle to the incremental growth option adopted in the 1980-81 plan. They reaffirmed, albeit with a greater emphasis, urban consolidation as the preferred approach for accommodating future growth. This involved accommodating 'more intensive development in established urban areas' (MPE, 1987: 36). Justifications for this approach were similar to those found in the 1980-81 plan: it created efficiencies in infrastructure provision and employment access; stabilised population distribution; and increased housing choice and affordability. However, the authors acknowledged that development would continue to occur on the city's urban fringe. As such, they reaffirmed the corridor-green wedge approach developed and refined in the 1971 and 1980-81 plans, respectively. This involved confining future urban fringe development to the already established 'Plenty corridor in the north and the Berwick-Pakenham corridor in the south-east' (MPE, 1987: 37), thereby protecting the green wedge

corridors from this development. Moreover, they also reaffirmed the activity centre approach developed and refined in the 1954 and 1980-81 plans, respectively, albeit with some changes. This involved designating as activity centres places in which commercial and industrial activity took place. Changes included a hierarchical structuring of these centres, with the retention of 'Central Melbourne as the prime metropolitan focus for administrative, cultural, retail, commercial and tourist activities' (MPE, 1987: 37), as well as encouraging more centres of activity in the north and west. Justifications for this approach related mainly to boosting economic activity.

In order to achieve this metropolitan development outcome, the authors presented a preferred policy position for each of the nine themes and formulated specific measures to achieve them. In total, more than one-hundred and twenty-five measures were presented across the nine themes. Too numerous to examine in full, these measures varied greatly in nature. The authors described them best: 'they entail action such as changes to regulations and legislation, changes to Government programs, reallocation of resources, development of detailed plans, undertaking of specific works, promotion and advocacy. They include immediate priorities as well as longer-term action' (1987: 56). There are two things to note about the measures. Firstly, they lacked implementation detail. There was no indication as to how or when they were to be completed. A number of academic commentators have criticised the plan for the vagueness of its measures and, in particular, the lack of implementation mechanisms (see McLoughlin, 1992; Buxton et al., 2016). Secondly, only a handful of them were related to statutory planning. As will be explored in the next subsection, statutory planning was in a state of limbo – the MMPS was to be abolished in favour of a second iteration of local planning schemes but this was not due to come into effect for another six months. However, it appeared that the authors were expecting local governments to ensure that these local planning schemes achieved the Government's preferred metropolitan outcome.

The Government will use its metropolitan strategy as the basis for a co-operative approach to working with local government, which will have a particularly important role in implementation, especially in the areas of urban consolidation, structure planning for outward growth, local development initiatives, activity centres and the delivery of human services (MPE, 1987: 56).

This is understandable, given that local councils tend to have greater knowledge of the needs of their municipalities than the State Government.

Problem

Shaping Melbourne's Future marked a crucial development with respect to the genealogical principle of the problem. For the first time, the practice of providing certainty was not present in a metropolitan plan for Melbourne. The strategy did not use planning controls to achieve its desired outcomes. As determined in Chapter 3, certainty in metropolitan plans can only be provided through the use of statutory planning controls. Melbourne's previous three metropolitan plans – the 1954, 1971 and 1980-81 plans – were all implemented by their translation into the statutory planning controls of the MMPS, the details of which were either present in or accompanied the documents. Consequently, it was determined that these three plans all provided certainty with respect to development. However, the situation that allowed for such an outcome changed several months prior to the publication of the plan. The *Planning and Environment Act 1987* was set to abolish the MMPS in favour of a second iteration of local planning schemes. As such, this avenue of implementation was no longer possible. As with Melbourne's first metropolitan plan – the 1929 strategy – *Shaping Melbourne's Future* relied on a range of measures to ensure its implementation. While a handful of these measures were related to statutory planning, they only went so far as reviewing and suggesting alterations to existing land-use zones to encourage residential, commercial and industrial development. The measure to 'make small-scale medium-density developments in outer ring and fringe residential areas a permitted use, subject to conditions' (MPE, 1987: 36) was typical of these statutory planning-related measures. They provided no indication as to what the altered land-use zones would comprise, or even what constituted the outer ring or fringe residential areas. Ultimately, the strategy, like the 1929 strategy, relied on councils interpreting the policy into their local planning schemes. As such, it was within these local planning schemes that certainty for and from development could be found.

Discourse

Regarding the genealogical principle of discourse, the term certainty was not present in the strategy. The absence of the term means it is necessary to instead return to an examination of the discourse surrounding the notion of certainty – that planning should provide an assurance with respect to the development of property. The discourses of stabilising property values that underpinned the 1929 and of improving the efficiency of the city that underpinned 1954 plan were not present in the strategy. Interestingly, the discourses of growth and conservation, which underpinned the 1971 plan, were definitely present. The term growth was used on 88 separate occasions, while the term conservation was used on 11 separate occasions. The opening paragraph of the introduction was typical of its use. ‘The Government’s metropolitan policy will guide the development of Melbourne through the next decade... It will influence the form the city will take; where future growth will be directed’ (MPE, 1987: 1). However, unlike the 1971 plan, the terms were not typically used to indicate where urban development was allowed or prohibited. Moreover, and most importantly, growth and conservation were no longer the most prominent discourses. It was within the above passage that the most prominent discourse of the plan laid: development.

The discourse of development featured heavily in the strategy. The term appeared in the strategy on more than 200 separate occasions – an average of slightly more than 3.5 times per page. The authors used the term in reference to the physical development of Melbourne. The final paragraph of the strategy exemplified such use. ‘In establishing a strategy for the metropolitan area, the Government has created a sound framework for guiding Melbourne’s development into the twenty-first century’ (MPE, 1987: 57). The strategy was ultimately concerned with guiding the development of the city. This was clearly the notion of certainty: providing an assurance with respect to the development of property. The use of the discourse around development is hardly surprising, given that the Victorian economy was languishing at the time. It can be understood in relation to the need to stimulate the economy and reinvigorate the declining inner city. What is surprising, however, is that when talking about guiding development, the term certainty was never used. As shown in the previous chapter, the 1980-81 plan used the term certainty to refer to a greater confidence in urban development outcomes. It was an explicit use of the term of certainty in reference to the underlying notion of certainty. Why was it not used again? There are several possibilities for its absence. Firstly, as discussed above, the strategy served to co-ordinate metropolitan planning with the Cain Government’s other government policies,

the majority of which were economic in nature. As such, the Cain Government may have been more focused on attracting economic activity, than on just urban development (MPE, 1987). Secondly, the strategy was created during challenging and rapidly changing economic times. As such, the Cain Government may not have thought it was possible to provide assurances for development. Thirdly, and relatedly, the strategy did not have in place the same statutory planning mechanisms as the 1980-81 plan. As such, the Cain government may not have thought it was possible to provide assurances for development, as these assurances were at the local level. In any case, to these ends, the strategy used the discourse of development, rather than certainty, to refer to the notion of certainty.

Power

The genealogical principle of power explains both the development of *Shaping Melbourne's Future* and the planning system more generally during this period, especially regarding the provision of certainty. This section explores the ways in which decision-making power was exerted in all three developmental stages of the strategy: conception, contents and outcomes.

Conception

It was the Strategic Planning Division of the newly expanded MPE that initially conceived the strategy (Sposito, 2004). The Director of SPD, Victor Sposito, exerted decision-making power by approaching the Minister for Planning, Evan Walker, and requesting, on behalf of the Division, the creation a new metropolitan strategy for Melbourne (Former Senior Planner, Personal Communication, 25 September 2017). He argued that the 1980-81 plan was not a true metropolitan strategy, as the MMBW believed, but rather just a statutory plan, and that it was reactive, not proactive (Former Senior Planner, Personal Communication, 25 September 2017). The Government exerted decision-making power by agreeing to the request, as well as establishing the Metropolitan Strategy Task Force (MSTF) within the MPE Strategic Planning Division, of which Victor Sposito was made Project Director, to develop the strategy and a Cabinet Committee to guide its preparation (Sposito, 2014).

Contents

In terms of its proposed urban form, one academic commentator aptly described the strategy as ‘nothing new’ (McLoughlin, 1992: 17). The strategy specified policy directions for nine separate themes relevant to urban development. From this emerged a familiar urban form consisting of a balancing act between urban consolidation within the city’s established residential areas, particularly around activity centres, and fringe urban development within the city’s established urban growth corridors. What was new, however, was the way in which the proposed urban form was to be achieved. The strategy no longer used direct statutory planning controls for its implementation, as the MMPS had been abolished in favour of local planning schemes. Instead, more than one-hundred and twenty-five vague implementation measures were included. Most importantly, the strategy relied on councils interpreting the strategy for their local planning schemes to achieve its proposed urban form. The decision-making power structure behind this entire situation was simple but unlike that which had come before it. An interview with a former senior planner who worked on the strategy helped to shed some light on it. Despite it having assumed the responsibility of metropolitan planning from the MMBW, the Cain Government did not play an active role in the creation of the strategy (Former Senior Planner, Personal Communication, 25 September 2017). It allegedly gave the Metropolitan Strategy Task Force no direction as to the contents of the strategy. The Government’s only real input related to the clarification of strategic directions and initiatives (Sposito, 2004). As such, the Task Force exerted decision-making power by driving the contents of the strategy itself (Former Senior Planner, Personal Communication, 25 September 2017). Such a situation is understandable, given that it was the MPE Strategic Planning Division, rather than the Cain Government, that conceived the plan.

However, questions remain as to why the Task Force chose the contents that it did. The decision to explore policy directions for nine separate urban development-related themes resulted from the Task Force wanting to ‘blend a whole lot of issues’ not seen before into a metropolitan plan (Former Senior Planner, Personal Communication, 25 September 2017). In particular, the strong economic focus was that of the Project Director, Victor Sposito, who had a keen interest in economics and planning (Former Senior Planner, Personal Communication, 25 September 2017). The economic condition of Melbourne allegedly played no significant role in this focus. While such a claim seems dubious, as mentioned

above, the plan was created between economic downturns. The decision to use a range of measures, largely non-statutory planning in nature, was similarly that of the Task Force. It allegedly did so because of a belief that metropolitan planning needed to be proactive and that statutory planning controls were reactive. However, statutory planning controls had been localised and the State Government had little control over local planning schemes. Moreover, the Task Force believed that smaller measures 'were much better for implementation' (Former Senior Planner, Personal Communication, 25 September 2017). There was also allegedly no outside pressure from lobby groups. In fact, the only time the Task Force sought outside advice was when it commissioned several complimentary studies by various consultants (Sposito, 2004). To these ends, the creation of the strategy was a uniquely insular project, with levels of decision-making power not seen before given to its creators, the Metropolitan Strategy Task Force.

Outcomes

The outcome of the strategy was also a result of the exertion of decision-making power. As discussed above, decision-making power was exerted to change the way in which the strategy was to be implemented. Firstly, it was the MPE that formulated the strategy. As such, all that was needed was for Cabinet to approve the document, thus making it the Cain Government's official policy. However, issues regarding implementation detail led to a six-month delay in Cabinet approval (Sposito, 2014). Secondly, and most importantly, the strategy did not make use of the MMPS. As such, there was no legal need for it to be submitted for public comment (McLoughlin, 1992). Moreover, nor was there the legal need for it to be gazetted. The Cain Government just slowly undertook the measures it formulated in the strategy, implementing what they could through the second iteration of local planning schemes that came into operation on 16 February 1988 (McLoughlin, 1992). The Cain Government also exerted decision-making power by requiring that other organisations implement specific measures in the strategy, which included making sure council plans adhered to the principles of the strategy.

However, decision-making power would return over the next few years. In 1988, the Cain Government successfully passed the *Subdivision Act 1988*, which detailed an updated procedure for the subdivision and consolidation of land. That same year, the MPE released the *Residential Development Provisions*

for Victoria (MPE, 1988), a document containing guidelines for new residential development and subdivision. These guidelines were incorporated into ‘every planning scheme in Victoria in 1989 pursuant to s 6(s)(j) of the *Planning and Environment Act*’ (Eccles and Bryant, 2011: 34-5). Prior to this, residential development and subdivisions were subject to the standards contained within the Victorian Building Regulations, which were developed in the 1980s to replace decades of local building by-laws, and within individual local planning schemes (Eccles and Bryant, 2011). In 1990, the Cain Government restructured the MPE as the Department of Planning and Urban Growth (DPUG). The DPUG managed to produce only one major document during its short lifespan – the *Urban Development Options for Victoria Discussion Paper* (DPUG, 1990), which detailed strategic options for urban consolidation.

Upon Cain’s forced retirement in August 1990, Joan Kirner assumed the Premiership. The newly appointed Minister for Planning and Urban Growth, Andrew McCutcheon, set about extending the boundaries of the Werribee and southeast growth corridors (Porter, 1990), something ‘unthinkable under the MMBW with its meticulous research-based policy and adherence to policy objectives’ (Buxton et al., 2016: 29). In January 1991, the Kirner Government restructured the DPUG as the Department of Planning and Housing (DPH), as part of a larger restructuring of government departments. This department produced two major documents during its time. The first was the *Victorian Code for Residential Development – Subdivision and Single Dwellings* (DPH, 1992a), known as *VicCode 1*. As its name suggested, the document developed design guidelines for single dwellings and subdivision. These guidelines were designed to ‘provide a single comprehensive and integrated set of performance standards to cover most aspects of residential development’ and to ‘ensure cost-effective residential development reflecting appropriate community standards for health, safety and amenity’ (DPD, 1992a: 9). Their formulation was based on the *Australian Model Code for Residential Development* (AMCORD) (Model Code Task Force of the Green Street Joint Venture, 1990), a resource document containing residential development codes created by the Commonwealth Government for state and local government adaption, and the *Residential Development Provisions for Victoria* (MPE, 1988) discussed above. These guidelines employed ‘the “performance” approach to residential development regulation’ (DPD, 1992a: 10), in which the overall design element was more important than the way in which it was to be achieved. More flexible controls meant that local

authorities were able to use discretion in the assessment of applications against these guidelines, increasing their power. This US-originating concept was introduced to Australia through AMCORD. *VicCode 1* was eventually incorporated into every Victorian planning scheme and used as the basis for assessment of planning proposals (Eccles and Bryant, 2011). The second was *A Place to Live* (DPH, 1992b), which was a strategy for the urban growth and development of the state as a whole, which favoured urban consolidation and job creation. But before anything could be made of it, Kirner lost government to the Jeff Kennett-led Liberal-National Coalition at the 1992 state election. This change in government ushered in an era of further reform to metropolitan planning.

Discontinuity

Shaping Melbourne's Future represented significant discontinuities between it and its three immediate predecessors. Firstly, there was discontinuity in terms of its authorship. It was the first metropolitan planning document created by the Victorian State Government, not an independent body. As such, it represented a clear discontinuity from independent metropolitan planning towards politicised metropolitan planning. *Shaping Melbourne's Future* was a reflection of the Cain Government's policy response to the problems of managing the future metropolitan development of Melbourne, not that of the MMBW. Most importantly, it discontinued the use of the MMPS in metropolitan planning. Instead, management of this future development was to be achieved at the local level through new-and-improved local planning schemes. As such, *Shaping Melbourne's Future* was intended as a strategy rather than a plan that would guide the direction of these local planning schemes. In doing so, it discontinued the previous *episteme* with respect to the provision of certainty and began a new one. Certainty was no longer to be found at the metropolitan level, it was to be found at the local level. Interestingly, the 1987 strategy continued the incremental growth option of its predecessor, opting to locate future development within the established urban growth corridors, with an increased emphasis on urban consolidation. Moreover, the strategy provided a concept map to highlight this pattern (see Figure 7.2). It was the first such map in a Melbourne metropolitan planning document and represented a shift towards concept-based planning. The strategy placed an increased emphasis on development facilitation. The strategy also placed a new emphasis on the idea of co-ordinating responses to

achieving future urban form. The document contained a list of one-hundred and twenty-five measures, which were to be completed by a range of government departments and outside groups.

7.4 Historical analysis: the 1990s

With respect to the genealogical principle of history, the period of the 1990s shared similarities with the previous period. Both the Commonwealth and Victorian State Governments were again preoccupied with economic recovery – this time from the early-1990s recession. However, unlike the previous period, there was no great ideological divide between the ways in which each approached this recovery. A newly elected Victorian State Government joined the Commonwealth Government in the adoption of neoliberal economic policies, resulting in a similar economic and political experience. It was in the midst of this that a sixth metropolitan planning document for Melbourne was developed.

The continued Commonwealth experience

The Commonwealth experience during this period began with a continuation of Labor Government rule. However, after a successful leadership challenge in December 1991, Paul Keating replaced Bob Hawke as leader of the Labor Party and, thus, Prime Minister (Walter, 2013). The new Keating administration continued the strong economic focus of the previous Hawke administration, but also introduced a social focus (Bolton, 2006). It made significant reforms in the social areas of indigenous recognition, discrimination and arts funding (Bolton, 2006; Walter, 2013). With respect to the economy, the Keating Government inherited a national economy that had recently returned to positive economic growth following the early-1990s recession (Butlin et al., 2015). However, this growth remained precarious and unemployment rates persisted above 10 per cent (Butlin, Dixon and Lloyd, 2015). Keating built on the neoliberal economic policies for recovery he helped install as treasurer during the Hawke Government, including reducing trade tariffs to the Asia-Pacific region to stimulate trade (Bolton, 2006). But with little left in the Australian economy to ‘rationalise’, he resorted to more Keynesian methods of economic stimulation and job creation, including infrastructure spending and greater employment regulations to stimulate job growth (Keating, 2015). These measures did help to improve economic growth, but by the end of 1992, unemployment rates were peaking at 11.4 per cent

(Butlin et al., 2015). The Liberal-National Coalition opposition, led by John Hewson, a trained economist, made increasing political mileage on the issue of the economy. As such, it looked like the Australian public was set to emphatically reject Labor, which had been in power for a record ten years, at the 1993 federal election. However, Keating launched a spirited election campaign centred on tax cuts and a rejection of the opposition's planned GST policy, resulting in an unlikely victory for Labor over the Liberal-National Coalition (Walter, 2013).

The Keating Government's second term did not get off to an auspicious start. It was revealed that its expenditure was pushing the budget deeper into deficit – \$14.6 billion for the 1992/3 financial year, more than that during any time of the Fraser Government, and growing (Butlin et al., 2015). In response, the Keating Government all but abandoned its promised tax cuts. Moreover, it delved back into neoliberal economic policy, further privatising a number of government-owned services, including Qantas. The Keating Government also spent the next two years devising its flagship economic policy, *Working Nation*, which was designed to create more than two million jobs through a workfare scheme and changes to industrial relations (Bolton, 2006). The Australian economy eventually recovered to its pre-recession levels and unemployment rates improved (Butlin et al., 2015). However, the Keating Government still had trouble reducing the budget bottom-line. The John Howard-led Liberal National Coalition opposition was able to use this, as well as instability in the cabinet, to prosecute its case for a change in government. The Labor Party was resoundingly defeated by the Liberal-National Coalition at the 1996 federal election (Walter, 2013).

The Howard Government also came to power with a strong economic focus. It had inherited from the Keating Government a mixed position in terms of the national economy; the budget deficit stood at \$7.6 billion, but economic growth, inflation and unemployment rates were all at respectable levels (Butlin et al., 2015). Over the next few years, the Howard Government embarked on a programme of economic reform, inspired by neoliberal ideology, to address the budget situation and stimulate greater economic growth. The most significant of these reforms were downsizing the public service to reduce government expenditure, privatising yet more government-owned services to increase government revenue, changes to industrial relations and unemployment benefits, and widespread income tax cuts (Keating, 2015). The narrative of a strengthening national economy resonated well with the Australian

public. As such, the Howard Government was re-elected at the 1998 federal election, defeating the Kim Beazley-led Labor Party, allowing it to govern well into the twenty-first century (Walter, 2013).

The new Victorian state experience

The new Victorian state experience began, unsurprisingly, with political change. The Jeff Kennett-led Liberal-National Coalition comprehensively defeated the incumbent Joan Kirner-led Labor Party at the 1992 Victorian election. The Liberal Party actually won enough seats to govern in its own right but decided to honour the coalition agreement (Murray, 2007). The Kennett Government came to power with an unwavering focus on improving the state economy. This focus proved a necessity, as it quickly became apparent that the Government had inherited from the Cain-Kirner years a dismal economic position. The state economy was stagnant following the early-1990s recession, which, as mentioned in the previous section, had hit Victoria particularly hard (Murray, 2007; Dixon and Mahmood, 2008). Moreover, the state was running a budget deficit of \$2.1 billion and carried a total debt of \$32 billion (Murray, 2007). This news did little to faze the Kennett Government, for it had already prepared an ambitious economic reform agenda prior to its election. However, this was no ordinary reform agenda. The Kennett Government opted for a neoliberal approach inspired by the Thatcher Government of the United Kingdom and the Reagan Government of the United States, departing from Victoria's state welfare liberal traditions (Buxton et al., 2016). Its reform agenda was centred on three key elements: reducing the state budget deficit and debt; creating a more competitive business environment; and creating greater government efficiency. According to Buxton et al. (2016), these elements originated in a report jointly prepared by pro-business think tanks, the Tasman Institute and the Institute of Public Affairs, just prior to the 1992 state election, entitled *Victoria: An Agenda for Change* (1991).

The Kennett Government undertook its neoliberal economic reform during the period. Firstly, in order to reduce the state budget deficit and debt, the Kennett Government almost immediately implemented large, widespread cuts to public expenditure, which resulted in the forced retrenchment of almost 50,000 public servants and the closure of many small public schools and hospitals (Murray, 2007). Moreover, it also privatised many state-owned services, including some public utilities, and sold significant government land holdings (Murray, 2007). Furthermore, it also raised state taxes and

charges (Buxton et al., 2016). Collectively, these measures 'halved state debt and brought in a budget surplus in 1996' (Buxton et al., 2016: 30). Secondly, in order to create a more competitive business environment, the Kennett Government attempted to attract more capital investment into the state. To achieve this, it implemented changes to industrial relations and union undertakings that heavily favoured business (Buxton et al., 2016). Moreover, it commissioned a number of high-profile capital works projects, largely funded through public-private partnerships, including Federation Square, the Melbourne Museum, the Melbourne Convention and Exhibition Centre, the Melbourne Sports and Aquatic Centre, the CityLink tollway, and the Docklands Stadium, the centrepiece of the government's urban renewal of Docklands (Murray, 2007; Blainey, 2013). Furthermore, it also attracted a number of high-profile international sporting events, including the Formula 1 Grand Prix and the 2006 Commonwealth Games (Murray, 2007). Thirdly, to create greater government efficiencies, the Kennett Government substantially reorganised the public sector. Most relevant, it reduced through forced amalgamations the number of local government areas (LGAs) in Victoria. The total number of LGAs was reduced from 210 to 78, with Melbourne LGAs reducing from 52 to 26 (Buxton et al., 2016). Moreover, it also restructured government departments to reduce their overall number (Murray, 2007). Importantly, the DPH was restructured as the Department of Planning and Development (DPD), perhaps foreshadowing the reformation the Kennett Government had in store for planning. Collectively, these actions helped greatly to turn around the economic fortunes of the state (Murray, 2007).

Somewhere in the midst of the above reform agenda, the Kennett Government was re-elected decisively for a second term (Murray, 2007). Its 1992 and 1996 state election victories gave the Liberal-National Coalition majorities in both houses of parliament. This, combined with a persistent public perception of mismanagement of the state economy by the previous Labor Governments, allowed the Kennett Government to undertake its neoliberal economic reform agenda with ease (Buxton et al., 2016). However, towards the end of the period things slowly started to unravel for the Kennett Government. A series of political and personal scandals began to take its toll on the Government and on Premier Kennett himself. So too did an increasing backlash from rural voters about the Melbourne-centric focus of his economic reform agenda (Murray, 2007). Moreover, there was also growing discontent in the suburbs during this period about the negative effect of increased residential

development (Lewis, 1999). A politically savvy Labor Party opposition, led by Steve Bracks, a former teacher and public servant from Ballarat, was able to tap into this rising dissatisfaction at the 1999 state election. Despite polling predicting a third term for the Kennett Government, the Labor Party won enough seats to form a minority government with three rural independents, ending Jeff Kennett's time as both Premier and a politician (Murray, 2007). The Bracks Government would go on to govern well into the next decade.

7.5 *Living Suburbs* (1995 Strategy)

In contrast to its predecessor, the incoming Kennett Government immediately involved itself in matters of metropolitan planning, as well as planning more generally. It had come to power with a bold vision to reform the Victorian planning system, which had only recently been reformed under the Cain Government through the *Planning and Environment Act 1987*. Prior to the 1992 Victorian state election, the Liberal Party had identified the planning system as a key component to generating new and much needed economic activity in the state (Victorian Liberal Party, 1992). As such, it decided that the planning system needed reform to create both an efficient and liveable city. This would, in turn, help attract industry, investment and development to Melbourne, a cornerstone of the Liberal agenda for economic recovery. Initial action to again reform the system came quickly. Just one month after its election victory, the newly appointed Minister for Planning, Robert Maclellan, a former public servant and teacher, appointed a committee chaired by Les Perrott, an architect and planner, as well as four other private consultant planners, to examine the planning system and propose changes to reposition to facilitate economic development through urban development (Buxton et al., 2016). This increased emphasis on the importance of development was further strengthened when the DPH was restructured as the Department of Planning and Development (DPD) in 1993.

The Perrott Committee, as it became known, published its findings and recommendations for a new planning system in August 1993 (DPD, 1993a). The Committee found that the planning system had grown needlessly complex. It reported that there were two-hundred and six separate local planning schemes in operation across the state, which contained a total of 2,871 individual land-use zones – 150 residential and 250 commercial and industrial – over their collective 26,272 pages (DPD, 1993a).

Moreover, these two-hundred and six schemes had been amended 4,871 times since their introduction in February 1988. The Committee used these figures to argue that the current planning system was ‘an impediment to development’ (DPD, 1993a: 2). However, several academic commentators have questioned the validity of these figures, arguing that the Perrott Committee simply totalled the gross number of land-use zones in operation across the state, ignoring the widespread prevalence of identical or very similar zones caused by the transposition of the MMPS zones into the local planning schemes (Buxton and Tieman, 1997; Buxton, Goodman and Budge, 2005). Regardless, the Perrott Committee used these figures to devise their final recommendations for a new planning system based on the concept of a state-wide planning scheme, standardised planning controls and more as-of-right development (DPD, 1993a).

Minister Maclellan responded to the Perrott Committee’s findings and recommendations in the release of a ministerial statement, *Planning a Better Future for Victorians* (Maclellan, 1993). In it, he pledged that the Kennett Government would make a number of changes to the planning system, including reducing the overall number of land-use zones, changing zones to allow uses as of right and allowing discretion in the approval of planning permits that did not meet every requirement. These changes were reported as designed ‘to cut through the red tape for developers’, which were estimated to be adding \$7,500 to the cost of each new dwelling (Elias, 1993a: np). Importantly, amongst these changes was a push to involve local governments in strategic planning. The Kennett Government wanted to give councils more autonomy to set population targets and create strategic plans to help manage this growth (Maclellan, 1993). As Elias noted, ‘councils will then be able to indicate how to distribute the various planning zones within their municipal areas’ (1993b: np). These changes indicate that the Kennett Government wanted to provide greater certainty regarding development and also further solidify the localisation of its provision. However, they were never delivered as originally promised. The Kennett Government instead opted for a significant reform of the entire statutory planning system. This began in November 1993 with creation of the *Victorian Code for Residential Development – Multi-dwellings* (DPD, 1993b), known as *VicCode 2*. The document developed design guidelines for multi-dwelling residential development, much like *VicCode 1* had done for single dwellings and subdivisions. These guidelines were ‘incorporated into the then State section of planning schemes in 1993’ (Eccles and Bryant, 2011: 72). Statutory planners were required to assess planning permit applications against

either *VicCode 1* or 2. However, the most significant of these reforms occurred from 1995 onwards (discussed below).

In his ministerial statement, Maclellan also signalled that the Kennett Government would begin work on a sixth metropolitan planning document for Melbourne. This process began in June 1994 with the release of a 63-page discussion paper, entitled *Melbourne Metropolitan Strategy: A Discussion Paper*. The document, which was produced by the Public Affairs Branch of the DPD, was intended to elicit comment on the creation of a ‘corporate strategy’ that would ‘establish a framework for Melbourne’s growth and prosperity over the next 10 to 20 years’ (DPD, 1994: 1). The term ‘corporate’ was added to indicate a new strategic approach involving government-wide integration of policies and projects for the development of Melbourne, rather than just physical planning. A new document was necessary, according to the authors, ‘because the 1987 metropolitan policy, *Shaping Melbourne’s Future*, is now out of date and does not reflect the current Government’s intentions and priorities’ (DPD, 1994: 1-2). The discussion paper discussed six interrelated issues – comparative advantages, liveability, transport, infrastructure, the use and conservation of resources, and urban management (DPD, 1994: 17-57) – and four strategic principles – sustainable metropolitan environment, technical and technological efficiency, international centre of employment, research and education, and the image of the city (DPD, 1994: 58-60). These would form the basis of the future plan, making it clear that the Kennett Government intended the new metropolitan planning document to prioritise the use of planning to facilitate economic competitiveness and development.

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Figure 7.3: Front cover of *Living Suburbs* (DPD, 1995a).

In December 1995, after a year-and-a-half-long process, the DPD finally released its metropolitan plan for Melbourne, *Living Suburbs: A Policy for Metropolitan Melbourne into the 21st Century*. While it was referred to as both a policy and a strategy, it is here called a strategy. It was just the second such strategy created by a Victorian state government. The physical appearance of the document should firstly be noted. It was slick document containing dozens of glossy, aspirational photographs, which was no doubt a result of its production by the Public Affairs Branch of the DPD. Appearance aside, the strategy was designed to perform two key functions across its 72-pages: detail the Kennett government's 'policy for Melbourne's future', which complimented both its capital city and regional Victoria policies; and provide 'a framework for future development' (DPD, 1995a: 2).

In terms of its first function, the strategy began by providing a clear vision for metropolitan Melbourne, something missing from its immediate predecessor. This was underpinned by five strategic directions.

Implementation of *Living Suburbs* will enable Melbourne to grow into the 21st century as a metropolis of international standing whose prosperity is based on its livability; the knowledge, skills and creativity of its citizens; the strength of its relationship with regional Victoria; the quality of its environment; the sophistication of its economy; and its positive climate for business (DPD, 1995a: 4).

The strategy next outlined its ‘foundations of the future’ (DPD, 1995a: 5). This was part overview of the present, part goals for the future. Economic concerns seemed to dominate this section. Only one-and-a-half pages were dedicated to the goal of the future urban growth of the metropolis. With respect to this growth, the authors devised ‘five basic spatial objectives’ (DPD, 1995a: 10), which were very similar to that of its predecessor. The objectives, ‘multi-functional activity centres serving local and regional needs should be developed at key transport nodes around the suburbs’ and that ‘the central city should continue to be a prime focus for commercial, retail, cultural and entertainment activity’ (DPD, 1995a: 10), reaffirmed the activity centre approach developed in the 1954 plan and refined in the 1980-81 plan and 1987 strategy. The objectives, ‘optimum use should be made of existing urban land and land already set aside for growth’ and ‘Melburnians should continue to have ready access to green spaces and non-urban land offering recreational and related opportunities’ (DPD, 1995a: 10), reaffirmed the growth corridor and urban consolidation approaches introduced in the 1971 and 1980-81 plans and refined thereafter. However, it is important to note that there was no mention of green wedges anywhere in the strategy. The final objective, that ‘land-use planning should recognise and, where appropriate, respond to the needs of business’ (DPD, 1995a: 10), was a new approach devised by the Kennett Government. These spatial objectives would reappear later in the document as policies. Unfortunately, no map was provided to accompany this proposed future urban growth pattern. Indeed, it was the first metropolitan planning document not to include anywhere in the document a map showing the pattern of future metropolitan development expected.

As mentioned above, five strategic directions underpinned the vision: ‘provide a business environment conducive to sustainable long-term economic growth’; ‘build on Melbourne’s strengths as an international transport, production and communications hub’; ‘strengthen links between Melbourne and regional Victoria to increase the competitiveness of the Victorian economy as a whole’; ‘enhance Melbourne’s environment and liveability’; and ‘create a more functional city by better managing Melbourne’s infrastructure and urban development’ (DPD, 1995a: 15, 25, 32, 38, 53). The bulk of the strategy was spent detailing these directions, as well as the policies and actions designed to achieve them and the vision. As the authors noted, ‘each of [the directions] sets the parameters for detailed policies and actions to be implemented in partnership with the Commonwealth, local government, the private sector and the general community’ (DPD, 1995a: 14). It is important to note that only the latter two directions were relevant to urban development. The first three focused primarily on larger considerations important to the economic success of the city. In total, twenty-six separate policies were presented across the five strategic directions. However, like the directions, most of these were economic in nature. Most relevant to future urban development were the policies to ‘encourage the efficient use of land and infrastructure and increased housing choice’, encourage ‘redevelopment in [inner city and the older middle suburb] areas with underused infrastructure capacity’ and integrate ‘land development with transport systems, particularly at major transport nodes and activity clusters’ (see Figure 7.4 for location of these clusters) (DPD, 1995a: 60, 67). Together, these three policies reaffirmed the spatial objectives of the strategy mentioned above.

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Figure 7.4: *Living Suburbs* – Major Activity Clusters (DPD, 1995a: 68)

In terms of its other function, the strategy presented, as mentioned above, achievable actions for most of the policies. In total, one-hundred and twenty-three actions were identified. However, this was well short of the framework for development the strategy was said to perform. Too numerous to examine in detail, these actions varied between policies. However, all were presented in a vague, non-committal manner. Words such as ‘encourage’ and ‘promote’ typified the actions, a far cry from the strong language present in the 1954 plan. Importantly, unlike its predecessor, none of the actions were related to statutory planning. This was not really surprising given that a significant restructuring of the entire statutory planning system was right around the corner. However, like its predecessor, the actions lacked detail on how they were to be implemented even though the final three pages of the strategy were dedicated to the strategy’s implementation. With respect to this implementation section, the authors noted that

the State Government will have primary responsibility for ensuring that the policy is implemented... the Department of Premier and Cabinet will take responsibility for overall coordination through departmental business planning processes, with line agencies being responsible for particular measures. The Departments of Planning and Development and Treasury and Finance will have a significant role in this process (DPD, 1995a: 70).

Unfortunately, no further detail on this departmental involvement was forthcoming. Instead, the authors provided detail on the responsibility of local governments to implement the strategy. It was their intention that councils would be required to conduct strategic planning in accordance with the strategy. 'The policy will also guide regional and local strategic planning. Councils will continue to be responsible for planning at the local level; they will also be responsible for preparing detailed strategies within the framework established by this document' (DPD, 1995a: 70). To these ends, the authors listed seven concerns that councils had to address, 'sub-metropolitan strategies' to help achieve the metropolitan plan (DPD, 1995a: 70). Finally, and quite interestingly, the strategy also included a monitoring and review process, which involved annual minor reviews and a major review every five years.

Problem

As to the genealogical principle of the problem, *Living Suburbs* joined the 1929 plan and the 1987 strategy as the only metropolitan planning documents for Melbourne up until that point not to provide certainty. The strategy, like these other documents, did not use planning controls to achieve its vision. This was simply because it could not use them. Statutory planning in Victoria had been localised under the *Planning and Environment Act 1987*, which came into effect the next year. The MMPS was once-and-for-all replaced by the second iteration of local planning schemes. The State Government could not make changes to these schemes. As such, its metropolitan strategies could not use planning controls and, thus, could not provide certainty. Rather, the strategy, like the 1987 strategy, relied on a range of actions to achieve its vision. Most notably, it relied on councils integrating the plan in their 'sub-metropolitan strategies' (DPD, 1995a: 70) and prescribing its requirements in their local planning

schemes. It was within these local strategies and related planning schemes that certainty for and from development could be found.

Discourse

As to the genealogical principle of discourse, the term certainty appeared just once in *Living Suburbs*. It was used in reference to the provision of services in growth areas: 'Recently enacted legislation governing developer contributions provides for greater consistency and certainty in this area' (DPD, 1995a: 62). In this case, the term did not, however, refer to the notion that planning should provide assurance with respect to the development of property. As such, it is necessary to instead examine the discourse around this notion. The discourse of stabilising property values, which underpinned the 1929 strategy, was absent from the strategy. The discourse of improving the efficiency of the city, which underpinned the 1954 plan, however, was present. The term efficiency was used on ten separate occasions. However, it was used in reference to improving the efficiency of service delivery, rather than improving the efficiency of the city proper. The discourses of growth and conservation, which underpinned the 1971 plan, were present. The term growth was used on 49 separate occasions, while the term conservation was used on just six occasions. The term growth, however, was used in reference to economic growth, rather than assurances of where urban development was allowed or prohibited.

The discourse of development, which underpinned the 1987 strategy, featured heavily in the strategy, albeit not quite to the same extent. The term appeared in the plan on more than 100 separate occasions. It even featured in the plan's fifth strategic direction to 'Create a more functional city by better managing Melbourne's infrastructure and development' (DPD, 1995a: 53). The strategy used the discourse of development in much the same way as its predecessor. It was used primarily in reference to the physical development of the city. This is probably best exemplified with respect to the purpose of the strategy. The strategy sought to outline 'a framework for integrated metropolitan development into the 21st century' (DPD, 1995a: 5). In other words, the strategy sought to establish a framework that would enable the future physical development of Melbourne. This was the very notion of certainty: providing an assurance with respect to the development of property. As with its predecessor, the use of this discourse was hardly surprising. The Victorian economy was struggling and it was believed that

facilitating physical development would increase economic activity. What is again surprising was that in discussing the need for development, the term certainty was not used. Up until this point only the 1980-81 plan made use of the discourse around certainty. Interestingly, the strategy did introduce discourse around investments. However, the term investment was used only in relation to public investments in infrastructure and services in order to attract private capital investment into the state. It was not used in reference to investment in property. This situation can possibly be explained by the changing nature of the planning system. Planning Minister Maclellan wanted to change the system to allow more discretion in the decision of planning permit applications. Moreover, the Kennett Government wanted to give local governments more power in terms of strategic planning. Perhaps it knew that metropolitan planning could no longer provide certainty, and thus the term was not used. In this respect, the strategy is similar to its predecessor. It wanted to facilitate physical development but could not provide guarantees for that development.

Power

The genealogical principle of power explains both the development of *Living Suburbs* and the planning system more generally during this period, especially with respect to the provision of certainty. This section explores the ways in which decision-making power was exerted in all three developmental stages of the strategy: conception, contents and outcomes.

Conception

As mentioned above, it was the Minister for Planning, Robert Maclellan, who conceived of the new metropolitan strategy. Minister Maclellan exerted decision-making power by releasing a ministerial statement, *Planning a Better Future for Victorians* (Maclellan, 1993), based on the findings and recommendations of the appointed Perrott Committee, a group of highly partial, pro-development individuals, which committed to updating the metropolitan strategy (Sposito, 2003).

Contents

An increased government presence made the decision-making power structures behind the strategy more complex than its predecessor. The Kennett Government took an active role in the creation of the strategy, which was understandable given that the strategy was government-conceived. This active role firstly included outlining the future urban form directive – another rehash of the existing balance between urban consolidation in activity centres and urban fringe development – that the new metropolitan strategy was to take (Maclellan, 1993). Interestingly, this directive was based on the recommendations of the Perrott Committee Report published not long before, suggesting that the Committee itself wielded significant power. The Government next established the Strategic Reviews Group (SRG) within the DPD, which was tasked with preparing the new strategy. According to Victor Sposito (2003), who was again charged with developing the plan, the SGR was allocated the resources for just eight planners and initially none for engaging private consultants.

The SRG itself was able to exert some decision-making power by successfully convincing the Government of the need for a corporate strategy approach to the new metropolitan strategy and for the need for additional resources to engage private consultants to develop background analyses. This corporate strategy involved a government-wide integration of policies and projects for the development of Melbourne, rather than just physical planning (Sposito, 2003). Yet, unlike its predecessor, the Government reduced this power by establishing four more groups to assist in the production of the strategy: an Interdepartmental Co-ordination Group, containing representatives from government departments, public agencies and public utilities; a Melbourne Metropolitan Strategy Working Group, containing similar representatives; a Reference Group, containing representatives from related professional organisations, including the then-Royal Australian Planning Institute, the Victorian Planning and Environment Law Association, and interest groups, including the UDIA and the then-Building Owners and Managers Association; and a Ministerial Steering Committee containing the Ministers for Planning, Transport, Conservation and Environment, Natural Resources, and Roads and Ports (DPD, 1994; Sposito, 2003). No real indication was given as to the level of influence, if any, these group members had on the strategy. However, several key elements of the plan, such as a continuation of balanced future urban form and, as will be shown below, its public relations spin, suggests little influence from these groups. The Government also allowed for very limited public consultation, which was not reflected in the strategy (Sposito, 2003).

However, the clearest exertions of decision-making power by the Government occurred just prior to the publication of the strategy. According to Sposito (2003), the Strategic Reviews Group completed a draft of the strategy in July 1995. The Ministerial Steering Committee initially approved of the draft strategy, which differed from the final version in terms of strategic directions and actions. However, the cabinet refused to endorse the draft, claiming that the policies and actions to implement the strategy were unfunded (Sposito, 2003). According to Sposito (2003), Minister Maclellan informed the SGR Group that ‘the hand of the Premier’ would rewrite the strategy and it was relieved of its duties. This rewrite involved, for political reasons, renaming the document *Living Suburbs* and replacing detail with colourful photographs (Sposito, 2003). The Public Affairs Branch of the DPD was responsible for the production of the final strategy (DPD, 1995a), giving further weight to the argument that the strategy became a public relations document devoid of detail (Sposito, 2003). Cabinet exercised its decision-making power by eventually approving the rewritten strategy, making it the official metropolitan strategy of the Kennett Government.

Outcomes

Like its predecessor, most of the outcomes of the strategy resulted from the exertion of decision-making power. The nature of the strategy meant that its implementation on the whole did not require much exertion of decision-making power. It was the Kennett Government that, through the DPD, formulated the strategy. As such, there was no need for it to be submitted for approval by the Government. Moreover, the strategy did not make use of statutory mechanisms meaning there was no need for it to be submitted for public comment or for it to be gazetted. The State Government’s primary implementation obligation was to undertake the measures it set for itself in the strategy. The only exception was the exertion of decision-making power in requiring other organisations to implement specific measures, most notably for councils to integrate the strategy into their sub-metropolitan strategies and, thus, local planning schemes.

However, decision-making power was exerted parallel to and following the creation of the strategy plan. In July 1995, several months before the release of the strategy, the DPD released and

incorporated into all Victorian planning schemes *The Good Design Guidelines for Medium-Density Housing* (DPD, 1995b). This document replaced *VicCode 2* with updated design guidelines for multi-dwelling residential development. It gave developers a clearer insight into site-responsive design that would satisfy their planning requirements. Although the guidelines were largely discretionary, it provided developers with a greater level of certainty with respect to development. The following year, the Kennett Government restructured the DPD as the Department of Infrastructure (DI). However, a more significant change was in the works.

In December 1996, the Kennett Government passed the *Planning and Environment (Planning Schemes) Act 1996*. The legislation amended the principal act to reform the structure of planning schemes by standardising them into the present-day form, a third iteration of local planning schemes. To achieve this standardisation, the legislation inserted into the *Planning and Environment Act 1987* the Victoria Planning Provisions (VPPs). The VPPs were a source document, separate to the Act, which specified the exact form and contents for all third iteration-planning schemes. According to the legislation, this document could take the form of either ministerial directions or guidelines. The Minister for Planning, Robert Maclellan, opted for the former, releasing the ministerial direction, *The Form and Content of Planning Schemes* (Maclellan, 1996). As Buxton et al. (2016: 33-34) notes, the Kennett Government ‘provided six objectives for the VPPS: to facilitate development, reduce local variation, improve strategic planning, reduce the size and complexity of planning schemes, provide greater certainty and make planning schemes more efficient and less costly to administer’. These objectives were consistent with the final recommendations of the Perrot Committee to improve the efficiency of the Victorian planning system (DPD, 1993a).

The legislation required that all Victorian councils prepare a new planning scheme for their municipality in line with this VPPs source document. In terms of form, the ministerial direction specified that each planning scheme was to comprise three parts: maps; an ordinance, often referred to as the planning scheme; and any incorporated documents. Moreover, it specified that each scheme was to comprise 11 sections (see Figure 7.5 for a diagram of the new schemes). Several sections are worthy of note: the State Planning Policy Framework (SPPF), which included planning policies relating to issues of state, including metropolitan, significance; the Local Planning Policy Framework (LPPF),

which included a Metropolitan Strategic Statement (MSS) outlining council strategies and how they are to be implemented through local planning policies; zones and their schedules; overlays and their schedules; particular provisions and their schedules for anything not covered by the zones or overlays; general provisions and their schedules for the administration of the scheme; and incorporated documents and their schedules (Eccles and Bryant, 2011; Buxton et al., 2016). In terms of contents, the direction also included a suite of 25 zones, 22 overlays, 31 particular provisions, 31 general provisions and 29 incorporated documents, all complete with their own schedules, which could be in the preparation of the new schemes (Maclellan, 1996). Councils could only apply these provisions to their new schemes. As such, their individual involvement in the creation of planning schemes was reduced to the selection of provisions and the creation of that which fell under the LPPF. It is also important to note that these provisions, in particular zoning, were primarily discretionary in nature. ‘Many zones allow a large number of uses and developments to be considered and contain a small number of prohibited uses’ (Buxton et al., 2003: 8). This was also consistent with the recommendations of the Perrot Committee (DPD, 1993a). The first batch of these third iteration-planning schemes was gazetted in late-1998 (Eccles and Bryant, 2011).

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Figure 7.5: Third Iteration Planning Scheme Structure (DELWP, 2017b)

It was around the late-1990s that planning became a contested political issue in Victoria. As Buxton et al. (2016: 35) show, the ‘state was witnessing a development boom’. The above move towards a more discretionary planning system, as well as changes to allow more ministerial intervention with respect to planning permit applications and amendments to planning schemes, led to an increase in medium-density development across Melbourne’s established residential areas (Lewis, 1999: Buxton et al., 2016). Understandably, backlash to this development soon emerged. A number of community-turned-lobby groups were established in opposition to medium-density development, such as Save Our Suburbs (Lewis, 1999). Moreover, the Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA), a professional association established in Victoria in 1914, re-emerged as a powerful force. The TCPA rallied planners and a concerned public to participate in a Planning Crisis Conference in June 1996, which resulted in the development of a *Charter for Planning* for the Minister for Planning (Lewis, 1999: Buxton et al., 2016). Interestingly, though planning became more and more a political issue, it was said to be the Kennett Government’s preoccupation with Melbourne and neglect of the rest of the state that was its

ultimate downfall (Murray, 2007). The Liberal-National Coalition was narrowly defeated, with the help of three rural independents, at the 1999 state election. This ushered in a Steve Bracks-led Labor Government. However, as will be shown, it did not usher in a new direction for metropolitan planning in Melbourne.

Discontinuity

Living Suburbs offered more continuity with its predecessor than any two Melbourne metropolitan planning documents before it. Most importantly, it continued the metropolitan planning response established in the 1987 strategy. *Living Suburbs* was, like its predecessor, a strategy rather than a plan. It aimed to provide strategic direction for the future growth of Melbourne that councils would integrate into local planning schemes. In doing so, it continued the *episteme* with respect to the provision of certainty established in the 1987 strategy. Certainty was provided at the local level in local planning schemes. It also continued the previous strategy's desire to locate future development within Melbourne's established residential areas and growth corridors. In doing so, the strategy continued to focus on facilitating development, adding to it the idea of attracting investment. Interestingly, the strategy did not provide a map, conceptual or otherwise, to illustrate the preferred growth locations. Moreover, importantly, the strategy continued the politicisation of metropolitan planning. The Victorian State Government through the DPD created the strategy. The strategy also continued the idea of co-ordinating responses to achieve a future urban form. It provided a list of government actions to be undertaken to achieve its vision. The only significant biggest discontinuities were its physical appearance – the Public Affairs Branch carefully crafted the strategy to appear like a public relations document, complete with glossy, aspirational photographs – and the removal of environmental issues.

7.6 Historical analysis: late-1990s – late-2000s

Regarding the genealogical principle of history, the period from the late-1990s to the late-2000s was somewhat of a reversal of the previous period. It began with economic prosperity in the national and Victorian state economies and finished in a state of economic unease. However, politically, it was much the same as its predecessor. There were long-serving governments at both the Commonwealth

and state levels. It was in the midst of this that a seventh metropolitan planning document for Melbourne was born.

The continued Commonwealth experience

The prosperity of the Australian economy carried over into the late-1990s (Butlin et al., 2015). In the 20 years from 1992, the Australian economy grew at an average rate of 3.5 per cent per annum (Keating, 2015). While the exact cause of such growth remains disputed, a number of factors are accepted as having partly contributed to the growth: the microeconomic reforms of the Hawke, Keating and Howard Governments; the transition to a service-based economy; and an increased demand for resources, including oil, gas, coal, iron ore, gold and other minerals (Goot, 2013; Butlin et al., 2015; Keating, 2015; Keneley, 2015). In any case, the prosperity quickly brought the federal budget back into surplus. Using the strength of the Australian economy and the low unemployment rate, the incumbent Howard Government was able to position itself as the better steward of the economy (Goot, 2013; Keating, 2015). This resonated well with the public and the Howard Government was comfortably returned at the 1998 federal election (Goot, 2013). In 2000, Howard furthered his Government's neoliberal economic reforms with the introduction of a goods and services tax, an unpopular policy. Regardless, Howard's strong leadership, especially on matters of border protection and economic management, helped him secure a third and fourth term at the 2001 and 2004 federal elections (Goot, 2013). The 2004 triumph gave the Coalition a majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, essentially allowing it to pass whatever legislation it desired. In 2006, the Howard Government used its majority to further deregulate the labour market, through amendments known as WorkChoices to the *Workplace Relations Act 1996*. However, this move ultimately backfired, as WorkChoices became a hot election issue (Goot, 2013). The Kevin Rudd-led Labor Party was able to seize upon this, as well as voter fatigue over a four-term government, to deliver the Coalition a comprehensive defeat at the 2007 election which saw Howard become just the second sitting prime minister to lose his seat (Goot, 2013).

The Rudd Government made some immediate strides, including abolishing the Howard Government's WorkChoices policy and working towards setting up a carbon emissions trading scheme. Unfortunately

for Rudd, he came to power just as the global financial crisis hit (Goot, 2013). The subprime mortgage bubble in the US led to a banking crisis, which pushed much of the world's economies into recession (Keating, 2015). Australia was the only developed nation to narrowly avoid economic recession, attributed to a combination of the continued demand from China for Australian resources and a controversial series of economic stimulus packages by the Rudd Government which sent the federal budget into deficit (Goot, 2013; Keating, 2015). However, GDP growth slowed to between one and two per cent (Butlin et al., 2015). Interestingly, the response of the Rudd Government, which included national building infrastructure projects such as the National Broadband Network and Building the Education Revolution, was a reversion from neoliberal economic principles to state welfare liberalism principles (Goot 2013). Rudd intervened and spent to avoid economic recession. As the nation approached the turn of the decade, the state of the economy remained in positive growth, albeit if only slightly (Butlin et al., 2015). The state of the economy and the federal budget, combined with a number of scandals, saw Rudd's popularity dwindle within his own party and the electorate (Goot, 2013). The period ended with the deputy leader, Julia Gillard, successfully challenging Rudd for the Labor leadership. On 24 June 2010, Gillard replaced Rudd, becoming the nation's first female Prime Minister (Goot, 2013).

The continued Victorian state experience

In Victoria, the period began with a change of government. With the support of three rural independents, the Bracks Labor Party narrowly defeated the incumbent Kennett Coalition (Murray, 2007). Despite inheriting from Kennett a favourable economic position – the Victorian economy was growing steadily and the state coffers were overflowing – the precarious nature of its election win meant the Bracks Government pursued little significant change during its first term (Blainey, 2013). Its comprehensive victories at the 2002 and 2006 Victorian state elections, however, changed that. Throughout its second and third terms, the Bracks Government embarked on a number of projects. These included infrastructure building, such as the drought-busting desalination plant and the EastLink tollway, and reforming the voting system for the Legislative Council, the upper house of the Victorian parliament (Blainey, 2013). The strong state of the Victorian economy and the budget position made, in particular, the infrastructure projects, possible. In July 2007, Bracks resigned as Premier, allowing John

Brumby, the Treasurer, to assume the top position. Similar to Rudd, Brumby gained power at an inopportune time. Victoria was not immune to the economic slowdown caused by the global financial crisis. However, throughout the rest of the decade, economic growth remained positive, unemployment remained low, the budget remained in surplus and the state kept its triple-A credit rating (DTF, 2009). The period came to an end with the narrow defeat of Labor at the 2010 election by the Ted Baillieu-led Coalition, which campaigned well against Labor's spending, amongst other issues (Blainey, 2013).

7.7 Melbourne 2030 (2002 Strategy)

While the 1999 state election result took many by surprise, the Labor Party was somewhat prepared, having developed policies to take to the electorate. Its policy on the issue of planning, which critic Paul Mees describes as 'thin' (2003: 288), was highly critical of the planning system established under Kennett (ALP, 1999). In it, Labor argued that the market-led system provided 'less certainty for all stakeholders and increased delays and costs for residents, councils and developers' (ALP, 1999: 1) and was 'at the core of Victoria's planning crisis' highlighted earlier (ALP, 1999: 5). Attempting to allay the concerns of disgruntled residents, Labor pledged to review the VPPS, which had now been in operation for over a year, if it won office. Moreover, in terms of metropolitan planning, Labor pledged that 'Metropolitan and regional development strategies will be prepared and integrated with a whole of government approach to planning. Land use planning will be tied to transport, environmental, social and economic planning' (ALP, 1999: 10). Upon successfully negotiating to form a minority government, the Bracks administration made some immediate strides in planning. Amongst these was the appointment of John Thwaites, a former barrister, as Minister for Planning (Murray, 2007). One of Minister Thwaites' first acts was to release a statement, *State Planning Agenda: A Sensible Balance – Certainty, Consistency, Sustainability, Community* (1999). In it, he argued that the balance of the planning system had tipped in the favour of developers at the expense of residents. As such, he pledged the Government would help achieve a better balance between the needs of both sides. This involved a commitment to the preparation of a new metropolitan strategy.

The Bracks Government, through the DI, began work on the seventh metropolitan planning document for Melbourne shortly before the turn of the millennium. This involved an extensive development

process that lasted nearly three years (see Appendix G). Over this period, a total of 12 technical reports into various metropolitan planning issues were produced (DI, 2002a). These reports, which were created by both government departments and outside consultants, and comprised more than 1,200 collective pages, formed the background data on which the new strategy was based. This was by far the most background work put into any metropolitan planning document for Melbourne to date. Moreover, a significant amount of public engagement was undertaken. Firstly, an issues paper, *Challenge Melbourne* (DI, 2000), was produced for comment. The paper explored a number of options for accommodating Melbourne's future growth. Next, two rounds of public consultation were undertaken. This involved a number of public forums, workshops and targeted interviews with a range of participants, including 'representatives of local government and of special interest groups, including youth, women, the elderly, and the development and investment communities' (DI, 2002a: 16). In addition, the public were able to make online submissions, a first for Melbourne metropolitan planning. According to the DI, 'more than 5,500 people came to a forum or workshop, or made a submission or contacted the website' (2002a: 18). From this, the DI was able to formulate a draft and, after further consultation with a 'separate group of peer reviewers, expert in planning and related fields' (DI, 2002a: 16), a final version of the strategy was produced. It is important to note towards the end of this process, Mary Delahunty, a former award-winning journalist, replaced John Thwaites as Minister for Planning, who relinquished the position to concentrate on the Health portfolio (Murray, 2007).

Meanwhile, the Bracks Government also attempted to rebalance the planning system with a significant shakeup of the existing residential design standards. As mentioned above, design standards for low-density residential development and subdivisions were stipulated under the Kirner government's *VicCode 1* (DPH, 1992a) and standards for medium-density development were covered under the Kennett government's *The Good Design Guidelines for Medium-Density Housing* (DPD, 1995b). Both had been incorporated into all subsequent Victorian planning schemes and needed to be given consideration when assessing planning permit applications. In August 2001, the DI did away with these by introducing a new set of residential development standards, known commonly as *ResCode*, into the particular provisions sections of all Victorian planning schemes (Eccles and Bryant, 2011). *ResCode* followed the AMCORD *Good Design Guideline* structure. It required responsible authorities to assess residential subdivision, residential development of one dwelling or residential development of two or

more dwellings against ‘a performance-based code dealing with elements such as privacy, overlooking and overshadowing, on-site open space, building envelope, site density, site layout landscaping, dwelling entry, and neighbourhood character’ (Eccles and Bryant, 2011: 72). Interestingly, *ResCode* placed an increased importance on this last element. Consistency with existing neighbourhood character was ‘the starting point for assessing all residential development applications’ (DELWP, 2017c: np). These changes can be seen as a deliberate attempt to appease those concerned about the perceived planning crisis in medium-density development in Melbourne’s established residential areas.

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Figure 7.6: Front cover of *Melbourne 2030* (DI, 2002a)

The DI finally released its metropolitan planning document, aptly referred to as a strategy, for the city, *Melbourne 2030: Planning for Sustainable Growth*, in October 2002, approximately 18 months behind schedule (Mees, 2003). It was the third such strategy created by a state government and not an

independent body. The metropolitan strategy was composed of three elements: a 192-page strategy document, hereafter referred to as the strategy; six implementation reports for specific planning issues, which totalled a combined 189 pages; and a 53-page advisory note on how it was to be integrated into the planning system. In terms of its physical appearance, the strategy raised the stakes set by its predecessor. The strategy document, in particular, was very colourful. Nearly every page contained numerous photographs of, as Mees (2003: 289) aptly describes, ‘smiling families, historic buildings and other ‘feel-good’ subjects’. Those pages that did not contain photographs featured either maps or graphs. Appearance aside, its purpose was similar to that of the 1987 strategy. The strategy aimed simply to ‘manage growth and change across metropolitan Melbourne and the surrounding region’ (DI, 2002a: 1).

In terms of its contents, the main elements of the strategy followed a familiar hierarchical format. It was comprised of an overarching vision for the city, seven underlying principles on which this vision was based and nine key directions to achieve the vision. The authors referred to this as the ‘strategic framework’ of the plan (DI, 2002a: 27). Moreover, it included 50 policies to achieve these key directions and 226 initiatives to achieve these policies. However, the strategy did not begin with the vision. It began by providing a brief summary of its main elements. Next, it outlined ‘the basis for *Melbourne 2030*’ (DI, 2002a: 11) and ‘the scope of *Melbourne 2030*’ (DI, 2002a: 19). The most important aspect to come out of this background section was an articulation of the need to adequately plan for population growth and thus urban growth. The authors presented population and household growth figures over the 30 years to 2031, which predicted that Melbourne’s population could grow by ‘up to one million additional people, or 620,000 new households’, the ‘equivalent to adding a city the size of Adelaide’ (DI, 2002a: 14). The authors noted that if this growth were to occur without a plan, it had the potential to cause a range of problems, including those affecting housing, infrastructure and the environment.

The strategy next outlined the strategic framework mentioned above. It began by presenting a vision for the city. ‘In the next 30 years, Melbourne will grow by up to one million people and will consolidate its reputation as one of the most liveable, attractive and prosperous areas in the world for residents, business and visitors’ (DI, 2002a: 28). Interesting, the terms ‘prosperous’ and ‘liveability’

made a return appearance. The vision was based on seven underlying principles: sustainability; innovation, adaptability; inclusiveness; equity; leadership; and partnership. It is important to note that the first principle was that of sustainability. This marked the first appearance of environmental sustainability in Melbourne metropolitan planning. Moreover, it is also important to note that one of the principles was adaptability. The authors wrote that ‘the Government is determined to plan for change and to be adaptable when faced with the unexpected’ (DI, 2002a: 29). They wanted the strategy to be able to deal with uncertainties that may arise during its implementation. However, the ability to actually achieve this adaptability was severely compromised (see Wilkinson, 2011). The strategy also detailed nine key directions to achieve the vision: a more compact city; better management of metropolitan growth; networks with regional cities; a more prosperous city; a great place to be; a fairer city; a greener city; better transport links; and better planning decisions, careful management (DI, 2002a). It is important to note that economic growth was downplayed in *Melbourne 2030* – most likely due to the relatively prosperous times in which it was created. The most relevant of these directions to the future growth of Melbourne and the provision of certainty were the first, second, fifth and ninth. It is these four directions that will be explored further.

With respect to the future growth of the city, the strategy did not significantly differ from its predecessors. The first key direction – a more compact city – called for urban consolidation through a continuation of Melbourne’s activity centre approach to urban growth. The authors wrote that the strategy ‘encourages concentration of new development at activity centres near current infrastructure, in areas best able to cope with that change while meeting the objective of sustainable development’ (DI, 2002a: 30). Three policies were provided to achieve this key direction. The most important of these policies was to ‘build up activity centres as a focus for high-quality development, activity and living for the whole community’ (DI, 2002a: 46). The policy classified and designated activity centres into five types: the Central Activities District, of which there was only the Melbourne CBD area; Principal Activity Centres, of which there twenty-five; Major Activity Centres, of which there were eighty; Specialised Activity Centres, of which there were ten; and Neighbourhood Activity Centres, which were to be designated by local councils (see Figure 7.7).

Relatedly, the second key direction – better management of metropolitan growth – also called for urban consolidation but this time through a continuation of Melbourne’s corridor-green wedge approach to urban growth. Four policies were provided to achieve this direction. The first policy was to ‘establish an urban growth boundary (UGB) to set clear limits to metropolitan Melbourne’s outward development’ (DI, 2002a: 60). This groundbreaking policy prohibited urban development outside this boundary, thereby limiting urban sprawl (see Figure 7.7). Policies were also included to ‘concentrate urban expansion into growth areas that are served by high-capacity public transport’ (DI, 2002a: 63) and ‘protect the green wedges of metropolitan Melbourne from inappropriate development’ (DI, 2002a: 66). The intended move towards further urban consolidation can also be seen in the strategy’s projections for the dispersal of future residential development. The authors proposed that 31 per cent of new residential development would be located in urban growth areas – down from 38 per cent; 41 per cent in activity centres and strategic redevelopment sites – well up from 24 per cent; and 28 per cent in established residential areas – down from 38 per cent (DI, 2002a: 30). A concept map was provided near the beginning of the document to illustrate the overall pattern of the future growth that metropolitan Melbourne sought (see Figure 7.7).

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Figure 7.7: *Melbourne 2030* – Strategy Elements Concept Map (DI, 2002a: 6-7)

The strategy also attempted to provide greater assurance with respect to the development of property. The fifth key direction – a great place to be – called for excellence in urban development. This can be seen as a deliberate attempt to appease property owners in established residential areas concerned about the prospect of poor, inappropriate development nearby. While nine policies were provided to achieve this key direction, the first two, ‘promote good urban design to make the environment more liveable and attractive’ (DI, 2002a: 92) and ‘recognise and protect cultural identity, neighbourhood character and a sense of place’ (DI, 2002a: 95), were most significant to this respect. The authors wanted to ensure that development and redevelopment in metropolitan Melbourne respected ‘heritage values and built form that has resonance for the community’ and ‘the values, needs and aspirations of the community’, in order to ‘ensure protection of existing valued urban and neighbourhood character’. The proposed 28 per cent of new residential development that was to occur in establishing residential areas would need to be respectful to existing property owners.

Somewhat relatedly, the ninth and final key direction – better planning decisions, careful management – called for improvements to the planning system. However, unlike the previous direction, which was of benefit to existing property owners, this direction was of benefit to developers. The authors wrote that ‘at present, the planning system is under stress because of high expectation, scarce resources and heavy workloads’ (DI, 2002a: 162). Moreover, ‘planning schemes and policies must clearly express their intentions’ and ‘planning processes must be effective and efficient’ (DI, 2002a: 162). While five policies were provided to achieve this key direction, again the first two, ‘achieve better planning decisions’ (DI, 2002a: 162) and ‘speed up resolution of appeals’ (DI, 2002a: 163), were the most significant. These two policies sought to streamline the planning system mainly by reducing the need for planning permits, and better resourcing the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) and the appeals system.

The strategy dedicated a substantial effort – the most of any metropolitan plan for Melbourne up until this point – towards its implementation. As mentioned above, the strategy provided a number of initiatives to achieve each policy, which were in turn to achieve the key directions and overall vision. In total, 226 separate initiatives were proposed. Too numerous to examine in detail, these initiatives

varied. Some were, like the actions listed in its predecessor, non-committal. Phrases such as ‘work towards’ and ‘support’ were typical of these. Conversely, others were a little more committal. Phrases such as ‘produce’ and ‘apply’ were typical of these. However, according to the authors, they were only ever indicative of ‘how the Government intends proceeding to implement *Melbourne 2030*’ (DI, 2002a: 170). Implementation was instead to be achieved through combination of implementation plans for various subject areas and the use of the planning system. In terms of the former, a total of six draft reports were created for the subject areas of the UGB (DI, 2002b), growth areas (DI, 2002c), housing (DI, 2002d), activity centres (DI, 2002e), green wedges (DI, 2002f) and integrated transport (DSE, 2003a). According to the authors, ‘The draft implementation plans have been developed to build on sections of *Melbourne 2030* where new or different actions are proposed and to provide further detail on some – but not all – of its initiatives’ (DI, 2002b: 1). Actions replaced initiatives to achieve the key directions of the plan. Each implementation plan provided a detailed description of the actions to be undertaken, including timeframes and who was responsible.

In terms of the latter, a draft advisory note (DI, 2002g) was created to demonstrate how the strategy was to be implemented through the Victoria planning system. The note contained two new ministerial directions. The first, *Ministerial Direction No. 9 – Metropolitan Strategy*, required that planning scheme amendments have regard to *Melbourne 2030*. The second, *Ministerial Direction No. 10 – Urban Growth Boundary*, required that affected councils prepare an amendment to the planning scheme to include the UGB. It also contained two amendments to existing ministerial directions, *Ministerial Direction No. 2 – Werribee Growth Area* and *Ministerial Direction No. 3 – South-Eastern Growth Area*, to include growth area maps. However, most significantly, the note also contained a new clause to be inserted into the SPPF of all planning schemes. Clause 12 detailed *Melbourne 2030*’s overall vision, principles, eight of the nine key directions – it excluded the ninth direction concerning improvements to the planning system – almost all of the policies of the eight key directions and the initiatives of these policies. In other words, it translated that which was relevant to land use, development and subdivision from strategy plan into planning schemes. Interestingly, the implementation plan on green wedges also included two new land-use zones, the Green Wedge Zone and Rural Conservation Zone, which councils on the urban fringe could choose to use (DI, 2002f). Relatedly, according to the authors, ‘planning authorities, responsible authorities and other

stakeholders are expected to consider and implement relevant parts of *Melbourne 2030*' (DI, 2002g: 5). Like its predecessor, councils were required to plan within the strategic framework established in the strategy. Finally, the last part of its implementation involved a commitment to review the strategy every five years (DI, 2002a).

Problem

As to the genealogical principle of the problem, *Melbourne 2030* was quite unique. Despite making use of planning controls to achieve its overall vision, it joined the 1929, 1987 and 1995 strategies as the only metropolitan planning documents for Melbourne up until that point not to provide certainty. As discussed above, nearly the entirety of the strategy was translated into the SPPF of all planning schemes. This was made possible under the *Planning and Environment (Planning Schemes) Act 1996*, which gave the State Government the power to specify, through the VPPs, the form and contents for all third iteration-planning schemes. As such, it can be said that the strategy made use of planning controls. However, it cannot be said that these controls provided an assurance with respect to the development of property. The new Clause 12 of the SPPF compelled councils only to consider the strategy. As Mees notes, it required 'local municipalities to do little more than include in certain decisions a statement that, before making decision, the municipality has 'had regard to the Metropolitan Strategy'' (2003: 293). Ultimately, there was no requirement for development to adhere to the key directions or policies of the strategy. Certainty thus instead remained elsewhere in the third iteration-planning schemes. Fortunately, the two new ministerial directions alluded to its location. *Ministerial Direction No. 9 – Metropolitan Strategy* and *Ministerial Direction No. 10 – Urban Growth Boundary* both required councils to make plans and planning scheme amendments consistent with the metropolitan strategy. Moreover, two new land-use zones were created, the Green Wedge Zone and Rural Conservation Zone, to assist in this (DI, 2002f). As was the case with its two predecessors, it was only within these local plans and the local sections of planning schemes that assurance with respect to the development of property could be found. To these ends, the strategy did not make use of the right planning controls to provide certainty.

Discourse

Regarding the genealogical principle of discourse, the term certainty was present in *Melbourne 2030*. It had also begun to appear in documents prior to the release of the strategy. The term was used in the Labor Party's 1999 state election policy on planning (ALP, 1999). The authors wrote that the current market-led planning system provided 'less certainty for all stakeholders and increased delays and costs for residents, councils and developers' (ALP, 1999: 1). Moreover, it was used in John Thwaites' first statement as Planning Minister, where it even featured prominently in the title, *State Planning Agenda: A Sensible Balance – Certainty, Consistency, Sustainability, Community* (Thwaites, 1999). It is little wonder, then, that the term found its way into *Melbourne 2030* several years later. The term certainty appeared on 13 separate occasions across the strategy document and the implementation reports, which interestingly was the exact same number of appearances as in the 1980-81 plan. However, while it was used in that plan to represent solely the idea of development certainty, it was used in *Melbourne 2030* to represent both the ideas of development certainty and process certainty – as identified in Chapter 3.

The term was used to represent the familiar idea of development certainty. It appeared in exploration of the measures designed to control development on the urban fringe. About these measures, the authors wrote that 'giving long-term certainty about growth areas is important as this will minimise speculative pressures on land values in nearby urban areas and help retain productive rural use' (DI, 2002a: 34). Moreover, they wrote 'clear, consistent direction is needed to give greater certainty for decision-makers, investors and the community, and to reduce speculation' (DI, 2002b: 4). More specifically, in terms of the UGB, the authors wrote 'clarifying where urban development will be allowed and where rural activities and environmental values are to prevail will enable landowners in green wedges to plan and invest with greater certainty' (DI, 2002f: 7). Moreover, they wrote 'the approach in green wedges is to ... provide certainty to landowners and the community about land use and development' (DI, 2002f: 20). It is clear here that the authors used the discourse to demonstrate that they wanted to provide an assurance with respect to development on the urban fringe. Interestingly, discourse around land speculation returned. Its return coincided, as explored above, with a return to economic and urban growth. Profits were again to be made in property, and the authors wanted to minimise speculative investment.

However, joining the above representation of the term was the unfamiliar idea of process certainty. It appeared in exploration of the issue of urban consolidation through activity centres. The authors wrote that ‘the list of Principal, Major, Specialised and Neighbourhood Activity Centres will be given statutory effect in planning schemes. This will give decision-makers certainty about where future growth and change will take place in metropolitan Melbourne’ (DI, 2002e: 7). Moreover, they wrote that ‘providing greater certainty and clarity in decision-making is important if we are to achieve our aims for activity centres’ (DI, 2002e: 24), which typified such use. It is clear here that the authors were not concerned about assurance with respect to development. Rather, they used the discourse to demonstrate that they were concerned about assurance with respect to plan making. They wanted to give planners assurances so that they could make appropriate plans and planning decisions with respect to established residential areas.

In addition, the term was used in ways to represent the ideas of both development and process certainty. This was evident in discussion of the overall strategy. The authors wrote ‘its long-term approach will provide the private sector, local government and individuals with the certainty and confidence needed to make investments and pursue opportunities’ (DI, 2002a: 19). It was also evident in its exploration of the issue of transport. With regards to the development of an Integrated Transport Plan (ITS), the authors wrote, ‘An ITS provides government, local government and the private sector with a transport framework that allows development decisions to be made with greater certainty’ (DSE, 2003a: 24). In both these instances, the authors were concerned about assurances for the private sector and public sector. For the private sector, individuals included, these assurances were with respect to the development of property. For the public sector, these assurances were with respect to the plan-making process.

The re-emergence of the discourse of certainty can be understood in much the same way its emergence could back in the 1980s – through the economic and urban condition of the city. As mentioned in Chapter 6, Melbourne was, at the beginning of the 1980s, facing the problems of economic recession and inner city decline (McLoughlin, 1992). It was believed that urban development would stimulate the economy and reinvigorate the declining inner city (Logan, 1981). These conditions were most likely

responsible for how and why the discourse of certainty was used in the 1980-81 plan. The authors used the discourse to demonstrate that they wanted to provide assurance with respect to the development of property, in order to achieve said development. In comparison, as mentioned above, Melbourne was, at the turn of the millennium, experiencing much more prosperous economic times (Murray, 2007). Urban development was occurring, particularly medium-density development in the city's established residential areas (Buxton, et al., 2016). While it reinvigorated the inner city, it also led to community backlash (Lewis, 1999). These conditions were also most likely responsible for how and why the discourse of certainty was used in *Melbourne 2030*. The authors of the strategy no longer needed to seek development in order to stimulate the economy. In fact, they needed to better control it in Melbourne's established residential areas. As such, the authors used the discourse to demonstrate that they wanted to provide an assurance with respect to the plan-making process when it came to urban consolidation in activity centres. They wanted to give planners assurances so that they could make appropriate strategies and planning decisions that benefited the established residential areas. The authors did use the discourse to demonstrate that they wanted to provide an assurance with respect to the development of property. However, this was in reference only to property on the urban fringe, which was of no threat to established residential areas. Greater assurances for development were possibly needed, given the introduction of the new UGB. To these ends, the re-emergence of the discourse of certainty occurred in a different way to its original emergence and for different reasons. The power relations behind the change are explored below.

Power

The genealogical principle of power explains both the development of *Melbourne 2030* and the planning system more generally during this period, especially with respect to the provision of certainty. This section explores the ways in which decision-making power was exerted in all three developmental stages of the strategy: conception, contents and outcomes.

Conception

The conception of the strategy can be seen as a clear result of the exertion of decision-making power. As mentioned above, Labor made an election promise to prepare a new metropolitan strategy if it won government (ALP, 1999). Upon forming government, Minister Thwaites exercised decision-making power by committing the DI, now headed by Prof. Lyndsay Neilson, to prepare the strategy (Thwaites, 1999). Interestingly, the DI, under its former Department Secretary Dr. John Paterson, had commenced work on an analysis of metropolitan Melbourne. According to Wilkinson (2012: 250), this was done with the intention of ‘improving the Department’s understanding of the drivers of urban change’, rather than replacing the 1995 strategy. Mees (2003: 295) speculates that this analysis may ‘have been intended to provide an intellectual justification for the policy of market-led ‘urban consolidation’, of which Paterson was a strong defender’. This analysis was commenced in spite of the metropolitan planning team at the DI being reduced to just three members under the Kennett Government (Anonymous, personal communication, 4 October 2017). However, the analysis did not affect the conception of the strategy. An anonymous source close to the plan (Personal communication, 4 October 2017) said the decision to prepare a strategy was firmly that of Minister Thwaites, in order to fulfil the Labor Party’s election pledge.

Contents

The final version of the strategy was a result of a one-sided power struggle over decision-making between the Bracks Government and outside influences. Its development began in November 1999, soon after the decision of Minister Thwaites to prepare a new metropolitan strategy, with the creation of the Strategy Development Division (SDD) within the DI (Mees, 2003). According to Wilkinson (2011), over the course of the strategy’s development, the SDD slowly expanded to over 70 staff. It was not until May 2000 that outside influence was sought through the establishment of the Community Reference Group (CRG). The CRG was shocked to discover that the SDD, in partnership with other departmental officials, had already developed ‘a broad outline of the strategy’, commissioned background technical reports into twelve strategic topics and established interdepartmental liaison groups (Mees, 2003: 296). According to Mees (2003), attempts by the CRG to take some control over the direction of strategy met with contempt. As its Chair, Prof. Neilson exerted decision-making power by informing the CRG that ‘the overall process will remain as at present proposed by the DI. The Chair

confirmed that the role of the Reference Group is advisory. The group is to assist the department with its work' (Minutes of Meeting, 21 October 2000, cited in Mees, 2003: 295). Government decision-making power also suppressed the background technical reports and public consultation – a massive public consultation process was undertaken – that did not conform to the plan envisioned by the DI (Mees, 2003). As Mees notes, 'there was no process for deciding the content of the strategy, merely a drawn-out exercise in writing down predetermined decisions in away that put the best possible 'spin' on them' (2003: 297). Interestingly, according to an anonymous source close to the plan (Personal Communication, 4 October 2017), the SDD was solely responsible for deciding how the strategy was to be implemented. It developed a number of implementation levers, such as legislation, regulation and funding, and used its best judgement as to what would achieve the most desirable outcomes. The use of the planning controls was about trying to align local planning schemes with the plan through the use of the SPPF (Anonymous Source, Personal Communication, 4 October 2017). Under deadline pressures from the Minister Thwaites (Anonymous Source, Personal Communication, 4 October 2017), the SDD submitted the final draft of strategy for internal review by a team of reviewers and the CRG. In response to the negative reviews, the DI engaged additional writers and public relations experts to improve the strategy (Mees, 2003). To these ends, as Mees notes, the plan ultimately 'reflected the collective views of the officials who comprised the [SDD]' (2003: 297).

Outcomes

Decision-making power was exerted during the outcomes process of the strategy. Coinciding with the release of the strategy in October 2002, the Bracks Government introduced and passed legislation to put in place an interim UGB (Birrell et al., 2005). Not long after, it introduced legislation to make these changes permanent. Upon its release, the DI also engaged in a four-month consultation process seeking public comment on the strategy (DSE, 2003b). Interestingly, there was no legislative requirement to do so. Only the 1954, 1971 and 1980-81 plans required exhibition, as they were amendments to the MMPS. According to Wilkinson (2011), the Bracks Government did it to build broad ownership of the strategy. The Department of Sustainability (DSE), originating in the restructuring of the DI in late-2002, received almost 1,500 submissions regarding both the strategy document, including its nine key directions and 50 policies, and the draft implementation reports, including their actions (DSE, 2003b).

In November 2003, the DSE published its 366-page response to these submissions, *Melbourne 2030: Planning for Sustainable Growth – Response to Submissions* (2003b). It is interesting to note that the term certainty appeared in this document on 30 occasions. The quote, ‘Many submitters want certainty that the overall impact of increased densities on quality of life, residential amenity, heritage and environmental sustainability will be minimal’ (DSE, 2003b: 95), was typical. Evidently, some Melburnians were concerned about the prospect of higher-density development in established residential areas. The DSE responded to the submissions by reaffirming the nine key directions of the plan and developing implementation priorities for all of its policy and actions (DSE, 2003b).

While the initial reaction to *Melbourne 2030* was largely positive, enthusiasm for the strategy quickly waned (Mees, 2003; Birrell et al., 2005; Mees, 2011; Wilkinson, 2011; Buxton et al., 2016). The strategy drew criticism on two fronts: its contents and its process (Mees, 2003). In terms of the former, the public became increasingly concerned about the strategy’s impact on higher densities of development within Melbourne’s residential established areas (Wilkinson, 2011). The crystallising moment was, according to Wilkinson (2011: 599), the ‘support by VCAT for a controversial higher density housing proposal on the grounds it was consistent with *Melbourne 2030*’. In October 2004, a public rally was held on the steps of the Victorian Parliament in protest of such development. In response, the Bracks Government quickly released a suite of new zones designed to better control the density of development, referred to as the Protecting Neighbourhood package (Wilkinson, 2011). In terms of the latter, the strategy was largely maligned for its lack of implementation detail (Mees, 2011; Buxton et al., 2016). As Buxton et al. note, ‘The Department of Infrastructure, which developed the plan, did not formulate an implementation plan until, in effect, forced to do so by its own external implementation committee and by public pressures’ (2016d: 39). However, such criticism unfairly misses the intentions of the strategy. In 2005, under pressure to demonstrate implementation of the strategy, the SDD looked towards the process of strategic navigation to legitimise the approach. Strategic navigation involved ‘a reconceptualisation of the role of strategic planning, a codification of the subsequent organisational implications through the draft business planning process and the identification of leverageable strategies as a way to enact adaptability’ (Wilkinson, 2011: 596). However, this was just, according to Buxton et al., ‘a justification for inaction, and obscures the reality of a failed implementation process for a plan with few measurable outcomes from the outset’ (2016:

39). In any event, the strategic navigation process was never adopted and the implementation of the strategy continued to languish (Wilkinson, 2011).

In 2006, the Minister for Planning, Robert Hulls, who replaced Mary Delahunty, announced a review of *Melbourne 2030*. Hidden within the plan was a commitment to undertake a review of the strategy every five years. In June the following year, the new Minister for Planning, Justin Madden, established the independent Audit Expert Group (AEG) comprised of four planning experts (Moodie, Whitney, Wright and McAfee, 2008). The AEG was tasked with ‘providing advice on strategic and implementation issues for the next five years’ (Moodie et al., 2008: 10). To assist this, the Government called for public submissions. In March 2008, the AEG released its report, *Melbourne 2030: Audit Expert Group Report* (Moodie et al., 2008), in which it concluded that three issues needed to be addressed: determining who had responsibility for implementing the plan; providing greater resourcing for implementing the plan; and creating broad-based support for the plan – all of which went towards addressing the areas for which the plan was criticised. Two months later, the Government released *Melbourne 2030 – Planning for all of Melbourne* (DPCD, 2008a), which responded to the audit with commitments and actions to implement the strategy. This included updating the strategy with the latest information, including population and economic growth trends, and community needs. In December 2008, the Department of Planning and Community Development (DPCD), which emerged from the restructuring of the DSE in 2007, released *Melbourne 2030: A Planning Update – Melbourne @ 5 Million* (DPCD, 2008b), better known as just *Melbourne @ 5 Million*. The strategy update tried to address the issues of infill development by better planning for activity centres. This included the designation of six new Central Activities Districts. Interestingly, the UGB was also expanded, creating a 30-year outer-urban land supply (Buxton et al., 2016). However, the Government’s efforts were in vain. The Baillieu-led Liberal-National Coalition defeated the incumbent Brumby-Labor Government at the Victorian state election in November 2010, and then set about replacing *Melbourne @ 5 Million* with its own metropolitan strategy (Buxton et al., 2016).

Discontinuity

Melbourne 2030 represented both continuities and discontinuities between it and its predecessors. Most notably, it continued the metropolitan planning response established in the 1987 strategy and continued in the 1995 strategy. *Melbourne 2030* was a strategy providing overall direction on the future growth of Melbourne. However, slightly different, the new-look local planning schemes made it possible for these directions to be incorporated directly into the SPPF of local planning schemes. Councils were to plan and assess planning permit applications consistent with these directions. This outcome saw the strategy also continue the *episteme* with respect to the provision of certainty. Certainty was provided at the local level in local planning schemes. The strategy also continued to locate future development within Melbourne's established residential areas and growth corridors. Like the 1987 strategy, a concept map was provided to highlight this preferred growth (see Figure 7.7). However, absent from the plan was discourse surrounding development. It was primarily replaced with the discourse of sustainability. The focus on sustainability also led to the implementation of the UGB, designed to limit urban sprawl. Interestingly, this measure was achieved through legislation. Also present was the discourse of certainty, which had been absent since the 1980-81 plan. However, it was used to convey more the idea of adaptability of the strategy, rather than strictly development certainty. Finally, the strategy continued the politicisation of metropolitan planning. The Victorian State Government through the DI created the strategy. Like the 1995 strategy, it was presented as a public relations document, complete with hundreds of positive photographs. Moreover, like its two predecessors, it also continued to the idea of co-ordinating responses to achieving future urban form.

7.8 Episteme discontinuity

The third phase of Melbourne metropolitan planning, the late-1980s to 2000s, represented a clear *episteme* with respect to the provision of certainty, a phase discontinuous with the previous one. The three metropolitan strategies created during this phase – *Shaping Melbourne's Future* (MPE, 1987), *Living Suburbs* (DPD, 1995a) and *Melbourne 2030* (DI, 2002a) – did not provide development certainty, a stark contrast with the three metropolitan plans, policies and strategies created during the previous phase. This discontinuity was the result of significant changes to the Victorian planning system that occurred in 1987. The mechanism by which certainty had previously been provided at the metropolitan level – the MMPS – was abolished in favour of local planning schemes. Moreover, the

administration of these schemes was ultimately left up to local councils. As such, the three metropolitan strategies could not translate their recommendations for the future growth of the metropolitan region into statutory planning controls. Instead, they made use of a range of other non-statutorily binding measures, actions or initiatives to achieve them. Most notably, they all relied on councils incorporating the metropolitan strategies into their respective local planning schemes. Importantly, the discontinuity was not an entirely new way of thinking with respect to the provision of certainty. Rather, it followed the same approach as that evident in the first phase of Melbourne metropolitan planning, the 1900s to 1940s. The only metropolitan planning document created during that phase – the *Plan of General Development* (MTPC, 1929) – similarly proposed the introduction of local planning schemes, which were to be consistent with the metropolitan plan. To these ends, between the 1900s and 2000s, there were two different discontinuities across three phases with respect to the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning: one where metropolitan plans could, by virtue of the planning system, provide certainty and one where metropolitan plans could not.

7.9 Conclusion

Historically, the period from the late-1980s to the 2000s was one of contrasts. It began with economic turbulence. Both the national and state economies experienced economic recession. However, the Commonwealth Government and Victorian State Government initially handled the economic realities differently. The Hawke-Keating Commonwealth Government embraced neoliberal economic principles to stimulate the economy, while the Cain-Kirner State Government resisted. The succeeding Kennett State Government eventually turned towards neoliberalism. Two metropolitan strategies were created during this period – *Shaping Melbourne's Future* (MPE, 1987) and *Living Suburbs* (DPD, 1995a), both of which sought to address the problem of economic decline through development. The national and state economies eventually recovered and prospered. At the state level, the Bracks-Brumby Government embraced a hybrid ideological approach between neoliberalism and state welfare liberalism. It produced one metropolitan strategy: *Melbourne 2030* (DI, 2002a). Understandable given the improved economic situation, the strategy was concerned less with stimulating development and more with better accommodating it to a rapidly expanding metropolis. While the intentions of the plans may have differed, they were all similar in one important respect: they no longer provided certainty.

This was because changes to the Victorian planning system abolished the mechanisms by which this could be provided, the MMPS, in favour of local planning schemes. As such, they relied on other non-statutory means to achieve their similar desired urban form. Most notably, there was an intention that councils would incorporate the metropolitan strategies within their local planning schemes. This represented a clear discontinuity with respect to the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning. However, it did not represent an entirely new way of thinking – an *episteme*. Rather, it was similar to the *episteme* of the first phase with respect to the provision of certainty. Interestingly, the discourse around development certainty was only present in the 2002 strategy and its supporting documents. As shown in Chapter 3, its appearance has increased considerably since then. The 1987 and 1995 strategies instead relied on the terms ‘development’ and ‘investment’ to convey the idea of assurances with respect property investment. Ultimately, it was largely a series of ideological and decision-making power relations that were responsible for the contents and outcomes of the metropolitan plans. Most prominently, it was the decision-making power of the Government, either directly or through the responsible planning division, which was responsible for the way in which certainty was provided through Melbourne metropolitan planning from the late-1980s through the 2000s.

8. CRITICAL REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

8.1 Introduction

The previous three empirical chapters have provided detailed genealogical-inspired analyses of Melbourne metropolitan planning and the way in which it has or has not provided certainty. To this end, the following final chapter seeks to provide critical reflections on the key objectives and research questions outlined in the introductory chapter of this thesis. To do so, it is divided into five sections. The first section reflects on the use of genealogy as a theoretical framework for researching Melbourne metropolitan planning. The second section reflects on the notion and provision of certainty with respect to metropolitan planning. The third section reflects on the overall historical development of the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning. The fourth section reflects on the implications of this research. The fifth and final section of this thesis ends with some brief concluding remarks.

8.2 Genealogy as a theoretical framework

The first key objective of this thesis was to explore genealogy as a theoretical framework for researching Melbourne metropolitan planning. Responding to this objective, the first research question was what is genealogy and how can it be used to explain the historical development of the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning? Regarding the first half of this question, it was initially established in this thesis that genealogy is a historiographical approach, belonging to the late French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault, concerned with explaining the historical development of a deep-seated practice or belief that is held to be fact. It is one of several historiographical approaches used in the planning history field and was selected over these other approaches because it aligned well with the author's beliefs and the needs of the research. The second half of the question is a little more difficult to answer. Challenges were faced trying to determine how genealogy could actually be applied. That was because genealogy does not represent a unified approach. Rather, it is an ongoing collection and refinement of methodological principles used to analyse human culture in line with the theory that all human culture can be understood through history. Confounding this was the abstract and

covert nature of these principles. They were devised to investigate specifically the topics of Foucault's historical inquiries and were hidden deep within the resultant texts. For a budding researcher, it was a significant struggle not just to identify the component principles but also to determine how best to apply them to a historical inquiry far removed from the work of Foucault. Eventually, five methodological principles were identified as comprising the approach: history, problem, discourse, power and discontinuity. Moreover, it was eventually determined how they would be operationalised in the case of the historical development of the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning. This was a significant achievement, as never before had the genealogical approach been as clearly articulated.

Considered critically, the second part of this research question pertains to the success of the application of the five methodological principles to the case of Melbourne metropolitan planning. Four principles – history, problem, discourse and discontinuity – were applied with little or no issue. The principle of history was used to provide necessary historical context to each of the seven Melbourne metropolitan planning documents analysed. Interestingly, these contexts revealed the importance of both politics and the economy to their development. The principle was also used in the identification of the different *epistemes* with respect to the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning. The three different *epistemes* that were identified were not immediately obvious. It was only after the collection and analysis of the research data that they began to become apparent. As such, the structure of this thesis underwent several iterations to ensure the historical account was presented in chapters responding to these *epistemes*. The principle of the problem was used to both identify the problems that necessitated metropolitan planning action and examine how Melbourne's metropolitan planning documents responded to the problematised issue of providing certainty. This was straightforward and worked well. The principle of discourse was used to analyse the discourse regarding the provision of certainty present in, and auxiliary to, the metropolitan planning documents. However, it quickly became apparent that not every document contained discourse regarding certainty. As such, the prevailing discourses had to be analysed and explored relative to the notion of certainty. In addition, non-discursive practices regarding the provision of certainty were also analysed. However, as they related to the principle of the problem, they were included in the problem section of the analysis of each document. This highlights an important point and resultant issue: these five methodological

principles are interrelated. Finally, the principle of discontinuity was first applied by dividing the empirical chapters into the three discontinuous *epistemes* with respect to the provision of certainty, as mentioned above. It was also applied by examining continuities and discontinuities between metropolitan planning documents. This worked well, helping to uncover significant changes in Melbourne metropolitan planning over time.

However, significant difficulties were faced when trying to apply the principle of power. It was discovered early that Foucauldian power was quite problematic to operationalise. It was found to be too abstract, big picture, for the specific parameters of this thesis — a short, recent timeframe involving matters involving politics and the economy. As such, outside conceptions of power sympathetic to these parameters were sought. Luke's three-dimensional typology of power fitted this requirement and was chosen. Operationalising the three dimensions, however, proved challenging. During the data collection stages, it was discovered that sufficient data could not be collected to satisfy the requirements of the last two dimensions. Non-decision-making power and ideological power both required high-level insider knowledge not readily available through archival or secondary research. Moreover, finding interview participants with such knowledge willing and able to speak was also extremely difficult. As such, it was decided that only the first dimension, decision-making power, would be used. In the end, decision-making power proved sufficient to explain the power structures behind the conception, contents and outcomes of each Melbourne metropolitan planning document analysed. However, ultimately it could not adequately explain why decisions were made and why these power structures existed in the first place. A further refinement of the application of this principle may be necessary in the future. To these ends, while not without its problems, genealogy, as a methodological approach, can be used to explain the historical development of the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning.

8.3 Certainty as a notion

The second key objective of this thesis was to examine the notion of certainty with respect to metropolitan planning. Responding to this objective, the second research question was what is the notion of certainty in a planning context and how may it be provided? This was fairly straightforward.

With respect to the first part of this question, it was found that within international planning literature, the discourse of certainty has been used to represent two different notions: process certainty and development certainty. Process certainty, the less popular notion, was concerned with increasing certainty in the plan-making process. Here authors wrote of the need to reduce uncertainty in order to provide more certainty for planners to make positive decisions when planning. Development certainty, conversely the more popular notion, was concerned with providing certainty for those involved in the development process. Here authors wrote of the need to provide assurances to all stakeholders – mainly developers and property owners – with respect to the development of property. These assurances related to whether development would be allowed to occur or be prohibited. In other words, it was certainty for and from development. In Melbourne metropolitan planning, the discourse of certainty was used to represent the latter notion of development certainty and, as such, was the notion on which this thesis focused. Moreover, it was used at two different levels: the notion of certainty was generally present, represented by other discourses; and when the discourse of certainty was present to represent the notion of certainty, it was used for rhetorical purposes. This will be explored further in the next section.

Within this review of international planning literature, two interesting revelations were made. Firstly, the discourse of certainty appeared in the international planning literature in four distinct waves: the 1960s; the late-1970s to 1980s; the 1990s; and the mid-2000s to the mid-2010s. Each wave corresponded to a period of conditions unfavourable to development, caused by either economic instability or the upheaval of planning systems. During such times, there were requests for both notions of certainty. Secondly, the notion of development certainty has underpinned planning since it became a government action in the early-twentieth century, long before the discourse of certainty was used to represent it. Prior to this point, development occurred largely unrestricted. In order to see planning accepted, it was promoted to create wealth and protect wealth, by providing assurances for and from development, respectively. This view of the purpose of planning continued to survive.

With respect to the second part of this question, it was found that certainty was provided through the use of statutory planning controls – land-use zones, overlays or other provisions. This is because statutory planning controls restrict how all property, public or private, may be used and developed. As

such, these controls determine which assurances can be made for the development of property. Moreover, it found that in the Victoria planning system, these controls are currently located within local planning schemes and have been so historically, except for a brief period when they were also located within the metropolitan and other regional schemes. This will also be explored further in the next section.

8.4 The historical development of the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning

The third key objective of this thesis was to critically examine the historical development of the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning. This was the crux of the thesis. Responding to this objective, the third research question was how and why has the provision of certainty developed historically in Melbourne metropolitan planning? A considerable undertaking, the answer to this research question can be found in the five key interdependent methodological principles that comprised the genealogical framework applied in this thesis. This is because they tell a story of everything that needed to be in place for the provision of certainty to develop historically in Melbourne metropolitan planning. To these ends, this section brings together the principles analysed in the three empirical chapters. A comparative table (see Table 8.1) helps illustrate the story. However, rather than discussing each plan relative to the five principles, as was done in the empirical chapters (the red boxes in Table 8.1), this section discusses the five principles relative to the plans (the blue boxes in Table 8.1). As such, it is divided into five subsections, one for each principle. Ultimately, they demonstrate that a range of planning, economic and political factors were responsible for the development of the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan over its near one-hundred-year history.

Table 8.1: Genealogical Comparison of Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Documents

Principles / Documents	1929 Strategy	1954 Plan	1971 Plan	1980-81 Plan	1987 Strategy	1995 Strategy	2002 Strategy
History: <i>Episteme 1</i>			<i>Episteme 2</i>			<i>Episteme 3 (similar to Episteme 1)</i>	
History: Circumstances	- Economic growth - Population growth - Development growth - Conservative State Government	- Economic boom - Population boom - Development boom - Conservative State Government	- Continued economic growth - Continued population growth - Continued development growth - Reformist State Government	- Economic instability - Development decline - Reformist State Government	- Continued economic instability - Redevelopment projects - Reformist State Government	- Economic decline - State budget deficit - Neoliberal State Government	- Economic growth - Budget surplus - Reformist State Government
Problem: Necessitation	- Unregulated urban growth and development - Land speculation	- Poor regulation uptake - Urban sprawl	- Out-dated metropolitan plan - Continued urban sprawl	- Decline in inner-city residents and jobs	- Need for economically stimulated development	- Continued need for economically stimulating development	- Politically sensitive development in established areas
Problem: Provision	- Local planning schemes consistent with metropolitan strategy (never enacted)	- MMPS (initially in form of IDO)	- MMPS	- MMPS - Local development schemes	- Local planning schemes (2 nd ed.) consistent with metropolitan strategy	- Local planning schemes (2 nd ed.) consistent with metropolitan strategy	- Local planning schemes (3 rd ed.) consistent with metropolitan strategy
Discourse	- Stabilisation of property prices	- Efficiency	- Growth and conservation	- Certainty	- Development	- Development - Investment	- Certainty
Power: Conception	- CMMC <> Lawson State Government > MTPC	- TCPB <> Holloway State Government > MMBW	- Local Government Minister Hamer > MMBW / TCPB	- MMBW Chair Croxford > MMBW	- SPD Director Spisto <> Cain State Government > MPE	- Planning Minister Maclellan <> Perrott Committee > DPD	- Planning Minister Thwaites > DI
Power: Contents	- MTPC-driven	- MMBW-driven	- MMBW (Bernard Evans)-driven	- MMBW-driven	- MSTF (MPE)-driven	- SRG (DPD)-driven	- SDD (DI)-driven
Power: Outcomes	- Legislation allowed to lapse in the Legislative Council	- IDO applied in 1956 - MMPS submitted in 1958	- Am. 3 and 21 to the MMPS gazetted in 1974	- Am. 150 to the MMPS gazetted in 1983	- Cabinet approved - Cain State Government implementation	- Kennet State Government implementation	- Legislation enabling the UGB approved - Bracks State

		- MMPS gazetted in 1968						Government attempted implementation - Strategy review
	- Voluntary regulation	- Rational planning approach - Used Victorian planning system	- Blueprint plan response - Use of MMPS (through amendment) - Certainty provided at the metropolitan level	- Blueprint plan response - Use of MMPS (through amendment) - Certainty provided at the metropolitan level - Radial future urban growth - Additional non-planning implementation measures	- Radial future urban growth - Urban consolidation - Urban development schemes	- State Government authorship - Strategy response - Concept plan - Local planning schemes - Certainty provided at the local level	- Strategy response - Local planning schemes - Certainty provided at the local level - State Government authorship - Radial future urban growth - Urban consolidation - Development facilitation focus - Non-planning implementation measures	- Strategy response - Local planning schemes - Certainty provided at the local level - State Government authorship - Radial future urban growth - Urban consolidation - Largely non-planning implementation measures - Public relations appearance
Discontinuity: Continuity:								
Discontinuity:	- Different type of development regulation	- Blueprint plan response - Use of MMPS - Certainty provided at the metropolitan level - Urban growth focused in east and south-east - Plan implemented	- Radial future urban growth - Environmental focus - Additional non-planning implementation measures	- Urban consolidation - Local development schemes	- State Government authorship - Strategy response - Concept plan - Local planning schemes - Certainty provided at the local level	- Investment focus - No environmental issues - No growth map - Public relations appearance	- Sustainability focus - UGB	

History

As shown in Table 8.1, it was ascertained that the state of the Victorian economy and its resultant effects on demand for urban development were the historical circumstances most crucial to the development of each Melbourne metropolitan planning document. Of Melbourne's seven such documents, four – the 1929 strategy, 1954 plan, 1971 plan and 2002 strategy – were developed during periods of positive economic growth, either modest growth or economic boom. This growth positively affected population growth, which resulted in increased demand for urban development. As discussed in the next subsection, when urban development increased to meet demand, it created numerous problems that eventually necessitated metropolitan planning action. Those four documents sought to address these problems by controlling urban development through planning controls. In contrast, three documents – the 1980-81 plan, 1987 strategy and 1995 strategy – were developed during periods of negative economic growth, either recession or, at the very least, economic instability. During these periods, demand for urban development decreased, creating different problems that necessitated metropolitan planning action. Those three documents sought to address these problems by stimulating urban development through planning controls, most notably via reforms to the controls and planning system more generally.

Similarly, it was identified that the state of Victorian politics was the historical circumstances most crucial to the outcome of each Melbourne metropolitan planning document. The 1929 strategy and 1954 plan were developed during periods of conservative government or a conservative parliament. As will be discussed in the power subsection, the idea of a regulatory limitation of property rights in the form of planning controls did not mesh with the conservative viewpoint. It is of little surprise that these documents failed to be gazetted or were gazetted a decade after intended. In contrast, reformist governments ruled Victoria in the 1970s to 1980s and 2000s. Four documents – the 1971 plan, 1980-81 plan, 1987 strategy and 2002 strategy – were developed during these periods. These documents were created, approved and, in the case of the first two plans, gazetted, without obstruction or delay. Interestingly, the 1995 strategy was created under the neo-liberal Kennett State Government. The document was similarly created and approved quickly. The only real difference between it and those developed during the reformist government periods was market awareness.

With respect to the operationalisation of the other genealogical principle, that of history, it also identified three *epistemes* over three distinct time periods, referred to as phases, with respect to the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning. Interestingly, the first and the third phases shared very similar *epistemes*. However, this is discussed in the next subsection.

Problem

As mentioned above and shown in Table 8.1, various problems necessitated the need for metropolitan planning action in Melbourne. All of these problems were related to urban development; there was either too much development or not enough. Four metropolitan planning documents – the 1929 strategy, 1954 plan, 1971 plan and 2002 strategy – fall into the former category. They were created to control urban development and, in particular, urban sprawl. On the issue of development control, it is interesting to note that the 1929 strategy attempted to establish a planning system. Prior to this, urban development was largely unregulated. Moreover, due to the poor uptake of planning powers by councils following the eventual establishment of a planning system in 1944, the *Town and Country Planning (Metropolitan Area) Act 1949* reconfigured the said system to allow for the creation of a metropolitan planning scheme. The 1954 plan laid out this scheme. Importantly, as discussed above, these four documents were created during periods of economic prosperity. The problem of urban development was inextricably linked to economic and population growth.

In contrast, three documents – the 1980-81 plan, 1987 strategy and 1995 strategy – fall into the latter category. They were designed to stimulate urban development, particularly in the inner city. As discussed above, these three documents were created during periods of economic instability. Interestingly, while facing up to the problem of inner-city decline, the 1987 strategy was also facing the problem of urban sprawl. People were leaving the inner city but not metropolitan Melbourne. Moreover, there were also some additional problems specific to each document. The 1929 strategy was facing the unique problem of land speculation. At the other end of the time spectrum, the 2002 strategy was facing the problem of higher-density development in Melbourne's established residential areas,

which was causing a political backlash. These problems all highlighted the need for metropolitan planning action.

With respect to the operationalisation of the genealogical principle of the problem, Melbourne's metropolitan planning documents responded to the problem of providing certainty in two different ways: the local provision of certainty and the metropolitan provision. As discussed in the above section, certainty is provided through the use of planning controls. Four documents – the 1929 strategy, 1987 strategy, 1995 strategy and 2002 strategy – made use of planning controls at the local level. They are labelled as strategies specifically because they did not include planning controls. Instead, they were designed to inform local planning schemes. It was intended that councils would develop their local schemes consistent with the preferred urban growth direction of the strategies. As such, certainty for or from development was found in these local schemes, the form of which became more sophisticated, and eventually standardised, over time – and more discretionary. Importantly, the strategies also contained non-planning mechanisms to be completed by various authorities in order to help achieve a preferred growth option.

As mentioned above, the 1929 belonged to the first *episteme* with respect to the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning, while the 1987, 1995 and 2002 strategies belonged to the third *episteme*. These two *epistemes* were very similar. Both contributed to the way of thinking that Melbourne's metropolitan planning documents should be overarching strategies and that development control, and thus certainty, should be provided at the local level consistent with these strategies. However, there were subtle differences between the two. Under the 1929 strategy, local planning powers were to be voluntary. Under the 1987, 1995 and 2002 strategies, they were mandatory. Every municipality had to have a planning scheme consistent with the latest strategy. Interestingly, by the time the 2002 strategy was created, the Victorian planning system had been standardised; all local planning schemes, the third iteration, had the same form and made use of the same provisions. The SPPF of these third-iteration local planning schemes made it far easier for metropolitan strategies to guide local schemes. For the 1987 and 1995 strategies, the State Government stipulated through government regulations the contents and provisions of the second-iteration local planning schemes.

In contrast, three metropolitan planning documents – the 1954, 1971 and 1980-81 plans – made use of planning controls at the metropolitan level. The *Town and Country Planning (Metropolitan Area) Act 1949* introduced into the Victorian planning system the concept of a metropolitan planning scheme, the MMPS. It is important to note that under the parent *Town and Country Planning Act 1944*, the State Government stipulated through government regulations the contents and provisions of all planning schemes. The 1954, 1971 and 1980-81 plans directly informed the MMPS, hence the label ‘plan’, rather than strategy. They all specified a preferred urban growth direction for Melbourne and discussed their use of the planning controls in the MMPS to achieve it. It is interesting to note that the 1954 plan introduced the MMPS. As such, it was the most detailed in terms of planning control. The 1971 and 1980-81 plans were amendments to the MMPS. As such, they were less detailed, discussing only new planning controls. As mentioned above, these three plans belonged to the second *episteme* with respect to the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning, representing discontinuity between the other two *epistemes* – additional discontinuities between documents will be discussed in a later subsection. The plans all contributed to the way of thinking that Melbourne’s metropolitan planning documents should be blueprint plans that directly affected development control at the metropolitan level. As such, certainty for and from development should be found at the metropolitan level. However, the latter two plans also utilised additional controls, including planning objectives, which were more discretionary in nature. The 1980-81 plan also introduced local development schemes that were designed to provide localised planning knowledge not feasible with a metropolitan-wide scheme. Moreover, they both used additional non-planning mechanisms. These can be seen as the transition from this second *episteme* into the third *episteme* detailed above.

Discourse

As shown in Table 8.1, there was little consistency found in the most prominent discourses generated by the seven Melbourne metropolitan planning documents. Only two documents – the 1980-81 plan and 2002 strategy – featured the term certainty. The other five featured four different prominent discourses. However, there was consistency in the reasoning behind the disparate discourses. The discourses were informed by the historical circumstances and problems faced, as described above. With respect to the use of a certainty discourse, the 1980-81 plan used the term in reference to

development certainty. For the authors, certainty was an aim to which planning should aspire and as part of a justification for the planning actions proposed by the plan. Its use can be understood relative to the historical circumstances and the problems faced by metropolitan Melbourne. The MMBW wanted to stimulate urban development. It should be noted that the plan actually provided development certainty through the use of the MMPS. The 2002 strategy, on the other hand, used the term to refer to both development and process certainty. The authors wanted to provide assurances for both the private and the public sectors with respect to development and plan-making, respectively. It should be noted that the strategy could not, on its own, provide certainty, as it was effective only when integrated with local planning schemes. As such, its use to represent development certainty was more for rhetorical purposes. This is understandable, given the historical circumstances and problems discussed above. The state government wanted to appease residents fearful of inappropriate in-fill development.

As other metropolitan planning documents did not feature the discourse of certainty, their most prominent discourse was instead examined. The 1987 and 1995 strategies both featured prominently discourse around development. Again, this was understandable given the historic circumstances of the time and the problem of needing to stimulate development. The first three metropolitan planning documents – the 1929 strategy, 1954 plan and 1971 plan – featured prominent discourses similarly informed by historical circumstances and problems. The 1929 strategy was centred on the discourse of stabilising property values. It was used to justify the responses to the problems of land speculation and unregulated development. The 1954 plan was centred on the discourse of efficiency. It was used to justify the proposed solutions to the problems of urban sprawl, uncoordinated development and congestion. The 1971 plan was centred on the discourse of growth and conservation. This was in reference to both the strong demand for urban development in Melbourne and the globally increasing environmental awareness of the early-1970s.

However, below the surface, these disparate discourses had more in common than just their response to historical circumstances and problems. The discourses all confirmed the notion of certainty, that metropolitan planning should provide assurances with respect to the development of property. The 1980-81 plan and 2002 strategy were overt confirmations of this notion. However, the rest all covertly confirmed this notion. The 1929 strategy's discourse of stabilising property values and the 1954 plan's

discourse of efficiency can be seen as wanting to protect the value of property by regulating urban development. The 1971 plan's discourse of growth and conservation referred to assurances of where urban development was allowed and where it was prohibited, respectively. The 1987 and 1995 strategies' discourse of development was similarly a reference to guiding the development of the city. To these ends, discourse played an important role with respect to the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning. While a variety of discourses were used, all informed by different historical circumstances and problems, these discourses all confirmed, either overtly or covertly, the notion that metropolitan planning should provide assurances with respect to the development of property. This no doubt contributed to the present-day belief that the purpose of metropolitan planning is to provide certainty.

Power

As shown in Table 8.1, the exertion of decision-making power was behind the conception of each Melbourne metropolitan planning document. The precise ways in which it was exerted and by whom, predictably varied. However, they can broadly be grouped into two categories: a group or individual convincing the powers in charge of the need for metropolitan planning action; or the powers in charge directing metropolitan planning action. The first two documents fall into the former. Independent bodies convinced state governments of their need – the CMMC conceived of the 1929 strategy and convinced the Lawson Government, while the MMBW conceived of the 1954 plan and convinced the Holloway Government. The 1987 strategy also falls into the former category. The Director of the SPD, Victor Sposito, convinced the Cain Government of its need. In this category, the respective governments also exerted decision-making power by agreeing to the creation of the metropolitan planning document. Interestingly, the situation around the 1929 strategy and 1954 plan highlighted how the state governments were reluctant to actively involve themselves in planning. The situation around the 1987 strategy highlighted more the workload of the Cain Government. It was busy undertaking other planning actions, such as legislative reform and redevelopment projects.

The 1971 plan, 1980-81 plan, 1995 strategy and 2002 strategy all fall into the latter category. They were conceived by the powers in charge. The relevant minister conceived of the 1971 plan, 1995

strategy and 2002 strategy. The Minister for Local Government, Rupert Hamer, instructed the MMBW and TCPB to prepare outlines for what would become the 1971 plan – the MMBW's option was ultimately chosen. The Minister for Planning, Robert Maclellan, instructed the then DPD to prepare the 1995 strategy. The Minister for Planning, John Thwaites, instructed the then DI, as part of an election pledge, to prepare the 2002 strategy. The 1980-81 plan was slightly different. It was the Chair of the MMBW, Alan Croxford, who instructed the MMBW's planning department to prepare the new plan, not the minister. In this respect, he was as powerful as the relevant minister. Interestingly, Minister Maclellan's decision to instruct the DPD to prepare the 1995 strategy was informed by the Perrott Committee, which he had appointed previously. In this respect, Maclellan exerted decision-making power to establish the Committee, which in turn persuaded him to recommend a new strategy, and he again exerted power by agreeing to it. To this end, the conception of each metropolitan planning document arose from the exertion of overt decision-making power.

The contents of the metropolitan planning documents also resulted from decision-making power. This thesis identified without exception that it was the authors of the documents that exerted power over their contents – the MTPC in the case of the 1929 strategy, the MMBW in the case of the 1954, 1971 and 1980-81 plans, and planning departments, or more specifically the various strategic groups within them, in the case of the 1987, 1995 and 2002 strategies. While the contents themselves differed between documents – the specific continuities and discontinuities between documents will be discussed in the next subsection – they all appeared to resist outside business and political influence. They instead responded to the identified problems with contemporary planning practice.

The exertion of decision-making power was also responsible for the outcomes of each Melbourne metropolitan planning document. The way in which this power was exerted and by whom varied. In the case of the 1929 strategy, it was the members of the Victorian Parliament's Legislative Council that exerted decision-making power over its outcome. The strategy required planning legislation to enable its implementation. These members ultimately allowed the proposed legislation to lapse in the Legislative Council. In the case of the 1954, 1971 and 1980-81 plans, it was the Governor in Council – consisting of the Governor, Premier and various Ministers – that exerted decision-making power over their outcomes. The MMPS and its subsequent amendments required approval and gazettal from the

Governor in Council. The Governor in Council approved and gazetted the 1954 plan as an IDO in 1955, before approving and gazetting the MMPS proper in 1968. The Governor in Council approved and gazetted the 1971 and 1980-plans as amendments to the MMPS three years after their respective publications. In the case of the 1987, 1995 and 2002 strategies, it was the cabinet of the responsible governments that exerted decision-making power over their outcomes. These strategies had no legislative basis and, as such, did not require approval or gazettal by the Governor in Council. Instead, each strategy was simply approved by the government cabinet, becoming official government policy, after which time the implementation process began. Governments were solely responsible for implementing what had become partisan political documents. The exception to this was one element of the 2002 strategy, which required passing legislation – which it did successfully – to establish the UGB. To these ends, the framework for each document’s implementation – legislation, Governor in Council or government cabinet – influenced who and how decision-making power affected the outcomes of the documents.

Discontinuity

Finally, as shown in Table 8.1, the research identified a plethora of continuities and discontinuities across the seven Melbourne metropolitan planning documents. The most important of these related to the use of statutory planning controls and the provision of certainty. Even though legislation to enable its implementation was never enacted, the 1929 strategy continued the idea that urban development should be regulated at the local level. However, rather than use local by-laws, it proposed the creation of local planning schemes, which were to be informed by the strategy. In doing so, it began the idea that development certainty should be provided at the local level. The 1954 plan continued the idea that urban development should be regulated through planning schemes. However, it discontinued the idea that these schemes should occur at the local level, introducing instead the metropolitan-wide MMPS. In doing so, it established the idea that certainty should be provided at the metropolitan level. Importantly, the document was directly translated into the MMPS, reflecting the change from guiding strategy to blueprint plan. The 1971 and 1980-81 plans continued these ways of thinking. However, they increasingly looked towards additional planning, such as policy statements and short-lived local development schemes, and non-planning measures, such as financial measures and advocacy, to

achieve their aims. The 1987 strategy also continued the idea that urban development should be regulated through planning schemes. However, significant changes to the Victorian planning system discontinued regulation at the metropolitan level. The document re-established the idea of local planning schemes informed by an overarching metropolitan strategy and, in doing so, re-established the idea that certainty should be provided at the local level. The 1995 and 2002 strategies continued these ways of thinking. Importantly, further changes to the Victorian planning system meant that the strategic direction of the 2002 strategy, and all subsequent strategies, could be directly incorporated into each local planning scheme. However, these directions were not statutorily binding and were intended only to guide local planning schemes. To these ends, the use of statutory planning controls and the provision of certainty has been almost cyclical.

Just as the statutory planning controls have changed over time, the way in which metropolitan Melbourne was to accommodate future urban growth also changed. The 1929 strategy indicated that urban growth would occur in a balanced fashion alongside Melbourne's radial rail network. The 1954 plan discontinued this thinking, instead directing urban growth towards Melbourne's east and southeast, and making statutory provisions for it to do so. The 1971 plan discontinued this future urban growth pattern. Reverting more to the thinking of the 1929 strategy, it recommended that urban growth should occur in a radial fashion along Melbourne's rail and now road network, which it referred to as growth corridors. The plan also made statutory provisions to achieve this, establishing protected areas between these growth corridors, which it referred to as green wedges. Every Melbourne metropolitan planning document since the 1971 plan has continued this future urban growth pattern. However, since the 1980-81 plan, this growth has increasingly been accommodated through the consolidation of Melbourne's established residential areas and less on the urban fringe. The 2002 strategy attempted to finally limit urban sprawl by establishing the legislation-backed UGB. Importantly, the way in which this future urban growth was illustrated also changed over time. The 1929 strategy provided zoning maps, indicating how local councils could zone each property within metropolitan Melbourne (see Figure 5.2). Relatedly, the 1954 plan provided MMPS maps detailing precisely the planning controls affecting each property (see Figure 6.2). Despite being implemented primarily as amendments to the MMPS, the 1971 and 1980-81 plans did not include MMPS maps. The maps that were included were more of a general outline (see Figures 6.4 and 6.9). Detailed MMPS maps, however, could be found in

the accompanying MMPS amendment documentation. The documents from the 1987 strategy onwards provided only maps conceptualising the future urban growth of metropolitan Melbourne (see Figures 7.2, 7.4 and 7.7). This was understandable, given that, as strategies, they could not affect the physical location of this development. To these ends, the future urban growth pattern proposed in Melbourne metropolitan planning documents has largely remained the same since 1929. However, visual illustrations of this pattern within the documents have decreased in detail.

Other, less significant continuities and discontinuities were also identified. Markedly, the authorship of the metropolitan planning documents changed. Independent bodies were responsible for the first four documents; the MPTC created the 1929 strategy, while the MMBW created the 1954, 1971 and 1980-81 plans. However, this was not a strict continuity. The MPTC was an advisory body with no power to implement the recommendations of the strategy. In comparison, the MMBW was the body responsible for administering the MMPS. The idea of independent bodies creating metropolitan planning documents was discontinued following the transfer of the MMBW's planning powers to the state in the mid-1980s. Each document created thereafter – 1987, 1995 and 2002 strategies – was the responsibility of the State Government that created it. Interestingly, the 1995 and 2002 strategies took on the appearance of a public relations document, complete with uplifting statements and photographs. Importantly, the foci of the documents also changed. The 1929 strategy focused on inappropriate urban development and land speculation. The 1954 plan focused on the efficiency of the metropolis. The 1971 plan introduced an environmental focus, which reappeared in the 2002 strategy under the banner of sustainability. Between these two documents, the 1980-81 plan and 1987 and 1995 strategies focused largely on stimulating development. Ultimately, all of these foci were reflections of local problems and larger-scale issues. To these ends, authorship of Melbourne's seven metropolitan planning documents changed over time but these changes did not correlate with the changing foci of the documents.

8.5 Implications of this research

The fourth and final key objective of this thesis was to determine the implications of this research. Responding to this objective, the fourth and final research question was what are the implications of

this research for Melbourne metropolitan planning? Far from just an historical account, this thesis has wide-reaching implications for Melbourne metropolitan planning practice, theory and further research. These implications are in response to the three main findings to have come out of the above analysis: development certainty has, for the most part, been provided at the local level; metropolitan planning does not currently provide development certainty and did so only for a brief period; and the use of discourse around the provision of certainty emerged for rhetorical purposes.

This thesis firstly has implications for Melbourne metropolitan planning practice. Changes to the Victorian planning system in the late-1980s, specifically the localisation of statutory planning and the move from a blueprint to a concept-based strategy within Melbourne metropolitan planning, has meant that these documents can no longer provide certainty. As such, Victorian state governments should, as the authors of Melbourne metropolitan planning documents, avoid using the term certainty to describe these documents. They should be honest with the public and describe these documents for what they are: an indication of intended future urban development, not an assurance of it. It is, of course, understandable why state governments would want to use the term to describe their actions. The politicisation of planning that occurred with the changes to the planning system in the late-1980s meant that the Melbourne metropolitan planning documents are now a reflection of government. Importantly, the rhetoric around the provision of certainty looks good to both those for and those against the development of property. However, its use is blatantly deceptive. A solution to this would be for state governments to save the term for when it actually applies. State governments have always been able to affect the provisions within planning schemes. They did so first through government regulations and now through the VPPs. While they cannot apply these provisions to property, they can change them so that once applied, development certainty is delivered. For example, in 2013, the Minister for Planning at the time, Matthew Guy, used the term to describe the introduction of new residential zones into the VPPs. This eliminated discretion by mandating building heights (Guy, 2013). This provided assurances with respect to one important element of property development and could be touted as such. Saving the term for when state governments directly affect statutory planning controls would satisfy their public relations needs, while still respecting the changes in metropolitan planning that have made it no longer possible to provide certainty in the metropolitan planning documents themselves.

This thesis secondly has implications for Melbourne metropolitan planning theory. Importantly, while it has purposely refrained from making judgements as to efficacy of the abovementioned changes to the Victorian planning system, this thesis does offer insights that could inform contemporary theoretical debates. With respect to debates regarding the level at which development should be controlled, and thus certainty provided, this thesis provides an important historical insight into why these changes took place. In the early-1950s, the control of development was arguably better suited to the metropolitan level for a number of reasons: the Melbourne metropolitan region was relative small; there were not enough professional planners to work at the local level; and there was not enough interest in controlling development at the local level. However, these circumstances eventually changed. By the 1980s, the control of development was arguably better suited to the local level for a number of reasons: the Melbourne metropolitan region was much larger; there were many more professional planners; and, importantly, there was an increased realisation that local planning knowledge is important for balancing the competing needs of development and conservation. The introduction of local development schemes under the *Town and Country Planning (General Amendment) 1979 Act* highlighted this last point. To these ends, it could easily be argued that these changes were for the best.

With respect to debates regarding the purpose of metropolitan planning, this thesis provides an important historical context for understanding why the Melbourne metropolitan documents changed. In doing so, it also provides a potential defence of the new-look strategies. This thesis shows that the changes to the Victorian planning system shifted the purpose of metropolitan planning from controlling development through blueprint plans to guiding it through concept-based strategies. As such, the documents had to become less certain and more flexible. These changes were in line with the European trends in strategic planning identified in Chapter 3. Importantly, criticism has been levelled at these strategies, most notably the 2002 strategy, because they were not implemented (Mees, 2011; Buxton et al., 2016). However, such criticism may have missed this shift in purpose. Of course metropolitan planning documents were going to become less certain and more flexible in terms of implementation; with changes to statutory planning in Victoria, how could they become anything else? There was no longer a metropolitan statutory planning framework into which the documents could be translated. To this end, it could easily be argued that these changes to metropolitan planning were an inevitable outcome of localising development control. Whether or not this was for the best would require further

research. Interestingly, perhaps the above suggestion about clearly defining the purpose of Melbourne metropolitan planning documents would help change negative perceptions.

This thesis also has implications for further research. There are numerous opportunities for future research based on this thesis, which can be divided into three categories: extension, expansion and transplantation. With respect to the first category, research could be undertaken to extend the historical inquiry of this thesis beyond the timeframe of this thesis. It finished in the late-2000s not because the notion of certainty became less of an importance for Melbourne metropolitan planning – in fact, quite the contrary. Rather, it did so only due to limitations on the scope of the research and the availability of data. As such, there exists an opportunity to conduct future research that essentially extends this thesis to include the two Melbourne metropolitan planning documents created after its arbitrary end point: *Plan Melbourne* (DTPLI, 2014) and *Plan Melbourne, 2017 – 2050* (DELWP, 2017a). However, the latter issue of the availability of data remains a potential barrier to this future research.

With respect to the second category, given the century-plus timeframe in question, this thesis had to be quite broad in nature. As such, there exists opportunities to expand on its important, yet under-explored elements. These elements relate mostly to certainty. There firstly exists opportunities to research exactly what within statutory planning controls provide certainty. For example, research could be undertaken to examine what it is within a land-use zone or other provision that actually provides assurances with respect to development. Secondly, there exists opportunities to research how the use of discretion within these controls affects the provision of certainty. For example, research could be undertaken to examine how approved development differed from that intended under the planning controls. Thirdly, there exists opportunities to research the ways in which these controls can be circumvented, thereby weakening the provision of certainty. For example, research could be undertaken to examine how VCAT- or ministerially-approved development differed from that intended under the planning controls. All of these research opportunities could be historical or contemporary in nature. Moreover, they could all be tied to metropolitan planning or could stand-alone. Fourthly, and related to the above, there exists opportunities to investigate whether these statutory planning controls actually provided development certainty. For example, a longitudinal study could be undertaken to compare actual development to the planning controls in place at the time. It would be of tremendous

value to see if the assurances provided through these controls were real or not. Fifthly, there exists an opportunity, as mentioned above, to determine if the changes to the Victorian planning system and metropolitan planning have been for the best.

Finally, with respect to the third category, an interest in certainty is not exclusive to Melbourne. As discussed in Chapter 3, the notion of certainty was present in other Australian metropolitan regions. There exists opportunities to transplant the genealogical framework established in this thesis to those other regions to determine if and how their metropolitan planning documents provided certainty. From this, a greater understanding of Australian metropolitan planning and the circumstances in which it operates could be understood. To these ends, a plethora of different opportunities exist for future research based on this thesis. As such, this thesis marks not the end of a research journey but the beginning of one.

8.6 Concluding remarks

This thesis began with the overarching aim to critically investigate the notion of certainty and the historical development of its provision in Melbourne metropolitan planning. Through the use of a Foucauldian genealogical approach to planning, innovatively synthesised and operationalised in five key methodological principles, this aim was ultimately realised. It was found that certainty could only be provided through the use of statutory planning controls, which in the Victorian planning system are located within planning schemes. Applying this knowledge to Melbourne's metropolitan planning history, it found, across three discontinuous phases, two different ways of thinking with respect to the provision of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning. It was only during the second phase, the 1950s to the mid-1980s, that Melbourne's metropolitan plans – as distinct from strategies – actually provided certainty, as during this phase the plans were implemented directly through a metropolitan planning scheme. The first and third phases, the 1900s to the 1940s and the late-1980s to the 2000s, respectively, did not provide certainty, as during these phases the metropolitan strategies – as distinct from plans – relied on their transposition into local planning schemes for implementation. Interestingly, it found that, despite rhetoric to the contrary, the more recent Melbourne metropolitan planning documents do not actually provide certainty. This thesis contends that a variety of economic, political

and, crucially, planning factors, as well as a great number of people, were responsible for these shifts. Finally, the resultant findings represent an excellent opportunity for applications to Melbourne metropolitan planning practice and theory, and for further research.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Ethics Approval 15 April 2014 – 28 February 2015



Design and Social Context College Human Ethics Advisory Network (CHEAN)
Sub-committee of the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC)

Notice of Approval

Date: 15 April 2014

Project number: CHEAN A 0000018128-02/14

Project title: Challenging the doxa of planning for certainty: a case study of Melbourne and its implications for strategic spatial planning theory and practice

Risk classification: Low Risk

Investigator: Professor Jean Hillier and Mr. Cael James Leskovec

Approved: From: 15 April 2014 To: 28 February 2015

I am pleased to advise that your application has been granted ethics approval by the Design and Social Context College Human Ethics Advisory Network as a sub-committee of the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC).

Terms of approval:

- 1. Responsibilities of investigator**
It is the responsibility of the above investigator/s to ensure that all other investigators and staff on a project are aware of the terms of approval and to ensure that the project is conducted as approved by the CHEAN. Approval is only valid whilst the investigator/s holds a position at RMIT University.
- 2. Amendments**
Approval must be sought from the CHEAN to amend any aspect of a project including approved documents. To apply for an amendment please use the 'Request for Amendment Form' that is available on the RMIT website. Amendments must not be implemented without first gaining approval from CHEAN.
- 3. Adverse events**
You should notify HREC immediately of any serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants or unforeseen events affecting the ethical acceptability of the project.
- 4. Participant Information and Consent Form (PICF)**
The PICF and any other material used to recruit and inform participants of the project must include the RMIT university logo. The PICF must contain a complaints clause including the project number.
- 5. Annual reports**
Continued approval of this project is dependent on the submission of an annual report. This form can be located online on the human research ethics web page on the RMIT website.
- 6. Final report**
A final report must be provided at the conclusion of the project. CHEAN must be notified if the project is discontinued before the expected date of completion.
- 7. Monitoring**
Projects may be subject to an audit or any other form of monitoring by HREC at any time.
- 8. Retention and storage of data**
The investigator is responsible for the storage and retention of original data pertaining to a project for a minimum period of five years.

In any future correspondence please quote the project number and project title.

On behalf of the DSC College Human Ethics Advisory Network I wish you well in your research.

Suzana Kovacevic
Research and Ethics Officer
College of Design and Social Context
RMIT University
Ph: 03 9925 2974
Email: suzana.kovacevic@rmit.edu.au
Website: www.rmit.edu.au/dsc

Appendix B: Ethics Approval 17 March 2015 – 30 November 2015



Design and Social Context College Human Ethics Advisory Network (CHEAN)
Sub-committee of the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC)

Notice of Approval

Date: 17 March 2015

Project number: CHEAN A 0000018128-02/14

Project title: The historical development of certainty in Melbourne metropolitan planning

Risk classification: Low Risk

Investigator: Dr Benno Engels and Mr Cael James Leskovec

Approved: From: 17 March 2015 To: 30 November 2015

I am pleased to advise that the replacement of Chief Investigator from Professor Jean Hillier to Dr Benno Engels to the project, extension request until 30 November 2015 and title change has been granted ethics approval by the Design and Social Context College Human Ethics Advisory Network as a sub-committee of the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC).

Terms of approval:


- 1. Responsibilities of investigator**
It is the responsibility of the above investigator/s to ensure that all other investigators and staff on a project are aware of the terms of approval and to ensure that the project is conducted as approved by the CHEAN. Approval is only valid whilst the investigator/s holds a position at RMIT University.
- 2. Amendments**
Approval must be sought from the CHEAN to amend any aspect of a project including approved documents. To apply for an amendment please use the 'Request for Amendment Form' that is available on the RMIT website. Amendments must not be implemented without first gaining approval from CHEAN.
- 3. Adverse events**
You should notify HREC immediately of any serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants or unforeseen events affecting the ethical acceptability of the project.
- 4. Participant Information and Consent Form (PICF)**
The PICF and any other material used to recruit and inform participants of the project must include the RMIT university logo. The PICF must contain a complaints clause including the project number.
- 5. Annual reports**
Continued approval of this project is dependent on the submission of an annual report. This form can be located online on the human research ethics web page on the RMIT website.
- 6. Final report**
A final report must be provided at the conclusion of the project. CHEAN must be notified if the project is discontinued before the expected date of completion.
- 7. Monitoring**
Projects may be subject to an audit or any other form of monitoring by HREC at any time.
- 8. Retention and storage of data**
The investigator is responsible for the storage and retention of original data pertaining to a project for a minimum period of five years.

In any future correspondence please quote the project number and project title.

On behalf of the DSC College Human Ethics Advisory Network I wish you well in your research.

Suzana Kovacevic
Research and Ethics Officer
College of Design and Social Context
RMIT University
Ph: 03 9925 2974
Email: suzana.kovacevic@rmit.edu.au
Website: www.rmit.edu.au/dsc

Appendix C: Ethics Approval 13 April 2017 – 31 October 2017



Notice of Approval

Date: 13 April 2017

Project number: CHEAN A 16249-02/14

Project title: The Historical Development of Certainty in Melbourne Metropolitan Planning

Risk classification: Low Risk

Investigator: Dr Benno Engels, Mr Cael James Leskovec

Approved: From: 13 April 2017 To: 31 October 2017

I am pleased to advise that your extension request has been granted ethics approval by the Design and Social Context College Human Ethics Advisory Network, as a sub-committee of the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC). Ethics approval is extended until 31 October 2017.

Terms of approval:

- 1. Responsibilities of investigator**
It is the responsibility of the above investigator/s to ensure that all other investigators and staff on a project are aware of the terms of approval and to ensure that the project is conducted as approved by the CHEAN. Approval is only valid whilst the investigator/s holds a position at RMIT University.
- 2. Amendments**
Approval must be sought from the CHEAN to amend any aspect of a project including approved documents. To apply for an amendment please use the 'Request for Amendment Form' that is available on the RMIT website. Amendments must not be implemented without first gaining approval from CHEAN.
- 3. Adverse events**
You should notify HREC immediately of any serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants or unforeseen events affecting the ethical acceptability of the project.
- 4. Participant Information and Consent Form (PICF)**
The PICF and any other material used to recruit and inform participants of the project must include the RMIT university logo. The PICF must contain a complaints clause including the project number.
- 5. Annual reports**
Continued approval of this project is dependent on the submission of an annual report. This form can be located online on the human research ethics web page on the RMIT website.
- 6. Final report**
A final report must be provided at the conclusion of the project. CHEAN must be notified if the project is discontinued before the expected date of completion.
- 7. Monitoring**
Projects may be subject to an audit or any other form of monitoring by HREC at any time.
- 8. Retention and storage of data**
The investigator is responsible for the storage and retention of original data pertaining to a project for a minimum period of five years.

Please quote the project number and project title in any future correspondence.

On behalf of the DSC College Human Ethics Advisory Network, I wish you well in your research.

Dr David Blades
DSC CHEAN Secretary
RMIT University
E: dscethics@rmit.edu.au

**Appendix D: Members of the Metropolitan Town Planning Commission (MTPC,
1929: 5-6)**

<i>Position</i>	<i>Member</i>
Chair	Alderman Frank Stapley , F.R.V.I.A. – Member, Melbourne City Council; Member, Commission of Public Health; Commissioner, Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works; Architect. He was appointed on the nomination of the Melbourne City Council and subsequently elected Chair by the Commission.
Municipal Representatives	Councillor Colonel C. E. Merrett , C.B.E., V.D., J.P. – Member, South Melbourne Council; Commissioner, Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works; Merchant. He was appointed on the nomination of the Cities of Brighton, Port Melbourne, Sandringham, South Melbourne and St. Kilda.
	Councillor J. J. Liston , J.P. – Member, Williamstown and Melbourne City Councils; Commissioner, Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works; Secretary of Liquor Trades’ Defence Union. He was appointed on the nomination of the Cities of Brunswick, Coburg, Essendon, Footscray, Northcote, Preston and Williamstown.
	Councillor Edward C. Rigby – Member, Hawthorn Council; Solicitor. He was appointed on the nomination of the Cities of Collingwood, Fitzroy, Hawthorn, Kew and Richmond and the Shire of Heidelberg.
	W. A. Wharington J.P. – Former Member, Caulfield Council; Manager. He was appointed on the nomination of the Cities of Box Hill, Camberwell, Caulfield, Malvern, Oakleigh and Prahran and the Shires of Blackburn, Mitcham and Moorabbin.
Business, Technical and Professional Members	E. Evan Smith , F.R.I.B.A., F.R.V.I.A., M.R. San. I., Lond. – Chief Architect, Public Works Department of Victoria.
	H. E. Morton , M. Inst. C.E., M.I.E., Aust., L.S. – Former City Engineer, Melbourne City Council; Member, Sydney Civic Commission.
	T. P. Strickland , B.E., M.Sc., M.I.E.E., M. Amer., I.E.E., M.E.I., Canada, M.E.I. Aust. – Chief Engineer, Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board.
	S. Tuxen , M.V.I.E, A.M.I.E.A, M. Amer. C.P.I. – Licensed Surveyor; Certificated Municipal and Water Supply Engineer.
Additional Members	C. H. Fethney – Superintending Engineer, Way and Works Branch, Victorian Railways. He was appointed on the nomination of the Victorian Railways Commissioners in accordance with Section 2 of the Metropolitan Town Planning Commission 1925 Act.

Appendix E: Members of the MMBW Planning Organisation (MMBW, 1954:

xviii)

<Image removed due to copyright restrictions>

Appendix F: Statutory Planning Controls in Metropolitan Melbourne Over Time

Control / Year	Local By-Law 'Zoning'	Local Zoning Schemes	Local Planning Schemes	Local Development Schemes	Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme		
1921	Empowered under the Local Government Act 1921						
1922							
1923							
1924							
1925							
1926							
1927							
1928							
1929							
1930							
1931							
1932							
1933							
1934							
1935							
1936							
1937							
1938			Empowered under the Slum Reclamation and Housing Act 1938				
1939							
1940							
1941							
1942							
1943							
1944							
1945				First iteration of local planning schemes			
1946							
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1966			Empowered under the Town and Country Planning Act 1944				
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1968						Empowered under the Town and Country Planning (Metropolitan Area) Act 1949	
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2014					
2015					
2016					
2017					
2018					

Appendix G: Melbourne 2030 Timeline (DI, 2002a: 16-17, 181)

Year	Month	Event	
2002	D	Implementation Plan #6 Released	
	N	Melbourne 2030 and Implementation Plans #1-#5 Released	
	O	Technical Report #12 (Urban Design) Released	
	S		
	A		
	J		
	J		
	M	Technical Report #11 (Rural Living Development) Released	
	A	Technical Report #10 (Heritage) Released	
	M		
	F		
	J		
2001	D		
	N		
	O		
	S		
	A		
	J	Technical Reports #5 (Regional Areas), #8 (Activity Centres), #9 (Culture) Released	
	M	2 nd Round of Public Consultation Released	
	A	Info Bulletin #3 Released	
	M		
	A		
	M	Info Bulletin #2 Released	
	J	Info Bulletin #1 Released	
D	1 st Round of Public Consultation		
N	Technical Reports #4 (Housing Past, Housing Futures), #6 (Population Projections), #7 (Freight) Released		
O	Challenge Melbourne Issues Paper Released		
S	Technical Report #2 (Green Wedges and Non-Urban Issues) Released		
A	Technical Report #1 (Environmental Issues) Released		
2000	J		
	J		
	M	Technical Report #3 (Globalisation and Competitiveness) Released	
	A		
	M		
	F		
	J		
	1999	D	Commitment to Prepare Metropolitan Strategy
		N	

Appendix H: Chronological List of Melbourne Planning Events

N.B. The following table is not a comprehensive list of every metropolitan planning event and piece of legislation in Melbourne’s history. It is a list of events and legislation deemed to be most important in helping to explain the historical development of the provision of certainty within Melbourne metropolitan planning.

1835	Melbourne founded
1837	<i>Grid Plan</i> for the Melbourne CBD released by Hoddle
1849	Melbourne city proclaimed
1851	Colony of Victoria proclaimed
1855	Colonial government established
1888	Royal Commission to Inquire and Report Upon the Sanitary Condition of Melbourne
1890	Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works (MMBW) established — to provide water and sewerage
1901	Federation of Australia
	Congress of Engineers, Architects, Surveyors and Members of Allied Profession
1913	Joint Select Committee on the Housing of the People in the Metropolis
1914	UK Garden Cities and Town Planning Association (GCTPA) Australasian Tour
	Victorian Town Planning and Parks Association (VTPPA) established, later renamed the Town Planning Association of Victorian (TPAV) and then Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA)
1915	Royal Commission on the Housing of the People in the Metropolis and in the Populous Centres of the State
	<i>Town Planning</i> released by Morrell of the Public Works Department to the Minister for Public Works
1916	Melbourne City Council (MCC) introduce CBD building height limits
1917	First Australian Town Planning and Housing Conference and Exhibition held in Adelaide
1918	Second Australian Town Planning and Housing Conference and Exhibition held in Brisbane
1919	First Victorian Town Planning Conference and Exhibition held in Ballarat
1920	MCC resolution for a conference of municipalities to discuss planning responses passed
	Conference of Metropolitan Municipalities held
1921	Report into the findings of the Conference of Metropolitan Municipalities released by the conference committee to the state government
	<i>Local Government Act</i> — gave local governments the power to introduce by-laws to prescribe areas within the municipality as residential areas and prohibiting or regulating the erection or use of any buildings for non-residential purposes

1922	<i>Metropolitan Town Planning Commission Act</i> — gave power to establish the Melbourne Town Planning Commission (MTPC) and report to the Minister for Public Works on general plans and recommendations
1923	MTPC established
1925	<i>First Report</i> released by the MTPC
1929	<i>Plan of General Development: Melbourne</i> released by the MTPC
1936	Housing Investigation and Slum Abolition Board (HISAB) established
1937	<i>First Report</i> released by the HISAB
1938	<i>Slum Reclamation and Housing Act</i> — gave local governments the power to prepare zoning schemes, plans and maps for municipal development (residential, business, industrial, public amusement and open space) and gave power to establish the Housing Commission of Victoria (HCV) to, amongst other things, oversee the preparation of the above controls
	HCV established
1941	Curtin (post. Forde and Chifley) Labor federal government elected
1943	County of London Plan released by Abercrombie and Forshaw
1944	<i>Town and Country Planning Act</i> — this “parent act” gave local governments the power (absolving their previous powers under the Slum Reclamation and Housing Act) to prepare local or joint planning schemes consistent with the supplied broad schedule and implement interim development orders (IDOs) and gave power to establish the Town and Country Planning Board (TCPB) to administer planning schemes and report to the Minister for Public Works. However, it provided no legal definition as to the form and exact content of the planning schemes and zoning ordinances. This legislation was based largely on that present in the <i>Plan of General Development: Melbourne</i> . It was the chief piece of planning legislation until 1961
	Greater London Plan released by Abercrombie
1945	Commonwealth State Housing Agreement signed
1946	TCPB established
1948	Cumberland County (Sydney) Planning Scheme released by the Cumberland County Council
1949	Menzies (post. Holt, McEwen, Gorton and McMahon) Liberal-National Coalition federal government elected
	<i>Town and Country Planning (Metropolitan Area) Act</i> — gave power to the MMBW to prepare a metropolitan planning scheme due to limited or unsatisfactory uptake of local or joint planning schemes and IDOs. Local government power to prepare local or joint planning schemes and IDOs was not disrupted, allowing two equal sets of development controls
1951	Regional and Town Planning Institute established (RTPI), later renamed the Royal Australian Planning Institute (RAPI)
1952	Cain Labor state government elected
1953	<i>Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme 1954: Report, Survey and Analysis</i> (MMPS) released by the MMBW and exhibited
1955	Bolte (post. Hamer) Liberal and Country state government elected
	MMBW implements Interim Development Orders (IDOs) to stop development inconsistent with the MMPS

	<i>Plan for the Metropolitan Region, Perth and Fremantle</i> released by Hepburn and Stephenson
1958	Finalised MMPS released by the MMBW to the state government for gazettal
1961	<i>Town and Country Planning Act</i> — this “parent act” largely just restructured the legislation to improve the planning system. It was the chief piece of planning legislation until 1987
1966	Minister for Local Government (Hamer) instructs the MMBW and TCPB to prepare reports about their planning roles, visions
1967	<i>Organisation for Strategic Planning</i> released by the TCPB
	<i>The Future Growth of Melbourne</i> released by the MMBW
1968	<i>Future Shape of Melbourne</i> released by the TCPB
	MMPS gazetted by the state government
	<i>Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act</i> — created a three-tiered planning system for Victoria: state, regional and local. It gave power to the TCPB to coordinate state planning, gave power to establish the State Planning Council (SPC) to create ‘statements of planning policy’ that had to be given regard in the preparation of all planning schemes and gave power to establish regional planning authorities to create regional planning schemes, similar to the metropolitan planning scheme. Moreover, it extended the metropolitan planning scheme boundary from its original 1949 boundary. It also gave power to establish the Town Planning Appeals Tribunal (TPAT) to hear appeals
	SPC established
	TPAT established
1969	<i>Melbourne Transport Plan</i> released by the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC)
1970	<i>Statement of Planning Policy No 1 - Westernport</i> released by the TCPB
	<i>Statement of Planning Policy No 2 – Mornington Peninsula</i> released by the TCPB
1971	<i>Statement of Planning Policy No 3 – Dandenong Ranges</i> released by the TCPB
	<i>Statement of Planning Policy No 4 – River Yarra</i> released by the TCPB
	<i>Planning Policies for the Metropolitan Region</i> (Amendment 3 and 21 to the MMPS) released for comment by the MMBW
1972	Whitlam Labor federal government elected
	Federal Department of Urban Development established (DURD)
1973	Ministry of Planning (MP) established
	Hunt appointed inaugural Minister for Planning
	<i>Statement of Planning Policy No 7 – Geelong</i> released by the TCPB
1974	<i>Report on General Concepts</i> (Amendment 3 and 21 to the MMPS) released by the MMBW
	Amendments 3 and 21 to the MMPS accepted by the state government
1975	SPC restructured as the State Coordination Council (SCC)

	Fraser Liberal-National federal government elected
	DURD abolished
	<i>Statement of Planning Policy No 8 – Macedon Ranges and surrounds</i> released by the TCPB
1976	<i>Statement of Planning Policy No 1 – Westernport (As varied)</i> released by the TCPB
1977	<i>Melbourne’s Inner Area: A Position Statement</i> released by the MMBW
1979	<i>The Challenge of Change: A Review of Metropolitan Melbourne’s Planning Options</i> released by the MMBW
	<i>Alternative Strategies Metropolitan Melbourne</i> released by the MMBW
	<i>Town and Country Planning (General Amendment) Act</i> — gave local governments the short-lived power to create local development schemes with finer-grained zoning than planning schemes provided they were consistent with the metropolitan planning scheme
1980	<i>Metropolitan Strategy</i> released for comment by the MMBW
	TPAT restructured as the Planning Appeals Board (PAB)
1981	<i>Metropolitan Strategy Implementation</i> (Amendment 150) released by the MMBW
	MP restructured as the Department of Planning (DP)
	TCPB absorbed into the DP
1982	Cain II (post. Kirner) Labor state government elected, Walker (post. Keenan, Roper and McCutcheon) appointed Minister for Planning
1983	Hawke (post. Keating) Labor federal government elected
	DP restructured as the Ministry for Planning and Environment (MPE)
	SCC abolished
	<i>New District Centre Policy and Zones</i> released by the MMBW
	Amendment 150 to the MMPS accepted by the state government
1984	<i>Central Melbourne: Framework for the Future</i> released by the State Government of Victoria
1985	<i>Town and Country Planning (Transfer of Functions) Act</i> — gave power to transfer planning powers from the MMBW to the MPE
	Planning Division of the MMBW absorbed into the MPE
1987	<i>Planning and Environment Act</i> — this “parent act” substantially restructured planning controls in Victoria. Metropolitan and regional planning schemes and IDOs were removed in favour of improved local planning schemes for each municipality. Local planning schemes were to now contain a state section (matters of state significance), regional section (for metropolitan municipalities, this was the provisions of the former MMPS) and local section (at first this was zoning maps but later the provisions of the former MMPS relating to that municipality). It remains the chief piece of planning legislation to this day
	Shaping Melbourne’s Future: The Government’s Metropolitan Policy released by the State Government of Victoria
	PAB restructured as the Planning Division of the of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Victoria (AAT)
1989	<i>Metropolitan Activity Centres</i> released by the State Government of Victoria

	<i>Plenty Valley Strategic Plan</i> released by the State Government of Victoria
1990	MPE restructured as the Department of Planning and Urban Growth (DPUG)
1991	DPUG restructured as the Department of Planning and Housing
	<i>South East and Werribee Growth Area Plans</i> released by the State Government of Victoria
1992	<i>Cities in Suburbs</i> released by the State Government of Victoria
	Kennett Liberal-National Coalition state government elected, Maclellan appointed Minister for Planning
1993	DPH restructured as the Department of Planning and Development (DPD)
1994	<i>Creating Prosperity: Victoria's Capital City Policy</i> released by the State Government of Victoria and Melbourne City Council
	Kennett restructures local government areas (LGAs) — Melbourne's number of LGAs reduced from 53 to 26
1995	<i>The Good Design Guidelines for Medium-Density Housing</i> introduced by the DPD
	<i>Living Suburbs: A Policy for Metropolitan Melbourne into the 21st Century</i> released by the Victorian State Government
1996	Howard Liberal-National federal government elected
	DPD restructured as the Department of Infrastructure (DI)
	<i>Planning and Environment (Planning Schemes) Act</i> — gave power standardising local planning schemes across the state. Each local planning scheme must contain the following Victoria Planning Provisions (VPPs): the state planning policy framework (SPPF), a local planning policy framework (LPPF), including a Municipal Strategic Statement (MSS), and state standard zones, overlays and particular provisions relating to specific categories of use and development. This is the present-day format
1998	<i>From Doughnut City to Café Society</i> released by the DI
	AAT restructured as the Victorian Civil Administrative Tribunal (VCAT)
	First of the present-day format local planning schemes gazetted
1999	<i>A Better Future for Victorians: Implementation, Integration and Innovation</i> released by the DI
	Bracks (post. Brumby) Labor state government elected, Thwaites (post. Delahunty, Hulls and Madden) appointed Minister for Planning
	<i>Linking Victoria</i> released by the Victorian State Government
2001	<i>ResCode</i> introduced by the DI
2002	<i>Melbourne 2030: Planning for Sustainable Growth</i> released by the DI
	Local governments instructed to create structure plans (SPs) to be implemented in local planning schemes for activity centres, later activities areas
	DI restructured as the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE)
	RAPI restructured as the Planning Institute of Australia (PIA)
2003	<i>Planning and Environment (Metropolitan Green Wedge Protection) Act</i> — gave power to define the Urban Growth Boundary (UGB)
2004	<i>Linking Melbourne: Metropolitan Transport Plan</i> released by the Victorian State Government

2005	<i>A Plan for Melbourne's Growth Areas</i> released by the DSE
2006	Growth Area Authority (GAA) established help incorporate precinct structure plans (PSPs) created by developers, local governments or the GAA for urban land within a number of growth areas into local planning schemes
2007	DSE restructured as the Department of Planning and Community Development (DPCD)
	Rudd (post. Gillard and Rudd) Labor federal government elected
2008	<i>Melbourne 2030 Audit Expert Group Report</i> released by Moodie et al.
	<i>Planning for All of Melbourne</i> released by the DPCD
	<i>Melbourne @ 5 Million</i> released by the DPCD
	<i>The Victorian Transport Plan</i> released by the Victorian State Government
2009	<i>Delivering Melbourne's Newest Sustainable Communities</i> released by the DPCD
2010	Baillieu (post. Napthine) Liberal-National Coalition state government elected, Guy appointed Minister for Planning
2012	<i>Growth Corridor Plans: Managing Melbourne's Growth</i> released by the GAA to inform PSPs
2013	DPCD restructured as the Department of Transport, Planning and Local Infrastructure (DTPLI)
	Abbott Liberal-National Coalition federal government elected
	<i>Plan Melbourne: Metropolitan Planning Strategy</i> released for comment by the DTPLI
	GAA abolished
	Metropolitan Planning Authority (MPA) established — to implement <i>Plan Melbourne</i> and take over precinct planning responsibility in growth areas
2014	Finalised <i>Plan Melbourne: Metropolitan Planning Strategy</i> released by the DTPLI
	Reformed residential zones came into effect state-wide
	Andrews state government elected, Wynne appointed Minister for Planning
2015	DTPLI restructured as the Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning (DELWP)
2017	<i>Plan Melbourne, 2017 – 2050</i> released by the DELWP