INTERROGATING THE DYNAMICS OF 'COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY'
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE CASE OF CAMBODIA

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A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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November 2010
Acknowledgements

I have been very fortunate throughout the PhD to have had a great deal of support from a variety of sources.

On an academic level there are numerous people that I wish to thank in gratitude for advice and help over the years. At Birmingham, my supervisor Jill Steans has done a tremendous job in keeping me from wandering too far from the various theoretical paths that I have attempted to tread. She has been with my project from day one, and I am privileged and grateful that she has shown the same high level of interest from when I first arrived. I was also lucky enough to have had a plethora of second supervisors come and go over the years; each has become embedded within my work at various stages. Luis Cabrera, Caroline Hughes, Simon Caney and Magnus Ryner, have all been inspiring, in particular I would like to mention Caroline; I do not think I would ever have had the pleasure of undertaking an empirical case study of Cambodia were it not for her keen interest and support.

In Australia where I spent an educational few months at the University of Queensland, I would like to thank Martin and Heloise Weber who were an inspirational source of ideas for both my theory (Martin) and empirical (Heloise) chapters.

In Cambodia I would like to thank John Clark and Carmen Malena at the World Bank, and all of the team at CAS, for allowing me to participate in their Social Accountability project.

My colleagues in the department have been exceptionally helpful over the years, not just providing an arena for intellectual debate, but fulfilling the social side of a PhD that is essential on the long journey. There are far too many to thank individually, but I hope that you are all aware of my eternal gratitude and know that the PhD would never have been finished had it not been for your support.

My friends and family outside of the department have in a similar way been a constant source of support, particularly looking after me during the write-up year and steering me towards the light at the end of the tunnel.

Finally I would like to thank the Economic and Research Council who have funded this thesis as part of the 1+3 scheme. I have been fortunate enough to have a funding body that allows flexibility and creativity within research, something that I fear is becoming all too rare in funding bodies these days.
Abstract

This thesis engages in a sympathetic critique of the critical (dialogical) dimension of cosmopolitan democracy and its idealisation of a specific form of global civil society (GCS) to contest the exclusionary practices of contemporary global governance. Drawing upon the work of Jürgen Habermas, the critical approach assumes civil society as a communicative (local) vehicle that draws from the lifeworld, to steer the systemic neoliberal modes of global governance. The thesis in contrast, describes a scenario resulting in the reversal of this logic; global neoliberal modes of rationality can actually colonise the communicative spaces of (local) civil society. To highlight this claim, a specific neoliberal global democratic project is examined to reveal two new roles for global civil society; professional service providers, and democratic watchdogs. These roles re-inscribe a new identity for civil society akin to the neoliberal form of systemic rationality. An empirical case study of these roles within Cambodian civil society is then undertaken to demonstrate how endogenous communicative spaces can be marginalised through exogenous neoliberal interventions. The thesis suggests that the critical cosmopolitan democratic project must reject its de-contextualised communicative assumptions of global civil society in order to retain its inclusionary ideal.
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to interrogate the dynamics of the cosmopolitan democratic project and its ambitious attempt to formulate a more inclusive conception of global governance. The attempt to extend the boundaries of the democratic political community outside of the nation-state relies upon an elevation of the role of civil society, as an inclusive and participatory structure capable of transcending these territorially defined boundaries, and allowing a more diverse set of stakeholders the chance to impose their collective voices on the coordination of global processes.

A nascent 'global' form of civil society is privileged within these frameworks as a solution to the perceived 'democratic deficit' that exists on a global level, contemporary structures of global governance are largely coordinated by actors representing either state or market interests; a bounded sphere of decision-making that largely excludes citizen's interests located within democratic communities. This gap between the decision-makers and decision-takers within global politics is furthermore exacerbated by the increasingly asymmetrical relationship of the territorial state under the contemporary process of globalisation, understood in its spatial form as, “the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social interaction” (Held and McGrew 2002, p1). In this understanding, globalisation can be seen as increasing the democratic deficit between global forms of governance and bounded political communities; globalising processes increasingly affecting the lives of many, are coordinated outside of the nation-state in the hands of the few.
The potential for a global form of civil society is seen in this regard to represent an important link between the local and the global, a transmission belt that can increase the representation and participation of a variety of interests that emerge from within and across national boundaries, offering new channels of communication often blocked or marginalised through the more formal routes of political participation outside of the nation-state.

The role of civil society as an inclusive ideal within contemporary structures of global governance is furthermore juxtaposed with that of a specific form of globalisation, the neoliberal dimension and sets up a dualism that I aim to interrogate at the heart of the thesis; the globalisation of civil society as a counter-weight to the globalisation of neoliberal modes of governance. Before interrogating this dualism it is important to introduce two different approaches to the cosmopolitan democratic project that I have categorised as the liberal and the critical dimension, in order to firstly understand the way in which they approach this dualism and secondly, to expose my own position as a sympathetic engagement with the latter, before moving on towards discussions of the research hypothesis.

The liberal dimension of cosmopolitan democracy attempts to create a multi-stakeholder approach to the operational logics of global governance, through reforming the present United Nations (UN) system to a more inclusive and democratic structure. Within this project there is an inherently liberal bias emanating from the cosmopolitan influences of Immanuel Kant to create a democratic form of governance that invokes universalistic moral principles aimed at a more 'humane' form of governance. This privileging of the individual as the ultimate unit of moral worth leads the liberal dimension to critique the unjust forms of neoliberal economic
globalisation, as a valorisation of capital over humanity and the inequalities that impact on the welfare of individuals.

The remedy to neoliberal forms of global governance that prioritise market and economic expansion, is contained within the potential of global civil society to 'tame' and control this exclusive dimension, thus to put democratic decision-making in the hands of individuals rather than markets. Civil society is seen under this model as a moral domain that links the grassroots with the global, concerned with questions of the good life, the environment, social welfare and justice. This dimension of cosmopolitan democracy is concerned largely with the democratic deficit as a problem of access for the participation of civil society within global structures such as the UN system. The argument suggests that so long as spaces are created for these actors, the democratic deficit will be eradicated and the neoliberal forms of globalisation will be subordinate to the aims of humanity. This prioritising of access, fails to question the quality of democratic participation itself, assuming that within global structures, representatives of civil society, the state, and the market, will be guided by a moral cosmopolitan framework; the quality of participation is assured to result in a more equitable and humane outcome than present structures.

The critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy takes a different approach to the construction of a more inclusive form of democratic governance beyond the nation state. Drawing upon the work of Jurgen Habermas, it attempts to formulate a global framework based upon a *dialogical* rather than a *monological* formation of the principles, norms and rules, in the outcome of democratic decision-making. The liberal dimension draws its principles through a form of monological self-reflection associated with Immanuel Kant, and
strongly criticised by Habermas for relying upon a foundational epistemology to validate/invalidate truth claims through an a priori standpoint. Monological self-reflection can be seen as “any strategy of examining rational commitments and orientations in an artificial state of inward-looking self-reflection” (Kingwell 1995, p19). The liberal dimension promotes the universalistic moral primacy of human rights, ecological sustainability and social welfare from a pre-determined structure, the critical dimension, however, attempts to generate universal accepted discourses through dialogic interaction (grounded in intersubjective communication) rather than this form of monological reasoning.

The liberal dimension is accused here, of creating a selective framework that appears to allow a greater inclusion of actors into the global democratic framework but at the expense of marginalising those that exist outside, or fail to adhere to, the liberal cosmopolitan framework. Civil society keeps its ethical and humanitarian promise within these structures, but only because it is seemingly guided by an overarching cosmopolitan framework that pre-determines the content of dialogue within these newly generated spaces. The attempt to create a more inclusive form of global democratic governance is seriously questioned when the frameworks are pre-established along monological criteria, thus they are deeply exclusive. As a consequence, the thesis turns towards the critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy as harbouring the potential for a more inclusive discussion on global democratic governance.

The critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy, employs a 'minimal-foundationalist' epistemology that “reject[s] the supposition that there is one conception of the good life which ought to be universalised...their resistance to unjustified modes of exclusion is linked with a conception of the self and society which values the expansion of the boundaries of dialogic
forms of life. Dialogue is the preferred means by which subjects should decide whether systems of exclusion are justified” (Linklater 1998, p109). There is an acceptance here of the foundational content of truth claims, but these must be constructed through a dialogic process to be deemed inclusive and valid. To this end, the critical dimension attempts to create a global democratic framework that privileges the role of civil society within a deliberative democratic framework; an attempt to link the local with the global that is not only concerned with access for the participation of civil society under these frameworks, but the actual quality of this participation (through the adjudicatory mechanism of deliberation) to ensure that decision-making is inclusive and truly democratic.

The critical project accepts that the search for an inclusive global democratic project is admirable, but ultimately misguided if our intent is to expand pluralistic spaces to ensure that representatives of civil society have the same decision-making access as representatives of the state and the market, instead our task is to expose sites of domination and exclusion where decision-making structures at the global level are imbued with what Habermas deems 'distorted communication'.

We can now return to the dualism constructed between civil society and neoliberal forms of global governance; under the liberal cosmopolitan framework, civil society offers a solution to those unaccountable governing structures that prioritise the unfettered expansion of markets, through subsuming them under the guiding structure of liberal cosmopolitan principles. As this thesis will demonstrate, the concept of a ‘guiding’ structure is, however, problematic in its claims for democratic inclusion. In contrast, this thesis supports the notion of a critical cosmopolitan framework that focuses on a critique of the steering mechanisms
that are associated with neoliberal forms of governance. This form of governance promotes a form of instrumental rationality within decision-making that effectively distorts the validity of decision-making structures at the global level. Democratic deliberation at the global level is seen as authentic when actors participate through communicative action rather than instrumental reasoning; to this end the critical project enlists civil society as the communicative vehicle that can challenge the exclusive forms of rationality inherent within the (neoliberal) spaces of global governance. This links to the Habermasian separation between system and lifeworld, where the systemic forms of rationality emanating from the (administrative) state and the (economic) market attempt to impinge on the social dimension of undistorted communication; the lifeworld. In order to remedy the effect of systemic imperatives, civil society is elevated as a panacea; drawing from the communicative structures of the lifeworld and effectively steering, through the framework of deliberation, neoliberal modes of rationality that are claimed to saturate the contemporary structures of global governance.

The numerous authors that draw upon this framework to inject an inclusive, deliberative form of democracy at the global level all draw upon the importance of civil society as a communicative sphere that is tasked with attempting to steer the systemic forms of neoliberal governance. These authors utilise the notion of global public spheres to analyse decision-making processes under deliberation where civil society can fulfil this role and create more inclusive structures. Although many of the authors remain sceptical of the current ability for civil society to successfully influence and steer these exclusive practices, its role as a communicative sphere emanating from the lifeworld remains largely unquestioned; only the obstacles that need to be overcome are questioned in order for their success.
I am sympathetic to this critical project for attempting to formulate an inclusive link between the local and the global, where civil society is privileged as the vehicle through which a more legitimate global democratic framework can be constructed outside of the nation-state, in this respect the thesis offers a sympathetic problematisation of the critical project that hopes to intervene within the internal debates, but without seeking to undermine its raison d’être. The core contribution of the thesis should therefore be thought of as a constructive intervention in order to strengthen this vein of work and carry on the critical tradition of exposing sites of exclusion within the global democratic project.

The critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy is often within the literature concerned with an abstract discussion on the problems of inclusion and exclusion at the global level, thus at times discussions on the creation of frameworks such as ‘global public spheres’ and even the more empirically grounded analysis of global regimes, tend to be vague and hypothetical. In some respects this is understandable; the literature avoids the liberal pitfalls of establishing pre-determined frameworks, and instead tends to analyse what is already emerging, thus the aim is to interrogate potential systems of inclusion / exclusion within these frameworks. As will be demonstrated within the thesis, few actively engage in an analysis of the actual concrete practices of global governance, the downside is that with this lack of contextualised engagement with empirical research, a number of assumptions are made by the critical cosmopolitan project that are replicated throughout their theoretical frameworks. The key question raised by the thesis is that of the identity of civil society promoted under these frameworks, a subject that has not received adequate attention within the literature.
External criticisms have been aimed at both the liberal and critical variants of cosmopolitan democracy for basing their theoretical hopes on an assumption that the emergence of a 'global civil society' will supply the fuel and machinery required to transform the exclusive structures of global governance. These critics often describe the unevenness of global forms of civil society such as the dominance of northern over southern networks for example or the unequal funding opportunities that affect who can and who cannot participate, yet the cosmopolitan project attempts to side-step these criticisms through describing the role of global civil society as firstly a spatial rather than geographical phenomena, and secondly, as a project to be realised. The spatial understanding has resulted in authors using the term 'transnational' rather than global within their projects to avoid making geographical assumptions (though of course there are those that still use the term ‘global’ albeit within a spatial rather than geographical understanding), and outlining that problems with the inherent unevenness of global forms of civil society do not undermine the project itself, merely reflect the barriers and obstacles that must be overcome in order to create an inclusive democratic project. I am sympathetic with these critiques at the lack of empirical engagement with the concrete forms of global civil society, however, I want to push this critique further and suggest that the critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy needs to problematise its de-contextualised discussions of civil society, and re-engage with contextual practices of contemporary global civil society in its geographical as well as spatial form.

The critical literature makes a key assumption about civil society within the global democratic framework, that despite problems and obstacles in its composition, it still has an important role as a communicative vehicle that draws from the lifeworld whilst attempting, under a framework of deliberation, to steer the systemic modes of governance. Empirical analysis of
contemporary structures of governance all assess the role of civil society as a persuasive and communicative force that deploys reflexive action in its attempt to guide and instigate decision-making away from the instrumental modes of reasoning associated with state (administrative) and market (economic) logics. The dualism is again exposed as one where civil society and its communicative potential are juxtaposed against neoliberal forms of instrumental reasoning. The battle for a more inclusive global democratic project revolves around utilising the steering mechanisms of civil society to legitimise the content of democratic decisions, thus to relegate the systemic forms of administrative and economic logics as a servant to democratic will-formation.

This thesis raises a simple yet important question, what if the supposed communicative identity of civil society as a steering mechanism vis-à-vis systemic modes of governance, were demonstrated to be potentially reversible? By this I provoke the question that, what if under certain contemporary frameworks, systemic modes of rationality could effectively permeate the communicative structures of civil society, amounting to what Habermas would classify as 'colonisation'. The critical cosmopolitan project seems content with the assumption that if civil society fails to steer systemic forms of rationality within global decision-making structures, then these are structures to be reformed, yet it fails to interrogate the possibility that the very vehicle responsible for channelling communicative action into global structures of governance, may in fact be colonised, by the instrumental logics it seeks to undermine. I propose to demonstrate that such a case exists; neoliberal forms of instrumental rationality at the global level can in fact colonise the perceived communicative structures of civil society at the very local level of collective organisation. This is not to undermine the communicative ideal of civil society per se, merely to point out that it is far from invulnerable to systemic
saturation within its structures.

There are further implications with this line of thought that the thesis will draw out, namely, that those systemic steering mechanisms that I will argue are colonising the communicative potential of civil society, reflect a problematisation of the assumed local-global links constructed by the critical cosmopolitan project. Their frameworks tend to imply that the exclusive global dimension of governance can be solved through the elevation of the inclusive local, yet there is a general failure to understand and interrogate the relationship of the local-global link in practice. This thesis will demonstrate how neoliberal forms of global governance can be implicit in the construction of local spaces for civil society, seriously questioning the unidirectional assumptions of the local-global link within the critical cosmopolitan framework. The critical cosmopolitan project accepts the problems at the global level of instrumental rationality inherent within the neoliberal spaces of governance, yet it fails to recognise that these are not simply steering mechanisms, but effectively part of a political project that has incorporated civil society as part of a new democratic and participatory agenda.

The thesis does not however, attempt to suggest that this global-local reversal is a universal process and that neoliberal constructions of civil society are globally reproduced, it merely wishes to highlight that this is a potential problem that the critical cosmopolitan project must respond to through re-aligning its critical focus towards the local, before engaging in discussions of the global.

The core contribution that this thesis will make to the critical literature is to provide evidence of the colonisation of (local) spaces of civil society from the (global) neoliberal modes of
systemic rationality. This theoretical contribution will provide an important critique of the way in which the critical approach relies upon a model of civil society that is communicatively bounded; a coordinating mechanism to steer systemic forms of governance. To demonstrate this, I have drawn upon an original case study of civil society in Cambodia that effectively traces (global) neoliberal development frameworks influencing the democratic structures of governance within the country, and the effect they have when interacting with (local) civil society organisations (CSOs). The result is to provide a detailed account of how the various identities of CSOs at the local level can become colonised under neoliberal forms of systemic rationality, highlighting the need for the critical cosmopolitan project to reassess its theoretical understanding of CSOs as communicative conduits. The critical cosmopolitan project needs to refocus its neoliberal critique internally at the potential for colonising identities of actors participating in structures of global public spheres.

**The Methodological Underpinnings of the Cambodian Case Study**

In order to successfully utilise the case study of Cambodian civil society, it is important to understand its function within the thesis and the important theoretical/empirical link it implies. A case study can be seen as a specific entity or 'bounded system’ to denote that regardless of complexity, cases are objects rather than processes, reasons or policies (Stake 1978, p6).

Stake (1995, p3) outlines three different approaches to understanding the use of a case study within social research. If there is a desire to learn about the case itself, not for generalisation or extrapolation, but because of its particularity then this is known as an *intrinsc case study.*
On the other hand, if the case study is a means to another end, for example to accomplish something other than an understanding of the particularities of the case, then this can be deemed an *instrumental case study*. Finally, if the case study in its instrumental form is co-joined with other case studies to analyse the linkages and coordination between them, this is known as the *collective case study*.

The Cambodian case study represents in many ways an instrumental case study, given that it is not being interrogated to uncover new understandings within the particularities of the case (no matter how interesting these are), but in order to extrapolate these findings in order to modify a theoretical framework. In this respect the thesis employs a single-case study that invokes a notion of 'theory testing' rather than utilising the case-study in a deductive method to generate new theories and hypotheses (George and Bennett 2004, p115).

Single case studies within social science research have at times been heavily criticised for their inability to say something meaningful without further qualification (see Flyvbjerg 2006, p224-228), however, these criticisms usually fall under the natural science approach to research and are linked towards positivist techniques, discussed below. Instead there are a variety of ways in which single case studies can be utilised for a rigorous research paradigm. A useful list of these case-study approaches is compiled by Lijphart (1971) and includes the six categories of: *atheoretical, interpretative, hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, theory-infirming and deviant*. The first two reflect intrinsic case study approaches, *atheoretical* approaches are descriptive and refuse to construct generalisations, instead focusing on contextualised data-gathering. *Interpretive* approaches are similar, however, they differ in the incorporation of a generalised hypothesis within the case study to see whether
data collated can improve or refute this hypothesis. The final four approaches in contrast are used primarily for theory-building. *Hypothesis-generating* approaches aims at constructing hypothesis in areas where no theory exists yet, often the theory found is tested among a large number of cases to create generalisable theory. *Theory-confirming* and *Theory-infirming* are both similar approaches that draw upon an established theoretical generalisation and test its proposition through a case study. A Theory-confirming case study tends to strengthen the proposition whilst theory-infirming case studies weaken it, yet both are can be seen as single additions to a multitude of cases, offering one more case to either support or critique the generalisation. The final case study approach, and the one most closely drawn upon by the Cambodian case-study, is known as the *deviant case analysis*.

Deviant case analysis can be seen as the “detailed examination of cases that seem to go against the pattern identified. This may serve to disconfirm the pattern identified or it may help to add greater sophistication to the analysis” (Gill cited in Marvasti 2004 p114). The Cambodian case study is utilised within the thesis as an example of 'deviant case analysis'; a single case study that is selected because it can demonstrate a deviation from established theoretical generalisations. These cases are purposely selected to expose and refine theoretical propositions, thus the focus on the case itself is more instrumental than intrinsic and makes no claim to generalisability of the findings to other cases. In this way they “weaken the original proposition, but suggest a modified proposition that may be stronger” (Lijphart 2008, p257).

Deviant case analysis, however, implicitly links the single case study to a comparison of other cases in order to rigorously prove that the said case study is indeed a deviation, thus although it is seen as a useful tool for theory building, it is reliant on other cases for legitimacy (Lijphart 2008, p258). This case study departs from this notion of a 'deviant case among
many', and instead can usefully be combined with an approach that creates a stronger link between the single empirical case study and its relationship to a theoretical framework; the extended case method.

The extended case method is often attributed to Michael Burawoy (1998, 1999, 2009; Burawoy et al. 1991, 2000) employing the logic of deviant case analysis, by revealing flaws in existing theoretical assumptions, and then drawing upon an in-depth empirical case study to reconstruct these theoretical assumptions (Pearce 2002, p105; Babbie 2009, p10). Theory is therefore logically prior to the empirical case study, “not discovered but revised, not induced but improved, not deconstructed but reconstructed...In short, theory exists to be extended in the face of external anomalies and internal contradictions. We don't start with the data, we start with the theory” (Burawoy 2009, p13).

In this way the extended case method aims, “not to abstract the minimum number of essential features in one case that can be generalized in other cases but, rather, to situate the individual case in as much richness of detail as possible with the wider social fields that structure the processes unfolding within that case” (Sullivan 2002, p265). The Cambodian case study employs this approach because it firstly recognises the utility of an empirical analysis in questioning the perceived generalisations of a wider theoretical framework, and secondly, because it attempts to distance itself from positivist principles of research whilst simultaneously linking the general (theoretical premise) with the particular (empirical case study). Positivist approaches tend to be critical of the ability for a single case study to provide the objective rigour in order to be able to say anything about general theoretical concepts, unless the research methods can reflect this and offer the potential for replication. Burawoy
attempts to adopt a form of 'reflexive science' (1998b) and suggests that the case study can be subjective and partial, whilst accepting that external macro-theoretical debates can be interrogated within these micro spheres, and can form legitimate conclusions from them.

There are four important implications of the extended case study whilst undertaking social research, summarised by Burawoy as:

The extension of the observer into the lives of participants under study, the extension of observations over time and space; the extension from microprocesses to macroforces; and, finally and most important, the extension of theory (2009, pxv)

The first two implications demonstrate a critique of positivist understandings of research by suggesting that although objectivity and impartiality of research is impossible, we should not assume this as a problem. We need to be aware that we cannot separate ourselves as the observer, from the participant, “no matter how we approach our research we are always simultaneously participant and observer, because we inescapably live in the world we study” (Burawoy 2009, p9). The positivist approach to research attempts to gather data from an objective and external standpoint, in an attempt to “insulate ourselves from our subjects, observing them from the outside, interrogating them through intermediaries” (Burawoy 1998, p5). In this methodological approach the aim of research is to effectively bracket ourselves off from the subjective realm; separate facts from the distorting effect of values. Within the positivist paradigm of grounded theory\(^1\), reliability and coding of data analysis is the preferred option for gathering accurate and generalisable deductions; categories and sampling

\(^1\) Grounded theory, associated with the work of Glaser and Strauss aims at “the discovery of theory from data systematically obtained from social research” (1999, p2). In this way the authors avoid a priori assumptions through generating theoretical claims after a rigorous and testable process of data extraction. This process is of course closely related to the positivist method of predicting and explaining behaviour.
techniques attempt to make a more objective and replicable set of results. The attempts to engage with positivist methods such as survey research, attempts to de-contextualise experience into observable facts and data, Burawoy equates this method with homogenising a form of experience that represents Habermas' notion of the system in its lack of reflexivity and therefore attempts to colonize the lifeworld (Burawoy 1998, p30)\(^2\). This interesting insight allows us to recognise that the participants we engage with are not mere subjects that we can quantify in an instrumental way; they are the vital resources through which dialogic interaction (in the shape of semi-structured and open-ended interviews or participant observation) can tell us more about their lives and the social processes that shape them.

The move towards a reflexive model of science as a model that “embraces not detachment, but engagement as the road to knowledge” (Burawoy 1998, p5) represents an acceptance that as observers/participants, we have to be aware that we cannot but help bringing theory to the field whilst undertaking social research. The aim of the social researcher is therefore to attempt to minimalise communicative distortions rather than attempt to stand outside of the social context as a neutral. This is contrary to the positivist approach of grounded theory in that we should not try and cast off our preconceptions of what we may find within the case study and in fact should outline “as coherently as possible what we expect to find in our site before entry” (Burawoy et al 1991, p9). The social research undertaken within Cambodia mirrors this critique of the positivist approach to research, through firstly, the undertaking of a more reflexive method of data-collection (outlined below), and secondly an understanding that the interrogation of socio-economic practices within Cambodia were inevitably framed through the theoretical lens guiding the hypothesis.

\(^2\) For a more in depth discussion on the Habermasian duality of system-lifeworld see p93-95
Burawoy's idea of extending micro processes to macro forces and the implications of this extension to a theoretical model defies the classical form of anthropology utilising the interpretive understanding of research to argue for a form of subjectivity through confining fieldwork to isolated social practices, where attempts to interact with local actors inevitably cannot be replicated or even deemed significant for discussions on the general level (Burawoy et al 2000, p2). This is not the case for the fieldwork in Cambodia that I have undertaken; the reflexive empirical methods employed serve to frame a discussion that can extend to the macro-theoretical level.

With this extrapolation of the Cambodian case study to the macro-theoretical level, it is important to reiterate that the thesis does not intend to set itself up as an anthropological investigation into the complexities and nuances of Cambodian civil society as a whole. There is in no way an attempt here to construct a holistic ‘map’ of the multifaceted aspects of civil society that is developing in the country today. The case study is utilised, following the Burawoy methodology cited above, as an important tool to highlight and problematise aspects within the critical interpretation of cosmopolitan democratic theory.

The thesis draws upon the Cambodian case study as a method to problematise the theoretical assumptions of the critical cosmopolitan democratic project in constructing a certain understanding of civil society as a reflexive and communicative force to steer the unaccountable sites of neoliberal global governance. ³ In essence, the case study provides

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³ The term neoliberal global governance is outlined in more detail throughout chapter two, though it is worth stating here that this purports to an understanding of neoliberalism as a political project that prioritises a systemic and instrumental understanding of governance at the international level, often severed from democratic communities who lack the ability to form an influential public sphere to convert communicative
evidence of the way in which an increasingly pervasive global neoliberal project has closely aligned itself with the development of civil society, colonising the communicative potential and imbuing various local actors within Cambodia with an instrumental identity that requires urgent attention and critique\(^4\). Furthermore the case study highlights that for those authors supporting the construction of deliberative global public spheres, the very identities of actors within these spheres needs to be taken into account; particularly given the pervasiveness of the link between neoliberalism and civil society in the current epoch. Advocates of critical cosmopolitan democracy (to which this thesis is ultimately sympathetic) need to engage in a more contextually understanding of the identity of CSOs within their democratic projects; the Cambodian case study reveals that the supposed communicative steering mechanisms of civil society can in fact be subverted through neoliberal systemic logics.

**The Cambodian Case Study: Methods of Research**

As stated previously, the aim of the case study is to demonstrate the global permeation of neoliberal practices into the communicative structures of local civil society actors, effectively re-inscribing an instrumentalist form of rationality internally. Cambodia proved to be an interesting choice to highlight these colonising practices; the devastation of Cambodian society under the Khmer Rouge era (1975-1979) resulted in a large influx of aid and development programmes attempting to 're-build' Cambodian society. These programmes were supported by a variety of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies (including INGOs) who had a relatively free hand in implementing them due to an unstable Cambodian power into meaningful forms of governance

\(^4\) A critique of instrumentality and the pathologising nature of neoliberalism as a system of domination is at the heart of the legacy of Critical Theory (see Honneth 2009). This thesis makes clear throughout that it supports a critical stance against neoliberal forms of governance for its disciplinary logic and attempted distortion of communicative spaces (in particular see p92-98)
government, and a strong belief that Cambodian civil society represented a 'blank slate' with an opportunity for reconstruction. The result, as will be described within the thesis, is that Cambodia represents an opportunity to observe the unhindered external influences of neoliberal development practices and the impact this can have on the development of local forms of civil society.

There have been very few studies of civil society in Cambodia; those that have engaged with an analysis of the sector have quite rightly described how local and endogenous forms of collectivised activities are sporadic and difficult to pinpoint, whilst externally constructed forms of civil society are overly dependent upon the organisations that formed them.\(^5\) This case study attempts to link those dependency discussions with new primary research to demonstrate how a specific neoliberal form of civil society is privileged by external donor policies and the colonising effect this is having on new roles (and a new identity) for civil society development within the country.

In order to identify these neoliberal interventions in Cambodian civil society, numerous semi-structured interviews of civil society actors were undertaken during two visits from the 4\(^{th}\) March - 30\(^{th}\) March 2007, and from the 2\(^{nd}\) January - 14\(^{th}\) January 2009. Respondents were selected from a variety of contexts in order to ensure that a discussion on civil society was not limited to specific sectors within the country, interviews were therefore obtained from a mixture of more formalised sources including staff of NGOs, bilateral donor organisations, think tanks, and also less formal sources; members of Community Building Organisations (CBOs) and village chiefs.

\(^5\) For example local NGOs are often depended upon International NGOs and/or bilateral donors, whilst CBOs are often dependent upon NGOs
The first fieldwork visit coincided with the World Bank’s attempt to carry out a ‘Civil Society Assessment’ in Cambodia as part of its Social Accountability project. In order to obtain a preliminary assessment of Cambodian civil society, the bank contracted out the work to a local Cambodian think tank; CAS (Centre for Advanced Studies) to plan and carry out the preliminary assessment over a period of three days in the districts of Tramkok and Koh Andeth (both in Takeo province) from 22nd-24th March 2007. I was fortunate enough to participate in this preliminary assessment of Cambodian civil society as an observer, including the consultation weeks before, and after the fieldwork, therefore I was able to situate myself within the global (World Bank) perceptions of civil society, and the local (Cambodian) evidence on the ground.

During this period I also carried out interviews within the urban NGO sector in Phnom Penh, to complement the analysis of civil society with the research team in rural Cambodia. The second visit from the 2nd January - 14th January 2009, followed along the same lines and attempted to look specifically at the more formalised NGO sectors in the capital. It is worth turning now to an analysis of the data collection methods used within the fieldwork

Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the method of data collection for the case study for a variety of reasons. They allow for a more reflexive discussion than that afforded by rigorous surveys and questionnaires, thus avoiding the positivistic pitfall of trying to obtain generalisable data from a neutral and objective standpoint. Interviews using a more structured approach

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6 This assessment was concerned with the more rural CSOs as opposed to the dominant urban NGO sector, and forms an important part of the fourth chapter.

7 This distinction is extremely important for an analysis of what constitutes civil society in Cambodia, outlined in chapter three.
(including surveys and questionnaires) tend to set rigid questions that can marginalise and silence respondents through a crude categorisation process that rarely takes the pluralistic social context of a respondent into account. Questions within semi-structured interviews are thus guided through a dialogic process centred around key topics and themes rather than standardised direct questions (Babbie 2009, p318).

Semi-structured interviews are furthermore seen as flexible and continuous; each interview allows the researcher to create a clearer image of the phenomenon under study, and therefore to refine and improve future questions (Babbie 2009, p318). The aim was to approach each respondent with a basic question that could establish the purpose and focus of the interview, yet rather than following a pre-set interview guide, the intention was to “listen actively and to move the interview forward as much as possible by building on what the participant has begun to share” (Seidman 2005, p66). This sharing was important; information obtained from one respondent created a snow-ball opportunity to pinpoint and engage with others in the field that had not previously been considered. At the same time, the sharing of information helped to clarify what was happening within civil society far more effectively than any form of survey or structured interview approach. Within reflexive semi-structured interviews, researchers enter into a reciprocal relationship with respondents, to develop a genuine (albeit guided) conversation (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006 p134).

At the same time the semi-structured interview process holds a distinct advantage over the open-ended interview process by allowing for a link with the macro-theoretical arguments made in the thesis through key topic areas for discussion, rather than an interview without parameters focusing entirely upon the respondents themselves.
There are difficulties, however, in the attempt to create a global-local link within the interview process, especially when the objective is to identify 'neoliberal' colonising interventions of civil society. Due to this complexity, interviews were framed around a more non-academic discussion that intended to interrogate the micro-processes involved with institutions without discussing the macro-processes that frame the results within the thesis. In order for this to be accomplished, questions aimed at respondents working within the urban NGO sector (including donor agencies) were designed around a discussion of the economisation of the sector, particularly focusing upon the core terms such as *competition, professionalism* and an engagement with the *market*. This would allow a fruitful discussion on the changing NGO sector within Phnom Penh over the last decade in line with external donor strategies, without the difficulty of engaging at a theoretical level on the dimensions of neoliberal instrumentality and colonisation of communicative practices. Burawoy's extended case method allows for a sensitive discussion on these economic micro processes that can then inform the macro-theoretical dimension of the thesis.

Interviews utilised within the rural CSO sector were focused upon a broader exploratory discussion of CBO dependency on NGOs and the increasing market influence within CBO collective activities. This allowed for a discussion on the micro-processes affecting various individuals at the local level, and allowed me to utilise the data within the thesis to provide a more macro-theoretical discussion on neoliberal forms of rationality; the product of this CBO dependency.

Interviews undertaken within the urban NGO sector were accessible without the need for a
translator; the heads of most local NGOs have a good grasp of English, whilst heads of international NGOs and donor organisations are often foreign nationals who also speak fluent English. For interviews undertaken in rural Cambodia and those associated with CBOs, I was fortunate enough to have a member of CAS act as a translator for the questions/responses that the research team were posing to individuals within CBOs, and also to translate the questions that I was allowed to raise during the interview process, effectively including me within the research process and allowing me to gain a better grasp of localised collective activities.8

The decision to undertake a qualitative research project in Cambodia required an understanding of the social context and climate within which I would be engaging with respondents. The time spent with CAS gave me an important insight into how interviewing techniques required a great deal of sensitivity when dealing with critical subject areas. There are of course problems associated with situating oneself within a localised rural context, given the way that an outsider can potentially distort and 'write themselves' into the setting (Mason, 2002 p86). Despite this, it is important to attempt to situate as close as possible rather than to stand on the outside as a neutral observer; my integration as part of the research team, hopefully helped to reduce some of these distortions.

Research in the field was carefully orchestrated by the team, who determined that a more exploratory and open-ended interview would be fruitful to engage local people about their relationship with civil society and the state but without risking being perceived as antagonistic to the government. The research team were specifically tasked with exploring the relationship

8 The CAS research team carried out a more open-ended interview process in order to fulfil the goal of a 'civil society assessment', thus the translator described the conversations to the best of his ability. I was fortunate to be allowed to intervene in the conversation and steer it towards a discussion on dependency and economisation as a form of semi-structured interview technique, without any objections.
between citizens and the state as the core element of civil society from the World Bank perspective, yet asking citizens about their views on whether the government was adequately held accountable etc... could have been perceived as being critical of the government and unlikely to yield a genuine response.

The recent Khmer Rouge legacy has left problems with trust between citizens and those in authority, many Cambodians still openly refuse to (critically) discuss the state or the dominant political party in power for fear of reprisals. CAS researchers were therefore careful to ask about civil society in general, and use the results to determine what the role of the state was in this relationship. This open-ended process allowed myself the chance to interject and guide the discussion towards an analysis of the economisation of collectivised activities (through microfinance for example), without imposing questions on them that could potentially jeopardise the interview.

With these issues in mind, CAS kept the interviews anonymous to ensure that no pressure would be placed upon the respondents during the discussion and could therefore engage in a full and frank account of the various collective activities at a community level. As a consequence, my interviews were also kept anonymous to respect both the wishes the respondents, and that of CAS.

Interview respondents in the NGO sector within Phnom Penh were also offered anonymity in order to be able to successfully discuss internal organisational practice in a more critical light.

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9 In my opinion this was the best method; the 2009 World Bank document 'Linking Citizens and the State' discussed within the thesis as an outcome of CAS's research, demonstrates that there is very little interest from citizens in demanding accountability from the state, thus structured interviews enquiring about this interest would have been of little use.
The NGO sector in Phnom Penh is relatively close-knit: a critical discussion of their financial and organisational dependency on donor organisations runs the risk of adverse effects in their relationship with donors without this anonymity (particularly when the results are published and the target audience is likely to include the NGO sector in Cambodia\(^\text{10}\)). I was also fortunate to have been given advice from two prominent Cambodian scholars who suggested that if I wanted to investigate a more critical view of internal transformations and external dependency then it would be best to use anonymous interviews to ensure that no pressure is unduly placed between staff members and forms of hierarchy.

In terms of obstacles and hindrances to research in the country, the one that I believe proved the most challenging, was attempting to obtain interviews from the more professional organisations of the NGO sector (for example, the microfinance sector). I was extremely interested in how this sector was transforming in Phnom Penh from small scale donor-sponsored NGO projects towards commercialised ‘microfinance institutions’ (MFIs), however, attempting to obtain interviews from the more commercial organisations proved difficult. Two of the most advanced (in transformatory terms) MFIs, would only agree to be interviewed if I arrived with a completed check-list; A copy of my thesis outline, a list of questions to be asked, one signed letter of recommendation from a ‘University Chancellor’, and a photocopy of my passport. This was in contrast to the donor-funded NGOs working in microfinance where staff were happy to answer any questions without these check-lists in place.

These problems served to highlight that the more professional sectors were expecting a

\(^{10}\) For example some of these interviews were reproduced in Norman (2010)
positivist qualitative interview approach (hence the expectations of questions in advance), however, this went against the reflexive and semi-structured approach that had been the foundation of my interview techniques thus far. If the aim of my case study was to demonstrate a shifting NGO sector towards more professional neoliberal organisational practices, then this kind of barrier to my research only served to strengthen the case.

The reflexive interview process undertaken in Cambodia, enabled me to utilise primary empirical research in support of the theoretical hypothesis discussed above. I will now turn towards a brief discussion on the framework of the thesis, in order to clarify how the case study on Cambodia can be explicitly linked to the theoretical discussion on cosmopolitan democracy

**Framework of the thesis**

The thesis commences, with a broad literature review of the cosmopolitan democratic project, and its idealisation of civil society (in a nascent global form) as a potential solution to the 'democratic deficit' in global politics. The chapter proceeds to outline both the liberal and critical variants of this project in both their theoretical and practical attempts at forming inclusive frameworks of global governance. Whilst both elude to the inclusive nature of their frameworks, the chapter demonstrates how the liberal dimension reproduces a layer of exclusion, and therefore turns towards the critical dimension as a more adequate solution to the democratic deficit. The utilisation of CSOs within global public spheres is interrogated to reveal a specific ideal role; an inclusive communicative steering mechanism that can counter the exclusive systemic (neoliberal) forms of global governance.
The second chapter introduces the neoliberal dimension of global governance, outlining the origins and rise of a specific form of neoliberal economic paradigm and its link with global development discourses emanating from the core Multilateral Economic Institutions (MEIs). Importantly, the chapter examines the emergence of a 'neoliberal democratic project' enacted by the World Bank and a plethora of bilateral donors, who have effectively incorporated a new role and identity for CSOs within their policy discourses on development. The chapter describes how this renewed interest in civil society has resulted in two specific roles for CSOs under a neoliberal ideal-type; professional service provision, and as a democratic state watchdog. These roles are discussed within a general context, drawing from a variety of studies, to demonstrate how this neoliberal ideal-type represents a reversal from the assumed communicatively bound steering power of CSOs under the critical cosmopolitan project. Under the new global neoliberal development paradigm, one can observe systemic colonisation of CSOs through the attempt to forge a neoliberal form of rationality within these organisations.

The third and fourth chapters represent the empirical case study of Cambodia, and serve to demonstrate in concrete terms, the discussions outlined in chapter two. It aims therefore, to highlight the new neoliberal democratic project that has penetrated Cambodian civil society, from the global policy discourses emanating from Multilateral and Bilateral donors, to the very grassroots of collectivised civil society construction. It focuses upon the emerging dual roles of service provision and democratic state watchdog, and outlines how the effects represent systemic forms of colonisation. The result is to observe the marginalisation of endogenous communicative forms of civil society under the exogenous neoliberal model.
Chapter three looks explicitly at the urban NGO sector in Phnom Penh, the dominant understanding of civil society within the country, and demonstrates how a level of dependency on external donors has resulted in neoliberal forms of professionalisation saturating the sector. After a general analysis of the sector, the chapter moves towards a specific look at the service provision role of microfinance within the country, and highlights how global neoliberal discourses are re-shaping the identities of NGOs practicing microfinance towards a more instrumental understanding of the sector.

Chapter four shifts away from the urban NGO sector, towards an analysis of civil society development within rural grassroots communities. The chapter examines the lack of endogenous CBOs, and describes how most CBOs in rural Cambodia are actually externally introduced, and nurtured, by the NGO community. This has inevitably resulted in a relationship of dependency, the side-effect of which is to observe external (neoliberal) idealisations of civil society introduced to the grassroots. This includes introducing an entrepreneurial and credit culture among social collectives (including rural forms of microfinance) and results in a similar attempt to construct systemic forms of rationality within collective activities.

The chapter then turns towards the second role of CSOs as democratic state watchdogs and includes a discussion on the new World Bank project of Social Accountability at the grassroots. The chapter describes how the World Bank recognises the need to externally ’stimulate’ the demand for accountability due to a lack of endogenous infrastructure, resulting in the increasing promotion of technical and depoliticised CSOs in a conscious attempt to turn
advocacy and critical dissent in Cambodia 'from shouting to counting'.

The concluding chapter attempts to re-integrate the findings of the Cambodian case study within the theoretical discussions of the critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy. It discusses the implications of these findings and outlines important future directions if the critical dimension is to fulfil its promise as an inclusive democratic project.
Section One: Interrogating the Dynamics of Democratic Global Governance
1. INTRODUCING THE COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRATIC PROJECT

1.1 Introduction

The origins of cosmopolitanism are said to originate from Athens with the cynic philosophy of Diogenes in the fourth century BC. When asked one day what countryman he was, Diogenes replied that he was a 'citizen of the world' (Diogenes 1853, p240-241). This was intended to suggest that Diogenes' loyalties were not restricted to the Athenian polis and represents a critique of the narrow allegiances that the polis demanded upon its citizens. The concept was drawn upon more positively by the Stoic tradition\textsuperscript{11} to more fully develop the idea of a kosmou politês (world citizen) and imply that there are two communities, the local community from birth, and the boundary-less community of human 'argument and aspiration' (Nussbaum 1996, p4). This idea was revitalised within the enlightenment period, specifically with Immanuel Kant, who attempted to develop a vision of a universal community of humankind, bound through a 'transcendental formula' of public right.\textsuperscript{12} (Kant 2000, 2003). This implies that for cosmopolitanism, the sphere of justice is without boundaries and therefore “owed to all regardless of location or origin, race or gender, class or citizenship” (O'Neill 2000, p45). There are three fundamental tenets that are generally agreed upon as forming the basis for an understanding of cosmopolitan morality: 1. Individualism, and the belief that the individual is the ultimate unit of concern 2. Universality; all human beings possess equal moral status, and 3. Generality, all persons are the subject of concern for

\textsuperscript{11} The Stoics were a group of philosophers in the third century BC who believed in the idea of a universal natural law, thus they denied the ethical traditions of Plato and Aristotle, associated with a personal ethics of the polis. The Stoics therefore introduced the concept of the Cosmopolis (see Colish 1985)

\textsuperscript{12} Public right comes from publicity, and suggests that all moral actions between people are deemed wrong unless publicly accepted by all (Kant 2003, pviii)
everyone, thus the human status has global scope (Pogge 1992, p48; Caney, 2005, p3-4; Hayden 2005, p3)

This chapter will not, however, focus on the debate surrounding moral cosmopolitan 'justice' that has a long and contested history within International Relations literature and specifically as the sub-division of international ethics\(^\text{13}\) and instead moves towards those cosmopolitan approaches that tend to focus on the *political* acts of inclusion/exclusion that feature within contemporary global institutions with a specific focus on the project of 'cosmopolitan democracy'. This moral dimension is less concerned with the institutional arrangements of global politics and instead seeks to interrogate the underlying debates of justice beyond borders (Beitz 1999, p519), exclusion is seen as occurring when justice becomes bounded within particular spheres, especially the contemporary boundaries of the nation-state (O'Neill 2000). At the global level, the moral position recognises that humanity has an obligation to strive for a world without inequality\(^\text{14}\), and that in order for this to happen, governance must not be subservient to state-centrism but the individual (see Singer 1972; Barry 1991; Beitz 1994; Nussbaum 1996; O'Neill 1996; Pogge 2000; Caney 2001, 2005). The shift towards a cosmopolitan analysis of democracy moves from this 'moral' form of cosmopolitanism and its view of the nation-state as an inhibitor of universal forms of moral worth, towards more ‘political’ cosmopolitanism that recognises the need to push further and reform contemporary institutions in order to elevate the individual to the centre of these frameworks; democracy

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\(^{13}\) For instance the Kanitan Lineage has been drawn upon within IR from authors such as O'Neill (1996, 2000) and Barry (1989). Another school drawing upon the cosmopolitan principles associated with John Rawls (1993, 1999) have inspired contemporary authors within IR such as Beitz (1979, 1994, 1999), Pogge (1989, 2001) and Caney (2005)

\(^{14}\) The cosmopolitan position outlined valourises human rights and distributive justice as normative values to defend, therefore they view circumstances such as global poverty as unjust and as a consequence the state has a moral duty to the individual to ensure its eradication (see Pogge 2001)
becomes the vehicle of this reform. In this respect political cosmopolitanism is not just about the call for global moral responsibility in the contemporary era, but a practical attempt to apply the principles of democracy globally (Archibugi 2000, p143).

The cosmopolitan democratic project in its most basic form can be understood as an attempt to expand democracy beyond the nation-state, thus it is often seen as synonymous with 'global' and 'transnational' notions of democracy. There is a debate surrounding what the term 'global' means in this context, authors such as Holden (2000) and Morrison (2003) argue that authors using cosmopolitan terminology tend to equate global with the geographical expansion of democracy whilst 'transnational' conceptions reinforce the spatial distinction of democracy as beyond the nation-state. This is, however, not so clear cut in the literature; most cosmopolitan authors use the terms interchangeably and tend to denote the term global as spatial rather than geographical. In order to maintain consistency this chapter will keep with the more popular spatial usage and takes up Archibugi's usage of cosmopolitanism to transcend the 'statism' that is present in global politics (2002b, p31).

As with the distinction between the moral and political practices of cosmopolitanism, there are fundamental differences between the variety of authors who support a form of cosmopolitan democratic project, I have attempted here to categorise these authors into two distinct schools of thought that represent their differences in approach; a liberal cosmopolitan and a critical cosmopolitan approach to democracy beyond the state. Their differences will be drawn out throughout this chapter, however, it is important to establish this differentiation here in order to understand their different understandings of inclusion and exclusion in global

\[15\] The contrast between the moral and political forms of cosmopolitanism leads Archibugi to classify his cosmopolitan democratic project as 'cosmopolitical democracy' (2000)
politics.

The Liberal dimension tends to lean closely towards the Kantian moral concern of individual worth and attempts to construct a more humane order “in which people's needs come to take precedence over the interests of states and their geopolitical machinations” (McGrew 2002a, p272). Booth recognises that the liberal dimension of this cosmopolitan project relies upon the establishment of the universal declaration of human rights to transcend the sovereign dimensions of governance and reinvent the 'global human being' (1999, p66). This is not to denigrate the importance of democracy, merely to point out that allowing people a voice in the structures of global governance must be complemented by a 'cosmopolitan' framework that reflects the primacy of the individual through a global order based upon universal morality and justice. Indeed, Richard Falk, a liberal cosmopolitan, argues that “Democracy is conceived as extending beyond constitutional and free, periodic elections to include an array of other assurances that governance is orientated towards human well-being and ecological sustainability” (2000, p172).

The critical dimension, retains a broadly sympathetic approach to the global democratic project, however, it draws its theoretical inspiration from the neo-Kantian writings of Jürgen Habermas and tends to be critical of the liberal strands of cosmopolitanism of inclusion for pre-formulating global frameworks through a form of monological self-reflection; thus as will be argued, it is actually deeply exclusive. As an alternative position, it attempts to formulate a dialogical approach to global governance through applying the theory of deliberative democracy to the structures of global governance.16 This entails constructing democratic

16 This link between cosmopolitanism and dialogue has led to some authors explicitly using the term 'dialogic' cosmopolitanism (see Linklater 1998, Dobson 2003, Mignolo 2000).
spaces outside of the state in a similar form to the liberal project, but it refuses to pre-
determine the substantive content or boundaries of democratic dialogue. For the critical
dimension, the quality of participation is just as important as the access for participation;
democracy is about creating substantive norms on the common good through a process of
intersubjective dialogue where moral decisions are formed within, and not prior to, dialogue.

Throughout this chapter it will become apparent that there are subtle differences between
them in the way that they approach questions of inclusion, the cosmopolitan democratic
project in all of its guises, however, is concerned with two interrelated features of
contemporary global politics; firstly the problems of a 'democratic deficit that is said to exist
within contemporary practices of global governance, and secondly, the rise of a global form of
civil society that is emerging and offers the potential to remedy this deficit.

1.1.1 Global Governance and the Democratic Deficit

The cosmopolitan democratic project can be contrasted with much of the mainstream
literature in International Relations that tends to focus on enhancing democracy globally; the
promotion and expansion of democratic states throughout the international system, often
equated with 'Democratic Peace Theory' (DPT) and its state-centric conceptions of the
promotion of democracy. This is, however, counter to the projects described in this chapter,
which attempt to transcend the state-centric bias present in DPT and extend democracy to the
global political order and therefore to be concerned with democratic global governance rather
than a globality of democratic governments. Governance can include government but it is

17 DPT tends to stipulate that the spread of democratic governments around the world would inevitably result in
liberal zone of peace due to their primary assertion that democracies do not go to war with each other. See for
also not solely restricted by it; it lacks 'sovereign centres' (Dryzek 2006), is 'pluricentric' rather than 'unicentric' (Fenger and Bekkers 2007) and includes a variety of informal non-governmental mechanisms that are equally attempting to satisfy needs and wants within the system of rule (Rosenau 1992, p4, Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Governance therefore includes a myriad of actors from political institutions, corporations and civil society, but importantly it is the way in which governance can sustain coordination between these interests (Pierre and Peters 2000, p3-4).

DPT advocates tend to recognise that a democratic deficit exists in the world that can be fulfilled through the expansion of liberal democracies, in this definition a democratic deficit is defined by the absence of democratic political systems throughout the world (Kaldor 2007, p37). There are many who are critical of the current democratisation trend that has led Freedom House to suggest recognising the twentieth century as the ‘democratic century’ (cited in Gaventa 2006, p8), calling to attention the deficits within the actual practices and quality of democracy itself. In contrast the cosmopolitan democratic project recognises that a democratic deficit exists on a global level when the territorially-bound state engages in democratic decision-making mechanisms at a global level that directly affect the rights of citizens without allowing them a say in this process.\(^\text{18}\) This echoes a concern that contemporary global institutions are generating a gap between the decision-makers and the decision-takers of global politics (Held 1998). Citizens are rarely able to influence policies that occur from outside of the territorial state; national parliaments within democracies are directly elected and accountable through a form of representation that simply does not exist on a global level, contributing to a weak democratic chain (Scholte 2005, p87).

\(^{18}\) At its most basic level it can be seen as “the absence of a developed platform where...issues are presented for public scrutiny and debate” (Ward 1992, p8).
Contemporary global structures are seen as deeply exclusionary due to the lack of representation and participation afforded to citizens. Criticisms of major institutions for lacking citizen representation include for example, the UN system (Childers and Urquhart 1994; Kochler 1997), the WTO (Keohane and Nye 2000; O'Brien at al 2000; Nanz and Steffek 2005; Eckersley 2007), the IMF (Scholte 2000; Dawson and Bhatt 2002), and the World Bank Group (Bhatnager and Williams 1992; Fox and Brown 1998; Woods 2000; Clark 2002). Important decisions on trade-rules, debt relief, macro-economic restructuring policies, intellectual property rights and the privatisation of key public services are all undertaken behind closed doors of the undemocratic global system, vastly contributing to the anguish felt by many over the democratic deficit (Naidoo 2008). The democratisation of contemporary institutions has largely been ignored by governments; there has been no major global institutional reform since the end of the cold war (Archibugi 2004, p438). Scholte labels this exclusion part of an institutional democratic deficit, where oversight of these global public spaces has been weak and limited in access for the ‘demoi’; states, intergovernmental and supragovernmental organisations have bypassed democratic procedures through high levels of exclusivity and a lack of democratic representation (2002, p291).

There is, however, another element of the democratic deficit that is of equal importance for advocates of cosmopolitan democracy, which Scholte labels the structural democratic deficit, marked by an increasing gap between ‘supraterritorial spaces and territorial self-determination’; the democratic state is territorially bound and thus cannot effectively regulate

\[19\] For example private sites of global governance such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICASS) and the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) have no public participation or consultation, thus contributing to the notion of unaccountable structures of governance (see Scholte 2002, p291).

\[20\] Except for the formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002
global spaces. In addition, the territorial state has traditionally represented a nationalist structure of community, yet under globalisation there is an increase in 'substate and transstate ethnonations' where democracy is struggling to break away from traditional conceptions of the 'people' (Scholte 2002, p291). This global democratic deficit is exacerbated by the complex relationship between the territorial democratic state and its increasingly asymmetrical relationship with the contemporary process of globalisation. Held and McGrew pose a definition of globalisation in its spatial form as, “the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social interaction” (2002, p1). Globalisation can be understood as a spatial phenomenon that lies upon a continuum of the 'local' at one end and the 'global' at the other, implying a shifting from the local forms of human organisation towards transcontinental and transregional patterns of activity (Held 2002, p305). These patterns of social interaction that permeate across territorial borders form 'domains of activity' and include, economic, political, technological, military, legal, cultural and environmental transborder shifts (Held 1998, p13). Germain highlights how for example, the logic of global financial governance often subverts political authority bounded by the nation-state due to the former's heterogenous and transnational outreach in contrast to the latter’s territorially defined domain (2010, p495).21

The result is on the one hand an intensification in the development of 'overlapping communities of fate'22 and on the other, a sharp decrease in channels of democratic control available to citizens outside of their territorial political communities. Held (2002, p307-308) outlines five key dis-junctures appearing between the process of globalisation and its

21 The contemporary financial crisis serves as an illustration of the problematic systems of control available to the territorially defined state in the wake of unaccountable transnational forms of capital

22 In essence to banish the myth of the discreet homogeneous community, according to Held, “the fate of one country and that of another are more entwined than ever before” (1998, p24; 2004, p1)
relationship with the democratic political community:

1. The notion of a self-determining national collective is becoming increasingly defunct given that many fundamental economic, social, cultural and environmental processes that are determinates of the 'political good' now lie outside the grasp of individual polities
2. Nation-states are not the sole political force beyond territorial borders, but are embedded in complex networks of power at regional and global levels
3. This does not entail the collapse of sovereignty, but the dispersal of power and shifting of authority to ensure that the state is no longer the owner of a territorial exclusive form of public power
4. In order to enhance the public good, coordinated multilateral action is required to ensure that this is effective. Also, transboundary problems may pressurise and force domestic adjustments from states, creating the need for stronger global regulatory regimes to ensure a strengthening of local-global ties through multi-layered governance
5. Finally, the traditional distinctions between domestic and international issues are increasingly blurred where states face issues of non-renewable resources, nuclear waste management, financial market regulation, AIDS crisis, spread of WMD etc...

Although this analysis of the relationship between globalisation and democracy demonstrates an understanding of the need for the 'globalisation of democracy' as well as the 'democratisation of globalisation' (understood as a form of control over the processes of globalisation as a spatial phenomenon), the cosmopolitan democratic project has moved
beyond the analytical understandings of globalisation, towards a more normative concern at how specifically the economic dimension is not just diminishing the potential for democratic control at a global level, but is in effect a deeply exclusive organising principle. This highlights one of the core themes running throughout the cosmopolitan democratic project; an explicit critique of the neoliberal form of globalisation. This critique can be divided along the liberal/critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy as briefly discussed earlier. Both dimensions recognise the negative attributes of neoliberal globalisation and its expansion under the Washington Consensus principles, yet their critique diverges in the ways in which they target these attributes.

The liberal dimension tends to focus on the one hand on the ways in which the spread of global markets and capital is largely bypassing the control of citizens who remain tied to the nation-state. Markets when left on their own can perpetuate economic and political difficulties, for example global financial flow can destabilise national economies, increase development asymmetries produced by SAPs and other unfettered market policies, reduce the role of welfare provision and dilute non-market social factors that can balance competition with cooperation especially with regard to public goods (Held 2005a, p15). There is clearly an emphasis on the need to establish a form of democratic control over markets, not to eradicate them, but to understand that the market is a “good servant but a bad master” (Faulks 1999, p208). The liberal dimension specifically targets the 'market-orientated' agencies such as the WTO, World Bank and the IMF as needing to be challenged through not just opening them up further to public scrutiny and transparency but the strengthening of alternative global governance mechanisms to bolster the areas of the environment and social affairs to

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23 The neoliberal form of globalisation and its relationship to the Washington Consensus is outlined in chapter two.

24 See p122
counteract their dominance (Held 2003, p178). This leads to the second critique aimed at neoliberal forms of globalisation; the expansion of harmful market practices are seen as an impediment to the construction of more 'humane' forms of global governance (Falk 1995). This construction of a liberal framework, as discussed below, includes the privileging of universal human rights, justice and ecological sustainability at the heart of the democratic project to ensure human well-being\textsuperscript{25} (Koenig-Archibugi 2003).

The critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy attempts to undermine the neoliberal promotion of markets not necessarily because of the negative effects that they have on the human condition, but because the logic that drives them are formed with an instrumental purposive-rationality that seeks to restrict critical and reflective freedom of the subject (O'Byrne 2005, p4). Often within the literature this market expansion is equated with the term 'capitalist modernity', yet it should be more be more accurately understood as neoliberal modernity; a form of governance that is dominated by individualism and economism, concerned with the expansion of the market into all spheres of social life (Comeliau 2002, p73-80)\textsuperscript{26}. Critical projects call for a specific form of democracy, deliberative democracy, to challenge contemporary forms of global governance, severely restricted by what they see as 'systemic' modes of rationality; instrumental forms of rationality associated with the technical, bureaucratic and market expansion of neoliberal forms of governance. The framework of deliberative democracy is promoted as an attempt to dislodge this form of rationality representing a form of communicative domination; the conversion of subjects as consumers rather than citizens.

\textsuperscript{25} Falk argues this is important in order to challenge the “moral emptiness of neo-liberalism” (1999 p147)

\textsuperscript{26} The link between modernity and neoliberalism is revisited in chapter two
The liberal and critical interpretations of neoliberal globalisation will be expanded upon further within this chapter, however, despite these differences, they both recognise the 'dualistic' nature of globalisation and advocate a strengthening of the 'positive' side of globalisation; the emergence of non-state actors under a loosely defined conception of a 'Global Civil Society' to contest the exclusive nature of neoliberal globalisation, and expand democracy from the local to the global. Smith (2008) labels the duality of globalisation under two forms of networks; the 'neoliberal globalisation network' and the 'democratic globalisation network', of which the former can be characterised by the spread of markets, the latter; globalising networks of civil society actors.

The focus upon these actors as contributing to global democratic reform, allows the cosmopolitan democratic project to avoid its critics and their charge of the impossibility of aligning representative democracy beyond the nation-state, through a shift towards acknowledging the importance of participation as a democratic ideal and the promotion of voice rather than vote. Participation of non-state actors can function as an alternative source of representation that allows us to conceptualise a form of inclusion that does not have to be rigidly focused on the territorial dimensions of populations and constituencies, instead non-state actors can offer a form of modified representation through the promotion of ideas and issues raised from domestic populations; thus voice rather than vote becomes elevated as the source of democratic legitimacy (see Young 2002; Keck 2004; Bexell, Tallberg and Uhlin 2008).

27 Often referred to as political globalisation within this literature to contrast it with the unregulated economic modes of globalisation, however, this definition will be interrogated in chapter two.

28 For a critique of the cosmopolitan project for the possibility of replicating representative democracy outside of national borders see (Sandel 1998; Kymlicka 1999; Dahl 1999; Saward 2000; Moravcsik 2005)
It is important to note here, however, that there are two very different understandings of democratic inclusion that emanate from the liberal and critical variants of cosmopolitan democracy, and this has an impact upon how they perceive the global democratic deficit. The liberal cosmopolitan position, despite placing an important emphasis on ‘voice over vote’ through the participation of non-state actors into their global governance reform proposals (discussed below), still tend to rely heavily on electoral reform at a global level. Goodin labels this democratic reform that is highly centred around elections as ‘reform-act democracy’ and argues this adequately defines the liberal position who encourage the global reform of institutions with a strong role for electoral oversight (this can include the strengthening of civil society within these institutional designs). This is contrast to those theorists that Goodin labels as ‘antistatists’ for eschewing strong intergovernmental institutions and instead placing a primary focus on developing a strong participatory civil society; he alludes here to the critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy (Goodin 2010, p176).

In contrast to the more liberal leanings of cosmopolitan democracy and its focus on the formal architecture of electoral governance, the critical dimension draws its inspiration from the republican notions of democracy where participation and dialogue form the basis of democratic legitimacy (although as will be discussed below, the critical dimension moves away from the problems inherent within classical republican thought towards a preference for a deliberative form of democracy at the global level).

Republican thought is often directly linked to the classical Athenian model of democracy.

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29 This is in homage to the term used during the British legislature changes to expand the franchise in the 19th century
emphasizing the value of participation and decision-making of the citizenry within the political sphere. Though heavily criticised for its restricted citizenship30, this model represents one of the first uses of democracy to grant citizens not just political equality, but a direct say in the legislative and judicial functions of the state (see Held 1999, p13-35). Athenian democracy introduces the idea of civic virtue; the subordination of private life to the public sphere and a collective decision making process on the common good (Held 1999, p17).

It is important to note, however, that there are two competing strands of republicanism according to Held (1999); developmental republicanism and protective republicanism. The former draws upon the Athenian polis and emphasizes the intrinsic value of political participation to the enhancement of democratic rule, whilst the latter draws upon the later Roman republic and subsequently modified the classical interpretation. Protective republicanism retains the core focus upon participation, but only in recognition of its instrumental value in order to protect the interests of citizens (Held 1999, p36-69), thus in this way it retains a close link as a predecessor to modern conceptions of liberal representative democracy.

The critical cosmopolitan understanding of democracy draws closely upon the developmental strand of republicanism, and thus eschews the liberal representative model. According to Habermas, under a liberal model, the government is seen as an 'apparatus of public administration' in the sense that it employs administrative political power to serve private interests. The state's role within this model is simply to maintain a mediating function. On the republican conception, however, politics is 'the reflective form of substantial ethical life' and

30 The original republican belief in deliberation for the public good was closely tied to practices of exclusion informed through racial and gender prejudices; citizenship was an exclusive club (Sunstein 1988, p1540).
involves an important shift towards forms of solidarity and the common good; the state is not simply about fostering administrative power and individual personal interests, it includes solidarity and an orientation to the common good (Habermas 1994, p1). The liberal conception of democracy utilises citizen's votes as a quantified expression of support for different 'strategically acting collectivities' (perhaps best viewed as elite bargaining) in this respect choice is equated with the market and aggregate demands31. Within the republican tradition, however, it is not the market that decides questions of preference but dialogue and communication orientated towards mutual understanding (thus the republican tradition can be seen as a culmination of administrative and economic governance mechanisms, steered by the solidarity public sphere of communication). In this respect they differ at the very fundamental basis of freedom and the distinction between positive and negative rights; the liberal democratic position prioritises freedom from the state (through liberty and free speech) whilst the republican democratic tradition prioritises participation and communication (Habermas 1994, p2).

The problems with the liberal democratic tradition can be highlighted further through an understanding of the way in which democracy is simply “the legal institutionalisation of an economic society that is supposed to guarantee an essentially nonpolitical common good by the satisfaction of private preferences” (Habermas 1994, p5). Republican forms of democracy reflect a stronger use of public reason and a more active form of participatory citizenship within governance mechanisms. This republican form is, however, problematic in its strong focus on the ‘public use of reason’, and tends to assume that a public citizen is automatically a ‘virtuous citizen’ in contrast to its private counterpart (Habermas 1994; Petit 2003). Active

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31 Hence authors such as Mansbridge, view this as a form of aggregative democracy (1990)
citizens therefore bring pre-conceived ethical convictions to the public sphere, yet their very publicity is deemed democratically legitimate within the republican framework. The lack of an adjudication mechanism within the public sphere is what leads the critical cosmopolitan project to interject a model of deliberation\textsuperscript{32} into the republican model in order for the active citizen to intersubjectively unsettle ethical norms from the private sphere. The shift towards deliberative democracy as an important correction to this problem of republican thought, can be seen as a form of ‘modern republicanism’ with an elevated role for deliberative contestation within public spheres (see Bohman 2004)\textsuperscript{33}

Under the modern republican model, democracy can be seen as:

“…that set of institutions by which individuals are empowered as free and equal citizens to form and change the terms of their common life together, including democracy itself. In this sense, democracy is reflexive and consists in procedures by which rules and practices are made subject to the deliberation of citizens themselves” (Bohman 2010, p2).

This of course links to Habermas’ argument earlier about the central importance of reflexivity and the ability for citizens to normatively engage in re-shaping democratic norms and steering systemic modes of governance in accordance with public (reflexive) reason. Accordingly, this is central to the concerns of a reflexive form of democracy, that the public sphere has the ability to produce enough ‘communicative power’ in order to influence ‘administrative power’; utilising civil society as the social basis of an autonomous public sphere. In the end,

\textsuperscript{32} For a detailed discussion of deliberation, see p84-98
\textsuperscript{33} This form of republicanism attempts to rule out a general voting mechanism where participants privately form judgements about common interests and then base their votes on these assumptions. It entails a collective form of deliberation to avoid the Rousseauian notion of republicanism where votes are obtained without collective deliberation (Rousseau was concerned that group deliberation could lead to individual intimidation and thus distorted interest) (Petit 2003, p14).
this balance allows economic, administrative and solidarity spheres to form the basis of modern social integration (Habermas 1994, p5).

The promotion of a particular form of deliberative democracy is important as a counterweight to the increasing democratic deficit that was briefly discussed earlier. In many respects the key concern revolves around the increasing visibility of ‘juridification’; the “tendency toward the increasing expansion of law and law-like methods of formal rules and adjudication to new domains of social life” (Bohman 2004, p321; see Habermas 1988 P12-34). The process of juridification can be observed in particular when the steering mechanisms of the state and market increasingly permeate and regulate the lifeworld; on a global level this can be observed through the unaccountable modes of regulation enacted by MEIs and the way this undermines the link with a democratic community (Bohman 2004, p321-322).

The liberal cosmopolitan project recognises this element of the democratic deficit as a form of unaccountability, however, it resorts to a moral argument in its critique of neoliberal forms of governance that is pre-discursively constructed. As an inclusive democratic project, this position fails to recognise the monological dimension to its reform project. This pre-discursive mechanism is deemed exclusionary by the critical cosmopolitan project that prioritises the democratic nature of reform as a direct antidote to neoliberal forms of governance; its focus on an intersubjective form of legitimacy requires a deliberative form of democracy to steer these forms of governance through below rather than above. According to Bohman, whilst the critical project is:

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34 See p86-90
35 Governance from ‘above’ means here that reform ideals are institutionalised through appealing to liberal moral codes built into the new legal system that emerges, whilst from below alludes to the construction of these reform ideals through an intersubjective process among the subjects of law within deliberative forums to assess legitimacy (See Bohman 2005).
“...entirely consistent with cosmopolitan moral concerns...[it]... is not directly justified by moral principles. Its political character can be manifested in its emphasis on humanity as a political status rather than merely a moral property of individuals. As such, humanity exists only if there is a political community for the right to have rights establishes justified claims [sic]” (Bohman 2010, p3)36

According to the critical cosmopolitan project, the increasing juridification of global governance requires more than mere ‘reparliamentaization’; it actively requires the deliberative participation of civil society anchored within global public spheres as the communicative and democratic link with contemporary global governance (Bohman 2004, p322). As stated previously, the critique of neoliberal forms of governance for exacerbating the democratic deficit, can be remedied through applying a deliberative model of democracy to prioritise the ‘forum’ over the ‘market’ (Bohman 2004). This therefore ensures that the construction of an authentic public sphere can allow “the political aspect of collective life to escape the domination of technique and administration that rules so much of mass society” (Germain 2010, p10).

Throughout both cosmopolitan projects, the concept of civil society is strongly invoked as a solution to the democratic deficit, and accordingly appropriated into their global democratic frameworks.

36 Bohman refers to his project as juxtaposed to the cosmopolitan vision of a singular ‘demos’ at the top of a hierarchical apex (especially linking to a formal electoral process), thus he labels his project as ‘transnational democracy’. As stated previously, this is in line with the critical cosmopolitan label for reforming global institutions centred around a plurality of deliberative public spheres (see Bohman 2010).
This chapter will now turn to an analysis of civil society and in particular the concept of a ‘global’ civil society as an emerging buzzword within global politics, and to specifically look at how it is incorporated within the cosmopolitan democratic project.

1.1.2 The role of Civil Society in Global Politics

Civil Society is a highly contested concept, where few can rarely agree upon an exact categorisation. A useful starting definition can be extrapolated from the authors at the London School of Economics’ Centre for Civil Society (CSS) as:

...the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy group[s] (LSE 2009)

This definition is helpful in situating the site of civil society as operating between the state and the market, but it fails to capture the normative dimension of civil society and its complex relationship with particularly the market in contemporary usage. Two strands of thinking have evolved with regard to the role of civil society vis-a-vis the market; on the one

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37 This was not always the case, the origins of civil society stretch back to the Romanic and Greek periods where civil society (translated as ‘Sociatas Civilis’ and ‘Politike Koina’ respectively) was used to describe a society that is rationalistic and law-governed by humans, contrasted with the 'natural society' of the animal kingdom (See Seligman 2002; Parekh 2004). This constructed civil society as a space that constituted the state, and was a conception used throughout the seventeenth century by various theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, Grotius, Peffendorf and Montesquieu to demonstrate how a well ordered civil society was needed to protect free, equal and rational humans from the 'state of nature'. The Scottish enlightenment thinkers followed a similar path in many respects, with a focus on contrasting rational civil society with a primitive and irrational 'savage' society therefore to privilege the rule of law (Parekh 2004, p16). The distinction between ‘political’ society of the state and ‘civil society’ of collective associations outside of the family begins with Hegel and effectively ends the classic period of civil society, towards its more modern usage as a sphere outside of the state (See Taylor 2003).
hand it can be seen as an autonomous sphere that can potentially partner the market whilst balancing against the state, and on the other it is seen as an autonomous sphere that has an antagonistic relationship with the market whilst balancing against the state. Edwards recognises that these definitions can be seen in their extremes from the influential Cato institute of Washington DC labelling civil society as an apolitical force for market expansion and individual liberty, to the World Social Forum defining it as “the single most viable alternative to the authoritarian state and the tyrannical market” (cited in Edwards 2008, p236). Implicit within these extremes lays a dualism that tends to construct civil society as either an autonomous sphere in the service of the market or an autonomous sphere against the expansion of the market.

The first approach, linking a supporting role for civil society vis-à-vis the market, draws its inspiration from what Edwards has labelled ‘civil society as associational life’. This approach has become one of the most dominant interpretations among, politicians, foundations and international agencies (2004, p10). Although this conception is outlined in more detail in chapter two, it is worth briefly stating here.

The link between civil society and associationalism is largely indebted to a liberal reading of civil society, emphasising the plurality of voluntary associations that exist outside of state frameworks, often described as “the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules” (Diamond 1994, p5). From the liberal perspective, the main strength of civil society is its dense interconnectedness, regardless of individual group motivation whether for wealth, power, religious identity or public interest etc… (see Lomasky 2002, p55;
Walzer 2002, p35). In the 1990s the debate surrounding the importance of civil society to democracy exploded in American political science, drawing upon de Tocqueville and the pluralist understanding of collective associational life. Accordingly civil society fosters an autonomous civic culture that “was believed to protect society against destabilizing mass mobilization and [the] social atomization characteristic of totalitarian movements and states” (Castells 2008, p264). The emphasis in importance of fostering an autonomous civic culture was drawn upon by scholars such as Robert Putnam, to generate the much needed ‘social capital’ for societal cohesion and the fundamental basis for a stable democracy. In more recent years, the idea of social capital has been explicitly linked with civil society as an important enabling environment for the market, seen as a ‘bridging mechanism’ for economic development in the space between the state and the market.38 This ‘neoliberal’ understanding of civil society is developed throughout the second chapter and represents the promotion of a synergy of interests between the state, market and civil society; it is heavily drawn upon by practitioners in the politics of aid as part of a strategy to promote stable liberal (market) democracies in developing countries. This practitioner understanding is juxtaposed with an alternative approach to civil society that tends to dominate in scholarly literature and raises important questions about its relation to the market and perceived neutrality.39 Both the practitioner and academic understanding of civil society, however, allude to similar spatial assumptions as a sphere that remains distinct from the practices of governance and economy; the former as a neutral collective association and the latter a ‘solidarity sphere’ of progressive transformation of that collective association.

38 For a discussion on social capital and its modern relation to the market see p149-154
39 The practitioner/academic divide is summarised in an interesting article by Amoore and Langley (2004) to highlight how both positions hold different ideals for civil society, though they argue the former is more restrictive in debate than the latter, a subject this thesis returns to.
The cosmopolitan project in both its liberal and critical guises ascribes to this interpretation of civil society as a sphere of progressive transformation that is found overwhelmingly within academic discourse, and is therefore largely critical of its positionality as a neutral terrain or being utilised in support of the market. This conception of civil society is not only distinctly separate from the state and the market, but a normative site of resistance against these perceived sites of exclusion. This distinction tends to emanate from the brief writings of Karl Marx on civil society whereby contrary to Hegel the distinction between state and civil society was an antagonistic dimension, through which civil society becomes a tool used by the bourgeois class to subordinate the proletarian class within civil society and maintain control of the state (see Marx 2008, Baker 2002).

Civil society played only a small part of Marx's theoretical analysis, where he tended to focus on its relations with the material economic structures of society, however, his work was to inspire both Antonio Gramsci and Jürgen Habermas on their readings of a more positive role for civil society from which most of the contemporary work today tends to draw from for theoretical consistency (see Edwards 2009, p8-9). Apart from a few exceptions in the 17th century, civil society has always been seen as one half of the state/civil society dualism. The emergence of Marxian inspired Critical Theory, however, created another category to which civil society must counter; captialist economic relations (Chambers 2002, p90).

Gramsci moved away from the dualism created by Marx between civil society and the state, towards a tripartite structure that involved the realm of civil society as juxtaposed against both the state and the market. Gramsci took Marx's critique of civil society as the realm of culture

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40 Hegel made a distinction in his work between the family and the state, whereby civil society operated between them both. The family produced humans imbued with love and altruism, whilst civil society allowed for individuals to follow their self interest and individual desires, albeit within the rules and laws established by the state as representing public authority and objective rationality (Parekh 2004, p17).
and ideology through which the state can command ‘hegemony’ through a mixture of coercion and consent, but recognised that there was potential within this sphere because civil society could also be the locus through which a form of counter-hegemony could be constructed thus to resist state and economic spheres that Marx argued was the inevitable folding of historical dominance (see Bobbio 1979, Texia 1979 Gramsci 2005, chp 2).

Habermas in a similar perspective created an optimistic reading of civil society through combining a Marxist concern for exposing and eradicating sources of domination within civil society, with the Kantian belief in the possibility of finding sources of authentic autonomy from which civil society can emerge as an emancipatory realm free from the exclusionary logics of power operating from the ‘system’; the state and the market (Habermas 1990, 1993, 1996).

It is this understanding of civil society that informs the liberal and critical project of cosmopolitan democracy, as an autonomous ‘third sphere’ that can be utilised as a normative critique of the exclusionary logics of the state and market. Despite this commonality, both projects have important conceptual differences that have implications for their views of democratic legitimacy.

The liberal dimension tends to draw upon an ideal of civil society described by Edwards as ‘the Good Society’; an autonomous sphere imbued with strong normative values of tolerance, non-discrimination, non-violence, trust, cooperation, freedom and democracy (2004, p38).

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41 Hegemony in the original Gramscian sense can be defined as “the ability of one class to articulate the interest of other social groups to its own” (Mouffe 1979, p183).

42 Kant argued that public reason was attainable within civil society as ‘unprejudiced thinking’ and able to offer reflective judgement according to his categorical imperative (Bohman 1997 p185)
From the perspective of cosmopolitan democracy advocates, these values are deemed missing in global politics, and are in fact essential in order to ‘tame’ the expansionary economic practices that do tend to proliferate global networks and undermine democratic collective control. As stated previously, there is a strong Kantian bias here that leans towards monological constructions of the good life, where civil society is seen as a vehicle to channel these progressive ideals. In contrast to civil society as ‘Associational Life’ and ‘the Good Society’, the critical dimension tends to draw upon an ideal of civil society situated within the ‘Public Sphere’ (Edwards 2004). It is this idealisation of civil society that arguably provides the most inclusive and democratically legitimate building blocks to the project of cosmopolitan democracy.

As stated previously, the critical dimension accepts that “civil society is the cornerstone of democracy. Without an effective civil society capable of channelling citizen debates over diverse ideas and conflicting interests, the state drifts away from its subjects” (Castells 2008, p78). Civil society represents a ‘solidarity sphere’ where communicative coordinating mechanisms are located that can effectively challenge the instrumental systemic practices and steering mechanisms of the state and market. Civil society thus can effectively represent the public sphere;

“the arena for argument and deliberation as well as for association and institutional collaboration: a non-legislative, extra-judicial, public space in which societal differences, social problems, public policy, government action and matters of community and cultural identity are developed and debated” (Edwards 2004, p55).

As stated previously, the reflexive notion of democracy in its deliberative form relies upon a

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43 This is discussed further on p67 and includes a variety of perspectives on taming economic globalisation from Falk’s ‘humane governance’ to Held’s ‘social covenant’
strong civil society that nurtures communicative forms of power in order to influence administrative power that typically embody state and market governance mechanisms.\textsuperscript{44} This is different in conceptual understanding to both the liberal and neoliberal readings of civil society as ‘associational life’, through the way it problematises the economy as an unreflexive steering mechanism that exudes an instrumental rationality that can be damaging to the lifeworld\textsuperscript{45}, whilst its link with deliberation circumvents the liberal cosmopolitan problems with monological norms construction on the ‘good society’. Before delving further into the link between democratic inclusion and the public sphere as articulated by the critical project, it is worth discussing how both the liberal and critical cosmopolitan projects have drawn upon a globalised understanding of civil society in order to supplement their projects for global democracy.

How has the ideal of civil society become incorporated within these cosmopolitan projects?\textsuperscript{46} An increasing literature on the emergence of a nascent form of GCS has attracted these scholars towards the possibility of reconciling the local spaces of citizen participation with the unaccountable global structures of governance. The normative dimension inherent within this vision of civil society, drawn upon by the cosmopolitan democratic project, is seen to contain the potential to ‘reclaim’ the exclusive dimensions of neoliberal globalisation through

\textsuperscript{44} The link between deliberation, the public sphere and civil society as articulated by Habermas and his contemporaries working on global deliberative frameworks is discussed in further detail on p83-98

\textsuperscript{45} See p93-95

\textsuperscript{46} It is important to note here that this thesis is specifically interrogating the usage of civil society from the cosmopolitan democratic perspective and therefore the work on global civil society emanating directly from the work of Gramsci is not discussed within the thesis. It is interesting in the way that the ‘neo-Gramscians’ parallel much of the cosmopolitan literature in their formulation of a third sphere that aims to resist neoliberal forms of governance much in the same way that the cosmopolitan project does. The difference, however, lies in the way that for the neo-Gramscians, global civil society is specifically the vehicle from which to end class exploitation, for the cosmopolitans the extension of democracy into governance structures is the primary goal, which is argued to then undermine the exclusivity of neoliberalism as a by-product. It is this concern with democracy and global governance that frames the thesis, however, for an interesting discussion on neo-Gramscian understandings and problematisations of global civil society see for example; Amoore and Langley (2004) Cox (1999), Ford (2003), Germain and Kenny (1998, 2005), Rupert (1998)
promoting democratic citizen control.

There is a wealth of controversy trying to pinpoint where to situate thinking of GCS when there clearly is no global state to which we can delve into the debates of old surrounding civil society, to this end the usage of GCS is a complex one that has drawn from a variety of theoretical standpoints to debate not only the existence of such a term but also its role in global politics. Lipschutz argues that theorising over GCS has always been a bit of an 'epistemological free-for-all'; even the classical theorists associated with civil society have failed to produce a consistent agreement, thus raising questions about the difficulty of agreement when we discuss the globalising of civil society (2005, p171). O'Brien (2005) and Scholte (2000b) argue that GCS is essentially any civic action that involves one or more of the following: addressing transworld issues, engaging in transborder communication, containing a global organisation, or forming a type of supraterritorial solidarity (Scholte 2000b, p80; O'Brien 2005, p214).

Discussions of GCS suggest that the concept can be positioned descriptively by the identification of a new growth in transnational actors and greater prominence to their effects on political reality, and secondly, normatively by prescribing a global future that involves a greater shaping of global governance through civic forces than the present dominance of state/market collaboration (Falk 2005, p69). The descriptive dimension contains those authors who have consciously attempted to avoid a normative bias in their analysis of GCS and instead incorporate a more descriptive/explanatory method. This approach allows them to test the globality of civil society, often through empirical analysis, and avoiding turning GCS into an 'ethical promise' (See Keane 2003 Anheier and Themudo 2002, Colas 2002, 2005, Keck
and Sikkink 1998, Chandler 2005). Stone argues that the literature advocating the democratisation of global governance such as the cosmopolitan democratic project and even the (critical) turn towards deliberation, tends to focus on what should be rather than what is; thus to put the (normative) cart before the (conceptual) horse (2009, p64). In contrast the normatively orientated cosmopolitan democratic project avoids relying upon the empirical globality of GCS and instead demonstrates its utility as 'a project to be realised' through its normative goals of expanding democracy and participation on a global (spatial) scale (Chandler, 2005, p17).

This approach views GCS as a response to the perceived democratic deficit and problems of accountability in global governance structures; a normative shift from the older conceptions of international relations as primarily concerned with survival (relegating normative questions of the ‘good life’ to the domestic sphere) to an acceptance that non-state actors are introducing normative issues to the global sphere, no longer constrained by domestic boundaries (Chandler 2004, p3). This is of course more of a description of the liberal dimension of cosmopolitan democracy with its strong Kantian emphasis on the ‘good society’. Baker and Chandler (2005) summarise the normative dimension of GCS as having three core aims; to extend the notion of political community beyond the nation-state, to re-emphasize human agency in the face of economic determinism under the rubric of neoliberal globalisation, and to extend/deepen the notion of democracy and democratic participation through inclusive spaces such as deliberative forums. These three criteria represent the foundations of the cosmopolitan democratic project, however, though within each project

47 Colas argues that even the attempted neutral position advocated by the editors of the London School of Economics' Global Civil Society yearbooks “reproduce certain core liberal values including pluralism, non-violent contestation, dialogue and debate through global civil society” (Colas 2005, p18).

48 For example the classic state-centric survival perspective of realist scholars in the discipline of International Relations (see Morgenthau 2005, Waltz 2001, Mearschmier 2001)
there is a discrepancy between which of the three are prioritised.\textsuperscript{49}

Previous discussions on the neoliberal underpinnings of civil society, drawing upon the associational approach, tend to lack this normative dimension in its idealisation of GCS, this is apparent within policy making circles where the neutral and pluralistic reading of civil society is key, indeed as Amoore and Langley note:

“The policy prescriptions and commentaries of the principle international organisations have tended to treat GCS as a neutral category, populated in a pluralistic fashion by voluntary organisations, thereby depoliticising its significance in governing global political economy. By contrast academic discussion in IR/IPE has tended to assert the transformative potential of GCS, particularly in terms of groups to defy neoliberalism and democratise global governance” (2004, p90).

The normative idealisation of a civil society that operates as a critique of neoliberal practices and as a vehicle to democratise global governance is in direct contrast to the depoliticised formation of civil society under the associational approach. Despite both strands of cosmopolitan democracy sharing this strong critique of neoliberalism in their global democracy projects involving CSOs, the former lacks the reflexive notion of democracy under a deliberative framework and thus its critique of neoliberal practices falls into liberal justice arguments that remain problematic from a Habermasian inspired understanding of intersubjectivity.\textsuperscript{50}

One of the key questions that needs to be addressed here, is what concrete CSO practices can the cosmopolitan project claim to draw upon when it extrapolates its theoretical understanding

\textsuperscript{49} For example the third criterion, deliberation is used almost entirely by the critical dimension of the cosmopolitan democratic project, albeit the increasingly liberal work of David Held draws upon it at times, this is a point that is returned to later within the chapter.

\textsuperscript{50} This point will be made more apparent when a thorough analysis is undertaken of both models of cosmopolitan democracy on p67-111
of civil society to the ‘global’ level? According to its advocates, the permeation of non-state actors across borders and the increasing influence they are beginning to herald within the global structures of governance, warrant enough evidence to be described as ‘global’ and contain the potential for fulfilling the democratising role idealised under their frameworks. This definition of the global that I will use here is again a spatial rather than geographical distinction (see Wapner 1995; Friedman, Hochstetler and Clark 2005). Some authors purposely use the term transnational civil society, over global civil society, because of the associated problems with under-representation and the unequal concentration of civil society globally (see Florini 2000). The cosmopolitan democratic project semantically shifts between usages of transnational/global forms of civil society, yet tends to emphasize the spatial distinction and concentrates upon the notion of a project to be realised, against counter-claims of under-representation. In this respect unless otherwise stated I will assume transnational and global under semantic similarity as the spatial transcendence of the nation-state.

The wealth of literature on the subject of global civil society seems to have emerged around the 1990s, though its practices long pre-date this modern scholarly interest. Often within this literature there is a heavy bias towards Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as the vehicles for civil society. The influential John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project defines NGOs as being private (in that they are separate from the state), non-profit (not aiming to provide returns to the owners), self-governing and voluntary (Salamon et al 1999). This categorisation does, however, run into the problem of defining those NGOs that

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51 Note for instance the global role of religion, catholic missionaries or example, or movements to end the slave trade in the 19th century (see Florini 2003, p7-10; Keck and Sikkink 1998, chp2)

52 The term NGO is still problematised by some authors who prefer to use the term 'civil society organisations' (Falk 1998) or 'civic associations' (O'Brien 2005) believing that the term non-governmental creates a hierarchical dualism that privileges the state as a central focus, or that the term non-governmental can technically include corporations and market actors.
are funded by the state (especially common in post-conflict countries where the NGO sector can be heavily donor funded from Western states\textsuperscript{53}), this however was recognised when the project released its 2004 edition, changing the conception of 'private' to include “not part of the apparatus of the state, even though they may receive support from government sources”\textsuperscript{54} (Salamon and Sokolowski 2004, p8). Alongside this updated notion, the term 'non-profit' has shifted towards 'not profit-distributing' to reflect that NGOs operating in a financial capacity can use surplus income to be re-invested in the objectives of the organisation, but strictly not in the form of profit to shareholders, directors and managers\textsuperscript{55} (Salamon and Sokolowski 2004, p8).

The term NGO is used in a variety of ways that are at times complex and contradictory, reflecting the particular ideological standpoint of the author. They can be defined through their 'public interest' basis which is often taken at times to stand in for (universal) 'humanitarian interests' and imbued with a moral sense of purpose, whilst at the other scale they can be seen as promoting (particular) specific interests through professional and efficient organisational structures\textsuperscript{56} (Hirsch 2002, p197).

NGOs are often prioritised as the representatives of civil society in cosmopolitan frameworks because of their potential for acting in global capacity, and being able to globalise domestic issues through a form of representation and participation of those voices often marginalised,

\textsuperscript{53} See chapter two.
\textsuperscript{54} For example the prefix 'non' is taken by most to mean outside somehow of the state apparatus, yet within the literature one can find examples of QUANGOs (Quasi-non-governmental-organisations) and GONGOs (government-organised-non-governmental organisations) demonstrating the ways in which NGOs can be partnered or even funded by governments (Hirsch 2002, p197).
\textsuperscript{55} This is popular within the microfinance industry where NGOs often make a financial return on their loans to the poor, and reinvest according to their social missions. This point is discussed further in Chapter Three.
\textsuperscript{56} These NGOs promoting specific interests through professional structures are often characteristic of neoliberal interpretations, the focus of chapter two.
or subordinated, in formal political channels. NGOs in their transnational capacity have exploded onto the global scene in the last few decades (Boli and Thomas 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Cohen and Rai 2000; Florini 2000; Higgot, Underhill, and Bieler 2000; Edwards and Gaventa 2001; Milner and Moravcsik 2009). NGOs have carved out spaces for participation at key UN conferences\textsuperscript{57} (Weiss and Gordenker 1996; Clark Friedman and Hochstetler 1998; Pianta 2005) and the key Multilateral Economic Institutions (MEIs) such as the World Bank (Clark, Fox and Treakle 2003; Nelson 2000), the IMF (Scholte 1998, 2002) and the WTO (Scholte, O'Brien and Williams 1998).

It should be noted here that alongside the term NGO various authors privilege social movements as an important dimension of civil society, defined “as incoherent democratic struggles that are not homogeneous but internally fragmented, yet aiming to promote the voices of the subaltern and marginalised” (Fernando 2006, p10). These more informal mobilisations equated with social activists have become a presence on the global stage in the last few decades, from the anti-authoritarian movements in Eastern Europe and South America in the 1970s, to the ‘new’ social movements that emerged focusing on issues such as gender, the environment, human rights and peace, representing a new collective form of expression about the very ‘grammar’ of our forms of life (Habermas 1981, p33). These new social movements are often seen in self-defence of society against the exclusive logics of the state and market economy and involve “a reflexive relation to the objective, subjective, and social worlds insofar as they thematize issues of personal and social identity, contest the social interpretation of norms, communicatively create and agree on new ones, and propose alternative ways of relating to the environment” (Cohen 1985, p708).

\textsuperscript{57} The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm in 1972 represented for many commentators the start of an ‘unprecedented’ inclusion of NGOs (Willetts 1996, p57)
At the beginning of this decade there has been an increase in attention to the spontaneous protests and mobilisations as part of an anti-neoliberal agenda, culminating in global protests at economic summits such as Seattle, Prague and Genoa. For some, the emergence of these social movements represent 'transnational advocacy networks' where activists can put pressure on governments to effect policy changes (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The presence of social movements on the global scene has led to the institutionalisation of organisations such as the World Social Forum (WSF)\(^{58}\) where activists and NGOs can make their presence heard in response to the perceived inaccessibility of the formal global apparatus of governance. Various authors tend to equate social movements that cross borders and operate outside of the state such as 'Transnational Social Movement Organisations (Risse-Kappen 1995; Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999; Florini 2000; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002) and ‘Global Social Change Organisations’ (Maclean 2003) with those International NGOs that normatively address humanitarian issues. I will attempt to use the umbrella term Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to include all of these organisational forms, and when appropriate, refer to their individual components.

These examples are utilised from the cosmopolitan perspective, to demonstrate the capacity of CSOs to expand citizen participation from the local to the global and therefore the potential to democratise global governance. Scholte (2001) recognises that despite the myriad of examples available of the positive impact of CSOs within contemporary structures of global governance, very few authors analyse this through the lens of democratic potential. The

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\(^{58}\) The WSF formed in Brazil in 2001, as a rival to the exclusive World Economic Forum (WEF) held annually at Davos. It aims to be an inclusive space for a variety of activists and NGOs that can come together in an open environment to discuss alternatives to the perceived neoliberal strategies at the WEF. Due to its popularity it has spawned a variety of regional social forums and attracts thousands of activists each year.
cosmopolitan democratic project engages with this very notion and relies upon the emergence of CSOs as the legitimising force required to create a truly inclusive global democratic governance project able to remedy the contemporary democratic deficit and 'reclaim' globalisation from the exclusionary neoliberal dimension.

CSOs within the cosmopolitan democratic project are perceived to increase three aspects of democratic legitimacy; input-, throughput- and output legitimacy in an effort to remedy the democratic deficit. *Input-orientated legitimacy* tends to be associated with the ideal of 'governance by the people', therefore to privilege the quality of representation, opportunities for participation, and the openness of agenda-setting processes. *Throughput-orientated legitimacy* specifically focuses on the quality of the decision making process itself, thus to assess the role undertaken by participants. Finally, *output-orientated legitimacy* is concerned with the intended/unintended effects of 'governance for the people' hence the need to measure the performance, effectiveness and efficiency of decisions to ensure the legitimacy of constructed policies (see Scharpf 1998; Bekkers, Dijkstra, Edwards and Fenger 2007).

Both the liberal and the critical strands of cosmopolitan democracy implicitly invoke these three questions surrounding democratic legitimacy, however, as will become apparent, the liberal dimension of cosmopolitanism tends to prioritise input-orientated legitimacy through its normative framework of inclusion by focusing on the ability for non-state actors to have greater levels of access and opportunities to participate within the structures of global governance. There is an attempt to shift focus towards questions of the actual decision making processes themselves, however, they remain largely vague and under-theorised. The more critical orientated strands tend to privilege the second dimension arguing that access,
representation, and participation for non-state actors is not enough to supplant the democratic deficit, genuine inclusion can only occur when certain criteria are established to measure legitimacy within deliberative engagement and the output of decision-making policies.

This chapter will now turn towards the frameworks constructed by both the liberal and critical dimensions to demonstrate the differences between them and the way they incorporate CSOs within them; for the liberal project this tends to focus upon greater representation; a numerical form of inclusion within new democratic frameworks to control the spread of unregulated market forces. The critical dimension, however, attempts to interrogate exclusion and domination present within existing structures to analyse the potential for CSOs to expose and eradicate these forms through the construction of deliberative global public spheres.

1.2 The Liberal Cosmopolitan Democratic Project

1.2.1 Introduction

frameworks; the aim is to achieve what Falk labels ‘humane governance’ (Falk 1995).

This global project does not entail the collapse of the nation-state or its subsuming under a federal system, or even a world government, it is instead a new framework that attempts to diminish somewhat the role of the state to enable the voice of the citizen to be heard in the formation of transnational issues. At its most basic level, Cosmopolitan democracy proposes to construct a vibrant democratic society that is within, among and beyond the state system (Archibugi 2004, p438). The UN is privileged within these frameworks because it contains the potential to oversee this form of democratisation at the global level and is seen as the only actor “with the authority to mediate among states and the scope to represent a point of reference for civil society” (Archibugi, Balduini and Donati 2000, p128). Democratic reform of the UN has often been rendered problematic; in 1996, UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali wrote an agenda for democratisation with the aim of major institutional reform including strengthening NGO representation at Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, and an expanded UN Security Council (see Boutrous-Ghali 2000). The proposals, however, were toned down by the incoming UN Secretary General Kofi Anan and the democratic element sidelined (Falk 1998, 2000; Archibugi, Balduini and Donati 2000). The cosmopolitan democratic project see itself as attempting to add weight to this call for democratisation through offering further concrete proposals rather than abstract utopian frameworks.

In one of the first attempts to establish the workings of a cosmopolitan model of democracy, Held (1995, p279-280) outlines a variety of short term and long term strategies to be pursued in order to achieve a more inclusive and fair system of global governance. Under political
reform, Held advocates the restructuring of the UN Security Council (UNSC) into a more inclusive structure that gives developing countries a stronger say in the decision-making processes, and scraps the veto that dominates the UNSC\(^59\) to be replaced by a near-consensus principle to allow for 'balance of voices' (Held 1995, p279, 2004, p152)\(^60\). Secondly the UN General Assembly (UNGA) would focus on issues of global importance such as poverty, the environment, global warming, and the reduction of WMDs instead of the more traditional security concerns and would be accompanied by the establishment of an Economic and Social Security Council in order to coordinate poverty reduction and global development policies, and a specific environmental IGO to coordinate multilateral approaches to sustainable ecology (Held 2004). Archibugi advocates the development of an expanded World Parliamentary Assembly (WPA) that aims at direct citizen elections to the UN, in order to advise the UNGA and SC, though without holding the executive power bestowed on these organisations. The WPA's role could be to decide upon matters of humanitarian intervention, debate boundary disputes, and identify the best methods of dispute resolution among cross-border communities (Archibugi 2008, p172-173). The political environment of the UN system would effectively be used to regulate the economic environment and tame the unfettered spread of neoliberal market forces, according to Held:

> A bridge has to built...between international economic law and human rights law, between commercial law and environmental law, between state sovereignty and transnational law, and between cosmopolitan principles and cosmopolitan practices (Held 2004, p155).

The expansion of issue areas on poverty and development at the UNGA and its complementary agencies are perceived as “vital to offset the power and influence of market-

\(^{59}\) Or in Archibugi's recommendation; restrictions on when the veto can be used (2008, p163).

\(^{60}\) Held has also added the need to integrate 'credible threshold tests' and minimum conditions for the authorising of force from within the UNSC (2004, p148).
orientated agencies such as the WTO and IMF” (Held 2004, p112). In order to 'tame' neoliberal forms of globalisation requires the construction of a 'new coordinating economic agency' (Held 1995) or a 'world financial authority' (Held 2004). This has yet to be concretely formulated but would involve a greater capacity to regulate the spread of global markets and promote a development framework committed to debt cancellation among developing countries as well as introducing mandatory global labour and environmental standards (Held 2004). The United Nations would be at the forefront of “a new Bretton Woods agreement – an agreement which would tie investment, production and trade to the conditions and processes of democracy” (Held 1995, p256).

Two important questions emerge here; firstly how can we expect states to adhere to these new frameworks given the recent historical trend of the dominance of 'power-politics', and secondly how can this new framework effectively incorporate the local into the global and transcend state-centrism. These two questions are answered through the establishment of a holistic 'cosmopolitan democratic law' and the inclusion of non-state actors within governance frameworks to create the multi-stakeholder process required to implement the substantive content of the cosmopolitan democratic law.

In its basic premise, cosmopolitan democratic law “creates powers and constraints, and rights and duties, which transcend the claims of nation-states and which have far-reaching national consequences” (Held et al 1999). This law would reflect the Kantian attempt to establish not just a (state) republican constitution61, but a 'people's law' that recognises the inviolable right of individuals as members of a universal community (Archibugi 2009, p119-121). Held

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61 Kant's framework of law consisted of three parts, a law of the republic, a law between republics, and a cosmopolitan law for individuals as members of humanity (see Kant 2003)
defines eight core 'principles' that serve as the guiding ethical basis of cosmopolitan democracy and required for the legitimate construction of the cosmopolitan democratic law:

1. **Equal worth and dignity**: this is to recognise that humankind belongs to a universal moral realm
2. **Active agency**: humans must have the capacity to self-determine their actions and choices
3. **Personal responsibility and accountability**: differences in choice must not prevent others from securing their basic needs
4. **Consent**: the basis of non-coercive collective agreement
5. **Collective decision-making about public issues through voting procedures**: consent must be linked to voting mechanisms of majority rule
6. **Inclusiveness and subsidiarity**: those who stand to be affected by a decision should directly or indirectly have an influence in its process
7. **Avoidance of serious harm**: the key principle of social justice to ensure urgent needs are met and that active agency and participation is not compromised
8. **Sustainability**: all decisions taken on development must not disrupt ecological balance of the environment.

These are accordingly categorised into three groups, the first three principles represent the ontological condition of cosmopolitanism as privileging an autonomous moral individual, the second set (principles 4-6) transfers this individual importance towards collective structures and regulatory regimes in order to safeguard the inherent autonomy of the individual. The final principles are to establish a moral framework that secures urgent needs and resource conservation, i.e. to ensure ecological balance and sustainable resources are prioritised whilst ensuring that the most vulnerable in society are imbued with the material capacity for them to act autonomously (Held 2004, p170-178; 2009, p538-539). Held's principles closely echo the Kantian conception of cosmopolitan law, defined as 'universal hospitality', though Held has gone further to attempt to institutionalise these values through a concrete legal structure that would define relations of global governance (see Held 1995, p226-233; Heater 2002, chp 4)
1.2.2 Cosmopolitan democracy and the participation of civil society

In order for the substantive content of this cosmopolitan democratic law to be constructed in an inclusive environment, Held turns towards the importance of multi-stakeholder approaches and argues that the UNGA would only be legitimate when its policy consensus building involves a 'global constitutional convention' of states; IGOs, INGOs, citizens groups and social movements.

Implicit here is the acknowledgement that the global cannot be adequately democratised without the inclusion of the local; citizens’ voices are integral to the new cosmopolitan agenda. Held recognises that the promises of political globalisation bring the emergence of 'new' voices of a 'transnational civil society' (1999, p108) that whilst creating new forms of public life within the debating and framing of global issues, also contain the potential to establish new methods of holding “transnational power systems to account” (Held 1999, p108). The emergence of a nascent ‘global public opinion’ stemming from a multitude of social movements, are said to represent the foundations of a truly inclusive cosmopolitan order that requires not just the safeguarding in international institutions but the nurturing of civil society from opinion shaping to more direct voices on policy frameworks within these institutions (Archibugi 2004).

One of Held's most recent ideas for the direct role of NGOs within his cosmopolitan framework is for the creation of Global Issue Networks (GINs)\textsuperscript{62} that are designed to

\textsuperscript{62} The idea originates from the work of former World Bank Vice-President for Europe, Jean-Francois Rischard (see Rischard 2002).
investigate specific global problems and search for solutions. These networks would be comprised of members from governments, businesses and international CSOs thus representative of a multi-stakeholder approach to governance. In the short term GINS will formulate policy recommendations and report to the key UN institutions, however, their role could increase in the long term as 'rating agencies' engaging in the naming and shaming of domestic governments that are not adhering to the policy prescriptions (Held 2005, p254-258).

It is important to note that within this framework the 'business' actors are far removed from those in operation today in global politics. In order to make them more 'public interest' and align them closely with INGOs, Held advocates a deeper embedding of cosmopolitan principles within the organisations themselves. Trans-national Companies (TNCs) are expected to integrate the core cosmopolitan framework within their articles of association to effectively internalise social justice through respecting employees as free and equal, having access to learning and welfare schemes as well as a greater level of access to the decision-making opportunities within these organisations (1995, p251-253). This call for corporate responsibility goes further than Kofi Annan's Global Compact because of the institutionalisation within the modus operandi of economic organisations, effectively a form of global compact 'with teeth' (Held 2004, p155). Archibugi explicitly privileges the role of 'global civil society' through the creation of new permanent global institutions to oversee specific issues, such as the environment, development and disarmament, or tasked with the observation of human rights (2008, p112). His proposals for the actual role of NGOs as the

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63 The Global Compact attempts to align the objectives of the international community and those of the business world, involving an established list of ten principles that TNCs should adhere to in order to promote corporate social responsibility. For a list of these principles and more information see www.globalcompact.org.
formal representatives of civil society are quite vague, though he argues that they need to be 'reinforced' and 'formalised' within the permanent institutions of the UN, citing that perhaps a separate assembly of 6,000 recognised NGOs may be one such solution (2008, p176-177).

Johan Galtung\textsuperscript{64} (1995, 2000) takes a slightly different approach to the cosmopolitan democratic project through the construction of a 'World Central Authority', based upon three UN organs; the existing United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and two separate chambers to be constructed under this, the United Nations People’s Assembly (UNPA) and the United Nations Corporate Assembly (UNCA). This tripartite structure would ideally over time shift in executive power from the UNGA to the UNPA, as the people’s parliament become the democratic global voice of legitimacy. One of his project ideas is a new reformulation of the UN system to include a more inclusive role for the consultation of 'International People's Organisations' (IPOs)\textsuperscript{65} as a counterweight to the low accountability and economistic culture of TNCs, through the establishment of a 'World Assembly of IPOs' similar to the Conference of Non-Governmental Organisations (CONGO) existing today thus acting in consultative capacity (1995, p207-8). Galtung recognises that global democratisation requires the strengthening of civil society because unlike the state and the market it is the only site of power that reflects the very foundations of democracy; “moral power, legitimacy and decision-making” (1995, p202). Civil society under this model is promoted as a legitimate form of governance that privileges empowered citizens rather than market consumers and in order to be an important force for inclusion and democracy, there is a need to expand the restricted accreditation policies in place today to allow a greater variety to engage in a more

\textsuperscript{64} Galtung has written extensively in the field of peace studies, and whilst most of his early work was focused on elaborating a critique of imperialist world systems from a Marxist conception, he has recently moved towards a more moral cosmopolitan position in his attempt to find post-Westphalian democratic reform based upon a utopian reading of the extension of liberal humanitarian values (See Lawler 1995)

\textsuperscript{65} Essentially a preferred term for NGOs (Galtung, 1995, p215).
open and fair structure (Galtung 2000, p155).

Richard Falk attempts to reformulate the UN system in line with a form of cosmopolitan democracy that represents a departure from the work of Held, Archibugi and Galtung through a critique of their projects for remaining too close to the principles of Westphalia and not pushing further ahead with the de-centring of the state in global democratic governance. Instead, Falk focuses squarely on the drive of 'globalisation from below'\(^\text{66}\); GCS as the democratizing force to bring greater levels of democratisation, participation, accountability, transparency and autonomy to these institutions\(^\text{67}\) (1995, 2005a, 2005b). The role of GCS then in its humane, progressive and moral form, is to inject greater levels of substantive democracy, as opposed to constitutional democracy in order to challenge the 'moral emptiness' of neoliberal globalisation (Falk 2000, p171). This form of 'humane governance' represents the building of frameworks that firstly protect and nurture the full realisation of human rights, whilst extending democratic participation into spheres previously dominated by political and economic actors (1995, p125). The linking of GCS within this ethical framework is seen as a form of 'compassionate globalism' (Falk 1995, p212).

Falk is critical of contemporary reform proposals at the UN for essentially reaffirming its statist dimension, and argues that the 'rudimentary glimmering of civil society' that has become influential in recent UN summits and conferences needs to be nurtured and protected through an appeal to democratic structures promoting the values of “peace, economic well-
being, social and political justice, and environmental quality” (1998, p323-4). In order to successfully institutionalise these actors, there needs to be a 'global democratic forum' in the form of a weak assembly that can consider issues of environmental standards and economic justice, eventually forming a democratic oversight over the core IEOs of the IMF, WTO and World Bank (Falk and Strauss 2003, p15). Within this forum, civil society actors and businesses could work together to further the cosmopolitan principles required for a more just cosmopolitan democratic order, eventually they may be able to establish formal powers alongside the UNGA and form a “bicameral world legislative” (Falk and Strauss 2003, p18). Furthermore, and in a more ambitious tone, the construction of this 'global democratic forum' could help to construct a more inclusive form of UNGA into a Global People's Assembly (GPA) where citizens would become vote-holders rather than states (See Falk and Strauss 2000). It is noticeable here that in a similar gesture to Held, Falk allows businesses into this post-Westphalian framework, but assumed to be tamed through their inclusion alongside civil society. For Falk there is a dualism growing at the heart of contemporary global politics, between two sets of equally opposed actors; TNCs and their business allies who further the neoliberal agenda of profit, capital and trade, and INGOs that represent the marginalised through concerns of poverty environmental sustainability and human rights (1998, p320) The rise of non-state actors have created contemporary shifts in governance towards multiple layers of authority alongside the state and allowing elements of cosmopolitan principles to filter throughout and actively challenge the economic heart of neoliberal globalisation (2002b).

The projects outlined so far demonstrate the importance attached to GCS (and in particular, NGOs) as a democratising and moral force when they are able to effectively participate within
new cosmopolitan structures, whether 'top-down' structures advocated by Held, Archibugi and Galtung, or the more 'bottom-up' approach of Falk. Representation here is the key to ensuring the input-orientated legitimacy of the democratic project. On this account cosmopolitan democracy is seen as more inclusive when NGOs are visible within these frameworks effectively undermining the exclusionary nature of the global system. It is worth interrogating the second dimension of throughput-orientated legitimacy and the quality of participation that the liberal project also alludes to within their frameworks, but as it will be demonstrated this analysis tends to be more vague and rendered with a distinctly liberal bias; the effect is to expose a layer of exclusion built into this dimension of cosmopolitan democracy

1.2.3 Cosmopolitan democracy and the quality of participation

Andrew Kuper (2004) formulates a theoretical model of 'institutional cosmopolitanism' that like Falk, remains deeply sceptical of the way that civil society has been incorporated under the 'top down' model of cosmopolitan democracy. He analyses the work of Held, Archibugi and Galtung and their attempts to formulate a more inclusive model of the UN through a broadening of its institutional format to include a greater number of non-state actors, and argues that their work, although imaginative, fails on two accounts. Firstly, all three authors tend to reproduce a form of statism/territoriality within their projects and although they recognise the supplementary and consultative role for non-state actors, serious questions are raised as to the influence that these actors can have within these frameworks. Secondly, they all recommend an increase in the size and internal plurality of the United Nations yet this numerical extension tends to overlook how non-state actors can “improve the quality and efficiency of process and decision” (2004, p162).
In response to these shortcomings, Kuper advocates a representative global assembly that accepts that “non-state actors-such as IGOs and NGOs as well as local and regional territorial authorities-are sometimes better placed than states to operate decisively over crucial functions, and should be formally empowered to do so” (2004, p164). Kuper (2004, p166-168) attempts to remove the territorial preferencing of the contemporary UN general assembly to include state and non-state actors in an executive role so long as they meet nine criteria in order to 'sieve' good from bad candidates. These criterions include:

1. **The criterion of basicness**: ensuring that the actor is concerned with basic human interests such as basic human needs and rights.

2. **The criterion of inclusiveness**: ensuring that actors within an organisation represent a substantial cross-section of society including gender. There is an element of exclusion here in that actors representing views “couched in purely cultural relativist terms would not gain entry”.

3. **The criterion of Distributive Subsidiarity**: ensuring that actors reflect a shared global interest (otherwise actors' interests could best be served at lower levels of governance).

4. **The Criterion of Democratic Control**: to ensure that organisations are internally democratic through either elections or a system of checks and balances.

5. **The Criterion of Permanence**: to ensure that an organisation has a track record of successful action, thereby enhancing debate and policymaking.

6. **The Criterion of Non-Deception**: to ensure that an organisation is fully transparent and accountable in its mission statement and intentions.

7. **The Criterion of Audit**: ensuring that an organisation can survive financial scrutiny by
both independent private auditors and accountability agencies.

8. The Criterion of Non-Dependence: ensuring that an organisation receives a multitude of funding sources so as not to be entirely dependent upon one source of finance and the undue influence this could entail.

Clearly Kuper has attempted to conceptualise a more central and executive role for non-state actors in his attempts to reform the exclusionary structures of global governance. There is an important recognisable shift in Kuper's formulation of 'institutional cosmopolitanism' that he argues separates his work from the previous authors who all establish civil society as an homogeneous 'moral' force and therefore privilege civil society as able to solve the democratic deficit, simply by being a presence within these new cosmopolitan frameworks. These authors tend to focus on the first criteria of democratic legitimacy; input-orientated legitimacy, whereas Kuper's model appears to ask questions about the identities of NGOs and the consequences for the quality of their participation, through a mechanism of adjudication (2004, p166). Despite his criticism of the previous authors, he fails to acknowledge that this questioning of the quality of participation is also apparent within the cosmopolitan democratic project of Held, who similarly establishes a framework to test the validity of democratic decision-making within his project.

Held argues that within his framework of global governance (for example GINs) there must be a method to determine the legitimacy of decisions among these multi-stakeholder discussions, in effect he argues for a form of deliberation as the form of adjudication. This model recognises that “there can be no adequate specification of equal liberty, rights and vital

68 The usage of deliberation by Held is rarely commented upon in the cosmopolitan literature and its critics, this could be due to its vague application and also to the way that Held’s book Models of Democracy only introduces a section on deliberation in the third edition (see Held 2006, chp 9).
interests without a corresponding institutionalization of 'the public use of reason' in uncoerced national and transnational forms of dialogue and debate” (Held 2002, p313). Public reason and justification of decisions are tied towards the Kantian conception of testing validity through open-ended interaction, uncoerced agreement, and impartial judgement. This 'meta-principle of impartialist reasoning' according to Held, is achieved through participants offering normative claims that are defensible from universal rather than particular standpoints, in this way he claims that his notion of deliberation is 'not as rigorous' as the Habermasian conception (Held and Patomaki 2006, p118).

Both Kuper and Held ask important questions surrounding the role of decision-making within these global democratic structures, and that determine that the simple inclusion of NGOs may not in fact be enough to determine the democratic legitimacy required for a more inclusive order. Kuper creates a set of criteria to limit which actors can participate within his framework in order to determine what he regards as a more legitimate democratic framework, thus to increase the quality of democratic decision-making, whilst Held's notion of deliberation allows all CSOs within his framework, but the substantive content of their deliberation is to be 'guided' through his liberal cosmopolitan principles and therefore limits acceptable discourses prior to deliberation. For example Held suggests that decisions within deliberation can be subject to the notion of 'reasonable rejection' which he argues could include decisions that violate the avoidance of serious harm and the amelioration of urgent need (Held 2002, p312). This links to his 7th principle of the avoidance of serious harm; establishing a 'prioritising commitment' that creates a moral framework for privileging the most vulnerable in society, and his 8th principle of sustainability; ecological privileging against damages to

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69 The Habermasian notion of deliberation will be discussed below and serves as the model from which the critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy draws from.
irreplaceable and non-substitutable resources (2005, p266).

Both Held and Kuper effectively introduce a liberal bias of selectivity into their deliberative frameworks, reflecting their intellectual debt to John Rawls in contrast to the deliberative project of Jürgen Habermas; in essence they construct frameworks of legitimacy through an appeal to monological self-reflection. This attempt to select the criteria of inclusion will be returned to below and exposed for being exclusionary and marginalising to those actors not conforming to liberal cosmopolitan principles.

The liberal cosmopolitan model offers a variety of projects to democratise global governance, and attempts to incorporate the local into the global through the elevation of CSOs in order to remedy the democratic deficit. Throughout these models there is an implicit belief that civil society can not only bring a more inclusive form of democratic governance, but a moral form through the challenging of neoliberal notions of globalisation understood as the spread of unregulated markets and unjust economic policies. Within all of these frameworks there is an expectation that NGOs can work alongside states and TNCs as a 'taming' force within a more inclusive and 'humane' global structure.

1.3 The Critical Cosmopolitan Democratic Project

1.3.1 Introduction
As stated previously, the liberal literature tends to privilege democratic legitimacy through an input-orientated approach, the 'critical' dimension, however, pays particular attention to the throughput-orientated approach, and its central concern becomes the role of the actor within
participatory mechanisms. The liberal literature tends to privilege an increase in the *visibility* of CSOs within new formalised structures, seen as an inclusive advantage to counter the exclusionary practices of contemporary state-centric and market dominated global practices, yet the critical literature tends to recognise that elevation into these structures does not necessarily guarantee a greater level of participation unless it is combined with a deeper integration of democratic values within global governance frameworks.

The critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy contains a multitude of authors that are broadly sympathetic to the notion of expanding democracy beyond the state, though unlike the liberal dimension they draw upon the work of the Frankfurt school of 'Critical Theory'\(^70\) and particularly the work of Jurgen Habermas, to engage with a dialogical democratic structure outside of the state. As will be discussed, this focus on the dialogical interrogation of global frameworks, rather than the (liberal) monological construction is more inclusive through opening up the substantive content of democratic discourses to an open deliberative process, where exclusion is generated within intersubjective dialogue rather than prior to it. This approach views civil society as democratic, participatory, inclusive and legitimate when it is situated within a 'global public sphere' and that interactions between the agents of global governance (whether state, market or civil society) will only produce democratic, participatory, inclusive and legitimate outcomes under a process of 'deliberation'\(^71\)

One of the main distinctions between the liberal and the critical understandings of civil

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\(^70\) The Frankfurt school of Critical Theory is associated with a plurality of neo-Marxist scholars concerned with elevating the humanist work of Marx from his economic determinism in order to expose social sites of exclusion and domination thus contributing to a more emancipatory form of politics.

\(^71\) There is an interesting amount of scholarship produced that argues for creating more deliberative space for citizens within participatory institutions, however, this has not been included in this chapter because it tends to look at localised spaces for citizens, whereas this chapter is concerned at the global dimension where citizen participation tends to be equated with civil society for inclusionary strategies, however, for interest see Fischer (2006), Goetz and Gaventa (2001), Santos (1998)
society is that the liberal position tends to see individual voluntarism as the defining feature; whilst for the Critical Theorists it is 'communicative autonomy'. Similarly, liberal notions of civil society recognise threats to autonomy as threats to individual choice\textsuperscript{72}, whilst Critical Theory recognises threats to autonomy as threats to the way interaction is possible communicatively (Chambers 2002, p93). This dualism can also be seen through the liberal privileging of freedom as non-interference, where an actor can block another's ability to choose, versus freedom as non-domination, where an actor can \textit{interfere} with another actor's choice without considering the interests of those affected (Young 2002, p258-259, Petit 1997). Taking their theoretical insights from the work of Jurgen Habermas, they have applied his notion of communicative action in order to determine the validity/invalidity of contemporary global frameworks based on a theory of deliberation.

1.3.2 Deliberation and Communicative Inclusion

The deliberative model of democracy has been at the forefront of discussions in democratic theory over the last two decades\textsuperscript{73}, arising out of a critique of aggregative notions of democracy\textsuperscript{74} for basing democratic legitimacy on a shallow notion of numerical representation (producing passive democratic voters) and modes of discussion focused around strategic voting and bargaining. In its place, the theory of deliberative democracy attempts to go beyond this model by placing the focus of legitimacy on the quality of voice and

\textsuperscript{72} Held explicitly links the cosmopolitan democratic project with its liberal dimension ontologically privileging the individual as a moral agent that demands equal worth and liberty; democratic self-determination becomes the overriding concern to allow the individual to "make independent choices" (2002b, p311).

\textsuperscript{73} James Bohman declared that the popularity of deliberation for democratic theory has led to 'the coming age' of deliberative democracy (1998)

\textsuperscript{74} Also known as interest group pluralism, the term used to describe contemporary democratic politics centred around democratic decision making as the simple aggregation of citizens' preferences, thus creating a competitive and strategic ethos among a political elite vying for popular strategies (see Macpherson 1977, Mansbridge 1990).
discussion over simple representational voting.

Despite the variety of approaches to deliberative democracy\(^7\), Elster attempts to stitch a commonality among them; primarily they are *democratic* through a belief in the importance of collective decision making including the participation of all who stand to be affected by the decision, and *deliberative* through these participants being committed to the twin values of rationality and impartiality with collective decision-making (1998, p8). Furthermore one of the most cited definitions of deliberation comes from the work of Joshua Cohen who argues that it is “focused on the common good, requires some form of *manifest equality* among citizens and *shapes the identity and interests* of citizens in ways that contribute to the formation of a public conception of the common good” (1989, p17).

Deliberation is at the heart an inclusionary ideal, allowing those usually marginalised in expressing moral dissatisfaction a chance to participate in the negotiation of a genuine moral consensus (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). It thus raises the stakes of accountability further than procedural and constitutional democracy (including the liberal project of cosmopolitan democracy), citizens must give reasons that can be accepted by all those “who are bound by the laws and policies they justify” as well as addressing the claims of all those who are significantly affected. (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 129)

This brief notion of deliberation allows for a reconsideration of the work of Held and Kuper who as noted previously, allude to the dimension of deliberation within their work as a dialogical forum where civil society actors can debate on issues of the common good whilst

\(^7\) There are roughly two main historical traces of deliberative theory that are influential today often associated with either John Rawls (1996, 1999) or Jurgen Habermas (1990, 1991, 1993) though their contemporaries have applied these insights in a variety of styles and directions.
ensuring that all those affected by the decision get a chance to participate. Their frameworks, however, introduce substantive constraints on the issues to be debated, and an a priori selective criteria on who is to be included within deliberative processes. The result is a leaning towards the Rawlsian notion of deliberation rather than a more Habermasian notion that remains deeply critical for the monological self-reflecting construction of these boundaries of exclusion (both content of deliberation and access to deliberation).

Both Habermas and Rawls are deeply inspired by Immanuel Kant and the attempt to construct legitimate universal moral standpoints within society. The Kantian project of morality constructed a belief in the universal obligations of humanity under the categorical imperative\(^\text{76}\), as a way of demonstrating that impartial judgement on right and wrong was obtainable despite cultural differences (Rehg 2003, p83-85). Rawls in a similar gesture to Kant, attempts to formulate a universal theory of 'justice' that can be created impartially and acceptable to everyone, his infamous usage of an 'original position' demonstrates a method through which universal moral outcomes can be tested and validated (1998, 1999). The original position is a hypothetical situation where individuals come together and debate the principles of justice without being constrained by 'social forces' (Rawls 1999, p107). In a similar vein to Kant, and what separates him from Habermas, is the way in which Rawls constructs the 'hypothetical' original position as a monological form of validity testing.

Habermas, however, accepted the criticisms of Kantian cosmopolitanism from Hegel, as a monological formulation of morality from a metaphysical method of reasoning that determines the rights and obligations of individuals from a priori principles; 'transcendental

\(^{76}\) “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant cited in O'Neill 1998, p104)
deductions of cosmopolitan right’ (Fine and Smith 2003, p481). This was therefore to accuse Kant of formulating false notions of universality from the “totalising accomplishment of the transcendental subject” (Habermas 1996, p337).

Hegel was critical of the way that an autonomous examination of the human mind could supposedly discover universal forms of morality, and instead argued that this failed to respect the particularistic moral reasoning attributed to different communities and that moral norms produced are constitutive of the community. In Hegelian terms they are nicht hintergehbar; there is no going behind them (O'Neill 2000, Rustin 1999, 176). In response, Habermas attempted to weave between the theoretical positions of both Kant and Hegel to construct a universal form of morality that was based upon a dialogical method of validation; intersubjective communication. According to Hutchings, Kant's formulation of the categorical imperative is undertaken by an individual testing his or own maxims to decide the legitimacy of moral content, this is, however, unacceptable for Habermas, who instead advocates the testing of moral maxims through an intersubjective procedure that draws upon the universal properties of argumentation rather than the self-reflective mind (1996, p75). In essence Habermas “shifts the frame of reference from Kant's solidarity, reflecting, moral consciousness to the community of moral subjects in dialogue; and it replaces his Categorical Imperative with a procedure of practical argumentation aimed at reaching reasoned agreement among those subject to the norms in question” (McCarthy 1994, p46).

The work on deliberative democracy that is inspired by Habermas is strongly critical of the Rawlsian attempt to formulate universal maxims from an internal a priori validation

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77 This critique heralds the starting point of the communitarian position that denies the universality of moral values (see MacIntyre 1984, Taylor 2006, Sandel 1998)
mechanism, especially the consequences this has with regard to substantive constraints placed upon acceptable dialogue and access within deliberative forums. Rawls places a strong emphasis on the idea of the 'reasonable citizen' to ensure that universal maxims constructed are legitimate, his work has been criticised for introducing liberal biases within the construction of the reasonable citizen, thus those that situate themselves outside of the liberal framework of justice are to be excluded as unreasonable (see Mouffe 2005, p41-59). This form of reasonableness is tied into his liberal theory of justice and according to Friedman “by excluding from the legitimation pool exactly those persons who do not accept the political values and basic tenets on which Rawls grounds political liberalism, Rawls rigs the elections in advance” (2000 p22).

Dryzek (1994, 2000) is equally critical to the Rawlsian notion of deliberation for its contaminated relationship with liberal constitutionalism, whereby deliberation becomes a process that exists under the guidance and institutionalisation of liberal principles. Liberal notions of deliberation that stem from Rawls are problematic because dialogue is deemed authentic when it conforms to a notion of 'public reason' and therefore to a liberal notion of justice, this in effect privileges a certain ideal format to be adhered to in deliberative forums in order to guarantee an authentic outcome. Essentially the problem with defining authenticity in terms of public reason is that it becomes a “set of commitments that individuals must adopt before they enter the public arena, not what they will be induced to discover once they are there” (Dryzek 2002, p11). Habermas argues that once a normative theory, like Rawls’ theory of justice, strays into more substantive issues, it simply becomes one of many issues that contribute to practical discourse for consideration among people (Habermas 1993, p122).
The Rawlsian construction of cosmopolitanism clearly lingers within the liberal cosmopolitan democratic project, where despite the appeal to deliberation as an 'open' adjudication device of legitimacy, there are still liberal obligations emphasized as constraints to access and acceptable discourses. As stated above, Kuper tends to privilege access criteria based on personal preference inspired by liberal frameworks of justice; his model is therefore arguably constructed from a monological self-reflective standpoint. For example, non-state actors are to excluded for being culturally relativist, not associated with basic human needs, unsuccessful (without analysing why this may be so) or those dependent upon a single source of funding. These principles are seemingly constructed from a partial viewpoint that is representative of the author, and thus can be deemed guilty of a move towards a form of Rawlsian selection within the 'original position' through Kuper's liberal self-reflective bias posing as a universal set of criteria for inclusion/exclusion strategies. Indeed as Coles argues:

Kuper, like Rawls, decides from on high and completely prior to any engagement with all persons involved, not only the content of principles but also the form within which their material specificities are to be further deliberated on—that is, the logic of the original position and an ethically neutral public reason (Coles 2003, p21).

Held in a similar way owes a debt to Rawls for his concept of 'reasonable rejection' (Held 2002b, p312), and as discussed earlier, tends to base the validity of deliberative outcome on his cosmopolitan principles to ensure that a 'fair' and 'reasonable' outcome is obtained. This Rawlsian inspired framework is recognisable within the work of Gutmann and Thompson (1996) whose influential work incorporates a similar embedding of liberal principles through ensuring that basic liberty, basic opportunity and fair opportunity are established in order to govern the content of deliberation and the outcome of policies (1996, p12). Gutmann and Thompson, unlike Habermas, believe that the content of deliberation is just as important as
the conditions of deliberation. The inclusion of all discourses under the ideal speech situation\textsuperscript{78} is not enough in their eyes to be legitimate and acceptable as potential public policies, the shift towards an emphasis on the content of deliberation leads the authors into constructing criteria that must be followed during the act of deliberation itself, thus actors must also have pre-deliberative intentions, for example:

No matter how earnestly citizens carry on deliberation in the spirit of reciprocity, publicity, and accountability, they can realize these ideals only to the extent that each citizen has sufficient social and economic standing to meet his or her fellows on terms of equal respect (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, p149).

This 'social and economic' standing is left to be decided prior to deliberation, thus creating a monological form of inclusion/exclusion at the whim of those constructing the deliberative spaces. The liberal understanding of deliberation ultimately creates a layer of exclusion within its framework through the a priori construction of the parameters for legitimate deliberation, and the guiding of discourses prior to deliberation. This chapter will now turn to the critical interpretation before outlining the influence this has had on contemporary cosmopolitan democratic projects.

Habermas' dialogic form of argumentation, often known as 'discourse ethics' suggests that in an ideal community of communication, participants are autonomous yet embedded in a communication context. Discursive agreement depends upon the participant being able to independently say yes or no, and the participant being able to overcome his/her egocentric viewpoint (Habermas 1993, p202). This relates to what Habermas describes as the 'ideal speech situation' a list of criteria to allow for an unrestricted communication community.

\textsuperscript{78} A regulatory principle present within deliberation, see p91
stipulated under four basic premises: 1. All subjects with the competence to speak can take part in discourse, 2. All assertions are open to challenge, 3. Any assertion may be introduced to the discourse, 4. All subjects can express their desires and needs (Habermas 1990, p89). In order to ensure the validity of accepted assertions, Habermas argues that the process of argumentation must insure “that all concerned in principle take part, freely and equally, in a cooperative search for truth, where nothing coerces anyone except the force of the better argument” (1990, p198). The force of the better argument holds consensus rather than compromise as its goal, therefore 'non-communicative' aspects of language (utterances, expressions) cannot help in constructing a rationally motivated agreement, and are therefore potentially normatively inappropriate (Habermas 1996, p317-328). In essence deliberation within democracy privileges rational argumentation as the basis of consensus-forming whilst displacing the attempts to achieve consensus through either bargaining or voting.

Nancy Fraser agrees that despite the ideal speech situation a seeming utopian ideal, this should not reduce its value. Autonomous subjectivity as an ideal can be used as an argument against dominating asymmetrical forms of power where communication has been distorted (1989, p47). The distortion of communication is extremely important for Habermas and his contemporaries who, actively attempt to use the ideal speech situation to expose these negative forms of power and domination that marginalise actors within dialogic interaction. Communication can be seen as one of a triumvirate of modes of coordination of human life, the others being state (administrative) power and market economies, the latter two being

79 This is probably one of the most controversial of statements from Habermas among his supporters, who have strongly criticised him for exclusionary restrictions to dialogue that he himself had previously labelled at Rawls. Criticisms emanating from the so called 'difference democrats' have challenged the exclusivity of argumentation and seek to expand it to include rhetoric (Young 1996, p123-4), and testimony (Sanders 1997, p346-349).

80 In essence administrative power is associated with the state through a specific mode of steering that attempts
non-discursive modes of coordination that tend to lean towards strategy and domination; the antithesis of deliberative democratic outcomes (Habermas 1985 p85-88; Calhoun 1991, p6).

Actions that are coordinated by money/profit and administration are aimed at the “cognitive-instrumental organisation of the production of exchange and goods on the basis of monetary profit (economy) and the formation of government to reach binding decisions in terms of bureaucratic efficiency” (Deflem 1996, p5; Fraser 1996, p133). These two modes of coordination are further defined as exhibiting 'instrumental rationality', a form of rationality that distorts the authenticity of communication among subjects, indeed Dryzek (1994, p4-7) offers an interesting discussion as to its relationship with domination:

1. Instrumental rationality can destroy the more spontaneous, egalitarian and meaningful aspects of human association through the administration of technical expertise in the service of private profit or political power.
2. Instrumental rationality is seen to be anti-democratic; bureaucratisation involves a concentration of power among an administrative elite, it is also considered threatening to democracy when individuals acting as automatons and 'calculating machines' can be subsumed under totalitarian appeals.
3. Instrumental rationality can lead to the suppression of individuals, creativity and forms of artistic expression through the increased dominance of technical experts.
4. Bureaucratisation cannot comprehend complex phenomena and tends to disaggregate social problems into its component parts and resolved instrumentally.

Administrative power often residing within the bureaucracy of a state, is linked to technical forms of rationality associated with efficiency and productivity. It should be noted that when Habermasians discuss civil society as a critique of the state and market dominated spaces within governance, it is the steering mechanisms that arise from these institutions rather than the institutions themselves that are the focus of critique.
This instrumental mode of reasoning stems from egocentric calculations of utility based upon differing interest groups rather than attempting to reach an understanding through intersubjective dialogue (Habermas 1985, p101). Habermas places the two forms of rationality (communicative/instrumental) into two realms; the 'lifeworld' and the 'system', and argues that under the conditions of capitalist modernity\(^{81}\) the lifeworld is becoming 'colonised' by the system through an increasing penetration of market logic in contemporary society, and the increasing bureaucratisation of the state. Habermas describes the ‘system’ as a form of network society where social relations of exchange and interaction are undertaken through market and administrative based decisions of instrumental rationality, whilst the lifeworld operates at the opposite end of this spectrum; a social form of interaction “based on mutual understanding, intersubjectively shared norms and collective values” (Habermas 2001, p82).

Habermas’ predecessors, Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, analysed the penetration of systemic rationality through the \textit{reification}\(^{82}\) of economic and political systems on the subject, arguing that the result was immense damage to human behaviour, needs and instinct. In response to the perceived closure of the subject through a ‘false objectivity’ (Adorno 1983, p190) there was little offered as a counteraction within their work other than critical expressions found within the form of art, the only site which seems to be able to avoid the extension of systemic modernity (Habermas 2001, p141). Habermas was in agreement with the way in which modernity can be seen to extend the logics of bureaucratisation and the

\(^{81}\) The First generation of Frankfurt School authors such as Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, tended to equate modernity with the rise of industrial capitalism and its commodification of the subject (see Adorno and Horkheimer 1997). This was echoed by the work of Herbert Marcuse and his notion that economistic rationality was constructing society alongside the lines of ‘one dimensional man’ (2002). Habermas is equally as critical of modernity, however, he depicts it as an ‘unfinished project’, the colonising tendencies of the system can be challenged through communicative practices present within the lifeworld (see Habermas 1990)

\(^{82}\) Reification is conceived by Adorno as “the progressive monetarization and bureaucratisation of a society's infrastructure” (Baxter 1985, p39).
market into our collective social domain, and that its promotion and reification of ‘instrumental rationality’ seeks to eradicate any form of intrinsic counterforce rooted within the concept of rationality itself (Habermas 2001, p141). Modernity's preoccupation with bureaucratisation and economisation is clearly recognisable within its contemporary form; neoliberal forms of governance. According to Habermas, neoliberal orthodoxy “advocates the subordination of the state to the imperatives of a market-led integration of global society, and pleads for an “entrepreneurial state” that would abandon the project of decommodifying labor power and, more generally the role of protector of lifeworld resources” (Habermas 2006 p79). As the next chapter outlines, the twin steering mechanisms associated with systemic forms of governance have combined to create a formidable global discourse\(^\text{83}\) under the neoliberal project of governance.

The response, however, is more optimistic from Habermas, recognising that the lifeworld represents a source of counter-rationality that cannot be wholly colonised, and can be drawn from by competent individuals against systemic processes. Individuals can effectively avoid this contamination of the subject through drawing upon “distinct modes of symbolic interaction...that continue to protect the lifeworld against the functionalist rationality of their agents” (Cook 2004, p11). For Habermas, this symbolic interaction is reproduced through cultural tradition, social integration\(^\text{84}\) and socialisation and can “only operate in the medium of action orientated towards reaching an understanding (Habermas 1993, p102).

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\(^{83}\) The usage of discourse has previously centred around a form of communication and language, as in the Habermasian form of ‘discourse ethics’ its usage here, however, expands upon the narrow confines of dialogue towards a more ideational understanding typified by by Hajer's definition as: “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that is produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given physical and social realities” (cited in Berejikian and Dryzek 2000, p207). The expansion and permeation of neoliberal practices globally represent a powerful form of discourse that will be discussed in chapter two.

\(^{84}\) Or 'solidarity formation' according to Fraser's interpretation (1985, p107).
The lifeworld can be defined as the social background to communicative action, our 'stock of knowledge' that contains taken-for-granted background assumptions, when these come to the fore and are drawn upon by participants within shared horizons of meaning (such as cultural standards), they lose their taken-for-granted status and are opened up to communicative action (Baxter 1985, p46).

In order to understand how resistance against the imperatives of systemic rationality can take place, the discussion of civil society re-emerges within the context of the 'public sphere'. Habermas describes the public sphere as “a network for communicating information and points of view (i.e. expressing affirmative or negative attitudes); the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesised in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions” (1996, p360).

Habermas recognised the importance of the public sphere that began to gain prominence in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, attributed to the decoupling of the state from the fabric of everyday life. The resulting decouplement combined with higher levels of centralisation and political authority, created an increase in calls for accountability from the newly emerging public sphere. Individuals began to meet away from the private spaces of their own homes/work, to public arenas such as coffee houses where politics was freely discussed in a collective capacity. The emergence of this public sphere, however, was seen as bourgeois in that it reflected the interests and rationality of a predominant number of white, middle class men (Roberts and Crossley 2004, p3-5; Fraser 2003).

Despite the bourgeois connotations it was seen as important, firstly because a form of societal
gathering had risen that created a distinction between the private domain from state authority (constructing a form of 'public interest' through increased numbers of participants), and secondly, this form of public interest involved the *communicative* use of reason to debate on issues greater than private particular interests (Habermas 1991 p14-30). Contemporary forms of the public sphere are seen as more inclusive given the advances in the infrastructure of communication; examples include 'micro' public spheres such as book clubs, citizen's juries, to more global public spheres such as the World Social Forum and internet sites such as openDemocracy (Edwards 2009, p66). According to Edwards, these spaces are deemed public in so much as they do not attempt to silence or exclude alternative viewpoints, or allow one set of voices to dominate others (Edwards 2009, p64). The construction of these spaces are seen as the pinnacle of the inclusive critical cosmopolitan project, an open and pluralistic dialogic structure that can generate social norms and moral agreements free from the interference of the instrumental forms of reasoning, a product of self-interested forms of administrative or economistic modes of steering.

Habermas' early conceptualisation of the public sphere was as an oppositional space that could draw upon the resources of the lifeworld to create communicatively legitimate norms that would then feed into the political realm of state and market, the systemic modes of governance, to steer political outcomes (Habermas 1991 ch8). As a realm of communication, however, the public sphere is just as susceptible to the steering mechanisms of instrumental rationality from systemic imperatives, civil society, however represents the solution because it can “anchor the communication structures of the public sphere in the society component of the lifeworld” (Habermas 1996, p360). Civil society here is seen as the antidote to systemic

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85 Habermas follows Cohen and Arato's notion of civil society as a space demarcated from the state and economy, whilst being anchored within the communicative sphere of the lifeworld, comprised of non-governmental and non-economic actors (Habermas 1996, p367-70).
forms of rationality, and can keep the public sphere from becoming rationalised by the core institutions of capitalist modernity.

Civil society actors such as social movements are held as integral to expand and revitalise the critical foundations of the public sphere, both Habermas (1996) and Cohen and Arato (1992) elude to the 'dual orientation' that civil society undertakes of pursuing both offensive and defensive goals. Offensively they promote a variety of social issues, mobilising those deemed positive and criticising those deemed negative aiming at influencing political will-formation (the formal site of politics), whilst defensively they aim to preserve the critical nature of the communicative infrastructure of the lifeworld through generating subcultural counter-publics and consolidating new identities (Arato and Cohen 1992 p519-532; Habermas 1996, p370-372).

The critical cosmopolitan democratic project incorporates this dualistic notion of civil society as both a defender of the public sphere from instrumental rationality, and a “vehicle for marshalling public opinion as a political force” (Fraser 2007, p7)\(^\text{86}\). The usage of deliberative frameworks therefore allows actors within civil society the ability to 'steer' political and economic forces along more inclusive and legitimate lines; democracy is intertwined with unrestricted communicative rationality.

1.3.3 Critical Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Public Sphere

The public sphere as described above, is clearly not synonymous with the concept of civil

\(^\text{86}\) Simply put, civil society for Habermas is to be found on the borders of the lifeworld and the system, attempting to preserve the former and limit the intrusion of the latter (Ray 1993, p60).
society, though at times the usage of global civil society and the global public sphere tend to be used interchangeably especially when used within the cosmopolitan context; public spheres tend to stand in for civil society as the actual framework for democratisation (see Delanty 2000). Despite this differentiation, Delanty argues that the construction of normative frameworks involving GCS must be based upon a cosmopolitan public sphere in order to create the framework necessary for a fundamental change in the values of contemporary global governance (2001, p49). Bohman demonstrates in a similar way the integral link between the two for the critical cosmopolitan project, arguing that “the formation of a cosmopolitan public [sphere] requires the development and expansion of a transnational civil society” (1998, p201).

The actual site of the public sphere within global governance frameworks is, however, more of a contentious issue among the strands of critical cosmopolitanism, and can be drawn upon here to demonstrate key differences between them and the consequences this has on the formation of their projects. Hendricks (2006) has recently attempted to distinguish between two types of deliberative action; micro-deliberation, that assumes a more formalised role for civil society within the decision making structures of governance and effectively collaborating with the state, and macro-deliberation, that categorises civil society as a more informal sphere situated outside of these decision-making structures and in a contestatory relationship with the

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Some authors label these transnational elements of civil society such as the growing numbers of dissident social movements and influential international NGOs as part of a ‘transnational public sphere’, however, it should be noted that they do not invoke the same theoretical criteria as the critical cosmopolitan approach. For them, it is analytically defined as “a space in which both residents of distinct places (states or localities) and members of transnational entities (organisations or firms) elaborate discourses and practices whose consumption moves beyond national boundaries” (Guidry, Kenedy and Zald 2000, p6-7). The public sphere is therefore home to all types of actors without critical adjudication of inclusion/exclusion (see Keane 1995, Kohler 1998; Koopmans and Erbe 2004). This is an integral part of the normative cosmopolitan project and as Fraser highlights, the growing literature on the international public sphere fails to ask about the critical dimension and asking whether these new spaces can aid in “checking domination and democratising governance” (Fraser 2007, p15).
state. Hendricks does, however, tend to simplify micro-deliberation to those theories of deliberation that are less concerned with civil society and more concerned with the process of deliberation, whether state actors or TNCs, what Chambers (2009) calls democratic deliberation as opposed to deliberative democracy.

The examples of micro-deliberation that I outline below are explicitly concerned with civil society, whilst at the same time situated within formal decision-making institutions, thus, they tend to concentrate on the ability of NGOs to operate as steering mechanisms alongside state actors and TNCs. This micro-political form of public sphere encapsulates both the lifeworld (drawn on from by NGOs) and the system (represented by state actors and TNCs) but where NGOs are able to effectively operationalise communicative power and challenge the instrumental modes of power within global structures.

This shifting of the public sphere, runs counter to the earlier work of Habermas (1962, 1990) where the public sphere operated as a counter sphere to the operational logics of formal governance (thus it can be labelled as a theory of macro-deliberation); a sphere of opinion formation. Habermas was criticised for creating a dualism between an overtly agential reading of civil society and the structural characteristics of the system, which had the effect of isolating reflexivity and critical associationalism within the public sphere but without seriously analysing how this can 'steer' the latter spheres of interaction (see Fine 1997).

This criticism is taken up by Steffek and Nanz who depart from Habermas' earlier conception

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88 For example a number of projects that are concerned with deliberation but less on the emphasis of civil society involvement include deliberative polls (Fishkin 1997; Fishkin and Luskin 2000), citizen's juries (Crosby 1998; Eriksen 2000; Smith 2000), parliaments (Bessette 1980; Uhr 1998), consensus conferences (Joss and Durant 1995) and even the idea of having a deliberation day (Ackerman and Fishkin 2003).
of the public sphere as being de-centred and outside of political decision making bodies, in that for them CSOs\(^\text{89}\) can function as an integral part of a transnational public sphere that interacts with both the public and within global governance structures to open them up to public scrutiny and create more inclusive forms of decision making structures (2005, p197; 2008, p8). They recognise that CSOs can act as a 'transmission belt' between the global citizenry and the institutions of global governance to fulfil the promise of inclusion and participation. This transmission belt operates in two directions; firstly civil society gives voice to citizens concerns and channels them through deliberative processes into international organisations. Secondly, they open up the decision making apparatus of international organisations and disseminate the technical issues to the wider public in a more transparent way (Steffek and Nanz 2008, p8).

Eckersley similarly advances a notion of the public sphere as an intermediary structure in order to help 'channel-up' democratic participation to contribute to alternative problem-framing, agenda setting and the formulation of legal norms (2007, p335). NGOs are privileged in the formation of this type of global public sphere because it is seen as a more inclusive model than states and markets within international politics, having the ability to transcend borders whilst at the same time being capable of recognising generalisable interests for the good of collectives rather than narrow self-interest (Payne 1996, p132).

According to Risse, NGOs can also attempt to communicatively persuade states and firms through deliberation as a non-hierarchical mode of steering, allowing not just greater participation within these institutions as privileged by most theories of GCS, but an effective

\(^{89}\) CSOs are defined in this context as “all the non-governmental, non-violent, non-profit seeking actors that have legal personality recognised by at least one country” (Steffek and Nanz 2008, p29).
voice that can overcome hierarchical modes of steering typified by the rational choice approach of states and markets (Risse 2000 p11-13).

The micro-deliberation approach tends to focus upon the role of regimes in global politics as the potential site of global public spheres. Samhat and Payne (2003, 2004) argue that regimes represent a shift from the 'top-down' cosmopolitan conception of constructing an ambitious global parliament or reforming UN internal structures, through the combining of a formalised state and market dominated architecture with more informal spaces available for civil society to interact within a deliberative steering process, transforming them into models of transparency, participation and uncoerced dialogue (2003). They argue that we must be careful in advancing the use of a global civil society to democratise these frameworks due to the problems for NGOs often lacking accountable structures and inconsistent strategies, however, the authors tend to point out that these are simply obstacles to be overcome and new waves of democratising measures aimed at NGOs are helping them to fulfil their potential as “countersystemic pressure” (2004, p45).

Bohman in a similar way, points towards the importance of global regimes as harbouring the necessary communicative potential, through an informal power base of international publicity rather than coercive state or (neoliberal) market interventions; global forms of civil society play a critical role in this and when coupled with a greater level of democratic deliberation, can offer the solutions to the democratic deficit in global politics (1999). Bohman eludes to the emergence of the global human rights regime, environmental regimes and even trade/financial regulatory regimes that are often driven by civil society pressure and represent a form of publicity lacking in contemporary practices (1999, p506). Contemporary global
institutions fail to offer the democratic potential required in order to steer global economic processes, yet there is potential within existing forms of cosmopolitan public spheres associated with civil society that if institutionalised more effectively, can represent a more inclusive form of cosmopolitan governance. Public spheres can only become global in scope alongside the development and expansion of a global form of civil society (Bohman 1998, p201, 2004, p138). NGOs can act as intermediaries between the local and the global, not as 'expert communicators' for the local, but as facilitators of public spaces, allowing for critical and reflexive communication among citizens under deliberative frameworks (Bohman 2007, p81).

Habermas has recently attempted to engage more closely with the role of democracy outside of the nation-state albeit in the form of a 'cosmopolitan Europe' (2001, 2003). Nonetheless, it is recognisable within his work that the role of civil society is paramount to the construction of a more inclusive order to elevate the strength of the lifeworld in response to the perceived systemic forces of neoliberal globalisation, and consists of a global organisation that is loosely connected through multiple transnational regimes (2003, p99 2001, p55). Within these transnational regimes there needs to be a stronger institutionalisation of NGOs to create the spaces for deliberation, allowing for a more inclusive process of decision making whilst at the same time rendering the process more transparent for national public spheres and grassroots decision-making (Habermas 2001, p101). Civil society has a functional process here as the intermediary network between transnational regimes and national public spheres involving a plurality of interest groups, NGOs and citizen's initiatives (Habermas 2003, p98). This link between national public spheres and political regimes demonstrates Habermas' dual track approach to civil society linking the ability for communicative opinion-formation within the
Iris Marion Young argues similarly that the global democratic project requires a higher level of global coordination through 'democratic federated regimes of global regulation' which “enable the formation of public spheres composed of active citizens in global civil society” (Young 2007, p36). Young envisions seven global regulatory regimes that organise around the specific issues of peace and security, the environment, trade and finance, direct investment and capital utilisation, communications and transportation, human rights (including labour standards and welfare rights), citizenship and migration (2002, p267). Young's conception of civil society follows a similar pattern to the micro-deliberative framework in that despite its virtues as “promoting inclusion, expression and critique for deep democracy” (Young 2002, p156) it cannot be seen as a preferred alternative to the state; the state is regarded as essential for democracy in the way that it excels at “co-ordination, regulation and administration” (Young 2002, p156). Young invokes Habermas' and Arato and Cohen's notion of the dual track purpose for civil society, as a steering mechanism for systemic forms but not as an alternative. In doing so, she relies upon the same distinction of system and lifeworld, where civil society “corresponds to associative activities of the lifeworld” (2000, p159). Interestingly she relies upon a close link between civil society and the state in order to regain control of the political realm from what she sees as the greatest threat to democracy; private economic power. This again serves to demonstrate that critical cosmopolitan democracy is not antithetical to the state and the market, it is the steering mechanisms associated with these institutions that render democratic decision making problematic.
Empirical investigations analysing the role that civil society can an undertake as part of a global public sphere, are often found lacking within the literature, authors who invoke deliberation tend to discuss the potential for a global public sphere in more abstract terms (Kissling and Steffek 2008, p216). Despite this there have been recent attempts to undertake an empirical analysis of the potential construction of a global public sphere, for example a number of studies have sought to highlight the potential for deliberation at the WTO; one of the most exclusive of international regimes. The WTO is seen as a significant target of critique by these authors because its rules “increasingly determine the environmental, agricultural, health and food safety rules of democratic communities, and, thus, affect the fundamental welfare of their citizens” (Nanz and Steffek 2005a, p190). Eckersley (2007), Higgott and Erman (2008), Kapoor (2004) and Krajewski (2001), have all engaged with attempts to recognise deliberative possibilities and problems inherent within internal WTO mechanisms, whilst using deliberation as a yardstick to assess the deficits still present within the organisation.

Krajewski draws upon a deliberative framework to analyse the legitimacy of the WTO, arguing that its contemporary form suffers from a democratic deficit through its lack of deliberative legitimacy; negotiations within the WTO lack transparency and openness and are “dominated by bargaining instead of arguing” (2001, p177). Three recent models have recently been proposed that Krajewski scrutinises; increasing the national role of parliaments, establishing a form of parliamentary assembly, and opening the WTO to the participation of NGOs (2001, p183). The first two however fail to stand up to deliberative criteria because both preclude a form of exclusion of ‘global public discourse’ (and the former proposal would very likely be based upon strategic gains of bargaining rather than argumentation). Krajewski
recognises the similarities to Held's project of a global assembly but argues this would not stand up to deliberative legitimacy without opening up the parliament to further global public discourses. The model of increased NGO presence within WTO policy-making represents the best method of equating democratic legitimacy on deliberative grounding as “there seems to be little disagreement about the deliberatory functions of NGOs by enhancing societal deliberations about WTO matters within or across national borders” (2001, p185). They are also able to promote the all-affected principle through stake-holder functionality.\textsuperscript{90} NGOs are valorised here as enhancing the legitimacy of decisions through their ability to promote argument and rational deliberation.

Ilan Kapoor (2001) argues that the WTO also suffers from a democratic deficit because its key decision making procedures are imbued with a form of ‘western hegemonic neoliberalism’ that is deeply exclusive for a lack of accountability and legitimacy. The WTO establishes that all decisions on global trade rules must be by consensus (or majority vote if this fails to apply), however this takes place within an exclusive framework that seems to favour a significant presence of ‘friendly’ TNCs whilst the numbers of sceptical environmental based NGOs are significantly lacking. NGOs are allowed to attend ministerial meetings but access is restricted and controlled. According to Kapoor this is problematic for deliberation because NGOs represent not just a counter-weight to states and TNCs, but as a counterweight to economic and technological arguments; the hallmark of neoliberal discourses (2001, p 532-534). He concludes that NGOs need to be incorporated into a framework where the state loses its membership privilege, and TNCs are to be limited and regulated to ensure the incorporation of greater transnational issues such as human rights and the environment (2001, p537).

\textsuperscript{90} The deliberative ideal of all-affected is difficult to reproduce globally thus NGOs represent a variety of specific interest groups, mixing representation with participation under deliberative criteria
Similarly for Higgott and Erman (2008), there needs to be a shift away from what they label Global Governance type I (GGI) to Global Governance type II (GGII), at the WTO, in essence to move from economic/technocratic solutions of governance to more political solutions however:

Assumptions about how to advance the GGII agenda, emanating from essentially cosmopolitan views of global civil society, have simply assumed an extension of the ‘domestic analogy’ to the extra-territorial, or global, context (2008, p6)

In order to remedy this apparently neutral categorising, the authors add the need to instil deliberation at the heart of this project in order to include a wider range of participants and exclude “coerced decision-making, false consensus and inequitable outcomes” (Higgo and Erman 2008, p9).

On the more positive potential of creating a truly inclusive public sphere at the WTO, Robert Eckersley (2007) analyses a recent mechanism in use at the WTO, the amicus curia brief91, and demonstrates how it has led to the development of a form of ‘green public sphere’. One particular case outlined (surrounding the biotechnological uses of GM food), demonstrated the ways in which non-state actors had combined to pressurise the WTO into adopting an environmental over economic/technocratic stance thus demonstrating the reflexive potential of non-state actors to challenge dominant technocratic (state) and neoliberal (market) ‘instrumental’ proposals. Although this example ended up being ultimately unsuccessful92,

91 Literally ‘friend of the court’, this mechanism allows non-state actors to intervene in the dispute resolution arm of the WTO by publishing ‘amicus briefs’ that outline their views and expertise on the dispute, which is openly available alongside member state briefs and has been used to inform panels
92 The EU took up the case on the side of amicus briefs submitted by non-state actors, but was defeated by the US opposition stance.
demonstrates the potential for public spheres that have emerged in response to the ‘system’.

The WTO is not the only regime that has been analysed from a deliberative perspective, indeed Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler (2005) and Dany (2008) look at the potential of deliberation within the UN system of global conferences and summits. Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler in their previous work argued that the state was dominant within the UN system despite an increase in the numbers of NGOs participating (1998). Their latest work has included a shift towards using the term deliberation, albeit in a vague context, and suggests that NGOs can in effect create a deliberative sphere through their effective inclusion and participation in a variety of UN conferences and summits (2005). Conversely, Dany looks at the UN World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and determines that despite the initial optimism at the increased level of access for NGOs, these organisations were inevitably made to 'adjust' their positions in the face of state interests and therefore found deliberative standards lacking (2008, p67).

The empirical evidence tends to suggest that within these micro-deliberation studies the global public sphere is often blocked by systemic forces despite the inclusion of communicative minded NGOs attempting to steer these forces. Despite the pessimistic readings of some of these authors, their work serves to demonstrate the problems of contemporary frameworks and highlights how despite the increased interest in the higher levels of inclusion of NGOs within global structures, there is much to be done before a genuine level of democratic participation can be said to exist at the global level.

93 An interesting comparison can be observed between Eckersley's deliberative criteria for observing inclusion/exclusion of NGOs using the amicus curia brief, and Kuper's more liberal discussion on allowing non-state actors a role in a transformed international court of justice, where NGOs are to be granted a similar amicus curia status; the difference here is that Kuper's model has a rigorous selection process based upon his own 'nine criterion' (Kuper 2004, p154, n298).
The pessimistic readings of the role of NGOs within micro-public spheres is a view supported by the recent work of John Dryzek (2006), who has attempted to formulate a theory of the global public sphere that is situated outside of formal frameworks and aligning closely to the early Habermasian formulation of its role in public opinion-formation rather than direct (will-formation) political influence. Habermas (and the other micro-deliberative supporters) are criticised here for presuming that the communicative power present within civil society can effectively steer administrative and economic power in order to create more inclusive forms of legislation within these frameworks (2000b p82, 2000c p244). Instead, Dryzek’s model of deliberation accepts that the public sphere is “constituted in large part by social movements and actors in confrontation with the state” (2000b, p81). Dryzek is not critical of the role of civil society as the vehicle for a reflexive communicative power, drawn from the lifeworld, merely the site of where this can be most effective; outside of the instrumental strategies of political will formation. Reflexive action is seen as more straight forward for civil society actors (he eludes to NGOs and activists here) than political and corporations, however, they are seen as disadvantaged vis-a-vis more conventional and strategic forms of power, yet they are the 'wellsprings of transnational democracy' and therefore should be nurtured outside of the formal political arena (2006, p123). Formal institutions are tied to an executive decision meeting the demands of market liberalism, the global public sphere, however, is less constrained and can easily act as a form of 'counter globalisation' bringing communication across borders (Dryzek 2006, p104).

In terms of actual transnational sites for deliberation, Dryzek is often vague, arguing that there needs to be a loose connection with structures of authority in order to influence them in a
strategy similar to a siege, but without conquering the system (2006, p62). In an article about local strategies of deliberative democracy, he alludes to the potential of 'mini-publics' such as consensus conferences, citizens juries, deliberative polls, that are relatively unconnected to the state administrative and economic apparatus, and therefore autonomous opinion-forming institutions that can feed from and shape public opinion particularly having a potential soft-power impact of discourse production (2006b). In this respect the form of deliberation proposed by Dryzek is also known as 'discursive deliberation'\(^{94}\) because of his emphasis on the role of discourses rather than actors within deliberation, effectively attempting to solve the problems associated with the 'all-inclusive principle' that is often raised when attempting to globalise democratic decision-making. The idea of including all individuals affected by a decision within decision-making structures is seen as absurd within the real-world attempts to construct deliberative forums, thus Dryzek suggests that analysing the contestation of discourses can allow for a more legitimate form of inclusion (2000, 2001). Bohman takes a similar line of response through his notion that “Size is not the issue as much as multiperspectival inquiry into innovative democratization” (Bohman 2004, p40).

Dryzek's deliberative globalisation\(^{95}\) operates at the opposite end of the logic of 'There Is No Alternative' (TINA) by subjecting the dominant discourse to critical scrutiny and reflexive contestation through a more direct form of democratic engagement. It is seemingly difficult to manipulate discourses that are often heavily embedded in social belief systems, yet through the use of reflexive action, located within the public sphere, they can be bent in various directions (Dryzek 2006b, p106). The construction of anti-globalisation discourses to counter

\(^{94}\) Though he argues that the two terms 'deliberative democracy' and discursive democracy' are often used interchangeably (2006, p167)
\(^{95}\) Deliberative globalisation is in itself another form of globalisation in that deliberative public spheres can transcend national boundaries through the expansion of communication (Dryzek 2006, p104).
the contemporary neoliberal project relies upon the development of a vibrant global public sphere to allow the production of reflexive citizens capable of fulfilling the ideals of deliberative competency. This form of macro-deliberation tends to be more abstract than the former emphasis upon micro-deliberation, however, perhaps an interesting avenue would be to concentrate on the potential for global institutions such as the WSF as a macro-deliberative site that exists outside of systemic structures.

1.4 Concluding Thoughts: Civil Society as a Panacea

The Cosmopolitan democratic project in both its liberal and critical variants, has sought to extend democracy to the global level through a de-centring of the Westphalian system of governance in response to an increasingly perceived democratic deficit. The elevation of civil society as an inclusive intermediary space connecting the local with the global, is romanticised by the cosmopolitan democratic project for its ability not just to globalise a more participatory form of democracy, but to democratise the exclusive forms of (neoliberal) globalisation.

For the liberal dimension, the permeation of a form of global civil society into the contemporary unaccountable and exclusive structures of governance represents the reclaiming of a *humane* form of governance that places individual worth rather than state or market interests, at the heart of governance. The focus is attempting to tame the exclusive practices of

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96 The WSF tends to be drawn upon from a variety of literatures often to emphasize the inclusive role of civil society in the formation of neoliberal counter projects in the Gramscian sense (see Fisher and Ponniah 2003, De Sousa Santos 2006). Those that draw upon it for its democratic potential usually equate this with plurality in a liberal form (see Smith 2004, Della Porta 2004), however, there are a few sources that begin to raise the question of its deliberative potential as an inclusive global public sphere (see Glasius 2005, Ylä-Anttila 2006, Glasius and Timms 2005).
globalisation 'from above' through a greater level of control by globalisation 'from below', in order for this transition to occur, however, there is a need to instil a form of Cosmopolitan law to safeguard the extension of democracy in its post-Westphalian form. This is essential for the liberal project and its battle with the 'predatory' form of globalisation under the Washington Consensus that prioritises the extension of capital over human well-being.

This chapter has demonstrated how the construction of a universal form of cosmopolitan morality present within the liberal dimension, attempts to incorporate pre-negotiated substantive principles of democracy into its global frameworks. The appropriation of an increasingly Kantian form of morality, leads the authors to construct global frameworks in a monological fashion; civil society is included into a democratic structure that is essentially predetermined. Indeed, as Urbinati argues:

“theorists of cosmopolitical democracy hope for a bottom-up movement while proposing a top-down strategy. If cosmopolis will succeed, it will hardly be through democratic means” (Urbinati 2003 p75, see also Cochran 2002)

The result is to strive for a more inclusive order that appears to be based upon the liberal plurality of representation, yet this is actually deeply exclusionary because the frameworks and substantive content of democracy is prescribed through a form of monological self-reflection that is cloaked in impartiality; the name of humanity. The critical cosmopolitan project, emanating from Habermas, recognises the inherent forms of domination present within this mode of reasoning. Ironically, Held summarises the Habermasian conception of domination rather well:

...whenever an individual's choices, goals, purposes and the means of attaining
them are prescribed, domination can be said to exist (Held 2003, p149)

The liberal project clearly fits into this category with its prescribed democratic forms of participation, marginalising democracy as a legitimation strategy under a totalising universal morality. In response the critical dimension focuses upon the dialogical method of morality, substantive issues are debated upon freely by individuals within intersubjective dialogue to produce a more inclusive form of decision-making where consensus relies upon the all-affected principle.

The critical cosmopolitan project aims to extend the intersubjective dialogic structure of deliberative democracy into the decision-making structures of global governance with the intention of similarly linking the local with the global; civil society as a localised participatory ideal holds the potential to eradicate sources of domination within global governance. These sources of domination include the systemic forces associated with neoliberal globalisation as administrative and economic forms of 'instrumental' rationality within decision-making structures. This of course does not mean that individuals exuding administrative and economic forms of instrumental rationality are to be excluded from all forms of decision-making at the global level, merely to suggest that when attempting to formulate inclusive debates on the common good within democratic frameworks, this must according to the Habermasian framework, be undertaken by actors from outside of the steering mechanisms of political and economic authority, hence the promises of civil society.

The global democratic project remains a distant ideal for most of those associated with the critical dimension, yet their work serves as a critical yardstick to analyse both contemporary and (potential) future frameworks for their inclusive potential. What is important here, and
serves to frame the rest of this thesis, is the way in which the critical cosmopolitan project draws upon the notion of civil society as the idealised form of communicative inclusion within contemporary/future frameworks. If Habermas' concept of the lifeworld is to be accepted as the irrepressible background of an open plurality of communication, and the system as an attempt to subsume communication to the instrumental dimension of profit, efficiency and productivity\textsuperscript{97} (associated with administrative/bureaucratic state actors or market actors), then civil society is drawn upon from the former, to steer the latter.

The global democratic project associated with deliberative democracy, constructs an idealised notion of civil society as 'anchored' within the communicative realm of the lifeworld. The next chapter will problematise this theoretical assumption of civil society as the vehicle for communicative forms of rationality, specifically the contemporary usage of CSOs as conduits for reflexive action, through an interrogation of the expansionary systemic project of neoliberal globalisation that has engaged in a collaborative role with concrete practices of civil society, raising serious questions as to the perceived unreflexive privileging of CSOs within cosmopolitan frameworks\textsuperscript{98}. The problems of colonisation as raised by Habermas’ reflections on modernity, will be invoked as a contemporary condition facing many CSOs under neoliberal external ‘civil society building’ techniques. As stated previously, this colonising tendency recognises that:

\begin{quote}
“As the institutions specialized in socialization, social integration, and cultural transmission are increasingly functionalized to serve the imperatives of uncontrolled and ever-expanding subsystems and as communicative coordination
\end{quote}

\footnote{This concept will be further elaborated upon in chapter two, where it is demonstrated to be tied closely to the neoliberal forms of socio-organisation.}

\footnote{In the literature, only Dryzek has acknowledged the potential for civil society to be ‘invoked’ in support of market-orientated governance, which he deems ‘problematic’ for the deliberative project in a footnote, but without further interrogating the important implications of this argument (2006, p167).}
of action in the relevant areas is replaced by the media of money and power, there will be more pathological consequences” (Cohen and Arato 1994, p449)

The consequences of colonising tendencies within CSO identity production discussed in the second chapter (and concretely examined in the third chapter; an empirical case study of external ‘civil society building’ effects in Cambodia), demonstrates the problems of assuming a bounded reflexive CSO sphere in critical cosmopolitan projects; identities matter.
2. THE NEO-LIBERAL PROJECT OF DEMOCRATISATION

2.1 Introduction

Cosmopolitan interpretations of civil society have, according to the previous chapter, privileged an autonomous space that is not only analytically separate from the state and the (neoliberal) market, but is also crucially a normative interpretation that incorporates civil society as a vehicle to resist the exclusive spaces of governance, generated by the neoliberal expansion of unregulated markets. Accordingly, the local is panegyrized as a solution to the global effects of neoliberal policies and modes of rationality, through the conduit of civil society. The placing of civil society onto a pedestal of inclusion, as the de facto solvent for the democratic deficit and eliminator of neoliberal modes of rationality within governance, runs into severe problems when an interrogation of the dynamics underlying the neoliberal democratic project and its contemporary relationship with civil society is undertaken.

Habermas' original concern regarding the 'colonisation of the lifeworld' by systemic imperatives, has been overlooked by the contemporary generation of critical theorists in their global democratic project. They focus on the ways in which CSOs as exclusive conduits of the lifeworld within the public sphere can steer systemic/instrumental modes of reasoning, therefore neglecting a fundamental dimension; contemporary practices of civil society, as an anchor within the lifeworld, can just as easily become co-opted under these instrumental modes of reasoning.
This chapter will demonstrate how the neoliberal form of globalisation is inherently a political project that has constructed new spaces for civil society through the fusion of economic market principles with a new emphasis upon inclusion, democracy and civil society and extended through development discourse globally.

The World Bank and its global (neoliberal) development strategies are interrogated within this chapter because of the way in which it has shifted from a traditional position of excluding civil society within its frameworks, to one where civil society has become seemingly integral. This is important because the World Bank, seen by some as the 'mother of all governments' (Cammack 2002) has in recent decades, enacted its own global democratic project by attempting to replicate globally a specific model of development involving the intertwining of democracy and the free market that now includes civil society as the crucial enabling environment through which this project can be deemed a success. The rise of a new development paradigm centred around 'good governance' focuses upon the democratic potential of civil society as a participatory mechanism within developing countries, yet it is not just limited to the World Bank as a multilateral donor, and in fact includes the majority of bilateral donors who have recently attempted to harmonise this new orthodoxy within their frameworks.

In this respect neoliberalism has become a powerful global discourse that constitutes an ideological apparatus as much as an economic theory and as discussed within this chapter, proves to be expansive or ‘colonising’ in the way in which it has reconfigured the idea of civil society and participation along systemic lines.
What is of fundamental importance, is that their focus on civil society has resulted in the construction of not just new spaces for civil society, but a new identity under a neoliberal ideal-type. In this respect the chapter will show how the previous dualism constructed of civil society as a communicative dimension that effectively challenges the instrumental logic of neoliberal governance, is actually reversed under the neoliberal democratic project, where civil society is exposed directly to the systemic forms of rationality associated with (state) bureaucratic efficiency and (market) economic logics\textsuperscript{99}, the result is the potential permeation of instrumental forms of rationality at the very heart of a supposed communicative ideal.

\textbf{2.2 Neoliberal Globalisation: The rise of the Washington Consensus}

Neoliberalism was first coined in 1932 at a conference in Dresden by Alexander Rustow whose speech \textit{Freie Wirtschaft, starker Staat}\textsuperscript{100} established the founding principles of the economic theory as maintaining a strong non-interventionist state to allow for a self-regulating market (see Hartwich 2009). His ideas failed to gain popularity until they later resurfaced within the work of Milton Friedman, who is often seen as the architect and figurehead of neoliberal economic theory through his promotion of a form of 'lassez-faire' economics that involved the reduction of the state from economic intervention in order to increase the freedom of the individual to pursue their economic ambitions through the private sphere of the market\textsuperscript{101}. This term is often synonymous with 'classical economic liberalism'.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[99] It should be reiterated here that I am interested in the systemic steering mechanisms (or logics) associated with the state and the market that permeate the identity of civil society, not the actual physical entities themselves.
\item[100] Free Market, Strong State
\item[101] This concept was in direct contrast to the economic principles established by his rival, John Maynard Keynes, for which the interventionist state was required to guide markets and take an active role in macroeconomic policy. Keynes, became extremely influential and his work formed an economic paradigm around the development of most post-war economies, leading Time Magazine in 1965 to declare; "we are all
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
because it represents, according to Friedman, an early reading of liberalism prior to the 19\textsuperscript{th} century before it became 'corrupted' through state expansion in welfare and equality programmes to supposedly protect liberties (Friedman 1962, p47-51). Friedman's central claim was for a reduction in state intervention to allow the market to operate freely and that the only place for the state was to become an 'umpire' to make sure that all players stick to "the rules of the game" (1962, p56).

Friedman and his associates came to be known as the 'Chicago Economic Tradition' attracting interest in the early 1970s as major economies went through an economic crisis of stagflation\textsuperscript{102}. Their expertise was called upon by the US government under the Reagan administration to help economic structural reform of the Chilean state following the 1973 US-backed coup of General Pinochet (see Silva 1993; Valdez 1995). It is here that the first coherent economic policy prescriptions that have come to be known as 'neoliberal' were practised, exported by the 'Chicago Boys'\textsuperscript{103} who attempted to dismantle the macroeconomic policies within the country in favour of a neoliberal approach.

The transformation of the Chilean state represented the start of a shift towards a new global economic paradigm, and a shift away from the economic structures populating the post-war international system of 'embedded liberalism' (Ikenberry 1992; Ruggie 1983) under the direct nurturing influence of the Bretton Woods institutions\textsuperscript{104}. In contrast neoliberal practices have

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\textsuperscript{102} Essentially a combination of inflation and a stagnant economy, it was particularly descriptive of the effects of the 1973 oil crisis when the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) placed an embargo of oil on the US.

\textsuperscript{103} A group of Chilean economists that had worked under Friedman at Chicago and who became the technocrats responsible for designing and implementing the neoliberal reform programmes under the Pinochet regime (see Silva 1991).

\textsuperscript{104} The Bretton Woods institutions included the IMF (1946), World Bank (1946) and the GATT (1947), and
been rigorously pursued, not just within national borders but across national borders (Jessop 2002). Throughout the 1970s, neoliberal economic reform spread\(^{105}\) accompanied by the globalisation of financial markets, production, capital and labour across increasingly permeable borders (See Levitt 1983; Mittleman 1996; Castells 2000; Scholte 2000).

The debate over the empirical reality of globalisation as a truly 'global' project has led to the divergence of two main strands of thought between the 'hyper-globalisers' and the 'sceptics'. Both schools of thought debate the role of the state within the rhetoric of globalisation, for the hyper-globalists, the globalisation of markets have circumvented the control of nation-states, leaving them at the mercy of capital (see Ohmae 1990, 1995, Cox 1996). The Sceptics, however, argue that the unmitigated spread of capital is an exaggeration and that empirically globalisation is unevenly distributed, with a key role still played by the state (see Hirst and Thompson 1996; Sutcliffe and Glyn 1999) Although important, this debate is not interrogated within this chapter and instead aims to focus on what tends to be mutually accepted by both schools of thought, that despite questions of empirical globality, economic globalisation can still be seen as synonymous with a neoliberal form of ideology in its attempted expansion (see Gill 1995; Rupert 1995). Hay (2004, p508) usefully outlines seven traits that can briefly summarise and define the common principles of neoliberalism that were applied:

1. Promotion of the market as an efficient mechanism for allocating scarce resources.

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\(^{105}\) Very few countries globally have resisted the shift towards some form of neoliberal economic strategy, from the often cited Thatcher and Reagan administrations in the UK and US (see Hall 1988; Prasad 2006; Hunt 2007), the Scandinavian traditional social democracies (Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby 1999), post-apartheid South Africa (Bramble and Barchiesi 2003) and even China (Wang 2003) has embraced elements of this doctrine.
2. The attempt to globalise a regime of free trade and capital mobility.

3. A non-interventionist role for the state, except as facilitator or market mechanisms.

4. The rejection of Keynesian demand-management techniques in favour of monetarist or neo-monetarist supply-side economics.

5. The removal of those welfare benefits that could be perceived as disincentives to market participation.

6. A defence of labour-market flexibility and the promotion of cost competitiveness.

7. The promotion of private finance in public projects, and market mechanisms in the provision of public goods.

Whilst many of these neoliberal reforms were introduced as a response to the economic crisis, or because of the perceived benefits to a closer integration with the 'global economy', neoliberal policies shifted from an economic response to a crisis, towards an explicit political project that sought to expand the logics of its economic doctrine globally through the core MEIs, under the rubric of development and poverty reduction.

During the 1982 debt crisis that hit South America, the US administration under Reagan offered a helping-hand through the granting of loan packages from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank106, attached with strict conditionalities requiring states to reformulate their economic policies along neoliberal lines, known as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). SAPs were loans designed to stimulate structural adjustment of a country's economic sector and became a 'good development practice' framework that was replicated globally to those countries that had high levels of debt and inefficient centralised

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106 Although it is usually seen as the IMF as the institution that initiates loans to developing countries attached with conditionalities, the World Bank in the 1980s moved closer to this model and the two were often drawn upon simultaneously (see Bird 1994)
economies. Both the World Bank and the IMF lend through SAPs, though the former tends to be more project based and the latter on a macroeconomic scale to reduce fiscal imbalances. The Bank also lends through Structural Adjustment Credit (SACs) from its IDA department, which are interest free. For the purposes of this chapter it is worth noting that despite the different intentions, they all have the same conditionalities in their structural application.

SAPs lent under the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1986 became synonymous with the expansion and penetration of neoliberal policies within developing countries, and involved the re-structuring of macroeconomic systems alongside monetarist lines to ensure the ‘opening up’ of the economy through a de-restriction of trade, state deregulation of market mechanisms, fiscal and budgetary austerity, reduction of social welfare, and the increased privatisation of key industries away from the bureaucracy (IMF/WB 1987a; IMF 1997; Milward 2000). These loan packages were globally reproduced without interrogation of country specificities and resulted in a wave of criticism from within and outside of the policy environment aimed at the systematic intensification of the ‘Washington Consensus’ policies that were permeating societal structures under ‘dogmatic neoliberal ideology’ (Fine 2003, p2).

Before discussing these criticisms and the policy response, it is worth reiterating here the ideological role of neoliberalism as a specific project that incorporates the market as its primary referent and the economistic formulation of instrumental rationality that it imposes on social models of organisation. At its basis neoliberalism has become a dominant economic paradigm, premised upon Rational Choice Theory (RCT) and the assumed consequential reproduction of instrumental rationality of bureaucrats, politicians and electors as self-

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107 First coined by John Williamson (1990) to categorise the policies coming out of the key financial institutions, such as free trade, fiscal restraint, deregulation and privatisation as integral to growth and stability (see Williamson 1990, 1993)

The turn to homo economicus, or 'rational economic man', as the idealised rational actor under neoliberal frameworks, assumes the separation of scientific facts from values in order to obtain objective decisions\(^\text{108}\), in doing so, the attempted separation and subversion of values seeks to eradicate those modes of reasoning representing instability, spontaneity and unpredictability within economic frameworks such as what Flam describes as 'emotional man' (1990, p42), or *homo sociologicus* (Archer 2000, Anderson 2000). Rational economic man is a calculating, consistent, competitive, selfish utility-maximiser that disregards social context as a distortion\(^\text{109}\), this of course relies upon observing the human model as imbued with a certain egocentric quality and a level of instrumentality centred around 'self-centredness' through which action is only undertaken in response to desire (Petit 2001, p77)\(^\text{110}\). These desires are to be nurtured through the construction of frameworks ensuring the freedom and autonomy of homo economicus; the market\(^\text{111}\). The ideal concept of a free market is one that is isolated from social contexts of any significance. There is therefore no political regulation

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\(^{108}\) Clearly this form of reasoning is based upon a positivist epistemology that is purely descriptive and determines objective truth through the separation of distorting *values* from scientific evaluations (Popper 1976, p97). In this respect a model of human nature was constructed that allowed the dispensing of social distortions from the natural capacity to be selfish and utility maximising (Hollis and Nell 1975, p49).

\(^{109}\) The eradication of the social dimension, includes cooperation, altruism and creative questions of normativity (Anderson 2000). The separation of 'is' and 'ought' suggests the law of nature and the law of social norms are autonomous spheres, one of facts, the other of values and in true positivist fashion, the aim of theory is to elevate the neutral whilst rejecting the normative (Habermas 1976, p144, Nicholson 1994, p140).

\(^{110}\) Various feminist authors have challenged these assumptions of rational economic man for its inherent masculine bias present within the construction of the subject, consistent with a model of human nature that valorises Hobbesian man as an unemotional economic actor associated with the logic of the competitive market (see Tickner 1992 chp3, Hewitson 1999; Runyan 1997, Waylen 2000, England 1993).

\(^{111}\) Of course this can be seen as the paradox of RCT; frameworks to nurture the autonomy of individuals to make free choices, yet the only choice available according to this model is the rational one (Hay 2002, p103-104).
from the state and no influence on market exchanges from the social and cultural values of the surrounding society (Dawson 2000, p1). Under the neoliberal model, forms of governance are constructed that are driven by 'objective' technocrats\(^{112}\) and professionals in order to create the right conditions for the free market to function at its optimum levels; competition, transparency and efficiency become the criteria of governance in order to allow the flourishing of homo economicus and by (atomistic) proxy; firms.

It is here that we encounter the *project* of neoliberalism as an explicit attempt to expand not just the free market, but the *values* of the free market into society. As Harvey argues, neoliberalism is “an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to all human action, and substituting for all previously held ethical beliefs...It holds that the social good will be maximised by maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to bring all human action into the domain of the market” (Harvey 2005, p3). The notion of the market as a social good, detracts from the idea of neoliberalism as simply an economic theory, and allows economists to link the pursuit of self-interest with a wider more normative ambition to re-construct the social (Williams 1999). Gill argues that this represents a form of 'disciplinary neoliberalism' through an attempt to re-model society through a form of market civilisation (1995, 2002). There is an explicit attempt here through the expansion of neoliberal policies and frameworks to ‘de-politicise’ forms of social organisation to be replaced by a technical, neutral and rational subject that can express freedom through the economic market, perhaps best summarised through Margaret Thatcher's belief that “economics are the method; the object is to change the soul” (1981).

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\(^{112}\) Technocrats are seen as individuals who tend to lack electoral experience and instead derive their expertise from the more positivistic and 'hard' elements of social science- economics, business administration etc... (Schneider 1998)
This links back to the Frankfurt School's critique of modernity and specifically Habermas' colonisation of the lifeworld thesis where instrumental modes of rationality attempt to subvert critical and social forms of organisation. The neoliberal production of an economistic form of subjectivity creates an autonomous economic system that is importantly supported through the (state) administrative sphere in a complementary role (Habermas 2001, p15). It is within Habermas' dualistic conception of the system that one can observe both the profit and competition driven logics of the economic sphere and its supporting administrative/bureaucratic sphere of productivity and efficiency utilised under the neoliberal model as a consumption smoothing process for the market.113

The previous chapter demonstrated that the critical literature acknowledges the problems of domination and exclusion present within the forms of economic rationality that are produced and intensified under the neoliberal project, however, it clings to the solutions offered by a communicatively competent model of civil society that can effectively steer these instrumental modes of rationality present within contemporary structures of global governance. What this analysis lacks is a recognition that neoliberal forms of global governance have recently actively engaged with the concept of civil society under its new approach to democracy and participation, and this global-local link raises important concerns regarding the continued idolisation of a form of the local that is deemed communicatively homogeneous and able to steer these systemic forms. The Neoliberal democratic project essentially expands these systemic forms of rationality into the very identities of CSOs. In order understand how this is occurring, it is worth interrogating the emergence of the good governance development paradigm from the perspective of the World Bank and its

113 This idea of the state as an administrative steering mechanism in compliment to market logics is demonstrated within the discussion on New Public Management on p116
relationship with the localities of civil society, and then demonstrate how this has been replicated through the frameworks of the majority of bilateral donors.

2.3 Good Governance and Development

The IMF and World Bank recognised in the late 1980s that the SAPs introduced through 'external shocks' throughout developing countries were not met with the level of success that they had been expecting, reasons given were the limited flexibility of governments to react to the proscribed economic changes (IMF/WB 1987b, p20). Governments in non-democratic governments for example, faced great difficulties in persuading inefficient and stubborn bureaucracies to accept change (IMF/WB 1987b, p495; Stern 1991, p3). This was particularly acute in Africa where there was a lot of state resistance to the reform packages being implemented, resulting in an 'unmitigated failure' of economic management of the economy (Apter and Rosberg 1994; Jilberto and Mommen 1996, p8).

In 1989 the Bank released its report Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, recognising an important new role for the state, not in its minimal and reductionist form outside of development as had been advocated under SAPs, but as a better state within development frameworks. The report implicitly invoked the need for a democratic state that could be of use in supporting the market rather than separate from it (World Bank 1989). Although the term better governance was used in this capacity, it wasn't until 1992 that a new paradigm began to develop that has risen to unflinching orthodoxy today; good governance.

The term was arguably first coined by head director of the IMF in 1992 when he referred to
the need for countries to open up internal democratic mechanisms as a form of 'good
governance' to ensure “accountable and active governments that enjoy the trust and support of
their societies” (cited in Woods 2000, p824) In the 1992 World Bank report 'Governance and
Development' this idea was emphasized further to include the need for good governance to
implement 'sound development management' and sustain an enabling environment for
development projects to take root (1992a). Good governance was seen to be introduced into
policy discourse to combat two main concerns that were plaguing countries in the developing
world – undemocratic governments and inefficient non-market economies (Weiss 2000). The
World Bank as expressed in its own articles of agreement cannot set political criteria within
its development model, and has often loaned to both democratic and non-democratic
governments in the past, however, the two key shifts emanating from the problems of SAPs in
authoritarian governments and the collapse of communism in the post-cold war context have
allowed a more implicit expansion of democratic ideas. Good governance in its early format,
therefore, tended to refer to the application of public management reform within developing
states in order to merge free market reform with a model of liberal democracy to promote
efficient and accountable public administration114 (Nelson and Eglington 1992; Leftwich
1993).

Development assistance became embedded in the political discourse of good governance to
the extent that conditionalities were attached to aid projects ensuring these two problems were
directly challenged in order to ensure developing countries would progress economically and
politically. The absence of good governance was seen as damaging for poverty alleviation
projects which can be undermined through a lack of public accountability, corruption and elite

114 According to Leftwich, this approach was novel in that previous attempts to modernise developing countries
assumed that democracy could arise once economic development had been fulfilled, this approach to good
governance however brought democratic reform alongside neoliberal market reform (Leftwich 1993).
capture (World Bank 1992a, p10). Governance here was concerned primarily with concentrating on public sector management reform since the early 1990s, to emphasize the need for a smaller state that is enmeshed with a professional and accountable bureaucracy to provide an enabling environment for private sector led growth (World Bank 1994). There was therefore a shift towards a strategy of 'New Public Management' that arguably reflects a strong model of neoliberal rationality designed to improve the overly bureaucratic frameworks of donor-recipient states to a more efficient, accountable, decentralised form of governance.

New Public Management is an important field of policy making practice and scholarship that has rapidly risen in importance since the late 1970s. The growth in interest of this field largely stems from the national economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s which suggested a need for stricter control over public agencies, implemented in accordance with the neoliberal ideology of state minimal-bureaucratic reform (Lynn 2006). NPM became billed as a new form of public sector administration that has re-invented the modern state, synonymous with the idea of an 'entrepreneurial government' (Osbourne and Gaebler 1992, p328). According to Ketl, there are six core components that the NPM draws upon; increasing productivity, encouraging market-style incentives, improving service provision through market choice, decentralising public ministries, improving policy-making and oversight capacity rather than delivery, and incorporating results-driven systems of accountability rather than traditional rule-based systems (2005, p1-3). These attributes represent a more private sector oriented approach to government with its preference for quality and performance management (Lynn 2006, Polidano 1999) and shifted towards greater levels of auditing to ensure that governments

115 Note how this is similar to Habermas' notion of the entrepreneurial state as the hallmark of systemic modes of rationality, administrative and market logics combined (Habermas 2006, p79).
remain responsive and accountable, an effect that Power (1997) has dubbed 'the audit society'.

Competition forms an important tenet of NPM deriving from the theoretical basis of rational choice theory designed to motivate departments within organisations through internal competition and incentives (Gruening 2001). The underlying management strategy parallels neoliberal economics, whereby public organisations are equated to a theory of the firm acting within market structures. Firms are formed and dissolved according to market opportunity, being led by external structures (for example shareholders require firms to act on market conditions in order to be efficient and have the highest performances). Public institutions are being managed according to these same market strategies; focusing upon performance, accountability and efficiency as the core values of NPM best practice (Lynn 1998, p234). NPM is therefore more than simply a set of management techniques because it implies the transition to a certain administrative culture towards a more entrepreneurial form of management (Gow and Dufour 2000, p579). This form of administration represents an interesting coupling of the systemic imperatives criticised by the Frankfurt school for colonising the lifeworld, what NPM represents is the merger between an administrative form of governance that operates under market logics; thus there is a synergy between the 'state' and 'market' functions of instrumental rationality.

NPM as administrative practice became increasingly popular on a global scale seen as a ‘best practice’ ideology to be implemented throughout various public organisations (Aucoin 1990; Osbourne and Gaebler 1992; Hughes 1998; McCourt and Minogue 2001), to the extent that some authors have labelled it a ‘managerial revolution’ (see Clarke and Newman 1993, 1997; Kettl 2005; Lane 2000). This managerial revolution is a global phenomenon that “has gone
around the world, affecting all countries, although to considerably different degrees” (Lane 2000, p3). The exporting of SAP best practices globally by the World Bank reflected a strong emphasis of these NPM principles on public organisations within developing countries in order to remedy the inefficient bureaucracies that were seen as obstacles to macroeconomic reform (Ferlie 1996; Polidano 1999; McLaughlin et al 2002).

The NPM drive for good governance exported a decentralised market rationality on developing states in order to streamline neoliberal macroeconomic structural reform. This narrow focus was, however, to receive much criticism in the mid 1990s, the World Bank in particular as the perceived global debt manager became a 'lightening rod' (Brown and Fox 2000; Nelson 2000) for these criticisms from both inside and outside of the institution. The former World Bank Vice President Joseph Stiglitz criticised the Washington Consensus principles for their simplistic market economic outlook (see Stiglitz 1998).

Furthermore, studies of the impacts of SAPs have demonstrated the adverse affects on standards of living in developing countries (see UNRISD 1995). Social costs had been overlooked and a general ignorance of the urban/rural divide within many developing countries where the rural poor have a lack of access to foreign exchange markets and tend instead to rely upon subsistence production (Sahn 1994; Zack-Williams 2000). Environmental repercussions were also overlooked, where the poorer sectors of society that had now lost social safety nets, engaged with 'coping strategies' and ended up over exploiting the natural resources now freely available through new markets (Cruz and Repetto 1992; Kaimowitz et al 1999; Mohan 2000).
In response to these criticisms there began to be a shift in emphasis towards a broader notion of good governance to include something the Bank had often neglected to consider in its formation of development projects; inclusion of non-world bank actors. The Bank recognised that it had to pay closer attention to the individuals and groups affected by these development projects and so a key aim became the attempt to involve them as stakeholders within the design and implementation stage (Adams 1999, p70).

The focus of lending to more accountable governments was combined, following the Portfolio Management Review Task Force's 1992 'Next Steps' action programme, with a need to shift towards more local ownership of development projects including Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) plans (World Bank 1992b). In this respect the World Bank were announcing that "participation" is intrinsic to good governance" (World Bank 1994, p42) The rationale behind this was that through the inclusion of a wider range of stakeholders, Bank projects would be seen as more legitimate and responsive to the needs of communities; ultimately they would be more successful (Adams 1999, p70). This is significant as previously the World Bank has historically been antithetical towards notions of public participation (see Cahn 1993). Previous projects at the Bank were implemented via an 'external expert stance' as opposed to the new focus that has developed throughout the mid 1990s turning towards a 'participatory stance', the former representing the construction of projects through outside experts applying their knowledge to local contexts, whilst the participatory stance shifts development project construction towards the local context for preparation (World Bank 1996, p3-4).

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116 "Participation is a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which effect them" (World Bank 1996, pXI)
This is important because it represents a shift in the recognition that democratic governance is not simply about reformation of government actors within bureaucratic frameworks (and thus reformation of the representative democracy model) but towards an understanding of participatory forms of democracy that are held as key to the success of development projects.

This approach was not simply concerned with state-centric notions of participation as formulated by an elite in the donor-recipient country, but to be effectively combined at a community level. The strategy to involve greater levels of community participation in these projects is designed to ensure the smooth functioning of their implementation, the bank learnt in the wake of criticisms for its externally enforced development policies that it would need local participants to ensure support. Former World Bank President James Wolfensohn stated in 1996 that moving towards support for more participatory mechanisms within its projects was a new direction and integral as, “those people affected by development interventions must be included in the decision-making process” (cited in World Bank 1996, pIX). This more inclusive definition of good governance moves away from the narrow state administrative definition of the early 1990s, and mirrors closely the more social definition promoted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as:

Participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society (cited in Richards 2003, p1)

The shift here towards an acceptance of a multi-stakeholder approach to good governance,

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117 Wolfensohn is an important figure in this shifting perspective from the Bank, his appointment was seen as a reaction against the unpopular image of the bank in the wake of the criticism of SAPs, thus his mission was to carve out a new mission for the bank and re-build its legitimacy (see Fender 2002)
retains a core emphasis upon the eradication of corruption and the need for an efficient and effective form of development, however, it reveals a new emphasis upon the community and decisions undertaken by the local populace; in effect there is an acceptance that a participatory form of democracy is required in order to ensure that good governance will lead to a sound poverty reduction framework. This 'democratic good governance' mirrors the previous cosmopolitan project by accepting an implicit form of ‘the all-affected principle’ as fundamental to development.

The introduction of a more inclusive stakeholder approach to development under democratic good governance strategies, creates what Mohan and Stokke call a 'revised' neoliberalism (2000) that accepts that markets cannot be the sole responsibility for social equality and determinate of welfare, thus there is a need to consult with local actors within civil society to construct more inclusive and participatory approaches. As a consequence many began to talk about a new, ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ (PWC) that emerged; a new institutional approach that recognised the need for non-market means to deal with market imperfections (Fine 2001, p142). This in some respects represents a break from the Washington Consensus because it recognises that market imperfections can occur, therefore actors such as the state and civil society are required to intervene, particularly in the sphere of public goods and welfare provision. This emanates from a new form of macroeconomic thinking that accepts an important role for welfare provision within the dominant NPM framework: New Institutional Economics (NIE). NIE attempts to expand the role of institutions within development frameworks, questioning the perceived notion that the market left to its own devices will produce a more beneficial outcome (Stiglitz 1989; North 1990, 1997; Williamson 2000). The perceived problems with implementing SAPs led to a new interest in NIE and towards
constructing a more comprehensive framework surrounding broader notions of poverty reduction and good governance *in order to make markets work* (Kimchoeun et al 2007, p12).

This shift away from the narrow market confines of neoliberal macroeconomics, has been reflected within the popular discourse of 'Third Way' politics\(^{118}\), representing a compromise between the overly centralised state and the laissez-faire practices of the market (see Giddens 1998, Blair 1998). Stiglitz attempted to expand the core values of the Washington Consensus through a broader analysis of the quality of the institutions that underpin markets, privatisation and market liberalisation cannot be seen to work in the interests of the poor unless they are accompanied by a strong regulatory structure (1999, p587-588). Welfare economics are seen as important within developing countries where privatisation has failed to create the competition necessary for a thriving economy, and to this end the *state* and *civil society* must play a more collaborative role as a “complement to markets, undertaking actions that make markets work better and correcting market failures”\(^{119}\) (Stiglitz 1998). This approach encapsulates a new consensual relationship between the public and the private under the form of 'welfare pluralism' (Cook and White 2001, p26). The World Bank's 2002 development report 'building institutions for markets' reflects the organisation's shift towards a broader framework that accepts markets cannot operate along and require the (limited) intervention of the state in a supporting capacity to facilitate a healthy market structure (2002).

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\(^{118}\) The Third Way represents a form of politics that dominated the late 1990s agenda of the UK under Blair, the US under Clinton, and Germany under Schroeder. Billed as a way to reinvigorate social democracy in the wake of neoliberal economic dominance of the previous decade, the Third Way suggests that a synthesis can be obtained between social justice and neoliberal economics.

\(^{119}\) It is somewhat ironic that the first to coin the term neoliberalism, Alexander Rustow, envisaged a form of third way politics that involved a greater institutional role for the state (see Hartwich 2009)
The shift emphasises a more socially orientated infrastructure, pluralistic forms of governance, the promotion of partnerships between the public and private sector, and greater stakeholder participation within institutions (Edwards and Gaventa 2001, p2-3). Ultimately, and what is important here, is that the broadening of non-market solutions to welfare now includes a greater engagement with civil society under this notion of welfare pluralism, and as will be outlined below, this has combined with a new participatory role for civil society within poverty reduction frameworks (Burki and Perry 1998; Fine et al 2001; Edwards and Gaventa 2001).

However, despite the rhetoric of a broader development agenda, the inclusion of civil society arguably represents another layer of this 'enabling environment' for the market, and has steadily come to be perceived as being essential to the continuation of a more pluralistic form of the Washington Consensus (Edwards 2001; Weber 2004; Mercer 2003; Crawford 2003). As a consequence it can still be seen as 'economic reductionist' through the application of neoliberal principles that attempt to “aggressively...colonise the other social sciences by extending its methods to them, treating non-economic or non-market relations as if they were economic” (Fine 2003b, p8, see also Harriss 2002; Ferguson 1990).

The close link with NIE under the post-Washington consensus is seen here as a simple progression from the previous neoliberal economic paradigm because it “builds on, modifies, and extends neo-classical theory to permit it to come to deal with an entire range of issues” (North 1997 p17). The popularity of the NIE inspired Third Way politics, and the linking of public/private partnerships,¹²⁰ is still recognised as embracing the logics of private sector

¹²⁰ Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) are services that are joint funded by both the public (state) and private (market) sector, often to promote urban and rural regeneration and shift away from an exclusive public
rationality and thus reflecting a neoliberal form of economic reductionism (Moore 1999; Callinicos 2001; Ryner 2002; Dent, Chandler and Barry 2004; Cutler 2004). We should be careful not to equate post-Washington extension with transformation; NPM principles are still eagerly applied to public agencies, and as this chapter will outline, they have simply expanded into new avenues that include civil society.

There may be a shift in emphasis towards broader notions of participation, democratisation and civil society, yet at the core the same authoritarian principles apply that treats the political as an economic realm. For example, the World Bank approach to initiate new Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)\textsuperscript{121} as a way of increasing participation from the donor recipient, is still described by a variety of authors as simply a more subtle way to legitimise the continual exposure to neoliberal market led reform strategies (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Craig and Porter 2003; Cooke 2004; Chakravati 2005). The PWC can be seen as a further saturation of neoliberal market mentality in that the previous preoccupation of a sole focus on the role of the market (\textit{vis-a-vis} the state and civil society) is to be fully implemented throughout the triadic structure in a more inclusive and pluralist framework.

It is important to now analyse what this supposed new role is for civil society that the World Bank has forged in its participatory and democratic turn under the post-Washington consensus. The Bank's initial interaction with civil society occurred in the 1970s through open dialogue with NGOs\textsuperscript{122} concerned about the environment (World Bank 2009). The

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{121} PRSPs are the new form of SAPs introduced in 1999, designed to be more inclusive through the designing, implementing and monitoring being undertaken by the recipient donor state. They are also supposed to include a greater variety of stakeholders such as civil society in their consultation stages (see World Bank 2009)
\item \textsuperscript{122} In the 1997 development Report the World Bank identifies NGOs as the 'missing middle' between active
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
potential for closer interaction with NGOs working within the development context in the late 1980s was recognised by former World Bank President Barber Conable who argued that “government policies and public programs play a critical role in poverty alleviation. But governments cannot do everything. Non-governmental organizations in many developing countries have enormous potential for flexible and effective action” (Conable cited in Salmen and Eaves 1989, p1). World Bank-NGO meetings at this time placed a priority on expanding NGO services towards attempting to mitigate the negative effects of structural adjustment loans (Salmen and Eaves 1989, p3). At this stage however, interaction with NGOs was minimal, and tended to reflect the dominant ideas at the time that NGOs were a separate humanitarian phenomenon that could prove useful as supplements to those drastically effected by welfare state reduction strategies.

In 1994, the World Bank began to recognise the role that NGOs could play within this new good governance architecture and that although they were not seen by the bank as ensuring greater levels of participation within projects at this time, “they are nonetheless likely to continue to play an intermediary role in channelling information to and from beneficiaries” (World Bank 1994, p44). The reliance upon a narrow understanding of NGOs as supplements to structural adjustment began to transform with this new emphasis of a broader notion of good governance to include democratic frameworks that recognised the integral role of civil society within development. Alongside the World Bank's new terminology of 'Civil

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123 Between 1973 and 1988 only 5.6% of World Bank supported projects involved NGOs (Salmen and Eaves 1989, p7), this had significantly increased by 1993 to an involvement in around 30% of World Bank projects (World Bank 1994, p44).

124 NGOs campaigning for greater participation in the Banks poverty reform agenda have framed participation as the inclusion of stakeholders in the decision making process. The Bank has responded in similar fashion to the IMF (see Scholte 2000) by seeing problems of project implementation being smoother integrated if communities have a voice in the process (Nelson 2000, p157).
Society Organisations’ (CSOs)\textsuperscript{125} there became an understanding within the organisation that civil society could be at the forefront of democratic reform, essential for the smooth integration of an efficient market economy.

A useful summary can be found within the 2007 World Development Report in outlining that the reform of governance within developing countries requires:

\begin{quote}
The reinforcement of civil society as a way of increasing the resilience of social institutions...A rich associational life may enable communities to maintain local law and order, support a safety net, and resist official corruption and exploitation (World Bank 2007a, p160).
\end{quote}

Two key roles are highlighted here for CSOs that are important; supporting a safety net, and resisting corruption and exploitation. The first describes the long established role of NGOs as service providers, however, under the broadening of the good governance framework “they are now seen as the preferred channel for service provision, in deliberate substitution for the state” (Edwards and Hulme 1996c, p2). The roles for NGOs in development have significantly shifted over the last few decades from offering emergency relief, to now a more formal role within service delivery. This links into the good governance agenda and involves the contracting out of welfare services to NGOs as part of a more democratically decentralised and participatory state structure.

The Second role highlights civil society as a democratic watchdog in order to hold corrupt

\textsuperscript{125} defined as “...non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations” (World Bank 2009)
governments accountable. NGOs are incorporated here alongside other forms of community based organisations (CBOs) into local governance frameworks in order to tackle corruption and demand accountability from government actors. Both roles represent the fusing of neoliberalism and democracy through attempting to reformulate a more decentralised and participatory form of democracy in the service of the market, in effect “...the World Bank valued democracy and pluralism less in their own right and more as a means to economic reform and development” (Crawford 2001, p14).

This role for civil society in the support of a neoliberal democratic state, is not just associated with the World Bank as the key multilateral donor agency in the development context, in fact I will argue throughout the rest of this chapter that the majority of bilateral donor agencies operating globally have formed an homogeneous understanding of this form of democratic good governance, the consequences of which are the construction of what Robinson (1993) coins the 'New Policy Agenda' and a specific neoliberal promotion of civil society.

2.4 Donors, civil society and the rise of the New Policy Agenda

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s there was very little coherence in the development projects of International NGOs (INGOs) and bilateral donor agencies, where the latter tended to see the former as helpful in aid emergencies but not as development partners (Lewis 2001, p63). Donors throughout the 1980s began to recognise the potential role of NGOs as key to the

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126 This term is increasing in popularity particularly within donor institutions; the World Bank tends to recognise that one of the key differences between NGOs and CBOs is the relationship to the community. NGOs are often seen as serving a wider variety of individuals, whilst CBOs are tied directly to the community from which they emerge (see Gibbs et al 1999). CBOs can therefore be equated with a variety of local associations, self-help groups, and committees etc..

127 There are four main types of donors that fund NGOs within the development context, bilateral donors,
internal development of developing countries, being perceived as more efficient, locally active, and a cheaper alternative than supplying aid directly to host governments (See Drabek 1987, Sogge 1996). With the ending of the Cold War and the perceived victory of capitalist democratic governance, development aid became increasingly linked with conditionalities that challenged authoritarian donor-recipient states to adopt SAPs and conform to Western economic models (see Crawford 2001). New forms of conditionality began to be imposed due to the perceived problems of authoritarian corruption that led to the collapse of SAPs as the stalwart of development, and instead promoted “the idea that a more democratic and accountable state could foster economic growth and development and allow the market to operate freely” (Howell and Pearce 2001, p40)

Early analysis of the role of donors in this new attempt of democracy promotion through aid channels demonstrates a bias in the implementation of formalistic procedural notions of democracy as a quick fix solution to the inherent problems within the state structures in developing countries (see Stokke 1995). It is important not to reify the image of a highly homogeneous set of actors known as the 'donor community', however, development co-operation centred around democratic reform became the objective of all major donors throughout the 1990s, and despite the heterogeneity of projects enacted, all tend to focus on liberal democracy and an efficient market economy as the overriding framework that includes good governance as the mechanism from which to achieve this (see Crawford 2000; Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Hearn 1999; Mohan 2002)128. In the contemporary climate with the shift towards a more post-Washington conception of development, the differences between the donor agencies appears ever more marginal, as the buzzwords 'good governance',

128 According to Robinson (1996) civil society was hardly ever mentioned within donor conceptions of good governance in the early 1990s.
'participation' and 'civil society' merge into a dominant paradigm.

This coordination can be observed in the way that donors have developed strong institutional linkages for example in 1960, the Development Assistance committee (DAC)\textsuperscript{129} of the Organisation for Economic cooperation and development (OECD) was established as “the venue and voice of the world's major bilateral donors” (DAC 2006). In 1989 the DAC first acknowledged the existence of “a vital connection between open, democratic and accountable political systems, individual rights and the effective and equitable operation of economic systems” (DAC 1997a).

The emerging post-Cold War environment allowed the opportunities to promote democratic governance and resulted in 1993 with DAC approving a working party on Participatory Development and Good Governance (PDGG) with the intention of mainstreaming this theme into development cooperation\textsuperscript{130}. The shift towards PDGG introduces an overarching framework that permeates all of the key development goals among various donors, from poverty reduction to the reversal of environmental degradation (DAC 1997b). Good governance within this framework includes strengthening the rule of law, reforming public sector management, fighting corruption and reducing military expenditure, and necessitates that the means to this reform stems from a multi stakeholder approach involving civil society as a supporting institution for a more participatory development process (DAC 1997b).

\textsuperscript{129} The DAC serves as an international hub between not just major bilateral donors, but the World Bank and the UNDP, and includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States

\textsuperscript{130} The DAC became aware in the early 1990s that the low levels of development and increasing poverty in Asia, South America and Africa were attributed towards 'bad governance' (Van de Sand 1996, p23).
The DAC has been instrumental in helping to implement key donor alignment strategies such as the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (2003) and the subsequent Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) that have attempted to harmonize aid policy among donors and acts as a best practice for donor policy coordination. This includes 'eliminating duplication of efforts', 'rationalising donor activities' and 'defining measures and standards' (see OECD 2009a). These moves to harmonize development practices reflect the 'growing convergence' between donors on the priority of good governance towards these objectives (OECD 2009b, p11), and the role that civil society plays as fundamental to this attainment (OECD 2009b, p15).

Civil society has since the 1990s emerged as an important political force within the New Policy Agenda, which is driven around two core sets of beliefs; neoliberal economics and democratic theory (Moore 1993; Robinson 1993; Edwards and Hulme 1996b) where various bilateral and multilateral donors recognise civil society's potential to “enable choice, scrutinise errant governments, and ultimately lead to regularised, plural democracy” (Mohan 2002, p125). The twin roles of service provision and democratic watchdog under this framework serves to create the ideal model of a decentralised liberal democracy that is responsive to the demands of its citizens but as will be argued in this chapter, subverts these actors under a form of market rationality in the service of democracy. The shift towards promoting democratic decentralisation, contains a supply side reformulation of public administration including improving service delivery, and a demand side that places an emphasis upon civil society as integral as a pressure point to demand accountability from the state.
This PDGG strategy and the dualistic role of civil society under the NPA can be observed throughout the majority of bilateral donor mission statements, themes and funding priorities. The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) has created a multitude of Partnership Programme Agreements (PPAs) to ensure 'strategic' funding agreements with major INGOs\(^{131}\) including the encouragement of projects to support service provision and building voice and accountability mechanisms within developing states. Those INGOs that are not part of the PPA process can apply to an annual competitive 'Civil Society Challenge Fund' (CSCF) that also encourages 'voice and accountability' and 'service delivery' and generally those NGOs that are involved in opening up stronger avenues of participation within the state (see DFID 1999)\(^{132}\).

United States Aid (USAID) released its 'New Partnership Initiative' in 1995 with an acknowledgement that 'civil society' could play an integral role in development as an important *enabling* mechanism for the institutionalisation of the free-market, voluntary associations are to have a privileged role in not just the eradication of poverty through service provision, but in a supporting capacity to help developing countries 'graduate' from US government assistance (USAID 1995). USAID also recognised from 1996 onwards the potential that civil society could play under the banner of 'civic advocacy organisations' where they would be “serving as watchdogs in ensuring accountability in government” (1996).

Other Donors have a similar understanding of how civil society can be integral to

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\(^{131}\) There are currently 18 PPAs formed through DFID including influential INGOs such as Oxfam, Christian Aid and the WWF (DFID 2006). As of 2006, DFID has increased its funding to CSOs by 50% since the founding of the organisation in 1997 (2006, p3)

\(^{132}\) Funding for NGOs within the developing country context tends to follow two patterns; either NGOs will create project proposals to submit to INGOs and bilateral funding agencies for example DFID’s Joint Funding Scheme (JFS) or Sida’s NGO Programme, or INGOs and Bilateral funding agencies can subcontract the work out to local NGOs and give them the funding required (Lewis 2001, p66)
development projects associated with good governance, for example the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) recognising this important link where NGOs can act as 'civil society monitoring bodies' and become involved in 'anti-corruption efforts' (BMZ 2009, p26-28). The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) recognises the importance of CSOs as service providers of health and education (Sida 2009a) as well as a role in observing anti-corruption to counter balance against the state (Sida 2009b).

In the context of development, civil society is seen to have descended from the ivory tower to become absorbed into an international aid system as they become “the topic of the day” (Rooy 1998, p1). The previous chapter described a specific conceptualisation of civil society as analytically distinct from the state and the market, with a normative critique of both for their perceived sites of democratic exclusion. The promotion of civil society under contemporary development frameworks appears to be starkly different; there is no problematisation of the market as a socio-organising principle, in fact this can be deemed part of the 'neoliberal school' of civil society due to its emphasises on democratic good governance reforms in order to create market-friendly institutions (Mohan 2002).

The liberal theories of civil society tend to be seen as synonymous with voluntary association as the core defining feature, thus including all forms of social groups regardless whether they are motivated by wealth, power, religious identity, public interest etc... in essence no groups are excluded so long as they are free and consensual voluntary membership organisations (Lomasky 2002 p55; Walzer 2002, p35). Larry Diamond describes this form of civil society as “the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting,
autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules” (1994, p5).

Under this conception, civil society reaches into both the political and economic domain alongside the more typical social notions associated with the term and crucially; ensuring the protection of civil society from an interventionist state. Furthermore this relies upon the fostering of a 'pluralised network of associations' between the citizen and the state, where the state is required to be held in check by an active citizenry (O'Donnell and Scmitter 1986; Putnam 1993; Halpern 1999; Anheier and Kendall 2002). The idea of a plurality of associations stems from Alex de Tocqueville's influential book Democracy in America, who in his research on society in America discovered that:

Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which we all take part, but associations of a thousand kinds, - religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive (1864 p129).

The development of overlapping networks of associations within a democratic society was seen as helping to combat the problem of excessive individualism; individuals engaging and cooperating with each other offers the best method to ensure a check on the interfering powers of the state (Tocqueville 1864). In recent years there has become a revival of the Tocquevillian understanding of civil society and its fundamental link with democracy. Interest has emerged alongside an important trend occurring in global politics at the time; the increasing spread of democracy within many of the ex-Soviet satellite states throughout the early 1990s, dubbed at the time as the 'third wave' of democratisation (Huntington 1991, 133).  

133 Individualism here was seen as a product of the democratic system, de Tocqueville was concerned following the French Revolution where the feudal structures of the French state that served as intermediaries between individuals and government, were eliminated. His analysis of America demonstrated that the atomisation of social life under the French democratic system need not follow the same pattern given the emerging complex web of associations developing (Watson and Morris 2002, p263-254)
1993, 1996, 1997; Fukuyama 1992; Diamond 1996, 1999, Diamond et al 1997). The third wave literature emanates from Huntington's analysis of the waves of democratisation that have occurred globally, starting in the period 1828-1926, then 1943-1964, and finally the third phase from 1974 onwards. The twin pillars of democracy and capitalism were seen as triumphant in the face of authoritarianism, and their ideological supremacy has been eagerly promoted through 'pressure and conditional assistance' globally (Diamond 1996, p35). Civil Society in its liberal dimension was seen as integral to this phase of democratisation; its Tocquevillian revival as a bulwark against the authoritarian state (Diamond 1994, 1999).

This revival is often closely associated with Robert Putnam and his work on social capital to describe the essential ingredients to a successful and vibrant democracy, founded upon a dense network of CSOs. Social Capital is defined by Putnam as “features of social organisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate cooperation and coordination for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995, p67). The importance of fostering networks of trust and coordination among CSOs was demonstrated through his research in Italy where he argued that communities with high levels of social capital created a form of trust and activism that was largely redundant within communities with low levels of social capital, characterised by higher levels of corruption (1993). Putnam found that “the quality of governance was determined by longstanding traditions of civic engagement (or its absence)...these networks of organised reciprocity and civic solidarity, far from being an epiphenomenon of socioeconomic modernization, were a precondition for it” (1995, p66).

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134 Huntington recognised that there were empirical patterns emerging in 'waves' where countries would go from being undemocratic to democratic and sought to trace the chronology of these occurrences.

135 Putnam is only one of a number of authors that have engaged closely with the notion of social capital, including Coleman (1988, 1990) and Bourdieu (1985), however, the debates on social capital are vast, and for the purposes of this chapter it is Putnam's usage that has been drawn upon by development practitioners, and therefore warrants further investigation.
The point here was that communities needed to engage in greater networks in order to create forms of overlapping solidarity as fundamental to the health of not just a community but democracy itself, thus the importance of localised CSOs was highlighted in order to generate extra-community links. High levels of social capital garnered through forms of solidarity, can therefore help to balance against the interfering nature of the state (Hadenius and Uggla 1996) and represents the very “sine qua non of stable liberal democracy” (Fukuyama 2001, p7).

Putnam's analysis of social capital began to filter through donor discourses on development, recognising not just the role that local communities and CSOs could play in ensuring a check on the state, but also merged with a specific neoliberal understanding of the importance that communities and civil society could play in the nurturing of an enabling environment for the market.

Neoliberal economic theories tend to focus on either states, firms or individuals yet the new emphasis on civil society is seen as an important bridging mechanism for economic development as an institutional arrangement that mediates the space between states and markets (Woolcock 1998, p153). Accordingly, the problems of SAPs and the attempt to stimulate a private sector can be solved through an understanding that communities require high levels of social capital in order to have the confidence, trust and mutual understandings to invest in collective economic activities (Pretty 2003, p1912). According to Fukuyama, social capital among community groups has an important relationship to the development of a healthy free market because it can help reduce the transaction costs “associated with formal coordination mechanisms like contracts, hierarchies, bureaucratic rules, and the like” (1999, p3). The attempt to reduce transaction costs links closely to the economic parameters of game
theory, such as the prisoner's dilemma model\textsuperscript{136}, aimed ultimately at fostering trust, cooperation and transparency to create a more efficient and optimum operation of market logics. The opposite occurrence associated with the absence of strong extra-community networks between civil society actors creates inward looking community groups that build their relations on kinship ties and other familial attachments, this has been blamed for problems with integrating the market due to the increase in transaction costs caused by a mistrust to outside influences (Woolcock 1998, p171-172). In effect, social capital in its highest form requires enough intra-community solidarity in order to produce a bonding mechanism between individuals (though too much will create an inefficient inward looking community that increases market transaction costs based upon loyalties and kinship bias), whilst generating enough extra-community links to ensure that members can expand their access to other markets and remain competitive and efficient (Woolcock and Narayan 2000). Communities that are linked with a diverse stock of social networks and CSOs are are seen as being in a stronger position to alleviate poverty and undermine vulnerability, whilst having the opportunities to participate in the market (Woolcock and Narayan 2000, Moser 1996)

It is here that one can find the neoliberal underpinnings of civil society that has combined a 'tacit acceptance' of this liberal notion of civil society as an integral ingredient for democratic association, whilst combining it with neoliberal political discourse emphasizing free market economics (McIlwaine 1998, p654). The moral domain of this interpretation of civil society suggests that the good life is to be found only within the market place, “where individual men and women, consumers rather than producers, choose among a maximum number of options”

\textsuperscript{136} A model in game theory that demonstrates that in some instances only suboptimal outcomes are possible under market logics requiring the construction of an enabling environment to guarantee optimal outcomes (see Axelrod 1984).
This of course elevates the idea of freedom and choice, those core pillars of liberal thought, however, the neoliberal 'twist' situates these values within the domain of the market as a moral good in itself. Taken to its extreme, the neoliberal view of democracy views the role of government as an apparatus of public administration, and society as a “market-structured network of interactions among persons” (Habermas 1999a, p135).

The World Bank became interested in social capital debates following Putnam’s 1993 publication, inviting him as a frequent advisor to various projects, recognising that the social agenda being promoted could complement the overtly economistic reputation of the Bank (Bebbington et al 2004, p41). The World Bank’s acknowledgement of social capital first appeared in the 1997 development report where it was defined as “the informal rules, norms, and long-term relationships that facilitate coordinated action and enable people to undertake cooperative ventures for mutual advantage” (World Bank 1997, p114). Wolfensohn’s emphasis upon a new direction for the Bank of including non-market actors within a post-Washington consensus understanding of development, under the new broader understanding of democratic good governance, was seen as “critical for effectively tapping social capital's development potential” (Fox and Gershman 2000, p173). Although there were a variety of social capital debates within the internal departments of the Bank, the most popular conception acknowledges social capital as attempting to create a more efficient and equitable exchange of service provision, thus to draw upon a notion of social capital that is highly embedded in a neoliberal economic understanding (Bebbington et al 2004, p40).

The second dimension of social capital is that the distribution of public goods such as those

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137 Indeed the state can be seen as having a negative impact on the accumulation of social capital, “when they start to undertake activities that are better left to the private sector or to civil society” (Fukuyama 1999, p11).
138 For an interesting discussion on these debates see Francis (2002).
involving NGOs and state ministries, can be strengthened and made more accountable when communities have a greater participatory role in informing public officials of problems arising in their distribution, and pressurising them to improve the situation (World Bank 1997, p117). Again this links with the role for civil society as a democratic watchdog of a decentralised state to “match public services more closely with local demands and preferences and to build more responsive and accountable government from below” (World Bank 1997, p120). The role of the state under these frameworks is to provide an enabling environment such as implementing the rule of law to ensure individuals have full access in the designing and implementation of development projects, in this way the state is deemed responsible for “safeguarding the right of people to organise, to gain access to information, to engage in contracts, and to own and manage assets (World Bank 1997, p120).

The literature on social capital that is emerging within key development institutions such as the World Bank, reflects the linking of the democratic good governance agenda with the community itself, and demonstrates how neoliberal conceptions of civil society can link explicitly with the grassroots basis of civil society as well as the more formalised NGOs that have come to populate the new policy agenda. The development narrative thus far generated within this chapter, describes a path of neoliberal governance that has shifted from excluding civil society as unimportant to development, to an understanding that a strong civil society is the fundamental precondition for development. It is here that an important link between the global and the local is created; neoliberal economic policies emanating from a global collaboration of multilateral and bilateral institutions have permeated national borders and incorporated the formal entities of civil society under the NPA, even shifting recently with the re-invigorated interest in social capital, to the very grassroots community groups
themselves. As I have described previously, there tends to be two important roles involving civil society here, firstly in the role of service providers to communities under the new interest in welfare pluralism and secondly, in the role of monitoring the state (including service provision) to ensure stronger levels of accountability between citizens and the state.

The chapter will now turn to a brief abstract analysis of the effect these two roles under the NPA have on the identity of CSOs, before moving towards a more contextual analysis within the case study on Cambodia in the succeeding chapter. I will argue that these new spaces created for civil society result in a more professional, efficient and technical sector, a direct result of the administrative transformations occurring specifically within NGO identities, and a greater enmeshment within the logics of the market. Both represent systemic interventions in the production of CSO identities and raise questions as to their representation as communicative actors under this framework.

2.5 Service Provision: NGOs and the 'Magic Bullet'

According to Clayton et al (2000) there are arguably two 'major global policy changes' that have been instrumental in the construction of an NGO-led industry in service provision, firstly the increased interest in civil society following the democratisation trends in the early 1990s and the new good governance agenda designed to consolidate these transitions. Secondly the emergence of the NPM paradigm led to the contracting out of service provision to the private sector as part of a bureaucratic overhaul (Ferlie 1996, Knapp et al 2001, McLaughlin et al 2002). These changes created a proliferation of NGOs within development policy and a new role for them within decentralised welfare systems. NGOs have traditionally played a vital
role in providing social services in the wake of 'complex political emergencies' (Clayton et al 2000, p5), however, the difference in the contemporary development climate is the way in which they are being incorporated within the mainstream development policies as a substitution for the bureaucratic state; part of a new 'shadow state' (Karim 2008, p6).

NGOs have often been recognised by donors as ideal models to deliver services to the poor\textsuperscript{139}, often equated with the idea of a 'magic bullet' (Vivian 1994), specialist quick-fix solutions to humanitarian emergencies and more recently, cheap effective and viable alternatives to state sector service provision. NGOs are seen as having a comparative advantage in low-cost service provision when compared to the overly bureaucratic public sector, and can reach the most vulnerable and inaccessible groups of beneficiaries more effectively than government counterparts (Salmen and Eaves 1989; World Bank 1993). They are seen as flexible and specialised, thus donors feel they can pick and choose those that suit particular projects whilst dispensing with those that do not (Smith and Lipsky 1993), as well as being closer to the community in order to understand the needs of the people (Ullah et al 2006). They are seen as an effective 'ideological antidote' for the failures of previous development aid that had merely reduced welfare programmes without looking at the role civil society could play in offering alternatives (Belloni 2001, p178). Furthermore, NGOs within this service provision role become 'intermediaries'; linking community needs and interests, with external funding sources (Tijl 1987, p53).

The result of renewed interest under good governance strategies is that NGOs have become a

\textsuperscript{139} This is, however, still a debatable claim, and very little evidence is available to analyse the long term ability of NGOs to bring about poverty reducing services to the poorest groups (see Biekart 1998, Oakley 1999, Ridell et al 1997, Gilson et al 1994)
dominant force within service provision throughout much of the developing world, highly centralised state systems have been significantly reduced through decentralised bureaucratic reform; disposition of state based welfare responsibilities has led to the contracting out of work to a more professional sector, one where NGOs have been seen as ideal to fulfil this gap (White 1999). What has been the effect of this increase in funding opportunities and spaces for NGOs within a new framework of neoliberal governance? The effect, as I wish to outline here, is that their engagement with mainstream neoliberal notions of development, has had a transformatory effect on the internal structures of NGOs and that their very identities as (quasi) autonomous organisations have become intertwined with the neoliberal valorisation of homo economicus; professional, competitive, efficient, and separative from the social context within which they interact.

The increase in funding and spaces available for NGOs has created a 'development marketplace' within the service provision industry, this has combined with an increased effort on the behalf of donors to 'improve' the efficiency and structures of NGOs to ensure that they can fulfil these roles in the absence of the state. Donors have sought to make NGOs more accountable as a fundamental criterion within funding initiatives, through the infusing of New Public Management strategies directly into their frameworks to create a 'professional' form of NGO that can implement donor projects more smoothly (Dichter 1999, Silliman 1999, Alvarez 1999; Jad 2004; Bradshaw 2006; Fernando 2006b, Gideon 2008).

There are numerous studies of this new service provision role for NGOs, for example in Africa (Semboja and Therkildsen 1995; Gary 1996; Abrahamsen 2001, Mohan 2002; Pleiffer 2004) South America (McIlwaine 1998; Schild 2002) and Asia (Freizer 2004)

It must be reiterated here that CSOs in the development context, and in particular NGOs, are often indirectly funded from the state, however their role has always been outside of the domain of the state and the market within a developing country.

NGOs that work within the development context are increasingly dependent upon official bilateral and multilateral sources for their income, it is generally accepted that those not dependent upon these sources are becoming more the exception rather than the norm (Edwards and Hulme 1996c, p3)
Accountability within this context has been narrowly interpreted to link closely with NPM through accountancy, evaluation and audit procedures in an attempt to be responsible for the funds that are channelled through them (Frumkin and Andre-Clark 2000 p405; Frumkin 2003; Sievers 2004; Dixon, Ritchie and Siwala 2006). As a consequence a culture of audit appears, where NGO’s attempt to appear 'fundable' to their donors, often instilling projects that can be quantitatively measured, monitored and evaluated in order to have the best chances of demonstrating success (Vivian 1994; Guthman 2008).

NGOs, unlike businesses within the private sector, have no 'bottom-line' against which performance can be measured and therefore are not subject to the same judgement criteria, however as demonstrated here, they are now integrating private sector notions of accountability resulting in, “imposed systems of accountability deriving from linear world views, with targets and sanctions to be imposed in the event of non-achievement” (Desai and Howes 1996, p84). The results of course ultimately lead to what Edwards and Hulme recognise as a “tendency to “accountancy” rather than “accountability”, audit rather than learning” (1996c, p13). In essence new forms of participation and inclusion within service provision have been restructured under NPM principles towards performance based measurement and management improvement (Brinkerhoff and Coston 1999, p348).

Public administration reform is traditionally associated within the confines of the developmental state, however the rise of a new development culture surrounding an inclusive NGO community involved in service delivery has simply shifted what Cooke calls 'neoliberal modernity' away from statist variants to a more decentralised form (2004, p610). Fyfe labels

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143 Often NGOs must succeed to donor demands because if they are not deemed fund-able, they will more often than not cease to exist as a viable organisation, whilst donors can simply find a more efficient and obedient NGO to fund (Walker et al 2007).
these professional NGOs as demonstrating a more 'managerial' model towards poverty reduction through good practice frameworks that tend to reinforce a form of economic rationality within the organization (2005, p544). This creates a separation between more informal organizations that concentrate on community input, and 'corporatist' groups that concentrate heavily on vertical conceptions of accountability to donors and consequently construct more professionalised audit mechanisms (Fyfe and Milligan 2003). NGO accountability mechanisms have been at the forefront of discussion under the NPA and their elevated status within development projects, and whilst there has been much (needed) talk of self-regulation standards as fundamental to good organisational practice 144, there is still a dominant focus on vertical accountability towards donors and external funding sources (Fisher 1994; Edwards and Hulme 1996b; Dagnino 2007; Dolinhow 2001).

These corporatist organisations are the result of NGOs 'scaling-up' in order to meet the new demands required by donors in terms of management efficiency and also in order to effectively expand operations in order to meet the increased supply. How can NGOs effectively scale-up? Wils (1996) establishes five different strategies; the transformation to BINGOs 145, through increasing the size and scope of the organisation; multipliers, combining a multitude of CBOs in order to expand; diffusion, the attempt by NGOs to expand their knowledge through seminars and publications in order to focus on particular audiences; multi-actor programming, essentially working alongside political and business actors to increase their impact area and finally; mainstreaming, where NGO models are directly incorporated into official policy frameworks (1996, p68-73). The consequences are that those NGOs attempting to be more professional and expand or establish links with larger development

144 For a general discussion on internal NGO accountability structures see Jordan and Tuijl (2006)
145 BINGOs or Big NGOs, are seen here as having more than 500 members and engaging with a budget that exceeds one million dollars.
players, often a lack of accountability vis-à-vis the very grassroots communities of which they aim to serve.\textsuperscript{146}

NGOs may be idealized as intermediary organizations, between the local (communities) and the global (donors), but rather than being seen as a two-way process of knowledge transfer and voice, as suggested within the previous chapter as part of the 'transmission belt', they are recognised here as being firmly accountable to the global dimension and therefore to the detriment of the local conceptualisation of civil society. The shift in accountability upwards can have the effect of 'grossly deforming' the shape and nature of civil society (INTRAC 1998, p77), and 'distorting the agenda' of NGOs who cannot respond as effectively to demands of citizens (Gideon 1998, p311; Freizer 2004). This severing of a link between the community and professional NGOs, often results in community projects being designed and implemented by a competitive market sector that is more concerned with project output rather than community input (Smillie 1994; Fowler 2000, p14), and organisational structure over localised specialisation (Gordenker and Weiss 1997, p445). In essence, many of these NGOs fail to live up to the representative claims that they entail, the products of donor funding rather than social demands for representation (Ottaway and Carothers 2000).

A recent shift in donor strategies of service provision, has been to take an interest in the fostering of CBOs such as farmer's associations, women's associations and business associations as a strategy of incorporating service provision within their self-help approaches to community self-sufficiency, linking directly towards a strong emphasis on the Tocquevillian ideal of a multitude of associations incorporated with the free market of choice

\textsuperscript{146} Conversely, those organisations that attempt to expand downwards through diffusion and multipliers, tend to disperse neoliberal forms of identity throughout these grassroots collectivities (as will be demonstrated in chapter four)
(Anheier 2005, Anheier and Kendall 2002). CBOs, understood in their democratic capacity as a realm of associations, function within the wider context of ‘welfare pluralism’ (Robinson and White 1997, p79) where they are capable of fulfilling the neoliberal democratic emphasis on freedom and choice within an individual self-help environment without state intervention (Rankin 2001, p20; Walzer 2002, p41). A typical example of this is the way in which microfinance schemes are being globally promoted within a variety of CBO projects\(^\text{147}\).

This localised form of service-provision represents the pinnacle of post-Washington Consensus understandings of development, through an enhanced role for welfare strategies embedded within collective community projects. Microfinance is said to contribute to the levels of social capital within associations because of the way in which it encourages members of these associations to form both closer intracommunity ties as a bonding mechanism among social groups, and closer extracommunity networks through bridging mechanisms with external agencies such as NGOs (Woolcock and Narayan 2000, p231). The succeeding chapters will demonstrate, however, that this welfare approach is deeply embedded within the market and has important implications for the construction of homo economicus at the grassroots level of civil society (Rankin 2001; Weber 2002, 2004; Fernando 2006).

2.6 Civil Society as a monitoring body for good governance

The elevated role for CSOs within service provision represents the supply side of good governance, a method to improve the effectiveness of a liberal democracy with its focus on

\(^{147}\) The role of microfinance and its relationship to both NGOs and CBOs as a neoliberal form of service provision is interrogated within both chapters three and four.
decentralised structures of authority. The contemporary support to CSOs acting as democratic 'watchdogs' represents the demand side of good governance, and has in recent years drawn the attention of the donor community as a method of holding the state to account through the participation of non-state actors.

Demanding accountability of the state has become a core development goal, where civil society is elevated to strengthen “the demand for reform, promoting and monitoring transparency and accountability in the fight against corruption” (DCD/DAC 2006). Corruption is deemed an important development target because it is seen as “a symptom of weak governance” (OECD 2007) therefore it is the antithesis of good governance that has been promoted vigorously over the past two decades. After the Paris Declaration on Aid effectiveness (2005) the DAC released a list of key principles to guide donors as best practice in the fight against corruption148, recognising that civil society held a supporting role, as it states:

Work, where government commitment is weak, with local and international civil society and private sector actors as the primary alternative, but recognising that strengthening government commitment is the essential objective in the long term (DCD/DAC 2006, p4)

Clearly the need to strengthen civil society is seen here not as an end itself, but in the services of an anti-corruption agenda; essential in the construction of the liberal democratic state. In order to successfully pluralise and open up the democratic practices of fragile states in developing countries, civil society is seen as the bridging mechanism between citizens and the state.

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148 The DAC/DAD released a report in 2003 outlining the failures of donors in addressing corruption of donor-recipient governments, this was highlighted by the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and became a policy initiative and culminated in the signing of the 'Principles for Donor Action in Anti-Corruption' in 2006 (see DCD/DAC/GOVNET 2003, DCD/DAC 2006)
state through, tasked with constructing an enabling environment that can allow citizens the
ability to demand *accountability* from the state for its actions. The World Bank calls this
'Social Accountability’ and involves organising citizens and CSOs into frameworks that can
allow for civic engagement in 'exactng' accountability from the state (Ackerman 2005, World
Bank 2004a).

There are generally five areas that are targeted as the functional domains of social
accountability: (1) budgets (2) public policy making and planning, (3) public goods and
services, (4) expenditures, (5) public oversight and monitoring (Sirker and Cosic 2007). In order
to enact accountability within these areas, various tools have been implemented by local
NGOs for citizen and community participation including for example, citizen report cards,
community score cards, citizen ombudsman offices, citizens juries oversight committees,
participatory budgeting, social audits, and participatory performance monitoring.

Social accountability initiatives are still in the early stages of experimentation, yet they are
being globally reproduced\(^{149}\), and as I will attempt to briefly argue here, represent another
neoliberal form of rationality at the heart of civil society. Social Accountability tools
contribute to the construction of identities within civil society that are akin to the passive and
technical form of homo economicus; a valorisation of instrumental modes of rationality. As an
example, the popular citizen report cards\(^{150}\) and community score cards\(^{151}\) are modelled on
private sector practice, involving performance monitoring of client satisfaction, including the

\(^{149}\) For example Arroyo and Sirker (2005), working for the World Bank in a stocktaking exercise, discovered
over 80 different SA initiatives in 13 countries within the Asia-Pacific Region alone

\(^{150}\) Report Cards originate in 1994 from the Public Affairs Centre (PAC) in Bangalore, India and have been
reproduced around the world (see Paul 1998).

\(^{151}\) First developed by CARE International in Malawi 2002, these are more specifically designed at the rural
community level and encourage meetings within villages to discuss issues with service provision and
evaluate performances through designated indicators.
quality, efficiency and adequacy of public service provision. They can be seen as a 'surrogate for competition' (Transparency International 2004, p45) for institutions that lack the same levels of responsiveness found within the private sector when enterprises respond to a client's needs, therefore they offer a “comparative and competitive dynamic similar to that imposed by the market” (Ackerman 2005, p14). In order for them to be successfully implemented they are linked by donors with the more technical minded NGOs that can serve as intermediaries between demanding citizens and the accountable state (Paul 2004). NGOs can respond to citizens' complaints through pressing the state for reforms, and disseminating information about the progress of these proposals. These more professionally and technically skilled NGOs are to help design report cards/score cards that “aim at being constructively critical. It may be unhelpful if the goal is solely to embarrass or laud a service provider’s performance” (Transparency International 2004, p48).

It is interesting to note that this role for citizens, community groups and NGOs are to become an oversight committee of an area of the state, particularly service provision (effectively contracted out to NGOs in many developing countries as previously argued), thus the two roles of service provider and watchdog can become linked under a market based technical approach to participation. There is a shift towards not just being the providers of social services but also monitors of service provision (World Bank 2004).

In a similar fashion, social audits involve the community scrutinising public projects enacted by the state, often they are created by NGOs who disseminate project information through public hearings, foster local scrutiny, and then expose their findings (Arroyo and Sirker 2005, p11-12). Participatory performance monitoring entails community groups monitoring and
evaluating the performance of public services in a similar way to the social audit, whilst budgetary monitoring allows citizens the chance to be involved in key decisions and analysis of financial spending, NGOs are again involved through helping demystify the technical content of budgets, raising awareness and educational training to improve budget literacy.

These Social Accountability tools firstly rely upon a specific type of NGO to design and enforce the projects; the professional model, and secondly construct spaces for citizens collectively working within informal groups, associations and committees as a form of civil society that links advocacy to the neutral and instrumental form of democratic participation that leaves little room for critical ownership of the development process. The World Bank summarises this most succinctly with its recent report entitled 'from shouting to counting' where, “It’s not just about people protesting and making noise. This new approach to citizen action actually involves systematic analysis and intelligent use of data, making sure their governments spend effectively and keep their promises” (World Bank 2004b).

Keane in his latest book *The life and Death of Democracy* (2009) describes this form of democratic participation as typical of a new form of democracy that is emerging within recent historical trends, an alternative to both the representative model, and the more direct democratic model; monitor democracy. This form of democracy involves the decentralisation of 'power-monitoring institutions' including not just political actors but civil society in a new elevated role (2009, pxxvii). Implicit within this disciplinary form of civil society there is the acceptance that progress and development depend upon the increasingly collaborative linkage between civil society, the market and the state where good governance relies upon an holistic framework and a 'synergy' between state and society (Ackerman 2005)
where CSOs interact in a 'refreshing' pro-active engagement with the state (Sirkir and Cosic 2007 p77). This synergy recognises that civil society is still more-or-less analytically separate from the state and market in composition, however, it tends to reflect systemic (state and market) interruptions in the identity of civil society actors.

2.7 Concluding Thoughts: The Neoliberal co-option of civil society

The promotion of neoliberal economic strategies have emerged within the last few decades as part of a complex global political project, with the intention of transforming not just countries' economic structures along free-market lines, but imposing a market-based ethos at the heart of those countries' public administrations. The post-cold war climate has allowed key economic actors such as the World Bank, and a host of bilateral donor agencies a new impetus on creating a democratic ideal of the market economy under the new paradigm of 'good governance'. Democratic interest in revitalised notions of social capital and the participation of civil society has allowed the good governance paradigm to flourish, where civil society can perform two important functions, firstly through providing greater levels of choice and efficiency by supplying service provision.

Secondly, they can help form a dense network of associations and community groups to act as the state's democratic watchdog and demand social accountability. Both the supply and demand side of good governance valorises the inclusion of civil society alongside the state in a more collaborative framework where the overriding emphasis is upon ensuring the development of an enabling environment for market logics; the normative core of freedom, choice and participation.
It is interesting to note that the buzzwords of civil society, participation and democracy have been championed by both the right and the left of the political spectrum as a method of bringing the excluded and marginalised into development discourse. Despite this perceived consensus, it is specifically the neoliberal conception of participation that has become the dominant notion in international development discourse, and increasingly embedded within local spaces leading authors such as Dagnino to label this consensus as the 'perverse confluence' (2007). This confluence “creates an image of the apparent homogeneity among different interests and discourses, concealing conflict and diluting the dispute between these two projects” (Dagnino 2007, p56).

This neoliberal construction of space for CSOs involves the production of the technical-professional NGO, tasked with creating an internal competitive environment to secure external funding, whilst providing efficient and low-cost service provision in response to community needs. This technical-professional NGO has also become the preferred choice within the neoliberal conception of advocacy, seen as a de-politicised mediator between the active citizen and the state, where it encourages the neutral participation of observation whilst disseminating technical information accordingly. What has been implied within these roles of service provision and monitory oversight is on the one hand the increasingly external construction of NGO identities caused by the overwhelming reliance upon donor funding as an attempt to integrate the principles of homo economicus into the very modus operandi of these organisations.

On the other hand these roles serve to demonstrate the decreasing detachment of local
representation and participation within this form of collectivity, raising questions as to the potential for an *endogenous* formation of civil society. This is compounded further by the role of NGOs in constructing and nurturing CBOs in these roles as part of the drive for a dense network of local associations to complement the market and observe the state. Although they have only been briefly eluded to within this chapter, the donor emphasis on promoting CBOs in a similar manner to NGOs is outlined further in more concrete terms within chapter four, demonstrating further the neoliberal attempt to externally construct the spaces for collective action and the sources from which to draw communicative frameworks within the lifeworld. If the role of civil society according to the critical cosmopolitan position is one that is anchored in the communicative realm of the lifeworld tasked with steering the systemic imperatives of the public sphere, then the examples highlighted here demonstrate that the reverse can occur under neoliberal frameworks where civil society can in fact become anchored in the systemic resources of instrumental reasoning and in fact demonstrate a form of colonisation of the lifeworld.

The next section will attempt to ground the abstract discussion I have undertaken on the dual roles of civil society under the NPA framework, with a concrete examination of these external neoliberal processes that can construct the spaces and the meanings of civil society into a more instrumentalised form.
SECTION TWO: UNPACKING THE INCLUSIONARY AND EXCLUSIONARY DYNAMICS OF REFORM AND DEMOCRATISATION IN CAMBODIA
3. NEOLIBERAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF CAMBODIAN CIVIL SOCIETY: NGOS AND THE RISE OF A PROFESSIONAL SECTOR

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter served to outline the increasing cooption of civil society under a neoliberal framework, demonstrating how NGOs have become elevated into new spaces to help foster the neoliberal democratic project of a participatory form of market governance. This chapter will build upon the previous argument, but through a more concrete analysis of the relationship between the global (neoliberal discourse) and the local (civil society) by focusing on the specific case of Cambodia. Cambodia represents an interesting case study because of the way in which the donor community\(^\text{152}\) has firstly had a relatively 'free hand' in implementing its increasingly homogeneous strategy of good governance, and secondly, attempted to re-introduce civil society to the country due to a perceived deficit of social capital in the wake of the Khmer Rouge atrocities. The permeation of neoliberal policies through good governance, have created new spaces for civil society in Cambodia, though as this chapter will interrogate, these spaces of inclusion are deeply exclusive through the construction of a singular universal model of the professional, competitive, and efficient

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\(^{152}\) The usage of the term donor community within Cambodia represents the bilateral donors Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Russia, Thailand, UK, and the US, as well as the multilateral institutions of the World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and a variety of UN agencies. These external development partners make up the influential 'Consultative Group' (CG) and the Government Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) to harmonize and improve aid strategy between the government and donors.
NGO.

This chapter is concerned with NGOs, as the formal representative of civil society in the country, demonstrating firstly how they have become part of service provision marketplace resulting in a certain conformity to external donor pressures of NPM style accountability, and secondly, their relationship with the emerging microfinance sector that is rapidly growing within the country; a neoliberal form of service provision through which NGOs are elevated and transformed.

In order to understand how the donor community has become so dominant in both the neoliberal democratic reform project and the external construction of civil society, it is worth briefly outlining Cambodia's contemporary history. French colonial rule came to an end with the country declaring independence in 1954 and forming a constitutional monarchy to become the Kingdom of Cambodia under Prince Norodom Sihanouk. There followed a period of relative stability throughout the 1950s, however a decaying economy, government corruption, and the rise of dissidence against an increasingly hard-line rule led to a general lack of confidence in the Sihanouk regime (Tyner 2008 p55-84). Sihanouk became increasingly paranoid about the increasing popularity of the Khmer Rouge\textsuperscript{153}, whilst equally he was concerned with the perceived close relationship with the US and its attempt to bring Cambodia into the war against the Vietnamese Communists.

In 1970 Sihanouk's increasingly unpopular rule came to an end when his Prime Minister

\textsuperscript{153} The Khmer Rouge were a communist movement originating from a group of Cambodians educated in Paris in the 1950s, involving and eventually being led by Saloth Sar, or Pol Pot as he later became known. For an insightful analysis of Pol Pot and his secretive yet authoritarian role within the Khmer Rouge see Chandler (1992) and Short (2005)
General Lon Nol\textsuperscript{154}, ousted him from power in a military coup. Whilst Sihanouk had attempted to walk a fine line between the communist sympathisers in Cambodia and the US administration, Lon Nol had become increasingly anti-communist, seen as a staunch ally of the US administration and began to engage increasingly in military skirmishes with the Communist Vietnamese forces (Vietcong) that were permeating Cambodia's borders as part of their offensive with the US (see Clymer 2004, p128-152). Sihanouk had fled to Vietnam to attempt to establish a government in exile\textsuperscript{155} and in doing so strategically align himself with the communist movement that was growing within Cambodia, the effect was to split public opinion in Cambodia between the two factions. Inevitably, the spill-over of US bombing raids on the Vietcong in Cambodia began to have an effect on the rural population who suffered greatly through the deaths of thousands of villagers, the destruction of entire villages and arable land (see Ledgerwood 1994; Nee 1995).

In addition to the rising anti-US sentiment, Lon Nol had become increasingly paranoid about communist insurgents and so turned his armed forces towards the rural countryside in an effort to repress opposition and dissent, whilst consolidating an increasingly authoritarian position within the government (see Hinton 2005, p58, Kamm 1998, p100-119, Martin 1994, p127-131). Lon Nol's forces began a fully-fledged campaign against the Vietcong forces who in 1971 had managed to capture Angkor Wat, a symbol of the Khmer dynasty, and increasingly drew upon US military assistance and finances whilst consolidating his hold in parliament by passing a new constitution\textsuperscript{156} and declaring that it was time to end “the sterile game of outmoded liberal democracy” (cited in Kamm 1998, p110).

\textsuperscript{154} Lon Nol had become Prime Minister in 1969 from his post as defence minister
\textsuperscript{155} Sihanouk established the Front uni national du Cambodge (FUNC) and called upon Cambodians to rise up against the 'American imperialists' (Martin 1994, p134).
\textsuperscript{156} This was the official constitution that transformed Cambodia from the Kingdom of Cambodia to the Khmer Republic in 1972 enabling Lon Nol to become head of state
The increasing disenchantment with Lon Nol and his American ties, combined with the success of the Khmer Rouge during the early 1970s in waging a propaganda war against the government (and of course legitimised by the deposed Sihanouk as a figurehead of the Khmer Rouge movement) led to another coup on April 17th 1975 as the Khmer Rouge seized Phnom Penh and created the state of 'Democratic Kampuchea'.

The Khmer Rouge operated a ruthlessly brutal regime under the banner of 'Angkar' (the Organisation) an alias for the Communist party of Kampuchea that was now in full control of the country. Between 1975 and 1979, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge intelligentsia enacted a radical restructuring of society that is unparalleled in contemporary history, decimating the Khmer people and contributing to over one and a half million deaths (from a country with a population of eight million at the time) through murder, starvation, disease, malnutrition and overwork. This restructuring was loosely based upon Karl Marx's notion of a communist utopia, however, in stark contrast to Marxist doctrine, the Khmer Rouge attempted to deliberately enact this revolutionary path through a re-making of Cambodian society and applying the label of inevitability in order to keep the wheel's turning. This radical project involved 'liberating' the Khmer people from the capitalist system, therefore money and private property was abolished, economic production was collectivised along agrarian lines including the forced evacuation of the urban elite from the cities, religious worship, freedom of speech, formal education, doctors and non-agrarian professions were all banned (Hinton 2005), in an attempt to purify the Khmer citizen through the 'idolatry of the peasantry' (Tyner 2008).

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157 This number has been the centre of an intense debate, due to the difficulty in obtaining this data given the lack of written records, often figures will range between 1.5 and 3.3 million (see Vickery 1988, Kiernan 1990; Bit 1991, Nee 1995, van de Put 1997; Heuveline 1998)

158 An expression found throughout the Khmer Rouge regime was “The Wheel of history is inexorably turning: he who cannot keep pace with it all shall be crushed” (Tyner 2008, p85-86).
“destructive engineering on a nationwide scale” (Semelin 2007 p333) resulted in the collapse of traditional Khmer society and the forced repatriation of the ‘New Khmer’ a name given to citizens who were not members of the Khmer Rouge when Phnom Penh fell.

In 1979 the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia and forcibly removed the Khmer Rouge from power, resulting in the establishment of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) under the leadership of the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) in an attempt to remove the radical dimensions of the Khmer Rouge era whilst keeping the government tied closely to communist principles emanating from Vietnam. The PRK attempted to reverse the extremities that had characterised the former regime, the practices of Buddhism and Islam were restored\textsuperscript{159}, communal dining, forced labour were abolished (Etcheson 2005). In July 1979 the new regime established a People's Revolutionary Tribunal, designed to bring Pol Pot and his deputy, Ieng Sary to answer to charges of genocide and demonstrate to the Cambodian people that another form of government had taken charge. Conflict carried on within Cambodia as a variety of factions attempted to resist the Vietnamese backed government, primarily these were the Khmer Rouges in retreat towards the Thai border, FUNCINPEC\textsuperscript{160}, a newly established party under Sihanouk, and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) comprised of the remnants of the old Lon Nol government prior to 1975.

In 1991, the Vietnamese withdrew its military forces leading to the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, and the establishment of a Supreme National Council (SNC) comprising 6 members

\textsuperscript{159} Though this restoration was not fully complete until the Vietnamese withdrew and Buddhism again became declared as the official state religion

\textsuperscript{160} Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC) was formed by Sihanouk from FUNC in 1981, comprising of Cambodian exiles that were hostile to both the Vietnamese invasion and the Khmer Rouges
of the PRK\textsuperscript{161}, 2 from the political arm of the Khmer Rouge, the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), 2 from FUNCINPEC and 2 from KPNLF. This council was envisaged to serve as a symbolic body, whilst the newly established United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) would retain ruling power whilst attempting to organise democratic elections (Widyono 2008, p34-35). Finally in 1993 Cambodia had its first democratic elections\textsuperscript{162} resulting in a coalition government between FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP)\textsuperscript{163}. Cambodia's democratic transition since 1993 has been controversial to say the least, with questions over intimidation, corruption, elitism and patronage politics (Human Rights Watch 2003, Peou 2006) however three elections in 1998, 2003 and 2008 have demonstrated that the country is slowly beginning to recover from the dark days of the authoritarian practices of the Khmer Rouge even if this form of democracy is described as a more 'hybrid' form\textsuperscript{164} (Un 2005; Ojendal and Lilja 2006; Kim and Ojendal 2009)

Cambodian society suffered immensely during this period and it is generally acknowledged that atrocities undertaken during the Khmer Rouge era had “all but destroyed most forms of social capital in Cambodia” (Colletta and Cullen 2002, p24). Under Putnam's conception of social capital determined by dense networks of associations and 'trust' it could be argued that Cambodian society during the years of conflict had an extremely low level of social capital. Trust in the Cambodian context, translated as 'tuk jat' (to put and keep in the heart), tended to turn towards mistrust in the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge atrocities. According to Muecke,

\begin{itemize}
  \item Which had been renamed the State of Cambodia (SoC) since 1989, under the leadership of Hun Sen and his dominant KPRP and introduced elements of the free market in parallel to what was happening in many communist countries globally.
  \item The Constitution that came into force on September 24, 1993, was a watershed in Cambodian history, containing a separation of powers (Article 51), adherence to international human rights treaties (Article 31) and a series of provisions respecting basic civil rights (Articles 32 to 50).
  \item The CPP was the new name for the KPRP after 1991, still in power today.
  \item In essence containing the formal institutions of a liberal democratic state but failing to comply to the norms values and procedures of a democracy (Kim and Ojendal 2009 p102).
\end{itemize}
unlike in the aftermath of the genocide perpetuated against the Jews in World War II, the Cambodian survivors have not developed a new sense of ethnic attachment, due to the fact that “compatriots tortured and killed each other, children killed adults, and the selection of those to be murdered seemed capricious and arbitrary” (Muecke 1995, p37).

The arrival of UNTAC in 1992 after the signing of the Paris Peace accords created a level of stability that had been absent in the country for decades, and heralded a massive increase in the numbers of INGOs and Development projects to assist in the rebuilding of Cambodian society. According to PACT Cambodia, one of the first INGOs to arrive after the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, when they arrived there was little collectivised activities due to a break down in trust, cooperation and communal bonds, its aim therefore was to mend these social deficits in order for a new civil society to emerge (Barton 2001, p12). Even the RGC recognised that this period represents 'starting from ground zero' (RGC 2006).

The international donor community began to heavily promote the emergence and growth of civil society, the post-conflict fragile Cambodian state represented a unique opportunity for them as the country took on the perception of being a ‘blank slate’ for donors to carry out their various development projects (Hughes 2003, p138). Guilt over a lack of support during the Pol Pot regime combined with the view that Cambodia was wide open to new development projects and experiments, led to an abundance of aid programmes in the mid 1990s. Importantly, the fragility of the Cambodian state allowed the vast numbers of aid agencies a relatively free hand to construct these projects (Grant 1998, p71). Two very different elements of civil society have emerged within the post-Democratic Kampuchea context, firstly the urban-based NGOs found mainly within Phnom Penh that are the results of
localisation from the large influx of INGOs over the last few decades. These NGOs have until
the last few years, been recognised by both the donor community and the Royal Government
of Cambodia (RGC) as the official representatives of Cambodian civil society. Secondly are
the more ambiguous rural CBOs that have been largely designed by donor strategies and are
continuously emerging and dissipating within Cambodia, often closely intertwined with their
NGO counterparts who attempt to nurture them within a parental relationship.  

3.2 Civil Society in Cambodia: the external NGO bias

As previously stated, an analysis of civil society within Cambodia tends to be seen by donors
and the RGC as synonymous with the emergence of a vast NGO community. The lack of
collectivised activities within rural Cambodia due to the devastating repercussions of the
Democratic Kampuchea era meant that in the 1990s there was very little link between the
emerging urban NGO community and grassroots CBOs, thus even when Cambodians discuss
the emergence and growth of civil society, they tend to do so with a very heavy NGO bias
(Hughes 2003, p139).

There is little reliable information on the numbers of active local NGOs in Cambodia due to a
lack of legal structure and regulatory framework to account for their numbers. Some figures
have estimated that there are around 220 active NGOs (CCC 2006c), whilst others have
described the numbers upwards of 700 (CDC 2006) and even estimates of 900 (World Bank

165 These rural CBOs are interrogated within the succeeding chapter.
166 There are as yet no laws regarding the formation of NGOs in the country, the RGC attempted in 2004 to
construct and implement a 'Law on Non-Governmental Organisations' however this has yet to materialise.
167 This represents a vast increase since 1991 when only two indigenous NGOs existed, Khemara, an NGO
focusing on women's health, and ADHOC, a human rights NGO. Interestingly the CDC survey suggests that
there are around 1495 registered NGOs, therefore only 45% are actually described as active.
An overwhelming number of these NGO's tend to focus on service delivery as their primary function and almost all were established externally by INGOs (Henke 2010, p7). Even the numbers of INGOs operating within the country tend to fluctuate depending upon statistical source, latest statistics suggest 125 active in 2005 (CCC 2005), and up to 314 in 2006 (CDC 2006). Furthermore the World Bank (2008, p14) has attempted to estimate the geographical range of operational NGOs, estimating that approximately 70% are located within Phnom Penh, highlighting the division between what is often seen as an urban bias of NGOs compared to the primarily rural development of CBOs. Despite the problematic statistical datasets, and the lack of codified legal structure within the country, NGOs are surprisingly highly coordinated and have created a dense network of informal structures and umbrella organisations.

The lack of a legal context drew NGOs together to create a standard of consistency within organisational practice, for example in 1997 representatives of over 150 NGOs signed a ‘code of ethics for social development NGOs and People's Organisations' to promote non-partisanship and disavow political loyalties (see Clamor 2001). Various networks and umbrella organisations create a degree of coherence and coordination; the Cambodian NGO support Network (CNSN) formed in 1995 between CIDSE, Pact, Oxfam and Canada Fund, to discuss coordination among the NGO sector and to offer capacity building, training, and technical assistance to Cambodian NGOs. The Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) established in 1991 as an umbrella organisation for over 100 NGOs in Cambodia with the specific task of facilitating the exchange of information throughout the NGO sector. NGO-forum, another umbrella organisation, comprises of 94 NGOs (international and local) and

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168 The balance between service provision and advocacy work is severely unequal in the country, figures suggest seventy percent of NGOs undertake the former, whilst seven percent undertake the latter (CDC 2006)
aims primarily at information sharing, debate and advocacy of key issues that affect Cambodia's development. Over the last decade these organisational networks have come to be seen as important representatives for the NGO community, liaising with both the donor community and the Royal Government of Cambodia on key development issues to provide relevant support, information and training to their NGO members.

The origins of contemporary civil society in Cambodia reflect its exogenously constructed history, largely from the influx of INGOs in the early 1990s who have established the present NGO community that is based mainly in Phnom Penh. This chapter will now turn towards the role of the donor community within Cambodia, specifically to observe how its multitude of aid projects in the early UNTAC period have become more strategic and coordinated as they have aligned with the contemporary shifts in global development thinking towards the New Policy Agenda of democratic good governance and civil society participation. The result of which is to reflect a relatively homogeneous donor agenda that incorporates Cambodian civil society into an integral piece of the neoliberal development regime.

3.2.2 The emergence of a neoliberal development model

Following the signing of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, the donor community convened the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia (MCRC)\(^{169}\), leading in 1992 to the establishment of the International Committee for the Rehabilitation of Cambodia (ICORC). This was eventually succeeded in 1996 by the establishment of the Consultative Group (CG) a combination of donors that meet annually to discuss key

\(^{169}\) Japan and the UNDP were the key instigators of this conference
development priorities and to coordinate work with the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC) to carry out donor stimulants. The fragility of the newly democratic Cambodian state ensured that the government had a mainly passive role as observers and implementers in the various post-conflict aid reconstruction projects that were emanating from donors.

The heavy reliance upon INGOs as a conduit for emergency relief and aid in the early 1990s, whilst keeping the state at arm’s length, was largely because major donors were still concerned about the stability of the Cambodian state (Curtis 1998, p74). This concern was due to the problems of corruption that had manifested itself within the post-Democratic Kampuchea regime. In the 1980s the Cambodian state suffered from a lack of material resources and spent a vast amount of energy attempting to prevent any resurgence from the old regime, the primary role for state officials became the promotion of loyalty and stability to the party and the state, hence very little time or energy was spent on post-conflict institution building (Hughes 2003, pvi). 1989 represented the introduction of the free market to the Cambodian economic system, yet the lack of institutional regulation brought high levels of corruption and it became common for officials to “promote opportunities...which exploit the poor, as a means to ensure the loyalty of subordinates” (Hughes 2003, pvi). In recognising these problems donors shifted away from providing aid as emergency relief, towards the “rehabilitation and the development of the physical, social and political infrastructure of the country” (Grube 1998, p3)

In the global development context in the early 1990s, aid began to take on an increasing number of 'political conditionalities' from donors after the collapse of the Soviet Union when
it became no longer necessary for Western states to support authoritarian governments as part of larger anti-soviet alliances. By the 1990s, democratisation became a core theme throughout much of Eastern Europe and Latin America as donors attempted to enhance liberal democratic structures alongside new private sector market mechanisms, to ensure the progress of development (Smith 2007, p2). In this respect Cambodia represented a typical developing country that faced political and economic pressure from the donor community to reform political and economic structures to ensure a smooth transition from a centralised economic planning system to the free market.

As a perceived antidote to the endemic corruption that was apparent within Cambodia, the international donor community attempted to integrate the free market further into Cambodia through SAPs in order to liberalise the economy further. This Washington Consensus approach was applied as eagerly to Cambodia in the 1990s as it was to other developing countries in the world, the shift to a market based economic restructuring programme seen as essential to push Cambodia out of its previous stagnant centralised planning system under the KPRP regime. In 1993 the IMF approved a 41 million dollar enhanced structural adjustment facility loan to support the macroeconomic policies that Cambodia was enacting under the new guidelines. The financial package was seen by Cambodian officials as desperately needed to reform the economy, Pou Sothirak, the Cambodian Minister of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME) stated in 1995 that:

We (The Royal Cambodian Government) firmly believe the private sector can much better kickstart the economic development because foreign investors have capital. It's quite obvious that the state does not have enough money (cited in Ear 1997, p81)
The relative success of the first IMF loan was followed in 1995 through a second annual loan to cover the 1995-1996 fiscal year of approximately another 41 million dollars, this emphasized the continuing shift to a more efficient free market economy through privatisation of state assets, and public administration reform (IMF 1995).

The donor community at this stage tended to prioritise economic reform and poverty reduction through monetarist macro-economic reform typified by the Washington Consensus doctrine, yet the political problems facing the country in 1997\textsuperscript{170} coupled with the financial instability that ensued, led to a reduction of loans and projects from donors. For example the IMF postponed two of its scheduled loan payments in 1997 partly as a result of the instability but also at the perceived lack of progress in economic management. The World Bank followed in similar suit and failed to renew its 1996 assistance budget for 1997. Similarly the CG meeting in 1997, that had often reflected high levels of support for the RGC in economic restructuring, resulted in disenchantment at the political situation and continuing role of the RGC in failing to foster a sound economic environment\textsuperscript{171}. (Gruber 1998, p5). The event contributed to a shift in donor strategy towards a stronger emphasis upon “strengthening the rule of governance, and tackling corruption”\textsuperscript{172} (IMF 1999). In November 1998 when stabilisation returned to Cambodia, the IMF announced that the third structural adjustment loan in the 1999-2002 period would involve overcoming the weak administrative and institutional capacities of the state, and fostering an environment for private investment (IMF

\textsuperscript{170} In 1997 violence broke out between the power-sharing parties of the CPP and FUNCINPEC, resulting in victory for the CPP, but at the expense of international condemnation

\textsuperscript{171} According to Gruber (1998), the press statements released surrounding this turbulent period, suggested that the donor community had rescinded funding en masse, this however, was not the case, merely a more pragmatic realignment to ensure that corruption would in the future be targeted heavily as a conditionality of loans

\textsuperscript{172} Corruption is seen here as a major obstacle to economic growth and can undermine social economic and political development in the country, the remedy therefore is to increase accountability through promoting both good governance strategies and implementing mechanisms to hold government officials accountable for their actions.
Shortly after winning the 2003 general elections, the CPP released an attempted new and transparent economic development plan known as the 2004 'Rectangular Strategy' in order to support its political platform. This programme is regarded as a landmark in that it attempts the first holistic and overarching attempt at establishing a comprehensive strategy, drawing upon key elements from the Millennium Development Goals, the Cambodia Socio-Economic Development Program 2001-2005 (SEDPII) and Cambodia's National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005 (NRPS) to create a framework that places *good governance* as the 'cornerstone' of Cambodia's development (Hun Sen 2004, p6). Good governance is described as a fundamental pre-condition to economic development, requiring participation, the sharing of information, transparency, equality, inclusiveness and the rule of law, in order to ensure that corruption is significantly reduced, and the voices of the most vulnerable in society can be heard in decision-making processes (2004, p6). The Rectangular Strategy received mixed reviews from Cambodia's international development partners, it was described as an important document that took greater responsibility for sustainable development but that its targets appeared 'ambitious' (ADB 2003, p3), and offering little tangible guidance for programme implementation (OECD 2006).

In 2004, the Cambodian Consultative Group (CG) a meeting between key donors in the

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173 The political agenda of the re-elected CPP was focused around four core values, 1. Promoting economic growth, 2. Improving levels of employment for Cambodian workers, 3. Ensuring equality and social justice, 4. Accelerating poverty reduction reforms to achieve sustainable development (see Hun 2004)

174 The Rectangular strategy was seen at the time as an important stepping-stone for the government to demonstrate ownership of its own development process, as well as recognising the role it must play in improving governance as a precondition for economic development (see ADB 2005 p3)

175 To date there has been 8 CG meetings, though the documents available only stem from the 6th meeting in 2002. Documents relating to these meetings in 2002, 2004, and 2006 are available from www.cdc-cdrb.gov.kh
country and the RGC, released a donor consensus statement declaring the twin priorities of combating corruption and increasing accountability. The previous 2002 meeting had prioritised building partnerships between the RGC and donors around a variety of poverty reduction strategies, the release of the Rectangular Strategy in 2004, however, gave added weight of the need to tackle good governance as a priority for both donors and the RGC. The 2006 CG meeting carried on with the good governance theme as a means to combat corruption, various donors reiterated this as a number one priority, for example the United States government pledged to harmonise its various funding projects in the country and would continue its strong ODA as long as “there must be sustained political dialogue and even greater effort by the Cambodian government to strengthen accountability and combat corruption” (CG 2006a). USAID has established it as a primary goal alongside health and education, arguing that the integration of good governance principles are essential to “determine whether Cambodia succeeds or fails as a country” (USAID 2006, p1) Likewise the Australian government announced it would continue funding but that it was “clearly conditional upon strengthened governance and reduced corruption” (CG 2006b).

The World Bank released a review document shortly after the Rectangular Strategy was released stating that governance in Cambodia needed more radical transformation than the RGC had proposed to ensure development progress. The report suggests that in order to reduce poverty and fulfil the long-term strategy of good governance, specific attention must be paid to making the state more accountable through enhancing financial transparency, decentralisation\(^{176}\) and the removal of barriers to private sector growth (World Bank 2004).

\(^{176}\) In theory decentralisation can help improve poverty reduction strategies as it allows for greater access to public services for those normally excluded. Popular participation, responsiveness and accountability can allow a voice among the poor and thus create more inclusive programmes to reduce poverty (Pellini and Ayres 2005, p4).
The usage of the term ‘accountability’ in Cambodia in recent years has not been without problems, the very term 'accountability' itself does not translate easily into Khmer. There is no direct translation, the closest being 'Kanakney-Pheap' which is associated in Cambodia with civil servants and financial accounting (Vuthy 2006; Kimchoeun et al 2007). Despite the overt financial connotations associated with the Khmer understanding of the term, it can be argued that the way accountability reform has been integrated into the political and economic institutions of the Cambodian state does resemble a very subtle form of financial accountability through the privileging of the market through ‘New Public Management’ bureaucratic reform.

The rise of the bureaucratic state in Cambodia under French colonial rule, created a strong discipline of public administration throughout the political system that is still present today in the basic structures of the state (Kimchoen et al 2007, p6). This traditional public administration model constructed a notion of accountability that ensured political actors could be held accountable for their actions by revealing information on budget construction and expenditure, complemented with enforcement mechanisms to ensure the accountability structure remained strong.

In the 1980s, the global rise of the New Public Management paradigm, affected the Cambodian state in much the same way as other countries with a shifting focus towards a focus on managerialism (Kimchoeun et al 2007, p8). In the 2004 Rectangular strategy, the

Recent Concept of New Public Management

Yet even this concept is a recent term that technically doesn't exist in the Khmer dictionary (Vuthy 2006). Interestingly the language of accountability tends to have certain financial connotations even when addressed to the local community, many community groups tend to define it as accurate reporting and spending according to an agreed budget (CCC 2006, p6).
RGC outlined the need for public administration reform in order to enhance sustainable development, described as being “neutral, transparent, professional, responsive and responsible” (Hun 2004, p8). This was a reiteration of the National Programme for Administrative Reform 1999 (NPAR) and its subsumation under the Governance Action Plan 2001 (GAP), essentially outlining a broad package of administrative reforms to strengthen the rule of law, enhance civil service management and importantly; establish good governance within service provision. This has recently been updated with the Deputy Prime Minister, Sok An, announcing a Second Administrative Reform programme to be implemented in 2009 with a focus on improving the transparency and quality in the delivery of public services in order to provide effective governance whilst enacting key reforms in the area of Public Finance Management (PFM). The reform ideas are an outcome of the frequent 'Government-Development Partners Coordination Committee' and highlights the continual influence that Cambodia's development partners have on the guiding good governance reforms.

The international donor community since 1998, has clearly attempted to influence public sector reform, however, key concepts such as the drive for good governance, have come to change very slowly (Hughes 2003 pViii). Recent shifts towards a broader notion of good governance entail a new emphasis on recognising the role that civil society can play in creating a more democratic and accountable state structure to ensure that corruption is curtailed and the smooth functioning of the market.

In 2004 the World Bank and the CG recognised the importance of a broader notion of accountability and good governance and argued that civil society could play an integral role in

178 Though as of December 2009 this has not yet been instituted
179 These reforms include developing new incentive structures for civil servants such as Merit Based Performance Incentives (MBPIs)
the fight against corruption through providing opportunities for citizens to hold the government accountable (CG 2004). The World Bank views this within Cambodia as the development of, “a concerted effort to strengthen, and in many cases to build from scratch, the foundations of a modern chain of accountability” (World Bank 2004, pi). This ‘modern chain’ of accountability is defined as:

The obligation of power-holders to account for or take responsibility for their actions. “Power-holders” refers to those who hold political, financial or other forms of power and include officials in government, private corporations, international financial institutions and civil society organizations (Melena 2004, p2).

Furthermore accountability is linked to two important and distinct frameworks here, the first is designed for civil servants in the role of accountable service providers. Cambodia's bureaucratic system was decimated following the brutal Khmer Rouge regime and as a result accountability practices have been slow to take root, the World Bank's 2004 report detailed the need to encourage a new accountable structure that would transform bureaucratic service provision; internal systems of audits, evaluations and monitoring mechanisms that can act as a system of checks and balances to combat corruption and poor service delivery (2004, p7). The second dimension of accountability comes from the need for citizens, as a force within civil society, to monitor and hold these civil servants (as key service providers) to account and ensure that they are transparent, as the Bank states:

If the government is serious about its commitment to work with civil society as a partner, it needs to encourage NGOs to organise communities and the poor, as well as monitor the performance of bureaucrats and service deliverers (2004, p10).

These two elements of accountability are crucial to the framework of this case study, and link
explicitly with the previous chapter's emphasis of the role of civil society under the New Policy Agenda. Firstly, the World Bank is keen to emphasize the efficient and neoliberal transformation of service provision, what is neglected here is that in Cambodia, like most other post-conflict countries, service provision is increasingly carried out by NGOs. This case-study will demonstrate that NPM style frameworks of accountability have therefore been expanded from bureaucratic state-based service provision, directly onto the governance structures of NGOs themselves as part of an increasingly professional sector.\textsuperscript{180}

Secondly the World Bank has taken a new interest with a broader conception of civil society to include local grassroots CBOs and the role that they can play as 'democratic watchdogs' through its new approach to 'Social Accountability' in order to hold the corrupt Cambodian state to account. The latter approach will be interrogated in the ensuing chapter as an example of the effects of good governance at the grassroots, this chapter will now turn towards an analysis of the former approach and demonstrate the effects upon the NGO sector in Phnom Penh of a global neoliberal reform agenda that not only determines the local spaces available for NGO activities but also the identity of these organisations.

The application of NPM reform criteria reflects a conception of equating good governance with a form of 'managerial fix', that is technocratic, professional and efficient; the hallmarks of a form of instrumental rationality that is permeating the spaces of the public sphere through civil society, raising questions as to the autonomous sphere of communicative reasoning as outlined in chapter one. Accountability and decentralisation, when promoted through NPM techniques, exudes a neoliberal form of governance that places ‘economic’ rationality at the

\textsuperscript{180} Professionalism in the Cambodian context is a western concept that has been defined by dependent local Cambodian NGOs to mean being schooled in Western values vis-a-vis Cambodian values (Hughes 2003, p150)
heart of the political sphere.

3.2.3 Neoliberal engagements with the NGO sector in Phnom Penh

The key development policies that emanate from the recent NSDP 2006-2010, not only focuses on reformation of the core state ministries, but adds equal weight to both the private and civil society sector too. These three institutions are seen as needing to be more accountable, transparent and participatory in order to meet the criteria required for a thriving and developed Cambodia (RGC 2006). Good governance strategies have highlighted the notion of ‘governance’ to expand it through recognising the role of non-governmental organisations in technical and managerial models to help formulate and implement these new strategies as well as improve the delivery of public services.

The elevation of NGOs into the role of public service providers created a massive expansion in the numbers of NGOs enacting various programmes and projects towards donor specifications, the inevitable consequence was the creation of a ‘development marketplace’ where donors were faced with an immeasurable number of new NGOs forming and submitting funding requests, leaving donors the opportunity to select preferred candidates dependent upon set criteria. NGOs became effective sub-contractors to this competitive aid market whilst government counterpart organisations severely lacked the skilled personnel to cope with the influx of funding and projects (Grant 1998, p71). This resulted at first in the rise of a multitude of Come-and-go NGOs (ComeN'GOs) that were specifically targeting donor funding for entrepreneurial motivations, often disbanding once projects had expired. These NGOs start new projects, not because of bottom-up demand from societal needs, but because
of the top-down supply of resources from donors (Reimann 2005, p43). Local NGOs have therefore been largely dependent upon external assistance, calling into question their very sustainability (Houm 1999, p40).

Donors also tend to often have the luxury of selecting their NGOs according to the projects they wish to implement. According to one member of a donor organisation, there was a case of a rival donor that took nearly a year deciding on which NGOs they would take on in a funding capacity, prompting a rise in competitiveness among local NGOs in order to try and secure funding contracts (interview 2007i).

NGOs inevitably found themselves adopting certain strategies in order to secure funding contracts, raising questions as to their autonomy when constructing development projects and their relationship with donors. According to Khlok et al:

...the influence of donor agencies are clearly enhanced as local NGOs and groups formulate proposals around the perceived interests of donors, adding a gender dimension here, inserting environmental issues there, and adopting donor discourses of empowerment, participation, sustainability and income generation to lend credence to these proposals (Khlok et al 2003, p11).

One member of a think-tank suggested that in Phnom Penh if NGOs are ever observed 'doing something' for the people through progressive ideas like empowerment and gender awareness, it is often to remain accountable to donors and funding sources rather than any form of accountability to the people that they are claiming to represent (Interview 2007a). Even some of the donors in Cambodia recognise the constraints that are being placed upon NGOs to follow certain criteria in order to secure funding and support, one project manager from a donor organisation suggested that NGOs are as dependent on donors as donors are to their
respective government funding authorities, very few are lucky enough to escape the new pressures of competition that exist in today’s aid market (interview 2007b). Many INGOs themselves have to work hard to secure external sources of funding from their government and so their hands are often tied into whatever policies governments set regarding development, especially democracy and civil society capacity building techniques that are popular in Cambodia at the moment (interview 2007b)\textsuperscript{181}

Another member of a donor organisation described that although there are a variety of interesting NGO projects that appear localised and consultative, yet if you read between the lines there are obvious signs that they have been engineered externally. At the consultation stage between NGOs and donors, projects may be on the table, however, they are pre-defined by donors and all that is left for NGOs is to implement the policy. Some donors attempt to involve NGOs within project construction but this is often paying lip-service because as a general rule, NGOs fall down the priority list; one face looks towards Cambodia, the other is constantly looking towards Europe (interview 2007b). Indeed, this mirrors closely with a statement made recently by the outgoing director of the Médecins Sans Frontières division of Cambodia (MSF-Cambodia):

\[\text{I have to confess that sometimes we come in and say "we want to do this", and we don't even bother asking if this is what [Cambodians] want. It is true that we are very arrogant - sometimes too much...The problem with the NGOs today is that they are funded by donors, so what they do, and I cannot blame them, is follow where the money is going. It's very tricky (Berneau cited in Strangio 2009)}\]

This of course has the reciprocal effects upon local NGOs who are forced at times to prioritise accountability to donors, over accountability to the local population. One NGO in Phnom

\textsuperscript{181} These will be discussed in chapter four
Penh that deals specifically with women whose husbands have died of aids, through training them to be able to cope with the dual burden of income generation and family care, faces certain donor requirements under USAID their main donor, where they are forbidden to work on abortion and must promote abstinence throughout their projects; something that is still culturally sensitive (Interview 2007c). Another NGO in the capital described their role as 'whatever is in the interest of the donor', describing how their programmes have a certain level of flexibility but only when initially approved by donors (interview 2007d).

The rise of the competitive aid market creates structural constraints on NGOs because “contractors compete for the rights to provide services, but are answerable to the principle through clearly defined output expectations, tight monitoring and evaluation against key performance indicators” (Kimchoeun et al 2007, p10) The direct consequence among NGOs who are clearly dependent upon donors for funding sources, and show a willingness to shape their projects alongside donor priorities, is the creation of standards of best practice and a level of conformity alongside donor ideals. These standards of best practice are reflected in the international donors’ desire to bring good governance to civil society as part of its elevation alongside the state in forging democracy and the smooth transition of the market.

NGOs are seen as fundamental in the diversification and decentralisation of the Cambodian state, however donors such as the World Bank recognise that they “need to practice what they preach by being responsible and ensuring that their management and finances are subject to the same degree of transparency and accountability that they demand of government” (World Bank 2004, p6).
NGOs are therefore attempting to develop and display proof to donors of their organisation adapting good governance internal mechanisms, and has resulted in a new project underway in Phnom Penh, the ‘NGO Good Practice Project’ (NGO-GPP), to create an accreditation process that can help to single out those NGOs that display an adherence to good governance principles.

In the last decade the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) argued that it was integral for NGOs to appear as accountable and transparent as they could in order to have the best chance of attracting donor money for their projects; not appearing to be interested in ‘good governance’ would make it extremely difficult to operate in Cambodia (interview 2007e). In 2004 it created the NGO-GPP with a fundamental intention to “strengthen the NGO sector in Cambodia by encouraging and promoting NGO accountability and good organisational practice” (CCC 2006a, p1). The first stage of the NGO-GPP project was to create a minimum set of standards and ethical principles that would structure NGOs into being more accountable and fundable to donors (see NGO-GPP 2007). These include ensuring that NGOs have a clearly defined mission statement, a commitment to internal governance mechanisms that promote accountability and transparency, and a regular procedure for monitoring and evaluating staff and management. Interestingly the shift towards a more professional approach includes, having an annual global financial audit, financial management systems and annual performance appraisals (NGO-GPP 2007).

This has been reflected in an updated NGO-GPP programme that demonstrates the shift towards a more professionalised approach that NGOs should follow in order to be ‘certified’ as practitioners of good governance. The training course, running from May 2009 to April
2010 offers daily topics on ‘organisational policies and board development’, ‘effective human resource management’, ‘sound administrative and financial management’, ‘monitoring and evaluation’ and ‘organisational and strategic planning’ (CCC 2009). The NGO-GPP, once fully functional, will complement the newly emerging NGO sector in Phnom Penh with a professional and accountable ‘certificate’ that has been designed to demonstrate to donors the suitability of an NGO for funding considerations.

The benefits of the voluntary NGO certification system are seen as including increased donor confidence in NGOs, promoting a greater level of credibility, and to attract prospective staff and boards members (NGO-GP 2007b). In a stakeholder survey undertaken in 2006, to look at the potential benefits of the NGO-GPP, it was reported that donors viewed NGO accountability as important for a variety of reasons; it ensured tax payers requirements could be met through a transparent process, stakeholders could have more influence in project design, and information could be readily available on an organisation's agreed mission goals. Interestingly, these mission goals are seen by some donors as accountable when they are “at least partly contingent on their willingness to share or be responsive to the donor's values and mission. Indeed, donors usually will not consider a partner NGO for funding unless they share the donor's values” (CCC 2006c, p4). Donors questioned in the survey also overwhelmingly voted that they would be more likely to fund NGOs that had been certified, one even suggesting that it would help them 'narrow down' the field of NGOs in consideration for funding (CCC 2006c, p20)

Currently the accreditation strategy is only being targeted at local and international NGOs as seen as the more professionalised and formalised aspects of civil society. Small NGOs
currently cannot afford to pay the fees in order to join the NGO-GPP scheme, but it is something that the team want to think about at a later stage, as it is their intention to expand as an independent accreditation technique for all NGOs in Phnom Penh (Interview 2007f). Professional NGOs are seen as important for the future in Cambodia, funding has become so competitive that donors are continually looking for the right 'tick boxes' to implement their projects therefore the NGO-GPP represents a way for NGOs to conform to these demands and secure greater channels of funding (Interview 2007f).

In 2008, the NGO-GPP had an increased budget of $409,000 and focused on expanding its network with the new accreditation system in operation. At the beginning of 2008 there were 13 NGOs undertaking the application process and another 30 in the process of preparing an application (CCC 2008). Over 300 NGOs have participated in NGO-GPP workshops.

When an accreditation process for NGO best practices is applied within the contemporary development marketplace, it raises further the potential exclusion of NGOs that are not professional and do not fall in line with distinctly western notions of civil society. Local more informal NGOs that are currently not being targeted because they are not seen as professional enough to undergo the organisational changes needed in order to apply for the certification, are sure to struggle when they apply for the vital funding to secure their projects if competing alongside these accredited opponents.

The emergence of good governance practices within donor discourse has filtered down towards the NGO sector in Phnom Penh who, in a competitive environment, has attempted to

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182 At a seminar in Phnom Penh this concern became apparent raising concerns that only NGOs that were well funded, professionally trained, and better resourced, would effectively be able to adapt these self-regulation techniques being implemented through the accreditation system (NGO-GPP 2006, p12).
become more professional and accountable resulting in the implementation of NPM style reforms of NGO structures and the shift towards a more neoliberal mentality.

Accountability under NPM principles as embedded in private sector notions of incentives and sanctions; results in NGO managers having to reach certain performance requirements that can be measured quantifiably (Kimchoeun et al 2007, p10). Most NGOs have turned towards auditing as a standard method to remain accountable and fundable; many in Phnom Penh are now audited through the UK audit firm PriceWaterhouseCooper (PWC) and must provide adequate financial disclosure and administrative reporting as demanded by the international donor community.

The dominance of PWC in Cambodia reflects the new changes that have taken place within International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRTS) and marks a shift towards global private regulation and an increase in the power of the ‘big four’ private firms who have an unprecedented global reach (Perry and Nölke 2006, p576) Previously, the rise of macro-accounting structures in the wake of the 1929 Wall Street crash to force companies to have their financial reports audited, was undertaken at a national level of regulation by state ministries. In 1979 there was an emergence of independent commercial auditors, many became transnational through forming the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) that is heavily funded by the World Bank to expand accountancy alongside capital markets within developing countries (Windsor and Warming-Rasmussen 2007, p4-8, Oguri 2005, p91). The rise of the neo-liberal paradigm has enabled powerful accountancy firms to expand their role in unparalleled ways, alongside auditing they sell advice on deregulation, privatisation and self-regulation. As Windsor and Warming-Rasmussen remark:
Audit firms expanded into consulting and became multi-disciplinary businesses selling everything from legal and management advisory services to the installation of computerised information systems (2007, p36).

In response to this many NGOs in Cambodia hire business staff in order to understand and facilitate the administrative demands required. For example one small NGO in Phnom Penh that was locally established and specialises in helping domestic violence victims felt that they had been given a large amount of independence from their donor to pursue their own visions and implement their own projects. Despite the initial optimism of a local NGO that could operate without external pressure, it became apparent that the organisation had undergone significant internal transformation in order to be acceptable to donor funding. Within a short space of time the NGO had established a board of directors, management committee and a financial committee as well as getting PWC on-board to carry out financial audits each year (interview 2007d). The result was to see an increase in the numbers of personnel that had now been trained in business style techniques working in the NGO and helping to carry out project funding requests, audits and general administration (interview 2007d). Similarly another local NGO that works to improve employment among the urban poor, had to create new internal structures in order to qualify for funding, they felt that they struggled with the auditing side and had taken on extra staff with the knowledge required to liaise with PWC (Interview 2007g).

There are many NGOs in Phnom Penh that still retain strong links with their parent INGO, often due to the fact that many NGO directors are from the country of origin as the original establishing INGO. For some local NGOs this is seen as helpful because the personal

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183 The RGC enforced a Prakas on the implementation of Cambodian Accounting Standards (CAS) in 2003
relationships that are made between themselves and the parent INGO could create a clash of views or a misunderstanding over project direction under a Cambodian director (Interview 2007f). This highlights the way in which there is a level of dependency built between local NGOs and the 'parent organisations'.

This has started to change within the last decade and there appears to be a general move towards greater localisation of NGOs and their management structures, however, like many of the changes underway in NGO organisational structures, localisation is complemented with a schooling in western NPM methods. Cambodians that have been promoted to managerial roles such as directors or coordinators, are all fluent in English and trained in business management techniques to help bridge the NGO-donor gap and streamline the implementation of projects (interview 2007e).

The RGC recognises that service provision needs to undergo dramatic change in order to meet with donor demands and its own development targets, it is aware that:

Despite remarkable progress in key reforms aimed at strengthening good governance, the quality, efficiency and delivery of the public service still remain as challenges and could not yet respond fully to the real needs of the people (RGC 2008)

Furthermore the RGC is currently attempting to push through a Royal Decree on the common principles for establishment and operation of 'Special Operating Agencies' (SOAs), which are sub-level ministries that receive donor and RGC funding for contracting out service provision to NGOs and the private sector (Hun 2008b). The only example of this in practice so far within the country comes from the World Bank's Second Health Sector Support Program
2008-2013 (HSP2) that is currently under-way through the funding of health service providers. Currently AusAid, DFID, IDA Credit, UNFPA and UNICEF are co-funding the project alongside the World Bank with a budget of approximately $199 million in 2009, and is specifically attempting to change the culture of health service provision through coordination with the Ministry of Health (MOH) on administrative and civil service reform.

This reform involves the introduction of SOAs within the MOH in order to promote good governance and creates new accountable and competitive grants to NGOs (See World Bank 2008b). These agencies are designed to be highly flexible to consumer demand and represents a break from the previous decade where donors have directly funded NGOs from outside of the state framework, instead independent ministries would have more control in awarding contracts to relevant clients (though of course they would still be dependent upon donor finance). This is important because the terms of Service Delivery Grants (SDGs) and Management Contracts (MCs) are to be based on the principles of good governance, transparency, accountability and efficiency (Im 2008; World Bank 2008b, p50; Hun 2009). The World Bank accepts that progress has been made regarding Cambodia’s public sector reform over the last decade yet there is still a long way to go “particularly in changing the culture of service delivery” (World Bank 2008).

The consequences of subtle external neoliberal pressures impinging on the NGO sector in Phnom Penh, creates a sector that has become more accountable, efficient, professional and fundable; in short they are being personified as *homo economicus*. The creation of a funding market has constructed NGOs imbued 'instrumental rationality', their new 'professionalism' is synonymous with neoliberal private sector management techniques.
Nowhere is this professionalised shift among NGOs felt more keenly than through the emerging microfinance industry that is growing at a phenomenal rate within the country. Microfinance as I will outline here, represents a neoliberal shift to a social welfare approach under the Post-Washington Consensus, yet it tends to represent the intensification of NPM principles into the NGO sector further, illustrating the ways in which NGOs can be elevated within neoliberal development discourse to create a new private sector industry where NGOs have become facilitators for the market.

3.3 Microfinance in Cambodia: the rise of a neoliberal development paradigm

Microcredit is a poverty reduction strategy that aims to provide small amounts of credit to the rural poor, not only for income generating activities but also for supplementing basic requirements such as food, health, housing and education (Deshmukh-Ranadive and Murthy 2005, p31). In essence microcredit is about empowering the poor by giving them a chance to stand on their own two feet and create new business models, therefore instilling a sense of dignity and self-sufficiency without reliance upon welfare provision or other forms of economic dependency.

In recent years there has not only been an expansion in outreach to the poor but also in the number of services microfinance institutions are able to offer. Originally restricted to small credit loans, microfinance today offers an array of financial products and services such as microinsurance, savings schemes, remittances and payments services (Helms 2006,
The expansion of microfinance services and products is largely driven by the contemporary commercialisation of the industry and its relationship with the competitive market.

Microfinance is increasingly seen as an important poverty reduction strategy. Many of the world's poorest are without sufficient access to credit: fulfilling this unmet credit demand will provide the poor with sufficient tools to acquire control and autonomy over their economic situation and break the vicious cycle of poverty. It is often cited in the literature that “the poor remain poor because they are powerless. Once empowered the poor are able to change their lives and overcome seemingly impossible odds” (CGAP 2006)

Microcredit began to emerge in the 1970s through experimental small scale rural development projects tasked with opening up credit access for the poor. The founding of the Grameen Bank by Mohammed Yunus in 1983 represented the start of a re-conceptualisation of the poor as credit worthy and capable of participating in economic markets. Yunus believed that some of the more extreme forms of poverty were breakable by bringing the poor into the financial market, a radical position rejected at the time by the orthodox theories of economic development that saw the poor as outside of the financial system thus excluded from its positive potential (Yunus 2006).

Microfinance remained firmly on the margins of international development throughout the

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184 In the literature this is what commonly differentiates microfinance from microcredit; the broadening of financial options rather than just focusing upon credit loans. However it must be noted that the two terms are increasingly used interchangeably throughout the literature; this chapter will however will keep with the more common use of microfinance.  

185 Muhammad Yunus is often cited as the pioneer of microfinance and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for his efforts at combating poverty through the use of microfinance projects.
1980s as small scale localised poverty projects. However in the mid 1990s the international
donor community and key international organisations (the World Bank, United Nations,
International Labour Organization [ILO] etc...) began to take an increasing interest in it,
particularly in the wake of criticisms being received from inside and outside these
organisations for the problematic implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAPs). The World Bank in response began to shift its emphasis towards poverty reduction,
and particularly the development of national PSRPs as a focal point for directing reform in the
economy systems of developing countries. The shift to the post-Washington Consensus
entailed a re-focusing from the macro-political to the micro-political, and a recognition that in
the wake of market failure a welfare safety net was required in order to tackle the recognised
persistence of poverty and rising inequality within countries. Microfinance found itself
elevated from the margins to the mainstream and an integral part of the new 'global poverty
reduction agenda' (Weber 2006, p44).

This agenda also entailed increased interest in the participation of civil society in
development projects (Porter 2003; Sarker 2005). In this respect, microfinance was seen to
contribute to a localised, non-state approach to micro-economic development. Global
movements in microfinance found themselves in increasingly important partnership roles with
global economic institutions like the World Bank, as the privileging of non-state approaches
to poverty reduction gave microfinance global prominence. 1997 can be seen as a pivotal year
in the increased mainstreaming of microfinance and its institutionalisation in global
development practices. The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) was established,
comprising of a global network of powerful donors (and partnering the World Bank) to assist
in the global expansion and coordination of microfinance. In June 2004 microfinance
received further recognition as a critical component to global poverty reduction when the G8 endorsed the 'key principles of microfinance' which have been translated into concrete operational guidance for the international donor community working with CGAP and establishing best practice methodologies for NGOs working in the field (CGAP2006).

The first 'World Microcredit Summit Campaign' was also held in 1997 in Washington DC. The campaign summit was a global conference that brought together leading practitioners and policy-makers in the field. At the summit, a universal document of intent and future aspirations was put forward and agreed upon by the participants. Core themes to be emphasized over the coming years were agreed upon including: reaching the poorest; empowering women; constructing self-sufficient finance systems; and ensuring a positive impact on clients and families.

The rise in prominence of the Microcredit Summit Campaign and the powerful role of CGAP demonstrate the links between global social movements, advocating microfinance as a non-state solution to poverty reduction, and the elevating of microfinance by powerful economic institutions. This is part of a larger convergence between civil society and development occurring as part of the socially oriented 'post-Washington consensus'. This relationship, however, needs closer interrogation to uncover the unsurprising link between microfinance as a market-led poverty reduction strategy, and (contra post-Washington consensus rhetoric) the continuation and greater intensification of the neoliberal economic regime with its focus upon

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186 The 1997 conference brought over 2,900 people from 137 countries to participate. Since 1997 there have been global microcredit summits in 1998, 1999, 2002, 2006; throughout this period there have been successful regional microcredit summits, reflecting the growth and diversity of the sector (see www.microcreditsummit.org for a general overview).

187 This increasing global recognition culminated in the United Nations World Summit’s announcement of 2005 as the ‘Year of Microcredit’ and recognising it as a critical tool in the effort to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
Microfinance has been promoted and intertwined with mainstream neoliberal economics to construct an enabling environment to empower the poor in order for them to engage in self-help commercial and entrepreneurial activities regarded by neoliberals as the most appropriate path out of poverty. Mohamed Yunus himself notes that:

All it needs to get the poor people out of poverty (is) for us to create an enabling environment for them. Once the poor can unleash their energy and creativity, poverty will disappear very quickly. (2006)

The Microcredit Summit Campaign claims “microcredit allows families to work to end their own poverty - with dignity” (Microcredit Summit Campaign 2009). The concept of dignity (coupled with the rise out of poverty) is embedded within the business approach to poverty reduction: the aim is for anyone, no matter how poor they are, to have the opportunity to become an entrepreneur and thus a ‘somebody’ imbued with dignity. In essence, in the rhetoric of microfinance, the market and its entrepreneurial (neoliberal) subject is privileged (Brigg 2006, p77).

From small scale rural projects emanating from the Grameen bank, microfinance has been incorporated into the larger international development architecture. There are still, however, numerous debates in the literature about whether microfinance is effective at poverty reduction and whether it can reach the poorest of the poor (see, Goetz and Gupta 1996, Kabeer 2001; Copestake 2002). This is of less concern in this chapter, however; what is important is to understand how, in the case of Cambodia, microfinance has been introduced as an idealised form of poverty reduction and embedded within the dominant neoliberal
development orthodoxy, and crucially to see what the repercussions are on socially-minded NGOs, when tracing the history of microfinance in Cambodia.

3.3.1 The Growth of Microfinance in Cambodia

Microfinance has in recent years become of increasing importance to the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) as an integral tool to reaching its poverty reduction targets and stabilising an inclusive credit market to the poor. The development of the second Socio-Economic Development Plan 2001-2005 (SEDPII) and its subsequent inclusion into the National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005 (NPRS) highlighted microfinance as one of the government's priority poverty reduction actions. The NPRS adapted the SEDPII targets to try and localise the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to Cambodian conditions and in this way microfinance has been elevated as an example of NGOs, the private sector, and international donors working together to decrease poverty in Cambodia. Since its elevation to being included in the National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010 (NSDP) and the Financial Sector Development Plan 2001-2010 (FSDP), the industry has “evolved from a series of small, isolated projects into what is arguable the most sophisticated segment of the national financial services sector” (Chou et al 2008).

In 2006 a national summit on 'Microfinance in Cambodia' was held, organised by the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). At the summit, the Prime Minister, Samdech Hun Sen, recognised the growing importance of microfinance to Cambodia, officially declaring 2006 as the 'Year of Microfinance'. Current World Bank president, Robert Zoellick, visited Cambodia in August 2007 (his first to a
developing country since becoming President in July) where he met local entrepreneurs and was given a brief overview of the microfinance industry in Cambodia to which he remarked “The success of the microfinance industry in Cambodia is remarkable given the challenging business environment and the difficulty of reaching rural and remote areas” (World Bank 2007). Despite these challenges the figures remain impressive; active borrowers with access to rural credit and micro-business loans totalled over 464,122 clients in 2006, an increase of 27% over the previous year (NBC 2006). The number of borrowers further increased to 624,000 clients at the end of 2007 (Chou et al 2008, p7) and has grown to approximately 951,325 clients in the latest statistics released at the end of 2008 (CMA 2008) demonstrating a vast level of expansion and greater levels of inclusion of rural households. The high growth rate of the Microfinance industry has been described as “a phenomenon that is relatively rare and could make Cambodia the envy of its neighbouring countries over the next few years.” (Sinha 2008)

How has microfinance developed from small isolated projects to an impressive 'sophisticated' industry that is continually expanding? What structural transformations have been undertaken given Cambodia's economic and social fragility in recent decades? It is to these questions that the focus will now turn.

After 20 years of civil unrest had devastated the social and economic infrastructure of Cambodia (from 1970 to 1990), access to credit was virtually non-existent outside of informal money-lending activities. In the 1990s Cambodia went through a transitional period with the introduction in rural villages of a cash-based economy, subsequently, non-farming activities

188 Although these figures represent the expansion of the formalised sector since 2001, there are still numerous NGOs that have not transformed and work throughout various provinces which are difficult for statistical calculation.
began to rise in importance in parallel to new marketing activities (Kim 2002). The underdeveloped urban banking system also undertook key changes to embrace the market and change from a monobanking system in 1989, to its first two-tier banking system, allowing the establishment of private commercial banks and constructing a centralised autonomous NBC through the 1996 central banking law (ADB 2001).

By 2001 credit access for those outside the newly developing financial system (much of the rural poor) was still underdeveloped; the main suppliers of credit were from informal sources of NGOs practising microfinance. At this time it was estimated that approximately 40% of the population had no access to the formal banking sector, due to a weak financial architecture (ADB 2001). Compare this with statistics in 2009, suggesting that despite this 'gap', demand for credit is rapidly being filled from outside of the formal banking system via microfinance. From a low 7-8% coverage of the gap in 1997 to around 25% today, the rise of microfinance has led one observer to note that at current rates of expansion, in the next 5 years approximately 95% of the unmet credit demand will be filled (Sinha 2008, p11).

Microfinance, therefore, has been an important element in allowing greater access to credit for Cambodians outside of the formal banking system. Its earliest origins in the country can be traced to UNICEF in 1989 and the large ensemble of INGOs and donors from 1990 onwards; arriving to offer aid and stabilize the country, whilst experimenting with small microcredit programmes

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189 It is also worth noting that it was not until 1985 that market-orientated reforms were considered acceptable and heralded the rise of the private sector (ADB 1997).

190 The first to do so were the INGOs, Group de Recherche et d’Etudes Technologiques (GRET), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), and World Vision, as well as the international donors, United Nation Children’s Fund (UNICEF), International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nation Development Programme (UNDP), Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and USAID, see Chou et al (2008, p3)
In order to regulate and coordinate this large influx of donor funded microfinance NGOs, the RGC established the Credit Committee for Rural Development (CCRD) in 1995. The CCRD was supported by the UNDP to design a legal framework and establish the rules of the environment in which NGOs had found themselves operating in Cambodia. In order to modernise and tie the microfinance sector more closely to Cambodia's financial regulatory sector, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) pressurised the CCRD to in turn place pressure upon the NBC to take more responsibility and to implement more regulatory measures in the sector (Flaming et al 2005, p6). Following this pressure, in 1997 the 'Supervision Office for Specialised Banks and microfinance institutions' was established in the Bank Supervision Department of the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC), highlighting the expansion and importance of microfinance to the development and financial sector.

This period of the 1990s can be seen as a period of maturing of NGO activities in Cambodia as microfinance projects became institutionalised through a sharing of objectives, principles and strategies in order to make development coordination more effective (Chou et al 2008, p2). NGOs were seen in this context as the key facilitators for the growth of microfinance. Their local knowledge and high mobility meant they were the ideal vehicle for supplying microcredit and various saving schemes to local poor communities. Their social objectives provided a platform in rural Cambodia for the pursuit of poverty reduction through expanding access to credit to the poor and offering various saving schemes, culminating in a multitude of coordinated projects.\footnote{This will be expanded upon in chapter four, where the effects of microfinance on CBOs are interrogated}
Since the end of the 1990s, microfinance in Cambodia has undergone a period of rapid commercialisation of the sector. This has involved a shift in NGO funding sources from donor to self-sustainability; significantly, it has also entailed a more professionalised and market-centred approach to poverty reduction. As they move from the margins to the centre of development assistance, Cambodian microfinance institutions are rapidly changing – they must now be seen to be businesslike and professional. At the heart of this transformation of the sector lies the intensification of neoliberal rationality in the construction of poverty reduction; as scaling up market expansion and the intensification of entrepreneurial identities. This entrepreneurial and business-orientated approach is not an isolated coincidence; it is part of a global managerial transformation of perceptions as to the way that organisations should be structured. This shifting attitude is part of the rise of New Public Management techniques that, emanating from western donors and development institutions, have as discussed in the previous chapter, permeated the organisational structures of NGOs in Cambodia. New Public Management techniques create structural constraints on NGOs/microfinance institutions, forcing them either to adhere to market logic and contemporary 'microfinance best practices,' or risk being excluded from it.

It has created a competitive environment that NGOs and microfinance institutions must now operate in, and international donors prioritise those actors who engage most effectively with the market, seeing them as more ‘professional’, whilst penalising those seen as inefficient and unprofessional.192 CGAP’s Country-Level Effectiveness and Accountability Review (CLEAR) study emphasized that it is imperative that NGOs adapt to this new private sector

192 In this respect NGOs and microfinance institutions become synonymous with inefficient/efficient, unprofessional/professional respectively.
development model. If there are reasons why an NGO cannot become an independent licensed institution then guidelines should be introduced for integrating the NGO into an existing microfinance institution in order for the microfinance sector to progress (Flaming et al 2005, p6). Also CGAP recommended that:

Based on a competitive process, fund only registered NGOs that can become commercial, either by transforming into licensed microfinance institutions or by linking to sustainable microfinance institutions. Selection criteria could include the potential to become sustainable, including charging market interest rates; ability to reach scale quickly; commitment and capacity of management; and innovative delivery systems and product mix to reach unserved clients (Flaming et al 2005, p17).

It has started to seem natural that NGOs should follow the economisation of the sector and internally adjust accordingly; if not, they risk becoming ‘inefficient’ and failing to compete with contemporary development practices.

3.3.2 Microfinance in Cambodia: towards greater commercialisation

In Cambodia since the 1990s there has been a shifting in structure of NGOs practicing microfinance towards this neoliberal form of organisational management and it has had a profound effect on the way that the industry as a whole has shifted towards a more commercial economic perspective of poverty reduction

Following its establishment in 1995. CCRD jointly wrote a review with the ADB in 1996 which concludes that, although NGOs were the main supplier of rural credit, they were not expanding fast enough to reach the unmet demand for credit (ADB 2001). Following publication of the report there existed a general consensus within the government and among
western donors that NGOs would need assistance in order to engage more effectively with the unmet credit demand. Consequently, the conversion of microcredit NGOs into formal legal entities operating as Licensed Financial Institutions became a development goal (ADB 2007).

Under pressure from the ADB and following various talks with leading donors, the NBC decided to construct and implement a *Prakas* in 2000, requiring, under certain criteria, the transformation of NGOs practising microfinance into independent limited liability companies. One of the greatest impacts has been that NGO microfinance programmes have been separated from their NGO parents to become microfinance institutions. In many cases entire NGO structures underwent a complete transformation in order to conform to the new 2000 regulations.

Although the RGC effectively created the legal context for the creation of microfinance institutions, it is important to understand that the government faces strong pressure to avoid directly providing any financial service themselves to microfinance institutions, indeed under NPM principles they are expected only to develop policy frameworks that can enable a vibrant and competitive (private sector) market structure for microfinance to excel in.

Number 8 of CGAP's influential 2004 key principles states that the job of governments is not to provide financial service to the poor directly but to construct a supporting policy environment (CGAP 2006). This reflects the shift to the post-Washington Consensus in that

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193 This decision resulted in the creation of Prakas B7.00-06 on the licensing of micro-financing institutions, see NBC (2000).

194 For a list of the criteria see NBC (2000). NGOs that meet the minimum requirements must be licensed and therefore this requires transformation. However those that do not (generally the smaller NGOs that do not have as large credit portfolios) must still be registered, which for now does not require a shift in organisational structure.
governments can be effective in working with donors and developing policy frameworks that can stimulate a vibrant and competitive microfinance structure rather than directly providing financial services themselves (CGAP 2004). Governments are seen as having an important role to play in involving the private sector in formulating poverty reduction strategies and elevating it to a leading role in development strategies.

The RGC backed commercialisation of NGOs and the microfinance industry is not a trend isolated to the Cambodian case and can be seen throughout the world where “microfinance institutions are...expected to follow on a linear path on which they transform themselves from informal evolving funds to NGOs, to licensed microfinance institutions” (Conroy 2003, p141). Donors that had established and provided the funding for NGOs engaging with microfinance programs are now being replaced by ‘socially responsible investors and private finance institutions’ (Flaming et al 2005, p6). This involves new boards of shareholders and an entirely different funding structure from the original donor-dependency. One of the key areas of NGO-microfinance institution transformation therefore is the shifting in funding from top-down donor grants to bottom-up market-based private sector self-sufficiency.

In Cambodia there are 18 key organisations that are responsible for the delivery of microfinance services in Cambodia (see table 1.). They are seen as key for a number of reasons; firstly, they make up a vast percentage of the entire microfinance sector,\(^{195}\) secondly, they are the only members of the Cambodian Microfinance Association, an umbrella organisation established to coordinate microfinance policy across Cambodia. Finally, they are made up of all the organizations that have applied and gained licenses at the NBC and despite

\(^{195}\) A report in 2004 suggested that ten of these institutions represented over 84% of all microfinance loans delivered (Pickens et al 2004)
a majority of them being NGOs prior to the 2000 Prakas, they are now all are commercial companies\textsuperscript{196}.

Table 1. Number of borrowers of Microfinance as of September 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Number of Borrowers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACLEDA</td>
<td>202,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMRET</td>
<td>202,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMK</td>
<td>173,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPC</td>
<td>92,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRASAC</td>
<td>83,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VFC</td>
<td>82,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKL</td>
<td>40,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEB</td>
<td>33,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREDIT</td>
<td>30,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIC</td>
<td>9,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEILANITHIH</td>
<td>7,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPR</td>
<td>4,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUDF</td>
<td>2,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBIRD</td>
<td>2,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAXIMA</td>
<td>1,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFMF</td>
<td>823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAP</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>951,325</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cambodian Microfinance Association database available at www.cmanetwork.org

\textsuperscript{196} Indeed in order to become a member of the CMA network, NGOs must have gained a license, or be in the process of gaining a license from the NBC; thus they must also have transformed from NGO to Microfinance institution.
According to economic policy experts there are some common reasons why NGOs in general choose to convert into microfinance institutions. One of the primary reasons is to improve access to commercial funds. NGOs were previously dependent upon donor funding but this becomes difficult to sustain financially whilst expanding an NGO’s service outreach. Relatedly, limitations on service outreach is often combined with a limited range of financial services that can be offered by an NGO; for example most deal with credit only, and yet in order to mobilise savings effectively an NGO must transform into an microfinance institution in order to have the ability to attract a larger pool of clients (Hishigsuren 2005). With transformation, NGOs can access capital markets with ease, source capital more rapidly, and expand their loan portfolios at reasonable costs (Campion and White 2001, p6).

Practitioners in the microfinance industry claim that NGO-microfinance institutions bring a higher level of efficiency and financial performance than in their previous organizational NGO form. Microfinance institutions become more susceptible to the demands of the market once they become financially formalised; thus they must conform to the demands of customers in order to be competitive; their services and projects therefore become more efficient and attuned to the customer’s needs (Campion and White 2001, p6) Banks and other formal financial institutions are reluctant to lend vast amounts of money to unregulated microfinance institution-NGOs as these organizations struggle to leverage their equity base or offer a guarantee facility. A Regulated microfinance institution however is subject to ongoing supervision and regulation; potential investors respond to increased security with increased investment (Campion and White 2001, p7). In Cambodia newly registered/licensed microfinance institutions are continuously regulated by the NBC to ensure financial integrity.
These views are predicated upon the common assumption that it is of primary importance to create a professionalized, accountable and efficient microfinance industry; and that separating from donor funding requires closer conformity to market principles. Microfinance institutions in Cambodia have taken up this professionalised approach, and most have undergone internal structural changes in order to adapt to a more commercialised sector.

As an example, Hattha Kaksekar\textsuperscript{197} underwent a transformation typical of the emerging pattern of NGO conversions to a microfinance institution in 2001. First they registered with the NBC in 2000, then, after completing the transformation into a limited company with a three year microfinance licence, the company took on a host of shareholders. The former NGO is now known as Hattha Kaksekar Ltd (HKL). HKL conducted a complete internal restructuring of the management and staff structure in order to become sustainable. Internal audit, credit, financial management information systems and human resource departments were newly formed in order to manage the company’s expanded financial activities (HKL 2003). In 2004, HKL received its first rating by Micro-Credit Ratings International Ltd\textsuperscript{198}, and was congratulated for its financial transformation over the last three years to a sustainable company. 2004 also saw the company officially become self-sufficient in terms of operational status, and yield a net profit increase of 195% from the previous year (HKL 2004). In their 2006 annual report, HKL recognised that microfinance institutions are becoming more competitive and that there is still a sizeable market remaining; therefore they are focusing greater efforts, in line with other microfinance institutions, on market penetration and expansion (HKL 2006). The organisation has therefore undergone a vast transformation to

\textsuperscript{197} ‘Farmer's Hand’, an NGO that was established in Cambodia with the help of Oxfam Quebec in 1996

\textsuperscript{198} M-CRIL was established in 1998 to help facilitate the flow of commercial funds into microfinance. The aim of M-CRIL is to provide a standardised tool to assess the financial worthiness of microfinance institutions to allow investors to understand financial suitability of specific microfinance institutions, and be aware of their strengths and weaknesses for institutional capacity building.
adapt to the changing microfinance sector. The early donor-based organisation has commercialised to become a self-sufficient (and expansion oriented) economically viable microfinance organisation.

ACLEDA\textsuperscript{199} was initially established as the Association of Cambodian Local Economic Development Agencies, as a resettlement project of the International Labour Organisation and the United Nations Development Programme focusing on providing enterprise development training and supplying credit. After expanding to become a successful NGO, ACLEDA received strong support by donors such as Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), United UNDP, ILO and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), who promoted the idea of further transition from an NGO to a commercial institution and offered the NGO a wealth of technical and financial assistance (Flaming et al 2005, p13). According to ACLEDA’s current managing director, In Channy, the organisation took the decision to transform from an NGO to a public limited company and then a bank based upon some important factors. The first was to be able to expand their network to cover 14 of Cambodia’s provinces. The second was that ACLEDA wanted to have the ability to operate at a profit to ensure sustainability (they had broken even financially in 1998). Access to funds is extremely difficult to obtain by NGOs in the contemporary development climate. To fill the unmet gap in demand for credit, NGOs like ACLEDA felt compelled to obtain greater access to commercial funds, thus there was a change in the structure of ownership and the desired move towards licensing to become a PLC capable of accessing funds from wholesale financial institutions and commercial banks.(In 2002). Importantly, ACLEDA was forced to become a bank in order to comply with the 1999 law on banking which stipulates that the activities

\textsuperscript{199} Perhaps one of the most successful to undergo NGO-microfinance institution transformation, it is often viewed as the role model of Cambodian Microfinance
undertaken by ACLEDA are compatible with what the RGC calls a ‘specialised bank’ (In 2002, p5). There was an inevitable cultural change when ACLEDA went through the motions of changing from an NGO to a microfinance institution and took on a commercial attitude to better serve its clients. The management structure received an overhaul in order to deal with the complexities of expansion into commercial banking including strengthening the internal auditing function and bringing PriceWaterhouseCooper on board as external auditors. A new board of directors was established in order to bring a broader range of skills and experience in the business sector (In 2002, p5). ACLEDA therefore represents the trend in NGOs who felt that financial security could only be met by transforming the internal structure of the organisation to a more professionalised, privatised shareholder approach in order to expand and become competitive in the market.

It is clear that many of the newly emerging microfinance institution structures are shifting priorities towards remaining competitive in the new market environment; thus they are shifting strategy to concentrate more on scaling up operations and increasing market share. As a senior member of a microfinance institution explained, throughout transformation there is still a consistent emphasis upon the poor and how best to serve poor clients. However the private sector management style requires a priority shift towards expansion and competitiveness in order to meet unmet credit demand (Interview 2009a). This shift in strategy is consistent with New Public Management principles and the new priorities of a competitive market: expansion as a way to include those who are excluded from the market. The priorities of the privatised microfinance institution equate with a neoliberal conception of
poverty that views the ultimate priority of poverty reduction as ensuring everyone has access to credit. This shift has not always been easy for those involved in the sector, and indeed there are still questions raised over whether the current commercialised sector represents a form of ‘mission drift’ from the earlier conceptions of poverty reduction brought into Cambodia in the early 1990s.

3.3.3 Microfinance: Social and commercial tensions

An analysis by the ADB of the sector's shifting commercial focus, revealed that it wasn't as easy as first thought to merge the social NGO sector with a stronger private sector ethos as “…target NGOs were going through a corporate culture shock at being transformed into corporate entities” (ADB 2007). This culture shock resulted in the ADB's initial promise of a $20 million loan (to be channelled through the Rural Development Bank) being reduced down to $5 million due to the underestimation of how many newly created microfinance institutions would meet the criteria established by the ADB in order to be able to qualify for the loan. As the ADB noted:

The procedure for forming a company in itself was cumbersome as it involved shareholding decisions, the appointment of directors and officers, the formulation of memorandum and articles of association, etc. As this was a major transformation in corporate behaviour for financial institutions mostly operated by NGOs, the result was a great deal more time that envisaged was required for an LFI to qualify as a project participant (ADB 2007).

According to Tanmay there is a major concern within the industry at the moment surrounding the potential repercussions of a market shift. See Tanmay (2007)

The ADB loan expired in March 2006 and had successfully helped finance seven microfinance institutions (Hatthakakseka Ltd, Seilanithih Ltd, AMRET Ltd, Cambodia Entrepreneur Building Ltd, Thaneakea Phum Ltd, ACLEDA, Canadia Bank) These microfinance institutions (and two Banks) were the only microfinance institutions that had fulfilled the criteria established in order to receive loans via the RDB. See ADB (2007)
The transformation from an NGO to an microfinance institution has many implications that parallel the shifting perspective in contemporary microfinance policy directives, as Hishigsuren argues, “balancing the composition of old-NGO and new-commercial staff and board members is difficult...It is not always clear how one can merge these values with poverty reduction” (Hishigsuren 2006, p11).

Clearly any cultural shift requires a break from the traditional approaches undertaken by the NGO. Campion and White believe that in order for the transition to be successful, microfinance institutions need to hire staff familiar with local markets and the business sector. The typical social service perspective associated with NGOs needs to be converted to a customer service orientation appropriate for a financial intermediary.(Campion and White 2001, p10). Microcredit Ratings International Ltd found in its study on the impact of rating schemes for microfinance practice that many of its clients still suffer the usual weakness of newly converted microfinance institutions: namely, they lack the current business orientations which can severely limit sustainability. This, it is argued, is a product of microfinance institutions emerging from NGOs and limiting market opportunities by not adequately “dispensing with a social agenda” (MCRIL 2002)

Essentially the language from much of the international donor community suggests that market expansion (which is of utmost importance for the neoliberal conception of creating an enabling environment for the poor to be given access to the market) and self-sustainability is being heavily hampered by the continuing social NGO structure that cannot 'cope' with the competitive demands of the market. NGOs operating in microfinance often express concern and anxiety over the direction their organisations will take when converting into microfinance
institutions privileging market expansion.

There are a few examples of some NGOs that have reduced their microfinance orientated projects because of the impact it has on the social dimension of projects they are involved with, problems have been highlighted with the way that poor villagers in rural areas tend to struggle paying the money back and the consequences of this are a worsening in relationship between the borrower vis-a-vis the rest of the community as well as creating feelings of isolation and segregation (interview 2007h). A member of an NGO currently going through the transformation process explained that his organisation has always given a low priority towards the expansion of market share and prefers to work on quality products with the small number of clients on its books. However there is a general fear that once they join the competitive market for funding (as opposed to being solely funded by their donor INGO) there is always the chance they will have to conform to other shareholder wishes of greater expansion in order to remain competitive and that this could represent an example of mission drift (interview 2009b). This can serve to highlight the very differences between NGOs and microfinance institutions and the decisions they are faced with when left to the demands of the market. The process of attempting to merge these two cultures together can prove to be a challenging task, yet it is undeniable that the commercial culture associated with neoliberalism is continually being promoted by shareholders and development agencies.

Commercialised MFIs have a tendency to focus on the 'economically active poor', as opposed to the 'poorest of the poor', the latter of whom are less interested in financial services and more in need of subsidised provision of social services such as food, healthcare and education (Ito 2008). In Cambodia there is a problem developing surrounding 'chronic indebtedness' in
many rural communities, this is often caused by periodic droughts and floods and results in farmers having to borrow money in order to overcome food shortages. (Kim 2002, p5). Indeed ADB country director Arjun Goswami surmised that in the wake of the global economic turbulence currently effecting Cambodia “The demand for MFI services will rise because of the impact of the slowdown on the poor - there will be a greater demand for their services and the poor will have to borrow more. The rural poor population may need to borrow for their very immediate necessities” (cited in McLoed 2009). This rise in borrowing levels does not equate to entrepreneurial choice, but out of necessity in a country with no welfare state. Despite claims to the contrary from its advocates, neoliberal strategies do not imbue freedom of choice when faced with difficult economic climates, and the saturation of chronic indebtedness does nothing to help the coping strategies of the poorest in society.

This raises the question further of the supposed link between these commercialised NGOs and the community, particularly in rural Cambodia, the inclusive, endogenous and communicative dimension of civil society is clearly lacking in the development of microfinance in Cambodia, where NGOs are increasingly upscaling to become commercialised entities in the wake of a state based social safety net and encouraged by the neoliberal orthodoxy of market expansion. These new spaces are filled with an instrumental form of logic where the poor are viewed as customers and clients, and solutions to poverty are externally imposed rather than debated in an inclusive public sphere where NGOs represent the voices from below.

202 Loans can become burdens on the poor; for example a study by Kleih et al suggests that there are various limitations of microfinance schemes in Cambodia, one of these limitations is that they found examples of a number of people borrowing money from one NGO in order to refund a loan from another NGO that had previously helped them (2006)

203 This is a theme returned to in chapter four
The urban NGO sector in Phnom Penh has clearly been implicitly forced to undergo a shift towards a closer engagement with neoliberal practices, most NGOs are dependent on donor funding and have been given little alternative other than to follow neoliberal good governance strategies in order to entice funding and support for survival. The overwhelming percentage of NGOs involved within service provision has led to the emergence of a 'development market place' among competing NGOs and has resulted in the arrival of accreditation schemes such as those being implemented by the NGO-GPP, and as has been demonstrated, results in the prioritising of more efficient, transparent and accountable NGO structures. This accountability, far from being a form that links NGOs with their representative constituents, is squarely focused upwards to obtain donor funding, and incorporated within the NPM paradigm of accountancy, auditing and performance. The service provision sector of microfinance represents an interesting to micro-case study to demonstrate how a neoliberal post-SAP safety net has become incorporated as an increasingly dominant form of poverty reduction, and the relationship this has had on those NGOs that have been typically involved in microfinance service provision. These NGOs within the service provision sector demonstrate a good example of how civil society can effectively be colonised from the systemic forces of instrumental rationality from a combination of administrative power (NPM) and economic power (market ethos), and revealing the problematic assumption of equating civil society (and the formal dimension of NGOs) with the communicative structures of the lifeworld capable of steering the system.

The microfinance industry in Cambodia has come a long way since the early 1990s, from small scale, donor-funded NGO projects they have emerged as autonomous self-sufficient, shareholder-based microfinance institutions. This transformation can be traced to the recent
pressure from international donors to instil neoliberal NPM principles into the NGO sector. Combined with the resulting new legislation in Cambodia, a competitive microfinance industry has been constructed where newly formed commercial organisations attempt to expand their outreach thanks to new, more efficient, managerial structures.

The neoliberal vision of poverty alleviation promotes the expansion of the market to meet unmet credit demand, and when coupled with the self-sustainability of microfinance institutions, is seen as the fundamental method to contribute to the reduction of poverty in the country. This ensures that NGOs are active in creating an enabling environment for the poor to become entrepreneurs and contributes to a further layer of consumerism into the culture. Early notions of empowerment that were brought in with donors in the 1990s were attached to nearly every project enacted, however these days it is becoming increasingly rare to hear the term empowerment employed in microfinance institution internal policy discussions and therefore in contemporary microfinance projects (Interview 2009c). This is an interesting point; empowerment as an overriding major theme throughout earlier projects has become subsumed under the commercial preference for market expansion and service outreach, however, and as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, there is an implicit form of empowerment here, one that is narrowly related to the economistic notion of access to credit as the basic neoliberal element of becoming 'empowered'. The lack of an overt emphasis on empowerment within the formal NGO sector of microfinance, is juxtaposed with microfinance projects at the rural level where empowerment is increasingly on the rise yet as will be argued, the content is essentially the same; access to the market, the pinnacle of freedom and choice in a liberal democracy.
The next chapter will keep this core theme of the external infiltration of civil society from neoliberal practices and principles, however, it will now shift towards an analysis of the rural construction of civil society that is currently underway in Cambodia, and demonstrate how neoliberal interpretations of civil society promotion are being applied at the very grassroots in the country, raising important questions as to the ideal of an endogenous and impartial form of civil society.
4. NEOLIBERAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF CAMBODIAN CIVIL SOCIETY: STIMULATING GRASSROOTS ORGANISATIONS

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has demonstrated how civil society tends to be equated with a professional urban based NGO sector in Phnom Penh; a consequence of the influx of INGOs since the Paris Peace Accords. A USAID funded report released last year recognised that this amalgamation of NGOs are hardly representative of genuine notions of 'civil society' because they consist entirely of “a superstructure of primarily service delivery organizations and almost totally dependent on foreign funding along with guidance, training, and 'protection' to some major extent. This very dependence, while necessary, brings into question their 'legitimacy' as expressions of a Cambodian civil society” (Blue, Blair and Mitchell 2008, p53). Interestingly this recognition that the NGO sector fails to offer the endogenous forms of collectivity required for a truly 'Cambodian' civil society, relates to the way in which the donor community in Cambodia has in the last two decades been actively promoting CBOs within the rural population. These have been externally promoted through a combination of state, donor and NGO projects since the 1991 Paris Peace accords, in response to the perceived lack of social capital in the wake of the Khmer Rouge atrocities.

The attempt to integrate greater levels of microfinance within CBO structures is viewed as
fundamental to the reconstruction of a more peaceful and democratic notion of social capital in the country. A recent study funded by the World Bank suggested that although postconflict communities such as within Cambodia have the potential to increase social capital through closer kinship integration and primary bonding relations, this is insufficient in the long term and represents a weak chain of social capital. In response a focus on “postconflict market penetration may easily reverse this pattern and lead to more outward-focussed, bridging social capital in the medium-to longer-term transition to peace” (Colletta and Cullen 2000, p32).

The attempt to get communities to engage with the market is a core theme found throughout this chapter as a consequence of donor interventions at the grassroots. To this end the chapter will firstly interrogate some of the consequences of the shift towards incorporating the service provision ailment of microfinance on CBOs. Secondly, the chapter will demonstrate how a new approach to 'Social Accountability' is being examined and implemented among rural NGOs and CBOs, to create a form of civil society that can excel in the role of democratic watchdog. Concerns with good governance and accountability of state ministries have led the World Bank and various donors to engage with NGOs as bridging mechanisms between citizens/CBOs and the state in a professional monitoring role, consequence of which is the depoliticisation and technical approach to democratic participation.

The drive for good governance in Cambodia encourages grass roots civil society to play two important roles; challenging the entrenched interests of the state by demanding a responsive government, and addressing the needs of vulnerable groups and remote communities through service provision that government agencies find difficult to gain access (Henke 2010, p4). Both of these examples are consequences of the NPA that was discussed in chapter two,
however, they represent a closer link to the grassroots than is often observed in the literature where 'detached' professional NGOs are selected for service provision and democratic oversight. The twin pillars of state and market engagement ultimately represent a form of colonisation of the lifeworld where civil society, often romanticised as an endogenously communicative entity, is externally constructed and reproduced within neoliberal discourses to produce instrumental forms of rationality at the heart of these collectivities; the production of homo economicus.

4.2 Building CBOs at the grassroots

The attempt to construct CBOs within rural Cambodia has been a difficult task for international donors, most villagers tended to be sceptical at first when INGOs arrived and attempted to construct collective projects because of the association with the Khmer Rouge era, where forced collectivisation threatened to stamp out individuality (Goran, Pon and Sok 1999. p9). Despite these troubles, there are generally three distinct groups that tend to represent this form of civil society in rural Cambodia; traditional associations, Village Development Committees (VDCs), and externally sponsored groups (Pellini and Ayres 2005; Henke 2010). The numbers of these CBOs that have emerged in recent years are almost impossible to determine given the relative instability of many, and the lack of harmonisation among donors/NGOs with regard to the construction of a database to detail the variety of CBO experiments that are being carried out. Despite the emergence and nurturing of these forms of association, levels of membership of CBOs are low in Cambodia, a recent poll from the World Bank suggests that only 23% of people claimed to be involved with a CBO and of

204 Trust, as a key ingredient of social capital was seen as severely depleted in the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge atrocities and hindered many of the projects that the donor community attempted to instil (see Muecke 1995)
that number an overwhelming 95.5% stated that they only belong to one organisation (World Bank 2009, p41).

Traditional associations such as the Pagoda\textsuperscript{205}, represent a place where villagers gather for communal meetings. Pagodas are normally linked to between six and eight villages. Pagoda committees are formed by elected or appointed Achars (Clergymen) from nearby villages to help organise ceremonies and maintain the Pagoda. Other Traditional associations include traditional self-help groups (Kroms), credit groups (Tong tin) that are informally based lending groups where villagers will loan cash to others with a view to make profit through interest.\textsuperscript{206} These traditional forms of association were largely but not entirely depleted under the Democratic Kampuchea era, yet demonstrates that social capital in the form of collective association does still exist in its indigenous form, despite the overarching donor 'blank slate' mentality (see Oveson, Trankell and Ojendal 1996; Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002).

Despite this research is still scarce on indigenous forms of civil society, instead the donor community has 're-introduced' these forms of association in the 1990s, coupled with western forms of organisation through the nurturing influence of NGOs

Although the pagoda represents one of the few traditional collective associations that survived the civil war that has been endogenously formed, contemporary projects that have sought to enhance the role of the pagoda within civil society such as the Pagoda Coordination Committee (PaCoCo) in Kampong Thom, typifies the way in which NGOs are influential in developing collective organisations in Cambodia, and embody external notions of civil

\textsuperscript{205} The Pagoda, or Wat, is a Buddhist temple
\textsuperscript{206} Tong Tin groups are often seen as a last resort for getting access to credit and are perceived as fraught with risk due to various tales of deception and fraud, much in the same way pyramid schemes are often perceived. They are becoming a rarity due to the existence of more formal procedures for obtaining credit in the country.
society that are adopted and reproduced as localised ownership. The PaCoCo was designed as a vehicle in which donor funds could be channelled through to the (re)established modern associations discussed below, therefore seen as an important link between funding sources and local development (GTZ 2003, p5). This role is therefore largely about oversight, and includes the task of selecting which associations are functioning well and deserve continual funding by designing the criteria in order to be eligible for continual support (Aschmoneit 1998, p12).

The Pacoco has been influential in the nurturing and progress of associations and continually implements new ideas such as ‘selling shops’ and other self-help commercial activities. These new ideas were externally implemented by various donors in the area such as GTZ and as such according to Wharton, demonstrates two major dependencies; firstly that any projects benefiting association members would not take place without the coordination of the PaCoCo, and secondly, the PaCoCo is itself still reliant upon the training, funding and support from GTZ (2003, p6).

Village Development Committees (VDCs) were first established in the 1990s through the Seila Programme to enhance civil society's link to local governance. Their role is to improve participation through the inclusion of local people in decision-making practices concerning development issues. By allowing individuals a voice in development projects at the local level, this bottom up approach to planning is new to the Cambodian people who until the ending of the Democratic Kampuchea period, “have only experienced being told what to

\[^{207}\text{Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zumsammenarbeit (GTZ) a German based INGO that operates in Phnom Penh}\]

\[^{208}\text{translated as 'foundation stone', this programme was enacted by the RGC in 1996 with funding from the UNDP Cambodia Reintegration and Rehabilitation (CAREPE) project, to support the construction of infrastructure that would aid in alleviating poverty and decentralising the structures of governance. This includes small-scale public investment from roads, schools and irrigation, to developing greater levels of community participation such as the VDCs. For an overview of the Seila Programme see Anderson (2004)}\]
do” (ADB 2001, p47). The RGC engages with VDCs through establishing in 1999 a number of 'Provincial Rural Development Committees' (PRDC)\(^{209}\) tasked with liaising between VDCs and the government institutions responsible for implementing development projects. Whilst this approach to participation is commendable, it needs to be critically analysed to understand that the process is reliant upon the external nurturing by NGOs, and therefore they are dependent upon the vision and ideology of these NGOs. This can result in the permeation of economistic forms of collective activity alongside the building of civil society, for example the Lutheran World Federation (LWF)\(^{210}\) held over 393 VDC workshops under the 'Integrated Rural Development through Empowerment Project' (IRDEP) in 2008, in an attempt to mainstream new concepts such as 'community-based enterprise' and 'Community Finance Institutions' into VDC development projects (LWF 2008a).

It remains to be seen how effective and widespread these groups will become in Rural Cambodia given that in 2005 they were only operating in 8,000 of the 13,964 villages recorded due to a lack of financial resources (Pellini and Ayres 2005). VDCs are still seen as only being active when supported by external development agencies, whether this is the Department of Rural Development or the NGOs that tend to work alongside VDCs in a training and educational capacity (Mansfield and Macleod 2004, p22).

The third and most numerous pillar of civil society observable at the community level is represented by those modern associations\(^{211}\) that have emerged in post-conflict Cambodia

\(^{209}\) These are essentially decentralised committees from the Department of Rural Development as part of the decentralisation framework that is underway in Cambodia

\(^{210}\) An INGO that has been established in Cambodia since 1979, to date it has spent over $34 million on rural development in Cambodia and plans to localise in 2010 (see LWF 2009b)

\(^{211}\) Also known as CBOs, a term often cited within policy documentation
under the direct tutelage and nurturing of NGOs, such as Self-Help Groups (SHGs)\(^{212}\), Pagoda associations, school support committees, funeral committees, midwife associations, help the aged associations, water-user associations, dry season rice cultivation associations, saving associations, community fisheries, forestry communities, and road maintenance committees (Sedara and Ojendal 2007, p8). These groups tend to be established to aid in the fostering of social capital, poverty reduction, and the enhancement of political participation through collectivised activities; thus they are often seen in the country as the 'building blocks of civil society (Colletta and Cullen 2000, p23).

In particular the increasingly common 'associations', are not based upon kinship or primary bonds, they cut across multiple communities as social capital bridging mechanisms (representing an increase in horizontal forms of social capital) and are sometimes referred to as 'second-order organisations' because they operate at a supracommunity level (Bebbington and Carroll 2002, p235). Despite the heterogeneity of these associations, they all share the commonality of a dependence upon NGOs in order to remain functional. Sedara and Ojendal (2007) highlight that their work on community fisheries demonstrates that villagers involved in local projects struggle to recognise the 'local' dimensions as “members feel that they are affiliated with, or even being the staff of, an NGO or a technical department, rather than part of a local community initiative. They become too dependent on either the authorities, who determine the limits for their work, or the particular external partner that is financially supporting their activity...” (Sedara and Ojendal 2007, p31).

In Takeo province there are various associations that have been established by NGOs and still

\(^{212}\) The modern form of Self Help Group (SHG) that is seemingly widespread in contemporary Cambodia has only been in practice since the 1980s and were formed by NGOs, usually for collective income generation activities with a focus on savings and credit (see Khlok et al 2003).
in many respects remain dependent upon their support to remain functional. In 2003 CEDAC\textsuperscript{213} helped establish a farmers' association in the Tramkok district, comprised of over 75 families (out of 113 within the village selected), to coordinate and disseminate new agricultural techniques alongside savings and credit schemes as part of an overarching development framework. The association was initially divided into two groups; the ‘products group’ and the ‘group for the dissemination of information’ before a year later expanding to incorporate a ‘group for the poor’, ‘group for women’ and a ‘group for youth’. The farmers' association became fully democratic with its first elections in 2004 and became officially self-dependent, however, most of the elected committee struggled with the administrative side of maintaining the association and were wholly dependent upon CEDAC for bureaucratic duties such as administering a draft by-law (Interview 2007h).

CEDAC's training schemes have, however, enabled a few of the villagers to visit various regions of Cambodia to observe other farmers' associations and to undertake training seminars and workshops. One committee member interviewed expressed a positive attitude at the way in which the farmers association had helped local communities to unite since its inception (Interview 2007i), however, the translator was later to express to me his scepticism as to the style of language used by the committee member as being heavily influenced by their NGO training. In 2004 CEDAC administered a savings and credit scheme in order to help the ‘group for the poor’ and provided technical training assistance, however, although it is largely becoming popular there are still many problems with villagers borrowing money from the association and facing debt collectors and property repossession when they struggle to pay back what was borrowed (Interview 2007j).

\textsuperscript{213}Centre d'Études et de Développement Agricole Cambodgien (CEDAC) is a French based NGO that specialises in training communities in agricultural development techniques
Chamroen Chiet Khmer (CCK), an NGO in Koh Andeth district, Takeo province, was established in 1992 with the help of Oxfam GB as a disaster management and community development project. Over the years it has decreased its focus on disaster management towards its preferred project of rural development consequently establishing among other collectivised groups, a forestry community in the area\textsuperscript{214}. CCK have been extremely influential in training and supporting the established forestry community to ensure that the committee members understand their legal status in the protection of local forests from illegal logging activities\textsuperscript{215}. Despite an attempt to maintain a minimum of contact with the forestry community, one member of CCK admits that this is difficult, especially given the lack of administrative know-how on behalf of the elected committee, for example they have become intermediaries between the forestry ministry and the forestry community by becoming spokespersons for the community and reporting back the feedback from the ministry (Interview 2007k).

Interestingly as is a similar pattern in many of the emerging CBOs in the region, CCK as part of their disaster management mission and at a request from their donors, trained many of these members of the forestry community in saving and credit schemes alongside the legal/policy advice. CCK is a partner of CEDAC among other NGOs and so various savings and credit schemes are shared throughout their CBO ‘projects’. For some, this mass introduction of microfinance projects within associations and communities, creates problems

\textsuperscript{214} Forestry communities are more often or not established by INGOs, and receive technical training and management support from them. Many forestry community leaders were also personally trained by NGOs and contribute to a certain style of management that is not locally instituted (Sedara and Ojendal 2007, p21)

\textsuperscript{215} These illegal activities have been controversial in Cambodia over the last decade because of the lack of enforcement to stop the logging by the CPP, there is also no written legal law regarding forestry practices to compound the difficulties further.
for dependency and can create cycles of debt that are not easy to pay off. This was a particular concern for one of the village chiefs in Takeo province, who explained that in his capacity as a VDC official he turned down a host of MFIs approached him to set up credit banks in the area, because in his observations the poor tended to borrow frequently even when they knew it would be difficult to repay the money back (Interview 2007). It should be noted here that the specific MFIs that approached were from Phnom Penh and attempted to offer a more direct form of loans system, rather than the more popular NGO supported self-help credit groups that are integrated throughout most civil society associations in the country, this difference is more of organisational structure rather than explicit differences within the raison d’être of microfinance.

In this developing rural microfinance sector there are roughly three identifiable approaches undertaken by NGOs when lending to the local community. The first is through ‘self-help groups’ (or village bank groups as they are sometimes referred to) which are small and socially homogeneous groups of 10-20 people who are mutually self-managed being given control over credit management. These are very popular in Cambodia and receive small grants coupled with training and support from NGOs who develop their savings capacity. The second approach is for NGOs to establish ‘groups as loan guarantors’ thus groups take responsibility for their member’s debt and financial management, actively monitoring each other to ensure compliance. The third strategy ‘lending to individuals in solidarity groups’ is for smaller groups of approx 5 people to be formed with the help of NGOs, who defer financial responsibility to MFIs such as those outlined in the previous chapter. These MFIs manage the credit and saving schemes of the group to ensure maximum transparency and efficiency (see Kleih et al 2006, Tietze and Villareal 2003).
It is almost impossible to quantify the numbers of these different projects established within rural Cambodia, the previous chapter showed the outreach of the key MFIs (although information itself is only recently available thanks to the coordinating process of the CMA), yet given the difficulty in counting the numbers of NGOs within the country let alone those that offer microfinance projects within their attempts to establish CBOs, it will be some time before an official database will become available. I am inclined to believe that given the way that the formal sector within Phnom Penh has shifted towards a direct preference for a more efficient, transparent and professional form of microfinance, that the solidarity group process under MFIs, may well become the dominant form in the future, given its perceived potential for market expansion; the ultimate neoliberal poverty reduction ambition to ensure access to credit.

Villagers participating within various credit schemes do not always understand the implications of loan repayment, in fact many are observed engaging in forms of conspicuous consumption such as jewellery, or the opposite; borrowing to make up for crop short-falls, education, and other social related services. Villagers tend to lack an understanding of the levels of income generation required in order to be able to pay it back effectively, concentrating on the obtaining of credit rather than its repayment (interview 2007m). This of course runs counter to the attempt by most NGOs to instil an entrepreneurial ethos, described below, through lending credit in the hope that it will be used to foster new local business models and generate new markets within rural communities. This demonstrates the problems with instilling market logic among the poor who are liable to use it for direct welfare necessities, or as a form of surplus income, and raises questions about the apparent preference
of self-help versus state-supported forms of social safety nets when business logics are shunned at the grassroots.

The increasing numbers of competing credit schemes on offer, whether directly from MFIs working within villages, or through NGO supported self-help saving and credit schemes, are often confusing for villagers (Interview 2007n). This has, however, not prevented a large proportion of villagers attempting to engage with these schemes. Sometimes collective associations (such as farmers, fisheries, forestry etc...) are even increasing in numbers because of the opportunities that are perceived to be available for obtaining credit from the banks that are seemingly closely involved. A non-member of a farmer's association in Takeo described the desire to join her local farmers' association because although previously she had not been interested in participating in the collective meetings and training offered by NGOs, the recent arrival of credit opportunities could be helpful to obtain cheap loans with low interest (Interview 2007o). Reasons given for obtaining credit was as a support mechanism in case of problems with rice and crop growing in the coming months (Interview 2007o).

This in itself of course, can be used to highlight the relative success of microfinance, its expansion within the rural landscape, and how demand is being met through greater opportunities to generate income. The evidence from various villages and associations suggests that collectivised activities that operate under the banner of (an externally produced) civil society in Cambodia are closely intertwined with microfinance strategies as an integral framework to promote poverty reduction, it is seemingly quite rare to encounter a collective in rural Cambodia that does not offer some form of credit scheme.
It is interesting to notice that one of the most important distinctions, in my opinion, between the urban based lending structures of MFIs, and the more informally constructed self-help groups, centres around a preference for using or not using the term 'empowerment' within these collectives. As noted within the previous chapter, many MFIs have disregarded the notion of empowerment, seen as part of the 'social' NGO climate and therefore out of sync with a commercial approach to microfinance. Instead they place particular attention to economic market expansion, and emphasizing that the end product of poverty reduction and a welfare safety-net, is the outcome of this commercial process. The self-help model in contrast focuses more keenly on the notion of empowerment within credit based approaches and attempts to merge the credit system within a more social context (Reddy and Manak 2005).

A good example to demonstrate the fusion of microfinance with an empowered form of community building in rural Cambodia comes from Pact Cambodia's Women's Empowerment Program (WEP) that ran in the country from 2004-2007, aiming to empower poor women in the country through village-based savings groups216 and combining a comprehensive training package to help them “achieve literacy, produce income and evolve as social leaders (Pact Cambodia 2009a). The origins of this project emanate from a USAID sponsored program in Nepal in 1999 that has been replicated throughout the countries of Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. This approach to microfinance is, however, an alternative to the typical projects enacted previously in that it is a 'savings-led' approach217 that still appears to be under the radar of major donors, attracting

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216 These consist of 20 women who are taught through a trained 'empowerment worker' from PACT that assist them in the building and training of these groups. When the project finished in 2007, there were approximately 144 empowerment groups, reaching almost 3,000 women in the country (see PactWorld 2009b).

217 This differs from the standard credit approach from MFIs in that savings groups are managed within the community and thus interest is retained and shared in the form of dividends. Savings groups themselves are
approximately only 2% of public donor funding (Mayoux et al 2008, p1).

The WEP in Cambodia, now renamed the WORTH programme, involved firstly developing women's basic literacy skills through reading educational documents regarding banking and lending strategies, then applied through the forming of a village group savings bank. Secondly, once the village bank was up and running, women were encouraged to establish micro-businesses and support these businesses with the dividends accumulated from the interest on loans. Finally successful groups would then help others to become empowered through a repeating of these steps known as the 'Worth Empowerment Circle' (Pact Cambodia 2009a). The perceived success of the model has led to renewed calls for its expansion and outreach to a larger number of poor women within rural Cambodia. This expansion is to be tested through a new initiative aiming for 2010; a social franchise model. In a rather predictable move reflecting the trend of microfinance in Cambodia as commercial scaling-up, Pact's new idea is to charge women for the training and entrepreneurial knowledge offered (through nominal annual membership fees) and in return a centralised WORTH global model will provide this training²¹⁸ alongside new products and services to help women create income-generating businesses (PactWorld 2009b). The aim is to recoup over a third of Pact's expenses in order to reach 30,000 new participants by 2011 (PactWorld 2009b).

The interest in women's empowerment mirrors an attempt by donors to raise the participation rates of women in decision making structures at the village and commune level. Earlier

²¹⁸ This training will be carried out by WORTH entrepreneurs who are recruited by new WORTH 'franchisees' paying a license fee to WORTH global
studies have shown that despite the introduction of more participatory structures such as VDCs, SHGs and associations, they remain dominated by men, raising questions as to their supposed inclusive ideals. VDCs are almost entirely male-dominated (Chim et al 1998) whilst when women are represented they are often marginalised and remain passive (Biddulph 1998). SHGs are often valourised for their large contingency of female participants, however, research shows that the males present within these groups still tend to take the key decisions (Rao and Swift 1998).

Empowerment programmes are designed to remedy these effects and can be seen along the lines of a liberal notion that prioritises the access of women to greater levels of participation. This involves using microfinance to create an economic enabling environment to provide the required tools of knowledge to raise the ability of women to engage with decision-making structures. Sardenberg (2008) argues that this liberal notion fosters a form of 'empowerment without power' because although it focuses upon access, inclusion and participation, it does so without interrogating the structures of power that can often be responsible for the situation of exclusion, or dis-empowerment in the first place. The World Bank's often cited definition of empowerment reflects this, seen as:

...the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives (2002, pvi).

This definition highlights the need to expand 'freedom and choice' of the poor, who are often seen as voiceless and powerless in relation to the state and market (World Bank 2002, pv).

Popular debates on gender and microfinance have sought to address these issues and
specifically look at the power dynamics underlying not just access to, but control of credit within the household and the community. On the one side there are those that have sought to demonstrate the ways in which microfinance often fails to challenge the patriarchal relations within the household resulting in low levels of management and control of loans (Goetz and Gupta 1996; Rowlands 1997; Batiwala and Dhanraj 1998; Rahman 1999; Mayoux 1999, 2001). On the other side; studies demonstrate how microfinance loans have effectively allowed women to have greater access to bargaining power within a household and the positive social effects this has (United Nations Expert Group on Women and Finance 1995; Johnson 2000; Kabeer 2001; Skarlatos 2003).

Whilst these debates are important to further the enquiry of whether microfinance actually improves access and control over credit for women's lives, what is more important within this chapter, is the way in which the increased permeation of microfinance within community projects effectively imposes an economistic (neoliberal) rationality on women's collective organisation, that is reproduced within CBOs.

Microfinance has become a crucial tool in the neoliberal toolbox; a complementary 'safety net' in the wake of structural adjustment, except this safety net, unlike a potential welfare state orientated alternative, is designed to construct an enabling environment to empower the poor within specific self-help entrepreneurial identities (Weber 2004). This usage of microfinance as a safety net echoes the post-Washington Consensus approach of replacing the dismantled social welfare systems (under SAPs) with a market welfare approach, using the term empowerment as a way to describe the decentralisation of power and control of welfare to 'self-help' communities (Batliwala 2007). This shift reflects viewing women as entitled to
welfare rights under the old sector lending system, “to women clients with responsibilities to themselves and families” (Rankin 2001, p29). The neoliberal conception of poverty reduction focuses on the poor by seeing them as at ‘risk’ and in need of help (to which microfinance becomes the solution), rather than viewing the poor as citizens entitled to rights and active participation within the formulation of these policies (Dagnino 2007, p67).

Poverty reduction as the core development goal of donors, tends to equate poverty as the consequence of unfulfilled market potential; empowerment becomes synonymous with filling this potential (Weber 2006, p51; Fernando 2006b, p16; Dagnino 2007, p66). This is of course not to argue that microfinance isn't actually empowering, merely that its form of empowerment is consistent with the production of entrepreneurial subjectivities. Fernando argues that this transformation of identity can be seen as a form of 'clientification of gender' where women's identities are being reproduced through notions of the 'client' and the 'borrower', in essence to promote a more subtle form of 'rational economic man' that is being tied to the language of empowerment but one that is overwhelmingly economistic (Fernando 2006c, p228). The negative dimensions of microfinance, such as individuals finding themselves taking on credit loans to satisfy basic needs in times of hardship, and then taking up further loans in order to repay prior loans, is often dismissed in the rhetoric of neoliberal terminology for the pragmatic language of 'consumption smoothing' and 'pyramid loans systems' (Weber 2006).

The examples that I have encountered within fieldwork interviews, of villagers and NGO activists, who stated a concern at the way in which microfinance was attempting to induce an entrepreneurial form of poverty reduction despite many clients using the loans as a form of
welfare security, is often lacking within the microfinance literature. The lack of criticism aimed at microfinance is an uncomfortable trend according to Fernando, who argues that the incorporation of notions such as empowerment and inclusion for the poor, offers powerful linguistic techniques that can marginalise challenges and deflect them as disregarding 'the needs of the poor' (2006b, p4).

Microfinance can either be aggressively pursued through MFIs lending to solidarity groups within villages, reflecting this attempted form of market expansion and construction of entrepreneurial identities (though as has been observed this has been met at times with either confusion or hostility), or more subtly combined with the social dimension of education and empowerment. The WORTH project represents an incorporation of women into a win-win framework on the basis of a poverty reduction package that can build women's social capital and strengthen women's networks, incorporating education and opportunity as part of the 'virtuous spiral' (Mayoux 1999, p960-966). This spiral is a form of spill-over effect that assumes the economic dimension of microfinance can contribute to a form of empowerment that will lead to social and political notions of empowerment. Lazar argues this is a form of credit culture that incorporates the market within a framework that includes social issues such as family planning, human rights and self-esteem to combine into a form of 'credit with education' (2004). This approach, however, simply incorporates the 'competitive ethos' of grassroots capitalism (Weber 2002, p541) as an enabling environment for the construction empowered businesswomen who through this self-help process, can engage within greater levels of collective activities.

As an example, a recent USAID document focusing on rural Cambodia, states that the
fostering of women as 'business leaders' and using their entrepreneurial skills learnt through microfinance, can help contribute to greater levels of policy dialogue and accountability with the state through increasing their participation further into local decision making structures (Blue, Blair and Mitchell 2008). This link with accountability and the state will be discussed below, but it is important to recognise that civil society at the rural community level is seen as the perfect experiment for a market-based social safety net that in the neoliberal mindset, constructs not just a self-help form of poverty reduction, but actively empowers women to be have higher levels of self-esteem, literacy skills and education in order to play a greater part in civil society, whether VDCs, or the various associations that are populating the country.

The WORTH project offers a comprehensive framework combining business, banking and literacy with the end result of a new role for women as “social activists, social entrepreneurs, and effective leaders” (Mayoux et al 2008, p1). Women within this model are seemingly not able to participate within civil society, become the ‘breadwinners’ of the household, or engage in political structures, unless they can become entrepreneurs. This is of course not meant to suggest that women in Cambodia do not face problems of unequal relationships vis-à-vis men within the house-hold, civil society, and political participation, merely that the perceived solution to 'empowering women' is brought about through increasing access to the market and instilling an entrepreneurial ethos.

There is a link here with the contemporary usage of de Tocqueville, drawn upon by authors such as Putnam and Fukuyama, to emphasize not just the importance of a dense plurality of associations to deepen democracy, but the elevation of freedom and choice within the free
market as integral to this relationship. CBOs effectively incorporate market based service provision within its structures, whilst NGOs entrench the principles of homo economicus on the poor, reflecting the neoliberal ideal of civil society, and demonstrating that the critical cosmopolitan idealisation of a communicative force drawn from the lifeworld, can be colonised through the systemic properties of the market.

These self-help groups draw upon a form of solidarity that is nurtured by NGOs in order to ensure that social capital remains high and that trust and reciprocity keep transaction costs low among members. Interestingly, according to authors such as Granovetter argue that 'uncontrolled solidarity' can have the effect of producing an excessive amount of non-economic claims that could hinder the efficiency of enterprise within these groups (1995). In order to ensure this solidarity is kept 'in check' from the economic domain, it is argued that individuals increase their extra-community linkages so that they can further expand into other markets when their entrepreneurial skills become more sophisticated (Granovetter, 1995; Woolcock 1998). This potentially has an effect within self-help groups where the poor and the non-poor separate; the poor retain close solidarity networks within the community to ensure protection and risk management, whilst the non-poor expand outside of these networks for strategic interests in other markets (Kozel and Parker 2000; Woolcock and Narazan 2000 ). Civil society is seen here as a stepping stone for entrepreneurial achievement, the nurturing of solidarity, often highlighted as a fundamental element of communicative resource among a community, is overlooked in favour of greater commercial expansion.

This chapter will now turn towards the second dimension of the neoliberal role of civil society; the democratic watchdog. This involves an analysis of the latest donor project to be
externally introduced at the grassroots to promote the demand side of good governance in Cambodia; the World Bank's 'Demand for Good Governance' (DfGG) project that is specifically being targeted to 'stimulate demand' from civil society in order to hold the Cambodian state to account. This project has important repercussions on how the World Bank views civil society in Cambodia; a technical mechanism for the monitoring of the Cambodian State.

4.3 Social Accountability initiatives at the grassroots: The Demand for Good Governance Project

The RGC has established decentralisation as a process of promoting pluralist participatory democracy at the local level to aid in the reduction of poverty in the country. In order to reach this goal, there is a generally held belief that civil society needs to be strengthened and to hold a minimum degree of social capital, in order to foster demand side approaches to decentralisation and accountability (Rusten 2003, p3). Deconcentration and decentralisation efforts have been implemented in Cambodia since the establishment of commune councils in 2002, however, questions are still being asked about the relationship between the creation of democratic, decentralised institutions, and the lack of democratic local politics on the ground.

According to Sedara and Ojendal, the entire decentralisation reform process is called into

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220 Genuine citizen participation is seen as the ideal counterweight to corruption prevalent in the contemporary political system in Cambodia, it can be structured into an inclusive framework of good governance and used as a supporting mechanism to combat poverty (GTZ 2006, p5).

221 In February 2002, the first ever election of 1,621 commune councils was undertaken as a major step in the decentralisation of political power in Cambodia, tasked with engaging in dispute resolution, implementing development projects, and general administrative duties (see Mansfield and Macleod 2004)
question given the unique context of Cambodian civil society as a subdued and politically uneducated rural population, there is therefore very little upwards pressure to support decentralisation efforts (2007, p4). In response, the construction of participatory spaces in development projects to help educate and 'stimulate demand' have now become a core development goal in Cambodia and a cornerstone of aid policy shortly after the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005.

The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), following the majority of Western donors, shifted its focus from viewing participation as a model for sustainable development cooperation, towards viewing it as a constituting feature of successful democratisation and decentralisation (GTZ 2006, p6). Earlier models of fostering government accountability relied solely upon supply-side effects of internal government mechanisms yet the new thinking involving civil society represents a shift towards creating demand-side institutions, where NGOs and citizen participation are seen as the forefront; powerful tools of accountability (Kimchoeun et al 2007, p28).

Social Accountability is a recent initiative to emerge from the World Bank's poverty reduction framework, considered integral to the World Bank's more inclusive approach to good governance as well as contributing to sustainable development and promoting citizen empowerment. This initiative focuses primarily on a new method of holding public officials and public servants to account through developing mechanisms that allow the direct

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222 It is widely believed that citizens can only force accountability from government officials when they are properly organised and able to use these mechanisms and tools to compliment models of accountability (Kimchoeun et al 2007, p27).

223 Often referred to as the 'demand side of good governance', it is significantly different to conventional notions of accountability because of its close link with participation (Malena 2004, p7)

224 This is made possible through a focus on improving service delivery performance
participation of ordinary citizens as part of a broader *civil society* context. This form of civil society differs from the typical donor understanding within the country, as an amalgamation of professional NGOs providing services, towards a new monitory role as described by the World Bank:

> NGOs may also need to consider a change in their current roles and, instead of substituting for weak service delivery, support efforts to manage and monitor health system performance and strengthen community-level social accountability arrangements (World Bank 2008b, p34).

In 2006 the World Bank initiated the DFGG in Cambodia, arguably the first of its kind to focus exclusively on developing demand side approaches to tackle governance issues in the country, connecting both state and non-state institutions.225 The project is in response to what the World Bank deems low standards of governance and ‘endemic corruption’ as the primary obstacles to achieving higher levels of economic and social development in the country. The World Bank has consistently struggled with combating corruption within the Cambodian state, as mentioned previously it suspended loans in 1997 due to the political instability, and despite the success of encouraging the RGC to acknowledge good governance as a core concern, it was forced to suspend various funding projects further in 2006 due to “allegations of fraud and corruption under certain contracts in each of these World Bank funded projects” (World Bank 2006b)

Indeed, as acknowledged by both the World Bank and the Royal Government of Cambodia (in the recent Rectangular Strategy 2004-2008 paper), the attainment of the Cambodian Millennium Development Goals seem a distant hope without substantial reform towards

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225 Although the DfGG project was conceived in 2006 it did not become operational until 2009
‘good governance’ practices (World Bank 2007, p10). In order for these obstacles to be overcome, particular focus is placed upon “stimulating demand from citizens for greater accountability” thus an emphasis upon strengthening civil society in order to create upwards pressure on governance accountability (World Bank 2007, p1). The core aim of this project is to allow citizens and civil society organisations to be able to hold the state accountable and therefore responsive to their needs. In return the DfGG project enhances the capacity of the state to become more transparent, participatory and accountable to these demands. There are four core elements of the World Bank's DFGG project:

1. Promotion of Demand
   a) Disclosure of information, including budget and expenditures
   b) Demystification of information, educating citizens in legal rights, policies etc...
   c) Dissemination of information, spreading legal, financial, and policy issues to the ordinary public
   d) Collective action, mobilizing broader action through awareness / advocacy campaigns to help ‘promote’ demand

2. Mediation of demand - In order for demand to become effective there needs to be the strengthening of avenues for feedback of citizens and civil society to public officials, also informal and informal mechanisms for dispute resolutions between the state and non-state actors.

3. Response to Demand – Programmes need to be developed within the executive in order to

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226 According to William Reuben the coordinator of the ‘participation and Civic engagement’ department at the Bank, there is a “lack of transparency on both sides, on the part of civil society to demand social accountability and on behalf of government to respond to these demands” (cited in World Bank 2005)
be able to respond to this demand from below, thus the strengthening of service delivery and participatory action planning

4. Monitoring to Inform Demand – monitoring and oversight by non-executive actors such as civil society is essential for good governance, this can include mechanisms such as social audits, feedback surveys, vigilance committees etc...

The DfGG project is clearly a new approach, not just for the Bank, but also Cambodian society and therefore it recognises “the constraints of the challenging governance climate that the project faces in Cambodia means the approach for developing a project that is essentially charting new territory in the country’s socio-political landscape should be gradual, realistic and strategic” (World Bank 2007, p3) There is an implicit recognition that social accountability mechanisms are not historically situated or embedded in Khmer culture thus they need to be ‘developed’ or ‘stimulated’ through capacity building mechanisms among NGOs and various CBOs. In order to ensure that this project will be smoothly implemented the World Bank has chosen to enact a capacity building project among CSOs by developing a complementary programme; the Program for Enhancing the Capacity for Social Accountability (PECSA).

PECSA is an initiative launched by the World Bank and endorsed by the Cambodian ministry of interior in response to the RGC’s rectangular strategy. As a precursor to the DfGG project it has two key aims, firstly to enhance the capacity for civil society to design and implement projects focusing on social accountability and good governance. Secondly and relatedly, the aim is to build on and scale up existing civil society efforts ensuring that the RGC is more
There are various Social Accountability initiatives that are being considered by the World Bank as an attempt to create ‘bridging systems and mechanisms’ between a willing civil society to demand accountability, and a willing RGC to hold itself to account. These included for example, practices of participatory local planning, participatory budgeting, public reporting of expenditures, community scorecards, citizen oversight committees and civil society ombudsman intermediation (CAS 2007).

For the World Bank, the primary audience for the Social Accountability project is the RGC, in order to make them more accountable to the donor community and its citizens. In this respect the interest in civil society becomes a secondary objective, as a pressure point from which the World Bank can create a new demand for accountability through various programmes centred around decentralisation, good governance, transparency etc...

4.3.1 The neoliberal implications of Social Accountability initiatives

In 2007 the World Bank started work on a 'Civil Society Assessment' of Cambodia in order to establish the possibilities and pitfalls of promoting good governance through social accountability techniques, this involved the contracting out of a research team to initiate a study of grassroots civil society and culminated in the recently published Linking Citizens and the State: An Assessment of Civil Society Contributions to Good Governance in Cambodia (2009a). The initial meeting between the World Bank members and the research team led to
concerns raised on behalf of the research team about whether the World Bank was so eager in its focus for anti-corruption and accountability drives within civil society, that it would overlook genuine collectivised efforts local to Cambodian grassroots perceptions.

One member of the research team suggested that at times it felt as though the team were simply contracted to offer a form of legitimacy to the World Bank project rather than the role they had hoped for; a general assessment of civil society in Cambodia (interview 2007p). It should be noted that although the World Bank had labelled the project ‘Civil Society Assessment’ it was frequently reiterated that this entailed looking at the scope for potential within civil society for social accountability initiatives rather than looking at a general overview of what constituted civil society. This came as a surprise to a large majority of the research team who were expecting a general overview of local CBOs within the country. As a form of compromise, when the World Bank contacted the research team to undertake the review, the senior consultant was adamant that the review would pay particular attention to CBOs rather than western (NGO) notions of civil society or they would retract their input (Interview 2007q).

The World Bank research undertaken represents one of the very few studies of Cambodian civil society, yet at the same time it follows the same problematic patterns as previous attempts to understand civil society; its western centric bias. It was noted by the author of an earlier assessment of civil society that most attempts undertaken to study civil society in the country are for the purpose of strengthening it along post cold-war interpretations (Houm 1999, pv). This is largely due to the persistent interest by the international donor community of attempting to 'repair' social capital in the wake of the Khmer Rouge era, and the belief that
western style notions of civil society as an autonomous force to hold the government to account would best serve Cambodian society. In this respect it is understandable why the World Bank’s latest project follows on along the same lines, however, it only serves to perpetuate the external neoliberal construction of civil society that this chapter has argued is currently being undertaken.

The report cites a variety of mechanisms that exist in Cambodia that contribute to a form of social accountability closely resembling what the Bank is seeking, for example table 2. demonstrates that there are plenty of examples on both the national and local levels for citizens to gain access to public policies, revenues, budgets, expenditures, services and oversight (of state performance). Interestingly, there is still a heavy NGO bias involved in these activities (particularly on a national level), and that on the local level initiatives tend to be implemented through either state agencies or NGOs, yet the evidence of genuine citizen involvement is somewhat problematic.

As an example, the government distributed ‘accountability boxes’ in 2005 to a variety of CBOs, with the idea that people could place anonymous complaints about poor quality projects and misuse of funds, however the report shows that a poll taken demonstrated only 1% of respondents had actually used the box (2008a, p63). This is recognised by the World Bank as one of the fundamental obstacles to the institutionalisation of social accountability initiatives; local participation is often lacking within these projects which tend to be formed by more Western orientated NGOs schooled in the technical expertise of social accountability. Indeed the Bank recognises that some of its proposals involves “a level of technical expertise that even professional NGOs can find challenging” (World Bank 2008a, p28).
Localised civil society representatives in Cambodia are acknowledged to have a limited knowledge of budgetary monitoring, and auditing knowledge which is an extreme hindrance to the project. Many of the examples of local social accountability initiatives from table 2. are actually rarely undertaken, from school budgetary committees to community scorecards, the actual evidence of a healthy level of activity is severely lacking (World Bank 2008a, p17-20). This lack of demand for social accountability is due to a variety of factors that the report highlights, for example low government transparency (thus little opportunity for access to information), low levels of knowledge among citizens about accountability and the channels they can use to demand it, underdevelopment of civil society to implement these initiatives effectively (World Bank 2008a, p24-30).

In response the World Bank calls for a greater level of 'stimulating demand' to ensure that citizens are actively aware of the opportunities that surround them for demanding accountability, but that this must be combined with an increase in capacity building to ensure that civil society can take on this monitoring role with the right technical knowledge to be effective at demanding accountability from the state.

Table 2: Social Accountability Initiatives in Cambodia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policies/plans</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>National</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participatory local planning (Commune councils, PACT)</td>
<td>Citizen/civil society influence on/participation in policy-making (NGO Forum, Community Legal Education Center, Medicam)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public revenues</td>
<td>Public dissemination of financial transfers to commune councils</td>
<td>Monitoring government revenues (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Publish What You Pay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public budgets</td>
<td>Monitoring the management of commune council budgets (Provincial</td>
<td>National budget monitoring (NGO Forum)</td>
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There is still a general scepticism among some in Cambodia that the Social Accountability scheme will take off given the lack of interest on the ground for demanding such accountability. The idea of the World Bank exporting models from various developing countries into the Cambodian context and hoping for a similar adaptation was described as living in a dream world (Interview 2007r). Indeed even some donors recognise the difficulties in trying to stimulate demand for accountability when there really is no formal structures of civil society at a grassroots level, the dominance of NGOs in the urban sector of Phnom Penh are regarded as the closest model to western ideals and therefore these can be effectively engaged with accountability strategies but it is pointless trying to apply this in rural Cambodia (interview 2007b).

One of the priority recommendations to come from the report, is a call for the expansion of those grassroots initiatives that seek to 'empower' citizens both politically and economically,
this is to recognise that the majority of Cambodians living in moderate or extreme poverty need to be alleviated from these conditions as a perquisite to political empowerment and able to demand social accountability (World Bank 2008a, p12).

The bank advocates the expansion of 'economically empowering' initiatives such as Farmer's Associations with the focus on credit initiatives as poverty reduction strategies, to complement its political empowering 'stimulating of demand'. There are still many questions that are left hanging by the report, however, especially what this stimulating of demand will actually entail. One commentator on the initial draft pointed out that the Bank has recognised the problem of a lack of interest and involvement from local Cambodians in social accountability yet its recommendations to increase capacity building fails to tackle how this will entice greater interest from people (Interview 2007q). The point here of course is that this represents a form of civil society building that is seen as integral to the democratic essence of Cambodian society, yet it is seemingly constructed without the actual consent or representation of the people.

Donors such as the World Bank have attempted to link citizens and the state through accountability demanding mechanisms yet they are effectively having to 'stimulate' this demand. This is not of course to deride the attempt to connect local participatory structures with the state, corruption is an important issue that cannot be dismissed, however, two interrelated problems tend to emerge. Firstly, the external attempt to construct this role for civil society runs the risk of neglecting the very constituents of collective organisation; the local people themselves. Studies conducted within the two villages of Prey Koh and Prasath, suggest that local people tend to view social capital as a community level experience,
unconnected to the state and in fact attempts by the donor community to increasingly link the community and the state or promote market penetration are seen as a weakening of social capital (Colletta and Cullen 2000 p78). This is interesting because it demonstrates the way in which a specific Western (neoliberal) construct of civil society adapted from de Tocqueville, and deployed in the service of the new democratic good governance paradigm, seems contrary to the understanding, and indeed the wishes of those endogenous forces constitute civil society in the country.

Secondly, this externally influenced role inevitably leaves traces and prints of the (neoliberal) development experts themselves that are tasked with 'stimulating' this demand. This reflects the way in which the participation of local people and community groups can be coopted through neoliberal influenced training schemes in order to stimulate knowledge and interest on Social Accountability.

In order to enhance the capacity of civil society to undertake social accountability initiatives, PECSA, as a supplement to the DfGG project, offers training and support to those organisations willing to introduce and adapt global accountability mechanisms to the local Cambodian context. The programme has recently announced the intention to run a variety of 'Social Accountability Schools' in Cambodia through an intense three week training programme that is open to a variety of civil society organisations, from NGOs to media professionals. Silaka has been chosen by the World Bank to instruct the training courses due to its professional expertise in the field. Silaka and VBNK are the two key training agencies in Phnom Penh that have had a significant impact on establishing a more professional and

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227 The first social accountability school took place in April 2008, the second; November 2008
flexible sector to attract donor funding. Silaka has trained over 5,000 individuals from INGOs and Local NGOs in Cambodia in organisational practice and capacity building, they have recently shifted the focus of their training towards good governance techniques in order to create accountability and transparency within NGOs. This includes undertaking workshops in budgetary monitoring, evaluation mechanisms, and administration skills (see Silaka 2007). VBNK is a similar organisation established to provide training and consultation to other NGOs and assist in their capacity building, this includes helping them develop multiple audit systems in line with external best practices and conform to donor demands. In order for successful implementation, VBNK organise various training workshops on financial management, budget planning and monitoring, accounting systems and professional development (VBNK 2009).

Teaching material provided by both Silaka and the World Bank for the Social Accountability school demonstrates the attempt to create a de-politicised notion of civil society in the monitoring and evaluating of service provision. For example participants are taught about the key tools in the demand for social accountability such as Citizen Report Cards (CRCs), these are promoted as “blending the “science” of surveys with the “art” of advocacy/reforms” (Nair 2008)\(^{228}\). The 'scientific' side is said to be integral to the data collection and analysis of service provision, whilst the 'art' side associated with advocacy tends to be significantly de-politicised, for example one of the key outcomes of the report card is the engagement of constructive criticism with service providers, yet:

> The findings of the report card should aim at being constructively critical. It may be unhelpful if the goal is solely to embarrass or laud a service provider’s

\(^{228}\) This links with the World Bank concept of social accountability as 'beyond advocacy' (Melena 2004, p22)
This statement contains more than a coincidental resemblance to Transparency International’s best practice suggestions for its own CRCs. The CRC is a methodological process where citizens can design and conduct surveys, analyse and interpret the results, present the findings, and establish partnerships to pressure service improvements. Indeed within this positivist framework can be found a bias towards the more neutral ideal of “counting and discussing instead of just shouting” (Nair 2008). Social audits (of which the CRC is an example), are important tools for the social accountability framework, the teaching resources available from Silaka discuss how the shift from upwards accountability in the traditional sense was aimed at checking and verifying transactions of the state and its agencies, however, with the development of the NPM paradigm, social auditing focuses upon downwards accountability to citizens through “compliance, quality management and efficiency” (Silaka 2008).

This external training offered is complemented by the provision of grants from PECSA for CSOs undertaking Social Accountability related projects, including a new scheme launched to create a ‘development marketplace’ mechanism to adjudicate between potential beneficiaries of the available sources of funding (PECSA 2009b). The construction of a development marketplace parallels much of the previously discussed NGO sector in Phnom Penh with the introduction of intense competition and could see the same inevitable outcome of localised accreditation strategies and the transformation of local NGOs or even CBOs in order to improve funding/support opportunities.

Another example comes from the Commune Council Support Project, a coalition from a number of prominent NGOs in Cambodia, who in 2004 designed a Citizens’ Rating Report
(CRR) to enhance the Social Accountability projects that are being undertaken in various rural regions of the country to “promote citizen monitoring of public service delivery” (CCSP 2009). The CRR aims to document and assess basic social services, budget expenditures, administrative services, and infrastructure projects as a method of observing and holding not just the state but importantly since 2001, the democratically elected commune councils, to account. In the long term vision of its advocates there is a hope that it will contribute to the development of a core 'professional' group of practitioners that at the commune level can aid in the overall ideal of promoting greater levels of social accountability (CSSP 2007, p47). The CRR, despite being touted as a way to organise and collate citizen feedback on service provision potentially contributing towards the formation of grassroots advocacy, is also predictably “not intended to embarrass or praise service delivery providers and other local government players” (CSSP 2007, p44).

The CRR clearly attempts to create a neutral and seemingly objective mechanism to depoliticise the process of feedback and collective response. Civil society actors are being “encouraged to create performance based mechanisms...and performance-based evaluation systems under NPM. Citizens can participate in quality monitoring and evaluation of delivered services, improving public servants’ attention to rules and performance indicators in the future” (Kimchoeun et al 2007, p29).

There is an important emphasis within the training and implementation of this monitory form of democracy on participation. The rush to secure participation within development projects in response to the new focus on a broader framework of good governance, led to a variety of techniques deployed by professional development experts within development agencies and
NGOs to ensure greater levels of inclusion such as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) in order to boost the role of local people in the decision-making processes of development.

Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) is a broad set of approaches and methods emerging from the 1990s, and used by a multitude of international donors and NGOs to incorporate participatory decision-making practices of local people and local knowledge in the planning of development projects (see Guijt 1998 Leurs 1996). PRA therefore is about empowering those traditionally marginalised by development policymaking in recent decades, giving them a greater level of control over their lives. According to Chambers one of the influential architects of PRA, there are three common ideas that this approach shares; firstly that the poor are creative and capable enough to be able to carry out investigation, analysis and planning. Secondly the role for outsiders (through which technical and financial assistance is often rendered) is to be conveners, catalysts and facilitators. Finally, there is a general belief that the weak and marginalised should be empowered in order to effectively raise the level of participation from rhetoric to reality (1983, 1994, p953).

This approach, however, has not been without critical interrogation and indeed a backlash is said to have formed throughout the last decade at the content of this participation being promoted by key development agencies; a neoliberal technical and de-politicised notion that uses the language of empowerment but without engaging with a notion of power (for example Cooke and Kothari 2001, Kapoor 2002; Hickey and Mohan 2004). Indeed the training programmes of Silaka attempt to incorporate this form of PRA into its workshops (Silaka 2008), however, it is apparent that the language used in constructing ideal spaces for civil society are closely mirrored alongside a professional and de-politicised form of engagement.
Silaka, like many of the NGOs in Phnom Penh, are heavily reliant upon external consultants who are often at times 'idolized' within the NGO community yet this can often result in the unquestionable role of the expert within training sessions and the output of professional, technical discourses that can have profound implications through the shaping of ‘expressions of dissent’, potentially undermining alternative emancipatory approaches (Kothari 2005, p437).

4.4 From Shouting to Counting: the (de)politicisation of dissent

The recent social accountability initiatives that are being implemented in Cambodia represent a typical idealisation for the role of civil society, as a technical and professional mediator between the demanding citizen and the accountable state. The latest NPRS progress report released in 2004, states that the continuing work of civil society is integral towards the monitoring of poverty reduction and urges NGOs to help prepare report cards in order to convey poverty concerns from the public (IMF 2004, p113). It is believed that NGOs are the perfect candidates for this role in the current climate, however, with more capacity building it won’t be long before more localised CSOs such as trade unions and farmer’s associations, will take on this monitoring role (IMF 2004, p113).

The idea links directly to the World Bank’s social accountability initiative through empowering citizens to hold governments accountable for their actions, and actively monitor what governments are doing with aid. Performance monitoring allows the level of transparency required to undermine corruption, and requires a highly technical and

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229 This of course can often be put down to the way in which the intelligentsia of Cambodian society were systematically purged during the Democratic Kampuchea era
professional conception of civil society in order to undertake these roles. The World Bank's recent 'From Shouting to Counting' document vindicates this strategy where it is presumed that citizens and civil society should act professionally and in a neutral manner in order to create the collaborative institutions necessary for an accountable liberal democracy (2004b). According to a recent USAID report:

CSOs should conserve the energy they often expend on confrontation, and demand, in concert with donor partners, achievable but significant short-term reforms from the RGC. By involving both service-oriented and advocacy NGOs in the negotiating and monitoring process, the donors will be planting the seeds for a grand alliance designed to root out corruption at national, regional and commune levels (2004, p14).

Civil Society in Cambodia, under current neoliberal development frameworks, is being constructed along neutral, technical and de-politicised lines. This de-politicisation is viewed by the international donor community as important to create professional and technical channels for dissent, though arguably this may in fact have the reverse effect of suppressing dissent. For example, trade unions in Cambodia are subject to a similar level of 'dissent dampening' through de-politicising spaces for dissent and replacing these spaces with technical/managerial structures. Hughes outlines how the ILO and the RCG created a regulation regime to monitor trade union-employer disputes, however, the outcome was to quell the highly politicised urban labour sector (who had previously been influential in mobilising demonstrations and protests) through feeding grievances upwards along professional and technical channels (2007, p844). According to Hughes, the growing numbers of NGOs since the 1990s still significantly failed to create a genuine sense of empowerment, instead, NGOs retain an 'instrumental' approach through planning projects and calculating budgets. This management approach is said to represent a preferencing of the professional
over the political (Hughes 2003, p148).

This theme of the suppression of dissent has been instilled within contemporary notions of social justice emanating from neoliberal development projects under the rubric of 'fostering self-esteem' through self-help. According to Pupavac (2005), the neoliberal project of promoting empowerment through notions such as self-help and self-esteem, rather than inducing high levels of ambition and emotional self-reliance, seeks to “moderate emotion, to temper frustration, not [to] fire ambition” (2005, p64).

Social movements are seen as unlikely to emerge in Cambodia as a challenge to the status-quo of a dominant donor and state driven development project that seeks to include citizens in pre-formulated projects. Henke offers three examples of activist networks that represent the possible emergence of social movements occurring since 2007, without NGO involvement, however, their protests were threatened with government intervention and as a result turned towards the professional channels of NGOs who “end up legitimating, rather than challenging, the existing...nexus of political and economic power” (2010, p16). Activism at the community level is often guided by local NGOs that offer technical advice, training and consultations that in effect teaches these groups how to network, but ensures the professional channelling of inclusion and participation; the end product is to ensure “an emerging political awareness, but not yet a political challenge” (Henke 2010, p23).

The neoliberal project of democratic good governance has increased the spaces available for civil society but this has had the effect of creating a more technical and neutral form of civil

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230 This is prevalent within the drive to instil professional credit initiatives within emerging CBOs in the country that were analysed earlier in the chapter
society where activism is increasingly disabled. The implication is a form of participation where civil society can interact with *development alternatives* but is seemingly isolated from being able to effectively influence *alternatives to development* (Bebbington 2008), in effect to legitimise pre-determined plans from the donor community and have a say in the implementation if they conform to the required standards of professionalism and technical knowledge. There is therefore “a displacement of issues such as poverty and inequality: dealt with strictly as issues of technical...management, poverty and inequality are being withdrawn from the public (political) arena” (Dagnino 2007, p67).

This chapter has demonstrated that the emergence of grassroots civil society in Cambodia is largely exogenous rather than endogenous, heavily nurtured by professional NGOs under the guidance of a framework of good governance. The perceived 'blank slate' approach by the donor community in response to a lack of social capital has allowed for a relatively free hand in constructing a neoliberal idealisation of a dense network of associations that operate in a supportive relationship with the free market.

The integration of microfinance at the grassroots promotes a form of community empowerment tied to the operational logics of the market through a self-help safety net approach to poverty reduction. This localised form of service provision is to be kept in check through the second role of civil society; a democratic oversight mechanism to ensure the smooth efficient performance of service provision. This second role also includes the monitoring of the state in order to ensure it remains democratically accountable and uncorrupted; essential to the functioning of the market economy. The current role for CSOs as the new privatised social welfare provider and simultaneous professional pressure valve on
the state, effectively allows “market forces to work their magic without causing social disruption or resistance” (Reimann 2005, p47).

The rise of a professional role for civil society, either as a conduit of service provision, or an active monitor of the state, attempts therefore to disable (and colonise) the local endogenous forms of activism that potentially draw from the communicative properties of the lifeworld. The systemic imperatives of (state) administrative and (market) economic power are intertwined within the rise of a professional form of civil society within the country. This analysis is of course not attempting to suggest that there are 'no alternatives' or that collective forms of communicative groups are not in existence, merely the aim has been to demonstrate that under the neoliberal model there is an attempt to construct civil society through systemic forms of rationality; homo economicus, and a marginalisation of communicative practices.
CONCLUSION: INCLUSION / EXCLUSION AND THE APOTHEOSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The thesis has attempted to interrogate the compositional elements of the cosmopolitan democratic project, specifically its focus upon civil society as an attempt to form an inclusive dimension to global governance. The inclusion of civil society into these decision-making structures represents a direct link between the local and the global; a form of participatory democracy that allows individuals outside of the narrow confines of political authority the chance to impose their collective voices on the coordination of global processes.

I have demonstrated that there are two distinct strands operating under a broad notion of cosmopolitan democracy, although both share the ambition of extending democratic control outside of the territorially defined nation-state, they diverge in the criteria they establish for the formation of a genuinely 'inclusive' project. As has been discussed previously, the liberal dimension of the cosmopolitan democratic project seeks to create a multi-stakeholder approach to the operational logics of global governance. Targeting the transformation of the United Nations as the key organisational actor in global politics, various authors have put forward their ambitious goals to expand its decision-making structures to include civil society as a way of ensuring that there is a wider model of representation at the global level; essential to their perspective on eradicating the democratic deficit.

This deficit is the product of an asymmetrical relationship between the territorially bounded democratic political community, and the ever permeable process of globalisation, diminishing

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231 Often this is a synonym for NGOs; the formal representatives of civil society, who are regarded as the most capable of representing citizen interests within the formal structures of a reformed UN system.
the ability for citizens to participate in the decisions on political, economic, environmental, legal, technological, and military structures that are taken at a global level. Explicit within this problematisation of the spatial processes of globalisation, is a rejection of the economic dimension associated with the rise of neoliberal economics and its increasingly unaccountable ascendency within the practices of global governance, rendering a prioritising of the expansion of capital markets over the welfare of individuals. It is within this critique that the liberal cosmopolitan democratic project reveals its strong normative dimension resonating from the forms of philosophical cosmopolitanism associated with Immanuel Kant and John Rawls.

The extension of democracy to the global level is designed to ensure that individuals can control and 'tame' this neoliberal process of globalisation. Liberal projects thus incorporate the forces of global civil society into their frameworks as the democratic side of globalisation (and as a counter project to the neoliberal dimension), valorised as the 'vehicles of humanity' that can not only transcend the confines of the nation-state, but channel those issues central to the lives of people such as the environment, social welfare, justice, human rights etc... onto the agenda of global decision-making structures. In this respect there is an implicit acceptance that civil society is imbued with a form of morality and legitimacy given its supposed representational link with the grassroots, not in the interest of the market or political power, but in more general questions regarding society and the good life; citizens, rather than market consumers (Galtung 2000, p155).

The liberal project thus tends to prioritise the input-orientated legitimacy of civil society in order to ensure that greater levels of representation and the ability to participate, are
recognised within the multi-stakeholder approaches to global governance. For example, Held attempts to incorporate Global Issue Networks (GINs) as a way to increase the visibility of civil society and expand its influence vis-a-vis political and economic specialists. Similarly, Galtung attempts to create a 'World Assembly of IPOs', Falk envisions a 'global democratic forum', and Archibugi eludes to the possibility of a reinforced separate NGO assembly; all are attempts to incorporate civil society directly into transformed structures of governance as a way of broadening the exclusive confines of contemporary structures dominated by political and economic actors.

Within these projects, an important question arises; how can we guarantee that civil society can fulfil this promise as an 'ethical domain', and effectively challenge the entrenched state and market bias within structures of contemporary global governance? This question has not been given adequate attention by these authors, who often fail to problematise the identity of civil society actors, and tend to assume that their mere inclusion within global decision-making structures can in effect eradicate the democratic deficit and effectively control the unaccountable and unjust forms of neoliberal globalisation. This clearly indicates a prioritising of representation and access for civil society, rather than analysing the quality of this participation within decision-making structures.

Two responses have, however, been developed in an attempt to answer this question within the liberal project emanating from Kuper and the more recent work from Held. Kuper acknowledges that the liberal dimension has effectively ignored the variety of actors representative of civil society and seeks to create a legitimation framework to determine which of these actors should be included within contemporary global structures. Held vaguely
eludes to a notion of deliberation within his multi-stakeholder process of governance where no actors are to be excluded within the decision-making process, yet as was argued within the first chapter, his view of deliberation is a less rigorous conception of ensuring that substantive content is tested through the idea of 'reasonable rejection'. What is important about Held's notion of deliberation is that despite claiming to be a less rigorous form of adjudication in contrast to the Habermasian form, it is actually implicitly selective through a direct guidance of liberal cosmopolitan principles. These principles espouse a moral framework that is designed to ensure that actors representing civil society, the state, and businesses follow outlined principles such as ecological sustainability, avoidance of serious harm, protecting the vulnerable etc... 232

Both Held and Kuper establish a legitimacy test for the inclusion of actors within their frameworks, however, this test of legitimacy is pre-determined through a form of monological self-reflection (Held through a Kantian appeal to universal cosmopolitan principles, combined with a Rawlsian notion of deliberation to reject those deemed 'unreasonable', Kuper through a Rawlsian form of 'original position' without dialogic consultation). The end result is that these attempts to create not just a privileged access point for civil society, but a more democratically legitimate decision-making process, are severely curtailed by the way in which frameworks are pre-determined and only those actors that subscribe to liberal cosmopolitan principles are deemed authentic voices within the global community. All of the liberal projects described tend to engage with this monological form of reasoning when constructing their global democratic projects, privileging universal ambitions for human rights, justice and

232 This links back again to the liberal cosmopolitan justice argument that tends to prioritise justice over democracy in formulating a 'good society' approach to cosmopolitan governance (See Caney 2006).
social redistribution inspired by Kantian forms of reasoning on universal cosmopolitan principles. Under this framework civil society keeps its ethical promise, but at the trade-off of marginalising those that exist on the outside of the cosmopolitan tradition.

I have attempted to demonstrate that despite the promises of the liberal dimension of a form of inclusion that can eradicate the democratic deficit, its frameworks firstly fail to analyse the actual quality of participation within democratic structures, assuming that numerical representation equates with democratic decision-making. Secondly, those that attempt to remedy this through introducing an adjudication mechanism for democratic legitimacy during decision-making, tend to introduce a form based upon the monological form of selectivity along the lines of a Kantian/Rawlsian cosmopolitan morality; an a priori construction of the criteria for the inclusion/exclusion of CSOs and the democratic legitimacy of their decisions.

The weaknesses and exclusive practices of the liberal dimension can be supplanted through turning to the critical cosmopolitan project that, in a similar way to the liberal dimension, attempts to expand democracy outside of the bounded political community through the promotion of civil society as an inclusive dimension to global governance. Unlike the liberal strands, however, the critical project focuses clearly upon the visibility and the quality of participation of a more inclusive form of global governance to solve the democratic deficit. In order for this to occur, frameworks are constructed along dialogical rather than monological lines; deliberation becomes the adjudication mechanism to ensure that democratic decision-making is deemed legitimate and that any claims made to universality (such as the privileging of universal human rights under the liberal cosmopolitan dimension) are discursively tested. This form of deliberation, unlike the Rawlsian inspired attempts by liberal supporters, refutes
the attempt to predetermine the boundaries and the content of dialogue, its internal adjudication mechanism relying upon the ideal speech situation to ensure validity of outcomes. Built into this inclusive method are the practices of exposing forms of domination within deliberative frameworks, therefore to transcend the liberal confines of autonomy as non-interference, towards understanding autonomy as non-domination.

The critical project outlined by Habermas recognises that domination exists when communicative interaction becomes distorted through systemic modes of reasoning, this is associated with state (administrative) and market (economic) forms of reasoning, that tend to privilege efficiency and profit within discursive engagement; a form of 'instrumental rationality'. The separation between communicative rationality and instrumental rationality relates to Habermas' two realms of the lifeworld and the system, where the lifeworld represents the background of shared human experience that can be communicatively drawn upon to form social meaning, values and morality, whilst the system is concerned with instrumental forms of bureaucratic improvement and market logics; efficiency, productivity and profit. The critical project aims not just at defending the plurality of meaning within the lifeworld from the instrumentalist notions of the system (therefore to resist its colonisation) but actively attempt to develop *steering mechanisms* that can ground and legitimise the systemic decisions undertaken by bureaucratic and market actors through a communicative engagement (therefore to avoid a de-coupling of the lifeworld and system where the systemic forms of rationality would operate without any form of inclusive legitimacy).

Civil society becomes the vehicle of choice for this task; it is seen by the critical project as not only able to draw communicatively from the lifeworld (representing the inclusive
mobilisation of social issues) but effectively able to steer systemic modes of reasoning by influencing political will-formation. The critical cosmopolitan democratic project thus attempts to look at the role of civil society in creating a more inclusive form of global governance, attempting to use civil society (in its global form of being able to transcend the nation-state) as a counterbalance against the deeply exclusive forms of collective decision-making currently undertaken by state representatives and market actors, idealising a role where civil society can not only bring legitimacy to these decision-making structures but effectively steer them in directions that are determined by legitimate deliberative frameworks. The focus on exposing distorted communication by systemic imperatives, leads the critical dimension away from formulating new structures of governance in the same manner as the liberal dimension, choosing instead to focus more keenly on present structures to expose exclusionary practices, or suggest ways in which inclusive spaces can be strengthened. This understanding of civil society is integral to maintaining an inclusive participatory democratic project, given the perceived importance attached to linking communicative powers and solidarity formation drawn from the community (the reflexive demos) to legitimise systemic coordination at the global level.

In this respect the majority of projects have analysed the spaces where (global) civil society interacts with state and market actors, such as global regimes, seen as more informal and open to civil society contestation. Most of these discussions are more abstract and advocate the greater need to include civil society within these spaces to ensure that they can fulfil their role as defenders of the communicative realm of the lifeworld, through the incorporation of a deliberative structure to allow civil society to effectively steer the systemic forces presently enjoying dominance of decision-making within these structures. Where empirical analysis
does exist, it tends to reflect how far away an inclusive democratic project is within grasp, where civil society is often blocked, excluded and undermined by instrumental actors in pursuit of their own self-interest.

These projects have focused upon micro-sites of deliberation, between CSOs, state representatives and business actors,\(^{233}\) however, Dryzek's macro-deliberative approach to the global democratic project is to concentrate on the ability for civil society to keep its distance from the systemic modes of organisation, focusing upon its ability to generate political opinion-formation rather than direct will-formation. In this way civil society can act as a steering mechanism from afar, rather than directly involved in the formal structures of governance using its ability to generate 'soft power' to influence the shaping of global discourses. The WSF as an informal global institution outside of the direct systemic forms of governance, I have argued, could be an interesting avenue to pursue this idea of a quasi decoupling of the lifeworld and system (where steering is undertaken through the shaping of global discourses), however, it opens itself up to the problems of whether it will be as politically effective as the micro-deliberative attempts at a more direct steering mechanism through deliberative engagement involving civil society, the state and the market within deliberative global public spheres.

This is not a debate that I have chosen to focus upon within the thesis, however, instead I have demonstrated that throughout all of these critical projects, there is an unproblematised understanding that the dominant systemic forces operating within the structures of global governance, can be steered through the inclusion of civil society as an inclusive, localised

ideal that represents the communicative link between the lifeworld and the public sphere. Civil society is seen to operate under the dualistic logic of defending the communicative infrastructure of the lifeworld, whilst simultaneously operating as a steering mechanism to influence (both directly or indirectly\textsuperscript{234}) the systemic modes of governance associated with efficiency, productivity and profit (the instrumental rationality of state and market actors in governance).

My central problem with this notion is that it creates an homogenised understanding of the contemporary practices of civil society as an antidote to neoliberal forms of instrumentality at the global level, its elevation as a communicative platform representing the local, is said to steer the exclusive systemic forces entrenched within the global dimension of governance in order to create a more democratically legitimate framework. What this analysis fails to understand, is the way in which neoliberalism understood as a political project rather than a simple steering mechanism, has constructed new spaces for civil society that effectively 'colonises' the communicative dimension through an incorporation of systemic modes of rationality.

The vision of global civil society as a panacea for the communicative legitimacy required to contest the illegitimate instrumental forms of global governance that currently operate have been problematised within this thesis, where I firstly outlined how the neoliberal project of democratisation has sought to incorporate the participation of a modified role and identity for CSOs under the instrumental logic of homo economicus. Secondly, I have attempted to

\textsuperscript{234} This again represents the differentiation between micro and macro deliberative spheres, emanating from early Habermasian understandings of macro deliberation outside of the formal sites of politics (to which Dryzek has argued can steer indirectly through discourse production), to the later work by Habermas and the majority of the critical cosmopolitan project. These frameworks attempt to include the formal aspects of politics within deliberation as a direct form of steering.
interrogate the *global* influences of this project on the *local*, through a case study of Neoliberal strategies within Cambodian civil society. I will briefly summarise these findings before drawing upon them to discuss the implications of theorising global democracy from the critical cosmopolitan democratic project.

The second chapter within this thesis attempted to interrogate the origins of 'neoliberal globalisation' that is invoked by the critical cosmopolitan democratic project, as an exclusive and unaccountable economic dimension of globalisation driven by systemic modes of rationality through the expansion of markets and the administrative logics that support them. The chapter briefly traces the economic rise of neoliberalism and its monetarist origins into a dominant economic paradigm that prioritises the expansion of the market and has been replicated globally through the key IEOs of the World Bank and the IMF.

The expansion of the so called Washington Consensus through structural adjustment programmes has been at the forefront of critique from the liberal cosmopolitan democratic project, seen as unjust and harmful because of the social welfare and environmental costs, the critical cosmopolitan position, however, tends to focus on how the logics that drive this consensus are directly linked to the production of an instrumental form of rationality; *homo economicus*. At this stage the critical project recognises the scale of the task at hand; reversing this logic of globalisation that promotes an efficient, market driven form of governance often to the detriment of a communicative dimension. Its solution to incorporate civil society as the communicative saviour to steer this form of globalisation and 'reclaim control of the market' (Habermas 2001, p156), fails to recognise the way in which neoliberal practices and processes of global governance have taken a keen interest in the idea of civil society as an enabling
environment in the service of the market; part of the new democratic good governance agenda. Ultimately it raises important questions about the identities of actors that participate within global public spheres, potential distortions need to be recognised and interrogated as exclusionary practices.

The World Bank, and a variety of key bilateral donor agencies, have constructed a new role for civil society within their development projects, designed to ensure that markets are smoothly integrated through promoting and strengthening the liberal democratic state within developing countries. This notion of democratic good governance creates a supporting and participatory role for civil society, firstly as a decentralised form of service provision that is seen as more efficient than the welfare state (and one where the community is afforded more choice and freedom through the application of a competitive market structure; the hallmarks of a neoliberal notion of democracy). Secondly, they are to play an observational role as democratic watchdogs of the state, involving not just holding the government accountable to ensure that corruption is undermined, but also the performance monitoring of the aforementioned service provision.

Both roles are described in brief detail as an abstract process that is representative of the neoliberal New Policy Agenda paradigm, an agenda that in line with the more contemporary usage of CSOs over NGOs, includes the nurturing of CBOs as endogenous forms of civil society that are seen as having the potential for increasing social capital within the communities.

The notion of Social capital stems from de Tocqueville's study of democracy, and the
importance attached to increasing the numbers of CBOs as a rich plural network to effectively keep the state in check, and intertwined with notions of self-help, where these CBOs can become responsible for their own welfare. The link forged between neoliberalism and a participatory form of democracy (that focuses on civil society) as the inclusive force required to ensure the smooth functioning of the market, has resulted in the transformation of not just the role, but the identity of CSOs partaking within these projects.

The idealisation of civil society as a remedy to the neoliberal dimensions of (global) governance from the critical strand of cosmopolitan democracy, fails to understand that civil society itself can become colonised under the NPA agenda. The examples within this chapter attempt to briefly interrogate these new identities, highlighting how NPM strategies have transformed service providing NGOs into organisations imbued with a de-politicised, technical and ultimately an instrumental form of rationality. This instrumentality can be observed within the construction of a role for CSOs as democratic oversight mechanisms that are promoted by donors (such as the social accountability initiative), where this 'advocacy' role for CSOs involves a technical, professional and de-politicised observation role, scrutinising budgets and forming technical reports, ultimately to enact a form of counting rather than shouting.

Neoliberal forms of global governance have engaged with a new global democratic project, this is of course different to the cosmopolitan democratic project, because it can be understood as a geographical global democratic project (rather than a spatial attempt to transcend the nation-state) in a similar way to the literature on democratic peace theory. The difference here of course is that unlike the DPT, there is an overt focus on governance (thus to
explicitly include civil society), whilst prioritising the free market as the end product of its
democratic good governance interventions. Never-the-less this global project is important
because it engages with the local through building new spaces for civil society and represents
the systemic colonisation of these CSOs through implementing an instrumental form of
rationality that captures the neoliberal essence of productivity and efficiency in the service of
the market; state (administrative efficiency) and market (economisitic) systemic logics are
embedded within the structures of civil society.

Discussions at this point have only involved generalised notions of civil society and the roles
CSOs have undertaken under the neoliberal project of democratic good governance. In order
to provide a concrete description of the external colonisation of civil society under systemic
modes of rationality that links the global with the local, the thesis turned towards an empirical
case study of Cambodian civil society. This case study is crucial to provide the evidence of
colonisation at the very local level of civil society construction, in order to refute the
assumption of the critical cosmopolitan democratic project, that contemporary civil society is
solely anchored within the lifeworld as a communicative dimension and designed to steer the
systemic modes of (neoliberal) governance at a global level.

Cambodia, as outlined previously, is an interesting case study to demonstrate this direct form
of systemic colonisation through the permeation of neoliberal practices, the result of an
influential development community that has externally constructed and nurtured CSOs in
accordance with the neoliberal democratic good governance paradigm. The first part of the
case study demonstrated that the perceived lack of social capital in the country in the wake of
the Khmer Rouge atrocities, resulted in an influx of INGOs offering humanitarian aid, and a
relatively free hand by bilateral and multilateral donors in enforcing their good governance agenda to reduce what was perceived as endemic corruption; a barrier to the smooth functioning of the market. This good governance agenda became a central focus of the donor community in the wake of the 1997 political violence and growing questions as to the culture of democracy present within the country, resulting in the intensification of NPM reform of state ministries, and an increase in spaces for NGOs as part of the decentralised service provision industry.

Donor preferences for an efficient, competitive and productive service provision industry under an NPM format, led to the transformation within the very identities of NGOs themselves; systemic forms of rationality began to permeate these structures through a close alignment between efficient administrative reform and the logics of the market.\(^{235}\) NGOs in Phnom Penh are predominantly involved in service provision and the shift towards a 'development marketplace' has led to the emergence of a competitive industry where NGOs cannot afford to lose out on the funding offered, resulting in internal shifts towards greater efficiency, productivity and performance based accountability systems.

The development of the NGO-GPP has increased this level of competition, seen as an accreditation certificate that is valued by donors and requiring new levels of systemic professionalism. Observing these trends in Cambodia, it was noticeable that one service provision sector, microfinance, was receiving an unprecedented interest within the country as a neoliberal form of social safety net, directly linked towards a self-help notion of poverty

\(^{235}\) To reiterate, the Habermasian conception of the system includes the state and the market, however, this is not the same as suggesting that actual state and market entities influence civil society, but to analyse how the administrative steering mechanisms associated with state actors and market logics associated with an economic approach can influence of civil society.
reduction. An interrogation of the actors involved reveals the extent to which systemic forces can permeate the structures of NGOs within the capital; some have become so professional and market orientated as to dispense with their more social attributes that originally took priority, instead focusing upon greater market expansion and penetration.

This professional direction has led many NGOs to transform into MFIs, raising questions as to whether they can even be said to represent a form of civil society any longer, let alone the increasing gap between representation and accountability to the local communities that are the beneficiaries, or 'clients'. The chapter demonstrates how urban NGOs within the capital have developed in accordance with the structural logics of external development policies that focus on democratic good governance as a method of ensuring a greater role for NGOs within service provision, but only a certain type of NGO; the professional instrumental form of organisation, at times imbued with a form of rationality resembling homo economicus.

The dominance of NGOs within the urban capital of Phnom Penh, clearly represent a formalised component of civil society yet it is only part of the story within Cambodia, and so I attempted to interrogate the dynamics of civil society within the rural populace, arguably representing a closer link to communities than the overly professional and increasingly unaccountable (at least in vertical conceptions towards the community) NGO sector in Phnom Penh.

Civil Society was understandably lacking in the country where traditional community groups had been disbanded under a universal model of forced collectivisation implemented by the Khmer Rouge, the result was a heavy campaign of civil society building by INGOs and
donors after the Paris Peace Accords. The development of associations and self-help groups that are increasingly emerging, are interesting to analyse because of the way in which they incorporate service provision in the form of microfinance, within this collectivisation. This is directly linked to the perception of social capital as overlapping market transactions to provide choice and a self-help form of 'community' that doesn't need to rely upon the (inefficient and overly bureaucratic) state. At the same time it contributes to the notion of welfare pluralism where civil society retains responsibility as consumers for welfare. The result is to observe an attempt to saturate the market within collective organisations, often under the terms of 'empowerment' where civil society aims at imbuing individuals with the ability to participate within the market through collectivised activities.

An interesting example was outlined through USAID's WORTH programme where specifically poor women were deemed in need of empowering through access to credit and the market as part of an enabling environment for a neoliberal welfare safety-net. The example served to highlight how external donor projects can not only effectively colonise the communicative dimension of civil society, but reconstruct subjectivities within these spaces towards the production of homo economicus; perhaps this could serve as a demonstration of how even the lifeworld itself can be colonised by systemic forces through the creation of subjects structurally bound by the stock of knowledge pertaining to instrumental forms of reasoning. Of course as reiterated previously, the lifeworld cannot be entirely closed off or subsumed under systemic logics; the point is to suggest that contemporary practices of civil society can potentially be the conduit through which systemic imperatives can attempt this colonisation of the social stock of background knowledge.
This is not to suggest that endogenous forms of civil society cannot draw from the lifeworld, merely to highlight that the contemporary understanding of civil society as synonymous with the lifeworld's communicative practices and shielded from the systemic forms of interaction, are in fact problematic.

The democratic good governance agenda within rural Cambodia that has resulted in a more participatory approach to service provision, also includes a new role for civil society as a democratic watchdog of service provision and the state in general. This monitory form of democratic participation was investigated through an analysis of the World Bank's recent social accountability agenda, an attempt to uncover potential for local associations, self-help groups and VDCs to demand accountability from the state.

In Cambodia, there are a few social accountability mechanisms in operation, however, this approach is unheard of as an endogenous activity among local collectivities. In order to secure the desired results of a bridging mechanism between CBOs and the state to demand accountability, there needs to be a certain level of 'stimulating' of this demand among individuals and communities. Two consequences of this are that social accountability mechanisms being implemented within Cambodia are firstly, externally implemented according to donor prescriptions of those included and excluded in this form of organised advocacy (thus technical and professional NGOs are selected for their ability to implement and disseminate complex economic budgetary and audit information). Secondly, the construction of these selective spaces for advocacy roles, serve to disable the construction of critical spaces for activism and more fundamental questions of participation in the macro-questions of development; instrumental observation as participation is the preferred option to
a more reflexive form of control over development policy.

Systemic imperatives of instrumental rationality ensure that civil society remains a depoliticised and technical fix to pre-constituted development projects. The idealised role of civil society as (defensively) nurturing democratic 'opinion-formation' and even (offensively) forming democratic 'will-formation' (Cohen and Arato 1992; Habermas 1996), is severely tested under the neoliberal model in Cambodia. It is not that civil society fails to undertake these dual roles, more that they are undertaken through instrumental means where collectivisation and democratic participation is subsumed under administrative and economic formations.

The case study serves to demonstrate a number of important points about the critical cosmopolitan attempt to construct a more inclusive form of democratic global governance. The liberal dimension demonstrates that its preference for the progressively moral forms of civil society need to be nurtured through some form of selective inclusion criteria, whether this is under a monologically constructed 'cosmopolitan law' (Held) or the promotion of a simplified monological process to select those 'preferred' NGOs involved in global structures (Kuper). These forms of selectivity are deeply exclusive for the way in which they reject those that do not conform to liberal cosmopolitan principles.

The critical dimension creates a more open and inclusive framework where all CSOs are to be included through a process of deliberation within the global public sphere; future frameworks, norms, practices and policies are subject to a discursive testing mechanism to determine the legitimacy of outcomes. I have highlighted how the problems associated with this more
inclusive ideal emanate from the belief that civil society can operate as a steering mechanism against systemic imperatives saturated within contemporary frameworks of global governance. This is because civil society is presumed to be an entity that operates as a form of communicative and reflexive rationality, able to steer systemic imperatives through the framework of deliberation.

The case study supports my problematisation of the reification of civil society as a communicative structure and presumed antidote to neoliberal forms of governance. The concept of civil society as a panacea has been severely questioned through an analysis of Cambodian civil society, demonstrating that systemic forms of rationality can effectively marginalise endogenous and communicative forms, colonising the very identities of CSOs. This is not of course to suggest that civil society construction in Cambodia is simply the instrument of systemic processes and that this is a uniform process occurring throughout the country, merely to point out that these are the dominant tendencies associated with (global) neoliberal forms of organisation that are having a transformatory impact on (local) spaces for civil society. Utilising Burawoy’s extended case method provides the empirical evidence to support the theoretical hypothesis that we cannot simply assume that civil society operates as a communicative vehicle, embodying the potential to steer systemic logics that operate within the exclusive dimensions of contemporary governance.

The case study raises a further point with regard to this panacea role for civil society; the attempt to create an inclusive global democratic structure presumes that the local (civil society) can be used to provide the communicative legitimacy required to steer the global (neoliberal forms of governance). Where is the interrogation of the local within these
projects? The local, a term that is invoked as the democratic anchor within the exclusive structures of global governance, tends to be equated with civil society as a transmission belt between the citizenry of nation-states and the formal structures of global governance, able to represent a plurality of voices and issues; the communicative antidote to the instrumental logics plaguing present structures today. Yet this local remains elusive and abstract, reified as the steering mechanism within deliberative frameworks at the global level. Abstract discussions on the importance of a global public sphere from the critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy, describe how CSOs represent the communicative realm that can create the inclusionary dynamics required for a legitimate form of global governance, yet there is little interest from these authors in unpacking the role and identities of these organisations and questioning their supposed representation of the local.

The positioning of civil society as an antidote to neoliberal forms of globalisation contains the usual assumption of neoliberalism as an unaccountable global economic process that permeates national borders, yet what is missing from this understanding, is the way in which the democratic project of neoliberal forms of global governance, have drawn upon the participatory logics of civil society for smooth implementation of its global development policies. There is a tendency here within the literature on cosmopolitan democracy to under-theorise the role of neoliberal globalisation and a general failure to recognise that it is a profoundly political project that incorporates and marginalises the very actors that are assumed to provide the 'steering' mechanisms at a global level.

The case study of Cambodia represents the tracing of these neoliberal forms of democratic transition to show how the global (neoliberal policies) impinge upon the local (Cambodian
civil society) and demonstrates that the battle for a more inclusive form of global democratic governance, must take seriously questions of the local.

Once the critical dimension takes seriously the possibility that systemic modes of reasoning can penetrate from the global to the local, in opposition to the assumed steering logics of civil society from the local to the global, then it can more effectively pinpoint sites of resistance and expose sources of domination that exist within the construction of civil society itself. Cambodia represents only a narrowly focused case study that can highlight these faults within cosmopolitan theorising, but what about the wider implications for the practices of a truly inclusive structure of global democratic governance? I want to briefly return to the notion of the 'global' here, it is commonly used throughout the cosmopolitan literature in both its liberal and critical variants as a spatial description, essentially outlining the potential for civil society to transcend the nation-state. This has allowed authors to tread carefully around issues of geographic globality, given the evidence that suggests around the globe there are large discrepancies in the ability for CSOs to form networks and engage in decision-making outside of the nation-state.

Authors such as Dryzek for instance use the term transnational to avoid the practical obstacles associated with the geographical form of the global, and keep the post-Westphalian conceptions of democracy as an ethical promise to be realised. Whilst I understand and sympathise with trying to forge a global democratic project as a normative ideal where the problems of CSO access are obstacles to be overcome, without an interrogation of actual concrete global (geographical rather than spatial) practices, the project runs the risk of constructing generalised and de-historicised ideals of the local, such as I have described with
respect to the assumptions of civil society.

Cosmopolitan democracy has created an ahistorical and de-contextualised notion of civil society as an assumed communicative steering mechanism in a post-Westphalian context, this thesis argues that not only is this a problematic assumption when an interrogation of contemporary practices are undertaken, but that the global democratic project of neoliberalism may in fact be constructing a project that is expanding geographically and having an impact upon those countries within which are susceptible to its democratic good governance agenda. The cosmopolitan democratic project cannot hide behind the spatial form of the global when evidence is emerging that the very actors it privileges as an inclusive anchor within the global governance project, risks being undermined by a counter-global discourse of good governance that is being replicated geographically.

I have hinted that this may be the case within the second chapter by describing how the dominant neoliberal development paradigm is having an effect on a multitude of local contexts globally, with evidence obtained from a variety of interrogations of neoliberal projects at the grassroots. This is not only situated within developing countries where the relationship with neoliberal development policies are most intense, but even within the so called developed world where third way politics and NPM strategies are just as penetrating. What this means is that the empirical case study on Cambodia represents a call to arms for those advocates of a cosmopolitan democratic project, to re-engage with a contextualised local in order to resist the (potentially) global colonising practices on civil society, essential to realise more fully the promises of a truly inclusive form of global democratic governance.
At times, I find myself more sympathetic to the macro understanding of the de-coupled global public sphere. The micro-deliberative frameworks seem to highlight far too often the violations of deliberative legitimacy within forums encompassing CSOs, state and market actors. If we accept the Habermasian understanding that only those logics pertaining to communicative competence are to be accepted as valid under strategies of argumentation, then it seems strange to be surprised that frameworks including systemic forms of reasoning would invalidate deliberation. To locate strategies of deliberation within the formal spheres of politics, perhaps asks too much to expect that systemic forms can be 'bracketed' off from argumentation. In this respect, I can understand the hesitance from authors such as Dryzek, to engage so closely with these formal sites and instead locate deliberative frameworks outside of the formal spheres. The WSF represents an interesting avenue because it is situated outside of the formal apparatus of governance within the global system and is comprised of a potentially more communicative resource to draw upon for deliberative legitimacy. Despite the questions that can be raised about how successful this global public sphere can be in a (quasi) re-coupling with the formal sites of power, there is still an important point that needs addressing.

Although the thesis has described how a global synergy of state and market modes of rationality can effectively permeate the structures and identities of CSOs (thus to provide more legitimacy to the macro de-coupling argument), it has also shown how we cannot assume that civil society in contemporary historical contexts is communicatively bound. The repercussions are that separating global governance into a crude system-lifeworld distinction in a way that the macro-deliberative approach does (such as CSOs at the WSF vis-à-vis state and market actors at the WEF), runs the risk of failing to understand that civil society is itself
Honneth (1995) makes an important criticism of Habermas’ system-lifeworld dualism for effectively idealising a lifeworld that is deemed free from strategic and instrumental forms of action, and a system that lacks a normative dimension within its modes of action (1995, p298-303). Civil society under the cosmopolitan project follows a similar line of thought, where it is reified as a communicative /anti-instrumental lifeworld that neatly forms a dualism against the instrumental / anti-communicative system. The very contested logic of civil society that I have described within the thesis, serves to demonstrate that systemic forces can just as easily impinge upon the collective dialogic community, and in fact restrict the reflexive forms of knowledge and dialogue that these authors presume the foundation of civil society. Local collectivised activities in Cambodia demonstrate how reflexive dialogue is marginalised through a disciplining system that rewards and encourages instrumental forms of dialogue; the goal of instilling the logic of counting over shouting simply furthers the tempering of critical reflexivity.

What are the implications of this thesis for the critical cosmopolitan project? I have made it clear throughout that the thesis remains sympathetic in the attempt to create a more inclusive democratic project utilising non-state actors within a deliberative public sphere. The attempt to construct a global framework that connects the three sites of administrative, economic and solidarity formation (where the latter acts as the locus of communicative power and anchors the legitimacy of the first two steering mechanisms) is admirable in the overriding focus of a more reflexively democratic coordination mechanism at the global level. Various deliberative projects have highlighted the importance of civil society as the vital link between the
lifeworld and the system; preserving the former whilst guarding against permeation and attempting to steer the latter, yet this thesis has raised questions about the internal identities surrounding civil society actors and the potential systemic distortion effects that can occur prior to deliberation within the public sphere. Empirical deliberative projects tend to analyse the obstacles that can undermine authentic deliberation for NGOs in various international regimes, highlighting the ways in which state and market actors can shape dialogue and coordination mechanisms to the detriment of NGOs. This is of course valuable research and offers an important adjudication mechanism to highlight illegitimate and exclusionary practices at the global level where reflexivity is lacking without authentic discursive practices. The key concern with this research is, however, the way in which civil society actors are still assumed as communicatively bound; there appears to be a lack of research into the very identities of these actors within deliberative models. These theorists are correct to look at distortions between CSOs and state/market actors, but they must deepen the adjudication mechanism to analyse the very distortions possible within CSOs themselves. Interestingly, Bohman has recently recognised that in order to generate the reflexivity required for communicative freedom and institutionalising it as communicative power; civil society must have a high degree of plurality in perspectives in order to meet the “diversity necessary for deliberative practices” (2010b, p436). He argues that:

“Deliberation about the implementation of such goals is certainly inferior if the full range of actors and their epistemically relevant perspectives are not included. This improvement concerns the shaping of the process of deliberation rather than the specific outcome, since the pool of reasons is narrowed by testing” (Bohman 2010d, p440).

This is an important idea that begins to look at how we can construct an adjudication mechanism without simply excluding those actors deemed ‘distorted’ in a pre-discursive way.
in a similar method to the liberal cosmopolitan project. His analysis is to test the ‘narrowing’ of discourse produced during argumentation and can have the benefit of recognising systemic identities that offer little reflexivity in terms of deliberation.

Bohman also briefly recognises the problems of ‘NGOization’ and the way in which criteria should be constructed to “judge the democratising potential of various forms of civil society or associations” (2010b, p441). As of yet this criteria mains elusive and must be undertaken in a cautious manner in order to avoid the pitfalls of liberal pre-determined inclusion/exclusion categories. This brings me to the second element of the thesis that needs further investigation and operates as a potential avenue for future research. I have demonstrated that the target of deliberative critique, unreflexive neoliberal steering mechanisms, can actually permeate the identities of CSOs themselves and is part of a larger neoliberal global democratic project under the New Policy Agenda. Research is urgently required to link the various empirical projects in the literature that highlight NGOization,\(^{236}\) with a sustained theoretical critique of colonising tendencies emanating from key discourses on NPM best practices and depoliticised ‘shouting to counting techniques’. These systemic imperatives that re-shape CSOs’ identities towards a technocratic understanding, fundamentally violates the solidarist link between lifeworld and system where they are incorporated into capitalist functional spheres. As Germain notes, deliberative democracy is ultimately important in the battle to ensure that political decisions can be made without abandoning the grounds of politics to technical administration. In essence the critical cosmopolitan project must acknowledge that “crucially the link between power and the organisation of capitalism needs to be recognised as a central concern of debates on deliberative democracy and the public sphere” (Germain 2010, p496).

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\(^{236}\) Understood as the professionalization of the sector into a technocratic coordination mechanism
More research is thus required to resist this neoliberal colonising agenda and its attempt to construct an ideal form of civil society in its own image, the increasing synergy between state, market and civil society subsumed under systemic logics and coordinated globally; requires urgent attention. Critical cosmopolitan discussions on CSOs at a global level, must acknowledge the potential for these distortions within their deliberative projects, and effectively engage with the very local contexts that they are anchored within. Assumptions of de-contextualised entities can only serve to undermine the construction of a more inclusive global democratic project.
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