The unbearable closeness of the East: embodied micro-economies of difference, belonging, and intersecting marginalities in post-socialist Berlin

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THE UNBEARABLE CLOSENESS OF THE EAST:
EMBODIED MICRO-ECONOMIES OF DIFFERENCE, BELONGING AND INTERSECTING
MARGINALITIES IN POST-SOCIALIST BERLIN¹

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ABSTRACT

This article examines micro-politics of belonging in the post-socialist outskirts of Berlin-Marzahn, one of new urban immigrant settlement areas in Europe. More specifically, it focuses on what locals perceive as an acceptance-precluding conspicuous presence of nominally white immigrants of German ancestry from the former Soviet Union, the Aussiedler (resettlers). Thus the paper outlines how long-term residents read and interpret these immigrants’ everyday embodiments, constructing what I call micro-economies of embodied difference, in order to mark the latter as Eastern-European and thus non-belonging. In order to make sense of such practices, the article examines the embeddedness of this suburban locality in extra-local politics of belonging, showing how Marzahn and its old-time residents have themselves become post-wall Berlin’s (and Germany’s) internal Others, saturated with uncommodifiable traces of now denigrated state-socialist Easternness. I suggest that in such a context these residents’ practice of ascription of the unwanted Easternness to recent immigrants works to deflect it in order to buttress their own claims to full membership citizenship in the unified Germany they feel they have been excluded from so far.

[belonging, immigrants, embodied difference, Othering, Easternness, Berlin]
INTRODUCTION

“And so Marzahn became Little Moscow,” lamented Lena, a young old-time Marzahner when commenting on the transformation of her locality engendered by the settlement of about 20,000 Russian-speaking migrants of German origin in this northeastern outskirts of Berlin over the past 15 years. During this time Marzahn had become home to the largest concentration of these migrants, the so-called Aussiedler (resettlers/repatriates), in the territory of former East Germany. Their settlement here is a part of the broader trend of diversification of immigrant destinations beyond traditional immigrant gateways across the global north (e.g. Massey, 2008; Fonseca, 2006; Zuniga and Hernandez-Leon, 2006; Mahler, 2001). While in their effort to contribute to a more complex understanding of contemporary political landscapes of immigrant settlement in the US many geographers have turned their attention to such new locations (e.g. Leitner, 2011; Nelson and Hiemstra, 2008; Nelson, 2008; Veronis, 2006; Mahler and Foner, 1996; Trudeau, 2006), research in Germany continues to privilege traditional destinations, such as inner-city neighborhoods of West German cities. By examining one of the suburban, and specifically post-socialist milieus of immigrant reception in Germany this article aims for a parallel step in a less-examined European context.

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3 Aussiedler make up between 11 and 17% of the local population in northern and central Marzahn, the areas of research focus, respectively (Augustin, 2008).

4 By 2003 this migration flow counted 2,995,000 people, including Aussiedlers’ family members (Oezcan, 2004). Additional 100,000 to 200,000 Aussiedler arrived since then, based on the data of the Federal statistical office of the FRG. As such these migrants are by now the second largest migrant group in Germany.
I approach the examination of local responses to the arrival of immigrants in Marzahn through the concept of politics of belonging, which centers on discursive processes through which any collective - with its attendant ‘we’ - gets constructed (Yuval-Davis, 2011). The paper focuses on boundary-making practices, a crucial component of politics of belonging, unfolding most often through the construction of the “Other” (e.g. Leitner, 2011; Favell, 1999). Since local milieus are of the utmost importance for the actual prospects of immigrant inclusion (Leitner, 2004), this paper examines more specifically everyday local practices of Othering, or micro-politics of belonging. At the same time, however, particular places are also embedded in national and regional landscapes of belonging with their dominant discourses – rather than just institutionalized technologies of formal belonging such as citizenship laws - about who counts as a worthy member of the community and who does not. The ways in which citizen subjects understand and enact their belonging in particular places are then situated within such broader frameworks (e.g. Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2003; Berdahl, 1999). Yet, crucially, regions, cities and neighborhoods are differently positioned within these landscapes, effectuating in turn place-based particularity of local negotiations over belonging. This paper then, secondly, examines the positionality of eastern Berlin in extra-local landscapes of belonging, allowing me to highlight how they continue to be animated by the legacies of Cold War.

The paper unfolds in the following way. I first discuss the existing urban geographies of belonging, Othering and embodiment, highlighting the neglect of nominally white immigrants and of non-visually discernible bodily practices in this scholarship - neglect this paper seeks to redress. A brief outline of the role that the East and East Europeanness have played in the construction of European identity and that of unified Germany is followed by a more specific examination of the positionality and Othering of Marzahn in wider landscapes of belonging in
Germany, and in particular in the post-wall Berlin. I then turn to the analysis of how local residents of Marzahn read and construct immigrants’ varied embodied everyday practices as signifying their Easternness. I argue that locals’ Othering works as a practice of deflection and displacement of Easternness, that they are themselves seen as saturated with, onto these newcomers in order to enhance their own claims for full belonging in Berlin and Germany. In the conclusion I reflect on the implications of this case for studying politics of immigrant belonging in European cities.

In making its argument this article ties together varied sources, including primary and secondary data. The primary data were gathered in Marzahn between February and October 2007 as a part of a project on practices of communal integration projects5, during which I was institutionally anchored at two such projects, namely Meridian and Kieztreff, as a part-time volunteer. I draw here especially on the excerpts from focus groups conducted with 43 native-German residents and Aussiedler, which inquired participants about their experiences with migrants or local residents, integration projects and their views about changes in Marzahn. The

5 The project focused on integration projects developed locally over the past decade in response to increased tensions between migrants and native Marzhaner and social isolation of the former. They are usually funded for 1-3 years by grants available through various partnerships between local, regional or federal governments, and foundations. They offer a variety of services and activities, including free individual consultation and translation services, native-language lectures on issues such as German health-care system, or German and Russian language. Most projects also incorporate social and cultural activities, such as intercultural dinner “cook-ins”, weekend dance evenings or weekly breakfasts that are intended to improve local-immigrant relations through increased interactions.
participants were recruited through flyers posted in neighborhoods’ commercial and public spaces and with the help of the two community centers housing the above-mentioned projects. Some of the participants also worked or volunteered in these centers, which allowed me to get to know them more in depth. Crucially, the paper is equally strongly informed by the broader ethnography, namely participant observation and everyday informal conversations with residents I engaged with at casual meetings, neighborhood gatherings, and integration-related events. Finally, the paper also uses data from a few of the 25 expert interviews conducted with local integration practitioners, politicians and urban planners.

GEOGRAPHIES OF IMMIGRANT BELONGING, OTHERING AND EMBODIMENT

In wake of news about radicalization of some of the immigrant youth and urban tensions involving immigrants in Western Europe, questions about immigrants’ belonging and their social incorporation have moved anew to the political limelight over the past decade. These renewed public debates tend to be dominated by the ascription of blame for the social exclusion to

6 Each group discussion lasted about 1.5 hours and took place in the main communal room of the community center housing project Meridian. As the overall project focused primarily on middle-aged residents, the largest proportion, 39% of the participants were between 50-60 years of age, 28% between 40-50, 14% between 30-40 and 12% over 60. 3 (7%) of the participants were under 30. Especially native German groups were gender balanced with 55% of participants being women. About one third of participants had college degrees, and one German participant was pursuing graduate studies at the time. With the exception of three native German subjects, all the other participants experienced de-skilling/underemployment after 1989 or their settlement in Germany, as well as precarious employment and in some cases also long-term unemployment (lasting more than 6 months).
immigrants themselves, rather than by the discussions of how state and so-called host society attitudes and practices contribute to immigrants’ socio-economic and cultural marginalization. It has been precisely the socio-spatial relations between the receiving society and migrant newcomers, and in particular varied dynamics of everyday negotiations between them that involve claims of rightful belonging, that Patricia Ehrkamp and Helga Leitner (2006) have suggested as a much-needed focus of urban migration geographers. In response scholarship has highlighted how for example immigrants’ transformations of neighborhood landscapes - especially more permanent and visible changes effecting the built environment that attest to immigrants’ close involvement with local milieus - spark intense contestations (e.g. Ehrkamp, 2005; Trudeau, 2006; Mitchell, 2004b). Others have shown how locals often racialize those parts of their towns most associated with immigrant presence in an effort to spatially fix and distanciate themselves from immigrants perceived, and simultaneously constructed, as different (e.g. Leitner, 2011; Hiemstra, 2010). Such racialization unfolds through varied processes, including locals’ hierarchical interpretations of immigrant expressions of masculinity or femininity, as Patricia Ehrkamp (2008) has shown in a case of ‘Turkish’ neighborhood in the German city of Duisburg. Others have highlighted how different local histories of political mobilization and race relations result in geographical unevenness of immigrant-native landscapes of belonging (Nelson and Hiemstra, 2008; Winders, 2006). Much of this writing approaches politics of everyday belonging as a micro-political process that involves negotiations over socio-cultural identifications within a context of uneven power relations. As Mee and Wright have argued, such negotiations are “inherently geographic” (2009, p. 772) because they pivot on boundary-making processes that are underpinned by competing conceptions about the
appropriateness of certain bodies and practices in particular places and communities (see also Trudeau, 2006, Antonsich 2010).

Drawing on the understanding of identities as relational and contingent, some of the research on immigrant belonging has focused more specifically on processes of Othering. In social constructivist approaches it is through such drawing of a difference between oneself and “the Other” that one’s own identity is established and valorized. Geographers have additionally stressed how habitual national and regional media and state constructions of immigrants as non-belonging Others often provide a credible resource that the ‘natives’ draw on in the everyday life (e.g. Kastoryano, 2002; Pratt, 2005). In Germany for example, state-sanctioned legal categorization of migrants as foreigners (Ausländer) contributed for a long time to a quotidian understanding of migrants as Germans’ Others (e.g. Vertovec, 1996; Ehrkamp, 2006), rather than potentially Germans-in-the-making.

Much of the existing scholarship on Othering has traditionally focused on the representations of Others, especially in media and literary cultural production (e.g. Ridanpää, 2007; Jansson, 2003; Dodds, 2003). As cultural geographer Michael Haldrup and his colleagues have argued, the extent to which exclusions from belonging through marking the Other have been effectuated through “banal, bodily and sensuous practices” of everyday encounters has been rather underestimated (2006, p. 173). Moreover, the work that has focused on such practices has often neglected varied nature of embodied materiality in favor of “visual objectification of Others”, reinforcing the “methodological ocular centrism” of social sciences (Haldrup et al., 2006, p. 182). While public visuality remains crucial to the processes of racialization and Othering (e.g. Ehrkamp, 2008), these other aspects of embodiment, in particular the auditory, are also highly salient to everyday politics, if in potentially more subtle ways (see e.g. Smith, 1997).
Finally, much migration writing on embodied encounters focuses primarily on processes of Othering as they occur between white local residents and those immigrants conventionally accepted as non-white. This lack of attention to the construction of difference amongst somatically ‘same’ or highly alike subjects has also been characteristic of whiteness studies (e.g. van Riemsdijk, 2010). Yet native residents also often read and construct nominally white immigrant bodies as different. In her discussion of the Irish migrant women in London, Breda Gray (2002) for example draws on Alison Bailey’s (1998) notion of ‘whitely’ scripts to highlight the contingent relationship between ‘whitely’ performances and looking ‘white’. In her study she especially points out how bodily and racial scripts are gendered: Irish women’s lacking compliance with lady-like, reasonability and respectability-based femininity associated with British white women serves as a basis of their assessment as un-British and culturally inferior. Such differentializing practices are not limited to white subjects, as Robert Potter and Joan Phillips (2006) have shown in case of Barbados. Here local residents stress such practices of 2nd generation black British-Barbadian returnees, like walking fast in public spaces or in the sun as marking their difference. Such varied bodily practices become a basis for what I call micro-economies of embodied difference: that is, ensembles of embodied micro-differences constructed and interpreted in a hierarchical fashion in order to produce the value of ‘authentic’ belonging. Before I turn to examine the specificities of such micro-economies in case of Aussiedler in Berlin-Marzahn, I first outline the role that Othering has played in the construction of Europe, and more specifically in post-wall Germany.

BELONGING IN EUROPE: OTHERING, THE EAST AND THE CASE OF UNIFIED GERMANY
As has often been remarked, self-understanding of Europe has to a large extent developed through a particular kind of Othering, namely orientalization. The East has played a constitutive role in the European identity construction for several hundred years; ever since the East-West divide replaced an earlier South-North divide (Wolff, 1994). As Edward Said (1979) has shown, (Western) Europe constructed its identity as the bearer of progress and Enlightenment modernity through the construction of “the East”, the Orient, as its inferior Other. This intellectual project focused geographically on the Ottoman empire and Egypt, drawing a strong boundary between them and Europe, and positing them as Europe’s constitutive outside. Closer to home, the construction of territories east of the Austrian half of the Habsburg empire specifically as Eastern Europe unfolded through the same binary logic. Certainly, Eastern Europe did not become essentialized to the same extent as the classical Orient, imagined as steeped in barbarity and unreason. Still, through “demi-orientalization” Eastern Europe found itself cast as Europe’s internal Other, at best forever lagging behind (Wolff, 1994, p.7). Due to its historical closeness to the Ottomans, the Balkans, in particular became seen as geographically of Europe, but culturally outside of it (Hammond, 2007; Todorova, 1997). Russia, posited as (West) Europe’s pupil, as “just having been tamed, civil, civilized”, has historically equally played a crucial role in the European self-conception, including during the post-WWII division (Neumann, 1999, p. 110; Said, 1979). And it was precisely the Cold-war era that solidified Eastern Europe, historically a rather unstable formation and concept, as the antithesis of the capitalist and democratic (Western) Europe (Kuus, 2004).

Germany found itself, as a divided country, in a very particular position within this larger geopolitical environment. While prior to the rise of the Nazi regime it considered itself long a Central European nation par excellence, straddling the West and the East, over the second half of
the 20th century its image and self-understanding changed into that of a country culturally inherently located within Western Europe (e.g. Palmowski, 2008). This was of course the case only for the Federal republic of Germany (FRG). Nevertheless, it was the FRG that portrayed itself as the legitimate representative of the whole German national and cultural community. And, crucially, it was the FRG and its geopolitical imaginary of Germany as firmly of Europe/the West that came to gain hegemonic currency after 1989. After all, the unification of former West and East Germanies was the process of joining of equal parts - that the term itself evokes - only in the name. As Germany’s leading public intellectuals forewarned, the unexpectedly speedy unification only exacerbated the Cold-war era power differentials between the two (e.g. Habermas, 1998). Many in the East came to see the process rather as one of internal colonization (see e.g. Mandel, 2008).

Strong celebratory moment that unification elicited quickly gave way to a deep disappointment of former subjects of German democratic republic (GDR) over their nominal sameness and equality with the “old” citizens. Media accounts turned to differences between East and West Germans, or more specifically to the ways in which Easterners differed from Westerners, implicitly positing the latter as proper citizens of unified Germany to be emulated by the “newcomers”. Reflecting the domination of German media and political landscape by the West such differences were then “constructed hierarchically”, allocating “German ‘genealogical heritage’” to the (former) West, and in turn producing East German marginalization (Hörschelmann, 2001, p. 986). Such region-based Othering, embedded in particular geopolitical histories, is ubiquitous in most countries (see e.g. Ridanpää, 2007; Jansson, 2003 on south-north differentiation in Finland and the US respectively). What is of importance in the German case is
the role that Easternness, reflecting a broader Europe-making project, played, and, as I show, continues to play, in the hierarchization of German citizenship today.

Unification brought a number of peculiar developments, including the birth of an Ossi. Or rather, Ossi, an old pejorative term for Easterners derived from the German word for East (Ost), came to connote former GDR citizens in a wide-spread national discourse. Ossis came to be continuously constructed also in everyday encounters, through not least the Wessis’ interpretation of East Germans’ bodily practices (e.g. Berdahl, 1999)\(^7\). While these have over time refocused on more subtle differences, recent research suggests that oft-evoked “mental wall” not only persists but that it has recently intensified, including amongst the youth (e.g. Schroeder, 2006). As the spokesman of Social democratic party (SPD) for immigrant integration in Marzahn, a university student in his mid-twenties, opined in our interview: “Even between the West Germans and the East Germans here in Berlin, even if they live close to each other….this imaginary wall, this border still exists for many people, I belong to that generation, too” (GL, male, 20-30). Many former East Germans continue to feel as second-class citizens, homeless and out of place in unified Germany, establishment of which was pervaded by the devaluation of ‘all things East German’ (Hörschelmann, 2002; Berdahl, 1999; Boym, 2001). Additionally, I suggest that Marzahners’ position from which they negotiate their belonging in Berlin and in Germany is doubly interesting. This is so because in addition to their socialist experience shared with other

\(^7\) In the early 1990s bodily markers such as “pale faces, oily hair, poor dental work, washed-out formless jeans, generic gray shoes, and acrylic shopping bags” as well as perceived olfactory differences such as body odor dominated this process (Berdahl, 1999, p. 167). These were over time replaced by others, such as those related to body language or more subtle expressions of a lack of a “cultural fluency in consumption” (Berdahl, 1999, p. 159).
former GDR subjects their very place of residence, Marzahn, has by now become constructed as
the constitutive Eastern outside of the new, putatively united Berlin. I now elaborate on this
proposition, first briefly touching on the contested position of the East and Easternness in the
new Berlin, and then introducing at length the locality of Marzahn with a focus on its
construction as the remnant of the undesirable East in the city.

MARZAHN AS BERLIN’S REMNANT OF THE EAST

The fall of the wall, accompanied by the 1991 relocation of the capital from Bonn,
certainly opened up the opportunities for socio-political and cultural re-integration of the
previously divided city. Yet city planners and politicians concentrated rather on the attraction of
investment and capital in their quest to make Berlin into a “global city”, a city that would be on
par with other (West) European metropolises (Krätke, 2001; Cochrane, 2006; Raiser and
Volkmann, 2003). Post-wall Berlin’s relationality to the East has proved to be, at best,
ambivalent in this process. Local political elites had for example initially hoped, if rather futilely,
for the economic capitalization of the Berlin’s geographic proximity to the former Eastern block
(Cochrane, 1999). Mimicking the national discourse, they posited the city as a ‘bridge’ between
Western and Eastern Europe (Mandel, 2008). But when large numbers of circular and more
permanent migrants from post-socialist countries crossed that, figuratively speaking, bridge, the
city reacted with discourses bemoaning Berlin’s ‘eastern-europeanization’ (Rada, 2001).

Concrete place- and image-making processes after 1989 also made the undesirability of
Eastern Europeanness in the city clear. Compared to other post-socialist cities, material legacies
of state-socialism were for example excised from Berlin’s landscape in a particularly speedy and
obsessive manner (e.g. Colomb, 2007). The decision to replace the GDR parliament building
with a replica of the 18th century Royal Palace, the culmination of this process, in particular
epitomized the city’s underlying orientation to represent its post-1989 existence as a continuation of its pre-1933 past, portrayed as a ‘traditional’ (West) European city (Colomb, 2007). Its state-socialist and East European past, seen as an aberration, became in the process confined to a few select locations readied for tourist consumption.

Making of new Berlin’s identity has additionally involved its representation as a hip mecca of internationalism (Vertovec, 1996). While politicians often focus on inner-city districts such as Kreuzberg or Wedding as problematic localities in need of special management because of the high concentration of impoverished residents of Turkish and Arab origin, these once devalued margins of West Berlin have simultaneously become associated with the image of cool “Multi-Kulti” Berlin (Düspohl, 2005; Kil, 2006). Similarly some eastern parts of the city, such as Prenzlauer Berg or Friedrichshain have been included in this post-modern cosmopolitan urbanity as they turned into desired places of residence and entertainment for young professionals and artists (e.g. Levine, 2004). Not so Marzahn, discredited routinely as “not the real Berlin”, by Berliners outside of Marzahn I engaged with.

[Insert Figure 1]

Marzahn’s marginality in the present-day Berlin presents in fact quite a reversal of its pre-1989 fortunes. One of the five localities of the district of Marzahn-Hellersdorf (see Figure 1), it was constructed at the end of the 1980s as a part of the GDR’s push to relieve nation-wide housing shortages (e.g. Castillo, 2001). Before 1989 such housing estates were rather coveted residential areas offering modern, family-sized housing with facilities unavailable in dilapidated inner city apartments that almost half of Marzahner resided in before moving here (Hübner et al., 1999). Marzahn became additionally attractive thanks to its abundance of green spaces. After the unification, however, such pre-fabricated housing estates came to represent “inhuman
modernism, concretized collectivism, and the ghettos of tomorrow” (Kil and Silver 2006, p. 111). And Marzahn, as the largest such an estate, home to almost 200,000 people in its heyday in the late 1980s (Hübner et al., 1999), became an “object of contempt” par excellence (Kil and Silver, 2006, p. 101).

Marzahn’s initial negative image in post-wall Berlin as a particularly gloomy and crime-ridden Eastern periphery (e.g. Rueschemeyer, 1993) ushered a spiral of decline as better-off residents started leaving en masse in mid-1990s. Northern and central Marzahn were affected particularly severely by this outmigration. Northern Marzahn alone lost over a third (35%) of its population between 1995 and 2002 (Buhtz and Gerth, 2003; Overmeyr, 2007). In conjunction with rising unemployment, this outflow resulted in the increased concentration of socio-economically precarious and welfare-dependent population, further reinforcing Marzahn’s image as the place for and of the “losers of unification”. Recently Marzahn’s notoriety spread also nationally, as evident in derogatory referencing of Marzahn amongst some political figures or popular culture icons, such as comedian Ilka Bessin. In Marzahn, residents and politicians are very much aware of their locality’s negative reputation, and many perceive it as deeply insulting.

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8 This reflects a broader trend of post-1989 suburbanization and exurbanization in eastern Germany. While its population declined 5.1% between 1995 and 2005, the amount of land devoted to urban uses increased by 12% (Schmidt, 2011).

9 For a comparison, the entire district of Marzahn-Hellersdorf lost about 16% and the locality of Marzahn about 20% of their residents within the same period. While the population decline has slowed down since 2002 to about 1.8% in the north and 1.4% in central Marzahn, the second area of research focus, these rates are still more than double the average for the whole district (Augustin, 2008; Stadtteilporträt Marzahn-Nord, 2008; Stadtteilporträt Marzahn-Mitte, 2008).
and hurtful. During my research residents and interviewees would raise the topic without solicitation on a regular basis, often starting our first conversation by inquiring about my impressions of Marzahn, as if to probe whether I subscribed to the dominant imaginary of it.

When Berlin designated northern Marzahn in 1998 as its first housing-estate area to be included in the federal program “Socially integrative city” supposed to arrest the social and economic decline in the poorest urban areas in Germany, many of Marzahn’s leaders and residents in fact opposed the measure precisely on the ground that the program, associated with high poverty, problem areas, would only worsen Marzahn’s already pitiful reputation. Despite this initial opposition, northern Marzahn, however, did become designated an “area with special need of development”, and thus a recipient of additional funding for local improvement projects.

An expensive campaign designed to improve the image of northern Marzahn in the city was one of the projects funded, first for two years and then for additional two years, despite a sharp decrease of overall funding. Targeting Marzahn’s association with undesired Easternness became campaign’s priority. The initial promotional materials purged any trace of grayish high-rises by presenting northern Marzahn simply as a colorful and small-scale residential area, reminiscent of built environment in the West (see Figure 2).

[Insert Figures 2 & 3]

While Marzahn’s landscape has indeed changed slightly over the past decade as many apartment blocks were retrofitted with new facades and some high-rises were scaled down (see Figure 3), the image presented in the campaign is still a highly selective one, since most of buildings

\[\text{10} \] Interview with Ms Cremer, Head of the UrbanPlan Ltd. running the program; July 2007

\[\text{11} \] This transformation has unfolded through the federal program *Urban Redevelopment East* established in 2001 (Kabisch et al., 2004).
remain in more or less the original state (see Figure 4). The second round of the campaign brought an even more explicit attempt at ridding Marzahn’s image of its Eastern connotations. Its signature mental map for example invited the viewer to see Marzahn as unequivocally a part of not only Western Europe, but also of West - represented by New York City - more broadly (see Figure 5). Regardless of such efforts, however, Marzahn rather continues to remain Berlin’s internal Eastern Other; one that, as one of Berlin’s foremost integration experts concluded, does not match Berliners’ “elevated perception” of themselves.\footnote{Interview with Ms Forner; July 2007}

This dominant self-image of Berlin and Berliners includes, as mentioned earlier, also an embrace of multicultural urbanity. Despite having gained a substantial number of immigrant population over the past two decades, Marzahn has been omitted from this multicultural iconography of Berlin, dovetailing its territorial marginality. I would suggest that in addition to Marzahn’s material legacies and its present socio-economic marginalization, several factors - and their cultural-political interpretation through the dominant framework of commodifiable multiculturalism - have contributed to this state of affairs. In the first place, Marzahn’s immigrant landscape is dominated heavily by \textit{Aussiedler}, with the second largest immigrant community – that of Vietnamese origin – only counting about 2,000 members (Augustin, 2008). Marzahn is thus lacking any sizeable non-white minorities that tend to be associated with multicultural diversity. And second, \textit{Aussiedler} do not fit this scheme also because for the progressive promoters of multicultural Germany and immigrant cultural and political inclusion into the German society \textit{Aussiedler} represent an outdated model of Germanness they aim to overcome. \textit{Aussiedler} namely - as already their official name signals (meaning ‘resettler’) - were

\footnote{12 Interview with Ms Forner; July 2007}
not conceived of by the German state as immigrants because of their (however distant) German heritage. Instead, they were historically constructed as extra-territorial members of German national community with a constitutionally guaranteed right to immediate naturalization and full legal equality with native-born Germans. As a German national minority they were thus not a part of the multiculture ‘carried’ by immigrants. And while the state and in many cases the public have started treating post-unification Russian-speaking *Aussiedler* as *de facto* immigrants – due to their similarly high unemployment rates and insufficient German skills\textsuperscript{13} – in Berlin it has been rather post-Soviet Jewish immigrants who are now starting to be accepted as a part of the city’s cosmopolitan landscape. And last but not least, it is also the image of Marzahner themselves as xenophobic and unable to embrace the newly desired multicultural urbanity that fosters Marzahn’s cultural exclusion as the embodiment of undesirable Easternness (Dorsch et al., 2001 in Bauder and Foertsch, 2003).

East Europeanness then sits rather uneasily within the dominant imaginaries of what it means to be a proper Berliner, and a German, after the unification due to the city’s and country’s own Cold war division. Territorial inclusion and closeness of post-socialist German subjects, especially those residing in certain sites like Marzahn, is disconcerting because it threatens to destabilize the dominant notion of Germanness from the inside. Unless marked as *Ossis*, Marzahner then upset this norm, because - unlike subjects more safely at distance thanks to their

\textsuperscript{13} Despite the introduction of passing of German language exam as a pre-condition of *Aussiedler* settlement in Germany in 1996, the German language skill proficiency of newly arriving *Aussiedler* has decreased over time as the proportion of migrants of German ancestry – in comparison to their Russian relatives - within this migration stream decreased from 74% in 1993 to 31% in 1998 (Dietz, 1999).
more easily established, in particular somatic difference - they claim commensurate Germanness. I suggest that the similar danger of territorial closeness of Aussiedler as Eastern Europeans who claim Germanness lies - in conjunction with the sheer size of their community – also underneath their becoming the primary target of Marzahners’ resentment. Neither non-white bodies of Vietnamese residents, the second largest immigrant group in Marzahn, nor their speaking Vietnamese in public space seemed to elicit similarly strong reactions by native Germans during my research. In fact, local-born Marzahner that I talked to expressed often more positive views towards these immigrants, seeing them as quiet, family-oriented and education improvement-driven residents, even if they complained at times about the 1st generation’s lacking German language skills and a strong orientation towards their own community. Locals’ concerns about the ‘problem’ of immigrant settlement in their neighborhoods tended to focus instead on Aussiedler. And it was these immigrants’ alleged embodied conspicuousness (Auffälligkeit) that was regularly raised in conversations as an obstacle to their integration and a marker of their non-belonging in Marzahn and in Germany. I now turn to practices of Othering pertaining to such embodied micro-differences of Aussiedler in Marzahn, and the ways in which locals use them to construct these immigrants’ Easternness.

MARZAHNERS’ OTHERS: RUSSIANIZING AUSSIEDLER

“In Russia we were Germans, and now [in Germany] we are Russians” (Pfetsch, 1999, p. 1) Visual Economies of Difference

The conspicuous differences commented on by native Marzahner came to be epitomized particularly through the figure of babushka - Russian for grandmothers and more broadly for elderly women - referenced regularly in everyday conversations with Marzahner, and in several instances also other Berliners, about how immigrant settlement changed Marzahn’s
neighborhoods. Such elderly female Aussiedler were indeed quite an everyday presence, sitting on benches in front of the apartment blocks or in parks during the day, sometimes alone but often in pairs, wearing darker-colored clothes, in particular knee-long puffed-up skirts with apron-like adornments on top of them, and small headscarves tied underneath their chins. In one of the focus groups, this figure representing Aussiedler Otherness appeared with a particular vehemence:

With older people it’s noticeable that they’re 200 years behind, in part, and that they’re still shaped by their cold homeland, with their headscarves, or whatever, with their apron dresses, with their so on and so on, sitting outside. No one would run around here like that...Can someone tell these people something? That they should maybe go around differently here, so that they don’t attract attention right away? ‘Oh, it’s them again’! They stick out right away and one can see, Oh, here they come from their cold homeland’. (Andreas, M, 50-60)

These old women in particular were seen as changing Marzahn’s landscape with their bodies, occupying the space in a fashion inconsistent with that of a modern German urbanite. As a mode of embodiment it was associated with an imagined geography of a cold, peasant Russian East. In Andreas’s description these elderly women seemed to be particularly saturated with a visible difference. A conventional German expression he used, “die fallen sofort ins Auge”, literally translated as “they immediately fall into one’s eye”, also assigns the blame for being seen and noticed to the immigrants. While another focus group participant, Heike (F, 50-60) commented on how terrible it was to judge people by their appearance, others stepped in to confirm the validity of Andreas’s unease:
Hanna (F, 50-60): The question is where the threshold is. You can say what you want, it all sounds nice, but when you don’t know the person that you come across and his appearance says nothing to you, you react differently to him than to someone who’s standing next to you and whose appearance *is* familiar to you.

Heike (F, 50-60): That’s natural.


Sophie (F, 30-40): I think that, just like in other countries, they should adjust here a little bit.

If reminded that these old women in headscarves were in the first place just a tiny minority of *Aussiedler*, locals would point out other ways in which they saw *Aussiedler* women as different from German ones:

With women one can tell from for example the earrings… I mean, even when they’re so stylishly dressed, you can always find a little spot that lets you know exactly that that’s an *Aussiedler* woman…For example, it’s the red gold, we have yellow gold and the Russians have more red gold…and you also see it from the way they are made up…this whole fairy-tale style, this ballerina-like make-up, this ostentatious style…. (Heike, F, 50-60)

One notices perhaps other traditions from the Russian culture, like ladies wearing a lot of gold. We don’t have that anymore. (GL, M, 20-30; SPD immigrant integration spokesman for SPD in Marzahn, *emphasis added*)

These excerpts point to the extent to which visually based Othering of *Aussiedler* bodies in Marzahn is strongly gendered. As in Breda Gray’s (2002) study of Irish women in Britain, in Marzahn it was also primarily a different kind of corporeal way of being a woman, and
specifically of feminine fashion aesthetics, that formed the pivotal point of its visual micro-economy of difference. Certainly, native Marzahner noted also Aussiedlers’ other, visually observable bodily practices without any particular reference to gender. They highlighted, for example, that often times the way Aussiedler moved through the public space, such as in a somewhat slouched and uncertain manner of walking, alerted them, in conjunction with other apprehended differences discussed here, to the identity of a particular body as an Aussiedler body. It is also likely that such body-reading practice include scanning for what count as ‘typical’ somatic features associated with Slavic people; even if only one local resident ever explicitly mentioned (some) Aussiedlers’ “Slavic features, like those big cheekbones” (GL, M, 20-30; SPD immigrant integration spokesman for SPD in Marzahn 14. Still, as in focus groups highlighted above, locals I engaged with in everyday conversations equally centered on women’s bodily practices to delineate the Aussiedlers’ difference.

Such bodily practices marked a lack of Aussiedler women’s conformity with the dominant bodily scripts of German women that Marzahn’s women saw themselves as embodying in these local encounters. Much of Aussiedler women’s bodily aesthetics was seen as expressing culture that is different, and more specifically, not on par with Germany’s post-industrial modernity. For example habitual remarks about Ausiedler women’s skirt- rather than trouser-wearing were usually explicitly tied to gender norms deemed traditional and outdated. This is not to suggest that such assertions about gender norms amongst Aussiedler were made primarily on

14 Reflecting a general trend of racialization, one focus group participant also attempted to read an immigrant-associated somatic marker into Aussiedler bodies stating that „some are somewhat darker“ before immediately retracting this observation as not really applicable to this group of immigrants.
the basis of observations of women’s clothing styles. Interpretative frameworks for visually observed and constructed differences of Aussiedler, like in any other contact, drew on other kinds of observations, experiences and micro-knowledges about these immigrants that the subject had gained previously. One of the focus group participants Florian (M, 40-50) drew for example on such a personal experience as being derided by an Aussiedler man for doing “women’s work” when he helped serve food and clean up during a social event for Aussiedler at Kieztreff where he was volunteering. Such anecdotal experiences and knowledges then joined each other in the practice of reading and interpreting specific bodily practices, just as these were, in turn, used to buttress a broader assessment of Aussiedler gender norms as backward.

Needless to say, gender practices were furthermore seen as only one expression of a broader, wholesomely conceived Aussiedler culture - foreign and characteristic of less developed countries of Eastern Europe, and Russia in particular. Other practices within familial circles or overall “simpler way of life” as Katja (F, 50-60) assessed it, came to fit within this framework of Aussiedler culture as belonging to the past - a result of an unfinished project of industrial modernity in the Russian/Soviet East. As Hanna (F, 50-60) explained in regard to Aussiedlers’ strong orientation towards extended family in Germany: “The thing with the extended family is also a question of time. Industrialization means that it eventually doesn’t exist [here] anymore and the same thing will happen to Russians”. That Aussiedlers’ reliance on their family networks might have been a coping strategy with migration-induced loss of other social capital is besides the point. After all, such a “veridical deficit” is not the main issue with Othering and orientalizing discourses (Isin, 2005, p. 32). The point I want to make is that such a spatio-temporal Othering of Aussiedler subjects’ cultural practices that Marzahner claim not to engage
in *anymore*, posits these immigrants as culturally out-of-time and thus out-of-place in the modern Germany that Marzahn simultaneously becomes an integral part of.

*Audible Economies of Difference*

While local residents drew on *Aussiedlers’* visually observable bodily practices, these immigrants’ audible practices played an equally strong role in everyday constructions of their difference. Old-time Marzahner complained regularly especially about the *Aussiedler* youth:

They’re making noise, or shall I say they *roar* as they drag down the Schwarzburger street, *loud*, they have to speak *loud*, *loud!* They have to be heard......I say to myself, man, that’s impossible, they are elsewhere now, not somewhere in Kazakhstan, in that wide-open space! There they can do it, the life went on outside the house there anyways, they only slept inside. (Andreas, M, 50-60)

While these residents disapproved also of local German youth drinking outdoors late at night, *Aussiedler* youth were singled out as appropriating public space in an improper, too audible, and almost savage way. Importantly, locals often tied the charge of an inappropriately loud self-expression of *Aussiedler* to the imagined pre-migration socialization of these immigrants in a wide-open steppe of Russia.

The geographic imaginary of Russia, including the Central Asian territories it used to rule over, as a vast cold steppe with extended families living communally in rural dwellings, figured also in a common charge of *Aussiedler* as invaders of private spaces of locals’ homes, their apartments and apartment buildings. *Aussiedler* were begrudged, as other immigrants often are, for increasing levels of noise due to their overcrowding, perceived as a long-formed, environmentally-conditioned ‘habit’, as the following quote aptly epitomizes:
There’s 10 to 12 of them living in an apartment for 2 people, really great housing...they know it from back then, [having had] only one room. Even when they had more rooms at their disposal they never used them, they only stayed in one room, huddling together.

(Lena, F, 20-30)

While such allegations of overcrowding have no real basis (e.g. Augustin, 2008), I want to point out here once again locals’ culturalist – rather than for example economistic - reasoning of this putative behavior. Such culture-based explanations were underpinned by and further perpetuated the imaginary of *Aussiedler* as immigrants hailing from the Russian East diametrically different from Marzahn.

For their part, migrants themselves also shared many stories regarding conflicts with their local German neighbors over noise; be it in cases involving active or crying children, late-night talks, or renovations of their apartments. Sometimes *Aussiedler* seized onto the concept of a boisterous Russian in order to disparage local residents, positing them in turn as cold and lacking in care for others:

We needed to put a nail into the wall, and there he went, he called the police. In the [Soviet] Union we got used to talking loudly, and here – whispering. Please, write this down, Germans are born quietly, get married quietly and die quietly. In Russia (*u nas*), we have jolly marriages, births, baptisms and deaths, too. We celebrate it all. But here…they like dogs more than people. (Irina, F, over 60)

Several exchanges later however, Irina, along with several other participants, pleaded with her peers to decrease their audible conspicuousness by speaking quieter in public. The issue became of utmost importance in particular in relation to the *Aussiedler* youth, whom the parent and
grand-parents critiqued heavily and unanimously for speaking Russian loudly on purpose of “getting back” at local Germans’ reluctance to accept them as Germans.

The issue of alleged loudness is strongly connected with the fact that it is not just any foreign language that Aussiedler speak. For a great majority of the Aussiedler Russian had become their first language over the last two generations. This linguistic assimilation in the Soviet Union resulted from a loss of cultural autonomy and cultural rights to for example German-language schooling, as well as high rates of intermarriage following mass deportations of German settlers from culturally autonomous regions on the Volga during the World War II (Münz and Ohliger, 1998). The continued preference of post-Soviet Aussiedler for Russian as their everyday language has served as a basis for their Russianization in Germany, as the quote I opened this section with points out. As Russians they are Easterners par excellence, culturally distant from Marzahner firmly embedded in (Western) Europe. Or as Tobias (M, 40-50) expressed it: “The Russian culture is very distant for me. I describe myself as a European and European roots come from somewhere else, from the Mediterranean, which has…culturally nothing to do with the East”.

THE RETURN OF/TO THE SOCIALIST EAST

Large settlement of Russian-speaking Aussiedler provoked strong negative reactions from local residents as it has represented for them a renewed implantation of the East in their midst; not of any kind of East, but precisely the post-socialist, Soviets-connected East that precludes Marzahners’ own full inclusion in the new Germany:

And then came the Wende….we were so to speak Russian-free, Soviet-free. But boy, not long afterwards, I open the window, look outside, and hear it. What is going on here?

Russian is being spoken again, here in our streets! I thought we had become sort of, so to
speak neutral. But now we have here this wave of these Lordships, they are being flown in here again! And slowly a Russian-speaking space develops here. I think to myself, that’s not possible! Where have I ended up? (Andreas, 50-60)

Andreas’s consternation pivoted around his interpretation of the German state-socialist regime as an imposition of a foreign political and cultural system over the eastern part of Germany. In particular he drew direct ties between the Russian-speaking Aussiedler and the presence of the Russian language in socialist East Germany, for example in schools, where learning Russian was mandatory. This allusion to the Cold War-era presence of Russian in Marzahn creates an impression of Marzahn’s everyday streets eat that time as materially occupied by Russian-speaking Soviet bodies in a similar way as they are today. Yet this was not the case before 1989. In fact, as Tobias points out, there were actually not many opportunities to engage with Soviet citizens in Germany on an everyday basis during that time.

All of us here I’d say were socialized in the GDR and there we had the German-Soviet friendship. Now that’s something, state-sanctioned friendship, right? A heavy topic for us. Well, in hindsight we’re actually having our first contact, the so to speak everyday contact [with people from the former Soviet Union] only now, with the Aussiedler. (Tobias, 40-50)

While Andreas’s pronouncement exhibited a particularly visceral reaction to the Aussiedler, it provides insights into a broader tendency to conflate the Aussiedler as Russian-speakers with the Soviets, notwithstanding the highly problematic relationship they as a German minority had with the Soviet regime. In this post-socialist encounter of subjects shaped by the state-socialist experience Aussiedler have been drawn into the relation of equivalence with ‘Homo Sovieticus’. As such these immigrants have become associated particularly closely with
state-socialism, unlike the unwilling former East Germans on whom state-socialism is seen as having been more or less imposed. The idea that post-Soviet Aussiedler are more ‘natural’ state-socialist subjects resurged also in locals’ popular explanations about their settlement in Marzahn. Marzahn residents namely opined that the concentration of Aussiedler in Marzahn implied their natural inclination for this kind of environment i.e. for uniform grey socialist-era high-rises evoking memories of home. This stood in contrast to the local German residents who moved out, or wanted to move out of this area. Local Germans’ reasoning revealed further another geographic imaginary of Russian speakers, this time naturalizing the latter’s intrinsic tie to Soviet-era urban landscapes. This imaginary, focused as it was on Soviet cities, might have contradicted the one of the Russian wide-open steppe that underlaid Marzahners’ explanations of Aussiedlers’ alleged loudness. Nonetheless, it worked towards the same goal of re-inscribing Aussiedlers’ belonging as resting firmly with the Russian East, the home of state-socialism.

Negative emotions spurred by the renewed Russian-speaking presence in Marzahn drew to a certain extent on dissatisfactions that Marzahner had experienced as East German subjects during state-socialist times. In one of the focus groups participants reflected substantively on how present-day tensions are animated by grievances arising, for example, from obligatory participation in state-socialist practices, including the institution of the “Soviet-German Friendship”. As Hanna recounted:

...And because it was some kind of an obligation...people also positioned themselves mentally against it, said to themselves ‘It’s not really my thing’. And that remains still somewhat entrenched. It lasted 40 years here, right? And that it created certain aversion against the Russians themselves is quite normal. At least that’s the way it is with me, that it really stems from the old times. Of course there were some conformists who
really enjoyed doing it. But amongst the normal people who were obliged for example to march on May 1st…it spurred an aversion that just won’t disappear from one day to another, even though it’s certainly partially also unjust. But the aversion’s there.

(Hanna, 50-60)

Concurring with Hanna, others elaborated on how almost daily practices required of GDR citizens, such as mandatory learning of Russian, fostered inner resistance towards the regime. Some, including Hanna above, admitted that this antipathy now extended towards the Aussiedler from the Commonwealth of Independent States, might have been “unfair”. Yet it was seen as deeply embedded in the former Eastern German citizenry. The aversion sticks and is hard to overcome.

Those who claimed lack of any such aversion, like Heike (F, 50-60), were in fact charged with “having truly believed in the system”. The accusatory tone of such a response points to the fact that while such antipathy towards the Soviets, and by extension to the Russian language and its speakers, might have certainly been a part of the experience of many GDR citizens, present-day interpretations of former east Germans’ relation to the regime have been also strongly shaped by the negative appraisal of the East German state-socialist experiment in the context of unified Germany. In Marzahn traces of recalcitrance against such a post-unification banishment of not only East German collective but also their individual achievements, knowledge and experiences are still tangible. In fact, in our conversations about the issue of immigrant integration, local Marzahner often turned to bemoan lack of their own integration and full acceptance in post-1989 Germany. As subjects marginalized in the national as well as Berlin’s post-unification landscape of belonging and citizenship as undesirable and entrenched Easterners, Marzahners’ Othering of Aussiedler as Russians and thus true Eastern subjects has
then effectively worked as a practice temporarily displacing this socialism-associated Easternness onto another population group – with the goal of establishing their own Europeanness that would enhance their claim to first-class citizenship as proper Germans.

CONCLUSION

Contemporary European landscape of immigrant settlement has become characterized not only by migrants’ dispersal to smaller cities, suburban and even rural areas, but also by their increasing ethno-cultural, racial and religious heterogeneity. Such developments have brought about an increased diversification of forms of contestations of belonging, including new patterns of segregation, racism and prejudice, or experiences of space and cross-cultural contact that provide new avenues for urban migration research (e.g. Vertovec, 2007). That much research continues nonetheless to focus on the largest non-white minorities might be understandable in so far as these seem to dominate national imaginaries of difference and belonging, not least because the ‘host’ society’s acceptance of migrants continues to be conditional to a large extent on their invisibility (e.g. Valentine, 2010; Ehrkamp, 2008; Fortier, 2005).

Yet, as this paper shows, what constitutes visibility varies depending on the local context. While Aussiedler as white-bodied subjects might be less visible and construed as less of a “problem” in Berlin than migrants of Turkish or Kurdish origin, in Marzahn they are at the center of everyday politics of belonging. Aussiedlers’ visibility and difference is constructed in the everyday life through local residents’ reading and interpretation of how the formers’ bodies dress, behave, maintain and adorn themselves, as well as speak differently from what is the accepted norm of Germanness. The publicity or conspicuousness of bodies out of place has then an important auditory dimension, even if audible difference is easier to conceal. The auditory is certainly not limited only to the experience of hearing a foreign language or accent, which are
themselves often ranked from more to less acceptable. Yet in countries like Germany, namely countries with a strong legacy of a conception of the nation as a linguistic community, the native-level fluency of the dominant language is a prime marker of belonging. And as Anne-Marie Fortier (2003) pointed out, in specific time periods such cultural markers might other and ethnicize migrants more than somatic differences.

As clear from the case of Marzahn, significance of such markers is circumscribed also by the specificity of local contexts in concrete places. This specificity includes, crucially, geopolitical legacies of relations between the countries of origin and settlement, which impinge on the conditions of immigrant settlement (see e.g. Fortier, 2003, 2000; Nagel, 2002). In post-unified Germany and Berlin, such legacies – namely those of Cold war era division and the inequitable unification that followed - additionally permeate and shape internal contexts of belonging. Here places like Marzahn, and their residents, find themselves cast into a position of an internal Other - not quite new Berliner nor proper German - because they seem saturated with those uncommodifiiable traces of now castigated state-socialist Easternness that threatens the dominant conception of Germanness. The sizeable and palpable everyday presence of Russian-speaking migrants in this post-socialist suburb has then become a source of particular resentment for locals as it is seen as reinforcing locality’s association with such Easternness. Territorial closeness of these white, East-associated bodies has, if also somewhat paradoxically, become even more uncomfortable because of Aussiedlers’ claims to authentic Germanness. In such a context locals’ marking of Aussiedler as the authentic Easterners instead has worked to displace the Marzahn-associated Easternness onto these migrants, constructing them as the subjects in whom the East resides.
Such a practice of buttressing of one’s own (West) Europeanness through an ascription of Eastern Europeanness to others became rather commonplace in post-1989 Europe, as Eastern Europe became a highly unstable cultural construction (e.g. Kuus, 2004; Wolff, 1994). If for example Polish or Slovak political elites resurrected the category of Central Europe in their attempt to join the European Union and NATO – a project conceived of as a “return to Europe” – it was to mark those countries further to the east, such as Ukraine, as properly Eastern European and thus not quite fit, unlike themselves, for the membership (Agnew, 2001; Haldrup et al., 2006). The latter in turn used such a strategy towards their own eastern neighbors (Neumann, 1999; Neofistos, 2008; Bakic-Hayden, 1995). This attribute of Easternness/Eastern Europeanness continues to be, however, crucial – if possibly not to the same degree as in previous decade - also in quotidian negotiations of belonging amid white European subjects, underpinning, as I have shown, micro-economies of embodied differences that reproduce citizenship hierarchies.

The case of post-socialist eastern Berlin might be quite specific due to the persistence of Cold war era cleavage within the country’s regime of citizenship and belonging. Still its specificity is valuable in that it reveals, if in a particularly sharp way, the myth of an integrated society - both at an urban and national scale - that immigrants encounter and in which they are thought to strive for acceptance and inclusion. While Marzahner as Germany’s post-socialist subjects explicitly tied their own lack of cultural and socio-economic integration and inclusion within the unified Germany to that of Aussiedler, similar axes of differentiated belonging run through any society. Citizenship, as an expression of belonging, is after all based not only on the exclusion of those deemed foreign because they lack formal citizenship status. In any given polity there are also always those citizen-status bearers who are considered more valuable than others, despite the putative equality of liberal citizenship. Such axes of differentiation are
multiple, running along class, racial, regional and religious lines, and congeal in different configurations in concrete cities and their neighborhoods. In other words, multiple differently scaled contexts of marginality work themselves into everyday landscapes of social relations lived, navigated and constructed by the interaction of immigrants and long-term residents. Sensitivity to so-called internal politics of citizenship and belonging needs to become an integral part of examinations of longer-term residents’ interactions with varied populations of immigrants in European cities. In Marzahn’s case such a consideration serves, as I hoped to show, not to excuse many of its residents’ anti-\textit{Aussiedler} attitudes but rather to avoid pitfalls of simply reinforcing the West-dominated discourses about xenophobic \textit{Ossis} that seek in turn to underline \textit{Wessis}’ superiority as tolerant multicultural European moderns.
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FIGURES

# 1

# 2

# 3
FIGURE CAPTIONS

# 1 Map of Marzahn. The green area represents the whole district of Marzahn-Hellersdorf in the lower map of all of Berlin, and the actual locality of Marzahn in the cutout.


Map produced by BishkekRocks on August 2, 2007. Permission to use granted under GNU Free Documentation License.

# 2 Colorful logo of Marzahn-Northwest – “Colorful Neighborhood”


# 3 An example of a former high-rise on Ahrensfelder street in northern Marzahn after the removal of top seven floors and an addition of new balconies through the program of *Urban Redevelopment East*.

Source: Author

# 4 Apartment buildings in the original state in central Marzahn.

Source: Author

# 5 Signature mental map of Marzahn-Northwest, shown on free promotional shopping bags.