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REPRESENTATIONS OF THE HAN DURING THE LATE QING AND EARLY REPUBLICAN PERIOD:
CHINESE INTELLECTUALS, SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS AND DICTIONARIES

By

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Sociology

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the discourses of race, nation and ethnicity in late Qing and early republican China, focusing primarily on representations of the Han. It argues that the competing and changing representations of the Han in this period formed an integral part of the process of modern Chinese nation building.

The empirical basis of the dissertation consists of three layers: intellectuals’ discourses, school textbooks and dictionaries. These layers constituted interconnected layers of discourses that were involved in the broader process of Chinese nation-building. The dissertation demonstrates that intellectuals’ discourses played a central role in constructing new notions of Chinese identity and the role of the Han, and thereby also in producing different ‘templates’ or for Chinese nation-building during the late Qing and early republican period. After the establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1911, these modern perceptions of Chinese national identity were endorsed by the ruling elites and were gradually disseminated and popularised further by means of school textbooks and dictionaries. Taken together, the examination of discourses on the Han in these three types of sources therefore offers an account of how early Chinese nationalist ideas were produced among the elites and then disseminated among the broader population.
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TABLE 6:1 A list of main Chinese dictionaries published during the early republican period
Introduction

Over the past few decades, social identities and social inequalities related to ideas of nation, ‘race’ and ethnicity have been analysed extensively across different academic disciplines. In regard to relevant studies on China in this field, the period of the late Qing and early republican China is playing an increasingly important role in Chinese historical research. As a period associated with radical social reforms and revolutions, and social controversies, it saw the conflicts between and the interweaving of ideologies developed within traditional Chinese society and modern Western discourses on human difference. These discourses established Chinese identity in relation to the concepts of race, nation and ethnicity, which were used as social markers of essential human difference, and had an increasing impact on the Chinese society during this period.

The significance of the period of late Qing and early republican China has been noted by different scholars. For example, Frank Dikötter (1992) has highlighted the historical significance of the late Qing and early republican period as a time associated with radical social changes, and has emphasised the increasing impact the West had on Chinese society:

‘During the 19th century, a new social environment was shaped by internal and external developments. Population growth, social dislocation, peasant rebellions, administrative fragmentation and political crises were the most important aspects of internal change. Western intrusions from the Opium War (1839-42) onwards were superimposed upon this established pattern of internal decline’ (31).

1 The term race is used with quotation marks by many authors, to indicate that the concept of race has no inherent validity and is fundamentally socially constructed. Although my research shares this view I will not use quotation marks in the remainder of the thesis, because the constructed nature of race is evident from my analytical approach. It is the assumption of this thesis that the concept of race should always be considered within social, political and cultural contexts, to uncover how it is represented and deployed in specific circumstances.
These factors make the late Qing and early republican period an ideal focus for my thesis, which examines the competing representations of the Han, as a race, a nation or an ethnic group, and investigates how these representations relate to the wider political, social, cultural and historical contexts. In particular, my thesis argues that the competing and changing representations of the Han in this period formed an integral part of the process of modern Chinese nation building.

The empirical basis of my research project consists of three layers: intellectuals’ discourses, school textbooks and dictionaries. I shall argue that these layers constituted interconnected layers of discourses that were involved in the broader process of Chinese nation-building. I will demonstrate in my dissertation that intellectuals’ discourses were playing a central role in constructing new notions of Chinese identity and the role of the Han, and thereby producing different ‘templates’ or ‘programmes’ for Chinese nation-building during the late Qing and early republican period. After the establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1911, these modern perceptions of Chinese national identity were endorsed by the ruling elites and were gradually disseminated and popularised further by means of school textbooks and dictionaries. Taken together, the examination of discourses on the Han in these three types of sources therefore helps me gain an insight into how nationalist ideas were produced, transformed and spread from cultural elites to the popular masses.

The Han as the largest ethnic group in Chinese society played a major role in the social fabric and transformation of Chinese society during the late Qing and early republican period, and remains the predominant group in present China. According to relevant data based on the latest census conducted in 2010, the total national population in mainland China (including 31 provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities and CPLA, excluding Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and overseas Chinese) has reached 1,347,350,000 by the end of 2010. Out of these, 1,225,932,641 people in mainland China are Hanese, which accounts for 91.51% of the national population. Compared to the relevant data in 2000, the proportion of the Han in the national population had
increased 5.74% and the majority of Chinese people are Hanese (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010).

Representations of the Han vary, and in contemporary English language literature on the topic, the term Han is often used with reference to a variety of categories of difference such as race, nation and ethnicity. For example, in his article focusing on the comparison of life between ethnic minorities and Han Chinese, Wei Shan (2010) has referred to the Han as a ‘nationality’ and ‘ethnic group’: ‘besides the majority Han Chinese (91.5% of the population), the government recognises 55 other ‘nationalities’ or ethnic groups, including Zhuang, Manchu, Hui…’ (14). Anthony Howell and C. Cindy Fan (2011), on the other hand, exclusively referred to the Han as an ethnicity in their study on ethnic migration and inequality in Xinjiang (119). In a similar vein, Forsby (2011) used the term ethnic group, even though his usage of this term comes close to race: ‘even if one may question the validity of referring to a distinct Han-race from a purely genetic perspective, there seems to be a good case for employing the broader term of ethnic group to underline the common descent of the Han-Chinese and to delineate them from some of the non-Han minority groups within China’ (16).

This corresponds well with the ways in which Chinese language literature represents this group, referring to it as a nationality, an ethnic group, a race or a nation. The understanding of the relationship between the Han and the Chinese nation is shifting accordingly. In addition, the term Han in Chinese is frequently used in combination with the term minzu, which can be translated as nation, race or ethnicity, depending on context. For example, the contemporary Chinese ethnologist Fei Xiaotong (1999 [1989]) compared the Han to a ‘snowball’ (4) when he explained the formation of the Zhonghua minzu (Chinese nation/race). By this he meant that the Han were like a core (hexin) that literally fused (ronghe) other minority ethnicities into a Han-centred whole, which made the ‘snowball’ bigger and bigger (4). Influenced by Fei, many Chinese scholars searched for scientific evidence to prove the existence of the shared origins of the Chinese nation, i.e. to prove that all different groups were ultimately integrated in a single Chinese nation. For
instance, Chen Liankai (1994) has outlined the development of an indigenous Han culture in the Central Plains regions of the Yellow and Yangtze river valleys since 7,000 years ago, based on which a large group named Zhonghua minzu (the Chinese nation) was shaped gradually. While Chen emphasised the shared origin of the Han and other groups in China, other scholars have drawn from what they consider the biological dimension of Hanese identity, clearly coloured by the modern concepts of race and modern genetics. Wen Bo (2004) and his colleagues for example defined the Han as a group with a shared genetic make-up when suggesting that, ‘the Y chromosome and mitochondrial (mt) DNA data have demonstrated a coherent genetic structure of all Han Chinese’ (302).

These multiple meanings of the Han suggest that attempts to understand Han as a term associated with one exclusive social category (nation, race or ethnic group) are analytically limited. Therefore, instead of attempting to provide a definitive answer to the question of whether the Han can be understood as an ethnic group, a race or a nation, my research seeks to identify such competing and multi-faceted ways of categorising and describing the Han, and to investigate their social significance in a particular historical and social context, namely the late Qing and early republican era. Why was the understanding of the Han so fluid? As I will seek to show, the different meanings of the Han were closely linked to different (and contested) understandings of the Chinese Self and its relevant Others, both internal and external. As such, they constituted part and parcel of the process of nation-building, which gave rise to a modern sense of the Chinese national Self and was closely intertwined with large-scale institutional, political and cultural changes at the time.

As acknowledged at many points in this thesis, my work was inspired by Frank Dikötter’s (1992) study of racial discourses in China. Dikötter has pursued a comprehensive study on racial discourses in China, including the period of late 19th century and early-20th century that I have focused on. In Dikötter’s understanding, however, other social categories and discourses, e.g. nation and ethnicity, were predominantly subsumed under race and racial
discourses, and he did not pay much attention to how these discourses interacted and overlapped. In contrast, my study pays close attention to a range of different social categories and discourses of inclusion and exclusion, and considers how they together contributed to the construction of Han identity and more generally, Chinese identity, in relation to the process of nation building. In addition, when discussing the racial representations of Chinese identity, Dikötter has mainly focused on intellectuals’ discourses, without paying much attention to their dissemination and reception among the broader population. My research, in contrast, moves beyond intellectuals’ discourses and considers the discursive construction of the Han and Chinese identity in a wider sphere, namely in school textbooks and dictionaries, which served as important instruments for building modern national attachments at mass level. Last but not least, my study examines the understanding of the Han in relation to the Chinese Self and its constituent groups, and hence also pays close attention to the delineation of belonging and exclusion within the Chinese Self - in relation to the Han and the Manchu, for instance - rather than focusing primarily on racial and other discourses that distinguish the Chinese Self from its Western or African others. In this sense, my analysis therefore moves beyond and complements Dikötter’s seminal work in this area, by examining Chinese identity discourses (with a focus on the Han) from the perspective of nation-building.

There are several reasons for adopting such an analytical focus, and for focusing the analysis on the late Qing and early republican era. The notions of nation and nationalism were introduced to China from the West in the late 19th century, i.e. during the late Qing era. During the decades that follow, these ideas gradually took root first among the Chinese elites, who used ideas of nationhood and nation-state to make sense of the role of China in the world and especially vis-à-vis the West and Japan. Slowly but surely, these ideas started entering public debate, first through pamphlets and speeches among the intellectual elites. By the early 1914, Western observers started noting fundamental changes in Chinese self-perceptions. In 1914, Max Weber described the developments in China in the following, rather telling manner:
'Only fifteen years ago, men knowing the Far East, still denied that the Chinese qualified as a "nation"; ... yet today, not only the Chinese political leaders but also the very same observers would judge differently. Thus it seems that a group of people under certain conditions may attain the quality of a nation through specific behaviour, or that they may claim this quality as an “attainment”' (174).

Arguably, what Weber was describing was a process of Chinese nation building, a process that led ‘from a universal but loosely connected empire into a particularistic but centrally governed nation-state’ (Zhao, 2004: 37). It is also worth noting that this process was paralleled by other modernisation processes in China, including military modernisation, the building of a modern state and modern educational system, as well as a rise in anti-Western sentiments (cf. Zheng, 1999: 1).

As I seek to show in my dissertation, it was during the early republican era that the nation-building process at mass level started in earnest. It was at this point that modern national discourses, and modern perceptions of the Han as a part of that, entered wider public consciousness by means of mass education and mass communication. To demonstrate this, my thesis traces the competing and changing discourses about the Han and the Chinese not only in elite discourses, but also in school textbooks and dictionaries. By comparing the discourses from the two periods I show how the modern ideas about the Han and the Chinese self gradually replaced earlier, pre-modern conceptions of the Chinese Self. With the help of these modern means of mass education and communication, the modern sense of the Chinese national Self was spreading among wider and wider circles of the population, drawing them all into the same Chinese ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983). As Eric Hobsbawm (1983) argued, ‘the nation, with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories and the rest, all rest on exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative; if only because historical novelty implies innovation’ (13). Drawing on Hobsbawm’s ideas, my thesis thus seeks to trace this process of ‘social engineering’ by examining and comparing three layers of public
discourses, moving from elite discourses outwards to mass-circulated discourses.

**Structure**
The thesis consists of three main parts. The first part is concerned with ‘theory, methods and history’. I first provide a theoretical discussion of relevant literature on race, nation and ethnicity with their intersectionality, focusing on both English and Chinese language literature. I will also offer a brief overview of some of the key literature on nation-building and nationalism, and consider it in relation to developments in Chinese society in modern times. This is followed by an introduction of the sources and methodologies adopted in my research. In order to provide a more comprehensive outline of the period that my research focuses on, a historical overview of key developments during the late Qing and early republican period is included as the last chapter of the first part. The second part of my dissertation is focused on the analysis of the representations of the Han in three selected Chinese intellectuals’ discourses during the late Qing and early republican periods: Zhang Binglin (1868-1936), Sun Zhongshan (1866-1925), and Liang Qichao (1873-1929). The third part of my project consists of two chapters. The first one provides an analysis of the representations of the Han in Chinese school textbooks during the late Qing and early republican periods, while the second one examines the representations of the Han in dictionaries in the same period. This is followed by a reflexive conclusion based on the results gained in my analysis of these different sources.
Part 1:

Theory, Methods and History
Chapter 1: A Review of Literature on Race, Nation and Ethnicity

In this literature review, two main issues will be discussed: the first part of the review reflects upon the classic debates on race and racism, nation and nationalism, and ethnicity, in Western (mostly English-language) literature, since these concepts have been mainly developed in the context of European societies, and have been subsequently transferred to different social and cultural environments, including the Chinese environment. The second part of the review focuses on the equivalents of the terms race, nation and ethnicity in Chinese society, and briefly looks at differences in the ways they are defined and translated.

However, such a division of the chapter does not imply that it is possible to distinguish neatly between the two sets of discussions - the ‘Western’ and the ‘Eastern’ approaches. Rather, these two types of perspectives overlap. Chinese debates were clearly influenced by, and built upon, Western ideas; however, they were also appropriated to suit Chinese traditional culture and established understandings of the Chinese Self. Before I proceed with the analysis, it is therefore important to note and understand these differences and appropriations.

1. The Discussions of Race, Nation, and Ethnicity in the West

In contemporary social sciences, race, ethnicity and nation are mainly debated as socially constructed and interlinked categories of social inclusion and exclusion. This section will reflect upon the scholarly discussion of these concepts in Western social sciences. In this part, the perspectives will be discussed separately at first, before contradictions and intersections between the terms race, nation and ethnicity are considered.
1.1 The Discussion of Race in the West

The modern idea of race, used to categorise humans into allegedly biologically and culturally clearly distinct groups, was predominantly invented in the 18th and 19th century and closely linked to scientific racism and the period of European Enlightenment (Miles, 1989). During the Enlightenment, European scholars developed hierarchical systems of racial classification, and separated human groups into different races, arguing that these could be categorised on the basis of both physical and moral qualities.

Enlightenment race discourse was often pseudo-scientific and dubious. The number of existing races of mankind, the permanence of ‘racial types’ and the criteria of race classification, were questions of significant controversy among scholars. However, most theories shared an ideology of white superiority, considered the white race as powerful and superior to other races, equipped it with supreme physical and moral qualities, and placed it on top of the racial hierarchy. Steve Garner (2007), among others, has referred to his ideological link between white supremacy and power:

‘The power talked of here is of unchecked and untrammelled authority to exert its will; the power to invent and change the rules and transgress them with impunity and the power to define the Other, and to kill him or her with impunity’ (14).

Bernasconi and Lott’s *The Idea of Race* (2000) provides a useful framework for the historical review of modern Western research on race, covering a range of important historical and contemporary literature on the topic. German philosopher Immanuel Kant, according to them, was the one of first Western thinkers who constructed ‘a rigorous scientific concept of race’ (2000: viii), which was marked by his focus on ‘the permanence of racial characteristics across the generations’ (ibid).

Michael Pickering has demonstrated how in the later 18th and 19th century, the theme of race became increasingly associated with the representation of white racial superiority, which ‘belonged first of all to Europeans’ (2001: 113).
The corresponding racialised ‘stereotypical Other’ of the non-European people was therefore socially constructed, and became an ideological component leading the European colonial-imperial expansion during the 19th century. Alber Memmi’s *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (1957), which explored the national injustice and stereotype, has influenced many scholars. They considered that Western nations in this period are racialised both - the ‘coloniser’ and the ‘colonised’ - ‘the colonial situation manufactures colonialists, just as it manufactures the colonised’ (56). Memmi and other scholars presented the former as white, civilised, and racially superior to the colonised people, represented as inferior, uncivilised others in need of white control, and domination. This attitude of white chauvinism is reflected in the work of many Enlightenment thinkers, among them, David Hume, who stated in his in *Essays - Moral, Political and Literary* (1741/1742):

‘I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites. There scarcely ever was a civilised nation of that complexion, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient GERMANS, the present TARTARS, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular’ (374).

To clarify the characteristics of the idea of race and its crucial role as an ideology legitimising social inequality and domination, Pickering (2001) notes: ‘the category of race denotes a form of labelling imposed on certain groups by those who base their sense of difference from these groups on their self-arrogated superiority. It is an exclusive form of categorisation because it attempts to define groups as inherently inferior to those who command the labelling, and on these grounds to legitimate their social domination’ (114). As such, race can be seen as a socially constructed category of difference, that attempts to naturalise social difference as essentially naturally inherited.

‘Scientific-racism’, associated with the Enlightenment discourses on race in
European thought in the 18th and 19th century, was one of the core sources of modern racism. Many earlier monogenist representations of race, which assumed a common origin of all human races, became gradually marginalised by polygenist theories. The latter promoted the idea of more permanent racial types and argued that human races did not share one origin but were of essentially different origins. Such polygenist views became increasingly popular since the mid-19th century. For example, Robert Knox argued in *The Races of Men*: ‘race is everything: literature, science, art - in a word, civilisation, depends on it … Look all over the globe, it is always the same; the dark races stand still, the fair progress’ (Knox, 1862 [1850], cited in Young, 1995: 93).

Hierarchical theories of race were advocated by different European scholars of this period, who attempted to legitimate and rationalise European imperialist ambitions and colonial conquest. Audrey Smedley (1993) asserted that, in the course of the 19th century, ‘race … [became] a worldview, …a cosmological ordering system structured out of the political, economic, and social realities of peoples who had emerged as expansionist, conquering, dominating nations on a worldwide quest for wealth and power’ (25). Ideas about race during the 19th century and early 20th century were deeply influenced by the ideologies grown within the colonial environment (Lawrence, 1982). As several authors have argued, theories of race and racial hierarchies served to naturalise and reproduce the existing inequalities of social power between different groups and more specifically the dominance of the white race over other races (Frye, 1992). For example, the black race was often represented as physically unusually strong, ugly, bestial, immoral, inherently criminal etc. (Bell, 1992). By analysing Bolt’s work, Pickering concludes that ‘Victorian racism did not exist in a direct causal relationship to imperialism and colonial policy. It should not be seen simply as their *ex post facto* endorsement, but rather as centrally informing them and functioning as their “variable though invaluable adjunct”’ (Pickering, 2001: 134). In other words, racism was the core and dominant mechanism in promoting any types of imperial policies during the late 19th century (Curtin, 1960-63: 40).
The theory of Social Darwinism that emerged in England and the United States in the 1870s was an influential theory of this period seeking to apply the principles of Darwinian evolution to sociology and politics. It postulated that biological and accordingly cultural differences were racially determined and was used to generate additional scientific support for earlier theories about the alleged racial superiority of the white race. A core argument within Social Darwinist discourse was the idea that other non-white races were inferior and less adequately equipped in the natural struggle for survival, and some of them doomed to vanish (see for example Brantlinger, 1985). Rudolf Cronau among others used social Darwinist arguments to oppose the idea that the ‘lower races’ could be civilised, and considered them ‘doomed’:

‘The current inequality of the races is an indubitable fact. Under equally favorable climatic and land conditions the higher race always displaces the lower, i.e., contact with the culture of the higher race is a fatal poison for the lower race and kills them… [American Indians] naturally succumb in the struggle, its race vanishes and civilisation strides across their corpses… Therein lies once again the great doctrine, that the evolution of humanity and of the individual nations progresses, not through moral principles, but rather by dint of the right of the strong’ (cited in Weikart, 2003: 273).

The racial discrimination evident in Western historical racial studies of this period culminated in the eugenic notion of the degeneration and destruction of allegedly ‘inferior’ races. The rise of eugenics as a new scientific discipline in Europe in this period is associated with the work of Francis Galton, who defined ‘eugenics’ as ‘the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage’ (1909: 35).

Francis Galton’s *Hereditary Genius* (1869) made a case for the comparative study of different races and argued eugenics co-operates with the workings of Nature by assuring that humanity shall be represented by the fittest races. ‘What Nature does blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly, man may do providently,
quickly, and kindly. As it lies within his power, so it becomes his duty to work in that direction; just as it is his duty to succour neighbours who suffer misfortune’ (Galton, 2000 [1911]: 83). Galton and his supporters considered that the different human races were fixed by heredity and had set them into a racially hierarchical system without allowing them to be changed during the process of evolution. The distinctions among different races were clarified by quoting a range of social markers including both physical and mental characteristics. In addition, eugenicists were convinced that it was justified to encourage those considered the ‘fittest races’ to breed, while preventing those considered ‘racially inferior’ from breeding.

Western polygenist ideas regarding the permanency of racial types, eugenic race theories, and the race discourse of the European Enlightenment more widely have been questioned and criticised widely in contemporary Western social sciences (e.g. Garner, 2009; Omi, 2001 and Silverstein, 2005). Robert Miles, one of Britain’s most renowned theorists on the topic, for example, suggested with Malcolm Brown in year 2003 that the concept of race is not a useful term without considering its social construction:

‘Thus, perversely, social scientists have prolonged the life of an idea that should be consigned to the dustbin of analytically useless terms: There are no races and therefore no race relations”. Unfortunately, social scientists have frequently assumed that it is possible to overcome the problems inherent in using the term race analytically by simply using scare quotes - that is substitute race for race. This has the virtue of emphasising that race is not a real attribute of human biology, but socially constructed and discursively perceived. In this case, the theory, by simply using the term, is contributing to perpetuate the racism’ (Miles & Brown, 2003: 90).

Instead, Miles suggests to replace the concept of race with the concept of racialisation, which he defines as ‘a dialectical process by which meaning is attributed to particular biological features of human beings, as a result of which individuals may be assigned to a general category of persons which
reproduces itself biologically … The process of racialisation of human beings entails the racialisation of the processes in which they participate and the structures and institutions that result’ (Miles, 1989: 76). He went further to explain racialisation as ‘those instances where social relations between people have been structured by the signification of human biological characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated collectivities’ (Miles & Brown, 2003: 101).

Early critics of Enlightenment race discourses and the belief in white racial superiority included Franz Boas, whose empirical investigation aimed at examining the ‘Instability of Human Types’ (Bernasconi & Lott, 2000: xii-xiii). Boaz criticised, ‘the old idea of absolute stability of human types’ as one that ‘must, however, evidently be given up, and with it the belief of the hereditary superiority of certain types over other’ (Boas, 2000 [1911]: 88). In addition, John Rex (1986), in order to criticise the negative impacts created by existing racial ideologies on African humanity and their culture, noted that ‘ethnic groups sometimes had identities imposed on them to restrict their mobility and to facilitate their exploitation and oppression’ (71).

Another important early scholar in the field, Ashley Mongtagu (2000 [1941]: 105) went even further in his radical refusal of the biological validity of race as a marker of difference. In the mid-20th century, he published an article under the programmatic title The Meaninglessness of the Anthropological Conception of Race (105) and explained: ‘the indictment against the anthropological conception of race is 1) that it is artificial; 2) that it does not agree with the facts; 3) that it leads to confusion and the perpetuation of error, and finally, that for all these reasons it is meaningless, or rather more accurately such meaning as it possesses is false’ (ibid). A similarly radical critical argument is provided by Anthony Appiah. As Montague, he questioned the validity of the anthropological concept of race by suggesting ‘the truth is that there are no races: there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask race to do for us’ (Appiah, 2000 [1986]: 134).

The scholarly Western debates around the topic of race could be therefore
divided into two different camps: those thinkers who consider race to be ‘a fixed, concrete, and objective set of biological characteristics’ (Bernasconi & Lott, 2000: xv); and those who assume that race is a ‘mere illusion, an ideological construction designed to serve the interest of racists’ (ibid: 134).

Today, the Western scientific community has largely abandoned the essentialist biological and anthropological ideas of race characteristics of the first of these camps. Instead, many social scientists suggest studying race critically as a social and cultural construct (e.g. Scott & Marshall, 2009). They examine its historical and social construction, and analyse race as a social category of identity, as well as a category (re-)producing relations of power and inequality in modern societies. The contemporary research on race within the social sciences is therefore ‘largely concerned with examining the causes and consequences of the socially constructed division of social groups according to their so-called race’ (Scott and Marshall, 2009: 543).

In regard to the research focused on race and racism, a wide range of influential works covering different aspects of the topic was published in recent years. For example, Michael Banton, in his influential work *Racial Theories* (1998 [1987]), provides a useful overview of Western historical theories of racial and ethnic relations and contemporary debates on these older claims. The book shows how the concept of race was defined in the West during the 18th and 19th century, and emphasises the link between racism and domination by defining it as ‘the predication of decisions and policies on considerations of race for the purpose of subordinating a racial group and maintaining control over that group’ (187).

Regardless of this critical turn in Western studies on race and racism and the contemporary refusal of scientific racism, the widespread perception of racial ideas in viewing the world, which is referred to as ‘popular racism’ by Michael Pickering (2001), continues to be a problem in modern Western societies. Historically, this popular form of racism was strengthened by the development of modern public media and the promotion of racialised stereotyping of the Other and the superior Western white Self in various popular cultural forms.
According to Pickering, 'racist and imperialist views were (in both senses of the term) articulated by journalists, artists, novelists, travel writers, historians, advertising copy-writers, cartoonists and songwriters, as well as by scientists and intellectuals. Their ubiquity was such that they were commonplace in the visual images found on such ephemera as brand labels, postcards, alphabet books and cigarette cards' (126). Although contemporary media and cultural forms are no longer as obviously racist as in the past, racial stereotyping persists to this day (e.g. Entman and Rojecki, 2001).

1.2 The Discussion of Ethnicity in the West

According to John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (1996), 'ethnicity' is a relatively new term that firstly appeared in the *Oxford English Dictionary* in 1953; however, the English origin of its relative term 'ethnic' has been used since the Middle-Ages in Europe (4-5).

Scholarly attempts to define ethnicity have often remained vague and demonstrate the conceptual ambivalence of the term. Vilfredo Pareto, for example, has in this context considered ethnicity as 'one of the vaguest terms known to sociology' (1963: 2). It has been widely accepted by academics that ethnicity is often linked with culture, and may include 'objective' markers such as language, religion, traditions etc. In some early studies, Geertz (1962) and Shils (1957) referred to ethnicity as a primordial natural phenomenon with its foundations in family and kinship ties. By emphasising the impact of 'kinship' as the primacy of ethnicity, Geertz (1963) argued:

'By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens' or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens' of social existence: immediate contiguity and live connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so
on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times, overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves' (109).

This approach of defining ethnicity is emphasising the emotional ethnic bond and relating it to a biologically and culturally grounded ethnic identity. More contemporary scholars, on the contrary, have conceptualised ethnicity increasingly as a socially constructed category of difference, grounded in the make-up of modern societies. For example, Okwudiba Nnoli (1995) conceives ethnicity ‘as a social phenomenon associated with some forms of interaction between the largest possible cultural-linguistic communal groups (ethnic groups) within political societies such as nation-states’ (1). However, due to centuries of migration, cultural groups, languages and traditions are spread across the globe, and often contribute to the construction of so-called ‘hybrid’ identities. As Fenton (1999) suggested, the presence of hybridity and the global hegemony of English language may not be necessarily conducive to clear-cut forms of collective identification.

Furthermore, several academics have argued that ethnicity is primarily subjective rather than objective in character, and linked to subjective feelings of belonging, identification with a group. Definitions of ethnicity that adopt a subjective approach are widespread and varied. For instance, Max Weber was one of the first social scientists referring to the concept of ethnicity in modern society in relation to a subjective sense of association and commonality. He hence perceives ethnic groups as those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent (1994 [1948]: 389). Young (1965) likewise regarded ethnicity as ‘the active sense of identification with some ethnic units’ (234). In a similar vein, Sanda (1976) defines it as associated with a strong ‘feeling of allegiance to one’s ethnic group’ - in other words - a sense of belonging (33).

Many more recent works on ethnicity conceptualise it entirely as a social and cultural construct and a central element in the formation of group identity. Sian Jones (1997), for example, sees ethnicity being made up by ‘all those social and psychological phenomena associated with a culturally constructed group
identity’ (xiii). Ethnic identity is similarly seen as a subjective phenomenon. He argues it to be grounded in perceptions and feeling of cultural identification with/and belonging to a group, constructed in cultural opposition to Others and/or in terms of a shared lineage. Jones hence refers to ethnic identity as ‘that aspect of a person’s self-conceptualisation which results from identification with a broader group in opposition to others on the basis of perceived cultural differentiation and/or common descent’ (ibid).

The concept of ‘ethnicity’ has seen various applications, since the term can be applied to various social categories in modern society, e.g. class, gender, and etc. The analytical usefulness of the terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic groups’ have been questioned by different scholars (e.g. Ruane and Todd, 2004; Brubaker, 2004). Bob Carter and Steven Fenton (2010), for example, are among those who have criticised the definition and explanation of complex social processes in terms of ethnic qualities or ethnically grounded social forces as reductionist. At the same time, Carter and Fenton (2010) are critically aware that ethnicity - despite scholarly attempts to emphasise its socially constructed character - is sometimes still used as an essentialist category with ‘natural’ connotations. In a recent study on the concept of ethnicity, they have argued that:

‘… the term ethnic and its derivatives do not serve “us” well analytically when presented as either “ethnicity” or as “ethnic groups”. The first (ethnicity) fails because it implies a factor, a social force, an essential element, or a social process which is definable by its ethnic quality and, as such, has causal power’ (7).

This critical reflection is helpful, as it draws our attention to the analytical limitations and socially and culturally constructed character of ethnicity and ethnically defined identities. We can see that to some extent ethnicity is as other social markers of difference, e.g. nation, gender, class, a discursive element in societal processes of ‘making up people’ (Hacking, 2002, 2006), which means that ‘… numerous kinds of human beings and human acts come into being hand in hand with our invention of ways to name them’ (Hacking,
The ways in which people categorise themselves and others, and form social identities have historically changed, and are now seen as socially influenced by wider society, and enhanced within both the political and the academic sphere. As argued by Immanuel Wallerstein: ‘ethnicity must be viewed as a plastic and malleable social construction, deriving its meanings from the particular situations of those who invoke it … Ethnicity has no essence or centre, no underlying features or common denominator’ (Wallerstein, 1987, cited in Smith 1998: 204).

Following this line of thought, according to Peter Ratcliffe (2004), ethnicity might be viewed as a social category that is ‘multidimensional and stratified’ (190). Similarly, Carter and Fenton (2010) also conclude that: ‘ethnic categories are found in all social systems and actors deploy them as ‘practical categories’. The task of the sociologist therefore is to understand the key elements of the social system in which ethnic categories are implicated. This requires re-inserting ‘ethnicity’ into the general theory of social action and social structure.’ (8) Thus, rather than considering ethnicity as a fixed concept with clearly defined specific characteristics, it is more important to analyse the process of its social and cultural construction and the means by and ways in which it is formed. Last but not least, the concept of ethnicity plays an important role in ethno-symbolist theories of nation and nationalism, which will be discussed in the next section.

1.3 The Discussion of Nation in the West

In his book *Contemporary Debates on Nationalism*, Umut Özkirimli (2005) reviewed two basic camps in debates over how to define the nation, which are similar to those identified in debates about ethnicity: one focuses primarily on ‘objective’ markers of the nation, i.e. those that are accessible to an external observer; while the other puts emphasis on subjective elements, i.e. those that become evident only once we take into account the thoughts and feelings of people that constitute a nation. As Hutchinson and Smith (1994) have argued, one of the most representative definition of nation that focuses
exclusively on ‘objective’ elements or markers can be found in the work of Joseph Stalin, who defined the nation as ‘a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture’ (20).

However, this perception of the conceptualizing nation as being grounded in several ‘objective’ elements, has been criticised intensively in academic debates on the subject. Zygmunt Bauman (1992), among others has criticised the idea that nations are based on objective criteria, and can be defined in objective terms. He instead emphasises the elusive, ambivalent and changing characters of nations, when suggesting that, the attempts at defining the nation in an objective way are ‘de-problematizing the very elusiveness and contingency of the nation’s precarious existence’ (677). Bauman promoted a more critical perspective on the study of nation and nationalism when criticising the ‘objective definition’ as one that - ‘obliquely legitimises nationalistic claims’ - dismissing the belief that nations can be defined in an objective way as ‘an artefact of boundary-drawing activity’ (ibid). He attempted to deconstruct synthetic qualities of nations rather than exposing pre-existing, ‘objective’ factors.

Given these criticisms, it is easy to understand why there are only very few scholars today who are aiming to define the nation as a phenomenon that can be understood as being based on objective criteria. Instead, subjective elements have come to be considered necessary in academic circles in defining and correctly understanding what a nation is. Different scholars have analysed the subjective factors involved in the building and reproduction of nations in various ways, taking into account factors such as national ‘solidarity’ (Renan, 1990 [1882]: 19, Hechter, 2000: 11), ‘self-awareness’ (Connor, 1994: 212), ‘loyalty’ (Weber, 1994 [1948]: 25) and ‘collective memory (Young, 1993).

Apart from their discussion on the question ‘what is a nation’, academics in the field of nation and nationalism are also often preoccupied by the question
of when the idea of nation is ‘born’, and how it developed. Authors typically associated with the so-called ‘modernist’ school share the conviction that nations and nationalisms are recent socially and culturally constructed communities and formed as a consequence of the development of modern industrial societies. They argue that the nation did not exist as an immemorial phenomenon, but is rather associated with different socially invented, imagined and mythical qualities. Ernest Gellner was one of the leading representatives of ‘modernist’ school. In his classic work *Nations and Nationalism* (1985), he argued that both nations and nationalism are essentially modern phenomena. According to him, nationalism is a ‘new form of social organisation, that is based on deeply internalised, education-dependent high cultures each protected by its own state’ (48). Benedict Anderson’s (1991) concept of nation, which became one of the most commonly quoted definitions in this research field, defines the nation as ‘an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (6). National communities are here defined as limited, as they are set up within geographical boundaries, which Anderson acknowledges to be to some extent elastic and contested in historical context. Nations are defined as sovereign, as the concept of the modern nation is according to Anderson closely linked to progressive Enlightenment concepts of freedom, democracy, national independence and sovereignty.

The national community is an imagined community, because even though the members in the smallest nation would not know each other ‘in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’ (ibid). Therefore, according to Anderson, ‘communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined’ (ibid). In this context he refers to Gellner’s argument that: ‘nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist’ (Gellner, 1965; cited in Anderson, 1991: 6).

However, some scholars have argued that subjective national consciousness does not develop on its own; but to some extent relies on objective markers, which are necessary to generate the feeling of commonality that gives birth to
or sustains the nation. In other words, in the process of their formation, nations are seen as necessarily seeking references - ‘ostensibly objective features’ (Tamir, 1993: 65) to validate their existence. Anthony Smith (1991), the leading representative of the Ethno-Symbolist school in the study of nation and nationalism, agrees in principal with the modernist thesis that nations and nationalism are predominantly specific to the modern era. However, he argues that modern nations and nationalism are normally rooted in pre-modern ethnic groups and traditions. He claims that most nations hold pre-modern ethnic ties, and defines the nation as ‘a named population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for its members’ (14).

Smith (1991) defines ‘ethnie’ similarly as ‘a named population sharing a collective proper name, a presumed common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differing elements of common culture, an association with a specific “homeland” and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population’ (14). He is convinced that a strong relation exists between modern nations and their pre-modern cultural-ethnic ties. He has attempted to combine both subjective and objective factors in defining a nation. Smith (1991) claimed the ‘modernist approach fails to account for contemporary trends in ethnicity and nationalism’ and sees ethnie as a key concept for the analysis of the genesis of modern nations (14). The dominant modernist school has criticised Smith in return for over-rating the relevance and importance of ethnic elements in the construction of modern nations; and has shown that many modern nations developed without references to pre-modern, ethnic ties, a clearly defined ethnic character, shared ethnic core, or descent. Modernists have in this context argued that ethnie is not a pre-modern precondition of modern nations and nationalism, but in itself a social construct linked to the rise of modern nationalism (see The Warwick Debates on Nationalism, Smith, 1996: 357-370).

Other scholars have supported Smith’s theory, among them are Alain Dieckhoff and Natividad Gutiérrez (2001), who suggest that national
identities exist within distinct pre-modern ethno-heritages, which are determined by ‘the patterning of historical sequences, territorial associations, traditions and values of a particular ethnic community’ (3). David Miller (1995) argued similarly that ethnicity is a powerful foundation for nationalist sentiment. However, he also claimed that ‘even nations that originally had an exclusive ethnic character may come, over time, to embrace a multitude of different ethnicities’ (20). The nation, according to them, is something constantly perceived adaptable to the political environment and social context.

Newer approaches in the analysis of the concepts of nation and nationalism have distinguished and categorised two different types of national identities defined in the public realm, generally, civic and ethnic forms of nationalism. Oliver Zimmer (2002) argued, ‘national identity, thus understood, is a public project rather than a fixed state of mind. Taking place at the interface of culture and politics, the public definition (and re-definition) of nationhood is contingent within certain limitations’ (173-174). Simply speaking, both cultural and political constraints are included in the construction of national identities. Zimmer provided a useful summarised distinction between the civic and the ethnic concept of nationalism:

‘Civic nations, so the classic argument runs, derive their legitimacy and internal cohesion from their members’ voluntary subscription to a set of political principles and institutions. In sharp contrast, ethnic nations are founded on a sense of self-identity determined by “natural” factors such as language or ethnic descent. Consequently, civic nationhood is the outcome of deliberate human commitment, while ethnic nationhood results from long-term cultural and historical evolution’ (174).

It has been shown that although the debates on defining the nation continue, a growing number of authors are coming to the conclusion that it is impossible to define the term nation in a universally applicable way. Craig Calhoun (1997) hence came to conclude that the understanding of nationalism should be linked to its historical and social construction:
‘Nationalism is too diverse to allow a single theory to explain it all. Much of the contents and specific orientation of various nationalisms is determined by historically distinct cultural traditions, the creative actions of leaders, and contingent situations within the international world order’ (123).

John Hall (1993) has similarly emphasised the need to discuss nationalism within its diverse historical contexts. He argued that ‘no single, universal theory of nationalism is possible. As the historical record is diverse, so too must be our concepts’ (1). Thus, the best way of analysing the competing definitions and theories of nation and nationalism might be to regard them as competing representations of, or discourses about, identity emerging within specific historical contexts. As a consequence, it would be naïve to simply take the terms ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’, and the various definitions of these terms developed in the Western world and apply them directly in an examination of Chinese society. Instead, we should first look for Chinese terms and definitions that refer to similar phenomena, and examine how they are used. I will discuss such terms in the Chinese context in the second part of this literature review.

1.4 The Relations between Nation, Race and Ethnicity

In regard to the discussion of the relationships between the terms nation, race and ethnicity, two basic approaches can be distinguished. Some scholars focus their attention mainly on the distinctions between these social concepts. Other authors, instead, consider and analyse these terms (race, nation and ethnicity; and often also gender and class), and the phenomena they refer to, as interconnected and sometimes even interchangeable (e.g. Andersen and Hill Collins, 2006; Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Hill Collins, 1998, 2000; Crenshaw, 1991; Dill and Zambrana, 2009; and Wigger, 2009, 2010). Instead of treating these terms as distinct and mutually exclusive social categories, they prefer to analyse them as different but interlinked representations of social identity, and investigate how they ideologically underlie complex
processes of social inclusion and exclusion, and politics of belonging and not-belonging in Modern Society.

The concept of intersectionality has provided a new way of viewing the relationship between gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, class and nationality, which is focused on analysing the multi-faceted ways in which these categories are discursively intertwined. There are various forms of combination of categories that have been studied broadly. For example, race and gender are investigated as intertwining ‘simultaneous and linked’ social identities (Browne and Misra, 2003: 488). Patricia Hill Collin (1990) has conducted an influential study on black feminism to study the representations of multiple social categories rooted in specific social backgrounds. As Crenshaw (1991) suggests, ‘indeed, one of the projects for which postmodern theories have been very helpful - is thinking about the way power has clustered around certain categories and is exercised against others’ (1296-7).

The concept of intersectionality, which has been termed ‘a fundamental idea’, is based on the analytical insight that ‘neither race, nor class, nor gender stand alone as organising principles of society; rather, they intersect, overlap, intertwine, simultaneously structure, and weave the fabric of all people’s experiences’ (Andersen, 2006: 75).

Judging from the literature in the field, the relationship between race and ethnicity is particularly complex and vague. The essence of ethnicity, according to many sociologists (i.e. Bulmer: 1986), is associated with ‘memories of a shared past’; in other words, ethnicity is related to collective memory, while race is rarely defined in terms of memory. Some scholars have highlighted the necessity of clarifying the distinction between these two concepts. Malik (1996) notes, ‘there is a general sense that if race describes differences created by imputed biological distinction, ethnicity refers to differences with regards to cultural distinctions’ (177). Other scholars (Banton, 1998; Guillaumin, 1995) offer a slightly different explanation of the relationship between ethnicity and race, and argue that race can be defined as the biologically and culturally determined hierarchical classification and naturalisation of groups, while ethnicity is seen as related predominantly to an
internal, self-identification.

A similarly complex relationship exists also between the terms ethnicity and nation, akin to that between ethnicity and race. In many cases nations are considered to derive from an ethnic group; for example, some scholars claim that nations are merely ‘politicised ethnic groups’ (Smith, 1993: 48-62), or ‘institutionalized ethnic groups’ (Eller, 2002: 17). The concepts of nation and ethnicity share certain elements, for example, their association with collective memory of past experiences (either it is remembered or imagined).

In regard to the distinction between the nation and a mere ethnic group, Craig Calhoun (1993) considered that ‘[i]t is precisely the attribution to the former of the right to an autonomous state, or at least autonomy of some sort within the state. On such an account it doesn’t matter whether the nation is an ethnic group that has proved its superiority in historical struggle (material or ideological), or a multi-ethnic population’ (220-221). It has been shown that, one of the significant distinctions between these two terms lies in the link between nation and nationalism: nationalism is commonly related to a clear demand to establish a state, in order to politically legitimise the boundaries, which is not requisite for an ethnic group, which will discussed in more detail in the following section.

On the other hand, several scholars do not believe it is necessary to distinguish these terms in an absolute and universally applicable way, or assume they refer to distinct social spheres. Instead, they believe that ethnicity can be used together and interchangeably with the term race. As Yasmin Gunaratnam (2003: 4) points out, Stuart Hall had doubts about the usefulness of clear-cut distinctions between ethnicity and race. After drawing a binary opposition between race and ethnicity, he noted that ‘biological racism privileges markers like skin colour, but those signifiers have always also been used, by discursive extension, to connote social and cultural differences’ (Hall, 2000: 223). Due to this, attempts to systematically isolate these categories of social sciences (race, nation and ethnicity) have been rejected by several scholars. They on the contrary have emphasised the
importance of studying the reciprocal connections, discursive overlaps and intersectionalities between these social concepts of difference. For example, Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (1992), argued that 'racisms cannot be understood without considering their interconnections with ethnicity, nationalism, class, gender and the state' (VIII).

The theoretical paradigm of intersectionality, and its emphasis on the interconnections between markers of difference such as nation, race, ethnicity and gender that have been widely used in Western literature, has obvious advantages for this project. Foremost so, since representations of the Han in Chinese society used different categories of identity and meanings of Han, combining ideas of nation, race, ethnicity and culture. However, in the context of this thesis, the analysis of intersectionality is a means rather than an end. By attending to the relationships between the ideas of race, nation and ethnicity in the three types of discourses - intellectuals’ writings, textbooks and dictionaries - I will seek to show that these ideas were effectively involved in the broader process of Chinese nation-building. I shall return to this question in the last section of this chapter.

2. The Discussions of Race, Nation and Ethnicity among Chinese Scholars: Issues of Translation and Definition

The concepts of race, nation and ethnicity based on English language literature have been theoretically reviewed in the last section, and multiple contradictions and interconnections between these terms were addressed. In this following part of the chapter, I will focus on the equivalents of these terms in Chinese society, and briefly look at differences in the ways they are defined and translated.
2.1 The Discussion of Nation and Nationalism in China

The notions of nation and nationalism first started being used and discussed in China in the context of modern nation-building processes in the 19th century. The process formed part of broader, fundamental social transformations driven by both internal and external factors, and gave rise to a thorough re-conceptualisation of Chinese self-perception. The modern notion of China as a nation departed significantly and challenged several key dimensions of the traditional construction of identity in Chinese society. To put it simply, Chinese people underwent a profound change in their perception of themselves and their country, from the notion of their country as synonymous with ‘the world’ (tianxia) to the acknowledgment of their country as only ‘a part of the world’, i.e. as one nation among many.

After the eruption of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894, various intellectual institutions were established in the country, including the Baohuang hui (Chinese Empire Reform Association, established in 1899 in Canada, by Liang Qichao [1873-1929] whose work will be examined in detail in the following chapter, and Kang Youwei [1858-1927]). Such institutions deeply influenced the Chinese public, and especially impacted on the Chinese immigrants living abroad. The core of the Baohuang hui is characterised by the aim of protecting the emperor, which has owned a wide social root. This is because of the fact that most Chinese immigrants at the time were seeing the emperor as the representative of the nation (Wang, 1988: 139).

The term nation was first translated into Chinese by Liang Qichao when he applied the concept to minzu and minzu zhuyi, which referred respectively to nation and nationalism. Hughes Christopher (1997) noted that, the term minzu ‘was only introduced into the Chinese vocabulary in 1899 by the constitutional reformer Liang Qichao in Minzu cidian (National Dictionary)’ (3). The term minzu appeared in Liang Qichao’s work Dongji Yuedan (Comments on Japanese Book), published in 1899, in which he refers to the dongfang minzu (the Eastern nations) and minzu jingzheng (national competition) (41).
However, the term nation was not always translated using the word minzu; sometimes another Chinese term guo (nation, state) was used in some literature. The growing consciousness of national identification within China in this period was demonstrated by the increasingly popularity of the usage of the term minzu, which was in meaning closely linked to the notion of ‘nation-state’ (guo).

The concept of nation in modern China after the outbreak of the First Opium War in 1839 has been differentiated by academics from the collective consciousness of belonging among the Chinese in the past. ‘In the traditional Chinese cultural norms, ethnic identity rested on the distinction between barbarian minorities and civilised Han’ (Ma, 2007: 5). The creation of a modern Chinese nation, of national consciousness itself, however, was associated with new concepts resting on the acknowledgement that the world order had become one of competing nations. The traditional foreign policies proposed by ancient China were focused on promoting Han culture and persuading other ethnic groups within Chinese society to accept and be integrated into Han culture. These policies were developed at a time when the late Qing government was rather weak and was faced with the challenge of powerful Western military technologies.

Chinese intellectuals, therefore, were looking for appropriate theoretical and ideological guidelines to stabilise the weakened Chinese government. In this context, a group of terms that were created in the modern Western social sciences were translated into Chinese, including territory (guodì), sovereignty (guóquán, or zhuquán) and citizen (guómin, e.g. a Chinese journal name Guóminbào published during the time), all of which were among the key building blocks of Chinese nationalist discourse at the time. The appearance and usage of these terms reflected a growing focus on politics among Chinese elites in touch with the foreign countries.

The Chinese term guo has been sometimes also used as a translation of the English term nation and vice versa. In 1887, the Chinese diplomatic minister Zeng Jize, for example published an article in English in The Asiatic Quarterly
Review in London, entitled China: The Sleep and the Awakening. In the Chinese translation of this famous article, the word ‘nation’ was translated as ‘guo’ (1992 [1887]: 155-164). The same pattern was also followed by Western authors writing in Chinese, including the author of Waiguo Shilve (The Summarised History of Foreign Countries, 1847) Robert Morrison, the author of Diqiu Tushuo (The Graphic Theory of the Earth, 1856) and others.

Some academics have argued that the Western cultural imprint on the term nation was not matching a specific corresponding term in Chinese. For example, Rui Yifu (1972) stated: ‘according to Sun Zhongshan, the meaning of guozu is same as minzu; and minzu and guojia can be understood in the same way. All these three terms are actually sharing a same origin in Latin “nationem”, which is commonly used as the term “nation” in English, German and French. This is why I claim that the meaning of these three words is a trinity’ (1972: 4).

As evident from the above, it is rather difficult to identify a universally applicable Chinese translation for the English term nation. The usage of the term nation in Chinese society has shown differences in various contexts. This is due not only to the confusion over the definition of the term nation in English, but also to the complexity of the structure of Chinese characters. It frequently happens that we cannot find the exact one-word English equivalent for a particular Chinese word; instead, it is always necessary to consider the contexts when specific usages of the term are investigated.

2.2 The Discussion of Ethnicity in China

Having discussed different reflections of the term ethnicity within modern Chinese history, the Chinese sociologist Ma Rong (2001), as well as some other Chinese scholars (Fei, 1989; Huang, 2002) selected the term zuqun in Chinese as the standard translation of ethnicity and ethnic group. According to Ma Rong (2004), ‘zuqun (ethnicity) can be regarded as a term reflecting the nature of lineage and culture of a community’, while nation is more focused
on politics (64). The main purpose of this was to clarify the relationship between ethnicity and nation (Ma, 2001). In another article, Ma (2007) noted: “nation” is related to “nationalism” and the political movement for “national self-determination” taking place in Western Europe in the 17th century’ (201). The term ‘ethnic group’, on the other hand, ‘refers to groups that exist and identify with a pluralist country with various historical backgrounds, cultures and traditions’ (ibid).

However, the debates about ethnicity among Chinese academics are often intertwined with debates on nations and nationalism, and it is impossible to discuss the particular definitions of ethnicity without at the same time considering how these relate to debates about nation and nationalism. This is influenced by the traditional perception of civilisation among Chinese intellectuals: ‘the Western invasion has created a boundary for Chinese intellectuals with the foreigners, which is supposed to be the boundary for the nation or nation-state; however, it is more a cultural boundary existing in the ideas of Chinese governors and intellectuals’ (Gao, 2007: 45). It has been shown that both political and cultural markers were brought into consideration in order to differentiate between a Chinese Self and the Others by applying the categories of nation and ethnicity.

In regard to this issue, the already mentioned Liang Qichao (1873-1929) drew a conceptual link between the Han as a nation, and the Han as an ethnicity. He distinguished between two forms of Chinese nationalism (1989 [1903]): xiao minzu zhuyi (large nationalism), which referred to ‘the relationship between the Han nation and the other nations (tazu) in the country’, and da minzu zhuyi (small nationalism), which referred to ‘the relationship between the various nations within the country as a whole and the various nations abroad’ (75-76). In his discussion of Liang’s work, Zhao (2004: 66) argued that Liang’s large nationalism is the equivalent of state nationalism, while his small nationalism can be seen as the Chinese equivalent of ethnic nationalism.

In contrast, Zhang Binglin (1868-1936), a Chinese philologist and
revolutionary, and another author whose work I examine in detail later in this
dissertation, considered the Han not only as an ethnicity, but also a nation,
definitely excluding the main rival group of the Manchu, as well as other
ethnicities in China. In his article *paiman pingyi* (Level-headed Discussion of
Anti-Manchuism) published in the newspaper *Minbao*, argued that ‘it is just
like if the key rope of a fishing net is loose, all the meshes are open, anti-
Manchu is the precondition of everything’ (1908, Vol 2: 8).

The different understandings of nation and ethnicity in Chinese society
outlined above are based on different ways of categorising human groups in
specific historical contexts. Although some of the understandings resemble or
echo those familiar from Western literature, the meanings of the Chinese
terms for nation and ethnicity are clearly multiple and shifting. This suggests
that any simple application of Western concepts can be misleading. Instead, it
is necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of the representation of these
ideas in specific texts and historical contexts, and to investigate in what ways
they use all the different terms identified above (*guo, minzu, min, zulei*) in
order to construct the Han, and more broadly identity and difference during
the period of the late Qing and early republican China.

**2.3 The Discussion of Race in China**

The debates about race in non-Western societies have historically been
ignored for a long time. Ideas and representations of race have played a role
in Chinese society as well, and predate the import of the Western concept of
race into Chinese society. One of their core elements was the equation of
Chinese with Hanese, and the portrayal of the Hanese Chinese people as
culturally superior. This representation was linked with the perception of non-
Hanese people in China as ‘barbarian’ or less civilised. It was ideologically
grounded in the belief that Han cultural and moral system could be seen as
the only and absolute standard of evaluating the degree of civilisation of a
certain group. This idea can be traced to the period of Chunqiu (722-481 BC)
(Dikötter, 1992: 2-3).
According to Frank Dikötter (1992), ‘the ruling elite, dominated by the assumption of its cultural superiority, measured alien groups according to a yardstick by which those who did not follow “Chinese ways” were considered “barbarians”’ (2). Li Chi (1928) used the distinction between ‘raw’ and ‘cooked’ food as a marker in defining the boundary between a ‘civilised’ group and a ‘barbarian’. People who were considered barbarian by Hanese Chinese standards included according to Li (1928): ‘The tribes on the East called Yi. They had their hair unbound, and tattooed their bodies. Some of them ate their food that without being cooked’ (229).

From the 18th century onwards, following the intensification of relations with the West, racial stereotypes of Western society proliferated. Westerners and the West in general were described as evil and equated with devils or ghosts in China. The description of Westerners as yangguizi (foreign devils) was very common at the time (Meng, 2006). Some descriptions of Western people included references to physical features, for instance the term hongmaofan (red-haired barbarians) (ibid: 9).

Simultaneously, the racial discourse in modern China was referring to the perception of racialised and dehumanising stereotypes of Africans in Chinese society, which could be seen as a discursive echo of prominent Western racialised identifications of Africa as primitive. Kang Youwei for example, one of the most significant Chinese intellectuals at the time, degraded and dehumanised Africans in his book The Book of Great Unity (da tong shu, 1956 [1901]) claiming ‘…those people have iron faces, silver teeth, protruding pig-look jaw, like an ox from the front, with all body covered in hair, and dark black hands and feet…they are as stupid as the sheep and swine’ (23).

Racialised and inferiorising stereotypes like the ones above, which are a typical element of racism in modern Western societies, were widely used throughout modern Chinese history. This reflects the Chinese recognition of Western ideas as well as the ways in which they were defining the Self and Others’ hierarchically. Thus, it is necessary to conduct archive analysis of specific Chinese historical texts and investigate in what ways the Chinese and
Hanese were defining and representing themselves in racialised terms, in order to construct their identity and distance themselves from people they categorised as Others. In particular, it is important to consider how the category of race was applied in such representations, and how it was related to other categories of identity and difference identified earlier (guo, minzu, min, zulei).

In regard to the racialised representations during the late Qing period in China, ‘the idea of zhong [seed, species, race] started to dominate the intellectual scene at the end of the 19th century and continued to be considered a vital problem by many intellectuals until the end of the 1940s’ (Dikötter, 1999: 420). The discussion of race was especially intense during the colonial period because of the increasing influence of Western ideas, which makes the problem even more complex. Liang Qichao, Yan Fu, and others were deeply influenced by Western theories. For example, Yan Fu worked on the translation of some important Western books, among which Evolution and Ethics (Huxley, 1893) is one of the most important. The translation of this book brought a new understanding of race and ethnicity to the Chinese academic scene.

Liang Qichao made an effort to define the conflict and struggle with the West in a racialised construct when arguing: ‘the yellow race is defined in direct opposition to the white race’ (1999 [1896]: 52). He eagerly advocated the integration of the yellow race in order to resist white domination, and emphasised the important role of China and the Chinese population within what he considered the yellow race: ‘The Chinese population counts for 70 to 80 percent of the of yellow race, thus the survival or extinction of the yellow race is determined by the survival or extinction of China’ (ibid).

The racial construction of identity in modern China clearly reflected the ‘fears of extinction’ among the Chinese (Dikötter, 1992: 75). Having witnessed the weakness of modern China, racial discourse in China ‘indicates that the white peril was not merely a political weapon: racial extinction was a genuine
concern shared by many Chinese who felt threatened by the West towards the end of the nineteenth century’ (Dikötter, 1992: 77). Therefore, the demand to organise reform became an urgent task for Chinese intellectuals, since the late Qing government was considered incapable to resist the challenges from the West.

3. Who are the Han?

The definition of the Han in China was and continues to be shaped by all of the debates and identity categories mentioned so far. The Han are defined in various ways, all of which are closely related to the understanding of ‘China’ and ‘Chinese’. Some studies argue that Han culture’s dominance in Chinese society involves elements of race and racism. Chow Kai-wing (1997) for example, analysed statements made by Zhang Binglin, who was among the first to describe the Han as a race. Chow echoed Zhang’s claim that the Han was constructed as a racial group: ‘although divided by dialects, those who consider themselves Han Chinese have a sense of belonging to a group which shares more or less the same culture, a history and a vague sense of belonging to the “yellow race”’ (34). The significance of the term yellow race in structuring the racial discourse in modern China is clarified by Dikötter (1997) as well, who argued ‘the symbolic meanings ascribed to the colour yellow placed it [the yellow race] in a privileged position in the construction of social identities’ (12).

The sharpest conflict exists surrounding the debate whether the Han should be considered as a nation or an ethnic group. Some scholars represent the Han as a nation, and equate Hanism to Chinese nationalism. Fei (1999: 119), for example, traced the emergence of the Han as the ‘magnetic core’ (ningju hexin) of the Chinese nation to long before the founding of the first Chinese empire, the Qin dynasty, in 221 BC. He claimed that people residing in the central plains of the current territory of China were already seen by outsiders as a ‘quasi-nation’ (zu lei) and that ‘the Han people in fact formed a national entity (minzu shiti)’ (ibid).
Ancient mythology and archaeology have been used to support this argument (Bai, 2003). This interpretation of history was very important for the creation of the myth of the unitary Chinese nation-state because, as Fei Xiaotong has suggested, *lishi de rentong* (historical identification) is the spiritual basis of ethnic identification and plays an extremely important role as the integrating force of the Chinese nation. Due to this force, ethnic minorities on the frontier who were assimilated into the Chinese nation also accepted this historical identification in addition to accepting the Han lifestyle (Fei, 1989). Similar ethnocentric views can be found in other types of nationalism, since the construction of national identity ‘often involves privileging the culture of a specific ethnic group either as the dominant group of the political arena or the oppressed subgroup of the nation’ (Chow, 2001: 1-2).

On the other hand, a number of previous studies support the view that the Han should be seen as an ethnicity. For example, Dru Gladney (1993) regarded the Han as an ethnic group that played a key role in the development of Chinese society. A similar view was adopted by Edward J. M. Rhoads (2000), who analysed the ethnic relations and political power in Late Qing and Early Republican China.

However, both of these opinions are challenged by Fei Xiaotong (1988: 119), who developed the thesis of *Duoyuan yiti geju* (A Unitary Pattern with Pluralist Origins), regarding the relationship between Chinese identity as a unit and sub-identities among different groups. Fei argued that the *zhonghua minzu* (Chinese nation) is a unitary and independent nation (the Chinese *minzu*) of its own, which is constituted by plural nationality or ethnicities, including the Han and all the other *minzu* in the Chinese territory. Zhao Suisheng (2004) summarises this thesis in three brief phrases. ‘1) Han has been the *zhuti minzu* (core nationality); 2) there has been a fusion of many ethnic nationalities in Chinese history; 3) contemporary China as a nation-state was created by the joint efforts of various ethnic groups’ (61).

Judging from this brief overview of competing definitions and categorisations of the Han, it is clear that there is little point in trying to fit the Han into one
single category of race, nation or ethnicity. Instead, I would argue that what we need is an alternative approach that focuses on the multiple ways in which the Han are constructed and represented, and approaches them as competing ways of imagining the Chinese nation, embedded in particular social and political contexts. These competing imaginings, I argue, formed part and parcel of the broader process of Chinese nation-building.

4. The Process of Modern Nation-building and its Reflection in China

The history of modern China is characterised by the fall of the Qing government and the rise of a modern nation-state. My analysis of the discourses of the Han and the Chinese nation is effectively an investigation of the process of Chinese nation-building, and more specifically an analysis of competing (nationalist) identity discourses and the way they were formed among the elites and then, disseminated among the wider population by means of intellectuals’ writings (published in newspapers and pamphlets), textbooks and dictionaries. This section briefly examines a selection of key theories of nationalism and nation-building and draws on them to establish an interpretive framework for the analysis of discourses about the Han and the Chinese in these three sets of sources.

The concepts of nation and nationalism are widely debated. One of the key issues at stake in existing literature is the relationship between nations and nationalism and modernity. While some scholars, sometimes known as the ‘modernist group’, emphasise the modern qualities of nations and regard nationalism as a product of the modern development and transformations of materials and discourses (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Özkirimli 2000), others, typically referred to as ethno-symbolists, seek to show that modern nations are constructed and developed based on pre-existing ethnic groups, and cannot be understood fully without reference to pre-modern roots (Connor, 1990; Smith, 2003).
Definitions of nations and nationalism differ accordingly. Anthony D. Smith, the most influential scholar in the ethnosymbolist group, defined the nation in his book *National Identity* (1991) in following way:

>'a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members' (14).

As evident from this quote, Smith puts emphasis on ‘historic territory’, ‘common myths’ and ‘historical memories’, all of which he sees as closely ties to pre-modern ethnic communities which served as the basis for modern nations. In response to modernist theories, Smith claimed that ‘too great an emphasis on the “modernising” potential of nationalism overlooks the importance of the ethnic roots in the past’ (Smith, 1983: xi). He took particular issue with Hobsbawm’s theory of ‘invented traditions’, discussed further on, arguing that it ‘places too much weight on artifice and assigns too large a role to the fabricators’ (1998: 130). Smith re-stated his approach again in his recently published his book *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* in 2009, which again emphasizes the importance of pre-modern ethnic roots and their symbolic dimensions for the understanding of the persistence and appeal of modern nationalism.

In contrast to ethnosymbolists, modernists generally assume that nations are a product of modernisation, and can be invented regardless of whether suitable pre-modern ethnic groups exist or not. More specifically, modernists consider that nations are the consequence of nationalism, as noted by Ernest Gellner (1983): ‘it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way around’ (55). Gellner’s (1983) emphasis on the constitutive and revolutionary nature of nationalism is evident also in his definition of nationalism:

>'In brief, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state - a contingency
already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation - should not separate the power-holders from the rest' (1).

The following passage, which emphasises the role of invention in nationalism and nations, is indicative as well:

‘Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist - but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, even if, as indicated, these are purely negative’ (168).

Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm - are two further important scholars in the modernist group. Compared to Gellner and other modernists such as John Breuilly, who focus primarily on political and economic aspects of nation building, they are more focused on cultural processes. As my dissertation is interested primarily in discourses and hence culture, their work is of most direct relevance.

Like Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm (1983, 1991) emphasised the invented and artificial character of nations, and focused on - as the subtitle of his key book on the topic suggests - the process that led from nationalism as a ‘programme’ and nation as a ‘myth’ to nations and nation-states as taken-for-granted elements of ‘reality’. The emphasis on invention comes particularly clearly to the fore in his book *The Invention of Tradition*, where the examined different ‘invented traditions’ used historically to engender mass support for nationalist ideas. Hobsbawm defined ‘invented tradition’ in this way:

“‘Invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983: 1-2).

Among examples of invented traditions Hobsbawm’s book examines diverse
cultural phenomena, from national songs, flags and holidays to celebrations and folk costumes.

Hobsbawm's work has proved to be particularly useful as a general framework for my analysis of the process of constructing a modern Chinese identity, linked to a modern Chinese nation-state. What I seek to do in my thesis is to trace the formation of modern (nationalist) ideas about the Chinese Self and its Others, and its gradual dissemination among the wider population. Using Hobsbawm's words, I am hence tracing the process of Chinese nation-building from the early national ‘programmes’ and ‘myths’ to the point when these programmes were gradually translated into ‘reality’ in the sense that they became shared and taken for granted among the broader population. As I show further on, the establishment of the Republic of China was paralleled by fundamental changes in discourses about the Han and the Chinese, which were then incorporated into new educational materials and dictionaries. Furthermore, several of these changes involved ‘inventing’ traditions, which served the political aims of the new republican, nationally-minded elites. The Chinese Self and its history were selectively reinterpreted to suit the purpose of modern Chinese nation building, and the perceptions of the Han changed accordingly.

The early republican period was also a period of growth in state administration and expansion of education brought by the growth of the modern state, which were both prompted by the increasing recognition among the Chinese authorities that these institutions could be used as effective vehicles of propaganda. Because nationalism is a mass ideology, dependent on the acceptance of nationalist ideas among civilians at mass level, propaganda, and more generally the popularisation of nationalist discourses, is crucial to its success, and constitutes an integral element of nation-building. This point has been noticed by Hobsbawm as well, who also noted the key importance of nationalist propaganda in the context of war:

‘... it is significant that the belligerent governments appealed for support for this war, not simply on the grounds of blind patriotism, and
even less on the grounds of macho glory and heroism, but by a propaganda addressed fundamentally to civilians and citizens’ (89).

These points apply well to Chinese nation-building as well. As Zhao Suisheng (2004) argued, wars – and especially China’s defeats in conflicts against Western countries and Japan - were a key incentive for the creation of a modern, unified nation and nation-state:

‘Modern Chinese nationalist consciousness was a product of recent history sparked by China’s defeats in a series of wars against the Western powers and imperial Japan in the nineteenth century. Fearing the extinction of China in the newly encountered nation-state system, seasoned Chinese political elites searched for the nationalist thread among the tangled fabric left by the breakup of the universal empire and followed that thread through the chaos of disunity to the creation and maintenance of a new, unified nation-state’ (38-39).

In line with this, my analysis will look at how these key conflicts were tied to, and served as incentives for, changes in discourses about the Chinese Self, and hence the rise of a modern sense of the Chinese national Self, defined in contrast to Japan and the Western Other, and seen as culturally unified or at least integrated, centred on the cultural core embodied in the Han.

A particular challenge in this process was the overcoming of hostilities between China’s numerous ethnic groups, and in particular between the Manchu and the Han. As my analysis shows, intellectuals’ discourses about the Chinese Self and its Others in the late imperial era were initially rather divisive and sought to exclude and demonise one or more ethnic groups. After the establishment of the republic, however, elite discourses changed and became more open conciliatory and inclusive, in line with the growing need for national integration and unity. Comparable traits can be found also in dictionaries and in particular in school textbooks from the same period. Arguably, similar to many other cases around the world, modern Chinese education sought to engender political loyalty based on a set of ‘meanings
that individuals impute to their membership in an ethnic community, including those attributes that bind them to that collectivity and that distinguish it from other in their relevant environment’ (Esman, 1994: 27). At the same time, and similar to many other cases across the world, the process of modern Chinese nation-building involved the process of elimination (or integration) of cultural and social distinctions that existed among many ethnicities in China, with the aim to justify the establishment of a unitary state. Arguably, like other examples of modern nation building, Chinese nation building was aimed at building ‘the convergence of territorial and political loyalty irrespective of competing loci of affiliation, such as kinship, profession, religion, economic interest, race, or even language’ (Hass, 1986: 709).

Another important modernist theory of nations and nationalism that proved useful to my analysis of discourses is the theory of nations as imagined communities developed by Benedict Anderson. According to Anderson, ‘print capitalism’ is the central aspect of modernisation, and he argues that ‘print capitalism’ was as a powerful force that can explain the rise of nations and nationalism, because it provided the basis for national imagination:

‘what, in a positive sense, made the new communities imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity’ (1991: 42-43).

Anderson therefore emphasised the role of printed language in the process of nation-building. He regarded books, periodicals and newspapers as different cultural means that participated in the construction of an imagined national community, and helped build a standard national written language. In this way, national discourses, embedded in mass circulated newspapers and books, served as effective vehicles of spreading and unifying national imagination as well as national written language as a means of this imagination.
Of course, Anderson’s theory is not directly applicable to the materials I am examining, because Chinese economy at the time was far from a modern capitalist economy, and we therefore cannot talk of ‘print capitalism’ in the sense Anderson has in mind. Even though commercial publishing existed, the driving force being the use of print for the purpose of nation-building was the state. This is particularly clear in the case of print media I examine in the second and third layer of my analysis, i.e. school textbooks and dictionaries, which were overseen and regulated by state institutions. As I will show, in the period of the early republic, these print media served as means of spreading a new, modern Chinese national imagination, and thereby arguably served as efficient modern instruments of national propaganda for the republican government. With regard to each of these sources, I will also show how the discourses they helped spread are linked to the particular, changing social and political environment in which they appeared.

A further thing worth explaining in this context is my understanding of discourse and its link with nationalism. To put it simply, my approach follows that of Özkirimli (2005) who defined nationalism as a particular type of discourse, or a specific way of seeing the world:

‘… people live and experience through discourse in the sense that discourses impose frameworks that limit what can be experienced or meaning that experience can assume, thereby influencing what can be said or done. Hence, nationalism is a particular way of seeing and interpreting the world, a frame of reference that helps us make sense of and structure the reality that surrounds us’ (29-30).

More specifically, what my analysis focuses on are the key elements of nationalism as discourse, namely the perceptions of the Chinese Self, its relevant Others, the choice of markers used to delineate between the Self and the Other (e.g. biological and cultural markers) as well as (at some points in the analysis) the perceptions of the national past.

To sum up, the three levels of discourses and sources I am analysing are
linked to key modern institutions that were established as part of nation-building, and which served as instruments of diffusing nationalist ideas at a mass level: the institutions of the public sphere (with different newspapers, pamphlets and other outlets by means of which the intellectuals were spreading their ideas, as well as dictionaries for popular use) and the modern education system. Hobsbawm’s arguments about mass culture and its propaganda functions, and Anderson’s focus on the role of print in national imagination, provide a useful general analytical framework for my analysis. From this perspective, these modernist approaches to nations and nationalism are evidently valuable for my analysis. At the same time, my choice of these theories should not mean that I necessarily agree with every single aspect of them. For instance, I have already pointed out that Anderson’s theory is not entirely and directly applicable to the Chinese case.

More generally, by choosing these theories, I do not wish to imply that competing approaches, such as ethnonationalism, are entirely mistaken. For instance, my analysis shows that there are some basic continuities between the late imperial and early republican discourses about the Chinese, in the sense that they are both Han-centred and based on the belief in the cultural and civilizational superiority of the Han. At the same time, I also note key differences in the relationship between the Han and other ethnic communities. Evidently, at discursive level, the modern Chinese nation was indeed rooted in, and built on, older, late Qing discourses of the Self. However, to make a more informed assessment of these issues and the relative strengths and weaknesses of modernist v.s. ethnosymbolist approaches, my thesis would need to focus more directly on exact continuities and discontinuities between modern Chinese nation and pre-modern ethnic groups. To do so, I would need to move beyond discourse analysis, and employ a different range of sources, which is beyond the scope of this project.
Chapter 2: Sources and Methodology

In order to gain an insight into the different representations of the Han in Chinese society of the late Qing and early republican period, my empirical research will cover three types of sources:

1. The works of three selected Chinese intellectuals;
2. The content of school textbooks;
3. The definitions of nation, race, ethnicity, and other relevant concepts such as state and people, in Chinese dictionaries, as part of the process of nation-building.

By covering these three types of sources, I will seek to understand not only the competing definitions of the Han in elite intellectual discourses, but also the ways in which these definitions were disseminated and popularised among a broader audience.

This chapter offers an overview of each of the three types of sources, and explains my method of analysis. Before that, however, I shall first explain my choice of historical focus.

1. Choice of Historical Focus

My analysis focuses the period between the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War and the first decade of the twentieth century. This choice is inspired by Frank Dikötter’s influential study that discusses the development of racial thought in China from a historical perspective, and reconstructs the evolution of the idea of race from 1793 to 1949. He divided the historical development of the definition of race within Chinese society into four stages:

1. The Emergence of a Racial Consciousness (1793-1895)
2. The Reformers and the Idea of Race (1895-1902)
3. The Revolutionaries and the Nation-Race (1902-1915)

In my study, I decided to focus on the two middle stages, during which social conflicts in Chinese society were particularly serious and marked by intense patriotic passions. This was the time of some of the most momentous events in Chinese modern history, including the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the Chinese republican revolution of 1911, and the formation of the first Republic of China. Jon Woronoff (2008) explains the significance of this period in the following way:

‘Over its very long history, China has usually been a calm and predictable place. But one period stands out for its radical, dramatic, and often bloody change - with different forces pulling in different directions, so evenly balanced that until the very end no one could foresee the outcome. What occurred during the century-and-a-half “modern China” period is not only unprecedented; it was also largely unexpected and is still not fully understood’ (2009: ix).

This was also a period of growing influence of Western modern ideas of race and nation, heated discussions about the correct definition of Chinese identity, and the social role played by Han identity in Chinese society. My decision to study the period of late Qing and early republican China was also influenced by the fact that important Chinese intellectuals published their main works during this time.

2. Methodology: Discourse, Narrative and Comparison

My research perspective is discourse-oriented and discourse analysis is therefore the most important method has been adopted. My analysis is conducted in the methodological frame of a historically oriented discourse analysis.

The term discourse is widely defined, for example, one of the broadest
definition is made by Fasold (1990) noted ‘the study of discourse is the study of any aspect of language use’ (65). Candling (1997) refers to the term discourse as ‘language in use, as a process which is socially situated’ (ix). According to Fairclough (1995), ‘discourse analysis can be understood as an attempt to show systematic links between texts, discourse practices, and socio-cultural practices’ (16-17). This method has been widely used in different ways, and is often focused on the ‘relationship between language use and social structure’ (Deacon et al. 1999: 146-148). It also reflects on ‘forms of representation in which different social categories, different social practices and relations are constructed from and in the interests of a particular point of view, a particular conception of social reality’ (ibid: 148).The discourses considered in this thesis consist of the sentences and phrases, which have been used in intellectuals’ articles published in books or newspapers, school textbooks and dictionaries during the late Qing and early republican period that are linked to my research topic.

The discourses that have been identified for my research are focused on showing systematic links between discourses on the Han and the changing socio-political context of late Qing and early republican China. More specifically, I seek to demonstrate that the different ways of situating the Han discursively - as a race, a nation or an ethnic group - were closely connected to changing socio-political circumstance in which the discourses were produced. This is particularly clear in my comparative analysis of intellectuals’ discourses, because each of the chosen intellectuals adopted a slightly different political stance, and their definitions of the Han (as well as other groups within the Chinese population and understandings of China and the Chinese more generally) differed accordingly, as well as changed over time in line with their changing political convictions. In a similar vein, the analysis of dictionaries and school textbooks shows how the discourses changed as we moved from one historical period and context to the next.

These three types of discourses - intellectuals’ discourses, school textbooks and dictionaries, could be to some extent related to the different classes, namely, elites, educated middle-classes, and wider population. At this point in
history, Chinese educational system was still open to select few (universal compulsory education was introduced only later) and it is therefore feasible to argue that school textbooks reached primarily the educated (upper) middle classes. Dictionaries were potentially read among a wider public, especially if we consider that they were likely to be used in a group or family setting with both illiterate and literate members. My thesis therefore traces the process of formation of modern national ideas among the elites and their dissemination among the educated middle-classes and the wider population (Yu, 1996: 137).

I should also clarify that while focused on the Han, my analysis also examines the discourses on other groups and identities linked to the Han, especially the Manchu and of course the broader identity of China and the Chinese, as well as the identities of relevant external others, including Westerners and the Japanese. This is necessary because any definition of the Self is closely tied to the definition of the Other (Pickering, 2001) and hence the discourses about the Han were inextricably linked to discourses about other groups that were considered as either part of, and linked to, the Chinese Self, or presented as its Other.

In terms of the specific textual analytical methods adopted, my analysis centred on two discursive elements: a) identity categories such as race, nation, ethnicity and their equivalents in Chinese and b) identity markers, for instance the different adjectives or phrases used in connection with different identity categories, such as ‘civilised’, ‘educated’, ‘smelly’, ‘yellow’ etc. By investigating the use of identity categories and identity markers together I was able to show, among other things, that identity markers we usually associate with race and racism today, and which refer to biological and physical characteristics - e.g. ‘smelly’, ‘tall’, ‘well-proportioned’ etc. - were not necessarily used only in connection with the category of race, but also descriptions of nations and ethnic groups. This alone is enough to show that a clear-cut differentiation between ethnic, nationalist and racist discourses is not particularly useful in this context.
In my analysis, I also seek to use comparison - across different types of sources and different periods - to gain a better understanding of a) the nature of debates about the Han and their links with contemporary discourses about race, nation and ethnicity in the chosen historical period; and b) the ways in which these discourses were disseminated among the broader population. Given these aims, it is clear that my main focus is on 'how', rather than explanatory, even though I also seek to relate the changing discourse to changes in the broader political, social and cultural environment, and to processes of nation-building.

Another method of relevance to my analysis, especially in the analysis is narrative analysis. In historiography, the narrative has traditionally been the main rhetorical device used (Stone, 1979). The term narrative has been discussed in different ways, as it is ‘a primary act of mind’ (Hardy, 1977: 12), ‘the primary scheme by means of which human existence is rendered meaningful’ (Polkinghorne, 1988: 11), and ‘a means by which human beings represent and restructure the world’ (Mitchell, 1981: 8). Bruner (1990) summarised it as an ‘organising principle’, by which ‘people organise their experience in, knowledge about, and transactions with the social world’ (35).

One of the clearest and simplest explanations of the narrative method can be found in Connelly and Clandinin’s (1990) work, who argue that ‘humans are storytelling organisms who, individually and collectively, lead storied lives. Thus the study of narrative is the study of the ways humans experience the world.’ (2). Griffin (1992) defines narrative as the organisation of simultaneous actions and occurrences in a consecutive, linear order ‘that gives meaning to and explains each of its elements and is, at the same time, constituted by them’ (Griffin, 1993: 1097). In line with this, my analysis of textbooks was particularly concerned with the question of which historical events or issues were chosen and how they were arranged in a narrative. In relation to this, I also examined who, or which groups, were presented as the Self and the Other in these events and narratives.

More broadly speaking, my research is also influenced by social
constructionism, a research perspective rooted in the work of the German sociologists Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, as outlined in their influential book *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966). They argued that ‘it is important to keep in mind that the objectivity of the institutional world, however massive it may appear to the individual, is a humanly produced, constructed objectively’ (57). They therefore highlighted the contribution of individuals’ performance to an improved construction of society: ‘one must also be initiated into the various cognitive and even affective layers of the body of knowledge that is directly and indirectly appropriate to this role’ (72).

The three layers of knowledge that will be focused on in my research - intellectuals’ discourses, and the content of school textbooks and dictionaries, are all produced by different ‘individuals’, and all demonstrate different authors’ understandings and perceptions of the social phenomenon and the identity of Han. They were influenced and shaped by the social reality during the late Qing and early republican China, and vice versa. I will apply these analytical perspectives to my research to understand how ideas of the Han were socially and historically constructed and developed in Chinese intellectual discourse, encyclopaedias and dictionaries, and textbooks during the late Qing and early republican period.

### 3. Intellectuals

A growing number of contemporary studies of modern Chinese history consider the relevance of ideas developed by Western scholars for an understanding of Chinese identity. The important works in this context include Dikötter’s study on the racial discourses in modern China, and Joshua A. Fogel’s study on the concept of ‘people’ (1997). Some of these studies also take into account the work of one or two specific Chinese intellectuals. For example, Howard Richard’s (1962) study focuses on Kang Youwei’s intellectual ideas, and Eris Chiyeung Ip (2008) focuses on Sun Zhongshan’s constitutionalism. Others put emphasis on the discussion of relationships between the Han and the Manchu in Chinese society (Rhoads, 2000).
These studies differ in their analytical perspectives and discussions of Chinese and Han identities. Nevertheless, they all demonstrate the relevance of Chinese intellectual debates during the period of late Qing to the early twentieth century for an analysis and historically adequate understanding of the development of representations of the Han in Chinese society. However, there have been few attempts so far to study the development of representations of the Han in Chinese intellectual discourse in empirical depth as I do here.

My analysis of the discourses of Chinese intellectuals is mainly focused on the main works of three core thinkers of this period: Zhang Binglin, Sun Zhongshan and Liang Qichao. I selected them for two main reasons: firstly, they were all among the most influential intellectuals of their age played an important role in shaping public debate, and their writings continue to be regarded as important sources for Chinese studies across the world. Secondly, they also represent different typical attitudes towards, and understandings of the role and definition of Han identity in Chinese society.

In the following section, I will briefly outline the contributions of these three thinkers, and identify the writings I have used as the basis of my analysis. Further detail about the biographies, ideas and political careers of each of these intellectuals is provided in Chapter 4.

3.1 Zhang Binglin
Zhang Binglin (1868-1936), who is well known for his extensive and profound knowledge and scholarship, was a Hanese representative of the intellectual camp, a radical Chinese nationalist and especially famous for his promotion of the idea of anti-Manchuism (*paiman*). Manchu is a large Tungusic ethnicity, which originated in Manchuria (today’s Northeast China). They arose during the seventeenth century, conquered the Ming Dynasty and established the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). The Qing Dynasty ruled China until its abolition in 1911 by the *Xinhai* Revolution, and the establishment of the Republic of China.
The conflict between the Manchu and the Han had existed for a long time in Chinese history, yet became acute after the failures of the Manchu government in the wars with the Western powers, including the First (1839-1842) and Second (1856-1860) Opium Wars, and the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). The late Qing Dynasty is a period during which ‘the Western and Japanese invasions became a fatal threat to China’s independence’ (Ma, 2007: 206).

Zhang Binglin was born in a traditional Hanese family in 1868. His father Zhang Jun actively supervised Zhang Binglin and his brothers’ learning in classic Chinese culture during their childhood period. Apart from the eldest brother who died at an early age, Zhang Binglin and his two brothers had all got good results in the keju examination. Zhang Jun required his sons to excel in two main aspects: the first was the integrity of personality, while the other was knowledge (Chen, 2008: 4). Zhang Binglin was greatly influenced by his father’s supervision, especially with regard to these two requirements. Chen Yongzhong (2008) explains these two requirements as the following: ‘the first is actually to require his children not to grovel to the Qing court; the second is to require his children to comprehensively and deeply understand the classics and history works, instead of focusing on literature and painting. In addition, the integrity of personality is always more important than knowledge’ (4).

Having witnessed the weakness of the Qing court, the idea of anti-Manchuiism spread quickly among the Hanese intellectuals. Zhang Binglin’s work was representative of this camp. Zhang considered that the Han had been suffering from the Man Qing’s cruel government for a long time and concluded that there had never been ‘an equality between Manchu and Han’ (1997 [1901]: 151). However, this radical attitude was not accepted by all Han intellectuals. Some of them, like Kang Youwei, held a traditional sense of loyalty to the Manchu government, while others like Liang Qichao and Sun Zhongshan considered the revolt against the foreign invasion to be the
primary task for Chinese people. These perspectives will be discussed in the next part of the chapter. Zhang's racial and national ideas were obviously distinct from other famous Chinese intellectuals at this point, which inspired me to analyse his work and contributions to intellectual discourse on the Han in China in depth.

The main body of Zhang's work I will analyse consists of the writings published in Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji (The Selection of Zhang Taiyan's Political Discourses), edited by Tang Shiju (1977). This book contains 257 articles written by Zhang, including his political essays, discourse, speeches, announcements, letters and poems, which provide a comprehensive insight into the changes of Zhang's ideas in different historical periods.

3.2 Sun Zhongshan

Sun Zhongshan (1866-1925) is widely recognised in contemporary China as the ‘Father of the Modern China’ (Ip, 2008: 327). Being a Hanese scholar, Sun is one of the main founders of the Republic of China and of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang). He is therefore undoubtedly an important figure in modern Chinese history.

Sun Zhongshan was born in a Cantonese Hakka family of farmers, in the village of Guangdong province. In 1878, when Sun was aged 13, he went to Honolulu to live with his elder brother. Apart from this, Sun had various experiences of studying in Southeast Asia, which has differentiated his ideas from other Chinese intellectuals who had received the traditional Confucian education in China, for example, Kang Youwei.

After studying various scientific disciplines in the United States and Southeast Asia, including English language, Christianity, science, and mathematics, Sun went back to China at the age 17. He received a vocational training in medicine at the Guangzhou Boji Hospital. After the First Sino-Japanese War, Sun Zhongshan started promoting the idea of revolution to overthrow the Qing government and establish a modern political structure to replace the old
dynamic system. He organised different communities to promote anti-Manchuism, for example, Xingzhong hui (the Society for the Revival of China) in 1894. He had also raised money to support these communities and to organise revolutionary activities (Mackerras, 2008: 31). On New Year's Day of 1912, he helped establish the Provisional Government of the Republic of China, which was also the first republican government in Asia. Being widely respected by the delegates from 16 provincial assemblies, Sun was named the 'provisional president' of the newly established government (Schoppa, 2006: 140; Spence, 1990: 267).

In 1904, Sun Zhongshan had created the revolutionary philosophy of sanmin zhuyi (Three Principles of the People), which includes three principles of minzu (nation, nationalism), minquan (democracy, the People's power) and minsheng (the People's welfare, livelihood). Richard Wilhelm (1931) evaluated Sun's political ideas and stressed its synthesising and integrating qualities:

‘The greatness of Sun Yat-sen rests, therefore, upon the fact that he has found a living synthesis between the fundamental principles of Confucianism and the demands of modern times, a synthesis which, beyond the borders of China, can again become significant …’ (8)

The significance of Sun Zhongshan’s work in the history of Chinese revolution and in the context of social changes in Chinese society during the late Qing and early republican China has been widely analysed by Western scholars. For example, Harold Z. Schiffrin (1970) conducted a study investigating Sun’s political practices until 1905. In a later book, Schiffrin (1980) has further extended his work on Sun Zhongshan, covering the period until 1925. Sidney H. Chang and Leonard H. D. Gordon’s book *All Under Heaven* (1991) has more recently provided a comprehensive analysis on Sun Zhongshan's revolutionary thoughts. Nevertheless, Marie-Claire Bergère (1994) considers that the importance of Sun's political idea has not yet obtained enough attention in Western scholarly circles: ‘in the West, Sun's *Three Principles of the People* has never been rated as one of the great works of contemporary
Chinese thought' (391).

The influential impact of Sun Zhongshan’s political ideas and their relevance to an understanding of modern Chinese history as well as the representations of the Han during the late Qing and early republican period have influenced my decision to analyse Sun’s thoughts in the context of Chinese identity. My in-depth analysis of his work will mainly focus on *Sun Zhongshan quanji* (Complete Works of Sun Zhongshan) (1981), *Guofu quanji* (Completed Works of Father of the Nation) (1973), both of which have included a large number of Sun’s works published in different periods that allow adequate historical comparison for research purposes.

### 3.3 Liang Qichao

As Wang and Wei (2005) state, Liang Qichao (1873-1929) was ‘a leading intellectual of the late Qing and early Republican eras’ (67). As noted by Xiao Yang (2002):

‘Liang Qichao (1872-1929) was one of the foremost intellectual leaders of contemporary China and one of its major political figures. He was arguably the most widely read public intellectual during the transitional period from the late Qing Dynasty to the early Republican era. Like Diderot in France and Herzen in Russia, Liang was a thinker whose opinions and activities changed the direction of political and social thought in his country’ (17).

Liang was born in a small village in the Guangdong province. In 1890, he went to the capital and became a student of Kang Youwei, another influential intellectual figure at the time (Wu, 2004: 40). Liang Qichao's political standpoints were similar to Kang Youwei's. They both advocated constitutional monarchy and Western democracy. Their differences arose from the failure of the 100 Days Reform, after which Kang Youwei was still loyal to the Qing emperor and government while Liang became increasingly radical and opposed to royalist attitudes (Wu, 2004: 85-91).
In 1899, Liang Qichao published his work *Dongji yuedan* (Comments on Japanese Books) (1989 [1899]). He was one of the earliest intellectuals who used the term *minzu* (nation) when he referred to the *dongfang minzu* (the Eastern nations) and *minzu jingzheng* (national competition) in his work. Subsequently, he was also influential in introducing Western theories about nation and nationalism to Chinese society. His ideals were related directly to Johann Caspar Bluntschli’s (1808-1881) thesis of No State, No Nation, for ‘the Nation comes into being with the creation of the State’ (Bluntschli, 1885: 86). From 1899 to 1903, Liang published various articles introducing and promoting Bluntschli’s theories in the newspaper *Xinmin Congbao*, e.g. *Guafen weiyan* (The Prophecy of Chinese Division) (1999 [1899]: 30), *Guojia sixiang bianqian yitonglun* (The Discussion on the Changes of the Similarities and Differences in National Ideas) (1999 [1901], 94-95) and *Zhengzhixue dajia bolunzhili zhi xueshuo* (The Theory of Political Scientist Bluntschli) (1999 [1903]). Bluntschli was a Swiss jurist, politician and contemporary of Liang Qichao. One of Bluntschli’s works discussed by Liang is *The Theory of State*, in which he argued that the state was supreme over the nation and society. This idea inspired Liang Qichao to argue against the attempts of the anti-Manchu movement that promoted the overthrowing of the Qing government; instead, he called for reconciliation between the Manchu and the Han, in order to establish a state that integrated different groups in China and was capable of resisting the West.

Liang Qichao was an enthusiastic supporter and promoter of Chinese nationalism, similarly to the other two intellectuals, Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan, though they had different understandings of the goals of nationalism. He made a great effort in praising nationalism and its significant function of standardising the relationship among different nations, which he believed to claim that a nation should not invade or be invaded by other nations (1989 [1899], vol.1: 19).

Liang Qichao has published a large number of writings, many of which appeared in the *Yinbing shi heji* (Collected Writings from the Ice-Drinker’s Studio) (1989 [1936]). This book includes more than 700 of Liang’s articles,
has been published several times and is considered to be the most comprehensive collection of Liang Qichao’s work (e.g. Wilkinson, 2000: 401). My analysis is therefore focused on this collection.

4. School Textbooks

School textbooks serve as one of the crucial organs in the process of constructing legitimated ideologies and beliefs in a society, and can be regarded as a reflection of the history, knowledge and values considered important by powerful groups, including academic experts, in society. In many nations, debates over the content and format of school textbooks are sites of considerable educational and political conflict. This is because school textbooks play an important role in spreading elite opinions and ideas among the general population and in shaping the opinions and values of future generations. The production of textbook content can therefore be considered as the result of a competition between powerful groups and their struggle over meaning (Liu & Hilton, 2005). Textbooks inform and shape peoples’ understanding of the world, and are hence seen as crucial in the creation of collective national memory, designed to meet specific cultural, economic and social imperatives.

Being an important type of discourse, the content of textbooks published during a specific period reflects the corresponding social facts in this same period. When he refers to the link between textbooks and society, Nicholls (2003) noted that ‘to an overwhelming extent the initiatives represent a response to the devastating wars and conflicts, often fought on ethnic, nationalist or sectarian grounds, that dominated the twentieth century’ (11). He argues from a critical perspective that textbook research should focus on ‘the mechanisms within national education systems that perpetuate prejudice, stereotyping and bias and, through bilateral and/or multilateral dialogue’ and ‘discuss alternative ways of proceeding’ (ibid).

The second part of my research will therefore focus on the sphere of
education. I am going to discuss some of the most important school textbooks on the subject of history published during the period of the late Qing and early republican China. In order to collect the relevant sources of school textbooks and also dictionaries, I have spent 1 month at the Chinese National Library in Beijing at the end of 2008. The key words I have used to search the relevant results were student (xuesheng), middle school (zhongxue), primary school (xiaoxue), textbook (keben, jiaocai or jiaokeshu) and history (lishi). By setting the publishing time, and the key words as the conditions of searching, I was able to obtain all the relevant resources. However, for the purpose of presenting my analysis of school textbooks, I chose to focus on some texts in a few numbers of textbooks, which means that some sources were not included after consideration because of the limited length required for the thesis. The textbooks I have included were all influential works and representing different standpoint in shaping public debate, which were frequently mentioned and discussed in different academic disciplines of Chinese studies.

In my analysis, I attempt to identify and discuss the key representations of Han and Chinese identity, and clarify in what ways and by what means school history textbooks in China tended to retain an ethno-centric and nationalistic role in the education system. The textbooks are hereby regarded as a form of ideological discourse, which presents national history in specific ways, to express different ideas and promote disparate ideologies, as well as different understandings of the Han as a nation, race and ethnicity.

The analysis will focus on three key themes that are common to textbooks published during the late Qing period as well as those published in the early republican era: 1) the origin of the Chinese nation; 2) the significance of minzu and the position of the Han; and 3) the role of minority groups. By comparing and contrasting the ways in which these themes are addressed in the two different periods I shall demonstrate how historical narratives and notions of Han and Chinese identity appearing in textbooks shifted with the changing political and social context.
5. Dictionaries

The third part of my empirical research consists of an investigation of definitions and explanations of the term Han and related terms such as nation, race and ethnicity in Chinese dictionaries during the late Qing and early republican period. The focus on dictionaries is informed by their crucial role in the construction and reproduction of knowledge in modern societies. Dictionaries are widely accepted as authoritative sources of information, and are holding a power of definition in society. The public generally trusts the entries and explanation of terms in dictionaries, and considers their content to be objective, and trustworthy. This contributed to the significance of this book genre in forming people's knowledge systems and ideas. Some scholars have argued that the determination of the meanings of words is essentially a social phenomenon concerned with relations of ideology and power. For example, Russian scholar Vološinov (1986) described words as ideological signals, whose forms are determined by conditions of a particular social organisation and specific participants within their communication. He has argued that, 'the meaning of a word is determined entirely by its context. In fact there are as many meanings of a word as there are contexts of its usage.' (1986: 79). From this perspective, dictionaries can provide an excellent insight into the changing, contextually defined meanings of words.

The definitions and explanations of certain terms in dictionaries developed through history and reflect changes in society. They are influenced by intellectual discourses. Academics whose ideas are changing and developing historically, influence the definitions and meaning of terms in dictionaries, and can in this sense have an impact on social reform in return. As ‘books of knowledge’ written by intellectual experts and consulted by people in their daily lives, they form a link between expert discourses and public discourses. Hence, the dictionaries have a crucial educational function in society in that they are shaping peoples’ understanding of society. According to Moon (1989), a dictionary is a tool of ideological expression in modern society, while Benson (2001) argues that the form of the dictionary itself, and the ways in which it conveys information about language and the world, tend to suppress
cultural diversity and privilege the dominant ideology within a society (29).

In line with the rest of the analysis, the investigation of dictionaries is split into two parts. The first part focuses on the late Qing period and on the *Kangxi zidian* (Kangxi Dictionary), while the second part examines the early republican era and focuses on a group of dictionaries that were most influential in this period, including the *Shehui kexue da cidian* (Dictionary of Social Sciences) and the *Zhonghua da zidian* (Simplified Chinese). The analysis centres on definitions of specific terms, including Han, *zhong* (race), *ren* (human being), *zu* and *minzu* (ethnicity/nation) and *guo* (state).

Like my analysis of textbooks, this part of my research is driven by the wish to move beyond elite discourses and gain an insight into popular discourses about the Han, race, nation and ethnicity in China at the time. I should immediately clarify that I do not want to suggest that the content of textbooks and dictionaries offers a direct insight into popular perceptions of the Han as such. Rather, I see textbooks and dictionaries as only one of the factors (albeit a very important one) that shaped popular perceptions, alongside, for instance, local and familial authorities. Also, despite the growing influence of education in China at the time, illiteracy rates were very high and systematic attempts to eradicate mass illiteracy did not start until the dawn of the Communist republic (Peterson, 1997), which meant that the impact of written materials was limited to a rather narrow social stratum. Nonetheless, given the lack of other more direct sources, textbooks and dictionaries still offer valuable insights into the dissemination and popularization of ideas of race, nation and ethnicity at the time.

Chinese dictionaries during the late Qing and early Republican period were organised very differently from English dictionaries. Most of them were graphically organised, rather than in alphabetical order. This means that the process of identifying sections relevant for my analysis was different from the one characteristic of alphabetically organised dictionaries. Each Chinese character contains a radical (*bushou*), which partially implies the meaning of
the character. For example, the characters tree (shu, 树) and forest (lin, 林) share the same radical 木. When I looked for a character in Chinese dictionaries, I had to identify its radical first, since all the characters sharing the same radical were listed together in a specific section. This is followed by counting the strokes of the character, because they were all in order with an increasing number of strokes that contain. In this way, I was able to locate the place of the characters I was looking for in a dictionary. Different types of Chinese dictionaries will be discussed in a more detail in Chapter 6.

In the course of my empirical research on representations of Han in Chinese society I aim to investigate and compare definitions and explanations of terms related to Han, such as people, minzu, nation, race, ethnicity in Chinese dictionaries from the late Qing period to the first decade of the 20th century. The focus on this period corresponds with the other two layers of analysis in my project, namely, intellectuals’ discourses and school textbooks. This arrangement allows me to conduct a comparative analysis of the above terms in different dictionaries of this period to historically reconstruct the meanings which the dictionaries attached to Han, and examine how they are linked to representations of race, nation, and ethnicity,
Chapter 3: A Historical Overview of the Late Qing and Early Republican Period

To provide a sound historical context for my investigation of the outlined three different layers of analysis, namely, intellectuals’ discourses, school textbooks and Chinese dictionaries during the period of late Qing and early republic, I will in this chapter offer a general historical overview of this era. It will demonstrate in what ways modern Chinese society has experienced various challenges to its existing social order from both internal and external powers, and highlight major areas of social conflicts and transformations in social and political thoughts. It will also examine in what ways the Chinese people responded to what they considered threats from the West.

The social situation during the period of the late Qing and early republican China was characterised by two ‘great dramas’ described by Fairbank (1978): one linked to the conflict between Western forces and the resistance of the Chinese ruling class; the other generated by the tension between the Chinese ruling class and the wider Chinese population (1-2), both of which together contributed to the shape of Chinese modern history. Rebecca E. Karl (1998) has described the historical significance of the period between 1895 and 1911 as a time of radical social and political change in Chinese society. It ‘witnessed a transformation in both national and global consciousnesses’, and ‘saw the simultaneous breakdown of the dynastic socio-political order and the emergence of a broad consciousness of an unstable global order among Chinese intellectuals’ (1099). More recently, Peter Zarrow (2006) has also highlighted the importance of this era as a time of fundamental systemic changes in the social and political order of Chinese society, associated with the decline of the Chinese dynasty and the birth of the modern Chinese nation:

‘The importance of the late Qing and Republican periods can hardly be exaggerated. Many historians, looking back, have called the early twentieth century “transnational”. It marked the end (more or less) of one sociopolitical system and the beginning of another. An empire
ruled by a dynastic house became a nation with a constitution, even if the organs of the nation-state remained weak’ (3).

Inner conflicts and social upheaval and transformation in Chinese society were closely intertwined with broader conflicts between China and the West. Being a large-scale country, Chinese people believed that they had created the most advanced civilisation in the world. However, the situation changed in modern times: the lack of communication with the outside world during the Qing Dynasty, which was a result of the ‘Close-door Diplomatic Policies’ pursued by the Qing court, had largely limited the understanding of the global environment as well as the development of modern capitalism. The modern Western invaders during the late Qing period challenged the long-term understanding of foreigners that traditional China was able to control and govern in the past. Furthermore, the traditional Chinese habit of differentiating between the civilised Chinese Self (Hua or Huaxia) and the barbarian/non-Chinese other (Yi) had been threatened and undermined by the West. In the traditional Chinese cultural and moral system, the distinction between the identities of the Self and Other most commonly referred to notions of the civilised Han and the barbarian non-Han. As argued by Ma Rong (2007): ‘the ancient Chinese viewed Chinese culture as the “most advanced civilisation” of the world, which would sooner or later influence surrounding “barbarians”. From this point of view, those who were assimilated into the Chinese civilisation became “members” of this “civilised” world with “Han” as its “core”. Those who were un-assimilated remained “barbarians” who needed to be “educated”’. (6)

This perception of identity among Chinese people was radically challenged by the Westerners during the late Qing period, who were challenging China coming from the sea, with their advanced weapons. The large size of Chinese territory and population had motivated Western countries to attempt gaining and expanding their influence in China since an expansion of markets and sources was needed to achieve the further development of capitalism in Western countries. At the same time, increasing conflicts between China and the West were also provoked a rise of nationalism in Chinese society.
According to Colin Mackerras (2008), nationalism was a defining emotion of this period of Chinese history: ‘it is doubtful if any other single emotion characterises this period politically in China more strongly than nationalism. The main reason for this is that the Chinese were reacting against their experience of the nineteenth and early twentieth century’. (6)

Discourses of identity and difference became central in the course of these transformations, and internal and external conflicts in Chinese society became more focused on nationalism, and less associated with traditional Confucianism. As a result, Chinese intellectuals active during the late Qing period gradually abandoned the extensive usage of the term Yi when referring to foreigners (Gao, 2007: 44). They realised that Western invaders were not only culturally different from ‘us’ - but also more advanced in natural sciences and technologies. In addition, a growing number of ideas in modern Western politics had been adopted by Chinese intellectuals’ and applied in their reflections on Chinese society during the late Qing and early republican period. For example, Peter Zarrow (2006) has focused on the pursuit of constitutionalism, which he argues ‘represented a major break with the past’ (78) by the Chinese officials during the late Qing period: ‘in late Qing China, officials pursued constitutionalism with cautious optimism, convinced that a populace that was inculcated in proper values and disciplined by a paternalistic but all-seeing state could unite with the Throne’ (76). All of these transformations contributed to the historical significance of the period.

In order to more comprehensively analyse the representation of Han in intellectuals’ works, school textbooks and dictionaries in different stages, this chapter will now provide a historical review, serving as an introduction to the historical background surrounding representations of Han in the late Qing and early republican period. My selection and inclusion of specific events and issues discussed in this chapter was guided by the aims and focus of this dissertation - namely the aim to examine the changing discourses about the Han and the Chinese in late Qing and early republican China. One of the central arguments developed in the thesis is that these discourses were shaped by the broader social and political context of the period. This chapter
therefore seeks to provide an overview of the key historical events and trends that played a role in changing the structure of Chinese society, especially with regard to changes of the political, social and educational system, technological developments, as well as China’s position in the international arena, and its relationship with the West. The large-scale transformations of Chinese society that occurred in the late Qing and early republican era are of course more than a sum of individual events and issues. Nonetheless, an overview of these events and issues can provide a helpful introduction to broader trends and shifts of interest to the thesis, and is indispensable if we are to understand the discursive shifts analysed in subsequent chapters.

This historical review is divided into four sections. The first three sections each on one period each. The first period is the late Qing period, from the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894, to the start of the Chinese Revolution 1911. The First Sino-Japanese War was an important watershed in the history of modern China and East Asia. It marked the start of the fall of the Qing court (Larsen, 2008: 231). The failure of the First Sino-Japanese War had also motivated Chinese intellectuals’ wish to promote reforms, which was one of the conditions of the Hundred Days’ Reform. The second period is the revolutionary period itself (1911-12), culminating in the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912. The third period is the early republican period from the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912 to the May Fourth Movement in 1919, which was interpreted as the first major peak of the 20th century movement to alter the content of ‘Chinese tradition’ (Mackerras, 2008: 41). Each part of the chapter will begin with a brief introduction of the period and its key actors, and continue with a review of the key events. The last, fourth section of the chapter, offers an account of Japan’s modernisation, which had an important impact on Chinese development and on discourses about the Han and the Chinese throughout all the three periods.
1. The Late Qing Period

From 1894 to 1910 the Qing court was ruled by two emperors, namely Emperor Guangxu (1871-1908) and Emperor Xuantong (1906-1911). In contrast to the early Qing Dynasty, especially the period of the emperors Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong, the last years of the Qing Dynasty were a period of decline, which was mainly characterised by a series of so-called ‘unequal treaties’ imposed by Western powers. Paul J. Bailey (2001) claimed that ‘the Qing Dynasty’s problems were compounded by the emergence of a new and potentially far more dangerous threat, that of an expanding West aggressively demanding commercial and trading privileges’ (20). The following chart shows the foreign encroachments in late Qing China.

FIGURE 3:1 The foreign encroachments in late Qing China

The Westerner’s economic success and increasing power in China linked to the use of advanced technologies prompted the Chinese to acknowledge that ‘only by adopting certain aspects of Western technology could China hope to cope with the West’ (Mackerras, 2008: 16). Led by this realisation, the Qing government sent a large number of Chinese students to study abroad, and sought to adopt advanced modern Western technologies, including the telegraph, the machine industry and ship building technologies.

Facing the imperial threat from Western powers determined to broaden their influence in and imperial control over Chinese society, it was now more important than ever for Chinese intellectuals to disseminate their knowledge and ideas among the wider population, in an effort to help modernise Chinese society. The technology of the printing press played a key role in this effort. During the late Qing Dynasty, various newspapers were established in several Chinese provinces. These newspapers allowed readers to obtain access to a range of political opinions that accordingly inspired various directions of political and social awareness and preferences (Spence, 1990: 225). They also helped raise popular awareness of China’s position in the world.

This was also the time when terms such as nation, race and ethnicity were introduced into the Chinese vocabulary (Gao, 2007: 56-72). Writings published by Chinese intellectuals - many of them appearing in the newly established newspapers - as well as textbooks and dictionaries played an important role in popularising these new ideas and concepts, and in standardising their meaning (ibid).

The main source of these social upheavals and changes was the widening influence from the West, which had gradually increased towards the end of the 19th century, and played an important role in shaping the transformation of Chinese society as a whole. The challenge brought by the West was enormous and unprecedented, as explained by Schoppa (2000):

‘China had faced foreign invaders before, but they had come by horseback, on land, and hade wielded bows and arrows. Generally,
China had been able to deal with them, to a greater or lesser degree, bringing them into the Chinese cultural sphere. But now the foreign invaders had come by ships, with powerful cannons and other armaments, and there was no indication that they would ever accept the Chinese cultural tradition. The disjuncture with the past was evident. The crises of the nineteenth century thus presented Chinese leaders with a dilemma: how to overcome their obvious military and strategic weakness so that they might deal with these foreigners from a position of some strength' (38).

In other words, the priority for Chinese leaders at that time, was to seek an appropriate way to ‘enable China to catch up with the West, defeat imperialism and establish for China a respected position in the world community’ (Mackerras, 2008: 5). Therefore, one of the most important characteristics of the late Qing period was the increasing contact and conflict with the West in different spheres, including economics, culture and sciences.

The First Opium War in 1839 had forced China to abandon its long-standing isolationist policies and open its doors to foreign influence (Bickers, 2011: 18). Due to the growing needs of the development of Western capitalism, China was regarded as one of the main targets of Western expansion due to its huge market and rich resources. The increasing economic contact with the West had brought a great number of benefits for Western countries, which on the other hand had further weakened the power of the Qing court. Imperial China under the Qing court accounted for approximately 32% of the world’s economy before 1800, while thereafter and especially after 1860, Chinese economy had shown less than 1% growth annually until 1949, and her share in the world’s economy dropped to less than 5% (Maddison, 1998: 39). Having benefited from the Opium Wars in the 19th century and the resulting treaties, Western countries had intensified their imperial demands directed at China (Bickers, 2011: 18-51). The term ‘unequal treaties’ was frequently used in the early 20th century in China, and this was considered by the Chinese people a humiliation to the country ‘because they were not negotiated by nations treating each other as equals but were imposed on China after a war,
and because they encroached upon China’s sovereign rights … which reduced her to semicolonial status’ (Hsü, 1970: 239). There were a large number of ‘unequal treaties’ (e.g. Treaty of Nanjing signed after the First Opium War, Treaty of Shimonoseki that was signed after the First Sino-Japanese War, and etc.) that had been signed during the late Qing period. These treaties were a reflection of the increasing weakness of the Qing court as well as the Chinese social reality, the desire of Western imperialism, and also an important motivation for the rise of Chinese nationalism and the wish to learn from Western political practices.

Hence, the second strand of Chinese society during the late Qing period was characterised by different ideological reforms, transformations in social and political thought, including the shift from traditional Confucianism to the promotion of nationalism, the re-cognition of the Self and the relationship with the Other. Mackerras (2008) sees the rise of Chinese nationalism, associated with the concept of the modern Chinese nation and nation state as linked to changes in public understandings of ‘loyalty’: ‘so the people within the nation should give their loyalty not to the emperor or family, as had earlier been the case in China, but to the state that represents the nation’ (7). Having witnessed the privileges increasingly enjoyed by foreigners and the proliferation of unequal treaties with the West, Chinese elites began doubting traditional Confucian teachings and their ability to stem the onslaught of Western imperialism. Instead, they embraced patriotic ideals as the only way to ensure national survival.

All the above transformations were intertwined with a range of tensions and conflicts both externally, between China and the West, and internally, between the proponents of new ideas and those supporting established traditions. Schoppa (2006) has summarised different Chinese responses to the West into two main cultural perspectives - a traditionalist and a reformist: ‘some saw China’s saving strategy in the revivification of its culture: traditional culture was incomparably great… the use of such implements of war would sully the Chinese hands that wielded them. If tools of war were to be part of the answer to China’s problems, then the Chinese should use those from the Chinese
repertoire warfare from the past’ (38). Others, however, ‘contended that Western weapons and ships were simply inanimate machines - culture-neutral, as it were. These self-strengtheners argued that foreign weapons and ships could thus be bought or manufactured without cultural contamination’ (ibid).

The social and political conflicts and reforms occurring during the last period of the Qing Dynasty were mainly associated with these two conflicting perspectives. We will now turn to three important historical events that served as triggers or catalysts for the wide-ranging economic, ideological and political changes outlined above: the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), the Hundred Days’ Reform (1898) and the Boxer Uprising (1899-1901).

1.1 The First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)

‘In regard to the last era of the Qing Dynasty, the first Sino-Japanese War has been considered a historically important marker of social change in Chinese history. As noted by Larsen (2008):

‘The Sino-Japanese War is a significant watershed in East Asian history. It marks the beginning of an increasingly aggressive Japanese imperial expansion onto the Asian mainland. For many, it also marks the beginning of the end of the Qing Empire, as the demoralizing defeat on the battlefield was followed by increasing foreign inroads into the Qing Empire as outside powers sought to “carve the Chinese melon”’ (231).

The Qing Dynasty had experienced a time of outstanding prosperity in its early stages, which could be shown to some extent by its successful attempts at expanding its territory. Qing rulers successfully claimed rule over different regions, including Korea, the Liuqiu Islands, and Burma (Larsen, 2008). In the late stage of the Qing era, however, the rise of Japanese imperialism played an important role in Asian history, which changed the relationship among
Asian countries. For example, the relationship between the Qing Empire and Korea was broken by the Meiji Japan, which requested to include Korea as a part of their territorial expansion (Larsen, 2008). The following chart illustrates the changes in the Qing territories during 1800 to 1900, which clearly demonstrate the expansion of territory in the early stage of the Qing Empire and a reduction of territory during the late era of the Qing Dynasty.

**FIGURE 3:2 Changes of the Qing territories during 1800 to 1900**


The Meiji Japan's power in Korea had rapidly grown in the 1880s; additionally, Japanese diplomats were able to station in Seoul and open treaty ports in 1882 (Larsen, 2008). Since 1892, the banned Korean religious society Donghak (East Learning Society) started gaining ground again. A large number of peasants had joined Donghak and undertaken various activities
against the Korean government; the rebellion developed so rapidly that
government troops were unable to resist the threat. In May 1894, the Korean
King Kojong requested the Qing Empire to help suppress the rebellion. The
Qing court issued the request for assistance. An official statement issued on
June 7 1894 claimed the need ‘to restore the peace of our tributary state, and
to dispel the anxiety of every nation residing in Korea for commercial
purposes’ as the primary justifications for the Qing intervention (Conroy, 1960:
245). After the domestic situation in Korea calmed down, the Chinese
representative Li Hongzhang planned to leave Korea. However, Japan then
declared its agenda to contribute to Korean reform as a whole, rather than
only focus on the Donghak Rebellion.

The Qing court rejected the Japanese proposal to build a jointly sponsored
reform project: ‘the idea may be excellent, but the measures of improvement
must be left to Korea herself. Even China herself would not interfere with the
internal administration of Korea, and Japan, having from the very first
recognised the independence of Korea, cannot have the right to interfere with

Having been declined by the Qing court, on July 23, 1894, Japanese troops
seized the Korean royal palace and officially declared War to China on August
1. The Chosŏn government announced a statement claiming the alliance with
Japan, in order to expel the Qing power from Korea on August 22, 1894
(Eastlake & Yoshi-aki, 1897: VII).

The Chinese reinforcements sent by the Qing government had experienced a
painful failure in a series of battles with Japanese forces in Korea. By late
October 1894, the Japanese managed to cross the Yalu River and entered
into Chinese territory. In a devastating battle, the Japanese troops destroyed
one of two battleships and a significant number of cruisers in Weihaiwei in the
Shandong Province of China. Humiliated by the defeat, all the senior Chinese
admirals and commandants of the forts committed suicide. (Spence, 1990:
222-223)
The Treaty of Shimonoseki, which was signed at the Shunpanrō hall on April 17, 1895, marked the end of the First Sino-Japanese War. This treaty ended China's centuries-long suzerainty over Korea and recognised the pro forma independence of Korea. The Meiji Japan government took control over Korea and received annual tribute. China was also forced to cede control over Liaodong, Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands to Japan, and was required to open various ports and rivers to Japan for trading purposes. The Manchu government issued Japanese merchants the right to build up factories and rent warehouses and transportations in China without paying any taxes to the Chinese government (Elleman & Kotkin, 2009: 15).

Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese War marked the growth of its national influence in Asia and the whole world, and was followed by further territorial expansion and an increasingly aggressive stance in foreign policy that continued until World War II (Spence, 1990). To conclude, the First Sino-Japanese War and the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki can be regarded as a milestone reflecting the weakness and decline of the Manchu court. The signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki weakened the legitimacy of the imperial court, as well as stimulated the Chinese younger generation’s demands for reform in a wide range of areas. These increasingly pressing demands eventually led to the Hundred Days’ Reform.

1.2 The Hundred Days’ Reform

China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese contest over Korea made it clear that China was lagging well behind modern developments not only with respect to the West, but also with regard to its small, long disregarded neighbour Japan, which made great advances in assimilating and appropriating Western technologies and knowledge. Chinese intellectual elites were increasingly keen to follow the Japanese example and adopt ‘Western learning’ for practical purposes, yet at the same time, they were also adamant about the need to preserve the essence of traditional Chinese culture. Kang Youwei, who was an influential Chinese intellectual serving in the Qing court, which
culminated in the decision to implement the so-called Hundred Day’s Reform (Grasso, Corrin & Kort, 2009: 54-55). The issued edicts aimed to undertake a range of reforms in different spheres in Chinese society, including administration and education, and also directed the elimination of different political posts, e.g. the post of governors in the provincial bases (Bailey, 2001: 31-33; Chesneaux, Bastid & Bergere, 1976: 321).

Evidently, the Guangxu Emperor as well as his advisors, such as the intellectuals Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, were aware that the fundamental structure of the Chinese philosophical and moral system had to be reconsidered if China was to respond to the challenges of modernisation and ensure the continuity of its cultural traditions (Bailey, 2001: 31-32). In response to these demands, the reform began on 11 June 1898, and although it only lasted for 104 days, it ‘brought to light not only the systemic problems of late-Qing imperial rule but also… rising tensions in the Chinese political discourse (Kwong, 2000: 693). In regard to the social significance of this reform, Luke S. K. Kwong (2000) argued that it was intertwined with nationalist ambitions: ‘few students of modern China would dispute that the Hundred Days Reform of 1898 ushered in a major nation-building effort that, despite false starts and setbacks, has continued to this day’ (663). Stressing the historical significance of the Hundred Day’s Reform, and its contribution to the reform of late Qing Chinese society, he sees it as linked to the formation of a modern Chinese ‘civil society’, and brings the power of both elites and ordinary mass into the consideration:

‘the rapid growth of study societies and of the periodical press after the Sino-Japanese War raised the question of elite empowerment that ought to be closely studied in any discussion on the emergence of “civil society” in modern China. The intensifying concern for “people’s power”, for the political potential of social groups, and for national and dynastic survival was but a short step away from demanding a greater voice in public affairs’ (693-694).

The reformers claimed that innovation had to be accompanied by both
institutional and ideological changes. The program of the reform included a rapid construction and strengthening of the Chinese economy by means of applying the principles of modern Western capitalism; the introduction of modern manufacturing and commerce; a reform of the Chinese military; the introduction of a constitutional monarchy with elements of democracy; and the modernisation of the traditional exam system and creation of a modern educational system that paid greater attention to mathematics and science rather than Confucian texts (Spence, 1990: 226-227). Traditional schools had to be transformed into modern institutions. One of the best Universities in China - Peking University - was founded during this time (Chesneaux, Bastid & Bergere, 1976: 321).

Liang Qichao promoted new ideas and theories borrowed from modern Western social sciences. He praised the ideals and achievements of the French Revolution and admired influential Western works such as Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* and Charles Darwin's *The Origin of Species*. He also attempted to apply these theories to Chinese reality, in an effort to construct a new Chinese identity (Spence, 1990: 226-230; Gao, 2007: 58-62). Liang Qichao was not alone in admiring Western ideas at the time. Yan Fu (1854-1921), who was educated in England, translated Charles Darwin's *The Origin of Species* into Chinese and played an important role in promoting Darwin's ideas in China. Darwin's work provided a key theoretical reference for Chinese intellectuals during the late Qing period (but also later) and had a major impact on newly formed often racialised ideas about Chinese identity and the origins of the Chinese nation (Dikötter, 1992: 67-71).

The wish of the Emperor Guangxu and his supporters, among them Kang Youwei, to promote the reform across China, however, was counteracted by some negative attitudes in Chinese provinces regarding its implementation. Most of the provincial officers 'paid only lip service' to the reform, except for the governor of Hunan, Chen Baozhen, who was the only high-ranking provincial official who actively supported the new policies (Kwong, 2000: 691; Chesneaux, Bastid & Bergere, 1976: 322; Rodzinski, 1979: 369). Thereafter, the reform movement encountered a powerful opposition, led by the Manchu
Empress Dowager Cixi (1835-1908), who put an end to the reforms on 21 September 1898, by imprisoning the Guangxu Emperor and arresting the reformist leaders, in order to take all power back into her own hands (Kwong, 2000: 675).

Although the overall failure of the movement further weakened the power of the Manchu government and the public’s confidence in the Qing court, some elements of the reform were re-instated over the coming years. The traditional keju examination was abolished in 1905 and replaced by a new, modernised educational system. The Chinese military was reformed as well, largely following the Japanese military reforms. In addition, thanks to the rapid spread of print technology and publications, growing numbers of Chinese were gaining access to new ideas derived from the West, including new ideas about the origins and the distinguishing traits of the Chinese nation, and about its position in the world (Spence, 1990: 230; Gao, 2007: 59-62). Gray (2002) is one of the authors (alongside Kwong, 2000 and others) who have emphasised the historical significance of the reform despite its initial failure. In his book Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to 2000, he defined the significance of the Hundred Day’s Reform as a time in which the Chinese public attempted to express and share opinions: ‘it could be said that the Hundred Days’ Reform failed because Chinese public opinion was still unorganised and inarticulate. It was only after this failure, and in reaction to it, that a modern Chinese public opinion began to crystallize’ (134).

On the other hand, the failure of the Hundred Days’ Reform led many proponents of the reform to abandon any hope for internal reform in China, initiated by the Manchu Court itself. Instead, many Chinese intellectuals started to argue that the only way to put an end to China’s gradual decline was to first overthrow the Manchu Monarchy (Gao, 2007: 73). This shift in attitudes to the Manchu was evident also in the writings of some the intellectuals analysed further on in this thesis.
1.3 The Boxer Uprising (1898-1901)

Ashamed of the decline of their country and the loss of national sovereignty, not only the intellectuals, but also the broader Chinese population, were growing increasingly restless and dissatisfied with what they considered to be outdated societal norms. A historical newspaper article from Guangzhou published in 1899 clearly expresses the Chinese people’s growing indignation against foreign aggression:

‘All foreign countries are insatiable and are ready to carve up China: Russia robbed Arthur Port and Dalian Bay, and sent 25,000 troops into Manchuria; Britain actually took possession of as many as seven provinces of the Yangtze River basin; Germany has occupied Jiaozhou and claimed Shandong Province as her own, and additionally started exploring Henan; France has occupied Guangzhou Bay, though her covert plan is the full possession of Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan and Guizhou; Japan has possessed Taiwan, and covets Fujian Province... Therefore China must be vigilant and promote innovation, in order to increase the awareness of being attacked’ (cited in Huang, 1964: 128, 131, 132).

This increasingly hostile atmosphere was felt also by foreigners present in China. For instance, when reporting about the situation in China, the British Rear Admiral Charles Beresford noted, ‘the continuous riots, harassment and rebellion across the whole country’ (quoted in Ma, 1957 [1899]: 163), which in his view presented a serious threat to the security of British companies’ investment in China.

The Boxer Uprising (Yihetuan yundong) in 1898-1901 was one of the most representative events reflecting this growing social unrest, which fed on an ‘atmosphere of superstition, economic depression, extreme privation, public anger over foreign imperialism, and resentment of the missionaries’ (Hsü, 1995: 390). The Boxer Uprising, also known as the Boxer Rebellion, was a movement led by ‘the Righteous Harmony Society’ (yihetuan), mainly aimed at opposing the influence of Christianity and Western threats in China. The
Righteous Harmony Society was founded in the Shandong Province in response to the succession of unequal treaties signed with Western powers and the blatant weakness of the Manchu Qing government. The members of the movement consisted mainly of people who had lost their farmland due to natural disasters and Western exploration (Su & Liu, 2000). As noted in Victor Purcell’s influential work on this rebellion *The Boxer Uprising: A Background Study* (1963): ‘one feature at least of the Boxer Uprising is beyond dispute, namely that it was “Anti-foreign”, and, in particular, “anti-European”’ (57).

These anti-Western attitudes were clearly evident also in one of the first reports on the activities of the movement that culminated in the Boxer Rebellion, which was contained in a letter written by French Jesuit Father Gouverneur in June 1898 (Pelissier, 1963). According to his report, placards were posted on the walls during the baccalaureate examinations on 27 April 1898, containing the following message:

‘Notice. The patriots of all the provinces, seeing that men of the West overreach Heaven in their behavior, have decided to assemble on the 15th day of the fourth moon and to kill the Westerners and burn their houses. Those whose hearts are not in accord with “us” are scoundrels and women of bad character. Those who read this placard and fail to spread the news deserve the same characterisation. Enough! No more words are needed’ (cited in Pelissier, 1963, Kieffer [trans.], 1967: 216).

As evident from the notice, the rebels held a very negative view of the West and Westerners, and want to see them killed. In order to spread their influence, the Boxers sought to promote their ideas by incorporating them into Chinese popular cultural form, such as music, religion, popular novels and street plays. Due to this, the Boxer Uprising managed to attract a far more extensive popular support than the Hundred Days’ Reform, in spite of lacking any systematic ideology (Spence, 1990: 233-235).

There has been a wide range of academic work published in both English and Chinese that analyses the Boxers Uprising. Many studies are collected in Su

Another important piece of empirical research on the process of the Boxer Uprising was undertaken by scholars from Shandong University during the 1960s, who collected testimonies from survivors of the Boxer era. The data of this study has been published in the work *Shangdong daxue yihetuan diaocha ziliao huibian* (Collection of Shandong University survey materials on the Boxers) (Lu, et al. 2000). The empirical investigation was focused on the experience of Chinese people who witnessed the rise and development of the movement. These testimonies provided particularly valuable insights into internal developments that sparked the rebellion. Among these, the testimonies highlighted the famine occurring in China in 1900. Most of the Chinese people who were interviewed in the process of the uprising, remembered that a serious famine happened in the 26th year of the Guangxu Emperor (1900), which was considered by them as the main reason contributing to the spread of the Boxer Uprising. These are two characteristics excerpts from the testimonies:

‘The 26th year of the Guangxu Emperor was a bad year, which was marked by a poor crops harvest... Many people had to eat bran or grass while some others had starved to death’. (Ma Dengying and Ma Yuming, from the Nangong County Liyuan Tuen, Zhao Village, 1960, cited in Lu, 2000: 1).

...‘There was a frost in August of the 26th year of the Guangxu Emperor, which led to the little crops harvest’. (Li Laozhong, from the Nangong
Another important factor that led to the uprising was the Western challenge. Some scholars, for example, Victor Purcell (1963), Fairbank (1978), Thompson (2003), have paid attention predominantly to the influence of Western challenges, and regarded the Boxers rebellion often as a Chinese force resisting imperialism. Their arguments are supported by the testimonies of survivors of the Boxer era as well:

‘There were four Catholic presidents: Zhang De, Wang Laozhai, Yan Laotong and Chen Laochong. They are very arrogant. If we have said a wrong word, we have to feast for apology. None of “us” dared to offend them’ (Han Dengxiao, from the Nangong County, Liyuan Tuen, Xian Village, 1960, cited in Lu, 2000: 14).

According to these survivors, the foreign Christian missionaries and their local supporters were the main targets of the Uprising. The Catholic privilege in the rural areas in China had existed since the 18th century. The conflict between Catholics and non-Catholics became increasingly radical during the period of famine (according to the historical sources collected in Qingmo jiaoan [Late Qing Religious Cases], 1998: 229-230). Lu and his colleagues from Shandong University recorded the testimonies of the witnesses of Catholics’ privilege, which demonstrated a massive number of conflicts between Catholics and the Boxers described by the survivors of the Boxers era (Lu, 2000: 25-30). On 15th March, 1899, the Guangxu Emperor was forced to grant titles to foreign missionaries, which had legitimised and formalised their governmental priorities in China (Wang, 1982: 954-965). Since then, ‘the Bishop has been granted the status of the provincial governor’ (ibid).

A similar argument is shared by other Western scholars as well. For example, Paul Cohen (1997) suggested that the drought occurring in this year had enhanced the public’s hostile feelings toward the Catholics since Christians refused to participate in community prayers for rain. The cause of the drought was therefore partially attributed to Catholics by non-Catholics in China.
A series of straightforward violent activities has been undertaken by the Boxers towards Christian properties. They burned churches and houses, and additionally destroyed railway tracks, stations, telegraph lines and those products which represented modern Western technologies, such as lamps and clocks. They even killed four French and Belgian engineers and two English missionaries (Spence, 1990: 233). Some Chinese provincial officials sometimes tried to negotiate with the Boxers to protect the foreigners’ safety. In other cases, officials were themselves taken by the ideals promoted by the rebels and condoned their behaviour. In order to guarantee their citizens’ safety, the Western countries felt they need to send additional troops to Beijing from other parts of China to resist the Boxers’ power. However, due to the broken tracks torn up by the Boxers, some Western troops were beaten by the Boxers and experienced a heavy loss (Spence, 1990: 233-235; Pelissier, 1963, Kieffer [trans.], 1967: 217-219).

The main aim and a famous slogan during the later stage of the Boxer Uprising was ‘fuqing mieyang’ (Support the Qing, annihilate the West), which demonstrates that the major characteristic of the Boxer Uprising was to establish an anti-Western rebellion. This is reflected in the following announcement issued by a leader of the Boxers:

‘Big Brother Wu Xiu, who pointed to our flag and gave the speech, promoted the idea of fuqing mieyang. How this aim can be achieved? The Qing court has experienced a complete failure since she lost in the war with Japan in the 26th year of the Guangxu Emperor. This is because that the Qing afraid of death, and is totally lost without a fight. The international meetings are discussing about carving up China. Although we are bullied by the Christians, we will suffer much more if we let the West carve China. There are no troops in China; nevertheless, we have a large number of public mass in China. If we are united, we can lift up the back of the Qing, in order to exterminate the foreigners. They want to carve up China, as for the dream’. (Liao, 1981: 109)

This announcement has called for the extermination of Western foreigners,
which illustrates the radicalism of the Boxer movement. On June 21st 1900, the Qing court issued a *Xuanzhan zhaoshu* (Declaration of war) to the Western countries after a series of meetings (Ma, 1957 [1899]: 218-219). This decision was far distinct from the previous tolerance shown by the Qing government to the West, which greatly stimulated the morale of the Boxers (Mou, 1997: 213).

Nevertheless, the Boxer Uprising rapidly crumbled when further reinforcements of approximately 20,000 foreign troops from eight countries entered into Beijing (Spence, 1990: 234-235; O’Connor, 1973). Those included Austria-Hungary, the United States, Japan, Russia, Britain, the United States, and France, and were collectively named ‘The Eight-Nation Alliance’ (ibid). Finally, the Boxer Protocol, which marked the end of the uprising, was signed in September 1901 between the Man Qing government and eight Western countries (Esherick, 1987). According to the Protocol, The Qing government was required to pay 450,000,000 Haikwan taels, or $333,900,000 (Harding, 1915: 459) to these eight countries as the price of the ending of the war. Apart from this, the Boxer Protocol also included some other conditions, which required the Qing government to pay an extremely heavy price for this uprising (the complete version of Boxer Protocol can be found in the Appendix 1). The terms of the Protocol contributed to the further weakening of the Qing government and its legitimacy, and helped accelerate its final demise.

The Boxer Uprising has played an important role in Chinese history, which increased the pace of the fall of the Qing court, and promoted a consciousness of national identity among the Chinese intellectuals as well as the wider Chinese public, most of whom had lost trust in the Qing government. Paul Herry Clements argued in 1915:

‘the Boxer Rebellion was the last protest of China against the inevitable, and, in the completeness of its failure, was the final lesson necessary in that series of international events even since 1840 to teach China that, however excellent her civilisation may be in some
respects, it was inadequate when judged by the spirit and achievements of the 19th century’ (1915: 204).

This has on the one hand accelerated the process of decline towards the end of the Qing Dynasty; and contributed to the beginnings of the modern nation state building on the other (Cohen 1997: 55-56). Colin Mackerras (2008) and others argue similarly to Cohen that the Boxer Uprising has contributed to a rise of nationalism in modern China: ‘…there is no doubt that nationalism took on a new impetus from the beginning of the twentieth century’, influenced by ‘the major powers that had inflicted the humiliation upon China’, and associated with ‘the desire to roll back the forces and influences of imperialism in China’ (23).

As I have shown in this chapter, the historical significance of the Boxer Uprising is associated with Western imperial threats and its deep impact on China and world history during and beyond this period: ‘the Boxer Uprising and the Boxer War were incidents inextricably tied into the world of 1899-1900, of global developments in imperial thought and practice, and in anti-imperial critique’ (Bickers, 2007: xxiv).

2. The Chinese Revolution (1911-1912)

The Chinese Revolution in 1911 can be regarded as a turning point in Chinese history, which brought an end to the dynastic system that had existed for some 2,100 years (Zarrow, 2005: 30), and also ‘profoundly disrupted the mixture of bureaucratic power, cultural and religious symbolism’ (Rankin, 207: 260) in China. In regard to the historical significance of this revolution, Schoppa (2006) symbolically referred to the Chinese Revolution (1911-1912) as a watershed that bridged the end of an empire and the construction of a modern government:

‘The meaning of the events from October 1911 to February 1912 was extraordinarily revolutionary... Now the abolition of the monarchy
demolished the whole political structure. In place for over two thousand years, the Son of Heaven and the empire were gone, along with all the traditional political principles, laws, customs, and morality... As China entered the spring of 1912, it was beginning the process of constructing a new Chinese identity, of building a new state and nation - the new China - in a completely uncharted, unmarked future'. (141)

Disappointed with the behaviour of the Qing court and China’s deteriorating position in the international arena, some Chinese intellectuals adopted a more radical attitude towards the Qing government and called for its overthrow and for a full-scale revolution. Sun Zhongshan (1866-1925) another important Chinese intellectual whose work is examined closely in this thesis - was one of the most influential voices among the proponents of a revolution. Many of the rebellions in the first decade of the 20th century in China, were initiated by Sun and his alliance (Schoppa, 2006: 136). Two other influential Chinese intellectuals, namely Zhang Binglin and Liang Qichao were also playing important roles in contributing to the shaping of public opinion and publishing of various core works on politics during this period; however, compared to Sun Zhongshan, they were less close to the core of the Chinese Revolution.

The fall of the Qing court effectively started with the abdication of the last Qing Emperor Puyi on 12 February 1912 (Mackerras, 2008: 32). This was triggered by a series of events that occurred in October 1911 in Hankou, one of three Chinese cities that were later merged into the city of Wuhan, the capital of the Hubei province. During the late Qing period, another city of the Hubei province Hanhou, was home to a large number of students who had finished their studies in foreign countries and were therefore deeply influenced by modern Western ideas, especially nationalism and patriotism, which provided the ideological basis for the 1911 revolution (Spence, 1990: 262-263). These students and other Chinese students, who were studying abroad, together with some Chinese individuals who were inspired by modern Western ideas, set up several organisations aimed at spreading their revolutionary ideas. Among these organisations was the Tongmeng hui (the Chinese United League), which was established by Sun Zhongshan in Tokyo in 1905 and
became an influential platform for Chinese intellectuals to communicate revolutionary ideas (Bailey, 2001: 62).

By the summer of 1911, several soldiers of the New Army troops, which were established by the Qing court after the signing of the Boxer Protocol, also became influenced by these ideas and consequently became the military basis of the revolution (Schoppa, 2006: 138). The uprising was triggered by an explosion that occurred on 9 October 1911 when some revolutionaries were building bombs in their meeting house in the city of Wuchang, then situated in the Russian Concession - i.e. a part of Chinese territory ceded to Russia. The explosion attracted the attention of the Qing authorities that decided to investigate the event. The investigation led to the capture and execution of a number of revolutionaries by the Qing court. In addition, the Qing authority also obtained a list of revolutionary society members that contained names of registered soldiers. Given this precarious situation, the revolutionaries decided to launch the uprising immediately, to prevent further arrests of their members (Spence, 1990: 263).

On the morning of 10 October, the Wuchang Eighth Engineer Battalion seized the English ammunition depot in Wuchang. Other soldiers, stationed outside of the city, joined the uprising, and the revolutionary forces soon won the support of another three New Army regiments. Following the success of the Wuchang uprising, other revolutionary societies launched several successful uprisings in Hanyang and Hankou on 11 and 12 October (Mackerras, 2008:31; Bailey, 2002: 60-64; Spence, 1990: 262-264). In response to the unrest, the Qing court ordered two divisions of the Beiyang Army ² to coordinate a counterattack and requested Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), a long-term military commander, to suppress the uprising (Rhoads, 2000: 174; Spence, 1990: 263-265).

² The Beiyang Army was a powerful, Western-style Chinese military force created by the Qing government in the late 19th century. It was the centrepiece of a general reconstruction of China’s military system (Atwill & Atwill, 2009: 152).
A series of armed clashes with revolutionary forces made the Qing court loose more and more cities, especially in central and south China. There had been a large number of cities joining this revolution in early November, including Hangzhou (5 November), Zhenjiang (7 November), Fuzhou (8 November), and Guangzhou (9 November) (Rhoads, 2000: 187). Sun Zhongshan returned to China from exile in France at the end of 1911. On New Year’s Day of 1912, he helped establish the Provisional Government of the Republic of China, which was also the first republican government in Asia. The capital was set in the city Nanjing. Ever since the founding of the first anti-Manchu association Xingzhong hui (the Society for the Revival of China) by Sun Zhongshan in 1894, Sun had made various efforts to raise money for the societies, organising revolutionary movements (Mackerras, 2008: 31). Being widely respected by the delegates from 16 provincial assemblies, Sun was named the ‘provisional president’ of the newly established government (Schoppa, 2006: 140; Spence, 1990: 267).

The representative of the Qing court, the military leader Yuan Shikai, offered to force the Qing Emperor to abdicate in exchange for being named the president of the Republic of China. In order to ensure the stability of the newly established government, Sun Zhongshan agreed to Yuan’s demands and stepped down from his position as ‘provisional president’. The Qing emperor declared his abdication on 12 February 1912, and thereby ended the 268-year long rule of the Qing Dynasty. On 10 March 1912 Yuan Shikai was inaugurated as the second ‘provisional president’ of the Republic of China (Spence, 1990: 267-268).

3. The Early Republican Period
The success of the 1911 Chinese Revolution has opened another chapter in Chinese history. However, the newly established republic experienced several difficulties in understanding and practically embodying the implementation of the ‘republic’ (Schoppa, 2006: 144). Accordingly, Yuan Shikai’s government relied strongly on a group of foreign advisors, drawn from Australia, Japan,
France and Belgium, who provided advice on China’s foreign policies, railway construction, military and religion (Spence, 1990: 284). In order to guarantee the stability of his government, Yuan made many concessions to foreign powers. For example, he signed-off the ‘Twenty-One Demands’ in 1915, which had legitimised Japan’s growing control on China in various fields, including factories, railways and ports in Manchuria and Mongolia (Rankin, 1997: 278). For the same reason, the new republican government did not manage to dispel the fear of foreign domination. Yuan Shikai’s government adopted a rather obsequious attitude to the West and seemed to be doing little to restore China’s power and enhance its position in the international arena (Spence, 1990: 284). On the other hand, the rise of a ‘potent provincialism’ was another challenge for Yuan Shikai’s government (1983: 213).

These policies further intensified the tensions between Yuan Shikai and revolutionary leaders, including Sun Zhongshan. After the leadership of the government had been transferred to Yuan, Sun focused on organising a political party named *Guomindang* (the Nationalist Party), with the hope of being voted to be prime minister if the *Guomindang* members could gain the majority of seats in the Assembly (Schoppa, 2006: 146). The Nationalist Party has played an important role in modern Chinese history. It was the ruling political party of the Republic of China in mainland China (1912-1949), which was guided by the ideology of *sanmin zhuyi* (Three Principles of the People) developed by Sun Zhongshan. The party headquarters are now located in Taiwan (e.g. Bedeski, 1981).

To expand his powers and ensure unbridled implementation of his policies, Yuan dissolved the democratically elected national parliament and replaced it with a body consisting of 66 men he selected from his own cabinet. This group produced a ‘constitutional compact’ in 1914 that effectively replaced the provisional constitution and gave Yuan ‘unlimited power over war, finance, foreign policy, and the rights of citizens’ (Spence, 1990: 284).

In 1914, Japan quickened its expansion westwards and northwards into
China. By the end of 1915, a secret ultimatum, which was called “Twenty-One Demands”, was sent to Yuan Shikai in Beijing from Japan, which ‘clearly signaled the beginning of Japanese expansion and conquest in China’ (Cheow, 2006: 20). Yuan’s decision to comply with the ‘Twenty-one Demands’ resulted in a final and fatal blow to his legitimacy. The ultimatum included demands for more economic and political privileges for Japanese subjects in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and a guarantee that China would not open any of its ports or islands to foreign powers except Japan (Spence, 1990: 285-286). When these demands became known public opposition within China found expression in widespread anti-Japanese demonstrations.

To regain his authority, Yuan decided to revive the monarchy and declared himself Emperor of the Chinese Empire on 1 January 1916, and planned to take the throne of the ‘Grand Constitutional Emperor’ (Schoppa, 2006: 147) However, strong opposition from both domestic forces and foreign governments made him postpone the coronation (Spence, 1990: 286; Pelissier, 1963, Kieffer [trans.], 1967: 260). The move also prompted many of Yuan’s close political allies to withdraw their support. Yuan died of uremia on 6 June 1916 and was succeeded by the vice-president Li Yuanhong (Zarrow, 2005: 81-82).

To conclude, it can be argued that Yuan Shikai’s rule only deepened a sense of failure among the Chinese population. The deep fear of foreign invasion and domination induced many Chinese intellectuals to seek new political ideas and new ways of promoting social cohesion and strengthening the sense of belonging among the Chinese population. These efforts provided the foundation for the so-called ‘May Fourth Movement’.

3.1 The May Fourth Movement

Chow (1964) described the May Fourth Movement as a period lasting from 1917 to 1921, characterised by an ‘intellectual atmosphere’ and constituting the first major attempt at altering the Chinese traditional culture. Schoppa
(2006) described the May Fourth Movement similarly as a radical reform movement with a highly critical perspective on Chinese traditional culture and values: ‘if the abolition of the civil service examination and the monarchy brought the destruction of the traditional political and social structures, the May Fourth Movement struck a paralyzing blow at traditional cultural norms and structures’ (163).

The May Fourth Movement occupies a special position in scholars’ consideration of modern China. Yeh (1994) noted that ‘1919 was identified as the very moment of origin when cultural iconoclasm was joined to a political activism of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle: the watershed affecting the flow of all subsequent revolutionary history’ (903). In the narrow sense of the word, the May Fourth Movement refers to an ideological movement that grew out of student demonstrations that took place on 4 May 1919 in Beijing. About 3,000 students assembled in the Tiananmen Square to protest against the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, which would result in China ceding Shandong to Japan (Lee, 2009: 33; Spence, 1990: 311; Schoppa, 2006: 171-173; Chow, 1964: 100-105).

The New Cultural Movement is seen as the primary stage of the May Fourth Movement. The core of the New Cultural Movement was focused on the abolition of traditional Chinese culture and aimed to construct a new cultural and ideological direction that distances itself from Confucianism, and promoted Western democratic and scientific norms (Schoppa, 2006: 163). One of the most influential works of this period was the magazine of New Youth, which was established in 1915, edited by Chen Duxiu. The main ideological standpoint of New Youth was to promote ‘two gentlemen’, namely Mr Science and Mr Democracy during the movement (Mackerras, 2008: 41).

The May Fourth Movement has since been characterised in various ways: as a response to Western liberal influence; as a product of education abroad in Japan, Europe or America; as an awakening to the call of international Bolshevism; and as an evaluative rejection of traditional Confucianism as the primary source of authority (Yeh, 1994). In addition, inspired by the new
ideologies and ideas introduced from the West, Chinese intellectuals started to reconsider their history as well as their culture in new ways, which was distinct from the ‘traditional chronological way of recording the past’ (Mackerras, 2008: 42). Whether liberal or revolutionary, these intellectual developments were then seen as the inspiration for a unified national political movement that spread outward from Beijing and Shanghai into provinces (Yeh, 1994: 903).

There have been many Chinese intellectuals who contributed to this movement, for example, Hu Shi (1891-1962), who wrote in the vernacular to discuss social problems, and also Lu Xun (1881-1936), a Chinese writer, who was famous for his incisive criticisms of contemporary Chinese society. He described the problematic situation at the time in the following way:

‘Imagine an iron house without windows, absolutely indestructible, with many people fast asleep inside who will soon die of suffocation. But you know since they will die in their sleep, they will not feel the pain of death. Now if you cry aloud to wake a few of the lighter sleepers, making those unfortunate few suffer the agony of irrevocable death, do you think you are doing them a good turn? But if a few awake, you can’t say there is no hope of destroying the iron house’ (5)

The historical significance of the May Fourth Movement has been stressed in various aspects: it was firstly one of the most important milestones of the Chinese revolution; it was additionally regarded as ‘China’s Renaissance’ and the ‘Chinese Enlightenment’ (Schoppa, 2006: 179); it was simultaneously closely linked to the rise of nationalism and communism in Chinese society.

4. The Impact of Japan’s Westernisation

An important element that needs to be included into a historical review of modern China is the increasing Japanese cultural impact on Chinese society during the late Qing and early republican period. A number of Japanese
books, most of which were translations of Western books discussing modern political, social and economic concepts, have been translated into Chinese during this period. The late Qing court sent a number of selected students abroad, including Japan and some European countries, to study Western sciences and technologies and transfer them to China in order to enhance the power of the government (Zhu, 1989).

It is worth noting that the Japanese awareness of the prospect of an increasing Western impact in Asia had been strengthened during the period of Meiji Restoration\(^3\) from 1868. Having witnessed the benefits brought by advanced Western technologies in sciences around the world, especially for the military, the Japanese had therefore recognised the necessity of learning from the West. One of the manifestations of Japanese efforts to learn from the West was the translation of a large number of Western cultural and political works into Japanese (Murphy, 2010). The profits gained from Western knowledge became apparent in Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, which, on the other hand, provided a good example of the benefits of Western knowledge for the Qing government and also for Chinese intellectuals who were keen to improve China’s international standing. Japanese works, which were a reflection of modern Western advancement in various fields, were regarded as a perfect medium for Chinese intellectuals to get access to the Western culture - something they were not familiar with and felt hard to understand. As argued by Alex Murphy (2010), ‘many Chinese reformers viewed Japanese translations of Western political, scientific and technological notions and terms as trustworthy foundations for their reform efforts’ (31), which had provided an alternative channel for Chinese intellectuals to educate themselves as well as ordinary people.

In addition, the transmission of knowledge and the ideas of reform and revolution were facilitated by the travels of many Chinese intellectuals to

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\(^3\) Meiji Restoration refers to a chain of events that restored imperial rule to Japan in 1868 under Emperor Meiji. The Restoration led to enormous changes in Japan’s political and social structure, which greatly contributed to the modern nation-building of Japan in the early 20th century.
Japan after the First Sino-Japanese War. By absorbing the relevant context from Japanese-translated modern Western ideologies, Chinese intellectuals found an inspiration for re-defining China as a modern nation, and for their efforts made to promote reform and revolution. These factors partially explain why some Chinese intellectuals established their reform and revolutionary societies in Japan rather than in China. For example, this was the case with *Tongmeng hui* (the United League of China), which was established by Sun Zhongshan, who was one of the most important Chinese scholars at that time (his revolutionary ideas will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter). Another reason that made Chinese intellectuals leave their home and promote their revolutionary ideas from a foreign country, Japan, was to avoid the political persecution from the Qing court after the failure of the Hundred Days Reform. Although the Qing court was initially itself keen to send Chinese students abroad, it became increasingly suspicious of how they used the newly gained knowledge. Even Kang Youwei, who was highly positioned in official bureaucracy and able close to the core of imperial power, Emperor Guangxu, had to exile himself to Japan after the Hundred Days Reform (Murphy, 2010).

The impact of ‘Japanese learning’ on Chinese academia was obvious in my research. Liang Qichao, who was the first Chinese author who used the term *minzu* to refer to a modern definition of identity, translated this term from Japanese. The influence was also evident in the explanations of relevant terms in Chinese dictionaries published during the time. Some terms are believed to be translated from Japanese and included into Chinese dictionaries at the time, e.g. *minzu*. Furthermore, a large number of school textbooks, especially those published during the late Qing period and very early republican era, were translations of influential Japanese history books. Even in some of the other textbooks, which were not direct translations, editors’ understanding of Chinese history was strongly shaped and impacted by Japanese history books.
5. Conclusion

As evident from this brief overview, the political and social upheavals of the late Qing and the early republican era were accompanied by wide-ranging ideological shifts. The traditional Chinese perception of the world, based on Confucianism and the belief in the absolute superiority of Chinese culture was challenged by Western (as well as Japanese) expansion and technological advances. Faced with the decline of their country, Chinese intellectuals became increasingly open to reformist and revolutionary ideas, including those imported from the West, and sought to use them to establish a new understanding of China and its role in the world. The idea of nation, as an imagined community, imagined as sovereign and limited (Anderson 1983), became increasingly influential in Chinese society at the time, and began shaping the perceptions of Chinese collective identity. The selected three types of discourses were playing different roles in shaping, promoting and popularising these nationalist ideas. Borrowing from Hobsbawm (1990), they helped establish the modern Chinese nation first as a ‘programme’ and ‘myth’ and then as a ‘reality’. This new understanding of the Chinese nation was rooted in a new perception of the Chinese Self, its history and its significant Others.
Part 2:

Intellectuals’ Discourses
Chapter 4: Nation, Race, Ethnicity, and the Han among Intellectuals in Late Qing and Early Republican China

Historically, the writings of Chinese intellectuals played an important role in the shaping of public discourses about Han and Chinese identity, as well as about nation and nationalism, race and ethnicity. On the one hand, these writings directly reflect the different opinions of these scholars as individuals. On the other hand, they also indirectly - by either supporting/promoting or opposing/criticising - provide an insight into popular ideas about issues of identity, nationhood and race in China at the time.

The conflict between the Manchu and the Han had existed for a long time in Chinese history, yet became acute after the failures of the Manchu government in the wars with the Western powers, which revealed a weakness and reluctance of the government to play an appropriate role in foreign affairs. This fact was radically criticised by some Han intellectuals, e.g. Zhang Binglin. During the period of the late Qing Dynasty, Chinese intellectuals shared similar views on and attitudes towards foreign colonial powers. Yet their opinions varied in regard to the inner relationship between the Han and other groups living within the Chinese territory - especially the Manchu, who were then in the position of power. There were two basic camps in the debates on ethnic relationship; one was arguing for the integration of and equality between the Manchu and the Han, while the other was opposing the Manchu court, aiming to restore the Han government (e.g. Chang, 1987 and Zhao, 2004).

Facing a changing social reality, Chinese intellectuals were deeply influenced by traditional perceptions, particularly those rooted in Confucian philosophy. Their encounters with the West, e.g. travelling to the West or reading Western literature, also had an impact on their ideology. Confronted with the increasing
influence of Western nations in China, and their considerable imperial ambitions, they were seeking to rescue their country from the Western invasion that led to increasing social divisions. The progressively unstable social conditions in Chinese society, as well as the intellectuals’ personal experiences of Chinese societal instability, altered their opinions and views of both the outside world and of China itself. The interrelated perceptions of the Other and us, based on the social categories of race, nation and ethnicity, expressed in their writings, echoed contemporary discussions of nationhood, race and ethnicity among Western academics (Metzger, 1977), and bore the imprints of traditional Chinese teachings.

In the following sections, I am going to analyse the writings of three leading Chinese intellectuals active during the late Qing and early republican period, namely Zhang Binglin, Liang Qichao and Sun Zhongshan. Being the most influential intellectuals in China at that time, their discourses (including their books and articles on journals and newspapers) were playing an important role in shaping the understanding of the Chinese nation and nationalism, first among the elites and then among the masses. As such, these writings should be regarded as a significant media that had greatly contributed to the process of Chinese nation-building. Although my discussion is confined to the works of a limited number of Chinese intellectuals, this does not mean that the Chinese construction and representation of Han was determined by these three intellectuals exclusively. Instead, the work of these intellectuals should be seen as representing different influential - and sometimes related perspectives on the Han and Chinese identity. By returning to the original, primary sources - namely their writings themselves - I aim to complement and move beyond interpretations predominant in the existing secondary literature on these thinkers in both Chinese and English.

Existing research in Chinese language on Chinese intellectuals in this historical period mostly regards them as divided into two camps: ‘reformists’ and ‘revolutionists’ (e.g. Chang, 1987, Zhao, 2004). This distinction is based
on their attitude to the Manchu government. ‘Reformists’ (who were also called *baohuang pai* [loyalists]) are those who asserted to maintain and strengthen the Manchu government, while the ‘revolutionists’ argued that the precondition of solving the Chinese problem was to expel the Manchu court (Zhao, 2004). However, this division relies entirely on the intellectuals’ attitudes towards the Manchu government, and provides a rather limited and one-sided understanding and explanation of their ideas as a whole. A close reading of the intellectuals’ writings reveals that even an intellectual who would most likely be labelled ‘reformist’ could express some revolutionary ideas, while the most radical ‘revolutionist’ could also have and express some reformist ideas. For example, Zhang Binglin, who is commonly labelled as a revolutionist, in his early age, supported Kang Youwei in his efforts to promote the *bianfa* (reform) movement, advocated by the Emperor Guangxu.

In contrast to existing literature on Chinese intellectuals in this period, the aim of my analysis is to distinguish between different intellectuals’ positions with respect to their conceptions of the Han, and taking into consideration their understanding and use of identity categories such as ‘nation’ and race. It is important to note that most Chinese intellectuals at that time faced a similar dilemma, namely whether to focus on academic research or political aims. Most of them opted for the latter, and this is why intellectuals played a significant role in major political events in Chinese history. Clarifying the relationship between these scholars’ academic research and their political ideas is an important aim of my analysis. However, my main analysis is focused on their interpretation of the Han, and on studying how and in what ways it is related to their understandings of nation, race, ethnicity and their interconnections. I argue that these divergent conceptions of the Han can help better elucidate the different attitudes toward reform and revolution among Chinese intellectuals, and allow for a more differentiated understanding of

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4 Manchu is a large Tungusic ethnicity, which originated in Manchuria (today’s Northeast China). The Manchu arose during the seventeenth century, and conquered the Ming Dynasty and established the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). The Qing Dynasty governmentally ruled China until its abolition in 1911 by the Xinhai Revolution, after which the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) became the government of China.
their debates at the time. By linking political positions to different understandings of collective identity and difference (or the Self and the Other), we can demonstrate that definitions of collective identity are intimately linked to the field of politics, and more broadly to the socio-historical context within which the intellectuals operated.

The following chapters first discuss each of the chosen intellectuals individually. Each chapter starts by briefly outlining some key facts from the intellectual’s biography, and then moves on to discussing the key characteristics of his thoughts on the Han, nationhood and race, all in relation to the shifting political and social context at the time. This is followed by a chapter that provides a comparative analysis of the key ideas of the three intellectuals, and highlights the key differences and similarities between them.

1. Zhang Binglin

Zhang Binglin (1868-1936) is recognised as one of the most important intellectual figures in late Qing and early republican China and is known for advocating new perceptions of social reality and new solutions to existing social problems in Chinese society. He and his work feature in much of existing research on this historical period (e.g. Chow, 1997; Murthy, 2011; Shimada, 1990; and Wong, 1989).

His radical and sometimes controversial ideas were debated intensively, and also gave rise to confusion. Zhang’s own intellectual complexity and radical revolutionary attitude have made it difficult to understand his ideas fully. Some of Zhang’s contemporary fellow scholars, for instance Huang Xing⁵, even called him ‘Zhang fengzi’ - that is - Zhang the mad man (Xu, 2004). Regardless, it cannot be denied that Zhang made an important contribution to the history of the Chinese revolution in many aspects, which is recognised in

⁵ Huang Xing (1874-1916) was one of the founders of the Kuomingtang (KMT) and the Republic of China. His position was next to Sun Zhongshan and they were known as Sun-Huang during the Xinhai Revolution.
more contemporary research on China and its history.

As far as political attitudes are concerned, Zhang Binglin was widely viewed as a representative of the intellectuals who promoted the idea of *pai*-Man (expelling the Manchu). Zhang believed that the Han had been suffering under the Qing’s government for a long time and concluded that there had never been ‘equality between Manchu and Han’ (1977 [1901]: 151). However, these convictions were not shared by all Han intellectuals. Many of them either remained loyal to the Manchu government, like Kang Youwei, or claimed to eliminate the boundary between the Han and Manchu, like Liang Qichao, and regarded resistance to foreign invasion as the primary task for Chinese people, like Liang Qichao and Sun Zhongshan.

When analysing Zhang’s works - as well as other Chinese intellectuals’ works - I noticed the complexity and interconnections between different markers of identity and social categories - including nation, race and ethnicity - in the construction of self-identity. To put it differently, when examining Zhang’s writings, I often encountered biological identity markers - such as ‘smelly’, ‘barbarian’ and etc. - and it sometimes proved very difficult to clearly distinguish between cultural and biological markers. Yet mainstream literature on Chinese history leaves one with the impression that the idea of a Chinese superiority at the time - which mostly appears in the form of beliefs in Han superiority - is rooted primarily in notions of cultural and civilisational rather than biological superiority. For instance, Loewe (1966) argues: ‘The principal considerations whereby the Chinese have distinguished themselves from other peoples have been concerned neither with race, colour nor religion. Attention has been fixed simply on the degree of civilisation, as this is illustrated by a people’s behaviour and mores’ (248).

Similar views can be found both in older as well as more recently published literature about this historical period. For instance, to Zhao (2004) the Self-image of the Chinese people before the 19th century was ‘culture-centric’ rather than nationalistic: ‘A sense of Chinese identity was based on a Confucian cultural system of ancestor worship’ (41). Harrison (1969) also
used the term ‘culturalism’ to describe the dominant worldview of China before the collapse of the traditional Chinese order that occurred in the 19th century (2). Thus, Han identity could be considered as a form of cultural pride based on the assumed superiority of Han standards of civilisation, embodied in Confucian ideas. Moreover, Harrison suggests that rather than thinking that distinctions between human groups are based in nature, Han people, according to the Confucian scheme, believed that ‘all members of the human race can be improved by means of education and discipline, and all barbarians who can be subjected to these process are to be included under the imperial aegis’ (249). This means that once a person considered a ‘barbarian’ received sufficient Confucian education and behaved completely according to the Confucian standard, s/he would and should be included in the traditional Han society. Dikötter (1999) instead, made an effort to discuss the development of racial thought in China from a historical perspective. Although he mainly focused on research on race, he admitted that those definitions, e.g. race, nation, ethnicity and etc., ‘possess a high degree of flexibility and may vary considerably as a result of the changes in the perceptions and the valuations that the ingroup has about outgroups’ (425).

It is indeed true that the idea of cultural superiority - which is more compatible with the idea of nation as typically understood today among Western scholars - is widely present in Chinese intellectuals’ writings on Han identity. Nevertheless, this does not mean that racial or ethnical elements, which have more to do with biological and physical factors, are entirely absent. My study clearly showed the interconnections and overlaps among these ideas. The following quote from Han scholar Zhang Binglin’s work is a case in point: ‘The smelly enemy Manchu does not belong to the same nation as we do. Thus, whether the Manchu government will pursue the reforms or not, whether the Manchu government will rescue Chinese lives or not, we should carry out the revolution and expel them’ (1977 [1903]: 233). This statement clearly shows that Zhang was using biological markers - i.e. markers we typically associate with racial discourses - when defining the Chinese nation and considering the Manchu a ‘smelly enemy’. In other words, the Chinese nation was identified with the Han, and defined in opposition to a biologically - not only culturally -
Another aspect of Zhang’s thinking that speaks in favour of this interpretation is his use of the ancient Chinese idea of *Hua-yi zhi bian* (Hua-yi Distinction). *Hua-yi zhi bian* is a historical concept used to biologically and culturally differentiate the classic ‘China’ (*Hua/Huaxia*, which is regarded as the origin of Han) from the ‘Yi’ (barbarians/Others/non-Chinese) (Liu, 2004: 11-12). This idea clearly produced a boundary, which was based on the belief in the superiority of Han culture and civilisation. However, although the Hua-Yi Distinction referred primarily to cultural and civilisational differences, it could easily assume more explicitly racial and biological overtones. For example, Zhang Binglin referred the Manchu, which was one of the *yi* groups in China, to a ‘smelly’ and ‘barbarian racial group’ (1977 [1903]: 233). The term ‘barbarian’ was used with reference to a combination of cultural and racial markers to differentiate the Manchu from the Han. In the following paragraphs, I am going to examine the different identity markers and identity categories used by Zhang in more detail, to demonstrate that cultural and biological markers of identity were indeed closely intertwined in his work.

Based on the preliminary analysis of Zhang’s works, I have divided the development of Zhang’s political thought and the understanding of the Chinese social reality into three main stages. The first stage encompasses the period between 1894 and 1898. During this period Zhang was an outspoken anti-Manchu scholar, but he did not yet argue for the expulsion of the Manchu. The second period starts with the beginning of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and lasts until the establishment of the early Chinese republic in 1911. During this period, Zhang argued in favour of expelling the Manchu as well as against Western imperialism. The third stage starts in 1911 and lasts until 1915. During this period Zhang’s attitudes towards the Manchu softened and he expressed a clear desire to establish a Chinese Republic which included them. While dividing Zhang’s work in this way I do of course also acknowledge that there were important continuities in his thinking across all the three periods. However, it makes sense to distinguish between them analytically for the sake of the clarity of the argument.
1.1 Period I: 1894-1898

During the first period, Zhang Binglin was widely viewed as a representative of anti-Manchu revolutionists (Kallio, 2011: 49). However, it is rarely acknowledged that during this same period, Zhang was also actively supporting the *Bairi weixin* (The Hundred Days’ Reform) organised by the reformists such as Kang Youwei in 1898. At this stage, Zhang was attempting to find an adequate reform that would help the Manchu government to resist the threat of Western imperialism. In other words, instead of arguing for the expulsion of the Manchu court, Zhang at this time actually agreed that the Manchu should continue to be the official government of China. He believed maintaining the Manchu government was necessary in order to promote the cooperation among all Chinese to resist the increasing impact of Western imperialist ambitions on their society. As we will see, this idea appeared again in his work after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911. He abandoned anti-Manchuism soon after the Wuchang Uprising and instead concentrated his energy on resisting effectively what he considered the threat of the Western imperialism. Clearly, the intensity of Zhang’s anti-Manchu agenda varied depending on his concerns about the power of Western nations in China.

In order to make his views about maintaining the Manchu government publicly known, Zhang published a large number of articles in the newspaper *Shiwubao* (The Chinese Progress) during this period. This newspaper was sponsored by the *Qiangxue hui* (Society for Self-strengthening Studies), which was one of the organisations formed by intellectuals and government officials who were supporting the reform. The *Shiwubao* mainly published articles that discussed the ways of improving and strengthening the Manchu governmental power, which also indicates Zhang’s support for the Manchu court in this period.

Zhang expressed his towards the Manchu during the first period related to his views on the Han and Chinese identity. He intended to provide a framework for clarifying boundaries between different human groups by drawing upon
both cultural as well as biological factors. He (1977 [1897]) noted,

‘While human beings vary in their height, colours as well as morals and customs, they are all biologically different from animals, and this is something shared by all civilised nations [zu]. However, only we own the rich territory, elevated morals and righteous characteristics bestowed by God, own the complete and advanced moral system, as well as the righteous religion, our race [zhong] is the noblest and the most honourable’ (8).

We can see here that, Zhang did not categorise and judge other races exclusively with reference to biological factors such as skin colour; instead, he admitted the legitimacy of the civilisations of other groups. Nevertheless, he clearly attempted to construct a standard moral and cultural hierarchy between the Han and all other groups of human beings. Han is here constructed as a race (zhong) that sets itself apart through its material wealth (rich territory), allegedly ‘god-given’ superior cultural and moral qualities and advancement. Zhang sees Han superiority grounded in its cultural attributes - the seemingly outstanding - nobility and honour of the Han, and grants them the highest position amongst the civilised nations.

When drawing racial boundaries between large-scale human groups, Zhang frequently referred to geographical boundaries. For example, he claimed,

‘the world is divided into five continents with clear boundaries. All kinds of animals, as well as human beings, exist independently on each continent. Therefore, the Caspian Sea and the Ural Mountains should be used as the territorial boundary that differentiates Asia from Europe and the yellow race from the white race’ (1977 [1897]: 5).

As this quote reveals, geography was along with skin colour an important marker of race for Zhang, who suggests here that racial units can be mapped onto territorial units. Zhang believed races to be intimately, almost organically related to different (clearly identifiable) territories, to the point that he believed these territories were literally ‘owned’ by different races. This kind of
understanding, of course, leaves little room for migration and ‘inter-racial’ mixing.

Zhang’s writings from this period contained frequent references to the skin colour of different races, which was historically a crucial marker of race difference in Western race discourses. This is particularly evident in Zhang’s arguments about a necessity of Chinese cooperation with other Asian nations in the struggle against Western imperialism. Zhang felt strongly that different Asian nations belonged to the same yellow race, and needed to unite against the white race. The following quote is a case in point: ‘if there is anyone who decides to raise a war, this is actually the inner conflict among our yellow race, which could only lead us to become the corpses of the white race’ (1977 [1897]: 6). He even warned that, expelling the Manchu was regarded as a priority: ‘the whites will take this opportunity to devour our territory’ (1906 [1900]: 61). It is clear from these quotations that Zhang was constructing the yellow race in opposition to the white race, and called for the cohesion and cooperation of the former to protect itself from the threat of the imperialistic white race.

Apart from physical and biological elements such as territory and skin colour, Zhang also often included cultural factors and more specifically religious factors into his discussion of Chinese identity. He additionally believed the weakness of the Chinese nation, namely its inability to resist foreign invasion, was rooted in the weakening of Chinese traditional religion:

‘foreign religions are brought into China, which have only little influence, however, when they come across inequality, they fight by using their sword and bow, which is due to the prosperity of their church. Chinese Confucian intellectuals stagger on the street without relying on anything… Although we have talents; we are not able to occupy the official position… The weakness of the race [zhongzu, here he actually means Han] is due to the decline of Confucianism’ (1977 [1897]: 8-9).
In the same text, Zhang also argued that ‘we own the complete and advanced moral system, as well as the righteous religion’ (ibid). Combined with the last quotation, it is not difficult to understand that the religion he referred to here is Confucian, and that he sees this religion as the basis of Chinese morals and strength.

To conclude, during this period, Zhang Binglin showed a lack of interest in the distinctions and conflicts between the Han and the Manchu, and was in favour of maintaining and strengthening the Manchu government by promoting reform and the unification of the yellow race, in order to resist a Western white dominance over China. As a consequence, his writings in this period regularly included references to the category of race, and to what he considered the similarities and differences between the yellow and the white races. However, it would be misleading to conclude that Zhang’s work was somehow more explicitly racist in this period, and that he later, when his interest shifted to relationships between the Han and the Manchu, became more nationalistic in character. Instead, this particular use of the category race in this period was linked to his political preferences and the broader political context at the time.

When considering who represented a greater evil for China, the Manchu or the Westerners, Zhang clearly believed that it was the latter who represented the most dangerous threat. Therefore, he tended not only to regard the Manchu court as the legitimate government of China, but even tried to include Japan and other Asian countries into the same [yellow] racial group [zhong or zhongzu] with China (1977 [1897]: 5). Race was therefore not a category that included only the Han, or only the Manchu or the Japanese; instead, it was a category that was stretched to include all of these in opposition to the white race. By using the category of race and the deictic expression ‘us’ in this way, Zhang attempted to call for the assistance of other Asian countries in the anti-Western struggle.

Zhang’s understanding of Han identity was thus clearly related to the specific political context at the time, and echoed the specific social environment in which he and other Chinese intellectuals operated. In other words, his focus
on defining the Chinese race in opposition to the white race - rather than looking into differences between the Manchu and the Han - was in line with his tolerance of the Manchu government and his worries about the imperial ambitions of the West and their increasing impact on China. In this period, therefore, differences between the Han and the Manchu were pushed aside due to the presence of a dangerous common enemy - the West.

1.2 Period II: 1898-1910

The beginning of the second period in the work of Zhang was marked by the beginning of the First Sino-Japanese War, which destroyed his only hope for the maintenance of the Manchu government. Zhang decided to break with the Qing court in 1901, when it signed the Boxer Protocol with a number of Western countries: Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the United States. According to this unequal treaty, the Qing government was required to pay 450 million taels of silver, which is approximately equal to US$ 6.653 billion today (Hurst, 1972). Zhang was disappointed by the weakness of the Qing court. Since then, he adopted a more negative attitude towards the Manchu government. On the one hand, he criticised it for its poor performance in resisting the Western threat; on the other hand, he also condemned the Manchu's rulers for persecuting the Han - for instance during the Boxer Uprising - in order to consolidate their political power. It is in this context that his theoretical interest shifted from the relationship between the Chinese and the West to differences and conflicts between the Manchu and the Han.

The shift in Zhang's political ideas appears very clearly in his writings. In the

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6 The Jiawu War officially named the First Sino-Japanese War between China and Japan, started in 1894 and ended in 1895. The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed afterwards. According to some clauses in the treaty, China had to admit the complete independence and autonomy of Korea. Meanwhile, China was required to cede the full sovereignty of Penghu and Taiwan and pay 200,000,000 Kuping taels to Japan (Hurst, 1972).
article *Kedi kuangmiu* (Correcting the Erroneous Guest Emperor Thesis\(^7\)), published in 1900, i.e. before the signing of the Boxer Protocol, he argued that the Manchu government should be maintained and strengthened if the Qing emperor acknowledges past mistakes of national oppression and supported Confucianism (1977 [1900]: 120). In 1901, however, he published *Zheng chouman lun* (Correct Discourse on Hatred for the Manchu), and in this essay he suggested that the Han was the only legitimate master of the Chinese territory:

'We now exclude Manchu, which means that we reclaim our garden and house that have been occupied by others in violation of the contract. Meanwhile, those three provinces in Northeast China are Manchu territory. This is why we argue for excluding Manchu instead of wiping out the Manchu'. [1977 (1901): 94, 97]

In 1902, Zhang organised a protest rally held in one of Tokyo's parks in Japan, and gave a speech in which he emphasised that it had been 242 years since the Chinese nation came under Manchu rule. He argued that the downfall of the Ming Dynasty 242 years ago was a ‘loss for the Chinese nation [zu]’ (Tang, 1996: 125) because the Manchu was an alien nation [zu] comparable to the Europeans and the Americans.

This position differs considerably from the one dominant in the first period, when Zhang saw the Manchu as part of a wider Self, faced with a common enemy - the West. Now he rejected the legitimacy of Manchu rule and encouraged the Chinese people to expel the Manchu and fight for the restoration of a Han-dominated Chinese nation. Zhang also believed this understanding of the relationship between the Manchu and the Han, and the associated understanding of the Chinese nation, should be reflected in Chinese historiography, as this would allegedly help advocate Han patriotism. It is due to this that he suggested to Liang Qichao, who was planning to

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\(^7\) The Manchu was widely considered not to be the traditional government of China. Zhang thus argued that the Qing emperor should be only named a “guest emperor” (1977 [1900]: 120).
systematically compile a Chinese national history, to include a volume about race/nation [zhòngzu] (1977 [1902]: 168).

Zhang’s understandings of the terms zhòngzu (race) and zu (nation) in this period become clearly apparent in his attempts to distinguish between recovery and revolution. He equated the anti-Manchu movement with the recovery, reconstruction or restoration of the lost Chinese state, and not with revolution. In line with this, he emphasised the need to use the term guāngfù (reconstruction/recovery/restoration) rather than gémíng (revolution) when he argued for the necessity of anti-Manchuism:

‘The conflicts within the same race/nation [tóng zu] are defined as revolution; while the conflicts between different races/nations [yī zu] are defined as destruction. Improving the institution and government of the same race/nation is named a revolution; while expelling the different race/nation means honourable recovery [guāngfù]. Given the fact that China has been destroyed by the enemy Manchu, we should commit ourselves to the honourable recovery instead of revolution’. (1977 [1903]: 193)

Here he actually claimed the necessity of the thorough exclusion of Manchu from the Chinese nation, while some other intellectuals, e.g. Kang Youwei, considered that the only method to solve the Chinese social problem was to organise a revolution without expelling the Manchu government. Analytically rather interesting is that Zhang did not any longer represent the Manchu as fellow members of the same yellow race as the Han: they are instead constructed as a race/nation that was different to the Han, and could be expelled in an honourable attempt to recover the real Han Chinese nation/government.

In this period, Zhang tried hard to clarify the distinction between the Han and the Manchu further. He now drew a clear racial line of division between the Manchu and his own Han race - distinguishing between them from a biological perspective and with reference to ideas of their different origins and assumed
distinct biological characteristics. The Manchu, were no longer referred to as important fellow yellow allies in the fight against Western white imperialism, but rather defined by Zhang as the Other: a ‘smelly’, ‘barbarian racial group’ (1977 [1903]: 233), which was essentially distinct from the Han. By identifying Han and Manchu as two distinct racial groups, Zhang aimed to question the legitimacy of their Manchu government and expel the Manchu from China. He argued: ‘the exotic Manchu who constitute the current government, are actually far removed and distinct from the Chinese (1977 [1899]: 87). The Manchu were hereby reconceptualised as an exotic and racially distinct group different from the Han, which Zhang defined as the authentic Chinese.

However, although Zhang did clearly refer to physical and racial differences between the Manchu and the Han, this was not the main focus of his writing in this period. His anti-Manchuism was rather primarily based on his arguments about history and culture. According to Zhang, Manchu was the ‘alien’ (ibid) rule, which should be opposed since their culture is alien (Xiao, 1975:905). In his famous article Zheng chouman lun (Correct discourse on hatred for the Manchu) (1977 [1901]: 94, 97), he reviewed the history of Manchu’s violent government of the Hanese. Thus, Zhang claimed that Manchu were a violent, less civilised, and, most importantly, alien government. He concluded that the hatred of the Manchu government was a precondition of the Chinese revolution:

‘We Chinese nationals [zhongguo ren] are the masters of the nation [guojia]. If the government cannot undertake to discharge itself of all the responsibilities of the public/civil servant, and to the contrary, it is satisfied with destroying and ravaging the people, then it is no different to a rascal and a robber… That is why I said we Chinese cannot claim revolution without the hatred of the government. Do we Chinese have the inborn characteristics of slaves and the quality of being cows and horses? Should we Chinese be benumbed when the government nibbles our body and tramples our territory?’ (1977 [1903]: 229).

We can therefore summarise two main reasons that contributed to the forming
of Zhang’s anti-Manchu ideas: on the one hand, during the Qing Dynasty, the Manchu court dominated, controlled and subjugated the Hanese, and its representatives lived a privileged existence segregated from the Han, while benefiting from the government policy of political discrimination. Zhang also argued that the establishment of Manchu authority involved several cases of violent attacks on the Han: ‘the Yangzhou massacre, Jiading massacre, Jiangyin massacre and Jinhua massacre [promoted by the Manchu] were violence like black vulture eating meat, and doe group robbering houses’ (1977 [1899]: 87). On the other hand, in Zhang Binglin’s eyes, the Manchu rulers were not only becoming more corrupt and oppressive, they were also too weak to defend China’s territory against rapacious Western imperialism.

Zhang’s anti-Manchuiism reached its peak between 1904 and 1907. For the occasion of the commemoration party in celebration of the establishment of a revolutionary newspaper Minbao, he rethought the whole history of China, excluding the Yuan Dynasty established by Mongolia and the Qing Dynasty established by the Manchu (1977 [1906]: 326) from Chinese history writing. He was actually making an effort to establish a pure Han Chinese history. Yet again, he claimed that ‘the extinction of Manchu is the fortune and happiness to Hanese’ (1977 [1906]: 343).

During this period, Zhang frequently used the term ‘great Han’ (1977: 310, 336, 343, 345 and etc.) expressing a conception of superiority. He further summarised what he considered Manchu’s abuse: ‘The greed of Manchu is ten times bigger than that of the Hanese’ (1977 [1908]: 423). One of the core values of the Hanese, argued Zhang, was their admiration for intellectuals, while the Manchu valued business. This allegedly led to a stronger sense of morals among the Hanese, and a mocking attitude towards morals among the Manchu. For instance, on one occasion, Zhang described the Manchu as a group of ‘horse thieves’ (1977 [1908]: 423), who got rich by stealing from people’s graves. Indeed, we can see here that Zhang was using both cultural and biological markers when distinguishing between the Han and the Manchu, though he put more emphasis on cultural elements in their representation.
In regard to Zhang’s views about the Han in a more detailed sense, Zhang argued that ‘it has been widely accepted that China consists of a number of assimilated nations [minzu] and it is hard to define China in a national way, we need to consider the majority national group as the main body of the Chinese kinship. This is because of the fact that the Chinese kinship originates in Chinese culture’ (1982 [1904]: 173). According to Zhang, ‘the majority national group’ and ‘the main body of the Chinese kinship’ were respectively referred to as the Han and the Han culture, which should be viewed as the standard of Chinese civilisation. These ‘Han-centric’ views are clearly reflected also in his arguments about Chinese history:

‘From the ancient time, [China] tried hard to construct a culture which absorbs alien races [wai zu], set their lineages in order, and made effort to civilise them in a Chinese way. Those people [ren] who were originally different, after standardisation of the written language and the social customs, became one race [zu] and composed the present China’. (Zhang 1982 [1904]: 39)

Zhang’s arguments about the need to expel the Manchu government were closely intertwined with his arguments about the necessity of a reconstruction of the Chinese national identity as Hanese. He defined the Han from a historical perspective and claimed that over time, the Han absorbed different alien nations and made them follow the Han moral system. Zhang also believed that the Han were actually ‘civilising’ the ‘barbarians’ by making them use the Han language and follow Han social customs (1982 [1900]: 2-7). This view was rooted in his understanding of the hierarchy of civilisations in both biological and cultural ways and obviously demonstrated Zhang’s perception of cultural superiority of the Han over the Manchu. His attempt to contrast both groups as racially distinct, and portray the Manchu as inferior, less civilised and weaker in contrast to the superior Han lineage was also evident in another example:

‘Although the Han regime is weak at the moment, the people would fight for and even die for it since they are of the same origin. The
Manchu are however inferior and less civilised, which is why they were radically and essentially despised by the people, and thus they will definitely be annexed by Europe and America’. (1982 [1900]: 90)

Given his belief that the Manchu were inferior, evil and weak, and would crumble under Western imperialism, Zhang called for a re-construction of Chinese national identity of the Han - a necessity in his eyes. He summarised two key factors in promoting Han patriotism, ‘one is to enhance national morality by increasing the confidence using the traditional religions; the other is to motivate the national sense/consciousness [zhong xing] and to promote patriotism by publicizing/educating the cultural quintessence of China’ (1977 [1906]: 272). In order to promote patriotism among the Hanese, Zhang criticised the theory claiming nation/nationalism is something purely created. He argued, ‘without admitting that the nation is something physically existent, it is confusing and chimerical to claim patriotism’ (1977 [1907]: 361).

The restoration of the national identity of the Han was very important in Zhang’s view. He believed that China could not survive as a nation without clearly defining its identity. This definition was based on a sense of national identity. Zhang, when he claimed the necessity of advocating the national cultural quintessence of the Chinese, understood and explained it as the history of the Han. Meanwhile, he referred to the Han language/character to explain the Chinese language/character and criticised those ‘Westernisers’ who had lost their loyalty to the Chinese nation and race. In the foreword to the magazine Hanzhi (Han Flag Periodical) (1977 [1906]), he defined China as a pure Han nation, and noted: ‘after the coming of the robber Manchu, Han lost its own rules; however, the name of Han is like the contrary of the so-called Manchu’ (345). His effort to exclude Manchu from the national identity of China was closely tied to his attempts to restore a pure Han government within the Chinese territory.

As evident from the above, during the second period, Zhang was concerned primarily with what he now considered essential - biological and cultural differences between the Han and the Manchu. However, this does not mean
that he forgot about the threat of Western imperialism altogether. Instead, even during the time when he most radically stressed the necessity of expelling the Manchu government, he never forgot what he considered as the danger of white imperialism, which was - from his perspective - the real driving force of modern Chinese nationalism. In some articles, for example, *Fanzhen lun* (Discussion on the Renegade Military Governors of Boarder Provinces) (1977 [1899]: 99-100), Zhang frequently referred to the term *baozhong* (The protection of the *zhong*). In this article, Zhang encouraged the Chinese to resist the invasion of the whites (1977 [1899]: 99-100) to promote our race (*zhong*), which he meant to be the yellow race. This is evident in his claim that China should treat Japan as the *tong zhong* (same race), and that it was important to incorporate Japan and the Japanese as ‘brothers’ in the attempts to resist the invasion from the whites. Zhang argued:

‘The conflict between Japan and “us” is different from and much less serious than the deep-seated resentment to Britain and France. It is easily understood that Japan is a country that belongs to the same race [*tongzhong*] as ours, which is close to the Eastern China Sea. However, the violations of our frontier produced by those European people are long-standing, and we are totally out of support without Japan, who shares the same destiny with us. In regard to the current situation, the hatred between Japan and “us” is far less serious than what we have with the white race [*bai zhong*]. That we brothers fight against each other will only benefit others’. (Zhang 1977 [1898]: 54-55)

He therefore appeals to his readers to support cooperation with Japan, and even generously give up some Chinese territories and hand them over to Japan:

‘...if China becomes more powerful, it will collectively benefit both of us; on the other hand, if China will be weak, it only benefits Japan on its own, without doing any other good...It is better to let Japan occupy the Northern Shandong than let Russia and Germany capture it; it is better that we presented it as a gift to Japan than that Japan occupies it after war. Then why not present our stagnant regions as a large gift
Zhang’s idea to ‘present’ some part of Chinese territory as a gift to Japan was very novel one and very different from ideas advocated by most other Chinese intellectuals at the time. Giving national land to other countries as a gift was obviously not an easily accepted opinion. This demonstrates Zhang’s serious concern about the threat of Western imperialism.

To conclude, Zhang’s writing in this period was focused primarily on distinguishing the Han and the Manchu as racially and culturally distinct groups, and promoted the idea that the Han were superior to the Manchu, and the only legitimate representatives and rulers of the Chinese nation. This was closely linked to his political views in that period. In drawing distinctions between the two groups Zhang was using both biological and cultural markers, and both the categories of nation and race. At the same time, he also occasionally continued to use the word race [zhong] to refer to a larger unity including other Asian groups, in particular the Japanese, and distinguish between this larger racial unity and the white race. In both cases, the distinctions between ‘us’ and them were rooted in his perception of the social hierarchy of races, i.e. the biological and cultural superiority of the Han race (vis-à-vis the Machu) and the yellow race (vis-à-vis the white race). Such racialised ideas echoed Western social sciences research of the time, and the development of scientific racism in the West throughout the 19th century.

This flexible use of the category race confirms that the terms race and nation were partly interconnected and even interchangeable at the time. Instead of treating these terms as distinct and mutually exclusive social categories, which refer to clearly distinct kinds of social groups, it is therefore better to see them as partially overlapping representations of social identity and difference (inclusion and exclusion, belonging and non-belonging) without a clearly defined, fixed meaning. Instead of defining the Han by using exclusively one of the concepts - be it race, nation or ethnicity - Zhang combined various social categories and markers and used them differently depending on the context, although each time with the aim to clarify the
1.3 Period III: 1910-1915

The third period of the development of Zhang’s ideas began in 1910. From this year onwards his anti-Manchuism became less radical, and he started differentiating between the Manchu government and the Manchu people. He explained that anti-Manchuism was aiming to overthrow the Manchu government rather than expel all Manchu people (Tang, 1982 [1910]: 520).

The changes in Zhang’s attitude are once again closely related to his perception of the rising Western imperialist threat. When considering the major threats that the Chinese nation allegedly faced at the time - the Manchu on the one hand, and the Western invasion on the other hand - Zhang argued that their relative importance had shifted, and that the latter became far more serious:

‘It seems that the Manchu was considered as a greater danger than the Western threat in the revolution; however the truth is that the Westerners are actually ten thousands of times more dangerous than the Manchu at this moment’. (1915 [1909] vol 3: 43)

Zhang also believed that other nations that were similarly occupied or invaded by Western forces were in a similar situation as the Han: ‘We are concerned not only about the Han nation [zu] but also those nations [yi zu] whose territories were occupied, whose national rights [minzu zhuquan] were usurped and whose people [ren] are enslaved’ (ibid). Among other nations suffering under the foreign yoke he mentioned India which was colonised by the British Empire, and Vietnam which was colonised by France. This shared suffering, argued Zhang, was the basis for a particular form of compassion among nationalists from different nations. On one occasion, he even argued that: ‘a real nationalist [minzu zhuyi zhe] is the one who sympathises with other nations [minzu] that are experiencing the same excruciation as his own
nation’ (ibid). Ideas of this kind were characteristic of the third stage of the development of Zhang’s representation of Chinese identity and the Han.

Zhang’s understanding of the Han changed as well during this period. As demonstrated in the previous section, his nationalist claims about Han superiority were initially mainly based on the belief in the superiority of Han customs, language and culture. Apart from these cultural markers, he also regularly referred to biological markers of difference, such as skin colour, to differentiate between the Han and the Manchu. However, after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911, he started associating Han identity and Han nationalism with the construction of state, and put less emphasis on the cultural aspects of Han identity and on the idea that the Han are the only group entitled to govern China. Instead, following Sun Zhongshan’s ideas - which will be discussed at a later point in this chapter - Zhang started advocating the political unification of the Han, the Manchu, the Mongols, and Tibetans.

In this period, Zhang argued that national interests [guojia liyi] were more important than personal feelings. He wanted to include as many people as possible into the group of ‘Chinese’, and presented this as something that is in the interest of the Chinese population as a whole. In his letter to Chinese students in Japan in 1910 he noted: ‘the aim of the national revolution [minzu geming] is to reconstruct our national identity [zhuquan], and thus prevent being captured by others; this neither means massacring all the Manchu and making them die sonless nor treating them as slaves’ (1977 [1910]: 519). Further on in the same letter, Zhang clearly stated that the Manchu are part of the Chinese nation, and even claimed that they should enjoy the same right as the Han: ‘Our Manchu are also Chinese, enjoying equal rights of undertaking farming, engaging in commercial activities, using language as well as being eligible to participate in election’ (ibid). When arguing for the equal treatment of the Han and Manchu, Zhang appealed to what he considered the values and nature of the Han:

‘It is in our Hanese nature to be peaceful and humane. We have no
wish to massacre other nations [zhongzu], nor do we hold prejudices against different classes. Given that within our territory, there are Mongols, Uyghurs, as well as Tibetans, who are all treated equally, why we only unjustly treat the Manchu?’ (1977 [1910]: 520).

Interestingly, the honourable Hanese values Zhang was appealing to - e.g. humanness - were the very same values he associated with the Han already in the previous period. He earlier claimed that the Han, among all the other human groups, was the only civilised zu, with ‘elevated morals and righteous characteristics’ (1977 [1897]: 8). However, in the previous period these values were used to foster hatred against the Manchu, while now he used them to argue for the equal treatment of the Manchu.

Zhang’s national ideas became especially clear after the uprising of the Xinhai Revolution (known as the Chinese Revolution) in 1911. During that time, Japan showed a clear desire to occupy Manchuria, which was the home of the Manchu. In contrast to his early effort to locate the Manchu as a distinct racial/national group from Han, Zhang now highlighted the historical connection between the Manchu and the Han. On the 1st of November, 1912, he wrote in the newspaper Dagonhe ribao: ‘[although] Japan and Russia made an utmost effort to penetrate Manchuria, the historical bond between [the Manchu and us] cannot be broken’. In his article Lun jiaoyu de genben yaocong ziguo zixin fachulai (On How the Foundation of Education Should Come from One’s Country and One’s Own Heart) (1977 [1910]: 507), although Zhang regarded Han culture as the representative of Chinese traditional culture, he had also to some extents affirmed the development of Chinese culture during the Qing period that ‘the study of literature, mathematics, and li [ritual], which had experienced a long-term darkness, brightened during the Qing. The development of histography has reached the standard of the Song Dynasty’ (ibid).
1.4 Conclusion

Zhang was regarded as one of the most radical revolutionists in late Qing and early republican China, especially due to his anti-Manchu ideas. He made a great effort in advocating new interpretations of social reality and new solutions to existing social problems. Zhang’s own intellectual complexity and radically revolutionary attitude have made it difficult to understand his ideas fully, and this is true for many other Chinese intellectuals during the late Qing period. However, no matter how much Zhang’s standpoint was changing (in line with changing political and social context), he always used various identity markers in order to define the Han, the Self and to construct and clarify the boundaries between the Self and the Others.

In the first period, Zhang was actively supporting the *Bairi weixin* (The Hundred Days’ Reform, organised by Kang Youwei), in order to help the Manchu government to resist the growing influence and power of the West in China. Instead of arguing for the expulsion of the Manchu court, Zhang actually agreed that the Manchu should continue to be the official government of China. He believed maintaining the Manchu government was necessary in order to promote the cooperation among all the Chinese to resist Western imperialism (1977 [1899]: 86). However, this standpoint was still based on his deep belief in Han’s racial and cultural superiority, as the Han were seen as the ‘noblest and the most honourable’ of all ethnicities (1977 [1897]: 8). Although Zhang was in favour of maintaining the Manchu government, it is evident from the quotation above that he undoubtedly believed that the Han stood in the highest position in a racial, moral and cultural hierarchy among the various groups of human beings.

In the second period, Zhang was disappointed by the increasing weakness of the Manchurian Qing court. He adopted a more negative attitude to the Manchu government. On the one hand, he criticised the Manchu government for its poor performance in resisting the Western threat; on the other hand, he also condemned the Manchu’s rulers for persecuting the Han - for instance during the Boxer Uprising - in order to consolidate their political power. During
this period, Zhang’s construction of the Self and them was frequently shifting: he paid much attention to the conflict between the Han and the Manchu; yet simultaneously, he never forgot to highlight the danger of the Western taking over China. He represented the Manchu and the Han as two distinct racial/national groups, and used cultural and biological markers of difference to construct the former as inferior to the latter, while calling for an exclusion of the Manchu from the Chinese national community.

As we have seen, Zhang’s anti-Manchui sm became less radical in the third period. He started differentiating between the Manchu government and the Manchu people and explained that anti-Manchui sm was aimed at overthrowing the Manchu government rather than expelling the whole Manchu people (1982 [1910]: 520). The changes in Zhang’s attitude can be seen yet again closely related to his perception of the Western imperialist threat. When considering the major threats that the Chinese nation allegedly faced at the time – the Manchu on the one hand, and the Western invasion on the other hand – Zhang argued that their relative importance had shifted, and that the latter was ‘ten thousands of times more dangerous than the Manchu’ (1915 [1909]).

2. Sun Zhongshan

Sun Zhongshan (1866-1925) is widely recognised in contemporary China as the ‘Father of Modern China’ (Ip, 2008: 327). This indicates the crucial role of Sun in the Chinese nation building process, especially in overthrowing the Manchu government in 1911. He was the first provisional president of the Republic of China, established in 1912. Sun’s effort in promoting the Chinese revolution gained him his high reputation in both mainland China and Taiwan.

Distinct from other Chinese intellectuals during the period of late Qing, Sun Zhongshan was born and educated in the USA. This unique experience contributed to the complexity of his ideas, especially to his attitudes towards the West. On the one hand, he was aware of the impact of Western
imperialism on Chinese society; on the other hand, in order to achieve his aim to establish an anti-Manchu movement, Sun relied to some extent on Western help. These two aspects co-influence Sun’s academic and political ideas, which showed a considerable diversity and were at times contradictory.

In order to study main patterns and changes in Sun’s ideas, influenced by the changing social and political background, I will divide the development of Sun’s ideas into three periods. The first period lasted from the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War to the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911. During this period Sun defined self-identity in a considerably narrow sense and expressed a clear radical attitude towards the Manchu government, he argued: the Han was and should be the only representative of China. During the second period, between 1911 and 1914, Sun stated that ‘the purpose of the establishment of the Republic of China is to advocate the free power of the trillion of nationals [guomin], which contains the Han, Manchu, Mongolia, Hui and Tibet’ (1985 [1911] vol 2: 23-24). The national unity of China was his main emphasis during this period. In the third period, between 1914 and 1919, Sun proposed that all Chinese people should be equally treated without being differentiated by ‘nation [guojia], race [minzu], class and religion’ (1985 [1911] vol 2: 106).

2.1 Period I: 1890-1911
The time from the last decade of the 19th century to the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911, could be roughly summarised as the first period in the development of Sun Zhongshan’s ideas. Sun was deeply disappointed by the result of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894. During the war, the Manchu government mobilised only a fairly low level of resistance to the Japanese forces. The Manchu court not only totally lost the long-term control over Korea, but also lost the Liaodong province to Japan, which was known as the origin of Manchuria. In the same year, the China Revival Society was established by Sun Zhongshan in Honolulu. Sun called for the exclusion of all ‘barbarians’ from China, and promoted the restoration and unification of the
Chinese nation as the main task of the Chinese revolution: It was up to the Chinese to: ‘expel the barbarian, restore China, and establish the united government’ (The Second Historical Archives of China, 1994 [1894]: 83).

The Western imperialist threat, which can be considered one of the main reasons leading to the fall of the Manchu government, became one of the main motivations for public criticisms of the Manchu government, especially among radical revolutionists such as Sun Zhongshan. He believed that, the inner reforms that took place within the Qing court would not really help to save China and the Chinese people. Instead of maintaining and strengthening the Manchu government, it was seen as necessary to establish a ‘pure’ China, which was based on the rule of the dominant Han and excluded the Manchu. Sun Zhongshan was clearly one of those who advocated the establishment of such a ‘pure’ exclusively Hanese-Chinese nation at the time. He stated:

‘we should promote nationalism among the non-Manchu Chinese, which is my lifetime responsibility. Once this spirit (of nationalism) is awakened, the Chinese nation will inevitable arouse the power of its 4 hundred million people, to forever expel the Manchu Dynasty’ (1985 [1902] vol 3: 2).

In Sun’s eyes, the weakness showed by the Manchu court in the wars with the foreign nations, especially the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, contributed to the spreading of Han Chinese nationalism and an ardent desire to re-establish a pure Han Chinese government. This distinguished Sun’s ideas from those of the other two intellectuals I discuss in this chapter, Zhang Binglin and Liang Qichao, both of whom initially advocated maintaining and improving the Manchu government. It could be concluded that Sun Zhongshan never expected anything from the Manchu government throughout his life. Furthermore, he never gave any chance to the Manchu court to improve their governmental abilities. This is because from the very start, Sun Zhongshan refused categorically to accept the Manchu as Chinese nationals: ‘China was subjugated by the Manchu for more than 260 years’ (1981 [1906] vol 1: 311-312). Therefore, ‘Our nationals [guomin] who are patriotic, must make their
effort to smash the Manchu to restore our nation [zuguo]. If there is anyone who works for the Manchu, he is actually against his nation [zuguo]. China should be the Chinese China, but was conquered by the Manchu’ (1981 [1906] vol 1: 312). In another essay, Sun explained similarly that ‘the true meaning of China is the Chinese China, the Chinese politics and should be governed by the Chinese’, which requires the expelling of the Manchu and restoration of the Han national sovereignty (1985 [1907] vol 1: 233).

As indicated by the above, Sun considered that Chinese people had a strong passion for their nation, but a very weak sense of national identity. This apparently contradictory phenomenon was addressed by other Chinese scholars at the time. For instance, Liang Qichao (another scholar I will discuss in the next section) argued that, ‘we Chinese always existed as a uniquely independent nation [minzu], which was called by we Chinese “the whole world under the sky/heaven” [tianxia] instead of Chinese nation. As there is no nation [guo] but the whole world under the sky/heaven [tianxia] instead, how can we say nationalism then?’ (1990 [1899]: 270). Indeed, Liang Qichao is correct to point to the fact that the Chinese historically referred to themselves as ‘the whole world under the sky’. Yet this was due to the fact that at the time, they did not constitute a nation in the modern sense of the world. As we will show in our analysis of Chinese textbooks, the sense of identity was in this period tied primarily to Confucian values, i.e. to religion rather than nationhood. Or, to return to Liang Qichao: the lack of national consciousness was not simply a consequence of the absence of a national identity label, but stemmed from the fact that nationhood as such simply did not exist in its modern form in the Chinese context.

Another factor that helps to explain the relative lack of national consciousness that Sun notes in his work lies in the Chinese political system at the time. Although China had a very long historical tradition of a centralised political system, the central government (Qing court) of that time was rather weak (Zhao, 2004: 71), which contributed to the instability or relatively late development of a consciousness of national identity among the Chinese. In the long run, however, the weakness of the Manchu government towards
Western powers also provided the basis for Chinese national mobilisation - led, among others, by intellectuals such as those explored in this chapter - and thereby strengthening the consciousness of a Chinese national identity associated with the Han. I will discuss these issues at greater length in my analysis of Chinese textbooks.

Sun’s understanding and use of the categories nation and race in his writings were closely tied to his political ideas at the time. As evident from the above, the remarkable characteristic of this period was Sun’s radical attitude towards the Manchu and a strong emphasis on promoting the anti-Manchu movement. These attitudes were rooted in his understanding of the Manchu and the Chinese. For Sun, the Manchu were first, a foreign group from a biological perspective of lineage, and second, a ‘rude’ (1981 [1896] vol 1: 46), ‘barbarian’ and ‘uncivilised’ (1981 [1903] vol 1: 232), ‘tyrannous’ (1981 [1897] vol 1: 172) community from the perspective of culture and morality. Sun here constructed the Manchu as a different and separate group from the Hanese with reference to both biological racialised markers (lineage), and cultural markers of difference (civilisation, barbarism and tyranny).

In one of his essays, Sun wrote: ‘the current occupants of the important posts in the throne, the government and the army, all belong to the foreign nation [yizu]’ (1985 [1896] vol 2: 224), and also ‘[It is necessary] to entrust China to the pure Chinese to govern’ (1985 [1896] vol 2: 236). The term Chinese here refers to the Han. These two quotations represented two meanings: one is that the Manchu is a foreign nation, which is different from ‘us’ Han; on the other hand, they also mean that the Manchu is not and should not be included among the Chinese. The following quote provides another example of this kind of reasoning, and questions the legitimacy of the Manchu government explicitly: ‘The Manchu government is as we always mention totally different from the Chinese government. There is no government in China, thus the two terms (Manchu government and Chinese government) can never be alternatively used. If anyone who directly used the term Manchu government (referring to the Chinese government), it is wrong in law’ (1981 [1904] vol 1: 244). Apart from promoting a clear opposition to the Manchu government, Sun
further claimed it necessary to expel all the Manchurian from ‘our’ territory (1985 [1903] vol 2: 250-251).

Sun classified the Manchu as foreign, and as initially referred to them as a rude, barbarian, tyrannous, uncivilised nation from the perspective of culture and morality. In another verbal attack against the Manchu government, he argued: ‘regarding the Manchu thief, which has governed China for more than 300 years, they view fooling the Hanese as the principle of their government. They also suck the blood of the Hanese, bind the hands and feet of the Hanese’ (1981 [1897], vol 1: 172). Sun expresses in this passage that he considers the Manchu as having a ‘parasitic’ and paralysing status in Chinese society, ‘sucking their blood’ and binding the Hanese. The reason Sun felt the Manchu government was ‘fooling’ the Hanese was because the Manchu tried to promote their own culture as well as their lifestyle in Chinese society, which were considered as very distinct from and also inferior to the traditional Han customs. Sun believed that this also went against the long-term process of national integration between the Han and Others since the minority groups were always required to follow the standard of Han civilisation, including the culture, lifestyles and etc.

In contrast to the Manchu, Sun believed the Han to be very peaceful, morally superior, and civilised. In one essay, he preached that the ‘Chinese [here he referred to the Hanese] are the most peaceful nation [zhongzu] in the world’ (1981 [1903] vol 1: 219). He also put particular emphasis on the power of Chinese cultural morality, and regarded it as the reason for the submission of the neighbouring nations to China (ibid). By representing the Han in this way, he was clearly constructing a very positive image of the Self (the Han) in binary opposition to a very negative image of the Other (the Manchu). In Sun’s view, these stark differences between the Han and the Manchu made it impossible to support the Manchu government in any shape or form. He thus opposed Zhang Binglin’s ideas to protect and maintain the government of the guest emperor: ‘it is impossible to protect the “guest emperor” and reconcile [ourselves] to be the eternally doomed slaves. The incompatibility between the Manchu and the Han is like the difficulty of firing an ice mountain’ (1981
These radical views about the Han and the Manchu were also reflected in Sun’s reflections on Han and Manchu history. He constructs it as a history of two distinct racial groups that differed substantially in terms of their historical heritage, and cultural and moral status. According to him, ‘the Manchu were originally a nomadic group and a barbarian and a jianzhong [currish race], while we Han own 4000 years of civilisation’ (1981 [1903] vol 1: 232). This kind of thinking is characteristic of a long-term traditional self-perception of the Hanese, which defines Han culture and the Hanese moral system as the superior, proper standard of civilisation against which other groups are measured. Although the Manchu constituted the government of China at that time, Sun actually believed they were under civilised and culturally inferior to the Han. This perceived lack of civilisation was yet another reason that made him argue that the Manchu were unfit to govern China.

As evident from the above Sun’s negative attitudes towards the Manchu were based on two grounds. One is Manchu’s allegedly violent style of governance and more generally oppression of the Hanese, as well as their low status in the civilisation hierarchy. The other intertwined argument he makes is that the Manchu do not count as Chinese nationals, but are to be considered a distinct foreign and inferior race, and thus any Manchu government, no matter how advanced, is seen as illegitimate.

Sun’s views about the Westerners were also significantly influenced by racial categories. This is clearly evident from the following quote: ‘The territory of five continents is mostly swallowed by the white race [bai zhong]. The current only survivors are Japan and Manchu’ (1981 [1905] vol 1: 260). Although Sun felt that China was threatened of white imperialism, in his opinion, expelling the Manchu government and re-constructing a pure Han Chinese government should be the guiding principle of the Chinese revolution. In a speech given on the occasion of the establishment ceremony of a revolutionary society Tongmenghui (the United League of China), Sun claimed: ‘the reason for promoting the Chinese revolution is that China is currently conquered by the
Manchu… The Qing emperor is from a waizu [exotic nation]. The Hanese who are able to clarify zhongzu zhi bian [the national distinction] would never treat a thief as his/her father’ (1981 [1910] vol 1: 442-444). Sun believed that after expelling the Manchu court, all other problems would be automatically solved (1981 [1897]: 172-173). The Manchu were indeed conceptualised as another racial/national/ethnical group that essentially differed from the Han. He believed that only the Han were meant to be the representatives of the true China.

This emphasis on expelling the Manchu, and on sharp differences between the Han and the Manchu, is one of the most significant characteristics of Sun’s political and academic ideas in this period. Yet surprisingly, Sun is famous primarily for his attempt to promote the integration of Han, Manchu, Mongolia, Hui and Tibet, which was, as we will see, a key trait of his ideas later in his life. In contrast, his proposal to expel the Manchu from ‘our’ Chinese territory was less often mentioned and discussed in scholarly texts. Distinct from other Chinese intellectuals during the period of late Qing, for example, Zhang Binglin and Liang Qichao, who expected to maintain and strengthen the governmental power of the Manchu court in their early age, Sun Zhongshan never acknowledged the legitimacy of the Manchu court.

2.2 Period II: 1911-1914

The second stage in the development of Sun’s ideas started with the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911. In his view, the purpose of the Republic of China was ‘to advocate the free power of the trillion of nationals, which contains Han, Manchu, Mongolia, Hui and Tibet, that means the unity of nation’ (1985 [1911] vol 2: 23-24). We can easily notice that his attitude to the minority nationalities, especially the Manchu, had radically changed. It is difficult to judge if this statement was due to the changes of Sun’s national ideas or motivated purely by his political considerations at the time. Sun’s shifting ideas could be to some extent explained by Brass (1991) theory of ‘ethnic nationalism’ (8), which
emphasises the instrumental use of nationalist discourse by political elites. According to Brass, nationalism is almost exclusively a product of manipulative elites, rather than something that also arises due to the particular requirements of modern economies and states. Although Brass’ theory is often criticised to be too instrumentalist, and the instrumental behaviour of the elites could not be seen as the only source of nationalism, it has been clearly demonstrated that intellectuals’ discourses are closely linked to the social reforms and changes occurring in Chinese society at that time.

After the ruling power in China was back in the hands of the Han, Sun abandoned his former calls for expelling the Manchu from the Chinese territory. In one of his writings from this period, he claimed: ‘the Republic of China is established today. Whoever belongs to the Manchu, Mongolia, Tibet, Tsinghai or Hui, who used to suffer from despotism, gains the national political rights, and becomes the owner of the Republic’ (1985 [1911] vol 3: 66). Having included the Manchu, Mongolia, Tibet, Tsinghai and Hui in the composition of Chinese republican national identity, Sun further argued for the necessity of equality, and an unification and assimilation among these nations: ‘the current five nations (Han, Manchu, Mongolia, Hui and Tibet) are unified and equal’ (1985 [1911] vol 3: 72) and also ‘[we should] strictly promote the assimilation among the nations’ (1985 [1911] vol 2: 35). Sun thus defined China in the following way: ‘today China from Guangzhou [a Southern city of China] to the Manchuria (the Northern China), from Shanghai [an Eastern city of China] to the national boundary (in the West), are absolutely a single state and a single nation’ (1985 [1911] vol 3: 87).

As I have discussed above, the changes of Sun’s ideas on Chinese nationalism were related to the fall of the Qing court and the establishment of the Republic of China. He no longer emphasised the cultural/political uniqueness of the Han; instead, he clearly opposed the social dominance of the Han in Chinese society. Interestingly, Sun’s rejection of Han dominance and his attempt to establish a multiethnic political community were actually both a representation of his belief in the existence of Han superiority, as I will clarify further. Echoing Liang Qichao, Sun made an effort to seek for the
historical evidence in order to show that China has long been a multiethnic nation, which was very different from his earlier ideas. This shift in Sun Zhongshan’s ideas can be explained as a consequence of the nation-building effort, and in particular as an instrument of justifying continued control over the existing Chinese territory and population. If Sun Zhongshan continued to demand the expulsion of the Manchu, this would have potentially meant giving up a substantial part of the territory and the population. In contrast, integrating the Manchu provided the basis for claiming national unity among a broader array of ethnic groups as well as the basis for a strong claim to a larger territory.

However, despite these changes, Sun Zhongshan still frequently criticised the violent government of the Manchu during this stage: ‘it has been 268 years since the Manchu stole China. During this period, [the Manchu’s] governmental violence cannot be counted’ (1981 [1912] vol 2: 8). This demonstrates that his views about the Manchu government remained unchanged, and were still based on the belief that the Han should be the ruler of China.

2.3 Period III: 1915-1919

Further changes in Sun’s ideas on Chinese identity were strongly influenced by frontier conflicts at the border of the Chinese territory and the increasing Western imperialist threat to China. The third stage of the development of Sun’s position was inosculated with the second. Following his argument about the integration of the Han, Manchu, Mongolia and other minority nationalities, Sun further claimed, ‘the Chinese people are all equal, without being differentiated by nation, race, class and religion’ (1985, vol 2: 106).

The New Cultural Movement, which became influential in 1919, and which imported a large number of competing Western ideologies into China, especially the ideas of democracy and freedom, deeply influenced the Chinese intellectuals of the time. Many of them (for example, Chen Duxiu, Li
Dazhao and etc.) started to pay more attention to constructing a liberal, democratic politically unified republic, instead of emphasising the racial or ethnical characteristics of the central government. Sun was one of them. He also began to criticise Hanism (the Great-Han nationalism):

‘We have finished the task that to expel the Manchu and restore the Han, however, this only achieves the passive aim of minzu zhuyi [nationalism]. [We] should make our effort from now onwards to achieve the positive aim of nationalism. What is the positive aim [of nationalism]? It is that the Hanzu [Han nation] should sacrifice its lineage and history, as well as its zizun, zida [national pride and superiority], be genuine to the people of the Manchu, Mongolia, Hui and Tibet, in order to be unified and be fired in the same stove, to construct a new Chinese nationalism’. (1985 [1919] vol 2: 335)

Sun showed in this quote, that he considered it as a completed and necessary task of Chinese nationalism to have expelled the Manchu government, and restored the power of the Han. He was on the one hand promoting the integration and assimilation of different groups to achieve national unity, and discussed in this respect their equal status. On the other hand, however, it is important to note that at the same time, his vision of the Chinese nation was clearly based on Han superiority and leadership, which had not changed from the beginning.

This was the first time Sun publicly criticised Hanism. It was because of the fact that Hanism was widely and deeply accepted among the Chinese intellectuals as well as the mass public at the time. Hanism appeared in different forms before and after 1911: before 1911, it manifested itself mainly in anti-Manchuism; while after 1911, i.e. after the Manchu court was expelled, it underpinned calls for the assimilation of minority nationalities, based on the acceptance of Han culture and the Han standard of civilisation (for example, Zhang Binglin).
2.4 Conclusion
Sun Zhongshan was closer to the core of the Chinese revolution than any other intellectual discussed in this chapter, thus his discourses more seriously impacted on the process of the Chinese revolution. Although his standpoint was changing and adjusted in different periods, to echo wider political and social changes in Chinese society, and in order to achieve different political aims, he clearly used various social markers in order to define the Han, the Self and to clarify the boundaries with those he considered Others.

By discussing the development of Sun’s ideas over time, we could find that one of his main themes was the growing range of groups included in the category of the Self. At the very beginning, according to Sun Zhongshan, the Self only consisted of those he considered pure Hanese, which he then represented as the only group that could be considered Chinese. He used both biological and cultural markers in clarifying the difference between the Manchu and us, and calling for the exclusion of the Manchu from the Chinese nation. To him, the Manchu as a group were more deleterious to China than the threat of Western imperialism. The emphasis on expelling the Manchu was one of the most significant characteristics of Sun Zhongshan’s political and academic ideas in his early life.

However, as I hope to have shown, the main focus of his writings changed after the establishment of the Republic of China. Instead of supporting the anti-Manchu movement, and emphasising the cultural and biological uniqueness of the Han, he clearly opposed Han nationalism and promoted the establishment of a multi-ethnic Chinese political community including the Manchu.

In his third stage, he went further to claim that the Chinese people are all equal, without being differentiated by nation, race, class and religion (1994, vol 2: 106). To achieve this goal, he suggested that the Han should abandon their lineage and history, as well as what he considered their national superiority (1985 [1919], vol 2: 335). However, although Sun clearly criticised
Hanism and made considerable efforts in promoting the integration between the Han and other groups, his vision of the Chinese nation remained to some extent based on Han superiority and leadership.

3. Liang Qichao
Liang Qichao (1873-1929) was born in a small village in the Guangdong province. Liang showed great intellectual promise as a child. He passed the traditional Chinese official examination in the provincial base and obtained the title of Juren when he was only 16. In 1890, he went to the capital and became a student of Kang Youwei, who was one of the most important chancellors in the Guangxu Emperor’s court. After having read various translations of the works written by Western and Japanese intellectuals, Liang became deeply influenced by modern Western ideas in the social sciences. Liang shared considerable similarities with Kang Youwei’s political standpoints. They both advocated constitutional monarchy and Western democracy within the Manchu court as well as Chinese society. Their differences arose from the failure of the 100 Days Reform, after which Kang Youwei was still loyal to the Qing emperor and government, while Liang became more and more a revolutionary rather than a royalist.

The mainstream of Liang's ideas was made up by two standpoints. Firstly, he advocated the fivefold racial classification of mankind, and aimed to clarify racial boundaries between human groups in both biological and cultural ways. Secondly, Liang was mostly critical of anti-Manchuiasm, but occasionally conceded that anti-Manchu sentiments were justified in some circumstances. This set him apart from the other two Chinese intellectuals (Zhan Binglin and Sun Zhongshan) discussed in the previous chapters. Since neither Zhang

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8 Juren is a title that shows one's capacity as a scholar in the Imperial Examinations. The Imperial examinations in Imperial China determined who among the population would be permitted to enter the state's bureaucracy. The Imperial Examination System in China lasted for 1300 years, from its founding during the Sui Dynasty in 605 to its abolition near the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1912.
Binglin nor Sun Zhongshan had ever been very close to the core of national power in the imperial court, compared to these two intellectuals, Liang showed a strong loyalty to the imperial authority of the Manchu court.

The development of Liang’s representations of the Han was not marked by any radical changes. Instead, his perception of the Han developed in a continuous line, and referred to interconnected racial, national and ethnic markers of difference, rather than following a chronologic pattern. I will hence examine Liang’s ideas by discussing central themes in his work, focusing on 1) his reflections on ‘history’; 2) his discussion of China’s position in the world; and 3) his discussion of Chinese national integration and the role Han played in it.

3.1 Reflections on ‘History’

In regard to Chinese history, Liang was looking for historical evidence to show that China had long been a united nation. This was his preoccupation especially after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911. To respond to the argument on a national distinction between the Han and other minority groups, Liang repeatedly emphasised ideas of national integration rather than of differences. Many of his efforts were aiming to conclude that the concept of the Chinese nation was based on a long-term historical idea of unification and required a wide acceptance of what was considered the dominant Han culture.

To include the Manchu into the Chinese nation from a historical perspective, Liang summarised the development of Chinese history by referring to the list of all the dynasties: ‘those so-called Tang, Yu, Xia, Shang, Zhou, Qin, Han, Wei, Jin, Song, Qi, Liang, Chen, Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, Qing, are names of various dynasties’ (1999 [1900]: 410). Here Liang included the Qing Dynasty in his concept of Chinese history, following a perspective very different to that of Zhang Binglin, who refused to mention the Yuan Dynasty (which was established by the Mongols) and the Qing Dynasty (which was
established by the Manchu) when summarising the periods of Chinese history. This showed Liang's efforts in seeking evidence to support the argument that China had long been a unified multi-ethnic community, by providing a historical narrative that presented the different groups, including the Manchu, as an integral part of Chinese history.

When reflecting on the history of China, Liang clearly and directly referred to racial markers. In his opinion, history and human development were mainly constructed by inclusions and exclusions shaped by race:

‘What is history? History is nothing else than the account of the development and strife of human races [zhongzu]. There is no history without race… I have no idea if we can enjoy the great harmony of mankind without being differentiated by racial boundaries in the future. However, it is not exaggerated at all to claim that racial conflict [zhongzu douzheng] is the most severe problem in the current world… The essence of history is to demonstrate and treat the rise and fall of every race in the thousands of years while the spirit of history is to uncover the reasons for this rise and fall’. (1997 [1901], vol 9: 11-13)

As evident from this quote, Liang perceived history as something created and determined by race; and the development and fall of human groups essentially as a matter of their ‘racial qualities’.

At the same time, Liang’s views on history and race were also shaped by culturalism. Culturalism is a term used to describe the sense of cultural superiority held by the Chinese intellectuals for over 2000 years (e.g. Zhao, 2004: 41). From the early Qin dynasty, the distinction between the Self Huaxia (China) and the Other Yidi (Barbarians) was established based on criteria of culture and civilisation, which were ‘based on the historical heritage and acceptance of shared values’ (Harrison,1969: 2). These culturalist understandings are clearly apparent in Liang’s work, and similarly in the work of the other two intellectuals I discussed. Liang emphasised more than once the persistence of the traditional unity of China, despite the presence of a
large number of ‘barbarian’ groups that surrounded it. According to Liang, traditional Chinese society was stable and though inner conflicts sometimes happened, it had not experienced any serious external threats (1999 [1896]: 12, see also 1999 [1898]: 235). This lack of serious internal conflicts among different Chinese groups he believed to be related to the ‘fact’ that in opposition to the Han, other minority groups in China had a vastly inferior degree of historical civilisation and culture.

These views demonstrated here are characteristic of Liang’s conception of the Hanese historical and cultural superiority and of his perception of minority groups as barbarians. For him, Chinese history was actually a process of Hanisation, through which the minority groups were more and more assimilated into the Han. He argued that ‘even when minority groups governed China, they were not able to assimilate China when they entered into China; instead, they were assimilated by China’ (1999 [1899]: 257-260). In Liang’s view, this was due to the lack of culture and civilisation among these minority groups: ‘the exotic nations which used to govern China, which were all nomadic inferior groups, were all assimilated by China without exception. Their degrees of civilisation were all far lower than that the degree of civilisation in our China’ (1999 [1899]: 316). Both of these quotes show that according to Liang, all other groups which used to govern China were culturally inferior to the Chinese, and were assimilated by China, which he constructed as characterised by a higher, superior degree of civilisation.

We can see from the above that, Liang’s historical proposition was influenced by his understanding of cultural differences. His definition of civilisation was determined by Han culture, which was in his view the only standard of civilisation. This perspective will be further discussed in the third part of this chapter.
3.2 Discussion of China’s Position and its relation to the World

Liang was one of the Chinese intellectuals who first used the term nation [minzu]. This word appeared in his Dongji Yuedan (Comments on Japanese Books), published in 1899, in which he refers to the dongfang minzu (the Eastern nations) and minzu jingzheng (national competition): ‘ten years before, the Japanese started to translate a large amount of Western literature and followed the Western format and concepts to conduct a world history. In the preface of the book, they call themselves donfang minzu [Eastern nations]’ (1990 [1899]: 82).

Liang was also influential in introducing Western theories about nation and nationalism to Chinese society. Liang Qichao was inclined to emotionally support nationalism in China:

‘Nationalism is the brightest, most open and upright, and most justified ideology, which allows neither the invasion of other nations, nor the invasion initiated of others by our nation. When this doctrine is applied to my nation, it means the independence of human beings; when the doctrine was applied to the world, it means the independence of nations’ (1990 [1901]: 459).

Hence he concluded that ‘it is necessary for us to promote our own nationalism, in order to save our nation from the threat of the Western national imperialism’ (1990 [1902]: 656). Liang’s attempt of constructing an ideological acceptance of nationalism among wider Chinese populace to resist the challenges from other nations had clearly showed that Chinese intellectuals began to consider their country in a more political and territorial perspective as a nation-state, rather than in a cultural sense that had existed among Chinese elites in earlier Chinese society.

However, in line with his opposition to the anti-Manchu movement, Liang actually paid more attention to the classification of mankind based on racial distinctions, and did not have much to say about differences between different
minzu. The concept of race was one of the important perspectives and criteria in analysing Societies for many Chinese intellectuals of that time, and it was central to Liang Qichao’s reflections on China’s position in the World. In 1898, another influential Chinese scholar Yan Fu had provided a theoretical introduction of Western Darwinism by translating the book *Natural Selection*. Thereafter, racial and social markers were used by many Chinese intellectuals, in order to clarify the differences between China and what they considered other races.

Among them Liang repeatedly advocated the racial classification of mankind, focusing on biological and cultural factors, and much of his account of human society was informed by what would be considered vulgar racialised stereotypes in contemporary society. It is noteworthy that in an 1897 article *Lun zhongguo zhi jiangqiang* (A Discussion of the Future Power of China) (1989 [1897], vol 2: 13), Liang tried to explain the differences among races using (supposedly objective) scientific knowledge. He argued that human races were biologically different in microcosmic way and that the ‘*xueguan zhong zhi weishengwu*’ (Microbes in the Blood Vessel) were distinct among different races. This argument was an obvious echo of the research and developing race theories in the Western natural sciences and social sciences at that time.

An antagonism, opposition and battle between what he considered the ‘yellow race and the white race formed the core of Liang’s racial classification of humans. This racial antagonism underlined his calls for an integration of different groups in a racial ‘yellow’ community under Chinese leadership. It also informed his attitude to the Manchu government, and his suggestion to include it in Chinese history. In this context, Liang argued, that the ‘Western threat’ was much more dangerous to Chinese society than the Manchu, and that only a united yellow race could resist the threat of white domination:

‘The unskilful fighter, without the awareness of the danger of the large exotic nations [*yi zhong*], concentrated on the wars with the small exotic nations, could be compared to the fact that when the snip and
the calm grapple, it is the fisherman who stands to benefit. The bloody battle between the yellow race [*Huang zhong*] and the white race [*bai zhong*] will definitely happen in 100 years... The Chinese population counts for 70-80 percent of the population of the yellow race, thus the integration of the (yellow) race must be started from China'. (1990 [1896]: 54)

The conflict and racial struggle that Liang constructs here shaped his perception of the yellow race, which he as a result, ‘defined in direct opposition to the white race’ (1990 [1896]: 52). He intensively advocated the integration of the yellow race in order to resist white domination, and emphasised the important role of China and the Chinese population within the yellow race: ‘The Chinese population counts for 70 to 80 percent of the of yellow race, thus the survival or extinction of the yellow race is determined by the survival or extinction of China’ (ibid).

Another example of Liang’s attempts to promote the integration of the yellow race in opposition to the white race can be found in an article written by Liang in 1901 in which he is referring to the Filipino as members of the yellow race: ‘the Filipino had wars with the whites for two times and belong to the same continent and same race as ours' (1990 [1901]: 469). Here Liang is trying to demonstrate that the Filipino were closer to the Chinese - to the Self - than Westerners since they were geographically closer to *our* territory and shared the same racial identity with *us*. In the same context, Liang also made efforts to promote the communication with Japan: ‘The national danger of our China has reached the peak today. Anyone who expects the independence of our yellow race should obey the following principles... [We should] closely communicate with Japan, promote the friendship between two nations’ (1990 [1898]: 187).

Influenced by the Western idea that different standards of civilisation could be ascribed to different human races, Liang argued:

‘The Westerners summarise the different degrees of civilisation into
three categories: the first was described as *you jiao* [civilised], the second was described as *wu jiao* [non-civilised], while the third was *ban jiao* [semi-civilised]’ (1990 [1896]: 150). China is the one which was defined by him as semi-civilised. According to Liang Qichao, it is undoubted that China is more civilised than the black race in Africa or the red race in Australia, and this is evident from its various valuable historical cultural relics and traditional standard social rules. However, he regarded the yellow race as less civilised than the white race because of its allegedly corrupt social morality, the narrow mind of the intellectuals, and the stupidity of the ordinary people’ (1990 [1896]: 150).

These quotes demonstrate Liang’s efforts to classify and interlink racial categories with cultural norms to form a system of hierarchical order which seemingly reflected natural difference (see Hund, 2008: 171-203). Liang’s proposition of defining and describing Others as ‘non-civilised’ barbarians, which referred to Australians and Africans, was constructed on the basis of his superior sense of Han-culture, as well as its origin. He considered Han culture as something in-born which was determined by skin colour and fixed for the Han, and distinguished the Chinese from both the far-away Others (Australian and African) and closer Others (the Manchu and other minorities in China).

Liang’s construction of a racial hierarchy underlined by biological and cultural markers of difference clearly indicates their discursive interconnection and overlaps. It also demonstrates the impact of the Western racist ideology of White supremacy (e.g. Mills, 1997 and Fredrickson, 1982) on Chinese intellectual discourse. Although Liang was very sensitive to the dangers of Western imperialism, he shared the belief in White supremacy. In his opinion, the Western civilisation consisted of various Western nations and could be viewed as a ‘white civilisation’ as a whole, and he considered this civilisation to justly hold the highest position in the racially determined world-wide hierarchy. Liang believed that the white race was superior in various ways: morally, intellectually and culturally. All this completely echoes the thinking about racial hierarchies and whiteness that was widespread in the West at the
time. It ‘involved numerous patterns of differentiation and status enhancement which identified whiteness as a normative indicator for membership in an aesthetically as well as morally, intellectually and culturally privileged part of humankind’ (Hund, 2008: 202).

3.3 Ideas on Chinese National Integration

In this section, I will mainly discuss Liang’s ideas on Chinese national integration, on how Chinese society was shaped, and the role the Han played in it. Liang’s basic proposition in regard to Chinese national integration was characterised by his invention of twin Chinese terms: da minzu zhuyi (large nationalism) and xiao minzu zhuyi (small nationalism). Based on this distinction, he advocated the adoption of large nationalism and the abandonment of small nationalism, as a means of confronting the threat of imperialism. As we will see, this distinction between two types of nationalism was also central to his understanding of the relationship between the nation and the state.

Anti-Manchuism was one of the most important themes among the Chinese intellectuals during the late Qing period. Liang had also contributed to some of the anti-Manchu discourses. For instance, in one of his essays he argues that: ‘in order to awaken the spirit of nationalism, it is unavoidable for “us” to fight against the Manchu. Anti-Manchuism is the best idea for current China, comparable to the anti-Tokugawa movement in Japan’ (1990 [1920]: 62).

Although the above quotation shows Liang’s involvement in anti-Manchu discourse, it cannot be understood in isolation. It is important to consider that Liang to some extent also tried to question those who promoted anti-Manchuism and treated it as the principle of solving all the problems in Chinese society: ‘The current Chinese intellectuals, irritated by the closed-door policy of the Manchu government, promoted the claims to exclude the Manchu government and clarify the boundaries between the Manchu and the Han. Is this really beneficial to China?’ (1990 [1896]: 52). He further claimed it
to be important for the prosperity of Chinese society to ‘overlap the boundaries between the Manchu and the Han’, which is ‘absolutely the first step for achieving self-improvement’ (1990 [1896]: 53). In response to other Chinese intellectuals, e.g. Zhang Binglin, who showed a radically critical attitude towards the Manchu government, as well as the Manchurians, Liang asked: ‘of the current Han and Manchu, which is a superior nation while which is an inferior one? There is no standard answer to the question’. (1990 [1896]: 51)

Moreover, when the revolutionaries (e.g. Zhang Binglin) repeatedly made efforts to construct and clarify racial differences between the Han and Manchu with reference to physical and cultural anthropology, Liang Qichao tried to oppose Zhang Binglin’s construction of racial differences between the Han and the Manchu; instead he constructed the Han and the Manchu as sharing the same racial identity as members of the yellow race. Liang Qichao suggested: ‘the Qing Dynasty was originated from the Tungus… Compared with the white, brown, red and black races, they definitely belong to the yellow race as us’ (1997 [1901] vol 9: 13). He further argued:

‘It has been said that the Manchu and we [here he referred to the Han] are completely different races, which is however not a strict truth. In fact, the Manchu has been definitely assimilated into “us” in four out of the six elements which are applied to the criteria of defining a race. In the remaining two elements, it is not easily at all for anyone to draw a conclusion that they and we are different... We therefore conclude that, judging from the sociological definition of race, the Manchu has already assimilated into the Han and has been sufficiently qualified to be one of the members of our mixed nation’. (1997 [1902] vol 19: 21)

However, Liang’s attempts to include the minority groups in his construction of a Chinese national community and identity in his discourses do not mean that he believed in the equality of all national groups. Although he claimed that it was hard to conclude if either the Han or the Manchu were superior (1990 [1896]: 51), he simultaneously (1990 [1896]) and frequently pointed out that
groups other than the Han were historically inferior. As argued earlier in this chapter, he believed that minority groups actually had a lower degree of civilisation and culture to speak of, and that they had instead assimilated into the Han civilisation. This demonstrates that according to Liang all other groups, including those that used to govern China, were to be considered culturally inferior to the Han Chinese, and were rightly assimilated by the Han. In other words, the precondition of the equality he was taking about was the prior assimilation of all minorities into Han civilisation.

Although Liang suggested that the Hanese needed to some extent to give up their cultural privilege in order to achieve the national integration of the Chinese nation, he seemed at the same time convinced that the Han were culturally superior. In this respect, the principle of a unification of the traditional Chinese nation for Liang involved the acceptance of the dominance of Han culture, as well as its standard of civilisation. He argued: ‘There are various nations within China, though with the same origins of the academic ideas, which is the acceptance of being the posterities of the yellow Emperor’ (1990 [1902]: 563). However, the boundary between China and other communities belonging to the yellow race defined by him was not fixed or static; instead, it was open to changes, adaptation, and an inclusion of the Other, if the other ethnic groups adopted Han Chinese culture and behaved like the Han Chinese. For Liang, once they totally accepted the Han culture and its moral system, they became Chinese. In other words, the process of Chinese national assimilation was actually a process of Hanisation.

To Liang Qichao, Hanese China was constructed by its cultural contents, and the Han was the only civilised group in traditional China, while all the other entities in the region were only uncivilised barbarians, which were never equally viewed. Liang was worried about a lack of national consciousness among the Chinese - noting:

‘there have been hundreds of millions of people lived in this guojia [country] for several thousands of years, and until today they have not had a name for their country yet. Even the word, zhongguo [China], is
what peoples from other zu [races] call us, which is not what the people in this country have used to name themselves’ (1990 [1900]: 15).

To solve this problem of a lack of national consciousness in China, Liang promoted a new kind of nationalism. He attributed the key factor of the development of the West to the spread of nationalism in Europe: ‘Since the 16th century, the development of Europe as well as the world was due to nothing else but the enormous power of nationalism’ (1990 [1902]: 656). The military weakness of the Chinese brought about a consciousness of the weakness of culture and sciences in China. The Chinese intellectuals at that time had to seek for some new ideas to foster the Chinese revolution.

Liang’s understanding of nationalism is of particular interest to us, among other things also because it yet again demonstrates how closely intertwined the categories of nation and race were at the time. Liang explained the term nationalism as showing a close link to race, culture and religion:

‘What is nationalism [minzu zhuyi]? It is defined by the same race [zhongzu], same language, same religion, same customs as well as the attitude viewing each other as compatriots. Nationalism is an expectation to establish and organise an independent and complete government, in order to seek for the common good and to join force to resist the violation from other groups’ (1990 [1902]: 656).

Similarly to his ideas about race, Liang’s ideas about nationalism were also strongly influenced by Western thinking. Liang’s understanding of nationalism was related directly to Johann Caspar Bluntschli’s (1808-1881) thesis of ‘No State, No Nation’. Bluntschli argued that:

‘[T]he Nation comes into being with the creation of the State. It is the consciousness, more or less developed of political connection and unity which lifts the Nation above the People. A Nation which leaves its own country may be imagined as continuing to be a Nation, but only provisionally so, until it succeeds in forming a new State in a new
country. Again, the Nation may precede the State’ (1885: 86).

From 1899 to 1903, Liang published various articles introducing and promoting Bluntschi’s theories in the newspaper Xinmin Congbao, e.g. *Guafen weiyan* (The Prophecy of Chinese division) (1990 [1899]: 30), *Guojia sixiang bianqian yitonglun* (The Discussion on the Changes of the Similarities and Differences in National Ideas) (1990 [1901], 94-95) and *Zhengzhixue dajia bolunzhili zhi xueshuo* (The Theory of Political Scientist Bluntschli) (1990 [1903]). While being influenced by Western theories, Liang’s national ideas were of course also shaped also by China’s experience arising from the modern frustration with the West and the social struggles and unrest within Chinese society. Whether revolution or reform, a democratic republic or a constitutional monarchy, in Liang’s views these were all means and strategies to build a modern ‘nation-state’. This was the main focus of Liang’s ideas, and building a state - using whatever means - was to him the core goal for China:

‘The meaning of freedom refers to the group’s freedom, rather than the individual’s freedom ... The value of individual freedom lies in the promotion of the rich and powerful national-state’ (1984 [1902]: 227).

The supremacy of state over nation and society allowed Liang Qichao to argue against the divisive racialist republican revolution directed against the Manchu Dynasty. His ideal of a Chinese nation, including the Han, Manchu, Mongo, Xinjiang and Tibet, as well as the rest of minority nationalities in the country, represents the origin of contemporary dominant national values that are shared by Chinese academics to this day.

Liang thus conceptually clarified the term nation and state by differentiating the two different degrees of nationalism. As mentioned earlier, he distinguished between *da minzu zhuyi* (large nationalism) and *xiao minzu zhuyi* (small nationalism), and argued: ‘small nationalism is used to describe the opposition between Han and other national groups within China while large nationalism is used to describe the opposition between the united China consisted of all the nations and all the foreign nations (*guowai zhi zhuzu*)...
He thus advocated the adoption of large nationalism and the abandonment of small nationalism, as a means of confronting the threat of imperialism. He claimed:

'It is the fact that the Manchu has been fully assimilated into China, although this is the issue neither the anti-Manchuists nor me are pleased to mention… there is now seldom a Manchurian within China who can speak and write Manchurian language... [Thus], the construction of the Chinese state has nothing to do with anti-Manchuiism' (1990 [1903]: 1069-1070).

In line with his support for ‘large nationalism’ Liang believed that China was a unified nation composed of various groups. He argued for the necessity to diminish the boundary between the Han and Manchu. This is because he believed the key reason of the weakness of Chinese society was the conflict between the Han and Manchu:

‘the weakness of China, is not due to the Manchu government, instead, it is because of the Manchu governing China which resulted in the deep boundaries between the Manchu and the Han. The Chinese nationals are suspicious and jealous of each other due to the boundaries between the Manchu and the Han’ (1990 [1900]: 424).

He thus advocated the social equality of all the Han and Manchu, as well as other minority groups (ibid), to resist the invasion from foreign nations. However, as argued earlier, Laing’s vision of national integration was based on the very idea of Han’s cultural and racial supremacy, and dominance. When he claimed that the ‘Chinese state should allow the merging of Manchuria, Mongolia, Turkestan, Miao and Tibet, to construct a large nation, which accounts for one third of the world population’ (1990 [1903]: 1070), he simultaneously predicted and looked forward to complete Han domination:

‘If this dream comes true, this large nation will be definitely centred on the Hanese and it will be undoubtedly in the control of the Hanese. It is not worth arguing about this. In order to achieve this goal, we have to
temporarily abandon the narrow revanchist nationalism, and make use of the Manchurian… In the future, there will be only two possibilities: the Han and Manchu may be both reduced to the slaves; otherwise Han will definitely become the kernel of the national-state’ (ibid).

3.4 Conclusion

In this section, I have mainly studied three main themes apparent in Liang Qichao’s work. The first is his reflection on ‘history’. In order to construct a Chinese identity, Liang made an effort to seek historical evidence to show that China has long been a united nation. Responding to the argument about distinctions between the Han and other minorities, he repeatedly emphasised ideas of national integration rather than of differences. In line with this, he was stating that Chinese history was a history of unification and integration, premised on the assimilation of all minority groups into Han culture.

The second focus of this chapter was Liang’s discussion of China’s position and its relation to the West. Liang showed a widely critical attitude to Western civilisation and imperialism, but also uncritically reproduced stereotypical racialised ideas of white supremacy. On the one hand, he was very sensitive to the danger of Western imperialism. He considered that the Western threat was much more dangerous to Chinese society than the Manchu and that only a united yellow race could resist the threat of white domination (1990 [1896]: 54). On the other hand, Liang admired Western civilisation and believed it rightly enjoyed the highest position in the racially determined world-wide hierarchical order.

The third focus was Liang’s ideas on Chinese national integration. Liang Qichao tried to oppose Zhang Binglin’s construction of racial differences between the Han and the Manchu; instead he constructed the Han and the Manchu as sharing the same yellow racial identity. However, Liang’s attempts to include the minority groups in his construction of a Chinese national community do not mean that he believed in the equality of all the national
groups. Although he claimed that it was hard to conclude if either the Han or the Manchu were superior (1990 [1896]: 51), he believed minorities were essentially without a higher degree of civilisation and culture like the Hanese were (1990 [1896]: 12). Although Liang suggested that the Hanese needed to some extent to give up their cultural privilege in order to achieve the national integration of the Chinese nation, he seemed at the same time convinced that the Han were culturally superior. In this respect, the principle of the unification of the traditional Chinese nation for Liang involved the acceptance of the dominance of Han culture, as well as its standard of civilisation (1990 [1902]: 563). Liang's basic proposition in regard to Chinese national integration was characterised by his invention of twin Chinese terms: da minzu zhuyi (large nationalism) and xiao minzu zhuyi (small nationalism), based on which he thus advocated the adoption of large nationalism and the abandon of small nationalism, as a means of confronting Western imperial ambitions in relation to China.

4. Similarities and Differences
As Liang Qichao said in 1898, ‘the 4000-years dream of our nation was actually awakened by the Jiawu War [The First Sino-Japanese War]’ (1999 [1898]: 234). My comparative study on the national, racial, and ethnic ideas in the work of three Chinese intellectuals thus mainly focuses on the period of 1895-1919, during which the Chinese nation and its people were struggling for survival. Chinese society had experienced a substantial reform in both physical and spiritual ways. The traditional Chinese moral system that had been in place for more than 2000 years for the first time met the powerful challenge of Western ideas. The ideology of nationalism, introduced from the West and Japan, had shown its value of increasing national power and achieving more benefits in the international affairs. Chinese intellectuals who were playing a central role in spreading the modern Western ideologies in Chinese society had therefore re-considered the construction of identity of their country. They published numerous books and articles on newspapers to promote their national and political claims, which had created a significant
contribution to the process of Chinese nation-building. These factors and massive social changes in Chinese society make this period of Chinese history a particularly significant period when analysing Chinese intellectuals’ perceptions of nation/race, the Han and Chinese identity.

This section of the chapter aims for a direct summative comparison of the three intellectuals’ representations of Han and Chinese identity, and consists of three parts. In the first and second part, I will respectively discuss Chinese intellectuals’ attitudes towards the Manchu and the West, to analyse in what ways Han identity was constructed and represented in opposition to the constructed Other. The third part of the chapter will mainly focus on the construction of Han superiority in national and racial ways, and the role played by the Han within the Chinese national community.

4.1 The Han and Anti-Manchuism

Anti-Manchuism played an important role in the Chinese intellectuals’ discourses during the late Qing period. It contributed to the formation of a racial consciousness among the Chinese people and stimulated some significant revolutionary movements, which cumulated in the 1911 Revolution, which ended the Manchu government and brought about the establishment of the Republic of China.

The conflict between a long-term tradition of and belief in Han superiority in Chinese society, and the fact that the whole of China was governed by the Manchu, which was considered to be an exotic, foreign group, had existed for long and became increasingly radical after the end of the First Sino-Japanese War. The Chinese intellectuals were disappointed by the weakness showed by the Manchu court in response to the invasion of the West. They thus promoted anti-Manchu ideas in different ways by referring to different perspectives and theories, some of which were related to traditional Chinese culture while others were a product of their encounter with modern Western ideas.
In regard to anti-Manchuiism, Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan adopted a more radical attitude, though neither of them held this attitude throughout their life. Both Zhang and Sun directly and rigorously advocated the necessity of expelling the Manchu government. Zhang and Sun argued that it was necessary to draw a distinction between the Manchu and the Han in both biological and cultural ways, although the latter was often given more attention.

Zhang Binglin argued that irreconcilable conflicts existed between the Manchu and the Han. In his article *Bo Kang Youwei lun gemingshu* (The Refutation on Kang Youwei’s Work: The Discussion on the Revolutionary), he presented a clear anti-Manchu argument. This is a famous typical anti-Manchu article, which enjoyed great popularity among the Chinese public at that time. He explicitly criticised Manchu traditional culture as barbarian: ‘the Manchurian devils’ warship is not the religion of jiaoqiu⁹; the Manchurian hair style is not the traditional Chinese patrician style; the Manchurian language is not formal but a lingua from a dismal and remote area’ (1977 [1903], vol 1: 199).

Zhang adopted an even more radical attitude to the Manchu in another of his articles *Zheng chouman lun* (Correct Discourse on Hatred for the Manchu) (1960 [1901]). Here he presented the Manchu as a different nation outside the Chinese people, and thereby excluded them from his construction of Chinese identity. Stating that the Manchu were illegally ruling China, he explained that when the government that is established by a nation, is robbed by another nation, it is more than fair to rebel (94).

In order to promote resistance to what he considered Manchu oppression, Zhang wrote: ‘nationalism is prosperous during the 20th century. The smelly enemy Manchu does not belong to the same race/nation [zhong] as we do. Thus, whether the Manchu government will pursue the reforms or not, whether the Manchu government could rescue Chinese lives or not, we

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⁹ *Jiaoqiu* means the traditional Chinese empire fete to their ancestors.
should carry out the revolution to expel them’ (1977 [1903]: 233). Sun went even further in aiming to expel the Manchu by claiming that the Manchu ‘was originally a nomadic group and a barbarian and a currish race’ (1981 [1903] vol 1: 232). He thus opposed Zhang Binglin’s ideas to protect and maintain the Qing government, which according to him belonged to a guest emperor, and considered the tension between the Manchu and the Han was something insurmountable (ibid). We can see that both Zhang and Sun constructed the Other Manchu in a racial way by contrasting them with the Self Han.

The idea of cultural superiority was one of the main characteristics shared by Chinese intellectuals of that time, which will be discussed in detail in the following part. Both Sun and Zhang referred to racial markers to construct a difference between the Han and the Manchu, which included both biological and cultural elements. Race for Sun is culturally charged, hierarchically structured, and closely linked to concepts of culture and civilisation. In Sun’s opinion, Han racial superiority was grounded in their supreme culture and civilisation, and the concept of racial inferiority of the Manchu, based on what he labelled as their ‘barbarian’ racial status. Sun distinguished between the two in terms of a racial differentiation, in which cultural and biological markers are interrelated.

Zhang was the one who was most radical in advocating Han culturalism:

‘(All) are human beings; though they vary in their heights, colours as well as morals and customs. [However], only we [here he refers to the Hanese] own the rich territory, elevated morals and righteous characteristics bestowed by God. Thus, we Han race/species [zhong] is the noblest and the most honourable’ (1977 [1897]: 8).

This quote shows Zhang’s racialised perception of the Han. It also echoes Sun’s vision of the Han as a culturally superior race, compared to the Manchu, and also any other groups in the world.

Sun also highlighted the allegedly dominant role of biological features in the
composition of Chinese national identity. He put emphasis on the role of ‘lineage’, and thereby defined Chinese identity in a racialised way in line with the predominant modern discourses on race popular in the West at the time. He argued that ‘the forming of a minzu is influenced by all sorts of complex factors, among which lineage is the most important element. The Chinese are yellow because of the yellow lineage. The lineage will eternally pass to generation to generation from the ancestor’ (1981 [1904]: 210-212). It is farfetched to equate the Chinese to the yellow race. This passage clearly indicates that Sun’s concept of the Chinese puts a strong emphasis on race. It in fact corresponds with his hierarchical concept of the Han and the Manchu, as two different races to which he attributes different superior and inferior cultural characteristics.

However, unlike Sun, Zhang Binglin drew a special distinction between the Manchu public and Manchu government. In Zheng chouman lun (Correct Discourse on Hatred for the Manchu), he showed an even more radical attitude towards the Manchu. He represented the Manchu as both a different minzu (nation) and zhong (race) outside the Chinese people, and thereby excluded them from his construction of Chinese identity. This attempt to socially exclude the Manchu as an outside threat was linked to an ideological call for a revolt against the allegedly ‘evil outsiders’ (1978 [1901]: 94).

It has been demonstrated from the previous analysis and the quotes above that Zhang regarded the Manchu as an external invader who was ruling China without any legitimacy, and constantly robbed Han territory. He therefore argued that it would be ‘more than fair’ for the Hanese to overthrow the Manchu government.

It seems that Sun showed a comparatively greater tolerance in dealing with the relationship between Han and Manchu identity (and other groups within the Chinese territory). However, this tolerance was actually limited, insofar as it was created on the basis of an assumed Han superiority and also considered the Manchu an ‘outside group’. In regard to the Chinese population, Sun suggested that ‘there are 400 million in total, among which …
the total amount of “outside group” people (including Manchu, Tibet, Mongolia and Turkic) is no more than 10 million’ (Institution of the Party History of Kuomintang, 1973: 2). Thus, ‘we could say these 400 million Chinese are totally Hanese, who are sharing the same lineage, same language, same religion, same customs that absolutely belong to a specific nation [minzu]’ (1973: 2). In this way, the national integration Sun was promoting was not based on equality and cultural integration among different groups within China. Instead, he promoted unification at the expense of non-Han people and minority groups.

Liang’s views on the relationship between the Han and the Manchu were considerably different from the ones advocated by Zhang and Sun. In his article *Lun bianfa bi zi ping manhan zhi jie shi* (The Discussion on the Recovery of the Boundary between the Manchu and the Han is the Precondition of Reform) (1898), Liang clearly stated that, ‘there might be numbers of slightly different ethnicities [zuqun] within a nation [minzu]; but also numbers of greatly different ethnicities outside the nation’ (1936 [1898]: 80). He combined nationalism with the loyalty to the Guangxu Emperor, and even regarded the loyalty to the Guangxu Emperor as the precondition of nationalism. Liang saw ‘the equality between Man and Han’ as the priority of social reform (1990 [1898]: 77-92). According to him, there was no essential difference between the Manchu and the Han. Instead, he believed that Chinese society was challenged by outside groups, who differed from both the Han and the Man, and were considered a threat to society.

However, Liang’s proposition to form an alliance between the Han and the Manchu does not suggest that he completely ignored the conflict between them. Rather, Liang’s attitude to include the Manchu in the composition of the Chinese nation was more based on a practical and realistic approach. In the same article, he noted, ‘the identical conflicts epidemically increased in these years…those who are specialised in war, are well aware of the importance of conjoining the inner groups in order to compete against the outside groups, thus they put enough emphasis on the communication with the inner groups. [In contrast], those who are blindfold to the threat of outside groups, and
focus on the enemy within the inner group, could well be described as creating a conflict between the snip and the calm, which only benefits the fisherman’ (1990 [1898]: 80). He also noted, that ‘the Chinese population stands for 70 to 80 percent of the Asian population. Thus, the integration of identity of the Asian should be started with the integration of the identity of China’ (1990 [1898]: 88). Both of these two quotations show his support for the cooperation between the Han and other minority groups.

To summarise, both Sun and Zhang were in favour of expelling the Manchu and excluded the Manchu from the Chinese race/nation, though their attitudes changed over time. Sun was initially an ardent supporter of expelling the Manchu court from Chinese territory, but he reconsidered and altered his opinion after the establishment of the Republic of China, and argued for the integration of all the national groups within Chinese society, in order to resist Western imperialism. Zhang’s attitude was to some extent constantly changing. In his early stage, he argued it would be right to maintain the Manchu government (although the Manchu emperor was a guest emperor). Later on in his career, he clearly argued that the object of the Chinese national revolution is to expel the Manchu (1999 [1908]: 426-428). He changed his views again to promote national integration and national equality after the establishment of the Republic of China. Liang Qichao instead held a basic standpoint that the Manchu should always be included in the construction of Chinese identity as well as Chinese history.

We can see from the above that, although these three intellectuals emphasised different factors, (i.e. Sun Zhongshan paid special attention to the relationship between territory and national identity, while Zhang Binglin was more focused on the cultural uniqueness of the Han, and Liang instead showed a more tolerant attitude towards the Manchu in a social way), they all adopted the same markers (biological, cultural, historical) in interpreting the Self and them. In defining the Han Self in opposition to the Manchu Other, all of them tended to use the same social categories (nation, race and sometimes ethnicity) to distinguish between the Han and Manchu, although they held different political views. All of them also constructed the Han as
culturally and racially superior. A detailed discussion of how the three authors construct the Han will follow at the beginning of part 3.

4.2 The Attitude to the West

After the outbreak of the First Opium War in 1839, the West played an important role in the reforms of Chinese society. On the one hand, more and more Chinese noticed the necessity to study Western advanced technologies in both civil and military industries; on the other hand, modern Western ideas in social scientific research, especially the development of more systematic Western discourses on nation and race had a considerable impact on Chinese intellectuals. Meanwhile, the relationship between the Han and the West, the Chinese nation and the West as well as the East and the West, were widely discussed by Chinese intellectuals during the late Qing period.

Zhang provided a framework for clarifying the boundaries between what he considered to be different races, referring to colours and geographical boundaries as markers of racial differentiation. He accordingly racially differentiated the Asians and the Europeans and linked the territorial boundary between Asia and Europe to a racial boundary (1977 [1897]: 5). He considered that it would be necessary to enhance the cooperation with other Asian countries which belonged to the same yellow race, in order to resist the threat of Western imperialism. Therefore, according to him, any attempts of raising an 'inner conflict' would result in a worse position in relation to the white race (1977 [1897]: 6). He even warned that, if we regard the expelling of the Manchu as our main task, 'the white will take this opportunity to devour our territory' (1906 [1900]: 61). This quote comes from the period when he had a less negative disposition towards the Manchu.

A similar idea was held by Liang Qichao. Liang also argued that, the world was categorised into different groups by racial markers. Liang was one of the Chinese intellectuals who repeatedly advocated the racial classification of mankind, focusing on biological factors, and much of his account of mankind
was suffused by what can be considered vulgar stereotypes. For example, Kang Youwei, who was Liang Qichao’s teacher and one of the most acclaimed scholars of the late Qing period, dehumanised and inferiorised the African drastically as having ‘the looks of pigs, with iron faces, silver teeth, slanting jaws, full breasts and long hair, look like an ox from the front’ and also ‘their hands and feet are dark black, they look stupid like sheep and swine’ (1956 [1902]: 118-122). He further advocated the intermarriage of whites and yellows with blacks, since he felt this could lead to a ‘purification of mankind’ and contributed to an ‘improvement of the races’ (ibid).

It is worth noting that in an 1897 article *Lun zhongguo zhi jiangqiang* (A Discussion of the Future Power of China) (1997 [1897] vol 2: 13). Liang tried to explain the differences among races using his own scientific knowledge. He argued that the races were biologically different in a microcosmic way and that the ‘xueguan zhong zhi weishengwu’ (Microbes in the Blood Vessel) were distinct among different races. This argument was an obvious echo of research in the Western natural sciences and social sciences at that time.

However, despite these general similarities in their perceptions of world-wide racial hierarchies, the authors differed in the emphasis they put on various markers of difference. For instance, in discussing the distinction between the Self (which sometimes referred to the Han, but more often to China as a whole) and the West, Zhang Binglin mainly focused on biological factors and political needs for the integration of the Eastern nations in order to oppose the Western imperialism. However, Liang also paid attention to cultural elements. He argued:

‘the Westerners summarise the different degrees of national civilisation into three categories: the first is a civilised (nation), the second is a non-civilised (nation), while the third is a semi-civilised (nation). China is a nation [guo] that is semi-civilised. There is no doubt that China is more civilised than the black in Africa or the red in Australia due to its various valuable historical cultural relics and traditional standard social rules. However, (it is obviously) less civilised than the whites because
of the corrupt social morality, the narrow mindset of the intellectuals, and the stupidity of the ordinary people’ (1999 [1896]: 150).

As this quotation suggests, Liang considered China to be less civilised than the West because he used the Western definition and criteria of ‘civilisation’.

In contrast to Zhang and Liang, Sun, who was educated in America, and kept a close relationship with a few governments of Western countries, initially considered the Manchu to be a more dangerous threat to Chinese society than Western imperialism, and even made efforts in seeking Western help for the Chinese revolution. For example, in one of his letters to his family (1985 [1900]), he noted ‘I will gain the support from the Japanese Embassy when I go back to China this time’ (199). However, after the failure of these efforts, he became disappointed with the West and shifted his focus to promoting the Chinese revolution on its own.

It is shown in the above discussion that, although the three intellectuals emphasised different elements in regard to the West, and even expressed preference for different attitudes towards the West, they all used similar markers, both biological and cultural, in clarifying the distinction between the Self (the Chinese, the Han, the yellow race) and the Western Other.

4.3 Constructing Han Superiority and the Chinese National Community

Although Liang, Zhang and Sun developed different political ideas about the relationship between the Han and the Other - largely due to distinct political convictions they held - all of them represented the Han as superior to the other groups. Zhang and Sun clearly shared and promoted a perception of Han superiority based on a combination of racial and cultural markers. They both referred to the Han as a superior race, and grounded their perception of Han superiority in the idea that the Han had a long tradition of civilisation and culture. At the same time, they also pointed towards biological and physical
differences or lineage when they distinguished the Han and the Manchu. Liang also promoted an ideology of Han supremacy, but mainly emphasised some similarities and communalities between the Han and other groups. Instead of arguing for different lineages of the Han and the Manchu, he claimed they shared the same history and memory:

’Some say that there is no patriotic sense among “us” Chinese, which is not the truth. If it seems that the Chinese have no consciousness of nationalism [minzu zhuyi], it is due to the fact that they have no idea about what is a nation [minzu guojia]. China was always united. It was surrounded by various small barbarian groups without civilisations and cultural heritages as well as national regimes, and without being recognised as nations. Hereby we [here he means the Chinese] never equally viewed them as nations as “us”’ [i.e. China] (1990 [1899]: 270).

Although not supported by empirical evidence, the above quotation provides an interesting and partially correct insight into the evolution of Chinese national consciousness. According to Liang, the consciousness of Chinese identity was not clearly present until modern times, when the perception of the Other was highlighted and strengthened. We could therefore argue that it is only when the Chinese were faced with the threat from modern Western imperialism that the need arose for the promotion of nationalism and national consciousness in its modern sense of the word, especially after the establishment of the Republic of China. I will return to this issue again in my analysis of Chinese textbooks from the late Qing and early republican period.

The tendency to claim cultural superiority was one of the most important ideas shared by Chinese intellectuals for over 2000 years. From the early Qin dynasty, the distinction between the Self - ‘Huaxia’ (China) and the Other - Yidi (Barbarians), based on perceived cultural and civilisational differences, historical heritage and values, was rather common (Harrison, 1969: 2). Among these three intellectuals, Zhang was the one who was most radical in advocating Han culturalism; as mentioned earlier, he believed the Han were ‘the noblest and the most honourable’ race (1977 [1897]: 8). Sun
Zhongshan’s views were similar, and he used several culturalist arguments to contest the legitimacy of the Manchu government.

In contrast to Sun and Zhang, Liang Qichao showed more moderation in advocating Han superiority in both cultural and social ways. He even argued that it was necessary to overcome the boundaries between the Manchu and the Han and believed the Manchu Dynasty formed an integral part of Chinese history. Yet although Liang claimed the Hanese should abandon their social superiority in order to achieve Chinese national integration, it is not difficult to find the evidence to prove his belief in a cultural superiority of Han. To him, the precondition of a unification of the traditional Chinese nation was the acceptance of the dominance of Han culture, as well as its standard of civilisation. In his view, the boundary between China and the Other (‘barbarian’) groups was not fixed or static; rather, these groups could be included in the Chinese population, if they adopted Chinese culture and behaved like the Chinese (which in this context meant Han culture and Hanese behaviour). Once they totally accepted the Han culture and its moral system, they became Chinese. This means that Liang in fact promoted a complete cultural assimilation of other groups.

Despite differences in their interpretations of the status of the Han in the Chinese nation, Zhang, Sun and Liang shared similar views about the Han as a part of the yellow race. All of them were clearly aware of the increasingly challenging threat of Western imperialism to Chinese society, and promoted a racialised perception of the Chinese and Westerners. For example, Liang argued: ‘the bloody battle between the yellow race and the white race will definitely happen in 100 years… The Chinese population accounts for 70-80 percent of the population of the yellow race, thus the integration of the (yellow) race must start from China’ (1990 [1896]: 54). Sun also noted ‘day and night [I am] worried about the decline of the yellow race day and night; (I) feel heartache about the weakness of China’ (1985 [1902], vol 3: 2). Zhang went even further to argue that Asian countries should treat each other as teeth and lips (1977 [1897]: 2), so integrated parts of one organic body In the process of depicting the Western Other, all three intellectuals made an effort
in the construction of the Han and wider Chinese identity, by promoting the cooperation among the yellow race, which according to them had to be led by the dominant Han Chinese.

Another significant similarity shared by Zhang, Sun and Liang was that all of them deeply believed that the Han would dominate the Chinese nation, as well as the yellow race in the future. For instance, Liang noted the ‘Chinese state should allow the merging of Manchuria, Mongolia, Turkestan, Miao and Tibet, to construct a large nation, which accounts for one third of the world population ... If this dream comes true, this large nation will definitely be centred around the Hanese and it will undoubtedly be under the control of the Hanese’ (1990 [1903]: 1070). Similarly to Liang, the two others also constructed the Han as superior with reference to other groups in what they perceived to be the yellow race.

5. Conclusion

My comparative study on the works of three intellectuals illustrates that although their political standpoints varied; they were all using similar social categories and markers in defining the Self and constructing boundaries between the Self and the Other. Most importantly, their changing ideas about the Han and the Chinese effectively constituted competing ideas of, and programmes for, Chinese nation-building

In regard to the early stage of their work, Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan were obviously more radical in the discussion on the relationship between the Manchu and the Han. Both of them clearly promoted the anti-Manchu movement, while Liang Qichao instead argued to eliminate the boundary between the Han and Manchu. However, although Liang Qichao argued in favour of cooperation between the Manchu and the Han, he to some extent used the same markers as Zhang and Sun did in defining the distinction between the Manchu and the Han. Although Liang claimed the Hanese should abandon their social superiority in order to achieve the national
integration of the Chinese nation, his belief in Hanese cultural and moral superiority was also clearly shown. According to him, the only way to achieve the unification of traditional Chinese society was the complete acceptance and adaptation of the Hanese cultural and moral system by other groups within China. Meanwhile, this was the only way for other groups within the Chinese nation nations to achieve ‘civilisation’, which was defined and standardised by Hanese culture.

In their late stage, on the other hand, all three intellectuals showed a clear support for national integration among different groups within Chinese society. Among them, Sun Zhongshan and Liang Qichao went furthest and argued that the Han should abandon their social and cultural superiority. This is particularly evident in Liang’s support for ‘large nationalism’, i.e. united-Chinese nationalism, and his critical attitude toward ‘small nationalism’, i.e. Han nationalism (e.g. 1990 [1903]: 1069-1070). Liang argued for the overriding importance of large nationalism because of the threat of Western imperialism, which corresponded with calls for a stronger state to defend the Chinese nation. He therefore argued that the Chinese nation-state should also include Manchuria, Mongolia, Turkestan and Tibet. It is worthy to mention that Liang wrote his essay on large nationalism and small nationalism in 1903, when both Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan were still opposed to this idea. However, less than ten years later, they both changed their position on the matter to support this idea.

Arguably, the different ideas promoted by the Chinese intellectuals can be seen as different visions of the Chinese nation, and hence as different ‘programmes’ for Chinese nation-building - some premised on the expulsion of the Manchu while others on their inclusion. The divisive nationalist ideas of the late Qing era made sense at the time as a tool of reform and republican revolution, i.e. as a tool that helped bring down the Manchu court and turn the Chinese empire into a modern state. However, as the state was established, it became apparent that ethnic division and exclusion presented a threat to its unity, and even the most radical intellectuals started airing more conciliatory ideas in the interest of national stability and territorial unity. In the interest of
nation-building, nationalist exclusion gave way to national unity and integration. This shift can be seen as a very good example of Hobsbawm’s (1990) argument about nations and nationalist ideas being a product of particular elite power interests, tied to the establishment of a territorial state. As he argues: ‘Nations only exist as functions of particular kind of territorial state or the aspiration to establish one’ (9). Indeed, as imperial rule gave way to a modern nation-state, and the once oppositional intellectual elites gained positions of power, their views on the position of the Han vis-à-vis other ethnic groups changed accordingly.
Part 3:

Textbooks and Dictionaries
Chapter 5: Nation, Race, Ethnicity and the Han in Chinese School Textbooks in Late Qing and Early Republican China

The second focus of my empirical research turns to the sphere of education, and more specifically to some of the most important school textbooks on the subject of history published in China between 1895 and 1920. This was a period that was crucial not only for the formation of modern ideas of Chinese identity and the role of the Han in Chinese society, but also for the formation of a modern national historical narrative. As Liu and Hilton (2005) argue, historical narration is central to the construction of identity:

‘History provides “us” with narratives that tell “us” who we are, where we came from and where we should be going. It defines a trajectory which helps construct the essence of a group’s identity, how it relates to other groups, and ascertains what its options are for facing present challenges. A group’s representation of its history will condition its sense of what it was, is, can and should be, and is thus central to the construction of its identity, norms and values. Representations of history help to define the social identity of peoples, especially in how they relate to other peoples and to current issues of international politics and internal diversity. Taking group’s representations of their history into account can help “us” understand why countries will react differently to a challenge where their common interests are ostensibly the same’ (537).

Being one of the most important public representations of history, history textbooks can therefore provide important insights into how a people’s identity is created, maintained and changed. In my analysis, historical narration emerges as a powerful tool in constructing identity, with implications for action (Rime, 1997).

One of the main reasons for politicians being able to make use of history, is that history in the creation of narratives, is that history can never speak for
itself; instead, it can be only described through interpreters’ tongues. Therefore, it provides a way of connecting the individual to a larger collective, by which the consciousness of identity is constructed. However, this construction is not fixed and unchangeable; instead, it is an ‘open-ended drama’ (Laszlo, 2003), since the different components of historical representations can be challenged by constituent groups and may be renegotiated (Liu & Hilton, 2005: 540).

This flexibility and malleability of historical narratives is confirmed by my analysis, which shows that the representations of Chinese history found in textbooks published in the late Qing period differed markedly from those appearing in the textbooks from the early republican era. To demonstrate this, my analysis focuses on three key themes appearing in textbooks from both periods. The first is the origin of the Chinese nation, and more specifically, the question of whether the Chinese nation originated from the West or from within China. The second theme is the signification of minzu and the position of the Han vis-à-vis the minzu. Finally, the last theme is the interpretation of the role of minority groups in relation to the Han and to China as a whole. These themes broadly correspond to three questions: 1) who are ‘we’; 2) what are ‘we’ and 3) who are ‘they’/the Others? As I will show in my analysis, answers to these questions and understandings of the Self and the Other in Chinese textbooks were changing with time, in line with the transformation of the social context.

It is also important to note that the analysis presented in this chapter covers a historical period during which the Chinese education system underwent a profound transformation that laid the basis of the modern Chinese education as we know it today. More than 100 years ago, on the 2nd of September 1905, the Qing government promulgated a decree proposed by the Guangxu Emperor: since the year of bingwu\textsuperscript{10}, the provincial examination known as the keju was abolished as well as all the yearly examinations in all provinces. In

\textsuperscript{10} Bingwu is one of the branch year names in the traditional Chinese calendar, which corresponds to the year of 1903 in the Gregorian calendar.
traditional Chinese society, the *keju* examination system was the most important channel for selecting talented people within Chinese society. The *keju* system deeply influenced various social spheres, including education, elections, politics, economy, culture and even customs and psychological aspects. In imperial China, the *keju* system was used as the major mechanism by which Chinese intellectuals could obtain access to the national bureaucracy. In addition, it was also an efficient tool by which the central government was able to capture the loyalty of local-level institutions.

Due to the importance of the *keju* system this chapter starts by explaining its general characteristics, the changes it underwent during the late Qing period, and reasons for its abolishment. This will be followed by the analysis of textbooks, divided into two periods: the first period is from 1895 to 1911, during which most of the Chinese history textbooks were translations of Western and Japanese works, and only a limited number of these were edited by Chinese authors. The second period is from 1911 to 1919, during which Chinese scholars were well aware of the propaganda function of education and advocated the use of textbooks edited by Chinese authors. However, given the lack of reliable historical sources in Chinese, the authors of textbooks still had to rely somewhat on Western historical works.

1. The *Keju* System

1.1 The Main Characteristics of the *Keju* System

*Keju*, refers to the imperial examinations in Imperial Chinese society, which determined who among the population would be allowed to get access to the state’s bureaucracy. The system of *keju* was established in 605 during the Sui Dynasty (581-618). It had lasted for over 1300 years until it was abolished near the end of the Qing Dynasty. During the rise of Chinese feudal society, the *keju* exam effectively contributed to a centralisation of political power, which therefore promoted the stability of the bureaucratic structure.
Under the *keju* system, the Chinese educational curriculum was organised in accordance with the four subjects of *jing* (Chinese classic texts) *shi* (historical works) *zi* (philosophical works) and *ji* (literary works). The *jing* texts refer to the pre-Qin Chinese texts, all of which were written in classical Chinese. The *jing* was an essential component of traditional Chinese culture, and the *sishu wujing* (Four *shu* [Books] and Five *jing* [Classics], which were chosen by Zhu Xi in the Song Dynasty, as the subjects of mandatory study), were also the main content of the *keju* examination. Confucian scholars, who wished to become government officials, were required to pass and receive high marks in the *keju* examination with no exception. Any political discussion was full of references to this background, and one could not be one of the literati, or even a military officer, without knowing them. Chinese students were required to memorise these classics in order to ascend in the social hierarchy (Gu, 2008).

Prior to the *keju* system, most appointments in the imperial bureaucracy were based on recommendations from prominent aristocrats and local officials. The Wu Emperor in the Han Dynasty started a basic form of the imperial examinations, in which local officials would select candidates to take part in an examination of the Confucian classics, from which he would select officials to serve by his side. The Yang Emperor in the Sui Dynasty established a new category of recommended candidates for the *jinshike* (mandarinate) in 605 CE, which marked the first time that an examination system was explicitly instituted for a category of local talents. This is generally accepted as the beginning of the imperial examination system *keju* (Ren and Xue, 2003). Theoretically, the *keju* examination provided a considerably fair mechanism for those ordinary people who expected to participate in the government. Any male adult in China, regardless of his social status, could become a high-ranking government official by passing the imperial examination. There are large numbers of examples in Chinese history showing that individuals climbed to political prominence from a very low social status through success in the imperial examination (ibid).

In imperial China, the *keju* system played an important role in tightening the
relationship between the central bureaucracy and local-level elites. It was used as the major mechanism by which the central government was able to capture the loyalty of local-level institutions. On the other hand, the loyalty of local-level elites contributed to and maintained the integration of the state and cultural uniformity (Tian, 2005: 74).

1.2 Educational Reforms during the Late Qing Period

Wang Ermin (2003 [1976]) described the historical period from 1840 to 1900 in China, as a process of ‘absorption, fusion, budding and metamorphosis’ of ‘new concepts’ (xin gainian), and further argues that this period of 60 years is ‘an important time of transition that brewed modernity, and also a unique development of academic thought’ (1-21). It not only determined the development of the modern Chinese academic basic pattern, but also shaped the narrative patterns of people’s understanding of the ‘past’ and ‘present’. According to Liu (2002: 2), different methods of classification led to the different classification in Chinese society of modern academic concepts in the process of transformation of modern knowledge. Moreover, knowledge of the nature of disciplines and disciplinary boundaries are all greatly distinct from traditional academia.

The main target for changes in the educational system was the content of the examination. Although bagu wen (the Eight-legged Essay), which was the main entry of the keju examination, was widely criticised by the Chinese intellectuals in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, it was not changed until the end of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894. The unprecedentedly serious national crisis, as well as the rising tide of political reforms, contributed to the abolishment of bagu wen (Elman, 2002). During the period of bairi weixin (the Hundred Days’ Reform), bagu wen was finally abolished, while shiwu celun (a discussion on current affairs) was included in the content of the examination, which involved astronomy, geography, manufacturing, sound, light, chemical, electrical and other disciplines, as well as Western educational, financial, military organisation, business and legal systems. This was a major reform of
the old *keju* examination, and since then, Western scientific and cultural knowledge became central to examination content.

During the Late Qing period, the abolishment of the *keju* was closely linked to the rapid emergence of modern *xuetang* (schools), which was one of the most important markers of the development of the Chinese educational system. After the *keju* was abolished in 1905, the number of schools around the country increased dramatically: there were only 8277 schools in China nationwide in 1905; the number reached 23,856 in 1906 and rapidly rose further to 59,117 in 1909 (Zhu, 1989).

After the abolishment of the *keju* system, development in the field of education was also reflected in the establishment and gradual improvement of the new academic system. A new law on degrees was introduced: *renyin* and *kuimao* were promulgated in August 1902 and January 1904. For the first time, China had an established academic system in the modern sense, in which the degrees of primary, middle and high schools were clearly categorised. In addition to general education, various kinds of special education were also included, such as the Educational School, the Administrative Law School, as well as some specialised schools, such as agriculture, industrial, medicine, gymnastics, arts and police schools. In 1906, the Qing court defined the new educational objectives in the following way: loyalty to the Qing court, Confucian beliefs, sufficient attention paid to public spheres, military and physical education. This marked the change in the focus of education from traditional Confucianism that consisted of encompassing rituals to practical, specialisation oriented transition. The new schools did not simply focus on the moral philosophy and the political philosophy of education, but also paid attention to vocational and modern scientific knowledge. While Confucianism continued to exist as the national religion, it lost its dominant status in the educational field, and it was reduced to being only one among an array of subjects (Ichisada, 1976).

In order to ensure a smooth progress of transition to the modern schools, specialised education administration and management systems were also
established. Xuebu (The Study Department), established in 1905, was the highest executive body in the country’s education management (Yang, 2001: 271).

1.3 The Reasons for the Abolishment of the Keju Examination

There were two main factors that contributed to the reform and abolishment of the keju system: the internal will for change among Chinese elites, and external challenges from the West. Internal factors were discussed in the section above. In the following paragraphs I will mainly focus on the external factors.

As scholars were keen to participate in the keju exam, the attraction of the keju became the most powerful obstacle for Western missionaries attempting to disseminate their religious ideas. At the General Missionary Meeting in 1869, it was seriously discussed whether Chinese Christians should be allowed to participate in the keju examinations. As both of the provincial and metropolitan examinations lasted nine days and included weekend exams, participants were in conflict with the church on the weekends. Moreover, most Western missionaries believed that the content in the keju exam would negatively impact the understanding of the true meaning of Christianity. Thus, most of them did not allow Chinese Christians to participate in the keju exams in China (Hartwell, 1869: 217-220). However, these Western missionaries in China also knew well that most Chinese scholars would definitely participate in the keju exam, and that they could play an important role in contributing to the spreading of Christianity in China. Hence, some Western missionaries would distribute the Bible and other Christian handouts before the time of entry into provincial examinations, in order to make an effective impact and generate more Christian recruitment among the Chinese students (Hill, 1888: 282-283).

On the other hand, Western missionaries also established some church schools in order to teach Western knowledge, which challenged the weak keju
system, and accelerated the disintegration of the imperial examination system.

While missionaries’ influence on the Chinese *keju* examination system was considered rather minor and gentle, consisting of a kind of ‘cultural infiltration’, the Western military forces had exerted a violent and direct influence on the *keju*. In 1900, the *baguolianju*\(^{11}\) (Eight-nation Alliance) entered Beijing, and burned down Beijing *gongyuan* (Beijing Imperial Examination School), which was a concrete symbol and visible expression of the invisible *keju* system. In the capital Beijing, the *gongyuan* was one of the largest buildings, second only to the imperial palace. During the late 19\(^{th}\) century and early 20\(^{th}\) century, Westerners had been well aware of the imperial examination system and the *gongyuan* and of the importance of Chinese scholars, and knew that this attack would have an enormous impact. According to the Boxer Protocol signed in 1901, Western powers had forced the Qing government to cancel the *keju* examination in some provinces as a punishment (Wang, 1957: 1012).

Some Western scholars argued that there is no direct connection between the signing of the Boxer Protocol and the abolishment of the *keju* system (Franke, 1960: 67-68). However, after the Beijing *gongyuan* (examination hall) was burned, the *keju* examination had to take place in the Henan *gongyuan* from 1902 to 1904, which had never happened during the history of the *keju* exam. The normal operation of the *keju*, including the rules, content and forms was largely disrupted by the threat of the Western military, which indicated the demise of the *keju* system. We can therefore conclude that the signing of the Boxer Protocol actually played an important role in the abolishment of the *keju* exam, even if the causal link between the two was not direct.

\(^{11}\) *Baguolianjun* (The Eight-Nation Alliance) was a military alliance made up of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, which consisted of approximately 45,000 international troops. After the campaign, the Qing government was made to sign the Boxer Protocol in 1901 (O’Conner, 1973).
2. Period I: 1894-1911

In 1902 and 1904, the Qing government successively promulgated the *qinding xuetsang zhangcheng* (Authorized School Regulation) and the *zouding xuetsang zhangcheng* (Contemporary School Regulation) and also named *yinyan xuezhi* (Yinyan Education System) in order to promote an education reform. According to these new regulations, the length of primary education (including elementary school and high school) was nine years and the length of secondary education was five years, which amounted to fourteen years in total. History as a curriculum was set in both primary and secondary schools, which was respectively arranged as ‘History’ in elementary primary schools and ‘Chinese History’ in high primary schools and ‘History’ in secondary schools. Qu and Tang (1991) argued that this curriculum was built to ‘explain the reasons of strength and weakness, rise and fall, as well as enhancing troop morale of Chinese’ (3).

However, providing adequate textbooks for history teaching proved to be a challenge. The comment made by Bai (1997) is indicative in this respect: ‘The format of comprehensive history textbooks in contemporary China, is actually copied from the West, which is inherently, non-Chinese’ (208). Although Bai may have exaggerated the situation, it was true that cultural communication between China and the West, and especially Japan and the West at the end of the 19th century strongly influenced the writing and editing of history textbooks in China. At the time of the keju system, historical education was not systematically designed. After the abolishment of the keju exam and the establishment of modern schools, history teaching and history textbooks had to be developed almost from scratch. Initially, most schools adopted translated textbooks based on those brought to China from Japan or the West. It was only after the proclamation of the Republic of China in 1911 that Chinese literature began to be used as the source of school history textbooks, even though Japanese and Western sources remained influential as well. In this first part of my analysis, I will focus on the period before 1911.

At the time, Chinese traditional scholars firmly believed in the existence of
national boundaries between *yi* (barbarians/non-Chinese) and *xia* (or *Hua/Huaxia*, which is regarded as the origin of Han) (Liu, 2004: 11-12), which was discussed in detail in the last chapter. Most of them believed that the Han nation was the only truly civilised culture, while all other cultures were seen as barbarian and less developed. One of the consequences of this idea was the lack of interest in foreign historical knowledge. Although there were some Western works translated into Chinese by foreign missionaries, most of them were about technology and natural sciences, while only a few focused on history. According to the *Reading List of Western Books* (*xixue shumubiao*) published in 1896 by Liang Qichao, there were only 25 books which could be categorised as historical. It is understandable that it was difficult for the Chinese intellectuals at that time to comprehensively understand the world and its history using such a limited number of Western books. Moreover, some intellectuals criticised the quality of these translated works. For example, Tu argued (1897: 17) that the information provided in the translation works was out of date and was usually related to religion, since most of these works were translated by missionaries, and were therefore unable to inspire Chinese wisdom. Ye (1996) summarised four shortcomings of the translations as follows: a) they were unsuitable for teaching and learning; b) they were unsuitable as an outline of political science; c) the content was hard to comprehend; d) they were full of conflicting views and contradictions (358).

Despite these negative views, Chinese schools had little choice but to use translated textbooks, because the amount of reliable local historical sources in China at the time was very limited. For example, according to the announcement made by *xuebu* (the Chinese Education Department) in 1907, ‘there has seldom been any suitable textbooks for history as a curriculum, thus we have to leave it as a blank until there are some excellent works coming out and we will then make another announcement’ (quoted in Wang, 1957: 56). It was further explained in the announcement that, ‘there is no reliable version of history textbooks available for analysis currently, even the limited number of existing relevant literature was translated from the foreign works. We therefore have to use the existing foreign textbooks to satisfy the educational needs’ (57). Using the translated Western history textbook to
address the needs of domestic needs was therefore legally approved.

Another reason that led to the widespread use of the translations from the West and Japan, as well as the lack of Chinese historical textbooks, was that many Chinese intellectuals were suffering from a strong sense of frustration and weakness from the failure of the Hundred Days’ Reform in 1898. Some of them were fascinated by Western works and strived to promote Western Enlightenment. Meanwhile, they completely denied the value of Chinese culture and civilisation, and some even argued for the Chinese language to be substituted by Esperanto. This attitude was radically distinct from the long-existing national pride of the Han, which regarded the Han as the only standard of civilisation. This phenomenon was criticised by some scholars, for instance by Liu Shipei (1906), who argued: ‘when they view the current things, there is nothing bad if it is foreign while there is nothing good if it is domestic. Thus the only concern of them is whether they look like foreigners when they try their best to pretend to be’ (300).

Since the late 19th century, Chinese students who had studied abroad made a great effort in organising educational institutions and translating the foreign history textbooks, in order to meet the Chinese educational needs. During that period, the organisations which made a great contribution included, for instance, Huiwen Society, Dongwen Society, and Guangzhi Society, while the most significant publications were Shangwu Press (The Commercial Press) and Wenming Bookstore (The Civilisation Bookstore). During the early 20th century, the Chinese translation industry was very active and a massive number of works were published, especially translations of foreign political and historical textbooks. However, while publishing translated Western and Japanese books soon proved to be a lucrative business, quality was often lacking. Seeking quick profits, publishers often employed translators without adequate qualifications, and as a consequence, the quality of translations was rather low. This phenomenon was criticised by some scholars. For instance, a representative of the Qunyi Society (1903) argued critically:

‘...translators with little understandings of the book, who randomly
focused on some of the terms in haste and finished the work imprudently, can never negotiate with the authors. Some even regarded commercial benefits as the only target, entirely ignoring social decency, which only leads to a large number of translations that are far from being readable and that make little contribution to the inspiration of nationals’ consciousness’ (27).

Due to such problems, a very limited number of Chinese translations of Western history textbooks were officially validated before the Chinese Revolution in 1911. The following table includes all the officially approved translations of Western history textbooks, which were widely adopted by most schools across the country and therefore exerted a considerable impact on Chinese education. These are also the textbooks I analyse in the remainder of this section, focussing on the three themes identified earlier.

**TABLE 5:1 A list of main Chinese school textbooks published during the late Qing period**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication Time</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author/Editor</th>
<th>Publishing Press</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td><em>Dongyang shiyao</em> (The Summarised History of Asia),</td>
<td>Kuwabara Jitzuzō (Japanese), translated by Fan Bingqing</td>
<td>The Commercial Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td><em>Zhina shiyao</em> (The Summarised History of China)</td>
<td>Ichimura Sanjirō (Japanese), translated by Chen Yi</td>
<td>The Guangzhi Bookstore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td><em>Zhina wenmingshi</em> (The History of the Chinese</td>
<td>Shirakawa Jiro and Kokufu Tanenori</td>
<td>The Jinghua Bookstore</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.1 The Origin of China

Consideration of the origin of the nation is one of the main focuses in national historiography of the 19th century and early 20th century. This approach focuses on the constitution of the national group, and aims to identify the inner characteristics of the group members (e.g. their somatic appearance, language, culture etc.), based on which it is allegedly possible to identify and trace the same, or similar, supposedly objective characteristics of members of the nation over space and time. On the basis of this, Chinese historians in the 19th century and the early republican era sought to analyse the relationship of their nation and other nations, and thereby also contributed to the
development of a sense of the Chinese collective Self and its Others. It is not a coincidence that this theme became prominent in national historiography precisely at a time when both international and intra-national conflicts were particularly acute, both in China and on a global scale. As Heinrich von Treitschke (1874, cited in Lawrence, 1979), a German nationalist historian and politician noted,

‘War is political science par excellence. Over and over again has it been proved that it is only in war that a people becomes in very deed a people. It is only in the common performance of heroic deeds for the sake of the Fatherland that a nation becomes truly and spiritually united’ (17).

At the time, most scholars, including Chinese intellectuals, were writing or editing historical books from a nationalist perspective. As Stefan Berger (1999) noted, ‘the nineteenth century witnessed the increasing professionalization of historical writing’, which was closely linked with ‘the task of nation-building’ (10), and therefore showed ‘remarkable zeal in demonstrating the uniqueness of their particular nation-state’ (12). Ronard Suny (2001) further concluded that even historians not directly involved in nation-building endeavours were often ‘deeply affected by the emerging discourse of the nation’ and generally did not question ‘the progressive evolution of peoples into nations, and the claim that nations had a unique right to sovereignty and political representation’ (346). Thus, the construction and conceptualisation of Chinese national identity cannot be unearthed from the study of various written sources in its national historiography.

Regarding the school textbooks in history, my first concern is the origin of China and the Chinese. The origin of the Chinese was narrated in a wide range of fairy tales, but there were hardly any reliable historical resources recorded in Chinese. One of the scholars dealing with this topic, Lu (1987 [1933]) argued that there was little reliable evidence of the origins of the Chinese nation. He considered that the Chinese people had a lack of knowledge about foreign countries in the past, and regarded their nation as
tianxia (the entire world). However, ‘the comprehension of the outside world has been strengthened and the Chinese started to recognise that China is only one of the nations in the world’ (7), and more importantly, to acknowledge that other nations with their own civilisations exist (ibid).

In regard to the discussion of the origin of the Chinese nation, which was equally referred to as the origin of the Han, tuzhu shuo (nativeness) and wailai shuo (foreignness) are the only theories that have been considered. The scholars in the first camp claimed that the Han originated within the territory of China, while the rest argued that the territory was originally occupied by barbarians who were subsequently replaced by the incoming Han. This view, regarding the Han as an exotic immigrant to Chinese territory, dominated the discussion of the origin of the Chinese nation during the period from the late Qing to the early 1930s.

One of the most important works discussing the origin of the Chinese nation is the French sinologist Terrien de Lacourperie’s (1845-1894) *Western Origin of the Early Chinese Civilization from 2,300 B.C. to 200 A. D.* (1894). Lacourperie considered that the origin of the Chinese was a branch of a group he called ‘Bark’:

> ‘Everything in Chinese antiquity and traditions points to a Western origin … Nakhunte (modern: Nai Hwang ti), the first leader of the Bak tribes who reached China, had led his people into Chinese Turkestan, and then along the Kashgar or Tarym river, reaching after a time eastward of the Kuenlun, “the Flowery land”, a name which its great fertility had long merited to the lands of future China … The Bak tribes though under the general command of one chief, were divided into several branches … some of the Bak tribes must have separated from the whole body, and travelled northwards near the upper course of the Yenissei, where inscriptions apparently in the writing of the time have been found … It appears from all the comparative evidence and, the break in the traditions and social connection that it is in the XXIIIrd century B.C. that the Bak tribes, future civilisers of China, branched off from the vicinity of Elam and Babylonia, and migrated eastwards’. (4-7)
Lacouperie cited hundreds of similarities in the fields of an astronomical calendar, language, science and technology, invention and the political system between China and Babylon, and therefore concluded that Chinese civilisation resulted from emigration from Babylon. His idea was rapidly echoed by some Japanese scholars, e.g. Shirakawa Jiro and Kokufu Tanenori (1903), as well as Kuwabara Jitzuzō (1899) and Ichimura Sanjirō (1902).

The book *Dongyang shiyao* (The Summarised History of Asia) written by Japanese sinologist Kuwabara Jitzuzō (1899), was recommended by Liang Qichao: ‘this book was the latest to be published, and therefore it has benefited from all the other works’ (1990 [1899]: 84). Kuwabara defined the origin of the Han as ‘an immigrated group from Babylon to the mainland, which settled down by the yellow River and thrived across the Chinese territory’ (1909 [1899]: 15). He went further to argue, ‘the yellow race trekked from North-West of Babylon, decided to end their journey in shu (Sichuan Province in current China)’ (15). Kuwabara here clearly used racial markers to define the Han since he constructed the Han as being a part of the yellow race. He identified three explanations of the origin of Han: some thought the group passed through Qinhai, which was located in the Northern part of Tibet; others considered that the group travelled through shu and afterwards settled down alongside the Yangtze River; while the rest claimed that the ancestor of the Han followed the flow of the yellow River and eventually settled down in shu (ibid). Kuwabara believed that the Yellow Emperor was born in and had grown up in Babylon, led one of the ethnic groups emigrating towards the East, and had arrived at the yellow River in 2280 AC finally (ibid).

Another Japanese work *Zhina shiyao* (The Summarised History of China) written by Ichimura Sanjirō (1902) supported Kuwabara’s ideas: ‘The Hanese immigrated from North-West, further multiplied their descendants, travelled towards the South and excluded the Miao nationality progressively, and eventually dominated the entire China’ (4). Although Ichimura did not clearly point out the origin of the Hanese (which was clarified by Kuwabara as Babylon), he considered the Han as a group which immigrated from elsewhere.
Among Chinese scholars who supported Lacouperie’s arguments was Jiang Zhiyou, who published *Zhongguo renzhongkao* (The Investigation into the Origin of the Chinese) in the *Xinmin Congbao* (New Citizen Journal) in 1903. In this article, Jiang thoroughly explored Lacouperie’s work, and tried to provide evidence from the records of ancient Chinese history to support Lacouperie’s theories. This theory, claiming that Chinese people emigrated from another territory was widely accepted in school textbooks during the late Qing period and the early Republic.

For example, Liu Shipei, in his *Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu* (The Textbook of Chinese History), published in 1906, clearly supported the claim that the Han Chinese originated from Babylon:

‘The Han was originated from Chaldea of Babylon, which was known as *tai di* in the ancient works. They went over the Kunlun Mountain (presently known as Pamirs), crossed *daxia* (presently located in the Mid Asia) and eventually resided in the middle of China. For that reason, the name *Huaxia* used by the West was sourced from the Flower Kingdom of the Kunlun’ (300).

Liu further made an effort to explore relevant Western literature to find clues echoing the corresponding contents, including the fields of academia, technology, writing character and literature, within the traditional Chinese society. By identifying the similarities and interconnections between Chinese and Babylonian cultures, Liu concluded that the Han originated from Babylon (ibid). Liu’s thinking thus corresponded with Kuwabara’s ideas, and used similar comparative methods to demonstrate that the human race (and the Han) originated in the West.

It is also worth noting that these debates about Chinese national history and origin went hand-in-hand with the geographical repositioning of China on the

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12 The West described the origin of *Hua* as that when immigrating towards the East, the founder of China was inspired by the Kunlun Mountain and addressed his nation as ‘Hua’ nation, which was kept and passed down, successively to his generations, and finally named *Hua*. 
world map. After the outbreak of the Opium War in 1839, the Qing government had no choice but to accept the fact that China was only one of many nations in the world. However, due to the long-term policy of seclusion by the Qing court, most Chinese intellectuals had very little knowledge and understanding of the wider social landscape outside China.

The Chinese geographer Xu Jiyu’s book (1849) *Yinghuan zhilve* (A Short Account of the Maritime Circuit) made a great impact on many intellectuals, including Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, in helping them understand the geographical composition of the world (Drake, 1975). The Qing court’s failure of the First Sino-Japanese War generated a deep sense of crisis, which led Chinese intellectuals to re-place China into an expanded wider social landscape. Of particular interest to my analysis is the fact that this new interpretation of China as well as the world was strongly shaped by racial stereotypes. For instance, the renowned Chinese scholar Yanfu, who had studied in Britain, simply equated Asia with the yellow race, and Europe with the white race (1986 [1898]).

The theory of *wailai shuo* dominated Chinese academia until the early republic. Some scholars suggested that the wide acceptance of *wailai shuo* resulted largely from the admiration of the Western civilisation. They argued that the theory of *wailai shuo* can be considered as an attempt to link the traditional Chinese ancestor worship with the West, in order to create a sense of equality between China and the West by highlighting the similarities between Chinese and Western civilisations (e.g. Lu, 2001 & Sun, 2004). Other scholars went further to claim that there could not be any consideration of the origin of the nation before Chinese civilisation had been included in the national order of the West (Sun, 2004).

To conclude, we can see that the narrative about the origins of China and the Han that dominated school textbooks in the late Qing period can be linked to the wider social context at the time. Due to China’s declining international status, it was the first time that Chinese civilisation, which was based on Han cultural and moral standard, was radically challenged. Some scholars (e.g.
Kohl & Fawcett, 1995) distinguish between two different kinds of elites: professional historians and political scientists, who usually attempt to provide a ‘dispassionate’ record of the past, versus politicians and opinion leaders, who on the other hand, always seek to ‘persuade the public of the correctness of policies they advocate’ (Liu & Hilton, 2005: 541). In the case I am studying, these two types of intellectuals were mostly working together, by claiming the necessity of national integration, in order to serve the shared goals - to save China from the Western threats by creating and promoting a consciousness of collective identity. To that end, however, they also needed to overcome the tension between the sense of political inferiority and that of traditional cultural superiority. One could argue that the theory of *wailai shuo* helped resolve this tension by relating the powerful West to China, both racially and culturally.

2.2 The Meaning of *minzu*: Position of the Han

At the end of the Qing Dynasty, history textbooks often used the term *minzu* to identify and categorise social groups. The history textbooks of the late Qing consistently mentioned the term *minzu* as an important historical actor, and made a great effort to discuss and explain the term. However, Japanese and Chinese-edited textbooks from this period differed significantly in their understanding of *minzu* and in the role they accorded to the Han. While Japanese textbooks considered the Han to be only one of the groups in the larger Chinese population, Chinese-edited textbooks suggested the Han were the most powerful and influential of the groups. Furthermore, there were also some significant differences among the Chinese-edited textbooks themselves. In the following paragraphs I shall briefly outline these differences.

For example, in *Shina shiyō* (The Summarised History of China), Ichimura Sanjirō (1902) listed five renzhong (national groups), namely Miao, Han, Mongol, Manchu and Hui, to describe the Chinese *minzu*. In this context, the Han are listed as only one of the national groups. A similar understanding can be found in *Dongyang shiyao* (The Summarised History of Asia), written by Kuwabara Jitzuzō (1899). Kuwabara categorised the various groups in
Japanese history as representing the ‘Asian race’, which ‘was permanently in domination regardless of any social changes’ (15). In order to demonstrate the detailed categorisation of Asian groups in Kuwabara’s book, I offer the following chart.

**FIGURE 5:1 Kuwabara Jitzuzō’s categorisation of the Asian groups**

*(drawn by the author)*

Kuwabara saw the Asian Race as being divided into two major groups: the Chinese and the Syberian. The former consisted of the Hanese, the Tibetan, the China JiaoZhi, and the latter consisted of the Japanese, the Tungusian, the Mongolian and the Turkish. The construction of his categorisation of the yellow race was not comprehensively explained; nevertheless, he used various social markers in identifying the yellow race, e.g. territory boundaries, collective origin, and etc. He further explained the racial hierarchy within Asian groups in this way: the Han, Tungus, Mongol and Turkey were the most important renzhong in Asian history, while the rest were considered less significant. His standard of judging the importance of minzu was based on whether those minzu had governmentally dominated the Chinese mainland. Kuwabara considered the Han to be the most important zhong in Asian
history, which originally inspired the Asian civilisation. However, he denied that the Han was the dominant nation in Chinese history; and instead, he thought the above-mentioned five national groups as having ruled China in sequence (1899: 6-8).

In contrast, Chinese edited history textbooks provided a different understanding of the Han, the role of minority groups, and of the relationship between the Han and the remaining minorities. In Zhina siqian nian kaihuashi (A History of 4000 Years of Chinese Civilisation) (1903), the author provides a detailed description of both physical and spiritual characteristics of the various renzhong in China. This can serve as a telling example of how the description of the various renzhong in Chinese-edited textbooks differed from the one in Japanese textbooks:

‘The Miao was the most ancient group and had been inhabitants of the Yangze River, Huai River and its environs, who were the most obstreperous amongst others. The Hanese, who are widely considered as the initiators of China, occupy the largest portion of Chinese territory. Although the Han later experienced rises and downfalls, most of the emperors in various dynasties were Hanese, which is why the Han dominate the Chinese mainland and exerts a great influence on Chinese society. Compared to other minority groups, the Hanese are the most educated and intelligent group. The Mongolian was the most violent group and obsessed with destruction. It became weak and less aggressive as a result of Russian superstition of religion which fooled them. The Manchu’s appearance was very close to the Hanese, but more vivacious in some respects. The Hui are little different from the Han nowadays, yet they believes in Moslemism’ (5-7).

The book Zhina siqian nian kaihuashi (A History of 4000 Years of Chinese Civilisation) (1903) is based on the Japanese textbook Shina shiyō (The Summarised History of China) (Ichimura, 1902), but was edited considerably by the Chinese editor. Although the renzhong listed in the former book were the same as those in the latter, the narrative in the Chinese version was significantly different from the one in the Japanese original. Ichimura briefly
introduced the origin, composition and development of each renzhong, without any evaluation and judgment. Instead, in the book Zhina siqiannian kaihuashi (A History of 4000 Years of Chinese Civilisation) (1903), the author’s evaluation and criticism of all the other minority groups was fully based on the Han being set as representing the highest standard of civilisation. The Han civilisation was seen as the only standard of cultural and civilisational judgment, the Han moral system was viewed as the only standard of social virtue. This construction of Han-centred narration, which established a clear social hierarchy in the relationship between the Han and minorities based on the constructed superiority of the former, and the constructed inferiority of the latter, was widely seen evident in Chinese edited history textbooks during the late Qing period.

In Xia Zengyou’s (1904) Zuixin zhongguo jiaokeshu zhongguolishi (The Latest Middle School Textbook: Chinese History), we encounter another version of this Han-centred narration. Here the terms China and the Han are used virtually interchangeably, and other groups do not feature at all. In Xia Zengyou’s opinion, the Han were not only the dominant nation, but also the unique pure ethnic group in China. In the discussion of the origin of China, he investigated the origin of the Han without mentioning any of the remaining minority groups. For example, he noted, ‘with regard to the origin of China, it was named as the Han by the Xiongnu13 during the Han Dynasty’ (3). This textbook, which had been re-published six times between 1904 and 1907, was widely admired by some of the most influential Chinese scholars at that time. For example, Liang Qichao (2003 [1903]) praised Xia Zengyou’s work as ‘a fresh view of Chinese history’ (68). Due to such endorsements, this textbook likely had considerable impact in Chinese school education during the late Qing period.

The different understandings of the Han outlined above were related to

13 The Xiongnu were a confederation of nomadic tribes from Central Asia with a ruling class of unknown origin. The identity of the ethnic core of the Xiongnu has been a subject of varied hypotheses, since only a few words, mainly titles and personal names were preserved in the Chinese historical sources.
different understandings of the term minzu. The shift of the term and the meaning it referred to can be generally summarised in two different ways. On the one hand, minzu was sometimes used to refer to all the nations within Chinese territory, or in Chinese history, or in China. The Han were just one of such minzu. As seen, this meaning was mostly adopted by Japanese edited textbooks. For example, in Kuwabara’s (1899) work, although he claimed that the Han were the most important group in the Asian history, he did not argue that the Han were the dominant group in Chinese history. On the other hand, the term minzu could sometimes refer to a collection of nations, among which the Han hold an absolute dominance, e.g. the term Zhonghua minzu (the Chinese nation). For example, Liu Shipei (1906), in his Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu (The Textbook of Chinese History), mentioned other minzu within the Chinese territory when he discussed national integration and separation in the Chinese context. However, when he was discussing zhongguo renmin (Chinese people), he used the term minzu only to refer to the Han.

These differences between Japanese-edited and Chinese-edited textbooks suggest the growing influence of Chinese Han-centred nationalism at the time, arguably prompted by the challenge of the West and the (perceived) need for national unity among Chinese intellectuals. Japanese historical narratives were therefore adapted to suit the political context and ambitions of the Han-dominated elites. As some of the examples discussed suggest, these nationalist narratives were also closely intertwined with racial thinking.

2.3 Minority Groups

The construction of the Self is always intertwined with the construction of the Other. For the Chinese national Self, the minority groups' sometimes constituted the Other and in textbooks the understanding of minorities and their role was changing hand-in-hand with the shifts in the representations of the Han.

The long established Chinese cultural tradition was based on the assumption
of a natural hierarchy of ethnicities within China, with Han Chinese placed at the top, and minorities at the bottom. In various dynasties, some Hanese criminals were made to settle in the territory of those minorities, usually as a form of punishment. Moreover, hanhua (Hanisation) was widely accepted by elites as well as the Han public, as the only way of achieving civilisation for those minority groups. Han intellectuals considered that it was up to them to bring a higher form of life to those minorities, which was believed to be embodied in the Han cultural and moral system.

These Han-centric cultural assumptions exerted an impact on Chinese editors of textbooks. This becomes clearly evident if we compare the portrayal of the relationship between the Han and minority groups in Japanese editions with those that appeared in Chinese editions. For example, the event of wuhu luanhua (The wuhu Uprising Jin Dynasty) was pointed out by most Chinese history textbooks for its importance. Wuhu was a Chinese term referring to the five northern minority tribes, which rose up against the Jin Dynasty (265-420) of China, and therefore delimited the territory of the Jin Dynasty (a Hanese regime established to the south of Huai River). The wuhu Uprising was always hereby seen as one of the most devastating events in Chinese history, since it introduced a fairly long period during which China was divided.

However, different from Chinese editors, who presented the Han as a group enjoying a higher social status than the hu (barbarians), Japanese-edited textbooks tended to treat the Han and other groups as equals. For instance, in Shirakawa’s (1903) and Kuwabara’s (1899) books, the regimes established by the Han and hu (barbarians) were both ‘states’. Moreover, Kuwabara included the hu (barbarian) into China jiaozhi (minority groups within China), while Shirakawa (1903) paid a lot of attention to those hu heroes who successfully obtained some parts of the territory of the mainland which had belonged to the Jin Dynasty, by admiring them as ‘the heroes with braveness and intelligence’ (1903: 40). Shirakawa’s narration of this part of Chinese history was based on an external angle, without the belief that the Han should be the core of the nation. Instead, he placed the Hu and the Han in an equal position.
Some Chinese intellectuals therefore argued that Shirakawa’s work was actually an effort in promoting Japanese domination in Asia, by questioning Han’s dominant role in China and driving a wedge between the Han and the minorities. For instance, Fu (2002 [1931]) considered that Japan was actively participating in the construction of the world in order to enhance its position in world history. To become the dominant country in Asia, the first task to be completed was to replace the traditional Han domination of China. Therefore, Fu criticised Shirakawa’s work for hardly containing any clues in tracing the origin of the national subject of China; instead, it seemed more like a territory carved up by different world powers (Fu, 2002 [1931]).

In contrast, the narratives provided by Chinese edited textbooks were influenced by Han-centred nationalism, which defined the Han as the traditional and unique representative of Chinese civilisation as well as the kernel of China. For example, in Zuixin zhongguo jiaokeshu zhongguo lishi (The Latest Middle School Textbook: Chinese History), Xia Znegyou (1904) described the enthronement of the Xiongnu emperor - i.e. the emperor of a confederation of nomadic tribes from Central Asia - in very negative terms, referred to it as a wei (puppet) regime, and described it as a process as full of intense pain of subjugation and humiliation. Zeng Kunhua’s (1903) book Zhongguo lishi (Chinese History) provided another case in point. Zeng listed Han, Mongol, Tungus, Turkish, Tibetan and Miao as the ethnic groups which played a role in Chinese history. He used the term benzu (our nation) to refer to the Han, and argued that Chinese history was actually the history of the Han. In contrast, the other five nations were named as waizu (alien nation). Based on this, Zeng argued in an organic analogy that the Han and other groups hold ‘naturally’ different positions in the social hierarchy of Chinese society: ‘Han is the main trunk of China, while the remaining five minorities are the branches. Chinese history was therefore constructed by the combination of trunk and branches’ (18).

We could argue that such continued exclusion and exoticisation of the minorities in China served as a reminder of the supposed cultural and moral superiority of the Han.
3. Period II: 1911-1919
By the end of the late Qing era, Chinese intellectuals and cultural elites more generally were convinced that history education, compared to other subjects taught in school, should play a significant role. They believed that the compiled and translated versions of history textbooks, such as those used in the late Qing period, were not particularly effective in fulfilling this role, and insisted that it was an essential requirement for Chinese students to use history textbooks that were written by Chinese authors. The continued use of Japanese textbooks was seen as a cultural threat, as it could gradually indoctrinate the Chinese primary and secondary school students with Japanese scholars’ conception of history and their values and ultimately achieve cultural colonisation. Such ideas were evidence of the rising wave of modern patriotism in Chinese school history education in this period.

A report written in 1910 by a group of Chinese scholars provides a good example of this growing influence of patriotism in history teaching. The report sought to demonstrate the great negative impact that existing textbooks had on education and national consciousness, because of their reliance on the translations. In this report, Pan Shusheng (1910) argued, ‘there are various types of history school textbooks in China, though most are copied from Western literature that has been cut and modified. However, none of these textbooks is suitable for contemporary Chinese education.’ (21) Therefore, one of the unavoidable results of using these textbooks will be that foreigners might have destroyed all of ‘us’ (23). Pan linked the function of school textbooks to the cultivation of a national character and the maintenance of national continuity in China.

This idea was shared by Qian Mu (1913), who wrote that the ‘history lesson is the important subject of national education, which is designed for the formation of national character of a specific nation instead of any other nation’ (57). He continued, ‘we have our own national culture and customs while other nations have theirs, thus the information brought by other nations to their nationals are definitely not for our students’ (57). Pan and Qian’s were
not alone in sharing such ideas. Rather, their understanding of history and its role was very similar to ideas taken for granted among some of the most influential European historians at the time. For instance, according to the German scholar Friedrich Meinecke (1862-1954), the social sciences should attempt to uncover ‘the general characteristics of nations’ and it is the responsibility of the historian to ‘concentrate more on observing the particular features of an individual nation as faithfully and precisely as possible’ (1970 [1907]: 10). As evident from the works written by Chinese intellectuals at this time they (just as Meinecke and other European historians) perceived history writing as a patriotic mission. To use Meinecke’s words again: historians believed that it was their responsibility to construct the nation as a legitimate object and to enable recognition of the nation-state as the ‘supreme value and final goal of history’ (Meinecke, 1970 [1907]: 21).

After the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911, this growing patriotism in history education was soon translated into concrete policy measures. With regards to the educational aims of the middle school, the government promulgated the *Putong jiaoyu zanxing banfa tongling* (Interim Regulation on the Orders of General Education) (1912), in which it was stated that the ‘thrust of the historical education is to introduce the important events and social changes in history, the evolution of nations, the rise and fall of other nations, with extra emphasis on the revolution of the political system as well as the foundation of the establishment of the Republic of China’ (23). This Interim Regulation also prohibited any further use of the textbooks used in the late Qing period. Instead, a new set of textbooks was published, which were mostly written by Chinese authors. These textbooks are listed in the following table and constitute the basis of the analysis that follows.

### TABLE 5:2 A list of main Chinese school textbooks published during the early republican period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication Time</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author/Editor</th>
<th>Publishing Press</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td><em>Xinzhu benguoshi</em> (The Newly Edited National)</td>
<td>Zhao Yusen</td>
<td>The Commercial Press</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.1 The Origin of China
As explained in the previous section, the theory of *wailai shuo* (foreignness) was the dominant theory of the origin of China in late Qing textbooks. After the establishment of the first republic, influenced by data provided by archaeological research, and also by changes in the international environment, the *wailai shuo* theory was gradually replaced by the *tuzhu shuo* (nativeness) theory. Scholars advocating the *tuzhu shuo* theory such as the Scottish Sinologist John Ross (1842-1915), who wrote the book *The Origin of the Chinese People* (1916), claimed that the Chinese emanated from and multiplied their descendants within the mainland. This gradually became the dominant position in this field of study after the establishment of the Republic.
of China in 1911. The question of the origin of China and the Chinese was addressed also by the famous British scholar Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), even though his conclusions were ambiguous in that: ‘…where the Chinese came from is a matter of conjecture. Their early history is known only from their own annals, which throws no light upon the question.’ (1923: 18) However, he afterwards argued: ‘It seems certain that, when Chinese history begins, the Chinese occupied only a small part of what is now China, along the banks of the yellow River (ibid)’. He also highlighted the uniqueness of Chinese culture in that ‘the traditional civilisation of China had developed in almost complete independence of Europe, and had merits and demerits quite different from those of the West’ (10).

The theory of wailai shuo did actually exist before the establishment of the Republic of China. A significant example on this topic was Zhina tongshi (The General History of China), written by a Japanese sinologist Naka Michiyō (1903). In this book, he pointed out that the Chinese national awakening started at a very early stage, compared to the rest of the nations in South-West Asia. The ancestors of the Hanese, who were a group of aboriginal people living in tribes, addressed themselves, as well as this land, as Huaxia (8). Naka was convinced that the Han were the native residents, experienced an early national awakening, and were advanced well ahead of nearby groups, especially in their standard of manners and music, which formed its own style and mature civilisation. He therefore concluded that, the Han group was sufficiently equipped to be defined as a nation (9). However, although Naka wrote his book already in 1903, Chinese intellectuals have not paid much attention to his arguments.

In the 1920s, the theory of the wailai shuo was increasingly criticised in some of the Chinese textbooks. For example, Jin Zhaozi (1925), in his book Chuzhong benguoshi (The National History Textbook for Junior High School), showed a clear critical attitude towards the claim that the Chinese originally derived from elsewhere. Similarly, He Bingsong, who was very critical of the theory of the wailai shuo as well as Western research on the Chinese origins, noted in his Zhonghua minzu qiyuan zhi xin shenhua (The New Myth of
Chinese Origins) (1990 [1929]):

‘The European are awed by the long history of China and its significant status in the world, and therefore they let their imagination run riot and claim that the Chinese culture has originated from the West, in order to prove Westerners’ contribution to China’ (170).

He therefore criticised the Chinese scholars’ adoption of the *wailai shuo*: ‘the Westerners arrogance is shown in all their academic research … Some scholars in our country, indiscriminately adopt Western theories, which only results in falling into the trap of imperialism without consciousnesses (ibid). In his opinion, the theory of the *wailai shuo* was not only a misrepresentation of Chinese origin, but also, more importantly, a representation of Western imperialism that has offended Chinese culture.

Thereafter, some Chinese scholars, who used to be firmly convinced of *wailai shuo*, shifted towards support for *tuzhu shuo*. For example, Lu Simian, who made a great effort in seeking the evidence to support *wailai shuo* in his book *Baihua benguoshi* (A General Discussion on National History), published in 1923, later fundamentally changed his proposition to promote *tuzhu shuo*: ‘Han was the major *minzu* that lived in the *zhongyuan* (the central plain of China), with the independence of its unique language, custom and culture. This *minzu* originally resided alongside the yellow River and the Yangtze River, and afterwards explored in all four cardinal directions’ (1987 [1933]: 1). He even felt guilty about having previously supported *wailai shuo* (ibid: 8).

In the study of Chinese origins, one of the main concerns is the tracing of ancestors. Huang-di, also named as the yellow Emperor, is a legendary Chinese sovereign and cultural hero present in Chinese mythology. He was widely regarded as the ancestor of all *Huaxia* Chinese. During the early period of the first republic, the claim that all of the Chinese nations shared the same origin, identifying the yellow race, as well as the ancestor of the yellow Emperor, was widespread within the Chinese academy. For example, Zhong Yulong, in his *Xinzhi benguoshi jiaoben* (The Newly Edited History Textbook)
(1914) argued: ‘all of Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibet belong to the yellow race, with the same origin’ (1).

As argued earlier, the rise of the wailai shuo theory is viewed by some Chinese scholars as the reflection of a feeling of failure among Chinese people. The establishment of the idea that the Chinese came from the West was based on the belief in and complete acceptance of the ideology of Western superiority, which was represented in national, racial and ethnical ways. In contrast, the shift to the tuzhu shuo theory occurred in the early republican era, and thus was linked to the establishment of authority and legitimacy of the new government. The new historical narrative of Chinese origin served to underscore this new governmental power, authority and legitimacy.

3.2 The Meaning of minzu: Position of the Han

The understanding of the term minzu in textbooks, published during the early Republic of China was closely linked to the concepts of wuzugonghe (the Republic of Five Races) and zhonghua minzu (Chinese nation). Wuzugonghe was one of the major principles upon which the Republic of China was originally founded. This principle emphasised the harmony of the five major ethnic groups in China as represented by the coloured stripes of the Five-Coloured Flag of the Republic: the Han (red), the Hui (white), the Manchurians (yellow), the Mongolians (blue) and the Tibetans (black). In most textbooks, the national groups within the Chinese territory, including the five nations mentioned, were conceptualised as a minzu. This use of the term minzu suggest equality among all five groups, and is a sign of the recognition of all ethnic groups in China as constituting the Chinese nation, which was established and widely accepted after the establishment of the Republic of China.

From this perspective, the textbooks published in the early republican era
clearly differed from those published in the late Qing era. They were also rather critical of the Han-centred narratives that were prominent in late Qing textbooks while promoting national unity. For example, Zhong Yulong (1914) argued:

‘most of our national history works are focused on the Han, with obvious prejudices towards other nations. This book will view wuzugonghe as the principle, with equal attention to the development and integration of the Manch, the Hui, the Mongol and the Tibet. Even for those conflicts between them and Han, I will not judge by preference, in order to strengthen the emotion between these five nations, and to promote national integration’ (1)

Nonetheless, despite the emphasis put on the importance of national integration, the Han continued to be represented as culturally superior to other Chinese minzu. For example, in Xinzhi benguoshi jiaoben (The Newly Edited History Textbook), Zhong (1914) noted:

‘The Han, the Manchu, the Mongol, the Hui and the Tibet commonly belong to the yellow race, and shared the same origin. They all immigrated from the West in groups, among which the Han was brought by the yellow Emperor… Compared to the other four nations, the Han owned the best location of territory and the most brilliant culture, which can be never reached by any other minority groups’ (3).

Although Zhong admitted that the five nations shared the same origin, his argument was based on a concept of Han cultural superiority, which was very similar to the traditional ideas of Han’s domination in Chinese society. Although the establishment of the Chinese republic went hand-in-hand with a more inclusive approach to other groups, and hence with more inclusive historical narratives, these narratives still maintained a sense of traditional cultural and civilisational hierarchies.

It is important to note that this (partial) shift away from Han-centred narration and Han-centred nationalism is very similar to developments noted in some of
the intellectuals’ writings from the same period, discussed in the previous chapter. Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan were both initially seeking to differentiate the Manchu and the Han using a variety of racial and cultural markers, and claimed that only the Han were the true representatives of Chinese culture and civilisation. However, their attitude changed to some extent at a later stage, even though their belief in the supremacy and leadership qualities of the Han remained. Arguably, this shift in intellectual discourses had an impact on textbooks and their historical narratives as well.

This also means that the textbooks were perhaps influenced more by ideas promoted by Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan than those promoted by Liang Qichao, who was one of those Chinese intellectuals who disagreed with Zhong’s ideas and argued for a broader, more inclusive definition of the Chinese nation.

### 3.3 Minority Groups

In line with a changed understanding of the Chinese minzu the treatment of individual groups within the larger Chinese nation changed as well. Contrary to the late Qing textbooks, which regarded the Han as the only pure Chinese, the early republican textbooks acknowledged the contribution made by the minorities to national integration and the development of the Chinese nation. This also meant that the understanding of the role of different nations in the origin of the Chinese nation as a whole changed: the theory of monogenism was gradually replaced by the theory of national assimilation. More attention was paid to the significance of a collective identity of the various nations in China especially after the establishment of the first Republic.

The concept of national assimilation was understood and interpreted in different ways at different times. However, its main doctrine was that of Han’s cultural superiority. It was originally equated with the process of Hanisation, in which minority groups were gradually included into Han by fully accepting and adapting its advanced civilisation. The process of Hanisation is
monodirectional, which means that the Han cultural and moral system was the only social standard of ‘being civilised’. In short, whether and how much people behaved like the Han, was the only ruler measuring the level of civilisation. On the other hand, the impact of minority groups onto the Han was described in a fairly negative way, including warfare and destruction. Those minority groups which had not been included in the Han were therefore excluded from Chinese history.

National assimilation was explained in various ways by Chinese intellectuals discussed in the previous chapter. Liang Qichao (2003 [1903]) introduced and promoted the concept of nationalism in the early 20th century based on national assimilation. He had also seen the existence of assimilation between some Chinese nations over a long period of time and the fact that ‘China had an outstanding power of assimilation and had been approved by the Eastern and Western historians’ (13). It is the assimilation between nations that made up Chinese history. Liang summarised that between Chinese nations various kinds of relations were established. The Northern Wei nation was an exception and was hardly swayed by assimilation whereas the Dong Hu nation virtually had no difference when compared to Han. Liang’s idea of national assimilation claims that a number of Chinese nations were assimilated by the Han.

Ideas such as Liang's were echoed in early republican textbooks. For example, Zhao Yusen (1913) listed six different nations in China in his Xinzhu benguoshi (The Newly Edited National History), namely, Han, Mongol, Eastern Hu, Turkic, Tangut and Miao. The description of these nations was almost identical to that of historians from the Qing Dynasty apart from its emphasis on their status vis-à-vis each other and the Han: ‘the interrelationship and organisation among these nations contributed to the unity and formation of a unique country as a whole’ (2-3). He further prominently claimed the homology in regard to the origin of all the nations within Chinese territory and even argued that all the existing nations in the world shared the same origin. They became distinct from each other by the differentiation of their physical appearance and skin colour after branching out
and being influenced by various climates in different regions (3). For the people of China, he said: ‘they are differentiated by being split into six different nations along with the ownership of different residential locations’ (4). However, he argued that those who read history should understand that despite being six separate nations, they were still closely related. The author further claimed, ‘it is the most glorious and fortunate to have all four hundred million people united as a whole to form a country’ (7). Zhao therefore concluded that, all the minzu within China were and should be sharing the same origin, and were only differentiated by the variation in their locations. According to him, the six nations originated from the same source, could therefore never be separated.

Zhao Yusen’s evaluation and interpretation of historical events and processes was rooted in this understanding of assimilation. His treatment of the wu hu Uprising is a case in point: rather than being wholly negative, as the descriptions of the event in late Qing era textbooks were. Zhao’s account of the event was more ambiguous. He stated that the ‘ancient period’ was the most crucial period for the formation of the Chinese nation and the assimilation of other nations with the Han. The ‘ancient period’ was divided into four phases, and the wu hu uprising happened in the fourth. According to the author, the wu hu uprising created substantial damage to Chinese culture. Nevertheless, it also exerted a significant impact on the formation of the Chinese nation, ultimately promoting national integration (53).

Zhong Yulong, in his Xinzhi benguoshi jiaoben (The Newly Edited History Textbook) (1914), narrated the event of the wu hu uprising in a related manner, linking it to wu hu tonghua (wu hu assimilation) and Hanhua (Hanisation). He noted:

‘After the wu hu uprising, Chinese language had been vitiated with the mixture and interlacement of languages of the Manchu, Mongol, Hui, Tibet and other minority groups, which marked the decay of the Han culture. However, the event of wu hu uprising simultaneously contributed to the interconnections and the national integration. There
was hardly any local and national culture of the Manchu, Hui, Mongol, Tibet and other minority groups, as a result, they had been inevitably assimilated into the Han culture after they entered into the mainland of China, since the Han culture is definitely more powerful and advanced’ (57).

Hence, he concluded that the ‘invasion’ of the wu hu to the mainland, brought considerable catastrophe to the Han culture and resulted in the decay of Han. At the same time, in his opinion, it initiated and catalysed the integration of Han and the five minority groups. In other words, these five minority groups had been eventually assimilated into the Han (ibid). National integration during this period was thus linked to the process of Hanisation, which was monodirectional in only allowing the minorities to accept and follow the ‘superior’ Han culture.

To sum up, the narratives in early republican textbooks were more inclusive of the different groups, but still rested on the idea of Han superiority. The authors of these textbooks started to acknowledge the existence of ethnic and cultural minorities in Chinese history, though they considered that the contribution made by these minorities to Chinese civilisation was less significant compared to that by the Han. The national identity constructed by these scholars was thus borne out of the coexistence and aggregation of all the nations in China, which echoed the particular political exigencies of the time. As Liu and Hilton (2005) argued, ‘ethnic and national identities are often formed when disparate groups unify to achieve some shared goal, such as defending themselves against a shared opponent’ (544). This statement is directly applicable to changes in historical narratives we have noted in this chapter. Facing a common enemy prompted Chinese intellectuals to abandon the more radical version of Han-centred nationalism and instead adopt a somewhat more inclusive approach.

They attempted to construct a new historical angle that allowed as many nations as possible to participate and be involved in the national agenda and the re-definition of the national identity, which was to some extent distinct from
the traditional Han-centred cultural discourses, that had hitherto prevailed, while at the same time maintaining the doctrine of Han superiority and leadership.

However, these changes made no attempt to challenge the notion of an uniqueness of Han culture and its dominance in Chinese civilisation. Instead, these representations were only used as a tool in positioning the identity of minority groups in relation to the Han nation. In the cases of textbooks discussed above, categorisation as a member of a multi-ethnic united Chinese state was not voluntarily chosen by the minority group; rather, Han intellectuals regarded it as a necessity of promoting an alliance with different minorities in reaction to the increasing Western imperialist threat.

Although minority groups were described and categorised in different ways by scholars, it is not difficult to recognise that they made a potential agreement on vehemently believing that the non-Han are subjects of China, and should be grateful to be so. Moreover, combined with powerful political slogans, this even enhanced the legitimacy of the sense of superiority of the Han, prompting all the allegedly less civilised minorities to achieve a Han-defined national integration, with a celebration of those minorities being civilised. The effort made by the Han to achieve national integration was widely praised in history textbooks. However, the intent was to strip native peoples of their own culture and make them ‘civilised’ in Hanese terms.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have examined the representations of the Han in school textbooks during the period of late Qing and early republican China. As we have seen, the narratives found in late Qing textbooks were distinct from those found in early republican era, and these differences can be linked to changes in the wider social and cultural context as well as to changing political conditions.
The first layer of my analysis focused on the treatment of the origin of the Chinese nation. The theory of *wailai shuo* (foreignness), which claims that the Chinese territory was originally occupied by the barbarians, and was subsequently replaced by the incoming Han, was dominant in late Qing era. In early republican textbooks, this opinion was gradually replaced by the *tuzhu shuo* (nativeness) theory, which considers that the Hanese originated within the territory of China. Being one of the main focuses in national historiographical research during the 19th century and early 20th century, the consideration of the origin of the nation was seen as a useful mechanism of analysing the inner characteristics of the group members, and the constitution of the national group. The dominance of the *wailai shuo* theory, which considered that the Chinese originated from the West, has to some extent challenged the long-term superiority of Chinese culture. However, it could be also shown that the acceptance and promotion of the *wailai shuo* theory by Chinese school textbooks authors were an effort to relate the ‘powerful’ West to China, in order to strengthen the consciousness of cultural superiority of the Han and China that had experienced a considerable threat in modern times.

In the late 1920s, along with the dominant usage of Chinese edited textbooks in the Chinese education system, some scholars started to criticise the theory of the *wailai shuo* as actually a Western perspective that tried to present the prosperity of Chinese culture as something that China owes to the West (e.g. Jin, 1925; He, 1990 [1929]). The gradual replacement of the dominance of the *wailai shuo* theory by the *tuzhu shuo* in Chinese school textbooks has shown a change of Chinese scholars’ attitude towards the West during the late Qing and early republican period. By linking this change to the intellectuals’ discourses that have been analysed in the last chapter, it can be found that Chinese scholars’ sensitivity to the Western threat had been strengthened after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911.

The second theme I have discussed in this chapter was the meaning of the Chinese term *minzu* and how it was associated with the Han. Here I noted the transition from the initial equation (in Chinese-edited textbooks) between the
Han and Chinese *minzu* to a more inclusive definition which acknowledged other groups as *minzu* as well and considered them part of the larger Chinese *minzu*. Despite this shift to a more inclusive definition of the Chinese *minzu*, the perception of Han superiority in the social hierarchy of Chinese society was not fundamentally changed. In all the textbooks edited by the Chinese I have analysed, when the term *minzu* was applied to the Han, the Han were constructed as the most powerful and influential *minzu* in China without any exception.

The last theme considered was the interpretation of other ethnic groups in China. I noted a shift from highly exclusive Han-centred narratives to more inclusive narratives, based on the notion of national assimilation - which, however, still assumed Han superiority. This shift is in line with the shift in the meaning of Chinese *minzu* and its relationship with the Han. This is not a surprise, since the construction of the Self (in this case, the Han/the Chinese) is always intertwined with the construction of the Other (in this case, other groups in China).

The analysis suggests some clear parallels with discourses found in intellectuals’ discourses discussed in the previous chapter. As in intellectuals’ discourses, textbooks presented the Han as superior to other groups. This tendency persisted despite a shift to more inclusive definitions of Chinese nation and an emphasis on national integration in the early republican era. This pattern - namely, a shift towards a more inclusive definition of the Chinese nation, yet underscored with a continued belief in Han superiority and centrality - is very similar to the developments noted in Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan’s writings from the same period, analysed in the previous chapter. Both of them were seeking to differentiate the Manchu and the Han by using various racial and cultural markers before the establishment of the Republic of China, and changed their standpoint to claim the inclusion of the Manchu as part of ‘us’ afterwards. Nevertheless, their belief in the superiority of the Han remained.

As with the changes in intellectuals’ discourses, changes noted in school
textbooks from the late Qing and the early republican era can be seen as evidence of the process of Chinese nation-building. The dominance of the more inclusive, multi-ethnic notion of the Chinese nation can be seen as an instrument of national integration and nation-building after the establishment of the Chinese republic, where the key aim was to maintain national unity in order to enhance loyalty to the new republic, as well as to justify its claim to existing (imperial) Chinese territory. The growing importance of the link between the Chinese Self, state and territory - an integral element of a modern, national sense of belonging - was evident also in the changing narratives of national origin in the Chinese-edited school textbooks. Arguably, the replacement of the wailai shuo theory by the tuzhu shuo, i.e. the rise of narratives emphasizing the nativeness of the Chinese people and their historic link with the Chinese territory, can thus also be seen as an instrument in Chinese nation-building.

The results of my analysis of textbooks also suggest that during the early republican era, school textbooks began to be used as tools of modern Chinese national imagination - thereby confirming Anderson’s (1983) argument about the central role of print media in the spreading and consolidation of national communities. By means of reading the same textbooks, pupils across China became acquainted with the same historical narratives and the same perceptions of the Han and the Chinese. Even though these pupils did not know each other in person, they could assume that each and every one of them formed an ‘imagined community’, imagining themselves and other as members of the same Chinese nation.
Chapter 6: The Han in Chinese Dictionaries in Late Qing and Early Republican China

This chapter turns to another important source of public representations of the Han and discourses on race and nation during the chosen period, namely dictionaries. Similarly to textbooks, dictionaries functioned as means of promoting, simplifying, spreading and popularising discourses on race and nation, and therefore offer further insight into the relationship between popular and elite notions of belonging in late Qing and early republican China. The chapter starts with a general discussion of the genesis and role of dictionaries in modern society, which provides a definition of dictionary, an introduction to Chinese dictionaries in terms of their history, types and structures, and a discussion of the social role played by dictionaries, especially with regard to their function of bridging the gap between elite and popular discourses.

The main body of this chapter will be an investigation of Chinese dictionaries in two periods, namely the late Qing period, and the early republican period. The discussion of the late Qing period will mainly focus on the prominent Kangxi zidian (Kangxi Dictionary), which was an influential grand dictionary that has contributed to the standardisation of pronunciation, meaning and format of characters in Chinese lexicography, and also played an important role in developing Chinese classical and historical literature and philosophy. Liu Heyun (1986) evaluated the significance of the Kangxi zidian as an ‘outcome of times, and an influential grand collection of existing Chinese character books’ (100). The second part of the analysis examines the early republican era and focuses on a group of dictionaries that were most influential in this period, including the Shehui kexue da cidian (Dictionary of Social Sciences), and the Zhonghua da zidian (Simplified Chinese).
1. The Role and Genesis of Dictionaries in Modern Society

1.1 The Definition of Dictionary

The definitions of dictionary in lexicography vary even more frequently than the definitions in dictionaries. Some authors have tried to provide a more general definition. For example, Samuel Johnson defined dictionary at the beginning of the 20th century as ‘a book containing the words of any language in alphabetical order, with explanations of their meaning’ (cited in Boswell, 1907: 822). One of the most important functions of a dictionary (in some dictionaries, it is exclusively defined as the unique function of a dictionary) is that of providing references to their readers. For example, in the Collins Dictionary of the English Language (2nd ed., 1986), the dictionary has been defined as ‘a reference book that consists of an alphabetical list of words with their meanings and parts of speech, and often a guide to accepted pronunciation and syllabification, irregular inflections of words, derived words of different parts of speech, and etymologies’; ‘a similar reference book…’ and also ‘a collection of information or examples with the entries alphabetically arranged’ (cited in Hanks, et al. 1986).

A similar definition of dictionary was provided by The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed., Vol. IV, 1989: 625), which has highlighted a dictionary’s function of implication:

‘A book dealing with the individual words of a language (or certain specified classes of them), so as to set forth their orthography, pronunciation, signification and use, their synonyms, derivation and history, or at least some of these facts: for convenience of reference, the words are arranged in some stated order, now, in most languages, alphabetical; and in larger dictionaries the information given is illustrated by quotations from literature’.

However, these attempts to define the term dictionary do not satisfy everyone; instead, scholars consider that there is NO perfect definition of dictionary.
Béjoint (2004), for example, assumed that ‘it is certainly unreasonable to expect a general dictionary to provide a definition of dictionary that can satisfy the specialist’ (9). He attributed the reason for varying definitions of ‘dictionary’ to the fact that each author is writing from his/her own point of view and aiming to serve a particular group of readers (ibid).

Béjoint (2004) additionally discusses the function of dictionaries and is critical of the assumption that dictionaries are composed of ‘a series of separate, independent paragraphs that [are] not designed for continuous reading’ (10). He further explains that the basic structure of a dictionary is characterised by different levels of entries/sub entries, which are related to each other and designed to be read in connection with one another, and compared (ibid). This is due to the fact that a dictionary is designed for consultation instead of continuous reading, and meant to help the user to verify a particular piece of information without a comprehensive reading regarding the topic. Therefore, the text in dictionaries was in his opinion, ‘fragmentary’ and ‘superficial’ and he criticised dictionaries as only designed as an inferior guidebook for ‘lazy’ people rather than those readers who tend to do serious reading (10).

In regard to the structure of dictionaries, European lexicographers decided to start from the leftmost letter when they began using the alphabetical order as the basis for the arrangement of words. The conveniences brought by the alphabetical order in locating words were admitted by the public. On the other hand, however, this order has been heavily criticised especially by structuralist linguists since this mechanism of alphabetical arrangement has ignored the internal connection among the words that are logically related to each other (Gold, 1979).

Some scholars, therefore, suggested to arrange words in dictionaries onomasiologically rather than alphabetically. A reference work, in which words are arranged semantically, is called a thesaurus or lexicon. One of the most famous examples among Western dictionaries is probably the Thesaurus written by Peter Mark Roger (1852), which was influenced by the Western encyclopedic tradition. The main characteristic of this dictionary was that
words were grouped together according to their semantic links. However, this type of dictionary has also been criticised for being inconvenient, since it is based on an organisation of human knowledge that is subjective, bound to vary from author to author, as well as from reader to reader. Moreover, most semantically arranged dictionaries are equipped with an alphabetical index to facilitate consultation, e.g. Roger’s *Thesaurus*. Thus, the alphabetical order in organising dictionaries is in no danger of being replaced by any other forms. As Malkiel (1962) argued: ‘the alphabetical arrangement, though strictly conventional, is so overwhelmingly dominant that the ordinary person associates with this familiar sequence the very genre of the dictionary’ (17).

The definitions and debates about the functionalities and structures of dictionaries discussed so far are applicable primarily to dictionaries written in Indo-European languages and produced mostly in the West. As argued in the following section, Chinese dictionaries developed in a somewhat different fashion. Before we consider their ideological, social and cultural functions in relation to changing notions of belonging in China, we need to highlight some of the characteristics that make Chinese dictionaries distinct from Western ones.

### 1.2 Chinese Dictionaries: Structure, Types and a Brief Historical Introduction

The collation or lexicographical ordering of a dictionary generally depends upon its writing system. For a language written in an alphabetic order, dictionaries are usually ordered alphabetically. Due to the characteristics of the Chinese script - namely the use of characters or logographs instead of an alphabet - Chinese dictionaries are not arranged in an alphabetical order. As a result, some of the Western definitions of dictionaries are not applicable to Chinese dictionaries. For example, Samuel Johnson (1755) defined *dictionary* as ‘a book containing the words of any language in alphabetical order, with explanations of their meaning’ (203). To Johnson, not having an alphabet is not to the Chinese’s credit, and he even declined to acknowledge Chinese
dictionaries as dictionaries because of their non-alphabetical form (ibid). In contrast, Robert L. Collison (1982), a more contemporary scholar critically claimed that already about two thousand years ago Chinese dictionaries had made some significant achievements, yet their achievements had been totally ignored by the West until recently (20). This might relate to the mechanism of Chinese characters, which were based on hieroglyphs that represent certain meanings from the characters’ structure, without implying the pronunciation. In other words, Chinese characters are constituted in a logosyllabic way instead of relying on a system of alphabets of compact. A character usually represents one syllable and may be a word on its own, and also a part of a polysyllabic word.

In terms of their form and organisation, Chinese dictionaries can be divided into two groups: zidian (character dictionary) and cidian (phrase dictionary). The former type of dictionaries, zidian, is focused on the explanation of single characters; while the later type, cidian, is edited to explain the meaning of phrases that are combinations of characters. In fact, the Kangxi zidian was the first Chinese book titled with zidian, and the term zidian was exclusively referred to as the Kangxi zidian during the Qing Dynasty (Liu, 1983: 1).

A different typology of Chinese dictionaries was suggested by Liu Yeqiu (1983), who identified three types. I will briefly discuss these three types by comparing them with Western dictionaries:

**Graphically Organised Dictionaries**
A good example of a graphically oriented dictionary is the Shuowen jiezi (Explaining Article and Analysing Compound Characters), a famous Chinese book edited in CE100-121, in which entries are arranged by characters through a system of 540 bushou (section header) radicals\(^{14}\). The Kangxi
\(^{14}\) A Chinese bushou (section head, radical) refers to the semantic elements of a specific character, always representing the originally internal meaning of the character. For example, the character 樹 (shu, means tree) and 林 (lin, means forest) share the bushou木 (mu, means wood), which contains the internal implication of wood.
zidian (Kangxi Dictionary) is another work included in this type. It was edited in 1716, complied with the requirements of Kangxi Emperor of the Qing Dynasty, and was regarded as the standard dictionary of traditional Chinese characters, popularising the system of 214 radicals. The format and structure of graphically organised Chinese dictionaries are very similar to European dictionaries in the sense that they are both ordered according to the form of entries rather than their meaning. In European dictionaries, this formal basis of ordering is provided by the alphabetical order, i.e. the entries are grouped by letters, starting with A. In Chinese graphically organised dictionaries the formal basis of ordering is provided by a system of hundreds of section header radicals, while characters are arranged according to these. As most Chinese characters are semantic-phonetic ones, the radical method is usually effective, thus it continues to be widely used in the present day.

**Semantically Organised Dictionaries**

An example of a semantic dictionary in Chinese society is Erya (Approaching Correctness), which is viewed as the oldest extant Chinese dictionary and a pre-Qin compilation of glosses to classical texts in the academic sphere. It contains lists of synonyms arranged into 19 semantic categories (e.g., a section explaining the meaning of all words referring to plants, a section explaining all words referring to animals etc.). This type of ordering existed in Western dictionaries as well, for example, in the *Thesaurus* of Peter Mark Roget (1852). However, this type of dictionary cannot work on its own unless it is combined with a graphic structure. In traditional Chinese semantically organised dictionaries, words are organised in a graphic order under each entry or sub-entry. As discussed earlier, the consultation of such dictionaries is not easy, since the logic of arranging entries into semantically related groups can be very subjective and varies greatly from author to author, as well as from reader to reader.

**Phonetically Organised Dictionaries**

This type of dictionary collates its entries by syllable rime and tones, and comprises the so-called rime dictionary. The first surviving rime dictionary is
the *Qieyun* (Cutting Rimes) edited in CE601 during the period of the Sui Dynasty, which was viewed as the standard of pronunciation for Middle Chinese. Phonetically organised dictionaries can be found in the West as well, for example, Diane Frank’s *Gabby’s Word Speller Phonetic Dictionary: Find Your Word by the Way It Sounds* (2008). One of the clear limitations of this type of dictionaries relies on their requirement of the knowledge of rime.

### 1.3 A Brief History of Chinese Dictionaries

The history of Chinese dictionaries can be traced back over two millennia to the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (Norman, 1988: 170-180). The origin of the Chinese dictionary has been a subject of controversy among different scholars. For example, Liu (1983) considered that *Yijing* (Classic of Changes, one of the oldest of the Chinese classic texts, the origin of which can be traced back to the 3rd to the 2nd millennium BC [Stamps, 1980: 207]) should be viewed as the first Chinese dictionary that was arranged according to the structure of dictionary. In Zhou’s (1999) opinion on the other hand, *Yijing* should be regarded as the first Chinese dictionary - being not a Chinese language dictionary, but a dictionary on a specific subject instead. Other scholars (Liu, 1983) have argued that ancient *zishu* (character books) should be considered the earliest type of Chinese dictionary. An example is the character book *Shizhoupian*, which was written in the court of the Xuan Emperor during the Zhou Dynasty (827-782 BC). Although the content of *Shizhoupian* is impossible to trace, at least 223 terms contained in another more famous dictionary *Shuowen jiezi* had been collected from the former (Wang, 1983: 257). If *Shozhoupian* is the earliest type of the Chinese character dictionary, the origin of the Chinese phrase dictionary can, according to Wang be associated with the *Cangjiepian*, which was named after the inventor of Chinese writing CangJie (Wang, 1983: 279). The *Cangjiepian* was edited by Li Si and used as character textbook for children, and helped to standardise *Xiaozhuanshu* (small seal script, an archaic form of Chinese calligraphy) during the Qin Dynasty (221-207 BC) (Yong et al. 2006: 112-113).
Despite the long history of Chinese dictionaries, systematic inquiry into the history of Chinese lexicography is something of a novelty, and only started developing in the last quarter of the twentieth century. *Zhongguo cishu shihua* (A Narrative History of Lexicography in China) by Fang Houshu (1979) is the first serious monograph concerned with dictionary research in China and covers a wide time span. It also initiated a whole series of academic articles and works on Chinese dictionaries (Yong & Peng, 2008: 3). While this growing body of work recognises the importance of the traditional Chinese dictionary in Chinese history as well as its impact on the Chinese society as a whole, in-depth research dealing with specific aspects of dictionaries and their profound cultural and social role in shaping public opinion is lacking. The aim of this chapter is to fill a part of this research gap by examining the representations of the Han and the Chinese, and more broadly the discourses about race and nation, as they appear in Chinese dictionaries of the late Qing and early republican period.

The late Qing period after the first Sino-Japanese War (1894) to the Republic of China (1911-1949) represents a particularly interesting time in the history of Chinese dictionaries. As mentioned earlier, this was a significant period during which China experienced an important transformation from feudal society to a modern society with a modern government. Western ideas played a central role in altering traditional Chinese culture, as well as in influencing the Chinese social moral system. Chinese notions of belonging, self-perceptions and perceptions of other peoples were changing as well. On the one hand, the idea of Han superiority, especially in respect to the Hanese cultural and moral system, was still strongly present. However, the Western challenge pushed the Chinese to acknowledge their weakness in technologies and international status. It is reasonable to expect that all these social changes had an impact on Chinese dictionaries and on definitions of the Han, nation, race and related terms provided in them. As Yong and Peng (2008: 296) argued, the lexicon of a language is always the medium which is most susceptible to any change in society, whether political, technological, ethical or of any other type.
Of particular importance to my analysis of dictionaries during the Qing Dynasty is the phenomenon of wenziyu (Literary Inquisition). This phenomenon made many of the Chinese intellectuals involved in the production of literature - but dictionaries in particular - very cautious and wary of any critical discussion of terms related to society and culture to prevent themselves from being caught and punished by the Qing court. As the Chinese scholar Gu Mingdong (2003) explains, the cases of wenziyu were particularly serious during the Qing Dynasty:

‘In Chinese history, there are numerous cases of wenziyu (Literary Inquisition). The late Chinese dynasty, the Qing, is especially notorious for this phenomenon. As an ethnic minority who conquered the previous Ming dynasty, the Qing rulers were so sensitive to their alien position that they practically became paranoid about the denotations and connotations of the two Chinese characters: Ming (bright) and Qing (clear)’ (126).

During the Qing Dynasty, the wenziyu had a deeply negative impact on various social spheres of Chinese society, including education, elections, politics, economy, culture and even customs and attitudes. The intellectuals and even their families sometimes could be convicted by the court and suffered serious corresponding punishments, for example, being sentenced to death or exile. A single word or phrase considered offensive by the ruler could be enough to trigger a prosecution. As a result, the Chinese intellectuals during the Qing period were generally trying to avoid mentioning any sensitive terms in their works, including dictionaries. It is also worth noting that at the same time, the content of the keju exams was exclusively focused on Chinese classics rather than the discussion of current political and social affairs, for broadly similar reasons. As I show further on, the threat of the Literary Inquisition had a significant impact on the context of late Qing dictionaries.

The development of Chinese dictionaries after 1911 was characterised by significant changes in their type and content. There are two dictionaries that
can be regarded as the most representative works during this period: namely Zhonghua da zidian and Ciyuan. The Zhonghua da zidian (Simplified Chinese), firstly published in 1915, is considered to be the first large-scale Chinese language dictionary after the publication of the Kangxi zidian (1904 [1716]), and also marks a transition from traditional Chinese characters books to modern language dictionaries (Yong, 2006: 408-409). The other key dictionary from this period, Lu Erkui’s (1915) Ciyuan (Sources of Words) was an outstanding effort in Chinese lexicography and can be considered the first cidian (word dictionary) in a modern sense (Yong, 2008: 409-410). These two dictionaries included a range of new terms stemming from the development of both natural and social sciences at the time, including those linked to modern notions of race and nation and thus directly relevant to my research. Due to these changes, Chinese lexicography as a whole experienced a new lease of life during this period, resulting in a great variation in the type, scale, content, function, and compilation levels of dictionaries and an expansion of the influence dictionaries exerted in the social, cultural, and academic spheres.

1.4 Analytical Framework

Similarly to the intellectuals’ and textbooks’ discourses, the discourses in Chinese dictionaries are developing along with societal and historical changes. As such, dictionaries can also provide an insight into the changing nature of public discourses about the Han, the Chinese, race and nation. Unlike the writings of intellectuals, however, dictionaries - along with textbooks - can also be seen as a ‘bridge’ between elite and popular discourses, since they are explicitly designed to make ideas and meanings available and accessible to the broader public. In addition, compared to the discourses in intellectuals’ works, and to some extent also compared to school textbooks, the power of definition exerted by dictionaries is much stronger. This is due to the fact that users tend to assume that their dictionaries are ‘both authoritative and beyond subjectivity’ (Moon, 1989: 158). Most readers do not notice that the information contained in the dictionaries is transient, and instead believe that the information provided by
the dictionaries is timeless, eternally correct. This explains the fact that some families keep the same dictionaries for generations.

Due to this powerful and authoritative function of definition, the dictionaries are also often seen as instruments of ideological control (Moon 1989; Benson, 2001), particularly in totalitarian and authoritarian regimes (Veisbergs, 2002). Mengham’s (1993) description of the 18th century dictionary provides a good example of such an understanding of dictionaries as instruments of social control:

‘The lexicographer would determine what should be included in, and what should be excluded from, a body of knowledge that the pragmatic user of his work would learn to regard as the foundation of a national language and culture. The body of knowledge would be subject to stratification, thus helping to inculcate a sense of rank and respect for privilege identified by degrees of breadth of command over language-use. The dictionary could become an instrument of social control, dispensed indirectly and fostering assumptions that need not be insisted upon too forcibly’ (112).

By analogy, we can also treat Chinese dictionaries as an instrument of social and ideological and control, and, more specifically, as a means of controlling popular discourses about the Self and the Other, belonging and exclusion. By studying the definitions of the Han, the Chinese, race, nation and related terms in Chinese dictionaries, we can therefore gain an insight into the popularisation and spreading of racial and national ideologies during the late Qing and early republican period, and into the processes of selection and stratification of publically available knowledge at the time. By comparing these definitions to those found in intellectuals’ writings and textbooks, we shall also gain an understanding of which definitions of the Chinese Self and its Others were accorded privileged status in public discourses, and hence became taken for granted definitions of who the Han and the Chinese are. To achieve these aims, the remainder of this chapter focuses on representations of the Han, Chinese identity, and the Other in specific dictionaries. I will discuss
some of the most important dictionaries published during the period of the First Sino-Japanese War to the establishment of the Republic of China (1911-1949). The list of dictionaries I will focus on is provided in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Publishing</th>
<th>Name of Book</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1904 [1716]</td>
<td>Kangxi zidian (Kangxi Dictionary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Shehui kexue da cidian (Dictionary of Social Sciences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Zhonghua da zidian (Simplified Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Zhonghua zhuyin zidian (Chinese Phonetic Dictionary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Guoyu putong cidian (Ordinary Dictionary of National Language)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Biaozhun guoyin shiyong xin zidian (Dictionary of National Pronunciation for Students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Xinqiao zidian (Xinqiao Dictionary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Xiaoxuesheng de zidian (Dictionary for Primary Students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Xuesheng biaozhun zidian (Standard Dictionary for Students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Biaozhun guoyin xuesheng zidian (Dictionary of National Pronunciation for Students)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I will study in what ways the authors of Chinese dictionaries constructed and represented Han identity by analysing how they defined specific terms, including Han, zhong (race), and ren (human being), zu and minzu (ethnicity/nation) and guo (state). More specifically, the analysis will focus on three aspects of dictionary representation: 1) the definitions of the Han; 2) the definitions of ren; 3) the definitions of zu and zhong; 4) the definitions of guo.
(state) and other relevant phrases. In relation to each of these aspects, I will discuss both continuities as well as changes in representation over time across the late Qing and early republican period.

Before providing an analysis of dictionaries from the late Qing period, I will first provide a description of the wenziyu (Literary Inquisition), i.e. the official prosecution of intellectuals due to their writings or speeches.

Due to the inquisition, Chinese scholars involved in producing literature, including dictionaries, were very cautious and avoided including any terms relating to social phenomena, especially those terms that could be linked to a controversial anti-Manchu position or a controversial understanding of the Han. This was the main reason behind the fact that only a very limited number of dictionaries produced during the Qing period included the terms relevant to my analysis of representations of the Han and Chinese identity. I therefore decided to focus on the Kangxi zidian, originally published in 1716, which was the main dictionary of the period and which continued to be reprinted through the late Qing period (the version used for my analysis was published in 1904). My decision reflects on this grand dictionary’s historical significance in standardising the pronunciation, meaning and format of Chinese characters, but also takes into account the fact that the Kangxi zidian was edited by the Manchurian rulers, which allows me to analyse how the Han have been represented from a different standpoint by the Manchu - the Other.

My analysis of developments in the early republican period opens with a discussion of the academic movement xixuedongjian (Western Learning), which played an important role in shaping Chinese modern culture. Among other things, this movement was responsible for introducing modern Western ideas of race, nation and ethnicity, which also exerted an influence on dictionaries published in the early republican era as discussed in the second part of my analysis.

Several influential dictionaries were published during the early republican era. For example, the publishing of Zhonghua da zidian (Simplified Chinese, also
known as Chinese Great Dictionary) (1915), edited by Xu Yuangao and others, was the first step in the establishment of the new format of Chinese character dictionaries after the publication of the Kangxi zidian. This dictionary marked an important watershed in the historical development of Chinese dictionaries that had marked the end of old Chinese character books and the birth of modern Chinese dictionaries (Yong, 2006: 408-409). Another important dictionary published during the early republican period was Shehui kexue da cidian (Dictionary of Social Sciences) (Gao et al. 1929), which provided a comprehensive explanation of some modern terms of Western origin that appeared in modern China. This dictionary included terms and explanations from a group of dictionaries and encyclopedias originally written in different languages, including Chinese, Japanese and English\(^\text{15}\) during the early republican period. Along with other dictionaries listed in the table, these dictionaries constitute the focus of my analysis.

### 2. Period I: The Late Qing Period

#### 2.1 Wenziyu (Literary Inquisition)

The nature of political rule established in Qing China had a profound impact on Chinese cultural production, including the production of dictionaries. The relationship between political power and culture during this period can be clearly demonstrated by examining the phenomenon of wenziyu (Literary Inquisition) and its stifling impact on the development of Chinese culture throughout the whole Qing Dynasty. This directly led to a decline in the production of different literary forms, including dictionaries, which was relevant to political discussion. The wenziyu refers to the official persecution of intellectuals for their writing in imperial China, which flourished during the Ming and Qing Dynasties. Such persecution was used by many emperors in

\(^{15}\)These dictionaries and encyclopaedia included the Encyclopedia of Social Reform (Blise, 1897), the Dictionary of Socialism (Rappaport, 1924), the Shehui wenti cidian (Dictionary of Social Problems) (Chen, 1929), and the Shehui yundong cidian (Dictionary of Social Movements) (Wang, 1930).
feudal China in order to further suppress Chinese intellectuals and strengthen the centralised power of the imperial court. Although literary censorship was not created by the Qing court, it reached its peak during this period (Liu, 1988). The number and severity of convictions as well as the intensity of suffering caused by them were at their highest levels under Qing rule, especially under the court of Yongzheng and the reign of the Qianlong Emperor, i.e. the third and fourth emperors of the Qing Dynasty (ibid). As Wang (2002) explains, ‘The cases of wenziyu have experienced a significant increase during the reign of Emperor Yongzheng. Seven important wenziyu cases happened in 14 years of his reign. In addition, the number of wenziyu cases gradually increased to 130 during Qianlong’s reign’. (91)

The key targets of the persecutions were publications - sometimes even single words - that were considered offensive to the rules, or challenged their legitimacy. Many scholars and their relatives fell victim to wenziyu due to writings that were not even meant to be anti-government but were nonetheless perceived as such. The Qing emperors were especially sensitive to anti-Manchu thoughts among the Han Chinese. During the regime of Yongzheng and Qianlong (the third and fourth emperors of the Qing Dynasty), several prominent Chinese scholars were persecuted. One of the most famous cases was the mingshi an (Case of the history of the Ming Dynasty) under the reign of Emperor Kangxi, in which about seventy people were killed and even more exiled (Wong, 2000: 275). Another interesting case of wenziyu involved a poet who used the term qing feng, which means clear wind in Chinese, and who had been severely punished since this term contained the word qing - considered by the Qing rulers to be offensive to their government (Gu, 2003: 126). Chinese intellectuals, who either lost their creative drive because of the wenziyu or were too intimidated to write anything that could subject them to conviction, made henceforth no considerable efforts in producing works including dictionaries, dealing with social or political facts. For this reason, ‘literary gentlemen with aspiration and integrity were nowhere to be found’ in this period, since even a single unintentional word might bring unexpected disasters (Liu, 1988: 731).
The wenziyu had therefore a considerably negative - and restricting impact on Chinese culture during the Qing Dynasty, and hampered the development of Chinese dictionaries. Even for the limited number of dictionaries or reference books published during this period, the writers involved were very cautious and often focused primarily on explaining words related to the realm of nature and natural sciences rather than society and culture. Nevertheless, it was also during the Qing Dynasty that an earlier officially sanctioned and well-established dictionary made a great contribution to the development of Chinese lexicography, namely, the Kangxi zidian (Kangxi Dictionary) (Liu, 1986: 100), which will be discussed in the following section.

2.2 The Kangxi zidian (Kangxi Dictionary)

In the eyes of Chinese feudal authorities, the main task was to promote Chinese culture, and to that end they invested in the production of literature in order to popularise Confucianism. The key aim of the works published in feudal times, including dictionaries, was to provide a systematic standard explanation of Confucianism for the wider audience (Yong, 2008: 137). Therefore, Chinese dictionaries published under the feudal government, instead of being a systematic index of collection of words, were only a fragmented collection of different quotations from Chinese classic text. The Kangxi zidian was no exception.

In 1710, Emperor Kangxi assigned the compilation of the Kangxi zidian to a team of scholars, including Zhang Yushu\(^1\) (1642-1711) and Chen Tingjing\(^2\) (1639-1712). The dictionary was completed and published in 1716, with the

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\(^{16}\) Zhang Yushan was one of the most trusted chancellors in Kangxi’s court. In contrast to other chancellors, who were in permanent conflicts with each other to enhance their status in the court, Zhang’s career developed smoothly without experiencing any serious difficulties. Until his death in 1711, he had never experienced a serious failure in his official career.

\(^{17}\) Chen Tingjing was the teacher of the Emperor Kangxi. In the second year after Kangxi’s edict of the complement of the Kangxi zidian (1710), Zhang Yushu died of illness. Chen took charge of the remaining work on his own.
preface written by Emperor Kangxi himself. This dictionary builds on the tradition of previous character dictionaries. In particular, it is based on the revision and enlargement of Mei Yingzuo’s *Zihui* (The Comprehensive Dictionary of Chinese Characters)\(^\text{18}\) and Zhang Zilie’s * Zhengzitong* (The Rectified Dictionary of Chinese Characters)\(^\text{19}\). In Emperor Kangxi’s view ‘the *Zihui* is overly simple while the *Zhengzitong* is, by contrast, excessive’ (Yong & Peng, 2008: 299-300). He commanded that a new dictionary should be compiled to ‘amend the above two dictionaries and establish an everlasting paradigm for dictionary compilation’ (ibid).

The *Kangxi zidian* was the first officially published dictionary with the title *zidian* (character dictionary) in the history of dictionary-making in China. It contains 47,035 character entries, categorised into 42 volumes and grouped into 214 radical sections. The entries in the dictionary are organised into groups of rhyme diagrams, each of which occupies one volume. The Qing scholar Zhou Zhongfu evaluated the contribution of the *Kangxi zidian* as ‘the fruit of the philological studies in both ancient and modern times and the peak of culture through all previous dynasties’ (cited in Yong, 2008: 301). He also argued that ‘none of the succeeding scholars involved in the study of Chinese characters could go beyond the *Kangxi zidian*’ (ibid). Over the 200 years since its publication, the prominent value of the *Kangxi zidian* has been maintained until the present time. The *Kangxi zidian*, as an influential grand dictionary has contributed to the standardisation of pronunciation, meaning and format of characters in Chinese lexicography. It also played a major role in developing a standard, systematic description of Chinese classical and

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\(^{18}\) The *Zihui* (Literal Lexicon) is a Chinese dictionary published in 1615 during the late Ming Dynasty, edited by Mei Yingzuo. This dictionary was seen as significant due to its arrangement of radicals, which provided the foundation for subsequent Chinese dictionaries organised by the order of radicals (Liu, 1994: 29).

\(^{19}\) The *Zhengzitong* (Correct Character Mastery) was originally edited by Zhang Zilie and published in 1627 during the Ming Dynasty as a supplement to the 1615 *Zihui* dictionary. Liao Wenying renamed it as *Zhengzitong* and published it by referencing his own name in 1671 during the Qing Dynasty (Liu, 1992).
historical literature, and of the diversity of schools of Chinese philosophy (Yong, 2006: 328-329).

There have been numerous different versions of *Kangxi zidian* that were published after its first publication. It was republished several times, including during the reign of the last Qing emperor Xuantong, the early period of the Republic of China, and also after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. After the completion of the *Kangxi zidian*, it was not revised until 1827, when Daoguang Emperor decreed to modify the mistakes in *Kangxi zidian*. This was also the only revision of *Kangxi zidian* before the establishment of People’s Republic of China in 1949 (Liu, 1986: 100). The version of the *Kangxi zidian* being analysed here was published during the Emperor Guangxu period in 1904, which was the same version that was edited by Wang Yinzhi in 1827.

From the point of view of the aims of this dissertation, the Kangxi Dictionary provides important insights into the officially sanctioned representations of the Han and related terms such as *ren*, *zhong* and *guo* during the late Qing era. As demonstrated in the following pages, these representations bear the imprint of ethnic relations in China at the time, and were strongly influenced by the powerful position of the Manchu - the Han’s most important Other.

### 2.2.1 The Definition of Han in the Kangxi zidian

The term Han was defined in the *Kangxi zidian* in various ways (1904: 697). It was firstly related to some geographical meanings, e.g. Han River, Hanyang\(^{20}\). Han was also explained as an ignoble man, with a reference to the book *Chuogenglu* (Retirement to the countryside), which was a private history of the late Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368).

In the *Kangxi zidian*, Han was never defined in a sense of social community, whether in racial, national or ethnical ways. The same phenomenon applies to the term Manchu as well. The intentional avoidance of relating either Han or

\(^{20}\) Hanyang is a city in the present Hubei province in China.
Manchu to a social category was a result of Manchu emperors’ efforts to avoid addressing the relationships between the Manchu and the Han.

As some authors argue, the Manchu were, by that time, fully assimilated into the Han. This is also the view of Rhoad (2003), who suggested that,

‘The Manchus became an all-but-forgotten people by the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is widely believed that they had become so assimilated into the culture of the majority Han population that they were no longer identifiable as a separate and distinct group’ (9).

Central to this assimilation was the transformation of the *baqi* (Eight Banners). The *baqi* (Eight Banners) were administrative divisions designed to place all the Manchurian troops, which were constructed according to pre-existing lineage or tribal connections, in their respective membership. It provided a basic framework for the Manchu military organisation and was created for a more centralised military force. The *baqi* originated exclusively from the Manchurian; it included some people from other ethnicities afterwards, like the Hanese, who were given Manchurian surnames by the Manchu emperors. The inclusion of Hanese into the *baqi* largely contributed to the national integration between the Han and Manchu. At the same time, this inclusion also led to the loss of their distinctive Manchurian identity (Rhoads, 2000: 9-11).

It has been shown in the previous chapters that the Han intellectuals were making numerous efforts to distinguish themselves from the Manchu during the late Qing and the early republican period. In regard to the Manchurian governors, although they had shown hardly any tolerance towards literature that could be regarded as promoting Han identity, it was a fact that they had completely accepted the classical cultural system. The *keju* examination system, which was most importantly a political mechanism of selecting talented people to participate in national governance, was based on the examination of Han classics. The *Kangxi zidian*, which was officially sanctioned for public use by the Qing court, was written in Han characters. In
addition, the definitions and explanations of the terms included in the *Kangxi zidian*, were a collection of references to Hanese classics.

In other words, being a powerful tool in the enhancement of the national language and culture, the 1904 edition of *Kangxi zidian* - although it had carefully avoided mentioning any sensitive elements that could be applied to social categories and the difference between these groups - was to some extent a reflection of Manchu’s acceptance of the Han perspective on Chinese society.

### 2.2.2 The Definition of *ren* in the *Kangxi zidian*

The term *ren* (human beings) was explained in the following ways in the *Kangxi zidian* (1904: 91):

> ‘the most honorable species in the entire world … a kind of benevolent beings, which are merciful to other species … the morality of the heaven and earth, the watershed of ghosts and gods’ (91).

It can be seen from the explanations of the term *ren* in the *Kangxi zidian* that the editors made no effort to subdivide *ren* into different groups such as races or nations. The criteria differentiating the human beings from other (non-human) ‘species’ were chosen from a perspective that can be seen as reflecting a traditional Chinese cosmology and philosophical thinking that could be explained as *tianrenheyi* (The Unity of Heaven and Man), which was focused on the harmonious relationship between the Heaven/universe and Man. According to the definition of *ren* in the *Kangxi zidian*, the status of human beings was superior to that of other ‘species’ - they were described as ‘most honourable’ as well as ‘benevolent’ and ‘merciful’ to other beings - which implies a hierarchical understanding of the world and relationships between species. However, this idea is derived from the traditional Chinese cultural and philosophical system, and is not linked to a racial differentiation among different human groups themselves.
2.2.3 The Definition of zhong in the Kangxi zidian

In the Kangxi zidian, the term zhong (1904: 850) was on the one hand used to refer to agricultural products, such as cereal, grain and vegetables. It was also used to describe farmers’ seemingly unsophisticated look, using quotes from the book Zhuangzi21.

Besides, zhong was defined as ‘the family’, using a quote from the book Shiji22: [he] was worried the Qin court will murder his whole zhong [family] if he could not succeed’ (1904: 850).

On the other hand, and more interestingly in the context of this analysis, the Kangxi zidian also used the term zhong to refer to the Qiang ethnicity using a quote from the book Houhan23: ‘Wuwei County, north of the border with the Huns, south of the border with zhong Qiang, where most people have abandoned their fields because they are afraid of pirates’ plunder and abuse’ (1904: 850). The Qiang are an ethnic group of China, which had been living mainly in the northwestern part of the present Sichuan province. It is important to note that in regard to the explanation of the term zhong in the Kangxi zidian, using the term Han was avoided. Instead, the term zhong is used to refer to other ethnic groups living in the Chinese territory. What is also telling is the fact that in this quote, the Qiang (but also the Huns, another ethnic group in China) are indirectly described as ‘pirates’, and contrasted with ‘the people’ who ‘abandoned their fields’. This negative description is in line with perceptions of the Qiang among the Han intellectuals at the time,

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21 Zhuangzi was an influential Chinese philosopher who lived in the 4th century BC during the Warring States Period, which is concluded with the victory of the state of Qin in 211 BC. His thoughts were summarised by later generations of scholars in a book titled Zhuangzi.

22 Shiji (The records of the grand history) was a famous Chinese historical work, written by Sima Qian, from 109 BC to 91 BC. As the first systematic Chinese historical text, Shiji profoundly influenced Chinese historiography and prose.

23 Houhan (The history of the later Han) was one of the official Chinese historical works, which was compiled by Fan Ye in the 5th century, using a number of earlier histories and documents as sources. It covered the history of Eastern Han from 25 to 220 AD.
which grouped the Qiang together with other ‘barbarians’ or yi (e.g. Wang, 2007). As explained in the chapter about intellectuals’ discourse, these perceptions were rooted in ancient Chinese ideas. From the ancient Chinese idea of Hua-yi zhi bian (Hua-yi Distinction) to Chinese intellectuals’ discourses and dictionaries published during the late Qing period, the image of ethnic minorities in China had hardly experienced any significant change. They were always perceived as barbarian, inferior, rude and uncivilised. This can be clearly demonstrated from the traditional Chinese idea of Hua-yi zhi bian (Hua-yi Distinction) that has been discussed in the previous chapter, which was a historical concept differentiating the Han from the Yi (barbarians/Others/non-Chinese) in both biological and cultural ways.

The definition of zhong in the Kangxi zidian therefore suggests that the Manchurian authorities had at least in part adopted the racial hierarchies and perceptions of the Other and the Self as used by the Han intellectuals. Ironically, for the Han intellectuals, the Manchu themselves were considered barbarian and of the same status as the Qing and other non-Han groups.

2.2.4 The Definition of guo in the Kangxi zidian

In the Kangxi zidian, the term guo was used as a synonym of jiuzhou (the Nine Provinces), a term which is often used as a reference to China as a whole24 and other types of territorial divisions in China. For example, a quotation from the ancient book Zhouli (The Rites of Zhou) was included in the description of the term guo to identify the meaning of the term guo by stating that, ‘the guo has been divided into nine provinces’ (1904: 218).

The meaning of the term guo representing different administrative levels from central to local within ancient China, which can be found in the Confucian

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24 Jiuzhou (the Nine Provinces) is a term used in ancient Chinese histories to refer to territorial divisions during the Xia and Shang dynasties, and has later on come to symbolically represent China.
book *Li*\(^{25}\) (ritual propriety) as well: ‘A *shu* consists of 5 *guo*; a *lian* consists of 10 *guo*; a *zu* consists of 20 *guo*; a *zhou* consists of 210 *guo*’ (1904: 218). The terms *shu*, *lian*, *zu* and *zhou* are all used to refer to different levels of territorial divisions in China.

Apart from referring to different administrative levels (that can be a union, a nation, or a province) and size of territory, *guo* had been also adopted by the *Kangxi zidian* as the equivalent of the English term state. For example, the quotation from the book *Zhouli* (The Rites of Zhou) was used to explain the term: ‘a *guo* that has won the battle towards another *guo* is defined as the *guo of victory*’ (1904: 218). Another sentence quoted from the book *Zhouli* noted, ‘distinct totems are used to represent different images when different *guo* send their envoys: the *guo* which is surrounded by mountains would use the image of tiger; the *guo* which is full with soil field would use the image of human being; the *guo* which is surrounded by river would use the image of dragon’ (ibid). The examples provided also suggested that *guo* were closely tied to a sense of identity and belonging, as well as exclusion, since some *guo* were presented as ‘our’ and others as ‘their’ or alien. The following quote from the book *Zuo zhuan*\(^{26}\) (Commentary of Zuo) in the *Kangxi zidian* is a case in point: ‘the *guo* which lives beyond the scope of *jiuzhou* are alien *guo*’ (ibid).

To sum up, compared to the narrow definitions of the term Han and *min*, *zhong*, the term *guo* had been explained in a deeper and broader way and was clearly related to a sense of (territorialised) identity and belonging, as

\(^{25}\) *Li* is a classical Chinese word which encompasses an abstract idea instead of a definitive object. It is therefore translated into English in various ways. Henry Rosemont and Roger Ames’ translation of *Li* into “ritual propriety” is adopted in this thesis. It is other times explained as customs, etiquette, morals, the standard of proper behaviour, etc. (Mattice, Ashton & Kimber, 2009: 8).

\(^{26}\) The *Zuo zhuan* is a book among the earliest Chinese works of narrative history, which covers the period from 722 to 468 BC, and was one of the most important sources for analysing the history of the Spring and Autumn Dynasty.
well as exclusion.

The results of my analysis of the definitions of the Han, ren, zhong and guo in the Kangxi zidian can be explained by reference to different factors. First, in the late Qing period the import of Western concepts of race and nation had only started and they were not yet widely used in Chinese officially sanctioned public discourse. Second, and most importantly, due to the threat of literary inquisition scholars were wary of linking the terms Han or Manchu to social groups. Nonetheless, this avoidance should not lead us to conclude that Chinese people in this period lacked an awareness of Han identity or an awareness of collective belonging and exclusion. Due to the intensity of the conflict between the Manchu and the Han during the late Qing period, the identity of the Han became an issue that could not be avoided. Also, as my discussion of the terms guo and Qiang ethnicity have shown, even late Qing dictionaries included traces of modern forms of belonging and exclusion, and hence contributed to their spreading and popularisation among the broader population.

3. Period II: 1911-1949

With the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911, Chinese intellectuals had recognised that the Kangxi zidian, which was originally published in 1716, could not satisfy the need for academic research nor education of the public adequately. Influenced by social changes occurring during the early 20th century, and by the emergence of a large number of new ideas and new knowledge, as well as by the increasing influence of Western political and scientific culture, Chinese dictionaries published after the establishment of the Republic of China were considerably different from those published during the Ming and Qing Dynasties. One of the most visible changes was the appearance of several modern terms borrowed from the modern Western sciences, including gongye (industry), jingji (economics), wenhua (culture) and other (Yong, et al. 2006: 407-409).
The introduction of terms borrowed from the West was part and parcel of a much longer historical process known as *xixuedongjian* (Western learning). Due to the importance of Western ideas for early republican-era dictionaries, I shall first provide a brief discussion of *xixuedongjian*.

Having witnessed the success achieved by the Western countries, an increasing number of Chinese intellectuals started to study Western knowledge in order to strengthen the Chinese national power. One of the most influential intellectuals during the late Qing period, Kang Youwei referred in his chronicle to the importance of Western leaning. He considered it necessary and beneficial for the Chinese government to integrate new Western theories and political ideas into Chinese society, and argued for the necessity of translating Western knowledge into Chinese:

‘There are only a very limited number of Western books that have been translated into Chinese. The books translated by Fu Lanya are all focused on medicine, which can be evaluated as useless. The most outstanding Western books are political literature that contains a large number of new ideas and theories, which could not be found in China. The establishment of a specific department dealing with the translation issues is therefore the most necessary task’. (1992: 14)

Prompted by such fascination with Western knowledge, an academic movement *xixuedongjian* (Western learning) developed among the Chinese intellectuals, which played a significant role in the development of Chinese modern culture in various fields. Western learning refers to a process through which modern Western academic thoughts were brought to China, using a variety of media from newspapers and books to new forms of education. This process started in the late sixteenth century, under the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and was initially associated with Jesuit missionaries who used Western science as an instrument of evangelization (Jami, 2011: 13). During the Qing Dynasty, Chinese started acknowledging the value of Western knowledge and their attitude was transformed from an initial rejection and resistance to a gradual acceptance. Some of them even claimed the necessity of a complete
'Westernisation', which would consist of understanding the whole system of Western technologies and culture, and applying them to Chinese society (Wang, 2003: 3-7).

In the process of Western learning, Western philosophy, astronomy, physics, chemistry, Medicine, biology, political sciences, geography, sociology, economics, law, history, applied technology, literature and art, were widely introduced into Chinese society and had a great impact on Chinese academics. As part of this movement, the modern ideas of race, nation and ethnicity had also been imported and explained to the Chinese people by Chinese intellectuals, who were introducing and translating the literature of modern Western Social Sciences.

Western learning was a widely used term in Chinese society during the end of the Qing period. The process of Western learning started with the translations of Western academic books, which were considered to be the medium for an initial introduction of key concepts, contents and ideas of Western sciences to the Chinese. In contrast to scholars in the Ming Dynasty, Chinese intellectuals in the Qing period, who had been brought up with Chinese traditional culture and values, would mostly not abandon the traditional learnings when they incorporated Western ideas into their thoughts. Instead, they made an effort to absorb what they considered to be the strengths of Western knowledge to complete their original structure of culture (Sun, 2008: 24-27).

The Western learning movement during the late Qing Dynasty was prominently associated with educational reform, starting with the yangwuyundong (The Modernisation Movement) in 1861, which was a movement aimed at emulating foreign technologies and industry, in order to modernise various spheres in China, e.g. engineering, chemistry, the military etc. (Jiang, 1997). In regard to educational reform, the Qing court introduced several new policies. For example, outstanding Chinese students were sent abroad to study advanced Western technologies and a large amount of Western literature was translated into Chinese. In addition, some modern study organisations were established. The setup of subjects in the new
educational system was marked by and emphasise on Western literature and technologies, in contrast to the old content which was focused on the bagu wen (The Eight-legged Essay) (Zhu, 1989).

The Western learning movement played a key role in preparing the intellectual grounds for broader changes that transformed the traditional Chinese understanding of identity, and introduced new perspectives in social sciences and various aspects of social life. Moreover, the increasing recognition of Western culture in China also weakened the strict literary censorship conducted by the Qing court. All these factors also laid the basis for the development of new Chinese dictionaries after the establishment of the Republic of China. We should also note, however, that the spreading of ideas originating from modern Western Social Sciences did not mean a wholesale abandonment of traditional cultural ideas based on Confucianism. As we will see from the following analysis, some elements of traditional Chinese culture were still playing an important role in the dictionaries published during the early republican period, even though they were adapted to fit ideas borrowed from the West.

Another issue worth considering when discussing the impact of Western learning on modern Chinese dictionaries during the early republican era is the role of Japanese translations. According to some authors (e.g. Murphy, 2010: 53), several Chinese terms in contemporary dictionaries were borrowed from Japanese translations, and had become an integral part of the Chinese language during the late Qing and early republican period. These borrowed terms allegedly comprised half of the neologisms in contemporary dictionaries, including terms such as minzu (nation), lishi (history), shehui (society) and others. However, some Chinese scholars, for example, Yong and Peng (2008), deny this and instead argue that it is difficult to establish whether these new terms were indeed borrowed from Japanese translations, or were home-made terms (331).

After this brief overview of relevant historical processes and contexts influencing the early republican dictionaries, I shall now proceed with the
analysis of the dictionaries themselves. I will mainly focus on the definitions of three terms, namely, zu and minzu, and Han. I will show how these terms are defined and explained in terms of group identities associated with notions of nation, race and ethnicity, and how this contributed to the construction of perceptions of the Self and the Other in Chinese society.

3.1 The Definition of zu in Dictionaries of the Early Republican Period

The Chinese’ will to establish a modern national state was not apparent until the beginning of the 20th century, and when it emerged it was seen as a response to Western imperial threats (Kuhn, 2002: 1). The term zu was often used by Chinese intellectuals in the early republic to refer to a powerful social body that was capable of resisting the Western Other. As such, this term embodied Western views of the political self and was closely related to national, racial and ethnic signifiers. Due to this, zu is one of the most important terms to be analysed in Chinese dictionaries during the early republic period.

During the early republican period, the term zu was in many Chinese dictionaries used to refer to lineage. For example, one of the explanations of zu in Zhonghua da zidian (Simplified Chinese) was ‘family, the father and son, descendants’ (Xu et al. 1915: 203). In the Zhonghua zhuyin zidian (The Chinese Phonetic Dictionary) (Sun et al. 1921), the term zu was explained in a similar vein as ‘the relationship of cognition and affinity, e.g. jiuze27 and

27 According to the definition in Sanzijing (Trimetric Classic, written in the 13th century and attributed to Wang Yinglin, which was one of the Chinese classic texts), jiuze refers to nine different consanguineous relations that an individual had with other people, including great-great-grandfather, great-grandfather, father, self, children, grandchildren, great-grandson, and great-great-grandson. These relations, under Confucian principles, were bonded by filial piety, which meant that all the members in this network of relations were responsible for crimes committed by any others due to guilt by association, because of their unabated strict loyalty to each other. It also provided a consanguineous loyal foundation for the entire family that should be responsible in supporting each other in the case of a rebellion against an invader.
sanzu\textsuperscript{28} (1921: 34), which means different levels of relationship in a specific family. Another example can be found in the \textit{Guoyin biaozhun baihua cidian} (The National Standard Vernacular Dictionary) (Fang, 1924), in which the term \textit{zu} was exclusively referring to relatives or family: ‘\textit{zu} means the members in a family with lineage connections’ (217).

However, dictionary definitions of \textit{zu} in this period did not refer only to lineage; in addition, \textit{zu} also became linked to larger social categories, such as nation and ethnicity. In this context, national identity was constructed in relation to different social groups, and several dictionaries used the term \textit{zu} in combination with Han. For example, in the \textit{Zhonghua zhuyin zidian} (Chinese Phonetic Dictionary) \textit{zu} was explained as ‘shared nation, e.g. Han \textit{zu} and Latin \textit{zu}’ (Sun et al. 1921: 34). Likewise, in the \textit{Biaozhun guoyin xuesheng zidian} (Standard Chinese Phonetic Student Dictionary) and in also the \textit{Zhonghua jiben jiaoyu xiao zidian} (Dictionary of Chinese Primary Education) (Wu, 1947: 143), \textit{zu} was explained as \textit{minzu} (nation) (Zhang et al. 1934: 35). Such overlapping of familial lineage and national belonging in definitions of the term \textit{zu} echoed prominent theories of race and nation in the Western social sciences of this time, which also interpreted large-scale collectives such as nations as akin to familial relationships.

In the \textit{Zhonghua da zidian} (Simplified Chinese), \textit{zu} was also explained with reference to predominantly racially defined categories: ‘[it refers to] categories, which are for example used in so-called Aryan, Teutonees and Slavdom’ (Xu et al. 1915: 203). The term Aryan was an important term in this period, and was linked to racial thinking. The term was also at the centre of Nazi Germany’s racial ideology, which idiosyncratically emphasised the importance of racial purity, and strong beliefs in the superiority of a Germanic Aryan race. In line with this, Hitler (1943) believed that ‘all the human culture,

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{28} The interpretation of the term \textit{san zu} was distinct in different Chinese works. The inclusion of parents, brothers and wives was a kind of definition. In some other works, it was defined as father, mother and wives. Besides, it was sometimes understood as the relationship among father, son and grandson (Ma & Zhou, 2002).
\end{footnote}
all the results of art, science, and technology that we see before us today, are almost exclusively the creative product of the Aryan’ (290).

However, such links between zu and race were rare in early republican dictionaries. Apart from the example just quoted, these dictionaries did not link zu to race, nor did they associate race with zhong. Also, even though the Zhonghua da zidian links zu to race, it never combines zu with words such as bai (white), hei (black) or huang (yellow) - as in ‘white race’, ‘black race’ etc. In this respect, early republican dictionaries differed significantly from intellectuals’ discourses at the time, where zu is repeatedly used to refer to race.

Finally, early republican era dictionaries also used the term zu with reference to non-Han ethnic groups, and represented zu as associated with the general Chinese term zhong. For example, in the Xiaoxuesheng de zidian (The Dictionary for Primary School Students) (Fang & Su) from 1933, the term was explained as based on ‘a shared common zhong, e.g. the Han, the Manchu, the Mongolian, the Hui and the Tibetan’ (145).

3.2 The Definition of minzu in Dictionaries of the Early Republican Period

The Shehuikexue da cidian (Dictionary of Social Sciences) (Gao et al. 1929) used the phrase ruoxiao minzu (small and weak nations) as an example in the definition of the term minzu:

‘Ruoxiao minzu (small and weak nations) refer to colonial, semi-colonial nations, as well as other regimes that are independent in name only, and the internal government of which is interfered by imperialism. They are also known as the oppressed nations. The rapid development of the local imperialism is the reason leading the aggression towards those small and weak as the imperialist countries have no other choice but seeking foreign markets, a cheap labor force and raw materials.
When the development of capitalism reaches the highest stage - stage of financial capitalism, they have to rely on the foreign conquered regions to consume domestic surplus capital. Therefore, the use of violent force to conquer the small and weak nations is a necessary task for imperialists’ (474).

This quote clearly illustrates that this Chinese dictionary had not only started to use modern Western notions of nation, but had also developed a critical perspective on Western colonialism, imperialism and capitalism by marking it as aggressive and exploitative. The detailed data on the size of territory that had been occupied by European countries and America was also provided to demonstrate the scale of Western imperialist expansion. For example: ‘the United Kingdom since 1870, had obtained Baluchistan … In addition, [the British] had also occupied the New Guinea Islands … the total size of regions listed is equal to a hundred times of their domestic territory’ (475).

The same dictionary also included a definition of the term minzu zhuyi (nationalism). The editors noted that, ‘the meaning of minzu zhuyi (nationalism) can be regarded as a request of achieving equality with the Western powers, and an equal status in the international environment’ (Gao, et al. 1929: 139). The term minzu zhuyi (nationalism) in this dictionary was associated with two meanings with reference to a speech given by Sun Zhongshan in year 1924:

The term minzu zhuyi (nationalism) contains two aspects of meanings: the one is the self-liberation of the Chinese nation; the Other is the equality of all the national groups within the Chinese territory. In regard to the first aspect, the aim of minzu zhuyi (nationalism) is to achieve a free and independent status of the Chinese nation in the world… In regard to the second aspect, the Manchu had a superiority status to other nations in China before the Chinese Revolution, which has been overcome after the Chinese Revolution. The equality and integration of all the nations in China can be therefore achieved’ (ibid).

It can be seen from the quote above that one dimension of this definition of
nation and nationalism is clearly the attempt to claim China’s identity as a free and independent sovereign nation-state, which should be achieved by ‘self-liberation’. The quote also relates the term minzu zhuyi to an attempt to include ‘all the national groups within the Chinese territory’ into a larger Chinese national community and presents this as something that could not be achieved before the end of the Manchu court. This definition of minzu zhuyi is evidently based on intellectuals’ discourses analysed earlier in this dissertation, and is also marked by an anti-Manchu stance and an attempt to foster cross-ethnic national integration, both of which were key tenants of intellectuals’ discourses in the early republican era. In relation to this it is also worth noting that the dictionary entries avoided addressing differences among groups in the Chinese territory, even though this was a time when differences among groups were becoming increasingly pronounced thanks to independence movements (e.g. in Tibet). Along with the emphasis on cross-national integration evident in the quote above, this brushing over of internal fractions and differences can be seen as part and parcel of broader efforts at national unification at the time. These efforts were led by political and intellectual elites and also shaped dictionary definitions of the early republican era. Still, this emphasis on integration does not mean that all groups were integrated into the wider Chinese national self under common terms. As shown further on in the analysis, the Han were clearly seen as the primary bearer of Chinese identity.

Another concept linked to the term minzu in some dictionaries during this period was the term guojia (state). The term guojia (state) was used for the first time and was also most comprehensively explained in the Shehuikexue da cidian (Dictionary of Social Sciences) (Gao et al. 1929). It was defined here as the following:

‘Guojia (State), according to a description of modern sociologists, refers to a political organ of the human social organisation. There are four elements relevant to the analysis of the term: 1) the human group involved in the activities should have the same purposes; 2) the ownership of a certain size of land is essential; 3) it presupposes the
existence of some public authorities that represent and implement the public will; 4) it should be ruled and controlled by a supreme force of domination’ (500).

The term *guojia* is here closely linked to political rule and ownership of territory, which is associated with a common belonging to a group of people, and the need for a ‘supreme force of domination’. The *Shehui kexue da cidian* also identified three types of relationships that can lead to constructing a *guojia* (state). In relation to this the dictionary also discussed the role of classes, drawing on Engels’ and Lenin’s ideas:

‘A group of distinct relationships can be considered in regard to the origin of states: 1) [a state] can emerge from the lineage relations; 2) [a state] can emerge from the religious relations; 3) [a state] can also emerge from the economic relations… However, according to the socialists’ recent investigation, state is an authority dominated by a class that suppresses the other class. This can be applied to either monarchies or bourgeois democratic countries. This is Engels’ theory. In this way of thinking, Lenin has therefore concluded that state will disappear. The general idea of his theory is that the proletarian state is built on the basis of abandoning the classes; the elimination of state is happening simultaneously with the disappearance of classes' (ibid).

These definitions of *minzu*, *minzu zhuyi* and *guojia*, were evidently influenced by a range of political concepts and theories developed in modern Western social sciences research and political debates at the time. Politics was becoming increasingly significant in defining a nation and creating a sense of belonging, which set these definitions apart from earlier attempts at defining boundaries between groups, which were rooted in traditional Chinese culturalism and based primarily on distinctions between civilised and uncivilised groups. Moreover, the quote emphasises the importance of economy and class struggle as factors contributing to the shaping, development and critique of the modern nation-state, drawing on Engel’s and Lenin’s arguments. This quote suggests that the adoption of Western ideas of state, nation and race went hand in hand with the adoption of modern political
ideologies, including those based on Marxist thinking.

As many aspects of early republican China, these dictionary definitions cannot be understood without considering the impact of Western ideas. As argued by Kirby (1997), the early republican period was 'defined' and 'shaped', and should 'ultimately be interpreted - according to the nature of its foreign relations' (433). As my analysis suggests, this argument applies also to the content of dictionaries. However, we should also be wary of overemphasising the reliance of early republican dictionaries on Western sources. Despite prominent links with Western ideas, the explanations of terms analysed here, especially the term zu, were still relying on quotes from Chinese classics as examples.

3.3 The Definition of Han

Like their late Qing equivalents, Chinese dictionaries published during the early republican era often explained the term Han as a name of the river on the heaven. For example, in the Zhonghua zhuyin zidian (Chinese Phonetic Dictionary) (Sun, 1921), Han was firstly explained as ‘the name of a river’ and ‘the river in heaven’ (岬: 34). In the Zhonghua da zidian (Simplified Chinese) (Xu, et al. 1915), one of the explanations of the term Han was also ‘the river in heaven’ (岬: 164). The reference of ‘the river in heaven’ was present also in a wide range of dictionaries published in the second decade after the establishment of the Republic of China, for example, in Wang Songtang’s Zhonghua xinzidian (1947) and in Yang’s Shiyong da zidian (Practical Large Dictionaries) (1945). This definition of Han as ‘the river in heaven’ originated from the Shijing (The Classic of Poetry), which is known as the earliest existing collection of Chinese poems and songs (Idema & Lloyd, 1997).

Another widely used definition of the term Han in the dictionaries published during this period was ‘the name of the dynasty’ (for example, Zhonghua zhuyin zidian [Chinese Phonetic Dictionary] [Sun, 1921,岬: 34 and Zhonghua da zidian [Simplified Chinese] [Xu, et al. 1915,岬: 164]). The term Han was
also explained as the name of different places in the Chinese territory. For example, in the *Zhonghua zhuyin zidian* (Chinese Phonetic Dictionary) (Sun, 1921), it was explained as relating to ‘the name of Han river’ and also ‘the name of the city Hankou’ (34). The same definitions were also adopted by the *Xiaoxuesheng de zidian* (The Dictionary for Primary School Students) (Fang & Su, 1933: 234) and the *Xuesheng biaozhun zidian* (Standard Dictionary for Students) (Wang, 1935: 371).

However, in contrast to late Qing dictionaries, early republican dictionaries also defined the Han as a particular social group, using terms such as *zu* or *zhong*. Yet, when such definitions appeared, they were often confusing and did not provide a good sense of whether *zu* or *zhong* were meant to refer to ethnicity, nation or race.

For instance, in some definitions, the term Han was presented as synonymous with the term China, and consequently excluded other nationalities. For example, in the *Zhonghua da zidian* (Simplified Chinese), the term Han was explained as ‘China’s name by alien *zu*’ (Xu et al. 1915: 164). According to the definition of the term Han in the *Xuesheng biaozhun zidian* (Standard Dictionary for Students) (Wang, 1935), ‘Han *zu* is the name of *huazu* [Chinese nation]’ (269). It could be inferred from these quotes that the term Han was meant to refer to the Chinese nation. Several examples from other dictionaries confirm this. For instance, in the *Xiaoxuesheng de zidian* (The Dictionary for Primary School Students) (Fang & Su, 1933), Han was defined as the other name of the Chinese nation, while ‘Hanwen’ (the Han language) was defined as ‘another name for Chinese language’ (234). Another example could be found in *Xuesheng biaozhun zidian* (Standard Dictionary for Students) (Wang, 1935) which states that Han ‘is the name of the Chinese nation’ and ‘Han language is equal to Chinese language’ (371). Likewise, the *Zhonghua xinzidian* (New Chinese Dictionary) (1947) states that ‘Han means Chinese people or Hanese’ (222), while in Zhai Jianxiong’s *Cidian jinghua* (Dictionary Essence) (1947), the term Hanxue (Sinology) was defined as ‘the study of Chinese culture’ (606). These quotes clearly show
that the early republican era dictionaries equated the Chinese nation with the Han, Hanese language and Han culture, implying an exclusion of other ethnic minorities.

However, at least some dictionaries from this period provided a somewhat wider range of definitions of the Han. For example, in Wang Songtang’s (1947) Zhonghua xinzidian (New Chinese Dictionary), Han was defined as: 1) ‘the name of China’, ‘the Chinese, e.g. the Han language’ and ‘the Chinese people’, but also as 2) ‘the name of zu, e.g. the Han, the Manchu’ (222). In the first definition, the term Han is used as a synonym of the Chinese and is also linked to language. On the other hand, in the second definition, Han is seen as a group with equal status to the Manchu. By combining these two definitions we can conclude that the Chinese nation was seen as related exclusively to the Han, while the Manchu were excluded. Yet, the second definition also suggests that the Han were seen as equals of, rather than superior to, the Manchu. This understanding departs from the traditional sense of Han superiority, which has long served as the key marker of belonging and exclusion in the Chinese context. A similar example can be found in Fang and Su’ Xiaoxuesheng de zidian (The Dictionary for Primary School Students) (1933), which states that ‘the Han, the Manchu, the Mongolian, the Hui and the Tibetan are sharing a common zu’ (145). In this quote, the Manchu, as well as other ethnic minorities in China, were included into a wider social group that shared a common belonging of a zu. Still, this definition made no effort to relate the Manchu and other ethnic minorities to the construction of a unified Chinese nation.

To conclude, my analysis on the dictionary entries for the term Han suggests that the dictionaries published after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911 perpetuated a sense of dominance of Han culture. Although the emphasis on the civilisational and cultural superiority of the Han virtually disappeared, the belief in the dominant position of the Han was not challenged. Rather, dictionaries suggested that the Han were the unique representative of all that is Chinese, while people from other ethnic minorities in China were excluded from the construction of Chinese identity. The
occasional references to the Han as a group of equal status as other groups in China did not change this fundamentally. Rather, their presence suggests a (limited) degree of ambiguity in dictionary definitions, similar to the ambiguity and multiplicity of meanings and arguments found among Chinese intellectuals.

4. Conclusion

As we can see from the analysis presented in this chapter, the dictionary definitions of Han, zu, and related terms changed significantly over the course of the late Qing and early republican periods. In the late Qing era, and specifically in the Kangxi zidian, the terms Han and Man (Manchu) were not connected to a social group at all, and off all other terms present, only definitions of guo included clear traces of modern ideas of belonging and exclusion such as those promoted by the Han intellectuals at the time. An in-depth analysis of some of the entries in the Kangxi zidian also revealed evidence of traditional ideas about Han superiority such as those found in intellectuals’ works. I therefore suggested that the Kangxi zidian had to some degree adopted the traditional Hanese way of defining the minority ethnicities as barbarian, even though this was not applied to the Manchu. On the whole, however, such similarities with intellectuals’ discourses were rather limited. This was largely a result of Manchu emperors’ efforts in evading the discussion of boundaries between the Manchu and the Han, and strict rules related to the wenziyu (Literary Inquisition), and the fact that Han intellectuals had little influence over the production of officially sanctioned dictionaries. Instead, their ideas, influenced by modern notions of belonging and exclusions linked to notions of ethnicity, race and nation, were spreading primarily through newspapers and study societies, and as we have seen, partly through textbooks.

During the early republican era, this situation changed dramatically. Ideas promoted by Han intellectuals and inspired by Western social sciences and political thinking now echoed in dictionaries. The change in definitions of the
Han provides a particularly telling example of this shift. In early republican era dictionaries, this term became directly linked to a social group, and not only that, this group was seen as synonymous with China. Ideas of Han superiority, which played only a minor role in the Kangxi zidian, but were amply present in intellectuals’ discourses I have analysed, were now very prominent. At the same time, however, early republican era dictionaries also embraced the idea of wuzugonghe, which suggested that the Han, the Manchu and other groups share the same zu and belong to the same group. As already mentioned, such ideas were originally promoted by one of the three influential Chinese intellectuals, and then popularised among Chinese scholars and in other cultural spheres, including school textbooks.

To conclude, my analysis on the dictionary entries for the term Han and related terms suggests that the dictionaries published after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911 were influenced by the Chinese intellectuals’ understanding of Chinese identity and the Han, as well as by the corresponding perceptions of the Other. This means that dictionaries helped disseminate and popularize modern notions of ethnicity, nation and race, as developed in intellectuals’ discourses. Along with that, the dictionaries also helped perpetuate and disseminate beliefs in the dominant status of the Han in Chinese society and assumptions about the Han culture as the standard and representative of Chinese culture as a whole.

As such, dictionaries were, alongside intellectuals’ discourses and school textbooks, an important instrument of nation-building, popularizing a modern understanding of the Chinese imagined community. Several elements appearing in the early republican dictionaries (but not evident in late Qing dictionaries) testify to that. First, early republican dictionaries presented the Han as a social group, defined in modern national and/or racial terms. Second, although the Han were often equated with the Chinese, other definitions suggested a more open, inclusive understanding of the Chinese Self, comparable to the one found in intellectuals’ discourses and textbooks from the same period. Most importantly perhaps, the early republican dictionaries also, for the first time, included definitions of the term state, which
was unmistakably modern and rooted in nationalism, in the sense that it linked the state with the nation and with territory.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

The notion of the Han (*Han ren*) as a particular social group has existed for centuries since the Han Dynasty (206 BC - AD 220). However, it was only in the modern era, and more precisely during the late Qing and early republican periods, that the Han came to be seen as social group defined in terms of nationhood, ethnicity and race. As shown in my dissertation, this transformation was a result of both internal and external factors, namely both internal political, social and cultural changes within China as well as the influence of Western political powers and ideas. To put it differently: the transformation was a result of both ‘native thought’ and ‘Western influence’ (cf. Dikötter, 1992: 65). This dissertation has traced the transformation in the perceptions of the Han - as well as the related representations of China and the Chinese, and other Chinese ethnic groups - through an in-depth analysis of three types of empirical sources: intellectuals’ discourses, history textbooks and dictionaries. I have argued that these changing discourses formed an integral part of the process of Chinese nation-building.

In this chapter, I shall provide an overview of key conclusions derived from the analysis of these three types of sources, outlining key developments and changes visible in these discourses over the course of the late Qing and early republican periods. Throughout this chapter, I will also reflect on similarities and differences between the three types of sources and on what they can teach us about the nature of transmission and popularisation of modern understandings of the Han and associated modern perceptions of the Chinese Self and its Other(s) in the late Qing and early republican era. More specifically, I will reflect on how these discourses were tied to the process of nation-building in modern China.

1. The Late Qing Period

One of the most telling results of my analysis of the late Qing period was the disjunction between intellectual’s discourses on the one hand, and textbooks
and dictionaries on the other hand. This was particularly evident with regard to
the representations of the Han and their relationship with the Manchu. In
intellectuals’ discourses, this was a central issue, while in the other two
sources; the Han were mentioned only sporadically, if at all. Furthermore,
inTELlectuals’ discourses were marked by openly negative or at least critical
attitudes towards the Manchu, which was not the case for the other two types
of sources. The following paragraphs examine these elements into more
detail and discuss their causes.

1.1 Intellectuals
The idea of anti-Manchuiism was playing a dominant role among Hanese
intellectuals during the late Qing period – in fact, it was the Manchu, rather
than the West, who were the main Other of the Chinese Self for them. An
important factor that contributed to the negative attitude towards the Manchu
in the late Qing era was the tension between a long established tradition of
and belief in Han superiority in Chinese society, and the fact that the whole of
China was governed by the Manchu, which was considered to be an exotic,
foreign group. This tension intensified after the First Sino-Japanese War. The
failures experienced by the Qing court and the country as a whole in relation
to the West, as well as the signing of treaties, followed by a large number of
reparation and other heavy losses, prompted heavy criticism of the Manchu
among Chinese intellectuals, especially among Hanese scholars. Another
factor fuelling negative attitudes towards the Manchu were strict cultural and
social rules promoted by the Qing court, due to which it was difficult for the
Han people, as well as other ethnicities, to get access to the government; the
zhuangyuan (very best scholar in the keju system) were usually Manchu, and
the wenziyu (Literary Inquisition) stifled any open criticism, however mild.

The hostility and open enmity between the Han and the Manchu has reached
its peak among the Han intellectuals during the late Qing stage. At that point,
a wide range of articles appeared which questioned and criticised the
legitimacy of the Qing government. As shown in my analysis of the writings of
two key intellectuals from this period, Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan - these articles, promoted anti-Manchu ideas in different ways by using different perspectives and theories, some of which were related to traditional Chinese culture, while others were a product of the encounter with modern Western ideas, especially theories of nation, race and ethnicity. The Manchu were designated as a national, ethnic and/or racial Other, and as such they were seen unfit to rule China.

During the late Qing era, the three intellectuals I have discussed in my analysis developed different political ideas about the relationship between the Han and their main Others, yet they all shared the assumption that the Han are superior to other groups. This was a very influential idea which had largely shaped their construction of the Han Self as well as the Chinese Self. All these three intellectuals also shared similar views about the Han as a part of the yellow race and promoted a racialised perception of the Chinese and Westerners. What differed was the way in which they defined Han superiority.

Zhang and Sun clearly promoted a perception of Han superiority based on a combination of racial and cultural markers. Apart from regarding the Han as a culturally civilised superior group, both of them used biological and physical lineage and differences when they constructed the identity of the Self (the Han) by defining the boundaries with the Other. Liang Qichao, however, mainly emphasised similarities and communalities between the Han and other groups, and downplayed differences, especially in relation to the Manchu. On different occasions he argued that the Han and the Manchu shared the same history and memory, and claimed it was necessary to overcome the boundaries and tensions between the two groups. Although he believed that the levels of civilisation achieved by the Han and Manchu varied, he was also adamant that both of them belonged to an ‘always united’ China (1990 [1899]: 270). Nevertheless, despite his emphasis on similarities and on the need for national integration, his writing made clear that this integration would effectively mean Hanisation. According to Liang, the non-Han ethnicities were all ‘nomadic inferior groups’, which could be only assimilated by the Han without exception (1999 [1899]: 316). However, he also claimed the Hanese
should abandon their social superiority in order to achieve Chinese national integration, meaning that the process of national integration and assimilation should go hand-in-hand with growing equality among the groups.

Regardless of their differences vis-à-vis the Manchu, however, the discourses of the three intellectuals shared some basic key features: 1) they were not satisfied with the government of the current Qing court; 2) they were seeking different ways of re-defining and re-constructing the national identity of China; and 3) the Han nation, compared to other minority ethnicities, is culturally superior. Arguably, the national imagination promoted by Chinese intellectuals in this period was aimed primarily at contesting the existing power structure, and urging for reform. Especially in the cases of Zhang and Sun, the ideas of nation and nationalism were applied in a way that allowed them to argue against existing ruling (Manchu) elites, and in favour of a Han-led revolution and establishment of a modern national state linked to and owned by the Han. In Liang’s case, nationalist ideas were used as an instrument for justifying reform, rather than complete overthrow, of the Qing court. In both cases, however, the Manchu appeared as the main Other of the Chinese (which were identified with the Han).

1.2 School Textbooks

Compared to intellectuals’ discourse, school textbooks and dictionaries published during the late Qing era included little discussion of the Manchu as such, or their differences vis-à-vis the Han. This is not a surprise, because the ruling Manchu had control over the production of textbooks and dictionaries at this time; and by then, they were largely assimilated into Han culture. Nevertheless, a close analysis of narratives of specific events revealed that even in this period one could find traces of pro-Han thinking in some school textbooks. An example of this was the description of the historical event in Chinese history named wuhu luanhua (The wuhu Uprising, in the Jin Dynasty) in Chinese edited textbooks and those edited by Japanese authors. The Japanese author Shirakawa’s (1903) narration on this part of history was
based on an external angle that treated all Chinese groups, including the Han and the Manchu, as equals. In contrast, Chinese editors were guided by the belief that the Han were the traditional and unique representative of Chinese civilisation and the core of China. They therefore considered that other ethnicities in China were *waizu* (alien nation) while only the Han were *benzu* (our nation) (Zeng, 1903).

Such Han-centred ideas were also present in some of the school textbooks published during the late Qing period - namely textbooks edited by Chinese authors, as opposed to those edited by Japanese authors. For example, Kuwabara Jitzuzō (1899), a Japanese scholar, categorised the Asian race into two major groups, namely Chinese and Syberian. According to him, the Han, as other ethnic groups in China, was only one of the groups in the larger Chinese population. In contrast, in the *Zhina siqianian kaihuashi* (A History of 4000 Years of Chinese Civilisation) (1903), edited by a Chinese author, the Han are described as the dominant, largest, most influential and ‘Compared to other groups … the most educated and intelligent group’ (6-7). A similar narrative can be found in Xia Zengyou’s (1904) *Zuixin zhongguo jiaokeshu zhongguolishi* (The Latest Middle School Textbook: Chinese History), which described the Han only as the dominant nation, but also the unique pure ethnic group in China.

The Han-centred narration, premised on a clear social hierarchy with the Han as the highest standard of culture and civilisation, was clearly evident in Chinese edited history textbooks published during the late Qing period. It is therefore not surprising that these textbooks were praised by Chinese intellectuals at the time. For instance, Liang Qichao (2003 [1903]) praised Xia’s work as ‘a fresh view of Chinese history’ (68). However, compared to the writings of intellectuals, textbooks presented such narratives in a more matter-of-fact way, as something that is self-evident, and also largely avoided openly negative descriptions of the Manchu.
1.3 Dictionaries

Similarly to late Qing era textbooks, dictionaries published in the same period included virtually no trace of anti-Manchu attitudes, largely due to the wenziyu (Literary Inquisition) policies promoted by the Qing emperors. In fact, the main dictionary published in this period, the Kangxi zidian (1903 [1716]) did not even use the term Man (Manchu) as a reference to a social group of any kind whether in racial, national or ethnic terms. The same applied to the term Han as well. The intentional avoidance of relating either Han or Manchu to a social category implied Manchu emperors’ efforts in evading the discussion of boundaries between the Manchu and the Han. Nonetheless, even here, a close analysis of other terms unearthed traces of traditional assumptions about Han superiority. For instance, to demonstrate the meaning of the term zhong, the Kangxi zidian used a quote from a traditional Hanese book Houhan, in which the zhong Qiang and Hun were described as ‘pirates’ which forced the local population to abandon their fields (1904: 850). Although there was no mention of the Han as such, this stereotypical description of the zhong Qiang and Hun is an integral element of long established notions of Han superiority. We could therefore suggest that the Kangxi zidian had to some degree adopted the traditional Hanese standard of defining the minority ethnicities as barbarian, even though this was not applied to the Manchu.

In contrast to intellectuals’ writings published in the late Qing era, the Kangxi zidian (1903 [1716]), included virtually no trace of Han-centred discourse. The term Han, just as the term Manchu, was not used as a reference to a social group of any kind whether in racial, national or ethnic terms. As explained earlier, this was a result of the literary inquisition and the tight control exerted by the Qing court over the production of dictionaries. Nonetheless, ironically, the explanations of terms in Kangxi zidian consisted of a collection of quotes from classic Han literature, which indirectly demonstrates the Qing’ court’s acceptance of Han culture and its dominance in Chinese society.
1.4 Summary

On the whole, we can conclude that the anti-Manchu attitudes found among Chinese (Han) intellectuals did not find their way into textbooks and dictionaries published in this period. This is understandable, given that the publication of these texts was regulated by the Qing court. However, what is perhaps more surprising is that the Manchu, despite having control over the educational and publishing system, did not really use this system to actively promote themselves and their legitimacy using nationalist or racial arguments. For instance, they did not promote history textbooks that would present a pro-Manchu version of Chinese history in which the Manchu would be presented as a legitimate ruler of the Chinese nation. Perhaps this was in part due to the fact that they were a minority (and by then a largely assimilated minority) and hence could not use nationalist or racial arguments to this effect. One could also argue, however, that modern nationalist and racial thinking did not seem to matter to the Qing rulers, because the legitimacy of their rule was not based on nationalist ideals (e.g. cultural similarity between rulers and the ruled), but on feudal-era ideas of divine selection and dynastic succession.

The late Qing era was thus a period when nationalism as a discourse was limited primarily to the discourses of the intellectual elites, and was not yet consciously used as a tool for collection mobilisation and loyalty at mass level via textbooks and dictionaries. Furthermore, among the intellectual elites, nationalist discourse was Han-centred and excluded the Manchu. As such, this pre-republican era nationalism was used as an ideological tool to challenge the legitimacy of Machu rule.

2. The Early Republican Period

After the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911, representations of the Chinese nation and the role played by the Han changed considerably. In contrast to the Qing course, the new republican government started exploiting the various modern state institutions as propaganda instruments. They have effectively used these institutions as powerful mechanisms of defining and re-
defining the framework of national territory, politics, culture and economic. Similar with other nation-states in which one nation plays a dominant role in the governance of the country, the republican government ought to build and define the national identity by legitimising and promoting a specific culture and language - Han culture, which at the same time involves the marginalisation of minority cultures.

As we have seen, the perception of the Han as the most advanced and culturally dominant group in Chinese society was a prominent element in intellectual discourses already in the late Qing era. As we will see, this element persisted in intellectuals' discourse also after the establishment of the Republic of China, as well as spread into textbooks and dictionaries. However, because of the political need to promote national integration vis-à-vis the common external threat, namely Western imperialism, claims about Han superiority now became more subdued and often appeared in conjunction with calls for greater harmony and even equality among groups. It is also necessary to consider the fact that the early republican era was a time when differences among other minority groups in China were becoming increasingly pronounced due to independence movements (e.g. in Tibet), Chinese elites had to seek a way to ease the tension between the newly established republican regime and other minority groups in China, in order to include as many members as possible into a Chinese unity, to oppose the Western threat. Traditional beliefs in Han superiority therefore had to be adapted and linked to modern ideas of national integration and state building.

2.1 Intellectuals

Compared to school textbooks and dictionaries, which require an institutional infrastructure and systematic work carried out by a group of professionals, the intellectuals are able to immediately respond to specific socio-culture contexts. It should therefore not be a surprise that intellectuals' discourses changed almost immediately after, and even slightly before, the establishment of the Chinese Republic, while changes in the other two types of sources took
longer. As I have shown in Chapter 4, all three intellectuals have started supporting national integration after the establishment of the Republic of China. This had consequences for their perceptions of the Han as well, and their relationship with the Manchu and other minorities.

On the whole, the balance now shifted in favour of Liang Qichao’s ideas, and both Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan adopted a less negative attitude towards the Manchu. According to their understanding, the most dangerous threat to Chinese society after the establishment of the Republic of China was the military imperialist threat from the West. They therefore made efforts in adopting different social markers, including nation, race and ethnicity, to construct the identity of the Western Other, which was differentiated from and could be seen as a danger to ‘us’. Anti-Manchuiism became less radical and was replaced by an emphasis on Chinese national integration involving all ethnic groups.

In order to interpret the West as the Other and differentiate it from the Chinese Self, intellectuals in this period all adopted biological and cultural markers, and drew on the idea of nation and nationalism. In this context, anti-Manchu attitudes were no longer considered of importance. Zhang Binglin, for example, compared the relative level of danger coming from the Manchu and the West and concluded that the latter was ‘actually ten thousands of times more dangerous than the Manchu at this moment’ (1915 [1909] vol 3: 43). He went further to promote ‘national revolution [minzu geming]’ in order to ‘prevent being captured by others’ (1977 [1910]: 519). Here he referred to the Westerners as the Other, which would ‘capture’ the Chinese territory. Similar ideas could be found in Sun Zhongshan’s discourse several years later, who claimed the necessity of ‘constructing a new Chinese nationalism’, in order to solve the frontier conflicts at the border of the Chinese territory and the increasing Western imperialist threat to China (1985 [1919] vol 2: 335).

Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan, who frequently promoted Han superiority and referred to racial markers of difference to differentiate between the Han and the Manchu and the remaining groups in China, started associating Han
identity and Han nationalism with the construction of the state, which was supposed to include the Manchu and other minority groups in China, and they also put much less emphasis on directly claiming the cultural and political uniqueness of the Han. Furthermore, they even clearly opposed the social dominance of the Han in Chinese society (Hanism, or Great-Han nationalism), and claimed equality between the Han and other minority groups. Their understanding of Chinese identity and the construction of the Self were now very similar to Liang Qichao’s ideas of ‘large nationalism’.

These changes are a perfect example of the Chinese ‘imagined community’ as defined by Benedict Anderson, namely as an imagined community that is ‘imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (1991: 49). The modern Chinese nation was now imagined not only in cultural terms, as the Han were in the late imperial era, but also in political terms, as a sovereign nation that had the right to govern itself, rather than being governed by others (be it the West or Japan). It was also imagined as a limited community, and the link between this community and its territorial border were becoming increasingly important to collective imagination as well. The sudden inclusion of the Manchu as a part of the Chinese nation also offers a good demonstration of Hobsbawm’s and Gellner’s arguments about the artificial, constructed nature of nations. Indeed, borrowing from Gellner (1964: 69) we could argue that Chinese republican nationalism was not the awakening of a pre-existing Chinese nation to self-consciousness. Instead, it invented a nation where it did not exist – or, more precisely, it invented a Chinese nation that was no longer exclusively limited to the Han and defined in cultural or civilizational terms, but was a political community that included other ethnic minorities and tied to its own modern state and territory.

2.2 School Textbooks

The shift of regarding the West rather than the Manchu as a more threatening Other that needed to be opposed was also evident also in the school textbooks published after the establishment of the Republic of China. In
regard to the origin of the Chinese nation, the theory of *wailai shuo* (foreignness) was gradually replaced by the *tuzhu shuo* (nativeness). The former theory can be interpreted as an effort to relate the ‘powerful’ West to China, while the latter was clearly an attempt to sever the connection with the West and establish China as an independent entity. The perception of the West as the most important and threatening Other also underscores Sun Zhongshan’s idea of *wuzugonghe* (the Republic of Five Races), which exerted considerable influence on Chinese school textbooks during the early republican era. The idea of *wuzugonghe* emphasised the harmony of the five major *zu* (the Han, the Hui, the Manchu, the Mongolia and the Tibet), all of which formed part of the Chinese nation and contributed to national unity. It is not difficult to conclude that the most dangerous threat to this unity is the West.

Such ideas - especially Sun Zhongshan’s idea of *wuzugonghe* (the Republic of Five Races), and hence the belief in the necessity of achieving national integration, echoed also in school textbooks and dictionaries published in the early republican period. However, in contrast to intellectuals’ writings, the format of textbooks and dictionaries meant that national integration was not something that was explicitly argued for, but rather something that was presented as an uncontroversial fact. For instance, in Zhong’s (1914) *Xinzhi benguoshi jiaoben* (The Newly Edited History Textbook), the Manchu, the Mongol, the Hui and the Tibet were simply defined as belonging to the yellow race and ‘sharing the same origin’ with the Han (3). At the same time, traditional beliefs in the superiority of Han Culture persisted. For instance, taking an example from the same textbook, the pride of Han culture and civilisation became clearly evident in the following comparison between the Han and the remaining groups in China: ‘compared to the other four nations, the Han owned the best location of territory and the most brilliant culture, which can be never reached by any other minority groups’ (3). As in intellectuals’ discourses, a more inclusive approach to other minority groups thus went hand-in-hand with a sense of traditional cultural and civilisational hierarchies.
2.3 Dictionaries

Finally, the construction of the West as the Other is evident also in Chinese dictionaries published during the early republican era. For instance, the terms *zu* and *minzu* were sometimes used as social categories to refer to other human groups in the world. An example can be found in the *Shehuikexue da cidian* (Dictionary of Social Sciences) (Gao et al. 1929), in which *ruoxiao minzu* (small and weak nations) were defined as ‘colonial, semi-colonial nations, as well as other regimes that are independent in name only, and the internal government of which is interfered by imperialism' (474). In addition, this dictionary also adopts a critical perspective on Western colonialism and imperialism, and presents it as an act of aggression and exploitation. Another clear example, taken from the same dictionary, can be found in its definition of the term *minzu zhuyi* (nationalism), which is explained as ‘a request of achieving equality with the Western powers, and an equal status in the international environment’ (Gao et al. 1929: 139). This quote clearly refers to ‘the Western powers’ as a target in the process of struggling for ‘an equal status in the international environment’, and hence as an important Other.

Similar trends were identified in the dictionaries published in the early republican era. The terms *zu* and *minzu* were widely used as synonymous with China, referring to a powerful social body that was capable of resisting the Western Other (e.g. Sun et al. 1921: 34). Also, some dictionaries adopted the idea of *wuzugonghe* and used the term *zu* to refer to both the Han and the Manchu, and sometimes to other groups. A clear example can be found in Fang and Su’s *Xiaoxuesheng de zidian* (The Dictionary for Primary School Students) (1933), which states that ‘the Han, the Manchu, the Mongolian, the Hui and the Tibetan are sharing a common *zu*’ (145). In this quote, the Manchu, as well as other ethnic minorities in China, were included into a wider social group that shared a common belonging of a *zu*.

At the same time, however, several dictionaries defined or used the term Han as the name of China and things Chinese. For example, one dictionary stated that ‘Han *zu* is the name of *Huazu [Chinese nation]*’ (Wang, 1935: 269); while
another claimed that ‘Hanwen’ (the Han language) is ‘another name for Chinese language’ (Fang & Su, 1933: 234). In a third dictionary, the term Hanxue (Sinology) was defined as ‘the study of Chinese culture’ (Zhai, 1947: 606). This slippage between the terms China and Han suggests that the Han were still constructed as the unique or dominant representative of China, implying an exclusion or subordination of other ethnic minorities.

2.4 Summary
On the whole, early republican era school textbooks and dictionaries were clearly underpinned by the notion of the West as the key Other, but in contrast to intellectuals' discourses in early republican China, school textbooks and dictionaries rarely offered a direct critique of Western imperialism. Arguably, this was due to the characteristics of them as a particular type of cultural products. Intellectuals’ discourses are more personal, direct and they frequently try to persuade the audience to support their standpoint. School textbooks and dictionaries, however, are considerably more neutral in narration. They do not offer arguments and claims, but 'objective' definitions and descriptions that are presented in a matter-of-fact way. Nevertheless, despite these differences in the style of representation and narration used, the construction of the West as the Other in relation to ‘us’ Chinese is evident in all three types of sources I have investigated from the early republican era.

To conclude, the early republican era was the period when intellectuals’ ideas and discourses about the Han Self started exerting a greater influence on school textbooks and dictionaries. This also meant that modern notions of nation, race and ethnicity now started circulating among the wider Chinese population (i.e. beyond intellectuals and political elites). Although aspects of traditional Chinese notions of identity and differences, i.e. the belief in the cultural and civilisational superiority of the Han, persisted, they became incorporated into modern ideas of national belonging and racial exclusion. Arguably, such continuities with older discourses of the Han Self and its Others also helped popularise modern notions of belonging among the wider
population. In short, during the early republican era, Chinese nation-building started in earnest, as a large-scale mass exercise of inculcating a new sense of the Chinese self through mass education and mass communication.

Of course, when making such inferences, I need to be mindful of the nature of my sources, and the limits it imposes on my conclusions. Although textbooks and dictionaries do offer insight into what the wider (literate) population read at the time, it does not say much about how they interpreted or understood these modern ideas. To examine the popularisation and dissemination of these modern ideas further, it would therefore be interesting to examine other types of sources, for instance, personal diaries or school exams.

3. Conclusion

Apart from providing a better understanding of the nature of dissemination of modern notions of the Han Self and its Others, as well as the notions of identity and belonging, my analysis also enabled me to draw further general conclusions about the process of nation-building carried out by different types of discourses in late Qing and early republican China.

First, my research demonstrated the flexible interconnections and sometimes even interchangeability between the notions of nation, race and ethnicity. Instead of being regarded as distinct social categories, these terms were used as interlinked representations of social identity, whose meanings often shifted and overlapped. I shall hope that my analysis has showed that to understand the actual uses of these discourses it is necessary to examine them together and in historical context - rather than in isolation.

Second, my analysis confirmed that the sense of identity is not static, but rather changes in order to respond to the different orders of changing society. In particular, the perceptions of the Han (and the broader Chinese) Self and its Others changed in line with the shifting political and cultural environment, both internal (political and cultural reforms in Chinese society) and external
(Western imperialism). The changes became apparent first and most obviously in intellectuals’ discourses, while textbooks and dictionaries changed at a slower pace.

Third and most important, the discourses about the Han and the Chinese played a key role in the process of building a modern Chinese nation. In the late Qing period, exclusivist nationalist discourses were used by the intellectual elites as an ideological tool to legitimate reform and ultimately also the overthrow of imperial Manchu rule. In the early republican period, nationalist ideas were again used as an ideological tool, but this time with a different set of aims - to consolidate national unity and integration, legitimate republican rule, justify control over territory, and resist Western imperial threat. Because of these different political aims, the content of nationalist discourses changed as well, and became more inclusive. In this sense, using Hobsbawm’s (1990: 9) words, different ideas about the Chinese nation existed as ‘functions of a particular kind of territorial state or the aspiration to establish one’. Finally, the ruling elites also started spreading these modern nationalist Chinese discourses among the masses by means of school textbooks (used in the context of a thoroughly reformed and modernised education system) and dictionaries.
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## Appendix 1: A Chronology of Key Events in Late Qing and Early Republican China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Key Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1839</td>
<td>Lin Zexu arrested more than 1,700 opium dealers, and destroyed 1.2 million kilograms of opium, which has foreshadowed the eruption of the Opium War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>British army bypassed Canton and went forward to Xiamen in North, then sailed to Tianjin, which was closed to the capital of Qing dynasty. Chinese armies were undermanned and badly trained thus British spent approximately 6 months fighting with the Chinese armies and successfully forced the compromise of Qing government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1842</td>
<td>Qing government was compelled to sign on the Treaty of Nanjing on board Pottinger's vessel, HMS Cornwallis on 29 August 1842.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843</td>
<td>Hong Xiuquan established his religion and political organisation God Worshippers (Bai shangdi hui).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>Hong Xuquan revolted in Guangxi province, and declared the foundation of the ‘Heavenly Kingdom of Transcendent Peace’ (Taiping Tianguo).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>Taiping forces managed to take Nanjing and turned it into the capital of their movement, and issued the Land System of the Heavenly Dynasty to manage the land they owned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>The eruption of the Second Opium War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>Qing government respectively signed the Treaties of Tianjin, with</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
France, UK, Russia, and the United States. Kang Youwei was born.

1860 The armies of Anglo-French took Tianjin and Beijing. The Qing court signed treaties of Beijing with UK, France and Russia.

1861
- Qing court made an alliance with foreign armies to suppress the movement of Taiping Tianguo.
- Zeng Guofan established the Anqing Military Institute (Anqing junxiesuo), which was the first military industry of Westernisation Group (yangwu pai).

1864 The movement of Taiping Tianguo failed in the cooperate suppression made by Qing government and foreign armies.

1868 Zhang Binglin was born.

1872 Li Hongzhang set up the Ship Business Soliciting Bureau in Shanghai, which was the first industry created by the yangwu pai (Westernisation Group).

1873 Liang Qichao was born.

1876 The Qing government signed the Treaty of Yantai with UK.

1881 The Qing government signed the Treaty of Yili with Russia.

1883 The eruption of the Sino-French War.

1885 The Qing government signed the New Treaty between China and France.

1888 Kang Youwei submitted the first petition to Guangxu Emperor to
present the importance of political reform.

1890 Kang Youwei wrote *Kongzi gaizhi kao* (Confucius As a Reformer) and *Xinxue weijing kao* (Textual Research of the False Classics of New Study), both of which were highly praised by Liang Qichao.

1893 Kang Youwei established the *Qiangxue hui* (Society for Self-strengthening Studies) in Shanghai. Zhang Binglin joined the study society afterwards.

1894 The eruption of the First Sino-Japanese War. Sun Zhongshan established *Xingzhong hui* (the Society for the Revival of China) in Honolulu and swore the following oath: ‘Expel the foreigners, revive China, and establish a unified government’, which was summarised as ‘Three Principles of People’.

1895 - The Qing government signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki on 17th April. According to the treaty, the Qing court was required to pay Japan 200 million Kuping taels as reparation with the allowance of Japanese ships operating on the Yangtze River.

- Liang Qichao consorted with Kang Youwei in Beijing.

1896 Liang Qichao established the *Shiwubao* (The Chinese Progress) in Shanghai, and published series articles explaining his political ideas of reform.

1897 Yanfu published his translation of *Evolution and Ethnics*.

1898 In response to the Hundred Days Reform, Guangxu Emperor promulgated the prescript *dingguo shizhao* (Imperial Order of National Issues) and promoted reform. The reform only lasted for 103 days under the suppression and palace coup led by Cixi. The people
involved were sentenced to death. Kang Youwei escaped to Hong Kong, while Liang Qichao fled to Japan. Liang’s exile to Japan allowed him to speak freely and exercise his intellectual autonomy.

1899

- The Boxer Rebellion erupted in Shandong province. Liang Qichao travelled and studied in Hawaii.

- Kang Youwei was in alliance with Chinese immigration in Canada, and established the *Baohuanghui* (Protect the Emperor Society). The emperor he referred to was Guangxu.

- Zhang Binglin, responding to Liang Qichao’s invitation, went to Japan to make acquaintance with Sun Zhongshan.

1900

The Boxer Rebellion was suppressed by an alliance of eight countries, including Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

1901

The Qing government signed The Boxer Protocol with the Eight-Nation Alliance, plus Belgium, Spain and Netherlands.

1902

- Kang Youwei wrote and *The Book of Great Harmony* which was considered to be one of his most remarkable achievements. This book was greatly admired by the Chinese intellectuals at that time.

- Zhang Binglin published *Bo Kang Youwei lun gemingshu* (The Refutation on Kang Youwei’s Work: The Discussion on the Revolutionary), on the *Su* Newspaper.

- Liang Qichao established *Xinmin Congbao* (New Citizen Journal) in Japan to promote his idea of constitutional monarchy. He also published his collected work *Yiningshi heji* (The Ice-Drinker’s Studio). At the same time, Liang Qichao began to disagree with Kang Youwei’s on political proposition
and attempts.

1903 Zou Rong published *Gemingjun* (The Revolutionaries), prefaced by Zhang Binglin. Because of their radical political views, both of them were arrested because of the case of *Su Newspaper*.

1905 • The *Tongmenghui* (the United League of China) was established by Sun Zhongshan in Tokyo.

• The Qing government formally declared the abolishment of the tradition examination system *keju*.

1906 • Kang Youwei published articles in New York, to oppose the revolutionary activities in China. His main assertion was to maintain the domination of Qing government.

• Zhang Binglin made a public speech to state the importance of ‘national cultural characteristics’ and promoted nationalism.

1907 • Sun Zhongshan led uprising in Chaozhou, Huizhou, Qinzhou and Zhennanguan.

• Zhang Binglin published articles to oppose imperialism and emphasised the importance of national unity.

1911 • Sun Zhongshan and Huang Xing launched Guangzhou uprising and failed.

• On the 10th October, the eruption of the Nanchang Uprising, which was regarded as the beginning of the Chinese Revolution, had ended the Qing government and successfully established the Republic of China.

1912 • The reformers declared a provisional government. Sun
Zhongshan was elected as the provisional president. The new government published the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China.

- Qing monarch was decreed on the 12th February.

- Yuan Shikai, a leading imperial official, self recommended as the president of the Republic of China.

- Liang Qichao refused the Yuan Shikai’s appointment to be the deputy minister of Justice Department.

1913

- After the failure of the Second Revolution, which aimed to oppose Yuan's leadership, the political power of Yuan was gradually strengthened.

- Kang Youwei wrote articles to call for the end of the conflicts within the country and maintain a unity to oppose Western invasion.

1915

- Yuan Shikai accepted the Twenty-One Demands made by Japan, which required China to make a considerable concession in various economic fields of the country. Yuan Shikai imposed himself as the monarch of the Republic of China in December.

- Cai E organised National Army in Yunnan, to oppose the leadership of Yuan Shikai.

- Chen Duxiu established the journal Xinqingnian (New Youth) and published various articles to promote modernity in China. Chen claimed the importance of Mr De (democracy) and Mr Sci (Science), which was considered to be the origination of the Xinwenhua yundong (New Cultural Movement).
1916  • Yuan Shikai passed away.

• Li Yuanhong replaced him as the president of the republican government. The real power of the government was in the hands of Prime Minister Duan Qirui.

• The French officials expanded the area of French Concession (zujie) in Tianjin, which experienced serious resistance of the workers in Tianjin. The French had to give up their intentions.

1917  • Zhang Xun restored the Qing imperial government and elected Puyi as the emperor. This movement failed after 12 days.

• Duan Qirui declined the National Congress and the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China.

• Sun Zhongshan launched the movement in Guangzhou to oppose Duan Qirui. This movement was strongly supported by Kang Youwei while definitely opposed by Liang Qichao. Since then, Kang Youwei had split up thoroughly.

1918  • Luxun published the *Kuangren riji* (A Madman’s Dairy), which summoned the people to overthrow the old society and rules.

• Li Dazhao published articles to praise the Bolshevik Revolution of October.

1919  May Fourth Movement, the primarily stage of which was the New Culture Movement in 1917, constituted the major attempt at re-considering the Chinese culture and traditions.

1921  The establishment of the Communist Party of China.

1925  • Sun Zhongshan passed away.
• Jiang Jieshi became the new leader of the Guomindang (the Nationalist Party).

1931  Japanese troops in northern Manchuria destroyed one of their rail lines and accuse the Chinese, which led to Japanese annexation of Manchuria.

1937  The eruption of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

1945  • The Second-Japanese War ended with the end of the World War II.

        • The republic of China becomes a permanent member of the United Nations’ Security Council.

1949  • The end of civil war in China.

        • Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang troops moved to Taiwan.

        • The establishment of a new government – the People’s Republic of China.
Appendix 2: Boxer Protocol

Peking, 7th September 1901

Peace Agreement between the Great Powers and China

THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES of ... [Deutschland, Österreich-Ungarn, Belgien, Spanien, USA, Frankreich, England, Italien, Japan, Holland, Russland und China (Li Hongzhang und Yikuang)] have met for the purpose of declaring that China has complied with the conditions laid down in the note of the 22nd December, 1900, and which were accepted in their entirety by His Majesty the Emperor of China in a Decree dated the 27th December, 1900.

**ARTICLE I.**

By an Imperial Edict of the 9th of June last, Tsai Feng, Prince of Ch’ün, was appointed Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of China, and directed in that capacity to convey to His Majesty the German Emperor the expression of the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China and of the Chinese Government for the assassination of His Excellency the late Baron von Ketteler, German minister.

Prince Ch’ün left Peking the 12th of July last; to carry out the order which had been given him.

**ARTICLE Ib.**

The Chinese Government has stated that it will erect on the spot of the assassination of his Excellency the late Baron von Ketteler, commemorative monument worthy of the rank of the deceased, and bearing an inscription in the Latin, German, and Chinese languages which shall express the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China for the murder committed.

The Chinese Plenipotentiaries have informed his Excellency the German Plenipotentiary, in a letter dated the 22nd July last, that an arch of the whole width of the street would be erected on the said spot, and that work on it was begun on the 25th June last.
ARTICLE IIa.

Imperial Edicts of the 13th and 21st February, 1901, inflicted the following punishments on the principal authors of the attempts and of the crimes committed against the foreign Governments and their nationals:

Tsai-I, Prince Tuan, and Tsai-Lan, Duke Fu-kuo, were sentenced to be brought before the Autumnal Court of Assize for execution, and it was agreed that if the Emperor saw fit to grant them their lives, they should be exiled to Turkestan, and there imprisoned for life, without the possibility of commutation of these punishments.

Tsai Hsün, Prince Chuang, Ying-Nien, President of the Court of Censors, and Chao Shu-chiao, President of the Board of Punishments, were condemned to commit suicide.

Yü Hsien, Governor of Shansi, Chi Hsiu, President of the Board of Rites, and Hsü Cheng-yu, formerly Senior Vice-President of the Board of Punishments, were condemned to death.

Posthumous degradation was inflicted on Kang Yi, Assistant Grand Secretary, President of the Board of Works, Hsu Tung, Grand Secretary, and Li Ping-heng, former Governor-General of Szu-chuan.

Imperial Edict of the 13th February last rehabilitated the memories of Hsu Yung-yi, President of the Board of War; Li Shan, President of the Board of Works; Hsu Ching Cheng, Senior Vice-President of the Board of Civil Office; Lien Yuan, Vice-Chancellor of the Grand Council; and Yuan Chang, Vice-President of the Court of Sacrifices, who had been put to death for having protested against the outrageous breaches of international law of last year.

Prince Chuang committed suicide on the 21st February last; Ying Nien and Chao Shu-chiao on the 24th February; Yu Hsien was executed on the 22nd
February; Chi Hsiu and Hsu Cheng-yu on the 26th February; Tung Fu-hsiang, General in Kan-su, has been deprived of his office by Imperial Edict of the 13th February last, pending the determination of the final punishment to be inflicted on him.

Imperial Edicts, dated the 29th April and 19th August, 1901, have inflicted various punishments on the provincial officials convicted of the crimes and outrages of last summer.

**ARTICLE IIb.**
An Imperial Edict, promulgated the 19th August, 1901, ordered the suspension of official examinations for five years in all cities where foreigners were massacred or submitted to cruel treatment.

**ARTICLE III.**
So as to make honourable reparation for the assassination of Mr. Sugiyama, Chancellor of the Japanese Legation, His Majesty the Emperor of China, by an Imperial Edict of the 18th June, 1901, appointed Na T‘ung, Vice-President of the Board of Finances, to be his Envoy Extraordinary, and specially directed him to convey to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the expression of the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China and of his Government at the assassination of Mr. Sugiyama.

**ARTICLE IV.**
The Chinese Government has agreed to erect an expiatory monument in each of the foreign or international cemeteries which were desecrated, and in which the tombs were destroyed.

It has been agreed with the Representatives of the Powers that the Legations interested shall settle the details for the erection of these monuments, China bearing all the expenses thereof, estimated at 10,000 taels, for the cemeteries at Peking and in its neighbourhood, and at 5,000 taels for the cemeteries in
the provinces. The amounts have been paid, and the list of these cemeteries is enclosed herewith.

**ARTICLE V.**
China has agreed to prohibit the importation into its territory of arms and ammunition, as well as of materials exclusively used for the manufacture of arms and ammunition. An Imperial Edict has been issued on the 25th August, forbidding said importation for a term of two years. New Edicts may be issued subsequently extending this by other successive terms of two years in case of necessity recognised by the Powers.

**ARTICLE VI.**
By an Imperial Edict dated the 29th May, 1901, His Majesty the Emperor of China agreed to pay the Powers an indemnity of 450,000,000 of Haikwantaels.

This sum represents the total amount of the indemnities for States, Companies, or Societies, private individuals and Chinese, referred to in Article 6 of the note of the 22nd December, 1900.

a) These 450,000,000 constitute a gold debt calculated at the rate of the Haikwantael to the gold currency of each country, as indicated below...This sum in gold shall bear interest at 4 per cent. per annum, and the capital shall be reimbursed by China in thirty-nine years in the manner indicated in the annexed plan of amortization. Capital and interest shall be payable in gold or at the rates of exchange corresponding to the dates at which the different payments fall due.

The amortization shall commence the 1st January, 1902, and shall finish at the end of the year 1940. The amortizations are payable annually, the first payment being fixed on the 1st January, 1903.

Interest shall run from the 1st July, 1901, but the Chinese Government shall
have the right to pay off within a term of three years, beginning January 1902, the arrears of the first six months ending the 31st December, 1901, on condition, however, that it pays compound interest at the rate of 4% a year on the sums the payment of which shall have been thus deferred. Interest shall be payable semi-annually, the first payment being fixed on the 1st July, 1902.

b) The service of the debt shall take place in Shanghai in the following manner: Each Power shall be represented by a Delegate on a Commission of bankers authorized to receive the amount of interest and amortization which shall be paid to it by the Chinese authorities designated for that purpose, to divide it among the interested parties, and to give a receipt for the same.

c) The Chinese Government shall deliver to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking a bond for the lump sum, which shall subsequently be converted into fractional bonds bearing the signature of the Delegates of the Chinese Government designated for that purpose. This operation and all those relating to issuing of the bonds shall be performed by the above-mentioned Commission, in accordance with the instructions which the Powers shall send their Delegates.

d) The proceeds of the revenues assigned to the payment of the bonds shall be paid monthly to the Commission.

e) The seven assigned as security for the bonds are the following:
1. The balance of the revenues of the Imperial Maritime Customs, after payment of the interest and amortization of preceding loans secured on these revenues, plus the proceeds of the raising to 5 per cent. effective of the present tariff of maritime imports, including articles until now on the free list, but exempting rice, foreign cereals, and flour, gold and silver bullion and coin.

2. The revenues of the native Customs, administered in the open ports by the Imperial Maritime Customs.

3. The total revenues of the salt gabelle, exclusive of the fraction previously
set aside for other foreign loans.

The raising of the present tariff on imports to 5 per cent. effective is agreed to on the conditions mentioned below. It shall be put in force two months after the signing of the present Protocol, and no exceptions shall be made except for merchandize in transit not more than ten days after the said signing... The beds of the Rivers Whangpoo and Peiho shall be improved with the financial participation of China.

**ARTICLE VII.**
The Chinese Government has agreed that the quarter occupied by the Legations shall be considered as one specially reserved for their use and placed under their exclusive control, in which Chinese shall not have the right to reside, and which may be made defensible.

In the Protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th January, 1901, China recognised the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the said quarter for the defence of its Legation.

**ARTICLE VIII.**
The Chinese Government has consented to raze the forts of Taku, and those which might impede free communication between Peking and the sea. Steps have been taken for carrying this out.

**ARTICLE IX.**
The Chinese Government conceded the right to the Powers in the Protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th January, 1901, to occupy certain points, to be determined by an Agreement between them for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. The points occupied by the Powers are: Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tien-tsin, Chun-liang-Cheng, Tong-ku, Lu-tai, Tong-shan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Chin-wang Tao, Shanhai Kuan.
ARTICLE X.
The Chinese Government has agreed to post and to have published during two years in all district cities the following Imperial Edicts:

1) Edict of the 1st February, 1901, prohibiting for ever under pain of death, membership in any anti-foreign society.

2) Edicts of the 13th and 21st February, 29th April and 19th August, 1901, enumerating the punishments inflicted on the guilty.

3) Edict of the 19th August, 1901, prohibiting examinations in all cities where foreigners were massacred or subjected to cruel treatment.

4) Edicts of the 1st February, 1901, declaring all Governors, General, Governors, and provincial or local officials responsible for order in their respective districts, and that in case of new anti-foreign troubles or other infractions of the Treaties which shall not be immediately repressed and the authors of which shall not have been punished, these officials shall be immediately dismissed without possibility of being given new functions or new honours.

The posting of these Edicts is being carried on throughout the Empire.

ARTICLE XI.
The Chinese Government has agreed to negotiate the amendments deemed necessary by the foreign Governments to the Treaties of Commerce and Navigation and the other subjects concerning commercial relations with the object of facilitating them.

At present, and as a result of the stipulation contained in Article 6 concerning the indemnity, the Chinese Government agrees to assist in the improvement of the courses of the Rivers Peiho and Whangpoo, as stated below.

1) The works for the improvement of the navigability of the Peiho, begun in 1898 with the co-operation of the Chinese Government, have been resumed under the direction of an International Commission. As soon as the Administration of Tien-tsin shall have been handed back to the Chinese Government it will be in a position to be represented on this Commission, and will pay each year a
sum of 60,000 Haikwantaels for maintaining the works.

2) A Conservancy Board, charged with the management and control of the works for straightening the Whangpoo and the improvement of the course of that river, is hereby created. The Board shall consist of members representing the interests of the Chinese Government and those of foreigners in the shipping trade of Shanghai.

The expenses incurred for the works and the general management of the undertaking are estimated at the annual sum of 460,000 Haikwantaels for the first twenty years. This sum shall be supplied in equal portions by the Chinese Government and the foreign interests concerned.

**ARTICLE XII.**

An Imperial Edict of the 24th July, 1901, reformed the Office of Foreign Affairs, Tsung-li Yamen, on the lines indicated by the Powers, that is to say, transformed it into a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wai Wu Pu, which takes precedence over the six other Ministries of State; the same Edict appointed the principal Members of this Ministry.

An agreement has also been reached concerning the modification of Court ceremonial as regards the reception of foreign Representatives, and has been the subject of several notes from the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, the substance of which is embodied in a Memorandum herewith annexed.

Finally, it is expressly understood that as regards the declarations specified above and the annexed documents originating with the foreign Plenipotentiaries, the French text only is authoritative.

The Chinese Government having thus complied to the satisfaction of the Powers with the conditions laid down in the above-mentioned note of the 22nd December, 1900, the Powers have agreed to accede to the wish of China to terminate the situation created by the disorders of the summer of 1900. In consequence thereof, the foreign Plenipotentiaries are authorized to declare in the names of their Governments that, with the exception of the Legation
guards mentioned in Article VII, the international troops will completely evacuate the city of Peking on the 7th September, 1901, and, with the exception of the localities mentioned in Article IX, will withdraw from the Province of Chihli on the 22nd September, 1901.

The present final Protocol has been drawn up in twelve identical copies, and signed by all the Plenipotentiaries of the contracting countries