



University of Pisa DESTEC-GRNSPG

Nuclear Research Group in San Piero a Grado (Pisa) - Italy

AN ADDITIONAL SAFETY BARRIER FOR EXISTING AND NEW NPP

F. D'Auria

(with contribution by N. Debrechin and H. Glaeser)



NISLA 2018



NISLA 2018

Nuclear Industry Summit Latin America 2018
19-20 March 2018 :: Buenos Aires :: Argentina



LIST OF CONTENT

- ❑ MOTIVATION
- ❑ BACKGROUND
- ❑ THE ELEMENTS FOR THE PROPOSAL
 - ❑ ALARA
 - ❑ BEPU
 - ❑ E-SM
 - ❑ IA
 - ❑ ERT
- ❑ THE ADDITIONAL SAFETY BARRIER
- ❑ FINAL REMARKS
- ❑ APPENDICES (nuclear fuel & supporting references)



MOTIVATION – I, slide 1 of 3

THE NUCLEAR FUEL WEAKNESS - USNRC (draft) RG after 2014

Characterizing LOCA breakaway oxidation – RG 1.222 (17)



H₂ that enters the clad promotes rapid embrittlement (alloy composition dependent).

Determining Post Quench Ductility (PQD) – RG 1.223 (18)

High PCT (1200 °C) and high local clad oxidation (17%) may not ensure PQD. High Bu makes the situation worse.

Establishing (new) limits for Zr-Alloy clad material – RG 1.224 (19)

An alloy-specific cladding H₂ uptake model is required. Accounting for oxygen ingress on the ID is needed for Bu > 30.



MOTIVATION – I, slide 2 of 3

THE NUCLEAR FUEL WEAKNESS

Literature overview – Support information in Appendix 1

[FAILURES WITH PARAMETER RANGES WITHIN DBA BOUNDARIES]

- **BALLOONING:** burst, pressure, temperature and time (recently measured) showing clad temperature values (at burst) as low as 500 °C – 600 °C.
- **OXIDE:** oxide and oxide thickness (a function of Bu) ‘enlarge fuel failure region’, inducing spalling, hydride formation and embrittlement
- **HOOP STRESS:** individual nuclear fuel rod stress calculation now possible during the in-core fuel cycles: wide range results are predicted
- **PCMI & PCI/SCC:** complex failure mechanisms better understood, brittle rupture (frequently) possible.
- **SNF:** Clad weakness also affects releases from SNF and consequent radiological impact upon the environment (a function of Bu and LHGR)

... → THE BARRIER (B1, see below) CONSTITUTED BY CLAD IS NOT RELIABLE

MOTIVATION – I, slide 3 of 3

FURTHERMORE – *Literature overview*


ATR (Accident Tolerant Fuel), i.e. new material intended to prolong cladding life, the coated cladding supporting extended exposure to high temperature (1300 – 1400 °C) during LOCA, RIA and BDBA, the SiC (Silicon Carbide) cladding characterized by high melting point and minimal reaction with water (expected for commercial use in 2022), ***will not change the provided picture and the inevitable weakness of B1*** (see below).

Fuel integrity following mechanical loads generated by the pressure wave dependent upon the Break Opening Time (BOT) in case of LBLOCA is not ensured: no experimental evidence available, current computational capability questionable.


MOTIVATION – II, slide 1 of 1

THE NUCLEAR DISASTERS

TMI-2 - 1979




CHERNOBYL-4 - 1986



***(2) WE MUST WORK TO
MINIMIZE THE
POSSIBILITY OF
OCCURRENCE OF
THOSE EVENTS AND
THEIR CONSEQUENCES***

FUKUSHIMA-1-4 - 2011



BACKGROUND

THE ELEMENTS FOR THE PROPOSAL (20 & 21)

ALARA (*As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable*) is an early principle, adopted for Radioprotection & disconnected from DSA.

IA (*Independent Assessment*) is a requirement, pursued only in principle: a wish rather than an achievement .


BEPU (*Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty*) is a key approach [origin of the term: nuclear thermal-hydraulics and AA during the '90s], not commonly accepted.

E-SM (*Extended Safety Margin*) is derived from SM, i.e. an established concept in nuclear reactor safety

ERT (*Emergency Rescue Team*) is a virtual entity: it shall be mandatory after Fukushima.

BACKGROUND


THE VISION FOR NRS



BACKGROUND

THE VISION FOR SAFETY BARRIERS

The former B1 substituted by the 'new' B5




OBJECTIVE

TO PROPOSE

**THE BASES
FOR CONSTITUTING AN
ADDITIONAL SAFETY BARRIER**

**AGAINST THE RELEASE OF FISSION
PRODUCTS**



THE BEPU FEATURES

A HISTORIC OUTLINE

1970

NRC – Interim Acceptance Criteria

NRC – Appendix K to 10 CFR 50.46

a) OECD/CSNI efforts in the area of code validation (80's).

b) The US NRC CSAU (beginning of 90's)

c) The 'Wilks formula' and the 'accuracy extrapolation' (90's).

d) The UMS study within the OECD/CSNI (end of 90's)

e) The 'Internal Assessment of Uncertainty' (end of 90's)

f) The IAEA SRS-52 and SSG-2 (middle of 00's).

g) The BEMUSE study within the OECD/CSNI (end of 00's)

NRC – RG 1.157

Angra-2 BE LB-LOCA

NRC – RG 1.203

2010

Atucha-2 BEPU Chapter 15

2020

BEPU-FSAR

THE BEPU FEATURES – Accident Analysis

SAFETY ANALYSIS / LICENSING – IAEA SSG-2, 2010


Option	Computer code	Availability of systems	Initial and boundary conditions
1. Conservative	Conservative	Conservative assumptions	Conservative input data
2. Combined	Best estimate	Conservative assumptions	Conservative input data
3. Best estimate	Best estimate	Conservative assumptions	Realistic plus uncertainty; partly most unfavourable conditions ^a
4. Risk informed	Best estimate	Derived from probabilistic safety analysis	Realistic input data with uncertainties ^a

Realistic input data are used only if the uncertainties or their probabilistic distributions are known. For those parameters whose uncertainties are not quantifiable with a high level of confidence, conservative values should be used.




BEPU


THE BEPU FEATURES – BEPU & ALARA



WHAT IS BEPU?

- The BEPU is a logical process which connects the understanding in NRS (and licensing) with nuclear TH.
- The starting point for BEPU are the physical phenomena. This implies the DBA envelope.
- BEPU implies the existence of qualified computational tools dealing with different disciplines, input decks or nodalizations and a method to evaluate the uncertainty.
- BEPU needs the existence of qualified procedures for the application of the computational tools.
- BEPU needs the existence of qualified code users and of maven capable of evaluating the acceptability of analysis.
- BEPU needs the existence of 'legal' acceptance criteria.
- The application of BEPU implies the knowledge of the licensing process.
- The structure of the FSAR must be adapted to BEPU including the design of the core, the experimental data drawn during the commissioning, the design of EOP, etc.
- Any BEPU report should be a living document.





THE BEPU FEATURES

WHAT IS BEPU?- CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS

- ✓ Computational tools / SYS TH codes – design and development
- ✓ Computational tools / SYS TH codes – V & V procedures
- ✓ Computational tools / SYS TH codes – procedures for application
- ✓ Computational tools / nodalizations (or input decks) – development
- ✓ Computational tools /nodalizations – V & V procedures →
- ✓ Computational tools / code-coupling software – design and development
- ✓ Uncertainty methods / design and development →
- ✓ Uncertainty methods / qualification procedures →
- ✓ NPP parameters database
- ✓ Postulated Initiating Events (PIE)
- ✓ Phenomena / physical aspects which characterize PIE
- ✓ Databases for code and nodalization qualification
- ✓ Scaling demonstration / procedures and database
- ✓ Users of computational tools / qualification
- ✓ DSA – PSA integration
- ✓ Instrumentation and Control (I & C) modeling
- ✓ Documentation requirements for each elements
- ✓ Licensing framework – acceptance criteria, safety margins, procedures, etc.

V & V; UNC;

COUPLING; DB;

SCALING

DRAFT-IAEA V&V – 2017



Verification and Validation of Thermal-Hydraulic System Codes for Nuclear Safety Analyses

KEY ELEMENTS OF BEPU

V & V

VERIFICATION ESTABLISHED QA PRACTICE

VALIDATION: STARTING FROM SETF & ITF CCVM + FFTBM FOR ACCURACY QUANTIFICATION



RECENT CONCEPTS:

- **ASSESSMENT OF VALIDATION**
- **(MINIMUM) INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT FOR CODE USER**

KEY ELEMENTS OF BEPU


Nuclear Safety
NEA/CSNI/R(2016)14
March 2017
www.oecd-nea.org

SCALING

HIERARCHY & KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

'BRIDGES' & ACHIEVEMENTS


Scaling Applications



A state-of-the-art report on scaling in system thermal-hydraulics applications to nuclear reactor safety and design

OECD/NEA/CSNI S-SOAR – 2017

Edited by F. D'Auria (University of Pisa - Italy)




Nomenclature, Symbols & Notes

- CT = Counterpart Test
 - HT = Heat Transfer
 - HTC = Heat Transfer Coefficient
 - = Scaling Envelope
 - = No further Scaling (theory) Need
 - - - = 'Straightforward' Scaling Connection
 - · - · - = Scaling Issue considered
- : A wide variety of operational transient are available 'to bypass' the Scaling Issue.
 · : A few accident scenarios, other than TM2, are available 'to bypass' the Scaling Issue.
 Neutron Physics is not part of the current picture. However, this does not put a border to present conclusions.


KEY ELEMENTS OF BEPU

UNCERTAINTY

1 - PROPAGATION OF CODE INPUT "UNCERTAINTIES"



2 - PROPAGATION OF CALCULATION OUTPUT "ERRORS"




Safety Reports Series No. 52


Best Estimate Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants: Uncertainty Evaluation

IAEA SRS-52 - 2008

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency


ERROR FILLING PROCESS AND ERROR EXTRACTION PROCESS





KEY ELEMENTS OF BEPU


CODE COUPLING




Fracture Mechanics

The **crack shape** is assumed elliptical (two-dimensional crack) and the dimensions are taken from the ASME XI:



No.	Wall thickness (mm)	Crack depth (mm)	Crack length (mm)
1	102 – 305	¼ Wall thickness	½ Wall thickness
2	> 305	¼ (305)	½ (305)
3	< 102	¼ (102)	½ (102)



Crack position



RPV wall thickness = 290 mm
a = Crack Depth ~ 7 mm



KEY ELEMENTS OF BEPU

(TH) DATABASE / APPLICATION

NA-SA / UNIPI
ARN (REGULATORY BODY) - APPROVED 2012

We are here!

ACCIDENT ANALYSIS / FSAR – CHAPT. 15

LICENSING ↔ BEPU ← Other Disciplines + PSA
UNCERTAINTY


DATA

NPP

ITF

SETF

BASIC




SYS TH CODE DEVELOPMENT

V & V - SCALING

ENHANCING THE SM CONCEPT

E-SM CONTRIBUTED BY BEPU-FSAR





- A1) Safety Principles, i.e. SP-1 to SP-10;**
- A2) DID Levels, i.e. DL-1 to DL-5;**
- A3) Safety Barriers, i.e. SB-1 to SB-6;**
- A4) Safety Functions, i.e. SF-1 to SF-19;**
- A5) PSA Elements, i.e. PE-1 to PE-n;**
- A6) DSA Elements, i.e. DE-1 to DE-m.**

**A 'FEW' 10E4 E-SM
DEFINITIONS**

ENHANCING THE SM CONCEPT

E-SM CONTRIBUTED BY BEPU-FSAR





ISSUES WITH CURRENT IA

ISSUES

NPP COMPLEXITY

(efforts needed for IA 'too large' out of industry)

SAFETY DEPENDING UPON DETAILS

(details un-known out of industry; issue is proprietary information)

INDUSTRY ENGAGED IN CONTINUOUS CHANGES / IMPROVEMENTS

(changes not necessarily qualified, e.g. passive systems)

IA ONLY POSSIBLE WITH LATEST BE TECHNIQUES

(expertise may not be available out of industry)


EXPERT ANALYSTS NOT NECESSARILY AWARE OF LICENSING DETAILS

(the licensing framework is complex, too)

ERT

EMERGENCY RESCUE TEAM (20)

- To constitute a national (or regional) Emergency Rescue Team (ERT) capable of physically intervening in a failed NPP Unit having own devices and access locations in each Unit: this might be seen, as a new (active) barrier part of the defense-in-depth and summing up with the current (mostly passive) standard barriers.



1. ERT ELEMENTS

- Helicopter
- DG + pump
- Team (of around 5)



2. ERT OPERATION RANGE


About 500 km in a Country or geographical region targeting (typically) 10 NPP



3. ERT WORKING MODE

Plug-in pump delivery side to known (3-5) NPP ERT-connectors

Integrating ALARA, BEPU, E-SM, IA, ERT



ADDITIONAL SAFETY BARRIER

One may state that:

a **principle** (*ALARA taken from fundamentals of the technology*) +

a **requirement** (*IA, becoming actual*) +

an **approach** (*BEPU, becoming practical*) +

a **concept** (*E-SM established in nuclear reactor safety, now expanded*) +

a **virtual entity** (*ERT, becoming physical*) =

a 'new' SAFETY BARRIER

FINAL REMARKS - slide 1 of 3

- FURTHER EVALUATION OF CURRENT STATUS -

- **NOT-RECOGNIZING** *the weakness of the barrier constituted by clad,*
- **DELETING LBLOCA** *from the list of DBA (equals admitting no control of the technology),*

HAVE A CONSEQUENCE:

LOW (TECHNICIANS AND) PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE!

FINAL REMARKS - slide 2 of 3

- FIVE ELEMENTS FOR THE NEW SAFETY BARRIER -

- 1) **ALARA** at the origin of **BEPU**.
- 2) **BEPU** based on V&V, Scaling, Code Coupling, Uncertainty, and Database. **BEPU** extended to the entire **FSAR** (analytical parts).
- 3) **E-SM** (comprehensive and systematic set of) derivable with support from **BEPU**.
- 4) **IA** based on **BEPU** and making possible **BEPU**
- 5) **ERT** a (very) simple product of current technology

SUMMARY

BEPU: must be pursued. Any further delay is not justifiable for NRS. Safety Assessment (Licensing) must be independent of Vendor-Owner → BEPU-based I-FSAR & E-SM.

FINAL REMARKS - slide 3 of 3



- THE NEW NPP -

Reporting (again) the words of Australian-Chinese colleagues who analyzed the framework of the Fukushima event: “... upgrading and strengthening a nuclear regulatory system is not optional but imperative to prevent the next core meltdown.”



- 1) ... STRENGTHENING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK**
- 2) RISK OF CORE MELT LOWERED (to be demonstrated) FOR A FACTOR 10 - 1000.**
- 3) PROBABILITY OF CORE MELT (target) TO THE LEVEL OF METEORITE FALL ON THE NPP.**
- 4) COST OF NEW BARRIER \approx 1% CURRENT NPP.**

THE NUCLEAR FUEL WEAKNESS – Literature overview

BALLOONING: pressure and temperature during experiments w/o (15), (11) and w relocation (14) considered; azimuthal temperature asymmetry (6)




Burst pressure, temperature, time



APPENDIX 1 – (SUPPORT TO) MOTIVATION 2 OF 5



THE NUCLEAR FUEL WEAKNESS – Literature overview

OXIDE THICKNESS (11) vs Bu and failures (3). Hydride rim depth vs oxide thickness and burst failures (7) and sketch of spalling and hydriding (8)-(9)



THE NUCLEAR FUEL WEAKNESS – *Literature overview*


- **HOOP STRESS:** detailed NPP (Watts, US) calculations are possible showing widely changing conditions, including Bu effect (10)



APPENDIX 1 – (SUPPORT TO) MOTIVATION 4 OF 5


THE NUCLEAR FUEL WEAKNESS – Literature overview

PCMI failures – RIA (7) and PCI/SCC failures, IR project for BWR, (5).



Early (2010) RIA code results showing Bu effect upon clad failures (see also effect of oxide thickness- this appendix, slide 2 of 5).


The model assumes that SCC failures begin as an inter-granular fracture due to cesium–iodine chemical attack (in presence of oxygen potential) and independent of applied stress, ... that leads to cracks propagation. Clads fail with small diameter changes at relatively low values of LHGR (final ramp).



THE NUCLEAR FUEL WEAKNESS – *Literature overview*

SNF: Instant Release Fraction at high Bu (40 -60) sharply increases when LHGR > 20 kw/m (1)

Part 1 - When the SNF is disposed of in an underground repository, the radionuclides may gradually be released after failure of the canister and subsequent water ingress. The release rate of radionuclides differs depending on their chemical properties, their chemical speciation in the fuel, as well as the location where they are segregated within the SNF.



Part 2 - The release of soluble segregated elements from the accessible gap, cracks and grain boundaries is fast. Most of their inventory is released within a few months or even days. The quantity of these rapidly released inventories normalized to the total nuclide inventories is commonly called the Instant Release Fraction (IRF) ... they can significantly contribute to or even dominate the calculated dose exposure.

APPENDIX 2 – REFERENCES 1 of 2

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