

AKASHI Motojirō

Rakka ryūsui

Colonel Akashi's Report
on His Secret Cooperation with
the Russian Revolutionary Parties
during the Russo-Japanese War

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Selected chapters translated by
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Preface

The name of the Japanese colonel Akashi Motojirō attained fame for the first time when, in St Petersburg in 1906, the Russian state police published a booklet about his secret activities during the Russo-Japanese War (1904—1905). The correspondence between Akashi and his fellow conspirators published therein demonstrated that the Japanese Military Attaché had overstepped the normal limits of his office and had, using considerable sums, funded revolutionary movements functioning within the Russian Empire. Akashi's unusual activities were a consequence of the fact that Russia and Japan were engaged in a war in which Japan was forced to seek compensation for being the weaker party in regard to resources through the help of many diverse strategies.

Many European newspapers published broad accounts of the Russian booklet's disclosures. The only help proffered by Tokyo was to call Akashi back to Japan; he was never again sent to Europe in an official capacity.

Akashi's cooperation with the opposition movements among Russia's minority nationalities was closer than with the revolutionary parties led by Great Russians. The representatives of the national minorities served as middlemen, and as a smoke screen, for his work with the latter.

Akashi's operations against the Russian government were, for understandable reasons, greatly appreciated during the interwar years in Poland and Finland and were extensively described in many of the memoirs and biographies published in these countries. Before the 1930's, when Stalin made the history of the revolution into biased propaganda, the historical writing of both the victorious and the vanquished Russian revolutionaries also mentioned the connections with Japan.

After World War Two Akashi's name began to arouse interest in the western world because it was believed that he, like the German imperial government during World War One, funded the Bolsheviks' revolutionary action. Because of this interest almost everywhere in the world Akashi's name is associated with Russian history. Credit for this is due above all to Michael Futrell. It is revealing that Futrell was interested in Lenin's and the Bolsheviks' relations with Akashi although the Japanese evidently had much more to do with the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries than with the Bolsheviks. Being a true historical scholar Futrell

nevertheless came to the conclusion in his study that the Bolsheviks were a very insignificant offshoot of Akashi's operations.

After his death in 1919 Akashi actually became the subject of a cult in Japan. His relations with the Russian revolutionaries and his influence on the outcome of the Russian revolution of 1905 were exaggerated.

Nevertheless, an authentic source concerning Akashi's activities did exist; it was *Rakka ryūsui*, based on his official reports completed at the beginning of 1906. The original copy of the work was destroyed at the end of World War Two. However, three copies of *Rakka ryūsui*, slightly differing from one another, have survived. Japanese archives contain other original materials concerning Akashi's operations as well.

In recent years Japanese researchers have ascertained the connections which their country's official representatives established with the opposition movements of Imperial Russia. Because of the language barrier, however, this Japanese research is not known outside of the country. Likewise, in spite of its being of universal interest, *Rakka ryūsui* has been accessible only to those who understand Japanese.

During recent decades Akashi's operations have been studied from the viewpoints of Russian, Polish, and Finnish history. There is a definite need to synthesize the different viewpoints. One of the tasks of the present publication is to meet this need.

Our book is built around Akashi's *Rakka ryūsui*. Inaba Chiharu translated its principle parts. Relevant Japanese telegrams from 1904 and 1905 are published here as an appendix to the report. The work also includes all of Akashi's letters found in Finland and Sweden as well as research pertinent to Inaba's, Antti Kujala's, and Olavi K. Fält's articles. Inaba aims to reconstruct Akashi's activity during the Russo-Japanese War in its Japanese context with particular focus on the contention between the country's General Staff and Foreign Ministry. Kujala's study deals with the cooperative ventures among the revolutionary parties of the Russian Empire, 1904—1905. For his part Fält examines the significance of Akashi's activities in regard to the later development of Finno-Japanese relations.

Only the principal parts of *Rakka ryūsui* are included here. There is reason to emphasize, however, that the present English translation is more complete than all of the existing Japanese versions. Inaba's translation is based on a critical comparison of the three available versions. He has endeavoured to reconstruct the original contents of *Rakka ryūsui*. Akashi modified the names of his European contacts to suit written Japanese; they therefore often differ considerably from their originals. With a few exceptions, all the Europeans mentioned by Akashi have now been identified while in the Japanese versions to whom the names refer remains in many cases a riddle. This work of identification was done by Kujala.

We would like to thank the Finnish Historical Society which, in addition to funding the translation of *Rakka ryūsui* and Inaba's and Fält's articles, accept-

ed our work for publication in its *Studia Historica* series. We would also like to express our gratitude to *Aro-Yhtymä Oy* for financially supporting the translation of *Rakka ryūsui* and to the Finnish Academy for funding the translation of Kujala's study. *Aro-Yhtymä Oy* granted its aid before it was discovered that, through its own activities, this Finnish corporation has a direct connection to the central character of our publication, Colonel Akashi Motojirō. We believe that this surprising coincidence shows that, in spite of the great distance between them, Japan and Finland have more in common than commonly thought.

Our special thanks go to the following archives for giving us permission to publish documents in their possession:

The Archives of Constitutional and Political Papers, National Diet Library, Tokyo

The Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo

The Library of the National Institute for Defence Studies, Defence Agency, Tokyo

The National Archives, Helsinki

The War Archives, Stockholm

We owe a particular debt to Inaba Chiharu for his fruitful cooperation. Michael Berry, Roger Buckley, and Susan Schmidt expertly corrected the English of the sections written and translated by Inaba. Linda Harriet Edmondson's close reading of the text in its final stages resulted in numerous invaluable improvements. Peter Herring skillfully translated Kujala's study and Malcolm Hicks translated Fält's article. We would like to sincerely thank them as well as the numerous researchers we consulted and the staff of all the archives and libraries which we used in making this work.

The book has benefited greatly from the help and advice of all the above mentioned. It goes without saying that solely the writers and editors are to be held responsible for the work's inadequacies.

Helsinki, December 1988

Olavi K. Fält

Antti Kujala

Editors' Note

The translator and the editors have appended, both within the original text and in note form, numerous corrections and clarifications to the documents published herein. In order to prevent these revisions from becoming confused with

the original text they are printed in boldface and situated within the original text in brackets.

Throughout the book dates are given in the Gregorian, or new style, calendar, unless otherwise indicated as old style (o.s.). The old style, or Julian, calendar was used in Russia at the beginning of this century while Finland followed the new style in the Western European manner. To convert dates (in the twentieth century) from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar, thirteen days should be added to the former.

Transliteration from Cyrillic to Roman characters is based on a modified Library of Congress system. Well-known proper names have been transliterated according to popular usage, for example Gorky instead of Gor'kii.

In transliterating Japanese words into Roman characters we have followed the Hepburn system. Japanese personal names are given in this book in the order in which the Japanese use them; family name first, followed by the given name.

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INABA Chiharu

An Explanatory Note on Rakka ryūsui

Akashi Motojirō, a Colonel in the Japanese Army, arrived in Yokohama from Europe on 28 December 1905. In early 1906 he submitted to the General Staff several reports about the so-called *Akashi kōsaku*, his secret activities against Russia in Europe during the Russo-Japanese War. *Rakka ryūsui* is a copy of parts of those reports.

The original copy of the reports was kept strictly confidential in the Army and was probably burned with many other records at the termination of the Second World War.¹ Fortunately, however, historians now have access to three versions of *Rakka ryūsui* copied by Akashi's subordinates.

a) *Meiji 38 nen 12 gatsu 28 nichi hōkoku utsushi* [A Copy of the Report on 12 December 1905], Terauchi Masatake kankeimonjo, No 43, 446-3, Kensei shiryōshitsu [Archives of Constitutional and Political Papers] (KS), Kokkai toshokan [National Diet Library], Tokyo.

b) *Gokuhi, Rokoku kōsaku utsushi, Meiji 39 nen 1 gatsu kō* [TOP SECRET, A Copy of Activities against Russia, copied in January 1906], Bōeikenkyūjo toshokan [Library of the National Institute for Defence Studies, Defence Agency] (BT), Tokyo. This version was published in 1966: “Rakka ryūsui”, *Gaikō jihō*, July (1966), pp. 71–102.

¹ Inaba Masao, “Shiryō kaisetsu — Rakka ryūsui” [Explanatory Note of Rakka ryūsui], *Gaikō jihō*, No 1030, July (1966), p. 70.

c) *Daihisho, Meiji 39 nen 1 gatsu kō, Genkin* [Top Secret Papers, written in January 1906], Akashi Motojirō monjo [Akashi Motojirō Papers], No 91, KS.

This translation is mainly based on the revised edition of *Rakka ryūsui* which I published in 1986 (Inaba Chiharu, “Shiryō kenkyū, Rakka ryūsui” [An Explanatory Note on Rakka ryūsui], *Waseda kenkyūto jissen*, No 7 (1986), pp. 59—121). But at that time, I compared only the versions “a” and “b”. I did not know about Akashi Motojirō Papers which Akashi Motoaki, Motojirō’s grandson, deposited at the National Diet Library in 1985. They were made public in 1986. Akashi Motoaki kindly gave me a permission to use this material. In late 1986, I found a draft of *Rakka ryūsui* written by Motojirō himself² and a clean copy of the same manuscript, version “c” above. This new material suggested the necessity of modifying what I had published in 1986. The version of *Rakka ryūsui* in this volume is the result of this research, which has been based on a detailed comparison of all the known versions of *Rakka ryūsui*.

The forementioned three versions differ from one another in regard to chapter order, number of notes and misspellings and clerical errors. The latter arose when Akashi’s subordinates made their copy of the original edition of *Rakka ryūsui*. I think that version “c” is closest to the original *Rakka ryūsui*, since it has the least misspellings and the complete notes (for example version “b” is missing part of the notes).

Rakka ryūsui consists of five chapters:

I. *Rokoku rekishino gaiyō* [A Summary of Russian History]

1. *Rekishi* [A History of Russia]

2. *Tochi oyobi nōsei semusutobō shūgunkai* [Land Owning and Agricultural System and the *Zemstvo*, the Local Government Machinery]

II. *Kyomushugitōno gakusetsu kiin* [Origination of Nihilism and Other Principles]

1. *Nihirisumu, anarishizumu, soshiarisumuno kiin gakusetsu katsudō* [Origination, Doctrines, and Activities of Nihilism, Anarchism, and Socialism]

2. *Rokokunai huheitōno ruibetsu hidarinogotoshi* [Classification of the Russian Opposition Parties]

3. *Konnichimade keizokuseru shoundōni kankeiaru omonarumono hidarinogotoshi* [Important Persons Related to the Opposition Movement up to Now]

III. *Keimei kutō ki* [Episodes in Europe]

1. *Kanchō oyobi chōhō kinmu* [Intelligence and Spies]

2. *Kidan issoku* [Some Episodes in Intelligence Work]

IV. *Fuheitō undōno tenmatsu* [The Russian Opposition Movement against the Tsarist Regime]

² Akashi Motojirō monjo [Akashi Motojirō Papers], No 92, Kensei shiryōshitsu [Archives of Constitutional and Political Papers] (KS), Kokkai toshokan [National Diet Library], Tokyo.

V. *Ketsuron* [Conclusion]

In chapter I-1, Akashi wrote a short history of Russia from its origins to the period of Russification under Nicholas II. This historical account reflected a western European perspective and was probably based on a history of Russia written in German or French. Akashi's biographer wrote in 1928 that the Japanese Minister to Russia, Kurino Shin'ichirō, considered Akashi's spoken Russian rather good.³ But it is quite difficult to believe that Akashi was as fluent in Russian as in German and French. There are no letters or cards written in Russian in the Akashi Motojirō Papers. Moreover, his colleagues prevented him from visiting Finland because of his poor Russian.⁴

Chapter I-2 explained the Russian landowning system, especially the *mir* (a village commune or a communal organization based on joint ownership of arable and meadow) since the emancipation of the serfs in the era of Alexander II. Akashi discussed the *zemstvo* (an organ of local self-government) in detail and concluded that the new agricultural system sowed the seeds of disorder in Russia: the seeds cultivated in the era of Alexander III and Nicholas II produced disaffection among the peasantry and indignation against the government among the opposition parties. Akashi undoubtedly wrote this paragraph with the help of Konrad Viktor (Konni) Zilliacus, a leader of the Finnish opposition and Akashi's most important collaborator during the war. Akashi probably also relied on pamphlets of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party.

In chapter II-1, Akashi explained the origins, doctrines, and activities of nihilism from a historical and philosophical point of view and threw light on differences between anarchism and socialism. He wrote that the Chaikovskii (N.V. Chaikovskii) group, which was central to the Socialist Revolutionary Party, adopted anarchism even though socialism was the party's ostensible principle, and that the Russian Social Democratic Party adopted pure socialism similar to that of the German Social Democratic Party. Akashi regarded the Chaikovskii group to be the nucleus of the Socialist Revolutionaries. This is logical, given his personal relations with Chaikovskii during the war.

Akashi gave his views on the opposition parties and their leaders in sections II-2 and II-3. Many of these views were unfounded.

In chapter III-1, Akashi wrote about his intelligence activities in Europe. He criticized Russian news censorship which made news in the Russian press unreliable and forced him to rely on foreign newspapers. To understand Russian affairs better, he valued, for example, the *Daily Telegraph*, *Russische Armee* (especially for Russian military affairs), and *L'Echo de Paris*. To understand the opposition movement, he read *Iskra*, *L'Européen*, *Osvobozhdenie*, and others.

Akashi's intelligence network included seven spies and five assistants (some-

³ Komori Tokuji, *Akashi Motojirō*, I (Tokyo, 1928), p. 152.

⁴ See Rakka ryūsui in this present volume.

times the number varied) who maintained contact between him and the spies until the end of war. According to this chapter, he first relied on Swedish military spies whom Gösta Theslöf, a former Finnish military officer, and Swedish officers had introduced to him at the beginning of the war, but they had their own political goals. He sometimes got information from opposition members, but their information was not reliable enough as they had no grounding in military affairs. He found that the best spies were those who worked for hard cash. At the end of this section Akashi suggested to the General Staff that the most suitable spy might be a correspondent, and he proposed that Japan establish a permanent department for intelligence in Europe to cope with any future problems.

Section III-2 discusses some episodes and setbacks in his activities. One point that deserves special mention is a report by an agent of the Russian secret police that letters between Akashi and opposition members had sometimes been opened in transit.

Chapter IV describes Akashi's secret activities against Russia in Europe, e.g. intelligence, sabotage of the Trans-Siberian railway, and instigation of the opposition to revolt.

In section V Akashi emphasized to the General Staff the following points: Russia was weaker than the population of 130 million might suggest. Because her government had been rotten for a long time, political parties had turned their backs on "nationalism" and concentrated on "individualism", i.e. advancing narrow interests. Not only oppressed nations, such as the Poles, Finns, Caucasians, the Baltic peoples, and others, but also many Russians opposed the Tsarist regime, and were in conflict with each other. If the present government improved its political system, and became more liberal, it would collapse. Consequently, the regime would continue a policy of oppression. That was the reason why the current regime would maintain its military force for as long as it continued in power. Even though the Tsarist government had become corrupt, it was still strong militarily in the Far East. It was necessary for Japan to maintain military readiness in opposition to Russia, Akashi concluded.

Rakka ryūsui has been regarded as a volume of reports about Akashi's special activities in Europe against Russia, which he submitted to the General Staff after his return to Japan in December 1905.⁵ In fact, this report consists of several different papers.

First, only those sections entitled "Intelligence and Spies" and "The Russian Opposition Movement against the Tsarist Regime" can be substantially regarded as reports on these activities. It would be inappropriate to include "A Summary of Russian History" and "Some Episodes in Intelligence Work" in the contents of this report. Secondly, even though there is a travel record⁶ in Akashi's private papers, dates are seldom included in this service report.

Thirdly, there is hardly any reference to when, where, and how he had spent

⁵ Inaba M. 1966, p. 70.

the huge sum of secret funds, though a textbook of the War College published in 1925 claimed that one million yen (nowadays almost five milliard yen or thirty-five million US dollars) had been spent during the war.⁷ If he submitted a special service report, exact dates and a bill of expenditures ought to have been attached to it. In fact, there are several references in Akashi's biography to submitting a bill to the General Staff.⁸ Moreover, a part of the bill was left in his private papers.⁹ Because the three versions are incomplete and differ from one another, *Rakka ryūsui* can hardly be regarded as a volume of the report. It is more likely that Akashi selected those papers that put his career in a favourable light and excluded top secret records such as the secret funds.

Rakka ryūsui is actually a quotation from an old Chinese poem by Gāo Pián (who died in 887). Directly translated, it means "fallen blossoms (probably peach) and the flow of water" (along a brooklet in spring), metaphorically "being in love with each other".¹⁰ From the very nature of things, this title is unsuitable for the name of a special service report. No copy of the report was titled *Rakka ryūsui*.

The origins of this title are puzzling. The British historian Michael Futrell suggested that "probably it emerged from the head of some admirer after Akashi's death."¹¹ Presumably it was Inaba Masao who gave Futrell this idea. It hardly seems likely that Akashi used this title when he submitted the report to the General Staff at the beginning of 1906. When and by whom was this title adopted for the first time? The oldest known copy of the report with this title was typed in May 1938 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹² Takase Jirō, Chief Secretary at Section III (Information on the Soviet Union) of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time, recollected, "When the pamphlet was typed, this title was probably added by Section I (General Information). It is most probable that Andō Giryō, Chief of Section I, gave the name *Rakka ryūsui* to the report."¹³

⁶ Akashi Motojirō monjo, No 94, KS.

⁷ Tani Toshio, *Kimitsu nichirosenshi* [A Secret History of the Russo-Japanese War], (Tokyo, 1966), p. 268.

⁸ Komori 1928, II, part 5, p. 58, 69.

⁹ Akashi Motojirō monjo, No 94, KS.

¹⁰ Morohashi Tetsuji, *Daikanwa jiten* [Great Chinese-Japanese Dictionary], Vol. 9 (Tokyo, 1985), p. 763.

¹¹ Michael Futrell, "Colonel Akashi and Japanese Contacts with Russian Revolutionaries in 1904—5", *St Antony's Papers* 20, *Far Eastern Affairs* 4, (London, 1967), pp. 11—12.

¹² *Rakka ryūsui* (Akashi Motojirō taishō ikō [General Akashi Motojirō's posthumous work]), Gaimushō chōsabu dai'ikka [typed by Section I, Investigation Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], May 1938, Gaikō shiryōkan [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (GS), Tokyo. This pamphlet was typed from the copy owned by Akashi Motoyoshi, Motojirō's eldest son.

¹³ Interview with Takase Jirō in Tokyo on 23 December 1985. Takase also explained that a copy of *Rakka ryūsui* was typed by order of Andō apparently with a view to distributing it to the highranking officials in the Ministry. Perhaps he thought that it would

Today, *Rakka ryūsui*, especially the section “The Russian Opposition Movement against the Tsarist Regime” is the one and only detailed report about Akashi’s own activities in Europe just before and during the Russo-Japanese War. As this material was a service report submitted to the General Staff, it hardly lacks authenticity. It is useful for understanding Japanese activities, because the names of persons and places and the contents of activities were written concretely and in detail. But it is difficult to use it to throw light on Japanese monetary aid to the opposition parties, or for information on discord among the parties and Akashi’s correspondence with them, or on differences of intention between the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Some of the information in this material is incorrect. Some mistakes are based on secondhand information, others on errors of Akashi’s memory, and others on his misinterpretation. The reports also omit reference to his failure to sabotage the Trans-Siberian railway after the expenditure of considerable funds.¹⁴ And Akashi scarcely notes the fact that he built up an intelligence network in cooperation with Japanese ministers in Europe during the war,¹⁵ probably because he wanted to emphasize his work in intelligence and downplay the achievements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

be a useful textbook for Japanese strategy against Russia in the latter half of the 1930s. But Takase, who had the final say on the matter, opposed the idea. Plans based on Akashi’s activities would not meet future exigencies. The Chang-ku-fêng incident, a clash between Japanese and Russian forces at the junction of the Manchurian, Korean, and Siberian borders in July 1938 had demonstrated the superiority of Soviet mechanized units. Moreover, an updated version of Akashi’s activities in the early 1900s might put Japan at a great political disadvantage. First, it would be very expensive. Secondly, normal diplomacy would be less risky. Thirdly, there was probably no group in Russia capable of overthrowing the Soviet government. In agreement with Section II (Intelligence) of the General Staff, Takase favoured giving some aid to exiled Belorussians in cooperation with the Germans. In fact, the General Staff formed a special group of undercover agents led by Manaki Yoshinobu in 1937. Suzuki Kenji, *Chūdokutaishi, Ōshima Hiroshi* [Biography of Ōshima Hiroshi, Ambassador to Germany], (Tokyo, 1979), pp. 92—93.

¹⁴ The General Staff sent Akashi 30,000 yen to help hard-liners of the Polish National League sabotage the Trans-Siberian Railway in March 1904, and sent 40,000 yen to help a certain party, probably the Socialist Revolutionaries, do so at the beginning of February 1905. Inaba Chiharu, “Nichirosensōkino yōroppaniokeru nipponno tairosiākōsaku” [Japanese Activities against Russia in Europe during the Russo-Japanese War], *Hokuōshi kenkyū*, No 3 (1984), pp. 19—21.

¹⁵ Generally speaking, the General Staff used military spies to obtain information on Russian military affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs relied on published Russian, German, and French sources for political and economic information about Russia. But the General Staff requested the cooperation of the Ministry in order to build an intelligence network for tactical intelligence at the beginning of the war. Inaba C. 1984, pp. 16—17.

INABA Chiharu

Akashi's Career

Akashi Motojirō was born in Hukuoka, northern Kyūshū, in 1864. An undisciplined child, he was, nevertheless, the best student in his elementary school. At the age of thirteen, he went to Tokyo where he entered a military preparatory school in 1877, the Military Academy in 1881, and the Military Staff College in 1887.¹ One of his schoolmates said that he always ranked second or third, was the “cock of the walk”, and was indifferent to his appearance in the Military Academy years. His academic record at the Military Staff College was excellent, especially in tactics and mathematics.²

After graduation in 1889 Akashi was assigned to the General Staff, though a graduate officer was usually attached to a corps. He had a talent for languages and was sent to study in Germany in February 1894 but recalled in less than one year to serve in the Sino-Japanese War (1894—1895). He saw little action and only went to Formosa as a staff member of the Imperial Guard Division to suppress the opposition movement against Japan. In 1896, he was reassigned to the General Staff, and went with a group of inspectors to Formosa and French Indochina. In 1898, he studied the American annexation of the Philippines. In 1900, he was dispatched to China to negotiate the termination of the Boxer Uprising with Russia.

In January 1901, Akashi was sent as Military Attaché to France and went to Paris; thereafter he stayed in Europe for five years.³ On 15 August 1902, he was appointed Military Attaché to Russia and arrived in St Petersburg on 1 November.⁴ From this career, it is quite clear that Akashi was a member of the mili-

¹ Komori 1928, I, pp. 37—68.

² Komori 1928, II, chapter 5, pp. 16—17.

³ Komori 1928, I, pp. 69—79.

⁴ Terauchi Masatake, Minister of War, to Komura Jutarō, Foreign Minister, telegram

tary elite and had been trained as an expert in foreign affairs.

On 10 February 1904, when Japan declared war against Russia, Akashi was assigned to a position at the newly-established Japanese legation in Stockholm. This exceptional post, which was under the direct control of the General Staff, was created to establish the Japanese intelligence network in Russia, to sabotage the Trans-Siberian Railway, and to support the widespread opposition movements within Russia.

Both the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the General Staff considered Stockholm the best location for collecting general information about Russia and for establishing a military intelligence network. In addition to his previous function as Military Attaché in Russia related to establishing an intelligence network, Akashi also had to carry out his routine duties as Military Attaché to the legation. Because this new duty interfered with his secret activities, he asked the General Staff to relieve him of the official duties in the Stockholm legation.

In June 1904 Major Nagao Tsunekichi (Lieutenant Colonel in 1905) was appointed Military Attaché to Sweden.⁵ Akashi could now move freely throughout Europe with adequate funds for secret activities.⁶

On 11 September 1905, soon after the conclusion of peace between Japan and Russia, Akashi was ordered to return home, probably because the General Staff regarded him as the man who would hinder the normalization of future Russo-Japanese relations. He left Europe on 18 November and arrived in Tokyo on 28 December. In recognition of his wartime activities Akashi was awarded the Third Order of the Golden Kite. The same decoration was also conferred on Major Tanaka Giichi, later General and Prime Minister, for distinguished services as a staff member in the army dispatched to Manchuria, and on Colonel Utsunomiya Tarō, later General, who had collected important information in London as Military Attaché. This suggests how valuable the General Staff considered Akashi's services in Europe.

Soon after returning to Japan, Akashi was appointed Military Attaché to Germany responsible for reporting on the postwar Russian situation. But the Russian government published a pamphlet in St Petersburg about his secret activities during the war entitled "The Seamy Side of the Revolution: An Armed Uprising Funded by Japanese Money in Russia".⁷ This exposé was reported in German newspapers.⁸ The Russian government apparently feared a continuation of his espionage activities and sought to keep him out of Europe. As a result of these

No 470 on 9 August 1902, Kakkokuchūzai tai(kō)shikantsukibukan ninmen zakken [Papers Related to the Appointment and Dismissal of Military Attachés], 6.1.5.10, GS.

⁵ Komori 1928, I, p. 89.

⁶ Inaba C. 1984, p. 28.

⁷ *Iznanka revolutsii: Vooruzhennoe vozstanie v Rossii na iaponskiia sredstva* (S.-Peterburg, 1906).

⁸ For example, *Berliner Tageblatt*, 21 June 1906, and *Berliner Morgenpost*, 22 June 1906. See Akashi Motojirō monjo, No 126, KS.



Akashi as the Governor-General of Formosa in 1918 or 1919.

difficulties, he was called home after less than one year.

Back in Japan, Akashi soon became a Major General and on 7 October 1907 Head of Military Police in Korea. This was the most important post in the Residency-General of Korea established in 1904. Japan annexed Korea by military force in August 1910. Akashi became the Provost Marshal in Korea, responsible for maintaining law and order there. Why was Akashi appointed to the most important post in Korea? Futrell suggests: "It seems that Akashi was very effective in suppressing Korean nationalism. It is indeed likely that his exceptional experience in Europe had given him unusual qualifications."⁹ In fact, Akashi thoroughly suppressed Korean opposition movements against Japan by more skillful and cruel means than those employed by authorities in Russia.¹⁰

His meritorious service in Korea earned him the rank of Lieutenant General in December 1913. In April 1914 Akashi became Deputy Chief of the General Staff. When the First World War broke out in the summer of 1914, he advocated the occupation of Tsingtao and Kiaochow Bay, the Chinese territory governed by Germany, and insisted on the Twenty-one Demands, which also called for the transfer of former German rights to Japan and demanded other privileges in China.¹¹ Akashi's goal was a "koreanized" China — an objective he shared with Terauchi Masatake, the Minister of War and the Governor-General of Korea, and Hasegawa Yoshimichi, the Chief of the General Staff who had been the Commander of the Korean Corps during the Russo-Japanese War. This ambitious scheme led nowhere, however. In October 1915 Akashi became Commander of the Sixth Division in Kumamoto in central Kyūshū. In June 1918 he was appointed Governor-General of Formosa. The following month, he became General. In August 1919 he also became Commander-in-Chief in Formosa and endeavoured to strengthen Japanese rule there through the reform of the educational system. On October 1919 Akashi was designated Baron, but he died on 24 October.¹²

⁹ Futrell 1967, p. 14.

¹⁰ Komori 1928, I, pp. 437-500; Yamanobe Kentarō, *Nihon tōchikano chōsen* [Korea under Japanese Rule], (Tokyo, 1971), pp. 14—22.

¹¹ Komori 1928, II, pp. 1—10.

¹² Komori 1928, II, pp. 10—238.

Translator's Note

It is difficult today for a Japanese person to read and understand *Rakka ryūsui* because the system for writing the Japanese language was considerably revised after World War Two. Akashi's intricate expressions, with their multiple meanings, make the interpretation of his text problematic.

The distinctive features of the Japanese language create special problems for translation. For example in Japanese many passive sentences are used with the subject of the sentence remaining unspecified. In such cases it is not easy to determine the subject's identity, especially when it must be ascertained within the context of inadequately known past events. Because of the difference between languages and cultures translation is never merely repetition, it is also interpretation; this is particularly so in the translation of Japanese.

In *Rakka ryūsui* Akashi modified European names to conform with Japanese pronunciation. Furthermore, he had difficulties in remembering with even approximate correctness the names of many with whom he cooperated. Here are some examples, retransliterated into the western alphabet, of the form names acquired in *Rakka ryūsui*:

Volkhovskii — Wanhovusukii or Vanbovusuki
Varandian — Waranchan
Balogh de Galántha — Barogugaranta
Becker Bey — Blokkobei
Heftye — Hefuchii or Hehuti
Madame Roland — Madame Rōran
Le Gil Blas — Jiruburā or Giruburā
Sakartvelo — Sakarutoveru

Antti Kujala has identified the problematic European names on the basis of the Japanese forms which I informed him of. We have provided both forms in the text when the variation between them is exceptionally great. Unfortunately, a few names remained unidentified.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Japanese archives possessing the documents which I edited. I express my special thanks to Akashi Motoaki, Motojirō's grandson who gave me permission to use the Akashi Motojirō Papers in the Archives of Constitutional and Political Papers. Just as important was the advice I received in my translation work from the following people: Anzai Kazuo, Hamaguchi Manabu, Momose Hiroshi, Murai Makoto, Satō Eiichi, and Yamamoto Toshiro.

Inaba Chiharu

AKASHI Motojirō

Rakka ryūsui

Selected chapters translated
by Inaba Chiharu and annotated
by Inaba Chiharu and Antti Kujala

Classification of the Russian Opposition Parties

[Chapter II-2 in *Rakka ryūsui*]

THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARY PARTY*¹, S.R.:

This party is an embodiment of the *Narodnaia Volia*, one wing of the Nihilist Party. What distinguishes the party from the other socialists in Europe is the fact that the one basically employs violence while the others limit themselves to speeches and demonstrations against the Tsarist regime. In order to carry out violence, the party organizes a group prepared, if necessary, to die, called the *Boevaia Druzhina*² [its real name was *Boevaia Organizatsiia*, which means the **Fighting Organization**]. The tactics of the party are to intimidate the government by the use of this organization.

The purposes of this party have remained unchanged until now. It intends to set up a permanent parliament to supervise the affairs of state; to elect government officials by popular vote; to recognize the complete autonomy of the *mirs*

*¹ 800,000 members are said to have joined this party.

² The *Boevaia Druzhina* uses extreme direct measures as a combat strategy.

[village communes or communal organizations based on joint ownership of arable land and meadows] as an economic and executive unit; to establish freedom of speech, the press, and assembly, as well as universal suffrage; to abolish the regular army and establish a popular militia system; to nationalize all land; to gradually socialize property related to production.

That which distinguishes this party's programme from the others is the great importance members attach to peasant and agricultural land combined with their wish to postpone the socialization of property for workers. They believe the Russian peasant has sufficient experience of autonomy through the use of the *mir* as a system of common cultivated land, but that because Russian manufacturing industry is still in its infancy emphasis should not be placed upon it yet.

Therefore, most of the party's members are naturally peasants; workers are not particularly interested in the party.

To accomplish its purposes, this party aims to abolish imperial rule as quickly as possible. It is the most radical of all opposition parties.

THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY [the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party]³, S.D.:

This party, which is an embodiment of the *Peredel*, the other wing of the Nihilist Party, is quite influential. Its principles and purposes are almost the same as those of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, but what distinguishes this party from the above is the fact that it upholds the basic principle of the socialists, dislikes using terrorism and extreme measures, and tries to protect mainly workers without caring very much about agrarian affairs.

This party did not take part in the Paris conference of the autumn of 1904, left the Geneva conference in the middle of the discussions, and acted independently. The basic reason for this is that it adheres to pure socialist principles and dislikes violence. Moreover, the party was particularly jealous of the Socialist Revolutionaries who used violence as a tactic. Because of this, it was obliged to emulate the psychology but not the actions of its competitor, if it wanted to maintain its image. The radical wing of this party, Lenin's group, pronounced its support for the revolutionary movement against the Russian government wherever possible, though it did not join the united opposition movement. In fact, not a few members of the faction purchased revolvers and armed themselves. In the revolt of 22 January 1905 [**Bloody Sunday in St Petersburg**], this party's indirect aid largely made Gapon famous.

Jealousy made cooperation between the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats very difficult. There is an anecdote: an officer of a certain corps was once on patrol and saw by chance a few privates reading a pamphlet. When he approached them, one of them concealed it in his clothes. The officer confiscated the pamphlet. It was a written appeal of the Social Democrats. He left with-

³ One million members are said to have joined this party.

out a word. They were very worried. A few days later, a leader of the Social Democrats told the privates, "I know how anxious you were about the confiscation of the pamphlet. But you need not be alarmed. The officer, your senior in rank, is a member of the Socialist Revolutionaries. After he confiscated it, he communicated this matter to the headquarters of his party. So, today I understand that both parties have made propaganda in the corps."

THE LIBERAL PARTY [the Union of Liberation], which later changed its name to the Constitutional Democratic Party*⁴ [*Kadets*], K.D.:

This party includes many groups, like the hard- and soft-liners, though it is known as the Liberals. The Shipov [**D.N. Shipov**] faction, for example, supports the Tsarist regime and tries to reform her governmental system. There are also some less sanguine groups, including the Constitutionalists, who hope to establish a complete constitution.

The progressive wing of the party (the Union of Unions) is very different from the above groups. This is led by Struve, Miliukov, and Prince Dolgorukov, and publishes *Osvobozhdenie* as its organ. This group wants to establish democracy in Russia, so it proposes to introduce universal suffrage. Although this party has not yet decided to start a revolution and to achieve its goals, some members of the radical group are conspiring with the *Boevaia Druzhina* of the Socialist Revolutionaries. The progressives give at least indirect aid to the general revolutionary movement. This group increasingly antagonizes the Russian government, above all in speech and writing, as in the *zemstvo* (the local institution) [**an organ of local self-government**] campaigns. Generally speaking, members of this party belong to the upper and middle class, and are nobles and scholars. It is, therefore, impossible for the party to go on strike and to adopt violent measures.

THE BUND PARTY [the General Union of Jewish Workers in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia]:

This party is the secret society of Jewish workers. Its party line is socialism and its purpose is to improve the lot of the Jews. It always goes with the tide of the revolutionary movement. Lately, it has been cooperating with the Social Democrats.

THE ARMENIAN PARTY [the Armenian Revolutionary Federation or the *Dashnaktsutiun* (Federation)]:

This party is called the *Droshak* Party¹, the Armenian local socialist party. Its goal is to acquire complete autonomy and to establish an independent regional government. But it has not yet decided whether Armenia should separate from Russia completely or join hands with Russia through a federal system, after ac-

*⁴ One million members are said to have joined this party. There is a great difference between the hard- and soft-liners.

¹ The party's organ was named *Droshak*, which means "flag." Members have been called the *Dashnaks* or *Droshaks*.

complishing its goal. If Armenia, situated between Russia and Turkey, left the former, there would be a risk of its being intimidated and mistreated by the latter. It will not be easy for Armenia to be freed from today's tensions and acquire local autonomy. There are no methods to accomplish this goal without violence and the aid of the revolutionary movement. This party, therefore, decided to join the revolutionary movement in order to accomplish its objectives when the Russian opposition parties rise to power. It is said that Armenia was divided among Russia, Turkey, and Persia in the same manner as Poland was carved up by Russia, Germany, and Austria. Russian Armenia is prosperous commercially, particularly the Baku region.

THE GEORGIAN PARTY [The Georgian Party of Socialists-Federalists-Revolutionaries], the Batum region:

This party is called the *Sakartvelo* Party², the Georgian local socialist party. Georgia is generally a backward civilization, and the Georgians are ferocious and brave. Consequently this party is not as moderate as other socialist groups, and frequently uses explosives. Its *raison d'être* is virtually the same as that of the Armenian Party. Tiflis [Tbilisi] and Batum are the main bases of the party.

THE LETTISH PARTY [the Latvian Social Democratic Union]:

This party is a local socialist and radical party situated in the Livonian and Lithuanian region, called also German Russia or the Baltic Provinces. Although this party did not show any remarkable activity before the outbreak of the war, it has become increasingly radical since that time and is currently one of the most active revolutionary parties. Its activities, especially after 16 August 1904³, are noteworthy.

THE FINNISH CONSTITUTIONALIST PARTY:

This party is a genuine nationalist party in Finland. It has sometimes taken extreme measures, but generally has displayed self-restraint. The party's fear that it will suffer defeat has made it hesitant about taking decisive measures. Although the party is quite eager to establish a completely autonomous government in Finland and, if possible, even to acquire independence, it is not yet willing to use violence. The party explains that violence cannot accomplish its purpose and might endanger the whole nation. Finland has the greatest autonomy of all the oppressed nations in the Russian Empire and is the second oldest constitutional state in Europe, following England. The Tsar is nothing but the legislative head of the nation as the Grand Duke of Finland. Executive decisions are made by the senators, who are Finns and hold positions as ministers of Finland. In principle Finland could govern herself in accordance with her own constitution. The Finnish political situation under Russian rule is, therefore, similar to that of the Hungarians in Austria and the Norwegians in Sweden. However, the current Russifi-

² The party's organ was named *Sakartvelo*, which means Georgia.

³ This reference is to disorders that took place in Riga on 28 August 1904.

cation policy has trampled on the Finnish constitution and earned the Finnish people's contempt. This party has moved away from a previous policy of cooperation with Russian authorities in order to defend the constitution by many kinds of measures. It currently cultivates good relations with the radical group of the Russian Liberals.

THE FINNISH ACTIVE RESISTANCE PARTY*⁵:

This party is quite similar to the above party from a nationalistic viewpoint, but its party line is exactly the same as that of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries. Its members think that Finns, Poles, or Caucasians alone cannot change the political system of Russia. Only the Russian people, especially the revolutionaries, can bring about change. The party, therefore, believes that its goal should be to acquire and maintain the liberty of all nationalities in the Russian Empire by allying with the Russian revolutionaries. Consequently, it advocates strong cooperation with the Socialist Revolutionaries (preferably the hard-liners of the former Nihilist Party) to accomplish its purpose. Although a political party tends to stick to either a liberal or a revolutionary line, the Activist Party occasionally joins hands with the Finnish Constitutionalist Party and sometimes with the Socialist Revolutionaries.

THE POLISH NATIONALIST PARTY [**the Polish National League**]:

This party is quite similar to the Finnish Constitutionalist Party in its self-respect and reluctance to employ violence. Although the party displays hatred for Russia, it remains inactive out of fear of Russia and Germany: Russia could inflict major damage on Poland were the uprising unsuccessful or Germany could take Russia by surprise and annex Poland. Its party line is nothing less than unrealistic. Both the upper class and the farmers belong to this party.

THE POLISH SOCIALIST PARTY:

This party is one of the most radical opposition parties and is mainly composed of workers. Its short-term goal is to establish a Polish state which can detach itself from Russia at will (the autonomous system). It is very influential.

THE POLISH PROGRESSIVE⁴ PARTY:

This party is composed of members of the Polish Nationalist and Socialist Parties.

THE UKRAINIAN PARTY:

This party's objective is restoration of the Ukrainian nation, but because the people are numerous and the region is very large, the party organization is not yet complete. In the Ukraine there are many Socialist Revolutionary bases, espe-

⁵ Zilliacus, Secretary of the union of opposition parties against the Tsarist regime, withdrew from the Constitutionalist Party and established this party.

⁴ Akashi probably used "Progressive" when he should have used "Proletariat".

cially in the main cities, such as Botorii [**Poltava**], Kiev, Odessa, Sevastopol, and Kursk. The Socialist Revolutionaries are quite influential in the Ukraine.

THE BELORUSSIAN PARTY [**the Belorussian Socialist Hramada**]:

This is also a socialist party and aims to acquire local autonomy.

THE GAPON PARTY:

This party, the *Gaponovites*, was founded by Father Gapon and organized by many workers in the Russian capital. It acted as the nucleus of the revolt on 22 January 1905. Its goal is almost the same as that of the Socialist Revolutionaries, and it cooperates with the latter in opposition activities. It differs from the latter only in that it is named after its leader.

Groups which oppose the Tsarist regime include not only the above parties, but also Tatars, Muslims, *Starobriadtsy* [**Old Believers**, “**splitters**” of the **Russian Orthodox Church**], and other parties. Although I have had no time to provide details on small parties and nationalities, these organizations appear quite defective.

Important Persons Related to the Opposition Movement up to Now

[Chapter II-3 in *Rakka ryūsui*]

CHAIKOVSKII [N.V. **Chaikovskii**] (he was called C. for short in telegrams), Russian, is a senior member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, and leader of the Chaikovskii group which was the most radical of all in the Nihilist Party, though he is an anarchist rather than a nihilist. Zheliabov [**A.I. Zheliabov**], who blew up a part of the Winter Palace, is a central figure; Hartman [**Lev Hartman or Gartman**], who had a leading role in damaging the Tsar's [**Alexander II**] carriage in Moscow; Sofiia Perovskaia, who assassinated Alexander II [**1881**], and others were his disciples. Chaikovskii is well-known for his philosophical writings, and he is also a veteran and leader of the Socialist Revolutionaries. It is well-known in his party and in other parties that the creation of the joint opposition movement was at his suggestion.

KROPOTKIN [**Prince P.A. Kropotkin**], Russian, is one of the leaders of the former Chaikovskii group and a philosopher. He has written extensively on theoretical anarchism. He has criticized religious intolerance and cooperated in campaigning for social improvements with Count Tolstoy [**Leo Tolstoy**]. During negotiations leading up to the Franco-Russian Alliance, French Foreign Minister Freycinet [**Prime Minister Charles de Freycinet**] sheltered Kropotkin who was hiding in the country. This annoyed the Tsar [**Alexander III, 1881—1894**] and

delayed conclusion of the treaty. Although Kropotkin did not directly take part in the opposition movement because of his distaste for violence, he helped it indirectly, as a friend of Chaikovskii, in cooperation with Cherkezov. His comments on current Russian domestic policy, which a few European journalists reported this spring, gave encouragement to the revolutionary movement.

CHERKEZOV [Varlaam Cherkezov, a Georgian Prince and anarchist], Caucasian, is an old comrade of the above two figures. His writings are substantial, and his theory is quoted in many kinds of political philosophy. He has limited his help to assisting Chaikovskii indirectly.

BRESHKOVSKAIA [Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaia], Russian, is a member of the former Chaikovskii group, now the Socialist Revolutionaries. Last April she chaired the Geneva conference on the recommendation of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. She is a hard-liner.

VOLKHOVSKII [F.V. Volkhovskii]¹, Russian, is an old member of the former Chaikovskii group. Now he is one of the leaders of the Socialist Revolutionaries.

GOTS [M.R. Gots], Russian, is one of the leading Socialist Revolutionaries. As soon as there was a rumour that the Tsar [**Nicholas II, 1894—1917**] would visit the King of Italy in the autumn of 1903, Gots encouraged the Italian Socialist Party to prevent the Tsar's entry into the country. The press reported that his activities in Italy forced the Tsar to return to the north from Darmstadt.

DIKANSKII [his real name was E.F. Azef; Dikanskii was one of Azef's names in the party], Russian, is one of leaders of the Socialist Revolutionaries and the chief of the Fighting Organization of the party. Few people know whether his name is a pseudonym or not. Only the leaders know. As chief of that group it is necessary for him to be in Russia. Dikanskii is fat and composed, and the most powerful leader smuggled into Russia by the party. He was also a ringleader in the plot to assassinate the Minister of Interior [**V.K. von Plehwe, who was assassinated on 28 July 1904**] and the Grand Duke of Moscow [**Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, assassinated on 17 February 1905**], and an originator of the revolt of the Black Sea Fleet.²

SOSKIS [D.V. Soskis] is one of the main figures of the Socialist Revolutionaries and an assistant to Chaikovskii.

RUBANOVICH [I.A. or Eli Rubanovich] is a member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. He lives in Paris.

PLEKHANOV [G.V. Plekhanov], Russian, is a leader of the Social Democratic Party and the chief of *Iskra*.

¹ Akashi wrote Wanhovusukii, but he must have meant F.V. Volkhovskii.

² Here Akashi was mistaken. Azef had nothing to do with the *Potemkin* mutiny.



Azef and his friend Madame N. in Ostend in 1909 after Azef was exposed as a secret agent of the Russian police.

LENIN [V.I. Lenin, whose real name was Ul'ianov], Russian, is a leader of the Social Democratic Party.

Prince **DOLGORUKOV [Petr D. Dolgorukov]**, Russian, is a leader of the radical wing of the Liberal Party, and attended the Paris conference as a delegate of the party. His family is descended from the ancient princely clan of [**Iurii**] Dolgorukii, the founder of Moscow. The Dolgorukovs are one of the most distinguished families in Russia, and hold prominent positions in the Russian Court.

Professor **MILIUKOV [P.N. Miliukov]**, Russian, is a former professor of Moscow University, a sympathizer of the Fighting Organization of the Socialist Revolutionaries, and a radical member of the Liberal Party. He attended the Paris conference as a delegate of the party.

STRUVE [P.B. Struve], Russian, is a leader of the radical wing of the Liberals and the editor of *Osvobozhdenie*.

Maxim GORKY [**his real name was A.M. Peshkov**], Russian, is a famous writer. He does not belong to any party and is active among the Liberals, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and the Social Democrats.

Father GAPON [**G.A. Gapon**], Russian, became famous after the incident of 22 January. He has his labour union, named the *Gaponovites*, and is a sympathizer of the Socialist Revolutionaries.

SEMENOV [**E. Semenov**], naturalized Russian in France, is a former member of the Socialist Revolutionaries. He has French citizenship and is a secretary of the Friends of Russia [*Société des amis du peuple russe et des peuples annexés*] which was founded in Paris to oppose the Russian government.

ZILLIACUS [**Konrad Viktor or Konni Zilliacus**] (called Secretary in my report), Finn, is a former lawyer, but now a writer. He is the head of the Finnish Active Resistance Party which was organized as a separate unit of the Socialist Revolutionaries. He was the chairman of the Paris conference.

Victor FURUHJELM, Finn, is a former lawyer. He is an exile like Zilliacus and a leader in the Finnish Active Resistance Party.

WOLFF [**Eugen Wolff**], Finn, is the former English honorary consul in Helsingfors [**Helsinki; Wolff had in fact been the British Vice Consul in Viborg**]. He is a leader in the Finnish Active Resistance Party and an owner of a French paper company named *Bonflue*.

JODKO [**Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz**], Bachelor of Law, Pole, is a leader of the Polish Socialist Party.

MALINOWSKI [**Aleksander Malinowski**], Pole, is a former railway engineer and a leader of the Polish Socialists.

PAUL, Pole, is a member of the Polish Socialists in London. I do not know his real name.

DMOWSKI [**Roman Dmowski**], is a leader of the Polish Nationalist Party.

BALICKI [**Zygmunt Balicki**], is a leader of the Polish Nationalist Party.

Prince LORIS-MELIKOV [**Jean Loris-Melikov or Hovhannes Loris-Melikian in Armenian**], Armenian, is one of the main figures of the Armenian Party. He is a nephew of General Loris-Melikov [**General M.T. Loris-Melikov, Minister of Interior**] who was the chancellor of Alexander II.

MARMIYAN is a leader of the Armenian Party and the chief editor of *Droshak*.

VARANDIAN [**Mikayel Varandian, whose real surname was Hovhannisian**], is the same³ as the above individual.

³ Marmiyian alias Marmilov probably is the same person as Varandian who was the edi-

DEKANOZI [**Georgii Dekanozi or Dekanozishvili**], Caucasian from Batum, is a leader of the Georgian Party. He once worked as a secretary in the Imperial Ministry of Finance.

BAUD [**Eugène Baud**], Swiss, is an anarchist in Switzerland and the proprietor of a motorcar shop.

DICKENSON [**Robert Richard Dickenson**], Englishman, is an accountant for the Socialist Revolutionaries. He is a wine merchant by profession.

MORTON, American, is an American anarchist.

QUILLARD [**Pierre Quillard**], Frenchman, is a French anarchist, a journalist of *L'Européen* and a pro-Armenian journal, and a member of the Friends of Russia.

MINKE [**Ernests Minke**]⁴ is a leader of the Lettish Socialist Party. I do not know whether or not this is his real name.

STRAUTMAN [**Jānis Strautmanis alias Jānis Kruuslan**] is a member of the Lettish Socialist Party and a harbour master of Windau [**Ventspils**].

HARTMAN is a member of the Socialist Revolutionaries and a bomb expert.

BAUMAN is a member of the Lettish Socialist Party.

CASTRÉN [**Jonas Castrén**] is a leader of the Finnish Constitutionalist Party.

THESLÖF [**Gösta Theslöf**] is a former Russian staff officer, Captain, and a revolutionary member of the Finnish Constitutionlists.

IGNATIUS [**Hannes Ignatius**] is a member of the same party.

Professor REUTER [**Julio Reuter**] is a member of the same party. He is a professor at Helsingfors [**Helsinki**] University.

BLOKKOBEI [**probably E.G.W. Becker-Reuterskiöld, whose nickname was Becker Bey**] is a member of the same party. He is a lawyer.

tor of *Droshak*. Akashi's text makes it difficult to determine whether "same" means that the same person used both names or that both persons took part in the same party.

⁴ He was one of the organizers of the plan for shipping arms to St Petersburg in 1905. — We wish to thank Uldis Ģermanis and Seppo Zetterberg for helping to clarify the orthography of Latvian names in this work.

The Russian Opposition Movement against the Tsarist Regime

[Chapter IV in *Rakka ryūsui*]

No one acknowledges it, but there are dark tides of dissension on the Russian political scene. However, if we try looking for clues and inquire into the actual situation, we discern only a vague shore. All of the so-called opposition parties are secret societies, where no one can distinguish opponents of the regime from Russian agents, or even find out the names and addresses of the opposition's leaders. It is difficult for us to identify the real opposition activists, because they have a series of false names which they often change for yet other names. Russian agents have known only some of the leaders and followed them up: it has been impossible to continue such activity in Europe, outside Russia and Germany, because, with the lack of restrictions on political exiles in Europe, each leader has had access to the private establishments of ladies and gentlemen and has often been patronized by scholars or gentlemen.

For example, Zilliacus' wife, whose husband has been secretary of the opposition movement to be described below, was so welcome in society that I have seen her by chance at the party of Count von Leyden, the former German Minister to Japan. In those places, there were many other opposition leaders: Baron Gripenberg [**Lennart Gripenberg, Finnish Senator**], brother-in-law of Russian



Vera Zasulich when seventeen years old.

General Gripenberg [**Oskar Gripenberg**]¹, who was the commander at the battle of Sandepu [26—29 January 1905], Baron Gripenberg was one of the leaders of the Finnish Constitutionalist Party and an exile; Prince Khilkov [**D.A. Khilkov**], who was a younger brother of the Minister of Communication, Khilkov [**M.I. Khil'kov**]², Prince Khilkov was a leading member of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party; Vera Zasulich (whose younger brother Lieutenant General Zasulich [**M.I. Zasulich**] was defeated at the battle of Yalu [1 May 1904]), attempted to assassinate the city governor of St Petersburg [**General F.F. Trepov, 1878**] and is currently a leading member of the Russian Social Democratic Party; and so on.

Count Mannerheim [**Carl Mannerheim**], an exile friend of mine, heaved a sigh and said to me, “My younger brother [**Baron Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim who later became the Marshal of Finland and President of the Republic**], now a Russian Colonel, has gone with General Mishchenko to fight against your army.” He hoped that his brother would not be injured. Because of these complications, it was very difficult for me to form and retain close ties with opposition leaders.

The relations between Japan and the opposition parties are as follows. I asked Ueda Sentarō, a Japanese student in the Russian capital, to gather information about the opposition parties from university students, and also discussed this with a student named Braun³, whom I employed as a language teacher. I could not get contacts with opposition leaders from these sources, even though there were probably many students and *zemstvo* representatives. Around March or April 1903, there was news that the opposition leaders had been sent into exile and some disturbances had commenced in the provinces in Finland. I would have liked to have gone there and established contact with them at the first opportunity. But when I told Ueda of the plan, he prevented me from visiting Finland because my Russian was very poor at that time. I decided not to visit Finland, although I remembered a few of opposition leaders' names.

Later (the report at the end of 1903 or beginning of 1904), when Balogh de Galántha⁴ [**Miklós (Nicolas) Balogh de Galántha**]⁴ gave me the addresses of

¹ Balogh de Galántha is an Austrian living in St Petersburg. He came to the Japanese legation and asked for a meeting with the Minister [**Kurino Shin'ichirō**] just before the war. Though the Minister refused to see him without any letters of introduction, both Secretary Akizuki and Mr. Maruge saw him, but they gave up because Balogh de Galántha could not speak either German or Russian. After I told him that I was the Military Attaché, he was willing to talk with me, and, briefly, his views accorded with those of the revolutionary parties. Thereafter I started corresponding with him, though his character was unreliable. Later, although it was apparent that he was not a revolutionary, I was able to contact genuine revolutionaries with his help. This is the same as making a seemingly worthless investment.

² Lennart and Oskar Gripenberg were not brothers-in-law, but distant relatives.

³ D.A. Khilkov was actually not M.I. Khil'kov's brother.

⁴ Braun was employed by the Japanese General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He wrote a letter from Libau to the Japanese Consul in Copenhagen on 7 January 1905 that he had an interview with Admiral A.A. Birilev about the dispatch of the Third

Finnish opposition leaders in Stockholm, I intended to see them, because their names coincided with the above-mentioned exiles' names. Once relations between Japan and Russia deteriorated, it was impossible for me to leave the capital for even one day. I could not do anything under existing conditions. A few days before the outbreak of the war, Akizuki [**Akizuki Sachio**], who is currently the Japanese Minister to Sweden, and I went to a public house where we met someone by chance. A man who called himself a professor and a supporter of *Young Russia*, in reality a Nihilist as I realized, came to our table and we drank together. There was no way to determine whether he was really a revolutionary or a Russian agent. Nevertheless, I was inwardly pleased, because he called himself a real follower of *Young Russia*, which meant that he was a friend of Japan fighting against Russia, even though he may have been an agent. These contacts gave me reference data about the condition of the opposition groups in Russia. Once the war began, I left St Petersburg and arrived in Stockholm via Berlin on 22 February 1904, unless my memory is at fault.

As soon as I arrived in Stockholm, I was visited by Lieutenant Colonel Heftye^{*2} [**Thomas Thomassen Heftye**]⁵, an old friend since the time when we were Military Attachés in France. On that occasion, it was necessary for me officially to refer to myself as the Japanese Military Attaché to Sweden.

Using a messenger on the day of arrival [**in Stockholm**], I sent a secret letter to agent Castrén, the leader of the Finnish Constitutionalist Party. I had known

^{*2} Thereafter, he became the War Minister of the Twin Kingdom of Sweden-Norway. Recently he was appointed to the position of Chief-*Aide-de-Camp* to the King. **Baltic Fleet to the Far East. See the Japanese Consul in Copenhagen to the Minister in The Hague 11 January 1905 (extract of the note), Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan (rokukunobu) [Inner Affairs of Russia] 4, 1.6.3.2-9, GS.**

⁴ Akashi's description of Balogh de Galántha in footnote 1 is not correct. This Hungarian was not an agent for the Russian government. He had a very good command of German and Russian. At the beginning of the war he organized, at Akashi's request, a spy network in Russia. Balogh de Galántha was Akashi's middleman when he was establishing relations with the Finnish constitutionalists in February 1904. The Finns did not completely trust Balogh de Galántha and they made Akashi suspicious of him. Akashi terminated cooperation with Balogh de Galántha sometime between May 1904 and the beginning of the following year. From spring 1904 a few officers in the Swedish General Staff helped Akashi and his assistant, Nagao, to obtain Russian military intelligence. See Antti Kujala, "Japanin, Englannin ja Ruotsin yhteydet Suomen perustuslailliseen oppositioon Venäjän-Japanin sodan aikana" [The Finnish Constitutionalist Opposition's Contacts with Japan, England, and Sweden during the Russo-Japanese War], *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja* (1988), pp. 3—23 — a Japanese translation: Antti Kujala, "Nichirosensōjiniokeru finrandorikkenshugiteikōhato nihon, igirisu, suweedanno kyōryoku", translated by Inaba Chiharu, *Hokuōshi kenkyū*, No 5 (1987), pp. 36—51 and No 6 (1988), pp. 40—53.

⁵ Heftye was a Norwegian technical officer. He had been a Military Attaché to the legation of Sweden-Norway 1899—1902 or —1903 in Paris, at the same time Akashi had been there in a similar post. Heftye became a military adviser to the department of the Norwegian Cabinet in Stockholm in 1903 and Lieutenant Colonel on 22 October 1903. In 1905, he was appointed the chief of the Administration of the Telegraph Service in Norway. Compare Akashi's second footnote in which the reference to Heftye's career is incorrect.



Kurino, Japanese Minister to Russia, in Berlin in 1904.

his name for some time, and requested a meeting. My messenger came back and said, “Mr. Castrén said that he had no reason to receive a letter from you and that you have probably mistaken him for someone else.” He returned my letter.

I was greatly disappointed, but then a gentleman with a white beard and a silk hat visited me and gave me an envelope containing a card from a person named Konni Zilliacus³. The text read “Castrén’s best friend.” Zilliacus said, “We returned your letter earlier, because it was impossible to know whether you had sent the messenger. I beg your forgiveness. Both Castrén and I greatly favour your offer of discussions. However, this hotel is dangerous. Please stand in front of the hotel tomorrow morning at eleven o’clock. I will be sitting in the coach, which will come past you at that time, and you should get into it. If you pull down the folding top against the snow, it will be almost impossible for anyone to see you. So you will be able to come to the meeting point in secret.”

As planned, I met them at Castrén’s house the next morning. On entering, I thought it very strange that he had hung his banishment order signed by the Russian Emperor on the middle wall, with the portrait of His Majesty [**Japanese Emperor Meiji**] on one side and a signed photograph of the Danish Prince [**King Frederick VIII, 1906—1912**] (the elder brother of the Russian Dowager Empress

³ It was my first meeting with him.

[**Maria Fedorovna**]^{*4}) on the other. Later, I heard that this Prince was not particularly intelligent but was sincerely opposed to the oppression of the people, and often admonished the Russian Emperor through his sister. The Prince sometimes enjoyed meeting with Zilliacus and Castrén. Last summer they presented a statement of their views to him.

Incidentally, I asked them at the meeting to inform me of the policies of the opposition parties and of Russian domestic affairs. With respect to these matters, Zilliacus said, "I am willing to give you as much information about political affairs as possible, but can hardly commit our party to work as a Japanese agent because this work would cast reflection upon the party." Castrén said, "Wait a moment, I will ask my friend to do the work." Soon he called and invited a Swedish Staff officer, Captain Aminoff [**Iwan Tønnes Edward Aminoff**], who now frequents the Japanese legation as Minister Akizuki's language teacher.

Later, I was able to send Second Lieutenant Bergen to Russia, thanks to the efforts of Aminoff and another Staff officer, Lieutenant Klingenstierna [**Klas Axel Klingenstierna**]. At that time, when I required a reliable person to send money orders to agents and receive their acknowledgments, I was also able to employ the rich merchant Lindberg [**Sven Gunnar Lindberg**], a friend of Aminoff's. Lindberg subsequently became Japanese Honorary Consul in Gothenburg.

I shall now end my description of the intelligence work, and begin to comment on the opposition parties. At the beginning of March 1904, as I recall, Zilliacus returned from Europe [**Akashi used the term "Southern Europe"**] and showed me a letter from Chaikovskii^{*5}. Zilliacus said to me, "I quite agree with him that the opposition parties should unite with the Socialist Revolutionary Party as the focal point. You would doubtless feel it disgraceful that patriots, who have their own political opinions and hope to promote the public welfare, make plans for disruption at home during a national crisis, but this is not the correct way to understand Russian domestic affairs. On the one hand, no one needs convincing that the Russo-Japanese War will lead to the overthrow of the imperial regime. On the other, the so-called Nihilists, who call both the Emperor and government officials devils pillaging the country and causing distress, believe that they are destined to destroy those devils and let people live peacefully. So, it is appropriate that activist parties like Chaikovskii's group should consider the outbreak of the war as a favourable opportunity for their activities."

^{*4} It may be said in passing that she always listened to what her adviser Shervashidze had to say about the Russian situation when she visited her birthplace. [**G.D.**] Shervashidze [**he was Prince and Chamberlain**] is a Caucasian and commented freely on Russian affairs outside the country. The Georgian socialist Dekanozi is also his great friend. Berendsen [**Ivar Berendsen**], the Superintendent of the Danish Customs⁶, is Zilliacus' best friend and always helped him.

^{*5} He had been a leader of the left wing of the Nihilist Party in the past. At present the Socialist Revolutionary Party is a secret society with Chaikovskii's group as the central force.

⁶ He was a high-ranking official of the Danish Customs, not the superintendent.

When Zilliacus returned to Stockholm, Roman Dmowski⁶, leader of the Polish Nationalist Party, proposed to me that Polish soldiers in Manchuria might surrender to the Japanese army. In order to carry out this plan, Dmowski finally went to Japan.

It was so important to give aid to the Russian opposition movement that I needed a senior Japanese figure first to give support to my plan. But a mere secretary was *chargé d'affaires* in those days in the Japanese legation in Stockholm. So I visited Germany, Austria, France, and England, partly to find spies, to see Dmowski, and to talk with other opposition groups in Paris, but mainly, to confer with Hayashi Tadasu, the Minister to Britain, who held the most important post in Europe. I met him in London through Colonel Utsunomiya [**Lieutenant Colonel Utsunomiya Tarō, Military Attaché to Britain, who became Colonel in March 1905**] and gained approval for most of my plan.

At the end of June, relations between Zilliacus and well-known opposition parties matured. He and I went to Paris at almost the same time and consulted with Dekanozi of the *Sakartvelo* Party and Prince Loris-Melikov of the *Droshak* Party about the plan for creating disturbances in Russia. Thereafter, Zilliacus went to London and consulted with Chaikovskii. Then Zilliacus, with an introduction from me, met Utsunomiya as a first step toward meeting Hayashi. As soon as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff [**Nagaoka Gaishi**] sent an answer to Utsunomiya, I promised Zilliacus that I would pay 3,000 yen⁷ for written appeals.

At almost the same time, I organized a meeting of the opposition members and had Lieutenant Colonel Tanaka Hirotarō teach them how to sabotage railway lines. Later they tried to blow up a track in a few places, but the results were inadequate: they stopped trains for only one day even in the most effective instance. That was the reason why we finally gave up the venture.

I felt it would be necessary to coordinate the opposition's views more exactly, and had Zilliacus ask Loris-Melikov's opinion. Loris-Melikov feared, however, that a union among opposition parties would prompt the Russian government

⁶ I knew him through Castrén's introduction. When I urged Castrén to stage an uprising, he answered, "It would be impossible for only our party to do so." I said, "I would like to visit your friend in Cracow, Austria-Hungary, and persuade him to join the revolt." "That is a fine idea. I will introduce Dmowski to you," Castrén said, and gave me a letter of introduction. Then I left by train and travelled the whole day. When I arrived in Cracow at night and met Dmowski, I gave him introductions to both General Kodama [**Kodama Gentarō, Deputy Chief of the General Staff before June 1904**] and Major General Hukushima [**Hukushima Yasumasa, Chief of Section II (Intelligence)**].

⁷ Zilliacus said, "As your country is very familiar with Russian affairs, Japan need not gamble much money just now. Pay just 3,000 yen to finance the printing of written appeals for a start. You will be able to trace its influence. If and when good results are evident, you might consider how much to pay afterwards. If you simply give us 3,000 yen, it will make it easier for us to operate quickly. If we have to make a plan for spending even a sum of 3,000 yen from our own account, we will only quarrel with each other."

to become more reactionary, though he did not himself oppose cooperation. Moreover, he doubted whether any manifesto could ever totally satisfy every party. The Socialist Revolutionaries, the Social Democrats, the Polish Nationalists and Socialists, the Finnish parties, and other parties had different doctrines and purposes, and also different hopes.

Dekanozi, delegate of the *Sakartvelo* Party in Paris, spoke of the party's approval of a united front in principle without reference to methods, if I were to give them some subsidies. They were short of funds.

There were dozens of [Russian] opposition parties in Switzerland. Of course, it was difficult to locate each of their leaders since they had to conceal themselves. However, I learned their addresses by dint of Zilliacus', Loris-Melikov's, Dekanozi's and the French anarchist Quillard's connections.

I went to Switzerland in July at almost the same time as Zilliacus. Present there were Marmilov⁷, head of the *Droshak* Party; Plekhanov, head of the Russian Social Democrats; Breshkovskaia, the elderly leader of the Socialist Revolutionaries; Shshukov [**probably Isakov, who was better known as Mark Liber in his party; his real name was Mikhel Goldman**], a certain member of the Bund; and so on. Most of the opposition leaders' homes were in Chemin de Roseraie, an out-of-the-way place near Geneva, where they were engaged in literary work in the setting of snow-covered mountains and a big lake.

The greatest obstacle to making a plan for uniting the opposition parties was the frictions and jealousies among these parties. Even though they had the same goal of creating unity among themselves, it was always impossible for them to stop suspecting each other: the Socialist Revolutionary Party competed with the Social Democratic Party; enmity between the Polish Nationalist Party and the Polish Socialist Party was unavoidable as a matter of principle; and it was impossible to circumvent the influence of history on relations between nations, as in the case of Russians and Poles. The mediator among these parties was Zilliacus. As a Finn, he had not been involved in conflicts over principles and over territory and had also had a lot of friends among members of the former Nihilist Party; he not only maintained good relations with both the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats, but had some friends among the Finnish Constitutionalists and the Russian Liberal Party. For these reasons Zilliacus was the most competent person to mediate relations among the parties. In the summer of 1904, however, the Armenians, the Bund, and the Social Democrats had yet to send him their replies concerning participation. Under existing conditions, Zilliacus stressed to me, "As I am planning to hold a joint conference among the opposition parties in October 1904, whatever happens, I intend to ask each party to send a few members to the conference. Each delegation will explain their party's views on how to deal with the Russian government. If possible, I will induce them to make

⁷ The Japanese characters for Marmilov were different from those for Marmiyan, but the person called by both names was probably Varandian.

a joint written appeal and then to hold demonstrations.”

At the end of July, I left Zilliacus and went to Rapperswil, near Zurich, Switzerland, to see Balicki of the Polish Nationalist Party and to ask his opinion. He said, “I also doubt whether the joint conference can be a success, but will try to attend it if members of the party permit.”

Thereafter I went to Berlin, and waited for the end of the international socialist congress in Amsterdam [14—20 August 1904]. When it was over, I went to Hamburg, Germany where I met Zilliacus at the end of August. He invited Jodko, the leader of the Polish Socialist Party, from London and explained to him the current views of the opposition leaders living in Switzerland in my presence. Zilliacus asked Jodko to have his party attend the conference. Jodko agreed.

On the very day that I arrived in Stockholm, at the end of August, I received a telegram from Utsunomiya. It said, “Come soon if you want.”

I left there and went to London: this was the third trip to Europe. Utsunomiya arranged a meeting with Jodko and some other members of the Polish Socialist Party.⁸ The majority of those present argued that the party should not attend the conference in October because it would not produce any results. This view was the complete opposite of the one Jodko had given Zilliacus and me at the Hamburg meeting. One member said, “In the Bund (the Jewish Socialist Party in Russia), there is a man who says that Finnish leader Zilliacus is working for Colonel A. As I doubt whether such a conference will be a success, I am hesitant about attending it.” I said in company with Utsunomiya, “The promoter of the united movement is Zilliacus. I only want to help the movement, if that is necessary. If you do not agree, there is no alternative. I am not asking your party to attend the conference. I would rather not participate in this matter. You should be free to change the alignment of the opposition parties.” Jodko said, “While there are various conflicts between members, I want them to consider the issue carefully and am going to take all possible steps to attend the conference.”

By mid-September the other parties announced that they would attend the conference. Before then, Zilliacus and I disagreed over whether to send an invitation to the Russian Liberal Party⁹. I was afraid that the danger would be increased by inviting the Liberals, because the party had always included both hard and soft-liners in opposition to each other. A stubborn Zilliacus rejected my views and eventually asked the party to attend. The hard-liners accepted his request on condition that the conference be convened in Paris.

This demand was opposed by the Russian Social Democrats, who stood firm for holding it in Switzerland. Apparently this conflict originated in great differences over the scope of each party’s influence and means at their disposal. Russians, whose vice is to insist on trifling matters and to refuse to cooperate, could

⁸ The Polish Socialist Party had a branch in London.

⁹ Later, the Liberal Party changed its name to the Constitutional Democrats, the so-called K.D. [*the Kadets*].

not compromise on this matter. Plekhanov answered, "To my regret, first, I cannot enter Paris, because I was expelled from France. Secondly, the Social Democrats, who stick to socialist principles, cannot attend any conference not based on them." This second explanation reflected the jealousy of his group's powerful competitor, the Socialist Revolutionaries. Though the latter called itself socialist, it is actually anarchist, and has always been refused permission to participate in the Socialist International.

After the above affair, the Liberals, the Socialist Revolutionaries, the Finnish Constitutionalists, the Polish Nationalists, the Polish Socialists, the *Droshak* Party, the *Sakartvelo* Party and other parties, except for the Social Democrats and the Bund, met in Paris on 1 October.

This conference lasted for 5 days. Zilliacus was nominated as chairman, thanks to his central role in convening the conference. Those present at the conference were very much surprised to find out that the opinion of the Liberals was keener than was expected: the party insisted upon giving universal suffrage to the people; adopted many previously opposed measures; wanted to undermine the power of the Russian government; advocated establishing the conditions in which each party would be easily able to achieve its goal; and so on. The delegation of the Liberals included Prince Dolgorukov, a descendant from an ancient ruling dynasty, which is one of the most reputable families in Russia, Professor Miliukov, the notable Struve, and some others.

The contents of the resolutions of this conference are the same as reported in the telegrams which I sent to the General Staff. Motono [**Motono Ichirō**], the Minister to France, forwarded them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time. Though there were differences among the parties, the conference ended in success, thanks to Zilliacus' strenuous endeavour.

It was decided at this conference that each party could demonstrate in its own way: the Liberals would rally the *zemstvos* and attack the government in press campaigns; the Socialist Revolutionaries and other parties would make extreme measures their speciality; the Caucasians would use their skill in assassination; the Polish Socialists would use their experience in organizing demonstrations.

Inside the Finnish Party, a difference of opinion arose, though Zilliacus, who was one of the leaders of the party, acted as chairman and promoter of the conference. Former Senator [**Leo**] Mechelin's faction did not consent to the resolutions of the conference. Getting to the bottom of the matter, Mechelin believed the Russian government to be still so powerful that it would be dangerous for Finland to have recourse to reckless violence, and he stressed the need for military preparation, which meant that nothing should be begun until his faction had 50,000 rifles. This matter is discussed in his proposal included in the envelope labeled "*Somuku*" [**Disobey**], which I shelved because it irritated me.*¹⁰ That was the reason why Zilliacus organized a party and named it the

*¹⁰ Zilliacus' opinion was excellent. He said, "It is impossible to weaken and to over-

Finnish Active Resistance Party. As I said before, this party entered into an alliance and acted with the Socialist Revolutionaries.

After the conference, those parties which used extraordinary measures got together without the Liberals to draw up plans for active opposition against the Russian government. It was decided to obstruct the army's mobilization. After the resolution, I promised the parties that were short of funds that I would give them a subsidy and departed for Stockholm; each party also left Paris in the middle of October. Shortly afterwards, the Polish Socialists initiated strike action and engaged in armed conflict with the gendarmerie; reports in the newspapers of those days of the party's forceful activity showed how zealous its active resistance was.

At the same time, Zilliacus talked with influential figures on how to resist the Russian government after the demonstrations. I proposed this subject to the General Staff, and the Staff called my attention to it by telegram.⁸ In fact, I was not involved in the matter at all, but Zilliacus himself took part in it: he contacted and got support from Jean Jaurès, Vice Chairman of the French National Assembly and head of the Socialist Party, who had influence on the French government, and he gained support from the distinguished Doctor Anatole France, Senator Pressensé [**Francis de Pressensé**] and Clemenceau [**Georges Clemenceau**] to organize a group named the Friends of Russia (this means an enemy of the Russian government) who wrote against the Russian government in newspapers close to the group such as *L'Humanité*, *Le Gil Blas*⁹, *L'Aurore*, *L'Européen*, *Pro Armenia*, and *La Georgie*.

Simultaneously the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries tried to hold demonstrations in Kiev, Odessa, and Moscow, and to instigate agitation among university students. The Liberals held meetings of provincial and district assemblymen and doctors in the *zemstvos* in order to speak frequently against the government, and they attempted to organize press campaigns. The Caucasians assassinated about ten government officials every day. As the above matters were reported daily in detail in the international press, I need only refer to them here.

Such activities continued from November 1904 to January 1905. The Social Democrats struggled on single-handed, and their unaligned group tried to organize workers' demonstrations.

throw the Russian government, if only the subjugated nations would rise in revolt. The uprising had better be led mainly by genuine Russian groups. Subjugated nationalities must act in subordination to the Russians, who have the capacity for overthrowing the government. When the aim is achieved, the unity of the groups will be broken and they will be opposed to each other. At that time, Poland, the Caucasus, and Finland will naturally become independent of Russia. Despite my arguments, Senator Mechelin refused to enter the union of the opposition, unless the subjugated nations can acquire 50,000 rifles in order to begin an uprising." Zilliacus inveighed against a man who had made such a roundabout and foolish plan.

⁸ See telegram 6 in the Appendix to Rakka ryūsui, in the present volume.

⁹ *Jiruburā* in the Japanese original.



Father Gapon. The Finnish Active Resistance Party spread this picture in 1905. The cross hanging on his chest was erased from the picture.

On the day of Epiphany, [19] January 1905, a single bombardment [**an incident in which live shells were fired at the Winter Palace**] made the Emperor's blood run cold. Father Gapon became famous for the events of 22 January. As a priest among the workers he was faithful to revolutionary principles; he belonged to neither the Socialist Revolutionaries nor the Social Democrats, but took a middle position between the two parties and had close connections with both of them. While both parties were conducting propaganda, Gapon led the workers to the Winter Palace for a peaceful protest in cooperation with both groups. Gapon became famous for this affair; as a matter of fact, he was spontaneously chosen to lead the demonstration as a result of the confrontation and the competition between the two parties. To tell the truth, no one had carefully considered on an earlier occasion what all this would lead to. It far exceeded my expectations that a priest, who had merely gained the workers' confidence, could assume the leadership of tens of thousands of workers belonging to separate parties and shake the Russian capital after all.^{*11}

Though Gapon's protest demonstration was crushed by force, the Russian government lost prestige throughout Europe. The Friends of Russia actively sup-

^{*11} As the proverb goes, a rotten thing becomes verminous. If political conditions are too churned up, disturbances must occur.

ported the opposition movement in France, which was Russia's ally. The famous professor Doctor Seignobos [**Charles Seignobos**] said to his students, "In no circumstances should you underwrite a Russian loan and you should make my opinion known to your parents. I am not only afraid that your families will lose their wealth but am also worried about economic upheaval in France."

A foreign correspondent who had watched Gapon's demonstration reported, "A worker fell wounded from the gunfire and said, 'If only a Japanese battalion had helped us, I would not be dying here.'" Perhaps to give another example, you can understand that the opposition parties bore a grudge against the Russian government: one day, the veteran fighter Breshkovskaia said to a certain individual, "Though I have fought a holy war against the devil in the cause of the people for years, I have not succeeded yet. Now, our enemy Japan has given us the opportunity to exterminate the devil. It is iniquitous that we have so little power to destroy him. The only enemy people have in their hearts are the Russian government and the Tsar."

After Gapon's protest, demonstrations were continuously held in many places. The revolutionaries severely obstructed the mobilization of the Tsar's troops in the eastern, central, and western parts of Russia as well as in Poland and the Caucasus. In Georgia especially, some infantry companies which arrived to suppress the anti-mobilization movement were besieged, and then the mobilization orders of the First Caucasian Corps were completely withdrawn. Conditions deteriorated to the point that the permanent corps could not move from one region to another in Poland. During the same period, some officials were assassinated in Finland.

I left Stockholm and travelled south during Gapon's protest. This was my fourth trip to Europe. I was interested in changes occurring in Paris and elsewhere. On this trip I heard of a plan to assassinate a member of the imperial royal family. A few weeks later, an assassin killed Grand Duke Sergei, the extreme reactionary, with a gelatine bomb.

At that time, Zilliacus also came to Paris. After the Gapon massacre [**Bloody Sunday**], we met Volkhovskii of the Socialist Revolutionary Party and other opposition members. It became necessary to discuss with Chaikovskii the movement following the affair, because he was a veteran activist. As the result of this discussion, we decided to make good use of Gapon's famous name in order to invite each opposition party to a conference, and to make mutual plans for more intensive action in the summer.

This conference was held at Simon's house in Geneva at the beginning of April 1905. The extremist parties, such as the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the Polish Socialist Party, the Finnish Active Resistance Party, the *Droshak* Party (of Armenia), the *Sakartvelo* Party (of Georgia), the Belorussian Party [**the Belorussian Socialist Hramada**], the Lettish Party [**the Latvian Social Democratic Union**] and others, attended the conference. Though the Social Democratic Party and the Bund attended, they left without making a commitment to cooperate. They considered small groups such as the Lettish Party (the Letts live on the coast of the

Baltic Sea) too insignificant to be given equal voting rights. Later reports on the Letts' activities permitted outsiders to understand that the party had played an important role.

At this conference, in fact, Chaikovskii and Zilliacus had assumed that the opposition groups would continue their activities and take desperate risks in the summer. I handed the resolution to Ueda Sentarō in Berlin, and he seems to have kept it. The aims of this resolution were as follows: that both the Poles and the Finns would become independent of Russia but federate with her; the Socialist Revolutionaries would overthrow the present government and establish a liberal system of government and a federation with the subjugated nationalities; the Belorussians and the Letts would acquire complete autonomy. Later, the aims of the last two parties were advanced much more, and each tried to make a plan for building up its own independent government.¹⁰ Though the Liberal Party did not attend this conference, Prince Shakhovskoi [D.I. Shakhovskoi], Prince Dolgorukov and others later agreed to the resolution. The resolution was proclaimed in a paper named *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia*.

While this conference ended satisfactorily, the other plan of the Socialist Revolutionaries failed completely. A young lady named Leont'eva [Tat'iana Leont'eva], who was smuggled into the Court to assassinate an unnamed individual (no one said who, but it was supposedly the Tsar), was arrested and many of her fellow members were also arrested as a result of a search of her house. When I arrived from Stockholm in Paris at the end of April, the activists had been discouraged by this reversal. But the requested money had already arrived there, so I decided on its distribution and tried to restore their spirits.

Before then, the chief of the Polish Intransigent Party, Suddeniki [Wojciech Dzierduszycki] who waited for me in Vienna during my fourth trip to Europe, told me that there were some tens of thousands of inexpensive rifles in Switzerland. During my fifth trip, I arranged with a few men in Paris to buy those arms. While the Armenians were buying French rifles of the old style in Saint-Chamond, they told Dekanozi of the Georgian Party (in the Caucasus) of their wish to obtain Swiss Vetterli rifles and asked how to buy them. Dekanozi asked Baud, the wealthy Swiss anarchist, about this, using the famous philosopher Cherkezov as his middleman. Cherkezov was also an anarchist and Dekanozi's old friend from the same province. Baud made a purchasing contact with one of his former schoolmates who is now employed as a Colonel at an artillery arsenal.

During this time, each opposition party was busy buying arms. The parties that did not take part in the alliance, such as the Social Democrats and the Bund, were also particularly busy buying pistols.

Dikanskii [Azef], the most powerful leader of the Socialist Revolutionaries, reported that he had gone to Odessa with 40,000 yen to canvass and to seek ways

¹⁰ Neither the Belorussian Socialist *Hramada* nor the Latvian Social Democratic Union advocated the complete separation of their country from Russia.

to obtain arms. In June he provoked a disturbance there and escaped to Moscow. Vakulinchuk [**Grigorii Vakulinchuk**] and Feldmann [**Konstantin Feldmann**], both of whom were Dikanskii's disciples and Caucasians, organized a mutiny on the *Potemkin* which started the Black Sea Revolt; Vakulinchuk was killed and Feldmann was arrested: it is said that Feldmann broke out of prison and went into hiding until peace could be restored, but was arrested in Poland when he tried to smuggle himself back into Russia again.¹¹ This disturbance [**the Potemkin mutiny**] was not sufficiently prepared: the authorities knew in advance of the party's plans. However, the Russian government's prestige was impaired, and the disturbance undermined the confidence of the Tsar in the military.

Before this disturbance, the arrest of members of the Socialist Revolutionaries [**29—30 March 1905**] temporarily discouraged the opposition parties. In order to restore their spirits, it became necessary to take measures to encourage the opposition at large. Chaikovskii, the extreme hard-liner of the Socialist Revolutionaries, was the central figure in the plan, and Zilliacus, Gapon, Soskis, and others were actively involved. Thereafter, it was decided that if the Socialist Revolutionaries took a leading role, the other parties would follow, and activities to implement the plan would then begin. They therefore set about buying arms.

In regard to buying arms, I decided to give the Poles money in advance and a free hand, but the other parties received money only after they had found arms for sale.

It was hard to buy arms. This was particularly because each party wanted different kinds of arms. Parties composed mainly of workers, such as the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Polish Socialists, did not like rifles. In contrast, the Finns and Caucasians, who were mainly peasants, preferred rifles.

Toward May, while Zilliacus set about buying revolvers and Mauser-action cavalry rifles in Hamburg, Germany, Dekanozi, Cherkezov, and the Swiss anarchist Baud purchased Vetterli rifles.

Chaikovskii, Father Gapon, Soskis, and others made efforts to restore the strength of the opposition parties in the interior of Russia. Before then, the *Cysne* and the *Cecil*, small steamers, were bought by the above persons in order to land arms on the coast of the Baltic Sea. The American lady Hull [**Mrs. Vernam Hull**] became the owner of both steamers, and members of the Finnish, Lithuanian, and Lettish parties worked as their crews, including Schauman [**Frans Mikael Schauman**], whose elder brother [**Eugen Schauman**] had assassinated the former Governor-General of Finland [**N.I. Bobrikov, 16 June 1904**].

The rifles and other equipment purchased in Switzerland amounted to 16,000 rifles and 3 million bullets to be sent to the Baltic regions and 8,500 rifles and

¹¹ Feldmann was a Social Democratic agitator in Odessa and Vakulinchuk was a rebellious sailor killed on the *Potemkin*. Neither was Caucasian nor did they take part in Azef's activities.

1.2 million bullets to be sent to regions of the Black Sea.

As it happens, it was impossible for small landing steamers to transport these arms. It was, therefore, necessary to buy a transport ship of almost 700 tons. Later, this ship became famous in the international press as the *John Grafton*.

It was so complicated to transport these arms loaded on eight wagons from Switzerland by train, to follow the necessary procedure for purchasing the transport ship, and to take all possible steps for her to leave port that I cannot mention everything here. I entrusted Takada & Company as agent to look after all the necessary details, after I had applied to the General Staff for the purchase of the ship at that time. Yanagidani Minokichi, Branch Manager of this company, and Scott from England made the following plan.

In order to overcome any difficulty and legal complications, and to avoid in any way indicating the source of the arms, they ordered a certain store, as an agency of Takada & Company in Rotterdam, to receive the arms which Baud would send from Switzerland and to ship them to London. When the arms arrived there, Watt, a business connection of Takada, would load a large ship with these arms and send them to the English Channel under pretence of transporting them to Manila. The arms would be transferred onto the *John Grafton* off the Channel and sent northward to the Baltic Sea. There were also great difficulties in buying the *John Grafton*.

Baud appears to have set about the purchase toward the middle of June, with his friend serving at an artillery arsenal in Switzerland. Though it was not so easy for the friend to make boxes needed for packing these rifles and bullets, to clean them and so on, the preparation was completed in mid-July. The boxes were addressed and sent from Basle in Switzerland to Cordonnerie & Company in Rotterdam in Holland. But their transport to England was stopped for a while by the customs. Takada & Company and Watt made great efforts to find a solution, and the arms could finally be brought to England.

Before then, I was in England in order to make preparations for the united opposition movement and stayed at the Charing Cross Hotel for a while. The opposition groups could only be met in secret. The Secretary in this matter [**Zilli-iacus**] and I, therefore, stayed at the northern and the southern corners of the same floor of the big hotel. We needed to avoid public attention in spite of both of us going in and out very frequently. But to add to the complications of the opposition visiting there frequently, Gapon also stayed at the same hotel under a false name. On the day after the priest's first visit and as soon as I had delegated responsibility to Zilli-iacus, I changed hotels and hid myself completely.

This new dwelling was a small hotel named Craven in Craven Street. No one except Colonel Utsunomiya knew this address.

However, a letter addressed to "Monsieur Colonel Akashi" was sent to the address of this hotel (I still have this letter in my sack). It said, "Would you wait for me at the entrance to the metro in Avenue des Champs-Élysées, Paris, France, at 11:00 a.m. next Thursday? Though you do not know me, I know you. It is not difficult to look for you. I have something to tell you. Do not be afraid,

it is necessary for you to talk with me. Madame Roland.”¹² As I had business in Paris to discuss the arms transport to the Black Sea at that time, I decided to go there even though this letter was extraordinary. To locate my secret whereabouts was so strange that I thought, for better or worse, such a person could become useful, if circumstances permitted. So I was waiting for her at the meeting place at the appointed time.

A lady in her forties approached me and later came to the hotel that I chose. She said, “I am the French wife of an *Okhrana* agent [*Okhrana* = Russian secret police]. I am now separated from my husband. If you give me £ 400, I shall tell you about the *Okhrana*’s secrets.”

I said, “I spend money to obtain information. I only hope you will tell me as much as you know.”

“Do you not know you have been closely watched by the *Okhrana*? They have never taken their eyes off you wherever you have been. Manuilov [I.F. Manasevich-Manuilov], Chief of the *Okhrana*, has already seen you walking near the Arc de Triomphe at eight o’clock this morning, and reported that Akashi has come. You are cooperating with Nihilist leaders, such as Zilliacus and Dekanozi. The Russian government considers the Nihilists its most bitter enemy. As far as I know, you have been partly unsuccessful in buying arms from a person named Franck in Hamburg. Do you remember the person whom you met on the staircase of Hotel Streit where Zilliacus stayed, when you came from Berlin to Hamburg by a night train on a particular day? He was an agent named Springer and waited for your arrival there when you came to discuss matters with Zilliacus. After you came, Zilliacus hurriedly left the hotel with his luggage. I suppose your arrival at the hotel allowed Zilliacus to get away. Do you not know that the letter which you sent, under the pseudonym of George, to Dekanozi on a particular day was opened by the *Okhrana*? If you need, I can prove what was written in the letter. We know that you have been busily engaged in buying arms, but are now debating whether to buy them in Hamburg or elsewhere. It is so easy to follow a man on foot that I ask you not to walk. It is simpler to find you when you use your real name at a hotel. Will you use a false name there? Please stay at a big hotel, because it is easier for the secret police to keep track of a person staying at a small hotel than a big one. From now on I will warn you from time to time.”

Though all of this was true, I said, for fear of her outwitting me, “I am busy searching for agents who could smuggle themselves into Russia and collect information. If you know some suitable candidates, please introduce me. I am not so much interested in what the Nihilist parties do. Please give me information about conditions in the Russian army.”

“No one knows about the Nihilist parties better than you. I ask you to believe

¹² Madame Roland [Jeanne Manon Roland de la Platière] was famous as a fighter in the French Revolution.

me. Without my help, it would be impossible for you to advance the opposition movement in Russia. But do not talk about me. If you do, I will stop helping you. You must not forget to be extremely careful of the *Okhrana* during the arms purchase. What I would like to tell you is that the Japanese code has already been deciphered by the Russians.” (This was ascertained later. But I referred all of this top-secret information to Minister Motono after I had entrusted the affair to Suwa Hidesaburō.)

As stated above, I knew the *Okhrana* were paying more attention to smuggling arms into Russia than before. So it became important to be very careful in buying and transporting them.

I had Watt, a business connection of Takada & Company, buy the *John Grafton*. Watt, as a mediator, sold her to a wine merchant in London named Dickenson (also called Den Bey). Dickenson, acting as a treasurer of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party, was recommended for the task by Chaikovskii. Dickenson became her owner in consideration of his occupation as a wine merchant, and lent her to Morton, an American anarchist, as a matter of form. It was an urgent question under whose national flag the ship would sail. Unless the *John Grafton* sailed under the Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, or English flag, she might attract public attention on the Baltic Sea. It was not safe to use either the Swedish or Norwegian flag at that time, because the Norwegian struggle for independence from Sweden could lead to a war. It was also impossible to find a suitable owner at short notice. Therefore we decided, on Chaikovskii’s recommendation, that Dickenson would become owner of the ship and that she would sail under the English flag.

At the time when the *John Grafton* set sail from England, it was necessary to report her destination and the crew’s full names and nationalities, including the captain’s, and to get its certification. As all the crew were Russian, including Captain Strautman [**Strautmanis**] and Helmsman Bauman, there was great difficulty obtaining a master’s certificate of competence and a clearance certificate.

When the preparations were complete, the *John Grafton*, joined by her former crew, was sent to Flushing [**Vlissingen**], Holland. She could avoid English customs law by making transfer contract at that port. Her captain and crew went there and boarded her after the temporary crew went ashore.

Before this, a captain who was associated with Takada & Company as the recipient of the *John Grafton* came on board. She set sail from Flushing as soon as the Russian crew boarded. Again there was a difficulty with a clearance certificate, which was almost insoluble.

Obedying orders, the *John Grafton* sailed south through the English Channel at the end of July. She trans-shipped almost 16,000 rifles, 3,000,000 bullets, 3,000 revolvers, and 3 tons of explosive from Watt’s own ship off Guernsey. The sea was so rough that it took almost three days, working night and day, to trans-ship. Then the *John Grafton* sailed toward the north with only her Russian crew.

The command given to her was to sail through the Danish Sound and War-

nemünde on the night of 14 August; to unload the arms for the Letts (who live on the coast of the Baltic Sea) and to send them to Moscow on 18 August; to sail toward a small island to the south of Viborg [**Vyborg**] on the night of 19 August in order to wait for a boat off the island, to transfer arms onto a small ship, and to unload near the Russian capital. A little earlier, the *Cecil*, a small steamer, departed from London bound for the waiting point.

Branch Manager Yanagidani of Takada & Company painstakingly prepared this plan with Scott from England. The *John Grafton* set sail on 1 August.

Each of us chose a different route: Zilliacus departed for Denmark and made a plan for transporting 8,500 rifles from Switzerland, because carrying out the first plan for sending these rifles to the Black Sea became so difficult that it was thought better to direct them via the Baltic Sea rather than the Black Sea.

At the end of May and the beginning of June, Caucasian revolutionaries robbed the National Bank in the Caucasus and the Polish Socialist Party stole 30,000 yen from the National Bank in Poland. The Letts took 27,000 yen using the same methods.*¹³

I left London at the beginning of August and met with the Caucasian parties in Paris. We agreed to start activities as soon as revolts had broken out in the Baltic region. Thereafter, when I went to Berlin, the Russo-Japanese peace conference had already begun in the United States. As far as I can remember, I invited Jodko to Berlin, and heard his opinion on 18 or 19 August.

I knew from a German paper that the Lettish Party had started its activities in Kurland. I arrived in Stockholm on 20 August. Then, Lieutenant Colonel Nagao [**Nagao Tsunekichi**] told me that Furuhjelm had come from Finland and said, "Conditions are quite promising, but the activities in Kurland were too premature to succeed. As a watch house was discovered to the south of Viborg at the point where the *John Grafton* was supposed to arrive, I went to Denmark and gave her notice to change the former rendezvous to the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, near the border with Sweden." I felt very apprehensive whether or not she would know for certain about the change of unloading point.

Probably on 25 or 26 August, Zilliacus came to Stockholm with a passport in the name of Long from England and said, "I am really puzzled by the *John Grafton* business. She unloaded arms for the Lettish Party to the north of Windau on 18 August. But no boat was waiting for her at the arrival point to the south of Viborg on the 19th. The crew were so apprehensive that they sailed her back to Denmark and begged me to give new orders. So I made her set sail for the new unloading points yesterday: her new plan was to unload some arms in the district of Kemi and Tornio, on the Russian border with Sweden, and to sail south to unload the remainder. I altered the original plan as soon as I heard of

*¹³ These socialists thought that the robbery of the National Banks was not a crime but a means to divide the people's property equally. They had done this without consulting me.



The wreck of the *John Grafton*.

the discovery of a watch house. In fact, I received this report about a watch house at the beginning of this month, and sailed right round Warnemünde by moonlight on the night of 14 August so that I could give her the changed order. But I could not find even a shadow of the *John Grafton*. At last, I was able to give the order yesterday.”

The *John Grafton* unloaded arms in Tornio and another point, and ran aground when she arrived at the third point off the Ratan district.¹² She did not have good charts, because ships had not, of course, sailed near there. That is the reason why she ran onto an uncharted shoal at the beginning of September. This affair was written up as “The Mysterious Ship” or “The *John Grafton* Affair” in all the European papers.

As soon as the ship was stranded, the governor sent officers and ordered them to investigate. The crew seized the officers and shut them in a cabin. After they had finished unloading the arms, they released the officers. I angrily criticized

¹² Ratan is situated on the northeastern coast of Sweden. As a matter of fact, the *John Grafton* unloaded arms near Kemi and Jakobstad (Pietarsaari), not at Tornio, Finland, or at Ratan, Sweden.

the crew for having released the officers. They answered, “The officers were only doing their duty. It would have been inhumane to kill them.” The European attitude of “mistaken benevolence toward one’s enemy” sometimes allows such things to happen. For example, an opposition member behaved in almost the same way when he tried to assassinate the Governor-General of Moscow [**Grand Duke Sergei**]. Though the murderer had a good chance of assassinating the Grand Duke, he abandoned the attempt, because in his opinion it was inhumane also to assassinate an innocent child who happened to be riding in the same carriage, even though it was Grand Duke Paul’s child. I have heard of similar situations in which the life of an individual is placed above one’s duty. I regard this attitude as little more than ridiculous.

The officers reported the grounding to the Russian capital as soon as they were released. Then the *Aziza*, a converted cruiser, was dispatched to the scene.¹³

Prior to this, three machine guns and 15,000 bullets which the *Cysne* had on board were discovered by the English authorities, just before the ship left London. Morton from the United States, the nominal owner of these arms, was arrested and fined.

From the middle of August the Lettish revolt grew stronger and spread, so that the Russian government had to dispatch the Twentieth Corps. A part of the Eighteenth Corps was dispatched to Finland soon after the *John Grafton* affair took place.

Father Gapon came to Stockholm on the very day [30 August 1905] following the conclusion of a peace agreement [the settlement of the Sakhalin and indemnity issues on 29 August]. He was greatly discouraged but departed for Russia. As soon as news that the *John Grafton* had run aground was published in the newspapers, Chaikovskii came to Stockholm, and devised remedial measures.

During this time, the conflict between Tatars, incited by the Russians, and Armenians began in Baku in the Caucasus and Shusha in Georgia, and both provinces dissolved into total disorder.

I note that opposition activities occurred in various places between the beginning of October and 18 November when I left Europe. The most violent of these were the following: the Socialist Revolutionary Party led the demonstrations in Moscow; the Finns adopted a declaration of independence from Russia and hoisted the Finnish flag over the residence of the Governor-General of Finland;¹⁴ the Letts declared independence in Kurland; the Poles organized revolts and an endless series of extreme actions and demonstrations in various places, and these

¹³ The governor of Vaasa did not know anything about the *John Grafton*, before she was blown up on 8 September 1905. The officers Akashi referred to in Rakka ryūsui were Finnish customhouse officers.

¹⁴ During the General Strike in the autumn of 1905, the Finns did not adopt a declaration of independence from Russia nor did they hoist the Finnish flag over the residence of the Governor-General of Finland. The Finnish flag flew over several other public buildings during the strike.

events triggered a six-week uprising in Kiev, Odessa, and the Caucasus.

I surmise that opposition activities did not grow larger in St Petersburg because quite a few Socialist Revolutionaries were arrested in mid-August. A dissatisfied Gapon returned to Geneva after visiting the capital. When I left Paris on 6 August, I had a certain person ask Rubanovich a question. He answered, "An uprising may need so much money that it is difficult to continue it. That is the reason why I would discourage the opposition groups from going on strike for a while. The activity must be started at another time. Now it is difficult to anticipate when agrarian movements might arise, but I expect they will be able to start next spring."¹⁴

A few days before I left Paris, I received information that a plan had been completed to transport arms to the Caucasus and the Black Sea provinces, and a ship transporting 8,500 Swiss rifles and 1.2 million bullets had arrived in Malta in the Mediterranean Sea. After I returned to Japan, I received [from an unknown person] a letter dated 24 December 1905:

"Our movement has a bright future. We were not able to overthrow the Russian government at a stroke, but will try to do it step by step. No one doubts that the authority of the Tsarist government will collapse. The arms transported to the Black Sea arrived there safely. We were able to buy back the arms confiscated by the *Aziia*, a converted cruiser. They number 8,400 rifles."

¹⁴ The Socialist Revolutionaries' use of the French phrase "*mouvement agraire*" means using the most violent measures such as inciting peasants to rise up and throw Russia into disorder. If an opposition leader teaches ignorant peasants how to use extreme measures and how to oppose the authorities, he would not be able to stop their activities once the short-term goal was achieved. That is the reason why the leaders hesitate to instigate a full-scale rebellion.

Appendix

Important Japanese Telegrams Concerning the Russian Opposition Movement

selected, translated, and annotated
by Inaba Chiharu


1) Nagaoka Gaishi, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, to Iguchi Shōgo, the Chief of the General Affairs Department of the General Staff, 6 June 1904, Home Paper (not telegram), Hukuringō shoruitsuduri [Extraordinary Home Papers of the Adjutants' Office] June 1904, (Daihon'ei, Nichirosen'eki, M37-13), BT.

The draft of the telegram to Colonel Akashi is as follows: I have sent you the enclosed money for the period up to March. Later, I will send funds covering your travel expenses for April to September, and the overseas allowance (1,626 yen) for 10 February to 31 December.

Nagaoka

(P.S., 9,000 yen as a reserve fund will be sent on 17 June, but the travel and overseas allowance later.)

2) Hayashi Tadasu, Minister to Britain, London, to Komura Jutarō, Foreign Minister, Tokyo, 18 July 1904, Nichirosen'ekiniokeru finrandojin oyobi pōrandojinno taidokankei zassan [Affairs Related to Finns and Poles during the Russo-Japanese War], 5.2.15.13, GS. **[This is the original English text of the telegram.]**



Akashi (middle) as Military Attaché in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Komura, Tokyo

202. Utsunomiya to *Sanbōhonbu*. Transmit to Kirski: Witold has negotiated with some Finn. The latter supplied S.R. with arms. Witold proposed that he may supply and us with some quantity. Finn has made that dependent on agreement with his friend A. Two weeks after Finn has seen myself in London. It turned out that he wants to obtain for us from Japanese, and in his last report to the Colonel, he demanded 4,000 pounds sterling for this purpose. He settled this demand without our knowledge and agreement. During visit at the Colonel with Finn, I have granted and this money to be serviceable not only for arms. However I cannot resolve upon this affair, because at present only you are vested with full power. At the request of Colonel, I inform you about this affair. W.

Hayashi

[The *Sanbōhonbu* is the Japanese General Staff. Tytus Filipowicz, known as Karski (not Kirski), and Józef Piłsudski of the Polish Socialist Party went to Tokyo in July 1904 to make an alliance with Japan. Witold is Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz, a leader of the Polish Socialists, who had connections with Utsunomiya in London. Finn should be Zilliacus. A. refers to Finnish constitutionalists. Colonel is Akashi.]

3) Nagaoka, Tokyo, to Akashi Motojirō, Military Attaché, Stockholm, 31 August 1904, Santsūsuduri [Communication Papers of the General Staff] August 1904, (Daihon'ei, Nichirosen'eki, M37-1), BT.

Colonel Akashi, Stockholm

100,000 yen would be quite cheap, if the purpose can be achieved with certainty. The Staff has confidence in your ability to succeed. But obtaining cooperation among all the opposition parties is so difficult that you must take care not to spend the money on only a few parties.

Nagaoka

4) Nagaoka, Tokyo, to Utsunomiya Tarō, Military Attaché to Britain, London, 31 August 1904, Santsūsuduri August 1904, BT.

Colonel Utsunomiya, London

You are allowed to help only on condition that the Finnish plan (as the result of the conference, obtaining cooperation among all opposition parties) can be accomplished. You should discuss this affair with Akashi.

Nagaoka

5) Nagaoka, Tokyo, to Akashi, Stockholm, 29 October 1904, Santsūsuduri October and November 1904, (Daihon'ei, Nichirosen'eki, M37-3), BT.

Colonel Akashi, Stockholm

Your request, 100,000 yen, in the telegram of 29 August was barely approved by the Minister of War [**Terauchi Masatake**]. Do not forget my directive order of 18 October that you must not pay the opposition parties more than 100,000 yen. Two or three million yen for the second measure is not approved. If those parties do not start demonstrations because the General Staff refuses this financial help, you must not use the rest of the money.

Nagaoka

6) Nagaoka, Tokyo, to Kodama Gentarō, Chief of the Staff of the Manchurian Army, Manchuria, 14 November 1904, Santsūsuduri October and November 1904, BT.

The Chief of the Staff of the Manchurian Army, Manchuria

Akashi telegraphed back as follows:

“The cause of the reserve soldiers’ revolt [in his telegram to Akashi on 12 November, Nagaoka asked about the circumstances of the reserve soldiers’ revolt in Russia and the dissatisfied soldiers in Poland] is as follows:

When a leader of the party from the mobilized district returned to his homeland after the Paris conference, he acted on the recommendations of the conference and made anti-Tsarist speeches and organized a demonstration against the authorities. But this ill-prepared attempt, in which only revolvers and rifles were used, could not prevent the Russian government from forcing the people into

the army. However, public opinion is so critical of the authorities and so elevated that the party can plan to issue a declaration and to organize a new demonstration at the beginning of next month.”

I gave Akashi 100,000 yen as a subsidy for the opposition movement. His report is as follows:

“At present disturbances in Russia are caused by the united opposition conference which was held in Paris at the beginning of October by the Polish Socialist Party, the Russian Liberal Party, the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party, and other opposition parties (except the Russian Social Democratic Party). At this conference, the following decisions were made:

1. to publish the joint declaration of all opposition parties on 8 November;
2. to start demonstrations at the end of November or in December. Each party can use its own tactics;
3. to establish a coordinating body to help maintain inter-party contacts.

I received letters from some parties around 5 November. The contents of those letters are as follows: A few parties published small declarations and delivered addresses in many places. The disturbance in central Russia was instigated by the Socialist Revolutionaries or the Polish Socialists. There were many conflicts between reserve soldiers and the gendarmerie, and the reserve soldiers in the borderlands have been deserting. As the Liberals called for the promulgation of a constitution, the students began to waiver. In Poland, there are many people who are not responding to the draft call.”

Deputy Chief of the General Staff

[We do not know which party and leader Akashi referred to in this telegram.]

7) Akizuki Sachio, Minister to Sweden, Stockholm, to Komura, Tokyo, 21 November 1904, Nichirosen'ekikankei teikokunioite mitteishashiyō zakken [Affairs Related to the Usage of Spies during the Russo-Japanese War], 5.2.7.3, GS.

Komura, Tokyo

94. If giving money to destroy railways, to agitate, and to instigate rebellions in Russia is not contrary to Japanese governmental policy, I will cooperate with Mr. Akashi. If he is not suitable, please select another person. Akashi is now contacting opposition leaders, but I think it will be impossible for him to carry out future activities. Of course, we do not get involved with any assassinations.

Akizuki

8) Akizuki, Stockholm, to Komura, Tokyo, 3 January 1905, Nichirosen'ekikankei teikokunioite mitteishashiyō zakken, GS.

Komura, Tokyo

2. Public excitement in Russia so far increasing. I think however that the Government is not much surprised thereby and very determined to destroy anti-

autocratic movement by all means. Therefore there will fatally (finally?) come day when the opposition parties will be put into dilemma to stop their campaign or to take arms. I am sure that two or three parties are very determined but not sufficiently equipped. Due allowance being made, if they get up, they will be likely followed by some others. Nothing has yet been heard about the impressions caused in Russia by the latest event at Port Arthur but I anticipate it will not fail to cause general demoralization, while to greatly encourage anti-autocratic movement. As it is wise to hammer iron whilst still heated now, it is very good moment to do something according to my telegram 94. **[This is the original English text of the section above. The section below is a translation from the Japanese original.]**

So, I earnestly desire about 200,000 yen to be paid now. When prospects become clearer, an enormous additional sum will be required. In any case, please send me 10,000 yen by telegraphic transfer so that I will be able to investigate the internal conditions of Russia. Japan should have no scruples about conspiring with the Liberal Party, which is organized by men of wealth and the intelligentsia, because even that party conspires with the socialist parties. We Japanese should not hesitate, because sooner or later the existence of this conspiracy will be made public and it will conform to similar patterns of European history. So far the Liberals have been effective publicly and behind the scenes. I firmly believe that the conspiracy will be more effective and less expensive than before.

Akizuki

9) Komura, Tokyo, to Akizuki, Stockholm, 7 January 1905, Nichirosen'ekikankei teikokunioite mitteishashiyō zakken, GS.

Akizuki, Stockholm

2. According to the measures which you requested in your telegram No 2, it is necessary firstly to make an accurate estimate of the effect those measures will have not only on Russian domestic affairs, but also on the great powers bordering on Russia, such as Germany and Austria. Then Japan should take the necessary measures. Dispatch as soon as possible a suitable person to Russia to investigate conditions there. I remit 10,000 yen by telegraphic transfer to cover the expenditure.

Komura

10) Akizuki, Stockholm, to Komura, Tokyo, 25 January 1905, Nichirosen'ekikankei teikokunioite mitteishashiyō zakken, GS.

Komura, Tokyo

8. The autocratic law was withdrawn, and some of the Finnish exiles were pardoned. The incident of live-shell firing at the Winter Palace on the 19th was linked with the Liberal Party and the Socialist Revolutionaries, but not to the Fighting Organization, though I cannot confirm this in detail. The strike planned

by the Social Democratic Party was premature, but, according to my information, it obliged the Liberal Party to become more radical. Contrary to my predictions, the Russian government suppressed the demonstration [**Bloody Sunday on 22 January**] firmly without hesitation. Concerning the domestic conditions, the government must take drastic measures. On the other hand, the rioters can do little to oppose the government because they are so inadequately prepared. Therefore, please consider my request for the following subsidy as soon as possible. I hope you will not later regret having missed an opportunity. Send me 400,000 yen immediately, 250,000 yen after one month. In the end, you should make allowance for up to one million yen. If the affair is successful, I think it would not be unreasonable to pay more money. There is no deceit at all. I am certain that the partner cannot be a person who would deceive us. I have discussed the substance of the affair with Mr. Akashi and have considered it constantly since I arrived at my minister's post. It is not necessary to consider the views of Germany and Austria. There are signs of sailors' unrest and mutiny in Sevastopol.

Akizuki

11) Komura, Tokyo, to Akizuki, Stockholm, 26 January 1905, Nichirosen'ekikankei teikokunioite mitteishashiyō zakken, GS.

Akizuki, Stockholm

3. According to your telegram No 8, there has not been any evaluation yet on whether these subsidies had an effect or not, though I collect different information about Russian domestic conditions from all quarters. You must, therefore, do as much as you can to collect information about Russia in accordance with my telegram No 2, until I give you further orders.

Komura

12) Akizuki, Stockholm, to Komura, Tokyo, 10 February 1905, Nichirosen'ekikankei teikokunioite mitteishashiyō zakken, GS.

Komura, Tokyo

17. Though it was not easy to find men who are willing to investigate Russian internal affairs, I have entrusted men living in Russia with the investigation. One will investigate the current strikes and the other research the domestic affairs of the Russian government. But we can no longer expect them to do additional duties. The details of the opposition plan were known only to Utsunomiya and Akashi. But we need not communicate directly with the underground opposition in Russia; we can clarify most of the plan with opposition leaders living in France and Germany, such as Poles, Finns, and Armenians. I believe it is hardly necessary to know more details, and it has been difficult to get complete information about the plan because of communication problems. However, if the Imperial government wants to know more, I will try to do what I can. As to Russian domestic



Akashi (second from the left) and other Military Attachés.

affairs, please indicate what the Imperial government would particularly like to know.

Akizuki

13) Akashi, Paris, to Yamagata Aritomo, Chief of the General Staff, Tokyo, 12 February 1905, Nichirosen'ekikankei teikokunioite mitteishashiyō zakken, GS. [The Imperial Headquarters copied and sent this telegram as a top secret message to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]

The Chief of the General Staff, Tokyo

The Secretary of the opposition parties [**Zilliacus**] proposed the following: conditions in Russia are unexpectedly deteriorating. So there is no doubt that our goal, to overthrow the Russian government, will be accomplished, if the scheduled demonstration can be effectively delayed. It cannot be started until June because the peasants, workers, and some other parties are not yet prepared. However, this is still not too late, because, even if the Russian government were to start preparing peace negotiations with Japan, it is certain that she would require much time for such preparations. Therefore we continuously support the present opposition activities in order to exhaust the government, and we will try

to instigate a major movement [**uprising**] led by the Socialist Revolutionaries in June. This movement should determine the fate of the opposition parties. That is the reason why we ask Japan to increase the subsidy, in order to ensure complete success.

It is necessary to spend 440,000—450,000 yen, by my reckoning, and to pay it at the beginning of May; it is possible to pay in two installments. I will discuss the details with Akizuki and report to the Imperial Headquarters, but I ask the General Staff to pay the subsidy before then. As the parties are expected to destroy railway electric wire factories and other factories, may I postpone the negotiation with them about sabotaging the railways?

Akashi

14) Motono Ichirō, Minister to France, Paris, to Komura, Tokyo, 13 February 1905, Nichirosen'ekikankei teikokunioite mitteishashiyō zakken, GS.

(SECRET, This telegram was shown to the Emperor, all Ministers, the Four *Genrō*, Army, Navy and others.) [This is the original English text of the telegram.]

Komura, Tokyo

48. (calendar) the following is strictly confidential: (...)

Internal situation in Russia seems to aggravate from day to day. In spite of relative calm of these last days, there is at bottom profound agitation in all parts of Russia. Several of my French friends who six months ago still did not believe about a serious influence of internal events upon the issue of actual war, have now changed their opinions and begin to be persuaded that if Russia does not conclude peace as early as possible, there would be very grave internal perturbation. This opinion is confirmed by letter dated Feb. 1st and received by one of my informants from a French engineer residing at Moscow since many years. Colonel Akashi who arrived here a few days ago has had an interview with representative of revolutionary parties mentioned in my *Kimitsu* [**diplomatic papers**] No 34 dated Oct. 23rd. It results from conferences they had that the interior events of Russia having marched very much quicker than revolutionists themselves could have hoped, it was absolutely necessary to avail of the present circumstances with view of attaining our object. In consequence, Akashi telegraphed central headquarters asking subsidy of 450,000 yen. I earnestly advise you to take necessary measures as quickly as possible so that the demand of Akashi be complied with.

Motono

[The *Tennō* (Emperor) Meiji (1852—1912, reigned 1868—1912) was, in theory, the holder of sovereign power, commander of the armed forces, and center of national morality. The name of *Genrō* applied to a group of senior statesmen who advised the Emperor and exercised considerable influence in political affairs even when no longer holding high office.]

15) Makino Nobuaki, Minister to Austria, Vienna, to Komura, Tokyo, March 1905, *Nihon gaikō monjo* [Japanese Diplomatic Papers], 1905, No 2 (Tokyo, 1959), p. 628.

Komura, Tokyo

75. My agent living in Cracow informed me as follows:

Though the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist Revolutionaries are endlessly instigating revolution, their activities have suffered chronic setbacks. The Socialist Revolutionary Party, which is the most organized of all opposition parties, is the leading force within the opposition movement. Other opposition groups are satisfied to follow the lead of that party.

The plan for mobilizing reservists in Łódź and Warsaw was postponed.

Commerce and industries are completely stagnant all over Russia and economic problems are almost inevitable.

All troops are busily occupied guarding railways and cities under martial law.

It is quite unlikely that the Russian government will continue the war. I think domestic disturbances ought to be continued despite government retaliation and doubt whether the people will much value the "political reform" of the government.

Makino

16) Akizuki, Stockholm, to Komura, Tokyo, 3 March 1905, *Nihon gaikō monjo*, 1905, No 2 (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 630-631.

(SECRET, This telegram was shown to the Prime Minister, the Minister of War, and the Chief of the General Staff.)

Komura, Tokyo

25. At the beginning of February, a member of the Finnish anti-Russian party (whom I have indirectly known for some months and who appeared to be a person of high birth) requested as follows:

"We have a plan for an armed uprising and ask that you persuade the Japanese government to give us 50,000 rifles and some explosives, or the money equivalent to these arms. When you need to know the details, we will call a former staff officer from Finland and have him explain our plans."

I answered immediately that Japan will consider his proposal though she is correctly determined to carry out her aims mainly by military means. However, disorders will continue for the time being in Russia. The Russian army is so busy putting down these disorders and guarding railways, public buildings, and other important public services, that decisive action along the lines above will bring a chance of peace. If this scheme will make peace, does the Imperial government intend to agree to it? Unless it is acceptable, detailed consideration would be undesirable. I request instructions.

Akizuki

17) Komura, Tokyo, to Akizuki, Stockholm, 7 March 1905, *Nihon gaikō monjo*, 1905, No 2 (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 633—634.

Akizuki, Stockholm

6. According to your telegram No 25, disorders in Russia can be predicted to continue, even though Japan gives nothing to encourage them. Moreover, I think present Japanese aid would produce few practical results, regardless of whether the outcome is favourable. The home government has decided to adopt a policy of nonintervention so long as conditions in Russia do not change. Bearing my order in mind, you should tread carefully. Will you endeavour to report the actual situation?

Komura

18) Akizuki, Stockholm, to Komura, Tokyo, 9 March 1905, *Nihon gaikō monjo*, 1905, No 2 (Tokyo, 1959), p. 634.

Komura, Tokyo

28. According to your telegram No 6, there should be little disorder in Finland, because Finns possess self-restraint. Therefore, the question related to possible continuity of disorders is irrelevant. I suppose that disorder in other regions will continue without let-up. While some points have not yet been clarified, the leaders of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (Gapon exerts a favourable influence upon this party), which played a central role in throwing Russia into disorder, are expected to make arrangements about future activities sometime in the near future. Since it has been reported that some other opposition parties plan to gather at the same time, the details of their plan will become clear then. It is a matter of course that the great military victory on land will exert a favourable influence upon European affairs and that the help which I requested in the previous telegram will be obtained through devious means. Though I believe this help would have a not insignificant effect, I will tell the Finn something just to please him.

Akizuki

19) Makino, Vienna, to Komura, Tokyo, 14 March 1905, *Nihon gaikō monjo*, 1905, No 2 (Tokyo, 1959), p. 639.

(SECRET, This telegram was shown to the Emperor, all Ministers, the Four *Genrō*, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Minister of War.)

Komura, Tokyo

95. Lebedev wrote to me in a letter of 23 February as follows:

I have become acquainted with higher officials and members of the Red Cross. They gave me the following information: those supporting the war insisted upon fresh mobilization, but the Minister of Interior emphasized that the Ministry could not guarantee calm within the country, if the government were to dispatch any more soldiers to the battlefield.

Makino

[In June 1904 Makino employed Friedrich L. Landy to get secret information about Russian affairs. This Austrian was reported to have good connections in Vladivostok and Mukden. Makino dispatched him to St Petersburg and Moscow after consultation with Jōhōji Gorō, Military Attaché to Austria, in mid-January 1905. Lebedev was probably one of Landy's agents. See Makino, Vienna, to Komura, Tokyo, 22 June 1904 and 11 January 1905, Nichirosen'ekikankei tei-kokunioite mitteishashiyō zakken, GS.]

20) Inoue Junnosuke, Minister to Germany, Berlin, to Komura, Tokyo, 14 March 1905, *Nihon gaikō monjo*, 1905, No 2 (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 639—640.

Komura, Tokyo

110. Putting all the telegrams from St Petersburg to Berlin together, it appears to have gradually become difficult to contain the peasants' resistance to the bureaucracy. Peasants began a revolt in Chernigov and Orel provinces and plundered imperial property. The extent of the damage was some million rubles. It is known that there are also revolts of peasants in Nizhnii Novgorod and other regions. Government circles in Berlin regard this movement as the most serious to date. They appear to think that conditions in Russia will become chaotic, and the government might be overthrown, unless it can quickly quell the disturbances.

Inoue

21) Utsunomiya, London, to Yamagata, Tokyo, 20 April (1905), *Zaigaibukan hōkoku* [Reports from Military and Naval Officers in Foreign Countries], No 1, 5.1.10.7, GS.

(TOP SECRET)

The Chief of the General Staff, Tokyo

275. Report by a Pole: Nine parties, the Russian Social Democratic Party; the Socialist Revolutionary Party; the Polish Socialist Party; the Lettish Socialist Party; the Lettish Democratic Party; the White Russian Entry Party; the Finnish (except for a section of Zilliacus' Party), Georgian, and Armenian Socialist parties, in addition to Gapon's own party, attended the joint conference convened by Gapon (the Bund and twelve other parties were absent). It was resolved that southern Russia, Poland, and Finland would be independent and each have its own diet with full powers, and that the Caucasus would establish a diet with limited power. This resolution will be announced on 25 April. In order to achieve all this, an armed revolt must first break out in St Petersburg in June (the day is not yet determined).

Colonel Utsunomiya

22) Akashi, (Stockholm,) to Yamagata, Tokyo, 12 April (1905), *Zaigaibukan hōkoku*, No 1, GS.

(TOP SECRET)

The Chief of the General Staff, Tokyo

142. The message in cipher written by the Secretary of the united opposition parties [Zilliacus] is not very clear, but the outline is as follows:

The Geneva conference decided to hold the Russian Tsar responsible for past and future bloodshed. The new declaration was drafted by three people, the great b., Father g., and my agent f. The great revolt ought to begin in June, so the opposition is making more and more effort to acquire arms and explosives. The day of the revolt is still undecided, but it will be safe enough to transport the arms by sea. I learned from a reliable source that the government has decided in principle to pay an indemnity to Japan in exchange for prisoners of war. Prince Tunagusuko, who still expected the victory of the Baltic Fleet, got the decision deferred until the success of the fleet became obvious. People expect a public incident in Russia to set off the revolution. As the army is greatly influenced by the opposition, the troops in the capital are not inclined to shoot at the people on command. The peasant movement is making satisfactory progress. The details will probably be available in a week when I meet my source.

Colonel Akashi

[b. was Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaia, g. was G.A. Gapon, and f. was Victor Furuhjelm. Prince Tunagusuko cannot be identified with certainty.]

23) Akashi, (Paris,) to Yamagata, Tokyo, 7 May (1905), Zaigaijukan hōkoku, No 1, GS.

(TOP SECRET)

The Chief of the General Staff, Tokyo

The content of meetings with various parties is as follows:

The chaotic conditions in the Caucasus continue. Peasants plunder government-owned farmlands and do not pay taxes. Assassinations continue; the government can do little to prevent this anarchy. There are no measures other than future revolts. Poland follows the Caucasus. The Social Democratic Party is eager to stage an uprising this summer. If many small parties have arms, nothing can prevent continuation of the strife. There is some hope that the Finnish Moderate Party will split and new hard-liners will emerge. After I return, I shall submit a detailed report. The Socialist Revolutionary Party reported that a Russian officer group composed of 140 members offered to cooperate with the party. This move could bring troops over to the revolutionary side. People are encouraged to plunder government-owned farmlands. Each party has started buying arms in Switzerland, Hamburg, and other places. It is expected that we will be able to buy old rifles for about seven yen each. As I reported, the leaders are convinced that the uprising planned for the summer will succeed. But the Polish Socialist Party, the Caucasian Party, and I are worried about the prospects for success. Please

make it your policy to give them as many arms as possible. The Secretary [**Zilliacus**] ought to come to London soon to make arrangements for smuggling the arms. Though preparations are as described above, I realize it may be a little difficult to carry them through. The best Russian military correspondent, named n.d. [**V.I. Nemirovich-Danchenko**], who is a military officer and stayed here until yesterday, is influenced by revolutionary ideas. Now, everything goes against Morisaijo (whom I employed cheaply as an agent on condition that I would support her until the end of the war), because an agent risks being sent to the scaffold in Russia. If she can be useful in Japan, please help her.

Colonel Akashi

[The Secretary referred to in telegrams of 12 April and 7 May was Zilliacus, since Akashi wrote in *Rakka ryūsui* that the Secretary meant Zilliacus. The telegram of 12 April must have been sent from Stockholm, and that of 7 May from Paris.]

INABA Chiharu

The Politics of Subversion

Japanese Aid to Opposition Groups in Russia during the Russo-Japanese War

The Russian Revolution of 1905: a Japanese Perspective

The defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, especially beginning with the fall of Port Arthur, is generally considered one of the primary contributing factors to the Russian Revolution of 1905. In this article, I wish to draw attention to a somewhat neglected aspect of Japanese wartime policy. During the war Akashi Motojirō advocated and eventually won support for monetary aid to anti-Tsarist political and ethnic groups to assist them in fomenting unrest and weakening the Russian regime from within.

According to Tani Toshio, a lecturer at the Military College in the 1920s, the Japanese General Staff paid one million yen (nowadays almost five milliard yen, thirty-five million US dollars) to Akashi in order to assist the opposition parties in fomenting an armed uprising in St Petersburg and in creating disturbances throughout Russian Empire. Although this scheme failed and Japan did not reap any concrete benefits, Japanese monetary aid lent support to the activities of the Russian opposition between the spring and summer 1905, and therefore the Russian Revolution of 1905.

The significance of this aid has been overlooked, in part, because Japanese scholars have believed that the pertinent archival material were destroyed at the end of the Pacific War.¹ Yet, during the past two decades other scholars have uncovered evidence of extensive Japanese subversive activities in Russia. When Michael Futrell visited Japan in the 1960s, he discovered only a part of the Japanese archival materials on monetary aid. Nevertheless, by using this material and non-Japanese sources, he succeeded in clarifying the existence of Japanese aid to the opposition parties.²

Research by Jerzy J. Lerski and Alvin M. Fountain II on the Polish resistance and by William R. Copeland, Olavi K. Fält, and Antti Kujala on the Finnish and Russian opposition movements during the Russo-Japanese War have thrown additional light on Akashi's activities. Research on the activities of Konrad Victor (Konni) Zilliacus, one of the leaders of the Finnish opposition, who later became Akashi's close collaborator, has been important in this respect.³ By building on the results of this research, I was able to discover substantial archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Defence Agency. A detailed examination of this material helps to clarify how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff formulated their policies for giving aid to the opposition groups.

The Origins of a Subversive Policy

Akashi's activity originated in a strategy: Japan would encourage the political and ethnic opposition groups to revolt against the Russian regime with the intention of interfering with the mobilization of troops dispatched to Manchuria in European Russia and weakening Russian military power in the Far East. Major Tanaka Giichi, later Prime Minister, who had been assigned to the Japanese legation in St Petersburg as an assistant to the Military Attaché until 1902, thought at one point that he would retire from the service and throw himself into the revolutionary movement in order to carry out the above aim. He soon recognized

¹ Inaba M. 1966, p. 70.

² Futrell 1967, pp. 7–22.

³ Jerzy J. Lerski, "A Polish Chapter of the Russo-Japanese War", in: *The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Third Series VII (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 69–97; Alvin M. Fountain II, *Roman Dmowski: Party, Tactics, Ideology 1895–1907*, (New York, 1980); William R. Copeland, *The Uneasy Alliance: Collaboration between the Finnish Opposition and the Russian Underground, 1899–1904* (Helsinki, 1973); Olavi K. Fält, "Collaboration between Japanese Intelligence and the Finnish Underground during the Russo-Japanese War", *Asian Profile*, Vol. 4 (1976), pp. 205–238; Olavi K. Fält, "Nichirosensōjiniokeru nihonchōhōkatsudōto firando akutivisutino kyōryoku" [Japanese Stratagems against the Russian Empire and Cooperation with the Finnish Activists during the Russo-Japanese War], translated by Momose Hiroshi, *Shichō*, No 7 (1980), pp. 73–89; Antti Kujala, "The Russian Revolutionary Movement and the Finnish Opposition, 1905: The John Grafton Affair and the Plans for an Uprising in St Petersburg", *Scandinavian Journal of History* 5 (1980), pp. 257–275; Kujala 1988, pp. 3–23.

that developments in Poland could also be important for Japan.⁴ He believed that the movement of revolutionaries and minority nationalities could create shock waves throughout the Tsarist regime. After his return to Japan Tanaka became a staff officer and continued to advocate these views within the General Staff prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war.

As soon as preparations for the war commenced at the beginning of January 1904 the General Staff exchanged telegrams over intelligence activity with the Military Attaché to Russia, Akashi.⁵ Despite this exchange of telegrams no military archival material concerning a plan to instigate subversive activities has been found in Japan. It is possible that the Staff considered such activities at that time, but it is improbable that such ideas were judged sufficiently realistic to be included in the General Staff's budget. In any case, a subversive policy only began to take concrete form when Akashi established contact with Konni Zilliacus in the winter of 1904.

Polish Initiatives, Japanese Caution

When Akashi arrived in Stockholm in February 1904, he established relations with a Finnish group in exile which had played a leading role in the Finnish opposition movement against the Russian regime, especially with Zilliacus.⁶ As this group had been in contact with the Polish National League since 1903, Zilliacus proposed to Akashi a plan whereby Polish soldiers in the Russian army might surrender to Japan.⁷ Apparently Akashi judged this plan a practical way to disturb and weaken the Russian army in the Far East and informed the General Staff of his views. In any case, he obtained approval to proceed. Meanwhile, Akashi asked Zilliacus to arrange a meeting with the Polish National League. At the beginning of March, Akashi and Roman Dmowski, leader of the League, met in Cracow. As a result of this meeting Dmowski went to Japan with pamphlets appealing to Poles and the soldiers of the other minority nationalities to surrender to Japan without a fight.

Dmowski arrived in Japan in mid-May, and saw the Chief of Section II (Intelligence), Major General Hukushima Yasumasa, and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Kodama Gentarō, responsible for operational decisions.⁸ Kodama's meeting with Dmowski in the frantic period just before the Manchu-

⁴ *Tanaka Giichi denki* [A Biography of Tanaka Giichi], I (Tokyo, 1958), pp. 171—178.

⁵ Inaba C. 1984, pp. 16—17.

⁶ Konni Zilliacus, *Sortovuosilta, Poliittisia muistelmia* [Political Memoirs from the Years of Oppression] (Helsinki, 1920), p. 97; Rakka ryūsui in this volume; Kujala 1988, pp. 6—8.

⁷ Copeland 1973, pp. 141—146; Fountain 1980, pp. 114—115; Zilliacus 1920, pp. 96—98.

⁸ Zilliacus 1920, pp. 121—127; Lerski 1959, p. 73, 82; Fountain 1980, pp. 115—127; Rakka ryūsui in this volume.

rian Army's departure on 10 June suggests the importance that the General Staff placed on the Polish plan.

In mid-March the Polish Socialist Party submitted a similar plan to the Japanese Minister to Britain, Hayashi Tadasu, in London. The Polish Socialists' plan differed, however, in that it also proposed an armed uprising by the party in cooperation with revolutionary parties of other minority nationalities. The party therefore asked that Japan provide Poles with arms or subsidies until June 1904.⁹ That both Hayashi and the Military Attaché to Britain, Utsunomiya Tarō, reported the request of the Polish Socialists to Japan implies that they tried to obtain funds from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff in order to respond to the Polish request. But the Foreign Minister, Komura Jutarō, failed to reply to Hayashi's request. Nevertheless, it was decided that Józef Piłsudski, leader of the Polish Socialist Party, would visit Japan in July.

The Polish National League later emphasized that Piłsudski's voyage was financed by the Japanese General Staff, while Dmowski's travelling expenses were paid by a Polish industrialist.¹⁰ The General Staff was apparently interested in the Polish Socialists' plan, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which postponed an answer to Hayashi, probably opposed the scheme.

When Piłsudski arrived in Japan, he submitted a memorandum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he requested that Tokyo enter into an alliance with Poland (i.e. the Polish Socialists).¹¹ The Polish Socialist Party asked that Japan provide a subsidy for an armed uprising. The same proposal was probably submitted to the General Staff.

Dmowski, who feared the adverse consequences of an armed uprising, informed the Ministry on 20 July that any uprising in Poland would be easily suppressed. The Polish opposition forces would suffer a serious, long-term setback, and the Russian government would be free to transfer the military forces stationed in Poland to the Far East. The current unsettled situation in Poland would thus be better for Japan. Dmowski's views were sent to the General Staff and *Genrō* (elder statesmen).¹²

Japanese authorities decided against giving the Polish Socialists any aid.¹³ This

⁹ The Poles initially requested the subsidy for sabotaging the Trans-Siberian railway, but this could have been only a pretext for receiving money from Japan. See *Nihon gaikō monjo* [Japanese Diplomatic Papers], 1904, No 2 (Tokyo, 1957), pp. 526—29, 531—33; Hayashi, London, to Komura, Tokyo, 6 June 1904 (telegram No 173), *Nichirosen'ekiniokeru finrandojin oyobi pōrandojinno taidokankei zassan* [Affairs Related to Finns and Poles during the Russo-Japanese War], 5.2.15.13, GS. Also see telegram 2 in the appendix to *Rakka ryūsui*, in this present volume.

¹⁰ Kazimiera J. Cottam, *Bolesław Limanowski: A Study in Socialism and Nationalism* (New York, 1978), pp. 295—296; Fountain 1980, pp. 119—120. Fountain's account of Dmowski's expenses is somewhat perplexing. It is unlikely that Akashi would have given Dmowski a letter of introduction to Kodama but not provided any funds for his voyage.

¹¹ Lerski 1959, pp. 85—87.

¹² *Nihon gaikō monjo*, 1904, No 2, pp. 576—579.



Józef Piłsudski (middle).

¹³ From K. (no date), Nichirosen'ekiniokeru finrandojin oyobi pōrandojinno taidokankei zassan, 5.2.15.13, GS.

decision reflected an element of Japanese diplomatic and strategic caution. There were some basic obstacles to an alliance between the Poles and Japan: Japan required the quickest possible termination of the war, while the Poles would be glad to see it prolonged; both nations were remote from each other geographically and politically, and they had no direct economic relations.¹⁴ Moreover, Poland had been partitioned into three parts and had no official diplomatic channels.

In August 1904 the General Staff ordered Akashi not to give the Russian opposition groups any aid for an armed uprising. In October it repeated those orders.¹⁵ In July 1904 the General Staff wanted to support only those local activities that could directly influence military developments in Manchuria: disruption of the Russian army in the Far East by encouraging the surrender of Poles and sabotaging the Trans-Siberian railway. At this point in time Dmowski's plan dovetailed with the views of the General Staff, which became greatly interested in the prospect of armed uprisings and the revolutionary movement in Russia only after the Battle of Mukden (March 1905) demonstrated that Japan could no longer maintain military superiority in Manchuria.

An Ambivalent Response from the General Staff

Zilliacus wrote in his memoirs that he suggested to Akashi that cooperation among the opposition parties against the Tsarist regime was feasible and proposed holding a joint conference. Akashi considered Zilliacus' proposal interesting but impracticable. He promised Zilliacus, however, that he would write to Tokyo and urged him to establish secret connections with opposition leaders. Akashi later obtained authority to give all kind of aid including money.¹⁶ According to *Rakka ryūsui*, Zilliacus showed Akashi a plan for uniting the opposition parties at the beginning of March, then made contact with well-known opposition parties, and requested money to print written appeals.¹⁷

It can be inferred from both these sources that the General Staff received information from Akashi and became interested in a plan for the united opposition movement in March. It is unlikely that the General Staff gave its wholehearted support to this plan at the time when it received the information from Akashi. Probably it permitted him to ascertain to what extent the possibility of realization existed. On 17 June 1904, 9,000 yen was remitted to Akashi as a re-

¹⁴ Lerski 1959, pp. 86—87.

¹⁵ Vice Chief of the General Staff, Nagaoka Gaishi, Tokyo, to the Military Attaché to Germany, Ōi Kikutarō, Berlin, 15 August 1904, Santsūtsuduri [Communication Papers of the General Staff] August 1904, Daihon'ei, Nichirosen'eki, M37-1, BT; Telegram 5 in this volume.

¹⁶ Zilliacus 1920, pp. 101—108.

¹⁷ See *Rakka ryūsui* in this volume.

serve fund.¹⁸ Apparently the cost of written appeals was paid to Zilliacus and the rest of it was spent as research expenses. Akashi and Zilliacus travelled around Europe and met many opposition leaders after late June.¹⁹ This visit proved important to Akashi's efforts to promote cooperation between Japan and opposition groups.

Akashi was now convinced of the possibility of successful cooperation among the opposition parties. On 21 August he requested 100,000 yen to subsidy Zilliacus' plan. The General Staff approved his request on 31 August, but ordered Utsunomiya to assist Akashi only to the extent that he was sure Zilliacus' plan would be carried out.²⁰ The General Staff wanted more than mere cooperation among the opposition groups. Violent demonstrations and other disturbances should follow from this new cooperation.

The joint conference among the opposition parties against the Tsarist regime was held in Paris from 30 September to 5 October 1904. But little progress was made from the Japanese point of view. It was decided only to publish a joint declaration and to establish communication centres among these parties in St Petersburg and Copenhagen. Each party promised to hold demonstrations, but the conference produced no united action. Nevertheless, the parties closely related to the Socialist Revolutionary Party as well as the left wing of the Russian liberals participated in the declaration and small-scale armed demonstrations occurred in Poland and Georgia in November.²¹

However, these results certainly fell short of the General Staff's expectations. Zilliacus stressed in his report on the Paris conference that arms would be necessary for protection against retaliation by the Tsarist government following demonstrations.²² Akashi appealed to the General Staff for two or three million yen, probably at Zilliacus' request. But the Staff refused, and even prohibited him from spending the remainder of the 100,000 yen which had been remitted, stipulating that he might spend it only for raising demonstrations in Russia.²³

As had been the case prior to the Paris conference, the General Staff wanted to subsidy only the united front and opposed support to a few parties.²⁴ Given its point of departure it is no wonder that the Staff stopped giving any aid as soon as it concluded that there was no possibility of instigating demonstrations. This was especially logical, given the cutback in the military budget. Despite the

¹⁸ See telegram 1 in this volume.

¹⁹ See Rakka ryūsui in this volume.

²⁰ See telegrams 3 and 4 in this volume.

²¹ Zilliacus' report on the Paris conference, enclosed in: Motono Ichirō, Minister to France, Paris, to Komura, Tokyo, 23 November 1904 (diplomatic report No 34), and Motono, Paris, to Komura, Tokyo, 14 October 1904 (telegram No 213), *Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan (rokokunobu)* [Inner Affairs of Russia], 1.6.3.2-9, GS; Zilliacus, 1920, pp. 129–141. See Rakka ryūsui and telegram 6 in this volume.

²² See Zilliacus' report (Note 21).

²³ See telegram 5 in this volume.

²⁴ See telegram 3 in this volume.

Staff's directive, Akashi continued to give some subsidies for activities of opposition parties after the Paris Conference. In fact, there were armed demonstrations in Poland and in Georgia, though only on a small scale.²⁵

A Reluctant Foreign Ministry

On 21 November 1904, the Japanese Minister to Sweden, Akizuki Sachio, requested that Komura remit a subsidy for sabotaging the Trans-Siberian railway and instigating revolts in cooperation with Akashi.²⁶ This request suggests that Akashi tried to change the General Staff's policy by working through Akizuki and Komura, i.e. through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But before this approach could succeed, it was necessary for the opposition groups to widen their appeal in order to play a more active role. With the fall of the Port Arthur on 2 January and Bloody Sunday, the massacre in St Petersburg on 22 January 1905, as turning points, the Russian Revolution of 1905 burst into flames.

On 3 January, Akizuki notified Komura that the opportunity for a positive decision on aid had presented itself. He requested about 200,000 yen at once and an enormous extra sum to use once the situation became clear.²⁷ On 25 January, soon after Bloody Sunday, Akizuki again asked Komura to remit 400,000 yen immediately and 250,000 yen after one month. He also wrote that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should make allowance for as much as one million yen.²⁸ According to Akizuki and Akashi (a) the Russian people's dissatisfaction was increasing. The loss of Port Arthur had contributed to the anti-war and anti-Tsarist movement, and there were strikes and demonstrations. (b) The Russian government suppressed a peaceful demonstration by arms (Bloody Sunday). (c) The opposition parties intended to take up arms, but a lack of money, arms, and equipment prevented them from taking advantage of the current situation. (d) Stability might return and Japan could miss an opportunity unless the opposition groups could take action. (e) Japan should quickly give aid to initiate an uprising. (f) Those parties which would receive Japanese aid were reliable.

In response to Akizuki's and Akashi's assessment of the situation, Komura ordered every Japanese minister in Europe to collect information about the Russian revolutionary movement after the fall of Port Arthur.²⁹ In the telegram of

²⁵ See Note 21. Abraham Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray* (Stanford, 1988), pp. 153—154, 157.

²⁶ See telegram 7 in this volume.

²⁷ See telegram 8 in this volume; Futrell 1967, p. 17.

²⁸ See telegram 10 in this volume; Futrell 1967, p. 17.

²⁹ Komura, Tokyo, to Makino, Vienna, 4 January 1905, (telegram No 1), Komura, Tokyo, to Mihashi Nobukata, Minister to Holland, The Hague, 9 January 1905 (telegram No 9), Nichirosen'ekikankei teikokunioite mitteishashiyō zakken [Affairs Related to the Usage of Spies during the Russo-Japanese War], 5.2.7.3, GS. Also see telegram 9 in this volume.

7 January, Komura replied to Akizuki that it was not clear what would happen in Russia following an armed uprising and its influence on Germany and Austria had to be taken into account.³⁰ On 26 January, Komura posed the question of whether or not an armed uprising resulting from Japanese aid would grow into a large-scale revolt or a revolution.³¹ The fact that he sent these telegrams to Sweden means that Komura was not yet willing to make a decision on Akizuki's request.

By March 1905 all ministers to Europe had sent their replies to Komura. According to them the opposition movements had rapidly grown in strength.³² But there was a difference of opinion over the prospect of the development of revolution, and over the question of whether the opposition groups could create conditions without Japanese aid that would prevent the Russian government from continuing the war.

On the one hand, Akizuki stressed to Komura that, without Japanese aid, the opposition groups could not organize an armed uprising or that it would be on a small scale even if they could.³³ The Japanese Minister to France, Motono Ichirō, who probably had close relations to Akashi since the latter had served in the Japanese legation in Paris as Military Attaché, also stressed on 13 February that it was necessary to make the most of unrest in Russia, and recommended that Komura permit the subsidy of 450,000 yen which Akashi requested of the General Staff on 12 February as quickly as possible.³⁴

On the other hand, the Minister to Austria, Makino Nobuaki, who would later play an active role as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Home Minister, and would hold other important posts up to the Second World War, estimated that a revolution would break out in Russia soon because strikes and demonstrations had occurred continuously in various regions after Bloody Sunday. Consequently, he doubted whether the Russian government would be able to continue the war in the Far East.³⁵

Makino's reasoning apparently carried weight with Komura. On 7 March, Komura notified Akizuki that "The home government has decided to adopt a policy of nonintervention so long as conditions in Russia do not change."³⁶ In short, he refused to grant the aid.

³⁰ See telegram 9 in this volume; John Albert White, *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War* (Princeton, 1964), p. 140.

³¹ See telegram 11 in this volume.

³² *Nihon gaikō monjo*, 1905, No 2, pp. 575—633.

³³ *Nihon gaikō monjo*, 1905, No 2, pp. 602—603, 605—606, 628—629. See telegrams 12 and 16 in this volume.

³⁴ See telegram 13 in this volume.

³⁵ *Nihon gaikō monjo*, 1905, No 2, pp. 598—600, 607—608, 613—614; Makino, Vienna, to Komura, Tokyo, 5 February 1905, (diplomatic report No 3), Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan (rokokunobu), 1.6.3.2-9, GS; Roshia oyobi pōrandono kakumeiundōno genjō [The Present Revolutionary Movement in Russia and Poland], Makino Nobuaki monjo (shorui) [Makino Nobuaki Papers], 273-14, KS; Telegram 15 in this volume.

³⁶ See telegram 17 in this volume.

One possible explanation for Komura's opposition to monetary aid and the plan for sabotaging the Trans-Siberian railway³⁷ was Japan's weak position in international politics. Komura was probably anxious about the Great Powers' attitude toward Japan if the aid were disclosed. The root of this anxiety was the Japanese declaration at the beginning of the war that the war zone had to be restricted to the Chinese territory occupied by Russia and the sea area between Japan and China.³⁸ To give aid to the opposition parties in Europe would be a violation of this declaration of intent and of international law. If the monetary aid were to come to light, Russia could easily spread anti-Japanese propaganda. This might antagonize not only Germany and Austria, who were concerned with Polish affairs, but also the other Great Powers, who were fearful of a socialist revolution. It is not surprising that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opposed such risky involvement, especially when there was the possibility of revolution in Russia without Japanese assistance.

The General Staff Decides for Aid

After the Paris Conference of October 1904, Akashi encouraged the opposition parties to begin armed uprisings in Russia and requested huge subsidies from the General Staff, but his request was quickly rejected. Thereafter, Akashi approached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through Akizuki and Motonō. Concomitantly, he requested reconsideration by the General Staff by having Japanese ministers and military attachés in Europe send information about the opposition movement. The General Staff seems to have maintained interest in these opposition groups, even if it refused to respond to the request.

In the Far East, the loss of manpower and material resources during the battles for Port Arthur was much greater than the Japanese General Staff had anticipated. Consequently, it had to restrict military operations in Manchuria. A shortage of soldiers and ammunition after the Battle of Sandepu (26–29 January 1905) posed a more serious problem prior to the Battle of Mukden.³⁹ Against this background, the General Staff must have seriously considered ways to weaken the Russian military capacity. In fact, the Staff attempted to demoralize Russian soldiers by distributing pamphlets written about disturbances in European Russia.⁴⁰

³⁷ Inaba C. 1984, p. 20.

³⁸ *Komura gaikōshi* [A History of Komura's Diplomacy], Vol. 1, edited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo, 1953), pp. 389–393.

³⁹ Ōe Shinobu, *Nichirosensōno gunjishūteki kenkyū* [Studies of the Military History of the Russo-Japanese War], (Tokyo, 1976), pp. 401–449; *Nichirosensōshino kenkyū* [Studies of the History of the Russo-Japanese War], edited by Shinobu Seizaburō and Nakayama Jūichi (Tokyo, 1972), p. 275, 284.

⁴⁰ Nagaoka to Chinda Sutemi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, 14 February 1905



Yamagata, Chief of the Japanese General Staff.

More importantly, the Staff ordered Akashi to get one of the opposition parties to sabotage bridges of the Trans-Siberian railway at the end of January. During 1904 the General Staff had restricted aid and had required Akashi to report overhead expenses for the sabotage. Yet when he requested 40,000 yen on 6 February 1905, the Staff gave its ready consent.⁴¹ It is not clear which opposition party Akashi commissioned to undertake this activity, but the Socialist Revolutionary Party seems the logical choice. On 12 February Akashi telegraphed that the plan to sabotage the Trans-Siberian railway had been postponed temporarily in order to destroy factories producing railway parts in various places.⁴² Given the high cost of recent military campaigns it is not surprising that the General Staff decided to adopt Akashi's proposal to finance the Russian revolutionary movement even if this strategy might cause diplomatic problems if detected.

Akashi's telegram of 12 February to the Chief of the General Staff, Yamagata Aritomo, in which he requested 440,000-450,000 yen in aid for the opposition parties, was immediately forwarded to Komura by the General Staff.⁴³

(Home paper of the General Staff No 423-2), and 7 pamphlets written in Russian, *Kakoku naisei kankei zassan* (rokokunobu), 1.6.3.2-9, GS.

⁴¹ Nagaoka to Nagao Tsunekichi, 27 January 1905, Nagaoka to Akashi, 5, 6, and 8 February, Akashi to Nagaoka, 6 February 1905, Santsūtsuduri, Daihon'ei, Nichirosen'eki, M38-1, BT.

⁴² See telegram 13 in this volume.

⁴³ See telegram 13 in this volume.

Why did the Staff send this telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? The Staff could pay that amount from its own secret funds if it considered the situation desperate enough. It was not necessary to send the telegram to the Ministry. The telegram was probably sent because the Staff was pessimistic about the risks involved in giving such aid and wanted the agreement of the Ministry. Also, Akashi had requested support for the aid from the Ministry through Akizuki and Moto-no. This could be interpreted to mean that the aid was, in Akashi's thinking, such a serious matter that the Staff would not be able to act by itself.

Futrell emphasizes that the monetary aid was approved at the end of April, since *Rakka ryūsui* describes the subsidy as having arrived in Paris at the end of April.⁴⁴ But his assertion that the granting of permission for the aid coincided with that of the arrival of the subsidy is unfounded. There are three facts that cast doubt on Futrell's interpretation: first, a second joint opposition conference was held in Geneva from 2 to 9 April. The conference decided to organize an armed uprising in Russia, and the concrete preparations for an uprising in June were begun.⁴⁵ One can assume that Akashi had been informed of a positive General Staff response by the Geneva conference and had promised Zilliacus to pay reserve funds. Secondly, one can read between the lines of Akashi's telegram of 12 April that the preparation for purchasing arms and explosives had already begun.⁴⁶

Thirdly, there is a letter from Zilliacus in Copenhagen to Akashi in Paris on 25 April, published in a pamphlet in which Akashi's activities were exposed by the Russian government, saying that Zilliacus had used up all the funds Akashi had granted.⁴⁷ Zilliacus also wrote in his memoirs that he entered into a business relation with a Jewish merchant in Hamburg to purchase armaments.⁴⁸ One can conclude that Akashi received permission from the Staff to give aid, and that Zilliacus started to purchase arms in Hamburg secretly and had spent all the money by 25 April. Since all of this required time, it is reasonable to assume that Staff permission was granted before the beginning of April.

The outcome of the Battle of Mukden probably influenced the decision to give aid. One day after the occupation of Mukden on 10 March, a policy operational plan, of which the primary object was to hasten peace and to establish a strong position for the peace conference, was submitted to the Chief of the General Staff by his staff. The headquarters of the Manchurian Army also sent a similar proposal on 13 March.

As a result of discussions of the plan, Yamagata submitted, with the consent of Minister of War Terauchi Masatake, a memorandum entitled *Seisen ryōryaku gairon* [A Joint Outline of Governmental and Military Strategy] to Prime Minis-

⁴⁴ Futrell 1967, pp. 18—19.

⁴⁵ Kujala 1980, pp. 260—261.

⁴⁶ See telegram 22 in this volume.

⁴⁷ *Iznanka revoliutsii* 1906, pp. 10—11.

⁴⁸ Zilliacus 1920, pp. 146—147.

ter Katsura Tarō, Finance Minister Sone Arasuke, and Komura. The memorandum emphasized that it would be impossible to weaken Russia militarily. Consequently, the government should take diplomatic steps to hasten peace and the army should conduct the necessary operations to this end. Significantly, the suggestion in the memorandum that the Russian government would be interested in peace was based on the assumption that it could not continue the war because of extensive domestic unrest. The memorandum then emphasized that Japan would not have to wait long for such conditions in Russia.⁴⁹ The General Staff apparently anticipated disorder there.

An operational policy based on achieving peace by nonmilitary means was decided on by the Imperial Headquarters, the liaison organ between the General Staff and the Naval General Staff, on 30 March, and by the Cabinet Council on 8 April.⁵⁰ When one looks at the roles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff in the granting of permission, it is important to point out that some of Akashi's and Utsunomiya's telegrams after 30 March to the Staff about an armed uprising are contained in the archives of the Ministry.⁵¹ These telegrams were sent to the Ministry by the General Staff. Whether or not the Staff needed the consent of the Ministry, an understanding had emerged in favour of the policy that Akashi had previously advocated in vain. On 28 March, the Chief of the Staff of Manchurian Army at that time, Kodama, visited Tokyo secretly. The decision-making process cannot be reconstructed in full, but probably Kodama made the proposal and the aid for an armed uprising was permitted tacitly by Katsura and Komura.

A letter from Zilliacus to T. (maybe Th. Homén) on 19 March 1905 implies that Zilliacus had already received Japanese approval of aid from Akashi at that time.⁵² This suggests that the aid had already been approved in the middle of March. However, telegrams from Makino and Inoue Junnosuke, Minister to Germany, dated 14 March 1905,⁵³ stated that disturbances were spreading in Russia and, therefore, the Russian government could not dispatch troops to the Far East. Makino's telegram was forwarded to the Emperor, the *Genrō*, and the army leadership.

By sending this telegram to them Komura perhaps wanted to emphasize that current disturbances in Russia rendered the aid unnecessary. In other words, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still remained opposed to aid in mid-March. Yet ap-

⁴⁹ Furuya Tetsuo, *Nichirosensō* [The Russo-Japanese War], (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 160–165; Shinobu and Nakayama 1972, p. 385; Seisen ryōryaku gairon, Katsura Tarō kankei monjo [Katsura Tarō Papers], Vol. 19, 109-3, KS.

⁵⁰ Furuya 1966, pp. 164–165.

⁵¹ See telegrams 21, 22, and 23 in this volume.

⁵² Zilliacus to T. (perhaps Th. Homén), 19 March 1905, J.N. Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, Åbo Akademis Bibliotek, Turku/Åbo. I am indebted to Antti Kujala for bringing this letter to my attention.

⁵³ See telegrams 19 and 20 in this volume.

proval for substantial aid had already been given to Akashi around 13 March. If the army, which had the right of direct appeal to the Emperor, really wanted to grant the aid, it did not necessarily have to obtain permission from the government before acting. Perhaps it decided to act and to get the permission later. On the basis of available archival material one can conclude that the practical decision on aid was probably made in mid-March but that a consensus among Japanese policymakers emerged only at the end of the month.

Prospects for Peace

The plan for an armed uprising in Russia began in March 1905. Akashi, Zilliacus, and some other opposition leaders started purchasing huge arms supplies and transport ships, and the Socialist Revolutionary Party began preparing for receipt of those arms and an armed uprising in St Petersburg. But the purchase and receipt of arms made slow progress.⁵⁴ Akashi telegraphed on 7 May that it would be difficult to meet the June deadline for the uprising.⁵⁵ Thereafter the plan was changed. At the end of July Akashi telegraphed Komura, who was visiting the United States to conduct peace negotiations with Russia at that time, that the arms unloading would be completed on 25 August.⁵⁶ But this episode ended in disaster when the *John Grafton*, the arms transport ship, ran ashore near Jakobstad (Pietarsaari), a small Finnish town situated on the Gulf of Bothnia. The crew blew her up on 8 September.⁵⁷

There is no known record of how Japanese policymakers evaluated the plan for an armed uprising in St Petersburg after making the decision to grant aid. The General Staff probably anticipated success after sending subsidies to Akashi for direct action.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, Japan cut off the flow of aid in the middle of August, immediately before peace was agreed upon.⁵⁹ As the prospects for peace grew, the General Staff must have decided to discontinue Akashi's activities in order to prevent possible detection. On 11 September, soon after the conclusion

⁵⁴ Kujala 1980, pp. 261—262; Inaba Chiharu, “1905 nen, peteruburuku busōhōki keikaku” [A Plan for an Uprising in St Petersburg in 1905], *Waseda, kenkyūto jissen*, No 6 (1985), pp. 59—64.

⁵⁵ See telegram 23 in this volume.

⁵⁶ Tachibana Koichirō, Military Attaché to the United States, Washington D.C., to Komura, New York, 31 July 1905 (A note written at the Arlington [hotel]), *Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan (rokokunobu)*, 1.6.3.2-9, GS.

⁵⁷ Michael Futrell, *Northern Underground: Episodes of Russian Revolutionary Transport and Communications through Scandinavia and Finland 1863—1917* (London, 1963), p. 77; Fält 1976, p. 233; Kujala 1980, p. 273; Rakka ryūsui in this volume.

⁵⁸ The General Staff forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs many telegrams describing conditions in the Russian Empire. See *Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan (rokokunobu)*, 1.6.3.2-9, GS.

⁵⁹ Kujala 1980, p. 272.

of the peace negotiations, the General Staff ordered Akashi to return home.⁶⁰

The Foreign Ministry, which was responsible for negotiating peace, had second thoughts about subversive activities in Russia. In short, the Ministry became interested in supporting the Russian opposition movement following the Battle of Mukden, but it remained uneasy about the attitude of the Russian government towards the opposition and the trend among the other powers and cautiously waited for an opportunity to make peace.⁶¹ Victory at the Battle of the Tsushima Strait (27 and 28 May 1905) brought this opportunity. The Foreign Ministry judged it inadvisable to wait any longer for the Russian peace proposals and asked President Theodore Roosevelt to use his influence to mediate with Russia.⁶²

Conclusion

Despite the initial opposition of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Staff provided opposition groups with extensive monetary aid for disturbances in Russia. Nevertheless, the plan for an armed uprising in St Petersburg ended in failure.

Viewed from a Japanese perspective, the General Staff's decision did not pay off and the subsidy failed to affect the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. It is probable, however, that Japanese aid influenced the activities of the opposition parties in the Russian Empire. Armed demonstrations in Poland and Georgia soon after the Paris conference as well as demonstrations and strikes by the workers and revolts by the peasants within the Russian Empire through 1905 can perhaps be attributed in part to Japanese aid even if all the Russian revolutionary movements themselves were prompted by domestic considerations.

Historically, the Akashi-inspired scheme to defeat Russia from within represents the first and the most ambitious Japanese attempt to intervene in the domestic affairs of a European country. The Japanese goal was limited, however, to winning the war. Neither the government nor the army cared about the fate of the opposition groups. The army used them as one uses mercenaries, providing economic support for the sake of military victory. It broke off relations with the opposition groups and stopped giving them subsidies when the war drew to a close, and called Akashi home soon after the peace was concluded.

It is hardly surprising that Japan cut off aid on the eve of a peace settlement. Japan had no desire to continue the military conflict in Manchuria after its military weaknesses had become apparent. Once the peace treaty was concluded, Japan adopted a more cordial policy towards Russia. Both parties sought to maintain

⁶⁰ Komori 1928, 1, p. 203.

⁶¹ Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan (rokokunobu), 1.6.3.2-9, GS; *Nihon gaikō monjo*, Nichirosensō, V (Tokyo, 1960), p. 266, 268, 272.

⁶² Shinobu and Nakayama 1972, pp. 384–389.

the new *status quo* in East Asia, and the Russo-Japanese convention of 1907 confirmed a new identity of interests of the two powers. The next time Japan became closely involved in Russian opposition policies was prior to and during the Second World War.⁶³

⁶³ Japan, particularly the army, considered the Soviet Union the most dangerous potential enemy before and during the Second World War. The General Staff, therefore, employed Polish intelligence officers in Manchuria to break Russian codes. Onodera Makoto, the Japanese Military Attaché to Sweden (1941—1945), took Michael Rybikowski, one of the leaders of Polish military intelligence, under his protection and collected much important information such as the Yalta agreement in February 1945 concerning Russia's attack on Japan. According to Onodera Yuriko, Makoto's wife, he also gave 300,000 Swedish *kronor* for the *Stella Polaris* operation, the secret plan in 1944 to transfer the Finnish military intelligence unit to Sweden. At that time, Onodera obtained deciphered Russian codes from Finns and sent them to Tokyo.

Reino Hallamaa, chief of the intelligence department of the Finnish General Staff, had established contact with Department II (Intelligence) of the Japanese General Staff as early as the Winter War (the war between Finland and the Soviet Union, 30 November 1939 — 13 March 1940). After the Winter War, the Japanese gave the Finns a lot of Russian five-numbered military messages collected between Khabarovsk and Vladivostok in the summer of 1940. With these messages the Finns were able to break the Soviet codes. The Department II gave some monetary aid to Finnish intelligence officers in the spring of 1941 and dispatched Hirose Eiichi, who had once worked at the cryptographic section, as Assistant Military Attaché to Finland. He arrived in Finland in June 1941, after Germany attacked Russia and Finland declared war on the Soviet Union. Hirose worked with the Finnish Naval intelligence section and showed to the Finns the book *Istoriia Vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (bol'shevikov), kratkii kurs 1938* [History of the Russian Communist Party (short course of 1938)], upon which the Russian additive numbers of codes had been based. Later, Hirose attempted to decipher Russian codes in cooperation with Reino Hallamaa, Erkki Pale, an expert cryptographer, and other Finnish intelligence officers. Ōkubo Toshijirō, Tairo angōkaidokunikansuru sōshi narabini senkuntōnikansuru shiryō [Materials Related to the Cryptography of Russian Codes], (Manshū, Shūsenjino nissosen, 28), BT; Onodera Yuriko, *Barutokaino hotorinite* [Memoirs of a Military Attaché's Wife during the Pacific War], (Tokyo, 1985), pp. 169-175; Inaba's interview with Hirose Eiichi in Tokyo on 8 May 1987, and interview with Erkki Pale in Helsinki on 29 August 1988.

Antti Kujala

March Separately — Strike Together

The Paris and Geneva Conferences Held by the Russian and Minority Nationalities' Revolutionary and Opposition Parties, 1904—1905

The strategy of “*Getrennt marschieren — vereint schlagen*”, of marching separately but striking together, was advocated by two leading Russian Social Democrats, G.V. Plekhanov and V.I. Lenin, to their country’s revolutionary movement at the beginning of the 1905 revolution as the one most likely to bring about the changes hoped for on the Left.¹ In practice, however, only the first half of the slogan came to be followed. The revolutionary parties ultimately proved incapable of dealing Tsarism the fatal blow. Too much at odds with each other to be able to agree on a common approach, they proved unequal to the challenge of developing any real measure of coordinated action, even in those fields where the parties concerned were sufficiently unanimous about the need for such action.

¹ (G.V. Plekhanov,) “Vroz’ idti, vmeste bit’”, *Iskra* No 87 10 February 1905 (o.s.), p. 1; V.I. Lenin, “O boevom soglashenii dlia vosstaniia”, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (PSS)*, izd. 5-e, T. 9 (Moskva, 1960), p. 280. — Throughout the article the Gregorian, or new-style calendar is used, unless otherwise indicated old style (o.s.). To convert dates from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar, thirteen days should be added.

The conferences organised by the revolutionary and opposition parties active within the Russian Empire and held in Paris in 1904 and Geneva the following year have attracted relatively little attention,² despite the range of participants who took part in them or were involved in their preparation, including Lenin, Plekhanov, Martov, Gapon, Chernov, Azef, Miliukov, Struve, Dmowski, and Rosa Luxemburg. The simple fact that these figures, together with the parties they represented, were conspicuously more successful in acting independently than jointly must go some way towards explaining this apparent oversight. The lack of coverage given to the conferences might perhaps be forgivable if they had failed to spawn any subsequent action. As this was clearly not the case, the origins and consequences of these two conferences surely merit a more thorough analysis than they have hitherto received.

Accounts written by the various Finns who took part in events at the time place great emphasis on the initiative of the Finnish constitutionalist opposition and Konni Zilliacus in organising the Paris conference. The Russian and overall imperial context of the conference is often overshadowed in these accounts by the writers' concentration on the domestic issue of whether the responsibility for the disintegration of the Finnish opposition which took place around the same time lay with Zilliacus or the moderate constitutionalists.³

For a Russian perspective on the two conferences we have to look to the accounts, admittedly partisan, written by the Social Democrat Iu. O. Martov, the liberal P.N. Miliukov, and the Socialist Revolutionary V.M. Chernov.⁴ Mili-

² The best surveys of events from the Russian standpoint can be found in the following: Shmuel Galai, *The Liberation Movement in Russia 1900—1905* (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 214—218 (the Paris conference); Alexander Fischer, *Russische Sozialdemokratie und bewaffneter Aufstand im Jahre 1905*, Frankfurter Abhandlungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte 2 (Wiesbaden, 1967), pp. 103—107 (the Geneva conference). For a Finnish perspective, see Olavi K. Fält, "Collaboration between Japanese Intelligence and the Finnish Underground during the Russo-Japanese War", *Asian Profile*, Vol. 4 (1976), pp. 216—222, 228—230. — The main points of my present study were published earlier in: Antti Kujala, "Lenin, Venäjän vallankumousliike ja Suomi 1898—1905", in: *Lenin ja Suomi*, I (Helsinki, 1987), pp. 73—106.

³ Konni Zilliacus, *Från ofärdstid och oroliga år: Politiska minnen*, I (Helsingfors, 1919), pp. 131—149; Zilliacus II 1920, pp. 5—48; Adolf Törngren, *Med ryska samhällsbyggare och statsmän åren 1904—1905* (Helsingfors, 1929), pp. 93—140. The latter of these is the best description of events surrounding the preparations of the Paris conference produced by a Finnish contemporary of the time, but, like many other accounts of its type, is very much concerned with the impact of events on Finnish interests. Zilliacus' memoirs are much less precise than Törngren's, but they stand out from the latter's and those of many others on account of the wider imperial perspective that their author brings to the issues involved.

⁴ J. Martov, *Geschichte der russischen Sozialdemokratie* (Berlin, 1926), pp. 93—95; P. Miliukov, "Rokovye gody, (Iz vospominanii)", *Russkii Zapiski* (June 1938), pp. 122—127; P.N. Miliukov, *Vospominaniia (1859—1917)*, I (New York, 1955), pp. 242—245; V. M. Chernov, *Pered burei: Vospominaniia* (New York, 1953), pp. 205—213; V. Lenuar (= V.M. Chernov), "Lichnyia vospominaniia o G. Gapon", in: *Za kulisami okhrannago otdeleniia*, sost. A.B. (Berlin, 1910), pp. 157—164.

kov's description of events, in particular, is thoroughly apologetic in tone, no doubt because the revelation of Zilliacus' involvement with the Japanese⁵ and the unmasking of another participant, Evno Azef, as a spy in the employ of the Russian secret police⁶ cast an embarrassing light on the Paris conference. When the Azef case came up for discussion in the Russian State Duma in 1909, the Prime Minister, P.A. Stolypin, announced from the dispatch box that Azef, in his secret report, had named Chernov, P.B. Struve, and Miliukov as having participated in the conference. This information, according to the minutes of the Duma debate, was greeted with shouted interjections from the centre parties, complimenting Miliukov and his associates on the appropriateness of the company they kept.⁷ These taunting remarks "Nice company, nice friends!" were almost certainly still ringing in Miliukov's ears when he later came to write his memoirs.

The Paris conference, therefore, aroused considerable political controversy at the time. The contrast with the modern interpretation put on that period of Russian history and which consigns the conference to a footnote reference or two, or to the dustbin of history, to use Trotsky's well-known phrase, could hardly be greater.

The dominant interpretation in research to date has been that the Paris conference was first and foremost a personal triumph for Konni Zilliacus. In line with this, writers on the major Russian opposition parties and their leaders have not shown themselves especially interested in the events leading up to the holding of the conference.⁸ In contrast, in a number of studies dealing with the Empire's minority nationalities and their socialist parties, attention has quite rightly been drawn to the fact that the Finnish opposition was by no means the sole political force which tried to establish some measure of meaningful cooperation between the various opposition and revolutionary parties active within the Empire in 1904. A number of other attempts at fostering joint political activity were indeed made,⁹ but the greater success of Zilliacus' initiative served to bury them.

The Geneva conference has generally been seen in recent studies as a behind-the-scenes conspiracy directed by Zilliacus and his Japanese confederates, aimed

⁵ *Iznanka revoliutsii: Vooruzhennoe vozstanie v Rossii na iaponskii sredstva* (S.-Peterburg, 1906).

⁶ B. Nikolaevskii, *Istoriia odnogo predatelja: Terroristy i politicheskaia politsiia* (Berlin, 1932).

⁷ *Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Tretii sozyv, Stenograficheskie otchety, 1909 g., sessija vtoraja, chast' II, zasedanie 50* (S.-Peterburg, 1909), pp. 1426—1427.

⁸ Richard Pipes, *Struve: Liberal on the Left, 1870—1905*, Russian Research Center Studies 64 (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 363—365; Galai 1973, pp. 214—216. See also Abraham Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray* (Stanford, 1988), pp. 48—50. Apart from these brief treatments, little else on the subject exists.

⁹ Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski, 1864—1945*, I (Paris, 1953), p. 126, 130; Henry J. Tobias, *The Jewish Bund in Russia: From Its Origins to 1905* (Stanford, 1972), pp. 281—282; Georg W. Sirobel, *Die Partei Rosa Luxemburgs, Lenin und die SPD: Der polnische "europäische" Internationalismus in der russischen Sozialdemokratie* (Wiesbaden, 1974), p. 215—217.

not only at aiding the revolutionary cause in Russia but also Japanese war aims.¹⁰ Some scholars, it is true, have pointed out that the Russian revolutionary parties, as well as a number of European socialist figures, also contributed their share towards the staging of the conference or to attempts to prevent its being held.¹¹

Zilliacus' central role in convening the Paris conference cannot be seriously disputed. He was also involved, albeit indirectly, in the efforts to organise a follow-up conference during the spring of 1905. A study of the events leading up to these conferences reveals, however, that they cannot be solely considered as the fruit of a conspiracy on the part of Zilliacus and of the Japanese alone. The notion of developing greater cooperation between the revolutionary and opposition parties was discussed in a number of quarters during 1904 and 1905, and was the subject of various moves to achieve it. The accepted idea of Zilliacus' dominant role in organising the Geneva conference could, therefore, bear some revision.

The Finnish Opposition's "Russian Studies" — 1903

From 1899 onwards the Russian authorities embarked on a series of policies aimed at integrating Finland more closely, politically and administratively, with the rest of the Empire. These policies were directed by and identified with the then Russian Governor-General in Finland, N.I. Bobrikov. The Finnish constitutionalist opposition, comprising the Swedish Party and the Young Finns, adopted a policy of passive resistance in a bid to maintain Finland's autonomy. In the spring of 1903, the Tsar issued a special decree granting Bobrikov a range of extraordinary powers to allow him to eliminate the opposition which had emerged. Under these new powers a significant number of the leaders of the constitutionalist opposition were ordered into foreign exile.¹²

Back in the autumn of 1902, the journalist Konrad Viktor (Konni) Zilliacus

¹⁰ Michael Futrell, *Northern Underground: Episodes of Russian Revolutionary Transport and Communications through Scandinavia and Finland 1863—1917* (London, 1963), p. 66; Fischer 1967, pp. 103—107.

¹¹ Dietrich Geyer, "Die russische Parteispaltung im Urteil der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1903—1905", *International Review of Social History*, Vol. III (1958), pp. 435—436; Walter Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday: Father Gapon and the St. Petersburg Massacre of 1905* (Princeton, 1976), pp. 296—297.

¹² On the policy of integration introduced by the imperial government in Finland, see Tuomo Polvinen, *Valtakunta ja rajamaa: N.I. Bobrikov Suomen kenraalikuvernöörinä 1898—1904* (Porvoo, 1984); Pertti Luntinen, *F.A. Seyn: A Political Biography of a Tsarist Imperialist as Administrator of Finland*, *Studia Historica* 19 (Helsinki, 1985). On the passive resistance, see William R. Copeland, *The Uneasy Alliance: Collaboration between the Finnish Opposition and the Russian Underground, 1899—1904*, *Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae ser. B* 179 (Helsinki, 1973).



Konni Zilliacus.

had publicly proposed that the Finnish constitutionalists abandon their isolationist attitude towards the Russian opposition movement. He argued that the abolition of the autocracy and the achievement of political freedom should be made the basis of a programme around which all the opposition elements across the Empire could rally. The various groupings within the opposition had up until this point been prevented from uniting their forces and working together by their attachment to different and often divergent social and political ideals. The Finnish opposition, because of its very lack of any policy programme covering social issues, was, in Zilliacus' opinion, ideally suited to taking on the task of coordinating the activities of opposition forces. By working together, the opposition groups would have a much greater chance of succeeding in their aim of overthrowing the autocracy, than by continuing the anti-government struggle separately.¹³ Zilliacus' ideas, however, proved far too radical at this point to evince any

¹³ (K.) Zilliacus, "Den ryska oppositionen och Finlands framtid", *Fria Ord* 12 September 1902, pp. 3—4; (K.) Zilliacus, *Den ryska oppositionen och Finlands framtid* (Stockholm, 1902).

positive response among the Finnish constitutionalists.¹⁴

A conference of those Finns exiled abroad, together with representatives of the constitutionalists active within Finland, was held in Stockholm at the beginning of September 1903 to consider the situation in Finland. It quickly became apparent that, as a result of the extension of Bobrikov's powers and the expulsion of leading figures in the opposition movement, the unresponsive attitude of the constitutionalists towards the Russian opposition began to change. While the moderate majority at the conference looked to the Russian *zemstvo* (liberal) party, Zilliacus and his radical supporters called for an alliance with the revolutionary parties. As no agreement could be reached on this, the question was passed on for further discussion to a committee made up of exiles living in Stockholm.¹⁵

During the autumn of 1903, a plan emerged among the Finnish exiles in Stockholm for the founding of a news agency to represent the Finnish opposition.¹⁶ At the end of November, Zilliacus decided to adapt the plan to fit in better with his overall strategy. His idea was that opposition forces throughout the Empire should set up a joint news agency which would be able to assume a coordinating role in organising the struggle against the government. In developing this notion, he gave new life to his old dream of the Finnish constitutionalists acting as the catalyst to unite opposition forces across the Empire.

Relations between the more conservative Finnish exiles and Zilliacus were coloured by a number of political and personal tensions and mutual suspicion. Zilliacus kept his most ambitious plans for uniting opposition forces secret from Leo Mechelin, an ex-member of the Finnish Senate, and other conservative members of the Stockholm committee, whom he referred to pejoratively in private as "senators both in name and spirit".¹⁷

In December 1903, the Stockholm committee decided to send Zilliacus on a fact-finding trip around Western Europe to establish contact with the various Russian opposition leaders living abroad and to sound out their views on the minority nationalities question and other political issues. He was also to find out if they were willing to set up a joint news agency. Although Zilliacus was now accepted as a member of the committee, some of its members remained less than

¹⁴ Copeland 1973, pp. 112—113.

¹⁵ Ernst Estlander, *Personliga hägkomster från det politiska motståndsarbetet i Finland åren 1901—(1905—1906)*, f. 155, V.M. von Born Collection, Sarvlaks arkiv (SA), Pernå; Lennart Gripenberg, *Från ett skiftesrikt kvartsekel, Utdrag ur minnesanteckningar* (1932), f. 157, 194—196, Valtionarkisto [National Archives] (VA), Helsinki; Herman Gummerus, *Konni Zilliacus: En levnadsteckning* (Helsingfors, 1933), p. 116.

¹⁶ L. Mechelin to V.M. von Born 25 September 1903, von Born Collection, SA; Adolf Törngren, *Från Finlands strid för rätt och frihet: Personliga upplevelser åren 1901—1914*, Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Litteratursällskapet i Finland CCXC (Helsingfors, 1942), p. 51.

¹⁷ Törngren 1942, pp. 49—51, 53—56; K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 18 November 1903, Arvid Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus to J. Castrén 28 July 1904, Jonas Castrén Collection 2, VA; K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 7 and 10 December 1903, F.V. Volkhovskii Collection, Hoover Institution (HI), Stanford, copy: USA tk 18, VA.

completely convinced of the wisdom of relying on him. They considered him too independent-minded and feared that he might decide to exceed his brief and be tempted to present himself in the role of official representative of the Finnish opposition, instead of concentrating on his main task of collecting information. The committee's recognition of his excellent negotiating skills, nevertheless, sealed the choice.¹⁸

In December, Zilliacus met the Socialist Revolutionaries E. Azef and I.A. Rubanovich in Paris and the anarchist P.A. Kropotkin, together with F.V. Volkhovskii and N.V. Chaikovskii of the Agrarian Socialist League, which had joined the Socialist Revolutionaries, in London, and presented his plan for setting up a joint news agency and for developing a more coordinated opposition strategy. All of these old acquaintances of Zilliacus backed his news agency proposal, agreeing that the Finns were ideally suited to the task of putting forward the idea of increased cooperation within the opposition.

The list of the people Zilliacus met shows that he was keenest to present his plan to the Socialist Revolutionaries and those closely allied to them before moving on to approach representatives from other groupings. In fact, he was not to have time to meet any of the latter during the course of this trip as a result of its being cut short. In his report to the Stockholm committee, he gave as positive a picture as possible of the Socialist Revolutionaries' stand on national self-determination.¹⁹ Thus Zilliacus sought to realise united opposition action in unanimity with, and according to the aspirations of, the Socialist Revolutionaries. His links with Volkhovskii and Chaikovskii were particularly close.

¹⁸ K. Zilliacus to T (probably Th. Homén) 19 March 1905, J.N. Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, Åbo Akademis Bibliotek (ÅAB), Turku/Åbo; L. Gripenberg, *Från ett skiftesrikt kvartsekel* (1932), ff. 198—199, VA; Törngren 1942, pp. 51—52; Herman Gummerus, "Aktivismens förhistoria: En relation av Konni Zilliacus", *Finsk Tidskrift* CVI (1929), pp. 161—162.

¹⁹ K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius "1903", 23 and 30 December 1903 (incorrectly dated 30 January 1904), and 6 January 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus to C. Mannerheim 19 and 28 December 1903, Carl Mannerheim Papers 1, VA; Copeland 1973, pp. 151—157 (Zilliacus did not return to London in January, as Copeland seems to assume); L.A. Rataev to A.A. Lopukhin 2 January 1904/20 December 1903, Okhrana Archives, XXI F. 1, H1 (USA tk 18, VA). The latter letter is based on information concerning Zilliacus' travels provided by Azef to the Russian secret police. — It is also worth noting that Zilliacus, together with a couple of other Finnish constitutionalists, had talks with representatives of the Polish National League at the beginning of January in Copenhagen, during which the idea of a joint news agency was presented to the Poles. See Copeland 1973, pp. 142—146; Alvin Marcus Fountain II, *Roman Dmowski: Party, Tactics, Ideology 1895—1907*, East European Monographs LX (New York, 1980), pp. 114—115.

The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War on Zilliacus' Plans

Japan attacked Russia at the beginning of February 1904. Following the outbreak of hostilities, secret discussions were begun between a number of the Finnish exiles in Stockholm and the Japanese Military Attaché in Stockholm, Colonel Akashi Motojirō, to sound out the possibility of developing some form of cooperation between the Finnish opposition and the Japanese authorities. One of those most active in pursuing this avenue was Zilliacus.²⁰ He was instrumental in putting Japanese representatives in contact with the Polish National League (*Liga Narodowa*) during March.²¹

Zilliacus was authorised by the Stockholm committee on 14 February to embark on a second fact-finding trip.²² Relations between Zilliacus and a major part of the constitutionalist leadership, which had for some time been under considerable strain, had however by this stage begun to deteriorate even further, to such an extent that at the end of February Zilliacus offered to abandon his fact-finding duties, and only after some persuasion agreed to continue.²³

As on his previous trip, Zilliacus prepared the ground for his forthcoming discussions through correspondence with Volkhovskii in London. On the basis of this exchange of views, Zilliacus set himself the task of working towards the declaration of a joint anti-war manifesto, to be sponsored by the opposition movement as a whole. Russia's military setbacks and the ensuing social unrest could, he saw, be used to turn opinion against the autocratic régime. The government and the outside world had to be shown that the opposition was capable of concerted joint action. As part of this strategy, the liberals were to be encouraged to call for the introduction of a constitution. Further efforts aimed at overthrowing the autocracy were planned, in the shape of demonstrations and armed disturbances to be organised in various parts of the Empire. Although Zilliacus was

²⁰ Antti Kujala, "Japanin, Englannin ja Ruotsin yhteydet Suomen perustuslailliseen oppositioon Venäjän-Japanin sodan aikana", *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja* 1988 (= Kujala 1988), pp. 3—23. For the same study in Japanese, see Antti Kujala, "Nichirosensōjiniokeru finrandorikkenshugiteikōhato nihon, igirisu, suweedenna kyōryoku", *Hokuōshi kenkyū*, No 5 (1987), pp. 36—51, No 6 (1988), pp. 40—53.

²¹ Jerzy J. Lerski, "A Polish Chapter of the Russo-Japanese War", in: *The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Third Series VII (Tokyo, 1959), p. 73; Fält 1976, pp. 211—216; Fountain 1980, p. 115. — See also Siegmund (= Z. Balicki) to Akashi 28 April 1904, No 89-10, Akashi Motojirō Papers, Kensei shiryōshitsu, Kokkai toshokan [National Diet Library], Tokyo.

²² L. Gripenberg, *Från ett skiftesrikt kvartsekel* (1932), f. 199, VA.

²³ Copeland 1973, pp. 158—159; A. Neovius to K. Zilliacus 27 February 1904, Leo Mechelin Letter Collection 46, VA; K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, ÅAB; A. Törngren to A. Neovius "1904" and 14 and 23 February 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; E. Estlander, *Personliga hägkomster* (1905—1906), ff. 178—179, von Born Collection, SA.

responsible for originating most, if not all, of the various elements of this plan, it was Volkhovskii who imbued it with a sense of true radicalism.²⁴

Zilliacus visited London in mid-April to discuss his plan with Volkhovskii and Chaikovskii. As a result of these talks, a call was now added for a joint conference of the various opposition movements. This was to agree on a common campaign of anti-government activities and nominate a central coordinating committee.

Once the plan of action had been finalised, Zilliacus lost no time in presenting it to the Japanese diplomats then resident in London, Baron Hayashi Tadasu, the Japanese Minister, and the Military Attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Utsunomiya Tarō. Zilliacus needed Japanese assistance to fund the various stages of the plan and the purchases of the weapons that would be needed in the armed operations. Funds were to be channelled in stages to the various opposition parties involved as the overall plan progressed. The intention was to disguise the origin of the money from the ethnic Russian parties.

Unrest and disturbances on the home front would, as Zilliacus saw things, prevent Russia from deploying all her military forces against Japan. It was this bait which he hoped would attract Tokyo's interest. His own aim in the longer term was for the establishment of a constitutionally-administered Russia and the granting of as wide as possible a measure of self-government to Finland.

Zilliacus acted completely on his own initiative in London. He was well aware that the course of action he was advocating could hope to gain the approval of only a section of the Finnish constitutionalist opposition. His links with those within the Finnish opposition who supported a more radical approach to relations with Russia were still relatively close at this stage. Zilliacus outlined his plan of action and his intention of acquiring weapons from Japan in some detail in his correspondence with members of this group. As he made plain to them, he foresaw an inevitable and irreversible split in the Finnish opposition into a moderate wing, significantly less interested in cooperating with the Russian movement, and a more radical wing committed to a greater level of active opposition. Zilliacus naturally hoped that his friends would choose to ally themselves with him.²⁵

The group on which Zilliacus pinned his hope in this regard did not, however, feel completely confident in him. Deciding to pursue its own approach, this group initiated discussions of its own, partly unbeknown to him, with Japanese representatives in Stockholm and London. While Zilliacus looked to improving Finland's

²⁴ K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 1 and 31 March 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA).

²⁵ K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 13 April and 8 August 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus to J. Castrén 18 April 1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA; K. Zilliacus to C. Mannerheim 18 and 24 April 1904 & J.N. Reuter, Promemoria (1904), Mannerheim Papers 1—2, VA; K. Zilliacus to M. Rosendal 14 April 1904, Eino I. Parmanen Collection XI, VA; K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, ÅAB; Zilliacus I 1919, pp. 131—132; Fält 1976, pp. 217—218.

position through the Russian revolutionary movement and links with Japan, those led by Jonas Castrén and J.N. Reuter wanted to disengage Finland as far as possible from Russia through the help of Japan and the European great powers.²⁶

Delays in the Preparations for the Conference and Its Postponement

Continuing his trip onwards from London to the Continent, Zilliacus believed that it would be possible to hold the conference as early as mid-May.²⁷ He was soon to find out, however, that there were as many opinions as individuals in the Russian revolutionary movement and that hardly anyone was willing to abandon their own proposals on the best way forward for the movement as a whole. Flexibility was not, as is widely known, one of the great strengths of the Russian revolutionary movement.

Inspired by Zilliacus' initiative, Rubanovich, who met the former during his visit to Paris, had asked the French socialists Jules Guesde, Paul Lafargue, and perhaps Édouard Vaillant as well, to do what they could to encourage a greater measure of cooperation between the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries and Social Democrats. The French had, in response to Rubanovich's appeal, offered to call a conference of all the opposition groups and to act as its sponsors. The proposal as it stood was seen by Zilliacus as likely to be unattractive to the non-socialists, and did not win his wholehearted support. It was, on the other hand, difficult to turn down out of hand without offending the French socialists, whose rhetorical attacks against the Tsarist régime were otherwise especially welcome.

It was left to the Polish National League to rescue Zilliacus from this dilemma by demanding that the conference should not be held under the protection of any foreign group. Rubanovich's proposal then was rejected at a very early stage, but it nevertheless remained to haunt Zilliacus right up until the Paris conference.²⁸


Fortunately for Zilliacus, the Socialist Revolutionaries, Chernov and L.E. Shishko, based in Geneva, did not come up with any private notions of their own to further complicate the picture.

Zilliacus' Socialist Revolutionary friends had suggested to him that it would probably be unlikely, as a result of the internal feuds dividing the Russian Social

²⁶ Kujala 1988, pp. 3–23.

²⁷ K. Zilliacus to C. Mannerheim 24 April 1904, Mannerheim Papers 1, VA. For details of Zilliacus' itinerary and the various figures he met, see Törngren 1929, pp. 94–95.

²⁸ K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 5 May (this letter is incorrectly dated 5 April) and 1 July 1904. K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 10 May 1904. Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA); K. Zilliacus to C. Mannerheim 24 April 1904, Mannerheim Papers 1, VA; K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 31 August 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; *Leninskii sbornik*, XV (Moskva, 1930), p. 45, 50.



Georgii Plekhanov.

Democrats, that the latter would take part in any joint conference.²⁹ To satisfy himself as to the true state of affairs on this point, Zilliacus gathered up his courage and presented himself for an audience with Plekhanov on 27 April. To Zilliacus' surprise, Plekhanov reacted favourably to the idea of a conference and the various aims Zilliacus had envisaged for it. The two-hour discussion between the two

²⁹ K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 13 April 1904, Neovius Collection, VA.

men in Geneva resulted in a fair measure of agreement on the main issues in question, which even the later revelations regarding Zilliacus' activities were not able to completely expunge from Plekhanov's memory. Zilliacus proved successful in making a positive impression on Plekhanov,³⁰ a not insignificant feat as the "grand old man" of the Russian Social Democratic Party was widely known for his readiness to make plain his antipathy, and refusal to cooperate with those to whom he took a disliking.

During the course of the same trip, Zilliacus presented his plan to Georgii Dekanozi (Dekanozishvili) of the Georgian Party of Socialists-Federalists-Revolutionaries in Paris, to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (the *Dash-naktsutiun*) and the Jewish Bund in Geneva, as well as to the Polish National League in Cracow.³¹

Zilliacus' Socialist Revolutionary friends had managed to convince him that the Russian liberals would not make any move on their own towards transforming Russia into a constitutionalist state, preferring instead to "feed on the chestnuts others have picked out of the fire". Zilliacus considered the Russian liberals, like the Finnish moderate constitutionalists, to be wind-bags and time-wasters. These opinions, which Zilliacus shared with the Socialist Revolutionaries, were not based purely on political prejudice, but also on the fact that, in the early stages of the war, some liberals had argued for holding back on anti-government action and adopted an intermediary position between official patriotism and defeatism.³²

At the end of April or the beginning of May, Zilliacus met P.B. Struve, the publisher of the liberal journal *Osvobozhdenie*, in Stuttgart. Struve, like all the others with whom Zilliacus had discussed the proposed conference, also reacted favourably to the idea, although he was unable to promise that the Union of Liberation, with which he was associated, would participate. Responsibility for such a decision lay with the organisation's leadership in Russia, to which Struve promised to write on the matter.³³ The liberals' procrastination on this issue was to emerge as the single biggest obstacle to the conference encountered by Zilliacus. A similar reply which he had received from the representatives of the Bund

³⁰ K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 28 April 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 5 May 1904. K. Zilliacus to N.V. Chaikovskii 24 May 1904. Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA).

³¹ K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 28 and 29 April 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 5 May 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA); Törn-gren 1929, pp. 89–90, 94–95. I am grateful to Ronald Grigor Suny for providing me with background information on Dekanozi and his party.

³² K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 1 and 31 March 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA). On liberal attitudes at the beginning of the war, see Pipes 1970, pp. 338–345; Galai 1973, pp. 196–205.

³³ K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 5 May 1904. K. Zilliacus to N.V. Chaikovskii 24 May 1904. Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA); P.B. Struve to A. Neovius 4 May 1904, Neovius Collection, VA.

whom he had met gave him much less anxiety, as the Bund was seen from the Finnish opposition point of view as very much a minor factor when it came to the conference.³⁴

Zilliacus arrived back in Stockholm at the beginning of May and presented the committee with his plan for a joint conference and manifesto. For the more conservative members of the committee whom Zilliacus had not bothered to keep informed of developments and had made little attempt to convert to his way of thinking, the idea came virtually as a complete shock. Zilliacus proposed that the Finnish opposition should send its own representatives to the conference, which was scheduled to meet the same month.

Zilliacus had no intention of postponing the conference on account of the indecision of the Russian liberals. He was quite willing to leave these by the wayside if they refused to keep pace with the rest of the opposition movement. To the majority of the Finnish constitutionalists, for whom the liberals represented the only group worth attention within the Russian opposition, Zilliacus' plan amounted to little short of sacrilege.³⁵

Zilliacus was unsuccessful in persuading his fellow countrymen to accept what he attempted to present as a *fait accompli*. He was forced, as a result, to inform his various contacts whom he had met on his recent trip that the Finnish opposition wanted to postpone the conference for a couple of weeks to give the liberals time to make up their minds about attending.³⁶

The constitutionalist position on the proposed conference came up for further discussion by the Stockholm committee and also within the constitutionalist leadership based in Helsinki which wielded the ultimate decision-making authority in affairs affecting the opposition. This took place during May. The Finns were keen that the opposition parties should organise a conference to nominate a joint coordinating body or central committee. Although the Stockholm committee did not put it in so many words, the overall aim was to support the Russian liberals in their efforts to secure a dominant place in government and introduce a constitutional form of government. Demonstrations were considered an appropriate form of providing that support. The Finns were also adamant that Finland had to be given back her autonomy. They sincerely believed that all previous Emperors had confirmed Finland's fundamental laws, which Nicholas II was now thought to be infringing. The constitutionalists were ultimately only willing to take part in a conference if the Russian liberals also took part.³⁷

³⁴ K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 5 May 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA).

³⁵ See Note 37.

³⁶ K. Zilliacus to N.V. Chaikovskii 24 May 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA).

³⁷ L. Mechelin to P.B. Struve 27 May 1904 (draft) and a longer draft version of the same letter. L. Mechelin to Petr D. Dolgorukov 20 October 1904 (draft). Mechelin Document Collection 23 (30), VA; L. Gripenberg, *Från ett skiftesrikt kvartsekel* (1932), ff. 199–204, VA; K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, AAB;

Leo Mechelin, an ex-professor of political jurisprudence, drew up a proposal running to over a hundred pages for a new constitution. The Russian liberals were to present it to the Tsar for approval at the appropriate moment. Mechelin was so enthusiastic in pressing his advice on the Russian liberals that the latter, representing a different and moreover much larger national group, soon found the situation more than a little irritating.³⁸

In a letter dated 27 May, Mechelin, who claimed to speak on behalf of the Finnish opposition, suggested to Struve that the latter agree the date and place of the conference directly with Volkhovskii and Chaikovskii. By making this suggestion, the Finnish opposition effectively disclaimed any direct link with Zilliacus and made little attempt to hide the fact.³⁹

Adolf Törngren, one of the major figures among the Helsinki-based constitutionalists, kept in regular touch with leading liberals active within Russia. Törngren informed Mechelin that his contacts had said that the liberals, due to difficulties in communication among themselves, would be able to make a final decision about attending the proposed conference by the end of July at the earliest. The reasons for this delay were described as purely technical. With the help of Struve it might, in Törngren's opinion, be possible to arrange a preparatory conference before this. A conference without the presence of the liberals would be unlikely to be of any benefit to the Finns, however. Törngren encouraged Mechelin to follow the line that had been recently adopted and approach Struve with a proposal for a preliminary conference. Mechelin was also advised not to put too much trust in Zilliacus and not to allow him too dominant a role in developments.⁴⁰

The Stockholm committee decided to send Zilliacus on a further fact-finding

Törngren 1929, pp. 93—102, 229—231. — Richard Pipes has interpreted Mechelin's idea of 'l'action pratique' proposed by him to Struve as amounting to an armed insurrection, when in reality Mechelin saw it as a way of achieving a constitution for Russia and aiding the liberals to power. See Pipes 1970, p. 364. On the question of Finland's political status and the theory of a separate state advocated by Finnish figures, together with the background to their deep-seated belief that Finland possessed a constitutional form of government, see for ex. Robert Schweitzer, *Autonomie und Autokratie: Die Stellung des Grossfürstentums Finnland im russischen Reich in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts (1863—1899)*, Marburger Abhandlungen zur Geschichte und Kultur Osteuropas 19 (Giesesen, 1978), passim; Osmo Jussila, "Die russische Reichsgesetzgebung in Finnland in den Jahren 1809—1898", *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 33 (1985), pp. 345—365. The theory contained a large amount of wishful thinking.

³⁸ Mechelin Document Collection 23 (31). Correspondence between L. Mechelin and Petr D. Dolgorukov, December 1903—1904, Mechelin Document Collection 23 (30) & Letter Collection 46—47. A. Törngren to L. Mechelin 18 July 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA; A. Törngren to A. Neovius 21 July 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; L. Gripenberg, *Från ett skiftesrikt kvartsekel* (1932), ff. 204—205, VA.

³⁹ L. Mechelin to P.B. Struve 27 May 1904 (draft), Mechelin Document Collection 23 (30). Struves reply dated 5 June 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA.

⁴⁰ A. Törngren to L. Mechelin 16, 17, and 21 June 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA; A. Törngren to A. Neovius 28 June 1904, Neovius Collection, VA.

mission and approved a set of guidelines for his negotiations in line with the May decisions. These made plain the opposition of the Finns to any form of political proclamation being issued at this stage. Zilliacus argued against having his hands tied in this way in advance, but to no avail. He did not believe that the Socialist Revolutionaries would agree to a conference which would only nominate a central committee to be given a free hand thereafter to shape opposition policies, without the publication of a manifesto.⁴¹

Shishko told Zilliacus in Geneva at the end of June that his party had lost interest in the idea of a conference. A conference without the parallel publication of a manifesto could not be seriously contemplated, he argued. As far as the Socialist Revolutionaries saw things, the ideal opportunity for holding the conference had been allowed to slip out of everyone's hands as a result of the decision to accede to the liberals' request for a delay. The Socialist Revolutionaries did not believe that the Russian Social Democrats, weakened by the worsening internal split, would be in any position to take part in the proposed conference.

Struve in Paris similarly had little better news for Zilliacus. The liberal leaders within Russia had still yet to make a decision on their participation in the conference.

By the beginning of July, it appeared to Zilliacus that the conference idea had more or less foundered, although he did not entirely give up hope that something might not be salvaged.⁴²

Subversion in Russia and the Japanese Government

From February or March 1904 onwards, Zilliacus began working in close collaboration with Colonel Akashi Motojirō, the head of Japan's European-based intelligence operations focused on Russia.⁴³ Zilliacus' activities in this regard brought him close to being a Japanese agent, although it should be noted that he refused to have any part in military intelligence-gathering work.⁴⁴

At the end of June or the beginning of July, Zilliacus received Akashi's ap-

⁴¹ Törnngren 1929, pp. 102—105; K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, ÅAB; Gummerus 1929, pp. 164—165.

⁴² K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 1 July 1904. K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 1 July 1904. Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA); K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 27 June, 1, 4, and 12 July 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, ÅAB; Gummerus 1929, pp. 165—166.

⁴³ On Akashi's activities, see John Albert White, *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War* (Princeton, 1964), pp. 138—142; Michael Futrell, "Colonel Akashi and Japanese Contacts with Russian Revolutionaries in 1904—5", *St Antony's Papers* 2, *Far Eastern Affairs* 4 (London, 1967), pp. 7—22. Also see Akashi's report Rakka ryūsui which is included in the present volume in a translation produced by Inaba Chiharu. For information I have had access to from Japanese-language sources, I am indebted to Inaba.

⁴⁴ See Rakka ryūsui, included in the present volume.

proval for the beginning of preparations for a series of violent demonstrations inside Russia. The Japanese General Staff had forwarded Akashi a smallish sum in June for use in subversion work. Writing to Shishko on 1 July, Zilliacus argued that, although an all-out revolution was not feasible, the issuing of a joint manifesto by the opposition, together with a series of small disturbances organised by groups of some fifty armed men, could well be enough to secure the fall of the régime headed by the Minister of the Interior, V.K. von Plehwe. Despite the limited gains likely to be thus achieved, the toppling of von Plehwe would mark a step on the way to finally overthrowing the autocracy in its entirety. The plan was for the armed disturbances to begin in the Russian heartland and to extend only later to areas populated by the minority nationalities, in order to deny the authorities the opportunity of fomenting Great Russian chauvinism and hostility towards the minorities.⁴⁵

Having discussed Zilliacus' proposal with Shishko, Volkhovskii wrote to the former on 3 July to ask him whether he would be in a position to arrange supplies to Russia of the weapons he had promised, or be able to provide the money for acquiring the weapons within Russia. Volkhovskii explained that the Socialist Revolutionaries had not the resources to bring more than about a hundred Brownings across the border.⁴⁶

The available records do not provide an unambiguous answer to the question of whether Zilliacus did, in fact, arrange for the supply of Japanese-funded weapons to the Socialist Revolutionaries as early as this. That he did offer weapons to the party is nevertheless clear from both Polish and Japanese sources.⁴⁷

In accordance with his plan drawn up that spring, Zilliacus did not inform the Socialist Revolutionaries that the weapons he was offering were to be paid for by Japan. It is unclear what cover story Zilliacus used in explaining the origin of the weapons. He had, however, revealed to his friend Volkhovskii back in March that he had made contact with Japanese officials through an intermediary.⁴⁸ Another close associate of Zilliacus, Chaikovskii, appears to have met

⁴⁵ K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 1 July 1904. K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 1 July 1904. (Zilliacus had also previously promised to acquire arms for the Socialist Revolutionaries, see his letters to Volkhovskii 31 March and to N.V. Chaikovskii 24 May 1904.) Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA). The Japanese General Staff provided Akashi with 9,000 yen, of which the latter gave 3,000 yen to Zilliacus (apparently in July). See Rakka ryūsui and telegram 1 in the Appendix to Rakka ryūsui, in the present volume. According to Zilliacus' memoirs, the initial reply from Japan to his proposal was favourable, albeit sceptical. This reference is probably linked to the period in question. Zilliacus I 1919, p. 140.

⁴⁶ F.V. Volkhovskii to K. Zilliacus 3 July 1904 (copy), Arkhiv Partii S.-R. (PSR) No 758/10, Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG), Amsterdam. — I would like to thank Leo van Rossum for his assistance.

⁴⁷ Telegram 2 in the present volume; Wł. Pobóg-Malinowski, *Józef Piłsudski, 1901—1908: W ogniu rewolucji* (Warszawa, 1935), pp. 176—177, 192.

⁴⁸ K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 31 March 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA).

some of the Japanese in London in June or July 1904 thanks to Zilliacus' help.⁴⁹ The Socialist Revolutionary leaders must sooner or later have realised whose weapons Zilliacus was offering them, but saw no reason to compromise themselves by confronting the latter with any direct questions on the issue.

In contrast to the circumsppection he employed with the Russian parties, Zilliacus revealed all to the minority nationality groups. He introduced the Georgian Dekanozi and Hovhannes Loris-Melikian, the nephew of the Russian ex-Minister of the Interior, M.T. Loris-Melikov, of the Armenian *Dashnaksutiun*, to Akashi in Paris in July.⁵⁰

Zilliacus had met Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) in Berlin at the end of June. The latter had requested arms for his party and Zilliacus promised to put the request to the Japanese, which he did on his arrival in London.⁵¹

Completely independently of Zilliacus, however, the PPS had already contacted Japanese officials back in the early spring. On 23 July, the Japanese General Staff nevertheless rejected the proposal put forward in Tokyo by Józef Piłsudski of the PPS. According to the proposal, the Japanese were to make an alliance with Poland and supply the Poles and other minority nationalities with arms to assist in the secession of the borderlands from Russia. The arguments put forward in Tokyo by Roman Dmowski, representing the Polish National League, about the likely harm to be caused by an uprising could well have influenced the Japanese decision, although it is true of course that Japan would not probably otherwise have been willing to enter into commitments of this kind in Europe. Rather than an all-out uprising, the Japanese hoped instead that the Poles would restrict themselves to organising sabotage operations to disrupt the troop and military equipment traffic moving along the Trans-Siberian railway.⁵²

The small group of Finnish constitutionalists led by Jonas Castrén and J.N. Reuter probably never received a final answer from the Japanese to their offers

⁴⁹ Consul General Uchida (New York) to Foreign Minister Komura 5 March, 12 March, and 24 June 1904 and Komura to Uchida 9 March 1904 (telegrams), Nichirosen'ekiniokeru finrandojin oyobi pōrandojinno taidokankei zassan, 5.2.15.13, Gaikō shiryōkan [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (GS), Tokyo; Rakka ryūsui in the present volume. See also Note 48; Kujala 1988, p. 7; Ascher 1988, p. 49. — Chaikovskii probably met the Japanese in order to discuss the Finns' proposal that the Japanese liberate the political exiles in East Siberia. There was also a plan for the latter to rise in rebellion. Chaikovskii was supposed to convey the list of political exiles to the Japanese. According to the telegram sent by Uchida in June the Russian secret police caught wind of the plan.

⁵⁰ Rakka ryūsui, included in the present volume. On Loris-Melikian, see Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1963), p. 155; Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia, II, From Versailles to London, 1919–1920* (Berkeley, 1982), pp. 492–494.

⁵¹ See Note 47. K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 27 June 1904, Neovius Collection, VA.

⁵² Lerski 1959, pp. 69–97; Fountain 1980, pp. 115–139. Also supplementary information provided by Inaba.

of cooperation which they had made in April and May. By not closing the door completely on this proposal, the Japanese hoped to be able to keep it in reserve in the event that changes in the military situation might make it more attractive. Through their non-committal stance, the Japanese did, however, put a brake on any further development of the idea in the short term, and little more was done about it for the remainder of the war.

Castrén's and Reuter's proposal did not attract the Japanese, as it would have required Japan to pledge herself to guaranteeing Finland's independence as part of a peace agreement between Japan and Russia, while lacking any clear assurance that the Finns were themselves committed to organising an uprising against the Russian régime. It was also ill-advised of Castrén and Reuter to request such a large quantity of weapons as 50,000 rifles for a single border area of Finland's size at a time when Japan needed to concentrate all her efforts and resources to prevent herself from being crushed under the Russian colossus.⁵³

Zilliacus, in contrast, did not ask the Japanese for any diplomatic or military commitments and limited his request for weapons to no more than perhaps about a thousand small arms.⁵⁴ These would not have been enough to start a revolution but nevertheless enough to tie down some Russian forces in Europe and hamper the overall Russian war effort. Japan had no wish, in any case, to be instrumental in triggering a revolution in Russia, the effect of which, it was feared, might well be to turn many European governments against Tokyo and deprive Russia of the type of stable government necessary for signing a peace treaty with Japan.⁵⁵

Zilliacus realised the need to ask the Japanese only for as much as would be likely to be acceptable to them while at the same time meeting his own requirements. Small-scale unrest, capable of being organised with minimal resources, would in any case prepare the ground for a move towards a constitutional form of government. Zilliacus' skill lay in his ability to develop an approach flexible enough to embrace the various aims of all the parties involved, the Japanese, the Russian revolutionaries, and the Finnish constitutionalists.

Research by Inaba Chiharu has revealed that the Japanese General Staff approved Zilliacus' proposed plan of action on 31 August 1904 and decided to free funds to finance it. In its instructions sent to Akashi and Utsunomiya, the General Staff emphasised that the proposed plan was to include all the opposition parties. Japan was not interested in supplying funds for specific particularist interests.⁵⁶ In the light of this, it is easier to understand why Japan reacted in such

⁵³ Kujala 1988, pp. 3–23. It is worth emphasising that this group represented only a small section of the Finnish constitutionalist opposition. The majority of the constitutionalists remained loyal to the imperial connection, although more in the name of political realism and out of force of habit, than out of any love for Russia or the imperial royal family.

⁵⁴ For details on the size of Zilliacus' request for arms, see K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 10 May and 1 July 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA).

⁵⁵ White 1964, pp. 139–142; Futrell 1967, pp. 17–18; Lerski 1959, pp. 93–94.

⁵⁶ See telegrams 3 and 4 in the Appendix to Rakka ryūsui, in the present volume. Also

a lukewarm way to the proposals put forward by the PPS and Castrén and Reuter.

Tokyo — or at least Akashi personally — must, in fact, have given Zilliacus the green light at the end of July when the latter restarted his efforts to push ahead with his plan for a conference. Zilliacus' own comment on the issue at the time was that Tokyo had approved the plan and forwarded the necessary funds to a Japanese representative (Akashi — AK) in Europe.⁵⁷

On 31 August the General Staff approved the placing of 100,000 yen at Akashi's disposal to fund the conference and associated series of demonstrations and unrest.⁵⁸

The Final Preparations for the Paris Conference

Zilliacus had so far felt himself obliged to abide by the guidelines given to him by the Stockholm committee and the constitutionalists in Helsinki, as it was they who had financed his trips.⁵⁹ Even so, he had sometimes strayed on to pastures distant from those which had been in the minds of his official backers. Even as recently as the previous spring, Zilliacus had thought that neither he nor the radical group which he wanted to establish within the Finnish opposition should accept money from Japan, although he considered “instruments” (weapons) acceptable.⁶⁰ Zilliacus abandoned this position when Tokyo decided in the summer of 1904 to begin funding his plan.⁶¹ The brake on his freedom of movement was now removed.

At the beginning of July, Zilliacus began work on the preparations for a conference based on his original outline plan which he had made in March and April. He wanted to give himself something to fall back on in the event that a conference of the type envisaged by the Stockholm committee failed to materialise.⁶² The hints made by the Japanese of the favourable reception likely to be given to his request put in the spring could well have increased his confidence. Zilliacus received preliminary blessing for his plan from Tokyo or Akashi at the end of July (prior to 8 August). From now on Zilliacus had little option but to go ahead with his part of the agreement, regardless of whether the Russian liberals

supplementary information provided by Inaba.

⁵⁷ Zilliacus informed A. Neovius about the matter in a letter dated 8 August 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; Törngren 1929, p. 106. It is of course possible that Zilliacus referred to the reply Akashi had received from Tokyo in June (see Note 45).

⁵⁸ See telegram 3 in the present volume.

⁵⁹ K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 1 July 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 1 July 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA).

⁶⁰ K. Zilliacus to J. Castrén 18 April 1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA.

⁶¹ K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 8 August 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; Zilliacus I 1919, p. 140; K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, AAB. See also Note 45.

⁶² K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 27 June, 1 and 12 July 1904, Neovius Collection, VA.

and the Finnish moderate constitutionalists would be willing or able to keep up or not. He was simply forced to show that he was able to achieve the results which he had promised.

At the end of July and beginning of August, Zilliacus wrote to the Socialist Revolutionaries and those Finnish constitutionalists who he thought would be willing to commit themselves to his lead, proposing that his plan for a conference and public disturbances should be put into action. Zilliacus believed that the Russian liberals would not attend. The Finnish radicals, for their part, should be willing, he contended, to disassociate themselves from their moderate colleagues and participate.

The Finns, in fact, were to be responsible for drawing up and dispatching the invitations to the conference to be sent to the other groups, as an invitation from a group conveniently outside the maze of mutual disagreements and suspicions bedevilling the mainstream opposition had by far the greatest chance of being accepted by all parties.⁶³ This had been made plain to Zilliacus numerous times during the course of his discussions with opposition leaders.⁶⁴

Zilliacus' approach to the conference was very much a pragmatic one and geared to achieving what was feasible rather than what was perhaps ideal. The revolutionary parties would never have acceded to accepting the role of silent partner proposed for them by Mechelin.⁶⁵

Arguing his case to the Socialist Revolutionaries, Zilliacus justified his revival of his earlier plan on the basis of the uniquely favourable conditions for the opposition created by the murder on 28 July of one of the key figures in the government, von Plehwe. A letter written by Zilliacus to Castrén at around the same time shows, however, that he had decided on his initiative prior to hearing the news of the assassination.⁶⁶

Zilliacus' mistrust of the liberals, which he had absorbed from his Socialist Revolutionary friends, proved in the event groundless. On 10 August, Struve informed Mechelin that the Union of Liberation had decided to take part in the conference, on condition that it be held at the end of September.⁶⁷

Those liberals, who at the beginning of the war had variously adopted a passive or semi-patriotic attitude to developments (Struve amongst others, had advocated the latter stance), had during the course of the spring moved increasingly closer to their political colleagues who were determined to take the maximum

⁶³ K. Zilliacus to J. Castrén 28 July 1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA; K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 31 July 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA); K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 8 August 1904 and the proclamation proposal appended to the latter, Neovius Collection, VA; Törngren 1929, pp. 105—106.

⁶⁴ K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 28 April 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; L. Gripenberg, *Från ett skiftesrikt kvartsekel* (1932), f. 200, VA.

⁶⁵ Reference has already been made to the negative attitude of the Socialist Revolutionaries. For the attitude of the Russian Social Democrats see later.

⁶⁶ See Note 63.

⁶⁷ P.B. Struve to L. Mechelin 10 August 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA.

advantage of the war and the difficult position in which the government found itself in order to advance their political aims. The setbacks encountered by Russian forces and the lack of popularity of the war within the country only further emboldened the liberals to develop a more uncompromising anti-government stance.

In the 3 June edition of *Osvobozhdenie*, Struve published a letter from a reader referred to simply as X which proposed a conference of all the opposition groups to be responsible for nominating a joint coordinating body and agreeing on a joint plan of action. This letter is too obviously Russian-orientated to have been written by a Finn. It would seem more than likely that it first saw the light of day in the journal's own offices. It was Struve's cautious way of supporting Zilliacus' proposal at a time when the leadership of the Union of Liberation within Russia had still to decide on its response to the proposal.

On the basis of his discussions with Petr D. Dolgorukov and a number of other Russian liberals, Törngren had argued throughout the summer that the liberals would not refuse to take part in a conference, if they were only given enough time to make up their minds.⁶⁸ Struve's statement on 10 August, therefore, served in effect to undermine Zilliacus' credibility in the eyes of the Finnish constitutionalists.

Following discussions with the Stockholm committee, Mechelin, in a second attempt to bypass Zilliacus, asked Struve to arrange a conference along the lines contained in the Finnish proposal of 27 May.⁶⁹ Struve, however, politely declined the role of acting as conference organiser, arguing that he did not have access to all the necessary contacts.⁷⁰ Struve's unwillingness could well have largely resulted from the liberals' feeling that the Finns themselves were better suited to acting as the prime movers on the conference question.⁷¹ Struve underlined his position by writing to Zilliacus to confirm his complete approval of the latter's proposed agenda for the conference.⁷²

Zilliacus presented his plan to the Bund and to Zygmunt Balicki of the Polish National League in Switzerland at the end of July. The international socialist

⁶⁸ On the change in liberal attitudes, see Galai 1973, pp. 196—213; 'X.' (pseudonym), "Pis'mo v redaktsiiu", *Osvobozhdenie* No 24 (48) 21 May (3 June) 1904, pp. 434—435; A. Törngren to L. Mechelin 16, 17, and 21 June and 18 July 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA; A. Törngren to A. Neovius 21 July 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; Adolf Törngren, *Minnen från en resa i Ryssland under april månad 1904* (1904), f. 41, Adolf Törngren Collection, VA.

⁶⁹ L. Mechelin to P.B. Struve 15 August 1904 (draft). Stockholm committee minutes dated 13 August 1904. Mechelin Document Collection 23 (30), VA; Törngren 1929, pp. 107—108. Zilliacus was informed of the reply sent to Struve: A. Neovius to K. Zilliacus 14 August 1904 (draft), Neovius Collection, VA.

⁷⁰ P.B. Struve to L. Mechelin 24 August 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA.

⁷¹ A. Törngren to L. Mechelin 18 July 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA; A. Törngren to A. Neovius 21 July 1904, Neovius Collection, VA.

⁷² K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 28 August 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA); Gummerus 1929, p. 167; Törngren 1929, p. 114.

congress held in Amsterdam in August gave Zilliacus the opportunity to discuss his ideas with a number of representatives from various socialist groupings. At the end of the month, he compared notes on the conference issue with Jodko of the PPS and Akashi in Hamburg. Zilliacus used these various meetings to build up support for his plan and prepare the ground for the formal calling of the conference.

Colonel Akashi often accompanied Zilliacus during this period of shuttle diplomacy, but was generally careful to keep a low profile, remaining very much in the background. His role was one of collecting information, providing Zilliacus with advice and keeping a check on his activities and seeing that they did not come into conflict with Tokyo's interests.

Akashi advised Zilliacus not to invite the Russian liberals to the conference. This is probably because it was not yet clear whether or not the liberals would take a radical stand against the government. Thus Akashi's opinion apparently influenced Zilliacus' desire to leave the liberals out. However, when the liberals gave notice of their participation, Zilliacus could not afford to assent to Akashi's wish.⁷³

Zilliacus returned to Stockholm in September, where the tug of war between himself and the committee continued from where it had left off. Zilliacus needed to have some Finnish group behind him to act as the nominal sponsor for the conference. In Volkhovskii's opinion, the Great Russian population within the Empire would be unlikely to react favourably to any joint public proclamation including signatories from amongst the minority nationalities. Zilliacus was therefore ready to replace the proclamation with a series of parallel resolutions, which were also, however, to be made public. This compromise suggestion did not meet with the committee's approval, neither did the proposed replacement of the central committee, which Mechelin had conceived of as something of an executive body carrying out liberal wishes, by a more restricted secretariat. Zilliacus had been forced to resort to this idea after he had seen that no single body would be able to accommodate representatives from all the parties.

Frustrated by the continuing delays surrounding the announcement of the Finnish position and with the time drawing closer when it would be necessary to dispatch the invitations for the conference, if it was to be held at the agreed time at the end of September, Zilliacus decided on his own initiative on 16 September to post letters of invitation to all the opposition organisations he was aware of. The conference was to be convened in accordance with the programme which Zilliacus had previously outlined. When forced to explain his actions to the Stock-

⁷³ K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 31 July 1904. K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 17 September 1904. Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA); K. Zilliacus to J.N. Reuter 23 August 1904, Reuter Letter Collection XXI, ÅAB; K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 22 August 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA; Karl (= Akashi) to J. Castrén 6 August 1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA; Zilliacus II 1920, pp. 5—10; Rakka ryūsui in the present volume.

holm committee, he argued that he had acted in line with the authority given to him by the other opposition parties. Zilliacus' aim in thus going out on a limb was to force the Finnish opposition to decide whether it wanted to be a part of the common opposition as a united body, or whether only in the shape of a smaller radical group. He also now made no effort to discuss the contents of the agenda with the committee. Faced with what was little short of a *fait accompli*, the committee was in no position to try and dictate to him; the tables had been turned.

The leadership of the Helsinki constitutionalists, together with the Stockholm committee, finally decided that the whole of the Finnish opposition should be represented at the conference. It was stipulated, however, that the Finnish movement would not append its name to any form of public proclamation or resolution. A desire to maintain the unity of the constitutionalist party and its links with the Russian liberals eventually tipped the balance in favour of taking part in the conference.⁷⁴

Mechelin wrote a special statement which the Finnish representatives were to read at the beginning of the conference. In addition to the mutual solidarity existing between the Finnish and Russian opposition movements, Mechelin stressed the important differences separating them. While Russian concerns were seen as logically being focused on the achievement of a constitutional form of government for Russia, Finland's interests were described as concentrated around restoration of the Grand Duchy's fundamental laws.⁷⁵

It seems paradoxical in the extreme that no other opposition group was the cause of so much difficulty for Zilliacus, or tried to modify his initiatives and proposals to nearly the same degree, as the Finnish moderate constitutionalists, who did their utmost to underline the separate status of Finland from the rest of Russia. The debate which went back and forth surrounding the terms under which the Paris conference was to be convened was, in fact, essentially concentrated within the ranks of the Finnish opposition.

This somewhat singular state of affairs is further highlighted when it is remembered that, of the Finnish constitutionalists, only Zilliacus and Törngren were seriously committed to the idea of a conference at all. The others in the move-

⁷⁴ K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 31 July and 28 August 1904. K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 17 and 23 September 1904. Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA); Mechelin Document Collection 23 (30). A. Neovius to L. Mechelin 28 August 1904. K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 22 August 1904. A. Törngren to L. Mechelin 21 September 1904. Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA; K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 31 August 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, ÅAB; L. Gripenberg, *Från ett skiftesrikt kvartsekel* (1932), ff. 205—207, VA; Törngren 1929, pp. 108—121; Gummerus 1929, pp. 166—171; Th. Rein, *Lefnadsminnen* (Helsingfors, 1918), pp. 441—445; Zilliacus II 1920, pp. 11—14, 17—20. — The Emperor's issue of a decree on 26 August summoning a meeting of the Diet made it even more difficult for the constitutionalists to come to a decision on attending the conference.

⁷⁵ For the original French-language version of Mechelin's statement, see Mechelin Document Collection 23 (30), VA. Published in Swedish in Törngren 1929, pp. 118—121.

ment were either indifferent or even averse to the whole idea. Mechelin and his associates, for example, clearly felt a sense of relief when it began to appear in July that nothing would come of the conference.⁷⁶ Zilliacus was not be put off, however, and effectively forced the other constitutionalists to follow his lead. Seen from the Finnish point of view, the Paris conference was very much Zilliacus' own creation.

The Anti-Russian Insurrection by the Minority Nationalities

Zilliacus was far from being the sole opposition figure advocating greater collaboration within the anti-government camp and his proposals were paralleled by a number of competing plans. The earliest of these was put forward by the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), which began efforts to develop a coalition between the socialist parties of a number of minority nationalities and established contact with the Japanese soon after the outbreak of war in March 1904.⁷⁷

Relations between the nationalist and separatist PPS and the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (RSDWP) of Plekhanov, Martov, and Lenin had been poor for a long time. The latter, while supporting the right of national self-determination in principle, argued for the need for a centralist approach within the existing political framework and demanded that the social democratic organisations of all the minority nationalities throughout the Empire join their party.

In a proposal made to the central committee of the RSDWP on 26 January 1904, the PPS suggested the holding of a meeting between representatives of the two parties to normalise relations between them and to help coordinate their joint struggle against Tsarism. As a prerequisite, the PPS insisted that the RSDWP give its support to the demand for Polish independence.

On receiving the proposal, Lenin, in his capacity as foreign representative on the RSDWP's central committee, enquired on 7 February whether the PPS would be willing to see representatives from the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL) at the same meeting. The reaction of the PPS to Lenin's idea was, as might have been expected, negative, as not only were the PPS and the anti-nationalist SDKPiL rivals, but also sworn enemies. The PPS nevertheless renewed its proposal for a meeting in its reply on 8 March.

Lenin presented a report, detailing the course of his correspondence with the PPS, to the council of the RSDWP, responsible for overseeing relations with other political parties, at its meeting on 13 June. After considering the case, the council decided to turn down the PPS' proposed meeting at its following sitting

⁷⁶ L. Gripenberg to L. Mechelin 19 July 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA; L. Gripenberg, *Från ett skiftesrikt kvartsekel* (1932), ff. 203—204, VA.

⁷⁷ Lerski 1959, pp. 74—79.

on 18 June. The internationalist SDKPiL, under the ideological leadership of Rosa Luxemburg, was after all a much more attractive collaborative partner to the Russian Social Democrats than the PPS, a fact which inevitably made the Russians reluctant to endanger the potential goodwill existing between the two through any move which might be seen as an attempt to court the PPS.⁷⁸

The Polish Socialist Party's proposal made to the RSDWP cannot be considered merely as a tactical move primarily designed to bypass the SDKPiL as the PPS also made efforts towards developing bilateral collaboration with the other major Russian revolutionary party, the Socialist Revolutionaries, asking for its assistance in blowing up munitions trains destined for Manchuria using the Trans-Siberian railway.⁷⁹ The RSDWP's refusal to lend its support to the PPS plan, together with its earlier reluctance to have any dealings with the PPS, could well have only served to strengthen the ideas which had already crystallised within the latter to focus its efforts in the future on developing links with the other minority nationalities, rather than the Russian parties.

On hearing of Zilliacus' plan from representatives of the Polish National League,⁸⁰ the PPS responded by developing its own variant. This called for the holding of a joint conference of socialist and revolutionary organisations representing the oppressed national minorities within the Empire. The conference was to be charged with nominating a central committee and with agreeing a programme of anti-government actions. The minority nationalities should also commit themselves to opposing any moves aimed at transforming Russia into a centrally administered constitutional state. Support for a federal form of future government was required of all organisations wishing to attend the PPS' proposed conference.⁸¹

Zilliacus first heard of the PPS proposal on meeting Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz in Berlin at the end of June. Jodko disclosed the ultimate aim of the PPS as being, with Japanese assistance, to foment a rebellion within Poland. The Poles were to be supported by the other minority nationalities. Zilliacus told Jodko straight off that the Finnish opposition would refuse any part in a gamble of this kind, which would only give the Russian authorities the opportunity to label

⁷⁸ Anna Zarnowska, *Geneza rozłamu w Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej 1904—1906* (Warszawa, 1965), pp. 123—124; Walentyna Najdus, *SDKPiL a SDPRR, 1893—1907* (Wrocław, 1973), pp. 178—180; Pobóg-Malinowski 1935, pp. 82—84; *Leninskii sbornik XV* (1930), p. 12, 45—48, 80. On relations between the various parties in the Polish socialist movement, see also J.P. Netti, *Rosa Luxemburg, I—II* (London, 1966), passim; Strobel 1974, passim. On the attitudes of the Russian Social Democrats on the nationality question, see Note 84.

⁷⁹ *Russkii politicheskii syzk za granitsei*, pod red. L. Men'shchikov, I, Minushee I (Paris, 1914), p. 183; Lerski 1959, p. 77.

⁸⁰ Törnngren 1929, p. 95.

⁸¹ "Primiritel'nye popytki 'Bunda' v 1905 godu, (Po povodu dokumentov iz arkhiva Ts.K. 'Bunda')", *Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia* No 11 (1922), p. 168; K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 27 June 1904, Neovius Collection, VA.

the revolutionary movement as little more than a cover for separatist sentiments, and which they would put down as they had the Polish uprising of 1863—64.

A number of the minority nationality movements leaning towards socialism and terrorism active in Lithuania, Belorussia, the Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia had, by this stage, already reacted favourably towards the PPS' conference proposal, according to Zilliacus. Zilliacus was, nevertheless, able to squeeze out of Jodko the promise that the PPS would hold back on going ahead with its conference until it had become clear whether anything was going to come of Zilliacus' own conference initiative. The PPS was, in any case, very sceptical about the latter's chances of success.

Despite the promise it had given to Zilliacus, the PPS decided in July to renew its efforts to sound out the degree of potential support existing for its own conference. This time, however, the PPS idea received a cool reception. In addition to the Finns, the Bund and the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party turned down the possibility of attending. Contact also failed to be made with a number of organisations. Faced with this situation, Jodko informed Zilliacus on 9 August that his party had decided, at least temporarily, to postpone its conference.

The minority nationalities-led insurrection envisaged by the PPS never materialised, following the Japanese decision to refuse support for it. Zilliacus made full use of the PPS plan and the fears it evoked as a way of softening up the opposition within the Finnish camp towards his own proposal.⁸²

Jodko proved the cause of further problems for Zilliacus when he announced that the PPS could not agree to attending the same conference or sitting on the same central committee as representatives of the SDKPiL or the Polish Proletariat Party. Zilliacus knew that a refusal of this type by even one group to accept the presence of another would inevitably lead to the conference ending in an open quarrel. As a result of the stand adopted by the PPS, Zilliacus therefore decided to replace the original plan for a central committee made up of representatives of all the parties present with a smaller secretariat.⁸³

The Russian Social Democrats

The ultimate success of the struggle against the autocracy and the socialist revolution which was to follow subsequently required, in the eyes of the Russian So-

⁸² K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 27 June, 4 July, and 8 and 31 August 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 22 August 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA; Pobóg-Malinowski 1935, pp. 174—177; Pobóg-Malinowski I 1953, p. 130; Najdus 1973, pp. 181—183. On the suspicions felt amongst the Georgian and Armenian revolutionaries towards the Russian opposition parties, see G. Dekanozi to A. Neovius 21 May 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; Törngren 1929, p. 94.

⁸³ K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 31 July 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, H1 (USA tk 18, VA); K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 31 August 1904, Neovius Collection, VA.

cial Democrats, the merging of all groups truly committed to socialist ideals to form a grouping as united and free of divisive nationalist sympathies as possible. Their ideal was of a single united social democratic party embracing the whole Empire. All models of party political activity incompatible with this ideal were considered by the Russian Social Democrats as representing species of bourgeois nationalism. The schism which had developed between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks during 1903 had not concerned the nationality question; both Lenin and his opponents remained wedded to the political ideas on this issue which had emerged during the pre-schism *Iskra* period.⁸⁴

During the course of the preparations for the Paris conference, it was emphasised on two occasions in the Menshevik paper *Iskra* that the systematic concentration of all the forces at the disposal of the proletariat throughout the Empire represented a much more effective way forward, in terms of advancing the cause of the overall revolutionary struggle, than any attempts to create alliances based on the mechanical linkage of socialist and nationalist movements which were otherwise keen to preserve their separate identities.⁸⁵ The Russian Social Democrats tended to look upon themselves as the champions of true socialist ideology, an attitude which made them generally disdainful of other revolutionary and opposition parties and distrustful of inter-party alliances.

This was reflected particularly clearly in the bitter hostility evident within the Russian Social Democratic leadership towards the other socialist parties active in the Empire. Typical of this was the following comment penned by the Menshevik, P.B. Axelrod, to Karl Kautsky, the main ideologist of orthodox marxism, on 6 June 1904:

“Mit den Letten, mach was Du willst, aber den ‘Bund’, die Armänier und noch ein halbes Dutzend ‘Nationen’ (z.B. die ‘Ukrainophielen’, Kleinrussen etc.) nehme uns vom Halse. Und die sogenannten ‘Soc.-revolutionäre’?”⁸⁶

In writing this, Axelrod may well have been thinking ahead to the meeting of the council of the RSDWP in Geneva which had been called for 13 June to discuss the proposals put forward by Zilliacus and the PPS. This meeting was attended by the Mensheviks Axelrod and Martov, Plekhanov, closely linked with the Mensheviks, V.A. Noskov, a representative of the more conciliatory stance adopted by the central committee active within Russia, and Lenin, representing the Bolsheviks. The latter had recently published his pamphlet *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: the Crisis in our Party*, which, with its vicious attacks

⁸⁴ Lenin, *PSS*, 7 (1959), pp. 95—106, 117—122, 233—242, 322—325. *PSS*, 8 (1959), pp. 65—76; (Iu. O. Martov,) “Revoliutsionnyi natsionalizm i sotsial’demokratiia”, *Iskra* No 66 15 May 1904 (o.s.), pp. 1—2; (Iu. O. Martov,) “Novsheiaia polemika ‘Bunda’”, *Iskra* No 73 1 September 1904 (o.s.), pp. 3—4.

⁸⁵ See the two articles by Martov cited in the previous note.

⁸⁶ P.B. Axelrod to K. Kautsky 6 June 1904 (D II 313), Nachlass Karl Kautsky, IISG.

on the Mensheviks, had only served to deepen the crisis already increasingly crippling the party.⁸⁷

Although the atmosphere at the council's meeting was superficially conciliatory, the minutes indicate that those attending were in silent alliance against Lenin. Plekhanov and Martov at least, and perhaps also Axelrod as well, had clearly agreed in advance about the decisions to be taken at the meeting.⁸⁸

Presenting Zilliacus' proposal addressed to the RSDWP, Plekhanov did not forget to recall the former's close links with the Socialist Revolutionaries, as well as the blessing which had been given to the initiative by the French socialists Guesde and Lafargue. The latter factor made it particularly difficult for the RSDWP to refuse to take part in the conference.

In his comments on Zilliacus' idea, Martov observed that the Social Democrats should ensure that they kept collaboration with non-socialist parties limited to individual issues. As the proposal did not in effect commit the party beyond this, Martov suggested that it could be accepted in principle. Continued links at the organisational level were, however, out of the question, as Martov saw it. He also went on to propose that, prior to any conference of opposition groups, joint discussions should be held between the major social democratic parties, the RSDWP, the Bund, the Latvian Social Democrats, the Polish Proletariat Party, and the SDKPiL, to agree a common line to be adopted at the main conference.

All the members of the council were agreed about the desirability of a conference of the type proposed by Zilliacus. Discussion about which groups should be invited to take part in the preliminary talks preceding the conference itself revealed a general wish to prevent too many supporters of a federalist form of party organisation from attending. The level of council members' awareness about the minority nationalities' parties was, in part, so meagre that an onlooker might easily have been forgiven for thinking that they were talking about developments in South America rather than in their own country.

In the final resolution proposed by Martov and unanimously accepted by the council, the party officially committed itself to taking part in the Zilliacus-sponsored conference and announced its intention to organise a preliminary meeting to be attended by the various social democratic parties.

Martov saw the conference's main role as essentially limited to that of acting as a forum for a public expression of the sense of solidarity felt between all the opposition forces involved in the struggle against Tsarism. He also underlined

⁸⁷ On the schism in the RSDWP, see for ex. J.L.H. Keep, *The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia* (Oxford, 1966), p. 107 ff.

⁸⁸ The minutes of the council's meeting are contained in three sources: *Katorga i Ssyl'ka* 32 (1927), pp. 57—72; *Sotsial-demokraticeskoe dvizhenie v Rossii: Materialy*, pod red. A.N. Potresov i B.I. Nikolaevskii, I (Moskva, 1928), pp. 323—337 (also pp. 127—128); *Leninskii sbornik* XV (1930), pp. 45—62. See also *Perepiska G.V. Plekhanova i P.B. Aksel'roda*, II (Moskva, 1925), p. 201; Fedor Il'ich Dan, *Pis'ma (1899—1946)*, Russian Series on Social History 3 (Amsterdam, 1985), p. 94.



Iulii Martov.

the need to call for the introduction of a democratic constitution in Russia. Any decisions were only to be taken with the approval of all those attending. This interpretation was approved unanimously to form the basis of the instructions to be given to RSDWP representatives attending. Zilliacus had agreed to meet Plekhanov again after the council's meeting to hear the party's response. It was decided not to inform him about these instructions or the planned preliminary discussion meeting to be held by the social democratic parties.

Martov was afraid that the conference would attempt, by the use of majority decisions, to push through resolutions on political and social questions outside its immediate brief, or try and restrict the independence of individual parties through the agency of the proposed central committee. He wanted guarantees against the possibility of what was described as the "nationalists and the moderate Finns" gaining the upper hand and dictating proceedings. Lenin initially considered Martov's various conditions proposed for the conference to be inappropriate and unnecessary. If the conference did develop in a way unacceptable to the social democrats, Lenin contended, they were quite free to walk out. Lenin did not however oppose approval of the Martov-inspired instructions.

It is clear from the records of the speeches made by the various participants at the meeting that their attitude towards the "moderate Finns", ie. the non-socialist Finnish opposition, was much more positive than their attitude to the Polish Socialist Party. While the former were seeking a meeting of all opposition groups, regardless of nationality or political allegiance, the PPS' primary

aim focused on trying to induce the Russian parties to give their blessing to Polish separatism.⁸⁹

The essential neutrality and non-nationalist aims of the proposal and of Zilliacus himself could well have contributed to the RSDWP's decision to take up the invitation to attend. The positive attitude of the Russian Social Democrats, otherwise often given to following their own policies, shows how well Zilliacus had been able to predict the needs of the different parties involved. One can only imagine the furor that would have erupted, had it been Mechelin's pro-liberal plan which had been put before the council for discussion, rather than that of Zilliacus.

In May, the Jewish Bund (the General Union of Jewish Workers in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia) rejected the invitation it had received from the PPS to take part in the latter's proposed conference of oppressed nationalities. The PPS initiative did, however, alert the Bund to consider the question of the need for developing cooperation between the social democratic parties. The Bund, together with the Latvian Social Democrats, accordingly proposed the holding of a conference to agree on a programme of joint action to seven major social democratic parties active within the Empire, including the RSDWP, the SDKPiL, and the PPS.

The council of the RSDWP responded favourably to the proposal on 13 June, informing the Bund and the other groups involved of its own plan for a smaller-scale discussion meeting aimed solely at the social democratic parties. The council had, in fact, got the idea for the latter meeting from the Bund proposal, but had decided to take the initiative into its own hands, reducing the number of participants to prevent control at the meeting possibly slipping into the hands of the federalists.⁹⁰

The Polish Social Democrats (SDKPiL) also made various moves towards closer political collaboration with the RSDWP, announcing that they would be willing to join the RSDWP after the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had settled their differences. Thus the leaders of the SDKPiL, Leo Jogiches and Rosa Luxemburg, pushed the responsibility for the lack of unity onto the Russians. The aim uppermost in the minds of the SDKPiL leaders was to isolate the PPS. Whenever the RSDWP and PPS showed signs of burying their differences, the SDKPiL returned to the theme of the need to achieve the formation of a united social democratic party. As the danger receded, it contented itself with merely talking about the necessity of increased inter-party collaboration.⁹¹

Having heard that the council of the RSDWP had, in principle, accepted the

⁸⁹ *Leninskii sbornik* XV (1930), pp. 45—56.

⁹⁰ *Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia* No 11 (1922), pp. 167—169; Tobias 1972, p. 281; *Pis'ma P.B. Aksel'roda i Iu. O. Martova*, *Materialy po istorii russkogo revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia I* (Berlin, 1924), p. 108; *Leninskii sbornik* XV (1930), p. 46, 52, 105; Najdus 1973, pp. 183—184.

⁹¹ Strobel 1974, pp. 215—219.

idea proposed by the Bund for a meeting of social democratic parties, Rosa Luxemburg wrote on 7 August to the Menshevik A.N. Potresov, a member of the editorial board of *Iskra*. She warned the Russian Social Democrats against succumbing to the federalist ideas being put abroad by the Bund, PPS, and what she described as other sowers of confusion (“*Konfusionsrat*”). Joint conferences and possible party alliances would only lead to the abandonment of the aim of true party unity, which was what the federalists were aiming at. In a bid to lend extra weight to her argument, Rosa Luxemburg included an extensive hymn of praise to the RSDWP and one which patently did not reflect her true sentiments, in the hope that this might help to break down her Russian correspondent’s defences. The SDKPiL did, however, promise to take part in the discussion meeting proposed by the council of the RSDWP.⁹²

The inter-party cooperation issue came up for discussion at the second congress of the Foreign Organisation of the Socialist Revolutionary Party held on the Swiss-French border between 22–28 July 1904. Little or no support proved forthcoming at this congress for any form of collaboration with the RSDWP. This was largely due to the by now well-established ideological and political divisions separating the two parties and, in particular, the resolution concerning the Socialist Revolutionaries which had been passed at the second congress of the RSDWP in 1903. This had described the activities of the rival party as harmful to the revolutionary cause. The émigré Socialist Revolutionaries decided to radically curtail collaboration with the RSDWP outside Russia until the latter disassociated itself from the resolution. Joint action with the RSDWP was not nevertheless ruled out in those cases when the initiative for such cooperation came from a third party.⁹³

Efforts to eliminate some of the divisions existing between the two main branches of the Russian revolutionary movement had now begun to be put in hand by the veteran populist leader, M.A. Natanson, who had recently completed a sentence of internal exile in Siberia and had now arrived in Switzerland. Natanson shared a common ideological credo with the Socialist Revolutionaries. Of the main RSDWP leaders, he found Plekhanov the most approachable, for they had been close allies in the populist movement thirty years previously.

⁹² *Sotsial-demokraticeskoe dvizhenie* 1928, pp. 134–136.

⁹³ For the minutes of the congress of the Foreign Organisation of the Socialist Revolutionaries and the draft resolutions, see PSR No 364a-b and 514, IISG. For the congress of the RSDWP, see *Vtoroi s’ezd RSDRP, Iiul’-avgust 1903 goda: Protokoly* (Moskva, 1959), pp. 430–431. Those attending the Socialist Revolutionary congress described themselves as Russian Social Democrats to the Swiss police. One participant referred to himself as Vladimir Ul’ianov (Lenin), the latter’s name being duly recorded by the unsuspecting police in the list of those attending alongside the names of some of the major leaders of the Socialist Revolutionaries. This mischief shows whom the Socialist Revolutionaries considered their staunchest opponent among the Social Democrats. Le Conseiller d’Etat chargé du Département de Justice et Police (Canton de Genève) au Ministère public Fédéral 3 August 1904, Bestand E 21 (Polizeiwesen 1848–1925), Nr. 14015, Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, Berne.

Following the advice of the Socialist Revolutionary leaders Chernov and M.R. Gots, Natanson tried to persuade Plekhanov of the need for closer links between the parties, both at the ideological and tactical level. In the wake of the successful assassination of von Plehwe by the Socialist Revolutionary Fighting Organisation on 28 July, Natanson decided to abandon his nominal neutrality and formally join the Socialist Revolutionaries. Plekhanov, in contrast, in line with the anti-terrorist precepts of the RSDWP, saw the assassination in a negative light, and believed that it represented precisely the type of misguided action which the Social Democrats would be wise to advise its supporters against because of its harmful effect on agitational work among the masses.

Following von Plehwe's murder, Zilliacus was able to rekindle interest among the Socialist Revolutionaries in the idea of a joint conference of opposition forces, while Natanson succeeded in persuading Plekhanov to promise that the RSDWP would also take part. Natanson proved more successful here than in his efforts to foster better bilateral relations between the two parties.⁹⁴

Chernov's memoirs have served as the main source of information on the discussions which took place between Natanson and Plekhanov during the summer of 1904. The Menshevik interpretation of events, as contained in the various accounts of the party's activities produced by Menshevik writers, has argued that Plekhanov changed his ideas about the value of terrorist action in the period subsequent to von Plehwe's assassination and that he proposed its acceptance, as a means of advancing the revolutionary cause, as part of the settlement arrived at with the Socialist Revolutionaries.⁹⁵ In reality, this shift only took place in March 1905.⁹⁶ None of Plekhanov's contemporaries seemed able to remember that Natanson and Plekhanov twice discussed the state of relations between their two parties. No signs whatever are evident, either in Plekhanov's articles or his private correspondence during the latter part of the summer or autumn of 1904, that he had abandoned or was in the process of abandoning the established hostility characteristic of the Social Democrats towards either the Socialist Revolutionaries or terrorism.⁹⁷

The two major Russian revolutionary parties remained almost as much at log-

⁹⁴ Chernov 1953, pp. 205—209; *Sotsial-demokraticeskoe dvizhenie* 1928, pp. 132—133, 375. On Zilliacus' renewed efforts, see his letter to L.E. Shishko 31 July 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA).

⁹⁵ L. (= Iu. O.) Martov, "Sotsialdemokratiia, 1905—1907 gg.", in: *Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale XX-go veka*, pod red. L. Martov, P. Maslov i A. Potresov, III:5 (S.-Peterburg, 1914), pp. 551—552; Martov 1926, p. 95; (A.S.) Martynov-Piker, "Vospominaniia revoliutsionera", *Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia* No 11 (46) (1925), p. 279.

⁹⁶ See my subsequent comments on this.

⁹⁷ G.V. Plekhanov to K. Kautsky 28 September and 10 October 1904 (D XVIII 597—598), Nachlass Kautsky, IISG; G. Plekhanov, "V Amsterdame, (Mysli i zametki)", *Iskra* No 74 20 September 1904 (o.s.), pp. 2—5, No 75 5 October 1904 (o.s.), pp. 2—5, No 76 20 October 1904 (o.s.), pp. 2—5; *Sotsial-demokraticeskoe dvizhenie* 1928, pp. 132—133.



The scene of Interior Minister von Plehwe's assassination.

gerheads with each other in the period following von Plehwe's assassination as they had been previously,⁹⁸ although neither the centralist type of party organisation advocated by the Social Democrats, nor the ideological and political divisions between them and the Socialist Revolutionaries, prevented progress being made with the plan for a conference embracing the widest possible range of opposition forces. All parties were aware of the ultimate necessity for greater cooperation within the opposition.⁹⁹ As was emphasised in *Osvobozhdenie*, the war had revealed the rotten state of the foundations of the autocratic system. The only thing that could prevent the régime from collapsing altogether was the lack of unity among its opponents.¹⁰⁰ An unprofitable and unpopular war created ideal conditions for the opposition's efforts towards unity.

Events therefore were moving very much in the direction hoped for by Zilliacus, but his own lack of caution around the time of von Plehwe's assassination served to frustrate his hopes of achieving the widest possible common front within the opposition. He made the mistake of considering the Bund a more nationalist organisation than it was, and hinted to its representatives in Geneva that money (or weapons) might be available to the Bund from Japanese military coffers. Opposition groups from all the other minority nationalities had seized upon this offer, but, in the case of the Bund, Zilliacus was soon forced to realise that he had made a fateful error of judgement.

The sense of indignation evoked in Zilliacus by the Bund's reaction to his suggestion never left him. In his memoirs published towards the very end of his life, Zilliacus gave vent to his feelings in the shape of the following caustic description of the Bund representatives in question: "They were a truly bizarre collection of individuals! Some of them in particular would not have been any the worse for a thorough encounter with soap and water."¹⁰¹

Zilliacus next met Plekhanov at the Amsterdam congress of the International held in August (14—20 August), where the latter informed him that his party had decided to take part in the opposition conference.¹⁰²

Representatives from the RSDWP, the SDKPiL, the Polish Proletariat Party, the Bund, the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party, and the Revolution-

⁹⁸ (Iu. O. Martov,) "Terror i massovoe dvizhenie", *Iskra* No 70 25 July 1904 (o.s.), p. 1; "Mezhdunarodnyi sotsialisticheskii kongress v Amsterdame", *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 51 25 August 1904 (o.s.), pp. 1—6.

⁹⁹ For ex. Plekhanov: K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 28 April 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus to N.V. Chaikovskii 24 May 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA). On attitudes within the RSDWP, see the meeting held by the party council on 13 June 1904. On those within the Socialist Revolutionaries, see "Na dva fronta", *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 53 30 September 1904 (o.s.), pp. 1—3.

¹⁰⁰ 'X.' (pseudonym), "Pis'mo v redaktsiiu", *Osvobozhdenie* No 24 (48) 21 May (3 June) 1904, pp. 434—435.

¹⁰¹ Zilliacus II 1920, pp. 14—17 (the quotation appears on p. 14). For the approximate date of the meeting, see K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 31 July 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA).

¹⁰² Zilliacus II 1920, p. 5.

ary Ukrainian Party organised a discussion meeting of their own in Amsterdam on 22 August. The invitation which had been sent to the PPS was withdrawn at the insistence of the SDKPiL. Among those present were Plekhanov, Axelrod, and F.I. Dan from the RSDWP, and Adolf Warszawski and Rosa Luxemburg from the SDKPiL. No Bolshevik representative would appear to have been invited to the meeting.

Deliberations concentrated exclusively on Zilliacus' conference proposal, while the plan for increased cooperation between the various social democratic parties put forward by the Bund and the Latvian party was left undiscussed. The Bund representative, Mark Liber, alias Mikhel Goldman, was quick to inform those present that Zilliacus was working for the Japanese General Staff. Warszawski and the Latvian representative indicated that the PPS also had links with the Japanese government. The Polish Social Democrats, for whom opposition to the PPS took precedence above all other considerations, demanded that the PPS' links with Japan be made public. Although this demand was not conceded to, it was decided in consequence to refuse to have anything to do with the Zilliacus-sponsored conference. Rosa Luxemburg drew up an outline for a joint letter informing Zilliacus of the decision. Despite his efforts, together with those of the Bund representative, to tone down the more caustic aspects of Rosa Luxemburg's text, Plekhanov remained dissatisfied with the overall letter. It was also agreed that each organisation would send this joint reply separately.¹⁰³

The refusal of the other groups to admit the PPS to the Amsterdam discussion meeting led the party at the end of August to begin re-advocating the idea of a joint conference restricted to the revolutionary parties of the minority nationalities. The proposal failed, however, to materialise this time around.¹⁰⁴

The issues raised in Amsterdam came up for consideration by the council of the RSDWP, in the shape of Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov, and Noskov, together with Dan (not a member of the council), at a meeting held on 3 September

¹⁰³ I. Volkovicher, "Partiia i russko-iaponskaia voina", *Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia* No 12 (35) (1924), pp. 119—122; Karol Grünberg, "Socjaldemokracja polska a ruch liberalny w państwie rosyjskim w 1904 r.", in: *Materiały i studia katedry historii powszechnej i stosunków międzynarodowych WSNS przy KC PZPR*, I (Warszawa, 1960), pp. 41—43; *Pis'ma P. B. Akse'roda i Iu. O. Martova* 1924, p. 109; Martov 1926, pp. 92—95; *Katorgia i Ssyłka* 32 (1927), p. 58; *Leninskii sbornik* XV (1930), p. 127; (Astaf von Transehe-Rosen-
eck,) *Die lettische Revolution*, 2. veränderte Aufl., II (Berlin, 1908), p. 100; *Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia* No 11 (1922), pp. 162—163, 168—169; Żarnowska 1965, p. 116, 125, 141; Tobias 1972, p. 282; Najdus 1973, pp. 184—185; Strobel 1974, p. 208, 216—217. For the text of the reply, see *Iskra* No 79 1 December 1904 (o.s.), p. 4; A.A. Makarov to L.A. Rataev 6 September 1904 (o.s.), Okhrana Archives, XXI F. 1, H1 (USA tk 18, VA).

¹⁰⁴ Żarnowska 1965, pp. 125—126. — Some of the émigré representatives of the PPS opposed their party's participation in Zilliacus' proposed conference after they had heard the news put abroad by the Bund that Zilliacus was acting as an agent of Colonel Akashi. These Poles obviously feared the possibility of a scandal on the issue. Jodko nevertheless promised the Japanese that the party would take part. See Rakka ryūsui in the present volume.

in Geneva. The council approved the actions of the party's representatives who had been present at the discussion meeting. Zilliacus' proposed conference appealed the least to Dan and Martov. They feared that the social democrats would be likely to lose out during such a conference and in the organisation of the planned news agency. No other groups, and particularly not any bourgeois groupings, should be allowed the opportunity to dictate the party's political activities, they argued. Zilliacus' close links with the Socialist Revolutionaries also served as a source of additional irritation.

Plekhanov agreed with Dan and Martov that the RSDWP could not take part in any conference serving the interests of Japan, but the Mensheviks' emphasis on issues of party particularism does not appear to have evoked much sympathy in him.¹⁰⁵ Natanson's communications had undoubtedly had their effect on Plekhanov.

In their joint reply to Zilliacus, the social democrats declared that, while they were ready to support every true opposition and revolutionary movement, they had been forced to decline the invitation to the conference because it would embrace too wide a spread of heterogeneous groupings, including some which pinned their hopes, in conflict with the principles of the class struggle, on a Japanese military victory. Effective revolutionary activity was only possible through a class struggle waged by the masses within the Empire and in unison with the Japanese socialist proletariat, aimed at bringing an end to the criminal war as soon as possible.¹⁰⁶

Rosa Luxemburg's party, the SDKPiL, had not at any stage been keen to take part in a conference of opposition groupings for the simple reason that it would not have been able to ensure the exclusion of the PPS, and because the SDKPiL was otherwise in principle opposed to party alliances cutting across ideological and class divides.¹⁰⁷ The other social democratic parties stayed away from the conference as a result of the revelations surrounding the links of Zilliacus and others with the Japanese government.

The Bolsheviks

Zilliacus had been able, through his Socialist Revolutionary friends, to keep abreast of the schism which had developed within the RSDWP.¹⁰⁸ Of the party's leaders, he had been in direct contact only with Plekhanov, whom he considered the most important figure within the main wing of the party.

¹⁰⁵ For the minutes of the council meeting, see Volkovicher 1924, pp. 119—122. Also see *Leninskii sbornik* XV (1930), pp. 45—55, 127; Note 114.

¹⁰⁶ *Iskra* No 79 1 December 1904 (o.s.), p. 4.

¹⁰⁷ *Sotsial-demokraticeskoe dvizhenie* 1928, pp. 134—136; Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, 1/2 (Berlin, 1979), pp. 456—461.

¹⁰⁸ K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 13 April and 4 July 1904, Neovius Collection, VA.

After learning from Bund representatives at the end of July that both factions wanted to take part in the conference, Zilliacus decided to drop his previous approach and tried to contact Lenin in Geneva. Lenin, however, was away at the time. Zilliacus decided not to approach Plekhanov directly to avoid creating the impression that he favoured one wing at the expense of the other and instead wrote to them both.¹⁰⁹ This was the only time when he is known to have approached Lenin.

The dispute which had developed surrounding the composition of the party delegation at the Amsterdam congress, together with a number of other issues, combined to further aggravate relations between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks during August. As a result of this development, Lenin did not travel to Amsterdam, or take part in the meeting of the party council held on 3 September.¹¹⁰ No representatives from the Bolsheviks seem to have been invited to the discussion meeting held between the various social democratic parties in Amsterdam on 22 August.

According to a Menshevik view of events dating from the period, Lenin refused to take part in the moves to publicise the existence of the PPS' Japanese contacts advocated by the Polish Social Democrats and the Mensheviks. This assertion, however, would appear to be at variance with the evident reluctance of the Mensheviks at the council meeting on 3 September to countenance anything which might lead to a public scandal on the issue. This must put a question mark over the interpretation put on Lenin's position, although there may be some truth in it all the same. At the meeting on 3 September, Dan and Martov both argued more strongly against relying on Japanese assistance than did Plekhanov. One possible explanation for this is that Dan would have been ready to expose the PPS' links with the Japanese in Amsterdam, but that Plekhanov had succeeded in persuading him against doing so. According to this argument, both Plekhanov and Lenin would have been against a public scandal on the issue from the start, and the Mensheviks and other social democrats would have had to yield to this.¹¹¹

The Bolsheviks' links with Japanese official representatives maintained by V.D. Bonch-Bruевич, a journalist working for the *Rassvet* magazine and in charge of the Geneva office of the RSDWP, ostensibly covering the transmitting of propaganda to Russian prisoners of war, came under scrutiny at the same council meeting on 3 September. Dan and Martov, in particular, were keen to use

¹⁰⁹ K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 31 July 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA).

¹¹⁰ *Leninskii sbornik* XV (1930), pp. 56—156; *Prilozhenie k No 73—74 Iskry*, pp. 1—2; *Pis'ma P.B. Aksel'roda i Iu. O. Martova* 1924, pp. 107—108; M. Liadov, *Iz zhizni partii: Nakanune i v gody pervoi revoliutsii, (Vospominaniia)* (Moskva, 1926), pp. 44—54; Martov 1926, p. 97. See also the memorandum dated 15 August 1904 produced by the RSDWP delegation at the Amsterdam congress, I 125, Archief Camille Huysmans (ACH), Antwerp.

¹¹¹ On the council meeting on 3 September, see Volkovicher 1924, pp. 119—122. For the Menshevik view of events referred to (B.I. Nikolaevskii), see Strobel 1974, p. 208.

this as a weapon against Lenin and the Bolsheviks, but Plekhanov argued that nothing certain had as yet been proved.¹¹²

No one has so far managed to find any clear evidence that the Bolsheviks had anything more to do with the Japanese than the propaganda dispatches envisaged or actually channelled to Japan by Bonch-Bruевич.¹¹³

Plekhanov's disagreement with Dan and Martov over the Bonch-Bruевич case leads one to suspect a similar difference of opinion having existed on the question of the revelation of the PPS' Japanese contacts. We can assume that it was in Lenin's interests to resist any attempts to publicly label the PPS as a Japanese stooge, if only because, if this kind of denunciation were deemed acceptable, the Mensheviks would have then also been in a position to tar both Bonch-Bruевич and the Bolsheviks with the same brush.

If our assumptions are correct, they would explain Lenin's passivity towards the Paris conference. Following the meeting of the party council held in June, according to the documents at present to hand, he did not once voice an opinion on the conference or the Menshevik stance towards it, either in his public writings or in his private correspondence.¹¹⁴ Why unnecessarily involve himself in such a sensitive issue?

Lenin's low profile on the conference question could naturally just as well be explained by his passionate concentration on the party's internal developments. Organising the Bolshevik group took up nearly all his time and energy at this stage.¹¹⁵ It could also be claimed that Lenin was in complete agreement with the decisions taken by the Mensheviks on the Paris conference. It is most probable, however, that the Bonch-Bruевич controversy was the main reason behind Lenin's passivity.

The Socialist Revolutionaries

In their policy on the minority nationalities question, the Socialist Revolutionaries, in the shape of their main ideologist, Viktor Chernov, stressed the impor-

¹¹² Volkovicher 1924, pp. 120—122; *Leninskii sbornik* XV (1930), p. 125; V. Bonch-Bruевич, "Zagranichnaia postanovka tekhniki v sots.-dem. rabochei partii i rasprostranenie nashei literatury", in: *Tekhnika bol'shevistskogo podpol'ia: Sbornik statei i vospominanii*, I (Moskva, s.a. = 1924), pp. 232—235.

¹¹³ Futrell 1967, pp. 7—22.

¹¹⁴ According to Chernov, Lenin, together with some of the Mensheviks, opposed the party's taking part in the conference in the period following von Plehwe's assassination, while Plekhanov supported it, the latter being left in the minority on the issue and ultimately defeated. Chernov's recollections have to be considered unreliable, however, as far as they concern Lenin. Chernov 1953, p. 209. See also V.M. Chernov, "Iz istorii Partii s.-r.: Pokazaniia V.M. Chernova po delu Azefa v sledstvennoi komissii Partii s.-r." (2 February 1910), *Novyi Zhurnal*, No 101 (1970), p. 173.

¹¹⁵ This is the picture conveyed by documentary evidence published in the Soviet Un-

tance of eliminating all forms of ethnically-based oppression as a means of achieving effective collaboration between different national groups. Minority peoples were to be free to decide themselves the nature of their relationship to the Empire, to which they had been forcibly annexed. Voluntary integration was only to be achieved by first granting the minority nationalities complete and unilateral self-determination. Responsibility for determining the status of each national group *vis-à-vis* the Empire, according to Chernov, lay with the working classes of these groups, who were recommended to make their decisions in line with the interests of social progress and socialism. He considered it quite acceptable that the Poles and Finns might decide to demand their country's complete separation from Russia. In the case of other nationalities which had as yet not progressed so far in political and social development, a federal arrangement, autonomy or some other form of local government would be a more appropriate solution. Chernov visualised federalism as likely to guarantee a good level of cooperation between individual nationalities much more effectively than any form of centralism, both in the areas of political, as well as party political inter-relationships.¹¹⁶

During the course of the first congress of the Foreign Organisation of the Socialist Revolutionary Party held in August 1903, it became clear that not all émigré leaders were as favourably disposed towards the separatist aspirations of the minority nationalities as Chernov. Although a joint resolution was not arrived at, the draft version that had served as the basis of discussion followed Chernov's overall ideas. This indicates that his views were, at least to a certain extent, representative of the general mood among the émigré leadership.¹¹⁷

The second congress of the Foreign Organisation of the party held in July 1904 covered the question of the party's relations with the other Russian parties. In its concluding statement, the commission set up to study and finalise party policy on this question declared that the Socialist Revolutionaries were willing to enter into agreements covering practical issues with any of the other opposition parties. A final resolution enshrining this principle, however, failed to be approved and the question was passed on for further discussion to the party's central committee.¹¹⁸

ion. *Leninskii sbornik* XV (1930), passim; *Perepiska V.I. Lenina i rukovodimykh im uchrezhdenii RSDRP s partiinymi organizatsiiami, 1903—1905 gg.*, 2—3 (Moskva, 1975 & 1977), passim.

¹¹⁶ See V.M. Chernov's anonymous articles: "Natsional'noe poraboshchenie i revoliutsionnyi sotsializm", *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 18 1 February 1903 (o.s.), pp. 1—4. "Natsional'nyi vopros i revoliutsiia", *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 35 1 November 1903 (o.s.), pp. 1—3; Dietrich Geyer, *Lenin in der russischen Sozialdemokratie: Die Arbeiterbewegung im Zarenreich als Organisationsproblem der revolutionären Intelligenz 1890—1903*, Beiträge zur Geschichte Osteuropas 3 (Köln, 1962), pp. 362—364.

¹¹⁷ For material relating to the congress, see PSR No 725, IISG.

¹¹⁸ For the draft resolutions discussed, see PSR No 514. Draft of the minutes: No 364a-b, IISG. According to the concluding statement referred to above (No 514), the Socialist Revolutionaries saw the possible granting of Polish independence as an exceptional solution and one which could not be applied to other nationalities.



The Socialist Revolutionaries (from left to right) V.M. Chernov, F.V. Volkhovskii, N.V. Chaikovskii, E.E. Lazarev, and L.E. Shishko.

The general position of the Socialist Revolutionaries regarding political organisation and nationality made it much easier for them than for the social democrats to accept the type of cross-party alliance embodied in the Paris conference. The occasional ambivalence evident in their stance resulted in the main from their doubts about the depth of anti-government sentiment felt by the liberals and the willingness of the social democrats to collaborate with other parties.

The very obvious low-key role taken by the Socialist Revolutionaries in the preparations leading up to the Paris conference was clearly linked to their realisation that Zilliacus, otherwise a close associate of the party, was far better suited to handling them than they were.

The Paris Conference (30.9.—5.10.1904) and Its Aftermath

Zilliacus sent out conference invitations to a total of 19 revolutionary and opposition parties. Eight of these accepted:

- 1) The Union of Liberation (represented by V. Ia. Bogucharskii, Petr D. Dolgorukov, P.N. Miliukov, and P.B. Struve)
- 2) The Polish National League (Zygmunt Balicki and Roman Dmowski)
- 3) The Finnish opposition (represented by Konni Zilliacus and Arvid Neovius, with Leo Mechelin acting as their unofficial advisor in Paris)
- 4) The Socialist Revolutionary Party (Evno Azef and V.M. Chernov; M.A. Natanson also attended).
- 5) The Polish Socialist Party (Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz, Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz, and Aleksander Malinowski)
- 6) The Georgian Party of Socialists-Federalists-Revolutionaries (Georgii Dekanozi and Gabuniia)
- 7) The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Mikayel Varandian-Hovhannisian)
- 8) The Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Jānis Ozols)

Of the eight parties represented, three (1—3) were non-socialist and one (8) social democratic. Support for the Socialist Revolutionaries was provided by the three minority nationality parties (5—7) otherwise close to them.¹¹⁹ The sole so-

¹¹⁹ For the official minutes of the Paris conference and the declaration that accompanied them, see *Listok Osvobodzheniia* No 17 19 November (2 December) 1904, pp. 1—2 & *Revolutsionnaia Rossiia* No 56 5 December 1904 (o.s.), pp. 7—9. For A. Neovius' account of the conference, see Törngren 1929, pp. 241—255. For the report, entitled *La conférence*, and the memorandum, entitled *Mémoire I* (October 1904), delivered by Zilliacus to the Japanese, see *Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan* (rokokunobu) No 3, 1.6.3.2-9, GS. For the report on the conference drawn up by the Russian secret police and based on Azef's communications, see *Russkii politicheskii sysk za granitsej* 1914, pp. 182—195. Memoirs containing references to the conference include: Zilliacus II 1920, pp. 21—28; Miliukov 1938, pp. 122—127; Miliukov I 1955, pp. 242—245; Chernov 1953, pp. 210—212. Neovius'

cial democratic representative present at the conference stressed that he was there to keep a check on whatever decisions were taken. His party, unlike the other seven organisations which were represented, did not sign the joint common declaration issued on coordinating the opposition's anti-government activities.¹²⁰

Although making it clear that their signatures on the declaration did not signify their having, in any way, abandoned their own individual programmes or chosen tactics, the parties were able to agree on the following common principles and demands:

- 1) The overthrow of the autocracy; the repeal of all moves taken undermining Finland's constitutional rights;
- 2) The replacement of the autocratic régime with a democratic form of government based on universal suffrage;
- 3) National self-determination; the freedom under the law for all national groups to be allowed to determine their own development; the elimination of the violent measures introduced by the Russian authorities against various nationalities within the Empire.

During the discussions surrounding the declaration, the PPS had demanded complete independence for Poland. The immediate aim of the Polish National League was restricted to achieving political autonomy alone. Representatives from the other minority nationalities also confined themselves to aiming only at autonomy. While the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Latvians were willing to approve unqualified recognition of the possibility of secession, the Russian liberals refused outright to put their name to any statement of this kind. The PPS and the Polish National League were responsible for drafting the final version of the third section of the declaration and wording it in such a way as to make it acceptable to all the parties involved.

Agreement in principle was reached on the second section of the declaration after one of the liberal delegates, Prince Dolgorukov, announced that his group accepted the demand for universal suffrage. At the suggestion of the Finnish opposition, the conference decided to restrict itself to approving this only as a matter of general principle and did not attempt to define its position on the details

report on the conference written immediately after its conclusion is the most reliable and detailed source on what happened during its course. The date of the final day of discussions (5 October) mentioned there is probably correct. The variety of references concerning the date of this concluding day has resulted from the fact that many representatives remained in Paris for their own discussions after the conference proper had ended. Neovius also includes a complete list of the organisations invited (p. 252). For a list of those which actually attended, see *Russkii politicheskii syzk za granitse* 1914, p. 185; Galai 1973, p. 216.

¹²⁰ *Listok Osvobozhdeniia* No 17 19 November (2 December) 1904, pp. 1—2; Törngrén 1929, p. 245, 247—248. The action of the Latvians went against the agreement they had made with the other social democratic groups in Amsterdam, but they did not consider it binding on them. See von Transehe-Roseneck II 1908, pp. 100—101.

of how it was to be implemented in practice, an area in which the parties had a variety of conflicting ideas.¹²¹

It was decided to set up a coordinating body, to be responsible for maintaining inter-party contacts within Russia, and a news agency abroad.¹²² Both decisions failed to be implemented in practice.

Zilliacus had received notice of the decision of the RSDWP, the SDKPiL, and the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party not to attend only shortly prior to the beginning of the conference. These decisions came as a complete surprise to him.¹²³ The Bund's letter declining his invitation arrived only later.¹²⁴

The conference approved a reply to the RSDWP in which the signatories attempted to refute the arguments which the RSDWP had advanced as part of its case for not attending, alleging that they were based on misunderstandings. It was decided to give the social democrats the possibility of subsequently aligning themselves behind the conference decisions, should they so choose.¹²⁵

Publication of the minutes of the conference and the joint declaration was postponed at the request of the Union of Liberation until the beginning of December, although the Finnish delegation received the impression that the material could be made public by the beginning of November. During the discussion prior to this decision, the Finnish opposition had unsuccessfully called for an even longer delay than that asked for by the Union of Liberation. The revolutionary parties, in contrast, had advocated immediate publication.¹²⁶

Much of the time during the course of the conference and the attendant informal talks was spent by the parties in discussing their plans on anti-government action. The revolutionary parties (all those present except the Union of Liberation, the Polish National League and the Finnish opposition) organised a separate meeting of their own to coordinate a campaign of civil disturbances directed

¹²¹ Törngren 1929, pp. 242—246. See also Leo Mechelin's memorandum entitled *La question du suffrage universel*, Mechelin Document Collection 23 (30), VA; Wiesław Bienkowski, *Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz: Życie i dzieło* (Wrocław, 1969), pp. 219—220; Chernov 1953, pp. 210—212; Chernov 1970, p. 172; Miliukov 1938, pp. 125—126.

¹²² Törngren 1929, p. 248; K. Zilliacus, *La conférence, Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan (rokokunobu) No 3, 1.6.3.2-9, GS.*

¹²³ Törngren 1929, p. 241.

¹²⁴ Törngren 1929, p. 241; *Russkii politicheskii syisk za granitsej* 1914, p. 186; A.A. Makarov to L.A. Rataev 6 September 1904 (o.s.), Okhrana Archives, XXI F. 1, H1 (USA ik 18, VA); *Iskra* No 79 1 December 1904 (o.s.), p. 3; *Iskra* No 82 1 January 1905 (o.s.), p. 2.

¹²⁵ Törngren 1929, p. 241, 249, 251, 254—255. Zilliacus wrote to Plekhanov and the Bund, amongst others, with this in mind, but to no avail. K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 23 October 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; *Pis'ma P.B. Aksel'roda i Iu. O. Martova* 1924, pp. 109—110.

¹²⁶ *Russkii politicheskii syisk za granitsej* 1914, p. 193; Törngren 1929, p. 131, 249—251; A. Törngren to L. Mechelin 4 and 8 November 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 48, VA; K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 16 and 23 October and 5 November 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus, *La conférence, Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan (rokokunobu) No 3, 1.6.3.2-9, GS.*

against the war and the government. Zilliacus attended this meeting, albeit not as an official representative of his party. Although a detailed plan of action to be adopted by all the parties concerned did not emerge, agreement was reached on the need to strengthen their actions and adopt a more radical approach directed, for example, at hampering military call-up and recruitment.¹²⁷

Unrest did indeed increase in a number of areas of the Empire towards the end of 1904, but primarily as the result of independent action taken by individual parties, rather than any concerted effort. The most visible signs of opposition activity, the banquet campaign mounted by the liberals¹²⁸ and the violent demonstrations masterminded by the PPS in Poland from 13 November onwards¹²⁹, cannot really be considered as resulting from either the talks in Paris or the efforts of Zilliacus. The liberals had not taken part in the separate set of discussions held by the revolutionary parties and Zilliacus remained opposed to the idea of disturbances breaking out first in any areas populated by minority nationalities.

In his memoirs, Zilliacus did not forget to mention the commendation he received from Japan for his work in organising the Paris conference.¹³⁰ The Japanese were nevertheless not completely satisfied with their enthusiastic associate. In his memorandum on the Paris conference, Zilliacus had requested Japan to state officially that it would rather conclude peace with a Russian constitutional government than with Tsarism, which it considered to be its real enemy. His request had not been well received within the Japanese Foreign Ministry, used as it was to working through traditional diplomatic channels. The General Staff refused Akashi's request to allow him access to additional funds for subversion above and beyond the 100,000 yen already granted. The General Staff had previously underlined to Akashi the need to ensure that funds were distributed to a range of parties and not restricted to two or three organisations.¹³¹

Writing to a correspondent in Finland in March 1905, Zilliacus indicated that he had passed on various Japanese monies to the parties which had attended the Paris conference after it had finished, taking care not to reveal the origin of the funds to the Russian parties.¹³² This money was probably part of the sum

¹²⁷ *Revolutsionnaia Rossiia* No 65 25 April 1905 (o.s.), p. 4; Michal Lusnia (= K. Kelles-Krauz), "Die Lage in Polen und Litauen", *Socialistische Monatshefte* 1905, pp. 235—236; Konni Zilliacus, *Revolution und Gegenrevolution in Russland und Finnland*, 2. Aufl. (München, 1912), pp. 87—90; *Russkii politicheskii sysk za granitsej* 1914, pp. 194—195; Zilliacus II 1920, pp. 25—27; Törngren 1929, pp. 246—248, 255—256; von Transche-Roseneck II 1908, p. 101; K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 16 October 1904, Neovius Collection, VA.

¹²⁸ Galai 1973, p. 218 ff.

¹²⁹ Michal Lusnia (= K. Kelles-Krauz), "Die Lage in Polen und Litauen", *Socialistische Monatshefte* 1905, p. 236; Lerski 1959, p. 95.

¹³⁰ Zilliacus II 1920, pp. 27—28.

¹³¹ K. Zilliacus, *Mémoire I* (October 1904), *Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan* (rokokunobu) No 3, 1.6.3.2-9, GS; Futrell 1967, p. 18; Telegram 5 in the present volume.

¹³² K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, AAB. Akashi's

(100,000 yen) approved by the Japanese General Staff for transfer to Akashi on 31 August the previous year.

The poor turn-out witnessed at the Paris conference served to reduce its overall significance. Of the 19 organisations invited to attend, only 8 sent representatives. Only the social democratic groupings are known, however, to have intentionally decided to boycott the conference. A number of those who stayed away were, in any case, of less than major significance.

Subsequent to the conference, the ranks thinned out even further. While the Stockholm committee was prepared to give a belated blessing to the Finnish delegation's decision to bypass some of its instructions, the Helsinki constitutionalists were adamant in demanding that all references to the Finnish opposition be removed from the minutes of the conference and the joint declaration. Following the Emperor's announcement on 26 August 1904 of the convocation of the Finnish Diet for a session beginning on 6 December, the Helsinki-based constitutionalists feared that their party's participation in an anti-government manifesto alongside Russian revolutionary parties would undermine their aim of the formation of a joint front in the Diet committed to campaigning for the return of autonomy.

The Helsinki constitutionalists were also moving towards the belief that it might now be possible to achieve an acceptable compromise with the autocratic authorities. The hopes centred around this ultimately weighed more heavily in the balance with the Helsinki constitutionalists than did calculations based on the possible success of the opposition in achieving some form of breakthrough which would affect the Empire as a whole. Particularist interest proved to be stronger than any sense of solidarity with the rest of the Empire, particularly after the Russian liberals had promised that the Finnish opposition's decision to remove its signature from the conference papers would not harm relations between the two parties.

During November, the Finnish opposition also persuaded the other signatories of the conference minutes to agree to the removal of all references to the Finnish opposition from material intended to be made public.

Around the same time, Zilliacus went ahead with his plan, which had been maturing in his mind for some time, for a separate party and founded a new radical opposition group known as the Finnish Active Resistance Party. The new party proved most attractive to the small group of supporters which had formed around him during September 1903, while the majority of the exiles resident in Stockholm, together with the constitutionalists active within Finland, remained faithful to the old party. The new party moved swiftly to fill the vacuum left by the decision of the mainstream Finnish opposition to rescind its association with the Paris conference, simply appending its name in the place of the latter's

letter to G. Dekanozi dated 18 November 1904 apparently covered funds to be paid to the Georgians, see *Iznanka revoliutsii* 1906.

to the official documents connected with the conference. It would be easy as a result of this switch of names to get the impression, from the documents alone, that it was the activist party and not the main Finnish opposition which actually took part in the Paris conference.¹³³

Another organisation not represented during the conference proceedings, the Belorussian Socialist *Hramada*, also subsequently added its endorsement to the conference decisions, although in this case its name was not added to the conference documents which were made public.¹³⁴

A lukewarm attitude towards the joint conference of opposition forces active throughout the Empire made itself felt not only among the Finnish constitutionalists, but also within certain elements of the Polish opposition. The Polish National League, in particular, did not attach much significance to the Paris conference. The weakness of the Russian revolutionary and opposition parties had, up until 1904, served to fuel the PPS' separatism, but the strengthening of the Russian opposition during the year forced the PPS to re-evaluate its attitudes towards Poland's eastern neighbour. Many of those within the party gravitated towards supporting closer cooperation with the Russian liberals. It was largely because of this that the PPS finally decided to attend the Paris conference. A substantial body of opinion within the party, however, remained opposed to the new policy.¹³⁵

The minutes of the proceedings of the Paris conference, together with the joint declaration issued, were published in a number of Western European papers on 1 December 1904.¹³⁶ These were accompanied in *Listok Osvobozhdeniia* by a

¹³³ Törngren 1929, pp. 122—136; Törngren 1942, pp. 145—149, 396—407; L. Gripenberg, *Från ett skiftesrikt kvartsekel* (1932), ff. 207—209, VA; A. Neovius to L. Mechelin 18 and 19 November 1904 (3 telegrams). A. Törngren to L. Mechelin 4, 11, and 12 November 1904. Mechelin Letter Collection 48, VA; K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 16, 18, and 23 October 1904 and 2, 5, and 8 November 1904. H. Neovius to A. Neovius 21 October and 29 November 1904. V. Furuholm to A. Neovius 24 November 1904. Lehmann to A. Neovius 12 October 1904. J.N. Reuter to A. Neovius 4 and 8 November 1904. A. Törngren to A. Neovius 21 and 22 October and 14 and 29 November 1904. Neovius Collection, VA; L. Mechelin to J.N. Reuter 29 October 1904. A. Neovius to J.N. Reuter 5 November 1904. A. Törngren to J.N. Reuter 27 October 1904. K. Zilliacus to J.N. Reuter 2 November 1904 and to T 19 March 1905. Reuter Letter Collection XIII, XIX, XXI, and XXIII, ÅAB; L. Mechelin to J. Castrén 6 August 1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA; O. Procopé's circular dated 30 October 1904, Törngren Collection, VA. For the documents relating to the party's founding and the Paris conference, see the Finnish Active Resistance Party Archive, VA; Zilliacus II 1920, pp. 28—37; Gummerus 1929, pp. 171—176; Alma Söderhjelm, "Det aktiva motståndspartiet", in: *Med lagen och svärdet: Kring svenska studenters insats i finländsk politik 1899—1919* (Helsingfors, 1919), p. 43 ff.

¹³⁴ *Revolutsionnaia Rossiia* No 56 5 December 1904 (o.s.), p. 8. See also Zilliacus II 1920, p. 22.

¹³⁵ On the League, see Fountain 1980, p. 209; Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski, drugie wydanie, I, 1864—1914* (London, 1963), p. 474; Stanisław Kozicki, *Historia Ligi Narodowej, (Okres 1887—1907)* (London, 1964), p. 238. On the PPS, see Żarnowska 1965, pp. 137—143 (96—157); Bienkowski 1969, pp. 218—219.

¹³⁶ *Fria Ord* 10 December 1904, pp. 7—8.

communiqué issued by the Union of Liberation making its existence and political aims public for the first time. The communiqué's calls for a democratic form of government went further than those agreed on at the Paris conference. In line with its political programme, the Union demanded not only universal suffrage but also equal suffrage, and secret and direct elections. The decision of the Union of Liberation to make its existence public at the time of the publication of the conference material indicates that it considered the conference to be of great significance.¹³⁷

A similarly positive attitude towards the conference was also typical of the Socialist Revolutionaries. According to an editorial published in mid-October in *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia*, collaboration between the socialist parties and other opposition forces on specific questions in the area of anti-government activities was an absolute necessity, on account of the sheer scale of the system the opposition was up against. It was at this point that the idea of “*getrennt marschieren, vereint schlagen*” was proposed; no permanent alliances or compromises on policy programmes or tactics with the non-socialists, on the other hand, were thought acceptable. Collaboration across party divisions in the struggle against the autocracy was also necessary, the journal argued, because it would allow the socialists a say in the decisions affecting society and the nationality question likely to follow an overthrow of the autocracy. After the final fall of the Tsarist régime, however, the ways of the socialists and their class enemies were inevitably bound to part.

Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia also argued that the socialist parties should work towards the establishment of a federative socialist bloc. Total unification would not be possible as long as political freedom did not exist within Russia.¹³⁸

Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia published the official conference documents in December. Alongside them, the journal also printed a declaration signed by the Socialist Revolutionaries, the PPS, the Georgian Party of Socialists-Federalists-Revolutionaries, and the Latvian Social Democratic Union (which had not taken part in the Paris conference). In this, the signatories emphasised the significant differences which existed between the socialist camp and the non-socialists in their attitudes towards the struggle against the autocracy.¹³⁹ In an editorial in the same issue, the journal denied that the socialists had agreed to any alliance or ideological compromises with the non-socialists during the conference.¹⁴⁰ The

¹³⁷ *Listok Osvobozhdeniia* No 17 19 November (2 December) 1904, p. 2; Galai 1973, pp. 189–190.

¹³⁸ “Na dva fronta”, *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 53 30 September 1904 (o.s.), pp. 1–3.

¹³⁹ “Ko vsem rabochim”, *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 56 5 December 1904 (o.s.), pp. 1–2. See also Michal Lusnia (= K. Kelles-Krauz), “Die Lage in Polen und Litauen”, *Sozialistische Monatshefte* 1905, pp. 235–236; Najdus 1973, pp. 196–197.

¹⁴⁰ “Sotsialisty-revoliutsionery i nesotsialisticheskaia demokratiia”, *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 56 5 December 1904 (o.s.), pp. 2–7.

Socialist Revolutionaries were right in assuming that it was precisely in this area that the social democrats would choose to attack them.

The international socialist congress held in Amsterdam in August 1904 had rejected revisionist attempts to transform the concept of revolutionary class struggle into a reformist type of policy, as well as all attempts advanced in various quarters to downplay the central tenet of class conflict, made in the hope of smoothing the path for collaboration with the bourgeois parties. The final resolution approved was particularly directed against the policies advocated by the French socialist Jean Jaurès, who had argued for the need for coalitions across class divisions as a means of advancing the progressive cause.¹⁴¹

The Menshevik paper *Iskra* believed that events at the Paris conference had led to the formation of a permanent bloc in which the most politically conservative of those represented had been allowed to determine the shape of the package of political aims which had been adopted there. As a result, the conference had not demanded the formation of a republic, a constituent assembly or the introduction of equal suffrage or secret and direct elections, although even the Russian liberals had approved the latter three principles. The paper also expressed its surprise at the behaviour of the PPS, which had previously called for the Russian Social Democrats to align themselves behind a call for Polish independence, but which had now satisfied itself with a significantly more modest demand after allying itself in a common front with Russian moderate bourgeois forces. *Iskra* underlined what it saw as the close parallel existing between the policies adopted at the Paris conference and those advocated by Jaurès. The paper declared that the social democrats should only enter into temporary agreements with the bourgeois parties.¹⁴²

A significant part of the international social democratic movement, however, reacted rather more favourably to the Paris conference than *Iskra*, the Bund and the Rosa Luxemburg-led SDKPiL.¹⁴³ The leader of the German Social Democratic Party, August Bebel, had, for example, recommended a policy of cooperation with the Russian liberals to Axelrod in September 1904.¹⁴⁴ *Iskra* soon found itself drawn into a polemical argument with the leading organs of the German and Austrian Social Democrats, *Vorwärts* and *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, which both considered the self-imposed isolation adopted by the Russian party with regard to other revolutionary and opposition forces as very much a regret-

¹⁴¹ *Internationaler Sozialistischer Kongress, Congrès Socialiste International, International Socialist Congress, Amsterdam 1904: Resolutions, Résolutions, Resolutions* (Bruxelles, 1905), pp. 5—10. Discussion: *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Amsterdam, 14. bis 20. August 1904* (Berlin, 1904), pp. 31—49, 58—78.

¹⁴² “Ob”edinenie burzhuznoi demokratiï”, *Iskra* No 79 1 December 1904 (o.s.), pp. 1—4.

¹⁴³ Tobias 1972, pp. 282—283; Żarnowska 1965, p. 142; Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, 1/2 (1979), pp. 456—461.

¹⁴⁴ A. Bebel to P.B. Axelrod 13 September 1904, P.B. Axelrod Archive, IISG; Geyer 1958, pp. 419—420.

table mistake.¹⁴⁵

In contrast, Karl Kautsky, in a letter written to Axelrod, expressed his approval of the Mensheviks' policy adopted towards what he termed the "liberal bloc". Kautsky hoped that Axelrod would present his group's approach in the German party press.¹⁴⁶

The Socialist Revolutionary journal *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* made sure that its readers were kept informed of the attitudes towards the conference expressed in *Vorwärts* and its views on the isolationist attitudes of the Russian social democratic movement.¹⁴⁷ To the annoyance of the Socialist Revolutionaries, Jean Jaurès also gave his support to the policies adopted at the Paris conference.¹⁴⁸ Only Struve, writing in *Osvobozhdenie*, expressed his satisfaction at Jaurès' move.¹⁴⁹ The Socialist Revolutionaries had traditionally been critical of this figure on the right wing of French socialism¹⁵⁰, and now suspected that he was attempting to interpret the decisions taken at the conference as approval for his own policies. The Socialist Revolutionaries feared that, unless they were careful to make their position clear, the Russian émigré socialist community, together with the international socialist movement, would put them in the same category as Jaurès and the other revisionists. In order to reduce this danger, Chernov dispatched a letter to Jaurès' *L'Humanité*, in which he explained that the limited coordination of opposition activities proposed at the conference was something quite different from a comprehensive joint plan of action uniting the opposition of the type which Jaurès had referred to.¹⁵¹

Seen from the outside, the argument which developed within the Russian socialist movement in connection with the Paris conference as to what kind of agreements with the non-socialist were acceptable seems little more than petty quibbling of the worst kind. Within the movement, however, the importance of the theoretical issues which lay behind this dispute was never questioned, irrespective of the patent gulf separating them from more practical, down to earth political problems.

The social democrats claimed that the Paris conference had taken a rather ambiguous stance on a number of democratic fundamentals. The Socialist Revolutionaries found it hardest to reply to this kind of criticism, which could not be

¹⁴⁵ *Vorwärts* 22 December 1904 and 20 January 1905; *Arbeiter-Zeitung* 22 December 1904; *Iskra* No 82 1 January 1905 (o.s.), pp. 1—2; Geyer 1958, p. 422.

¹⁴⁶ K. Kautsky to P.B. Axelrod 19 December 1904, Axelrod Archive, IISG.

¹⁴⁷ *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 58 20 January 1905 (o.s.), pp. 21—22.

¹⁴⁸ *L'Humanité* 1 December 1904.

¹⁴⁹ P. S(truve), "Jaurès o soglasovannykh deistviiakh russkoi oppozitsii", *Osvobozhdenie* No 61 13 December (30 November) 1904, pp. 185—186.

¹⁵⁰ "Voina s Iaponiei i interesy russkoi revoliutsii", *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 54 30 October 1904 (o.s.), pp. 20—22; *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Amsterdam* 1904, p. 62.

¹⁵¹ N.S. Rusanov, *V emigratsii*, Istoriko-revoliutsionnaia biblioteka XL—XLI (Moskva, 1929), pp. 278—280. See also Iu. Gardenin (= V.M. Chernov), "Nashim obviniteliam", *Vestnik Russkoi Revoliutsii* No 4:1, March 1905, pp. 386—410.

avoided by taking refuge in theoretical hair-splitting. In the view of *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia*, it had been unanimously accepted at the conference that confirmation of the principle of universal suffrage automatically implied equal suffrage, together with secret and direct elections.¹⁵² In reality, however, the conference had avoided spelling out in detail its position on the suffrage question, as agreement on any more precise definition would have been impossible to achieve. The Finnish moderate opposition, for example, would have refused to put its signature to a more specific resolution containing the latter points.

But, if some real measure of collaborative action between opposition forces was to be achieved, compromises would inevitably have to be made. The Socialist Revolutionaries considered it better to sacrifice something, if by doing so agreement — even if only a modest degree of agreement — could be achieved; in the view of the social democrats, on the other hand, the importance of allegiance to one's ideological beliefs and established policies was more important than the results to be gained from diverging from them in the name of compromise. It should be remembered, however, that this attitude only really emerged in the period subsequent to the conference. Particularist opinion gained the upper hand in the minds of the Russian social democrats over that more favourably disposed towards cross-party collaboration only after the social democrats had got wind of the Japanese links of Zilliacus and the PPS. In the final analysis, it was Zilliacus himself who effectively scuttled his own aim of uniting opposition forces. It is impossible to say, all the same, what degree of agreement would have emerged in Paris had the social democrats relented and attended the conference.

Moves towards Unification within the Russian Socialist Movement in the Wake of the Amsterdam Congress

The imperative requirement to establish a single, united socialist party in every country was underlined in a resolution issued at the conclusion of the Amsterdam international socialist congress.¹⁵³ This call was particularly addressed to the French and Russian socialists, both of which had thus far proved incapable of uniting their forces under a common banner. The divisions existing within the movement in Russia were additionally complicated by the fact that they resulted not only from conflicts of approach and emphasis, but also from the efforts evident among many of the socialists representing the minority nationalities to

¹⁵² *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 58 20 January 1905 (o.s.), pp. 21—22. See also “V otvet na zaprosy”, *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 74 1 September 1905 (o.s.), pp. 27—28.

¹⁵³ *Internationaler Sozialistischer Kongress...Amsterdam 1904...Resolutionen* 1905, pp. 11—13.

organise their activities around independent national parties.¹⁵⁴

Beginning in October 1904, August Bebel began a concerted effort aimed at tackling some of these problems. Bebel sought to organise a conference of social democratic parties and factions active across the Russian Empire to be charged with improving inter-group collaboration. Bebel's moves were backed by Karl Kautsky and the Austrian socialist leader Victor Adler. Adler also suggested inviting the Polish PPS and the Socialist Revolutionaries to the proposed conference. The divisions existing between the Russian socialists proved, however, yet again to be insurmountable and the conference, planned for January 1905, never took place. The Mensheviks, for example, resisted the idea of including the PPS, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolshevik faction on the list of those to be invited. They would also have preferred to see the national social democratic parties amalgamated with the RSDWP. Rosa Luxemburg too opposed the proposed conference, seeing it as being based on the federalist party model. She was also concerned about the threat of the PPS. It was her opposition which ultimately compelled Bebel to throw in the towel and abandon his conference plans.¹⁵⁵

The Russian socialists could not, however, have been left in any doubt that the continuing divisions existing within the Russian Left were viewed with increasing disapproval by the international socialist movement. This disapproval only grew following the moves taken by the French socialists in the wake of the Amsterdam congress towards establishing a single united party. In a meeting held on 15 January 1905, the International Socialist Bureau urged the national movements which had still failed to unite themselves to follow the French example and comply with the resolution on party unity approved at the Amsterdam congress.¹⁵⁶

The SDKPiL failed to prevent the Bund and the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party from organising a joint conference at the end of January 1905 in Riga. This was also attended by representatives of the central committee of the RSDWP and the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party. In an appeal approved by the conference, the central importance of achieving a united party was underlined. A demand was also made for the calling of an All-Russian constituent assembly to be elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage through direct and secret elections, and to be responsible for transforming Russia into a democratic republic. As part of this transformation, a large measure of local self-government was to be granted to the minority nationalities.

In a separate resolution, those attending agreed to refrain from making alli-

¹⁵⁴ On the disputes among the Russian socialists at the Amsterdam congress, see Geyer 1958, p. 216, 418—419; Tobias 1972, pp. 278—280; Najdus 1973, pp. 185—189.

¹⁵⁵ Geyer 1958, pp. 419—428; *Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia* No 11 (1922), p. 169, 173, 178; Najdus 1973, pp. 194—195, 223—224.

¹⁵⁶ *Bureau Socialiste International: Comptes rendus des réunions, Manifestes et circulaires*, éd. Georges Haupt, Matériaux pour l'histoire du socialisme international, 1^{re} sér. II, Vol. I, 1900—1907 (Paris, 1969), p. 117.



Rosa Luxemburg.

ances with bourgeois and democratic opposition parties (in other words, the liberals and the terrorist-inclined revolutionaries), although agreements covering limited joint action were deemed acceptable. This was, however, only on the condition that those with whom such an agreement was reached also committed themselves

to the demand for a constituent assembly elected by universal and equal suffrage through direct and secret elections.

A further resolution approved at the Riga conference condemned the decisions taken at the Paris conference as being insufficiently democratic in their content, the “liberal-democratic bloc”, as it was described, having restricted the conference to a call for a democratic form of government and universal suffrage. In the eyes of those attending the Riga conference, any link-up with the coalition of forces represented at the Paris conference ran counter to the social democratic political programme and, in consequence, could not be sanctioned.

The Polish Proletariat Party and the Armenian Social Democratic Workers’ Organisation subsequently added their names to all three resolutions, while the SDKPiL signed only the first (the appeal). Through the Riga conference, the social democrats effectively established their own bloc. Despite the efforts of the Bund, it nevertheless proved impossible to achieve an official party alliance which would have set the seal on linking the parties together at an organisational level.¹⁵⁷ The most significant social democratic group left outside this informal bloc were the Bolsheviks.

Father Gapon’s Collaborative Initiative

Father Georgii Apollonovich Gapon had, with the approval of the authorities, founded a workers’ association known as the Assembly of the Russian Factory and Mill Workers of the City of St Petersburg, with the aim of improving the conditions of the working class and keeping workers untainted by revolutionary ideas. Early in 1905, on Sunday 22 January, the Assembly organised a large demonstration in St Petersburg, which has since become identified as marking the beginning of the first Russian revolution (1905—1907). Despite the demonstration’s peaceful beginning, the government gave its armed forces permission to open fire on the crowds which had gathered. Bloody Sunday, as the day became known, quickly sparked off disturbances in various parts of the Empire. The authorities managed with some difficulty to prevent the collapse of the government and the autocracy, but their reserves and prestige continued to fade as time went on. Although successful in suppressing isolated disorders and outbreaks of violence, they proved incapable of putting a complete stop to the unrest.

Gapon declared himself a revolutionary and fled abroad.¹⁵⁸ Arriving in Gene-

¹⁵⁷ “Isveshchenie o konferentsii sots.-demokraticeskikh organizatsii Rossii”, *Iskra* No 89 24 February 1905 (o.s.), pp. 7—8; *Iskra* No 98 23 April 1905 (o.s.), pp. 3—4; von Transhe-Roseneck II 1908, pp. 102—103; *Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia* No 11 (1922), pp. 169—181; F.E. Dzerzhinskii, *Izbrannye proizvedeniia v dvukh tomakh*, 1, 1897—1923, izd. 2-oe, dopolnennoe (Moskva, 1967), p. 111; Najdus 1973, pp. 192—195, 219—222; Strobel 1974, pp. 217—219; Tobias 1972, p. 284, 290, 293—294, 303, 324.

¹⁵⁸ On Gapon, his Assembly and Bloody Sunday, see Sablinsky 1976.

va at the end of January, Gapon found himself taken under the wing of various leading Mensheviks. In order to please his hosts, Gapon agreed to put his name to a statement announcing that he had decided to join the Social Democrats, a statement which was published in *Vorwärts* and *Leipziger Volkszeitung*. By linking themselves with a world-famous revolutionary hero, the Mensheviks hoped to strengthen their own position. But there was no ignoring the fact that Gapon was essentially an untutored priest, who understood next to nothing about the niceties of socialist theory. He soon began to feel out of place alongside the intellectually-orientated Social Democratic leadership and gravitated towards the more practically-minded Socialist Revolutionaries. Finally he asked the Mensheviks to withdraw the notice regarding his decision to join the Social Democrats. This switch of camp, together with a Social Democratic leaflet which appeared soon after in Russia attacking him, served to thoroughly sour relations between him and the Mensheviks, although not, however, to completely break them altogether.¹⁵⁹

The Socialist Revolutionaries advised Gapon not to join their party officially, at least for the time being, and instead to concentrate on advancing cooperation between the Russian revolutionary parties.¹⁶⁰ Gapon represented something little short of an heaven-sent gift to the Socialist Revolutionaries, who were keen to take advantage of the tense situation created by the Bloody Sunday massacre in St Petersburg to advance the revolutionary cause.

Akizuki Sachio, the Japanese envoy in Stockholm, had informed the Japanese Foreign Minister, Komura Jutarō, on 3 January 1905 that a sum of 200,000 yen would be required for funding a joint campaign by the Russian revolutionary parties. Immediately after Bloody Sunday, on 25 January, Akizuki requested a million yen for the same purpose. Both requests were rejected by Komura, who particularly feared the possible reactions of Russia's neighbours, Germany and Austria-Hungary, should the campaign lead to a full-scale revolution.¹⁶¹

Although Akizuki's requests were formally put in his name, the main figures behind them were probably Colonel Akashi, the Military Attaché in the Legation, and Zilliacus. Akashi and Zilliacus had tried to organise various campaigns of subversive activity within Russia prior to Bloody Sunday, but it seems clear that it was only the events of 22 January and their aftermath which prompted them to begin planning an out and out uprising.

¹⁵⁹ K. Kautsky to P.B. Axelrod 14 February 1905, Axelrod Archive, IISG; *Iskra* No 87 10 February 1905 (o.s.), p. 4; (G.V. Plekhanov,) "Sviashchennik G. Gapon", *Iskra* No 93 17 March 1905 (o.s.), pp. 1—2; "G. Gapon i russkaia sotsial'demokratiia", *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 62 25 March 1905 (o.s.), pp. 1—3; Lev Deich (= Deutsch), "Geroi na chas, (Iz vospominanii o Gapone)", *Sovremennyi Mir* No 1 (1909), pp. 134—137, 142—144; A.S. (= S.A. Rappoport), "Iz zagranichnykh vstrech: Georgii Gapon", *Russkoe Bogatstvo* No 1 (1909), pp. 174—179; P. Rutenberg, "Delo Gapona", *Byloe* No 11—12 (1909), pp. 38—39; Chernov 1910, p. 145, 156—161; Martynov-Piker 1925, p. 279; V.I. Lenin, *Sochineniia*, izd. 3-e, VII (Leningrad, 1935), p. 449; Sablinsky 1976, pp. 292—295.

¹⁶⁰ Chernov 1910, pp. 157—158.

According to *Rakka ryūsui* written by Akashi in 1906, Zilliacus discussed the possibility of an uprising during talks in Paris with a Socialist Revolutionary leader Akashi named as Wanhovusukii. Akashi's presence at the Paris Embassy at around the same time allowed him to influence these discussions. Akashi and Zilliacus subsequently travelled to London to hear Chaikovskii's opinion on the subject.¹⁶² These talks in Paris and London took place between 2—12 February.¹⁶³ The mysterious Wanhovusukii could well have been Volkhovskii, as a number of other European names mentioned by Akashi in *Rakka ryūsui* were similarly distorted, some to such an extent that it is very difficult to clarify the identity of the person referred to. This is backed up by the fact that Zilliacus also made use of Volkhovskii and Chaikovskii, both close associates of his, on various other occasions as a means of access to the Socialist Revolutionary Party.

On 12 February, Akashi proposed to the Japanese General Staff that a sum of some 450,000 yen be granted to back an uprising coordinated by the Socialist Revolutionaries and timed to take place in June.¹⁶⁴

Azef informed the Russian secret police around the middle of February that Zilliacus had arrived in Geneva and offered the Foreign Committee of the Socialist Revolutionaries 2,000 revolvers to be used at workers' demonstrations. According to Azef, Zilliacus had also been active in moves to acquire weapons for a number of other parties as well.¹⁶⁵

In March, the Socialist Revolutionary Party sent P. Rutenberg to St Petersburg to lay the groundwork for a campaign of mass armed action.¹⁶⁶ The Finnish Active Resistance Party had already decided in February to begin the creation of an armed organisation to be responsible for coordinating revolutionary mass action.¹⁶⁷ These two moves were clearly connected with the new approach formulated by Zilliacus, Volkhovskii and Chaikovskii in their joint talks.

In order to achieve something concrete in Russia, collaboration between as many revolutionary parties as possible was a necessity. Moreover, it seems likely that the Japanese were no more willing to fund actions sponsored by individual parties at this point than they had been in the period prior to the Paris conference.

As a significant number of revolutionary parties had decided to boycott the Paris conference because of Zilliacus' links with the Japanese, it was obvious

¹⁶¹ White 1964, p. 140; Futrell 1967, p. 17; Telegrams 8—11 in the present volume.

¹⁶² *Rakka ryūsui* in the present volume.

¹⁶³ E. Wolff to I. Berendsen 2 February 1905, Ivar Berendsen Archive, Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen (microfilm Denmark 7, VA). According to this letter, Akashi preceded Zilliacus to Paris and had already waited there for him for a few days.

¹⁶⁴ Telegram 13 in the present volume; Futrell 1967, p. 18.

¹⁶⁵ "Doneseniia Evno Azefa, (Perepiska Azefa s Rataevym v 1903—1905 gg.)", *Byloe* No 1 (23) (1917), p. 220. See also the circular issued by the head of the Finnish Gendarmerie (the Russian Gendarmerie in Finland) to his subordinates dated 12 February 1905 (o.s.), Archive of the Finnish Gendarmerie, S 3 No 16, f. 27, VA.

¹⁶⁶ Rutenberg 1909, pp. 41—42; B. Savinkov, *Vospominaniia terrorista* (Khar'kov, s.a. = 1926), pp. 121—122, 134.

that someone else would have to be entrusted with the task of organising a follow-up conference. Zilliacus was also handicapped by not being a socialist, while the majority of the revolutionary parties adhered to the socialist cause. The hero of St Petersburg's Bloody Sunday was chosen to fill the place vacated by Zilliacus as a neutral mediator. Although keen to make Gapon the figurehead of their plan, the Socialist Revolutionaries were careful to avoid revealing to him at this stage the real extent of what they were aiming at.

Soon after mid-February, Gapon dispatched an open letter to the various socialist parties active within the Empire. In it he called on them to work towards an agreement on a set of common aims, foremost among which were the overthrow of the autocracy, the founding of a provisional government, the calling of a constituent assembly, and a joint plan for an uprising. Gapon also urged the need for making use of both individual and mass terror.¹⁶⁸

The first reactions to Gapon's letter were generally favourable. The Socialist Revolutionaries, who in any case lay behind Gapon's declaration, declared that they agreed with it in its entirety.¹⁶⁹

Lenin announced his overall backing for Gapon's proposal in *Vpered*, the paper he had recently founded, together with his support for mass terror and a militant alliance between the Social Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries, as well as other revolutionary parties, concentrated on organising a coordinated anti-government struggle.¹⁷⁰

Plekhanov drafted an article for *Iskra* in which he argued that given the situation in Russia nothing less than armed resistance against the government, ultimately escalating into an armed mass uprising, would be adequate. The success of the uprising, ie. the overthrow of the Tsarist régime, required in his opinion not only agitation among the masses, but also bourgeois society to be favourably disposed towards the uprising's aims, as well as a measure of terrorist action to paralyse the authorities and prevent them from mounting an effective counter-offensive. Political assassinations were also now deemed acceptable by the Social Democrats, something which they had been reluctant to do in more peaceful times, and this provided them, according to Plekhanov, with the opportunity to come to practical collaborative agreements with the terrorist movements.¹⁷¹

Plekhanov and Lenin adopted the slogan of "march separately, strike together" to form the basis of the hoped-for increased collaboration between the vari-

¹⁶⁷ See the annual report of the party council for 1904—1905, 19 November 1905, Finnish Active Resistance Party Archive, VA. The actual work of putting the decision into practice did not get very far, however.

¹⁶⁸ Georgii Gapon, "Otkrytoe pis'mo k sotsialisticheskim partiiam Rossii", *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 59 10 February 1905 (o.s.), p. 1.

¹⁶⁹ *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 59 10 February 1905 (o.s.), p. 1, 4.

¹⁷⁰ Lenin, *PSS*, 9 (1960), pp. 274—282 (Gapon's letter appears on p. 279). Lenin's response to Gapon's proposal appeared in *Vpered* No 7 21 (8) February 1905.

¹⁷¹ (G.V. Plekhanov,) "Vroz' iditi, vmeste bit'", *Iskra* No 87 10 February 1905 (o.s.), pp. 1—2 (Gapon's letter appeared on p. 4).

ous revolutionary parties. In so doing, they made plain the impossibility of any complete unification of the revolutionary parties, while at the same time underlining the desirability of limited cooperation between them. Plekhanov and Lenin made use of the same slogan as the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bund had previously.¹⁷² This move was an important declaration of principle to the other parties. The needs of the revolution were now unambiguously declared to be more important than the differences dividing the parties.

Gapon renewed his proposal made to the Russian socialist parties in a letter he sent to the International Socialist Bureau at the end of February. He also announced that he would continue, for the foreseeable future, to retain his non-aligned status and not join any party. In compliance with Gapon's request to the effect, the Bureau's Secretariat forwarded his letter to the member parties of the International on 2 March, thereby lending its implicit backing to his initiative. At the same time, it again urged the Russians to follow the example of the French socialists. *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* gave extensive prominence to the Secretariat's communiqué.¹⁷³

The Bolshevik-sponsored *Vpered* expressed its satisfaction at the fact that the news which had circulated previously of Gapon's joining the Mensheviks had proved unfounded.¹⁷⁴

Gapon offered his services as a mediator in discussions between the Social Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries, but the Menshevik-controlled council of the RSDWP, for whom the loss of their protégé to their competitors had come as a particularly unwelcome development, turned down his offer. The council argued that the leaderships of both parties should negotiate directly. By insisting upon this condition, the council also effectively excluded the Bolsheviks, one of the groups which Gapon had mentioned in his offer of mediation, from any possible discussions.¹⁷⁵

The Discussions between Plekhanov and Natanson

After the RSDWP had turned its back on Gapon, the Socialist Revolutionaries called on Natanson at the beginning of March to act as mediator between the

¹⁷² "Na dva fronta", *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 53 30 September 1904 (o.s.), p. 2; "Sotsialisty-revoliutsionery i nesotsialisticheskaia demokratiia", *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 56 5 December 1904 (o.s.), p. 4; Tobias 1972, p. 283.

¹⁷³ *Bureau Socialiste International* 1 1969, pp. 133—134; *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 60 5 March 1905 (o.s.), pp. 22—23.

¹⁷⁴ *Vpered* No 11 23 (10) March 1905, p. 4. See also *Iskra* No 94 25 March 1905 (o.s.), p. 2.

¹⁷⁵ *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 65 25 April 1905 (o.s.), p. 4; *Leninskii sbornik*, XVI (Moskva, 1931), p. 81.

parties, along similar lines to the previous summer.¹⁷⁶ Natanson had a number of secret discussions in Geneva on behalf of the Socialist Revolutionaries with the chairman of the council of the RSDWP, Plekhanov.

Natanson and Plekhanov were able to agree on two basic issues relating to a possible political agreement between their two parties: the transfer of land to popular control and the endorsement of terror as an appropriate and necessary part of the ongoing revolutionary struggle. With regard to the former issue, agreement on a choice of words acceptable to both parties was left to a later date.

Plekhanov presented the fruits of these talks to the council of the RSDWP, which, however, rejected the draft proposal he outlined at a meeting held on 11 March. Martov and Axelrod threatened to resign from the council and, bypassing the council altogether, to appeal directly to the party's membership for support to quash it, in the event that the council endorsed a policy condoning individual terrorist acts as an acceptable weapon in the anti-Tsarist struggle. They feared that if the RSDWP gave its blessing to terrorism the party's membership would abandon agitation and propaganda work among the masses altogether and resort to bomb-throwing.

The hard-core Mensheviks thus proved again to be more unwilling to tolerate any form of compromise than Plekhanov, in exactly the same way as they had done prior to the Paris conference.

In a memorandum drawn up the same day, the council of the RSDWP proposed to the Socialist Revolutionaries the holding of talks on a collaboration agreement, restricted to such technical questions as the coordination of mass action and individual acts of terrorism. The other revolutionary parties were to be encouraged to add their signatures to the agreement later. The council stressed that, despite an agreement of this sort with the Socialist Revolutionaries, the RSDWP would have to adapt its activities in line with the requirements imposed by the party's political alliance with its fellow social democratic parties. In conclusion, the council informed the Socialist Revolutionaries that the latter's break with the Paris bloc would significantly assist the revolutionary struggle being waged by both parties.

The council made it plain therefore that it continued to consider the social democratic parties of the minority nationalities as the RSDWP's political allies, while seeing the Socialist Revolutionaries as suitable partners only at a technical level. This was highly unlikely to go down well with the latter, who wanted the RSDWP to recognise them as the second major socialist party in Russia alongside the RSDWP itself. Plekhanov, even at his most charitable, was willing only to put the Socialist Revolutionaries into the category of petty bourgeois socialists.

The council, in the shape of Plekhanov, Axelrod, and L.G. Deutsch (Deich) forwarded its memorandum in person to Natanson the same day (11 March). Natanson was quick to express his disappointment at its content which ran largely

¹⁷⁶ *Byloe* No 1 (23) (1917), p. 223 (information provided by Azef).



Lev Deutsch.

counter to the joint discussions which had preceded it. Plekhanov promised to call a further meeting the following day. The council did not, however, meet on 12 March to discuss the draft agreement proposal; instead, Deutsch sent Natanson a letter in which he asked the Socialist Revolutionaries for a reply to the memorandum the council had sent the previous day. This came as yet a further disappointment to Natanson, as he had wanted to avoid having to put the RSDWP's memorandum before the Socialist Revolutionaries for official consideration, anticipating that his party would be highly unlikely to accept the terms contained in it.

With the discussions thus deadlocked, Natanson and Plekhanov wrote to each other (on 13 and 15 March) outlining their respective positions on the talks they had had and expressing the hope that the other side would be able to show a little more flexibility. Plekhanov, who found himself in a rather difficult predicament as a result of the situation, attempted to deny that any formal discussions on the issues in question had in fact even taken place. He least of all wanted to reveal that the other members of the council had run roughshod over him and forced him to accept their conditions. Both correspondents must have realised that the possibility of coming to an agreement at this stage had now dwindled alarmingly. This correspondence, in fact, effectively put the seal on the failure of the discussions between the parties to produce any workable agreement.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ RSDWP council memorandum, dated 11 March 1905, No 125 item 3, B.I. Nikolaevskii Collection, HI (USA tk 19, VA); M.A. Natanson to G.V. Plekhanov 13 March 1905

The divergent opinions held by the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries regarding the class nature of the Russian revolution had no meaningful part in the failure of the talks. Neither did the agrarian question emerge as a significant obstacle, as might have been expected. The decisive disagreements between the parties did not focus on policy programme questions, but were concentrated around a single issue, the role to be given to terrorist action. The Social Democrats were additionally hampered by their total unwillingness to recognise the Socialist Revolutionaries as a socialist party of equal standing with themselves.

One cannot be absolutely certain to what extent Natanson followed instructions provided by the Socialist Revolutionaries during these talks, or to what extent he acted independently. Various factors point to the latter being the more likely. According to Chernov's memoirs, Natanson had, during his exploratory talks during the summer of 1904, set his sights on bringing the Social Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries closer together in the areas of both programme and tactics, while the Socialist Revolutionary leaders, in contrast, had considered the hammering out of a much less ambitious practical collaborative agreement to be the main focus of interest.¹⁷⁸ *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* wrote, at the end of March, that a new conference was necessary to achieve the signing of a temporary agreement covering the joint organisation of an armed uprising.¹⁷⁹ Gapon's initiative was similarly aimed at developing only a limited degree of cooperation.¹⁸⁰

Although Natanson would appear then to have gone further than his party expected, it is, nevertheless, difficult to imagine that the Socialist Revolutionaries would have rejected the fruits of the talks between him and Plekhanov, if they had been ratified by the council of the RSDWP. That this would indeed have been the case is indicated not only by the obvious acceptability to the Socialist Revolutionaries of the initiative born out of the talks, but also by their greater willingness to promote inter-party collaboration compared to the Social Democrats.

As if by common agreement, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks allowed the discussions between Natanson and Plekhanov to be quietly forgotten. Neither side returned to them at any stage or made use of them in the conflicts which continued to divide them. As a result, virtually nothing has been known hitherto about this interesting stage in relations between the two parties.

(copy). G.V. Plekhanov to M.A. Natanson 15 March 1905 (copy). Natanson's name was systematically removed from both copies, apparently because he wished his role here to remain unknown. PSR No 758/11/b (a copy of the memorandum is also contained here), IISG. See also Martov 1914, pp. 551—552; Martov 1926, p. 95; Martynov-Piker 1925, p. 279; *Sotsial-demokraticeskoe dvizhenie* 1928, p. 375.

¹⁷⁸ Chernov 1953, pp. 208—209. It is not impossible that this difference of opinions remembered by Chernov relates in fact to the situation in 1905.

¹⁷⁹ "Nekotorye itogi Parizhskoi konferentsii", *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 61 15 March 1905 (o.s.), pp. 4—5.

¹⁸⁰ See Note 168.

The Social Democrats' Response to Gapon's Conference Proposal

Gapon sent out a formal invitation to a total of 18 revolutionary parties around 10 March, inviting them to send representatives to his proposed conference.¹⁸¹ In its reply sent on 14 March, the Menshevik council of the RSDWP rejected the invitation out of hand. Gapon's ambiguous status as a non-aligned figure and very much of a political novice was seen as effectively disqualifying him from the role of organising a inter-party conference or collaborative agreement. The council ensured that its reply was communicated to all 18 parties involved.¹⁸² The previous day (13 March) the council had received Natanson's letter making it plain that the attempts to narrow the rift existing between the Social Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries had come to nothing.¹⁸³ The foundering of these bilateral talks proved therefore the deciding factor in shaping the Menshevik response to Gapon's proposed conference.

The Bund was less inclined to dismiss the whole idea as the RSDWP had been. The émigré leaders of the Bund informed Gapon that the agreement signed between the various social democratic parties in January prevented the Bund from entering into any form of discussions on programme issues with other political groupings. Discussions, or even an agreement restricted to questions of joint action would be feasible, according to the Bund. As the final authority on the issue lay with the party's central committee in Russia, the Bund was forced to declare that it was in no position to agree to the date in the third week of March proposed for the conference by Gapon. The latter, in fact, agreed as a result to postpone the conference until the beginning of April.¹⁸⁴

Shortly before the conference, the Bund, the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party, and the Armenian Social Democratic Workers' Organisation sent Gapon a joint letter in which they made their attendance dependent on two conditions. According to these, all the organisations taking part in the conference were to commit themselves to a demand for a constituent assembly to be elected by universal and equal suffrage in secret and direct elections. This condition echoed the position which had been adopted by the social democratic parties at their conference in Riga in January. And secondly, the conference would have to restrict itself to discussing possible joint anti-government action, any decisions be-

¹⁸¹ Lenin, *PSS*, 10 (1960), pp. 180—181. *PSS*, 47 (1964), p. 20, 22; von Transehe-Rosenheck II 1908, p. 103. — The Socialist Revolutionaries also discussed the conference issues in advance with their most important ally, the PPS. See Stanisław Wojciechowski, *Moje wspomnienia*, I (Lwów, 1938), pp. 164—165.

¹⁸² *Leninskii sbornik* XVI (1931), p. 81; *Iskra* No 98 23 April 1905 (o.s.), p. 3; *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 65 25 April 1905 (o.s.), p. 4.

¹⁸³ M.A. Natanson to G.V. Plekhanov 13 March 1905, PSR No 758/11/b, IISG.

¹⁸⁴ "K biografii Gazona, (Iz Zhenevskago arkhiva Bunda)", *Minuvshie Gody* No 7 (1908), pp. 39—44; Rappoport 1909, p. 182; Lenin, *PSS*, 47 (1964), p. 22.

ing limited to purely technical questions.¹⁸⁵ As the Socialist Revolutionaries saw things, while not wanting to be seen as responsible for scuttling the conference outright, because of the prestige enjoyed by Gapon and the obvious enthusiasm of the Bolsheviks, these groups were effectively attempting, by imposing conditions, to achieve the same result. The conditions in question were, in any case, mutually incompatible.¹⁸⁶

The Bund did indeed take a suspicious attitude toward Gapon and his proposed conference.¹⁸⁷ Nevertheless, the Socialist Revolutionaries' interpretation of its motives was too simple. The Bund's interest in developing a role for itself as a third force alongside the warring Mensheviks and Bolsheviks and aligning the smaller social democratic parties of the minority nationalities alongside it, also has to be remembered.¹⁸⁸ The joint letter to Gapon produced by the three parties thus reflected a desire on their part to register their independence from the two factions of the RSDWP.

Remaining loyal to its own policies, the SDKPiL rejected the conference invitation it received from Gapon.¹⁸⁹

During the period leading up to Gapon's conference, the main focus of interest of Lenin and the Bolsheviks lay with their preparations for the third RSDWP party congress, which, despite being described as for the party as a whole, amounted in reality to their own group gathering. Weakened by further arrests, the party's central committee had now abandoned its previous conciliatory but quietly pro-Menshevik stance and instead entered into closer cooperation with the Bolsheviks. The émigré Menshevik-led party council proved unsuccessful as a result in its efforts to prevent the holding of Lenin's party congress.¹⁹⁰

Lenin's relations with Gapon were significantly better than those enjoyed by the Mensheviks. Gapon saw Lenin as sincere and candid, unlike Plekhanov, whom he likened to a wrestler whose greased body always seems to allow him to slip away before his opponent has managed to get a purchase on him.¹⁹¹ Lenin spent quite a lot of time with Gapon in order to pump him for information about the mood of the workers and peasants within Russia. He did not, however, consider Gapon a true revolutionary leader and made no attempt to hide this from Gapon.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁵ See the minutes (together with their draft version) of the Foreign Committee dated 7 April 1905, PSR No 18, IISG. On the Armenian Social Democratic Workers' Organisation, see Anaïde Ter Minassian, "Aux origines du marxisme arménien: les spécifistes", *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* XIX (1978), pp. 67—117.

¹⁸⁶ *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 65 25 April 1905 (o.s.), pp. 4—6; Rappoport 1909, p. 182.

¹⁸⁷ *Minuvshie Gody* No 7 (1908), pp. 39—41; Sablinsky 1976, p. 297.

¹⁸⁸ Najdus 1973, p. 193, 222; Strobel 1974, p. 219.

¹⁸⁹ Strobel 1974, p. 219; Dzerzhinskii 1 1967, pp. 111—112.

¹⁹⁰ *Keep* 1966, pp. 204—210.

¹⁹¹ *Minuvshie Gody* No 7 (1908), p. 40; N.P. Petrov, "Zapiski o Gapone", *Vsemirnyi Vestnik* No 2 (1907), IV, p. 17.

¹⁹² Lenin, *PSS*, 10 (1960), p. 180; N.K. Krupskaiia, *Vospominaniia o Lenine*, izd. 2-oe

For Lenin, the Gapon-sponsored conference marked an end to the long period of isolation which had afflicted the Bolsheviks, and the latter's recognition as a grouping on an equal footing with the other socialists. The conditions put by the Mensheviks on their attendance were seen by Lenin as an attempt to exclude the Bolsheviks from the conference.¹⁹³ In its reply to Gapon's invitation, the *Vpered* group stated that it did not see any necessity to restrict in advance the areas of discussion to be dealt with at the conference.¹⁹⁴ By adopting such an openly flexible approach, the Bolsheviks could not have made their enthusiasm for the conference more plain.

For tactical reasons and questions of prestige, Lenin considered the possibility of the Bolsheviks linking themselves to the alliance agreed on between the Bund, the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party, and the central committee of the RSDWP in Riga completely out of the question.¹⁹⁵ The differences between the responses given to Gapon by the two groups, the Bolsheviks and the one which had crystallised around the Bund, indicate that each decided on their position towards the conference completely independently of each other. Only in the immediate lead-up to the conference did the two groupings make any moves towards coordinating their positions.

On 30 March, Lenin received a letter from Fricis Roziņš of the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party enquiring about Lenin's feelings towards Gapon's forthcoming conference. On the opening day of the conference, 2 April, Lenin, together with A.A. Bogdanov (Malinovskii), met Roziņš and representatives from the Bund and the Armenian Social Democratic Workers' Organisation, at which meeting they agreed on a common course of action to be adopted during the conference.¹⁹⁶

The European Socialists

After meeting Gapon, through the good services of the émigré Socialist Revolutionaries living in Paris, Jaurès and Vaillant, who represented the moderate wing of the French socialist movement, gave their public support to his unification initiative.¹⁹⁷

(Moskva, 1972), pp. 96—102; A.V. Lunacharskii, *Vospominaniia o Lenine: Sbornik statei i vospominanii* (Moskva, 1933), pp. 11—12.

¹⁹³ Lenin, *PSS*, 10 (1960), p. 181. *PSS*, 47 (1964), p. 20, 22; *Leninskii sbornik XVI* (1931), p. 81; *Minuvshie Gody* No 7 (1908), pp. 40—41.

¹⁹⁴ See the minutes (together with their draft version) of the Foreign Committee dated 7 April 1905, *PSR* No 18, IISG.

¹⁹⁵ Lenin, *PSS*, 47 (1964), p. 20.

¹⁹⁶ *Vladimir Il'ich Lenin: Biograficheskaia khronika, 2, 1905—1912* (Moskva, 1971), pp. 44—45; Vladimir Medem, *The Life and Soul of a Legendary Jewish Socialist* (New York, 1979), p. 332.

¹⁹⁷ Rusanov 1929, p. 282 ff; Deich 1909, p. 144; Rutenberg 1909, pp. 40—41.

In Germany and Austria, *Vorwärts* and *Arbeiter-Zeitung* concentrated their attention in their articles and comments on the revolutionary movement within Russia on spontaneous popular disaffection and disturbances and acts of terror. The internal disputes afflicting the RSDWP were seen as an unwelcome development, about which little was said.¹⁹⁸ Against this background, Gapon's initiative inevitably reflected worst against the Russian Social Democrats. At the end of March, *Vorwärts* published Gapon's appeal for unity which he had sent to the International Socialist Bureau, together with the statement of support which had been issued in response by the organisation's Secretariat. In order to avoid there being any uncertainty about where *Vorwärts* stood on the issue, the paper also included alongside these two texts an extract from *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* underlining the fact that the blame for the lack of internal unity within the Russian socialist movement did not lie with the Socialist Revolutionaries.¹⁹⁹

Karl Kautsky, who felt an affinity with the Mensheviks, argued forcefully against Gapon's initiative. In his opinion, the Secretariat of the International had overstepped itself in deciding to act as what amounted to little more than Gapon's mouthpiece. As the latter had failed to show how unity within the Russian socialist movement was actually to be achieved in practice, his initiative, together with the Secretariat's backing for it, was worthless. Kautsky also criticised the assertion in *Vorwärts* that the Social Democrats were responsible for the split which had opened up in the Russian movement. When *Vorwärts* refused to print his comments, he turned to *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, which published them on 29 March. The Mensheviks naturally appreciated the support they received from Kautsky and reprinted his protest in *Iskra*.

Shortly later, Kautsky again took up the question of the split within the Russian socialist camp in an article in the journal *Die Neue Zeit*, in which he again made plain his sympathies with the Social Democrats.²⁰⁰

The Russian socialists succeeded in mobilising their European supporters to join in the fray. This effectively sounded the death-knell for any compromise solution to the schism.

The Geneva Conference (2—8/9 April 1905)

Many of the Russian socialist leaders despised Gapon because of his unsophisticated ways and lack of education, treating him little better than an overgrown

¹⁹⁸ Geyer 1958, pp. 428—429, 435—437.

¹⁹⁹ *Vorwärts* 26 March 1905. See also Note 173.

²⁰⁰ *Leipziger Volkszeitung* 29 March 1905; "Gapon i ob"edinenie russkikh sotsialistov", *Iskra* No 94 25 March 1905 (o.s.), p. 2; K. Kautsky, "Die Differenzen unter den russischen Sozialisten", *Die Neue Zeit* 23 1904—1905, 2. Bd., pp. 68—79; K. Kautsky to P.B. Axelrod 2 and 29 March 1905, Axelrod Archive, IISG; P.B. Axelrod to K. Kautsky 2 April 1905 (D II 317), Nachlass Kautsky, IISG; Dan 1985, p. 131; Geyer 1958, pp. 435—437.

child and trying their utmost to extract the maximum benefit from his celebrated status. When a more natural relationship failed to develop, Gapon resorted to cajoling. He was impulsive, but also intelligent and above all ambitious.²⁰¹ Through his proposed conference, Gapon hoped to make himself nothing less than the supreme leader of the Russian revolutionary movement. This he hoped to achieve through a special fighting committee set up to coordinate the revolutionary struggle. This committee was to be nominated by the conference and would consist of one social democratic representative, one Socialist Revolutionary, and Gapon himself.²⁰²

But in reality, however, Gapon's role was very much one of a figurehead. Neither Gapon nor Zilliacus can really be considered as being ultimately responsible for organising the conference. The latter, in fact, took no part in the preparations leading up to the conference and did not attend it once it had begun. Zilliacus satisfied himself with exercising influence over developments indirectly through the Socialist Revolutionaries.

Azef informed the Russian secret police on 8 March that Zilliacus had invited him to London.

“He (Zilliacus — AK) is busy organising a new conference to include the Social Democrats. The Social Democrats now want to join up with the Socialist Revolutionaries and consider terror, together with the drawing up of a plan for a popular uprising, as essential. . . . Zilliacus maintains links with the Japanese Legation (in London — AK) and has acquired large sums of money for the Finns and Poles (for the PPS — AK). . . . You will have to begin to keep a close eye on his activities. He often visits Hamburg, where he is negotiating various arms deals. 6,000 Mauser pistols have already been purchased and a ship will be bought within a month to transport these onwards.”²⁰³

On 19 March, Zilliacus informed an unidentified correspondent in Finland that “we will soon have a new conference embracing the revolutionary parties at the least and perhaps all the opposition, which will make the necessary decisions about the continuation of activities. I know which way these decisions will go and, as a result, I also know that the continued existence of the Tsarist régime is to be

²⁰¹ See the articles relating to Gapon contained in Note 159 (Deich et al.) and Sablinsky 1976.

²⁰² Rappoport 1909, p. 181; *Minuvshie Gody* No 7 (1908), pp. 40—41; M. Sizov, “Moi vstrechi s Georgiem Gaponom”, *Istoricheskii Vestnik* 127 (1912), p. 558; *Chetvertyi (Ob'edinitel'nyi) s'ezd RSDRP, Aprel' (aprel'-mai) 1906 goda: Protokoly* (Moskva, 1959), pp. 398—399; *Pervaya konferentsiia voennykh i boevykh organizatsii RSDRP, Noiabr' 1906 god, Protokoly s'ezdov i konferentsii Vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (b)* (Moskva, 1932), p. 157.

²⁰³ *Byloe* No 1 (23) (1917), pp. 221—222; Head of the Finnish Gendarmerie to the Governor-General 7 March 1905 (o.s.) (copy), Archive of the Chancellery of the Governor-General (ACGG), 1904, Special Section, II-5, VA.

measured at most in a matter of months, and preferably and hopefully in a matter of weeks.²⁰⁴

Regarding the conference's resolutions, Zilliacus knew enough to anticipate that they would be geared to the organisation of an uprising. As regards the possibility of the Socialist Revolutionaries settling their differences with the Social Democrats, on the other hand, he had no real influence. Rather than Zilliacus or any other outsider, it was the Socialist Revolutionary leadership which was ultimately responsible for organising the conference, while the conference's composition was settled in the talks held between them and the members of the council of the RSDWP.

According to the list of 18 organisations invited to the conference by Gapon, the social democrats enjoyed a comparable level of representation to that enjoyed by the Socialist Revolutionaries and their allies.²⁰⁵ On the day, however, on 2 April, a total of seven socialist revolutionary or allied parties attended, but only four social democratic organisations. These included:

- 1) The Socialist Revolutionary Party (represented by E.K. Breshko-Breshkovskaia and V.M. Chernov)
- 2) The Polish Socialist Party (Adam Buyno, Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz, and Henryk Walecki)
- 3) The Finnish Active Resistance Party (Victor Furuhjelm and Johannes Gummerus)
- 4) The Latvian Social Democratic Union (E. Rolavs and one other)
- 5) The Belorussian Socialist *Hramada* (one representative)
- 6) The Georgian Party of Socialists-Federalists-Revolutionaries (G. Dekanozi)
- 7) The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Mardiros Markarian and two pseudonymous representatives, Omon and Rusten; one of these was H. Loris-Melikian, also known as Loris-Melikov)
- 8) The RSDWP *Vpered* group and the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority (V.I. Lenin and A.A. Bogdanov)
- 9) The Bund (Vladimir Medem and Isaiah Izenshtat)
- 10) The Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party (F. Roziņš)
- 11) The Armenian Social Democratic Workers' Organisation (G. Ter-Ghazarian)

Gapon also attended, together with S.A. Rappoport, the latter acting as the conference's secretary at Gapon's request. As neither of them represented any specific group, they were only entitled the right to speak, but not to vote on resolutions.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁴ K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, ÅAB.

²⁰⁵ Lenin, *PSS*, 10 (1960), pp. 180—181.

²⁰⁶ The list of participants must be pieced together from many sources: *Byloe* No 1 (23) (1917), pp. 224—225; Zarnowska 1965, p. 205; Najdus 1973, p. 231; Johannes Gummerus, *Utdrag av minnen* (1909—1910), Parmanen Collection II, VA; Bernh. Estlander, *Elva årtionden ur Finlands historia*, III, 1898—1908 (Helsingfors, 1923), p. 304; *Bureau Socialiste International* I 1969, p. 392; Medem 1979, pp. 331—332; *Tretii s'ezd RSDRP, April'*

The four social democratic representatives made their entrance at the second session of the conference held on its opening day. Roziņš, representing the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party demanded that the Latvian Social Democratic Union's right to attend be withdrawn forthwith, as the latter organisation had no basis in reality and existed only on paper. Unless this demand was complied with, Roziņš declared, he would be forced to leave the conference. Lenin, Bogdanov, the two Bund representatives, and Ghazar Ter-Ghazarian added their backing to this ultimatum.

The insistence of the social democrats on the issue led to debate on it stretching on until the following day. According to Roziņš, the Latvian Social Democratic Union could not lay claim to any political base within Latvia and represented no more than a handful of socialist revolutionary émigrés, who described their organisation as social democratic only in order to pull the wool over workers' eyes.²⁰⁷

Roziņš had also tried to contest the Latvian Social Democratic Union's right of representation at the Amsterdam congress, but to no avail, as Ernests Rolavs' mandate to attend had been duly confirmed by the International Socialist Bureau. According to *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia*, Victor Adler had enquired from Roziņš whether, on the basis of his personal knowledge of the man, he considered Rolavs an honourable revolutionary. "You don't think I don't know him by now?" the latter was obliged to answer, "we were at school together, and we've both done time in prison together." "Well, you can sit in prison alongside him for the same offence, but not at the congress, is that it?", retorted Adler, and Roziņš had lost his case.²⁰⁸

Following the publication by the Secretariat of the International Socialist Bureau in 1906 in its circular of an announcement by the Latvian Social Democratic Union, Roziņš, together with his party colleague, Jēkabs Kovaļevskis, protested to the Secretariat. They claimed, amongst other things, that the social democratic organisations had concluded at the Geneva conference that the Latvian Union was a mere fiction. In its reply, the Union labelled this assertion a blatant lie as the majority at the conference had not sanctioned this interpretation.²⁰⁹

mai 1905 goda: Protokoly (Moskva, 1959), p. 381, 742, 747; Rappoport 1909, pp. 181—183; Chernov 1910, p. 163. The dates of the beginning and ending of the conference included in the title of this section are based on Gummerus' account referred to above and on information contained in documents in the archive of the Finnish Active Resistance Party (VA). Gerard Libaridian has kindly identified the Armenian referred to under the pseudonym of Safo as M. Markarian.

²⁰⁷ See Note 210.

²⁰⁸ *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 65 25 April 1905 (o.s.), p. 5. For an account of the incident by Roziņš and his party, see *Bureau Socialiste International* I 1969, p. 391. — It should be noted that Rolavs had at one time smuggled copies of *Iskra* across the border for Lenin. Geyer 1962, p. 321. On relations between the Latvian organisations, see von Transehe-Roseneck II 1908, pp. 103—110.

²⁰⁹ *Bureau Socialiste International* I 1969, p. 241, 265, 376—379, 391—392; F. Roziņš

As relations between the Latvian organisations were virtually as rancorous as those existing between the Polish PPS and the SDKPiL, Roziņš' ultimatum presented to the Geneva conference was meant in all seriousness and was in no way merely an excuse to torpedo the conference. On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that the presence of the Latvian Social Democratic Union represented a matter of secondary importance to the three other social democratic organisations. Central to the latter's concerns were the range of groups represented at the conference and the balance of power between them.

The social democrats had been aware in advance that they would find themselves in a weaker position compared to the Socialist Revolutionaries at the conference. Lenin and his associates suspected that the invitations sent out to the social democratic organisations had been deliberately arranged to guarantee the Socialist Revolutionaries a clear field of play. Speaking at the conference, Lenin made no bones about his irritation that the Finnish Social Democrats, the SDKPiL, the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, and the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party were all missing from the conference.²¹⁰ He was unaware that the SDKPiL had decided not to attend the conference.²¹¹

Lenin was informed by one of the Socialist Revolutionary representatives (probably E.K. Breshko-Breshkovskaia) that the activists had been responsible for conveying the conference invitation to the Finnish Social Democrats as they had been the only available channel open to the organisers, while the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians had never replied to the invitations they had been sent. This did not satisfy Lenin, however, as he knew from his own experience that contact with the Finnish Social Democrats could be arranged through the Swedish socialist, Hjalmar Branting.²¹²

The Russian Social Democrats (presumably Lenin) went on to ask whether the activists could be considered a socialist party. Breshko-Breshkovskaia replied that they were not, but that nevertheless their programme contained nothing which would have prevented socialists from joining them.²¹³ Lenin's attempts to get an unambiguous answer on this point were part of his efforts to search out the weak links in the conference preparations and among the allies of the Socialist Revolutionaries, to provide a suitable pretext, should one be needed, to justify

(Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party) to the International Socialist Bureau 17 August 1906 and J. Kovaļevskis to the ISB 2 August 1906, f/115/9. Foreign Committee of the Latvian Social Democratic Union to the ISB 7 November 1906, I 143, ACH. The section at dispute in Roziņš' German-language letter was translated incorrectly in the ISB's Secretariat's French-language circular (p. 392).

²¹⁰ *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 65 25 April 1905 (o.s.), p. 5; Lenin, *PSS*, 10 (1960), pp. 181—183; *Vladimir Il'ich Lenin: Biograficheskaia khronika* 2 1971, p. 45; Rappoport 1909, pp. 182—183; Medem 1979, pp. 332—333. See also the minutes (together with their draft version) of the Foreign Committee dated 7 April 1905, PSR No 18, IISG.

²¹¹ Strobel 1974, p. 219.

²¹² Lenin, *PSS*, 10 (1960), p. 181; Medem 1979, p. 333.

²¹³ Estlander III 1923, pp. 304—305.



Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaia.

a walkout by the social democrats from the conference.

The activists had not, in fact, conveyed Gapon's invitation to the Finnish Social Democratic leadership as, committed to operating legally, they would, in all likelihood, have refused to have anything to do with it. The activists were a completely non-proletarian party, although they did work in close cooperation with what was known as the workers' activist wing within the official Social Democratic Party. This group too was not informed of Gapon's invitation. Victor Furuhjelm and Johannes Gummerus were careful not to refer to the true state of affairs on this issue at any point during the conference.²¹⁴

The defence of the activists' case was effectively handled by Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaia, the oldest representative attending the conference (born in 1844) and commonly known by all as Babushka, as the party's own representatives, Furuhjelm and Gummerus, did not speak Russian.²¹⁵ In fact, the latter found themselves confined very much to the role of supporting players during the conference as a whole, although more on account of their political inexperience than their inadequate linguistic skills. Neither Konni Zilliacus nor Adolf Törngren spoke Russian well, although this does not seem to have created any undue difficulties for Zilliacus, as his work in organising the Paris conference shows, while Törngren moved with ease among Russian liberal circles. Törngren used French and German, as did Zilliacus, who also spoke English.

The majority at the conference refused to bow to the social democrats' ultimatum, acceding only in so far as to allow the latter's dissenting opinion about the Latvian Social Democratic Union's right to attend the conference be recorded

²¹⁴ See the annual report of the party council for 1904—1905, 19 November 1905, Finnish Active Resistance Party Archive, VA.

²¹⁵ Estlander III 1923, pp. 304—305.

in the minutes, with the result that the social democratic contingent duly walked out.

The dominant position of the Socialist Revolutionaries at the conference proved too much to swallow for the four social democratic organisations. The Socialist Revolutionaries were undoubtedly correct when they suspected that the social democrats had decided in advance to break up the conference.²¹⁶ The latter certainly must have been able to foresee that their ultimatum would not be met. If, against all the odds, it had been accepted, Lenin and his associates would undoubtedly have followed it up with new conditions, as the elimination of the Latvian Union would not, in any case, have altered the overall balance of power existing between those attending.

The impossibility of achieving a truly broadly-based conference had already been evident in the pre-conference discussions between the Socialist Revolutionaries and the council of the RSDWP. The decision by the most important wing of the Russian social democratic movement, in the shape of the Mensheviks, not to attend, set the seal on the balance of power at the conference, giving the Socialist Revolutionaries the upper hand. The latter's dominant role served, in turn, to prevent the Bolsheviks and the Bund, together with its associates, from taking part in the conference, despite the fact that Lenin was originally sincerely interested in Gapon's initiative.

Although the Socialist Revolutionaries were successful in outmanoeuvring the social democrats and dealing them the worst hand, responsibility for the failure of the attempt to arrange a broadly-based conference lay equally with both groups. The chances of the Mensheviks agreeing to some form of compromise solution would certainly have been greater, had the Socialist Revolutionaries been less enthusiastic in their attempts to use the Gapon gambit. The temptation to use Gapon's revolutionary reputation to boost the party's prestige proved, however, too great. It might well have been the case, nevertheless, regardless of Gapon, that the mutual suspicion and competition already existing between the two main wings of the Russian revolutionary movement would have anyway proved too deep-seated to have allowed them to come to some form of compromise agreement on the question of improved collaboration.

The Paris and Geneva conferences revealed beyond any shadow of doubt that, despite their protests to the contrary, Lenin and the Bolsheviks had assumed the role of a breakaway faction within the RSDWP set to challenge the main line represented by the Mensheviks.

²¹⁶ *Revolutsionnaia Rossiia* No 65 25 April 1905 (o.s), pp. 5—6; Lenin, *PSS*, 10 (1960), pp. 181—183; Medem 1979, pp. 332—334. See also the minutes (together with their draft version) of the Foreign Committee dated 7 April 1905, PSR No 18, IISG.

The Results of the Geneva Conference

The conference went smoothly following the departure of the representatives of the four dissenting social democratic groups. The remaining seven parties approved a general political declaration which contained a call for the overthrow of the autocracy through an armed uprising and the summoning of a constituent assembly to be entrusted with providing Russia with a republican and democratic form of government based on universal and equal suffrage and direct secret elections. The latter principles were also to be followed in the election of the constituent assembly itself. In addition, a number of other human and political rights and freedoms were also to be introduced.

Finland and Poland were to be excluded from the constituent assembly planned for Russia and instead to be provided with their own parallel assemblies. Finland would, according to the declaration, remain an autonomous constitutional state. "All the parties attending the conference ally themselves", it was announced, "with the efforts of the Finnish people, and proletariat in particular, to use the instruments at its disposal to ensure the calling of a constituent assembly", one, which it was planned, would be elected along exactly the same democratic principles as the parallel Russian assembly. The method of election to be used in the case of the Polish *Sejm*, on the other hand, was not specified in the declaration.

The Russian assembly was, according to the declaration, to be entrusted with arranging the details of the political relations to exist between central government and the sovereign Polish and Finnish assemblies through a free agreement arrived at with the latter bodies. The declaration also promised autonomous status within Russia to the Caucasus.

Six of the parties present, but not including the non-socialist Finnish Active Resistance Party, additionally signed a further joint declaration issued in the name of the socialist organisations. This itemised a number of economic and social demands over and above purely political ones. The most important of these were calls for an eight-hour working day and the socialisation of land presently worked on the basis of the exploitation of outside labour, in other words the adoption of a collective form of land management administered by the peasants and suited to satisfying local conditions and needs.²¹⁷

The demands made in the two declarations were largely equivalent to those

²¹⁷ "Obshchaia politicheskaiia deklaratsiia konferentsii" and "Deklaratsiia sotsialisticheskikh organizatsii", *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 65 25 April 1905 (o.s.), pp. 1—3. For an account of the conference ("Novaia mezhdupartiinaia konferentsiia"), see pp. 3—7. — According to Akashi, the declaration (presumably the general political declaration — AK) had been drawn up by Breshko-Breshkovskaia, Gapon and Furuhjelm. The contribution of the latter two, however, could not have been very considerable since Gapon had little comprehension of political theory and Furuhjelm did not understand Russian. See telegram 22 in the present volume.

contained in the Socialist Revolutionaries' minimum programme which related to the democratic phase of the revolution.²¹⁸ The reference in the general political declaration to the terrorist struggle only further underlines the dominant role played by the Socialist Revolutionaries in shaping much of what emerged from the Geneva conference.

In contrast, Gapon's influence at the conference was relatively small. His proposal for the setting up of a joint fighting committee to coordinate the revolutionary struggle and for his inclusion as one of its members gained no support.²¹⁹ The amount of discussion devoted during the course of the conference to the question of the rights of the minority nationalities and the separate assemblies proposed for them proved particularly annoying to Gapon. By concentrating so extensively on the rights of the borderlands, there was the danger that those of Russia itself would be overlooked, he thought. "Everyone only seems concerned with their own interests and no one thinks of Russia! We must think of her as well!", Gapon insisted.²²⁰

At its congress held in March 1905, the Polish Socialist Party had approved, as one of its short-term aims, the establishment of a Polish constituent assembly to be elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage and through secret and direct elections. This assembly was to be endowed with sovereign political authority in Russian Poland. The PPS now aimed at achieving national self-determination within the framework of the existing political borders and set the restoration of an independent Poland as a longer-term target. This shift in the party's policy had been unsuccessfully opposed by the separatist-minded right wing of the party.²²¹

The section of the general political declaration issued at the Geneva conference relating to Poland was undoubtedly put together by the PPS delegation.²²² The conference did not, however, go completely the way that the party had hoped for. The PPS and the Belorussian Socialist *Hramada* were unable to persuade the other parties, the Socialist Revolutionaries in particular, it would seem, to agree to committing themselves to demanding the summoning of a separate constituent assembly for Greater Lithuania (what is now Lithuania and Belorussia). Having failed in their attempt, the *Hramada* and the PPS issued a joint statement of their own calling for the area in question to be given its own separate political identity, albeit with the proviso that any final decision on the issue was to be made by common agreement between all the socialist parties active in the

²¹⁸ The party lacked an officially-approved programme, but a semi-official draft programme did exist: "Proekt programmy Partii Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov, vyrobotannyi redaktsiei 'Revoliutsionnoi Rossii'", *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 46 5 May 1904 (o.s.), pp. 1—3.

²¹⁹ Chernov 1910, pp. 163—164.

²²⁰ Rappoport 1909, pp. 183—184.

²²¹ Zarnowska 1965, pp. 180—181.

²²² Najdus 1973, p. 232.

region. The latter proviso would appear to have been included as a result of the arguments put forward by the proponents' opponents that no final decision could be taken when not all of the organisations concerned, such as the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party and the Bund, were present to put their views on the issue.²²³

To cover similar questions of this type, the hope was voiced in the general political declaration that it would be possible at some point to agree with the socialist parties representing the other nationalities and national areas on the necessary constitutional guarantees that would be required to provide for their future development.

The Georgian Party of Socialists-Federalists-Revolutionaries called for autonomy and a federal relationship to be established between Georgia and the rest of Russia, while the Armenian *Dashnaktsutiun*, for its part, contented itself with similar arrangements for Armenia or Transcaucasia. This indicates that the autonomous federal status suggested for the Caucasus (Transcaucasia and the Northern Caucasus) by the conference presumably satisfied both groups.²²⁴

The outline formulation regarding Poland and Finland contained in the general political declaration did not, by virtue of its very lack of precision, exclude even the possibility of complete secession. In the case of Finland, however, it was stated that the country would remain an autonomous constitutional state, presumably because this was sufficient to satisfy the Finnish activists. Following the decision by the PPS in the spring of 1905 to content itself in the short term with a demand for a constituent assembly for Russian Poland and postpone the realisation of full Polish independence until some undetermined point in the future, the section of the declaration referring to Poland can be interpreted as an attempt at giving the country a measure of national self-determination within the framework of a voluntary federal relation with Russia.

²²³ Żarnowska 1965, p. 205; Najdus 1973, p. 232. Although the Hramada's programme demanded the status of federative autonomy for Belorussia, the party was also interested in the creation of a wider Lithuanian-Belorussian federation. The Hramada did not aim at Belorussia's complete secession from Russia. Nicholas P. Vakar, *Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, A Case Study*, Russian Research Center Studies 21 (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), pp. 84—86; Peter Scheibert, "Der weissrussische politische Gedanke bis 1919", *Jomsburg* (1938), p. 341; Eugen von Engelhardt, *Weissruthenien: Volk und Land* (Berlin, 1943), pp. 88—90.

²²⁴ *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 65 25 April 1905 (o.s.), p. 2. On the Georgian and Armenian organisations in question generally, see *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* No 46 5 May 1904 (o.s.), pp. 8—11, 24. No 63 5 April 1905 (o.s.), pp. 2—5; Richard G. Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918* (Berkeley, 1967), pp. 16—22; Anaide Ter Minassian, *Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement (1887—1912)*, Zoryan Institute Thematic Series 1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1984); Gerard J. Libaridian, "Revolution and Liberation in the 1892 and 1907 Programs of the Dashnaktsutiun", in: *Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change, Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia*, ed. by Ronald Grigor Suny, East European Series 2 (Ann Arbor, 1983), pp. 185—196.

The general declaration did not envisage leaving the task of defining the future status of Poland and Finland to the latter alone, but saw the Russian constituent assembly also playing a part in these decisions. This was somewhat at odds with Chernov's policy programme covering the nationality question, which proposed leaving the authority over the final decision on these issues solely in the hands of the minority nationalities in question.

The Socialist Revolutionaries therefore attached more importance to the unity of the Empire than Gapon had feared, even given the fact that their chosen approach to guaranteeing that unity provided for a significant measure of room for manoeuvre on the part of the borderlands. No other Russian party, in fact, went as far in trying to come to terms with the interests of the minority nationalities.

At the time of its founding in the autumn of 1904, the policies of the Finnish Active Resistance Party differed from those of the constitutionalists in the area of tactics for the most part. Unlike the constitutionalists, the activists were ready to resort to an active armed struggle against the Tsarist authorities and to link forces with the Russian revolutionary movement and to make use of terrorism. Both parties defended Finland's special political status with regard to the imperial government. In terms of its attitude to the Tsarist régime, the activist party therefore allied itself to the revolutionary cause, but in terms of its attitude on the question of the return of legitimacy, it was actually more constitutionalist than the constitutionalists. It took a few months before this implicit paradox in the party's position was resolved. The party lacked any policy programme covering social issues. In terms of their private opinions, a number of the activists were either openly socialist in their leanings, or shared sympathies with socialist thinking.²²⁵

The activist party's acceptance of the section on Finland included in the Geneva declaration meant, in effect, a shift in its position away from its constitutionalist roots to a revolutionary stance in regard to Finland's fundamental laws. No role, after all, had been proposed in the declaration for the existing undemocratic estate-based Diet, the handling of the country's affairs being transferred to a new constituent assembly to be elected by universal and equal suffrage. The inclusion of this section in the declaration had been dictated by the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, who brushed aside the doubts voiced by the activist representatives, Furuhjelm and Gummerus.²²⁶ The Socialist Revolutionaries were keen to avoid a repetition of the type of charges levelled against them

²²⁵ See the broadsheets produced by the Finnish Active Resistance Party between the end of 1904 and the proclamation No 5 issued 14 April 1905, contained in the party's archive. Also, O. Procopé's circular dated 30 October 1904, Törngren Collection, VA; Söderhjelm 1919, p. 43 ff.

²²⁶ J. Gummerus, *Utdrag av minnen (1909—1910)*, Parmanen Collection II, VA. The party congress held by the activists on 14 May 1905 approved the actions of the party's representatives and the call for a constituent assembly as *faits accomplis*. See the congress minutes and party proclamation No 6, contained in the party's archive, VA.

at the time of the Paris conference by the social democrats that they had compromised democratic objectives in favour of the class interests of the bourgeois parties. Lenin's questions put at the beginning of the Geneva conference about the nature and status of the Finnish activists had alerted the Socialist Revolutionaries to the possibility of a social democratic attack being directed in that quarter, and they therefore made every effort to buttress the section on Finland against possible criticism.

The idea of replacing the Finnish four-estate Diet with a revolutionary constituent assembly was also new to Zilliacus, as he had not proposed anything along these lines prior to the Geneva conference.²²⁷ This only serves to further indicate that his part in the planning of the conference was limited to dealing with the question of an armed uprising. It would be wrong to underestimate Zilliacus' role behind the scenes, but, as has become clear, the main role in the lead-up to, and in directing, the conference itself belonged with the Socialist Revolutionaries. The view put forward by some scholars that the Geneva conference represented some form of grand conspiracy masterminded from the wings by Zilliacus (and Akashi) is clearly mistaken.²²⁸

The seven parties attending the conference also decided to set up a coordinating office outside Russia to help maintain their mutual links and to collect funds for the revolutionary struggle. Delays meant that the office was only set up during the autumn of 1905 and did not have time as a result to develop into a significant factor in the opposition movement, as the revolutionary parties moved their headquarters soon after this to Russia.²²⁹

The decision by *Vorwärts* to print an announcement regarding the Geneva conference provoked *Iskra* to vent its anger in an article attacking the four social democratic organisations which had decided to send representatives to the conference. According to *Iskra*, the Bund, the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party, and the Armenian Social Democratic Workers' Organisation had, by deciding to attend, acted against the resolutions adopted at the Riga conference. There was every reason to doubt, *Iskra* argued, whether the latter of these was any more active within Armenia than the Latvian Social Democratic Union within Latvia, the Union's right to attend the conference having been the subject of fierce debate by the four organisations in question. According to *Iskra*, none of the organisations should have accepted Gapon's invitation to attend in the first place, as the invitation had made it plain that the Latvian Union would also be attending. The split which had developed within the Menshevik-led social democratic bloc clearly annoyed *Iskra* more than the success of the Socialist Revolutionaries.²³⁰

²²⁷ K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, ÅAB.

²²⁸ Futrell 1963, p. 66; Fischer 1967, pp. 104–105.

²²⁹ The secretary of the coordinating office to the executive of the German Social Democratic Party (draft), PSR No 63, IISG; Żarnowska 1965, p. 205.

²³⁰ "Sotsial'demokratiia i burzhuzno-revolutsionnyia partii", *Iskra* No 98 23 April



V.I. Lenin.

Lenin presented his report on the Geneva conference to the third (Bolshevik) party congress of the RSDWP on 6 May. He attacked the resolutions adopted at the conference as being based virtually exclusively on the programme of the Socialist Revolutionaries, seasoned with a number of concessions to the various nationalist non-proletarian parties present. Although the RSDWP party programme recognised the principle of national self-determination, it was impossible, he contended, for the Bolsheviks either to support or oppose the demand for a separate assembly for Poland which had been made at the conference, as no decision could be taken on this question without first hearing the views of the Polish workers' party, the SDKPiL. (Lenin may have been aware that the SDKPiL opposed this demand as separatist.) In Lenin's view, inter-party conferences covering practical issues should in the future be held in Russia, where it was easier to guarantee the presence of all the organisations and bodies concerned and to exclude those which only existed on paper.

The party congress approved a resolution stating that short-term agreements

1905 (o.s.), pp. 3—4. Also see the conference announcements in *Vorwärts* 29 April 1905 and *Arbeiter-Zeitung* 5 May 1905. On the disputes between Plekhanov and the Armenian Social Democratic Workers' Organisation, see *Bureau Socialiste International* I 1969, pp. 160—165, 174, 329; Ter Minassian 1978, pp. 86—87.

between the social democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries covering cooperation in the anti-government struggle were desirable in principle, but only as long as they did not restrict the formers' independence of action. Agreements at the local level were also considered acceptable, if put before the party's central committee for approval.²³¹

The Plan for the Uprising and Its Fate

During the early part of March 1905, the Japanese army had scored an important victory over Russian forces at the battle of Mukden in Manchuria. Despite this success, the Japanese General Staff concluded that Japan's already stretched economic and military resources would not allow pushing the front any further into enemy-occupied territory and thereby further protracting the struggle. Moves were put in hand, as a result, to sound out the possibilities of arranging an armistice and signing a peace agreement.²³²

If Russia could not be forced to the negotiating table by force of arms, it would be possible, according to Japanese thinking, to break Russian morale and determination to continue the struggle by paralysing the country from within through subversion. Abandoning their former caution on the subversion question following Mukden, the Japanese government and General Staff moved quickly to make up for lost time. According to Inaba Chiharu, Akashi received new instructions from Tokyo, in line with this shift in policy, prior even to the Geneva conference held at the beginning of April. A million yen was now allocated to backing an armed uprising and revolution in Russia.²³³

Zilliacus offered some of this to the Socialist Revolutionary central committee, allegedly as funds collected in America to promote the Russian revolutionary cause. The donators, Zilliacus told the committee, had stipulated that the money in question was to be used to arm the masses and not to be used for individual terrorist acts, and was to be divided between all the revolutionary parties, irrespective of their ideological differences. The central committee decided to accept the money on these terms.

The Socialist Revolutionary leaders B.V. Savinkov and Chernov appear, on the basis of their memoirs, to have been quite willing to accept Zilliacus' explanations at face value, even following the publication of the secret correspondence between Zilliacus and Akashi, after its seizure by the police, in St Petersburg in 1906. That something at least of the true origin of the money must have been known to the party is indicated by the fact that Nikolai Chaikovskii, a member of the party's Foreign Committee, was in direct contact with Akashi. Zilliacus'

²³¹ *Tretii s'ezd RSDRP: Protokoly* 1959, pp. 378—389, 456.

²³² White 1964, pp. 201—203; Futrell 1967, p. 18.

²³³ Futrell 1967, pp. 18—19. Information provided by Inaba.



Boris Savinkov.

connections with the Japanese were known to the Russian social democrats and the liberals. If the Socialist Revolutionaries really knew nothing of the origins of the money, they nevertheless certainly had good reason to suspect Zilliacus' explanation. It seems they simply wanted to avoid facing up to the truth.²³⁴

Following the break-up of the conference and the failure of the attempts that had been made to develop some kind of working relationship between the two wings of the Russian revolutionary movement, Zilliacus and Akashi had to resign themselves to the fact that only the Socialist Revolutionaries and their allies would be involved in the plans for a rebellion. This must have been a source of major disappointment to both of them, but particularly for the Japanese, who had considered it important to gain as wide a base as possible for the planned campaign of subversion.

The uprising was planned to start in St Petersburg following the arrival of the arms shipment from the West. The aim was to stage a final settling of accounts with the autocracy. Even if the uprising in the capital was to fail, it would be sufficient, it was assumed, to trigger popular rebellions in Poland, the Caucasus and elsewhere, which would serve to provide the impetus for a revolution embracing the Empire as a whole.²³⁵

²³⁴ Savinkov 1926, p. 123; Chernov 1953, pp. 234—235; Antti Kujala, "The Russian Revolutionary Movement and the Finnish Opposition, 1905: The John Grafton Affair and the Plans for an Uprising in St Petersburg", *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 5 (1980), p. 261. On Chaikovskii's relation with the party, see Manfred Hildermeier, *Die Sozialrevolutionäre Partei Russlands: Agrarsozialismus und Modernisierung im Zarenreich (1900—1914)*, Beiträge zur Geschichte Osteuropas 11 (Köln, 1978), pp. 55—56 and PSR No 18, HSG.

²³⁵ Kujala 1980, p. 262.

Zilliacus, Chaikovskii, Akashi, and the Georgian leader, G. Dekanozi, began to acquire arms and the vessels needed to transport them to Russia in the period immediately after the Geneva conference. The weapons purchased were intended for the Socialist Revolutionaries, the Finnish activists, the PPS and the Georgian revolutionaries. Gapon was recruited to serve as a figurehead to incite the workers in St Petersburg.²³⁶

The freighter *John Grafton* sailed for St Petersburg at the beginning of August, loaded with 15,560 rifles and 2,500 revolvers, together with ammunition and explosives. About a third of the cargo was destined for the Finnish activists. Zilliacus approved the inclusion of the underground organisation of the Finnish constitutionalists, the *Kagal*, and the Bolsheviks in the operation. He and Chaikovskii aimed for the uprising to get under way immediately on the arrival of the arms in St Petersburg. Akashi's desire for events to be put in hand as quickly as possible to take some of the pressure off Japan, which was by this stage sorely in need of a respite from the conflict, undoubtedly contributed to this decision.

The Socialist Revolutionary party leadership, on the other hand, argued for stockpiling the weapons until Russia was truly ripe for revolution. Zilliacus and Chaikovskii shut their ears, however, to Gots' warnings, putting their faith instead in Gapon's completely unsubstantiated assurances that his men were ready to move in St Petersburg and that the workers were just waiting for the sign to mount the barricades.

In an effort to swing developments more their way, the Socialist Revolutionaries turned to Henry Biaudet, a Finnish activist resident on the Continent, for assistance. Biaudet enjoyed a comparable amount of respect within the activist party to that enjoyed by Zilliacus. Biaudet duly informed his party's leadership in Finland that their Russian comrades wanted the uprising postponed to a more favourable juncture and that the weapons should be temporarily stockpiled.

At the beginning of August, the Helsinki-based activist leadership decided to bypass Zilliacus' promises made to the constitutionalist Adolf Törngren and the Bolsheviks regarding the arms shipment and changed the *John Grafton's* port of arrival from St Petersburg to the western Finnish coast in the Gulf of Bothnia. In so doing, they effectively accepted the argument for the need to delay the planned rebellion advanced by the Socialist Revolutionaries and backed by Biaudet, and at the same time openly challenged Zilliacus, the party's founder and undisputed authority up until then. An additional reason for this change of policy was the lack of preparation witnessed in St Petersburg.

Azef also played a part in the uprising plan. During the early summer, he travelled to Russia on behalf of the Socialist Revolutionaries to sound out the country's true level of revolutionary preparedness and thereby provide the where-withal to allow the party to finalise its position on the uprising question. Azef

²³⁶ Kujala 1980, p. 262, 269; N.V. Chaikovskii to O.S. Minor 3 June 1905, PSR No 262, IISG; Wojciechowski 1938, pp. 163—164, 167—168.

took a substantial quantity of money along with him provided by Chaikovskii and Zilliacus from the Japanese. Azef intended to use the money to ferment disturbances in southern Russia. It would seem more than likely, however, that this money played no part in the unrest which developed in the area over the summer or in the mutiny on the *Potemkin*. Azef probably salted it away for his own personal purposes. During his stay in Russia he did virtually nothing to promote the plans for an uprising in St Petersburg. Zilliacus was not completely mistaken when he later made Azef the scapegoat for the failure of the uprising plan, although he did exaggerate the latter's responsibility for the unpreparedness witnessed in St Petersburg, while at the same time passing over the degree which he had allowed himself to be taken in by Gapon's fabrications. As a result of this the true situation in the capital only fully came home to those in charge of planning the uprising after the *John Grafton* had already set sail.

Zilliacus' assertion that Azef effectively betrayed the arms shipment would not appear to hold water, on the basis of Azef's subsequently published secret reports, together with official Russian documents on the case. Azef kept his superiors informed of Zilliacus' arms purchases and plans for an uprising right up until the Geneva conference. After gaining access to Japanese funds in the wake of the conference, Azef probably stopped drawing his employer's attention to the subversive activities of Zilliacus and the Japanese, for understandable reasons.

Japan and Russia signed a peace agreement on 5 September 1905. Akashi had already halted his assistance to Zilliacus during the early part of August, if not before, most probably as a result of the dispute which blew up over the *John Grafton* and which had seen control of the project slip out of Japanese hands and into those of the Socialist Revolutionaries. Rather than the type of carefully planned revolution visualised by the latter, the Japanese had wanted an uprising organised as soon as possible, regardless of its outcome. The progress being made in the peace negotiations at the time may also have influenced Akashi's decision.

Zilliacus' planned uprising finally ended in complete failure, when the *John Grafton* ran aground on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, off Jakobstad/Pietarsaari, at the beginning of September 1905. Most of the weapons, possession of which had been the subject of so much manoeuvring by the activists, the Socialist Revolutionaries, the Bolsheviks, Törngren, and Gapon, were lost: those that were salvaged found their way to government arsenals.²³⁷

²³⁷ Kujala 1980, pp. 257—275 and the sources indicated there. The following sources which I have only had access to since my article mentioned above was written have forced me to correct the partially erroneous picture I gave in 1980 of the Socialist Revolutionaries' plan for the uprising, the moves taken by the Finnish activists with regard to them and the role of Azef: M.R. Gots to N.V. Chaikovskii 12 August 1905, No 115 item 14, B.I. Nikolaevskii Collection, HI (USA tk 19, VA); H. Biauudet to Sliotoff (a representative of the Socialist Revolutionary leadership) 31 October 1905, the portfolio of copies of Henry Biauudet's letters, ff. 31—33, in his collection, VA; Rapport du Comité Central sur l'affaire Azev (8 January 1909), PSR No 677a, IISG; Rakka ryūsui — For the government's knowledge of Zilliacus' plan for an uprising, see Fond 102 (Département poliitsii), 1905, Osob.

The Idea of Broad-Based Inter-Party Collaboration and Its Collapse, 1904—1905

The failure of the 1904 Paris conference to attract as wide a range of participants as had originally been hoped for by its organisers can be largely attributed to the revelation of Zilliacus' links with the Japanese, which prevented the social democratic parties from sending their representatives to Paris. The inability of the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks to come to any form of agreement about the role of terrorism emerged, in turn, as the major stumbling block which restricted the range of participants at the 1905 Geneva conference. The disagreements existing between the main wings of the Russian revolutionary movement effectively frustrated all the attempts made during the spring of 1905 to establish a common front.

Of the two main parties, the RSDWP and the Socialist Revolutionaries, the former, firmly committed to its own ideological orthodoxy and centralist approach, was clearly the less flexible in its attitude towards cross-party collaboration. Differences of opinion nevertheless existed with the party, with Plekhanov's attitude to joint action generally being more positive than that of the hard-core Mensheviks, such as Dan and Martov. The conciliatory approach adopted by Lenin in the spring of 1905 towards the other parties owed much to the Bolsheviks' desire to break out of their isolated position.

The various competing socialist parties representing many of the borderlands within the Empire often, however, enjoyed significantly worse mutual relations than those existing between the Russian Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries. Internecine competition came to dominate local opposition politics in a number of regions, particularly in the case of the Polish and Latvian socialist movements. The weak overall position of the minority nationalities tended to prompt their most important revolutionary parties to promote collaboration between revolutionary forces across the Empire more actively than the Russian parties. The activity of the minorities in this field was especially prominent in the early stages of the development of the idea of joint action during the spring and summer of 1904. As a result of the smaller degree of influence wielded by the minority nationalities, none of these parties was in a position to be able to torpedo the common front idea alone, unlike the larger Russian parties such as the RSDWP.

The Polish Social Democrats (SDKPiL) reacted to the question of collabora-

otd., op. 5, d. 450 t. 2 lit. A, Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii, Moscow; Ministerstvo inostrannykh del, II departament, sekr. dela I-4, 1905, op. 456, d. 8, Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossii, Moscow; ACGG, 1904, Special Section, II-5, VA; Archive of the Finnish Gendarmerie, S 3 No 16, f. 27, 36, 40, VA; *Iznanka revoliutsii* 1906; *Byloe* No 1 (23) (1917), pp. 220—225; 1905: *Boevaia gruppy pri TsK RSDRP (b) (1905—1907 g.g.)*, *Stat'i i vospominaniia*, sost. S.M. Pozner (Moskva, 1927), pp. 223—224.

tion between the social democrats and the other revolutionary parties and opposition movements the least favourably of any party within the whole of the Empire. In the lead-up to both the Paris and Geneva conferences, the SDKPiL consistently followed policies at odds with those espoused by the RSDWP and the other social democratic parties. Despite this, the Russian Social Democrats, both the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, favoured the Rosa Luxemburg-led party because of its renunciation of the nationalism advocated by its competitor, the PPS. The SDKPiL's unambiguous internationalist stance made the party an important ally for the Russian Social Democrats.

The Polish Socialist Party's attachment to Polish nationalism, together with its anti-Russian sentiments, forced the party into a position within the opposition movement which fell far short of its potential significance as the main socialist party of the Empire's second most important national group. The PPS' traditional separatism was based in large measure on the weakness of the Russian revolutionary movement. The strengthening of the Russian opposition during 1904 forced at least part of the party to reassess its attitude to separatism and to the idea of collaboration, and led to a number of disputes within the party over its future policy position.

Of the other parties, the Jewish Bund in particular attempted to promote unity among the social democrats, while among the Finnish opposition, Zilliacus, together with his supporters, similarly aimed at the creation of a joint front embracing all revolutionary forces, albeit one biased in favour of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries. The other minority nationality parties inevitably tended to play second fiddle to the major parties.

The obstacles in the way of cooperation between the revolutionary parties proved, in the final analysis, insurmountable. This alone, however, can hardly explain the failure of the 1905 revolution. The revolutionary parties were much weaker comparatively at the beginning of 1917, when even the small measure of collaboration existing in 1905 was lacking. The 1905 revolution remained no more than a "dress rehearsal" for things to come because of the fact that, despite its weakened position, the autocratic régime was able, drawing on what reserves it had left at its disposal, to avoid the type of complete and absolute collapse which it was to encounter only 12 years later.

Appendix: The Idea of Inter-Party Collaboration in the Light of Historical Research

In the eyes of Soviet party historians, everything diverging from the narrow road trod by Lenin and orthodox Bolshevism tends to be considered as an unnatural phenomenon which they would prefer to pretend does not exist. This is the conclusion one is forced to draw from the way in which the Bolsheviks' competitor parties and the various "lost sheep" not in tune with the party's so-called main

line have usually been treated in Soviet scholarship. They are typically given very little attention in relation to their political significance, and the space that is devoted to them takes the form, for the major part, of unforgiving criticism of their various “errors”. (What changes *perestroika* may bring in this regard remains to be seen.)

As a result of this type of approach, Soviet historical research has had little to say about the Paris and Geneva conferences. Those who are familiar with Lenin’s actual attitude to the Paris conference and its background have kept quiet about what they know. The Moscow Institute of Marxism-Leninism, in its chronological biographical survey of Lenin’s life and in his collected works, seems to suggest that in the lead-up to the Geneva conference Lenin negotiated solely with the Latvian Social Democrats in the shape of Roziņš and represented the Bolsheviks alone at the conference itself. Thanks to the memoirs of the Jewish socialist, Vladimir Medem, we know, however, that Lenin agreed on a common approach to be adopted at the conference not only with the Latvians but also with his old opponents, the Bund, as well as with the Armenian Social Democrats. Medem also reveals that Bogdanov, who later emerged as one of the leading figures of the Bolshevik wing opposed to Lenin, represented the Bolsheviks alongside Lenin at the Geneva conference.²³⁸

Western scholars of Russian revolutionary and opposition parties have generally looked upon the question of inter-party collaboration as an issue of third-rate importance and treated it accordingly. This can hardly be the result of the ultimate failure of the idea to take root alone, but must also owe its origin to the fact that, as representatives of major nations (the United States, Britain and Germany), the scholars in question have generally not been interested in a question in which various minority nationalities, otherwise of perhaps only peripheral interest, played what amounted to a quite central role. The question of inter-party collaboration has, for essentially the same reason, received the most attention in Western scholarship on the Bund and in Polish historical research. The latter stands out particularly favourably when compared to Soviet work in the field. The Finnish literature on the subject has tended to be dominated by a rather restricted, nationally-focused approach, although the amount of specific research on the issue has been sparse.

²³⁸ *Vladimir Il'ich Lenin: Biograficheskaia khronika* 2 1971, pp. 44—45; Lenin, *PSS*, 10 (1960), pp. 180—185; *Tretii s'ezd RSDRP: Protokoly* 1959, pp. 378—382; Medem 1979, pp. 331—334.

The Letters of Colonel Akashi and His Aide Major Nagao Preserved in Finland and Sweden

edited and annotated by Antti Kujala

[These nine letters are published here unabridged in their original languages. Linguistic and spelling mistakes have been left intact. However, errors which hinder comprehension of the text have been corrected in brackets.]

1) Colonel Akashi Motojirō (Karloff), Berlin, to Jonas Castrén, Stockholm, 14 February 1904, Jonas Castrén Collection 2, Valtionarkisto [National Archives] (VA), Helsinki.

le 14. fevrier 1904.

Monsieur

Permettez moi de vous prier de garder une lettre que j'adresse à Balogh de Galanta [Miklós (Nicolas) Balogh de Galántha] jusqu'à son arrivée à Stockholm et que vous auriez la bonté de lui donner quand il viendra chez vous parce qu'il m'a dit qu'il vas partir à Stockholm pour vous voir.

Veillez agreer Monsieur l'expression de mes sentiments respectueux et de mes sincères compliments.

Karloff.

32.^{III} Kleist str. Berlin

2) Akashi, Stockholm, to J. Castrén, Stockholm, undated (February 1904, probably 22 February), Castrén Collection 2, VA.

Monsieur

J'ai l'honneur de vous prier de me la faire savoir si vous connaissez l'adresse de Monsieur Balogh de Galanta qui devait déjà arriver à Stockholm de St Petersburg. Je Vous serai bien obligé si vous me donniez là-dessus un mot de reponse.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur, l'assurance de mes respectueux sentiment

Akashi

à l'Hôtel Rydberg.

[Letters 1 and 2 demonstrate that Akashi tried to make connections with the Finnish constitutionalists through the mediation of the Hungarian Miklós Balogh de Galántha.]

3) Akashi, Stockholm, to Captain Nils David Edlund, Stockholm, undated (8—10 March 1904), Nils David and Elsa Edlund Archive 7, Krigsarkivet [War Archives], Stockholm.

Mon Capitaine

J'étais extremement heureux de vous avoir eu à mon modeste dîner d'hier. Je vous en remercie beaucoup.

Comme Vous avez eu la bouté de me dire que je vous donne la resumée des questions, je profite de votre complaisance et je Vous envoie la note sous ce pli. Naturellement bien que je ne m'attende pas que toutes ces questions seront repondues d'une manière exacte, je serai heureux de savoir les choses autant que possible.

Mon desiré à présent est d'avoir 3 correspondants, (1) s'occupant des questions de Moscou accessoirement de Kazan et de Yaroslaw, (2) de celles de St Petersburg c'est-à-dire de l'état du centre, (3) de celle de Samara—Penza point important de transport militaire. Mais ce programme dépend seulement de nombre des correspondants, je ne compte que sur votre bonne volonté et sur votre avis pour qu'il doit être changé à cause de nombre de correspondants

Veillez agreer, mon Capitaine, l'expression de mes sentiments les plus respectueux et de ma cordiale amitié.

Akashi

P.S. Susmentionne (1) regarde surtout l'execution de transport que je mentionne dans le papier ci-ajoint

(2) (3) sont plutôt pour le mouvement des troupes que je mentionne aussi dans le papier ci-ajoint.

Dans le papier ajoint, je mentionne les choses que je veux savoir, naturellement c'est une chose très difficil je ne tiens pas donc à ce que toutes ces questions soient bien répondues, je donne seulement le principes.

Note principale [Appendix]

I. Pour le transport

- a) Nombre de trains partant chaque jour pour l'Extrême-Orient.
- b) Le numeros des regiments d'infanterie et de cavalerie ainsi que des autres unités, le nombre des hommes, des chevaux, des canons ou de materiaux que chaque train porte (si c'est possible)

Example

le 10. mars. un train de 30 wagons transportent 500 hommes 20 chevaux du 100^e regiments d'infanterie.

11 Mars. deux trains d'ont une 500 hommes et 8 pièces de 10 Brigade d'artillerie, et l'autre 700 hommes de 101 regiment d'infanterie.

12 Mars, un train de 30 wagon, hommes 300 de 5^e regiment d'infant. et de 400 du 6^e infant. regiment. Un train de 10 cavalerie regiment, hommes 200, chevaux 80.

etc etc

Mais ce n'est pas rigoureusement util de savoir les détails de transport comme susmentionné, il est largement suffisant de savoir combien d'hommes, quelle troupes ont été envoyé à quel jour.


- b) toutes les nouvelles concernant le chemin de fer transsiberien

II. Pour Le Mouvement des troupes dans la Russie.

- a) Mobilisation
- b) réorganisation
- c) rappel des reservistes etc.
- d) le bruit de susmentionnés a) b) et c)
- e) l'Etat sanitaire et moral des soldats renvoyés du théâtre de la guerre
- f) les choses concernant les arsenaux, les cartoucheries, les magasins de vivre, de ravitaillements etc
- g) l'état politique et stratégique quand c'est possible de savoir

[Captain N.D. Edlund was the Swedish General Staff's officer in charge of reconnaissance regarding Russia. On 8 March 1904 the Swedish Minister of War, Otto Virgin, ordered him to the Far Eastern front to follow the wartime activity of the Russian troops. Edlund left Stockholm for Manchuria on 10 March. Before his departure Akashi invited him to dinner. Edlund promised to arrange for military spies to serve Japan in Russia. Certain other Swedish General Staff officers, in particular Lieutenant Klas Axel Klingenstierna, also aided Akashi and Nagao in military reconnaissance. This cooperation began in the spring of 1904.

The Swedish government adhered to a strict policy of neutrality in regard to the participants of the Far Eastern war. The behaviour of the Swedish officers contradicted the government's official line and the government certainly did not give its blessing to it. Apparently a group formed within the General Staff which prepared for the possibility that Russia might be forced into war not only with Japan but also with some of the European powers, above all Britain. In such



**Då Castrens Jonas klef till talarepulpeten,
då smeto U-S-återna till kaffet i buffeten.**

As Jonas Castrén ascended the speaker's platform his opponents left for a coffee break.
Fyren 1908.

an event Sweden could get revenge on Russia for the loss of Finland in 1809.

As Akashi relates in *Rakka ryūsui* the Finn Jonas Castrén arranged contacts between Akashi and Swedish General Staff officers. In May and June of 1904 Finnish Captain Lieutenant Gösta Theslöf and Castrén briefly participated in joint Swedish-Japanese reconnaissance work but were not of much help to the Japanese.

A small group composed of Jonas Castrén, Julio Reuter, Carl Mannerheim and certain other Finnish constitutionalists tried to persuade the governments of Japan and Britain to commit themselves to procuring for Finland, with the conclusion of peace, as much independence from Russia as possible. In return the group proposed that the Finns might rise in rebellion against the Russian government. This, however, would have required Britain's participation in the war and massive aid from its fleet; other conditions for rebellion also had to be as favourable as possible. Since Britain had no desire to go to war and Japan was not interested in making military or political commitments in Europe, Reuter's alliance proposals in May 1904 in London to the Japanese Minister Hayashi and Military Attaché Utsunomiya and the British Minister of War H.O. Arnold-Forster (30 May) met with a cool reception. See Kujala 1988, pp. 3—23.]

4) Akashi (Karl), Stockholm, to J. Castrén (Herr Gustav), Stockholm, undated (18 March or 18 November 1904, probably 18 March), Castrén Collection 2, VA.

Mein Guter Herr Gustav!

Noch ein mahl theile ich Ihnen mit dass ich heute (den 18 Freitag) ganz sicher von jetzt bis zur 5½ zu Hause sein. Wollen Sie so gut sein den Herr von dem Sie gesprochen haben zu mir zu schicken. Herzlichter Grüss von

Karl

[The gentleman who Akashi wanted to meet with the help of Castrén was some unidentified Finnish constitutionalist who had come to Sweden to inquire into Japan's willingness for cooperation.]

5) Akashi, Stockholm, to J. Castrén, Stockholm, 25 April 1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA.

Hier d. 25/4 04.

Sehr geehrter Herr Rechtsanwalt!

Bitte Sie hiermit, morgen abend im kleinen gewöhnlichen Anzug, also nicht im eleganten wie Frack, zu erscheinen.

Mit achtungsvollem Grusse

Ihr

Karl.

6) Akashi (Karl), Stockholm, to J. Castrén, Stockholm, undated (27 April 1904), Carl Mannerheim Papers 2, VA.

Mein lieber Herr.

Hier habe ich zwei Brief umgeschrossen [umgeschlossen], einer von denen (ich habe nicht des Empfingers geschrieben) ist an den Herrn [Hayashi] von dem wir

gestern gesprochen haben und der andere ist an meinen Freund [Utsunomiya] der die Gelegenheit beschaffen soll. Wenn der letzte nicht zu sehen [sehen] wäre, ist es auch gut den weissen Brief (No 1 bezeichnet) direct Herrn H. [Hayashi] übergeben.

Genehmigen Sie den Ausdruck meiner herzlichsten Grüss

Karl

[Along with this letter Akashi sent by way of Castrén two letters of recommendation to Julio Reuter who travelled from Stockholm to London to propose his group's alliance offer to Hayashi and Utsunomiya.]

7) Major Nagao Tsunekichi (Heinrich), Stockholm, to J. Castrén, Copenhagen, 4 July 1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA.

Stockholm d. 4/7 04.

Sehr geehrter Herr Rechtsanwalt!

Viele Dank für Ihren gütigsten Brief. Der Herr [Akashi] kommt noch nicht hier an. Falls er kommt, werde ich ihm das übermitteln, was Sie mir kürzlich geschrieben haben. Der dortige Schlimmste [Governor-General N.I. Bobrikov] ist nun hingschieden, Gott sei dank!

Erlaube mir Ihnen zu wunschen recht angenehmen Aufenthalt und mit frischer Gesundheit zurückkommend, Sie wieder begrüssen zu dürfen.

Mit vorzüglichem Ausdruck Hochachtung.

Ihr sehr ergebener

Haeinrich.

8) Akashi (Karl), place of origin unknown, to J. Castrén, Ronneby (Sweden), 6 August 1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA.

6/8 1904

Mein Herr und guter Freund

Was verlebt nun mit Ihnen? schön länge Zeit habe ich nicht Sie zu sehen. Aber mein Freund N. [Nagao] gab mir oft Ihre lebensweise und ich danke vielmehr Ihnen Ihre lebenswürdige Freundschaft für meinen Freund N.

Ich sende Ihnen meinen herzlichen Grüss zum neuen Ergebniss [assassination of Bobrikov] das kurzlich geschehen ist. Meine Ruckkehr nach Stock[holt] ist noch nicht bestimmt. Ich habe fast die hälfte meiner Reise mit Ihrem Freund Z [Konni Zilliacus] zusammen verlebt.

Herzlichsten Grüss

Karl

9) Nagao (Heinrich), Stockholm, to J. Castrén, Ronneby, 8 August 1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA.

Stockholm d. 8/8 04.

Sehr verehrter Herr Advocat!

Eben habe ich von Karl den beilegenden Brief erhalten. Denselben sende ich Ihnen.

Mit viel herzlichstem Grusse.

p.s. Sie hätten meinen Brief schon erhalten. Herr Cap. [**Captain Lieutenant Gösta Theslöf**] kommt immer noch nicht.

Ihr ergebenster

Heinrich

Olavi K. Fält

The Influence of Finnish-Japanese Cooperation during the Russo-Japanese War on Relations between Finland and Japan in 1917—1944*

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

In order to acquire more weight than the paper on which it was written, Finland's declaration of independence on 6th December 1917 required a broad measure of international recognition. The most important recognition of all, that of Soviet Russia, was received at the beginning of January 1918, and this was immediately followed by similar statements from Sweden, France and Germa-

* Pages 177—190 of this article are based on Olavi K. Fält, *Eksotismista realismiin. Perinteinen Japanin-kuva Suomessa 1930-luvun murroksessa* [From exoticism to realism. The traditional image of Japan in Finland in the transition years of the 1930's.], *Studia Historica Septentrionalia* 5 (Oulu, 1982) and pages 190—196 on Olavi K. Fält, "Japanin ja Suomen suhteet kansainvälisen politiikan ristiaallokossa 1935—1985" [Japanese-Finnish relations in the cross-currents of international politics in 1935—85], *Suomalais-japanilaisia suhteita 1935—1985 — Lähetystyötä, politiikkaa, kulttuurivaihtoa*, Suomalais-Japanilainen Yhdistys R.Y:n 50-vuotisjuhlajulkaisu, Julkaisu No 4, Toim. Tuija Kinnunen-Härmälä (Helsinki, 1985), pp. 35—45.

ny. After this the situation remained unchanged for a considerable time, and it was not until 23rd May 1919, for example, that Japan declared her *de facto* recognition of Finnish independence¹.

The delaying of recognition by Japan was due to a general reticence on the part of the major victorious powers in the First World War in this respect in view of the apparently pro-German line pursued by Finland in 1918. Once Germany had lost the War and the political leadership in Finland had changed, Great Britain and the United States recognized Finland at the beginning of May 1919, and France, too, issued a confirmation of her earlier decision². Thus Japan, with her own declaration, was simply following the example set by the other World War victors in this respect³.

The first *chargé d'affaires* to be accredited to Tokyo and Beijing, and stationed in Tokyo, was Prof. Gustaf Ramstedt.⁴ The establishment of a legation in Tokyo was intended as a diplomatic safety measure to clarify Finland's new status as an independent nation in the eyes of governments in the Far East in the light of the strong support felt in Eastern Asia for a policy of anti-Bolshevist intervention and of the reservations towards Finnish independence harboured by the White Army in Russia and those in sympathy with this body.⁵ Also, Finland was interested in the possibility of a division of the Russian Empire in Eastern Asia, as elsewhere, into a number of independent national states, in which respect a legation in Tokyo was a necessary vantage point from which to observe developments.⁶

¹ Minutes of the Council of State 16.7.1919. Minutes of the Council of State 1919, July VII. Valtionarkisto [National Archives] (VA), Helsinki. *De jure* on January 27 1921. The Japanese Ambassador to Paris, Makino Nobuaki had proposed in private that Finland's independence should be recognized on condition that she allowed the White Russians to use her territory for offensives against St. Petersburg, but he later withdrew this proposal, largely on account of opposition from the American and British representatives. Jaana Koivisto & Salme Tuokila, *Japanin suhtautuminen Suomeen maailmansotien välisenä aikana* [Japanese attitudes towards Finland in the inter-war period], Lyhennelmä pro gradu-tutkielmasta, Turun yliopisto historian laitos, maaliskuu 1985. Turun Suomalais-Japanilainen Yhdistys. Julkaisu no. 3 (Turku s.a.), pp. 1—2.

² Juhani Paasivirta, *Ensimmäisen maailmansodan voittajat ja Suomi. Englannin, Yhdysvaltain ja Ranskan sekä Suomen suhteita vv. 1918—1919* [The First World War Victors and Finland. Relations between Finland and Britain, the United States and France in 1918—1919] (Porvoo, 1961), pp. 245—246.

³ Momose Hiroshi, "Japan's Relations with Finland 1919—1944. As Reflected by Japanese Source Materials", *Surabu Kenkyū* 17 1973, pp. 6—7.

⁴ Minutes of the Council of State 6.9.1919. Minutes of the Council of State 1919, September IX. VA.

⁵ Juhani Paasivirta, *Suomen diplomaattiedustus ja ulkopoliittikan hoito. Itsenäistymisestä talvisotaan* [Finnish diplomacy and the conduct of foreign policy from Independence to the Winter War] (Porvoo, 1968), pp. 185—186.

⁶ Heikki Pohjala, *Suomen ja Japanin suhteet (1919—1925) eli Miten se seikka, että Neuvostoliitto oli Japanin ja Suomen yhteinen naapuri, vaikutti suomalais-japanilaisen yhteistyön syntymiseen* [Finnish-Japanese relations in 1919—1925, or how the existence of the Soviet Union as a common neighbour led to the establishment of cooperation between Finland



G.J. Ramstedt.

The Tokyo legation had largely lost its importance by the early 1920's, however. Parliament made no grant towards its upkeep in the budget of December 1922, and although the grant was restored early in 1923 the legation began to assume a commercial rather than political role from that time on.⁷ Commercial relations were established on a firm basis with the signing of a trade and shipping agreement between the two countries in 1924, to come into force in 1926.⁸

From the Japanese point of view, Finland was in principle just one of the many nation states in Europe which had achieved independence as a consequence of the World War, and the minor importance attached to Finnish affairs was reflected in the fact that Helsinki fell within the province of the Japanese legation in Stockholm until 1st November 1936, when a legation was opened in the Finnish capital as well.⁹ The chief factor as far as Japanese foreign policy as a whole was concerned was undoubtedly the proximity of Helsinki to the Soviet Union, as

and Japan] (Degree dissertation in World History, University of Helsinki, 1970), pp. 11—12.

⁷ Paasivirta 1968, p. 186; Pohjala 1970, pp. 65—85.

⁸ Martti Lintulahti, *Finland to tainichikankei no enkaku. A Treatise of the Finno-Japanese Relations from the early Contacts to the Present* (Tokyo, 1963), pp. 56, 116—125; Koivisto & Tuokila, pp. 12—13.

⁹ Japanin Helsingin lähetystö VI [The Japanese legation in Helsinki]. Report no. 36 of Hugo Valvanne, Tokyo 3.11.1936. Finnish Foreign Ministry 5 C 15. Ulkoasiainministeriön arkisto [Archives of the Foreign Ministry] (UM), Helsinki.

shown by the speculation in the *Osaka Mainichi* on 13th October 1936 that the reason for the new legation lay in Finland's close relations with Japan and her status as an immediate neighbour of the Soviet Union.¹⁰

The Soviet Threat — a Common Denominator

It would seem from the above that the cooperation between the Finns and the Japanese which had taken place during the Russo-Japanese War scarcely had any influence at all on relations between the two countries. In actual fact, however, a stream of close relations fostered precisely by this earlier collaboration was running beneath the official surface all the time, and the image of Japan in Finland was a relatively favourable one, largely on account of her victory in that War, an image which the author has referred to earlier as an activist-constitutionalist view of Japan.¹¹ Admittedly that country's expansionist policies towards China in the 1930's later caused some polarization in this image, with the extreme right in Finland entertaining an extremely favourable view of Japan while the attitude of the left was highly critical. By the end of that decade, with the increasing threat of war in Europe, the public image of Japan in Finland began to assume a more neutral tone.¹²

The generally favourable stance adopted by the Finns towards Japan is well reflected in a letter from the Finnish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, J.K.Paasikivi, to the leader of the Social Democrat Party, Väinö Tanner, in 1940, in which he stresses the fact that Finland was rescued from the burden of the years of repression by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904—1905 and the World War of 1914—1918.¹³

A similar favourable attitude towards relations between the two countries may also be detected in Japan, since the first *chargé d'affaires*, Ramstedt, noted upon his arrival that a certain friendliness towards Finland existed in Japanese political circles precisely as a consequence of the collaboration which had taken place during the Russo-Japanese War, and that this naturally made the task of Finland's first representative in that country very much easier than that of the delegates from many other new nations.¹⁴

Ramstedt himself was able to convey the Finns' sentiments of approval in his

¹⁰ The *Osaka Mainichi* 13.10.1936. See also Momose 1973, pp. 10—12. On the significance of Finland to the Japanese as a vantage-point for observing circumstances in the Soviet Union in the early 1920's, see Koivisto & Tuokila, pp. 9—10.

¹¹ Fält 1982, pp. 101—103.

¹² Fält 1982, pp. 315—319.

¹³ Väinö Tanner, *Kahden maailmansodan välissä. Muistelmia 20- and 30-luvulta* [Between two world wars. Recollections from the 1920's and 1930's] (Fourth impression. Helsinki, 1966), p. 261.

¹⁴ Interview with Prof. G.J. Ramstedt. Papers of Eino I. Parmanen, file X. VA.



Akashi and his three children.

message of congratulation to Admiral Togo Heihachiro in 1920 on his victory in the Battle of Tsushima: "On behalf of the Finnish people, who have led a quiet life and have suffered much through the ages, I beg you to allow me as their first representative in this land of your birth to bring before you our thanks for the most significant improvements which have dawned even upon the distant

Finnish nation as a benefit achieved on account of your victory at Tsushima.”¹⁵

These memories of past collaboration did not have any political repercussions at that stage, however, unless one considers the support expressed by Japan for the resolution of the Åland question in the League of Nation in Finland’s favour in 1920—1921, although here one should perhaps pay more tribute to the active work done by Ramstedt to arm the Japanese delegation to Geneva with the necessary background information in support of the Finnish cause¹⁶.

Finland was known to the general public in Japan in the 1920’s most of all on account of the achievements of her athletes,¹⁷ and perhaps also as a respected nation belonging to the same race as the Japanese¹⁸. Early in the 1930’s Finland was still arousing interest in non-political circles within Japan as a country of sport and culture, whereas in the political sphere the main interest lay in her position as a bastion against the spread of communism into Europe.¹⁹

This favourable image of Finland as an anti-communist nation arose very largely out of the nature of Japanese society itself, where the communist party had been dissolved.²⁰ At the same time relations with the Soviet Union were strained, to the extent that considerable international speculation had been aroused on the possibility of a war between the two countries.²¹

The memory of earlier cooperation against Russia was a tinder box which it was easy to grasp for when the threat posed by the Soviet Union emerged as a new common denominator in relations between Finland and Japan. Particularly to non-socialist eyes, the chief problem in Finnish foreign policy from independence onwards had been the Soviet Union and the threat which it presented. Thus the Finnish defence forces had been armed specifically to repel a Soviet attack, and it was also for this reason that the League of Nations had come to the fore as the favoured alternative in terms of security policy in the late 1920’s and early

¹⁵ G.J. Ramstedt to Admiral Togo, Tokyo 6.6.1920 (draft). K 10, papers of G.J. Ramstedt. VA.

¹⁶ G.J. Ramstedt, *Lähettiläänä Nipponissa. Muistelmia vuosilta 1919—1929* [Envoy to Nippon. Recollections from the years 1919—1929] (Porvoo, 1950), pp. 56—59. See Momose 1973, pp. 13—15.

¹⁷ *Maailman hiryittävin murhenäytelmä. Kuvauksia maanjäristyksen kauhuista Japanissa* [The most terrifying tragic drama in the world. Pictures of the horrors of the earthquake in Japan] (Helsinki, 1923), p. 40.

¹⁸ Kalle K. Auermaa, *Itä-Aasian markkinamaat ja meidän mahdollisuutemme siellä* [The market economies of Eastern Asia and our chances in them] (Porvoo, 1923), p. 298.

¹⁹ Asiainhoitaja Wähämäen raportti Japanin oloista [Report on conditions in Japan by the chargé d'affaires Wähämäki]. Report no. 9 of G. Winckelman, Tokyo 13.12.1930. Finnish Foreign Ministry 5 C 15:2. VA; Japanilaisten suhtautuminen Suomeen [Japanese attitudes towards Finland]. Report no. 15 of the legation in Tokyo. H. Valvanne 29.12.1933. Finnish Foreign Ministry 5 C 15:3. VA.

²⁰ Edwin O. Reischauer, Albert M. Craig, *Japan. Tradition & Transformation* (Tokyo, 1978), p. 222.

²¹ David J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia and the Far East* (Printed in the U.S.A., 1949), pp. 11, 14—30.

1930's. Not that Finland entertained any very strong feelings towards the League of Nations, but simply because it was hoped in this way to obtain external support in the event of a threat from the Soviet Union.²²

One may conjecture that in the foreign policy situation which prevailed at that time any support which directly or indirectly increased Finland's security was at least a matter worth considering for those in charge of foreign affairs, and one possible source of such support was Japan. The invasion of Manchuria in autumn 1931 and later of northern China nevertheless complicated the picture greatly as far as the Finns were concerned, since this expansionism ran contrary to the fundamental principles which Finland had advocated in the League of Nations. More care had to be taken when framing official statements, although the Finnish *chargé d'affaires* in Tokyo, George Winckelmann, still maintained that the most important thing of all in spite of these offensives was that Japan should remain as a counter-balance to the Soviet Union.²³

Finland was confronted with her trickiest foreign policy problem in this respect when these matters came up for discussion in the League of Nations itself. This prompted President P.E. Svinhufvud to instruct the Finnish delegates that they should align themselves with other countries in a comparable position to Finland while bearing in mind at the same time the importance of preserving relations with Japan. Although Finland did vote against Japan, unofficial efforts were still made to ensure that relations were not endangered. The Japanese representatives in these discussions assured the Finns of their country's unshakable friendship and avowed that they understood very well the duty Finland felt to vote in support of the Lytton report which condemned Japanese action. The Finnish Foreign Minister Antti Hackzell expressed his regret to the Japanese representative for the way in which Finland had been obliged to vote. Finnish feelings were ones of friendship towards Japan, but because the League of Nations existed, Finland was unable to follow the dictates of her feelings. Hackzell also communicated to him the regrets of President Svinhufvud at having to resolve his country's stance towards Japan in this concrete manner.²⁴

A critical report drawn up in his own name by Ensio Hiitonen, head of the League of Nations office at the Finnish Foreign Ministry, regarding Finland's attitudes towards Japan and the League of Nations in the light of her policies towards the Soviet Union reveals very clearly what was really going on. He believed that the favourable attitude of the Finnish press towards Japan was a legacy from the Russo-Japanese War, from which time onwards Japan had been regarded

²² Kari Selén, *Genevestä Tukholmaan. Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikan painopisteen siirtyminen Kansainliitosta pohjoismaiseen yhteistyöhön 1931—1936* [From Geneva to Stockholm. The shift in the focus of Finnish security policy from the League of Nations to Nordic cooperation in 1931—1936], *Historiallisia tutkimuksia* 94. Publications of the Finnish Historical Society (Helsinki, 1974). pp. 31—43.

²³ Fält 1982, pp. 108, 140.

²⁴ Fält 1982, pp. 146—147.

as a supporter of the notion of Finnish independence and the most successful opponent of Russia, and in this way as virtually an ally. He went on to claim, however, that Finland should not resolve the question of her attitude to Japan on the grounds of any immediate benefit to be gained *vis à vis* the Soviet Union, for it was scarcely possible for Japan to contemplate any new confrontation, being more than occupied for the present with the Chinese question. He was of the opinion that the League of Nations had taken an important preventive measure on behalf of peace, at least in Europe, and that this was of greater significance for Finland than any conflict which the Soviet Union might be drawn into in the Far East.²⁵

In spite of Hiitonen's critical report, it may be said with some justification that Japan was indeed regarded in the early years of Svinhufvud's presidency (1931—1937) as a potential source of support for Finland against the Soviet Union.

Correspondingly, there were evidently some circles in Japan that believed that Finland would join the battle against the Soviet Union should war break out between that country and Japan. They even maintained that the Japanese and Finns together would destroy Russia, after which the Finns would be assigned extensive territories west of Siberia in which to create their ideal of Greater Finland.²⁶ The Japanese Military Attaché in Latvia, Kawamata, even sent back information, admittedly of a somewhat dubious kind, that the government and president of Finland were in favour of invading Karelia should war break out between the Soviet Union and Japan.²⁷

The Soviet Union was highly suspicious of the close relations that existed between Finland and Japan. It was claimed that the former had rejected the Soviet Union's offers of friendship and was instead accepting a hand proffered over their heads from the Far East. The *Journal de Moscou* avowed that reactionary circles in Finland were proposing the Altai Mountains as the future border between Finland and Japan.²⁸

Soviet suspicions cannot have been allayed in any way by the discovery in 1934 of an organization set up by Lt. Col. Lennartti Pohjanheimo to train activists to fight on behalf of a kindred nation to free the people of Ingermanland. The intention was to create unrest in Eastern Karelia and Ingermanland as soon as war broke out between the Soviet Union and Japan and to promote hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union.²⁹ Such suspicions were in all probabili-

²⁵ Fält 1982, pp. 147—148; Selén 1974, pp. 71—72.

²⁶ Momose 1973, pp. 2—3.

²⁷ Military Attaché Kawama to the Deputy Chief of Staff 17.3.1933 No. 10. Shogai-koku kan gaikō kankei zassan: F no bu A.2.2.0.XI F, 2(5). Gaikō shiryōkan [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (GS), Tokyo. See also Momose 1973, p. 17. I am indebted to Mrs. Koike Akemi for translating the Japanese-language sources into Finnish.

²⁸ Keijo Korhonen, *Turvallisuuden pettäessä. Suomi neuvostodiplomatiassa Tartosta talvisotaan II 1933—1939* [When security gives way. Finland in Soviet diplomacy from Tartu to the Winter War, II, 1933—1939] (Helsinki, 1971), p. 89.

²⁹ Korhonen 1971, p. 86.

ty strengthened still further by the founding of a Finnish-Japanese Society in May 1935, the participation in the inaugural meeting, where one third of those present were active military officers, being a clear indication of those circles in Finland that were particularly interested in Japan.³⁰

Suspicious regarding Finnish-Japanese collaboration were not confined to the Soviet Union, however, for they were also common in countries such as Great Britain and China, and Foreign Minister Hackzell was obliged twice, in 1934 and 1935, to deny in Parliament the truth of any such rumours.³¹

The suspicions were not entirely without justification, however, for President Svinhufvud was known to be planning an anti-Bolshevist front in 1934, when it became apparent that the Soviet Union was soon to join the League of Nations. The leading roles in this front were to be reserved for Great Britain and Japan. Svinhufvud regarded Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim as a suitable person to discuss this matter unofficially in various capitals of the world, but the latter had doubts about the venture and declined to accept the role of promoter for an anti-Bolshevist front. His reluctance was quite understandable in view of the utopistic nature of the venture.³²

The sympathy felt in Finland for the Japanese is also shown by the assurance of a friendly attitude on the part of Finland given to the *chargé d'affaires* Ichikawa Hikotaro by the First Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Eero Järnefelt, early in 1934³³, and also by the same assurance given to the Japanese Principal Secretary for European and American Affairs, Togo Shigenori, by the new Finnish Ambassador in Tokyo, Hugo Valvanne³⁴.

Further evidence of the rapport which existed between the two peoples is provided by a conversation which Valvanne had with Prince Chichibu early in 1935, in which the Prince enquired about Finnish relations with the Soviet Union. Valvanne replied that these were formally correct as far as Finland was concerned, but by no means cordial. There was little that the two countries had in common and a great deal that came between them. As long as the Communists remained in power in Russia, Finland, like Japan, would have to protect herself from that country's influence. Valvanne also described how the sympathy for Japan that had grown up during the Russo-Japanese War had been gaining in strength all the time.³⁵

³⁰ P.O. Enholm, *Suomalais-Japanilaisen Yhdistyksen 25-vuotiskertomus* [25th Anniversary Report of the Finnish-Japanese Society] (Helsinki, 1961), p. 2; Lintulahti 1963, pp. 74—75.

³¹ Fält 1982, pp. 163—164.

³² Kari Selén, *C.G.E. Mannerheim ja hänen puolustusneuvostonsa 1931—1939* [C.G.E. Mannerheim and his defence council, 1931—1939] (Keuruu, 1980), p. 193.

³³ Momose 1973, p. 19.

³⁴ Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki to Minister Kōshi Shiratori [Sweden] 17.2.1934 No. 4. Sorenpo Fuinrando kan fushinyaku jōyaku kankei ikken. B.I.O.O. FI/R2. GS.

³⁵ Keskustelu prinssi Chichibu kanssa [A conversation with Prince Chichibu]. Report no. 6 of Hugo Valvanne, Tokyo 7.2.1935. Finnish Foreign Ministry 5 C 15. UM.

Around the middle of the decade Finland followed a line of strict support for the League of Nations. Although Japan had resigned from the League in 1933, a decision which took effect as from spring 1935, Finland maintained friendly relations as a kind of safeguard against the threat which the Soviet Union was still felt to present, and this continued to be reflected in fairly widespread speculation on collaboration between Finland and Japan against the Soviet Union.

Signs of Estrangement

A certain cooling of relations between Finland and Japan is detectable from 1936 onwards, evidently due to Finland's new policy of Nordic non-alignment, announced towards the end of 1935. Japan began to lose the position which she had once occupied in the eyes of the leaders of Finnish foreign policy, although the basic excellence of relations between the two countries still could not be denied, as witnessed by the opening of the Japanese legation in Helsinki on 1st November 1936.³⁶ In terms of international politics this event coincided rather too well with the Anti-Comintern Pact signed between Japan and Germany on 25th November of the same year, which may well have once more aroused embarrassing suspicions abroad regarding Finland's motives. This led the German Consul in Shanghai to remark to the local Finnish Consul, Ville Niskanen, that Finland was a supporter of the same form of joint action, a subscriber to the same ideological movement but without a membership card, even though for tactical reasons she made declarations of neutrality.³⁷ Once more it fell to the Finnish Foreign Minister, this time Rudolf Holsti, to allay all speculations regarding his country's foreign policy and to insist that Finland would remain loyal to all causes that prevailed upon her to preserve peace.³⁸

The Japanese themselves did not find any very great hopes on the depth of Finnish sympathies. In their view Finland had settled for Nordic non-alignment, and the Japanese Foreign Ministry and General Staff never made any attempt to persuade her to enter the Anti-Comintern Pact. It was the opinion of the General Staff that Finland was being cautious and that she would not readily ally herself with Japan in any war between that country and the Soviet Union. This was quite the contrary assumption to that made in 1933, which in itself indicates, although admittedly indirectly, that Finland had rejected Japan as a guarantor of her security. On the other hand, it must be said that the Japanese army did not have a very high opinion of Finland's military power until the Winter War.³⁹

³⁶ Fält 1982, p. 211.

³⁷ Japanin-Saksan liittohuhut [Rumours of a Japanese-German alliance]. Report no. 20 of Consul V. Niskanen, Shanghai 25.11.1936. Finnish Foreign Ministry 53 Å 2f. UM.

³⁸ Parliamentary sessions 1936. Minutes 1, p. 729.

³⁹ Momose 1973, p. 21.

Finland's bid for non-alignment was emphasized in Japanese eyes by Foreign Minister Holsti's visit to Moscow in February 1937, an event which even caused some measure of disappointment among the Japanese, who may have entertained hopes of closer cooperation against the Soviet Union in view of the implications contained in the simultaneous opening of the Helsinki legation and signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Japanese diplomatic reports described Holsti's visit as an expression of Finland's aspirations with regard to Nordic neutrality, while Ichikawa saw the journey largely as a passive gesture aimed at normalizing the strained relations between Finland and the Soviet Union.⁴⁰

Holsti had assured Ichikawa that he had no intention of discussing any new political matters in Moscow, but that he was making purely a courtesy visit. The Soviet Union had invited the foreign ministers of neighbouring countries to an exchange of ideas, and Finland had accepted this invitation. The timing of the visit, he claimed, was the outcome of suspicions regarding Finnish attitudes towards the Soviet Union aroused in the United States and other countries by false Soviet propaganda. Holsti emphasized to Ichikawa that his journey did not imply any underhand dealing in opposition to Japan or Germany (only a month or so having elapsed since the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact), nor did it mark any change in Finnish foreign policy.⁴¹

Although, in the words of the assurances given, this journey did not mark any change in Finnish-Japanese relations, it did demonstrate to the Japanese the strength of Finland's alignment with the other Nordic countries. The Swedish Minister in Moscow took the opportunity to inform the Japanese Ambassador, Shigemitsu Mamoru, of the Scandinavia countries' view of this visit, explaining that in his opinion it was intended to reduce friction between Finland and the Soviet Union in every way following the tightening of relations between Japan and Germany. Sweden, Denmark and Norway had advised the Finnish Foreign Minister to go to the Soviet Union because it was in their own interests to avoid involvement in any crises in Eastern Europe, and it was after all the case that Finland was situated geographically between Scandinavia and the Soviet Union.⁴²

Holsti's visit was of considerable significance as far as speculations concerning possible Finnish-Japanese collaboration were concerned, since the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim M. Litvinov, was able to say to the Swedish Foreign Minister Richard Sandler when he had visited Moscow in July that the Soviet Union now believed that Finland would not constitute any threat even if war should break out with Germany and Japan.⁴³

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Chargé d'affaires Ichikawa Hikotaro to Foreign Minister Arita Hatchirō 31.12.1936 No. 19. Shogaikoku kan gaikō kankei zassan: F no bu: 2. Fuinrando no bu. A.2.2.0.XI F, 2 (5). GS; Momose 1973, p. 21.

⁴² Momose 1973, p. 22.

⁴³ Korhonen 1971, p. 158; Juhani Suomi, *Talvisodan tausta. Neuvostoliitto Suomen*

The parallel impressions of Finnish foreign policy obtained by the Japanese, by Litvinov and also by the Germans⁴⁴ strengthen the assumption it was the new policy of Nordic non-alignment, a safe harbour in the storms of international politics⁴⁵, that led to the cooling in her relations with Japan. Even so these relations could not be said to have been bad at any stage, as shown by an internal memorandum from the Japanese Foreign Ministry in February 1937, which referred to them as such especially in the light of Finnish-Soviet relations and the position of Japan in the world.⁴⁶

The heightened international tension at the end of the decade led Finland to pursue a still more reserved foreign policy, which meant that relations with Japan, which had been engaged in its war with China since July 1937, became even more distant. This became evident when Finland was required to define her own position with regard to the events in China when the latter brought up the question of the Japanese invasion in the League of Nations shortly after the outbreak of war. This time the directives approved by President Kyösti Kallio for the Finnish delegation made no mention at all of the importance of preserving good relations with Japan as had still been the case in connection with the Manchurian Incident in 1933. Five years earlier Japan had been viewed as a distant power which could serve as a guarantor of Finland's security in the face of a possible Soviet threat, but now the country's security was seen as residing in the League of Nations itself, in the western powers which acted as its leaders and in the pursuance of a common policy along with the Scandinavian countries.⁴⁷

The Japanese question was not regarded in Finland as posing any particular problems, since Foreign Minister Holsti did not mention it at all in his report on the general assembly sent out to all Finnish ambassadors and envoys, concentrating instead on the question of Spain's candidature for membership of the council of the League of Nations.⁴⁸

ulkopolitiikassa 1937—1939 I. Holstista Erkkoon [Background to the Winter War. The Soviet Union in Finnish foreign policy 1937—1939 I. From Holsti to Erkkö] (Helsinki, 1973), p. 84.

⁴⁴ Brita Hiedanniemi, *Kulttuuriin verhottua politiikkaa. Kansallissosialistisen Saksan kulttuuripropaganda Suomessa 1933—1940* [Politics in a cultural guise. Nazi-Germany's cultural propaganda in Finland in 1933—1940] (Keuruu, 1980), p. 109.

⁴⁵ Korhonen 1971, p. 131.

⁴⁶ Oakyokudaiikka Gaimusho 13.2.1937. Kakukoku kokujō kankai zakkan. Fuinrandokoku no bu. A.6.0.0.6.-10. GS.

⁴⁷ (Confidential) minutes of the Finnish Council of State, question raised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3.9.1937. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confidential minutes of the Council of State 1934 — Aug. 1939. Ca 8. VA.

⁴⁸ Ministeri Holstin kertomus ulkoasiainministerien konferenssista Tukholmassa syyskuun alussa, suomalaisen valtuuskunnan toiminnasta Kansainliiton yleiskokouksessa, Ruotsin ja Suomen ulkoasiainministerien matkasta Tornionlaaksoon sekä virallisesta käynnistään Berliinissä ja Riiaassa [Report by R. Holsti on the Stockholm conference of foreign ministers held at the beginning of September, the actions of the Finnish delegation to the League of Nations general assembly, the visit of the Swedish and Finnish foreign ministers

On the other hand there were evidently some circles in Japan which believed that Finland was only waiting for war to break out between the Soviet Union and Japan to commence an attack of their own,⁴⁹ and the official Japanese view was obviously that it was desirable to maintain friendly relations, since note was taken in discussions between Valvanne and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Konoe Fumimaro, in autumn 1938 of the interest felt by the peoples of Finland and Japan towards each other from the time of the Russo-Japanese War onwards. Konoe had expressed the hope that even under the conditions that prevailed at that time everything possible would still be done to maintain friendly relations.⁵⁰

One obvious sign of Finland estrangement from Japan was the lack of interest shown by the Foreign Ministry in concluding a cultural agreement with that country in May 1939, this reluctance being motivated by purely political considerations. It was not wished under any conditions to create an impression of close political cooperation with Japan, especially in view of the latter's recent cultural agreements with Germany and Italy.⁵¹ This view confirms that Japan no longer carried any weight as a guarantor of Finnish security as far as the Finns were concerned. On the contrary, it was consistent with Finnish foreign policy for the country to keep its distance with regard to Japan.

The Finnish armed forces similarly did not regard Japan as playing any role in Finland's security, the review of military policy issued by the General Staff in 1938 simply noting that: "From our point of view this war [the Sino-Japanese War] means in terms of military policy largely that Russia, by supporting China, has an opportunity to relieve the pressure previously exerted by Japan on her eastern border."⁵²

The cooling in relations is symbolized in concrete form by the emergence during the 1930's of the first actual cause of friction between the two countries. This arose because of a very rapid shift in the trade balance to Finland's disadvantage on account of the reduction in Japanese imports of Finnish wood pulp dictated the foreign exchange crisis precipitated in that country by her war with China. Negotiations lasting almost a year ended with an agreement in spring 1939 which

to the Tornio valley and official visits to Berlin and Riga], 6.11.1937. Finnish Foreign Ministry 5 D. UM.

⁴⁹ Maamme poliittinen suuntautuminen [Directions of Finnish foreign policy]. Letter no. 1584/228 from the Finnish legation in Shanghai. V. Niskanen, acting chargé d'affaires, 15.12.1937. Finnish Foreign Ministry 12 L Japan 1936—1940. UM.

⁵⁰ Prinsssi Konoe ulkoministerinä [Prince Konoe as Foreign Minister]. Report no. 45 of H.Valvanne, Tokyo 13.10.1938. Finnish Foreign Ministry 5 C 15. UM.

⁵¹ Ajatus kulttuurisopimuksesta Suomen ja Japanin välillä [The idea of a cultural agreement between Finland and Japan]. Confidential letter no. 60/113 1938 7032 from Minister E.E. to the Finnish embassy in Tokyo, 11.5.1939. Drafts of confidential correspondence, Jan.—June 1939. UM.

⁵² Katsaus sotilaspoliittisen aseman kehitykseen vuoden 1938 aikana [Review of developments in the military policy position during 1938] OP 1/YE T 2862/1. Sota-arkisto [War Archives] (StA), Helsinki.

guaranteed the Finnish woodprocessing industry a reasonable share in the Japanese market.⁵³

In spite of this internal cooling in relations, Finland's neutral attitude towards the Japanese hostilities in China differed markedly from the general condemnation of the operation expressed by the western nations. Japan had no other supporters at that time apart from Germany and Italy. It may be that the neutral attitude of the Finns was motivated to some extent by suspicion of the Soviet Union, strengthened perhaps by the traditional favourable image enjoyed by Japan as a consequence of the Russo-Japanese War.⁵⁴

The Second World War — a Conflict of Interests

When the Winter War broke out at the end of November 1939 with the Soviet attack on Finland, the Japanese government remained silent on the subject of the Finnish resistance. From the beginning of World War II onwards Japan had tried to preserve her neutrality and concentrate on her own war with China. The non-aggression pact signed between the Soviet Union and Germany had come as a complete surprise to Japan, especially in view of the Anti-Comintern Pact against the Soviet Union which Germany had concluded with Japan in 1936. Japan found it extremely difficult to adapt to the rapid, unexpected fluctuations in the European situation, in addition to which it was now necessary for her to avoid any future conflict with the Soviet Union, having just suffered one military defeat in connection with the Nomonhan affair on the Mongolian-Manchurian border which lasted a couple of months and led to the signing of an armistice only in the middle of September.⁵⁵

Much sympathy was nevertheless felt in Japan for the Finnish cause, as emerges very clearly from the newspapers, even though few hopes were entertained for Finland's chances in the war.⁵⁶ The government had strictly forbidden any official statements of support for Finland, however, just as the General Staff prohibited all sales of arms to Finland.⁵⁷ Even so, the Japanese Foreign Ministry had expressed its moral support before the outbreak of the Winter War, and once this had happened the eldest of the Emperor's brothers, Prince Chichibu, wished Finland success and assured her that everyone in Japan would follow the course of the war in a sympathetic spirit. The Foreign Minister, Nomura Kichisaburō, and his deputy, Tani Masayuki, both stressed that the Japanese government hoped

⁵³ Fält 1982, pp. 252—254.

⁵⁴ Fält 1982, p. 255.

⁵⁵ Fält 1985, p. 39.

⁵⁶ Fält 1985, p. 39; Olavi K.Fält, "Suomen kuva Japanissa 1939—1944" [The Japanese image of Finland 1939—1944], *Faravid* 3/1980, p. 173.

⁵⁷ Fält 1985, p. 39; Momose 1973, pp. 25—27.

for a Finnish victory, although their statements, like all other expressions of support, were quite unofficial.⁵⁸

As far as official opinion in Japan was concerned, the end of the Winter War meant above all a suspicion that having secured its western boundary, the Soviet Union would turn its attention more to the situation in the Far East. The Finnish question was touched upon in discussions between Japanese diplomatic representatives and representatives of the Soviet Union and Germany. In August 1940, V.M.Molotov noted that the solution to the Finnish question depended on Soviet — German relations, and by October the Germans let it be understood that they regarded Finland as belonging to their sphere of influence, being particularly interested in the ore reserves of Northern Finland.⁵⁹

When the Japanese concluded a Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union in April 1941 their own interpretation of the situation was that Finland did not approve of this move.⁶⁰ From the Finnish point of view, the agreement meant that Japan could no longer serve as a potential source of support against the Soviet Union under any conditions, although in practice Finland had long ago ceased to place any reliance on such support. Admittedly President Risto Ryti still reminded the Minister to Finland, Sakaya Tadashi, in November 1940 of the respect and interest felt by the Finns for the Japanese, dating back to the times of the Russo-Japanese War⁶¹, which could be interpreted as an indirect hint, at least, that Finland might be interested in Japan's political support in her current position.

Finland did have some military contacts with Japan during the period of peace which followed the Winter War, however. Col. Auno A. Kaila and Capt. Lauri Laine went to Manchukuo to direct training in winter warfare,⁶² and a further sign of a continuation of earlier relations was the opening of the Far East Line to Japan, the first vessel, the SS. *Tornator*, managing to arrive in Japan just before the outbreak of the Continuation War with the Soviet Union in June 1941.⁶³ Col. Kaila spent the remainder of the war as Military Attaché in Japan, with Capt. Laine as his adjutant, as it was impossible to arrange for them to return to Finland.⁶⁴ Another person in a similar predicament was the Japanese professor Kuwaki Tsutomu, who taught Japanese and the history of Japanese ideas as a visiting professor at the University of Helsinki.⁶⁵

On the resumption of hostilities in June 1941 the Intelligence Officer attached to the Finnish General Staff (which served as the Operational Headquarters dur-

⁵⁸ Fält 1985, p. 40.

⁵⁹ Momose 1973, pp. 28—29.

⁶⁰ Momose 1973, p. 31.

⁶¹ Momose 1973, pp. 30—31.

⁶² Confidential telegram J 22. Helsinki 19.11.1940 Finlandia Tokyo. J. to Tokyo 1940. UM.

⁶³ Open telegram J 30. Helsinki 30.5.1941 Finlandia Tokyo. J. to Tokyo 1941. UM; Confidential telegram J 41. Helsinki 25.6.1941 Finlandia Tokyo. J. to Tokyo 1941. UM.

⁶⁴ Open telegram J 52. Helsinki 20.8.1941 Finlandia Tokyo. J. to Tokyo 1941. UM.

⁶⁵ Momose 1973, p. 33.

ing the war) told the Japanese Military Attaché, Onouchi Hiroshi, that this was a “war of revenge”. Onouchi remembered later that the officers he had met from the General Staff (presumably the Operational Headquarters) had been optimistic about the course of the war throughout 1942. The first doubts regarding the possibility of a German victory had been expressed in January 1943, and by May of that year a General Staff officer admitted that Finland had lost the war. Japanese information reports that Väinö Tanner had stated in February or March 1944 that Finland had entered the war on the assumption that Germany would emerge victorious, and since she had obviously been mistaken in this, steps would be taken towards disengagement.⁶⁶

At the early stages of the Continuation War, Finland even moved closer to Japan politically to some extent by recognizing on 18th July 1941 the *de jure* independence of the puppet state of Manchukuo created by Japan in Manchuria in 1932.⁶⁷ In September of the same year the Finnish Minister in Tokyo, Karl Idman, took part in the celebrations to mark the anniversary of the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan,⁶⁸ and from spring 1942 onwards he was engaged in maintaining unofficial relations with the Ambassador of the Nanjing puppet government set up by the Japanese in China⁶⁹.

In the course of 1942 the Finns were interested in the possibility of a war between Japan and the Soviet Union, naturally on account of their own war, but information received from Japan convinced them that that country, at least, would not begin any such war, since future good relations with the Soviet Union were important and because Japan was geographically vulnerable to air attacks from the continent of Asia.⁷⁰

In spite of this, there were some signs of a warming in Finnish-Japanese relations in 1942, primarily in the form of an exchange of major decorations. The Emperor Hirohito was awarded the Grand Cross of the White Rose in July, and the Grand Cross of the Order of the Chrysanthemum was conferred on President Risto Ryti in December. Marshal Mannerheim, Prime Minister J.W. Ranngell and Foreign Minister Rolf Witting also received high honours from the Japanese.⁷¹

The real initiative for closer cooperation, admittedly a very tentative one, came from the Japanese side, when the Chief of the General Staff, General Arisue Seizō, approached Idman and indicated that he regarded joint action by those engaged

⁶⁶ Momose 1973, pp. 32–34.

⁶⁷ Confidential telegram J 47. Helsinki 19.7.1941 Finlandia Tokyo. J. to Tokyo 1941. UM.

⁶⁸ Confidential telegram J 70. Helsinki 26.9.1941 Finlandia Tokyo. J. to Tokyo 1941. UM.

⁶⁹ Telegram no. 44. Tokyo 19.3.1942 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1942. UM.

⁷⁰ Telegram no. 155. Tokyo 30.10.1942 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1942. UM.

⁷¹ Fält 1985, p. 42.

in war as a desirable thing.⁷² In addition to this, the Japanese Foreign Ministry showed interest in the 25th anniversary of Finnish independence on 6th December 1942, which received unusual attention, including radio coverage of the anniversary celebrations. The Foreign Ministry also helped to sponsor the evening reception arranged by the Japanese-Finnish Society, reports on which appeared in the newspapers.⁷³ The bare facts of reality, reflecting the tension in the atmosphere, were still to be seen even here, however, for the police were in the kitchen during the reception enquiring the names of those attending.⁷⁴

Exceptional note was also taken of Japan in public circles in Finland during 1942, in the sense that the magazine *Itsenäinen Suomi* [Independent Finland] published an issue devoted to Japan in February of that year.

The special interest shown by Japan in Finland, a movement towards some form of united front towards the end of 1942, may have been due to the worsening of that country's own position in the war. Her period of aggression had come to an end with the Battle of Midway in June, in which she had sustained her first substantial losses. This was followed by a long period of equilibrium in which neither side could claim complete mastery of the Pacific Ocean. The critical turn of events took place in 1943, however, when the United States obtained major reinforcements for her fleet.

The Finns had evidently not been sufficiently receptive to the Japanese approaches, however, for the Military Attaché, Onouchi, felt obliged to point out that while Japan made advances Finland was remaining cool.⁷⁵ The greatest obstacle to a united front was the incompatibility between the countries' interests. Finland was waging her own war with the Soviet Union, whereas Japan, trusting in her Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union, was at war with the United States and Great Britain, powers whose interests Finland was anxious not to infringe.

One manifestation of this conflict of interests was that the Japanese were led to criticize the Finnish press for the support it expressed for the United States and Great Britain in their war against Japan.⁷⁶ The Finns in turn, in pursuit of their own interests, were still trying to impress upon the Japanese in 1943 how important it was to gain victory over the Soviet Union before it would be possible for Japan to conclude any peace treaty with the United States and Great Britain.⁷⁷

⁷² Telegram no. 152. Tokyo 16.10.1942 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1942. UM.

⁷³ Telegram no. 171. Tokyo 11.12.1942 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1942. UM; Telegram no. 172. Tokyo 11.12.1942 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1942. UM; Momose 1973, p. 33.

⁷⁴ Telegram no. 172. Tokyo 11.12.1942 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1942. UM.

⁷⁵ Momose 1973, p. 33.

⁷⁶ Fält 1985, p. 43; Momose 1973, p. 33.

⁷⁷ Telegram no. 21. Tokyo 12.2.1943 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1943. UM.

Upon the capitulation of Italy in July 1943 Finland became still more important to the Japanese than ever. For she was now left with only one ally, Germany, and a potential ally in Finland, with which she had traditionally had a trouble-free relationship and which at least stood in the same anti-communist front. This awakened interest was manifested most clearly in the readiness of the foreign minister to enter negotiations with Finnish representatives.⁷⁸

In contradistinction to the above, Finland began to detach herself from her earlier close collaboration with the Axis powers by the beginning of 1944. Idman did not take part in the dinner held early in January 1944 for envoys of the Axis powers to mark their coming victory even though he had been invited.⁷⁹ By February it was evident that the Finns' opinion had not been shaken by the Japanese conviction that they were "in the same boat",⁸⁰ and when Finland seemed to be withdrawing from the war in May of that year, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu Mamoru, noted that it was very difficult for one nation to make peace in the midst of a major war. On the same occasion Idman, as if referring to the conflict of interests obtaining between Finland and Japan, mentioned that it might have been appropriate for Japan to join in the war against the Soviet Union, for he suspected that the latter might yet declare war on Japan, which would then have to pay dearly for her earlier victories over Russia.⁸¹ The situation could no longer be altered by the Japanese avowal of great admiration and sympathy for Finland at the time of the major Soviet offensive in June.⁸²

In spite of the fact that when Finland had signed a separate peace treaty with the Soviet Union in September 1944 the Japanese Foreign Ministry expressed the hope that this would not force her to break off her good relations with Japan,⁸³ Finland did sever diplomatic relations on 22nd September 1944, evidently at the instigation of Great Britain, an ally of the Soviet Union.⁸⁴ Thus one era in Finnish-Japanese relations was brought to an end.

In summary, it may be said that Finnish-Japanese collaboration during the Russo-Japanese War provided an excellent springboard for good relations between the two countries, and a suitable memory to fall back on when the threat

⁷⁸ See Confidential telegram copy no. 24. Tokyo 22.2.1944 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1944. UM; Confidential telegram copy no. 33. Tokyo 2.3.1944 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1944. UM; Confidential telegram copy no. 57. Tokyo 2.5.1944 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1944. UM.

⁷⁹ Confidential telegram copy no. 3. Tokyo 8.1.1944 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1944. UM.

⁸⁰ Confidential telegram copy no. 24. Tokyo 22.2.1944 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1944. UM.

⁸¹ Confidential telegram copy no. 57. Tokyo 2.5.1944 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1944. UM.

⁸² Confidential telegram copy no. 75. Tokyo 22.6.1944 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1944. UM.

⁸³ Confidential telegram copy no. 112. Tokyo 9.9.1944 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1944. UM.

⁸⁴ Momose 1973, p. 34.

posed by the Soviet Union in the 1930's became a common denominator in the foreign policies of both.

The situation during the Second World War was complicated, however, by the diametrically opposed roles played by the Soviet Union in their foreign policy planning. The Soviet Union was an enemy for Finland, but for Japan it was a friendly nation with which a Neutrality Pact had been signed which served the interests of both parties at that time. The unofficial contacts and dealings between the two nations nevertheless testify to the underlying mutual understanding which dominated relations between the two countries. Without doubt the cooperation during the Russo-Japanese War and the favourable impact which the Japanese victory had on conditions in Finland at that time undoubtedly lay behind these sentiments as well, not forgetting the later common threat to both countries, communism.

The existence of this underlying stream of friendship and understanding was clearly expressed in the collaboration between the intelligence services of the two countries, to the extent that data on this are available at the present time, which evidently resembled in some ways the cooperation that had been established during the Russo-Japanese War. Jukka Rislakki claims that official relations existed between the Finnish Central Investigation Police and Japanese intelligence in the 1930's.⁸⁵ A good example of collaboration in the interception of radio communications was the pile of Russian messages about a metre high, all in 5-digit code, which had been intercepted by Japanese intelligence between Vladivostok and Khabarovsk and were handed over to the Finnish radio intelligence division in summer 1940 in exchange for material of theirs. The Finns were gradually able to break the code used in these messages, an exercise which proved extremely valuable, since the Russians used the same code on the Finnish front in summer 1941. This enabled the Finns to decode about 70 % of the enemy's messages, giving the advancing Finnish troops a considerable advantage.⁸⁶

In order to ensure its lines of communication with Europe, the Finnish Intelligence Department set up secret radio stations in Rome, Madrid, Bern, Berlin and Ankara, the last-mentioned being of particular importance since contact was had there with Japanese intelligence agents in the city, enabling reviews of the situation to be exchanged on both sides.⁸⁷

Collaboration between the intelligence services of the two countries continued even after Finland had withdrawn from the war, at least to the extent that the Finns sold secret material concerned with the United States and the Soviet Union to the Japanese in Sweden.⁸⁸ In addition, one Finnish agent, Otto Kumenius,

⁸⁵ Jukka Rislakki, *Erittäin salainen. Vakoilu Suomessa* [Highly confidential. Espionage in Finland] (Vaasa, 1982), p. 125.

⁸⁶ Jukka L. Mäkelä, *Salaisen sodan saatosta* [In the course of a secret war] (Porvoo, 1965), pp. 28—29; Rislakki 1982, p. 241.

⁸⁷ Mäkelä 1965, p. 19—20; Rislakki 1982, p. 246.

⁸⁸ Onodera Yuriko, *Barutokai no hotorinite* (1985), pp. 171—172.

collaborated with the Japanese in Sweden for some time, although admittedly with the knowledge of both the Americans and Swedes.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Otto Kumenius, *Tiedustelu — tehtävä yli rajojen. Viiden rintaman vastavakoilija muistelee ja kertoo* [Intelligence — an assignment that knows no bounds. A counter-agent on five fronts recounts his memories] (Alea-Kirja Oy, s.a.), pp. 177—185.

Abbreviations

ACGG	Archive of the Chancellery of the Governor-General
ACH	Archief Camille Huysmans, Antwerp
BT	Bōeikenkyūjo toshokan [Library of the National Institute for Defence Studies, Defence Agency], Tokyo
GS	Gaikō shiryōkan [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Tokyo
HI	Hoover Institution, Stanford
IISG	Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam
KS	Kensei shiryōshitsu [Archives of Constitutional and Political Papers], Kokkai toshokan [National Diet Library], Tokyo
PPS	Polish Socialist Party
PSR	Arkhiv Partii S(otsialistov)-R(evoliutsionerov)
PSS	Polnoe sobranie sochinenii
RSDWP	Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party
SA	Sarvlaks arkiv, Pernå
SDKPiL	Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania
StA	Sota-arkisto [War Archives], Helsinki
UM	Ulkoasiainministeriön arkisto [Archives of the Foreign Ministry], Helsinki
VA	Valtionarkisto [National Archives], Helsinki
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